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AUSTRALIA

Hawke Seeks Regional Chemical Weapon Ban

Meetings to Include SRV

52004305 Sydney *THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD* in English 22 Jun 88 p 5

[Article by Mike Stekette: "PM To Seek Regional Chemical Weapon Ban"]

[Text] New York, Tuesday—Australia will seek the support of Asian and Pacific countries for a regional initiative against the spread of chemical weapons.

The move, if successful, could result ultimately in a regional treaty or chemical weapons-free zone, and controls on the trade of chemicals used in warfare.

The Prime Minister announced last night that the Federal Government would explore ways of tackling the problem which it is concerned could spread beyond the Iran-Iraq conflict.

The use of chemical weapons in the war between these two countries resulted recently in the death of an estimated 1,000 people in an Iranian village.

Australian officials said this demonstrated the ease with which the proliferation of chemical weapons could occur without the involvement of the major powers.

Addressing a dinner sponsored by the Asia Society and the American-Australian Association, Mr Hawke said that just before he left Australia he had asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, to start examining how a regional effort against chemical weapons proliferation could be developed.

Describing chemical warfare as an "abhorrence", the Prime Minister said Australia had been active in efforts to achieve a Comprehensive Chemical Weapons Convention in the United Nations Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

"But at the same time we may be able to complement these global efforts at a regional level," Mr Hawke said.

Australian officials said that department in Canberra would prepare the ground for a regional initiative.

Detailed discussions with Pacific and South-East Asian countries, including Burma and Vietnam, would follow.

The officials argued that Australia was in a good position to take such an initiative because of its good relations with countries in the region.

But they stressed that the Australian proposal was still at an exploratory stage and the first step would be to see whether there was common ground between countries in the region.

Lesser options would include a regional initiative in the UN Committee of Disarmament, where progress towards a convention on chemical weapons was slow.

The US has identified verification as one of the stumbling blocks for an international agreement on chemical weapons.

In his speech to the Asia Society, Mr Hawke described as simplistic the talks in the West about liberal versus conservatives in China.

"It is my assessment that there is no opposition to the modernisation process sufficiently strong to derail it," he said.

This was based on his spending "very many hours" with key figures in the Chinese leadership.

Mr Hawke repeated comments he first made in Moscow last year that he would welcome "constructive" Soviet involvement in political and economic developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

Editorial Skeptical

52004305 Sydney *THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD* in English 22 Jun 88 p 18

[Editorial: "PM's Chemical Weapons Ploy"]

[Excerpts] Mr Hawke's announcement in New York of an Australian initiative on chemical weapons control looks, sadly, too much like just another of the shows that Australian prime ministers feel obliged to put on when they got to the United States.

Mr Hawke's initiative for "a regional effort against chemical weapons proliferation" is in some ways different. It is said to arise from the energetic role Australia has been playing in international negotiations for stronger controls against chemical weapons. A strong reason behind the initiative is said to be the concern, arising out of the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran, that other countries with similar industrial capacities will be tempted to see chemical weapons as effective and acceptable parts of their armouries.

Of course, in the Iraq-Iran war, chemical weapons have been delivered by missile systems of a kind which few countries in South-east Asia and the Pacific can deploy at present. Yet the alleged use of chemical weapons by Vietnam in Laos was not dependent on missile delivery systems. That, and the especially devastating effect of chemical weapons in tropical climates, does make their possible use in South-east Asian and Pacific countries especially disturbing.

There is no doubting the seriousness of the question. And Australia does indeed have a very respectable record in international negotiations to control chemical weapons. But any effort to form a regional consensus on the subject is dependent on quiet preparatory work in the region, of which there seems to have been little so far. It is hardly helped by Mr Hawke's grandstanding in the United States.

That is not to criticise the underlying purpose of Mr Hawke's visit to the US. It is in Australia's interests that the Prime Minister personally sell his Government's economic policies to the world's major financial markets. It is also in our interests to have the US reminded, as forcefully as possible, of the damage done by its protectionist agricultural policies. And Australia should maintain its direct contact, at the highest levels, with the IMF and the World Bank. It does no harm for Mr Hawke to establish a personal relationship with whoever is to be the next president of the United States. And it does not matter if the Prime Minister can think of nothing wittier than a laboured comparison with a popular film character to make an impact with the Americans. The pity is the ease with which the Prime Minister is prepared to take a good and serious idea—regional cooperation to control chemical weapons—and turn it into a piece of theatre, possibly to its detriment.

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Observers To Attend Military Exercise in FRG
LD1309094788 Prague CTK in English
0940 GMT 13 Sep 88

[Text] Prague Sept 12 (CTK)—Czechoslovak observers will attend the "Golden Crown" exercises in West Germany in harmony with the document of the Stockholm conference.

The exercise, involving Belgian, British, and West German troops, is taking place September 12-23 and Czechoslovak observers will be present there September 13-22.

Observers To Attend 'Teamwork' Military Exercise
AU1609164288 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
15 Sep 88 p 1

[CTK report: "Czechoslovak Observers to Teamwork Exercise"]

[Text] Prague—According to an announcement by Norway, a joint exercise involving U.S. troops and troops from Great Britain, Norway, and The Netherlands will be held on Norwegian territory under the name "Teamwork" on 16-17 September.

In accordance with the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, Czechoslovak observers will be attending this exercise from 15 to 17 September.

TASS on Conventional Arms Negotiations
LD1309214888 Moscow TASS in English
2111 GMT 13 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshov:

In his report delivered at the Adenauer Foundation, West German Defence Minister Rupert Scholz said, among other things, that the Soviet leadership's new course was marked with dynamism, openness in the foreign and home policy, the readiness for dialogue with the West on the whole spectrum of international relations, including the sphere of disarmament.

One can only welcome such an understanding of the Soviet policy and hope for the appropriate response of the NATO countries, above all, the FRG. But, unfortunately, judging by the West German defence minister's report, his department holds unrealistic positions in the question of elimination of imbalances in the sphere of conventional armaments.

Considering imbalances and asymmetries in certain elements in the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty armed forces, stipulated by historical, geographical and other factors, the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies are known to have expressed readiness for mutual elimination of inequalities that appeared in these elements, through relevant reductions to be made by the side which proves to be ahead. On a practical plane this could be materialized as a "package" of proposals on reductions, envisaging a kind of an exchange in types of armaments in which the sides have advantages, without violating the general balance of forces. In the Warsaw Treaty's opinion, NATO's extra tactical attack aircraft and the Warsaw Treaty's extra tanks, for instance, could be simultaneously liquidated. Such a mutual procedure of reductions is also possible in other components of the military potentials of the sides.

But a two-way traffic does not suit Mr. Scholz. He proposes that the Warsaw Treaty states should take unilateral steps in reduction of tanks and artillery. While discoursing on "superiority of the East" in tanks and artillery, he "forgets" about Western superiority in other types of armaments, for instance in fighter-bombers, attack aircraft, combat helicopters, anti-tank weapons, carrier-based aviation planes, etc. Not only the West German defence minister, but also a number of his NATO colleagues are also "forgetful". Western experts admit that the North Atlantic Alliance lacks the concept

of air force reduction, though it is extremely necessary, since otherwise the would-be negotiations on reduction of troops and conventional armaments in Europe might lead to a blind alley.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries firmly stand for eliminating the unilateral approach to reduction of troops and armaments. Negotiations will be meaningful, if they deal with mutual and simultaneous reduction, elimination of disbalances and asymmetry. In this case, ways out could always be found. Mr. Scholz and his NATO colleagues should seemingly be reminded once again about this stand of ours.

Nuclear Test Carried Out Near Semipalatinsk

*LD1409061688 Moscow TASS in English
0608 GMT 14 Sep 88*

[Text] Semipalatinsk September 14 TASS—An underground nuclear explosion with a capacity of 100 to 150 kilotons was conducted in the area of Semipalatinsk, the Republic of Kazakhstan, at 8.00, Moscow time, [0400 GMT] on September 14, 1988.

The test explosion was conducted in the interests of a Soviet-American verification experiment.

The radiation situation in the area of the test and outside the test site is normal.

'Constructive Cooperation' Example

*LD1409081788 Moscow TASS in English
0636 GMT 14 Sep 88*

[Text] Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan September 14 TASS—The Soviet-American nuclear test verification experiment is an example of constructive cooperation between the two countries in the interests of limiting and ultimately terminating nuclear testing, a Soviet expert has said in Semipalatinsk.

Igor Palenykh, head of the Soviet delegation to the full-scale Soviet-American talks on the limitation and cessation of nuclear tests, currently under way in Geneva, arrived here on Tuesday with a group of Soviet and American experts, diplomats and journalists.

The Semipalatinsk testing ground is the site of the second phase of the joint verification experiment.

The first of the two nuclear blasts envisaged by an intergovernment agreement was detonated at the Nevada test site on August 17. The second explosion will be set off at the test site near Semipalatinsk.

As a result of these explosions, the yield of which should be close to 150 kilotons and be not less than 100 kilotons, the Soviet and American side will be able to conduct measurements using both the teleseismic method, proposed by the Soviet experts, and the hydrodynamic method suggested by the American side.

The aim of the joint experiment is to determine what improved verification measures could be used to verify the 1974 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests.

This treaty, as well as the 1976 Soviet-American treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, has not entered into force because the U.S. Administration maintains that verification measures contained in them are not sufficient.

It is believed in the Soviet Union that the ultimate objective of the joint verification experiment is to pave the way for a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions.

CPSU 'Military Expert' on New U.S. Warhead

*LD1309111288 Moscow TASS in English
1047 GMT 13 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—"The order issued by U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci on the development of a new type of nuclear missiles with burrowing warheads means the beginning of a new round of the arms race", General Geliy Batenin, military expert of the CPSU Central Committee, has said today.

He pointed out in a TASS interview that "nuclear missiles with burrowing warheads are an offensive weapon. They are intended for the destruction of enemy infrastructures, its command posts and the communication system, for depriving it of a possibility to organize retaliatory actions".

"The whole world is waiting impatiently for the USSR and the United States to take the next step on the way of nuclear-missile disarmament—to conclude a treaty on strategic offensive armament. And at this very moment the head of the U.S. Department of Defense issues an order which can be regarded only as the unwillingness of the United States to take further steps towards the reduction of nuclear armaments", General Batenin said.

Warhead Plans Viewed

*LD1309232288 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
2045 GMT 13 Sep 88*

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Pavel Kasparov]

[Text] Almost all the world's news services have reported the fact that the United States of America has begun developing a new type of nuclear missile with what are being called penetrating warheads. As the Pentagon has officially acknowledged, research work to study the possibility of developing such warheads, intended specifically to destroy underground targets, has been conducted by the U.S. Defense Department, which has been responsible for developing nuclear weapons for several years now. On 12 August this year, the Defense Department

council recommended that development of this innovation begin. The council's recommendation was subsequently endorsed by Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci. As for the fighting capacity of this new type of nuclear missile, a number of officials who have asked not to be named have nonetheless told journalists that the intermediate version could be ready in as little as 1 year's time. At the same time, it is pointed out that there are plans to develop a new type of warhead and this will take from 5 to 10 years.

Naturally this report from New York has created a wave of commentaries all over the world, and observers are primarily waiting for Moscow's reaction. As the agencies note, a CPSU Central Committee expert, General Batenin, said in a conversation with journalists that the U.S. defense secretary's instruction to begin developing this new type of nuclear missile with penetrating warheads effectively marks the start of a new twist in the nuclear arms race. Cables indicate that this innovation is an openly admitted offensive weapon, intended to destroy the opponent's infrastructure, his command posts, communications systems, and to deprive him of the opportunity to organize a response. General Batenin laid particular stress on the fact that the U.S. military department's instruction to start developing nuclear weapons with penetrating warheads at a time when the entire world is waiting for the USSR and the United States to take the next step on the way to nuclear missile disarmament can only be seen as Washington's reluctance to bring about a reduction.

Further Reportage on Joint Nuclear Test
LD1409231088 Moscow TASS in English
2230 GMT 14 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—Two flags, Soviet and U.S., are flying for the first time in 40 years over the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.

The Soviet Union and the United States completed on Wednesday a unique joint experiment there to improve methods of monitoring nuclear explosions, Soviet television reported from the test site.

The American delegation, working together with Soviet scientists and military men, includes 46 experts.

Exactly at 8:00 a.m. Moscow time the earth at the site shook sharply under the feet like during a powerful earthquake.

The nuclear device, located in rocks at a depth of 642 metres, was detonated in a peaceful explosion.

The parameters of the explosion were recorded by Soviet and U.S. highly sensitive instruments.

"If everything depended on engineers, scientists and technicians who prepared the experiment, it would take much less time to achieve an agreement and curtail, and ultimately cease, nuclear testing," Lieutenant General Arkadiy Ilyenko, chief of the Soviet nuclear test site, told Soviet television.

"That would be the solution of the programme, advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev, for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

"Things now will depend on diplomats and politicians who will use the data of our experiment," he said.

IZVESTIYA on Joint Verification Experiment
PM1409155788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by special correspondent B. Ivanov: "On the Eve of Explosion"]

[Text]Semipalatinsk—The Soviet nuclear testing range near Semipalatinsk... We Soviet journalists and correspondents from the United States, France, the PRC, the GDR, and other countries are to be present during a joint Soviet-U.S. experiment and witness a nuclear explosion which may eventually help to ensure that nuclear tests are stopped completely.

A few words of historical background: In 1974 the United States and the USSR concluded the treaty on limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and in 1976 the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. These are so-called "threshold" treaties because they permit a threshold of 150 kilotons for nuclear explosions. But to this day they have not entered into force, mainly because the U.S. side considers the verification measures envisaged in them to be inadequate.

That is why, briefly, the aim of the present Soviet-U.S. experiment is to reveal in practice the most effective verification measures—so that they can be used later to monitor the above-mentioned treaties. In the Soviet side's opinion, the teleseismic method is sufficiently effective and reliable. I recall that it is based on the recording of the amplitude of the topsoil's elastic vibrations at a distance of 3,000-10,000 km from the site of the explosion.

The United States insists on the so-called hydrodynamic method known as Corrtex. It is based on recording the position of the front of the powerful shock wave that spreads in the topsoil. In contrast to the teleseismic method, this method stipulates the compulsory taking of measurements directly at the site of the test. It is far more expensive and is in need of additional preparation.

Agreement in principle on holding the experiment was reached during the Soviet-U.S. summit talks.

Two explosions—at U.S. and Soviet nuclear testing grounds—are being held within the framework of the experiment. Their yield should not exceed 150 kilotons but must not be less than 100 kilotons. For the teleseismic measurements each side uses its own national seismic stations. The hydrodynamic measurements will be carried out by groups of Soviet and U.S. specialists directly at the testing grounds.

Part of the experiment has already been conducted. The first explosion thundered in Nevada on 17 August. Now it is the turn of the testing ground near Semipalatinsk.

A group of U.S. specialists has been working since April at the Soviet nuclear testing ground. They have drilled two holes—a main hole and a subsidiary one—650 meters deep, where they have installed special sensing devices and other apparatus necessary for the Corrtex method.

Soviet-U.S. official representatives taking part in the experiment have arrived at the testing ground region. I.M. Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation at the Geneva full-scale talks on limiting and halting nuclear tests, and his U.S. counterpart, Paul Robinson, head of the U.S. delegation at the same talks, met with journalists.

“I want to stress in particular,” I.M. Palenykh said, “that the main aim of our talks is not simply to limit the holding of nuclear tests but ultimately to achieve their complete cessation. The present experiment is an important step in this direction. On the basis of an analysis of the data obtained after the Nevada test and explosion, which will be carried out here on 14 September, we will determine the most perfect methods of verification in order to apply them later to the 1974 and 1976 treaties. I think that as a result, a protocol on methods of verifying the yield of nuclear explosions could be prepared and submitted for joint signing. That in turn will open the path to the ratification of the above-mentioned treaties....”

In P. Robinson's opinion the holding of the Soviet-U.S. experiment and the joint work by the two countries' specialists, in addition to purely scientific results, also promotes the creation of an absolutely new level of trust between people and between states. “I am an optimist,” the U.S. representative said. “I believe that none of those taking part in this program a year ago could have imagined that this was possible. Such events bring us closer. I think this will help further progress at our talks.”

Shevardnadze, Shultz Messages on Anniversary of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
LD1509165588 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1615 GMT 15 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow, 15 Sep (TASS)—The Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state today exchanged brief messages in connection with the anniversary of the signing of the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.

The texts of the messages, transmitted through the centers' communication channels, follows:

Esteemed Mr Secretary of State,

A year has passed since the signing of the agreement on nuclear danger reduction centers. I should like, in this connection, to convey sincere congratulations to you, and to wish the U.S. side a successful continuation of activity in this direction.

Over a short period of time, the agreement has proved its viability and the timeliness of the step undertaken by our countries.

Now, already, when the first practical steps have been taken along the path of actual disarmament, the centers are demonstrating their effectiveness by making a concrete contribution to the implementation of the INF Treaty.

I am convinced that in the future, as new agreements are concluded—primarily a treaty to reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons—the centers could extend their functions, which would promote the success of nuclear disarmament.

For its part, the Soviet Union will make every effort to ensure that the talks on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons under conditions of adherence to the ABM Treaty culminate in a rapid signing of the relevant agreements.

Yours sincerely,

E. Shevardnadze

Dear Mr Minister,

Allow me to convey to you my greetings on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the agreement between the United States of America and the USSR on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.

I should also like to express satisfaction at the substantial contribution being made by the U.S. and Soviet nuclear risk reduction centers for the attainment of our common goal—the creation of trust and security. Please accept my best wishes for further success in the work of the nuclear risk reduction centers in the cause of reducing the possibility of conflict between our two countries.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

U.S. Statement Noted

*LD1509223788 Moscow TASS in English
1214 GMT 15 Sep 88*

[Text] Washington September 15 TASS—Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres (NRRC agreement) in a White House ceremony a year ago.

The agreement marks a practical step forward in the efforts “to reduce the risk of conflict between the superpowers as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding,” says a White House statement issued here on the occasion of the agreement’s first anniversary.

The centres established in Washington and Moscow “provide a direct communications link between the two governments capable of transmitting messages relating to arms control and confidence building,” the statement says.

“When the nuclear risk reduction centres began operations in April 1988, the NRRC agreement called for certain notifications of ballistic missile launches in accordance with the 1971 ‘accidents measures’ agreements and the 1972 agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas (INCSEA). The entry into force of the INF Treaty and the conclusion of the strategic ballistic missile launch notification agreement at the 1988 Moscow summit broadened and increased the exchanges of information and notification handled by the centres.”

The White House statement emphasized that the establishment of the centres “serves a concrete example of our commitment to reduce the risk of conflict.”

Arbatov Comments

*LD1609091188 Moscow TASS in English
1411 GMT 15 Sep 88*

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—“The creation of nuclear-risk reduction centers in Moscow and Washington has been an important step to reducing the risk of outbreak of an armed conflict as well as a worthy example of Soviet-American cooperation,” said the chief of the Moscow center, Vladimir Medvedev.

The Soviet-American agreement establishing nuclear-risk reduction centers and two protocols to it was signed by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz exactly a year ago.

Over the year Moscow and Washington centers have sent each other several hundred notifications.

“This is an important confidence-building measure,” Academician Georgiy Arbatov said in a TASS interview in connection with the anniversary of the agreement’s signature.

“But I would like to stress that the nuclear risk-reduction centers by themselves won’t remove all the threats. One must be realistic about that,” he added.

“There is no doubt that this is a useful measure. But it is important to understand that everything depends on the substance of policies pursued by the sides.

“If our countries follow realistic policies, relations between them will be improving. I personally hope for the better.

“There are serious grounds for this—important agreements between our countries, in the first place the INF Treaty, and historic summits. The significance of confidence-building measures in this context is on the increase as well,” Arbatov said.

The nuclear risk-reduction centers are used to transmit notifications of ballistic missile launches if they are made beyond national territory towards the other side.

The centers are used to give notice also of ballistic missile launches posing a threat to shipping or air traffic.

Besides, they play an important role in transmitting information essential to the practical realization of the INF Treaty signed during the Soviet-American summit in Washington in December 1987.

Participants Cited on Semipalatinsk Test

*PM1609081388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Sep 88 Second Edition pp 1, 6*

[Article by special correspondent A. Gorokhov: “A Sign of Hope. Report From the Soviet Nuclear Test Site”]

[Text] Semipalatinsk—An underground nuclear explosion with a yield of between 100 and 150 kilotons was carried out within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. joint verification experiment at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site at 0800 hours Moscow time yesterday. The news of this explosion spread all over the planet, a sign of hope for a nuclear-free world.

It felt as if someone had dealt a hard blow against one’s heels. It is hard to pick even a remotely suitable analogy from everyday life to give PRAVDA readers some idea of the powerful impact caused by the explosion of a nuclear device sited 642 meters beneath the surface of the Balapan Steppe. This might give an idea: Stand on a table that you are not too worried about and ask the strongest of your friends to hit it with a sledgehammer from underneath.

We were 4 km away from the epicenter. The earth shook, the tripods of movie and still cameras shook, someone's briefcase flew off a bench, and the spontaneous applause of Soviet and U.S. experts was drowned out by guffaws at the observation stand which greeted the remote operator's question: "Should we try again?!"

What was it that brought diplomats, military personnel, scientists, and journalists here, to the Kazakh steppe? Here, where Soviet and U.S. experts spent several months at work drilling the main or, as it is known here, the "live" bore hole and next to it, just 10-15 meters away, the auxiliary measuring hole. The auxiliary hole housed the U.S. "diagnostic" equipment used in the hydrodynamic method proposed by the United States for direct measurement of nuclear explosion yields at explosion sites, known as the "Corrtex" method. A doctor of technical sciences, Professor V. Mikhaylov explained it to me.

"The task of the joint verification experiment," he said, "is to compare improved verification methods for the so-called 'threshold' treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests of 1974. In our view, the teleseismic method is perfectly effective and adequate, especially since the other side's personnel need not necessarily be present at the test site. The United States is proposing its own method, which we call the hydrodynamic method, based on measurements taken directly at the test site. The joint experiment will make it possible to compare the efficiency, suitability, and convenience of the two methods, in other words to lay foundations for the future elaboration of decisions and for transition from theoretical computations to practical work...."

We arrived at the spot approximately 1 hour before the explosion, when all preparatory work had been done and experts had taken their working positions in special measuring "trucks." We had time to become slightly familiar with our surroundings.

I will make no secret of this: I found that I did not have the easiest of tasks describing a Soviet military installation that is among those most closely guarded against prying eyes, the people who serve here, their daily life, the tests being conducted here, and especially the joint verification experiment. The available information spanned across the spectrum, and there was an exceptionally large number of meetings and conversations with residents of this town—no, it is not a town, it is a city—on the banks of the Irtysh River, and with guests who had flown here from Moscow and from Geneva, where the talks are being held. Actually, the term "guests" is not all that suitable for many of the Soviet military and civilian experts—much of their life is in one way or another linked with the test site.

I realize that a newspaper report will not be long enough even to list their names. Let me mention the main point: their benevolent attitude to mass media representatives, the desire to help....

N. Vakulin, who drove our "Volga," a native of the region, performed driving miracles and was instrumental in ensuring that the materials for PRAVDA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA were transmitted on time.... Communications specialists Colonel M. Grikhin, Lieutenant Colonels N. Blokhin and P. Kurinov, Private 1st Class S. Bezrukova, who provided the links with editorial offices.... Test site scientists Colonels V. Boyko and R. Blinov, Lieutenant Colonels S. Smagulov and A. Andreyev; Major A. Arianov. In addition to everything else, many of them have also gone through the Chernobyl experience—a detail of considerable importance. They explained the specific features of the forthcoming experiment, took us around the scientific subdivisions' small museum, and allowed us to sit briefly behind the console which, according to tradition, was manned by Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov....

Test site chief Lieutenant General A. Ilyenko and political officer Major General G. Soldatov, who, as you can imagine, had no time for lengthy conversations under such pressure, still managed to give a briefing on the history of the much-decorated test site where the first Soviet nuclear charge was tested in August 1949.

Aviation Lieutenant General S. Zelentsov, participant in the Geneva talks and eyewitness of almost all our nuclear explosions in the air and on land: "We will manage to achieve success only under conditions of complete trust...."

The chief of one of the USSR Defense Ministry's Main Directorates made no secret of the fact that service here is far from easy: It is hard and carries great responsibility. Test site experts have to "plan explosions" so as to obtain the necessary results and to prevent dangerous radioactive emissions. The general gave credit mainly to the test site personnel for the fact that nothing like this has happened here and that, to this day, background radiation in the Semipalatinsk region does not exceed unionwide values.

"The main point is," he added, "that the country's defense might was being created here, and it was here that the foundations of military-strategic parity were laid, ultimately ensuring the start of negotiating processes."

Diplomat I. Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. full-scale talks on the limitation and termination of nuclear tests: "The union of diplomacy, science, technology, and military work seems to be here, in Semipalatinsk. Scientists produce ideas which are reflected at the talks, and vice versa. This experiment is a unique event which would have been difficult to even imagine just a year ago. But now it is a gratifying fact. The next task is to translate the results it produces into 'treaty' language and to complete the work on the protocol to the 1974 treaty which, just like the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, has still not come into force...."

By way of amplifying the Soviet diplomat's words by our own "measurements," let us trace—briefly of course—the dynamics of this unique project whose results are at the focus of attention not only of the "nuclear club" member states but, it seems, of every living being on the planet earth. Accord was reached a year ago to conduct full-scale Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear test problems. These talks began in November last year. On 9 December USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz issued a statement on the procedure for conducting a joint verification experiment. The agreement to conduct the experiment was signed 31 May 1988 during the fourth Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. Soviet measuring equipment was delivered to the United States on 14 June on board an AN-124 "Ruslan" aircraft. At the end of the month the sides exchanged complete data on the 10 preceding explosions (5 by each side) as a backup to seismic measurement methods. U.S. equipment was delivered to Semipalatinsk in July. The first explosion under the "joint verification experiment" program rumbled at the Nevada nuclear test site on 17 August. Now it is the turn of the Kazakh steppe....

This is an enviable "pace," isn't it? That is what inspires hope.

U.S. delegation leader Paul Robinson, who also heads the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, declared at a news conference held inside a spacious tent:

"Our experts will find it difficult to leave their work here. They have simply taken this work to heart. Nonetheless, I hope that they will continue their activity here in the future. An experiment is an experiment when you do not know what its result will be. Now I am pleased to state that we obtained good results. This joint experiment is without precedent. I think that it reflects the concept which, in our country, goes like this: 'Let's try and then we'll buy!' We have had an opportunity to try out different verification methods. This will help us in Geneva.

"This was a wonderful day for us all," the ambassador added. "We will never forget it...."

The participants in the joint experiment were also asked about its "cost." Ambassador Paul Robinson replied that the U.S. part, taking into account expenditure on the Nevada explosion, the delivery of equipment to the Semipalatinsk region, and the drilling of the auxiliary borehole here, has cost approximately \$25 million. Expenditure on the Soviet side is estimated at R20 million. Yes, any live experiment, if one could use the expression—be it in the nuclear arms sphere or in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy—does not come cheap. But A. Protsenko, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, who was present at the explosion in the Semipalatinsk region, was perfectly justified in remarking in this context:

"This is a small price to pay for the achievement of an imposing and sacred goal—to rid mankind of nuclear weapons."

I will let you in on a small secret: The headline of this report was Prof V. Mikhaylov's idea. It was he who spoke at the news conference about "a sign of hope for a nuclear-free world." I do not know what method of measurement will be preferred by experts or what compromise, if any, they will reach; one thing is clear, however: The experimental explosions in Nevada and near Semipalatinsk are giving mankind a "sign of hope."

Nevada Test Shows 'Differences' in U.S., Soviet Goals

LD1509172588 Moscow TASS in English
1613 GMT 15 Sep 88

["American Corrtex Registers American 'Violation'"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 15 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev:

The recent Soviet-U.S. experiment at the test range in Nevada, THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, has led to unexpected results which called to question the position of the Reagan administration at the talks on measures to verify compliance with the 1974 threshold treaty on limitation of underground nuclear explosions.

Both Corrtex devices installed at the range, which are favoured by the U.S. as a monitoring technique, showed the yield of the American nuclear explosion, witnessed by Soviet specialists, to be over 150 kilotons, i.e. over the limit which the two countries had pledged to observe. At the same time the Soviet teleseismic monitoring means, which were dismissed by the American specialists as unreliable, showed that the yield of the American explosion was 140 kilotons as planned and that the United States did not violate the threshold test-ban treaty.

The case is one of paradox. Apparently, the Americans were let down by their own technical means, while the Soviet device helped to clear Washington of the possible accusations of violations.

Many American scientists made right conclusions. For example, a Columbia University geological sciences professor, Paul Richards, said that the experiments should prove the reliability of traditional seismic methods, i.e. the methods proposed by the Soviet side.

However, U.S. officials continue to claim that the American monitoring system Corrtex is the more advanced and refuse to acknowledge the fact of violation of the 1974 treaty which has been registered by the same more advanced systems.

This illogical position of Washington is explained by the fact that the Soviet method, in contrast with the American Corrtex system, enables to monitor compliance with the agreement on complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests. As for the Pentagon, it still fears that nuclear tests would be halted and opposes effective practical measures to promote the sides' progress in this direction.

The Nevada experiment has reaffirmed that differences still exist as regards the end goals, pursued by the USSR and USA in conducting experiments to determine the yield of nuclear explosions. The Soviet side regards them as a step towards the complete ban of nuclear explosions while the Americans side only as a measure to monitor the continued nuclear weapons tests.

Palenykh Interview on Results of JVE

*PM1509113388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Sep 88 Morning Edition p 4*

[Special correspondent B. Ivanov dispatch: "Explosion for the Sake of Stopping Explosions. IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent Reports From the Area of the Soviet-U.S. Experiment"]

[Text]Semipalatinsk—An explosive device was detonated 14 September exactly on time—0800 hours Moscow time—at the nuclear test range near Semipalatinsk. The nuclear explosion was observed by Soviet and U.S. measuring instruments; they were set up within the framework of a joint Soviet-U.S. experiment to determine the yield of underground nuclear tests.

The explosive device was placed in a hole at a depth of 642 meters. Monitoring sensors necessary for the hydrodynamic method of monitoring known also as Corrtex were put alongside in a specially bored auxiliary hole. Their readings at the time of the explosion were clearly recorded by a hypersensitive measuring apparatus placed in high-powered trailers 1 km from the test site. The yield of the explosion totaled between 100 and 150 kilotons. The participants in the experiment—Soviet and U.S. specialists, experts, members of the two countries' official delegations, and journalists—felt a tremor shake the earth at the command center 4 km from the epicenter.

Seismic stations on each country's territory also monitored the explosion.

I.M. Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting and ultimately stopping nuclear tests, who was at the testing range, talked about the results of the experiment to IZVESTIYA's correspondent.

"From the scientific viewpoint," he said, "both explosions—both the one in Nevada and this one—will provide us with the material that had been lacking for the elaboration of a protocol to the so-called threshold

agreements of 1974 and 1976. Now we have to analyze the results of the experiment. A preliminary exchange of 'raw' data will take place immediately after the explosion. Then, 1 month later, a concrete examination of the materials obtained by the specialists is to begin at the Geneva talks. The materials will be analyzed in both countries. Incidentally, scientists involved in the experiment from both the Soviet Union and the United States will also take part in the Geneva talks. Based on this analysis we will determine the scientific and technical criteria for monitoring."

[Ivanov] That is, whether to give preference to the teleseismic or the hydrodynamic method?

[Palenykh] No, not quite, I want to clarify this. It is not a question of choosing between the hydrodynamic and teleseismic methods. On the contrary, it is a question of using all available means at our disposal for monitoring, in other words finding the appropriate balance and a mutually acceptable combination of methods.

It is quite clear, for instance, that we cannot get by without the teleseismic method. Even now what was done in the course of the experiment shows us that this method must play a leading role. Moreover, we will also have to select the aspects of the hydrodynamic method that would be acceptable to the "threshold treaties" of 1974 and 1976. Thus our immediate task now is to elaborate the protocols as quickly as possible, ratify these treaties, and bring them into operation.

[Ivanov] What then?

[Palenykh] The next stage is the further limitation and reduction in the number of tests and in their yield. The point is that the monitoring methods now being elaborated will also be necessary for further steps in this sphere. We are convinced that the rational seeds that we find as a result of the experiment will also be used for future agreements and accords. But the final aim of this entire process is to secure the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

...The experiment is over. Its final assessment still lies ahead. But the main result is well known—experimental data have confirmed that the technical aspect of monitoring is not an obstacle. The effective and reliable verification [proverka] of the 1974 and 1976 treaties—if they are ratified—is a quite real possibility.

Geneva Delegations Update Draft Protocol *LD1609174288 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 16 Sep 88*

[Text] Geneva September 16 TASS—The delegations to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms continued work over the past week in the groups on strategic offensive weapons and on space armaments

with a view to drafting a treaty on the 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons in the conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

The delegations prepared updated drafts and adjoining documents reflecting progress reached in the course of the current round and issues demanding their solution in the future.

The joint text of the draft protocol to the future agreement on compliance and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has been updated.

The updated drafts will be submitted by the delegations to the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state during their forthcoming meeting in Washington.

Gerasimov Views Krasnoyarsk Initiative

*LD1809205388 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1400 GMT 18 Sep 88*

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] This summer saw international relations roll forward as a result of the push they had received earlier. On the one hand, a start was made on real, true disarmament as the Soviet Union and the United States began destroying intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We carried out joint experimental nuclear explosions. We will be returning to them a little later.

But, on the other hand, progress clearly came to a standstill. The United States even stated that no agreement on reducing strategic offensive weapons is possible while the Soviet Union maintains the radar station near Krasnoyarsk. According to them, this station violates the ABM Treaty. The United States takes the view that this relay station could be used for the purposes of antimissile defense while the treaty bans such stations deep inside national territory.

We invited eminent U.S. guests to visit it in order for them to see for themselves that the station would have scientific and not military purposes. The eminent guests noted the poor quality of construction and even said that in the United States the person in charge of such a construction site would probably be dismissed. But even this caustic observation did not prevent the Americans from sticking to their guns, although the station is no longer even a long-term construction project and has been frozen.

To be honest, the U.S. linkage of the fate of this station with the fate of nuclear disarmament cannot be sincere. It is an attempt to find a pretext to justify plans for setting up their own antimissile defense—they say you get Star Wars in exchange for Krasnoyarsk.

Nonetheless there was deadlock, and it had to be broken. The opening came in the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk on Friday. We proposed setting up on the site of the Krasnoyarsk station a center for international cooperation in the use of space for peaceful purposes. This internationalization of the situation should relieve the anxiety of the West, whether it be forced or sincere. The speech also contained seven proposals on bringing peace and tranquility to the Asia-Pacific region. These proposals will probably be widely discussed in the days ahead.

Support for Austrian Proposal at Mandate Talks

*LD1909120388 Moscow TASS in English
1123 GMT 19 Sep 88*

[Text] Vienna September 19 TASS—A regular session was held here today within the framework of consultations on the elaboration of a mandate for future talks on reducing the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At the session the Soviet delegation officially announced that the Soviet Union supports the proposal of the Austrian Republic that the above-mentioned talks of 23 member states of the Warsaw Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as well as talks of 35 CSCE countries on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe be held in Vienna, the capital of Austria.

Nazarkin Interviewed on Geneva Conference

*LD2009122788 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian
1000 GMT 20 Sep 88*

[Text] Geneva, 20 Sep (TASS)—The disarmament conference in Geneva has ended another session here. Ambassador Yuriy Nazarkin, leader of the Soviet delegation to the conference, has been asked by TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev to comment on the session's outcome.

Question: Has it been possible to achieve any specific results at the session and make headway toward signing agreements in the field of disarmament?

Answer: If I am to speak of the practical results of the session, I should start, of course, with talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At present it is the only area where ongoing work is connected with preparing a draft international agreement.

During the session, the draft of a future convention banning chemical weapons has been enlarged to include a whole number of new texts, and a search has been conducted for solutions to outstanding issues.

How can conditions be ensured whereby the development and manufacture of chemical weapons would be ruled out, while the normal progress of peaceful chemical industry would not be disrupted? I think this issue has

been the main one at the session, but I cannot say that an answer to it has already been found. But in any case ways of approaching a solution to it have been researched most thoroughly.

Another question is how chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities can be destroyed without detracting from the security of any state participating in the convention.

A certain rapprochement of the positions can be noted on this issue, although there still are difficulties with the "security margin" concept put forward by France. A definition has been found for a "chemical weapons production facility" and progress has been made in working out procedures for challenge inspections, issues of international cooperation in peaceful chemical industry and those of assistance to states in the event of their coming under attack involving chemical warfare agents. Work on these issues will be continued at the end of November, early December this year.

I would classify among definite positive results the preparation of an experiment on international inspections at enterprises of the chemical industry, the Soviet delegation chief noted. The conducting of such an experiment was proposed by the Soviet Union, and during this summer session the participants in the talks expressed support for such a proposal. A number of states have declared a desire to participate directly in such an experiment, that is, to nominate one chemical enterprise each at which an inspection would be conducted in order to form a prototype for a future inspection within the framework of the convention. The United States, Britain, the FRG, Sweden, Canada, and other states have declared readiness for such an experiment along with the Soviet Union.

What is the point of this experiment? The main provisions that will govern the conduct of international inspections at enterprises of the chemical industry have been elaborated at the talks. Now it is important to measure them up with the real conditions in various countries at such enterprises. Then, taking account of the results of these trial inspections, the provisions of the convention will be "fine-tuned"—that is, without changing the substance of provisions already agreed, we will add the details which will enable us to accomplish international verification more efficiently, quickly, and reliably in accordance with the convention.

Question: You have essentially related the results attained at the talks on banning chemical weapons. Can you point to any progress on other issues on the conference agenda?

Answer: At the session we have pressed for the start of multilateral talks on a nuclear test ban, on preventing the arms race from spilling over into space, and on some other issues. It has not proved possible, alas, to secure any real results in these areas.

The main obstructing force has been the United States. It is apparently unwilling to have its hands bound as regards SDI.

The 43d session of the UN General Assembly in New York will soon examine the state of affairs in the field of disarmament and make its recommendations. I think they will help the disarmament conference to intensify its activity next year.

Question: During the disarmament conference summer session, its delegates went to the Soviet Union to witness the destruction of Soviet RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles at the Kapustin Yar testing range not far from Volgograd. What do those who went there think of the trip? Has the event they witnessed had any impact on the work of the conference?

Answer: The trip made an indelible impression. The delegates saw with their own eyes a real destruction of nuclear weapons.

In essence we were present—and I was among those taking part in the trip—at the birth of a nuclear-free age, as it were.

Of course, the ambassador continued, the INF Treaty, in accordance with which the missiles are being destroyed, is a bilateral Soviet-U.S. treaty, and it does not have any direct relation to the conference. But I have the impression that the participants in the trip have started thinking seriously that specific results should be produced not only by Soviet-U.S. negotiations but also by the wide-ranging work pursued at the disarmament conference. This idea, by the way, has been expressed in the speeches of some representatives of delegations which returned from their trip to the USSR as well. I think that the stimulating effect of this trip ought to have some influence on the work of the conference.

Television Reports Comments

*LD2009233588 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 20 Sep 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The latest session of the conference on disarmament has ended in Geneva.

[Begin recording] [V. Dmitriyev] Its objective is to achieve universal and complete disarmament under strict international control, in keeping with the UN mandate. The treaty on banning nuclear tests in the three environments, the convention on banning bacteriological weapons, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, all of which are now in force, were drawn up by the conference. However, much remains to be done to make mankind's dream of a weapon-free world a reality. What are the main results of the present session?

[Nazarkin] As with the preceding ones, this session paid most attention to the questions of drawing up a future convention on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons. We agreed, in principle, and drew up the details for conducting an experiment; in other words, experimental international inspections. The proposal on this was put forward by the Soviet Union; and now it has received broad support from participants in the talks. A large number of states have announced their intention to open their chemical industry enterprises for the conducting of such inspections.

[Dmitriyev] Also on the agenda of the conference are questions on which little headway has so far been made: the complete banning of nuclear tests, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of the militarization of space, and

others. Not declarations, but practical efforts and political will on the part of all participating states are required for their speediest possible solution. [end recording]

U.S. To Destroy 41 Cruise Missiles

*LD2109081788 Moscow TASS in English
0753 GMT 21 Sep 88*

[Text] Washington September 21 TASS—A total of 41 ground-based cruise missiles and seven launchers will be destroyed at the U.S. air base Davis Monthan, Arizona, October 18-19 in keeping with the Soviet-American INF Treaty, an official Pentagon spokesman told a briefing at the Defense Department Tuesday.

These will be the first U.S. missiles of this class to be eliminated under the treaty. The Soviet Union had been notified of the upcoming elimination procedure, spokesman Dan Howard said.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Scholz Speaks on Force Reductions, Security

AU1309162188 Bonn DIE WELT in German
13 Sep 88 p 10

[Ruediger Moniac article: "Scholz States Conditions for Smaller Bundeswehr"]

[Text] Bonn—Defense Minister Rupert Scholz believes that in the case of successful East-West negotiations to achieve militarily balanced force potentials on both sides in Europe, the size of the Bundeswehr can, under certain conditions, also be reduced. In a speech before the Konrad Adenauer Foundation yesterday, he discussed the necessary conditions for talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on conventional stability. As the first and most important goal of these negotiations, he demanded a "reduction in existing disparities." He said that in this respect, some "evident progress" is appearing in outlines, after the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has "recognized the old Western demand for asymmetric disarmament." The minister said that once a "certain balance has been achieved, both sides can reduce jointly and symmetrically again." Scholz declined to say anything about the ceiling that would then have to be reached, and warned the West about "rashly stating figures," but added: "After asymmetrical disarmament measures have been taken or have been successful, the problem of the necessary size of arms and weapons systems—necessary in the sense of defense policy—will possibly appear in a new or substantially changed light."

In his speech on "Security in Europe," Scholz acknowledged indications in the Soviet Union that suggest its preparedness for cooperation and its intention to push detente, but he added that indications are not enough to reliably give the West a sense of security. In a historic review the minister analyzed the Soviet policy that is directed against Western Europe, and said that since the end of the Stalin era, it has pursued the disintegration of NATO, worked toward the elimination of all Western nuclear weapons "as the pillars of our strategy of deterrence," and is trying to initiate a development in the course of which the United States would withdraw all its forces from Europe. All this makes the Soviet "objective only too clear to strive for hegemony in Europe." Scholz said that even Gorbachev stated goals at the CPSU Congress in 1986, which "seem by no means to originate from a new thinking: NATO giving up its strategy of deterrence, the removal of all nuclear weapons, and the dissolution of the military alliances."

Scholz said that it is necessary for Western Europe not to relax its defense efforts, but on the contrary, to "develop its security policy awareness further." The problem is "whether U.S. interest in NATO will be great enough for the Americans to be prepared to bear the bulk of all

defense expenditures in the future as well." He said that it is important to preserve the U.S. commitment in and to Europe, because "without the Atlantic superpower, the United States, Europe cannot be defended."

UNITED KINGDOM

Soviet Accuses Government of Treaty Violation

52500027 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
1422 GMT 17 Aug 88

[Report by James Hardy, PRESS ASSOCIATION]

[Text] Britain was accused by a top Soviet military advisor today of breaking a superpower arms control treaty. Lt Gen Victor Pavlov said changes to the missile early warning station at Fylingdales, North Yorkshire, contravened the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty.

The general, an adviser to the Communist Party Central Committee, said new radars being installed at the station and an operational system at Thule in Greenland were "equal threats." But the Ministry of Defence said the new radars were only defensive and modernisation was permitted under the terms of the treaty. A spokesman said Fylingdales was established before 1972 and existing equipment was wearing out.

Interviewed in Moscow by specialist magazine JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Lt Gen Pavlov said: "Both systems are of the pave paws type and are deployed outside U.S. territory, violating the ABM treaty. "In allowing these systems to be sited on their territory, Denmark and the UK have become accomplices in undermining the treaty."

He accused the British Government of trying to conceal the violation by presenting the changes at Fylingdales as modernisations. "The replacement of several old radars with new ones of a completely different type cannot be described as modernisation," he said.

Lt Gen Pavlov said the treaty prevented the United States and USSR from deploying radar systems capable of identifying ballistic missiles except on their own soil, at test ranges or locations on the periphery of each territory. Thule and Fylingdales now contravened these requirements, he said, although the equipment in place when the treaty was signed could not be used for anti-ballistic missile purposes. But the MOD spokesman said Fylingdales had always been capable of tracking missiles and its use was not changing. Huge old-fashioned rotating mechanical radars were being replaced by modern electronic machines with no moving parts, due to become operational in 1992.

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