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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

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## CONTENTS

3 JUNE 1988

### CHINA

Strategic Arms Talks Update .....	1
Pre-Summit Stalemate in U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Talks Noted [Jing Wuwu; Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service, 24 May 88] .....	1
Superpowers' Strategic Arms Reviewed [Beijing XINHUA, 24 May 88] .....	2
Commentary on Fourth Soviet-U.S. Summit [Wang Chongjie; Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service, 25 May 88] .....	2
China on Disarmament, Arms Race .....	3
Meeting of Non-Aligned Movement Convened [Chen Shengtao; Beijing XINHUA, 27 May 88] .....	3
'News Analysis' of Meeting [Chen Shengtao; Beijing XINHUA, 27 May 88] .....	4
UN Disarmament Session To Begin [Qian Wenrong, Wang Xianpeng; Beijing XINHUA, 28 May 88] .....	5
Foreign Minister Departs for UN Arms Session [Beijing XINHUA, 28 May 88] .....	6
Disarmament Document Submitted to UN Session [Beijing XINHUA, 1 Jun 88] .....	6
Qian Qichen Calls On UN's Florin [Beijing XINHUA, 31 May 88] .....	7
XINHUA on Possible Results of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit [Beijing in Russian to USSR, 27 May 88] ...	7
Nonaligned Meeting Viewed As 'Success' [Chen Shengtao; Beijing XINHUA, 31 May 88] .....	7

### EAST EUROPE

#### INTRABLOC

Bloc Delegates Address Vienna CSCE Meeting .....	9
GDR's Fischer Speaks [East Berlin ADN International Service, 20 May 88] .....	9
Poland's Konarski Addresses Group [Franciszek Malinowski; Warsaw PAP 24 May 88] .....	9

#### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Communique Issued on SED-SPD Talks [East Berlin ADN International Service, 18 May 88] .....	10
U.S. Plans Concerning MX Missiles Criticized [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 21-22 May 88] .....	10

### NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

#### INDIA

Nuclear Arms Pact May Not Slow Armaments Race [Rakesh Gupta; New Delhi PATRIOT, 19, 20 Apr 88] .....	12
---	----

### SOVIET UNION

U.S. Attitudes, Press Coverage on INF Treaty Viewed [Stanislav Kondrashov Interview; Moscow ZHURNALIST, No 2, Feb 88] .....	14
Report on U.S. Senate INF Debate [V. Gan; Moscow PRAVDA, 26 May 88] .....	18

WEST EUROPE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CDU Youth Presses for Zero-Solution	[Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 14/15 May 88]	19
SPD's Voigt Recommends Scholz-Yazov Dialogue	[Bonn DIE WELT, 17 May 88]	19
Schmidt Appeals to Superpowers on Disarmament	[Hamburg DPA, 17 May 88]	19
SPD, GDR Joint Group Consider Security	[Hamburg DPA, 18 May 88]	19
Genscher, France's Dumas Comment on Talks	[Hamburg DPA, 20 May 88]	19
SPD for Third Zero Solution on Disarmament	[Hamburg DPA, 25 May 88]	20
Helmut Kohl Outlines Hopes for Moscow Summit	[Hamburg DPA, 26 May 88]	20
U.S.-USSR Moscow Summit Analyzed		20
Genscher Stresses Importance		
[Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG, 29 May 88]		20
Politicians Express Hopes	[Hamburg DPA, 28 May 88]	21
Envoy Delivers Shevardnadze Letter to Genscher	[Hamburg DPA, 30 May 88]	21

## Strategic Arms Talks Update

### Pre-Summit Stalemate in U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Talks Noted

OW2405064188 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0111 GMT 24 May 88

["News Analysis: "The Crux of the Matter" by XINHUA reporter Jing Wuwu]

[Text] Beijing, 24 May (XINHUA)—A 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is the objective the Soviet and U.S. leaders now want to achieve in arms control. This, however, will be hard for them to achieve.

They both want an agreement on a reduction in strategic weapons because the stockpiling of strategic nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union long ago reached the "saturation point." Both countries are adjusting their military strategies, and a 50 percent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons will do no harm to their military strength and the strategic balance, while it will lighten their financial burdens. Therefore, when the leaders of the two countries met in Washington last December after the signing of the INF treaty, they agreed unanimously to instruct the representatives of their respective countries to "concentrate on the study" of some key issues in Geneva and to strive to sign a strategic weapons reduction treaty in the first half of this year. Gorbachev wants to use this treaty to promote disarmament as further proof of his "new political thinking"; and Reagan intends to make another "historic contribution" to disarmament in the latter part of his second term so he will be remembered in American history as a "president of peace" who "seeks peace from strength."

Under these circumstances, why have the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic weapons been at an impasse since the beginning of this year? What is the crux of the matter?

The INF treaty provides for the complete elimination of intermediate long-range, intermediate-range, and short-range missiles. A treaty on strategic weapons will provide only for reducing some of these weapons; and it will be more complicated and difficult to verify and supervise the implementation of such a treaty. This of course is one reason for the impasse. But the fundamental reason is that strategic nuclear weapons are the key components of both the U.S. and Soviet deterrent forces. The following are the focal points in their present talks: The relation of a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons to space weapons, and the issue of limiting land-based mobile intercontinental missiles and sea- and air-based cruise missiles, which have a most important bearing on the strategic interests of the two countries. This is why neither is willing to make concessions lightly.

In their strategic arms limitation talks in the 1970's, they discussed rules for the arms race in terms of "a balance with a ceiling" [xiang shang ping heng 0686 0006 1627

5899]. Although they are now discussing "a balance with a bottom" [xiang xia ping heng 0686 0007 1626 5899], this also involves essentially a question of rules for their arms race. This reality can be seen from the following: In the talks, the U.S. side is determined to not let a strategic weapons reduction treaty bind it hand and foot in implementing Reagan's "SDI program" to develop space weapons; and the Soviet Union intends to use the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to restrain Washington and prevent it from moving ahead in the development of space weapons and space defense technology. This reality can be seen from the following: Each intends to weaken the other's strengths and, at the same time, maintain its own superiority—and this old pattern of arms talks continues to influence the process of this year's negotiations.

According to statistics, in sea-based cruise missiles the United States outnumbers the Soviet Union 2 to 1. In air-based cruise missiles and heavy strategic bombers, the United States outnumbers the Soviets 4 to 1. As for land-based mobile intercontinental missiles, only the Soviet Union possesses these weapons; the United States has no such weapons. This is why the United States, in the talks, is intent on banning all land-based mobile missiles and the Soviet Union firmly opposes it. On the other hand, the Soviet side is intent on limiting sea-based cruise missiles as well as U.S. superiority in air-based cruise missiles and strategic bombers. But the United States does not agree with such a limitation on the pretext of it being difficult to verify, and the United States is trying in every possible way to retain more of these weapons.

This knot is hard to undo not only because of who is superior in numbers but, more important, because of this: Air- and sea-based cruise missiles and land-based mobile intercontinental missiles are new types of strategic weapons the United States and the Soviet Union have developed since the late 1970's. Such weapons are very mobile and easy to conceal and have a strong capacity for survival. They are "second-time strike forces," which have a bearing on maintaining strategic stability between the two countries. Therefore, each is unwilling to relent if the other does not pay a considerable price.

In addition, obstacles have recently appeared in the talks due to political influences. Judging from what U.S. mass media have disclosed, the right-wing conservative forces in the United States advocate giving priority to settling the issues of conventional arms and chemical weapons and object to concluding a strategic arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union. The WALL STREET JOURNAL in a 2 May article said: Recently there are differences within the Reagan administration on the strategic arms talks; some people worry lest the United States go too fast and too far (in the strategic arms talks). "To placate these forces and take the general elections into consideration, Reagan has recently made his position known several times. He has said repeatedly

that he wants "a good treaty," not "a treaty that is signed quickly" and that any agreements must "accord with the interests of the United States" and "are conducive to strategic stability." According to U.S. press reports, before U.S. Secretary of State Shultz went to Moscow to meet with the Soviet foreign minister in April, the U.S. Government internally decided through consultation to make no substantial concessions in order to keep the pressure. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is faced with some difficulties at home. The struggle between those advocating reform and those opposing reform has come into the open since late March, which more or less affects the development of the situation. Gorbachev clearly pointed out when receiving Shultz on 22 April: It is unfeasible that U.S. leaders attempt to take advantage of "the unstable position of the Soviet leader" to "expect the Soviet Union to make principled concessions." Observers believe this is an open show of an increasingly uncompromising and tit-for-tat Soviet position in the strategic arms talks.

Judging from the above situation, it is not hard to explain why a Soviet-U.S. strategic arms reduction treaty is a goal which is now within sight but beyond reach. It is questionable whether or not the two sides will be able to sign such a treaty in Reagan's remaining days in office.

#### **Superpowers' Strategic Arms Reviewed**

OW2405082288 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0709 GMT 24 May 88

[“Backgrounder: Strategic Arms Balance Between U.S., USSR”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, May 24 (XINHUA)—The superpowers have maintained a rough balance in strategic arms with the number of missiles and the explosive power in the Soviets' favor while the U.S. missiles are superior in quality and armed with more warheads.

For a long time, the Soviet Union has stressed the practical needs of a nuclear war by building up continental ballistic missiles to be used in the first strike. The United States believes in the “guaranteed destruction” strategy which emphasizes the ability to launch the second strike and for this purpose, the development of sea-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles.

Despite their structural differences, both superpowers possess offensive strategic nuclear forces composed of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-launched missiles and long-range bombers.

According to the “strategic survey 1987-1988” published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Soviet Union owns 1,418 land-based ICBMs equipped with 6,440 warheads as compared with the

U.S. possession of 1,000 ICBMs carrying 2,261 warheads. The Soviet SS-25 ICBMs deployed in 1985 are the only existing land-based mobile strategic missiles in the superpower arsenals.

The Soviet Union possesses a total of 2,511 strategic missiles, 554 more than those owned by the United States. The U.S. missiles carry 13,873 warheads as opposed to 11,044 tipped on Soviet launchers. The explosive power of the Soviet missiles equals 5 billion tons of TNT, 1 billion tons greater than that of the U.S. weaponry. This indicates that the Soviet Union has a stronger capability of destroying “soft targets” such as cities.

The United States possesses 640 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) equipped with 6,656 warheads while the Soviet Union retains 928 SLBMs with 3,344 warheads.

In the category of long-range strategic bombers, the United States holds a four-to-one superiority to the Soviet Union with 317 such aircraft armed with 4,956 warheads on the U.S. side and 165 strategic bombers with 1,260 warheads on the Soviet side.

While the Soviet Union is catching up, the United States still leads in such qualitative aspects as accuracy, target option and abilities to penetrate the enemy's defenses and combat electronic jamming.

#### **Commentary on Fourth Soviet-U.S. Summit**

OW2505204488 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0533 GMT 25 May 88

[Commentary: “The Fourth Soviet-U.S. Summit in Perspective” by reporter Wang Chongjie]

[Text] Beijing, 25 May (XINHUA)—Whether Washington and Moscow can truly turn onto the right track of disarmament and ease world tensions, or continue to persist in the logic of the arms race and global confrontation remains the fundamental issue of the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit.

Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Reagan are scheduled to hold their fourth meeting in 4 years in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June to continue discussions on arms reduction, regional conflicts, bilateral relations, and human rights.

Before this meeting, last December's signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and medium and short-range missiles; and the agreement, which is already in force, among parties concerned for withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, constitute a sound beginning for promoting disarmament and finding political solutions to regional conflicts. However, the large number of INF missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and the United States remain yet to be dismantled completely,

and a final solution to the Afghan problem is still far away. If one looks at the overall situation of disarmament and easing of international tensions, one sees innumerable other world issues that are crying out for urgent solutions. Will the Soviet Union and the United States march forward or backward? Will they maintain their status quo positions? These questions will put the two superpowers to a test again at the Moscow summit.

However, judging from the relevant situations so far, one may say that it becomes clear that leaders of the two countries are already unable to fulfill their projected chief objective at the Moscow summit; namely, the signing of a treaty to halve their offensive strategic weapons.

People will remember that, in a joint statement issued after the Washington summit in December last year, Reagan and Gorbachev stressed their agreement to have their respective negotiators in Geneva "strive to work out as soon as possible the offensive strategic weapons reduction treaty and all relevant documents" for the two leaders to sign during their meeting in Moscow. But no real progress has been made over the past half year despite frequent meetings of Soviet-U.S. negotiators in Geneva and four rounds of tense talks between U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The arguments of both sides show that the two are still, at rock bottom, trying to take advantage of each other. While Washington is eager to cut a larger portion of land-based ballistic missiles, in which the Soviet Union is superior, Moscow wants to do the same with the U.S. dominance in submarine-launched missiles and strategic bomber-carried cruise missiles. The United States insists on developing the Strategic Defense Initiative to press Moscow for concessions in offensive strategic weapons reduction and in other issues. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, tries to use strategic arms reduction as a bargaining chip to hinder the United States from developing space weapons. There is little change to the stands taken by both sides half a year ago on these related issues.

Regarding regional conflicts, due to direct and indirect superpower meddling over the past years, efforts to remove numerous "hot spots" in the world fail to produce speedy solutions, and the two superpowers have found themselves shouldering heavy burdens throughout the world. U.S. interference in the Middle East and Latin American affairs has precipitated the Reagan administration's "Irangate" crisis for a period of time; and President Reagan himself has just barely survived through the difficulty. Sending troops to Afghanistan was the most conspicuous demonstration of "arrogant hegemonism and great-nation chauvinism" by former Soviet leader Brezhnev when he was in power. After having tasted to the full the bitter fruit of invasion into Afghanistan, the Soviet Union finally decides to extricate itself.

Recently, Soviet and U.S. officials have held frequent talks about solutions to regional conflicts without yet obtaining concrete results. Reagan and Gorbachev will continue to discuss these issues in Moscow. Leaders of the two countries often claim that the Soviet Union and the United States bear "special responsibilities" for world affairs. But, in the eyes of the world, their "special responsibilities" lie in truly ending their rivalry and actively promoting solutions to regional conflicts on the basis of respect for national independence, state sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Due to the restrictions imposed by various factors, it seems that it will be difficult for the Soviet Union and the United States to rapidly develop their bilateral relations in economy, trade, science and technology, and culture in the near term.

The intense arms race and global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States not only pose a serious threat to world peace and security, but also imperil the social and economic development of the two superpowers themselves. It requires the two of them to conscientiously make a choice. It is undeniable that a number of technical difficulties, indeed, exist in the efforts to conclude a strategic arms reduction treaty with reliable verification measures and sign agreements on other drastic arms cuts. Yet, the decisive factor lies in whether the two sides have the sincerity and determination to quicken the disarmament process.

The people of the world long for peace and development. This is the mainstream of the times at present. People hope that Soviet and U.S. leaders will be able to conform to the trend of the world, continue to find ways for disarmament and detente while in Moscow, and effectively adopt measures helpful for world peace and security.

### China on Disarmament, Arms Race

**Meeting of Non-Aligned Movement Convened**  
*OW2905235188 Beijing XINHUA in English*  
0549 GMT 27 May 88

["News Analysis: Non-Aligned Movement Seeks Disarmament (by Chen Shengtao)"] —XINHUA headline]

[Text] Havana, May 26 (XINHUA)—The special meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which opens here today, is the first of its kind ever to be held by the movement, but represents the latest of its steadfast efforts to bring about a cessation of the arms race and a substantial reduction of arsenals.

At the five-day meeting, representatives from 80 non-aligned nations will consolidate their positions on a wide range of issues for the third special session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to disarmament next month in New York.

Since its inception in 1961, NAM has been vigorously working for the maintenance of international peace and security based on the peaceful coexistence of states with different political and economic systems. Its priorities include the prevention of war, nuclear war in particular, and disarmament and the dissolution of military blocs.

It was NAM that first proposed the convening of the first special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament in 1978, at a time when the atmosphere of detente in the 70's was still in evidence.

At that session, the international community was for the first time able to reach a consensus on a comprehensive strategy for disarmament based on a set of principles and an order of priorities in arms reduction negotiations. The ultimate objective was to achieve a general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

This time, as one of the press reports here indicates, the movement is ready to make further contributions to the success of the upcoming special session in New York.

The reason for NAM's dedication to peace and disarmament is obvious.

All 101 members of the movement are in the Third World, most of them newly independent. As a whole, they are concerned with assuming their rightful place in the international arena and achieving social and economic progress. This is only possible in a peaceful environment with normalized international relations.

Viewed from another perspective, the NAM member states, mostly small and relatively weak, are the most vulnerable.

The superpower rivalry, escalated by a frenzied arms race, not only poses a threat to the survival of mankind, but has sown distrust and enmity and created tension and conflicts in many parts of the world.

It is this rivalry that is responsible in one way or another for many of the 150 wars the world has witnessed since 1945, all of them in the Third World.

Figures released by the United Nations show that as many as 20 million people have been killed in these conflicts, not to mention the heavy material losses incurred.

Furthermore, in an international environment dominated by an arms race, normal international cooperation is bound to be distorted. For many of the NAM states, one constant worry has been the susceptibility of their fellow members to the superpowers' military-strategic considerations, a threat to NAM's non-bloc, anti-bloc principle.

Mainly because of the arms race between the two superpowers, the overall armament levels of the world have been greatly enhanced. Although the developing world only accounts for some 15 percent of the world's total military expenditure, which now stands at 1,000 billion dollars a year, it is still an unbearable burden for them. The result has been a slowing of development.

However, in their fervent pursuit of disarmament objectives, non-aligned nations have always stressed the need to establish a lasting peace and international security based on the prohibition of foreign aggression and domination and the respect for people's right to independence and self-determination.

#### 'News Analysis' of Meeting

OW2705081488 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0135 GMT 27 May 88

["News Analysis: Non-aligned Movement Pursues Development Through Disarmament (by Chen Shengtao)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Havana, May 26 (XINHUA)—For many years the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) has been trying to address the problems of overarmament and underdevelopment as inter-related issues.

Press reports here disclosed that 80 members of the movement, which start a special session in Mexico today, will again deal with the issues as their major concerns.

The meeting is called to prepare NAM's positions for the upcoming third special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled to be held next month in New York.

In the view of the movement, which is shared by many other countries, both overarmament and underdevelopment are threats to international security, and the arms race seriously hampers development, especially in the Third World.

Statistics show that global military spending, swelling steadily as the world situation worsened over the superpower rivalry, has doubled in the past 26 years to the tune of 1,000 billion U.S. dollars a year.

Although developing countries account for some 15 percent of the total, economically they are the hardest hit.

Experts said some of these countries spend as much as a third of their national incomes for military purposes.

This logically has added greatly to the economic problems which have been plaguing the developing world. A case in point is its external debt which has run up to more than 1,000 billion dollars while 1 billion people there are living in abject poverty.

If overarmament is addressed, a mere 1 percent of the yearly military expenditure thus saved will be sufficient for buying enough farm equipment to help countries now unable to feed themselves realize self-sufficiency in food.

NAM also believes that the economic and social consequences of the arms race hinder efforts to create a new international economic order, which, in return, will help promote a lasting peace.

In another aspect, NAM advocates continued effort to seek the use of resources released from disarmament measures for development purposes, in particular for the benefit of the developing world.

This position also enjoys support from not a few developed countries. Former Swedish Under Secretary of State Inga Thorsson had this to say: Disarmament would benefit countries of both the North and South. While developing countries would be the immediate beneficiaries of military resources converted to development purposes, industrialized countries would benefit greatly, too. An improved economic performance in the South would stimulate demand for goods in the North.

#### UN Disarmament Session To Begin

OW2905090088 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1804 GMT 28 May 88

["U.N. Third Special Session on Disarmament Begins Next Week (by Qian Wenrong, Wang Xianpeng)"]—XINHUA Headline]

[Text] United Nations, May 28 (XINHUA)—Next week's third special session on disarmament at the United Nations General Assembly will be the largest and most representative meeting of nations ever held to consider the question of laying down arms.

To be held at the UN Headquarters May 31 to June 25, it is attracting 25 heads of state and government, more than 100 government delegations, and more than 200 non-governmental organizations.

It has been six years since the second such gathering on disarmament. The world has witnessed considerable relaxation of East-West relations in recent years, and United States and the Soviet Union are holding their fourth summit meeting. The international community rightly expects this political climate will contribute to a successful session, thus giving further impetus to bilateral, multilateral and regional disarmament talks.

However, the world today is facing a paradox. On the one hand, Washington and Moscow signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty last December to eliminate all their intermediate and shorter range nuclear missiles. They are also negotiating a fifty-percent reduction of their strategic nuclear forces.

On the other hand, the arms race between the two major military powers is expanding into the outer space. They are also working on a new generation of nuclear weapons and a variety of launching vehicles.

The world as a whole spent more than a trillion U.S. dollars on arms last year. The speed of the arms race far exceeds that of disarmament.

For all these reasons, a lot of attention has been focused on the forthcoming special UN session in the hope that it will further rally world public opinion for some real progress in checking the arms race and speeding up the disarmament process.

In this connection, the session will discuss the effect of new science and technology on the arms race, in addition to general disarmament issues.

The delegates are also facing other contentious issues. The West generally favors conventional disarmament and strict verification procedures while the non-aligned countries tend to stress nuclear disarmament and the security of non-nuclear countries.

Because of these differences, the preparatory committee for the special session failed to agree on a draft of the final document even after three meetings. Intensive consultations are still going on regarding the agenda, priority topics of discussion and selection of sub-committee chairmen.

The non-aligned foreign ministers are meeting in Cuba to formulate a joint position and draft its version of the final document to serve as the basis for discussion at the session.

The leaders of Sweden, India, Greece, Argentina, Mexico and Tanzania are also expected to propose an integrated multilateral verification mechanism within the framework of the United Nations.

However, there are already opposing voices from some member states on grounds that a verification system should be developed for each disarmament treaty by the parties to that treaty or agreement. The superpowers, in particular, oppose any multilateral verification effort outside their own agreement.

UN officials, nonetheless, hope that an agreement which is acceptable to all countries can be hammered out.

Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, Yasushi Akashi of Japan, told journalists recently that "there is willingness to face up to the issues and to identify the common interest among all."

He hoped that "a realistic and more balanced strategy" can be worked out that "will pinpoint the direction of multilateral disarmament and also delineate for us the primary areas of efforts in the future."



**Foreign Minister Departs for UN Arms Session**  
*OW2805091288 Beijing XINHUA in English 0833*  
*GMT 28 May 88*

[Text] Beijing, May 28 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen today urged the United States and the Soviet Union to shoulder "special responsibilities" for disarmament.

He made this appeal at the airport this morning prior to his departure for New York to attend the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament.

Describing the background of the coming session, the Chinese minister said that the INF agreement was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, some progress has been made in the 40-nation disarmament talks in Geneva, and the desire for disarmament by the world people has been growing.

Especially, the coming session is to be convened at a time when [the] Moscow summit between Reagan and Gorbachev takes place. "It is only natural for other countries to place hopes on the two countries," he said.

Representatives from more than 100 countries, including heads of state and government leaders, will attend the four-week session beginning May 31. Qian Qichen is scheduled to make a speech on July 2 at the capacity of the Chinese delegation head.

Qian spoke highly of the basic principles contained in the "final document" adopted at the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. Since that session, he said, disarmament has made headway thanks to the unremitting efforts by various countries and peace-loving people. "The tasks are still tough and require continuous efforts," he said.

Qian told XINHUA he will review in his speech at the special session the progress, difficulties, and questions in disarmament in the past ten years and expound China's stand on the issue.

He said that the Chinese delegation is willing to make concerted efforts with other delegations to make the special session a complete success.

The second special session on disarmament was held in 1982.

**Disarmament Document Submitted to UN Session**  
*OW0106061588 Beijing XINHUA in English*  
*0539 GMT 1 Jun 88*

[Text] United Nations, May 31 (XINHUA)—China today reiterated its call for the two superpowers to take lead in halting the test, production and development of all types of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing and destroying their nuclear arsenals.

The call was contained in a working paper submitted by the Chinese delegation to the UN Assembly's third special session on disarmament today.

The document pointed out that a new trend has emerged in the arms race between the two superpowers, characterized by its extension into outer space and the shifting to quality improvement of weapons.

A new priority should be given to halting the arms race in outer space, it said, adding that the two superpowers should not test, develop, produce or deploy space weapons and should destroy all their existing weapons of this kind.

The paper emphasized that the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the largest arsenals, bear a special responsibility for disarmament.

But disarmament should not be monopolized by a few big powers, and all states, big or small, enjoy equal rights to participate in discussions and settlement of the disarmament issues, it said.

The paper noted that since the second special session on disarmament in 1982, the people throughout the world have made unremitting efforts in opposing war and maintaining world peace. Progress has been made in bilateral and multilateral disarmament.

However, it said, the arms race between the two superpowers is still going on and the danger of war still exists.

It called on all nuclear states to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use them against the non-nuclear-weapon states and the nuclear-free zones.

On such a basis, the paper said, an international convention should be concluded with the participation of all the nuclear states to ensure the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

It said the two superpowers also bear a special responsibility for conventional disarmament and should negotiate in real earnest and reach agreement as soon as possible on the drastic reduction of conventional weapons.

The conventional weapons of all countries should only serve defensive purposes and must in no way be used for aggression and intervention against other countries, the paper said.

The document called for an early convocation of an international convention to ban and destroy all chemical weapons as well.

The United States, the Soviet Union and all other states possessing chemical weapons should pledge themselves not to use these weapons, the paper said.

It stressed that the role of the United Nations and that of multilateral disarmament machinery should be strengthened to promote and encourage all unilateral, bilateral and multilateral disarmament efforts.

**Qian Qichen Calls On UN's Florin**

OW3105182588 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1757 GMT 31 May 88

[Text] United Nations, May 31 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen called on Peter Florin, president of the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly, at the UN Headquarters here this morning.

The Chinese foreign minister expressed his hope that the UN General Assembly's third special session on disarmament would achieve positive results under the guidance of Peter Florin.

Florin said he is both optimistic and realistic about the special session which, he added, will surely be fruitful so long as common efforts are made by all delegations to the session.

When Qian said the Chinese delegation will present a working paper as part of its effort to make the special session a success, Florin expressed appreciation for China's longtime efforts in the realm of disarmament and the Chinese delegation's plan to present such a working paper.

Florin said he himself will make a 'political speech' at the special session.

Present on the occasion were Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Li Luyue and Chinese Ambassador on Disarmament Fan Guoxiang.

Qian Qichen arrived in New York on May 28 as head of the Chinese delegation to the U.N. General Assembly's third special session on disarmament.

**XINHUA on Possible Results of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit**

OW3105090988 Beijing in Russian to USSR  
1800 GMT 27 May 88

[XINHUA commentary: "Soviet-American Relations on the Eve of Reagan's Visit to Moscow"]

[Excerpts] The fourth meeting of U.S. President Ronald Reagan with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will take place in Moscow at the end of May. This will be the first visit by a U.S. head of state to the Soviet Union in 14 years.

In terms of moving away from the acute confrontation of the first half of the eighties to the relative detente between the two countries, the forthcoming Reagan visit to Moscow promises to improve these relations and further the process of detente.

In the early seventies, the leaders of the two countries have held a number of high-level meetings and have signed several dozen documents on arms limitation and on broadening exchanges in various spheres. However, even before the ink dried on the disarmament agreements, the arms race between the two countries became even more acute. Towards the end of the seventies, the invasion of the Soviet troops led to significant complications in Soviet-U.S. relations. In March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev took over the post of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, a plan to reduce international tension was outlined with the aim of accelerating the social and economic development of the Soviet Union. He made a number of disarmament proposals to the United States, at the same time showing a greater flexibility, basing the proposals on the principle of security parity and a balance of interests. Under these circumstances, Reagan's government, which up to then had adopted a hard line in its relations with Moscow, acting in behalf of American interests and on promptings by its allies and other countries, displayed signs of flexibility and began a dialogue with the new Kremlin boss. During the past 3 years, three meetings have been held between the two leaders. In comparison with the past, certain new characteristics can be observed in the present Soviet-U.S. relations. First, high-level dialogues are more frequent. In addition to the summit meetings, in the course of 3 years, more than 20 meetings have occurred between the foreign ministers of the two countries. Such frequent high-level contacts was not known in the post-war history of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Second, the dialogue framework has broadened from disarmament to include regional conflicts, bilateral relations, and several military areas. Also, to a lesser or greater extent, progress has been made in such areas as the signing of the INF treaty, and the agreement to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Generally, improvement in Soviet-American relations is beneficial to decreasing international tension. It should be welcomed if this process is taking place without harming sovereign interests of other countries. The people of the world are hoping that these powers, aware of their responsibilities to their own people and conscious of the international situation, will constantly decrease the factors of antagonism in their relations and will reach agreement in the interest of peace and security for the whole world.

**Nonaligned Meeting Viewed As 'Success'**

OW0106144188 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0752 GMT 31 May 88

["News Analysis: Nonaligned Disarmament Meeting a Success (by Chen Shengtao)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Havana, May 30 (XINHUA)—The successful special ministerial meeting of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) on disarmament, which closed in the Palace of Conventions here tonight, is another milestone in the movement's arms reduction effort as a champion for world peace and international security.

The ministers and their aides burned midnight oil for days, but the result of their work is rewarding and propitious.

The fact that the meeting, called on the eve of the Moscow superpower summit and the third special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, was the first of its kind in NAM's 27-year history was already significant enough.

NAM was inceptioned on the basis of commitments for independence of great-power politics and the prevention of war, nuclear war in particular. At this meeting, the movement reaffirmed many of its basic positions while expressing welcome to the improvement in the climate of international relations.

The ministers pointed to great power rivalries, policies of sphere of influence and the denial of the peoples' right to self-determination as factors continuing to "endanger international peace and security." They stressed the need for a world order of peace based on the principles of the UN Charter.

Such reaffirmations will undoubtedly enable the movement to continue addressing major world problems in the right perspective and to remain the mainstay in preserving world peace and security.

In the aspect of disarmament, NAM professed to adhere to the final document of the first UN special session devoted to disarmament, which was held in 1978 on the movement's initiative. The document, which provides for a set of principles and objectives and the priorities in negotiations, was once again upheld as the "bible" of arms reduction.

But the documents adopted by the meeting and the statements heard during its course also included a number of new observations and approaches conceived in view of the changing world situation and the movement's own experience in the disarmament endeavors.

The meeting, in both its final document and its message to the Moscow summit, emphasized much more explicitly the "overwhelming" or "special" responsibility of the two military giants in the various areas of disarmament. With regard to nuclear arms, the message urged them to reach an agreement within this year to cut their strategic arsenals by half, following their INF treaty signed last year.

The meeting also paid great attention to two new trends that again call for superpower commitments in the first place—the danger of the arms race extending into the outer space and the need for conventional disarmament becoming growingly urgent now with nuclear arms cut under way.

The need to promote development, particularly in the Third World, with resources saved through disarmament, was another prevailing topic among the participants of the meeting. understandably, it is time to correct the absurdity that both the yearly military spending of the world and the debt of the developing countries stand at 1,000 billion U.S. dollars.

A fourth salient characteristic of the meeting was that the non-aligned nations, while keeping those lofty objectives in their long-term strategy, turned more to flexibility and pragmatism in their approach on specific disarmament issues.

A large number of countries, including Yugoslavia, the first chairman of NAM, and Zimbabwe, the current one, stressed the importance of realism and constructiveness as prerequisites for NAM proposals.

Observers are of the view that in so doing, NAM will only find itself in a better position to play a positive role by broadening the base of consensus for the realization of its disarmament objectives, immediate and far-stretching.

The birth and growth of NAM, now in its prime of life, has been a product of the process of pluralization of world politics. Every success of the movement in advancing disarmament, one of its preoccupations, will contribute significantly to a safer and healthier world.

## INTRABLOC

### Bloc Delegates Address Vienna CSCE Meeting

#### GDR's Fischer Speaks

LD2005203988 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 1353 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Vienna, 20 May ADN—GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer gave a speech at a plenary session of the Vienna CSCE followup meeting today. He said that with the improvement of the international climate the possibilities for preserving and deepening the CSCE process were better. This has also increased the responsibility of all states for sustaining this process so as to shape it so that peace will become more secure and the basic problems of mankind will be solved step-by-step. It was up to the 35 states represented in Vienna to be aware and meet this challenge. This means not only carefully preserving what has been achieved with great effort, but building Europe into a common home. The 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act, if they are strictly observed by all member states, remain viable pillars of this European edifice.

For this reason alone, they also must not neglect to emphasize the basic meaning of the principles in the final document of the Vienna followup meeting. Respect for the sovereign equality of nations, respect for national laws, renunciation of all interference in the internal affairs of others remain elementary preconditions for productive cooperation. This can only be shaped peacefully through political dialogue.

In order to ensure that the disarmament process that has just been put in motion does not come to a standstill, the Vienna meeting must above all agree on starting negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe and on the continuation of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures that started in Stockholm, said Oskar Fischer. The GDR welcomes the progress reached in the talks of the states between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on a mandate for these negotiations.

The agreement already reached to start negotiations in 1988 on a reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals required an early settlement of outstanding questions on the negotiations on a mandate because the GDR is situated in the region with the biggest military presence and concentration of armaments in the world, the minister said, it had a special interest in the success of these negotiations, which are to reduce step-by-step the capacity for aggression on both sides and lastingly lower military expenditures. The agreed disarmament in one type of weapon must not, however, be wrecked by intensified arming and so-called modernization in other spheres. Because of these considerations, the GDR supports negotiations on the reduction of the tactical

nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-purpose systems. Similarly, it urges negotiations on the subsequent elimination of these weapons.

For the GDR, the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons with ranges under 500 km and the zero option remain topical.

The speaker underlined that regional disarmament and arms control steps—for example the projects initiated or supported by the GDR for a nuclear weapons-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe—can facilitate global settlements. The international meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones set for 20 to 22 June of this year in Berlin will enable a broad exchange of views on these issues.

Oskar Fischer underlined the GDR's readiness to actively participate in bringing about a balanced final document of the Vienna meeting. It must serve joint security and cooperation in a broad sense. There is no alternative to a sensible balance of interests that alone guarantees the continuation of the CSCE process.

On that basis and with the aim of switching from confrontation to cooperation, the GDR has made a constructive contribution to successfully ending the meeting in Vienna, and will continue to do so. The GDR considers the outline for the final document of the meeting in Vienna presented by the foreign ministers of the neutral and nonaligned states a significant initiative. Without underestimating the difficulties of the forthcoming negotiations, we hope that the work on the final document can be finished in the foreseeable future. Realism and perceptiveness from everyone are necessary to achieve a substantive and balanced final document. In this way, the dynamics of the CSCE process can be intensified; and this in turn can give considerable impetus to international security on a global scale.

Foreign Minister Fischer ended his official visit to Austria today. He was cordially seen off at Vienna-Schwechat Airport by his host, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Dr Alois Mock.

#### Poland's Konarski Addresses Group

LD2505020388 Warsaw PAP in English  
1902 GMT 24 May 88

[By PAP Correspondent Franciszek Malinowski]

[Text] Vienna, May 24—Leader of the Polish delegation to the CSCE plenary meeting here, Ambassador Wlodzimierz Konarski, told the meeting today that neutral and non-aligned states had successfully included the draft of a comprehensive final document in the negotiation. It can make a breakthrough in the negotiations if all the participating states reduce their objections and corrections to a minimum.

Ambassador Konarski said that Poland supports Austria's motion to hold in Vienna the two expected planes of European disarmament talks within the CSCE, perhaps this should happen still this year.

This requires a successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE meeting which is expected to adopt a final document and, together with it, a mandate for the core negotiations on disarmament.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Communique Issued on SED-SPD Talks

LD1805201988 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 1518 GMT 18 May 88

[Text] Bonn, 18 May (ADN)—The Berlin meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones would offer good possibilities to continue the international disarmament dialogue and the discussion on the proposals set out by the SED and the SPD for a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe and also for a nuclear weapons-free corridor in central Europe. This was established in a joint communique today by the joint working group of the SED Central Committee and the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group on questions of security policy, at the conclusion of their sitting in Bonn. The working group met under the leadership of Hermann Axen, Politburo member and secretary of the SED Central Committee, and Egon Bahr, chairman of the disarmament and arms control subcommittee in the Bundestag and member of the SPD Presidium. The group was thus continuing the consultations held in March on questions of nonaggression capability and reaching the lowest possible level of armaments with the mutual elimination of asymmetries. The consultations centered on the discussion of confidence-building measures. The working group prepared a number of proposals on this.

The two sides agreed, the joint communique adds, that negotiations by the 23 states which are members of the two alliances, on stability in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, should start as soon as possible. The working group also discussed other matters concerning disarmament and security. In particular they expressed their hope that the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles would soon be ratified and that the summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at the end of May would smooth the way for an agreement this year on a 50 percent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons.

This is the fourth meeting by the joint working group agreed to in May 1987 by Erich Honecker and Hans-Jochen Vogel. It was agreed to continue their work in Berlin on 14 June 1988.

In addition to Hermann Axen and Egon Bahr, the meeting in Bonn was attended by, on the SPD side: Karsten Voigt, chairman of the chemical disarmament working group, representative of the SPD Bundestag

group in the foreign affairs committee, and member of the SPD Bundestag group executive; Erwin Horn, representative of the SPD Bundestag group in the defense committee; Dr Hermann Scheer, chairman of the disarmament and arms control working group of the SPD Bundestag group and member of the SPD Party Council; and Wolfgang Wiemer, adviser to the SPD Bundestag group. On the SED side, the meeting was attended by Dr Manfred Uschner, deputy departmental head in the Central Committee and secretary of the Foreign Policy Commission in the Politburo; Prof Manfred Mueller, head of the Basic Values Department at the Institute for International Relations; Dr Guenter Hillmann, section leader in the GDR Foreign Affairs Ministry; and Karl-Heinz Wagner, member of staff of the SED Central Committee.

### U.S. Plans Concerning MX Missiles Criticized

AU2405152288 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 21-22 May 88 p 2

["W.M." commentary: "Obstructionism on the Part of Washington"]

[Text] The intercontinental U.S. MX missiles, which can carry up to ten nuclear warheads, are to be removed from their underground silos in Wyoming and to be stationed in special trains. This is dreadful news. As a matter of fact, the U.S. Administration, whose secretary of defense made this decision, recently—in the course of this month—during the negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva, submitted a draft agreement on the reduction of strategic arsenals which forbids the mobile stationing of intercontinental missiles. And, this is what the United States is initiating just now.

There are people in the United States who claim that the issues concerning strategic offensive weapons and verification in particular are so extremely complicated that the treaty on halving these arsenals will not be ready for signing at the Moscow summit. What is one to make of such statements from Washington if the matter in question that is so complicated is rendered even more complicated by creating facts that contradict the United States' own draft agreements!

And another question must be raised: Does the head of the Pentagon intend to pay the respectable sum of \$330 million for loading his MX missiles on trains, only to take them back to the silos a little later when the agreement on strategic weapons comes into force? Or does he not believe that his President should sign such a treaty at the end of this month in Moscow or somewhere, sometime?

These are questions that require clear answers. The world expects the United States to fulfill the obligations assumed by its highest representative in continuing the disarmament process. In a sarcastic comment, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU wrote about the mobilization of the MX missiles: "Such alternating hot and cold baths

hardly contribute to building confidence, either on the side of the allies or on that of the negotiating partner." The crucial point to consider is who in Washington is

interested in countering the process of confidence-building, disarmament, and improvement of the international situation by such demonstrative obstructionism?

## INDIA

### Nuclear Arms Pact May Not Slow Armaments Race

52500022 New Delhi PATRIOT in English  
19, 20 Apr 88

[Article by Rakesh Gupta]

[19 Apr 88 p 4]

[Text] December 1987 will go down in the history of disarmament as a landmark since it witnessed the signing of the INF Treaty that reduced for the first time a certain category of arms. As the treaty itself says, it "will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security." This is also the year in which the Soviet Union came up with the suggestion of "military sufficiency" as the guiding principle for maintenance of minimum of arsenals.

U.S. Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci has recently hinted that he would ask the Soviets where to look for it in the Soviet force structure and modernization. The assumption behind this is that the Soviet Union has a preponderance in conventional areas in Europe.

This view is also shared by the NATO countries. In the wake of the INF Treaty, NATO Defence Ministers met at Brussels and talked about security and stability that would mean the continuation of the strategy of flexible response and forward defence. The Final Communiqué issued by the Committee of Defence Ministers after INF Treaty said the NATO is "...determined to continue to provide the level, quality and mix of systems, nuclear and conventional, necessary to ensure the credibility of this strategy."

More emphatically, it stressed the need of the Conventional Defence Improvements (CDI) action plan. The Carlucci Annual Report to the U.S. Congress on military posture recognises the need to support it. Senator Quayle, who was opposed to the INF, has claimed championing the cause of CDI and its endorsement from the Pentagon. The CDI would involve the greater cohesion of the NATO alliance for collective objectives.

In this regard, it is necessary to note that the French position is not at variance with the NATO position. Recently the French Foreign Minister has underlined the need for greater NATO cohesion in the wake of changes in East-West relationship that might come about in future. NATO has also agreed to give "increased assistance to Greece, Portugal and Turkey to strengthen their conventional defence, in order that they may more effectively fulfill their proper roles in the collective defence of the alliance." In the wake of these decisions it is reasonable to expect a conventional arms race in Europe.

Equally it is reasonable to expect this in the Asian sector. INF reductions in Asia may reflect a view on the part of the Soviet Union that the Chinese cannot afford to use their nuclear arsenals and cannot hope to engage in a conventional war and win against the Soviet Union. On the first there is a Chinese commitment on first non-use. On the issue of conventional weapons Sino-Soviet dialogue if there is one on conventional weapons does not show any signs of disarmament.

The second area in which arms race will continue is the area of ADI or SDI. The INF Treaty says: "If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of the Treaty apply." GLBM stands for Ground Launched Ballistic Missile. Of course, the United States conceded to the Soviet Union that it will not break out of the ABM treaty for 10 years. Yet the post-Washington summit diplomacy on SDI suggests that some of the SDI components (both nuclear and non-nuclear) will be pursued particularly the Surveillance, Acquisition, Targeting and Kill areas for which maximum funds are being provided by the United States despite congressional cuts and Pentagon's reduced budget requests for the next 5 years.

The SDI diplomacy also shows that a standoff between the two powers may have something to do with arms race in another area of weaponry. It is well known that the United States has an edge over the Soviet Union on the sea despite Gorshkov strategy of achieving parity with the United States in all the seven seas.

The debate in the United States over the elimination of ballistic missiles has shown that there may not be any reduction in cruise missiles launched from the sea. Mr Thomas Schelling said: "I see no powerful reason for going the next step and eliminating sea-based missiles." In fact cruise missiles launched from underwater appear to be an adequate alternative.

These may replace sea based ballistic missiles with sea based cruise missiles. There may, however, be a mix of cruise and ballistic missiles.

The United States is developing both anti-submarine warfare weapons and cruise missiles that will be faster, quieter and deeper diving with better arms and the capacity to carry out under ice operations.

[20 Apr 88 p 4]

[Text] This is called SSN-21 Seacoff class. It will be the keystone of the U.S. tactical submarine fleet going well into the 21st century.

It is also believed that the Soviet Union is developing SS-NX-28 with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 nautical miles. It has stealth and supersonic capacity. As far as the United States is concerned its cruise missiles will be ready for delivery to the navy in 1994 and service by 1995.

The talks at Geneva in preparation for Moscow's summit indicate a discussion on missiles based on sea. It appears that the Soviet Union has recommended verification measures for the sea based cruise missiles and a possible experiment for the same. The United States has taken a diplomatic position while expressing its skepticism on the proposals.

The coming decade will positively witness a heightened arms race on the sea for the following reasons. Since conventional war is envisioned as more probable, NATO countries would not neglect sea control. Admiral Watkins had already suggested an aggressive plan of hitting the targets on Soviet territory, that is installations and amphibious capabilities in the Eastern Asia and North Europe.

The Soviet Union has to cross choke points in both the regions. In Asia-Pacific, Mr Gorbachev recommended confidence building measures, these were rejected by George Shultz. In fact, the United States is negotiating with the Philippines for the continuation of its bases there. It is also opposed to nuclear free zones in the region.

Soviet flotillas in the Atlantic have to pass through the Baltic Sea and for this it would wish the Danish Straits to be opened. It would require an adequate amphibious capability. NATO proposes a sea-control strategy for the region and the containment of the Soviet fleets in the wake of a conventional war.

Thus, the attempt will be to choke the Baltic sea. Recently, Soviet sovereignty in the Baltic has been violated. There have been joint exercises too and NATO emphasises its need. It may also be recalled that in the sector of East Asia, Soviet territorial sovereignty was violated a few years ago which led to the shooting down of the Korean airliner.

Recently, Mr Carlucci said: "The Soviet anti-continual upgrading of the quality of their attack and cruise missile submarines, combined with continued improvements in Soviet naval aviation has permitted Moscow to begin extending sea-denial areas into the Southern Norwegian Sea and north west Pacific." In the Mediterranean, Spanish armada is joining NATO, despite Spanish Government's rhetoric against NATO.

Finally, the airwing of the triad also shows that the arms race will be accelerated. There will be more dual purpose bombers. These have not been included in the INF agreement nor are they going to be in the agreement to be signed in Moscow.

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**U.S. Attitudes, Press Coverage on INF Treaty Viewed**

52001062 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian  
No 2, Feb 88 pp 68-71

[Interview with Stanislav Kondrashov, political observer and one of the special IZVESTIYA correspondents illuminating the Soviet-American summit meeting, by Viktor Gribachev; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] In response to the probable question of the reader, "Are we not going too far and are we not making too many concessions?" you along with N. Yefimov answered: "We are going no farther than the other side." It is impossible, of course, to convince all 100 percent of the readers of this; there will be skeptics or simply people who have no desire to comprehend the positions of the treaty. But most of our readers are "in favor." But was the American press able to explain the significance of the treaty to its compatriots?

[Answer] Of course it is impossible to convince 100 percent of our readers and one cannot convince 100 percent of Americans, especially considering the greater multipolarity. There were and are rather decisive critics of the treaty there.

Was the American press able to explain the importance and significance of the treaty to its compatriots? It is always difficult for me to answer such questions, because the American press is a heterogeneous concept, just as are the Americans themselves. Polls indicate that 70 and even 80 percent of Americans support the treaty: they understand and appreciate it. The "zero option," let us not forget, was proposed by R. Reagan as early as the end of 1981. The credit in the case at hand belongs not only and not so much to the press but to American officials. The very INF Treaty, and this must be understood, is in the course of Washington's official policy. And Americans, certainly many Americans if not the majority, generally believe their government and support its foreign policy. Especially in such a central area as Soviet-American relations. For this reason, of course, the treaty is understood and appreciated, although the question inevitably arises: how solid are these assessments? And further, what importance do they give to it?

I think that the degree of consent that the two leaders achieved defines not only the emotional but also the rational weighed political perception of most Americans.

[Question] At the meeting of M.S. Gorbachev with the managers of the leading U.S. mass media, the president of the CNN television corporation Ted Turner said that the future of Soviet-American relations depends to a considerable extent upon journalists. And, although there has not yet been a fundamental change for the better in our international journalism, we have begun to rid ourselves of obsolete ideas and to move away from the creation of an "enemy image."

But here is what is cause for concern. After previous Soviet-American summit meetings, we usually refrained from critical articles about the United States. With the passage of a certain amount of time, however, "we made up for what we had neglected": because we expected the American press to reciprocate and there was no reciprocity.

The meeting in Washington was not even over when the American press "came down" on us. And some of our journalists are also unable to restrain themselves and are beginning to respond in a like spirit.... In this connection, however, readers may accuse us of creating an exclusively "negative picture" of life in the United States....

[Answer] You have raised a lot of questions. To begin with the last one, again I must make the reservation that the American press is a heterogeneous concept. There are cheap and shrill sensational as well as serious newspapers. But even in the respectable publications, naturally, there remains and must remain their organically inherent dose of anti-Sovietism. Their attitude toward our ideology and our system is, of course, negative. It would be ridiculous to expect fundamental changes. They will not take place. But the climate of Soviet-American relations has improved, above all those changes taking place within our country are having an effect on them. Our perestroika, our close attention to our serious and even painful problems, and our self-criticality, at times pitiless, are all creating a different image in the West, including in the United States, of the Soviet Union, a more open and more frank state and society that has ceased to claim infallibility. In response to our glasnost, there has been a wave of benevolent interest in everything taking place in our country. And in this sense, having made the reservation that the American press is very diverse, it must be noted that changes for the better have occurred in the tone of the respectable publications.

[Question] At the end of December, the "first bell was heard" and the "Center for the Study of the Mass Media" published a report on the interpretation of the Soviet-American meeting by the three largest television companies of the United States. Staff members of the "center" expressed their extreme concern with the fact that "85 percent of all reporting was in favor of the USSR." During the Christmas holidays, there were also reports that the United States, they said, had made a mistake and the Russians had a different number of missiles than that set forth in the treaty. Thus, has a "reassessment of values" already begun in connection with the upcoming ratification in the Senate in the spring?

[Answer] I must say that these matters are totally explainable. We cannot expect the assessments of the INF Treaty by different people and groups to be completely identical. The accents can change in connection with the development of the American internal political situation in this year of presidential elections and in

connection with unexpected events or occurrences in Soviet-American relations. Here there is no reason to be surprised. And again I must say that in the respectable press there is now an entire range of shades in the assessment of the treaty, although, I repeat, an attitude of approval does prevail. It is also necessary to take into account such aspects as the relations of the United States with its allies, the attitude of different political circles in different countries of Western Europe to the treaty.... All of this gives a rather variegated picture.

But I am far from having fully answered your preceding question, more precisely, an entire bunch of questions. You quote the words of Turner. Yes, some things in Soviet-American relations do depend upon journalists. But by no means everything or the main thing. The main thing depends on direct politics. International journalism derives mostly from politics. The ideas about a particular country do not improve if the political and diplomatic relations with that country are poor. Taking its foreign political aspect, international journalism deals with politics, reflects politics and depends upon politics.

You touched on still another extremely large and important subject, that of the enemy image. I would not want to touch on it lightly. For some time, it has been fashionable and has become a banality. I must say that our people also worked very diligently on the enemy image, calling this counterpropaganda, and they are continuing to do so. A certain automatism and inertia have been maintained.

[Question] But how do you think this internal breaking down of stereotypes must take place?

[Answer] Stereotype—this is a word of foreign origin, which, as is the case with such words, does not contain any moral weight. The breaking down of stereotypes is something that seems to relate to a building site. And if we name things using understandable Russian words, then it is a matter of a serious, honest, intelligent and responsible attitude toward one's work, of helping your nation understand another nation rather than inciting still more distrust and enmity. International journalism must be broad-minded and bold in depicting another country, in depicting our relations with the other country—the United States in this case. And, if you wish, this goes right to the essence and is something that we have been lacking heretofore—it must also be broad-minded and bold in discussing our own shortcomings.

[Question] Precisely in discussion, as you wrote in the journal "Kommunist." Because, as the next step on the way to democratization, Americans demand exclusively criticism from us, including of the foreign policy of the USSR.

[Answer] Here it is necessary to differentiate. One thing is what the Americans say about us, what they accuse us of. They have their own standards, their own system and

own ideals and we have the right to take them into account or not. Much more significant for us is something else, the fact that our international journalism, although one of the bridges connecting us with the outside world, is aimed primarily at our Soviet reader. It is to him that we explain our policies and the world around us. Our primary responsibility is to him. And it is precisely our responsibility to our own people that forces us to set the task of a rather extensive and serious discussion of foreign policy issues in our periodicals, a discussion that does not boil down merely to applause and enthusiasm.

Take, for example, our path to that same treaty on intermediate and shorter range missiles. Or, perhaps, take and trace the evolution of the process of negotiations with the Americans beginning in 1979. We have given up many of our initial positions. Why? Readers, television viewers and radio listeners have a right to ask us these questions and they are asking them. Neither we journalists nor our diplomats or military people have yet given them sufficiently detailed answers. Although, it seems to me, there is nothing wrong with our acknowledging that some positions were not justified, that they could not lead to the achievement of an agreement, did not take into full account the reaction of West European countries, imposed an excessive and unnecessary burden on ourselves, and objectively worked for those on the other side who wanted an increase in the level of military confrontation as a means of exhausting the USSR economically. This is not salt in the wounds of self-esteem but lessons in soberness and realism and beacons to the future.

[Question] Stanislav Nikolayevich, what is your opinion: Why, although it is clearly understandable why, was our press formerly inclined to euphoria in assessing summit meetings? Do you think that we did without this euphoria this time?

[Answer] Yes, this time we dispensed with euphoria: in the press, you will not find one of the key characterizations of the first half of the 1970's—about the irreversibility of detente. We misused this characterization, forgetting that in international politics, particularly in relations with a power like the United States, the irreversibility of some process or other has never yet been proved by experience. When Comrade Gorbachev returned from Washington, as you know, he said that there can still be no talk of a fundamental change in the relations between our two countries. This is a sober and realistic evaluation. We have had too much experience of the most varied nature, including quite enough bitter experience, to fall into any sort of euphoria in assessing Soviet-American relations. In looking back at the 1970's, you see, alas, that our efforts in the area of international detente coincided with developing stagnation within the country. The internal situation was embellished at the same time as the state of detente, which was encountering more and more obstacles in political America. We

are now dominated—and I hope it will be maintained in the future—by a sober and realistic view of internal as well as international perestroika, I see no danger of euphoria.

[Question] American journalists, Sovietologists and Kremlinologists justify their unwillingness to express sympathy for the Soviet Union by the fear of unpleasant experiences. I want to present several examples. Dennis McCauliff, assistant editor of the "Washington Post Weekly," thinks that, in concentrating attention on the "dissidents" and numerous problems of Soviet society, the press is giving Americans a very distorted picture of life in our country. Explanation: the ignorance of most editors. That is self-critical...but the overwhelming majority of mass media in the United States resorts to the services of specialists. Jerry Hoff, a specialist from Duke University, in turn, complains about the journalists accredited in Moscow, who, for their source of information, rely solely on American or other Western diplomats who bring back the same "Washington line" to the American capital from Moscow. How would you assess this "closed circuit?" And can it be broken?

[Answer] If by a break you mean a fundamental change in their attitude toward us, I do not see or foresee it: the attitude will remain critical, as will be the nonacceptance of the foundations of our system. We can speak only of less prejudice and hostility and a more constructive approach as well as a more objective illumination of our life style by taking a broader choice of issues and showing more understanding for our peculiarities and differences as well as the necessity and possibility of coexistence. In this connection, some progress has already been made. They are explained by the process of glasnost and perestroika and our enterprising foreign policy that convincingly shows our peaceful intentions. All of this is evoking a growing and basically benevolent interest. So that we have already received some political dividends.

[Question] Do you not think that the New Year's address of President Ronald Reagan to the Soviet people specified the tasks of American propaganda as applied to the USSR—"human rights" and Afghanistan. Clearly, our journalists specializing in this subject also need to take into account this propaganda orientation in future work.... Can it not be assumed that the American press will hit at these targets?

[Answer] These subjects existed before and during the visit to Washington and will remain after it. Still, the main items in the summit negotiations were arms control questions.

[Question] And here is another subject for thought. Two years ago, the newspaper "Christian Science Monitor" appealed to its readers to write how they see the world of the year 2010. At the end of his article, Colorado Governor Richard Lamm put forward the traditional "happy ending": the leaders of the USSR and United

States will understand that the arms race is senseless. Before that, according to Lamm's forecast, a nuclear conflict will break out in Southeast Asia on 29 November 1994. Journalists will be the first to reach the site of the nuclear conflagration. They will show everything and write about everything and then the people will understand that the consequences of nuclear strikes are monstrous. Then the leaders of both countries realize the entire perniciousness of the arms race....

[Answer] Governor Lamm's scenario is one of the fantastic gloomy scenarios. If one wishes, others can be found. It should not be taken seriously. If a nuclear conflict breaks out, we will all find out about it immediately (if we are still around to do so!) and not just the journalists "present" in the exchange of nuclear strikes. It is not true, as indicated in the scenario, that the leaders of both countries realize the perniciousness of the arms race only after such an exchange.... They realize it already. There is no need for a nuclear conflict to understand all this: there are facts and everyone has the necessary minimum of imagination to see how terrible and tragic all of this is. By the way, the forecast of Governor Lamm was made prior to Chernobyl, was it not? And here you have a specific and unexpected example of how the dreadful reality forces people to give thought to the perniciousness of both the military and peaceful atom and to the world in which we live side by side with the nuclear threat.

[Question] An agreement has been reached on the destruction of four percent of the nuclear arsenals. How can one lower, even by that same amount, the frequency of the appearance of stereotypes on the Soviet threat in the American press?

[Answer] Well, in my view, the frequency of the appearance of gross anti-Soviet fabrications has already been reduced by 4 percent and perhaps by a little more than that.... Perhaps by 5 or 6 percent. And maybe even by 7 percent? It seems to me that the process of disillusionment is ahead of the process of real nuclear disarmament. And it must take the lead.

[Question] The question is of your and N. Yefremov's report from Washington, in which you for the first time presented specific data on the number of missiles to be destroyed and on the means of verifying the observance of the treaty. It is clear that our strategy is defensive. But is it easy to convince Americans of this?

[Answer] Our report was only a brief one, although it was an objective narration of the treaty's positions and of the memoranda to it with emphasis on verification and inspection. Perhaps it attracted your attention because you published several facts that the public did not know.

[Question] But to speak of the influence of such articles on politicians? I think that the role of journalists is rather great as it is and above all involves the informing of the broad public. There is no need for us to exaggerate our

influence on direct politics. The statesmen of different countries deal primarily with their own counterparts and with the political process itself and not with the reading of newspapers and journals or listening to the news on television. The shift that is now taking place in Western political consciousness is explained by the fact that we are showing through practical actions that the new thinking is not just empty words. This is seen above all in the change in our approach to questions in the control and verification of the reduction or destruction of arms. Much more openness and willingness to go much further than, let us say, 2 or 3 years ago does more to show the Western public and politicians the defensive nature of our military doctrine than any articles by our journalists. These are specific changes in political practices in fundamental areas of international life, at the seams of relations between states. And we will go further than our opponents in disarming ideologically and politically precisely through such a practice and through such constructive actions.

Here is a very simple example demonstrating, let us suppose, a truly fundamental shift in the thinking of that same President Ronald Reagan. Immediately before the meeting in Washington, defending himself against his critics on the Right, he said that in Gorbachev he sees the first Soviet leader who is renouncing the idea of the establishment of a "unified world communist state." For us, this appears ludicrous and naive, for who in the last half century, let us say, has raised the question of such a state? But Reagan needed seven years of his presidency with all the ups and downs of Soviet-American relations to become convinced of this idea. And he became convinced of it in the last year or two, specifically with the help of the three meetings with the Soviet leader. These are the kinds of seismic changes that are taking place in the minds even of inveterate conservatives, when they see the new Soviet policies in action with their own eyes. At the same time, however, one must not forget that the President has become neither a liberal nor some sort of progressive; he is still a conservative, convinced that it is possible to talk with the Soviet Union only from a position of strength and explaining his own actions by saying that precisely the position of strength demonstrated during the years of his administration is beginning to bear fruit in realistic negotiations on the part of the Soviet Union as well as the United States.

[Question] Much of what you have said is a forecast for the future. Still, the treaty has to be discussed in the Senate and then the President will visit us.... There will be other events that are difficult to foresee now. We all remain optimistic but what should we expect? How would you formulate your assumptions?

[Answer] My assumption is rather typical. I proceed from the fact that, despite all the expected roughness of the process of ratifying the INF Treaty in the U.S. Senate, it must be concluded successfully. A number of vacillating senators—Robert Dole, the leader of the

Republican minority in the Senate who would like to be president, for example—are convinced by the fact that the treaty enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of voters. Thus, the treaty is most likely to be ratified and will take effect.

As for the other and more significant treaty, the one on strategic offensive weapons, it, of course, remains to be seen. We have very little time. If we had reached the current stage of readiness a year ago, we would have more time to overcome the disagreements that still exist. A shortage of time is now being felt.

[Question] Stanislav Nikolayevich, this question is more personal in nature. For a long time, you were an in-house correspondent in the United States. Your observations have now "taken on a definitive form," many in the form of books. Do you intend to continue your in-house correspondence or will you travel to the United States just to illuminate some especially important events?

[Answer] I decided this question for myself long ago: there is a time for everything under the sun, including in the life of a specialist in international affairs. The time has long since passed for my long—for years—missions abroad, to that same United States, as a correspondent. America, of course, is an inexhaustible subject, one that is continuously developing. One cannot grasp the changing variegated hues of American life in brief visits. But, as they say, how much is possible? In the final analysis, a foreign country can interest one only to a certain extent.

The main thing for me now, and it always was, is my own country. The events taking place in our country are so interesting and so important for a person who has all of his roots in this land with sprouts emanating from it that you feel annoyed because your professional efforts and your time and energy are devoted to something else, to interpreting what is taking place abroad. And it turns out that you do not know your own country very well. One does not want to make such an admission, it is difficult. But that is another subject. I will say only that having become a specialist in American affairs inadvertently, I also inadvertently introduced an element of our life, of my own strange life as an international specialist, and of my feeling for my native land in my depiction of America. I tried to combine one with the other.

An international specialist's view of his own country.... This in general is a serious task in international journalism, especially now, in the period of perestroika, which is impossible without the most sober interpretation of our place in the world. Only timid steps have been taken toward the resolution of this task. How difficult and tempting it is to let this pass through your heart and mind, to show your own land and a foreign land as well as the nature of our common time.... I also approached

this subject—not a subject but a confession—but I was not able to express it fully. And is it even possible? This can be answered only after having made one more attempt.

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9746

**Report on U.S. Senate INF Debate**

PM2605113188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
26 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Gan: "A Reassuring Development. U.S. Senate Debate on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Washington, 25 May—Journalists daily gauging the temperature of the Senate debate on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles have noted a sharp rise today. In a rather unusual and impressive display of unity, the Democrat and Republican leaders in the upper house of the U.S. Congress submitted a joint resolution to "cut off" the debate on the ratification of the Soviet-American agreement.

Anyway, it was an unexpected step. Only yesterday, R. Byrd and R. Dole, leaders of the rival parties in the Senate, were obviously pessimistic about the chances of a vote on the treaty by the time of the Moscow summit. Delaying and obstructionist tactics—filibustering, as it is aptly called here—enabled those opposed to the destruction of missiles to put a brake on the debate, although all the "killer-amendments" they put forward were rejected by the vast majority of legislators. Since it is reckoned in principle that the treaty will get enough votes for Senate "advice and consent" to ratification, it all hinged on the problem of when. As both Reagan administration spokesmen and the Senate leadership pointed out, what is on the agenda is the question of the political prestige of the United States and of the President himself, who has

been forced, in planning his visit, to consider the possibility that, through the fault of the U.S. side, the meeting participants might not be able to exchange official documents ratifying the historic agreement.

To all appearances, today, on the eve of Reagan's departure from Washington, it was decided to bring massive pressure to bear on the obstinate opposition. In the morning, the President held a conference at the White House with leading members of the Senate, after which it was announced that a concerted effort would be made to resolve the procedural impasse. Later, Reagan invited the "filibusters" themselves—Senators Helms, Humphrey, McClure, and Symms—for a talk and, according to White House spokesmen, urged them to stop blocking the completion of work on approving the treaty. Then Helms visited Byrd and Dole to discuss "the possibility of a compromise."

The latter, however, is now hardly of great importance. Even if Helms and his cronies continue in their obstinate efforts to delay the voting, the resolution submitted by the Senate leadership will be put to a vote on Thursday. Byrd has no doubt that it will get the requisite backing of 60 senators and, as a result, the debate will be limited to a maximum of 30 hours. According to White House spokesman M. Fitzwater, the Democrats' leader told the president that "in all likelihood" the treaty would be approved by Friday.

In connection with this development, White House Chief of Staff H. Baker is delaying his departure from Washington until Saturday and will fly straight to Moscow with the requisite ratification documents.

At the beginning of this report, I said that concerted efforts by the Democrats and Republicans in the Senate were rather unusual. That is true. But it is not hard to see why—neither party wants to be considered responsible for hindering, let alone wrecking the treaty. After all, there is an election on the way and the Treaty on Eliminating Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has the support of the vast majority of Americans. In many respects, this fact explains everything.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### CDU Youth Presses for Zero-Solution

52002447 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 14/15 May 88 p 2

[Text] In spite of criticism from inside the party, including that of departing Federal Defense Minister Woerner (CDU), the JU [Young Union] is standing by its demand for a third zero-solution for land-based, short-range [missile] systems in Europe. JU Chairman Boehr announced after a meeting of the executive committee in Bonn that they will present this demand, which has long been raised by the SPD and the Greens, at the CDU Party Congress in mid-June in Wiesbaden. The executive committee of the Union parties' youth organization also questions the prevailing NATO strategy of "flexible response." Boehr said that because of the possibility of mutual destruction by nuclear weapons, the strategy could not be regarded as a permanently reliable instrument of deterrence. This is why the JU will propose at the party congress that all nuclear weapons be dismantled. For the sake of security, however, the JU "deems necessary simultaneous, asymmetrical reductions in the area of conventional weapons."

### SPD's Voigt Recommends Scholz-Yazov Dialogue

DW170945 Bonn DIE WELT in German 17 May 88 p 7

[Article by "SKS": "Scholz Ought To Seek Dialogue with Yazov"]

[Text] Bonn—As a result of the experience gained in last week's official talks, the SPD's disarmament expert Karsten Voigt recommended to Federal Defense Minister-Designate Rupert Scholz the earliest possible commencement of a dialogue with his Soviet counterpart Yazov. Voigt, who together with SPD Chairman Vogel had also met General Staff Chief Marshal Akhromeyev last Friday, pointed out in Bonn that in his view there is also great interest in Moscow in an exchange of views with the inspector general of the Bundeswehr, as well as with the inspectors of the various military services. The underlying thought Voigt would like to establish for such willingness for dialogue is that "current differences ought to have an educational effect."

### Schmidt Appeals to Superpowers on Disarmament

LD1705131988 Hamburg DPA in German 1036 GMT 17 May 88

[Excerpts] Moscow (DPA)—Former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt today opened a 3-day meeting of former heads of state and government in Moscow with an urgent appeal to the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to continue their disarmament effort further.

Schmidt underlined the significance of the Soviet-U.S. INF agreement on the removal of all land-based intermediate-range missiles. The treaty could possibly lead to a second phase of detente. Millions of people are also hoping for further disarmament steps. Schmidt also called for a global renunciation of the export of ideologies and systems. Tolerance is increasingly becoming an "absolute must". Most large problems would cross national borders and ideologies.

Schmidt stressed the realization of price reform as "indispensable" for the success of the Soviet policy of reform. This is a "painful process". If the policy of "perestroyka" (restructuring) is successful then Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev might possibly become the most significant politician of the 1990's.

### SPD, GDR Joint Group Consider Security

LD1805170388 Hamburg DPA in German 0824 GMT 18 May 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — The Joint Working Party of the SPD Bundestag Group and the SED Central Committee have continued their deliberations on joint security in Europe with a fourth meeting in Bonn today. The meeting was concerned with questions of the nonnuclear area and possibilities of achieving nonattack capability in the military structures of both sides. The SPD group was led by disarmament expert Egon Bahr, and the SED delegation by Politburo member Hermann Axen.

### Genscher, France's Dumas Comment on Talks

LD2005170988 Hamburg DPA in German 1509 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—It will be impossible to present an overall disarmament concept for the NATO alliance before 1989, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said in Bonn today. Following consultations with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Genscher announced plans to prepare a joint Franco-German analysis of such an overall concept.

They intend to prepare this analysis by this fall, Genscher said, for use as a planning document. It will take into account the three main elements of the overall concept: the East-West situation, arms control and disarmament, and defense. Dumas stressed that Moscow's new policy has to be gauged realistically against its actions.

With Genscher's remarks, this overall concept, which has been the focus of recent discussions on the early modernization of short-range weapons, has for the first time been given an approximate time framework.

Genscher told newsmen that it will be possible only to discuss the overall concept at the NATO foreign ministers' conference in Madrid in early June. The Franco-German paper will be available this autumn. It will then be possible to make an interim assessment at NATO's

winter meeting in Brussels in December. Without giving more specific dates, Genscher said he hoped it will be possible to adopt it "next year."

Foreign Minister Dumas, who has worked closely with Genscher in the past and who today repeatedly stressed their "very cordial friendship," promised support for Genscher's plans for closer cooperation. In this connection he backed, on behalf of his government, Genscher's plans for a European Central Bank. He said that at the European summit in Hannover at the end of June, France will support Genscher's proposal to convene a committee of experts.

The foreign ministers, who announced that they will meet again soon, agreed to further deepen their cooperation. It will extend even further into the spheres of technology and personnel exchange.

**SPD for Third Zero Solution on Disarmament**  
*LD2505114488 Hamburg DPA in German*  
0957 GMT 25 May 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The SPD supports the third zero solution—for missiles with ranges under 150 km—and is calling on the Federal Government to reject any modernization or new armaments. The SPD parliamentary group will introduce these demands as a motion in the Bundestag, the spokesmen for foreign policy and disarmament policy, Kartsen Voigt and Hermann Scheer, announced at a joint news conference in Bonn on Wednesday.

The SPD politicians warned against Bonn agreeing to new armed forces objectives by NATO, which are due to be decided by the defense ministers of the alliance on Thursday in Brussels. Nuclear arms depend on the setting of objectives for conventional strength. It could then be decided, Karsten Voigt declared. The German public would then be deceived. Voigt and Scheer underlined statements by CDU/CSU parliamentary group leader Alfred Dregger, who had urged far-reaching disarmament in tactical nuclear weapons.

Voigt said that it was planned to circumvent the INF treaty on missiles with ranges of 500 km to 5,000 km by introducing new cruise missiles with a range of just under 500 km, to which the range of the "Tornado" missile carrying aircraft could be added, and the old situation before the conclusion of the INF treaty would thus return. The need to keep more powerful nuclear weapons in Europe was also contested by the SPD politicians. According to their information, the majority, if not all, of the Soviet short-range missiles in the CSSR and in the GDR are armed only with conventional warheads.

**Helmut Kohl Outlines Hopes for Moscow Summit**  
*LD2605161188 Hamburg DPA in German*  
1547 GMT 26 May 88

[Text] Berlin (DPA) — Chancellor Helmut Kohl does not expect that the Moscow summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will bring a breakthrough in the reduction of intercontinental missiles. Kohl told RIAS radio on Thursday that he believes that there could be "very considerable progress" in START talks before the end of this year. This is in accordance with the wishes of the Federal Government, since such progress means another step on the path of reason.

The chancellor expects that there will also be discussion of human rights in Moscow, but one shouldn't "overburden" the talks with expectations. As regards these matters he looks to the future "with great optimism".

The text of the interview was made available to DPA in advance.

**U.S.-USSR Moscow Summit Analyzed**

**Genscher Stresses Importance**  
*DW301235 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German*  
29 May 88 p 6

[Article by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: "The Summit Serves Europe"]

[Text] The U.S.-Soviet Moscow summit will also be a summit for Europe. Rapprochement between both big powers serves European interests first of all.

The intermediate-range missiles agreement must initiate disarmament in all fields—particularly in the conventional field because here the East has geographic advantages. It is superior in significant weapon systems, such as tanks and artillery. Therefore, we want to achieve a balance on a lower level.

However, we want more: We want a system of cooperative security for Europe ruling out the surprise attack ability and wide-spread offensives on both sides.

We hope the summit will produce positive initiatives for political, cultural, and economic relations between the East and the West. Security can no more be guaranteed solely militarily.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated, by resolving numerous human rights cases, by improving exit possibilities, by accepting the western demand for on-site verification of disarmament agreements, and by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, that Gorbachev's words are followed up by action. That Soviet policy—together with a critical view of former Soviet foreign policy and

with the domestic reform policy—facilitates new developments in East-West relations. Despite all the difficulties still facing us, a historic chance is opening up. We must exploit that chance.

We want to create more stability, more common interests, and more confidence through economic cooperation. Thus we want to make the way to more security irreversible. In the nuclear age man has become a surviving community. We can survive only together, but not against each other.

The FRG considers its future task to be the driving force for the East-West balance. Good German-Soviet relations are important for all of Europe. In the dynamics of East-West relations Europe must play a part in accordance to its weight and its interests.

We Germans suffer greatly from the partition between East and West. We have carried the main burden of the cold war. The border running through Europe is the border separating Germans from Germans. Every step made by the East and by the West toward each other, brings Europeans closer to Europeans and Germans closer to Germans. We cordially wish that the Moscow summit meeting will be successful. A successful summit will be a summit for Europe—and also a summit for us Germans.

#### **Politicians Express Hopes**

*LD2805140688 Hamburg DPA in German  
1223 GMT 28 May 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The government and opposition in Bonn today expressed their hope that the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, which begins in Moscow on Sunday, will lead to greater disarmament and cooperation between East and West.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), in an article for BILD AM SONNTAG, said that the meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev would also be a "summit for Europe," since the rapprochement between the superpowers primarily serves European interests. Genscher underlined that the Federal Republic would support every step for cooperation, and also regards its task as being a "driving force for the East-West balance."

In a radio interview (Bremen Radio), governmental spokesman Friedhelm Ost expressed his hope for further steps for improving the whole range of East-West relations. Following the conclusion of the agreement on the reduction of medium-range missiles, the aim is now

further measures for disarmament and arms control. Bonn wants a halving of the strategic systems, a ban on chemical weapons, and a reduction of a conventional arming.

The Social-Democratic opposition is also hoping for a "new political impetus for disarmament." SPD disarmament expert Hermann Scheer added that the INF agreement must not be undermined by new arming in nuclear short-range missiles. Scheer criticized the NATO defense ministers for wanting to raise military expenditure precisely at a time of renewed detente between the superpowers.

The FDP Federal Executive in Wuerzburg stated that this first visit by a U.S. President to Moscow in 14 years demonstrates that the superpowers are increasingly aware of their joint international political responsibility. The FDP supports all efforts aimed at utilizing the opportunity provided by the new policy in the Soviet Union. This opportunity must not be killed by too much discussion or wasted through adherence to old stereotypes.

**Envoy Delivers Shevardnadze Letter to Genscher**  
*LD3005173088 Hamburg DPA in German  
1616 GMT 30 May 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—A far-reaching agreement exists between Bonn and Moscow on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. This was stressed in Bonn Monday by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher after talks with Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Kvitsinskiy. The ambassador conveyed to Genscher a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The Soviet foreign minister was replying to a 13 May letter from Genscher to all members of the UN Security Council. In that letter Genscher referred to the use of poison gas in the Gulf war and, citing Security Council Resolution 612, called for increased efforts for a worldwide ban.

The Foreign Office announced today that Shevardnadze, too, had called for a worldwide ban, including the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons "under international control." Genscher agreed with a proposal by Shevardnadze for talks between experts from the two countries on all problems connected with a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

The German foreign minister is to hold further talks with his Soviet counterpart next week. In his talks with the ambassador in Bonn today Genscher was preparing for a meeting with Shevardnadze to be held on 7 June on the sidelines of the June special General Assembly in New York, a spokesman said.



10

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