


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25 AUGUST 1988



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INTRABLOC

FRG Officers Inspect USSR-GDR Maneuvers

Inspection Begins 12 August

*LD1208121888 Hamburg DPA in German
1056 GMT 12 Aug 88*

[Excerpts] Bonn/East Berlin (DPA)—At noon today, four Bundeswehr officers began their inspection of maneuvers by Soviet and GDR troops in a region southeast of Berlin.

According to the rules of the "Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe" the period of inspection by the Bundeswehr officers (48 hours are envisaged) will end at about noon on Sunday. The maneuvers of the Soviet troops and units of the GDR National People's Army started on Monday, and will end this Sunday. Fourteen thousand Soviet and 500 GDR soldiers are taking part in the maneuvers.

Two Killed in Collision

*LD1308121788 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1144 GMT 13 Aug 88*

[Text] Berlin, 13 Aug (ADN)—In the early hours of 13 August there was a serious traffic accident in the village of Niebel near Luckenwalde in Potsdam Bezirk. There was a collision between the leading vehicle of a column of armored vehicles of the GSFG [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany] and a Trabant car, in which the two occupants of the car were fatally injured.

The exact circumstances surrounding the accident are currently being investigated by the appropriate authorities.

Exercise Ends 14 August

*LD1408170888 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1612 GMT 14 Aug 88*

[Text] Berlin, 14 Aug (ADN)—The joint exercise by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] and the NVA in the region of Burg, Jessen, Luebbenau, Teupitz, and Luckenwalde ended on Sunday. About 14,500 members of the two fraternal armies took part.

Under the direction of Lieutenant General Aleksandr Kozlov, deputy to the commander in chief of the GSFG, troops and staffs in recent days demonstrated their increased level of training for defensive action. The troop formations and units withdrew to their garrisons on Sunday according to plan.

The exercise had been announced to the signatory states of the Stockholm Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe.

FRG Inspectors Complete Work

*LD1408152488 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1419 GMT 14 Aug 88*

[Text] Berlin, 14 Aug (ADN)—Commensurate with the stipulations of the Stockholm Agreement concerning adherence and control of notifiable military activities, four officers from the FRG inspected from 12 to 14 August 1988 troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and of the National People's Army [NVA]. The inspection covered the Glienicke, Brandis, Grossenhain, Luebbenau, Teupitz, Luckenwalde, and Lehnin area, where a joint exercise took place from 8 to 14 August.

As reported the GDR Government approved the FRG inspection request on 11 August 1988. In deciding on the request and in the practical execution of the inspection the GDR has adhered strictly to the Stockholm Document. The inspection group arrived in their own vehicles 36 hours after the application. According to their request the inspection group was provided with two helicopters and two NVA cross-country vehicles. During its stay in the GDR the group was accompanied by officers of the Defense Ministry. The inspectors ended their work after 48 hours.

As an inspecting state the FRG is obliged to immediately send an inspection report to the signatory states of the Stockholm Agreement.

Inspectors Comment

*LD1408145988 Hamburg DPA in German
1406 GMT 14 Aug 88*

[Excerpts] Potsdam (DPA)—Four Bundeswehr officers today ended their 48-hour inspection of a Soviet and GDR troop exercise southeast of Berlin. In reply to journalists in Potsdam who asked about the treatment the officers received in the GDR, Colonel Baron Otto Grote said after the inspection that everyone had been very businesslike. He was convinced that such inspections have a confidence-building effect. The officers returned to the Federal Republic this afternoon. [passage omitted]

According to Grote, two divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and a smaller contingent of the NVA took part in the week-long exercise which ended today. In 48 hours, the inspectors were able to travel within the exercise area using helicopters. Grote did not want to evaluate the exercise.

In reply to a question on the reduction of "enemy images" by means of such confidence-building measures, Grote said that the training of many years did not allow "itself to disappear in a few weeks or months." Beforehand, NVA Major Gerd Doischer, who escorted the inspectors, said that such meetings "definitely" reduced enemy images. Every such step led to more understanding and security. [passage omitted]

BULGARIA

Danish CP Chairman on Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone

*AU1308140788 Sofia BTA in English
1303 GMT 13 Aug 88*

["The Danish Communist Party Positions"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, August 13 (BTA)—Mr Ole Sohn, chairman of the Danish Communist Party, believes that NATO is the main obstacle to the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The overwhelming majority of Danes favour the setting up of such a zone. The same applies to the people of Norway, Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries, he says in an interview carried in today's RABOTNICHESKO DELO.

Significantly, when they met at their summit in Brussels last spring after the I.N.F. Treaty was signed, the NATO countries' leaders said that the alliance opposes nuclear-free zones. As is known, the USSR has declared its readiness to provide guarantees for the status of such a zone. The only obstacle, therefore, is the policy of the North Atlantic alliance, Mr Ole Sohn indicates.

The interview points to the need for communist parties to promote their cooperation in solving problems of security and disarmament, global problems concerning the ecology and the building of a common European home.

To us, in our capacity as a political party, the processes of restructuring in the socialist countries are of great importance, Mr Ole Sohn emphasizes. The new attraction which socialism now holds will help us in our work. I have in mind the new approach of the CPSU and of other communist parties which are in power to cooperate not only with social democrats and the left, but also with some bourgeois politicians who share the concern for the maintenance of peace, the Danish Communist Party chairman goes on to say.

He stresses that in its work, his party assigns priority to the struggle for peace and sets great store by the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Kessler Writes on Military Bloc Cooperation

*AU1108131388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 9 Aug 88 pp 3, 4*

[Article by Army General Heinz Kessler, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and minister of national defense: "Safeguarding Peace—Purpose and Aim of Our Military Activity"]

[Text] The recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee has set new guidelines on the path toward a Europe where East and West no longer

direct weapons at each other, but draw benefit from trade and change, from the exchange of goods and values, skill and knowledge, and from the people and ideas in a hitherto unknown manner. This happened barely 14 months following the adoption and publication of the statement on the military doctrine in Berlin by the leading political representatives of the allied socialist countries.

The basic documents which were adopted at the time and the recently published documents express the resolve to exclude war once and for all from the life of human society. This is the fundamental question of our time. The two leading concepts of the 29 May 1987 Berlin statement can be summarized in a few sentences:

1. The military doctrine of our alliance—as well as those of every individual member state—are aimed at the task of preventing any kind of war between NATO and the socialist defense alliance, no matter whether this war is waged with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons.

2. Our military doctrine is oriented toward limiting the armed forces of our countries to a level of defense capability that is absolutely necessary and that corresponds to the military activities and abilities of NATO. In this, our countries consider the approximate military-strategic balance of forces that has been achieved an essential factor in safeguarding peace, but deem it imperative to gradually reduce this balance to a lower level and to perfect at the same time all political instruments and methods to safeguard peace.

In other words: Our military doctrine is aimed at putting an end to the arms race which, in the long run, is getting more dangerous and more expensive, and at bringing about disarmament. The present condition of mutual destruction capability should be replaced as swiftly as possible by a stable international system of mutual joint security. It should be a security system that is based on set political rules and methods aimed at the exchange of interests, the settlement and prevention of conflicts by political means, as commanded by reason and as has proven possible and efficient.

At the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, held in Berlin 2 months ago, it was interesting for us to learn in how many countries all over the world—including NATO states—the view is beginning to prevail that nuclear deterrence must sooner or later be replaced by a cooperative political safeguarding of peace, even if there is still strong resistance to this within NATO.

The Berlin statement is characterized by the fact that it closely links principles concerning the military doctrine with specific goals regarding the stages during which they are to be implemented:

In the second part, the general principles that have been explained in the first part are developed into a comprehensive program that is designed to reduce and ease

military confrontation and to eventually dissolve both military coalitions.

Thus, our military doctrine does not place emphasis on the expansion of armed forces, on the development of new and increasingly perfected types of weapons of destruction, which unfortunately characterized the resolutions adopted by NATO in the spring of 1988. Mutual reduction of armaments and the reduction and eventual elimination of the danger of war is and continues to be the supreme concern of the military-political concept of our community of states. This also applies to the full extent to the GDR's corresponding views on the military concept.

At the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, held in Berlin in June 1988, Erich Honecker stressed that "the safeguarding of equal security for all states is our goal. The path toward this goal must be characterized by disarmament, starting with the most dangerous offensive weapons, which should lead to a structural incapacity to attack on both sides."

As the CPSU, the SED, and other fraternal parties have repeatedly pointed out in recent time, the military policy and military strategy of the allied socialist states is determined by these principles. On 12 July Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, welcomed the proposals submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Sejm of the PPR to reduce military confrontation in Europe, and assessed them as an important initiative for building confidence, for strengthening security in Europe, and continuing the process of disarmament. The proposal to establish a center for the reduction of the danger of war, which includes the possibility of steady cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is closely linked with the ideas expressed by the GDR and the proposals made by the CSSR.

The resolutions of the 16 July Warsaw Pact meeting have contributed to enriching the broad peace program of the socialist community of states, which is aimed at detente, with new initiatives of far-reaching international significance. The proposals contained in the statement of the Warsaw Pact member states on the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe are to be viewed as further steps to implement our joint military doctrine. It has been proven that the document adopted in May 1987 was not a short-term, day-to-day political activity. It will provide the framework, direction, and target for the coordinated military policy and military strategy of our alliance, including measures aimed at our country's military protection.

In the middle of the year 1988, which is decisive from several points of view—as Erich Honecker pointed out—and in the aftermath of the most recent international

events and in view of upcoming events, it is justified to ask: What has been achieved after the adoption of the Berlin statement? What will be the most important tasks during the next few months in order to proceed on the path toward a Europe with fewer weapons but with more mutual confidence and more security for all?

We Did Not Stop at Words

Owing to the extraordinarily active and resourceful policy of the USSR and other socialist states in the fields of disarmament and the promotion of military confidence, thanks to a flexible style of negotiations and a most far-reaching readiness for compromise on the socialist side, in the course of only 1 year a degree of progress was achieved that was hardly conceivable a little while ago.

The most important result of the Washington and Moscow summits was the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. It initiated a change toward real disarmament in a whole category of nuclear weapons, and the mere fact that it was concluded and ratified furnishes proof that, despite existing serious differences of interests and opinion, prospects for a world free from threats of nuclear destruction are beginning to become discernible.

The agreements reached by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on further steps to limit and reduce weapons, on regional conflicts, and the shaping of constructive relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which have been stipulated in the Moscow communique, are the second significant result.

These agreements, for the signing of which the CPSU general secretary could rely on the mandate of the community of socialist states, have brought us closer to the conclusion of a treaty on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons of both powers, while observing the stipulations of the ABM Treaty as it was concluded in 1972. Bearing in mind how difficult it is to find solutions to problems concerning the main military forces of the two social systems that are acceptable for both sides and to fend off the open and concealed resistance to disarmament agreements of influential military circles of NATO, what has been achieved in Moscow is to be valued all the more highly. Here, not only different structures regarding nuclear missile forces are involved, but also great differences of opinion on increasingly complicated verification procedures and the general disclosure of difficult problems regarding military security and secrecy on both sides.

Some other results of negotiations that are important to develop understanding and confidence between states with different social systems are to be seen in this light as well. This includes the establishment of centers for the reduction of nuclear risks in Moscow and Washington,

and the setting up of working groups of members of the Soviet and U.S. military to improve communication and consultation possibilities in cases of crises and increased tension.

It also includes the joint development of a Soviet and U.S. verification procedure on the nuclear tests sites of Semipalatinsk and Nevada to monitor a future ban on underground nuclear tests. It includes the agreement on early information on missile starts and, last but not least, it also includes the exchange of views between the defense ministers of the USSR and United States on basic issues concerning the military doctrine and military strategy of the two powers, which was initiated by the Soviet Union and continued through several meetings, including encounters between the general chiefs of staff.

These and other results of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue, which are not specified in detail here, were supported and enriched as much as possible in the spirit of the Berlin statement by the initiatives of other socialist countries.

In this context, special mention is to be made of efforts by the PPR, the CSSR, and GDR to bring about disarmament and enhance confidence-building in central Europe. The CSSR and GDR, which, as alliance partners of the Soviet Union, were also directly affected, did not only promote the conclusion of this agreement. Both states immediately took all the required legal steps and supported the early withdrawal of Soviet OTR-22 missiles from their territories in February this year.

Following the first on-site inspections on the territories of our two states, U.S. experts acknowledged the correct and careful fulfillment of all contractual obligations by the representatives of both host countries. The proposals for a nuclear-free corridor, a chemical-weapons-free zone, and a recent proposal for a zone of confidence and security in central Europe, which have been developed by the SED together with the SPD since 1986 and which were welcomed by the fraternal states, also testify to the serious and responsible approach of the socialist countries.

At the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, Erich Honecker made the proposal—which was strongly supported by our allies—to create mechanisms aimed at the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the prevention of military incidents in central Europe, including direct connections between the heads of state in Prague, Berlin, and Bonn, as well as joint bodies and centers for the promotion of confidence, equipped with the required technical facilities.

It fills us with satisfaction that the increasing significance of the proposals aimed at disarmament and strengthening security on a regional basis was particularly stressed at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. The implementation of such

confidence-building measures, which would strengthen the security of the peoples and states on our continent, would essentially contribute to reducing the mistrust that still exists, to promoting mutual understanding, and to paving the way to further disarmament steps, as stipulated in the Warsaw resolutions.

Consultations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which were suggested 1 year ago in order to compare the military doctrines of both alliances, to analyze their character, and to discuss their future limitation to principles of defense, also point in the same direction.

What Was NATO's Response?

So far, NATO has not officially responded to this offer. Irrespective of this, questions concerning the military doctrines assumed a central role during talks between the Soviet defense minister, Army General Dmitriy Yazov, and U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci in Bern and Moscow, and recently between the Marshall of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev and Admiral Crowe. In other NATO states, too, this document has been undergoing close scrutiny after the publication of the Berlin statement. It is quite natural that differing viewpoints have emerged, which sometimes sharply contradict each other.

But, above all, one fact is remarkable: In the capitalist world, the circle of realistically minded politicians, representatives of the economy, cultural workers, and members of the military is constantly increasing. Their views on the security interests of NATO differ sharply from those of some of the so-called "hawks," and are indeed compatible with the corresponding principles and proposals of the Warsaw Pact states. This includes the insight that a war between the military coalitions cannot be won by either side, but that it can destroy human civilization, which means that it must be prevented. This also includes a growing interest in military strategies and structures of armed forces that stress the defensive character, and in the creation of nuclear-free zones, as was clearly expressed by the international meeting in Berlin.

Today, partners for a policy of joint security are no longer to be found exclusively in the one or the other leftist opposition party in capitalist countries, in the trade unions, youth, women's, and church organizations, but also in ruling conservative parties in West European states, in concerned leaderships, and in entrepreneurs' associations. FRG Government representatives, for example, reacted in a businesslike and relatively open-minded manner to the most recent proposals of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, aimed at disarmament and the strengthening of security in Europe. Despite some reservations that he explained, FRG Defense Minister Scholz also indicated his willingness to discuss basic questions concerning the military doctrines and the military strategy of both alliances, as discussed several times during Soviet-U.S. dialogue.

The opening of similar talks between the defense ministers and military experts of other NATO states and the Warsaw Pact—including the GDR and FRG—could be useful and important for getting to know each other better, for better mutual understanding, and for the development of a promising basis for negotiations.

We Do Not Overlook the Resistance

In all this we do not overlook the fact that the international situation is still complicated and contradictory, and that the opponents of disarmament are intensifying their activities. The most militant representatives of anticommunism in the important NATO states are making considerable efforts to delay and halt the process of disarmament and confidence-building that has just started, to gain the advantage over the socialist countries, and to push ahead with the arms buildup.

In the FRG several high-ranking military officials, in reacting to the Warsaw Pact proposals, had nothing more urgent to do than to conjure up the fading phantom of the "pressing superiority" of our Joint Armed Forces, to strongly emphasize the "indispensability" of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and declare the strengthening of the "European pillar" of NATO—in particular through modernizing the conventional armed forces and armaments—the "particular duty" of the European NATO states.

As the decisions of the NATO spring sessions again demonstrated, the most influential governments of the member states of this alliance insist on the principle of "nuclear deterrence." They are against any further reductions of nuclear weapons in the European NATO area and are still striving for military supremacy.

This course, which is contrary to Europe's security interests, is most clearly expressed in the plans to "compensate" for the land-based U.S. nuclear missiles, which have to be withdrawn from West Europe and destroyed in line with the intermediate-range missile treaty. This is to be achieved by first rearranging or deploying other, additional intermediate-range nuclear arms systems of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Thus, at the end of April the NATO Nuclear Planning Group decided in Brussels among other things to deploy additional U.S. nuclear combat planes and combat ships in West Europe and in the European fringe seas and to provide additional nuclear-capable combat planes for those NATO states that have such planes.

The transfer to Italy of the squadron of 72 U.S. F-16 fighters that have been stationed in Spain until now will shift these carriers, which are designed to carry nuclear weapons, 1,500 km to the East, into the southern flank of the socialist defense coalition, and will increase the existing NATO superiority in the Mediterranean area. In order to avoid a new escalation of armament, the USSR, on the other hand, has offered to withdraw air forces from

advance positions in East Europe, if the United States refrains from transferring its F-16's from Spain to Italy.

A second direction of NATO's striving for military superiority, which directly affects us from the viewpoint of our country's security interests, is the planned "modernization" of nuclear weapons, in particular in NATO's central European area. The FRG critics of NATO's arms buildup are justified in pointing out that not only certain technical improvements are being considered in this connection, but the introduction of principally new generations of weapons. Thus, the operative-tactical "Lance" missile is to be replaced by the mid 1990's by a follow-up system with a greater range—up to 450 kilometers instead of 130 kilometers—greater precision, and programmable charge.

Similar projects also exist with regard to the nuclear carriers of Great Britain and France. Recently the British Government decided to develop over the coming years a new air-to-ground missile with a range between 400 and 500 kilometers and to integrate it into the variety of weapons used by the British "Tornado" fighters. This is one of the new precision proximity weapons [Prazisionsabstandswaffen] which are to be enabled to penetrate our air defense system by means of the radar-absorbing "Stealth" technology.

France has started to refit its new nuclear carrier with a "Mirage 2000 N" fighter bomber squadron. This carrier can make nuclear attacks with a range of up to 1,500 kilometers with air-to-ground missiles and thus has a range that is about 45 percent greater than that of its predecessors.

New high-technology weapons systems are also the clear focal point in NATO's nonnuclear armament programs. As an example let us take the development of airworthy bomb dispensers that are launched by combat planes and are capable of taking thousands of highly explosive scatter mines or homing shells to their target areas over distances of several hundred kilometers. In order to appease the public, some FRG Government politicians claim that the "modernization" of the nuclear systems will be discussed only in the remote future, because at present there is "no need for any decision." But the communiqués of NATO meetings use a different language, and as early as April 1986, the U.S. secretary of defense frankly admitted in a talk with FRG journalists: "Modernization is under way. At present we are renewing our nuclear combat planes and our nuclear artillery. Together with the British, we are planning an aircraft missile which is capable of hitting ground targets at greater distances. The decision that the Lance missiles must be compensated for has long been made."

What We Consider Particularly Inopportune

Such activities of the military-industrial complex of the main NATO countries, which are anything but favorable for the process of disarmament and confidence-building,

mainly serve to increase the capability of the NATO forces to mount a surprise attack. With such weapons systems, the air and naval forces in particular are to be enabled to make sudden "deep attacks"—with or without nuclear weapons—against the centers of the Warsaw Pact's political and military leadership, against intelligence and communications centers, missile sites and airports, staffs and troops, supply sites, and other important targets in order to paralyze the political and military leadership and to deprive the Joint Armed Forces of their ability to develop their defense in a coordinated and planned way. This is what NATO's current operational training rules say. Contrary to the calls of the peace movement and even conservative politicians—which can be heard ever more clearly in the NATO countries, too—to renounce such aggressive, provocative concepts and to give preference to defensive combat principles and armaments, the supreme political and military organs of NATO have categorically rejected this to date. They take every opportunity to emphasize the allegedly "purely defensive" character of NATO's strategy: It is only directed against military threats from the East; therefore, there is no reason to change anything in the current guidelines. But NATO's armament does not just aim at defending it against the nonexistent threat of an attack by the Warsaw Pact forces, there are totally different goals behind all this: We must not be indifferent to the fact that particularly the determined advocates of plans for "compensation" and "modernization" do not hide their intention to eliminate socialism as a social system as soon as they get the chance. Even though these declared enemies of socialism consider a strategic attack too risky at present, they are trying to come closer to their goal by combining the arms race, ideological diversion, and political coercion. And in all its strategic exercises NATO continues training with all forms of the use of military force, all stages of escalation from combat to the selective first use to the massive use of nuclear weapons by all its member forces. The states and the armies of the Warsaw Pact must and will keep close watch on this.

Aggressive Intentions Are Alien to Socialism

The Berlin document confirms the defensive nature of our military doctrine and the military activities that have already been undertaken or will have to be undertaken in the future in order to implement it. It is the meaning of socialism to ensure the working people of a life in peace, social protection, and prosperity. No member state of our alliance—nor any social interest group in the socialist community—intends to revise the borders with other countries or to conquer territory, not to mention of the goal of subjugating another people. In socialism no one gains any social or personal benefit from the arms race or links his own existence with the development of the arms trade and arms profit. There is no socioeconomic base for this here.

And the socialist revolution is no military export commodity either. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other leaders of the workers movement categorically opposed anarchist

and ultraleftist delusions of "fanning" socialist revolutions from the outside and countered such intentions with the principle: Revolutionary changes of social conditions can only be the result of the development of internal contradictions and of the work of the revolutionary classes in the respective country itself.

In the same determined way, however, in which we reject the spreading of socialist social conditions to other countries and peoples by force, we state that we will not permit anyone to eliminate our socialist achievements in an anticommunist crusade! This is guaranteed by the readiness for and capability of defense of the peoples of our community of states under the leadership of their Marxist-Leninist parties, which we will always maintain at the necessary level.

The defensive nature of the socialist military doctrine is expressed as follows, as is set down in the Berlin statement:

- We do not declare any people or any state our enemy.
- We do not have any aggressive intentions against anyone else.
- We will never be the first to start an act of war.
- The USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The military preparations and the activities of the Warsaw Pact forces are limited to those things that are necessary to preserve peace and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our countries in accordance with the UN Charter.

In order to support the assertion of the allegedly offensive character of the Soviet military doctrine, some advocates of NATO strategy—including official representatives of the Bonn Defense Ministry—sometimes quote from older books or articles of socialist military literature, which talk about the offensive destruction of any imperialist aggressor on his own territory.

They deliberately do not mention that during the civil war and the war of intervention, and then during the Great Fatherland War, the Soviet country was repeatedly subjected to brutal aggressions and invasions by imperialist armies, which forced the first worker-peasant state in the world to defend itself while incurring exorbitant casualties and to sometimes even cede great parts of its territory. Only after this, could the Soviet Army—together with the other armies of the anti-Hitler coalition during World War II—start to destroy the imperialist aggressors on their own territory.

Such dubious polemics also keep quiet about the fact that postwar Marxist-Leninist military science drew the lessons from the bitter experiences of the Soviet people and the peoples of Europe. They culminated in the guiding principle: June 1941 will never recur! The socialist forces need a level of combat strength and readiness that will insure they cannot be surprised by any imperialist aggressor.

Nevertheless, the theory and practice of the Soviet Armed Forces and the military efforts of the Warsaw Pact states have always been limited to averting or repelling a potential imperialist aggression, in particular an aggression with nuclear weapons, which they have had to seriously fear since the 1950's because of NATO's strategy of "rolling back" socialism. The more than 3 decades of peace in Europe have not come as a matter of course. They have come to pass not least thanks to our military vigilance and combat readiness.

Finally, the slanderous insinuation of an "offensive orientation" of the military strategy of our socialist defense alliance completely ignores the changes that have taken place in the military, political, and strategic thinking of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact and which are unambiguously expressed in the principles set down in the Berlin statement. This is particularly true of the principle of response actions and the principle of sufficiency or—as it is also called—of sufficient defense capacity.

Response Actions—Not "Preventive Attacks"

The principle of response actions says: Our alliance never was and never will be the initiator of military activities that endanger the independence and security of another country. Everything we do to preserve peace and our legitimate security interests in the sphere of defense is done to counteract potential or actual threats to peace and our security. The kind and scope of our military preparations or responses will in any case correspond to the kind and scope of military threat by NATO, which does not mean that the same steps will be taken.

The principle of response actions applies to the entire sphere of our alliance's military policy and strategy. It applies to the provision of the financial, material, and personnel resources necessary for defense, to the development and production of weapons and other technical combat means, to the training and positioning of troops and staffs, and to the potential employment of troops.

Scientists have proved in detail that over the past 4 decades the Soviet Union or any other socialist state has never made the first step to increase armament expenditure or to develop new kinds of weapons. Almost all steps to halt the arms race, for unilateral moratoriums on nuclear tests over fairly long periods, unilateral reductions of troops, and for other deeds of goodwill originated with the Soviet Union and its allies.

Similar aspects apply to behavior in situations and areas of crises. Year after year it has been proved that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members are exercising utmost restraint in this respect, in contrast to the arrogant, provocative actions of some imperialist powers that defy international law. The Soviet Union and all our countries are doing whatever possible to finally cool down the murderous hotbeds of crises that endanger world peace and international security, such as

those in the Near and Middle East, and to bring about political solutions to the conflicts in this region, which is demanded, above all, by the vital interests of the people directly affected.

The direct military precautions for our defense also follow the principle of response actions. This means, among other things, that preventive attacks—no matter with which forces and means—are strictly excluded. Combat actions of forces of our alliance or of one member state can and must be started only after there has been a military aggression. Such operations against an aggressor are consistently planned as defense operations and are prepared within the framework of national defense. They are limited to the goal of preventing the aggressor's success under any circumstances. Specifically speaking: Our defense capability and willingness must be so clearly obvious that they make the potential aggressor face a deadly risk under any circumstances and thus keep him from any adventures.

Our military doctrine warns that if our countries are attacked, the forces of the allied states will "crushingly rebuff the aggressor." This is a very serious warning to any aggressor to think about his end before he starts a war. The success for which we are striving is not victory in war but the prevention of war.

Sufficient Defense Capacity—Not "Excessive Armament"

The scope of all our defense activities is determined by the principle of sufficient defense capacity. In accordance with the character and scope of NATO armament, it requires the necessary minimum, not the possible maximum of soldiers and weapons, in order to preserve the approximate military balance between the two military coalitions. Our alliance does not strive for military supremacy, which would be necessary to wage a war on the basis of attacks. But we will not permit the other side to achieve such supremacy, either. As long as NATO—as I have already mentioned—continues to have an enormous potential for attacks of strategic scope and intends to considerably increase this potential well into the 1990's, this requires us to maintain an appropriate defense potential. And we will do this—which is also expressed without doubt by the latest resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States. In contrast to NATO, our alliance, however, in no way insists on the preservation of the current potential, but energetically strives for the fastest possible reduction of the level of military confrontation, until an inability to attack is reached by both sides.

This is proven by the proposals submitted at the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of our alliance's member states. The communique of the Warsaw meeting cites the following as the priority tasks: the 50-percent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons

of the USSR and the United States, while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty; a nuclear test ban; a ban on chemical weapons; the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe with a corresponding reduction of military expenditures; and use of the financial means that are freed through disarmament for economic and social development, particularly in the so-called Third World.

A primary concern of the Warsaw meeting was to provide a strong impetus to bringing about new negotiations on disarmament and confidence-building in Europe. Therefore, the statement adopted for this purpose, which is to pave the way for the start of negotiations by the end of this year and the fastest possible conclusion of an agreement, is of particular importance.

Our joint proposal is aimed at reducing the level of the strength of the armed forces and the armament stocks to approximately equal ceilings in a first stage, above all by eliminating imbalances and asymmetries on each side, following the principle that those who have more arms have to disarm.

In the second stage, a reduction by about 25 percent of the armed forces of both sides has to be achieved, including their structural armament, especially those components that can be used for attack.

In a third stage, the armed forces of the two sides would be reduced and restructured to such an extent that they "become strictly defensive in nature."

From the first stage onward, the possibility of surprise attacks should be restricted by the establishment of strips or zones of reduced armament along the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, where the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons systems are withdrawn or partly withdrawn and where military activities—such as exercises and troop transfers—are strictly limited or completely prohibited.

This process would be introduced and accompanied by the official exchange of all necessary information and by strict verification measures, up to permanent monitoring posts and on-site inspections.

Nuclear disarmament remains a priority issue. Separate negotiations on the reduction and ultimate elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—including the carriers that can be used both for nuclear and nonnuclear weapons—would doubtless contribute to strengthening the stability of the military strategic situation on the continent and to further reducing the danger of wars.

The proposals submitted in Warsaw prove the following: The states of our defense alliance do everything possible to enhance without a pause the process of steady disarmament and confidence building which is necessary to preserve and strengthen peace on our continent. In this, we take into consideration the fears expressed by the

NATO countries—no matter whether they are exaggerated or not—and accommodate their wishes and proposals as far as possible in the interest of joint security.

This is certainly one of the reasons why the proposals submitted in Warsaw by our alliance have met with an overall positive response, despite the fact that militarist opponents of further disarmament and detente continue to raise objections. Of course, we will carefully see to it that the defense capability that corresponds to the continued threat to our security is ensured in all stages until corresponding negotiations are opened and agreements concluded. In this, a distinction must be made between what is necessary today to reliably protect socialism and what continues to be required tomorrow after sizable, equal reductions on both sides in armed forces and weapons—particularly arms for surprise attacks—and in forces and means that are necessary for sudden "deep attacks."

The emphasis is on "on both sides" and "equal." At times, certain politicians and members of the military within NATO pretend that today only our allied Armed Forces are capable of launching offense attacks. They also claim that the main criteria for the combat effectiveness of armed forces in the nonnuclear sphere are tanks, of which the armies of the Warsaw Pact states admittedly possess larger numbers than those of NATO states. However, there is never any mention of NATO's superior air attack capacities, of the more far-reaching effectiveness of NATO naval forces and their steady increase. These politicians ignore the fact that NATO continues to be strictly opposed to doing what our defense alliance has again suggested in Warsaw: To stop striving for unilateral superiority regarding types of weapons that are particularly suited for attack operations.

We do not allow ourselves to be discouraged by such onesidedness. We hope that peace forces will become stronger, that reason and realism will continue to penetrate the influential political circles in NATO states. Without reducing our vigilance, we will work for the steady continuation of disarmament and the promotion of confidence, for the conscientious fulfillment of the agreements reached in this respect.

As confirmed by the joint statement of the SED Central Committee Politburo, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers on the results of the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the GDR "will continue to use all its force to contribute to the further improvement of international relations to make irreversible the change for the better that has been initiated."

Air Squadron Training With Poland To Be Held
AU1108123388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10 Aug 88 p 2

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—On Tuesday [9 August], a flight squadron of the Polish Air Force landed at the National People's Army's "Gebhardt Leberecht von Bluechner"

unit air base. Together, the members of the friendly armies will fulfill air combat training tasks and impart their specific experience to one another. The exchange of squadrons with Warsaw Pact air forces is a tradition with the "Gebhardt Leberecht von Bluecher" unit. On the same day, a flight squadron of the National People's Army was transferred to the PPR for training.

FRG Inspectors To Observe Army Exercise

*LD1108172088 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1600 GMT 11 Aug 88*

[Text] Berlin, 11 Aug (ADN)—The FRG Government asked on 10 Aug 1988 to carry out an inspection on GDR territory, based on the stipulations of the Stockholm Document on Confidence-Building Measures and

Security and Disarmament in Europe. It will probably begin on 12 August 1988 and take place in the Glieniche, Brandis, Grossenhain, Luebbenau, Teupitz, Luckenwalde, and Lehnin region, in which a joint troop exercise by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army is now being held. The exercise was announced to all signatory states of the Stockholm Document in line with the GDR's 1988 annual survey of military activities. Up to 14,500 members of the two armies are taking part in it.

The GDR Government has granted the request and has granted entry to the FRG inspectors. All signatory states of the Stockholm Document have been informed of this through diplomatic channels.

CSCE Conventional Arms Talks: Unproductive Forum

18120095c Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 28, Jul 88 p 12

[Article by Lev Bezymensky]

[Text] "War is too serious a business to be left to the generals," it is said. There are numerous variations of this dictum and one of them warns against leaving the cause of peace to the diplomats. That, of course, is the extreme view. Recent years have shown how useful diplomats can be when they project the political will of statesmen into the reality of international relations.

Nevertheless, I wish to raise my voice in protest. Against the danger to Europe of the substitution for a broad political movement of narrow diplomatic activity. To the Europe which in 1975 performed a feat of supreme civic courage by proclaiming that Charter of the 20th Century—the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. This laid the foundation for what in contemporary foreign policy parlance is termed the all-European process.

It is a momentous process. If only because it involves not one but 35 countries, and (apart from everything else) includes the two opposite poles of the modern world—the USSR and the USA. How important that is! For some reason, however, it has become customary to assume that the relations between the "superpowers" is one thing and Europe is something else again. Would it not be better to take this view: the more mutual understanding there is between the USSR and the USA the better it is for Europe inasmuch as both countries are participants in the all-European process.

But where is that process? Since 1975 diplomats from the 35 countries have been meeting regularly—in Belgrade, in Madrid, in Stockholm and now in Vienna. They hold sessions. For months. For years. They argue. They draw up new documents, investing tremendous energy and no mean skill in their drafting. But has this imparted significant momentum to the all-European process and raised it to a higher qualitative level? What is happening, as I see it, is the gradual self-alienation of diplomatic action from the real life of Europe. After all, substantial changes are constantly taking place on the continent. Mutual ties are being strengthened, missiles are being removed. Accordingly, the situation as regards verification and mutual confidence is radically changing. A major step forward has been taken in relations between the CMEA and the EEC. Yet at the meeting of the 35—this time in Vienna—the "tug-of-war" and the weighing of the various "baskets" has been going on for more than 18 months.

It is not we who are to blame for the formal approach to the all-European process. When back in 1977 in Belgrade, the American delegation took the "third basket" out of the general context of the Final Act and counterposed the human rights issue to all the other provisions

of the Act, it started the fragmentation of that document and the subsequent debates that dragged out for months and even years. As a natural reaction to the over-emphasis on the "third basket," the majority of the participating countries wanted to see balanced decisions on all the "baskets," and this in turn complicated the adoption of the relevant documents. In Belgrade the debate went on for six months, in Madrid, for nearly three years. When one issue (essentially the first "basket") was chosen for discussion at the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament, its examination took more than two years.

Now, since November 1986 debates have been going on in Vienna. Moreover, a curious situation has developed: when the Vienna session was still in the offing a new initiative was advanced which opened the way to resolving the main obstacle in the Helsinki process—scaling down military tension in Europe. The idea of reducing armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals which was put forward in the beginning of 1986 by the Warsaw Treaty countries, went beyond all previous approaches to the question of military detente. How did it fit into the Vienna "baskets?" At first, not at all. Subsequently, in a sense in the framework of the meeting of the 35, there began meetings of 23 countries members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, to work out the terms of reference for new negotiations.

Meanwhile life goes on. Not long ago the Warsaw Treaty countries worked out a new and extremely effective blueprint for talks on reducing conventional armaments. It envisages several stages: exchange of information, inspection and verification, elimination of asymmetry, simultaneous reduction of 500,000 men on each side, and transition to a new structure of the forces of both blocs. But for this blueprint to be realized the talks must be started. One might ask the diplomats in session in Vienna: is it necessary to wait for agreement to be reached on all the "baskets," on every paragraph, before the talks can begin?

Here is another instance of the divergence between real life and diplomatic practice. It would seem to be clear to all by now that all attempts to make headway in the talks (also in Vienna) on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe have failed. More than 14 years have passed, and nothing has been achieved! Yet the diplomats go on meeting only to mark time. Meanwhile life has produced (over the heads of the diplomats) some highly interesting and imaginative ideas: to create a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe and zones of scaled-down confrontation. The ideas were advanced by participants in the Helsinki conference—the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland. They are supported by Sweden, Greece and public opinion in the FRG. The Berlin meeting showed how popular these ideas are.

The European public should not sit back with folded arms in the face of the imminent deformation of the Helsinki decisions. All attention must be focussed on

Vienna, should be the watchword. It is imperative to set up without delay groups for the observation and control of the all-European process. To send delegations and petitions to all the talks going on in Vienna. To underscore the importance of the all-European problems and urge solutions. The committees for European security and cooperation already existing in many European countries could play an important role here.

The Helsinki process must be raised to a higher, more realistic plane. At the recent conference of political and public leaders in Potsdam GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer rightly observed that the Helsinki Final Act laid down the "rules of behavior" in our European home. But should life in any home be confined to the observance of rules? From Helsinki the road must lead forward, for the underlying all-European idea set forth in the Final Act is not confined to one or another of its provisions. If there are paragraphs that prove to be obstacles, so much the worse for the paragraphs.

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SLCM, ABM Treaty as Obstacles to Agreement in Geneva

18120095a Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 28, 17-24 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by Vladimir Nazarenko: "Knots in the Geneva Talks"]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons are to resume on July 12. Before reaching any agreement, however, the delegations have two serious knots to untie: the question of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), and that of fulfillment of the agreement concerning the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The "sea knot" is complex, but can be untied. In their Joint Statement last year Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan said: "The Sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range nuclear armed SLCMs.... The Sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations."

The U.S. Navy has Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles of two types—with a nuclear warhead (200-250 kilotons, range of up to 2,600 km) and with a conventional warhead (single or cassette, range of up to 1,500 km). Some 800 nuclear cruise missiles and nearly 2,600 cruise missiles with conventional warheads are scheduled for completion by the mid-90's. Up to 200 nuclear subs and surface ships are to be armed with nuclear Tomahawks and Tomahawks that can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. Many of these ships may be deployed in the next few years off the coasts of Western Europe, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in the Okhotsk and Japan seas, and in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

That's why the United States is reluctant to discuss the Soviet proposals on establishing a ceiling of 100 cruise missiles, with both nuclear and conventional warheads on a definite number of agreed-upon types of ships.

The Americans are also avoiding the system we proposed for SLCM control and they reject the possibility of distant detection (with technical means) of nuclear weapons aboard a warship. U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci said during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow: "You can't distinguish those missiles from conventional sea-launched cruise missiles or, indeed, you can't distinguish them from nuclear weapons on board a ship." In response to Soviet proposal to hold a joint experiment to check the effectiveness of national means for distant control, the United States said that U.S. scientists had studied this question and concluded that at present no experiment in this field would produce a perfect means of control.

But it is possible to control the SLCM—one observes all the points of the route covered by the missile from the producer-plant to the carrier-ship, and if one uses national technical means and the existing basis for cooperation and on-site inspection (on the roads, at bases and when cruising).

The United States realizes that the Soviet proposals are realistic, but refuses to join in experiment. Why? The confirmation in practice of the effectiveness of our proposed control system would only point up the United States's reluctance to reveal whether its ships carry nuclear weapons. Because then, these countries with ports at which U.S. ships constantly call would be able to detect the presence of nuclear weapons aboard them.

Moreover, the Americans do not want to include long-range SLCMs in the category of strategic weapons or the 1,600 carriers and 6,000 nuclear warheads which the United States and the USSR will be allowed under the agreement being worked out in Geneva. And they don't want to limit non-nuclear SLCMs.

Washington proposed adopting a kind of joint statement on SLCMs saying how many nuclear missiles each side expects to deploy by 1995.

But is that a solution? Is a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms (SOA) possible without limits and controls on SLCMs, without barriers against the proliferation of these formidable weapons all over the World Ocean?

The interconnection between SOA and ABM is a no less acute problem—on which the possibility of an agreement on SOA depends.

The United States has proposed that the SOA treaty not be connected with the ABM Treaty. The United States claims there is no connection between the two. How can that be when Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan

agreed in Washington and confirmed in Moscow that given preparations on the SOA treaty an accord will be reached obligating both sides to abide—for a specified period of time—by the ABM Treaty in the form it was signed in 1972. We think this is an accord of a fundamental importance.

“Effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems,” says the ABM Treaty, “would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons.” This means that making the ABM system a broad-scale one, including space deployment, would provoke a strategic arms race. To ignore the connection between the reduction of SOA and fulfilment of the ABM Treaty means hindering the drafting of an agreement at the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

Wouldn't it be better to preserve the ABM Treaty as it was before 1983 and find a way to reconcile it with the SDI programme, work on which in space is forbidden by the Treaty? It's impossible to take part in talks on curbing SOA on the Earth while trying to build a bridge for the arms race in space.

Is the United States prepared for a real strategic arms cuts? The U.S. administration's political decision will give the answer. The sooner Washington produces it, the sooner the delegations at the Soviet-U.S. talks will draft a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of SOA. The Soviet side is ready for the next round of talks.

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Chemical Weapons Ban: Problems of Verification, Size of Stocks

Agreement Is Necessary

18120095b Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 29, 24-31 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by Enrico Jacchia, director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, Rome]

[Text] A European continent free of chemical weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals may seem like a dream. But there are many people in Western and Eastern Europe who would very much like to see it become a reality, in the not too distant future.

If we take a broader view, beyond our continent, the world looks to be set for a large proliferation of chemical weapons. There are good grounds for believing that many medium and small states will then embark on chemical weapons production, as they are easier and cheaper to produce than nuclear weapons, and because their production is so far not prohibited by any existing international treaty.

For more than 15 years a UN committee meeting in Geneva has been working on the draft of such a treaty. But the obstacles are still formidable. Meanwhile the likelihood of global proliferation is increasing dangerously.

If we turn now to the European continent, however, the picture is completely different. An agreement between the U.S., the USSR and other European states to ban chemical weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals is now in the realms of the possible.

Two main obstacles have been removed, which needs to be further illustrated for Soviet readers.

Until a few years ago, the official Soviet attitude at all international forums was to refuse to discuss the amount of Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons, or even to admit possession of them. As a result, fear in Western Europe increased. Influential Western sources estimated the Soviet stocks at more than 300,000 tons. This is an enormous amount when you think that it takes only a milligram of nerve gas to kill a human being. NATO sources claimed that Soviet troops and tanks had excellent protection against chemical weapons and had undergone intense training, involving large-scale manoeuvres.

Fear is a bad adviser. After a long battle with the majority of the U.S. Congress the Pentagon succeeded last year in getting funds for a new programme of chemical armament, which is now underway. West European governments reluctantly accepted storing new chemical agents on their territory. Unfortunately, this was all a result of the unwillingness of past Soviet leaders even to discuss the USSR's chemical armaments. No one really knew the real magnitude of the Soviet arsenal, and Western military circles started attaching exaggerated importance to the chemical warfare aspect of Soviet military doctrine.

But then, the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee started a new policy of openness. The consequences were quickly felt. The existence of Soviet chemical weapons was publicly acknowledged in official statements. On December 26, 1987, a Foreign Ministry statement in Moscow disclosed the size of Soviet chemical stocks: “They do not exceed 50,000 tons.”

Now we have the figures. The total current U.S. holdings are unofficially estimated at some 30,500 tons (including 6,500 tons of chemical munitions in West Germany). The Soviets declare 50,000. We are entering a new phase which finally allows discussion of the real size of existing stocks. This would have been impossible a few months ago.

Stocks, however, have to be verified. And here we have made a second relevant breakthrough: the new attitude of the Soviet Government on verification.

The problem of the Soviet Union's refusal to accept mandatory foreign inspection on its territory seemed insurmountable until Mikhail Gorbachev came along with the new policy of glasnost. Now the Soviet government wants both verification and on-site inspection, and is prepared to go far beyond any of the present American requests in that field.

The main Western objection to an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet and American chemical weapons from the European continent was that the US stocks would have to be transported back across the Atlantic. If there were a crisis, they could not be quietly redeployed in Europe, while the Soviets would be able to bring back their chemical stocks by road or railway, secretly and at any moment, without the West being able to verify.

Now there is an answer to these worries. The new Soviet policy of verification can give assurances to the West that the stocks will be stored beyond the Urals and be subject to permanent control.

Consequently, the two main obstacles to a European agreement have been removed.

The improved climate in U.S.-USSR relations opens up prospects for a new major effort by the two powers to contain the proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide. That would be a major achievement.

Meanwhile, the withdrawal of American and Soviet chemical weapons from Europe, within the framework of an agreement by the European states not to produce them (no European state possesses or produces nerve gas except France), would be a formidable step in the direction of improved relations and an example to the rest of the world. It would gain the overwhelming, enthusiastic support of the citizens of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Nerve gas is a tremendous mass-destruction weapon which kills human beings in a matter of seconds, like insects. The same chemical agents are, in fact, used for insecticides.

We are not insects.

Key Issues Remain Unresolved

18120095b Moscow MOSCOW TIMES in English No 29, 24-31 Jul 88 p 6

[Article by Anatoly Kuntsevich, Academician, Academy of Sciences, leading chemical weapons expert, USSR Ministry of Defence]

[Text] It is very good that experts in different fields are widely discussing issues related to the banning of chemical weapons. This can only be welcomed since the discussions are ultimately aimed at creating conditions necessary for signing a convention capable of eliminating the threat of the use of toxic agents against humans.

I can well understand the universal concern about the present situation. The convention has yet to be signed and the USA is already producing chemical weapons of a qualitatively new level. For example, the American armed forces presently have some 1,000,000 units of ammunition stockpiled within the framework of their binary-gas armament programme. At the same time, chemical weapons have been and continue to be used in various regions throughout the world. There has been no ban on them as yet, and the modernization of their arsenals makes the prospect for their complete elimination even more distant.

The question arises: why is this so? Both the world public and the governments of many countries demand that chemical weapons be done away with, and the Soviet Union has been backing these demands. Nevertheless, the working up of the relevant convention at the Geneva Disarmament Conference has been openly impeded. And it is very important to understand what exactly is blocking the way to an agreement.

The article by Prof. Jacchia leads one to the conclusion that either way it would be hard to free Europe of chemical weapons, since the Soviet Union could always bring them back to the Old World secretly. However, Moscow and incidentally, the majority of participants in the Geneva Conference, view the issue differently. The convention on banning chemical weapons must necessarily be of a global and universal character rather than just applying to certain regions like, say, Europe. The document won't be any good if it doesn't take into account the interests of both East and West, North and South. And this is clear to all those who are participating in mapping it out.

It's another matter that the process of chemical disarmament can be started in separate regions already now. The Soviet Union supports the proposals made by the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia about setting up a chemical- and nuclear-free zone in the centre of Europe, as it does an initiative tabled by Bulgaria and Romania concerning a similar zone in the Balkans. Alas, the USA and some of its NATO allies are not ready to implement these projects yet.

There's yet another point of view in the West: that the publication of precise data concerning the chemical weapons stocks held by the USSR and the United States would serve as an impetus to the cause of disarmament. As is known, the USSR was the first to officially disclose the extent of its chemical weapons arsenal, which happens to be less than 50,000 tons. The American side only pretends to have disclosed its actual amount of stocks. In fact, the number of chemical weapons located outside the United States (in Europe and certain other regions), including in direct proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty Organisation countries, is known. This information has been modestly omitted.

The Americans only make mention of that portion of its stock which they plan to destroy in order to subsequently replace it with more effective binary charges.

As I see it, the issue of the quantity of Soviet and American stocks is not a priority one in drawing up a convention to ban such weapons. First and foremost, such a convention must be signed. Only then, after the convention has been signed and the machinery for data exchange and mandatory verification set into motion, will it become clear exactly who is to destroy what, and how much. The question of chemical weapon stocks, now being raised in the West before the convention has been signed, is potentially capable of involving the Geneva participants in a fruitless discussion of the reliability of the data supplied and of the lack of trust on both sides.

The Soviet Union has been and is still of the opinion that the exchange of precise information concerning the quantity of chemical weapons and their location, as well as the disarmament verification, must be carried out according to the procedures stated by the convention. The Soviet Union's official disclosure of the ceiling on its chemical weapons' stock was aimed at moving the development of the convention along and putting an end to all the speculating. I'd like to emphasize that neither the United States, nor France or any other nation has on an official level done even that. The Soviet Union has also proposed a memorandum concerning multilateral information exchange. The purpose of that document is to have announcements concerning the issue of chemical weaponry made continuously and in accordance with how the talks are progressing.

I consider the main obstacle here to be the lack of any political decision by the United States which would serve to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons. And their position on two key issues testifies to this.

The American side wants exclude private companies from verification under the convention—in other words, to keep open a channel for the legal and absolutely uncheckable development of chemical weapons. The USSR, other socialist countries, in fact, every country is fully aware that such a channel makes the convention pointless. That is the first key issue.

The second one deals with the binary-gas programme developed in the United States. This programme changes the situation entirely and raises very serious questions concerning verification, since the entire binary weapons production process can be divided: component products can be produced in different places and then combined right on the battlefield. That means that the consecutive stages in the development of component products capable of producing toxic agents must be traced, as well as those of the final product. For that you need to establish national and international systems for registering components that can be used in the production of binary ammunition, as well as a system for

verification of chemical, pharmacological and biochemical laboratories, for inspections of industrial enterprises in both the private and state sectors, and of multinational corporations. Only an absolute system of control can ensure that binary weapons are not being produced.

Whether these obstacles could be quickly overcome depends both on the West European states and on the entire world community. It's impossible to consider it normal when a leading Western state openly manufactures binary weapons, undermining the very notion of the elimination of chemical weapons and every other condition preventing the world-wide proliferation of chemical weapons. What is this if not a blatant challenge of world opinion?

/08309

U.S. Inspectors Observe Launcher Dismantling
AU1708091688 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
9 Aug 88 p 3

[RATAU V. Mazanyy report: "Beating Swords Into Plowshares"; boldface as published]

[Text] **Sarny, Rovno Oblast, 8 Aug—The dismantling of launchers and transporters for the delivery and transshipment of SS-20 missiles began today at the site for eliminating RSD-10 support equipment.**

An inspection team from the United States observed the dismantling operation. The Americans were shown 18 launchers that had to be destroyed in August.

The first dismantling operation consisted of destroying the erector-launcher mechanism using gas cutting equipment. Then instrument sections had to be removed, and the hydraulic control system had to be detached from the unit and destroyed. It was as if the transporting and transshipping unit were being relieved of a heavy burden at every stage. And when the leveling supports and a portion of the vehicle chassis were cut off with the assistance of a plasma gun developed in the Ye.O. Paton Electrowelding Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, the vast object, which had formerly been formidable, was turned into an ordinary tractor. This machine will still serve the national economy for a long time.

The elimination of the first RSD-10 launcher has been recorded in the protocols exchanged by the Soviet and the American sides.

"I have behind me 30 years of 'missile' service," said Colonel Ye. A. Kozlov, one of those in charge of the dismantling. "I was also among those who had to prepare the first RSD-10 complexes, and today I part with them without regret. We soldiers better than anyone comprehend the danger of nuclear confrontation...."

In a conversation with a RATAU correspondent, Terry Cornail, leader of the American inspection team, said: "This was the eighth Soviet military base that I have managed to inspect. We have satisfied ourselves that Soviet soldiers are not only good hosts, but also excellent specialists with technical know-how and enviable training.

"Today we came one step closer to the goal: the complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles. I am confident that, in this important sphere, full mutual understanding between us will also continue in the future."

Scholar Notes Adverse Effects of 'Mirror Imaging' on Disarmament

*PM1808122188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Aug 88 Second Edition p 4*

[Article by O. Bykov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "The 19th Party Conference and Problems of Peace": "Overturning the Logic of the Arms Race"]

[Text] In the past 2-3 years the world situation has markedly improved. Confrontation in international affairs has begun to give way to cooperation. There have been positive advances in Soviet-American relations. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has been concluded and gone into force. Opportunities have occurred to ease the dangerous military confrontation in Europe. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has begun on the basis of the Geneva agreements. The influence of world public opinion in international relations has increased. The direct threat of nuclear war has diminished.

All this is undoubtedly true, and it makes one optimistic that the breakthrough in world development for which mankind has waited so long is approaching. But the bitter experience of the past poses an awkward question: Has not what is happening at the moment happened before, in the past? In fact, on more than one occasion there have been glimmers of light on the international horizon, but, again and again, the black clouds of the danger of war have swept in. What is new about the present situation? Most important of all, what guarantee is there that what has happened will not recur?

Let us look at the recent past. Indeed, in the international arena tension has alternated with periods of detente. But none of these periods was destined to be irreversible. Why? The explanation is relatively simple if one is talking about the first thaws in the international climate in the latter half of the fifties and beginning of the sixties. The shoots of political realism, barely breaking through the dense crust of distrust and enmity, could not survive the icy breath of the cold war. It was the latter that set the tone of world politics—one minute it was overt, the next minute it was all secret. The cold war's main source of nourishment was the imperialist

policy based on military, above all nuclear, force. The United States, which had by then lost the monopoly on nuclear weapons and the strategic invulnerability of its territory, was still acting in international affairs "from a position of strength."

But at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies the situation changed, and changed radically. Strategic parity was established between the USSR and the United States. The inevitability of a total arms race led to an impasse, where nuclear weapons ceased to be a means of attaining any rational goal. There could be no victor in a war in which they were used. Both the direct antagonists and the whole of mankind would be consumed in the flames of a nuclear conflagration.

Strategic military equilibrium objectively strengthened international peace and established the basis for a move away from fruitless and dangerous confrontation to constructive and mutually advantageous cooperation. It seemed to be time to embark in earnest on solving the central problem of our times—the problem of mankind's survival—and completely eliminate nuclear war both in the conceptual plane and in the plane of material preparations for it. And steps were taken in that direction, but the steps were not decisive or consistent enough.

Despite certain measures to limit the arms race it continued to gather speed, increase its dimensions, and threaten to spread to new areas, in particular space. A gap opened and widened between the awareness of the unacceptability of nuclear war and the preservation of the established global system of military confrontation. The prevention of war is the paramount task of a sensible policy, but the colossal forces and resources deployed by the opposing sides over the decades continued to be geared to the possibility of waging a war and even winning it.

It was a paradoxical phenomenon, but perfectly easy to explain. The stereotypes of pre-parity and in some cases of pre-nuclear times are very much alive and well. The realistic trend has not yet gained priority in the policy of the United States and other NATO countries; it exists alongside the confrontational trend which is constantly being fed by the interests of the most bellicose groupings of the Western ruling elite. The positions of the military-industrial complex remain intact. The very process of accumulation and refinement of armaments has acquired a massive force of inertia. The arms race is escalating steeply.

A critical analysis demands the admission that the Soviet Union's responses to the militarist challenges of the United States and NATO have not always been appropriate. Even after the attainment of strategic parity it focused attention and resources on the military aspect of safeguarding security to the detriment of the exploitation of political opportunities to that end, and thus allowed itself to be drawn into the arms race. This resulted in an

unwarranted drain on resources required for the solution of the country's acute domestic problems, and the Soviet initiatives in favor of peace and disarmament began to lose conviction.

Military competition, nullifying the positive changes which were becoming apparent in international affairs, became increasingly self-sustaining. It threatened to get out of political control, become irreversible, and create critical tension fraught with unpredictable consequences.

The slide to universal destruction had to be halted. This required qualitatively new political thinking and a sober view of the realities of a contradictory and explosive, but interrelated world. The bold, creative reappraisal of the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy, started by the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and 27th party congress as part and parcel of the revolutionary restructuring in our society, gave rise to a philosophy of peace and disarmament based on consistent realism and comprehensive consideration in international affairs of the diversity of interests and the integral nature of the world community, and the priority of general human values.

The Soviet program of stage-by-stage elimination of mass destruction weapons, other singular, major initiatives, and the willingness to make profound compromises activated the talks on disarmament questions, which had been getting nowhere for many years. The elaboration of mutually acceptable solutions was lifted out of the deep rut of fruitless bargaining over individual aspects of military confrontation and the pursuit of short-term propaganda advantages, and raised to the highest political level. The meetings between the Soviet and U.S. leaders in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, revealing the deep-lying common interests of mutual and general security, made a fundamental breakthrough in the disarmament sphere possible. After 4 decades of the baneful influence of military competition on Soviet-American and, in fact, international relations in general, a step of historic significance was taken—the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was concluded.

The commencement of the destruction of two classes of the most up-to-date weapons is significant not only in itself. This unprecedented event reflects the profound, qualitative changes the new political thinking has introduced into the disarmament sphere. Whereas in the sixties and seventies there were only partial measures to limit the arms race, now the cutting of a considerable quantity of armaments and the consistent dismantling of the entire military machine are becoming a reality. The elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles is the precursor of a 50-percent reduction of the main, strategic forces of the USSR and the United States, and then further nuclear disarmament. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was an example of the way to approach the

elimination of imbalance and asymmetry, and not only in nuclear, but also in other types of armaments. It is hard to overestimate the significance of the real revolution in the sphere of verification connected with the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Exchange of on-site inspections, which was unimaginable not so long ago, is now the prototype of an extensive system of mutual trust and mutual monitoring of future disarmament agreements.

Real disarmament has started—this is the chief thing that distinguishes the present improvement of the international situation from all previous ones. The sinister cycle of confrontation and the arms race have been broken. They are beginning to be gradually pushed away by the beneficial interaction of the dynamically developing political dialogue and the continuous process of arms elimination.

Nevertheless, to all appearances, it is premature to talk about a radical breakthrough in world politics and say that the curtailment of the arms race that has begun is irreversible. The road ahead for disarmament is by no means smooth. Much of what was blocking or impeding it in the past remains to this day and is not going to disappear in the foreseeable future. The foundations of the global system of military confrontation that has always been an obstacle to military and political detente have not been touched yet. This gigantic, ossified system, geared primarily to waging war, not to preventing it, objectively became obsolete long ago in its present form and is increasingly finding itself at odds with the realities of the modern world. But it is highly stable, continues to act in accordance with the "mirror image" principle, and is unsusceptible to transformation even under the pressure of profound changes in the world situation. Moreover, by relying on the established system of confrontation, the militarist forces are trying to halt any further curtailment of the arms race.

There are worrying symptoms of a dangerous trend. Disarmament is just taking its first steps, but the military and political leaders of the United States and NATO are already concerned lest it make them reorganize and adapt to the new conditions. Having lost the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, they are demanding "compensation" in the form of modernization of the remaining nuclear weapons, and are obstructing movement toward lowering the level of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. Once again there are calls to hang on to "trump cards" at disarmament talks, although practice has shown that they do not help, but hinder the reaching of agreements and that they aggravate distortions in the balance of forces which are so difficult to straighten out. This has all happened before.

So is it possible, then, for militarism to again block the positive process that has begun? Obviously it would be a dangerous illusion to regard such a development as out of the question. But it is equally wrong to regard it as inevitable. In the present, fundamentally new, unique

situation it is possible to overturn the logic of the arms race and make the changes for the better in international life irreversible. The necessary prerequisites for this exist today.

Above all, real disarmament—in active interplay with political dialogue among states and actions by the peace-loving public—can serve as a powerful stimulus to the general demilitarization of international relations and strengthening of general security. The arms elimination process has enormous, dynamic power for further continuous development in both depth and breadth. Beginning with the removal of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles from the equation, it creates a “chain reaction” through the arms spectrum. Such key problems as a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments while preventing weapons from being placed in space; the limitation and ultimate complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests; a total ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks, and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe have been placed on a footing of practical solution.

It is perfectly clear that increasing reciprocal efforts are needed for a mutually acceptable solution of these tasks. There must be no pauses in the disarmament process. Progress in one area is meant to contribute to advances in others. Nuclear and conventional disarmament must flow together in a common channel.

This is the objective of the foreign policy activity of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states, as eloquently evidenced, in particular, by the enterprising new initiatives they put forward at the recent Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee. The allied countries proposed an appreciable lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe through the elimination of existing imbalances and asymmetries, a substantial mutual reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the adoption of measures to prevent a surprise attack, extensive exchange of information, and the creation of an effective verification system.

As well as the disarmament that is gathering momentum, another promising trend can be discerned in the present situation—recognition of the vital need to bring military confrontation, while lowering its level and strengthening mutual trust, into line with the strategic situation today. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the opposing military systems need to be restructured but, in view of their dissimilarity, not necessarily on a strictly symmetrical and synchronous basis. This process is part and parcel of disarmament, although it is by no means rigidly dependent on it. It is capable of developing largely independently, not waiting for more disarmament agreements, but even anticipating them and thereby preparing favorable ground for them.

The USSR military doctrine, geared to preventing war, is in accord with the spirit of present-day USSR foreign policy. The non-offensive nature of this doctrine

demands profound transformations in the military-technical sphere and a reasonable sufficiency of forces and facilities. As was stressed in the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference, all defense development must henceforth be geared primarily to qualitative parameters. While guaranteeing the reliable security of the Soviet state and its allies, it must be implemented strictly in accordance with our defensive doctrine.

Something noticeably new is taking shape in world politics. And in the not too distant future one will see the contours of reasonable, civilized relations between states and peoples in which the arms race, through common efforts, can be pushed into the background once and for all and ultimately banished completely from the life of human society. The future belongs to disarmament.

Chervov Replies to Kampelman Interview

PM1608113188 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 33, 12-18 Aug 88, (Signed to Press 11 Aug 88) pp 6-7

[“Expert Commentary” by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Chernov, first secretary of the USSR Foreign Ministry, published beneath a 4,000-word reprint of an interview given by Max Kampelman, “special adviser to the U.S. secretary of state and head of the U.S. delegation to the talks on nuclear and space arms,” to Hamburg’s DER SPIEGEL: “To Strengthen Trust, Not Undermine It”]

[Text] M. Kampelman’s interview with DER SPIEGEL opens with a high appraisal of the results of the Moscow meeting between M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan. Indeed, Moscow gave a new boost to the search for solutions to the remaining key problems at the talks and reduced the number of major unresolved issues concerning the treaty being prepared on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. A specific example is offered by the agreement reached in principle on the implementation of verification measures regarding mobile land-based missile systems.

An overall solution to the question has been found, and only technical details remain to be worked out. There seem to be no serious problems here, and yet the interview contains a passage which somehow draws attention away from current questions linked with the preparation of the treaty. This is the remark to the effect that the Russians are significantly ahead in terms of mobile missiles and are unwilling to ban them.

At this point it would be interesting to ask Mr Kampelman what sort of strategic forces the United States would like to see in the Soviet Union following a 50-percent or greater reduction of strategic offensive arms. Probably not a first-strike capability. Probably forces clearly indicating that they are part of a defensive strategy; in other words, possessing enhanced invulnerability and a number of other specific qualities. If the United States were

also left without a first-strike capability, we would have ensured the maintenance of reliable strategic stability in the process of reducing nuclear arms. At present, however, the greatest likelihood of survival is achieved through mobility. This is well known to the Americans, especially through the debates around the MX program.

What would the Soviet Union have to do if it were to go ahead and ban mobile missiles, as the United States wishes? Take to the seas, like the Americans? Build new missile-carrying submarines? Demolish the entire structure of its strategic forces? Such a path would be unacceptable by virtue of a whole series of geostrategic, military, economic, and many other factors. The USSR is a continental power. Most of its nuclear potential is on dry land. Consequently it is there that we must concern ourselves with the survival of means for a retaliatory strike.

The second option is to deploy ICBM's in hardened silos at fixed launch sites. Given high-precision strikes, however, a missile inside a silo is vulnerable. But I do not think that this is the main point. It must not be forgotten that Kampelman is conducting talks on behalf of the Reagan administration, whose favorite brainchild is the SDI. Hence the idea that the fixed method for basing Soviet missiles could, from the viewpoint of the SDI's developers, considerably facilitate the task of keeping space-based ABM systems targeted on our ICBM's. These are factors that determine our stance on mobility.

But let us get back to the interview. The problem of limiting sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's] remains a major unresolved problem at the talks on nuclear and space arms. Kampelman doubts that there is a practical way to solve it, and claims that the Soviet proposals on SLCM verification could substantially curb the U.S. Navy's freedom of action and its ability to defend its allies. The Americans propose that the SLCM issue be withdrawn from the talks on nuclear and space arms, that its solution be deferred until a better time, and that for the time being we limit ourselves to unilateral USSR and U.S. declarations regarding their medium-term plans in this sphere. The question is: What sort of a treaty will this be if it does not cover an entire class of strategic nuclear arms which, moreover, could be built up without any verification? What about President Reagan's favorite proverb: "Trust, but verify"? And since we are talking about deep cuts in strategic offensive arms, it is necessary to make sure that we leave no loopholes for circumventing the treaty.

As for the fears regarding restrictions on the U.S. Navy's freedom of action, they are groundless. The Soviet proposals envisage strict verification along the entire route taken by SLCM's "on dry land"—from the plant to their loading onto ships or submarines, which will have to be of certain agreed classes. As for the situation at sea, we are prepared to envisage forms of verification which, being reliable, would guarantee the navy unhindered performance of its functions.

The correspondent failed to ask Kampelman about other unresolved problems, especially the counting of air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's]. To all intents and purposes the U.S. side at the talks is seeking to take certain heavy bombers outside the scope of restrictions and to establish a counting procedure for nuclear-armed ALCM's installed on heavy bombers; this would leave open the possibility of deploying more of them than envisaged in agreed level of 6,000. The interview did not touch on the problem of observing the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, or nonwithdrawal from it for an agreed period of time. This, incidentally, is the main question at the talks.

Despite the formula elaborated at the Washington summit meeting, the U.S. delegation is actively seeking to gain certain "rights" to carry out feasibility tests for the creation of "an effective strategic defense," including space basing, and the "right" to deploy it following the completion of the agreed period for nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. And all this is being discussed in the context of prospects for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. The conclusion which suggests itself is that the U.S. side needs deep cuts in strategic offensive arms in order to reduce the number of targets on USSR territory and thus attempt to make the projected ABM system with space-based elements somewhat more effective. Naturally, it is pointless to count on our cooperation in these intentions.

Even a brief review of the state of affairs at the talks would show that a number of substantial differences remain in the sides' positions. It is nevertheless important not to relax efforts in the quest for mutually acceptable solutions to problems, and to advance step by step toward the goals which were defined and agreed during the Washington and Moscow meetings between the two countries' leaders. Judging by Kampelman's interview, we and the Americans agree on this.

Now a few words about Kampelman's statements on European problems. Here we come up against the highly unfair thesis that "the Russians have so far made no contribution to the solution of the problem" of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. Have they not, indeed?! We and our allies elaborated and agreed upon a three-stage reduction program, formulated the concept of defensive strategy and military sufficiency, submitted the proposal to discuss the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to exchange data, and so on. We are ready to talk, but NATO has still not defined its stance.

As regards progress at the consultations to agree on a mandate for the Vienna talks, here too we deserve no reproach. The West has manifested at the consultations an unwillingness to include nuclear systems among the topics at the talks. We did not insist, and agreed that the talks should focus on conventional armed forces including all conventional arms and equipment deployed on dry land, with nuclear weapons to be discussed at other

talks. There has been no constructive response to this proposal, and we perceive in this the intention of the United States and several of its allies to drag out the consultations and apply the brakes to the process of disarmament in Europe.

Kampelman's interview groundlessly claims that we would be pleased for the United States and the USSR to make all decisions behind their allies' backs. Even though we are striving to reach mutual understanding with the United States on various European problems, this does not at all mean that we want to conspire with it at our allies' expense. Such a practice is profoundly alien to mutual relations between states within the Warsaw Pact framework. Nothing can be resolved without the agreement and active participation of European states themselves, both in the East and in the West.

And now, finally, about the wedge which we are supposedly trying to drive into relations between the United States and West Europe. The Americans bring this up every time we come out with some proposal to ease military tension on the continent. Instead of talk about constructive proposals in this same direction—on behalf of the entire bloc including, of course, the United States—we hear talk about this wedge. Is this not a way to artificially delay the process of disarmament?

The United States is a full participant in the all-European process and bears its own share—and a considerable one at that—of the responsibility for strengthening security and developing cooperation in Europe. It is called upon to actively cooperate in solving European problems and strengthening trust between East and West, rather than undermining this trust by resorting to distortions of the essence of Soviet foreign policy.

General Tatarnikov Comments on Break in Vienna Talks

PM1708103588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 88 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Major General V. Tatarnikov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office: "Reliable Security for Europe"; date and place not given—first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] There was a break recently at the consultations between the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on drafting the mandate for future disarmament talks in Vienna. In this connection, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office put a number of questions to Major General V. Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation at the meeting of representatives of the states which took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Question: Why has there been a break, Viktor Mikhaylovich, and what are the results of the work which has been done?

Answer: The break was needed to allow the delegations of the 23 countries to make the last amendments to their positions, making it possible to conclude work on the mandate and to embark this year on all-embracing talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The consultations had previously agreed on the sections of the mandate on the aims of the talks and the control and exchange of information, on the preamble, and on the provision on starting the talks in the current year of 1988. In recent months and weeks, coordinated provisions have been added on the composition of the participants and the compulsory international nature of future agreements. A wide range of questions on organizational conditions and the procedure for holding future talks have also been decided. In fact this is the draft document on which basis talks will be held and measures will be implemented to reduce military potentials in Europe. This work must be performed so as to relieve future talks as much as possible of the "procedural burden" and to avoid holding a special preparatory conference, so as to embark on the jist of the matter in the very first days.

As a whole it may be said that the greater part of the road to coordinating the mandate has been traveled.

Question: But do any uncoordinated elements remain?

Answer: Yes, it must be said frankly that a great deal still has to be done—key elements of the mandate remain uncoordinated, primarily the topic of the talks (what forces and armaments will be subject to reduction) and the geographic zone of the reductions. Uncoordinated elements also include the name of the talks and the question of the principles for conducting the talks and implementing the coordinated measures. We must return to these questions immediately after the break.

But on the questions of the topics of the talks and the zone of the reductions, the sides have begun to understand each other's positions and mutual concerns better and more clearly. This in itself is important as a prerequisite for finding mutually acceptable solutions. The Warsaw Pact countries' delegations are seeking to ensure that the agreements encompass not only conventional armaments but also dual-purpose systems; that is, weapons which can also employ nuclear munitions. Mutual understanding on this problem now exists.

It is important that the other side, that is the NATO countries, understand our serious concern that no conventional armaments, including dual-purpose systems, or, as they are called here, "arms with other capabilities in addition to conventional capabilities," be excluded from the talks. At the same time the Warsaw Pact countries are prepared to reject the idea that the talks be conducted not only on dual-purpose systems but also on the entire spectrum of armaments. It seems that a balanced consideration of the sides' main concerns has been found on this question.

Question: That means that we can understand you as saying that the basic difficulties at the Vienna consultations have already been overcome?

Answer: No, there are still difficulties in coordinating the topic of the talks. For instance, the Warsaw Pact countries will not allow the talks to encompass fighter aircraft, but the NATO countries would like reductions to encompass these aircraft. The point is that fighter aircraft are part of the defensive air defense structure and are used as cover for our political, economic, and military targets against strategic aircraft strikes. They cannot be used for a surprise attack and do not undermine the foundations of states' security. So why include them in the talks if, in the "aims of the talks" section, the sides participating have admitted that the reductions should extend primarily to systems with a potential for a surprise attack, which include tactical strike aviation, heavy artillery, and tanks, but in no way fighter aircraft?

Common sense should undoubtedly triumph—fighter aircraft should not be examined at the talks. At the same time we are firmly in favor of the talks encompassing strike aviation—together with tanks, artillery, and other types of conventional arms.

There is also some headway on the question of the geographical zones. Proximity of positions has been revealed with regard to the question of how future measures should encompass the territories of all participating states in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. That concept includes the continental territories of the European states taking part in the talks and the islands and archipelagos of these states in sea and ocean regions adjacent to Europe.

As for the Asian part, here our side has proposed including in the zone Soviet territories west of the Urals, the Ural River, and the Caspian Sea on condition that the talks encompass Turkish territory, including that in Asia. The basic difficulty is that Turkey would not like to include its entire Asian territory in the zone. We believe that the approach in this sphere should be open and honest—all armed forces and armaments located in the zone should be included in the overall balance of the sides' forces. And, of course, the military bases of other participating states located on Turkish territory should be encompassed by the talks.

At the consultations we should also lend concrete form to the provision that the zone will include the islands and archipelagos of the participating states in the sea and ocean regions adjacent to Europe. It is no secret that there are military bases on some of them, and therefore island territories should be encompassed by the talks and should be under control.

Given the political will in the Western countries and particularly Turkey, it will be possible to resolve the geographical zone question very soon after the consultations are resumed.

Unfortunately, to this day the question of the talks' name has not been resolved (although, as recent discussions showed, the sides are close to agreement here). But the NATO countries are as yet not ready to include a provision on "armaments" in the name of the talks, even though they are essentially one of the main targets of the reductions. This position not only puzzles us, it also puts us on our guard.

In general, the situation at the consultations demands that the NATO countries approach the solution of the remaining problems of the mandate soberly and without preconceptions. In that case the delegates of the 23 countries could complete work on the mandate in September and begin talks this year on the entire spectrum of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. People everywhere now understand how overloaded with weapons the European area is, and how it needs to have its dangerous burden lifted.

INF Inspections Proceeding on Schedule
LD1608175688 Moscow TASS in English
1735 GMT 16 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev reports:

"The schedule of reciprocal inspections for checking the initial data for the INF Treaty is being fully observed both by the Soviet and American side," Colonel Nikolay Shabalin, deputy head of the USSR National Centre for the Lessening of Nuclear Threat, stated today.

According to the information of August 15, two weeks before the end of a two-month term of such inspections envisaged by the treaty, the American side checked on Soviet territory 108 out of 117 installations, with the checking of the whole of the Eastern part of the country, strenuous work is going on there, Colonel Shabalin told TASS.

"Soviet groups of inspectors are working equally hard. They checked 26 out of 32 installations on U.S. territory. The work at the installations in West Germany, Britain, Belgium and Holland that were to be checked has been completed. Only one operational missile base in Italy remains to be checked. There are grounds to believe that the checking of the initial data will be completed by the set date or even earlier," Colonel Shabalin said.

There are five groups of American inspectors staying on a permanent basis in the Soviet Union today, he continued. One of them is working in Votkinsk. A plant is located there that turned out RSD-10 missiles known in the West as SS-20. The rest of the groups are working in the places where the missiles are eliminated—in Saryozek, Kazakhstan, Stankovo, Belorussia, Sarny and Lesnaya, the Ukraine.

By today 32 combat missiles and 12 training missiles of the OTR-22 (SS-12) type have been eliminated in Sar-yozek. 15 launching installations for missiles of this type were eliminated in Stankovo. The elimination of RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles by the method of explosion will be started in Kapustnyy Yar, the Volgograd region, on August 28.

Colonel Shabalin believes that good working relations that have formed between Soviet and American servicemen promote the successful fulfilment of their missions by the inspection groups. "On our part, we are doing our best for organizing both the work and recreation activities of American inspectors. My impression is that those efforts were not futile. On more than one occasion our partners did not hurry home after ending the inspection. They used the spare time they had in Moscow for going to the Red Square, the Novodevichy Convent and the circus. When visiting the United States, Soviet inspectors also pointed out the openness and goodwill of U.S. servicemen and the local population," he pointed out.

"The acquired experience of the inspections proved their high effectiveness as a means of control. It could be successfully used in the future for control over strategic offensive armaments," Colonel Shabalin said in conclusion.

Soviet, U.S. Scientists Monitor Explosion
*LD1708191088 Moscow TASS in English 1842 GMT
17 Aug 88*

[Text] San Francisco, August 17 TASS—TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin reports:

A Soviet-American experiment for monitoring nuclear explosions was held at the range in the area of Pahute Mesa, Nevada. A nuclear charge with a yield of up to 150 kilotons was exploded at a depth of about 700 metres at the foot of the plateau.

The yield and parameters of the explosion were registered by highly sensitive seismographs and other equipment installed by Soviet and American scientists close to the epicentre and also at a considerable distance from it. One of the aims of the experiment was to compare the effectiveness of the two different methods of establishing the size of nuclear explosions: a teleseismic method by which explosions can be registered at a considerable distance, and a hydrodynamic method under which the equipment is installed close to the site of the explosion. The aim of Soviet and American scientists is to choose the optimum method which would suit both sides in verifying nuclear explosions. When the information is computerized, the participants in the experiment will compare the data they arrive at with initial parameters of the charge and by the degree of coincidence will establish the reliability and effectiveness of the methods developed.

A similar experiment will be made at the Soviet range in the area of Semipalatinsk in September. Such tests were already held successfully in Semipalatinsk last year and in Nevada last spring. They confirm that both countries have reliable means of verification of nuclear explosions.

The results of joint research that has become possible due to the arrangement reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit in December 1987 are of fundamental importance for the progress at the talks between the USSR and the United States on the question of nuclear testing. As an initial step the participants in the talks are to agree upon effective measures of verification which will finally make it possible to ratify the 1974 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests (threshold test ban treaty) and the 1976 Soviet-American treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (peaceful nuclear explosions treaty). Then it is planned to start coordinating further intermediate restrictions on nuclear tests so as to achieve the ultimate aim, the termination of nuclear testing.

Experiment 'Great Success'
*LD1808080288 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0055 GMT 18 Aug 88*

[Excerpts] San Francisco, 18 August (TASS)—Andrey Sidorin, TASS correspondent, reports:

U.S. and Soviet specialists described as a great success the joint experiment on verification [kontrol] of nuclear explosions conducted by them at the test ground in Nevada. [passage omitted]

Only the first part of the experiment has now been completed in Nevada, elaborated I.M. Palenykh, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva full-scale talks on limitations and the ultimate halting of nuclear tests, who is in Nevada. Its second and final stage, he said, will take place on 14 September of this year when an analogical joint nuclear test will be carried out in the area of Semipalatinsk, where U.S. specialists have already arrived. Based on the results of the two explosions, a decision will be made at the Geneva talks as to which of the verification methods [metody konrolya] should be included in the protocol to the 1974 treaty on limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons. The determination of such a method will make possible the ratification of this treaty and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. After that we should turn to the next stage of the talks—further limitations on nuclear explosions with regard to their power and number. One should not wait for ratification of the talks already under way. Our goal is the complete halting of nuclear tests, emphasized the Soviet representative.

Maj Gen Tatarnikov Calls for Enhanced Security Measures

LD1708145288 *Moscow TASS in English*
1430 GMT 17 Aug 88

["Europe: The Need for Broader Confidence-Building Measures"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 17 TASS—The confidence-building measures, embracing military activity of land forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO in Europe, are being successfully carried out. The activity of land units has become to a certain extent open, verifiable, and, consequently, more predictable, said Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of the states, parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in a MOSCOW NEWS interview.

Naval activity and independent air exercises still remain major "blank spaces" in the process of confidence- and security-building measures. The air and naval forces have an unprecedented striking power, a big range and high target hitting precision.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation and some other European states therefore believe that the time has come to take under control naval and air activity in Europe and the adjacent sea and oceanic areas, to make this activity open and predictable. And this work should begin at the regular stage of the Stockholm conference.

These measures should remind those applicable to land military activity: inclusion of major air and naval exercises into annual plans of the notified military activity, notification about independent naval and air exercises and other actions, exceeding certain ceilings. Observation should also be carried out over air and naval activity in the sea and oceanic areas, the air space, adjacent to the European Continent, and also the landing of big units of troops.

There should be mandatory notification about the transfer of troops and military equipment to Europe by sea-going and air transport and, at long last, it is necessary to consider questions of banning naval exercises in areas of intensive navigation and fishing, limiting of naval concentration in areas of international significance, primarily anti-submarine naval forces.

Discussed undoubtedly could also be other measures pertaining to air force and naval activity, with strict control to be established over these activities, up to inspection with no right to refuse. These and other measures to cover the naval and air force activity, said Viktor Tatarnikov, would be a timely and quite logical step, particularly if one takes into account the Western calls for predictability, verifiability and openness in the military sphere.

U.S. 'Unwilling' To Talk in 'Businesslike Manner' at Geneva

LD1908224688 *Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland* 1900 GMT 19 Aug 88

[Text] [Announcer] The senior Soviet arms negotiator at the Geneva talks on strategic arms reduction, Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov, has criticized the U.S. side for its unwillingness to discuss problems in a businesslike manner. He said that merely declaring one's readiness to work constructively wasn't enough. Here is Yuriy Minayev of our staff looking at these problems of the arms reduction process.

[Minayev] Since 12 July, when the negotiations in Geneva were resumed, the Soviet Union has advanced several new proposals, and Aleksey Obukhov said the two sides haven't really discussed them because of the unwillingness of the U.S. side even to discuss the proposals. What can be behind this unwillingness? Well, one factor is probably the presidential election campaign now in full swing in the United States. There is naturally uncertainty over who will be the next president, Mr Dukakis or Mr Bush, and it has become clear from their speeches that there are certain differences in their approach to disarmament issues.

But there are also other developments that can seriously hinder the negotiations on strategic arms reduction. I mean the radar system under construction at the Royal Air Force base in Fylingdales and the operation radar at the U.S. air base in Thule, Greenland, which pose a threat to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Both systems are deployed outside U.S. territory, thus violating this treaty which restricts both Soviet and the United States' defenses against nuclear missiles, and for this reason the ABM Treaty is of great importance assuring an ABM status quo, absolutely vital to the Geneva negotiations.

According to JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, the new radar at Fylingdales, located about 200 miles north of London, is to cover the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa, and would be able to track Soviet sea-launched ballistic missiles. This would be a direct violation of U.S. commitments under the ABM Treaty, which prohibits ABM-capable radars except in certain specified cases.

[Announcer] Speaking to newsmen, Ambassador Obukhov also accused the United States of refusing to discuss control of sea-based longer-range missiles. By talking about difficulties of verification the United States is obviously trying to have sea-based missiles left beyond the framework of the treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic weapons. In that event, this particular channel of the arms race would remain open, which would practically reduce to nil the importance of nuclear disarmament agreements, both the existing and those yet to be achieved. In the final analysis, these agreements are aimed at preventing a nuclear attack. If sea-based missiles are retained, the threat of their use will still be there.

As for the difficulties of verification, if the Soviet Union's proposals were accepted, the problem would at least be easier to solve, above all in the case of inspection of naval ships and munitions plants manufacturing sea-based cruise missiles. Now, why is it that the United States shows a negative stand on the issue? Here is one opinion from the chief of the Soviet General Staff, General Nikolay Chervov.

[Begin Chervov recording, in Russian with superimposed English translation] The reason is that the United States and NATO have a large advantage in naval forces over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. The buildup of naval forces, including those in the northern seas, continues. Among the most dangerous practices are those of equipping U.S. warships with sea-based longer-range cruise missiles. This class of missiles is meant for reaching targets on Soviet territory and in the Warsaw Pact countries. Naturally, this course of events cannot but cause concern on our part. [end recording]

TASS Assesses Nuclear, Space Arms Talks
LD1908214888 Moscow TASS in English
2119 GMT 19 Aug 88

[Text] Geneva August 19 TASS—A regular plenary meeting of the delegations at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms was held past week. The meeting was called by the Soviet side. The delegation of the USSR declared again for the need to keep up a due pace at the talks needed for an early conclusion of the drafting of an agreement on 50-per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms in conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

The USSR delegation submitted new compromise proposals aimed at coordinating the provisions of a protocol to a future agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty and non-withdrawal from the treaty for a specified period of time. The protocol which will envisage measures of verification, confidence building and predictability of actions is called upon to make the sides confident about the observance of the commitments under the agreement and the ABM Treaty.

When the questions of strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction were discussed, the Soviet side paid special attention to the problem of verification of the observance of commitments with regard to all types of strategic offensive arms to which the drafted treaty will apply.

The radical Soviet proposals for the limitation of longer-range submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMS) with appropriate verification, advanced at the previous round, were confirmed in this context. The Soviet side urged the U.S. delegation to embark on their business-like discussions and to reach agreement on them.

The USSR delegation tabled two more important compromise proposals on the drafted protocol on inspections. Combined with wordings tabled by the USSR delegation past week, the new Soviet proposals make it possible to reach agreement shortly in full volume on those sections of the protocol on inspections that regulate the activity of the sides for continual observation of the facilities producing strategic offensive arms.

The USSR delegation also declared for intensifying work in the subgroup on the drafting of a protocol on the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms, in the framework of which the Soviet side tabled during the current round a whole number of proposals taking into account the viewpoint of the U.S. delegation and providing a good basis for reaching agreement upon disputed provisions.

As to the work of the group on space arms, it is still hindered because of the striving of the U.S. side to alter in the spirit of the so-called "broader" interpretation the Washington agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty and not withdrawing from it for a specified period of time.

Soviet Says Joint Nuclear Test 'Successful'
PM2308103588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Telephone interview with I. M. Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. full-scale talks on limiting and halting nuclear tests, by own correspondent A. Blinov, under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Calling": "The Agreement Is Acquiring Specific Substance. Soviet and U.S. Instruments Monitor Nuclear Explosion in Nevada"; date not given—first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Washington—A nuclear explosion, monitored by Soviet and U.S. measuring instruments, was conducted deep beneath the surface of a rocky plateau in the U.S. state of Nevada. The instruments were installed in Nevada within the framework of the joint Soviet-U.S. experiment to determine the yield of underground nuclear explosions.

The group of Soviet experts at the Nevada test site includes I. M. Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. full-scale talks on limiting and halting nuclear tests. He described the objectives and substance of the experiment in a telephone conversation with IZVESTIYA's correspondent....

[Blinov] What is the purpose of the experiment that has been conducted?

[Palenykh] The experiment was conducted in accordance with the agreement concluded last May in Moscow during the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. It was signed by USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Its purpose is to develop

better methodology for an accurate determination of an explosion's yield. It is well known that the so-called threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976, which set limits on nuclear explosion yields, were never ratified. The inadequacy of verification methods was cited to justify the nonratification. The joint experiment should eliminate such objections. Soviet experts arrived in Nevada to take part in the experiment, and the measuring apparatus was delivered to Washington in a gigantic "Ruslan" transport aircraft. The Americans forwarded it to the test site.

[Blinov] What methods were used to verify the explosion's yield?

[Palenykh] Two familiar methods for measuring explosion yields—hydrodynamic and seismographical—were tested. The first was used directly at the point where the explosion was carried out. Verification monitors were installed at various levels in the borehole where the explosive device was sited at a depth of 650 meters. A second auxiliary borehole was also fitted with these monitors. Their data were received by Soviet and U.S. monitoring centers, huge trailers containing complex measuring instruments. An explosion with a yield between 100 and 150 kilotons of TNT was carried out at 0400 hours local time. Not all of us at the command center, located 65 km away from the epicenter, felt the tremor, but we did see the accurate work done by the instruments. We then exchanged tape recordings made at the monitoring stations. They now have to be analyzed by experts.

Both sides must also make available to each other data produced by five seismic stations on the territory of each country (by this I mean observations carried out in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement and not measurements taken under the accord between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council.)

[Blinov] How do you assess the results of the experiment?

[Palenykh] According to the opinion of all present at the Nevada test site—both Soviet and U.S. experts—the experiment was successful. Of course, we will await the results of the study of data obtained. Similar tests will take place on Soviet territory 14 September at the test site near Semipalatinsk. Preparatory work is already being done there with the participation of U.S. experts.

I am convinced that a protocol on methods to verify nuclear explosion yields will be submitted for joint signature as a result of the experiment. This, in turn, will create an opportunity for ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. Ratification is the first task facing the Soviet-U.S. full-scale talks on limiting and halting nuclear tests. The next stage is to further limit explosion yields. The ultimate goal of this process, as recorded in a number of joint Soviet-U.S. documents, is to achieve a total halt to nuclear tests. I think that the experiment

conducted in Nevada is an important step along this path. I also want to mention the smooth work by Soviet and U.S. experts and the warm reception and close assistance given by the U.S. authorities. This is a good example of cooperation in the solution of problems whose importance for the whole world cannot be overrated.

Petrovskiy, Canada's Roche Discuss Arms Issues
LD2008152888 Moscow TASS in English
1219 GMT 20 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS—Soviet-Canadian consultations on disarmament issues in the context of the upcoming 43rd session on disarmament were held in the USSR Foreign Ministry Friday. Douglas Roche, ambassador on disarmament of the Canadian Foreign Ministry, who arrived to conduct the consultations, had talks at the Department of International Organisations, at the Department on Arms Limitation and was received by Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR.

Air Force Official on Pact, NATO Strengths
LD2008154088 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 20 Aug 88

[Report on interview with Colonel General Valentin Pankin, chief of the USSR Air Force General Staff, by unidentified correspondent on the occasion of Air Force Day; date and place not given—Pankin remarks recorded in Russian fading into superimposed English translation]

[Text] The Soviet Union marks Aviation Day on Sunday, 21 August. Our reporter has interviewed the chief of the Air Force General Staff, Colonel General Valentin Pankin. One of the questions concerns Western claims that the Soviet Union has a supremacy in combat aircraft, described as one of the imbalances between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

[Pankin] It's easy to notice that the West is biased in estimating the strength of the air forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. It focuses on those components in which we do have superiority, but ignores others in which the United States and NATO have an advantage. The structure of the air forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries stems from the purely defensive purposes of our military doctrine. Under the basic provisions of that doctrine, we have formed a force in the western areas of the Warsaw Treaty countries that ensures a parity in aircraft. We have maintained that parity mostly by fighter planes, which are a defensive component. As for attack aircraft, NATO has a major advantage. Besides, one must also keep in mind NATO's army aviation, which is twice stronger than ours [as heard].

[Correspondent] The Soviet Union has said that it will withdraw part of its forward-deployment aircraft from Eastern Europe if NATO agrees not to deploy its F-16 fighter bombers in Italy, earlier rejected by Spain. Our reporter asked General Pankin how important that would be in military terms.

[Pankin] If carried out, this measure would significantly reduce both the nuclear and conventional attack potential of each side. Secondly, it would ease tension in the Mediterranean.

[Correspondent] And why then did the Soviet proposal meet with a negative reaction from the United States and some other NATO countries, we asked the general.

[Pankin] I am confident that some high-ranking Western leaders have paid lip service to promoting early arms reductions and a better situation in Europe. They haven't taken any practical steps along these lines. On the contrary, they've been trying to compensate for the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by bringing attack aircraft closer to the borders of the socialist countries.

[Correspondent] There was an upsurge in Soviet-American military contacts lately, for instance those between the air forces of the two countries. Last month General Pankin visited the United States. What impressions does the Soviet military pilot have of that trip?

[Pankin] During my visit to the United States, I met with people representing various sections of American society. I was greatly impressed by the meetings we had with our American counterparts, Air Force pilots. They are strong and bold people. It's my impression that they want peace, friendship and cooperation with Soviet Air Force pilots. We have some experience of cooperation with pilots of other countries, and we're always ready to meet our partners half-way.

Zholker Views ABM, Space Weapons Talks
LD2208175388 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 22 Aug 88

[Political observer Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] To begin with, I will point out that the present meeting in Geneva, although it is a routine one, has special significance. The fact is that such meetings are held every 5 years on the basis of the Soviet-U.S. treaty signed in 1972. This time, however, it concerns not only the past and present but the future, too, because parallel to this meeting, Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons are being held in Geneva. A treaty is being drafted on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons of the United States and the USSR. It is understandable that in order to achieve such a radical measure, it is necessary to have guarantees that while weapons are being reduced on earth they are not put into space. That is why already at the Washington summit

agreement was reached in principle on the USSR and the United States not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty for an agreed term, but so far agreement on this term has unfortunately not been reached. This is what the Soviet and U.S. experts are engaged in in Geneva.

These talks have been closed so far, but some reports are coming in on the atmosphere in and around Geneva. I have noted, for instance, that at the recent U.S. Republican Party Convention there was nothing but praise for the Star Wars plans, and this was not just a matter of preelection rhetoric. In parallel, the Pentagon is placing orders, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale—quite specific orders for the manufacture of space weapons. Indeed, the speeding-up of the launch of the "Discovery" spacecraft is being linked to pressure from the U.S. military.

What is the position of our country, however? The head of the Soviet delegation, upon his arrival in Geneva, confirmed the desire of the USSR to consolidate the treaty on limiting ABM systems. At the same time, our delegation brought to Geneva fresh compromise proposals on a major aspect of the talks: on measures for monitoring [kontrol] observance of both the ABM Treaty and the agreement now being drafted on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. The question of monitoring, after all, has been the main stumbling block at all the disarmament talks for a very long time. Now, as shown by the joint Soviet-U.S. experiments at the nuclear testing grounds and the destruction that has begun of two classes of U.S. and Soviet missiles, this obstacle has been cleared from the road leading to disarmament. It is just a matter of goodwill and new political thinking.

20-Kt Nuclear Test in Tyumen Oblast
LD2208175188 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 22 Aug 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An underground nuclear explosion of a force of up to 20 kilotons was carried out today at 2020 Moscow time in Tyumen Oblast in the Soviet Union. This explosion was carried out in the interests of the national economy.

'Mutual' Force Reductions Necessary
PM2308102188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Aug 88 Second Edition p 5

[Yuriy Zhukov "International Notes": "What Is To Be Scrapped?"—boldface as published]

[Text] While the endless debate is continuing in Vienna over how, when, and where to hold talks on reducing armed forces and arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, the European public is voicing its concern increasingly loudly about the incomprehensible dragging out of this preliminary dialogue.

As the influential Paris newspaper LE MONDE pointed out in an editorial on 17 August, the stormiest discussion of this issue is now taking place in the FRG. "H. Kohl's government," the newspaper writes, "is currently under strong public pressure to take concrete measures to further develop the disarmament process. At the same time, it has been forced to maneuver so as to combine the NATO allies' interests with purely German interests." LE MONDE emphasizes here that the initiatives and proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee are "very popular in the FRG."

Judging by numerous statements by West German public and state figures, this "stormy" discussion in Bonn is now centered on the question of what approach to take in solving the question of eliminating the "imbalances," that is the discrepancies between the levels of individual kinds of NATO and Warsaw Pact arms.

The USSR and other Warsaw Pact members propose a simple solution that everyone can understand: If someone has more tanks, let him begin by scrapping those that exceed the number possessed by the other side; if someone has more aircraft, let him reduce the "excess"—naturally, on condition that the other side does likewise. Then both sides can begin further arms reductions in equal shares—down to the level of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

But for some reason this idea is like a thorn in the flesh to NATO strategists. Defending NATO's positions, Bundeswehr General Inspector D. Wellershoff declared in reply to a question from the weekly VORWAERTS about his attitude to the Warsaw Pact proposal to eliminate "imbalances":

"I would suggest that the Soviet Union (!) begin reducing its own superiority in the sphere of tanks... while the West is still finalizing the details of its concept for reducing conventional arms."

"Do you not consider," the VORWAERTS correspondent asked reasonably and not without irony, "that NATO too could unilaterally scrap some things?"

"No," NATO's defender snapped. "Because there is nowhere (?) that we possess an advantage."

"NATO has the advantage in the sphere of air forces," the correspondent retorted.

"That is not so important," D. Wellershoff brushed him aside.

A journalist can be brushed aside, but not the opinion of millions of Europeans. It was no coincidence that right after the Bundeswehr general inspector made his statement, Scheer, chairman of the disarmament and arms control working group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany's [SPD] parliamentary faction, called a press conference and advocated including the question of the mutual reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact air forces in the talks on conventional arms. He emphasized that the elimination of the imbalance that exists in air forces will have to be discussed.

"In the air," Scheer said, "there is a disproportion in the West's favor." However, the West keeps quiet about its own considerable superiority in this sphere. NATO does not accept the concept of reducing air forces, but this concept must be recognized or the talks could get deadlocked.

In particular, the SPD spokesman proposed reducing the number of fighter-bombers on each side to 1,000 units by cutting 3,800 NATO aircraft and 1,550 Warsaw Pact aircraft.

Well, it is probably a bit too soon to talk about specific figures—let the experts tackle the corresponding calculations when the talks on reducing conventional arms finally begin. But the SPD spokesman described the crux of the matter quite clearly and justly. If NATO is serious about the question of reducing arms, then it is possible to speak only of the mutual elimination of "imbalances" and not of unilateral disarmament by a particular side.

M. S. Gorbachev mentioned this very definitely in his 30 July conversation with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, FRG federal minister for foreign affairs. Emphasizing the interest of the USSR and all the Warsaw Pact states in concluding these meetings without delay, he said: "We are prepared to go a long way to resolve the problems that have arisen there, but let no one count on our unilateral disarmament."

However complex and difficult disarmament issues are, the facts show that, given goodwill, progress is possible. The first explosions of the missiles being destroyed in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles have already thundered out. The talks on other types of weapons are also making progress, albeit not as quickly as we would like. I am sure that we will also get around to conventional arms, a considerable proportion of which will also ultimately be scrapped—tanks, aircraft, guns, and all other means of homicide will be scrapped.

But only on one condition: on a mutual basis. **Only on a mutual basis!**

**Soviet Inspectors To Visit Pueblo Arsenal,
Davis-Monthan AFB**

*LD2308054688 Moscow TASS International Service in
Russian 0410 GMT 23 Aug 88*

[Text] San Francisco, 23 Aug (TASS)—TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin reports:

Thirty Soviet inspectors have arrived at Travis Air Force Base, not far from San Francisco. In accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, they will inspect a number of military facilities in the western United States with the aim of verifying [proverka] the implementation of its provisions.

As the TASS correspondent was told by a spokesman for the base commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Vagovich, it is expected that the Soviet experts will visit the Army arsenal in Pueblo, Colorado, which holds components and a maintenance center for the Pershing-2 missiles to be destroyed. They will also visit a training center for the

preparation of calculations on land-based cruise missiles at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. The duration of inspections at these facilities is limited to 24 hours. However, by agreement between the sides, Vagovich noted, inspections may be extended by 8 hours when necessary.

Then 15 Soviet inspectors will set off for Magna in Utah to a secret factory that manufactures Pershing-2 missile components, where they will relieve 15 of their 29 colleagues who are already there.

“We are very satisfied with the cooperation and the high professionalism of inspectors from the Soviet Union. On-site inspections are conducted precisely according to plan, and it may be said that both in the United States and the Soviet Union they are passing off successfully. By 1 September, both sides are planning to end on-site inspections and to proceed to the next stage of implementing the historic treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles,” Vagovich stressed.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Czech Dissidents Drop Call for Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD1108102888 Hamburg DPA in German
0937 GMT 11 Aug 88

[Text] Prague (DPA)—The Czechoslovak dissidents have changed their position and no longer insist on the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the CSSR. They demand from the Soviet Government only an official declaration that the troops currently stationed in the CSSR are in the country "in the name of the defense commission of the Warsaw Pact." This emerges from a statement by the dissident organization "Democratic Initiative," which was made known in Prague on Thursday. The statement was drafted to mark the 20th anniversary of the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into the CSSR.

On domestic policy, the statement demands that the party revoke the official document adopted 2 years after the events of 1968, entitled "On the Lessons of the Crisis-Ridden Development in the Party and Society," and remove from political life those functionaries who were involved to a marked extent in repressions after 1968. Expressly named are only CSSR President Gustav Husak and Central Committee Secretary Vasil Bilak.

Brockdorff Views Conventional Disarmament Strategy

AU1108151788 Bonn DIE WELT in German
11 Aug 88 p 5

[Cay Graf Brockdorff article: "The Soviet Union Is To Be Deprived of Its Capacity To Attack on a Wide Front"]

[Text] Brussels—The course that NATO intends to pursue at the conventional arms control conference with the East bloc is gradually taking shape. A NATO special group that is supposed to develop specific disarmament plans of the West met in Rome late in July under strict secrecy.

The 16 NATO countries have not yet adopted a position. However, according to high-ranking sources, the theoretical models under discussion pursue the goal of bringing about a "dramatic change" in the East's military weight. It has been stressed in Brussels that, if they were to be implemented, they would eliminate Moscow's predominance over the East European countries, which has grown historically since 1945. The Soviet Union would be deprived of the capacity to launch large-scale offensive operations against Western Europe.

According to this information, NATO will suggest to the Soviet Union the elimination of between 24,000 and 25,000 battle tanks. NATO would have to destroy

between 900 and 1,000 tanks to bring both sides to an equal level; this is about 5 percent under NATO's current strength. Similar steps would be envisaged for artillery.

Under a more far-reaching proposal, troops deployed in Europe would be bound not to maintain more tanks or artillery in a country than the country in which they are deployed has itself. Because the Soviet Union has deployed 70 percent of the battle tanks in the GDR, it would have to reduce their number to the number of tanks maintained by the National People's Army. The FRG would not be affected by this theoretical model, because it provides 60 percent of the battle tanks on its territory, and its allies 40 percent.

A prerequisite for negotiations on conventional armament is a mandate to be given at the Vienna CSCE meeting. After the summer recess, the talks will resume early in September.

At NATO headquarters the impression prevails that the positions of East and West have meanwhile come closer to each other, even though definitive formulations are not yet in sight for defining the subject matter (forces) and the area of application (geographical area). According to sources, Moscow is still trying to bring in nuclear weapons—something that NATO rejects on principle.

On the other hand, the United States, in particular, is seeking to reach a compromise, because it has realized that, if the Soviet ideas were to be totally rejected, pressure to hold separate negotiations on short-range weapons in Europe would mount.

Defense Minister Favors Conventional Arms Talks

LD1408083588 Hamburg DPA in German
0618 GMT 14 Aug 88

[Excerpt] (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz has come out in favor of an early start to negotiations on disarmament and arms control in the conventional sphere. In an interview on Deutschlandfunk on Sunday, Scholz said that such a conference was not dependent on the advance agreement of an overall NATO strategy on security, arms control, and disarmament.

Referring to the offer of talks by the GDR Defense Minister Heinz Kessler between the Defense Ministries and military experts of the GDR and the FRG, Scholz expressed the opinion that one had to talk to anyone who could achieve anything. But first the conventional disarmament conference had to be set in motion swiftly, and then one would see "what further talks, contacts and so on are possible over and above that." However, one thing was clear: that there would be no exclusively German policies.

In reaction to Kessler's proposal, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said on ZDF [Second German Television] this afternoon that he would "consider it very, very carefully and talk it over with our partners, naturally those in the coalition also, but also with our international partners." He did not think much of those gut reactions made in the aestival warmth on the eve of a summer storm [Er halte jetzt nichts von solchen Schnellschüssen, die da in der waerme des Sommers am Vorabend eines Sommergewitters abgeschossen werden].

Scholz Views Peace, Defense, Disarmament

*AU1608150188 Bonn DIE WELT in German
15 Aug 88 p 2*

[Article by Defense Minister Rupert Scholz: "We Must Continue To Be Vigilant"]

[Text] In our time, it is day-to-day events that arouse public interest, that give rise to controversies, and that determine the headlines. Therefore, it is little wonder that a particularly interesting date has received little attention. During these days, a "record" was broken, something that cannot be taken for granted in this century: The Germans have been living in peace for about 43 years and 3 months. This is longer than the peaceful period between the end of the German-French War in 1871 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

The fact that this very historic date has hardly been noticed by the German public may be taken as a sign that, at least in Central Europe, today peace is considered the normal condition and that in view of the easing of tension in the international atmosphere threats to this peace are not recognized or are simply ignored.

As a matter of fact—this may be rooted in man's nature, as history seems to teach—peace is an asset that must be newly acquired and preserved every day. If the Germans have experienced their longest period of peace in history, they must not overlook the fact that this is not a gift, but that the preservation of peace requires continuous, new efforts.

A glance at postwar history shows that since the end of World War II, some 17 million people have become victims of armed conflicts in the world. In Asia, Africa, Central America, and in the Middle East countless people, soldiers and civilians, are still dying from the consequences of armed conflicts. According to the Washington-based organization World Priorities, 25 wars are currently being waged in the world. These facts indicate that we Germans, too, must not take it for granted that in our part of the world peace will last forever. There is certainly no acute threat to peace in Europe. The Warsaw Pact, too, is certainly not interested in starting a war. If this is the case, this is certainly not least due to the fact that the community of values of the free West, to which

the FRG belongs as one of the two states in Germany, has constantly and unmistakably expanded and stressed its defense readiness and capability. It would not be correct to say that in Germany peace has not been exposed to threats during the past 4 decades.

Shortly after the end of World War II, the Berlin Blockade harbored the danger of armed conflicts. In addition to that, tensions that carried the risk of escalation resulted from the suppression of the people's uprising on 17 July 1953, from the construction of the Wall on 13 August 1961, and from the forceful intervention of Soviet military power in Hungary, Poland, and the CSSR.

These events have demonstrated that after the experiences of two world wars Central Europe itself is also not invulnerable to armed conflicts. This insight should be borne in mind by those who believe today that the West can—or even must—decrease its defense efforts. The feeling of an immediate threat no longer exists among the population. It would amount to mistaking the effect for the cause if we drew the conclusion that NATO can unilaterally reduce its readiness for defense or that the current strength of the Bundeswehr is to be questioned. If today we can look back over more than 40 years of peace and if we want to continue peace, we must be aware that this will only be possible if we are able to defend ourselves so that we are not vulnerable to political blackmail.

This is not in contradiction to the current disarmament efforts, which are to be vigorously supported. Quite the contrary: It is particularly the FRG that supports the numerous efforts in this sphere; many of the initiatives aimed at efficient disarmament have been developed by the FRG Government and have been incorporated in the NATO proposals. The government will strictly adhere to its policy of supporting disarmament efforts wherever possible in order to achieve an increased level of mutual security.

However, it will not permit the defense capability to be reduced through unilateral measures by the West, and it will not allow peace to be endangered in Europe.

Steadfastness—this has been demonstrated by the discussion about the NATO dual-track decision and its implementation—will continue to pay off in the future; it will facilitate disarmament efforts and thus serve to preserve peace.

In all this, one thing must not be overlooked. The Germans can look back over a 40-year period of living in peace and freedom. It is not possible to say this about the people in the second state in Germany, the GDR. They also live in peace but not in freedom. This must be mentioned, as well, if tribute is to be paid to the longest period of peace in recent German history.

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