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Editorial Welcomes INF Treaty

52200008 Ottawa *THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English*
26 Nov 87 p A8

[Editorial: "The INF Blessing"]

[Text] The superpowers' strategic balance is for the most part a contest of gloomy ambiguities; even small advances are rare, and carry their own paradoxical dangers. In such a world, the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty is a remarkably unambiguous success.

After years of arduous negotiating, the two sides have finally agreed how to ban their entire arsenals of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The treaty is to be signed Dec 9 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, and (if ratified by the U.S. Senate) it will make the world safer.

The treaty provides for the elimination of hundreds of Soviet and U.S. missiles—weapons that have offered neither side security anyway. The agreement also provides a unique system of mutual verification, a system that might be a model for bigger treaties later.

That is not to say the treaty will prompt no criticism. As the Senate debate unfolds, conservative hard-liners will attack the agreement with three claims. All are false.

One claim is that abolishing ground-launched cruise and Pershing missiles from Europe will weaken the Western Alliance. Nonsense.

NATO will still have nearly six million men under arms. It will have thousands of nuclear-ready battlefield missiles and artillery pieces, more than 1,500 land-based strike aircraft and some 200 missiles aboard submarines—all in the European theatre.

Another claim is that INF abolition will somehow destabilize the strategic balance, by altering the perception if not the reality of Western power. Wrong again.

NATO's military power never rested on its INF missiles (which only began to be deployed in late 1983). Leaving aside the West's unquestioned political and economic superiority, its military power lies as well in the deterrence of its strategic nuclear forces.

The critics' third claim is that the INF treaty will either disconnect that deterrent from Europe, or appear to. This comes close to a fact of history: INF installation was originally proposed by Europeans concerned that a U.S.-Soviet SALT II treaty would leave Europe vulnerable to Soviet bullying.

Even so, this fear of "delinking" the deterrent is baseless. No Soviet leader in his right mind can assume the United States would watch Europe fall under a Soviet invasion without nuclear retaliation. No Soviet general could promise his leader such a thing is possible.

The intrinsic value of the INF treaty can easily withstand such criticisms. More than that, it sustains two hopes.

The first is for new momentum toward a U.S.-Soviet treaty halving their strategic missile forces. The second is for a new effort at reducing conventional forces in Europe.

In this murky world there maybe no such thing as an entirely unmixed blessing. The INF treaty comes close.

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Prospects for Limiting Strategic Weapons

11100140 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1224 GMT 6 Jan 88

[Commentary by reporter Li Yannian: "The Last Year of Reagan's Tenure"]

[Excerpt] Washington, 5 Jan (XINHUA)—At the U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington last December, the two sides signed the INF treaty and agreed to speed up negotiations and strive to draw a treaty on cutting each side's long-range strategic nuclear missiles by 50 % within the next 10 years, a treaty to be signed at the Moscow summit.

When Reagan meets Gorbachev in Moscow, three things could happen: First, the two sides could already have reached an agreement and the treaty is on the table to be signed by the two leaders; second, the negotiations reach an impasse and the two leaders have to negotiate directly with each other during the summit to reach an agreement and work out specific articles of the treaty later; and third, even after the Moscow summit, the two sides are still unable to reach an agreement and it becomes impossible for President Reagan to sign this treaty while he is in power.

In their New Year's greetings broadcast in each other's country, both Reagan and Gorbachev expressed the wish of reaching an agreement on the question of cutting strategic nuclear arms by 50 %. It seems that both of them have great determination.

Indeed, both the United States and Soviet Union have political and, particularly, economic needs to reduce the scale of the arms race, to change some of their approaches toward the arms race, and to ease the relations between the two countries to a certain extent. As for Reagan, since he was sworn in 7 years ago, he has taken a strong anti-Soviet stance, advocating huge expenditures for military buildup. However, if, in addition to the INF accord, he signs another treaty (or reaches a basic agreement) with the Soviet Union on reducing strategic nuclear weapons before his term expires, he will secure himself a special place in U.S. history as a president whose "peace through strength" policy paid off handsomely.

Reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 50 % is, after all, a far cry from eliminating a limited amount of medium-range missiles. The stakes are so high that both parties are afraid of being taken in by the other and emerging disadvantaged in the end. In addition, both countries face opposition and obstructing force at home and abroad. Also involved is the question of strategic space defensive weapons, an issue on which an agreement has yet to be reached. As for a comprehensive improvement or easing of U.S.-Soviet relations, it involves even more problems. In the election year of 1988, all these sensitive issues, if handled inappropriately, could cause great

uproar or even affect the next summit meeting. On the other hand, if handled properly, they may boost the prestige of President Reagan and his administration.

XINHUA Roundup: Focus Now on Strategic, Space Weapons

11140523 Beijing XINHUA in English 0826 GMT 13 Jan 88

["Round-up: Superpower Arms Talks Center on Strategic, Space Arsenals (By Xiang Kuiguan and Li Ruirong)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Geneva, January 12 (XINHUA)—The United States and the Soviet Union are now concentrating their talks in Geneva on strategic and outer space weapons, following the signature last December of the treaty to abolish intermediate-ranged missiles.

The international attention is now attracted by the superpower talks, the ninth round of the kind, scheduled to be held Thursday.

Whether the two delegations can make a new agreement on strategic arms ready for signing will exert great impact on the fourth meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled to be held in Moscow in the first half of this year.

Offensive nuclear weapons make up over half of the superpower nuclear arsenals. The current number of the two countries' land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based ballistic missiles, and long-ranged strategic bombers totals 4,468 plus 24,917 warheads. The two countries own 48,000 warheads of all kinds.

Strategic arms is a key part of the nuclear strategy for either of the two superpowers. Although they started negotiations on weapons in this category as early as in 1969, little substantial progress has been made as a result of major differences.

When Reagan and Gorbachev met in Iceland in October 1986, they agreed in principle to cut by half strategic arsenals of the two countries.

The two sides once came near on the controversial issue of implementing the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

However, the insistence on the Soviet side on linking strategic weapons to outer space weapons, an attempt to make Washington revoke the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, has made it impossible for the two countries to reach any agreement on strategic weapons.

Some progress was recorded when the two leaders met in Washington early December last year. They agreed to limit the warheads on the land- and submarine-based missiles to 4,900 out of the 6,000 which they previously accepted as the ceiling on their warhead total.

The remaining differences are limitations on the concrete figures land-based intercontinental missiles, submarine-based missiles and huge strategic bombers as well as terms for reduction, verification measures, terms for implementing the antiballistic missiles and space weapons.

The United States asks the Soviet Union to cut more land-based missiles, a category in which Moscow is superior, while the Soviet Union urges the United States to reduce more submarine-based missiles and long-ranged bombers, with which Washington gains the upper hand.

It is obvious that both want to limit the superiority found in each other.

On the term of reducing strategic weapons, Washington advocates a period of 10 years. Moscow says the term should be 5 years. Moscow also sticks to the prerequisite that an agreement on strategic weapons cannot be reached unless both agree to keep the ABM Treaty effective for 10 years.

But Washington maintains that it will abide by the treaty for 7 years and interprets in a broader way in order not to upset its ongoing research and experiments on the SDI program.

Besides, the measures for verification of the strategic weapons will be more complex than the intermediate missiles, which the two countries have agreed to abolish.

Although the two countries both have wishes for reducing strategic weapons by half and order their delegations to make quick efforts to facilitate the talks, many differences exist in the way towards a draft accord before Reagan and Gorbachev meet in Moscow this year.

But one thing is certain, that is, the two delegations will try all means to bargain each other during the more complex and arduous ninth round of arms talks.

JAPAN

UNO Urges Further Disarmament by USSR, U.S.
52600020 Tokyo KYODO in English
0958 GMT 17 Dec 87

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 17 KYODO—Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno urged the Soviet Union Thursday to negotiate a further cut in nuclear arms with the United States and also achieve progress on issues relating to regional, human rights, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral matters.

He also demanded that the Soviet Union return to Japan as early as possible four small Japanese islands it holds off Hokkaido and to provide a detailed report on last week's intrusion by a Soviet reconnaissance plane into Japanese airspace over Okinawa Prefecture through diplomatic channels, a Foreign Ministry official told reporters.

Uno made the requests when he met Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, who is here to brief Japanese officials on the outcome of last week's U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Washington, at the ministry.

Uno said Japan welcomed the signing of the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) treaty and said that global nuclear arms should be brought to a lower and balanced level, the official said.

He deplored the Soviet intrusion of Japanese airspace occurring during the Washington summit last Wednesday.

Uno demanded details of the intrusion through diplomatic channels, pointing out the Soviet already gave an explanation to reporters in Moscow.

Adamishin said the superpower summit had opened the way for a new nonconfrontational approach to the solution of international problems.

He said the U.S. and the Soviet Union require the cooperation of other countries and requested Japan's assistance.

Adamishin gave no positive reply on the territorial issue.

On the possibility of a visit to Japan by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Adamishin said it is difficult to decide the exact date because the foreign minister is busily occupied with negotiations with the U.S., the official said.

/06662

INDIA

Defense Expert on Importance of INF Treaty
52500010 Delhi General Overseas Service in English
1010 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Commentary by C. Rajamohan of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis: "New Hopes for Peace"]

[Text] The prime minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, has welcomed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force—INF—treaty signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, describing it as a triumph of reason. The Union Parliament joined him in congratulating the two leaders.

The treaty, product of 6 years of tortuous negotiations, was formally signed at the Washington summit on Tuesday. There is worldwide hope that this sapling would grow into a mighty tree of peace. The epoch-making agreement of the INF seeks to eliminate all land based nuclear missiles having a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The historic significance of this treaty rests on the fact that it is the world's first nuclear arms reduction agreement. It will lead to the scrapping of about 1,500 nuclear warheads on the Soviet side and about 400 on the American. The tragic history of nuclear arms control until now has given us agreements which legitimized quantitative and qualitative proliferation of nuclear arsenal. The INF treaty is, thus, a radical departure from the past practice of pursuing the nuclear arms race through negotiations.

It is indeed the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. In the past only obsolescent weapons have been removed. The INF treaty would lead to the dumping of some of the most modern nuclear weapon systems, like the Soviet SS-20 and American Pershing-2 missiles. The treaty has also broken new ground on the vexing question of verification. By introducing extremely intrusive on-site inspections, the treaty has overcome the verification hurdle, which had so often in the past complicated the arms limitation process. The mind-boggling verification procedures to be implemented under the INF treaty, include a provision for continuous inspection of certain missile production facilities in the United States and the Soviet Union for 13 years. Verification is also to be extended to third countries where American or Soviet INF are at present deployed. The INF accord also marks a new era of openness in nuclear negotiations. Under the agreement an unprecedented range of information on weapon systems and their deployment has been exchanged.

Skeptics had pointed out that the treaty affects only about 4 percent of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. But the political significance of the INF accord goes far beyond the issue of numbers. By providing the world with the much needed conceptual breakthrough in thinking about nuclear arms

limitation, the INF treaty opens up enormous new possibilities for disarmament. By legitimizing zero as the final goal of nuclear arms reduction, the INF treaty forms an extremely valuable first step in the long struggle for a nuclear free world.

The Soviet-American agreement on INF could also mark the first step toward ending the recent second cold war which has poisoned international politics for nearly a decade. The agreement would not only deescalate Soviet-American tensions, but also set the tone for progress in a variety of arms limitation issues. It is expected that a treaty on reducing longer range arsenals by a half would be ready for signature in mid-1988 when President Reagan is scheduled to visit Moscow. Even on the SDI issue the two sides are groping for a compromise. The INF treaty has already triggered off a new process for the overall reduction and lowering of East-West military confrontation in Europe.

India in particular has reasons to be pleased with the INF treaty. Throughout the nuclear age, India has championed the disarmament approach in a radical opposition to the philosophy of nuclear arms control. The arms control approach followed by the nuclear powers institutionalized the nuclear arms race threatening the very survival of life on earth. The INF treaty is the vindication of the disarmament approach. This approach has also been the central element of the Delhi Declaration issued in November 1986 by Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev. The declaration gave the call for the replacement of nuclear balance of terror with comprehensive international security. The historical opportunity provided by the INF treaty must not be fully used to realize the goal of a nuclear free and nonviolent world.

/06662

PAKISTAN

Editorial Alleges Soviet Openness Led to Arms Accord
52004700 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
11 Dec 87 p 4

[Text] The United States and the Soviet Union have signed the first treaty which would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. As Mr. Gorbachev said, December 8, 1987, would go down in the history books as the 'beginning of a new era in human life.' Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan have together planted a sapling which, the Soviet leader hoped, would one day grow into a 'mighty tree of peace.' The US President described the INF Treaty, as it is called, an 'impossible vision turned into reality.' It proves that given goodwill and understanding the most difficult problems can be solved through negotiations.

Pakistan and many other countries have welcomed the signing of the Treaty. Tehran has called it a "positive development" and China has cautioned against 'over-optimism.' Although the two superpowers have reached an understanding to outlaw all intermediate range and short range nuclear missiles together with their spare parts, the implementation of the Treaty will take time. It will take three years to dismantle the weapons and then there will be a ten-year period of inspection of the former sites to make sure that the missiles have all gone and are not being replaced: something to which President Reagan alludes when, in his characteristic manner, he says, "trust but verify." Anything, a spark in the Gulf, for example, can lead to reversal. However, the entire world, big and small powers, would look cautiously forward to the total destruction of nuclear weapons and the possibility of agreement on a substantial reduction in the conventional forces in Europe, as Mr. Gorbachev put it.

It is largely due to the new Soviet leadership, their new philosophy of openness and reconstruction of society, that this Treaty became a reality. It builds hopes that the two leaders will not put their heads together to resolve some of the ticklish and complicated problems such as the armed conflicts in the Gulf and, nearer home, in Afghanistan, not forget the deep festering wounds of Palestine.

08309

Commentary Alleges Weakness Brought Superpowers to Summit
52004701 Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
12 Dec 87 p 4

[Text] The Third Summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has ended in Washington with smiles and handshakes, and of course, the signing of an INF accord. Both leaders have referred to the Summit as a constructive one. President Reagan in fact called it a "clear success," while Mr. Gorbachev said that what had been achieved had "on the whole justified his hopes." If the expectation was for the summit to produce a breakthrough on the issue of long range strategic weapons, that has not been realised. Nor was there any breakthrough on regional issues, principally Afghanistan and the Gulf War. In his speech at the conclusion of the Summit, President Reagan did not report progress on regional issues. Nor did he say whether he will be going to Moscow next year. Certainly on the Gulf issue, Washington does not seem to have made headway in getting Moscow's support for an arms embargo against Iran.

So this really turned out to be an arms control Summit, although both leaders would obviously want to use the framework established by the summit for better relations between the two adversaries. This was a summit that both leaders needed for their own domestic reasons. President Reagan, has over the last few months faced one setback after another, ranging from the Iran-Contra

fallout, the Bork nomination, to the Wall Street crash. He wished then to restore some lustre to a fading and weakened Presidency. For Mr. Gorbachev on the other hand, a foreign policy success (even the modest one symbolised by the INF treaty) was essential to give him room to manoeuvre on the domestic front, especially in the face of problems and criticism encountered by his reform programme. From this perspective both leaders were seeking to make the Summit a success out of essentially domestic compulsions. In the process, however, the 'atmospherics' generated could help lead to an improvement in superpower relations. Whether this marks the start of 'Detente II' is a question that will only be answered in the months to come.

In one significant sense, however, there was an air of unreality about the superpower parleys in Washington. As the leaders of the two most militarily powerful and technologically advanced powers discussed issues around the world, one thing must have been apparent. The world they were discussing is no longer the one where superpower dictates apply or indeed one which is subject to the kind of superpower influence seen in the past. Both the superpowers have been humbled by forces, short on advanced technology but long on resolution and faith. The Soviets have found this in Afghanistan while the Americans have found this in their confrontation with Iran. The declining global influence of the superpowers is an important and distinctive feature of the contemporary world. No longer can the superpowers reshape and reorder the world in line with their own interests, if indeed they ever could. No Yaltas are possible today. The predominant sentiment in the Third World is best epitomised by the expression 'neither East nor West.' But these are realities that are hard for either Washington or Moscow to acknowledge. Coming to terms with them however, can contribute more to world peace than any number of Summits.

08309

USSR Summit Hailed as Beginning of Mature Relationship
52004702 Karachi *DAWN in English* 18 Dec 87 p 22

[Article by Shameem Akhtar: "A Major Step Toward Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The two sides had done enough homework on the INF draft treaty—a 200-page document which had been negotiated by the experts for 32 months—to ensure that the summit makes a hit. And it did, partially.

Both Ronald Reagan who has entered the lame duck year of his presidency and Mikhail Gorbachev, who has run in to problems with the old guard needed this breakthrough, the beginnings of which had been made at Reykjavik.

There, at the Iceland summit, a deal on the long-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons foundered on the rock of SDI or President Reagan's Star Wars programme. After some time the Soviet Union in a gesture of accommodation delinked the issue of INF and shorter-range weapons with that of the SDI. Yet another obstacle was removed when the West German Chancellor, Kohl agreed to remove 72 Pershing I missiles with US warheads from his territory. By signing a treaty on INF that eliminates—and not just cuts—a whole class of land-based medium and shorter-range weapons—2,800 missiles with 3,800 warheads from Europe and Asia President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev have made history.

These weapons operate in a range varying from 500 to 5,000 kms and are targeted against East and West Europe. A study of the treaty document shows that the US had deployed a larger number of longer-range INF missiles in West Europe and the Soviet Union had removed a number of its SS20s and SS4s early this year. Neither of these figures were published by the US officials but they were mentioned in the text of the treaty.

Under this treaty the US will have to dismantle 364 warheads in addition to spares. The Soviet Union will scrap a total of 1,567 warheads, including 441 SS20s (1,332 warheads) of which 270 (710 warheads) are deployed in Eastern Europe and the rest in Asia. In addition 112 SS4s (2,000 km), 132 missiles belonging to SS12, SS22 (900 km) and SS23 (500 km) categories each with a single warhead will be destroyed. The destruction of this arsenal shall be completed within 3 years.

What gives credibility to the treaty is the establishment of a near-foolproof verification regime. To safeguard against violation and cheating, both on-the-spot and short-notice inspection of the missile sites, bases and repair facilities would be permitted for 10 years.

Furthermore, the US and USSR have agreed to allow each other's teams to monitor their test explosions in the Nevada desert and Semipalatinsk. Both the NATO and Warsaw alliances have endorsed the treaty and the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, West Germany and Hungary have signed agreement permitting verification under the INF accord.

With eyes to the Senate, President Reagan emphasised the fact that he had made a good bargain by eliminating one for four Soviet warheads. It certainly is asymmetrical reduction. Won't this serve as a model for reduction in conventional weapons of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries? With the exception of Britain and France still harbouring nuclear dreams, the remaining West European States, including West Germany, would be only too glad to get rid of the nuclear arsenal which makes them vulnerable to genocidal weapons. Mr Gorbachev has recognized the concern of NATO's European members over what they believe to be Warsaw Pact countries' overwhelming superiority in tank, artillery and aircraft.

In a recent meeting with the West German Foreign Minister, Genscher, the Chief Soviet Arms negotiator, Victor Karpov conceded the two-to-one superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in tanks and promised to remove the imbalance. If Mr Gorbachev agrees—as he might—to asymmetrical reduction of the conventional arsenal of the Warsaw alliance, the development will have far-reaching implications for the prospects of detente in Europe. The two leaders have expressed support for the balanced reduction talks under way in Vienna.

The 3-day summit made some progress on 50 percent cut in the land-based long-range missiles. On this an agreement in principle was already reached at Reykjavik but the deal was wrecked owing to SDI. Although the Soviet position on linkage between the long-range missile and strategic defence initiative hasn't basically changed, there has been some movement toward a compromise whereby the US will have to agree to the extension of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, possibly for 10 years during which period the two would not deploy the weapon. While such an agreement will only postpone the deployment of the space weapon for a specified period, the US and USSR would, however, continue their research and testing in this field. President Reagan has made it a point of personal prestige and has repeatedly said before and after the summit that his Star Wars programme is not a bargaining chip. Meanwhile, the Western media has disclosed that the Soviets have been engaged in research and development on space satellites, lasers and X-rays since the 60s and have been spending 2 billion dollars a year on their programme—a revelation confirmed by Mr Gorbachev himself.

Early next year, when the two sides get down to business they would find a lot to talk about on limits and scope of the testing of the space-based weapons.

The American and Soviet leaders have agreed to enter into bilateral agreement or support move for convention aimed at the destruction of chemical weapons.

Another positive indication of a thaw in Soviet-American relations is the 9 December agreement for the expansion of commercial airline service between the two countries. Besides, the two sides have agreed to cooperate in the protection of environment and stratospherics. Already there exists an arrangement under the Helsinki Accord to promote such exchanges but owing to the chill in the Soviet-American relations little headway could be made.

Although arms reduction is central to a meaningful detente in US-Soviet relations, there are other issues on which the two sides are at loggerheads: regional conflicts. President Reagan has vowed to press Mr Gorbachev for a definite deadline for the Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan. Anxious to pull out his 115,000 troops from there, Mr Gorbachev had indicated even before the summit that an evacuation maybe completed within a year provided the US stopped the financial and military

aid to the insurgents. For his part Mr Reagan seemed willing to help the Soviet's pullout of the Afghan quagmire but he has been blowing hot and cold in the same breath. The US administration stepped up military aid to the Afghan insurgents, arming them with Stinger missiles: Only recently President Reagan played host to the leaders of Afghan insurgency and pledged them full support in the struggle. He went to the extent of saying that his administration would not stop military assistance to the insurgents even after the Soviet withdrawal for fear that the 'puppet' Kabul government would be powerful enough to crush the Afghan resistance.

In return, therefore, Mr Gorbachev offered nothing new; he simply repeated his earlier position on troops withdrawal, linking it with the stopping of US aid to the rebels. Mr Gorbachev however, assured Mr Reagan that Moscow would not seek a pro-Soviet government in Kabul provided the US, too, did not seek to install a pro-American government after the Soviet withdrawal. In other words, the Soviet leader has offered to set up a neutral government presumably headed by the former ruler Zahir Shah.

Until lately, both Kabul and Moscow had been insisting on a pro-Soviet coalition headed by Zahir-Shah. But such a coalition can be formed only by negotiations between the ruling and the opposition parties—a purely internal matter. At the beginning of the year the Kabul Government invited the opposition parties, including the Pakistan-based 7-party alliance, to participate in the formation of a coalition government to replace the present one. The insurgents rejected the offer. Instead, they demand the abdication of the Kabul government in their favour!

To Moscow, the insurgents, however, assure that given authority, they would maintain friendly relations with

the Soviet Union. If the Reagan Administration wants Soviet evacuation from Afghanistan, it will have to persuade the Afghan insurgents to negotiate a political settlement aimed at the establishment of a neutral coalition government in the country. So at the Washington summit there was no progress on Afghanistan as the two leaders kept arguing in circles.

It seems that on the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Angola, and Nicaragua, the Big Two simply exchanged their views—at times bluntly. Their positions on these issues are so far apart that they could not come anywhere nearer a solution. They, however, agreed to promote a peaceful solution of regional conflicts possibly through the UN on the basis of respect for security and sovereignty of the state concerned.

On the human rights issue, the Soviet leader reminded President Reagan that he should stop acting like a prosecutor because he had no right to lecture to him. In the past the Soviet leader reminded his critics about the plight of the blacks and Red Indians in the US and the Irish and Asian immigrants in the United Kingdom and the unemployed in America and Western democracies. He seems to have impressed his American audience with the sincerity of his efforts to open the Soviet society and liberalise the system. Although his host feels that a lot more remains to be done, he admitted that lately the Soviet Union has released some political prisoners but thousands still remain in jail.

Regardless of the merit of the arguments of the two sides, the very fact that they can have a free and frank dialogue on such a touchy subject bears evident of the beginning of a healthy and mature relationship.

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Results of Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting
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[Article by N. Koliukov under "Realities of the Contemporary World" rubric: "New Political Thinking in Action: On the Results of the Berlin Meeting of the PCC of the Warsaw Pact Member States"]

[Text] The meetings of the top leaders of the seven socialist states united by the Warsaw Pact always attract close attention throughout the world. Politicians and military people, participants in the antinuclear movement, and broad groups of the international public are closely following the new steps of the socialist defensive alliance, which for more than 30 years now has been one of the most important factors in European and international security.

As a rule, such meetings are accompanied by new proposals for the resolution of the most urgent problems in world politics. So it was this year as well, when on 29 May the Political Consultative Committee [PCC] of the Warsaw Pact member states completed its work in the capital of the GDR. The interest in the conference in Berlin was all the more justified by the fact that observers were also evaluating its results from the point of view of the changes taking place in the socialist countries, especially the course of the restructuring of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

The Berlin conference carefully analyzed the results of the implementation of a coordinated foreign-policy course in the year that has passed since the time of the previous meeting of the PCC in Budapest, including the progress of the program then put forward for a radical reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. There was an intensive exchange of opinions on the key questions of our time—the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the guaranteeing of the peaceful future of the socialist states and the entire world community.

The result was the adoption of three important documents: a document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states, a communique and a document on ways to overcome underdevelopment.

I

On the threshold of the 21st century, when colossal stockpiles of nuclear missiles and other weapons threatening the very existence of humanity have been accumulated, when the very course of scientific-technical progress has so raised the degree of interdependence of states that they can resolve common, regional and even many national problems only through joint efforts, the task of ensuring one's own security as well as the security of one's allies can no longer be resolved through former

traditional methods. The entire experience of the post-war decades confirms the senselessness of the arms race, the danger from the military confrontation of the two social systems, and the tremendous and, in a certain sense, irreplaceable loss for all states from the refusal to cooperate with one another in the name of the preservation of peace and life on earth.

Needed are a new political thinking and a new responsible and nonconfrontational approach to the questions of war and peace and disarmament as well as to other complex global and regional problems. It is necessary to reveal those points and zones of contact of the states of both systems where their long-term vital interests objectively coincide. It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the mutual fears dictated above all by security interests and therefore for both sides to take definite steps aimed at overcoming such fears and at the establishment and strengthening of mutual trust on the basis of the predictability of the behavior of each side in some situation or other.

And objective observer will doubtless note that the documents adopted at the conference in Berlin are imbued with precisely the new political thinking and an attempt to apply it to a large number of problems of our time, problems that, as a rule, cannot be put off and also cannot be resolved by individual states or groups of states.

Decades of "cold war" and the arms race led to a piling up of unresolved problems and humanity has already reached a dangerous point: whether it is a matter of the arms race, the increasing disparity in the levels of development of states, or of the contamination, critical in a number of cases, of the environment. It is natural that the increase in problems was accompanied by an increase in efforts to resolve them and to find ways for humanity to survive, a search that is continuing on both sides of the social boundary dividing the contemporary world.

"Nuclear war must never be unleashed and there can be no winners in it," the USSR and United States "will not strive to achieve military superiority." These fundamental conclusions reflect the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva in 1985. Here, in essence, is the point of departure for the development of a different nonfrontational approach to the basic task of our time—the prevention of nuclear war. To this one should add the obvious fact of the increase in the interdependence of states and the interweaving of their strategic and other interests. Finally, a common understanding of the fact that not a single one of the current global problems can be resolved outside the framework of the comprehensive and long-term cooperation of many and, at times, of all the states of the world without exception.

It may be that these postulates alone are enough to construct a model of a secure world. A single condition is needed for it to work. And it is named in the communique of the Berlin conference: "the uniting of the efforts

of all states and all peace-loving forces, the strengthening of trust in the relations between states, especially those belonging to different social systems, and between their military-political alliances, and the correct understanding of the concerns, objectives and intentions toward one another in the military area."

But this model, being limited by such a general statement, would be only an abstraction. Real politicians met in Berlin, leaders not only bearing responsibility for the fate of their own states but also having a certain responsibility for European and international security. They needed to give answers to all acute questions in European and world politics, constructive answers that would take into account the interests of their own security as well as the security of the other side and the preservation of international stability. It was necessary to work out an approach to the real and, as everyone knows, sometimes very profound contradictions of the contemporary world that could attract the attention of the West and outline the prospects for cooperation where it is already possible and, at the same time, the contours of joint actions in the future.

It is not difficult to see that the documents of the Berlin conference of the PCC contain proposals on possible political compromises in the area, for example, of nuclear disarmament, in the approach to the determination of a forum for negotiations on problems in reducing conventional arms, in expressing the willingness to remove all nuclear weapons from the corridor along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on a mutual basis, and elsewhere. Well, the method of compromise, natural in relations between states in general, is becoming practically the only possible method in resolving disputes in the age of nuclear missiles. And this is just one of the postulates of the new political thinking.

The lively interest with which the documents of the Berlin meeting of the PCC met in the world indicate that they were a practical contribution of allied socialist states to the development of political dialogue between East and West. They were still another step in the destruction of those political and psychological stereotypes that prevent one from seeing the realities of our time and from realizing their dramatic nature and the urgent necessity of restructuring both political thinking and mass consciousness.

The program of action formulated in Berlin and its individual components also encountered opposition, of course, above all in the circles of the North Atlantic alliance. Well, this also helps the broad public everywhere in the world to compare the objectives and means of both alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the arguments put forward by both sides and to come to their own realization as to who is in reality increasing tension and who is seeking to reduce it.

Understandably, the platform of the Berlin conference did not arise in a vacuum. It was the continuation of the foreign-policy concept of the 27th CPSU Congress, of the congresses of fraternal socialist countries, on the line of the preceding conferences of the PCC, especially in Sofia and Budapest, and of a number of major actions aimed at reducing the level of confrontation in the world arena recently undertaken by the Warsaw Pact member states both collectively as well as individually. The new documents of the allied socialist states also take into full account the special critical nature of the international situation, when the shape of a practical agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe was outlined and when it appeared possible to destroy operational-tactical missiles here as well and thus to disrupt for the first time the "ugly endlessness" of the nuclear arms race and to reverse it.

The Berlin documents also outline a long-term goal that the socialist countries are seeking to achieve. It is a matter of the gradual formation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Comprehensive both in the sense of including all states large and small belonging to different social systems as well as in the sense of covering different spheres of security of each state: military and political, economic and humanitarian. National security in our time and especially in the future will be guaranteed not only through military means. Other aspects of security are also important. The participants in the Berlin conference proposed adding to the four indicated spheres interaction in the area of ecological security, the understanding of the necessity of which is increasing in the public consciousness and in the consciousness of every person.

"Such a system of security," they declared, "would lead to the building of a nuclear-free world in which the application of force or the threat of force would be excluded and the relations between peoples would be built in a spirit of mutual respect, friendship and cooperation. The initiative of the socialist countries is aimed at overcoming approaches of confrontation and at affirming civilized norms and an atmosphere of glasnost, openness and trust in international relations."

Glasnost, openness and trust in international affairs—a system of security built on such a basis would doubtless be solid and would dependably guard the interests of different states, including those within one's own social and political system. It is a noble goal but is it achievable in our world torn by contradictions and conflicts? The future will answer this. But to approach this goal, it is necessary to begin the movement right now. The unanimous adoption of the document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states at the Berlin conference was a step in this direction and a major one at that, the first of its kind.

II

Each state participating in the Warsaw Pact, and this is natural, has its own military doctrine reflecting the geopolitical and other peculiarities of the country and

defining the tasks and objectives of its armed forces and consequently the nature and special features of their formation in peacetime. But the states united by the Warsaw Pact in the name of the defense of their own security also have common defensive military-political goals that in part coincide with their national objectives and in part are beyond their scope. The document signed in Berlin reflects these above all. "The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, just as that of each of its participants," it states, "conforms to the task of not permitting war, be it nuclear or conventional."

Because of the very nature of the socialist social order, these states favor the resolution of all international disputes through peaceful and political means only. They have not and are not linking their future to a military resolution of international problems. For countries with a different social order, however, this path is fraught with unpredictable consequences, for in a nuclear and space age the world has become too fragile for war and a policy of force.

By the way, at the political level, this truth is sometimes recognized in the West as well. At the military level, however, one sometimes hears a candid declaration of the possibility of a preventive strike, "limited" nuclear war, and the like. And even the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" is a graphic example of the politics of force. In this connection, it was stated unequivocally: "World war, especially nuclear war, would have catastrophic consequences not just for the countries directly involved in the conflict but also for life itself on earth."

Here attention is drawn to the words: "world war, especially nuclear war." That is, even if one can imagine a situation where in the course of a conflict the sides refrain from the use of nuclear weapons but the scale of the conflict becomes global, the consequences will probably also be catastrophic for the inhabitants of the earth. It suffices to think about the peaceful nuclear targets that will inevitably be subjected to destruction, even through nonnuclear weapons, and about the rivers that have been dammed up. Not to mention the fact that the destructive force of conventional arms is growing rapidly.

The military doctrine of the allies in the Warsaw Pact is strictly defensive. Its essence is expressed in the Berlin document through the following positions. The participants in the pact

—will never under any circumstances begin military actions against any state or alliance of states if they themselves do not become the object of an armed attack;

—will never be the first to use nuclear weapons;

—have no territorial claims on any state;

—do not view a single state or a single people as their enemy and are prepared to build relations with all countries on the basis of mutual consideration of the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

It must be said that realistically thinking circles of the Western public have recently also been working out various concepts of "nonoffensive defense"—the reduction of the number and establishment of purely defensive structures of conventional armed forces. But this presupposes the rejection of nuclear weapons. And, as shown by the recent debates in the NATO countries in connection with the problem of medium-range missiles, the leading circles are not prepared to do this. They are still depending on the strategy of "nuclear deterrence."

The socialist countries recognize very well that as long as relations of trust have not been established in the international community and as long as there is a real threat of aggression they are forced to maintain the necessary defense potential and to keep their armed forces in such a composition and at such a level that would permit them to repel any attack from outside against any state participating in the pact.

In Berlin, it was declared firmly that if an attack is made against the allied states they will repel the aggressor decisively.

To describe the necessary arms and armed forces for this and the degree of their military preparedness, the document uses the concept of "adequacy" and the "limits of adequacy for defense and for the repulsion of a possible aggression." The concept of adequacy is indefinite in this context, of course, and it cannot be otherwise. It is important, however, that it correlate the level of armed forces with the extent of the threat from the potential aggressor and that it establish their interdependence and therefore make it possible for there to be mutual balanced reductions.

They utilize the correlation, the interrelationship for determining the degree of security for which the allied states are striving: the socialist states are not seeking greater security than other countries but neither will they settle for less. In the West, some political analysts assess this formula, first recognized at the 27th CPSU Congress, as a "major reinterpretation" of basic requirements in the area of security by the Soviet Union. "Gorbachev," writes one of them, "is the first Soviet leader who has analyzed the link between national and general security, the idea that the security of one country is linked with the security of other countries and that its loss by the adversary is not at all necessarily a gain for us."

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact precedes from the existence of military strategic parity, which is seen as a "decisive factor in not permitting war." Parity is not a goal in itself, however, but a means to ensure security. And a further increase in the level of parity, that is, a

continuation of the arms race "on equal terms" does not lead to greater security. It is rather on the contrary. There is only one conclusion, that one should do everything possible so that balance of military forces is maintained at lower and lower levels. "Under these conditions," states the document on military doctrine, "the stopping of the arms race and the implementation of measures for real disarmament attain truly historic importance."

Further, it formulates six basic goals of the participants in the Warsaw Pact flowing out of the defensive nature of their military doctrine—from the prohibition and elimination of nuclear, chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction, the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, and the strict verification of disarmament measures to the establishment of zones of a reduced concentration of arms and increased confidence in different regions of the world and the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is thereby important that in each case intermediate goals be formulated and definite stages outlined through which the reduction of arms will take place. There is emphasis on the specification of the theme of mutual security and on the bilateral and reciprocal nature of the entire process of the reduction of tension and the increase in confidence.

It may seem strange to some that the military-political union of socialist states is proposing, and not for the first time, its own dissolution as its final objective. It goes against "Parkinson's Law," according to which an organization, once it has arisen, will strive above all to consolidate itself and to justify its own existence. By this very means, however, the socialist states are again stressing that the Warsaw Pact is an instrument for strengthening their overall security under conditions in which there is a military bloc of imperialist states and a continuing threat of aggression. When and if these conditions change, there will no longer be a necessity of providing for the collective security of the European socialist states in such a way.

The publication of the document on military doctrine doubtless makes it possible to understand better the objectives and intentions of the allies in the Warsaw Pact, the true rather than the supposed objectives that imperialist propaganda is trying to attribute to them. To remove possible misunderstandings in this connection, the allied states proposed to the NATO countries the holding of consultations with the purpose of the detailed comparison of the military doctrines of both alliances and the analysis of their nature and directions of evolution. Such consultations would help "to eliminate the mutual suspicion and mistrust that have accumulated over the years and to achieve a better understanding of each other's intentions." They would be a substantial step on the way to strengthening trust in relations among the states of both alliances, the shortage of which continues to have a negative impact on the European and world political climate.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union and its allies have their own concerns in relation to the NATO military doctrine. We remember how strategic goals "with respect to Russia" were formulated in the documents of the first postwar years that have now been declassified. We recall the directive of the U.S. National Security Council, whose authors dreamed of seeing the Soviet Union "weak in the political, military and psychological relations in comparison with outside forces beyond the bounds of its control." We also know that the United States and NATO are betting on a "preventive strike" and on the first use of nuclear weapons. One of the goals of the consultations proposed in Berlin is to remove the concerns associated with these and other aspects of the NATO military doctrine. The countries of the Warsaw Pact, in turn, are prepared to give the other side the necessary explanations in relation to its own military doctrine.

Another subject of consultations could be the imbalances and asymmetries arising in individual types of arms and armed forces of the two sides by virtue of historical, geographic and other reasons. The participants in the Warsaw Pact proposed to the NATO countries that they jointly, through consultations with each other, determine ways to eliminate such imbalances and asymmetries on the basis of reductions by the side that is ahead in some type of arms or other. Such a refinement is necessary because in the NATO countries the prospect of reducing nuclear arms in Europe has given rise to demands for "additional armament," for an increase in particular types of arms, which understandably would not serve the objective of strengthening mutual security.

The publication of the document on military doctrine is evidence of the great responsibility of the Warsaw Pact member states for the fate of peace in Europe and in general and is a specific expression of the new political thinking and search for construction solutions to the urgent problems of security in the age of nuclear missiles.

III

The fundamental positions of military doctrine are supported by the practical measures in the disarmament area, above all nuclear disarmament, formulated in the communique. Today there is no task more important and more urgent than to stop the slide of mankind toward nuclear catastrophe. The meeting in Berlin established that it has now become possible to take definite practical steps toward this goal.

Paramount here is the proposal on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and simultaneously of operational-tactical missiles (talks would be held on such missiles in the eastern part of the USSR and in the territory of the United States). It is proposed to resolve the question of tactical nuclear weapons in multilateral negotiations in the spirit of the Budapest initiative of 1986.

The leaders of the allied socialist states declared themselves in favor of developing "key positions" relative to strategic offensive arms and the strengthening of the operation of the agreement on ABM defense as well as nuclear tests. These positions could become the subject of an agreement during the next Soviet-American summit meeting, which, as everyone knows, could take place before the end of this year.

The Berlin conference paid close attention to ways to implement a program for reducing armed forces and conventional arms on the European continent—from the Atlantic to the Urals—simultaneously and together with tactical nuclear weapons. Contemplated is the gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional arms to a level where "neither of the sides, in ensuring its own defense, would have the means for a surprise attack against the other side or for the carrying out of offensive operations in general." A meeting of the foreign ministers of the European states, the United States and Canada could set the stage for full-scale negotiations on this account.

In confirming their good will, the allied socialist states declared their willingness to show maximum restraint with respect to their military potentials. Being prepared on a mutual basis not to increase their armed forces and conventional arms and to declare a moratorium of 1 to 2 years on increasing military expenditures, they called upon the NATO countries to exhibit the same approach.

They emphasized the importance of the specific steps recently taken by the European Socialist states to reduce the level of confrontation in Europe, to increase confidence and to strengthen stability on the continent. These steps include proposals on the establishment of zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons and a nuclear-free corridor 300 kilometers wide along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, above all in central Europe. They expressed the willingness for a mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of arms from the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances.

The provision of an adequate and effective system of verification based on a combination of national technical means and international procedures, including the establishment of the appropriate international authorities, exchange of military information, and performance of on-site inspections, is attaining extreme importance in the transition to practical disarmament measures. The allied socialist states are proceeding from the fact that verification of the reduction of nuclear weapons must be guaranteed in all stages and all places; measures for the verification of the military activity of the troops remaining after reductions must also be provided for in the area of conventional arms.

At the present time, the development of the overall European process is concentrated at the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has

now entered into a critical stage in the elaboration of agreements called upon to raise good neighborliness and cooperation in our common European home to a new level. This set of questions was examined at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states in March of this year in Moscow and was also discussed at the conference in Berlin. Having expressed their willingness to take an active part in general European cooperation, the socialist countries firmly declared that peace and good neighborly cooperation in Europe can be guaranteed only under the condition of respect for the existing territorial and political realities on the continent. At the same time, there was strong condemnation of the activities of revanchist forces, above all in the FRG, and of the promotion of revanchism wherever it may be.

IV

As everyone knows, the Warsaw Pact covers the region of Europe, historically having been intended for the strengthening of security on the continent. But it is obvious that this task cannot be resolved, especially today, if one ignores the situation in other regions of the globe, in the world at large. That is why the meetings of the PCC, as a rule, examine ways to regulate regional conflicts in the world and to strengthen the interaction of the entire world community in the main directions for guaranteeing international security.

The Berlin conference examined the subject of the developing countries under two aspects. First, from the point of view of the elimination of existing conflicts and sources of tension there. Second, under the aspect of the overcoming of underdevelopment and the establishment of a new international economic order.

The Warsaw Pact member states declared their support for the course of the achievement of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and the very rapid political settlement of the situation around it on the basis of the cessation of all interference in the internal affairs of this country and respect for its independence and sovereignty. As everyone knows, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is foreseen in the framework of such a settlement.

They also expressed their attitude toward other conflicts existing in the world: they noted the necessity of consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula and of resolving all conflicts and problems in Southeast Asia through political means and by way of negotiations and stressed their demand for the cessation of aggressive actions against Nicaragua. The top leaders of the seven socialist states expressed themselves resolutely in favor of recognizing the right of each nation to determine the course of its own political and economic development freely and without interference from outside.

The document "On Overcoming Underdevelopment and the Establishment of a New International Political Order" adopted at the Berlin conference summarizes the approach of the participants in the Warsaw Pact to one of the most important global problems of our time.

The central conclusion drawn in the document is that only disarmament can liberate additional resources for overcoming economic backwardness. Each step on the way to limiting arms and disarmament must result in the freeing of additional means for this purpose. The flagrant discrepancy between the colossal expenditures for the support of the military machine and the intensification of the arms race, including attempts to transfer it to space, and the distress of many developing countries must be eliminated.

Underdevelopment is the result primarily of the prolonged colonial exploitation. But today the system of imperialism continues to exist largely through the robbery of developing countries, their exploitation in neo-colonial forms, and the striving of transnational monopolies to shift the burden of economic crises to them. To overcome underdevelopment, it is essential to have a new international economic order and a fair international division of labor and to achieve sovereignty over national natural resources.

The document pays considerable attention to the problem of the indebtedness of the developing countries in foreign exchange, which now exceeds \$1 trillion. This problem, which arose largely as a result of the exploitive policy of the Western nations and the unfavorable trade conditions for developing countries, has gone beyond economic bounds and become a factor complicating international life. The participants in the Warsaw Pact spoke out in favor of a complex of measures aimed at limiting the size of annual payments of external debts, including the rejection of protectionism, the reduction of interest rates on loans and credits, and the restructuring of the international foreign exchange and financial system. The United Nations could play an important role in this process.

The allied socialist states demanded that arbitrariness and illegal embargoes, boycotts and trade, credit and technological blockades be excluded from international economic relations and that goods be freely admitted to international markets. They are prepared to activate economic cooperation with developing countries and to share with them experience in resolving such key problems as the formation of a rational national economic structure, the establishment of a state sector, and the development of their own scientific potential. The participants in the Warsaw Pact supported the striving of developing countries for a strengthening of cooperation with each other and for solidarity and unity and came out in favor of the convocation of a worldwide forum in which there would be comprehensive discussion of the problem of a new international economic order.

* * *

The Berlin conference was a major new milestone in the development of the political interaction of socialist countries. Its participants spoke out in favor of making foreign-policy cooperation more dynamic and of further improving the mechanism of such cooperation. The establishment of a multilateral group for current reciprocal information comprised of representatives of all states participating in the Warsaw Pact was a specific step in this direction. A special commission on disarmament questions will also be a new organ in the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact. The group and the commission established in Berlin are called upon to play an important role in the formation of a coordinated foreign-policy course of fraternal countries and in the activation of the work of each of them in the international arena.

In speaking in Berlin on the occasion of the conclusion of the PCC conference, the head of the Polish delegation W. Jaruzelski stressed that socialism has entered into a period of great fundamental changes that will determine its place in the history of the planet on the threshold of a new millennium. "The tremendous spiritual forces and human and material reserves of our social system and the reliable Leninist compass of our parties," he said, "give us the assurance that socialism will meet the demands of history and will always serve for all humanity as a synonym of peace, fairness and progress."

The political results of the conference in the capital of the GDR will long influence the development of world events and the entire set of relations between East and West. In the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, it has once again demonstrated the indissoluble bond between socialism and peace and the great responsibility with which the socialist states are approaching the building of the peaceful future of our planet.

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Danish Professor Discusses Nonaggressive Defense

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[Article by Professor Anders Boserup under the rubric "Forum in Moscow": "Road to Trust: 'Non-aggressive Defense'"]

[Text] In discussing nuclear disarmament in Europe it is important not to lose sight of its close connection with the question of conventional disarmament. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe is not only (perhaps not even primarily) their physical presence but the role they play in the military doctrines, especially on the Western

side. The tactical and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals in Europe are a source of danger and instability not because they are deployed in this continent, but because such is their purpose, their role being to lend credibility to a threat of nuclear escalation which is inherently incredible.

The Western belief that its conventional forces are so outnumbered that it must keep open the option of first use of nuclear weapons is well known. Whether this corresponds to the truth does not matter, but as long as this remains the public perception it will be easy for opponents of nuclear disarmament to block all significant disarmament measures by presenting them as a security hazard for the West.

I think one has to face the fact that true denuclearization of Europe will not come about unless both sides are convinced that their conventional forces, taken alone, provide sufficient, even amply sufficient defence.

This makes nuclear disarmament in Europe conditional on the achievement of an adequate balance of the conventional level. The obvious difficulty is, that this balance is not a question of simple numerical equality between the forces of NATO and of the WTO; it is not a question of a formal balance but of a real balance where commanders on both sides feel sure that they have all it takes to fend off an attack, even under the most unfavourable circumstances.

This being so, it is clear that the security concerns of both sides cannot be reconciled simply by altering the relative size of the opposing armies. It can only be done by changing the character of the forces and ensuring that they are much stronger when fighting in the defensive than they are when fighting offensively. The condition for genuine balance is therefore not the equality of the forces on the two sides but two inequalities connecting the relative strength of two opponents, "a" and "b," when fighting in a defensive and in an offensive mode:

$$D(a) > O(b) \text{ and } D(b) > O(a)$$

This situation of "mutual defensive superiority" is the true condition of balance and stability at the military level. It is the basis of the idea of non-offensive" or "non-threatening" defence and it is, I believe, the only possible basis on which one could establish lasting confidence and speak meaningfully of "common security."

In the present context let it simply be noted that in principle these inequalities can be satisfied either through a common effort to shift the emphasis in the force structures towards more defensive types, or through unilateral measures. It is clear, however, that the military requirements to be met if a condition of mutual defensive superiority is to be implemented unilaterally are much greater than in the case of joint implementation.

Today's highly mobile and heavily armoured units are strike forces. As long as they are the mainstay of the armies on both sides, there is no hope of true balance in the above sense. Not surprisingly: they are after all the direct descendants of the German panzer divisions which were specifically designed for a swift-moving offensive mode of warfare. Should it ever come to war in Europe, what we need is not rapid penetration and swift decision but forces so designed that the armies would quickly grind to a halt due to the superiority of that side which fights in the defensive.

This is not the place to discuss what forces might look like. This question has been examined at length in the Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces in Europe with the participation of scholars, soldiers and others from East and West.

Four factors in the present situation which give rise to particular concern are, however, worth mentioning:

1) The enormous amount of armour arrayed on the Eastern side which seems to reflect a doctrine of "offensive defence," designed to ensure that the theatre of operations in case of war is pushed as far to the West as possible. Such a doctrine would be readily understandable in view of the Soviet and East European experience in World War II. Nevertheless I believe that it does not serve the true interests of the Soviet Union and of its allies because it is an absolute impediment to effective nuclear disarmament and to the establishment of a regime of common security in Europe for the reasons given above.

2) The Western reliance on nuclear escalation whose destabilizing character has already been touched upon.

3) The strike aircraft deployed in large numbers on both sides. Air forces seem to be a particularly destabilizing element because they are both vulnerable and threatening. In a severe crisis the pressures for pre-emption could become irresistible, particularly in view of the fact that both sides would have to fear preemption by the opponent.

4) Deep-strike concepts, notably "Follow-on Forces Attack" (FOFA) in the West and "Operational Manoeuvre Groups" (OMG) in the East. These are destabilizing if, as must be assumed, their capability for deep penetration threatens the defences on the other side.

In the last few years the interest in the idea of non-offensive defence has been growing rapidly in Western Europe. It has been endorsed in one form or another by the Social Democratic Parties in the Federal Republic and in Denmark, by the Labour Party in Britain and by some smaller Socialist and Centrist Parties as well.

But there is also strong opposition to the idea, mostly because it is always seen as implying a Western concession with no *guid pro quo*. It is then easy to claim that implementation of the idea of non-offensive (or less-offensive) defence would fatally weaken the West and expose it to military pressure. If the idea of joint East-West effort to establish a regime of mutual defensive superiority in Europe seemed a real possibility, the focus would shift radically and there would be little left of the objections.

Given the interest in several West European countries, a Soviet initiative that made the pursuit of mutual defensiveness a proclaimed goal of national policy could dramatically influence the prospects for disarmament in Europe.

There are also encouraging signs that government circles are increasingly recognizing the importance of curtailing offensive capabilities and achieving mutual defensive superiority.

First Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary, Gyula Horn, has been speaking recently of the need to extend the concept of sufficient security to conventional weapons adding that "this would mean reducing conventional arsenals to defensive weapons, with offensive weapons eliminated from the system of security."

On the opposite side, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, Hans-Dietrich-Genscher, has been speaking of "the creation of cooperative security structures in Europe" which preserve the alliances but are "so designed in terms of the armament, equipment, structure, geographical deployment and doctrine of the armed forces that each side has only the capability for defence, not, however, the capability for attack and invasion." Again, I interpret certain parts of the Budapest Address as going in the same direction. In this address the member states of the Warsaw Treaty recognized the need to base the military concepts and doctrine of the military alliances on defensive principles and proposed to work out procedures for the reduction of armed forces and armaments such that this process would lead to the lessening of the dangers of a sudden attack and would promote the consolidation of military-strategic stability on the European continent.

While recognizing the importance of such openings it is also a fact that they have been in a low key, almost like side remarks, and easy to overlook. In the West, at any rate, these signals have not been heard, and their potential significance has not been understood by the public. I believe that the idea of "mutual defensive superiority," of "jointly shifting towards more defensive force structures" or whatever else it may be called could have strong public appeal, East and West because it is so plainly the only logical approach to confidence, disarmament and true security in Europe.

In the last few years the interest in the idea of non-offensive defence has been growing rapidly in Western Europe. It has been endorsed in one form or another by the Social Democratic Parties in the Federal Republic and in Denmark, by the Labour Party in Britain and by some smaller Socialist and Centrist Parties as well.

But there is also strong opposition to the idea, mostly because it is always seen as implying a Western concession with no *guid pro quo*. It is then easy to claim that implementation of the idea of nonoffensive (or less-offensive) defence would fatally weaken the West and expose it to military pressure. If the idea of joint East-West effort to establish a regime of mutual defensive superiority in Europe seemed a real possibility, the focus would shift radically and there would be little left of the objections.

Given the interest in several West European countries, a Soviet initiative that made the pursuit of mutual defensiveness a proclaimed goal of national policy could dramatically influence the prospects for disarmament in Europe.

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of "jointly shifting towards more defensive force structures" or whatever else it may be called could have strong public appeal, East and West, because it is so plainly the only logical approach to confidence, disarmament and true security in Europe.

This suggests that the time is ripe for a clear, public commitment at the very highest political level to this as a long-term goal. This would be a strong political signal of the will to unwind the arms race in Europe and leave behind the system of confrontation, threat and counter-threat on which so-called security has been based for decades, and it would encourage the examination of possible steps—unilateral and multilateral—that might bring us closer to the goal.

The time is also ripe for going beyond the general principles and set down working parties from the NATO—and Warsaw Treaty countries which could take a concrete look at the possibilities and develop specific proposals. If governments are slow in acting (and even if they are not) there is a strong case for forums of scientists such as the present one to take an initiative, drawing into the process, of course, not only scientists but also other relevant experts: soldiers, politicians, diplomats and others.

/12232

Chervov on SDI, ABM, NATO-WP Troop Reductions

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English
No 19, Sep 87 pp 2-4

[Article by Col Gen Nikolai Chervov, Department Head, General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "U.S. Policy Arouses Concern"]

[Text] The USSR is concerned over the American Administration's manoeuvres around the ABM Treaty, a treaty of unlimited duration. SDI and the ABM Treaty are incompatible, and neither propaganda stunts nor legal tricks can reconcile them. As soon as testing begins in space - and the Pentagon's research and development program has come very close to starting this - the ABM Treaty will be blown off. If the treaty ceases to exist, the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons will naturally become meaningless.

The West and the East have such economic, scientific, technological and military possibilities that neither of the sides will allow military superiority of the other. In response to SDI the USSR will find an effective and cheaper alternative, which will be implemented in a very short time. We tried to dissuade the American Administration from taking weapons to space. All our arguments have been in vain, and it continues its Star Wars policy with surprising stubbornness. I can repeat: The United States will not win tranquility by means of the Star Wars because we won't sit on our hands. The Soviet Union proceeds from the idea that in the nuclear age it is

impossible to create two systems of security - a stronger system for oneself and a more vulnerable for the neighbour. Security can only be for all, and it is indivisible. In case of the Soviet Union and the United States, there can only be equal mutual security - precisely what we suggest: universal security for the whole world.

Soviet peace initiatives are neither a part of a political game nor a device designed to corner the partner, to outpace him in armaments or to score political points. They are clear and honest, whereas Washington's response is not. I want to cite several examples to illustrate my point.

The Soviet Union has opened its entire territory for inspection, without the right to refuse, in line with the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and with a view to fulfilling the agreement on medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. The United States sort of bluffs.

While working for the termination of all nuclear tests, the USSR proposed to limit the yield of nuclear explosions to one kiloton and to cut the number of such explosions to 2-3 times a year.

At the talks in Geneva there is a Soviet proposal for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons with a simultaneous ban on testing strike space weapons and the Budapest program for a 25-percent reduction of the armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional armaments of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. We are prepared to discuss the imbalances and asymmetries in the two blocs' armed forces and armaments and to carry out cuts in the forces of the side that has superiority.

Is there anything unacceptable in the Soviet proposals? Why don't we receive an adequate answer from the United States? Judging by everything, the United States is only ready for an "armed truce" between East and West and only in some individual areas of their military confrontation.

/08309

Primakov on Arms Race, Economic, Regional Issues

52001033 Moscow NEW TIMES in Russian
No 42, 26 Oct 87 pp 14-15

[Interview with Evgeny Primakov, Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences by Alexey Bukalov: "In the Same Boat"]

[Text] Following the publication of M.S. Gorbachev's article "Realities and Guarantees for a Safe World," our correspondent met with the Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Evgeny Primakov. "That article is the quintessence of ideas that

enable one to understand the new Soviet approaches to world problems, how we regard the world today, and what it will be like in the near future," Academician Evgeny Primakov said. "The 21st century is round the corner..."

N.T. What is essentially new about these approaches?

E.P. I would like to remind the readers of the New Times of the dialectical formula about the unity and conflict of opposites. Until a certain point in the past we unjustifiably emphasized the conflict of opposites and paid far less attention to the unity of the world in which the conflict of opposites takes place. And this in spite of the fact that the unity and integrity of the world is becoming increasingly tangible and obvious. The 27th CPSU Congress corrected that theoretical imbalance.

The case in point is not confined to the problem of survival uniting us all, although it is of principal importance. There is also the world economy, with all the regularities inherent in it. Generally speaking, they transcend the laws according to which the socialist and capitalist systems are developing.

There are also all-human problems which ought to be approached on the premise that the world is an interdependent and interconnected whole.

The ecological problem is one of them. If we continue to treat nature as savagely as we have done up to now we shall inevitably have to face great calamities. There is also the problem of new diseases, AIDS being a case in point; it appears to be a punishment meted out to the human race for its imprudence and failure to realize that it may very well destroy itself. Surely, joint efforts are called for to deal with these diseases.

Yet another problem is the backwardness of the Third World. It is not only a reproach to the whole of mankind, but also a threat to its well-being and security. These and many other problems must be dealt with jointly, and this is the essence of the new Soviet approach to international relations.

N.T. But be that as it may, the arms race remains the chief source of concern for the world public. How realistic is the idea of a nuclear-free world?

E.P. The present state of the world and its security rely on nuclear parity, amoral and unstable as it is. It is amoral, because one cannot build one's own security on the fear of mutual destruction. It is unstable, because a continued arms race spreading to new spheres as well as the upgrading of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of weapon bring closer the terrible prospect of a nuclear holocaust. At present nuclear parity remains a means of stabilization and deterrence, but a continued arms race would effectively put paid to this. There is only one way out: parity must be sustained at progressively lower levels until a minimal level of deterrence is

attained. We believe nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from that parity altogether. What was proposed in the statement of January 15, 1986, is not a new slogan, but a realistic programme whose every stage had been carefully thought out and one that can and must be discussed and defined in greater detail.

In this connection I permit myself an excursus into the past.

I recently reread the famous Decree on Peace, and Lenin's comments on it in his address to the 2nd Congress of Soviets. Students of our revolution have always made a point of stressing that Soviet Russia proposed peace without annexations or indemnities. That was certainly the main thing, but certain details of interest and importance were overlooked. For instance, in his address Lenin spoke of the need to appeal to peoples and governments alike and the governments in question were imperialist. He emphasized that the Soviet proposals were not ultimatums and that this country was prepared to consider other proposals concerning the time limits within which the war was to be ended.

That Leninist principle is of great importance to us. We are not advancing ultimatums, we are prepared for reasonable compromise, mutual tolerance and concessions. This is especially relevant now that the threat of a nuclear holocaust is looming over the world.

We have a wealth of experience to fall back on and we now know much more about what makes up this world. We can even look into the future, and it is on the basis of scientific knowledge that we have advanced a programme for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons.

A year ago, at the time of the Reykjavik summit, the idea of a nuclear-free world was for the first time the subject of serious political negotiations. Today we have taken a real step towards such a nuclear-free world. And it seems to me that after Reykjavik the world community entered a new stage in its development, at any rate in the approach to resolving the problem of nuclear weapons. And this was borne out by the results of the recent visit of the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to Washington. Our foreign policy shows flexibility and realism. We proposed 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive nuclear weapons without linking them to any specific time limit for eliminating all nuclear weapons, but on the understanding that the ABM treaty is strictly adhered to. That linkage is necessary because once that treaty has been violated the way will be clear for a further arms race, but we say at the same time that once nuclear weapons have been eliminated the importance of setting up an international system of comprehensive security will assume another dimension.

N.T. What would such a system consist of?

E.P. In its vertical dimension it would incorporate agreements on military-political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian issues. We are not trying to evade any of them. In its horizontal dimension the system covers the entire world.

N.T. How is economic security to be understood in the light of the above?

E.P. In concrete terms it incorporates the whole package of measures to be taken to deal with the disproportions and explosive injustices that have piled up in international economic relations.

The Soviet Union recently voiced its readiness to contribute with that goal in mind to the UNCTAD raw materials general fund. We are prepared to do a great deal to stabilize the situation in world economic links by, among other things, assuming certain economic obligations. Surely, the situation cannot be considered normal when trading terms are consistently unfair to the developing countries and the scale of the developing countries' debts threatens the entire world economy. The key to resolving all these problems is the democratization of international economic relations, and that is what the Soviet Union is pressing for. In this particular case I mean the North-South dimension. Much stands in the way of progress here, as, for instance, embargoes and all kinds of political sanctions which are introduced out of time-serving considerations interfere with economic ties between capitalist and socialist countries. Naturally, we are against them. We are for a democratization that would cover that element of relations as well.

I would not, however, confine the issues of international economic security solely to democratization of world economic ties. The major problem of disarmament and development is also relevant here. It appears to be quite impossible to develop the Third World and close the huge gap between it and the rest of the world without releasing huge funds and using them for development. Here is one striking figure: national per capita incomes in the developing countries amount to a twelfth of what they are in the industrialized capitalist countries. Clearly, these problems cannot be resolved at once. What is needed are joint economic efforts, and there are various ways of making them.

N.T. Reports in the media remind us daily that there are wars going on in various parts of the world, albeit "small and local" wars, but nonetheless wars that take a huge toll of human lives, do terrible damage, and inflict enormous suffering. Regional conflicts are a dangerous source of international tension. How is that factor accounted for in today's Soviet policy?

E.P. Let us dwell first on the rationale for approaching such conflicts arising from economic, social and political contradictions in various parts of the world. It would be utterly unfair and dangerous to regard these conflict

situations from the standpoint of Soviet-American rivalry. There is no going back to the times of John Foster Dulles, who used to say that if U.S. influence is removed in one part of the world (he meant the emergence of national states committed to an independent policy) there would inevitably appear a vacuum filled by the Soviet Union. That sort of an approach is fundamentally wrong. It must be discarded in both theory and practice.

U.S. students of regional conflicts distinguish the phase of controlling or managing conflict situations and the phase of settling or resolving them. I would like to call attention to the fact that the first phase of approaching conflict situations in this way does not even provide for their eventual settlement, but rather aims to accelerate or slow them down in the interests of U.S. policy and confrontation with the Soviet Union. Now that conflicts of that nature could spark off a global conflagration, such an approach is absolutely unacceptable. At the same time, the entire world community, along with the Soviet Union and the United States, must take parallel or joint action in order to settle international conflicts. The Soviet Union is placing the emphasis on the need to involve the world community more in all these matters.

What is the actual situation now? Regrettably, the United States often tries to push the Soviet Union aside and prevent it from contributing to resolving complex situations. That is how it was in the Middle East. This indicates that the second of the phases mentioned above is also used for purposes of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Would it not be more reasonable to act together with a view to resolving conflict situations?

There is one further important consideration here. Before the Geneva summit, President Reagan somehow attempted to confront the issue of arms reduction with the issue of settling regional conflicts. His line of reasoning went something like this: initially confidence is attained by settling regional conflicts and only subsequently are arms reduced. To me that statement of the problem seems absolutely unacceptable. The two problems cannot be opposed; a broad front approach must be taken to achieve progress. The two go together.

N.T. There is one other problem that appears both pressing and relevant. It was emphasized on many occasions in the past that on the ideological front there can be no peaceful coexistence. How can one realistically isolate ideological differences from international relations?

E.P. It would appear to me that here one must take into account the evolution of the very concept of peaceful coexistence.

Lenin gave a theoretical substantiation of the need for peaceful coexistence of states belonging to different systems with a view to ruling out war as a means of conducting policy and promising multilateral relations and, above all, economic relations between them.

At the early stages of the establishment of the Soviet state, peaceful coexistence was regarded in practice as a respite before another attack on us. It was only natural that we tried to take advantage of that respite to take action to strengthen our security and defences.

After World War II the interpretation of peaceful coexistence as a form of the class struggle appeared. It is my view that that was a result of the cold war. With the benefit of hindsight one can now argue against that interpretation of peaceful coexistence, but the crux of the matter is not in the retrospective assessment, but rather in the current state of international relations. On a planet overstrained by the burden of weapons of mass destruction peace becomes the supreme asset and peaceful coexistence, the universal and only form of relations between all states, including those belonging to different political or social systems.

As was recorded in the Delhi Declaration, for instance, peaceful coexistence means not only ruling war out, but also ruling out force and even a demonstration of force in relations between states.

There is more to it, though. During the early years of Soviet government and in Lenin's lifetime we already understood peaceful coexistence as a positive development of relations and above all economic relations. Right now we are pressing for humanitarian problems to be included in that concept, too. Significantly, we meet with resistance on the part of the West over exactly that issue and one over which we have always been accused of all mortal sins. We have suggested holding a conference on human rights here in Moscow. The United States and some of its allies are opposed to the idea.

We must look for areas where the national interests of various countries coincide. These interests can and must coincide and it is on this that our approach to setting up a system of international security rests.

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LE MONDE Article Criticizing Double Zero Draws Response

*18120029 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 43, 2 Nov 87 pp 12-15*

[Article by Nikolai Portugalov: "Double Strategy-Double Error"]

[Text] Monsieur Pierre Lelloche, vice-director of the French Institute of International Relations, may reproach me with plagiarism. The Paris newspaper LE MONDE recently carried his article entitled "Double Zero-Double Danger." The two headings are indeed somewhat similar, but, as the reader will probably guess, I have chosen mine intentionally, indeed, I do not hesitate to say, with the express purpose of starting a

polemic. Let me explain at once that the word "polemic" is used here only in a sense of discussion, a collective discussion between experts—"an expert," as the French say.

The very heading of Pierre Lellouche's article clearly indicates that he does not agree with "double zero" on the medium- and short-range missiles, considering it "a double danger for (Western) Europe." At the beginning of his article Lellouche cites with resentment masquerading as irony Caspar Weinberger's slighting reference to critics of a possible agreement on these missiles as "all these experts imbued with their own importance." Since the U.S. defence secretary "flings mud at experts," Lellouche promises, "leaving technicalities aside," to consider INF agreement "simply from the standpoint of the common sense of an average citizen."

It was a rash promise, and I can say right away that the french foreign affairs expert did not succeed in fulfilling it. Politics today is perhaps in urgent need of common sense. But common sense is for all intents and purposes out of the question when nuclear weapons are stubbornly regarded as the linchpin of national security and policy for all time, while national security is considered, as before, "a thing in itself" in no way related to the security of other members of the world community.

I am not at all disposed to underrate such highly skilled experts as Pierre Lellouche. It is politicians who upbraid experts. As for the experts themselves, they usually treat each other with respect. The vice-director of the French Institute of International Relations is, of course, not an "average citizen," but a leading member of the French political elite.

The idea of the "double zero" on medium- and short-range missiles and in general of a nuclear-free Europe is opposed by many in France, with top politicians, experts and journalists among them. Some articles have more scathing headings than the one by Lellouche—"Zero option: Munich II," for instance. But of the numerous expositions of the Paris stand on the question, I have chosen Lellouche's chiefly because it is written in plain language and in the brilliant style characteristic of French experts.

Everything in his article seems convincing. What is false, however, is its basic premise. The impression is that a deliberately wrong programme had been fed into an excellent computer. Albert Einstein once said in jest that the main thing is the starting point. With an appropriate starting point, even the Ptolemaic system will look as impeccable as the heliocentric one.

The point is that the French political and military elite are basing their strategy exclusively on nuclear weapons and, as Mikhail Gorbachev said, are trying persistently to convince the world (first themselves and then the average citizen) that "the road to the abyss is the most

correct one." It may be that the elite cannot yet image another way to the national security of France. Disappointment will then be even more bitter.

What Is Removed or Held Back

The content of Lellouche's article can be succinctly expressed in a few words: by scrapping its Pershing 2 and Pershing 1 missiles in exchange for the dismantling of the SS-20s, "which constitute a mere 5 percent of the Soviet nuclear potential," NATO has forfeited the only weapon capable of hitting the territory of the USSR and its allies from European soil.

As a result, the U.S. nuclear guarantees to the European members of NATO have evaporated, the two great powers have concluded a kind of nuclear non-aggression pact at the expense of Europe, NATO's strategy of flexible response is blasted, and a new strategy must now be worked out urgently. But whatever it might be, this strategy must be based on nuclear deterrence, as only such deterrence can counterbalance both the nuclear power and the superior conventional and chemical weapon potential of the Warsaw Treaty states.

Analyzing the strategic situation in the European region of NATO, the French expert resorts to an old trick, unworthy of a man of his standing: he ignores, removes and occasionally holds back anything that does not suit him. Let us begin with the above-mentioned controversy with Caspar Weinberger. Advocating the double zero" by virtue of his office, the defence secretary said it would not require modifications in NATO or whittle away the American guarantees.

Lellouche mentions this point of Weinberger's, but considers it erroneous. The defense secretary, however, explained that hundreds, indeed thousands of other American nuclear weapon systems capable of reaching targets on Soviet territory would remain in the European region of NATO. Among them are aircraft, missiles on American submarines attached to the bloc, and many other weapons.

Lellouche seems to keep all these systems out of the argument contending that tactical nuclear weapons, "the military utility of which is more than doubtful," and the Anglo-French national systems continue to be the only means of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

The use of tactical nuclear weapons with arrange of less than 500 km deployed along the dividing line of the two blocs is "more than doubtful," of course. As Lellouche himself admits, they can "intimidate" only the Germans in the FRG and the GDR on whose territories they will explode. How to explain, then, the vigorous opposition of the author, and of many French political leaders, to a "third zero in Europe"? As for the British and french nuclear systems, why are they worse than Pershing 2s if nuclear deterrence is regarded as a panacea?

One question follows another, and the arguments obviously do not hold water. Lellouche himself notes that the new strategic situation in Europe still needs "unbiased analysis." But for the present only one thing is clear to him: The West should preserve nuclear deterrence at any cost, because a non-nuclear Europe is for him the ultimate evil.

This is so, he says, because Western Europe is today unable to ensure its security without American nuclear guarantees, while these guarantees are not convincing without a U.S. nuclear presence on the continent. If the U.S. nuclear presence were eliminated (the American missiles which Lellouche fails to mention), other forms of nuclear deterrence—not yet clear today—would have to be thought of.

It is here that Lellouche omits the main point. He speaks of Soviet superiority as axiomatic, without troubling to furnish proof. To an "ordinary citizen" of common sense, it is argued, everything is clear even without proof, and we French experts have done our best to ensure this.

Following the example of Pierre Lellouche, I shall not go into "technical details"—the numerous manipulations and exaggerations from which the NATO strategists have drawn their conclusion on the Warsaw Treaty's superiority in conventional armaments. One of the main tricks here is that the French military potential is not counted, being deemed to bear no relation to the North Atlantic bloc. The inquiring reader can be advised in this connection to see an article by Antoine Sanguinetti published in a recent issue of LE MONDE Diplomatique. In his article, "Military Balance Between the Two Blocs in Armed Forces and Armaments," the retired French vice-admiral cites figures that explode the myth of Soviet superiority.

We are already used to fact-juggling by experts. But here is something more striking. Lellouche conducts his "lucid analysis" as if absolutely nothing had changed in Soviet strategy and foreign policy in the little over a year since the Reykjavik summit, as if the new thinking—achieved by us through much suffering in the full sense of the word—had not prevailed in Soviet foreign policy.

One surprising lesson of Reykjavik for us was that Europe was not prepared to accept non-nuclear status as outlined at the summit. This shows how accustomed to West European countries have become to American guarantees and how far they have come to believe in the myth of the "Soviet threat." "I've not yet learned to live without you," the young Piccolomini says to Wallenstein in Schiller's works.

Moscow quickly drew its conclusion and met Western Europe halfway on a wide range of issues. The medium-range and, alter, short-range missiles were removed from the Reykjavik package in the belief that, whatever the stratagems of flexible response might be, none of the

West European countries where the new American missiles are deployed will survive a nuclear conflict. Moscow also agreed to remove from the "medium-range equation" the Anglo-French systems which belong for the most part to this class missiles, and the Europe-based U.S. systems mentioned above by Weinberger. This was a major concession.

The Soviet Union admitted in this way that by deploying SS-20 missiles it had tried to build security overkill without considering how this step would be interpreted by the Europeans.

It went even further, proposing to NATO that negotiations be started on conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons with due regard for the existing imbalances on both sides, according to the principle that in each class of armaments bigger cuts are made by the country having superiority in these armaments.

The ultimate goal of such negotiations would be to determine the limits of reasonable sufficiency—the quality of weapons needed for a "non-offensive defence" that objectively excludes the very possibility of attack. This goal could be achieved after the withdrawal from Europe of nuclear and other types of essentially offensive weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the Soviet Union has provided conditions for the early prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

In short, Moscow has made the building of a common European home one of the chief objectives of its comprehensive security system in a future non-violent world.

All this would probably have impressed the average Frenchman, M. Dupont, had he not been confused by experts. The Vienna talks on conventional armaments are proceeding at a snail's pace, with the West still insisting that tactical nuclear weapons and even dual-purpose systems should not be a subject of discussion. Incidentally, Bonn would have no objection to discussing these weapons, but it is being strenuously restrained by London, and, more particularly, Paris.

Why is Paris so vigorously opposed to any disarmament steps in Europe? Why has it become the main obstacle in the way of military detente and hence, at the present time, detente as such—that brainchild of de Gaulle? Why is Paris doing everything in its power to perpetuate nuclear confrontation in our common home?

Does it really believe nuclear war to be fatally inevitable and is it therefore preparing for it? That is unlikely, we think. Indeed, the "nuclear non-aggression pact" for which Paris is rebuking the great powers has long been the core of French nuclear strategy. What is permitted to France is not permitted to others. Is not that so, M. Lellouche? Paris declared in favour of Pershing missiles, but on one indispensable condition: there could be no question of deploying them on French soil.

What is then the matter? France seems to be trying to derive political benefits from its nuclear arsenal and thus to gain political superiority over its economically stronger European rivals. For this purpose it wants to preserve nuclear confrontation. For this purpose it is returning to NATO through the back door, presenting itself to Washington as "the European pillar of the alliance" (a peculiar neo-Gaullism, this?). For this purpose it continues to fan the Soviet threat hysteria.

Such is the first part of the French strategy—the sacred egoism of national policy. But is it reasonable? Blocking the way to a nuclear-free Europe and a non-violent world for the sake of narrowly selfish interests is unseemly, and is unlikely to bear good fruit. The illusoriness of the French strategy will be even clearer if we examine the second part and see how French strategy planners and analysts hope to derive political dividends from their nuclear arsenal.

Cards on the Table

In the concluding part of his article, Pierre Lellouche puts his cards on the table. It is more likely than not, he writes, that Bonn will try to get rid of tactical nuclear weapons (the use of which threatens the FRG alone) by agreeing to destroy them in exchange for the disbanding of Soviet tank units in the course of future talks on the stability of conventional armaments.

Is this a bad deal? It is apparently a good deal for the West Germans. But for Europe, the author believes, it would be a terrible deal because it would pave the way for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and thus sharply aggravate the military situation on the continent.

But what has Europe to do with this? Such a course of events does not suit Paris or, more exactly, does not fit in with its present economic policy and strategy. In the last lines of his article, Lellouche arrives at the conclusion that in view of the above, a "double zero for Europe is not an opportunity but rather a formidable challenge which can only be accepted if current strategic developments are subjected to a lucid and not an opportunist analysis."

The author does not reveal the results of this analysis. But they can easily be logically divined. Lellouche and some other of his colleagues evidently have in mind the establishment within NATO of an autonomous Franco-West German alliance with joint defences on the Elbe, the forward lines. What is most important, however, is that France's strategic nuclear guarantees, rather than unreliable American ones, will be extended to the FRG and that Bonn and Paris will be able to organize cooperation in the field of nuclear armaments. Much is being written about this today in France.

The West Germans may then hold on to the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and NATO's nuclear-equipped bombers stationed on their territory, and deploying the French tactical Hades missiles that are to be fully developed by them—all this in exchange for the reliable guarantees provided by the use of forces de frappe for the "defence" of the FRG.

It should be said that this plan entails considerable risks for Paris even within its present national strategy. It is not for nothing that for the time being French leaders are sedulously avoiding talking about nuclear guarantees for the FRG, leaving it to their experts to put out feelers.

These plans meet with sympathy on the right-wing fringe of the West German political spectrum, for they hold out the prospect of eventually drawing closer to the nuclear button—little by little, of course, or the French won't let. First, the distribution of targets, then the double lock and powerful industrial and financial participation in the expansion of forces de frappe. Later on, some "co-operated systems" a la Pershing 1 will appear, and then... a breath-taking prospect.

But most of politically sensible West Germans treat these French plans—not yet fully formed—with well-founded skepticism and are not inclined to overestimate the initial steps in Bonn-Paris military cooperation, like the much-talked-about Moineau hardi (Daring Sparrow) exercises. Incidentally, Lellouche himself does not overestimate these exercises, regarding them as a tactical move in the political game.

As for the broad West German public, the picture is even clearer. Here is a single convincing excerpt from SÜD-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: "It is feared here that France will turn us into an instrument of its strategy. In other words, all French initiatives (in the field of military cooperation with the FRG—NP) ...are taken as attempts to link the 'German glacis' firmly to France and prevent the Germans sliding into neutralism."

This idea can be developed further. By assigning the Federal Republic the role of a French nuclear glacis, regarding the two German states as the only theoretically conceivable nuclear battlefield in Europe, and drawing Bonn into an autonomous anti-Soviet military alliance within NATO, Paris is trying first of all to weaken its economically more powerful competitor, make the FRG dependent on France in the political and military fields, and—if the worst comes to worst—use the West Germans as a shield.

Incidentally, this is a continuation in the nuclear age of the policy pursued by Richelieu and Louis XIV in relation to the Germans. ("Messieurs, burn Palatinat" the Roi-soleil told his marshals when he was testy.) No wonder the West Germans, and especially the "ordinary citizens" on whose common sense Lellouche counts, treat this policy with justified mistrust, no matter how it is disguised.

And what if the West Germans refuse to exchange the doubtful American guarantees for even more doubtful French ones when they are offered them? If, moreover, on sober reflection, the West Germans, as Lellouche puts it, nevertheless exchange the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons for Soviet tanks? If, in general, the West Germans take the course of establishing a zone in Central Europe with thinned-out armaments and, then, non-offensive defence on both sides of the dividing line, the course of building a common European home that is safe and comfortable for them?

If that does not suit NATO, why can't it be presumed that Bonn, guided by its national interests and following the example of Paris, will—when the opportunity arises—withdraw from the military organization of the North Atlantic Alliance? The example of France shows that this is in no sense tantamount to neutralism. Be frank, M. Lellouche, you fear such a turn of events. Indeed, on what can the policy of Richelieu with regard to the Germans then be based in the nuclear age? On a French military presence in the Federal Republic—a couple of divisions in Baden? Let them stay there till doomsday or till they get tired of their presence.

A Realistic Course Is Possible

Some 3 years ago we were still talking, given the opportunity or in its absence of "special friendly relations with France." As if remembering the days of de Gaulle, we insisted that European detente still existed, though, as it has at last become clear today, detente is not compatible with the implementation of huge military programmes by both sides.

But even then some observers asked themselves: What is the basis for these "special and friendly relations"? We held opposite positions on the issue of nuclear armaments. In the sphere of economic ties France was being outstripped by other West European partners of the Soviet Union. Moreover, in no other country did the mass media attack the Soviet Union so fiercely as in France—across the whole political spectrum. Incidentally, the French media are still engaged in a virulent anti-Soviet campaign. What remained was only sympathy for French civilization and culture, experienced by us as by all Europeans, and recollections of the glorious past. This does not seem enough for special relations.

At this point we can imagine a French partner appearing on the scene and saying reassuringly that a basis for special relations does exist, that our two countries are guarantors of the postwar arrangement in Europe. We may object by saying that Paris has signed numerous Atlantic declarations in support of the "reunification of Germany in conditions of freedom," and so on. In reply, we might hear: comment? Perhaps somebody else advocated reunification, but not the French. Francois Mauriac once said: We love Germany so much that we want there to be two of them. As for declarations, they were signed on purpose. After all, we signed them with our allies.

Well, there can perhaps be no doubt about that. It is to be supposed that Paris is not striving for the reunification of Germany and that our standpoint, as expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev—"there are two German states with differing socio-economic systems and with their own values; the two German states are today a reality"—meets with no objections in France.

But on other issues our views differ again. The present French strategy assigns both German states the role of, respectively, the Western and the Eastern glacis opposed to each other saturated with foreign nuclear weapons, and separated from each other by a nuclear missile fence and an impenetrable border.

In our view, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany can make a tangible contribution to the cause of peace in Europe. They can cooperate with each other, on the basis of full sovereign equality, in all spheres—from disarmament to the economy and humanitarian issues, with the height of frontier barriers directly depending on the level of their good-neighbourly relations.

It should be said for the sake of clarity that the recent visit of Erich Honecker to the Federal Republic, far from arousing any concern among Soviet news analysts (as distinct from their French counterparts), is viewed as a major success of the diplomacy of our ally, the German Democratic Republic.

Speaking in the Saar, his homeland, Erich Honecker noted that if the two German states succeed in establishing cooperation for the sake of peace, the day will come when their borders will unite, not divide, them. In our opinion, these words are an example of the foresight and political wisdom of the German Communist statesman.

We hope that sooner or later the main political forces in the Federal Republic will come to the conclusion that the national interests of their country are incompatible with either the role of an American "continental sword" or the less envious role of a French "nuclear glacis," that the future of Germans is a peaceful, secure life in our common European home, in the two German states rid of the world's largest stockpiles of weapons, states from which weapons of mass destruction, then offensive armaments in general and, in the longer term, foreign military presence will be removed.

M. Lellouche would probably agree that such a course is quite realistic once the Germans really want to adopt it. And if simultaneously progress is achieved in the reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic armaments, then Paris will just have to realize that France cannot indefinitely stand aloof from the highroad of disarmament and detente.

French strategic planners will perhaps then believe that the steadily growing national nuclear forces are an inordinate burden for the country, a burden that prevents French export industries from catching up with their West German (and for that matter Italian) competitors.

Common sense will then tell French experts that their present strategy, as one of Napoleon's associates said, is worse than a crime because it is a mistake—a double mistake.

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Concept of Parity Reassessed

18120028 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 47, 3 Nov 87 pp 9-10

[Article by Igor Malashenko, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences: "Parity Reassessed: The New Way of Political Thinking Calls for a Thoughtful Reappraisal of 'Unquestioned' Concepts"]

[Text] The floating research base Convention, the command post of a Soviet-American space experiment, is on the high seas between Vladivostok and San Francisco. The location of the vessel at the mid-point of a straight line with the principle of absolute parity that is at the heart of an unprecedented joint planetological research project. The Convention has two captains, a Soviet and an American, who have the same measure of authority, and the same mirror principle governs the architecture of the entire experiment, crowned by a Soviet-American orbital station called Parity. Thus Chinghiz Aitmatov visualizes cooperation between the USSR and the USA in space in his fantasy, "A Day Lasts a Century."

There is something very attractive about that vision of ideal parity. It is clear to anyone reading the novel that if at some point the Convention moved closer to the USSR or the USA or if the organizers of the experiment chose to abandon the idea of strictly symmetrical manning, the experiment would have gone ahead anyway. But the experiment in the novel symbolizes broader parity between the two countries and for that reason every small detail is significant.

Unfortunately, we are more accustomed to using the term "parity" to describe a state of nuclear balance than to describe cooperation between the two countries. We are also accustomed to taking nuclear parity to mean "the preservation of a rough equality between the nuclear potentials and weapon systems of the two opposing sides for the purposes of their security," the definition given in the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. We take that kind of approach for granted, but is there any other way of guaranteeing security?

The postwar arms race has shown that at best it can guarantee an equal degree of threat, and this despite the fact that in recent years competition in nuclear weapons has been conducted on a footing of parity. The 27th

CPSU Congress reached the conclusion that the arms race could push the above equal degree of threat to a limit where even parity would no longer be a military or political deterrent.

What has happened? Why has the idea of safeguarding international security defeated its object before our very eyes?

The term "parity" gained currency in American specialist usage in the mid-1950s, when the Soviet Union began to acquire the capability, albeit a hypothetical one, of delivering a retaliatory strike in the event of a massive U.S. nuclear attack. The United States began to regard the situation as a nuclear stalemate. Former U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara now says that "parity existed in October 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis," while he acknowledges that "the United States then had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads, compared to the Soviets' 300." He goes on to say that "despite an advantage of 17 to 1 in our favour, President Kennedy and I were deterred from even considering a nuclear attack on the USSR by the knowledge that, although such a strike would destroy the Soviet Union, tens of their weapons would survive to be launched against the United States. These would kill millions of Americans. No responsible political leader would expose his nation to such a catastrophe." Mr McNamara's conclusion is that the "width" of the 'band of parity' is very, very great."

The former secretary of defence understands parity as a military-strategic equilibrium whereby no political end may be gained by either side if it uses its nuclear weapons. To maintain that equilibrium does not require that the nuclear potential of the other side be symmetrically matched weapon for weapon. Experts on the Soviet Scientists' Committee for Peace, Against the Nuclear War Threat believe that the dynamic range of military-strategic equilibrium is very wide, and that this levels out the differences between the nuclear arsenals of the two sides.

Until the early 1970s, parity was understood as the capability of the United States and the Soviet Union to cause an unacceptable amount to damage to one another regardless of who delivered the first strike. That interpretation did not suit Washington, as a situation of parity made the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals pointless.

That is why American strategists began to advocate a different idea of parity as the qualitative and quantitative equality of nuclear arsenals. That Washington tends to place so much emphasis on equality clearly betrays an ulterior motive, the more so as in the early 1970s the U.S. strategic arsenal was far superior to the Soviet one in its combat capability. The signs are that the United States has no intention of abandoning the leading role in the arms race. The new notion of parity was designed to

force the Soviet Union into a position of endless pursuit because Washington was certain that it would be able to stay way out in front in the race, relying on its "technological superiority."

The point was to turn the very idea of parity into a mechanism for accelerating the arms race. Instead of remaining a mutual nuclear deterrent, parity was turned into an esoteric mathematical formula. Washington even attempted to use in its own interests the procedures for counting weapons arrived at as part of the SALT process. These procedures are of an essential technical nature and their framing agreements and verifying compliance with them; Washington, however, turned them into the principal criterion in assessing military-strategic balance. As a result, the fact that any nuclear war, however "limited," is absolutely unacceptable to both social systems from the political, moral, and social points of view was pushed into the background.

The symmetrical interpretation of parity has gradually come to be taken for granted. At first glance it did not contradict the common sense approach according to which a new weapon system acquired by the other side can only be counterbalanced by a similar system, and "their" hundred warheads only be matched by "one's own" hundred warheads, and so on. That interpretation ignores some important details. First, the interpretation of parity as the equality of the strategic capabilities of the two sides enables the Americans for force us into avenues of the arms race of Washington's choosing, putting us at a disadvantage. Second, American hawks acquire a means of readily stalling the process of negotiations with the Soviet Union, as agreement is hard to arrive at where arms control experts themselves cannot distinguish "levels" from "sublevels." And third, misled public opinion in various countries fails to understand why the process of disarmament has entered an impasse and begins to believe the claims about the "equal responsibility of the superpowers."

As former U.S Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger said while in office, parity is also important for "symbolic purposes," because the strategic forces have come to be seen as "important to the status and stature of a major power." This would rule out the tricky "why" and "wherefores" with respect to accepted status symbols.

The new political thinking calls for a thoughtful reappraisal of the most established and indisputable notions as the Soviet leaders have said on many occasions, the Soviet Union will make every effort to maintain the military-strategic parity that prevents a nuclear war from breaking out, but there is no need to take part in the arms race on a footing of parity. This is demonstrated by the concept of reasonable sufficiency in defence suggested by Soviet experts, and the rejection by the Soviet side of a symmetrical response to SDI, a move that provoked considerable annoyance in Washington. The double zero

option with respect to medium- and shorter-range missiles does not fit into symmetrical parity either, as the Soviet Union is prepared to scrap far more weapons than the United States is. Some U.S. policy makers have, it seems, met themselves coming backwards: they did propose something of the kind, but they did so because they felt that Moscow would never accept their proposals. That Washington tends to consider armed force nothing short of the principal means of maintaining

America's prestige is of course its own business. The Soviet leadership has largely taken a different line whereby "achievements" in the arms race are not viewed as contributions to the status and stature of a nation on the world scene. Its standing can only be strengthened in other, constructive, areas.

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BELGIUM

Genscher Views INF Agreement, EEC, Gulf *13151456 Brussels LE SOIR in French 4 Dec 87 p 4*

[Interview with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-dietrich Genscher by Jean-paul Marthoz and Pierre Lefevre—date and place not given]

[Text] [Interviewer] Aside from the INF agreement, what do you think the forthcoming Reagan-gorbachev summit can achieve?

[Genscher] The third summit provides an opportunity to show the new state of mind which has developed in relations between the two superpowers. On the one hand, energetic decisions ought to be made to reduce the two superpowers' strategic potential by 50 percent. But the latter must also reach agreement on the contributions which the West and East ought to make to eliminating hotbeds of crisis in the world, notably the Gulf, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and southern Africa.

In Reykjavik, the two statesmen not only expressed their intention of shouldering their joint responsibilities, but also acted on their pledges, as the agreement on the double zero option proves.

[Interviewer] You said that Mr Gorbachev must be taken at his word....

[Genscher] I said that we ought to take Mr Gorbachev seriously and that we ought to take him at his word. It is obvious that he is struggling to pursue a policy of openness in both domestic and foreign policy. His aim is certainly not to establish a democratic state and a democratic society like Belgium or Germany, but to promote a sense of responsibility and individual creativity. He described this objective as revolutionary. It is true that if this objective is compared with the Soviet Union as it was when he took office, he is probably right. A more open Soviet Union would be a better and more predictable partner for the West. Mr Gorbachev has recognized that in an interdependent world characterized by the most modern technological developments, particularly by entry into the information society, a policy of isolation would be synonymous with stagnation or even regression.

[Interviewer] Ought we to encourage Mr Gorbachev's policy, and how should we do so in order to avoid exposing our security to excessive danger?

[Genscher] We can encourage Mr Gorbachev's policy by stepping up our cooperation and pursuing a policy of disarmament which creates more, not less, security.

This presupposes that the Eastern bloc implements disarmament measures in many spheres on a larger scale than the West. The side which has more weapons than the other must disarm on a larger scale. But, if we stick to

old ways of thinking, and assume the worst possible hypothesis when talking about the Soviet Union, we will be paralyzed. The threats to our security do not come from our efforts to increase stability and confidence through cooperation with the Eastern bloc, but from a policy likely to miss truly historic opportunities when they arise.

[Interviewer] Following the agreement on the Euromissiles, how should arms control be continued?

[Genscher] The West's concept in the disarmament sphere is clearly defined. It was confirmed at Reykjavik by the NATO countries' foreign ministers. We want to achieve a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons as quickly as possible.

We want to successfully complete negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world as quickly as possible.

We want to achieve stability and security throughout Europe by conventional disarmament and by eliminating the possibility of invasion and surprise attack.

In the context of conventional disarmament and the elimination of chemical weapons, we want a clear and verifiable reduction in the number of short-range nuclear missiles to equal levels.

[Interviewer] Is the resistance to the conclusion of this initial disarmament agreement a threat to the subsequent process of detente? In particular, what would be the impact of the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify this treaty?

[Genscher] The double zero option increases security for all, for West and East Germans, for West and East Europeans, and also for the two superpowers. Thanks to the double zero option, the West has achieved a disarmament objective which it had formulated itself. This is why we are expressing the importance we attach to the U.S. Congress giving its assent to the agreement. At all events, it is clear that nobody opposing this agreement in the United States can justify his opposition by invoking the FRG. We want this agreement.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher, Karpov Discuss Conventional Weapons *08121157 Hamburg DPA in German 1118 GMT 12 Dec 87*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—DURING a meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-dietrich Genscher in Bonn Saturday, Soviet disarmament expert Viktor Karpov underlined Moscow's readiness to reach a balance in conventional weapons and so eliminate Soviet superiority in tanks.

The foreign ministry announced that Karpov and Genscher agreed that an agreement on halving the strategic weapons systems of the USSR and the United States could be achieved as early as the first half of 1988.

Genscher at the same time spoke in favor of a rapid conclusion to the Geneva negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons so an entire class of weapons and the threat of its expansion can be eliminated. He raised the Federal Government's concern about the continued Soviet superiority in short-range nuclear weapons.

Karpov came to Bonn on behalf of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to inform the Federal Government immediately after the summit meeting in Washington about the result and the views of his government. The 2-hour talk was also attended by Yuliy Kvintsinskiy Soviet Ambassador to Bonn.

The foreign ministry said Karpov underlined the Federal Government's contribution to bringing about the agreement on the scrapping of INF missiles. Without this contribution, said Karpov, the treaty would not have come about. Genscher stressed the "historic importance" of the agreement and paid tribute to the "new thinking" of the Soviet leadership on questions of disarmament and East-West relations.

Genscher, Andreotti To Urge Worldwide CW Ban
08121431 Hamburg DPA in German
1404 GMT 12 Dec 87

[Embargoed until 1715 GMT, 12 Dec 87]

[Excerpt] [no dateline—as received]—Genscher announced in an interview with Bavarian radio on Saturday that together with his Italian colleague, Giulio Andreotti, he will be urging the speedy conclusion, before Geneva disarmament conference in January, of the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons. Andreotti and he informed the NATO allies in Brussels about this on Friday. Genscher underlined that Italy and the Federal Republic are particularly interested in an early conclusion to these negotiations.

"Chance for security and foreign policy consensus"
[subhead]

With a view to the domestic discussion following the conclusion of the U.S.-SOVIET treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles Genscher expressed the view that there is now the chance of bringing about the SPD a "new security and foreign policy consensus on important issues." If this is possible then "it will be the responsibility of government and opposition to bring it about," he said.

Despite the encouraging west-east development there will, in his view, "always be difficult stretches" which require such a security and foreign policy consensus. [passage omitted]

Shultz Briefs Genscher, Kohl, Woerner on Summit
08151141 Hamburg DPA in German
1110 GMT 15 Dec 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—IN Bonn on Tuesday, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz praised the German contribution that had promoted the conclusion of the U.S.-SOVIET treaty on elimination of medium-range missiles. At the start of their talks, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher congratulated his U.S. colleague on "such a great success of Western policy," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. A January continuation of the talks was agreed upon, at which time Genscher will be visiting Washington as acting president of the EC Council of Ministers.

Afterward, Shultz drove to the chancellery, where he was received by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. His tightly packed schedule for the 6-hour visit also provides for a meeting with Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) and a press conference. The U.S. secretary of state is on a round trip of European allies to brief them on details of the Washington summit.

Also among the topics discussed at the Foreign Ministry were short-range missiles. A spokesman said that the foreign ministers had underlined once again the wording from the communique of the NATO Council of Ministers, which call for reductions that should bring about identical upper limits.

Shultz Holds News Conference in Bonn
08151558 Hamburg DPA in German
1449 GMT 15 Dec 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz praised in Bonn Tuesday the U.S.-SOVIET medium-range (INF) treaty as an example of the success of a united alliance. In this the Federal Republic played a "key role," Shultz emphasized, whose main objective of his 6-hour visit was to brief Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl about the Washington summit.

Shultz also spoke with Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU), and—to quote Shultz—"with my old friend Helmut Schmidt" (SPD). After a press conference and a luncheon with Genscher, Shultz flew to London, the last stage of his European tour.

At his press conference, Shultz repeated details of the disarmament sequence of the next few years, which he had already expounded at the NATO council session in Brussels Friday: strategic missiles, conventional weapons, chemical weapons. The view expressed in Bonn of dealing with short-range missiles at the same time was

not shared by Shultz. These nuclear weapons, with a range under 500 km, should "by no means be excluded," but they are not among his priorities, the U.S. secretary of state reiterated.

He denied that via the short-range missiles deployed on its territory the Federal Republic would have to be the only one to play a nuclear role. This is also the task of other countries within the alliance, Shultz said. Apart from that, many things had to be discussed in Bonn so he had not raised this topic, which had already been dealt with in Brussels. The foreign office noted, however, an "exchange of views" on the treatment of short-range missiles. Kohl and Genscher underlined in their talks with Shultz the German interest in using the impetus of the INF Treaty for other disarmament talks. The German-U.S. consultations will be continued in January during Genscher's visit to Washington, the foreign office announced.

Shultz explained in Bonn for the first time details of the planned Berlin initiative, which he made known on Brussels Friday, between the three western protective powers. According to him, the main aim is considerable improvement in air services. Shultz said that the improvements for Berlin were also a topic of the summit talk between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Berlin was "important." He was hoping to achieve progress gradually. Shultz said, however, nothing about the state of an initiative which the United States, France, and Great Britain intend to submit to Moscow.

Dregger Comments on Conventional, Short-Range Disarmament

17171125 Bonn DIE WELT in German 17 Dec 87 p 8

[Article by "UR": "Dregger Warns About Avoidable Threats"]

[Text] CDU/CSU Bundestag Group chairman Alfred Dregger has taken issue with the thesis stated by U.S. President Reagan and his Security Adviser Powell, that the East's conventional superiority should be reduced before short-range missiles could be considered. Dregger said in Fulda yesterday that there was "no reason at all to postpone the reduction of Soviet short-range superiority until the Soviet Union's superiority in chemical and conventional weapons has been reduced." Excluding the systems with a range of less than 500 Km from the double-zero solution would "add another avoidable threat to the unavoidable special threats our country is exposed to," he said.

Dregger described "the idea of some of our allies" that our weaponry could now be changed into short-range nuclear systems as a "disastrous fire wall concept." It was "absurd" and would "isolate the FRG from NATO'S solidarity." However, the CDU politicians also warned against "denouncing nuclear weapons morally."

In addition, Dregger recommended that the two superpowers not stop at the envisaged halving of strategic weapons. The CDU politician called for a reduction of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to a level "that would correspond to that of the two European nuclear powers taken together." That would not only "considerably reduce" the nuclear weapons capabilities, but would also be sufficient for deterrence, Dregger said. At the same time, in his view it would also lead to "the buildup of antimissile systems"—meaning the U.S. strategic defense initiative SDI—"losing in importance."

What is behind that proposal by Dregger obviously is the wish to give Europe more influence on the disarmament process. Here Dregger continues his considerations that the double-zero solution now agreed upon is in the U.S. and Soviet, but not in the European interest.

Genscher Discusses Chemical Weapons Ban *17041318 Hamburg DPA in German* *1216 GMT 4 Jan 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the view of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), the world needs a ban on all chemical weapons, and not more perfection in the production of such warfare agents. The resumption of the production of the most modern binary chemical weapons in the United States showed how urgent an agreement is, Genscher stressed at a working breakfast with journalists in Bonn on Monday.

Genscher, who regards the sought-after worldwide chemical-weapons ban as one of the most pressing disarmament requirements, on 4 February together with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti will again appeal for the agreement at the UN Disarmament Committee at Geneva.

The foreign minister's criticism was also directed at "voices in the Western camp" who are constantly expressing new objections to the chemical weapons agreement under the pretext that a ban on chemical warfare agents is not verifiable. Genscher noted the Soviet offer to be open to on-site verification in the event of a halt in chemical weapons production.

"Not without concern" was how Genscher assessed the danger of proliferation. Chemical weapons have developed into the "nuclear weapon of the little man or of the nuclear have-nots", the foreign minister stated, criticizing the verification demands which have been added on. The world needs a ban and not "more and more perfection of new production."

Genscher sees new positive points in common with the SPD. At the start of work in 1988 he discerned a "breakthrough to new thinking" in the Federal Republic. This is based, first, on the disarmament policy supported "by all sides" and, second, on the evaluation, shared by all parties, of the seriousness of the new Soviet policy of

perestroyka (restructuring). These common points "cannot be valued highly enough for German foreign policy," Genscher stressed. The federal foreign minister also underscored his "positive assessment" of the possibility that the SPD will make proposals to support foreign policy. In making this assessment, he intends neither to "paper over" differences which remain, nor to create artificial differences. In disarmament policy, Genscher agreed with one of the SPD viewpoints when he said short-range missiles should not be regarded as stopgaps for deficiencies in conventional defense. This viewpoint, which continues to be represented by conservative politicians, comes close to the old war scenarios which should finally be done away with. He stressed the intention of achieving a mandate for short-range negotiations in the Western alliance.

Honecker Sends Note on Disarmament to Kohl

*17041440 Hamburg DPA in German
1407 GMT 4 Jan 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker has sent a letter to Chancellor Helmut Kohl commenting on disarmament questions. Government spokesman Norbert Schaefer told the media in Bonn Monday that the letter is currently being examined by responsible bodies and will be answered. It refers to the Washington summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and deals with questions of security and disarmament policy.

Kohl, U.S. Senator Biden View INF Treaty Ratification

*17051851 Hamburg DPA in German
1803 GMT 5 Jan 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl believes the U.S. Senate should swiftly ratify the agreement on the worldwide elimination of medium-range missiles signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in early December. In an exchange of views with U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, the chancellor said this evening that he would welcome this.

In the talks with Biden, who is a Democrat, Kohl emphasized, according to Government Spokesman Friedhelm Ost, that NATO should soon have finished its stocktaking and have elaborated an overall concept for disarmament and arms control. For the Federal Government, a halving of the strategic systems, a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, and the establishment of a balance in the conventional sphere take priority here.

CDU-CSU Reject Short-Range Missile Zero Option

*17051929 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German
1900 GMT 5 Jan 88*

[Announcer-read report]

[Text] CDU-CSU support the reduction of the number of nuclear short-range missiles. However, they reject a zero option for such weapons. That was made clear by

the CDU-CSU party group chairman Alfred Dregger today in Bonn. Dregger welcomed the letter sent by GDR party and state head Honecker to FRG Chancellor Kohl. It becomes obvious that the GDR also wants to include those missiles in the disarmament process, Dregger said.

Genscher Remarks on Chemical Weapon Ban

*17051247 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 5 Jan 88 p 3*

[Article by "TER": "Warning"]

[Text] Formerly it seemed to be easier to disarm chemical weapons than nuclear missiles. The use of poison gas was too questionable even to those military people who are reluctant to give up any weapons. However, developments have taken a different course. The United States and the USSR achieved a breakthrough in nuclear weapons. Meanwhile the Geneva negotiations on a chemical weapons ban threaten to fail owing to new obstacles.

Federal Foreign Minister Genscher warned about that danger in recent weeks. On Monday he reiterated the warning in Bonn. Genscher's warnings were addressed to the Western alliance partners rather than to the East. The minister said that the East had meanwhile accepted the West's ideas about verification in a chemical weapons ban. Now the West has made "additional demands," he said.

Formerly, opinion differed on the international verification procedure. The subject matter of the negotiations is complicated because chemical factories are much more difficult to monitor than nuclear weapons production facilities. There are too many of them. However, when Moscow agreed to the principle of inspection on suspicion, a way had apparently been found. We have an idea where the opposition originates. The United States has just begun to produce a new type of chemical weapon. France suddenly insists on being allowed to retain a "strategic reserve" of poison gas. Several Third World countries strive for the chemical weapon as the "poor man's atomic bomb." Time is pressing. We may not only be confronted with an East-West arms race, but with worldwide proliferation.

Dregger's Reaction to Disarmament

Comments on Soviet Disarmament Goals

17051233 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5-6 Jan 88 p 1

[Article by "CAS": "Dregger Welcomes Moscow's Disarmament Goals"]

[Text] Bonn—CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Chairman Alfred Dregger has welcomed Moscow's disarmament goals as outlined by Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinskiy in

an interview. Dregger said in an interview with SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG that he was pleased to see that those goals "largely agree" with what the Bundestag urged in two resolutions. However, in listing possible disarmament steps, Kvitsinskiy failed to mention the sphere of short-range nuclear systems with ranges of less than 500 km, the CDU politician said. He pointed out that those missiles in which the USSR was superior by 15 to 1 almost exclusively threaten "Germany on both sides of the dividing line." "The CDU/CSU Bundestag Group would appreciate it if the Soviet Union did not pass over that weapons category in silence, but would agree to the German proposal that it be included in the disarmament process—as the NATO foreign ministers' meeting had done at German insistence," Dregger said. In addition, nothing would hinder the Soviet Union from "dismantling" its superiority "unilaterally." It could start doing so in 1988, Dregger said.

Welcomes Honecker's Remarks on Missiles

08051057 Hamburg DPA in German
0954 GMT 5 Jan 88

[Text] Bonn—The CDU/CSU Lower House Group Chairman Alfred Dregger has reacted positively to Honecker's remarks on short-range nuclear missiles. Dregger said in Bonn on Tuesday that his group welcomed the GDR's support for the CDU/CSU's demand to include in the disarmament process systems below the 500 km range. These nuclear missiles threatened Germany almost exclusively, on both sides of the dividing line. It would be welcome if the Soviet Union, too, would no longer ignore in silence the short-range nuclear missile issue.

Dregger underlined that the CDU/CSU was in favor of upper limits at a lower level for the short-range systems. The requisite minimum number should be laid down by NATO and then negotiated by the superpowers.

U.S. Chemical Weapon Production Decision Viewed

17051410 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5-6 Jan 88 p 4

[Article by "CAS": "Verification Instead of Weapons"]

[Text] The U.S. decision to produce new chemical weapons has met with little understanding among all parties in Bonn. The reason Foreign Minister Genscher has again been urging a worldwide ban of that category of weapons—thus, being at least once in agreement with CSU chief Strauss—is evident. In the end, only contractually guaranteed renunciation can work against the alarmingly processing proliferation. Regarding international flashpoints, that seems to be imperative: Chemical weapons are as fatal as nuclear ones as far as their effect is concerned. However, their production is considerably less expensive. But chemical weapons must not become weapons of destruction for those who cannot afford others. For a long time, it was the Soviets who blocked an

agreement within the framework of the Geneva disarmament conference. They refused to allow verification on suspicion on their territory. Later, however, at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Security in Europe, they surprisingly accepted the U.S. proposal of November 1984 providing verification by on-site inspection. Thus, the Soviet leadership seems willing to let its words be followed by deeds in that field of disarmament.

Against that background, Washington's adherence to the production of a new, more perfect weapon makes little sense. On the contrary, it might even harden relaxed fronts. The argument that the U.S. decision is just, consistent with the attitude which would have induced the Soviets to give in, in case of NATO counterarmament, does not work in that context. The USSR has already shown readiness to cooperate. Foreign Minister Genscher is right in saying that the West should seriously consider how to achieve ever more perfect verification, instead of producing increasingly better weapons. And it is right, too, that he will do everything to achieve an agreement on chemical weapons before the end of 1988.

Editorials View Honecker's Letter to Kohl

17061255 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 6 Jan 88

[From the Press Review]

[Text] One of today's editorial topics is the letter from GDR state and party chief Honecker to Chancellor Kohl.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: If the two leading statesmen of the two German states had to make up a list of problems to be solved first, the list would look different from what Honecker had written to Bonn. The 16 December letter reads as if it had been drawn up in Moscow and mailed in East Berlin. A week after the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement on a double-zero solution, a third-zero solution is offered, beginning with a modernization ban for short-range weapons. The Moscow offer fits exactly two statements that are frequently used by West German politicians, but that are misleading—that war must never again emanate from German soil, and that short-range weapons will hit only Germans. Bonn's response will show whether the Federal Government and the other allied governments will be able to act in the new year's East-West dialogue according to their idea instead of the Soviet one, as last year. The newspaper goes on to say: As to the disarmament proposal submitted by Honecker, it must be said that a third-zero solution would bring Europe considerably closer to an old goal of Soviet policy toward the West, making the existing conventional preponderance even more threatening to Western Europe.

The daily DIE WELT notes: Honecker's letter to the chancellor includes two hints about the further development of disarmament talks. To the background of Warsaw Pact consultations, Honecker asks the recipient to

renounce formally the modernization of nuclear short-range weapons. The Warsaw Pact is considering such a renunciation, and it is prepared to eliminate the asymmetry and accept further zero solutions—a third one. The second hint involves the Warsaw Pact's interpretation of ground-based medium-range weapons. Both German states should definitely oppose the introduction or development of comparable systems. Compensations of that kind would depreciate the zero solution. That is aimed at NATO plans to threaten Soviet territory through air and sea-based medium-range missiles, which are not subjects of the agreement. Both suggestions together aim for continued denuclearization of Europe, or at least the FRG. NATO so far has not made a decision on the basically permissible compensation for ground-based missiles in Europe.

Appeals for Accord

17061251 Hamburg DPA in German
1150 GMT 6 Jan 88

[Excerpts] Stuttgart (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) has passionately appealed to the superpowers to conclude an agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons within this year. "These are not weapons but means of destroying people which themselves must be destroyed," Genscher shouted to the applause of the approximately 1,500 participants in the Epiphany meeting today in Stuttgart.

The Washington agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles is a "first step; others must follow," Genscher added. "Do not let yourselves be talked into believing that the treaty is disadvantageous to our security." The Russians are destroying 1,500 warheads, the West 350: "I can see no disadvantage in this." All the FDP leadership assembled as is traditional for the Epiphany meeting in the Stuttgart State Theater. In contrast to previous rallies, the event took place without disturbances. [passage omitted]

Commentary on Honecker's Talks in Paris

17101240 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Jan 88 p 4

[Article by "JJ": "Message to Honecker and to Bonn"]

[Text] France speaks a clear language in East-West affairs—no matter whether it is governed by the left, the right, or as at present, by both. At any rate, Erich Honecker heard less diplomatic statements in Paris than he did earlier in Bonn. More trade—as the SED leader urged on the Seine? But that requires more change—as President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac stressed. Mitterrand argued that in view of the growing goods exchange it was really paradoxical not to "dismantle the anachronistic barriers restricting freedom of movement of persons and ideas."

More disarmament? Jacques Chirac stated: "Peace is not only based on counting troops and missiles. It grows from the intention to clear away obstacles, multiply contacts, and expand exchanges." He said that the Berlin Wall was a "painful reality." The French were particularly clear when Honecker started propagating his pet theme—the third-zero solution, meaning the removal of short-range missiles with ranges of less than 500 km. Mitterrand's cool response was that we should not interfere in the process that has just begun, by initiatives that would advance the next step—strategic disarmament.

France did not agree with the GDR on that concern, Mitterrand said. French short-range missiles, such as the Pluton and Hades, were "pre-strategic" weapons and as such were not part of those negotiations which should now rank first on the agenda: the Warsaw Pact's conventional and chemical superiority. Such warnings are based on France's iron interests: NATO's nuclear deterrence cannot be sacrificed to the Germans' special wishes; two zero solutions are more than enough for the time being. Even though that message was addressed to the GDR, it was in reality also meant for the German friends in Bonn.

CSU Meeting, Kissinger, Strauss Remarks Viewed

17101315 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Jan 88 p 7

[Hans Holzhaider article: "Kissinger Warns CSU About Gorbachev"]

[Text] Kreuth, 8 January—At a closed meeting of the 49th CSU Bundestag deputies in the spa of Kreuth, former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger gave an extremely skeptical assessment of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the elimination of all medium-range weapons and of the other disarmament negotiations. Even though Kissinger stated before the press on Friday that he agreed with his "old friend," CSU Chairman Franz-Josef Strauss, on all important issues, his interpretation of the prospects for new East-West relations clearly differed on various points from that given by Strauss after his return from Moscow.

The statement made by Strauss that the exportation of the world revolution and the "last great liberation war" were no longer an issue for the Soviet Union, was commented on by Kissinger with the phrase: "Stalin also said that." For the Soviet Union to be engaged in Angola or Nicaragua with military aid, "objectively" resulted in "consequences for the world revolution, whether they say so or not," Kissinger said.

Kissinger warned expressly about further nuclear disarmament steps, as long as the Soviet Union failed to make definitive concessions in the conventional field. The INF Treaty on the reduction of medium-range missiles did not reduce the nuclear threat to Europe, but limited the

opportunity for NATO to conduct a nuclear counterstrike from Europe, Kissinger said. If negotiations were now continued exclusively on nuclear disarmament, it was as if Goliath urged David to abolish the slingshot.

Kissinger emphatically rejected making concessions to the Soviet Union now. Glasnost and perestroika were an attempt to modernize the Soviet Union, without changing it. If it were to be successful, without entailing a change in Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet Union would become an even more difficult problem for the West, Kissinger said.

On the first day of the CSU closed meeting, Kissinger had a 4-hour discussion with the members of the Bonn Land Group. Strauss briefed the deputies in detail on his Moscow trip. CSU Land Group Chairman Theo Waigel said he did not share apprehensions that Strauss' new assessment of Soviet policy could touch off irritations at the party grassroots as the billion DM credit grant to the GDR did previously. He said he was "quite sure" that the Land Group, the Land Diet group, and the party "will accept our report."

The CSU chairman stressed that he, too, had qualified his statements following his Moscow visit, that the West did "no longer" have to "fear" Moscow's aggressive intentions, by listing a number of conditions. "We have to renounce the capacity of aggression on both sides. That does not mean denuclearization." Only if that objective, set by the Soviets themselves, is pursued, "can we cease to be afraid of a Soviet aggression." Strauss said that Moscow also refused to renounce the nuclear option and would therefore not offer a third-zero solution for missiles with ranges of less than 500 km, even though "they could thereby bring us into a difficult psychological and political situation." Asked about the statement he made in Moscow that a "new chapter" had been "opened" in German-Soviet relations, Strauss said: "When I open a chapter in a novel, that does not mean that a chapter in the Bible changes." Kissinger said he did not hear Strauss say anything that he did not agree with. There were still good reasons for East-West tensions. It was the task of negotiations to bring about a change in that respect.

Kissinger said on the German problem that unlike many Americans, he could understand the Germans' desire for the right of self-determination for their compatriots in the GDR. However, some quarters in the United States viewed that as a sort of nationalism, "which it really is." The former secretary of state added: "however, it is not bad nationalism." Strauss said that at present it was impossible to discuss the reunification issue with the Soviet leaders. His Moscow talks had shown that this could be no subject of negotiations. However, the Germans rejected a policy as pursued by the Palestinians under the motto "heat up unrest."

Government Concerned Over Chemical Weapons Issue

*08111742 Hamburg DPA in German
1431 GMT 11 Jan 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl intends to talk personally with U.S. President Ronald Reagan about the next steps in disarmament. At his press conference Kohl today confirmed his plan for talks with Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz early this year. In this, the problem of chemical weapons is to play a role; these weapons are of "particular importance" for the Federal Government.

The announcement was made against the background of reports concerning the foreign minister's increasing worries that the negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons might not merely be blocked by the United States, a partner in the alliance, but also by the German military, with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner at their head. Behind this lies the U.S. call to be able to keep larger stocks of chemical weapons for security until the proven annihilation of the Soviet stocks, the news magazine DER SPIEGEL reported on Monday.

The resumption of the production of the most modern chemical weapons by the United States, and a similar French attitude, together with the standstill at Geneva have alarmed the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry. Genscher will be addressing this issue during his Washington trip on 21 January. Furthermore, Genscher intends to champion the chemical weapons ban in front of a larger public when he speaks to the United Nations Disarmament Committee responsible for this on 4 February. For this purpose, he has recruited his Italian counterpart, Giulio Andreotti, as co-speaker. As was being said in Bonn, Genscher intends to point out clearly that the United States calls for impeccable supervision of the [kontrolle] annihilation of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union. Subsequently however, the West has brought new opposition into play.

The latest statement from the U.S. Department of State is not perceived as a reassurance in Bonn. On Sunday in Washington, a spokesman welcomed the Soviet information of chemical weapons stocks but at the same time postponed their own disclosures until Soviet information has been "checked."

Soviets 'Not Interested' in Third Zero Solution

*08130935 Hamburg DPA in German
1718 GMT 12 Jan 88*

[Text] Bonn/Munich (DPA)—The CSU chairman and Bavarian minister-president, Franz-Josef Strauss, gained the impression on his visit to Moscow that the Soviet Union is not interested in a third zero solution on missiles with a range of less than 500 km. In reply to a question from Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU), about whether this had been expressly stated,

Strauss told the CDU/CSU Bundestag group in Bonn on Tuesday that his assessment is derived from what his partners in the talks said about disarmament policy.

At the caucus of the CSU Bundestag group in Wildbad Kreuth, Strauss stressed that the Soviets would not offer a third zero solution, although they could put the West in a difficult psychological situation by so doing. Moscow does not want to be without a nuclear component.

In contrast, GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker, in a letter to Chancellor Helmut Kohl last week, did not exclude the possibility of further zero solutions, if modernization of short-range systems is dropped. CDU/CSU parliamentary group leader Alfred Dregger welcomed the fundamental readiness of Honecker for further disarmament steps on missiles under 500 km in range, but made it clear that the union continued to reject a zero solution on these systems. CSU Bundestag group chairman Theo Waigel is of the opinion that a conventional balance in Europe cannot secure peace. A certain nuclear component is necessary for this.

Woerner pointed out to Strauss, who was reporting on his Moscow trip to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, that there is still a wide gap between words and deeds of the Soviets in disarmament policy. CDU deputy Bernhard Friedmann stressed in the discussion that the German question must repeatedly be placed on the agenda. He was referring to observations made by Strauss that reunification could not be discussed with the Soviets at the moment. CDU deputy Herbert Czaja called for the economic strength of the Federal Republic to be used for reunification and for the implementation of human rights. Dregger said Strauss had worthily represented the union's position in Moscow.

Addressing the plenum of the Bavarian Senate in Munich earlier, Strauss described as false the view that his statement that no solution to the German question could be achieved with the sword was an abandonment of reunification. Public puzzlement about his remarks following his Moscow trip were a result not of a fundamental change in his own position but of the "cliches" put about by some of the media. Strauss countered critics of his remarks on disarmament and on Germany policy, saying that had only been a "change from a Strauss who never existed to one you are now seeing." Strauss gave an assurance he is "no dreamer or utopian."

CDU-CSU Spokesman on Discriminate Deterrence

17211704 Frankfurt/Main *Frankfurter Allgemeine in German* 19 Jan 88 p 5

[Article by "FY.": "NATO Cohesion Doubted"]

[Text] Bonn, 18 January—The U.S. "Discriminate Deterrence" strategy study's recommendations, published in Washington last week, are of topical importance already today, said Willy Wimmer, the CDU-CSU

Bundestag group's spokesman for defense policy, "because the recommendations doubt the Western defense alliance's cohesion in the long run." According to a statement on the study made by Wimmer, America is in a dilemma regarding the nuclear balance toward the Soviet Union. As a result of it, the threat of using its own nuclear weapons always implies the risk of self-destruction. By the promise of nuclear protection, which America gave its European NATO partners, the American fate is linked existentially to its allies, he said. That association of solidarity is the protective guarantee for the whole alliance and the basis for NATO's strategic unity, he added. However, should Washington one day make the decision to consider its strategic nuclear weapons as "national self defense weapons", which are no longer connected with the rest of alliance's defense potential, then NATO's deterrence capability would no longer exist for all alliance members. "That would be the decision of retreat toward the 'stronghold America.' From that safe platform, there might be global activities with a calculable risk' then. A great part of the rest of the world, including the European NATO area, would then be degraded to a zone in which 'small wars' might be carried out. The danger of the 'great' confrontation with the other superpower would then no longer exist for America," says Wimmer.

However, such "considerations of waging war" are not acceptable for the countries affected. Even a limited war with precise weapons would cause unacceptable destructions. NATO's right to exist comes from the fact that it may, with a very high degree of probability, avoid war for all its members. Even in a changing world, the basic solidarity among all partners must not "go to the dogs," says Wimmer. For Western Europe's NATO countries, the long-term question arises how they might support the United States in solving its "nuclear dilemma." In that context, they cannot get away from the fact to unite Western Europe in terms of security policy, "to grow out of the role of America's security policy junior partner by means of purposefully creating a European identity."

CDU's Dregger on Pentagon Document

17211255 Bonn *DIE WELT in German* 21 Jan 88 p 5

[Article by "Ruediger Moniac": "Dregger Describes Consequences for Europe"]

[Text] CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Chairman Alfred Dregger has urged the U.S. administration not to accept, as written, the recommendations of the "Discriminate Deterrence" study recently completed under the chairmanship of Fred Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter and presented to President Reagan. Europe's security could then no longer be guaranteed in the present form.

The CDU politician's criticism proceeds from the following "key sentence" of the study: "The Alliance should not threaten the use of nuclear weapons as a

connecting link to an even more extended and destructive war—although that would include the risk of a further escalation—but mainly as an instrument to frustrate the attacking armed forces' success."

Dregger concludes: In that case, U.S. strategic weapons would no longer be at the disposal of a "deterrence network" with Europe. The United States, it is true, would not disassociate itself from Europe, because its troops are still deployed in Europe and would be equipped with nuclear field weapons with a range up to 500 km, but would refuse to risk escalation. "Their guarantee is only effective so long as the troops are deployed in Europe," Dregger stated. Should the United States accept the concept recommended by the Ikle report, Europe would fall under the Soviet Union's "power policy dominance."

The CDU politician calls on European to analyze the situation on their continent and to take the "decisive step" to achieve their own identity. According to Dregger, Europe should speak "with one voice," so that no "European confusion of voices" can be heard in Washington or Moscow anymore.

In his opinion, the WEU is the most appropriate institution at present to establish Europe as a uniform force within NATO. Its members are—apart from the FRG—Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries. On that basis, says Dregger, Europe should have a part in the arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of nuclear weapons. According to Dregger, Europe should "sit at the table as the third party."

However, that does not mean that France and Great Britain's nuclear weapons would be up for negotiation as well. "The world powers will only have reason to demand disarmament from the European nuclear powers when they will have reduced their own strategic potential to the approximate level of the two European nuclear powers," the group chairman stated in Bonn yesterday.

On that occasion he noted the recommendations of the "Monnet committee," whose members are leading politicians of all significant parties from the EC countries. At the conclusion of its recent session in Paris, the committee appealed to Europeans to "find a framework to coordinate and strengthen their forces." That would help to strengthen the balance between the United States and Europe in NATO and permit Europe to make "a more effective contribution to common security." The recommendation adopted in Paris even says that a new organization framework would enable Europeans to find common positions to solve security problems outside Europe. Dregger interpreted that as an expression of Europe's global interests.

Genscher Interviewed on Talks With Reagan
17211943 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German
1800 GMT 21 Jan 88

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by correspondent Helmut Reitze on the "Heute" newscast; in Washington today—recorded]

[Text] [Reitze] Mr Genscher, did you discuss the elimination of chemical weapons with the U.S. President?

[Genscher] Important points during the talk with the President were—first, issues of economic relations between the EC and the United States: how we can jointly contribute to growth in the world. Second—how we can benefit from the successful conclusion of the disarmament treaty on medium-range missiles. Both sides are interested in using the momentum for reaching further progress.

[Reitze] Is such progress to take place in the field of disarming chemical or conventional weapons?

[Genscher] In the whole Western disarmament area. That means a 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons, a world-wide elimination of chemical weapons, and of course a very strong concentration on conventional stability in Europe, which concerns us particularly.

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