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22 August 1984

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

ROLE OF KOMSOMOL IN INSPIRING, CRITICIZING FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 84 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Sergey Andreyevich Bobylev: "The Lieutenant Years: On the Forward Line"]

[Text] Col Gen Sergey Andreyevich Bobylev devoted several years to Komsomol work in Army service.

In the war years Bobylev went through many positions successively: commissar and deputy commander for political affairs of an antitank battery, Komsomol organizer and party organizer of a regiment. He celebrated the day of the great victory in a Prague liberated from the fascists as assistant chief for Komsomol work of the political department of the 7th Guards Army.

Col Gen S. A. Bobylev now is the member of the military council and chief of political directorate of the Air Defense Forces.

In going over his service and the years he has lived in his mind, every commander and chief probably clearly realizes that he always found active assistants in his very difficult work. The ability to rely on them correctly and firmly invariably accompanied success. Our Komsomol organizations also are among such reliable assistants, and this is easily explainable, for Komsomol members represent the flower and pride of Soviet youth and are in the vanguard of its grand achievements.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade K. U. Chernenko gave a high appraisal of the Leninist Komsomol at a meeting with workers of the Moscow Serp i Molot Metallurgical Plant. He remarked that the "Komsomol is a reliable reserve and combat assistant of the party. The party has entrusted and is entrusting responsible work to the league of young Leninists. The party knows that the Komsomol can be relied upon."

And take any military collective. As a rule, Komsomol members represent the overwhelming majority in it. What a significant force this is in accomplishing the tasks of combat readiness and of indoctrinating and training the personnel!

But it would be erroneous to assume that the large size of the Komsomol family just in itself predetermines its leading role. Of course not. The young people must constantly see and sense that they have concerned and very experienced senior comrades who will support, suggest and advise at a necessary minute.

Events of my distant officer youth come alive in memory. I had occasion to go down the frontline roads for almost four years. Behind every fierce fight against a crafty foe and behind the endlessly difficult passages and marches I see our wonderful fighting men and commanders and their unbending faith in victory. And each time I remember how the Komsomol members always were next to the party members on the most forward line.

I can't forget Col Orlov, commander of the 425th Rifle Regiment. He seemed suited as a father for us young people of Komsomol age, but this never was a hindrance for his lively contact with the young people. He somehow always did this gradually, tactfully and unobtrusively. Later I began to realize that the commander was especially attracted to meetings with people on the eve of fierce clashes with the Hitlerites.

Once (it was in 1942, and at that time I was a regimental Komsomol organizer) the battalions were preparing to assault a powerful enemy strongpoint. It is well known that in such minutes and hours the commander and staff have more than enough work, as the saying goes, in organizing for combat. But Col Orlov found the time to make his way to the soldiers in the trenches along the connecting passages from the command post. He requested me to summon the company Komsomol organizers. What did the commander talk to them about? All of us already had been informed of the operation order and now each person was living that order and believed that they would succeed in breaking and destroying the enemy. Col Orlov, however, spoke to the Komsomol leaders about how best to do this without unnecessary sacrifices. He realized that his audience now consisted of the activists who stood closest of all to the fighting men and so had good knowledge of their strong and weak points. And here in a hastily dug trench the commander gave advice and taught them how to conduct political work with people on the eve of an attack.

The commander knew firmly that now the Komsomol organizers would disperse to their own companies and carry his words to each person who was faced with a stern ordeal, that they would pass on to the people a fervent belief in combat superiority over the enemy, and that later they themselves would draw their comrades into a victorious attack. And that it was always when the combat situation demanded the greatest exertion of the soldiers' moral and physical forces. Those fights were difficult. People were disabled and if the Komsomol organizer was among those disabled Col Orlov always would ask with concern who had replaced him, whether or not it was a brave person respected in the company or platoon collective, and whether or not he was able to find the hidden paths to the soldiers' hearts.

Our combat traditions also are strong in the fact that in each new generation of military people they find their faithful continuers who augment the

veterans' grand deeds. And so it is already among the battalion, regimental and division commanders of the present 1980's we see those who have not taken part in a war and who have not risen up for an attack against the leaden storm, but who worthily bear the baton of frontline valor. Among the many, I would like to mention Lt Col N. Bochkovskiy, commander of a surface-to-air missile regiment and a party member. His subordinates always are vigilant in operational readiness duty and they show persistence and initiative in performing the most difficult tasks of military improvement. There is one other important indicator determining the make-up of the unit: for over 20 years there have been no extraordinary occurrences here and other infractions of military discipline have been reduced to a minimum.

I listened to Officer Bochkovskiy at a district party conference and experienced a feeling of profound satisfaction. He modestly informed the delegates of the successes, giving considerable credit for them to his predecessors. Of course, he did have a good "heritage" left to him. The skillfully arranged training and indoctrination process and well organized socialist competition are the basis of the achievements. Everyone in the regiment knows how close Komsomol affairs also are to the commander. He knows all leaders of the youth in the subunits by first name. meets with them regularly, teaches them and exhorts them in their work.

Once in analyzing the status of military discipline in one of the subunits Lt Col Bochkovskiy discovered a certain slump in it. What was the reason for this? He had a thorough chat with the commander and political officer. And what was the view "from below" of the deficiencies and what did the Komsomol members think about it? He gave a report at a meeting, which was a genuine invitation for a frank discussion and a heart-to-heart talk. Why did some Komsomol members close their eyes to "minor" flaws in comrades' behavior and what was the reason for some soldiers' narrow position ("It is no business of mine")? And he succeeded in stirring up the people and hearing their opinions about burning issues. Needless to say, after such revelations the points for application of efforts in the struggle for Komsomol members' exemplariness in military discipline became better visible.

Komsomol organizations have vast opportunities to exert a beneficial influence on the hearts and minds of privates, NCO's, warrant officers [praporshchiki] and lieutenants. The young people's affairs and concerns must be reflected in the Komsomol worker's restless heart. Any cloud over the head of a young man, our soldier, cannot help but heighten a worker's attention. It is well when people responsible for work among Komsomol members find a genuine calling in it, and when a person views the company, battalion or regiment not simply as a troop formation but as an Army family where the success of one is a joy for all and where someone's failure is a common concern. It would appear that the Komsomol worker will be able to find the primary points of application of his forces only in this way.

I will note right off that in order to achieve this, a person must elevate and strengthen the authority of Komsomol workers in every way. But at times one must state with distress that some commanders and chiefs who, by the way, at

one time were in the Komsomol and who unquestionably know the force of its influence on the young people, somehow keep aloof from lively contacts with the Komsomol organization or even (it is no secret) brush aside their useful initiatives.

Unfortunately we also have not gotten rid of instances where, for example, Komsomol workers are ignored when persons who distinguished themselves are commended after tactical exercises and firings, which are the crown of combat training. But who if not the activists, concerned with best performance of operational training missions, have made their substantial contribution to establish a lofty mood for work in the team, platoon, battery or squadron?

It was emphasized at the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum how important it is to develop in young people the high qualities of patriots and internationalists, convinced fighters for communism who are irreconcilable toward views and tastes alien to our way of life. Komsomol organizations of our Armed Forces can and must make a great contribution toward accomplishing these exceptionally important tasks.

I know from my own experience, tested by frontline life, that concern for the authority of a Komsomol organization also is concern for the personal example of Komsomol members in training, service and observance of military discipline. I remember back in the summer of 1943, in preparing for the battle for the Dnieper, we political department workers (at that time I was assistant chief of the division political department for Komsomol work) especially glorified those who distinguished themselves in fighting. Soldiers with Komsomol cards at their hearts set high examples of heroism. Now, on the threshold of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory, we give their names proudly. One of the heroes is battalion Komsomol organizer Lt Veniamin Gzhesyuk. An energetic, buoyant, charming young man who at that time was not yet even 20 years old, he was the soul of the collective and a desperately brave person. He was among the first to make an assault crossing of the Dnieper in the vicinity of Kremenchug and later he held a miniscule beachhead on its opposite bank with a group of persons just as brave as he was until the main body arrived. Later we saw the patch of soil which was literally entirely torn up by shells and beaten by fragments and bullets. But the enemy had not succeeded in breaking the staunchness of our fighting men and commanders. That is how Komsomol organizers of the fiery years fulfilled their military duty.

Are there really few Komsomol leaders today whose service is an example of faultless devotion to the Motherland? Here is one of them--Maj Aleksandr Golobokov. He has given more than ten years of officer service to Komsomol work among the troops--imaginative, inspired work of initiative. He was decorated with the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class for his labor and for high successes.

The soldiers are very familiar with Pvt Igor' Kozhemyakin, who was decorated with the Order of Red Star and the "Combat Merit" medal for courage and heroism in performing international duty on the land of the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan. Igor' Kozhemyakin now is studying successfully in the second course of the Smolensk Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Engineer School and is a deputy secretary of the Komsomol committee.

Komsomol group organizer Sgt Nikolay Petukhov has more than a single handful of uninterrupted trackings of control targets to his credit. The subordinates of the first class specialist are his equal.

Yes, the well of good deeds of Army Komsomol members is not running dry. They carry the baton of their fathers and grandfathers and continue the grand annals of the Leninist Komsomol with pride and dignity. They will be representatives of the Air Defense Forces as well at the upcoming All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries. They will bring with them the hot breath of training routine and the keen sense of fighting men of the forward edge--defenders of the homeland's sky. They will take an active part in the work of the large representative forum.

The military council and political directorate of the Air Defense Forces are placing great emphasis on the indoctrination of the Komsomol aktiv and are teaching commanders and political workers how to orient the aktiv's efforts toward improving the communist indoctrination of young people and toward assuring the exemplariness of Komsomol members in training, service, competition and all matters directed toward a further strengthening of military discipline and an improvement of combat readiness of the units and subunits.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COMMANDERS CALLED UPON TO SERVE AS MODELS, TEACHERS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Tolubko: "The Commander's Development: Style and Result"]

[Text] One and a half years have gone by since I received a new assignment and left the unit in which I had served several years and which had become home for me. I didn't break off ties with former colleagues and recently while on TDY I even had the good fortune to meet with them. I was sincerely happy for many of them. As before, officers A. Mazykin, S. Fartushnyy, V. Yakovlev and others take a responsible and loving attitude toward service and as a result they either have been already advanced to higher positions or have been sent to study. But there are also those who somehow faded in these 1½ years, became complacent and aren't fully justifying the hopes placed on them.

For example, I had a chat with my former subordinate, Sr Lt A. Mel'nikov and learned that not everything was shaping up well for him. The subunit he heads is among the ones "in the middle." This was a surprise to me. It seemed that Sr Lt Mel'nikov had everything going for himself to cope successfully with the duties of subunit commander. When he was a team commander and then deputy subunit commander, he gained much experience in training and indoctrinating the soldiers and became a master. And Mel'nikov possessed one other enviable quality--interest in his work. Hence his diligence, enthusiasm and praiseworthy restlessness. Where had all that gone now? Had the officer become complacent or taken on airs? Or were there other reasons: the fact that all of us, both his former superiors and the present ones, did not discern something very essential in his character and work style?

I remember how unevenly Capt I. Perelygin's development took place. He would win you over with many good qualities, and above all a high level of special training, initiative and a firm grasp of matters. One would think that he was one hundred percent ready to command a subunit.

Then an opportunity to advance Perelygin presented itself. Initially everything went well. The specialists' proficiency rose and the cohesiveness of teams increased in the subunit. "Good lad, Perelygin!" it was said on the unit staff. "He is fully justifying the hopes." Then suddenly, like a bolt

from the blue, came a crude infraction of discipline in the successful subunit and, after some time, a second infraction...

When we thoroughly looked into each infraction and delved deeply into the subunit commander's work style we saw that Perelygin was focusing all his efforts on preparing the teams, with indoctrination taking a back seat for him as it were.

When we pointed this out to Perelygin he took offense: I myself work without let-up and I strive for this in others, so where is my blame? The person accustomed to working listlessly is the one who complains of exactingness, in his words.

Yes, Perelygin himself worked conscientiously and gave his all to service. At the same time, by placing poor trust in subordinates and indiscriminately doing his own work and that of others, he was shoving assistants aside, as it were. They developed the impression that they were not pulling their weight.

For example, one of the young officers was appointed to the position of deputy subunit commander. Perelygin should have helped his deputy get settled in the new position, but after the young officer's very first mistake he began to coddle him, and in such a way that, deprived entirely of independence, the young officer soon "began to request" to go back to the previous position.

It became necessary to hold a hearing for the subunit commander at a service conference, and he also gave an account at a party bureau session. The deficiencies in his work style were given the most severe and principled evaluation and only after all this did the officer ponder in a really thorough manner the "distortions" he had committed. Subsequently he was able to draw correct conclusions from the mistakes.

No, Capt Perelygin did not become less strict and exacting. Those in the subunit knew that if they allowed laxity or irresponsibility they couldn't expect condescension. But now Perelygin's exactingness was implemented on a regulation basis; it was correct in form and just in content. The commander began to rely skillfully on the party and Komsomol organizations; he wasn't ashamed to consult with subordinates and heed their opinion in deciding complicated issues. The results of such skilled organizational and indoctrinational work were not long in coming, as the saying goes: the subunit won the title of outstanding and the commander himself was sent to study.

In short, everything had fallen into place in Capt Perelygin's career as a commander, but this instance leads to reflection. At times it happens where certain merits of an officer win us over so much that we no longer see his weak points and, even if we do see them, they appear to us as insignificant and easily correctable against the background of unquestioned merits. But the whole problem is that deficiencies in character or work style are not remedied on their own. It is necessary to work on this, and of course it is necessary for the officer himself above all to do this. Did Capt Perelygin sense a need for this when he had just taken over the position of subunit commander? No, he

didn't. We praised him, saying he was an excellent specialist, energetic and diligent. It was as if we didn't see the fact that he lacked the ability to work with people. We didn't see it until this deficiency made itself known.

Isn't something similar also happening with Sr Lt Mel'nikov? At one time he was considered a capable, promising officer and was advanced to a higher position. Since he is capable, he will cope, was the thought, and we let it go at that, i.e., in essence we forced him to "stew in his own juices."

Here is where all things unexpected and "surprises" begin. One person, believing that he is developing command qualities, will and firmness, begins to shout at subordinates and display arrogance. Another, trying to justify the high evaluation given him, works diligently, but expends energy for nothing and "spins his wheels" because he doesn't get help and support on the part of senior comrades. Some time passes and the promising officer becomes unpromising, as it were. The same persons who a year or two ago foretold his success are perplexed: "Our comrade really let us down. Just how could we have been wrong about him?"

Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed at the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "A precise, well-conceived system is important in working with cadres as it is nowhere else.

Commanders and political workers are directing their efforts toward carrying out this party demand. They work painstakingly and purposefully and, as a rule, productively with candidates for advancement. The principle which is the basis of their work and which they follow strictly is that each commander (or chief) personally teaches an officer immediately subordinate to him and is responsible for that officer's training as he is for his own. Another demand also is fulfilled no less strictly: young officers themselves are obligated to work incessantly on themselves and perfect pedagogic proficiency and organizing abilities. All this backed up by supervision and high demands permits avoiding all kinds of hitches and precluding "inadvertence" in advancement.

Just three years ago when Maj P. Borisov was a deputy subunit commander there was hardly anyone who considered him promising. While sincerely respecting him for many wonderful human qualities (responsiveness, honesty, diligence) and for a thorough technical and special training, his colleagues at the same time noted that the officer was so extremely shy and excessively mild in contact with subordinates. At a critique of one of the classes Borisov held, Officer V. Bitskiy, who was directly responsible for Borisov's training, said with disappointment: "Pavel Vasil'yevich! At least learn to give commands louder, so you can be heard..."

But Officer Bitskiy rarely got annoyed at his ward. He taught him constantly and knowledgeably, passing on to him his own experience and knowledge bit by bit. Let's say that a special tactical class is under way in the subunit where Borisov is serving, when suddenly Bitskiy gives a narrative problem: "The commander is gone and the training is continued by his deputy." The next time the very same thing would be repeated in a summarization of results.

The following also would happen. Bitskiy would say to Borisov: "Have a talk with Pvt Ivanov and then tell me your opinion of him." Borisov would have a talk and feel out the new recruit's mood and what was inside him. It never occurred to the officer that Bitskiy knew this young private well and wanted to know only one thing in addition: what impression Borisov would form of him in order then to compare his own opinion and Borisov's about the new recruit and consult on how best to work with him.

It is possible that in reading these lines some young officer who is experiencing certain failures and difficulties in service will think that he too would be able to unfold and show himself under the aegis of such a commander as Officer Bitskiy. It is possible that he will complain about those who are teaching him for something. But I am pursuing a different goal in citing this example. It will be much more beneficial if each officer who ponders his Army career will think above all about himself: "How do my subordinates and my commanders perceive me? What qualities do I lack? Where and how must I readjust? What must I learn above all?" The fact is, no matter how great is the role of senior comrades in a young officer's development, it is above all he himself who polishes his character and his style by steadfast work on himself and by self-indoctrination. Until a person absorbs this demand into his flesh and blood, as the saying goes, it is difficult to hope that he will achieve stable successes.

In analyzing the service of foremost officers one invariably notes one and the same qualities in them. It is a feeling of responsibility, a high awareness of duty, a conscientious attitude toward the job, a feeling for new things, exactingness toward themselves and others and, I would say, assertiveness and dynamism of character which are important in a commander's work both as an inner motivating force and a magnetic example for others. In respecting them and adopting their abundant experience, their subordinate officers also try to assume a heavier burden. This largely determines the psychological climate in the subunit, the people's fighting mood, and the atmosphere of friendship and comradely exactingness. People rally about such commanders, there remains no place among them for conceit, and they evaluate the highest results in an exacting, party manner, which creates preconditions for new forward progress and the successful accomplishment of missions in the summer training period.

6904

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

FORMALISTIC ATTITUDES TO POLITICAL WORK UNCOVERED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 May 84 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col M. Ziyemin'sh, Red Banner Volga Military District: "We Tell About All-Army Conference Participants: Assert Yourself by Action"]

[Text] Lt A. Zinov'yev recalls those events of almost a year ago as if it were now. Everything began in an ordinary, routine manner. There was a telephone call and, as the voice over the phone said, he was being assigned to prepare a memorandum about the regiment's Komsomol affairs. The memorandum was to be such that everything in it was significant: the figures impressive, the names of the very best, the activities out of the ordinary... It was explained why such a memorandum was necessary. It had been decided to show the work style of the regimental Komsomol committee on a positive plane at a Komsomol aktiv meeting. At the same time Lt Zinov'yev was told to speak at this meeting and share work experience.

"Prove that we are not planning to orient others on you in vain," said the voice over the phone.

"It's somehow awkward," said Lt Zinov'yev, who was about to object on this score. "It has been only a few days that I have been secretary of the Komsomol committee, and already onto the rostrum with experience..."

Zinov'yev tormented himself a long while with conjecture: Why did such a choice fall specifically on him? And what could he say about his work style if he didn't yet have a style as such? This style had not yet taken shape as the secretary was just entering the new position, and entering it in a not very simple manner. How many days, for example, had it happened to him that he would decide and plan to do one thing but would have to do something quite different? He would concoct some kind of papers, answer telephone calls or himself sit on the phone for a long while, and he would be forever running errands for someone: pick up, bring, take away, clarify or arrange something. All the while there was some kind of fuss. He was constantly eaten by dissatisfaction in that he didn't always know ahead of time what he would be doing. It is ridiculous, but that was his present work style. Is this what they were advising him to tell others?

The secretary's workbook contained the regiment's overall indicators for combat and political training, and some kind of calculations could be made to show the Komsomol members' successes. Such figures "would resound" at the meeting. The regiment was the best in the division [soyedineniye] and that told everything. And it would be no problem to name the best Komsomol activists and draw up a list of the most memorable events, but he decided to visit the companies and chat with the people in order to determine more surely the "sore spots" which troubled them...

Again the telephone rang. Acting regimental political deputy Maj F. Samofal was summoning him.

"Andrey Nikolayevich," he said, "what kind of a hullabaloo is going on in the subunits at your initiative? They are trying to take the people from classes."

It turned out that it couldn't have been worse. Lt Zinov'yev hadn't informed the senior comrades. And so it turned out that independent action had been allowed on his part for which he had to answer...

Others prepared the memorandum.

But the greatest surprise, or ordeal if you like, lay ahead of him. Several days later he was sitting in the hall of the enlisted men's club listening to the report at the Komsomol aktiv meeting. It was not without nervousness that he waited for them to begin talking about the regiment's affairs.

The report also mentioned the regiment's affairs, and how! Impressive figures and the names of the "cream of the crop" were given... The impression was given that affairs in the regiment's Komsomol organization were going almost ideally and that there were no serious problems here, that he, Lt Zinov'yev, the beginning Komsomol committee secretary, already "showed himself to be a skilled organizer and a self-starting, imaginative leader of the youth"...

Lt Zinov'yev pictured himself from one side: here he was, deafened by complimentary appraisals, sitting and saying nothing. Judging from what was said, he no longer had anything more to work on. As a matter of fact, however, there were many difficult problems. For example, one of the company Komsomol organizations was credited with achieving the highest percentage of highly rated specialists in the division--almost 90 percent. Lt Zinov'yev knew otherwise: the highly rated combat vehicle driver-mechanics had been assembled in the company to train young specialists, and that is how the high indicator was reached. No one looked at the substance.

But Lt Zinov'yev was troubled most by the problem of the Komsomol members' personal example in combat training. This had been discussed in the subunits more than once and very good decisions were made but, as before, there were those among the Komsomol members who had not fulfilled pledges. It seemed the companies were reconciled with that situation. The response to criticism was approximately the following: we see our deficiencies and know them, and we are taking steps to remedy them. And should someone give a reminder after some

time that such optimistic assurances had been heard from the rostrum even earlier, then an answer would be found even to this: we are working, but not everything is going right...

Lt Zinov'yev spoke about this and much more fervently and emotionally at that time at the Komsomol aktiv meeting. Not everyone liked this, of course. The only thing that pleased Andrey were the words heard after the meeting: "This one isn't like the previous committee secretary." The former secretary was active and businesslike on the rostrum: he would criticize, advise and propose. But when the time approached in the regiment for final problems, the lieutenant who was the Komsomol secretary would undertake something that didn't immediately submit to evaluation: he would hurriedly fuss over another unscheduled leave. He would advance one argument more substantial than another. It later turned out that he was pursuing the goal of avoiding unpleasantness at all cost, and there was a reason for this. It was easy to compromise oneself at the firing line or in driving combat vehicles. The lieutenant wasn't distinguished by the desire to learn to fire accurately and drive a combat vehicle well. He managed to receive an unsatisfactory grade even in drill training.

Back from the beginning of his service in the position of deputy company commander for political affairs, Zinov'yev had the immutable rule to always be with the people; to know how the company lived, what troubled the young people and who had need of his help and support as the secretary; and fire and drive the combat vehicle as an equal with everyone. The secretary's example would be sure to help more than one young soldier believe in his abilities during classes in moral-psychological preparation in the compound...

The discussion of personal example is not by chance. All who are in the regimental Komsomol committee are specialists with high ratings, and deputy secretary WO Vorob'yev is a master of combat qualification. It is Lt Zinov'yev's dream, which he does not conceal from comrades, to see that this situation becomes the standard for each company Komsomol buro. In his opinion, this will have great meaning...

Once Zinov'yev was writing out the agendas of Komsomol meetings for a recent period of time on a sheet of paper, and he was saddened by the similarity of wordings: tasks, tasks, tasks. It was as if invention and the creative search were completely exhausted. In one battalion he saw three such announcements next to each other at the same time. He assembled the activists. Is it really impossible, let's say, to word it differently, in a youthful way, if only as follows: "What do you understand friendship and troop comradeship to be?" (the subject was to be the Komsomol organization's role in making the military collective cohesive) or: "Hello, young soldier," and "How is your service going, soldier?" These words are addressed to each person directly, and each person must speak personally for himself: he must assess his conduct in the collective. If he behaved unworthily toward a comrade a direct accounting must be demanded of him.

As Zinov'yev saw, formalism reflected in papers also often indicates an indifference in the work with young people better than any words. For example, he knew that there had been infractions of military discipline in the company commanded by Capt A. Yakovenko. The company commander was justly rebuked for this, but Lt Zinov'yev was troubled by something else: the infractions were occurring in off-duty time, on days off or on the days preceding them. It was basically when officers were absent in the company. But why was a large company aktiv which, by the way, makes up almost one-third of the personnel, inactive?

Pvt V. Akhunkin was late for evening roll call. The soldier's infraction was discussed and condemned at a Komsomol meeting and Pvt Akhunkin repented. But when Lt Zinov'yev took a closer look at the situation he very quickly saw that company Komsomol buro members had reacted formally to the soldier's misdeed. It was necessary to return once more to this miserable event...

Lt Zinov'yev often had occasion to hear from the unit commander and political officer about the need to be in the companies more often. Now he saw with his own eyes that the company is a serious area for Komsomol committee work, and there were many problems here. For example, why weren't all Komsomol activists in that same company where he recently chatted with Pvt Akhunkin activists in practice, in live work? Komsomol organization secretary Sr Sgt I. Yanzytov often would follow the path of least resistance in distributing social assignments: whoever pulls more, figuratively speaking, is the one who is given a heavier burden. For example, Sr Sgt I. Kuzenbayev at times would have to function in almost ten roles: assistant political study group instructor, agitator, artist, sports organizer (when the regular organizer was absent for some reason), and a member of the wall newspaper editorial board. Is it any surprise that Komsomol work in the company often was reduced to weightlifting contests? The secretary did not rest easy until he succeeded in catching the young people's interest in social affairs and forming a fighting nucleus of an aktiv in the company.

In another subunit Lt Zinov'yev established that all company personnel had been active unit library readers at the beginning of service, but now only a few people visited the library.

"What's the matter?" he asked. "Did the young people lose interest in books?"

"No," he was told. "They love to read, but various situations deprive them of an opportunity to leaf through a book even in free time..."

The lieutenant chatted with young battalion officers about this and the situation was corrected, but not without the secretary's help. Soon, however, he had occasion to make one other unexpected discovery. It was this way. Lt Zinov'yev inquired into the service of a Komsomol member from whom a punishment recently had been removed, but the company commander knew nothing at all. This fact placed the secretary on guard. A personal matter is not an ordinary occurrence which can be ignored in the life of the company and its Komsomol organization. Further discussion showed that the officer had his own

established view on this score: there is a party organization and it keeps all these matters in view. Lt Zinov'yev spoke at a regimental meeting which was discussing problems of party leadership of the Komsomol. It seemed the company commander had changed his point of view sharply...

Not long ago the district political directorate prepared a methods aid for Komsomol activists entitled "Success is Forged in the Company." It also contains many kind lines about Lt Andrey Zinov'yev, participant of the All-Army Conference...

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

CORRECT PROPAGANDA METHODS REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 84 p 2

[Article by WO [Michman] P. Sadovskiy, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Ideological Work: Experience, Opinions: Why It Is Interesting to Learn"]

[Text] The propagandist's work usually is evaluated by inspectors, superiors and by the propagandist himself. The following notes contain an evaluation on behalf of those to whom his word is addressed...

"Today, comrade students, let's work independently." This phrase by Capt 3d Rank V. Gapeyevtsev can be said to have become traditional during a long deployment.

And we worked, each on something different. One person would be copying something from another's synopsis, another person would bury himself in a mystery and others would doze openly. Our instructor also seemed to be serving out his time. It seems to me that he didn't even conceal this when he would give lectures or hold seminars.

After returning to base it was learned that a new instructor, Capt-Lt V. Zolotukhin, would take over the warrant officer political study group. New instructor or not, we didn't expect any special changes in the conduct of classes, nor did they occur. It was the very same boring lectures and the very same seminars at which it was possible to get by easily with another person's synopsis. Meanwhile, the group was regarded as not half bad, and in any case I didn't have occasion to hear it criticized anywhere.

Soon I was transferred to serve in another unit and I ended up in the political study group conducted by Capt 3d Rank V. Ivanov. I admit that here too I went to class the first time without any interest. When the order of the day indicates it, that means one must sit in the auditorium for the prescribed time. On crossing the threshold into the room I saw some kind of sketches, diagrams and charts hung on the walls. I could hear the warrant officers talking about the past class, and not just talking: they were arguing sincerely and with enthusiasm. I understood that in that class there was a discussion of the discipline of labor and of military discipline. It was this discussion that was continuing. The warrant officers freely used materials of

the CPSU central committee plenums, quoted Lenin's sayings from memory and relied on examples from the life of their subunits. I was surprised by this heated discussion before a class, over the fact that it arose at all and by its fervency.

Capt 3d Rank Ivanov also gave the lecture on the next topic not as my previous instructors had. He spoke about the tasks set by the party for industry and agriculture and about the need for a struggle for very strict economy, and he presented the material as if he himself and we along with him bore direct responsibility for the affairs of every kolkhoz and every plant. Vasiliy Ivanovich somehow naturally included first one student, then another in his narrative. The figures in the sketches and diagrams "began to talk" and became capacious and graphic. I didn't notice how I myself wanted to have a word, but then one warrant officer who, as I learned later, also was new to this group, tossed out a retort:

"We are military people and have no direct relationship to these problems."

The captain 3d rank heard the comment and said:

"Who can raise an objection to the comrade? WO Khryunov? Please."

"The economy concerns all of us, in things large and small," said Khryunov, and he shared his thoughts about a thrifty, proprietary attitude toward state and military property.

The students actively supported him with examples.

"Yesterday pieces of bread suitable for biscuits again were found in food scraps in the galley although there were so many conversations about the inadmissibility of this..."

"A truck was sent to the depot for paint, and there was some kind of confusion and an unplanned inventory there about which no one had been warned. As a result our vehicle as well as others rolled tens of kilometers for nothing..."

Other facts were given about the economic negligence of colleagues, and here is what is typical: they were not cited simply for the sake of backing up a theoretical conclusion. The students were reflecting how to fight deficiencies more decisively and they were making specific proposals. I caught myself thinking that this wasn't a meeting, there are no minutes here and no resolution will be adopted, but this discussion probably will be remembered without fail both at party and at Komsomol meetings. And even without waiting for meetings we warrant officers can do something realistic to see that there is more order in the unit.

I didn't even notice when this class came to an end. We were in no hurry to leave. Each of us really felt a part of the great achievements of our own people and a part of their affairs and concerns. That same day I overheard by chance how WO A. Mel'nikov was briefing the daily detail:

"Today we will perform unit duty, which means we are responsible for everything. If someone has forgotten to turn off a light in the room for the night, it is our fault as well and we are performing duty poorly. Don't forget: take care of the kopecks and the rubles will take care of themselves."

I became interested in studying in the new group. After some time I realized that I was waiting for Monday impatiently. I pictured how Vasiliy Ivanovich would enter the auditorium and, as a warm-up, as the saying goes, for purposes of joining vigorously in active work, he would suggest:

"WO Glinchenko will tell us about the most important events in the country for the past week and WO Struk will tell about foreign events."

But I know that my name too may be given, and any other student has to be ready to tell briefly and precisely about what occurred in the world during the past days. And, strange as this may sound, because of such a "warm-up" I learned to read newspapers regularly and constantly follow the pulse of our planet with the help of radio and television. It is no secret that previously I had occasion to put my foot in my mouth. The seamen would be discussing some bit of news in their circle and then they would turn to me: "Comrade Warrant Officer, what do you think about this?" What am I to think if it is the first time I hear about it? I would have to use fast talk to refer to my being busy and hurry to senior comrades so they could brief me about the event of interest to the seamen. Now it is a different matter. Those in the unit already know well that each student in our warrant officer political study group can conduct a political briefing in an interesting manner. Commanders and political workers of the subunits also are satisfied to entrust us with holding talks with the personnel on various current issues of domestic and international life.

I remember my first presentation at a seminar. It was not a particularly difficult matter, but I couldn't tear away from the synopsis. Ivanov stopped me and asked WO A. Alekseyev to cover this same matter. I looked and my colleague revealed the topic precisely, in a well-reasoned manner and without the help of his notes. Noticing my embarrassment, Vasiliy Ivanovich said:

"Never mind, Sadovskiy, you too will learn to answer without the synopsis."

I did learn. Regular appearances before the seamen with talks and political briefings also helped in this.

We very much like to see the feature of an ability to listen in a group instructor. One immediately senses that he is interested in what you are saying and in you yourself. We believe that Vasiliy Ivanovich also goes to every class with satisfaction and that contact with us also enriches him.

Here is one other feature of our classes. When you answer a question about some event or phenomenon, also be ready to express your personal attitude toward this and your personal evaluation. If you blunder somewhere the instructor and your class comrades will help you arrive at the correct conclusion without fail.

We are proud that our warrant officer political study group has been declared outstanding three years in a row. The majority of students has the rating of master of military affairs and almost each person is an outstanding person in the Navy. Recently we all warmly congratulated our instructor: the unit political department published a leaflet which generalized the work experience of non-T/O&E propagandist Capt 3d Rank Vasiliy Ivanovich Ivanov.

I impatiently await next Monday and the next class in our group.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LT GEN UTKIN ON PARTY'S ROLE IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 9, May 84 pp 11-15

[Article by Lt Gen B. Utkin, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Communist Party--The Inspirer and Organizer of the People's Feat"]

[Text] The memory of a grateful mankind will never forget that radiant day of May in 1945 when the artillery salvos of the holiday salute announced the long-awaited victory.

The Great Patriotic War was a very severe testing for our state and it was a war not only for the liberty and independence of the USSR but also for saving mankind from the terrors and obscurantism of fascism. The farther the difficult years of wartime move back into history, the more vivid are the greatness and immortality of the military and labor deeds of the Soviet people and their valorous Armed Forces. Our people, the hero people, the knight people, raised the glory-wreathed Leninist banner, the banner of Great October high above the world and victoriously carried it through the fire of the wartime years.

Our path to victory was unbelievably difficult. The duel with the colossal military machine of Nazi Germany lasted almost 4 long years. Nazi Germany and its satellites treacherously threw against the Soviet Union an enormous invasion army without any declaration of war. The military and political leaders of the Third Reich had not even a shadow of doubt on the success of their "lightning" campaign to the East. But, having attacked the USSR, the Nazis marched toward their death.

Soviet arms won undying glory in the brilliant victories of our troops at Moscow, where the Soviet Army once and for all buried the Third Reich "Blitzkrieg," and in history's greatest Stalingrad Battle which lasted more than 200 days and nights during which the Nazi bloc lost one-quarter of its forces then fighting on the Soviet-German Front, as well as in the famous Kursk Battle during which the Nazi Army lost 30 of its crack divisions and, regardless of the lack of a second front in Europe, was confronted with a military catastrophe. In the great engagements at Stalingrad, on the Kursk Salient, the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Dnepr, the Soviet Armed Forces achieved a fundamental change in the Great Patriotic War and this had a decisive influence on the course of the entire World War II.

In 1944, our army was dealing crushing blows against the enemy at Leningrad and Novgorod, in the Baltic and Belorussia, on the Right-Bank Ukraine and at Kishinev and, having completely cleared the territory of our country of invaders, began to carry out the great liberation mission beyond the frontiers of our motherland. The 1945 offensive operations which were the greatest in terms of scope and results ended with the Battle for Berlin. The Soviet soldier, in fighting his way through the severe hardships of the war and having shown wholehearted dedication to the socialist motherland, unprecedented courage, steadfastness and heroism in the battles, raised the Red Banner of Victory over the devastated reichstad. On 8 May, Nazi Germany unconditionally surrendered. The war ended where it had been conceived. Several months later, the Soviet Army defeated the million-strong Kwantung Army of Imperialist Japan.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was an outstanding event of our century and of world historical significance. This was a victory of the socialist system and the socialist economy, a victory of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and a demonstration of the might of our Army and Navy. This victory was visible proof of the invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It caused irreversible changes in the world.

It is an indisputable fact that the Soviet people and their heroic Armed Forces bore the basic burden of the war and played the decisive role in achieving victory. They worthily carried out an historical liberation mission and won the love and respect of the progressive people of the world. The operations to liberate the foreign countries involved over 7 million Soviet soldiers and more than a million of them gave up their lives for liberating them.

The main and decisive factor in the historic victory of the Soviet people was the organizing and ideological activities of the Communist Party which invested its collective wisdom, will and energy into the cause of defending the socialist fatherland. Our party anticipated the possibility of a military clash with the forces of imperialism and prepared the nation and the people for defense. The socioeconomic victories of the prewar five-year plans and the ideological and political unity of society forged in the course of building socialism laid the foundations for the victory sustained by us in the Great Patriotic War.

In being guided by the ideas of V. I. Lenin on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the Communist Party elaborated a program for mobilizing all the forces of the Soviet people to fight the enemy. This program was set out in the Directive of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee to the Party and Soviet Organizations of the Frontline Oblasts of 29 June 1941. Headed by the combat staff of the Central Committee which provided the superior political and strategic leadership, the CPSU with its organizational genius and unbending will united all the springs which fed the might of the socialist state and channeled the energy of the people to defeat the enemy. It turned to the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia with the appeal: "Everything for the Front! Everything for Victory!"

In the very difficult situation, the Army and Navy were strengthened, the economy was put on a wartime footing and the country was turned into a single combat camp. The faithful and unflinching sons of the party were in all the most

crucial areas on the front and in the rear. Thousands of party workers joined the army including around one-half the membership of the Central Committee, the secretaries of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms. During the first 6 months of the war, more than a million communists and over 2 million Komsomol members joined the Army and Navy.

The communists in the rear worked with unprecedented enthusiasm and the greatest responsibility. And here too they were in the most difficult areas and by their personal example led the masses to a labor feat. Under the most difficult conditions, an enormous number of industrial enterprises was relocated to the East and plans were successfully carried out for the development of metallurgy, power, capital construction, for developing new lands, increasing the harvest in the Volga, the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. This made it possible to overcome the difficulties caused by the temporary occupation of the industrially and agriculturally developed Western oblasts. The front began receiving an ever-increasing amount of everything necessary for conducting combat operations. And everywhere, in all areas, during this period the communists set the example for organization, discipline and self-sacrifice.

By the heroic labor of the Soviet people under the conditions of the harshest war, the task was carried out of providing the Army and Navy with modern and most effective weapons in quantities surpassing the armaments of Nazi Germany. During the war years, our country produced 2-fold more weapons and military equipment than did Nazi Germany and with higher tactical and technical specifications.

A characteristic feature of the party's activities was the rapid and effective focusing of efforts on carrying out the main military tasks. During all stages of the Great Patriotic War, the Leninist Central Committee and the leading bodies organized by it profoundly and thoroughly assessed the military-political situation within the country and on the international scene, they perceptively determined and energetically carried out specific measures to increase the economic and military might of the Soviet state and outlined the strategic goals of the military campaigns and operations and the ways to achieve them. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people were able to brilliantly realize the advantages of the socialist system and to put into action all the factors of victory.

During the war years, the Soviet people became even more profoundly aware that the Communist Party was the mind, conscience and honor of our age. In going into battle, thousands of Soviet soldiers submitted requests to be admitted to the ranks of the VKP(b). As a total during the war years, more than 1.64 million communists joined the Armed Forces and this equaled one-half the party membership by the summer of 1941. Over the period of the war, more than 5 million persons were admitted as candidate members of the party and around 3.5 million persons as full members. By the start of 1945, around 3,325,000 communists were in the Armed Forces and this was almost 60 percent of the entire party membership. By their personal example, heroism and courage they raised the combat morale of the masses, led them to carry out feats and instilled firm conviction in a full victory over the enemy. Some 3 million communists died a death of the brave in the battles for the motherland.

The party Central Committee at the outset of the war reorganized all ideological work. One of the main areas, as before, was held by patriotic indoctrination. The party urged each Soviet patriot to embody his hate for the enemy in specific deeds: on the front to mercilessly destroy the Nazi invaders and in the rear to work unstintingly for the front and for bringing victory closer. The party gave great attention to further strengthening friendship among the Soviet peoples, to increasing the moral-political unity of the Soviet people and the morale of the Armed Forces and to improving the quality and effectiveness of party political work.

The military councils played an enormous role in carrying out the tasks set by the Communist Party for the Armed Forces. They constantly carried out the line of the Communist Party in the troops, they directed the work of the Army and Navy political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations, they strengthened one-man command, the political-moral state and discipline of the troops and carried out important questions of rear support.

The Army and Navy political bodies and party organizations showed particular concern for the vanguard role of the communists in combat. Lenin's instructions that in defending the socialist fatherland it is the duty of each communist to be "ahead of the others on the front" were unswervingly observed during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

They, the members of the Leninist party, were the first to rise up to the attack, the first to meet the enemy tanks with strings of grenades, it was they who, without hesitating, rammed Nazi aircraft and who on pieces of paper or newspaper wrote: "I am dying but I do not give up." In perishing they believed in victory, in the strength and courage of our people, in the Leninist party and in the fine future of their fatherland. And this belief was handed on to millions of Soviet soldiers, it increased their strength and urged them to carry out a feat.

In directing and organizing the armed struggle of the Soviet people, the Communist Party and its Central Committee were constantly concerned with strengthening troop morale. In accord with the instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee under the GlavPU RKKA [Main Political Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army], a Council of Military-Political Propaganda was established under the chairmanship of A. S. Shcherbakov. It included responsible workers of the party Central Committee and the main political directorates of the Army and Navy. The council was to be concerned with working out the political problems and generalizing the experience of ideological work in the troops as well as elaborate recommendations on the most important areas for improving this.

During the war years, the party Central Committee gave unflagging attention to increasing the ideological level and effectiveness of the press and the radio and cultural-educational work. The literature and art workers made a significant contribution to the common cause. During the war years, more than a thousand members of the USSR Writers Union were in the operational army. Cultural sponsorship of the Army and Navy which was established even during the first years of Soviet power during wartime assumed truly a mass scope. As a total over the years of the Patriotic War more than 42,000 artists gave around 500,000 concerts and performances in the troops. There were more than 6 million cinema showings on the front. It would be hard to overestimate the

historical and moral value of the movie chronicle of the feat of the people. This was created by the labor, talent and courage of 252 frontline cameramen, with one out of every five dying a death of the brave.

In the interests of indoctrinating the personnel and maintaining high combat morale, the works of Soviet composers and artists were widely used. Song helped them endure during days of severe testing and inspired the men to military feats. Of all the types of fine arts the most effective, pertinent, mass and popular was the poster and the caricature. Along with the Soviet Army units these went on the offensive, they urged the defense of the homeland and ripped the mask from the face of the enemy.

The party, in strengthening ideological and political influence in the troops and in improving the forms and methods of agitation, propaganda, cultural educational work, developed in the Army and Navy personnel high moral-political and combat qualities. The party was constantly concerned with the military, moral and aesthetic indoctrination of the personnel, it maintained high combat morale in the men and inspired them to military feats in the name of the Soviet fatherland.

Some 39 years have passed since the victory salvos of the final salute have died away. Over this time, enormous changes have occurred in the world. The victory over Naziism became a historic turning point in the fate of all mankind and its most profound consequences are the present-day successes of world socialism and the constant growth of the revolutionary forces. However, the positive changes in the world are clearly not to the liking of the imperialist reaction which is endeavoring at whatever the cost to recover its lost positions and to regain the role of the dispenser of the fates of others.

The U.S. reactionary imperialist circles have initiated military preparations of an unprecedented pace and scale. While over the last 3 years the Pentagon has received around 640 billion dollars, during the current year alone it is already over 280 billion. As a total over the next 5 years (1985-1989), U.S. defense allocations will be the colossal amount of 2 trillion dollars. In other words, as much as the United States has spent on the arms race as a total over the 35 postwar years!

All the actions of the Reagan Administration in the political, military, economic and ideological areas are subordinate to the adventuristic goal of establishing world domination and primarily at achieving military supremacy over the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

Our nation is a peace-loving power. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at preserving and strengthening peace, at a lessening of tension, at checking the arms race and at broadening and deepening collaboration between states. This has been the constant desire of the Communist Party and all the Soviet people. In recent years, the USSR has put forward an entire series of peace-loving initiatives.

Throughout the world there has been enormous interest in the proposals formulated by Comrade K. U. Chernenko that the relations between powers possessing nuclear weapons be subordinate to definite standards and principles. The Soviet

Union has put these peace-loving principles at the basis of its foreign policy. It is ready at any time to come to terms with the other nuclear powers on the joint recognition of such standards and making them obligatory.

The April (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Sitting, with new strength demonstrated the desire of our country to do everything to prevent a nuclear war and to preserve and strengthen peace in the world. The CPSU and the Soviet government have worked consistently and with initiative to eliminate tension in the world political life, to check the arms race and dependably ensure national security.

The Soviet Union does not require military superiority, it does not intend to impose its will on others but it will also not permit anyone to break the achieved military equilibrium. "Let everyone know," stated Comrade K. U. Chernenko at a meeting with voters, "that no devotees of military adventures will succeed in catching us unaware and no potential aggressor can hope to avoid a crushing retaliatory strike."

The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War is a severe warning to the aggressive forces which are endeavoring to revise the results of the last war and justify its immediate guilty party, imperialism. They are unable to alter the course of history and ignore the indisputable fact that in the world there is no force which is capable of shaking the socialist system and conquering the people totally dedicated to the ideas of communism and indoctrinated and led by their Communist Party.

As a great socialist power, the Soviet Union is fully aware of its responsibility to the peoples for preserving and strengthening peace. In taking enforced measures to strengthen its security and the security of its allies, the Soviet Union is not letting up on its efforts to lift the military threat from mankind and to improve the international situation. At the same time, the party and government are doing everything so that the defenders of the motherland have the most advanced weapons and combat equipment of various sorts. Our Army and Navy have been turned into a powerful, invincible force capable of conducting successful operations under any conditions, on the land, in the air and at sea, during the day and at night, and in any season.

The Army and Navy personnel are responding with flawless service to the constant concern of the party and all the Soviet people for the armed defenders. The Soviet military, in warmly approving and unanimously supporting the decisions of the April (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, are devoting their knowledge, strength and energy to further increasing vigilance and combat readiness and to strengthening military discipline. The results of the winter training period clearly show that the profound ideological conviction, political awareness and active position in life are being manifested by our military in concrete deeds. On the training fields, ranges and launch areas, in standing duty, during flights and sea cruises, the personnel is steadily mastering the difficult science of winning and increasing their combat skill. In the course of winter training, the number of outstanding men and class specialists increased in the units and on the ships and new unutilized reserves were disclosed and began to be more actively carried out in further increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of

the troops. Loyal to their military oath, the Soviet military have shown courage and bravery and in an exemplary manner have carried out their sacred duty in peacetime, too. A readiness to carry out a feat is becoming a characteristic moral trait of an ever-larger number of soldiers, sergeants and officers. In recent years alone, thousands of officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], sergeants and petty officers, soldiers and seamen have received high governmental decorations for courage and valor shown in carrying out military duty.

The might of our Armed Forces is based upon the unbreakable unity of the army and the people which underwent a severe testing on the battlefields of the Patriotic War. The Soviet Army and Navy are a magnificent schooling in life for the young patriots, a school of discipline and endeavor, a school of courage. Our personnel take an active part in the sociopolitical life of the nation. Thousands of their representatives have been elected members of the leading party bodies and deputies of the soviets. The personnel of the units and ships maintain close sponsorship ties with the workers of industrial enterprises and construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, with the student youth, the war and labor veterans.

The Soviet Armed Forces are celebrating the glorious Victory Holiday powerful and strong as never before, united with their people and party and linked by an unbreakable combat alliance with the Warsaw Pact armies. Totally dedicated to the ideals of communism and loyal to their sacred duty, they are a dependable guard for the peaceful labor of our people and a bulwark of universal peace.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

IDEOLOGICAL WORK ALLEVIATES PRO FORMA ATTITUDE TO EXERCISES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Col V. Sein, chief of agitprop department, deputy chief of political directorate of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Ideological Work: Experience, Opinions: Continuity"]

[Text] Not long ago I visited the unit which then was commanded by Lt Col V. Mishchenko. I asked about how the improvement of the training facility was going and rode to the weapons compound and the artillery range. Here is what struck the eye: the artillerymen were working listlessly, without enthusiasm, although the day was just getting into full swing.

"They haven't gotten used to it yet," said Lt Col Mishchenko.

But I had another opinion on this score.

"What are we doing? We're digging a trench," the soldiers responded to me. "Why? Well, they say that they plan to build something here."

It was the very same in the training classrooms. Almost none of the soldiers had a clear idea of what kind of work they were doing or what it was for. Isn't this why they were performing it somehow mechanically, without spirit?

It was different in another unit, where Maj A. Aver'yanov is a party committee member. In beginning to improve the training facility, the commanders and political workers together with party and Komsomol activists widely explained to the personnel why refitting the training center was necessary and what it would provide for an increase in their combat training. The personnel were familiarized with the concept, models and diagrams of what was to be done and there was a clear determination of the amount of participation by each subunit in accomplishing what was planned. A conference was held with the officers devoted to issues of intensifying combat training and a competition was arranged in the unit for ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the outlined plan.

For that reason there were no simple performers here--there were interested creators of initiative. The following fact is indicative, for example: over ten innovative suggestions were adopted during the renovation of training facilities. When I spoke with the soldiers they told me enthusiastically that

there would be a new simulator in this classroom, there would be a functioning model of such-and-such a mechanism in the adjacent room, and their own initiative was to make an automatic tester...

When a person observes such examples, he falls to thinking about a great deal, and above all about the continuity and togetherness of organizational, ideological and political indoctrination work, about what fruits are provided by this unity and, conversely, what is provided by its absence. It would appear that people were doing one and the same thing in both units, but some "simply" were digging trenches and nailing displays together, while the others had a visible picture of the results of their work from the very beginning and were gripped with enthusiasm to achieve them faster and perform the assignment with quality. Why is that so? It is because in one instance the command was given to begin work and that was it, but in the other instance the commander's order was supported by explanatory and indoctrinational activity and people constantly remembered that there has to be ideological content in any matter, or else we will have mechanical performers.

The truth, as the saying goes, tested many times in practice. V. I. Lenin pointed out, and this was stressed at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, that the socialist state is strong in the awareness of the masses. It is strong when the masses know everything, when they can judge everything and when they take up everything consciously. The party shows steadfast concern to see that the accomplishment of all tasks--economic, scientific-technical, management and so on--is invariably reinforced by ideological work or, more accurately, it performs in an inseparable unity with it. "Only a merging of ideological indoctrination work with political, organizational and economic work produces the necessary effect," said Comrade K. U. Chernenko. He elaborated on this thought at the February and April 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenums, and we find the very same key to successes in accomplishing assigned tasks in materials of the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries.

Are these party directions embodied to the full extent in our daily practice? We are talking about this today in analyzing how our work style has changed and what new things have appeared in it in what has been almost a year since the June Plenum, and in interpreting just how to practically achieve continuity of organizational, ideological and political indoctrination work and, finally, where this continuity shows up.

Here is what I would like to emphasize above all: much comes from an ability to back up particular organizational measures of the commander and combat training plan by mobilizing the people's will and energy for performing assigned tasks and by developing their high political and moral sentiment. In other words, in beginning the next job a person has to ponder not only its organizational aspect, but its ideological aspect as well and also "shift" any task, whether it be a combat or an everyday task, to the language of indoctrinational measures.

When a question arose in the Proskurov-Berlin Guards Tank Regiment imeni G. I. Kotovskiy at the beginning of the current training year about the soldiers performing a more detailed study of equipment and weapons and about improving their technical schooling and culture, the commander, party committee and staff drew up a comprehensive plan for accomplishing these tasks.

Its meaning was that any organizational measure generates a series of indoctrinational measures and relies on them. For example, a demonstration or instructional methods class would be preceded by technical quizzes and talks by company political workers, agitators and specialists with a high rating. Appropriate emphasis was placed in political classes and during officers' Marxist-Leninist training. Mass cultural work was reoriented and the wall newspaper also hammered it home.

The results of this work can be expressed in the following figures: all soldiers in the regiment authorized to become rated specialists did so, over 70 percent became specialists with a higher rating; and much fuel and engine operating time was saved. But how and with what statistics can one pass on the soldiers' emotional enthusiasm and describe that moral atmosphere which firmly formed in the unit? The fact is that the guardsmen did not just gain technical knowledge in performing an important common job. For example, technical innovation received new impetus. On his own initiative Gds Maj M. Makarov developed a chart-diagram for checking the most complicated electrical circuits of the tank weaponry, and Gds Lt Col V. Galkin set up a training complex in an empty room which permits the officers to successfully work all lessons in fire and fire control on an electrified miniature range. The cohesiveness of military collectives also became higher and good lessons of troop comradeship and mutual help were learned.

And here is the result. At first glance they undertook only technical tasks, but they also accomplished indoctrinational and ideological tasks.

But this is only one facet of the problem, as the saying goes. Another is the ability to transform or "shift" an indoctrinational task to the language of organizational measures. Take, for example, the matters of soldiers' international indoctrination. It stands to reason that lectures and talks are necessary, but is this enough? Obviously not. For example, the unit where political worker Maj V. Trubitsyn serves set up the "Club for Friends in Arms," within which extensive organizational and mass political work is done to strengthen the friendship of Soviet soldiers with soldiers of the GDR's NNA [Natsionale Volksarmee: National People's Army]. It includes meetings, joint nights of leisure, amateur concerts, sports contests and, of course, debates, talks and lectures.

Problems of international indoctrination are resolved in a uniquely interesting manner in the Proskurov Motorized Rifle Regiment as well. Here for example is just one organizational measure--regular correspondence with the parents of soldiers of various nationalities and with countrymen who were frontlinesmen. But the fact is, it provides so much of benefit, and how it enriches the content of indoctrinational work in the unit! Correspondence

materials are used in theme nights, in verbal propaganda (both by agitators and members of the agitprop group), and in the wall and radio newspapers.

Experience indicates that a skillfully conducted ideological and indoctrinational measure can provide an impetus for organizing something new and that propaganda and agitation are capable of actively influencing the resolution of many matters and "leading" people to some kind of new practical solutions. And again, here is an example from the Proskurov Motorized Rifle Regiment. One of the subunits held a Lenin lesson about the need to learn military affairs in a genuine manner. A suggestion originated with the soldiers under the impression of this emotional discussion that every outstanding person being released to the reserve prepare a worthy replacement for himself. The suggestion received support and now it has become a motto in the regiment and a part of competition. The individual pledges of almost all foremost personnel contain the statement: "Prepare a replacement" and this point is considered in summing up results.

All these examples indicate that there are not and cannot be any "pure organizers" or "pure propagandists." This was emphasized at the June Plenum: ideological work is a job for every party member. If someone understands this matter differently then sooner or later he will receive poor results from his work. That also happened with Lt Col Mishchenko, who stressed only administrative measures, forgetting about such an important duty as the duty of an indoctrinator.

During the year of work following the plenum we have become convinced of something else: it is very important to see and foresee the political and moral consequences of organizational decisions.

While working in one of the units not long ago I had occasion to come across the following fact. The level of military discipline had dropped in 1st Battalion and the deputy regimental commander suggested issuing instructions for battalion officers to spend more time in the subunit, to lead the soldiers to the mess hall and the combat vehicle motor pool, and appoint vehicle commanders...

But the regimental commander reasoned differently, Look how much we will lose here, he said. By "locking in" the officers on these "trivial" matters we will take them down to the role of first sergeants. The authority of NCO's also will suffer--in the soldiers' eyes we will present them as being incapable of imposing order as it were. And the Komsomol organization? We thus will brand it with the tag of impotence. No, we have to find a different way. We have to elevate the role of NCO's and Komsomol members and strengthen individual work. I don't object to the "extra hours" the officers are present in the subunit at first, but this is only so that they can work with the junior commanders and Komsomol activists on this plane, and not substitute for them.

As time showed, this decision was correct. It produced the desired result.

And there is one more thing I would like to single out: indoctrinational work is a good means of "feedback." During lectures, talks, unified political days and question-and-answer nights one can and must identify the people's moods and the questions troubling them. Here is where there is food for thought, for organizing work in the wake of petitions and complaints, and perhaps also for reorganizing the work of propagandists in certain things.

These all are facets of the same issue and the same problem: how to ensure that organizational, ideological and political indoctrination work is conducted in a continuous unity, since herein lies a guarantee of attaining highest results in improving combat readiness, strengthening discipline and developing a person with communist conviction.

6904

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

CRITIQUES OF EXERCISES SHOULD NOT CURTAIL CREATIVITY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm V. Tolkachev: "Efficiency and an Imaginative Approach: Atmosphere of a Critique"]

[Text] This happened several years ago. At that time I was in command of a unit of surface ships in the Northern Fleet. Based on an umpire's narrative problem during an exercise, it was necessary to land a subunit with combat equipment on the shore of one of the remote inlets. The large landing ship commanded by Capt 3d Rank K. Lizunov was assigned to deliver the subunit. It proved to be no simple task. When the ship approached the designated site it was learned that the equipment could not be unloaded as the rocky ground and rather heavy sea made this impossible. Moreover, night was fast approaching. The umpire permitted the matter to be postponed until the morning. What was his surprise when early in the morning the ship's commander reported that the loading had begun and the first combat unit had gone ashore. It turns out that during the night Lizunov found an original solution to the situation and because of this the mission was accomplished.

It would appear that the commander deserved praise for the sharpness and creative approach to matters which he displayed, but my report about this and my petition for Lizunov's commendation found no understanding with the umpire. For some reason he took a biased approach to evaluating the navyman's actions, from the position of an overcautious person. "It is still not known how all this will be evaluated by the command element," he said with a skeptical smile. "I hope there's no scolding for your 'creativity'."

Such an "evaluation" was followed by various kinds of conjectures and false rumors to the effect that Lizunov had blundered somewhere. It is difficult to say how all this would have affected the moral and creative atmosphere among the commanders had it not been for the critique which the flag officer soon gave. Quite a different atmosphere reigned here. There were no reservations, backward glances or cautious steps; to the contrary, there was total clarity and precision of evaluations from the position of genuine interests of combat readiness. In particular, the senior chief did not consider Capt 3d Rank Lizunov's initiative to be unworthy of attention. His actions were appraised as correct, resourceful and meriting commendation.

We often say that the critique is a school of generalization and dissemination of experience and a school for improving command proficiency. This is really so. In critiquing exercises and cruises and summing up results of the latest inspections, the senior chief takes note of what is best and foremost in the work of ship commanders and other officers, and he uncovers deficiencies. The flag officer teaches his subordinates creativeness, boldness, thoughtfulness, thoroughness and determination using these specific examples which have been properly evaluated. By delving into the achievements of foremost persons here, ship commanders broaden their tactical horizons and learn the art of improving the training and indoctrination process. But how important it is here to think and be concerned not only about the professional depth of a critique, but also about the moral climate formed in and around it--formed above all by the senior chief himself, his behavior, his appraisals and the line which he implements.

The critiques by Rear Adm (later Vice Adm) G. Vasil'yev, under whom I had occasion to serve in my officer youth, are very memorable to me. We lieutenants considered it our very good fortune to attend a critique held by Georgiy Konstantinovich. His appraisals always were distinguished by severity, competency and thorough substantiation. But there was also something special in them: an accentuated, respectful attitude toward the dignity of ship commanders and an invariable attempt to single out the positive aspect in their actions. Rear Adm Vasil'yev never deprived the officers of an opportunity to express their opinion on a particular issue even if it didn't coincide with the opinion of the flag officer himself. Even a commander who had made a mistake somewhere went to a critique conducted by Vasil'yev without that depression which an upcoming rude dressing-down causes in people.

Here is a recent example. Not long ago a number of flotilla ships were inspected by representatives of the Main Navy Staff. This inspection was held in an exacting but at the same time creative atmosphere. There was vigorous, interesting training for several days, with a thorough, instructive critique held in conclusion. Many deficiencies were noted there along with the positive aspect, but no one took offense because the rebukes were just and the form in which they were presented was tactful. The entire critique was permeated with the desire to help commanders gain a deeper understanding of the missions facing them, get a better view of the ways of accomplishing them, and resolve current issues more effectively.

As USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov emphasized at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, the basic criterion of party and state evaluation of the qualitative state of ships and units is their level of combat readiness. The person who has been entrusted with the lofty right of command, and with it the right to evaluate and critique subordinates' actions, always must remember this and must not permit a divergence of those demands which he places in words from his actions at sea, in the process of accomplishing operational training missions, and in critiques. During my service I have had occasion to meet many unit [chast' and soyedineniye] commanders for whom consistency, principle and justness in evaluating subordinates' work were a natural standard of daily activity. There also are many

such people in our flotilla, among whom I could name, for example, Capt 1st Rank B. Knyaz'chan, Capt 2d Rank A. Nefedov and many others.

But unfortunately at times we also encounter those superiors for whom there is a unique "scissors action" which forms between what they say and demand in critiques and how they in fact organize the training of ship commanders and their crews. In a critique of the commander they call for boldness and initiative, but at sea while accomplishing operational training missions they fully deprive him of independence, fearing complications and fussing to have an appearance of well-being in affairs. On shore the commander is criticized for an absence of creative activeness but at work, in an attempt to be over-cautious, the officer is placed within a framework where stereotypes and oversimplification can in no way be avoided. In constantly experiencing such a duality of requirements, even the experienced commander may be deprived of self-confidence. It is even worse if an officer begins to become dodgy and adapt himself to such a superior.

For example, that happened at times in the division which was commanded until recently by Capt 2d Rank N. Potemkin. He recently was relieved of his position for serious omissions in service. But the fact is that for a rather long time he had the reputation among us of being an exacting, principled commander. One would listen to his speeches at critiques and automatically think: How strict an accounting the officer demands for omissions in service and how he roots for the cause. As a matter of fact, however, the division commander's exactingness had a double bottom, if it can be thus expressed. Those commanders who tried to report honestly about the state of affairs in their crews and to uncover the existing deficiencies got it most from Potemkin. This accustomed his subordinates to strive for the appearance of well-being above all.

Potemkin left the division and the various organizational flaws he had allowed managed to be corrected rather quickly. But it will require much more effort and time to readjust the psychology of ship commanders in the division.

In evaluating his subordinates during a critique, the senior chief voluntarily or involuntarily evaluates as it were his own work as well. If, let's say, the ship commander functioned uncertainly at sea then a substantial portion of the blame for this rests with the flag officer who, it turns out, didn't teach or prepare him in the proper manner. A low grade given some crew by the staff in an inspection is in a certain sense also a low grade for the work of the staff itself... It is not always pleasant to admit this. This is why the person who has been entrusted to evaluate and critique the actions of others must be guided in any situation by the interests of the matter above all and must have genuine party principle and moral maturity so as not to make even the slightest compromise with his conscience. Life indicates that any attempt to remove responsibility from oneself does not strengthen, but undermines, authority in the subordinates' eyes.

Not long ago flotilla staff officers were inspecting one of the patrol ships. Prior to this the division staff here had passed a ship-type training task with a grade of good. It was learned that this grade was clearly inflated.

Serious deficiencies in the organization of duty of a number of departments and in equipment upkeep were found aboard ship. There was a very severe, principled and self-critical discussion at the critique of the inspection. Flotilla staff officers tried not only to evaluate the work style of division specialists, but also to provide a graphic lesson of an honest, party attitude toward the performance of their duties. Maj Med Serv O. Dubentsov was the exception. He declared that no criticism had been identified in his area. Of course, it is not at all obligatory that everything has to be poor everywhere, but even the division medical officer did not dare refute the clear omissions in his area of responsibility. Just why did Dubentsov "not notice" them? Well, it was because he was playing the hypocrite. He very much wanted to "stand out" against the general background.

Such attempts to approach matters from narrowly bureaucratic positions and evaluate subordinates' activities while orienting oneself not toward the interests of combat readiness, but toward various considerations of existing conditions must receive the most resolute rebuff both on the part of senior chiefs and on the part of political entities and party organizations, just as many other matters on which the moral climate of critiques depends demand a keen appraisal and careful party attention.

For example, the faulty practice of turning critiques into scoldings is invariably condemned. Nevertheless, we find senior chiefs who to this day in critiques engage in whipping up an atmosphere of fear in subordinates for mistakes instead of a businesslike analysis of subordinates' work, development of a creative atmosphere, and the generalization and study of collective experience.

Unfortunately such superiors at times even find support from certain persons. Their lack of manners and rudeness toward subordinates are viewed undeservedly as a display of will and high exactingness. We must wage a resolute fight against such instances, for they only discredit genuine exactingness and do much harm.

The atmosphere of a critique... What should it be like? Of course, it should be businesslike, creative and exacting and, of course, each critique above all must be a genuine school of professional expertise. But we also cannot forget another aspect--it also must be a school of honesty and principle and a school of kindness and a commander's tact. It has to be a school of high moral qualities.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MOSCOW KOMSOMOL CALLS FOR IMPROVED POLITICAL EDUCATION

Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 84 p 2

[Article: "Improved Military Patriotic Education"]

[Text] The Moscow CPSU City Committee, Mossovet [Moscow City Soviet of Workers' Deputies] Ispolkom and the MGK [Moscow City Office] Komsomol yesterday held the MGK and MK [Moscow Committee] conference of party, soviet and Komsomol activists and workers of Moscow's military commissariats at the Home of Political Education. They discussed "Missions for Moscow's Party, Soviet and Social Organizations In Further Improving Workers' Military Patriotic Education And Also In Preparing Young People For Service In The USSR Armed Forces".

Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Soviet of Ministers V.I. Kazakov opened the conference. He warmly congratulated those gathered on Moscow's being awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the RSFSR Council of Ministers for having the best indicators in preparing young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces in 1983 and he presented the Motherland's prestigious award.

Commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District General of the Army P.G. Dushev presented the Moscow Military Commissariat the Challenge Red Banner of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the best preparation of young people for military service and for its conduct of military call-up in 1983. He also read greetings from CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov and Chief of the Main Political Directorate for the USSR Army and Navy General of the Army A.A. Yepishev.

Secretary of the MGK CPSU V.P. Trushin spoke at the conference.

It was noted that with the high labor and political enthusiasm that was stirred up by the results of the February and April (1984) CPSU Central Committee Plenums and the first session of the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the capital's workers, like all Soviet peoples, are selflessly working to put the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress into practice and to fulfill party plans for further improving developed socialism.

Resolving the missions of further strengthening the economic and defensive might of our Fatherland, perfecting the socialist state system and democracy,

the communist indoctrination of workers and increasing the well-being of the people and the party, the Soviet government is consistently and firmly holding a course towards normalizing the international situation, bridling the arms race, strengthening peace and social progress and averting a nuclear missile war.

Based on the current international situation the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo and the Soviet government are showing the necessary concern for the reliable defense of socialism's accomplishments and for strengthening the country's defensive might.

In his speech at the forum of the Army and Navy Komsomol members which has a long-term program improving all educational work with young people, Comrade K.U. Chernenko stressed with all his might the importance and necessity of further strengthening the military patriotic education of young people.

This is why the city party organization reviewed military patriotic education as a task of great political and state importance, the resolution of which was urged in every possible way to facilitate patriotism and the high ideological, moral-political and psychological qualities necessary for the reliable defense of socialism's achievements.

Moscow's party and soviet agencies, labor collectives, educational institutions, professional unions, Komsomol organizations and creative unions are doing significant work in this area. This is in strict compliance with the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the June (1983) Central Committee Plenum.

The propaganda of our country's heroic past and present plays an important role in the military patriotic education of workers and more the 8000 lecturers from the Znaniya Society and the capital's DOSAAF have a role in this work.

The Moscow section of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans which unites more than 80,000 people in its ranks is making a significant contribution to military patriotic propaganda.

Military patriotic work is being actively conducted in Voroshilov, Krasnopresnensk, Tushin, Pervomayskiy and Sverdlovsk rayons.

More than 2700 museums, reading rooms and halls of military and labor glory are operational in labor and training collectives.

Party organizations in the Serp i Molot [Sickle and Hammer] Metallurgic Factory and the Automotive Factory imeni I.A. Likhachev and Leninist Komsomol are doing a great deal to propagandizing the glorious traditions. The museums and reading rooms of worker and labor glory in these enterprises have a rich exposition telling about the exploits of the older generation.

The capital's Komsomol organizations have accumulated a lot of good experience in military patriotic work.

While noting the positive moments in this work, we must at the same time resolutely overcome elements of formalism, window dressing and cliches in using mass forms for educating young people. Comrade K.U. Chernenko was speaking primarily about this in his speech at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries.

As shown by the results of the work in 1983, Brezhnevskiy, Krasnogvar'dsk and Sovetskii rayons are the best at training young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces. They have held the top places for a number of years and have attained these high results primarily because rayon party and raysovet ispolkoms are constantly putting attention in training young people for military service and are demanding this in a timely manner and on principles from the officials responsible for this. The city DOSAAF organization which has about 80 percent of Moscovites in its ranks plays a visible role in military-patriotic work and in training young people to meet their honored constitutional duty, service in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Conference participants noted with great satisfaction that according to the results of its work the Moscow City Defense Society has held first place in the country for eight years already. It was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council], Central Committee Komsomol and USSR Central Committee DOSAAF.

City and rayon voyenkomats [military registration and enlistment office] are making a heavy contribution to training young people for military service. Recently the level of work in recording pre-conscription young people and conscripts and their military training has risen. The ties between military commissariats and the party, Komsomol and professional union organizations and city labor collectives has been strengthened and the influence on raising the general educational level of young people, their physical training and their indoctrination with the moral-psychological qualities necessary for a future soldier has become stronger.

However, in reviewing what has been done, we cannot be satisfied with the level reached. We must concentrate primary attention on the shortcomings and choke points in our work. The organization of military-patriotic propaganda requires serious improvement. The largest shortcoming substantially lowering the effectiveness of its influence on the consciousness and feelings of people is that one still sees formalism, the inclination for a flashy phrase and the mechanical reiteration of well-known truths and facts instead of their deep and creative understanding. Workers of city and rayon military commissariats, military academy professors and instructors and officers from supported military units are all to seldom attracted to this work.

Military patriotic subjects are still presented poorly on the stages of Moscow theaters and on the screens of movie houses. Collective viewings of such performances and films are rarely organized and supportive ties between labor

collectives and educational institutions and military units, groups and shops are still not developed well enough.

When organizing military-patriotic work, party raykoms, raysovet ispolkoms and rayon Komsomol committees, military commissariats and labor collectives must be directly guided by the words of Comrade K.U. Chernenko who said at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "Being a patriot today means tirelessly strengthening the economic and defensive potential of our Motherland, increasing its readiness to defend the world from any encroachment by imperialist aggressors and relating conscientiously to military duties".

Military-patriotic education must be done in a complex manner and in inviolable unity with all ideological and political-indoctrinational work.

Military patriotic and defensive mass work in preparation for the 40th anniversary of Victory must serve to further increasing the labor and political activity of Moscovites in fulfilling the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the latest CPSU Central Committee Plenums and the proposals and conclusions contained in the speeches and statements by Comrade K.U. Chernenko. We must make each worker clearly conscious of the fact that under current conditions fulfilling the planned tasks, conscious productive labor, high organization and discipline are not only a civic duty but the patriotic duty of every Moscovite, just as it is for all Soviet peoples.

Conference participants voiced the firm conviction that workers of hero-city Moscow through their own selfless labor will also henceforth contribute to strengthening the defensive might of our state and to increasing the political vigilance and the readiness to defend the Soviet Fatherland.

Moscow's Military Commissar, Major General F.N. Illarionov, First Secretary of the Brezhnevskiy CPSU RK [Rayon Committee] I.A. Tikhomolov, Chairman of the Krasnogvar'dsk raysovet ispolkom A.A. Semenov, MGK Komsomol Secretary V.A. Shchukin and Chairman of the Moscow City Committee DOSAAF D.N. Kuznetsov spoke at the conference.

First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department of Administrative Agencies V.I. Drygov, Deputy Chairmen of the Mossovet ispolkom A.I. Kostenko and V.N. Stepanov and Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District A.U. Constantinov took part in the conference's work.

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CSO: 1801/353

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

GEN YAZOV FAULTS MILITARY EDUCATION, SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA KUL'TURA in Russian 28 Jun 84 pp 1-2

[Article by General of the Army D. Yazov, commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District and Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Ready For An Exploit"]

[Text] In my free time I often walk to the Alma-Ata Park imeni 28 Guards-Panfilovites, with its quiet, age-old alleys, and up to the Memorial of Glory. There at the Eternal Flame Pioneers are on constant honor guard, solemnly and sternly, with automatic weapons at parade rest. Their neckties glow with reflections of military colors. The Memorial of Glory, made from granite and metal, immortalizes the memory of heroes who fell in battle for our Motherland's freedom and independence. The soldier-Panfilovites, ready to staunchly defend the Motherland, the Soviet people and those same children who are guarding the Eternal Flame to the memory of the Great Patriotic War, stand with widely spread hands.

The young people standing in the honor guard have military bearing. They are strict and filled with the feeling of the very important duty. The honor guard of school children is the personification of the moral continuity of the generations. Many of today's soldiers in our military district, outstanding individuals in military and political training, first felt themselves soldiers of the Motherland here in the Pioneer guard at the Eternal Flame. The soldiers are cautiously and piously guarding the memory of revolutionary and civil war champions and front line heroes of the Great Patriotic War and our twenty million citizens who perished.

We will soon mark a great date, the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. And the planet is again restless. The international situation has become sharply intensified by the actions of militarist of all stripes, and primarily the U.S. administration, and the threat of nuclear catastrophe has grown.

The words of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, spoken at the All-Union Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, were imprinted on every Soviet citizen, and especially on us, Soviet soldiers. He said, "When you talk about the security of peoples, foreign policy and diplomacy can do many things. But not everything. In the world arena you must also deal with political forces to whom good will is alien and which are blind to arguments

of reason. And here the restraining power of our defensive potential plays an indispensable role. Now it is not only a guarantor of the constructive labors Soviet people but also a guarantor of total peace on earth."

The domestic Communist Party and the Soviet government are consistently and steadfastly fighting for peace and for the strengthening of international security. At the same time the CPSU is displaying tireless, indeed Leninist concern for strengthening the country's defensive might and for indoctrinating every citizen with the spirit of daily readiness for the defense of our socialist Motherland and the fulfillment of their first constitutional duty. This is why the military-patriotic indoctrination of Soviet peoples and especially of young people is the most important component of the whole process of communist creation and the formulation of the new man.

New reinforcements, primarily from the graduates of schools and technical and professional-technical schools, annually enter the ranks of the Armed Forces, to include those in our district. And therefore the Army is very interested in the new document on reforms in general-education and professional schools. Today the Army must have soldiers and officers who know the exact sciences really well so they can direct modern military equipment. We want each new army replacement to be more educated, more intelligent and spiritually stronger.

Our military district constantly supports ties with schools and PTU's [professional technical schools] of Kazakhstan, Kirghiz and Tajikistan. Secondary School No 56 of Frunze has been awarded the Challenge Banner of the Central Asian Military District's Military Council three times for successfully training young people to serve in the Armed Forces. Its graduates serve well in the army and navy and numerous letters of thanks which come from military units are convincing proof. This is the result of the work of school teachers and party and Komsomol organizations.

The collective of Alma-Ata Secondary School No 12, headed by Hero of Socialist Labor, honored teacher of the Kazakh SSR and candidate of pedagogical sciences R.B. Nurtazina, has done significant work in the military-patriotic indoctrination of students. A participant in the Great Patriotic War and bearer of two Orders of the Red Star, reserve Lieutenant Colonel B.V. Berilovskiy has worked as the military instructor for more than ten years and the school has a museum of military glory where meetings with veterans of the war and the Armed Forces and with Soviet soldiers are held. It is no accident that the majority of the youths called into the army from this school are well prepared for military service. Many of its graduates have completed military schools and become officers.

We are well acquainted with many school directors and instructors of military affairs for we study and summarize the best experience of work in military-patriotic indoctrination. District officers and soldiers often visit schools and the children are often in our military units. Strong friendly contacts with mutual interest are begun. Military units are patrons of schools, help children conduct the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" games, help in club and school DOSAAF and in the organization of museums of military glory.

Through the combined efforts of party, soviet and social organizations, voenkomats and military unit commands, a single-minded system of military-patriotic indoctrination for our young people has been developed in the republics on whose territory our military district is located. This work is done with the understanding of its state-wide and party-wide importance. Special attention is put on propagandizing the revolutionary and military traditions of the Soviet people and of the USSR Armed Forces. Sons and daughters of Russian, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tajik peoples took an active part in the revolutionary struggle and bravely fought at the fronts of the civil and the Great Patriotic wars. Thousands of their representatives were awarded orders and medals for bravery and heroism displayed in battles and many reached the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union. The names of soldier-heroes I. Panfilov, V. Klochkov, D. Shopokov, Ch. Tuleberdiyev, T. Erdzhigitov and others were given to settlements, kolkhoz's and sovkhoz's and city and village streets. Hundreds of memorials and obelisks immortalizing the deeds of heroes were erected and veterans meet with Pioneer and Komsomol members and pre-military youths at these locations.

Youths of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan consider it a high honor to serve in the foremost units of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District in the Rezhits Order of Lenin and Red Banner Order of Suvorov Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Major General I.V. Panfilov and in the Red Banner Frontier Detachments in Khorgossk, one of the country's oldest and where Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko served in the 30's.

Party and soviet organizations consider military-patriotic indoctrination work their primary duty. For example, not long ago a muster was held for those students from secondary, professional-technical and technical schools and young workers who had expressed the desire to enter the Alma-Ata Senior Combined Arms Command Academy. This is the one which Nikolay Akramov finished in his time. He later attained the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage displayed while fulfilling his international duty in Afghanistan

An officer from our district, company zampolit [deputy commander for political activities] Aleksandr Kiselev, performed an heroic feat during exercises in military grenade throwing. A young first-year soldier pulled the pin from a grenade, was suddenly afraid to throw it and lost his head. There were less than three seconds until the explosion... Kiselev snatched the grenade from the soldier's hand but was unable to throw it... Surgeons in the Alma-Ata hospital saved his life.

There is an exposition dedicated to zampolit Kiselev in the Central USSR Armed Forces Museum. His sword belt and notebook holed by fragments are there and you can add the record book of Aleksandr Kiselev, a student at the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin. He had received only outstanding grades.

As a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet I often have to meet with voters and as a rule they ask me about today's military equipment, about life in the army and about its heroes of today. In telling them about the heroic deed and the courage of zampolit Aleksandr Kiselev, I ask them to also think about why a feat so expensive to repay is necessary. We do not have the right to close

our eyes to the fact that some lads come to the army insufficiently trained to do their military duty. Military-patriotic education is still far from using all its possibilities.

Zampolit Kiselev tried to fill the gap in the training of one soldier who lost his head and his self-control not in battle but in an exercise.

And very recently something happened in our area that I feel it is my duty to report.

A fellow who had just been called up into the army from Gorkiy Oblast... willfully left his military unit. No, the soldier did not hide. He got on a train and went directly to his own village. He explained his disgraceful deed simply by the fact that he didn't like army service. It was difficult, whereas things were better at home. We inquired as to how his village presented pre-conscription work with young people and were told that there was no preliminary training for them. He didn't even study the rudiments of military affairs in his village school as there was no military instructor. A school with no military instructor, especially in remote areas, is not such an unusual fact. There are still cases where casual people teach military affairs without using any authority. And these "pin-holes" in the military-patriotic education are very costly. We do not have the right to cover up such occurrences with our total, satisfactory numbers, successes and achievements. We must bravely draw conclusions and take timely measures.

We also have the right to count on parents in military-patriotic education and in training young people for a soldier's service for everything begins with the family. And here I could give many good examples, but... Take stock yourselves, fathers and mothers, You are very happy with a son's good marks in mathematics, physics and literature but successes in work, physical education and initial military training excite you a great deal less. Isn't that so? And yet training sons for military service is the primary civil duty of all parents. It is not easy to make up deficiencies in pre-conscription youths' education in the army. Frequently parents of young soldiers complicate our work even more and some act like they have sent their son not to the army but to a Pioneer camp.

We must propagandize the military oath and military regulations more widely so that parents and sons better understand what the Army is and what a big responsibility it is to be a soldier. For example, I have known the text of the military oath by heart since 1936 when it was published in PRAVDA. I volunteered for the Army at 17, in 1941, and I still remember the songs that we sang in school: "Three tankers" and "He Was Ordered West". I also remember the films used to educate us: "The Battleship Potemkin" and "Chapayev".

Certainly there are far more beautiful songs and films today than during my youth. And yet a youth entering the army often knows only the spirit-tweaking songs about love which can be hummed with a guitar. We must again teach young soldiers political and patriotic songs, including those which were written and which received recognition long ago and also drill songs.

Many young people after becoming soldiers have no concept of films about the war years and sometimes they haven't seen films about the Great Patriotic War that are famous throughout the world, such as "The Fate Of Man", "Ballad Of A Soldier", "A Soldier's Father" "But Quiet Is The Dawn" and "Liberation".

There is no system for looking at films in schools and PTU's and no constant work contacts with film rentals and film programs. As best, from time to time they organize cultural trips to see new films which don't always present the most beneficial moral lessons. At the recent All-Army Conference of Film Workers they sharply discussed the lightness of some films and noted that recently the creative activity of cinematographers working on films dedicated to the history of the revolution, civil war and the Great Patriotic War had weakened.

The modern military theme, today's Army and Navy life, is still marginal and not well mastered by famous artists. Many beginning writers and dramatists write about the Army without thoroughly knowing the theme and sometimes they create examples of officers that in no way correspond to reality.

People in the Army understand, love and highly value artistic works. A generation of Soviet soldiers has been reared on the immortal works of N. Ostrovskiy, M. Sholokhov, K. Simonov and other Soviet literary classics. And contemporary Soviet writers, film workers and artists have created quite a few clear works about the military exploits of the Motherland's defenders. Readers estimate the true worth of new works by Yu. Bondarov, V. Karpov, I. Stadnyuk, A. Chakovskiy and other authors. Very recently the USSR Writers' Union and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy awarded a group of writers medals imeni A.A. Fadayev for their major creative contribution to the development of military-patriotic literature. Gold medals were also presented to Kazakh poet D. Muldagaliyev for his collection "The Voice Of Love". A very interesting readers' conference on the book by Hero of the Soviet Union author V. Karpov was recently held in military units in our district.

We are grateful to the masters of art who come to give us good concerts. However, in our opinion the cultural patronage in the army needs intelligent, concerned improvement. For the most part it is conducted like a rose tour. We must look for more effective forms of work with pre-conscription youths and conscripts by writers, painters and artists.

In our day, when the majority of future soldiers got an secondary and higher education before entering the army, literature and art had one of the leading roles in the moral and military-patriotic indoctrination of young people. Works of art were addressed both to the reason and to the spirit of the young man and actively formed a communist point of view.

The issues of our young peoples' military-patriotic indoctrination and their thorough preparation for the defense of the socialist Motherland and the fulfillment of the Leninist order "to study military affairs with real examples" were the primary business on the agenda of the All-Army Conference Of Komsomol Organization Secretaries and were thoroughly developed in the

speech by Comrade K.U. Chernenko at the conference. We army workers took as a guide to our daily activity the party order, "In meeting the important 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War it is necessary to display the work of military-patriotic indoctrination more widely. We must work more persistently to indoctrinate young people with a feeling of love for the Motherland and hatred for its enemies, high political and class vigilance and a constant readiness for heroic deeds. And we must do this work in such a way that there is less jabbering and a little more creativity and innovative sweep, without which working with young people is, in general, inconceivable". There is no doubt that the recommendations expressed in Comrade K.U. Chernenko's speech will indeed become programs not only for us, the soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also for all those who work at indoctrinating the younger generation and especially for the pedagogical community, the teachers who are still called to school desks to formulate civil and patriotic qualities in future soldiers and workers.

In my free time I go to the Park imeni 28 Guards-Panfilovites to bow before my military comrades. I myself served in the legendary Panfilov Division. This was a great honor and a very great responsibility.

The CPSU Central Committee resolution "The 40th Anniversary of the Victory of Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" says, "the lessons of the Great Patriotic War have eternal significance". The primary one is that one must fight against war before it starts.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are doing everything necessary to repulse the military threat and to defend the Motherland. This is not only the concern of the military but of all our people and one that must not be forgotten.

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ARMED FORCES

ROLE OF COMMANDER IN MODERN WARFARE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Tymchuk, commander, Nth Motorized Rifle Regiment: "The Reliability of Control"]

[Text] The regiment developed the attack in the depth of the "enemy's" defense when a special situation arrived: the defenders had landed a tactical airborne force. Its goal, judging from everything, was to launch a strike on the regiment's right flank. A reinforced tank battalion under the command of Captain L. Beloded was operating on this flank. I establish communications with him, inform him of the situation, and assign the mission. The battalion commander reports on the decision which he has adopted: to stop the counter-attackers by fire from in place with a portion of the force--a tank and attached motorized rifle companies. To execute a maneuver with two tank companies and attack the paratroopers from the flank. I approve the battalion commander's concept.

However, the dynamics of the battle soon convince me that not everything has been considered. One of the tank companies executing the maneuver reached a mine-field. The battalion commander orders the company commander, Captain S. Petrov, to look for a by-pass. Meanwhile, the other tank company under the command of Senior Lieutenant R. Timerbayev executed the maneuver and is ready for the attack. There can be no delay: "enemy" combat security had discovered the tankers. Powerful antitank weapons had been moved up to meet them. The flank of the assault force was covered and the pressure on the position of the motorized rifle and tank companies which are repelling the counterattack by fire from an advantageous line is increasing with each passing moment. The situation is critical.

Captain Beloded is looking for a solution. With the aid of the forward air controllers who are in the battalion's combat formations, he redirects the helicopter gunships to the positions of the "enemy" antitank guided missiles. He orders the subunits which are holding up the paratroopers from the front to simulate a withdrawal. A new mission is assigned to the company under the command of Captain Petrov--it still has not found a by-pass route: to wait until the "enemy", pursuing the "withdrawing" subunits, presents his flank for a strike and attack him. Soon the "enemy" paratroopers already found themselves in a difficult situation. Two companies conducted fire on them from the front, the company commanded by Captain Petrov attacked in the flank, and the tankmen under

the command of Senior Lieutenant Timerbayev overcame the "enemy" antitank shield with the use of helicopter gunships and turned up in the enemy rear. The battalion not only accomplished its mission successfully--it repelled the counter-attack--but also, creating a unique killing ground, it destroyed the subunits of the opposing side.

At the critique of the exercise's results, the senior commander evaluated highly the good management of Captain Beloded and his ability to think and act under conditions of a rigid time restriction. "With all the changes in the situation," he stressed, "the control of the battalion and attached and supporting subunits remained reliable."

Reliable control permits utilizing the combat capabilities of equipment and weapons with maximum effect, instills in subordinates confidence in the commander and in the correctness of his decisions, and imparts to the personnel steadfastness under sudden and unexpected complications in the situation. Many of the commander's qualities find concentrated expression in his ability to control the battle firmly and continuously: his analytical turn of mind, will, and the ability to employ creatively the provisions of guidance documents and assume responsibility for the decisions adopted. These qualities are both checked and perfected in training battles. But as practice convinces us, tactical and command-post exercises are not enough for even the most capable, promising commander for his professional growth. Constant and painstaking work on himself and independent study are needed in the course of all command training.

It is not by chance that I told in detail about the skillful actions of Captain Beloded on the exercise. There was a time when the officer experienced difficulties in a complex situation. They are natural for a person who is mastering new duties and acquiring experience in a higher post. And it can be said without exaggeration: for the young battalion commander each lesson in the system of command training became a step toward skill and combat maturity. By the way, not only for him. I know the interest with which these lessons are awaited by the battalion commander, Captain O. Avtushenko, and company commanders Senior Lieutenants A. Pyatishev, V. Bobylev, and S. Uryshev. They are not disturbed by the circumstance that the subject has already been worked out many times by all and, it would seem, was mastered long ago. Nor does it disturb the regimental staff because with good and thoughtful preparation any lesson can be saturated with elements of the new and unaccustomed and be made such that all officers must work with full intensity.

How do we achieve this? First of all, by the optimum combination of theory with practice and by working out the problems directly in the field, on the ground. We especially distinguish problems of control in each subject. Here, for example, is how a recent group exercise with company commanders took place. The subject was not new: the attack of a defending enemy by the company from the march. I had the occasion to visit the lessons where this subject was being worked out in accordance with the following scheme: the tactical situation was outlined--make your decision. We leaned in the direction of practice. With the assistance of the communications officer, Major A. Pavlenko, we organized a training site for radio drill. After sizing up the tactical situation the company commanders learned to bring the decision which had been made to the attention of subordinates by radio, controlled the actions of their subunits in accordance with the special situations of the lesson director, organized the check of execution of their

orders, and so forth. In short, the group exercise was a model of a training battle.

The lesson's participants experienced great morale and psychological loads. When, let us say, Senior Lieutenant V. Malyutin reported that the company had been counterattacked by superior "enemy" forces, the situation was immediately made difficult by a special situation--radio communications had been interrupted. By a series of flares of a stipulated color, the officer required that his subordinates switch over to the alternate frequency. But it also proved to be obstructed by jamming. The company commander gave a new signal: "Do as I do!" and he directed the commander's BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] in the direction of the counterattackers. Then occupying an advantageous line, he sent a messenger to the battalion commander with a report.

In the course of the group exercise, both Senior Lieutenant Malyutin and other officers encountered similar situations many times. Acquiring knowledge and skills, they also improved their emotional stability. And that is how it should be, here there is little that is new. But we ask ourselves: do we consider the actual capabilities of contemporary means of electronic warfare on all lessons? Do we remember that battle also encompasses the air and that the conditions for the control of the subunits and fire will be extremely unfavorable? It must be admitted that at times we prefer eased conditions and put up with simplifications.

One of the exercises is recalled. The motorized rifle company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Vorob'yev implemented the battalion commander's concept rather clearly. But then the battalion commander was forced to shift to an alternate channel. Communications ceased. Regardless of the number of signals concerning the change in conditions for radio communications which were transmitted, the company commander did not guess their significance. A hitch in operations and disruption of mutual understanding in real battle would have cost dearly. After that exercise, it was also decided to introduce corrections in the organization of command training. In this training year, for example, not one group exercise and not one tactical quickie exercise in the regiment was conducted without the creation of jamming for radio communications and without the use of special situations directed toward the complication of conditions for command and control.

Lessons were also conducted on which subunit commanders learned to eliminate malfunctions in organizational radio equipment and the rules for radio traffic were reviewed once again. The reconnaissance officer, Captain A. Fal'kovskiy, constantly informs the officers about the development of electronic warfare means in foreign armies. And of course, we do not forget the experience of the Great Patriotic War when the control of troops using various signals was developed and effective.

The reliability of control is determined not only by the lofty personal qualities of the commander, the coordination of the staff, and the skillful use of communications equipment. In contemporary battle with its tremendous spatial scale and sudden and surprise changes in the situation, much depends on the ability of the officers and all personnel to operate with initiative and resourcefully. It is appropriate to recall the thought expressed at the February (1984) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that the improvement of control is linked with the

improvement of work with people and an increase in the responsibility of the leaders as well as the executors. The regiment's party organization is delving deeply into the problems of the officers' professional training and establishing an atmosphere of high demandingness toward those officers who have not yet acquired the knowledge and skills which the organizer of a battle needs.

The conclusion of the winter combat training is approaching. The time has come to sum up its results. In accordance with my conviction the evaluation of the training of officer personnel should be approached with the strictest yardsticks. Their combat readiness depends to a decisive degree on our professional skill and ability to direct the life of the subunits and units.

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ARMED FORCES

MINISTER OF DEFENSE TO PUBLISH 1-VOL EDITION 'GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR'

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 84 p 2

[A. Sergeyev: "Not Subject To Time"]

[Text] Preparation of the "Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945" Encyclopedia is being completed. This book is being published jointly by the "Soviet Encyclopedia" Publishing House and the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History.

A lot of documentary, artistic, scientific and memoir literature has been published on the last war, but the job of putting all of this information into one manual is complicated," says deputy chairman of the scientific-editorial council of the Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House M.I. Kuznetsov. "It will be published at the beginning of next year, on the 40th anniversary of our people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Here are some facts that will give you an idea about the work completed. The encyclopedia will have around 3,500 articles arranged alphabetically. There will be more than 150 maps and schematics of military operations and a thousand illustrations, to include episodes from battles, military equipment, reproductions of pictures dedicated to the heroic epopee. In addition, there are numerous economic tables and an extensive bibliography. And finally, there is information about almost 1300 state, political and social leaders, famous military leaders and front-line heroes, partisan unit commanders, underground members and leaders in the anti-Hitler coalition. Material is also presented on rear area workers, such as directors of enterprises, scientists, construction workers, production innovators and also the enemy.

The new book in a way continues this publishing house's series that is dedicated to the most important period in this country's history. Earlier the "Great October Socialist Revolution" and the "Civil War" encyclopedias were published. A great number of authors worked on these books and now to one degree or another dozens of research institutions, hundreds of industrial collectives, outstanding social and military leaders, Soviet social and military historians, specialists in the field of international relations, economists, writers, cultural and artists leaders and war veterans have been drawn into preparing materials.

Recently the first party manuscript was sent to press to the No 2 USSR

Goskomizdat [USSR Soviet of Ministers State Committee on Publishing, Polygraphy and Book Trade] publishing house. And work on others still continues. Article names such as "Victory Holiday", "A Minute of Silence", and "A Memorial to the Soviet Peoples' Victory in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945" (erected on Poklon Naya Gora in Moscow) are deeply symbolic and touching. By the way, the encyclopedia has quite a little space on memorials to battle and labor and museums allotted to it. Its authors are literally repeating after the poet, "People, please remember what the price was for winning happiness!"

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ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL CRITIQUES WINTER TRAINING RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 84 p 1

[Lead editorial: "To Conclude Winter Training Successfully"]

[Text] Units and ships are concluding the fulfillment of winter military training plans and beginning to sum up their results. This places particular responsibility on commanders, political organs, headquarters, party and komso-mol organizations and all personnel. It has become a tradition in the army and navy to view the results of each period of training and each stage of competition as an accounting to the party and people about the results of their military labor, the level of field, air and naval training attained, and the degree of mastery of weapons and equipment. The present examinations should also become an inspection of combat readiness and a check of organization and procedures in all areas.

Many large units, units and ships have come to the concluding stage of winter training with remarkable achievements. Among them, for example, is the Zaporozhye Guards Tank Division. At all exercises the guards tankers demonstrate good tactical and firing training and the ability to use equipment and weapons effectively and exceed the norms. Intense work over many months lies behind these results. From the first days of winter training the division, which is fighting for the title of leader in its armed service, has been concerned about careful use of training time and thoroughness in accomplishing exercises, and has been critically assessing its achievements. The division's subunits are summing up results of competition effectively and objectively. Precise organization of the training process is combined with daily and hourly struggle to further strengthen military discipline and adherence to regulations.

The aviators of the guards fighter air regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col Yu. Temnikov and the sailors of the nuclear missile cruiser Kirov successfully solved many difficult combat training tasks this year.

At the same time, there are units and ships which are lagging in fulfilling training plans and programs and commitments in competition. The unit commanded by Lt Col Ye. Kapitonov was not able to ensure the necessary rhythm of military training and strict accomplishment of scheduled classes. Some topics had to be hastily made up in supplemental classes. Many subunits are satisfied year after year with average results in training and are weak in studying and introducing advanced experience. We cannot be reconciled to this. During the course of examinations, commanders, political organs and staffs must devote

particular attention to lagging subunits, uncover the true causes of shortcomings, and outline specific ways to improve military training.

In the concluding days of winter training it is important to mobilize all reserves, apportion time and material and technical resources effectively, and give all subunits the opportunity to carry out final exercises on a high level. The training and exercises which sum up the results of the training period must become for everyone a school of exactingness, and a model of a demanding approach to matters and strict observance of the provisions of regulations. Unfortunately, it frequently happens that the marks given by subunit commanders, and even by unit and ship commanders, are not corroborated by subsequent checks conducted by higher headquarters.

Commanders' training of officers warrants the closest attention. Is it properly organized and varied in form? Does it consider the needs of all categories of specialists and the latest achievements and methodology and military science? Without detailed answers to these questions it is difficult to ensure the constant improvement of the professional competence of officers, and improve their ability to think and act under severe time constraints and tremendous moral, psychological and physical burdens.

Summarizing the results of Marxist-Leninist training of officers and political training of all personnel should be permeated by the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress, and the June 1983 and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums. It is important to be sure that everything has been done in the unit or on the ship to educate soldiers as conscious political warriors, capable of evaluating social phenomena independently, seeing the relationship between current tasks and our final objectives, and rebuffing decisively any manifestation of lack of principles and ideals. No objective assessment of the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training and political studies is possible without taking into account their influence on combat readiness and the state of military discipline and adherence to regulations.

April concludes the first stage of socialist competition of army and navy personnel held under the slogan, "Be on guard, in constant readiness to defend the gains of socialism!" It is necessary to sum up these results everywhere and combine word and deed. Military labor, like any other, is senseless without thoughtful moral incentives, honoring of the winners, fair criticism of the laggards, and without that exacting approach to people about which Comrade K. U. Chernenko spoke in his electoral speech at the February 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Mobilizing personnel for the successful completion of winter training is a most important task of party and political work. In orienting their activity toward organizing the fulfillment of decisions made and checking fulfillment, commanders, political organs and party organizations are called upon to maintain a climate of high demandingness in units and on ships, and to ensure that each communist sets a personal example in training and competition.

To increase vigilance tirelessly and be in constant readiness to deal a crushing defeat to any aggressor -- this is the task that the party and Soviet

people place before the personnel of the army and navy. Every officer, warrant officer, sergeant and senior sergeant, soldier and sailor should constantly remember this, and give all his efforts and knowledge to increasing the combat readiness of the army and navy.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

April's Numerous Patriotic Letters

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 84 p 2

["Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section]

[Text] In April 1984 the editors received 15,362 reader letters and 545 of them were published in the paper. 1096 responses to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA articles were received:

"I live in Siberia, in a crowded village on the banks of the beautiful Angara. I work in a local tailor shop and our collective is primarily women. It is a happy group, responsible for the work assigned. I often think about how fortunate I am to be a daughter of such a country as ours. To live under its care and to be in the thick of all the business to which our native Communist Party and the Soviet government invite us. The CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the first session of the eleventh convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet have just taken place. We in our collective heartily approve the documents adopted by them. And in a workmanlike fashion we declare that everything that the party planned will be dutifully carried out.

Thermonuclear war is threatening us from across the ocean. It doesn't intimidate the Soviet peoples. Yesterday I sent a letter to my oldest son Valeriy who is a soldier. I know that he is serving well because his commander reported this to me. My order to my son was, "Protect the country. And when you return home, your younger brother will take your place in the army."

Lyudmila Nikolayevna Bryukhanova from the Siberian village of Boguchan wrote these lines. The soldier's mother expressed as she was able her sincere thoughts about the Motherland, the party, the world and the necessity to tirelessly protect the planet from war.

Major A. Subbotin from the Transbaykal Military District, Sergeant I Vasyukov from the Leningrad Military District, retired Lieutenant Colonel F. Makarov from the Moscow Military District, retired Warrant Officer I. Zheleznyy from Ryazana and many others of our readers have written about the inseparable unity between the party and the people. Soldiers of the Army and Navy, proudly

and unanimously approving the decisions of the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the first session of the eleventh convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, are devoting all their efforts and the ardor of their hearts to increasing the military preparedness of the Armed Forces. Letters from tactical training fields and from distant cruises contain the good news that many units, ships and subunits are successfully completing the summer training period.

Captain 3rd rank V. Yarmak from the Pacific Ocean Fleet relates, "Shore batteries completed their record firing under difficult meteorological conditions while there was a heavy fog over the ocean. The high tactical, technical and fire training of the artillerymen subordinated to officers V. Mitenskov, A. Larchuk and V. Yegorov allowed them to totally destroy the sea targets of the "enemy".

There are many such reports in the April editorial mailbag. Moreover their authors, devoting what is necessary to the successes achieved and having said good things about the outstanding people in field training, are correctly turning their attention to the necessity of even now most seriously concerning themselves about the accumulated experience in the military collectives, about disseminating it and improving training and indoctrination in those units and subunits which were unable to keep their word and were among those lagging. This obligates commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations to carefully analyze shortcomings and errors in the training and indoctrination of personnel and not to permit the errors to be repeated during summer training period. The April CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted that "The demand must be greater after every failure and after every imperfection allowed this year than ever before. Our party position can be no other."

The Leninist theme had a large place in the April mail. Readers wrote about the fact that the country and soldiers of the Army and Navy met the 110th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth and conducted an All-Union Communist Subbotnik [free labor on Saturday] dedicated to this wonderful date. "Leninist lessons and Leninist readings were held in our unit on the eve of this holiday," writes Lieutenant N. Klimov from Volga Military District. "In April many soldiers visited Ulyanov, Il'ich's birthplace."

April is also the 39th anniversary of the Great Victory. Many letters have been coming in these days from front-line veterans. They remember the severe battles with the enemy, talk about their lives and about taking part in the military patriotic work of indoctrinating the younger generation in the revolutionary, military and work traditions and express their sincere and deep appreciation to the domestic Communist Party for its motherly concern for its veterans.

True to the traditions of front-line veterans, Soviet soldiers are tirelessly improving their own combat training and are carefully and reliably guarding the great accomplishments of socialism.

Fighting Indifference in Issyk-Kul

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 84 p 2

[Text] Captain V. Mamayev's letter was printed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 14 March under the heading "Running into Indifference". It discussed indifference shown by workers of the Dzhety-Odyz rayvoyenkom [Rayon military district] at Issyk-Kul Oblast while they were reviewing a request from a unit on the state of affairs in Private A. Baygabylov's family.

As the head of Issuk-Kul Oblast's obvoyenkom's political department, Lieutenant Colonel Shybin, reported to the editors, the facts were corroborated. The Dzhety-Odyz rayvoyenkom military commissar, Lieutenant Colonel V. Rudenko and the secretary of the party organization, Major L. Serdyuk, were severely reprimanded for shortcomings in their work of reviewing letters, requests and statements. The newspaper article was discussed in the political section and the oblast rayon and city voyenkomats. The condition of their work with letters, requests and statements was carefully checked. Serviceman A. Baygabylov's mother received help in laying in fire wood, coal and hay.

Indifference Among Officers Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 84 p 2

[Text] A letter from our reader A. Andriashkina and the commentary on it by the paper's correspondent Major N. Medvedev which were published on 7 February under the heading "Responding to the first Bell" discussed some unit officials' indifferent attitude toward the living arrangements of a unit junior officer that had arrived.

Military council member and chief of the Ural Military District political department Lieutenant General V. Sharygin responded to the editors. He reported that the paper's article was reviewed at a meeting of the district's major unit leaders and at a meeting of commanders and political workers from the garrison where the unit was stationed. Lieutenant Colonel A. Yefimenko who was criticized in the paper was relieved of his position for those and other service omissions and was held accountable to the party. A meeting of the district military council was devoted to working with junior officers and developing a careful attitude toward their requests and needs.

12511

CSO: 1801/323

ARMED FORCES

DISABLED MILITARY VETERAN LIVES USEFUL LIFE

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Article by special KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent I. Morozov, Cherkassy:
"The Return, The Soviet Character"]

[Text] At the age of 24, Senior Lieutenant Sergey Chervonopiskiy, commander of an assault company, was deprived of his ability to walk. It happened one fine November morning in 1981. But then one day, a fine day in April 1984, I dialed long distance, waited out the wearisome drone of the ringing and asked to speak to Sergey Chervonopiskiy. I heard a cheery, animated voice reply: "He's gone out"

But let's take things in order. Let's begin our story on that clear November morning back in 1981, when a mine exploded under Guards Senior Lieutenant Sergey Chervonopiskiy's combat assault vehicle. When the senior lieutenant was thrown out of his mangled assault vehicle and laying in the dirt by the side of the road, soldiers bustling about with bandages and tourniquets and staring at their senior lieutenant. "Stop it!" the senior lieutenant demanded. "Cut the tears!" And then he scolded them. He asked for a cigarette. "But you can't, comrade senior lieutenant," they told him, "You've been hit with fragments all around your mouth" "Nonsense," he replied. "I can still smoke." And he did smoke. He smoked it right down to the end, still lying there in the dirt beside the road, looking at the wreck of his assault vehicle and quietly swearing. It'd be better just to let yourself lose consciousness, they told him. It'll be easier that way. I'll make it, the senior lieutenant insisted.

Then they took him by helicopter to a hospital, where he was quickly prepared for surgery. Some very young nurses wheeled him into the operating room, and as they were pushing him in he gave them his address. Write for me, girls, the senior lieutenant said. Write, otherwise it's going to get depressing. And I'm a happy man. Yes, of course, the girls told him. By all means. They looked at the senior lieutenant's legs.

Or rather, where his legs should have been.

Two years later I tell Sergey Chervonopiskiy that I think what happened that November morning was a truly heroic feat. He takes a drag on his cigarette and smiles briefly: No, man You're mistaken there. The first heroic feat he ever performed in his entire life, the senior lieutenant says, came much later.

In the hospital. When he was finally able to turn himself over onto his stomach. Now that was a heroic feat, the senior lieutenant says.

The diagnosis? "Amputation stumps, both thighs, virtually impossible to fit with prosthetic appliances." And this diagnosis was signed by a famous specialist. A colonel. This meant a wheelchair. This meant setting around all day, watching television and collecting a pension. It might be depressing, but there was simply nothing to be done about it. So I'm not going to be like everybody else? the senior lieutenant says. What are you talking about, they ask him. I mean ... he starts, but then abruptly falls silent.

He begins making his own decisions back at this point. After having been taught all his life to defer to and trust his superiors, the senior lieutenant now puts no faith in the colonel. Perhaps for the first time in his life this faith and confidence isn't there. And the first thing he does then is to try to turn over on his stomach.

The senior lieutenant was still in the hospital, but his friends and relatives had already found him a famous prosthetist. But not even in the presence of this specialist, a general this time, did the senior lieutenant quail, this balding elderly man with glasses, who studied him for a while and then started mumbling something about what a tough case this was. I'll tell you what, young man, he said finally. He pushed his glasses back up on his forehead and took out a crumpled cigarette. If I can, I'm going to quit smoking. Really, the old man said.

A month later and the senior lieutenant was making his first try to stand up. So how are we doing, the prosthetist inquires with a touch of jealousy.

Sergey wipes his sweaty palms: "Give up your smoking, Vasil'ich."

Every evening was now like the day before a battle. And every morning like the attack itself. The senior lieutenant was attacking the corridors of the hospital. He started to measure time not in days — what were days? — but rather in terms of corridors. The nurses began to complain: you can't ever find him in the ward, they'd say. They complained, but he would come in at night and, with a grimace of pain, remove his blood-stained hospital pants. His doctor would come in in the morning, and the senior lieutenant would rise to report on his feet: so many corridors covered for the day. Then it got to be so-and-so many corridors and so-and-so many stairways. The doctor would look at the senior lieutenant's pants and say: not very many. Not very many, he would say, and then he would leave and make his way through the long hospital corridor and think about this senior lieutenant. He was no longer a young man and had seen a good many different types of people in his day. Strong, healthy people who had been weakened by disease. And then there were the weak one who grew stronger. He had know patients who ultimately drank themselves away and others who just let themselves go to pieces, but then there were the ones who would have been the envy of anyone with his own two good healthy legs. And this was really the nub of the matter, the doctor thought: to desire to be as good as anybody else. If that desire is there, everything else is going to fall into place

Maybe this is why when one day the senior lieutenant received a letter from the Airborne Forces Museum requesting him to send it his photograph ("Your photo will

be given an honored place in our display.") his immediate reaction was to hide both the letter and his photograph for a while. To become a museum piece while still in his twenties was definitely not for this senior lieutenant. I don't know whether Sergey was right or not. But whether it was the right thing to do or not, at that particular point he wasn't going to have anything to do with any museum. Something else was the most important thing on his mind back in those days: to get himself back to the point where he could be like everybody else.

Sergey was ultimately discharged from the hospital, but he pressed on with his nighttime attacks. It was easier for him this way. He was afraid of the sympathetic looks we would get than he was of mines and bloody hospital pants. So, the senior lieutenant taught himself to walk after dark. One block. Two blocks. Three. Four. Thirteen. He would fall down. Get up. Fall down again. Get up again. All by himself. Without any help.

But still, he did need some help. And more help than simply supporting him, holding him by the elbow. Let us underline the fact at this point that around this man who more than anything else in the world wanted to be like everybody else were people who wanted to see this no less than he did. And they did everything they could to help him achieve this.

A letter was sent to the authorities responsible for this sort of thing asking them to approve an application requesting that, as an exception, the senior lieutenant be given a Zhiguli rather than the Zaporozhets the government ordinarily provides free of charge in these cases. For the fact was that the prostheses Sergey had were not the kind you ordinarily see. His were attached right at the base of his thigh. The problem was that with this type of prostheses Sergey couldn't slide into a Zaporozhets. He was a good-sized fellow, and the fit was just a little too tight for him in there. So they delivered him a car. Senior personnel from the Petrovskiy Machine-Building Plant built the senior lieutenant a garage. On the door they welded a stainless steel star. A star that seems to shine at night, too

In the meantime, the attacks continued. While the individual manual controls were still being made for his car, the senior lieutenant began to try to get along without them. Once again he wanted to test himself — could he really do it like everybody else? He would get out and practice at night, when the city streets were almost empty, no cars, no pedestrians. And here's how he did it: he used his prostheses on the clutch and a cane on the gas pedal. As a former driver 1st class, he assured me that this was a lot easier than trying to drive an assault vehicle on mountain roads.

And the attacks continued. It was at about this time that at a joint session the bureau of the city party committee and the city executive committee adopted a resolution, the only one of its kind at the time perhaps. The bureau decided to give Guards Senior Lieutenant (Retired) Sergey Chervonopiskiy, a category 1 invalid, a three-room apartment in a new residential building. Vladimir Gorigor'yevich Sokorenko, party committee first secretary, requested that he be familiarized with the layout of the new building, and then he personally picked out an apartment for Sergey, one with a spacious kitchen and a broad corridor.

But then people started telling Sokorenko that perhaps he was taking something of a risk. People in the gorispolkom office responsible for housing assignments

were pulling their hair out in anticipation of big trouble Forty-eight square meters was too much for anybody, they thought. Even for an invalid. The bureau had taken this step on its own responsibility. What guidelines were you using, I asked Sokorenko. You mean, how did we think we were going to be able to get away with it? the first secretary asked in reply. Well, we were looking to the future, of course, he said. The thing was that they simply were convinced that things would ultimately work out for this doggedly determined young man, somebody who was out every night counting off the long city blocks. The bureau had faith that Sergey was going to have it all — to include a family, with children. And by that time he would be eligible for an apartment immediately. Legally. This was all going to have to happen sometime, the bureau had decided.

Now this probably could seem a little strange. Responsibility for what? For somebody else's happiness and convenience? I know that when the bureau decided to take on this responsibility, Sergey picked up the telephone and heard a voice which could wait for hours, a voice he had dreamed about at night. He listened. And then in an exaggeratedly calm voice he said: "Don't call back here again."

Maybe he was a strong man at that particular moment. Or at least he wanted to be. But there's nothing more painful, it turns out, than to be a strong man

The calls continue. The next day. Then the next. The next month. We probably have no right to be going into all this, and, after all, really, there's no point to it Suffice it to say that at one point the calls finally stopped coming. One day the call came right to his door. And the caller had come to stay.

Our senior lieutenant was getting married. He was marrying a fine girl named Natasha, whom he had met back while he was still in active service discharging his international duty. They held their wedding in the new apartment. And at the wedding, the senior lieutenant danced

He danced a waltz by holding on to his partner. And to rock 'n' roll he danced alone. Just like you're supposed to dance it. Just like everybody else does it. And according to reliable witnesses, the senior lieutenant gave a pretty good account of himself on the dance floor.

And now let me leap ahead some and report that when I arrived I found that the Chervonopiskiy's were really no longer the true masters of this three-bedroom apartment. The real master of the house, the one with the real authority, was now two-month-old Vadik, while diapers hung drying on a line like sails in the hallway

No, the bureau had not been mistaken. But this still wasn't the end of it. What was going to be next on the senior lieutenant's agenda? He was, indeed, a strong, courageous man: two Orders of the Red Star say a lot. He was awarded them for bravery and heroism displayed while performing his international duty. And yes, in spite of everything he had taught himself how to walk again; and although you don't get any medals for it, it's still a heroic feat, courage demonstrated here as well.

So, once again, this was truly a strong man. But we have to ask ourselves this question — what now? Speak to packed auditoriums at the schools and vocational

training centers on Saturdays? Why not. He could do it, and he liked to do it; he took the enthusiastic applause he always got seriously: it meant he was telling them what they needed to hear, saying what needed to be said. But then what? Spend all day peeling potatoes, waiting for his wife to come home from work? Why not, he could do that, too, and he certainly didn't see anything wrong with that, either. But still, was there going to be anything else?

Well, there was.

Something then happened which really took some people by surprise, but which others just as honestly took to be either an honest mistake or at least a misunderstanding.

It all happened like this. On one occasion the city party committee together with the city Komsomol committee invited Sergey Chervonopiskiy in for a chat. Sergey was offered a job. As chief of the organization department of the city Komsomol committee. In the mildest of terms, some people said it was just not the appropriate thing to do. After all, they said, you know perfectly well what kind of work the chief of the organization department has to do. They call him the first yeoman. In their view, a man with no legs and a category I invalid was just not suited for this kind of position. But the people on both city committees looked at things differently: a fellow has to be able to support himself in life. And the gorkom people had in mind something else besides just walls, even though they might be the walls of a three-room apartment. A fellow has to support himself in life mainly by working. And if it's difficult, if it's hard work, then so much the better.

And the party and Komsomol city committees were backed up in this case by the party and Komsomol oblast committees.

So Guards Senior Lieutenant (Retired) Sergey Chervonopiskiy became chief of the organization department. For him this signalled the beginning of still another attack.

This was indeed a new attack, but not as messy as those nighttime operations, on which he would out and count city blocks. The new chief did keep a grip on things, and while it wasn't the pistol grip he was accustomed to, it was still something a little like one. And he still said "Yes, sir!" when he answered the telephone. On one particular occasion an enterprise secretary, who was being given time off from work to perform this function, came in to see him, and Sergey ordered him to "report what you've done about turning the documents over to the archives as assigned." The secretary said he had just been worn to a frazzle, that it was almost Saturday, that he didn't have anything to do with the archives and that, to make a long story short, he just hadn't gotten around to it. Chervonopiskiy was thunderstruck: what do you mean, you didn't get around to it? This was an instruction, that is, an order! The secretary replied nervously that, by the way, he'd been doing this job for five years now and so he had some idea of priorities, of what had to get done right away and what could wait a while. At this Chervonopiskiy exploded, but couldn't find anything better to do than fish around in his table for a copy of the regulations and point to the page which covered the principles of democratic centralism. The organization chief reached dejectedly for a cigarette and started thinking about what a

mess things were in: after all, you can't send the raykom with all your organization people on an extra-duty detail to the mess hall to peel potatoes.

He had to do some studying.

Chiefs of the organization departments of party city committees are not ordinarily invited to plenary sessions of the oblast committees. But Chervonopiskiy they invited. It was explained to me this way: we want to nip this thing in the bud as quick as we can. The first secretary mentioned the new organization department chief in his report at the very first such plenum. Mentioned him by name. And they let Chervonopiskiy have it. For poor organization in connection with preparations for competition for best rationalizing suggestion. So then I ask the first secretary whether he thinks it was really worth going to these lengths. He's still just a new man, after all. And after all

The first secretary winked slyly. You say he's an invalid, the first secretary continues. Nonsense, he says. You mean, he was an invalid. Now he's the chief of an organization department. First yeoman. And he once again he winks slyly. There aren't any invalid organization department chiefs. There isn't any position like that on our table of organization.

So now the pattern's becoming clear: wherever it's been possible to dispense with criticism and reprimands before, no effort has really been made in the case of the new organization department chief to avoid them. Where quarrels have been avoided in other instances, they let the new man in this case have it. Now I can see it: when Sokorenko would frequently feel like stopping in on the organization department chief just to inquire about his health, he would at best inquire about some report, at worst he would decide against dropping in at all. After all, he would say, the first secretary of a party city committee doesn't ordinarily give much personal attention to the chief of a Komsomol organization department. So this is what it was decided to do. Don't make any allowances. Don't cut him any slack. Suggestions — certainly. Any time, night or day. Help — by all means. Just ask. But if he has to keep his nose to the grindstone from morning until night, that's just what he's going to have to do.

Now I know about all this and I think: what devil's good luck Chervonopiskiy has nevertheless had in his relations with this tough bunch. And tough is the word for it. And I say good luck, because long live the toughness which brings a man to see that people are not going to be treating him like an invalid, but rather like any other worker. Just like everybody else.

So the chief of the organization department studied and learned. He learned from his mistakes and his successes, from the discoveries and from the surprises. Just like everybody else. In the morning — reports and elections. Lunch time — a speech to a big crowd of boys from the cinema club. Then consideration of the case of a girl who has refused to participate in a voluntary Saturday work program. Then along toward the end of the day — time to work up the reports on progress made in implementation of routine directives. Reports, reports. A veritable mountain of reports. Emotionless, terse, dry. Such and such accomplished. So and so much collected. Those present. Those absent. No feeling here — it's a different genre. But the new chief of the organization department is still a man of emotion.

He flipped me one of these reports, one on the results of socialist competition between the city's Komsomol youth brigades. I give it my near-sighted squint: I see a column of figures that look like Egyptian hieroglyphics. Now you would think there'd be nothing simpler, Chervonopiskiy says. Here: equipment maintenance facility - plan fulfilled 130 per cent. Chemical combine brigade - 100.5 per cent. So you put the equipment maintenance people in first place and that's that, right? the chief asks me. Right, I agree without argument. The hell you say, he says. First, now, call up the experts and find out what the equipment maintenance people mean by "overfullfilling" their plan, and then what a half-per cent is in "chemistry."

O.K., the chief says, now a little more temperately. Here's something better for you: did you read the announcements in the paper inviting children to the kindergartens? Where could you read about it? Right here. In Cherkassy. The point is that the Komsomol helped build them, I'll have you know. Voluntary Saturday work. Then voluntary Sunday work. O.K., the chief says once more. We've finally finished with the kindergartens. He's now much more interested in something else — the Pioneer Palace now under construction. Also, more to the point now, a project the Komsomol is helping with. And we're sweating blood to have the thing done on time. The chief of the organization department, now, incidentally, has to phone up "Azot" to round up some more youngsters to work on the project. To get them for some voluntary Saturday work.

And he gets them. He has always gotten them. He's worn his finger out on the telephone dial and talked himself hoarse, but he's always gotten his people. So he can then sit down at his desk at the end of the working day. And accurately record the entries for his next report: so and so many volunteered for work on Saturday. Such and such accomplished

Now the report writing goes on until evening. But then after he gets home at night people come to him and ask him to "do something with my son." What the Komsomol recommends. So he "does something." So where are you going to get away? Saturday you've got a meeting scheduled with the rayon committee. Some fellow has a pregnant wife who's not working, so they have to be paid for a private apartment. You've got to help scare up some housing for them. And then Sunday — a children's sports competition, so the organization department chief has to be there to announce the winners and losers, to settle the protests and look into the notes.

"You don't get tired, chief?"

"What do you mean?"

What, in fact, do I mean? That it's still a little difficult to keep up a morning-until-late-evening schedule without any legs?

No, certainly, not that. Or rather, not simply that. When was he stronger, this man with the closely cropped forelock? That's what I've been thinking about. When he asked for a smoke as he lay in the dirt by his mangled assault vehicle? Or today on the telephone, behind his heaps of interminable reports, records, tables, summaries and who-knows-what-other-kinds of forms, at all the meetings and sessions of the bureau he has to attend? When? Back then or today? It's today, as far as I'm concerned. It's right now, I think. It looks to me like

this man has learned to stand straight and tall on something else besides the asphalt. And this, after all, is the most difficult thing. And the most important.

And I also think about the possibility that this man will achieve true greatness during his lifetime. That, for example, he might ultimately occupy some high and important position in one of our respected institutions. Or that he will become, for example, a writer (I do know that he has tried to write.). Maybe that's what he'll be. And then something else will have to be said about this man. But something written a little differently. Because this will be a different story.

And now when I dial his city and ask to speak to the chief of the organization department, I usually don't find him at home any more. As a rule, someone will say in a cheery, animated voice: "He's gone out"

8963

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO ZNAMENOSETS EDITOR, RESPONSES

Duty Station Preferences Criticized

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 18

[Letter by Capt 1st Rank B. Petrov: "'I Want to Serve in Odessa'"]

[Text] WO [Praporshchik] (Res) A. Panshin doesn't describe for us the sights of Odessa. If someone has not been there, he of course has heard about the beauty of the coastal city, but Panshin persistently assures us that he cannot live without the "pearl by the sea." He is even prepared to serve next to her, but not very far away. The Central Group of Forces told him to continue service in the Far East Military District, and an attempt was made to convince him of the advisability of such a trip... But it was all in vain. He refused. He would like to go to the Odessa Military District, but the personnel department was not able to consider the warrant officer's insistent desire. Then, with reference to family circumstances, he decided to be released to the reserve. No matter how much regret there was to part with an experienced specialist, it was necessary to prepare documents for the release.

But the dream of the wonderful city and the warm sea, the bluest in the world, did not leave Panshin. Then he came to the military commissariat at his place of residence: "I request that you send me to the Odessa Military District." They looked at his documents there and asked the reason for his refusal to serve in the Far East, and they said: "Wait." "Why are they slow in acceptance for duty?" writes Comrade Panshin to the editors.

WO I. Il'in also informs us of his disappointments. He was prepared to travel to one of the groups of Soviet forces abroad, when suddenly he was told: "You have to go to Sakhalin." This deviates from his personal plans.

WO D. Taysin chose a new duty station for himself. The reason was that there was a higher staff category there, which meant higher pay and allowances. "I live in my own home, everything has to be purchased and debts paid off, but they aren't transferring me," he says, perplexed.

Different letters, but still they are similar in content. The basis for their requests is a desire to satisfy only personal interests, and there is not a word about the interests of duty or the interests of combat readiness.

Of course the Black Sea is warmer than the Sea of Okhotsk or even the Sea of Japan and Odessa unquestionably is larger than Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk or Ussuriysk, but it isn't these criteria which determine our duty station. It is not customary to reject an offer to accept a new position or be where it is more difficult in the Army and Navy. The regulation words "Yes, Sir!" stand out among others in the lexicon of the military person. They reflect a readiness to execute an order or instruction of the commander or senior chief. They are also uttered when receiving an assignment to a new duty station.

When, if not in the youthful years, are we to test the force of our character, temper will or test ourselves for strength? Youthful military years not only are a time of expectation; they are a time of romance and of great accomplishments. They are capable of the most difficult, most distant and most responsible sectors. The exploit of the first Heroes of the Soviet Union, who rescued the brave Chelyuskin men, originated on the homeland's eastern borders, there the heroes of Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol augmented the glory of Soviet arms, and Pacific Fleet submariners set the first records for duration of underwater navigation. The legendary border guard Nikita Karatsupa was renowned here, and Nikolay Vilkov and Petr Il'ichev repeated the exploit of Aleksandr Matrosov on the Kuriles...

Many of our generals and military leaders began duty in the Far East, the Transbaikal, Central Asia and the Far North. Their character was tempered and command development took place here. Marshals of the Soviet Union V. K. Blyukher, G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, A. M. Vasilevskiy, K. K. Rokossovskiy and K. S. Moskalenko defended the Motherland here... S. G. Gorshkov, now CIC of the Navy and deputy USSR minister of defense and a fleet admiral Soviet Union, arrived in the Pacific Fleet as a young navigator. Mar SU V. I. Petrov, CIC of the Ground Forces and deputy USSR minister of defense, gave almost three decades to the Far East.

During my years of duty in the Pacific Fleet I had occasion to be on Kamchatka and Sakhalin and to meet navymen, pilots, motorized riflemen and border guards on posts large and small. All of them emphasized in conversation that they were Far-Easterners and Pacific Fleet personnel! One sensed in this a pride in serving on the Motherland's distant borders and responsibility for defense of native Soviet soil.

Soldiers, including warrant officers, who are successfully accomplishing patriotic and international missions in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan demonstrate high awareness and a profound understanding of the complicated international situation.

A refusal to serve where the interests of the Motherland require it and persistence in carrying out personal and at times even selfish plans do not raise the authority of a warrant officer. Comrades Il'in and Taysin must know this. Comrade Panshin also is showing surprise for nothing in the fact that military commissariat officers are slow in making out his documents. They obviously had doubt as to the moral qualities of Comrade Panshin, who refused to travel to the Far East.

Of course anything can happen in life. At times the state of health of the warrant officer himself, the illness of near ones and other reasons demand a change in duty station. Both the commanders and personnel entities take account of these circumstances. Guided by the statute on performance of duty by warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany], they take the necessary steps, but still in all instances the interests of duty and of combat readiness must remain the primary criteria.

Just as the song goes: "Think first of the Motherland, and then about yourself."

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Priority of Duty, Marriage

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 18

[Individual letters commenting on previously published letter: "If She Loves You..."]

[Text] ". . . Now I have a choice: the girl I love or military duty. What am I to do?" These are lines from a letter by WO [Michman] Grinev to the editors of ZNAMENOSETS which was published in the March issue. It drew the attention of the readers and we publish the first responses.

I read WO V. Grinev's letter "I Want to be Happy..." and thought about my own career. It took shape just as for Viktor.

I fell in love with a girl and got married. The unit assigned us an apartment and everything seemed to be fine, but soon troubles began, and all because my spouse didn't like my military service. I come home late and I love the soldiers more than her...

At that time I almost left the Army. Thanks to colleagues and my commander, Officer Ya. Svetvatov, I was convinced in time and I chose the Army.

Now I have a new family and two growing children. My comrades elected me Kom-somol organization secretary. Everything is going fine and life is a joy. When I think about the sources of this joy I see that it lies in our spiritual harmony and in the fact that my duty is job number one for my wife as well.

I don't know what to advise WO Grinev, for he also has to choose between personal happiness and official duty. Let him decide for himself. Perhaps my example will help him. I can say one thing: it is not good when a person who has linked his life with the Army tries to gain where and how he can do so best. And further, Viktor fears approaching the commander in vain. The fact is that the commander certainly has both life and duty experience and will suggest how to proceed.

And most important, if you are in love, you have to sense especially acutely the responsibility for your love and for her future. And the future for us lies in the Motherland's happiness.

WO V. Fedotov

Of course, a formula for happiness has not yet been invented, but it seems to me that it is reflected in a favorite job, a beloved person and the Motherland. There are no hopeless situations and I believe, although I have been in the Army only five years, that there also can be no happy life without a favorite profession and a sense of duty to society. In my opinion, Svetlana, WO Grinev's beloved, has to understand her chosen one and, as the saying goes, "the thread goes where the needle goes." If she really loves him...

Lt A. Markov

If Svetlana loves Viktor, she will fly to where he is serving. This is in the hearts of our women, to be next to the husband and be his support. Remember the wives of the Decembrists.

Yes, we military wives do not always succeed in working in our specialty, even if we have a diploma. But we always can master a new trade. It only takes the desire.

And so think, Viktor, does Svetlana love you?

G. Savchuk,
A serviceman's wife

. . . WO Grinev encountered the first difficulty and already shirked. The fact is that living a life is not the same as crossing a field. There is much of everything ahead. One must be able to maintain character, and remember the important thing: a soldier must have one commander--his lifelong job, and not a capricious wife. If you even now are giving in to her, what will come later?...

WO L. Danilyuk

. . . If Svetlana set the condition: choose me or the Army, it would appear that she is not the person on whom one can rely. I can say firmly that such a "half" will not make a single whole in the family, and Viktor later will regret that he left the Army.

WO G. Butenko

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WO Recalled to Duty

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Item: "Called into the Army"]

[Text] "Into the Reserve Because of a Complaint" was the title of a critical article by Maj A. Kupryashin published in the November 1983 issue.

As the editors were informed by Lt Gen Avn L. Klochikhin, the journal's article was studied by the Air Forces' leadership. With consideration of all circumstances of the matter, WO [Praporshchik] N. Makhnovets was recalled to active military duty and assigned to the position of senior aviation mechanic of a helicopter and aviation engine periodic technical servicing group.

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Views on Discotheques Expressed

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Letter by WO [Michman] A. Zvonov and WO A. Zhukov: "Our View of the Discotheque"]

[Text] We read with interest and discussed the article entitled "Alien Disco-rhythms," included in the December 1983 issue of ZNAMENOSSETS.

As is generally known, discotheques are supposed to have the purpose of propagandizing music and the creativeness of various ensembles, and Soviet ensembles above all. Their organizers could adopt the best from the discotheques here, shown for example by Kiev television. In the majority of cases, however, discotheques don't propagandize music, but clowning, fashionable jeans, and athletic shoes...

Discotheques are an attraction for a portion of the young people in the ages of 14-18 who are insufficiently mature in the ideological and spiritual sense. But the fact is that after some time they will come to serve in the Army and Navy and will become the Motherland's defenders. What esthetic and moral impressions will remain in a young person from nights where poor-quality western music plays deafeningly and where there is no culture of dancing or behavior? How will such a sorry excuse for a pastime enrich young people? In no way. Moreover, it will bring harm.

But if such an activity of an officer's club or unit enlisted men's club has a negative effect on young soldiers and distorts their understanding of excellent and worthy things, then the question automatically arises: Why such an activity? Only for the sake of profit?

No matter who is keen on discotheques--garrison teenagers, young soldiers, warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] or officers--the

GDO [garrison officers' club] chiefs and the garrison public cannot neglect these activities. The dignity of the Soviet soldier and his desire for genuine musical and dance culture will help get the upper hand over the temptation to follow examples of western fashion alien to us.

We support the opinion of the author of the article "Alien Discorhythms." Income from disco nights must not weaken our political vigilance or help in propagandizing banality and bad taste.

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Promised Housing Not Received

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Letter from WO [Praporshchik] (Res) V. Sorokin: "They Promised..."]

[Text] Dear editors! After serving 26 years in the Army I was released to the reserve and had a ceremonial send-off. The personnel were formed up, the commander said many kind words about me and presented the medal "USSR Armed Forces Veteran" and an Honor Scroll. Then he assured me before formation that I would be given a two-room apartment in the city before the end of 1982.

In October of that same year I went to see him during a reception period to find out how my apartment problem was being decided, but he calmly responded: "It isn't; you have lost touch with the Ministry of Defense." But when I reminded him of his promise, he refuted his own words. How can that be? I am accustomed to believe people, especially commanders.

I turned to the higher political entity on this matter. Its representatives chatted with me and promised to look into things. It is already 1984, but the problem troubling me has not been resolved to this date. Who needs such promises?

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WO Relieved of Blame

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Editorial item: "An Inspection Showed"]

[Text] A letter from support platoon commander WO [Praporshchik] G. Bondar' stated that he was absent from the unit for four months for valid reasons (first he was being treated in the hospital and then he was on a lengthy TDY). But when he arrived at his duty station a large shortage of fuels and lubricants was discovered. He was held materially liable for a large amount. "My conscience is clean, but what am I to do?" asked the warrant officer.

The editors went to the military procurator's office of the Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District with the warrant officer's letter. Soon Lt Col Justice A. Dalinenko reported that a procurator's inspection had been made based on the letter from WO Bondar', the unit commander's order holding the warrant officer materially liable had been appealed as unfounded, it was proposed that the order be rescinded and the money recovered be returned to Comrade Bondar'. Inasmuch as the shortage of fuel and special fluids occurred in the serviceman's absence, the command element has been told to conduct an additional administrative investigation and determine those actually guilty in order to hold them materially liable in conformity with the law.

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WO's Complaint Refuted

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Editorial comment: "Conclusions Drawn"]

[Text] WO [Praporshchik] L. Glinko wrote to the editors that despite his heavy duty load he copes well with his duties and takes an active part in Kom-somol life but the chief of the KECh [billeting unit] of the rayon where he works allegedly is biased toward him and imposes punishments on him almost every day.

Engr Col D. Ovetskiy, chief of the billeting directorate of the Red Banner Far East Military District, responded to the editors' query. It was learned that although WO Glinko does cope with his duties, lately he has begun to be rude to persons senior in rank, he doesn't observe the wearing of the uniform, and reacts oversensitively to the KECh chief's criticism. There were instances of his being late in returning from regular leaves and of an unauthorized departure for hunting involving theft of a car.

WO Glinko admitted his mistakes in a personal conversation and gave his word to change his behavior.

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Transfer for Family Reasons

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Editorial comment: "Transfer Accomplished"]

[Text] WO [Praporshchik] A. Bessarabov requested ZNAMENOSETS to help speed up the decision on the question of his transfer from one district to another, on the territory of which his elderly father, a Great Patriotic War invalid, is living. His father recently suffered two infarctions and requires care, but there are no relatives nearby.

We sent this letter to the personnel entity and soon received an answer. Col A. Ryzhenkov informed the editors that the necessary documents for WO Bessarabov's transfer had gone through all echelons. The warrant officer was transferred to the commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District by an appropriate order.

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Housing Construction Cooperative Procedures

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 19

[Editorial comment: "For WO [Praporshchik] V. Yevstaf'yev: You Asked, We Answer"]

[Text] "Please tell me the procedure for servicemen to join a housing construction cooperative," you write.

Warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] and extended-term servicemen with no housing or who require an improvement in housing conditions can join housing construction cooperatives at their place of permanent residence on a universal basis, and on an equal basis with other citizens, through the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies.

A limit has been established on cooperative living space for union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts and cities for servicemen of this category performing duty abroad, in areas of the Far North and the equivalent, and on isolated military posts located outside large populated points. Therefore, to join a ZhSK [housing construction cooperative], servicemen should go through channels to the KEU [billeting directorate] (KEO [billeting department]) of the district, group of forces or fleet MIS [naval engineering service] at their duty station. In this case servicemen who have reached the maximum age for being on military duty and those who have no more than three years remaining until reaching that age have the right to priority acceptance to a ZhSK.

Warrant officers and extended-term servicemen who have lost ties with the Soviet Army and Navy but who live on closed and isolated military posts have the right to enter ZhSK's set up in cities and populated points of those union republics (not having an oblast breakdown), autonomous republics, krays and oblasts on whose territory these persons live.

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ARMED FORCES

CORRECT RADIO SET-UP, FIELD USE DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) pp 22-23

[Article by WO [Praporshchik] V. Ustimchuk, platoon commander, master, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Military Discipline: Equipment Operation: The Instruction is the Law"]

[Text] What causes the malfunctions arising in radio communications equipment in the process of its operation? How can they be eliminated from troop practice? WO V. Ustimchuk, a master of communications, reflects on this.

For several years I performed the duties of chief of an R-140 radio van. I know other equipment and became convinced long ago that our Army's modern communications equipment is simple to operate, reliable and trouble-free.

I often tell subordinates about this. It is true that I add without fail that equipment reliability depends directly on whose hands it is in. If you handle it skillfully it repays you well, but if you are negligent toward it, expect unpleasantness.

I have encountered many examples of this in my career. I recall that on arriving in the designated area in an exercise we immediately began setting up the station. The work was the usual kind and each communicator had a good idea of what he had to do. After awhile the crew began setting up the transmitting antenna. As always, Pvt A. Kudinov secured the telescopic mast, but this time he took longer than usual installing the guys on the first mast section. Fearing that the crew would not keep within the norm, the soldier did not set about fastening the guys of the second and third tiers, deciding to do this after the antenna was raised.

Everything seemingly went normally. They raised the antenna and the soldier unhurriedly began to fasten the remaining guys, but a sudden gust of wind tilted the mast heavily and everything had to be begun again.

I recalled another instance, also involving the setting up of a station. The weather was dank, and driver-electrician Pvt A. Bakulin could in no way start the power generator. Finally the engine started with a snort, but the soldier, still worried, did not leave it.

After waiting for the engine to warm up he supplied voltage and sighed with relief, but immediately recalled that he had forgotten to ground the generator. "Never mind," decided Bakulin, "I'll do it right now without turning off the voltage." Pounding the prescribed peg at the proper distance, he began to connect the ground wire to it when suddenly he received a heavy jolt from the current. The soldier wasn't about to try to finish setting up the ground a second time without removing the voltage.

Reflecting on such incidents, which unfortunately are still encountered in signalmen's combat training, one notes that they usually are caused by not following the sequence of performing operations as prescribed in operating instructions.

Violations of instructions also entail more serious consequences. The useful lives of instruments and sets are shortened, electronic elements malfunction prematurely and the personnel receive injuries.

Most often young signalmen deviate from instructions. The firmness of their knowledge and extent of confidence are still far from that desired and so when the atmosphere of "combat" during exercises demands precision and speed they sometimes become confused and overlook what they have done many times without prompting in a calm atmosphere.

But during exercises equipment malfunctions usually arise through the fault of comparatively experienced signalmen as well, and again because the soldiers violate requirements of the instructions. Although that same Pvt Kudinov planned to secure the antenna mast fully, he still deviated from operating procedures prescribed for this. It is understandable that had it not been for the wind, the misunderstanding which nullified the entire crew's efforts might not have happened. By the way, this is what the soldier was counting on, but that is why the instructions indicate a certain sequence in performing the operations in order to successfully prepare the equipment for work and to operate it under the most unfavorable conditions.

But we will say that one can understand the state of a young specialist who has blundered through ignorance or sudden confusion. One can even excuse in principle a soldier's praiseworthy attempt not to allow a delay in preparing equipment by deviating from what are in his view certain inessential requirements of the instructions. It is much worse when a soldier consciously scorns them out of laziness or unconscientiousness.

An analysis of a breakdown not previously encountered served as an instructive lesson for many of us: the electric motor burned out in the mechanical storage unit of one of the radios. It seemed there were no objective reasons for this; moreover, periodic technical servicing recently had been performed on the set. When an examination was made it was learned that the motor burned out because of increased friction of mechanical connections; in fact, they were lacking lubrication. Sgt G. Onishchenko had been assigned to restore the lubricant regularly, but he had not done this.

Of course Sgt Onishchenko was punished, but that is not the point. Didn't he really know the possible consequences of his unconscientiousness and lack of discipline? He unquestionably did, but still the self-complacency and supreme irresponsibility for his area drove the specialist to the crude violation of the instruction.

Just how can we prevent or at least reduce to a minimum the appearance of malfunctions which arise through the fault of personnel, and primarily due to the specialists' nonobservance of the requirements of appropriate instructions?

In my view, much depends on the commander's high demands placed on subordinates from the first to the last day of their service. For young soldiers, exactingness becomes a unique factor in expanding theoretical knowledge and honing practical skills. The fact is that practice, including the working of norms, above all means training in following the operating procedure prescribed by instructions. And so in mastering the equipment the young specialist learns from the very beginning to perform the necessary operations competently and in a strict sequence. But any kind of indulgences gives a soldier reason to doubt the obligatoriness of particular actions, which means ignoring them on occasion.

A commander's exactingness is necessary to no less an extent for specialists who on the whole have mastered the equipment, and not just for further professional growth. They fully realize that any evasion of their duties, inaccuracies, let alone mistakes in practical work, will always be viewed as an infraction of military discipline, with appropriate conclusions drawn. And no one wishes to hear rebukes, let alone receive punishments.

It is especially useful when the commander skillfully combines exactingness toward subordinates with the development in them of such qualities as professional pride, high awareness and execution and when he sees to it that concern for the equipment becomes a need of human nature, as it were. Then a specialist simply is incapable of intentionally violating the instruction.

There is one more thing simply necessary to mention. It is common knowledge that both the training and indoctrination of personnel depends substantially on the preparedness of junior commanders, whose knowledge and attitude toward their duties are shaped in the training subunit. When NCO's perceive that following instructions is the primary duty of the specialist, they also strive for this in subordinates and consequently there will be fewer equipment malfunctions.

The experience of our leading teams headed by warrant officers V. Kretov, G. Lopayev and others graphically shows that soldiers are capable of operating communications equipment without breakdowns and of keeping it combat ready.

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ARMED FORCES

LACK OF RESPECT FOR VETERANS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) pp 24-25

[Article by ZNAMENOSETS correspondent Capt 1st Rank P. Burikov, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "TDY in Response to a Letter: Belated Apologies"]

[Text] That day differed from others for personnel of the artillery subunit only in the fact that one other activity was included in the routine: the send-off of Officer N. Kotov to a new duty station. It was for this reason that there was a formation, kind words in parting, and a shotgun by which to remember his colleagues. Officer Kotov thanked the soldiers for the warmth and attention, but it was apparent that he was embarrassed by something...

There is nothing unusual in the ceremony of the send-off itself. That is what always is done when a comrade in arms with whom you have covered many difficult roads and many storm-tossed nautical miles departs from the unit or ship for various reasons. Many letters to the editors indicate a sensitive, attentive attitude toward Armed Forces veterans who are departing for a deserved rest. This is the standard of life of Army and Navy collectives.

"We have the tradition that we try to give attention to each person going into the reserve or to another unit," affirmed political worker Ye. Gubin.

We were forced to doubt his optimistic assertion by a letter which came to the editors from this unit. Sr WO [Praporshchik] (Res) T. Panasyuk wrote that a feeling of resentment overwhelmed him in connection with his release from service. It was difficult to part with his own collective and the beloved job to which he had given 25 years of his life, but instead of words of gratitude he heard harsh, insulting words from Officer Kotov...

Isn't that why Comrade Kotov felt embarrassed? Perhaps in that hour he recalled Sr WO T. Panasyuk who had been released to the reserve and his feeling of guilt before Panasyuk: He had been in a muddle and had forgotten to apologize and thank Panasyuk for his duty in front of everyone.

Not many in the subunit know what Comrade Kotov said to Sr WO (Res) Panasyuk "in the heat of the moment," but many saw what effect this produced on the unit veteran. He could not conceal his emotion in retelling what happened

even a few months later. The emotional trauma held him tenaciously in a depressed state.

Why did that happen? Why wasn't there a worthy send-off to the reserve for a unit veteran who had served for many years as subunit first sergeant, who had been a party activist and who was awarded the medal "For Distinction in Military Service" 2d Class? Perhaps this was an unfortunate accident? And perhaps the unit really does have a tradition of surrounding those who have devoted their lives to military service with attention and concern, as political worker Ye. Gubin asserts? But it was one more instance of forgetfulness of the command element that caused resentment in WO I. Sezonyuk, who also was released to the reserve without a send-off.

"I reminded the political worker," says Officer I. Gamburg, "but he responded that it was none of his business."

"I was incorrectly understood," says Comrade Gubin in surprise, "I couldn't have said that. Yes, we blundered. I can't remove my blame. I was away, returned, and learned that there had been no send-off, but we had everything ready and the gift had been purchased."

"There is still no gift, but the money was collected. I have it, but don't know what to do now," explains WO V. Tarasyuk.

And what does staff officer M. Zugravu, who is responsible for working with the personnel, think about what happened? The fact is that the "USSR Armed Forces Veteran" medal and a certificate have been lying in his desk for more than a half-year. Didn't this really remind him that it was high time to correct the mistake?

"But what could I do?" he says, shrugging his shoulders. "I told the commander and the political worker, then I went on leave and assigned WO Denisyuk to do everything."

It is strange that this forgetfulness has lasted since July of last year. It seems that the unit is in no hurry to correct the blunder. The fact is that Comrade Panasyuk remained on this same post. He could have been invited in, given an apology in front of everyone and been given a kind word. It is true that on the day of the correspondent's arrival Comrade Gubin and an officer of the political department visited Panasyuk at home. They apologized and invited him to the unit, but the belated apologies reopened the emotional wound of the veteran, who has the right to think that they would not have remembered him at all had he not written a letter to the journal editors.

"I am ashamed in front of my colleagues. I seem to be begging for this send-off," says Terentiy Nikolayevich Panasyuk, "but the fact is, it's nice to have everything in its place."

Yes, the editorial mailbag sometimes brings reports about instances of indifference to those who conscientiously performed military duty for many years.

Sr WO (Res) B. Orlov writes about his disappointment to ZNAMENOSETS. He has served in the Army more than 24 years, performed exemplary patriotic and international duty as part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and was awarded the "Combat Merit" medal.

"The unit command element arranged a send-off ceremony on departure from the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. Each of us felt the sincere warmth of handshakes of friends in arms. I will remember this day all my life," reports Comrade B. Orlov. "But then we arrived in one of the units of the Baltic Military District, where we were not even introduced to the personnel. I served without criticism, but when it came time to go into the reserve neither the commander nor the political officer said a word in parting. I received some kind of documents, and it was as if I was not even there."

Such an attitude toward a warrant officer with considerable experience of performing military duties under difficult conditions is worthy of regret. He obviously not only should have been given kind words in parting, but also set as an example for others and he should have been given an opportunity to tell his colleagues about the courage and heroism which Soviet soldiers are showing in helping the friendly Afghan people build a new life.

Extended-term MSgt V. Vistyak also is surprised at the cold attitude toward himself. After 29 years in the Army his state of health deteriorated sharply, and once he had to resort to the ambulance. He has been in in-patient care for the last two months. During this time the unit announced to the medical establishment that Comrade Vistyak had been released to the reserve. "Dear editors, I would very much like to have you tell me whether or not they treated me properly by releasing me in such a condition?" asks Vasilii Ivanovich.

We asked this question of the unit command element and the political officer.

WO V. Arapov, a veteran of a Siberian Military District regiment, expresses resentment over the red tape around the release from duty. He was removed from the unit rolls without the appropriate documentation and for several months now has been awaiting both the documents and apologies, albeit late.

A release to the reserve is an inevitable event and an important stage in the life of a military person. It always bears the stamp of sadness connected with parting with the Army or Navy and with a sharp change in life. The commander, political officer, and party and Komsomol activists are called upon to help veterans overcome this difficult psychological barrier. But the attempts of some of them to take shelter in a workload or official affairs cannot serve as justification for indifference.

Attention to a veteran is a special act carrying an enormous indoctrinational charge and moral force. It has a great influence on the collective's microclimate and generates a sense of pride for a comrade who has devoted his life to military service. That is why appropriate documents clearly provide for the actions of appointed persons which are mandatory in such instances. The

slightest deviation from these rules generates bewilderment and even a bitter resentment in those who should be given a kind word and in those beginning military service. The Motherland has given the commander great rights, including the trust of thanking the veteran for his service in her name and hearing from him for the last time: "I serve the Soviet Union!" But one must take into account that the veteran is going into the reserve, which means that he will rejoin us in formation tomorrow should it be necessary.

Personnel workers also must not remain aloof from this matter. Unfortunately, some of them limit themselves to making out documents. This is of course very important, but it would not be superfluous to have them remind the commander or political officer about timely send-offs for those who gave many years to the job of defending the Motherland and performed their constitutional duty in an exemplary manner.

We often say that service in the Army is a good school of indoctrination. Those are true words, but it is important for this school to function to the last day of a veteran's duty and that his send-off to the reserve be a good moral example for those who are now in combat formation.

USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov emphasized at a meeting with Armed Forces veterans that the work of veterans--those who continue to serve in the Army or Navy, those who are working in various sectors in the building of communism, and those who are enjoying a deserved rest--requires constant attention and support. An attentive attitude toward them, respectfulness, sympathy and assistance represent one of the manifestations of a fulfillment of Lenin's behests. We are obligated to remember always that veterans are our most valuable possession. These are people of whom the entire country and all the Soviet people are proud.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Editors' May Mailbag

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mail"]

[Text] The editors received 10,842 letters from readers in May 1984, 410 of which were published in the newspaper. There were 1,119 responses to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's coverage.

The All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries was held in Moscow during 28-30 May. A vivid, meaningful speech was given there by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade K. U. Chernenko, who presented the Army and Navy Komsomol with the Order of Red Banner.

This event evoked a large flow of letters to the editors, the authors of which announced that the party's concern for the younger generation of the Motherland's defenders is inspiring soldiers to new achievements in military labor. Gds Maj K. Yuroyt' of the Belorussian Military District writes that Komsomol members of the subunits commanded by officers L. Yerygin, V. Shchepetil'nikov and V. Tomashevich took a significant step forward in perfecting combat proficiency.

And there were these lines from Lt V. Luchko's letter: "The crew of the patrol ship 'Arkhangel'skiy Komsomolets' is renowned in the Northern Fleet for its high degree of naval schooling and firm discipline. It has many long cruises and service firing exercises performed for a grade of outstanding to its credit. The crew again took first place in socialist competition and was recognized as one of the best in the Fleet.

"During these days the navymen are studying with great interest the vivid and meaningful speech at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Comrade K. U. Chernenko. A meeting was held in the unit, where participants unanimously declared that award of the Order of Red Banner to the Army and Navy Komsomol inspires the personnel to perform new achievements in military labor."

The editors received letters from the troops. Responding to the party's new concern for the younger generation of the Motherland's defenders, Army and Navy personnel are improving their combat schooling with even greater vigor and creative enthusiasm and they are safeguarding socialism's great achievements vigilantly and reliably.

The editors' mail in May contained many letters from frontlinesmen about the war which cannot be read without quivering emotion and a feeling of pride for heroes living and dead. People arise from the pages of these letters who have performed immortal exploits and shielded the homeland staunchly in a menacing hour of stern ordeals. "The race of time is inexorable," writes Kiev resident P. Golenach. "The years of war turmoil move further and further from us, but even now, as soon as wounds received at the front make their presence known, I recall a trench on a small piece of ground on the Neva, how we rose up for bayonet attacks and how my countrymen in arms would dream of living to see the victory in the minutes of lull before battle. Peace was won at a high price in the mortal clash against fascism. Remember this, people! Don't forget it for a minute!"

Our fervent gratitude to participants of the war never will fade, and we will celebrate the 40th anniversary of their immortal exploit next year. Nor will the gratitude fade for the fact that even today veterans remain in formation on the forward lines.

The Communist Party, Soviet government and all the people have surrounded veterans with concern, respect and honor. They write to the editors about this with emotion and with deep gratitude. Among the stream of such letters, however, now and then one will encounter an alarm signal about indifference and insensitivity of some officials toward war participants. Here are the lines from a letter by Patriotic War invalid A. Sidorenko: "I live in Sumy Oblast in the city of Akhtyrka. I have been trying to improve my living conditions for a long while. Finally came the joyous day when I was assigned an apartment in a new house, but I only had to cross the threshold and my joy was replaced by pain and resentment. The bungling builders had left so much unfinished work and defects in the habitable rooms that there could be no question of moving in. My ordeals of going to various establishments began from that hour. Nowhere can I find justice because of the bad workmen."

After the editors intervened steps were taken and Sidorenko's apartment was repaired. The buro of the Akhtyrka gorkom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine gave a strict reprimand to A. Martychenko and A. Batrak, the heads of construction work, with an entry in their record, for the inattentive and indifferent attitude toward the frontlinesman's requests and petitions.

This story of red tape reminds us once again how inadmissible are instances of emotional callousness, deafness and indifference toward people who have earned the love and recognition of all the people.

Specialization in Military Explained

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 June 84 p 2

[Letter to editors by V. Kukhar' and response by Maj Gen F. Illarionov, Moscow city military commissar: "For Those Preparing to Join Formation"]

[Text] Dear editors!

This year I am finishing the PTU [vocational-technical school] and the day is not far off when I will be called to serve in the Army. My contemporaries dream of becoming tankmen, signalmen, and drivers of armored personnel carriers and artillery prime movers. Please tell me about the procedure for selection of draftees for these and other specialties and about what is taken into account.

At school I am mastering the specialty of fitter of monitoring and testing instruments and automatic equipment. I recently heard that there is such a military specialty as metrologist. I would like to find out what troops have the greater need for such specialists and is there an opportunity to acquire this specialty during first-term service in the Army?

V. Kukhar'

The editors asked Maj Gen F. Illarionov, Moscow city military commissar, to answer these questions from our reader.

In deciding the question of registering a young person with a particular combat arm or a particular specialty, military commissariat workers consider the personal qualities of predraft-age youths: the level of their physical training and the knowledge and skills gained at school, in the vocational-technical school or in the tekhnikum. Work experience the young men have gained at machinebuilding plants, at civil aviation enterprises, aboard maritime and river fleet vessels or on rail transportation also is considered. For example, the ability to handle construction equipment also is taken into account.

The nature of military labor may vary, but such qualities as endurance, tempering of will, composure, attentiveness, punctuality and so on are determining for future soldiers of all specialties. There also are those specialties which require instantaneous reaction, precision in movements and an ability to receive a multitude of signals simultaneously.

The local DOSAAF organizations--naval, motor vehicle and radiotechnical schools, various circles and courses, and technical sports clubs--help the young people gain the necessary military-technical knowledge and skills and ready themselves for mastering a chosen military specialty. Graduates of such educational institutions usually are sent to the troops according to those military specialties which they acquired before service in the Army.

We also try to take account of the draftees' personal requests if they are sufficiently grounded and coincide with the missions facing a given military commissariat, but a military commissariat naturally is incapable of satisfying all requests of draftees. Young people must be ready for the fact that during Army duty they will have to acquire new military specialties since not all civilian trades can be applied under conditions of Army duty.

Believe me, there is no need to become overly distraught here. There are many interesting specialties in the Army. The person who approaches the need for preparing himself in advance for service in the Army with deep understanding, who wants to work and who is able to work, quickly finds himself and becomes outstanding in combat and political training. Moreover, the specialty acquired by a young person in the Armed Forces remains with him for life.

With respect to metrology, the role of various kinds of measurements in troop operational training activities has grown sharply over the last decades. The pool of military measurement equipment now includes measurement equipment varying in complexity, beginning with the simplest instruments and ending with automated sets and systems. Military metrologists have been assigned the task of keeping all this equipment and all these tools in a technically serviceable condition and performing a systematic inspection, servicing and repair of them. Such specialists are serving in aviation, in missile and radiotechnical troops, aboard ships, in the artillery and so on.

Of course, the specialty of military metrologist is not as widespread in the Army as, let's say, that of driver-mechanic, a gunner of artillery systems or a radar operator. But if we take a broader look and discuss those specialties which are directly connected with the operation, servicing and repair of measurement equipment, then it simply will be difficult to enumerate them all. In this regard the letter's author can be boldly confident that during service in the Army his knowledge and skills gained at the PTU definitely will find application.

Interpretation of Regulations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 84 p 2

[Letter to editors by Capt B. Laponogov, Red Banner Carpathian Military District, and commentary by Col Yu. Kudinov, chief of troop service department of Ground Forces Main Staff: "Letter with Commentary: Not in Step with the Regulation"; passages printed in all capital letters rendered in boldface in source]

[Text] Not long ago, while serving as unit duty officer, I received instructions from higher headquarters. The document enumerated typical omissions in the organization of guard duty and prescribed an improvement in the quality of the briefing for guard personnel. In particular, we were to give the reminder that weapons are to be used "only when a sentry is sure that an enemy has penetrated to the post" (I am quoting word for word).

The desire of the comrades who prepared this document is understandable: to improve order among the guards even more. But can this be achieved by interpreting the precise and clear provisions of the USSR Armed Forces Garrison and Guard Duty Regulation in one's own way? The fact is that even a slight deviation from regulation requirements or a shift in emphasis in explaining their essence to members of the guard can hinder performance of the combat mission of guarding military facilities.

Capt B. Laponogov,
Red Banner Carpathian Military District

At the editors' request, a commentary on the letter from our reader is provided by Col Yu. Kudinov, chief of the troop service department of the Ground Forces Main Staff:

Capt B. Laponogov is correct: any imprecision or approximation in interpreting demands of the regulations can do harm to service. At first glance the wording from the staff instruction which he quoted in the letter is inoffensive, but it no longer has that clarity and unambiguousness which is inherent to Article 175 of the USSR Armed Forces Garrison and Guard Duty Regulation.

I encountered approximately the very same situation in one of the units while attending a briefing for guard personnel. The company commander who was giving the briefing asked one of the members of the guard: "In what instances does a sentry have the right to use a weapon without a warning?" Outwardly this is a question like any other, but essentially it distorts the meaning of the regulation's demands. There it is not a question of the RIGHT, but of the DUTY to use a weapon without a warning in case there is a clear attack on the sentry or the facility he is guarding. A right may or may not be used. A duty is another matter. If a sentry does not completely fulfill his duty at a post and does not provide for its reliable security and defense, he will bear responsibility under all the severity of Soviet law.

I once also had occasion to hear a statement that when necessary the regulations allegedly "are changed and supplemented" by commanders. Such statements merely indicate juridical illiteracy. Only the one who approved the regulations and gave them the force of law--the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium--can change and supplement them.

It is impossible to provide for precise organization of troop duty in the unit, correct relationships among servicemen, and firm discipline without the precise, strict observance of all provisions of combined-arms regulations. In concluding my comments on Capt Laponogov's letter, I will stress that directions and instructions which do not coincide or, moreover, which contradict the demands of regulations are inadmissible. They merely undermine the authority of the superior from whom they emanate.

Weapons Training Deficiencies Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Is It a Matter of Electronics?'"]

[Text] That was the title of an article by Maj N. Khaust published on 24 April. It discussed deficiencies in the weapons training of personnel in a battalion where Maj A. Gedz' is the chief of staff. As the editors were informed by Maj Gen A. Chumakov, the newspaper's article was discussed at a service conference and steps were taken to remedy the deficiencies. Particular attention was given to officer training. Demonstration classes were held with company and platoon commanders and with NCO's where lessons were worked involving the organization of competition in weapons training tasks and norms as well as fulfillment of exercises in firing from infantry fighting vehicles and with small arms day and night. The requirements of guidance documents in weapons training and other kinds of combat training were studied in greater detail. Supervision over ammunition issue during firing has been reinforced. Subunits have selected and briefed servicemen to be the chiefs of ammunition supply points.

The unit party organization discussed the question of increasing the personal responsibility of officer-party members for the quality of weapons training classes, and accounts were heard from party members who received unsatisfactory grades in an inspection. Battalion chief of staff Maj A. Gedz' and company commander Capt V. Kudryavtsev, who committed an infraction of the gunnery course in performing a control exercise, were given disciplinary punishment.

Canteen's Alcoholic Sales Prohibited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Under the Same Roof'"]

[Text] The article by Col A. Drovosekov published under that title on 12 May told about a snack-bar which had become a hang-out for drunkards and which was located in the same building as the Tyumen Oblast military commissariat and a garrison officers' club.

Maj Gen A. Ponomarenko, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Trade Directorate, informed the editors that the newspaper's article had been discussed with the workers of the directorate, military exchanges and public dining enterprises of the Siberian Military District.

The sale of alcoholic beverages in the snack-bar was prohibited by decision of the garrison commander and chief of the district trade directorate.

Personnel Placement Deficiencies Punished

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'The Person at Fault was Given a Higher Position'"]

[Text] That was the title of the critical article by Col A. Zakharenko which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 27 March. It revealed shortcomings in the work of personnel selection and placement in Unit "X." As the editors were informed by Lt Gen N. Kizyun, member of military council and chief of political directorate of the Far East Military District, the newspaper article was discussed with command-political leaders of the district air defense troops. The facts presented in the article were checked out on the spot and were confirmed fully. The guilty parties were given strict punishment. Lt Col S. Yevtushik, who displayed a lack of principle in assessing the job and moral qualities of Maj A. Zhigunov and who remained aloof from supervising the status of combat equipment and weaponry, was demoted in position. As a party member, Yevtushik was held accountable by the party and he was given a reprimand with an entry in his record.

Maj A. Zhigunov, who did not draw the necessary conclusions from a criticism of deficiencies in his official activities and who displayed no persistence in imposing regulation order in the battalion, was relieved of his position and assigned to a lower position. Party Member A. Zhigunov was reprimanded through party channels with an entry in his record.

Officers V. Levitskiy, M. Shinkarev, A. Tvoronovich and P. Gavriilyuk were given disciplinary punishment for serious deficiencies in studying, selecting and placing cadres.

The district military council pointed out mistakes made in the selection and placement of officer cadres to Lt Gen V. Zudin, chief of the district personnel directorate, as well as to the unit commander.

School Museum's Absence Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Maj (Ret) P. Stakozov: "Letter to the Editors: But Still No Museum"]

[Text] It was several years ago that Secondary School No 25 imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, one of the oldest schools in Alma-Ata where military subunits were activated during the Great Patriotic War, had a good combat glory museum. Before my eyes Young Pioneers would collect for the museum photographs, letters and personal articles of former pupils who fought courageously at the front. The small room was lovingly arranged which told how the school's pupils cared for the wounded during the war and how they helped their elders gather warm articles of clothing for fighting men. Theme nights and meetings

with frontlinesmen often would be held here and Young Pioneers and Komsomol members would come here to remember the heroic past and to be alone with their thoughts and dreams.

But on coming to the school I learned bitterly that the museum no longer existed. New training rooms were needed at one time and the heads of the school found nothing better than to allocate the room accommodating the museum for this purpose. The exhibits carefully assembled by the children's hands were, simply speaking, discarded.

At that time I tried a long while to persuade school director G. Izotova and the teachers of the need to re-establish the museum, but the discussion led nowhere. Various reasons were found which hindered the museum's re-establishment.

Some ten years have gone by since then, and still there is no museum in the school. The very same situation also exists in some other educational institutions of the city. For example, there is neither a combat glory room or museum at schools No 33, 39 and 56, which have been in existence for more than a single decade.

Such a situation cannot be deemed normal. Military-patriotic indoctrination is one of the important directions in the system of ideological-political indoctrination of the growing generation. As many years of experience have shown, school museums and the vigorous, purposeful work of their councils also play a large part in this.

Schoolchildren wish to take part in locating little-known heroes and opening up new pages of their area's history. I have had repeated occasion to hear this at meetings with schoolchildren. Who will help them achieve this noble goal? There are only discussions about setting up museums in the best instance, but nothing is being done.

It is strange, but this appears not even to cause special concern for workers of public education entities who have authority over the schools. The fact is that the need for stepping up the work of such museums is mentioned in the "Basic Directions of Reform of the School of General Education and Vocational School."

And I would like to mention one thing more. I often have occasion to visit school museums and often encounter instances of careless treatment of the exhibits. Photographs, letters and documents often are kept in any old way. But the fact is that some of them are unique and are of great historic value. It happens where they disappear forever, and all because no one bears personal responsibility for the safekeeping of exhibits. It would appear that the need has arisen to bring order to this matter.

Frontline relics of war veterans are bits of our history and we must treat them solicitously and with all responsibility.

Absence of Release Ceremony

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 84 p 2

[Letter to editors by Col (Ret) B. Chauzov and Lt Col (Ret) V. Solbiyev and commentary by permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Transcaucasus Military District Lt Col A. Yurkin: "Letter with Commentary: They Saw Off the Veteran"]

[Text] Gds Sr WO [Praporshchik] Ivan Matveyevich Myakotin served for over 40 years in one unit [soyedineniye]. He fought the enemy under its guards colors and was decorated with two orders of Red Star, three "Valor" medals and two "Combat Merit" medals. He became a party member in 1944. After the war Ivan Matveyevich did not forget about the duty of a frontlinesman as he set an example of zealous attitude toward service, took an active part in the heroic-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and shared combat experience with the personnel. Our countryman recently completed active military duty. How disappointing it was for us to learn that his departure from military formation went by unnoticed by subunit personnel. There was essentially no send-off.

Col (Ret) B. Chauzov
Lt Col (Ret) V. Solbiyev

Lt Col A. Yurkin, permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Transcaucasus Military District, went with this letter to the battalion where Gds Sr WO I. Myakotin had served for a long while. Here are his comments:

There is a new commander in the battalion--military academy graduate Gds Maj V. Olariu. He didn't have occasion to serve together with Gds Sr WO Myakotin, but he knows the veteran well. He shows photos made quite recently in which Ivan Matveyevich Myakotin is among soldiers of his own battalion.

"We held a traditional NCO day," explains the battalion commander. "We decided not to restrict ourselves to briefings and demonstration classes, but organized a meeting with an NCO of frontline times. Myakotin was the most suitable candidate and his story was interesting."

It turns out that Ivan Matveyevich hadn't taken offense at his countrymen for the fact that he hadn't heard kind words from them or an expression of gratitude for many years of faultless service on the day of his send-off.

"But the reproach expressed to us in the letter to the editors is correct," says political worker Gds Maj A. Mikhalev. "For many long years Myakotin was the only representative of the frontline generation in the battalion as well as in the unit, and he represented it worthily. With regard to the send-off, the subjectivism of former battalion commander Maj Nikol'skiy showed up here. He had a dislike for Ivan Matveyevich because of critical speeches at party meetings..."

We will note that the senior chiefs should have corrected Maj V. Nikol'skiy but, judging from everything, they didn't understand or value the indoctrinational significance of a send-off. Arranging a send-off for a veteran in the spirit of grand traditions of the Armed Forces also means showing concern for indoctrinating the young generation.

Improvement in Mass Sports

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Why Are the Fanfares Silent'?"]

[Text] That was the title of a letter to the editors from Maj A. Chumachenko published on 1 February, which related that insufficient attention was being given to the organization of mass sports competitions in Unit "X" of the Far East Military District.

As the editors were informed by the chairman of the unit sports committee, the article found a proper response among the command element, political department and sports committee. The criticism was deemed proper.

It was recommended to improve the quality of the athletes' training in the subunits and to hold competitions with observance of all necessary rituals. The organizers of physical training and sports were given specific directions for this purpose.

Maj S. Zavalko was reprimanded for poor quality in organizing and conducting contests.

Apartment Exchanges Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jun 84 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich: "In the Wake of a Letter: Triple Exchange"]

[Text] An officer's wife, Lyubov' Mikhaylovna Biryukova, turned to the editors. She lives with her husband and three sons in a small two-room apartment and they aren't even being placed on a waiting list for improving housing conditions. At the same time, many on post have improved their conditions. Is this really just, asks Lyubov' Mikhaylovna.

I visited the Biryukov family. There is no question that it is really cramped for five persons in the apartment with adjoining rooms, a small kitchen and anteroom. But it is also impossible to rebuke, for example, the unit housing commission for an unjust attitude toward this family. The unit has many officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki] who do not yet have their own apartments at all, so that the commission's attempt to provide them above all with housing is unquestionably correct.

The justness of those commission decisions where in a number of cases it nevertheless improved housing conditions for some also gives no cause for doubt. For example, an officer who was to be released to the reserve lived in just as cramped conditions as the Biryukovs. That means in the future the unit would no longer be able to give him a more comfortable apartment. And an accident occurred in another family: an officer's son received a serious injury and was bedridden... Yes, in those exceptional instances (and as a special inspection in the unit established, only in those cases) the housing commission did accommodate someone by postponing the housewarming date for others. But can it be rebuked for this? Of course not.

The fact is that the Biryukovs also were given new housing as an exception by decision of the senior chief. Initially it was a four-room apartment and later a three-room apartment, but they rejected them. You see, one apartment was not spacious enough and the other was located in a remote area...

And so is it at all conceivable, under those circumstances, to doubt the kindly attitude of appointed persons and the housing commission toward the family? Or is it all a matter only of Lyubov' Mikhaylovna's inability to fathom someone else's concerns?

The feeling that we have been treated unjustly grows out of many conditions. For example, it is important for us that everything be done as prescribed by law. And it is very good that the very demanding inspectors did not find any kind of infractions in the unit housing commission's work, but there is a question of how the commission's decisions are made known to the people. Commission members will make brief announcements at meetings, and that's it. But when someone has not been at the meeting or someone understood incorrectly, this produces grounds for the most varied rumors. For example, it was only from the correspondent that this same Lyubov' Mikhaylovna learned that today there are two officers among those without apartments in the unit who, like her, have three children. But the fact is that her resentment was dictated to no small extent by what seemed to her to be a lack of special attention to her family with many children.

The fact of who it is that makes the decision--people with a faultless reputation or those who are capable of compromise and of humoring someone out of personal sympathies--also is very essential for our appraisals of what is occurring.

The idea itself of a biased attitude by housing commission members to the Biryukovs seems to me to be groundless. Commission members did not object when the family was granted apartments by the senior chief's decision. The members also believe that conditions under which the family is living are far from ideal; it is only that the commission doesn't have the capability to immediately improve housing conditions for everyone who needs it. But it is about the commission's capabilities that Lyubov' Mikhaylovna talks with me:

"They find those capabilities when it is for themselves!"

And I understand what she has in mind: the so-called triple exchange housing commission chairman Col P. Kharchenko made which resulted in his family expanding what was already spacious housing even by a little over 20 more square meters.

I will say right off that the housing commission itself has nothing to do with it. A housing exchange is a voluntary matter and it is important only that outsiders not end up in departmental living space and that there are no other infractions. This is monitored by the post commander, the KECh [billeting unit] and the ispolkom.

In this instance the exchange rules were not violated. Two elderly people felt uncomfortable in a spacious four-room apartment and decided to exchange it for a good two-room apartment. The latter was found, but even for the people living in it the apartments offered turned out to be much too spacious. And so the people turned to the housing commission chairman for assistance. Of course it was no difficulty for that person to find a version satisfying everyone. He only had to open the register of those needing an improvement in housing conditions and choose those for whom the mansion being vacated would be just right. But... The apartment was such an extremely good one and Pavel Yegorovich suggested that the proprietor of the two-room apartment take over Kharchenko's own housing so that he himself could move into the more spacious one. And so three families changed addresses in a roundabout way to their own general satisfaction. Everyone was helped by the occasion, as the saying goes.

An occasion is an occasion. There are many such occasions in large cities and no one pays particular attention to them, but in the small confines of a military post it is simply impossible not to notice this. This is especially true when the question of housing is a sore spot for many; when it is one of the leaders, the housing commission chairman, who improves his conditions; when he moves from one four-room apartment into another four-room apartment, into the maximum permissible space under the law; and additionally, when one of the members of his family for whom maximum metric area also has been allocated is on a lengthy absence.

"They had nine square meters each, and then 13½ square meters," clarified Lyubov' Mikhaylovna. "But as you see, we have five square meters each, and nothing is authorized for us. There's your justice."

And it is difficult to object to her because she has no faith in the housing commission chairman's very ability to defend her interests and the interests of her family with the very same persistence and even inventiveness which he displayed in resolving his own problem.

I will say more: under such circumstances it is also more understandable why the Biryukovs do not consider their refusal of the apartments offered them to be a mistake. If a multiple-move exchange is possible in the housing commission chairman's interests, then what hinders finding not simply a more spacious dwelling, but also one located where they would like it to be for them as well?

In short, by a single rash act Officer Kharchenko not only sowed doubts in people as to the correctness of many housing commission decisions, but also prompted them to make clearly unrealistic claims. Yes, only Lyubov' Mikhaylovna speaks openly about the unjust allocation of housing on post and the administrator's use of his own position for personal purposes, but many know about what happened and evaluate it in their own way. It stands to reason that this doesn't contribute to an improvement in the moral climate on post.

Alas, Pavel Yegorovich himself does not at all believe that he acted rashly or, moreover, reprehensively.

"The apartment exchange is a strictly personal matter," he repeats.

But is it possible to regard in this manner the act of an administrator who provides a reason for gossip? It is generally known that it is not enough for the administrator to follow the letter of the law. His conduct must be free of everything which offends a person's moral feelings. It is a pity that the party member doesn't understand this. It is a pity that neither those in the unit nor those who came here on an inspection reminded him about this.

"Unfortunately we learned about the exchange too late to prevent it," says the unit's senior political officer and because of this he apparently believes it to be justified that Kharchenko's act was not properly evaluated.

"Of course, in that situation which existed with housing on the post Kharchenko should not have undertaken such a provocative exchange," says Col A. Aldoshin, agreeing with me. He is one of those who inspected the work of the unit housing commission. "There were really bad repercussions."

Yes, bad ones. This makes it even more necessary to preclude such a thing from happening in the future. There must be broad publicity in allocating housing and indoctrinational work with people must be improved so that no one can have doubt that the burning issues are being decided correctly and justly.

Punished for Deficiencies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'How Deficiencies Were Divided'"]

[Text] That was the title of an article published on 5 April. As the editors were informed by Capt 2d Rank L. Gritsenko, chief of political department of Unit "X," the facts cited in it were confirmed. Division commander and party member Capt 3d Rank V. Tsaplin was reprimanded for taking belated steps in response to the deficiencies which had been identified. He also had a hearing at a session of the party commission of the unit political department, where he was given strict instructions about deficiencies in the work of assuring the safekeeping of equipment and of military and state property.

By order of the Fleet commander, Officer Yu. Kalmykov, commander of a coastal minesweeper, was relieved of his position and given a lower assignment for personal lack of discipline and poor political indoctrination work. Sr Lt S. Rodin was given a severe reprimand and Kalmykov and Rodin were held materially liable.

Sr Lt S. Melikyan passed the prescribed tests for authorization for independent management of a department.

Socialist Competition Deficiencies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Pledges and Circumstances'"]

[Text] That was the title of an article published on 3 April which told of deficiencies in the organization of socialist competition in Motorized Rifle Regiment "X."

Maj Gen Ye. Makhov, first deputy chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Political Directorate, informed the editors that the newspaper article had been discussed in the political department of the large unit [soyedineniye] as well as at a division officers' conference. Specific steps were taken aimed at improving the role of competition in bettering the personnel's combat proficiency. Because of this, changes for the better have been seen in the regiment mentioned in the article during the time which has elapsed since the article's publication. Demonstration classes were held in which lessons on organizing competition by tasks and norms were practiced. The party committee generalized the commanders' work experience on these matters.

A session of the Group of Forces military council decided on steps to improve the effectiveness of competition.

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ARMED FORCES

COL GENERAL DEBALYUK DISCUSSES DOCTRINE, MORALE, AFGHANISTAN

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 84 p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Debalyuk, member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District, conducted by M. Shimanskiy, special correspondent for IZVESTIYA, Minsk: "Soldiers of the 80's"]

[Text] V.A. Debalyuk has served in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces for 45 years. In 1939, while a student at Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman, he was drafted into the army. In the Great Patriotic War as an officer and political worker he took the front line route from Stalingrad to Berlin and after the war he completed the Military-Political Academy imeni Lenin and the General Staff Military Academy imeni K.E. Voroshilov. Colonel General Debalyuk has recently been assigned to the Belorussian Military District. He is a member of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee and the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Question] Aleksandr Vasil'yevich, you are an eye-witness to the technical revolution which has taken place in military affairs. What is the essence of the changes that it entailed?

[Answer] The army at the beginning of my military service and today's army are, as they say, very far apart. Many types of technology and weapons which then, in '39, we could not even have dreamed about have appeared. Nuclear missiles, automated complexes, various radio-electronic machinery, lasers and infra-red instruments are only a part of the things in the inventory now. Here is a characteristic example. The number of military specialties in that period has grown from 160 to more than 2000. Essential changes have taken place also in military art and tactics and the significance of the time factor comes up repeatedly. Whereas earlier the level of weapons development allowed one to take several shots at a target, now even a second shot or launch might be simply impossible.

The might of our Armed Forces had grown immeasurably, but the character of our army remains unchanged. It was, is and will remain an army of the people. It was created to defend socialist achievements and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

[Question] The Army is a military organization where two main components, people and technology, interact. What are the peculiarities and complications of such interaction today?

[Answer] Many Western military theoreticians think that with the current level of technological development man has become simply its appendage. Putting information into a computer and pushing buttons are all that is required from a soldier as, they say, the machinery will do the rest. A soldier doesn't have to think. He becomes a somewhat blind executor of someone else's will.

We have different views on these problems. We think that a man's role is growing even greater. At the 26th Party Congress they named military skill and an indestructible moral spirit along with the high technical equipping of the Army and Navy as components of the Soviet Armed Forces' military potential. Pay attention, for two of the three components are associated with man.

People have and will continue to win victory in war. And not simply people, but conscientious warriors with strong spirits. They are a hundredfold stronger than the drilled robot soldiers about whom Western military specialists argue or, if you will, dream.

High moral spirit has always been a distinctive feature of Soviet peoples. As far back as 1919 V.I. Lenin said, "Morally... we are stronger than everyone". The correctness of these words was also clearly shown during the Great Patriotic War. I remember the Stalingrad battles in which I had occasion to participate from beginning to end. Soviet soldiers held out in the Stalingrad shelling because the steel of their character was stronger than Krupp steel.

Today high moral spirit is still our strongest weapon. However, this in no way signifies that we are reducing or under-estimating the role of equipment. We hold this point of view. The power of modern military equipment becomes many times stronger if highly principled, hardened soldiers devoted to their Motherland direct it. Our commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations are trying to indoctrinate such soldiers and all auxiliary work in the forces is directed toward this.

A young soldier conscripted into the army is still not a soldier, although he is morally ready to fulfill his military and civil duty. So that the complicated military equipment, saturated with delicate electronics and smart automated mechanisms, is a threat to the enemy, he must possess firm knowledge and skills, ability and knack and authentically jewelers skills. Here only the desire, enthusiasm and even a heroic burst of passion aren't enough. Only work, persistent and stubborn work can bring success.

How do the district's personnel cope with this? We have units and subunits where up to 70 percent of the personnel are specialists with high qualifications. This is a very high index. After mastering their own specialties many soldiers acquire complimentary ones and if necessary they can confidently replace a comrade who has left the ranks. Groups and units

successfully completed the last training year and the number of high rated specialists rose. A significant number of military collectives attained the rank of "outstanding". This training year, considering the sharp complexion of the world situation, district personnel have taken yet more strenuous socialist obligations and are persistently struggling to fulfill them.

[Question] In the Army indoctrination work has its own distinctive traits. What do these entail?

[Answer] One can state with conviction that the Army gives people a start in life. Their civil upbringing takes place more quickly here than under normal circumstances. This is promoted by the tense rhythm of army life, the severity of orders and the weapon which is given to the soldier, along with the right to use it in resolving the assigned mission. But the main educator all the same is military work. Strenuous, heavy work to the last drop of sweat, at times risky, and often not limited to daylight hours, at times as soon as necessary, without rest. Firm human character is fashioned primarily by such work and is well tempered. And this tempering lasts for a lifetime.

It goes without saying that at times we run into major problems. I would like to give just such an example. According to the 1970 census half of the families in the USSR are single-child families. In such families children often get a so-called hothouse upbringing. In the army they have it more difficult than their contemporaries from families where two, three or more children grew up. They are unable to do many things and their collectivist beginning is weakly developed. And it is not easy to indoctrinate such soldiers.

Modern youth are in many ways different from the older generation, but this is only an external difference. Today's lads' blood spiritual relationship with their fathers and uncles clearly shows through. This is especially noticeable in the army where increased demands are made on a man. Today's soldiers in the district are politically mature defenders of the Fatherland, wholeheartedly devoted to the party and the people. And when circumstances demand, they display examples of selflessness, determination, self-control and often real courage. During training for "Zapad 81" Sergeant Mikhail Shevtsov's tank caught fire and crew members who found themselves in a critical situation did not abandon the burning vehicle. Risking their lives, they were able to put out the flames.

Fulfilling their international duty in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was a serious test of character for a number of the district's servicemen and they passed the difficult test with honor. With special pride I want to introduce readers to Major Fedor Ivanovich Pugachev. This young officer was awarded the rank Hero of the Soviet Union for bravery and heroism displayed while fulfilling his international duty. He is now again serving in one of the district's units. Many other officers and soldiers who served in the district are annually honored with high state awards.

In one of his books my military colleague in the past and now a famous author, Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Karpov, called the indoctrination of people

an eternal battle for the minds and hearts of soldiers. This does not stop for a minute and there are no imitations and conditions in it. It is always real. And the peculiarity of this battle is that people do not die, but are born in it. But this makes it no easier. As in every battle, victories in this one are difficult to achieve and these are very just, exact words.

It is still extremely difficult to indoctrinate soldiers and inculcate real soldierly qualities in them. Moreover, the increased cultural and general educational level of modern youth produces an increased demand on the army school teachers, the officers. To be equal to these demands, to use authority with subordinates, to stay, as they say, several steps ahead of them an officer must have not only high military training, but also competence, erudition, remarkable pedagogical skills and a thorough knowledge of psychology. In short, he must be a creative person, developed in all aspects and able to resolve the most complicated pedagogical and methodological tasks.

Do we have such cadre? Yes. The overwhelming majority of our commanders and political workers are people who by vocation and calling of the heart have selected the difficult profession of an officer, teaching and indoctrinating subordinates, continually learning themselves and keeping pace with the demands of time. More than 80 percent of our officers are communists and more than 75 percent have higher military and military specialist educations. It is significant that junior officers, the direct supervisors of soldiers, practically all have a higher education.

[Question] Where is the emphasis today in indoctrinating soldiers?

[Answer] Primarily on formulating high political, moral-fighting and psychological qualities in the personnel.

In general, the character of a brave and daring soldier must not be shaped, but forged. Therefore we try to bring the training and indoctrination process in district units and subunits as close as possible to real battle conditions. The principle, "teach the soldier what he needs in war," has become an irrefutable law tested by life. In particular, during field exercises soldiers experience "rolling" tanks, go through fire lanes, throw combat grenades, drive tanks underwater and complete many-kilometer march assaults in heat and cold with full packs. In short, we create a chain of difficulties and dangers which he must be able to overcome. A courageous, decisive man with strong will is born in the constant contact with these challenges.

District forces keep up active work in the ideological tempering of personnel. The Leninist ideological-theoretical heritage, decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the latest CPSU Central Committee Plenums, the successes of the Soviet people in constructing communism and the military traditions of the Armed Forces are propagandized and the complexity and explosive danger of contemporary international relations and the necessity for high political vigilance are explained and bourgeois ideology unmasked. There are rich possibilities for doing this work in units and subunits. For example the number of hours set aside for political activities with soldiers and sergeants

in two years of service is almost the same as a VUZ course in a Marxist-Leninist department.

In the district we put a lot of attention on indoctrinating young soldiers in battle traditions. Our veterans help us to accustom the young army generation to the glory and valor of the Soviet Armed Forces, to indoctrinate in them the demand to keep abreast of the eternal heroes and to multiply their front line exploits in outstanding military training and service. Now, on the threshold of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Belorussia and of our Great Victory over the Fascists, veterans are especially frequent guests of soldiers.

We have the total right to call our Army a school of internationalism. Soldiers come to us literally from all corners of the country and there are units in which representatives of 15-20 and more nationalities serve. In the army collective they become a single military family where everything is shared equally in happiness and in the bitterness of failure. Certainly, all of this does not come by itself. It is the fruit of the purposeful daily work done in the forces.

I had occasion to participate in the 5th All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries. A collective image of the soldier of the 80's was somehow given in the reports and speeches resounding from the rostrum in the Kremlin. This soldier is a spiritually and physically hardened soldier-patriot, totally equipped with the most complex military equipment, carefully and reliably protecting the peaceful labors of the Soviet people and the peoples of fraternal countries. Soviet fighting men are the soldiers of the 80's, ready at any moment and I stress at any moment, to fulfill the order of the Motherland. The main trait of their character consists primarily of this.

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ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA IDENTIFIES OFFICERS

PM141427 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 1984 second edition front-pages a report on the opening of the museum of the history of the Red Banner Far East Military District which identifies Lieutenant General N. Kizyun as district military council member and political directorate chief.

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 June 1984 second edition carries on page 2 an 1,800-word article under the rubric "My Years as a Lieutenant" and titled "Heritage of Bravery," containing World War II memoirs by Colonel General of Aviation and honored USSR Air Force pilot Vladimir Ivanovich Voronov, who is identified as deputy commander of naval aviation.

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 June 1984 second edition publishes an article on page 2 under the headline "Effect of Updating; Building Rapidly, Economically, Soundly." The author of the article is identified as "Major General A. Katkov, deputy commander of the Red Banner Volga Military District for Construction and Billeting of Troops."

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 June 1984 second edition carries on page 2 an 1,800-word article by Lieutenant General A. Kovtunov, who is identified as "chief of staff of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District."

The article, published under the rubric "Control on Combat" and entitled "In Conditions of Interference," describes successes and shortcomings in troop control on the basis of field exercise experience.

CSO: 1801/363

ARMED FORCES

NEED FOR KIRGHIZ DRAFTEES TO KNOW RUSSIAN STRESSED

[Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz 18 March 1984 page 2 carries a 900-word article by M. Gafarov on the necessity for future servicemen to know the Russian language well. It has been emphasized in various forums that one of the important factors in preparing young men for service in the Soviet army is a fluent knowledge of Russian. For those who know the language poorly it will be more difficult to serve in the army and to master new technology. Letters have been sent to the SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN editorial board expressing satisfaction with some Kirghiz young men who are carrying out their military duty well. For instance, a unit commanding officer M. Galkin wrote that it is possible to single out some dependable, efficient, hard-working Kirghiz soldiers. But he also notes that there are some young men who know Russian poorly and that they are having difficulties carrying out their service. Galkin writes, "We appeal through the newspaper SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN to pedagogues who teach Russian in Kirghiz schools to impart a deep knowledge of the Russian language in young men who are to be called into the army and to attain a high-quality teaching of it." Gafarov contends that a knowledge of Russian, among other things, ensures an accurate organization of personnel and helps in a rapid mastery of modern military technology and in raising military and political preparation. Schools along with their military commissariats must identify those draftees who know Russian poorly and send them to courses. But the facts show that this matter is still unsatisfactory. Because the material base for primary military preparation classes is inadequate at a number of schools, teachers conduct theoretical lessons in classrooms only, even though it is expected that most of the classes in the program are to be conducted in the field.

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ARMED FORCES

TEACHING MILITARY TERMINOLOGY IN RUSSIAN CLASSES PROPOSED

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad MUGALLYMLAR GAZETI in Turkmen 26 February 1984 page 4 carries a 1,500 word article by R. S. Aliyeva, Responsible Secretary of RUSSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V TURKMENSKOY SHKOLE, in which the duty of the citizen to defend his country in the armed forces is emphasized. As a consequence, "it is demanded that a soldier of non-Russian nationality have a good command of the Russian language because military training in the armed forces is given in this language." Recommendations are made on introducing and emphasizing Russian military terminology in the VI-VIIth grades by means of extensive vocabulary drill and grammar. These studies are to be reinforced by various forms of extracurricular activity--"meetings with veterans of the Great Fatherland War and soldiers of the Army and Military Fleet, thematic evenings, etc."

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GROUND FORCES

MOTOR RIFLE REGIMENT FAILS TO ACHIEVE GOALS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Col V. Bogdanovskiy and Lt Col M. Lishniy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents, Group of Soviet Forces Germany: "Commitments and Circumstances: Why the Effectiveness of Competition Was Low in the "N" Motorized Rifle Regiment"]

[Text] In the past training year the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Ryzhov did not fulfill its commitments in socialist competition. The shortcomings of this unit in organizing the training and educational process and in competition were discussed at the Group of Soviet Forces Germany Party Conference.

"We outline high goals," admitted Lt Col Ryzhov in the discussion, "but do not keep our word."

We decided to visit the unit and become familiar with the organization of competition in the current training year. The lessons learned should have had some impact. The first thing which struck us was that last year's and this year's commitments were as alike as two drops of water. This picture was clarified after talking with officers, sergeants and soldiers. It turns out that the commitments were undertaken in haste. "Saving" time, they copied the old text and voted for it in the meeting.

As is well known, acceptance of commitments begins from below, from the individual person. Later the goals of squads, platoons, companies, battalions and the regiment as a whole are determined.

In this instance they were begun from the top. For example, it was decided to develop some number of soldiers who were "excellent" in military and political training. If one counts the number of sergeants and soldiers struggling to confirm this high rank or earn it, an entirely different and more modest number is obtained. We are not talking about officers. As it turned out they did not take on individual commitments at all. About the same situation entailed with class qualified specialists and rated sportsmen. The information at regiment headquarters states that four companies must become "excellent" in this training year. In actuality, six companies had committed themselves to become "excellent." In this case the initiative from the bottom exceeded the instructions from higher headquarters.

High goals are planned in the regiment with amazing ease. No matter what point you take, you will see no calculation or justifications. Say that last year they hoped to economize three percent on fuel and lubricants and the same amount on electricity. They failed to economize that much. Nevertheless, they accept an even more difficult commitment. How do the motorized riflemen plan to fulfill it? No one thought about that seriously. They just hastened to send in the report. It must also be mentioned that there were no records enabling one to determine how much fuel a given driver had saved in the subunits commanded by Major N. Urbanovich or captains G. Kniga or F. Shafigullin. Nor does the regiment headquarters have data on the savings.

Last year half of the regiment's personnel struggled to master related specialties. The commitment went unfulfilled. Time and material and technical resources are needed for its fulfillment. They can be found, given precise organization of the training process and high quality lessons. The experience of the best units confirms that the most capable soldiers can successfully master related and new specialties. This, of course, is important for the combat readiness of the subunits. However, in this regiment the words were not backed up by deeds. Nevertheless, in the new training year all the motorized riflemen had already resolved to master related specialties in addition to their primary ones. Is this realistic? Is it possible? The organizers of the competition did not consider these questions. It would have been an impressive figure.

Last training year a significant number of soldiers struggled for the rank of "excellent." Few earned it. Are there any noticeable changes in this area now? It is hard to see them. For example, in the platoon commanded by Sr Lt V. Gil' there have been no entries made in the records journal for months. Lessons go on, but their results are unknown. The same picture exists in certain other subunits.

Competition lives by visibility, comparability of results and the opportunity to repeat leading experience on a mass scale. Without this there is no competitiveness, no real struggle to achieve an excellent result in each lesson, no surpassing of yesterday's indices, and no movement forward. It is difficult to set up effective control over how the plans are being implemented. Last year the unit headquarters developed a special report designed to reflect the course of fulfillment of commitments. The report begins, as prescribed, by listing the commitments themselves. But there is not a single other mark. The document lay in a safe the entire year without being touched. Nor were the subunits particularly concerned about reporting the course of competition or about maintaining an effective and business-like record of its results. As we ascertained, even now they are not concerned.

In the Lenin Room of the company commanded by Lt V. Korol', there is a chart about the course of competition among the squads and platoons. It amazed us. The blocks were filled in right through to May, overtaking events, so to speak. The company artist explained that "1983" had been removed from the old chart and the current year written in. This was the extent of the updating. Need it be said that this sort of "agitation" will squelch anyone's desire to compete?

The low indices with which the motorized riflemen concluded last year and lapses in current winter training have many causes. They include mistakes in organizing socialist competition and the inability to utilize its mobilizing force. One would think that the regiment headquarters party committee would devote particular attention to questions of competition after the past failure. However, the party committee did not discuss these issues either last year or this, and not a single communist heard about his fulfillment of commitments. Nor were the party activists concerned about the fact that many officer-communists did not plan specific goals for professional development. Headquarters also stood aside from competition. The modest indices of individual officers are explained in the headquarters by inadequacies in the organization of commanders' training and also by an irresponsible attitude toward improving professional skill. This explanation is correct but not complete. In places where commanders' training is imbued with the spirit of competition and the results of leaders are constantly contrasted with those of laggards, shortcomings are eliminated more quickly and people feel greater responsibility for individual training.

Formalism in the organization of competition in the unit would long ago have been eliminated, had the division headquarters and political department paid attention to these issues. It was with their participation that the "tasks" were developed from which the motorized riflemen hastily adapted their commitments. Apparently the higher headquarters developed the impressive and influential overall figures. We acquainted ourselves with the plans for the work of several comprehensive committees which examined the state of affairs in the regiment. It is strange, but among the numerous problems which attracted the attention of the division headquarters and political department officials, no place was found for competition. Only once did a committee state that competition was organized in a formalistic manner in the regiment and was not distinguished by high effectiveness. But even then the inspectors did not go into the essence of the organization of competition or make specific recommendations for its improvement.

And so it turns out that as it was making commitments and outlining goals for the training period and the year, the regiment did not think about how to accomplish them. Most important was to get them in on time and to look no worse than the others. In inspecting the regiment, senior comrades also prefer to make the most general assessment possible, which is obvious even without thorough analysis. The details which fall from view are such that without them it is difficult to fill competition with vital and specific content, having fused the initiative of the masses with sound calculation and the personal responsibility of each for the unity of word and deed.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON AIR DEFENSE TROOPS IN ARCTIC REGION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 84 pp 1-2

[Article by Col V. Nagornyy: "On the Shore of the Arctic Ocean"]

[Text] Our correspondent, Colonel V. Nagornyy, visited the men of the PVO [air defense] who are performing their service which is very difficult, important, and filled with romance on the shore of the Arctic Ocean. We invite the readers' attention to his report.

The airliner made a landing approach at the airport of destination. In order to make my way even farther toward the upper latitudes where the subunit of radio troops had deployed its sensitive radars. I had to transfer to another airplane --one less comfortable and cared for but, in return, more accustomed to the whims of the severe climate here.

The heavy frozen snow crust showed icily white beneath the wing. Short larches protruded sparsely from it like wire brushes for cleaning weapons. Then, becoming smaller and smaller, the small trees disappeared completely and now the huge, lifeless tundra spread out down below.

Executing a simple maneuver, the pilot confidently landed the airplane and, it seemed, came to a halt at the very edge of the Earth.

At first, the combat work proceeded without special tension. Most likely for this reason the report of Private Aleksandr Lemekh suddenly sounded prosaic:

"Target detected! Azimuth...."

Intersections again and again. Did the operator make a mistake? The distance to the aerial "enemy" who had appeared was too great, clearly at the limit of the equipment's technical capabilities. However, the first-class specialist had made no mistake and now precise information was issued on the check target continuously although it maneuvered intricately.

For the skill displayed on exercises, Private Lemekh was rewarded with a brief leave with travel to his native district. The commander also cited other men who operated in the best manner that night. I asked one of the officers of the

unit, Lieutenant Colonel V. Tatauroz, to comment on the details of the combat work. Nevertheless, it is difficult to "wring" the highest possible parameters out of the assigned equipment....

"That is correct," Vladimir Pavlovich agreed. "However, equipment is equipment. But in this situation, I believe, we are right in speaking of people's high ability. I say as follows: recently we have changed almost nothing on the positions in the plane of technical innovations. Nevertheless, the quality of the operators' combat work improved noticeably."

People at the "points" who are surrounded by the wild northern silence display their own participation in raising combat readiness by specific deeds. Even if at times they may seem to be not so significant or tangible. But you see, there are no deep rivers without tiny brooks.

Prescribed maintenance was to be done. CPSU candidate member Sergeant Nikolay Shipitsyn turned to the commander: "I propose distributing the specialists somewhat differently. In this way, it appears, we will be able to reduce the time for the prescribed maintenance." The commander permitted working differently. In the end, the savings in time with excellent quality turned out to be substantial....

Communist Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Novozhilov has commanded a company for less than a year. Together with the deputy commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Stavriyanov, and other officers, he saw that the average grade for performing operational readiness increased. Now it is steadily higher than the former grade by one or two tenths....

Here they also told me about the commander of an excellent company, Captain Ivan D'yachenko. The subunit deserves only high grades for the standing of operational readiness. And it so turned out that I heard this in general common name-- D'yachenko-- at another "point" which I had to reach by helicopter.

Major Vasiliy Udovichenko, also a company commander, knows Captain D'yachenko rather well. How could he know him? For the officers serve in different places. It turns out that here the "fault" is socialist competition.

"I learned," Major Udovichenko related, "that the indices of our distant neighbors were higher. They were going after leading experience. They borrowed something from D'yachenko. We are striving to surpass the leaders."

Clearly, it is not a vain feeling that moves Major Udovichenko--in other words, not simply to outstrip and gain the upper hand over those who, for the present, surpass his subordinates in training. Not at all. The officer seized the opportunity to contend with a strong collective. Here, you see, reserves for raising combat readiness are also concealed. But Vasiliy Yevstafiyevich is not a novice in his work. And really, he is not acquainted with the North by hearsay.

Several years ago, he served at a "point" beyond the Arctic circle. At that time he had heard much about the difficulties and romance of service in these districts. But reality convinced him: some stories, even the very vivid ones,

transmitted only just a little of how the North is difficult and how it is beautiful. He saw everything--the violence of the elements, the marvellous summer tundra and, most important, courageous people. Several years later, he departed from here for a promotion, to the shores of a tender southern sea. And everything here developed magnificently: he led the radar company up among the leaders and had an excellent three-room apartment. But the North was not forgotten. Evidently because at one time he tempered his will, learned to understand complex human characters, and forged the ability to overcome difficulties steadfastly. And Vasiliy Yevstafiyevich soon wrote an application with a request to be offered the opportunity to serve again beyond the Arctic Circle. Where the winters and nights are long-drawn. Where the Arctic tests a person for steadfastness.

By the way, they also told me of other officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] who are "mastering" these northern districts for more than 10 years and somehow cannot conceive of service in other places--where nature is more merciful.

I asked Major Udovichenko what, he says, his family thought about the transfer. Vasiliy Yevstafiyevich smiled:

"With complete understanding. My older son, Valeriy, one can say, was infatuated with the North. We returned here, he acquired a dog team and studied the tundra like a true hunter. Now his child's play is behind him. Now he is attacking a course of sciences in the Krasnoyarsk Higher Command School for Air Defense Radio Electronics."

It turns out that here one can already speak of an officer's family dynasty. Just as, by the way, about one more dynasty of officers about which I had the occasion to learn in the deep beyond the Arctic Circle.

Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Tkachenko is tall and with a well-formed figure. It is interesting to hear his intelligent, sober-minded story about the deeds and concerns of the troop collective and you soon begin to think: most likely it is customary to say of those like he--a person in his place. In addition to Viktor, two more sons grew up in the family of the veteran and disabled fighter of the Great Patriotic War, Ivan Mikhaylovich Tkachenko--Anatoliy who is now an Engineer-Captain 2d Rank and a teacher in a military school, and Aleksey--a major. Officer service scattered the brothers to different ends of the country but they serve the motherland with the same zeal.

Even before my acquaintance with Lieutenant Colonel Tkachenko, I knew that he is a good methodologist. He is able to bring each lesson close to the conditions of real combat work and, therefore, the detachment of masters of military affairs is continuously growing here. Naturally, I wanted to see this with my own eyes, and I asked Viktor Ivanovich to "leave" me at some "point" a little farther away.

"This can be done," Tkachenko agreed. Here he began a telephone conversation with someone, the meaning of which it was difficult to catch. The lieutenant colonel asked meticulously about the weather and defined in detail the wind force and visibility. Meanwhile, making an impression with its first-formed beauty, the endless snow showed blue calmly beyond the military post and the

lazy ground wind became confused listlessly along the chilly snowdrifts which had piled up. Putting down the receiver, Viktor Ivanovich explained with concern:

"There they," he vaguely nodded his head somewhere to the side, "they are still having a snowstorm. The second day. So to say, a microclimate. We will try to get through on a UAZ. In any case, they will send a prime mover to meet us."

It was difficult to believe that quite close to here bad weather had broken loose and that is necessary to be concerned ahead of time about measures capable of countering it.

The UAZ is a tested and reliable army work truck, adjudged the "king" of the northern roads, and this time it could querosely overcome only dozens of kilometers of route. Later, desperately assaulting the next obstacle, although not long before us a worm-type snow remover passed through here, it was hopelessly stuck in a white pile of snow which the raging blizzard drove like a wedge into the loose road. Soon the hazy silhouette of a vehicle began to move out from the dull gray cover: a prime mover hastened to our assistance.

We approached the "point" completely before daybreak. The wind moaned and howled in its cool secluded corners and it seemed as though some unknown force is not simply hurling biting and vicious snow at you but breaking through and through you. Everything was confused in the continuous, chaotic darkness, and now it was difficult to figure out where the ground is here and where the sky is.

At those moments I thought: how can there be any talk of any special training now? Well, it would be good if some lesson in the training classroom was planned. But you see, at the position it was wide open with inclement weather. However, the drill began exactly at the determined time. Officers Viktor Safonov and Nikolay Kharichko were concerned about its clear organization. At one of the tense moments when, in accordance with the special situation, the tactical situation became especially strained, it was required to displace the assembly at the position. And this within the framework of a rigid time limit, among snow obstructions. The decision matured quickly: transportation was accomplished with the chain from two prime movers. The rhythm of the training-combat work was not disrupted.

Later, Lieutenant Colonel Tkachenko said to me:

"I am satisfied with the drill. By the way, today's weather is still tolerable. There are also more severe days."

The political officer, Major Yuriy Smirnov, supported him:

"In the North, a sense of personal responsibility for combat readiness is especially sharp among the people. And here is one such case...."

A blizzard raged for several days driving masses of wet snow over the groaning tundra. Lieutenant Colonel Eduard Yanovskiy observed with alarm how it settled on the reflector of the radar antenna. And the wind grew stronger and stronger, threatening to overturn the construction which had grown heavy. This is what would happen--the subunit would be deprived of one of its radars for a long time.

There was one way out--to throw off the snow which had been compressed to the density of a stone. All radar personnel were called upon to perform this difficult and dangerous operation. It was entrusted to three--Junior Sergeants Nikolay Chizh and Yegveniy Venfer and Private Viktor Kukharev.

The daredevils, secured like steeplejacks by belts, climbed up along the central bearing beam for several meters and then began to move slowly along the cross-beam. The wind had already attained storm force. But the people did not retreat and continued to fight for the stability of the antenna. They chopped the icy armor with wooden probes for three hours, throwing down a weight of half a ton from the antenna.

And so this is a "point" in the Far North. But it turns out that here they do not consider it the most difficult among others: "For Lyubchenko, however, everything is a little more difficult...."

Senior Lieutenant Igor' Lyubchenko headed this subunit at the "point" several months ago. His length of service as an officer is quite short. After completing a civilian higher educational institution and call-up to the army he served the prescribed two years and really decided to remain in the Regular Army--he found his calling here. He soon climbed up the service ladder. Then one more step....

And the "point" had already succeeded in convincing Lyubchenko rather well that it is really one of the especially difficult categories. It is sometimes almost completely isolated from the outer world. It has its own bakery and boiler house. And there is even its own...floating equipment. The fact is that the subunit deployed the combat equipment and simple facility on the bank of a river.

During the brief summertime, during the counted weeks of navigation, the hot hard work begins not only for the boatmen headed by Warrant Officer [praporshchik] Aleksandr Renchinskiy. People who are free from their difficult service work indefatigably in processing cargoes which arrive--fuel, food, and construction materials. All this must be arranged efficiently in the warehouses and must be carefully protected until the next delivery. But the perfidious river incessantly brings surprises--either the water suddenly begins to "wander," and then it is difficult to understand exactly where the allegedly so well studied channel is; or a belated ice floe carries away the pier which was constructed with tremendous labor.... Everything happened.

One day (at that time Lyubchenko's predecessor, Captain Valeriy Baborykin, now a student at a military academy, commanded here) a political officer, Major Sergey Bolonkin, reached the "point" over difficult impassable roads. Along with other things, he was interested in how officers' families live. And here some, as they say, gave him a hostile reception. They said that we almost never see our husbands, that they disappear for days at the position. Belonkin joked: they say, it is nothing terrible for they work during the day. And the polar day is endless! They understood and appreciated the joke. Then Sergey Konstantinovich invited the young wives to the position. There was no end to their amazement.

Their husbands know to perfection and service the most difficult equipment. It turns out that the approach routes to the combat equipment were also laid out by the hands of the officers and soldiers. They delivered timber with great labor and constructed a reliable corduroy road. There is no need to say how much time and effort were required for this! Each one understood: the snow will melt and the tundra will thaw down to the permafrost and no one will walk or drive over it.

The women spent half a day at the position, and many of them then understood and felt for the first time that "the officer is an heroic profession" are by no means pretty words. Then they assembled in the Lenin room. They had a heart-to-heart talk. Many recalled what had already been endured. How one day the heater boiler broke down and the temperature in the quarters suddenly began to drop. And then the political officer, Major Leonid Shustalov, who had mastered fitters' work in his youth crawled into the boiler himself to learn what had happened there. Then, with great difficulty, together with Warrant Officer Gennadiy Ignatov he eliminated the danger which hung over the heating system.

They also recalled a person who would seem to be far from army service--the pediatrician of one of the hospitals, V. Bogdanov, who once made his way here over the unreliable ice of the river on an all-terrain vehicle in order to give the children inoculations....

No, this "point" which is lost in the tundra never was by itself. People who are knitted together by common thoughts live on it as one family. The highest criterion of their very difficult service is indefatigable vigilance. Officers' wives are contributing their worthy bit to the strictly masculine matter. Anna Lyubchenko, Tat'yana Yatskevich, and Lesya Shepetina applied much effort so that there was sparkling merriment at the New Year's party in the soldier's barracks. It is by their endeavors that surprises are prepared for those who are celebrating their name day--national dishes or excellent cakes. Almost all the young women have a higher education and are not stingy in transferring their knowledge to soldiers who dream of becoming students in higher educational institutions.... In other words they, just as their husbands, are doing quite a lot so that there is a good attitude in the small army collective. And from this, you see, the difficult service also becomes a joy.

It is the command post.... The brain center where the complex equipment is located, the plotting board is transparently lit up, and the green seconds of the electronic clock which read the exact time blink. Information which characterizes the aerial situation reaches here over communication lines. Figures, figures, figures.... And I saw people behind them--strong-willed, skillful, and strong with whom I had the luck to meet in the district beyond the Arctic Circle.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSE TRAINING METHODS, NORMS REVIEWED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 11

[Article by Jr Sgt Yu. Kostovarov, launcher crew commander, Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "Competition-84: Proficiency of Missilemen is Growing"]

[Text] Following the example of socialist competition initiators in the Air Defense Forces/The time factor and a reduction of norms/It is impossible to get by without self-control.

We were to perform third by lot, and it was with careful attention and--it is no secret--even with a certain bias that we followed the combat work of other participants in the competition of launcher crews. It was difficult to pick out any kind of flaws in the team members' actions, and both crews showed an excellent time, but the pace slowed when it became necessary to display technical competence in finding and remedying specially created stoppages. We thought anxiously: "Won't the very same thing happen with us?" It would be vexing, for so much had been done to ensure ourselves against any chance happenings in placing the missile in a condition to be launched.

Our team took shape with difficulty. Pvt A. Ignat'yev and I came from the training subunit at the same time and one can say that we were regarded as novices. Privates N. Asatiani and A. Mytse came over from other teams. At first I was inclined to explain all failures by the fact that we had not meshed with each other. I reassured myself that mutual understanding would arrive in time, but the time for meshing dragged on. What was the reason?

The solution came when I analyzed in detail how more experienced team commanders such as Sgt V. Kozhukhar' arranged training. In contrast to me, he registered, simultaneously with the platoon commander, all plusses and minuses in subordinates' fulfillment of techniques.

At the advice of Sgt Kozhukhar' and with the assistance of Lt Dombrovskiy, I started special training schedules, in which we entered the time shown by each team member in performing operations, with deficiencies also shown. This

provided an opportunity to constantly see the changes in the level of specialist training. The schedules also permitted conducting a detailed critique of training sessions.

It was no accident that I took a close look at the work of the commander of the leading team. The fact is that our teams had made an identically high pledge, following the example of initiators of socialist competition in the Air Defense Forces: to better the combat work norms by 12 percent. Once at the beginning of the training year Sgt Kozhukhar' inquired about my team's successes.

"There have been improvements," I responded. "We have begun to get rid of mistakes, but for now I can't report anything more specific."

"That's bad," remarked the sergeant.

And he explained that he himself didn't wait for the end of the month when results would be summarized. Kozhukhar' is ready at any moment to report what results the team achieved and how successfully socialist pledges are being fulfilled. This is all because he sets specific tasks for the day and for the week. If the team learned to better the norms by four percent under all weather conditions not long ago, the task for today is to double this percentage. Competition goals also have been set for each specialist. Knowing the control figures, the soldiers try to get close to them in practices and even to better them.

Now I realized that an absence of constant reference points in competition led to a situation where not everyone on the team was working to the full extent of his abilities. I began to require subordinates to fulfill individual assignments.

We had to work more thoroughly to practice each cycle in converting the missile to a combat condition from any previous condition. I saw that privates Asatiani and Mytse were losing time when they uncovered the launcher. They would toss off the cover at random. It was necessary to practice this technique in detail. It was more advisable to roll up the cover right on the equipment, then carry it aside. There was a struggle to gain seconds in other operations as well, especially in the process of loading the launcher.

I didn't forget to remind subordinates that the factor of time now is of decisive importance. Modern combat against the air enemy, especially when he operates at low altitudes, can last a matter of seconds. The reminder about responsibility prompted the launcher operators to build up time and quality indicators daily.

Activities under difficult conditions at night and in a situation with "enemy" use of mass destruction weapons provided a great deal. Gradually the team members drew into the strict rhythm of work and fewer and fewer inaccuracies were committed during control tests.

It is well known that success in norm fulfillment rests on a firm knowledge of equipment, with an important role here resting with independent training. In additional classes I along with subordinates studied launcher hardware and the functional duties to the extent prescribed by the position and for a related specialty. The command "Team members change places!" often was heard in our practices. Once Lt Dombrovskiy proposed that teams change places.

"What's the difference?" I asked in surprise. "Let's assume we go to the next launch position, and what will change? The equipment is the very same."

But still there was a difference. It is not said by chance that there is a home court advantage. It is somehow handier to perform operations on one's own launcher. All team members must have sensed this. We showed a below normal result.

We began to practice the following in training sessions. Each team would receive a task of loading several launchers in a row without a break. Both the time and quality of loading were evaluated, with the idle teams exercising the most captious monitoring.

Indicators then were compared and opinions and suggestions expressed. For example, there had to be greater coordination with TZM [transporter-loader vehicle] drivers, who sometimes commit errors in driving up to the launchers.

A great deal was provided by training following that methodology. We developed readiness to work on any equipment and accustomed people to endure great physical stresses.

A form of competition such as a mutual check of norm fulfillment also caught on with us. Each member of a neighboring team observes his opponent in competition and later points out mistakes and advises how to achieve the optimum work regime. An opportunity appears to adopt everything valuable and instructive and to become mutually enriched with experience.

Regular competitions among teams and specialists contribute to increased interest in rivalry and to the desire to better the norms.

...The command came for our team to load the launcher. All launcher team members functioned precisely and cohesively. Narrative problems complicating norm fulfillment abounded, but this didn't trouble the specialists. They demonstrated the ability to compress the normative time to the limit with an excellent work quality.

With respect to bettering the norms by 12 percent, we kept our word. Final problems showed that the team achieved this important goal.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MEANS OF IMPROVING TECHNICAL SKILLS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 5, 1984 (signed to press 24 Apr 84) p 12

[Article by Maj Z. Bantsevich, Red Banner Belorussian Military District:
"Military-Technical Propaganda: The Technical Circle is a Good Assistant"]

[Text] How can the technical circle's capabilities be used
more fully to deepen aviators' theoretical knowledge?
Circle leader Maj Z. Bantsevich tells about this.

More than once I have had occasion to assist TECh [technical maintenance unit] specialists in servicing and repairing aviation equipment. Looking from one side, you see that both the highly rated and the less experienced specialists are working identically. But then a hitch occurs, such as the disappearance of a signal or a unit's output parameters being outside the norm. With a clear idea of the system's purpose and the physical essence of the phenomena, our masters, warrant officers [praporshchiki] A. Mal'tsev and A. Osipenko, are in no hurry to take a look at diagrams. They identify the malfunctioning unit by mentally estimating possible failure variants and by manipulating toggles and switches, and only then do they analyze it in detail.

On the other hand, in such situations senior mechanics who recently completed warrant officer school immediately look for a suggestion in the technical documentation. Since modern built-in systems are rather complex, they spend considerably more time looking for a malfunction using various diagrams.

There is a simple explanation for this: a repairman's skills are gained only in the course of lengthy practical work. School familiarizes him with the signs and methodology for detecting only the most typical malfunctions. If you hardly encounter them in a unit you forget a great deal after some time. And so it sometimes happens that a warrant officer performs rather quickly the complicated inspections done day in and day out, but spends more time on the simpler ones.

What has been said also relates considerably to first-term soldiers who service aircraft. They often only know the narrow range of their duties. Moreover, the plans for their technical training also primarily pursue the practical

aspect, on the understanding that specialists learned the theoretical matters in the training subunit.

But first of all, the knowledge they gained is not very firm and, secondly, equipment is improving continuously, which means one must constantly become familiar with innovations. That is why there originated in the unit one of the current directions in the technical training of aircraft mechanics, which conditionally can be called: "from practice to theory."

Technical circles headed by unit engineers assumed the initiative for expanding aviators' general theoretical horizons. Twice a month senior mechanics and mechanics work here under the direction of the best trained officers. For example, one group brings together aviators of squadrons and the TECH's which service radiotechnical equipment, another brings together specialists on the aircraft and engine, a third is for weapons specialists, and so on.

Experience has shown that it is most advisable to plan the circle's work for the entire training year. With that number of classes the topics can be made specific and consequently it is easier for students to assimilate material. For example, I have had to explain such matters as "Physical principles of radio navigation," "Physical principles and principle of operation of the radar," "Range measurement channel," and so on. After a critique of theory I would move on to a specific piece of on-board equipment, familiarize the specialists with the functional diagram and show how our instruments interface with other systems. Experience shows that the interconnection among systems is one of the specialists' weak points. Hence such careful attention to this in the circle.

Class topics often are suggested by the aviators themselves. During periodic technical servicing WO A. Khonskiy had difficulty adjusting navigation gear. At the next meeting we examined the equipment's operating principle in detail. WO S. Stepanov also made a similar request.

The training was not in vain. Classes in the circle helped warrant officers Stepanov and Khonskiy master the servicing of the aircraft's sighting-navigation system in compressed time periods. Last year they became specialists 1st class and now are preparing to conquer the master's level.

Every other first-term soldier went to a higher level class rating based on last year's results. The circle awakened a real love for equipment in many of them.

I remember radio mechanic and driver Pfc Yu. Korzikov. He had not even had a soldering iron in his hand before the Army. Our classes developed a ham operator's curiosity in him and Korzikov became a 1st class specialist and an active innovator.

As a rule, the training of circle students varies, which is taken into account in the work. For example, privates M. Gordidze, Ye. Rakhimov and Z. Babayev, who had poor knowledge, were given individual assignments and soon these soldiers drew themselves up to the level of the other aviators.

It is no secret that the circle's effectiveness depends largely on the instructor's training quality. It is difficult to tell about complicated physical phenomena intelligibly, interestingly and convincingly. This was especially felt at first. Sometimes it is necessary to look over many books and popular science journals in preparing for a class. It now has become simpler, since a certain amount of consolidated material has formed.

In my view, the time also has come to make more improved graphic diagrams for such classes. Some officer-instructors also suggest conducting experiments revealing the essence of physical phenomena. In short, it is necessary to have a modern training facility to make the effectiveness of our classes even higher.

We in the unit already sense a real return from the technical circles, and not just from a growth in the number of rated specialists, the mechanics' heightened interest in aircraft equipment and higher quality in servicing on-board systems. There is one other indicator: after a year of classes we have begun to invite in unit engineers for troubleshooting more rarely. The aviators have strengthened their own knowledge and skills and their military proficiency has been perfected.

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NAVAL FORCES

TORPEDO EXERCISE DETAILED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 84 p 6

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank S. Turchenko, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Torpedo Attack"]

[Text] There is biological silence in the submarine's command center. This means that only machinery is putting out sound (a monotonic humming). The sea is quiet for the "enemy" is still far away. Sonar is quiet as there is nothing to report to the commander, and he is silent, lost in thought. The submarine is penetrating the sea's thickness with its powerful steel hull.

The navigator is determining the location and the engineer is conjuring over the EVM [computer] (if something has been checked six times, it won't hurt to check it a seventh). The chief of the radio section is preparing a table to work on and the boatswain, screwing up his eyes, is looking at the depth gauge.

The silence is focused and businesslike.

I remember a conversation with the deputy submarine commander of the political section that took place before the cruise. It was about heroics in the submariner service. The political worker then said "A sailor goes on watch and this is a sort of heroism. But regardless of how long the cruise may be, weeks or months, he must not lose his vigilance for a second and he must be ready at any moment for decisive and conscious actions. It is difficult to describe such heroism as it is almost never shown externally."

Minutes pass. We change course several times but there is no "enemy". People in the control center are beginning to get nervous and are beginning more and more often to look now at the sonar station azimuth indicator which is passively tracing its too clear phosphorescing circumference and now at the door of the sonar operator's post. And once in a while uneasiness flashes in their eyes. Is it possible that the KBR [naval combat crew] missed...

The KBR is the naval combat crew and the role of each of its members is important. Here is a short sketch on its "first string".

The commander. He is 35 years old and has commanded since he was 30. He has made nearly 100 training torpedo attacks. Not long before this one (if it finally does come off) while completing a military exercise under difficult conditions and in a disadvantageous position he destroyed a target in a torpedo attack at maximum range.

The starpom [commander's senior assistant]. In the complicated military training environment he is remarkable calm, but also attentive. For example, he has the ability to listen to and analyze three or four reports from combat posts at the same time and is always exact to the "dot over the 'I'" and doesn't let the smallest detail slip by while doing this. He loves and values jokes and his favorite proverb is, "There are many orders in the navy and they all have deep meaning".

The navigator. He is an outstanding specialist and works like a master of military affairs. He is a Komsomol activist and is a big help to the zampolit [deputy commander for political affairs] and the komsorg [Komsomol organization] in indoctrinating its Komsomol members.

The torpedoman. Chief Petty Officer Aleksandr Kiselev is a Komsomol member. Every attack that he has taken part in has been graded "good" or "excellent". He has won the right to be called a follower of the war years' best specialists.

But the search drags on. Either the enemy has still not entered this sector or... But no one wants to think about that. We have maneuvered correctly and the sonar is experienced.

Time stretches out agonizingly. Then suddenly... No one has yet heard anything but everyone is frozen at once. It is possible that the submariners' nerves themselves got the silent signal from the sonar operator's post.

"Center! Sonar is working in sector..."

"Training alarm! Torpedo attack! Lay on course..."

A historical reference. On 11 May 1942 submarine M-172 commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union Captain 3rd Rank I.I. Fisanovich was the first in the history of submarine warfare to make a torpedo attack without use of a periscope. Using only one sonar system, M-172 approached the target, took up a combat course and went to its firing point and both of the North Sea sailor's torpedoes were direct hits.

How long ago that was! Our navy has made such advances in combat skills and in equipment improvement since then. But, as earlier, each attack demands the crew's highest coordination.

The situation is now similar, although it is only training. They are relying on the sonar operator.

The control center is bursting with a multiplicity of reports and orders. The starpom, like an omnipotent, multi-channel EVM, is analyzing and not letting a single report escape. He gives the commander "clean" information on the "enemy".

A lot is already clear and orders go out. We zigzag under water and then stay on course several minutes. But where is the primary target? That is the question.

"Sonar operator, speed up target classification."

The sonar operator's post. High ranking specialist Warrant Officer A. Pavlovich is behind the stand and his first assistant, Petty Officer 2nd Class A. Kislyy, is nearby. Both are tensely listening to the noises of the deep. Classifying a target is not easy. One must know tactical and technical data on a number of ships (screw speed, ship speed, sonar characteristics, etc.). In addition, one must have phenomenal hearing.

The warrant officer finally reports, "According to bearing target number one is the primary".

The central post. The commander fastens his eyes on the sonar station indicator. The green rings are dotted with the marks of targets. There it is, the primary! Now to attack! But...

"In a minute the primary target will be in line with an escort ship," reports the warrant officer.

The commander looks at the radio technical service chief's table. He is feverishly drawing an intersection line. The "enemy's" turn is still not plotted. Time, how quickly it goes. It's impossible to fire when they are lined up so we need a new position. Seconds of sea time are flying away like a frantic jet. The distance to the target is inexorably being reduced. But there is still a minute, the last. Things for the navigator are going at full tilt. For the commander's experienced glance a second is enough to evaluate the situation and make the correct decision.

"Get ready to use 'omega'."

The torpedo room. This is where the torpedo gear is mounted. The best specialists from BCh-3 [underwater weapons department] service them. At the firing shield the back of Chief Petty Officer A. Kiselev is taut with effort. He awaits the command that crowns the attack.

"Fire!

Kiselev picks himself to man the firing shield. A string of pressure pushes the torpedo with a hiss out of the apparatus and speeds it toward the target.

An interview after the attack. The commander along with the navigator is still checking the combat training maneuver.

"Are you sure of success?"

"I have no doubt that they hit."

The starpom smiles, "It is very important that we observe the main tactical principle. Be sure to report to the readers."

"Which principle?" I am keenly interested.

Putting on a stern face, the starpom didactically says, "The main tactical principle is trying to shoot the enemy's side. This as a minimum gives a fifty percent hit probability."

"Why fifty percent," I ask, still not understanding the starpom's treachery.

"You either hit or miss. There is no third option given"

The room erupts with laughter. Well, now that the attack has been done well, one can joke.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

OUTSTANDING OFFICER IN RADAR UNIT PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 84 p 2

[Article by Col N. Kalmykov: "Only One Year"]

[Text] Two facts interested me from the thus far quite brief officer biography of Senior Lieutenant Nikolay Obertas. The first fact: Obertas is the youngest of the officers in the Nth Radio Unit who are performing the duties of command post operations duty officer. The second fact: he won first place in the competition of command post [CP] specialists on the scale of the Order of Lenin Moscow PVO [air defense] District, and on the scale of the air defense radio troops--fourth place.

In such a very difficult matter as operations work skill in the true meaning of the word usually comes after many, many years of strained labor. For Obertas in essence it is only the beginning of troop service--the time of officer youth. And already such achievements!

How could these merge--the time of officer youth and the heights of skill? I admit that I questioned Obertas long and meticulously about his cadet life. I was confident: it was precisely there, in the school that his inclinations and abilities for work at command posts were disclosed; there enthusiasm should have arrived and, with it, the first skills and first experience. There, evidently, they underwent initial improvement and preliminary polishing. And otherwise--how could it be?

It turned out that it was nothing like this. The only and constant passion of cadet Obertas was the radar stations and, if you want it more specifically--their operation. And he prepared himself for the role of operator. He thought of nothing else prior to his very arrival in the unit to which he had been assigned.

He made his selection unexpectedly for himself and, what seems surprising for him up to now, without special wavering. Officer Iosif Andreyevich Andriyevskiy, the most experienced specialist of the command post, uttered the words one day which suddenly forced him to look differently at his chosen life's path.

"Operations work at the CP," said Andriyevskiy, "is a special kind of matter which requires years and years of diligent labor for the sake of, it may so happen, one single minute. It happens that such a minute may not even come during

your entire service. But you must constantly be ready for it. This must be realized forever."

Obertas then did not immediately understand the hidden meaning of what had been said; he only felt how something strained and alarming breathed from these words. Behind them stood an unknown life which follows special laws.

But in general, all of them, the three lieutenants who had been selected from the graduates of military schools who had arrived at the unit, were already a little involved in it, this life--for the present by thoughts alone and by impressions--and that is why they were selected and acquainted with the command post in such detail and so thoroughly. Difficulties were not concealed from them and they were not promised calm service even in the distant future. Moreover, they were warned: it is completely possible that some of them may simply prove to be incapable of work at the CP. This, of course, will be ascertained only with time. And then it will be necessary to begin everything all over again. So that the decision remained theirs: decide.

But the more Andriyevskiy and other officers told of what the contemporary command post is and what the role of the operations duty officer is at it, the more clearly did the meaning of the very difficult service of the CP sections show through behind their words and the more strongly was Obertas imbued with the desire to test himself in the new matter. This is very important at a young age--to learn of what you are capable and what you can do at moments of real tests. And the new matter, judging from everything, promised to provide the most accurate answers to these questions sooner or later.

They were also attracted by the scales of responsibility and difficulty of future service. An officer who is performing the duties of operations duty officer should be able to direct the actions of the CP sections at least as well as the commander himself. In the majority of cases a very difficult stage in temporary air defense combat befalls his lot--its beginning. And not only this. The success of the fighter pilots and missilemen and the reliability of repelling an air raid--this also begins to a great extent with him, the operations duty officer, and with his actions and professional competence.

This, in the most general features, is how Obertas and his two comrades formed their impression of the new matter which they were to master. But even this impression was sufficient to incline them toward the work.

This was the beginning.

To my question of how, nevertheless, he could attain such successes in such a relatively short time Senior Lieutenant Obertas answered: "There were good teachers." "Well, and what depended on you yourself?" I make more exact. And here he fell to thinking and began to meditate. He studied. He tried to borrow experience.... Just as the others. "So just what depended on me personally? Perhaps I understood a little earlier than the others: you need today rather than tomorrow for the matter. Everything else follows from this...."

It occurred to me: and you see, perhaps, this is very important--to understand what you need today, that the matter depends only on what you can do and on what you are capable of at this moment and not on what you will become tomorrow. How

many times in the cases of the protracted development of an officer must one hear the faint notes of excuse: they say that his time has not yet come, that the time will come and he will be cut out with all his capabilities. But do our military service and combat readiness give us such a right--to wait?

Obertas required only one year to travel the path from the best CP specialist in the unit to best CP specialist among the district's radio troops.

Everyone with whom I had the occasion to speak about Obertas especially stressed one feature of his character among many: he knows the value of time and does not waste even a minute in vain.

Obertas, and I understood this from a conversation with him, directed himself toward the attainment of the maximum from the very beginning. He studied in the minutest detail the documents which regulate combat alert service, the capabilities of the equipment, the algorithms for combat control, and the range of service duties. At the beginning it appeared to him that only such knowledge which has been brought to perfection will permit him to stand at the same level as the most experienced CP specialists. It turned out that for his work this was insufficient. He understood that in addition to knowledge one must have a special cast of character--he was to cultivate it within himself, and one must be able to do much and, first of all, to be able to think and to find almost instantaneously from many acceptable decisions the most weighed and correct one--he was to learn this constantly.

Obertas was lucky: experienced, knowledgeable specialists worked with him. Officers I. Andriyevskiy and V. Kiselev taught him lofty professionalism and taught him to live and serve very well. Obertas was also lucky in that he proved to be a capable pupil who was able to understand the main thing: even the most talented teachers cannot teach skill if you don't strive for it yourself.

At one time, Captain Valeriy Shvalyuk was the model of a CP specialist for Obertas. He adopted his work methods, manner of actions, and even the intonation of the voice with which Shvalyuk issued commands. They frequently analyzed difficult situations which had occurred at one time and usually Obertas, playing the role of operations duty officer, found quick and correct solutions. He was pleased by his own successes; they were his ability to join instantaneously in the substance of an unfamiliar problem which had come up unexpectedly and, sorting through a great number of variations for its solutions, to find the only correct one and immediately embody it in the specific actions of people....

But there were other moments. Captain Shvalyuk, who considered it his service obligation and party duty to teach the young officer everything which he knows and can do himself, often issued such special situations that Obertas committed errors one after the other. Analyzing them later, he often found gaps in his knowledge and discovered for himself questions which he had not pondered earlier.

One day, in solving a problem which had been improvised by Shvalyuk, he committed an error because he did not consider something very simple--how well trained the operator of a distant "point" from whom information arrived was. They then even argued a little: does the operations duty officer have to know each specialist? And is it possible if the operators are located dozens of kilometers away?

"Under normal conditions, perhaps, it is not mandatory to know each one's capabilities," said Shvalyuk then. "But neither can we exclude the following variant: precisely because of this an inaccuracy or error is committed in your decision, and exactly at the decisive moment when it will be late to alter something. You should proceed from this...."

Obertas automatically compared what had been said with the words pronounced once by Lieutenant Colonel Andriyevskiy. The words were different but their content was the same: one should be prepared in all respects so as to be equal to the occasion at the most needed moment. This is dictated by necessity and the meaning of all work at the command post.

Thus, with the aid of his commanders and fellow servicemen Obertas was constantly oriented toward the main thing in service and this helped him to work purposefully, overcome failures, and bring his knowledge and skills to perfection. Time did not cool his strivings and successes did not lower his diligence and activity. Rather, the opposite. Horizons are expanded with experience, responsibility for the cause which you serve is perceived more sharply, and the possibilities which have not yet been mastered in full measure are seen more clearly. The striving to fill life and time with the best, more substantial content arrives even more strongly with experience. These thoughts were expressed by Obertas himself. More precisely, they are his convictions.

We spoke of the past year--the one most visible and happiest in his life. In addition to service successes the year was also marked by other joyous events--the communists elected him as a member of the party commission with the unit political department, he had a son, and two soldiers whom he was called upon to help in special training became experts.

We spoke of service, of his plans and dreams, his enthusiasms. I tried to learn as much about him as possible in order to understand better and more deeply: what is he now, the contemporary young officer, what are his views and thoughts, what is his attitude toward the assigned matter? To understand, to imagine what the one in whose hands the future of our army will find itself will be tomorrow.

And later, I learned of a case which strengthened even more my faith in his reliability as a CP officer.

On that day the drill at the command post outwardly did not differ in any way from others. Nothing, it seemed, presaged complications. And that is why the following report sounded so unexpectedly:

"An airplane is giving the 'distress' signal."

Obertas had not encountered a similar, very rare situation in his practice. A swarm of questions went through his head: what kind of airplane, who is the operator, how reliable is the information? It was necessary to make a decision without losing even a second. But first it was necessary to clear up and compare much.

The signal was given by an airliner which was located at the very edge of the radar's zone of detection and was discovered by Private I. Goryachev, a first-

class specialist. Commands and reports began and information was transmitted to all interested instances. Obertas knew one thing: people need help and everything possible should be done for this. This same thought guided the actions of all the CP specialists. The section headed by Obertas operated faultlessly and clearly.

After a while, Obertas read a TASS report in the newspaper. In it, it said that by threatening an explosion two criminals had attempted to hijack a passenger aircraft flying on the Moscow-Tallinn route. The attempt was thwarted.

The report ended with the words: "The passengers and crew did not suffer." And this was the best reward for Obertas and his combat comrades.

6367

CSO: 1801/329

CIVIL DEFENSE

CIVIL DEFENSE EDUCATION TO BE STRESSED IN SCHOOLS

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad MUGALLYMLAR GAZETI in Turkmen 19 February 1984 page 2 carries a 1,200-word article by D. Rakhmanov and G. S. Selifontov, section heads on the TuSSR Civil Defense Staff, and V. E. Shapovalov, Chief of the Civil Defense Department at the M. Gorkiy Turkmen State University, proposing improvements in the civil defense and first aid courses taught in schools. It is noted that "civil defense preparation of general education middle school graduates is especially weak. One of the basic reasons for this is that courses are of a low quality or are not taught at all. With regard to first aid training, teaching falls upon nurses who are directors of school medical offices or on workers at territorial disease prevention administrations. Since these people are heavily burdened with their regular work, situations in which first aid courses are not given or are methodologically at a low level are not rare." It is proposed that 1) "Civil Defense in the USSR" be made an independent course in general education schools and that first aid become a part of this course; 2) teachers specialized in civil defense be trained; 3) first aid teachers be doctors or nurses; and 4) a special budget be allocated for these courses "with the goal of raising the quality of civil defense and first aid teaching."

CSO: 1833/20

MILITARY HISTORY

LT GEN ZHILIN DISCUSSES 'SECOND FRONT'

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Lieutenant General P. Zhilin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History: "The Second Front: The Truth and The Myths"]

[Text] The Second World War was a war of coalitions and the very fact that the anti-Hitler coalition was formed and a military-political union of states with different social systems was created was an event of major historical significance. Of course, the coalition character of the war superimposed definite features on many aspects of inter-state relations, including the relationship among armed forces.

The Second Front played a positive role in the anti-Hitler coalition's struggle against Fascist Germany and its allies. The Soviet people give proper credit to the people of the U.S., England, their soldiers, sailors and officers who did a lot to bring victory nearer. Nonetheless, the Second Front was opened three years after Fascist Germany's treacherous attack on the USSR. Why did the Allies wait so long? The answer is simple. The imperialistic, class essence of the policies of U.S. and English ruling circles became apparent while the opening of the Second Front was prolonged and these countries were counting on the Soviet Union being bled white.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet government tried to give the coalition of anti-Hitlerites that had formed all possible effectiveness and efficiency. It was considered necessary to mobilize military forces of all the states fighting against the Hitlerite Bloc and to use all forces and reserves to speed up crushing the enemy. Opening the Second Front in Europe could be the most important step in this direction.

The struggle to open the Second Front continued for more than two and a half years.

Basing their actions on the 12 June 1941 agreement the Soviet Union officially presented the English government with the advisability of the West's creating a Second Front against Hitler. On 3 September the Soviets repeated the recommendation on opening a Second Front. In making this recommendation the Soviet government well imagined the difficulty of opening a second front in Europe, but our country was still having a difficult time. The opening of the

Second Front would not simply be a help to the Soviet Union, but would also create serious advantages for the Allies and the whole anti-Hitler coalition because it would significantly worsen Hitleristic Germany's position as it would be in a vice from the east and the west.

But a strange picture emerged. The Allies agreed with Soviet reasoning in word but in deed they obstructed and put off its completion with all sorts of pretexts.

In difficulty, the English government refused to review this decision on opening the Second Front in 1941. Meanwhile in the winter of 1941-42 the German Fascists sustained a shattering blow near Moscow. Finally the Hitlerite plans for a "lightning war" against the USSR failed and the myth of Wiermach invincibility was shattered. However, the absence of the Second Front gave the German command the opportunity to reinforce their troops in the east. From December 1941 to April 1942 39 divisions and 6 separate brigades including 16 divisions from France were transferred to the Soviet-German Front from the west. In spring of 1942 it became evident that the German Fascist leadership intended to use the absence of a second front to organize a decisive attack against the Soviet Union and the issue of opening up the Second Front came up with new force.

The United States' entry into the war against the Fascist Bloc significantly increase the Western Allies' ability to open a second front in Europe. In a 3 April 1942 message to W. Churchill. F. Roosevelt wrote, "Your people and mine are demanding the creation of a front which would weaken pressure on the Russians and these people are wise enough to see that Russians today are killing more Germans and destroying more arms that we are together. Even if we don't get total success, the purpose will be important".

Under the influence of American society's persistent demands to give the USSR effective aid, in April 1942 President Roosevelt sent a proposal to the Soviet government to start an exchange of opinions on the issue of a second front and he asked that they send a delegation to the U.S. to negotiate. In May-June 1942 the USSR Narkom [peoples' commissar] of Foreign Affairs made a trip to London and Washington during which the issue of the second front was discussed. Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiques on the results of negotiations between the USSR, England and the U.S. that were published on 12 June 1942 indicated that "they reached total agreement regarding the urgent problem of creating a second front in Europe in 1942". However, this time also the ruling circles of England and the U.S. avoided fulfilling their accepted obligations.

In negotiations and correspondence with the Soviet government the English and American governments assured them that despite the landing in North Africa the Second Front would open in 1943. Even these promises were not fulfilled and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Stimson revealed the real reasons for the delay. In his memoirs he wrote, "Not opening a strong Western Front on time meant that the total weight was on the Russians."

The United States National Archives is holding an important document, the Protocol of the 20 August session of the Joint Anglo-American Staff. This session reviewed the prospectives of U.S. and English policies vis a vis the USSR and was attended by the most senior military leaders of the U.S. (Admiral H. Leahy, Generals Marshall and G. Arnold and Admiral A. King) and England (General A. Brook, Admiral D. Pound and Chief Marshal of Aviation C. Portal). Paragraph 9 of the Protocol, "Military considerations in relations with Russia", indicates that they discussed the question "will the Germans not support" the entry of Anglo-American forces into German territory "to repulse the Russians". It is difficult to imagine that in 1943, when the Soviet Union was in single combat with the Fascist Reich and was building the path to victory for the anti-Hitler coalition, leading U.S. and British military figures were discussing such a question. Nonetheless it happened!

The shattering rout of the German Army at the Kirsck Bulge in June-August 1943 and the successful development of a wide offensive by Soviet forces were indicative of the fact that the USSR could defeat Germany without Allied help. The aspiration "not to lose the chance" began to play a more and more important role in the calculations of U.S. military leadership. As far back as May 1943 in a talk with Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England Field Marshal Brook, General Eisenhower recommended, "If Anglo-Americans throw all their forces in the Mediterranean Theater, then maybe the Russians will take Central and Western Europe". U.S. Secretary of Defense Stimson from his side warned President Roosevelt that post-war U.S. interests would be in an extremely dangerous situation if Germany was defeated by the forces of the Soviet Union alone. The Allies were faced with the dilemma of not opening the second front too early or too late.

Finally at the Tehran Conference in November 1943 the Allies agreed that an invasion of Anglo-American forces across the English Channel would take place in May 1944. The head of the Soviet government, I.V. Stalin, then declared, "So as not to give the Germans the ability to maneuver... and jump significant forces from the Eastern Front to the West, Russians in May will make a major attack against the Germans in several locations and rivet German divisions on the Eastern Front, not giving them the opportunity to cause any problems for 'Overlord'".

On the morning of 6 June 1944 American and British-Canadian forces crossed the English Channel and began landing on Normandy beaches in north western France. The Allied Expeditionary Forces significantly outnumbered the Fascist German forces opposing them. At the beginning of the landing the Allied armies had a numerical superiority over Wehrmacht forces of 3 to 1 in tanks and SAU [self-propelled guns], 2.2 to 1 in weapons and mortars and 61.4 to 1 in combat airplanes. This overwhelming superiority was an important factor guaranteeing the success of the Allied landing and the strengthening and expansion of the area taken.

From 25 June to 25 August Allied soldiers attacked from the beachhead and went on to the Seine and Doubs Rivers, taking almost all of northwestern France. The huge attack which the Soviet Army made in summer of 1944, the anti-fascist

struggle of Europe's people and the active operations by French Resistance Forces which liberated many villages and regions even before Allied forces reached there facilitated the success of the Allies.

On 15 August American-French forces that had landed in southern France with Resistance help quickly widened the area and began to move toward the north. On 19 August French patriots began an anti-fascist armed uprising in Paris and on 4 August Paris was almost completely liberated. The German Fascist force situation became critical and on Hitler's orders in early September after leaving France these forces went to the western German border and went on the defense along the Zigfried Line. The more than two-million man Allied army was stopped in front of this defensive line.

Undoubtedly the Normandy operation was one of the largest landing operations in the Second World War. The landing of Anglo-American forces on the northwest coast of France and their subsequent operations in French territories and in Germany were an essential contribution to the over-all action of the anti-Hitler coalition, but they did not change the decisive significance of the Soviet-German Front in the Second World War. As earlier, it rivetted the basic forces of the Fascist Bloc comprised of the most battleworthy major units and equipment.

To support their western allies in the Normandy invasion the Soviet Army in this period undertook a series of major strategic offenses. The attack by Leningrad forces began on 10 June 1944 and the Belorussian Offensive, one of the largest in the Second World War, was started. Soviet Army successes created favorable conditions for Allied operations and right up to the day the Hitlerites surrendered the general conditions of the war in Europe were shaped by the decisive role of the Soviet Union which weakened and crushed Fascist Germany.

Opening the Second Front was a major victory for all the world's progressive forces. However, this was still essentially not the same front which we had waited for the first two years of the Great Patriotic War. At that time opening a Second Front in Western Europe would have forced Fascist Germany and its European allies to disperse their armed forces and material resources which were concentrated in one powerful fist on the Soviet-German Front.

But the Second Front was really opened when it was because the basic sudden change in the war had been made through the heroic efforts and huge sacrifices of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces. The strategic initiative had been ripped from the enemy's hands and a deep crisis which heralded its unavoidable failure had set in both in Fascist Germany itself and the Fascist Bloc as a whole.

Starting back in the second half of 1943 it had become clear that the Soviet Armed forces could have independently crushed the enemy and freed the peoples of Europe. On 9 November 1943 the Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to Moscow, Major General D. Dunn, reported to Washington that as he saw it Soviet government interest in the Western Allies invasion across the English Channel

was reduced because the Soviet Army "believed in its ability to penetrate to Berlin without the help of the Allied Army in the west". Under the conditions that had developed the Western Allies had rushed to open the Second Front specifically to prevent the growth of USSR authority and political influence in the international arena.

As was already noted, classic reasons lay at the basis of the Western Allies' attitude toward the problem of a second front. The reason for postponing it to later dates was to shift the total weight of the war on to the Soviet Union in that very difficult period so as to use it struggle for their own interests and in the end to weaken the world's first socialist state so that they could later dictate their own conditions for the world's postwar organization. This policy contradicted the basic interests of the peoples of the U.S., England and the countries occupied by the fascist invaders since it led to the continuation of the war and new victims. This had advantages only for the American and English monopolies which had made huge profits in the war business. Finally, the U.S. and English course in postponing opening the Second Front reflected the colonial interests of English and American imperialism which had tried to preserve its supremacy in Africa, the Near and Middle East and in the countries of Asia.

In the postwar period bourgeois historians made numerous attempts to justify the United States' and England's non-fulfillment of their obligation to create a second front in 1942 and 1943. They tried to explain this by the fact that the Western Allies didn't have the necessary forces and means. This point of view was disseminated in a number of U.S. and English works on the history of the Second World War. In his book "Crusade To Europe" General Eisenhower maintained that it had been impossible "to begin the huge invasion into Europe" since the U.S. couldn't provide the number of forces equal to the British to participation in the first phase of the invasion and "American industry could not produce the huge quantity of armaments necessary". As is evident, they were trying to create "comfortable" conditions for their landing forces. In his memoirs W. Churchill also justified the inability to open the Second Front by references to the insufficient amount of landing craft and forces concentrated on the British Isles.

These assertions are biased for the military potential of the Western Allies even in 1942, never mind 1943, was such that had they wished, with mobilization, distribution and use they could have quickly accumulated forces on the British Isles and made the landing in northern France. The situation in Western Europe in 1942 was very favorable for an invasion across the English Channel.

The myth about the "decisive significance" of the operations by Anglo-American forces for victory over Fascist Germany after they opened the Second Front in Europe were widely circulated in bourgeois historiography. Many Western authors present the history of the Second World War in such a way that after 6 June 1944 the German Fascist leadership's total attention was switched to the West and the Soviet-German Front became secondary for the Hitlerites. American historian S. Morrison states that the destruction of Germany was "a

direct consequence of the Allied landing in Western Europe". According to the assertions of Colonel P. Ruckbrodt of the West German Bundeswehr, "the battle in Normandy had exceptional significance for the outcome of the war".

Such assertions incredibly exaggerate the role of military operations of the Western Allies after opening the Second Front. Undoubtedly the Normandy landing by Allied forces worsened Fascist Germany's position but it did not create the basic redistribution of Wehrmacht forces between the Western and Eastern Fronts. One should also keep in mind that the Second Front was opened under conditions exceptionally favorable for the Anglo-American forces and this was caused by the major offensive operation of the Soviet Army. The dire situation that Fascist Germany was in on the Eastern Front by summer 1944 did not allow Germany to detach enough forces to create a firm defense to repulse the Allied landing in northern France.

It is easy to become convinced that the scale, might and results of operations by Western Allied forces in France during the summer and fall of 1944 can in no way be compared with the offensive by Soviet forces in this same period. Whereas German Fascist force losses from June to August 1944 were 296,000 on the Western Front, their losses on the Soviet-German Front were 917,000 men, or two and a half times greater.

Now under the influence of increased anti-Sovietism by the ruling circles of U.S. and other NATO states bourgeois propagandists are trying to discover more diverse and specific methods for justifying the anti-Soviet activities by the U.S. and England during the Second World War. This is indicative of the hopes of monopolistic bourgeois ideological servants, to put it graphically, to provide imperialism's contemporary military-political programs and its aggressive ventures with "historical experience".

In the Second World War including its closing stage the Soviet Union endured severe trials and endured them with honor. It was primarily the Soviet Union that blocked the Fascist aggressor's road to world supremacy and stopped the spread of expansion to other countries and continents. The Soviet Union did that which no other Western country could have done. It destroyed the base of the enemy forces and military equipment in a fierce battle and thus deprived the enemy of the means for waging war. More than 73 percent of all German Fascist losses in personnel and three quarters of the military equipment losses took place on the Soviet-German Front.

The Soviet Union led the rout of the Fascist aggressors and helped many people rid themselves of German and Japanese occupation. The Soviet Union was especially helpful to the people of Central and Southeastern Europe who had actively struggled for their freedom from Hitlerite tyranny.

Such is the historical reality and the truth about the opening of the Second Front. It convincingly and clearly refutes the myths devised by the various servants of aggressive imperialism to justify the present anti-Soviet course of the U.S. and its NATO allies. No false methods of history's perverters can muffle the size and international resonance of the deed done by our people and

its glorious Armed Forces. Preparing everywhere to mark an important date, the 40th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, people of good will throughout the planet today are paying deepest homage to the heroic people of the country of Soviets, the defenders of freedom and peace on earth.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. USE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS DURING WWII DISCUSSED

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[Article by Admiral V. Ponikarovskiy, chief of the Naval Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko: "The Use of U.S. Aircraft Carrier Forces During WWII"]

[Text] By the start of the Second World War, aircraft carriers were the youngest and least numerous class of surface ships. The U.S. Navy had five of them, England had seven, Japan--six and France--one.¹ Germany and the other belligerent countries did not have any. And although it had already become clear in WWI that aviation, including naval aviation, had a great future, during the period between wars and immediately before WWII in the navies of the states who had aircraft carriers or who had started building them, it was supposed that aircraft carrier forces would be used for supporting operations of squadrons of large artillery ships.

Carrier aviation was given such missions as conducting tactical reconnaissance, air defense of a squadron in transit and in battle, delivering preemptive strikes against enemy ships in support of artillery engagements, adjusting artillery fire of its own ships and exploitation of success. As a rule, the mission of delivering powerful strikes against fleet forces at bases and against both important military and economic objectives along the shore and, moreover, destruction of the main strike forces of the enemy's fleet (battleships) at sea, in which carrier aviation could have played a decisive role, was not assigned by any of the navies, including the American navy.

In spite of the fact that the experience American Navy's combat training before WWII indicated the positive prospects of using aircraft carrier forces in fighting at sea, the leadership of the U.S. Navy, as before, relied on battleships and their heavy artillery as the main means of achieving victory in a naval engagement. It is noteworthy that in the summer of 1940, the United States adopted the so-called "two-ocean navy law", in accordance with which it was planned to build powerful battle fleets in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Furthermore, it was considered that the tonnage ratio of battleships and aircraft carriers should be 3:1.²

By the time the U.S. entered the war, the Japanese Navy had more than triple the number of aircraft carriers than the American Navy and nearly triple the number of aircraft based on them.³

A radical change in the views of the U.S. command toward the role and place of aircraft carrier forces in battle at sea took place during WWII. The vast size of the Pacific Ocean and the considerable distance of combat operations from aircraft bases predetermined the greater importance of carrier aviation than in other theaters. The nature of the theater of military operations, the belligerent countries having aircraft carriers, the considerable increase during the war years in the number of them in the composition of navies, especially the American Navy, and the expansion of the fighting capabilities of carrier forces gave combat operations in the Pacific Ocean a pronounced "aircraft carrier tint". Most of the American aircraft carrier forces and practically all of the attack carriers conducted combat operations in the Pacific Ocean.

As a result of the Japanese Navy's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the main base of the American Pacific Fleet, the U.S. battle fleet, considered the main force and the backbone of this power's navy, in less than an hour lost its combat capability for many months. All battleships, 6 light cruisers, a destroyer and 272 aircraft were destroyed or damaged.⁴ At the moment of the Japanese attack the carriers were outside of the base and did not suffer any losses.

The successful operation of the Japanese aircraft carrier forces helped intensify the construction of ship-platforms of strike aviation--aircraft carriers--and their widespread attraction for fighting enemy ships at sea and at bases. Not only was the building of aircraft carriers, laid back before the war, accelerated, but a supplemental schedule for building ships of this class was also adopted.

Aircraft carrier building was done by large series and high-speed methods. Essex-class ships made up the basis of the attack carrier forces. Of the 24 ships planned for large-series building, 17 were commissioned during the war and the rest after it ended. At full displacement of 33,000 tons, an aircraft carrier had a speed of 31-34 knots and could carry about 100 aircraft. Furthermore, based on the hulls and propulsion plants of light cruisers, nine Independence-class aircraft carriers were built came to be named light aircraft carriers. The high speed of these carriers (33 knots) and the ample amount of aircraft on board (about 50) enabled them to operate jointly with the Essex-class carriers as part of fast aircraft carrier formations, intended for delivery of torpedo and bomb strikes by deck aircraft against ships at sea and bases and against coastal objectives, and also for conducting reconnaissance and providing air and antisubmarine defense of the ship formations.

As far back as 1941, before the U.S. entered the war, for the purpose of defending communication lines, especially of the Atlantic, the Americans began building escort carriers based on the hulls of suitable merchant marine vessels. After entering the war, the decision was made to expand mass construction of them based on series production of merchant vessels. Convoy

(escort) aircraft carriers with a standard displacement of 8-11,000 tons had a speed of 16-19 knots and carried 20-30 aircraft. All told, during WWII the USA built 30 attack and 115 convoy (escort) aircraft carriers. In 1941-1944, 76 of these carriers were transferred to England.⁵

Along with aircraft carrier building, mass construction of aircraft was expanded in the USA. As a result, the number of aircraft in the U.S. Navy grew from 1,700 in July 1940 to 41,300 in July 1945.⁶

Even before the development of the powerful aircraft carrier fleet, the Americans began using carrier formations for delivering strikes against enemy coastal targets and also for active countermeasures to Japanese amphibious landings. So, in February-March 1942 American carrier formations conducted raids against Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands, the Gilbert Islands, the island of New Guinea and the atolls of Wake and Marcus.⁷ These raids were conducted by fairly small forces and pursued limited goals: to influence the enemy, force him to disperse his forces in the huge theater and, thus, slow down the Japanese advance. In April 1942, 16 American B-25 Army bombers, having taken off from the carrier Hornet with a subsequent intermediate landing, attacked Tokyo and other cities of Japan.

In view of the fact that the American aircraft carrier aviation at that period did not have numerical superiority, the main attention of the U.S. command was directed at achieving surprise in attacks. This was helped by the high maneuverability of the aircraft carrier forces and the American command's sufficiently skillful use of hours of darkness and poor visibility for hidden deployment to the aircraft launch area. The carrier formations secretly approached the enemy shoreline to the combat radius of the deck aircraft, delivered surprise attacks and quickly withdrew. This tactic, called "bite and run", was typical for the Americans practically right up through 1944, until powerful aircraft carrier forces were developed which could provide a reliable self-defense even during long periods off the enemy coasts.

During the early years of the war, task forces, the nucleus of which was the aircraft carriers, as a rule, were temporary formations created for conducting raids on the enemy coastline. They were made up of 1-2 aircraft carriers, 3-4 cruisers and 6-8 destroyers.

Though in the spring of 1942 the military situation for the USA in the Pacific Ocean continued to be unfavorable, however, by that time the American Armed Forces had recovered from the initial failures and found it possible to assume more aggressive actions. So, U.S. Navy task forces, whose nucleus was aircraft carriers, were widely used for breaking up the assault landings by the Japanese at Port Moresby (New Guinea) and Midway Island. The combat actions of the aircraft carrier forces to destroy enemy naval forces at sea, the backbone of which was also aircraft carriers supporting the landing of the assault forces, were the main essence of these anti-assault-landing operations.

Combat operations of the aircraft carrier forces took the form of battles (in the Coral Sea in May 1942 and at Midway Island in June 1942). Furthermore, the Battle of Coral Sea was the first sea battle in the history of wars, in

the course of which sea engagements were conducted beyond the range of artillery and torpedo weapons of the ships. Carrier aircraft were used for destroying enemy naval forces and all other forces supported the operations of the aircraft carriers. Having lost the light carrier Shoho and 77 aircraft during the Battle of Coral Sea (besides that, the carrier Shokaku was damaged), the Japanese abandoned the assault landing at Port Moresby.⁸ Granted, the Americans at the same time lost the aircraft carrier Lexington which was considerably superior in firepower to the Japanese one sunk.

The Battle of Midway was the second battle, larger in the scope of aircraft carrier usage, in which the outcome of fighting was decided entirely by carrier aviation. As a result of American carrier aircraft strikes, the Japanese lost all 4 aircraft carriers together with 332 aircraft from the composition of the carrier force which was supposed to support the assault landing at Midway Island. This meant total failure of the Japanese operation.

The effectiveness of aircraft carrier aviation operations for destroying ships at sea was brought to light in the course of these battles. Aircraft carrier aviation, especially with massed usage and close coordination carrier torpedo-bombers and fighter aircraft, demonstrated the ability to deliver such powerful strikes against enemy ships that the need for an artillery duel of large surface ships was eliminated.

The battles of Coral Sea and Midway Island showed the decisive importance of first strike in an engagement of aircraft carrier formations, on which the outcome of the engagement depended. Enemy aircraft carriers were to be attacked immediately after their detection. In this case, the fighter aircraft could not be launched and the aircraft carrier ended up readily vulnerable. This corroborated the further increase in the role of reconnaissance in an engagement. Persistence and purposefulness in conducting it and skillful use of the reconnaissance data were the key guarantee of success.

Combat operations of aircraft carrier forces in the Coral Sea and at Midway Island, along with the successful operations of the Japanese aircraft carriers preceding these events and a number of other factors, led to a change in American views toward the nature of operations and combat actions for destroying enemy naval forces in the vast ocean theater. From that time on, aircraft carriers became the nucleus of large attack groupings of surface forces, which also included the newest battleships. The Battle of Midway Island not only contributed to the final consolidation of the Americans' point of view on advancing aircraft carrier forces into the class of the main fleet forces, but also confirmed the need to have a stable complement of aircraft carrier formations.

It should be noted that the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Second World War are trying to prove that supposedly the turning point in the course of war in the Pacific Ocean had come during the Battle of the Midway, successful for the Americans, even before the defeat of the German Nazi troops at Stalingrad. However, an analysis of the existing relative strengths of the sides after this battle and the defensive nature of combat operations which followed it contradicts such assertions.

If we are to talk about the reasons for the Japanese abandoning aggressive actions in 1943, then they primarily lie in the fact that the major defeats of Germany and its allies at the Soviet-German front forced Japan to abandon the offensive strategy and go over to the defensive. Besides that, the extent of expansion and the expansionist plans of Japan turned out to be incommensurable with its capabilities to provide long-term protection of the captured territories. Nevertheless, the United States government did not seek to unfold major offensive operations in the Pacific Ocean theater and limited itself to operations of a local nature. Only late in the year did the intensity and scale of actions of the U.S. Armed Forces in this area increase somewhat.

Starting in late 1943, after aircraft carrier aviation had been reinforced considerably, especially with the commissioning of Essex-class aircraft carriers, the newly formed aircraft carrier formations began to be widely used by the Americans during amphibious assault operations. The main missions of the aircraft carrier forces in these operations consisted of achieving supremacy at sea and in the air in the area of the operation by preliminary destruction of enemy fleet and aviation forces at bases and airfields, effective cover of the assault landing force in the area of the landing, close air preparation and support of the assault landing, as well as ensuring its reliable antisubmarine and air defense in transit and in the area of the landing. Thus, the missions of supremacy in the air and on the sea and effective cover of the area of the operation were given to fast strike carriers, which in 1944-45 in the Pacific Ocean were combined into one task force. This force had a permanent commander and staff, practically a fixed numerical strength and, as far as possible (upon preserving the combat capability of the ships), a stable force composition. It included 15-17 Essex and Independence class aircraft carriers, 7-9 battleships, 18-20 cruisers and about 60 destroyers. This force's authorized complement of aircraft exceeded 1,000 airplanes and in the most intense combat operations supported up to 2,500 aircraft sorties per day (see the table).⁹ According to its composition, combat capabilities and nature and scope of missions carried out, it actually was a large strategic formation (ob'yedineniye) of aircraft carrier forces.

Carrier Task Force (TF) Composition in Various Operations

| Aircraft Carrier Formations | Operations and When Conducted | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| | Marianas (1944) | Philippines (1944-45) | Okinawa (1945) |
| Designation | TF 58 | TF 38 | TF 58 |
| Composition: | | | |
| Aircraft carriers..... | 15 | 17 | 17 |
| Battleships..... | 7 | 6 | 8 |
| Cruisers..... | 21 | 14 | 16 |
| Destroyers..... | 66 | 58 | 64 |
| Aircraft carrier airplanes.. | 956 | 1280 | 1237 |

An aircraft carrier formation was broken down, as a rule, into four task groups. The strong aspects of such groups were: considerable striking power and combat stability, high maneuverability and a large range of action. The circular cruising formation ensured a rapid change of formation, depending on the main threat, to an air-defense or antisubmarine formation. In transit, along with all-round observation by technical means, the groups conducted aerial reconnaissance at a radius of up to 300 miles (560 km), which guaranteed the necessary time for launch and deployment of aircraft for strikes against the detected enemy forces.

Preceding an assault landing, the American carrier force delivered strikes against enemy bases and airfield for the purpose of destroying or weakening those forces which might offer opposition to the assault. The high maneuverability and combat stability of the carrier forces enabled them to deliver powerful surprise strikes against enemy forces at a long distance from their own bases, outside of the range of ground based aircraft. The actions of aircraft carrier forces at the end of the war took the form of rather lengthy operations, with strikes against bases, ports, airfields, ships and convoys at sea.

The tendency toward achieving supremacy in the air in the area of delivering strikes was characteristic for the operations conducted by American aircraft carrier forces in the Pacific Ocean in 1944-45 against bases and coastal objectives of Japan. This was achieved by preliminary destruction of enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air. For this purpose, reinforced fighter groups were assigned to the first aviation echelons and jointly with the bombers they achieved supremacy in the air. Only after a weakening of the enemy's air defense did the bombers and torpedo-bombers, escorted by fighters, deliver massive strikes against coastal targets, ships and vessels. In March 1944, while striking the Palau Islands, torpedo-bombers under fighter cover simultaneously mined the channels.

The tremendous size of the theater, the dispersion of Japanese forces throughout it and the high maneuverability of the aircraft carrier formations made the task of achieving surprise during the first strikes and achieving air supremacy in the area of the operation easier for the Americans. The Japanese delayed in redeploying forces for defending important objectives and for delivering retaliatory strikes against the enemy, and as a result suffered large losses. From June through December 1944 alone, Japan's naval aviation lost over 5,200 airplanes.

In the final stage of the war in the Pacific Ocean, thanks to the great striking power and maneuverability of aircraft carrier formations, the presence of American floating logistical units and also due to the weak opposition by the Japanese, the operations of aircraft carrier forces against Japanese bases and coastal installations were distinguished by a large spatial scope and duration. Instead of single strikes against one target, they began carrying out massive, successive strikes against many objectives hundred miles apart.

The experience of using carrier aviation against land objectives in WWII was widely used later on by the American militarists in local wars, especially for

delivering strikes againsts the troops, cities, bases, airfields and land lines of communication of the DPRK and DRV.

The allocation by the Americans of sizable groupings of the fleet's forces, the basis of which aircraft carriers made up, as operational covering forces and the desire of the Japanese to break off the landing of assault forces, mainly by fleet forces, led to a series of major naval battles in which the decisive role belonged to the carrier formations. Thus, in the Battle of the Marianas (June 1944) 24 aircraft carriers from both sides participated (15 American and 9 Japanese). It was one of the largest engagements of aircraft carrier forces. The Japanese Navy lost one-third of its aircraft carriers and most of its carrier aircraft in this battle, which had a substantial influence on changing the situation at sea.

In the course of the American invasion of the Philippine Islands (October 1944), the attempt by the Japanese naval forces to break off the landing of the American assault force led to the Battle of the Philippine Sea--the largest naval battle of WWII. It signified the end to the era of major engagements of gunships. In these engagements, the competition of old weapons, represented by the battleships carrying heavy-caliber artillery, with the new aviation weapons, developed for armed conflict at sea, ended in victory for the latter. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in which the Americans had nearly a ninefold superiority in aircraft carriers, the Japanese Navy not only suffered heavy losses in battleships and cruisers, but also lost its aircraft carrier forces. The forces of the Japanese Navy that remained, deprived of air support, did not have the capability to conduct combat operations successfully in all subsequent naval operations in the Pacific Ocean at any considerable distance from its own shores.

With the increased role of aviation in armed conflict at sea, strike aircraft carrier forces came to play a leading role in the destruction of enemy naval forces at sea, and the aircraft carriers themselves became the main targets of enemy strikes. This caused engagements and battles of aircraft carrier forces in which carrier aviation carried out the main mission. An engagement of carrier formations was a series of successive strikes and attacks by deck aircraft of both sides, differed fundamentally from naval engagements of the past and signified a new landmark in the evolution of naval art. The consequence of each side striving to strike before the enemy did was that the engagements of aircraft carrier groupings began at the limit of the tactical radius of strike carrier aviation and, given the presence of intermediate airfields, beyond its limits.

In 1944 the Americans began using strike carrier forces for disrupting Japan's ocean and sea lanes. In all, carrier aviation sank 359 Japanese transports (not counting small vessels with less than a 500 gross registered ton capacity) with an overall tonnage of 1.329 million gross registered tons¹⁰, which was 54 percent of the total tonnage sank by all elements of aviation (naval, army and others). As a result, carrier aviation immediately took the lead over other branches of aviation in antishipping. It used an average of 75 aircraft sorties per 1,000 tons sank, but shore-based aviation used an average of 313.¹¹ This is explained by the massed usage of aircraft carrier

aircraft, the higher level of training of its pilots and the widespread use of torpedoes.

Along with using the forces for disrupting Japan's communication lanes in the Pacific Ocean, the American command used escort carriers for defending the allied lanes of communications in the Atlantic, where U.S. convoy aircraft carriers began operating in 1943. Unlike the operations in the Pacific Ocean, it was conducted in the form of systematic operations. The main methods of using the carrier forces here were: escort carrier operations as part of the local security forces of convoys and active search and destruction of submarines in the navigation areas by carrier antisubmarine hunter-killer groups.

The inclusion of escort carriers as a part of convoy security provided a continuous aerial antisubmarine screen by the radar-equipped deck aircraft at a radius of up to 125 miles around the convoy on the entire transatlantic passage, even beyond the range limits of antisubmarine aircraft from coastal airfields. It made it possible to detect submerged submarines and attack them at a considerable distance from the convoy, which introduced an important offensive element into the tactics of convoy escort. The German submarines were largely deprived of the opportunity to close in on the convoys submerged, even at night. This was one of the major reasons the German-Nazi command was forced to abandon group usage of submarines.

The presence of aircraft carriers as part of the surface antisubmarine hunter-killer groups increased the effectiveness of their operations considerably and made it possible to carry out aerial antisubmarine observation and to organize aggressive joint operations of ships and aircraft in the search and destruction of submarines in the areas located outside of the coverage zone of shore-based antisubmarine aircraft. American hunter-killer groups (each consisting of an escort carrier and 3-11 fleet or escort destroyers) destroyed 51 German and 2 Japanese submarines in the Atlantic and adjacent waters between 1943-1945.¹² Whereas combat operations to defend shipping areas in the Atlantic at the beginning of the war were directed merely at impeding submarine penetration into zones of the most important lanes of communication and their presence in areas of combat operations, by the end of the war they took the form of aggressive fighting with submarines which involved the search and destruction of them in the shipping areas.

For the purpose of barring the entrance of German submarines into especially important areas, in March-April 1945 the Americans began establishing so-called mobile antisubmarine barriers (2 carriers and up to 20 other antisubmarine ships) on their probable deployment routes in the open part of the Atlantic. This was a new method of using antisubmarine forces for fighting submarines under conditions of the ocean theater.

Thus, the increase in the number of aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy during the war years and the sizable hitting power, combat stability, high maneuverability and large operating radius of the carrier formations enabled them to carry out successfully a wide range of missions in armed conflict at sea. The most important of these were the destruction of enemy ships at sea

and at bases, destruction of his aviation on the ground and in the air, destruction of coastal installations, disruption of the enemy's ocean and sea lanes of communication and the defense of their own, support of amphibious assault landings and breaking off those of the enemy, and air support of ground forces in coastal sectors. The wide range of combat application of carrier forces made them the most versatile arm of the naval forces, whose combat capabilities in WWII exceeded the capabilities of the traditional arms of the naval forces in many respects.

FOOTNOTES

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8. "Istoriya...", op. cit., Vol 5, p 390.
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12. Calculated according to data from: Morison S. E. "Bitva za Atlantiku vyigrana" [The Atlantic Battle Won], abridged translation from the English, Voenizdat, 1959, pp 327-333.

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12567

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AFGHANISTAN

PROFILE OF SOVIET SOLDIERS IN AFGHANISTAN

Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 7,8 Apr 84

[V. Sukhodol'skiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent written especially for RABOCHAYA GAZETA, : "Afghanistan Profiles"]

[7 Apr 84 p 3]

[Text] They are now far from home, artillerymen and motor riflemen, drivers and helicopter pilots, engineers, medics and communicators serving in the complicated and at times difficult situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Soviet soldiers true to their international duty are daily showing tenacity, courage, valor and heroism.

Where do they get these qualities? From faith in a just cause and in our ideals, from a firm conviction in the fact that our mission in Afghanistan, to help the Afghan people in their difficult struggle, is lofty, noble and great. From time to time courage and heroism are shown here while resolving the most diverse missions: delivering rice to a distant kishlak, providing fuel to tractors in Afghan cooperatives, rebuilding destroyed bridges over raging torrents in the mountains and saving the life of a peasant wounded in a Dushman attack.

The formation became still. Decorations were being presented to the best of the best, to military drivers. A ZIL-130 which had served faithfully and honestly for four years was being put on a pedestal in their honor. The vehicle had been riddled by bullets and had carried many thousands of tons of freight. Here at the monument the Order for "Service To The Motherland While In The Armed Forces" 3rd Class was being presented to transportation officer Ivan Kononenko. He has dozens of difficult trips under his belt and has seen mines in the road and Dushman bullets... His subordinates, military drivers sergeants Yuriy Ryabenko and Nikolay Makaseyev and privates Sergey Panteleyev and Vladimir Mazorchuk have acted decisively and with initiative in the most complicated situation.

One of the foremost soldiers in the subunit is Private Vladimir Slushnyy, a reliable, industrious driver. His home is in the village of Besedka in Kiev

Oblast's Stavishchenskiy Rayon. His parents Petr Nikolayevich and Mariya Matveyevna live and work there on the kolkhoz imeni Lenin. Before he left to join the Army Vladimir completed the Skvir's DOSAAF Automotive School and worked for a while as a driver for Selkhoztekhnika [Agricultural Equipment Association]. His parents can be proud of their son as he has not let the Ukrainian corn growers down. The soldier is fulfilling his military and international duty in Afghanistan with honor.

From trip to trip--this is the life of military drivers. They return to their own subunit, put their equipment in order and they're back on the road. Oh, the roads of Afghanistan...

In Afghanistan there are many soldiers and officers wearing orders and medals for valor displayed while fulfilling their international duty. Among them are the helicopter pilots of the squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Trubin.

The sun is just coming up over the other side of the mountain ridge, lighting up the eastern sky, but their work is already in full swing. At daybreak the helicopter pairs are raising in flight, and above the earth they meet the sunlight.

Some crews will return from missions, from the distant kishlaks of Badakhshan, from Khayraton, from ancient Herat. Work... Everything they have is interwoven into an undissolvable, tight knot, both their military training with daring raids on the "enemy" and their trips with cargo for their Afghan friends, at times into unfamiliar regions and often under Dushman fire. The squadron has many junior officers. Each day makes them stronger, for they fly a lot here and complete extremely diverse missions.

"I am satisfied with the lieutenants. Many are inspired by their command," says squadron commander Yevgeniy Trubin.

Above the land fly Heroes of the Soviet Union officers Vyacheslav Gaynutdinov and Vasiliy Shcherbakov, famous helicopter pilots and the pride and glory of the subunit. They set an example for the lieutenants to imitate.

Soviet aviators are sharing their knowledge, their "secrets", with Afghan pilots. They often fly together in narrow ravines and the spaciousness of river valleys, over yellow deserts and above snow-capped mountains. Soviet officers Vladimir Kuralenya, Igor' Markov and Sergey Kachalov are always dear guests in Afghan helicopter subunits.

And that day, after completing a training mission, the helicopter pilots landed as guests at an Afghan field airport.

Regimental commander Colonel Muhammad Vali met us. We sat with him in a small pavilion with low adobe walls and a roof built from the branches of evergreen Afghan cedar. The yellow airport was burnt by the merciless sun and from time to time clouds of yellow dust lifted over the take-off strip and the helicopter park. These were airplanes and rotodynes leaving on missions. The dust remained in the air for a long time, as if fog had settled over the airport.

Afghan helicopters have gone on missions in a combat operations area. Among them is the crew commanded by Lieutenant Gulyan Dzhan. A very short while ago he came here to this regiment for practical experience while a cadet at the VVS [Air Force] and PVO [Air Defense] Academy. After finishing school he was again assigned here. He flies confidently and time and time again he acts skillfully in the most complicated situations, coming in under Dushman fire and returning from missions with bullet holes from large caliber machine guns. Regimental commander Colonel Muhammad Vali describes him as a "daring, courageous officer".

"Not long ago he received an award, the Order of the 'Star' 3rd Class. Also decorated for successful military operations against the enemies of the people of Afghanistan were Lieutenant Muhammad Salem and Senior Lieutenant Rishad Akhmad."

Colonel Vali talks with pride about his charges. Academy cadets, future officer of the Afghan VVS are getting their flying experience in the regiment. Their combat development is taking place in a complicated environment. Even now it is hot in the Afghan sky. The undeclared war against popular power continues and the aviators of the Afghan Armed Forces are courageously and selflessly fighting the enemies of the republic. Many of them have been decorated with military orders and medals.

Among those honored with an award from the people of Afghanistan is a Soviet officer who commands an artillery battery, Captain Vladimir Skiba.

Pictured courageously fulfilling their international duty in Afghanistan from left to right are military drivers sergeants Yuriy Ryabenko and Nikolay Makaseyev and privates Vladimir Slushnyy, Vladimir Mazorchuk and Sergey Panteleyev. Also shown are peaceful trips by helicopter pilots.

[8 Apr 83 p 3]

[Text] We have seen him twice. The first time was in a former royal palace where the DRA Ministry of Defense was located. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's Minister of Defense Colonel General Abdul Kadyr was presenting the young artillery officer Vladimir Skiba a high award, the Order of the "Star" 3rd Class. I was unable to talk to him then, but several days later I found myself in the same area where his battery was deployed in the mountains. And I again met the commander -- in an overcoat and helmet among artillery privates Ivan Korshak, Aleksandr Bardabysh, Yuriy Azarov and Mikhail Shcherbachenko and Junior Sergeant Andrey Razdetov. He was just as he had been in the royal palace. He was conducting himself calmly and modestly, but with a feeling of self respect, courtesy and respect for others and high demands on himself and his actions.

There are garrisons in Afghanistan where several subunits stand together side by side. In his two years here Vladimir Skiba has moved three times and each time his battery is the garrison. And he, a junior officer, has been the primary "shuravi" for the Afghan inhabitants for many dozens of kilometers around. He has been the one they turn to for help and advice. He has helped them with transportation and shared provisions and fuel. On Sundays soldiers from the battery have gone to work in peasant fields. They helped build a dam and repaired a school and they did this selflessly, with a pure heart. And the people sense this. They may be illiterate and still not know that this is an "international duty" but they can distinguish friend from foe by their actions. And by a smile, expression in the eye, voice tone and also by warmth of heart. Skiba will leave, but here in these kishlaks, at the foot of two neighboring mountains, as they turn yellow in the rays of the passing sun, "Captain Volodya" who for some reason always understood them, will be remembered... He will receive subsequent promotions but here he will be remembered only as a young, slender man with four small stars on his shoulderboards.

He was born and raised on the Dneiper in Zaporozhye. His father worked at Zaporozhstal' as a steel roller all his life. He had always stood out and was known for his deeds, memorial medals and prizes. Vladimir Fedotovitch Skiba was recently pensioned, solemnly and in a simple workman's manner. People said some good things, gave some gifts and sincerely regreted his parting. Captain Skiba's mother Dar'ya Semenovna still works at the factory. His younger brother Oleg is in the Army stationed in Ciscarpatmia. Captain Skiba's wife Larisa Vladimirovna who was in his same class in school and is raising their four-year old son, also lives in Zaporozhye and waits for his letters and his return.

Vladimir Skiba and I walked through the firing battery position. The battery had gone into the mountains on an exercise and he told me about his comrades.

Scout-range finder operator Private Kirill Zheman had already left for the Motherland and soon to leave were gun commander Junior Sergeant Artur Frolenko and senior radio-telephone operator Private Mikhail Shcherbachenko. They were good, kind friends and people with whom you could share everything.

Life's highest reward is the love and respect people give. The love of the people. The Afghan people's attitude to the Soviet soldiers who have come to Afghanistan in this difficult hour is a special, loving attitude. Therefore People's Afghanistan recognizes the best of the best with military decorations.

"Russia will always remain the first friend of the Exalted Afghanistan State..." These are the words of Vladimir Il'ich and the Soviet people support Lenin's words with their actions. They are giving their Afghan friends all their strength and skills. Vladimir Kolpakov, head of a group of our specialists, and Comrade Sharifi, factory president, are working hand in hand in the nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif. Soviet engineer Aleksandr Rovnyy is generously sharing his experience with Afghan vehicle repairmen at the automated Dzhangalak plant in Kabul.

Chief of the Department of Construction Muhammad Sharif met us at the paving asphalt factory in the steppes near Naibabad. This factory was built two years ago with Soviet assistance. Sharif told us that factory production was guaranteeing the construction of a road from Naibabad to the port of Khayraton.

"A road means life," said Muhammad Sharif. "And this is doubly true in Afghanistan. We need roads to defeat the enemy and become a powerful country. We will have them and they will be good ones."

All of his life has been associated with roads. Muhammad Sharif is proud of the fact that for a quarter of a century already he has worked with Soviet engineers. Together with them he built Salang, was chief mechanical engineer for construction there and received the Soviet order "Badge of Honor" from the hands of Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin. Then he built the Kunduz-Kashim-Kabul-Dzhelalabed road and now they are putting in a new roadway here in the north. He has many friends in the Soviet Union. Among them are Evgeniy Ivanovich Bronitskiy from Siberia with whom he worked in Salang. He worked in Puli-Khumri with Alya Gasparov from Tyumen and with Vyacheslav Filimonov from Moscow. His son Nadzhib, a future construction engineer, is studying in Moscow and his other son Bashir is a student at Baku's Institute of Oil and Gas.

People at the factory love and respect Soviet engineer Ivan Petrovich Mikhaylov. Their "Vanechka" would not leave the factory until they reached their desired goal of 400 tons of paving asphalt per day.

Roads are Afghanistan's future and Soviet and Afghan workers and engineers are building this future with their hands.

A memorial column of white rock is being erected at the entrance to Kabul's Central Military Hospital area. On it one can read that this hospital complex was constructed with economic and technical assistance of a friendly neighboring country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Soviet and Afghan doctors work hand in hand in it. Together they equipped the medical and operating rooms with modern technology and they now work there together. The war with counterrevolutionaries is continuing and Afghan soldiers are not sparing their lives, fighting bandit formations directed from abroad. And not sparing their efforts, here in the hospital the people in white smocks are fighting for the lives of wounded Afghan soldiers and officers.

Among them is Afghanistan's first female surgeon, Sukhayla Seddyk. And she is not just a surgeon, but a talented surgeon able to do the most intricate operation.

Sukhayla was born and raised in Kabul but she became a doctor in Moscow. She studied in the 1st Moscow Medical Institute imeni I.M. Sechenov and completed graduate work and defended her disserattion there. Sukhayla left for Moscow a girl, but returned to Kabula as Candidate of Medical Science Surgeon Sukhayla Seddyk.

Sukhayla lovingly talks about her instructors. Among them were Professor Viktor Ivanovich Struchkov and Emmanuil Vikent'yevich Lutsevich. She recalls classmates Irina Voyevodskaya and Tat'yana Shmidt.

Wounded were brought in and the operation begun. The next operation is done by Central Military Hospital's chief of surgery Major of Medical Services Sukhayla Seddyk, assisted by Soviet surgical nurse Lyudmila Valil'yevna Babikova, her faithful assistant and good friend.

Soviet doctor Nikolay Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, a reknown specialist in organizing medical work, now works here in the hospital. He is a very experienced man and he generously gives his knowledge, habits and skills to his Afghan friends. He with pride and respect praises his colleagues. "I am proud of Candidate of Medical Sciences Khan Aka Saida, chief of blood transfusion station Dzhuma Kayumi and the hospital's leading surgeon Ramaki and am happy for their successes," said Nikolay Ivanovich. "They are excellent doctors and real revolutionary soldiers."

Yes, and here in the hospital the front line passed today. It is an invisible front with popular Afghanistan on one side and its enemy the counterrevolution on the other.

It is difficult to live in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Bands of counterrevolutionaries directed from abroad are terrorizing the local population, destroying schools and hospitals and are spreading diversion in factories and plants. Washington has apportioned 105 million dollars for the Afghan counterrevolution for the next fiscal year.

But the republic has a true, tested friend, its northern neighbor the Soviet Union. In this difficult hour for the Afghan people, the Soviet Union has come to help.

Popular Afghanistan is flourishing and spreading its wings, driving the uninvited guests from its land. And this time is not far distant! The best sons and daughters of the Afghan people are dreaming about this and are bringing it closer with their very lives. And next to them in their difficult struggle are the Soviet people.

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AFGHANISTAN

TASHKENT CITES PLUNDERING OF REFUGEE FUNDS IN PAKISTAN

GF121807 Tashkent International Service in Uzbek 1700 GMT 1 Jun 84

[Unattributed commentary: "The Leaders of the Enemies and the Question of Afghan Refugees"]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, with the help of patriotic youths, peasants, and [word indistinct], the DRA armed forces have broken up many of the large enemy groups. However, the enemies of the April Revolution are continuing to send new Basmachi groups in to the DRA from foreign countries and train harmful counterrevolutionaries and secessionists. However, the enemies of the April Revolution have not succeeded in diverting the path chosen by the Afghan people. It is due to this that at night time they are terrorizing the people of villages, seeking vengeance from the local actives of the populist sovereignty, forcibly acquiring foodstuffs and livestock products from the farmers, and causing damage.

What is causing the continuation of this state of affairs? Western imperialist forces and their agents are supplying funds and arms to the criminals. However, the leaders of Basmachi groups are not always succeeding in fulfilling the expectations of their (?patrons). It has been some time now that they have been making a greater effort to attract ordinary farmers to their ranks--farmers who live in refugee lairs on Afghanistan's borders. In fact, they are resorting to force in that regard. The enemies are threatening the families of farmers who refuse to join the ranks of Basmachi groups.

The general volume of the aid extended to the Afghan refugees by a number of international organizations, agencies, and countries totals over \$1 billion. However, as it has been admitted by foreign press organs, the Afghans who have been placed in refugee lairs in [words indistinct] are experiencing difficult times in the lairs. Very little of the aid given by foreign countries is finding its way to them. The main portion of the large funds made available in the form of aid is (?disappearing). The funds are being channelled to refugees through various refugee centers. But who are benefitting from the foreign aid in such institutions? The plunder begins in Islamabad, continues in provinces bordering Afghanistan, and ends in the hands of the officials in refugee lairs.

The aid extended by foreign countries is first channelled to Islamabad. Through various intrigues, the government officials there and the leaders of Basmachi groups plunder the major portion of the funds. The scandal related to the ill-fated aid extended by imperialist countries supporting the Afghan counterrevolution is a daily case among the leaders of Basmachi groups. They are even slandering one another with a view to plundering funds made available for the upkeep of refugees.

All this discloses the identity of the renegades Washington and its allies are relying on in the struggle made against the DRA. Therefore, under the circumstances, there is no salvation for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. However, if they decide to leave [words indistinct] and return back to the homeland, it is not always possible to realize this decision. Pakistani officials, Basmachi centers, and their (?collaborators) are creating many difficulties for such people. Special prisons are being set up in refugee lairs. Those who refuse to participate in Basmachi activities are being thrown into them. Difficult tasks are assigned to those put into such prisons and those who refuse to carry them out are killed.

Irrespective of all this, however, the return of refugees to their beloved homeland has recently increased. The general amnesty declared by the central government in Kabul is helping this trend.

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AFGHANISTAN

DRA'S RESTORATION OF PANJSHER VALLEY NOTED

LD191342 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 19 Jun 84

[Text] Boris (Zavodyan), our correspondent in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, reports:

[Zavodyan] In almost every issue of the Afghan papers one can read reports on how the situation is being normalized in the Panjsher Valley. The inhabitants of these parts, isolated from the outside world by tall mountains, have always been downtrodden and shackled by traditional or religious prejudice.

With the victory of the April 1978 Revolution the counterrevolution has made attempts more than once to use the geographic situation of the Panjsher and the traditional suspicion of the Panjsher inhabitants toward central authority for its own self-interested goals. Until recently a large band of counter-revolutionaries was active there; it has been responsible for blowing up dozens of bridges and electric-power transmission lines. But the greatest crime was committed against the peaceful inhabitants, who were driven out to the mountains. There they lived in caves, they froze, they starved, they suffered sickness.

To free the population from the Basmachi's oppression, the leadership of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan worked out an operation which was successfully completed at the beginning of May.

As for the current situation in the Panjsher Valley, I asked (Adaf Ahim), deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to tell us about it.

[Begin recording, fading into translation] I have recently returned from a trip to the Panjsher Valley, says (Adaf Ahim). The situation is being gradually normalized there. As is known, a large detachment of volunteers formed by the Kabul City party committee recently visited the Panjsher. Its fighters selflessly toiled, eradicating the damage caused by the bandits. In the villages of the Panjsher, schools and hospitals have been refurbished and the dams and irrigation system cleaned by the efforts of the volunteers.

The inhabitants of the Panjsher, continues (Adaf Ahim), never knew what electricity was before. Now there is a diesel generator installed there which

lights hundreds of Afghan homes. To aid the inhabitants of the valley, tons of flour have been brought to the Panjsher, as well as tons of vegetable oil, sugar, hundreds of kilograms of tea, blankets, matches, and other essential goods. The party and the revolutionary government will also give aid in the future to the inhabitants of the Panjsher, (Adaf Ahim) said in conclusion.

CSO: 1801/380

END