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# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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3 April 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT  
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ROMANIAN SURVEY OF HUNGARIAN MINORITY LITERATURE REVIEWED

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 22, 25 Nov 83 p 48

[Review by Buia Simion of book "Romaniai Magyar Irodalmi Lexikon" [Lexicon of Hungarian Literature in Romania] by Edgar Balogh, Kriterion Publishing House, Bucharest, 1981, number of copies printed and number of pages not specified]

[Text] As an expression of the general constructive lively atmosphere stimulated by the Romanian Communist Party in all fields of activity, of its concern for ensuring the conditions for the full manifestation of the cultural creativity of the Romanian people and - with fully equal rights with them - of the cohabitating nationalities, the appearance of the first volume of "Lexiconul literaturii maghiare din Romania" [Lexicon of Hungarian Literature in Romania] is noted as a fruitful contribution to the better understanding of the value of Hungarian literature in Romania and its organic link with Romanian realities and Romanian spiritual affairs.

This broad scientific summary written by Edgar Balogh, in cooperation with over one hundred specialists, has marked a real editorial event, constituting a faithful reflection of the inclusion of the Transylvanian Hungarians into the realities of our country, as reunited in 1918 by the unification of the Ardeal with Romania and the desire of the educated progressive Hungarian people to participate in the creation of a democratic society by way of a productive cooperation with the progressive elements of the Romanian people. Benefiting from the rights to cultivate their language and traditions and to preserve and develop their own spirituality, the Hungarians in Romania have been integrated into the general development process, with one of the eloquent expressions of this fact being the appearance of Hungarian literature having as a specific characteristic "belonging to Romania."

The lexicon is centered around the bibliographies and work of the quasi-totality of authors who, from the formation of the unified Romanian national state until today, have contributed to the development of Hungarian literature in Romania, with the notion of "literature" also including scientific and journalistic accomplishments of any type. The articles in the lexicon facilitate the reconstruction in retrospect of the moment in which - within the new geographic and spiritual borders and within the environment of the new political and social realities - the literary and artistic creative forces of the Hungarian population in Transylvania began to outline their own profile and to experience a unified development within the Romanian state.

From the spring of 1919, the first Hungarian magazines appeared in Oradea, Tirgu Mures, Arad and Timisoara, oriented towards bourgeois radicalism, cultivating philo-proletarian vanguard literature. Cultured people like Bela Zsolt, Geza Tabery, Osvat Kalman, Zoltan Franyo or Gyorgy Szanto started in regrouping the viable, healthy forces of Hungarian literature in Transylvania. As a result, even in 1920, in NAPKELET, a literary supplement to the daily KELETI UJSAG, over 130 Hungarian writers from our country had articles, with their efforts totaling 1,408 pages. Gradually, quantity was transformed into quality. During the inter-war period, Hungarian literature in Romania was characterized by a progressive development, even if its multilateral prosperity was also accompanied by the appearance of certain distortions. It was the period of the affirmation of certain new talents, such as, for example, "The Group of Szeckler Writers," led by Aron Tamasi. A series of anti-militarist novels appeared unmasking the cruelty of World War I, such as "Manastirea neagra" [Black Monastery] by Aladar Kuncz and "Garnizoana din Siberia" [The Garrison in Siberia] by Rodion Markovits, as well as the Hungarian historical novel in Transylvania dedicated to evoking revolutionary traditions. Within this framework, Karoly Kos placed on paper fragments from the life and struggles of Antal Budai Nagy.

In 1921, the magazine PASZTORTUZ came into being, one conservative in its intentions, but which needed to ask along the way for the collaboration of writers having more radical views. In 1924-1926, the bases were laid for the "Erdelyi Helikon" literary society, which, in 1928, published a periodical with the same name and also administered the Erdelyi Szepmives Ceh Publishing House. All this shows that in the context of the new Romanian realities the Hungarians found numerous and significant forms of their own expression on the soil of the realities of their common country.

As is clearly shown in the articles in the lexicon, alongside the literature of bourgeois humanism and its various trends and currents, a leftist, militant and Marxist literature was also being outlined. The spirit of proletarian radicalism appears in Zoltan Franyo's magazines, GENIUSZ and UJ GENIUSZ, and in the periodical PERISZKOP by Gyorgy Szanto. In the 1926, the magazine KORUNK was created. Laszlo Dienes, the first chief of this publication, openly stated the ideal of committed, revolutionary art. Until 1940 - the point it was suspended by the Horthyst authorities - KORUNK, headed since 1929 by Gabor Gaal, had affirmed itself as a publication of high theoretical and progressive leanings.

During this period, literature from the popular front also made itself known, under the leadership of the democratic and progressive forces headed by the RCP, against fascism and Horthyst revisionism and for the defense of the unity and integrity of Romania. Its objectives were formulated at the meeting at Tirgu Mures on 2 October 1937 by Hungarian young people in Romania: the reaffirmation of the ideal of brotherly coexistence and of the desire for cooperation with the Romanian people for the purpose of achieving a democratic radical turning point that would also guarantee the future of the Hungarians in Romania and for the purpose of rejecting fascism and revisionism. The

message of the Tirgu Mures meeting was broadly spread and applied in the struggle carried out by the progressive forces of the Hungarian nationality on the eve of the fascist Diktat of Vienna and the opening of World War II.

In evoking the progressive traditions of the literature of the Hungarian nationality and dedicating the minutely documented articles of the authors, groups, books and publications of the era, the lexicon offers an encompassing picture of the present, the realities of socialist Romania and the fruitful results of the policy of the RCP in the nationality problem and of the thoughts and practical actions of the secretary general of the party, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. The constant development and the growth of the esthetic value of Hungarian literature and publications in Romania are brought together in an impressive picture. Speaking about the realities of socialist Romania and militating for its prosperity and for brotherhood and cooperation - on the basis of the most equal rights - of workers without regard for nationality, this literature is harmoniously included within the unified boundaries of today's literature and journalism in our country.

Incontestably, without an awareness of its past no literature is able to fulfill its fundamental social functions. The authors of this lexicon are rightly guided by the ideas of Gabor Gaal: "Literature that forgets its past cannot have a future." That is why, in addition to the important concerns regarding the socialist present, the cultivation of historical traditions and the investigation of the universal values of Hungarian literature remain a constant concern.

Hungarian literary creations naturally reflect the ascendent evolution - in an economic, social and spiritual sense - in the affairs of the Hungarian nationality in our country and the furthering of the continuous process of its historical self-understanding. The literary magazines, UTUNK in Cluj-Napoca, IGAZ SZO in Tirgu Mures and the other approximately 30 gazettes and daily newspapers, publish numerous literary works in poetry and prose. At the same time, another characteristic trait of their activities has started to be the increased attention that is being given to scientific journalism.

"The Lexicon of Hungarian Literature in Romania" also contains in its pages the phenomena of interaction that have resulted from the material and spiritual coexistence of the Hungarian nationality with the Romanian people. Likewise, in this book we see the institutions that have been created and made available to the Hungarians by the Romanian state, and diverse aspects are presented from the fruitful activities of the publishing houses, theaters, mass media and so forth that are in the Hungarian language. We have, therefore, a documentary, scientific and demonstrative summary containing a veritable encyclopedia of the political, cultural and other rights that the Hungarians today enjoy in Romania. They are concretely and convincingly attested to in the daily life of our common country, increasing ever more the prestige of the policy of our party and state.

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FRG REPORTS ON EMIGRATION WAVE, PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS

Recent Events, Possible Effects

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 38 No 10, 5 Mar 84 pp 17-19, 21

[Article: "'Erich, Turn the Lights Out'"]

[Text] In order not to worsen relations with Bonn, the SED leadership is steering an unusual course: Thousands of GDR citizens are allowed to leave the country, and East Berlin even submits to such spectacular escape actions as that by Stoph's niece going into Bonn's embassy in Prague. While such liberal policy brings Honecker closer to the next credits for billions, it carries high risks to the stability of the SED state.

Before Helmut Kohl and his ministers last Wednesday joined the Rhenish fools in the lobby of the chancellery, the Chancellor asked his Inner-German Relations Minister Heinrich Windelen for a report on not all too cheerful a matter.

Windelen's report: In the afternoon of 24 February, the niece of GDR Prime Minister Willi Stoph, Ingrid Berg (39), with her husband, two children and her mother-in-law, sought asylum in the FRG Embassy in Prague and now wanted to leave for the West. Together with the Berg family, Windelen reported, as many as 25 GDR citizens were now in the embassy, some since 2 February.

As usual in such cases, his State Secretary Ludwig Rehlinger had got in touch with the East Berlin lawyer Wolfgang Vogel. There was no doubt, said Windelen about the state of negotiations, that the Berg family would get to the FRG in the "usual way." Like other GDR escapees before, Stoph's niece would first have to return to the GDR but had received assurances for a speedy departure.

The FRG government, the Chancellor decided, had a "top priority interest" in not seeing this long established practice upset. The spectacular escape by Stoph's niece should not furnish the GDR leadership with a pretext for stopping the generously granted emigration permits for thousands of GDR citizens since early this year.



That pretext almost came from Minister Heinrich Windelen himself, one of the tail-enders of the Kohl Cabinet--because of "his loquaciousness" (Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher).

Windelen, that is, not only had confirmed the defection story as published by two Springer papers Sunday a week ago, he also, along with it, babbled about a couple of things to which East Berlin normally reacts with extreme sensitivity. The Bonn government, as both WELT AM SONNTAG and BILD AM SONNTAG were quoting the Inner-German Relations Minister, was "seeking a solution through an attorney's mediation." Windelen had added: "We sometimes got quick and positive decisions from the other side in the past."

"Such excessive communicativeness," Genscher had announced through his press spokesman, was "poison for inter-German relations." The Foreign Minister ordered his personnel to keep their mouth shut about Berg's tricky defection attempt.

Last Wednesday Windelen bitterly complained about Genscher in the Cabinet. His under-secretary of state, Rehlinger, the upset Inner-German Relations Minister justified himself, had coordinated the official go-ahead for the prominent escape with GDR attorney Vogel. Both had agreed such a spectacular event could not be hushed up. Genscher probably did not know about that and instead had publicly attacked him.

Chancellery Minister Philipp Jenninger rebuked his party friend Windelen saying such criticism of a colleague was improper around the Cabinet table, especially since Genscher was absent. Instead of complaining there, he should have settled the matter with his colleague by phone.

The minister responsible for inner-German relations in the chancellery had every good reason for stopping the controversy, for last Wednesday it by no means looked as if the case of the prominent escapees in the Prague Embassy could be settled the normal way.

The SED Politburo, to be sure, a day before in its weekly meeting, had agreed to accommodate the Bergs as much as the six GDR citizens late in January who had sought asylum in the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin and were allowed to leave for the West a few days later--after first voluntarily leaving the U.S. Embassy.

Yet in the Lobkowitz Palace in Prague, Bonn's Ambassador Klaus Meyer and his officials first ran into fierce resistance from the Berg family about letting itself be released to the FRG via the GDR. Especially the husband, Hans-Dieter (36), well-off at home in Zeesen as a private plumber, had conducted himself, so a Bonn official said, "like someone part of the nomenclature." The couple had delayed negotiations by raising "conditions"--the Meissen china had to come along and an old grandfather clock as well.

Finally, however, the inner-German "coalition of reason," SED Boss Erich Honecker keeps talking about, stood the test: Last Thursday the Bergs returned to the GDR--provided with an assurance from lawyer Vogel that they soon could emigrate to the FRG.

It was not so much the worry about the fate of the Prague refugees that caused that excitement in Bonn. Rather, the FRG government was afraid the public ado about the escape might have negative effects on something far more important to inter-German relations: Since January East Berlin has let up to 200 citizens tired of the GDR to the FRG daily, a total of circa 4,000 thus far. According to SED circles that the unusual increase in departures is to continue till mid-year.

By this generous gesture, according to Bonn's interpretation, Honecker means to demonstrate how much value he attaches to good relations with the FRG in spite of the general East-West tensions. SED people are spreading the information their boss this way was paying tribute to that the Christian-Liberal government, which he is convinced will last long, had renounced turn-about maneuvers in the Germany policy.

That he pursues his own interests in this is understood. For the urgently needed modernization of its industry and the redemption of debts to the West, the GDR needs more billions from Bonn. That Honecker has to compensate for this with a solid quid pro quo that Helmut Kohl can show to the CDU/CSU constituency, as Honecker learned from the vehement reactions by parts of the CDU/CSU last summer after CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss engineered credits worth billions.

Based on extensive analyses by MfS (Ministry for State Security), the SED Politburo, after along debates, came to the conclusion that the reciprocities the FRG government insists on most stubbornly--reducing the minimum conversion rate for visitors from the West and the travel age for GDR citizens--would create very serious problems at the moment.

Instead, the top dogs decided on a perceptibly more generous handling of emigration applications from their subjects--which is possibly also a dangerous game.

Their citizens' unquenchable drive to go west has persecuted the East Berlin regents like a nightmare as long as there has been a GDR.

Before 13 August 1961 nearly 2.7 million inhabitants slipped out of the GDR, most of them through the loophole Berlin. Even the wall did not provide the SED with the respite hoped for: Up to 1966, more than 10,000 GDR citizens got away annually through the barriers or via third countries.

Not until the SED had secured the inner-German border by ever more sophisticated installations, mines, automatic shooting devices, tripwires, and bare trails, the break-out number fell, to 228 last year.

Yet year after year, several thousand GDR citizens managed to sneak away from real socialism. In 1983 alone, 2,000 GDR citizens got to the West against the will of their bosses.

One of these forbidden paths has since the mid-1970's led through the FRG's diplomatic missions in the East Bloc, mainly through that of Bonn in Hannoversche Strasse in East Berlin. Already in 1977 there were 13 GDR citizens who switched sides by means of this discreet track, meanwhile the number may be far in excess of 100.

For a limited number of GDR citizens the chance to leave legally existed before. Even in the years right after the building of the wall, when the SED was most fussy about keeping the subjects in, the GDR top dogs let between 30,000 (1963) and 11,000 (1969) of their fellow-countrymen out--most of them pensioners who were a burden on the GDR and not of much use.

The number also remained constant after Bonn and East Berlin had relaxed their relationship through the Basic Treaty in 1972. In a correspondence on that Basic Treaty, the GDR committed itself to "solving problems resulting from the separation of families." In the wake of family reunification, a few thousand GDR citizens have since joined their relatives in the FRG on request each year.

This humanitarian gesture had a side-effect East Berlin did not want at all: More and more GDR citizens, invoking the UN Charter and the CSCE Helsinki accords, apply for emigration to the West, even those who have no suitable relative there.

The first climax in the wave of applications came in 1976: Between 100,000 and 200,000 people, as FRG experts estimate, then left a record with the authorities that they wanted to leave their socialist homeland. Thereafter the congestion dropped again, yet 7 years later it reached another record when there were as many as 500,000 GDR citizens, according to figures circulating within the SED, who now made exit applications to the authorities--and that would be 3 percent of the entire GDR population.

Neither the high standard of living in the GDR, compared with the fraternal socialist countries, nor the high unemployment in the FRG evidently have been able to make the slogan "GO West" unattractive. What is especially embarrassing to the SED is that among those who want to go are more and more young citizens who grew up in the GDR and who are familiar with the FRG only through the double-filter of socialist anti-propaganda and FRG TV.

That the gates to the West are now opened wider than last year may have been helped by the public spectacle over the escape of the six GDR citizens into the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin, which publicized this surreptitious way to the West all the way to the most remote corners of the GDR. The SED fears too many imitators if no valve is opened--correctly, as has meanwhile been shown, and not only in Prague. Still, the East Berlin event was not crucial for Erich Honecker's decision to let more notorious would-be emigrants go.

Even last summer, to the former chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, the general secretary intimated he saw little sense in forcing people to stay who by no means wanted to accommodate themselves to the workers and farmers state. "It may be his philosophy that travelers should not be stopped," an SPD Honecker expert said.

As a matter of fact, even the deployment of new U.S. missiles in the FRG produced no negative effects, Bonn had been afraid of, on family reunification and prisoner release purchases. On the contrary: the GDR prepared internally what since January has become a veritable emigration wave to the FRG.

As applications are unevenly processed by the internal affairs authorities from bezirk to bezirk and from town to town, regional congestions had formed over the

years. Some offices treated the would-be emigrants like criminals; their applications, if accepted at all, often remained unprocessed for years, and frequently the applicants would lose their jobs.

Especially these people then who really had nothing to look for any longer in the GDR threatened to become an uncontrollable source of unrest. By late last year Honecker evidently saw to it that the authorities proceed more uniformly, old applications are processed and more recent ones are also dealt with generously.

From that the GDR gains two immediate advantages. For one thing, it gets rid of some of the citizens it can no longer integrate. And then, it gets foreign exchange into its treasury. Bonn has always paid for family reunification, either by goods like raw materials or by cash.

The price is far below that of buying the release of prisoners, to be sure, but it rises in conformity with the status of vocational training and to the extent that the proven or claimed relationship to persons in the FRG diminishes. The current emigration wave is likely to be made up mainly by cases of the so-called counterfeit, i.e. expensive, family reunification. Bonn sent East Berlin a lump-sum payment ahead of time for it.

The SED boss is taking a big chance. The dash for the West could easily cause the opposite of what Honecker intends. Anyone who can get out not only makes those envious who have to stay and wait, he also animates others who were reluctant thus far and, furthermore, are bound to be afraid that after the end of the ongoing release activity perhaps nothing will work any longer.

The SED Politburo is aware of the risk to the GDR's internal stability. Through a restrictive decree on exit permits issued last fall, the bosses do have an instrument in hand, in conformity with the resolutions from the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid, for rejecting applications from all those whose departure is in every way undesirable.

That group of persons is more or less identical with those GDR citizens whose Western contacts are forbidden for reason of state and party. That includes the circa 2 million SED members, the functionaries of the Bloc parties fused in the National Front, all economic functionaries and civil servants.

The SED leadership thus is engaged in a double-strategy: Long before the exit wave got started the party organized a rigorous ideological campaign against contacts with the West and emigration applications.

Not even indoctrinated SED types, let alone the state security characters, expect the SED will score.

What they know about desires of the GDR people is rather more like what a popular GDR joke suggests: Honecker one evening returns from a trip abroad. Riding from the airport to the capital he is amazed: everything lit up but no person out in the street. Finally he arrives at a hole in the wall and finds a slip of paper that says: "Erich, you are the last, turn the lights out."

## Refugee Views, Reactions Reported

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 38 No 10, 5 Mar 84 pp 20-21

[Article by Hans-Joachim Noack: "A Packet of Tobacco and the Basic Law--Report on the GDR Emigrants at the Giessen Refugee Center"]

[Text] As though blinded Wilfrid Breitfeld stands late Tuesday evening on the lower Bahnhofstrasse in Giessen in front of show-windows of "Moebelstadt Sommerlad," "Mode-Treff," and "Backparadies Joest." Which of the displays jumping at him from all sides should he deal with first, get into first?

Butcher Breitfeld (34) of Mildenau, Erz Mountains, tarries long in the middle of the street. "Boy, am I dreaming?" No, of course not. What he sees there, to him is a "dreamlike reality," A Streetcar Named Desire, after three and a half years of incessant pressure to be allowed to depart for the West.

Bus-driver Helmut Ulitsch (35) of Poessneck in Thuringia experiences this moment of supreme happiness as a triumph, like "having accomplished a feat." He had "tried something, without pause, which actually does not work, and now it did work after all."

This tough worker, tired of real socialism, had tried 29 times since 1981 to get his application through for leaving the GDR. That many times, and never a response.

Then, last Friday, within a few hours he gets everything he had wished for all these years: from the "state motor vehicle division" his labor contract cancellation for change of residence," from the kreis council, his "release from GDR citizenship," a substitute ID card--and a hint from state security to get out "quietly."

No longer a "feat"? That is the way it meanwhile looks indeed. Nearly 200 emigrants are welcomed in a single day at the transit camp in Giessen. When Ulitsch and Breitfeld, both with wives, move into a room together there on 28 February, camp director Heinz Doerris reporting a "veritable exit boom."

Nothing like that has happened since the wall went up in Berlin. So much of a boom it is that night, that dozens of emergency cots are not enough. This is a situation that evokes from the father of the hostel, a Hessian with heart, a flexibility tried and tested for 30 years. Doerr opens up the meeting room to the Trentsch family from Dresden with their 2-year-old daughter, Claudia.

Ossi Brauner, in charge of organization, is cheerful as he dishes out food to a line of waiting people: "Please, do not mind that we have to move a bit closer. But in freedom, one can put up with a bit of crowding."

Sometimes it looks as if the terrible times had returned. Whenever a train from Bebra arrives in Giessen and a crowd of men, women and children forms on the platform moving, carrying their belongings in suitcases, bags and cartons toward the camp. Pictures of refugees like 40 years ago in Germany--and still a presence.

Many of those who are going west from the east are between 25 and 40, in their best years, that is. The number of skilled specialists is also amazingly high.

Why they precisely now may leave the GDR--some decades after making their first application for it, others after only 3 months--is likely to remain a secret for the time being. Is the next billion about to come, or is the protest potential to be reduced? Or is the leadership of the workers and farmers state about to lighten the burden on its own labor market?

Gratitude, almost devotion, is what marks these days in Giessen. As if good behavior was a desired precondition for rapidly acclimatizing themselves, the arrivals had no trouble to refer to the GDR from now on as the "zone." Unsolicited, they take sides: "Grenada, what about that, what is there to object to that?"

Breitfeld, the butcher, has made a deal with himself to learn and never to embarrass the authorities. Especially against the government he will "never object even with a word, because it has received me," instead he wants to defy the communists. "When some DKP type comes down the line, I'll spit at him," on that, this state can always rely.

"Reality related," that is what Karl Mai, director of the department for resettlement affairs in the Hessian social affairs ministry for fellow-citizens from the east of Germany calls them while they are getting set for their integration. Well informed by the Western TV Channel 7, they are all ready to adapt themselves to most positions.

With the reception money of 150 Marks, machinist Eberhard Kern (41) of Karl-Marx-Stadt buys himself a packet of Pall-Mall tobacco and the Basic Law. The one is "for pleasure," the other, "for the mind because you've got to know the Constitution.'

But, paraphrasing Marx, Kern also knows that "practice is the criterion of truth." What he expects is a "country of doers" and of production conditions freed from the burdens of ideology and solely oriented to an increase in the GNP.

Even so: That is is not a "land of milk and honey" is clear to all arrivals (Breitfeld). The Western channel made its point in that too. They did not have to wait to be told about unemployment in the FRG by SED propaganda.

The nice times when the obligatory recruiters would shale bands in front of the camp gates are over. Only one firm in Dieburg said it needed a few mechanics. The rest is silence.

Contemplating their work prospects, the new Western citizens indicate they want to be modest. Menial jobs are offered to get them through somehow. A student from Cottbus will work as a "window-washer for 2 or 3 years in order to establish himself on the market." As Germans, they furthermore expect their fellow-countrymen's help in competing, "if necessary, to vie with Turks for the garbage collection."

The overwhelming majority of those going through the legally prescribed reception procedures has an objective and a notion for getting started. Even if their reason for departing, "family reunification," was horribly overextended, they all still can come up with some uncle in Detmold or an aunt in Berchtesgaden.

Michael Ulbricht (24) of Grossenhain near Riesa has none but Inge, a pen-pal of Nuernberg who, however, "now does not want to see me anymore." And he did not even seek to get out. This conscientious objector, "member of the antisocialist sub-culture" in his hometown, got his expatriation without application from the GDR authorities.

This lonely molder from Saxony spends his first evening in the West in a Giessen disco. First there is a little curiosity, then a bit flirting, and finally a sudden rejection--that is what he got out of the woman he spoke with behind the bar. "Communist assholes are not wanted here," the girl sneers at him, "beat it, man!"

"And for something like that one got mixed up with politics," he says the next day and is depressed. There he sits in the camp cafeteria over a beer, in order to better hide the tears in his eyes. This promised land holds no promise for Ulbricht. He does not care about where he will end up.

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CSO: 2300/326

FRG ANALYST COMMENTS ON POTENTIAL HONECKER SUCCESSOR KRENZ

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Feb 84 p 10

[Article by Peter Jochen Winters, chief of Berlin editorial staff, datelined Berlin, in February: "The Crown Prince's Name is Krenz--in the GDR, Honecker is Making Long-Range Plans for his Succession"]

[Text] When the GDR party and state delegation bowed before the bier of Andropov in Moscow, it became publicly visible for the first time how things might continue in the GDR after the Honecker era. In addition to Prime Minister Stoph, who will be 70 this year, and the president of the People's Chamber, Sindermann, 69 this year, Honecker, looking forward to his 72nd birthday in August, had brought along the two men who will presumably run the party and the state in the GDR: Egon Krenz and Guenter Mittag.

As in the Kremlin leadership so also in the SED Politburo, there are two clearly differentiated age groups: the seniors, long beyond their retirement age but wielding the power and the younger ones, still below 60. Among the seniors are, in addition to Honecker, Stoph and Sindermann, the Politburo members Erich Mielke, minister for state security, at 76 years the senior of the Politburo; Alfred Neumann (74), first deputy prime minister; Erich Mueckenberger (73), the last former Social Democrat in the Politburo and chairman of the SED's central party control commission; defense minister Heinz Hoffmann (73); Paul Verner (72), up to now central committee secretary for security; Kurt Hager (71), central committee secretary for science and culture; and Hermann Axen (68), central committee secretary for international relations. They are contrasted by Horst Dohlus (58), central committee secretary for party organs; Guenter Mittag (57), central committee secretary for economics; Harry Tisch (56), chairman of the FDGB; Werner Felte (56), central committee secretary for agriculture; Werner Krolikowski (55), first deputy prime minister; Joachim Herrmann (55), central committee secretary for agitprop; Konrad Naumann (55), first secretary of the SED Bezirk Management for East Berlin; and Egon Krenz (46), central committee secretary for security. In addition there are seven--non-voting--Politburo candidates, between 52 and 62 years of age.

For the coming GDR prime minister and successor to Stoph, SED general secretary Honecker has been priming systematically Guenter Mittag, central committee secretary for economics, for years. Mittag, railroad worker by training and graduate economist, has been busy as the economic expert in the SED leadership since the



1950's. Between 1958 and 1961 he was the secretary of the Politburo's economic commission, from 1962 to 1973, and again since 1976, he has been the central committee secretary for economic affairs. From 1973 to 1976 he was one of the two first deputy prime ministers of the GDR. Since 1963 he has been a candidate, since 1966 a member of the Politburo. To invest this leading economic party functionary with a governmental function that would guarantee a proper standing to him on foreign trips according to protocol, Honecker in 1979 appointed him again a member of the GDR State Council--the GDR's chief-of-state collective--which Mittag had belonged to even before, from 1963 to 1971. Mittag has taken many trip even to western countries in recent years. When Honecker goes on important trips abroad, Mittag is always going along, e.g. at Honecker's state visits to Austria and Japan in 1980/81.

Some have interpreted the prominence given to Mittag and his preferential treatment by the GDR's party and government boss in recent years to mean that in him Honecker was preparing his successor. Such speculations miss the fact that Mittag is little suited to become general secretary because he is inexperienced in security and cadre (personnel) policy--to mention but those two fields. Nor is he an ideologue, not a man of the apparat, but a specialist--an excellent one, to be sure, but only that and no more, that means not a good party boss but probably a good government boss whose main task is, in a communist state, after all, not only to keep the centrally managed state economy running but also to manage and plan it in such a way that it works as efficiently as possible.

It had been uncertain for a long time whom Honecker would favor as his successor in heading the party because apart from Mittag no Politburo and Central Committee secretariat member had received special prominence. Then, late in November, the SED Central Committee at its seventh session elected Egon Krenz, since 1974 chairman of the FDJ and since 1976 Politburo candidate, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary without, however, indicating what Krenz was supposed to be in charge of in the Central Committee secretariat. Honecker at once demonstratively awarded this Benjamin of the Politburo with the highest GDR medal, the Karl Marx Medal, and in the speech awarding it informed the "dear Egon" and the astonished audience: "I need not say that this pleases me especially." From then on indications have accumulated suggesting that Krenz has assumed the role of the crown prince.

The new Politburo member Krenz--exchanging without adjustment difficulties the blue shirt of the FDJ for the dark suit of a Central Committee secretary--not only made appearances in the GDR, in the Ministry of the Interior and in the Ministry for State Security, smacking of first official steps. Krenz also headed the SED Central Committee delegation to the DKP Congress in Nuernberg and initiated a course with the chiefs of the youth and sports commissions under the SED bezirk and kreis managements at the Karl Liebknecht party school in Kleinmachnow. Furthermore, Honecker included him in official dinners with guests of state and had him receive foreign delegations. Finally Krenz was appointed election commission chairman for the 6 May 1984 communal elections. All this clearly shows that Krenz has in fact fully assumed the tasks that previously were the responsibility of Paul Verner.

When Honecker succeeded Ulbricht as party boss in May 1971, Verner became the central committee security secretary, which had been Honecker's function till then. Since then Verner rated as the number two man in the SED party apparatus, a sort of Honecker deputy. As central committee security secretary Verner was responsible not only for the GDR armed and security forces--external and internal security--but also for the churches and for youth. Furthermore, as a "western expert," he maintained the relations with the DKP. Whether Verner, one of the most zealous advocates of the GDR's demarkation from the FRG and also an opponent of the practice, tolerated by Honecker, of letting people eager to emigrate and prisoners go against payments from Bonn, now had to quit for age and health reasons--which is likely--or had to go after losing his dispute with Honecker, has not yet been totally clarified. The fact is that Verner has not shown in public since mid-January and was, notably, the only one of the Politburo members and candidates absent from the last two weekends' SED bezirk delegates conferences.

The political careers of Honecker and Krenz show remarkable parallels. Each was FDJ chairman for 9 years. As the only ones thus far, they became during that time Politburo candidates, and both started their work in the SED secretariat by being assigned to security matters, Honecker, by Ulbricht, Krenz by Honecker. Under Ulbricht, "crown prince" Honecker long directed the work of the central committee secretariat; much now suggests that Honecker has similar intentions with his pupil Krenz. Egon Krenz also is likely to be sent on trips abroad soon. As a precaution Honecker made him already a member of the State Council in mid-1981 so that his treatment abroad will then be proper as to protocol. Honecker became a Politburo member in 1958, when Ulbricht was 65 and SED boss for 8 years. Honecker had to wait 13 years to assume Ulbricht's succession. Now he is 71 and has been the SED boss for 12 years. Krenz is 46 and has time.

In the years ahead Egon Krenz will have to demonstrate whether he can assume the proper stature as Honecker's successor as party boss. He is likely to run into some competition, too. Conceivable alternatives at the present are the ambitious and busy Konrad Naumann, since 1971 Paul Verner's successor as head of the East Berlin SED Bezirk Management, and Werner Felfe, impressive in his business-like attitude, from 1971 to 1981 head of the SED Halle Bezirk Management and since then central committee secretary for agriculture. Others may be added in the course of years, visible they are not as yet, however.

5885  
CSO: 2300/331

HAND-HELD ANTI-TANK ROCKET LAUNCHER DESCRIBED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 1 1984 (signed to press 11 Nov 83)  
inside and back covers

[Article by Lt Col H. Knoeppler, engineer: RPG-7, 40 mm Anti-Tank Rocket"]

[Text] 1. PRINCIPLES OF USE AND COMBAT CHARACTERISTICS

With the Soviet RPG-7 the socialist armies have acquired a light, dynamic-reactive anti-tank weapon that takes a logical place in the total anti-tank system. That system consists of anti-tank missiles, anti-tank artillery, anti-tank rocket launchers (heavy, light, and disposable) as well as of anti-armor hand grenades. The anti-tank rockets can also be used against hostile fortified positions, in addition to armored moving targets.

The anti-tank rocket launcher fires the PG-7W active-reactive supercaliber shaped charge projectile. The round has sufficient penetration for effective action against the above-mentioned targets.

2. OPERATION OF THE WEAPON AND AMMUNITION

The booster charge is ignited when the firing pin strikes the detonating cap. Combustion of the booster charge generates explosive gases which cause the rocket in the tube to rotate around its axis (with the help from a small builtin turbine) and at the same time expel the rocket at a slow initial velocity.

Upon leaving the tube stabilizers that have been snug against the shaft of the open, the fuse becomes armed, and at a certain distance from the marksman the propelling charge of the reaction engine (sustainer engine) is ignited.

The stream of the burning gases through the jets results in propulsion that increases the rocket's speed threefold compared to the initial velocity. After the propelling charge has been completely consumed the rocket continues in free flight. Once the rocket finds its mark the fuse causes the explosive charge to ignite. This produces a cumulative stream that penetrates the armor.

The rocket launcher can be fired from the prone, kneeling, or standing positions, depending on the terrain and enemy fire. For concealment and

protection from hostile fire the launcher is to be fired from a covered position, under the necessary safety precautions; the covering material can also be used to support the weapon.

### 3. EXPLANATION OF SOME TERMS

The original Soviet term from the weapon is "Ruchnoyi protivotankoviy granatomyot RPG-7." A literal translation would be "hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher." It is a light anti-tank weapon, termed "leichte Panzerbüchse" in the NVA.

As stated above, the RPG-7 is a dynamo-reactive rocket launcher. In this context the term dynamo-reactive must be explained. A dynamo-reactive rocket launcher is one where the rocket obtains the required velocity from the increase pressure in the tube caused by the burning of the combustible gases of a booster charge. These rocket launchers have a shorter effective range than reactive rocket launchers, but they have a much greater density of hits and are smaller in dimensions and weight. The term active-reactive super-caliber shaped charge rocket also requires explanation. Reactive grenades of rounds are those identical to a rocket. The additional term "active" indicates that the projectile acquires in flight additional acceleration and thus a higher velocity from a builtin sustainer engine (propelling charge). Supercaliber rockets are rockets having parts with greater diameter (exceeding the caliber) than the tube of the weapon.

### 4. CONSTRUCTION AND SERVICING

As described below, the weapon and the projectile have a simple construction. This permits very uncomplicated servicing by the rocket gunner, who is assisted by a submachinegun gunner from personnel of the launcher group. The latter carries three PG-7W projectiles in a case, in addition to his own equipment.

The basic construction of the various RPG models that include the RPG-7, RPG-7W and RPG-7D is identical and consists of the following main parts: tube, stock and trigger and safety assemblies, striking device, sighting device (including the PGO-7 or PGO-7W optical sights and a mechanical aiming device), and accessories.

The rocket launcher can also be equipped with a night aiming device (usually NSP-U). The RPG-7W and RPG-7 are the most commonly used models. Both can be equipped with and optical sight (PGO-7W or PGO-7). When these are used their proper attachment to the rocket launcher must be assured (cf. weapon condition card!) The use of the proper adjustment table for the proper inspection of the weapon-optical sight complex depends on this.

A brief note should be made of the RPG-7D (see back cover) that is usually equipped with the PGO-7W optical sight. This model is used by special troops. It differs in construction from the RPG-7W by having a quick locking device between the front and back halves of the tube. This allows the disassembly of the tube into a short packet for travel.

To avoid possible accidents caused by firing from an improperly assembled tube the trigger can only be operated after the locking device has been closed and the tube halves have been locked through a stop pin.

## 5. SPECIFIC HINTS FOR USE

The following advice is to be followed to prolong the life of the parts and to assure correct use, as well as to make maximum use of time available for maintenance and care.

### 5.1 ADJUSTMENT

The rocket launcher must be adjusted:

Upon delivery to unit,

After initial firing and after every 3-5 firings,

After unsatisfactory results in firing,

After repairs to parts of the aiming device.

Standard adjustment tables are included in VWL set 2, available from the rocket and ordnance service shop, or they can be built by the unit. In order to adjust a rocket launcher with the help of an adjustment table the latter is to be mounted perpendicularly 20 meters in front of a fixed weapon (point of reference is the tube muzzle).

### 5.2 OPTICAL SIGHT

To illuminate the graduated scale a lighting device was constructed. It is to be attached to the sight only when use is imminent. Otherwise it is to be stored in the sight case together with other accessories. The gastight NC batteries in the illuminating units are to be charged with the ZWL-1(4)/59 single or quadruple charging device, or with the EB-62a. The EWZ set contains an adapter cable to connect the batteries to the charging device. To preserve the charge of the illuminating device the provisions of the operating instructions regarding charging cycles and charging time must be meticulously followed.

### 5.3 TUBE SPONGE

The universal adoption of an improvement suggestion has made the jamming of the sponge in the tube due to an opening of the spreading jaw in the loading chamber impossible. This was realized with the addition of a crosspiece (fig. 3). At the same time the front part of the sponge as well as the spreading jaws were constructed of plastic. This means that in exceptional cases the tube can be cleaned with the sponge.

#### 5.4 ASSEMBLY AND DISASSEMBLY OF THE THRUST PIECE WITH STRIKER SPRING

Whenever the thrust piece is to be separated from the striker spring, the following must be observed in the assembly (fig. 4): The thrust piece must be placed on a wooden surface so that the long arm of the piece is directed away from the body of the assembler (army member) and the short arm of the thrust piece is directed toward him. Now the striker spring is to be inserted and depressed with the thrust sleeve (with the perpendicular slot pointed left for threading the drift punch) until the drift punch can be pushed in from the left through the bore in the thrust piece. To compress the striker spring the screwdriver is to be pushed into the upper slit of the thrust sleeve and depressed with both palms. If the described relative position of the parts is not followed the thrust piece cannot be inserted into the stock housing (the drift punch is inserted in such a way that the long arm of the thrust piece points forward). Then the work has to be done over again.

#### 5.5. CLEANING AND INSPECTION AFTER FIRING

After every shot the tube has to be inspected. It must be seen whether remnants of the cardboard housing of the booster charge have remained in the tube. In that case these must be removed with a disc-equipped staff, screwed onto the cleaning rod. After completion of firing especial care must be taken to assure that in addition to cleaning and oiling of the tube interior parts of the striking device are disassembled, cleaned, and lightly oiled.

#### 5.6 EWZ [spare parts, tools, accessories] ALLOCATION

Due to the importance of rocket launchers in close combat against tanks each individual weapon has been equipped with necessary tools and accessories as well as with a certain amount of special spare parts for the weapon and the optical equipment. After the consumption of these parts they are to be immediately reordered and brought up to the required stockage level. (Extent and number of these parts are listed in appendix 3 of the operating instructions).

#### 5.7 PUS-7

For marksmanship training, to include loading training, a training device, the so-called subcaliber tube PUS-7 has been developed. The shape and weight resemble the PG-7W rocket. For the barrel a 7.62 mm barrel was installed to fire M43 rounds.




Bild 1 40-mm-Panzerbüchse RPG-7

Bild 2 Panzerbüchse RPG-7 im Einsatz




Bild 4




Bild 3

# 40-mm-Panzerbüchse RPG-7D






PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. 40 mm Anti-Tank Rocket RPG-7
3. Front part of Tube Sponge
  - (1) Sponge front part
  - (2) Spreading jaw
  - (3) Spring bow
  - (4) Rivet pin (swivel joint for the spreading jaw)
  - (5) Cleaning rod, front part
4. Separating the thrust piece from the striker spring
5. 40-mm Anti-Tank Rocket RPG-7D

9240

CSO: 2300/312

WESTERN PROGRAM RECEPTION NOT AFFECTED BY CABLE TV EXPANSION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Mar 84 p 6

[Article by Peter Jochen Winters, head of Berlin editorial staff, datelined Berlin, 29 Feb 84: "Western TV via Cable--The GDR Is Also Working With New Technologies"]

[Text] Not only in the FRG but also in the GDR cabling has already made a start. General director Schulz in the postal and communications ministry of the GDR tells us that technical development is not passing by the GDR. Certainly nobody there is ecstatic over the new methods of disseminating radio and television programs. Because precipitate steps would not pay and the GDR could ill afford economic losses and since employment of the new technologies would have to be fitted into long-term planning this development is not as stormy as it is in the FRG. Nevertheless, the status of cabling is entirely comparable to that in West European countries.

Since 1971 the GDR has been hoping that through the development of large community antenna facilities it would be possible by cable to improve the distribution of the radio and television programs of the GDR transmitters and at the same time get rid of the "antenna forests" on top of the houses. The latter aim has not only esthetic but also solid economic justification: individual antennas not only damage roofs, they also swallow huge quantities of aluminum which the GDR national economy could better use for other purposes. Thus the new housing construction areas in the GDR are being supplied from the outset with large community antenna facilities. In Berlin-Marzahn or Leipzig-Gruenau one no longer sees any individual antennas on the roofs of apartment houses. But cabling is also part of the program during modernization of older structures. In addition, large community antenna facilities are erected wherever supply gaps need to be filled up, and wherever natural obstacles or shadowing by tall buildings impair reception. The installation of large community antenna facilities is carried out under communal responsibility. The "German Postal System" of the GDR influences the planning of large community antenna facilities but operates none. The postal service is responsible only for broadcasting and transmission.

General director Schulz of the postal ministry gives some figures on cabling: after more than 10 years of continuous development there are today 2.3 million households in the GDR--that is, just 40 percent--which are supplied via

large community antenna facilities and cable with radio and television programs. Some of these facilities already have the characteristics of cable radio installations. He mentions Neubrandenburg with 27,000 and Schwedt an der Oder with 20,000 cabled households. But he might also have mentioned Eisenhuettenstadt or Rostock-Luetten Klein. Up until 1990--the year in which the housing problem in the GDR, considered as a social problem, is expected to be solved--annually an additional 200,000 households are to be connected into large community antenna facilities. Then about two-thirds of all radio and television viewers in the GDR will have been supplied with such facilities.

For the radio and television viewers in the GDR cabling does not bring with it any connection costs. The supply of radio and television programs is included among the basic needs subsidized by the state. For those households which are "cabled" the monthly rent is increased by from 1.50 to 2.00 marks. In this connection the people in the postal and communications ministry of the GDR point proudly to the fact that the radio and television tax in the GDR since 1969 has remained unchanged at 10 marks monthly and this despite the introduction of color television and stereophonics.

The introduction of new techniques of transmission and dissemination for radio and television has led in the FRG to a discussion of the issue of eliminating the public radio monopoly and the endorsement of private program suppliers. On the other hand in the GDR--where radio and television programs are created centrally by the State Committee for Television and Radio--the discussion is over whether or not in the course of cabling the reception of Western radio and television stations is to be improved or rendered impossible. In this connection general director Schulz says: "Wherever the reception of foreign programs through individual antennas is possible the possibility of receiving these programs will continue even after cabling. However, we shall not undertake any strenuous technical efforts to extend reception possibilities for foreign programs." Does that mean that, for example, in Dresden where one cannot receive the West German television that after cabling it will still be impossible to receive Western television? "The GDR will not undertake any investments in order to create possibilities for reception of Western transmitters in places where previously reception has not been possible," answered general director Schulz.

#### Party and State Fear Unrest

This official reply is remarkable in two respects. On the one hand it dampens the hopes of all those who in the GDR have until now been unable to receive Western transmissions and have been expecting that this situation would change after cabling. But can one really expect the SED to supply additional money to fetch the "class enemy" into the living rooms of dwellers in the GDR? But on the other hand the announcement from the postal and communications ministry documents a change in the attitude of the GDR toward the reception of Western radio and television programs. While years ago every effort was made to prevent the Germans in the GDR from tuning in Western radio and Western television--because of fears of the destabilizing effect of free information and opinion--now in contrast the Western programs are being delivered to the

house by cable although that very cabling could have made it possible to totally ban Western programs from the homes of the GDR.

There are two possible reasons for this. On the one hand it may be that party and state fear substantial unrest if when about 80 percent of their population are able to receive Western programs today regularly this particular aspect of the quality of life were to be taken away from them by cabling. Another reason could be that Western television and Western radio are no longer considered as destabilizing by the party and the state but rather as stabilizing. Finally, it is unnecessary any longer for GDR television and GDR radio to point the finger at unemployment and social discords in the FRG. This is done abundantly and shrilly by the Western stations themselves and the Western transmitters in addition receive more credence. Whether it is really the case, as has been maintained now and then, that in the GDR the highest percentage of requests to emigrate occur where Western programs cannot be received is doubtful. Were this the case then the inhabitants of Dresden and of the other "white spots" of Western reception in the GDR would perhaps still have a chance to enjoy by cable what they have so long done without; an enjoyment moreover for which some are willing to pay by making long trips often several times in a week under the motto: "I drive for miles to get Western television." In fact no one can be certain that the sovereignty of the GDR leadership will not one day switch over on this point to a more fearful and restrictive attitude.

Wherever in the GDR the Western programs are already entering homes via large community antenna facilities and cable the reception is often substantially better than it had previously been with an individual antenna. In many localities of the GDR, for example, in Eisenhuettenstadt and Schwedt an der Oder Polish programs are also available by cable and in the area where community antenna facilities are located close to the Czechoslovakian border Czech programs are delivered to GDR households. Apart from such special regional peculiarities the GDR is uniformly and centrally supplied with two GDR television and four GDR radio programs. In GDR television there are no regional programs nor are they expected in the future. On the radio, within the framework of the Radio GDR II transmitter chain, 5 hours of regional programs are broadcast in the morning which are primarily "service oriented." But according to the postal ministry of the GDR as cabling progresses there will in no case be a multitude of regional programs and special services--as provided in the FRG.

Also in the GDR the opinion prevails that the glass fiber cable, the light conductor, and the broad-band cabling which it makes possible belongs to the future. For 3 years the light conductor has been under test by the post office in East Berlin. In fact it is definite that the use of broad-band cabling, in which not only radio and television programs but also telephone and teletype are carried over one and the same cable, will not begin before 1990 in the GDR. At first large community antenna facilities will be installed with copper coaxial cables and at best pilot projects will start in the direction of providing light conduction to the recipients. Because the use of copper, because of its high cost, is possible in the GDR only to a limited extent and the step-by-step introduction of light conductors is still far off one cannot look forward to any acceleration in the cabling of the GDR.

8008

CSO: 2300/333

BOOK DISCUSSES FAILURE OF SOCIALISM TO CREATE EQUALIZED SOCIETY

Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian No 1, Jan 84 pp 31-32

[Review by Gyorgy Csepeli of the book "Social Structure and Class Differentiation" by Tibor Halay]

[Text] Marx left human beings a tough legacy. The explanation of society by trans-societal or extra-societal principles became forever impossible, and he linked thinking about society with thinking about action, with the alteration of society. He made the study of the whole, of the totality of society, the fundamental task, while there had to be discovered its entire extremely complicated nature, the unity of function and structure, the separation of the various functional systems from each other, its historical-temporal constraint, and at the same time, its revolutionary transformability.

Socialism brought into existence the kind of society where initially the boundary between the "is" and the "ought" seemed to disappear, and feverish changes did away with centuries-long nightmares in moments, measured by historical standards. Inequalities caused by property relations disappeared, education increased rapidly, millions lingering in misery under the minimal subsistence level sprang to life, industry and city became dominant in countries that common knowledge in the developed countries repeatedly spoke of as thousand-year-old peasant border civilizations. For decades the Marxist thought that was in the process of realization held the investigators of conditions under its spell, and to some extent made them blind to certain conditions. Understandably, because action is always interested in seeing its goals as reality to all intents and purposes, or as a reality that is already almost achieved, and in regarding the mere observer of the process as a malicious critic or a narrow-minded opponent.

A long but eventually successful road led in our society to the acceptance of the suspiciously-viewed sociological cognitive position, to its recognition as an independent science. The reasons obviously are to be found in the fact that the realization of socialism did not at all assume the kind of rate that its theoretical founders expected, and the realization of the fundamental principles of the program produced unforeseeable consequences, which loomed as an obstacle over the road to the original abstract ideal, the universal liberation of man, his admission into the realm of freedom. We may term the aggregate of these difficulties the particular structure of socialist

society based on social property relations, a paradox of which is that the revolutionary change that has come about in property relations, the equality that has been attained, has not annihilated other varieties of inequalities coming into being among people as a consequence of social factors, and what is more, socialism has begotten further inequalities "in its own right."

The unity of cognition and action continues to be our methodological principle, but in our present situation it is undetermined what, in point of fact, we should do with the products of cognition. How should we act: among whom should we decrease or increase the inequalities that have come into existence, how should we meet the requirements of an intensive economy, the challenges of sharpening international economic competition, without living to see our new situation as a renunciation of, a withdrawal from, our value and ideals?

Tibor Halay has compiled the kind of studies that speak about the structure of present-day Hungarian society that has come into being on a socialist basis, and provide information about the questions sketched above. The virtue of the studies is that they move not in the realm of the "ought," but in that of the "is," they manipulate well-grounded statistical, empirical sociological material, and in this way beneficially differ from the marks of scholarship concerned with socialist society that previously were not uncommonly normative, prettifying, and in many cases fostered ostrich-like policy demands. What sort of trends do the authors of the studies discern, on what sort of dilemmas do they shed light?

Once the structuring role of property relations has become weakened, by what, according to the authors, can the fact that our society is still not a paradise of equality be explained? It is obvious that income, place of residence, social status, and knowledge are all factors that entrench stratification, and on the basis of the authors' data it is predictable that these differences will persist, and perhaps intensify, in the future. There is no complete agreement among the authors as to how we should evaluate these differences. The negative line of argument to some extent impatiently calls the present to account for the goals postulated by socialist society, and is apprehensive about the achievement of these goals as a result of the survival or intensification of inequalities. The positive evaluation sees in inequalities an incentive force, which may make people interested as individuals in the crumbling away of their differences, and looks at conflicts deriving from this as states of insecurity holding both good and bad in store. The viewpoint advocating the elimination of inequalities at a rapid rate considers an enhanced role for central leadership and a not explicitly formulated "political consciousness" desirable, yet it is not entirely obvious whether the equality to come into being in this way will definitely be a universal equality of development of the economy, affluence, and personality, or whether it holds in store for us the prospect of an equality languishing in relative backwardness, in the preservation of a specifically Eastern European condition of existence.

There are two arguments to the viewpoint that is more patient toward inequalities that appear weighty. One argument cites the fact that the social policy of the past decades, which raised the direct proportion of social benefits, in point of fact perpetuated, or rather, intensified, inequalities by benefits, in point of fact perpetuated, or rather, intensified, inequalities by eliminating the possible incentive role of benefits merited by actual work results. The advantages of the initial state, that is to say, increased the availability of these benefits, while the disadvantages made it shimmer like a mirage, but on its merits did not make it possible to live on these benefits. In 1974, for example, the frequency of holidays showed an astounding degree of variation by social strata: 55 percent of intellectual workers, 23 percent of laborers, and 7 percent of those belonging to the peasantry in cooperatives vacationed for more than three days. This series of data is really interesting the other way around: that is to say, 45 percent of intellectual workers, 77 percent of the laborers, and 93 percent of the peasantry belonging to cooperatives did not vacation. And all this occurred at the height of the reduced-rate holiday program that was organized as a social benefit!

The second argument may be formulated by saying that if we regard the anomalies of the efforts to increase equality as also removable in principle--for which in any case there is not much proof--equality preserves, keeps back, does not lead to change, since it is interested in the immeasurability of achievement, in the bureaucratic distribution of benefits that are impossible to supervise, and, as the most serious consequence, it is not even inconceivable that in the face of inequalities thus manifesting themselves it will be said ideologically: This is equality, this is the Promised Land. This is dangerous because it also inevitably over-dimensions the political-ideological significance of the critique and makes impossible, or rather, discretion, investigation directed at actual functioning.

Another prominent motif of the volume's six studies is mobility, the problem of movement from certain social strata into others, and the reverse. Every author is in agreement that in the last 35 years our society has organized itself as a pyramid emerging from the sea of peasant existence, and that "de-peasantization" is the consequence of industrialization and urbanization. It is also apparent that this process was more rapid and more spectacular until the middle of the 60's, then completely slowed down by our day. Mobility today may be characterized by micro-movements among strata, which does not mean the elimination of mobility, but only a new type of significance to it. Our society has become more differentiated; new, numerically large strata have appeared in the system of the division of labor, entrance into which is not perhaps a welcome event according to the traditional concept of mobility, but is indeed as far as our present conditions of life are concerned. It becomes evident from the volume that to be a member of the intelligentsia in this new structure is by no means as great an advantage as the traditional concept of mobility would suggest. All strata of the intelligentsia have fallen behind the front rank (for example, the feminized teaching profession), and only the "border fortresses" of the elite now hold their apparent advantages almost as a closed community--shown by the tiny numbers of official income statistics.

But it is not only the intelligentsia that shows a high degree of differentiation; the working class, too, is not as homogeneous as we might guess on the basis of textbook formulations. On the one hand, its boundaries are relative vis-a-vis the "semi-skilled" groups of both the peasant strata and the intellectual workers on the other hand, as a consequence of its internal differences, the index numbers of income, technical knowledge and private agriculture show a wide spread. The numerical loss to the peasant stratum is on the order of millions, yet in exchange its standard of living has risen, and there is the prospect of a certain kind of "re-peasantization."

It is clear from the volume that the issue area of "those in a cumulatively advantageous position" is not a research subject, whereas the problem of "those in a cumulatively disadvantageous position" is decidedly one. In point of fact, this is the group of millions of people where reality may impatiently confront the values of socialism, and the widest joining of forces of society finds its proper task in the elimination of certain types of these disadvantages, or rather, in the amelioration of their consequences. It seems especially worth considering to what extent the number of children growing up in families harms structural positions, pushing those with many children into a magic circle, where those who see the advantages believed to derive from children in point of fact only harm their situation. On the other hand, the society that wishes to contrive a source of benefit for its members from childlessness, or rather, from having few children, is devouring its own future.

The book offers the opportunity primarily for diagnosis and prognosis. It would be good if, in the work of the therapies to be followed, it were to stimulate social debate and the activation of our public opinion. It has been published, it is accessible, it should be read. (Kossuth)

8971

CSO: 2500/227



DUTIES OF CIVIL DEFENSE CHIEFS ON ALL LEVELS DEFINED

Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish No 73, 29 Dec 83 pp 955-957

[Council of Ministers' Order dated 23 December 1983 on the detailed scope of duties of the Chief of National Civil Defense and the provincial, town, neighborhood, gmina, and town and gmina civil defense chiefs]

[Text] Based on art 12 par 8 of the law dated 21 November 1967 on the universal obligation to defend the Polish People's Republic (DZIENNIK USTAW 1979, No 18, item 111, and 1983, No 41, item 185, and No 61, item 278) it is ordered as follows:

§ 1. The duties of the Chief of National Civil Defense include:

- 1) as regards the preparation of drafts of assumptions and principles of operation of civil defense in particular:
  - a) planning the directions of the development of civil defense in accordance with the defense requirements of the state,
  - b) preparing drafts of long-range plans for the development of civil defense,
  - c) preparing, in coordination with the Chief of the Polish Army General Staff, a draft plan for the civil defense of the state,
  - d) determining, in coordination with the Chief of the Polish Army General Staff:
    - drafts of assumptions pertaining to the relocation of workplace work forces and evacuation of the remaining population,
    - principles of preparation of civil defense plans of provinces, gminas, and workplaces,
    - assumptions of organization and conduct of civil defense drills of national, regional and interprovincial range,
    - principles of participation of civil defense formations in rescue tasks and other tasks in support of military and militarized units,

- e) determining the principles of organization and conduct of rescue operations and the action of the civil defense formations in these operations, and the principles of protecting the population and workplaces against the sources of destruction,
  - f) determining the organization, methods and programs for training civil defense formations and, in coordination with the interested ministries, the program assumptions, organization and method of defense training of school youth and defense training of female students of the higher schools,
  - g) preparing the assumptions, organization and programs for training the population as regards universal self-defense,
  - h) establishing special-lesson programs for members of youth labor detachments performing regular service in civil defense and a defense-training program for persons performing substitute conscript service;
- 2) as regards the establishment of the general principles of the accomplishment of civil defense tasks in particular:
- a) determining the principles of the accomplishment of civil defense tasks by chief and territorial organs of state administration and organs appropriate to the execution of particular measures,
  - b) evaluating the state of civil defense preparation and initiating measures aimed at the full execution of civil defense tasks,
  - c) participating in the planning of needs relating to financial and material resources indispensable to the execution of civil defense tasks,
  - d) establishing, in coordination with the Chief of the Polish Army General Staff, equipment standards for civil defense formations applicable to military equipment and the possibilities of meeting these requirements, planning and submitting these requirements to the appropriate units, and executing tasks relating to supplying and equipping civil defense formations and workplaces in this regard;
- 3) as regards the coordination of specific measures and the exercise of control over execution of civil defense tasks in particular:
- a) coordinating drafts of regulations pertaining to civil defense, prepared by chief organs of state administration,
  - b) giving an opinion on drafts of provincial civil defense plans,
  - c) initiating the development of scientific-research activity as regards civil defense, and particularly presenting proposals and suggestions pertaining to research plans, participating in the acceptance of scientific-research work and in standardization-normalization work in this field,

- d) determining the assumptions and initiating the conduct of popularizing activities and the dissemination of achievements of civil defense,
- e) organizing and conducting inspections of the execution of civil defense tasks by chief and territorial organs of state administration and by workplaces,
- f) calling for removal of shortcomings ascertained during inspections and for the undertaking of measures which would prevent their recurrence, and in case of serious transgressions, holding responsible those persons guilty of these transgressions.

§ 2. The duties of the Chief of National Civil Defense also include:

- 1) exercising the functions, described in separate regulations, relating to the performance of regular service in civil defense,
- 2) exercising general supervision over the course of service in civil defense formations and over the training of the population in universal self-defense,
- 3) directing civil defense exercises of national, regional and interprovincial scope,
- 4) exercising general supervision over the preparation and relocation of workplace work forces and the evacuation of the remaining population, and over rescue actions and assistance given to victims, and also, in case of need, exercising direct leadership in this regard,
- 5) directing the operations of directly subordinate civil defense formations,
- 6) taking other measures indispensable to the execution of assigned tasks.

§ 3. The Chief of National Civil Defense cooperates with foreign countries on matters lying within the scope of his duties.

§ 4. The Chief of National Civil Defense periodically reports to the National Defense Committee and the Minister of National Defense on the state of accomplishment of civil defense tasks.

§ 5. 1. The Chief of National Civil Defense executes his tasks with the help of the National Civil Defense Inspectorate.

2. The head of the National Civil Defense Inspectorate is the Chief of the National Civil Defense Inspectorate, who is the deputy chief of National Civil Defense.

§ 6. 1. A Council for Civil Defense Research and Development Matters works with the Chief of National Civil Defense.

2. The Council is an advisory and consultative organ.

3. The tasks of the Council, its composition, how it is appointed and the principles of its operations are determined by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

§ 7. 1. The duties of the provincial and gmina civil defense chiefs include direction of preparations and accomplishment of civil defense measures by state institutions and enterprises, cooperative organizations and social organizations operating in their territories, and in particular:

- 1) planning activities relating to the accomplishment of civil defense tasks,
- 2) evaluating the state of civil defense preparation and taking measures aimed at full accomplishment of civil defense tasks,
- 3) preparing provincial and gmina civil defense plans and supervising the preparation of workplace civil defense plans,
- 4) organizing civil defense training and training of the population in universal self-defense, and granting assistance in defense training of school youth and defense training of female students of the higher schools,
- 5) preparing and ensuring the operation of a universal warning and alarm system and a system for detecting contamination,
- 6) directing the creation, preparation for operations, and operations of civil defense units,
- 7) directing the preparation for relocation of work forces and evacuation of the remaining population, rescue campaigns, and assistance given to victims, and also organizing and coordinating the conduct of these operations,
- 8) ensuring transport means indispensable to the relocation and evacuation and rescue campaigns,
- 9) planning and preparing suitable accommodations, living conditions, medical and social aid for persons subject to relocation and evacuation, and ensuring conditions for the functioning of schools and care-upbringing centers for the youth who are evacuated,
- 10) ensuring supplies of potable water for the population and food-industry workplaces and water for special equipment for decontamination and fire-fighting purposes,
- 11) preparing and assuring the functioning of shelters and special facilities and equipment for the needs of civil defense,
- 12) ensuring the preparation and accomplishment of blackouts and light-extinguishment in towns, villages, workplaces and means of transport,
- 13) organizing the accomplishment of measures which would increase the degree of protection to workplaces and public utility buildings and equipment against destruction,
- 14) planning the utilization of machinery, equipment and materials, remaining at the disposal of workplaces, which would be useful for the accomplishment of civil defense tasks, and deciding, in case of need, how they are to be used,

- 15) preparing health service establishments to give assistance to victims,
- 16) planning and supplying civil defense units with equipment, means and uniforms and workplaces with equipment and funds, and ensuring suitable conditions for storing, conserving, operating, repairing and exchanging this equipment, means and uniforms,
- 17) planning, distributing and implementing, within the limits of defense expenditures, funds designated for civil defense tasks,
- 18) organizing protection for farm crops and animals and food products and feeds, and also water intakes and equipment, against means of destruction,
- 19) organizing protection for cultural assets against means of destruction, and evacuating these assets, and also ensuring distinguished artists and scientific workers suitable working conditions,
- 20) conducting popularizing activities and disseminating the achievements of civil defense,
- 21) executing other tasks described in separate regulations, and in particular the tasks established by the Chief of National Civil Defense.

2. The civil defense chiefs of the cities of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin also direct the preparation and execution of civil defense measures in the areas of the seaports of these cities, cooperating with the organs of the maritime administration on these matters.

3. The provincial civil defense chiefs coordinate and supervise the civil defense activities of the gminas and establish for them periodic principles for the accomplishment of civil defense tasks.

§ 8. 1. The civil defense chiefs set tasks and inspect the state of civil defense preparations in state institutions and enterprises and in cooperatives and social organizations which are located in their area of activity.

2. In setting the tasks referred to in par 1, the civil defense chiefs take into account the assumptions and principles and methods of accomplishment of special tasks in the field of civil defense, specified by chief organs of the state administration in separate regulations.

§ 9. 1. The direction of preparations, the accomplishment of measures and the establishment of civil defense tasks in workplaces which are under the Ministries of National Defense, Internal Affairs, Justice, Communications, Transportation, and also the Prosecutor General of the Polish People's Republic, the "Polish Radio and Television" Committee for Radio and Television, and the president of the Polish National Bank and the presidents of other banks, lies within the scope of the duties of these organs.

2. The provincial and gmina civil defense chiefs, in coordinating the preparation and accomplishment of civil defense measures in the area of their activity, also take into account the civil defense activities of the workplaces

mentioned in par 1, and especially as relates to universal warning and alarm and relocation of work forces and evacuation of the remaining population.

§ 10. 1. The civil defense chiefs of provinces, towns and neighborhoods, whose inhabitants are subject to relocation and evacuation, appoint teams for work force relocation and evacuation of remaining population, and the civil defense chiefs of the towns, gminas, and towns and gminas to which the inhabitants are to be relocated, will appoint teams on matters relating to the receipt of persons subject to relocation and evacuation, in accordance with the decisions of the National Civil Defense Chief.

2. In cases warranted by civil defense requirements, the provincial chiefs of civil defense may appoint, with the permission of the National Civil Defense Chiefs, other teams also.

§ 11. Civil defense chiefs issue orders and guidelines on matters lying within the scope of their duties.

§ 12. Civil defense chiefs execute their tasks:

- 1) in provinces, in towns numbering over 50,000 inhabitants, and in neighborhoods, with the help of provincial, town and neighborhood inspectorates of civil defense,
- 2) in other towns and towns and gminas and in gminas, with the help of workers employed in positions dealing with defense matters.

§ 13. Territorial organs of state administration, on the basis of decisions made by the National Defense Committee, determine the internal organization and the number of jobs in the territorial inspectorates of civil defense and the number of jobs for defense matters in town offices, towns and gminas, and gminas.

§ 14. The provisions of the order pertaining to:

- 1) the chief organ of the state administration--apply also to the chairman of the commission performing the function of the chief organ of the state administration, the director of the central office, the main board of the cooperative union, or the director of the state institution not under the chief or central organ of the state administration,
- 2) the province and the provincial civil defense chief--apply respectively to a city of the provincial level and to the civil defense chief of a city of the provincial level,
- 3) the gmina or the gmina civil defense chief--apply respectively to a city other than that mentioned in point 2, a neighborhood, town and gmina, and to a civil defense chief of this town, neighborhood and town and gmina,

4) the workplace--apply to a state enterprise and institution, an office of the organ of authority and state administration, a school, a scientific, cultural and educational center, a health service establishment and to a cooperative and social organization.

§ 15. The order becomes effective on the day it is published.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers: General of the Army /s/ W. Jaruzelski

9295

CSO: 2600/658

U.S. ARTICLE ON 'HUNGARY'S NEW WAY' ATTACKED BY ROMANIANS

Bucharest MAGAZIN ISTORIC in Romanian No 2, Feb 84 pp 17-21

[Article by university Dr Mihail Diaconescu and Gheorghe David: "Between Ignorance and a Willful Error"]

[Text] Any serious publication earns its respect by providing correct information to its readers. Every publication has the civic and ethical obligation to respect the continually developing role that mass communications currently has with regard to those who place their trust in it. Therefore, any publication has the moral responsibility to seriously reflect upon the accuracy and honesty of the sources that are used, as well as upon the moral, propagandistic and other types of consequences of the information that it uses. Without further mentioning the need to take the credibility of these sources into consideration. In cases contrary to this, one arrives at providing disinformation to the readers by spreading certain erroneous news.

There are, however, also cases in which the manipulation of data is done in a deliberately tendentious manner for the purpose of provoking confusion and mystifying the truth. Mystification can similarly be achieved via the intermediary of perfect goodwill, but bad information or, purely and simply, naive information. The authors - the actual authors of the falsehoods - remain in the shadows. Nonetheless, they can easily be uncovered through the simple question: To whom is it of use?

These thoughts recently came to us while reading a report that appeared in the well-known American publication NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (the Official Journal of the National Geographic Society), published in Washington, D.C. It is a report headed with the title "Hungary's New Way" and published in Vol 163 (No 2, February 1983, pp 225-261) of this magazine, signed by John J. Putnam, senior writer. In reading the report, we were struck by the maps published by the author on pages 226-227 so as to show the historical evolution of Hungary. We wondered many times whether he was fooled or was wittingly deceived so that, in turn, others could be led astray, that is, the millions of readers of this magazine, people of goodwill. Equally striking are "the marks" on these maps, since we more than once wondered if the author had been disinformed or uninformed or both. We leave it to those who publish NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC - whose goodwill, similarly, we have no reason to doubt - and to the author himself to answer these questions.



Just as - in the case where we are talking about disinformation - we leave it to their judgement whether it is good or not for a senior writer of a publication (which, otherwise, enjoys a traditional and deserved prestige) to be manipulated by certain ill-willed elements that are in conflict with the historical truth. This is so since it is certain that those who inspired the publication of these maps are cynically combining an outrageous lie with intellectual deception. And how!

The first map, entitled "The Kingdom of Hungary (in 1100)," has as an explanation the text: "The Magyars, the first Hungarians, invaded (presumably the territories indicated in the drawing since the exact area is not specified -ed.) in the ninth century, migrating from the region of the Ural Mountains. They were converted to Christianity by Stefan I, crowned in 1001." However, on this map we see listed as the neighbors to the lands upon which the Hungarians settled the Poles, the inhabitants of the Holy Roman Empire, the Serbs, the Byzantines and those of the Russian principalities. Only the Romanians are missing. They are missing even though historical sources, even those originating from the Hungarian kings, attest to the existence of the Romanian voivodes headed by Gelu, Glad and Menumorut, as well as other Romanian political formations that were created during those times on the geographic territory of Romania. Certainly, the omission has a purpose. It is designed to point out - reviving a thesis long ago condemned by scientists everywhere, but dear to certain pseudo-historians of yesterday and today - that the territory upon which the Hungarians settled following their migration was devoid of any population. And, thus, through this simple and "innocent" omission the author, in a forced and unreal manner, throws away a millenium of history of our Geto-Dacian and Daco-Romanian ancestors, who - for Mr Putnam's knowledge - had a statal tradition right from the first century B.C. through the great king Burebista, a contemporary of Caius Julius Caesar. But, the authors of the maps (and along with them the author of the article) pretend that they do not know this over 2000-year-old "detail", just as they show that they are not aware of any data about the several-centuries-long battle carried out by the Romanian voivodes against the Magyar penetration. Is it possible that the "creators" of these maps have not heard of the voivode of Transylvania? Is it to be purposely passed over quietly? If these "creators" of the maps ignore things especially well-known to historians everywhere, it means that their scientific authority is debatable, let us not say zero. And, especially when such cartographic inventions are disseminated for "scientific and educational" purposes, the reasons make one wonder. Perhaps, nonetheless, the authors of the maps are not so ignorant. Perhaps they suffer from a sudden amnesia. At least during certain moments. For example, when they omit the historical and demographic borders of Romania. And, in this case, the amnesia does not represent a simple forgetting, but a more complex phenomenon. He who has no memory, cannot have an understanding of the exact meaning of his words.

With regard to such a mystification, any examination done in goodwill cannot exclude the possibility that the authors of the maps knowingly avoided the real data in order to give the unknowing a glaring falsehood. Regardless of whether it is deliberate or not, the falsehood nonetheless remains a falsehood. Thus, regardless of the jokes a poor (or, on the other hand, a very good) memory

can play on them, the Romanian feudal states at the beginning of the medieval period constitute a reality and cannot be knocked out of history and the collective memory of the Romanian people, Europe and humanity no matter how persistent is the ignorance or glaring falsehoods of those who pretend that they have not heard of them.

Naturally, all these falsehoods have a purpose. They are linked to the effort to present Transylvania as an integral part of the so-called historical Hungary, reaching to Wallachia and Moldavia. In fact, the voivodeship, the principality of Transylvania, existed as a country (regnum) separate from the kingdom of Hungary, being nothing more than a new stage of development of the old Romanian duchies (voivodes) from the 8th to 11th centuries. The voivodeship remained a Romanian institution specific only to Transylvania and not encountered in any other part of the Hungarian kingdom. This persistence of specific institutions and an old tradition explains why Transylvania was never joined together with the Hungarian kingdom, why they remained two fundamentally different countries (as the Hungarian historian Sandor Szilagyi stressed) and why "the country beyond the forests" constantly gravitated, in a demographic, economic, religious, cultural and political sense, towards the other two Romanian countries (a fact noted by another Hungarian historian, Laszlo Kovari).

And, if the American writer found it, perhaps, more difficult to consult the above-mentioned authors, it would have been all right - in this case - to thumb through an encyclopedia, which, we have no doubt, was available: "The Encyclopedia Britannica - Macropedia," Vol 15, p 1,047, published right in the United States in 1973-1974. He could have, thus, found out that historical and archeological research shows that on the territory of today's Romania a native Geto-Dacian population was present, a population which had developed a high-level economy and civilization "long before the Roman armies crossed the Danube." He would have also found out that the Romanian people, steadfastly staying in their homeland, inhabited "the territory of today's Romania towards the end of the first millenium A.D." and that "the first mention of the Vlachs - the name given to the Romanian peoples by their neighbors - appears in the ninth century." He could have also learned (this time in "The Encyclopedia Britannica - Micropedia," Vol X, p 98) that Transylvania, "the nucleus of the Dacian (Getic) state" that flowered in the period of the first century B.C. to the first century A.D., an area occupied by the Hungarian kingdom "after King Stephan I - according to tradition - crushed the resistance of the local prince Gyula," evolved as a distinct, autonomous region led by a voivode or governor. Similarly, he would have seen that after the Battle of Mohacs (1526) "Hungary was divided between the Habsburgs and the Turkish sultan, while Transylvania was transformed into an autonomous principality under Turkish suzerainty (1566)." One could also find in this book a map which clearly shows the political situation of the different states in 1566 and, in this case, it would not have been necessary to call upon uninformed or ill-willed cartographers. Furthermore, the great geographers and cartographers of the era - Georg Reicherstorffer, Abraham Ortelius and the renown Mercator himself - clearly

marked on their maps the political realities in this part of the world, which, as can be seen, only the authors of the maps and article in NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC are ignoring.

Let us now move on to the other maps published in the NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC. They show the same systematic tactic of disinformation and - surprisingly (or not!?) - also in connection with Romanian realities. Thus, the Romanian countries, which - as is very well known - had an autonomous status throughout the entire medieval epoch, are not mentioned either on the map designed to depict Hungary's political situation in 1566, in the central and southeast European geographic context, or on the one for 1740 or the one for 1812 showing the same type of schematic. It is at least surprising that a magazine renowned for its cartographic service and the excellent quality of numerous maps that it has published over its long existence would endorse such questionable work in the area of geographic and historical work and exactness. Where the Romanian principalities were actually located and where there should have been mention of them as neighbors of Hungary, the authors of these maps attempt to convince us that this area was covered by... the Ottoman Empire. But, despite certain relations of suzerainty specific to the epoch (a status that Transylvania also had between 1541 and 1688), the Romanian principalities never were effectively part of the Ottoman Empire. By virtue of old treaties concluded with the Ottoman Porte, throughout this entire period they had full internal autonomy and intense activities in the field of international relations. Let us review what the celebrated British historian A. J. Toynbee wrote in his monumental work "A Study of History:" "With regards to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, they were founded by colonists of Romanian nationality, Orthodox Christians; these people had come down from the plateaus of Transylvania." And, Toynbee also states: "The Wallachian and Moldavian Romanians knew how to obtain from the Turks much more favorable conditions than their neighbors to the south of the Danube."

But, the mystification of historical realities continues to aim at the situation of Transylvania. Not only is it not marked in any way as an autonomous principality in 1566, but the other two maps - 1740 and 1812 - attempt to convince the readers that Transylvania was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, reconstituted after the Habsburg offensive that followed the siege of Vienna. We need to remind those who assert this that after being conquered by the Habsburgs Transylvania was organized as a great principality, directly dependent upon the court at Vienna and never was it integrated into Hungary until 1867.

The authors of the maps and the writer who endorsed them ignore these historical realities however, just as they ignore many other things so that the reader of the magazine cannot but remain confused by such persistent and systematic ignorance. Furthermore, with regards to map No 5 (where, finally, we see the existence of a Romanian state, which probably just fell from the sky!), a map entitled "World War I (1914)," the reader encounters the following explanation: "Hungary entered World War I as part of the expanded Dual Monarchy. After defeat in 1918, Hungary lost 64 percent of its population and 71 percent of

its territory (next map)." On the next map, the reader meets the following explanations: First: "Areas acquired by Hungary 1938-1941 and lost in 1945." Second: "Hoping to regain lost lands, and defenseless against Nazi Germany, Hungary entered the war on the Axis side." On this map, the northern part of Transylvania is covered with hatch marks as "acquired" (the words of the cartographer) after the wretched Diktat of Vienna, as well as certain Czechoslovak and Yugoslav areas.

Such a falsehood and such a cartographic manipulation in such a small space would fill even the most capable professionals with envy. Nonetheless, in order to get the performance of the falsehoods to attain new heights, on page 253 of this article one can read: "It is an irony that after World War I when Hungary regained its independence for the first time in the modern era it lost by a treaty 71 percent of its territory, much of its population. Those lost people remain in the consciousness of the Hungarians. Especially those in Romania; they are badly treated. I was told this more than once."

Thus, all of these falsehoods have a purpose. It involves several neighboring countries, especially Romania and today's domestic Romanian policy. What the author "forgets" to show (or the authors forget) in his maps and text is the fact that the dissolution of the rotten multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire does not in the least represent an "irony" of history, but rather an objective and inexorable truth.

First of all, this truth is explained through the energetic desire of the Croats, Serbs, Romanians, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks in Austro-Hungary to escape the terror exercised over them by a despotic empire which was constantly trying to denationalize them, in the name of an absurd "Greater Hungary." Hungary could not have lost 71 percent of its territory for the simple reason that you cannot lose what is not yours, even if for a given moment you held it by force and diktat. And, it could not have lost 64 percent (or in the words of the article's author "much") of its population for the equally simple reason that the vast majority of this population was not Hungarian and was never considered Hungarian despite the systematic policy of denationalization that was practiced by the authorities.

Such practices, of presenting conquered territories and subjugated peoples as one's own territories and inhabitants, are not new. Even at the end of the last century the Central Association for the Magyarization of Names was created - which, at the beginning of this century, was headed as president by Simon Telkes, the one who in 1898 published certain "scientific" works (just as "scientific" as the maps we have been discussing), as well as "Hogy Magyarosítsuk a vezetéknévket?" (How We Can Magyarize Patronimic Names), within the framework of a systematic, official and merciless policy.

The publication of such maps and the placement of certain peoples on the map of the continent clearly show what types of models are inspiring those who are playing an irresponsible joke with the historical truth. It is no

less an "irony" of history that the Serbs, Croats and Romanians in Transylvania and Bukovina, and the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks broke away from the Austro-Hungarian Empire through their own will and that the international treaties later and once and for all consecrated this final separation. Just as, and not in an "ironic" manner, Robert Lansing, the secretary of state, wrote in 1918 in the name of the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson that "the Government of the United States is a witness to the great suffering and sacrifices of the Romanian people for the cause of freedom in the face of its enemies and oppressors. In sympathizing with the spirit of national unity and the desires of the Romanians in all regions, the U.S. Government will not hesitate to impose its influence so that the political and territorial rights stolen from the Romanian people will be achieved and ensured against any external interference." (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Presidential Paper Microfilm, Woodrow Wilson Papers, roll 345, Series 4, Case file 3183).

The year 1918 was the year of the liberation of these peoples. On 1 December 1918, the National Assembly of all Romanians in Transylvania, the Banat and Hungary solemnly and for all time proclaimed their unification and the territories inhabited by them with the motherland - Romania.

In an ethnic, demographic and historical sense, the so-called territories "lost" by Hungary were never Hungarian. It is true that in these areas a number of Hungarians were left to live alongside the Croats, Serbs, Romanians or Slovaks, but they represented numerically only a minority, many times noted as such by the official Habsburg statistics themselves even during the time of the former Dual Monarchy. Thus, according to the 1910 census conducted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities under conditions of a permanent offensive to denationalize the Romanians, the population of Transylvania was composed of (in percent): 46.2 percent Romanian, 25.7 percent Hungarian, 7 percent Szeckler, 11.6 percent German, 4.6 percent Serbs and Croats, 2.6 percent Ruthenian, .6 percent Slovak and 1.7 percent other nationalities ("1918 With Regards to the Romanians. The Completion of the National-State Unity of the Romanian People," Foreign Documents, Vol 1, Bucharest, 1983, p 19). With regards to the authors of these statistics, one can say anything except the fact that they would have been favorable towards the Romanians.

The Hungarian population remaining in Romania after 1918 enjoyed all the rights and freedoms ensured by the Constitution and the laws, as well as by the structure and manner of organization of the diverse institutions, religions and organizations within which they were present. The coinhabiting nationalities in Romania (including the Hungarians) know better than the detractors abroad how real and effective their rights and freedoms are. We say with pride, because we have reason to, that the coinhabiting nationalities in many other places in the world would like to enjoy such rights as they enjoy in Romania. Along this line of thought, we would be pleased to have Mr John J. Putnam or any other reporter from the NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC come to the Socialist Republic of Romania so as to be convinced by his own eyes concerning the situation of the coinhabiting nationalities in Romania. No one, however, has the right to present - nearly 40 years after the end of the last world war - the claims of the fascist Horthy regime to restore

with the help of Hitler and Mussolini and through new territorial conquests at the expense of the neighboring countries, the so-called Greater Hungary as a simple "obtaining" of territories and to present the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as "an irony of history." Such an irony, and one so filled with perfidy, is to speak about "lost" (especially in the context of the borders today of Romania and the other countries neighboring Hungary) territories and peoples from the dead Habsburg Empire or the fascist Horthy state.

In the article in NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, John J. Putnam notes the fact that during the Horthy regime 600,000 Jews were sent to and exterminated in concentration camps. A portion of the Jews sent by Horthy to the ovens at Auschwitz had been deported from the northern Transylvania that had been "obtained" by Hungary following the Diktat of Vienna. In addition to Jews, Horthy also sent many Romanians to the camps. Other Romanians, thousands and thousands of people, were forced in the name of "Hungarian nationalist ideology" to abandon their property and homes, were sent to work as slaves in Hungary or, purely and simply, were shot, hanged or beheaded or murdered by all kinds of atrocious tortures purposely invented from them by "the ragamuffins"\* of a sad past.

If the writer John J. Putnam wants to know these facts in detail we can recommend to him the work of the American writer and professor at New York University, Randolph L. Braham - "Genocide and Retribution: The Holocaust in Hungarian-Ruled Northern Transylvania," published right the U.S. in 1983 by the Cluwer Nijhoff Publishing House, a publishing member of the Cluwer Academic Publishing Group, Boston-Hague-Dordrecht-Lancaster. Its introductory study (50 pages) and especially the collection of documents (approximately 180 pages) clearly show the monstrous crimes carried out by the Horthyst occupiers against the Romanians, Jews and other nationalities in the northwestern region of Romania, temporarily taken by the fascist Diktat of Vienna.

We have reason to believe that Mr. John J. Putnam has heard of the locations Lidice or Oradour sur Glane. We suggest to him to also be interested in some Romanian places which experienced the same atrocious tragedies. We do not forget the massacres carried out on Romanian territory during Horthy's reign at Ip and Treznea, Moisei and Sarmas as well as at other places where entire settlements were destroyed, when long lines civilians - old people, women and children - were taken night and day to the edge of their villages, made to dig their own graves and killed en masse in the name of "Hungarian nationalist ideology" and the so-called "right" of Hungary to call the fall of the rotten Habsburg Empire and the peace treaties of Versailles and Trianon (which only Hitler cursed with such ardent passion) an "irony" of history. Perhaps if he

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\* The "Rongyos Garda" (the Ragamuffin Guard), a nationalist paramilitary organization composed of former White Guard officers in Hungary. Their name comes from the ragged civilian clothes in which its members dressed.

comes to Romania, Mr John J. Putnam will feel compelled to place a flower and dedicate a moment of pious thought at the places of torture of so many innocent victims and to eventually reflect upon the attempts of certain people and organizations in different circles to revive fascism in the world and especially the idea of a collective memory opposed to any type of programmed amnesia.

This is the truth! An emigration thrown overboard by history, one stubborn and stupid in which are swarming all the dregs and desperations caused by an irreversible history, attempts once again to fly the anachronic flag of Horthyst fascism by all the means it can. Furthermore, it is not the only face of fascism which is trying to be revived today in the world.

In this regard, it would be interesting to know in more detail which media, which institutions, which people and which documentary sources were of service to Mr Putnam for his statements. John J. Putnam knows, certainly, that in science the citing of sources is of an elementary obligatory nature. Not of another time, but from the time in the world that is so agitated and filled with violence in which we live where we see a proliferation of cartographic offensives, irresponsible games with false historical data, covert, obscured political dealings and affairs of the most harmless words. They perfectly fit Dostoievski's words, which state that those who lie and listen to their own lies reach a point where they cannot distinguish the truth in themselves and the things around them, and they no longer have respect for themselves or for other people.

So it is that historic truth cannot be prescribed.

Perhaps in the future the editors of NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE will be careful regarding the historical data that they receive from different sources, including cartographic sources, in putting together articles.

We do not doubt that Mr John J. Putnam, as a senior writer, and the editors of the magazine NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, those responsible for the appearance of its text, will by themselves draw all the required conclusions from the idea of respect for the truth and for the millions of readers of the publication that they serve.

8724  
CSO: 2700/147

SHORTCOMINGS IN HEALTH CARE REVEALED AT HEALTH COUNCIL PLENUM

Bucharest MUNCITORUL SANITAR in Romanian 27 Dec 83 p 3

[Unsigned article: "Plenum of the Higher Health Council"]

[Text] The proceedings of the Higher Health Council, in plenum and according to commissions, were held in Bucharest on 21 December 1983.

The proceedings were attended by the council members and the following guests: representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Academy of Medical Sciences, and the Union of Medical Sciences Societies, teachers in the IMF's [Institute of Medicine and Pharmacy], directors of health units and other specialists in the field of health protection.

The proceedings were opened by Comrade Alexandrina Gainuse, member of the Political Executive Committee of the CPR Central Committee, deputy prime minister of the government, and chairman of the Higher Health Council. She said the plenum was being held shortly after the session of the Grand National Assembly, which had ratified program documents vital to the goals set by the 12th Party Congress and the National Party Conference for Romania's rise to new heights of civilization and progress. As Party General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out at the recent Plenum of the CPR Central Committee, at the session of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development, and at the plenums of the National Workers Council and of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, Romania is confronted with particularly complex tasks in this period, and the workers must devote all their energy to their fulfillment alongside the health operatives, who are expected to make an even greater contribution to the public's good health.

The following items were on the agenda:

1. The report on the Ministry of Health's actions for distribution, maintenance, and efficient use of medical equipment;
2. The report on the main demographic developments in the period from 1 January to 31 October 1983;
3. The long-term health program to prevent and control stomatological diseases;



4. The report on fulfillment of the Uniform Plan for the Public's Health Education for the 1981-1983 Period, with emphasis on aspects of growth of the birth rate, prevention and control of occupational diseases, and reduction of the incidence of temporarily incapacitating diseases.

The report on medical equipment was read by Comrade Eugen Proca, minister of health.

The following spoke in the discussions at the plenum: Lucia Ioana Anghelescu, director of the Timis County Health Directorate /DS/; Francisc Jeszensky, director of the Harghita County DS; Maria Rusu, director of the Bacau County DS; George Iacob, director of the Bucharest Municipal DS; Poliana Cristescu, chairman of the National Council of Pioneer Organizations and secretary of the UTC /Union of Communist Youth/ Central Committee; George Litarczek, professor at Bucharest IMF; Veronica Ciobanete, director of the Constanta County DS; Leonida Gherasim, rector of Bucharest IMF; Dan Alessandrescu, director of Polizu Maternity Hospital; Valeria Bobocea, director of the Buzau County DS; Anicuta Panciu, social problems secretary of the CPR Prahova County Committee; Lucian Ene, professor at the Bucharest Faculty of Stomatology; Rada Mocanu, deputy minister of education and instruction; Ion Birzu, professor at Bucharest IMF; Andrei Firica, director of the Emergency Clinical Hospital; Maria Silea, editor in chief of the journal SANATATEA; and Nicolae Dumitru, deputy general director at Romanian Radio-TV.

The report on the Ministry of Health's actions for more efficient use of medical equipment brought out the fact that in the 1976-1980 period alone medical equipment and instruments to the value of 1,235,000 lei were supplied, and in the first years of the current five-year plan they amounted to 683 million lei, indicating the special emphasis on the medical inventory in both domestic production and imports. Moreover in the last few years the health units have been outfitted with modern, highly technical equipment such as the linear accelerator, installations for cobalt treatment of malign tumors, tomographic and echographic computers for ultrasound diagnosis, monitoring installations etc. The Ministry of Health has given priority to outfitting hospitals in heavily industrialized areas (Petrosani, Resita, Hunedoara, Baia Mare, Galati etc.) with highly technical equipment for diagnosis and first aid. Many devices of Romanian design have been developed and placed in industrial production with the aid of the National Council for Science and Technology and under Academician Dr Eng Elena Ceausescu's direct and regular guidance, so that in some fields such as stomatology, physiotherapy and sterilization the requirements are met entirely out of domestic production. Furthermore the activities of activating and testing and maintenance and repair of medical equipment have been improved, while 54 work units have been organized for the purpose on the county level as well as two units with juristic personality, one under the Ministry of Health (Station for Testing and Maintaining Medical Equipment) and another under the Bucharest Municipal DS (Central Maintenance and Repair Shop for Medical Equipment). The report and the ensuing discussions also revealed some shortcomings in distribution of medical equipment (Some hospitals have more equipment than they need and others not enough), in control of the use of instruments and equipment (Some of it is not installed, not activated or not distributed, causing public dissatisfaction), and sometimes in maintenance of the latter.

Therefore redistribution and immediate activation of equipment still not in use have been ordered, as well as joint use of all existing highly technical equipment by all the health units in an area; periodic analysis, in the COM's /Workers Councils/ of the DS's, of the supply and distribution of the equipment; repairs and procurement of spare parts, etc.

Some of the as yet unsatisfactory results brought out both by the report on the evolution of the main demographic indicators and by those who joined in the discussion are due to some shortcomings in medical care of mothers and children and especially in preventive care.

For instance in some counties pregnancies are detected tardily. The methodology of prenatal consultations is not always observed as regards frequency and content. Women with hazardous pregnancies are not correctly treated in the dispensaries, and they are not interned in maternity hospitals early enough. There are still cases where the physicians do not check the development of birth but leave it entirely to the intermediate personnel.

Although infant mortality has continued to decline in the last few years (The rate for the first 10 months of 1983 is 23.7 out of 1,000 live births compared with 27.4 for the same period of last year), there are shortcomings in this area too, such as the still high proportion of deaths at home and in the first 24 hours after internment because the newborn infants are not always examined by the dispensary physicians in the first 24 hours after discharge from the maternity hospital. The periodic medical check-ups of infants and small children are not made regularly, and the examinations are superficial at times. In some medical dispensaries differentiated medical examination and checking of infants with risks aggravated by illness are incorrect.

Moreover transmission of information among hospitals, polyclinic-dispensaries and home dispensaries concerning the latter's reception of children discharged from hospitals or requiring checking at home is sometimes neglected.

In addition to the actions already taken, measures such as the following have been adopted: institution of a new system of reporting by the DS's that will permit periodic evaluation of the measures adopted in each county's own programs organization of guidance and control programs in counties with deficient indicators, updating of the methodological guides to the activity of the OMCT /expansion unknown/ inspectors and of the county pediatric and obstetrical-gynecological methodologies, and continued examinations of women of child-bearing age for more thorough determination of the state of their health, detection of gynecological ailments, and application of recuperative treatment.

Methodological letters will also be composed concerning the organization and operation of the consulting rooms for premarital counseling, infantile gynecology and feminine and masculine sterility and infertility.

On the basis of the findings on the incidence of buccal-dental ailments, the Ministry of Health with the aid of the county people's councils has developed the material base and steadily increased the number of specialists in order to prevent and treat stomatological diseases. New stomatological units have been established in the last few years, primarily in the big workers centers and in

communes. The subject consulting rooms for children and youth have been given priority in the urban areas. At the same time the equipment made to meet the needs of this important medical care sector has been improved. Despite the progress that has been made, there is a certain discrepancy between the effectiveness of stomatological work and the material resources and personnel provided. There are still possibilities for making more rational use of the material base by extending the units' work in two shifts, replacing partitioned booths with dental units, distributing the units for adults and children more evenly, avoiding dispersion of personnel, making better use of the technicians trained for infantile orthodontics and prosthetics, etc.

There has been an improvement in the quality of the products used to supply stomatological materials, but some materials are still being supplied irregularly. This situation will be improved by the introduction of domestic chromium-nickel-molybdenum alloys for making joined prostheses and the alloy for coronary-radicular restorations, as well as some products essential to the work of the dental equipment laboratories.

The health program for prevention and control of stomatological diseases is aimed at the following objectives:

- A. Improvement of stomatological care and its primarily preventive orientation.
- B. The most efficient use of the material resources and personnel in the stomatological units.
- C. Development of scientific research on stomatology with priority on applied subjects.

We note the following tactical measures of the program: intensified preventive and health education measures; improved stomatological therapy; improved professional training of personnel in the stomatological network; consolidation and development of the units for stomatological care; recruitment of personnel essential to stomatological care; providing for materials essential to therapeutic and preventive stomatological care by assimilating production of stomatological equipment, instruments, materials and drugs in Romania; and improved facilities for maintenance and repair of stomatological equipment.

The program also calls for development of scientific research on stomatology with priority on applied subjects.

Organizational measures have been adopted to implement the program for development of stomatological care, concerning the DS's, the Ministry of Health, its Commission of Specialists for Stomatology, the Directorate for Medical Care, and other central bodies.

The report on fulfillment of the Uniform Plan for Health Education for the 1981-1983 Period analyzed the following: health education on the subject of protection of mothers, children and youth; programs of that kind aimed at workers in industry, agriculture and the other socioeconomic sectors; health education, on matters of hygiene, for patients in health units with beds and for out-patient care; collaboration among participants in implementation of the uniform plan; and aspects of material resources and personnel of concern to the health education laboratories.

The following proposals were made for improvement of the public's health culture and for rationalization of individual health and the state of community health: The Ministry of Health and other elements implementing the Uniform Plan for Health Education will use ways and means of education that have a wide audience in order to enhance the effectiveness of the programs. Steps will be taken to train students in the IMF's and pedagogic institutes in the methods of health education. More emphasis will be placed on development of the health education laboratory in the Bucharest Institute for Hygiene and Public Health in regard to performance and results obtained in the field of health-education propaganda and improvement of the whole population's health culture. Measures will also be taken on the level of the health units of all descriptions to further the interest taken in matters of the public's health education (scientific nutrition, prevention of chronic diseases, etc.), with special emphasis on improvement of the demographic indicators (actions to familiarize women and youths with the serious effects of abortion upon health), improvement of hygiene at work places, and prevention of occupational diseases. A special health education program will be prepared for workers taking various treatments at health resorts, for their knowledge and more effective use of the natural curative factors to strengthen health and shorten the period of physical recovery. The DS's will take measures for better use of existing personnel and material resources in the health education laboratories.

Those attending the plenum pledged to make every effort to improve the work in the health sector in keeping with the conditions created by the party and state and with society's constantly increasing demands. All the prerequisites have been provided for this and, in particular, medical personnel who are thoroughly trained politically and professionally, experienced administrative personnel, and viable workers democratic bodies. Better organization of labor is needed in order to make use of all these conditions to carry out the party's and state's health policy with high qualitative indices as well as the tasks assigned by Nicolae Ceausescu, the beloved and respected son of the people and the architect of modern Romania.

In the new spirit in which our activity is to be conducted, with dedication and perseverance as the CPR secretary general asks of us, let us do all we can to protect the public health, upon which the health and strength of the labor force depend as well as the fulfillment of the great tasks confronting us.

5186  
CSO: 2700/152

REASONS FOR INCREASED NUMBER OF MEMBERS LEAVING LC EXPLORED

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 84 p 3

[Article by Branko Vlahovic: "Why I Turned in My Party Card"]

[Text] The number of members voluntarily leaving the LC has been rising again over the last 3 years.

For about 3 hours I tried to persuade locomotive Eng Dragan Kojic that he should stay in the LC. It was all to no avail, although I could see that it was hard for him and that he was on the verge of tears. I asked him if his dues were too steep. He told me that this was not the reason he wanted to return his red card. He told me in detail how he had tried to speak constructively at Party meetings, proposing solutions for improving the situation, but nothing changed.

And so Eng Dragan Kojic of Zagreb, who had been a committee member during the last period of service of the committee, explained to Ivan Matija, Secretary of the Trnje Municipal Committee of the Croatian LC his reason and desire to leave the LC. People who worked with him at the time say that he was very diligent, talkative, and constructive. He was known to have come to a morning meeting of the committee after working all night. The effort by the municipal committee secretary to persuade this good worker to stay in the LC and to fight along with his comrades to change things for the better did no good. Kojic turned in his Party card.

Party statisticians point out that the number of members of the LC who voluntarily leave the ranks of the party has been rising again over the last 3 years. Over the last 20 years, more than 16,500 workers have left the LC in Croatia. The problem of voluntary departure becomes more acute when we remember that over the period of the last several congresses the Party has sought to strengthen its ranks with workers engaged directly in production.

Although the statistical data show us the trends about how many members are leaving the LC, or about how many are joining it, or about what their occupations are--these data do not tell us the most important thing: What do those who leave the LC say? To find out about it, we talked with several former members of the LC in preparing this article.

### Meetings Yielded No Results

Milutin Milinkovic, machinist at the Osijek foundry and machine factory, like several workers whose explanations we read at the Zagreb Trnje Committee, could not come to Party meetings because he was building a house for his family. Osijek worker Milutin Milinkovic recently told our Osijek correspondent, Zeljko Hodonje, why he left the LC. Meetings in the basic organization sometimes lasted 6 hours or more, and at the time he was building a house for his family. "The meetings lasted a long time, but led to no results. The agendas and resolutions which were never put into effect were repeated time and again. It was a waste of time. At the same time, the mason was building and was not raising the walls straight. If I don't supervise him, I lose money. It's no joking matter. All this was weighing on me, states Milinkovic, adding that he could no longer withstand the mental strain. He was attending school in Vinkovac. He was warned for missing meetings 9 times, and he was also disciplined. According to Milinkovic, the only fault found with him was that he did not come to meetings. Then he decided to turn in his party card. Leaving the LC had no effect on the career of Milutin Milinkovic. After completing intermediate technical school, he became production inspector at the Osijek foundry and machine factory, and has now entered a higher school in Vinkovac.

### Dissatisfied But Not Exhausted

"Many LC members do not bear direct responsibility for the many failures in the economy. I do not know of a single case of a party member being called to account for a wrong investment, local favoritism, or the like. And now who is being held responsible for this business with prices? We fail to honor decisions by the highest agencies and institutions LC members disregard decisions made by their own leaders. In a situation such as this, which I cannot accept, and when I see that little is being done to change the situation, I cannot but tender my resignation from the party. I would consider myself a hypocrite if I acted otherwise." These are the words of Branko Vuksic, pensioner in Rijeka, until recently senior safety technician at the rijeka refinery. He also told our associate Damir Konestra that his comrades talked to him and tried to persuade him to stay in the LC. They also recommended that he "take a vacation" for several years, but he did not accept their recommendation. He says that he was not tired but that he is dissatisfied with the current activities of the LC.

Vuksic was a Party member for many years. He was accepted on 15 May 1945, at the time he and his comrades were liberating Karlovac. He joined the National Liberation Struggle in 1942, and the Communist Youth League in 1943.

### We Are Still on Salary

Miljenko Ritmanic of Varazdin was in the LC from April 1969 to September 1983. Now he has voluntarily left the ranks of the party. He told our associate Karmen Gumbas that he did not leave the LC because of disagreement over political ideology or high membership dues. Nor was there any conflict where he works.

"For several years now the work of our basic LC organization in the labor collective of the Special-Interest Collective for worker and farmer health and health insurance in Varazdin has amounted to reading of materials received from higher authorities. At the meetings there has been less and less discussion

of labor problems. I felt that we could improve work and the organization, since it has become outmoded and does not meet the needs of our operation. We are still on salary; we do not have remuneration according to work. I believe that the labor collective basic organization has not played its part. Since the employees of the collective did not fully agree with me, I left the LC, but did say that I would continue to be a conscientious worker."

When a campaign was in preparation in the Croatian LC to rate members at the Zagreb Tresnjevac, more precisely at the Nikola Tesla, party members were rated on a trial basis. Some Communists then turned in their party cards. Journalist Lijiljana Pracevic talked with Eng Ivan Zderic, who voluntarily left the LC at that time.

"When I found myself on the list of people who were to be discussed because of insufficient activity, I decided to leave the LC. I felt that I was unable to discharge my professional, private, and sociopolitical obligations equally well. I was not going to meetings regularly and I did not take part much in discussions. But I was carrying out my obligations at work, and wholeheartedly at that. I came to the point where I felt that I was giving as much of myself as I could. Since I felt that I could no longer meet the requirements and cope with the intensified activity of the LC basic organization, I felt that the most honorable thing to do would be to leave the LC," said Zderic.

#### Wrong Criteria

Office worker Saveta Horvat of the Community Health SIZ of the Zagreb Community of Pescenica is disappointed by the evaluation process in her basic organization.

"I was accepted in the LC after being recommended as a good worker. At the time no one asked me to be more talkative than I am naturally. But when I was transferred to another LC basic organization, following the reorganization of the basic organization, I was criticized for not taking part in the discussions at meetings. To be precise, there was a discussion of the number of meetings and of sentences spoken by individuals: This was to be the criterion of our activity. I obviously disagreed with such criteria," says S. Horvat.

#### Still With the Party in Spirit

The persons voluntarily leaving the LC include a large number of young people. The reason given by Robert Knaus, a Zagreb student at the Electrical Engineering Faculty, may be considered "typical," since we have heard similar answers given by students who have deliberately stopped coming to Party meetings.

Knaus joined the LC in 1976 and left the Party on 28 March 1983. In his written statement submitted to the committee, he states that "I am dissatisfied with what the LC is doing to solve the economic problems of the country and of ordinary people, young people in particular. I have the housing problems and employment in mind. These topics are often on the LC agenda, but aside from endless repetition these problems have not been solved even in part. The LC calls 'certain' and 'individual,' but not specific, persons to account, even though I am certain that those whose actions are at variance with the policies of the LC also include party members." The bitterness in the explanation given by this 24-year-old student is similar to that found in many

explanations by young party members and workers who on their own turn in their party cards. In the large number of explanations we have read, no matter if written by people who took part in the war or young people, we often come across the sentences "In my heart I remain a Communist and will keep on doing my job properly, but I am leaving the LC because of the inordinate amount of time taken to eliminate irregularities." They say that, if they are needed, they will be among the first to defend the country and the party line.

#### Workers in the Majority

Mijo Ivurek, executive Secretary of the Trnje Community Committee, states that an increasing number of LC members do not want to explain why they are leaving the ranks of the party.

Analysis of the phenomenon of voluntary departure from the LC over the last 20 years shows that many more blue-collar workers are leaving than members in any other category: young people, specialists, or administrative personnel. The greatest number of blue-collar workers left the LC in 1970, 1958. In the following year many workers also left, 1833, and there were 1398 in 1972. The number of administrative personnel and specialists, who are lumped together in columns of statistics, was one-half as large. Starting in 1973, the number of departures declined considerably in comparison to the preceding 4 years. Over the last 15 years the smallest number of blue-collar workers voluntarily leaving the LC of Croatia was in 1977 (258), the number of specialists and administrative personnel being 148. The number of persons leaving the LC has been rising again since 1980. In that year, 476 workers left the LC, in 1981 533, and in 1982 661, while in the first 6 months of 1983, 306 workers left the party in Croatia. From 1964 to the present, almost twice as many workers as specialists and administrative personnel have left the LC. The majority of them had been party members for 6 years or more. It should also be remembered that the group of persons stricken from the rolls for nonpayment of dues or failure to come to meetings may also be added to the number of those who have left the LC "on the quiet." It is known from experience that some members do not want to explain their reasons for disagreement with the other members in the basic organization in which they work, and so they stop coming to meetings. The majority of the persons stricken from the rolls are also blue-collar workers and young people.

#### Why Workers Exactly?

Why do workers voluntarily leave the LC in greater numbers than others? It would be too naive to believe that it is easier for workers engaged directly in production to notice negative phenomena than the highly educated. In addition, those better informed--persons in managerial positions and with better education--know more about weakness, but the negative phenomena obviously do not irritate them as much. We believe it no exaggeration to say that a large number of well educated members of the LC know when to keep quiet., that is, they do not want to speak up out of fear that a blot on their party record, or as the saying goes, an "ideological measure," might their advancement in their profession, that is to say, might hurt their careers.



The occupation of an official calls for so-called ideological and political suitability, which most frequently is identified with membership in the LC. To avoid having advancement in his career checked, an official is capable of remaining silent even when he is not 100 percent in agreement with a particular decision or resolution. Thus we believe it to be much more honorable to leave the ranks of the party than to stay in the party and in reality not see eye to eye with it. There are more than a few persons who assert that LC members, who are known to be good workers and honest citizens, who leave the Party are unconsciously doing the LC harm. That is, their presence and discontent might be of more use than their leaving a basic organization where the rule is "not to make waves." It is truly difficult to answer the question of whether departure from the LC stems from cowardice or not. Clearly, the departure of every good, honorable worker weakens the party.

It would be no surprise if the number of workers and young people leaving the LC were to continue to grow in the future. In this context we note that at a session of the Presidium of the LCU Central Committee last Tuesday it was stated, among other things, that irresponsible behavior on the part of the authorities acts to lower the confidence of the working class and citizen in the capabilities and efficiency of our self-managed socialist system and its institutions. The statistical graphs make it crystal clear that the number of persons leaving the party has been higher during times of weaker party activity, and vice versa. A lesson should be learned from this history.

6115

CSO: 2800/208

SDB THREATENS SWEDISH RESIDENT IN RECRUITING ATTEMPT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Feb 84 p 10

[Article by Sune Olofson: "Was To Be Recruited To the Security Police! Agents Who Entered the Country Threatened Yugoslav"]

[Text] Two agents, who entered the country from Yugoslavia, have tried to recruit a 36-year-old Yugoslav, originally from Croatia, who now lives in Goteborg. When the 36-year-old refused to cooperate, his life was threatened and he had to escape to Stockholm.

"The man now receives a certain amount of protection," says Detective Superintendent Bertil Brusvall of the immigration authorities.

In October last year, the 36-year-old was contacted by men unknown to him. They told him that they worked for the Yugoslav security services SDB and that they had arrived in the country as tourists. According to the Yugoslav agents, SDB had chosen him as collaborator in Sweden.

According to statements which the police have not been able to verify, the 36-year-old was instructed to pick up an un-named person by car, transport him to Malmo or Goteborg and there deliver him to his principals. When the 36-year-old asked what would happen to this person, he was told that he was not allowed to know.

The 36-year-old refused to collaborate with the Yugoslav agents and argued that it was not his business.

"Then the man's life was threatened, he was thrown from a window and slightly injured," tells Bertil Brusvall.

The 36-year-old decided that the only way to avoid these unwelcome attentions was to escape from Goteborg and to keep out of the way for a while.

In Stockholm the 36-year-old contacted the Immigration Authorities and reported that he was frightened and felt persecuted by Yugoslav agents. After questioning him Bertil Brusvall contacted the Security Police. A source within the Security Police tells the SVENSKA DAGBLADET:

"The 36-year-old has been able to name one of the persons who contacted him. But if this person is temporarily in the country, it will not be easy to determine his identity and whereabouts, since Yugoslavs do not need visa for Sweden."

#### Believe the Tale

Both the Security Police and Superintendent Brusvall believe the story of the 36-year-old.

"The statements we have been able to verify so far have shown to be accurate," says Bertil Brusvall.

The source within the Security Police considers that the fact that the 36-year-old still has not dared to return to Goteborg, where he has an apartment and his belongings, speaks for the story being true. The 36-year-old is in touch with the police every week.

The Security Police have long had their eye on the so-called "Yugoslav civil terrorism," a phenomenon which has manifested itself in a concrete manner in, West Germany, among other places. During a five-year period, the police there have been able to verify 15 murders and 16 attempted murders of Croatians who have been politically active for a free Croatia.

As late as December last year, restaurant owner Luka Kraljevic was shot by two unknown men. Kraljevic is still hospitalized badly wounded. The attack is believed to have followed Kraljevic's appearance on TV in West Germany, where he revealed details of how the Yugoslav security service operates abroad.

The 36-year-old in question came to Sweden in 1978 as a political refugee. His father, who is Croatian, lives in Yugoslavia. When the 36-year-old moved to Goteborg, he was at first suspected of being a Yugoslav agent. He was reported to the Security Police in Goteborg as a "strange foreigner" at Croatian parties and meetings. He was then questioned by the Security Police but was cleared of suspicion.

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## OPINION SURVEY AMONG BELGRADE LCY MEMBERS ANALYZED

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[Article by Z. Sekulic: "Crisis Erodes Prestige"]

[Text] What is, in your opinion, the prestige of the LCY in society today? Will the economic situation improve or worsen in 1984? Do the present situation and needs of the economy and society require large numbers of persons in responsible positions to be replaced? These are only a few of about 50 questions posed to Belgrade communists in a survey entitled "Members of the LCY on Current Social Questions" by a group of researchers from the Center for Political Science and Public Opinion of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade. Who are the respondents? A total of 883 LCY members from the Belgrade opstinas of Stari Grad (39 percent) and Rakovica (61 percent) were polled. LCY basic organizations from working organizations provided 74 percent of the respondents, LCY basic organizations from the university 16 percent, and LCY basic organizations from local associations 10 percent.

According to Dr Vladimir Goati, manager of the survey, the current Yugoslav situation led to this effort to learn what Belgrade LCY members think of the present situation and of the activity of their organizations. The complex problems that confront Yugoslav society, especially the economic crisis, with its negative effects on the living standard and on employment opportunities over a period of years, point up the necessity for appropriate involvements by the LCY, the most influential organization in our society. The success of the strategy for a way out of the crisis, according to Dr Goati, will depend among other things on the confidence of the LCY members in the appropriateness of measures and decisions that the LCY advocates and on their readiness to promote the realization of the approved measures and decisions.

Let us see, first, what Belgrade communists think about our economic situation.

#### Optimists and Pessimists

Few Belgrade communists think the general situation in our country to be favorable--only 6 percent. Twenty-three percent of the respondents do not consider it unfavorable, whereas two-thirds of the respondents maintain the situation is unfavorable (44 percent of the respondents give an "unfavorable" mark, and 22 percent more a "very unfavorable" mark. It is interesting to

note that older communists give fewer unfavorable marks. Older communists are consequently more optimistic. However, the degree of optimism and pessimism is best shown by answers to the following two questions. First: "Is the present economic situation more favorable or less favorable than a year ago?" Eight percent of the respondents maintain the situation to be more favorable than last year, 30 percent the same, 53 percent less favorable. The second question reads: "What will be the situation in 1984?" Thirty percent of the respondents maintain it will improve, 21 percent think it will remain unchanged, 24 percent say that it will worsen, 25 percent did not know what to anticipate. Slavko Pegan, analyst of this part of the survey, says that neither gloomy nor serene expectations prevail in the respondents' forecasts. In the same proportion, i.e. with equal frequency, the respondents state that the economic situation in 1984 will improve, or will worsen, or will remain unchanged. Unfortunately, an entire quarter of the respondents abstained and made no forecast. Pegan terms a positive sign of the present social-psychological situation the fact that communists show a certain degree of optimism. Optimism and confidence in society's own potentialities are as important as constructive criticism. Without optimism, concerned involvement by communists themselves is inconceivable, as is the mobilization of the masses of working people for economic stabilization and social-political consolidation, for general revival and development...

Also of interest are the answers to the question: "Is there something to be changed in systemic solutions?" The majority, 56 percent, regard the consistent application of existing systemic solutions as necessary and sufficient, whereas others, 35 percent, see the way out of the present economic and other troubles in radical changes in systemic norms. The former call attention to what they regard as widespread disregard of existing systemic norms. Insistence on existing norms rather than opposition to possible new ones is implicitly involved with the concern that new norms might suffer the same fate. The second group of communists want essential systemic innovations as a way of cautioning that simple corrections lead to nothing, that with them the existing situation is maintained with a tendency to worsen further. Stressing the need for systemic innovations, it is very important to emphasize, does not mean that the existing system has to be turned upside down; rather, the system's self-managing and other foundations must be solidified as a basis for successfully functioning and genuine progress. And, paradoxical as it may seem, there are no substantive differences between these two stands within the LCY. There are only finely-shaded statements from the same point of view. Therefore, both are right.

#### In Favor of Personnel Changes

We reach the next survey question: "Are widespread personnel changes necessary?" What are the answers? The vast majority, exactly 85 percent of the respondents, think so; 41 percent think a great number of people should be replaced, another 41 percent agree in part. Only 5 percent of the respondents say no; 10 percent did not answer this question. Respondents with a higher education and with the highest incomes are more inclined to the idea of widespread personnel changes.

Why are personnel changes necessary? The reasons are numerous; we list only some that stand out in this survey. To begin with, the respondents say that

high officials stay long, too long, in their positions, shifting from one to another, moving only horizontally to functions of the same rank and prestige and same emoluments. Nobody asks whether a candidate has performed satisfactorily in his previous job, or in general for guarantees that the person is qualified for the new position. One of the respondents says "they have gotten attached to their easy chairs;" they have lost contact with the masses and the working class, they do not have a mobilizing effect. You read further in the survey: "They have become conservative in their views and in their activity in the workplace or opstina and elsewhere." They are powerful and firmly inter-connected; as another polled communist says, "There is no force that can remove them, although it is urgent to do so." Many respondents find it hard to tolerate the irresponsibility of high officials. A position is not taken seriously, as though it did not involve a commitment. Tasks are not carried out, sluggishness and indifference to the social consequences of easygoing behaviour dominate. Officials also hide behind the masses, invoking "self-managed" decisions or the saying "we are all guilty." According to some respondents, high officials are inactive or even apathetic because many among them "have fulfilled their life plans." When polled communists speak about the incapacity of high officials, there is no difference between respondents at lower levels (working organization or opstina) and at upper levels (region, city, republic or Federation). Some say, we repeat, that large numbers of people must be replaced but not all, while others say only some of them. Which people should be replaced? Those, the respondents say, that "do not match the time," that only "talk a lot," that "are always late with decisions," show ignorance and incompetence, sloppiness and incapacity. Analyst Pegan says that hints in the answers suggest that any polled communist could mention the names of a bigger or smaller number of persons whom he had in mind in his remarks.

The survey further tells that the remarks about the moral image of high officials are particularly critical. Numerous respondents list it as the main problem, or the main reason for the replacement of a lot of high officials. They also mention unacceptable moral characteristics: "Title and position as mere ambition and even a stimulus for a shameful fighting with competitors, careerism; a natural counterpart of this, and of irresponsibility, is the neglect of the interests of the working collective and society, with preference for personal profit."

Making these numerous critical remarks, the surveyed communists naturally expect a lot from future personnel policy. Their expectations are directed to "new blood," to new people, especially to young people and specialists. They say that accepted standards of personnel selection should be respected: real abilities, honesty on the job and throughout, a sense of responsibility toward the society, the moral qualities of the candidate... "Keys," mandates, and other formal elements should be secondary and not at the expense of work, results, and the actual needs of society. Bureaucracy and monopoly in personnel policy should be overcome.

Interestingly, a similar survey produced similar results--"The Assembly Elections of 1982"--when 76 percent of the respondents were in favor of thorough personnel changes. One year later, as we see, the number increased to 85

percent! Dr Goati says that the difference must result from the fact that there are no visible signs of improvement in the social situation; the conviction that personnel transformations are needed spreads as a consequence.

#### On the LCY

In such a situation, the competence of communists for social-political activity is of special importance. According to the indicators in this survey, only one-third of the polled members of the LCY can be considered well qualified, one-third are average qualified, and one-third are poorly qualified. One percent of the respondents have no knowledge of Marxism at all! There is no homogeneity among the members of the LCY in regard to social-political involvement. The results of the survey are as follows: 31 percent of Belgrade communists are very active, 35 percent are average active, and 34 percent are inactive. Asked about the causes of inactivity in the LCY, the polled members mentioned the discrepancy between words and deeds (35 percent), the feeling that one cannot influence vital political decisions (27 percent), members who do not deserve to be (27 percent), and excessive obligations (5 percent). As a prerequisite for greater involvement, communists most often stressed a quicker solution to society's problems.

The vast majority of communists (80 percent)--in relation to the question about the mode of LCY activity--answer that communists should orient society, should mobilize working people to solve problems. According to Goati, this shows that the LCY's way of doing things under the Program of 1958 is accepted by most members as their own. However, 12 percent of the respondents maintain that the LCY should take everything in its hands--no negligible figure!

In conclusion, we call the attention of the reader also to answers to the question "What is in your opinion the prestige of the LCY?" Twenty-one percent say "great," the same percentage "slight," 53 percent "mediocre," 5 percent "no answer." Dr Goati comments that this indicates rapid evolution among LCY members on this question. The erosion of the prestige of the LCY, visible from the survey in the spring of 1974, continues. Then, almost 10 years ago, 78 percent of the respondents estimated the prestige as "great." One year later, the percentage had diminished to 69 percent. From then on, surveys were not conducted until this one. And today, as we see, that number has dropped to 28 percent! How does Dr Goati explain this decline in prestige? "The trend of the decline of the LCY's prestige can be explained by the troubles and problems that confront our society. Although the LCY does not directly make the society's decisions, it definitely directs the society's development beyond any doubt; consequently, the members of the LCY (and people in general) find it responsible for all failures, and meritorious for all successes. Thus the crisis and weaknesses in society inevitably lead to a decline in the LCY's prestige."

So much about prestige; and about the survey, which was commissioned by the Belgrade City Committee of the LCY.