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8 October 1985

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REGIONAL

PAPER VIEWS GULF STATES' RELATIONS WITH USSR

GF241606 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 24 Aug 85 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "Soviet-Gulf Relations"]

[Text] Diplomatic and trade relations between the United States and China began with table tennis tournaments. Will diplomatic and trade relations between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union begin with soccer tournaments? We raise this question in light of the extraordinary reception accorded to the Saudi chairman of the Youth Welfare Organization, who is one of King Fahd's sons, as well as the "warm" statements he made at Moscow airport which included an invitation to Soviet sports teams to play in Saudi Arabia.

The reception accorded to the Saudi official was extraordinary because he was received by a high-ranking Soviet diplomat, that is, the chief of the Middle East Department at the Foreign Ministry. According to protocol, diplomats usually do not receive sports officials at the airport, especially when the diplomat is the chief of a political department at the foreign ministry of a big country. This is a clear indication of the Soviet Union's great interest to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia while the latter, for its part, gave a sign by making sure that King Fahd's son chaired the delegation of his country; he could have deputized somebody else as has been the case with various sports occasions.

One cannot easily dismiss the fact that the visit of King Fahd's son to Moscow is an indication that "developments" are taking place in contacts or in Saudi-Soviet "relations." This is supported by the constant news being leaked from the periodic meetings between the ambassadors of Riyadh and Moscow in London, and the previous meetings between the Saudi foreign minister and Soviet officials during the visit of the seven-member committee to Moscow 2 and 1/2 years ago.

We also point out the recent statements by the Bahraini prime minister in which he said it was necessary for the GCC states to look into the question of their relations with the Soviet Union. Could these signs be a prologue to upcoming diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and some other GCC states and the Soviet Union, in addition to the relations between Kuwait and Moscow which have existed for years and which, by Kuwaiti assessments, have been successful and fruitful relations?

International relations in this century are based on the mutual interests and diplomatic relations is the official contact channel between countries. Taking into account these two considerations, we find that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the GCC states and the Soviet Union has become a must which should be undertaken with courage.

The GCC countries have various interests in which the Soviet Union too has an interest, besides being a superpower which has influence on world events.

There is no need to go into the interests which the Soviet Union influences or those which it is influenced by. It is enough to state the following points: The Soviet Union is the superpower geographically closer to the Arabian Gulf; it has a direct interest in developments in the Iraq-Iran war which is taking place near its borders. It also has a direct interest in the Arab-Zionist conflict; there is no need to explain its supportive stance on Arab rights. Moreover, the Soviet Union is a basic side in the Afghanistan problem. The region's states are concerned with the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan.

The most dangerous and important point of all concerns the subject of oil. The Soviet Union is the biggest oil producer in the world, has the biggest gas reserves in the world, and its decisions on production and prices and its projects with regard to gas in Europe directly affect the world's oil market. This alone requires that the "OPEC" countries, whose basic body are the GCC states, coordinate in the oil sector with Moscow.

These are a number of issues of interest to the region and the Soviet Union, without taking into account the importance of equilibrium in international relations. These issues alone are enough to warrant seriously looking into the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

CSO: 4400/261

EGYPT

ANIS MANSUR COMMENTS ON AIDS DISEASE IN AMERICA

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Aug 85 p 12

[Commentary by Anis Mansur: "Positions"]

[Text] Just as medicines and political and economic problems come to us from America, Europe and Japan, so do diseases. The most recent disease is AIDS or the disease of immune deficiency.

America today is the number one exporter of AIDS. It has allocated about \$2 million so that scientists may research the virus that causes this disease to find out how it is acquired, how it stays with the person and how it is fatal.

This disease was transported to America from the heart of Africa where man mingles with beast and where sanitation is nonexistent. This virus settled in Haiti, the favorite place for the white gay community. They contracted it and transported it to America and from there to Europe and the rest of the continents thereafter.

This virus attacks the immune system in the white blood corpuscles causing them to age prematurely and die and, consequently, the patient dies.

It appears only after several years when the patient becomes emaciated and develops blue blotches on different parts of his body.

It is communicated from male to male, but not from male to female or female to female. It is carried via blood and via "deep kisses" and also via blood transfusions and contaminated hypodermics.

This epidemic has caused a public panic. The gay community has staged demonstrations, not to declare their penitence but to demand government protection!?

The believers say it is a divine revenge against homosexuals and underscores the fact that only right is right, only the straight are straight and virtue brings health and depravity brings disease. Many night clubs and brothels have closed their doors out of fear of this disease.

Educators say it is the price of the freedom men are demanding to have the right to be straight or perverted.

Environmentalists say the white people have sucked the blood of the black people and the time has come to settle old accounts!

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CSO: 4504/475

EGYPT

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION, OTHER ISSUES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Aug 85 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali by 'Adli Jalal: "Kamal Hasan 'Ali in Exclusive Interview with AL-AHRAM; Challenge of Second Plan Is To Provide Adequate Goods, Housing and Food to Every Citizen; We are Working To Solve Problem of Wages in Government Sector by Linking Wages to Production"]

[Text] Prime Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali stated that most of the industrial sectors are being reorganized as companies whose yardstick is profit and loss and that as a result of this reorganization, the production value rose by 1.06 billion pounds last year, 208,000 feddans were reclaimed in 3 years and the government offered 600,000 feddans for sale, provided that they are used for cultivation. He asserted that the masses respond to state projects and that the sums contributed last year alone amounted to 81 million pounds. He said that there are enormous challenges. But they are surmountable because we tackle them realistically and with a well-studied scientific policy. He also said that there are excesses on the part of the opposition and of those who exploit the democratic climate to spread fanaticism and radicalism. Despite this, there will be no backsliding on democracy and the law will be the judge on any violation. Following is the text of the interview given by the prime minister to AL-AHRAM:

[Question] What are the diplomatic efforts which Egypt will exert in the wake of President Husni Mubarak's meeting with His Majesty King Husayn to solve the Palestinian and Middle East issue?

[Answer] The diplomatic efforts we are currently exerting are concerned with encouraging the United States to embark speedily on talks with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, especially since the PLO has named the Palestinians to be included in this delegation.

On the instructions of President Mubarak, this issue was the axis of my latest visit to Washington where I met with Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, the secretary of defense and a number of prominent senators and congressmen.

I found great readiness on their part toward the contents of President Mubarak's message to President Reagan regarding the importance of launching

this dialogue. It is expected that Murphy, the assistant secretary of state for Middle East affairs, will visit the area shortly to explore with us, with Jordan and with the Palestinians the procedures pertaining to the convocation of this meeting.

Nobody is unaware of the importance of these talks to laying down the foundations of an understanding between Washington and the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and to reaching agreement on the proper form for beginning the negotiations within an international framework.

International Terrorism Is Uncivilized Phenomenon

[Question] International terrorism has, very regrettably, become a phenomenon. What is his excellency the prime minister's opinion on this phenomenon and do you have any proposals for an international position to confront this phenomenon?

[Answer] International terrorism, which is spreading to many of the world's societies is an uncivilized phenomenon. It is a return to the law of the jungle and to shedding the blood of the innocent. It is, moreover, an immoral phenomenon because it is unreasonable for the unarmed innocent people to pay with their lives as the price for positions to which they are not a partner. A fundamental rule established by orthodox Islam says: "Do not punish a person for another person's crime."

However, we support any effort exerted by the international community to combat terrorism, whether emanating from individuals or from states. This support is evident, for example, in our observance of the revolutions of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

At the same time, we call for seeking out the causes of terrorism so as to uproot them. In our Arab area, it is important to find a just solution to the Palestinian issue and to end the Iraq-Iran war as an inevitable means to eliminating the causes of radicalism and terrorism.

Therefore, our efforts to reach a just solution to the Palestinian issue and to end the Iraq-Iran war are at the same time efforts to uproot terrorism.

Convocation of Arab Summit Is Necessary in Current Phase

[Question] What is the prime minister's opinion of King Hassan's call for the convocation of an emergency Arab summit on 7 August 1985 even though there is no consensus on convening this summit? What results can such a summit produce?

[Answer] The principle of convening the Arab summit is essential under the deteriorating conditions being undergone by the Arab nation, especially since a number of Arab states have isolated themselves from Egypt, thus creating the severe conflicts being experienced by the Arab arena.

The Arab leaders need to pause with themselves and with their peoples. How

long will their conflicts continue, with the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples paying the price, not to mention the state of instability which has led to the escalation of radicalism and terrorism?

I hope that the emergency Arab summit will adopt the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement without any acts of oneupmanship and without any attempts to impose custodianship on the PLO. The PLO signed this agreement after it had been approved by its constitutional institutions, embodied in the Palestinian National Council and the Executive Committee. Thus, the states meeting in the summit should do nothing but bless and support what the PLO has accepted as a means to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, especially since time is not in our favor and since any attempt to impose custodianship will mean the total loss of the West Bank and Gaza under the impact of Israel's expansion of the construction of settlements and of its imposing a fait accompli which we may not be able to change in the future if we squander the present opportunity to urge the United States to embark on a dialogue with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as a prelude to pushing forward the peace process within an international framework.

I hope that the conferees in the summit will take these circumstances into account without any consideration for the blackmail attempts by those who have decided to boycott this summit.

Excesses in Means of Democratic Action

[Question] Some people, and we are not among them, reiterate that the democratic climate prevalent in Egypt currently has created a kind of excess. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] Of course there are violations of the means of democratic action. There are excesses on the part of some opposition circles who do not embrace the method of constructive criticism. The government welcomes all objective criticism dealing with the various positive and negative aspects of the positions and the problems. As for putting the emphasis on the negative aspects solely and for making malicious accusations without any proof or fact, this is tantamount to the misuse of the principles of democracy.

There are excesses on the part of those who exploit the democratic climate to spread fanaticism and radicalism at a time when we need to safeguard our national unity whose roots date back to hundreds of years.

Despite these excesses, there will be no backsliding on democracy. Democracy and the purity of the regime in Egypt are the characteristics of our political system and they reflect in turn the political stability enjoyed by Egypt under the leadership of President Mubarak. We tell those who commit excesses to reexamine themselves and their positions and to ponder the extraordinary efforts exerted by the government to lay down the foundations of democracy, self-sufficiency and justice. We also tell them that the law is the final judge vis-a-vis any excess.

Egyptian Labor

[Question] We find that most of the Arab countries are now curtailing foreign labor and we are aware that there are a minimum of 2 million Egyptians working abroad. What would happen if they return and what are the problems that will emanate from their staying in the motherland in terms of housing and food crises and of numerous other problems?

[Answer] It is an exaggerated assumption to imagine that more than 2 million Egyptians working abroad will return because many of the Arab countries prefer Egyptian expertise at various levels and in various spheres. This expertise has, to a large degree, become a part of the wheel of work in these states. Moreover, Egyptian labor is an element of political stability in the Arab states. Because of its Arabism, this labor complements the peoples of these countries culturally. Moreover, this labor is not at all involved in Arab political activity. This labor's sole concern is to contribute technically in the face of the challenges of Arab development.

As for the possibility of the return of part of Egyptian labor, those returning are welcome in their motherland and the labor market is extremely thirsty for them because they represent an element of scarce expertise which we lack in numerous spheres. Despite this, we endure the absence of this labor for the sake of our Arab brothers.

I don't believe that there will be big problems insofar as housing and other aspects are concerned because many of these people either possess their own houses to which they return during their summer holidays or have left their families in Egypt while working abroad, as in the case of the rural workers.

Splitting Public Transport into Companies

[Question] Now that it has been decided to split the Public Transport Authorities into companies, what are the motives for this decision and when will implementation begin? Is there a tendency to apply this system to other sectors?

[Answer] This decision's objective is to improve the public transport utility so that it may serve more efficiently more than 3.5 million passengers a day. This decision was made after detailed studies, which showed that it has become difficult for the Public Transport Authority to manage centrally more than 2,700 buses, especially since the number of buses actually fit for use is 1,800 buses.

This is why it has been decided to manage the public transport utility through several companies within the framework of the Public Transport Authority and according to the geographic division of Cairo, provided that these companies operate in an economic manner that guarantees service to the masses and service to the companies' workers through the wages and bonuses they receive.

Moreover, 500 small units, consisting of semi-buses and minibuses, will be introduced into the service. Economic operation will not be confined to the

Public Transport Authority only. It is a tendency we are seeking to apply to numerous public authorities. This is evident in the industrial sector, for example.

Our Bonds with Sudan

[Question] How does your excellency view the special relationship between Egypt and Sudan and the popular role in this regard?

[Answer] It is indubitable that Egypt and Sudan are tied by fraternal relations and a single destiny emanating from the Nile River, this natural artery that determines the pace of the common growth and progress of our two countries. Therefore, our ties with Sudan surpass any transient political developments. This is confirmed by numerous events experienced by relations between the two countries.

Moreover, any attempt to sow sedition between the two countries is doomed to failure and death, especially since relations between the two countries are not only relations between governments but primarily relations between two peoples bound to each other by fateful historical ties.

Opposition Parties and Their Activity in Sudan

[Question] It is noticed that the Egyptian opposition parties have been actively engaged in contacts with Sudan's political parties since 6 April whereas the National Party's role in this regard is almost minute. What are the reasons for this?

[Answer] This is not true. The National Party leaders are in constant contact with their brothers in the Sudanese parties through partisan channels. These contacts include the latest visits to Khartoum by Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi, the National Party assistant secretary, and Dr Mamduh Jabr. I would like to point out again what I have already mentioned, namely that the relationship between the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples is a relationship that surpasses and rises above any policies.

Economic Challenges

[Question] All the studies assert that Egypt's overcoming of the economic crisis can be achieved only through increased production. What, in the opinion of Egypt's prime minister, are the dimensions of this intricate issue and what unconventional solutions do you see in this regard?

[Answer] The dimensions of the economic challenges we are facing pertain to the development of the economic course, whether in connection with the production sector, with the infrastructure projects or with the services. The government is acutally facing these challenges with a planned, well-studied and unconventional approach, meaning that it is dealing with the actual problems with practical solutions.

For example, most sectors of industry are being now reorganized in the form of companies whose yardstick is profit and loss. This has helped increase

this year's production to 6.8 billion pounds compared to 5.74 billion pounds in the corresponding period of 1983-84.

As for agriculture, 208,111 feddans have been reclaimed in the past 3 years of the plan. The government has also recently offered for sale 600,000 feddans, provided that they are used for cultivation within a period of 3 years from the time utilities are supplied to these lands.

Preparations are currently underway for the sale of 1.7 million state-owned feddans to the citizens in phases. We will have thus achieved an important objective, namely not just stop the erosion processes in the cultivable lands resulting from leaving lands fallow and from scooping away top soil but also increase the cultivable area so as to achieve food security for every citizen.

Comprehensive Development of Egyptian Economy

As for the economic structure projects, they are being implemented with intensive efforts whose fruits have actually begun to show. Moreover, extensive studies are being conducted by the Council of Ministers for the comprehensive development of the Egyptian economy. I hope that these studies will be completed and their implementation will begin within 5 months at the most.

The results of the infrastructure and service projects have begun to show clearly, as demonstrated by the improved telephone lines to which 700,000 new lines have been added in the past 3 years, by the improved roads and by the overhead bridges. This improvement has also shown in the water and sanitary sewerage utilities in which the United States is investing \$1.25 billion.

As for housing, the government is focusing on economy housing because the private sector shows no interest in this type of housing.

This is in addition to the underground metro which will greatly ease Cairo's traffic problems when completed.

New Tourist Villages and Encouragement of Technical Education

Regarding tourism, work is currently underway to build new tourist villages on the northern coast, on the Red Sea and in South Sinai with the objective of enabling recreational tourism to keep pace with archaeological tourism. In this connection, the committees emanating from the Higher Tourism Council are currently preparing their studies on boosting tourism generally and on simplifying the procedures from the moment the tourist arrives at Cairo airport to the moment he leaves it. The committees will present the outcome of these studies to the Higher Council within a few weeks so that the council may make its decisions in this regard.

In the sphere of education, for example, the educational curricula are being currently reexamined so that they may be made compatible with production needs. This includes encouraging technical education which must have priority over the spheres of theoretical education.

The government is also working to encourage intrinsic efforts for the construction of new schools, considering that the target of the 1985-95 plan is the construction of 9,800 schools. The government will be able to build only 5,000 of these schools. Consequently, intrinsic efforts have their importance in this sphere. The value of the contributions for education amounted last year to 81 million pounds and we expect these contributions to grow bigger through the efforts of the local governments in this regard.

I will conclude by saying that there are enormous challenges but that they are surmountable because we are tackling them, as I have already noted, realistically and with a well-studied scientific policy.

Developing Fish Resources and Reducing Meat Consumption

[Question] The problem of fish in Egypt is a strange problem. It is unreasonable that Egypt should have the great Nile River and still face this problem. It is true that the problem has been discussed repeatedly, but does your excellency have a plan to tackle this issue either by manufacturing or importing an equipped transport fleet with which to solve the problem? What is your opinion?

[Answer] The government is devoting special attention to developing fish resources.

- First, by supplying the Nile and its tributaries and all the water bodies (canals and drainage canals) in Upper and Lower Egypt with fish fingerlings.

- Implementing the authority's plan to complete the artificial hatcheries, numbering 10 hatcheries of which 3 have been completed so far. Work is underway to complete the others.

- Exerting efforts to increase the productivity of the fish farms and to set up four new farms.

- Farming fish in the rice fields: a total of 55,000 feddans were farmed with fish last year and this year's target is to farm fish in 100,000 feddans.

The second aspect pertains to the fishing fleet. It has been decided to merge the three fishing companies--namely the Egyptian Company for Fishing Equipment, the Northern Fisheries Company and the Egyptian High Seas Fishing Company--in a single company named the Egyptian Company for Fishing and Fishing Equipment.

Central Bank and Its Subservience to Council of Ministers

[Question] It has been decided to put the Central Bank under the supervision of the prime minister. There are, however, a number of economists who oppose this direction. What is your opinion?

[Answer] There is a People's Assembly resolution calling for the Central Bank to be under the control of the Ministry of Economy. Consequently, the prime

minister's supervision of the bank is intended solely to insure coordination between the Central Bank governor and the minister of economy. God be thanked, the understanding between the two in serving the public interest is ideal.

As for the economists who oppose the Central Bank's subservience, they proceed on the basis of the concept of the importance of the Central Bank's independence so that this bank may be remote from politics and may follow a purely economic course. The United States adopts this direction.

However, the subservience or non-subservience of the bank is an issue that is governed by the circumstances of each state and by what changes such circumstances produce.

[Question] Wages in Egypt are no longer compatible with rising prices. It is true that rising prices constitute an international tendency but the fact is that wages in Egypt need a decree to raise them. What are the dimensions of the prime minister's view of reforming wages in Egypt, especially government and public sector wages?

[Answer] I would like to point out first that there is no problem of wages in the public sector, the private sector or the investment sector. The wages in these sectors are high enough to insure a reasonable income for the workers. This is something that motivates many a graduate to seek work in these sectors. This year, for example, 65 percent of the university graduates took up jobs in the said sectors whereas only 35 percent took jobs in the government sector. We are working now to guide the graduates toward government jobs or toward businesses compatible with their specializations and capabilities.

I will say that the graduates' interest in the non-governmental sectors is a healthy phenomenon because the problem of wages in the government emanates fundamentally from the accumulation of large numbers of workers in the government agencies in a manner that is not compatible with ideal job utilization. Herein lies one of the difficult equations for which we are trying to find a solution by linking wages to production.

There is a committee which is currently studying the issue in connection with the size and efficiency of the government apparatus. On the other hand, we are working to curtail inflation so that the rise in prices may not overwhelm any wage increase. Therefore, it has been decided in principle that the Ministry of Agriculture will deliver its production of food commodities to the Ministry of Supply so that the latter may market it, thus increasing the commodity supply and curtailing the rise in prices.

It is important to point out that one of the reasons for the rising prices is the excessive prices charged by some wholesalers and retailers. This is why 9 million pounds have been allocated this year to build 40 new outlets for the distribution of goods, thus allowing the supply of such goods to increase and, consequently, curtailing excessive increases in prices.

Increased Commodity Production and Development Beyond Valley

[Question] God be thanked, all the reports indicate that we are moving ahead with the plan at the targeted rates, which is something happening for the first time in Egypt's history. Would the prime minister point out to us the most prominent features of the objectives of the Second 5-year Plan which is being prepared by the government agencies? Moreover, what is the biggest accomplishment which the government estimates it will achieve in the service:

First, of the Egyptian economy generally?

Second, what is the impact of this accomplishment on the overwhelming majority of the people's masses?

[Answer] We do truly thank God that we have been able to move forward with the plan at the targeted rates. This shows that when there is a clear and definite policy and there is determination to implement and follow up on this policy, the people's masses working in the various sectors respond with effort and production. Though the government is the side that formulates the policy, the people are the actual executor of this policy.

The projects to rebuild the economic structure have consumed enormous allocations from the investment plan. This will insure that the second plan will proceed from a firmer base, thus helping to put greater emphasis on supplying the citizen's needs of goods and housing. Therefore, the features of the coming plan focus on:

- Increasing commodity production so as to reduce by a great degree our need for imports, thus saving hard currency to invest it in production sectors.
- Continuing to improve the economic structure, thus enabling the Egyptian economy to absorb the production without any bottlenecks that damage any production that cannot be conveyed to the consumers.
- Construction development beyond the narrow valley--development embodied in the new cities that can offer housing and work, especially for the new generations. This is the real challenge.
- The ideal use of the water resources so as to supply the water needed for irrigation of the reclaimed lands.

I hope that by the end of the Second 5-year Plan in 1991, we will have achieved sufficiency for the citizen in commodity production and in housing, thus achieving self-sufficiency in food and producing an industrial output that meets a large part of our needs and opens spheres for the exportation of products to which we will be proud to affix the phrase "made in Egypt."

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EGYPT

TRADE, INVESTMENT WITH FRG INTENSIFIES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German 9 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by W. An.: "Projects in Egypt With German Assistance; Federal Government Providing Financial Support for Several Projects"]

[Text] German-Egyptian economic relations have intensified recently. The volume of trade increased to DM 4.6 billion in 1984 compared to DM 3.7 billion during the previous year. German exports to Egypt increased from DM 2.95 billion (1983) to DM 3.2 billion. Imports from Egypt jumped sharply by 78 percent to DM 1.4 billion. In particular, the Federal Republic exported machinery, motor vehicles, and electrical and chemical products. Egypt provided for the most part petroleum, aluminum, cotton, textiles, and vegetables. Egypt continues to be a focal point for German development aid. The German-Arab Chamber of Commerce in Cairo promotes German-Egypt economic relations whenever possible.

Government negotiations were concluded in March with an agreement stipulating that the Federal Republic of Germany would make available a total of DM 268 million during the current year. Of this amount, DM 235 million are expected to go for projects in the field of financial cooperation (long-term and low-interest credits), and DM 33 million for technical assistance rendered free of charge. The latter is intended to serve primarily for purposes of reforestation, soil conservation, technical vocational training, agricultural extension, and activities pertaining to housing construction and city planning. In addition, DM 15 million are being rescheduled from prior commitments.

The credits are to be used, in particular, for the Kous pulp and paper project (DM 130 million), the second stage of the Kafr el Sheikh sewer system project (DM 40 million), four transformer substations and the Siouf power generating plant (DM 16.5 million), and for assistance in operating the El Nasr Casting Company's manufacturing plant for the production of ductile cast-iron pipe (DM 15.5 million) as well as the cement factory owned by the National Cement Company in Tabbin (DM 15.0 million). In addition, DM 11 million have been set aside for expanding the telecommunications network and DM 8.5 million for the second stage of the control system improvement project for the Egyptian railways. In 1984, the Federal Republic granted loans amounting to DM 250 million and technical assistance equal to DM 18 million.

As was the case during the 3 preceding years, in 1984 Egypt held a leading position in terms of German direct investment in Africa. Investments made on the part of the Germans totaled DM 264.4 million with an emphasis on the petroleum industry, compared to DM 256.9 million the previous year and DM 284.4 million in 1982. Total German direct investment in Egypt increased to about DM 1.15 billion by the end of September 1984.

At this year's Cairo International Fair, held in March, German exhibitors once again held a top position among 32 nations in terms of numbers and exhibition area. The Federal Republic of Germany was represented officially with a joint exhibition. Participating in it were 119 German firms on a surface area of about 6,000 square meters. Most of them are expected to be present again at the following international fair in Cairo, which will take place in March 1986, with renewed official participation by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Egyptian exhibition company is the General Organization for International Exhibitions and Fairs (GOIEF), Cairo-Nasr City, which also organizes specialized trade fairs with German participation.

The German Financing Company for Investments in Developing Countries GmbH [Deutsche Finanzierungsgesellschaft fuer Beteiligungen in Entwicklungslaendern GmbH - DEG], Cologne, which also belongs to the federal government, is making efforts to increase involvement by private German firms in Egypt. One new German-Egyptian joint venture that was formed with DEG participation is Allweiler Al-Farid Pumps Co. S.A.E., which at its location in the new city 10th of Ramadan, 50 kilometers east of Cairo, manufactures 3,300 pumps annually for private, industrial, and agricultural use. The trade partner in this joint venture is the firm of Allweiler AG, Radolfzell, which holds a share of 26 percent. Local partners are an Egyptian private company as well as two banks.

The DEG also provided promotional assistance in Egypt to Abicon S.A.E., Cairo, which is involved chiefly in deep-well drilling, and to Egyptian German Electrical Manufacturing (EGEMAC), Cairo, which is a producer of switching devices and switchgear. The German trade partner for Abicon S.A.E. is Rautenkranz Internationale Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, of Celle, and the partner in the case of EGEMAC, which was DEG's first project in Egypt, is Siemens AG, Munich/Berlin.

The Egyptian government is expected to make a decision in early autumn as to who will receive the contract for building the country's first nuclear power plant. Three interested parties are in the running: in addition to the American firm Westinghouse Electric Corporation and a French-Italian consortium under the guidance of the French Framatome agency, there is the German firm of Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU), Muelheim/Ruhr, which belongs to the Siemens AG company group.

The federal government has announced its willingness to grant a State guarantee of DM 2 million for construction of the nuclear power plant in El Dabaa, located approximately 160 kilometers west of Alexandria. In case of default, KWU would bear 25 percent of the risk itself. The value of the contract for KWU in building this nuclear power plant (with a 1,000 megawatt pressurized water reactor) would equal about DM 3.5 billion. The Federal Republic and Egypt signed a cooperation agreement that became effective in March 1982, for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

EGYPT

ISSUE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS DISCUSSED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 12 Aug 85 pp 16-17

[Article by Ahmad Hamrush: "Issue Is Not Shari'a But Government"]

[Text] I have heard from some Sudanese brothers that a number of those who were subjected to the Islamic legal punishment in the days of Ja'far Numayri have been proven innocent and that the real criminals confessed too late.

To what physical and psychological pain is an innocent person subjected when his hand is cut off and when such is a person is powerless but to surrender and complain to God?

In what kind of humiliation will such a person live while explaining to people the injustice to which he has been subjected?

How can the magistrates of these special courts, which consisted of a magistrate, an army officer and a police officer, sleep when they have turned the healthy into disabled people?

What adverse effects will these tragedies have on the nobility and tolerance of the Islamic Shari'a?

I recall that many years ago, in 1951 specifically, I was sitting with friends and relatives around Shaykh Ibrahim Hamrush, then shaykh of al-Azhar, on a stone bench in front of the village chief's house.

The gathering was interrupted by a village guard pushing in front of him a pale youth carrying on his shoulders a bag full of corn ears. The guard told the chief boastfully: I have caught this boy stealing from so and so's field.

The village chief said simply and without wishing to disturb those present with an administrative problem: Take him to the police station.

But the shaykh of al-Azhar, who was born in the village and who knew all its inhabitants, interrupted to ask: Whose son is this young man?

The village guard answered that he was a vagrant with no family and that he lived in an shack he had built on the water canal.

The shaykh of al-Azhar went on to ask: Doesn't he possess anything and doesn't he work?

Not at all.

I was surprised to hear the shaykh of al-Azhar say:

Then release him. His act is excused. Find him work.

The village chief hesitated a little but the shaykh of al-Azhar settled the issue, saying that the young man was not considered a criminal or a thief because life's circumstances forced him to do what he did. He then told those present that 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab suspended the legal Islamic penalties in the year of starvation, explaining that the Shari'a dictates that every person must find enough to keep him alive, to preserve his dignity and to provide him with an existence that does not push him to crime.

The village chief implemented the legal opinion of the shaykh of al-Azhar. I can still see the look on the face of the pale youth while raising his hands toward the sky and shouting: Long live justice, long live justice.

Justice is a word with great human weight. Justice is not present in special courts with a political color, such as the courts set up in Sudan.

The bitter Sudanese experience requires us to confront this call that masks itself behind the garb of religion and advocates implementation of the Islamic Shari'a while actually aspiring for and seeking power.

Our modern history shows that some people have tried to use religion as a means to pounce on power.

The Muslim Brotherhood was the group which performed this role before the revolution after changing its original character--a character which did not exceed the boundaries of the religious call.

In the final days of al-Wafd cabinet of 1944, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, then minister of interior, summoned Shaykh Hasan al-Banna [then grand master of the Brotherhood] and told him that the ministry would not permit the Brotherhood's scout groups to gather in railroad stations to meet him or to stage scout marches for him.

Mustafa al-Nahhas then summoned Hasan al-Banna to meet him at Mina House where al-Nahhas lived for a short period and told the shaykh with his well-known frankness: Listen, Shaykh Hasan: Religion yes, politics no."

This was tantamount to a warning against mixing religion with politics and to a demand that the shaykh show his true face.

After dismissal of the Wafdist cabinet, the Brotherhood entered the "political game," encouraged by the minority parties which were hostile to the true democracy that always put al-Wafd Party as the representative of the popular

majority at the time. This support for the Muslim Brotherhood peaked when Isma'il Sidqi became prime minister in 1946 in the wake of the Kubri 'Abbas massacre. Immediately upon assuming the premiership, Sidqi rushed to visit the office of the Brotherhood's grandmaster and coordinated his policy with the Brotherhood, which began to propagandize and defend his policy. Mustafa Mu'min, the Brotherhood representative, stood to say in a speech at the university: "Mention Isma'il in the Book. He has been sincere in his promise and he has been a messenger and a prophet."

Thus the Brotherhood entered the "political game," but not in an attempt to convince the masses with its ideas. Rather, it resorted to terrorism and assassinated a number of political figures, such as Ahmad Mahir and Mahmud al-Naqrashi, and judiciary figures, such as counselor Ahmad al-Khazandar and others. The Brotherhood then formed an underground organization of army officers led by Mahmud Labib, an officer who had lived for a time in Nazi Germany.

When the July revolution triumphed, the Brothers thought that they were in control because a large number of the Free Officers belonged to their organization. But Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's eagerness to keep the revolution far from the parties and to have the Free Officers enjoy special independence led to confrontation between the revolution and the Brotherhood, a confrontation which materialized in the March 1954 crisis that erupted while 'Abd-al-Nasir was delivering a speech in al-Manshiyah Square after the conclusion of the evacuation treaty.

As a result of this attempt, the revolution tried to liquidate the Muslim Brotherhood in an administrative manner which exceeded humane bounds, thus proving that terrorism is countered with terrorism.

The revolution made no effort to confront the Muslim Brotherhood with dialogue or to purge or liquidate its ideas at a time when the revolution was capable of doing so by virtue of the popular accomplishments and gains it had achieved.

Islam was never the subject of disagreement between the revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood. After the revolution, the number of mosques increased greatly, a number of religious broadcasting stations were set up, the Islamic Conference and the Islamic Research Council were founded, the law to develop al-Azhar was issued and religion became a compulsory subject for passing school examinations.

Thus, the disagreement was not over Islam or over protecting Islam but over attaining power. The Muslim Brotherhood's means was not that of trying to win over the masses democratically but that of keeping society ignorant and using terrorism, as happened when the Brotherhood reassembled in 1965. What happened in 1954 recurred in a different form.

When Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir departed to God's vast realm, some radical religious associations tried to pounce on power by way of terrorist acts, such as the incident at the Technical Military School, the assassination of Shaykh al-Zahabi and other incidents.

What is surprising is that Anwar al-Sadat encouraged some of those groups, especially in the universities, to fight the leftist and Nasirist organizations, in the same way as minority groups encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood prior to the revolution.

Since Anwar al-Sadat's assassination, the radical groups have continued their instigation on the issue of the application of the Islamic Shari'a as if we were not Muslims before their instigation. They have been encouraged in this regard by what Ja'far Numayri imposed on the Sudanese people.

Are these people trying to sow the seeds of a sectarianism that leads us to the abyss of politics, that serves imperialism and Zionism and that turns Egypt into another Lebanon?

I know that some of the advocates of the application of the Islamic Shari'a follow the path of their leaders who consider our society to be in a pre-Islamic state and I know that some of their opponents classify these advocates as pre-Islamic people. This may end up in a conflict and fighting which floods the land with blood and which no person loyal to his country and his people wants.

The Ministry of Interior did well when it issued its decree that religious slogans be eliminated from vehicles so that they may not advertise and propagate sectarian conflicts and the ministry is doing well in its administrative confrontation against those who seek to impose on society a state of tension charged with sectarian and isolationist ideas. But at present, as in the past, the matter still requires an intellectual confrontation and an objective dialogue. Administrative confrontation alone, regardless of how efficient it is, cannot wrench thoughts from the minds of those who are convinced of such thoughts.

The information media must play a major role in this regard and must not allow those who ride the back of radicalism, sectarianism or superficiality to surface.

Another task is to fight corruption firmly so that corruption may not provide the well-meaning people who want a better future for their society but who are shocked by horrible examples of laxity and disintegration that act as a justification for the advocates of terrorism and radicalism.

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EGYPT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, WAFD DISCUSSED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 12 Aug 85 pp 14-15

[Article by Jamal Salim: "Why Does Brotherhood Put its Hand in Wafd's Hand"]

[Text] What keeps the Muslim Brotherhood at al-Wafd's bosom?

Al-Wafd is no more faithful nor more Muslim than the other parties, al-Wafd chairman does not wear a turban on his head and his name is still Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din and not Shaykh Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din. I don't think that there is a provision in the Brotherhood's code or program dictating that the Brotherhood join al-Wafd and throw itself into its bosom.

What, we wonder, is the reason for this sudden love and exaggerated fondness between the Brotherhood and al-Wafd? It must be acknowledged in advance that the New Wafd is not the old Wafd. The New Wafd is something different. It is a product of the 1980's, of hostility to social change, of condemnation of the revolutionary movement, of ties to world capitalism, of the settlement of accounts with the July revolution, of striking at social accomplishments, especially the public sector, of distorting the major projects, especially the High Dam and heavy industry and of hostility to the liberation of the peasants and so forth.

This is not al-Wafd we wanted nor al-Wafd for whose reemergence we were enthusiastic.

We saw al-Wafd as the only party qualified to continue carrying the 23 July banner of social change, to continue the struggle with democratic means and to gather all the forces under its banner.

Numerous intellectuals, workers and farmers put their names in the lists of founders of the New Wafd, trusting and believing that it would pronounce what the old al-Wafd pronounced and that it would include numerous and varied segments of the social forces. But it was trust in a leaning wall, as the proverb goes, and a misplaced belief.

The New Wafd has been exposed as the party of the landlords, of company owners, of founders of consumer projects and of businessmen who drain Egypt's economy.

Leftist and seekers of social change feel that their place is not in al-Wafd whose seats are occupied by the landowners--the extinct creatures who have returned to take vengeance on the farmer who has gained his dignity and on the worker who has gained his place in the executive board of the company or establishment in which he works.

Al-Wafd no longer includes faces such as Dr Mandur, 'Aziz Fahmi, al-Khamisi and al-Sharqawi. It has come to represent the face hostile to the July revolution.

Al-Wafd chairman exposed himself and declared that he disagrees with the July revolution by 180 degrees. This means that al-Wafd has been turned into a factory hatching elements hostile to July and its accomplishments.

At this very time, the Muslim Brothers were seeking a canopy to protect them and protect their returning wealth, their companies, their lands and their hamlets which they have begun to own since their return from the oil countries that embraced, hosted and assisted them to spite 'Abd-al-Nasir and the July revolution. When 'Abd-al-Nasir died and the era of the open-door policy started, they felt that their time and their hour had come and that all they had to do was to ride the wave. They did in fact offer a solution--a solution whereby they perform the role of the barrier in the face of imported principles, i.e., in the face of the winds of social change, not because they believe or do not believe in these principles but because their interests have come to be tied firmly with the open-door society.

Axiomatically, there was nobody other than al-Wafd to protect the Muslim Brotherhood and its interests. Al-Wafd is against nationalization, against the public sector and against social change and al-Wafd demands liquidation of the public sector.

Thus, al-Wafd's interest has been tied to the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had to offer something representing an instrument of pressure on the government and on the regime which states that it derives its legitimacy from the July revolution and from the ruling party which declares that it is the defender of the July revolution.

The Brotherhood has offered the needed condemnation, namely that the regime is not one that rules in accordance with God's dictates and that such a regime must be declared infidel.

The Muslim Brotherhood did not make such statements in the days of the monarchy and it did not issue a single resolution charging the king with profligacy and the monarchical class society as a tyrannical and unjust society. Was King Faruq a righteous and just ruler?

Was the king clean of hand, tongue and conscience?

Was the regime noble, chaste and pure?

Of course not. The pre-July revolution regime was a feudalist regime in which capital dominated the government. It was a class regime and this is the common denominator between al-Wafd and the Brotherhood.

What is sought is a class society. Therefore, all the clamor, radicalism and allegations by the radicals that the society is an infidel pre-Islamic society are attributable to the fact that they want a class society because it is the society that protects their interest and influence.

Every assertion that they are doing all this on behalf of Islam and on commission from divine providence and that their motive is fear for Islam and the Muslims is an assertion that lacks evidence and proof.

What is important is that we must know that interests are what motivate individuals and groups and that the masses' interest does definitely not lie in the return of the monarchial system, the return of feudalism or capital's control of the regime. This might be in the interest of a certain faction or group, which is normal. It is our duty to guide this faction and to lead this group, calling it to the right path.

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EGYPT

NEW RULINGS TO IMPLEMENT PERSONAL STATUS LAW

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 2 Sep 85 p 1

[Article: "Executive Decision Regarding New Personal Statute Law. Wife Guaranteed Presentation of Divorce Papers"]

[Text] Justice minister Justice Mamduh 'Atiyah issued an executive decree concerning the new personal status law outlining the procedure for declaring divorce and for presenting the wife with the divorce papers and informing her of the new marriage. The order requires that the competent notary public show clearly in the divorce declaration the address of the divorcee and brief her, whether or not she was present for the notarization. In all cases, the notary public must establish the divorcee's address in the divorce declaration. He also must notify, within 7 days from the date of the divorce notarization, the wife personally of the divorce through an official report in the event she does not attend the notarization of the divorce. The notification must include the effective date of the divorce, the name of the notary public and his place of work and the number of the divorce declaration. The divorcee must acknowledge receipt of the divorce declaration from the competent notary public within 15 days of the notification date.

The notary public must serve the divorcee or her proxy with a copy of the divorce declaration and get a receipt for that to be attached to the declaration. If the divorcee or her proxy fails to appear at the notary public to receive a copy of the declaration, the notary public must turn over the copy to his court 30 days after the notarization date in accordance with a receipt to this effect. In this case, the court must send it to the divorcee by registered mail with a return receipt if she is a resident of Egypt or via the Foreign Ministry if she resides abroad.

The decree requires the notary public who notarizes the marriage document to state in it clearly the husband's marital status. If he is married, the statement must include the name of the wife or wives in his charge and their places of residence. This statement is substantiated by the husband's affirmation. The notary public must notify the wife or wives in the husband's charge of the new marriage within 7 days of the date of notarization of marriage via registered mail if the wife is a resident of Egypt and via the channel prescribed by the civil and commercial code of procedure if she resides abroad.

12502
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ALARM RAISED OVER EGYPT'S USE OF OIL

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Aug 85 p 1

[Commentary by Ibrahim Nafi': "We Are Squandering Oil"]

[Text] I was surprised by the decision to raise the price of gasoline 5 piasters per litre at a time when I was getting ready to write about a serious problem related to the future of our oil resources and the revenues we got from it.

I had a chance to look at some serious figures regarding our oil consumption which alarmed me and compelled me once again to try to push the panic button about the future of our limited oil resources.

The figures say that our consumption of gasoline in 1967 was 300,000 tons and in 1970 it rose to 440,000 tons. In 1975, it escalated to 656,000 tons, then took a tremendous jump in 1980 to 1,158,000 tons and maintained its jumps in 1985 to hit the 2,103,000 ton mark.

What Do These Figures Mean?

They simply mean that our gas consumption is doubling every 5 years. They also mean that if our consumption is maintained at these same rates, it will grow 100 percent. These are extremely serious indicators because no more than 15 percent of the highest quality crude oil Egypt produces is gasoline. So if our consumption of fuel oil for cars is doubled, our consumption of crude oil to produce it will be six times as much!

If our gas consumption rates are maintained at current levels, in only 5 years we will lose oil which otherwise can be exported to help meet our hard currency needs.

Realizing the fact that the oil reserve in Egypt will last no more than 11 years at best, this means that we will squander our resource on local consumption in a short time. And this reserve, which we are trying to stretch by every means, will dwindle faster than we expect and we will be forced to import all or some of our needs from foreign markets, thus adding to our burdens and to our need for foreign currency.

What Shall We Do?

I say clearly it is a disgrace to watch our oil resource getting away from us because many of us do not believe in the rationalization of car fuel.

It is also a disgrace for all of us not to try to cut our consumption of gas, both for public and private use.

And if the government, through large projects for building overhead bridges and roads, is trying to ease traffic and provide energy, it is our duty as individuals and citizens to take part one and all in rationalizing and cutting our gas consumption in an endeavor to preserve our country's future.

Most countries of the world, ever since oil prices went up right after the October War, have initiated intensive programs to cut their consumption of car fuel and long-term programs to produce alternate fuel that will eliminate their dependence on oil.

Experts realize that cutting personal consumption of car fuel was a cardinal goal of most European and American countries facing this problem.

Most of these countries used the weapon of inflated oil prices to urge their citizens to cut consumption in an effort to safeguard their revenues and available funds from being used up by oil imports.

The efficacy of this weapon notwithstanding, I believe it is not the only weapon for facing this problem, the gravity of which must be made known to the public so that everyone may avoid its effects.

I call upon all people to protect their oil resources from rapid erosion due to the frivolous and excessive use of cars and car fuel. There is no doubt that such impudence is encouraged by the fact that, despite the recent price hike, gas prices are still the lowest compared to other places in the world.

A litre of gas in West Germany costs 59 piasters; in Italy, 89 piasters; France, 73; England, 50; Japan, 76; Greece, 62; and in Algeria, 59.

Therefore, I call upon all to have a sense of national responsibility for the future of their country by taking part in stretching our oil resource as far as possible through preservation and rationalization of consumption.

In this connection, I can say that each of us has a duty toward his country as well as the next generations which he can fulfill by rationalizing his consumption of oil in its various forms and by urging others to take upon themselves this great responsibility.

12502

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EGYPT

NEW FAST ROAD TO LINK AL-'ALAMAYN TO SOUTHERN EGYPT

Ciara AL-AHRAM in Arabic 29 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Hasan 'Ashur: "Expressway Between al-'Alamayn and Southern Egypt. International Industrial Zone at Gulf of Suez"]

[Text] It has been decided to build an expressway between al-'Alamayn on the northwestern coast and the southern part of Egypt inside the Western Desert. This expressway will link the various development areas in western Egypt.

It has been decided to form a committee under the chairmanship of Eng 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Tudi, head of the Central Agency for Reconstruction, which will include Eng Michel Fu'ad, head of the Architectural Planning Authority, to choose the best route for the expressway and to propose what means of transportation will link this expressway with the architectural development areas bypassed by the proposed route.

Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, minister of reconstruction and new communities, stated that next August is the deadline for the study being conducted by the ministry in cooperation with the Japanese government to develop the Gulf of Suez area with a view to transforming it into an area that attracts Cairo and Delta inhabitants and to creating employment opportunities in it through the establishment of an international industrial free zone, as well as developing it agriculturally and touristically, in addition to housing projects.

The minister added that this project is considered the most important project in the next phase and will lead to the development of this area.

12502
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EGYPT

CURRENT NILE WATER LEVEL EXCEEDS 1984 LEVEL

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Aug 85 p 13

[Article by 'Adil Shafiq: "Nile's Water Supply This Year is 84 Billion Cubic Meters Compared to 57 Last Year"]

[Text] The inundation of the Nile for this year is expected to reach 84 billion cubic meters, according to water levels and scales at the Nile sources for the current month. Egypt's share is 55.5 billion cubic meters; Sudan's share is 18.5 billion cubic meters; and 10 billion are lost in the river at the High Dam Lake.

Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi Radi, head of the Irrigation Methods Research Institute, stated that last year's inundation yielded 57 billion cubic meters and we had to draw 23 billion cubic meters from the lake.

The aquatic year starts the first of August and ends at the end of July of the following year. Water gets to Egypt about 1 month after it reaches the Nile's main sources in the Ethiopian Plateau and represents about 12-14 percent of the plateau's total rainfall. Part of it is lost to evaporation, another part is used for agriculture while a third part seeps down into the ground. Water which gets to the rivers that constitute the Nile's main sources is called surface flow. This flow is expected to drop 12-14 percent from the usual rate due to the past drought and the probabilities of water seepage in larger than usual amounts.

Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi Radi added that the preliminary picture of the Nile River yield during the inundation will be confirmed at the beginning of September and October due to the fact that 75 percent of the inundation water arrives between August and October.

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LIBYA

AL-QADHDHAFI PRAISES LUNAR CALENDAR IN NOTE TO ISLAMIC LEADERS

LD161842 Tripoli JANA in English 1737 GMT 16 Sep 85

[Text] Tripoli, Muharram 1, Sep 16, JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY--The leader of the revolution sent a cable to the presidents, kings and leaders of the Islamic states on the new lunar year. It read as follows:

On the occasion of the end of the lunar year 1394 from the death of the Prophet (F.D.P.) and the beginning of the year 1395 F.D.P., it gives me pleasure to send to you and to the Muslim people of your sisterly country the best of wishes entreating the mighty Allah to grant you and the Muslim people more prosperity and happiness.

On this occasion, the best thing we do is to endeavour in making this event eternal. This, without doubt, the most serious event that affected the history of Islam. The death of God's messenger--Muhammad--which represented the completion of the revelation of the Koran, eternally terminating the inspiration on earth and the completion of the last heavenly message.

What event in the history of Islam is possible to ascend in importance to reach the occultation of the last of God's messengers and prophets from earth? No doubt, Islam. Islam had never witnessed, during the life of the holy messenger, decisive events as the immigration to Ethiopia, the immigration to Medina, Badr Battle, the Mecca liberation and other battles. But, anyone of these stay limited in effect when compared with the death of Muhammad.

What immortalising is more effective than our adoption of the year the event took place as a starting point of our calendar in the Islamic world.

We in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, realised the importance of the death of the messenger and what it represents, years ago we adopted it as the beginning of our calendar.

We call on all Muslims in all the countries to use it to mark historical events for its eminence and importance which no doubt surpasses the importance of the birth of the Messiah which was one of the Almighty God's miracles and a sign of his, which was adopted by his followers as the origin of their calendar.

Also I call you on this occasion to look into his most exalted saying: "They ask you about immolation, say it is a calender for people and for pilgrimage." And ponder on his saying--Praise be to him--"the number of months to Allah are twelve months in a Allah's book when he created the heaven and earth, four of them are holy, that is the straight religion." Are not these verses sufficient to draw our attention to adopt the lunar calendar.

Your Brother Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi

CSO: 4500/213

LIBYA

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL RECLAMATION FUNDS--Benghazi, 12 Dhu al-Hijja, 28 Aug, JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY--An official source said that the total expenditure on the agrarian reform and land reclamation in Benghazi Municipality reached 2,787,000 Libyan dinars in the first half of this year. He indicated that the transformation budget for this sector in the current year reaches 8,322,000 dinars to carry out a series of productive projects in the agrarian and livestock fields. [Text] [Tripoli JANA in English 1753 GMT 28 Aug 85 LD]

AL-QADHDHAFI TOURS ECONOMIC FAIR--Tripoli, Muharram 1, 15 Sep, JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY--The leader of the revolution toured yesterday the fair of economic achievements being held these days in Tripoli. He inspected samples of industrial and agricultural products of thousands of industrial and agricultural fortresses realised thanks to the great Al Fatih revolution. The economic fair was held as a follow up to the show of military and morale force during the festivities held by the Libyan Arab people to commemorate the 16th anniversary of the Great 1st September revolution. [Text] [Tripoli JANA in English 0932 GMT 15 Sep 85]

CSO: 4500/213

SUDAN

PRIME MINISTER AL-JAZULI DAF'ALLAH INTERVIEWED

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 30 Jun-6 Jul 85 pp 30-31

[Interview With Prime Minister Al-Jazuli: "Points of Difference Between Us and the Military Council"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The revolutionary masses carried out of the Kober prison on their shoulders the leader of the doctors' union and the secretary general of the National Grouping. Following the uprising, al-Jazuli Daf'allah launched into heated dialogues with members of the Military Council until the charter was endorsed and he became prime minister. Al-Jazuli was one of the readers of AL-HURRIYAH before it was banned in Sudan under Numayri's rule. He began talking regularly with AL-HURRIYAH under the rule of freedom. This interview took place between us.

[Question] While we were in Sudan we followed the animated debate between the [National] Grouping and the Transitional Military Council [TMC] regarding the proposed draft constitution. The basic part of this debate centers on the authority of the cabinet. How do you view the jurisdictional boundaries between the two bodies.

[Answer] Our view is that the TMC is the sovereign authority which enacts basic legislation. What we mean by basic legislation is what the cabinet has designated, for example. Under basic legislation the approval of the form of the flag comes under its jurisdiction, as do many [other] things relating to sovereignty.

As for the cabinet, its authority begins with implementation. There is no conflict in this. The current difference is based on the responsibility of legislation. We believe that everything pertaining to legislation which relates to implementation is under the authority of the cabinet. The constitution of 1956, as amended in 1964, decided this issue.

It said that the cabinet initiates legislation and refers it to the sovereignty council for approval. If the sovereignty council, now embodied in the TMC, does not approve, it goes back to the cabinet. If the cabinet then approves by a majority of two-thirds, it becomes law.

[Question] Do you not believe that the arrangement between the cabinet and the TMC differs from that of 1964, and that their functions differ as well?

[Answer] In 1964 there was a sovereignty council and a civilian council. Today the sovereignty council is subsumed under the TMC. Before the establishment of the constituent assembly the cabinet appointed the sovereignty council.

[Question] And now, has the opposite happened?

[Answer] [No response]

[Question] Yesterday you said that you had formed a committee to draw up amendments to the new constitution. Will these amendments be added to the constitution of 1956 which was agreed to by the grouping and the TMC, or will they be added to the draft constitution proposed only by the TMC?

[Answer] The amendments are to the constitution of 1956, as amended in 1964, because there are gaps in that constitution which do not take the current situation into account.

[Question] What are the principal changes required by these amendments?

[Answer] The situation in the South was not mentioned in the Constitution of 1956, as amended in 1964, nor was regional rule. With the addition of these amendments, this constitution will become the basis of rule.

The Transitional Constitution of the TMC Contains a Great Deal of Vagueness

[Question] This formula suggests that you are ignoring the transitional draft constitution proposed by the TMC.

[Answer] From the beginning we have focused on considering the constitution of 1956, as amended in 1964 and again in 1984, as the basis of rule. However, the committee charged with this task came up with a new constitution called the transitional period constitution. We had reservations about this. The cabinet debated this matter and decided to form a committee to submit a memorandum so that the national forces represented in the National Grouping could benefit from what the committee accomplished; therefore, the cabinet did not study the transitional draft constitution in detail. Instead, it concentrated its efforts on the constitution on which we agreed as elements in the grouping. By elements of the grouping, I mean the unions, the parties, and the TMC.

[Question] Why was the TMC's draft not discussed?

[Answer] Because it contained a great deal of vagueness and confusion, while the constitution is clear.

[Question] From what you are saying we believe that you still consider the TMC an element in the grouping, which also includes the unions and parties.

[Answer] This is true; or so it was when the charter was signed.

[Question] But the TMC has proposed a draft, without consulting the grouping, and without reaching agreement with individual elements in the grouping, as some of the leaders of the grouping are doing. Under this arrangement, the grouping has become an element, the TMC has become an element, and the cabinet a third element. Does this arrangement cause you some concern?

[Answer] Yes, but we give it the benefit of the doubt and interpret this as the result of misunderstanding. The elements were not properly represented in the committee which drafted the transitional period constitution. Therefore we felt that the committee which drew up the draft was not representative of all sides. If there are grounds for argument, it has to be in the fact that the draft was the result of discussion by the three sides on the basis of the charter which these sides drew up; discussion among the sides cannot begin in a vacuum. There is an existing charter which has been proposed and which relies on the constitution of 1956 as amended in 1964.

The TMC Has Gone Beyond Its Authority in Appointing Regional Officials

[Question] Do you believe that the TMC has overstepped its authority by appointing regional officials?

[Answer] Yes. I believe that this is an executive action and not an act of sovereignty. It is within the jurisdiction of the cabinet; however, Sudan's situation is unique and requires adoption of daily formulas which meet the needs of the revolution. In such an atmosphere the boundaries [of jurisdiction] are blurred for those things which do not fit the framework.

We begin a new effort; we are all new to power, but such appointments must not become a regular procedure.

[Question] Let us go on to another subject: the liquidation of the remnants of the May regime. It seems to me that a mixing of the constitutional and political dimensions of this process has taken place. The trial of those you call "custodians" is proceeding on the basis of the very same laws which were formulated in Numayri's time. Therefore, in my close contacts with the people I noticed a feeling of disappointment as a result of the release of a large number of people or the failure to try other "custodians."

The Who Cooperated with Numayri Will be Tried in Two Different Ways

[Answer] There are realities which we must take into account regarding this regime, I mean the May regime. The regime endured 16 years, and various political sectors cooperated with it during this period. It began in 1969 and lasted until 1985. The collaboration process continued in various stages and forms. There are large numbers of citizens who have committed mistakes which are considered crimes against people. We therefore are confronted by two forms of collaboration: sectors (parties and individuals) which have cooperated because of a political error, and citizens who have engaged in practices which are considered crimes against the people. Therefore, we must distinguish between both. If we want to try a political line allied with the regime, we must begin with the year 1969 and end in 1985. I believe

that this is not practical because we will be judging the results of nearly all political forces. It is rare to find a side which did not have a bitter experience with Numayri, who was in the habit of enticing people and stabbing them later.

We have divided cases of collaboration into two categories: one is political, in which the people will judge democratically. They are the ones who will strip away confidence from those who collaborated with Numayri through a political choice. Then there are groups who have followed treasonous paths, accumulated wealth illegally, and committed crimes of oppression, etc. These cases will be held accountable by law. The revolution has raised the slogan of sovereignty of the law and independence of the judiciary. Numayri has been held accountable based on this point. Therefore, it must wipe away the effects of May through the sovereignty of the law and independence of the judiciary. We believe this is the best way to eradicate the effects of the May regime. There are problems which would arise if we were to enact a new law to try the custodians. How would we apply this law retroactively? This is not legally permitted. A law goes into effect on the date of its passage.

[Question] When you took over the cabinet, you proposed, as a pressing demand of the people, an attempt to get Numayri back and bring him to trial. This is taken from your ministerial program. Is this still your demand?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] But the members of the TMC think this unlikely and consider relations with Egypt more important.

[Answer] Getting Numayri back to Sudan is an important matter, first of all because it is a demand of the Sudanese people and also because he is responsible for the disasters and crimes of 16 years in Sudan. He must be tried under the law. Relations with Egypt are no less important; this is a historical and necessary relationship. However, we cannot deal with the two matters in a positive way, I mean putting the matter of Numayri's return on the same footing with the strengthening relations between the two countries and the two peoples.

[Question] How?

[Answer] I believe that the Egyptian people are such that they can comprehend democracy and understand the right of the people of Sudan to recover their rights by prosecuting traitors to the joint cause. Can we as an authority and a Sudanese people persuade the Egyptian people that Numayri, who is in Egypt, has committed crimes against Sudan and against Egypt as well, crimes such that his extradition should be an Egyptian demand as well? We hope that Arab and Egyptian nationalist forces will make efforts in support of this demand. We will work very quietly and sensibly to persuade the Egyptian popular forces and authorities. We hope that we succeed in this.

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SUDAN

ZUHAYR AL-JAZA'IRI REPORTS ON SITUATION IN COUNTRY

Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 30 Jun-6 Jul 85 pp 32-34

[Article: "Is Sudan Witnessing a New Coup?"]

[Text] At the end of a performance by Sudanese progressive singer Muhammad Wardi, struggler Fatimah Ibrahim went up on stage and asked the audience to stay and listen to what she had to say: "There are those who want to deprive you of this happiness; a foreign quarter is plotting a coup which will deprive Sudan of the road to democracy. Be prepared to mount a political strike to foil this conspiracy."

There were no expressions of concern in the audience. This announcement was nothing but a reminder of what was going on among the people. [She continued:] "There is a major plot being engineered by the Americans to bring Sudan back into the fold." Events began multiplying and became intertwined in the mind of the Sudanese citizen who is sensitive to politics.

During my stay in Sudan I heard more than five coup scenarios from ordinary citizens. The latest revolved around an attempt to apprehend members of the [Transitional] Military Council [TMC] while they were visiting Juba, the capital of the South. The repetition of such stories is simply the result of the citizen's sensitive concern over the political situation and the sluggishness of the "revolution" on the first leg of the road. This concern, and its accompanying questions, grew following the visit by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker to Khartoum on 27 May. Information on Crocker's meeting with a number of military and political personnel leaked to the Sudanese man in the street, for whom secrets are no problem. He spoke frankly to them of the U.S. administration's concern about what is happening in Sudan and he concentrated on a number of points:

- Increasing anti-American radical sentiments and fear that these may form a source of pressure on the authorities;
- Fear of the development of Sudan's relations with Libya and the People's Democratic Republic of the Yemen at the expense of relations with the Egyptian regime;
- Continued opening of the Falasha files and the possible exposure of the involvement of countries other than Sudan, as well as names other than the

three around whom the investigation revolves, i.e. Numayri and his deputies, 'Umar al-Tayyib and Baha'-al-Din Muhammad; and

- The growth of influence of the Communists and the unions in the fertile land of famine.

Those Who Are Trying To Sweeten America's Image

The Reagan administration's fears affect the way the new authorities act. A number of personnel in authority have begun to try to sweeten America's image to the Sudanese man in the street. It is not simply due to neglect that the arch which had been erected in the heart of Khartoum commemorating "Sudanese-American Friendship" and welcoming the visit of Schultz during Numayri's last days remains. Some in authority are attempting to stress that there will be no major change in the traditional relations between the two countries. AL-HURRIYAH attended a press conference by the Sudanese minister of finance before his visit to America. In this conference the minister painted an extremely bleak picture of the Sudanese economy and ended up with an attempt to exonerate the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] vis-a-vis the crisis. He praised in particular U.S. economic aid: "The United States alone has provided 1.6 billion tons of grain, more than the rest of the world put together," according to the minister of finance.

The authorities have not yet dared to infringe upon U.S. interests in Sudan. Even when it became clear that the U.S. Chevron company was using spare parts from Israel in the company's exploration operations, the authorities simply punished the company and asked that such equipment be replaced. AL-HURRIYAH's correspondent has observed new batches of American experts pouring into the few hotels, accompanied by translators speaking in the Lebanese dialect and moving as an emergency team. The U.S. aid mission was accompanied by a rock group which came to sing to starving Sudan in order to give the young people an example of American life. AL-HURRIYAH has learned that the "Services and Operations Company," which has close ties to the U.S. embassy in Khartoum is now bringing a number of those released from Numayri's now disbanded security organization into "civilian" positions. A foreign female correspondent attending a function at the U.S. embassy noticed that U.S. diplomats were extremely concerned about the situation among the masses in Sudan, and they stressed time and time again that "there must be an energetic effort."

Sensitivity of Brothers

It appears that Numayri's excessive ties with the Egyptian regime have created a cautious and suspicious sensitivity in Sudan vis-a-vis Egyptian relations. It has reached the point where the drought was attributed to Egypt's use of the lion's share of the Nile waters. The editor of AL-HURRIYAH witnessed how the Sudanese journalists rose up against an Egyptian journalist who mispronounced their prime minister's name. [They said:] "You are always ignorant of everything about us, while we know everything about you." It appears that this sensitivity was behind the postponement of the visit of any senior Egyptian official to Sudan.

There is no doubt that Egypt's and Mubarak's embracing "the butcher of the Sudan" feeds this sensitivity. The masses are pressuring the authorities to demand that Egypt return Numayri to be tried. Al-Jazuli reflected this demand in the first interview granted to journalists the day he took office as prime minister: "We will endeavor to achieve the demand of the people to return the despot and bring him to trial." The TMC said no to the prime minister and attributed failure to demand [Numayri's return] to "Egypt's special circumstances." In an interview granted by Minister of Defense and member of the TMC 'Uthman Muhammad Amin to AL-HURRIYAH regarding the joint defense treaty with Egypt, he said: "The Sudanese people's rejection of this treaty is based on rejection of everything ratified under Numayri. The call for its abrogation is not based on an accurate understanding of it; it does not contain secret provisions nor does it endorse a military presence by either country in the territory of the other except by the will of the political and military leadership, in the event of a clear external attack." (We will publish the text of the interview in the next edition of AL-HURRIYAH). Even though the minister of defense promised to publish the text of the agreement soon in order to allay the fears of the Sudanese, there are still those who emphasize that the publication of the treaty would be delayed until after the summit meeting and the visit by the Sudanese minister of defense to Egypt, at which time some of the provisions of the agreement will be changed, especially Article Four, which provides for immediate mutual security protection in the event of any threat to the other regime "on the pretext of foreign interference."

Debts and Suspicions

Sudan's debts to the United States are certainly mounting. Its current need for 4.5 million tons of grain to feed its hungry mouths forms an effective American-Egyptian-Saudi entry point and source of pressure. Sudan dreams that it can persuade the U.S. administration to reduce part of its mounting debt to the World Bank and the IMF (\$130 million). The U.S. administration has offered 1.2 billion tons of grain to Sudan, while Egypt has provided an air bridge to transport foodstuffs. TMC Chairman 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar-al-Dhahab noted that Saudi Arabia would cover Sudan's fuel requirements for the next 3 months and pay back some of its foreign debts.

Despite the need of the Sudanese for this aid, they view it with instinctive distrust. I heard a Sudanese politician convincingly express apprehension about American-Egyptian coordination in transporting food aid to the Sudan: "This is the best kind of military training operation for intervention." The Hercules aircraft which transport the aid are the Americans' preferred aircraft for landing and supplying military personnel. Although military intervention in the Sudanese situation, where the masses are up in arms, would be somewhat foolish, the emergency economic aid to starving Sudan forms a point of entry into domestic Sudanese affairs. After Siwar-al-Dhahab's return from Saudi Arabia, the first country he visited after coming to power, he announced to journalists at the airport: "Economic aid and the domestic situation in Sudan were the two basic points in my discussions with his majesty."

The Muslim Brotherhood certainly would not have enjoyed the welcome it has received by Sudanese officials if the outside influence of Saudi Arabia were not added to their domestic influence. This has left its mark on the draft constitution proposed by the TMC because Article Four of Chapter One stipulated that "the Islamic Shari'ah and customary law ['urf] are the main sources of legislation."

By putting this controversial point in the constitution the authorities appeared to be sacrificing the Christian South for the sake of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. John Garang reacted to this immediately, announcing his rejection of any talks with the TMC. But this item does not affect just the South; moreover, the danger is not hidden by adopting the Islamic Shari'ah, because the Numayri experience has taught the Sudanese citizen how the distorted Islamic Shari'ah can be used to intimidate the people and protect the ruler. In AL-HURRIYAH's interview with Muslim Brotherhood leader Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the latter said: "If we were given the opportunity to apply the Islamic Shari'ah again, we would not abandon the divinely ordained punishments--meaning the whip and cutting off the hands--and we would not wait for approval by society, because this is a Qur'anic prescription." The danger of these provisions, however, comes from the demand of the parties of the religious right that ratification of the constitution should be accompanied by "an honorary list of parties." Thus it would be possible for these provisions to be a sword to be wielded to eliminate or impede the role of what al-Turabi calls "the apostate parties" and their associated unions in the event of undue expansion of the activities of these parties. One of the leaders of the National Grouping told AL-HURRIYAH's correspondent: "The point of concern in the draft constitution does not lie in this provision; rather, it started with the manner in which this document was proposed. The draft was prepared behind the back of the Grouping, ignoring the charter which the Grouping and the TMC signed; it was drawn up by agreement between a religious party and the TMC. Thus it went beyond the Grouping and the cabinet."

The Brotherhood and The Army

The religious right is trying to feed the tyrannical tendency in the military in order to confront the democratic tide and the trade unions. Al-Turabi candidly told AL-HURRIYAH; 'We are for the TMC's keeping the right of legislation because the armed forces are closer to nationalism. Our experience with the left in 1969 taught us how these parties betrayed the trust. The alleged Trade Union Grouping represents only one very limited part of the trade unions and has become a front for the Communist party and a proponent of the abrogation of the Islamic Shari'ah. Therefore, the armed forces are the most qualified to restore faith to the people." Sudan's recent and not-so-recent experience has indicated that the religious right, which is closely linked to parasitic commerce, flourishes only in military dictatorial atmospheres; they have limited effect in a democratic climate. Therefore, it is currently working to distort the experience of party pluralism by portraying instances of clashes and violence as the only format of the parties' dialogue in Sudan. The incident in thy city of 'Atbarah exemplifies this effort. The Muslim Brotherhood held a seminar for the Islamic National Front

in this workers' city, which is well-known for its sympathy with the communists and the nationalist left. On the day of the seminar the Brotherhood announced: "The communists, the Ba' thists and the Nasserists pelted the Islamic Grouping with stones. We shall respond to them by neutralizing any meeting they hold. We have special means for this." There is also a lot of talk about militias starting to appear in the guise of protection for political leaders. I left the presidential council in a car of a military pilot who graduated in the United States. He said to me: "If things keep going the way they are, our country will be turned into another Lebanon, with Garang from the South and armed parties everywhere." Thus the religious right is trying to persuade the military to tighten its grip in order to rescue the country from the anarchy of the parties.

Military from the People, or Military above the People?

The basic danger on the road to a democratic Sudan might be in using Sudan's urgent needs as a starting point for separating the TMC, which insists that it was an extension of, not a substitute for, the will of the rising masses, from the populist base which undertook the uprising and which is embodied by the grouping. The TMC would thus lose the base on which it relies to resist the pressures of the creditors and would be turned into a clique of weak generals in the face of external pressures which are strong vis-a-vis the people. However, there is in facing all of these dangers a great guarantee called by the minister of defense and member of the TMC "the masses who have undertaken the uprising, and from them the armed forces." These masses have not lost their memory yet and are still the driving force behind the uprising. Abu Janzir Square, where the Khartoum uprising began, still accommodates the thousand youths who were weakened by hunger and thirst. They slept there without amenities and without provisions; they are "the vagabonds who marched to the capital and began the riot," as Numayri described them a few days before the uprising. They went beyond politics and hunger in a deep solidarity. The first thing the youths did when they rose up from their beds made of the previous day's newspapers was to buy that day's newspapers to weigh their gate and their deeds in the news against the promises of the officials. For these people as well as the workers who debated the new draft constitution item by item in the seminars of the grouping, the uprising was not simply a commemoration, it was labor pains for the future.

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ISRAEL

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBERAL PARTY REVIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Jul 85 p 9

[Article by Ilan Shahori: "Moda'i's New Coalition"]

[Text] Rival ministers Yitzhaq Moda'i and Avraham Sarid met at the beginning of the week for a face-to face meeting at Liberal Party headquarters in Tel Aviv, after years of quarreling and personal enmity, to discuss the future of the party. However, while Moda'i was endeavoring to coopt Sarid on his way to negotiations on a merger with Herut, a special team appointed by Moda'i was putting the finishing touches on a plan to change the fiber of the party and to establish the supremacy of his faction over all the power centers of the party.

It emerges that Yitzhaq Moda'i wasted no time after his victory at the Liberal Party Congress last month. While the secret marathon talks on the economic program were in progress, he was concerned with another secret program: his plan to take control of the power centers of his party and to turn it, from a frozen fragment of a party, into an independent, active, and self-reliant party. One of the first steps he took immediately after the party congress was to form a coalition force through which he intended to effect his revolution. Moda'i himself has a relatively small group within the party, but with the aid of other factions and currents, he managed to rally 70 percent of the party members around his person. The front that emerged includes Moda'i's faction; the workers' association led by Tzvi Renner, which makes up 20 percent of the entire party; the merger opponents, who joined together in a faction called "The Faithful of the Liberal Party"; and Dan Tichon's group, which unites some 60 congress delegates who at the time supported Avraham Sarid's faction. This is the force with which Moda'i wants to effect his reform.

With an overwhelming majority, the party congress empowered Moda'i to bring about the unification with Herut, through a 12-man committee that he is to appoint. In the meantime, until the unification, he will run the party bodies. The establishment of the 12-man committee involves more than a few difficulties. Aside from Minister Sarid's refusal to participate, in view of Moda'i's intention to include Dan Tichon at Sarid's expense, Moda'i is in no hurry to form it, so as not to create a renewed momentum in favor of unification with Herut. Sources close to him claim that the unification procedures among the Liberals are currently frozen, and will remain so at

least until the Herut Center meets to adopt a similar decision in principle on the merger with the Liberals, according, of course, to Moda'i's formula.

Four Stages

Consequently, Moda'i decided to devote his time and energy to running the party bodies. For that purpose, he put his close aide and confidant Rafa'el Hatzvi (a special adviser to the Bazak company and former secretary general of the party) in charge of the "take-over plan." And indeed, in the past 2 weeks, with Moda'i's personal involvement and with the cooperation of the newly formed coalition, a document was hammered out, featuring a detailed timetable, on how to change the party within 2 months.

The main steps of the plan are the following: convention of all the party bodies--management, center, and committee--and adoption of constitutional and organizational decisions which will pave Moda'i's way to exclusive domination. According to Rafa'el Hatzvi, the purpose is to pull the party out of the deep freeze of the past 4 years in four major stages. It would seem that since the 1980 Liberal congress it has not been possible to add new members to the party. An investigation carried out by HA'ARETZ last March showed that the safe of the party secretary, Me'ir Huberman, contains over 6,000 statements of people interested in membership, but who were barred from joining by the factions' heads, afraid of disturbing the balance of power. Hatzvi claims that there are up to 20,000 such statements and that the ranks of the party have not been expanded because of narrow personal interests. According to him, the first thawing step will be to admit new members into the party. Naturally, many of the frozen statements and future ones will belong to supporters and potential members of the Moda'i faction.

Second stage: leadership changes in the party bodies. Moda'i is not interested in a "general head chopping," but in installing his people in all the bodies, with a view to reducing or eliminating his rival's influence. At the second stage, all those who were absent from three out of six meetings will be removed from the party bodies, and replacements will be appointed for those who died or resigned. The document reveals that this involves 75 members of the party committee (out of 400 total membership). A similar ratio exists in all the other bodies.

In all probability, Moda'i does not intend, at least not in the first stage, to bring about Sarid's removal from his post as executive chairman. However, people close to him say that if Sarid refuses to participate in the reorganization he will in the end find himself excluded from all circles of power. The third stage is the reform of the party committee. The intention is to bring about the removal of Knesset Member Elly Koles as chairman of the committee. The candidate for this position: Rafa'el Hatzvi. Koles is one of the senior members of Sarid's faction. The plan envisages the appointment of a general party chairman, and according to Hatzvi, it will be a well-known public figure. A spokesman will also be elected, for which the ballot is expected very shortly. The party has been without a spokesman for 5 years, and the appointment of a general chairman has been under discussions for approximately the same length of time. Two names had been mentioned for the post in the past: Ya'akov Barger, former director general of the Fairs Center

who left the job after a very short involvement, and Eytan Rozman, former chairman of the workers' council of EL AL.

The last stage will be the reform of the statute. The most significant change will be the selection of party candidates for the Knesset. According to Hatzvi, the free election system failed in the party, and the proof of this is the composition of the party faction in the Knesset. It is intended to return to the system of nominating committees. This, by the way, is one of the ultimatums of the Workers' Association, which expressed its willingness to join Moda'i's coalition.

Hatzvi says that the changes will be completed within 2 months, by 1 September. According to the plan, the party board will meet in about 10 days at the initiative of the newly formed coalition. The party center will be convened on 25 July, when Yehezkel Har-Melech is expected to be elected chairman of the center against the possible candidacy of Gid'on Pat from the rival camp. On 10 August the party committee will meet to decide on personnel changes in its bodies. A few days ago secretary Huberman received the signatures of 20 members of the party directorate's supporters of the Moda'i coalition--who requested a special meeting of the body in order to begin implementing their plan. They want the meeting to discuss four topics: the function of the organization's department, statements of members that have not been endorsed yet, election of a committee in charge of membership, and miscellaneous.

Sarid is not happy with this request. So far he has refused to authorize this agenda, and it is not clear how he will react to the signatures presented. At this stage Sarid prefers to continue his waiting game, while stressing that there will be no dictatorship and no one-man leadership in the party. It would seem that his meeting with Moda'i at the beginning of the week did not turn a new page in the relationship between them, and that Moda'i's take-over plan will only accompany the quarrels to the top.

Note that at the 1980 party congress, too, Moda'i won a great victory, being elected chairman of the party presidium. Then, too, he succeeded in forming a coalition and with its help achieved his victory. However, the coalition lasted for a short time only, and in the end Sarid and his men managed to seize most of the key positions in the party.

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ISRAEL

DEFENSE BUDGET ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Nehemiya Strassler: "No Recovery Without Defense Cuts"]

(Text] Recently, a small air force base in the center of the country was required to lay off one regular army man. A dispute arose among the base command whether to dismiss one of the Shekem [Army Canteen Organization] men or the gardener. The dispute has still not been settled. At the same base, soldiers have long forgotten how to clean bathrooms or wash dishes; for that they have workers who come every morning from a small neighboring town and do the job. They have also forgotten how to stand guard: reservists are called up every month to spend the nights patrolling the fence, while the troops nurse their strength for the week-end. Within a process that began with the Six-Day War, the army that was once small, economical, and efficient has become big, clumsy, and wasteful, an army that prevents economic recovery.

In the first half of the 1960's defense expenditures made up about 10 percent of the national product, and despite that, Israel managed to win on three fronts within 6 days. Following the victory, the generals increased their slice of the national pie to 18 percent. At the time they claimed that precisely because we won and because our borders are long, larger resources should be allocated to defense.

The army continued to grow at the beginning of the 1970's, but the modern airplanes and sophisticated tanks did not prevent the Yom Kippur war. And then, when we were hurt, it was obvious that the defense budget should be increased, which it was, to record figures in the 1973-75 period.

Political Reasons

Al-Sadat arrived toward the end of 1977, a peace treaty was subsequently signed, and the Sinai was demilitarized. The war between Iran and Iraq began in 1980, whereby two potential enemies in the east ceased to pose a threat. This year we left Lebanon, the Arab oil weapon lost of power, and the Arab world is plagued by lack of coordination and even hostility, such as between Jordan and Syria. However, all these extensive strategic changes failed to make the due impression on the defense minister. This week he began to wave around a perennial threat: the Syrian threat.

Rabin abstained in a vote on the new economic program, a gesture that some interpret as an attempt to prove that he does not play in Peres' orchestra.

However, in order to give the new economic program the slightest chance of success, Rabin must agree to deep cuts in defense spending.

After deducting from the national budget domestic and foreign debt payments, the cash left to the government for administration and social services, for the economy, defense, and relief comes to \$10 billion. The defense budget as it appears in the budget ledger, takes up 40 percent of that amount, i.e., \$4 billion.

However, that is not the entire amount. The United States has pledged to increase its defense grant this year from \$1.4 billion to \$1.8 billion, so that \$0.4 billion will be added to the defense budget at the beginning of October, when the money arrives. To the budget one must add the loss of product and services caused to the economy by the absence of the manpower taken up by the army. According to a report of the U.S. Arms Control Agency, the Israeli regular and enlisted army totals 180,000 men. Also, the number of days served by reservists each year comes to some 10 million. These two factors add a burden of \$3.5 billion.

To the above figure we must add the export and sale of old equipment to various countries--about \$0.3 billion, which are used to finance various operations in the defense budget. We must also add about \$1 billion in annual payment of old debts, and deduct the \$1.8 billion award. The end calculation shows a budget of \$7.4 billion--32 percent of the national product! A world record.

For the purpose of comparison let us note here that the U.S. defense budget makes up 7 percent of the national product, the NATO member-states spend 4 percent on defense, while Japan spends only 1 percent. In this situation, even the conservative report of the Bank of Israel does not hesitate to state that "it is difficult to solve the problems of inflation and the worsening balance of payments without considerably reducing this burden."

All defense and economy experts--outside the Defense Ministry--agree that cuts must be made. Some of them recommend stopping the manufacture of the Lavi, the new submarines, and the large missile boats. Others claim that the decision adopted on the eve of the Lebanon war to reduce the IDF by 6,000 men must be implemented. Whether the first are right or the latter, Israel's economy cannot take the defense budget in its present magnitude.

The Defense Burden
(in billion dollars)

Basic budget	4	
Additional U.S. award	0.4	
Total overt budget		4.4
Lost productivity because of regular and enlisted service	2.9	
Lost productivity because of reserve duty	0.6	
Equipment sales abroad	0.3	
Debt repayment to the United States	1.0	
Total concealed budget		4.8
Total budget (gross)		9.2
Minus U.S. award		(1.8)
Total budget (net)		7.4

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ISRAEL

SEPHARDI INTELLECTUAL COMMENTS ON 'KAHANISM'

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Jun 85 p 27

[Article by Erez Biton: "Kahanism: Political Explosive"]

[Text] Kahane's ideology does not accord with the cultural, social, and emotional characteristics of the strata from which he draws his potential electorate. At their origin, the basic values underlying the behavior of Oriental Jews are values of tolerance, moderation, altruism, and distance from extremism.

The historical occurrence of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Islamic countries created mutual economic and cultural relations which compensated for feelings of hostility and alienation.

That being the case, what is the background for the Kahanistic potential that has emerged among Oriental Jews in poor quarters and development towns?

Three major factors come to mind:

- A. Exposed helplessness in the face of a harsh and complicated existence from economic and security viewpoints.
- B. Identity crisis following the collapse of a traditional system of values.
- C. A feeling of disappointment with and alienation and isolation from the country's governing bodies.

Public reaction by politicians and media to Kahane's target population is usually marked by hostility, condemnation, and contempt. There has been almost no attempt to penetrate the hardships and fears that brought about the identification with Kahanism. The relatively quiet atmosphere created by the establishment of the coalition government gives the mistaken impression that everything is alright.

However, people who closely followed Kahane's appearances and perceived the increasing support for the man and his philosophy must ask the question: If everything is alright, what can be so bad about people escaping into

Identifying with a sharp and extreme ideology basically opposed to the fundamental values with which they grew up?

Identification with Kahanism is merely a symptom of the fear, anxiety, and helplessness of a population that has no means of expressing its suffering. Kahane found in it a wide and vulnerable field of action, because the other political factors and social movements steered clear from this weaker population. The political factors, which for the most part surround themselves with a wall of enlightened cultural declarations and complacency, increasingly distance themselves from this potential electorate which may fall like a ripe fruit into the lap of Kahanism.

The break away from the weak strata is not determined by community considerations, but by social and intellectual status. In other words, among those taking their distance are also intellectuals and political leaders from the oriental community, who increasingly remove themselves from the weak population.

The reality of the remoteness between the oriental leadership and the weak strata of the population enhances the danger of Kahanism, in view of the fact that the latter are left without refuge and leadership.

Various public figures make life easy for themselves by blaming the educational system for the fact that Kahanism is gaining ground among the population in general and among young people in particular. The oft heard view that Kahanism can only be stopped by education and brain washing is patronizing and hopeless, because it does not take into account the roots of the distress that feeds the identification with Kahanism.

Without real solutions to the economic, security, and cultural needs of the weak strata, no educational brainwashing can help; on the contrary, it may even exacerbate the frustration, alienation and extremism.

The identification with Kahanism is today's equivalent to yesterday's tire burning, and just as much of a symptom of social disease.

The feeling of remoteness between the leadership and the people may contribute to expanding the identification with Kahanism beyond the strata defined as weak from a social viewpoint, because the government is not satisfactorily dealing with cases of terrorist murder. These terrorist murders create an atmosphere of fear and helplessness, and a desire for immediate solutions among entire strata of the population.

In point of fact, Kahane has come to fill a vacuum, and that explains his statement: "I only say what you think but do not say." It may actually be said that Kahanism is a political explosive charge, or an extreme reaction to the remoteness and inaction of the authorities.

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ISRAEL

EFRAYIM SNEH, HEAD OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN THE TERRITORIES

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Jun 85 (weekend supplement) pp 32, 33, 39

[Article by Immanu'el Bar-Kidma: "The Doctor and His Son"]

[Text] The appointment last week of Dr Efrayim Sneh as head of the civil administration in the West Bank was not a routine event. The appointee, a physician who became a battle unit officer and served as adviser to Sa'd Haddad, bears one of the most significant names in Israeli history. The son of Dr Moshe Sneh, the Hagana leader who became leader of MAKI, has demonstrated talents and qualifications. Nevertheless, both the right and the left are anxious to see how he will deal with the most sensitive nerve of Israeli reality--the occupied territories.

Time thinned their ranks, but the small group continued to gather year after year around the headstone in the Nahalat Yitzhaq [cemetery] section set aside for Hagana veterans. They know each other well, far beyond first names. Among them there is a solidarity and intimacy such as is found only among people who have marched long years in the desert in the unity of a closely knit zealot sect. These people have been flamed by the God of communist belief, patterned after the Soviet model, which is never wrong. They have hung the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the walls of their houses and carried their pictures in their wallets like others carry the pictures of their girlfriends.

These people who have suffered the most wrenching personal tests, have been thrown out of kibbutzim, and have often been fired from their jobs. Together, shoulder to shoulder, they have passed difficult tests of friendship. Today, each one of them stands in a different corner of life, a different private world, and on a different political soap box. However, each year they come to the headstone bearing the name of the man--which with the passing of time becomes more beautiful and more attractive in their memory--who in those years was their pillar of fire and the cloud before the camp: Moshe Sneh.

Dr Moshe Sneh died in March 1972. His wife Hannah passed away a year later. Now, the short, stocky man wearing a red beret, colonel bars, campaign decorations, and paratrooper wings and standing in the middle of the group in strange contrast to it, is Efrayim, his son. A military career is not common in these circles; on the contrary they and their sons served, if at all, as a sort of conditional soldiers. Special classification. Not allowed to come close to sensitive areas, and not particularly curious. After the Six-Day War they themselves imposed their own limitations, such as not serving outside the Green Line.

Today, almost none of them sits across the fence of the Zionist consensus any longer. But there is still the inertia of the past. Most of them are not in close touch with Efrayim Sneh and are ignorant of his motivations. They look at him wonderingly, curiously, trying to understand. He, too, the uniformed colonel, was a special classification soldier during his enlisted days, which he finished as a private. At age 21 he was still subject to one obligation: "I will do everything that the Communist Party tells me," he had said to an interviewer.

Later, after finishing his medical studies, having to complete part of his military service which had been deferred, he underwent a transformation and decided to volunteer for the paratroopers. As a doctor, he became an officer. For the past 13 years he has been a career officer.

At first sight, and seen through the eyes of this dwindling group of the Sneh political tribe, it is unnatural that Efrayim, the crown prince and appointed heir, should be a career officer. But that is only at first sight. In a way, Dr Efrayim Sneh is the son of a career officer, since his father, Dr Moshe Sneh had been, at the peak of his active life, head of the national command of the Hagana, the man who had led and steered the armed forces of the Jewish Yishuv in Erez Yisra'el through most of the 1940s. He marked glorious chapters in the history of the struggle against the British and the Ha'apala, the organization that helped survivors escape from Europe. The MERI movement, the joint illegal body of the Hagana, ETZEL, and LEHI was established and run during his term of leadership.

The name Sneh is one of the most significant names in the history of Zionism and of the Jewish Yishuv in Erez Yisra'el. He was a star in the Zionist firmament, who traveled along his public and private life in long and ample steps. Like a reconnaissance scout, he mapped out his life road in sharp turns. In his political thinking and actions, he marched from the center to the extreme left only to turn back a certain distance to the humanistic left and to the broad Zionist camp. Everything--decisions, path, reasons, the why and the how--were thoroughly outlined and reasoned out. Sneh was one of the brilliant brains of his time, blessed with a certain kind of genius. He was a brilliant orator with a great talent for formulating ideas, and a charismatic leader. Before the age of 30 he was already the leader of the Polish Jewry, second only to Yitzhaq Grinbaum, which in itself is a compelling story. He immigrated in the midst of World War II and was received with open arms. The leaders of the Labor movement, who were the moving spirit in the country, immediately received him into their inner sanctum, the Hagana.

Within the balance of forces in the Jewish Yishuv in Erez Yisra'el, Sneh was the representative of a relatively small Zionist faction, the Liberal Faction ("General Zionists A"). To give a rough comparison, they were something like the Shinui of today, and were led by Professor Hayim Weizmann. The short, plump man with a moustache, who was in the habit of wearing suits and ties and smoking fine cigarettes through an ostentatious cigarette-holder, adjusted well to the puritan-socialist environment of Erez Yisra'el of the 1940's. He managed not to appear strange next to Eliyahu Golomb's Russian shirt, Yitzhaq Sade's shorts, Yisra'el Galili's kibbutz clothes, and Berl Katzenelson's beret. The admiration and amazement aroused by his talents effaced all feelings of the strange and unfamiliar.

Moreover, Sneh fitted in not only among the leadership. At first sight there could not have been a greater gap than that between the dapper Warsaw physician and the generation of sabras, kibbutz and moshav sons, and the members of the Halutz youth organization who made up the PALMAKH. But there, too, much to everyone's astonishment, each visit and each speech were a mutual experience. During the period of struggle, when, according to the decision of the political wing, the Hagana moderated its armed opposition to the British, it was Sneh who toured the PALMAKH camps to calm the seething spirits. Not for the first time in his life, and certainly not for the last, Sneh defended a position that was diametrically opposed to his. According to a story dating back to that time, at the end of one particular speech, Sneh threw away the notes for his speech (which in those days were known as theses) and the person who picked them up found the following annotation to one paragraph: weak reasoning, must raise the voice.

In the end, of course, this schizophrenia could not last. Sneh was not the man to remain in a state of dilemma for long; the dilemma arising from the opposition or contradiction between his views and the obligations imposed by his public position. Sneh soon left the Hagana leadership, and Ben-Gurion, the second party to the controversy, stepped into the newly created vacuum.

The two figures, Ben-Gurion and Sneh, then opened the chapters that were to become central and decisive in their biography. Ben-Gurion entered the defense leadership, and Dr Sneh took the first steps on his way to the left.

That was the point that decided the fate--even in the Greek-mythological sense of the word--of each of them. Ben-Gurion went straight to his place in the history as the father of the State of Israel, while Sneh went first to the political wilderness, then left the camp altogether. According to popular belief, had Dr Sneh steered his life differently as of the second half of the 1940s, he could have become prime minister of Israel. Ben-Gurion stepped into the shoes of Arlozorov after the latter's death; who could have stepped into his?

Only one man, the doctor, Moshe Sneh.

However, Dr Moshe Sneh had in his pocket a compass that led him to the other realms. The Soviet star cast its light on him from the far north. His analytical mind told him that we here, in Erez Yisra'el, would soon become

one of the historic and inevitable conquests of victorious communism. Therefore, in order to survive, we had to find our way to that camp. Moreover, there was also social consciousness. The world that emerged after World War II was not a beautiful world. It was a world that needed to rebuild its ruins.

Sneh was of the conviction that the new world must be built upon enlightened social principles which, in his view, were borne on the shoulders of "the revolutionary camp led by the Soviet Union." This line, the one between quotation marks, he bestowed upon MAPAM as the pinnacle of its political world outlook. Ironically, it was Ya'qov Hazan, the lowly kibbutznik, who spoke in the Knesset about the second fatherland. In time, Efrayim Sneh came to verify that his father never believed, even at the peak of his identification with the Soviet monolith and his denial of Zionism as the solution to the Jewish national problem, that a person, even a communist, can have two fatherlands. A few years later, Hazan pursued Sneh and his supporters in the kibbutz movement about the "leftist deviation."

Efrayim Sneh was born in the house on 14 Bilu Street, not far from Shenkin, in 1944. It is said that Galili helped his mother, Dr Hannah Sneh, to change his diapers while his father, the doctor busy with political and underground affairs, was absent from home, and while the mother continued to work as a Kupat Holim pediatrician. As a child, he experienced various changes in the home; what did not change was the underground atmosphere.

When the Hagana leaders disappeared, the MAPAM leaders took their place. Note that it was the MAPAM discussions that Isser Har'el was listening in on with the aid of hidden bugs. Efrayim, a talented and alert child, would have been described as gifted. At age 4 he learned how to read without script pointing. He formed close ties to the people frequenting the house. Later, when the sensation of persecution became more acute, the house filled with a different set of people. He would sometimes wake up in the morning to see strangers sleeping on the floor. Those were people who overnight had been thrown out of their kibbutz with only the shirt on their back. Their crime: Snehism. Sneh also became a threatened personality and had bodyguards. Then came the final excommunication. Being a communist was being a marked man. Remembered experiences include scenes of the Sneh family attending public events outside the party, and almost no one coming near or greeting them. Tabu. Most of his former friends looking through him as if he were made of glass. The head of the national command not being awarded the Hagana decoration.

Efrayim was sent to the school for workers' children on Tschernichowsky Street. The school principal was Yitzhaq Gurevitz, a distinguished educator. He belonged to MAPAI, but he was also the father of Amikam Gurevitz, a central figure in the Sneh camp and bodyguard to the doctor for a while. Efrayim was an outstanding student and popular among his peers. Nobody bothered him much about the communist business. Much later, he was to remember only one incident, when one of the older children blew a horn in his ear with all his might. The child turned out to be Yosi Sarid. Sarid denies it.

As of the mid 1960s, Moshe Sneh began to retrace his steps back to Zionism. To his dying day he did not see himself as a penitent, but as a seeker for answers. In 1969 he already described his political position as a "dove with talons," and said that "you cannot bring peace from a position of weakness, but only of strength." It is said that he helped Prime Minister Levi Eshkol take several unusual decisions.

Efrayim Sneh, a medical student at the time, decided, as we said, to complete the deferred portion of his military service as a paratrooper. He became a battle unit doctor. He fought in the southern sector in the Yom Kippur War. For a time it was rumored that he had fallen, and he had to be brought specially to his mother, who by then was desperately ill, in order to reassure her.

The Yom Kippur War brought him to the decision that his objective was to serve Israel's defense. This is a precise definition that he still holds. Precise and clean. He dismisses interpretations that link his decision to his father's political geography as "psychologism". However, he agrees that his father bequeathed upon him the doctrine that subordinates all personal considerations to public interest. And as we said, his public interest is defense.

It is difficult to ignore the great physical resemblance between father and son. The same short stature, the same solid posture, feet firmly planted on the ground, the same round face, and dark hair. Only the moustache is missing. Efrayim also inherited his father's intellectual talents, and a brain that works like a sophisticated scanner. His perception is quick and precise. It would seem that he also has the same impact on people. As a military doctor, he advanced rapidly from one function to the next. We know that he acted as physician in the Entebbe action, and there were other missions which will undoubtedly be talked about in the future.

Strangely enough, Efrayim Sneh, too, had to take personal decisions in his life similar to his father's. For example, he abandoned medicine as a daily occupation. Moshe Sneh came to that decision very early. It would seem that the last time he worked as an active physician was as a reservist in the Polish Army, during its short-lived opposition to the Nazi invaders. However, toward the end of his life he told one of the people close to him: "Medicine is the most beautiful profession a man could practice."

Could that have been another expression of regret? Perhaps.

Efrayim, too, was faced with this decision when he abandoned the IDF medical corps. He was given direct command positions, including the command of an elite unit. But, in contrast to his father, medicine is still a parallel track for him; there are intervals in which he works as a doctor. He has recently returned from one year of advanced studies with a major medical center in Boston, in the United States, and until these very days has been serving, as an officer on sabbatical, as head of the ambulatory clinic of the Ichilov Hospital.

Efrayim Sneh is married, and he and his wife Tiqva have two daughters. At the time he arrived at his professional maturity, medicine was no longer the same humane and humanitarian profession that it used to be in his father's day. Efrayim Sneh came to know a medicine almost totally stripped of its human elements. A doctor no longer needs to touch his patient to diagnose him, but sends him instead to the computer or the laboratory. Electronic devices have replaced intuition and human contact. Hospitals are impersonal and the healing process has become sterile, devoid of the touch of a human hand, metaphorically and in actuality. Medicine has also lost its social distinction. The time has passed for stories of doctors traveling long distances in their carriage on dark, stormy nights to save a dying man or deliver a baby. Now there is the Kupat Holim. Even poor people receive free medical care. There are no more special ideals in the technological and specialized medicine of our time.

The military identity of Col Dr Efrayim Sneh was first revealed when he was appointed commanding officer of the southern Lebanon sector, and as such, as advisor to Maj Sa'd Haddad. Some eyebrows were lifted among the remembrance-day group, in view of the fact that Haddad was not exactly the embodiment of a moderate, dovish approach to the Lebanon problem. The Haddad connection was, if you want, one of the threads leading to a more extensive link to the Christian element in Lebanon, and thus to the war.

The press began publishing pictures in which the head of the young doctor peeked from behind Haddad's shoulder. It would seem that a special relationship was formed between the introverted Lebanese officer and the Israeli intellectual. "He introduced a measure of stability in the area," says a media man, and sums up Sneh's service in southern Lebanon as "all in all, positive." He is also described as wise and sensitive. His sensitivity to the Shi'ite minority in southern Lebanon is emphasized. He saw their poverty and the discrimination against them, and exerted himself on their behalf. He once took the responsibility upon himself and allowed a large group of Shi'ite believers inside the Green Line, to their holy site between el Malikiya and Yir'on.

However, the question mark considerably increased last week, when it was announced that Efrayim Sneh had been appointed head of the civil administration in Judaea and Samaria, or the West Bank. Again, the memory of his father comes up. On a visit to the new Kefar Ezion after the Six-Day War, he told the future founders of Gush Emunim: "Kefar Ezion is a point. I want to talk to you about a line." And this line says that Jews and Arabs have an equal legal right to Erez Yisra'el, and that the road to peace does not, under any circumstance, go through the station of Greater Erez Yisra'el.

And now the son, Efrayim, has become the highest Israeli authority on the West Bank, a sort of high commissioner. His only superiors are the defense minister and the coordinator for the territories. It is difficult to appraise the importance of this position in the circumstances of the split political reality in Israel. In the absence of a policy acceptable to all, the head of the civil administration has a very broad latitude for his influence and outlook.

What is Efrayim Sneh's outlook on West Bank affairs? I do not know. Yitzhaq Rabin's personal appointee will soon be the highest executive instance in the area. "His influence on what happens in the West Bank will range between great and dramatic," said a senior civil administration man. He will have an impact on everything: the relations between Jews and Arabs, the activities of the universities, book censorship, quality of life, and political organization. Everyone is waiting in suspense to see which direction he will take in his new position.

Chewing on their fingernails, people are waiting to see on what door among the doors of the West Bank leaders he will knock first. That will be an indication as to his outlook. It is no secret that the settlers are worried, be it only because of the associations aroused by the name. It is still an outstanding name in politics, not only for the right, but for the left, too. Left-wing personalities apprehensively wonder what he will do about what is known as the "Sneh inheritance."

Knesset member Ya'ir Zaban, the man who wrote down Moshe Sneh's will upon the latter's dictation and who lived with the family for many years, sees Efrayim as a man with a world of his own, who seeks and finds his own way, while nevertheless respecting his father and his inheritance. As for his political views, I only found the following indirect definition: "Most of the people I met in the youth organization remained in the left wing, in the sane ward. They did not venture beyond the fence."

Zaban perceives several phenomena among the sons of politicians. There are those who run away from politics as though from fire, due to an oppressive, slighted, neglected, and unhappy childhood; there are those who firmly step into their father's shoes; some remain attached to their parents' influence, but from a certain distance, and others join the opposite camps. One finds all those variations among the sons of Ben-Gurion, Begin, Landau, Arens, Ya'ari, Ahime'ir, and Arlozorov. Where does Efrayim Sneh fit in this family?

The relations between Efrayim and Moshe Sneh were marked by great love, tenderness, and mutual understanding. The family was very warm and loving. Efrayim was very much involved in his father's activities, until the last day.

The West Bank is the end of the most sensitive nerve in Israeli reality. It will be interesting to see how Dr Efrayim Sneh deals with it, from the viewpoint of both diagnosis and treatment.

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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

PALESTINIANS SEEK TO CONVERT--In the course of the past year, 11 young Arabs from Judaea and Samaria appealed to the Qiryat Arba' Rabbinical Court in order to convert to Judaism. The military government is involved in each case from the aspect of security, and deliberations take a very long time. The Arabs who asked to convert need security clearances, and only after that begins the actual process of dealing with what they need to learn to convert. It is to be noted that this is a new phenomenon beyond the Green Line. The Qiryat Arba' Rabbinical Court has so far performed no conversions, having opened only 1 1/2 years ago. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 22 Jul 85 p 8] 12782

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KUWAIT

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO STUDY WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE ISSUE

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 18 Aug 85 pp 1, 21

[Article by Ahmad al-Dawsari: "Al-Huwaylah to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM: Legal Opinion of Awqaf Is Not End of Road for Kuwaiti Women; Interior and Defense Committee Not Required To Respond; Issue Is on Agenda of New Committee"]

[Text] Prior to leaving for Montreal, Canada, with the Kuwaiti parliamentary delegation, Hadi Hayif al-Huwaylah, the National Assembly's Interior and Defense Committee chairman, told AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM that the Interior and Defense Committee was not involved in sending a letter to the Legal Religious Opinion Section of the Ministry of Awqaf asking for this section's opinion on the permissibility of women participating in the parliamentary elections. The current reports that the committee has ended its examination of the issue after receiving the answer from the Ministry of Awqaf's Legal Opinion Section are untrue. The Interior and Defense Committee chairman stated this in response to reports in some local papers that the committee has "washed its hands of" this issue.

Deputy al-Huwaylah added: When the committee sent the said letter to the Ministry of Awqaf's Legal Opinion Section it did not enter its mind that the answer would be binding to it, knowing that the final say on this issue is in the hands of the National Assembly and not in the hands of the committee or the Legal Opinion section. Therefore, the answer we received will not be the final decision. The committee has not yet concluded its study on the issue and the Legal Opinion Section is one of the circles which the National Assembly's Interior and Defense Committee has deemed fit to consult on the issue out of its wish to familiarize itself with all aspects of the issue.

Ministry of Awqaf's Answer Is Not End of Road

The Interior and Defense Committee chairman added: Therefore, I wish to reassure Kuwaiti women that the answer of the Ministry of Awqaf's Legal Opinion Section is not the end of the road and that a comprehensive study is being made on the issue. This study will be presented to the Assembly and no one will be done an injustice. Time is sure to set matters aright because this answer has not been and will not be binding on the committee. It is well known that there is no consensus among Muslim jurisprudents on the opinion that denies women the right to participate in parliamentary elections.

As for me personally, I will call for a special symposium to discuss this issue upon our return from Montreal so as to take the opinion of the voting citizens who have elected me to this Assembly to represent them and defend their interests and so that a frank and clear opinion may be crystallized on this issue.

Waiting for Next Legislative Session

Deputy al-Huwaylah added: There is no cause to resent this step. The answer has been given more significance than it merits. The committee has now put the issue on the agenda because the first legislative session has ended and we are waiting for the next legislative session. The committee that will come after us will complete the trip and greater light will be shed on the details of the study we have conducted on this issue. The final decision will be in the hands of the deputies among whom I find a few who support giving women their full political rights to voting and nomination.

8494

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8 October 1985

KUWAIT

MORE PUBLIC HOUSING TO BE BUILT SOON

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 20 Aug 85 pp 1, 17

[Article by 'Isa Muhammad: "Housing Authority Begins Implementation of Projects in Its Second 5-year Plan"]

[Text] An official source of the Public Housing Authority told AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM yesterday that the authority has begun implementing the projects of the Third 5-year Plan which begins in 1985 and ends in 1990. The authority has invited bids for preparation of the housing units and for building the houses included in the plan for the various parts of Kuwait.

Bidding was invited yesterday for Sabah al-Salim housing quarter and its services. The area will include 327 housing units. Bidding has also been invited for south al-Firdaws areas, which includes 233 units. A third bid has been invited for east al-Andalus area, which will include 350 units.

The source said that work in these projects will begin by the end of the fiscal year, asserting that these projects will be completed by the end of 1986. Bidding will also be invited for 2 projects in 2 different areas: the first south of al-Rabiyah and including 450 units. Work on these units will be begun at the end of 1985 so that the units may be completed by the end of 1986. The construction of 500 more units will also be begun in the same area at the end of this year, with the units to be completed by the end of 1987. Bidding will also be invited for a project in al-Jahra' area--No 3-- for the construction of 1,200 houses. Work on these houses will begin at the end of 1985, with the project to be completed by the end of 1987.

The source added that the Public Housing Authority has numerous other projects within the framework of the 5-year plan approved in 1985, asserting that bids will be invited for al-Funaytis area on the coastal strip--Sectors 4 and 2-- and that the project includes 845 units [qasimah] and 1,200 houses. The bids will be invited at the end of next September, with the project to be implemented in phases and to be completed by the end of 1987. Numerous other projects are being planned and work on them will begin between 1988 and 1989 in al-Funaytis area where Sector A will include 1,200 houses, Sector 21 will include 590 houses, Sector B1 will include 1,230 houses, Sector B2 will include 1,460 houses, Sector C1 will include 840 houses, Sector C2 will include 1,470 houses, Sector D1 will include 890 houses, Sector E will include 1,370 units, Sector F

will include 750 units and Sector C will include 850 units. Al-Zawr village will include 200 houses in 1 unit. Concluding his statements to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, the official source said that the Public Authority has presented a new projection concerning the total appropriations allocated for the Public Authority for a period of 11 years, amounting to 1,000,500,000 dinars, and that the authority has requested 700 million dinars to cover the costs of the projects to be implemented shortly within the framework of the plan for the next 5 years.

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KUWAIT

WORK TO DEVELOP KUWAIT AIRPORT DISCUSSED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 12 Aug 85 p 4

[Article: "Comprehensive Plan To Develop Kuwait Airport; New Runway To Go into Operation by End of 1986"]

[Text] Kuwait--KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY--Nabil 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Zamil, the head of the civilian installations section of Kuwait Airport, noted that it is expected that Kuwait Airport's new runway is expected to be delivered by the end of 1986.

Al-Zamil added: "We began a year ago building aprons capable of accommodating 25 planes and have prepared and developed the old passenger hall so that it may be ready for use. The preparations also include the construction of four additional aprons for planes and the installation of lighting and fences, in addition to supplying all the technical requirements needed by planes."

Engineer al-Zamil also noted that the higher committee entrusted with preparing for the conference recommended the construction of billets for the security forces and other buildings for inspection and for conducting emergency security procedures.

He added that there is a tendency to set aside the new airport building and runway and the new VIP reception hall for the conference while letting the ordinary air traffic continue in the present building.

Daily Maintenance

He said that the daily maintenance of the current 3,400-meter-long runway costs nearly 50,000 dinars a year and that the periodic maintenance carried out from time to time according to the need and to the air traffic circumstances is costly. The cost of the latest maintenance operation carried out for the runway in May 1982 amounted to nearly 1 million dinars and included the runway and nearly 20 accesses connected with it.

Engineer al-Zamil also pointed out that international consultants have, at the request of the General Civil Aviation Directorate, conducted a comprehensive scientific study to evaluate the structural plan of the present airport and to determine the alternatives available for dealing with the future increase in passenger numbers.

The study, conducted by a French working team, has shown that the airport's present location is the best in the country for building the new airport in the future. The team made this conclusion after studying all the positive and negative features of the alternative sites.

The report was referred to the Higher Aviation Council which, in turn, referred it to the Higher Structural Planning Committee. The report calls for selecting West Umm al-Hayman area as a future alternative site. The municipality has been instructed to reserve this site, which is located 20 km south of al-Ahmadi area.

Engineer al-Zamil further added that an adviser from the International Civil Aviation Advisers Organization was delegated to conduct a similar study last year and that the conclusions of this adviser's report were identical to the conclusions of the study conducted by the French experts.

Site Selection

The Higher Structural Planning Committee and the Higher Civil Aviation Council adopted the report 3 months ago and the site of the present airport has been approved as the location for the future airport, with Umm al-Hayman site disregarded. However, the recommendation called for keeping Umm al-Hayman site only as a reserve.

Al-Zamil also said: We embarked this year on the step following the evaluation of the airport's structural plan, namely the step to carry out a study to organize and develop all the services and installations in a manner compatible with the airport's future needs. In coordination with the Ministry of Planning, we invited consultants to draw up the plan for the new airport and for the desired expansion, which will include the passenger building that has a maximum capacity of 4 million passengers a year. We have currently reached nearly 3.5 million passengers a year, meaning that we need the expansion to counter the steady increase in the number of passengers.

The third step, namely the executive phase of the structural plan, will be implemented by the end of the 1980's.

Plane Runways

Engineer al-Zamil touched on the issue of the plane aprons, saying that the construction of a new runway in the port will help greatly in the maintenance operations, considering that we close the runway in case of damage. We will be able to use the new runway in such cases and will not need to suspend air traffic from 2400 to 0600 in the morning, as we do at present.

He pointed out that the presence of two runways will give them freedom to do the work at low wages and simple costs because the restriction of the maintenance work to 6 hours requires special types of materials for the maintenance operations and these materials pose big risks to the people working in this sphere.

Al-Zamil added that a new tower will be built between the two runways and that it will be higher than the existing tower and capable of controlling both runways simultaneously and that it will be tantamount to the control center regulating traffic in the airport.

Engineer al-Zamil stressed the importance of the maintenance work, saying that the most dangerous phase of the flight is the moment of takeoff and the moment of landing and that this requires daily and periodic maintenance to make sure that the runway and the accesses leading to it are clean and safe and that all cracks or fissures resulting from use are repaired, especially since the weight of the Jumbo jets, their speed, their method of landing and the surface area and number of their tires have an impact on the runway surface, especially at the points of landing.

He added that the materials used for the runway of the military airport are not different from those used for the civilian airport, saying that small private planes need no more than one-fourth of the runway for taking off or landing whereas the Jumbo jets need the entire length. At times, a Concorde needs no less than 4,000 meters to land.

As for the criteria for measuring a runway's durability, Engineer al-Zamil pointed out that runways are ordinarily designed according to the number and the weight of planes using them and that the durability of a runway is measured by using special equipment built for the purpose and for testing durability in accordance with the international regulations and standards. The Kuwait Airport runway underwent this evaluation test nearly 4 years ago.

Construction Cost

In response to a question on the cost of the new runway, Engineer al-Zamil said the cost of building the runway and setting up all the firefighting, rescue and technical services needed ranges from 17-20 million dinars.

He added that inaugurating the new runway requires redoubled efforts. We will need an additional work team for the maintenance operations because the current number of workers is only 25 technicians and laborers, including 10 Kuwaitis.

Al-Zamil also noted that work is underway to develop and renew the old passenger building so that it may be used to support the present passenger building. He also said that the capacity of the new building is 2 million passengers a year and that the system of operation is simple and easy and has not cost the state a lot "because we have not changed it extensively." He added that there are numerous suggestions for the use of this building, including a proposal that it be set aside for the Gulf Cooperation Council member states. No decision has been made in this regard yet.

Discussing the idea of beautifying the spaces surrounding the runway and the accesses leading to it and planting them with grass--an idea which has

been discarded--Engineer al-Zamil noted that the idea was examined and that it became evident that it is costly. According to the latest study on this issue, it is evident that the cost of planting a small area between the accesses amounts to nearly 100,000 dinars, including the costs of soil, fertilizer, water and seeds. This is why this idea has been discarded.

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KUWAIT

OFFICIALS COMMENT ON ECONOMY, INVESTMENTS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 10 Aug 84 p 4

[Article: "Officials of Kuwaiti Investment Authority: Kuwaiti Economic Position Is Good and Oil Reserves Will Stay; We Watch for Investment Opportunities in Arab Countries and Try To Participate"]

[Text] London--KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY--Three Kuwaiti officials asserted in London yesterday that the medium and long-range Kuwaiti economic situation is in "good health" and that if the current production level is maintained, the oil reserves will last for 150-200 years.

The three officials of the Public Investment Authority, namely Dr Fahd al-Rashid, general director and commissioned member of the Public Investment Authority; Badr al-Rashid, the deputy commissioned member; and Fu'ad Ja'far, deputy director of the Kuwaiti Investment Bureau in London, added in an exclusive interview with the KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY that the medium and long-range indicators of the Kuwaiti economy are good, especially since the oil revenues are still at a good level. Moreover, the relatively small population is not considered an obstacle in Kuwait whereas there are other countries suffering from the problem of population growth.

The officials asserted that the saving rate among individuals is considered among the highest in the world, that the inflation rate is dropping steadily and that Kuwait is a country which takes advantage of its borrowing capability. The officials asserted that if the indicators prove true, they will be positive factors in the Kuwaiti economy.

Dr al-Rashid pointed out that what reinforces this tendency is the 5-year plan which has been submitted to the National Assembly and which will contribute to and help to channel the revenues more accurately and more beneficially for the local economy.

In response to a question on the role of investments in the Kuwaiti economy, Dr al-Rashid said that the role which investment can perform is to contribute to the national income directly or indirectly by developing the local economy.

The officials also pointed out how these reserves are used, saying that Kuwait's reserves are divided into two parts: the reserves for the future generations

which are growing by force of the law because they are raised annually by 20 percent of the state's gross income, in addition to the reemployment and investment of the reserves for future generations, and the general reserve constituting the source from which the state meets its burdens and commitments, including the budget burden or any other commitments needed for meeting the requirements of the local and foreign economic policy.

Answering a question on the reasons why Kuwaiti investments steer clear of the Arab countries, Badr al-Rashid, the authority's deputy commissioned member, asserted that Kuwait has actually invested some of its monies in a number of Arab countries, that it constantly watches for investment opportunities in the Arab countries and that it exerts efforts to increase its investments whenever the opportunities become available. But he added that the investment opportunities are limited due to the political instability in these countries and due to the fact that these countries view the investments as aid. But he said that Kuwait has no objection to investing its monies in the Arab countries if there is a fertile investment soil.

Al-Rashid stressed that Kuwait diversifies its investments so that they may not be concentrated in commercial and real estate investment but may include industrial investment and all kinds of investment.

Al-Rashid also emphasized that Kuwaiti investments are not tied to a single currency but to a basket of various strong currencies so that they may not be exposed to decline. Regarding the Kuwaiti Investment Bureau of the Kuwaiti government's Public Investment Authority, Fu'ad Ja'far, the bureau's deputy general director, said that the bureau's objectives are to make profits and to invest and protect the Kuwaiti monies within the framework of the general policy formulated by the Public Investment Authority and within the state's general tendencies.

As to the reasons why London has been chosen as the bureau's headquarters, he said that the British capital is the only international financial market and that most investors use the British capital as the headquarters for their investments, pointing out that most of the U.S. banks have diverted their investment branches to Britain because of the investment climate London enjoys, because of the abundance of investment data and because of the suitability of London's time to the eastern and Middle Eastern countries and to the American continent. He added that the British capital is considered one of the world's biggest financial centers and includes most of the international banks.

As to whether the bureau faces pressures from the British government, Ja'far said that the bureau faces no such pressures from either the government or the British firms.

He asserted that the bureau has no other branches in the world but pointed out that it invests its monies in numerous parts of the world after making detailed and careful political and economic studies on the market.

Risk Reduction

In response to a question on the consequences that may affect the Kuwaiti assets existing in Britain should any negative developments crop up in the British-Kuwaiti relations, Dr al-Rashid said that the investments are not concentrated in a certain country but distributed in numerous countries and that investments are made only after the political and economic aspects of a market are studied fully, asserting that the policy of channeling the Kuwaiti monies is drawn up and founded on the importance of reducing the risks to the lowest practical level possible.

The economists stressed that the bureau is considered one of the best international investment houses because it includes national Kuwaiti experts and foreign experts with long experience in the sphere of investment. Moreover, the bureau has been present there for a long time, thus getting ample opportunity to study the market and gain expertise in money management.

The bureau director said that the number of Kuwaitis working in the office amounted to 30 percent of the investment officials, pointing out that the bureau also trains the Kuwaiti officials working in the authority and that a large number of Kuwaiti officers have left the bureau and returned to Kuwait to hold high-level positions there after having gained expertise in the sphere of investment.

Regarding the bureau's investment activity and policy, Dr Fahd al-Rashid pointed out that the bureau carries out its investment activity within the framework of the investment policy, strategy and programs formulated and reviewed by the Public Investment Authority in accordance with the state's general policies and tendencies, saying that this visit is taking place on the instructions and directions of the minister of finance and economy and the chairman of the Public Investment Authority for the purpose of a periodic review and reaffirmation of the above-mentioned policies.

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KUWAIT

PROBLEM OF UNPAID BANK LOANS DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 30 Aug 85 p 48

[Article: "One-third of Loans by Kuwaiti Banks Will Not Be Repaid; Irredeemable Loans Awaken Banking Control"]

[Text] A number of Kuwaiti financial establishments are currently facing numerous serious problems embodied in a high percentage of irredeemable or doubtful loans constituting a portion of the establishments' lending purse.

These problems began to surface in the final months of 1984. The Central Bank opposed an idea presented by the banks to distribute the profits in cash and in the form of shares and decided that it is better to convert these profits into reserves to meet the banks' needs to strike out the irredeemable and doubtful loans.

In searching for the main sources of the banks' problems, the recent statistics published by the Central Bank of Kuwait show that the total sum of the credit facilities advanced to the local market amounted to nearly 4,109,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars by the end of 1984.

The two main problems that have caused a large part of the loans advanced by the banks to be turned into perishable or doubtful loans can be summed up in the following:

A. Vast growth in the credit facilities offered: In the 1980-82 period, i.e., the period which experienced al-Manakh Market turmoil, the credit facilities rose from 1,917,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars at the end of 1979 to 3,897,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars at the end of 1982, i.e., growing by 26 percent in 1980, by 31 percent in 1981 and by 23 percent in 1982 and by a total of 80 percent in the said 3-year period. This led to inflating the banks' budgets with big loans advanced to a small number of establishments and individuals in a relatively small market like the Kuwaiti market.

B. Sectoral distribution of loans: A high-percentage growth in credit facilities has occurred in three sectors:

1. Financial services.

2. Individual loans.

3. Real estate sector.

The loans advanced to the financial services sector grew by 18 percent, 65 percent and 14 percent in 1980, 1981 and 1982, successively. The loans advanced to individuals grew by 21 percent, 21 percent and 65 percent in 1980, 1981 and 1982, successively.

Most of these loans were used to purchase shares in the local stock market. Meanwhile, the loans advanced to the real estate sector rose by 19 percent, 43 percent and 31 percent in 1980, 1981 and 1982, successively.

We can make two conclusions from these given facts, namely:

1. The loans were advanced to this sector without any guarantees and on the strength of the names of the individuals loaned.

2. These sectors have experienced a big drop in their value, with the prices of shares dropping by more than 60-75 percent in the past 2 years. At the same time, real estate values dropped by 30-50 percent. If the loans advanced by the banks were used for the purchase of shares and real estate, then the owner or holder of these assets experienced a drop of nearly 50 percent in the value of the assets. This means that there has been a parallel drop of more than 50 percent in the capability of the borrower to repay a bank's loan. Consequently, if the banks agreed to stocks in a sector, to shares or to real estate as collateral for their loans, then the value of this collateral will also drop by nearly 50 percent.

The estimate of the volume of irredeemable and doubtful loans depends on two factors:

1. The loan collateral and the market value of the collateral given.

2. The sector in which the borrowed money is used or invested (commerce, industry, real estate, stocks, etc.)

To clarify the first point, i.e., if the loans advanced are covered by collateral, it can be said that Kuwait's banks advance loans on the basis of name and personal connections. This means that the banks have not gotten adequate collateral and have not enquired about or investigated carefully the sphere in which the loans advanced are used. If we take this into consideration, we can assume that nearly one-third of the loans are not guaranteed loans. This means that if the banks have a large number of clients who are unable to pay or who do not wish to pay, then there will be more and more inactive loans recorded in the books of these banks. The banks will also need to pursue the borrowers more actively in the courts in order to collect their dues.

Clarification of the second factor depends on three possibilities or scenarios, assuming varying percentages of irredeemable or doubtful loans in each of the economic sectors. We will study this through the chart below.

The chart shows that in Case No 1, the total sum of doubtful loans is estimated at 694 million Kuwaiti dinars by the end of 1984. This estimate represents the more conservative scenario. But this sum is considered low because it assumes that 25 percent of the individual and real estate loans are irredeemable loans.

In Case No 2, we conclude that 1.1 billion Kuwaiti dinars, or nearly 26.8 percent of the loans advanced to the local market, are considered irredeemable or doubtful loans. This scenario comprises moderate estimates.

Case No 3, the most pessimistic, encourages us to conclude that 1,358,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars of the total loans advanced, or nearly 33 percent of these loans, are irredeemable or doubtful.

Even though these estimates are high, the assumed percentage of the irredeemable or doubtful loans advanced as personal and real estate loans, namely a percentage of 40-50 percent, is not imaginary and not very unrealistic. The assets of these two sectors dropped by nearly 40-50 percent between 1983 and May 1985.

The recent statistics published by the Central Bank of Kuwait indicate that the total sum of the capital and reserves of the commercial banks amounted to 832 million Kuwaiti dinars by the end of March 1985. If we add nearly 600 million Kuwaiti dinars from the banks' internal reserves which are not noted in the published statistics, we can conclude that the banks possess nearly 1.4 billion Kuwaiti dinars of reserves or support to deal with the irredeemable loans. What is more important than this is the support offered by the government which has stressed that it stands by the financial establishments in Kuwait.

In the absence of any direct assistance from the government, the Kuwaiti financial establishments will have to face the loan problems on their own. Even though the Kuwaiti minister of finance stated that the government wants to increase its deposits in the banks, the banks and financial establishments have to get used to the idea that they will have irredeemable and doubtful loans in their books for a long time.

Within the framework of these given facts, it is expected that the fiscal authorities will define clearly their tendencies to classify the loans and the percentages of the reserves necessary to confront the various types of frozen loans. Moreover, the Central Bank will intensify its control over the banking apparatus generally and over the position of the reserves, guarantees and quality of the loans advanced to the financial establishments.

Percentage of Irredeemable Loans

Sector	Value of Loans on 31 December 84	Case No 1		Case No 2		Case No 3	
		Percentage of Irredeem- able Loans	Value of Irredeem- able Loans	Percentage of Irredeem- able Loans	Value of Irredeem- able Loans	Percentage of Irredeem- able Loans	Value of Irredeem- able Loans
Commerce	988	10	99	20	198	25	247
Industry	143	10	14	15	20	25	36
Construction	683	10	68	15	103	20	136
Agriculture & Fishing	24	5	1	10	2	10	2
Financial Services	361	15	54	25	90	30	108
Personal Loans	1,040	25	260	40	415	50	520
Real Estate	743	25	186	35	260	40	297
Others	125	10	12	10	12	10	12
Total	4,109	-	694	-	1,100	-	1,358

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KUWAIT

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM--Kuwait, 15 Sep (KUNA)--A decree was issued Sunday appointing 'Abd al-Muhsin al-jee'a'n as Kuwait's ambassador plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Belgium. [Excerpt] [Kuwait KUNA in English 1853 GMT 15 Sep 85 LD]

KUNA-XINHUA AGREEMENT--Kuwait, 15 Sept (KUNA)--A cooperation agreement has been signed Sunday between the KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY (KUNA) and the NEW CHINA AGENCY (XINHUA) on news and photographs exchange. The agreement included the establishment of bureaus of both agencies in the two countries' capitals as soon as possible. It also said that the two agencies shall provide their correspondents with all possible facilities. [Excerpt] [Kuwait KUNA in English 1105 GMT 15 Sep 85 LD]

ROK COMMUNICATIONS ACCORD--Kuwait, 12 Sept (KUNA)--A memorandum of understanding between Kuwait and the Republic of Korea was signed here Thursday on exchange of expertise and sophisticated equipment in the field of tele-communications. Kuwait's Undersecretary of the Ministry of Communications Abdul-aziz Ahmed al-Ayoub [agency spelling] signed the memor today with the Korean communications corporation in the presence of top officials from the two sides and Korea's ambassador. The memo, which will be followed by a programme of cooperation, also covers exchange of information and research. The ceremony was preceded by a meeting between representative of the Korean corporation and Communications Minister 'Isa Muhammad al-Masidi where an exchange of views on scope of cooperation in the communications field was conducted. [Text] [Kuwait KUNA in English 1349 GMT 12 Sep 85 LD]

CSO: 4400/260

LEBANON

BEIRUT AWAITS RESULTS FROM DAMASCUS 'SUMMIT'

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21 Jul 85 pp 8-9

[Article by Nabil Barakis: "The Damascus Summit and the Beirut Base"]

[Text] Before sitting down at the conference table in the office of the Syrian vice-president, 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, in the al-Mahdi ibn Barakah section of Damascus opposite the Ibn Sina Garden, the members of the expanded Islamic meeting received an urgent telegram containing information about the clashes taking place between armed elements of two allied parties, that of Junblatt and the Amal Movement. The whispering between some of the members of the Islamic meeting and Syrian officials turned into discussion and a call for the need to intervene to stop the fighting before it got out of control; for what was happening was a blow at the heart of the meeting, particularly insofar as it was being held under Syrian auspices and the fighting in Beirut was between two Syrian allies.

Last week, the Islamic summit in Damascus stole the light from any ongoing or past event on Lebanese soil. Even the departure of the Palestinian Badr Forces from central al-Biqa' for Jordan and the latest Israeli attack on the al-Baddawi and al-Barid refugee camps did not influence the treatment of the Islamic summit's results on the Lebanese scene.

The summit focused light on three things:

1. Syria's new role in Lebanon after 1982--a military intervention role in the first instance as observers, but with a view to the fact that any fighting occurring in West Beirut between any armed party and the Syrian observers would not produce the same effect as if the Syrian forces were intervening in West Beirut in the manner of the pre-1982 Deterrent Forces, since this new intervention might be a prelude to broader and greater intervention by the Syrian army in Beirut;
2. The urgency of settling the security issue in West Beirut;

3. The inclusion in the summit of the issue of Sidon and security there (one of the members of the Islamic meeting considered it possible to characterize the meeting as "the Sidon summit," rather than as the summit of Beirut Muslims).

Information reaching the Syrian officials asserts that something is happening in Sidon that might be much more dangerous than what took place in Beirut. Minister Nabih Birri confirmed this information when he said that the first half of the Damascus meeting had been devoted to discussion of reports of a planned attempt to create an explosion in Sidon similar to the one that had taken place in the southern suburb and the refugee camps of Beirut.

In his observations on the Damascus meeting, a certain diplomat said that what happened in the Syrian capital made the following points clear:

1. The basis of participation in the Damascus meeting has been expanded to include second-echelon leaders. It is as if Damascus, no longer satisfied with the wright to be gained through representation, was out to secure a cover of unanimity. Stands taken at the conference would be taken in the name of all; no one would be allowed afterwards to evade them or oppose them. Any voice contradicting these stands would have broken with the conference group. Perhaps what was meant by "outside the group" was the basis for peace-keeping operations in Beirut represented by the Murabitun, the Union of Working People's Forces, and the 'Arafat supporters.

2. Unanimity in the area of how to handle the fighting in West Beirut after the events of the refugee camps will constitute a cover for the coming stage, which, as the communique states, will require disarmament both of the Palestinian camps and of the Beirut streets. This would represent a Syrian gain on the eve of discussion of the Arab summit.

3. The formation of a committee to be responsible for communication with the Lebanese leaders, a committee to be composed to Prime Minister Rashid Karami and ministers Junblatt and Birri, raises the question: Why the committee when these men are members of the government of national unity? Why has the government of national unity not been revived? Was it not formed for this purpose? Or does the committee's formation constitute Syrian recognition of the fact that the government of national unity is no longer alive?

This diplomat also says that in any case these and other considerations--such as the complaint raised by the Christian leaders about their having been kept away, or the displeasure voiced by certain government officials as a result of the absence of a role for the legitimate government (insofar as the security forces stand at the disposal of the prime minister and the defense minister, the source of military orders and military implementation procedures being defined by law,

constitution, and custom)--should not make us forget that what is important, in spite of all this, remains implementation--implementation of the measures. Any failure in implementation this time will impair the credibility of Syrian influence. The Lebanese ask for no more than a halt to the destructive battles going on in the heart of the capital.

The Greatest Fear

A former foreign minister supported the words of this diplomat, saying that in spite of the fear that the stage through which we are living may be similar to the one before 17 May and the fall of the mountain, the greatest fear is that what was agreed upon in Damascus at the by-meetings may have been to put pressure on the legitimate government and the side across from West Beirut--meaning, specifically, the Christian side--so as to effect a change in the system and bring down the government.

He adds that the National Democratic Front, which failed in the past to include the Amal Movement and the Communist Party, has through the new front (the National Alliance Front) succeeded in preparing the plan for a new fight to bring down the regime.

Concerning apparent contradictions in the final communique, which calls for the abolition of party security [forces] but also states that the present Lebanese army is unserviceable, he asks who is to manage security in West Beirut in the period between the abolition of party security and the reconstitution of the Lebanese army.

Finally, the integrated proposal announced by Prime Minister Rashid Karami after the Damascus meetings appeared to be yet another ministerial statement issuing from the Syrian capital. What if the other faction of Lebanese does not adopt it?

However, the former foreign minister thought that the Damascus Islamic summit might be seen from the point of view of diplomatic, rather than security, realities. As is known, this summit comes after sectarian fighting has gotten out of control--first, in West Beirut among groups on the Islamic side, and then threatening to destroy many districts and further Lebanese territory. After this came the struggle between allies--Syrian allies--specifically, between the Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party. Also, the present summit was preceded by a Damascus summit to deal with fighting at the refugee camps, fighting which was not between 'Arafat supporters and the Amal Movement, but rather between the pro-Syrian Palestinian Salvation Front and the Amal Movement, also supported by Syria. Another diplomatic reality is that information coming from abroad--especially events in Arab capitals--points to a disturbance in relations between America and Egypt. The latter was supporting the PLO and Yasir 'Arafat in the question of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian

delegation for negotiations with America. The split between America and the moderate Arab states has led the United States to give Syria the predominant role, following the isolation faced by Syria in the past. Syria, as the former foreign minister says, has known how to profit from this role and how to use it to get the Lebanese card back into its hand.

The Black Images Brighten

The former foreign minister adds that the role Syria is playing has brought back into its hand many of the cards that it had lost in the last few months, beginning with the Sunni-Shi'ite struggle and extending to the battle for the southern region, the eviction of the Christians, and the battle for the refugee camps.

The black images of Syria that were current in the Persian Gulf region, in the West because of the Christians, and in the Arab world because of the Palestinians, have begun to brighten up again in recent days. To begin with, the United States, speaking through its president, Ronald Reagan, has deleted Syria's name from the list of terrorist nations. Not only that, but there have been numerous letters of thanks to the Syrian officials who took part in the operation to free the American hostages from the hijacked airplane. Also, the black images of Syria in the Arab world will not be quite so sombre after the news agencies begin to transmit pictures from Beirut and from Sabra and Shatila of Syrian steam shovels beginning to remove the marks of the fighting and pictures of the engineers supervising the cleanup operation.

Syria's image in the West may lose its blackness after it becomes known, as has been mentioned, that Syria will undertake to secure release of the French kidnap victims.

The Flight into Sectarianism

Hence, the objective of what took place in Damascus and of what is going to take place in Beirut is more Arab and international than local. The Damascus summit covered over the problem of factions among Muslims with specious talk about Islamic demands and about rights that must be wrested from the Christians; basically, however, the summit was called to confront the deep and dangerous divisions among the Muslims themselves. It found nothing better than the smoke of sectarianism to cover up factional wounds. Political sources believe that any shift of focus from the problem [Muslim and Christian] inhabitants of Beirut will complicate the situation, particularly since international reports circulated 2 days ago reveal that no role will be given to any effective group, country, or party: the solutions in Lebanon have not yet ripened; matters on the ground--all the ground--have not yet settled, and the negotiations that will take place in the Middle East in the near future will have to use Lebanese soil for their passage.

An expert on Lebanese affairs has diagnosed that Beirut, after the Islamic meeting, has entered into an intermediate period between "a freeze" and "disarmament": a freeze on the big explosions, and the disarmament of Syria's enemies in the region.

As for talk of reforms, the period is not one concerned with reform, but rather one concerned with security. It is expected that a number of things will be set in motion and that explosions within the ranks of one side will take place in more than one region. Probably, there will be other meetings in Damascus, but this time they will not be Islamic meetings. Machinery to prepare for these coming meetings has already begun to operate. West Beirut was the prelude; other regions will follow. The "operatives" will try to carry the explosion from region to region according to "need," but the leaders have become conscious of the ways of civil strife and will call up all the forces of prudence and self-control so as not to fall into the snare that the machinery has started to set up. Numerous agencies are known to have begun work to frustrate the results of the Damascus summit--in West Beirut, and then in Sidon and Tripoli. If, as an Islamic leader says, the Islamic summit convened in Damascus, the base remains in Beirut and was absent from Damascus. What is meant here by "base" is naturally the two men, Ibrahim Qulaylat and Kamal Shatila, with their fighters, not to mention the supporter of Yasir 'Arafat. Will the summit succeed in curbing the base, given the fact that the base was not represented at the summit? Will Rashid Karami provision Yasir 'Arafat? Will the summit succeed in curbing the base, even though the base was not represented at the summit? Will Rashid Karami, Salim al-Huss, and Mufti Khalif act on behalf of the Murabitun, Shatila, and the 'Arafat supporters after the crisis and bloody conflict between Junblatt and Qulaylat supporters, between Amal and the Palestinians with their Sunni allies, has reached a level of hostility that explodes every day? Will the renewed fabrication of a Muslim-Christian sectarian conflict (even in the form of political and constitutional demands) be enough to cover over the profound factional hatred that is working to turn West Beirut more and more into a hell?

That is the question. It seems that this time Damascus is determined not to neglect the need to make the results of the summit a success and to put the file of the Lebanese crisis in order generally. As a Syrian source said to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, "We have less than 2 months before us. Either the results of the Islamic conference will be effective and will establish security in Beirut--all of Beirut--or for every incident there will be talk."

This source did not explain what he meant by "Talk," but it is known that Syrian patience, although long, has limits.

12937

CSO: 4404/444

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PALESTINE BANK OF GAZA PROBLEMS ANALYZED

Jerusalem AL-'AWDAH in English 4 Aug 85 p 20

[Text]

Soon after the 1967 occupation the Israeli military authorities closed down all banks operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This led to 2 Israeli banks, Bank Leumi and Israel Discount Bank, having a monopoly in the areas. A few years ago the Palestine Bank of Gaza was allowed to reopen its main Gaza branch, but its transactions were to be limited to Israeli currency only. This was obviously a deliberate policy to restrict the economic feasibility of the Bank, because the world money market has little confidence in the shekel, most major transactions, including those made by Israeli banks, are in either the US dollar or the Jordanian dinar.

The 1985 Annual Report, by the Board of Directors of the Palestine Bank of Gaza, placed its problems in the context of the worldwide economic recession, especially with the ever increasing debt cycle of the third world. However, the problems of the Bank in Gaza were further exacerbated by the policies of the Israeli military authorities. The occupied territories were

compelled to link their economy with the sinking Israeli economy, which with the imposition of exorbitant taxes has also worsened the situation, according to the report.

Another effect of restricting bank transaction to Israeli shekels, according to the report, is: "that large sums of money cannot be deposited for long terms". Consequently a large amount of the Bank's funds are in other Arab banks abroad, especially in Egyptian banks, and therefore less easily controllable. The report condemned Arab states activities, for example black market dollar deals in Egypt and the smuggling of dollars abroad. These led to the devaluation of the Egyptian pound to the dollar: "this decline has had a serious impact on this Strip, eventually causing a loss to the Bank of Palestine, especially in the value of its funds deposited in the Egyptian banks", according to the report.

Many of the problems, could be overcome by allowing the Bank to deal in foreign currency on the same footing as Israeli banks. The Bank has taken its claim, for the right

to deal in other currency, to the Israeli Supreme Court, the case is now entering its 4th year and seemingly "lies fast asleep" according to the report!

However, despite the problems confronting the Bank, a profit was declared for the year. The report also stated that the Bank had been able to improve its services to all fields of agriculture, industry and commerce.

The report stated that:

"the Bank was conscious of its national tribute, realizing in particular that it is the only national banking institution in the country".

The Bank was able to offer loans at a special and low rate

of interest to citrus growers because they provided the main source of income to the fragile economy of the Gaza Strip.

The Bank also gave assistance to national, charitable and social foundations. In the past year one of its projects had been to re-roof the classrooms of Jabalya Boys School.

The Bank has acquired new premises in the town of Gaza and is expected to issue new shares to raise more capital, because it is hoping to re-open more of its old branches and to set up new ones in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in the coming year. This, however, is dependent upon regaining the right to deal in all currencies and not just the unstable Israeli shekel.

CSO: 4400/259

QATAR

EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

DOHA—The total number of employees in the government of Qatar is 33,035. Of them, the single largest group is of Qataris (13,763 men and 3,094 women) with Asians accounting for 9,224 (1,345 women) and Arab expatriates 8460 (2136 women). Others are from the rest of the AGCC countries and other parts of the world.

The figures have been published by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) in the extracts of the fifth annual publication. The extracts themselves are a sizable volume and figures are up to 1984.

Meanwhile, reliable sources indicate that there are no plans this year to retrench government employees, as had been the case in 1983 and to some extent in 1984.

The figures quoted above do not include "mixed sector" institutions like the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and the heavy industries in Umm Said. Senior officials of the heavy industries have said there are no plans of reducing their work-force this year. The QGPC is now engaged in launching the North Field project.

The total number of employees in the private sector are 67,758. Of them, only 888 are women. Arabs total 10,239, and non-Arabs 55,703. The mixed sector employs 3,916 people with non-Arabs forming the bulk, 2,681. Arabs account for 848, excluding Qataris, who number 387. There is only one Qatari woman in the mixed sector, according to the CSO.

The QGPC is the largest employer in the mixed sector, with 1,617 employees, with non-Arabs making up 849 and Arabs 494. Some 274 are Qataris. The Ministry of Education is the biggest in terms of employees in the government with 9,062, of whom 3,849 are women. There are more Qatari women in the Education Ministry (2,476) than men (1,168).

The next big government employer is the Ministry of Electricity and Water, with 6,421 employees, all men. The third is Hamad General Hospital, with 3,245 employees, of whom nearly half, 1,578, are women.

Most government employees have put in between five and nine years of service. Professionals and technicians form the largest group of government employees, accounting for 11,508, closely followed by production workers and labourers, 10,979.

As for educational status among government employees, the CSO figures categorise "illiterate, or read and write" as the single largest grouping, 13,042. The next large group is of graduates, 6,597. In the "mixed sector", however, those with secondary education are on top of the list, with 1,184. Illiterates or those who can just read and write are 608, but form a smaller group than diploma holders (757) and graduates, 659. There is a good number of Ph.Ds in the government, 322 men and 29 women. There are only three Ph. Ds in the mixed sector, none of them a woman.

The private sector also has more illiterates, or those who can just read and write (39,394), followed in size by secondary education qualified, 8879.

CSO: 4400/262

QATAR

PETROCHEMICAL PLANT NEARS COMPLETION

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 17 Sept 85 p 13

[Text]

DOHA—The \$54 million ethane enrichment plant of the Qatar Petrochemical Company, (Qapco), is expected to go on stream by November this year, right on schedule.

Work on the plant started last year after Qapco raised a government guaranteed loan for the project. The mechanical erection part of the job was completed on August 21, about ten days before schedule.

Yves Michaux, General Manager, Qapco, said right now, "we are busy with the pre-commissioning stage, cleaning, checking and allowing for very careful drying. I think we should have the preliminary start up by the end of October."

Contractor for the job is CDF-Chemis of France, which is also a 16 per cent share-holder in Qapco. The plant as a whole will need a certain amount of time to be linked up with the ethylene plant and a period of adjustment. Mr Michaux hopes it will reach its full capacity of 500 tons per day towards the end of December.

The supply of ethane rich gas from the new unit, supplemented by the original unit's 600 tons per day would mean Qapco getting its full requirement of fuel to reach designed capacity of 140,000 tons per year of low density polyethylene (LDPE).

Mr Michaux said compared to 1981, prices for LDPE were down by \$125 per ton.

He described 1985 as the worst year in petrochemical history in terms of demand and prices. Some slow recovery is expected in 1986.

Qapco set up a record in monthly production during last month when LDPE figures reached 16,400 tons. It was 30 per cent more than the designed capacity. Production for 1984 as a whole was 150,000 tons. "It was a very good performance and I doubt if any other plant in the world could match it," Mr Michaux said.

By the end of August the ethylene plant had had a trouble free production for four months in a row.

CSO: 4400/262

SAUDI ARABIA

DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION FIELD DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 30 Aug 85 p 65

[Article by Sultan 'Abdallah: "King Fahd: Information is Honesty, Integrity, and Objectivity. New Plans to Develop Saudi Information"]

[Text] The Saudi monarch is known to have an opinion on the responsibility of information in his land, which he has expressed more than once since he was minister of interior more than 15 years ago. He himself summarized that opinion once when he said: "The responsibility of information media, and especially the press, is to always seek out the problems of the citizenry, discuss them with honesty, sincerity, and objectivity, then bring them to the attention of the state without sensationalism or finger-pointing."

Saudi information, in all its various media, has enjoyed governmental support and the personal attention of King Fahd in order to develop it to a level commensurate with the Saudi position in the international community. This was coupled with total commitment to Islamic values, a balanced approach based on objective facts and true information rather than on exaggeration and verbosity, and a policy that honors the word in an Islamic context that reflects the values and mores of the Islamic moral code.

Saudi information has recently witnessed the emergence of highly cultural tendencies to satisfy the needs of intellectuals in the country. Contributions are solicited from senior researchers, scientists, intellectuals, and opinion-makers who are invited to publish their findings and make their activities known to the masses. At the same time, young talent is looked after and encouraged morally and materially. Exposure is given to anything that serves society by asserting its Islamic values, preserving its mores, and confirming its Arab traditions.

Saudi information is increasingly paying heed to bolstering cooperation with the Arab states and to improving the Arab image internationally by providing foreign information media with a true picture of the kingdom and the Arab world, by inviting foreign journalists to see actual accomplishments in the kingdom, and by opening information centers abroad to present a true and positive image of the kingdom and those of the Arab League states.

The international dimension of Saudi information emerged during the Sixth Conference of Islamic Ministers in July of 1975 when the kingdom called for the creation of the Islamic Broadcasting Organization, headquartered in Jeddah, which seeks to spread the call of Islam, defend the causes of Muslims, and cement cooperation between Islamic broadcasting services.

Saudi Arabia was in the forefront of states financing this organization since its contribution to the budget reaches 10 percent, the highest contributor. It also supported it with a special contribution of \$3.5 million, according to the bulletin of the Saudi Information center in Tunis. The Saudi capital is headquarters for the Arab Space Communications Organization, the main earth control station for Arabsat, and the Gulf Television Authority. It has also made substantial contributions to the Kuwait-based Production Center for Joint Programming of the Arab Gulf States, the Bahrain-based Gulf News Agency, and the Center for Information Documentation in Baghdad.

When we examine the history and beginnings of Saudi information media, we realize the extent of progress they accomplished in a very short time.

Broadcasting began in October of 1949 and now reaches most of this vast country as well as several foreign nations via short wave.

The Saudi Broadcasting Service comprises the general program which began broadcasting from Jeddah in 1964, then from Riyadh. The service was unified in 1979 into a joint service comprising several programs--religious, cultural, political, family, children, and health. The service was later segregated into the current general program broadcast from Riyadh and the second program broadcast from Jeddah.

Because of the Kingdom's responsibility and its role in the Islamic world, beamed programs were created to bring the voice of Islam to all parts of the world in various languages, including Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Benghali, Swahili, Somali, Indonesian and Turkistani. Broadcasts are also planned in Albanian, Hausa and Spanish. For the same reason, programs are broadcast daily from Jeddah and Riyadh in English for 6 hours and French for 4 hours. The Broadcast Service plans its programs on the basis of three annual seasons the last of which is comprised of two mini-sessions to coincide with the month of Ramadan and the Hajj season.

Telecasting, on the other hand, began simultaneously from two stations in Riyadh and Jeddah on 7 July 1965. Color television began in 1976 and now reaches more than 90 percent of the kingdom's population. Telecasts average 70 hours per week and increase to 100 hours during Ramadan and the Hajj.

A second television channel was created in October of 1983 to carry foreign programming in English and French. During the pilgrimage season, programs are also telecast in Urdu, Swahili, Persian and Indonesian.

The second channel, despite its young age, has attained a large measure of success in that it is watched by most viewers as evidenced by their letters and comments on programming published in the newspapers.

The Saudi press, on the other hand, passed through three stages of structural development. First was the journalism of the individual which lasted between 1950-1958. Then came the period of amalgamation when only one strong paper emerged per city. The third stage began in 1964 with the creation of large press houses.

UMM AL-QURA is considered the first newspaper to publish under the Saud dynasty, in 1924. It was followed by SAWT AL-HIJAZ in 1932, AL-MADINAH AL-MUNAWWARAH in 1937, AL-YAMAMAH in 1953, AKHBAR AL-ZAHRAN in 1954, AL-FAJR AL-JADID and HARRA' in 1956, AL-ADWA' and 'ARAFAT in 1957, then AL-NADWAH, AL-KHALIJ AL-'ARABI, AL-QUSAYM, 'UKAZ, AL-JAZIRAH, and AL-RIYAD in 1962. This was in addition to a number of weekly magazines such as AL-YAMAMAH and 'IQRA' and monthly periodicals including AL-MANHAL, AL-'ARAB, AL-FAYSAL, AL-MAJALLAH AL-'ARABIYAH, and AL-DA'WAH among others.

Officials admit to soon-to-be-disclosed plans to bring further evolution and development for Saudi information.

12945

CSO: 4404/449

SAUDI ARABIA

STATISTICAL STUDY ON CAR ACCIDENTS ISSUED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 13 Aug 85 p 16

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Shaykh Muhammad: "Car Accidents in Jeddah. Bachelors are More Accident Prone because they Ignore Signals"]

[Text] Jeddah had 3,144 car accidents last year involving people from all walks of life and causing 3,920 injuries, of which 307 were fatal, according to a study by the Jeddah Traffic Department.

The study, recently published in pamphlet form, contains unique statistics on the social and educational backgrounds of those involved in accidents, and the types of autos involved.

According to the study, bachelors accounted for 52.1 percent of those involved in accidents in the city of Jeddah in 1984, as compared to 47.9 percent for married men. Some analysts attribute this to the fact that 'marrieds' are more responsive to street signs that remind them that their families await them and urge them to reduce speed in order to reach home safely.

The study says that 79.7 percent of drivers involved in traffic accidents in Jeddah last year were educated while the other 20.3 percent were not. Some analysts say this is because there are more educated drivers in Jeddah than uneducated ones. Others believed that uneducated drivers are more cautious.

The study also shows that 56.8 percent of those involved in accidents in Jeddah last year were non-Saudi and 43.2 percent were Saudi; 55.3 percent had private driving licenses compared with 44.7 percent [as published] with no driving license of any type.

Small cars, according to the study's statistics, were more likely to have accidents, logging a record 62.1 percent, immediately followed by medium trucks at a mere 13.9 percent.

The study further points out that the 18-to-30 age group caused most accidents in Jeddah last year, accounting without exaggeration for 48.63 percent, followed by the 30-to-40 age group at 31.12 percent. The 40-to-50 age group accounted for a modest 6.24 percent of accidents.

Analysts attribute the low accident rate of the last group to the maturity, wisdom, and patience developed through experience and acquired through the years.

The study also finds that auto collision caused 42.46 percent of all car accidents while pedestrians were involved in 41.48 percent.

Ignoring traffic signals caused a high 40.6 percent of all accidents. Excessive speed, at 29.11 percent, was found to be the second highest cause. This indicates that ignoring traffic signals while driving at high speed poses a serious safety hazard on public roads.

The study indicates that accidents in the city center (79.1 percent) far outnumber those on the highways or in the outskirts of Jeddah (20.8 percent).

The study finally shows that 66.9 percent of all accidents happen during the school year compared with 61.08 percent [as published] during the holiday.

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CSO: 4404/449

SAUDI ARABIA

ANTI-SMOKING CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 19 Aug 85 p 15

[Article by Baha'-al-Din Ahmad: "Broad Anti-Smoking Campaign in Saudi Arabia Led by the Minister of Education"]

[Text] The Saudi Ministry of Education will, during the coming 1985/86 school year, which begins September 3, target students in an intensive 7 day anti-smoking campaign. Saudi Minister of Education Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Khuwaytar will inaugurate the campaign with some instructive remarks, obtained by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, in which he says:

"Islam allows us good food and good drink and other things and forbids us to consume bad objects and anything that is harmful to man. God, glory be to him, is more knowledgeable than his worshippers of what is in their best interests. Smoking has many harmful effects. There is medical proof that smoking is a major cause of cancer, not to mention loss of appetite, excessive coughing, and tooth decay. All countries without exception have anti-smoking campaigns to make people aware of the dangers and harmful effects of tobacco.

"The blessed religion of Islam had the foresight to deal with this and other matters. Many Qur'anic verses and Sayings by the Prophet forbid man to bring harm upon himself and others. Smoking is harmful to man physically, socially, and financially. God says in Surat al-A'raf, 'They may partake of the good but they are forbidden the harmful.' In Surat al-Baqara God orders his worshippers not to destroy themselves: 'Do not cause your own destruction.' Smoking is destructive. Jabir, may God be pleased with him, relates that the prophet, may the blessings of God be upon him, said that 'angels are offended by what humans find offensive.' We all know that smoking in public places offends many people. The smell of smoke on clothes also offends those who pray.

"The Qur'an and Sayings of the prophet clearly indicate the position of Islam toward anything that harms. Smoking is harmful to your health and pocketbook. It behooves teachers and students to keep away from tobacco and to urge their colleagues to do the same."

Distinctive Campaign

Mr Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Qudayri, director of student guidance in the Saudi Ministry of Education, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that this campaign, called the

anti-Smoking Preventive Guidance Program, will be distinctive in that "we will employ a new technique by emphasizing the advantages of not smoking. Educators, when guiding youngsters, believe it is more effective to emphasize advantages rather than harp on disadvantages."

Al-Qudayri said that contacts will be made with the various information media, such as television, radio, and newspapers, in order to coordinate the various phases of the campaign. The cooperation of the Ministry of Health will also be sought. Literature will be distributed to all administrations of the Ministry of Education and other relevant ministries such as Health and Information, as well as to newspapers, local magazines, the Directorate General for Youth Affairs, and others whose contribution is sought to this enlightenment campaign.

The various boards of education have also prepared comprehensive reports detailing their views and suggestions for the campaign. They will issue directives to all schools on how to carry out an effective campaign, distribute literature unique to each school, and arrange for their students seminars and lectures in cooperation with local health information teams and health unit physicians. Cultural and artistic anti-smoking competitions will also be held and winners will receive material and symbolic prizes. Educational pamphlets will expose the harms of this dangerous epidemic. Drawings showing the dangers of smoking will be made into posters. Schools will be supplied with video films dealing with the dangers of smoking and how to quit.

Information Media

Mr Al-Qudayri said that the boards have recommended that the anti-smoking campaign be maintained year-round by all information media. Anti-smoking posters with impact and good design are to be erected and properly illuminated at major intersections in every town. Anti-smoking video cassettes are to be available to schools at all times and should be shown to students every now and again. It is important that all ministries and government agencies take part in these programs,

The boards also recommended the establishment of a smoking clinic at one of the hospitals in each region so that the health units can coordinate programs with it to help smokers give up that harmful habit. Television could also be used to broadcast anti-smoking slogans during station breaks. Textbooks could have anti-smoking slogans printed on their covers and their pages interspersed with photographs with impact on smokers, especially in the primary and secondary schools.

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CSO: 4404/449

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

JEDDAH PORT ACTIVITIES--Jeddah, 14 Sep (SPA)--During the past 4 years, 72 million tons of goods arrived in Jeddah Islamic port, including 1,400,004 containers, 11 million heads of livestock, and 1,036,000 passengers. [Summary] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 0625 GMT 14 Sep 85 GF]

GIFT OF RICE--Moroni, 8 Sep (AFP)--The Comoros on Sunday in Moroni officially received a Saudi gift of 805 tons of rice worth about \$270,000. The rice, which was bought in Thailand, was shipped to the Moroni port at the expense of Saudi Arabia to be handed over to Said Ahmed Said Ali, minister delegate to the minister of state at the President's Office in charge of management, state companies, and commercial and industrial public organizations, by the secretary of the Saudi Embassy in Nairobi, Ibrahim Mohamed Zaine al Abidine. This gift, indicated the Saudi diplomat during a ceremony in Moroni, falls within the framework of friendly and fraternal relations which link the two Muslim peoples. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1403 GMT 8 Sep 85 AB]

CSO: 4400/260

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

REPORT ON SA'DAH ELECTIONS

Sanaa AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 29 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Murtada: "Problems in Sa'dah Few"]

[Text] The supervisory committees for the elections to increase the membership of the General People's Congress and the general assemblies of the local councils for cooperative development in the governorate of Sa'dah have concluded their task after 4 days of work, during which they conducted elections in electoral centers and offices with success and very great precision. They exceeded all expectations, due to the great national awareness on the part of the sons of the governorate of Sa'dah, in holding elections governed by the spirit of democracy that is embodied in the elections law and whose climate is created by our September political leadership, springing from, in their directives and pioneer steps, a spirit of the principles of the national charter, derived from our Islamic faith and our deeply-rooted cultural heritage. The brother officials and supervisors of elections in the counties have returned to the capital of Sanaa, bearing with them detailed reports on the conduct of the election and the names of those who won the confidence of the citizens. In a discussion with a number of the brother supervisors who carried out the supervisory duties, they expressed their satisfaction and great appreciation of the role of the sons of the counties in facilitating their supervisory tasks, which were carried out according to the plan for them in the electoral guidelines, confirming at that time the conscious opinion of the citizens in the rural areas and the cities of their level of importance. In an interview with the brother governor of the governorate and member of the standing committee, Lt Col Yahya Muhammad al-Shami, by a number of brother journalists and media people, our correspondent in Sa'dah asked the brother governor whether he had encountered any problems while conducting the elections, since he is the top official in the governorate, and what he thought the most important of these problems were. The brother governor answered: "I thank the newspaper AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM. The problems that occurred while conducting the elections were trivial. Among them were the desire of the people to have a large number of representatives and tribal disputes. These were problems caused by citizens. Other problems included the fact that some villages were not entered on the election roles because they were not registered in the census lists, due to conditions in the past that accompanied the process of census taking, since the citizens did not know the importance and

benefits of census taking. In addition, distribution of the election centers was not perfect, which delayed the elections a little in some centers until adjustments were made and these problems settled. Praise God, these elections have been completed in all counties of the governorate within the time set. In some of the counties, the supervisory committees finished their work in 3 days."

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CSO: 4404/455

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

'IYAL YAZID ELECTION WINNER INTERVIEWED ABOUT ELECTIONS

Sanaa AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 5 Aug 85 p 6

[Interview with 'Ali Muhammad al-Thamriy, member of General People's Congress and general assembly of local cooperative development council, by 'Ali Muhammad Ahmad al-Maghribi; date and place not given]

[Text] Our country has experienced and is still experiencing the greatest of its weddings, that is, the elections for the general assemblies of the local councils for cooperative development and membership in the General People's Congress. On this great occasion, the newspaper AL-RY'Y AL-'AMM takes pleasure in its participation in a meeting with one of those who won the confidence of those who chose and elected him to represent them in the general assembly of the local councils for cooperative development and in the General People's Congress, brother 'Ali Muhammad al-Zamri, and in asking him the following questions.

[Question] Brother 'Ali Muhammad 'Amir, can you tell us the dimensions of these elections which all areas of our country have experienced, especially since our country has not experienced anything like this event before?

[Answer] Our people, by means of their cooperative experiment, have established and developed cooperatives until they have achieved this level of interest on the part of our political leadership under the presidency of a shining son of Yemen, Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic, commander in chief of the armed forces and general secretary of the People's Congress, with the goal of advancing and developing our country by means of continuing the democratic and development journey, in the light of the national charter.

[Question] Concerning those who won the confidence of the people and were elected to the general assemblies of the local councils for cooperative development and membership in the General People's Congress, what do you think are the characteristics that are required of a member? And what tasks will he undertake to render during the coming stage?

[Answer] Concerning those who won the confidence of the people (the citizens) and who were elected to the general assemblies of the local councils for cooperative development and membership in the General People's Congress, the higher committee on elections published an election guideline in which

the necessary conditions were set forth. There is no distinction between men and women, or between age or youth. However, there are conditions for nomination, as follows: he must be able to read and write, be able to prove that he is at least 25 years of age and not have been convicted previously of violating honor or something similar. This is out of consideration for our political leadership and protection of the public treasury. As for the tasks which he will undertake to render during the first stage, they are large and weighty. They are the election of the administrative members of the local councils. It is the responsibility of the members of the general assembly of the local councils to be precise in choosing, and to select those who are honest, able and completely free to perform their duties.

[Question] Concerning yourself, did you nominate yourself or were the voters the ones who approved you and elected you to membership in the general assembly of the local councils for cooperative development and membership in the General People's Congress? How did you feel when the voters were delivering their votes for you?

[Answer] Concerning candidacy, there is no distinction between one who wants to nominate himself or one who wants the people to nominate him. No candidate is successful save by the consent and choice of the citizens, by election by secret and direct balloting, without any pressure or flattery, conducted according to the most modern election methods in the world.

[Question] As one who has experienced an election battle, do you think the elections procedures were accompanied by any errors or disregard for law number 12 of 1985?

[Answer] The committees with direct supervision of the elections carried out their major national role in an excellent way and a successful manner, and led the elections along a path of success in a general way. This points to the desire and concern of the leader president, General Secretary Col 'Ali Abdallah Salih, and to the unceasing national effort he exerted and is exerting on behalf of his country and nation, to advance and develop our country in light of the national charter.

[Question] Finally, what major steps will the general assemblies and the local councils for cooperative development take?

[Answer] A first step that the general assemblies and the local councils for cooperative development will take, in partnership with different agencies of the state, is drawing up and implementing programs for development, creation of new services, encouragement of the creation of agricultural cooperatives and work to provide necessary commodities locally, to bring about self-sufficiency.

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CSO: 4404/455

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

ELECTIONS DESCRIBED AS A SUCCESS

Sanaa AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 5 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Amin Ahmad Mani': "The Citizen Was Responsible"]

[Text] For the first time in the history of the Yemen Arab Republic, indeed, in the history of ancient and modern Yemen, elections are taking place in a sound democratic manner. The door has been opened for all Yemenis of various movements. The conditions required are that the candidate be of Yemeni nationality and that he be able to read and write. I, and many others as well, would have thought the elections in the rural areas, by secret ballot by means of cards, would have encountered problems with regard to the spread of illiteracy, on the one hand, and to the lack of interest by the people in the elections, due to a low level of awareness, on the other. But what happened, according to my observation of many areas of the governorates of Sanaa, Dhamar and Ibb, was acceptance by the Yemeni masses such as I have not witnessed throughout my life. I do not say this without reason, but rather by experience, or more properly, previous experiences. I have previously supervised cooperative elections in a number of areas in Sa'dah, Ibb and Dhamar, when we went to the citizens, to their farms, and tried to designate assembly places. But we did not succeed. The citizen passed us by and went to work in his field without regard for working into his reckoning any thought for the elections. He did not know what elections are.

Today, the situation is completely different. The citizens have become very aware. Whenever I observed the crowds in the election centers I knew that our people had gotten past the initial stages. There is no return to the tutelage imposed on them in the past, when the administrators made them choose Zayd, or 'Umar. They did this by raising their hands when the name of so-and-so was called out, and woe to whomever did not raise his hand for his master. He did not accord the matter any importance, because concern for his existence led him to choose someone he did not like, under coercion.

But our great Yemeni people, when they learned, by means of the media organs and the national press, official and popular, which, thankfully, performed a role in the task of enlightenment, that the matter is important, all got going and raced, in groups and singly, to the election centers, to say "yes" for those they want and "no" to those they do not have confidence in. This was in spite of some very minor mistakes. Some mistakes resulted from an

error by the supervisory committees on election guidelines and the election law, but most of them were made by the official in charge. The elections took place in a form that has no precedent.

Our people benefitted, by studies and lessons, a great deal from these elections, which, most importantly, urged on the people the need to eliminate their illiteracy, since it is a condition of approval for candidacy that one be able to read and write, as I stated previously.

I must mention a story that happened in one of the election centers in the county of al-Siyani in the governorate of Ibb, where a citizen nominated himself to membership in the general assembly and the General People's Congress. When his name was submitted to the supervisory committee, it called him to examine him to learn whether he could read and write. The committee asked him to write his name, and learned that he did not read or write. They said that membership was not possible for someone who could not read or write. He retreated from the place, embarrassment showing in his face. A brother citizen recognized him and said: "You nominated yourself knowing that you do not read or write." This was a form of mockery of the nominee. The nominee said that he would attend classes to eliminate illiteracy, if God wills, for the next elections.

Finally, I will not repeat what I said except to add my voice to the voice of the brother leader of liberation, and repeat what he said, or more truthfully, what he witnessed, and I say: "I confirm that it was honest."

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CSO: 4404/455

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

DHAMAR RESIDENTS COMPLAIN ABOUT PUBLIC SAFETY

Sanaa AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 29 Jul 85 p 1

[Article: "An Open Letter to the Governor of Dhamar"]

[Text] Your Excellency, the Most Honorable Governor of Dhamar,

Greetings and salutations to you, for what you have done and are doing for this governorate, for having made it like the other governorates by implementing various types of projects, by spreading security and tranquility throughout its territory and by solving all problems and difficulties in it.

Those of us in the city of Ma'Bar Jiharan complain to you about an important and grave problem and implore you to find a solution for it.

The city of Ma'bar Jiharan has become an open field for murder, rape, retaliation and other such inhuman acts that affect it. Each crime committed is worse than the one before. We believe that you do not approve of this, nor of the conduct of the judges and qadis who hardly have in their hands a problem, whether of the shari'a, disputes or murder, but that they begin to delay finding a speedy solution or judgment for the problems between the parties. For this reason, as a result of the mockery of finding a solution and speedy judgment, the citizen loses what belongs to him, until the judgment that the law requires against his adversary is blocked. His problem makes him poor, which makes him resort to a speedy solution to the problem, more speedy than the judgment of the courts, which can take months and years in interpellation. And this method is murder.

Therefore, we implore you, by God and your love of country, to find a solution for this miserable city.

Ma'bar is not closed, but is open to all who come and go from all areas, near or far. Due to the lack of a sufficient number of security people or a branch of the military police, these problems happen easily. We will not list for you all that you know. We only hope to find a rapid and sound solution for this problem which besets our miserable citizens, whose lives are beset by these problems. We are in an open and spacious city, not a village, with residents who come from everywhere.

Finally, we implore you, by God and your responsibility for this.

May God give you success and watch over you for the public good.

The citizens of Ma'bar Jiharan
14 July 1985

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CSO: 4404/455

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

WOMAN ELECTED IN AL-BAYDA'--Sister comrade Samiyah al-Ahmadi, the daughter of martyr struggler 'Ali al-Ahmadi, the first minister of information in the revolutionary era, was successful in the elections for the general assemblies of the local councils for cooperative development and was elected a member of the General People's Congress in the governorate of al-Bayda'. She is considered to be the first woman to win this type of election in the entire eastern area. Our congratualtions to the daughter of struggler al-Ahmadi and our best wishes to her for good fortune and success. [Text]
[Sanaa AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 29 Jul 85 p 1]

12780

CSO: 4404/455

BANGLADESH

MEMBERSHIP IN CABINET NUMBERED AT 32

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 19 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] With the recent reorganisation of Ministries and Divisions, the size of the ministries now stands at 28 with 25 ministers, reports BSS.

At the present shape, the number of Cabinet members is less than the number of Ministries.

Two Ministries, namely, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Establishment, are being held by the President.

The Religious Affairs Ministry is now being looked after by the Minister for Law and Justice while the Civil Aviation and Tourism Division which fell vacant last week is also at the disposal of the President.

Besides, the Cabinet Ministers, there are three State Ministers and four Deputy Ministers. Together with the ministers, State Ministers and Deputy Ministers, the total number of ministers now stands at 32.

Out of the 25 Cabinet Ministers, seven are the members of the Armed Forces who are drawing their own salaries. They are performing responsibilities as Ministers in addition to their duties in Armed Forces.

Drawing a comparison between the size of the present Ministry and that of 1979, official sources said earlier there were 48 ministers including the Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, 31 Ministers, 12 State Ministers and two Deputy Ministers. During 1980 the number of Ministers was 40 including 17 State Ministers and five Deputy Ministers.

The sources said during that time there was a Vice-President who also held charge of a Ministry.

Besides, there were 20 District Development Coordinators in 1980 assigned for each district for co-ordinating the development projects of the districts. The D.D.Cs held the rank and status of Deputy Ministers.

In 1973, there were 37 ministers including 14 State Ministers in addition to the Vice-President and the Prime Minister.

In late 1973 and in 1979 there were 37 ministers including the Prime Minister and 15 State Ministers.

CSO: 4600/1711

BANGLADESH

PAPERS REPORT FORMATION OF PRO-GOVERNMENT FRONT

Signatories, Objectives

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 17 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] The five-party pro-government Front--Jatiya Front--a 12-member steering committee was formally launched on Friday.

The component parties of the front are Janadal BNP (Shah Aziz) United Peoples Party Ganatantrik Party and Muslim League (Siddiky).

The objectives of the front are independence and sovereignty, Bangladeshi nationalism, democracy, establishment of Islamic ideals and ensuring freedom of all other religions and social progress leading to economic emancipation.

The front expressed its solidarity with the policies and programmes as enunciated by President Lt General H.M. Ershad. The front also declared its commitment to uphold and inspire the policies of the present government regarding reforms, decentralisation of administration disinvestment of nationalised industries and investment in the private sector along with public sector.

The Steering Committee of the front has been formed with two representatives from each of the five component parties and two members without having party identity.

The members are: Shah Mohammad Azizur Rahman and Barrister Sultan Ahmed Chowdhury (BNP Shan) Mr Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury and Mr Shamsul Huda Chowdhury (Janadal). Mr Sirajul Hossain Khan and Mr Anwar Zahid (Ganotantrik Patry) Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Mr Mostafa Jamal Ilaidir (UPP), Mr Justice B.A. Siddiky and Mr Salauddin Kader Chowhury (Muslim League Siddiky).

Mr A.K.M. Mayedul Islam, General Secretary of BNP (Shah) who is a signatory to the manifesto of the front was however, not included in the Steering Committee. Without party identity are Barrister Maudud Ahmed and Mr Anwar Hossain.

The signatories to the front called upon all nationalist, democratic and patriotic forces and individuals to forge unity with the front. The front stressed the need for greater unity of all political and social forces in the interest of democratic system, political stability and economic progress.

The aims and objectives of the front include: national consensus on all vital state issues and National Unity, peaceful transition to constitutional rule from Martial Law holding on national polls at the shortest possible time on the revival of the suspended Constitution, handing over of power to elected representatives and revival of the suspended Constitution after the national elections. The programmes of the National Front also include resistance against hegemonism and expansionism to ensure consolidation of national independence and sovereignty, build up a national economy free from all control and exploitation and to protect national culture from alien influence.

The front also believes that the state would honour the religious sentiment of the majority of the country's Muslim population and establishment of religious values in social life and tolerance to all religions.

One of the major objectives of the front is to promote better friendly relations with China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Burma and all neighbouring countries. The front termed the issues relating to the sharing of the waters of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and other border rivers establishment of the sovereignty of Bangladesh on the island of South Talpatty, Dahagram, Angorpota and Tin Bigha corridors and construction of barbed wire fencing and watch towers along the border as threats to national existence and dignity of Bangladesh. The front believes that long-term and mutually acceptable and honourable solutions of these issues can be the basis of building up a friendly neighbourly relations between Bangladesh and India.

Another salient feature of the objectives of the front is to consolidate Bangladesh's relations with the Muslim countries and promote the unity of the Muslim Ummah under the banner of OIC. The front also expressed its active support to the freedom-loving people of Palestine, Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Namibia in their struggle against all sorts of expansionism, racism, colonialism and hegemonism.

The front also declared to adopt certain immediate steps aiming at achieving its objectives. The steps include the creation of a favourable political atmosphere to hold national elections for transfer of power to elected representatives, immediate opening of political activities with a view to paving the way for participation of political parties and forces in the elections.

The programmes of the front also aim at reviving the clauses of the suspended constitution re human rights and writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

The front called for winding up of Martial Law offices and restoring the pre-March 1, 1985 situation to create an atmosphere congenial to the holding of free and fair national elections.

Analysing the context of the emergence of the front, the signatories of the front stated that the absence of political stability in the country was the main reason for creating an atmosphere where the forces opposed to the country's independence and sovereignty were gaining ground. They believe that only an elected democratic government can resist such forces.

Referring to the events during the last two and a half years, the front leaders said that the disunity among the nationalist and patriotic forces led to the political rehabilitation of anti-democratic forces and created anarchy. Such political unrest deprived the people from reaching the desired national goal of democracy. They said that under such a situation the promise of president Ershad for the establishment of a democratic government could not be materialised. They also noted that the transition to democracy has become uncertain in view of lack in ideas, acumen and far-sightedness of certain quarters in properly evaluating the prevailing situation. This has created frustration among the people, they observed.

Hindu Parishad Joins

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh Hindu Parishad has joined the newly formed Jatiya Front, reports BSS.

Announcing this to the Press, Mr Sunil Gupta, State Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources and Adviser of the Parishad, expressed the hope that the Front would contribute a lot to overcome the national crisis.

Appreciating the policies of the present Government, particularly the administrative decentralisation, industrial policy, agriculture reforms, drug policy and the new wage policy for labourers, he maintained that the solution to the existing political problems of the country rested on the formation of a democratically elected government.

He also hoped that the four principles of the Front aiming at holding the national polls would dispel the frustration and anarchy and help create a greater national unity in the country.

CSO: 4600/1710

8 October 1985

BANGLADESH

RELEASED POLITICAL DETAINEES INTERVIEWED

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 16 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] BNP leader K.M. Obaidur Rahman and Awami League organising secretary Tofail Ahmed were freed from detention on August 10 while the release of some other political detainees are learnt to have been under active consideration of the government.

The political detainees who are yet to be released from the jail include BSD (Mahbub) leader Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Workers' Party leader Nasim Ali, DUCSU vice-president and Chhatra Sangram Parishad leader Akhtaruzza-man, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal leader Jalal Ahmed and Sylhet district BNP leader Shishir Miah.

All of them were arrested under Special Powers Act following tightening of martial law with involvement in activities prejudicial to the state.

Tofail Ahmed was picked up from his residence by the police in mid-night of April 9 and detained for an indefinite period and Obaidur Rahman was taken into custody on April 12 from a house at Jigatola where he was hiding to avoid arrest.

Obaid

Obaidur Rahman was shifted from Dhaka Jail to Sylhet Jail on April 26. In Sylhet Jail he was kept in solitary confinement for one month and then transferred to another room where other division detainees were kept.

Talking to Holiday he dismissed forthwith a rumour about the possibility of his deserting the BNP.

He said, "I am doing politics of BNP and will continue to do it and maintain confidence in the leadership of Begum Khaleda Zia."

He further said that he would not budge from his stand under any circumstances to fight for establishment of democracy under the leadership of BNP and through the simultaneous movement of the 7-party combine and 15-party alliance.

He demanded release of all political detainees including Belayet, Manna, Akhtar, Jalak and Shishir.

Tofail

Tofail Ahmed told Holiday: "We will continue with the democratic movement on the basis of the five-point programme to regain the fruits of the five-point movement."

He said that extreme political and economic crises were prevailing in the country and the only way to resolve these was to hold elections to a sovereign parliament on the basis of the five-point demand and transfer power to the people's elected representatives.

Tofail Ahmed said, "The government has no political base and hence it is trying to demoralize politicians by dangling the bait of ministerial positions before their noses."

He expressed his determination to fight for restoration of democracy and demanded release of all political detainees.

CSO: 4600/1709

BANGLADESH

PURPOSE OF SOVIET DELEGATION'S VISIT DISCUSSED

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 16 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Hassan Abul Quasem]

[Text] Bangladesh and the Soviet Union will discuss the whole 'gamut' of bilateral relations between the two countries at an official level meeting to be held in Dhaka in the last week of this month.

A two-member Soviet delegation, to be led by Mr A.L. Valkov, head of the South Asian Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, will visit Dhaka in this connection. Though official Soviet delegations are routinely visiting different countries on the eve of the United Nations General Assembly session, local diplomatic circles are attaching much importance on this visit, as the discussions are likely to concentrate on ironing out some of the differences between the two countries arising from the Soviet "diplomatic setback" in December 1983.

This will be the first senior official level meeting to discuss the major outstanding issues in about six years. Mr Valkov, holding the ambassadorial rank equivalent to that of a director general of Bangladesh foreign ministry, will exchange views with the concerned government officials on the possibility of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields.

No agenda has yet been fixed. The Soviet Embassy and Foreign Ministry officials are now busy fixing areas of discussion during the visit of Mr Valkov who is likely to arrive at Bangladesh capital on 23rd of this month. (Diplomatic circles believe that the Soviet delegation will discuss about the 'irritants' standing in the way of improving the bilateral relations between the two countries).

The Soviet Union is now happy at the existing economic and trade cooperation between the two countries, but feels unhappy over Bangladesh's 'negative' attitude in reciprocating the sentiments for expanding cooperation in cultural and political fields. Bangladesh government last April declined a request to allow a Soviet cultural groupe to visit Bangladesh under a cultural protocol signed between the two countries a month earlier.

Bangladesh did not accept the request on the ground that the country was passing through an abnormal situation following the worsening of the flood situation.

The USSR, however, was not convinced by the official reply and raised questions about the willingness of the Bangladesh government to make the cultural agreement fully operative, according to diplomatic circles. The refusal of the government to issue clearance to the members of a Bangladeshi youth delegation to attend International Youth Festival at Moscow last month reflected the present state of relations between the two countries, the circles added.

The Foreign Ministry has been maintaining a very low profile as the USSR has taken the initiative to improve bilateral relations. But earlier a number of steps was taken by Bangladesh and the Soviet Union to normalise their relations after the expulsion of a number of Soviet diplomats and the closing down of the Soviet Cultural Centre in Dhaka.

A trade protocol was signed between the two countries last June. Mr Semenilkov, head of the trade department of Foreign Trade Ministry paid a visit to Bangladesh in this connection. Bangladesh has since permitted the USSR to reopen its cultural centre in Dhaka. But formal reopening has been delayed by some internal problems, including the arrival of required manpower.

A cultural protocol has also been signed. A film delegation visited the Soviet capital recently. Despite these steps, bilateral relations still appears to be 'cool,' says a government official.

CSO: 4600/1709

BANGLADESH

REPORTAGE ON VISIT OF SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION

Arrival on 19 Aug

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 20 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] A two-member Soviet Foreign Ministry team led by Ambassador Anatole I. Valkov, Head of South Asia Desk, arrived in Dhaka yesterday afternoon for consultations aiming at 'better bilateral relations.'

Mr Valkov told BSS at the Zia International Airport that during the five-day visit he would discuss with the officials of Bangladesh Foreign Office mainly on the issues likely to come up at the 40th UN General Assembly sessions and also on better bilateral relations.

The meetings and consultations, he said, would be intended to have better knowledge of each other's positions and views.

It is the first visit to Bangladesh by a Soviet Foreign Ministry team since 1978. In April last a Soviet trade delegation visited Dhaka for signing the 14th Annual Barter trade Protocol. But Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister ET Grishin who was scheduled to lead the team could not come, Soviet embassy officials said, as he suddenly fell sick. The trade team was led by G. Semenilov, Head of Foreign Trade Department.

Quoting Russian proverb Mr Valkov said, 'It's better to see to once than hear a hundred times.'

Of course we know each other for pretty long and know each other's views, he said.

Asked how would he describe the existing bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Bangladesh, Mr Valkov said, 'on the whole our relations are developing rather satisfactorily. But we want it to be better. There is scope for further developing cooperation in various spheres.'

Soviet Ambassador V.G. Beliaev present at the airport to receive the team, said Mr Valkov would like to call on Foreign Minister Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury.

Mr Valkov said, "personal contacts always play a very important role."

Mr Valkov, who leaves here for Kathmandu on Friday, said replying to a question that among the issues likely to come up at the UN General Assembly his team was mainly interested to discuss prevention of a nuclear holocaust and maintenance of peace.

Talks with Foreign Minister

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 21 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The visiting Soviet Foreign Ministry team on Tuesday called on Foreign Minister Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury and they discussed bilateral relations and the issues likely to come up at the UN General Assembly.

A Foreign Office spokesman later told BSS that the visiting team led by the head of the South Asia Desk of Soviet Foreign Ministry Ambassador Anatole I. Valkov, reiterated his country's "desire for continued friendship with Bangladesh and also a faster pace of cooperation in all fields."

During the discussions they expressed satisfaction at the existing "realistic bilateral relations," he said.

Mr Valkov who arrived in Dhaka on Monday on a five-day visit informed the Foreign Minister that the Soviet Union wanted continued economic cooperation with Bangladesh.

The Soviet team leader agreed with the Foreign Minister when the latter said there was need for improved trade relations.

They discussed the UN agenda and sought to know each other's views on the issues.

Asked whether the Afghan and the Kampuchea questions were discussed, the spokesman replied in the affirmative and added "they apprised each other about their stands on the two issues."

Bangladesh supports the demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and solution of the problems in the two countries by their own peoples.

The Foreign Minister explained the position of Bangladesh on various international issues and expressed his satisfaction at the similarity of views of the two countries on the issues of South Africa, Middle East and Namibia.

Mr Valkov said that his country felt the need for increased contacts at the official level between the two countries.

He conveyed to Mr Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury the greetings of Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and Mr Chowdhury reciprocated.

The official teams of the two countries would begin their formal talks today for "improvement of bilateral relations" and also discuss the UN General Assembly issues.

Additional Foreign Secretary Mr Rezaul Karim will lead the Bangladesh team while Ambassador Valkov will lead the Soviet team, the spokesman said.

Mr Valkov's team is the first for a Soviet Foreign Ministry team to visit Bangladesh in last eight years.

In April last the two countries signed their 14th annual barter trade protocol for which a Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry team was here.

CSO: 4600/1715

BANGLADESH

REPORTAGE ON BANGLADESH-MALAYSIA JOINT COMMITTEE

Meeting Opens

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 20 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh and Malaysia began in Dhaka yesterday morning a two-day meeting of their Joint Economic Committee (JEC) to discuss expansion of bilateral cooperation in economic and other fields, reports BSS.

The second meeting of the JEC will also review progress in the implementation of projects in the areas of economy, trade, technology, culture and host of other areas as was agreed in the first meeting held in Kuala Lumpur last year.

The two sides said there was ample scope to increase cooperation between the two fraternal OIC countries.

The two sides will also discuss a number of regional and international issues of mutual concern including Kampuchea, Iran-Iraq war, Middle East situation, Sahara situation and the status of Antarctica.

The JEC was set up under the economic and technical cooperation agreement the two countries signed in 1979.

Malaysian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Zainal Abidin Sulong is leading a 10-member team of his country while an 18-member Bangladesh side is being led by Foreign Secretary Faruq A. Chowdhury.

Sleeper Supply Accord

Meanwhile, an agreement was signed in Dhaka on Sunday between the Railway Division of the Ministry of Communication and the Malimex (M) of Malaysia for supply of 4,460,000 cft sleepers worth 2.6 million dollars for Khulna-Parbatipur 2nd ADB project of Bangladesh Railway.

The Bangladesh Government has taken up a project for rehabilitation and improvement of Khulna-Parbatipur Section in the western zone of Bangladesh Railway under ADB assistance. The project will cost Tk 22548.63 lakh, including foreign exchange component of Tk 11765.97 lakh.

8 October 1985

The project called "system improvement and rehabilitation of Bangladesh Railway" includes rehabilitation of mechanical workshops, rehabilitation of tracks on Khulna-Parbatipur broad-gauge section, establishment of integrated telecommunication system and consultancy service.

The track rehabilitating portion will cost Tk 9442.89 lakh including foreign component of Tk 13944 lakh.

Meeting Ends, Delegation Departs

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 21 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) between Bangladesh and Malaysia concluded its second meeting in Dhaka on Tuesday with an agreement to undertake a number of actions directed to stimulating trade between the two countries.

The EC meeting also stressed the need for further expansion of exports from Bangladesh to Malaysia to offset the existing trade imbalance between the two countries. The export from Bangladesh to Malaysia amounted to Taka 5.81 crore in 1984-85 as against import from Malaysia amounting Taka 87.32 crore.

The visiting Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Mr Tan Sri Jainul Abidin Sulong and his counterpart Mr Faruque Ahmed Chowdhury who led their respective delegations in the JEC meeting signed an "agreed minutes" at the end of the two-day talks.

A high-level trade delegation from Malaysia will visit Dhaka soon to explore the feasibility of further expanding trade and taking up joint ventures. The JEC meeting agreed to facilitate further contracts between the private sectors on both sides to promote joint ventures.

The Malaysian delegation disclosed in the JEC meeting the results of the market survey undertaken by the Malaysian authorities which confirmed that there is an excellent market in Malaysia for a number of Bangladesh's products.

Talking to newsmen at the end of the JEC meeting Malaysian Foreign Secretary Jainul Abidin said that they wanted to increase the trade volume and diversify Bangladesh's exports to Malaysia. He observed that frozen fish, spices, vegetables and jute products from Bangladesh had good prospects in Malaysian markets.

The leader of the Malaysian delegation to JEC meeting suggested for more contacts between private entrepreneurs of the two countries. He said that the private sectors had crucial role to play in improving trade relations between the two countries.

The Malaysian side informed the JEC meeting about the active and sympathetic considerations now being given to reducing the duty on jute carpets from Bangladesh.

The JEC meeting stressed the need for improving the frequency of sailing of ships between the two countries in order to further expand both-way export traffic. The Malaysian Foreign Secretary suggested to introduce Chittagong-Singapore-Penang and shuttle service to increase the flow of export between the two countries. He also advocated for direct shipping service in the future.

CSO: 4600/1715

BANGLADESH

FORMATION OF ANTISMUGGLING TASK FORCE ORDERED

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 21 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad on Tuesday ordered formation of task force to check smuggling effectively, reports BSS.

The directive came at a high level meeting held at the CMLA's Secretariat with President Ershad in the chair.

The President directed that the task force should keep constant vigil and surveillance on the border and deal with smuggling cases with heavy hands.

President Ershad also asked Bangladesh Navy to strengthen its patrolling in the maritime area and along the coast line to check smuggling through sea route.

He emphasised on social resistance and awakened of public opinion against the menace of smuggling which create adverse effect on the national economy "Anti-smuggling measures have to be geared up in the greater interest of national economy" he pointed out.

The meeting suggested conducting regular swoop on disposal centres of smuggling goods to deter such activities.

While reviewing the law and order position in the country President Ershad took serious note of the situation arising out of anti-social activities of some elements against the women particularly the girls, including assaults on them.

He directed the law-enforcing agencies to intensify measures against such activities.

The President stressed on active cooperation between the law-enforcing agencies and the members of the public in dealing with crimes and criminals and creating social resistance against the threat that tends to destroy the social fabric curbing the rights of the women.

The meeting took into consideration the causes and nature of crimes and decided to take remedial steps to set the situation right.

It also decided to take special measures which include creation of special intelligence cell to collect and provide information to concerned authorities both from internal and external sources about the activities of smugglers and their ring leaders.

The meeting was attended among others by the DCMLA and Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Sultan Ahmad, Home Minister, Major General Abdul Mannan Siddiqui PSO to the CMLA, Major General Atiqur Rahman, Chief of General Staff Major General Abdus Samad Zonal Martial Law Administrator Zone 'C' Major General Nuruddin Khan, Director General, Bangladesh Rifles Major General Sufi Ahmed Chowdhury and concerned high officials.

An official spokesman later told BSS on smuggling that some quarters are trying to play up the situation beyond proportion to serve their own political interest. The Government is always aware of the situation and has decided to further intensify the anti-smuggling measures.

CSO: 4600/1715

BANGLADESH

WRITER DISCUSSES PROBLEMS IN WATER-SHARING TALKS

Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 16 Aug 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by N.M. Harun]

[Text] It is understood that Bangladesh and India have lately been labouring hard to work out some new approaches to their bilateral water dispute, with the Ganges in the focus.

Thus the one-year-long stalemate on the Ganges which began with the expiry of the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding in April 1984 has a possibility of ending.

For the last one year all the efforts of Bangladesh to re-open talks on the Ganges bore no fruit. This time the initiative has come from India, thanks to the upcoming SARC summit and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's apparent desire to project himself as a benign regional leader.

The July 31-August 2 mission of Rajiv Gandhi's special envoy, Shiv Shankar, to Dhaka obviously did the spadework for the current tentative moves on the water front.

In the absence of any official confirmation, an intelligent guess is that Dhaka and Delhi have already exchanged their tentative new formulations regarding the resolution of the water dispute.

It is, however, unlikely that any agreement would be reached quickly. There is every possibility of new controversies being opened.

Anyone who has been following the tortuous water talks knows that India has always been consistent in its stand though its leaders may have changed the emphasis or style of negotiations from time to time. India has stubbornly been subordinating its international obligation to lower riparian Bangladesh to its domestic master plan--its national water grid which envisages diversion of the Brahmaputra water into the Ganges.

But Bangladesh has so far been unable to adopt any consistent and principled stand vis-a-vis India. It once opted for basin-wise planning (Article 6 of the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace:

"The High Contracting Parties further agree to make joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation"); then agreed to the concept of augmentation (Indira-Mujib joint declaration of May 16, 1974); then signed the Farakka Agreement of 1977 which formally introduced the suicidal Indian scheme of Ganges-Brahmaputra link canal and linked the sharing of Ganges water to the augmentation of its flows; then revalidated the 1977 Farakka Agreement through 1982 Memorandum of Understanding, then belatedly approached India to de-link sharing from augmentation; and now thinking of newer approaches.

Shocking Reality

What is the strategic goal of Bangladesh? Even a layman would say that its strategic goal should be nothing but to ensure, first, the legitimate share of all the 50-odd common rivers with India. But the shocking reality is that all the governments of Bangladesh have so far behaved like a one-eyed bull attacking the problem of the Ganges, Teesta or any particular river or groups of rivers in piecemeal and fighting with false bravado, but never taking any comprehensive approach. All the governments have tried to meet contingencies rather expediently and have in the process created new problems. One wishes the past will not be repeated this time.

There are reasons for genuine apprehensions when the air is thick with the talks of so-called basin-approach or regional approach. These are extraneous issues so far as Bangladesh's legitimate share of common rivers is concerned. More so because these terms are controversial, with Bangladesh giving one definition and India another. One should not also forget that only the Ganges and the Brahmaputra have coriparians other than Bangladesh and India, and the rest of the rivers are bilateral problem. To introduce China, for example, one would require to complete first a global diplomatic feat by negotiating between India and China. Also, one should not forget that by accepting the extraneous concept of 'augmentation,' the issue of sharing the Ganges water got complicated.

Deciding Strategy

When the Memorandum of Understanding expired in the April 7, 1984 issue of Holiday we wrote:

Since Bangladesh swallowed the bait of augmentation in 1974, the experiences from the 1974 Indira-Mujib joint declaration, the 1977 Farakka agreement and the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding show that the linkage of augmentation with the sharing of Ganges waters allows India to twist the arm of Bangladesh and threatens the country with the twin dangers of deprivation of an equitable share of the Ganges waters and the usurpation of Brahmaputra waters by India with the consent from Bangladesh government through the noose of the Indian dragon "link canal."

One must not suffer from self-deception that with the lapse of the Memorandum of Understanding all the dangers have withered away. Taking into account the fallout of the Indira-Mujib joint declaration, the Farakka agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding, the government of Bangladesh must decide on certain principles before it embarks on fresh negotiations with India on the Ganges if it does not want to be haunted, as before, by the spectre of the Indian-proposed link canal.

First, the basin must be defined. According to Bangladesh, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra (along with the Meghna) are two separate river basins while according to India, these two rivers form one single basin. If this dispute is not settled, India may manoeuvre to deprive Bangladesh of its legitimate share of both Ganges and Brahmaputra waters by compounding its demand on the waters of the two rivers considered as a single river basin. One must note that India made an apparently absurd suggestion to divert one lakh out of one lakh 20 thousand cusecs of dry season Brahmaputra waters into the Ganges to meet its so-called requirement of Ganges water.

Secondly, will Bangladesh remain wedded to the concept of augmentation? In that case, Bangladesh will remain bound to study whatever augmentation scheme India may propose and be prepared to implement the same. Predictably the India proposal will always be the "link canal."

Thirdly, will sharing of the Ganges waters remain linked to augmentation? In that case, India would always have a leverage to pressurise Bangladesh to accept its augmentation scheme, increasingly with every occasion of renewal of sharing arrangements.

Fourthly, will Bangladesh ask only for sharing of water or first sharing and then possible augmentation? If the second alternative is preferred, then it must be clearly stated from what sources--from the Ganges basin itself or from all the water sources of the two countries. Also will have to be clarified whether other coriparians, like Nepal and China, may be involved in the enterprise, and in that case what should be the investigating and implementing agency. A bilateral organisation like the JRC cannot handle a multilateral business.

CSO: 4600/1709

BANGLADESH

BRIEFS

GREEK AMBASSADOR'S CREDENTIALS--The Ambassador-designate of Greece to Bangladesh, Mr George A. Sioris presented his credentials to President Hussain Muhammad Ershad at Bangabhaban in Dhaka yesterday morning, reports BSS. While presenting the Letter of Credence, the new envoy expressed the hope that during his tenure of office, the existing friendly ties and cooperation between the two countries will be strengthened further to the mutual benefit of the two peoples. Reciprocating, the President assured the Ambassador of all possible cooperation in the smooth discharge of his duties. Earlier, on arrival at Bangabhaban, the Greek envoy was given a guard of honour by the President's Guard Regiment. He took salute and inspected the guard. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 18 Aug 85 p 3]

PRC ECONOMIC COOPERATION--The Chinese Ambassador in Bangladesh Mr Xiao Xiang Qian yesterday called on Minister for Planning Mr Sultan Ahmed Chowdhury at his office, reports BSS. During the discussion, the Ambassador informed the Minister that the design of the bridge over Buriganga river would be finalised by October and the internal tender would be floated in China by November this year. The Ambassador also assured that China can supply more textile units at a very competitive price. The Ambassador said that China might be interested in establishing fertilizer factory of the size of Polash Urea Fertilizer Factory in the private sector. [Text] [Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 15 Aug 85 p 1]

ACTIVITIES IN UN--Bangladesh has been elected a member of the Industrial Development Board and the programme and budget committee of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) on Monday last, at its general conference in Vienna with record votes, according to a message received on Wednesday, said an official Press release in Dhaka. [Text] [Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 15 Aug 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/1717

8 October 1985

INDIA

U.S. ASSURED COMPUTERS NOT FOR NUCLEAR USE

Madras THE HINDU in English 31 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

After protracted exchanges spread over several months, India and the U.S. have finally evolved mutually acceptable assurances that sophisticated computers would not be used for any nuclear purposes that are not consistent with American laws on the subject.

A letter to this effect from the Government of India to the U.S. embassy in New Delhi for transmission to Washington, handed over on August 23, has cleared the way for the grant of import licences by the U.S. Department of Commerce for the sale of the super computers that India wants to buy for various uses.

Built-in guarantees: After the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on transfer of high technology was signed in November last, a follow-up agreement on procedures for the sale of equipment and regulation of its uses with built-in guarantees against diversion to third countries without prior U.S. approval, was concluded in April last. The agreement was due to be signed during the visit of the U.S. Commerce Secretary, Mr. Malcolm Baldrige, to Delhi in May before the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Washington.

But as there was a last-minute hitch over the definition of nuclear uses, only the remaining part of the agreement dealing with other categories of technology transfer were included in the agreement signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, on the last day of Mr. Baldrige's visit. The sections dealing with sale of super computers was left open pending a high-level review by the Government of India of the implications of the assurances the U.S. was seeking against the use of this equipment for any nuclear-related purpose.

During the earlier stages of these negotiations, India was prepared to give an under-

taking that these super computers would not be used for making nuclear weapons. But the U.S. insisted on blanket assurance that these would not be used for any nuclear purposes, since in its view there was hardly any difference between tests carried out for peaceful or potential military uses.

Diversion of equipment: In arriving at the latest understanding, the Government of India has relied partly on the formulations used in the nuclear agreement signed by China with the U.S. providing the necessary guarantees against diversion of equipment to third countries or its use for non-authorized purposes. As the text of the letter containing these assurances, that has been given to the U.S. Government is being kept secret, it is not possible at this stage to ascertain how far India has gone in complying with the U.S. requirements.

There is no basis at all for reports emanating from Washington that this understanding on nuclear uses had been finalised during the recent visit of the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry, Dr. V. S. Arunachalam, to Washington. The necessary policy decision on the kind of assurances to be given was taken in Delhi well before his visit.

Military supply relationship: The U.S., which continues to evince interest in the establishment of a military supply relationship with India had, no doubt, taken Dr. Arunachalam and his colleagues to different defence establishments and arms manufacturing plants including some aircraft factories to indicate the wide range of weaponry that could be made available. But so long as the U.S. continues to attach unacceptable conditions and restrict technology transfer for co-production of such weaponry and ammunition, the Government of India would not like to enter into any such arms purchase relationship with it.

CSO: 5150/0071

8 October 1985

INDIA

NUCLEAR ANALYSTS RESPOND TO PAKISTANI'S LETTER

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 28 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

New Delhi, Aug. 27 (PTI): Nuclear analysts here have questioned Dr A.Q. Khan's reiteration that Islamabad's offers to Delhi to renounce the weapon option are sincere. Dr Khan is the scientist behind Pakistan's uranium bomb project.

Responding to a letter from Dr. Khan published in *The Muslim*, a Pakistan daily, the analysts said the motive behind Pakistan's proposals was to make India accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This would give legitimacy to the arsenals of the five nuclear weapon powers and accept Chinese nuclear hegemony in the Indian subcontinent.

Reiterating the peaceful nature of India's nuclear programme, they questioned the credentials of the Pakistani policy and said a survey of the various developments regarding Islamabad's nuclear programme shows that it is progressing towards the bomb, if one has not been made already.

In his letter, Dr Khan reiterated the various Pakistani proposals to India to renounce the weapon option, and said Pakistan was "sincere and straight forward" in its proposals. He also questioned the peaceful credentials of India's programme and, referring to the 1974 Pokharan peaceful implosion, said, "We do not differentiate between a device and a bomb."

The letter was in response to an article in the daily by the noted Indian defence analyst, Mr K. Subrahmanyam, entitled "Why Pakistan wants the bomb?" Mr Subrahmanyam had said in the article that he found the Pakistani case for a bomb "rational and sensible," but opined that Islamabad was "insincere" in its offer to renounce the weapon along with India.

Referring to the Pakistan's proposals to India to renounce the weapon option, the analysts noted that Pakistan's stand vis-a-vis the non-proliferation treaty was not based on any principle but by the fact that India has not signed it.

India, they said, has not signed the treaty because it was unequal; did not control proliferation among the weapon powers and legitimised nuclear weapons as the currency of power.

Referring to the offer regarding mutual inspection of the nuclear facilities, they felt it was asymmetrical to India and only adequate mutual confidence could make such inspection a success. They noted that references in the letter by Dr Khan to Mr Subrahmanyam as "the notorious Indian Josef Goebbels" and his being "fully aware of the hatred" that "such extremist Hindus" had against "the Muslims in general and Pakistan in particular" did not help to build mutual confidence.

Recounting the various steps indicating Pakistan's move towards a bomb, the nuclear analysts said Dr Khan had worked with a urenco nuclear enrichment facility in the Netherlands. Moreover, Pakistan had imported natural uranium from the Niger through Libya, procured 6,200 centrifuge tubes from the Netherlands for the enrichment facility at Kahuta and claimed that it had acquired the capability for enrichment beyond the power-grade three per cent.

Pakistan also successfully tried out the US-made krytron electronic switches in a non-nuclear explosion recently.

CSO: 5150/0067

INDIA

REPORTAGE ON ASSASSINATION OF SANT LONGOWAL

Assassins Planned Strategy

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 22 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

Chandigarh, Aug. 21: The assassins of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal had worked to a well-planned strategy, according to a senior intelligence officer of the Punjab police. The securitymen at gurdwara Sherpur where Sant Longowal was gunned down yesterday by a group of terrorists were caught off guard when the first shots were fired at the Sant. Even as the shots missed their target, another assailant fired at Sant Longowal from point blank range.

Jarnail Singh, one of the alleged assassins of Sant Longowal, was arrested at Halwara near Ludhiana last night, the police said today, reports UNI.

Jarnail Singh was wanted by the Ludhiana police in connection with several criminal cases.

The 3000-strong crowd, which had gathered at the gurdwara to listen to the Sant, ran helter-skelter and there was total confusion which the policemen could not control.

Two of the assassins, identified as Gyan Singh and Harwinder Singh, were nabbed at the gurdwara. Gyan Singh later said that he and Harwinder Singh had come to the gurdwara on a motor cycle accompanied by one Jarnail Singh. The police believes that Jarnail Singh masterminded the assassination.

It was learnt that Gyan Singh

had fired the first shots at Sant Longowal from his .455 pistol. But the shots missed Sant Longowal and injured three others sitting near him on the stage. In the confusion, Harwinder Singh darted in from another direction and emptied his .455 pistol on the Sant at point blank range. A personal bodyguard of the Sant fired at Harwinder, seriously injuring him. Harwinder has been admitted to the Government Rajindra hospital in Patiala. Gyan Singh and Harwinder Singh belong to Lillian village in Ludhiana district. Jarnail Singh comes from Halwara, also in Ludhiana district. According to intelligence sources, Jarnail Singh had visited Pakistan a number of times.

Gyan Singh was interrogated by senior officers of the state police today. An intelligence officer said Gyan Singh had not admitted links with extremists.

Posed as Bodyguard

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 22 Aug 84 p 4

[Text]

Sangrur, Aug. 21: One of the three assassins who shot the Akali chief, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, from a point blank range at Sherpur village about 30 km from here last evening had posed as a bodyguard of the deceased leader.

This was revealed to this correspondent by an eyewitness—Issar Singh—a school teacher, during a visit to the shoot-out spot this morning. His version was endorsed by other eyewitnesses present at the Akali convention at the village gurdwara last evening.

According to Issar Singh the assassin who killed Sant Longowal escaped. The government has, however, claimed that both the assassins of the Akali chief were arrested on the spot.

Following is the eyewitness account: "The Akali convention started at around 12 noon. Sant Longowal arrived at the convention, attended by at least 5,000 people at around three in the afternoon. Two senior Akali leaders, Sukhjinder Singh, and Jeevan Singh Umranangal, spoke first. The Sant spoke for about 45 minutes. He mainly talked about the Delhi accord and Hindu-Sikh unity.

"In his concluding remark he stressed that the Akali Dal had succeeded in extinguishing the fire of communalism from Punjab by reaching an agreement with the Centre. The Sant also appealed to the people to maintain Hindu-Sikh unity and not to

cast their votes in the coming elections on the basis of caste.

"After finishing his speech the Sant sat down on the dais on which were sitting 40 other Akali leaders and activists. The first volley was fired by an assassin who was in the pandal itself.

"He took position from a distance of about five metres from the dais and fired at the Sant. First we thought someone had burst a cracker but then the commotion followed. After five or six shots were fired people ran. Some shouted 'How is Baba-ji? Where are his bodyguards?' Santji was also heard saying he was safe. Obviously no bullet had hit him.

"Then the second assassin appeared on the stage posing as a bodyguard of the Sant. He fired three shots at the Sant at point blank range. The Sant fell down on the dais. He was bleeding profusely.

"There was also a third assassin firing from his revolver. He was overpowered by Santokh Singh, an Akali jathedar. The first assassin was also nabbed when he tried to escape from the main gate of the gurdwara.

"But the assassin who killed the Sant managed to escape in the commotion that followed. Within minutes of being shot at the Akali leader's car arrived at the gurdwara gate and he was taken to hospital."

Issar Singh and a number of other eyewitnesses disclosed that the man killed in yesterday's incident was a Sikh youth from a nearby village.

Planned in England

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 22 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

Birmingham, Aug 21 (UNI) —
The conspiracy to assassinate Akali Dal president Harchand Singh Longowal was hatched and motivated by extremists living in a foreign country.

Informed sources here claimed that soon after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed the Punjab accord with Mr Longowal last month, a secret meeting was held in London by various extremist groups where it was decided that the Akali leader should be eliminated because he "was a traitor of the Sikh panth."

According to the sources, the secret meeting was held a couple of days after the signing of the accord.

The sources said the time-limit for the "mission" (to eliminate Mr Longowal) was fixed for inside a month after the signing of the accord.

Thousands of pounds were sent from a country bordering India to extremists in India for the 'mission', the sources said.

Those who participated in the secret meeting last month owed allegiance to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.

Madras THE HINDU in English 21 Aug 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug. 20.

After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the killing today of the Akali Dal President, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, by some Sikh terrorists is seen here as the most serious challenge to Indian democracy, secularism and peace in the country.

What the political and communal repercussions of this dastardly act are going to be, in terms of the implementation of the Punjab accord and also the orderly conduct of the impending elections in this troubled State, it is too early to foresee except in the general context of the increasing threat posed by the extremists.

But the mood in the Government circles in Delhi tonight was one of grim determination to meet this challenge with all the resources at the command of the Centre, giving no quarter and showing no mercy to those bent on practising and promoting the cult of the gun.

Neither the Centre nor the State Government is going to give in to the dictates of the extremists, whatever these are, whether it is a demand for secession or a plea for special position within the Indian Union, in the face of this terrorism.

Centre distressed: The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, sent a message wishing the critically wounded Akali leader speedy recovery as soon as he heard of the attempt on his life. The Union Cabinet which was holding its weekly meeting adopted a resolution in a rare gesture voicing its "deep distress" over the assassination attempt and calling upon the people to fight unitedly all such anti-national forces.

The Prime Minister sent the Home Minister, Mr. S. B. Chavan, and his Parliamentary Secretary, Mr. Arun Singh, to Punjab to be available to the Punjab Governor, Mr. Arjun Singh, for consultations on the spot, in dealing with any developments following the attempt on Sant Longowal's life. At the Centre itself, the crisis

management group was alerted to render all possible assistance to the Punjab Government.

The late night reports from Punjab indicated that Sant Longowal, who was hit twice in the stomach by bullets, was having breathing trouble. Though the doctors struggled hard to save his life it was not possible to do so because of his loss of blood and the shock suffered by him.

But those who have welcomed the recent Punjab accord believe that Sant Longowal had, indeed, set the tone for a return to moderation in Sikh politics and his martyrdom would help to restrain the forces of extremism.

Unexpected: The Government expected that the terrorists would do something to foul up the atmosphere, but those in authority at the Centre did not evidently expect that the extremists would strike so soon.

The Centre ordered tonight an intensification of security precautions in all the northern States, including Delhi, to prevent a backlash after the killing of a Congress (I) leader in Punjab

Murderers Must Be Identified

New Delhi PATROIT in Englisht 21 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by R. K. Mishra]

[Text]

Sant Harchand Singh Longowal has become a martyr to the cause of national unity and integrity. For his courage of conviction and fearless defiance of the forces of secessionism and terrorism he has paid with his life. The Punjab accord, which he signed with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was a sharp rebuff to forces of destabilisation and disunity. Sant Longowal's sacrifice should induce a serious rethinking amongst those who had begun to nurse the illusion that imperialism will now watch idly Indian people's heroic attempts to foil its designs against this country. No; the more doggedly we fight to defeat the conspiracies, the more ferocious will be the enemy's attempts to spread mayhem and exacerbate tensions.

Unlike some other Akali leaders, Sant Longowal displayed rare quality of leadership at a very critical juncture in our nation's history. He had faith in the Punjabi people, particularly in the patriotism of the Sikh masses, and that is why he was able to resist all pressures. He knew his life was in grave danger. In addition to the security provided by the Punjab Administration, he was guarded by his own trusted followers. But the assassins struck at him inside a gurdwara when he was bowing before the Guru Granth Sahib.

Sant Longowal's assassination calls for an urgent and comprehensive review of the Punjab situation by the Centre. When Indira Gandhi was assassinated we had underlined the need to identify the forces which were behind the hands that pulled the trigger.

We repeat the question: Who is/are behind Sant Longowal's murder? The forces opposed to peace and stability in Punjab must be identified. In fact, a *de novo* exercise should be undertaken to go to the roots of violence and terror that has rocked the State during the last three years.

Who opposed Sant Longowal's earnest efforts to break the stalemate in Punjab and why? Who encouraged the formation of a separate faction by Bhindranwale's father Joginder Singh? Who incited and encouraged some important Akali leaders to dissociate from the Rajiv-Longowal accord? For the last ten days, Sant Longowal had been sending messages to Mr Parkash Singh Badal and Mr Gurcharan Singh Tohra to join him in building a State-wide campaign in support of the Punjab accord and they were shying away. Why was Sant Longowal gunned down on the day when a rapprochement appeared to be in sight? Was the Sangrur meeting and the dastardly crime a premeditated conspiracy? Is there a link between Sant Longowal's assassination and the murderous attack on some Congress leaders on the same day. The Government of India owes it to the people of Punjab and to the rest of the country to provide convincing answers to these questions.

True, there can be no surrender to terrorism which must be fought ruthlessly. But, as we have said earlier, this is not only an administrative but a political task. Unless the root of the problem is attacked and all its ramifications are unearthed the menace will continue unabated. In this there should neither be complacency nor self-deception.

The foremost task is to launch in Punjab a massive political campaign against terrorism, secessionism and communalism. All these are different facets of the same evil. The battle for harmony, security and stability must receive precedence over everything else. All patriotic and secular political parties and forces must join this battle and reach every village in Punjab with the sole objective of isolating and eliminating terrorists, secessionists and communalists. With a massive political mobilisation behind it, the administration should be geared to root out these evil elements. Nothing should be allowed to distract us from this paramount task. All impediments in the path of establishing normalcy in Punjab must be removed. No consideration should be allowed to weaken the people's and the Government's resolve in this regard.

A war was declared against India when Indira Gandhi was assassinated. We were lulled into believing that the worst was over. With the Punjab accord, the people were looking forward to an era of peace. These hopes have suffered a severe blow. Sant Longowal's assassins have administered a jolt. The war continues — against India's unity and integrity. Punjab is the battle ground. And Delhi must take command. There is no time to lose.

CSO: 5650/0242

INDIA

SIKH STUDENT LEADER ADMITS HAND IN HIJACKING

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 27 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

Srinagar, Aug. 26: Sarabjeet Singh, secretary of the All-India Sikh Students' Federation, has confessed to the interrogation authorities here that he was involved in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Airbus to Lahore in July last year.

Sarabjeet, who was arrested by the Punjab police from the Golden Temple complex on August 18, was brought here on Saturday for interrogation by a special team comprising police and intelligence officials.

According to reliable sources, Sarabjeet told his interrogators that he knew the five Sikh youths, two of them from Jammu and Kashmir, who hijacked the Airbus soon after its departure from Srinagar on July 7, 1984. The authorities, however, have reserved comment as they fear further investigations will be

hampered if anything is divulged.

Sarabjeet was escorted to Jammu by a team from the city's Gandhi Nagar police station, where some cases are registered against him. Police sources said many cases of murder, explosions and dacoity were pending in other Jammu police stations.

Soon after his arrival at the Gandhi Nagar police station under heavy security, Sarabjeet was shifted to an interrogation centre on the outskirts of Jammu.

PTI adds: Sarabjeet Singh has also confessed that he had stayed in different parts of Pakistan, including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, for four months and returned to India in April with a "definite plan of sabotage and subversion."

The AISSF leader reportedly disclosed that he had been assigned a special mission by the

Pakistan military authorities to incite communal hatred and encourage violence and terrorist activities in northern India, especially Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

He also disclosed the names of some AISSF activists who were trained in terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. But no one has been arrested so far.

Before his arrest, Sarabjeet had been declared a proclaimed offender and a Rs 50,000-award had been announced for any clues for his arrest.

Meanwhile, the Kashmir police has arrested two youths, Shabir Ahmed Butt and Firdous Ahmed, alleged activists of an underground militant organisation—Muslim Militia. They are said to have been involved in circulating clandestine anti-India literature and other subversive activities in Kashmir for some time.

CSO: 5650/0246

INDIA

ASSAM POLICE REPORT RISE IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 26 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] Guwahati, Aug. 25--Five persons have been killed and some others injured in over 80 violent incidents in Assam since the signing of the Assam accord on Independence Day, report PTI and UNI.

In a Press release issued here today the Assam police headquarters strongly suspected the active involvement of supporters of the All Assam Students Union in the killings.

The Press release said that a large number of incidents of assault, planting of bombs in buses and railways tracks, hijackings and attempted arson were reported. The victims included Congress (I) MLAs, Ministers and supporters and members of minority communities.

The Press release denied the allegations regarding police atrocities in some parts of Assam published in a section of the Press.

On Independence Day, a time bomb exploded in the crowded Rabarbagan area of Tezpur, killing three persons and injuring four others, all belonging to minority communities.

The next day, the North Salmara District Congress (I) chief, Amrit Roy, his father and one of his brothers were assaulted by a group of people at Abhayapuri market. Amrit died on the spot and his brother succumbed to his injuries at Guwahati Medical College Hospital.

Concern

The Citizens Right Preservation Committee today expressed serious concern over the Assam accord and described it as contrary to commitments made by Indira Gandhi and other national leaders.

In an emergency meeting held here the committee executives expressed concern over the proposal to defranchise the voters of 1966-71 and said this was against the law of all nations.

The meeting in a resolution said the accord had emboldened the regional forces, thereby threatening the stability and integrity in the region.

Another resolution adopted at the meeting said that owing to the manner in which the electoral rolls were being prepared by issuing circulars of a "partisan nature", one million voters belonging to the various minority groups would lose their franchise.

The meeting expressed its solidarity with the organizations and parties opposed to the accord and pledged to work on a common programme of "struggle to combat the mischief of the accord".

The meeting called upon the people concerned and secular democratic forces to stand united to defeat the forces of disruption.

A Staff Reporter adds: The West Bengal Schedule Castes and Tribes Employees Council in a resolution in Calcutta today condemned the Assam agreement and said that the "black agreement" would only encourage the "foreign-power backed" divisive forces in the country.

At the State meeting during the day, the council expressed fears about the fate of about 200,000 people who would be affected by the new agreement, which had left no alternative provision for them.

The council also criticized the newspapers which described the Scheduled Castes and tribes as a "privileged" class on the reservation issue.

CSO: 5650/0245

INDIA

DELHI TAKES STAND ON ARREST OF BENAZIR BHUTTO

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] After great deliberation, the Government of India has decided to deplore publicly the arrest of Miss Benazir Bhutto and urge the President of Pakistan, Gen. Zia Ul Haq to head the many appeals made to him for her release.

An official spokesman said today: "The Bhutto family has suffered greatly. It appears there is widespread sympathy in Pakistan for the suffering of the family and the support to the cause they espouse."

This is the farthest that India has gone in all these years in not merely voicing its unhappiness over the continued ill-treatment of the Bhutto family, but also openly acknowledging the fact of widespread public support to its relentless crusade against the military rule in Pakistan.

Pakistan Involvement in Punjab Crisis:

This is an unmistakable reflection of India's great indignation over Pakistan's involvement in the Punjab crisis and the disquieting disclosures of the training given to Sikh extremists at secret camps across the border to confront this country with a growing menace of terrorism.

At the time of Z. A. Bhutto's execution, the Janata Government went to the ridiculous limit of refraining from joining the rest of the international community in first appealing to Gen. Zia for sparing his life and then deploing his decision to carry out the death sentence.

The then Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai and his Foreign Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, justified this astonishing policy with the apologia that any public expression of concern over Bhutto's fate could be misconstrued as interference in the international affairs of Pakistan.

For the First Time

Though Mrs. Indira Gandhi had no hesitation in voicing her distress over the arrest of Mrs. Bhutto and her daughter, Benazir, she was careful not to make

any mention of the sympathy for the Bhutto family's plight or support for its fight against General Zia's military rule.

India Will Hit Back

But now for the first time, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's Government has come forward with a statement saying that the arrest of Miss Bhutto in the wake of public demonstrations of sympathy and support on her return to Pakistan for her brother's funeral was "even more unfortunate."

It remains to be seen how the Zia regime reacts to this public expression of India's distress and dismay over the arrest of Miss Bhutto on this sad occasion. It is bound to characterise this as uncalled for interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, but such remonstrance cannot conceal its uneasiness over the reality that sooner or later India will hit back if it continued to aid and abet the extremists in Punjab to step up their campaign of terrorism.

CSO: 4600/1724

INDIA

ANALYST REPORTS ON PROGRESS OF SRI LANKA NEGOTIATIONS

Need for Tamil Unity

Madras THE HINDU in English 31 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug. 30.

The leader of the Sri Lankan delegation, Mr. Hector Jayewardene, had his final meeting today with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, before calling on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on the eve of his return to Colombo tomorrow afternoon.

The Indian officials, who have negotiated the latest understanding with the Sri Lankan delegation on the scope of the proposed devolution and the procedures for it, seemed satisfied that the working paper was comprehensive enough to serve as a starting point for a fresh dialogue between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil leaders for finding a lasting political solution to the island's ethnic conflict.

But it remains to be seen whether the Sri Lankan Government is going to drag its feet again, or it will utilise this opportunity to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Tamil problem. The way that Mr. Hector Jayewardene and his colleagues had fought hard during the last ten days to avoid any advance commitment on the degree of devolution, especially in relation to law and order and land settlement, indicates that the Sri Lankan Government is not likely to yield on some of these issues without some pressures.

Highest priority

At the moment, India is giving the highest priority, to the stabilisation of ceasefire, before discussing suitable venue and date for the resumption of the dialogue. But the next round of talks is not expected to be held in Thimpu in any case, since what happened during the last two rounds in the Bhutanese capital does not augur well for holding the more substantive negotiations there.

The Government of India is trying to establish contact with the leaders of the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) through the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, instead of relying entirely on intelligence agencies to get the right messages across to them. The leader of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Mr. Uma Maheswaran, who left for Madras this evening, has also been requested to get in touch with the other militant leaders and urge them to respond promptly to the renewed invitation to meet Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi soon.

Diplomatic circles in Delhi have generally welcomed the accord reached between India and Sri Lanka on the scope of devolution which, in their view, is all that could have been achieved in the present circumstances. But they are not very sanguine that this conciliatory mood could be sustained if the Sri Lankan army continues to indulge in savage reprisals killing innocent people.

As the Government of India sees it, the foremost need at present is Tamil unity and unless both the moderates and militants are able to rise above their differences and speak with a united voice, it would not be possible to make the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, and his Cabinet colleagues reconcile themselves to the realities of the situation.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is, therefore, very keen that the new dialogue should start soon before feelings begin to harden again. He is inclined to rescind the deportation orders against Dr. A. S. Balasingam and Mr. S. Satyendra as well, if he is assured that they are not going to stand in the way of fresh talks on the basis of the broad framework evolved during these talks in Delhi.

Madras THE HINDU in English 1 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug. 31.

The Government of India announced today that a "comprehensive paper" on Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict has been drawn up, "covering all aspects of importance and relevance" that could lead to a peaceful political settlement of the Tamils problem.

In a brief press release issued before the leader of the Sri Lankan delegation, Mr. Hector Jayewardene, left for Colombo after a nine-day stay in Delhi, it was stated that this "detailed draft" would serve as a "basis for negotiations" towards a "mutually agreeable accord" between the parties concerned.

The press release said that Mr. Hector Jayewardene who called on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on two occasions during his stay in Delhi had "detailed and constructive discussions" with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, on all aspects of this ethnic problem. But it did not disclose the details of these discussions or the scope of the understanding reached other than stressing that the working paper which has been drawn up would serve as a basis for further negotiations.

Bhandari cancels visits: The Foreign Secretary, who had cancelled his visits to Algiers and Belgrade, to devote more time to these crucial talks on Sri Lanka, has decided not to go to Luanda for the non-aligned ministerial conference, to be readily available in Delhi for any further exchanges on the subject with the Sri Lankan Government. The intention is to take the Tamil leaders into confidence by inviting them to Delhi for an early meeting with the Prime Minister at which they will have adequate opportunity to voice their views on the implications of the new proposals, before the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, endorses them after consultations with his Cabinet colleagues.

The original Indian expectation was that the Sri Lankan side would be more accommodating by agreeing to both the procedures and substance of devolution so that the Tamil leaders, both moderates and militants, could be persuaded to accept the new pack-

age. But as it so happened, Mr. Hector Jayewardene and his advisers refused to commit themselves on the substantive aspects relating to issues like law and order, land settlement, the future of Trincomalee and linkage between the Northern and Eastern Provinces, while agreeing to establish provincial councils through a constitutional amendment and delegate executive powers also through some sort of legislation.

Positive development: So all that the Government of India will now do, during the proposed meeting of the Tamil leaders with the Prime Minister, is to commend the "comprehensive paper" that has emerged from these talks in Delhi as a "basis" for further negotiations, without persuading or pressuring them to accept the Sri Lankan Government proposals in their present form with some modifications. But in urging them to resume the dialogue, the Prime Minister will probably also stress that what had been conceded by the Sri Lankan delegation in regard to the procedural aspects of devolution is a positive development indeed, however limited it might be in terms of the overall Tamil aspirations for a more effective share of power as part of a wider political settlement.

Text of press release: The following is the text of the brief press release issued today by the Government:

"Dr. H. W. Jayewardene, leader of the Sri Lankan delegation to the Thimpu talks, stopped in New Delhi on his way to Colombo at the invitation of the Government of India. Dr. Jayewardene was in New Delhi from August 23 to 31. "During his stay here, he called on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on two occasions. Dr. Jayewardene had detailed and constructive discussions with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari.

"A comprehensive paper has been drawn up covering all issues of importance and relevance. The detailed draft would serve as a basis for negotiations towards a mutually agreed accord by the parties concerned."

Tactics of Negotiators

Madras THE HINDU in English 1 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

THE Indo-Sri Lanka talks in Delhi have been an exasperating exercise in futility with the Sri Lankan negotiators, about a dozen of them headed by the jurist, Mr. Hector Jayewardene, making a fine art of procrastination. They were unbeatable in their doggedness, stone-walling anything that did not fit neatly into their grand design of equivocation, yielding no ground on

any point of substance that did not suit their objective of evasion.

At the social level, they were amiable, urbane, cultivated and reassuring, appearing to be eminently reasonable, revelling in their platitudes and full of remorse for the cruel fate that has befallen the victims of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. But when it came to discussing a viable basis for settlement, they were rigid and unyielding, abrasive and argumentative, in a calculated bid to wear down the Indian side by simply prolonging the agonies of suspense, going round and round the same mulberry bush with astonishing persistence.

Frustrating exercise

The Indian negotiators, led by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, who were quite new to this diabolical game of dissimulation, were often at their wits' end during these tortuous discussions, wondering whether the Sri Lankan Government was really keen on a lasting political settlement or was merely playing for time by going through the motions of this frustrating exercise.

In their impatience for quick results, the Indian officials went to the farthest limits possible to accommodate the Sri Lankan point of view on many aspects of the proposed devolution but were dismayed when Mr. Hector Jayewardene and his colleagues kept on arguing like petty lawyers as though they were engaged in litigation in a district court, not in serious political negotiations of great consequence to the very survival of their island nation.

The Tamil leaders too have been victims of their own myths which tended to exaggerate the Indian role, expecting the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, to exert enough pressures on the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. The moderates have been fervently hoping against hope that sooner or later, perhaps sooner than later, India would be able to secure a reasonable measure of autonomy for the Tamil linguistic region that would enable the three million Tamils to live with dignity as part of a united Sri Lankan State. The militants, on the other hand, have been deluding themselves with the thought that, if they step up their insurgency to the level of an insurrection, public opinion in Tamil Nadu will compel India to intervene to save the civil population from savage reprisals by the Sri Lankan armed forces.

It is the inherent fallacies of this hypothesis that has made the Tamil militants imagine that they were being badly let down, if not betrayed, by the new policy-makers in Delhi, on the assumption that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was not as sensitive to their plight as his mother, who in their view was much more solicitous about their welfare. The moderates do not share this grave apprehension about India's fading interest in their fate, but they are also unhappy that the present Government in Delhi is not doing all that it could to compel Mr. Jayewardene to concede their demand for fuller autonomy without quibbling over the procedures for devolution.

What the Sri Lankan Tamils and their supporters in Tamil Nadu do not realise is that

the Centre is not anti-Tamil, but amidst its numerous other preoccupations it does not have the same degree of emotional involvement in their struggle. The problems with other neighbouring countries like China and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, attract greater attention than Sri Lanka in more normal circumstances. It is not a question of indifference but one of priority since no government can take the same degree of interest in all problems all the time. Whenever there is a flare-up in Sri Lanka, India gets drawn into it because of the fallout on Tamil Nadu, no matter which party is in power in Delhi.

Sri Lankan Govt. mistaken

The big mistake the Sri Lankan Government has been making is to base its current approach to the ethnic problem on the assumption that there has been a marked change in India's attitude towards the Tamils, especially the militants fighting for separation. The hardliners in Colombo seem to imagine that they would be able to placate and persuade Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to deny these militants sanctuary in Tamil Nadu and turn the heat on them to agree to a watered down version of regional autonomy by forsaking their demand for Eelam.

The Jayewardene Government missed a golden opportunity to utilise India's good offices to the fullest extent with its pettifogging tactics at Thimpu, where its delegation acted with an amazing lack of imagination. It could not have expected the militants to stop talking in terms of fundamental principles in the absence of meaningful proposals to open the way for a negotiated settlement. It kept harping on devolution only through the discredited district councils and infuriated even moderate Tamil leaders with its obduracy much to India's discomfiture.

The Sri Lankan President has been no less guilty than his brother at Thimpu in talking of both war and peace, not in Tolstolian terms but with the pretensions of a Clausewitz to whom peace was only a continuation of war in a different form. The phantom figures around Mr. Jayewardene, like his National Security Minister, Mr. Athulathmudali have been no less foolish in exuding an air of firmness to cover up their own clay feet, by behaving flamboyantly as though the choice between war and peace rested with the Tamils, and that the Sri Lankan Government was prepared to face both the alternatives with confidence.

Loss of direction

The Government of India, on its part, tripped badly in attempting to step up the pace of conciliation by renewing its mediatory efforts, as part of a wider diplomatic initiative to improve its relations with all neighbouring countries in the region. It sent the wrong signals indirectly encouraging countries like Sri Lanka to imagine that they could extract better concessions from the new Government in Delhi as a *quid pro quo* for their cooperation, while this was not the real intention.

The new policy was not aimed at appeasing Sri Lanka by sacrificing the Tamil interest, but only at creating a better awareness of the opportunities still open for arriving at an amicable

settlement. But unfortunately it lacked proper focus because too many people were involved in its articulation and implementation leading to a loss of direction. Though there was no basis for it, the diplomatic community in Delhi started jumping to the conclusion that India was no longer upholding the Tamil cause with the same fervour as it did in Indira Gandhi's time.

Wrong impression

The ill-timed and ill-advised deportation drama was staged in the midst of the discussions in Delhi with an amazing lack of imagination, giving a totally wrong impression to the Sri Lankan delegation that the crackdown was intended to assure them that India was not going to put up with Tamil militancy that had already reached the limits of its tolerance. This unfortunate event could have been avoided if some more preparatory work had gone into the Thimpu talks to make certain that the Sri Lankan Government would come forward with some fresh proposals and not try to present the old ideas in the shape of a new package.

But what was disquieting was how the Government of India could have acted in this high-handed manner, even assuming that Mr. A. S. Balasingam, Mr. S. C. Chandrasekaran and Mr. S. Satyendra, were responsible for the breakdown of the Thimpu dialogue. It has come out of this controversy with a tarnished image damaging its own liberal traditions. The way the first two were bundled out of the country smacked of not merely churlishness, but utter disregard for human rights.

During the eight-day discussions in Delhi, Mr. Hector Jayewardene and his colleagues continued to play the ostrich displaying an amazing lack of sensitivity, imagining that they could get away with their obduracy through sheer persistence. As a result, the idea of a

draft agreement had to be abandoned and only a working paper was produced containing just a broad approach to devolution without spelling out the extent of delegation of powers to the provincial executives.

The details have been left to be worked out during the resumed dialogue, creating a grey zone of uncertainty that could further complicate the prospects of a fair settlement.

So it took a lot of effort on the part of the Government of India to restore the missing perspective and nudge Sri Lanka to adopt a more responsive attitude. The broad framework that has emerged from the talks is not a bad package but much would depend on the Sri Lankan Government's good faith and the negotiating skills of the Tamil leaders whether this could be transformed into a lasting political settlement. It will be in the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils to make India a party to this accord so that it has the responsibility to ensure its smooth implementation.

There are still many gaps in the proposals that are open to differing interpretations and the Sri Lankan Government will not easily give in on essential details, unless it is left with no other choice. This is where Indian diplomacy will come in again with a role to play in evolving agreed procedures for implementation.

It will certainly be a feather in Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's cap if this ethnic conflict which has taken a heavy toll of innocent lives and imposed terrible suffering and humiliation on the Tamil minority is settled without further bloodshed and bitterness in a spirit of mutual accommodation. And it will augur well for India's good neighbourly diplomacy demonstrating eloquently to all other neighbouring countries that with a measure of goodwill and confidence, all such problems could be resolved through negotiations.

Delhi's Anxiety Noted

Madras THE HINDU in English 3 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 2.

The good offices of the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, are being utilised by the Centre to ascertain the reactions of the leaders of the Tamil militant organisations to the Sri Lankan proposals, contained in the working paper and its annexures, before the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, meets them in Delhi.

A copy of the working paper and the annexures initialled by the leader of the Sri Lankan delegation, Mr. Hector Jayewardene, have been sent to Madras so that Mr. M. G. Ramachandran can take the Tamil militant leaders into confidence and communicate the contents to them.

This procedure has been adopted first to

soften their opposition by allaying their apprehensions about the inadequacy of the new Sri Lankan proposals that have emerged from the Delhi discussions and then urge them to meet Mr. Rajiv Gandhi along with an assurance that he has no intention of exerting any pressures to compel them to accept these propositions. All that the Government of India wants them to do is to get back to the negotiating table and engage themselves in a purposeful discussion to arrive at a lasting political settlement without in any way sacrificing their legitimate interests.

Indian Govt.'s anxiety: The Prime Minister and his advisers, who are waiting to see how the Sri Lankan Government reacts to the contents of the working paper evolved in Delhi,

want to keep up the momentum of expectations by urging all concerned to resume the dialogue soon. They are trying to avoid undue delay in the resumption of talks because the prolongation of the present uncertainty could lead to a complete breakdown of the ceasefire.

When the talks are resumed and the dialogue gets going on the basis of the new proposals, the Government of India will do its best to persuade Sri Lanka to fill the gaps with some generous concessions to meet the Tamil aspirations.

Vesting police powers: One of the suggestions under consideration is that more police powers could be conceded to the provincial executives by entrusting them with greater authority in the maintenance of law and order in their respective areas without whittling down the Centre's overall responsibility for internal security in the entire country. It has been proposed that the entire provincial police should be locally recruited, bearing in mind the broad ethnic proportion in each province, with about 80 per cent of the force stationed there.

Supervisory role for Centre: The remaining 20 per cent could be rotated to give a wider national character to the island's security forces with the Centre performing a supervisory role over the functioning of the local police establishments. The head of each provincial police, an officer of the rank of a Deputy Inspector-General of Police, will be appointed by the Centre in consultation with the chief executive councillor of the province, who will be functionally under him, although he takes his orders from the Inspector-General in Colombo, who is answerable in all such matters directly to the President.

Land settlement: The Sri Lankan delegation had taken a very rigid stand on the question of land settlement, refusing to resile from its oft-repeated contention that the Centre should have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring an equitable division of the benefits of the new irrigation schemes and reclamation projects

among all sections of the people. The Indian suggestion is that this could be done with adequate checks and balances to avoid changes in the demographic proportion, especially in the Northern and Eastern provinces, to mollify Tamil opinion.

Use of Tamil language: Several such ideas relating to the use of Tamil language for official purposes in the Northern and Eastern provinces, due representation to different communities in central services and armed forces, creation of provincial civil services, regulation of industry, control of education and promotion of cultural activities, figured in one form or the other during the Delhi discussions. But these could crystallise into concrete proposals only during detailed discussions between the Sri Lankan Government representatives and the Tamil leaders, on the degree of devolution.

Reciprocal gesture sought: The Sri Lankan delegation reacted with varying degrees of reservations to some of these suggestions without giving the impression that it was totally opposed to all of them. But it indicated in quite unmistakable terms that the *quid pro quo* for such concessions should be a reciprocal gesture by the Tamil leaders, abandoning the idea of any linkage between the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Delhi concern over arms build-up: Meanwhile, there is considerable disquiet in Delhi over the Sri Lankan Government moves to increase the strength of its armed forces from the present level of 14,000 men to about 40,000. It has also been importing more arms to re-equip its forces with the latest weapons for a major offensive, if the peace talks fail, leading to renewed insurgency on a much larger scale.

The Indian view is that if this tragic ethnic tangle is not resolved soon, it could assume the alarming proportions of a bitter civil war that would be disastrous to both Sinhala and Tamil population. And Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's main effort is to avert the danger of this catastrophe

Distress Over Killings

Madras THE HINDU in English 4 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 3.

There is grave concern in Delhi over the kidnapping and killing of some prominent Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) leaders in Jaffna, because it is feared that this deplorable action by certain extremist elements is evidently aimed at wrecking the current Indian efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.

A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said today: "We are shocked and distressed at these senseless killings. Continued violence of this sort could be a setback to the peace process."

Those who have been dealing with the Sri Lanka crisis from Delhi feel that these killings are quite obviously intended to be a warning to both the moderates and militants functioning from Tamil Nadu that they would be endangering their own lives by agreeing to any compromise solution that could be deemed to be an abandonment of the struggle for an independent Eelam.

Frank discussion: The Government of India feels that, in the light of this distressing development, it has become doubly imperative to have a frank discussion with the leaders of the militant groups about their exact intentions.

how far they are prepared to go to arrive at an honourable settlement, before proceeding further with its efforts to bring about an early resumption of the talks with the Sri Lankan Government.

The attempt by some of them to insist on the revocation of the deportation order against Dr. A. S. Balasingam, as a sort of pre-condition for their meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is leading to a marked hardening of the Indian attitude.

The Indian authorities are inclined to reconsider the deportation order and let both Dr. Balasingam and Mr. Satyendra get back to Madras after some time, so long as no pressures are exerted by the Tamil militant groups for compelling India to reverse its decision. But the Government will not relent if these militants try to give the impression that they will not meet Mr. Rajiv Gandhi until at least Dr. Balasingam is back in Madras.

Sharp division: The Indian officials dealing with the Sri Lankan issue are following closely the current confabulations among these Tamil militant groups in Madras. Intelligence reports reaching Delhi seem to indicate a sharp division of opinion among them on how they should proceed, whether they should heed the Indian advice and join hands with the moderates represented by the TULF in seeking a negotiated settlement or rely primarily on an armed struggle for achieving Eelam.

A kind of crisis of confidence is thus building up between the Government of India and these militants which will be highly detrimental to the Tamil cause. The latest killings in Jaffna will only deepen the Indian misgivings, if the leaders of these militant groups do not come forward and openly denounce these senseless acts.

It is not enough for them to dissociate themselves from these killings, if they are not prepared to strongly condemn them. That is why the Government of India wants both the moderates and militants to raise their voices jointly and unequivocally against this sort of terrorism, without unwittingly giving the hardliners in Sri Lanka an excuse to spread the canard that the Tamils are not interested in any solution short of complete separation.

CSO: 4600/1725

INDIA

BRIEFS

ANTITERRORIST ACT EXTENDED--Parliament today gave its approval to extending the application of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act to Jammu and Kashmir, with the Rajya Sabha passing the relevant bill. The amending bill, moved by Mr. Arif Mohammad Khan, minister of state for home has already been passed by the Lok Sabha. Earlier, the house rejected by voice vote a statutory resolution of Mr. Ashwani Kumar (BJP) seeking to disapprove the ordinance promulgated in June which the bill sought to replace. Replying to the brief debate on the bill, Mr. Khan assured the house that the provisions of the bill would not be used against political rivals. Mr. G.M. Shawl (National Conference -- Farooq) opposed extension of the Act to Jammu and Kashmir as he feared it would be used to suppress "those fighting for restoration of democracy in the state." He said the "puppet Shah government" had already used even ordinary laws to put behind bars those agitating for its dismissal. Mr. Ruraj Prasad (CPI), also opposed the bill, saying terrorism should be dealt with politically and by taking economic measures. Meanwhile the Lok Sabha today unanimously approved a bill to restrict the jurisdiction of special courts under the Terrorist Affected Areas (special courts) Act, 1984 in the wake of the Punjab accord. The jurisdiction of the courts would not be confined to those waging war against the state and hijacking. [Text]
[Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Aug 85 p 16]

CSO: 5650/0241

IRAN

FAMOUS JOURNALIST: WEST MUST NOT COMMIT ANOTHER ERROR

London KEYHAN in Persian 29 Aug 85 p 2

[London KEYHAN weekly in Persian: founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] London--A famous Iranian writer and journalist said that the West should not make a false judgment about Iran and regard that country only from a narrow viewpoint of material interests.

The journalist, Amir Taheri, who was the chief editor of KEYHAN, the newspaper with the highest circulation in prerevolutionary Iran, participated in a press conference held last week in London.

He said: In the decade of 1970's, the West underestimated the Mullahs and the power they had achieved in coalition with the left-leaning guerrillas and the communists who supported the Soviet Union. Today also certain circles in the West are making precisely the same mistake, only in a different direction. These circles think that Khomeyni's unstable religious government will be able to last in Iran for a long time.

Taheri said: "This will be a grievous mistake because the Ayatollah has demonstrated his inability to establish a creditable system of government and is now holding to power only by using force and weapons and by distributing Iran's oil income among his supporters. The Ayatollah's regime is condemned to fall and nothing can prevent its demise. Those Western circles and their Iranian cronies who say that the Ayatollah's regime is viable and for that reason support it only help prolong Iran's disastrous conditions.

Taheri has come to London to speak about his new book, "Ruhollah". "Ruhollah" is the first book that contains a complete description of the life of the Ayatollah and currently has been translated into six languages. Its English version has been available for sale in England and the United States since 29 August. The book has already attracted the attention of the British and American diplomats and politicians.

In a BBC program on "Ruhollah", John Donne said: This is a profound [work] about Ayatollah's ideals and actions and, in the present complicated circumstances, gives the most realistic account of the conditions prevailing inside the Ayatollah's government. This famous political commentator's interview with Taheri was broadcast last week on the BBC's channel 2 radio.

In the news conference Taheri stated that the Ayatollah is progressively losing his initial power and popularity and will not be able to withstand the pressures that his government must sustain. These were the self-sacrificing Iranian youth who defended the country and so far have maintained the life process in Iran, he said. Our soldiers' commendable bravery in the battlefields and our youth's sacrifices that have prevented the complete economic disintegration of Iran have been purely the result of their nationalism and are in no way to be credited to the mullahs' religious regime. The Iranian people have fought and worked and accepted all manners of privation in order to defend their fatherland. The time has now come for Iran's constructive forces to come together and begin anew the difficult work of the reconstruction of Iran under the umbrella of a government rising from the bosom of the people.

During his short stay in London, Taheri has had a number of radio and television interviews, including interviews with BBC, Radio Scotland, Radio Wales, and a number of British newspapers and journals. Concurrently, Radio Australia, Radio Canada, BBC's Persian Program, and Voice of America also have conducted interviews with him.

In the press conference, a political reporter asked: In your opinion what is likely to replace the present regime? Taheri answered: The political struggle in Iran does not resemble the struggle among parties and individuals in the West. In Iran, two specific viewpoints stand against each other. A group of people want to take Iran back to the Middle Ages. They may be leftist, rightist, or moderate. All of them, however, have, in one way or another, extreme reactionary tendencies. On the other side of the struggle are groups and movements that want an Iran that exhibits the kind of life and progress shared by countries that belong to the atomic age. These also are divided into leftist, moderate and rightist groups that are fighting each other about Iran's future regime. But they agree on one point: they do not want to see Iran return to the dark ages of the past. As victory approaches, these groups will be forced to unite, or, at least, to refrain from the kind of malicious acts which will prove detrimental to all of them. This has been always the case. When forces are weak, and victory is far away, they tend to fight each other. But once they see victory at hand, as a near possibility, they tend to come together. This has been the case in all social and political movements.

At the end of the press conference Taheri added: "Those who now look to the western countries and seek support for the religious government in Tehran, must necessarily believe that the world of the Middle Ages can prevail over the world of the twentieth century. This is obviously an absurd claim. Humanity cannot be forced to move backward for a long time. The thirst for progress, change, constructiveness and innovation as well as the propensity to perform great things, are still quite strong among Iranians.

13024

CSO: 4640/704

IRAN

PALESTINIAN DELEGATES INTERVIEWED ON ESSENTIAL ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Aug 85 pp 3, 19

/Text/ Political Service: Following the arrival of Colonel Abu Musa and other officials of the Palestine National Liberation Front in Tehran, we had a conversation with them in order to become more familiar with their position.

After the 88-day war of the Palestinians with the Zionist regime, which ended in the occupation of a large area of Lebanon by the Zionists, Colonel Abu Musa and other members of the Palestine National Liberation Front severed relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The basis for this severance of relations was cited as the loss of heart by the said organization in its fight and its proclivity toward a diplomatic struggle.

The National Liberation Front of Palestine is strongly inclined to Syria and it enjoys the complete support of that country.

The arrival of this delegation in Tehran provided a good opportunity for us to become more familiar with their stance.

To this end, there were many questions regarding the position, policy, tactics and strategy of the National Liberation Front of Palestine which has to be cleared. Abu Musa admitted in this interview: "The National Liberation Front of Palestine is in a besieged state and its voice does not appear to reach anywhere."

Although, there were many questions which needed to be answered, because of the tight schedule and special program of the delegation in Tehran, we had little time to delve into many of the relevant questions and naturally a lot of them still remained unanswered. We hope to obtain the relevant answers in future interviews.

Our interview with Colonel Abu Musa, leader of the revolutionary Fath Front /Supreme Command/ began with this question:

Question: It seems that the conference of the heads of the Arab states in Morocco follows three objectives: A- The Iran-Iraq war, B- Return of Egypt to the enclave of Arabs, and C- Justifying the efforts for negotiations with the United States, which in the long run, means reconciliation with Israel. Despite

the opposition of the progressive Arab states, particularly the resistance front in holding this conference, what is your opinion as to the convention of this meeting?

Efforts of Arab Reactionaries

Answer: In reality, it is quite a while now that Arab reactionary forces have tried to set up this conference. However, progressive forces such as Syria and Libya are trying to postpone the convention of this meeting so that all interested individuals would recognize that under the existing circumstances in the region and the conditions which we live in, the convention of such an assembly will only help U.S. plans.

We believe that Israeli aggression and occupation of Lebanon in 1982 followed three goals:

- 1- Subjugating Palestinians along the lines and objectives of the Camp David agreement.
- 2- Subjugating Syria in following the orders of the initiators of the said agreement.
- 3- Creation of a government in Lebanon aligned with the plotting and machinating plans of U.S.-Israel.

However, as a result of the failure of the above-stated goals and neutralization of the plans for inflicting blows on Palestinian forces and crushing their resistance, and despite the great machination which is going on inside the ranks of resistance forces who are following the lead of Arafat and his deviation, and as a result of Syria's inattention to U.S. plans and lack of power for the creation of a strong and dependable government in Lebanon by Israel and the United States, in order to impose the objectives of Camp David agreement the United States is trying another approach, which is the new Jordanian approach.

While the imposed agreement of 17 May faced failure and as a result of persistent blows of Palestinian and Lebanese fighters--with the help and support of Syria and Libya--the Zionist forces were forced to withdraw from southern Lebanon. We witnessed how the United States revived the new Reagan plan of 1 September 1982 which had been proposed on the last day of the expulsion of the Palestinian revolution from Beirut.

Arafat's Inclination Toward Camp David

Abu Musa went on to add: We noticed how the leadership of the PLO, which were all dependent on Yasser Arafat and his policy, were all gravitating toward Egypt, the Camp David agreement and Hosni Mubarak. And we see now how he resorts to Jordan and proposes in a ludicrous and lying manner what he terms a confederation. But, it must be said that in reality there is no basis for the creation of such a union. On the one hand there is a country named Jordan with all its peculiar institutions and system; on the other hand there is a revolution scattered throughout the world and it does not have an equivalent and parallel existence with that of Jordan.

Therefore the creation of a confederation is nothing but a lie. But, apparently in order to explain the plot, the creation of such a confederation is proposed and Yasser Arafat mentions this point in something which is called the 11 February communique and announces that this communique is aligned with resolution 242 of the UN Security Council and that we all know that UN resolution 242 is not serving the interest of the Arabs or the Palestinians. There is no mention or prediction of a national solution for the Palestinian issue in this resolution--this resolution of 11 February only had a political motive and nothing else. It is for this reason that after such a long time, we see that the United States is adamantly persistent in holding a meeting of the heads of the Arab states and as it was mentioned above, the three issues are going to be discussed.

First issue: justification of the 11 February agreement. Second issue: the Iran-Iraq war, which was officially pointed out by King Hassan of Morocco. In fact, what they intend to do is under the cover of a political plot, with the participation of all the Arab countries, they are trying to provide Iraq with financial, economic, political and moral support and assistance in its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The third issue: return of Egypt to the fold of the Arabs, which we emphatically state is only a plot.

The return of Egypt to the Arab fold while that country is the initiator of the Camp David agreement, in fact amounts to the Arab world following the Egyptian example.

An agreement which is only a plot against the issue of Palestine. It is from this point that we can see the danger for the assembly of such a conference. For the first time in the history of the meeting of the heads of the Arab states, some progressive countries have boycotted such a conference. After King Hassan announced the postponement of the meeting, as a result of pressures from the United States, he announced at a press conference that the meeting would be held on 7 August. The main reason is that the United States cannot wait any longer and tries to exert its pressure on countries such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in order to speedily hold this meeting so that the above-mentioned objective could be realized.

While Abu Musa lit a cigarette and was looking at the pack in front of him which contained a few more cigarettes, he tried to convey his feeling through gestures and at times he seemed quite excited.

At this point, Abu Maher Yamani, member of the National Liberation Front of Palestine (Supreme Command) completed Abu Musa's sentence and stated: "In 1974 at the meeting of the heads of the Arab states in Rabat, it was announced that the Palestine Liberation Organization was the only legal representative of the Palestinian nation. But, today after over ten years they are telling

us that the PLO no longer is the legal representative of the Palestinian nation and the new representative is Jordan. And, thus they are trying to justify the Hossein-Arafat agreement, an agreement which is against the charter of the organization."

Question: How do you evaluate the success of the conference of the heads of the Arab states in Morocco?

In answer Abu Musa stated: Certainly they are going to make some decisions, however, the act of decision-making should not be construed as success in itself. Such decisions need to be translated into action and it is where the degree of success will most prominently exhibit itself. Therefore, as a progressive force, it is our duty to withstand the implementation of such decisions.

Those people are in a fix and they have to have a good answer for their masters, however, it is our duty to specifically differentiate our approach and opposition to such decisions.

Here, opposition and struggle mean resistance in the war against Saddam Hoseyn and then annihilation of the Egyptian regime, which has so far followed the agreement of Camp David.

Question: Now let's go back to the 88-day war in Lebanon and your separation from the PLO. In your opinion, what was Israel's objectives in this war and what was the result?

Answer: After Abu Musa lit another cigarette and inhaled a strong puff, he said: The reasons for the aggression of Israel in Lebanon were quite clear and as has been stated by the political and military leaders of Israel, their main objective revolved on crushing the Palestinian revolution and busting and breaking all Palestinian guns.

While we were besieged in Beirut for 88 days and were defending it, we also felt the threat from within the ranks of the PLO and that caused us to fight on two fronts, that is to day, one internal and one external front. On the internal front we had a political war so as to make sure that the leadership would not bend or knuckle under to pressure and surrender.

Here, my brother Abu Maher pointed to the fact that on 13 June 1982, while only 8 days had passed after the start of fighting, Arafat was ready to forego Beirut and give up his arms to the Lebanese army (the army which has stood side by side with the aggressor Zionists while they were occupying Lebanon) and by raising our white banner, through the intercession of the Red Cross we were to get out of Beirut. However, our national forces took this opportunity as a good chance for meeting the enemy face to face.

This was what transpired in Beirut. All the military rank and file decided to continue the fighting which lasted for 88 days at which time the enemy was held at bay--this was the longest such war with Israel and Arafat intended to follow the previous example of Arab wars with Israel and make it as short as possible; however, we made him accept the continuation of the war.

We saw that after our departure, Yasser Arafat became inclined toward U.S. plans. His last stance was announced on 4 May 1983 with the following statement: "Withdraw all the remaining Palestinian forces from the Bekka valley, Tripoli (Tarabulus) and the Beirut area toward Baghdad." In that case we would have been faced with two situations: one was to go either to Baghdad, Tunis or Jordan. In that case, we could not ever have said no to whatever Arafat had to say, since we would all be in a large prison and the other case was to tell him no right then and there which is just what we did. And it was from here that all the infighting and struggles within the PLO resurfaced and our fighting overshadowed the Lebanese war and all the progressive Palestinian forces joined us in our struggle.

And he went on to beg at the doors of King Huseyn and Hosni Mubarak.

Here Abu Maher Yamani added: It should be noted that in the Zionist aggression against Lebanon, three goals are being pursued:

First: Striking a blow against the foundation of the Palestinian revolution.

Second: Striking a blow against the progressive forces in Lebanon and imposing the contents of the Camp David agreement.

Third: The expulsion of the Syrian forces from Lebanon.

What they intended to do was to change Lebanon into a small Israeli satellite town. Of course, they were defeated and today, despite all their expectations, the Palestinian revolution is as strong as before.

They could not drive out the Palestinians and the agreement which had been signed by Arafat and Philip Habib regarding the withdrawal of Palestinians from Lebanon was neutralized and thus we find ourselves in a position of facing the Israelis as before.

As far as the second objective is concerned, the United States and Israel at first were able to impose the 17 May agreement on Lebanon; however, after the expansion of the Lebanese national forces and after striking a blow at American marines and other international forces, Lebanon with the help of Palestinians, Syrians and the role of the Islamic Republic through the support of Lebanese Hezbollah followers, this goal also faded away and the said agreement became null and void.

As far as we can see, the third goal was also doomed and the Syrian troops remained in Lebanon and the policies of the Syrian government are carried out in Lebanon and the Lebanese government is being assisted by those policies.

Palestinian Goals

Question: The wing of the organization with which you state your opposition believes that all the events which took place in 1982 in Lebanon were aimed at the elimination of that organization from the Middle East equation! What is your opinion on this matter?

In answer Abu Musa stated: I want to say that the "Faus" plan which had been proposed at the summit under the same name was exactly similar to the "Fahd" plan which likewise was aborted in 1981. We opposed the Fahd proposal, but Arafat used to insist on its implementation and used to threaten the opposition wing by saying that what you reject today, you will be forced to accept tomorrow. What I would like to emphasize here is that a leader who is eager for his revolution should not threaten his own friends with his enemies. He says those who reject the proposal are going to pay for it! By whom? By the enemy?

Question: Then, what were the Israeli goals in imposing the war on the Palestinians?

In answer Abu Musa stated: As I said before, the reason for Israel's transgression and aggression in Lebanon was to subjugate the opponents of the above-stated proposal and not to drive out the reconciliatory organization which was headed by Yasser Arafat.

The enemy does not want to see him gone since they will need a Palestinian who is going to accept their terms. If Arafat were gone, then who are they going to strike a bargain with, certainly not with the left wing?

When Reagan presented his plan, Arafat stated that his plan contained some positive points. This was the beginning of the downfall of Arafat until he signed the 17 February agreement with Jordan. And it is here that we do not agree with him when he says that they are trying to rob the organization of its national status. They would rather see a submissive organization and if that is going to be the case, such an organization is not going to be called liberated as the case may be, but a subservient organization. Even today many people would like to see Arafat stay in his position so that they can strike a bargain with him.

Thereafter, while pointing to the present Palestinian situation in their struggle, our correspondent asked: How should the armed struggle of the Palestinians continue? On what borders and under what necessary conditions should they continue their struggle? And who is going to give you a hand?

Continuation of Armed Struggle

In answer to this question Abu Musa stated: In fact, we've inherited a tangled skein from Arafat. It was Arafat who misdirected various Palestinian struggles as of five or six years ago. He created certain institutions which were a long way from the main goals and objectives of the revolution. The manner by which he devised these institutions resembled dealing with an existing country,

though no such state existed, but all you had to do was transfer the institutions to the new land.

Thereafter, he desisted from struggles and carrying out operations within occupied Palestine and he even went farther, that is to say, with the money which was delivered to him after the Baghdad summit, he became even more corrupt and contaminated the organization.

After the above-stated conference where it was decided that the resistance movement should be supported, we see that Arafat gravitated more and more toward Jordan (as of 1979) and the money which was appropriated at the conference and thereafter was spent on other things and places other than the arena of struggle where it was needed most. Then through his false promises that we were going to have a country and such things, he deviated the struggle and softened the position of the strugglers and began buying off the people.

It is where a heavy burden lies on our shoulders.

So far together with our friends in the various Palestinian resistance groups we have continued our fight in Lebanon, however, until now we have not found the opportunity to bring about the explosive aspect of the revolution inside the occupied territory. How can we restore the confidence in our nation? How can we reconstruct the resistance core and provide them with the possibilities? These are the pertinent questions. We see that the main arena of struggle against Zionist forces is one within or inside occupied Palestine. We do not consider external arenas as the main ones. We ought to exert all our effort along this line which is but our main program and not a mere decision.

Through our methods and approaches we ought to expand our operation. We have certain methods to get needed help to our resistance cores and their restructuring or reconstruction are part of our program. By this means we can redirect the revolution on its right path and role. Of course, we are facing a lot of problems, many problems both inside the Palestinian arena and the Arab arena.

Right now we have been driven out of our land. Jordan is a big and expansive obstacle and on the other hand, Egypt has closed our access to Palestine through the presence of American and multinational troops scattered throughout the Sinai desert.

Our entry to the occupied land is limited through Lebanon and Syria. However, if there is a will, a belief in struggle, a faithful leadership and a belief in an armed Jihad, we are certain that we can restore the struggle to its main path. The war with a Zionist enemy is not going to be a one or two month war but it is something which depends on the existence and non-existence of one of us.

Question: Then is the road which you have chosen going to solve the equation by an armed struggle?

In answer Abu Maher Yamani stated: What has been taken away from us with force should be taken back only with force, and our answer is but just and fair to what has been imposed on us. We have every right to take up arms and continue our fight until the final victory. The Palestinian issue is not one which concerns its nation only but it is an issue which concerns all the revolutionary Muslims throughout the world. We seek the assistance of all the revolutionary nations. Here I should add that in our struggle and fight we rely on the nations and the Islamic forces with Iran at its forefront and not on rulers.

In continuing the interview, our correspondent shifted the axis of conversation to the war against Palestinian camps and asked Abu Musa about his opinion on the goals and factors which play a role in this war. Our political correspondent asked: Was not the war against Palestinian camps meant to limit their struggle and take away the arms from the strugglers or drive them off to Jordan--something which was based on the statement announced by Sharon before the war with Lebanon?

Sharon's Plan

Answer: There are some clear reasons which need no analysis. From the very first day that this cruel war against our camps started, we asked for a truce to see what could be done through negotiations about what had been asked, or to see what problems caused this war to flare up and try to find a solution.

The answer to our demand from the "Amal" movement was something like this: We want to surrender all the arms to the sixth brigade of the Lebanese army--the brigade which is under the command of the Amal leadership. The matter is quite clear and there is no need for substantiation. There were some statements in the papers which asked us to surrender or deliver all our arms to the sixth brigade. As we stated in the National Liberation Front, we fought with Palestinians so that these arms would be retained and remain with the people of Palestine. Then under no circumstances is it possible for us to give them to somebody else, no matter who--and it was for this principle that we decided to continue our fight--not only for the mere existence of the camps, but in defense of the revolution. For this reason we fought for one month. Any how, the goal was quite clear--to disarm the Palestinians--and then if that had happened, it would have meant the end for Palestine. We decided to continue our fight and rejected the disarmament proposal. We suffered hundreds of martyrs and wounded victims and more than 90 percent of the camps were destroyed; however, this was the price which had to be paid. If we had accepted their proposal, then as you mentioned, we had to keep on moving again to a new land. But when they realized that we are not going to surrender, they started destroying our camps to force our people to move on. To where? To Jordan, the only place which was ready to accept them.

Now it is our task to rebuild the camps and this important mission and duty is the responsibility of the National Liberation Front which emphasized and proved that it had a right to carry arms and that our revolution has a right for its existence and continuity. This was agreed to in an agreement which was signed with the Amal movement under the supervision of Syria. Therefore, it is our task to rebuild the camps so that the issue to Palestinian decampment can be neutralized.

Question: Does not the Damascus agreement, considering its contents, make one think that the Palestinians have been confined in Lebanon and from now on they have no grounds for an armed struggle against Israeli's interests? I would like you to specifically give us your opinion as to whether Lebanon ought to be used as a frontier for a war with Israel or not?

In answer Abu Musa went on to say: As to the first part of the question regarding the confinement or limitation of Palestinian revolution, as far as this struggle is concerned, I have to say that the probability is very slim. In other words, in comparison to our position before the war, this war could not contain or limit our activities. Even in the three refugee camps of Sabra, Shatila and Borjalbarajineh we did not lose one cartridge, and after the halt in the war, we provided our people with all the necessary equipment and arms which they needed to defend themselves. This war cost more to the people who started it.

As regards the part of the question on whether or not Lebanon is an arena for the continuation of our struggle? My answer is yes, and this is something which we have included in the contract--that is to day, Lebanon ought to remain as our arena for the war against Israel and this right exists for the Palestinian revolution to use this arena for its war.

Likewise, we are trying to bring about similar conditions in other lands where we do not have such freedom.

As was mentioned at the beginning of the article, time was limited and Abu Musa and his accompanying party were on the verge of leaving for Behesht-e Zahra (Martyrs' cemetery) in order to pay their respect to the martyrs of the Islamic revolution. However, we insisted on more questions. Here is the next question.

Question: In your opinion, should the PLO remain or not? With Arafat or without him? What do the Palestinians say?

Abu Musa stated: We give more importance to the perpetuity of the Palestinian Liberation Organization than Arafat himself since this liberation organization is one of the achievements of the Palestinian struggles within a political framework which contains all the national forces which form our resistance core. We ought to protect and guard the achievements of the liberation organization.

We have emphatically pointed out this matter in our contract with the National Liberation Front to the effect that the NLF is but a temporary framework intended to redirect the liberation organization back to its primary objectives. We want to see that the liberation organization keeps and protects its anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anit-reactionary characteristics. The Palestine Liberation Organization is the national alliance of the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat has violated the Palestinian alliance and he has overstepped the bounds of the communique of the National Assembly; therefore, he has left the framework of the PLO.

There is no way for reconciliation and this is our opinion and the opinion of the Palestinian nation. The Palestine revolution cannot forego one inch of its land.

At this point our time was up, although there were many questions which needed to be answered. We asked Abu Musa to continue our conversation at another future opportunity. He was happy and really appreciative. Abu Musa considers the National Liberation Front as one with propaganda and publicity and he was thankful that ETTELA'AT had provided him the chance to defend the position of the National Liberation Front.

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PAKISTAN

BENAZIR-JATOI POWER STRUGGLE ANALYZED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 17 Aug 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Mohammad Ali in the column "Sindh Letter"]

[Text] The defunct Pakistan People's Party [PPP] is currently divided into many fighting factions. After martial law had been imposed on the country, the ladies of the Bhutto family proclaimed their acceptance of the leadership of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi in the power struggle between Jatoi and Mumtaz Bhutto. Jatoi thus became the all-powerful leader of the defunct PPP. After Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had played a leading role in the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] movement his position became unassailable. Not only did he have the confidence of the ladies of the Bhutto family, he even nominated the office-holders of the provincial organization of the PPP. There was an uproar of protests against this nomination inside Sindh, and this organization was declared illegal. Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi was one of the leaders of the protest. Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi is a popular worker of the party in Sindh, but has not been given any office at the provincial level. He conferred with Benazir Bhutto in London concerning the organization of the party in Sindh. On his return from London he became very active in working for the party.

Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman was the senior vice president of the defunct PPP. He was officiating as the leader of the provincial branch of the People's Party in the absence of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman is nearer Mumtaz Bhutto in political ideology and intends to fight openly for the rights of Sindh. In 1977 when Prime Minister Bhutto, in order to curb the National Front movement, asked Mumtaz Bhutto to make a tour of the rural areas of Sindh, Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman was with him. The Makhdum also attended the birthday party of G.M. Sayyed. He also sent his greetings to G.M. Sayyed on his birthday when the latter was under house arrest. Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman is held in great esteem in the Sindh PPP, because he is the son of Talib Almaula. Makhdum Amin Fahim represents his family because of his moderate views in party politics. Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman was arrested on 15 August 1983 in connection with the MRD agitation. He has been busy in public relations since his release. The aim of Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman is (in accordance with the wishes of Benazir Bhutto) to bring the young people of the People's Party to the foreground in the politics of Sindh. Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman claims to have Benazir Bhutto's complete confidence. Makhdum Mohammad Zaman Talib Almaula is a supporter of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, while Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman does not favor the political policy of Jatoi group. Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman tried to challenge the political

power of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi but was rebuffed. Two deputy secretaries of the defunct PPP, Gen Mohammad Usman Kapandi and Allah Bachyo Lighari, are Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's trusted friends. They have not been invited to the meeting of the Sindh Committee. Pervez Shah Jilani of Khairpur has been given a post on this committee. Pervez Shah Jilani had been under house arrest in connection with a bomb explosion on the occasion of Pope Paul's visit to Karachi. Pervez Shah Jilani is a near relative of the former federal minister, Qaim Ali Shah. The presence of Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi in Sindh along with Pervez Shah Jilani shows that Benazir Bhutto wants to organize the younger people in the PPP, and Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman, Pervez Shah Jilani and Pir Mazharul Haq will be given prominent positions in provincial politics. Pir Mazharul Haq is the grandson of ex-chief minister of Sindh, Pir Elahi Bukhsh Somru. Mazharul Haq and his brothers were arrested in Dadu in connection with the MRD agitation. In Dadu the Jatoi group of Ashiq Hussain Jatoi (Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's sister's husband) is very powerful. But Pir Mazharul Haq has the support of Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman. Pir Mazharul Haq was invited to the Sindh Committee of the defunct PPP. The Jatoi group claims that Pir Mazharul Haq is not a member of the Sindh Committee, and he was included in the committee just in order to cause a rift in the People's Party. The district delegates at the provincial meeting of the defunct PPP called these group clashes harmful for the organization and also demanded that punitive measures be taken against the members who had taken part in the elections.

The most impassioned speech at the Sindh Committee was made by Mohammad Saddiq Khosu, president of the defunct Jacobabad PPP. He said that the sincere members of the party were being degraded and the interests of the party were being neglected. He said that the general consensus is not being considered when taking decisions of political importance. He said, "We have made sacrifices for the party. We are willing to give everything for the party, but the party should be run according to the democratic principles. It is wrong to have a dictatorship in politics. Consensus should be the foundation for every decision that is made. The services of those who have made sacrifices for the party should be recognized." He criticized the attitude of the leaders of the PPP and said these people are mere opportunists and love their own interests rather than the interests of the party. These people, he said, were silent when Mr Bhutto was about to be hanged. They took no steps to save him even when the situation was disclosed to them. Mr Bhutto was hanged, but these people did not come out of their hide-outs. The Bhutto family had to undergo untold privations, while these so-called leaders slept on. When they started the MRD agitation (at the instigation of a foreign power) their purpose was not the restoration of democracy, but achievement of power for themselves. Saddiq Khosu said that the party could become strong only through self-criticism, self-improvement and getting rid of opportunism. Some party members said that some people are talking about "confederation." The public, they said, want to know what connection the PPP has with this slogan. Professor N.D.E. Khan answered this question by saying that, according to Benazir Bhutto, the PPP has no connection with this slogan and that the central committee of the party would deal with the members responsible for this slogan. Sayyed Ali Nawaz Shah, president of PPP Hyderabad, said that the party is breaking up into small groups and that Benazir Bhutto does not like the present provincial organization. That is why, he said, only Usman Kapandi and Allah Bachyo Lighari have not been invited to join it. He said that Benazir Bhutto had told him personally that the

provincial organization nominated by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was not with her. Then the bitterness within the PPP Hyderabad was criticized and Sayyed Ali Nawaz left the meeting. It was decided in the meeting that suggestions should be invited for the reorganization of the party at every level and that the committee should declare its stand on the problems infesting Sindh.

The meeting of the Sindh Committee shows that an experimental campaign has been started to do away with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's influence on the provincial organization. Benazir Bhutto is not willing to start a clash with Jatoi at present. That is why she has started to organize the younger and, friendlier, members of the PPP in Sindh. Benazir Bhutto is in London, but she is in touch with what is happening in Sindh. She is studying the situation in Sindh with deep attention. Removing the contradictions within the party is her aim, but she finds herself beset with difficulties.

The PPP is heating up to work. Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafiz Pirzada have joined the "confederation group." If Mumtaz Bhutto tells why he has left the People's Party, it can lead to a clash within the Bhutto family. That is why Benazir Bhutto is ignoring Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafiz Pirzada. She wants to get rid of the confederation group with the help of the central committee. Mumtaz Bhutto says that, when he was in Karachi central jail, Benazir Bhutto in London was said to be a champion of the rights of the smaller provinces. If any disciplinary steps are taken against him, Mumtaz Bhutto would publish Benazir's letters to make the political situation clear. Benazir is frightened by the differences mounting in the party. Her decision to strengthen her hold on the party is a reaction to the attitude of the "confederation group." Benazir has accepted, by phone, the leadership of the PPP in Sindh. She is looking for a "Jahangir Badr" in Sindh, too, who cannot challenge her leadership in the future. The meeting of the Sindh Committee under the present situation has encouraged group-making in the party. Makhdum Khaliqz Zaman, Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi and Hussain Shah Bukhari believe in accepting the direct leadership of Benazir Bhutto (they are under the influence of Pir Mazharul Haq). The Jatoi group is at present in full control of the party's activities. This group enjoys the cooperation of Makhdum Mohammad Zaman, Taliba Almaula, Pir of Ranipur, Pir Ghulam Rasul Shah Gilani and Bhajwal Shah. It appears that Benazir wants gradually to end the political monopoly of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi in Sindh. But Jatoi is a powerful politician, and the Sindhis are in favor of his moderate political views. It is possible that changes will occur in the politics of Pakistan. If it happens, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and other leaders can manipulate the political possibilities in the new situation. Changes can even occur at the government level.

The People's Party is at present a crowd of political aspirants rather than a solid political party. It seems to be impossible to bring some sort of unity in its ranks. The party lacks all balance and moderation with regard to democratic activity. The session of the Sindh Committee will result in severe disintegration and group-making within the party on a national level.

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PAKISTAN

ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDE, POLICIES OF THE SOVIETS DENOUNCED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 12 Aug 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Muslims in Soviet Union: A Warning"]

[Text] Nobody in the Islamic world has any illusions about the condition of the Muslims living in the regions of Muslim majority under Soviet rule. Despite all the Soviet propaganda, facts reach the free world from behind the Iron Curtain. The latest news tells us that the torture of the 55 million [as published] Muslims living in the Soviet Union has now been brought to the last extreme. The greatest tragedy for these people is that they are being deprived of their identity. When, after the Revolution of 1917, the Soviets started their campaign of expansionism and began to swallow up all the Muslim states of Central Asia including Uzbekistan, the Muslims were told that they were being freed from their cruel rulers. The Muslims of those states had been led to believe that they would be perfectly free in all matters. But the evil intentions of the Russians became apparent very soon. Now things have come to such a pass that the Muslims are not rid of the Soviet tyranny even after death. Muslims are not allowed to bury their dead according to Islamic rites. By a government order published in a newspaper in Tashkent, the Muslims have been barred from celebrating their religious festivals and burying their dead according to Islamic rituals.

The Soviet rulers have not succeeded in alienating the Muslims from their religion completely, despite their anti-religion propaganda coupled with all sorts of attractive promises for the Muslims. Hence they have decided to bar the Muslims from the Islamic way of life by force. Muslims are not given any free time for saying their Friday prayers. They are hindered when they try to say their prayers five times a day. Until some time ago they were not even allowed to keep a Koran with them. Even now the Koran and other religious books are not available everywhere. Above all, the Soviet Muslims are not allowed to learn Arabic and read the Koran. There is a lot of propaganda about religious freedom in the Soviet Union, and a delegation of Muslims is sent for Haj every year just to show the world, but the Muslims are not given any facilities for learning their religion. Now things have come to such a pass in the Soviet Union that the son of the learned Mufti Ziauddin Baba Khanov who is himself supposed to be a learned man advises the Muslims, before the Friday prayers, to shave their beards for the sake of cleanliness. It is true that there are no civil liberties in the Soviet Union, but the Muslims are victimized because

of their tenacity to their all-embracing religion. Islam is one religion which is the chief barrier in the way of the spread of (Godless) Communism.

Though Europe and America are not friendly to the Muslims, they at least have civil liberties, and as a result Muslims can practice religious freedom. Communism attacks religion directly. The Soviets are so frightened by the freedom fighters of Afghanistan that they no longer hide their animosity against Islam. This is a timely warning for the Muslims who think Communism and the Soviets to be their haven and last refuge.

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PAKISTAN

ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE OF PAKISTAN CALLED UNREALIZED DREAM

Karachi AMN in Urdu 14 Aug 85 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Quaid-e-Azam's dream of making Pakistan an Islamic welfare state has not yet come true. He, with his intelligence and vision, performed a political miracle by creating Pakistan within 8 years, but we, his successors lost half the country within 25 years. Now the country that had been created at a tremendous loss of men and money has shrunk to only four provinces.

It is better not to talk about the ups and downs through which Pakistan has passed, as it is a heart-rending story. It is a fact that the politicians never have had a say in the affairs of the country during the last 38 years. The country was either in the grip of the bureaucrats or ruled by the army on the excuse of the incompetence of the politicians. It is, therefore, hard to place the blame for the prevailing state of affairs: the bureaucrats, the politicians or someone else? It goes without saying that Quaid-e-Azam wanted to make Pakistan an Islamic welfare state. After the creation of Pakistan the Quaid did not live long enough to consolidate the state. Quaid-e-Azam wanted to make the new country a welfare state based on the Islamic moral code, but he was against mullaism and said so time and again. After the Quaid, we procrastinated in the work of Islamizing the country for so long that power was taken away from the hands of the politicians. The 14 years that followed can be likened to a dark night in our history. We had to face two wars during these years. The first one did not hurt us much, but the second split our country in two parts, and 90,000 Pakistanis were made prisoners of war.

After a long struggle, civil government was established in what was left of Pakistan. This government got the POW's freed and reclaimed all the regions lost during the war. This triumph could not have been won by the bureaucracy or any other power. This political government worked for less than 6 years and was then swept away by a flood of dollars. Some fortune hunters, created by the previous governments, invited the army to take control of the government.

Besides these, there was another brand of politicians, who during the struggle for Pakistan called Pakistan (land of the pure) Napakistan (land of the impure) and Quaid-e-Azam (great leader) Kafir-i-Azam (great infidel). But when they met with the communal cruelty in India, they came over to take refuge in Pakistan. These people, after 38 years, have the cheek to call themselves the authors of the Pakistan ideology and creators of Pakistan.

The present government has been claiming for 8 years that the law would be Islamized, but nothing tangible has been achieved so far. We have not even got rid of interest. Interest has been banned inside the country, but nothing has been done about the interest on foreign loans. The current laws have not been Islamized and many un-Islamic ordinances are still in force.

Everybody knows the situation of law and order in the country. Murder, plunder and other heinous crimes have become the order of the day. Corruption is so rife that honesty has become a rarity. Incompetence and sloppiness have become so common that anything different from them seems to be strange. Islamization is a good solution for our problem, but the trouble is that our religious leaders are all divided into sects. As long as they do not agree on the general principles of Islam, Islamization of society is not possible.

Everybody knows the political situation in the country. Whoever came into power conducted his own experiments in politics. One gave us "controlled democracy." Then basic democracy was imposed on us which eliminated the importance of the voter. Democracy was given a new definition. Now, once more, politics is being subjugated to force.

If the Quaid were alive today, his unfulfilled dream would have shocked him, but the general situation in the country would have killed him. What have we achieved during the last 38 years? We will be astonished to find that we have not taken even one step towards our destination. We have proved ourselves unworthy of what we inherited from the founder of Pakistan. Can a nation face a greater shame than that?

12476

CSO: 4656/158

PAKISTAN

ARREST OF TEHRIK-E ISLAMI WORKERS DENOUNCED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Aug 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Disgraceful Action"]

[Text] At least 88 workers of the Tehrik-e Islami were arrested in the various districts of Karachi for staging a silent protest in favor of introducing Shariat, the Islamic law. These workers of the Tehrik-e Islami demonstrated peacefully at the time President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, accompanied by King Faisal, left for Islamabad from Korangi. They were carrying placards and banners bearing slogans demanding the institution of Shariat in all walks of life, lifting of martial law without further delay, rehabilitation of political parties and restoration of the 1973 constitution. Such demonstrations were also carried out in Malir, Hassan Square and Federal "B" areas. Police arrested the demonstrators under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code for violating section 144.

Arrests and confinement of lovers of Islam demanding supremacy of Shariat in the God-given state of Pakistan is extremely disgraceful. This action is especially disgraceful for a government which for the last 8 years has been raising the lofty slogans of introducing Islamic laws, has been untiringly professing its Islamic ideals every morning and evening and whose head of state does not fail to avail himself of every possible opportunity of trying to prove himself to be a true servant of Islam. Can anyone inquire as to why these people were arrested whose only fault is that they were trying to draw the attention of the government to total introduction of Islamic laws and restoration of democracy and who were trying to remind the government that the goal of establishing Pakistan was "La Ilaha Illallah," introduction of Islamic laws. Turning away from this goal does not benefit rulers who should in fact continue to make every effort to fulfill the promises they have been making for the past 8 years that they will not rest until Islamic laws are introduced in every walk of life.

President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq, speaking at a public meeting held towards the end of last month in Murree, complained that 6 months have passed since general elections were held, but no one has talked about introducing Islamic administration although the thing that is most essential for this country is the implementation of Islamic laws. He also said that as long as the Islamic system of government is not introduced in this country, everything is meaningless. In light of the president's statement, it is difficult to understand why the workers of Tehrik-e Islami were arrested, since the goal of their

peaceful demonstration was also the same, that is, Islam should thrive and prosper in the true sense of the word, all laws contrary to the Koran and Sunnah should be abolished and divine instructions should have priority and supremacy above all other decrees and orders. We believe that drawing the attention of the government and the people to the accomplishment of such sacred objectives and bringing about peaceful pressure to this effect is, after all, not such a serious crime committed by the workers of Tehrik-e Islami as to deserve arrest and imprisonment.

We hope that the imprudent actions committed with utter disregard to consequences are the work of local authorities demonstrating more loyalty to kings than kings themselves and that the provincial or the central government is not responsible for these actions. Otherwise people will believe that there is a sharp contrast between the words and deeds of the rulers claiming to pave the way for introducing Islam and Islamic laws, and that their sincerity is limited to verbal assertions and political considerations. Only God knows best what their intentions really are. But if the government does not prove its sincerity with respect to this matter, then they will be exposing the truth about their claims of propagating Islam and introducing Islamic laws. Government will be passing through an acid test when the bill proposed by Maulana Gauhar-ur Rehman, National Assembly member from Frontier, comes up for hearing in parliament. At that time people will find out for themselves how sincere the government is with regard to its slogans about introducing Islamic laws.

At this time we demand the unconditional release of the workers of Tehrik-e Islami who were arrested the other day while demonstrating peacefully by the roadside and that severe action be taken against the "Buzar Jamhurs" (Buzar Jamhur was the wise prime minister of the Persian king known as Naushir-a-wan Adil) who have executed an unprecedented task of arresting peaceful demonstrators carrying banners and placards bearing fundamental slogans demanding institution of Islamic laws and restoration of democracy. The government, in order to prove its sincerity about introducing Islamic laws, rehabilitation of political parties, restoring political freedom and lifting martial law, will have to restrain the administration and bureaucracy from committing such actions. The people who sacrificed invaluable lives and property to establish Pakistan and once again during the 1977 movement will not renounce their demands for supremacy of Islamic laws at any cost and, at the same time, they will not even for a single moment allow their ultimate goals, for which they had to fight fire and flames at the time of the establishment of Pakistan, to be lost from view. They will not rest until the supremacy of Islam and God's sovereignty are established and the God-given land of Pakistan becomes a citadel of Islam in the true sense of the word.

9315

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PAKISTAN

MUSLIM LEAGUE'S EMERGENCE AS MAJORITY PARTY DISCUSSED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 5 Aug 85 p 9

/Editorial: "Revival of Muslim League as a Political Party"/

/Text/ The session of the National Assembly beginning on 7 August is important because the report on the proposed political structure by the specially appointed committee of 29 members will be discussed in it. In political circles the greatest news is the establishment of the Muslim League as a parliamentary party. Prime Minister Junejo thought it important to visit all provincial capitals to pave the way for this change. He is in Karachi now and according to news reports, the majority of Sindhi members of the National Assembly have expressed a strong desire to join the Muslim League party under his leadership. In Sindh they are even a step ahead in this direction. A committee composed of provincial ministers is already working on establishing a parliamentary party of Muslim League members. This effort has been greatly welcomed.

These efforts to establish a parliamentary group of the Muslim League, however, appear to have lost some momentum. Some important officials of the Muslim League (Secretary Gen S. M. Zaffar and Vice President Makhdoom Zada Hussan Memood among others) have affirmed that they will not let their party be "hijacked." Leaders of other parties have also criticized the prime minister's visit with the members of the National Assembly in the presence of state governors (who are also martial law administrators). They felt that this methodology would put the Muslim League party in the same category as the Unionist Party, Republican Party, and the Convention League. According to these critics, these parties were also established in the legislative houses because of their majority standing. They expect the Muslim League to meet the same fate as these parties met after losing their majority status. Not only have these disappeared, people do not even remember their names!

Comments ridiculing this system (of having a parliamentary majority party before a popular majority party) were not unexpected. The main reason for this attitude is the stand the government has taken since February 1985 in regards to the elections held on a non-party basis. There appeared to be

no other way to recognize any political group as the majority party. In addition to the prime minister, a large number of federal and provincial ministers (it would not be unrealistic to call it a majority) either belong to the Muslim League or are believed to be sympathetic to its ideology. Similarly, members of provincial and the national assemblies also belong to the same party or the same school of thought. Establishing a parliamentary party before a national party is equivalent to starting a building from the top instead of building a foundation first. The example of putting the cart before the horse is being cited in this content. However, the exceptional situation created by the elections held on a non-party basis demands this exceptional solution. Were the elections held on a party basis, the situation would have been different. The majority would have been held by the Muslim League or the combined membership of the other political parties. It cannot be denied, however, that after being established as the parliamentary majority party, if the Muslim League drags its feet in becoming a true representative political party in the real sense of a democratic system, it will not be in power for long. This weakness will make it dependent upon the bureaucracy. In that case the forecasts being made by the leaders of the Unionist party, the Republican party and the Conversion League will become a reality.

The leaders of the Muslim League do not appear to be naive about this problem. Pir Sahib Pagara, the leader of the party, while blessing the establishment of the parliamentary party, declared that the leadership of this parliamentary party will be temporary in nature. According to him these elected officials will be responsible for establishing councils at district, provincial and national levels. The permanent parliamentary officials will be elected after that. This procedure will help the Muslim League get the vote of confidence it needs.

Punjab's minister of industries, Ghulam Haider Wain, an old Muslim Leaguer, has also outlined a similar plan to reorganize the party with popular support. While addressing some newsmen he said that reorganization and reelections are unavoidable if the Muslim League wants to become the majority party in the real sense. He does not think the Muslim League can become a dynamic political party without this action. According to him, it is necessary that all officials be elected at the various levels and that the members of the party have full voice in electing these officials.

Only time will tell if sincere efforts will be made to implement the reorganization plans identified by Pir Sahib Pagara and supported by Ghulam Haider Wain. Keeping in mind the exceptional circumstances that have led to the establishment of this parliamentary party, it would be appropriate for Muslim Leaguers to bear the sarcasm of the opposition in the name of the political game. They should react to this criticism by improving their image. Regardless of what the opposition calls the Muslim League, it will always have the distinction of having played an important role in Pakistan's establishment. Of political parties there

have been many, but the Muslim League, in spite of losing much of its prestige, is still the largest and the most important political party in the country. There is still a large majority that supports it. Though they have not been consistent in their support, deep down all of them want this national party to succeed. This party has not been safe from inner strife, but it has managed to keep itself free from regional and factional politics which cause a lot of headaches to politicians in other parties. In order to keep its innumerable supporters happy, the Muslim League must follow a program of "unity, faith and organization." In addition, it will have to follow the traditions established by Quaid-e Azam, the founder of Pakistan. These traditions had made this party the only representative party of all Muslims in this subcontinent. The Muslim League never lacked opportunities nor does it now. However, in order to succeed, it must follow Poet Iqbal's advice: "Father's sword also needs father's arms."

7997

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PAKISTAN

CONFEDERATION TALKS DENOUNCED AS DISRUPTIVE

Karachi JANG in Urdu 1 Aug 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Contemptible Efforts By Despondent Political Elements"]

[Text] A former minister of law for Pakistan, who went abroad for medical treatment, while making the British capital the center of his activities, has for a long time been making a series of attacks on the unity and integrity of Pakistan. Participating with him in this regard are certain individuals who also held vital national posts during the era of the previous administration. Presently, they have all joined together to start a formal campaign in support of the establishment of a confederation in Pakistan. Right now, there are even talks in this regard about granting freedom and the status of independent states to all the four provinces, and also to have a separate flag for each province. In the past, all these individuals, as responsible members of a defunct political party, were bearers of national and universal fame. But now that they have started the demand of establishing a confederation in Pakistan, not only have the most responsible members of this party itself refused to support this demand, but the union of some defunct parties of Pakistan, too, has strongly condemned this demand. It is quite possible that on the basis of these ideologies, their own defunct political party might take some disciplinary actions against them. Thus, it might prevent them from participating in national politics and using their party's name in their contemptible efforts to dismantle the solidarity and unity of the beloved country.

We have always supported the freedom of expression of one's opinion regarding politics and, in these very columns, we have also expressed the desire to reinstate the political parties and complete, as soon as possible, the process of the restoration of democracy. Despite this, however, we can never, in the name of political freedom and the restoration of democracy, support the organized and consistent propaganda against Pakistan's unity and integrity. All those individuals themselves also, who are currently shouting the slogans of confederation, have in the past opposed all such measures whereby there was the slightest possibility of causing damage to the integrity and solidarity of the beloved country. Also, when a political leader of the former East Pakistan presented a six-point proposal regarding the political system of Pakistan, these individuals and elements also fully cooperated with the country's other patriotic elements to oppose this proposal.

In view of this background, let us analyze why these individuals have pressed a demand for confederation, at a time when the process of the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is proceeding forthrightly and there is full agreement and unity among all sectors to end martial law in the country and when, in the near future, the national assembly and the senate are going to commence their deliberations regarding this matter. So much so, that the prime minister of Pakistan has established contact on personal and official levels with the national assembly and the members of the senate with regard to this matter. Also, why are they talking about separate flags for each of the four provinces; a point which was never mentioned even by the leader of the former East Pakistan? We feel that merely for personal gains, these individuals wish to put Pakistan's solidarity and integrity at stake. Their patriotism is attributable and attached to their personal gains only.

Nevertheless, the thing that is a source of satisfaction is that those who shout slogans of confederation in Pakistan, do not enjoy the support of the people of the country. And those sectors themselves, with which these elements are identified, have opposed them regarding their contemptible scheme. We believe that the people of the country as a whole and all the defunct political parties of the country should jointly and unanimously negate these contemptible efforts. Political differences exist in every society and country. However, such disagreements always arise within the circle of the national integrity and solidarity, and always resolving them through mutual political understanding is in the best interest of the people and the country. If Pakistan remains established and eternal, then all of us, too, are permanently established. Similarly, if there is a sway of peace and prosperity in the beloved country, every Pakistani benefits from that both individually and collectively. Therefore, the individuals and the elements, who after crossing the national boundaries, talk about the accomplishment and acquisition of limited personal and party gains, can never be the well-wishers of the nation and the country.

We hope that, when the national assembly and the senate make a final decision regarding the lifting of martial law and when the program of reinstating political parties is given final shape, special consideration will be granted to the fact that only those individuals and elements should be permitted to participate in national politics who believe in the ideology of Pakistan and the enforcement of Islam. This country was established as a result of great sacrifices and unique passion for selflessness. Its existence, too, is hidden in the enforcement of Islam, and in the reinforcement of the ideology of Pakistan. The entire nation is in full agreement with these objectives. Therefore, those people, both within the country and outside, who even while regarding themselves as Pakistanis talk against their country and wish to involve the people of the four provinces of Pakistan in fighting against each other, and who talk about party politics and regional gains in the beloved country, are not true patriots. Pakistan's national and communal interests cannot be sacrificed for the sake of their personal desires.

9779

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8 October 1985

PAKISTAN

GOVERNMENT USE OF OFFICIAL ADVERTISING TO PUNISH NEWSPAPERS SCORED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Aug 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Government and Advertisements"]

[Text] The Working Committee of All Pakistan Newspapers Society [APNS] passed a resolution on the 6th of the current month expressing concern over, among other things, two points contained in the advertisement policy. First, that the government advertisements are being willfully and unfairly used as tools and, secondly, that, as a result of the provisional policy adopted by the government for the past 5 years with regard to the rates of these advertisements, there has been an annual increase of only 3.5 percent. The APNS resolution stresses the fact that there is no legal and moral justification for effecting considerable reduction in the rates of advertisements in some Karachi newspapers.

It is undoubtedly unfortunate that the present government, which has the honor of being an elected government, just like previous governments is resorting to the same traditional practices against the newspapers. As it is, there are a number of problems that hinder a positive relationship between the press and the government, but we believe that there are two matters that deserve immediate attention and, as such, we urge the government to abstain from exerting pressure on the newspapers through advertisements because such actions constitute a negative trend in the fundamental values of the freedom of journalism. Besides this, sufficient increase in the current rates of advertisements has also become unavoidable. Evasion would not only deliberately affect the [words illegible] of the newspapers but at the same time it will also be a negation of the lofty claims of freedom of the press.

We hope that negotiations will soon be started with the All Pakistan Newspapers Society and that a constructive policy with respect to the media will be announced.

9315

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SRI LANKA

REPORT EXAMINES ARMED FORCES' STRENGTH, STRUCTURE

Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Jul 85 pp 4-16

[Article by G. Jacobs]

[Text] An island nation of some 25,332 square miles (6,510-km²), the small armed forces and national police of this country have since last year been severely tested in the continuing communal riots and the insurrection mounted by radical Tamil nationals. In this period, the military arm of the country has been beset by problems of discipline, inadequate weapons for the task at hand, and an insufficient level of training and professional experience to deal with a mixture of terrorism and guerrilla warfare by radicals of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).


The "Tamil Tigers"

The TULF, which is a recognized party and holds seats in Parliament, has had as its spiritual leader Tamil nationalist Appapillai Amirthalingam, for the last two decades. Amirthalingam was elected to the National State Assembly in mid-1977, bringing the political party of the TULF into greater light and potentially offering an avenue by which the Tamil minority might solve its grievances with the dominant ethnic Sinhalese leadership of the country. Such has not been the fortune of the country. His son, K. Amirthalingam (or A. Kandipan) was founder of the radical Tamil "Eela Viduthalai Por Eyekam (EVPE), or Tamil Youth Revolutionary Front. The latter organization can trace its lineage to the present day organization commonly referred to as the "Tamil Tigers" (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Movement), an organization which espouses violent revolution to achieve a separate Tamil state on the island. There are some international support groups for the Tamil separatists the most important being the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), whose headquarters is in South India.

While the basic TULF party platform is for peaceful transition, the radical-wing has come into its own as a result of the government crackdowns after the student rebellion in April

1971. The secessionist movement was formed under the TULF in 1976, and the Tamil goal is the "Eelam" state for the north and northeast portions of the island. The ethnic Sinhalese, Buddhist by religion, originally came from north India about 2500 years ago. Repeated invasions since then by the Tamils of southern India eventually pushed the Sinhalese into the central hills and southern coastal plains, ultimately establishing a separate kingdom known as Yaalpanam in the 13th century. The Sinhalese have ruled the island and controlled the government since independence from Britain in 1948; more recently, Sinhalese (71% of the population) became the national language in 1972 and is viewed by most as the *single most important event leading to the polarization of the races on the island*.^{*} An estimated 600,000 Indian Tamils live in the country, but only 156,000 have ever been given citizenship — compounding the identity problem further. India's neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu is sympathetic to the Sri Lankan Tamils and politicians in Madras have done much to politicise the issue and to aid local groups. According to Tamil Nadu police chief, K. Mohandas, there are some 500 Tamil militants in India; an upward trend from the estimated 200 "Tamil Tigers" early last year. Various press reports in India do fix a training camp that has been set up for radical Tamils, though formal military training is unlikely to be easy to come by (in India) under current central government policies.

^{*} Prior to this government law, English was the "common" language of the ethnic groups on the island, and taught in schools, used in government documents, etc.



THE ARMY

The Sri Lankan army consists of a Regular Force and a volunteer reserve organization, generally patterned on British lines. The Regular Force is now believed to be composed of some 13,500-15,000 troops, with sources on this matter differing greatly. The *IJSS* "Military Balance 1984-85" lists current army strength at 11,000. It is known that throughout the 1970's the force remained at about 9,000 Regular Force personnel, supplemented by one-third to one-half of the Volunteer Force strength that is on active duty at any given time. The Volunteer Force maintains both active and reserve personnel, and is made up of a National Service Regiment (two battalions), five infantry battalions, two National Guard battalions, and four or five support battalions maintained in reserve status. Personnel serve five years on active duty in the army; Volunteer Force personnel serve for seven years. Individual units are from time-to-time called for active duty, usually at the company-level for specific assignments. During the period after the student rebellion in April 1971, and the follow-on civil disturbances of 1976, such units were called to reinforce the Task Force Anti-Illicit Immigration (TFAII) that patrolled the Palk Strait. That organization was disbanded in 1980, as part of a broad-based army re-organization effort.

As is best understood, the accompanying organization chart represents an approximation of how the armed forces is orga-

nized. The four Task Force areas, numbered one (in the south) to four (in the north), represents a decentralization of the former organization. The Inspector-General's position is not a clear line of authority over each of the Task Force geographic areas, but appears to be in conjunction with the Army Chief-of-Staff, operating out of army headquarters at Colombo. The current organization was derived in an effort to better deal with the Tamil internal security problem, which in May 1984 erupted again in various terrorist and insurgency efforts. All specialized forces (medical, engineers, etc) operate under a central "support" headquarters at Pangoda (12-km Southeast of Colombo).

The battalion is the basic organisational unit for the army in the field. The artillery is commonly held under the 4th Artillery Regiment (at Silva), but the organization is basically an artillery battalion in strength. Each infantry battalion contains a strength of about 800 personnel. Both the Reconnaissance Regiment and artillery regiment are also maintained at about the same numbers of personnel. The continued reference to "regiments" is probably a carry-over from the extensive British heritage. Infantry battalions are normally numbered consecutively. Most units remain deployed within their assigned regions; out-of-area deployments would be most unusual.

Training is conducted primarily at the Army Training Centre, Diyatalawa. The training centre handles both officer cadet and short-service commissioning programmes; over the years since independence the Army Training Centre (ATC) has undergone numerous changes since its establishment in October 1948. The centre's Commandant reports directly to the Commander of the Army; under the Commandant are three sections within the school: the Military Academy; Non-Commissioned Officers School; and, Recruit Training School. The military academy primarily trains officers in tactics and administration. Following commissioning, assignment is directly to Regular Force units. The officer cadet programme involves some 90 weeks of training, and is designed to prepare an officer to lead platoon-level units within the service. The Short-Service commissions, which usually accounts for twice as many personnel, amounts to about 56 weeks of training and indoctrination. No academic training is included in this programme. In December 1982, the ATC graduated six officers in the former category, and twelve in the short-course. In that year, 1,250 recruits were trained but not all at the ATC. Apparently the facilities of the ATC can handle only about 300 recruits, thus some are trained 'in-the-field' under various operational units (Engineer Regiment, Armoured Corps, Light Infantry and under the 'Watch' battalions). Specialized military training is intended after the ATC basic course. Foreign officer and senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) training is performed at various foreign country assignments, depending on the army's (or other services) needs each year. Most common countries where foreign training is received includes India (44 in 1980; 15 in 1984), United Kingdom, Australia, and Pakistan. The number involved in such training is small each year, and is inadequate to provide experience in changing doctrines and weapons use.

Weapons and Equipment

Probably still the most representative of the former British colonies that has changed its doctrines and equipment over the years, the small Sri Lankan army remains largely equipped with weapons of British World War II manufacture. Until the 1971 insurrection, most of the weapons in stock were Lee Enfield .303 rifles and carbines, a dozen 3-inch and 72-inch. British-pattern mortars, and a battery of eight British 4.2-inch heavy mortars. The artillery regiment possessed 24 KM.394mm (3.7-inch) anti-aircraft guns (leftovers from WW II) and 24 Bofors 40mm/L60 guns for the defence of Colombo and Trincomalee ports. A 12-vehicle armoured car company had 12 Daimler DINGO vehicles, and 18 Ferret MK.1 light armoured cars in service.

With the 1971 insurrection, the government received arms from a number of sources. Primarily given by governments favourably looked upon by the then prime minister, it included a Soviet donation of 12 82mm mortars and 10 BTR-152 armoured personnel vehicles. A purchase of 16 Yugoslav M1948 (B.1) 76-mm mountain howitzers was made. By far the most overwhelming "grant aid" was given by China. This included 30-plus Type 56 85-mm field guns, about 17,500 7.62mm rifles and 18,000 automatic rifles (SMGs). From Australia came 5,000 semi-automatic rifles in 1976-77 (supplementing 990 bought in 1968-70). At about this time, the United States was also the source for 80 1 1/2-ton light trucks. Prior to this, the army held about 350 1/4-ton to 6-ton military trucks and vehicles for use throughout the country. The 4th Artillery Regiment controls all the artillery within the country. The 'armoured force' consists of about 48 armoured cars, about evenly split between SALADIN and FERRET models. More recently, the Short Bros., Ltd. (Belfast) SHORLAND MK. 4 armoured patrol car has been purchased (beginning about 1983). These are all believed to be under control of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment, Armour Corps. Various reserve and support force personnel still have the Enfield rifles and carbines.

A large number of the country's front-line troops, artillery and armour is located in the immediate vicinity of Colombo, as the largest population centre and main port for the island. As an importing nation, and not militarily self-sufficient in arms, the country must consider protection of the international airport and naval and commercial port at Colombo of primary importance to maintaining contact with the outside world. Quartermaster items are manufactured in the country; as would be expected, heavy equipment suffers from a lack of spare parts and shortages of adequately trained maintenance personnel. The Ordnance Corps is responsible for storage of all shells and ordnance for the army, as well as medical, petroleum, and other logistical items. This is centrally located at the Welisara government ammunition depot.

The Air Component

In peacetime, the primary role for the air force is the transportation of tourists around the island, primarily to the central highlands (Kandy). The aircraft in the air component reflect this role and include widespread use of helicopters. The accompanying table of aircraft currently in service reflects this mission well. A single twin-engined medium transport has been kept in service for more than a decade in order to provide transport services out-of-country when required. This was first filled by a single Convair 440 aircraft, which in its time conducted some memorable flights to the Maldive Islands and India; currently, this mission is performed by a single BAe HS. 748 transport (since 1979).

Currently, the air force is composed of some 2,500 officers and non-commissioned personnel, operating about 40 aircraft. Most of the aircraft in storage probably could not be activated, except for the OH-13H helicopters and the Convair 440. These, and others not listed, are being retained in hopes of getting a national air museum going in the near-future. Flight squadrons include:

--No 1 FTS, China Bay air base: Cessna 150/152 Chipmunk trainers;

--No 2 Transport Squadron, Katunayake air base: Herons, Riley Skyliner-Heron, DC-3, HS. 748, Cessna 421s, -206 and -337 versions.

--No 3 Navigation Squadron, China Bay air base; 3 Doves.

--No 4 Helicopter Squadron, Katunayake air base: 7 Bell 206A, and 2 Dauphin II helicopters.

The air component also operates a Cessna 421C and Beach 18 on behalf of the government Survey Department. The No 3 Squadron helicopters generally operate under the name of "Helitours," for their peacetime mission of developing revenue to support other activities of the air force.

During the 1971 student rebellion, various aircraft were taken out of storage and placed in service. The Jet Provost T. MK. 51s were re-armed with British 3-inch (60-lb) rockets, which were acquired from abroad, and flown on air support missions. On 12 April 1971 the USAF delivered by C-141, the first three Bell "Jet Ranger" helicopters which were placed into immediate service. Civilian purchases were made of another six Bell 47G-2s in the U.S., which arrived by RAF "Argosy" transports. These were temporarily formed into a No 5 Helicopter Squadron, and temporarily armed with 7.62mm machine guns. The Soviets delivered Mig-17F/Fresco fighters and a

Mig-15UTI trainer, associated support equipment, two Kamov KA-26 rescue helicopters, and a small flight and advisory team. They formed a new No. 6 Squadron, but the five trained pilots did not complete operational status before most of the student rebellion had fizzled out and peace restored. With the emergency over, they were placed in storage shortly afterwards and have remained there since. Throughout most of the emergencies, both in 1971, 1976-77, and October 1981, the light transports and helicopters provided much needed transport, liaison work, and cargo-hauling functions to beleaguered police and armed forces facilities [from the central hub at Colombo/Katunayake air base]. The Bell 206As carried some 100,000 pounds (45,360-kg) of cargo and ferried some 900 troops on some 73 supply missions, including the air-lifting of some 36,500 pounds of ammunition, before the April 1971 emergency was over.

Besides the Air Force's flying squadrons, the basic organization is along very functional lines: Electronic Engineering and Aeronautical divisions, Administration, Operations, Medical, Logistics, and Procurement. The two AA Gun Battery Sections come under Air Force control and each is armed with 12 3.7-inch (94mm) AA guns. There are no radar sites to assist the guns and it is doubtful that existing ammunition would be very dependable. In general, the air force suffers from shortages of spare parts, and a budget that does not accommodate purchase of combat aircraft — not even those required for counter-insurgency air support (A-37B, HAWK, etc). Serviceability is probably about 50 to 60 percent for operational types.

The Air Force Academy, located on the China Bay air base facility, handles basic officer cadet training, as well as specialized follow-on training for junior and senior officers. Flight training lasts two years. Training is also provided for the country's air controllers, but at Colombo. The training centre at Diyatalawa handles air force requirements for weapons familiarization, and trains the small air force security force. After graduation, flight hours average 40 to 75 per month for liaison and transport pilots; more for helicopter pilots. Various advanced overseas courses are awarded to a small number of officers (about an annual average of 25) each year, primarily in the UK and India. There is also a small SLAF Volunteer Force. As the only organized reserve, members perform about six months initial active service and then carry out two-weeks active service per year after that. As it relates to the recent Tamil problems, all air force applicants are required to read and write Sinhalese, though, like the other military services, the preference is to handle administrative and other communications in English.

THE NAVAL SERVICE

The navy operates some thirty coastal patrol boats (PGM and CPC types) with a primary mission of anti-smuggling and illicit immigration surveillance duties. The force is also charged with enforcement of fishing rights within Sri Lanka's 200 nm EEZ, but this cannot effectively be accomplished with the numbers and types of patrol craft currently in service. The current force available to the navy is summarized on the accompanying chart; three additional craft recently entered service (*Abheetha* P714, *Edithara* P715, and *Wickrama* P716), but the class which these vessels belong to remains unknown. The navy recently began training its officers onboard the Ceylon Shipping Corporation's commercial cargo ship *Lanka Kanthi*. There is also a single lighthouse/Buoy support vessel.

The naval service primarily operates from Trincomalee and Colombo but secondary operating bases are also available at Karainagar, Welisara, Kalpitiya, and Tangale. The navy's biggest problem over the last two decades has been logistic support for its naval vessels; which has primarily been centred on problems of insufficient maintenance training for personnel, cumbersome material procurement procedures, poor administrative support, and the requirement to acquire electronic and gun equipment abroad and resultant spare parts replacement difficulties. The current force operates with a mixture of Chinese and British radars and gun systems. The service relies on the Colombo Dockyard and the repair slipways at the Trincomalee naval base for handling patrol craft maintenance. In the late-seventies, particular problems were common with the Chinese-built "Shanghai II" class PGMs, two of which were consistently in poor material condition and rarely operational. According to *Jane's Fighting Ships 1984-85*, two of the craft have since been deleted. This, as well as the reported disposal of the single ex-Soviet *Mol* class large gunboat *Samudra Devi*, has yet to be confirmed by Colombo.

The naval service has been the beneficiary of the best possible recruit personnel, and has been quite selective in recruitment of personnel. Personnel serve an initial ten-year military obligation when joining the naval service. Literacy is high, though the service has some officer recruitment problems due to limited promotion and command opportunities. A Naval and Maritime Academy provides naval training, including a 15-month basic officer course. Courses on navigation, seamanship and engineering are featured. Each year a small number of officer and NCO personnel are posted overseas for instruction, either on an advanced study curriculum or for specialized training regarding engineering or weapons training. Some sea-training for officers was conducted in Pakistan, but this is believed to have ceased some years ago. Most overseas training is done in the United Kingdom, with some in Australia, the United States and India. There is a small Volunteer Naval Reserve, consisting of some 35 to 40 officers and 300 ratings; there are no ships in "reserve" (mothballed). A former harbour patrol hydrofoil was maintained for some years in reserve, but this is believed to have since been scrapped.

Current naval construction projects centre on two programmes: a 330-ton (full load), 130.5 metre large patrol boat and a harbour/coastal patrol craft of 40 tons (20-metres). Two of the *Jayesagara* class large patrol craft have entered service, and three additional units were ordered late last year. The smaller *Pradeepa* class of coastal patrol craft is to assume primary patrol duties in the Palk Strait waters, which are shallow with numerous uncharted coral underwater structures. The other most effective patrol craft remain the five UK-built *Cheverton* type CPCs, locally known as the *Belikawa* ("421") class. Most of these craft are armed only with light machine guns in emergencies; the new *Jayesagara* class carries a single twin Chinese-made 25mm/L80 anti-aircraft gun mount forward. The *Mol* class vessel was acquired through the cajolings of former prime minister Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike, and was never popular with the navy, according to local officers. Lack of operable systems, particularly navigational and radar, plagued the ship from its initial delivery, as a "gift" of the Soviet Union.

The Chinese support remains of special interest, for since the 1977 visit of China's then Deputy Commander of the Navy, KAO Chen-Chien, Sri Lanka has been the beneficiary of on-again, off-again assistance from China. Earlier contacts were the direct result of the 1971 student rebellion and subsequent civil disorder, whereby five Shanghai II patrol gunboats were sold in 1972. Two more were added in 1980. President Junius R. Jayewardene visited China in May 1983, and from this visit it is understood Sri Lanka ordered an additional five Chinese patrol vessels, but the type remains unknown.

A final note should be taken regarding the position of the armed forces within the society. The President is nominal commander-in-chief, while the prime minister normally is Minister of Defence. However, since the May 1983 Tamil disturbances began, the special position of National Security Minister has been created and currently filled by Lalith Athulathmudali. Each military service has equal say in the defence establishment, but the army holds the dominant sway in most matters as a result of its vastly greater manpower.

The military services are a highly politicized organization; as such, officer promotions and assignments have been more determined by "whom one knows" and associates with, than does an individual's capabilities. Some reform efforts have been made in the past, but mediocrity remains in much of the higher officer ranks under the current presidency of Jayewardene. The previously almost insular nature of the island's military was shattered by the events of 1971. Since then, lower-level officers and the upper command levels have been exposed to greater security in the civil sector of society. The military was also the traditional route of many Tamils, only marginally educated, as a method of finding a guaranteed income and a better life for their families. In recent periods, the military was a more efficient organizational tool than most of the island's civil bureaucracy, and has been called upon to become involved in civic action programmes, particularly civil engineering projects.

THE NATIONAL POLICE

Sri Lanka is one nation where consideration must be given to the national police organization when considering "armed forces", for the force is truly a "paramilitary" organization and has great impact (and effect!) upon the current round of civil disturbances in predominantly Tamil areas. The force, which is believed to number some 15,000 (actually slightly larger than the army)*, is under the command of the Inspector General of Police (IGP). This places the police commander under the Ministry of Home Affairs; the force is divided into three geographic commands, and respective divisions to handle investigations, administration, etc. and the Special Police Reserve organization.

Until the 1971 events, it was not common for members of the police organization to carry weapons, though training had been given in the handling of pistol, rifle or carbine, and shotguns. In view of the continued disturbances in 1981, it was decided in April 1982 that police sergeants and constables on duty in the North would be issued handguns (revolvers). Past experience from the 1971 and later attacks on the police and their stations indicated that their members were either unarmed or carrying a rifle when attacked; the rifle is generally found to be a weapon unsuited for surprise attacks at close range against terrorists. As the IGP indicated, "My men need a weapon they can draw and use quickly in this situation."¹ Such training is now conducted at the Police College, at Katukurunda. The British Lee-Enfield .303 carbine or rifle has traditionally been issued to the police for emergencies, for countering extreme levels of civil disorder. Common handguns are the Pistol No. 2, MK.1 .38 cal. or Welby .455 No. 1, MK.VI — both six-round weapons. Large numbers of Chinese pistols have been bought within the last five years and probably include the 7.62mm Type 54 (a copy of Soviet TT-M1933) or the 9mm (Soviet PM) Type 59. These were also procured for the army.

The growth of the Tamil insurgency in the northern portions of the island has not been effectively controlled by the police forces. During the 1971 rebellion, 92 police stations were attacked and 37 policemen killed, along with 26 army personnel in subsequent operations. The Tamil ethnic group represents about 21 percent (21%) of the population; however, Tamils in the police force far exceed this ratio. The reason is much like the army — greater opportunities for upward mobility and a stable income. As evidenced by the 1982 and earlier riots of this last year, the police were not well trained in anti-aircraft methods or riot control. The communal riots of July 1983 caused extensive damage to property in the north. Alarmed by the extent of damage and the inability of the police forces to handle the situation, the government moved to greatly enhance the budget allocations in the direction of the police. Some \$24 million has been included for the police in the fiscal 1984 budget.

* This is the author's estimate of the size of the force, for no reliable figures from Sri Lanka's newspapers or other sources have been published that actually lists precisely the force total.

1 Daily News, Colombo, April 24, 1982, pl 1.

CONCLUSION


As in insurgencies elsewhere in the world, the radical wing of the TULF has made a major impact on government officials in Colombo. While there may exist a recognition of the emergency that is upon them, they have yet to make every effort to get the most out of the security forces at hand. Reform measures are underway, in both the police and army, under the direction of Lalith Athulathmudali. The most controversial of these measures has been to call for Israeli assistance, in the form of several members of Israel's SHIN BET counter-terrorist agency. This has been heavily reported in Colombo's newspapers, and in Parliament (beginning May 25, 1984). It should be remembered that Sri Lanka broke relations with Israel over the Palestinian question 15 years ago and has not had any military or diplomatic relations since then. The move by Sri Lanka's prime minister caused a storm of protest, both in the Arab countries and New Delhi. Rightfully, it should have . . . Sri Lanka depends heavily on *imported* Arab-produced oil, mostly in barter agreements that involves Sri Lankan agricultural goods in exchange.

In another action, six British SAS members have been "seconded" to the police forces, which is probably to the "Special Branch" division of that organization (which specializes in internal security and counter-subversion). Yet through all this, the military continues to rely upon the police for much of its "local" information of terrorist activity and the potential individuals involved. The government in Colombo has been reluctant to involve the army directly in this conflict; possibly one of the reasons why the riots and destruction of this last year got so far out of hand in the North. It should be remembered the police force is predominantly Tamil.

One of the controversial developments of the Israeli presence was the reported arrival of a number of jet transports in Colombo from South Africa, believed to be carrying South African-produced arms that the Israelis could purchase (on behalf of the Colombo-government) for use in augmenting existing arms. Obtaining arms from South Africa is less-than-popular in most of South Asia. However, it reveals what this analyst believes to be a tendency of the government and military forces to be engaged in a lot of "uncoordinated" efforts in responding to the threat. It is known that Short Brothers' (Belfast) armoured patrol cars have been procured (possibly as early as 1981-82). Locally, it is reported they are being assembled from knock-down assemblies being sent to the island by the manufacturer. Inclusion of this 7.7 to 9-mm protected vehicles, armed with a 7.62-mm machine gun and endowed with good speed, represents a significant increase in local police firepower; whether it is used properly is another matter.

There have been incidences of both army and police units having *severe* discipline problems. This includes the mini-mutiny of the 1st Battalion RAJARATA RIFLES in July 1983. Some of the officers were discharged, and the unit apparently was broken-up and personnel assigned elsewhere. Discipline has thus remained a serious problem; one could attribute some of this to insufficient leadership training in the officer and NCO ranks manifested in an unwillingness of officers and NCOs to become involved in discipline problems for fear of personal safety. These are some of the problems governments face when recruits are drawn from levels of society that come into the military margi-

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nally literate because of social problems in hopes of improving their own lot via the military services.

According to minister Lalith, the earlier events of May last year were precipitated by the radicals in order to create a New Delhi response. "We should be wise enough to distinguish our real problem; what the terrorists in the north wanted was to somehow let the island be invaded by Indian troops."² It should be pointed out that Lalith made very concerted efforts in discussions with New Delhi to stave-off any Indira Gandhi moves like that which occurred in the invasion of East Pakistan (later, Bangladesh). While the circumstances were not as grave, there remained real concern in Colombo that India might repeat the invasion. In the meantime, the Israeli "interest section" remains in the U.S. Embassy, Colombo.

It should be pointed out that not all Tamils support the "Eelam" concept, for many consider it an economic disaster (with good reason). Tamils overseas have also been caught up in the events as well; incidences in the Middle East, where many Sri Lankans are employed, speak of "Tamil Tiger" members harassing "non-joiners" in classical civil war fashion. In the interim, the government has maintained the mobilized 2nd Battalion Light Infantry of the Volunteer Force, in order to beef-up existing security forces. The military would like to see English restored as the "official" functioning language of the government and military).

There is little question that existing security forces cannot cope with greater civil disturbance levels in the North for long periods of time. Should the Tamil radical groups obtain international terrorist support, and there are indications of them moving in this direction, anti-terrorist training and professionalism of the armed forces will have to be significantly augmented. In the interim, most observers feel that the government will be satisfied with its current campaign to "isolate" Jaffna and the north in general. Further civil outbreaks could well force the retirement of President Jayewardene. This could result in more "moderate" thinkers moving into positions of influence, willing to compromise to reduce the current level of racial polarization that exists.

In any respect, Sri Lanka's armed forces can only be expanded within the limits of the island's economy and this places distinct limits on the expansion. Government reforms could reduce current hostility and defuse the growing civil war situation; if it doesn't happen that way, then the success or failure of the security forces will ultimately depend on the training and professionalism of individuals within the armed forces of Sri Lanka. ■

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END