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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS***

No 12, December 1987

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# Soviet Union

## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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JPRS-UWE-88-004

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19 MAY 1988

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### English Summary of Major Articles

18160004a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 158-159

[Text] L. Tolkunov in "Nuclear Disarmament as a Demand of Time" notes that the Soviet state stakes its hopes on the present generation which is responsible for the fate of civilization and life on Earth. This was declared at the jubilee meeting to mark the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. A grave responsibility for the world is placed also on two mighty powers—the USSR and the USA which with their enormous material and intellectual opportunities have accumulated the overwhelming nuclear potential. Time has come for these countries to display sufficient wisdom, ability, responsibility and respect for each other to unravel the present day world problems. One should derive due lessons from the past, particularly from the past of Soviet-American relations. It is necessary, firstly to clearly understand what has happened in the past, secondly, how we should live and cooperate in the world of the future. The article offers a short digression into history to reach an understanding of what has brought the world to the present critical stage, to the danger of a nuclear apocalypses. The author notes since man on the threshold of the 21st century knows and can accomplish a great deal he must realize the need to demilitarise the world. Strength, reminds the author, has always determined the American national security doctrine with its reliance on power, hegemonistic aspirations and weapons race, armed interference for social revenge. Today the U.S. military doctrine is being reconsidered once again, becoming more aggressive and dangerous. The military strategy, elaborated by the Pentagon envisages the U.S. and NATO war preparation. The sophistication of American and West European technology, arms race and concomitantly reckless squandering of limited resources is boundless. The militarization of mentality and way of life weakens and even removes all moral brakes on the road to nuclear suicide. But at the same time new realities, different factors of risk, time and others are in a new way posing the issue of disarmament. Such factors as unintended complications by error and computer failure should not be disregarded. The article considers some works by American authors, exposing military and political plans and strategic orientation of the US ruling circles concerning the USSR. At the same time American scientific thought notes that the important steps which the USSR and the USA have made towards disarmament give rise to hopes that the process will become deeper and improved. The author mentions some Soviet initiatives of immense significance for the entire world.

A. Arbatov, A. Savelyev, "Strategic Command and Control and Problem of Stability". Most of the undergoing research in strategic parity, balance and stability usually

centers on qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the weapon system (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers). However, the analysis of Command, Control Communication and Intelligence system demands equal attention. This issue is getting priority in latest arms control studies. The authors of the article try to explain the reasons of this growing interest to C<sup>3</sup>I problems. They review main functions of modern C<sup>3</sup>I system, analyse the problems of their growing vulnerability, give authoritative views of Soviet and US experts. A main trend of C<sup>3</sup>I development is aimed at attaining quick reaction to a possible attack, but in certain circumstances that could lead to a situation when the political leadership could lose control over important decision-making process. The problems of C<sup>3</sup>I are becoming more acute in the light of its growing vulnerability. The authors give their own recommendations on the possible steps in the field of arms control which could strengthen strategic stability.

L. Grigoryev, "Structural and Cyclical Aspects of the Process of Capital Accumulation in the US". The period of 1973-1986 was marked by a forced adaptation of capitalist economy to drastically changing and deteriorating conditions of reproduction, particularly the system of relative prices. As a result these years become a transitional period between the two states of the scientific and technological revolution. The labour saving but energy-intensive type of development under conditions of soared commodity prices led to fixed capital large-scale devaluation, which may be considered as a special case of the second type moral depreciation. The slowing down of the turnover of fixed capital and its devaluation demanded large investments for replacement. Correspondingly, the rise of the aggregate rate of accumulation in relation to the American GNP was accompanied by a considerable structural change in favour of replacement. This process was also furthered by an increase of new equipment investments at the expense of housing construction. In these years such investments existed side by side with a large volume of outdated means of production which could not but tell on the rise of fixed capital per unit of capacity in manufacturing and services. The acceleration of accumulation became an important form of adaptation of capitalist economy to structural changes. Another expression of the process was the narrowed "accumulation front". Main investments (particularly at the end of the 70s) were made in high/tech industrial equipment at the expense of other traditional industries. Analogous phenomena were observed in the investment structure by industry: after a "pause" in the 70s an investment boom took place in the manufacturing industry, particularly in mechanical engineering. Thereby the foundation was laid for mass modernization of fixed capital on a new technical basis. Rapid and large-scale transformations of investment structure could not but generate considerable changes in the cyclic character of investments. Oil and chemical industries in some cases acted in an anti-cyclic way by increasing investments in the years of crisis. The same must be said about the credit and financial system of the 80s and

engineering industry. The lowering of US capital investments in 1986, the period of an upswing of economy and dropping of oil and other commodity prices, signifies on the whole the end of capitalist intensive adaptation to structural shocks. One can expect that future accumulation process will be largely determined by a "traditional" mechanism of the second STR stage and not by specific structural aspects.

R. Markaryan, "On the Crises in the Persian Gulf Zone". The article analyses the peculiarities of the explosive situation in the Persian Gulf zone which has reached an unprecedented point of tension during the whole period of the Iran-Iraq war which has lasted for more than seven years. The situation is fraught with the risk of an eruption, the scale and consequences of which are unpredictable. The military intervention of the US and other NATO countries has exacerbated the conflict between Iran and Iraq which has reached a dangerous scale in 1987. Examining the regional aspects of the war the author notes that it has extremely exhausted the opposing sides, ever more aggravated Iran's relations with neighboring countries, disintegrated the Arab world and hampered its struggle for the just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As far as the global aspect of the crisis in the Persian Gulf zone it is largely due to US military activities. The author exposes the true motives of the American activity in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. role in intensifying and expanding the conflict fostered by the secret operations which were manifested in the course of the investigation of the scandal known as Irangate. Setting forth the Soviet stand the author notes that since the beginning of the conflict the USSR has repeatedly warned against interference by Western countries, especially the US, in the affairs of the countries of the Persian Gulf, stressing that the way to ending the protracted war lies through political means. The Soviet Union has also moved concrete proposals, directed at normalizing the situation in the region.

The approaching third millennium is enhancing our interest to generalized appraisals of the history of the 20th century and statements to the effect what mankind can expect from the 21st century. All these themes are inexhaustible in view of their complicity and debatableness of their conclusions. A. Bovin and V. Lukin in their dialogue "On the Threshold of a New Century" exchange their opinions on this issue, noting that three components are most visible: the arms race, fraught with global catastrophe, the accelerated ecological crisis caused by the aggressive misbehaviour of the technosphere in relation to the biosphere and the striking contrast between poverty and richness engendering the growth of social and international tension. All this is tangled with the sufferings and misfortunes of peoples. The authors note that mankind is approaching the third millennium in an atmosphere of crisis permeated with contradictions and paradoxes where divergencies between East and West exist in the essence and scale of the problems. A. Bovin and V. Lukin draw the conclusions that the tragedy of our civilization lies in the fact

that in our century the masses are deeply involved in world problems of a new level: accelerated change of the globalization of the problem of civilization. The authors do not avoid the problems and difficulties of socialism, international included, the fate of capitalism and tasks of the world communist movement. They stress that positive results of perestroika in the USSR could enhance our country's international prestige and help to decide the problems of disarmament.

The article "On the New 'Historical Debates'" by F. Falin deals with the discussions in Western historiography over the genesis of Nazism, the roots of aggressiveness of the German imperialism, the causes and character of the World War II. Some Western authors make efforts to revise the history of Nazi Germany, to write off the bloody crimes committed by Hitler's terroristic dictatorship and to produce its worldwide aggression as a natural reaction to the Versailles humiliation of Germany and the alleged Communist threat from the East. V. Falin reminds of the well-established fact that Nazism was fostered by German and international—U.S. in particular—imperialism both for suppression of popular discontent within Germany itself and for launching the military crusade against the USSR, the first and then the only socialist state of the world. The revisionist historians argue that the Nazi Reich did its best to meet both these ends, all the bloodshed and brutality having been but easily understandable and pardonable means. Their efforts go to the point that Nazi Germany fought in the World War II for the same anti-Communist cause as was adopted in the years of the Cold War, being thus the precursor of Western policy of nowadays. Such a conclusion not only acquits the Nazis of their crimes against humanity but also supports revanchist feelings in today's Federal Republic of Germany aggressiveness toward the socialist community in the West. It is worth notice that these theories are sponsored by reactionary circles from both sides of the Atlantic.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

#### **Computer Reliance Increases Nuclear War Risk Factors**

18160004b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 3-11

[Article by L. Tolkunov: "Nuclear Disarmament—Command of the Times"]

[Text] According to a scientific theory, the universe originated as the result of a "big bang". Now, however, an artificial "big bang"—owing to ill intent or a fatal mistake—could turn into a radioactive wilderness the Earth—the pearl of the universe. The threat is great. It is a question of the survival of mankind. It bears the responsibility for self-preservation and the preservation of life on the planet. "The present generations..." M.S.

Gorbachev's report at the ceremonial session commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October emphasizes, "are responsible for the fate of civilization and life on Earth itself. It depends on them ultimately whether the start of the new millennium of world history is its tragic epilogue or inspirational prologue to the future."

Of course, a special, heightened, unique, it may be said, responsibility to the entire human community for the fate of the world and its assured survival is borne by the Soviet Union and the United States—the two mightiest powers with vast interests and tremendous material and intellectual potential which concentrate, what is more, the overwhelming mass of nuclear weapons. And we are entirely justified in posing the question thus: these states—despite the fact that literally heaps of problems have accumulated between them—must have sufficient wisdom, ability, responsibility and respectfulness toward one another in order to understand today's world and prevent a catastrophe. This is expected of them by people of the Earth, particularly on the threshold of the meeting of Soviet and American leaders which begins on 7 December in Washington.

Pondering what needs to be done for an improvement in Soviet-American relations, M.S. Gorbachev writes in his book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World" of the need for lessons to be learned from the past, from the past of Soviet-American relations included, in order, first, to understand the reasons for what has happened and, second, to think about how we should live in the future in this world and how cooperate. "This," he emphasizes, "is a science, a serious science, a responsible science, if, of course, we hold to positions of truth" (p 221). It is perfectly obvious that more harmonious relations between the USSR and the United States cannot be approached if we remain in the grip of ideological myths. And it is not only a question of the tenacity of such myths, settled cliches of political thinking (paramount among which are the stereotypes of anti-Sovietism, the "Soviet threat" and the "enemy image") and traditional ideas concerning power and strength as the most dependable guarantee of peace. It is a question also of the existence of the actual interests of those who have, as they say, bound themselves fast to military business. It is a question of the activity of circles and forces united in M.S. Gorbachev's book in the concept of the "militarist party in the United States," which is "allergic to even the slightest easing of relations between our countries" (p 250). And if abrupt changes have occurred in Soviet-American relations since the war—from alliance during WWII to the "cold war" of the 1940's-1950's and from the detente of the 1970's to the sharp exacerbation on the frontier of the 1980's—this has largely been explained by the fact that the interests of the militarist grouping have in one way or another gained the ascendancy, as has happened repeatedly.

The brief excursion into history offered here is made not for the now fruitless elucidation of the questions: who is

to blame or who is the more to blame but for the sake of an understanding of what has brought the world to the present critical phase, to the danger of nuclear apocalypse.

## I

The defenders of militarism maintain that strength is a guarantee of peace. According to their logic, nuclear weapons preclude the use of weapons altogether and thereby serve peace. The past 40 peaceful years are cited in confirmation. Thus are attempts made to substantiate the effectiveness of the "nuclear restraint" or "deterrence" doctrine.

According to M. Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies and well-known American specialist in the arms control field, the United States' military doctrine has for several decades been based on an extremely erroneous and dangerous assumption concerning the possibility of fighting a nuclear war and winning it. According to him, operational nuclear devices of any type are not weapons in the conventional understanding of this word. They cannot be a means for either combatant of conducting combat operations and of winning. In the event of the use of such weapons, destruction would threaten not only the enemy but also the attacking side and all terrestrial civilization too. There would be no winner in such a war. However, the author concludes, despite the sufficiently obvious nature of this finding, the U.S. military and political leadership is elaborating strategic plans based on the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons; a vast military machinery of annihilation, which could get out of control, has been created.

It is sufficient merely to enumerate the American military doctrines and strategic concepts of the postwar period to persuade oneself that the power approach has been a constant dominant in Washington's ideas concerning "national security".

While the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still exuding lethal radiation, the strategy of "massive retaliation" was adopted. It was based on the United States' nuclear monopoly and the feeling of impunity and permissiveness ensuing from a belief in the total invulnerability of the North American continent. However, its bankruptcy was shortly revealed. The American nuclear monopoly was broken. Appreciable adjustments to the calculations of the U.S. military and political leadership were made by the launching in 1957 of the first Soviet artificial Earth satellite. It was apparent to even the most obtuse in Washington that, in the event of a conflict, the United States would be subject to a palpable retaliatory attack. The "flexible response" strategy appeared at the start of the 1960's. It could not have failed to have taken into consideration the approximate balance between the USSR and the United States in strategic arsenals—the "nuclear stalemate" which had arisen. The new strategy permitted a "measured" use of

military force commensurate with the "scale of the present danger". The "measure" itself envisaged the preparation and fighting of all wars—world or local, nuclear or conventional, large or small. This meant that the "massive retaliation" strategy had not been cast aside, as was stated, but had become an organic part of the "flexible response" strategy which had come to replace it.

In our time the military doctrine of the United States is being reconsidered once again. The present strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USSR and the United States provides on a global and regional scale for the implementation of wide-ranging programs of the modernization of the strategic offensive forces and general forces and the development of new types of weapons. Particular hopes are linked with the use of the latest S&T achievements and technological potential of the United States and the whole of the West for the purpose of the creation of new areas of military rivalry.

The military-political designs and strategic principles of the United States have in the past 40 years been specified in a whole succession of Pentagon plans. (M. Kaku) and D. Axelrod, the authors of the book "Winning a Nuclear War: the Pentagon's Secret Military Plans," which was published in 1987, write: "An close reading of the papers shows that, contrary to public statements concerning 'deterrence' and 'defense,' the real nuclear policy of America's military department has provided for the use of nuclear arms to threaten nuclear war, fight a nuclear war, survive in a nuclear war and even 'win' a nuclear war." This idea has been embodied in various concepts: under Truman it was called "atomic diplomacy," under Eisenhower-Dulles, "brinkmanship," under McNamara, "controlled escalation and "flexible response," and under Nixon, "limited nuclear options"; the formula "fighting a nuclear war," which assumes that such a war can indeed be fought and won, became current under Carter. The book sets forth the history of the inception of the "domination at all levels of conflict" principle, which forms the basis of all postwar American military doctrines.

As of the present time the United States has more than 1,500 military bases and facilities in 32 countries and maintains more than half a million servicemen overseas. As a report distributed by the White House on 28 January 1987 observes, U.S. security strategy, its global aims and the very nature of the threat require that "we be ready to defend our interests at the remotest frontiers from the North America. In accordance with this, our strategy relies to a considerable extent on the principle of the forward basing of forces in a state of readiness based on strong alliances. To maintain these relations we will continue to preserve in peacetime at the forward boundaries large army, naval and air forces in Europe and in the Atlantic and the Pacific and also other forces in the Western hemisphere and Indian Ocean."

As we can see, in elaborating its strategic concepts the Pentagon succumbs to the disastrous delusion that national security can be strengthened thanks to the buildup and creation of new weapons systems. Hopes are placed in an upgrading of military technology. The dangerous philosophy of "nuclear deterrence" is preserved, as before.

Many West European politicians also maintain that the idea of a nuclear-free world is utopian and that nuclear weapons are a deterrent factor. This idea permeates the speeches of M. Thatcher, J. Chirac and H. Kohl. There are also, of course, people who sincerely believe that the nuclear evil is necessary for preventing a greater evil—war.

But surely it is obvious that the "nuclear safe-conduct" is not trouble-free and not indefinite? The more the quantity of nuclear weapons, the fewer the possibilities of their "obedient behavior". Essentially, in the last decade the creation of increasingly new and more sophisticated means of warfare has increased the likelihood of an exterminating conflict.

A whole number of new, hitherto unknown "risk factors" has appeared. The threat of an accidental, unpremeditated nuclear catastrophe has grown primarily. Such a danger is increased noticeably by the "time factor," when decisions have to be made in a matter of minutes and seconds. And in this case it is necessary to call for assistance on complex computer devices, that is, to transfer intelligent political decisions to the trust of robots, which, of course, cannot be absolutely perfect and reliable. Even the latest apparatus does not preclude the possibility of a tragic mishap, miscalculation or error.

The threat is recognized by sober-minded people in the United States itself also. Thus J. Douglas, former U.S. assistant attorney general, wrote in the NEW YORK TIMES: "We are approaching the very edge of the abyss. But it should be recalled that in the past each newly chosen type of weapon was, with the rare exception, used. Clearly, the risk of a nuclear conflict is increasing. Technical progress and the strategic directions of national policy increase the possibility of fatal miscalculations. The time for adopting retaliatory measures has been reduced, nuclear weapons have been taken onto the battlefield and first-strike capacity has increased. Meanwhile technical progress continues to undermine the capacity for rational decision-making in periods of crises in relations between the superpowers."

The well-known American historian and diplomat G. Kennan wrote in the spring issue of the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS for 1987: "It is perfectly clear to me that the Soviet leaders do not want war with us and are not about to start a war. Specifically, I never believed that they considered the military seizure of West Europe as being in their interests or that they might in general attack this region, even if the so-called deterrent nuclear

forces did not exist.... I believe that the arms race in which we are now both participating represents a serious threat in itself not on account of the aggressive intentions of one side but on account of the fact that we have at times to act by force of necessity and also on account of the suspicions and anxieties engendered by such competition and on account of the highly serious dangers of the unpremeditated complications which it entails—computer errors and failures, wrongly understood signals or damage caused deliberately by third parties.”

## II

It was the so-called “deterrence” philosophy gave birth to R. Reagan’s “strategic defense initiative”. But in reality it was needed—and this is becoming increasingly apparent—not for “deterring” a nonexistent aggressor and defense of the United States against a mythical threat but for implementation of imperial policy, which has been stalemated under the conditions of strategic parity and which it is desired to extricate therefrom with the aid of space-based experiments. Is this not indicated, for example, by the arguments of Z. Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the U.S. President, in his book “Game Plan,” which was published in 1986? The essence of the concept which he expounds is thus. Military control of space is becoming a powerful lever of compulsion to geopolitical obedience on Earth. Given the tremendous power of destruction of nuclear weapons, which could be aimed at ground targets, undivided superiority in space could be of greater significance than was ever the case with domination at sea. Not submitting to the political demands of the power possessing indisputable superiority in space would mean bringing about destruction for one’s country, it lacking the weapons necessary for a retaliatory strike. Z. Brzezinski concludes from what has been said the following: rivalry in space is unfolding for the sake of acquisition of strategic means of pressure.

At the time of formulation of the ABM Treaty the USSR and the United States adhered to the common viewpoint that broad-based ABM defenses would destabilize the situation and increase the threat of the outbreak of war. They could be effective only against the retaliatory strike of weakened nuclear forces of a country which had been subjected to nuclear attack. For this reason a space shield is needed by those who are preparing first activation of the space sword. Even if “star wars” can never function as an effective defense system, (M. Kaku) and D. Axelrod, the authors of the above-mentioned book “Winning a Nuclear War: the Pentagon’s Secret Plans” observe, it has another sphere of application, in which even a partial, “pierced” shield has colossal military potential. If a country had such a shield, it could deliver a first strike, wipe out vast numbers of the enemy’s ground missiles and then avail itself of it to absorb the weakened retaliatory strike.

The Pentagon allows of the possibility of a breach of the American ABM system by hundreds and even thousands of warheads of unprecedented power of destruction.

Emphasis is now being put on the protection with the aid of ABM defenses of the American command centers, nuclear weapons dumps, missile silos, nuclear reactors and so forth.

In December 1986 the U.S. President put forward a new version of the “star wars” program providing for the deployment of the “first echelon” of broad-based ABM defenses in 1994 even. The purpose of the project is to speed up the transition from research in the field of broad-based ABM defense to the practical deployment of space-based systems. The plan provides for putting into orbit dozens of spacecraft carrying small missiles for destroying missile warheads in flight and creating a satellite system of reconnaissance and observation. The ABM defenses will also include hundreds of ground-based missiles. The proposed system is intended for the protection of a limited number of military facilities.

Having adopted a policy of the achievement of military superiority by way of realization of the “star wars” program, Washington is attempting to involve the Soviet Union in costly space projects of a military nature. American specialists have calculated that the creation of ABM defenses could cost four-five times more than the creation by the other side of missiles capable of overcoming it. Clearly referring to the economic consequences of an arms race in space for the Soviet Union, E. Teller, “father” of the American hydrogen bomb, maintained that if the USSR follows the U.S. example and starts the creation of its own broad-based ABM defense in space, “the SDI may be considered justified.”

The Soviet attitude toward the SDI is well known to the international community. First, this program is clearly linked with the United States’ hopes of surging toward military superiority and outflanking the Soviet Union. Second, the SDI means the transference of weapons to a new environment—space—which will destabilize the strategic situation sharply. Third, mere adherence to this program testifies to a political goal—putting the USSR by hook or by crook in an unequal position and at the same time exhausting it economically, involving it in a new twist of the arms race spiral. We have warned the United States in good time that if it succeeds in accomplishing its intentions in respect of the SDI, although this we strongly doubt, a Soviet response will follow. The response will be effective, reliable and economical. We have a study of how to devalue the SDI without spending on this the fabulous amounts which the United States will need to build it.

But this is not our choice. We want and are seeking a different solution. Disarmament is, as history has shown, an extraordinarily difficult problem. It is made even more difficult by the presence and development of nuclear weapons and the use in the process of the arms race of the latest achievements of science and technology. Nonetheless, we may be sure that mankind is capable of stepping back from the nuclear abyss and finding fundamentally new forms of ensuring security on Earth.

It took millions of years for intelligent life to originate on our planet. But today, in the nuclear and space age, it runs the risk of instantaneous annihilation. Such a monstrous prospect cannot be accepted. Scientists have yet to prove the existence of intelligent life on other planets of our system and throughout the universe even. And what could be a loftier and nobler goal than salvation of humankind!

The creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons has brought the world to the point of no return. Attention was called to the pivotal nature of the historic moment through which we are living by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech at the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Mankind," emphasizing that the creation and, subsequently, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems beyond all reasonable limits had rendered man technically capable of putting an end to his own existence. Simultaneously the buildup in the world of explosive social material and attempts to continue to solve problems of a cardinally changed world by force and methods inherited from the Stone Age are making a catastrophe highly likely politically also. Militarization of thinking and lifestyle weakens or removes altogether even the moral impediments en route to nuclear suicide.

In a word, the question is: either political thinking will come into line with the demands of the times or civilization and life on Earth itself could disappear. Mankind has no other choice. Yes, the ideological argument is irrevocable. But nuclear realities dictate the need for new thinking and a new philosophy of international relations. Security today is not determined by the number of missiles, submarines or aircraft. War and the use of force cannot be a prudent and acceptable instrument of policy. All peoples are like the climbers' rope on the mountain side. They can either climb further, toward the summit, together or fall into the chasm together.

This is not only a political and military but also moral question. A sign of a new approach to problems of the modern highly complex and contradictory world should be the humanitarian breadth of thinking of statesmen and politicians. They need no less breadth now than political calculation, diplomatic circumspection and parliamentary skill. Life emphatically demands that they, finally, move beyond the framework of narrowly conceived state interests and ascend to the level of a general approach to problems of the times. It is thus a question of statesmen's responsibility not only for the peaceful life and well-being of their own people but also for the security and prosperity of all mankind for genuine national interests are today essentially the interests of the entire human race. This is why at the end of the 20th century there should be no mistrust, hostility, alienation and enmity in relations between peoples. Ideological intolerance in order to alienate countries must not be cultivated. We have taken the necessary steps in our

policy to rid it of ideological prejudice. And the West needs to do this too. It is necessary to look ahead and see the reference points toward which all peoples can and must proceed in concert.

The time has come to establish sounder relations between all states of East and West. While remaining themselves in their systems and their alliances, they could play a positive part in world development and contribute to the stabilization of the international situation.

### III

The foreign policy program of the 27th CPSU Congress is a striking and indisputable embodiment of Lenin's evaluation of disarmament as the ideal of socialism. A policy based on force is today futile and dangerous. While not denying the need for sufficient defense capability, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are bringing to the fore political means of solving international problems. The task is not to stockpile new heaps of weapons but to seek accords and agreements between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO on arms reductions and confidence-building measures and to elaborate and activate mechanisms providing for general international security. Even military-strategic parity, which is today the foundation of peace, cannot perform this function forever. The balance of terror is not only amoral but also unreliable.

In lowering the parity level it is essential to move toward the main reference point—the gradual, complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass extermination on Earth. Stability in the world must be maintained not by force of weapons but with the aid of political and legal means.

Recognizing what a formidable threat nuclear weapons represent for mankind, the Soviet Union has since the very moment of their appearance advocated the banning and destruction thereof. At one of the first meetings of the UN Atomic Energy Commission on 19 June 1946 the USSR put forward a draft international convention banning the production, use and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for purposes of mass annihilation. The USSR proposed that all subscribers to such a convention solemnly undertake under no circumstances to use atomic weapons, to ban their production and storage and to destroy within a period of 3 months all stockpiles of available weapons and those in production. It never occurred to the United States, which had a nuclear monopoly, at that time to renounce this means of blackmail and pressure.

In subsequent years the USSR continued persistently to advocate a ban on nuclear means of annihilation. In the first half of the 1950's our country repeatedly proposed the announcement of an unconditional ban on atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapon of mass destruction. Importance is attached to the resolution "On the Nonuse



of Force in International Relations and the Prohibition Forever of the Use of Nuclear Weapons," which was passed on the initiative of the Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly session in 1972. Thanks to the persistent efforts of our country, the United Nations adopted in 1981 the declaration "Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe," which contains the declaration that states and statesmen who are the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the most heinous crime against humanity.

Subsequently the USSR has continued persevering struggle for the limitation, prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. In parallel, as the threat of the militarization of near-Earth space has become increasingly distinct, it has increased its efforts for the purpose of barring the way of weapons into space.

The flight of Yuriy Gagarin on 12 April 1961 was an important frontier in the development of human civilization. People of the whole world had won a most signal victory over the forces of nature. How far the world has advanced since that historic day in the study and rendering habitable of space! This process promises tremendous benefits. Today even space equipment is being employed extensively for terrestrial needs. The time for the accomplishment of the principal task of cosmonautics—the industrialization of near-Earth space and the creation of orbital factories and plants, which will produce, under conditions of high vacuum and weightlessness, fundamentally new products—is nigh. Space must serve people.

From the very start of the space era the Soviet Union has resolutely opposed plans for the militarization of near-Earth space. Back in 1958 the Soviet Government proposed that the UN General Assembly study the question of a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes. The Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was drawn up on the initiative of the USSR and came into force in 1967.

In 1976 the USSR submitted to the United Nations a proposal on the conclusion of a universal treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations. The draft document incorporated a proposition concerning renunciation of the use of armed forces using all types of weapons, including nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, on land, at sea, in the air and in outer space. The Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty banning the deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind and submitted to the United Nations in 1981 the draft of such a treaty. In 1983 the USSR proposed that a total ban be sought on the use of military force both in outer space and from space in respect of the Earth.

In 1984 the Soviet Union proposed to the United States a start on negotiations on the question of prevention of the militarization of near-Earth space and the renunciation of assault space-based weapons, including ASAT

weapons and ABM interceptors of all types of basing. In the fall of the same year the USSR submitted to the United Nations a proposal on the use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind. The General Assembly voted in favor of a draft resolution on prevention of an arms race in outer space and demanded that its conquest be undertaken solely without the use or threat of force. In August 1985 the USSR proposed for study by the United Nations the question "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Conquest of Outer Space Under Conditions of its Nonmilitarization".

As of the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, the USSR's foreign policy has risen to a qualitatively new level of dynamism and constructiveness. How we conceive of movement toward a secure, lasting peace has been clearly stated. Our country has presented a whole program of bold, multilateral, large-scale disarmament measures. An all-embracing, substantiated, realistic plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass annihilation on Earth was offered for the judgment of mankind for the first time in the historic statement of 15 January 1986.

The philosophy of the Soviet concept of peace is not simply one of rejection of nuclear terror or brinkmanship. It is a philosophy of life, a philosophy of action. It is developing together with the course of objective processes in the world.

When elaborating on the basis of new thinking the prospects of advancement toward a stable, nuclear-free world, Soviet political thought substantiated the need for and possibility of an all-embracing system of international security under conditions of disarmament.

Particular mention has to be made in this connection of relations between the USSR and the United States. Despite the fact that they remain complex, difficult and contradictory, an intensive political dialogue is being conducted between the two countries at the present time. Much has changed in them for the better since the top-level meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. Life has confirmed the soundness of the proposition that an important intellectual breakthrough in most important areas of current world politics was made in Reykjavik. This meeting imparted practical energy to the new thinking and permitted it take hold in the most diverse social and political circles and made international political contacts more fruitful.

The merit of Reykjavik was that it initiated a process which led to understandings on the third and fourth Soviet-American summits—in Washington and Moscow—definition of the concept of the meetings and the elaboration of their agenda.

At the meeting in the United States an agreement will be signed on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. An entire class of nuclear arms will thereby have been eliminated and the first actual step en route to the removal of nuclear arsenals will have been taken.

But time does not wait. The danger of an upgrading of weapons, which could get out of control, continues to increase. This is why the Soviet leadership has declared with all certainty that it will strive persistently at the upcoming summit meetings for a perceptible improvement and specific results in the key question of removal of the nuclear threat—that of a reduction in strategic offensive weapons and the prevention of weapons being put into space.

It is true, of course, that if we measure what has been achieved against the scale of the tasks which have to be tackled to ensure mankind's survival, little has yet been done. An aspiration to social revanche is nurturing a variety of the militarist programs of the West. A lack of responsibility and new thinking is still perceived in the policy of Western states. An understanding that outside of the new thinking policy becomes an unpredictable improvisation, contains risk factors and has no long-term basis has not taken root. However, and this is the main thing, a start has been made, and the first signs of changes can be seen.

L.N. Tolstoy said that ideas which have tremendous consequences are always simple. The idea of the deliverance of mankind from the burden of nuclear arms and weapons in general is essentially simple also. Its realization would have immeasurable salutary consequences for all peoples. A generator of tension, mistrust and hostility on Earth would be removed, and it would be possible to remove for all time the threat of the destruction of everything living, not to mention the fact that this would make it possible, finally, to embark in earnest on the solution of the greatest global problems which have confronted mankind.

It is today, it was emphasized at the gala festivities in Moscow, that the foundations of the future are being laid, and it is our duty to preserve our inimitable civilization and life on Earth itself, strive for the triumph of reason over nuclear insanity and create all the conditions for the free and all-around development of man and mankind.

The Soviet Union is demonstrating the political will and manifesting a firm resolve to have done with the threat of a world thermonuclear war. The right to live under conditions of peace and freedom is man's main right, for the sake of the defense of which it is worth living, working and fighting.

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### C<sup>3</sup>I as Factor of Strategic Stability

18160004c Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 12-23

[Article by A. Arbatov and A. Savelyev: "The Control and Communications System as a Factor of Strategic Stability"\*\*\*]

[Text] In studies devoted to problems of strategic stability, parity and balance of forces strategic offensive and defensive arms systems—ICBM's, SLBM's, heavy bombers and ABM systems—and their quantitative and qualitative specifications figure at the forefront, as a rule. The calculations and comparisons made in this connection are graphic and physically perceptible. At the same time a very important, if not key, question in study of the said problems is estimation of the state of the strategic forces' operational control and communications system (CCS).\*\* In recent years this subject matter has been illustrated increasingly in studies conducted in the arms limitation field. The advancement by the Reagan administration in 1981 of a program for the modernization of strategic arms, in which questions of an upgrading of the CCS play a principal part, has contributed to this to a large extent.

The increased attention to the CCS is explained by a whole number of factors. One has been brought about by the requirements of ensuring "nuclear deterrence," which is based on the principle according to which in the event of a hypothetical enemy launching a first strike a retaliatory strike against the aggressor would be inevitable and would reduce to nothing all the advantages which the attacking side would wish to derive. Such potential, according to the theory, makes the launching of a first strike pointless and suicidal and is considered the basis of stability even in periods of international crises.

However, in connection with the enhanced efficiency of strategic weapons systems and, consequently, the increased vulnerability of key components of the CCS, which, in addition, are in a number of instances more susceptible to the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion than the weapons systems themselves, serious fears that a direct attack on the CCS could be even more effective in the plane of averting retaliation than an attack on the strategic arms as such arise. In any event, if an aggressor sets as his goal the weakening of the power of the enemy's retaliatory strike, the decommissioning of the CCS would facilitate considerably the accomplishment of such an action. The development of ASAT systems and other space-based assault weapons would create an even greater danger for the control and communications complex. Under conditions, on the other hand, of the crisis development of the military and

political situation in the world the said factor would exert an even more serious destabilizing influence since it could increase incentives for launching a preemptive strike.

### **General Characteristics and Basic Functions of Modern CCS**

Strategic CCS consist of three main components. These are a system of the early warning, gathering and processing of reconnaissance data (early warning and photo and electronic reconnaissance satellites, radar stations and radio-intercept stations); political and military leadership command centers (both stationary underground and ground-based and mobile ground-, air- and sea-based); and communications systems uniting the first two components between themselves and with the direct effectors of the orders of the leadership (SSBN and strategic bomber crews and ICBM launch control post operational teams).

This complex affords the sides' military and political leadership an opportunity to exercise constant control over the strategic forces in peacetime; given a crisis development of the situation, to control the switch of these forces to enhanced combat readiness and, if necessary, to issue the order for their immediate use.

From the viewpoint of the tasks which they perform all functions of the CCS may be divided into two basic categories. The first is its use in peacetime. It implies assured stable communications between the top and lower command echelons, the gathering and processing of military information and the monitoring of the strategic and operational situation and also assured so-called negative control of nuclear arsenals. The latter means maintaining the appropriate level of combatreadiness of the strategic forces given the obligatory and unswerving technical blocking of the unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons (as a result of a technical malfunction, for example).

The functions of the CCS pertaining to the second category amount to its transfer to a prewar and war footing, when the exercise of positive control, that is, the transmission of orders of the military and political leadership and control of their execution under the conditions of the start of combat operations at the strategic level, moves to the fore. In other words, positive control is to provide assurances that the leadership's sanction of the use of nuclear weapons be complied with. It is this sphere which is at the present time the subject of the closest attention of a number of important studies in the field of problems of arms limitation and the prevention of nuclear war (1).

It should be mentioned that the specific features of individual types of strategic arms permit the exercise of strict control over them to a varying extent. Thus ICBM's deployed in launch silos represent from the

negative control viewpoint the most dependable component of the strategic triad. The multi-backup system of space- and air-based and underground communication links assures for the military and political leadership certainty that operational orders will be transmitted and received, and the corresponding operations of the effectors, controlled.

Strategic aviation is in a different situation. Reliable communications with the air bases make it possible, if necessary, to transmit an order for its emergency takeoff from the airfields. But, once airborne, the heavy bombers must not leave the defined zones in which radio communications operate. This increases the degree of their vulnerability and also gives rise to doubts that communications with the aircraft will provide for the possibility of control of compliance with all the orders of the command. In addition, in the event of strategic aviation leaving the defined zones, communications with it could be severed completely. Nonetheless, the central leadership still has sufficiently extensive opportunities for exercising negative control over strategic aviation's nuclear weapons, which makes their unsanctioned use barely likely.

Its exercise over the sea-based component of the strategic triad represents a far greater danger. In view of the absence of reliable two-way communications and the vulnerability and complexity of the functioning of airborne relay systems, the United States has introduced a system of control in respect of SSBN on combat patrol at sea whereby technical negative control from the center is lacking entirely. This means that the crew of a missile-firing submarine has in principle, if not organizational authority, the technical possibility of unlocking and launching SLBM's without the sanction of the central leadership. This probability, even if very slight, compels a view of SSBN from the standpoint of impact on the stability of the strategic balance somewhat different from what is customary in the United States, despite the assertions of American officials and experts that the high survivability of the submarines themselves in the ocean assures their "stabilizing" role. As far as the Soviet SSBN are concerned, they are, according to accessible data, equipped with the more dependable locking of the nuclear weapons, that is, are in a posture of strict negative control from the center. The area of patrolling of the preponderance of the submarines close to the shores of the USSR (for the purpose of surer protection against NATO ASW weapons) contributes to this also (2).

Thus the strategic forces' CCS does not at the present time allow the military and political leadership to exercise control over nuclear arms to an equal extent. In a period of crisis or under the conditions of the start of combat operations the shortcomings of the CCS (both its unreliability and vulnerability) could perform a sharply destabilizing role, in the plane of the probability of loss of control over one's own strategic forces included.

The enhancement of the operational specifications of offensive arms is undermining each side's confidence that this CCS component or the other will survive as a result of a nuclear strike. For example, according to the data of American studies, the North American Air and Space Defense Command (NORAD) Headquarters, which was located for the purpose of its increased protection in the interior of the granite rock of Cheyenne Mountain (Colorado), is regarded in the United States at the present time merely as the center of the operation of the CCS in peacetime and also of the reception, evaluation and transmission to the leadership of the signal warning of the launch and approach of ballistic missiles. The probability of its survival as the result of a direct hit is considered very low (3).

Such fears concerning the relatively increased vulnerability of the CCS are being expressed in a whole number of foreign studies. Specifically, B. Blair, director of the program for studying CCS problems of the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment, observes: "The mutual vulnerability of the command systems creates a strong impetus for a nuclear first strike before the enemy realizes his threat to this system.... For this reason both sides will be under growing pressure in favor of launching a preventive strike under crisis conditions" (4).

The increased threat of the direct destruction of the combat control system emanates not only from "exotic" arms of the future. Even now a number of weapons models is creating the danger of the decommissioning of basic CCS components. It is a question of cruise missiles, sea-based primarily, which, owing to the concealment of their flight, may deliver surprise attacks against early warning facilities (radar installations). The new sea-based ballistic missiles with enhanced counterforce potential should be distinguished particularly. The short time of the approach to target, a matter of minutes in a number of cases, and the unpredictable bearings of the attack create a real threat of the sudden decommissioning of the warning system and important control centers, airfields and airborne command posts and the disruption of communications channels. Such a danger in crisis periods makes the unleashing of nuclear war more likely.

A report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat observes in this connection: "The paramount significance of stability of the military balance is manifested in the extent to which the actual characteristics of the given strategic correlation of forces make in an acute conflict situation an exchange of nuclear strikes more or, on the contrary, less likely" (5). It is precisely individual weapons systems with this attribute or the other and also their control system which are the principal components of this strategic correlation.

As a result an essentially paradoxical picture is taking shape: together with the increase in the survivability of individual strategic offensive arms systems the CCS, which is of key significance, remains the most vulnerable

component of the sides' strategic potentials. This is attested by, specifically, the fact that at the present time U.S. specialists consider the most invulnerable components of the combat control complex airborne command posts, whereas among nuclear weapons strategic aviation is seen as an increasingly vulnerable component of the strategic triad.

#### The CCS and the 'Launch on Warning' Concept

In view of the complication of the tasks and growth of the vulnerability of the CCS two main ways of solving the problem are being discussed among specialists: simplifying the tasks of the control system and concentrating attention on increasing its survivability or reducing the emphasis on survivability to satisfy the growing demands of the operational assignments of the strategic forces. In the strategic arms sphere a tendency to move along the second path is being manifested, it would seem, which is fraught with dangerous and largely unpredictable consequences. A direction of such a development is the utmost increase in the speed of operation of the CCS and introduction to operational plans of the "launch on warning" concept, that is, the firing of missiles immediately upon receipt and confirmation of information on the launch of the enemy's strategic systems. Specifically, at the time of choice of basing mode for the American MX ICBM a most acute question was that of use of the existing Minuteman ICBM launch siloes. The opponents of stationary basing pointed out here that the vulnerability of the MX ICBM in silos was a destabilizing factor and would compel an orientation toward launch on warning, which would increase the risk of the outbreak of war.

The evolution of the strategic correlation of forces and military concepts spurred primarily by new initiatives of the United States in the arms race is objectively eroding strategic stability. An increase in the emphasis on launch on warning could in a certain situation be attended by serious dangers. Owing to the reduction in the time for decision-making in response to information of an attack or in an atmosphere of an unforeseen nuclear situation having arisen, the likelihood of an error or miscalculation, particularly at moments of crisis, increases. The short flight time of modern weapons systems and the reduced warning time owing to the deployment of cruise missiles, and in the future, systems employing Stealth technology leave no opportunity for a careful evaluation and recheck of information and the thinking over of a decision on retaliatory actions. Together with this some actions of a probable enemy could under crisis conditions be interpreted as the start of an attack, although the intentions of the opposite side here could be different (to assure the enhanced combat readiness of strategic weapons for surer "deterrence," for example). This applies, for example, to such scheduled measures of operational activity of the United States as the takeoff of strategic bombers from airfields, after which they could leave the field of vision of early warning facilities; the transfer of the entire CCS, including airborne components, to aerial

patrolling; the approach of bombers to air-based cruise missile release zones; the dispersal of tactical nuclear weapons from their dumps; the delegating of the authority to use nuclear weapons from the center to the effectors; and such.

Extensive historical experience testifies that wars have not always started and, even less, proceeded in accordance with the strategic and operational plans drawn up by general headquarters in peacetime. Politically prewar crisis situations have more often than not developed unexpectedly, confounding the foreign policy premises which military planning took as the point of departure. Crises, regardless of whether they have developed into armed conflict or not, have been attended, as a rule, by great uncertainty in governments' decision-making, contradictory information and assessments of enemies' actions and intentions and vagueness concerning likely consequences of one's own actions. As far as the military aspect is concerned, the strategic and operational planning of peacetime has more often than not been thwarted in instances where states have arrived at war with qualitatively new arms and combat equipment not tested under combat conditions and deployed in the army in mass fashion. The existence of huge modern arsenals of diverse nuclear weapons, whose use would most likely mean the destruction of human civilization and life on Earth itself even, intensifies immeasurably the unpredictability, tension and danger of crisis situations slipping out of control.

The well-known Soviet historian D.M. Proektor observes in this connection: "The irrationalism of the political and military thinking and actions of the leaders of the aggressor countries is not only an attribute of the personalities but also the result of many events and circumstances which are all interlinked and logically ensue from one another.... Is it possible to speak of the logic of war? In aggressors recognizing the rationality of world war this is the logic of the absurd. Initial erroneous decisions engender others, just as erroneous. There is an inexorable escalation of the absurd. The circle of irrationalism expands until its bindings snap.... If some leader is 'programmed' for a military solution, he will resort to it, although it is contrary to the situation and will lead to catastrophe. While another leader, but with a peaceful program tendency, adopting the wrong decision in crisis situations, will be no better off either" (6).

Not only the colossal power of destruction of nuclear weapons and the inconceivable consequences of their use convert at the present time the said regularities of the evolution of crisis situations to a fundamentally different dimension. Two other circumstances impart to the problem even greater seriousness. First, it is a question of the fact that in recent decades the strategic concepts and military planning of the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO have developed to a large extent independently of one another, proceeding from nonconcurring premises on how a conflict might arise and develop and on the kind of scenarios and purposes

of the sides' use of military force. Of course, the possibilities and intentions of a likely enemy have been taken into consideration here. However, they have been evaluated frequently with one's own ideas concerning the opposite side being taken as the starting point, without due analysis of its true motives and plans.

For example, NATO's military planning has traditionally proceeded from the idea of the gradual escalation of military operations, in accordance with which, following the utmost exacerbation of the political situation and mutual threats, wide-ranging combat operations of conventional armed forces on land, at sea and in the air begin. At a particular moment they develop into the use of tactical nuclear weapons, later, medium-range nuclear weapons, then, "selective" strikes by strategic arms, and only then, if the conflict does not cease, into the total annihilation of the population and industry of the warring parties. These five levels of the "ladder of escalation" have never been recognized and accepted by the Soviet Union and its allies inasmuch as the very use of medium-range and operational-tactical nuclear arms is tantamount for them in the practical plane to deep concentrated nuclear strikes against their territory. For this reason the military strategy and plans of the Warsaw Pact regard first use of nuclear weapons as transition to the nuclear phase of the conflict, which will not be of a limited nature and will inevitably develop into a world catastrophe (7). At the same time, however, the principles of the use of tactical nuclear weapons (land mines, artillery, air defense missiles, antisubmarine missiles and torpedoes, for example) are profoundly interwoven in the operational planning of NATO's conventional forces. And the military concepts of the Warsaw Pact allow of the probability of the use of conventional weapons against an enemy's nuclear arms (8).

The said most serious differences in the sides' strategic views, premises and plans threaten in a conflict situation to evoke their entirely different perception of identical events and to entail a catastrophic miscalculation in respect of the actions and intentions of the enemy.

Second, the unprecedented dimensions of the military machinery permanently maintained by the states' allies and the immeasurably grown power, range, diversity, mobility and interdependence of the branches of the armed forces, arms of the service, units and subunits and individual arms even have now raised to an unprecedented extent the demands on the coordination of action of all components of the sides' forces and resources. This imposes a tremendous burden on the functioning of the intelligence, data evaluation, control and communications systems. The troops' accomplishment of the set assignments depends more than ever on their unswerving compliance with the plans for a switch to heightened combat readiness, deployment for military operations and precisely coordinated transition to performance of the assignments.

This applies primarily to the strategic nuclear forces, but increasingly to conventional armed forces and arms also. Operational plans are drawn up on a permanent basis. They are periodically adjusted and honed at field and staff exercises. These plans encompass the operations of hundreds of thousands of effectors at all levels and provide for coordination of their operations over areas of many thousands of kilometers, as far as a global scale, and synchronization in time down to hours, minutes and seconds even.

All this leads to a lack of time for the political leadership's evaluation of the situation and decision-making in a crisis situation. It could be faced with a terrible dilemma: waiting for the situation to clarify and improvising, making chaotic the functioning of the armed forces and giving the other side tremendous advantages if the latter is bent on attack, or acting in accordance with some operational plan drawn up in advance, the correspondence of which to the actual military-political situation cannot be considered absolutely reliable. In both cases the probability of a nuclear catastrophe could prove very high. It is in this knot of political, psychological and military-technical factors that the greatest threat of a nuclear war being unleashed is now contained, it would seem. If in peacetime, in a tranquil atmosphere, political leaders do not pay due attention to strategic and operational plans and do not contribute elements of political commonsense to purely military logic, which, naturally, is always geared to the most efficient performance of operational assignments possible, they run the risk of losing control over events at the most crucial moment.

Such concepts and plans as the delegation to the effectors of authority for the use of nuclear weapons, certain measures for the transfer of forces and resources to heightened combat readiness and launch on warning increase to the greatest extent the danger of the uncontrollable unleashing of nuclear war examined above. Specifically, the launch on warning concept, while theoretically a factor of additional deterrence of a potential aggressor, could in an actual crisis situation increase the likelihood of a breakdown of the military-political mutual deterrence system. The greater the extent to which the strategic forces and their warning, control and communications system are oriented toward the launch on warning concept, the fewer the opportunities they afford for a careful evaluation of the situation and the thinking over of retaliatory steps and their realization.

The authoritative American specialist J. Steinbruner emphasizes: "Nuclear arms are permanently maintained at a high level of combat readiness and are adapted for such rapid response to information of impending attack that the difference between the retaliatory and first strikes is extremely negligible and could disappear completely under the pressure of an intense crisis situation.... Although the deterrent effect of the existing balance of forces is strong enough to dominate all rational judgments," he points out, "this does not guarantee the

prevention of war.... It is important to note that mutual deterrence has never been tested for reliability, which would be the case under crisis conditions, when both sides would simultaneously begin the transfer of their forces to heightened combat readiness. There is reason to fear that the innate tendency of preemptive transition to the performance of military operations would in practice be very strong if war came to seem inevitable..." (9).

Furthermore, given the preferred orientation of one side or both toward launch on warning, a hope of "out-flanking" or blocking the early warning system, which is theoretically possible given use of the new types of weapons, could arise. Escalation to nuclear war could obviously occur in two main directions: given the increased probability of the surprise decommissioning of the early warning system and other key components of the CCS (command posts, communications centers and so forth) and also the use of weapons systems and tactics of strikes reducing to the maximum the time of warning of the attack. It is essential to bear in mind here that, knowing in advance of the orientation of the forces of his adversary toward launch on warning, an enemy is capable of employing various options of attack in order to specially foil the possibility of such a launch or preempt it. The adoption of new systems of strategic weapons with a short flight time and warning time, the use of preliminary nuclear explosions in the stratosphere to create an electromagnetic pulse and block radio communications and various measures to deceive warning systems and disrupt their backup principle could contribute to this. Specifically, the "Stealth" technology for strategic aviation and cruise missiles being developed by the United States is designed to accomplish the task of the increased concealment of the flight of strategic systems to the targets and, consequently, a sharp reduction in the time of warning of the attack.

Throughout the postwar period the United States has resorted repeatedly to a heightening of the level of combat readiness of its strategic forces as a reaction to certain international events and also for the purpose of honing the very procedure of transition to a higher level of combat readiness. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has not once, according to authoritative Western studies, performed such operations (10). Thus throughout the history of the existence of nuclear arms there has not yet been an instance of both principal nuclear powers simultaneously engaging in operations to transfer their strategic forces to a higher level of combat readiness, which could have led to an extremely uncertain situation. The same applies to the delegating of authority for the use of nuclear weapons.

The side delegating such authority to the effectors under crisis conditions, proceeding here from the fact that it would not have time to carry out a launch on warning or deliver a retaliatory strike, runs the risk thereby of bringing about unpredictable consequences. By such a step this power could attempt to demonstrate to an enemy that his attack would not achieve "decapitation".

The enemy, on the other hand, could perceive this delegating as reliable evidence of preparation for a first strike and acquire strong impetus for a preemptive attack. For this reason the vulnerability of the CCS and its orientation toward speed of operation would under such conditions create an additional threat of the growth of a political crisis into an armed clash, and a conventional conflict, into a nuclear catastrophe.

In addition, the very delegation of the said authority means that the central leadership is releasing control of its own forces, although under crisis conditions it is extremely important to preserve complete negative control over them precluding the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. Here lies an in-built contradiction between negative and positive control under crisis conditions given the high vulnerability of the CCS: each side is afraid of not having the time to carry out a launch on warning (doubting the possibility of delivering a retaliatory strike), which prompts it to raise the level of combat readiness of its forces and delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons. This, in turn, increases the suspicion of the opponent and creates a greater threat of an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict.

Together with this strategic "resonance" the central leadership could deprive itself of the possibility of fully controlling the situation. As a result miscalculations or errors of the effectors sanctioned to launch on warning are fraught with the high probability of the unpremeditated unleashing of nuclear war. At the same time the delegating of authority could objectively contribute not only to a prolongation of the crisis but its growth into uncontrolled escalation since the restoration of the central leadership's negative control over the nuclear forces could present considerable difficulties. This applies primarily to the sea- and air-based segments of the strategic triad. Thus after having obtained the appropriate sanction, the SSBN could escape from control completely, particularly under the conditions of a conventional war being fought at sea, when they would more than likely be the target of enemy ASW activity. An attempt to go on the air under such conditions would increase the probability of disclosure of the SSBN's whereabouts. Aviation also could escape the field of vision of radio communications and not receive the corresponding orders from the central leadership. In addition, the communications systems themselves could prove a target of attack even without the use of nuclear weapons (given the assistance of ASAT systems, for example). All this would contribute to a considerable extent to the growth of the threat of the start of a nuclear war.

Proceeding from this, the modernization of the CCS for the purpose of its increased protection would, as a whole, seem quite justified and rational. But there are many contradictions here also: the programs being implemented in this sphere, in a broad range of directions, could contribute to the growth of its survivability to a very considerable extent, but at the same time a new danger is created also—the creation as a supplement to

the structure of the strategic offensive arms also of a system of control thereof, which are in sum intended to provide for the possibility of fighting a protracted controlled nuclear war. On the pretext of a strengthening of deterrence this task is at the present time moving to the fore in the organizational development of the U.S. armed forces.

Contrary to such assertions, this strategy fits ill with deterrence and will most likely lead to the undermining of strategic stability. As Academician M. Markov observes, "the upgrading of nuclear weapons in recent decades, on which trillions of dollars have been spent, has in fact led to a weakening or erosion of the idea of nuclear deterrence and the increased likelihood of nuclear war" (11). Many authoritative American experts are pointing to this also. Specifically, a report of the Union of Concerned Scientists published in 1986 and devoted to an assessment of the program of "modernization" of the United States' strategic forces, observes: "Deterrence is the proclaimed goal of U.S. strategy, but the requirements of deterrence are formulated such that they are in practice synonymous with the possibility of fighting a nuclear war and 'winning' it" (12). All this fully confirms the proposition of the 27th CPSU Congress that continuation of the nuclear arms race could lead to a position "where even parity ceases to be a factor of military-political deterrence."

From the theoretical standpoint a CCS with precise and realistically preset specifications could contribute, it would seem, to the goals of a strengthening of strategic stability and limitation of potentials to a reasonable sufficiency. First, it must be capable of surviving in the event of a surprise attack, but it would not be required to remain stable for more than a few hours under goal-directed nuclear strikes. Second, such a system must provide for the possibility of a careful recheck and evaluation of information on the attack, the adoption of a considered decision and the transmission of an order to the surviving forces on the delivery of a nuclear strike against the aggressor and then control of its execution. After this, the given system could cease to exist. The said CCS would be quite simple and constructed on the basis of backups for such of its basic components as facilities for the warning and rapid evaluation of the consequences of an enemy nuclear strike, ground-based mobile and airborne command posts and communications channels. The leadership of the country must exercise complete negative control here, being in constant two-way stable communication with its forces even after an opponent's attack in order to determine the presence of surviving forces and resources and, if necessary, transmit a command on retargeting (in order to make good the loss of some part of the forces) and the delivery of a retaliatory strike.

In practice such a system would differ appreciably from the CCS necessary for fighting a protracted war. It would need high survivability, but would not need a capacity for superfast operation for effecting a launch on warning



and the performance of most intricate operations pertaining to a redrawing of military plans and the recoordination of attacks in accordance with the rapidly changing situation of nuclear war. Inasmuch as the demands on survivability in the event of a surprise attack on the one hand and all the other enumerated functions on the other are technically and economically competitive, renunciation of the latter would permit the accomplishment with enhanced reliability of the main and precisely limited assignments of preservation of retaliatory strike potential.

### **The CCS in the Context of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks**

Discussion of questions connected with the influence of the CCS on the entire spectrum of the sides' strategic mutual relations is becoming an increasingly pertinent problem at the present time. This is connected with the proposal advanced by the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries concerning discussion and comparison of the military doctrines of the opposed military-political groupings and the embodiment in practice of the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and Soviet initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere. These questions are arising with particular seriousness in connection with the growing threat to the CCS on the part of new, more efficient weapons systems, both nuclear and "exotic," including the space-based weapons being developed per the SDI program.

Not only a quantitative buildup of arms but, which is now even more material, their rapid qualitative improvement are taking place in the course of the military rivalry. Consequently, strategic concepts and operational plans and assignments are becoming more complex and the demands on the capacity for obtaining and evaluating information in the course of combat operations, the coordination and multivariant nature of targeting and the speed and flexibility of retargeting are growing—and all this falls fully to the combat control system. The process thus moves in a closed circle: the buildup and upgrading of offensive arms increases appreciably the demands made on the CCS system proper and simultaneously increases the threat to the CCS of the other side. The programs of an upgrading of this system, in turn, increase the efficiency of the strategic arms potentials, permit the accomplishment of increasingly complex assignments, increase the threat to the enemy's forces and control facilities and so forth. These processes are seriously influencing strategic planning and programs and also the likelihood of the outbreak of war in a crisis situation.

Viewing the question of arms limitation and reduction with regard for the CCS factor, it is necessary first of all, it would seem, to analyze thoroughly the extent to which the proposed steps might contribute to a strengthening of strategic stability: to the sides' renunciation, first, of the advance delegating of authority for the use of nuclear weapons and, second, of the launch on warning concept.

Together with a lessening of the threat to the strategic forces measures to lessen the threat to the CCS should be of special, if not paramount, significance in this connection.

One such step could be an agreement on renunciation of the creation and deployment of sea-based counterforce systems—both SLBM's and cruise missiles owing to their clearly manifest destabilizing characteristics. The short flight time of the first and the concealment of the deployment and flight to target of the second create the greatest threat to the CCS, it would seem. This applies both to the infrastructure of the control systems (radars, command centers, communication centers) and the military-political leadership centers. Such an agreement (either separate or within the framework of a broader accord), bolstered by confidence-building measures in this sphere (a ban, for example, on the approach of SSBN and cruise missile-firing submarines closer than a certain zone to the shores of the other country), could contribute to an appreciable strengthening of strategic stability.

Upon realization of the concept of deep cuts in strategic offensive arms it would be useful to provide for the cuts leading also to a simplification of the assignments entrusted to these forces. The significant surpluses of strike arms constituting potential for annihilation many times over inevitably entail the elaboration of more refined concepts pertaining to their use and new forms and methods of targeting and the advancement of a variety of concepts of "protracted and limited" nuclear war and "victory" in such a war. An injection of commonsense in strategic planning and a parallel reduction in arms and an upgrading of the concept of their use in the light of the idea of minimum sufficiency (the possibility, say, of unacceptable damage being caused the main industrial centers in the course of a retaliatory strike) would also play a positive part in the plane of a strengthening of stability.

Particular importance in the sides' strategic relations is attached to an evaluation of measures to reduce the likelihood of escalation of a conflict and transition from crisis to military confrontation. It would be highly advisable for this reason to introduce to the practice of international relations notification not only of military exercises but also certain types of activity of the strategic forces (with an explanation of the purposes thereof). Such as, for example, the movement of a significant number of SSBN's from their bases and the takeoff from airfields of strategic bombers.

Together with this it is essential to adopt measures to further upgrade emergency communication lines between the leadership of the two countries and implement practical actions pertaining to the creation of crisis-elimination centers. The Soviet-American agreement on the creation of centers to reduce the nuclear danger signed on 15 September 1987 and the protocols thereto were an important step on this path. A positive



role could be performed also by the discussion of military doctrines and concepts, the mutual renunciation of measures to enhance the level of combat readiness of the strategic forces as a means of political pressure and renunciation of protracted nuclear war concepts. Recognition by the political leadership of the USSR and the United States of the fact that there would be no winners in a nuclear war should be underpinned by practical actions attesting the sides' sincere aspiration to avoid the outbreak thereof by all means.

As far as the CCS directly is concerned, an exchange of opinions specifically on these questions also would, it would seem, be highly useful. Proceeding from the fact that in accordance with the logic of the new thinking in the security sphere the sides should manifestly be interested in the growth of the survivability and reliability of the given systems and their simplification and reduced vulnerability, the problem of a reduction in the threat to the CCS could be an integral part of the talks on limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms and banning ASAT weapons and other types of space-based assault weapons.

From the viewpoint of stability it is essential, we believe, when evaluating strategic offensive arms to conceive of a composition and structure thereof most satisfying the requirements of defense. While nuclear weapons continue to constitute the basis of the combat might of the leading powers it is essential to exert the maximum efforts to ensure that these weapons never be activated. In line with the limitation of and reduction in strategic offensive arms ultimately aimed at their complete elimination the establishment of a structure of forces which would reduce to the minimum the probability of the use (either as a premeditated step, out of fear of an enemy attack or as the result of an uncontrolled escalation of a conflict) of nuclear weapons in a crisis situation could, it would seem, serve this task as an interim aim.

Simply having certain potential for a devastating retaliatory strike based on relatively invulnerable nuclear forces is manifestly insufficient in this plane. These forces and their control system must also completely preclude the possibility of the unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons and have dependable two-way communications, which would make it possible to renounce the delegating of authority for their use in a crisis period, that is, maintain their strictly centralized negative control. Finally, a nature of these forces such as would not require for the performance of the assignments of a retaliatory strike entrusted to them their organization on the basis of a launch on warning system would seem expedient. Only in this case might it be possible to speak of a strengthening of strategic stability and a lessening of the threat of the outbreak of thermo-nuclear war.

#### Footnotes

\* This article, in which the authors set forth their idea, is published by way of formulation of the problem.

\*\* In Western literature this system has been designated C<sup>3</sup>I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). Different terminology is employed with reference to the USSR Armed Forces, which is caused partly by the different structure and characteristics of this system. The importance thereof was pointed out back in the 1970's in many works of Soviet military specialists, who noted that "exceptional significance is now attached to the high combat readiness of all components of leadership and the entire system of control and communications as a whole.... The readiness of the control and communications system should be somewhat in advance of the overall readiness of the formations, units and subunits, precede it and be higher and more mobile than it" (A.A. Grechko, "The Armed Forces of the Soviet State," Moscow, 1975, p 266).

1. See B. Blair, "Strategic Command and Control. Redefining the Nuclear Threat". The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1985, pp 289-293.

2. "Managing Nuclear Operations". Edited by A. Carter, J. Steinbruner, C. Zraket. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1987, p 508.

3. See T. Karas, "The New High Ground. Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War," New York, 1983, p 35.

4. B. Blair, Op. cit., p 285.

5. "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms". Brief account of the study (adapted version). Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, Moscow, April 1987, p 7.

6. D.M. Proektor, "World Wars and the Fate of Mankind," Moscow, 1986, pp 15, 26.

7. See N.V. Ogarkov, "History Teaches Vigilance," Moscow, 1985, p 68.

8. See "Military-Technical Progress and the USSR Armed Forces," Moscow, 1982, p 301.

9. THE BROOKINGS REVIEW, Summer 1987, pp 23-24.

10. See "Managing Nuclear Operations," pp 76-77.

11. PRAVDA, 14 July 1987.

12. P. Clausen, A. Krass, R. Zirkle, "In Search of Stability: an Assessment of New U.S. Nuclear Forces. A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists," Cambridge (Mass.), 1986, p 3.

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**Danger of Persian Gulf Escalation Examined**

18160004d Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 37-49

[Article by R. Markaryan: "On the Crisis in the Persian Gulf Zone"]

[Text] A basic principle of an all-embracing system of international security, the idea of the creation of which was put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress, is a "just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts". A special place among them is occupied by the military and political crisis in the Persian Gulf zone. The Iran-Iraq war, which has been going on for more than 7 years now, the sharp exacerbation of the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with neighboring states, the unprecedented military presence of the United States and other NATO countries, the "tanker war," from which states which are not direct participants in the armed conflict are suffering—such are the main components of the explosive situation in this oil-rich and strategically important part of the world, which is increasingly fraught with development into a crisis of international proportions.

The exacerbation of the situation in the region is to a considerable extent the result of the militarist activity of the United States and a number of other NATO countries and the foreign military presence, which have assumed threatening proportions in 1987. There is every reason to believe that it is the interference of outside forces which has imparted to the crisis in the Gulf region features making acutely more difficult the search for possibilities of its settlement.

**I**

When the Iran-Iraq war erupted in September 1980, hardly anyone could have supposed that it would have taken on such a prolonged and bitter nature and that its negative impact on the regional situation and the international atmosphere as a whole would have been so significant.

In terms of the number of casualties and the amounts of material damage inflicted by the combatants and the scope of the military operations the armed confrontation between Iran and Iraq has broken all the lamentable records of recklessness and pointless brutality in the history of contemporary regional conflicts.

Even according to the most cautious estimates, in the 7 years of the war the number of dead and wounded is in excess of 1 million, and the material damage (including military spending, production losses and loss of revenue from oil exports) has amounted to more than \$500 billion (1). Incalculable sufferings are being experienced by the peaceful population, particularly as a result of the

"war of the cities"—mutual concentrated missile attacks and the bombing and shelling of inhabited localities and nonmilitary facilities not only in border territory but in deep-lying areas also—which developed virtually as of the very start of the armed conflict.

The socioeconomic development of these states has decelerated abruptly and in a number of areas has regressed. Specifically, a departure from the radical slogans and measures of the first stage of the anti-shah revolution has begun in Iran: implementation of the agrarian reform act has been suspended, the foreign trade nationalization act has not taken effect, the process of expansion of the public sector has been brought to a standstill and so forth. Democratic social transformations have been wound down in Iraq also.

Iraq is channeling 60 percent of budget appropriations into war needs, Iran, approximately 50 percent (2). The serious economic problems have been intensified by the fall in the price of oil, revenue from exports of which constitutes more than 90 percent of their currency receipts. Even in the event of a halt to military operations, Iran and Iraq would need multibillion-dollar loans and many years (up to 18-20 years, according to certain estimates) to restore the economy to the prewar level. Thus we may speak unequivocally about the extraordinarily severe situation of the combatants, which are in a phase of the extreme depletion of human, material and financial resources.

Nonetheless, the scale of military operations between them grows from year to year. The year of 1984 was more bitter, for example, than 1983, 1985 surpassed 1984 in this respect and the last 2 years have altogether "broken all records". In 1986-1987 active military operations were conducted in all sectors of a front of a total length of 1,200 km, the "tanker war" erupted in the waters of the Persian Gulf with new force and the "war of the cities" intensified. The most devastating types of conventional arms are being employed, and chemical weapons banned by international conventions are being used even.

The Soviet and foreign press have already discussed in detail the causes of the Iran-Iraq war: the border dispute, political rivalry and ideological contradictions.

Relations between these states were quite acute and unstable earlier also, until the sides signed in March 1975 the Algiers compromise agreement. The point of the compromise was that in exchange for the shah's ending of support for Kurdish rebels, who were fighting against the Iraqi Government, Iraq agreed to recognize Iran's equal rights to the Shatt al-Arab border river and the division of the river section of the border along the median line—the line of the river's maximum depth—whereas prior to this the water boundary had run along the Iranian bank. The sides also declared noninterference in one another's internal affairs.

Following the change in power in Tehran, tension broke out anew in their complex relations, and neither of the belligerents even attempted to remove or, at least, reduce it. Both states declared that they did not consider themselves bound by the 1975 agreement. In addition, both Iran and Iraq moved consciously, "with their eyes open," toward the unleashing of military operations, endeavoring to settle in their favor by arms the questions in dispute which existed between them.

To judge by everything, Baghdad thus attempted to consolidate its influence in the Persian Gulf and in the Arab world as a whole and also to neutralize the attempts of the new Iranian regime to undermine internal stability in Iraq. As far as Tehran was concerned, Iraq was the main target of the policy being pursued by the country's new leaders of exporting Islamic revolution, as a result of which, they intended, not a secular but a theocratic regime representing the Shi'ite community was to have come to power in Baghdad. Besides religious motives, the conflict with the neighboring state was seen by the Iranian leaders as a means enabling them to consolidate their authority among the people, distract their attention from the difficulties being experienced by the country and deal with the internal opposition.

A retrospective analysis of events makes it possible to reveal the erroneousness of many of the belligerents' calculations. It is a question primarily of an underestimation of both the enemy's capacity for sustaining a long and enervating war and the degree of his internal political stability.

I would like to dwell on the last proposition in more detail. The point being that at the initial stage of the conflict many people were predicting that the population of the Iranian province of Khuzestan—of Arab extraction—would assist the Iraqi army—their "blood brothers"—and turn against the central authorities. However, the anticipated uprising did not occur: the Arabs of Khuzestan, as a whole, demonstrated their loyalty to Tehran.

In turn, following Iran's move up to Iraq's national borders and then the carryover of military operations onto Iraqi territory it was expected that the Iranian forces would be helped by their "brothers in the faith"—Iraq's Shi'ites, who constitute more than 50 percent of the country's population (8 million out of 15 million). It was no accident that the Iranians chose as the main direction of the breakthrough Southern Iraq, where Iraq's Shi'ites live, in the main. But their gamble on the religious community proved baseless also. Nor did Iran and Iraq's attempts to weaken one another by means of rendering military and financial assistance to Kurdish organizations opposed to the other side produce any in any way tangible results. As a whole, both the Iranian and the Iraqi leaderships have been in sufficiently firm control of the situation in their countries.

When analyzing the military situation in the conflict it is advisable, evidently, to examine the course of armed operations on land and at sea separately.

Military operations on land may provisionally be subdivided into four stages:

1. September-November 1980. At this stage the Iraqi Army had advanced deep into enemy territory, capturing a number of cities and villages (20 cities and 1,200 villages according to Iranian information). However, the success was not consolidated.
2. November 1980-November 1981. Military operations assumed a positional nature. Fighting took place periodically the length of the line of the front.
3. November 1981-June 1982. The strategic initiative passes to the Iranian forces. Following several large-scale offensive operations, the Iranians had by May 1982 reached along the entire front practically the line of the border which had existed prior to the start of military operations. On 10 June Iraq declared a unilateral ceasefire and adopted a decision on a withdrawal within a period of 10 days of its armed forces from all Iranian territory. On 29 June Iraq reported the completion of the withdrawal of its forces. But this did not become the basis for a political settlement.
4. Since June 1982 Iran has annually conducted large-scale offensive operations, now on Iraqi territory. Although these offensives have been undertaken in all sectors of the front, Iran sees as its main task, many observers believe, to be breaking through on the southern axis and capturing Southern Iraq, operations in the northern and central sectors of the front being more of a diversionary nature.

At the end of 1987 the Iranians had managed to take possession of the Iraqi port of Faw and also a small amount of territory along the coast of the Persian Gulf and move close to the borders of Kuwait. Such results had been achieved at a price of incalculable hundreds of thousands of human losses which Iran sustained in the course of the offensives, employing "human wave" tactics, in the main. Despite the fact that since the summer of 1982 it has held the strategic initiative and has superiority in human resources, it has not, as a whole, been in a position to achieve a breakthrough in the war in its favor. Iraq, on the other hand, has been able, with superiority in the air and in tanks, to repulse the Iranian attacks and maintain its position on the front without appreciable changes. At the same time it is not in a position to compel Iran to abandon a solution of the conflict by force.

Now about the course of military operations at sea. The "tanker war" flared up almost immediately following the start of the armed conflict. Initially it was connected with attempts by each belligerent to deny the enemy an opportunity to export oil unimpeded (3). Not only the

framework of the "tanker war" but also the volume of the assignments which they attempted to accomplish by means of escalating it were expanded subsequently.

Iraqi naval operations were concentrated in the north-eastern part of the Persian Gulf, where the main Iranian oil-loading ports are located. Having declared this area "a zone of military operations closed to international shipping," Iraq began to subject Iran's oil ports and the "naval targets" located there to bombing attacks. The main oil terminals on the enemy's Kharg, Sirri, Larak and Farsi islands subsequently came within the range of Iraqi aircraft.

Iran initially established a so-called "advisory zone" encompassing the northern part of the Gulf, for putting in at which all ships had to obtain its permission. Subsequently Iran's military operations at sea were not confined to this area but were extended to other parts of the Gulf, including the territorial waters of the coastal Arab states. Kuwait and Saudi tankers suffered particularly heavily from Iranian attacks. Such operations at sea had a perfectly definite aim—forcing Iraq's main Arab allies to abandon financial and other economic assistance to it.

In the course of the "tanker war," which was supplemented by the "mine war" and spread to the waters of the Gulf of Oman, more than 350 ships had been subjected to attacks from both sides as of the end of 1987. Ships with a total tonnage constituting one-third of the tonnage of the ships sunk throughout WWII were sunk or put out of operation here, according to the Lloyds insurance company.

A halt to the armed conflict and its peaceful settlement are being blocked owing to the contrast of the sides' positions. Thus Iraq has proposed repeatedly an end to military operations, the withdrawal of the forces of both sides to the prewar boundaries and a solution of the conflict by peaceful means based on the UN Charter and rules of international law. Iran, however, believes that this must be preceded by a "restoration of justice" and "identification of the aggressor". The latter implies "punishment of the party guilty of aggression".

At the same time, while refusing to suspend the armed conflict as a whole, Iran declares that it is not averse to a "reduction in the sphere of military operations" and is agreeable to negotiating mutual nonaggression against cities and economic targets and renouncing attacks on ships and oil installations in the Persian Gulf. Iraq maintains in response to this that it cannot agree to partial measures.

The contrast in the sides' positions also explains the negligible results of the mediation efforts to end the conflict. Such efforts have been made within the framework of the United Nations (in the period from September 1980 through July 1987 the UN Security Council alone passed eight resolutions on the Iran-Iraq war, and

the UN secretary general visited Baghdad and Tehran repeatedly), the nonaligned movement, the Islamic Conference Organization, the "Committee of Seven" of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and by individual states and authoritative statesmen and politicians. We may as a whole, evidently, speak of the ineffectiveness of the international community's efforts for the purpose of achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict or, at least, a halt to military operations.

At the same time it has to be acknowledged that the most suitable and practicable mechanism within whose framework a halt to the bloodshed and a start on negotiations between the sides on a settlement of the conflict might be achieved is the UN Security Council. A sound basis for this could be Resolution 598 which it passed in July 1987 and which contains a demand that Iran and Iraq immediately cease fire and halt military operations on land, at sea and in the air and immediately withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries. The resolution also contains a request that the UN secretary general study in consultation with Iran and Iraq the possibility of entrusting an impartial body to investigate the question of responsibility for the conflict. It contains as a separate clause an appeal to all other states to show the maximum restraint and refrain from any actions which could lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.

Iraq immediately approved the resolution and expressed a willingness to comply with it. Iran did not assent to it. At the same time many observers noted certain positive shifts in its position. Whereas earlier in such cases Tehran has categorically rejected all Security Council resolutions, on this occasion its spokesmen stated the acceptability of some parts thereof and a willingness to continue to cooperate with the UN secretary general. Nuances also appeared in the well-known proposition that "identification of the aggressor" precede a suspension of military operations. Nonetheless, Iran, to judge by everything, is not yet willing to accept Resolution 598 in its entirety.

With the escalation and expansion of the framework of the Iran-Iraq armed conflict there has been a sharp increase in tension in the Persian Gulf region and increased hostility in relations between Iran and the Arab states of the region, which Tehran has repeatedly accused of a one-sided, pro-Iraq position, threatening, if necessary, to take military action against them. This is characteristic primarily of Iran's relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which are continuing to give Iraq considerable political and economic, including financial, support.

It should be said that the sheikhdoms of the region united in the GCC have made considerable efforts to reconcile the belligerents and keep up political contacts with Iran. Within the framework of the GCC's mediation efforts delegations thereof have visited Baghdad and Tehran repeatedly, and visits were exchanged between the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran. The GCC

countries viewed such visits and contacts as positive. The hope has been expressed that if this political dialogue, given continuation of Tehran's extremely rigid position, does not lead to a halt to the conflict, it will at least limit its existing framework, help prevent a spillover of military operations to the territory of the GCC states and, what is most important, lessen tension in relations with Tehran, which is reflected highly perceptibly in these states' internal political stability.

Despite the efforts that have been made, there has been no normalization of Iranian-Kuwaiti and Iranian-Saudi relations. In addition, Iran's confrontation with these neighboring Muslim countries intensified sharply following the events of July-September 1987. On 31 July there were bloody clashes in Mecca between Shi'ite and Sunni pilgrims, in the course of which hundreds of people died and an even greater number were injured. Iran and Saudi Arabia engaged in a sharp exchange of accusations of responsibility for the tragic incident. The next day demonstrators in Tehran wrecked the Kuwaiti and Saudi embassy buildings. In September Kuwait held Iran responsible for having fired missiles at its territory and expelled five Iranian diplomats. The majority of Arab countries condemned Tehran for spurring tension in the region. The Arab League stated the possibility of its members' reconsideration of their relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Iran-Iraq conflict has disunited the Arab states even more, some supporting Iran, others (the majority), Iraq. It has made more difficult the mobilization of pan-Arab efforts for the struggle to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression of 1967 and the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, facilitated for Tel Aviv the pursuit of an expansionist policy and, specifically, created the conditions conducive to the 1982 Israeli aggression in Lebanon.

Such is the disastrous impact of the Iran-Iraq war on the situation in the Persian Gulf zone, relations between Iran and neighboring states and the general political climate in the region.

## II

Up to a certain moment this impact was confined, in the main, to a regional framework. Specifically, the gloomy forecasts of the analysts who in the first weeks and months of the Iran-Iraq armed conflict were predicting the possibility of a total suspension of oil supplies from the Gulf region and the war's catastrophic consequences for the economy of petroleum-consuming countries were not justified. The fact that this conflict was often referred to at that time as the "forgotten war" also testifies to its negligible influence initially on the international political and economic situation.

The global aspect of the crisis in the Gulf was manifested later and was connected with the escalation of armed operations, the "tanker war" and the buildup of the

direct foreign military presence. It is all this together which has imparted to this conflict situation the present disturbing international resonance.

Without absolving Iran and Iraq of their responsibility for the actions which led to this development of events, it has at the same time to be mentioned that a new, more dangerous phase of the crisis has been provoked by the United States. Having concentrated by the summer of 1987 in the waters of the Gulf and in proximity to it a strong naval armada consisting of more than 40 warships, including carriers, assault landing craft and 25,000 servicemen, which have been ordered to open fire at any target "posing a threat to ships or vessels under the American flag," the United States has entered virtually into direct military confrontation with Iran and thereby become a direct participant in the crisis events in the region.

And although much is being said in Washington about the fact that it was not the United States which initiated this development of events and that its actions were only a forced response to the confrontation imposed on it, these actions concur strikingly with the scenario of American intervention in the Iran-Iraq conflict prepared back in May 1984 by Adm J. Howe, former director of the State Department's Bureau for Military and Political Affairs. At the final stage of intervention the scenario provided for "the active use of American armed forces to hit targets in Iran" (4). Judging by U.S. operations in the Gulf, this stage is at hand.

Washington's closest NATO allies also have increased their military presence in the Gulf zone. Although in terms of numerical composition the navies of the West European powers can in no way be compared with the U.S. Navy and are, as a whole, characterized by a certain restraint in their operations and an endeavor to confine their role to auxiliary functions (the active pro-American position of Great Britain constitutes an exception), their presence has exacerbated the situation even further.

In connection with the involvement in Washington's plans of the NATO allies there once again came to be talk in the United States of the possibility of the realization of long-nurtured designs for an expansion of the geographical range of the North Atlantic bloc. This June, on the threshold of the meeting of the seven most important capitalist states in Venice, the White House put forward the idea of the creation of a "multinational force for the Persian Gulf". At that time America's allies, remembering the bitter Lebanon experience, which resulted for some of them in human losses and political costs, failed to support Washington. However, they succumbed to its pressure subsequently.

Analyzing the U.S. actions which led to the American-Iranian confrontation and the destabilizing effect of the Western military presence in the region, the British OBSERVER, in particular, wrote: "It is hard for President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher to recognize,

possibly, that the biggest danger to peace emanates not from the Iranians... and not from the Iraqis.... The danger comes from the dozens of warships which are ironing out the Persian Gulf" (5).

Endeavoring to impart to its actions an aura of "noble mission," the U.S. Administration explained them by the need to ensure freedom of navigation and the West's access to Gulf oil. But has navigation in the Gulf zone become safer since the biggest U.S. naval armada since the Vietnam war has been concentrated there? The answer is obvious: by no means. On the contrary, it faces an even bigger threat. The very composition of the American naval forces in the region, which includes carriers and assault landing craft with specially trained personnel whose main function is destroying ground targets and carrying out amphibious landings, induces the thought that ensuring freedom of navigation and the protection of Kuwaiti tankers sailing under the American flag are by no means their priority assignment. This viewpoint is underpinned by reports leaked to the press concerning the United States' intention of using its forces in the region to strike at targets deep in Iranian territory, establish a naval blockade of this country and so forth.

It has already been said that the Iran-Iraq war has not created serious obstacles to access to the region's oil and has not in any way palpably affected conditions on the world oil market. Even in the tensest periods of the "tanker war" the quantity of liquid fuel exported thence has conformed entirely to the West's requirements. In addition, the reduction in the oil price pertained precisely to the height of military operations, which, naturally, could not have happened had the world community been experiencing "oil starvation". Rejecting this "explanation" of U.S. actions given out by the White House, THE WASHINGTON POST wrote plainly: "There is no threat to our oil supplies, but we are behaving as if there is such a threat.... The real threat to the United States in the Persian Gulf is the possibility of it being pulled into the Iran-Iraq war" (6).

One further "argument" was in use among American official spokesmen: the United States was forced, they said, to accede to military measures to counter the "Soviet threat" and the growing Soviet presence in the region. Thus H. Baker, chief of the White House staff, declared: "The United States will not relinquish control in the region to the Soviets, the Persian Gulf must not become a 'Russian lake'" (7). The "growing Soviet military presence" to which Washington is fond of referring in actual fact amounts to a few warships, which are performing the functions of escorting three tankers—the "Marshal Chuykov," the "Marshal Bagramyan" and the "Makhachkala" chartered by Kuwait for a year. Since May 1987 these tankers have been shipping Kuwaiti oil to various countries. The Soviet warships, as the Soviet Government statement of 3 July 1987 emphasized, "are unconnected with the spurring of tension in

this region". This obvious fact, incidentally, is recognized by many American specialists also. Specifically, J. Record, a leading associate of the Hudson Institute, wrote: "As far as the assertions concerning the growing Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf are concerned, ...this presence cannot be considered either meaningful or contrary to that freedom of navigation for which the administration is campaigning" (8).

Were the United States really concerned to lower tension in the region and counter the "Soviet presence," it should logically have adopted a positive attitude toward the USSR's proposal concerning the withdrawal from the area of all warships of countries which do not pertain to the region. Washington, however, simply brushed aside this initiative. Its position in concentrated form was set forth by V. Walters, permanent U.S. UN representative, who in an interview with the CBS television company declared that the United States would not withdraw its warships from the Persian Gulf region "even if peace is established there tomorrow."

The entire artificiality of the arguments adduced above is thus obvious: they do not withstand criticism upon a comparison with the actual state of affairs. An answer to the question concerning the true motives of American operations in the Persian Gulf may be found in the statements of the figures in the United States who recognize that these operations are dictated primarily by "strategic considerations".

A retrospective analysis of Washington's military-political practice permits the conclusion that these "considerations" conceal there an endeavor to maintain by any means control over the Persian Gulf in the context of the global confrontation with the Soviet Union, continue the exploitation of the region's natural resources and prevent any changes here which might present a threat to its own interests.

The United States' long-term strategy in respect of the Gulf zone was formulated back in the first half of the 1970's under the impact of a whole number of factors: Britain's departure from the area east of Suez, the strengthening of the role of the states of the region in world politics and the economy and certain independent measures which they had adopted which had given rise to American dissatisfaction (the oil boycott of the West in 1973, the accelerated energy crisis, the active role in a Near East settlement and so forth). This policy has been virtually unchanged since then: only the correlation of military and nonmilitary means of pursuing it has changed.

For example, in the 1970's the U.S. Administration endeavored, owing to a number of circumstances, to secure its interests in the region by nonpower methods, in the main. True, some of its spokesmen did not even then preclude the possibility of the active use of the armed forces to this end. The interview of then Secretary of State H. Kissinger given to the journal BUSINESS

WEEK in December 1974, in which he declared that in the event of a threat to supplies of Arab oil to the West the United States could occupy the oil deposits of the Persian Gulf, is widely known, for example.

The first scenarios of the Americans' occupation of the Gulf's oilfields and plans to create an assault force for use in the oil-bearing regions of the Near and Middle East also appeared in the same decade. Thus in 1977 J. Carter adopted the decision to form a special mobile "rapid deployment force" intended for military operations in areas of "vital importance" to the United States. The Persian Gulf region was designated the main sphere of the operations of this military formation. The "arc of instability" or "arc of crisis" concept advanced at the end of 1978 by Z. Brzezinski also was intended to be "substantiation" of the need for the American military presence in the region. The Gulf zone also proved to be incorporated in this arc. Following the anti-shah revolution in Iran, the White House's reliance on military methods of "defense of its interests" became particularly apparent. This choice was conclusively officialized in the "Carter Doctrine," which plainly declared the Persian Gulf a zone of the United States' "vitally important interests".

The militarist emphasis in Washington's approach to the region was not only confirmed but also intensified with the occupancy of the White House by the R. Reagan administration. It was under the latter that the decision to create a "rapid deployment" interventionist force of more than 300,000 men came to be implemented. A Pentagon circular entitled "Defense Directives" which was issued in 1982 testifies unambiguously to the assignments of this force. It says, *inter alia*: "We must be ready under any circumstances to commit American forces directly to this region if it **appears** (my emphasis—R.M.) that a threat to secure access to oil in the Persian Gulf has been created" (9).

The special U.S. formation—the Central Command—was formed in January 1983, its sphere of operation extending to 19 countries of the Persian Gulf, Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa, where this formation, according to its commander, Lt Gen R. Kingston, "has the undisputed right to conduct military operations" (10). The continuity of American policy in the region is indicated by the fact that a principal element of the "neoglobalism" doctrine officialized in the mid-1980's was the proposition concerning the United States' "vital interests" borrowed from the "Carter Doctrine".

Obviously, under the conditions of the crisis-free development of events in the Near and Middle East and regional stability it would be difficult for the United States to justify and pursue here a policy of a direct military presence. The attempts to use to this end the events in Iran and Afghanistan did not and could not have produced a long-term result. The crisis in relations with Iran in connection with the seizure of the American hostages had been settled, and the Arab sheikhdoms of

the Gulf were not persuaded that in connection with the Afghan events a "Soviet threat" to the region had been created to which American military "assistance" should be counterposed.

A suitable pretext was finally found—the Iran-Iraq war. The prolonged military confrontation between Iran and Iraq corresponded to Washington's interests for a number of reasons. Both because it made it possible to distract the Arab world's attention from the aggressive policy of Israel and the United States, which was supporting it, and because it engendered hopes for a restoration of American positions in the warring states. But mainly because the protracted armed conflict afforded U.S. imperialism new opportunities for a strengthening of its military presence in the Gulf zone.

Washington, to judge by everything, did not passively await this military clash but made efforts to accelerate the start thereof and subsequently prevent it being extinguished. The Kuwaiti newspaper AL-QABAS, in particular, wrote, citing W. Quandt, the well-known American specialist on the Near East, that on the threshold of the conflict the United States, attempting to embroil the two countries, supplied Iraq with false information concerning the Iranian regime and its intentions in respect of Iraq (11). And after the conflict had flared up, H. Kissinger cynically formulated Washington's goals as follows: "The ideal version of the end of the war for us (the United States—R.M.) would be for Iran to beat Iraq, and Iraq, Iran" (12).

The United States' interference in the crisis events in the region may be broken down into several phases. Having begun with declarations of neutrality, the United States gradually switched here to more assertive actions. These included military provocations like the arbitrary establishment in certain sectors of the Persian Gulf of the procedure for the flights of foreign passenger aircraft and the passage of ships accompanied by threats to use force in respect of those which failed to comply with the imposed "rules," diplomatic actions aimed at persuading the Arab sheikhdoms to request armed "protection" from Washington, the announcement of Operation Staunch allegedly designed to achieve a suspension of Western supplies of weapons to Iran, its own supplies to this country of arms and combat equipment spares and so forth.

The political scandal, which came to be called "Irangate," which erupted in the United States in November 1986, was the most striking testimony that the United States was actively promoting a continuation of the conflict. The French journal LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE wrote in its February issue for 1987 about the "mechanics" of this policy of the U.S. Administration: "Washington has been supplying Iraq with military intelligence, sometimes falsified, gathered with the aid of the AWACS aircraft radars and intended, *inter alia*, for the guidance of Iraqi fighter bombers. The White House has been supplying Iran with radar stations capable of



picking up Iraqi aircraft and missiles in order to shoot them down and, in addition, spares providing for the repair of F-4, F-5 and F-14 aircraft purchases by Iran so that they might once again be capable of flying in Iraqi skies. The Iranians were also sold approximately a further 2,000 TOW antitank missiles capable of destroying Iraqi tanks..." (13).

The administration's actions, subsequently revealed in the course of the "Irangate" investigation, were the point of departure for the present stage of U.S. policy in the region. Unabashed power recklessness and the spurring of militarist hysteria combined with attempts to pull its NATO allies into the confrontation with Iran have become a characteristic feature of this stage.

Thus the United States is attempting to camouflage its true role in dragging out the war in the Gulf and wreak a kind of vengeance on Iran for the loss of its positions in this country and in the region as a whole and restore the abruptly fallen trust of its "Arab friends," who have experienced a kind of shock at Washington's hypocritical and double-dealing policy.

It has to be acknowledged that as a result of a certain reconsideration of the former, negative attitude of a number of Gulf states toward the U.S. military presence there are more favorable prerequisites for Washington's present militarist activity in the region. Under the conditions of Tehran's extremely rigid and aggressive actions and statements addressed to its neighbors certain Arab regimes have come to regard the American presence as a means of deterring Iran and maintaining stability in their countries. At the same time, while not objecting to "limited assistance," they are following with extreme unease the expanding scale of the American operations and are refusing, as before, to make their territory available for U.S. military bases.

The United States' "peace-making" activity is causing growing concern in Congress. There is a strengthening mood on Capitol Hill in favor of activation of the so-called "War Powers Act," with which the legislators can compel the White House to withdraw American armed forces from the Gulf. As far as the present administration is concerned, the ascendancy therein has been gained, to judge by everything, by the supporters of a continuation of military adventures capable of entailing extremely dangerous and unpredictable consequences.

The United States' attempts to take advantage of the exacerbation of the situation in the Persian Gulf zone to establish military-political hegemony in the region are being countered by the policy of the Soviet Union, which is combining struggle for a strengthening of peace and the security of the peoples and a stabilization of the situation in various parts of the world with active opposition to the aggressive policy of imperialist forces.

From the very start of the Iran-Iraq armed conflict the USSR has invariably advocated the speediest end thereof and the solution of all contentious questions between the two warring parties by political means, at the negotiating table. The Soviet Union occupied this position both when military operations were being conducted on Iranian territory and, subsequently, when they had shifted to Iraqi territory. The development of events has confirmed the soundness of the Soviet evaluation of the war made back at the start thereof as "absolutely senseless from the viewpoint of these states' interests. But highly beneficial to imperialism, which is dreaming of how to restore its positions in this region." All these years the USSR has acted in its contacts with the contending sides and at international forums scrupulously and consistently in the direction of the elimination of this dangerous center of armed confrontation.

Under the conditions of exacerbation of the conflict the Soviet Union has warned repeatedly of the danger of foreign interference, which would create a threat of its expansion, complicate the task of a settlement and be fraught with a rise in dangerous accidents (like the shelling of the American frigate the "Stark," as a result of which 37 American servicemen died).

On 3 July 1987 the USSR Government put forward specific proposals aimed at an improvement in the situation in the Persian Gulf zone and stipulating, *inter alia*, that all warships of states not pertaining to this region be withdrawn from the Gulf as soon as possible and that Iran and Iraq, in turn, refrain from actions which could create a threat to international shipping. "Such measures, implemented, furthermore, in the context of an all-embracing settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict, would contribute to a calming of the situation and removal of the threat of expansion of the explosive center of military tension."

The USSR contributed actively to the UN Security Council's unanimous passage this July of Resolution 598 on the Iran-Iraq war, expressed full support for the efforts of the UN secretary general and called on all states to render him the utmost assistance. Recognizing the presence of a threat to the security of shipping in the Gulf, the Soviet Union believes that it cannot be ensured by individual states pursuing a "gunboat policy" but must be achieved by the efforts of the entire international community, which the United Nations represents. "If necessary, we will have to put at its actual disposal the appropriate adequate powers," USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze emphasized, addressing the UN General Assembly 42d Session.

The Soviet Union is demonstrating by its actions in every possible way a willingness to contribute to the speediest achievement of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf zone. "This policy of ours," the Soviet Government statement of 8 January 1987 observed, "is an integral part of the USSR's high-minded policy of the elimination of tension and the unlocking of conflict



situations by way of negotiations with regard for the legitimate interests of all sides and without any foreign interference and of the creation of the foundations of security in Asia as an important component of an all-embracing system of international security."

The rapid development of events in the Persian Gulf zone and around it predetermined the need to turn once again to the subject of the crisis in the region after the article had been prepared for publication.

The American-Iranian confrontation is assuming increasingly rigid forms. In addition to its naval forces in the Gulf the United States has dispatched thither nuclear submarines carrying cruise missiles fitted with nonnuclear warheads. New attacks on Iranian ships and offshore oil platforms have been carried out. At the end of October President R. Reagan announced the imposition of a total embargo on supplies of Iranian products to the United States. In turn, Tehran announced at the start of November "a week of mobilization actions of the Iranian people against the American aggression in the Persian Gulf" and its readiness to continue to confront the United States.

The list of casualties of the "tanker war" and the "war of the cities" continues to lengthen, and Kuwaiti targets have been subjected to new shelling. Reports have appeared on the massing of Iranian forces on Iraq's southern borders and the possibility of a broad-scale offensive with a view to the capture of Basra.

This confrontational policy is in sharp contrast with another policy—the stimulation of international efforts aimed at a normalization of the situation in the Persian Gulf zone by means of peaceful diplomacy.

At the behest of the Security Council, this September the UN secretary general presented for study to the two governments in the course of visits to Tehran and Baghdad a draft plan of implementation of Resolution 598. The same month he had a meeting with the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council. A joint communique for the press on the results of the meeting emphasized that the implementation of Resolution 598 "is the sole basis for an all-embracing, just, honorable and lasting settlement of the conflict". Mention was made of the particular importance of the unity of the permanent members of the UN Security Council in the approach to this question.

At the end of October Iran and Iraq handed the UN secretary general written replies to his new detailed proposals concerning compliance with the resolution. As J. Perez de Cuellar's spokesman declared, "in principle both Iran and Iraq responded positively to the UN secretary general's proposals." At the same time, the two sides maintain, these replies are of a "preliminary and initial nature," and judging by their official pronouncements, the stumbling block is, as before, the question of the time correlation between a cease-fire and the process

of identification of the side responsible for having unleashed the conflict. Owing to this contradiction, which has become central, in the positions of Baghdad and Tehran, many political observers are concluding that the chances of a halt to the conflict in the immediate future are very slim. Nonetheless, the certain progress achieved by the UN secretary general testifies that the potential of Resolution 598 is still far from exhausted and that there continue to be certain hopes for the success of persevering and patient diplomacy.

The special pan-Arab summit this November in Amman also called for new political and not military efforts for a halt to the Iran-Iraq war and the normalization of the situation in the Persian Gulf and for collective inter-Arab action in the business of compliance with Resolution 598.

Contributing in every possible way to the peacemaking efforts of the UN secretary general, the Soviet Union is continuing to make a substantial contribution to the search for ways of unlocking the crisis situation in the region. In October-November a Soviet representative visited Iran, Iraq and Kuwait; it was proposed that the UN Security Council Military Staff Committee be activated to put the question of the creation of anaval force under the aegis of the United Nations on a practical footing. The Soviet idea of the use of UN forces to provide for security in this region combined with continued efforts in compliance with Resolution 598 is meeting with growing support in the world, in the United States included.

The presence of various, frequently contending trends and approaches to a solution of problems of the region, the exceptional complexity and instability of the situation under the conditions of the continuing conflict, the tangled knot of Iranian-Iraqi contradictions—such are the basic features of the kind of culminating stage in the development of the situation in the Persian Gulf zone which had taken shape by the end of 1987. Events in the very near future will provide an answer to the question of whether it will be possible to achieve a turn for the better here or whether the crisis in the region will threaten international peace and security for a long time to come.

#### Footnotes

1. LE MONDE, 20 August 1987.
2. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 2, 1985, p 74.
3. The oil exports of Iran and Iraq depend on shipments by sea to a differing extent. For Iran this is the sole channel for oil exports. Even before the war Iraq was using to this end together with the sea route pipelines running across the territory of Syria and Turkey. After the main Iraqi ports in the Gulf—Fao, Umm-Kasr and Mina al-Bakr—were put out of action at the initial stage of the war, oil came to be supplied abroad only by

pipeline. Despite the fact that one of them was shut down in April 1982, Iraq succeeded in compensating for the losses, increasing the capacity of the pipeline running over Turkish territory and building a new one—across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. The construction of one further pipeline—to the Jordanian port of Aqaba—is planned.

4. THE WASHINGTON POST, 25 August 1984.
5. THE OBSERVER, 27 September 1987.
6. THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 July 1987.
7. Ibidem.
8. THE WASHINGTON POST, 9 June 1987.
9. Quoted from J. Epstein, "Strategy and Force Planning. The Case of the Persian Gulf," Washington, 1987, p 31.
10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 25 October 1982.
11. See AL-QABAS, 25 September 1984 (in Arabic).
12. AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, November 1984, p 42 (in Arabic).
13. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, February 1987.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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**Bovin, Lukin on Outlook for 21st Century**  
*18160004e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 50-62*

[Dialogue between A.Ye. Bovin and V.P. Lukin: "On the Threshold of a New Century"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The approach of the year 2000 is heightening interest in the history of the 20th century and predictions about what awaits us in the 21st century. The range of assessments is truly inexhaustible, both objectively by dint of their complexity and multidimensional nature, and subjectively because of the inevitable differences of opinion.

MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA offered the floor to IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Yevgenyevich

Bovin and Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Vladimir Petrovich Lukin. We proceed here from the premise that the controversial nature of individual judgments and conclusions must not serve as an obstacle to their publication.

**V. Lukin:** The end of both the century and of the millennium are approaching. "It is time to pick up the pebbles..." Everything has been predicted for the end of the second millennium, from the end of the world to the start of a paradise... And humankind's baggage at the approach of this arbitrary boundary, but nevertheless a boundary, is most notable for three components, namely, the arms race, fraught with the threat of universal catastrophe, the growing ecological crisis, resulting from the aggressive behavior of the technosphere vis-a-vis the biosphere, and the sharpening contrast on a world scale between poverty and prosperity and the associated increase in social tension and tension between nations.

**A. Bovin:** Everything that you say sounds dismal. Behind each of the components that you mention there are people. Or more accurately, their suffering and unhappiness. And death; the deaths of millions. This is the paradox of the times: never have so many people talked about peace as they do in the 20th century, and never have wars, large and small, gathered in such an abundant harvest.

Peace, like war, is divisible: zones of peace are contiguous with and alternate with zones of war. According to calculations done at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, last year alone there were 36 wars and armed conflicts in which 41 countries were involved. I do not think that these figures will change substantially this year. And so it must be recognized that by the end of the century there will be more fighting going on than at the start of the century.

**V. Lukin:** Perhaps we should try to add some optimistic tones to the overall picture?

**A. Bovin:** Of course, I would like to... But it is hardly worth translating our conversation onto the plane of "optimism-pessimism." Everything around us is too complex and serious. Rather more complex and serious than a "sense of profound satisfaction." Mankind is approaching the third millennium in a situation of crises that is permeated with contradictions and paradoxes.

Of course, when talking about crises, contradictions and paradoxes it is essential to see the difference between West and East, the differences in the nature and scale of the problems. But I am not about to absolutize these differences. The 20th century has passed under the sign of the establishment of world socialism. This is an indisputable and undoubted fact. But undoubtedly, other things are also indisputable. Socialism has still not

created an economy that is more efficient than the capitalist economy. A number of the socialist countries have encountered internal crises (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China, Poland).

**V. Lukin:** And to this we must add the situation that took shape in our country in the late Seventies and early Eighties, which was characterized by the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum as a precrisis situation.

**A. Bovin:** Of course. There is also the "experience" of the sharp disagreements at the international level, going as far as armed clashes (the USSR and the PRC, and Vietnam and the PRC). This is bitter experience but not removed from serious analysis.

**V. Lukin:** We have somehow still not become accustomed to discussing the problems and difficulties of socialism in an intelligent and businesslike manner. And it is high time that we did.

**A. Bovin:** It seems to me that your remark applies equally to the problems of capitalism and imperialism. We somehow understand this in some kind of way but the thought usually slips away into a dead-end rut...

The crisis of capitalism, which embraces all spheres of social life, is undoubted. The contradictions are multiplying. The impression of irrationality about what has happened is growing. On the one hand we have the true triumph of the intellect and human thinking. And on the other we have a fatal melancholy, a convulsion and deformity of the culture. To the "old poor," the birthmarks of "pre-era" capitalism are being added the "new poor," and the numbers of the declassed and marginal groups and strata are growing. The gift of scientific and technical progress.

**V. Lukin:** Since mankind's leap from the ethnographic to the sociohistorical condition, this present century has become probably the most spasmodic and discontinuous.

And the drama for our civilization is primarily that while objectively we have become something quite different, subjectively in many ways we are as we were previously. We have found ourselves in a century of quite new energy opportunities, in a century of a previously inconceivable replacement of technologies, in a century of the globalization of the world process of civilization, in a century of a fundamentally new level in the involvement of the masses in world problems, in a century of strict tests for the various social and national ideas of preceding centuries, in a century of the conversion into illusion of much of what initially seemed extremely real, and at the same time on the approach to the outlines of things that not long ago seemed quite abstract. For example, world apocalypse—nuclear, ecological or demographic.

Never in known history has the gap between the past and the future been as wide as it is for mankind in the 20th century. This is a most serious test for all of us, a true challenge to our history and our civilization. And we are still meeting this challenge only in a mediocre fashion. The old and the traditional are being rapidly pulled down. But the breaking of traditions is outstripping the establishment of effective new and modern forms of social life.

**A. Bovin:** In my opinion the spiritual atmosphere at the close of the century is typified by a certain dissatisfaction and disappointment on the left flank. Not everything—far from everything—has turned out as we thought, as was laid down in party programs and political platforms. To differing degrees this applies both to the social-democrat and to the communist detachments of the workers' movement.

Social democracy promised to "ennoble" capitalism and create a "state of general prosperity." It has done much to improve the life of the working man but there has been no "general prosperity." Many of the goals proclaimed by the communists have still not been attained, despite the enormous efforts made over seven decades.

Following Hegel, F. Engels used the expression "the irony of history." History is sometimes ironic for those who take it upon themselves to alter it. After they have made revolution people see with astonishment that they have not quite done what they wanted to do. For a long time we presumptuously thought that this did not apply to communist parties and socialist revolutions. Now we see that we were mistaken, and that history can also be ironic with us.

In the assets of progress there has been a sharp contraction of the sphere and domination of imperialism, and the most odious forms of political and economic oppression ("rampant" capitalism, fascism, colonialism) have been liquidated. What was the standard at the beginning of the century (Paraguay, for example, or South Africa), is now perceived as the exception. However, none of the critics of capitalism foresaw that capitalism would be so viable and show such adaptability to the new sociohistorical milieu.

I am not about to assert that each new stage in the general crisis of capitalism has brought nearer and made more real the prospects for socialist transformations at the centers of world capitalism. Early in the century the prospects for the revolutionary breaking of capitalism were perceived as more realistic and closer than they are now at the close of the century.

**V. Lukin:** Here, perhaps, we have arrived at the main point of the analysis. There are still people who are both well informed and optimists.

The sources of optimism stem from the Russia of 1917, from the October discontinuity in Russian and world history—the most important event of the century. Social thinking now combines it directly with our present restructuring, which may potentially play just as important a role.

Historians know all about the owl of Minerva, which this time is seriously delayed. Evidently it is difficult to keep up with the speed of the 20th century. However, the level and scale of party self-criticism, which breaks through the wall between words and reality, are set on an optimistic footing; the rapid work on a concrete program of revolutionary renewal of all aspects of life in Soviet society accomplished at the CPSU Central Committee January and June (1987) plenums, giving due consideration to the enormous difficulties, and the clear-cut and unambiguous definition of the further pivotal line of revolutionary reforms—the line of democratization—and finally the first but undoubted steps in the advance along this line.

Of course all of this is still only a beginning. Of course the memory of our generation has been weighed down with the baggage of unrealizable demands. But this demand is being made for the first time. And hence the optimism.

**A. Bovin:** We are perhaps at a turning point in the history of world socialism. It has found itself at an impasse, it has exhausted the model of socialism that put down roots in the specific historical circumstances (Russia's backwardness, hostile capitalist encirclement) involved in the formation of the first socialist state in history. Rigid centralism, the command-type administrative system for management of the economy, the inadequacy of democratism, the dominance of dogmatic narrow-mindedness in science and culture—these are some of the distinguishing features of the first model of socialism on the historical plane. The start of attempts to move away from this and to re-examine it can be dated from the 20th CPSU Congress. Three decades of failure along this road brought the USSR to the brink of crisis. Hence the enormous importance of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress leading to the renewal of socialism and the creation of a new model for it that combines a significantly more efficient economy with full-fledged democracy.

**V. Lukin:** And does it not seem to you that there was an alternative and that we missed it somewhere at the turn of the Twenties and Thirties?

**A. Bovin:** A special study is required here. So, "with the naked eye" it is difficult to say anything definite. We were "squeezed" by objective circumstances. Let me clarify that. The repression under Stalin or, for example, the extreme collectivization, were phenomena of a subjectivist nature, and just had to occur. But the all-penetrating centralism and the restrictions on democracy? I see no other alternatives for that time.

**V. Lukin:** And I am convinced that there was an alternative... The passage of a similar phase of development with basically different social costs; for me this is an alternative.

But today let us speak of more urgent matters. The more so since what is happening here among us belongs not only to us. Perestroika, glasnost, democratization... It is simply impossible to say where their significance purely inside the country ends and where an international significance begins. For example, we should sharply improve our economic affairs. And this is primarily a domestic issue. But it impinges directly on both the material and psychological aspects of our country's activity in the world arena. For over the past decade we have, on the one hand, achieved parity with the United States in the military sphere. On the other hand, however, our opportunities for nonmilitary influence on world affairs have been curtailed.

Simultaneously, the phenomena that are now called "deficit democracy" and stagnation trends in the social sphere have all affected our country's appearance (and this means also the appearance of world socialism) in the world. Thus, without our active opposition the objective prerequisites have been created for mass dissemination of the thesis of a Soviet military threat.

In our by no means sentimental century people are reluctant to believe proclaimed intentions and are very willing to investigate realistic opportunities that are based on worst-possible-case scenarios. We have little propaganda (or, as it is now fashionable to say, counter-propaganda) in order to eliminate in the West the firmly entrenched image of an enormous country with very great military opportunities and limited nonmilitary opportunities. We also have few very active foreign policy actions and initiatives. What is needed here is real results from perestroika, and in particular an equalizing of the balance between military and nonmilitary opportunities in international affairs, and when possible, these should be "on reciprocal courses."

The first steps in perestroika have already started to change the situation for the better. Public opinion polls in various countries show that people trust the Soviet leadership more than the U.S. leadership. But we can hardly flatter ourselves with this. It is still unclear what is greater here: trust in us or mistrust of them. Obviously the U.S. administration is very helpful to us here because it is engrossed in "ideological pop-art" and its shots are fired at primitive, decrepit targets. But presidents come and presidents go, but the negative psychological stereotypes are very persistent in the mass consciousness.

Only the first layer has now been stripped from the anti-Soviet stereotype. And much must be done to insure that it does not grow again—and not only at the propaganda level. And not even only at the level of foreign policy actions. This must be done mainly within the country.

Thus, perestroika and democratization constitute one of the most important conditions for creating opportunities for optimistic foreign policy predictions.

**A. Bovin:** In general, depending on the course of and successes in our perestroika, two scenarios are theoretically possible for the end of the century. Let us consider the first, the one toward which we are striving. Perestroika is embracing and transforming all spheres of public life in the USSR. Modernization is proceeding successfully in the PRC. The other socialist countries are managing to resolve their problems. In other words, the maturity of world socialism is being enhanced...

And how is this reflected in the position of the main centers and citadels of capitalism? Let us pose the question more specifically: what is the future for conservatism?

Neoconservatism, at any rate in its present Reaganite-Thatcher forms, is not eternal. However, two dimensions can be seen, two varieties of waves—short and long. The former is the specific leaders and their specific programs, positions and political fates. One—Reagan—will be departing sooner, others, like Thatcher and Kohl, later, but within the framework of the cycle we have selected, also quite soon. The other wave—the long wave—is the wave of contemporary conservatism and is associated with factors such as the features of the present stage in the scientific and technical revolution and with the crisis of liberalism, and also social democracy, and with the serious difficulties of leftist forces in general.

As the century draws to a close the new stage in scientific and technical progress has heightened the dilemma more than in mid-century, namely the dilemma of social regulation and economic efficiency. Reagan's response to this is gross and egotistical and limited by class. But it is a response notwithstanding, a clear-cut response to a changed objective reality. It is the same with Thatcher in Britain. And no clear alternative can yet be seen among their liberal and reformist opponents. It is not for nothing that in order to survive, the socialists in France and Spain have turned to "Reaganism with a human face." They have done this while "singing their own song at the tops of their voices," and are well aware of this. Obviously this song was composed long ago but was not sung early in our century.

Mark this well: according to polls in the United States and a number of the European states, the conservatives are considered weakest of all in the foreign policy sphere. And in the economic and, strange as it may seem, social spheres the situation is more complex and contradictory. Of course, this long wave too is receding. The doctrine and practice aimed at "improving" capitalism by means of an active social policy, that is, social reformism, are again being activated. However, the reformists must find an answer to the question of combining their own

traditional methods with the nontraditional resolution of problems concerning economic efficiency under the conditions of the new stage in scientific and technical progress.

Incidentally, at previous stages in social reformism much was taken from socialism. I think that in the future also the more energetically we develop perestroika, and particularly the component of an effective social policy, the more its potentials will be spread among leftist forces in the West, including their reformist trends.

**A. Bovin:** The end of the century is a new wave of the scientific and technical revolution. K. Marx' prediction that the worker would stop being "the chief agent of the production process and stand equal with it" (K. Marx and F. Engels. Works. Vol 46, p 213) is coming true. The age of production facilities without people is approaching. Given the synchronous development of social and scientific and technical progress it is possible to imagine tens and hundreds of millions of people being switched to the "services sphere" (culture, science, education, public health). But it is still early to be thinking of that. Meanwhile, as I see it, mass unemployment remains and will remain the chief social problem of the scientific and technical revolution.

Last year in the OECD countries more than 30 million were unemployed. And what if this becomes 80 million? Or 130 million? How will this affect political stability?

**V. Lukin:** A great deal here is still unclear. Structural unemployment has actually become a real fact of everyday life. However, at the same time the number of work places is growing in quite new spheres. Take the United States: there one of Reagan's chief propaganda acts is his statement that while he has been in power 13 million new jobs have been created. In America now the number of those employed is greater than at any time previously, while unemployment is lower than during the early Eighties. What is this? A temporary distortion of the long-term process that we mentioned previously? It is still hard to say.

Virtually all the new work places have appeared in the services sphere. Here, perhaps, we are observing a process of social restructuring of about the same order of magnitude as the destruction of the agrarian society and the flow of the main masses of the population into industry. In terms of its substance this process cannot help but be an international process based on world interdependence. In order for the services sphere in the United States or Britain to supplant industrial production, somewhere in the "newly industrialized states" it is necessary that the agrarian society be transformed into an industrial one. And consequently, the process of making the peasants into industrial workers, urbanization and so forth must occur. Does this not mean that the world's economic interdependence is becoming increasingly also a social interdependence?

In general, in my opinion it is question not of the simple supplanting of a work force but of considerably more complex processes. But there is room in them for what we mentioned earlier, namely, that the working class will become something else both in terms of working conditions and in terms of life orientation. The numbers of pensioners and the numbers of people living on allowances are growing. In a number of the capitalist countries a marked weakening of the positions of the trade unions can be seen. New social links are being forged and the old links are weakening. In short, the entire social milieu is changing.

**A. Bovin:** And once the social milieu changes, then obviously ideas about the socialist perspective will also change.

Often the reasoning goes like this: objectively socialism reached maturity long ago and is overripe for socialist transformations; but subjectively the force that would have been capable of realizing the historical trend has been significantly weakened by the split in the workers' movement, the contradictions between the social-democratic and communist parties, and the skillful ideological brainwashing of the masses that the bourgeoisie is carrying out.

First "maturity and overripeness." I think that posing the question in this way fails to take into account and underestimates the possibility of "restructuring" within the framework of capitalism, that is, the possibility of changing, transforming and improving capitalist production relations. With regard to subjective forces, particularly the communist parties, for understandable reasons we have often overestimated their real influence and real role in the political life of their countries.

Unfortunately, the facts indicate that many communist parties in the developed capitalist countries and the "third world" do not enjoy broad mass support and their political influence on the workers is weak. Study of the documents and materials of the fraternal parties and discussions within them enables us to single out several reasons for the situation that has taken shape. First, the long-standing traditions of sectarianism and of fencing off the "pure" representatives of the working class from the "adulterated" representatives. Second, the failures and difficulties along the road of developing real socialism, which, of course, have not attracted people to socialism but rather repelled them. And third, the fact that doctrines, political programs and strategy and tactics have lagged behind changes in the situation and the demands not of yesterday but of today and tomorrow.

In general the communist movement is approaching the end of the 20th century in a complex and difficult situation that requires nonstandard solutions and—the main thing—a breakthrough to the masses and the winning over of the masses.

**V. Lukin:** Yet another paradox for the end of the century: the masses in the capitalist countries are not supporting the political movement whose reason for existence is the struggle for the vital interests of the masses.

To those reasons that you have mentioned I would add another: the leaders of the bourgeoisie have succeeded in orienting themselves more quickly on the new situation than their political opponents, and they have managed to create a system of social amortization and social counterweights that have made it possible to direct the energy of the masses into the channel of reform, modernization and "improvement" of capitalism. In other words, they have displayed great political mobility. This has been the high price paid by many leftist movements for their inflexible doctrinaire approach, which as a rule is used to justify their arguments, which "alone are scientific." And the doctrinaire approach is not snatched out of the air. On the contrary, it arose from the deficiency of air, which our perestroika is designed to fill.

**A. Bovin:** Yes, the capitalists have learned much and have altered much, in politics and in economics. It is therefore advisable to consider the dynamics of imperialism, to see the changes in its structures and mechanisms over time and the substance of its history.

In Lenin's time monopoly capital dominated and state monopoly capitalism was only just coming into being. The latter half of the 20th century has seen the dominance of state monopoly capitalism; its bourgeois-reformist and social-reformist trends have dominated. To the point, the policy of the neoconservatives has merely altered but not eliminated this version of state monopoly capitalism. Theoretically it is quite possible that the state basis will gradually increasingly become only a monopoly basis and that this will lead to a relatively "pure" state capitalism.

The picture may be further complicated. The gigantic increase in the proportion of transnational corporations and transnational banks in the production process in world capitalism may be interpreted as the establishment of transnational forms, a transnational model of state monopoly capitalism.

**V. Lukin:** Could you make a projection of the five well-known attributes of imperialism on its, as you put it, "transnational form"?

**A. Bovin:** The framework of our dialogue is too narrow thoroughly to examine the subject you have proposed. I shall restrict myself to a basic approach to it. The five attributes of imperialism were formulated by V.I. Lenin 70 years ago. At that time imperialism was all-powerful. Now it is no longer so. And to translate and project mechanically the characteristics of that time to a fundamentally different time would be unscientific. Only a specific analysis of specific data can show which

attributes still make up the "constitution" of imperialism, which have changed, which have been lost in the past, and which have re-appeared.

In science, sentiment is fatal. Last year, when describing the political division of the world, one honored scientist offered as an attribute the example of the allocation of radio frequencies between states, and also the "allocation" of shipping routes and air routes. Lenin hardly needs this kind of "defense"...

**V. Lukin:** Let us return to the transnational corporations. The opinion is voiced that one of the general trends in world development is the increase in the conscious bases of social life. One particular case of this trend is the greater sense of organization and planning in the development of capitalism...

And here we have the transnational corporations...

**A. Bovin:** Something like Reaganomics on a world scale.

**V. Lukin:** Not very accurate but it will do.

**A. Bovin:** There really is a contradiction. The transnational corporation is a new, one might say ultramodern form for the organization of capitalist production, but its essential nature and fundamental basis is a return to the old, the intensification of random market relations in the world economic arena. However, experience has shown (and this experience has also been mastered by many of the theoreticians and leaders of capitalism) that weakened control over market spontaneity can be at variance with the interests of capitalism and can weaken capitalism as a whole. Accordingly, the transnational corporations and transnational banks will hardly be given carte blanche. The framework of their activities will be delineated by general agreements on the coordination of economic policy and the presence of regulatory political mechanisms on the international plane.

One such mechanism is the annual meetings of the heads of states and governments of the seven leading capitalist countries. And again we have a paradox. In practice the "seven" make extraordinarily few decisions if what we have in mind is specific recommendations on specific issues. But then, why? Why do these extraordinarily busy people, burdened as they are with countless urgent concerns and anxieties of all kinds, meet together again and again?

The meetings of the "seven" are an outward manifestation of one of the most profound trends in world development. Capitalism is adapting to the increasingly complex historical conditions of its existence. To strengthen the viability of capitalism and its opposition to any kind of adverse effect from the "environment"—these, in short, make up the meaning of the annual "shows" in which the elected political stars appear.

**V. Lukin:** And this becomes the more understandable if we look at what has happened to the broad historical positions.

The history of the capitalist economy as an economy operating on the principle of self-regulation ended with the "great depression" and world crisis of the early Thirties. Since then economic development in any particular capitalist country has taken place under the growing influence of the state and of government organs and institutions.

Everything is relative. And the success of state monopoly regulation is also relative. It cannot rid society of the deep and enrooted sources of economic contradictions and social conflicts. But by redistributing national income, it can blunt the sharpness of the antagonism between labor and capital. The crises, of course, have not disappeared, but under the influence of anticrisis "therapy" they have acquired the more respectable form of "recessions."

It has seemed to the ideologues of the "society of general prosperity" that finally a recipe has been found to keep capitalism eternally young. It has become obvious that the forms and methods of state monopoly regulation that were put in place as a response to the shocks of the Thirties now no longer correspond to the level reached in the socialization and internationalization of production forces and the growing complexity of economic links. This has, on the one hand, intensified the activity of the conservatives, who see the cause of all ills and evils in an "excess" of state intervention in the economy. Hence, Reaganomics, Thatcherism and other ideological forms of abandoning our times for the time of free entrepreneurship.

On the other hand, the upheavals in the mid-Seventies showed graphically that random, uncontrolled development of world economic processes exerts a baneful effect on the state of affairs in each country and hampers regulation of the economy at the national and state level. In the international arena there is no centralized political regulator for economic processes that would play a role comparable to the role of the state. As a result the world capitalist market and international economic relations in the nonsocialist part of the world were subjected much more to the effect of randomness than is permitted at the present level of state monopoly regulation within individual countries. This entails a permanent instability in world economic links, which under the conditions of the increasing influence of foreign economic factors on domestic economic development worsens the crisis phenomena in the economy. Consequently, finding solutions to domestic problems has now required the transfer of state boundaries and economic regulation to the international level.

**A. Bovin:** Yes, and here we have the genesis of the "seven." The first meeting of the great ones of this world took place in November 1975 in Rambouillet. The

specific circumstances have changed but the task being resolved is the same as that set 12 years ago, namely, through joint efforts to reinforce the positions of capitalism and learn how to regulate international economic links.

Of course, each of those participating in the this international economic directorate defends the interests of his own country and acts in line with his understanding of the situation. The contradictions that tear the fine fabric of agreement are obvious. Science is moving in one direction and it is enormously difficult to keep pace. Nevertheless, to judge from everything, the attempts to combine efforts, agree policy, and renew and enrich the arsenal of means and methods to influence the world capitalist economy will continue. The formation of an international capitalist mechanism to regulate economic activity will continue. Strengthening and consolidating the dominance of capital in their own countries, strengthening and consolidating the privileged position of the top league of "industrial" democracies in the world economy, and bringing international production under deliberate control—these are the long-term goals. And in the race for them capitalism will display and mobilize new reserves of survivability.

**V. Lukin:** This is the impression that we may encounter with any new version of capitalism, as, for example, that times long ago were characterized by "ultra-imperialism." I do not wish to hide my misgivings: have we not missed some kind of very important and, for dogmatic thinking, not very "pleasant" intermediate stage in the development of capitalist society? And are we now firing all guns at the place from where the "wild board has already departed"?

**A. Bovin:** I do not exclude this. It is true that inasmuch as this concerns the concept of "ultra-imperialism," as you know this was compromised by K. Kautskiy. But let us recall what they were talking about at that time.

Kautskiy suggested that in the not very distant future a "single world trust", an "internationally associated financial capital" would be created. The imperialist powers, Kautskiy suggested, would stop fighting each other and instead, relying on their common strength, would pillage the world around them.

Lenin's train of thought was different. He agreed that we "think" in the abstract about "ultra-imperialism" as a new phase of capitalism after imperialism, and that development moves in the direction of a united "world trust." Lenin, however, qualified the abstraction of ultra-imperialism as a dead abstraction. First because it absolutized the period of the "imperialist world" and forgot that it must inevitably be followed by a period of "imperialist wars" that would have to dynamite any form of association of imperialists. And second, that before going as far as creating a "world trust" imperialism "must inevitably be exhausted: capitalism will be transformed into its own antithesis.

It seems to me that V.I. Lenin's second argument still holds today. The capitalists simply cannot have the time historically to overcome their disagreements and create a unified "world trust." As far as the first argument goes, it has been "outrun" by history. The emergence of world socialism and the replacement of the colonial periphery with dozens of independent states have placed imperialism in the kind of conditions in which wars between imperialist states have become an impermissible luxury. And so, if we think about the major time periods, centripetal trends are stronger than the centrifugal forces and there is a greater need for policy coordination as an important means of enhancing capitalism's viability.

**V. Lukin:** When thinking about the fate of capitalism it is, of course, essential to bear in mind that the position at the centers of capitalism and the relations between them will depend largely on the evolution of the "third world." Here, in the "third world," the picture varies greatly. We observe a strengthening of the positions of capitalism in individual, and very important, regions of the "third world." Take the Asia-Pacific region, where in some of the major countries and subregions the question of paths of development has been resolved for a specific period into the future—and resolved not in favor of socialism. With rather less but still adequate explicitness the same can be said of a number of major countries and subregions in Latin America and Africa.

Why even relatively recently there was lack of clarity precisely in this direction is not a simple question and it requires careful study. One thing is clear: colossal difficulties—difficulties significantly greater than were being suggested in the Sixties—have been encountered along the path of noncapitalist development. Evidently objective problems and the immanent unmanageability of leaping across the natural stages of socioeconomic development and the subjective circumstances associated with the numerous errors and miscalculations by the political leadership in the corresponding countries have had their effect. Neither should we disregard the influence of the difficulties with which the world socialist system has had to contend.

**A. Bovin:** It is to be hoped that as perestroika proceeds in world socialism and as the international workers' movement is activated, its political vanguard will strengthen the anticapitalist trends in the "third world." Although the link here is not simple or unambiguous.

**V. Lukin:** And the position and the vectors are not unambiguous. One recent noteworthy phenomenon within the "third world" has been the emergence of its own "centers of power." Today, India, Brazil, tomorrow Indonesia and Nigeria, and the day after tomorrow (that is, in the next century)—others. The world of the future will be not only interdependent but also multipolar.

Now, the relations of "dependence—hegemony" are still very strong. The gigantic debts of the developing countries are in the public eye, the "second economy" is in



the public eye. This picture, however, is incomplete. Look at Brazil, at the "new industrial states" of the Asia-Pacific region. They are far from being only objects; they are subjects. They are the increasingly fierce and effective competitors of the developed countries, including in a number of fields of advanced technology. In general it can be said that relations of "dependence—hegemony" are being augmented, and in some places also supplanted by relations of asymmetric interdependence. The asymmetric "North-South" interdependence is a typical feature of our times.

And at the other pole of the enormous "third world" we have an increase in the most desperate and destructive trends. Losses resulting from death by starvation have exceeded the losses sustained in the world wars, the demographic crisis is growing steadily, areas sown to crops are shrinking... The impression is that the sum total of human suffering is approaching critical mass.

**A. Bovin:** The explosion can be averted. As it slowly and agonizingly deals with its domestic and foreign conflicts, the "third world" is evolving toward progress. Due consideration should also be given to the fact that despite all the contradictions, the "third world" and the developed capitalist countries are objectively interested in each other's dynamic growth, in cooperation. The maximum program for the developing countries is known as the new international economic order. The capitalist countries prefer other solutions. But time is working slowly, very slowly, in favor of justice...

**V. Lukin:** This means that you believe in the possibility of establishing a new economic order?

**A. Bovin:** In general, yes. This order is no more utopian than general disarmament or a nuclear-free world. If we are prepared to bridle militarism then why stop at neocolonialism? Ultimately all of history is a process of transforming utopias into reality. There was a time not long ago when an 8-day work day, a universally elected government or free medical care were considered a utopia.

**V. Lukin:** That is so. And what can you say about the "nature of imperialism," which as we all know, includes militarism and the desire for political and economic domination? I think that I shall not play devil's advocate if I ask the following: is "the nature of imperialism" a historical constant, something unchangeable, or can it be modified and altered?

**A. Bovin:** The word combination "historical constant" bothers me. History is change, development, movement that must involve change in certain "constants." In Lenin's time the "nature" of imperialism undoubtedly included the inevitability of wars between imperialist states, the inevitability of the mother country's political domination over the colonies. But now wars between the imperialist powers are virtually impossible, just as it is impossible to return to colonialism.

The crux of the matter is obviously that the "nature of imperialism" does not exist in and of itself, in some abstract realm. The following is more correct: it is precisely in the realm of the abstract that it can exist. But in real life it is subject, through a number of transmitting mechanisms, to the influence of the sociohistorical milieu. If imperialism finds itself in conditions in which war and the use of force stops being profitable, in which they threaten the interests of imperialism itself, then the opportunities for militarism are noticeably curtailed. Since it remains "by nature" aggressive, imperialism will be unable to realize its aggressiveness in politics. The construct is somewhat intricate, but history has taught us to study the "intricacies" and the "stratagems."

**V. Lukin:** The more so since people now have the technical ability to change their own history. A universal nuclear war threatens universal destruction. Meanwhile, the number and intensity of international crises is growing.

It is possible to cope with the "nature of imperialism" if the pressure is stepped up on militarism. But, first, the mosaic of dangers is by no means all the same color, and second, we are still far from the ideal mobilization of efforts to oppose these dangers.

In my opinion, one particularly alarming feature of present-day international relations is the lack of will to deal with international crises, the lack of will to deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the lack of will to deal with international terrorism.

**A. Bovin:** Is this not overstated? This struggle is going on on all three salients. Perhaps not as persistently or as energetically as we would like, but...

**V. Lukin:** Maybe so. We surround the sharp points of the problem with a wadding of words so that we do not prick ourselves.

Of course, even the approach to these problems is monstrously complicated. Accordingly, for politicians acting on the principle of "apres moi le deluge," weakness of will in these matters is an optimal course. Meanwhile, the mass destruction of people continues in various parts of the world. There are increasing numbers of nuclear weapons in identified and still unidentified vaults. The geographical confines of terrorism are expanding. And its methods are becoming increasingly sophisticated and audacious. And the prospect: nuclear terrorism?

And the politicians and diplomats and journalists all argue about who is bad and wrong and who is good and right, and in what circumstances. Now the situation is beginning to change distinctly. The changes, however, are really being seen only on our side. In Washington they are largely engaged in rehashing the old stuff. There they still trying to prove to the world that the mining, for example, of the Nicaraguan ports is correct and fine, but

the mining of American passenger aircraft is incorrect and bad. This approach is absurd even on the purely human plane. It is bad because it objectively limits opportunities to make difficult and politically painful decisions on these matters, but decisions that are essential for all mankind.

**A. Bovin:** Learning to control international conflicts, and even better, to get rid of them, and the preserve the values of civilization and survive, is not only a class interest but also a general human interest. Common dangers force us all, all social strata and groups who recognize what is happening, to regard themselves as fellow countrymen and to preserve our future together. For to argue about which is better, capitalism or socialism, they must as a minimum at least exist.

**V. Lukin:** The threat of war is not the only danger that provides incentive to place the emphasis on common human interests. Other global problems must also be resolved. But of course, halting the arms race alone may provide the means to save us from the overpopulation, starvation, and ecological crises that threaten everyone.

Man, of course, has been and remains class and social. But in our times his social nature has become global, and this means common to all humankind. Previously preservation of his own home, his own class, his own tribe, his own people meant to protect it against "others." Now it means to preserve and save mankind and the planet. Somewhere at the dawn of the historical process the social and the national started to be removed from the general human. Now, at the close of the second millennium of our era, these principles are again drawing closer together. Powerful forces that oppose this process still exist and act. They exist and act everywhere... It is precisely those forces that are the stagnant, reactionary forces of the end of the present and the beginning of the next century. However, the symptoms opposing them—symptoms of a really new understanding of common human values—are multiplying. Today these symptoms are clearer and are being seen more actively, here among us.

**A. Bovin:** I think that responsible politicians in the West do take account of the destructiveness and catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. And in my opinion, this makes the probability of a deliberate, premeditated general war extremely low. No one wants to die...

**V. Lukin:** But the danger of an unpremeditated war still exists. In a situation in which the nuclear and nonnuclear thresholds are becoming increasingly blurred, in which the control process is being increasingly computerized (including the control of war), in which the sphere of danger is being sharply expanded to include space and the ocean depths, and in which the decisionmaking process, which may include fatal decisions, is being

decentralized and automated, the degree of control over the situation that the technocrats from the arms race confidently prophesy, is becoming increasingly problematical.

**A. Bovin:** Whatever may be said, the only 100-percent guarantee of survival is nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

**V. Lukin:** There is much to think about here. For the goal is not merely to reduce the number of weapons. We want to reduce the danger of war. We are proposing that all nuclear weapons be eliminated. This means that the danger of nuclear war is also eliminated. And the danger of conventional war? M. Thatcher is not alone in thinking that removing the nuclear brakes and nuclear restraint may increase the danger of nonnuclear wars, including major (world) wars. For does it not seem to you that it is still difficult to provide an unambiguous answer to this question?

**A. Bovin:** Obviously the movement toward a nuclear-free world should be examined not as an isolated process but as one component in the formation of a new phase of detente. The first phase, which culminated in the 1975 Helsinki Conference, did not go beyond the framework of agreements to limit nuclear weapons. These were important and necessary agreements. Although it did not halt the arms race, this phase did create precedent and pointed out the right direction, and so ultimately it was frustrated by the militarist faction in the American bourgeoisie.

The phase of detente that should take the place of the last phase depends on the experience of past years and the deeper penetration into the specific features of the nuclear age, that is, the new political thinking. A real and significant reduction in arms, both nuclear and conventional, a well-considered set of confidence-building measures, and the gradual advance of an all-embracing system of security. And within the framework of this program, which would remove the suspicion and fear and stimulate greater trust between states, it is possible to see the prospect of a nuclear-free world as a realistic prospect.

Here we must turn again to the Soviet Union. Only if perestroika is successful and if our international influence increases, only in this case can solutions to the problems of disarmament be translated to a realistic plane.

**V. Lukin:** Here, influence should grow in parallel with the strengthening of mutual trust. I would say more: increased trust in us must become a basic form for the manifestation of our increased influence. But here there arises the pointed question of the nature and parameters of our influence. And in this connection we must do a great deal and must change a great deal. And nevertheless, what if the "ifs" you mentioned are not fulfilled?

**A. Bovin:** Then another scenario will be realized for the end of the century. Our influence in the world will decline and the difficulties of world socialism will increase. Capitalism will become more brazen and aggressive. Global confrontation will intensify.

**V. Lukin:** It is, of course, difficult to say such words. But they must be said distinctly. So that we can sense again and again the enormous, truly world-historic responsibility that we, Soviet communists and Soviet people, have assumed as we embark on the restructuring of our society and set out on the road of democratization. Their destiny is the destiny of the country, the destiny of the century, the destiny of the world.

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### **Report on UN Disarmament, Development Conference**

*18160004f Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 63-72*

[Article by Yu. Alekseyev and Ye. Bugrov\*: "Problems, Debates, Consensus"]

[Text] The conference, which ended in September 1987, was a major event in international life. It was the first official forum convened per a UN decision to discuss problems of the relationship of disarmament and development. Approximately 150 countries took part. The discussion was aimed at ascertaining, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his address to the conferees, "new possibilities in the approach to a solution of this cardinal problem of the present-day world." The proceedings of the conference and its results evoked the great interest of the world community. It was an important stage of the ongoing debate on questions of disarmament and development in their close and multilevel relationship.

### **The 'Disarmament-Development-Security' Triad**

The very first plenary sessions revealed an aspiration common to the conferees to view disarmament and development in a direct and inseparable connection with security. The value of this approach was not called in question in any of the speeches. The "disarmament-development-security" triad was not only at the center of the discussion but was also the canvas for coordination of the participants' positions on the whole set of questions discussed.

The theme of the relationship of disarmament and development logically led the conference to a debate on a system of international security created with the participation of all countries by way of the unification of their efforts in various spheres of interstate relations. The New York forum will go down in history as the start of a wide-ranging constructive dialogue at the official level in the interests of the elaboration of the concept of

an all-embracing system of international peace and security and as the threshold of the debate at the UN General Assembly 42d Session on this concept, which was suggested to the world community by the USSR and a number of other socialist countries. Having shown the possibility of agreement being reached on this problem in the context of the struggle for peace and general disarmament, the conference on the relationship between disarmament and development demonstrated the exceptional importance of an expansion and deepening of the dialogue on a restructuring of international relations on the basis of new political thinking. Two approaches to revelation of the relationship of the components of the "disarmament-development-security" triad requiring further coordination were brought to light in New York. The differences between them are not connected with nuances in wording but are of a conceptual nature and for this reason merit open discussion.

The first approach presupposes a relationship of these components whereby security is understood as the goal of states' joint efforts, and disarmament and development are viewed among the important means of achieving this goal.

We would explain that formulation of the question in such a plane does not deny the global nature and multi-dimensionality of the process of development but emphasizes the significance of various economic levers connected with development which may be commissioned to strengthen international security. This interpretation nicely reveals the relationship and mutual complementarity of actions in the sphere of a limitation of and reduction in arms and efforts to promote socioeconomic development, with the aid of resources released in the process of disarmament included, in the name of the common goal of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. This approach does not create once for all a fixed scale of priorities in the use of the means of achieving this goal, although under current conditions, when mankind is threatened by nuclear war, the priority nature of disarmament is obvious. At the same time the importance of means of strengthening security in the political, economic, humanitarian and other spheres of international life is not diminished. It is essentially a question of the parallel nature of efforts in all the said fields, given their overall specific purpose. This approach presupposes the possibility of differences in speed of movement on the parallel courses and a renunciation of artificial "linkages" turning this problem or the other into a cascade of difficulties. Under such conditions success in one direction will influence positively progress in the others, bringing the goal of the common efforts closer.

The second approach also presupposes the particular significance of international security in the system of its relationships with disarmament and development, but not as the goal of the common efforts of the world community but in the role of "prior condition" of disarmament and development. The "security as a prior

condition" formula was not buttressed in the debate at the conference by any in any way developed set of arguments. It was heard in the speeches of representatives of the West European states and was offered in draft summary documents as an incantation reminiscent of the ritual of many debates concerning the relationship of disarmament and international security in the United Nations and, even earlier, in the League of Nations. Western delegates referred to the "security vacuum" allegedly arising upon the realization of measures in the disarmament sphere. But it is hard imparting persuasiveness to the "first security, then disarmament and development" proposition since international security cannot come about at the waving of a magic wand and cannot become a reality without progress in the military-political and economic spheres and in the business of disarmament and development.

Common accord of the delegations on these questions was formed on the basis of the first and not the second approach, which was reflected in the conference's final document.

#### **Conference in the United States... Without the United States**

The very agenda of the conference presupposed the need for a disclosure of the content of the connection between disarmament and development both conceptually and on a practical footing.

It is not the first time that the international community has encountered this problem. The reality and importance of this connection were recognized in the Final Document of the UN General Assembly Special Disarmament Session (1978), the UN secretary general's report on the relationship between disarmament and development (1981) and in many other UN documents and the material of national and international research centers. For this reason progress was expected of the representative intergovernmental conference in New York—from the simple ascertainment of this relationship to its extended analysis and practical actions.

The need to progress in this direction was even more obvious under conditions where the United States had begun to depart from the previous, seemingly indisputable positions reflecting the broad agreement which had taken shape in the United Nations on the question of the fundamental importance of this problem. Having declined to take part in the conference, Washington gave as the reason for its "backward move" the fact that "disarmament and development are not questions which should be examined in interrelationship." E. Mortimer, correspondent of London's FINANCIAL TIMES, reasonably observed in this connection: "This is a perfectly understandable viewpoint, but inasmuch as many people of good will, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in

the 'third world,' adhere firmly to the opposite approach, the United States would be acting far more sensibly were it to participate in the conference and defend its opinion there" (1).

The American side gave no in any way detailed explanation of its position, which the NEW YORK TIMES termed "negative diplomacy" (2). The conference expressed perplexity at this self-isolation of the United States and its nonparticipation in a world forum discussing most important ways and methods of improving the international situation. The speeches expressed the hope that Washington would in the future reconsider its approach to international discussion and action in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development.

It is significant that the United States' NATO partners and other developed capitalist countries not only took part in the conference but also, granted all the differences and nuances in their approaches to the questions submitted for discussion, oriented themselves toward coordination of positions with the socialist and developing countries. We may cite, for example, the working paper submitted to the conference's preparatory committee by the 12 members of the European Community in April 1987 (3). It observed: "There is undoubtedly a definite connection between disarmament and development, however, these phenomena differ in their logic, nature and ultimate goal." Far from everything is indisputable, as the course of the conference showed, in this position, but it was a West European formula for dialogue open to amendment for the purpose of arrival at a common accord.

It is to be regretted that this consensus came about in the debate without representatives of the United States, a debate on which progress in disarmament and development depends to a large extent. Nor can there, we believe, be agreement with the opinion of J. Thorsson, head of the UN expert group preparing a study on the relationship between disarmament and development, who stated in New York that, given the participation of the United States, such a consensus would have been unattainable. The particular feature of this conference was precisely an orientation toward global consensus and the actual possibility of the achievement of such an accord on fundamental aspects of the relationship of disarmament and development, including recognition of the significance of the contribution which disarmament and development would make to a strengthening of international security.

The U.S. Administration's refusal to participate in the dialogue on these questions has to be linked with the pressure thereon from the country's extreme right, which had initiated a campaign to discredit the conference. Publications of the American Heritage Foundation, for example, were a direct appeal for it to be boycotted. They not only pronounced untenable the hopes of economic dividends from disarmament but also contained fabrications in connection with a "secret" conference

agenda which had allegedly been conceived as a "court of law" presiding over the United States in connection with its realization of the "strategic defense initiative" (4). The debate at the conference and its results showed the bankruptcy of such "warnings" from the camp of the ultraright. On the other hand, they strengthened the arguments in support of the United States' participation in the discussion of urgent problems common to all mankind.

### **The Socialist Countries: Political Innovation**

The success of the New York conference is undoubtedly explained to a large extent by the attitude toward it of the socialist states and their contribution to the achievement of overall accord. The top leaders of these states sent messages to the conference. Its secretary general was handed the socialist countries' "Disarmament for Development" memorandum, which set forth jointly formulated principles and practical recommendations (5).

This important political document advances as the initial premise the idea that the power of destruction of modern weapons and the nature of modern civilization with its intricate and fragile network of socioeconomic structures and vitally important lines of communication have shown the bankruptcy of national security concepts built on deterrence by weapons. Security has become general, encompassing the entire spectrum of military, political, economic, ecological and humanitarian problems. Militarization long since came into the most acute conflict with the requirements of the socioeconomic progress of mankind as a whole and the solution of such problems as the fight against starvation and disease, preservation of man's environment, energy supplies and release from the debt burden. The arms race and development are in a state of incessant competition for the planet's material and human resources and civilization's intellectual potential. The very course of history has confronted mankind with the fundamental question of disarmament and development. Disarmament could play a unique part in the world economy and ensure the basis for the accelerated development of states belonging to different social systems. There is no other as big and actual reserve of development assistance on our planet as this.

Recognition of the relationship between disarmament and development has become, the socialist countries believe, testimony to and a yardstick of realism in the approach to international problems of the end of the 20th century. The demilitarization of human society combined with development would also promote a restructuring of international relations on a just, equal basis, a strengthening of the economic security of all states and trust between them. It would be a powerful factor of predictability in international relations, their democratization and a break with outdated cliches of

exclusiveness and confrontation. Both disarmament and development are mutually complementary material foundations of a future all-embracing system of international peace and security.

The position of the socialist countries—disarmament for development—reflects the new political thinking rejecting militarism and oriented toward the cooperation of the whole planet and mutual assistance in an integral and interdependent world.

The memorandum speaks of the need for the continuation of active search for ways to reduce the amount of resources consumed by the military sector of the economy. The differences which exist in many countries in the arms price structure and also in the pricing mechanism have until now made a specific comparison of military budgets a complicated business. The socialist states treat this problem with all seriousness and will, for their part, contribute to ensuring that there be opportunities for a realistic comparison of different countries' military budgets.

The socialist countries expressed a willingness to take part in efforts aimed at an understanding being arrived at on the principles of the transfer of the resources released as a result of disarmament for development purposes. A special mechanism of the transfer of some of these resources to the developing countries and for the solution of global problems would provide for the necessary institutional connection between disarmament and development and demonstrate states' resolve to realize this connection in their policy and to create by practical action an atmosphere of mutual understanding, openness and predictability in international affairs, thereby strengthening international peace and security. The role of such a mechanism could be performed by an international "Disarmament for Development" fund open to all countries.

The socialist states described the conversion of the military economy into a civil economy as a most important component of the disarmament process and a method of the release of material, financial and human resources for development purposes.

The joint document emphasized the central role in the solution of questions of disarmament and development which the United Nations is called upon to perform. The socialist countries proposed discussion of disarmament and development problems at a special meeting of top leaders of states of the UN Security Council.

Both the memorandum and the speeches of the members of the delegations of the socialist countries showed that they had elaborated and subsequently submitted for discussion an integral concept of the relationship between disarmament and development which has imbibed the useful ideas and proposals advanced in political and scientific circles of various countries,

extended them in the spirit of the new political thinking and ensured the unity of theoretical ideas and practical recommendations on this problem.

In terms of its content and significance this concept goes beyond the framework of the first intergovernmental conference on disarmament and development. It will remain for years to come a precise reference point for an expansion of international activity in the interests of disarmament, development and a strengthening of security. Not everything therein proved acceptable to other, particularly Western, states, but nor were the socialist countries aspiring to a rigid, "uncompromising" discussion. They wished to submit their concept for discussion by the international community for the purpose of beginning a dialogue and ascertaining and recording as the common position what is even now, at the initial stage of official contacts on disarmament and development problems, acceptable to all and may lend impetus to collective efforts in this sphere.

Talks with the conferees—members of delegations and representatives of nongovernment organizations—showed that the contribution of the USSR and the other socialist countries to it is seen as political innovation in the name of peace and security. Their call for an extension of glasnost and openness in respect of military activity and military doctrines and spending, on the question of the comparison of military budgets included, was, in particular, characterized precisely thus. The American press also emphasized the importance of a policy of "military glasnost".

#### Positions of the 'Third World'

International debate and studies pertaining to disarmament and development in their interrelationship have always been conducted given the active participation of the emergent states. So it was on this occasion also. Like the socialist countries, the developing countries proceeded at the time of discussion of the agenda from the following realities: first, the race in arms, nuclear primarily, threatens mankind's existence; second, the inordinate growth of military spending in the world, the waste of material and intellectual resources and regional and other conflicts are coming into sharp conflict with the requirements of the socioeconomic development of the peoples and the surmounting of underdevelopment and backwardness; third, an ever increasing number of unsolved problems of a social, economic and political nature fraught with serious international complications and cataclysms is accumulating in the world, in the developing regions primarily.

These realities were not recognized by everyone or in all respects at the conference. It was necessary to persistently and perseveringly overcome what representatives of "third world" countries, addressing the Western powers, called an "allergy to facts".

While regarding disarmament and development as the most important problems of the present day and describing them from the viewpoint of the relationship of the military and nonmilitary aspects of security the emergent states emphasized attention to questions of development. And this is natural: they are sounding the alarm in connection with the calamitous situation of hundreds of millions of people suffering from starvation, poverty, disease and illiteracy. For this reason the representatives of India, OAU members and other countries reiterated frequently the idea that disarmament and development are, although interrelated, two different processes with their own mechanisms and trends.

It is important at the same time to emphasize the endeavor, which was manifested more strikingly than previously, of the developing states to analyze the possibilities and prospects of development in an inseparable connection with real disarmament. It was emphasized persistently at the conference that an interest in development dictates an interest in disarmament. It was this which was the main point in the position of the "third world" countries at the recent forum.

The developing states wholly supported the Soviet idea of the creation of an international "Disarmament for Development" fund. They regard the inauguration of such a fund as a positive and necessary step in the direction of the establishment of an institutional connection between the two processes and assistance to the solution of urgent socioeconomic problems of the "third world". The emergent countries advocate the elaboration of statutory provisions of the fund, on the formation and use of its resources included. It should, they believe, be created by the efforts primarily of the industrially developed states.

Certain nonaligned countries, among which was Sri Lanka, advocated an increase in development assistance by way of a voluntary reduction in military spending by the leading states militarily prior even to the signing of agreements on disarmament measures and prior to the creation of some permanent mechanism of the transfer of resources along "disarmament-development" lines. The idea of such an "interim" fund was not supported at the conference. Nor was any interest in Senegal's attempt to revive the idea, which had essentially been rejected by the international community, of the "taxation" of military spending as the first stage of the formation of resources for a development via disarmament assistance fund, and it went practically undiscussed.

Together with the socialist states the developing countries actively supported the enhancement of the role of the United Nations and its principal bodies and specialized institutions in the solution of disarmament and development questions and the implementation of a broad range of national and international measures in the interests of a winding down of the arms race and assistance to the development of all states, developing primarily, and thereby a strengthening of international

security. The debates at the conference revealed a broad concurrence of positions of the socialist and developing countries in principle and in respect of practical aspects of the "disarmament and development" problem. This mutual understanding and mutual assistance assured to a large extent the richness of the content of the discussions and the infusion of the summary document with fruitful ideas and proposals.

At the same time certain developing states displayed a certain passiveness at the conference. Their spokesmen said that they did not entirely believe in the possibility of the transfer to the "third world" of significant resources as the result of arms reductions in the foreseeable future. They declared in speeches and talks that the conclusion of such agreements was extremely difficult and would take time and that the industrially developed states—the main participants in the disarmament process—had their own urgent needs.

On the other hand, many developing countries emphasized that they were participating in the conference not in the hope of the immediate receipt of additional resources. They described the tasks which they had set themselves as being more of a political nature: comparing the views of different groups of states on the relationship of disarmament and development, discussing the conceptual and practical bases of an international mechanism of the transfer for development needs of the resources which would be released in the disarmament process and imparting additional impetus to the activity in this field of the whole world community.

#### **Platform of the European Community**

The 12 European Community countries agreed, as mentioned, to the quest for common, concerted approaches and evaluations with respect to the questions discussed. Nonetheless, it is worth taking a closer look at these countries' initial positions, which took shape back in the process of preparation for the conference, were upheld in the course thereof and amounted to an acknowledgment merely of the limited relationship of disarmament and development. This guideline was developed in a working paper of the EC states and in the speeches of their delegations in New York. In what, specifically, was the community of positions of the 12 states manifested?

Recognition, albeit with the reservations traditional for the West, of the political aspects of the relationship of disarmament and development was combined in the European Community countries with quite superficial evaluations of the economic, resource primarily, aspects of this relationship.

The general opinion of the EC states amounted to the fact that the release of resources as a result of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament was possible only in the long term and on a limited scale: "development assistance cannot be made dependent on subsequent disarmament agreements, whose realization

is possible only in the long term and which, let us not forget, will not necessarily lead, at the initial stage, in any event, to reduced defense spending. The assertion that disarmament will be linked with substantial expenditure might seem paradoxical, but is an incontrovertible economic fact" (6).

Much in this approach gave rise to objections on the part of other conferees. We shall cite the principal counterarguments. Disarmament, as studies which have been carried out, primarily within the UN framework, have shown, would secure appreciable socioeconomic benefits, the more, the higher the rate and bigger the scale of disarmament. The experience of various countries confirms the soundness of the conclusion that expenditure on the conversion of military to civil production is exceeded with interest by its economic benefits. The EC countries' policy of downplaying the socioeconomic significance of disarmament was not supported at the New York forum.

The joint statement of these countries presented by the Danish delegate said that the resources released in the disarmament process could be used for development purposes via the existing organizations of the UN system which have proven their usefulness and competence in this respect. While not enunciating outright objections to the proposal concerning the creation of an international development assistance via disarmament fund, they essentially opposed this idea. France occupied a dual position in this respect. On the one hand it subscribed to the EC platform. On the other, the speeches of its representatives observed that Paris maintained fidelity to the idea of the creation of a fund which it had originally put forward back in 1955. However, such devotion has to be considered to be diminishing, bearing in mind, specifically, the reservations made by the French side in the sense that the benefits from disarmament would prove incomparably small compared with development needs, that they would be difficult to assess and so forth.

The EC countries emphasized in their working paper the extraordinary importance of the problem of information concerning military budgets and their comparability and transparency and declared that any discussion of disarmament and development issues could be fruitful only when a precise definition of all components of the military budget and other expenditure connected with military preparations had been formulated. The demands for the "transparency" of expenditure were formulated even more categorically in the speeches of the West European representatives at the conference sessions. Yet, leaving aside the question of the sincerity of such statements, we would note that the demand for "transparency" has lost its former resonance under the new conditions, where the USSR and the other socialist countries have clearly advocated glasnost in the military sphere.



It would seem that, as distinct from the positions of the socialist and many developing states geared to a comprehensive analysis of the relationships of disarmament and development, the EC countries' approach took shape, if not under the influence, not without regard for the American "nonrecognition" of such relationships, lacked clear features of innovation and enterprise and was oriented toward a guarded convergence of positions with other countries (7).

### Voice of the Public

Broad strata of the population of various countries are joining increasingly actively in the struggle against the arms race and for disarmament and development. A pronounced role in the peace protests is being performed by national and international nongovernment organizations (NGO) uniting in their ranks persons of the most diverse professions and political, ideological and religious views. At the New York conference the NGO made themselves heard as active participants in international life and a significant antiwar force advocating wide-ranging and democratic discussion of problems of the arms race and disarmament and their influence on the fate of mankind.

It has become traditional for the NGO to prepare seriously for representative international meetings. Prior to the New York forum they held their own meeting with an analogous agenda in Stockholm, at which the representatives of 45 states were in attendance (8). The NGO wished thereby not only to formulate a common viewpoint but also call the attention of the world community to the importance of an analysis of the relationship between disarmament and development and prompt governments to discuss and adopt practical measures in this direction. The need for pressure on governments from outside is brought about, as many NGO understand it, by manifestations in the ruling circles of the West, of the United States primarily, of a dangerous skepticism in respect of the depth and significance of this relationship. The need for such pressure is connected, J. Thorsson believes, with "the tendency to separate the arms race with its many attendant problems from other ulcers of the present times such as the world economic crisis..." (9). The Stockholm conference was a kind of rehearsal at nongovernment level for the debate which was conducted in New York. And the rehearsal was highly successful, providing an outlet for comprehensive arguments in support of disarmament and development, an accumulation of ideas and efforts and the ascertaining of the mood and demands of broad circles of the international community. This was a big intellectual and emotional contribution to the work of the New York conference.

Approximately 500 representatives of 183 international and national NGO took part. They took advantage of the most varied opportunities to convey their opinion to the conference delegates and influence the course of the

discussion on the basis of the Stockholm recommendations: speeches in the full committee, dissemination of printed matter and statements, meetings with leaders of delegations of the main groups of countries, briefing sessions and roundtable meetings and so forth. Representatives of Soviet social organizations: the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, Scientific Council for Study of Peace and Disarmament, Youth Organizations Committee and a number of others participated assertively in their actions. A notable political action was the petition of 39 American organizations representing millions of people addressed to the U.S. Administration calling for a reconsideration of its decision to boycott the conference. The voice of the public increased the resonance at the conference itself of the calls for decisive action and conversion of the "disarmament for development" slogan into actual measures and specific deeds.

Indicative in this respect was the position of the NGO in connection with the discussion at the conference of such a question of the agenda as "study of the ways and methods of releasing additional resources via disarmament for development purposes, particularly in the interests of the developing countries". They presented an unofficial draft resolution which called on the UN members to embark on the elaboration of preliminary permanently adjustable plans for the transfer of resources from the military to the civil sphere in the event of the conclusion of sufficiently large-scale international arms limitation and disarmament agreements; study the possibilities of the release of resources as a result of a unilateral reduction in military-economic activity; study specific methods of transferring resources to the most likely aid recipients thanks to disarmament measures; examine the question of the use of disarmament resources for purposes common to the entire planet; notify the UN General Assembly of the work being done in all the said areas (10).

These and other proposals of the NGO were reflected in this form or the other in the conference's final document. It was shaped essentially both with the participation and under the influence of the international community, which was broadly represented at the forum. An important part in this respect was played by the joint declaration of a group of prominent experts in the field of disarmament and development, with whose basic propositions the conference delegates had been acquainted at the first plenary session. The declaration, which had been drawn up by scholars and public figures of 19 countries, including the USSR, was a valuable aid for many delegations on questions of converting disarmament into a factor of development. In the spirit of the best traditions of the United Nations the NGO representatives interacted with the delegations, conveying to governments ordinary people's aspiration to peace.

### Mechanism for Transferring Resources

Against the background of the continuous growth of military spending and the exacerbation of development problems the propositions concerning the negative influence of the arms race on the national and world economy



and concerning the positive effect of disarmament should not, it would seem, give rise to objections. However, representatives of the Western powers termed unconvincing the idea that disarmament would provide, besides political, economic benefits also. The British delegation, in particular, declared that military spending was not impeding the progress of its national economy and the world economy and that, consequently, a reduction therein could not be seen as an "economic" dividend of disarmament.

The conference as a whole was perfectly definite in this connection: disarmament could play the part of reserve and catalyst of development. The speeches of many delegates showed convincingly on the basis of the studies of national and international centers carried out in connection with the conference that disarmament is a powerful means of accelerating development. Taking these efforts as a basis, the Indian representative declared: "Given a situation in which huge resources are being channeled into military purposes, achieving the optimum level of development without disarmament is impossible."

The positive effect for development as a result of disarmament measures, V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy USSR foreign minister and head of the Soviet delegation, emphasized in his speech, would spread to all states, both developed and developing, regardless of their sociopolitical orientation. Of course, the greatest effect could be obtained with the creation of a nuclear-free, nonviolent world given general and complete disarmament. But even partial disarmament measures could positively influence the course and prospects of socioeconomic development.

An important area of the conference's work was an exchange of opinions on the mechanism of the release and use of resources as a result of a reduction in armed forces and arms, which could be triggered as of the start of actual disarmament. At the international level the "Disarmament for Development" fund, whose task would be to transfer the resources put at its disposal to the needs of surmounting underdevelopment and backwardness and solving other global problems of the present day, could, in accordance with the proposals of the socialist countries, act as such a mechanism. Participation in the fund should be open to all states, regardless of the level of their economic and military-technical development and social system. The implication here being that all the important military powers, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, should participate in balanced fashion in the formation of the fund's resources.

The basic principle of the formation of the fund, the socialist countries believe, should be the receipt of some of the actual resources released as a result of arms limitation and disarmament. Each country would itself

determine here the form of its contributions in the shape of various resources, equipment and services calculated in world market prices or financial contributions, in the national currency included.

The international "Disarmament for Development" fund could be created within the UN framework and resources channeled to the developing countries directly or put at the disposal of UNICEF, UNEP, the UN Development Program and other of its specialized institutions and bodies for the implementation of various programs at the national, subregional and regional levels. The mechanism for the distribution of resources for development purposes should be sufficiently flexible and provide for the granting of additional assistance along bilateral channels also and also the establishment of national branches of the fund which would concentrate some of the resources allocated by the state.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries consider important compliance with the following principles when rendering the developing countries assistance from the fund's resources: this type of development assistance should be a supplement to existing forms of economic and S&T assistance, should not lead to a reduction in them and should contribute to a strengthening of mutually profitable cooperation; the new influx of aid should contain a considerable element of favorability which would not intensify the developing countries' debt problem; the aid should be granted on a nondiscriminatory basis with regard for the most urgent requirements of the recipients, primarily the least developed countries, countries which have fallen victim to natural disasters and others.

The delegations of the developing countries supported the position of the socialist states in respect of the sum total of principles and methods of transferring resources used in the military sphere for development purposes and promotion of the socioeconomic progress of the "third world". The African OAU states expressed themselves particularly clearly on this question: "The various proposals pertaining to the creation of a disarmament for development fund represent positive steps in the disarmament process. It is necessary to study the concept of the fund in more detail in order to formulate a common basis on which it might be established" (11).

Various viewpoints and approaches to the creation of a mechanism for switching resources from military to peaceful purposes were revealed at the conference. This question has become part of the agenda of international debate, and serious discussion thereof lies ahead.

#### Result of the Debate

The New York forum culminated in the adoption of a final document. The General Assembly resolution on the convening of the conference had determined that it would be conducted on the basis of consensus, that is, general consent at the time of decision-making. This

presupposed the need for all delegations to be oriented toward a comparison of positions, the ascertainment of coincident and close interests and proposals and a search for compromise approaches. The big difficulties of work on a consensus basis, which is sometimes called in UN circles a "gruelling procedure," are well known. On the other hand, if consensus is foresworn, what is the point of voting when summing up debate on such problems requiring common efforts as disarmament, development and security?

Evaluating the outcome of the conference per the criteria of realism and not maximalism, it is correct, we believe, to speak of the success of the first worldwide political forum on the relationship between disarmament and development.

The final document records the general evaluation of the participants of the essence and significance of this problem and its place in the struggle for a strengthening of international security. We shall quote the most important propositions and conclusions of this document:

"Disarmament and development represent the two most urgent tasks currently confronting the world. They embody what is troubling the international community primarily, that in which all states, developed and developing, large and small, nuclear and nonnuclear, are interested to an equal extent. Disarmament and development are the two pillars on which lasting international peace and security could be built" (12).

"Although both disarmament and development strengthen international peace and security and contribute to prosperity, they are individual processes. Each should be implemented energetically, regardless of the rate of progress made in the other, and one process should not be held hostage to the other. The process of development cannot wait until resources have been released in the course of disarmament. Similarly, disarmament has its own urgent tasks aside from the goal of the release of resources for development."

"However, there is between disarmament and development a close and multi-aspectual relationship. Each of these processes could exert an influence at national, regional and global levels such that a situation contributing to realization of the other takes shape."

"The growing interdependence between countries, the relationship between global problems and the mutuality of interests and a collective approach corresponding to man's requirements as a whole are the basis on which a relationship between disarmament, development and security might be built."

The final document emphasized that disarmament would secure substantial socioeconomic dividends: "The release of additional resources for the purposes of the civil sector corresponds to the interests of both the industrially developed and developing countries since it

would mean a stimulation of economic growth, trade and private capital investment. For the developing countries it could also mean the receipt of additional resources for the satisfaction of urgent socioeconomic requirements, and for the industrially developed countries, serve as a contribution to the achievement of the goals of social security."

The action program contained in the document speaks of the need for an enhancement of the role of the United Nations and its appropriate bodies in the sphere of disarmament and development and also the extended study of these questions within the framework of the all-embracing task of a strengthening of international peace and security. The importance of research being conducted into ascertainment and propaganda of the benefits which could be derived as a result of a redistribution of military resources and also of questions connected with the transfer of military industry to peaceful purposes; and periodic surveys on the connection between disarmament and development, including their examination at the upcoming General Assembly Third Special Disarmament Session, was emphasized also.

Taken together, these propositions constitute an important political result of the conference. The international community recognized at state level disarmament and development as foundations of international peace and security and advocated a stimulation of UN activity in the organically interrelated spheres of disarmament and development. It cannot be said that the result does not correspond to expectations. The world community has been awaiting from governments clear and precise positions on this problem affording scope for new initiatives for the purpose of the creation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security with the aid of disarmament, development and other means.

It could, of course, be a cause of regret that the final document failed to reflect proposals of a practical nature which had been submitted concerning, for example, the creation of a development through disarmament assistance fund. We believe, however, that Western countries' refusal to support this solution should not be dramatized. Practice will yet show the importance of a transition to practical measures.

We heard positive evaluations of the conference and its results from many delegates. One further notable fact: the criticism of the "cautiousness in practical approaches" displayed by the conference did not prevent the NGO representatives at their general assembly describing the New York forum as an important success and terming the final document a "good consensus".

### The Conference and Scientific Quest

Although in the 1970's and 1980's the results of the work of UN expert groups and single-country studies have made it possible to step up criticism of militarism from

socioeconomic standpoints, the speeches at the conference of a number of delegations showed that an extension of socioeconomic arguments against the arms race and in support of real disarmament measures is essential.

It is a question primarily of studies permitting a comprehensive evaluation of the socioeconomic losses connected with the arms race. The "blanks" on the map of such studies are preserved primarily on account of the insufficient attention to quantitative evaluations of the negative influence of military preparations on economic growth, the use of S&T achievements for civil purposes, employment and other aspects of the working people's situation.

An appreciation of the socioeconomic benefits of disarmament is important as a parallel direction of the studies—again with the emphasis on quantitative indicators. The statements heard at the conference concerning the "negligibility" and "remoteness" of such benefits cannot be refuted by calls for prudence and references to the usefulness of economic reflection. What are needed are not maxims but strict calculations showing how many and which resources mankind would obtain for development purposes from the realization of specific accords in the disarmament sphere. There would evidently have to be in these calculations a consideration of the expenditure connected both with arms reduction verification measures and the original costs of the transfer of military production to the manufacture of civil products. These studies would have to go beyond a national framework since ascertainment of the advantages for the world economy as a result of its demilitarization is important.

Increasingly great importance is attached to further substantiation of the proposition concerning the important and multilevel benefits to the developing countries as a result of large-scale disarmament measures and a specific demonstration of the possibilities of an acceleration of growth and a solution of problems of underdevelopment in the "third world" given the active switch of resources to peaceful ends, in the developing countries themselves included. An in-depth analysis of the processes of militarization and the possibilities of demilitarization in "third world" countries is required in this connection.

The conference also showed the need for the scientific elaboration of the problem of international comparisons of military spending. Much in this sphere remains both complex and little-studied. A most serious difficulty is connected with the fundamental differences in the arms price structure and also in the pricing mechanism in countries with different and even identical social systems. The search for procedural approaches to such comparisons comes to the fore.

The topicality of scientific research shows through distinctly in one further field. This is the conversion of the military to a civil economy. The problems of such conversion require study both in capitalist and socialist countries. Soviet scientists could make a useful contribution to the elaboration of a statewide plan of conversion in our country. Use could be made in this work of the expanding international exchange of experience and knowhow pertaining to theoretical and practical questions of the switch of the economy to a peaceful track.

Such stimulation of scientific activity would help increase the contribution of Soviet scientists and their colleagues in other countries to the cause of disarmament for the sake of a strengthening of peace and development assistance.

#### Footnotes

\* The authors of the article, Doctor of Economic Sciences Ye.V. Bugrov, head of the Department of Military-Economic and Military-Political Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, and Candidate of Economic Sciences Yu.N. Alekseyev, leading researcher of the institute's Economics and Politics of the Developing Countries Department, took part in the conference as advisers to the USSR delegation.

1. FINANCIAL TIMES, 1 September 1987.
2. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 August 1987.
3. UN Doc. A/Conf., 130/PC/5, 16 April 1987, p 1.
4. See "Backgrounder" (The Heritage Foundation), 17 August.
5. See UN Doc A/Conf. 130/6, 24 August 1987. The memorandum was distributed on behalf of the Belorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, DPRK, MPR, Poland, Romania, USSR, Ukrainian SSR and the CSSR.
6. UN Doc A/Conf. 130/PC/5, 16 April 1987, p 2.
7. It has to be mentioned in this connection that a memorandum of North European countries to the conference secretary general described from more realistic standpoints the role of disarmament and development as factors of a strengthening of international security and showed more cogently the relationship of its military and nonmilitary aspects. These countries also made a sound evaluation of the salutary impact of disarmament measures on socioeconomic development on a global scale: "the release of resources from the military sphere as a result of disarmament represents a significant potential reserve of development in the industrially developed and developing countries" (UN Doc. A/Conf. 130/3, 7 August 1987, p 5).

8. "NGO Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development," 15-17 May 1987, Stockholm, 1987.

9. Ibid., p 20.

10. See "International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development". UN Doc. A/Conf. 130/NGO/11, 1 August 1987.

11. UN Doc. A/Conf. 130/4, 18 August 1987, p 5.

12. Here and below UN Doc. A/Conf. 130/21, 9 September 1987, pp 2-9.

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### Current Chinese Foreign Policy Environment, Line Discussed

18160004g [Editorial report] The article by Liu Liutan entitled "The Foreign Political Environment of Our Country and the Party Line at the Present Stage," pages 100-103, is a translation from the Chinese sociopolitical journal LIAOWANG of 27 August 1987, pages 19-21. An English translation of this article from the Chinese may be found in JPRS China Report: JPRS-CAR-87-049 dated 29 September 1987, page 22.

### Report on Japan's View of 21st Century

18160004h [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, December 1987 initiates on pages 104-108 a series of reports on problems of modern-day Japan by Soviet Doctor of Economic Sciences V.N. Khlynov, who was invited to be a guest researcher in Japan by the Council on Problems of National Security and the Japanese Center for Economic Research. In this first article, "Japan Views the 21st Century: Goals, Achievements, Difficulties," Khlynov addresses Japan's current economic achievements and goals for the future ("to achieve 14 percent of the world GNP by the year 2000") in section one. Section two assesses the domestic political situation, which, according to the author, "despite many serious difficulties, contradictions and problems, specially in the social sphere," is characterized by "relative stability". The long one-party rule, the November elections and standard of living and quality of life of the people are discussed in this section. The final section of the article is devoted to Japan's current position in and influence on the world capitalist economy.

### Arab Disunity Precludes Early Palestine Settlement

18160004i Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 109-113

[L. Medvedko review: "Key Problem of the Near East"]

[Text] Preparing for publication a book devoted to so serious a problem (1) was a manifestly difficult business. We can perfectly well understand the difficulties which the author encountered in arriving at the main purpose of the study which he formulated—"examining the history of the emergence of the Palestine problem and analyzing all its aspects: political, legal, territorial and economic" (p 4). A difficult task, let us say frankly, when this has to be done hot on the heels of events. The present year has been marked right away by two round dates connected with important landmarks of the development of the Near East situation and the evolution of the Palestine problem itself. Forty years ago, in November 1947, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181 (II) on the creation on the territory of the former mandated Palestine of two sovereign—Arab and Jewish—states. This resolution went remained unrealized. But, on the other hand, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the core of which was the Palestine problem, became as a result of this historical injustice the political reality.

Twenty years ago, in June 1967, Israel unleashed the so-called "Six-Day War," which developed into long-standing aggression. Its consequences have not been removed yet through the fault of the same Zionist bosses of Israel and their imperialist patrons have who sabotaged another UN Security Council resolution—242—on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territory. The seeds of violence sown by this aggression have produced bloody shoots. For four decades now the Near East has been virtually the sole area which since the end of WWII has not known a sure and just peace. The fate of the Arab people of Palestine, who have become a people in exile still championing their legitimate right to self-determination and sovereignty, is tragic.

The book in question is by no means a second edition, supplemented by new facts, of a work by the same author which has already appeared. It not only reflects but also fundamentally interprets anew many events which have tied the "Palestine knot" even tighter and made a Near East settlement more difficult. Even the preliminary analysis thereof, which Ye. Dmitriyev attempted to make without pretending to a full and in-depth study of events which are not yet over, permitted him to illustrate and evaluate anew many aspects of the problem which previously were obscure.

This current-basis incursion into the thick of political events which are as yet still too hot also conceals a certain danger, of course. Not all opinions and conclusions, possibly, may be borne out by the subsequent

course of events. In addition, even now—without a serious, thoughtful reading of the entire book—some of its propositions could give rise to argument and objections. This applies, specifically, to the title itself. Let's face it, in the light of the tragic events in Lebanon, which led to increased division in the Palestinian movement, and also under the influence of the Iran-Iraq war, which has exacerbated even more the disagreements in the Arab world and made a Near East settlement more complex, some people could get and, indeed, sometimes do get the impression that the fate of the Arab people of Palestine has ceased to be the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Having become, they say, a purely human tragedy, it has receded into the background of Near East policy. But the book convincingly exposes the true political purposes of this at first sight "humane" interpretation of the problem. On the one hand attempts are being made to revise history together with the fundamental documents of international law concerning the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its settlement: it is wished to portray the UN resolutions virtually as the first cause of all the troubles or, at least, as outdated and as therefore having lost their legal force. On the other, there is an endeavor to exclude altogether the Palestine problem from an all-embracing Near East settlement, reducing the latter to a series of separate agreements between Israel and the Arab countries.

The author specially makes a brief excursion into the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict—from the 1948-1949 Palestine war through the creation in 1964 of the PLO and from the 1973 October war through the 1982-1983 Lebanon crisis—in order in the dynamics of the development of events not only to show the main stages of the evolution of the Palestine problem but also to analyze in detail its main aspects in international law. The reader is persuaded that the deep-lying, true causes of the unsolved state of Near East problems, which are closely interrelated and tied into a tight knot, the Palestine problem included, are by no means to be found in the content of the UN resolutions which have been passed in various periods but in their sabotage by the participants in the American-Israeli strategic alliance, which began to operate long before it was legally structured in the period of preparation for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon at the start of the 1980's.

"If we conceive of the problem of the Arab people of Palestine in general form," Ye. Dmitriyev writes, "it may be said that it arose from the conflict between the Zionists, who aspired and continue to aspire to turn all of Palestine into a Jewish state, and the Arabs, who have since time immemorial constituted in this area the indigenous majority population and have aspired to the realization of their own ideals and the creation of their own state" (p 4). However, this general evaluation reveals merely the national aspect of the problem. At the same time the author points on subsequent pages to the socio-class nature of Zionism as a reactionary nationalist movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie, whose racist, anti-Arab focus was manifested prior to the proclamation of

the state of Israel. The book adduces numerous examples of the Zionists' cruel terror against the Palestinian Arabs in 1946-1947. These diversionary and terrorist acts were perpetrated for the purpose of "purging" Palestine. The Zionist leaders categorically rejected the mere idea of the creation of an Arab-Jewish federative state, although even within the borders defined by the United Nations in the 1947 November resolution Israel was not simply a binational state but a country with a definite majority Arab population: approximately 510,000 Arabs, 499,000 Jews (p 22). "Rectification" of this situation, disadvantageous to the Zionists, was effected in two directions: the first was initially the buying up and then forcible seizure of Arab land and property, the second, eviction and mass terror in respect of the Arabs. Both the buying up of land and settlement by Jewish immigrants and forcible actions against the Arabs were financed to a considerable extent here by imperialist circles, primarily the United States. So that even at the initial stage the Palestine conflict went beyond the framework of the internecine struggle of the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine.

It is owing to its international nature that this problem acquires a number of new aspects. And particularly pertinent here, it would seem, is the book's portrayal of the prehistory of the American-Israeli strategic alliance.

The efforts of the American side aimed at encouraging Zionist aspirations, the author recalls, were manifested in the fact even that in the 1944 election campaign in the United States both the Democrats and Republicans expressed support for the so-called Biltmore program adopted by representatives of American, European and Palestinian Zionists in 1942 and, specifically, such of its demands as the formation in Palestine of a "Jewish community," the granting to the "Jewish Agency" (2) of the right to accommodate immigrants in Palestine and recognition of Jewish armed formations' right to exist under their own flag (p 18).

Taking up residence in the White House following the death of Roosevelt, Truman was, as the book emphasizes, on many questions avowedly pro-Zionist. In August 1945 even he raised the question of the admittance to Palestine of 100,000 Jews from other countries and, later, fully supported the Zionist plan for the partition of Palestine in accordance with the proposals of the said agency. This U.S. approach was reflected, specifically, in a Truman letter to the king of Saudi Arabia, which was seen by the Zionists as America's "historic undertaking in respect of a future Jewish fatherland" (p 20).

Washington and the CIA, which was formed in the years of Truman's administration, also exerted much effort to ensure Israel's victory in wars with the Arabs. At the same time, however, all American presidents paid lip service to the right of each people to self-determination. In practice, however, they did everything possible to bury the plans for the creation of an Arab Palestinian state,

although the United States had voted for this in November 1947 at the General Assembly session and had even taken part in the conciliation commission formed in 1949 for the purpose of seeking Israel's departure from the occupied Arab territory.

The provisions of the UN resolution which provided for separation into a special international zone of the city of Jerusalem and also the adoption of all necessary measures to put a stop to all attempts at a forcible change in the plan for the partitioning of Palestine were also consigned to oblivion. Owing to the active opposition of the United States and Britain and also the expansionist aspirations of the Zionists, it transpired that the UN Security Council was not in a position to prevent such attempts either in 1948-1949 or in the course of Israel's June aggression in 1967. The author devotes insufficient attention to the latter, unfortunately, although it to a greater extent than all other Arab-Israeli wars complicated solution of the Palestine problem and a settlement of the Near East situation.

The "Six-Day War" and the subsequent annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights accompanied by Israel's active "assimilation" of the occupied Arab land on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip occupies a special place in the development of the Near East situation. It should be emphasized that it was precisely after the June war that not only did a demographic change occur (there remained on the territory of former Palestine fewer Arabs than there were in exile) but a qualitatively new stage in the Palestine liberation movement began.

In this respect the 1967 war was a kind of culmination of the Near East process. It was following it that the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM) began to gain momentum and expand and strengthen and the social and class nature of the conflict came to be manifested to an even greater extent. A process of consolidation of the pan-Arab front, which took shape not only on an anti-Zionist but on an anti-imperialist basis also, came to light in the course of the struggle to have done with the consequences of the war. In the vanguard thereof were the PRM and the progressive Arab countries, against which Israeli aggression was spearheaded. The struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinians, actively supported by the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries, became at the global level an integral part of the anti-imperialist movement. At the same time in the regional aspect its success came to be linked even more closely not only with the choice of path by the Arab countries which had been the victims of the Israeli aggression and the participants in the anti-Israeli coalition but also with the political orientation of the PRM itself.

However, these positive features soon, particularly following the Jordanian-Palestinian tragedy (fall of 1970), came to be neutralized increasingly by the exacerbation of disagreements both within the PRM and between the

leaders of the PLO and the governments of the Arab countries on whose territory various Palestinian organizations and formations were accommodated and were operating. These crisis phenomena, which sometimes developed into instances of avowed extremism, were also reflected in the fluctuations and swings from side to side which are typical of many political movements in which petty bourgeois elements are preponderant. Very important in this connection would appear to be the book's conclusion that a circumstance of such considerable importance as the trend toward a search for a settlement in the Near East on a separate basis and given the active mediation of the United States which showed through shortly after the death of Nasir in the policy of the Egyptian leadership contributed to a dangerous tilt in the PRM (p 80).

The fourth Arab-Israeli war (October 1973) undoubtedly defined a marked, significant boundary in the history of the Palestinians' struggle. Their active participation in the fighting, the work observes, showed that the PRM's enemies had been premature in deeming it weak and ineffective. However, the negative trends and the division in the Arab world, which intensified following Camp David, were reflected straight away in the PRM. They were manifested particularly keenly in the course of the developing Lebanon crisis.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon under the conditions of the continuing civil war there ultimately grew into collective Israeli-American-NATO intervention in fact spearheaded against the Palestinians and also the patriotic forces of Lebanon and the Syrian forces there from the inter-Arab security force. The book has for the first time in scientific Soviet literature, perhaps, analyzed with such thoroughness and detail the influence and role of the Palestinian factor in the development of the Lebanon crisis. It was no accident that Ye. Dmitriyev devoted great attention to it. This crisis essentially integrated all existing contradictions and unsolved conflicts in the Near East, including the Palestinian problem as the key problem for the Near East.

It is for this reason that the Lebanon crisis, like the Palestine question itself also, refracts, as the author accurately puts it, "not only the main contradiction inherent in the overall Near East situation between the Arab national liberation movement and the policy of the imperialist powers but also the sociopolitical, economic and class contradictions inherent in the Arab world" (p 85). However, this correct proposition did not, unfortunately, become the initial premise for important conclusions concerning lessons of the Lebanon crisis. Some of them are contained in a number of documents of Arab communist parties and should, we believe, have been reflected and evaluated in such a, albeit not major, nonetheless, quite comprehensive study.

The direct military support of the United States and certain other NATO countries for the Israeli aggression showed that for the first time in the entire history of the

Near East conflict they had essentially become involved in a direct military confrontation with the Palestine and the entire Arab liberation movement. This fact is reason to believe that the Lebanon crisis defined a qualitatively new stage in the dangerous development of the Near East situation. At the same time it revealed to a greater extent than all preceding Arab-Israeli wars the socio-class essence of the events taking place there. The Israeli aggression in Lebanon encountered the most resolute opposition only on the part of the PRM and Lebanon's National Patriotic Forces (NPF), which received direct support from only Syria of all the other Arab states. The question reasonably asked in this connection was: did not the other participants in the anti-Israel coalition decline to render the Palestinians effective support because the latter, as Niquila al-Shawi, now deceased general secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party, whom the book quotes, declared, had created in conjunction with Lebanon's NPF a most dependable alliance, which had become "a new qualitative phenomenon in the Arab national liberation movement" (p 92)? The absence or, more precisely, the limited nature of support for the Palestinians and Lebanon's patriotic forces on the part of other Arab countries determined the contradictory, largely negative results of the Lebanon crisis and its influence on the new alignment and delineation of forces in the Palestinian movement and the Arab world.

Although the aggression in Lebanon did not completely achieve the policy goals set by its organizers, particularly the main one—elimination of the PRM and the imposition of capitulationist, Camp David-type agreements on Lebanon and then Syria—as a whole, it inflicted serious damage on the Arab liberation movement. Division in the Arab ranks intensified. The Palestinian movement found itself weakened and scattered. The PLO was in fact split into several groupings supported by various Arab countries. All this led on the one hand to the comminution and disintegration even of a number of political and military structures of the PRM and also a weakening of the positions of the PLO—the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative on the international scene. On the other, this process, which reflected the exacerbation of the contradictions in the Near East, came to be accompanied by a veil being drawn over the socio-class nature of the liberation movements in the Arab world. Meanwhile the book discusses the intensification of nationalist and religious-chauvinist trends, particularly with an Islamic coloration, only with reference to Palestinian youth on the occupied territories (pp 96-97).

The Lebanon crisis, which incorporates a struggle not only between Christians and Muslims but also, at times, very acute disagreements between different Muslim communities (Sunni, Shi'ite, Druze), has lent in this respect, following the Iranian revolution, additional impetus to the "Islamization" of certain detachments of the Arab, including Palestine, liberation movement also. The delineation of forces here is proceeding in parallel per three characteristics—socio-class, national and religious.

The Shi'ite-Sunni rivalry in the Arab world has since the Lebanon crisis come to exert a growing influence on the alignment of forces both in Lebanon itself and in the PRM. This is intensifying the division among the patriotic forces, objectively contributing to a strengthening of the positions of imperialism and reaction. The latter are taking advantage of the Islamic factor not only to ignite religious rivalry between Muslims and Christians but also to provoke an internecine struggle within the Muslim groupings themselves, embroiling them with one another or, as has been the case in Lebanon, setting them at odds with "foreign Palestinian and communist atheists."

As George Hawi, general secretary of the Lebanese CP Central Committee, observed, "the religious factor, which at preceding stages undoubtedly played an important part in the patriotic upswing, has gradually begun to lose its national-democratic thrust in the struggle against the Israeli occupation and American domination" (3). It is exerting an increasingly disastrous influence on the national-democratic forces and objectively contributing not only to an intensification of the domestic political crisis in the country but also a weakening of the Arab liberation, including Palestinian, movement.

The Lebanon crisis, which is further complicated by the religious and communal struggle, has led to an uncoupling of the Palestinians in the face of the incessant Israeli armed provocations and imperialist intrigues. At the same time the book points out, albeit in passing, with every justification that it "has created unnecessary difficulties in Palestinian-Syrian relations which are hard to overcome" (p 112). It would have been appropriate to have emphasized another circumstance here, however—the role of Syria, which has grown in the course of the Lebanon crisis, in the struggle for elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression and a just Near East settlement. In the analysis of the basic trends of the development of the Palestinian movement the author draws the quite balanced conclusion, we believe, that under the conditions of the continuing division in the Arab world it would be unrealistic to expect a just and constructive solution of the Palestine problem in the immediate future (p 145). But this does not mean that its solution, as a most important condition of a Near East settlement, may be postponed indefinitely.

The failure of the American "peacemaking" in the Near East has shown that a separate approach to a settlement of the Near East conflict, given a disregard for the Palestine problem, has reached impasse. However the United States and Israel—not without the assistance of Arab reaction—have tried, excluding it from a Near East settlement is impossible. It was and remains the core of the knot of conflict which has been pulled tight by imperialism and which can be untied only by the collective efforts of all parties concerned. It is for this reason that the Soviet Union advocates the immediate convening of an plenipotentiary international conference on the Near East. The broad support for this Soviet proposal in



the United Nations testifies that the process of realization of the existing and generally recognized rules of international law on the question of the Palestinians' self-determination can and, as the author concludes, should accordingly be not only provided for but also "sanctioned" by the world community. As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in conversation in the Kremlin with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, "the whole process of a settlement and its final stage must be of a constructive nature. Mutual recrimination does not help. What are needed are just solutions of all questions, with regard for the interests of both the Arabs and Israel and, of course, guarantees" (see PRAVDA, 30 June 1987).

The Palestinians and their friends throughout the world have reason to look to the future with optimism. This conclusion logically ensues from Ye. Dmitriyev's cognitive and topical book. Life itself and the realities of present-day international relations demand a speedier end to the Palestine tragedy and the solution thereby of a conflict which has dragged on for decades.

#### Footnotes

1. Ye. Dmitriyev, "Palestinskaya tragediya" [The Palestine Tragedy], Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1986, 168pp.

2. An organization which was formally a consultative body attached to the British high commissioner, but in fact endowed with broad powers in questions of colonization, immigration and also the economic and political activity of the Jewish community (see "Large Soviet Encyclopedia," vol 19, Moscow, 1975, pp 116-117).

3. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 11, 1985, p 15.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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**Computer Problems, Electronic Crime in West**  
18160004j Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 121-123

[Article by A. Sarchev: "The Computer Racket"]

[Text] Reader I. Kharitonov asks us to describe the problems arising in connection with computerization of the financial sphere in the West, specifically, "electronic crime" and methods of combating it.

Under the conditions of S&T progress the major banks and financial institutions of the West are increasingly becoming international information and financial electronic centers. Powerful computers perform in a matter of minutes a colossal amount of accounting, payment,

currency-finance and analytical operations providing for an unprecedented increase in noncash turnover. Electronic equipment and modern means of communications afford organizations in the financial sphere an opportunity to increase their profits considerably thanks to a reduction in operating expenditure, the increased speed of payments and the development of new types of service.

Thus one of the biggest U.S. corporations, General Motors, concluded an agreement with eight banks on the automation and computerization of all settlements with 20,000 suppliers. As a result electronic transactions have replaced 400,000 drafts written out monthly in a sum total of \$4 billion.

The practice of customer service through the use of plastic cards which are gradually replacing bank checks and notes has become widespread. Special electronic machines have been installed in banks, at gas pumps, in stores and in busy streets. To make a payment a customer inserts a card into the aperture and types on the keyboard a code and the amount of the payment. The machine conveys the message, and the amount is transferred from the client's account in his bank or savings institution to the store or other establishment. The machine may, similarly, accept cash. There is also a type of card with which it is possible to obtain money or be paid on credit, that is, prior to resources having been entered into the client's account.

Specialized companies in the United States, West Europe and Japan are already producing tens of millions of plastic cards annually. Specialists are talking of the formation in developed capitalist countries of the "electronic money" society bringing about many changes in the economy and people's lifestyle. Safe-deposit boxes are diminishing in number, and employees sitting at cash registers and counting out notes or bank clerks with money bags climbing into armored cars under heavy guard may be encountered increasingly rarely. The public also resorts to cash increasingly rarely.

As a consequence of these innovations there has been a considerable narrowing of the field of activity of criminals specializing in stealing cash. There has been somewhat of a decline in the number of "classical" robberies accompanied by armed assaults on bank offices and clerks and safe-breaking.

But at the same time a new type of theft—computer—has been assuming increasingly significant proportions. A distinctive type of criminal has appeared who is well versed in electronics and has a detailed knowledge of the mechanism of banking operations. As distinct from the "traditional" representatives of the criminal world, who frequently come from the Lumpen-proletariat, computer criminals are more often than not highly skilled specialists with, as a rule, access to reference programs and secret ciphers and codes.



Banks and their clients are currently losing annually billions of dollars as a result of computer errors arising mainly on account of premeditated fraud. In Great Britain losses as a consequence of computer errors grew more than eightfold in the period from 1984 through 1986. According to the report of one British institute, half of the firms and companies which it polled had noted an increase in the number of computer errors for this reason or the other in the past 5 years, and one out of every six believes that it could fall victim to computer malfunctions in the very near future.

As a special survey conducted in Great Britain by the Bank of International Settlements showed, up to 63 percent of computer crime is committed by way of the alteration of data inputted into the computer or the substitution for one piece of source data of another. In this way swindlers have contrived to remove money from clients' accounts and grant a nonexistent subject short-term credit, used the bank's financial resources for speculating on the currency markets, paid off their own debts and so forth. Twelve percent of irregularities in computer operations occurred as a consequence of the fact that the criminals had put the computers' electronic control system out of operation, in seven percent errors had been loaded into the computers' programs deliberately and ahead of time. The case of a young programmer at a London bank organizing when inputting a new clearing accounts program the transfer of payments to his own account in a Swiss bank is well known. On the first day of the computer's operation per the new program the computer had in 60 seconds transferred to Switzerland 6 million pounds sterling. Fearing that the case would become public knowledge, the bank promised not to institute judicial proceedings on condition that some of the stolen amount was returned.

In some cases the data transmitted from a bank's head computer to the screens of clients' PC's have been intercepted by criminals with the aid of relatively inexpensive accessories.

Frequently theft becomes possible owing to the fact that bank employees ignore the measures pertaining to identification of the owners of deposits and supervision of transactions and disregard the rules of working with computer ciphers and codes.

Criminals also avail themselves of the fact that many banks and firms are reluctant to acknowledge or they conceal instances of computer theft and error for fear that this could scare away clients. Swindlers frequently blackmail the banks with the threat of making public secret codes and ciphers, knowing that this could force them to completely replace the program and the electronic system even, the cost of which runs into millions of dollars.

The "computer racket" is invading increasingly extensively the sphere of banks' and savings institutions' automated payments and settlements with individual

clients. In the United States alone losses as the result of the use of counterfeit plastic cards in 1986 amounted to the tremendous sum of \$6 billion. The swindlers avail themselves of the imperfection of the methods of identification of cardholders and forge the magnetic strips containing the client's code.

Recently criminals have been taking advantage increasingly often of cards which have been lost and stolen and also cards obtained under false pretences. Having learned the necessary information about the client, they fill in an application on his behalf or use forged papers and then disappear, having obtained cash from the dispenser. According to the data of one Chicago firm, 3 out of every 200 credit card applications are submitted by swindlers.

Do effective methods of combating the "computer racket" exist? What are the banks and other financial institutions doing to protect themselves and their clients? Special reserve funds of hundreds of millions of dollars in case of electronic error are being created and apparatus for monitoring the direction of the movement of data and checking the source thereof is being acquired. Taking advantage of the situation, the West's insurance companies have introduced a new type of bank insurance—against computer crime.

In addition, the finance companies, banks and industrial and commercial firms employ various methods of coding data when effecting electronic payments. The one used most frequently is the incorporation in the data being transmitted of a secret code which serves as a conventional symbol. If the data is counterfeit and the code is absent, the deal does not go through: the money will not be transferred to the recipient. By 1988 the U.S. Treasury Department intends having introduced such a coding method in all domestic electronic financial settlements. Coding apparatus is also being installed in banks of the U.S. Federal Reserve system.

Endeavoring to restrict access to the most important information, financial institutions are spending large amounts on acquiring biometric systems for monitoring and identifying their employees. Specially designed computers identify an individual by fingerprints, voice and even a pattern of the retina of the eye. In the last case, for example, a computer runs the pattern of the retina against the file in its memory. The procedure takes about 10 seconds. If 70 percent of the images concur, the person gains access to the secret information. Given greater stringency in respect of concurrence, there is a rise in the quantity of errors since, depending on a person's state, his eye retina pattern changes also. This device has already been successfully tested in a holding company of First Chicago Corp, the major American financial corporation.

In connection with the increased frequency of instances of plastic card forgeries the techniques of their manufacture are being perfected. Cards with the owner's signature inscribed on special absorptive material, from

which the signature cannot be removed without the card itself being damaged, have appeared. Cards with a 3-D hologram containing individual information and also microdefects inscribed by intricate instruments and installed in the bank computer's memory are becoming increasingly widespread. In 1987 some 90 percent of the cards of the international Visa firm were made with a hologram, and cases of their counterfeits are unknown as yet.

In addition, banks and companies are organizing their own services for identifying the most likely electronic malfunctions and also for ascertaining suspicious computer operations (in the event of a sharp increase in payments from the account of some client or other, for example). In some banks the computers have been programmed to compile blacklists of stolen or forged cards and also of clients whose actions give rise to suspicion.

In response to the extensive spread of "electronic theft" the corresponding articles of criminal law are being tightened and government and private services for investigating such crimes and accidental computer error are being set up. More than \$12 billion annually are being spent in the United States on such security services already, and by 1990 expenditure will amount to \$18 billion. The Confederation of British Industry has formed a special group to monitor computer-linked crime. It will study the scale of the problem and devise security measures, conduct briefings for banks and firms and coordinate action to reduce computer crime.

Nonetheless, despite the entire set of measures being adopted, the problem of computer swindling is far from being solved. Many specialists believe that it will intensify in the immediate future. Thus, to the disappointment of Western sociologists, the process of electronization of the financial sphere of the capitalist countries has not led, as expected, to the elimination of crime but merely contributed to its development on a new plane.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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**Yearbook on Disarmament and Security Reviewed**  
18160004k Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 124-125

[V. Karpov review: "In the Spirit of the New Thinking"]

[Text] The USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO Disarmament and International Security Department prepared and has published jointly with Novosti its annual analytical survey (Ye.M. Primakov, executive editor, A.G. Arbatov, leader of the group of authors). This publication in two volumes in Russian and English,

largely innovative for our scientific publications, is specific testimony to the extension of the policy of a broadening of glasnost and openness to the sphere of foreign policy and military organizational development.

The work makes an attempt, successful, on the whole, to reveal the essence and focus of Soviet foreign policy initiatives and show their businesslike, constructive nature and orientation toward satisfaction of man's vital interests—a strengthening of international peace and security. The progress of realization of the propositions of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 and the responses to the Soviet program for the creation of the foundations of an all-embracing system of international security advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress are analyzed in detail.

The yearbook is distinguished by a wealth of factual material, extensive scientific-reference matter and an abundance of diagrams, graphs and tables cogently buttressing and explaining the Soviet concept of security and disarmament.

The readers' undoubted interest will be evoked by the thorough exposition of the sides' positions at the negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms in Geneva and the detailed analysis of the Soviet approach. Simultaneously with the portrayal of its compromise nature there is cogent criticism of the American line of deriving unilateral advantages through an infringement of the USSR's security and a departure from the Reykjavik accords. There is a comprehensive examination of the results of the Soviet-American top-level meeting in Iceland, which showed the possibility of a nuclear-free world, and the political struggle surrounding its results.

Great attention, which is perfectly natural considering the key importance of these questions for the cause of peace and security, is paid to problems of preventing an arms race in outer space and exposing the plans of the United States to achieve military superiority via space. Not only a list of the various programs within the SDI framework but a detailed scientific analysis graphically underpinned by a number of graphs and tables are presented here.

Particular relevance, considering the seriousness of the political and diplomatic struggle surrounding the problem, is attached to the attempt made in the yearbook to compare various nonstandard approaches to the problem of radical reductions in the armed forces and conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe to the minimum level of a reasonable sufficiency for the purpose of precluding the possibility of surprise offensive operations.

For the first time, perhaps, a national work of recent times on the study of foreign policy contains an endeavor to combine a problem-solving approach to the subject matter of disarmament with a regional approach and an analysis of questions of a lessening of the military danger

and a strengthening of military and political stability in various parts of the world. The comprehensive disclosure of the Soviet approach to the problems of a strengthening of security and an improvement in the situation in the Asia-Pacific region formulated by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok in 1986 merits attention. In the next issue of the yearbook these questions could be studied in more detail with regard for the development of the Soviet position, including the Central Committee general secretary's interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA.

The yearbook also studies on a sound scientific level certain topical problems of multilateral disarmament, specifically within the framework of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, and propounds the idea of the need for an intensification of the corresponding negotiations. There is detailed illustration of the efforts of the USSR and the socialist countries to strengthen the practice of nuclear nonproliferation and settle international conflicts and our country's activity in organizing broad international cooperation in the field of S&T progress, ensuring the safe development of nuclear power and exploring outer space for peaceful purposes.

While noting the high professional standard of the publication and the expert, documented approach to an exposition of events and problems in the sphere of arms limitation and international security I would like to express the confidence that its future issues will present more extensively, if only by way of debate, the differing viewpoints of Soviet scholars on key problems of international security and disarmament. I believe that there is today every reason to expect of Soviet science—with regard for the facts accessible to researchers—an in-depth analysis for the long term of the development of the situation at the negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms, the process of cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and the role of the United Nations and its bodies dealing with problems of disarmament and also of the Conference on Disarmament in the business of internationalization of the problems of arms limitation and disarmament. The elaboration of alternative versions and possible ways of a solution of questions would be of great significance in this respect.

The next annual issue of the publication (for 1987) could only benefit, evidently, were it to contain more of Soviet scholars' own opinions, calculations and forecasts. In working more extensively with accessible international information on military matters our social scientists could assimilate even more decisively problems of limitation of the arms race and disarmament which have yet to be scientifically illustrated. Live polemics with opponents and a cogent analysis of the views of bourgeois military experts permitting the more prominent illustration of the essence of the Soviet position on questions of security and disarmament would contribute to the increased impact of the published material.

Study of the prospects and role in international relations of the nuclear potentials of China, Britain and France, the possibility of these states subscribing in the future to the nuclear disarmament process and the likely development of events in Europe following the elimination of the Soviet and American INF and operational-tactical missiles would be of great interest and practical significance.

With regard for the situation taking shape, more attention should have been paid, in our view, to the problem of radical reductions in conventional arms, an examination of various nonstandard concepts of reasonable sufficiency, "nonoffensive," "unprovocative" defenses and so forth, the prospects of reductions in and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and promotion of the Warsaw Pact countries' initiative concerning comparison of the military doctrines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The problem of a ban on chemical weapons and the possibility of the activation of new factors for the purpose of promoting nuclear nonproliferation and a ban on nuclear testing merits further in-depth study.

I would like to see the authors of the yearbook for 1987 devote more space together with attention to a critical analysis of practical subjects to fundamental problems like, for example, study of the concept of strategic stability in all its aspects linked with deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and prevention of the appearance of weapons in space.

It would also be desirable to see in the work more specific forecasts, brought closer to reality, of the development of the military and political situation in the world and an investigation of possible ways of solving the problems which will confront the Soviet foreign policy of the future.

Questions of the relationship of disarmament and security and the settlement of international conflicts, specifically, the Iran-Iraq and Near East conflicts and that in Central America, merit separate study.

Wishing the participants in this work new successes, we express confidence that specialists and all those with an interest in foreign policy and the international situation—in the USSR and abroad—have acquired a new and interesting publication which has a highly promising future.

#### Footnote

\* "Razoruzheniye i bezopasnost. 1986. Yezhegodnik" [Disarmament and Security. 1986. Yearbook], in two volumes, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, Novosti, 1987, vol I 256pp, vol II 244pp.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnoshe-  
niya", 1987

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### Avenues of Improved Soviet Trade With North America Explored

18160004! Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87 (signed to press 17 Nov 87) pp 129-131

[A. Kunitsyn review: "Difficult Path to Cooperation"]

[Text] The work in question\* completes the series of works of the IMEMO devoted to the USSR's economic cooperation with capitalist and developing countries. In this respect the North American region is of particular interest: the United States and Canada cater for over 28 percent of world industrial production and 16 percent of exports (p 5). Possessing colossal research potential, the United States retains the lead in most important areas of the contemporary S&T revolution. Mutually profitable business relations with the leading capitalist powers are valuable in the political respect also inasmuch as they strengthen the foundation of peaceful coexistence.

The monograph (A.V. Anikin, A.Z. Astapovich, executive editors) opens with an analysis of the objective prerequisites of the economic cooperation of the USSR and the United States. Pertaining here are the scale and high level of their economies, the symmetry of the basic directions of S&T progress, the wide-ranging list of manufactured products and the considerable complementarity of the structure of export-import transactions, the similarity of the tasks of development of the productive forces over a vast territory, mutual interest in the solution of global problems and others. While revealing the essentially inexhaustible potential of cooperation the authors at the same time rightly warn against overestimation of the role of objectively propitious prerequisites. The reality, unfortunately, is such that the state of Soviet-American business relations is in fact determined not by considerations of economic expediency but the unconstructive policy of U.S. ruling circles impeding their normal development.

The book makes a detailed study of trade policy problems and scrupulously traces the evolution of the American system of export, import and credit restrictions in respect of the USSR. The authors endeavor to penetrate the deep-lying seams of Washington's policy, analyze the alignment of forces in the administration and Congress and among business circles on questions of Soviet-American economic cooperation and draw on this basis practical conclusions. Thus noting that "at the present time... approximately 300 American firms, including 50 of the 500 biggest U.S. industrial corporations, are participating in the fulfillment of commercial and S&T agreements with Soviet organizations," the researchers emphasize that the future of Soviet-American relations

will depend to a considerable extent on how actively the major corporations "participate in the formulation of U.S. policy in respect of the USSR and how far they are prepared, acting in accordance with their own interests, to contribute to a change in the trade policy posture in respect of the Soviet Union" (p 103).

At the same time imprecise assertions are encountered in the exposition of trade policy problems also. For example, that policy in respect of the USSR is pursued within the framework of the so-called "differentiated approach" to the socialist countries (pp 30, 34, 38). It is difficult to agree with this inasmuch as both conceptually and in practice the East European region is considered the proving ground of the "differentiated policy". The opinion, which was fair enough for the start of the 1980's, that "the United States is making more intensive use of trade and economic relations as a lever of political pressure on the USSR" (p 38) is also in need of reassessment. The renunciation of economic cooperation with our country has resulted for the Reagan administration in a sharp narrowing of the hypothetical possibilities of the "linkage" of trade issues with political issues. This is noticeably troubling Washington and is a factor of the interest it is displaying in a certain expansion of American-Soviet trade.

The central chapters of the monograph are devoted to the basic forms of Soviet-American economic relations and cooperation in the solution of global problems. Analyzing the development of bilateral trade, the authors note its manifest failure to correspond to the partners' latent potential. The United States' share of the USSR's foreign trade turnover in the 1970's-1980's has not exceeded 4 percent, our country's relative significance in the commodity turnover of the United States has been kept at a level of less than 1 percent (p 129). The book adduces the following dispiriting fact also. In 1978 the Soviet-American Trade Commission studied 28 projects in various spheres of the USSR economy in which the participation of American companies was contemplated. However, as a result of the sharp deterioration in political relations practically all the projects had to be handed over to companies of other countries (p 133).

Compensation agreements with the USSR give rise to much discussion in the West. American firms account for only 5 of the approximately 100 Soviet such agreements with capitalist firms. Disclosing the particular features and advantages of this form of foreign economic relations, the authors draw a conclusion as to its great potential in relations with the West, particularly with the United States. Soviet-American projects, they believe, could encompass the development of raw material resources and the construction of large industrial facilities in various sectors of manufacturing industry (petroleum refining, chemical, metallurgical, pulp and paper, automotive, light, food) (p 141). Without questioning the

usefulness of compensation projects, I would like to observe, nonetheless, that this form of cooperation has certain shortcomings also, which the work does not mention.

Growing significance for East-West economic cooperation is attached to the development of direct production cooperation, particularly of such promising forms thereof as joint production based on specialization, science and production cooperation and joint ventures. Although the above-mentioned types have not yet been applied in the practice of Soviet-American business interaction, interest in them is undoubtedly growing, and it is only to be regretted that these important matters have been left outside of the framework of the monograph in question.

The scale of Soviet-American economic cooperation depends to a considerable extent on the state of bilateral credit relations. Since 1975 the USSR has been deprived in discriminatory fashion of the opportunity of availing itself of U.S. Government credit and guarantees along Export-Import Bank lines and has been able to obtain export credit only from private banks or the supplier firms. Noting the shortcomings of these channels, the authors show the possible paths of an improvement in such cooperation: use of consortium credit; attraction of investment banks and other long-term credit institutions of the United States (insurance companies, for example); extension of the list of Soviet official institutions in receipt of credit from American banks; the broader attraction of commercial banks of the states; and so forth. The recommendations made in the book with respect to the use of such a promising form of the financing of Soviet-American equipment trade as leasing also merit attention.

Unfortunately, questions of the extension of credit for Soviet exports to the United States have remained unstudied. We may also attribute to the incomplete-work category the use of outdated information on the fixed percentage levels pertaining to government export credit of the OECD countries, although it is known that they adopted a decision in October 1983 on the periodic (twice yearly) revision of the terms of the extension of export credit in accordance with the change in the credit interest level of private commercial banks.

Investigating the role of present-day global problems in the mutual relations of the two powers, the authors point to the difference in the Soviet and American approaches to their solution. The government report to the U.S. President "Entering the 21st Century" openly declares Washington's "right" "to expect the prevailing influence of its policy on the development of global trends," for which there are allegedly "very substantial grounds" (see p 182). The authors rightly categorize such assertions (and they are encountered quite often in American official declarations) as the virtual renunciation of equal international cooperation, which is simply inconceivable based on "principles" of diktat (see *ibid.*).

The selfish policy of the U.S. Administration is reflected negatively in international interaction in the accomplishment of planetary tasks and is impeding the rational use of intellectual and material resources on a bilateral basis. The examples adduced in the book of the fruitful unification of the efforts of the USSR and the United States in the sphere of environmental protection, power engineering and the exploration and conquest of space and the oceans testify to the big potential of cooperation.

The final chapters are devoted to the specific features of Soviet-Canadian economic cooperation brought about primarily by the "Land of the Maple Leaf's" place in the international division of labor. The leading sector of the Canadian economy is manufacturing industry, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of industrial production and 18 percent of GNP. A most important part therein is played by food-gustatory and pulp and paper industry, transport engineering, oil refining and coal conversion and the primary treatment of metals (p 222). The country is in one of the first places in the world in the production of basic agricultural products per capita, outpacing the United States in this indicator. Over one-half of manufactured Canadian commodities are exported. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the United States accounts for approximately 70 percent of foreign commodity turnover (p 224).

The USSR is Canada's fifth biggest trading partner. The book comprehensively examines the evolution and current status of bilateral economic relations, the singularities of Canada's trade policy practices and the alignment of political forces on questions of cooperation with our country. In the authors' opinion, the upgrading and linkage of the work of export and import foreign trade associations and the search for positions which would steadily produce export earnings are essential to achieve better cost results in trade with Canada (Soviet exports thither are as yet approximately 50 times less than imports). Among the priority areas of Soviet-Canadian cooperation they point to transport and agricultural engineering and the production of equipment for power engineering, electronics and extractive industry. Much attention is paid to progressive forms of business cooperation—mixed joint-stock companies and production and S&T cooperation.

It would be useful for workers in the field to take note of the information that in a whole number of sectors Canada currently possesses more progressive technology than the United States. These include wood-processing and pulp and paper industry, timber procurement, production of asbestos and nonferrous metals, construction under permafrost conditions and production of nuclear reactors on the basis of crude uranium and STOL aircraft (p 289).

As a whole, the work in question is a useful step forward in study of the complex problems of the USSR's trade and economic cooperation with leading capitalist states. The policy of the 27th CPSU Congress geared to the

renewal of the Soviet economy opens new paths of practical partnership with them. The scientific elaboration of these questions is an urgent task of Soviet researchers.

#### Footnote

\* "SSSR-SShA i Kanada: problemy torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy" [USSR-United States and Canada: Problems of Trade and Economic Relations], Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987 328pp.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnoshe-  
niya", 1987

8850

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**Publication Data**

Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian  
No 12, Dec 87

English title: WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNA-  
TIONAL RELATIONS

Russian title: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH-  
DUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA

Editor: Ya.S. Khavinson

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda"

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: December 1987

Signed to press: 17 November 1987

Copies: 26,000

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnoshe-  
niya", 1987.

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