


045059

JPRS-TAC-85-066

18 December 1985

Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL



19980728 083

A rectangular stamp with a double border, containing the alphanumeric string "19980728 083".

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

A rectangular stamp with a double border. The text inside reads: "REPRODUCED BY", "NATIONAL TECHNICAL", "INFORMATION SERVICE", "U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE", and "SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161".

9  
65  
AΦ4

Handwritten text in the bottom right corner, consisting of the number "9", the number "65", and the alphanumeric string "AΦ4".

## NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

## PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

18 December 1985

## WORLDWIDE REPORT

## ARMS CONTROL

## CONTENTS

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

Senior FRG Spokesman Responds to Scientists Criticism of SDI (Hans Ruehle; Hamburg DER SPIEGEL, 25 Nov 85).....	1
Dutch Commentators Differ on 'Clarity' of SDI (Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 21, 25 Oct 85).....	11
Labor Party Experts Skeptical, by Joop Veen, Bert Kreemers Heldring Rebuts Labor Party, by J.J. Heldring	11 13
Columnist Sees Turkish Participation in SDI as 'Unnecessary' (Ergun Balci; Istanbul CUMHURIYET, 6 Nov 85).....	16
Polish Critique of U.S. ASAT Program (Adam Wajda; Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY, No 45, 8 Nov 85).....	18

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

Soviet Army Paper on Post-Geneva Arms Control Situation (V. Pustov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Nov 85) .....	20
Soviet Scientists on Arms Proposals (Moscow TASS, 17 Nov 85).....	24
USSR: Summit Sets Stage for Continuing Dialogue (Yuriy Reshetnikov; Moscow World Service, 26 Nov 85).....	26
USSR: 17 Nov Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' (Moscow Service, 17 Nov 85).....	28
'Fairy Tales' About SDI	28
'Star Wars' Concept	29
UN Resolution	30
'Star Peace' Proposal	31
15 Nov Politburo Meeting	31
Question of Missiles in Europe	32

U.S. Threats of Nuclear Strike	33
U.S. Position at Geneva	33
Geneva Talks 'Complex, Difficult'	35
USSR: 'International Situation--Questions, Answers'	
(Moscow Domestic Service, 15 Nov 85).....	36
'Ensuring Favorable Results'	36
U.S. Reaction to Proposals	37
Deeds, Not Words Required	38
'Militaristic' SDI	38
Zero Option Proposals	39
World Awaits U.S. 'Constructive Response'	39
French Papers Assess Geneva Summit Results	
(Various sources, 23, 24 Nov 85).....	40
LE MONDE Editorial	40
LE FIGARO on Dialogue, by Serge Maffert	41
L'HUMANITE on 'Considerable' Results, Editorial, by Yves Moreau	42
Italian Paper Assesses Outcome of Geneva Summit	
(Francesco Gozzano; Rome AVANTI!, 22 Nov 85).....	44
Italy's Craxi Comments on Role in 'East-West Thaw'	
(Rome AVANTI!, 24-25 Nov 85).....	46
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
Anticruise Deployment Group Damages Air Bases	
(Paris AFP, 15 Nov 85).....	48
Parliament Approves Cruise Missile Deployment	
(Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 13, 14 Nov 85).....	49
Views Differ Among Parties	49
Deployment Approved Despite Opposition	50
Dutch Paper: New Government Could Reverse Deployment	
(Editorial; Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT, 4 Nov 85).....	52
Lubbers Letter on Cruise Deployment Published	
(Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT, 2 Nov 85).....	54
Lubbers Considers Separate Arms Talks With USSR	
(Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 13 Nov 85).....	57
PPR To Employ Nonviolent Resistance to Missiles	
(Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 18 Nov 85).....	58

Briefs

Netherlands To Reduce NATO Nuclear Role

59

RELATED ISSUES

Abe Wants To Promote 'Disarmament Diplomacy'

(Tokyo KYODO, 24 Nov 85)..... 60

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SENIOR FRG SPOKESMAN RESPONDS TO SCIENTISTS CRITICISM OF SDI

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 25 Nov 85 pp 155-159

[Article by Hans Ruehle, chief of planning at Ministry of Defense: "To the Limits of Technology"]

[Text] In view of the fact that the criticism of Munich physics professor Hans-Peter Duerr of the U.S. SDI project has become "in the meantime the printed creed" of German scientists against SDI, the director of the planning staff of the Federal Ministry of Defense now seeks an open debate. Hans Ruehle, close collaborator of Manfred Woerner, has set the goal for himself "to remove the most important building blocks from Duerr's argumentation structure." Duerr worked with incorrect figures, false assumptions and faulty or only theoretically developed reasoning, Christian Democrat Ruehle asserts.

On 23 March 1983 President Ronald Reagan formulated his vision of making the present nuclear missile threat obsolete through the development of a strategic defense system. To this end he started with the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), a research program that has been set up for 5 years and funded with \$26 billion. The "community of scientists" was asked "to devote its great talents to the cause of humanity and world peace."

While immediately thereafter the big U.S. laboratories, many universities and industry accepted the challenge of their president and started initial preliminary work, resistance developed in the scientific establishment of U.S. East Coast liberalism. Rallied around the natural scientist Richard Garwin and Nobel Prize laureate Hans Bethe, the "Union of Concerned Scientists," (UCS) started an embittered struggle against the SDI project. In March 1984 its first study appeared in which it was apparently conclusively explained that and why a space-based missile defense could not function: No fewer than 2400 laser satellites circling the earth are required, according to the UCS, to guarantee a nearly comprehensive protection for the United States. Since the UCS assumed a per-satellite price of one billion dollars, the SDI project appeared to be condemned to failure.

But meanwhile people in the big U.S. laboratories had not been idle. From Los Alamos came the news that the aim of the SDI can be achieved with only 90 satellites. Moreover, errors in assumptions and calculations were proved to the UCS; after some back and forth, Richard Garwin and his UCS had to retreat first to 182 satellites--approximately the figure that had been calculated from the start by an extremely critical study of the SDI by the Office of Technology Assessment--and finally to fewer than 100 satellites.

But the UCS did not give up. Nearly every month since then new calculations by Garwin appear in which he attempts to manipulate upwards the number of satellites required. With such--according to the technical jargon--GIGO calculations--(Garbage In, Garbage Out), i.e. nonsensical input necessarily leads to nonsensical results--now and probably also in the future, the UCS and its followers will try to discredit SDI. But this is unlikely to succeed.

In the Federal Republic, too, the struggle of the "Scientists Against SDI" has started. And here in the Federal Republic, too, the scientific scruples are small if the object is not to permit "heaven" to become "the forecourt to hell"--according to the title of a SPIEGEL article by Prof. Hans-Peter Duerr. However, the German scientists who publicly oppose SDI, according to their own statements, have no information of their own or special knowledge of the present status of SDI research in the United States. All of them uncritically take over the UCS assertions that have long been disproved.

Professor Duerr, who has formulated the thus far most detailed scientific attack against SDI in the FRG admits this without hesitation. Duerr states that what he has to say is "not new." Moreover, he says he is "not familiar in detail" with the technical problems that are connected with a missile defense system. The proof that SDI--analogously to a perpetual mobile--cannot function is possible on the basis of general physical and geometrical consideration, Duerr says.

But precisely here the director of the Max-Planck Institute for Physics and Astrophysics errs. The perpetual mobile indeed fails in light of fundamental laws of physics. But there is no fundamental law of physics that would render the SDI impossible by definition. In the case of the SDI, what is involved is not inventing "new physics" but only research on unknown border areas of technology.

Three things are evident even now: First of all, in view of the international situation and the domestic policy fronts, SDI will remain a central topic of German security policy and will probably be an important topic of the 1987 Bundestag election campaign. Secondly, this debate will be dominated essentially by technical arguments. Thirdly, in the Heisenberg and Teller student Hans-Peter Duerr, whose SPIEGEL article has meanwhile become the printed creed of the "Scientists Against SDI," a renowned German natural scientist will constitute the spearhead in the struggle against SDI for whom Rowe's "law of the assumed fact" works in a very special way. According to this law, any not clearly nonsensical statement of a recognized expert is immediately accepted and disseminated as a fact.

## Defense Systems Need not Be Perfect if They Are to Guarantee Security

Reasons, yes necessities enough to take issue in some detail with the most important arguments of the "Scientists Against SDI" in general and Professor Duerr in particular.

The most serious error in all statements of the "Scientists Against SDI"--this also applies to Duerr--is the absolutely unjustified and also logically incomprehensible assumption that defense systems had to be perfect if they are to guarantee or improve security and strategic stability. This fails to recognize the action mechanisms of deterrence and thus necessarily the possibilities of the manner in which a strategic defense system could contribute to the strengthening of deterrence.

Fundamentally the deterrence theory has two operating principles. On the one hand, an aggressor may be deterred by the fact that, according to his own estimates, the defender can deny him attainment of his military aims (deterrence by denial). On the other hand, deterrence also operates if the aggressor must be afraid that the consequences of retaliation are more serious for him than the benefit of the aggression (deterrence by punishment).

Both principles are reflected in the deterrence concept of the West. While in the case of the deterrence of conventional conflicts the denial of success plays the decisive role, in the nuclear area there dominates the idea of retaliation (punishment). The reason for this division of the Western deterrence concept into two parts simply lies in the fact that thus far an effective defense against the strategic-nuclear offensive potential of the Soviet Union (10,000 nuclear warheads) could not be technically achieved. Therefore, SDI is nothing else than the attempt to defend against the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union based on new technologies, thus changing over to deterrence "by denial" also in the nuclear field.

For the aspect of the effectiveness of a strategic defensive system this necessarily signifies that the criteria must be applied that are generally applicable for deterrence "by denial." That means again nothing else than that the aggressor not only--as Duerr believes--is deterred if he meets a perfect defense but already when in view of a strategic defensive system, even of only limited effectiveness, the military and political assessment of the situation shows that he cannot attain his aims.

But what are the military and political aims that could make triggering of a nuclear first strike by the Soviet Union appear to be sensible. Duerr argues that even one percent of the Soviet missiles--about 100 warheads--would cause "unacceptable" damage in the United States. But what kind of a first strike scenario is it in which the Soviet Union must expect--in view of about 2000 hardened targets in the United States--including 1000 intercontinental missiles--to get through merely 100 warheads and then see itself exposed to U.S. retaliation?

Duerr's assumption therefore applies only to the improbable case that the United States, while building up a strategic defense system, would scrap its



entire strategic offensive potential while the Soviet Union would keep its entire offensive potential. If this nonsensical case is excluded, then the buildup even of a U.S. strategic defensive system that is only somewhat effective means that a Soviet first strike is "possible" in the sense that it can be planned in a limited manner, only if no military (counterforce) targets would be attacked, but "soft" targets, i.e. cities, industrial installations, etc. But this corresponds neither to Soviet strategic thinking nor would it make any sense in view of the U.S. retaliation potential. "Realistic" first strike scenarios are always counterforce for the Soviet Union, too.

Thus it is with great probability that a large part of the 6000 nuclear warheads on Soviet SS 17, SS 18, and SS19, with high aiming accuracy, are targeted against about 2000 targets in the United States--strategic nuclear weapons, command centers and headquarters, airfields of the strategic bomber fleet, ports of the strategic submarines. With three warheads per target, the Soviet Union could destroy all 2000 targets with a 95 percent probability. However, if the United States possessed only a defensive system of the kind Duerr cannot exclude, but already considers as nonsensical--four layers with 65 percent effectiveness each--then the Soviet Union would have to provide 200 warheads per target, so that three warheads per target get through.

In other words: To achieve the same result which the Soviet Union can now achieve with 6000 warheads against 2000 targets, the Soviet Union would then have to employ 400,000 warheads. Which system is now more stable? The one in which the Soviet Union could carry out a disarming first strike against a ground-based U.S. potential and other important targets? Or the one in which the Soviet Union could get through the U.S. defensive system either 100 missiles--whereby it does not know beforehand which--or would have to increase its potential to 400,000 warheads.

Duerr's central "military-strategic" statement that only a perfect strategic defense system guarantees security and stability therefore is logically untenable. Therefore it also does not make any sense to impute to the U.S. government--as Duerr does--that its exclusive aim is a perfect system of strategic defense. It is true, the U.S. President in his speech of 23 March 1983 has conjured up the vision of a world with perfect defensive systems on both sides, this cannot and must not be misunderstood to mean that Reagan has formulated an all-or-nothing position.

What is more, in January 1985 he clearly and distinctly stated that "the total effectiveness of a multilayer strategic defense system does not have to offer 100 percent protection to considerably increase deterrence. It must merely create sufficient uncertainty for a potential aggressor concerning the prospects of success of his attack." With his entire argumentation against the perfect system, Duerr therefore first builds up a phantom to then chase it and to defeat it. Only: that has nothing to do with SDI.

Is SDI not After All a Visible Expression of U.S. Striving for Superiority?

How does all this look from the point of view of the Soviet Union? Doesn't it have to be afraid of getting into a situation as a result of the buildup of the U.S. strategic defense system in which the United States could carry out a

nuclear first strike against the unprotected strategic potential of the Soviet Union and subsequently could intercept the Soviet retaliatory strike with its defensive system? Thus isn't SDI, as Duerr gloomily predicts, not after all a visible expression of the unabashed U.S. striving for superiority?

The answer is comparatively simple. If the Soviet Union would not react at all to the U.S. initiative, this danger could indeed be conjured up--whereby it is eery to watch how easily Western analysts consider the possibility, yes even the serious danger of a U.S. nuclear first strike. But in the meantime the Soviet Union has repeatedly had the statement made officially and semiofficially that in case of a buildup of a strategic defensive system by the United States, it would install a similar system. But then there would no longer be a first strike instability at the expense of the Soviet Union even if the Americans were considered capable of the conceivably worst. Duerr's statements in this respect therefore are nonsensical even now.

As regards Duerr's technical analysis, it should first be noted that he concentrates exclusively on "directed energy weapons," especially lasers, and examines their possible effectiveness in the defense against enemy missiles in the boost phase. In this connection the impression arises that an effective defense against intercontinental missiles is possible only in the boost phase. However, this is not the case.

For one thing, directed energy weapons can be used in the postboost phase, i.e. the phase between cutoff of the missile and launching of the warheads and decoys as well as also in the so-called midcourse phase, i.e. the phase between ejection of the warheads and the reentry of the warheads into the atmosphere. Moreover, there are definitely also methods other than directed energy weapons for defense against missiles and warheads over their entire flight path. In this connection it remains a riddle why Duerr did not seriously consider the possibility to destroy enemy missiles by direct fire with nonnuclear high-velocity projectiles. This all the more so because the United States by its "homing overlay experiment" of 10 June 1984 has proved that a projectile can hit another projectile over a distance of thousands of kilometers. But also in the field of the defensive application of lasers, where Duerr appears to be competent and on which he concentrates in his statements, he is in most cases far removed from reality. This starts with the central "calculation" that 700 space-based laser stations are required to defend against 1400 intercontinental missiles in the boost phase. Hereby Duerr makes the same faulty assumption as his colleagues of the UCS: namely that all lasers will fight their targets at maximum distance. The fact that this assumption is untenable was very quickly admitted by the SDI critics of the UCS and the number of the required laser stations was reduced by more than half. To this extent it is Duerr's general problem that he has uncritically adopted earlier UCS statements--and is now confronted with all the mistakes that his admired colleagues have made.

Since the "calculation" of 700 necessary laser stations is incorrect, thus Duerr's central argument, the allegedly unbelievably high costs of a strategic defensive system, collapses on its own. Of the \$ 13 billion which Duerr has calculated as costs for transporting the fuel required for the operation of the lasers into space, with fewer than 100 laser stations all that is needed are \$ 2 billion. And the 14 years, required according to Duerr to transport this

amount of fuel into space by space shuttle, shrink to 2 years. In addition, Duerr in his calculations starts from the presently available space shuttle and the present costs per kilogram of payload. However, it is certain that by far less costly possibilities for transportation will be available at the time when laser stations are to be launched into space.

Work is now being done in the United States on a technology that could reduce by a factor of 100 the present costs of transportation into space from \$ 3000 per kilogram. Finally in this connection it should be pointed out that Duerr's assumptions for fuel consumption of a fluorine-hydrogen laser system with 0.4 tons per target--"6 tons for 15 shots"--does not correspond to the latest findings.

The recognized best German researchers in the field of laser technology now start from the assumption of a consumption of 0.01 tons per target (with a vulnerability of one kilojoule per square centimeter). But the present missile generation can hardly be hardened to more than 10 kilojoule per square centimeter. Duerr's assumption that the U.S. missile is hardened against lasers with an energy density of up to 20 kilojoule is more than ten times too high. The scientific advisory council of the U.S. government has described hardening of up to 20 kilojoule per square centimeter as attainable perhaps within 20 years. But with an increase of the degree of hardening to a multiple of 20 kilojoule per square centimeter it should, however, be remembered that lasers with extremely increased performance are also considered as possible, lasers that overcome any realistic hardening.

Duerr's opinion that geostationary laser stations must be out of the question for SDI at the present time, however his reasons are incorrect. In the case of Duerr this possibility fails because a mirror of a diameter of 100 meters is needed to be able to intercept missiles. Duerr does cite the alternative possibility of being able to reduce the size of the mirror to a few meters by employing a short-wave laser, but he then calculates the requirement of an aiming telescope with a diameter of about 100 meters for the "fiery tail radiating in the infrared range." If Duerr had taken into account that missile waste gases emit not only in the infrared but also in the visible and ultraviolet range of the spectrum, he would have come to the conclusion that an "aiming telescope" of about 10 meters suffices. But this is a dimension that is achievable according to the present state of knowledge.

#### The Electrical Output Required for SDI Could Come Directly From a Rocket Engine

Duerr's statement that for the operation of a strategic defense system electrical outputs corresponding to 20 to 60 percent of the electrical output installed in the United States would be required and therefore "electrical power plants especially designed for this purpose" would have to be built is absurd. Duerr should really know the difference between the possibilities for energy that can be produced for a short time and long-term power plant performance. Within the framework of the SDI research, work is being done in this connection on concepts of "magnetohydrodynamics" in which electric power is produced directly by a rocket engine. If this technology is applied--which incidentally has also been developed in the Soviet Union--then every main engine of a space shuttle

can produce several billion watts for the required very short laser pulses. Therefore there is no need either "for the power demand of hundreds of nuclear power plants for two minutes of star war" or for the \$40 to 120 billion which Duerr has calculated for the expense for electric energy.

Duerr not only concentrated his efforts on directed energy weapons as possible candidates for a strategic defensive system--i.e. especially kinetic weapons with terminal guidance neglected--he has also studied only the laser in detail among the directed energy weapons. On the other hand, Duerr has labeled the neutral particle ray as a whole as being unimportant now and "not achievable." But this is not true. A corresponding weapon essentially based on Soviet basic research already exists in the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Its output is sufficient to destroy attacking missiles over a distance of several hundred kilometers. Therefore research on particle ray weapons not without reason enjoys high priority within the SDI program.

A further key point in Duerr's argumentation is the discussion of possible technical countermeasures by which a strategic defensive system could be made ineffective. Duerr asserts that "without great effort a large number of enormously effective countermeasures" can be "cited which are, or almost are, available and can be mastered and moreover are simple and inexpensive."

This statement by Duerr is not only predominantly incorrect in contents, it also suggests a U.S. scientific naivete as regards the methodological employment of research which Duerr, who knows the U.S. science operation, cannot possibly believe. Therefore it is more than dishonest to inpute to the Americans that they research a strategic defense system without taking countermeasures sufficiently into account.

In reality, "blue" and "red" teams work within the SDI research program, whereby the "red" team has only the task to invent all conceivable countermeasures against the strategic defense system of the "blue" team. What is cited by Duerr as "simple" but effective countermeasures has long ago been tested and for the most part reduced to absurdity. The latter applies especially to the possibilities "for simulating the launching of additional missiles" by "artificial fiery tails" or "for preventing correct target finding by dropping an apron over parts of the fiery tail...." Therefore it is not by chance that Duerr does not become concrete at this point. The brotherhood of scientific experts--and definitely not only those promoting the SDI--has rarely laughed as much as about these two "possibilities" of countermeasures: classical products of esoteric "brain stormings."

This is reminiscent of a memorable meeting in the U.S. defense ministry during World War II. On the occasion of the growing threat to U.S. surface ships by German submarines, possible countermeasures were discussed. After prolonged back and forth, a civilian scientist spoke up and proposed heating the oceans and boiling the submarines to the surface. In answer to the question of a military man how that can be accomplished, the scientist answered: "I am here to produce ideas. To put them into effect is your problem."

A possible countermeasure--but only for the boost phase--is, as Duerr states correctly, the shortening of this boost phase by superfast missiles (so called

fast-burn boosters). The Fletcher Commission has already pointed that out and noted that a boost phase of 60 seconds or less (SS 18: 300 seconds) would make the defense against missiles considerably more difficult in the boost phase.

But the reduction of the boost phase is not as simple to achieve as this looks to Duerr. A cutoff and especially the launching of the multiple warheads cannot take place in the deep, dense atmosphere without extreme inaccuracies in aiming and range reductions. Therefore one starts from the assumption that no cutoff can occur at a height of less than 90 kilometers or a launching of the warheads at less than 120 kilometers. This again signifies that the boost phase according to the present state of knowledge cannot be reduced to less than about 100 seconds. This time is sufficient for target engagement if the envisaged and quite realistic laser performances and the planned reductions of the reengagement times are attained.

Also the remaining "countermeasures" discussed by Duerr in connection with a new design of future missile generations are not very realistic. On the one hand, all cited "countermeasures" protecting the outer skin of the missile are anyhow effective only against lasers--not, however, against neutral particle rays or highly accelerated kinetic energy rounds with terminal guidance--on the other hand a missile hardened against all weapons effects to be expected would be so heavy that it could not get off the ground or only with great difficulty. It remains a riddle how such a heavy-weight missile generation could then also be made superfast. There is after all a conflict of purpose that is difficult to resolve between comprehensive hardening and shortening of the boost phase. And not only that.

#### The Payload of Missiles Hardened Against SDI Would Be Reduced by up to 90 Percent

The possible reduction of the boost phase merely to the time now considered possible entails a 20-percent loss of payload. If the losses by additional hardening measures involving "more weight" are added, then the nuclear payload of such a missile would have to be reduced by up to 90 percent. But that is not yet all either. Duerr has broken down all costs which the United States would have to pay for a strategic defense system--all the figures are approximately tenfold inflated--but he has forgotten to point out that the present Soviet missile generation cannot be made superfast nor hardened in the best possible manner.

If the Soviet Union wanted to implement even only part of the countermeasures mentioned by Duerr, it would have to scrap all now available missiles and replace them by new (so-called responsive systems) with optimum characteristics for penetrating a strategic defense system. But "responsive systems" are expensive. If one starts from intercontinental missiles with a present cost of \$20-30 million per warhead, then this cost would probably increase to at least \$50 million per warhead for "responsive" systems. Therefore, if the Soviet Union had to replace its entire arsenal--which would be the inescapable consequence of an even only partially effective U.S. strategic defense system--then it would have to spend the proud sum of at least half a trillion dollars (\$500 billion) for this purpose for now available 10,000 warheads.

The cost ratio between offensive and defensive systems therefore is by no means as one-sided as Duerr wants to make people believe. The Soviet Union has recognized that in the meantime; it had a paper circulated a few months after Reagan's initiative in which it was asserted that the costs of development of the offensive potential amounted to 2 percent of the funds that would have to be spent for strategic defense systems. If the Soviet Union had ever believed that, it could have enjoyed watching how the United States ruined itself with SDI. However, the contrary has happened. The Soviet Union carries on an embittered struggle on all levels against SDI because it is afraid that this system could be a great deal more effective and economical than the Western SDI critics are now willing to admit.

Also the "countermeasure" discussed by Duerr of producing an infrared background through small nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere--a background in front of which the rising missiles could no longer be clearly seen--is likely to remain theory. By employing various types of sensors which sight the targets from many directions, this so-called "red out" problem can also be solved. Quite apart from the fact that it may be doubted that the Soviet Union would regard nuclear explosions in the atmosphere over its own country similarly as harmless as Duerr obviously does. Indeed the most likely and most promising countermeasure is likely to lie in multiplying the decoys which a missile ejects together with the warheads. Duerr regards this as not only applicable, he also points out possibilities of how to deal with this problem. But for that, he thinks, supercomputers are necessary which can perform more than a billion arithmetic operations per second. Duerr suggests hereby that this is far in the future or impossible to achieve. However, he should have found out that such computers are now being built.

Duerr mentions as one of the "main weaknesses" of a defense system against nuclear missiles the fact "that it can be underflown, e.g., by sea-based systems, intermediate range missiles, tactical nuclear missiles and especially cruise missiles." The only thing correct about this statement is the fact that a strategic defense system cannot neutralize the entire nuclear threat. It goes without saying--and it was understood by the United States from the start--that a strategic defense system must be supplemented by systems for defense against nuclear short and intermediate range missiles, cruise missiles, as well as for improved air defense. This can be achieved technically, in fact has already been achieved in considerable parts. Here Duerr simply does not know what he is talking about.

It only becomes annoying where Duerr indicates incalculable consequences if nuclear warheads are destroyed in space and their "highly poisonous and radioactive" material is freed. Duerr knows--or ought to know--that the nuclear charges of even several thousand destroyed warheads are comparable, e.g., to the natural radioactivity caused by sun bursts. Much remains to be said concerning Prof Hans-Peter Duerr's visions, judgments, and prejudices. But this is unnecessary. For, on the one hand, the general credibility of renowned natural scientists is very high, on the other hand errors weigh twice as much. In the field of exact sciences either everything or nothing is right.

Therefore it sufficed to remove the most important building blocks from Duerr's structure of argumentation to prove the faultiness of the entire calculation. Nevertheless it would be a misunderstanding if the conclusion were to be drawn from this article that the problems of a strategic defense system have been solved and SDI can be achieved at a relatively low price.

SDI is a gigantic technological task which becomes visible slowly in outlines; its implementation, moreover, will be very costly. Therefore, nobody can predict whether at the present status of technology and the presumable available funds the installation of a U.S. strategic defensive system is an option that can be achieved in the short or medium term.

The scientifically dubious, politically one-sided and military-strategically amateurish presentation by Duerr, however, does not do justice either to the moral concern of replacing a system of mutual threat of revenge by credible protection of the people nor does it represent the actual problems in the proper dimensions. The political purpose once more has justified the scientific means. Whether that benefits German natural sciences which allegedly no longer wanted to be misused politically should be doubted.

12356

CSO: 5200/2560

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DUTCH COMMENTATORS DIFFER ON 'CLARITY' OF SDI

Labor Party Experts Skeptical

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 21 Oct 85 p 7

[Commentary by PvdA (Labor Party) Defense Commission Members Joop Veen and Bert Kreemers: "SDI Will Not Be Given Benefit of Doubt if Vague"]

[Text] On the eve of a cabinet decision on Dutch participation in the American research into possibilities of strategic defense, SDI, J.L. Heldring pointed out in his column on 10 September and 1 October that SDI need not affect the deterrence with threat of mutually assured destruction, the foundation on which our security is based. According to him, it is now clear that SDI will never be able to provide an absolutely watertight protection. Since the vulnerability of our own territory and of our own population continues to exist in that manner, an attempt at a first strike by either party will be precluded, in his view.

In spite of that being clear, J.L. Heldring must defend himself against a variety of people who don't see it his way, such as Mient Jan Faber [of the Interchurch Peace Council] and Ambassador Korthals Altes. The fact that, in doing so, he always makes eager use of an article written by us in SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (July/August 1985) does not mean, however, that J.L. Heldring's standpoint is convincing to us. The clearness he sees is, after all, not yet becoming noticeable at all in the official American government policy with respect to SDI.

It is indeed true that one no longer takes the position that the SDI research will result in a watertight defensive system. Already on 28 December 1984 the White House made it known that the form of strategic defense desired by President Reagan would not have to be 100 percent effective. Such a not entirely effective defense would make the opponent unsure about the effects of an attack and therefore deter him. At that moment it was already clear that the SDI program, which comprises research exclusively and is justified in the defense budgets through 1989 if it is approved by the American Congress, would furnish neither in the technological sense nor in the financial sense the watertight defense against ballistic missiles desired by President Reagan. "The Strategic Defense initiative, by itself, cannot fully realize this vision (of the president) nor solve all the security challenges we and our allies



will face in the future; for this we will need to seek many solutions -- political as well as technological (...). The Strategic Defense Initiative takes a crucial first step,"/ [in English], according to the explanation of the White House on 28 December 1984. Already in his speech of 23 March 1983, President Reagan had pointed out that finding all those political and technological solutions "will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts."

#### Conditions

In this context it is important to indicate the exacting conditions which the United States has been attaching for some time now to the importing of defensive systems. Those conditions were revealed by the advisor of the president, Paul Nitze, on the eve of the negotiations in Geneva between the two superpowers. They are tightly coupled to the American negotiating position in Geneva.

In those negotiations, the United States put emphasis on drastic reductions in the number of offensive systems and on honoring the ABM treaty. In a later phase the emphasis would then be placed on a security policy based more on defensive systems, a policy which would be developed together with the Soviet Union. According to that vision, the defensive systems must be able to be protected and must be cost-effective. Ultimately, perhaps only over several decades, this must then lead to drastic reductions of the nuclear arms arsenals of the two superpowers.

#### Agreements

He who considers these conditions realistically will rapidly come to the conclusion that, although the policy is able to achieve much, it can in any event not manage to fulfill these indeed very exacting conditions. It seems more likely that defensive systems will start playing a more important, but nevertheless limited, role in the current security policy. Such an increasingly important role might fit into the framework of the ABM treaty of 1972. That treaty allows defensive systems to a limited extent; it regulates, as it were, the ratio between defensive and offensive armaments. The numbers of defensive systems can be subject to change. In 1973 the number was decreased, and the treaty likewise allows adjustments upward. The import of defensive systems based on new technologies must be subject to consultation between the two treaty partners, according to the treaty.

The import of such systems, even if it is a matter of new technologies, thus is not wrong in principle and is compatible with the ABM treaty as long as agreements on it are possible between the two treaty partners. Anyhow, the use of defensive means for the preservation of offensive armament, has been employed for a long time already by both superpowers. Strengthening of the strategic missile silos and the bomber sites, the initiation of mobile systems, and the use of air defense likewise are defensive means for the preservation of an offensive armament.

Our security policy is based on the lack of an all-destructive first strike capability and on the possession of an assured second strike capability. A mix

of offensive and defensive armaments agreed upon in mutual consultation is very compatible with that. So far, J.L. Heldring thus is right. Neither in the political, nor in the technological, conceptual nor financial sense, can the SDI program adequately fulfill the original desire of the President, a flawless defensive system, and the SDI offers possibilities of strengthening the current strategy.

On 4 June, President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive, in which it was stipulated that the SDI research is no longer aimed at specific results. Instead, the intent is to submit to a future president in the nineties a number of options for the forming of a strategic defense. What those options are is not clear, and so far it has never been officially announced whether in the conceptual sense research is being carried out already now. The latter would of course be desirable if one takes the stand, as J.L. Heldring does, that SDI can have a stabilizing effect in one certain form [*in italics*]. Nevertheless, the vagueness on the American intentions behind the SDI research continues to exist.

In his zeal to use the arguments of two PvdA members in order to portray both Mient Jan Faber and the entire PvdA as careless thinkers, J. L. Heldring forgot to mention a number of our objections to the SDI research. Those objections are directed precisely at the vague intentions behind the SDI, a few of which, we do admit, might indeed have a stabilizing effect. As long as that uncertainty continues, however, there is no reason to give SDI the benefit of the doubt.

#### Heldring Rebuts Labor Party

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 25 Oct 85 p 7

[Commentary in "These Days" column by J.J. Heldring: "Touch-ups on SDI Theme"; items in slantlines published in *italics*]

[Text] If I were suspicious by nature, I would have wondered whether the Messrs Veen and Kreemers, who disassociate themselves from me in their article in this paper of 21 October, had received a message from their party associates that they should not stand for the Judas kiss I had given them in my articles of 10 September and 1 October.

What happened? On 10 September I quoted an article, which the two gentlemen had written in SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (July/August 1985), in order to prove that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), at least in the manner it seemed to develop, strengthened the philosophy of deterrence rather than weaken it. Mient Jan Faber of the Interchurch Peace Council had claimed the contrary.

In their article of 21 October Veen and Kreemers used 5/6th of that article on a repetition of their relevant dissertation in S AND D, ending with the conclusion: "So far, J.L. Heldring thus is right." In the rest of their article (1/6th) they say that, in view of "the vagueness about the American

intentions behind the SDI research"--intentions "a few of which we admit might indeed have a stabilizing effect" (how is that possible if those intentions are unclear?)--they cannot give SDI the benefit of the doubt for the time being.

Great panic in the White House, of course. Two authoritative Netherlanders -- both gentlemen are members of the PvdA Defense Commission (which, for that matter, hasn't met for almost 2 years)--don't want to give SDI the benefit of their doubt! But let's stop joking. Was that article, which confirms my thesis rather than contradict it (even if I did not come to the conclusion that therefore SDI should be embraced), really necessary? Hence the suspicion which might have been aroused in someone more dyed in the wool than I am.

No one will deny that much is still unclear in SDI. That is inherent in all research, and SDI still is in that phase. "It will take years before we can form an opinion on the possibility of defensive technologies," President Reagan said in his interview with LE FIGARO (end September).

But whatever may still be vague about SDI, there is great clearness on the intentions, contrary to what Veen and Kreemers claim. (Whether those intentions can indeed be realized, that is what is unclear for the time being.)

For example, it is the intention that the strategic defense (if it will ever turn out to be possible) be built up in three layers. In the first layer the American defense intercepts the Soviet missiles which have been fired right after the launching; in the second layer it does that halfway on their flight; and in the third layer right before they reach their destination.

It is hoped, of course, that it will be possible to destroy most of the missiles already in the first layer--thus roughly still above Soviet territory. But if that would indeed succeed, that is to say: if the American strategic defense indeed should prove to be capable of that, then that would still have different consequences for stability from those which I and, I believe Veen and Kreemers too, have taken into account.

What was our thesis? It was that since "a flawless defensive system against ballistic missiles is not possible for the time being" (according to Veen and Kreemers in S AND D), an SDI which concentrates on decreasing the vulnerability of one's own intercontinental missiles would increase the credibility of a potential utilization of those arms, and thus increase deterrence, while the continuing vulnerability of the civilian population would be a guarantee against an American first strike.

But even leaving aside the question (posed by Dr S. Rozemond and drs J.G. Siccama in their article in this paper of 16 September) of whether "it is possible in practice to maintain a convincing difference between protection of bases and society as a whole," that thesis, at least as far as I am concerned, started from the premise that those bases would be protected in a manner which in essence is not very different from anti-aircraft artillery, that is to say: against missiles storming in.

That assumption, however, is at least questionable. After all, the intention of SDI is that such protection in the first instance be sought in a much earlier phase, namely in the first layer of the strategic defense, in which as many missiles as possible are destroyed still above Soviet territory.

Well, in that phase it is not possible to discern which missiles have bases as their goal, and which ones the civilian population. Even a non-flawless defensive system against ballistic missiles, a non-watertight SDI, might--to the extent it were to remove certainty from the Soviet Union as to its deterrent capability--have a destabilizing effect.

I don't know if that is what Rozemond and Siccama meant when they wrote that "even if Reagan and Weinberger were to align themselves officially behind Kreemers and Veen" (that is to say: would put up with a non-watertight SDI), we would still have the problem that this material would be eminently suitable for ghost stories in the United States and the Soviet Union about advances the other side has been able to achieve."

If so, then the word ghost stories, which suggests delusions, is an unintended understatement here. It does not seem to be very doubtful that both parties, if they are not already afraid of lagging behind, in any event are afraid of losing their lead. That fear is great, especially in a period of transition from one defensive system to another.

Therefore we can hold the Americans to the words spoken by their negotiator Paul Nitze on 15 October in San Francisco before the North Atlantic Assembly: "What we have in mind is a jointly controlled transition, in which the United States and the Soviet Union jointly would make a gradual and controlled transition to new defensive systems, while continuing to decrease offensive nuclear arms."

Of course, there is not much reason to hope that the Soviet Union will respond to such a proposal. It is reminiscent of the Baruch plan of 1946 which sought to place all nuclear energy under international control, and of the Marshall plan of 1947, which was also offered to Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union). Both ideas resulted in a Soviet refusal. Why? Even though the Soviet Union may call itself communist, that doesn't mean that it does not harbor an almost pathological distrust of anything which borders on joint control.

8700

CSO: 5200/2532

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

COLUMNIST SEES TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN SDI AS 'UNNECESSARY'

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Nov 85 p 6

["Problems in Politics" column by Ergun Balci: "Star Wars and Turkey"]

[Text] Our colleague Sedat Ergin's interview in Washington with SDI Deputy Director Dr Gerald Yonas reveals a number of scary facts about the Pentagon's designs on Turkey. Dr Yonas says that "it is possible" to install certain systems in Turkey with the aim of stopping Soviet missiles within the framework of the "Star Wars" project. Dr Yonas paints a rosy world for Ergin. He envisages to defend Turkey against short-range Soviet missiles using land-based anti-ballistic missile systems and "sensors" based in space which will report the launching time and the trajectory of the missiles.

Once you have this system installed, then the only task left is shooting down the Soviet missiles like partridges. Frankly, after reading Dr Yonas' remarks all of our fears were allayed. If a war breaks out with the Soviet Union we have nothing to worry about. If it is summer we can comfortably go to the beach or to a picnic; if it is winter we can go to the movies without worry. After all, the space-based defense system our American friends will build will blow the Soviet missiles out of the sky. Sedat Ergin asked Dr Yonas repeatedly how such a system could be effective given that Turkey and the Soviet Union share a common border and that consequently Soviet missiles would need very little time to reach Turkey. Dr Yonas implied that "God willing we will find a way to resolve that." He said that the Soviet missiles will be destroyed in the first phase of their flight, immediately after they are launched.

There are some things Dr Yonas does not say. Let us spell them out. Firstly, the proposed space defense system, or the so-called "Star Wars" project, envisions a three-stage defense plan. According to this plan, in the first stage Soviet missiles will be destroyed before they leave the Soviet air space and before the warheads separate from the launchers. Those missiles which break through the first stage will be shot down in space in the second stage. Finally, Soviet missiles which manage to break through the second line of defense will be destroyed in the third stage. In other words, contrary to what Dr Yonas claims it is impossible to destroy all Soviet missiles immediately after they are launched. American scientists also acknowledge this fact and that is why they are proposing to build a three-stage defense system.

Since Turkey borders the Soviet Union there will be no time to shoot the Soviet missiles which break through the first line of defense in the second and third stages. Another point Dr Yonass fails to mention is that it is impossible to destroy all enemy missiles with any anti-ballistic missile system. Even if the space-based defense system is 99 percent effective, around 100 missiles will be able to pass through. In order to destroy all enemy missiles the system must be 100 percent effective, which is impossible. In short, a space-based defense system cannot protect Turkey against Soviet missiles; on the contrary it makes this country a primary Soviet missile target because space weapons can be used as much for offensive purposes as for defense.

If the Strategic Defense Initiative or the "Star Wars" project is feasible then it will begin taking concrete form in the 1990's. At this stage the issue is very important for Turkey politically. As is known, "Star Wars" is an issue on which the Soviets are most sensitive. Moscow is strongly opposed to this project partly because it is behind the United States in this field and partly because of the enormous expenditures the project entails. If Turkey consents to or participates in the project, our relations with the Soviet Union will be severely affected. On the other hand, good relations with the Soviets may have a number of benefits for Turkey. Turkey and the Soviet Union have parallel interests on the Aegean dispute with Greece. Moscow can play a role in relaxing tensions between Turkey and Bulgaria. Finally, the Soviets may use their influence on Syria which sends terrorists trained in its camps to Turkey.

As we wrote previously, it is completely unnecessary for Turkey to get embroiled in "Star Wars" which is the thorniest issue between the two superpowers. Even some NATO countries have kept their distance from this controversy. Greece declared its opposition to "Star Wars" and Denmark, Norway and Canada announced that they will not participate in the project. France has strongly criticized the project from the very outset.

The Ozal government which appears eager on the "Star Wars" project must not disregard these facts.

9588

CSO: 5200/2548

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### POLISH CRITIQUE OF U.S. ASAT PROGRAM

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish No 45, 8 Nov 85 p 11

[Article by Adam Wajda, "The Space Pirate"]

[Text] An anti-satellite system, known to experts under its code-name ASAT, is one of the components of the American "Star Wars" program. Its purpose is to destroy targets on orbits up to 1,000 km, or even, according to some publications, 1,500 km. ASAT includes a mass-produced F-15 fighter plane armed with two missiles of 5.2 m length, 51 cm diameter, and 1,365 kg weight each. The missiles are comprised of two stages: the propelling one, and the warhead. Once the F-15 reaches the 15-30,000 m ceiling and the missile is fired towards its target, the homing warhead is detached, hits the satellite, and destroys it. The whole operation takes just a few minutes.

Next year, the first air squads armed with the new weapons will begin to be deployed. To start with, two groups of 18 planes each will be deployed in air force bases on the U.S. Eastern and Western coasts. One will be attached to the 318th fighter fleet at Landley [sic], Virginia; another to the 48th at McCord, Washington. Both will remain in constant communication with SPADOC, the space defense center established in October 1979 deep in the Cheyenne mountains range in Colorado, where the NORAD, North American air defense headquarters, is also placed.

Simulated attacks on Soviet satellites have been tested for a while, but serious exercises did not start until 21 January of last year, when--once the war alert had been sounded and the take-off order issued--an F-14 plane carried the missile to almost 30 km in altitude. Its "eye" a most sensitive infra-red sensor, is capable of homing from 700 km distance at an ice cube just 30 cm long, thanks to the temperature difference between the cube and the even more frigid space. According to the weekly DER SPIEGEL, during the first test, when R&D trials were still on, the warhead was not yet armed with what the Americans call "the miracle weapon": the "Miniature Homing Vehicle [MHV]", of just 35 cm diameter and 16 kg weight. Fifty-six miniaturized snouts home this device with 1 cm precision at a target, destroyed on impact.

In addition to the ASAT system, work goes on in the United States on later generations of anti-satellite weapons with enhanced target ceilings. The Pentagon dreams of a simple but effective system, capable of destroying targets in space--at an altitude of 36,000 km above ground--placed on geostationary orbits and deploying observation satellites which steer the flight of

space missiles. Space shuttles, among others, are intended to serve this purpose.

It has been claimed in Washington that "at the threshold of the new millennium, whoever controls space will rule the world." Thus, attempts to establish bridgeheads in space have a clearly aggressive character. Even authoritative Americans, such as Herbert Scoville Jr., former deputy head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, admit that President Reagan conceals space armament under "fake labels," to avoid responsibility for violation of Soviet-U.S. agreements.

The Soviet Union does not intend to remain inactive in face of the emerging threat. Two years ago, the Soviets have indeed proclaimed a moratorium on deployment and testing of space weapons, conditional on reciprocity; but, given the new situation, they warned they were not going to abide by it unilaterally. Thus, if the space armaments race is indeed about to begin, the U.S. will not enjoy its pre-eminence in the ASAT area for long.

12485/12859  
CSO: 5200/3011



## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON POST-GENEVA ARMS CONTROL SITUATION

PM241505 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 85 Second Edition p 3

[Own observer V. Pustov article: "Geneva: Before and After; Two Approaches to the Resolution of the Central Problem of the Day; What Lies Hidden Behind Washington's Position: Common Sense Must Prevail"]

[Text] It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that last week mankind was hanging on the reports from Geneva, where the summit between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan was held. People were impatiently and hopefully expecting results from the talks between them which would improve the situation in the world and reduce international tension, which is reaching a dangerous level. They thought and continue to think it reasonable that there is a chance of that -- given, of course, the political will for agreement on both sides.

As is well known, the USSR has that will in abundance. At the talks with the U.S. delegation the Soviet delegation brought up for discussion the prime and vital problem concerning the interests of everyone on earth. This is the problem of war and peace and of removing the nuclear threat on the basis of preventing an arms race in space and stopping it on earth. The Soviet position triggered favorable response and support worldwide. Public opinion in the West, Japan's MAINICHI stressed on the eve of the Geneva summit, believes nuclear disarmament to be the main factor in detente and supports the Soviet proposals in the disarmament sphere. London's THE TIMES and other newspapers -- including American newspapers -- made statements in the same vein.

They made a different assessment of the actions of official Washington, which had been trying to replace discussion of the most important problem of ensuring the sides' identical security with a discussion of so-called "regional conflicts," in which the United States supports antipeople and reactionary groupings. "If the summit turns out to be unsatisfactory," the U.S. newspaper TRIBUNE [as published] warned, "the fault will lie not so much with mass media exaggerations as with conscious attempts by U.S. Administration spokesmen to torpedo any chance for progress on the main security issues."

Those were not empty words. They were graphically confirmed, for instance, by the publication, which immediately turned into a political scandal, by certain U.S. newspapers of a letter in which Defense Secretary C. Weinberger recommended R. Reagan not to agree to any arms control measures at the Geneva talks. Not only U.S. observers but the President's entourage assessed the publication of this message -- which ran counter to the aspirations and wishes of the peoples, including the American people -- as a direct attempt to sabotage the Soviet-U.S. summit.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the Pentagon chief's dangerous demand was not a voice in the wilderness. Behind him stand extremely influential forces in the shape of the captains of the military-industrial complex. They too were not silent and also attempted to hamper the achievement of positive results at Geneva. The cynical revelation by a consultant to one of the Pentagon's subcontractors that "any easing of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States is a bad thing for the military budget" was a sinister phrase that flew round the world recently as if on wings. It is a bad thing for those who do business in blood, because for them, as THE WASHINGTON POST explained, "it is a question of the potential loss of tens of billions of dollars."

It was under the very influence of that same fear that a group of right-wing senators called on R. Reagan before his departure for Geneva to reject the possibility of any compromise on the "star wars" program and insisted on expediting the work to implement it.

Commenting on the Weinberger letter scandal, THE NEW YORK TIMES noted meaningfully that the latter's position coincides with that of the White House. And, as the U.S. press stressed, the painstaking preparations that preceded the Soviet-U.S. summit were accompanied by Washington's stepping up military preparations on all avenues. Both the Pentagon and the White House invariably stressed that the work to create [sozdaniye] systems capable of carrying out combat operations in and from space will be continued. The Soviet initiatives put forward with a view to creating a favorable political atmosphere for the Geneva summit were not [as published] simply ignored. What price, for instance, the U.S. response to such goodwill acts by the USSR as the Soviet Union's unilateral ending of all nuclear explosions until year's end, the declaring of a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles and buildups of other retaliatory measures in Europe, and the reaffirmation of the unilateral moratorium on ending antisatellite weapon tests! Nuclear tests, tests of antisatellite systems in the United States, and the siting of U.S. medium-range missiles in West Europe continued. According to figures from the Center for Defense Information in Washington, the United States is the world leader in terms of the number of nuclear explosions carried out. Between 1945 and 1985, 770 nuclear explosions have been staged.

Thus, even before the Soviet-U.S. summit there were two clear approaches to the resolution of the security problem -- the central problem in USSR-U.S. relations. The Soviet proposals are aimed at reducing military confrontation on the basis of the strictest observance of the principle of equality and the identical security of the sides. The prevention of an arms race in space and the ending of it on earth by reducing the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territories form the basis of the proposals. These proposals were submitted with the understanding that the USSR and the United States, as Comrade M.S. Gorbachev has stressed, are inter-linked [vzaimo svyazany] and cannot disregard each other's interests.

As for the U.S. proposals, one cannot help seeing the intention that lurks behind them to wreck the strategic military parity that exists between the USSR and the United States. How? Primarily by means of the militarization of space. The purpose is so obvious that it is admitted and denounced even by many U.S. military and political figures, including a number of former defense secretaries. The implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," J. Smith, former head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, said, is geared to creating a first-strike potential and the Soviet Union is right to be concerned about this. Work on creating [sozdaniye] these systems, J. Smith warns, "threatens future as well as past arms control agreements."

Readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are aware of the outcome of the first Soviet-U.S. summit talks in 6.5 years. They also know the Soviet side's assessment of the Geneva meeting: One would like to see it as the beginning of a dialogue aimed at bringing about changes for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations and in the world as a whole, as creating in this sense the potential for progress. No solutions were found at the meeting to very important questions associated with the task of halting the arms race and strengthening peace. The U.S. side was not yet ready for major decisions. That is the situation today.

At the same time it is perfectly natural and inevitable that all people who are concerned about the future of the world should want to look into the future. Will it be possible by force of common sense to disrupt the dangerous course of events? Is the U.S. side pondering the grave fears voiced by the Soviet representatives about the militarization of space and its destructive consequences? Will the accords reached in Geneva affect the implementation of the Pentagon's plans which endanger world peace, and how will they affect them?

And these plans, relating primarily to the "star wars" program and strategic offensive armaments, remain grand indeed. As yet there is no information other than that which confirms Washington's former course toward creating [sozdaniye] space strike weapons and quantitatively increasing and qualitatively improving first nuclear strike systems. The Lockheed concern, for example, has received an order from the Pentagon and will embark in the very near future on the creation [sozdaniye] of a land-based interceptor missile which is regarded as a key element in the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative." The interceptor is intended to destroy ICBMs outside the atmosphere.

Enterprises belonging to TRW and Rockwell International corporations are putting the finishing touches to prototype laser weapons which bear the codenames "Miracle," "Alpha," and ("Rashel"). A new nuclear explosion is planned for December at the Nevada test site during the testing of laser weapons. According to the U.S. press, appropriations for SDI "research" will amount to more than \$26 billion over the next 5 years, and the cost of the entire program is placed at \$1 trillion or even \$1.5 trillion.

Active preparations are taking place for the deployment of the new MX and Midgetman ICBMs. The former will be stationed in particular at the (Albiya) base (Wyoming) and the latter will be deployed either on mobile launch installations or in nuclear-hardened launch silos. As for the other components of the "strategic triad," appropriations have been earmarked for the construction of another six of the latest missile-carrying nuclear submarines, and the development of Trident D-5 ballistic missiles for them is continuing apace. According to London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, the prototype has been created of a new generation of strategic bombers -- the B-1B. The first squadron of 16 aircraft is supposed to enter service in late 1986. There will be a total of 100 of these aircraft.

Programs are also being carried out for the further buildup of general forces -- the Army (modernization of tank and mechanized divisions on the basis of the introduction of the latest combat equipment), Air Force (updating of the aircraft pool by bringing in new fighters and F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers), and the Navy (construction of three aircraft carriers and other classes of ships).

Special attention is being devoted to sea-based cruise missiles, U.S. naval command plans to acquire nearly 4,000 of these missiles (including some with nuclear charges) and deploy them on submarines and surface ships. It must be clear to everyone what a devastating effect this would have on strategic stability on the world. "In due course," THE NEW YORK TIMES stressed, "no matter what reductions are carried out in respect of the number of other U.S. and Soviet land-based strategic missiles and tactical nuclear weapon systems, heavy bombers and submarine-based ballistic missiles, all this will be nullified by the extensive proliferation of sea-based nuclear cruise missiles."

This is the real situation. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said, differences remain between the USSR and the United States and rivalry will persist. But one must make sure that it does not exceed the bounds of the permissible, that it does not lead to military confrontation. The guarantee of this is the preservation of strategic parity which has to be the natural state of Soviet-U.S. relations. That is why the Soviet Union will never permit the United States to secure military superiority over it.

For all that, guided by a special responsibility for the destiny of peace, the Soviet Union is prepared for a radical reduction of nuclear weapons on condition that the door to the development of an arms race in space is shut tight. And one would very much like to hope that the U.S. Administration will adopt the same responsible approach. Common sense must triumph.

/9365

CSO: 5200/1170

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### SOVIET SCIENTISTS ON ARMS PROPOSALS

LD171956 Moscow TASS in English 1940 GMT 17 Nov 85

[Text] Geneva, November 17 TASS — TASS correspondents Yevgeniy Ivanov and Yuriy Lopatin report:

A meeting of a group of prominent Soviet scientists and experts with mass media men who arrived in Geneva from many countries to cover the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting took place at the International Press Centre here today.

Academician Georgiy Arbatov, Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, Colonel General Nikolay Chervov and others touched upon matters aimed at curbing the arms race and on the new Soviet initiatives which are directed towards prevention of the deployment of striking forces in outer space and towards a radical, 50-per cent, reduction in the USSR's and the USA's nuclear systems capable of reaching each other's territory.

The universal task is to stop the arms race and to start disarmament without delay and to normalize the international situation, Soviet scientists and experts stated. The Soviet Union directs all its efforts towards the attainment of these goals which are served by the USSR's unilateral steps: the moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe; the removal from the stand-by alert of the SS-20 missiles which were additionally deployed in the European zone from June 1984 in reply to the deployment of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles; all the SS-5 medium-range missiles have been destroyed, and SS-4 missiles are being discarded; a moratorium on any nuclear explosions has been announced to remain in effect until January 1, 1986.

Subordinated to these goals are other Soviet foreign-policy initiatives and practical steps including the forthcoming meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President Ronald Reagan of the United States. In preparation for the meeting the USSR has submitted new proposals — constructive and quite tangible by their significance — to the U.S. Government for consideration.

As regards strategic offensive and space arms, the USSR has suggested to the USA to agree on full ban on space strike weapons and on a really radical, 50 per cent, reduction in the appropriate nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory.

On the USSR's part these are all strategic offensive arms: intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers — a total of 2,504 units. The Soviet Union has no other nuclear systems capable of reaching U.S. territory.

The United States, apart from strategic offensive arms (2,215 units), has medium-range weapons and forward-based systems capable of reaching the USSR's territory. Belonging to them are medium-range missiles and aircraft, including tactical and carrier-based aircraft — a total of 1,149 units. So, the aggregate number of systems subject to reduction on the U.S. side is 3,364.

At the same time the Soviet Union and the United States would come to terms on having an equal number of nuclear warheads — 6,000 — for the nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which would remain after the 50 per cent cutback (1,250 in the Soviet Union and 1,680 in the United States). THE USSR is prepared to do that, bearing in mind that an approximate strategic balance would be ensured thereby.

The Soviet proposal can be realized only provided an accord is reached on full ban on space strike weapons. The proposal is a fair one and ensures equal security for the USSR and the USA.

The USSR's territory is under a double threat on the part of U.S. strategic nuclear systems as well as U.S. medium-range systems (forward-based ones). The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to this double threat.

Along with the radical reduction the Soviet side suggests to the USA to renounce the programmes aimed at creating and deploying new strategic offensive arms; to reduce to the maximum the modernization of the existing ones; fully ban long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes; stop all work for the creation of space strike weapons; stop the testing and deployment of new kinds and types of nuclear arms; to stop the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The USSR suggests removing from the stand-by alert a certain percentage or number of strategic offensive arms of the sides and on a mutual basis by an agreed-upon date (for example, to dismantle 200-300 intercontinental ballistic missiles on each side).

As regards medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, the USSR suggests concluding a separate agreement. Such an approach meets the wishes of the West Europeans, thereby taking into account most directly the interests of their security.

The termination of further deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and a sharp reduction in their number within a comparatively short period of time down to an agreed-upon level should be the content of such an agreement between the USSR and the USA. At the same time talks on a more radical solution could be continued. In reducing to naught the number of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR would be prepared to have the same number of missiles here as Britain and France have, judging by the number of warheads. The USSR is ready to free Europe from nuclear weapons altogether — from both medium-range and tactical ones — on a reciprocal basis. The Soviet Union has thus put forward a whole package of far-reaching constructive measures and this has been done on the basis of taking into account honestly and objectively the security interests of both the United States and West European countries. A fundamentally new situation has developed, Soviet scientists and experts emphasize.

The USSR through its proposals strives to ensure the favourable-to-the-utmost prerequisites for getting the process of talks in Geneva moving and for reaching respective accords. Their realisation would mean a fundamental change in the development of international relations in favour of strengthening peace, security and cooperation and a big step on the way to full elimination of nuclear weapons.

How do the United States react to the Soviet constructive actions? Unfortunately, there is no constructiveness on the USA's part.

The USA hurries to deploy as many "Pershing-2" and cruise missiles in Europe as possible (218 of them have been deployed now, including 90 Pershing-2 and 128 cruise missiles; by the end of the year there will be 108 Pershing-2 missiles and a much larger number of cruise missiles); it is working in a speeded up way on the "star wars" programme, creating a new class of armaments — space strike systems; nuclear explosions are conducted in the USA one after another; strategic offensive arms are being built up, and first-strike nuclear systems are being created.

As far as the U.S. counter-proposals presented at the talks in Geneva are concerned, they are being seriously studied in the Soviet Union. One can only say that under the U.S. counter-proposals (in the event of their realisation), there would be not a reduction but a build-up of nuclear warheads on strategic arms up to 15,000 whereas the Soviet Union will have to break its strategic nuclear forces and build them anew according to the U.S. pattern.

The stands of the sides still remain fundamentally different. The main flaw of the U.S. counter-proposals is still the same: they bypass the key, fundamental matter, namely, the question of a ban on the creation of space strike weapons. Without a ban on them it is unrealistic to hope for effecting any cutbacks in strategic arms.

Such cutbacks would be both senseless and dangerous under the conditions when the USA tries to get a decisive military superiority over the USSR via outer space and to obtain a capability to deliver a first nuclear strike with impunity.

The USA states that the Soviet proposal on banning space strikes weapons is ostensibly a precondition, that the SDI should not be discussed at the talks and that the USA will create space strike weapons under any circumstances. All those discourses run counter to the January understanding jointly with the formulated task: to prevent an arms race in outer space.

By delaying a solution to the question of outer space, the United States hinders accords on limiting nuclear arms, scientists and experts stated. In outer space, there are no space strike weapons now and they should not be there. The USSR will never be the first to make a stride into outer space with weapons, and it calls on the United States to follow suit. One would like to hope that the United States will realize the reasonability of the Soviet stand.

/9365

CSO: 5200/1170

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: SUMMIT SETS STAGE FOR CONTINUING DIALOGUE

LD261045 Moscow World Service in English 0710 GMT 26 Nov 85

[Commentary by station observer Yuriy Reshetnikov]

[Text] Last week's Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva and the issues discussed there continue to hold the attention of international mass media. In the United States in particular, there has been a steady stream of comment on issues discussed in Geneva by both sides. Our observer, Yuriy Reshetnikov, has prepared this commentary.

By and large, the results of the Geneva summit apparently have been well received. Indeed, after years of near freezing temperatures in United States-Soviet relations, there has been a general sigh of relief worldwide following the summit. As President Reagan said, that a good start was made in Geneva [as heard] and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev noted that as a result of it, the world has become a safer place. Although the summit has not solved concrete problems of arms limitation and reduction, it has set the stage for a dialogue to effect a turn for the better in United States-Soviet relations and in the world as a whole.

Of principal importance was the joint declaration recognizing inadmissability of nuclear war and renouncing any attempts to achieve military superiority over each other. While the summit results have received a favorable and generally well-balanced coverage in the United States press, there have also been some conspicuous attempts to cast the meeting as being a victory for the United States side. One ranking administration official specifically noted that the Soviet side was allegedly not insistent on taking a stand against "star wars" in a joint summit statement, which he described as an important step.

The fact is, however -- and it is noted in the joint summit statement -- that the meeting had reaffirmed the January 1985 Soviet-American agreement on the necessity to seek ways of preventing an arms race in space and of stopping it on earth. What is more, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in a separate press conference in Geneva, forcefully pointed out that the USSR is prepared for drastic reductions of nuclear arms on condition that the door is slammed shut on an unfolding arms race in space. And you cannot possibly be more explicit on the issue.

At the Geneva meeting, it was explained to the United States side that the "star wars" program would not only spur the arms race in all directions, but would effectively put an end to all restraint in that arms race. Should the door on the arms race in space remain open, this would stimulate United States-Soviet military competition

that could easily get out of hand. Even today, we have reached a point beyond which there may be no return.

Whether or not we go beyond that point rests squarely with the American side, given its rigid stand on space strike weapons. And should the worst come to the worst, the Soviet Union would be able to find a response and that response would be effective, less costly, and could be accomplished within a shorter period of time than it might conceivably take the "star wars" program to materialize. However, such a course of events would never be of our making and would not be of our political choice. Our political choice, as noted by the Soviet leader, would be to try and get the United States side to reevaluate the situation and to conduct responsible policies based on common sense.

/9365

CSO: 5200/1170



U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: 17 NOV WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD171756 Moscow Service in Russian 1230 GMT 17 Nov 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program, presented by Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov, political observer on All-Union Radio and central television; with Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, IZVESTIYA's first deputy editor in chief]

[Text] [Tsvetov] Hello there, comrades. Soviet-U.S. summit talks will begin in Geneva in 2 days. The great expectations and great hopes which the peoples of the world are pinning on the Geneva meeting have already been reported on numerous occasions on the radio, on television, and in the newspapers, and these expectations and hopes are only natural. Let me remind listeners of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's remarks at the meeting with Nobel Prize winners. Here are his remarks: Without exaggeration our age can be described as a turning point. The question that is posed is indeed the following: Is humanity to be or not to be? And the reply depends significantly on how another question is resolved -- that of whether weapons are to be or not to be in space. The Soviet Union is prepared to reply unequivocally to this question; there must be no weapons in space. The Soviet Union is prepared to underpin this reply with any mutually acceptable accord. Of course, the Soviet Union would like to begin a dialogue on this subject now. To judge by numerous statements from representatives of the U.S. Administration, however, the United States does not want to give up the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which in the press has been given the figurative title of the "star wars" program.

'Fairy Tales' About SDI

[Yefimov] This is indeed the most important question of all. Replying recently to questions from Soviet journalists and counting on our being either ill-informed or naive, the U.S. President seemed to be attempting to lull both his allies and us with fairy-tales about how noble and inoffensive his program for the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons is. Just think, he is even prepared to give it to the Soviet Union if the United States has it, and if by that time neither side has nuclear weapons left. But why, when there are no nuclear weapons left? Why after that? Weinberger, his defense secretary, is much more frank. I quote: If the Russians are the first to develop [razrabotat] the program, then an extremely dangerous situation will arise in the world, he said. The U.S., British, and French nuclear deterrents would then count for nothing, and nothing would be able to prevent a successful Russian first strike. So that it turns out is what the program is for -- a first strike. One might ask what would happen if the U.S. develops it first then what is

going to happen? Will an extremely tranquil situation immediately arise in the world? Throughout the postwar years the United States has sought security for itself alone, at the expense of the security of others.

[Rogdanov] There is another point I would like to make. Take the U.S. side -- and this perception is, if you like, based on our historical experience of relations with the United States -- well, what is a shield? It signifies invulnerability. A country suddenly acquires a feeling of invulnerability, and the next word I would use is impunity. Insofar as I understand the United States and its policies and the entire 40-year history of our strategic relations, the conclusion I reach is that it is very dangerous for a country such as the United States, with the sort of ruling class it has and with the sort of hegemonist tendencies, very deeply ingrained in its consciousness, to suddenly acquire a feeling of invulnerability and impunity. I fear that this would be a misfortune for the whole world.

I would again like to draw your attention to one circumstance. Our listeners will, no doubt, recall President Reagan's interview in which he was asked a very clear-cut and precisely formulated -- I would say correctly formulated -- question concerning the U.S. attitude to the Strategic Defense Initiative. It must be said that it was not a written reply by the President, but an improvisation by him in reply to this question. He said that the United States would deploy a nuclear strike or space defense [as heard] only when offensive weapons are eliminated. When experts examined this statement of the President's, I must say bluntly that it aroused a very interesting reaction. It turns out, the experts thought, that things aren't the way we initially thought. There really is some element of defense in it if you first eliminate offensive weapons. After this, cold water was suddenly poured over the idea. No, they said in Washington; no, they said in the White House; you have misinterpreted the President. Offensive weapons will remain, they will remain without fail, and there will be a lengthy transitional period when both defensive and offensive weapons will exist.

Well, I would say that firmer confirmation of the danger of this system, this scheme, than this repudiation of the President's remarks to Soviet journalists cannot be imagined. You have an offensive weapon which is ready to decapitate your adversary and you have a shield which protects you against retribution. Well, tell me what this is if not a first disarming strike.

[Yefimov] It seems that Washington is displaying a lack of political sophistication as compared with Europe. In the nuclear age everything is interrelated and interdependent, you cannot survive alone. You can only survive, or perish, together.

#### 'Star Wars' Concept

[Tsvetov] I would like to give some precise details about the concept of "star wars," particularly since our listeners frequently ask what that concept embraces. First, the concept embraces space strike weapons, as we have just discussed. This involves primarily the ASAT system. It has already undergone a number of tests and it is expected to be deployed in 1987. Second, the concept of "star wars" includes an antimissile defense system with space-based elements -- that very antimissile shield which you have just described. It seems to me that the space systems which provide U.S. offensive forces with possibilities which sharply increase the ability to carry out a first strike should also be included in the "star wars" concept. Take the Navstar satellite system, which will probably be put into operation soon. It will enable the United States to double the accuracy of its Trident-2 submarine ballistic missiles and its MX

intercontinental ballistic missiles. All these three components of "star wars" have, as we have just said, the purpose of achieving military superiority over the USSR, of achieving the potential for effecting a first strike, first having destroyed the USSR's space objects, and then sheltering against a counterstrike behind the anti-missile defense system.

[Bogdanov] I think you have set out the matter very precisely and quite amply, and you were quite right to draw attention to the fact that if one were to replace the totality of this system, these so-called "star wars," with some other synonym, then, as I would put it, it is a war involving a first disarming strike. This phrase, it seems to me, very accurately and fully reflects the sense of "star wars."

[Tsvetov] And this U.S. line toward the implementation of the plan to prepare for "star wars" is assuming quite visible outlines. Another nuclear blast is planned for December during the testing of laser weapons. The Lockheed Corporation has received a Pentagon contract for the development [sozdaniye] of land-based missiles designed for hitting targets in space.

All these activities run counter to the wishes not only of world public opinion but also of the U.S. people. I would like to cite the results of an opinion poll conducted by USA TODAY. Eighty-four percent of the U.S. people polled are in favor of the conclusion of an agreement designed to reduce armaments. Seventy percent of those polled are in favor of an agreement on banning the deployment of armaments in space. The question then, is why are U.S. leaders acting against the wishes of the U.S. people.

#### UN Resolution

[Yefimov] They are not just acting against the wishes of U.S. peoples. The day before yesterday a vote was held in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on a resolution submitted by a large group of countries. The gist of the resolution was a call that at Geneva both sides should, at the earliest opportunity, reach effective accords on halting the nuclear arms race, averting an arms race in space, and on the use of space for peaceful purposes. The result of the vote showed 117 countries voted for the resolution, and the United States, all its NATO partners, as well as Japan and Israel, abstained.

[Tsvetov] Well, you will understand why the United States abstained when you take a look at this statement by a spokesman for the Lockheed Corporation, the Pentagon's principal contractor. This spokesman said that the "star wars" program is viewed by Lockheed as holding out promising prospects for the concern's financial prosperity. And it is a well-known fact that the U.S. Government acts on the basis of a fundamental principle which could be expressed in a paraphrase of a well-known saying: What is good for Lockheed is good for the United States. Not all listeners may know that the phrase "star wars" acquired currency thanks to a film by the U.S. movie director Lucas, which has the same title of "Star Wars." The term has acquired such an ominous significance that the director has felt like prosecuting people who use the term other than with reference to the film. I think that the phrase will die of its own accord if the concept which it refers to disappears.

As an alternative to "star wars," the Soviet Union proposes the "star peace" plan. This plan is also part of the political baggage which the Soviet delegation is carrying to Geneva.

### 'Star Peace' Proposal

[Yefimov] At the current session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union submitted a package of very interesting proposals, and in particular the proposal for "star peace". We propose, I repeat, not "star wars," but "star peace". What does this concept involve? Our listeners frequently ask about this, and ask us to describe it in greater detail. First, "star peace" means the nonmilitarization of space. In other words, we are talking of the renunciation by all countries of the development [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of space strike weapons. Such a renunciation would create the conditions for the peaceful study and development of space, for a pooling of efforts of all mankind in this sphere. This would of course give a powerful spur to the development of science and technology. We do not yet know all the possibilities of space, but without a doubt the resources of the heavenly bodies and the energy of the sun could, in the long term, be used for the benefit of all peoples, for solving global problems, for the creation of orbiting factories for the production of super-new materials under weightless conditions and in a vacuum.

Second, "star peace" would open up for all countries a host of other opportunities: carrying out broad, fundamental research of space and launching interplanetary space-ships and expeditions to this end; applying the result of space research in medicine, in materials technology, in the creation of new crystals, and so forth; creating new space technology, new orbital stations, and new spaceships.

Third, "star peace" means strict and complete adherence to previously concluded treaties and agreements, adherence to the principle of equality and respect for states' sovereignty, and the nonuse of force or threat of force.

Fourth, "star peace" also entails the creation of a world space organization, within whose framework all states could cooperate. That, briefly, is the "star peace" concept.

### 15 Nov Politburo Meeting

[Bogdanov] I would like to remind you that on Friday a news report on the sitting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo was published. The meeting discussed the results of Secretary of State Shultz' visit to Moscow and the results of his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This document we are talking about, in my view, contains a literally perfectly cast formulation of what we want and of what we are striving for in Geneva. It says that at the meeting of the top leaders of the two countries, attention should be devoted principally to the question of removing the nuclear threat on the basis of preventing an arms race in space and curtailing it on earth.

[Tsvetov] Among the initiatives made by the Soviet Union in preparation for the Geneva summit was a proposal to reach an agreement with the United States on completely prohibiting offensive space weapons for both countries, which we have just been discussing, and on genuinely, radically reducing by 50 percent nuclear weapons capable of striking the other's territory.

[Bogdanov] Yes, Vladimir Yakovlevich, that is a key point in the Soviet proposals. However, before we go on to discuss that subject, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this 50-percent reduction or, as the specialists say, deep cut, is very much in tune with what the U.S. people have repeated for many, many years, maintaining that they advocated these deep cuts. But now, the time has come when we, in effect, have gone

half-way toward the U.S. appeals, although, it must be said that the idea of deep cuts is by no means a U.S. invention. It is an old and consistent Soviet policy, to constantly reduce nuclear weapons. Let us recall that the SALT II Treaty stipulated a 25-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. We have gone half-way, not simply with regard to a 50 percent reduction of weapons capable of reaching the other country; we have gone further still, specifying that we are not merely reducing by 50 percent, but leaving no more than 60 percent of the total number of warheads remaining after the 50-percent reduction on any one component of the strategic triad. This means that these reductions will affect the most valuable component of the Soviet strategic forces -- land-based missiles.

#### Question of Missiles in Europe

But there is one question to which I would like to draw your attention. Our proposals use the formula of a 50-percent reduction of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the other side's territory. What is meant here? We mean nuclear weapons -- U.S. ones -- of medium-range and forward-based systems deployed in Europe, which, although strictly speaking, according to the accepted parameters, are not strategic, are nonetheless strategic for the Soviet Union. They are strategic because they threaten us to the same degree as U.S. strategic missiles deployed on U.S. territory. So we want to reduce these weapons. I think that not only do we have a moral right; it is a question of our security, a question of our survival. What arguments does the other side put forward against this proposal? They say that it is one-sided in the sense that it does not affect analogous Soviet weapons, above all the SS-20s, deployed on European and Asian territory, and that it means that only the United States will have to reduce while we do not have to reduce anything.

There is a large element of falsification here. We are willing to hold very serious talks on medium-range nuclear weapons; and, furthermore, we are willing to separate this issue from the issues of space weapons and other issues and single them out as a separate question, for we understand the full significance both for the peoples of Europe and for ourselves.

[Tsvetov] That constitutes precisely another Soviet initiative, put forward not long before the Geneva meeting. This initiative concerns medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. And you will remember that in order to facilitate reaching an agreement on this type of weapon, the USSR, as you have just said, proposed discussing the issue of medium-range missiles without directly linking them to the issues of space and strategic weapons.

[Bogdanov] In my opinion we have done everything to facilitate a solution to this issue, to make it resolvable.

[Tsvetov] In an attempt to break the deadlock over the question of a complete and universal ban on nuclear tests, the Soviet Union, as radio listeners know, launched a unilateral moratorium on all its nuclear explosions on 6 August of this year. This was also, in particular, in order to illuminate the political atmosphere on the eve of the Geneva meeting. The heads of state and governments of six Latin American, West European, and Asian countries recently appealed to the USSR and to the United States to announce a joint Soviet-U.S. moratorium on nuclear explosions for a period of 12 months. As we know, the Soviet Union responded positively to this appeal. Moreover, as Comrade Gorbachev stated in his answer to the appeal, the Soviet Union is ready as of now for an indefinite treaty banning all nuclear-weapons tests.

[Bogdanov] That proposal has enormous practical sense. Nuclear weapons need to be periodically tested, and periodically checked. If you do not test your stockpiled nuclear ammunition, then no military leader will ever be sure that the ammunition will work. In essence, nuclear ammunition which is periodically untested, in a specific sequence, loses its combat significance. Therefore, if you cease nuclear tests you in effect divest yourself of the opportunity of using nuclear weapons. This is the significance of the Soviet proposal and, incidentally, this is the reason why the U.S. side is so against the moratorium.

#### U.S. Threats of Nuclear Strike

[Tsvetov] All our proposals are aimed at maintaining military and strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States. This endeavor is not to be explained by some sort of arrogance or simply some kind of, so to speak, competition. There is very profound and great sense in it. Our radio listeners often ask what would happen if there were to be no military and strategic parity. In connection with this, I would like to mention the following interesting statistics. Over the past few decades Washington has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union 19 times. Of this total, the United States threatened us 16 times before 1963, when it enjoyed tangible strategic superiority. By 1963 the tilt in favor of the United States had become smaller, and in the period between 1963 and 1968 there were only two occasions when the sound of a nuclear threat could be heard from the United States. But after 1968 the United States only once dared to threaten us with a nuclear strike; and since 1971, when full strategic parity had been achieved, the United States has not once openly dared to threaten us with a nuclear strike.

In this connection I would like to recall what President Reagan said on 11 November. The President said: Weakness is temptation, it is an invitation to the quarrelsome [neuzhivchivyye] to impose their will on others.

That is why strategic parity with the United States is so vital to us, so that they are never tempted to try to impose their will on us.

[Bogdanov] The main problem is that strategic parity has been achieved in spite of the will of the United States, in spite of all they have done against the Soviet Union in 40 years since the war. The main, so to speak, annoying thing is the very state of this parity, precisely because of what you said. Parity deprives the U.S. of the opportunity to blackmail the Soviet Union. Why? Because as a result of parity, U.S. territory has become just as vulnerable and open to destruction as the territory of the Soviet Union. Suddenly they have found that their state is just as vulnerable as any other, and they have lost the opportunity of acting unpunished in the world arena. Hence the constant attempts to acquire military superiority over the Soviet Union.

#### U.S. Position at Geneva

[Tsvetov] This, evidently, explains the persistent attempts by representatives of the U.S. Administration to suggest to the press that one should not expect specific results from the Geneva meeting. In my view, this is an attempt to justify in advance the position of the U.S. side at the talks. And this position, as is clear from President Reagan's speech at the UN General Assembly's jubilee session and in his interview to Soviet journalists, evidently amounts to an attempt to lead the conversation in Geneva away from the main issue -- the question of arms control -- to secondary issues.

[Yefimov] We have proposed a large-scale peace program. What has the United States done? First, we heard confused voices in response saying that the problem of disarmament is not the most important one, that the most important thing is to discuss the situation in those countries where either the government or the political system does not suit Washington. The most definite thing in this context was said by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger. In his opinion, one should be discussing violations of human rights, observance of treaty obligations, regional problems, questions of bilateral relations, and arms reductions, in that order, with the most important one mentioned last. The nonmilitarization of outer space, as you noticed, is completely absent from his agenda.

Well, what is meant by discussing all these questions which members of the Washington administration place in the forefront, for example, human rights? Well, it is possible to discuss why in the United States, for example, they start bombing black poverty areas, as in Philadelphia, or to discuss the position of the unemployed, or the position of people living in reservations, or the absence of a social security system in the country. The Soviet Union does have something to say. The question is about something else. By bringing to the forefront those issues of the international situation which are not the most important, does Washington not want to emasculate the meeting and conceal its reluctance to hold serious talks on the most important issues? One cannot but agree with Senator Edward Kennedy who said the other day that the success and the effectiveness of the Geneva meeting must be judged by how the main question -- the question of nuclear disarmament and the question of space armaments -- will be solved or not solved.

Sometimes this question is thrown at us: Surely the very fact of a meeting between the leaders of two of the world's mighty powers is important? Of course it is. It is even more important if you recall the unfriendly rhetoric which we have heard in the course of a number of years from across the ocean. Of course, we do recall all that the U.S. President has said about the impossibility of talks with the Russians.

Five years ago he was seriously trying to convince people that one could not reach an agreement with the Soviet Union about anything because it had no morals, it did not believe in the Holy Scriptures and the future life. And here we have this same President preparing to go to Geneva to talk to the Russians! What can it be, an evolution of thought? Or something else? These are serious questions.

Obviously, the present U.S. Administration can no longer not go to such a meeting. It cannot ignore the mood of its NATO allies who are anxious about the exacerbation of international tension and also by the fact that Washington is thinking only about its own security, to the detriment of others. It cannot ignore either the mood of the broad masses both at home and abroad, especially in Western Europe, who cannot understand why hundreds of billions of dollars are being spent on the arms race, on the creation [sozdaniye] of more and more refined means of destroying people without having made even the slightest attempt to reach an agreement with the other side.

In recent weeks those who have followed the world situation closely could not fail to sense that the Soviet peace program which has been put forward to supplement all previous initiatives by the Soviet Union has received a huge response. Everything has shown that the White House's attempts to lead the forthcoming Geneva meeting away from the main issue are not in fact meeting with understanding from even the most loyal U.S. allies, even from Mrs Thatcher. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told President Reagan in a very confidential conversation: You must change your approach before the Soviet-U.S. summit, otherwise things may be unpleasant.

[Tsvetov] Nikolay Ivanovich, on the eve of the Geneva meeting your newspaper is probably receiving a large number of letters from Soviet people wishing our delegation success; letters in which our people are sharing their thoughts on the possible results of this meeting.

[Yefimov] Indeed, we are getting a great many; and the day before yesterday we published several letters in a leading article which was entitled: On the Eve of Geneva. Difficult though the Geneva talks may be the readers who are sending us letters realize that the talks will not be easy, they will be complex and people are hoping for an effective outcome. They believe in common sense, they believe that in the final analysis an accord can and needs to be achieved and that there simply is no other way. A Moscow writer, war veteran Yudovich, writes this: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has a difficult task, but the whole of our country is behind Mikhail Sergeyevich. We wish him success. May he feel behind him the breath of all Soviet people and of all honest people on our planet! There are a great many letters like that.

#### Geneva Talks 'Complex, Difficult'

[Tsvetov] So the Geneva talks will be complex and difficult. The Soviet side knows this, but still it is going to the talks. So much is at stake. At stake is the security of mankind's existence. The Soviet Union is going to the meeting with the firm intention of conducting it in a businesslike, constructive spirit. The USSR is setting the task of discussing and, as far as possible, achieving a positive advance on problems which are the determinant ones, both for an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and for a normalization in the world situation as a whole. That is why the Soviet side has prepared for the Geneva talks so thoroughly.

At this point our conversation at the roundtable is concluded. All the best.

/9365  
CSO: 5200/1154



U.S.-USSR GENERAL TALKS

USSR: 'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION--QUESTIONS, ANSWERS'

LD152109 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 15 Nov 85

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by foreign political commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev; with political observer Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin; and Leonid Rassadin, Galya Bashirova, Dmitriy Biryukov, and Vladimir Pasko who are not further identified]

[Excerpt] Hello comrades. The majority of letters arriving at the editorial office to some extent or another concern the problem which is worrying not only Soviet people today, but also the whole of humanity. This is first and foremost the question of the preservation of universal peace, the curbing of the arms race and the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Grigoriy Aleksandrovich Golubev from Moscow writes: People are aware as never before of the seriousness and the dramatic nature of the present complex international situation. Either there will be a halt to the arms race and a start will be made on reducing the threat of war; or, on the contrary, those forces which are continuing to stir up tension, which are accelerating the arms race and pushing mankind towards nuclear catastrophe will gain the upper hand. Our listeners Boris Andreyevich Zhilkin from Sredniy Khat in Kursk Oblast; Stepan Ivanovich Zubchenko, a veteran of the Patriotic War from the village of Novodaretskaya in Donetsk Oblast, and others also express such concern.

At the same time, the letters express hopes that the forthcoming meeting in Geneva between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States will be able to make a positive contribution to the cause of normalizing the international situation. The question which one meets most frequently is this: What are the participants taking to the summit meeting, and what can be expected from it? I shall invite the political observer Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin to answer this. Over to you, Gennadiy Arkadiyevich.

'Ensuring Favorable Results'

[Shishkin] On the part of the Soviet Union, the reply is clear and it is a reply which inspires justified hopes. By way of a practical contribution to ensuring a favorable result in Geneva, the Soviet Union has undertaken a number of unilateral steps. Our country has, for example, taken a pledge not to be the first to launch weapons into space. The Soviet Union has unilaterally announced a moratorium on the carrying out of nuclear explosions and on the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European zone. Moreover, the USSR has begun to reduce the numbers of

its missiles. All this was crowned with a whole complex of constructive and realistic proposals, the implementation of which could lead to a turning point in the development of international relations. These proposals were set out in the speech by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at a meeting with French parliamentarians. The Soviet Union has proposed that the nuclear armaments of the USSR and the United States which are capable of reaching each other's territory be halved, if there is a ban on the creation of offensive space weapons. It is generally acknowledged that this is a realistic and practical formula for preventing an arms race in space and for a real and radical reduction in nuclear armaments on earth.

And finally, the Soviet Union has proposed that the solution of the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe be separated from the problems of space and strategic armaments.

This is a definite concession on the part of our country which was made for the sake of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. In the situation which has come about, the Soviet Union also proposes a direct dialogue on the respective armaments of Britain and France. We cannot fail to take them into account, for already they consist of 500 nuclear warheads and it is intended to double their number in a few years.

#### U.S. Reaction to Proposals

The unilateral actions of the Soviet Union and the whole complex of its far-reaching proposals are so specific and convincing that they require a precise and clear reply. Yes or no. And no evasions or pretexts will be of help here. But it is precisely in this that they are now engaging in the U.S. capital. The Washington administration is undertaking attempts to weaken the attractive force of the Soviet proposals, to dissipate them, and to inculcate the idea that they are of an imbalanced nature and provide no approach to accords. They are stating, for example, that the antimissile defense treaty permits the creation of space weapons, and that the proposals on a 50-percent reduction in strategic forces on both sides is only to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Along with this, Washington has begun to consider it a good thing, on the threshold of Geneva, to change its instigatory militarist statements in favor of peace-making rhetoric.

I had the occasion personally to become convinced of the true value of this maneuver in the course of the interview which the U.S. President gave in the White House to a group of Soviet journalists. We came to Reagan's Oval Office, where the interview took place, through the so-called Roosevelt Room, which was evidently intended to be a kind of purgatory for us.

Hanging on the walls of the Roosevelt Room are the portraits of the two Presidents Roosevelt, Theodore and Franklin. Franklin is of course better known to us through the combat alliance of wartime. But the room was dominated by Theodore, the former president at the beginning of the century. One of the first and most zealous theoreticians and practitioners of U.S. imperialism of what is now called a policy of force, Theodore Roosevelt was famous for his eloquent credo: Speak softly and carry a big stick. Judging by the quotations from his speeches, he is highly regarded by the present President. The spirit of Theodore Roosevelt is also an invisible part of the Oval Office which is next to the Roosevelt Room.

### Deeds, Not Words Required

You make the bed soft, but it's hard to sleep on. This wise Russian saying came to my mind involuntarily when I heard the White House chief expatiating on the good intentions of the U.S. leadership on the threshold of the summit meeting in Geneva. We must learn to live in peace. It is impossible to win a nuclear war and it must not be allowed. This means that there must be no war between our countries. These good words, which not long ago were quite absent from the lexicon of the White House, could only be welcomed if they were corroborated by specific deeds and were not simply an unavoidable tribute to public opinion. For the true value of any general words is shown only in concrete actions and facts and in the real manifestations and directions of policies. These latter, unfortunately, do not allow one to conclude that the U.S. Administration is willing to go its half of the way toward the USSR and to make its contribution to the cause of preventing an arms race in space and of radically reducing it on earth.

### 'Militaristic' SDI

The Soviet journalists asked the President five written questions, thereby giving him a good opportunity to provide a considered and thoughtout answer to that which is worrying millions of people throughout the world. What does the United States, for its part, intend to do? But no, we got nothing concrete; and therefore, naturally, the first spoken question was: In your written answers you set forth old U.S. proposals. They have already been considered by the Soviet side and were judged to be imbalanced and giving unilateral advantages to the United States. You still have not mentioned what the U.S. answer to the new Soviet proposals is, yet the answer to this question is of primary interest to people before the Geneva summit. However, the President skirted this direct question, too. Instead, he chose to push his Strategic Defense Initiative. Again and again he manipulated words about this "star wars" program and the allegedly peaceful purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan assured us that the United States would only begin deploying [razvertyvaniye] its space shield after the elimination of offensive nuclear weapons.

However, not only we, but also the President's closest entourage, could not take this seriously, and it was with reason that the White House was obliged to practically disavow Reagan's words the very next day. Clearly, the space shield is needed by the Pentagon, above all, in order to use its cover to sharpen its nuclear sword for a first strike against the Soviet Union.

The militaristic nature of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative is obvious, but the thinking behind it is still wider and deeper. It is a question of attempting to guarantee technological superiority of the West over the socialist countries, and incidentally, not just over the socialist countries, but over their own allies. The all-out striving by the United States to guarantee itself unilateral advantages was shown in the zeal with which Reagan pushed his zero option in connection with the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. But it is well-known that if such an option were to be implemented, the Soviet Union would really be left with zero, while the United States would have all its medium-range nuclear bombers, including the aircraft carrier force, plus Britain and France's nuclear weapons which are also targeted on Soviet territory.

### Zero Option Proposals

The United States, for example, proposed reducing the number of ballistic missile warheads to 6,000 units on each side. On the surface it seems to be even, but there is no equality here at all. In actual fact, this proposal is a way of giving the United States military superiority. The U.S. approach leaves open the way to building up warheads on long-range cruise missiles. The U.S. side is attempting to remove sea-based cruise missiles from the framework of the talks and reductions. It avoids accepting the Soviet proposal to prohibit such missiles by general statements to the effect that the United States is willing to limit only somewhat air-based cruise missiles. As a whole, this stance taken by the United States envisages not a reduction but a buildup of nuclear warheads up to almost 18,000 units.

As we can see, while replacing harsh rhetoric with peacemaking rhetoric, Washington is not showing a genuinely serious desire to truly resolve important issues. Judging by what the U.S. President said during the interview, the White House is counting on gaining a propaganda benefit from the very holding of the Soviet-U.S. Geneva summit, without having any intention of correcting its stance on the essence of the main problems concerning the entire world. Instead, it clearly wants to try merely to settle certain issues in Soviet-U.S. relations, which, furthermore, are far from paramount.

### World Awaits U.S. 'Constructive Response'

Thus, the road to the summit in Geneva is not an easy one. But still, the very awareness of the need for a broad Soviet-U.S. dialogue is a positive phenomenon. The time for words is passing; the time for actions is beginning. I would like to believe that the Soviet Union's willingness to achieve a sharp turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations will be met by a constructive response from the U.S. side. This is precisely what the world awaits.

/9365

CSO: 5200/1154

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRENCH PAPERS ASSESS GENEVA SUMMIT RESULTS

LE MONDE Editorial

PM251649 Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Nov 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The 'Chemistry' of Geneva"]

[Text] "The most important thing is that the two men took complete control of things.... The length, intensity, and scope of their private fireside talks went much further than we expected.... This was really what we had come to seek, and it was very fruitful."

These comments by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz are an excellent summary of the assessment of the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit now being made not only in Washington but in most capitals. "The chemistry worked well," as they say in the United States. In other words the U.S. President and the Soviet number one seemed to hit it off. Indeed, it was essentially the length of the confidential talks and also the atmosphere of the meeting and the secondary meetings -- much friendlier than expected -- which were the surprise.

With regard to the essential issues, all the indications are, at least according to the information we have so far, that little progress was made. The disagreement over the U.S. SDI project is openly admitted, and, although an agreement in principle was confirmed for a 50-percent reduction in offensive nuclear weapons, disagreements remain both on the method of counting them and, it seems, on Moscow's precondition for its implementation: the abandonment of SDI. According to American indications, Mr Gorbachev was not even interested in Mr Reagan's offer to adhere to the 1972 ABM treaty for testing this space shield: He is apparently still demanding purely and simply an end to research and the banning of all tests.

Nonetheless it remains to be seen whether some progress was made in the fireside conversations. Mr Gorbachev is a realist; this summit's main lesson is precisely that he has decided to live with disagreements and to restore not only a sustained dialogue with the United States but also much more intense bilateral relations. The list of the agreements concluded in this sphere during the summit, a list which is impressive at least by its volume, is evocative of the years 1972-74, the days of the "great detente" between Brezhnev and Nixon.

The Soviet leader is probably playing for time. He may hope that the SDI, at least in its present form, will not survive the departure of its initiator from the White House in 3 years' time, that American opinion will grow weary, and that Congress will refuse funds. But in the short term he has taken the risk of boosting the "hard-liners" in the

Reagan team by making them think that their hard line has paid off. Although the U.S. President did not make any fundamental concessions, he has had to moderate his tone, forget the "Evil Empire," and credit his interlocutor with a sincere desire to seek peace.

In both cases the protagonists in the Geneva summit will certainly have to face criticism or attempts at obstruction from the most inflexible members of their entourages in the coming months. But the reaction of public opinions should encourage them to preserve the Geneva "chemistry." In the USSR and the United States the peoples naturally prefer peace, but they also want dialogue.

#### LE FIGARO on Dialogue

PM251709 Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Nov 85 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Serge Maffert: "New Climate"]

[Text] Geneva -- The American-Soviet dialogue which was broken off almost 6 years ago has been resumed and is being institutionalized. This is the most tangible result of the Geneva summit. Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev -- who obviously understand each other very well, even when noting their differences -- seem determined to set up and implement a system of consultation, the expected result of which would be calculated in terms of years rather than months.

This "new start," as Mr Shultz called it, or this "new impetus," as Mr Reagan described it, this "opportunity to make progress," to cite Mr Gorbachev, is intended to create first an atmosphere and framework for discussions rather than solving, at least initially, problems which are at present insoluble.

Provision has been made for the institutionalization of relations at all levels, from summit meetings between present or future U.S. presidents and Soviet leaders, between ministers in various specialities, to meetings between senior civil servants from all spheres. Regular meetings between the foreign ministers are also planned.

The joint statement published in Geneva yesterday and the agreements signed by Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Shultz, and the statements made by the Americans and Soviets before leaving the shores of Lake Geneva, reveal a large number of joint actions or enterprises, ranging from the assessment of regional conflicts to the fight against hunger and pollution in the world or the achievement of thermonuclear fusion.

All this may seem modest, although these are essential problems facing the whole of mankind. Nonetheless a new chapter has been opened in American-Soviet relations. The new situation can only be evaluated in comparison with the situation which prevailed in recent years.

But, having said all this, it is important to see that this political building and hence the future of Soviet-American cooperation presuppose the emergence of a fundamental element: the confidence which the two states must feel in each other. Without a minimum of understanding, mutual assurances, and certainty that Washington or Moscow are not seeking to destroy or simply undermine the other's existence, nothing is possible.

It is here that we see the limits of this extraordinary adventure of the first meeting between two men who are exceptional in many respects, totally different from each other but who certainly tried to examine things in depth during their long hours of private talks.

During his press conference yesterday, Mr Gorbachev said: "I venture to say that the world is a safer place after this summit." This is a remarkable tribute to the virtue of dialogue. However, it is obvious that as regards the essence of American-Soviet relations, and of East-West relations in general, no progress was made in Geneva, except at the level of a better perception of the other's arguments. Of course, there is talk here of complete deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union on everything relating to space weapons, which are generally known as "star wars".

Throughout the summit Mr Gorbachev argued passionately to stress the mortal danger mankind would run if there was an arms race in space. Mr Reagan reiterated his ideas on the benefits of his "war on nuclear war." In short, it was a dialogue of the deaf. The immediate future, in other words the next few months, will depend on the desire of the United States and the USSR either to seek an area of agreement on his subject, which seems very unlikely, or to transcend this fundamental disagreement, to set it aside in some way.

This second hypothesis is not absurd. On the one hand it does not rule out -- in the search for solutions to other problems, regional conflicts for instance -- the start of a mutual confidence-building process; in addition it is a move toward the ambition always cherished in Washington and Moscow -- that of a government of the world exercised jointly by the two superpowers. All this emerges clearly from the statements made in Geneva by both sides. Thus, after these 2 fascinating days we are on the confused border between realism and dreams.

#### L'HUMANITE on 'Considerable' Results

PM251535 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 22 Nov 85 p 16

[Editorial by Yves Moreau: "A Process"]

[Text] Two days of talks between Gorbachev and Reagan have not made it possible to overcome the fundamental disagreements which remain between Washington and Moscow. However, the results of the Geneva summit are very considerable. In fact they create favorable conditions for dialogue and a detente process.

Contradicting the forecasts made by many commentators, especially French ones, that nothing would emerge from the meeting, the two statesmen succeeded in adopting a joint statement and of talking a language which is not that of confrontation and invectives, but one of better understanding.

In this respect it is certainly not unimportant that the U.S. and Soviet leaders should admit that, in the event of a nuclear war, there would be no victors and vanquished, and that the search for military superiority is futile and dangerous. It is not so very long since Washington said quite the reverse.

The future meetings at the highest level which have been decided on, the consultations which the two countries have launched, the envisaged increase in their trade in many spheres -- all this heralds a thaw. That is what our prophets of doom feared!

With regard to the crucial problem -- preventing an arms race in space and ending the arms race on earth -- the Geneva summit of course merely resulted in the assertion of

good intentions. And yet the proposals which Gorbachev announced in Paris early last month provided a broad basis for agreement.

They opened up prospects which are still valid, as demonstrated by the Geneva joint statement: This statement refers explicitly to halving strategic arsenals and to the conclusion of a specific agreement on medium-range nuclear arms in Europe.

However, these are exactly the ideas which Gorbachev put forward. Their impact certainly contributed to the positive results of the Geneva summit.

Above all, the fact is that the aim of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting could not be merely to "get acquainted," according to the White House's initial very modest ambition, since that would have clashed with world public opinion, including American opinion. The great peace movement which has taken shape in many forms in all countries and which has recently taken the form of huge demonstrations from London to Madrid, from Brussels to Hamburg, and in New York, cannot be ignored.

After Geneva the discussions between the Americans and Soviets are going to continue. They will probably run into problems. That is one more reason for not relying solely on the Soviet and U.S. diplomats. Disarmament and detente are in the interests of all peoples. They require the active intervention of all governments, especially the French Government, whose inertia in this sphere is harmful.

The strengthening of popular pressure for peace is vital so as to ensure that the Geneva summit is really a fruitful turning point

/9599

CSO: 5200/2567



## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### ITALIAN PAPER ASSESSES OUTCOME OF GENEVA SUMMIT

PM261127 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 22 Nov 85 pp 1, 12

[Commentary by Francesco Gozzano: "Joint Pledge, But Problems Remain"]

[Text] Geneva, 21 Nov -- Their 5 hours of private talks permitted Reagan and Gorbachev to get to know one another better, but did not lead to a rapprochement of their respective stances on the most burning issue at this summit, namely, the SDI which was launched by the U.S. President. In fact, both sides vigorously reasserted their respective stances and sought to convince the adversary of the validity of their own arguments.

Of course, no one expected miraculous solutions from this meeting or even substantial steps toward the solution of the major problems on the agenda, still less a step forward in the arms reduction field: That would have entailed relinquishing stubborn opposing stances, which is something that did not happen. Basically it was an interlocutory success, not without results [such as the joint pledge to continue the dialogue and to institutionalize it at foreign minister level, and the announcement of exchange visits between the two leaders], but the worrying aspect is the spirit of confrontation which emerged from the talks.

On Gorbachev's admission, there was a "sometimes harsh, even very harsh" [these were the Soviet leader's own words] opposition against Reagan, who tried to persuade his interlocutor by means of a "missionary" approach of the need to move on from the concept of MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction] to that of a mutual assured security entrusted to the space shield, and the CPSU general secretary who, on the other hand, like a zealous pedagogue, tried to persuade him that an arms race in space would create an infernal spiral, opening up Pandora's box with unpredictable consequences. So on this problem things remained as before, though the pledge to continue the dialogue permits one to hope for further efforts to find some common ground on the problem of nuclear arms reduction.

On this issue Gorbachev certainly scored a point in his favor: The joint communique makes official at the highest level the understanding reached in January by Shultz and Gromyko to "avert the arms race in space and to end it on earth" -- a formula which sparked sharp controversies in the United States last winter because it appeared to be a concession to Soviet arguments. On the other hand, the Americans can claim to their own advantage the Soviet pledge to an interim agreement on Euromissiles, though it seems quite clear that the implementation of such an accord will be made subject by Moscow to the attainment of accords on the other issues of the negotiations. The same

applies to implementation of the principle of a 50-percent reduction of nuclear and strategic arsenals: Gorbachev made it quite clear that nothing will be done about it unless the door to SDI is "hermetically sealed."

Although no perceptible steps forward were taken on specific problems, nevertheless both sides made a positive interpretation of the summit: This assessment is undoubtedly largely due to domestic considerations of image, but it also seems to reflect a belief that, irrespective of any documents agreed and signed, some progress has been made on the road to mutual understanding. "We wanted a new start to Soviet-U.S. relations," Skulitz commented: "It was an important stage in relations between the two countries, a point of departure," Gorbachev echoes him, adding that he hoped that the United States had not said its last word on the subject of "star wars."

The CPSU general secretary also believes that the world is a safer place following the summit. Is such a belief well founded? We can only have an answer to this question in some months' or years' time, according to the U.S. secretary of state. It is up to all the countries which followed this summit from a distance to ensure that Shultz' forecast comes true before it is too late.

/9599

CSO: 5200/2566

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

ITALY'S CRAXI COMMENTS ON ROLE IN 'EAST-WEST THAW'

PM291649 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 24-25 Nov 85 pp 1, 8

[Unattributed report: "Craxi on Geneva Summit: Italy Contributed to Thaw"]

[Text] In an interview with IL MESSAGGERO, the prime minister issues a positive verdict on the recent Geneva summit ("It was undoubtedly a success"); says that "everything will be less difficult"; recalls the "important role" already played by Europe; and claims for Italy "an anticipatory role" in accelerating the processes of thaw and detente.

Craxi rejects any suggestion of nationalism and stresses Italy's role within the international context, the role of "a nation which correctly has a place among the world's major industrial powers. All this," the prime minister said, "has nothing to do with nationalism." "I am not pursuing any kind of nationalism, apart from my love of my country and my conviction that Italy is a great and civilized nation, more esteemed by the world than the Italians themselves sometimes seem to realize."

In the interview, almost entirely devoted to an analysis of the international situation following the Geneva summit and to Italian foreign policy, Craxi makes only one reference to the domestic political situation. In answer to a question about the political barometer, he replies: "The weather is seasonable" and adds: "We will be introducing some innovations."

"Things went almost too well in Geneva," the prime minister says. "I would not want the euphoric climate that has come about to create excessive optimism." "Now it is to be hoped that it was not just a flash in the pan and that the good intentions will put down roots." He also says that "the aim was not to reach conclusive accords" but rather "to resume a dialogue and to restore a climate of trust. This aim was achieved."

Talking next about Europe's role in paving the way to better East-West relations, Craxi recalls that our continent "has built bridges with the East even when controversies raged and conflicts became exacerbated. It has maintained close consultations with the United States, advising moderation and showing loyalty." In particular Italy has performed an anticipatory role in these processes of detente, "prompting the jibes and criticisms of conservatives in our own country. Ultimately that anticipatory outlook has been proved correct. We will continue with this action," Craxi says, "within a scenario that is now changed and that is definitely more favorable."

Referring to the New York meeting before the Geneva summit, Craxi says: "We asked the U.S. President to present balanced stances and to approach his Soviet interlocutor in an

open-minded and flexible frame of mind. It seems that this is what happened. Now it is a matter of not wasting this good start."

Recalling next that in foreign policy the government pursues the objectives and plans known to Parliament and the public, Craxi says that Italy's European commitment "is second to none in the effort to build and integrate an EC Europe which is still marking time." He describes suspicions that Italy wants to pursue a "fourth-coastline-type" policy as "entirely out of touch."

"We have asserted and are well aware of our vital interests in the Mediterranean," Craxi explains, "and this is the yardstick for our initiatives of cooperation and peace in the region."

"We have kept our dialogue with Eastern Europe open and have thus contributed to a new international climate," Craxi goes on. "No considerations of advantage or convenience can obscure our intransigent safeguarding of essential principles such as the defense of the peoples' rights and human rights throughout the world."

/9599

CSO: 5200/2567

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ANTICRUISE DEPLOYMENT GROUP DAMAGES AIR BASES

AU151315 Paris AFP in English 1310 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Text] The Hague, Nov 15 (AFP) -- A backup navigational system at three Dutch air bases was put out of action in an attack early today that was claimed by an unknown group protesting at the Netherlands' decision to deploy NATO cruise missiles, an Air Force spokesman said. The bases were Gilze-Rijen, a base in use by the Dutch Air Force, De Peel, a reserve base, and Woensdrecht, where the 48 missiles will be based in 1988, the spokesman said.

The attackers cut cables to a system of approach lights used by pilots in the event of poor visibility, he said. There were no details about the extent of damage or how long repairs would take. The operation was claimed in a telephone call to the authorities by a group identifying itself as the "Anti-Militarists Against Nuclear Violence." It said the attack was a protest at the Netherlands' decision on November 1 to deploy the weapons, in line with a 1979 North Atlantic Treaty Organization decision.

The group was linked the attack with the deployment of the first batch of cruise missiles in Europe, in Greenham Common Britain, two years ago.

/9599

CSO: 5200/2555

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PARLIAMENT APPROVES CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

#### Views Differ Among Parties

PM201353 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 13 Nov 85 p 3

[Correspondents' report: "Christian Democratic Appeal and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy Will Support Missile Deployment"]

[Text] The Hague, 13 Nov -- The parliamentary parties of the governing Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [VVD] coalition will support the cabinet decision in favor of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in 1988. It is expected that five or six members of the CDA parliamentary group will oppose the decision. The CDA and the VVD also take the view that further initiatives by the Netherlands in the field of arms control can only take place within the NATO framework.

In yesterday's Second Chamber debate on the cabinet's 1 November decision, the Labor Party [PvdA] parliamentary group reiterated its total opposition to cruise missile deployment. Group leader Den Uyl in a motion put before the chamber called the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands "no contribution to increased security in Europe." Den Uyl considers the 1 November decision to be "a capitulation to the idea that more missiles mean more security," he said.

In a motion presented by group leader Engwirda the Democrats '66 [D'66] parliamentary group called for the postponement of parliamentary approval of the deployment agreement with the United States. According to this motion, the chamber should pronounce its final judgment on this agreement only a short time before the date of actual deployment (the end of 1988).

CDA parliamentary group leader De Vries said that the 1 November decision is acceptable to the CDA because it also contains a decision for a reduction in the number of the Netherlands' nuclear units by two. He said that in this way the Netherlands is serving both solidarity within NATO and arms control. But he also admitted that with this reduction in nuclear units the Netherlands "is operating as odd man out" within NATO.

VVD parliamentary group leader Nijpels stressed above all the decision by the cabinet to increase the defense budget by 3 percent annually after 1986 and the leeway that has been left for adapting the Army's 155-mm howitzers for nuclear use if longer-range shells become available for them. The PvdA and D'66 opposition groups called for the rejection of this possibility in separate motions. The PvdA motion also called for an end to the existing nuclear unit comprising the 203-mm howitzers, while D'66 merely asked that

efforts be made within NATO to achieve this. In the past the CDA has always been opposed to the nuclear role of these howitzers ("battlefield weapons") but has accepted the continuation of the 203-mm howitzers' nuclear role, because otherwise our allies would have to take it over.

The CDA and the VVD have adopted different positions in the event of the possible reduction of the number of cruise missiles in the Netherlands as a result of an arms control agreement being reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. The CDA believes that an imbalance in the field of medium-range weapons in Europe is acceptable if, in return, the Soviet Union is willing to make concessions to the United States in the field of strategic arms (intercontinental missiles). The VVD takes the view that only bilateral reductions are possible in the field of medium-range weapons. Nijpels said that the disappearance of all SS-20 missiles must be the balance for zero cruise missiles in Western Europe.

In a motion to the Second Chamber the Political Party of Radicals asked for the termination of all the Netherlands nuclear units. Pacifist Socialist Party Deputy Van der Spek and Mr Wagenaar (Ar '85) [expansion unknown], formerly of the Reformed Political Federation), were in agreement in their motions that there is no connection between the deployment of cruise missiles and the rejection of the Netherlands other nuclear units, but Van der Spek approved of such rejection while Wagenaar disapproved. From the small right-wing parties Schutte (Reformed Political Union) called for the retention of the nuclear role of Orion aircraft since their nuclear depth charges cannot be replaced by conventional torpedoes, as proposed by CDA Deputy De Vries, but would have to be taken over by other alliance members.

#### Deployment Approved Despite Opposition

PM201605 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 14 Nov 85 pp 1, 3

[Correspondents report: "Second Chamber Majority Approves Cruise Missile Deployment"]

[Text] The Hague, 14 Nov -- A majority in the Second Chamber has approved the deployment of cruise missiles at the end of 1988. Because six members of the Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] parliamentary group opposed deployment the majority was only possible with the cooperation of the Political Reformed Party [SGP] the Reformed Political Union [GPV], the Reformed Political Federation [RPF], and Deputies Wagenaar and Janmaat. A Labor Party [PvdA] motion rejecting the deployment decision was rejected as a result by 80 votes to 69 (PvdA Deputy Zijlstra is still at the United Nations in New York).

At the end of the chamber debate yesterday evening, PvdA parliamentary group leader Den Uyl tried in vain to move the government to reconsider the situation and that the fact that the majority was only possible with the report of the small right-wing parties. According to Den Uyl the legitimacy of the government decision has been affected by the lack of full support from the government parties' parliamentary groups. Through the vote by six CDA members in favor of the PvdA motion, the deployment decision received indirectly the support of only 73 members of the coalition parties. Den Uyl said that such a situation must have repercussions for implementation of the deployment decision.

"On a major point in his policy the prime minister is losing the full support of the coalition parties. That is no disgrace, but it must have repercussions for the future decisionmaking process," Den Uyl said.

The prime minister rejected the PvdA leader's argument. The prime minister said that it was unfair that the votes of the members of the government parties should carry greater weight than those of members of other parties. He pointed out that in the past, important decisions have been made in votes of 76 to 74. This division of votes was seen a few years ago in the decision to legalize abortion.

Representatives of the SGP, the GPV and the RPF who supported the government decision in favor of deployment strongly opposed Den Uyl's views. Schutte (GPV) said that the support of parties which are not part of the government coalition do not weaken the chosen policy, but rather strengthen it. Van Rossum (SGP) noted a connection with past statements from Den Uyl who had described the small right-wing parties as "democratic." Leerling (RPF) said that by brushing aside the support of the small right-wing parties Den Uyl was "disenfranchising" half a million citizens..

In the name of the six dissident CDA deputies (Beinema, Couprie, Kraaijeveld-Wouters, De Kwaadsteniet, Laning-Boersema, and Van der Toorn) Beinema said that their voting behavior was not a vote of no confidence in or rejection of the government policy, nor did they wish to call the legitimacy of the decision reached into question. Den Uyl repeated the view that the absence of support from a majority of the government parties "has its constitutional effect" and forces the government to reconsider its decision.

A second chamber majority comprising the CDA, the VVD and the small right-wing parties also rejected a D'66 motion calling for the postponement of a final decision on actual deployment by leaving the chamber's approval of the agreement with the United States until the end of 1988. PvdA and D'66 motions to terminate the nuclear role of the Netherlands Army's 203-mm artillery in northern Germany were rejected by the same majority. The same happened to a PvdA motion opposing the adaptation for nuclear use of the 155-mm artillery. The government described this motion as superfluous since a decision on this will not be taken until a later cabinet period.

A motion for the Political Party of Radicals calling for the rejection of all the nuclear roles carried out by the Netherlands Armed Forces and for a Netherlands refusal to accept any new ones was rejected by a very comfortable majority. This motion did, however, win the support of 11 members of the PvdA Second Chamber group. GPV and RPF motions calling respectively for the retention of one and both of the nuclear roles which the government wants to terminate (those carried out by the Orion and F-16 aircraft) were rejected by an overwhelming majority.

/9599

CSO: 5200/2555



## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PAPER: NEW GOVERNMENT COULD REVERSE DEPLOYMENT

PM181105 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 4 Nov 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Settling the Account"]

[Text] Last year's 1 June decision was to a large extent dictated by internal political necessity. At the time the Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] was, it seemed, not ripe for a deployment decision (even with the gift wrapping of fewer nuclear units). And, it seemed, the cabinet was not happy about the confrontation with a large section of society that considered Dutch participation in the nuclear arms race much worse than an (extremely marginal) infringement of NATO loyalty.

Has the cabinet won ground in the last 18 months? It would seem to have done so with CDA parliamentary deputies who quote Russian "unwillingness" to limit the numbers of SS-20's on Russia's territory to 378 as an excuse for deployment. Since the announcements by Gorbachev in Paris this excuse has narrowed to a numerically unknown, but certainly not large increase in the number of SS-20 missiles in eastern Siberia. Thus, 48 cruise missiles in Woensdrecht compensate for Vladivostok and environs.

This artificial excuse has been made to appear even more poverty-stricken by the cabinet's unwillingness to leave any real room for the changes of trade-offs even after 1 November. After the successful petition against cruise missiles, this seemingly dictatorial approach will not increase the cabinet's powers of persuasion in society. The CDA and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [VVD] do not have a strong standing and thus all the stage management (which reaches as far as Washington) is directed at eliminating any influence the voters might have on deployment.

The Netherlands is the only deploying country that is entering into an agreement with long-term validity. This is because of the domestic political risks, as Foreign Minister Van den Broek recently indicated. This agreement is being hurried and the CDA and the VVD are already shouting as loudly as they can that this instance of tactically used "international law" must be fully respected, regardless of political changes in the Netherlands.

It seems as if the cabinet only dared to take the deployment decision after society had been politically gagged by a trick, while this same trick is intended to continue to remain valid for years after the cabinet's death. (The cabinet has gotten so much into the swing of things that nuclear units and conventional expansion have been fixed by the cabinet also--something that in the absence of legal foundation must be said to be assuming a lot.)

It would be completely honest if the CDA and the VVD were to put their arguments to the voters, before they made final the--in actual fact superfluous--agreement with the United States. But parties which have made no progress in convincing society prefer to eschew this sort of honest course. They hurry to limit democratic possibilities. They ensconce themselves in the stronghold of the Binnenhof [parliament] and stick their fingers in their ears.

But the conflict about the cruise missiles will only be finally won if, on 21 May 1986, a parliamentary majority in favor of cruise missiles is elected. If the CDA and the VVD do not manage this, there is sufficient moral justification and enough practical possibilities to reverse this trick played before the elections.

The 1 November decision is--given its history; the unwillingness to show flexibility; the form it has been given which, from the democratic viewpoint, is highly dubious; the thrust toward increased militarization--a slap in the face for half of the Netherlands. That is not the way in which we in this country generally do political business.

But the fact is that honesty and the will to reconciliation have been mislaid by the CDA, and the result will alas be a tug-of-war. He who sows unnecessary bitterness will harvest polarization. The Netherlands can settle the account with the political tricksters and the supporters of more--militarily totally superfluous--arms on 21 May next year.

/6091

CSO: 5200/2554

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

LUBBERS LETTER ON CRUISE DEPLOYMENT PUBLISHED

PM071145 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 2 Nov 85 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Text of Lubbers Letter to Second Chamber"]

[Text] The most important part of the letter from Prime Minister Lubbers and the defense and foreign ministers to the Second Chamber on the cruise missile deployment decision:

's-Gravenhage, 1 November 1985

With reference to the letter to the Second Chamber of 1 June 1984 on the decision and relevant information with regard to cruise missiles and the Netherlands nuclear units, you are hereby presented with the conclusions which the Council of Ministers reached today in accordance with the 1 June decision.

The decision of 1 June 1984 affirmed that the Netherlands should make as good use as possible of the as yet open-ended decision on the possible future deployment of 48 cruise missiles in order to effect a turnabout in the buildup in the Soviet Union's SS-20 arsenal which has been observed to have been increasing since 1977.

In this the government allowed itself to be guided by the confident conviction that all possibilities of an arms control settlement should first be investigated, before it would reach a decision on the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands, as provided for in the NATO December 1979 two-track decision. At that time the Netherlands made a commitment to accept its share of an arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which would include the retention of a number of medium-range missiles. With this decision the government wanted to make it clear that the Netherlands did not want to dissociate itself from the alliance's endeavors to produce an adequate response to the threat from the SS-20's.

With the appeal to the Soviet Union contained in the 1 June decision the Netherlands intended, within the framework of the alliance's security policy, to produce its own impulse toward arms control. In concrete terms this appeal amounted to the Netherlands' preparedness to reject on 1 November 1985 the deployment of 48 cruise missiles if the number of 378

SS-20 missiles which the Soviet Union had at its disposal on 1 June 1984 were not to be increased or, if increases had taken place, were brought back to this level.

As a result of this, through the medium of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the necessary safer and more evenly balanced situation between East and West in Europe could be reached--and for this ongoing reductions are necessary.

After the Second Chamber debate of 12 and 13 June 1984 the government informed the Soviet Union of the decision in writing and explained it to the Soviet Government. Since then on some four occasions, particularly during his visit to Moscow in April of this year, the foreign minister has explained in detail to his Soviet counterparts, both Mr Gromyko and Mr Shevardnadze, the significance of the 1 June decision and the wish of the government to arrive at arms control and arms reductions along the road set out in the decision. He has also made the Netherlands' appeal known to other East European counterparts, both in East European capitals and in The Hague.

In an exchange of letters with Soviet party leader Gorbachev the prime minister has made an urgent request that he pay heed to the government's arms control appeal.

From the letter from party leader Gorbachev received last week the government has been forced to note to its disappointment that the Soviet Union has not appeared to be prepared to come to meet our endeavors aimed at arms control and arms reductions as expressed in the 1 June decision. As is also apparent from alliance figures which are based on the most recent information provided by the United States the number of SS-20's is at present higher than 378. During the general political debate in the Second Chamber you continued to fully support the wish of some deputies to again postpone the final decision on the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands in the light of the recent announcement by the Soviet Union with regard to the number of SS-20 missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union and the forthcoming meeting between the U.S. President and Soviet Russian leader Gorbachev.

In that debate and during the debate on the Soviet Union's message of 30 October the government explained that the postponement of a decision would do damage to the credibility of Netherlands' policy and to the Netherlands' credibility as a NATO partner. And to the Soviet Union postponement would be the wrong signal. The Soviet Union could take further postponement as a sign that there is still a chance to achieve a unilateral reduction on the Western side without negotiations.

And at the forthcoming summit conference between party leader Gorbachev and President Reagan a Netherlands' postponement could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a weakening of the Western position and as a sign of divisions within the Western world.

The government intends to shed the Netherlands' current nuclear tasks which are at present carried out by the Orion and F-16 aircraft. Bearing in mind the military-technical situation, this will be synchronized with the actual deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. The government does not consider it responsible to shed or reduce its nuclear tasks which are currently carried out by the Lance and the 8-inch howitzer.

The proposals worked out by SACEUR are being studied at present. It is expected that decisions on these proposals will have to be made in mid-1986. The government takes the view that the acceptance of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands and the retention and the adequate performance of nuclear tasks in the future--that is, those performed by short-range artillery and the Lance missile--represent a balanced contribution to the deterrent effect of NATO. In its consultations with its allies the government is also resolved to raise its intended policy of additional efforts in the field of conventional forces. What is intended here is an improvement in air defenses. The money that is required for this will be given priority within the framework of the long-term budget for the coming years.

Here the government would again like to state expressly that this decision does not represent an end to its undiminished endeavors toward arms control and arms reductions, but that it will continue to make forceful efforts within the framework of the alliance for the achievement of an arms control agreement between East and West--guided by the desire that lives everywhere in the Netherlands and abroad for security and peace. In accordance with this--as set forth in the agreement with the United States--in the correct circumstances the number of missiles to be deployed or already deployed in the Netherlands could be adjusted.

/6091

CSO: 5200/2556

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

LUBBERS CONSIDERS SEPARATE ARMS TALKS WITH USSR

PM201119 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 13 Nov 85 p 1

[Correspondents' report: "Lubbers: Geneva Summit Will Determine Arms Control"]

[Text] The Hague, 13 Nov -- The government continues to take the view that for future proposals on arms control the Netherlands should look primarily to the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, Prime Minister Lubbers was unwilling to rule out separate contacts with the Soviet Union. In the Second Chamber this morning Prime Minister Lubbers also stressed that significant arms reductions can only come about through the negotiations in Geneva. In the continuation of the Second Chamber debate on the 1 November decision made by the government, Lubbers rejected opposition leader Den Uyl's suggestions that he showed insufficient readiness for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

"I think it is going too far to attempt to create here an atmosphere of The Hague being unreasonable and Moscow being reasonable," Lubbers said. Yesterday Den Uyl accused Lubbers of making a mistake in not agreeing to Soviet proposals for more detailed negotiations between Moscow and The Hague. Lubbers called the latest proposal, delivered by Soviet Netherlands Ambassador Blatov on 30 October, "an empty box." He stressed that this proposal did not aim at negotiations but at the postponement of the Netherlands' decision -- a postponement which would have strengthened the Soviet Union's position in Geneva. When Christian Democratic Appeal parliamentary group leader De Vries asked whether any new proposals have been received from the Soviet Union since the 1 November decision, Lubbers said no new proposals have been received. Ambassador Blatov's suggestion, made over the weekend following 1 November, that despite the 1 November decision Moscow still wanted separate contacts with the Netherlands has not been followed by other official signals. Lubbers expressed the view that possible new signals from Moscow are to be expected after the negotiations in Geneva.

/9599

CSO: 5200/2555

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PPR TO EMPLOY NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TO MISSILES

PM211157 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Nov 85 p 3

[Correspondents report: "PPR Wants Nonviolent Resistance to Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] Den Bosch, 18 Nov -- The executive of the Political Party of Radicals [PPR] must develop proposals for the conduct of forms of nonviolent resistance to the deployment of cruise missiles. The PPR congress passed a resolution to this effect at a meeting in Den Bosch on Saturday, 16 November.

The congress also called on all members not to pay a symbolic sum of personal taxes as a protest against the deployment of cruise missiles. The money withheld would then be paid into a peace fund by the PPR members.

The PPR party executive was also instructed by the congress to stimulate the discussion on nonviolent resistance to cruise missile deployment within the party. The person who put forth the resolution which won the congress' support said that nonviolent resistance is not in conflict with democracy: "it is the government which is undermining democracy."

Next year the PPR will take part independently in the Second Chamber elections. After the elections the party will attempt to enter into close cooperation in the chamber with the Communist Party of the Netherlands and the Evangelical People's Party. An attempt by the congress to call for cooperation with the Pacifist Socialist Party [PSP] was brought up, but party chairman De Boer voiced strong reservations. "The PSP remains welcome, but self-respect does mean that you cannot go on endlessly offering cooperation," he said. A PSP congress recently opposed, by a small majority, cooperation among the small left-wing parties.

The congress elected Zutphen local councillor Janneke van der Plaat as the new party chairman. Her profile in the party is as an advocate of continued cooperation among the small left-wing parties.

/9599

CSO: 5200/2555

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

NETHERLANDS TO REDUCE NATO NUCLEAR ROLE--The Hague, Nov 29 (AFP)--The Netherlands has turned down a NATO request to reconsider a decision to reduce significantly its overall nuclear role in the Western alliance, Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers said here today. He said the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had requested the reconsideration of plans to axe four of its six nuclear roles in the alliance. Mr Lubbers said the turn down was linked with the announcement in November to go ahead with the deployment here of 48 U.S. cruise missiles. The Netherlands intends to discontinue anti-submarine missions with nuclear depth charges, to abolish Dutch responsibility for atomic mines, the Nike air defence system and nuclear warheads on F-16 planes. The Hague has said it is willing to continue its remaining two nuclear-related roles concerning army artillery and Lance missiles. A ranking U.S. official who requested anonymity had said in Brussels that the "Dutch intended reduction had no rationale" and would have "serious negative effects on NATO's nuclear defence posture and allied deterrence." The official said the NATO allies had "strongly urged the Netherlands to reconsider their decision" and that Washington had written to the Dutch Government. The Dutch decision, which will be on the agenda at a NATO defence ministers' meeting next week came against a backdrop of general elections next year and a large pacifist movement. [Text] [Paris AFP in English 1748 GMT 29 Nov 85 AU] /6091

CSO: 5200/2562



JPRS-TAC-85-066  
18 December 1985

RELATED ISSUES

ABE WANTS TO PROMOTE 'DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY'

OW240526 Tokyo KYODO in English 0503 GMT 24 Nov 85

[Text] Tokyo, Nov 24 KYODO -- Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said Sunday Japan will promote its "disarmament diplomacy" following the success of the summit in Geneva between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

Japan wants to work hard "to create an international climate in which the agreements reached at the summit will be realized steadily," said Abe at a Sunday talk program of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK). The foreign minister noted that Japan has presented a proposal aimed at a gradual banning of nuclear arms testing to the Geneva disarmament conference. The Japanese government hopes to obtain approval of the proposal from world nations, Abe said.

He also hoped that the successful summit in Geneva will have a good influence on his talks in Tokyo next January with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. "I would like to see the same good atmosphere emerging at the meeting (with Shevardnadze) as that of the U.S.-Soviet summit," Abe said.

Abe said he will explain to Shevardnadze Japan's basic stand that it wants to start negotiations with Moscow for a peace treaty, which will cover the territorial issue concerning the Soviet-held northern islands off Hokkaido. Abe said he hopes his frank discussions with Shevardnadze will lead to an improvement in Japan-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze is coming to Tokyo as the first Soviet foreign minister to do so in 10 years.

/9599

CSO: 5260/016

END