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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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13 December 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT
 ARMS CONTROL
 CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

Effectiveness of U.S. SDI Effort Downplayed
 (Peter Bretschneider; Karl-Marx-Stadt FREIE PRESSE,
 24 Aug 85) 1

FRG Funds Eureka in 1986, Sets Terms for Further Financing
 (Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 2 Sep 85). 4

Briefs

Beijing Interested in Eureka 6

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

Soviet Expectations for Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting Discussed
 (Various sources, various dates) 7

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Report, by Radomir Bogdanov 7

Propaganda Campaign 'Unabated' 9

'Meeting of Hope' 10

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Comment, by V. Kobyshev 12

'Honest, Unprejudiced Discussion' Advocated,
 by Yevgeniy Makarov 13

PRAVDA Discusses Prospects, by Nikolay Kurdyumov 16

Calls for 'Wisdom' at Geneva, by V. Bolshakov 19

USSR's Lomeyko Interviewed 21

TASS Calls New U.S. Proposals 'Digital Variation'
 (Moscow TASS, 14 Nov 85) 25

TASS: U.S. Needs To 'Reconsider' Position on Arms
 (Moscow TASS, 17 Nov 85) 28

USSR Views Effects of Weinberger's Letter on Talks
 (Various sources, various dates) 29

Shows 'Internal Struggle' 29

Attempt To 'Torpedo' Talks, by Ye. Grigoryev,
 T. Kolesnichesko 30

'Distortion of Facts' 32

'Notorious Letter', by Dmitriy Biryukov 33

USSR: Nitze Remarks Highlight Problems at Arms Talks (Various sources, various dates)	34
Bogachev Comments	34
'Gray Hawk', by I. Zakharov	36
'Unseemly Propaganda Maneuvers', by V. Bolshakov	38
UK Labor Party Leader Cited on Summit Issues in PRAVDA (A. Maslennikov; Moscow PRAVDA, 8 Nov 85)	39
USSR's Zagladin, Afanasyev Interviewed on Talks Issues by Italian Paper (Giulietto Chiesa; Milan L'UNITA, 10 Nov 85)	40
FRG's Kohl Expresses 'Subdued Optimism' on Summit (Helmut Kohl Interview; Mainz ZDF Television Network, 17 Nov 85)	43
FRG CDU's Ruehe, SPD's Ehmke on Geneva Summit (Mainz ZDF Television Network, 21 Nov 85)	45
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
Danish Book on Deployment of U.S. Missiles in Europe Reviewed (K. Voronov; Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 7, Jul 85)	47
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
Soviet Paper Links AIDS Epidemic to CIA Experiments (Valentin Zapevalov; Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 30 Oct 85)	50
FRG's Kohl Receives GDR Reply on Chemical Weapons Zone (Hamburg DPA, 8 Nov 85)	51
FRG Receives Notes From GDR, CSSR on Chemical Weapons (Hamburg DPA, 13 Nov 85)	52
RELATED ISSUES	
Overview of International Events (March-May 1985) (V. Babak, Yu. Krashennnikov; Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 7, Jul 85)	53

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. SDI EFFORT DOWNPLAYED

Karl-Marx-Stadt FREIE PRESSE in German 24 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Peter Bretschneider]

[Text] "I am giving directives for comprehensive and intensive efforts to prepare a long-range research and development program in order to reach our final goal of eliminating the threat of strategic nuclear missiles." With these words the President of the United States Ronald Reagan addressed scientists in the United States in a televised speech on 23 March 1983.

As was expected, "proof" for the threat to the United States by strategic nuclear missiles was of course given as the "permanent Russian danger." What kind of "danger" comes, in fact, from the East was made clear by the Soviet Union a few months before Reagan's television appearance: Before the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament Questions in June 1982 the USSR solemnly promised never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. To this day the United States has not joined the USSR in this exemplary step.

Washington's plans for developing new space weapons were given the name "star wars" program after a film made in Hollywood in 1977. In order to hide Washington's true intentions and also to quiet the waves of protest that soon began all over the world--including in the United States itself and also among the NATO allies--the concept of Strategic Defense Initiative, abbreviated SDI, was introduced later on. This is a terribly macabre game of word distortion by Washington because SDI has just about as much to do with defense as does a small camp fire with a deliberately set large fire.

The actual aims pursued by Washington in materializing these plans are made clear in a statement by U.S. Under Secretary for the Air Force Aldridge: "We don't have to strain our imagination in order to see that the nation that controls space also controls the world."

And this is exactly the decisive point. The key words are not protection or defense but rather offense and destruction. The policy that certain western politicians and media praise in well-sounding words as the security intentions of the United States turns out to be in fact an elusive but dangerous attempt to gain military superiority with space weapons, to be able to make a first strike against the Soviet Union and, at the same time, eliminate the danger of a destructive counterstrike.

The U.S. star wars program has several components. Washington plans a satellite defense system in which airplanes can fire missiles with killer satellites at space objects. Work is also done on a laser weapons station in space and on other ray weapons that can destroy objects in space as well as on earth.

The U.S. Space Agency NASA is also fully integrated into the star wars project. Four out of five space shuttle flights are planned for military purposes of the Pentagon. The reusable space shuttle is expected to serve, among other things, as a carrier system for ray and nuclear weapons that can destroy within the shortest time targets on earth from space. Work is also done on test models of cosmic electro-magnetic canons as well as command posts on artificial earth satellites.

The planned missile defense system which is called "Reagan umbrella" in the United States is a three-layer project. In the first belt Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles--that have survived the American first strike--are expected to be destroyed while still in the stages of lift-off and ascent [with weapons] from a space platform. The second belt's job is to destroy--likewise with space-based ray weapons--intercontinental missiles that have passed through the first belt. The third belt, finally, is expected to destroy with ground-to-space weapons missiles that have penetrated close to their targets after their re-entry into the atmosphere.

There are several imperialist politicians and media that would like to make it appear that the Reagan umbrella is absolutely safe and that all possible countermeasures are useless. This is however not the case. Even hard-core supporters of SDI speak only of a 95 percent safety of the umbrella.

Considering the fact that at the present time there are from about 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, 5 percent of the retaliatory potential would be approximately 1,500 nuclear warheads that would reach their targets. Based on Western computations, however, even 1 percent of the existing nuclear warheads is sufficient to destroy all important targets in the Soviet Union and the United States.

Beyond this simple computation with all its possibilities there are other scientific-technical variants that could have considerable negative influence on the effectiveness of a missile umbrella of this kind. The inescapable conclusions would be the continuous perfection of the missile systems on both sides and that, in fact, would mean an armament race without limitations. Finally, history has proven that every weapon has eventually always found its counterweapon.

The question remains how the militarization of space planned by the United States can be prevented. The answer is given in the many constructive peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. This policy, marked by reason and realism, is an encouragement for all those forces in the world that are interested in eliminating the dangers of nuclear war, in stopping the arms race on earth, and in preventing its proliferation into space.

In East and West voices are getting stronger and stronger that expect that Washington will finally respond positively to the numerous Soviet proposals. The chief delegate of the U.S. delegation at the negotiations on the Salt I treaty, Gerald C. Smith, stated recently: "Instead of raising false hopes for an impenetrable defense system, Washington should concentrate on submitting negotiable proposals for new agreements in Geneva and on keeping already existing agreements."

This is the only way in which "star wars" will remain what it still is: a macabre film from the Hollywood studios.

8889/12947
CSO: 5200/3002

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG FUNDS EUREKA in 1986, SETS TERMS FOR FURTHER FINANCING

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 2 Sep 85 p 13

[Text] K B Bonn 1 September. The Federal Government evidently wants to make plans now for support funds for the expanded technical European cooperation within the Eureka program (agreed upon at the "Milan Summit"). It is expected in Bonn that the government will submit to the Bundestag Budget Committee during its impending discussions a plan that is to introduce binding appropriations authority for Eureka into the 1986 draft budget. This authority includes provisional calculations of expenditures for the project development in later years.

Direct cash contributions to the Eureka program are not to be made at the present time. The Research Ministry insists that cash contributions will be required in 1987 at the earliest. It is conceivable, however, that direct appropriations will be made for research projects that have already been started and that the FRG as a rule supports with a contribution of 50 percent of the costs after consultation with the partner enterprises or research institutes in European cooperation projects. The French government has already announced that it plans the equivalent of DM 300 million as first installment for Eureka. The British government, on the other hand, believes that the projects could be financed mostly by private industry if they are selected correctly, i.e., with the proper market orientation.

The fact that binding appropriations authorizations for Eureka are already included in the 1986 budget is considered by the Federal Government as an additional indication from Bonn for the European partners that the FRG is ready for close cooperation in the Eureka program. CDU budget expert Lutz Stavenhagen, who is in charge of research appropriations, considers the Eureka initiative as an opportunity to develop jointly advanced technology for the market of 280 million Europeans. Stavenhagen however also warns of going astray with the Eureka project. He believes that through the influence of other countries previous mistakes of German support must not be repeated to the extent that public financing is used for something that nobody needs afterwards. An example of this kind of mistake was support for the AEG computer during the first computer program of the Federal Government. In the end, this expensive computer was turned over as a gift to several universities.

In regard to the development of the Eureka program Stavenhagen makes the following demands: the market for technology in Europe must, first of all, be made uniform through norms, standardization and a procurement policy, reaching beyond national boundaries, of public employers, especially the postal and railroad systems. This is even more important, Stavenhagen believes, than the selection of appropriate projects. In selecting projects, he continues, strict attention must be paid that no money is spent and no development begun blindly, but rather that there is a clear analysis of marketing prospects for a development. In cases where there is a need but not yet a market, as is the case with some environmental protection projects, Stavenhagen believes that it is a public responsibility to guarantee financing. The stronger the market orientation of a project, the less the government should be expected to pay. This basic attitude of orderly political progress in support policy cannot be imposed on all other 16 Eureka partners by the Federal Government, but the Federal Government does not have to cooperate when projection and development of a planned project does not correspond with its orderly policy.

In determining if and to what extent the Federal Government assists in financing certain projects, pressure may be exerted from the outside on the government. The Federal Government would practically be forced to give assistance if a German and a French firm wanted to materialize a large project and if Paris participated from the beginning in financing this project. Individual German firms have already informed the Research Ministry that they can participate in certain projects only if Bonn gives financial support.

8889/9435
CSO: 3698/58

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

BEIJING INTERESTED IN EUREKA--Beijing (AFP)-- Possibilities of cooperation in the peaceful use of space were discussed yesterday at a meeting of French Foreign Minister Dumas with his Chinese counterpart Wu Xueqian [as published] in Peking. Members of the French delegation report that the ministers discussed disarmament problems. Both sides are reported to have emphasized unanimously that space should not be used for military purposes. It was reported that Wu Xueqian listened to a thorough explanation of the French Eureka project of European cooperation in developing first-rate technologies, a project that the Paris government envisions as an alternative to the U.S. SDI program. The report continues that Peking is in favor of the Eureka project and is interested in examining possibilities of cooperation between France and China in peaceful space exploration. [Excerpts] [West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL in German 31 Aug 85 p 5] 8889/9435

CSO: 3698/58

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET EXPECTATIONS FOR REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING DISCUSSED

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Report

PM121134 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Nov 85 First Edition p 5

[Article by Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, under the rubrics "Before the Geneva Meeting" and "Arguments and Facts": "Time for Crucial Decisions"]

[Text] Representatives of the present Republican administration show irritation at negative assessments of their many years of activity, which has heightened tension in the international arena and considerably worsened Soviet-U.S. relations. It is noteworthy that such assessments come not just from the Soviet Union and nonaligned countries, but also from states which are NATO allies of the United States.

The bitter truth, though, has to be faced. In any event, if you judge by deeds rather than by words, international tension is growing. The threat of a nuclear missile catastrophe is not waning. Mountains of weapons have been stockpiled and their production and modernization are being accelerated. The world today is not simply a "power keg," but something far more dangerous -- a concentration of the most up-to-date means of exterminating mankind. But even this turns out to be inadequate -- gigantic new arms programs are being feverishly developed and implemented. More and more new refinements are being made to extremely dangerous strategic concepts, despite the fact that our planet is too small and too fragile for strongarm politics.

As for the Soviet Union, it is doing and will continue to do everything possible to live in peace with states belonging to the other system. **THE CPSU ADVOCATES NORMAL, STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES,** [uppercase passage published in boldface] The draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses, "which presuppose noninterference in internal affairs, respect for each other's legitimate interests, recognition and real implementation of the principle of identical security, and the establishment of the greatest possible trust on this basis." Our foreign policy priorities are based above all on an interest in peace and in a stable international situation which would make it possible to focus attention and resources on creative work. We are resolute opponents of the arms race on earth and its transfer to space. This dangerous process must be stopped and disarmament must be urgently tackled.

This is precisely the goal served by the Soviet proposals expounded by M.S. Gorbachev in France. What is striking above all is the scale and realistic nature of the Soviet initiatives aimed at strengthening strategic stability and therefore, general security. The Soviet initiative's realism lies in the fact that it did not emerge in a vacuum.

USSR-U.S. military-strategic parity persists. The unlimited-duration Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems remains in force. The Salt II treaty is observed in practice. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three media are in force. These most important agreements provide the basis for further steps in the disarmament sphere.

The Soviet Union has taken a number of measures to create a favorable atmosphere for curbing the arms race. In 1982 the USSR unilaterally assumed a commitment not to be the first to use unclear weapons and called on other nuclear powers to follow its example. The USSR has unilaterally suspended the further deployment of its medium-range missiles and the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe and has called on the United States to respond in kind. The USSR also unilaterally decided to end all nuclear explosions as of 6 August 1985 and proposed to the United States that it take a similar step. No one should be in any doubt: Our country will not be the first to move into space with weapons.

What is the essence of the Soviet proposals? They constitute an integral program of specific measures. First, they are wholly in accord with the principle of equality and identical security of the sides. Second, their implementation would make it possible to halt the further buildup of nuclear arsenals and to eventually eliminate them. Third, space is not to be militarized, but should be kept exclusively for peaceful use for the good of all mankind.

The Soviet Union has proposed to the U.S. Government that agreement be reached on a complete ban for both sides on space strike arms and a really radical, 50 percent reduction in their nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. Earlier, even before talks in Geneva, the USSR proposed lowering the level of strategic arms by 25 percent. Now, however, readiness has been expressed to carry out more radical cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR. It is no accident that it is a matter of a reduction in the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. After all, it is no secret that U.S. medium-range facilities deployed in West European NATO countries can reach targets on the USSR's territory and constitute a serious addition to the U.S. strategic arsenal.

If the Soviet proposals are implemented, the total number of Soviet and U.S. nuclear facilities capable of reaching each other's territory will amount respectively to 1,250 and 1,680 units. That is, the Soviet Union agrees to the United States' having a certain advantage in terms of the number of delivery vehicles. The USSR does so bearing in mind that after the 50 percent cut in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the sides will have an identical number of nuclear charges -- 6,000 units each. A rough strategic equilibrium would thus be ensured. Since strategic offensive facilities are similar to one another in terms of their destructive capabilities, they must be regarded and evaluated together, as a single whole. This has always been the ultimate basis of talks. That is precisely why the Soviet proposal provides that no one component of either side's strategic "triad" constitute more than 60 percent of the total number of charges (6,000 units) remaining after the reduction. Such an approach does not demand a radical restructuring of the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces since each component of the "triad," including Soviet ICBM's would be subject to reduction.

Of course, a 50 percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. nuclear missiles capable of reaching the other's territory is only possible if an accord on a complete ban on space strike arms is achieved. That is an honest and fair approach. We are ready to talk

only about the nonmilitarization of space. In place of "star wars" plans, we propose a program of "star peace."

The Soviet proposals on radically reducing nuclear arms and on the nonmilitarization of space have been the focus of discussion by U.S. politicians and public figures. The U.S. Administration, while not rejecting as a whole the new major initiatives made by the Soviet Union, is making considerable efforts to discredit them. The U.S. Administration is worried by the fact that even NATO countries regard these proposals with enthusiasm. That is why louder and louder calls are coming from these U.S. figures who want to deadlock the chance of reaching mutually acceptable solutions as deeply as possible, gain time for implementing the SDI program, and ultimately, achieve military advantages over the Soviet Union.

In order to sow distrust of the new Soviet peace initiatives leading U.S. figures are seeking to convince the public that rough military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States does not exist at the moment and that the United States allegedly "lags" far behind the USSR in terms of strategic offensive arms. It is also claimed that the USSR has shot ahead in the sphere of creating [sozdaniye] an ABM defense of the country's territory. Old arguments! And an old falsehood! The truth is that rough equilibrium in strategic arms does exist between the USSR and the United States. Compared with 1979, when the SALT II treaty was signed, the number of the two sides' strategic delivery vehicles has not changed.

Propaganda Campaign 'Unabated'

LD112258 Moscow TASS in English 2247 GMT 11 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 11 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

With the USSR-U.S. Geneva summit meeting approaching, many questions occur to the people keeping an eye over the shaping of the American stance at the upcoming summit meeting. No, one cannot complain of a shortage of peaceful assurances in Washington. But one cannot overlook another thing: the obvious attempt to sink in the flood of pseudo-peaceful assurances the real hope for a possibility of attaining in Geneva constructive decisions, above all, an accord on the cardinal question of the present -- how to stop the nuclear arms race and turn it back, to prevent it from spreading to boundless outer space.

The propaganda campaign is under way in Washington, unabated. The aim of that campaign is to diminish the significance of the concrete Soviet proposals which were appraised on their merits all over the world, the proposals which now present a unique possibility to agree on a radical reduction of strategic nuclear armaments, medium-range nuclear weapons, on non-militarization of outer space. Seeking to relegate to the background questions of disarmament, the White House launched "smokescreen diplomacy," and put to the fore the question of "settlement" of regional conflicts. The American press reports that the United States intends to burden the Geneva meeting agenda by bringing there a list of all sorts of "problems" and "questions" the number of which has already exceeded two dozen. It is clear that a mere enumeration of these problems, and the translation to that, will take a lot of time in Geneva and there will be no time left for a thorough discussion of the problems uppermost in the minds of the peoples of the whole world.

What strikes the eye is "toughness" with regard to Moscow that Washington has obviously been demonstrating in the past few days. Primarily this concerns the main question -- prevention of the arms race in outer space and its termination on earth. The President and his aides declare, vying with each other, that the United States would never give up the Strategic Defence Initiative, that it will unfold it in any case, should it be at the disposal of the United States. To anybody, including Americans, and this is shown by public opinion polls, it is clear that the U.S.-propagandized Strategic Defence Initiative, if it is realized, would bar, like a huge log, any advancement towards disarmament and, moreover, make the nuclear arms race an uncontrolled process.

Such a stand of the U.S. official circles meets undisguised irritation even among U.S. NATO allies. It is being increasingly stronger criticized in the United States itself, and this is being done by the people who more comprehensively understand the substance of the matter than some representatives of the U.S. Administration. Former U.S. Defence Minister Robert McNamara said in an ABC TV programme that realization of the Strategic Defence Initiative had the aim to create the first-strike potential. The USSR, he stressed, would never agree to limitation of its offensive armaments, if the United States does not give up SDI works. One of the leaders of the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike, writes in the newspaper THE LOS ANGELES TIMES that Reagan continues stubbornly insisting on SDI realization, thus bringing to zero chances of attaining accords with the USSR. The world public, the peoples of the whole world demand that Washington should give up its non-constructive stand. They are awaiting from the U.S. Administration a realistic, sober approach to the principal question of the present and its constructive discussion in Geneva, but not empty assurances of it wanting "to make the world safer." As to the Soviet Union, it is ready to see to it that the meeting of the leaders of the two great powers should be efficiently held and justify the aspirations of the peoples.

'Meeting of Hope'

LD131219 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 13 Nov 85

[Text] The Geneva paper VOIX OUVRIERE has called the forthcoming event a 'meeting of hope.' This is a very accurate description. Throughout the world, people are hoping that the meeting between the leaders of the two great powers will serve to improve the international situation, make the threat of nuclear war more remote, and strengthen the cause of peace. I quote as an example the remarks of Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India. In one of his recent interviews, he said: We would like the Geneva meeting to bring significant results in the matter of disarmament, because this is now the most important problem. Many statesmen and public figures, eminent scientists -- for example, doctors of 16 European states who recently assembled for their first regional symposium in Brussels -- are currently expressing themselves in the same spirit.

This is not limited to expressions of good wishes. In many countries, active demonstrations in defense of peace are now taking place. These include the blockade of U.S. bases in Belgium and Greece, mass demonstrations demanding the liquidation of such bases in Spain, and the refusal of the staff of many FRG universities to take part in the production of American space weapons. In the United States itself, more and more voices are being heard warning of the dangers of Washington's "star wars" plans. One notable fact: Six former U.S. defense secretaries issued a joint statement calling on the administration to avoid actions that could undermine the Soviet-American treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems and to work for agreement on this question in Geneva. By

the way, the results of a recent U.S. opinion poll showed that an absolute majority of Americans, 63 percent, hope that accords will be reached in Geneva that will enable the danger of nuclear war to be reduced.

At the same time, something else has to be said. Recently, when the subject of the forthcoming meeting in Geneva has come up, markedly gloomy voices have been heard from Washington. They are appealing strongly there not to nurture excessive hopes nor to hold great expectations. Nitze, the President's adviser on arms reduction problems, addressing foreign journalists, even asserted that the question of arms control will not be discussed at Geneva at all. Why not? Hasn't the USSR set out quite specific proposals to reduce strategic weapons by half and to renounce space-based strike weapons altogether? Isn't our country backing up its proposals with actual deeds, from halting all nuclear tests to withdrawing from service a certain number of our medium-range missiles in Europe? And finally, haven't the American experts themselves, including those who were recently negotiating with us on strategic arms limitation, admitted that the USSR's new peace initiatives have created a favorable situation for the solution of a number of problems in curbing the arms race? Whence such passivism on the part of official Washington?

It seems to me that in order to answer this question, it is worth looking, for example, at the latest edition of the American business journal BUSINESS WEEK. It publishes the latest data on the profits of the leading U.S. firms for the third quarter of the current year. And an eloquent conclusion can be drawn from them: The greatest profits are being made by the firms in the arms business.

The overall record holder is the electronics firm IBM. In the third quarter, it made almost \$1.5 billion pure profit. The same tendency can be seen in other military firms. Martin Marietta, which produces the notorious Pershings, increased its profits by 40 percent this year. Northrop Corporation, which specializes in the aerospace business, registered a still greater growth of profits: 67 percent.

All this causes my American colleague Joseph Harsch, observer of THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, to come to the conclusion that tension in Soviet-American relations is beneficial primarily to the military industrialists. Contractors eager to take part in the production of modern military space equipment are lining up by the hundreds at the Pentagon's doors. It is this very American military-industrial complex which now, on the eve of the Geneva meeting, is doing all it can to complicate, if not altogether foil, the possibility of reaching Soviet-American accords on curbing the arms race. THE WASHINGTON POST writes plainly: The Pentagon leadership has organized a systematic campaign intended once and for all to halt the process of arms control.

Note, however, that the Pentagon is by no means almighty -- not even in America, let alone the rest of the world. World public opinion, as we see, is more and more insistently demanding that the arms race on earth be curbed and that it does not take place in space, and they cannot fail to take this into account in Washington too.

As for Moscow, it has again been authoritatively stated here recently that in politics we are supporters of a constructive dialogue and a search for mutually beneficial accords. This applies also to relations with the United States, including the forthcoming meeting in Geneva.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Comment

PM121429 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 85 p 9

[V. Kobysch "Observer's Opinion": "Before Geneva"]

[Text] It is a matter of days until the Geneva meeting. Naturally, the public in all countries, as we have already said, are attentively studying the speeches of the USSR and U.S. leaders, trying to discern their intentions and concrete actions in connection with the forthcoming summit meeting. They are studying them carefully and drawing the appropriate conclusions.

In this connection, particular attention was attracted by M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the 7 November reception in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. "In politics, we are supporters of constructive dialogue and the search for mutually advantageous accords," the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee stated. "This applies to mutual relations with the United States, too. As for the Soviet Union, it is not lacking in goodwill. It demonstrates this will in its actions. If a businesslike, constructive approach -- and we are prepared for such an approach -- prevails, the forthcoming meeting in Geneva could prove fruitful and serve to improve the international situation."

Now let us hear what people in Washington are saying these days. And they are saying a great deal of all kinds of things. It has become known that the White House has planned several major press conferences with the emphasis on the audience in West European countries. On the eve of the U.S. President's departure for Geneva, television has launched a whole campaign -- with predictions, forecasts, and even directives on how people should act there.

My own goal is more modest. I will not talk about what will be, but about what is. U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz returned to Washington after his talks in Moscow.

Immediately after his meeting with the U.S. President, the White House press secretary told journalists: "I want to warn you that differences remain between the sides, although success was achieved at the Moscow meeting in smoothing over these differences." Both G. Shultz himself and the U.S. President (who at the time was giving his latest interview to a group of correspondents from U.S. agencies) were asked about this trip. This was the question: "What would you like to see by way of results at the Geneva meeting?" The U.S. President answered: "I would not now reduce everything to the success or failure of the summit meeting. We intend to try to lessen the distrust. We have to live together on earth."

Good words, aren't they? But why is the U.S. press continuing to discuss Geneva in a minor key, persistently demonstrating that an accord on the main question -- the problems of security and disarmament -- is not yet in sight? I suggest that if you carefully study what is now being said in Washington on the main question, there are indeed some grounds for such gloomy conclusions. I wish to recall that when four of our journalists were received in the White House a few days ago, in the course of the conversation with them the U.S. President stressed repeatedly that the United States will not embark on the deployment of the program of so-called "strategic defense research" until it has held talks with the Soviet Union and the other nuclear

powers on the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms and until those countries have begun that reduction and elimination.

No more than a few days had passed when R. Reagan retracted this statement. At a press conference held the other day, asked how this withdrawal is to be understood, he stated clearly: "That was an incorrect interpretation of my words." And further: "That was an incorrect interpretation of my words." And further: "If we had a defensive system, we would embark on its deployment in any event." Secretary of State G. Shultz, for his part, stated that President Reagan "will never renounce SDI."

In this light, it is worth dwelling on Reagan's latest (regular) Saturday radio broadcast. He assured the listeners that the United States is embarking on the lengthy process of revealing the potential for the creation [sozdaniye] of a so-called "defense" in space. And when the research leads to the creation [sozdaniye] of some kind of "space defense shield," then the United States will offer all countries access to this U.S. "defensive system."

This reminds me of the story of the "Manhattan project," which is now common knowledge. Europe's best minds were involved, at that time, in the creation of the U.S. atom bomb. It was subsequently tested on the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was followed by Washington's proposal to create an international concern which would control atomic raw materials, while the overall monopoly of all this would remain with the United States.

History apparently repeats itself, although now we are assured that "star wars" are directed not against people, but against weapons.

The extent to which all this is not serious is realized by many people even in the United States. R. McNamara, former U.S. defense secretary, and G. Smith, former head of the U.S. delegation to the SALT I talks, have just subjected R. Reagan's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" to downright murderous criticism. The implementation of SDI, R. McNamara pointed out, pursues the goal of creating a first-strike potential. The USSR, he stated, will never accept the limitation of its offensive arms unless the United States renounces work within the SDI framework.

So much for talk, so much for action. On the threshold of Geneva, they must be known.

'Honest, Unprejudiced Discussion' Advocated

PM141655 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Nov 85 First Edition p 1

[Yevgeniy Makarov "International Review": "An Honest Dialogue Is Needed"]

[Text] With the approach of the Geneva summit meeting, demands to make the upcoming talks an important stage in the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation as a whole are being made with increasing persistence. The situation on the planet is too complex and acute. There are vast arsenals of mass destruction weapons. The process of the further buildup of the arms race is incredibly dangerous. This is why the actions of the international public, including the public on the other side of the ocean, in favor of honest and unprejudiced USSR-U.S. discussion are so strong.

The need to reach an agreement in Geneva on the question of reducing nuclear arsenals was mentioned, in particular, by the participants in the press conference held recently in Washington by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The White House desire to interpret "anew" the fundamental Soviet-American ABM Treaty has also been criticized by the public organization the National Campaign To Save the ABM Treaty. What is more, speaking in Washington, U.S. presidential adviser for national security affairs McFarlane himself admitted: "The country is living in expectation of the upcoming meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev."

Well, as we see, they count even in the White House. For what lies behind this admission is the results of numerous public opinion polls, and a significant majority of Americans insist on a constructive dialogue with the USSR. Some 92 percent of the U.S. population, against 5 percent, are certain that the USSR will never permit military superiority over itself. (Only a decade ago Americans still believed that the United States would be able to outdistance [obognat] the Soviet Union.) Finally, the President's adviser virtually states -- involuntarily, of course -- that his compatriots are fed up with the present administration's policy, which has led Soviet-U.S. relations into an impasse and brought the United States and the whole world to the brink of the nuclear abyss.

Is the administration justifying the expectations of its own people and of countries allied with the United States? Alas, the Washington leadership's rhetorical calls for peace and its practical deeds strikingly refute each other. "We are dragging heaven into hell" -- this was how the U.S. Union of Concerned Scientists succinctly and emotionally defined the Reagan administration's stand on the key question of the Soviet-U.S. talks, accusing it of intending to shift the arms race into space. The aggressive essence of the "star wars" program is manifested particularly noticeably when you compare it with the "star peace" concept which we propose.

President Reagan recently received representatives of U.S. conservative organizations behind closed doors. There were no official reports on the substance of the talks held in the White House. But, taking the President's position as his basis, D. Graham, former director of the Pentagon's intelligence agency, soon officially declared: Fulfillment of the SDI program will in no way be blocked by any agreement with the USSR. In this context the world has greeted with great doubt the White House statement that the United States is looking forward to the Geneva meeting with a view to "initiating an improvement in relations (with the Soviet Union) and beginning progress.."

Clear indications of uncertainty, contradiction, and confusion are easy to see in the actions of official Washington and its propaganda apparatus in this crucial period. A frantic operation is under way to rescue the "leader of the Western world's foreign policy and propaganda image on the eve of the Geneva meeting. Churchill once recommended: If your argument is weak, just raise your voice! So, in an interview with the U.S. NBC TV company, the head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva answered in the affirmative the question of whether he expected the struggle for public opinion between Washington and Moscow to continue; then, with a clear attempt at sarcasm that poorly concealed frank irritation, he added: "The Soviets, of course, are masters of such propaganda. This will end well for them."

It is hard to say whether there is more hypocrisy, cynicism, or elementary disregard for the facts in the words of the delegate from a country from which people expect a responsible, balanced approach to the fundamental problems of international relations. The U.S. Administration is deliberately shifting its emphasis. It is well aware that the Soviet side is thinking least of all about propaganda effects when it suggests that the United States examine its concrete foreign policy proposals.

To date, Washington has not been able to counter the USSR's position with anything other than routine verbal maneuvers. For example, last Saturday R. Reagan gave a radio address billed as an "important statement" on the Soviet-U.S. dialogue problem. For the umpteenth time recently, the President's comments again showed a dangerous tendency to manipulate words regarding SDI and its "peaceful purpose." With the best will in the world you cannot draw the conclusion from R. Reagan's speech that the U.S. side is prepared to meet the USSR halfway and make a real, and not merely verbal, contribution to the cause of disarmament. The Soviet Union's clear and constructive position forces the U.S. Administration literally at all levels to make unconvincing and persistent complaints about the "Soviets' propaganda offensive."

It is logical in its own way that this "offensive" should cause such a nervous reaction among those who, as the head of the U.S. military department acknowledges with hawk-like directness, are counting on "creating the most powerful possible" armaments. After all, the initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union are understood by all. The complete elimination of space strike armaments, the 50-percent reduction of the two countries' nuclear arsenals, and Europe's transformation into a real continent of peace and reliable security -- these are the points of our new proposals. The USSR was acting from a desire to help end the competition in the buildup of the nuclear arsenals when it announced the decision to unilaterally end all nuclear explosions on 6 August this year -- the 40th anniversary of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima. At the same time we proposed to Washington the resumption of talks on the complete banning of nuclear tests, so as to halt the arms race in the most dangerous -- qualitative -- area. The Soviet Union's unilateral commitment not to put antisatellite systems in space has been in force for 2 years now. Finally, the USSR initiated the historic commitment not to be first to use nuclear weapons. This is not a propaganda exercise but, as M.S. Gorbachev noted in his reply message to the leaders of the "Delhi six," a "real and practical formula for preventing the arms race..."

To these and many other Soviet initiatives Washington has responded and continues to respond in the negative. To the proposal to halve nuclear arsenals it responded with empty rhetoric. To the new initiatives to reduce military confrontation in the Old World, it responds by persisting in implementing its program to further saturate West European countries with medium-range nuclear weapons. To the Soviet moratorium it responded with an explosion in Nevada. To the Soviet UN proposal on peaceful outer space it responded with the testing of an ASAT system and the destruction in outer space of an actual space facility. Washington's call for constructive talks essentially disguise its long-standing design -- to achieve military superiority and exhaust us economically. A futile enterprise. They have not succeeded before, and they will not succeed now. The British ambassador in Washington, Wright, advising the United States to examine the realities of the present-day world more closely, says in the American newspaper NEWSDAY that "the USSR is a power which no one can order about, and the idea that it can be defeated by further armament is a piece of dangerous nonsense."

The USSR approaches the problems of Soviet-U.S. relations and the upcoming talks in Geneva from the standpoint of realism. "The Soviet Union advocates that the meeting should actually help resolve the central questions of our time, strengthen international peace and security, improve USSR-U.S. relations, curb the arms race, and prevent its extension to the expanses of outer space," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said during his meeting with a delegation from the Nobel Prize Winners Congress. Yes, honest, unprejudiced discussion imbued with a desire to find a way back from the brink of nuclear catastrophe is essential.

PRAVDA Discusses Prospects

PM161850 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Nikolay Kurdyumov "International Review"]

[Text] Responsible Approach

It can be said without exaggeration that the world is living in expectation of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva. Broad circles of the public in various countries are now following the preparations for it with exceptional attention and hope; and the upcoming talks on 19-20 November between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan, their importance, and their prospects, are the dominant theme in the world press. The following illustration is typical, in particular: A colossal "force" of journalists and observers — several thousand representatives of news agencies, newspapers, television, and radio from all parts of the world — has descended, so to speak, to cover the meeting between the two countries' leaders in Switzerland.

The tremendous attention being paid to the upcoming meeting and to Soviet-U.S. relations is understandable and natural. It is hard to overestimate the role and significance of Soviet-U.S. relations in the modern world. It is quite obvious that the international situation depends largely on the policy of the USSR and the United States and on the condition and development of relations between the two major countries in the world. Thus, as past experience shows, an improvement in relations has a favorable impact on the general world climate, while a deterioration in them leads inevitably to an increase in tension. Something else is also certain: the tremendous degree of responsibility borne by the two powers' leaders for the fate of peace on earth in our worrying, difficult time. Mankind has now reached a point where special wisdom in decisions, thoughtfulness [vzveshennost] and restraint in actions, and the consideration not only of national interests but also of the interests of the whole world community are required.

The Soviet Union is convinced that there can be no goals that would justify unleashing nuclear war. The Soviet and U.S. peoples, like all mankind, have a common enemy — the looming threat of nuclear war, and its danger is increasing as the arms race intensifies. Awareness of this danger and of our responsibility for the future of life on earth itself, the vital interests of the Soviet and U.S. peoples, and, finally, the dictates of reason urgently demand not confrontation but joint efforts aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat, curbing the arms race, resolutely improving Soviet-U.S. relations, and strengthening mutual trust.

It is precisely this that the Soviet Union is insistently calling for. "We in the USSR," M.S. Gorbachev declared in the course of the meeting in Moscow with a delegation of the Congress of Nobel Prize Winners, "believe that there is today no more urgent and important task than to block channels for the further stockpiling of nuclear weapons — and nuclear weapons of increasingly

sophisticated types — and at the same time to tightly close the door to the taking of weapons into space."

The Soviet Union's principled line vis-a-vis the United States and its unvarying and consistent course of peaceful coexistence were precisely and clearly reaffirmed in the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program. This fundamental document points out: "The CPSU is in favor of normal, stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which presuppose noninterference in internal affairs, respect for each other's legitimate interests, the recognition and implementation in practice of the principle of identical security, and the establishment of the greatest possible mutual trust on this basis. Differences of social system and ideology are no reason for tense relations." It is the CPSU's conviction, the document notes, that the policy of both powers "must be oriented toward mutual understanding, not toward enmity, which is fraught with the threat of catastrophic consequences."

The Soviet Union does not lack good will. It demonstrates by means of specific actions its sincere desire to secure a turn toward broad international cooperation and to sharply lower the level of military confrontation and its businesslike approach toward constructive dialogue in Geneva and the quest for mutually advantageous accords. Vivid confirmation of that is the whole complex of bold and large-scale initiatives, including the implementation of unilateral measures, which have aroused a tremendous international reaction and have met with approval from broad circles of the peace-loving public.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union — banning strike space arms and reducing by 50 percent the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching one another's territory — and also unilateral goodwill actions such as the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and the lowering of the number of SS-20 missiles in the European zone to the level of June of last year have met with unanimous support from the leaders of the socialist community countries. In the program document that was adopted the participants in the Sofia Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference reaffirmed the commonality of the positions of the fraternal parties and countries on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva and outlined real ways of returning international relations to the channel of detente.

In short, the Soviet side is going to Geneva for serious and productive work and is not going emptyhanded. It is no accident that many foreign observers, analyzing the Soviet peace initiatives in recent months — from the introduction of the unilateral

moratorium on any nuclear explosions to the all-embracing proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to France — conclude that the USSR's approach to the vital problems of our time is consistent and realistic.

Washington's Maneuvers

What is official Washington's position on the threshold of the Geneva meeting? Is the U.S. Administration prepared to travel its half of the way toward the USSR and to contribute to preventing the militarization of space and radically reducing arms on earth?

Despite the numerous assurances and declarations issuing from the White House recently regarding the U.S. desire to make the world "safer" and regarding the fact that our peoples "must live in peace," that the United States has no "hostile intentions" with regard to the USSR, and that "nuclear war must be prevented," in practice the U.S. Administration's approach to the Geneva talks can in no way be called constructive. The point is not only the tendency displayed in the U.S. ruling circles to avoid a fair solution of the most vital problems of our time by pushing them into the background, and not only the attempts to distort the meaning of the Soviet initiatives or deliberately belittle the possibility of achieving progress at the Geneva meeting. There is a clear intention to remove from discussion questions connected with the U.S. plans for militarizing outer space in the hope of using the latest scientific and technical achievements to break through into space with strike weapons and to secure strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union.

It is precisely this that is the point of the "star wars" program. And no matter what tricks the United States resorts to in order to portray the "Strategic Defense Initiative" venture as virtually a "boon" for mankind, nothing can conceal its sinister aggressive essence as part of far-reaching hopes of world domination. These imperial dreams and aspirations are shown, for instance, by a revealing remark by Edward Aldridge, Jr, U.S. under secretary of the Air Force. "There is no need to be specially imaginative," he declared, "to see that the country that controls outer space can control the whole world."

Many people inside and outside the United States note the futility of such hopes. "It is necessary to abandon the idea that technical innovations will ever make it possible to win a nuclear war or to protect a country involved in it from total annihilation," Jerome Wiesner, former special assistant for science and technology to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and now honorary president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, warns authoritatively. The people who are warning of the exceptionally dangerous nature of the "star wars" plans formulated by the Reagan administration also include former Pentagon boss Robert McNamara. He has noted that the program is aimed at smashing the existing equilibrium between the two countries and undermining the fundamental Soviet-U.S. accords in the sphere of arms limitation.

However, the White house, hypnotized by its "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), is showing no desire to heed the insistent calls to refrain from taking a fateful step that would inevitably intensify the threat of nuclear war and would lend impetus to an uncontrolled arms race in all spheres. The U.S. Administration clearly imagines that by creating a fundamentally new type of weapons — space strike means — it will secure military superiority. Now this is an illusion. People in Washington should remember that the Soviet Union, as it warns, will be forced to offer an adequate response to the challenge that they want to throw down to it.

Describing feelings in the United States in connection with the upcoming Geneva meeting, the Indian paper *PATRIOT* recently noted: "The Soviet peace initiatives, which envisage a considerable reduction in various weapons systems, have embarrassed the United States. Certain circles in that country, chiefly the Pentagon and the CIA, resolutely oppose arms reduction. The orders linked with the SDI program have already inflamed the appetites of U.S. corporations." A similar conclusion is reached by observer J. Kraft in *THE WASHINGTON POST*. He notes that "the Pentagon leadership is taking advantage of Reagan's unclear statements to mount behind his back a systematic campaign to undermine the arms control process." It is difficult to judge how accurately this assessment reflects the situation within the administration. However, something that is bound to cause concern is the fact that on the threshold of the Geneva meeting the Pentagon has produced another forgery clearly designed to justify the U.S. course of undermining the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, to torpedo the SALT II treaty, and at the same time to denigrate the Soviet Union. I refer to the military department's report prepared by the notorious Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, which repeats invalid and unfounded claims regarding alleged Soviet "violations" of concluded treaties.

When it comes to attempts to poison the atmosphere of the Geneva meeting, hard on the Pentagon's heels is a motley reactionary army; that is, those for whom, in the words of George Kennan, formerly an eminent diplomat, "a noisy display of bellicose anticommunism is their main political stock in trade. These people," Kennan noted, "prefer us to travel the path of total war preparations, rather than that of talks on establishing arms control." Thus one right-wing organization — the "Heritage Foundation" — believing that the State Department and certain White House advisers lack, or so it claims, "the boldness to be firm" with the USSR, has prepared for the Geneva meeting a peculiar handbook which essentially calls for direct pressure and blackmail on the Soviet Union.

Historic Opportunity Must not Be Missed

Reports coming in from various countries show that such "advice" clearly runs counter to the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples, including the U.S. people, who pin on the Geneva

meeting hopes that the historic opportunity to resolutely break out of the vicious circle of the escalation of the arms race will not be missed. This is shown, in particular, by the public opinion poll held by the U.S. paper *USA TODAY*. The poll's findings show that 84 percent of Americans advocate the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the USSR in the sphere of nuclear arms reduction, and 70 percent are in favor of reaching an accord aimed at banning the deployment of weapons in space.

The movement whose participants are demanding that the administration approach the Geneva talks with the utmost seriousness and contribute to achieving positive results is now expanding in U.S. cities and settlements on the eve of the summit. President Reagan is the first U.S. president since Truman not to have signed a single important agreement on questions of arms limitation, (S. Karmel), spokesman for the Committee for National Security public organization, declared. And the U.S. people are beginning to doubt whether he really does want to lessen East-West tension as he says.

The appeal from the Washington Center for Defense Information to President Reagan to immediately follow the Soviet Union's example and establish a moratorium on all nuclear explosions has met with a wide reaction in the United States.

Many politicians, statesmen, and public figures in various countries, condemning the position that the Washington administration continues to occupy on arms limitation questions, note that whereas the peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union are dictated by genuine concern for security on the planet, Washington intends to extend the arms race to space. Criticism of the U.S. "star wars" program was recently voiced by French Defense Minister P. Quiles, who noted in particular that the plan for creating ABM systems envisaged by the program "does not inspire particular confidence" and will lead to an intensification of the threat of war. The president of the Board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany's Presidium has called on the participants in the Geneva meeting to abandon plans to create ABM systems with space-based elements, to freeze nuclear arsenals, and to end nuclear weapon tests.

People all over the world await effective accords on ending the nuclear arms race, reducing nuclear arsenals, preventing an arms race in outer space, and using space for peaceful purposes. This hope is expressed in a document of the UN General Assembly First Committee signed by 117 member states of the international community calling for positive results at the Geneva meeting.

The tremendous importance that the public of the whole world attaches to the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit cogently shows that the Soviet initiatives aimed at reversing the arms race and reviving the detente process accord with the vital interests of all mankind and of present and future generations.

Calls for 'Wisdom' at Geneva

PM171900 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Nov 85 First Edition p 6

[Special Correspondent V. Bolshakov dispatch: "Time To Be Wise"]

[Excerpts] Geneva, 17 Nov--The many-colored flags of the Swiss cantons flutter over the Mont Blanc bridge. Soviet and U.S. flags adorn the places where the participants in the summit meeting will stay. Geneva is greeting them ceremonially, with full honors.

Across the Mont Blanc bridge the road leads to the Old City. There, at 40 Grand Rue, there is a memorial plaque: "Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born in this house 28 June 1712. Everything has been preserved as it was then."

Directly opposite Rousseau's house is a newsstand with the latest issues of *LE JOURNAL DE GENEVE*. A poster on the stand says: "The Gorbachev-Reagan meeting." You can tell the importance that the people of Geneva attach to the meeting from the speed at which they buy the paper and look first at the news about the meeting. Yes, people all over the world expect a great deal of it and are hoping that it will be a spur to ensuring that mankind can rid itself of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do everything possible for this. And the world greatly values this. But many Western commentators misinterpret the "motives" for this Soviet "behavior." The old familiar clichés leavened with anti-Soviet allegations are still very tenacious.

Exploded Myths

It is no secret that in the last few years bourgeois propaganda, taking its cue from the Washington administration, has persistently portrayed real socialism as a system that is stagnant and ossified in its development and therefore incapable of competing with the vaunted "free enterprise," namely capitalism. The propaganda rejuvenation specialists [gospoda yuvenologi] were unscrupulous in their "arguments" and used for their own purposes even forbidden methods in their attempt to portray capitalism, which is objectively senescent, as a dynamic, spiritually and physically strong leader who will certainly defeat socialism over the marathon distance of world history.

However, one doesn't need to be a professional political scientist, one merely needs to be an objective and honest person to recognize the obvious fact: the real contrast between socialism and capitalism, between the USSR and the United States, lies in policy. "Anti-Sovietism, that ideological foundation of the arms race launched by the U.S. Administration," U.S. journalist Bruce Kimmel writes, "is rapidly losing support. More and more people are rejecting the view that the USSR represents a military threat to the United States." The reason for this, B. Kimmel believes, is the striking contrast between the U.S. and USSR approaches toward the Geneva talks and disarmament as a whole. You need only recall the U.S. Administration's offer to invite Soviet representatives to observe underground nuclear weapon tests in Nevada. The absurdity of this "initiative" was heightened by the fact that it was the U.S. "response" to the Soviet moratorium on any nuclear explosions introduced on the 40th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima — as of 6 August

1985. "In addition to this," Kimmel recalls, "the Soviet Union ceased the deployment of medium-range missiles in its European part, introduced a moratorium on the development [razrabotka] of antisatellite weapons, and called for a zone free from chemical weapons to be created in central Europe."

During the Soviet-French meeting, new USSR initiatives on improving the international situation were made public and radical measures in the sphere of arms reductions and regarding the prevention of the threat of world war were proposed. These proposals met with such widespread approval from the world public that people across the ocean, at first clearly dismayed and discouraged, were struck by a sudden thought and began to speak of "Moscow's clever propaganda plot" to "win the sympathies of the Western press" and "use it to attain Soviet objectives."

The ignorance about the USSR that is so widespread in the West was also displayed in the way in which attempts were made repeatedly to convince the man in the street of the existence of another "plot." Through force of habit the professional anticommunists stubbornly refused to recognize the obvious fact: that the Soviet Union is a modern, highly civilized power and it is no novelty for its leaders to have contacts with the Western press; and when Soviet representatives meet with the Western press, they do not try to imitate "Western ways" but set out our viewpoint and do so in our way.

Nevertheless, some people in the West to this day entertain the hope that we will be reborn and refashioned in conformity with the bourgeois models that have long been insistently foisted on us. They try to convince themselves — by watching Hollywood movies, by reading the repentant "confessions" of renegades, and by familiarizing themselves with dissident "revelations" created on orders from the Western special services — that a modern and civilized man cannot be a convinced communist.

However, it transpires that he can, for communism is the legitimate heir of all best things created by world civilization and mankind's advanced thought. And if people in the West took a realistic view of things, they would reach the conclusion that the present changes in the USSR are not a political phenomenon taken from outside the context of our history, but the practical result of our party's consistent implementation of Leninist principles and the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The fact that these healthy principles of our society determine its main development is what constitutes the secret of the strength and viability of Soviet power, the "enigma" of which various "sovietologists" and "kremlinologists" have been struggling to understand for decades. They often cannot see the forest for the trees, our truth for our shortcomings — which we openly and impartially discuss — or the ultimate goal for the temporary

miscalculations and blunders. So they "ascribe" to "chance," "luck," or "propaganda operations" the growing prestige of scientific communism and the Soviet Union, which in a short historical time has succeeded in surmounting age-old backwardness, reaching the forefront of world science and technology, ensuring the people's well-being and the blossoming of culture and education, and creating a mighty economy.

It is precisely on this basis that the socialist world achieved approximate strategic military parity with the West. And the leaders of the capitalist world today have, willy-nilly, to face this reality both when assessing the correlation of forces in the world arena and when talking with the USSR and its allies.

It is interesting to trace how the approach toward such talks is shaping up, particularly in the United States.

"Shoots" of Awareness

At a recent briefing in Washington, a "high-ranking White House staffer" who wished to remain anonymous said: "We recognize that there are differences between us (that is, between the USSR and the United States — V.B.), that the Soviet Union will scarcely change, that we can change nothing about this, and that the Soviet Union possesses colossal military might. It should be explained that the existence of these real differences promises competition in the future, and that both sides must ensure that this competition is peaceful. The key to ensuring peaceful competition now must be sought in the establishment of a stable military balance, in other words, of a means of arms control..."

Or take this (this is the U.S. President in his message to the country before his departure for Geneva): Despite the profound and important differences between us, we can and must prevent our rivalry in the international arena from spilling over into violence. We can find as yet undiscovered paths by traveling which U.S. and Soviet citizens can cooperate fruitfully for the good of mankind.

One cannot help noting that, by comparison with the usual rhetoric, there are marked changes both in style and in progress toward consideration of the real situation in the world.

Nevertheless, the old themes unfortunately drown out the new ones in the speeches of high-ranking White House staffers. Thus the briefing to U.S. correspondents who asked what specifically is going to be the U.S. response to the large-scale Soviet peace initiatives, and primarily to the proposal that space strike arms be banned and that USSR and U.S. nuclear means capable of reaching each other's territory be reduced by 50 percent, boiled down to arguments of very dubious worth.

Their essence is as follows: "Arms control is useless" so long as the USSR continues to support the national liberation struggle and in particular helps the liberated peoples to defend their independence and freedom and to rebuff imperialist intrigues. All this shows Washington's reluctance to abandon the customary anticommunist stereotypes and to justify its shortsighted policy by referring to the imaginary "Soviet threat." [sentence as published]

However, it was precisely on the basis of this "justification" that the present administration began an unprecedented arms race that has already cost the U.S. Treasury a monstrous sum — \$1 trillion! Ehile prating about its commitment to human rights, official Washington has deprived of social assistance the more than 30 million of its citizens now living below the poverty line and has unleashed all-American persecution of dissidents and fighters for civil rights. People across the ocean have announced a "worldwide crusade for democracy" and have begun implementing a policy of state terrorism. They have proclaimed themselves champions of freedom and have begun to suppress it wherever the arm of the Pentagon and the CIA has reached, as in Grenada. They have elevated various "contras" and dushmans to the rank of "brothers of the North American democrats" and have decided with their help to implant "American-style democracy" by fire and the sword.

Crucial Choice

Practical U.S. actions show that it has still not abandoned hopes of resolving the dispute of ideas by means of force, yet nowadays this is a futile endeavor and is, moreover, exceptionally dangerous not only for those states that prefer muscle power to the power of reason but also for the entire world community.

On the eve of Geneva, the Soviet Union proposes a different path and has itself already traveled its half of that path. Our proposals both on the whole complex of problems of reducing arms and preventing the militarization of space and on the normalization of international relations as a whole are specific and realistic. The world public also expects specific and realistic actions from the United States.

What are we witnessing? A switch to more realistic positions by our partners in the talks, or an attempt by them, in the words of *THE WASHINGTON POST*, "to avoid the accusation that the United States is not serious about arms control, which would mean losing to Moscow in the battle for public opinion"?

There is no simple answer to that question. A great deal will become clearer in a few days, when the summit meeting here is over. But what is causing concern now, when there are only a matter of hours left before the meeting? Above all the clear inertia in the thinking of many Washington and NATO figures. Their reaction to the new Soviet initiatives boils down to the same stereotype: "Everything the Russians advocate is disadvantageous to the West because it is advantageous to the Russians." If only such positions were held only by incorrigible "hawks" like the Pentagon chief's famous assistant, Richard Perle, or Weinberger himself. A recent "forecast" by the latter — "the United States may breach the ABM Treaty" — caused such a rumpus in West Europe that the White House had to issue a special "reassuring statement." You can understand the U.S. allies. After all, tough statements are not only heard from the Pentagon and the U.S. President's entourage: "No concessions to the Russians on 'star wars' are planned. There will be no compromise when it comes to nuclear weapon tests..." And so on, and so forth. But what then is to become of disarmament talks? After all, talks consist in reaching accords on the basis of reciprocal steps toward each other. It is ridiculous to expect the USSR to make unilateral

concessions and to turn a blind eye to U.S. attempts to secure military superiority, including via the militarization of space. Discussion must be on an equal footing, and not otherwise. Does the United States realize that the time has come to bury the everyday myths of the "cold war" and to end preconceptions and prejudice? After all, without this it is impossible to achieve trust in relations between states and genuine security.

We do not impose our view of the world on anyone. But we are confident that there is no reasonable alternative to the triumph of reason. The only things that can save mankind from nuclear madness are the will of the peoples and the wisdom of the statesmen of our time. Now is the time to be wise.

USSR's Lomeyko Interviewed

PM191435 London MORNING STAR in English 19 Nov 85 p 2

["A Mutual Interest in Solving the Arms Race Is the Key"--MORNING STAR headline; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs press department, who is accompanying Mikhail Gorbachev to Geneva, talks to *STAR* Moscow correspondent Kate Clark about his country's proposals and hopes for peace as the summit opens.

The moment the world has been waiting for has arrived. The fate of humanity could well be decided at the summit meeting opening in Geneva today. Either agreement is reached on a freeze and a ban on space weapons — or the arms race spirals relentlessly upwards, bringing us all nearer to nuclear doom.

"The fact is that the danger of nuclear war is increasing, because the arms race is continuing," Vladimir Lomeyko told me last week. Mr Lomeyko, a tall bespectacled man with a high forehead and slightly greying hair, is well known to foreign correspondents in Moscow as the official government spokesman at key press conferences.

"Policies and concepts of strength continue to be applied, and this pushes all of us towards the nuclear abyss," he warned. "Soviet proposals are intended to put a stop to this process.

"For this, there must firstly be a freeze on nuclear potentials, and then an attempt to reduce them to as low a level as possible on the basis of parity.

"And we have to prevent new channels of the arms race from being opened up. That means in the first place, not allowing the militarisation of space.

"If we managed to get progress in this direction, to get concrete results in the approaches to solving these problems in Geneva, this would undoubtedly be a step forward.

"We are not going to Geneva just to get acquainted, or just to have a general look at the problem," Mr Lomeyko emphasised. When you hear him speak at Foreign Ministry press conferences, you get the impression of a person who doesn't suffer fools gladly.

Almost always speaking off-the-cuff, he handles press conferences with an aplomb born of extensive knowledge, experience and conviction.

"We want to find approaches to ways of solving the problems — of course they can't all be solved during the meeting — but it's very important that there should be mutual interest in their solution, and that both sides should try to solve the most vitally important problems which affect not only our two countries but the whole of mankind."

In this aim, Mr Lomeyko said, the Soviet leadership and the whole of the Soviet population were united. But the same could not be said of the United States.

There, he said alongside proponents of agreements with the Soviet Union, there were staunch opponents of any agreements, who are determined to continue operating from positions of strength and superiority.

Mr Lomeyko cited the anti-Communist Heritage Foundation's latest "recommendations" to the U.S. President, which boil down to demands that the American side should not agree to any concessions or compromises at the summit.

"The essence of the Heritage Foundation lecture is — if the Soviet Union doesn't do this or that, then there can't be any talk with the Soviet Union," Mr Lomeyko explained. "This talking-from-strength position was pointless in dealings with the Soviet Union," he added.

It was unconstructive, he said, and consequently was not even in the interests of the Americans themselves.

"Which line will predominate at Geneva, only the meeting itself will tell. And what is no less important, the subsequent stage: whether the agreements, if any are reached, will be put into effect."

What was his government's reaction to the latest U.S. proposal, I asked. They were in response to the radical Soviet proposals Mikhail Gorbachev had made in Paris, he said.

"They were being studied at the Geneva negotiations and would probably come up at the summit, so it might be premature to give a definite reply on them," Mr Lomeyko said.

"But I would just say that it's noteworthy that the Soviet proposals — on 50 percent cut in nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory — were at first called 'interesting' in the U.S. were later classified as 'unacceptable' and 'disadvantageous for the U.S.' etc.

"President Reagan's adviser Paul Nitze, for instance, gave journalists a whole number of reasons, and produced all sorts of manipulated figures," he added.

"It seems to me quite improper," Mr Lomeyko continued, "when Soviet land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles are called 'destabilising' and 'the most dangerous,' and yet U.S. sea-based cruise missiles are not supposed to be taken into consideration because they are difficult or impossible to check.

Strange Psychology

"This is not an objective approach to reality," Mr Lomeyko stressed. "For people, it doesn't make much difference which missile is responsible for their death.

"So to call one missile dangerous and another less dangerous — that in itself is a strange psychology. There are no good missiles and bad missiles.

"All missiles are bad. The point is though, who starts the production of these bad missiles?"

The Soviet Union, Mr Lomeyko stressed, has never, not once, originated any new type of weapons of mass destruction. "We are against such weapons, and have many times proposed agreements to prevent the creation of new kinds of weapons.

"Now here there is a real chance: not to see whose missiles are better or worse, but to agree not to make any — for there are enough of these barbarous weapons to destroy the earth and humanity many times over," he added forcefully.

Mr Lomeyko paused a moment. An extremely able and impressive speaker, he has all the facts at his fingertips. His slightly sardonic sense of humour in answer press conference questions belies a more kindly manner which comes to the fore in a personal conversation.

"At present there is approximate parity between the two sides. Talk about the Soviet Union having outstripped the U.S., or that the Soviet Union has long since created some weapons America hasn't got — this is sheer bluff," he emphasised.

"Even the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in a recent talk to President Reagan stated that there is parity. If they admit as much, what more proof is needed?"

"Yet American Administration officials keep stubbornly repeating that the Soviet Union has a threefold, now a sevenfold superiority over them.

"They produce absurd figures, absurd because they don't include all categories of weapons... there is this sort of juggling with figures.

"But it is generally accepted that there is parity, and this parity gives us the unique possibility for a freeze, and then reduction on the basis of equality.

"This is our philosophy, our approach to solving the problem," Mr Lomeyko said. "And at the same time to prevent new channels of the arms race being opened up.

"This is why we consider exceptionally dangerous, and not only for the Soviet Union, but for the whole world, the plans for first-strike space weapons which hide behind the innocuous formula of the Strategic Defence Initiative ('star wars').

"You see, so far the philosophical, political approach to solving the problems of the arms race is inadequate.

"We are proposing, first a freeze, then to reduce levels on the basis of equality. But our American partners propose reducing some things in certain cases, and in other cases to create new weapons, which would give rise to a new situation in the balance of forces. "All this makes the problem more difficult to solve instead of easier. [quotation marks as published]

"And at the same time they assert that SDI does not contradict the ABM treaty, although SDI directly contradicts Article Five of this treaty, which prohibits the creation, elaboration, testing and deployment of new weapons with space-based elements, which is what this new programme is."

The problem has to be looked at as a whole, not in parts, Mr Lomeyko insisted.

"If they start tossing figures around like tomahawks, all you can do is run away from them, like a third-rate cowboy film!

"What we need is a serious approach. This means respecting each other's equality and thinking of the other side's security as you would your own.

"Because we are all roped together in this, like mountaineers: If one falls, he's going to pull the other with him..."

In Britain many in the peace movement continue to blame both sides equally for the arms race. The recent CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament] demonstration, for instance, delivered letters both to the U.S. and Soviet embassies calling for an end to the arms race.

I asked Vladimir Lomeyko what he thought of the so-called "super-power theory."

There are organisations in the world which turn to the Soviet Union and the United States with demands for an end to the arms race," Mr Lomeyko explained. "In some cases this is done quite sincerely and naturally, whereas in other cases the attempt is to put us both in the same bag, the Soviet Union and the U.S."

"I want to say this: The Soviet Union has always been and is now against the arms race. This is why we make proposals which are intended to suffocate this snake-like spiral which is reaching higher and higher."

Vladimir Lomeyko's tone was earnest as he leant forward in his chair: "When people try to blame us as well as the U.S. for being responsible for the arms race, I don't agree with them, not because I'm a Soviet citizen and bound out of patriotism to stick up for my country.

"No, I don't agree because, in the first place, the whole essence of our policy differs from that which directs American policy," he said.

"First because in the Soviet Union there is no social group or stratum of the population which has a vested interest in producing new weapons.

"There is no group that gets any personal gain out of arms manufacture, either in the form of authority, or consolidation of personal capital, or influence in the country or in the world," Mr Lomeyko stressed.

Colossal Profits

"So to put us in the same bag as the U.S. is simply unrealistic. But what is the basis for SDI? The big U.S. aerospace monopolies look on it as a long-term programme for stoking up the arms race for themselves.

"If SDI is carried out, they will manufacture new types of weapons and receive colossal profits out of it."

"But in the Soviet Union there are no factories that belong to any individuals, who could get personally richer or who could strengthen their prestige or influence by making new weapons.

"We are unfortunately obliged to do this because we have to maintain parity.

"We learnt by our bitter experience of 1941, and no Soviet person will ever allow anyone in the world to think that the Soviet Union

is weak and therefore can be attacked, as Hitler did," Mr Lomeyko spoke strongly.

"Of course he was proved wrong, but the high price of that mistake is still in the memory of each of us," he said quietly.

Vladimir Lomeyko himself was a child in the Leningrad siege during the war and lost many of his close relatives.

"Another reason why it is wrong to put us in the same bag as the U.S. is that the Soviet Union has taken a whole range of unilateral steps:

"We have declared that we will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. America has not made any such commitment.

"We introduced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles. The U.S. continues deploying theirs.

"We have proposed a ban on producing new kinds of weapons. America has rejected our proposal.

"We introduced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. The Americans are carrying on testing.

"So how can both sides be held equally to blame?" Vladimir Lomeyko said with a hint of exasperation. "Saying this is ignoring reality.

"Why do they do this? Well, I understand that for some people in the West such a position is a comfortable one, because then they can't be accused of being sympathetic to the Soviet Union."

"But you know, defamation of this kind — this is also a political method. When a person doesn't get the chance to understand or express a favourable opinion on the Soviet proposals because before they have even heard his arguments, others are already shouting: 'Oh well, he supports the Soviet proposals, that means he's on Moscow's side.'

"This primitivism is a method of defamation," Mr Lomeyko said firmly, "to deter people from making their own comparisons.

"I know of many proposals from CND, the Greens — to the effect that the Soviet Union should set an example, to show others ...well, what is the Soviet Union doing if not that?

"All the unilateral steps I have just mentioned — there you have the good example, there you have the attempt to take the first step in the hope that others will follow.

"But the Soviet Union cannot go on disarming unilaterally for ever," the Soviet spokesman said. "For the precise reason that plans like Dropshop have existed, and we have no guarantee that similar plans do not still exist, plans for attacking the Soviet Union.

"The Soviet Union has never had, nor has any such plans for attacking the USA.

"So we don't need to be taught by those who perhaps have not yet themselves gained an understanding of historical realities."

Time was running out. Vladimir Lomeyko is a very busy person with a heavy schedule. Other people were waiting outside to see him. But he generously squeezed in a few more minutes to answer my question about the Soviet proposal on separate talks with the British Government on its nuclear weapons.

"Unfortunately we received a negative reply. Of course, it's up to every government to reply to any proposal as they see fit. But there has to be logic in it anyway," Mr Lomeyko said.

"British nuclear forces do exist and they don't exist in a vacuum. Even according to NATO plans, they have a quite specific whereabouts, and it has been seen in exercises, it has appeared in the press that many of those forces are directed against the Soviet Union.

"We are forced to take them into account in the overall balance. To us this is logical. To talk of them being relatively small and so on — this is not really serious.

"Because you can't, on the one hand, say you need these forces to protect your sovereignty and, on the other hand, say that they are only small and therefore don't need to be taken into account.

"It's not logical. Each missile if used would mean the destruction of many populated areas, and death for tens of thousands of people.

"Seen against this dreadful fact, it cannot be said that they are insignificant or small.

"The problem is there: it is not a simple matter to solve it. But we have offered to discuss it.

"If Britain is not yet willing to discuss it, well that's her sovereign right, but the problem doesn't go away. It still remains on the agenda."

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CSO: 5200/1155

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS CALLS NEW U.S. PROPOSALS 'DIGITAL VARIATION'

LD142152 Moscow TASS in English 2150 GMT 14 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 14 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The U.S. Administration, contrary to the principle of confidentiality adopted for the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, the principle which Washington likes to talk about and constantly urges the USSR to follow, has been disclosing during the past few days every detail of the latest U.S. proposals at the talks. Things have gone so far that the White House has released a special "fact sheet" on these proposals.

Washington's purpose is perfectly clear: It is trying to convince the public by unrestrained self-advertising that Washington wants reductions in nuclear armaments, and thus to sell a shoddy commodity to the gullible. Quite a few pompous epithets are used, such as "new constructive proposals" and "substantial and fair reductions," but Washington is obviously failing to prove anything like that. Under scrutiny, all this "package" is an even worse version of those American proposals which have long proved unsuitable for the process of arms limitation and reduction. There is no "fairness" in it and its only purpose is to secure unilateral military advantages for the United States.

What attracts attention first and foremost is the lack of any change in the U.S. stand on the "star wars" program. Washington continues to block the solution of the question of a ban on space-strike weapons and is seeking to put anti-satellite weapons outside the framework of the talks. Yet the U.S. Administration must be aware that if no agreement on the prevention of the militarization of space is reached, any "variations" on the subject of reductions in nuclear arms arsenals are pointless. There can be no reductions whatsoever because the other side should rely on arms arsenals to restore the balance of forces which is being upset by the development of a "space shield" of any kind. The deliberately provoked and maintained stalemate on the "star wars" is calling into question all the other proposals.

As regards strategic nuclear armaments, the White House is trying to create the impression that it has accepted the Soviet concept of 50 per cent reductions. However, it is an obvious attempt to mislead the world public. The "new" proposals of the USA are merely a "digital variation" of their old proposals while the untenable principles inherent in them have not been revised at all. It is proposed to reduce the total number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) to the level of 4,500 on the condition that the ICBM's carry not more than 3,000 warheads. Separate proposals call for a limit of 350 on the number of strategic bombers and for a limit of 1,500 on the number of air-launched cruise missiles carried by them.

The U.S. pattern essentially contradicts the Soviet proposal on 50 percent cuts. First, the Soviet proposal embraces all the nuclear weapons of the USA and the USSR reaching each other's territories. As for the USA, it is seeking to evade the reality that Soviet territory faces double threat, that from the U.S. strategic offensive forces and from U.S. medium-range missiles and forward-based systems deployed around the Soviet Union. This means that following reductions according to the U.S. pattern and given equality in the strategic systems, Soviet territory will face an additional threat from U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, from 560 nuclear-capable planes based on 14 U.S. aircraft carriers and from hundreds of U.S. planes stationed in close proximity of the borders of the USSR and its allies. But what about fairness and equal security?

Washington should also be reminded that the question of forward-based systems has never been removed from the agenda. It was subject to detailed talks and agreement upon the entry of the SALT-2 treaty into force. However, the U.S. side blocked the ratification of that treaty and now is trying to create the impression that forward-based forces should not be counted. But the existence of these forces is a reality and they must be counted in the nuclear balance.

Second, the Soviet proposal envisions that neither of the components of the strategic "triad" -- ICBM's, SLBM's or strategic bombers -- should incorporate more than 60 percent of the total number of warheads, which means that all those components are made equal from the point of view of the ceiling on the number of warheads allowed for them, this condition is fair because the patterns of the forces of the sides are different. But Washington, using these structural differences, proposes additional restrictions on the basic component of the Soviet strategic forces, ICBM's, and none for the strongest component of its own forces, SLBM's. Moreover, proposing a ban on all new "heavy" ICBM's and on modifications of such missiles already available to the USSR, the USA flatly rejects the Soviet proposal that the programs for the development and deployment of new types and kinds of strategic armaments be prohibited or severely restricted. In this way it would like to have a free hand to deploy the MX ICBM, Trident-1 and Trident-2 SLBM's, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers and long-range cruise missiles. Small wonder that the "fact sheet" of the White House says that the principle behind the implementation of the American proposals would be build down through buildup. But this principle is obviously meant to benefit the USA: even today restrictions under the SALT-2 treaty hamper Washington in the buildup of its new Trident SLBM's.

Third, proposing a ceiling of 350 on strategic bombers, Washington proceeds from its own needs because the USSR does not have even half that number (about 150 planes). By refusing to include the bombers in the total ceiling, Washington detracts from the nuclear balance roughly 2,000 bombs and air-launched small-range missiles. In so doing, the USA ridiculously "explains" its unwillingness by the existence of an air defense system in the USSR.

As for the ultimate results of reductions, differences of principle between the proposals of the USSR and the USA immediately strike the eye. According to the Soviet pattern, the sides would have left to them 1,250 and 1,680 vehicles, respectively, reaching each other's territories. Under the American proposals, however, the USA would have 1,600-1,900 vehicles -- plus hundreds of vehicles of the forward-based systems and medium-range missiles. All of them can reach Soviet territory. Another serious drawback of Washington's proposals is that they do not count sea-based cruise missiles.

As regards medium-range nuclear weapons, Washington came up with its old "intermediate" option, and even made it worse, non-constructive as it was, with additional demands. Under the proposal, the USA and the USSR would be left with 140 medium-range missile launchers in Europe, and the Soviet Union, moreover, would have to reduce its missiles in the Asian part of the country without any restrictions on the U.S. nuclear forces in the Far East. The "clarifications" of the White House on this matter sound downright funny: The USSR should reduce its missiles reaching the territories of the U.S. allies in Western Europe while the British and French nuclear systems capable of hitting targets in Soviet territory are not counted in the European nuclear balance. Moreover, the USA refuses to count in any way its forward-based systems too.

All this shows that the entire "package" of U.S. proposals has the sole purpose of ensuring reductions in the Soviet nuclear forces and severe restrictions on them and securing freedom of action for the USA. Any observance of the basic principle of equality and equal security, any respect for the partner's interest are totally absent from these proposals.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: U.S. NEEDS TO 'RECONSIDER' POSITION ON ARMS

LD171035 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 17 Nov 85

["Words and Deeds" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 17 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Anatoliy Krasikov writes:

The well-known Pentagon formula "reduce armaments by building them up" can be understood only as "while building up the U.S. and NATO military might, reduce the retaliatory strike potential of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact." Such a conclusion is prompted by the latest interview which President Reagan gave to Japanese journalists before going to Geneva.

Really, the head of the White House once again pledged his allegiance to plans of creating strike space armaments and qualified as "unacceptable as it is" the Soviet proposal to ban such armaments and to reduce 50 percent the Soviet and U.S. nuclear armaments that can reach each other's territory, by setting for the delivery vehicles, remaining after the reduction, a lowered level of nuclear warheads, equal to both sides. Washington would like to have a shield from Soviet missiles, to preserve intact the most powerful element of its own forces -- submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- and meanwhile, to place limitations on the basic element of the USSR's strategic forces -- inter-continental ballistic missiles.

One can find in the U.S. President's interview many good words about the need of creating "safer, more stable and more productive East-West relationship. He declared for "a safer and better world for ourselves and our children". Mr Reagan admits that "to reach effective arms control agreements requires genuine give-and-take on both sides."

Alas, as soon as things come to practical proposals, it turns out that Washington once again, for the umpteenth time, claims unilateral advantages in violation of the principle of undiminished security of both parties.

If the American side is ready in real earnest for serious negotiations on improvement of the international situation and establishment of constructive relations with the Soviet Union, it should reconsider its approach to these problems and make its half of the way towards a possible agreement.

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CSO: 5200/1159

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR VIEWS EFFECTS OF WEINBERGER'S LETTER ON TALKS

Shows 'Internal Struggle'

LD191333 Moscow TASS in English 1324 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Washington, November 19 TASS — U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has ordered an inquiry at the Pentagon to find out how information on his letter to President Reagan on the eve of the summit meeting leaked into the press. As is known, his letter recommended the President to adopt a "firm" stand at the Geneva talks and not to agree to any arms control measures that would jeopardize U.S. military programs and its plans for militarization of space. Most observers qualified this message of the Pentagon's chief as a direct attempt to sabotage the Soviet-American summit.

Commenting on this incident the ABC television company recalls that it was not for the first time that Caspar Weinberger tried to block the process of curbing the arms race. Not long ago, ABC says, Weinberger spoke out in favor of a "new interpretation" of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, an interpretation that would enable the Pentagon to conduct early tests of space-based armaments. Eventually a more restrictive interpretation prevailed. However, observers stress, the administration reserves the right to return in the future to a "broader" interpretation which would mean in fact violation of the letter and spirit of this major Soviet-American document on arms control.

The Pentagon's chief also says no to those members of the U.S. Administration who come out in favor of discussing possibilities for limiting the "Strategic Defense Initiative" in exchange for limitations in offensive strategic armaments, ABC says. representatives of the administration in Geneva, particularly Robert McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, are trying to belittle the significance of these arguments. But others believe that internal struggle within the U.S. leadership has serious implications. There is no agreement within the administration, internal disputes are deep and the opposing sides have no intention of backing down. That is one of the reasons, ABC says, why people here do not expect the summit to make great progress on arms control.

Attempt To 'Torpedo' Talks

PM181836 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Own special correspondents Ye. Grigoryev and T. Kolesnichenko 18 November dispatch: "Geneva: On the Eve"]

[Excerpt] Today, on the eve of the summit, it is apposite to recall the immense work and the persistent efforts made in the recent period by the Soviet Union to create a more favorable atmosphere for dialogue in Geneva. Constructive proposals have been formulated on the basis of which accords could be worked out given reciprocal good will; the honesty and sincerity of the Soviet power's intentions have been reaffirmed by unilateral steps of major importance. Measures such as the moratorium on the siting of medium-range missiles in Europe, the removal from combat standby of SS-20 missiles in the European zone, and the moratorium on all nuclear explosions made an immense impression on the public. On the eve of the summit important new proposals aimed at stopping and reversing the arms race and improving the international situation were presented for examination by the U.S. Government. On the condition that space is not militarized, the USSR is proposing to the United States that the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territories be very radically reduced, by 50 percent, and that the number of nuclear charges for each country be limited to no more than 6,000 units on the basis of equality and identical security.

At the same time, the Soviet side is proposing to the United States that programs for the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of new strategic offensive weapons be abandoned; that the modernization of existing strategic offensive weapons be limited to the greatest possible extent; that long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes be totally banned; that all work on the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike arms be stopped; that the testing and deployment of new varieties [vidy] and types of nuclear arms be ended; that the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe be ended; and that a mutual moratorium be established on all nuclear explosions. The USSR is proposing on a reciprocal basis the removal from combat standby and dismantling by an agreed date of a specified percentage or number of the sides' strategic offensive weapons (for instance, dismantling 200-300 ICBM's each).

The USSR proposes that a separate agreement be concluded on nuclear arms in Europe. This approach accords with the wishes of the West Europeans, taking their security interests into account in the most direct way.

Pondering the Soviet proposals, a Swedish observer noted in a conversation that they "could probably be a sheet anchor for mankind." The Soviet position on the problem of ensuring lasting peace accords with the hopes of the public that there is a real chance for putting international development on the right track, although the U.S. approach gives cause for alarm. How else can you interpret the fact that the United States, virtually on the eve of Geneva, has been continuing nuclear tests, has adopted a new military budget of record proportions, and has been expediting the siting of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The implementation of the "star wars" program, which would rule out the possibility of radical nuclear arms reductions, is being obstinately

continued.

At the same time, on the eve of his departure for Geneva, the U.S. President expressed a number of ideas about the impermissibility of confrontation and the need to "create a better and more secure world," promising to "lay the foundations for lasting peace." At Geneva airport he again advocated a "new beginning." We do not know whether maybe in the quiet of Geneva's Villa Saussure, where the President will be consulting with his advisers over the next few days, any specific amendments will be made to the U.S. stance and whether the necessary political will which would make it possible to give a joint Soviet-U.S. boost to the cause of ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space will be seen in the U.S. line at Geneva. Will it be so? We will have to wait and see.

It appears that, despite the enormous efforts made over the last few weeks, Washington has simply failed to improve its image in the eyes of the world public. This is very disturbing for the U.S. side, and yesterday morning White House spokesman L. Speakes inaugurated a special U.S. press center in the Intercontinental Hotel ballroom, set up in addition to the international press center. R. McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, was sent to the international press center at noon as "the chief command's reserve."

Following *THE NEW YORK TIMES*' publication of C. Weinberger's letter which, as L. Speakes gloomily joked, "the President would have preferred to read on his own in the oval office rather than in this newspaper," something which many observers suspected and had been written about in newspapers, including our newspaper, proved to be a reliable fact: There exists in the United States a highly influential grouping linked to the military-industrial complex which is doing everything possible to thwart any talks with the Soviet Union which could result in the termination of the arms race and a radical reduction of strategic weapons. In this sense, the "Weinberger letter" (this provocative document will obviously become part of history under this name) is the landmine which extreme reaction in the United States would like to plant to torpedo the Geneva summit meeting. Judge for yourselves: The U.S. secretary of defense recommends that the President actually reject any steps toward disarmament, from "promises to continue observing the provisions of the SALT II treaty" to any concessions at all on the development [razvetyvaniye] of the "star wars" program.

While President Reagan was crossing the Atlantic, the scandal caused by the Washington "leak" which resulted in Weinberger's letter being published spread around the world. AP reported that when a high-ranking official administration representative on board the presidential aircraft was asked whether he considered the publication of Weinberger's letter an attempt to torpedo the President's mission in Geneva, he replied: "This is undoubtedly so."

At the moment Washington is investigating who was responsible for the "leak." But if you think about it, the fundamental question is something quite different. Namely, the fact that the letter was written and sent to the President in the first place. It has to be said that in the administration itself, to be more accurate, at the very top, there is no common approach to disarmament problems.

That is why, when R. McFarlane appeared at the press center, there loomed behind him the specter not only of the Pentagon chief, but of many of those people in the United States who are lobbying for higher and higher arms race spirals, for so-called "modernization" of weapons, for the continuation of nuclear tests, and for the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons.

McFarlane was faced with the task of camouflaging and concealing the discord from the public. He tried to show that the administration is united, that it is experiencing "absolutely no pressure from the industrialists" (meaning the military monopolies). The journalists, especially the Americans, wore ironic smiles: A dead giveaway! McFarlane was all the more assiduous in his efforts to cast aspersions on Soviet policy, reiterating the tedious dogma about the "Soviet threat" and "Soviet military superiority."

But when your correspondents asked him point-blank, as they say: "Mr McFarlane, you claim that the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States in many strategic arms programs. Is one to believe you do not trust the estimates that have been repeatedly published by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirming the existence of a relative balance of forces? Or do you have one set of estimates for 'domestic consumption' and another set for propaganda?" No answer was forthcoming. When we asked him how his arguments about "switching to a defensive strategy as a result of SDI" squared with the fact that not only are none of the Pentagon's programs for the creation, modernization, and deployment of offensive armaments up to the year 2000 being curtailed, but, on the contrary, they are being expanded, the best Mr McFarlane could manage was to reiterate that all of it was "arms upgrading," an attempt to "catch up with the Soviet Union, and so on.

The Soviet side has come to the talks with honest intentions and in a businesslike frame of mind. A whole range of profound and realistic proposals covering all aspects of disarmament has been brought to Geneva. As a result of a sensible compromise they could be an important step on the path of delivering mankind from the threat of a nuclear apocalypse. And if those who bear responsibility for America's destiny, which is inseparable from the destiny of the world as a whole, heed the voices of millions of people all over the world, including Americans, rather than the incantations of Weinberger and people like him, they will see that the people of our planet want one thing: peace and security, a tranquil, happy life for themselves and their children. It is time to justify their hopes. Geneva offers the opportunities to do this and this is the path the USSR is proposing.

'Distortion of Facts'

LD181816 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 18 Nov 85

["The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex Is Opposed to Accords"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 18 TASS — By TASS news analyst Vladimir Bogachev. systems." Weinberger would not mention where he had gotten these figures.

High-ranking officials of the U.S. Administration have not abandoned attempts at discrediting the very idea of the possibility of reaching accords with the Soviet Union on the issue of curbing the nuclear arms race and preventing outer space militarization.

Robert McFarlane, national security assistant to the U.S. President, in actual fact solidarized with the conclusions made by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his recent letter to Ronald Reagan on the problem of accords with the U.S.S.R.

Responding to the request of newsmen in Geneva that he comment on the contents of the letter in which the Pentagon chief unequivocally urged the President to renounce the operating accords with the Soviet Union and not to sign new ones, McFarlane says that the old principles of deterrence, in action in the past 15 years, were allegedly no longer in effect. He repeated the absurd allegation that the Soviet Union had a marked "superiority" in the key areas of military equipment and, proceeding from that, demanded that the United States solve the problem of curbing the arms race by either reducing Soviet weapon systems... or by building up American systems, or by compensating these offensive arms with defensive systems, that is, strike space weapons.

McFarlane complained about the very appearance of the text of Weinberger's letter in the press, but nonetheless, described it as a show of "realism". In the meantime one cannot overlook the fact that even in the confidential messages to the head of the executive power of the United States which are seemingly not meant for the general public the head of the Defense Department permits himself to force and distort facts, while McFarlane, one of the closest assistants to the President, evidently, does not call the attention of his boss to that.

In his letter to the U.S. President Caspar Weinberger alleges that the decision of the United States to observe SALT II "could put rigid constraints" on the United States, and the U.S. would have "to dismantle between 1,320 and 2,240 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only about 558 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV

It is appropriate to recall that SALT II limits the aggregate number of ballistic missiles with MIRV systems, not the total number of warheads on them, to the level of 1,320. Until now the sides have not achieved that limit. The United States can breach that provision if the Pentagon, disregarding SALT II, deploys additional MIRVed warheads on MX and Midgetman ICBM's and SLBM's Trident II. This is evidently why Weinberger does not like SALT II so. The U.S. secretary of defense is trying to scare the president with the prospect of having to dismantle the existing U.S. weapons systems, but in actual fact, he is out to remove the barriers holding back their further buildup — the barriers, put up by the SALT II treaty.

Further, evidently in a bid to impress Reagan the Pentagon chief compares the number of U.S. warheads on strategic missiles with the number of Soviet delivery vehicles. It is like comparing the number of oranges in one basket with the number of stones inside the same oranges in another basket.

In another statement clearly designed for a propaganda effect — the interview to the *U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT* magazine — Caspar Weinberger alleges that the SALT II treaty did not provide for any reductions in strategic arms at all. Now, this is a deliberate attempt to deceive the public opinion. It is quite enough to read the text of the treaty and the report of the U.S. secretary of defense for 1981 fiscal to see that in case Washington ratified SALT II the Soviet Union, for example, was to cut its strategic forces by 10 per cent.

Evidently, Caspar Weinberger, McFarlane and other members of the U.S. Administration are alarmed at the very thought that the race in arms may be suspended and that the military-industrial complex may lose even a portion of its iniquitous profits. Hence, the distortion of the facts and the machinations in order to cast aspersions on the operating accords dealing with the problem of preventing the risk of nuclear war, and the campaign of discrediting the very idea of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union.

'Notorious Letter'

OW191355 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1124 GMT 19 Nov 85

[From "The World Today" program presented by Dmitriy Biryukov]

[Text] Hello, comrades: The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting opened today at 1200 Moscow time. One can be quite certain in saying that the whole world has anxiously awaited this day.

Articles and commentaries devoted to the meeting of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan have more than once quoted Comrade Gorbachev's words, which clearly and precisely define our country's position at the meeting. We propose very simple and clear things, stated Comrade Gorbachev: to reduce by one-half the corresponding nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States; to tightly close the door leading to the deployment of weapons in space; and to stop and turn back the build-up of nuclear missiles in Europe.

So the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, the first in the last 6 years, has begun. Talks and negotiations are today being held in a small country mansion, Fleur d'Eau. This mansion is located in a park on the banks of Lake Geneva. Talks will continue tomorrow at the Soviet mission.

World press commentaries devoted to the meeting in Geneva have repeatedly pointed out the existence of doubts and differences in the U.S. camp regarding the tasks of the current meeting. For instance, the London newspaper *THE OBSERVER* notes that the President was unable to unify his own allies, and internal disagreements between them led to Weinberger, U.S. defense secretary and one of Reagan's closest political allies, being left at home despite his persistent requests to be included among the persons headed for Geneva.

In this regard I would like to recall that on the eve of the meeting, Weinberger, as if summarizing the position of the extreme rightist circles, sent a secret letter to the President. You probably already know that it somehow ended up on the pages of *THE NEW YORK TIMES*. One could consider this as simply another

sensation, the leak of information from the very top, as it has already happened more than once in the United States.

However, I would like to draw your attention to something else: The notorious letter confirmed the fact that an extremely influential group, closely connected with the military-industrial complex, exists in the United States. Precisely this group, which is guided by selfish interests, is doing everything possible to frustrate any talks with the Soviet Union that could lead to the end of the arms race and a radical reduction in strategic weapons.

As has become known from this letter, the U.S. defense secretary recommended that the President turn down any steps in the direction of detente, including a promise to continue observing the provisions of the SALT II treaty. Incidentally, certain official representatives of the administration have agreed with the view that both Weinberger's letter and the fact of its leak should be linked together, and they consider it as an attempt to torpedo the summit meeting.

In our subsequent informational releases, comrades, you will find out how the events in Geneva are developing. I just want to stress again that the Soviet side came to these talks with honest intentions and a businesslike attitude, and it is very important for those who today are responsible for the destiny of the United States, which is inseparably linked with the destiny of the entire world, to heed the demands of millions of people throughout the world, including people in the United States, about the need to achieve peace and security for the current generation and those who are today only starting out in life. These opportunities exist in Geneva, and precisely our country proposes this path.

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CSO: 5200/1155

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: NITZE REMARKS HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS AT ARMS TALKS

Bogachev Comments

LD132259 Moscow TASS in English 2257 GMT 13 Nov 85

["A Step Back in Geneva?" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 13 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Despite a confidential nature of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva, U.S. official representatives make it a rule after "closed door" meetings to inform the press about their course. And the stand of the U.S. delegation is presented in the light advantageous for Washington, while the initiatives of the Soviet side are either passed in silence or distorted.

For instance, on November 8 such a "presentation" of the course of the talks was made by the U.S. presidential advisor Paul Nitze and on November 12 by two senior administration officials who preferred that their names should not be revealed in the press.

The Soviet Union suggests to reach agreement in Geneva on a complete ban on strike space arms for both sides and on truly drastic, 50 per cent, reduction of nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territories.

This Soviet proposal does not envisage any unilateral advantages for the USSR either for the structure of reductions, or for the number of warheads, or the number of delivery vehicles. The sides can determine themselves what part of their armaments and in what volume they should reduce, what structure of the forces they should have after reductions. No damage can be caused to the security of any of the sides also by the Soviet proposal not to deploy on any of the components of the remaining nuclear weapons systems -- intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), heavy bombers -- more than 60 per cent of the total number of permitted 6,000 charges. Under the Soviet proposal the USSR must cut the number of nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,250 units, while the United States to 1,680 units.

The officials from Washington, who preferred to remain anonymous, described the Soviet proposals as "unjust" since they "equate", for instance, the gravity bomb (American) to the SS-18 missile (Soviet). This is a blatant lie. The Soviet proposals envisage clear definition between carriers in which the United States will have an advantage,

and charges for them, where the exact parity of the sides in the amount of 6,000 units is established.

Certain persons in Washington do not like the fact that the Soviet proposal envisages the inclusion in this category of U.S. carrier-based aviation with nuclear-capable aircraft, U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft in the Far East. The question arises in what category of armaments Washington suggests to count these weapons. Maybe, together with nuclear arms of Britain and France, which, as they in Washington try to prove, do not exist at all?

Touching upon the cardinal question of the talks, on non-militarisation of space, Nitze emphasised particularly that the United States sees its main task at the talks with the Soviet Union in working out some road of cooperation in the question of how defensive armaments can be included in the composition of the forces of both sides. He made no secret of the fact that what the U.S. Administration means by "defensive armaments", is a large-scale space-based anti-missile defence, which is unambiguously banned by the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, other strike arms systems in near-earth space. Thus, Washington sets the course at the legalisation of arms in space, at the militarisation of near-earth space. Such a stand is, specifically, at glaring contradiction with the aims of the Geneva talks formulated by representatives of the USSR and the USA in the joint statement of January 8, 1985.

Paul Nitze alleged that the United States suggests to reduce the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems to the same level as in the Soviet Union's proposal, that is, to 6,000 units. This is another gross distortion of the real state of affairs at the talks. In reality, Washington proposes to set an aggregate limit of 4,500 warheads only for ICBM's and SLBM's, that is, without cruise missiles on bombers, thus actually giving a free hand to the United States in the build up of these dangerous armaments. But this U.S. script envisages a strict sublimit of 3,000 warheads for ground-based ICBM's, that is, precisely for those systems that constitute the basis of the Soviet Union's defensive shield. Meanwhile, Washington does not allow for strict limitations for SLBM's -- in the sphere, where the United States has an advantage.

The United States does not agree to include in the overall limit heavy bombers and air-based cruise missiles, which was, specifically, envisaged by the SALT-2 treaty. And then, the United States is prepared to limit cruise missiles carried by bombers to the level of 1,500 units only if the USSR agrees to carry out in advance a unilateral costly restructuring of the Soviet strategic forces. There are reasons to believe that the United States "new proposals" in the form in which they are presented to the press by Washington officials mean a step back as compared with previous U.S. initiatives, with earlier achieved agreements.

The United States is actually proposing a radical cut in Soviet weapon systems, while leaving the U.S. nuclear might virtually unaffected.

Nitze tried to uphold again Washington's absurd propaganda thesis "toward disarmament through the further build up of the United States' nuclear might". He described as one of the elements of the U.S. proposals a stage-by-stage reduction of arsenals with their slight simultaneous increase. It follows from his concrete points that "stage-by-stage reductions" of nuclear armaments should be made by the Soviet Union, while the United States should get the right to be engaged in their "simultaneous build up".

The United States proposals in the sphere of long-range nuclear weapon systems mean an old "intermediate version" altered somewhat. Specifically, it is still proposed that the USSR should cut its missiles in the Asian part of the country while there should be no restrictions on the U.S. nuclear forces in the Far East. The U.S. side insists as before, on not counting the British and French nuclear arms in the overall balance of the sides. In this proposal, as before, it is sought to ensure for the United States unilateral advantages in the flight time of medium-range missiles to important targets of the other side.

Such "proposals" of the United States on nuclear and space arms cannot be described as "equitable" even with most unrestrained imagination.

'Gray Hawk'

PM131006 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 5

[I. Zakharov "Pertinent Notes": "Rehashing an Old Tune"]

[Text] Not for nothing is P. Nitze, an expert in anti-Soviet activity and special adviser to the U.S. President and secretary of state for arms control problems, called the "gray hawk." In the long decades of his political career he has made enormous efforts to poison Soviet-U.S. relations, erect a palisade of obstacles in the way of their normalization, and hinder the reaching of agreements.

The same approach typifies Nitze's recent speech at the overseas writers' club. In his speech he touched on the Soviet nuclear arms reduction proposals and set forth the U.S. position, which, judging by Nitze's confident tone, reflects the White House's official position.

He spoke of the President's alleged intention to "study all the possibilities for implementing just and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals." And immediately, as if erasing the promise to seek acceptable ways, he stated the invariability of the former U.S. position. The same position to which the United States stubbornly adhered at the talks which it wrecked.

The Presidential adviser's inconsistent and often contradictory speech clearly reveals the outlines of the administration's obstructionist course of muddying the clear Soviet proposals, confusing obvious questions, and preparing for another deadlocked situation by introducing at the talks deliberately unacceptable "counterproposals" which are nothing but cosmetically retouched versions of the former proposals.

What does this boil down to?

First -- and this is the main thing -- they lack any recognition of the need to prevent the transfer of the arms race to space. This key point in the Soviet proposals is virtually totally ignored.

The U.S. proposal to conclude an agreement on some kind of "open laboratories" at which the sides would present each other with information on their programs and register the state of the work, but in no way limit the implementation of that work, cannot be taken seriously. Essentially, it is being proposed that we legalize and program an arms race in space.

As for offensive nuclear arms, the level of constructiveness of the "proposals according to Nitze" turns out to be just as low. Using figures superficially similar to those submitted by the Soviet Union, Nitze entirely distorts the purport of the Soviet proposals. If one follows his logic, the U.S. side would have a minimum of 350 heavy bombers "not covered" by the agreement. Moreover, the fulfillment of the new U.S. demand to limit missiles' throw-weight would be tantamount to a fundamental breakup [lomka] of the Soviet strategic forces. And in addition to this, there is a total lack of even the slightest reference to means capable of reaching each other. Those really are the "tactics of the deaf"!

Nitze lists the many U.S. nuclear arms that do not come under the definition of strategic arms as "intermediate-range nuclear forces." But here too, the sums involve overt falsifications: arbitrarily excluded from the number of these means are 560 nuclear-capable aircraft based at 14 U.S. air bases and hundreds of U.S. aircraft at bases in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR and its allies. And the nuclear arms of Britain and France (178 missiles with 530 nuclear charges) are left out of the reckoning. Agreement is expressed to talk only about "Pershings" and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe, while it is proposed to "exchange" them by taking into account the USSR's medium-range nuclear means over all our country's territory. Now, they are trying to present this proposal, which has long been justifiably rejected, as a swift U.S. administration reaction to the new Soviet proposals.

Near the end of the speech Nitze launched into a discussion of the "importance of monitoring the observance of treaty commitments." The Soviet Union has no doubts about the importance of such a process. So he should not bother to hammer at an open door. Mr Nitze ought to recall what M.S. Gorbachev said on this score: "I must note that we believe the Americans no more than they do us, and that is why we are just as interested as they are in ensuring that each agreement is reliably verifiable."

In P. Nitze's long speech the following formula from one of the "elements of the U.S. proposal" attracts attention: "the phased reduction of arsenals while slightly increasing them [poetapnoye sokrashcheniye arsenalov pri odnovremennom ikh nekotorom uvelichenii] as a means of implementing agreed reductions." If you excise the floridity and ornate words you are left almost literally with the U.S. proverb -- "to have your cake and eat it." As is well known, nobody will ever succeed in achieving that result.

It is time for those who love illusory plans to realize that any calculations on achieving military superiority over the USSR "by means of a treaty" are doomed to failure. The sole way in which agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union is the way of realism and a sober approach to the problems of nuclear and space arms.

'Unseemly Propaganda Maneuvers'

PM131141 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 85 First Edition p 5

[V. Bolshakov "Rejoinder": "Unseemly Maneuver"]

[Text] In the United States now it is not that easy to repudiate the recent Soviet peace initiatives with the usual epithet of "propagandist." Their popularity is too great.

They are clear, comprehensible, and specific, closing tight the door leading to the deployment of arms in space, effecting a 50 percent reduction to Soviet and U.S. nuclear means which can reach each other's territory, and halting and reversing the stockpiling of nuclear means in Europe. Nonetheless, even after U.S. President Reagan had stated in his UN speech that the Soviet proposals "contain shoots which must be fostered," the representatives of his administration do not let a day pass without "criticizing" the Soviet initiatives.

Thus, addressing the Washington club for foreign correspondents recently, the special adviser to the U.S. President and secretary of state on arms control tried to present these initiatives in the most disadvantageous light.

"These proposals," P. Nitze expatiated, "are less attractive to the United States and its allies than those submitted in 1983." But the legitimate question then arises: Why did the United States reject the USSR's proposals out of hand in 1983?

Indeed, talk on the degrees of "attractiveness" of the Soviet proposals is a blind. P. Nitze's task is clear: to "sell" the foreign public the U.S. "formula" for arms reductions. Under this formula Soviet arms systems which are "inconvenient" to the United States are declared to be "destabilizing," but all U.S. systems ready for deployment or already being deployed, like the Midgetman and MX, and long-range cruise missile systems are, like the MX, called "peacekeepers."

What did Mr Nitze not try to do to distort the Soviet stance? In particular, he claimed the USSR intends to refuse the United States the right to carry out fundamental research in its "space laboratories," but retains the right to such research for itself. Yes, in Geneva the Soviet Union suggested reaching agreement on banning the creation [sozdaniye], including research work, tests, and deployment, of space strike armaments. But, as the Soviet side authoritatively explained, when it is a case of scientific research activity and the need to ban it, we do not, of course, have in mind the fundamental sciences. This research is under way and will evidently continue. In the United States it is a case not of laboratory experiments, but of specific developments [razrabotki] which are being undertaken under instructions and contracts from the Pentagon. Experimental models of future components of the "space shield," that is, of "star wars" technology, are already being tested. And it is the right to this kind of "fundamental research" which P. Nitze is defending, "forgetting" that it is banned by the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty.

Nitze would obviously like the USSR to accept the "expanded" interpretation of this treaty invested by the "star wars" supporters in the Pentagon, and at the same time, embark on all the "limitations" proposed by the U.S. military department which would secure unilateral military superiority for the United States. But this is an illusion, a chimera. And it is dangerous to chase after it in the world today. It would be a good thing if Washington were to finally understand this and not engage in unseemly propaganda maneuvers.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

UK LABOR PARTY LEADER CITED ON SUMMIT ISSUES IN PRAVDA

PML21324 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Maslennikov dispatch: "Disarmament Problems Are the Main Thing:]

[Text] London, 7 Nov -- The forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit must focus on disarmament problems, N. Kinnock, leader of Britain's Labor Party, stated in an interview with your PRAVDA correspondent.

Of course, the regional and other problems which U.S. President Reagan mentioned in his speech at the UN General Assembly session are also important, N. Kinnock said.

But to spotlight them during the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. talks, particularly in the way that Reagan did, would mean departing from the main point and deliberately dooming the summit to fruitless disputes. Agreement can and must be reached on regional security problems, and not only where the United States would wish it, but in regions such as the Near East and Southern Africa. However, in my view this should be done at conferences of the relevant composition and level specially prepared for that purpose.

As for the forthcoming meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders in Geneva, N. Kinnock stated, it must certainly focus on disarmament problems. I personally believe that it is very important to achieve concrete results at the meeting, if only on one of the questions on the agenda. If, for instance, the two countries' leaders managed to agree to introduce a complete moratorium on nuclear tests, even for a limited period, that could considerably improve the international climate and be a precondition for continued talks on the whole complex of nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

We in the Labor Party, N. Kinnock said in conclusion, welcome the USSR's new peace initiatives and believe that they could form a basis for fruitful dialogue in Geneva, from which the whole world is expecting a positive outcome.

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CSO: 5200/1159

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR'S ZAGLADIN, AFANASYEV INTERVIEWED ON TALKS ISSUES BY ITALIAN PAPER

PM131102 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 Nov 85 p 10

[Giulietto Chiesa Moscow dispatch: "Vadim Zagladin, Viktor Afanasyev: 'We Expect Realists Like Ourselves To Come to Geneva'"]

[Text] Moscow -- Is the Geneva summit really a political crossroads at which the world's future course could be determined? Or is it an opportunity, however important, that can be missed without prompting one to tear out his hair? Or is it true, as U.S. Secretary of State Shultz said on his departure from Moscow, that "life does not end in mid-November"?

Nobody wants to make forecasts and probably nobody can, in view of the extreme uncertainty of the situation, its fluidity, and the chance of sudden surprises until the last moment. And yet the desire to understand the present stances and feelings of both sides, rather than the possible developments, is more than justified.

The following is the results of two conversations (both begun at the 7 November formal reception at the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses and continued the next day in separate locations) with two very prominent Soviet political figures: Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Section, and Viktor Afanasyev, editor of PRAVDA.

"The Soviet Union," Zagladin replied to my question about what is expected from the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, "is going to the Geneva summit with the resolute intention of conducting it in a concrete, constructive spirit. The main task we set ourselves is to achieve positive development with regard to the issues that are crucial both to Soviet-U.S. relations and to the world situation."

[Chiesa] But one of the issues that remains unresolved, particularly following Reagan's UN speech, is precisely that of what the two leaders of the major powers will talk about.

[Zagladin] Of course the USSR will be willing to examine any issue whatsoever. We do not need to -- and there is no reason why we should -- evade a discussion of every issue. However, we have already said that the principal, crucial issues must be at the forefront. And the principal problem is the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons under conditions of nonmilitarization of outer space. If this objective were to be achieved or if real steps were to be made toward its attainment, the meeting could be considered to have been a success.

[Chiesa] This is in fact the question that everyone is asking: What are the chances of the outcome being as you hope?

[Zagladin] We are often asked: Are you approaching Geneva optimistically or pessimistically? Neither. We are approaching Geneva realistically. This means that we are aware of the difficulty of the problems that must be tackled and of the fact that in recent years USSR-U.S. relations have witnessed numerous stratifications which are hindering such a decision. But we are sharply aware of something else -- that it is indispensable to forge ahead. Mankind has reached a limit beyond which a sequence of no-longer-predictable or controllable events could begin. The dangerous nature of such an eventuality is obvious, and the CPSU believes that that threshold must not be crossed, that confrontation and the arms race must be blocked, that a start must be made on reducing land-based weapons, that the transfer of offensive weapons to space must be prevented, and that there must be a return to detente, to the normal development of international relations and cooperation. This is in the interests of every country, every people, and every individual.

[Chiesa] My rapid conversation with Vadim Zagladin ended here.

My **conversation** with PRAVDA editor (also begun at the reception, immediately after Gorbachev's greetings message to foreign delegations and the diplomatic corps) continued the next day, Friday, in his office on the ninth floor of the huge building on the street named for the CPSU organ.

"In his interview with IZVESTIYA," Viktor Afanasyev began, "President Reagan had, among others, some not exactly negative things to say about the need for dialogue with the USSR and about disarmament, things which can only be welcomed. On those words are not matched by deeds.

The United States is involved in an unprecedented rearmament program. Changes of approach are not apparent. Moreover, we have made precise proposals -- a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons in exchange for the abandonment of the space shield. But we have received no positive replies. The U.S. replies have adhered to the old line, which fails to take account of the different structure of our two strategic systems."

[Chiesa] So, do you believe that Washington has not come half way toward reaching an understanding?

[Afanasyev] I am no expert so I do not engage in calculations. However, the substance of the U.S. stance is as before: to disrupt the strategic balance which we have worked very hard to achieve.

[Chiesa] Conflicting signs regarding the Geneva summit have come, and are still coming, from the Washington administration. How do you judge this fluctuation?

[Afanasyev] It is true. At this stage there does not seem to be much optimism there. Nevertheless, we believe that the meeting is a good thing in itself, a comparison of stances, a verification of approaches. Be that as it may, we are approaching it with the aim of improving relations, and we expect them to do the same.

[Chiesa] But from what is known, from the disclosures that have filtered through, it seems that there is still no agreement even on the priority points on the agenda. The USSR wants to discuss first and foremost the problems of disarmament, whereas the United States seems to opt for other priorities.

[Afanasyev] It is possible that Washington will insist on bringing other priorities to the summit. In fact, in his UN speech Reagan started by discussing "regional problems." We believe that everything can be discussed, but we do not believe that "regional problems" can be resolved in that forum. How is it possible to think otherwise? It is true that the United States and the Soviet Union exert influence on many world issues, but local issues cannot be decided without involving the countries and peoples involved. Take Afghanistan. We favor a political solution, but it is unattainable without a direct involvement of the countries involved. The same can be said of other issues raised by the U.S. President.

[Chiesa] From a certain viewpoint Reagan's position -- at least that expressed in his recent UN speech -- seems paradoxical and contradictory. On the one hand the United States is trying to deny the Soviet Union the status of a global power, while on the other it seems to want to boil down all the world's conflicts to the U.S.-USSR confrontation, thus implicitly restoring to the Soviet Union that which it is trying to deny it.

[Afanasyev] I see nothing paradoxical in Reagan's position. He is simply expressing a stance that is in its own way systematic and consistent -- the thrust, the pressure for a social and worldwide revenge both against socialism and against the processes of national and social emancipation under way in the world.

[Chiesa] Sometimes the U.S. President seems unable to mediate among the various impulses within his staff....

[Afanasyev] I am not acquainted with the internal workings of the White House. Certainly one notices that there are several viewpoints. For instance, those of Weinberger, an obvious "hawk," differ from those of the more reasonable Shultz. The impression is that there is still no common strategy.

But there are still some 10 days to go and a great deal can be further defined. We are not losing hope or our moderate optimism, above all because we are convinced that it is impossible to carry on this way. We proceed from the viewpoint that first and foremost it is necessary to guarantee mankind the chance to survive.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG'S KOHL EXPRESSES 'SUBDUED OPTIMISM' ON SUMMIT

DW181220 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1810 GMT 17 Nov 85

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by correspondent Joachim Jauer in Bonn on 17 November; from the "Bonner Perspektiven" program -- recorded]

[Text] [Jauer] Mr Chancellor: The range of topics for Geneva is worldwide, to include even space. Will Germany's special concerns and problems have any significant weight?

[Kohl] I believe so, Mr Jauer, because everything that is negotiated in Geneva on a worldwide scale, including space as you mentioned, directly affects us. More than anyone, we depend on reduced East-West tensions. That is also a declared goal of my policy. That is why what happens in Geneva is of paramount importance, not only to official policy, to governments, but to all of us, to the people.

[Jauer] Will the important subject of disarmament play a role in Geneva, Mr Chancellor, which your personal motto -- creating peace with fewer weapons -- demands?

[Kohl] You cannot separate one from the other, Mr Jauer. Creating peace with fewer weapons is a declared goal of my policy, and it was for the purpose of making headway on that course that I promoted the Geneva dialogue. It is easy for anyone to understand: If chiefs do not agree, those who are delegated cannot, of course, achieve a great deal in endless talks. I do not overrate this meeting. I am quite realistic. But in the preparatory phase for this summit so much has already started to move in the way of proposals, and especially in realizing what I recently said in New York jointly with President Reagan -- we intend to talk about weapons reduction and arms control. But that will only work if the improvement in relations comes on a broad front in the cultural field, in the economic sector, in exchanges which include sporting events, everything that the President mentioned once again in his speech. A chance does exist. Whether it is utilized, Mr Jauer, I do not know at this hour. If level-headed considerations prevail, it ought to be utilized. It is a fateful hour, and for this reason I expressly insisted that such an agenda item be included. I can only hope that both sides will grasp that each must move a bit, that it is not a question of gaining prestige at the expense of the other but of letting reason hold sway.

[Jauer] Does SDI not impede such motion, as you just mentioned? Or do you believe that SDI can make the Soviets receptive to making concessions?

[Kohl] Well, I do not take so seriously the whole propaganda clamor of the past few weeks or months in this context. Geneva would not have started again without our NATO

two-track decision. I am firmly convinced that this meeting would not have materialized without the discussion and the will to pursue research on SDI. After all, Mr Jauer, the truth is that the Soviet Union has been pursuing the same research for years -- it has never denied it and lately it even admits it openly. For this reason, it is useful now -- as long as research is still under way and no decisions have as yet been made, as long as nothing has as yet been finalized -- to talk reasonably with one another. That is what I refer to as subdued optimism.

[Jauer] Thinking beyond Geneva, Mr Chancellor, could you imagine a summit result which would make an officially blessed German participation in SDI superfluous?

[Kohl] I do not know about that. I stated for good reason that we will make our decision after Geneva on the form in which we as a government will participate.

[Jauer] Yet Geneva might shed a new, different light on your decision?

[Kohl] Quite so. This, after all, is the purpose of a timetable.

[Jauer] Mr Chancellor, General Secretary Erich Honecker is obviously waiting for a Geneva signal. What can this summit meeting mean to German-German relations?

[Kohl] I have a proverb that I have cited so often that I am almost reluctant to repeat it. It is nevertheless a truism, an old peasant proverb: Big water draws small water along. That means that if overall relations between East and West improve -- which I expressly support and demand -- it will have effects on our relations not only with Moscow -- between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union -- but also with other countries. During the past few weeks I have had many contacts, including nonpublic contacts, in individual capitals, including Prague and Budapest.

[Jauer] East Berlin as well?

[Kohl] Of course, East Berlin.

[Jauer] You like to make telephone calls.

[Kohl] In this connection it goes without saying that I have gotten the message that in the Warsaw Pact they are also interested in seeing Geneva, if possible, produce a positive, calming trend, so to speak. The invitation to Mr Honecker stands. It is up to him to say when he wants to come. He has accepted the invitation. But I will not have any part in this really absurd development that time and again occurs in Bonn. Will he or will he not come? I prefer to behave as I would as a private citizen if I have invited someone and he accepts the invitation, then it is up to him to say when he wants to come. Then we will discuss the circumstances of the visit and desist from publicly debating whether he will come or not. I think such debate is rather unseemly.

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CSO: 5200/2551

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG CDU'S RUEHE, SPD'S EHMKE ON GENEVA SUMMIT

DW211247 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1200 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] Here are the initial reactions to the Geneva summit from Bonn. The CDU and SPD in interview with ZDF Television Network evaluated the meeting positively. The fact alone that the leaders of the two superpowers talked with each other is viewed as a success. Here are the questions which Klaus Walther put to the security policy spokesmen of the CDU and the SPD, Ruehe, and Ehmke respectively:

[Begin recording] [Walther] What is the most important result?

[Ruehe] Most important is the fact that a better basis exists now for future negotiations. After all, the two most important men have put forth some orientation, data, and guidelines, which will now make it easier for negotiators to achieve constructive results.

[Walther] But no concrete agreement was concluded.

[Ruehe] That could not have been expected. For the last summit, negotiations had begun 7 years earlier, and then the agreement was signed. The current negotiations, however, began only 6 months ago.

[Walther] What is the most important orientation figure?

[Ruehe] The 50 percent reduction, that is the decisive point, and we should take care not to allow it to be dropped from discussion again, but to see that it is made concrete in a true disarmament agreement in the next few years.

[Walther] Do you anticipate any effects on the German-German relationship?

[Ruehe] Yes. If the great powers talk, the small and medium countries cannot be forbidden to talk. That was evident in the GDR-Soviet Union relationship last year.

[Walther] Do you expect Honecker's visit before the end of the year?

[Ruehe] I think we will learn very soon whether such a visit will take place this year.

[Walther] Professor Ehmke, from the viewpoint of the SPD, was Geneva a success or a failure, and were your expectations met?

[Ehmke] Geneva was a success. I believe that in political substance more came of it than had been expected in many places. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have not disappointed the hopes of the nations. As for the climate, this really can become an overture to a second phase of detente policy. The problems have not been solved; the arms control problems have not been resolved; yet, the time of not talking between the two superpowers is over. That makes hope that we will again enter into a phase of cooperation and detente.

[Walther] What, as far as you are concerned, is the most important result announced in Geneva?

[Ehmke] Most important is the fact that the two leading men have had ample meetings, including in private, and they have obviously succeeded in making it clear to each other that they have common interests: That neither can have security without the other, but that security can be had only jointly. If you will, Geneva, to me, is also reaffirmation of the SPD concept of a security partnership. There is yet a long stretch of road to cover until then, but Geneva has opened the way to it.

[Walther] Do you also expect effects on the German-German relationship, specifically, on the Honecker visit?

[Ehmke] I do not know whether one can see it that way. But, definitely, the positive result of Geneva will also have a positive effect on the German-German relationship.
[end recording]

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CSO: 5200/2551

DANISH BOOK ON DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MISSILES IN EUROPE REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 7,
Jul 85 (signed to press 12 Jun 85) pp 150-151

[K. Voronov review: "Concern for the Future"]

[Text] The book in question, "The European Theater. Book on the Missiles and the New Nuclear Debate," (Footnote) (D.J. Adler, "Det Europaeiske teater. Bogen om raketterne og den nye atomvabendebat," Copenhagen, "Eirene," 1984 p 452) was written by the well-known Danish journalist and public-political figure D. Adler. Written on a keenly publicistic and at the same time substantial documentary basis, it reveals the backstage aspect of NATO's so-called 1979 "twin decision." Particular attention is paid here to the causes and consequences of the deployment of the new American intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) in West Europe and the course of the antimissile debate in Denmark.

The author terms the start of the countdown to the appearance of the new class of INF the contract obtained in February 1969 by the American Martin Marietta military monopoly for modernization of the Pershing 1 missiles for the needs of the European theater. Following tests, the subcontractor--the Goodyear concern--produced a radar guidance system ensuring high strike accuracy--with an error of the order of 25-50 meters (p 86). The probable error factor is even better for the Tomahawk cruise missiles (BIM-109)--less than 20 meters according to certain data. "The provocative effect," D. Adler observes, "was obvious to everyone" (p 226).

Following such results promised by the monopolies, the book says, the American generals got to work, demanding the speediest replacement of the arsenals with the new first-strike nuclear weapons. And matters proceeded along the track well-trodden by the military-industrial complex: in 1972 the Martin Marietta firm obtained a contract for a sum total of \$10.5 billion, the first successful test was conducted in 1977 and engineering support--launchers, means of transportation and other equipment--was developed in 1978 (pp 87-89). In fact the Pershing 2 was a new missile inasmuch as of the 12,000 parts, 3,000 had not been used before (p 92).

Economic benefits play a part also--the cruise missiles ensure for NATO generals "a thousand times greater efficiency" than the Minuteman III ICBM

upon determination of cost effectiveness. Thus the cost of a Tomahawk constitutes only one-seventh of the expenditure on the production, support, and maintenance of an F-16 fighter bomber (p 102). However, the decisive part in the deployment of the new American missiles in Europe was nonetheless played, as the author rightly emphasizes, by purely political considerations. It is highly indicative that the political basis of the "twin decision" is characterized in the book as "verbal and pseudorational deception" (pp 110-112).

Employing a military-technical style naturally, the author believes that this prehistory helps us peer into the future inasmuch as the United States intends in the aspiration to even greater military-strategic superiority to equip the 102 Pershing 2 launchers with at least 3 missiles. The reloading of the batteries in 10 minutes thus presupposes the possibility of a triple launch. But even this is not all: Martin Marietta is actively developing a new increased-range Pershing 3 missile with separating individually targeted warheads (p 94).

As the study observes, the development and production of new types of nuclear delivery systems are producing for the United States' aviation and rocketry corporations huge profits. The cruise missiles example is indicative. Thus Boeing obtained an order for the production in the period 1982-1989 of 4,300 such air-based missiles for the impressive sum of \$8.2 billion. The value of the order for the manufacture of 3,994 sea-based Tomahawks (1982-1987) which the General Dynamics Corporation obtained is even greater--\$8.3 billion. Against such a background the \$3.3 billion constituting the sum total of the order obtained by the latter for the manufacture of 464 Tomahawks for deployment in West Europe plus the subsequent supply (in the next few years) of a further 560 such missiles (p 107) appear, as the author ironically put it, "quite modest."

NATO's nuclear strategy has always been a painful spot in the relations of the bloc's participants. D. Adler emphasizes the difference in the motives of the "transatlantic partners" and the differentiation of viewpoints in specific situations. He shows clearly and at the same time without oversimplifying the problem that Denmark has always occupied a special position in critical periods of NATO activity: in 1953 it refused to create air bases on its territory, in 1957 the deployment of nuclear weapons and in 1963-1964 plans for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (p 60). However, in 1979 the Folketing voted 130 to 29 to reject a resolution calling on the government to oppose at the notorious NATO Council December session the production and deployment of INF in Europe, just as, incidentally, it had rejected by an overwhelming majority a resolution in support of realization of the American plan (p 6).

As is known, an indispensable condition of the approval by Denmark and West Europe of the "twin" decision was recognition of the fact that the SALT II Treaty would ultimately be ratified by Washington. However, it was here, the author observes, that Europe was deceived (pp 396-397). These and other factors prompted the Danish leadership to propose at the said NATO Council session a 6-month postponement of the adoption of the "twin decision" and also in conjunction with Greece to record its special position in the final document (p 414).

Against a broad backdrop of international-political events D. Adler traces the peripeteias of the diplomatic struggle on the "missile question," paying tribute to the Soviet peace initiatives, realization of which could have prevented a new, highly dangerous twist of the nuclear arms race spiral in Europe. At the same time present in the book in one way or another is the proposition which has become widespread in West Europe concerning some equal "superpower" responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of the situation in the world. Nonetheless, the author puts the blame for the breakdown of the well-known Geneva negotiations on limiting nuclear arms in Europe, just as for the non-entry into force of the SALT II Treaty, on the "hawks" in the United States and NATO (p 282).

The work analyzes the course of the antimissile debate in the West European countries. The debate in Denmark in 1979-1983 reflected the increased influence of the new antiwar movement. Even the circles which played up to the United States' militarist plans do not feel more comfortable as a result of their implementation (pp 365-365). The logic of the new twist to the arms race spiral which has been added by NATO is such: the increasingly large number of missiles in the bloc's arsenals is reducing security. Realization of the "twin decision," which brought about forced retaliatory measures on the part of the USSR and its allies, the author observes, has only increased even more the West Europeans' disquiet and concern for their security (p 347).

As the work emphasizes, the bulk of the supporters of antimissile actions rejects the official myth of the "Soviet military threat," evaluating correctly the historical experience of the Soviet Union's struggle for the preservation of territorial integrity and independence, the colossal material losses and human casualties which it incurred in World War II and the structure of the armed forces, which corresponds precisely to the needs of the country's protection and defense against aggression (p 369).

The "resulting" conclusions at which D. Adler arrives are instructive for the reader. It is his belief that Denmark and West Europe as a whole may only be secured against the threat of nuclear catastrophe by emphatic deliverance from the omnipotence of the NATO military-bureaucratic machine and also the biggest monopolies, which are not under the control not only of the peoples but also of the governments of the bloc's members. "West Europe," the author appeals, "needs to rid itself of ideological pharisaism and anti-Soviet paranoia and cultivate the capacity to think and act independently" (pp 428-429). Besides ideological and psychological reorganization, he believes, it is essential in order to break out of the vicious circle of the arms race to impart to NATO in the next few years a defensive nature and to revise strategy and doctrine to this end (pp 423-424).

The book by the Danish journalist attracts attention by its emotional character and frank concern for the fate of peace in Europe. It reflects the broadening antiwar mood in West Europe and the demands of broad circles of the public that their governments switch from general discussion to practical steps to free the European continent of nuclear weapons.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET PAPER LINKS AIDS EPIDEMIC TO CIA EXPERIMENTS

PM051035 [Editorial Report] Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian on 30 October carries on page 14 a 3,000-word article by Valentin Zapevalov under the heading "The Panic in the West, or What Lies Behind the AIDS Sensation." The article begins with a lengthy account of the disease, its effects on the immune system, the history of its identification, and the scale of the current "epidemic" in the West, especially in the United States. This is followed by a historical study of alleged "experiments" carried out over the last 30 years under the auspices of the CIA and the Pentagon, including "secret tests of new types of biological weapons" in the fifties and sixties in North American cities; CIA-organized "tests of dangerous disease viruses, narcotics, and psychotropic drugs on clinic patients, volunteers, prisoners, and drug addicts;" and similar incidents which have come to light in recent years.

Zapevalov says: "All this information, in conjunction with the 'AIDS Enigma,' gives rise to serious thought. The reputable Indian newspaper PATRIOT, for instance, has openly suggested that AIDS is the consequence of 'similar inhuman experiments by Washington.'" Zapevalov goes on to quote the "facts" cited by PATRIOT in support of its claim. The "evidence" concerns work carried out by scientists at the Fort Detrick medical institute in infectious diseases, who "are concerned with questions of artificially influencing man's immune system and studying the mechanism of both acquired and natural immunity." It is asserted that the center has "links with the Pentagon" and with biological weapon research work in other countries. An example is quoted: "The Western press has informed readers that at the U.S. air base in Torrejon (a northern suburb of Madrid) a huge quantity of chemical and biological weapons is being stockpiled. The leakage of toxins from the dumps has already led to epidemics in the district, but no measures have been taken."

Continuing to cite the PATRIOT, Zapevalov reports that, according to that newspaper, scientists from Fort Detrick went to Africa to collect information on "highly pathogenic viruses not encountered in European and Asian countries," and that this led to the isolation of the AIDS virus. "The virus was apparently used to contaminate donor blood which, in the course of tests, was transfused during surgical and other operations into totally unsuspecting patients. Some tests may have taken place in Haiti (a U.S. satellite country, remember?) and others on certain U.S. population groups, primarily those on the margins of society -- drug addicts, homosexuals, the homeless..."

Zapevalov concludes by noting the rapid spread of the disease and suggesting: "It is quite possible that eventually, as has happened more than once before, a victim will bring a case against the Pentagon and the CIA, and then it will finally be revealed that all the victims of AIDS are the result of the latest monstrous experiment."

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FRG'S KOHL RECEIVES GDR REPLY ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ZONE

LD081320 Hamburg DPA in German 1226 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Text] Bonn, 8 Nov (DPA) -- On Friday at the Chancellor's Office the GDR's permanent representative in Bonn, Ewald Moldt, handed over a letter from the East Berlin government addressed to Federal Chancellor Kohl on the subject of a chemical weapons-free zone. Government spokesman Norbert Schaefer told the press that it was a reply to a letter from Kohl to the East Berlin and Prague leaderships at the end of September. Schaefer did not give details; he said the Federal Government wants to study the reply and is thinking of making it public over the next few days. So far there has been no reaction from Prague.

The proposal for a chemical weapons-free zone was contained in a letter from SED leader Erich Honecker and the CSSR Government which was received by the Chancellor's Office in mid-September. Kohl in turn proposed to the two countries that negotiations should take place between delegations within the Geneva disarmament conference on outstanding questions concerning a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. He referred to the Federal Government's efforts to achieve a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

The SPD and SED have already jointly worked out ideas for the inclusion of Central Europe, and particularly the FRG, the GDR and the CSSR, in a chemical weapons-free zone.

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13 December 1985

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

FRG RECEIVES NOTES FROM GDR, CSSR ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD131621 Hamburg DPA in German 1525 GMT 13 Nov 85

[Text] Bonn, 13 Nov (DPA)--The Federal Government has (?received) diplomatic notes from the GDR and the CSSR, in which the two Warsaw Pact countries support the [word indistinct] demand to work towards a worldwide ban on chemical weapons in the UN disarmament committee in Geneva. Government spokesman Norbert Schaefer confirmed receiving the notes today. They issued [word indistinct], and respond to letters sent by the chancellor on 27 September to the heads of state and government, respectively, of the GDR and the CSSR.

Schaefer stressed at the same time that differences of opinion still exist over the matter of whether there ought to be regional bans in so-called chemical weapons-free zones. The Federal Government is holding firm to the idea of a worldwide ban, "for good reasons," he said. Schaefer announced that Chancellor Helmut Kohl would be replying to the notes from Prague and East Berlin.

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RELATED ISSUES

OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS (MARCH-MAY 1985)

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 12 Jun 85) pp 86-105

[V. Babak, Yu. Krashennnikov international roundup: "Current Problems of World Politics"]

[Excerpts] 1. En Route to the 29th CPSU Congress

A most important event in the life of the Communist Party and the entire country in the recent past was the CPSU Central Committee Plenum held on 23 April. It received and discussed the report "The Convening of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks Connected With Its Preparation and Realization" which was delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The plenum adopted the decision to convene the 27th CPSU Congress on 25 February 1986 and confirmed the congress' agenda.

Great attention was paid at the plenum to questions of foreign policy. In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory the CPSU has again declared that it sees as the main purpose of its foreign policy activity the prevention of a recurrence of such a war, even more a nuclear catastrophe.

The struggle for the preservation of peace and to ensure general security is a difficult business and requires constant efforts. The international situation remains disturbing and dangerous. Responsibility for it lies primarily with the U.S. ruling circles, which are sabotaging disarmament, creating increasingly new types of weapons of mass destruction and continuing to act as the instigators of an arms race. Under these conditions, the plenum observed, an increasingly important task is the improvement and enrichment in every possible way of cooperation and the development of all-around relations with the fraternal socialist countries and their close interaction in the political, economic, defense and other spheres. The Soviet Union will purposefully and persistently develop relations with the other socialist states, including the PRC. The USSR's position on this issue is well known and it holds good.

The Soviet Union also advocates the further expansion of diverse cooperation with the Asian, African, and Latin American developing countries and the development of normal equal relations with the capitalist states, including the United States.

And the USSR's declarations are not at variance with its deeds. This is confirmed by the new large-scale Soviet initiatives put forward in the spring. Our country proposed that the USSR and the United States freeze both sides' nuclear arsenals for the entire period of the Geneva negotiations and halt further missile deployment. This proposal was put forward at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with members of the Socialist International's Consultative Council for Disarmament on 22 March.

In addition, guided by the endeavor to ensure a favorable atmosphere at the Geneva negotiations, the Soviet Union proposed a moratorium on the creation (including scientific research), testing and deployment of strike space arms, which would operate for the whole period of the negotiations. Not confining itself to this proposal, the USSR announced a decision to unilaterally impose a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and halt the implementation of other retaliatory measures connected with the deployment on the European continent of American intermediate-range missiles from 7 April through November of the current year.

The Soviet Union's proposals are honest, specific, and realistic. They pursue the goal of halting the arms race on earth and preventing it spreading to space. And it is a question of a stage-by-stage process, furthermore: it would be possible at the first stage to freeze the nuclear arsenals, which should be followed by a cardinal reduction in nuclear arms.

As a measure leading to a limitation of the arms race the USSR proposes negotiating a halt to nuclear weapons tests. In accordance with this proposal, all nuclear powers should announce a moratorium on all nuclear explosions for the period up to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general banning of nuclear weapons tests. Such a moratorium could be imposed as of 6 August--the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima--or even earlier.

The new initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union elicited extensive comment worldwide. They have been evaluated by broad strata of the international community as evidence of our country's sincere aspiration to remove the threat of nuclear war and contribute to a general thaw in the climate in the world.

Unfortunately, there was a different reaction on the part of Washington and some of its allies. They hastened to brush aside the Soviet proposals, calling them "propaganda." It is appropriate to quote in this connection the opinion of the West German newspaper KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER, which reasonably observes: "Nothing new occurs to the West other than to assert that it is a question of propaganda tricks or attempts to seal Soviet superiority. But how otherwise can disarmament be achieved if the arms buildup is not halted, if only for a start?" Another newspaper, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, wrote: "The West should treat the USSR's proposals with all seriousness if only because they contribute to an improvement in the political climate. Without any risk to its own security, the West could perfectly well respond with similar measures to the Soviet moratorium in the intermediate-range missiles sphere. Rejecting the Soviet Union's peace initiative, as the Bonn and Washington 'hawks' are doing, corresponds to absolutely no one's interests."

The first round of negotiations in Geneva showed that the United States does not intend to abide by the accords that were reached and is endeavoring on various pretexts to shift to the background such an important issue as the formulation of specific measures to prevent the militarization of space. Under the cover of the negotiations it is planning to carry out its "star wars" program, to which statements of high-ranking Washington representatives on the eve of the latest round of the Geneva negotiations, which began on 30 May, testify.

But despite the complex, tense situation and the difficulties at the negotiations in Geneva, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, the Soviet Union preserves a sober optimism. We hope that our partners will heed the voice of the peoples, who want peace and a halt to the arms race, and that common sense, political realism, and a sense of responsibility will prevail.

An important component of the struggle for peace and the strengthening of international security is liquidation of the centers of tension which exist in the world and the settlement of a number of conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The USSR believes that the adoption by each permanent member of the UN Security Council of an undertaking to strictly observe with the countries of these continents the principles of noninterference and the nonuse of force or the threat of force and not involve them in military blocs would contribute to this. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready to assume such a commitment.

Being simultaneously both a European and an Asiatic power, the USSR displays natural concern for the establishment of lasting peace in Asia. In the course of negotiations with Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi the Soviet leadership raised the question of a comprehensive approach to problems of security on the Asian continent and the possible use here of Europe's experience to some extent--as far as the holding in the future of an all-Asia forum for an exchange of opinions and joint search for constructive solutions.

2. The Mighty Strength of Community

The complexity and tenseness of the international situation dictate the need for a strengthening in every possible way of the unity and cohesion of the fraternal states. An important landmark on this path was the meeting at the end of April in Warsaw of the top party and state leaders of the Warsaw Pact states. They examined the question of an extension of the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty concluded in Warsaw on 14 May 1955 and exchanged opinions on urgent problems of European and world politics.

Many major initiatives aimed at consolidating security in Europe, development of the detente process and at disarmament are connected with the Warsaw Pact. As an example we may cite the Warsaw Pact states' proposal to the NATO countries on the conclusion of a treaty on the nonuse of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace. It is obvious that implementation of this proposal would contribute to the surmounting of Europe's division into opposed military groupings and would enhance the degree of mutual trust. However, the Western side is sidestepping the conclusion of such a treaty.

The fraternal members of the treaty have repeatedly declared their readiness to immediately dissolve the Warsaw Pact with the simultaneous dissolution of NATO. However, neither has this proposal met with understanding on the part of the West. Under these conditions the socialist states have been forced to adopt the necessary measures to ensure their security. At the meeting in Warsaw the heads of the delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR signed a protocol extending the treaty for 20 years with its subsequent prolongation for a further 10 years.

In a joint document the leaders of the fraternal states confirmed anew that they do not aspire to the achievement of military superiority, but neither will they permit military superiority over themselves. They advocate a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. The participants in the meeting once again declared their readiness to develop a peaceful dialogue with capitalist states in a spirit of good will and trust, but emphasized here that international relations may be introduced to a normal channel only on condition that imperialism abandon attempts to decide the historical dispute between the two social systems by military means.

And what is the "seven's" position on the cardinal issues of war and peace?

Paying tribute to the demands of the international community for a halt to the arms race and for a switch from confrontation to cooperation, the participants in the meeting declare their readiness "to conduct a high-level dialogue," their intention "to support the preservation and strengthening of a stable military balance at as low a level of armed forces as possible" and their aspiration to "an appreciable reduction in existing nuclear arsenals." At the same time, however, the declaration speaks of support for the United States' "positive proposals" at the Geneva negotiations, although, as is known, it is precisely Washington's position which is blocking the achievement of accords on a halt to the arms race on earth and its nonproliferation to space and a reduction in the level of military confrontation as a whole.

Nonetheless, we have to agree with the opinion of many Western press organs, particularly the British TIMES, that "the political declaration adopted at the meeting can hardly be seen as approval of the United States' approach to problems of "arms control" (but it was precisely thus that Washington interpreted its meaning--authors). The document does not mention Reagan's notorious "strategic defense initiative." True, considering the serious disagreements on this question, the organizers of the meeting did not include it on the agenda. But unofficially it occupied the principal place at the negotiations, in the course of which Washington attempted to gain the allies' consent to participate in implementation of the plans to militarize space.

The corresponding proposal was made by the United States for the first time (in official form) at the session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group which was held at the end of March in Luxembourg. In his characteristically arrogant manner Pentagon Chief C. Weinberger made it clearly understood to his colleagues that Washington did not intend a lengthy discussion with the West Europeans of the program of preparation for "star wars." They should get on with deciding whether they would participate in carrying out the "strategic defense

initiative" or remain aloof. "If your country is interested," was how Weinberger formulated his thought, as though dealing with clients of the law firm which he heads, "I request that you notify me within 60 days of an interest in this research program." Instead of sending his message a few days prior to the session to the capitals of the allied states, as is accepted diplomatic practice, the U.S. defense secretary personally handed the document to his colleagues and saw to it that it was made public immediately. Even in the government circles of the number of countries "invited" to participate in implementation of the "strategic defense initiative" (besides the members of the Nuclear Planning Group, this "offer" was also received by France, Japan, Australia, and Israel), Washington's demarche was seen as an ultimatum.

Without waiting for the completion of the allotted time for "reflection," the United States embarked on the concentrated indoctrination of the allies, seeking their unconditional association with the realization of the importunate idea of the creation of an "antimissile shield." All resources were activated: from deception as regards the true goals of the "strategic defense initiative" and intimidation with the mythical "Soviet threat" through attempts to tempt the partners with promises to afford them broader access to American technology. Washington even hinted at the possibility here of the easing of a number of restrictions in respect to technology exchange between the United States and the other members of COCOM imposed under pressure from the U.S. Administration for the purpose of preventing an expansion of East-West economic relations.

Such promises are being perceived very skeptically by Washington's allies. And with reason. As the French newspaper LA LIBERATION observed, the existence of American-West European cooperation in the space research sphere has already shown that the United States is interested in the technical achievements of its partners, but does not intend transferring to them its own technology. In inviting the allies to participate in the program of preparation for "star wars" the U.S. Administration is attempting to involve them in plans whose implementation will be controlled entirely by the United States. Thus the West European countries, LA LIBERATION concludes, would find themselves in the position of some kind of contractors for Washington.

Nonetheless, although political and business circles of the West European countries harbor no illusions as regards "equal partnership" with Washington, at the same time there are fears here that a refusal to participate in the "research" stage of the "strategic defense initiative" will lead to an increase in West Europe's already considerable technological lag behind the United States and Japan. Such fears are intensifying even more in connection with reports that leading American companies closely linked with the Pentagon are conducting a real hunt for specialists on the other side of the Atlantic, endeavoring to organize a "brain drain" to the United States. Another object of the unhealthy interest of the transatlantic traveling salesmen is the latest technology, which could be used for military-space purposes. According to Western press data, a number of American specialized agencies of the NASA type has already offered approximately 70 industrial firms and banks of the EEC states and also Japan participation in the "star wars" preparation program. The list of what the Pentagon would like to obtain from Japanese companies, for

example, includes laser and optic devices, apparatus for operation at superhigh frequencies, light guides, LCD's and a number of other innovations in whose development Japan has overtaken the United States.

But whereas in Tokyo Washington's requests are finding, to judge by everything, a favorable response, the reaction of the West European states is not that unambiguous. Worried by the possibility of a drain of "brains" and technology across the Atlantic, the French Government presented the initiative for the organization of the West European states' cooperation in the sphere of the latest technology, including the creation of large-capacity computers, artificial intelligence, lasers, sensors, and means of communication. In the opinion of political observers, this proposal (which has come to be called the Eureka Project) reflects Paris' endeavor to create a "united front" of West European countries in order to more successfully resist the American diktat and also not afford the United States and Japan an opportunity to consolidate their superiority in the development and assimilation of the technology of the future. The Eureka Project proposed by President Mitterrand, AFP observes, is the response to the technology challenge thrown down by the Americans in the sphere of both military and civil production.

To judge by the results of the Western European Union (WEU) Council session held at the end of April in Bonn, which discussed the Eureka Project, Paris' initiative has yet to gain the support of the majority of its West European partners.

The problem of the creation of a "technological Europe," to which France aspires, is directly linked with the question of the formulation of the common position of Washington's West European allies in respect of the "strategic defense initiative" and their possible participation therein. The attempts made in the course of the WEC Council session to overcome the existing disagreements were unsuccessful, and it was decided to return to an examination of this question at the council's next session in October. Commenting on the results of the session, the Japanese SANKEI SHIMBUN wrote: "The fact that the West European countries were unable to say 'yes' or 'no' to the 'star wars' plan reflects their intention to subject numerous dubious points of this program to serious discussion."

Washington was evidently hoping that the lack of a concerted position on the part of the allies on the eve of the summit would facilitate the task of their incorporation in realization of the "strategic defense initiative." However, the hopes were not justified. France rejected the United States' offer altogether, while the attitude of the majority of the other conferees to Reagan's idea, as the British OBSERVER put it, "varies from polite skepticism to unconcealed alarm." Only FRG Chancellor H. Kohl and Prime Minister Y. Nakasone declared the "legitimacy" and "justification" of research within the "strategic defense initiative" framework.

Many observers see the position adopted by Kohl (as far as Nakasone is concerned, he had spoken even earlier of his "understanding" of the plans for the militarization of space being concocted by Washington) as a kind of "payment" for the "firmness" which Reagan displayed in the scandalous Bitburg affair.

But there is evidently a more important fact also. In President F. Mitterrand's opinion, Bonn's expressed inclination to associate itself with the "strategic defense initiative" is explained by the endeavor of the FRG, which does not have the right to acquire nuclear weapons, to circumvent certain "prohibitions established in the postwar period." In other words, if there is as yet no chance of getting one's hands on nuclear weapons, why not try and break through into the great powers via space?

The Bonn meeting demonstrated acute disagreements not only between the three centers of capitalism but among the West European states also. Observers are calling attention to the fact that France and the FRG occupied essentially opposite positions both in respect of Reagan's "strategic defense initiative" and on the question of the specific time and conditions of the start of a new round of trade negotiations within the GATT framework. In both cases Washington's proposals were rejected by Paris, but virtually fully supported by Bonn. By his actions, the Western press believes, H. Kohl showed that he attaches far more significance to a strengthening of relations with the United States than with France. The summit, LE MONDE writes, again confirmed the "shakiness" of the so-called "alliance between Bonn and Paris." Yet it was this "alliance" which was long considered the main driving force of "European building," that is, the process of the economic and political integration of the West European states.

Essentially the disagreements in the positions of the two countries which came to light at the summit reflect in the broad plane of the different attitude of Bonn and Paris to the idea of the creation of a "united Europe." The Elysee Palace emphasizes in every possible way that progress in this direction is the "main pivot of the president's foreign policy and his vision of the world." FRG Government circles also have much to say about allegiance to the "European idea." But, as observers note, many of Bonn's actions contradict such declarations.

Whence the opinion which is widespread in France's official circles that the FRG is "turning its back on Europe." Characteristic in this connection is a headline of an article published in LE MONDE on the initiative, it is believed, of France's Ministry of External Relations: "Is West Germany Really Distancing Itself From the Community?" The position adopted by the FRG at the last summit can only strengthen such suspicions. True, after the meeting of the "seven" attempts were made on both sides "to fill in the crack" in relations between the two capitals. For this purpose FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher visited Paris on 23 May, while a few days later there was a meeting between President F. Mitterrand and Chancellor H. Kohl in the West German city of Konstanz. According to Western press reports, the main place at the talks was occupied by problems of the cooperation of the FRG and France and also the other West European countries within the framework of the French Eureka Project and the attitude toward Reagan's "strategic defense initiative." According to the statements of the two leaders, the sides reached an understanding concerning the creation in the very near future of French-West German groups of experts on modern technology issues. But it remains unclear here how to combine the FRG's possible participation in the Eureka Project with its contemplated association with the "star wars" preparation program. The meeting of Mitterrand and Kohl

did not remove the fundamental differences on this question. "The FRG chancellor acknowledges the vital importance of Eureka for Europe," the French LE PARISIEN LIBERE wrote, commenting on the results of the negotiations, "but at the same time continues to look toward the Americans."

To judge by West German press reports, this position is causing a strain not only in relations between the two countries but also within the ruling coalition itself. As the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes, whereas the CDU chairman, Chancellor Kohl, "has as a whole supported Bonn's participation in the space wars program," FDP Chairman M. Bangemann "has displayed caution," while another cabinet member from the FDP, H.-D. Genscher "although speaking of the government's unity on this question, is arranging his own emphases." The third party of the ruling coalition--the CSU--considers the FRG's participation in the plans for the militarization of space a "command of the times."

There are disagreements in the ranks of the ruling coalition on a number of other issues also, and recently, furthermore, they have assumed the nature of open divergencies. Observers connected this with the results of the 12 May North Rhine-Westphalia Landtag elections, which culminated in a convincing victory for the social democrats (who obtained over 52 percent of the vote) and a heavy defeat for the Christian Democrats (who lost more than 7 percent of the vote). The CDU defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia was the third since the start of the year. It had earlier incurred big losses at the elections to the Saar Landtag and the local authorities in Hessen.

Thus the results of the May elections confirm that there is growing discontent in the country with the policy of the center-right coalition, which is characterized by an offensive against the working people's interests, the encouragement of revanchist sentiments and subordination of the country's interests to Washington's global ambitions. The scandalous wreath-laying ceremony at graves of SS officers was also reflected, observers believe, in the election results. Broad strata of the FRG public reject "reconciliation" with the Nazi past.

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