


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12 September 1985

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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12 September 1985

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BONN SETS CRITERIA FOR EUREKA PARTICIPATION

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 26 Jun 85 p 3

[Text] Bonn--The federal government has now set clear criteria which will have to be taken into consideration for technological cooperation in Europe. The focus is to be the non-military use of the research.

In particular, Minister of Research Riesenhuber listed the following points after the session of the cabinet committee on future technology for research cooperation, which has become known by the name of Eureka and which will be the subject of the upcoming EEC summit in Milan:

-A boost for non-military technology must be achieved through the elaboration of joint standards and infrastructures and through the improvement of the allocation processes for public orders to European firms.

-Large and critical projects which can only be handled internationally, such as the development of artificial intelligence computer systems or the analysis of the problems of highly toxic wastes, should fall within the scope of Eureka.

-The research group should be open to European countries outside the EEC as well as to the states of the EEC. Appropriate groups must meet for each project.

-Ponderous bureaucracies must be avoided.

-Finally, in industrial projects within Eureka, care should be taken that adequate participation of industry is present to assure the usability of research results from the start.

The specific design of Eureka, and its financial base, must be formulated in the coming months. So far, as announced by the Ministry of Finance on Tuesday, not a single mark is in the "finance pot" for Eureka.

For European research the same as for national research, Riesenhuber stated the requirement that governmental activities must concentrate on basic research, the setting of basic conditions, as well as on problems of survival.

For European research initiatives, this basic principle also holds: the nearer the research is to the market, the greater the financial involvement of business itself should be.

In conclusion, Research Minister Riesenhuber explained: "A Europe of technology is not worthy of our efforts, but what matters is utilization of techniques which permit mankind to live at peace with nature, and, to that end, careful management of resources, energy and the environment. Eureka is a request to the political leadership of Europe to develop modern techniques increasingly for the solution of problems."

Before the EEC summit discussions at the end of the week in Milan, French and German political leaders will meet again this Wednesday in Bonn to reach agreement on Eureka plans.

The federal cabinet worked again on Tuesday on a further research policy theme and agreed on the technical information program for the years 1985 through 1988. Within it the federal government established the new orientation of its technical information policy and formulated its future goals, set new guidelines for the relationship between government and business, and concentrated support on critical issues.

Through 1988, a total of DM 939 million will be available for the further strengthening and expansion of federal computer database systems to bring the FRG to the fore in the competition for the new "production factor of technical information" of which Research Minister Riesenhuber speaks.

Production and supply in the technical information market are, according to the government guidelines, primarily the responsibility of private industry. The federal government does not intend to follow through on its original plan to establish 20 technical information centers and will limit itself to critical issues. Among these are the creation of a full text database in the patent division, the establishment of databases for the health service as well as the agricultural and environmental areas. Gradually, an information network for industry and applied research is to be developed which will facilitate access to German and foreign databases in a worldwide cooperative for users in science, industry, government and society.

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CSO: 3698/617

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER ON SDI PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS

LD181003 Hamburg DPA in German 0918 GMT 18 Aug 85

[Text] Stuttgart, 18 Aug (DPA) -- Horst Teltschik, the foreign affairs adviser of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, has expressly emphasized that should there be FRG participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] research program, this will not raise for the Federal Republic issues of a military nature. In an interview with South German Radio (SDR) Teltschik today, he said: "What is at stake at present is whether or not there can be cooperation between FRG and U.S. industries in the area of basic research."

At the repeated urging of the chancellor, Bonn has received from the U.S. Government "four very clear assurances," Teltschik said, which are, first, that SDI research would take place exclusively within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty (SALT I of 1971: first agreement on the limitation of strategic arms).

Second, the United States, according to Teltschik, promised not to make any decision on the development or deployment of new defense systems without consulting the alliance partners. Third, the United States would negotiate beforehand with the Soviet Union about such systems.

According to the fourth "official assurance of the United States," whose significance for the Federal Republic was specially stressed by Teltschik, the United States "will make no decision in connection with SDI which would induce the Soviet Union to expand its nuclear offensive potential." The question of what would become of the SDI research findings would pose itself in the early nineties at the earliest.

Teltschik underlined that U.S. willingness for close consultations with the alliance partners concerning the SDI program is essential for the Federal Republic. He said: "We will insist uncompromisingly on this assurance vis-a-vis the U.S. Government."

CSO: 5200/2746

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG ADVISER DISCUSSES INDUSTRY'S SDI COOPERATION

DW190148 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1700 GMT 16 Aug 85

[Interview with Horst Teltschik, adviser to Chancellor Kohl, by correspondent Walter in Bonn, date not given---recorded]

[Text] [Walter] Now that the Federal Government has talked with the representatives of FRG industry, where would FRG interests in the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] lie?

[Teltschik] FRG interests could lie in cooperation between FRG and U.S. industries in the field of research, because the SDI spells an enormous technological development in the United States. The question faced by FRG industry is whether it wishes to share in it.

[Walter] That really does not require an agreement at the government level because any industrial enterprise can participate in the SDI on its own.

[Teltschik] That is true; cooperation is on a private basis; any FRG company can start such cooperation without involving the government. The question faced by the government merely is whether it can provide by means of an agreement greater security to FRG companies so that technology transfer will go in both directions.

[Walter] What security could that be?

[Teltschik] It means creating, within the framework of an agreement, common principles pertaining to the questions of the rights of ownership and utilization, for example, or questions in the field of the protection of secrets, and all such questions.

[Walter] What does the Federal Government say about the SPD charge that it intends to sacrifice Eureka, the European project, for the sake of SDI?

[Teltschik] That charge is false, because we cannot sacrifice anything that we do not have. Eureka has not yet assumed a concrete shape. We will continue negotiating with our European partners in Hannover in November on potential joint research projects. Then we will have to create an overall package of the different research projects and establish priorities. Then Eureka will have a place of its own, as have other fields.

CSO: 5200/2749

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER, GENERAL ABRAHAMSON DISCUSS SDI

AU271601 Paris AFP in English 1218 GMT 27 Aug 85

[Text] Rome, Aug 27 (AFP) -- Italian Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini today discussed the possibility of Italian collaboration with the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) with the project's coordinator, General James Abrahamson. A communique said they had examined the "intellectual property, security of scientific know-how and possible technological repercussions in the civilian sector" of the programme. It said they had also exchanged views on how this technology might be used in European defence, including conventional weapons. General Abrahamson emphasised that SDI was a research programme into new technologies, with possible applications in the military domain in the early 1990s. Yesterday the general had talks with government officials and representatives of industry on possible Italian collaboration in the fields of lasers and opto-electronics, computers and space industry components. A technical U.S. delegation is due to visit Italy in the near future.

CSO: 5200/2759

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI COMPARES EUREKA, SDI

AU220850 Rome ANSA in English 0840 GMT 22 Aug 85

[Text] (ANSA) -- Naples, August 22 -- In a wide-ranging interview to the Neapolitan daily IL MATTINO, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti said that he was certain that Britain, Greece and Denmark would not deny that the European Economic Community is headed for slow, gradual paralysis unless changes are made. Change is necessary for progress, the minister said.

In terms of East-West relations and the Geneva negotiations, Andreotti saw a will to push the talks towards constructive paths even though the great suspicion of each other that exists between Moscow and Washington remains an obstacle.

In response to a question about "star wars," the minister made a distinction between the European Eureka project and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Eureka envisions a packet of projects, still in the embryonic stage, to advance European technology which has remained far behind in specifically civilian sectors, Andreotti said. SDI, on the other hand is a military program which is expected to also largely involve civilian industries, he continued.

Turning to the situation in South Africa, the Italian diplomatic chief said that the problem was extremely complex and in addition to the fight for equal rights (with authentic guarantees for everyone) there was also the problem of the guerrillas in neighboring states and independence for Namibia.

With regard to the Mideast, Andreotti maintained that there was no room for the diplomatic leadership of would-be peacemakers even though Italy is on good terms with all sides in the region, dealing with all with great honesty and seriousness. He recalled that both he and Premier Bettino Craxi had encouraged the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative put forward in February and claimed that it is still valid and has been strengthened by the recent Arab summit in Morocco.

Andreotti concluded the interview speaking about NATO which he insisted was not in crisis. He said that the lengthy peace to which NATO contributed so decisively has caused people to feel defense problems less. He likened the situation to that of a town where no fires had broken out for so long that people had forgotten all about the fire department or were tempted to cut expenses by abolishing it altogether. NATO is an effective structure and has stabilized the common defense of Europe, the United States and Canada, he said.

CSO: 5200/2751

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BELGIUM'S SCIENCE MINISTER ON EUREKA, SDI PROSPECTS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 17 Jul 85 pp 21-25

[Article by Frank De Moor: "Eureka And Europe Are First With Us."]

[Text] On 17 July the European Foreign Ministers and the Science Policy Ministers are meeting in Paris with some of their colleagues from non-EC member states and with Commission Chairman Jacques Delors jointly to give more form to Eureka, the European Research Coordination Agency-plan. The second part of the conversation which took place last week with Minister of Budget, Science Policy, and the Plan, Philippe Maystadt (PSC), was about this matter.

Before the end of this month, the Belgian Government will need a number of reports to get a better picture of what Belgian participation in Eureka means, on the one hand, and the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), on the other. As is known, early this year a number of ministers like Prime Minister Wilfried Martens and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Leo Tindemans (CVP) and Freddy Vreven (PVV) were openly enthusiastic about SDI, before any government deliberations had taken place, let alone a thorough study on the matter.

At the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) on 27 March in Luxemburg, Defense Minister Vreven went so far as to commit himself formally to participation in SDI, while Economics Minister Mark Eyskens (CVP) at the end of April waved a list of firms which, after study, doesn't look the least bit like the SDI listing which the Union of Belgian Enterprises (VBO) and the Department of Science Planning will propose officially one of these days. They will do that within the Working Group set up by the government on 17 March under the leadership of Ambassador Frans Baekelandt, currently ambassador to The Hague but in a few weeks scheduled to be named Director General for Policy at the Foreign Ministry in Brussels or directly involved in policy formulation. This Working Group must have a first draft ready for Prime Minister Martens by the end of this month.

Meanwhile, the Working Group within the West European Union (WEU) in London which deals with strategic questions connected with SDI must also have its interim report ready at that time. That group is chaired by WEU Secretary General Alfred Cahen who, until a short time ago, was Director General for Policy at the Foreign Ministry. As was discussed here more fully on 23 July,

and as Minister Maystadt also notes in this interview, the WEU Working Group led by Secretary General Cahen apparently has taken over from the Baekelandt Working Group the study of the geo-strategic implications of a possible SDI participation, while the Baekelandt Working Group deals exclusively with how to arrange research, technology, and patent transfers within the framework of possible Belgian cooperation in SDI (by means of a bilateral treaty?)

It is precisely for this reason that a delegation of the Baekelandt Working Group went to Washington at the beginning of this month. During that trip it appeared that the SDI office (SDIO) under the command of Lieutenant General James Abrahamson wanted to reach immediate bilateral arrangements particularly with firms or research centers, without entering into bilateral governmental agreements having a basically political nature. Lieutenant General Abrahamson and the American Pentagon clearly want to avoid getting stuck in administrative meandering. The General seems to be especially afraid of what he calls "getting bogged down in bureaucracy." It will not escape anyone that bureaucracy in this context is partly synonymous with democracy.

Time Lag

In the meantime, the proponents of the Eureka plan have in their turn made progress. As is well known, the Eureka plan was launched in mid-April by the French Government precisely in response to the technological challenge posed by SDI within Europe. For that reason the European Ministers of Science Policy convened in Rome on 4 June, and will do so again on 17 July. Therefore, the question put to Minister of Budget, Science Policy, and the Plan, Phillipe Maystadt (PSC), is: how far has Eureka come?

--Philippe Maystadt: At that time no decisions were made in Rome, but we did have informal talks there, which in the meantime have been continued in Luxemburg. The meeting of state and government leaders in Milan on 28 and 29 June has only taken us half way. I had hoped that, there at least, some concrete projects would be launched, but no. That will have to happen on 17 July. The more so, since among the Ministers of Science Policy there is a definite consensus growing in certain fields. To start with, everyone acknowledges that no member state by itself should try to catch up in a good number of fields where we are behind as compared with the United States and Japan. For this reason a consensus has definitely grown to tackle the information technologies together. It could become a program like Esprit (European Strategic Program of Research and Development in Information Technology), but then with concrete applications where artificial intelligence, super computers, computerized production and such are concerned.

As far as new material go, I think that a consensus is growing to develop jointly super conductors, lasers and the optics connected with that. Indeed, that was already forcefully pressed for in the original French Eureka proposal of mid-April. In Rome, as a matter of fact, the French and the Germans already asked themselves whether or not there should be a super laser and what kind of strength it should have. The Germans wanted it to be a bit more powerful than the French.

One can look at getting Eureka started from two different angles. Either we throw ourselves from the start into certain technologies, or we define first of all certain fields within which technological applications can be developed. That choice has not yet been made clear. The one, of course, does not exclude the other. In this way, we can immediately seize upon certain technologies, because we are convinced that Europe must master them; and we can not, for example, leave the Americans with a monopoly over powerful lasers.

Meanwhile, we can fund and direct more attention to certain scientific fields, such as oceanography. Because the Americans want to construct a defense shield in space does not mean that we should no longer be interested in the riches of the ocean. Viewing the scientific capacities which Belgium possesses in that field, we all have an interest in supporting the proposal made by my Danish Science Policy colleague and let it grow into a European initiative.

At first the French wanted to define only some ten technologies to trigger Eureka. Those were, as is now well known, optronics, new materials, powerful lasers, super speed computers, artificial intelligence, and accelerated Esprit program. In the meantime, biotechnology and computerized factories (FMS: Flexible Manufacturing Systems), equipped with robots having certain senses were added. Either we develop these technologies, or we tackle certain fields such as a new generation of transport and exploration into the uses of space. We must urgently decide on certain projects which by their nature will mobilize enough people and funding.

Disillusionment

In the meantime, as Minister of Science Policy, you are also involved with the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Using the Baekelandt Working Group and the Union of Belgian Enterprises (VBO) you are looking into the question of which firms in our country can participate in work on SDI. Do you think that a firm's participation in SDI would exclude it from participating in Eureka, or vice versa?

--Maystadt: The problems are different. With Eureka we would have no difficulty setting up something in a European context. There are no initial political or strategic implications involved. On the other hand, the American Strategic Defense Initiative raises some very important questions with regard to the defense of Europe and more such issues. As long as those questions are not answered, the government can certainly not give its official support to SDI. That would not prevent certain Belgian firms and university research centers from concluding contracts with Americans involved with SDI. No one can prohibit that.

--A university center uses government funds, doesn't it; and precisely for that reason doesn't the government have the right to prohibit participation in SDI?

--Maystadt: No, because they would not be using government funds in this case. On the contrary. The Americans are prepared to pay for everything. For some Belgian research centers, which are receiving less and less funding, this opportunity does not fall on deaf ears. The fact that certain university centers for that reason do accept projects does not mean that Belgium, as such, supports SDI.

--But it appears that the study of crucial questions and answers that must help define the Belgian point of view is drowning in the multinational Working Group of the West European Union (WEU) in London, while from the very beginning the government on 17 May gave to the Baekelandt Working Group the task of carrying out such a study in Brussels.

--Maystadt: Indeed, I am also surprised by the way things are going. The instructions that the government gave to Ambassador Baekelandt and his group, directed him to contribute to a coordinated response to a 26 March letter from American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. That response was also supposed to reflect strategic and diplomatic aspects. Now it looks as if the Baekelandt Working Group is limiting itself to purely technical details and that Defense Secretary Weinberger's letter is being interpreted all too narrowly. We are unable to answer his question about joining the SDI research program without first discussing the strategic implications of SDI.

--The VBO is clearly less optimistic than some diplomats about the possible participation by Belgian firms in SDI. As was explained here more extensively already on 3 July, Belgium should be satisfied if one or two firms are able to participate in SDI.

--Maystadt: That disillusionment seems to be just as great in other countries. Similarly, the enthusiasm of German industrialists has also cooled, whereas at first they were ardent proponents of SDI. As I have always said, it is becoming only too clear that the Americans only seek from us that which they lack themselves. It is, therefore, an illusion to think that SDI for us is the dreamed of opportunity for catching up with the U.S. in certain fields where we are behind. The Americans won't pay us for that anyway, will they?

--What do we have to offer them?

--Maystadt: In starting Eureka we circulated a letter to some 2,000 firms based on a list of services for Science Policy. We asked them for the fields in which they are interested. Up to now we have received some 400 answers, and from a first sampling it appears that half of them definitely want to participate in Eureka and have already pointed out certain well-defined fields. Thus, there appears to be a very specific interest in expert-systems, and in a joint European approach to the development thereof.

The same is true for new materials, and there again, certain firms are very precise when it comes to new kinds of resins or ceramics. If from this inquiry a number of fields are derived around which a consensus can be built, we will contact those firms again to request an even more detailed reply.

More Funds

--Should these same firms be interested in both Eureka and SDI, is there perhaps still a possibility for a joint approach?

--Maystadt: Before there can be talk of any official Belgian support for SDI a number of obstacles still have to be removed and that by far has not yet happened. SDI raises enormous questions about Europe's place in the geo-strategy of tomorrow. It makes no sense to evade these questions in order to permit participation now by a few firms in SDI and to support them in that officially. This purely commercial reflex doesn't counterbalance the issue of how our continent in the coming century will organize its defense. Added to this is the fact that participation in European programs like Eureka costs a lot of money, and that we cannot at the same time finance both European and American projects. Having said this, there will certainly be firms participating in Eureka as well as in SDI. Our budget is proportionately the least significant in Europe, and I think that these scarce funds must be spent on European projects first. Two years ago I did indeed introduce a separate provision for the Science Policy budget to finance participation in European projects. Well, by virtue of this provision, more capital will have to be allotted for Eureka. Should this become a genuinely joint project, as we hope it will, Eureka will be financed in the first instance by the European Community itself. Belgium will then already participate in it because of its contribution to the Community. Because Eureka will most likely become a European plan a geometrie variable, not all European member states will be obliged to participate in all programs and thus additional funding will have to be worked out.

--Is that where the idea comes from to establish an umbrella coordinating bureau with which the name of Viscount Etienne Davignon has been mentioned, or has it not?

--Maystadt: His name is indeed being mentioned by circles involved.

CSO: 5200/2733

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN, PRC FOREIGN MINISTERS TALK; WU OPPOSES SDI

OW310442 Tokyo KYODO in English 0432 GMT 31 Jul 85

[Text] Tokyo, July 31 KYODO -- Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said here Wednesday that his country opposes militarization of outer space and criticized the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the United States and a similar outer space program which he claimed to be under development by the Soviet Union. Arguing that outer space is a common asset for all mankind, Wu emphasized China's strong opposition to SDI and related research in a two-hour meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe. The Chinese foreign minister also charged that the Soviets are engaging in a similar program to militarize outer space, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said.

Abe proposed regular foreign ministerial meetings between Japan and China and Wu readily agreed, calling the Japanese proposal "a very good idea." The ministry official said Wu extended an official invitation to Abe to visit China "in October" and suggested the first ministerial meeting be held then. Abe said his visit to Beijing will be arranged through diplomatic channels.

Wu's talks with Abe at the Foreign Ministry were part of a series of meetings which Chinese ministers, here to attend a two-day ministerial meeting Tuesday and Wednesday, are holding with their Japanese counterparts. Abe offered to provide Japanese expertise in corporate accounting to China as a step to promote technological cooperation between the two countries, Japanese officials said. He hinted that certified public accountants and lawyers might be dispatched to China.

Wu noted that despite fairly smooth Sino-Soviet trade relations, the overall relationship between China and the Soviet Union is unlikely to make dramatic headway due to continued Russian aid to Vietnam and other factors, the officials said. The Chinese foreign minister charged that Vietnam is making sporadic military incursions into China, thereby heightening tension along its border with China in the hope of greater Soviet assistance, the officials added. Wu also reiterated that Taiwan remains a stumbling block to improved relations between Beijing and Washington. He pledged that China will address the Taiwan issue more flexibly than the Hong Kong issue, officials said.

CSO: 5260/012

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

TURKISH OFFICIAL DISCUSSES EUREKA PARTICIPATION--It has been announced that Turkey will participate in the second ministerial meeting of the Eureka project--which envisages technological cooperation among Foreign countries--to be held in the FRG in November. Foreign Ministry information director Yalim Eralp said that the FRG, the host country, invited Turkey to attend the meeting to be held in Hannover on 5 and 6 November. Eralp also said that Turkey will attend a meeting of high-ranking technicians to be held in September to discuss the agenda of the November meeting. [Text] [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 23 Aug 85 TA]

CSO: 5200/2755

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

IZVESTIYA ACCUSES U.S. OF IMPEDING PROGRESS

PM191307 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by P. Viktorov and A. Platonov: "Geneva: Two Approaches. Who Is Impeding Progress at the Talks on Nuclear and Space Arms"]

[Text] The Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear arms taking place in Geneva are currently in recess: The second round has ended, and the start of the next round is scheduled for 19 September. Meanwhile, commentaries on the exchange of opinions that has taken place at the talks and on the prospects for the achievement of constructive accords at them continue to occupy the pages of the world's press. And this is completely understandable: The problems submitted for the Geneva talks agenda occupy a central place in the range of issues on whose resolution both our planet's peaceful future and mankind's deliverance from the threat of nuclear annihilation looming over it depend.

As is known, the formula for the nuclear and space arms talks was agreed upon during the Soviet American meeting at foreign minister level which took place in Geneva last January. The joint statement issued on the results of this meeting indicated that the subject of the talks was to be the range of issues pertaining to space and nuclear arms (strategic and medium-range). It was emphasized that all the issues at the talks must be examined and resolved comprehensively, in their interrelationship.

The aim of the talks was also defined: the elaboration of effective accords aimed at averting an arms race in space and at halting it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at reinforcing strategic stability.

From the very outset of the talks in Geneva the Soviet side set course towards the preparation of decisions which, in the event of their realization, would represent the embodiment of the aims and tasks set in the January accord. The Soviet side put forward an entire program of measures whose distinguishing feature is its strict compliance with the principle of equality and identical security, which excludes either side's acquisition of military advantages.

A characteristic of the current stage of international development is the threat of the extension of the arms race into space which has emerged in connection with the plans adopted in the United States for the creation of large-scale ABM system incorporating space-based elements. Although Washington propagandists have designated this program the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), in reality it is a question of the creation of a completely new class of offensive armaments, space offensive means. According to

data being published in the American press, such space-based means will be capable of hitting targets in space, in the earth's atmosphere, and also proceeding at full speed in the United States. In other words, America's SDI is in terms of its scope an unprecedented program of preparation for "star wars," a new attempt on Washington's part to secure military superiority, this time through space.

The aggressive nature of the calculations of those American circles who are pushing for the implementation of SDI is attested by the fact that the large-scale ABM system incorporating space-based elements which constitutes one of the most important components of this program is designed to neutralize the other side's retaliatory strike. This means that the SDI has been planned as an adjunct of America's offensive strategic potential. Its aim is to ensure for the United States the capability to inflict an unpunished first nuclear strike.

It is superfluous to mention the illusory nature of these calculations. The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community possess everything necessary to ensure their own security and prevent Washington from breaking, to its own advantage, the prevailing parity in the military-strategic sphere.

But it is also clear that the implementation of SDI would inevitably entail a new and still more dangerous spasm in the arms race in all directions and would render it uncontrollable. Strategic stability would be radically undermined. The threat of the outbreak of nuclear war, including an outbreak resulting from a malfunction in the increasingly complex equipment which is given an ever greater role, would multiply.

In order to avoid such an extremely dangerous development, the Soviet Union has proposed that an agreement be reached on the mutual prohibition of the creation (including scientific research work), testing, and deployment of space offensive armaments. Everything the sides currently possess in this class of armaments, that is, antisatellite means, would be subject to destruction. The USSR simultaneously advocates the strict and undeviating observance of the indefinite 1972 ABM treaty, which directly prohibits the creation of systems for the antimissile defense of a country's territory, as well as the basis for such systems, along with the creation of space-based antimissile systems.

The radical solution of the space offensive arms issue being proposed by the Soviet Union would open up a broad prospect for deep cuts in the area of nuclear arms.

As a part of and in interrelationship with the solution of the problem of averting an arms race in space, the Soviet side has proposed an accord on the radical reduction of strategic means -- ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers -- with each sides' simultaneous repudiation of programs for the creation and deployment of new forms and types of strategic armaments, or with the severe limitation of such programs. The cuts would affect both the carrier vehicles and the overall number of nuclear charges they carry. The USSR also firmly advocates the complete repudiation of such a dangerous new form of strategic offensive armaments as long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes.

Back during the earlier talks on strategic arms limitation and reduction, the USSR advocated a 25-percent reduction in their levels. Now, the Soviet side has expressed

its readiness to go farther: to implement more radical cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR. Here, of course, the matter of how the question of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe would be resolved would also have to be taken into account, insofar as the American armaments of this class, deployed as they are in West European countries -- that is, within reach of targets on Soviet territory -- represent a direct and moreover weighty addition to the U.S. strategic arsenal.

The USSR is seeking a strict balance of forces at sharply reduced levels also as regards medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. The Soviet side has proposed a solution whereby the United States would withdraw its Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles from Europe, while the USSR would reduce its own medium-range missiles in the European zone to a level equivalent, in terms of warheads, to the corresponding nuclear means of Britain and France. As a result, the USSR would possess on its medium-range missiles in Europe not a single warhead more than the number possessed by the corresponding nuclear arsenal of the NATO countries.

Equal reduced ceilings, in accordance with the Soviet approach, would also be established between NATO and the USSR in Europe for medium-range [missile] carrier aircraft.

The USSR is also prepared for an even more radical solution: Europe's complete liberation from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union's proposed program of the above-listed far-reaching measures opens up an opportunity for reaching an accord which could become an historic milestone in the peoples' struggle for nuclear arms limitation and reduction, and for the easing and subsequent elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

In the desire to ensure appropriate conditions for the preparation of constructive solutions and even at this present stage to put an end to the burgeoning of the arms race along its most dangerous salients, the USSR is proposing to establish a moratorium on nuclear and space armaments for the duration of the talks.

The Soviet Union backs up its constructive line at the talks with unilateral actions geared to prompting the American side in its turn to embark on practical measures aimed at halting the military rivalry and reinforcing mutual confidence. Thus, in April the USSR unilaterally halted until November of this year the deployment of its medium-range missiles and the implementation of other measures in Europe undertaken in response to the U.S. deployment of its own new medium-range missiles on this continent. A unilateral Soviet moratorium on being the first to place antisatellite means in space was announced back in August 1983.

These good-will gestures are highly rated by the broad international public. People rightly perceive them as evidence of the USSR's sincere desire to lead the Geneva talks to a constructive conclusion in the name of peace and life on earth.

For all that, it has to be stated that there is still no practical progress toward reaching mutually acceptable accords at the Geneva talks. What is the reason for this?

The answer is simple: The responsibility for the stagnation in Geneva lies entirely with the American side and its actions both at the negotiating table and outside the talks.

On the entire range of problems raised at the Geneva talks the United States still adheres to positions which essentially rule out the possibility of concluding agreements which would accord with the previously agreed aims of the talks, to prevent an arms race in space and end the one on earth.

Let us take the key question of space offensive arms. The United States refuses even to hear of embarking on a discussion of measures to ban these means. The American Administration is focusing all of its efforts, including those at the talks, on securing the legalization of its SDI program, that is, essentially a policy of overturning the ABM treaty and, with it, the entire process of limiting and reducing strategic arms. It is proposed that we essentially agree not on preventing a race in the area of space offensive arms, but on the "rules" for running the race.

In this way, the American side is blocking right from the start the very possibility of taking effective steps to limit and reduce nuclear arms, since it is clear that a race for space offensive weapons would doom the efforts to end military rivalry on earth to failure.

The United States is also displaying an equally flagrant departure from the January accord on the subject and aims of the talks with regard to the specific problems of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear means.

On questions of strategic offensive arms the American side proposes that the Soviet Union implement a totally unjustified restructuring of its strategic defense potential, above all by sharply reducing its ICBM's which make up the basis of the Soviet strategic forces. As for the American strategic forces and the programs for building them up, they would remain virtually untouched. They talk of reductions, while in fact they adhere to a position which, were it to be implemented in practice, would mean an opportunity for the United States to sharply increase, by several thousands, the number of its strategic means primarily long-range cruise missiles of all kinds.

The American proposals in the area of medium-range nuclear means in Europe are also aimed at acquiring unilateral military advantages for the United States. As at the previous talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe, the American side refuses to take the corresponding British and French arms into account in the European nuclear equilibrium. The United States would like to leave its carrier-based aircraft and, essentially, almost all its other medium-range aircraft [samolety-nositeli] in the European zone outside the limitations. In circumvention of the SALT II Treaty, which established the equilibrium between the USSR and the United States in the strategic sphere, the United States is trying to secure for itself the "right" to deploy medium-range missiles in direct proximity to the USSR -- and not only in Europe -- reckoning on the possibility of using these means against the USSR in a first strike. In short, It is gadding about within the framework of its former positions, which long ago proved their uselessness for reaching a mutually acceptable accord.

The unconstructive nature of the American approach at the talks is also expressed in the fact of the negative U.S. attitude to the idea of a moratorium on nuclear and space arms.

Taking cover behind farfetched talk of some kind of USSR "superiority" in the military sphere (although the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledge year after year the existence of approximate parity between the USSR and the United States), Washington is doing everything to continue accelerating the deployment of arms which threaten life itself on earth. Thus, the buildup of warheads on ground-based ICBM's is continuing in full swing in the United States; the submarine fleet is being equipped with new boats and missiles of the Trident system; bomber aircraft are being modernized at an accelerated pace; and long-range cruise missiles are being deployed on sea-going ships and aircraft. Washington is also reluctant to halt the process of deploying Pershing II and long-range cruise missiles in West Europe.

On the threshold of the upcoming third round of the Geneva talks the following question naturally cannot fail to arise: Is there any possibility of overcoming the stagnation which has come about at the talks, not through the USSR's fault?

We believe that the work of the delegations in Geneva is by no means doomed to idle running. But what is needed for this, naturally, is political will and readiness to reach constructive decisions on both sides. The Soviet Union has this will. The entire package of proposals which the USSR has made at the talks graphically attests to the Soviet side's desire to arrive at mutually acceptable decisions in Geneva.

The USSR's good will and its sincere desire to erect a reliable barrier to the nuclear arms race were once again demonstrated by the Soviet Union's decision, announced by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to establish a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, starting 6 August this year. There is no doubt that, if other nuclear powers, and primarily the United States, make a reciprocal response to this peace-loving Soviet action, the prospects for an accord on questions relating to nuclear arms would be far more favorable.

It can be seen from all that has been said that the possibility of progress at the Geneva talks depends entirely on whether Washington manages to amend its position and abandon an approach aimed not at a mutually acceptable accord but at acquiring one-sided advantages for itself. Time will show whether the American Administration is capable of taking into account the peoples' desire to end the arms race and whether it will find within itself the political courage to embark on the path of seeking solutions which fully accord with the tasks of the talks and the principle of the sides' equality and identical security.

CSO: 5200/1371

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG'S KOHL COMMENTS ON SOVIET POSITION AT GENEVA TALKS

DW210657 Bonn DIE WELT in German 20 Aug 85 pp 1, 10

[Article by Bernt Conrad: "Chancellor Appreciates Soviet Position at Geneva Round of Talks"]

[Text] Bonn -- Chancellor Helmut Kohl has let it be known that the Soviet Union during the last round of negotiations in Geneva had dealt with the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) "to a greater degree in a businesslike and sober manner" and that it had also presented its own ideas on the issue. "Seen against this background I believe that progress is conceivable. In the event that drastic reductions in the field of offensive systems can be achieved, it would logically exercise an influence on the extent and need of a strategic defense," Kohl said.

Earlier, Horst Teltschik, the chancellor's foreign policy adviser, had stated that the tone prevailing between the U.S. and Soviet negotiating partners in Geneva had become "more businesslike, sober-minded, reliable, and serious." One can conclude, Teltschik said, that the third round of negotiations will be marked by the same spirit as the last phase prior to the summer recess, and for that reason will develop in a more positive way than the preceding talks.

This optimistic assessment, which Kohl in his interview with NEUE OSNABRUCKER ZEITUNG also attributed to the forthcoming Gorbachev-Reagan summit in November and -- though in a more cautious manner -- to FRG, Soviet relations and, above all, to the intra-German relationship, is, according to Bonn government quarters, by no means the result of fresh information received from the Soviets. Rather, it is based on an evaluation of the latest round of negotiations in Geneva and the general development of East-West relations that takes into account the "signs of more realism," though with certain reservations, in the attitude of Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev which had registered with Kohl.

Information about the talks held by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaeze on the eve of the CSCE anniversary meeting in Helsinki and about Soviet preparations for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in November, which Soviet envoy Terekhov submitted to the chancellor's office last Friday, apparently have not revealed any new findings in this connection. However, Teltschik used them in a radio interview as an argument for the view that Moscow does not want to let Bonn turn up among the "also ran" in the foreign field.

This was the impression gained by various observers for the following reasons: Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the last counterpart Shevardnadze received in Helsinki;

Gorbachev has not yet fixed any date for a visit to Bonn, although he will visit Paris prior to the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting; and the messages of greeting sent by the president, chancellor, and the federal foreign minister on the 15th anniversary of the Moscow treaty had been answered only "collectively." This last point even gained additional weight because Gorbachev had personally responded to a letter by SPD Chairman Willy Brandt on the 15th anniversary of the Moscow treaty.

Nevertheless, the chancellor stated in the ZDF interview that the Federal Government need not be concerned because the development in the Soviet Union will show "that the current Soviet leaders are perfectly aware that it is impossible to ignore the Federal Republic in what is necessary to safeguard peace and also to safeguard Soviet interests."

What stands behind it reportedly is Kohl's conviction that Gorbachev's plans for the rationalization of the Soviet economy cannot be achieved without the FRG's cooperation. That is why the chancellor has stressed Bonn's readiness "to achieve a new and better quality of relations with the Soviet Union and to hold and deepen talks on all levels." In its statements marking the 15th anniversary, the Soviet side had also "stressed its fundamental will to develop relations, regardless of some critical undertones."

However, Kohl clearly dissociated himself from Moscow by resolutely rejecting all attempts aimed at treating West Berlin as an independent political entity thereby undermining the Quadripartite Agreement. The world youth festival in Moscow showed that "the Soviet Union does not consider the feelings of German participants if propagating its views and political aims on the Berlin issue is at stake." That is why Bonn insisted on "strict adherence to and full application of the Quadripartite Agreement," as agreed upon with Moscow in 1973.

The chancellor also left no doubt about the fact that he has not changed his "unequivocal and unmistakable" position on the U.S. space research program regardless of all the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. The SDI research program fully complies with the ABM treaty, he said.

Kohl assessed the intra-German prospects somewhat less positively by saying: "Our relations with the GDR are developing in the right direction. However, as long as Germany is divided by walls and closed borders, and as long as our fellow countrymen in the GDR are deprived of their human rights, we cannot speak of any normalcy." Nonetheless, alleviations, as for instance in tourism, have been achieved, he said.

CSO: 5200/2753

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

THATCHER ANTICIPATES REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

PM201329 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 4-5 Aug 85 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by Paolo Filo Della Torre in London; date not given]

[Excerpt] London -- [Filo Della Torre] Prime Minister, how do you assess the prospects for the success of the Gorbachev-Reagan talks in November in Geneva?

[Thatcher] The first direct contact between the new Soviet leader and the U.S. President cannot fail to give us hope. But we must not exaggerate. Indeed, it is just a single meeting. It will be a crucial opportunity to create a climate of mutual trust in Soviet-U.S. relations. I believe that President Reagan's sincerity and honesty could make a positive impression on Gorbachev and could help to convince him of the U.S. will to negotiate. No one is better able than the President to achieve such a result. If this does happen the atmosphere of subsequent negotiations will be decidedly better. My sincere hope is that the Geneva summit may clear incomprehensions and unjustified suspicions from the path of negotiations.

[Filo Della Torre] You, Mrs Thatcher, were the first of the major political leaders to discover the "Gorbachev phenomenon." Do you still believe in "Gorbachev the icebreaker?"

[Thatcher] I have had two meetings with Mr Gorbachev. He is an able person -- shrewd, I would say, and endowed with great self-confidence. As I said after our first meeting, "One can deal with Mr Gorbachev; he is someone I could do business with." But one must not forget that he is someone who has known nothing other than communism. His first concern will always be to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economy. If we perceive in the Soviets a greater desire to seek a real compromise, a real determination on their part to honor their pledges, Gorbachev will perhaps find that we too are ready to act as "icebreakers" in East-West relations.

[Filo Della Torre] What contribution can Europe make to detente? Would Britain be willing to negotiate the future of Trident within an overall context binding for the other superpowers too? Is the future British independent nuclear deterrent necessarily linked to that of France?

[Thatcher] The most important contribution Europe can offer is to maintain Atlantic alliance solidarity so as to enable the West to negotiate with the USSR with a clear identity of aims. This kind of solidarity existed when it came to implementing NATO decisions on the deployment of medium-range missiles in a number of European countries

including Britain, Italy, and West Germany. And our countries can play an important role in detente by strengthening or building contracts with our neighboring countries in East Europe.

You also asked me about the French and British deterrents: Their total strength represents only 2.5 percent of the USSR and U.S. nuclear capability. The French nuclear force is obviously something about which I cannot express any aspirations. As far as the British deterrent is concerned, within the present balance of forces it would certainly not be possible to negotiate their reduction with the superpowers.

But we are pragmatic. We do not like to have to use words like "never." We do not say "never." On the contrary, we have already made it clear that if the Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals were to be substantially reduced and if there were no substantial strengthening of the USSR's military apparatus, both offensive and defensive, Britain would be willing to reappraise the position of its deterrent and the question of arms control, taking account of the fact that the outside threat to its security would be reduced.

[Filo Della Torre] Do you believe that Europe is progressing or regressing in its effort to restore its influence, prestige and prosperity?

[Thatcher] I believe that Europe is definitely progressing but I would sometimes comment "could do better," as school teachers do. If we are to compete on an equal footing with the major trading partners in order to create prosperity and jobs, we must complete the Common Market of goods and services, know-how and industrial cooperation.

CSO: 5200/2752

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

BRIEFS

SOVIET-DANISH CONSULTATIONS--Copenhagen, 9 Aug (TASS)--Soviet-Danish political consultations on a broad range of international questions, including the problem of ending the arms race, the state of affairs at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, preparations for the 40th U.N. General Assembly session, were held at Denmark's Foreign Ministry on 8-9 August. Taking part in the consultations from the Soviet side were First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Viktor Maltsev, USSR Ambassador to Denmark Lev Mendelevich, head of the Scandinavian Countries' Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry Georgiy Farafonov, from the Danish side--Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Moeller, Denmark's Ambassador to the USSR Rudolph Anton Thorning-Petersen, head of a department of Denmark's Foreign Ministry V. Egebjerg, other senior officials of the foreign ministries of the two countries. Viktor Maltsev was received by Prime Minister of Denmark Poul Schluter, and had a conversation with Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. In the course of the meetings an exchange of opinions was held on questions of the USSR-Denmark relations and also on some international problems of mutual interest. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1758 GMT 9 Aug 85]

CSO: 5200/1355

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

USSR: PROGRESS DEPENDS ON NATO ATTITUDE

PM131513 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Kashirin: "Do the NATO Leaders Want Success in Vienna?"]

[Text] The Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and related measures in central Europe are one forum where Soviet representatives together with delegations from the fraternal countries are waging a persistent struggle for headway on the path of military detente.

Why the Marathon?

The Vienna talks opened 30 October 1973. Since then the old-world Hofburg palace has witnessed over 30 rounds and still no end is in sight. Why?

The start of the Vienna dialogue seemed promising. During preliminary consultations which ended in the Austrian capital in the summer of 1973, the subject matter of the talks was defined (it is described by the forum's official name, cited above) as was their common task, helping to create more stable relations and to strengthen peace and security in Europe while observing the principle of not impairing the security of any country.

At the same time, the borders were delineated for the region of the reduction and for the application of measures related to this reduction: the totality of the territories of the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR and also the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It was also decided that not only the armed forces personnel but also the armaments of the states with troops in central Europe, to wit the USSR, the GDR, Poland, and the CSSR on the one hand and the United States, Britain, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, and Luxembourg on the other, would be subject to reduction. These countries were called the direct participants in the talks while the others (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Italy, Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey) had special status.

Finally it was stipulated later that, as a result of all reductions, the total numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces in Central Europe should be reduced to equal collective levels; 900,000 men each, including 700,000 ground troops for each side.

The main task of the Vienna talks, halting the buildup and reducing the concentration of armed forces and armaments in central Europe without impairing anyone's security,

thus gained the necessary conditions for its solution. And had the West displayed due political will, a mutually acceptable accord could have been reached long ago. That did not happen. Moreover, through the fault of the United States and its NATO allies the talks have been deadlocked for a long time. The recently completed 36th round also failed to make any headway.

It is not the numerous disputes and complications which depress world public opinion everywhere. As is well known, talks do not usually proceed smoothly, especially on such a complex issue. But the trouble is that obstacles in Vienna are being created artificially, exclusively to vindicate the reluctance of the United States and its allies to reach an agreement with the Warsaw Pact states on the basis of the principle of parity and identical security.

Two fundamentally different approaches toward the implementation of the talks' mandate appeared long ago in Vienna. Proceeding from the approximate equilibrium which has formed between the two military groupings in central Europe, the socialist countries have suggested a mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments on the basis of equal numbers or an equal percentage.

Washington and its partners have set themselves a totally different goal. Here it must be noted that the forces which are blocking the success of the important talks are directing the actions not only of the U.S. delegation but also of a number of delegations of the West European NATO countries. In particular the position of official Bonn, which is giving a hostile reception to any proposals which restrict the Bundeswehr even slightly, is far from constructive.

In brief, the NATO side is "borrowing" the worst experience of other talks on problems of military detente. It invariably tries to foist onto the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states inequitable conditions and restrictive commitments which, if they were realized, would create unilateral military advantages for NATO.

The Same "Figures Barrier"

The notorious "concept of disproportions" serves as the political and propaganda justification for the NATO officials' claims. According to this concept, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries have a substantial superiority in central Europe in terms of the numbers of armed forces and the quantity of their main conventional armaments and therefore should reduce their troops in far greater volumes than the NATO countries.

Yet the "figures discussion," which has been going on for several years with regard to the numerical strength of each side's armed forces in the area of reduction and during which there has been on two occasions, in 1976 and 1980, an exchange of figures on each side's troops, has merely confirmed the existence of approximate parity. For instance, as of 1 January 1980, NATO had 991,000 men in Central Europe, including 792,500 in the ground forces. The total numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact countries in this region as of 1 August 1980 (after the Soviet Union had unilaterally withdrawn 20,000 troops from GDR territory) was 979,000, including 796,700 in the ground forces.

The Western demands, deliberately unacceptable to the Warsaw Pact, on the question of monitoring the agreement's fulfillment are another serious obstacle. These claims were formulated in concentrated form in the "package" of accompanying measures submitted by the NATO countries. It contains, for instance, demands such as the monitoring of extra-garrison activity of troop formations beginning at division level, the extension of control beyond the agreed region of reductions, including the USSR's eight western border military districts, and ground and air inspections. In brief, the NATO countries were guided not by interests in achieving a mutually acceptable accord, but by a desire to control virtually the entire military activity of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces.

The obstructionist nature of the NATO countries' stance is also making itself felt in the persistent refusal to reduce armaments together with troops, and to limit the numerical strength of their air forces to 200,000 men and the size of military exercises to a ceiling of 40,000-50,000 men.

In an attempt to overcome the deadlock and above all the "figures barrier," the socialist states suggested a different approach in February 1983, a simple and practical one which would open the way to reaching an agreement. Its thrust is to stop the futile "figures discussion" and for each side to reduce its troops in central Europe as much as is needed to reach a lower level, the same for NATO and the Warsaw Pact, enshrined in a treaty, 900,000 for each alliance. To develop this proposal and to give it a basis in treaty and law, on 23 June 1983 the socialist countries submitted the draft "agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and related measures in central Europe." But this initiative of the Warsaw Pact states failed to meet with a positive response from their Western partners in the talks. Their proposal in reply, made in April last year, does not help to bring the sides' positions closer and on a number of issues it even sets them back.

The Point of the New Step

The lack of any prospect of reaching a broad-scale agreement in Vienna, would only please the adversaries of detente, if it could please anyone at all. That is why the socialist countries have taken a step on the path of seeking at least a partial agreement. The USSR and its allies, while leaving in force their draft agreement, submitted, on 14 February 1985, a draft "basic provisions of an agreement on an initial reduction of ground forces and armaments in central Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States and a subsequent nonincrease in the levels of the sides' armed forces and armaments in this region."

What specifically are the Warsaw Pact countries now proposing?

First, that within a year of the agreement coming into force the USSR and U.S. troops in central Europe be reduced by 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively in the form of combat units and their standard weaponry; up to 10 percent of these reductions could be carried out in the form of individual servicemen.

Second, upon the completion of the projected reduction of Soviet and U.S. troops, all states involved in the agreement would undertake, on a collective and national basis, not to increase the level of their armed forces and armaments in central Europe for the next 2 years.

Third, alongside the use of national technical means of control at the sides' disposal, specific measures for ensuring the agreement's fulfillment are planned such as the exchange of lists of units subject to reduction and withdrawal; reciprocal notification of the beginning and end of practical reduction measures; and the creation by each side, for the withdrawal period, of three or four observation posts through which the troops subject to reduction would be withdrawn.

The draft stipulates that after it has been implemented, talks on further, larger reductions would be continued until the ultimate aim was achieved, establishing equal collective levels for the sides' armed forces in central Europe at a lower level.

The point of the Warsaw Pact countries' new proposal is that it makes it feasible to achieve the first specific results on the way to practical reduction of the excessive concentration of troops and armaments in the center of the continent. This is the best that can be done in the present situation at the Vienna talks. Take note: The socialist countries' proposal focuses attention on those elements on which it is possible to have an agreement right now.

The achievement of the first specific positive result in Vienna, even in the form of a partial agreement, would be of important military-political and psychological significance. The level of military antagonism in central Europe would be substantially reduced (by 33,000 men). For the first time in several years, a limit would be set on the buildup of armed forces and armaments. Mutual trust would be strengthened and the prestige of the talks themselves would be asserted. The situation on the continent would improve.

Some 6 months have elapsed since the socialist countries' new proposal was submitted. But the NATO countries have still not voiced a principled attitude toward it. During the recent round of talks they kept to their old, stagnant positions. Hackneyed allegations that the so-called "geographical factor" operates in the Warsaw Pact's favor were again put into play. (The thrust of this factor is that the USSR is in the immediate vicinity of the reduction zone while the United States is separated by an ocean; but here it is "forgotten" that nine NATO states are adjacent to this zone). There was talk of the "inexpediency" of resolving the question of reducing or not increasing armaments; of the "inadequacy" of the monitoring measures proposed by the socialist countries; and so forth.

In brief, the last round showed that neither the United States nor its closest allies want to do anything really substantial to reduce the level of military antagonism. The only thing the NATO leaders would not object to is that the Vienna talks lead to a certain reduction in the numerical strength of military personnel alone. But here too, terms unacceptable to the socialist countries have accumulated, terms in the nature of hypertrophied monitoring measures which have nothing in common with the interests of normalizing the situation in Europe.

The Western countries' obstructionist line in Vienna and the unilateral nature of their positions, like their reluctance to seek mutually acceptable decisions, are no accident. They are a continuation and reflection of NATO's military-political concepts and practical actions, which are in flagrant contradiction with the talks' aims and point. One cannot fail to see that the material military preparations and accelerated programs for the technical updating and qualitative improvement of the armaments of the armies of all leading NATO countries are by no means aimed at curbing and restricting the growth of armed forces and armaments, but at their all-around buildup. The Western delegations' approach in Vienna is increasingly adapting to the NATO bloc's long-term military planning, which is pursuing the unrealizable goal of military superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

Without forgetting the interests of reliably safeguarding their defense capability, the socialist countries, at the same time, have done and are continuing to do everything possible to curb and limit the arms race through sensible agreements. But headway, including on the "Vienna salient," does not depend only on the Warsaw Pact. Let the NATO states stop pretending that there is absolutely no need for them to make adequate constructive efforts to achieve mutually acceptable solutions and a positive result at the Vienna talks. There is a possibility of making headway in Vienna. It depends on whether the NATO countries finally give a constructive reply to the socialist countries' recent proposal. This reply will show whether the NATO countries want the talks to succeed.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

SOVIET JOURNAL ON MILITARY BALANCE, MBFR PROPOSALS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 49-60

[Article by G. Vorontsov: "The United States, NATO and the Conventional Arms Race"--for the text of this article, see the USSR REPORT: WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JPRS-UWE-85-009 of 15 August 1985, pages 35-48]

[Excerpt]

Such an authoritative research center in the West as the London Institute of Strategic Studies notes in its calculations of the correlation of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO the existence of certain disproportions objectively present on both sides. However, as a whole, the associates of this center acknowledge, such disproportions mutually compensate one another, creating an overall picture of approximate parity.*

In the correlation of the two alliances' armed forces and armaments other factors influencing the strategic situation like, for example, the enlargement of the NATO bloc thanks to Spain's entry also have to be taken into consideration. The latter's armed forces number more than 340,000 men (5 divisions, 200 combat aircraft, dozens of warships).

Nor is the huge quantity of various conventional arms of the United States maintained at the developed network of numerous military bases on overseas territories (at 1,500 bases and facilities in 32 countries) always included in the overall balance of forces. The weapons dumps are being increased constantly. Recently they have also been accommodated on floating facilities in various parts of the oceans.

Consideration of all the factors adduced above and a balanced comprehensive assessment of the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Pact permit us to confirm the conclusion concerning the existence of approximate parity between them. This parity is objectively contributing to a

*See "The Military Balance 1982-1983," International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1983, pp 129-133.

stabilization of the situation in Europe and exerting a positive influence on the continent's security.

The unfolding of a conventional arms race which is being stimulated by the West, the advancement by the United States and NATO of concepts and doctrines of an aggressive nature based on the use of conventional weapons, the exceptionally dangerous consequences of the use of the latest types of such weapons--all this represents a serious threat to the cause of peace. The Soviet Union believes that such a development of events has to be stopped, more, to be turned back. Peace and stability in Europe as throughout the world, may be strengthened not on the path of an arms race but on the path of negotiations, arms reduction and disarmament.

It was the Soviet Union which was the first since the war, back in 1946, to raise before the UN General Assembly the question of the general regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments and of the establishment of a conventional arms commission. Subsequently also the USSR developed and concretized its proposals. In addition, in 1955-1956 and also in 1960 the Soviet Union reduced its armed forces unilaterally.

In the Peace Program adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress the USSR advocated a reduction in armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is particularly dangerous, primarily in Central Europe. The policy of a reduction in weapons stockpiles and disarmament was continued by the 25th and 26th CPSU congresses. In April 1978 the USSR appealed to states with major military potential for the discussion of a program for the implementation of a number of measures for a complete halt to the growth of arms and the creation of conditions for their subsequent reduction. A halt to the creation of new types of conventional arms of great destructive power and a renunciation of the enlargement of armies and an increase in conventional arms could have been important specific steps in this sphere.

In 1980 the Soviet Union made its 1978 proposal more specific, proposing that the permanent members of the Security Council and the countries connected with them by military agreements not increase their armed forces and conventional arms as of 1 January 1981 as a first step toward their subsequent reduction.

However, it has not yet been possible to make progress in cutting back conventional arms and armed forces, although there is positive process stock here. The convention banning or limiting the use of specific types of conventional weapons which may be considered to inflict inordinate damage or which have an indiscriminate effect at the present time, which took effect on 2 December 1983, is part of this. Together with the Soviet Union over 20 states are party to the convention and a further 40 countries approximately have signed it, but have yet to ratify it.

Undoubtedly, the limitation of conventional armed forces and arms is a complex and important problem. However, progress along this path is possible only given strict and unswerving observance of the principle of the sides' equality and equal security. It is primarily necessary to come to an

understanding on not increasing conventional armed forces and armaments and stabilizing their level.

The reaching of an agreement on limiting the sale and supplies of conventional arms could also be of importance. The volume thereof is measured in tens of billions of dollars, is continuing to grow and is a significant channel of the arms race. It would be expedient to resume the consultations on this issue between the USSR and the United States which were suspended by Washington.

The talks on a mutual reduction in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe which have been under way in Vienna since October 1973 are designed to play a big part. They have demonstrated the flexibility and constructive nature of the position of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. This position has been specified and supplemented repeatedly, and it has evolved in a constructive spirit, furthermore, with regard for the specific desires of the Western side.

As far as the Western participants in the talks are concerned, they have manifestly not aspired to the achievement of an agreement, advancing conditions which they know to be unacceptable to the other side. Such artificial obstacles put forward by the United States and NATO as the question of numbers and the problem of supervision have proven to be a stumbling block at the talks.

The USSR and its allies have exerted much effort to extricate the talks from deadlock.

For the purpose of imparting new impetus to the Vienna talks in mid-February 1985 the USSR proposed the draft "Basic Provisions of an Agreement on an Initial Reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of Ground Forces and Arms in Central Europe and the Subsequent Nonincrease in the Levels of the Sides' Armed Forces and Arms in This Region". It is proposed concentrating attention on effecting reductions in some of the forces of the USSR and the United States in interconnection with a subsequent freezing of the level of armed forces and arms in the said region of all the direct participants, doing this in treaty-legal form.

In the course of 1 year following the agreement taking effect the ground forces of the USSR and the United States in Central Europe would be cut back by 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively in combat military units together with their organic arms and combat equipment, and up to 10 percent of such reductions would be effected in terms of individual servicemen, furthermore.

It is further envisaged that upon completion of the cutback in the Soviet and American forces all the states subscribing to the agreement would undertake on a collective and national basis not to increase the level of their armed forces and arms in Central Europe in the time that the agreement is in force.

Together with the use of national technical means of supervision at the sides' disposal such specific measures to ensure compliance with the agreement as an

exchange of lists of the units being cut back and withdrawn, notification of the start and completion of practical cutback measures and the creation for the period of the withdrawal of the forces being cut back by each side of three-four observations posts each via which they would be withdrawn are proposed.

The draft agreement proceeds from the fact that negotiations on subsequent, larger-scale reductions of armed forces and arms would be continued for the purpose of reaching equal collective levels of the sides' armed forces in Central Europe down to 900,000 men, including down to 700,000 ground forces. The proposed agreement would take effect from the day that it is signed and last for 3 years.

The draft agreement is based on the approach to the outline of the reductions contained in the socialist countries' initiatives of February and June 1983. While preserving their topicality in full they ensure the shortest path to the achievement of a mutually acceptable accord.

Importance for the solution of questions of strengthening European security is attached to the Stockholm conference on measures to strengthen confidence and security and on disarmament in Europe. The USSR and the other socialist community countries have put forward for its examination a number of specific measures concerning both nuclear and conventional arms: the conclusion of a treaty on the nonuse of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace; an arrangement concerning the nonincrease and a reduction in military spending; the deliverance of Europe from chemical weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones on the continent. The Soviet Union also proposes the elaboration of confidence-building measures more substantial in nature and scope in development of the measures envisaged by the Final Act in Helsinki.

As far as the United States and the other NATO countries are concerned, however, the steps which they have proposed are aimed basically at obtaining additional information virtually of an intelligence nature.

The military policy of the United States and NATO in the sphere of conventional arms is aimed at destabilizing the existing situation. It is wholly and fully inscribed in the strategy of "direct confrontation" and in the context of the "crusade" against the Soviet Union and all progressive forces in the world proclaimed by U.S. leaders.

The orientation toward an arms race is combined in this policy with the blocking of disarmament negotiations and the erection of every conceivable barrier to a reduction in conventional armed forces and arms. The appearance of new concepts of conducting combat operations such as the "air-ground operation" convincingly testifies to the growth of the aggressiveness of the United States and NATO. It is a question of an unprovoked first strike not only against the forward edge of the Warsaw Pact countries' defenses but also further, deep in their territory.

All this is undoubtedly prompting the USSR and the socialist community countries to undertake decisive actions to cut short the attempts to disrupt the evolved

balance of forces and prepare the ground for aggressive actions. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states have declared repeatedly that they will not permit the West to achieve advantages and dictate its will to other states and peoples.

The sole acceptable path in the modern world is that of constructive and effective negotiations and peaceful coexistence. It is this path which the USSR and its allies intend to follow.

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CSO: 5200/1374

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

NATO CW USE AS DETERRENT URGED

DW091047 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Aug 85 p 10

[Editorial by "FY": "Do Not Crawfish"]

[Text] Bonn, 8 Aug -- It is high time for NATO to remember a truism: What deterrence requires is not just weapons and soldiers but also the inner determination to use them if need be. If doubts crop up about that then the deterrence effect of even the most modern armed forces will diminish. Anyone recognizing this can only be shocked at seeing how most European NATO partners behave in the face of the threat emanating from the Soviet chemical weapons potential. It seems as though they believe that they could handle the problem by ignoring it. This attitude can be summed up thusly: If the Americans want to counteract this threat they should do so in such a way that the Europeans, if possible, will not feel it, let alone have to share in the political responsibility for it. Can one blame the United States if it feels bitterness in view of such political "morale?" NATO need not have a bad conscience because of its defense expenditures least of all vis-a-vis the Soviets and not at all in the field of chemical weapons. On the contrary, it should advocate deterrence publicly in this field as well.

CSO: 5200/2750

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

BLOC CW TRAINING ALLEGED--Frankfurt, West Germany, Aug 21 (AFP)--Warsaw Pact troops train with real chemical weapons during mock attacks on Western forces, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG reported here today. Quoting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation "expert analysis," the daily said NATO knew of two training grounds where Eastern bloc forces were subjected to real chemical weapons during exercises. [Text] [Paris AFP in English 1207 GMT 21 Aug 85]

CSO: 5200/2750

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

PLANNED BERTHING FOR NUCLEAR ARMED SHIPS CHARGED

Suva THE FIJI TIMES in English 3 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] The government's new naval base at the former Fisherman's Lodge at Togalevu aims to provide berthing facilities for nuclear-armed ships, says the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG).

In a press conference at the Fiji Trades Union Congress yesterday, FANG's president, Mr Bob Kumar, said the organisation had doubts about the government's support on nuclear issues in the Pacific region.

"The United States Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz's visit to Fiji coinciding with the opening of the naval base shows doubts about government's support," Mr Kumar said.

Mr Kumar said it was "too much of a coincidence."

FANG, an organisation backed by the FTUC and Pacific Conference of Churches, is working towards a nuclear-free Fiji in the hope that it will ultimately contribute to regional and global disarmament and peace.

FANG drafting committee member, Mr Simione Durutalo, said yesterday that FANG had written to the Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, on Wednesday requesting that Fiji and other members of the South Pacific Forum refrain from signing any treaty until there were adequate discussions on the issue.

A Working Committee was established at the last forum meeting in Tuvalu in 1984 to draft a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty for the Pacific Region.

Forum Heads of Government are expected to present a treaty for ratification at the Forum meeting in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, next week.

Mr Durutalo said FANG felt that wide public discussions and debates were needed rather than heads of various countries taking the matter at their discretion.

He said a copy of the letter to the prime minister was also forwarded to the Fiji Forum delegation members, Dr Ahmed Ali, Mr Joiji Kotobalavu, and Mr Narsi Raniga.

Mr Durutalo said certain principles adopted by the Forum Heads of Government at the Tuvalu meeting needed clarification.

"In a meeting of the working committee in Australia in November last year, FANG was not allowed into the meeting," he said.

Mr Durutalo said the working committee took FANG's submissions but did not acknowledge them.

He said FANG had referred its submissions made to the working committee, to the prime minister.

Mr Durutalo said FANG felt that the matter should be discussed in parliament.

"But members of the parliament are not very well versed with nuclear issues," he said.

Mr Durutalo said they were considering assisting parliament with background information on the subject.

FANG was totally in favour of Kiribati and Nauru in the strong opposition to any form of nuclear dumping in the Pacific, Mr Durutalo said.

"Whether it is low-risk or high-risk waste material, we are against any form of nuclear wastes being dumped," he said.

Mr Durutalo said FANG strongly supported Vanuatu's nuclear-free zone concept to prohibit the entry of nuclear-powered or armed vessels and aircraft, within their 200 mile zone.

"If a treaty is to be signed by all the countries in the region, the FANG feels there should be no provision for bilateral agreements by individual nations," Mr Durutalo said.

Mr Durutalo said as far as FANG was concerned, there was not much credibility in a joint New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea scientific mission report.

"We support the recommendation of Nauru that an agency to monitor nuclear testing, dumping and levels of radiation in the region be established," he said.

Mr Durutalo said FANG wanted the proposed treaty to be something beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the United Nations signed by most Third World countries.

CSO: 5200/4354

NUCLEAR TESTING

SOVIET SPOKESMEN ON MORATORIUM, U.S. RESPONSE

Ambassador Israelyan

LD212004 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 21 Aug 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Viktor Levin]

[Excerpts] Hello comrades. Israelyan, the Soviet representative, has spoken in Geneva, where a session of the UN Organization's Committee on Disarmament is taking place.

He described in detail the new Soviet peace initiatives; the establishment of a unilateral moratorium on conducting nuclear explosions and the proposal for the main directions and principles of international cooperation in the peaceful development of space in conditions of its nonmilitarization.

However, Washington even now, while continuing to hold forth about peace, not only refuses to renounce the implementation of militaristic programs, but also forces through their realization. Attention is drawn to this by the fact that after the Soviet Union introduced on 6 August a moratorium on nuclear explosions, the United States began a new series of underground nuclear weapon tests; and after the concrete proposals on international cooperation in the peaceful development of space in conditions of its nonmilitarization, promulgated by the Soviet Union on 16 August, the United States, 5 days later, began testing antisatellite weaponry.

These comparisons show convincingly that the Soviet Union is sincerely and actively striving for the consolidation of peace while the United States is stubbornly pulling in the direction of confrontation and the increase of tension. In light of concrete facts, the assurances by representatives of the American Administration about readiness to make a contribution to consolidating peace look like the model of hypocrisy. It must be said that this feature is characteristic of the whole of Washington's foreign policy.

Charge in Bonn

LD211729 Hamburg DPA in German 1631 GMT 21 Aug 85

[Text] Bonn, 21 Aug (DPA) -- According to its Bonn Charge d'Affaires Vladislav Teretskov, the Soviet Union has not yet given up hope that the two superpowers will agree on a halt to nuclear weapons testing. In a rare press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, Teretskov said today that the Soviet Union's latest proposal on the peaceful development of space will be pursued by Moscow only if the United States drops its plans for the militarization of space.

Teretskov repeated the frequently stated Soviet arguments against the American's invitation to attend a nuclear test by the United States. Acceptance by Moscow will only legalize further nuclear tests, which the Soviet Union opposes. The purpose of the voluntary Soviet moratorium is to stop the arms race and, in the long term, the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Teretskov emphasized Moscow's step will remain in force only until the end of the year. The Soviet diplomat, whose statements did not hint at any new signs for agreement between the superpowers on this issue, disputed the argument that Moscow wants to use its unilateral moratorium to put the United States in a difficult position. This is above all demonstrated by the fact that the Soviet Union informed President Reagan of its intention in advance. Teretskov said the United States would have done well to halt its tests on the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima also.

CSO: 5200/1370

NUCLEAR TESTING

IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ON MORATORIUM, U.S. REACTION

PM201131 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "What We Offer Is Peace"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally halt all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 and our readiness to extend the moratorium deadline beyond this year if the United States reciprocates are currently an effective element in forming the international climate on our planet.

The USSR's new peace initiative opens up broad prospects for averting the threat of war -- a cause common to all mankind. "What we are offering," CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev stressed in answer to questions put by a TASS correspondent, "is a real opportunity to stop the further buildup of nuclear arsenals and really set about resolving the task of reducing and ultimately eliminating them."

The path from halting nuclear explosions to completely eliminating nuclear weapons is a long and difficult one. But it is a direct path. After all, the nuclear era began from just such "test" explosions -- at first, on 16 July 1945, in a remote American desert, and subsequently, on 6 and 9 August, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the "experiment" was carried out on no less than hundreds of thousands of people. Since then the echo of nuclear explosions has rumbled across the planet, bringing closer that point beyond which lies the bottomless abyss of thermonuclear conflict.

The honest and open move by the Soviet Union in declaring a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions offers the opportunity to push back that point indefinitely and remove it from the people's future. The specific, one might say, physically perceptible peace-loving action by our country makes it possible today, right now, to slow down and subsequently stop the nuclear arms race.

We have also set a date, 1 January, prior to which our country will not carry out a single nuclear explosion. That is the day on which International Peace Year, which is being held in accordance with a UN decision, starts. And it really could become a year of peace, a year without nuclear explosions, if our example of goodwill is followed by the United States and then by the other states possessing nuclear weapons.

Moratoriums are not, of course, an end in themselves. They can only be the first steps toward concluding an international treaty on the general and complete banning of nuclear weapons tests -- the first, albeit very important, steps. And that is precisely why these steps must be taken. Otherwise, what kind of general, joint progress toward halting improvements in nuclear arsenals and eliminating nuclear weapons can there be?!

The Soviet Union has also taken other steps, on other fronts of the struggle against thermonuclear danger. There is the unilateral renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. There is the moratorium on launching antisatellite weapons into space (so long as other states follow our example), which has now been in force for 2 years. There is the moratorium on deploying Soviet medium-range missiles and the suspension of other countermeasures in Europe that were prompted by American actions.

But the Soviet Union's peace initiatives are not to everyone's liking in the West. The opponents of a halt to nuclear tests include the military concerns, which are feverishly working the seam of nuclear and space arms that is golden for them but lethal to mankind. The opponents of a halt to the modernization of nuclear arms include the Pentagon, which is thirsting for military superiority over the USSR. Both the former and the latter have embraced those politicians obsessed with the "idea" of social revenge and "rolling back socialism."

Is it any wonder that they gave a hostile reception to the Soviet proposal? Is it any wonder that instead of a serious and constructive approach to our peace initiative they prefer to produce fables about the "Soviets' perfidy" and seek "counterarguments" designed for one thing alone -- to justify, maintain, and build up the arms race?

In brief, the attitude in Washington to the new Soviet initiative gives no grounds for optimism.

The impression is even being created that the people on the banks of the Potomac are concerned not with seeking ways to eliminate the thermonuclear danger but with looking for pretexts to abandon cooperation aimed at ensuring peace.

The position is not new. The United States, along with its allies, adopted it back in 1955 when the Soviet Union appealed to all states possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons to assume a commitment to end the testing of such weapons. The West has held to that position for 30 years now.

But the world public's broad and approbatory response to the Soviet Union's moratorium and the appeal to the United States to follow our example shows that the world expects a different attitude from the United States to the Soviet initiative.

That is also shown by the Week of Action for banning nuclear weapons and of solidarity with the victims of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which ended 13 August and was held in response to a WPC appeal. In tens of thousands of antiwar actions held throughout the Soviet Union our people expressed full approval for the decision to end all nuclear explosions and supported the appeal addressed to Washington to respond to the Soviet initiative in kind.

The wave of demands on Washington to respond to Moscow's voice of good will is broadening and growing in all countries. By no means least of all in the United States itself. And this is natural: The path proposed by the Soviet Union toward strengthening strategic stability and peace on earth not only does not contradict the U.S. people's interests but actually serves those interests to exactly the same extent as it serves the interests of the Soviet people and of all other peoples of our planet. Because the threat of thermonuclear conflict knows neither "outcasts" nor "chosen nations." The elimination of this threat is in the common interest. And is a common obligation.

CSO: 5200/1370

NUCLEAR TESTING

PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW ON MORATORIUM, U.S. RESPONSE

PM211015 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Aug 85 First Edition p 4

[Boris Kotov "International Review"]

[Excerpt] The USSR's Good Example

An open and honest position, a concrete and tangible measure -- that, put briefly, is how one may characterize the approval with which in recent days the broad international public has greeted the new peace initiative by the Soviet Union, which unilaterally ended all nuclear explosions from August 6 and appealed to the United States to go along with that action. In many countries of the world, including the United States, prominent public and state figures are coming out in support of the idea of a nuclear weapons test moratorium and of other nuclear powers' following the USSR's example.

This past week the teletypes transmitted to the four corners of the globe the text of M.S. Gorbachev's replies to a TASS correspondent's questions. Once again people have seen for themselves our country's true love of peace and have been filled with hope for the real slowing down and subsequent halting of the nuclear arms race. The USSR's political will to achieve these urgent goals is unshakable. They are clear and comprehensible to each and every person who is sincerely interested in preserving peace on our planet.

The international public has also assessed on its merits the fact that the USSR has not sought in any way by its own actions to place the United States in a difficult position or force it to "board a moving train," as it were. No, the moratorium could become a joint bilateral action if Washington responded in time to the Soviet initiative. After all, the U.S. President was informed about it in advance in a letter which contained a proposal to the U.S. side to act in a similar fashion.

The administration across the ocean now has no way out, as they say. All its propaganda ploys, the absurdities that it spreads about USSR policy, and the "counterarguments" against the moratorium scatter like dust in the face of the facts.

Nor does it correspond with reality to assert, for example, that the moratorium is unacceptable to the United States at present because the USSR has completed its own intensive series of nuclear explosions and can permit itself a pause, whereas the United States still has to carry out its nuclear programs. In fact, in order to impose a unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union had to interrupt its test program without

completing it. It was quite difficult to take such a step. Especially since to date there have been far more nuclear tests in the United States than in the USSR.

In taking the decision to impose a unilateral moratorium, our country was guided by principled political considerations and a desire to promote the end of the nuclear arms race and encourage the United States and other states possessing nuclear weapons to do the same. The USSR's aim is the general and complete ending of tests, not some pause between explosions.

As for America's nuclear programs, that is a different matter. It is common knowledge that they are closely linked with the Midgetman missile program now being implemented, for which appropriations running into billions have been allocated.

And that program is calculated to continue until the late eighties. The continuation of tests is also dictated by the U.S. President's notorious Strategic Defense Initiative that is, the program for the creation of offensive space armaments.

Here, for example, is what the well-known U.S. commentator J. Kraft wrote in the WASHINGTON POST on 11 August: One component of the "star wars" program which the U.S. Administration is implementing, he noted, is the development of so-called X-ray lasers, whose source of power derives from the energy of nuclear explosions. "The United States," Kraft writes, "wants to test this device, but the imposition of a moratorium would prevent that attempt." The commentator goes on to write that administration representatives are trying to ignore the direct link between nuclear weapons tests and the space militarization program. "The acknowledgement of that fact," he attests, "would graphically demonstrate the falseness of the administration's assertions that in the long term the 'star wars' program could do away with nuclear weapons once and for all. That is why its supporters dislike the idea of a moratorium on all nuclear tests."

What a contrast with the position of the USSR, which has now submitted to the United Nations wide-ranging proposals on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its nonmilitarization!

In vain Washington tries to explain its unwillingness to end nuclear tests by citing a U.S. "lag" behind the USSR. This is merely a pretext which Washington uses to try to conceal its desire to achieve military superiority and its unwillingness to resolve arms limitation questions.

Washington also cites the "extreme complexity" of the problem of monitoring nuclear tests. The saboteurs of the disarmament process have been trying to use that question for many years now to achieve their aim. But it has long been ineffective. It is generally recognized today that the scientific and technical potential existing in the USSR, the United States, and other countries gives the necessary degree of certainty that a nuclear explosion, even of small yield, will be detected.

As the BALTIMORE SUN noted this past week, the problem is not that the United States lacks the technical facilities capable of detecting an underground nuclear explosion or of distinguishing it from an earthquake; the administration lacks the political will to set about ending nuclear tests. The same BALTIMORE SUN commented with biting sarcasm on the administration's "expansive gesture" when it suggested in reply to the Soviet Union's peace-loving initiative that it send its observers to the nuclear test range in

Nevada: "Reagan should not respond to an invitation to a peace meal by offering breakfast with bombs in the desert."

As has been stated in Moscow, unilateral moves to end nuclear explosions cannot, of course, finally resolve the problem of the complete and general ending of nuclear weapons tests. An international agreement is needed to resolve that problem once and for all. In addition to the relevant commitments it would also contain an appropriate system of monitoring measures -- both national and international.

With this aim in mind our country is prepared to resume the tripartite talks involving the USSR, the United States and Britain, which were broken off by Washington in 1980. We are also prepared to examine the problem of ending nuclear weapons tests within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference if the United States and other Western countries stop sabotaging these talks, as they are now doing there.

The question is not one of where to examine the ending of nuclear weapons tests. The important thing is to examine this problem seriously and without delay, especially in view of the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. Sensing the growing support of the world's peace-loving forces behind it, the USSR will go to that meeting with an honest and sincere desire to achieve mutual understanding and accord.

It was clear that the Soviet initiative would not be to everyone's liking. Those in the West who link their policy with the further spiraling of the arms race and who profit from it do not want nuclear tests to end. But what has that to do with the national interests of the United States or the American people, interests which are continually cited in the White House? And what has that to do with the true interests of strengthening peace and international security? Here are the findings of a U.S. public opinion poll published on 14 August: 80 percent of Americans now favor the ending of nuclear tests. Forty major antiwar organizations in the country came out recently in support of the Soviet initiative. The leaders of the organization "Northern California for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze" stated, for example, that this initiative gave new impetus to the antiwar movement.

An American newspaper recalled the other day that the U.S. President once solemnly stated his readiness to "go the extra mile" in the interests of concluding a nuclear disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. Well, now there is every opportunity to take just one more step.

CSO: 5200/1370

NUCLEAR TESTING

PRAVDA ARTICLE URGING NUCLEAR TEST BAN

PM211444 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Aug 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by K. Borisov: "Ban Nuclear Tests"]

[Text] The new initiative by the Soviet Union, which has unilaterally ended all nuclear explosions and called on the United States to join in this action, has been greeted with approval in the world.

Eminent statesmen, politicians, and public figures in many countries, including the United States, are speaking out in support of the idea of a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. In deciding on a unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union was guided by principled political considerations and the desire to help terminate the nuclear arms race and to prompt the United States and other countries possessing nuclear weapons to do likewise. "Our objective is the complete and general termination of nuclear weapon tests, and not some kind of respite between explosions," M.S. Gorbachev declared in response to questions from a TASS correspondent.

Key Problem

The ending of all nuclear weapon tests would be an important contribution to strengthening strategic stability and peace on earth. It is well known that nuclear charges and the means of delivering them to targets are the main components of the most destructive modern weapons. The qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the creation of new varieties of them are inseparably linked with tests of them. This is why the ending of tests is essentially the key problem in really limiting the practical opportunities for the production of new types of nuclear bombs and warheads. Of course, the ending of tests would also be an important contribution to further strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons since it would prevent the emergence of new nuclear states.

The question of ending nuclear tests is not a new one. It dates back to the time when nuclear weapons first appeared. The nuclear arms race unleashed by the United States also gave rise to a race in nuclear tests.

A mass movement for an end to the dangerous experiments with nuclear weapons emerged and started gathering strength in various countries in the world during the fifties, and the question of the prohibition of tests was firmly placed on the international

agenda. The Soviet Union was in the vanguard of this movement from the very beginning. Our country was the only state of all those possessing nuclear weapons to come out resolutely and firmly in favor of ending the tests of such weapons at that time.

Consequently, certain successes were achieved in this cause. The 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water restricted the opportunities for the development of new types of such weapons, particularly the most powerful ones. It also eliminated to a considerable degree a dangerous source of radioactive contamination of the environment. This is one of the most authoritative and weightiest international agreements: 113 states are party to it at present.

But the task of achieving the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests was not removed from the agenda even after 1963. First, underground nuclear tests remained outside the ban, yet they are a means of improving nuclear weapons and therefore offer an opportunity to continue the nuclear arms buildup. Second, two nuclear powers, China and France, have still not become parties to the Moscow treaty.

The 1974 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests could have become a further step toward the complete ending of tests. By banning underground explosions with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, the treaty narrows the opportunities to create and perfect the most powerful and most dangerous types of nuclear weapons. A substantial contribution toward solving the test ban problem could also have been made by the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes concluded between the USSR and the United States. This treaty establishes a procedure for the conduct of peaceful explosions under which there would be no opportunity to use them for the purpose of improving nuclear weapons. But the United States is still delaying the implementation of these two agreements on various fabricated pretexts.

Talks started in 1977, on our country's initiative, between the USSR, the United States, and Britain for the purpose of concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Many important provisions of the treaty were agreed on during the talks. A considerable distance was traveled, with the Soviet side clearly going more than half way, including on questions of control. It seemed that the signing of the treaty was not far off. But the course adopted by the United States of stepping up military preparations resulted in these talks being broken off by the Western participants in the final stage.

All indications are that the prospects of ending nuclear weapon tests do not suit the incumbent U.S. Administration, which, having set the attainment of military superiority over the USSR as a priority task and relying in this mainly on nuclear weapons, perceives the prohibition of tests as a serious obstacle to the implementation of the extensive program it has adopted for a further build up of its nuclear arsenal. After all, these programs envisage the creation of a qualitatively new material base for the conduct of nuclear war, and the perfection of new nuclear warheads requires, of course, that they be tested.

Washington's Sharp Turnabout

It is interesting to trace how, with a view to providing political and propaganda backing for its militarist aspirations, the United States has radically changed its stance on the question of the prohibition of nuclear tests over the last few years.

Back in July 1980 the United States and the two other participants in the tripartite talks, the USSR and Britain, declared in a joint report to the disarmament committee that they "understand the enormous significance for all mankind which a prohibition of test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments would have" and that they "are fully resolved to make every effort and display the necessary will and persistence in order to bring the talks to a speedy and successful conclusion."

But as early as the end of 1980 the United States broke off the tripartite talks, and in October 1981 E. Rostrow, director of the United Nations, described the prohibition of tests as only a "long-term objective."

Finally, in March of this year D. Lowitz, U.S. representative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, went even further. Having expressed doubts that the prohibition of tests would help limit the nuclear arms race, he claimed that the implementation of such a measure would "have the opposite effect and delay such reductions." In order to rule out any misunderstanding of his country's present stance, the U.S. delegate declared: "I do not share the view that the comprehensive prohibition of tests is what the process of destroying nuclear arms should begin with."

There you have the sharp turnabout that has occurred within a relatively short 5-year period.

In order to disguise -- and very clumsily, it must be said -- its negative attitude toward the prohibition of tests, the United States usually cites the difficulties of control. But these difficulties are fabricated and specially invented, rather than real difficulties which are perfectly solvable on the basis of proposals already made by the USSR and many other countries. The possibility of effective control of the ending of nuclear tests by means of national scientific and technical means is confirmed by the most authoritative representatives of various countries.

It is possible to cite as an example the statement made by Sweden's Prime Minister O. Palme in Geneva last June. "The work done by my country's experts in this sphere," he said, "convinced me long ago that the scientific and technical knowledge and experience that have now been accumulated make it possible to ensure the necessary verification of the observance of a treaty banning any nuclear weapon tests."

The world's states (with the exception of the United States and some of its allies) demand that all test explosions of nuclear weapons be prohibited in all environments for all time. Their will has been reflected in an entire series of decisions adopted by the United Nations. The immediate prohibition of nuclear explosions was demanded last January by leaders of the six states that authored the Delhi declaration. Many politicians in the United States are also speaking out in favor of ending nuclear weapon tests. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Commission called on the Reagan administration in May 1985 to resume talks with the USSR with a view to concluding a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests and to submit for ratification the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-American treaties.

Opportunity Not To Be Missed

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it proceeds from the premise that the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests is solvable, and our country is not only ready for this but is proposing specific ways of solving it. The Soviet Union believes the most resolute and energetic actions are needed in order to overcome the deadlock in which this problem is entangled. For this purpose, it proposes accelerating the elaboration and conclusion of an international treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, for which purpose practical talks should begin urgently. Furthermore, our country is prepared, as its leadership has authoritatively declared, both to resume the tripartite talks between the USSR, the United States, and Britain and to conduct them at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The question is not where the end of nuclear weapon tests is to be discussed. What is important is that this problem be examined seriously and without delay, to include bearing in mind the forthcoming Soviet-American meeting.

Desiring to ensure the fastest possible progress along this path, the USSR submitted for examination by the UN General Assembly and the Disarmament Conference the "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests." This document takes into account everything positive and also the degree of consensus that has been achieved in the course of the many years of discussion of the problem of prohibiting nuclear tests. It also reflects the additional consideration of many states, particularly on questions of the control of a future treaty's observance. This document provides a good basis for reaching a swift agreement.

With a view to creating more favorable conditions for the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the USSR has also repeatedly proposed that some states possessing nuclear weapons, as a display of good will, proclaim a moratorium on all nuclear explosions as of a date to be agreed on between them. But it has not yet been possible to implement this proposal.

Now the Soviet Union has taken a resolute and bold step -- it has ended all nuclear explosions unilaterally as of 6 August and has called on the United States to follow its example. There is no doubt that a mutual USSR-U.S. moratorium on all nuclear explosions would set a good example for the other states possessing nuclear weapons. In other words, it now depends largely on the United States whether the dangerous experiments which nuclear weapons continue. Now a real opportunity has been created for real practical progress toward the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests. And this opportunity must not be missed; it must be fully utilized. Only one thing, a constructive response by the United States, is needed for this.

CSO: 5200/1370

NUCLEAR TESTING

SOVIET ACADEMICIAN EXPLAINS MONITORING OF NUCLEAR TESTS

PM221604 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 5

[IZVESTIYA interview with Academician M.A. Sadvoskiy, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute: "Obvious Truths"; subhead reads "Academician M. Sadovskiy: Existing Verification Means Are Adequate for Monitoring Nuclear Explosions"--first four paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] All progressive mankind reacted with satisfaction and hope to the statement which M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made 29 July 1985 in connection with the Soviet Union's declaration of a moratorium on any nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 through 1 January 1986.

The USSR thereby unilaterally assumed a commitment not to carry out nuclear explosions, a commitment which will continue to operate beyond that date if the United States for its part refrains from carrying out nuclear explosions. But the U.S. Administration has stated that "nuclear tests will continue." Using the hackneyed method to which it usually resorts when it wishes to evade constructive Soviet initiatives, the American side has again dug up the thesis that it is impossible to monitor observance of a moratorium on nuclear explosions. Thus, back in 1963, when there was a real opportunity to conclude a treaty prohibiting all types of nuclear test explosions, the United States, by advancing excessive demands in terms of monitoring, camouflaged its lack of desire to proceed to the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Since then, the United States has regularly used the monitoring question to thwart the conclusion of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and also to create obstacles to the ratification of the already signed 1974 treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground tests and the 1976 treaty between the USSR and the United States on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

As for the real possibilities of monitoring nuclear weapon tests, as prominent American scientists have stated in Congress recently, of all arms limitation measures nuclear explosions are the most susceptible to reliable monitoring. And in the view of such an extremely well informed figure as former CIA director Colby, observance of a moratorium on nuclear explosions "indisputably can be ensured with the aid of existing national technical means of monitoring."

What is the existing technical potential for monitoring nuclear explosions, including the U.S. potential?

The IZVESTIYA editorial board asked prominent Soviet scientist academician Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sadovskiy, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute, to elucidate on these questions. His answers, cited below, cast light on the real situation in terms of monitoring nuclear test explosions.

Question: What technical means does the United States possess for monitoring observance of the moratorium on carrying out nuclear explosions in the USSR?

Answer: The creation of a network of seismic stations located on the territory of both the United States and other foreign countries for the purpose of detecting Soviet underground nuclear explosions was begun by the United States in 1959 under the Vela-Uniform program. According to data published abroad, the United States has the potential to obtain seismic information from:

105 seismic stations located on the territory of more than 55 countries. These stations are linked in the Worldwide Standardized Seismic Station Network (WWSSN);

20 seismic array stations [stantsii seysmicheskogo grupirovaniya] located in 12 countries; and

17 Seismic Research Observatories (SRO) on the territory of 15 countries.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that the USSR's territory is completely surrounded by these seismic stations, some of which are actually sited in countries bordering on the USSR and Warsaw Pact states. The disposition of these stations creates the most favorable conditions for monitoring nuclear explosions in the USSR, increasing the reliability and accuracy of determining time and place and assessing yield. Furthermore, the United States obtains information about seismic phenomena from the International Seismological Center (ISC, Scotland). The seismic network used by the United States for monitoring is equipped to a high technical standard.

The seismic stations in the worldwide standardized network are equipped, as a rule, with highly sensitive seismometers which can record seismic fluctuations of a millionth of a millimeter.

Many of these stations are already recording seismic waves in digital form, which makes it possible to effectively analyze the data received using computers in processing centers.

Seismic research observatories possess still greater sensitivity and dynamic range than stations in the global standardized network. The higher performance is achieved by installing short- and long-period seismometers in deep wells, which makes it possible to substantially reduce the level of microseismic interference.

Seismic array stations usually link several dozen geophones scattered over an area. Joint processing by a computer in the center of the array of the signals recorded by the geophones makes it possible to increase the operational sensitivity of the station and also to promptly estimate the location and yield of an explosion.

Wishing to make maximum use of the array effect, in 1966 the Americans created in Montana a giant LASA seismic array, which incorporates 525 geophones over an area of 40,000 square km. The (NORSAR) seismic group consisting of 132 geophones was deployed near Oslo, Norway in subsequent years utilizing the experience gained in operating this array.

ALPA, the first array system in world seismological practice to use long-period seismographs, was set up in Alaska. Medium-sized seismic arrays have also been set up in Britain, Sweden, the FRG, Japan, and a number of other countries in the world.

Seismic data from array stations, research observatories, and stations in the worldwide standardized network are expedited to the United States for processing. The seismic data is processed by high-capacity computers to determine the location, time, depth, and yield of explosions.

Question: What is the potential of the system which you just detailed for monitoring nuclear explosions?

Answer: In order to answer this question it would be better to turn to the opinion of Professors L.R. Sykes and (D.F. Evernden) U.S. seismologists who are experts in the sphere of nuclear explosion detection. One of their articles, published by SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN in October 1982, cites an evaluation of the potential for detecting underground nuclear explosions on USSR territory.

As a result of research conducted by them, the authors concluded that a seismological network of only 15 stations located outside the Soviet Union's borders guarantees the detection of 1-kiloton yield underground nuclear explosions carried out anywhere in the USSR with a probability factor of no less than 0.9. Similar results have been obtained by other American scientists.

On the whole, Soviet seismologists share this assessment. At the same time, they believe that the practical potential of the U.S. seismological network is much greater since the above evaluation is based on only 15 stations while their actual number, as shown, is considerably higher. An increase in the number of recording stations with improved specifications and modern computerized methods of data processing make it possible to substantially lower the threshold at which seismic signals can be singled out from background interference and thus lower the threshold at which underground nuclear explosions can be detected.

Thus, in practice the U.S. seismic network ensures, with a high degree of probability, the detection on Soviet territory of underground nuclear explosions with a yield considerably below 1 kiloton.

The potential of the seismic method is also distinguished by the fact that a number of seismic stations in the world also register low-yield industrial explosions of chemical explosives. Thus, according to ISC bulletins, explosions of 20-30 metric ton yield are registered at distances of up to 2,000-3,000 km.

The high reliability of the U.S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions in the USSR has been confirmed by Sykes and (Evernden) on the basis of the results of its operation for the last 20 years. They write: "...to our knowledge, not a single one of the

several hundred underground nuclear explosions carried out in this period has been mistaken for an earthquake. Our experience indicates a very low probability of an event not being identified if all available methods are applied."

Question: Is there any real possibility of secretly carrying out nuclear explosions?

Answer: Specialists are currently examining the following ways of concealing nuclear explosions:

Reducing the seismic effect obtained from explosions in large underground chambers or in smaller chambers packed with energy absorption devices [energopoglotitel];

Camouflaging the explosion with an earthquake;

Camouflaging it with an industrial explosion of chemical explosives.

By carrying out nuclear explosions in large chambers, the seismic effect can be reduced tens of times over [v desyatki raz]. Realistically speaking, a reduction in the seismic effect of explosions in chambers is only feasible for low-yield charges (up to 1-2 kilotons). However, even when nuclear charges of this yield are exploded in chambers, the seismic signals can be detected thousands of kilometers away.

It is possible to create chambers of the required size by carrying out a preliminary high-yield nuclear explosion (of dozens of kilotons). Other means of creating large chambers entail serious technical difficulties. Moreover, it is virtually impossible for a preliminary high-yield explosion and preparatory large-scale work to create chambers to go unnoticed.

In examining the possibility of camouflaging underground nuclear explosions with earthquakes, it should be noted that modern methods of processing seismic tremors recorded by a network of stations make it possible to separate the seismic signals generated by underground nuclear explosions from recording of earthquakes. It should also be remembered that it is virtually impossible to predict beforehand the exact time and place of an earthquake in order to place a nuclear charge there in plenty of time.

As for camouflaging nuclear explosions with large industrial explosions, the latter would have to be dozens of times more powerful than the nuclear explosions being camouflaged. This is hard to implement in practice.

Question: There has previously been talk of the seismic method's potential for monitoring underground nuclear explosions, are there any other methods apart from the seismic method for detecting underground nuclear explosions?

Answer: The main method of monitoring underground nuclear explosions, of course, is the seismic method. In recent years, other methods have also been studied.

As is well-known, apart from the seismic wave, explosions and earthquakes are also accompanied by a subsonic acoustic wave, which, in propagating through the upper layers of the atmosphere, causes characteristic disturbances in the ionosphere and the earth's magnetic field. These disturbances can be recorded by ground stations and satellites. French and other West European scientists are also studying the influence of acoustic waves on the ionosphere and the earth's magnetic field.

Seismic and hydroacoustic facilities located in the sea and oceans can also be used to detect nuclear explosions. According to published data, the United States possesses such a network; the information from which goes to the center for the collection, processing, and analysis of data on nuclear explosions (Patrick base, Florida).

Moreover, existing satellite systems for observing the surface of the earth are capable of detecting the consequences of an explosion in the region of the epicenter (subsidence craters, surface disturbance, the release of radioactive products, temperature changes, and so forth) and monitoring work preparatory to carrying out underground nuclear explosions.

Thus it can confidently be stated that the present state of knowledge of the effects accompanying underground nuclear explosions and the level of technical potential of a number of states make it possible to reliably monitor nuclear test explosions using national technical means. Under the conditions of the moratorium which has been announced, the resolution of this task is considerably facilitated.

I would also like to stress that our national seismic system, which is situated solely on the Soviet territory, is oriented unidirectionally [odnostoronne] with respect to the American Continent and is therefore in a less favorable position to monitor U.S. nuclear explosions. At the same time, we believe that our national means are sufficient to monitor an underground nuclear test ban. So the resolution of the problem of completely prohibiting nuclear weapon tests does not depend on monitoring. Certainly not on monitoring, but primarily on U.S. policy. The present U.S. Administration, in categorically refusing to introduce a ban on nuclear tests, is doing so because it is creating new-generation weapons, the weapons of the nineties. So instead of responding positively to the moratorium on nuclear explosions introduced by the Soviet Union 6 August, the United States is continuing nuclear weapon tests. Another underground nuclear explosion was carried out at the Nevada test range on 17 August. At the same time, it has been announced that this is only the start of a vast new program of such tests.

This is the primary reason for all of the U.S. Administration's actions on the question of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests, and no excuses or references to the "inadequacy" of monitoring can disguise this self-evident truth. The means of verification already possessed by states, if they are used for monitoring the end of nuclear weapon tests, are perfectly adequate to ensure the necessary confidence in compliance with the agreement.

In his answers to a TASS correspondent's questions on 14 August Comrade M.S. Gorbachev bluntly pointed out that "it is precisely the United States that wants neither the ending of nuclear tests nor a reliable system of monitoring. No other conclusion can be drawn."

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NUCLEAR TESTING

EL PAIS VIEWS USSR NUCLEAR MORATORIUM PROPOSAL

PM191339 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 15 Aug 85 p 6

[Editorial: "Gorbachev's Proposal"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev's statement announcing a 5-month moratorium on nuclear testing by the USSR has created unquestionably interesting possibilities regarding the nature of future arms negotiations between the superpowers. This statement by Gorbachev is perhaps the least propagandist of those made by the Soviets on this issue for some years. This is why it has had a considerable impact, not so much in the media as in specialized circles. U.S. Vice Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, now retired and the deputy director of a private institution, the Defense Information Center, writing in THE NEW YORK TIMES, described the Soviet leader's statement as "the only significant development in arms control since the SALT II accords were signed 6 years ago."

It must be borne in mind that nuclear tests are absolutely crucial to the development of this kind of weapon. So if a real ban were to be introduced, it would not diminish the present stockpiling of nuclear weapons, but their development would be curbed. Negotiating, while at the same time testing--and thus improving--weapons, is not the same as negotiating without being able to conduct tests, and thus with a much lesser likelihood of one's interlocutor's being able to make any significant advances that would disrupt the balance. As is known, in 1963 a general agreement was reached banning tests on the Earth's surface, in the atmosphere, in space, and under the sea. Since then the United States has carried out 425 underground tests and the Soviet Union about 400. Each test is an extraordinarily complex and costly operation. The U.S. budget for this item was \$331 million in 1981 and the 1986 budget is almost double that--\$657 million. The corresponding Soviet figures are not known but at any rate these figures are a help in understanding the importance of nuclear tests in both powers' armaments policies.

Another basic factor to be borne in mind is that nuclear tests are monitorable. Both the USSR and the United States now have scientific equipment that enables them to know if a nuclear explosion has occurred anywhere on Earth. So if a Soviet-U.S. agreement were to be reached banning tests, each side could verify whether or not the other was honoring its commitment. It would thus be possible to eliminate the interminable discussions on control or verification, which have caused the failure of so many disarmament talks.

The U.S. response to Gorbachev's remarks has so far been negative. The White House has refused to decree a moratorium on nuclear testing similar to that dictated by the Soviet government. On the other hand, as a significant goodwill gesture, the Americans have invited a Soviet delegation to attend a nuclear test in the United States. The USSR has turned down the invitation, alleging that the presence of Soviet delegates would imply a kind of approval of the tests, whereas Gorbachev has proposed their suspension by both countries. The positive aspect of the U.S. invitation--which should be stressed--is that mutual attendance by both countries' specialists at experiments even of a military nature could help to create a climate of greater trust with a view to possible future negotiations on the issue. The Stockholm Conference is working in precisely this direction.

The chief U.S. argument in its rejection of Gorbachev's proposal has been that the United States is "behind" with its testing and that its suspension now would imply an advantage to the Soviets. All indications are that the U.S. response is designed more to gain time than to oppose the Soviet proposal completely, especially when Gorbachev's offer leaves a 5 month leeway for the United States to make up its mind. The Soviet unilateral moratorium is valid through 1 January 1986. After that date, nuclear tests will be suspended only if Washington adopts a similar measure. So the issue can be regarded as unresolved, and one can assume that the United States has not yet given its final answer. In fact the real moment for a decision on this extremely important issue will be at the summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev scheduled for 19-20 November in Geneva. The Soviets have accustomed us on several occasions to purely propagandist moves designed above all to leave their interlocutors at a disadvantage. But it would be illogical to classify Gorbachev's present proposal as another such move.

CSO: 5200/2758

GENERAL

USSR: SOVIET, WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS IN CDE, MBFR, GENEVA TALKS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEKHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5,
(signed to press 12 Apr 85) pp 24-36

[Article by A. Svetlov: "The Warsaw Pact in the Service of Peace and Security"--for the test of this article, see the USSR REPORT: WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JPRS-UWE-85-009, of 15 August 1985, pages 5-20]

[Excerpts]

The Political Declaration of the Prague conference of the Political Consultative Committee (January 1983) stressed: "The most important component of the task of eliminating the danger of war and of consolidating universal peace is the strengthening of security in Europe. This is determined primarily by the fact that an enormous number of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, are concentrated on the European continent, and that the armed forces of the two military alliances occupy positions directly adjoining one another." The countries of the socialist community consider that no chance should be missed and no possibility should be left unused when what is involved is removing and averting the danger of a catastrophe for Europe and the world as a whole. Proceeding from their principled policy, the Warsaw Pact states come out in favor of strict observation in the relations between European states of the principles of respect for independence and national sovereignty, the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, nonuse of force or the threat of force, and the peaceful resolution of all controversial questions through negotiation.

The countries of the socialist community oppose the course of militarization with a policy of strengthening security and cooperation in Europe and of the principles of universal peace. The Warsaw Pact states consider that it is possible to change the dangerous course of events in Europe and the world. "For this," it was stated in the communique of the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of Warsaw Pact member-states, held on 3 and 4 December 1984 in Berlin, "a shift toward a policy of realism and businesslike interaction in the solving of the tasks facing the peoples of Europe and other continents is needed. A serious and equal dialogue between states with different social systems is necessary, as are negotiations in which the sides recognize the great responsibility incumbent upon them and strive to achieve positive results."

Europe, and indeed the whole world, are faced with the most acute problems, which require solution without delay. The countries of socialism proceed from the fact that it is necessary to remove the nuclear threat, and to restore and continue the process of detente. This will permit peoples to live in conditions of trust, good-neighborliness, and mutually advantageous cooperation. The situation in Europe and in the world as a whole calls for large practical steps commensurate with the scale of the tasks mentioned.

Guided by these considerations, the fraternal socialist countries have advanced a realistic program, whose adoption would promote the strengthening of security in Europe and the averting of the threat of nuclear war, and would open the way toward a reduction of armaments and toward disarmament.

Measures in the sphere of disarmament, actions of a political and international-legal nature, and also measures to strengthen trust, are organically combined with each other in this program. It concludes the following important proposals.

In the sphere of disarmament:

The halting of the stockpiling of new nuclear weapons on the European continent, and radical reduction of them down to the total liberation of Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons;

the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe: in the Balkans, in the north of Europe, and in other regions;

the liberation of Europe from chemical weapons, and primarily non-deployment of these weapons where they do not already exist;

the non-increasing and reduction of the military expenditures of Warsaw Pact states and NATO member-countries;

the mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe.

Relating to the actions of a political and international-legal nature proposed by the Warsaw Pact states are the following proposals:

The undertaking by nuclear states of an obligation of no first use of nuclear weapons, as has been done unilaterally by the Soviet Union;

The conclusion of a Treaty on Non-Use of Force and Maintaining Relations of Peace Between Member-States of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance.

In the sphere of measures to strengthen trust, the socialist countries are making proposals for limitation of the scale of military exercises and for advance notification of large military exercises of ground forces and air and naval forces, and of large troop movements and transfers, and also for the exchange of observers to be present at large military exercises. Taking into account the useful experience of the implementation of the measures to promote

trust envisaged by the corresponding clauses of the Helsinki Final Act, the countries of socialism consider it important to develop measures of a more significant nature and of wider scope.

The countries of the socialist community introduced their plan to ensure European security and strengthen trust in Europe at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. In point of fact, the decision on its convocation was the first major agreement reached in recent years since international development left the road of detente and started along the dangerous path of military confrontation as a result of the militarist policy of the United States and NATO.

A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR minister of foreign affairs, said at the opening of the Stockholm Conference: "The peoples of Europe expect from the Stockholm Conference decisions, the implementation of which would be capable of changing events for the better. We advocate that the implementation of agreements--if we manage to reach them--should not become a dead letter."

The tension and acuteness of the situation in Europe predetermine the necessity of taking weighty and effective decisions at the Stockholm Conference. For this reason, there should be talk not only of the restoration of the trust that has been undermined, but also of the adoption of measures which would remove the threat of nuclear conflict and promote the general improvement of the political climate on the continent. This is the only reasonable way, if, of course, a substantial contribution to the cause of European security is to be seriously expected from the conference.

The United States and their NATO partners are striving to avoid making such decisions and to limit the discussion within the framework of purely technical questions, which would allow them to continue the build-up of their military potential in Europe, and to deploy ever new types of arms, including nuclear arms, here. Instead of questions of limiting military activity, curbing the arms race, and renunciation of the use of force, they are interested only in "transparency", that is, the acquisition by legal means of information of an intelligence nature on the armed forces of Warsaw Pact countries.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist states have no lack of good will or of genuine desire to achieve progress in Stockholm. And if the West makes its contribution to the joint search for constructive solutions, the way to strengthening trust between the states of Europe will lie open. Constructive dialogue is necessary in the interests of the security of the European peoples.

IV

Even in the hardest and most dangerous years, the best minds of Europe believed that reason would prevail over folly. Otherwise peace as one of mankind's greatest blessings would simply continue to be an enticing but unattainable dream, like the "blue bird" in M. Maeterlinck's well-known tale.

The pivotal area of the constructive foreign policy activity of the Warsaw Pact countries is the resolute struggle to halt the arms race and for disarmament. "The member-states of the Warsaw Pact," notes the communique of the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of these countries, held on 3 and 4 December 1984 in Berlin, "consider that the fundamental question of our time is the halting of the arms race and the shift to disarmament, primarily nuclear."

During its entire thirty-year existence the Warsaw Pact Organization has waged an exceptionally intensive and large-scale struggle in this most important area. Its energetic and consistent efforts have resulted in moving the disarmament problems to one of the primary places on the agenda of international life. Precisely the socialist states have played the leading role in proposing and developing the initiatives that, despite the stubborn resistance of the Western militarist and reactionary forces, have led to the conclusion of a number of accords and agreements that have slowed down the arms race to a certain extent in some of its aspects. These agreements have strikingly demonstrated the possibility for coordinated and purposeful actions of states with different social systems in the sphere of disarmament.

The U.S. militarist course, aimed at achieving military superiority over socialism, has resulted in a situation where, at the beginning of the eighties, negotiations have been wrecked in some areas or have nearly died out in other areas. Moreover, the Pentagon has started its undermining work against the agreements in effect, using the most ignoble pretexts for this purpose.

How many times already have the U.S. ruling circles developed an unprecedented arms race in their chase after the chimera of military superiority. The arms race has now assumed a truly total character because military developments are taking place virtually in all possible areas that are opening up as a result of the high rates of scientific-technical progress.

Naturally, all this has had the most negative consequences for the development of international relations. It was believed for a long time that the increase in weapons is more a consequence than a cause of world tension. But the scale of the contemporary military preparations is such that they themselves become a generating force of tension by promoting the spreading of the arms race to ever new spheres and drawing into its orbit more and more states.

The struggle waged by the socialist countries for ending the increase in weapons and reducing them and for disarmament is now essentially entering a new stage. It is being developed in an exceptionally acute and difficult international situation marked by an increased level of tension when militarism is engaged in the attempts at undermining detente and throwing mankind back to the period of "cold war" and it is sabotaging every step toward a normalization and stabilization of existing positions.

In these conditions the Warsaw Pact countries have proposed a realistic program of constructive actions to curb the arms race and move toward disarmament. This program includes such highly important proposals as those for achieving