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THE DANISH PERSPECTIVE ON BALTIC SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

KENN B. IVERSEN, CPT(P), DENMARK

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1998

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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE DANISH PERSPECTIVE ON BALTIC SECURITY by CPT(P) Kenn B. Iversen, Denmark, 115 pages.

This study examines Danish security policy since the end of the Cold War and offers insight into short-term perspectives on the future of that policy. Before 1990, Denmark pursued a relatively low-profile security policy, but that policy has since changed to one of "active internationalism." This term captures the essence of Denmark's recent change to a more active and initiative oriented approach to security issues. To demonstrate the full scope of this drastic change, current Danish policy is compared with Cold War policy. Building on this comparison, this thesis explores the possibilities, opportunities, and limitations inherent in the Danish situation, with special attention devoted to the evolving relationship between policy and the geopolitical environment of the Baltic Region. Finally, the analysis extends to the future (three to five years) of Denmark's security policy.

This thesis concludes that Danish security policy has changed immensely since the end of the Cold War, from one of passive acquiescence to what has been termed "active internationalism," characterized by greater dynamism and ambition. Further, this study argues that, while Denmark has taken a leading role in subregional security matters, there are no overarching leadership pretensions. The study also emphasizes that Denmark's freedom of action is limited primarily by the agendas of the Baltic states and Swedish initiatives. Further, this thesis suggests that Russian-Danish relations will enjoy improvement and that Danish assistance to the Baltic states over the short term will undergo a change in substance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Before and after just after arriving at Command and General Staff College, I was told about the voluntary MMAS program. It was described as challenging and a lot of hard work; attendance was far from unanimously recommended, primarily because of the workload. I arrived in Kansas with a firm decision not to attend the program. However, after introductory briefings by Dr. Philip J. Brookes at the beginning of the school year, the program appeared interesting and worth engaging in. Consequently, and after ample approval of my then pregnant wife, I decided to sign up.

The experience has indeed been rewarding and worthwhile. The program has given me a rare opportunity in a busy career to examine a worthwhile subject in depth. Additionally, the more long lasting benefit of engaging in research and writing a thesis is at least as valuable. My thanks go to Dr. Bruce W. Menning, my committee chair, who provided outstanding guidance and motivation throughout the project and who is one of the main reasons I have gained so much. From beginning to end, Dr. Jake W. Kipp has been an excellent and challenging mentor. LTC Mike J. Fallon provided additional mentoring and cogent advice. My gratitude goes to a magnificent committee.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BALTAP	Allied Forces Baltic Approaches
BALTBAT	Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIS	Confederation of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EDC	European Defence Cooperation
EU	European Union
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SFOR	Stabilization Force
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study examines changes in Danish security policy since the end of the Cold War and offers a three to five year perspective on the future of that policy. The thesis argues that over the last eight years Denmark has gained considerable freedom of political action, and that this situation has encouraged a shift to international activism in Danish security policy. Before 1990, that policy was one of passive acquiescence; since 1990 it has been one of “active internationalism,” featuring greater dynamism and initiative. Although Denmark lacks the pretensions to assume a pre-eminent regional role, in the absence of a regional security system, Denmark retains a realistic capacity to play the role of bridge to a larger Europe and the U.S., thus facilitating “soft” security in the Baltic region.

How this situation has come about, and with what prospects, are central concerns for this thesis. Some of the answers lie in the way that the changing geopolitical environment has—and continues to—shape and limit Danish security policy. Other answers lie in the more recent past, and for this reason considerable emphasis falls on a comparison of current Danish policy with the Cold War counterpart. On the basis of these and related considerations, the author will argue that Denmark now plays a leading role in subregional security

matters. At the same time, the author will argue that Denmark does not operate in a vacuum, and that Danish policy functions in accordance with various limitations, including finite resources and genuine constraints on freedom of action. Above all, the emphasis is on context, especially the geopolitical environment in the Baltic and how that environment impacts on contemporary and near-future Danish security policy.

Background

Until 1990, the Cold War and bipolarism dominated the political situation in Europe. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries stood on one side and U.S. led countries on the other. The Cold War ended with the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Western states at first gradually, then more perceptibly, changed their security policies because the threat that had shaped their previous policies and actions was gone.

Thanks to its record of international engagement since 1945, Denmark has been uniquely poised to play an important role in Europe's post-Cold War security architecture. Denmark remains firmly anchored in the international community, and Danish foreign and security policy have supported cooperation within the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the Nordic Cooperation Council. An important Danish response to the changed Cold War security environment has been a tendency, in part, to focus on the Baltic area. As the only Nordic country with membership in both NATO and the EU, Denmark continues to play an essential role in the Baltic region and in European institutions. At the same time, Denmark's new activism outside the Baltic ensures increased goodwill and

more influence in the Baltic region, as well as in NATO and the EU. In addition, Denmark has far more flexibility than, for example, either the United States or other great NATO powers because Denmark carries less baggage. These and other considerations mean that Denmark exercises a fair degree of power among the Nordic countries. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that Denmark's membership in both the EU and NATO confers a certain amount of preeminence.

However, Denmark does not function without constraint in the new post-Cold War geopolitical environment. Denmark is actively engaged in international conflicts, but its participation in the European integration process appears limited. During the years following the Cold War, Denmark has taken on new challenges, a fact distinctly demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia and the Baltic region. Although the new activist policy has enjoyed wide acceptance, broad support evaporates when Danes perceive that the European Union intervenes too actively in local affairs. Continued integration has been a hot subject for Danish debate. Still, a more positive and pro-European Danish policy has emerged despite popular aversion to the EU integration process. Denmark's relations with Germany remain an important problem area. Danish exceptions to the Maastricht Treaty and popular hesitation against a strong centralized European power in Brussels preclude Denmark from pursuing a policy that binds it more firmly to larger entities.

The nature of Nordic cooperation has changed as well. Common interests among the Nordic countries have led to a military dialog and constructive cooperation, both of which have resulted in a closer coordination of Nordic

positions and a closer cooperation in supporting the Baltic states. Here, Denmark has taken the lead among Nordic countries with its efforts to support and influence development in the Baltic region. Denmark's influence has come to equal that of Sweden, which traditionally had the lead. Thus Danish activism has given rise to sound competition among the Nordic countries. Instead of spoiling subregional cooperation, this competition thus far has increased the effectiveness of support to the Baltic states.

Significance of This Study

As the above assertions indicate, the significance of this study lies in the implications of changed Danish security policy for the Baltic region. Denmark seeks influence and seems to have far greater power than the sheer size of the country suggests. Denmark now plays a notable role in defining the security architecture in the region. With these considerations in view, the purpose is to examine recent changes in Danish security policy and the role Denmark now plays. This study finds its natural culmination with a review of constraints and possibilities for Danish policy in a three to five year perspective.

The Baltic region is currently undergoing great changes. Former Soviet republics strive for consolidation of their independence, while former East-bloc countries have given birth to democracies with high economic growth rates. Meanwhile, former neutral countries have altered their security policies and vigorously participate in European institutions, such as the EU. Some have made approaches towards NATO. Clearly, the environment continues to witness change, but there are unsolved security problems. In this dynamic subregion,

Denmark itself has evolved into an essential active player. Within this context, it is appropriate to clarify Denmark's subregional policy as outlined in the research questions governing this study. Another objective is to clarify the larger implications of subregional changes on the general situation. Within more general perspective, the purpose is to provide insight into the influence of the end of the Cold War on a subregion which was divided by the Iron Curtain for more than 40 years.

The primary research question is: "How has Danish security policy evolved in the Baltic region and with what consequences in a three-to-five year perspective?" In order to answer the primary research question, several subordinate research questions must be addressed:

1. "How has the historical perspective influenced Danish security policy concerning continuity and change?"
2. "What are the security threats in the Baltic region?"
3. "What are the responses of nations in the Nordic and Baltic region to these threats?"
4. "How does membership in NATO and the EU affect Danish security policy?"
5. "What are the influences on and what are the trends in Danish security policy?"

The first subordinate research question addresses the nature of Danish security policy before the end of the Cold War. To clarify the Danish role in the region, it is important to assess what has governed transition from past to current policy. Such an examination will show those relations and restrictions that still

influence Danish security policy for historical reasons. To reveal the full scope of historical precedent, it is important not only to look narrowly at Baltic security policy; Danish security policy in general becomes a subject for consideration.

An analysis of the international environment in the region is required for an analysis of what possibilities and limitations that changed security policy confronts. Therefore, the second and third subordinate questions form crucial parts of the larger investigation. This analysis will also extend to the security architecture of the region and the adjacent countries' roles in it.

The last two subordinate questions are the core of the analysis. Answers to them will clarify current Danish policy, its motivations, and its inherent limitations. Further, answers to these questions will enable the author to compare current policy with the past, while placing Denmark's security policy role squarely in the context of the international regional environment.

In sum, the subordinate questions provide additional guidance for researching areas that, added together, create a comprehensive picture of Danish policy and the environment in which it is applied.

Assumptions

The author has assumed that the countries under study act and form their policies based on rational approaches.

Foresight into future development is based on present-day realities. In this thesis, the assumption is that it is possible to foresee short term (three to five years) developments. The more distant future lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

In three to five year perspective, it is assumed that the United States' commitment to Europe will remain at the present level and that Russia will not use military force to impose its will on other powers. Further, the author has assumed that Russia will not improve its economical situation to such an extent that it will regain superpower status.

Limitations

The study uses open sources only.

Delimitations

Although this thesis considers perspectives of the U.S., Great Britain, and other relevant great powers, the study will primarily concentrate on nations in the Baltic region. The reason is that this area primarily affects Danish security policy and, largely, its defense policy. These countries are Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, and Denmark. A thorough analysis of Iceland's recent policy is not included in the thesis because the country has limited diplomatic and military influence in the area, thanks mainly to its small population and lack of armed forces. These limitations circumscribe the already broad scope of this study.

From a traditional perspective, military threats loom large among those forces which can destroy a nation. Yet, it is arguable that environmental destruction, refugees, and organized cross-border criminality also pose security problems. Although these "soft" security issues are relevant, the primary focus in this thesis will be on the military threats (the "hard" security issues) because they

still constitute the most important factor in the shaping of nation's security policies.

During the last few years, trends toward regionalization have appeared in Europe. That is, trans-border regions develop natural links to each other, meanwhile the EU integration process has not created a fully centralized Europe and there are reasons to expect that the integration of Europe will allow other patterns to emerge simultaneously.¹ For these reasons, subregional considerations likely to gain more influence along with unifying processes. As Europe has consolidated after the Cold War, subregions have emerged. The intense and growing cooperation in the Baltic area makes this region one of them.

The analysis of the nations involved in the region—and specifically Denmark—will focus on their actual external policies. To the extent it is necessary, relevant national issues will be addressed.

Definitions

The Baltic Sea Region or the Baltic Region. This region encompasses nations with coastlines on the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden.

The Nordic States. The three Scandinavian states of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, plus Finland and Iceland, are the Nordic States. These make up the European North, or "Norden" (also termed northern Europe or the Nordic region). They should not be confused with the three Nordic states that belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²

Collective Security. Collective security asserts that the security dilemmas of states can best be overcome not through national self-defense and balance of power but through the creation of institutions of communal commitments whereby each state undertakes to join in common actions against those among the collective who threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of others.³

Security policy involves efforts to maintain state power and institutions intact in the face of hostile or internal and external threats.

Foreign policy is the activity whereby states act, react, and interact diplomatically.⁴

Small powers are those states that usually have to rely on external assistance to meet their security needs. The following are characteristic behavior patterns: limited involvement in world affairs, strong attachment to intergovernmental organizations, support for international law, avoidance of the use of force, and a limited geographical and functional range of foreign policy activities.⁵

Middle powers are powers, for example Sweden and Italy, which display the will of great powers and have worldwide interests. Nevertheless, because they are not in the first rank in military and economic terms, they are not great powers.⁶

Great powers are generally those that can or are able to maintain their security independently and against all others; they normally have a strategic nuclear capability and possess economic strength. Great powers normally have global if not universal interests.⁷

Superpower. Today, the only superpower is the USA.

Short term is three to five years.

Long term is eight to ten years.

A nation is a social collective whose members share some or all of the following: a sense of common identity, a history, a language, ethnic or racial origins, religion, a common economic life, a geographical location and a political base. Usually, there is a strong sense of identity and unity.⁸

A state has a legal personality and, as such, possesses certain rights and duties under international law. States must possess the following qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining effective control over territory and the conduct of international relations. The role of diplomatic recognition often is crucial, since it implies acceptance in the international community.⁹

Neutrality. A state is neutral if by word or deed it has not declared support for one or another of the belligerents in a conflict.¹⁰

Geopolitics is a method to explain and foresee international political behavior in terms of geographical variables, including location, size, climate, topography, natural resources, technological development, and potential. Theoretical geopolitics is the study of spatial political division, its causes and effects.¹¹

Organization

The thesis follows the traditional model: introduction, review of literature, research methodology, analysis, and conclusions and prospects; however, the

model has been modified to account for naturally occurring complexities within the analysis of a complex region.

Chapters Four through Seven represent segmentation of what normally constitutes a single fifth chapter. Chapter Four, "the Historical Perspective on Danish Security Policy," presents a historical overview of Danish security policy since World War II. The fifth and sixth chapters, "Denmark and Major Regional Powers" and "Denmark and Its Baltic Neighbors", describe the current security environment in the Baltic region and provide additional explanation for change. Finally, Chapter Seven, "Trends in Current Danish Security Policy," presents current Danish security policy as well as projections for the near future.

Prospects and Conclusions are presented in Chapter Eight as a distinct chapter, including conclusions reached as a result of research and analysis for each issue examined.

The Baltic Sea Area




Figure 1.

¹Ole Wæver and Pertti Joenniemi, Region in the Making (Germany: Kiel Peace Research Series, December 1991), pp. 14-18.

²Arne Olav Brundtland & Don M. Snider, Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1994), p. 2.

³Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics (Simon & Schuster, c1990), p. 53.

⁴Evans, pp. 123-124.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 367-368.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

⁷Evans, pp. 143-144, and John O'Loughlin (ed.), Dictionary of Geopolitics (Greenwood Press, c1994), pp. 106-107.

⁸Evans, p. 257.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 375.

¹⁰Evans, pp. 271-272, and O'Loughlin, p. 173.

¹¹Evans, pp. 136-137, and O'Loughlin, pp. 93-95, and Osmo Tuomi, The New Geopolitics (National Defence College, Finland, 1998), p. 28.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on the security of the Baltic is abundant. Sources can be categorized by physical type to include books, journal and newspaper articles, and special studies. Or, alternatively, sources can be categorized by origin—government, non-government, academic, private, or other. Regardless of types of origin, various materials must be treated critically, in accordance with the usual canons governing scholarly study and analysis. The following discussion, while not exhaustive, serves to illustrate the breadth of materials and perspectives incorporated into research for this thesis.

Critical assessment of the sources facilitated a determination of the extent to which given information represented official or unofficial views. The most useful sources were often journals and commentaries which embodied unofficial assessments of issues and analyses of policies. Other sources were not as neutral in their assessment of events, a realization which heightened this thesis author's sense of caution and reinforced a more critical approach. Official sources were largely employed to determine and confirm current postures and policies.

Due to the very nature of the subject and its timeliness, events often overtook the pace of analysis and interpretation. This development necessitated

considerable reliance on more recent journal articles and even viewpoints from the popular press. Generally, quality of authorship figured prominently in the selection of sources, with some modification to account for the desire to gather information written from national perspectives and to incorporate material recommended by the research committee.

This study covers perspectives and events occurring before February 28, 1998, only.

An additional consideration, springing from the structure of this thesis, is that sources can be divided among those that address historical background, the present international environment, and current Danish security policy. However, the two latter categories are closely connected, and it is often impossible to separate sources on these areas. As mentioned above, newspapers and magazines, with all their strengths and shortcomings, were important sources for research. The following review is broken down into these large categories: newspapers and magazines; literature on the history and background of the Danish security policy; literature presenting the postures of the relevant actors in the Baltic region; and literature on current security policy.

Newspapers and Magazines

Daily newspapers and magazines cover recent events. Their number and the very breadth of their coverage precluded all all-encompassing search. Nonetheless, newspaper and magazine articles often reflect the views of knowledgeable and experienced authors. Therefore, their writings often not only clarified and confirmed information from other sources, but also provided updated

perspective. In some instances, these sources represent the only materials available on a given subject.

Because newspaper or magazine sources defy easy categorizing, they are not subjects of individual review for this thesis. Still, some brief remarks are appropriate. Newspaper sources are primarily from the Danish daily quality press, and they cover a broad political spectrum. The newspapers of record in Denmark occupying an important place in research for this thesis include JyllandsPosten, Berlingske Tidende, Weekendavisen, Politiken, Det fri Aktuelt, and Information. Newspapers of note are JyllandsPosten, Berlingske Tidende, and Weekendavisen, all of which are considered right wing. The remaining are deemed to reflect a centrist or socialist ideology.

History and Background

The sources primarily used in describing the historical background of Danish security policy fall into two main groups: literature written by civilian academics and literature written by government officials.

The former category embraces two perspectives. The first includes works by professors who specialize in Nordic and Baltic security matters, namely Nikolaj Petersen's "Danmark og den europæiske Union" and Jan Øberg's "Nordic Security in the 1990s." Petersen primarily describes the European perspective on Danish security policy, whereas Øberg focuses on the Nordic aspect and, to a lesser extent, on Danish matters. Both studies are well researched and useful. Yet, they are both quite narrowly focused. To compensate, Peter Unwin's Baltic Approaches, provides an added dimension. Unwin, a former British Ambassador

to Denmark, describes the geographical and historical significance of the region, and addresses current change and its possible outcomes.¹ The author affords an informative and thorough description of Danish relations and positions throughout history and relates Denmark to each of the Baltic countries. Unwin provides historical background for the present situation and approaches current topics from a unique and unbiased perspective.

The second category includes literature by Danish government officials. One of the more meaningful sources is "Østersøen i aktuel dansk sikkerhedspolitisk betydning,"² which describes Danish security policy to the year 1981, focusing especially on security and defense politics in the Baltic region. This study provides a good description of historical tensions and crises which have shaped evolution of the Baltic region. The reader of this thesis should also note that to some extent most of the sources contributed to the historical background for the larger study. Regardless of type, most sources describe relevant historical matters. Generally, the sources appearing between 1991 and 1994 must be used with care due to the rapid changes in the area; still, such sources can provide useful historical data and background for recent developments.

Literature on the Postures of the Relevant Actors

This research area encompasses two core fields: the national agendas of the international state actors in the Nordic and Baltic regions, and an examination of the Baltic security question. A variety of sources is available in these fields as the attached bibliography indicates. There seem to be two prevailing views in the

literature on the postures of the national actors in the region. The first view can be described as the traditional West European approach, which appears to be positive and optimistic about the region and its future. The second view comes from authors—primarily from the Baltic states, Russia, and Poland—who have a more pessimistic—even negative—approach to security questions and who are, for example, more worried about instability in Russia.

Authors who share the first view are generally Western Europeans who come from countries that are firmly anchored in the European security architecture. These authors appear reasoned and logical in their analyses. Their countries are neither heavily involved in a struggle for their nations' freedom of action nor in the midst of a fundamental change. Authors from Western European countries generally share basic norms and values, even though they represent a mix of neutral and NATO member countries.

The Russia-Poland-Baltic states based authors are heavily influenced by the security problems of their respective countries. Their descriptions and opinions are clearly shaped by their individual country's struggle for power and independence. Some of the studies seem to advocate causes and even argue to promote official policies. Yet, the value of these studies cannot be underestimated: they reveal popular perceptions, and popular perception plays a major role. One example is Rein Taagepera's, "Estonia – Return to Independence," in which Russians are described as colonists, and their inability to speak Estonian becomes a major point.³ From an Estonian standpoint these arguments are valid and play a valid role; yet, the description seems to favor

Estonian points of view. Another example is Trivimi Velliste's article, "The 'Near Abroad' in the Baltic Republics: The view from Estonia."⁴ The title already reflects a major concern of the author—and for the Estonian people in general—namely Russia's concept of the "near abroad" and the threat it poses to Estonian independence. In Atis Lejiņš' "Latvia in a Post-Cold War Europe,"⁵ the author asserts: "It must be clearly stated that the Baltics see the greatest threat to their security emanating from Moscow" and "I confine my observations mainly to Latvia..." These assertions demonstrate the perspective from which issues are dealt with. A final example: in Grigory Tischenko's "Baltic Security-Assessed from Russia," NATO's activities in the Baltic are emphasized and deemed threatening to Russia. He argues that the Russian response will be rearmament.⁶ Again, the author appears influenced by Russia's reluctance to accept enlargement of NATO.

Literature on Current Security Policy

In literature on current security policy, two dominant threads run through the studies: the official or semiofficial, and the civilian academic.

Official sources are government publications written primarily by commissions appointed by the government. An important example is the Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament.⁷ Although such studies thoroughly analyze current security policy, they argue and explain the changes very differently from more purely academic studies. Official publications on changed Danish policy base their arguments on the transformed international situation

after the end of the Cold War: an extension of cooperation has become possible; relatively more power has accrued to small states; a change in the national attitude about the European integration process has transpired, thanks to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. These changes explain the desire for more visible results and an improvement in the security environment which supports the regional focus of Danish foreign policy. Official treatments also explain that the increased utility of military means in peace operations stems from the fact that the great powers are less willing to take responsibility.⁸ In sum, while these and related arguments do not cover all factors, official studies appear more substantiated and based on visible and obvious evidence.

In contrast, academic authors employ various approaches in explaining changes in various aspects of Danish foreign policy. Examples include varying degrees of emphasis on Danish export norms, competition among nations to achieve greater regional influence, prestige, and so forth.⁹ These and related arguments often differ sharply from one another and reveal the more negative side of national motivation. At the same time, the authors use various scientific approaches and remain narrowly focused, which to a certain extent biases their analyses and shapes their outcomes. Examples of academic authors include Hans Mouritzen, Hans-Henrik Holm, Clive Archer, Don M. Snider, Nikolaj Petersen, and Bertel Heurlin.

In all of the above-described literature, the focus is on describing how Danish security policy has changed and on analyzing motives and causes for change. These studies generally neglect the limitations that Denmark faces. Within the literature, a "subregional study," namely a study which analyzes the

Danish security policy in the region from the subregional level, would prove useful in order to reveal the limitations and possibilities inherent in Denmark's security policy. Such a study would include an analysis of Danish security policy by comparing present realities with the past, by examining the total Baltic environment for limitations and possibilities, and by investigating current policy. It is precisely these lacunae the present thesis seeks to fill, thereby contributing to further clarification of Denmark's role and future prospects in the region.

Summary

As this overview has indicated, materials on Danish security affairs are abundant, perspectives are diverse, and context is complex. This overview has also indicated what has and has not been covered in the existing literature. The next task is to determine how various material can be employed systematically to shed light on the central questions with which this thesis is concerned.

¹Peter Unwin, Baltic Approaches (Norwich, Great Britain: Michael Russell Publishing LTD, 1996), p. 7.

²Major General C.S. Børgesen, "Østersøen i aktuel dansk sikkerhedspolitisk belysning" in Østersøen, Forsvarets Oplysnings- og Velfærdstjeneste, 1993, pp. 48-58.

³Rein Taagepera, Estonia – Return to Independence (the USA: Westview Press Inc., c1993), pp. 216-221.

⁴Trivimi Velliste, "The 'Near Abroad' in the Baltic Republics: The view from Estonia" in Don M. Snider, Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, c1994), p. 57.

⁵Atis Lejinš, "Latvia in a Post-Cold War Europe" in Don M. Snider, Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: CSIS, c1994), pp. 32-33.

⁶Grigory Tischenko's, "Baltic Security-Assessed from Russia" in Military Cooperation and Its Prospects in the Baltic Region (Finland: Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence College, Finland, 1997), pp. 32-35.

⁷Danish and European Security (Copenhagen: The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, 1995).

⁸Danish and European Security, p. 5 and pp. 28-30, and Dansk sikkerhedspolitik (Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, November 1996), pp. 3-5, and Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande, (Copenhagen:Regeringen, June 1997), pp. 11-12.

⁹Hans Mouritzen, "Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era: The Salient Action Spheres," in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 37-40, and Sweicicki, Jakub, Östersöen – säkerhet och samarbete, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Fall 1996, pp. 12-13, and Hans-Henrik Holm, "Denmark's Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constraints," in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 52-54.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN

Overview

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it imposes structure on this study, and, second, it describes the principles governing approaches to the topic. The primary research question—“How has Danish security policy evolved in the Baltic region and with what consequences in a three-to-five year perspective?”—and subordinate questions dictated the focus and nature of research. Figure 2 illustrates the model.




Figure 2.

The Method

By its very nature, this thesis belongs to the realm of qualitative inquiry. The subject matter, which relates broadly to modern Denmark and its security relationships with both a smaller and larger world, does not readily lend itself to empirical or quantitative analysis. Rather, the emphasis is on perception, description, comparison, analysis, judgment, and evaluation. As noted in the previous chapter, the raw data for this study come from a variety of primary and secondary materials, the majority of which afford viewpoints and assertions relevant to the evolution of Danish security policy. The subject itself and available materials about it naturally dictate the methodology appropriate to this study: the gathering and systematic review of appropriate sources, their critical interpretation and evaluation, the drawing of generally reliable conclusions from them, and the fashioning of a logical synthesis based on the materials and informed, in particular, by the research question and its subordinate considerations. As subsequent chapters will reveal, this method and its outcome are especially oriented toward exploration, discovery, and the application of inductive logic.¹

From the outset, several key assumptions drive this study and the method behind it. The first is the significance of the research question. Among the overabundance of materials and perspectives, the research question, along with subordinate questions, provide both a sense of focus and the capacity to assign priorities to diverse materials and viewpoints. Indeed, focus and sense of priority form the study's intellectual keel. Ribs and bracing come from the subordinate

questions which serve to strengthen and reinforce the general sense of coherence and structure.

A second essential assumption implicit in qualitative analysis is the primacy of the author and his relationship to the materials. In this case, the researcher is a serving officer in the Danish armed forces, who brings a certain background and perspective to the analysis, both of which afford an important set of qualifications for a study of Danish security policy. At the same time, the author is aware of the perils of proximity and bias, both of which the author acknowledges in a forthright manner. Compensatory measures include recognition of the problem, immersion in the materials, and a self-conscious emphasis on impartiality. The author has attempted to make sense of the Danish situation without imposing preexisting expectations on the phenomena or the situation under study. He has attempted to proceed from open-ended observations toward general tendencies and patterns. Based on the analysis, the author has further attempted to provide a modest projection of what these patterns hold for the near-term future. Above all, the author understands that the purpose of qualitative analysis is to produce findings. The author also emphasizes the importance of judgment and perspective in the approach to the diverse materials incorporated into the research design. ²

A third key assumption implicit in the method is a direct assertion of the importance of comparison with historical precedent. Present Danish security study cannot be fully understood without reference to its counterpart during the Cold War. For this reason, historical analysis, with reference to both Denmark and its situation, forms an important aspect of this thesis. Emphasis naturally falls

on Denmark and the immediate past, but the importance of history has also guided analysis of other prominent actors in Europe and the Baltic region. If there is any variation from the usual pattern of historical analysis, that variation occurs with regard to the importance of evolutionary patterns in the application of foresight for a determination of possibilities for the future.

A fourth assumption, or rather, assertion, is directly related to the third. That is, the author has consciously chosen to base the analysis on a realist or neo-realist approach to international affairs. The actions of states are seen as consequences of purpose and power. States are considered independent actors answering to no higher authority. Their actions are determined by the resources they command and the interests they pursue. A combination of structural conditions and their interests determine the outcome. This approach holds that norms and identities are irrelevant, that small states must pursue balancing policies, and that they cannot alter the conditions they face in the international system without joining international alliances. Other theorists see norms as the foundations for material power, and not the reverse.³ Under post-Cold War conditions, indications are that great powers have become less powerful and that small states have become less powerless. Consequently, the realist approach to analysis has been modified in some aspects of this thesis. Under modification, the approach becomes "neo-realist," with more attention devoted to distinctions between "hard" and "soft" security issues.⁴

A final assumption or assertion about method relates to the relevance of what might be loosely termed "methodological models." In general, qualitative inquiry rejects models to emphasize empathetic immersion in the materials

coupled with inductive—perhaps even intuitive—reasoning. At the same time, however, many analysts agree on the possibility for the application of a loose-limbed framework to govern qualitative research approaches as they apply to specific countries, regions, and situations. For example, instructors at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College have traditionally ascribed importance to a framework for study which is labeled a “methodology for strategy analysis.” Without entering into the complexities of this generalized model or method, it is sufficient here to note that the approach requires the researcher to understand the values, purposes, and interests which dictate the actions and policies of an actor on the strategic scene. It then asks the researcher or observer to describe and analyze the same phenomena for the remaining actors within a particular situation and under particular circumstances.⁵ This approach, incorporated into the present thesis, has affirmed the applicability of such a generalized model.

This thesis addresses security in the Baltic region as a subregional security system. It attempts to determine Denmark’s present and future role in the region and to clarify where Denmark, a small power, fits into the post-Cold War Baltic order. It examines this role of a physically small country with larger influence as that country has dealt with subregional problems in a new era. The Cold War globalized the security issues but the post-Cold War world has seen these issues slip to regional issues. The thesis examines current Danish policy by comparing it with historical precedent and relating history to the present security environment, including present and future tensions and possible crises.

The Research

The thesis is written on basis of critical research, into perceptions and interests in the region. Research has involved looking at Denmark as well other relevant regional actors in order to arrive at a reasonable understanding of regional players and the context in which they operate.

Selection of Research Topic

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall the security question in the Baltic Region was connected to the balance between the two superpowers, as was the case with most European security issues. Each nation in the region was allied with one of the superpowers and played a rather passive role. The Cold War suppressed certain tensions and conflicts. These resurfaced after 1990, and many changes ensued. A tendency to solve security problems at the subregional level emerged. Danish policy is a good example of a normal nation state in which the approach to such problems has changed radically. Policy is not as cautious as it was during the Cold War, and it actively takes part in seeking solutions for regional problems.

Thesis Construction

The actual organization of the thesis reflects the above-mentioned methodological concerns. It follows the traditional model with some modification for content and focus. That is, the flow incorporates the following concerns: introduction, review of literature, research methodology, analysis, and conclusions and prospects; however, the model has been modified. The actual

thesis structure has been guided by the attempt to answer the research question: "How has Danish security policy evolved in the Baltic region and with what consequences in a three-to-five year perspective?"

Chapters Four to Seven of the thesis diverge most from the traditional model. They have been shaped very specifically by the subordinate research questions. Chapter Four, "The Historical Perspective on Danish Security Policy," attempts to answer the first subordinate question: "How has the historical perspective influenced Danish security policy concerning continuity and change?" The fifth and sixth chapters, "Denmark and Major Regional Powers" and "Denmark and its Baltic Neighbors", have been shaped by the questions: "What are the security threats in the Baltic region" and "what are the responses of nations in the Nordic and Baltic region to these threats?" Finally, chapter Seven, "Trends in Current Danish Security Policy," answers the questions: "How does membership in NATO and the EU affect Danish security policy" and "What are the influences on and what are the trends in Danish security policy?" The following commentary addresses specific facets and characteristics of Chapters Four through Seven.

Chapter Four presents a historical overview of Danish security policy since World War II. Danish policy in the 1970s and 1980s will be emphasized, and the focus will be on tendencies that combined to shape and influence Danish security policy. The foundations of policy will be described and the results of Danish policy assessed.

Chapters Five and Six describe the current security environment in the Baltic region and clarify aspects of change. Geopolitical methods will be

employed as appropriate to explain and foresee international political behavior. The chapter will concentrate on national agendas in the area and possible threats to these agendas. The purpose is to get a clear picture of the threats Denmark faces and the roles each country can play. The chapter clarifies the roles of major players and the roles and interests that the small, middle, and great powers share. The chapter not only deals with nations in the region but also highlights issues of regional importance. The tendencies indicating that the Baltic area might evolve into a subregional security system will also be considered in this chapter.

Chapter Seven presents current Danish security policy as well as plans for the near future. The chapter uses Chapters Four, Five, and Six as a basis for an analysis of the Danish role in the region. Chapter Four connects current policy with the past to convey a clear picture of changes and new trends. This chapter also illustrates certain aspects of current policy that have historical roots. Chapters Five and Six outline the environment in which Denmark acts in order to provide a clear picture of the influences of the subregion on Danish policy. Weak and strong points of Danish security policy are identified and the discussion extends to the role Denmark plays today and in the future.

Finally, "Prospects and Conclusions" are presented as a distinct chapter based on the results of the research and analysis of each issue examined. The conclusions follow logically from the defined criteria regarding each issue examined. The chapter concludes with prospects for Danish policy and for a subregional security system.

¹For a general introduction to qualitative analysis, see, Eliot W. Eisner, The Enlightened Eye (New York: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 22-23 and pp. 32-40. See also Susan M. Hubbuch, Writing Research Papers Across the Curriculum (Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers), pp. 129-132.

²Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 31-32 and pp. 44-46.

³Hans-Henrik Holm, "Denmark's Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constraints" in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 52-53.

⁴Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, pp. ix-x, and Holm, pp. 52-53.

⁵DJMO Selected Readings Book, Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997) Module 1, Lesson 11, Reading B, pp. 11-B-1 – 11-B-13.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON DANISH SECURITY POLICY

Introduction

This chapter provides background to contemporary Danish security policy. The emphasis is on the evolution of Denmark's role in the Baltic. The objective is to define the main components of the Danish security policy during the Cold War.

In the Baltic Sea region, defined as the area from the North Sea and Skagarrak to the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland, Denmark's geographical position makes the country simultaneously a link between the central parts of the area and the world seas and a possible barrier between the Baltic nations and the world seas. Within the larger European picture, Denmark constitutes a bridge between continental Europe and the Scandinavian Peninsula. Denmark is, in other words, a northern European crossroads.¹ Clearly, this position precludes isolation; Denmark must seek engagement with the security and political realities in the region.² Denmark's geographical position and the importance of the Danish land in controlling the straits to and from the Baltic Sea render unrealistic any thoughts about Danish neutrality.

Danish security policy is in part a product of evolving political realities in the area. History provides a key to understanding how Denmark as a Baltic and as a West European country has shaped its policy over the years.

Down to 1720, Denmark followed an aggressive policy with numerous wars against Sweden over hegemony in the Baltic. These conflicts traced their roots to the Viking era. After 1720, Denmark pursued a policy of neutrality, initially within the larger context of various alliance systems, and subsequently, after catastrophes during the Napoleonic wars³, in accordance with non-alignment principles.

The two centuries between 1720 and 1940 left Denmark with a security dilemma akin to that of modern Finland. The continental center of power moved from Paris to Berlin, and Danish security became closely linked to the relationship with Germany. After losing one third of the kingdom to Germany in the war of 1864, Denmark's fate became entangled with Germany's. Denmark had to stick to a policy which convinced Germany that Denmark would never become an adversary. This relationship in many ways grew to resemble Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, during which the continental center of power migrated still further to the east.⁴ Astride the entrance to the Baltic Sea, Denmark either had to accommodate Germany or seek a great power alliance to check Germany. Such an alliance arrangement was not forthcoming for Denmark in the era of World Wars I and II. World War I did not expand to Danish territory, but World War II did when Denmark became a stepping stone for the German attack on Norway. In 1940, Danish neutrality fell victim to Nazi occupation.⁵

The German occupation of Denmark did not bring the war to Denmark initially, but gradually a significant resistance movement emerged. Germany attacked despite a non-aggression pact that had been signed in 1939. The

Danish Foreign Minister Peter Munch expressed the government's policy this way: "Denmark cannot be defended by military means, only by way of diplomacy." The capacity of the Danish military was therefore very small, designed merely for a position of neutrality. The Social Democratic-led government agreed to remain and chose to cooperate with the Germans. A wave of national sentiment washed over occupied Denmark but not until June 1941 did an actual resistance movement make itself felt. The Danish ambassadors to Washington and London declared themselves independent and "The Danish Council" was established in England by activist Danes. A wave of sabotage actions hit the country during the summer of 1943, and authorities and organizations were criticized for their cooperation policy amidst an emerging uprising. On August 29, 1943, Denmark was declared in a military state of emergency. SS-General Werner Best assuming dictatorial power. Danish cooperation with the Germans fell to a minimum. Resistance grew more accurate in its attacks and drew responses in form of death sentences. Denmark witnessed no final battles on its own soil, but on May 5, 1945 German capitulation became a reality.

During the Cold War

German occupation spawned the expression, "Never again a 9th of April." This battle cry of the wartime resistance movement lingered in post-war memory long enough to inspire new departures in Danish security policy. Membership in the United Nations after its foundation in 1945 did not in itself cause major changes in Danish policy. Throughout the Cold War, the UN provided the primary

framework for the global side of Danish security policy, in which stress fell on international order. Denmark became a devoted supporter of the UN, and to date more than 50,000 Danish soldiers have served in UN forces. In 1948, the Danish government rejected membership in a forerunner to the Western European Union as a solution to security problems.⁶ Denmark joined NATO on April 4, 1949, after failed attempts to create an arrangement for common Nordic defense cooperation. Subsequently, Denmark rejected an invitation to participate in negotiations for the establishment of the European Defence Community, which in 1951-52 aimed at creating a European army. When Germany became a NATO member in 1955, Denmark was relieved of security concerns over its southern neighbor. From the late 1950s and especially from 1962, when the NATO command Allied Forces Baltic Approaches was established, Denmark's cooperation with Germany received added impetus.⁷ Throughout the Cold War NATO remained both a significant component of Danish foreign policy and a pillar of security for the western world.

Failed negotiations in the later 1940s over a defense alliance with Norway and Sweden did not signal the end of efforts to foster closer relations with the other Scandinavian countries. In 1952, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden formed the Nordic Council, which over the years has labored on various fronts to improve relations among the Nordic countries. However, it gradually became evident that the interests of the respective Nordic countries differed so fundamentally that further integration was impossible; therefore, cooperation gradually came to signify chiefly a sense of identity for the Danes.⁸

Meanwhile, membership in NATO came to have important consequences in the realm of conventional foreign policy. Denmark's foreign policy became more open, thanks to active participation in an international organization. Open discussions of foreign and security policy became a tradition in parliament, as well as the passage of resolutions which forced Danish governments to acknowledge pursuit of a given policy. Continued participation in NATO corresponded with an increasing tendency to shape Danish policy in multinational forums, culminating in 1973 with membership in the European Community.⁹

EC membership marked another milestone in the evolution of Danish foreign and security policy. Economic and security issues became relatively compartmentalized, as reflected in their treatment under separate venues in various international forums, and this tradition continues. By the beginning of the 1960s, Denmark had adapted to the post-World War II international system, in which security and defense policy issues were customarily dealt with within NATO only.¹⁰ Now, however, EC membership became the primary forum for major economic issues, and the debate up to the referendum over EC membership in 1972 clearly demonstrated this development.¹¹ EC supporters on the referendum clearly stated that membership was economically motivated and that those security political aspects associated with membership would be declined. In other words, Denmark's membership in the EC was primarily motivated by economics.

As Denmark's economic link to the continent, EC also established a framework for additional cooperation with Germany. The first years of EC

membership marked a generally positive Danish disposition concerning "soft" European political cooperation then prevalent within EC.¹² This understanding informed Danish attempts to associate security policy more closely with European integration. Indeed, Denmark argued that CSCE policy ought to be handled within the framework of European political cooperation in the EC. Nonetheless, Denmark strongly resisted two attempts in 1975 and 1981-83 to deal with security political aspects under the auspices of EC.

Until 1980, NATO membership enjoyed constant and consolidated support among the Danish population and within parliament. This broad support for an alliance and coalition-oriented security policy had long ceased to be controversial on the political scene. Only during the late 1970s and early 1980s did economic recession erode consensus within the parliament for supporting constructive defense agreements. By that time, the Social Democrat Party could no longer support an increased defense budget.¹³

This general record of support did not mean that Denmark sustained NATO policies without reservation. Indeed, Danish alliance policy demonstrated several self-imposed restrictions on NATO activities within Danish territory, and these restrictions significantly affected Danish defense cooperation within the Alliance. These restrictions traditionally reflected both Danish internal concerns and an understanding of Soviet special security interests.¹⁴ First, Denmark did not accept permanent basing of allied forces on Danish soil, except for a minor U.S. force on Greenland which was stationed there according to an agreement of 1941 made well before NATO was founded. Second, it was Danish policy not to permit nuclear weapons on Danish ground or in airspace, including Greenland

and the Faroe Islands. Finally, Denmark restricted NATO military exercises in Denmark in order to avoid provocation of the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Historical inertia has played a role in the persistence of these arrangements, even after the end of the Cold War.

The above-mentioned constraints are closely related to the concept of the “Nordic balance,” which is useful as a model to understand security relationships in the Nordic region¹⁶. The Nordic region has been a low-tension area, thanks to a system of mutual restraint, which traditionally encouraged the superpowers to see self-restraint as lying in their own interests¹⁷. The Nordic balance became a concept both for academic analysis and for rhetorical purposes to legitimize policies. The following figure geographically depicts the Nordic balance.¹⁸




Figure 3.

The Nordic balance rested on the assumption that the strategic military motivation of the Soviet Union stemmed from military competition with the West rather than desire to export communism. The concept applied as follows: if the Soviet Union would increase its pressure on Finland, then the Nordic NATO members might ease their bans on foreign bases and nuclear weapons in

peacetime in order to allow greater U.S. and NATO presence. In other words, the Nordic balance reacted to regional tension by keeping superpowers out¹⁹.

Similarly, Denmark has not always agreed with the general policy of NATO. During the 1980s, Denmark along with Greece opposed major NATO policies, especially in nuclear questions.²⁰ Denmark obstructed cooperation in NATO and notoriously added footnotes to NATO declarations²¹ explaining Denmark's dissenting views. When the Western European Union was revitalized in 1984, Denmark did not participate. It has been said that one of the benefits of revitalizing WEU²² lay in the absence of Denmark and Greece. Denmark and Greece were not members of the WEU; therefore, the WEU was a perfect forum for security discussions among the West European nations. During the 1980s, the Danish parliament remained divided on the question of membership in the WEU, and the issue remains contentious even today. From the beginning, the Social Democrats resisted Danish membership fiercely, referring to the WEU as a product of the Cold War.

Since 1990, a significant rapprochement between the two primary wings in Danish politics has resulted in a more constructive policy toward both NATO and the EC. Until 1989, Danish foreign policy could be characterized as passive acquiescence. The prominent Danish Foreign Minister P. Munch (1929 to 1940) expressed it this way, "The first and last demand which we must make of Danish diplomacy is that it shall keep quiet and do its utmost to secure that we may live as unnoticed as possible."²³

In contrast with other institutions, the CSCE has since its foundation in 1975 been strongly supported by Denmark to ensure a dialog between East and

West Europe. During the 1970s and 1980s CSCE was the only forum where the U.S., Canada and all European nations could conduct a dialog on a regular basis, and the CSCE was seen as way to build confidence and decrease tensions. The CSCE was an instrument dealing with tensions involving nations from both the East and the West.²⁴

After 1989

In 1989, Denmark's shift to active internationalism was announced by the acting Danish foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, as he convened a government commission to examine the future Danish Foreign Service. The Commission concluded that success of the new policy required: independent and not reactive initiatives; thinking about security in global terms based on the means at disposal of a small state; a more sophisticated elaboration of strategy; and a Danish strategy towards Europe as the focal point. Previous foreign ministers had not conducted an active policy,²⁵ so "active internationalism"²⁶ in Danish policy is new. It has even been said that "Denmark has finally put the 1864 syndrome aside," a reference to Danish defeat in the war with Prussia in 1864, which symbolically became a turning point. Before that war, Denmark had been a player in European politics.²⁷

Since the spring of 1990, discussion of a political union, including security policy within the EC, again became important. The political discussion was still distinguished by diverging positions between the liberal government and the opposition led by the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats came out against the inclusion of foreign and defense policy under union auspices, while the

government adhered to a more open stance. Debate largely stemmed from the prospect of German reunification, a development that enhanced the tendency toward a more active and positive Danish policy in NATO and the EU.²⁸ Eventually, the two political wings agreed on a common attitude towards a future European union. The agreement stated that reinforcement of the community's foreign policy was important, including the economic, political, and security political aspects. It was clearly stated that defense policy, including establishment of common military forces, should not be a part of the new union. During the negotiations over the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Danish government succeeded in maintaining Danish preferences on a limited extension of European political cooperation.²⁹ Decisions over inclusion of defense policy and military cooperation in the union have been postponed. Military cooperation was limited to the WEU, in which Denmark is not a member. Danish membership in the WEU remains a sticking point, although today there are high ranking members of the Social Democrat party who have expressed interest in an approach to the WEU. The referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 resulted in a rejection of the Treaty by the Danish people by a very small margin. The Danish population did not like the extension of EC cooperation into the political realm. The so-called Edinburgh Decision in December 1992 exempted Denmark on four points from future cooperation. In 1993, a majority of Danish voters accepted the Treaty in a referendum. The exemptions deal with an extended economic and monetary union, union citizenship, incorporation of judicial and other internal affairs in daily decision-making, and participation in defense policy cooperation. Denmark subsequently retained observer status in the WEU. The text dealing with Danish

WEU membership states "that nothing in the treaty on the European Union obliges Denmark to become a member of the WEU."³⁰ Danish reluctance over WEU membership seems to be based on the Danish position dating to the 1980s, when the Socialist wing of the Danish parliament especially opposed the right wing government and heavily influenced Danish NATO policy. This socialist wing mirrors a general reluctance in the population against engaging in a centralized federal European union. This reluctance is difficult to explain but appears grounded in a general skeptical attitude towards power in the Danish population. Skepticism seems to have lost some strength; its residual power helps explain Danish non-membership of the WEU.

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the restrictions of the Cold War and the Nordic Balance have vanished. Denmark has either established or developed relations with a number of neighboring states, including Poland and the Baltic states.³¹ Formerly, these relations had been difficult to maintain, or simply broken off. More recently, Denmark's participation in the process of European integration has drawn strength from the entry of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the European Union. Denmark has gradually adapted to changed conditions, while confronting some of the new challenges inherent in the altered international situation. Expanded Danish participation in peacekeeping is an example.³²

Conclusion

Denmark has remained firmly anchored in the international community, and Danish foreign and security policy had, until the beginning of the 1990s,

supported active participation in the UN, NATO, the CSCE, the EC, and the Nordic cooperation. Since 1949 Denmark has been a NATO member, and since 1973 an EU member. NATO was the framework for securing the Western world from Soviet aggression, and the EC was primarily an instrument of economic cooperation. Denmark's largest neighbor, Germany, became also its largest trading partner, and the two countries cooperated closely within NATO and the EU. Denmark has been an active member in the UN since the foundation of the organization and has supported the organization to facilitate international order. Since the formation of the CSCE, now OSCE, Denmark has been an active contributor. The CSCE was the forum for alleviating tensions between the East and West during the Cold War. Finally, the Nordic Cooperation constituted a regional basis for a sense of identity.

In the years following the Cold War, Denmark has responded to new challenges, something which has been clearly shown by engagement in the former Yugoslavia and the Baltic region. A more activist policy has enjoyed wide acceptance, but broad support evaporates when Danes perceive that the European Union assumes too much power. Continued integration has been a hot subject for Danish debate, and the most recent hesitation of the Danish population manifested itself in the 1992 "No" vote on the Maastricht Treaty. Reservations concerning defense policy and military cooperation were less the products of deliberate analysis than an expression of Euro-political misgivings among voters.

¹Hans Garde, "European Security and the Baltic Challenge", RUSI Journal, April 1995, p. 19.

²Major General C.S. Børgesen, "Østersøen i aktuel dansk sikkerhedspolitisk belysning" in Østersøen, Forsvarets Oplysnings- og Velfærdstjeneste, 1993, p. 48.

³After the French revolution, Denmark found itself in a highly precarious situation, because Britain was exploiting its mastery of the seas. In an attempt to counter Britain, Denmark signed a pact of armed neutrality with Sweden, Prussia, and Russia. Britain responded by sending a naval expedition to the Baltic in 1801, forcing Denmark to withdraw from the pact. Britain feared that Denmark might place its fleet at the disposal of the French. The British attacked again in 1807, when Copenhagen was bombarded and the Danish fleet was seized by the British. The loss of the fleet combined with a British blockade generated a state of emergency in Denmark and actual famine in Norway.

⁴Peter Unwin, Baltic Approaches (Norwich, Great Britain: Michael Russell Publishing LTD, 1996), pp. 226-230.

⁵Børgesen, p. 49.

⁶Nikolaj Petersen, Danmark og den Europæiske Union, Atlantsammenslutningen, 1993, p. 12.

⁷Danish and European Security (Copenhagen: The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, 1995), p. 6, and Petersen, p. 12.

⁸Danish and European Security, p. 6.

⁹Danish and European Security, p. 29-30, and Børgesen, pp. 49-50.

¹⁰Petersen, p. 12.

¹¹Petersen, p. 12, and Danish and European Security, p. 6.

¹²Petersen, p. 13.

¹³Petersen, p. 13, and Danish and European Security, p. 30.

¹⁴Børgesen, p. 51.

¹⁵Børgesen, pp. 51-55.

¹⁶The concept is controversial. Some argue that the concept was not meaningful during the fifties.

¹⁷Jan Øberg, Nordic Security in the 1990s: Options in the Changing Europe (London: St. Martin's Press, c1992), p. 24.

¹⁸Øberg, p. 24-25.

¹⁹Arne Olav Brundtland & Don M. Snider, Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, c1994), p. 3, and Øberg, p. 25.

²⁰Øberg, p. 31.

²¹Frank Bjerkholt, "Metamorfose i dansk sikkerhetspolitikk," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, August 8, 1997, and Petersen, p. 13.

²²The main reason of the revitalization in 1984 was the U.S. decision of setting up intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe.

²³Hans-Henrik Holm, "Denmark's Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constraints" in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 57.

²⁴Danish and European Security, p. 6 and pp. 17-18.

²⁵Holm, pp. 56-57.

²⁶The term has been used primarily by academics and is not seen in official government publications. See "Denmark's Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constraints" by Holm, pp. 56-59.

²⁷Holm, p. 65.

²⁸Frank Bjerkholt, "Metamorfose i dansk sikkerhetspolitikk," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, August 8, 1997.

²⁹Petersen, p. 16.

³⁰Danish and European Security, p. 27.

³¹Danish and European Security, p. 5, and Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande, The Danish Government, June 1997, p. 12.

³²Danish and European Security, p. 6.

CHAPTER FIVE

DENMARK AND MAJOR REGIONAL ACTORS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the national agendas of the major regional players, and to point out possible future threats to peace in Europe. The chapter also specifies restrictions and possibilities for Danish regional influence. Denmark is not a subject for separate analysis, but consideration of the Danish perspective will be included as necessary.

The international system seemed simple during the Cold War. The two superpowers were locked in constant confrontation on several levels—military, economic, and ideological. The east-west conflict clouded all other conflicts and made itself felt in every local conflict. In broad terms, the former international system was based on competition between two superpowers. The currently evolving system appears multi-polar, with only one nation, the United States, capable—will and circumstances permitting—of exerting anything like hegemonic power. This system features several powers and, consequently, is characterized by a combination of cooperation and rivalry at varying levels of power and intensity. Security has again become divisible with peace areas in Western Europe, areas with conflict, as for example in the former Yugoslavia, and gray areas with instability in Central and Eastern Europe and regions of the CIS.¹

The basic structure of European security is a framework of interlocking institutions that include the EU, the United States, and Russia. Some of these organizations are weak. One of Europe's primary security concerns is Russia's instability. There is also uncertainty about the future of European integration as well as the U.S. commitment to Europe.

A U.S. reduction in its commitment to Europe would not be in Denmark's interest. As a small power, Denmark has to rely on alliances. Historically, Denmark's major security problem has been Germany. Denmark has embraced NATO, which ties the U.S. to Europe, to ensure that Germany's power is counterbalanced.

By virtue of geography, the EU and Russia share a common interest in many areas, but the relationship also portends of rivalry and strife for power, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The relationship between Russia and the U.S. is marked by U.S. efforts to stabilize a weak Russia and by mutual interests in the nuclear arena where the world's two greatest nuclear powers cooperate in arms control. The U.S. and the EU share historical and cultural values as well as substantial common interests regarding a stabilization of Russia. The once shared mutual external threat during the Cold War is gone, and this development seems to enhance the geographical distance between Europe and the U.S. This is potential for a higher degree of rivalry which may be seen more clearly in the future.²

Russia

Self-image and Fragile Democracy

To a growing extent, Russia has marked itself as a state which strives for power in the world and wants recognition as a superpower. Regardless of whether Russian democrats or authoritative nationalists control the political leadership in Russia, Moscow views itself as a world power, and believes that Russia should be recognized and treated as such.³ For the West, the security challenge would be greatest with a strong nationalistic government in Moscow. But even under the best possible circumstances, Russia will—as a great power—have permanent security interests which will not harmonize with those of the Western European countries, as well as most Central and Eastern European countries.⁴

The biggest threat to the Russian reform process and its security seems to be internal struggles among Russian politicians. The lack of will to acknowledge the changed world results in increasing inconsistency and irrationality in Russian policy.⁵ Russia does not pose the same military threat against the security of the West as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact did. However, despite the lack of conventional strategic military power Russia is still to an extent unpredictable. The Russians create uncertainty, which in itself creates security concerns.⁶ Russia has the resources and the population to support its great power ambitions but lacks political determination and cohesion. Yet, Russia's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction provides residual influence.

Strategic Thinking

NATO and EU are security concerns that Russia has with the West. For the first time in history, Russia's western neighbors have the potential to cooperate politically, economically, culturally, and militarily. Many Russians believe that history has told them to be cautious and that the best security relationship with the West is in the form of bilateral connections between the great power Russia and each of the European states. Politicians carrying this Russian historical luggage will clearly prefer a destabilized, semi-military zone of unsecured Central and Eastern European states on Russia's western borders. This zone has started to vanish with the enlargement of NATO, which Russia has attempted to prevent through veiled threats and harsh verbiage. So far Russia has unwillingly accepted the enlargement and increased influence of NATO.

Russia's military potential constitutes an indirect threat in the Baltic region. Russia has considerable potential military power compared with any European country, so Russia's military deserves special attention in view of the obvious need to establish strict controls over its latent strength. Clearly, there is no direct Russian threat to the Baltic region or Denmark. Yet, Russia's geographical size, large population, and military capabilities create a potential problem for the Baltic region in case political chauvinists take over in Moscow. Denmark's relative size and resources compared with Russia's, limit its possibilities for direct influence on future developments in Russia.

Relations to the Baltic States

The Baltic states have created significant problems for Russia so far: tensions concerning the Russian minorities; withdrawal of troops; and minor border disputes. The question of troop withdrawal and the border question have been solved, and a compromise on some of the minority problems has been found.⁷ For Russia, the Baltic region has been a sensitive issue in general.⁸ Russia's broad military interests in the Baltic region have two interrelated elements: prevent any single state domination and prevent militarization of the Baltic states.⁹ These interests partly explain Russia's efforts to limit the West's influence and the fight against admitting the Baltic states into NATO. It is especially painful for Russia to no longer possess the ports of the Baltic states – particularly at Riga, Tallinn, Klaipeda, and the oil terminal in Ventspils. These ports assured Russia naval access to the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and furthermore, they provided a military balance to German and NATO naval presence.¹⁰ Russia's posture on the Baltics limits how far Copenhagen can go in its support to the Baltic states.

Implications for Denmark

To prevent future conflicts in Europe it is critical that Russia not become a hostile and ultra nationalistic state. Instead, Russia should become a peaceful and democratic state; an unfriendly posture and isolation could result in a political change which would not be in Denmark's or any other European nation's interest. Danish policy options towards Russia must be weighed carefully, as carefully as Danish efforts to help the Baltic states. The future of Russia and its relations to

the West are still very uncertain because Russia's evolution over the past years has been unstable.¹¹

Russian security views must be respected by the West, including Denmark, but not to the extent where Danish interests in the Baltic region are compromised and severely affected. Russia is a great Baltic power which must be respected. If Russian views are not respected and seriously regarded, conservative forces in Russia could be further strengthened, with the risk of unwanted developments. To Denmark, this means that Russian views and demands must be heard and regarded to a certain extent. Empathy does not mean that Denmark has to give up its efforts in the Baltic, but merely Denmark and the West should proceed cautiously. One delicate question is whether admission of the Baltic states into NATO in a second enlargement round would be a bridge too far.

The establishment of the EAPC and NATO's special relations to Russia institutionalized in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council were designed to engage Russia in NATO and European security affairs. For example, on the subregional level, the Council of the Baltic Sea States is a forum where Russian viewpoints can be heard and "soft" security issues can be negotiated and resolved. Increased emphasis on this forum could provide Russia the subregional influence, which it in a historical perspective has had and is striving for today. In the long term, it is important not to isolate Russia but to support its democratic and economic development in the interests of stability.

Bilateral Russian-Danish military cooperation has been relatively limited so far. An example is the exchange of information on peacekeeping operations

and on promoting democratic control over armed forces. It is in Denmark's best interests to promote the positive tendencies that prevail in Russia today, and an extension of the current bilateral cooperation seems a viable solution. In addition, Denmark must continue to support the conventional arms control process that have led to a dramatic reduction of military forces in the Baltic region. Danish policy towards Russia is on target, focused on areas where Denmark is able to provide support that promotes positive democratic advances in Russia.

Unfortunately, Danish-Russian cooperation is not as close as it could be, due to Denmark's close relationship with the three Baltic states and Poland. Another factor effecting Danish-Russian cooperation is that Russia does not recognize Denmark as an important country and has not put emphasis on the relationship.¹² Denmark's strong support of the Baltic states has not created the best conditions for Danish-Russian cooperation, and has undoubtedly had a limiting effect on the relationship. Recent developments offer an opportunity for Denmark to deepen its cooperation with Russia, without compromising Danish policy in the region. The issue of NATO membership appears to have been settled, and Danish activities in the Baltic states have become established, for example, in the BALTBAT project and in increasing economical cooperation in general.

Kaliningrad

Kaliningrad is a region that has often been identified as a potential flashpoint in the region.¹³ Lithuania lies to the north and east of Kaliningrad, separating Kaliningrad from Russia¹⁴. Approximately one million people live in

Kaliningrad today, of which 78 percent are Russians, 10 percent Belarussians, 6 percent Ukrainians, 4 percent Lithuanians, and only 0.8 percent Germans.¹⁵

Despite being granted the status of a Free Economic Zone in 1991, Kaliningrad oblast today faces major economic, political, and structural problems. Most politicians and business people in the region agree that the oblast economy is in decline. Kaliningrad's gross domestic product is shrinking, comprising a mere 269 billion rubles (\$46 million) in the first quarter of 1997. Compared with 1996, when the region's industrial enterprises enjoyed profits of 58 billion rubles (\$10 million), in 1997 they had losses amounting to almost 27 billion rubles (\$4.5 million). On the note, that real wages have increased by 6.3 percent and tax collection has remained stable.¹⁶

Through many years Kaliningrad was an assembly area for strategic reserves or amphibious units, but today the oblast is merely a forward naval, air, and surveillance base. The Baltic Sea is only 300 kilometers wide at Baltijsk, which allows easy maritime and air surveillance of passing traffic. Russia has a considerable number of forces in the oblast which allows it to exercise a certain effect on Poland, Germany, Sweden, and the Baltic states.¹⁷ However, Kaliningrad is cut off from Russia with land access only possible through Poland or Lithuania. The demilitarization of Kaliningrad is in the West's, the Baltic states' and Poland's interest, and is a "soft" security issue to be negotiated. The Russian forces there do not pose any direct threat. Efforts to negotiate their reductions would enhance the security of the region. Unfortunately, the CFE process cannot influence Russia's right to position forces in Kaliningrad.

The lack of ports on the Baltic coastline creates problems for Russia. The ports of Kaliningrad are of importance to the Russians. Ports in the Baltic states had to be relinquished. Now the only remaining Russian ports in the Baltic Sea are in the Kaliningrad oblast and close to St. Petersburg.¹⁸ Russia's shortage of harbors in the Baltic will be a permanent problem in the coming years. Statistics for the 1980's show that only 30 percent of all Soviet ship visits were made to the harbor in St. Petersburg in the Gulf of Finland. The vast majority, about 70 percent, used harbors in the former Baltic republics and Kaliningrad. Baltic independence resulted in a substantially increased usage of St. Petersburg's harbors and its nearby areas. The problem is that these harbors had already been heavily overloaded with naval traffic. Consequently, the Russians are constructing additional facilities close to St. Petersburg.¹⁹ Until construction is finished, Russian commercial shipping is forced to cooperate with the Baltic states to get access to the harbors in these three countries. Should non-reformists take over in either the Baltics or Russia, access to the harbors in the Baltic states could create tension. If its interests were threatened, Russia could assert unwanted pressure on the Baltic states and cause a crisis in the region.

Russia's ownership of Kaliningrad has not been questioned. Despite Kaliningrad's history, the proprietary rights to it have not been an issue, and Lithuania, Poland, and Germany have officially announced that they have no claims on East Prussia or Kaliningrad.²⁰ Poland has no legal rights to the territory. Germany signed an agreement in Moscow in 1970 in which all claims to the area were abandoned. Lithuania has a weak historically based argument dating back to the 13th century for claiming Kaliningrad. Lithuania does not have

the economic strength to rebuild the area and lacks the population to absorb the large amount of Russian inhabitants in Kaliningrad. It recognized Russia's sovereignty in March 1994. Lithuania is particularly fearful of the presence of Russian troops in the oblast. Russia is demanding unlimited transit rights to Kaliningrad, which could mushroom into a potential crisis.

In theory, the Kaliningrad oblast could claim its independence, but the population is not indigenous; the Prussians, a Slavic tribe, were absorbed by the Germans around year 1500 and the Germans were replaced by Russians only some 50 years ago. Russia is quite clear on its position. It has been stated by the Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1993 that an effective presence in Kaliningrad is essential, and he characterized the area as the cornerstone of Russian military and economic interest in the Baltic region.²¹ Even if a majority of the oblast population favored autonomy, Moscow would never allow its full independence.

In sum, Russia does not constitute an immediate threat to the Baltic region. However, Russia has historically had a considerable military presence there and has played a major role. This role is being challenged, which makes limited access to Baltic harbors difficult for Russia to accept. As long as Russia does not deviate from its Cold War perception of security, namely the establishment of a geographical buffer zone, relations with the West become difficult. Danish policy has challenged and in some cases provoked Russia and has enhanced the freedom of the three Baltic states. Yet, a more balanced policy is advisable to enhance the Russian-Danish relations. This could strengthen

Russia's democratic process, which is currently not fully institutionalized and stable and increase Danish regional influence.

Germany

By its size and importance Germany, like Russia, is a force in the Baltic and is likely to dominate the politics of the region and shape its future. Whereas Russia is temporarily weakened, Germany has a freedom of action around the Baltic which exceeds that of any of its neighbors.²² The German government is exploring this freedom. With Denmark, Germany proposed and participated in the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Germany has also expanded bilateral assistance and investment eastward.

Germany recognizes the need to reduce Russian concerns over Kaliningrad, Russia's exclusion from the EU, and the advance of NATO into the eastern Baltic. The Germans have repeatedly stressed that Kaliningrad's status as a part of the Russian Federation is not questioned and as a result this has stabilized the entire region.²³ Up to 1945, Germany was the major security problem for Denmark, but after World War II Danish-German military cooperation through NATO has deepened without problems. Today Germany does not constitute any threat towards Denmark and has not attempted to limit Danish freedom of action. There seems to be a mutual agreement on a Danish focus on the Baltic states whereas Germany focuses on bilateral support to central Europe.

However, doubt among Germany's neighbors exists because of Germany's history and the political, economic, diplomatic, and military

disproportion between Germany and its relatively small neighboring countries. Germany's neighbors need Germany far more than Germany needs them. Only Russia has the potential to compete with Germany, but not for at least a decade. Germany holds a commanding position: economic strength, central position in the EU and NATO, and a hard-earned rectitude for post-war political morality and correctness.²⁴

In the long term, Germany is likely to gain more influence. Germany is gradually distancing itself from its historical baggage and, once the worst hurdles of the reunification process have been overcome, Germany will retain the energy and strength to attain a more commanding position. It is in Danish interests to support the integration of Germany in the EU, in order to influence Denmark's large neighbor to the south. It is also in Danish interests to deepen German ties to the EU to ensure that German policy is linked with the rest of Europe. This is done by promoting the European integration process in the EU. Today, German and Danish policies towards Central and Eastern Europe are very alike. However, the potential exists for Germany to use its considerable resources to force Denmark to adopt pro-German positions. Should EU integration fail, it is likely that Germany would adopt a policy that largely benefits its national interests.

Close military cooperation through BALTAP has constituted a sound foundation for military activities between Denmark and Germany. Germany and Denmark have also worked together on the integration of Polish forces into NATO. Such cooperation is of great importance to Denmark. First, it ensures a close link in the defense of the Baltic approaches through land borders. Second,

it gives Denmark influence and an ability to shape future defense structures in cooperation with Germany.

Germany's coastline on the Baltic Sea expanded considerably after reunification. This will increase Germany's influence in the region in the future. For the present, Denmark's support to the Baltic states seems to be consistent with German policy, and there are no signs of German interference with Danish efforts to engage the Baltic states in European issues.

¹Danish and European Security (Copenhagen: The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, 1995), pp. 7-8.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

³Sergei Oznobistchev, "Russia in its Neighboring Environment: New Challenges and New Policy?" in Arne Olav Brundtland and Don M. Snider (eds.), Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, c1994), p. 100.

⁴Sikkerhedens aktører, Atlantsammenslutningen, 1994, p. 18.

⁵Oznobistchev, p. 99.

⁶Christian Borch, Europas nye sikkerhed, Atlantsammenslutningen, October 1996, p. 14.

⁷These issues are more extensively described in the analysis of the Baltic states. See Chapter Six, pp. 61-71.

⁸Oznobistchev, pp. 105.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹¹Arne Olav Brundtland, "Nordic Security at the End of the Cold War: Old Legacies and New Challenges" in Arne Olav Brundtland and Don M. Snider (eds.), Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, c1994), p. 18.

¹²Sonneby, Peter, Lieutenant Colonel, Nordisk-Baltisk säkerhet i et dansk perspektiv (Speech held at Försvarshögskolan in Sweden, 1998), p. 7

¹³In the heavy battles of autumn 1944 and winter 1945, the former German province East Prussia was conquered by Soviet troops. After World War II, the Potsdam powers divided the area between Poland and the Soviet Union. The northern Soviet part covers 5,600 square miles and was renamed Kaliningrad and obtained the status as an administrative region to the Russian Federation, as an "oblast". The original two million German inhabitants fled the advance of the Red Army and ethnic purges which quickly "Russified" the region.

¹⁴Peter Unwin, Baltic Approaches (Norwich, Great Britain: Michael Russell Publishing LTD, 1996), p. 72.

¹⁵Website of "Kaliningrad In Your Pocket®," Mailing address: P.O. Box 52 - LT-2000 Vilnius-C - Lithuania, Tel. (+370-2) 22 29 76/61 20 40 Fax (+370-2) 22 29 82. Data is collected in 1996.

¹⁶Website of "Norwegian Foreign Political Institute" (NUPI), Centre for Russian Studies Databank, 1997.

¹⁷Unwin, p. 66.

¹⁸Nordberg, p. 86 and Dr. Jake W. Kipp, Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth.

¹⁹Mikko Viitasalo, The Baltic: Sea of Changes (Finland: National Defence College, Finland, 1996), pp. 11-12.

²⁰For an introduction to the historical background, see footnote 13 to this chapter.

²¹Nordberg, 87-88, and Viitasalo, p. 11, and Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States, Kaliningrad, 1996.

²²Unwin, p. 226 and p. 237.

²³Helmut Hubel, "Nordic and Baltic Security after the East-West Conflict: A German View" in Arne Olav Brundtland and Don M. Snider (eds.), Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, c1994), pp. 88-89, and Unwin, p. 237.

²⁴ Unwin, p. 238.

CHAPTER SIX
DENMARK AND ITS BALTIC NEIGHBORS

Introduction

This chapter addresses current geopolitical reality in the Baltic region. Its purpose is to clarify the national agendas of the states in the region, point out possible future threats to peace, and specify restrictions and possibilities for Danish regional influence. As in the previous chapter, Denmark is not the subject for separate analysis but its impact on its neighbors is included here.

The post-Cold War system is characterized by a combination of cooperation and rivalry at varying levels of power and intensity with only one nation, the United States, capable of exerting hegemonic power. Differing levels of security exist on the continent, from peace in Western Europe, to conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and instability in Central and Eastern Europe and regions of the CIS.¹ The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has led to a power shift from small states, previously protected by collective security arrangements, to large states which dominate the new international system. The post-Cold War system can be characterized by the increased participation and shared responsibility of small states in safeguarding international order. As a result of this system, all small and middle powers in the Baltic region have become involved in regional security

issues. These countries and the new are taking advantage of their newfound freedom and are exploiting new ways to cooperate with each other.

The Baltic States

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, unlike most Western European countries, face a “hard” security threat as well as a “soft” security concern. Their objectives are nothing less than full membership in as many European institutions as possible, most notably NATO and the EU. This section will analyze threats the Baltic states face, the influence the West has on them, and the regional cooperation that currently exists for them.

Security Threats

A Russian attack on the Baltic states does not seem likely after the Russian military failure in Chechnya. The debacle in Grozny resulted in a reduced military threat to the Baltics. It led Russian politicians and Russian military officers to reconsider any future military action against its neighbors. However, that does not totally discount the likelihood of other “hard” security options being employed against the Baltic states. The Baltic states could be subjected to covert and/or unofficial military action, low-level military activity in or around their borders such as illegal over-flight or incursion into their territorial waters, continued support to Russian groups within the Baltic states, and possible economic actions against the states. The latter action seems less likely because Russia’s trade with the three states has increased during the past couple of years.²

Since their independence, the Baltic states have pursued security in several ways. The first involves the use of their own resources, and the second encompasses external help. After 1991, the Baltic states had one major security consideration, namely Russia and its residual troops on their territory.³ Russia continues to be the main consideration, exemplified clearly by the Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs when in September 1996 he said, "It is not easy to sleep next to elephants."⁴ Fortunately for the Baltic states, the extrication of Russian military forces was conducted fairly smoothly. The movement of Russian troops to and from Kaliningrad through Lithuania, was difficult but successful and continues today.⁵ Understandably, Russian military overland transit through Lithuania continues to be a matter of tension. Today there are no Russian military forces stationed in the Baltic states. Once these troops were out of the countries a series of new security problems appeared, including ethnic problems, minority rights, international crime, environmental issues, and immigration.⁶

Minorities seem to be the greatest internal stability problem to the Baltic states. Right after their independence, the political leadership took an inflexible and fierce stance against Russian minorities. Those who were regarded as occupiers or colonists were to be repatriated to Russia and could not be recognized as legal citizens despite the fact that many had lived in the countries for generations. Neither the international community nor the minority groups saw repatriation as a solution and for the time being a compromise appears to have taken the pressure off the Baltic states. However, as figure 4 shows, the minority problem is significant.

Lithuania	Percentage	Estonia	Percentage	Latvia	Percentage
Lithuanians	80	Estonians	61.5	Latvians	52
Russians	9	Russians	30	Russians	34
Polish	7			Other Slavic groups	10

Figure 4.

Lithuania has the least problem with some 80 percent Lithuanians and only 9 percent Russians. The rather large Russian population in Estonia is primarily settled in the industrialized northeastern part of the country. According to surveys made in 1994, this group has largely accepted Estonian independence and it is optimistic about relations with Estonians.⁷ However there are tensions over the Russian population's inability to speak Estonian and it still causes problems.⁸ In Latvia, there is a significantly large Russian group of 34 percent, which when compared with a Latvian majority of only 52 percent, is notable. Hereto is added that in the ten major Latvian cities, the Russian population forms almost half of the population. Latvia was not allowed to join the European Council until 1995 because of questions on its naturalization policies and restrictions of political rights for minority groups.⁹ The situation was normalized in 1995 when the OSCE, EU, and the European Council became engaged and in the end, Latvia adopted a suitable citizenship law. Today the minority issue appears to be receding. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that

the present behavior of the Baltic states is heavily influenced by international pressure. The problem seems to be submerged for the time being, but could resurface. The international community has been able to apply pressure to the Baltic governments, because the Baltics strongly want to be admitted into major European security organizations. As soon as these guarantees are granted, or if membership appears unlikely, the minority problem could reappear. The problem is certainly not solved, and it might take decades before these minorities achieve acceptance.

The West's Influence

The relationship between the Baltic states and Russia has been greatly influenced by the West and the close attention international organizations have given these states. The international spotlight has its advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, close international security has probably deterred direct Russian intervention in the Baltic states. On the other hand, the West has accused the Baltic states of human rights violations based on their treatment of the Russian minorities. In general, Russia's policies towards the Baltic states are closely watched as an indication of Russia's new reformist direction.

There have been few indications of direct Russian interference in the region, and it appears the Russian government has accepted the independence of the Baltic states. However, the situation is fraught with uncertainties. First, the unstable democratic government in Russia creates some concern. If Russian conservatives and non-reformists come to power, the likelihood of aggressive actions and the willingness to use military force against the Baltic states would

probably increase. For now, Russian criticism of the Baltics' attempts to align themselves with the West has not been coupled with direct military threats to the Baltic states. Russia's statements were made primarily to influence western policy. The Russians used the same tactic in trying to influence the decision on NATO enlargement. This tactic has been somewhat successful. Russia has demonstrated that there is a limit to how deep the Baltic states will be allowed to integrate into European institutions. The cautious enlargement of NATO, with only three states admitted in the first round is an indication of the West's respect of Russian interests.

If the situation in Russia turns to the worse and non-reformists take over, it will have a dramatic impact on the Baltic states. In all likelihood, the West would move less cautiously and would execute a policy of containment in order to avoid repeating the failures of the 1930s appeasement policy which led to the occupation of the Baltics. If democratic reform is overturned in Russia the West would have to increase its commitment in the Baltic states in order to provide security to the three countries and contain Russia. The Baltic states could be quickly admitted into the EU and NATO and officially tied to other European institutions.

Regional Cooperation and Security Guaranties

Closer cooperation between the Baltic states is a way of enhancing their security. A certain degree of cooperation exists today, but more is required. Lithuania has been reluctant to participate in military activities, due to its past belief that it led to Russian occupation in the inter-war period.¹⁰ Still, some

institutions and agreements have been established. Following the Nordic model, an agreement on parliamentary and governmental cooperation was signed in June, 1994, which established a Baltic Council on the governmental level and a Baltic Assembly of parliamentarians.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Baltics are reluctant to be lumped together by the international community, and they resist taking on problems unique to each state.¹²

In the security area there has been an increased will to cooperate, for example, on peacekeeping, air surveillance, and a common minesweeping squadron.¹³ Within the defense field several activities have taken place: training and development of a Baltic peacekeeping battalion, BALTBAT; development of a common air-surveillance system; creating command, control and communications systems; and establishment of a Baltic naval training group.¹⁴ Still, the reluctance to accept a closer cooperation in the defense area is real. Each state's perception is that close cooperation might be seen as an alternative to NATO membership. This reluctance to cooperate too closely could have a detrimental effect on the relative influence of the Baltic states.

Joint efforts by the Baltic states would strengthen their position in the international community and enhance their security. Military cooperation on the BALTBAT project is an example on how powerful joint efforts can be. The BALTBAT is operational and effective, which is impressive considering that there were no forces available in the Baltic states only a few years ago. Today, the Baltic states are making a significant contribution to peace operations in Bosnia, which makes a strong argument for NATO membership, and sends a strong

political signal on Baltic commitment to the West. Similarly, Baltic economic and political cooperation could be fruitful.

The Baltic state's military cooperation with the Nordic countries has been extensive in the form of training Baltic troops together in the Baltic states as well as in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. In 1994, the Baltics established BALTBAT to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. Officers and non-commissioned officers were trained by British and Nordic instructors, and separate courses were conducted for component companies from the Baltic states. Additionally, Baltic platoons were trained by Denmark and integrated into the Danish UN peacekeeping force in Croatia. The presently deployed Nordic-Polish brigade in SFOR also has contributions from the Baltic states folded into the Danish battalion.¹⁵ External support is essential for the build up of their armed forces. The Russians left little to no military equipment when they left.¹⁶ This factor enhances Denmark's possibilities for influence.

The build up of the armed forces of the Baltic states is only in its infancy. The Nordic countries will play a major role in this area for many years to come; however, the focus of military aid must shift to projects with more long term prospects, like establishing sound military schooling. Nordic cooperation has been very valuable for the Baltic states in terms of helping them in negotiations with the great European powers, and by enlisting other states as advocates for their cause.

Baltic relations with the Nordic countries cannot replace sound relations with the larger and more powerful states such as Germany, France, Great Britain, and the U.S.¹⁷ In other words, the close cooperation with the Nordic

countries is no substitute for membership in larger European and Atlantic organizations. Neutrality or non-alignment as a foreign policy option has been rejected widely and firmly.¹⁸ The three Baltic states have taken part in NACC and in PfP activities since the foundation of these programs and exercises. All three states want full NATO membership because the NATO Treaty's article 5 will provide them the needed and desired "hard" security guaranties.¹⁹ Membership would be a clear deterrent to a democratic Russia. The Baltic states have argued that they will not only be "consumers" of security but will actively participate in, for example, peacekeeping operations. The Baltic states also fear that an expansion of NATO without their inclusion will lead Russia to believe that it can impose its will and deem them within its "sphere."²⁰ So far, NATO has been unwilling to provide security for the Baltic states. The Baltics have tried to achieve security by binding themselves as closely as possible to Western institutions. EU membership is close, especially for Estonia. Development of relations with the EU has been seen as a way to establish the desired security as well as a way to enhance their economic capabilities. The Baltic states have signed trade agreements with the EU, which provide a basis for relations with the union and the first step to possible membership.²¹ Additionally, the three states were granted Associate Partner status with the WEU in June 1994.²²

The Baltic states' relatively small Nordic neighbors are not able to provide the necessary "hard" security that the Baltic states need and want. Cooperation with Nordic states is perceived as a stepping stone to membership in NATO and the EU. These motives of the Baltic states limit Denmark's regional role. There is clearly a limit to how extensive the security cooperation can be. In long-term

perspective, the Danish role will decrease if the Baltic states are admitted into NATO and the EU. However, Danish NATO membership would position Denmark in an advantageous situation to further military cooperation. Support from Denmark and the other Nordic countries will in that case play a minor role because the pursued "hard" security guarantee will be achieved.²³ Still, Nordic military support will be important and inevitable for the Baltic states in the long term because their armed forces have to be built up from scratch.

The Baltic states were not included in NATO's first round of enlargement. Only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited. There are several reasons for this. In a NATO study on the subject, it was stated that enlargement should be part of a wider European security settlement that should also engage the EU. Furthermore, it was stated there should be no new division of Europe, which isolates Russia. All new NATO members should be able to take on all responsibilities of the Washington Treaty. The Baltic states had hoped to be considered, but when this NATO study was issued, their inclusion became increasingly unlikely.²⁴ Moreover, the Baltic states are the only former Soviet republics which applied for NATO membership, and the states have been subject to several verbal assaults from Russian politicians and government representatives. Tensions could result in an East-West crisis, which no one in the West wants. Also, it is not as if they have no security at all; the Baltic states have their strong Nordic relations which provide a security option.

The U.S.-Baltic partnership charter of January 1998 is an example of U.S. commitment to the region and clearly states that the U.S. will work for a Baltic NATO membership in the long term.²⁵ The charter is part of an U.S. strategy to

enhance stability on Europe's periphery. However, the charter does not provide any direct security guarantees, which places Denmark in an essential position to assert its influence in the region. As the only NATO member in the Baltic Sea, Denmark is in a position to work for the Baltic states membership into NATO and to continue its commitment in the broad security spectrum.²⁶

The Nordic states encouraged the Baltic states to join a wider cooperation with the states in the Baltic Sea region and to enter the Council of Baltic Sea States. The council was build around two former fishing and marine environmental protection commissions on a German-Danish initiative in 1992. The council encompasses all states with a coastline to the Baltic Sea, including Russia, and has the European Commission as an observer. The council does not deal with security issues directly but merely facilitates discussions and development of common strategies for regional political-economic development and it coordinates regional cooperation.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States establishes a forum for confidence-building meetings. The Council's primary mission is to create a basis for establishment of sound democracies. It only plays an indirect role related to security matters. For the Baltic states it plays a major role in linking the states to the West and creating connections to countries that are firmly linked into NATO and the EU. Furthermore, the council ensures that the regional dialog with Russia is maintained on the political and economical level. This council is important for the Baltic states in terms of maintaining a dialog with Russia. The three Baltic states' almost unilateral focus on establishing relations to the West could be dangerous. From a Danish perspective, the council enhances

possibilities of confidence-building and open discussions on matters, which indirectly affects Danish security and includes Russia.²⁷

In sum, the Baltic states have joined European institutions to an extent and have achieved a security for themselves. The states have turned to the West for guarantees, but these have not been given in any absolute form. The Baltics had to be content with activities that improve but marginalize their security environment. This situation positions Denmark in an ideal situation, as a member of both NATO and the EU, to serve as a mentor to the Baltic states, until memberships in NATO are granted. To maintain Danish engagement and influence, Danish military support to the three states must adopt a more long term approach.

Poland

Poland is clearly a Baltic nation with a Baltic coastline, a 200-mile frontage on the sea.²⁸ Two great Polish rivers pour into the Baltic, and Poland has three major Baltic ports. It is one of the Baltic countries that has no other openings to the sea. This emphasizes the importance of the Baltic to Poland.²⁹

The Poles seem prepared for the liberty they gained in 1989, and they have exploited their freedom but also chased it fruitfully since 1990. No one in Poland is going to hand it back, and although Poland might be economically weak, it has returned as a sovereign independent power upon the Baltic with a hastily growing economy.³⁰ Poland's total area of 312,683 sq. km, which is slightly smaller than New Mexico, and a 38 million population, make it a considerable Baltic and European power with a large potential.³¹

The Polish agenda is to seek membership in the EU, and its application for membership of NATO has been approved and is strongly supported by the Polish people.³² Simultaneously, Poland does its utmost to participate in the PfP program. Poland wants to keep pan-European institutions and forums in place but is suspicious of those who see them as substitutes for more muscular cooperation. Poland fears Russia and the uncertainty of Russia's future development. Russia has threatened Poland for the last 500 years, and still, Kaliningrad just to the northeast of Poland is crowded with Russian forces. Like the Baltic states, Poland finds itself vulnerable to Russia's possible revival of strength and imperialism.³³

Poland fears Germany in a different way. Poland welcomes Germany's support of its EU membership and the bilateral help and investment but will not forget past sufferings the Germans have imposed. Poland sees Germany as the weightiest force in the EU and economically pre-eminent in Europe and fears Germany's politically and economically capabilities, which in the future might take more, threatening forms.³⁴

Historically, Poland's traditional answer to its vulnerable situation between Germany and Russia has been to reach out to the West. Membership of the EU and NATO will provide Poland that western reassurance which it desires by getting the "hard" security guarantees through NATO's article 5 and a general cooperation with Western European forces. Furthermore, the link Poland gets to NATO forces the U.S. implicitly to counterbalance Germany. Membership in the EU is some years away, but Poland will join NATO in 1999.

To support these aims in the meantime Poland has enlarged its cooperation with Finland and the Scandinavian countries.³⁵ Moreover, Poland is actively engaged in UN operations mainly in the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia. Poland has several cooperation agreements with its surrounding countries and is participating in the Visegrad cooperation, the Central European Initiative, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States.³⁶ An important agreement for Poland and one of the most active recently is three-sided cooperation with Germany and Denmark on the establishment of a multinational corps based in Stettin. This agreement will prepare Poland for its integration in NATO, contribute to the European security component, and enhance security in the Southwestern Baltic Sea region. Poland also has an extensive cooperation with Sweden not only in the Council of the Baltic Sea States but also in bilaterally encompassing ties in the defense industry. Polish cooperation with the Baltic states and Finland exists but not to an extent as the previously mentioned, and cooperation with Russia on the military level has been brought to a minimum and only exists as a formality.³⁷

Polish-Lithuanian relations have historically been strained.³⁸ Since the independence of the Baltic states, relations have improved, although there are often lengthy delays at the Polish-Lithuanian border, and some elements in Poland have expressed a desire to see a return of the Vilnius area to Poland. Despite this, inter-governmental and trade relations are improving. Poland has even given Lithuania military equipment.³⁹

Clearly, it is in Poland's best interests to enhance its cooperation with Denmark and to make clear to Russia that Poland is out of its sphere and closely

linked to the West. Denmark has supported these efforts, and with Polish admittance into NATO in 1999, a close cooperation with Poland is reasonable and logical, not least because of the geographical proximity of Poland and Denmark. With its NATO membership coming up, Poland is already anchored in the West, and a shift of power to non-reformists in Russia would not change this development; however, Poland will probably assume a more cautious policy towards Russia. Denmark should continue to pursue a close relationship with Poland, which will only strengthen future Danish influence in the region. With its potential, Poland is likely to become a major player in the Baltic over the long-term.

The Nordic Countries

The primary forum for the Nordic countries is the Nordic Cooperation Council, which went through a reform process initiated in 1995 due to post-Cold War developments in Europe, including Finnish and Swedish membership in the EU. The aim was to redefine the role of Nordic cooperation as a regional forum in the new Europe. Today's cooperation is based on three pillars: traditional intergovernmental cooperation, relations with the EU, and finally, cooperation with areas adjacent to the Nordic countries, especially the Baltic states, the St. Petersburg area, North-western Russia, Kaliningrad, the Barents Sea, and the Arctic region.⁴⁰

The importance of the Nordic Cooperation Council has increased over the past decade. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are old NATO members and Denmark is a member of the EU, together with the two newcomers, Sweden and

Finland. Denmark is, in other words, the only country among the Nordic countries, which is member of both NATO and the EU. The end of the Cold War and the enlargement of the EU have created a new situation for the coordination of Nordic interests. Previously, it was not possible to discuss common foreign policy problems and practical defense cooperation. However, this has changed. Today, the Nordic countries have common interests, for example in the Baltic states and Northern Europe.

These common interests have led to a serious dialog and constructive cooperation at the military level.⁴¹ Nordic cooperation seems concentrated in two areas. First, Sweden and Finland are now members of the EU family and belong to a strong cooperation and decision structure, which strengthens Nordic cooperation. Second, the end of the Cold War has opened a new dimension of practical and political cooperation. Defense cooperation among the countries is emerging. Following the decreasing threat level, the defense budgets have faced cutbacks and the armed forces have been downsized. At the same time, the price of weapon systems has increased, which makes it beneficial for the countries to cooperate in defense procurement.

Operational defense cooperation has occurred among several Nordic countries.⁴² Common military exercises with Sweden and Finland have been conducted within the PfP framework, since both countries have adhered to the PfP program. Such exercises now and in the near future will also strengthen and develop cooperation in procuring defense equipment. Cooperation in developing operational and tactical doctrines is also a future possibility. Denmark and Norway are tied to NATO but, still, there is room for national doctrines.⁴³

These dramatic changes, internal and external to the Nordic Cooperation Council create new possibilities for Denmark. As the only member of the Nordic Cooperation Council that is also in NATO and the EU, Denmark serves as the linch pin. The Nordic countries share a common identity and to a large extent the norms and values which enhance possibilities for cooperation and the likelihood of influence in the region. Denmark's increased role in the Nordic Cooperation Council is in its own best interest. If democratic reform is revised in Russia, the Nordic Cooperation Council will have an increased security role. At the moment, cooperation has been non-threatening and almost neutral, but has also evolved and become relatively efficient and externally oriented. In any case, Denmark can only benefit from cooperation, as it will strengthen Danish influence in the Baltic region.

Sweden

The end of the Cold War in Europe made it intellectually and politically impossible for Sweden to maintain its traditional neutral position. Toward whom and what should Sweden be neutral? Sweden's membership into the EU has made a farce of its policy of neutrality, since the EU consists of a group of states with a common foreign and security policy cooperation. There are two different approaches to the neutrality question in Swedish politics: the integrationists' opposition and the more neutral stance led by the Social Democrats.⁴⁴ The Social Democrats who are heading the government at the moment subscribe to the opinion that neutrality has served Sweden rather well and they want a shift away from neutrality to be as limited as possible. The distinction between EU's

foreign and security policy and its common defense policy and common defense exists. However, defense policy and common defense are matters for the WEU, which serves as the military instrument for the EU. Sweden gained full membership of the EU in 1995, but has hesitated in joining the monetary union, and has only observer status in the WEU.⁴⁵ Sweden's policy to maintain "freedom from alliances in peacetime in order to stay neutral in wartime," which essentially means an independent military, should not be jeopardized by its EU membership because the EU is not a military alliance. Swedish security policy might be summarized in the following manner: Sweden participates in the common foreign and security policy of the EU while avoiding a military alliance in peacetime in order to obtain freedom of choice in case of war. Sweden's membership in the EU will create new possibilities for strengthening Nordic cooperation through joint efforts and will improve the security situation of the Baltic states. Despite the fact that Sweden is an EU member and in a way has chosen sides, it still is a declared neutral. This places Sweden in a more advantageous position than Denmark vis-a-vis Russia. Neutrality allows Sweden to maintain a better position for integrating Russia and Russian views into the security of the Baltic region. President Yeltsin visited Stockholm in December 1997, and Sweden appears to have warmer relations with Russia than Denmark.

Sweden has also taken an active part in the cooperation with the Baltic states. Sweden established a high profile Swedish Baltic Sea Council with Richard Hoolbroke, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs, as a member. The aim was to develop Swedish Baltic policy and advice on disbursement of Swedish funds. This seemed to be a change in Sweden's

policy towards increasing engagement in the Baltic region in order to take the lead among the Nordic states in cooperation with the Baltic states. The Swedish Prime Minister has said, "Sweden is ready to take up the leading role in the Baltic Sea cooperation" and the cooperation around the Baltic has assumed highest political priority in Sweden.⁴⁶ There seems to be a touch of competition with Denmark in this. Denmark was the first of the Nordic states to recognize the Baltic states and was the lead nation in the military support to the republics initially.⁴⁷ During the Cold War, Denmark had a high regard for Sweden. Denmark's respect was based on Swedish policy in the UN, Sweden's geographical size, larger population, and its formidable defense industry, which dwarfs Denmark's capability.

Finland

After the fall of the Soviet Union there was a significant decline in Finnish trade with the former East bloc, as well as with traditional markets in Sweden and Great Britain. These facts were the main reasons for Finland's interest in EU membership. Furthermore, Finland feared being left in a gray zone between the West and Russia once Sweden had joined the EU. Therefore, the Swedish EU application in 1991 had a strong influence on the Finnish decision to apply, in March 1992.⁴⁸ Finland has also, as Sweden, agreed to comply with the EU common foreign and security policy. Finland will give up its policy of neutrality in peacetime, but Finland has stated that it wants to be under the common foreign and security policy umbrella for political and not for military reasons. The Finnish Defense Minister Anneli Taina says, "the term neutrality is no longer used in our

political language. We say that Finland is a military non-allied country,” and she continues saying, “. . . we can not be considered neutral any longer.”⁴⁹ The Finnish step into the EU was bigger than Sweden’s. Finnish security policy during the Cold War was to stay neutral in disputes between the two superpowers. This was to avoid involvement in any war in which Finland was not under attack, or in which the Soviet Union was not under attack through Finnish territory.⁵⁰ Yet, the Soviet Union never really acknowledged the policy of neutrality.

Today, Finland has signed a “good neighbor” treaty with Russia, which is remarkably different from its predecessor. It contains no clauses of military cooperation with Russia of any kind. Nor does the treaty contain any clauses on “not to enter alliances directed at the other,” which allowed Finland to enter the EU.⁵¹ However, Finland’s common border with Russia seems to give it a lower profile in the Baltic sphere.⁵² The long border with Russia means that Finland’s future will always be tied to events in Russia. Yet, despite limitations, Finland has obtained its freedom of action. Finland’s policy toward the Baltic states is aimed at preserving Baltic independence and security, which is vital for Finland.⁵³ Finland will closely watch developments in Russia, and its major concern is whether Russia will grow strong and take active interest in its smaller neighbors.⁵⁴

Events in the Baltic and especially in Estonia are of concern because turmoil and possible conflicts might spill over to Finland simply because of its geographical proximity and cultural ties. Finland’s efforts in the Baltic states are mainly directed towards Estonia with whom it shares a history and to a large extent language.

Finland's policy is described by the Finns as neutral, and is likened by many to Swedish security policy. Finland chose to depend on its own defenses, and it is not looking for outside offers for a defense guarantee. Through an independent defense policy Finland indirectly supports the general international interest in promoting a stable Russia, which Finland contributes to by not joining NATO. Finnish policy will always have to consider Russia. No matter how much freedom Finland has obtained, Russia's location and power always will limit how far Finland can go. In other words, Finland will always be more limited in its policies than Denmark and Sweden, mainly because of historical and geographical circumstances.

Norway

Norway felt challenged by the Swedish and Finnish applications for EU membership and submitted its application in 1992. However, at the national vote on membership a majority of the Norwegian people voted "no". This places Norway, a long time NATO member in an odd situation. The Norwegian government is worried that Norway's possibilities for future participation in the EU's common foreign and security policy have been weakened. First, European interest in Norwegian matters has been considerably reduced in comparison with the period before those elections. Second, the coordination of the Norwegian policy as a whole vis-a-vis the world has been called into question. Lately, Norway has waged an ill-timed fight on minor questions concerning fishing rights of the Nordic EU member-countries. Originally, it was Norway's goal to strengthen influence in the EU through capitalizing on the Nordic "brotherhood".

This policy does not seem to have been a success. Third, it seems that Norway risks marginalization in security cooperation. NATO's most recent political-military concept relies on close cooperation between the U.S. and the great European powers as has been seen in Bosnia.⁵⁵ This new channel will probably result in strengthened cooperation between the U.S. and the EU. The Norwegian government strives to strengthen its defense cooperation within the WEU. Norway became an associated member in 1992.⁵⁶ Norway feels particular vulnerable to being marginalized, and, as the only NATO member bordering on Russia, it does not like the thought of fending for itself. The NATO allies have expressed little interest in northern questions, and Norway's greatest fear is to be left alone with Russia on the northern flank. In December 1994, Canada announced that it would withdraw a battalion earmarked for the defense of Norway in a crisis. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Bjorn Tore Godal, stated, "This is regrettable, because it falls into a picture of a possible reduction of a North American presence in the North Atlantic scenario."⁵⁷ Norway has no Baltic coastline but it is closely related to the area through Nordic cooperation. Norway seems to contribute more to the security in the eastern Baltic Sea than its geographical position suggests. An explanation for Norway's relatively large commitment to the Baltic Sea, aside from its links with the Nordic community, is Norway's fear of isolation because of its reluctance to join the EU.

¹Danish and European Security (Copenhagen: The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, 1995), pp. 7-8.

²Clive Archer, "Security Considerations between the Nordic and Baltic Countries," in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy

Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 85.

³During 1990, the three states declared their independence and started negotiations with Moscow. Generally, international recognition of the new states was not granted until after the coup d'état in USSR in August 1991.

⁴Andrey Muravyov, "The Trails of 'Sleeping Next to Elephants'", Inter Press Service, September 23, 1996.

⁵The majority of the Russian military forces in the three Baltic states were moved to the Kaliningrad enclave up to 1994.

⁶Archer, 84-85, and Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," Survival, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1996, p. 122, and Unwin, p. 82.

⁷Oznobistchev, 106, and Archer, 86, and Mark Galeotti, "Baltic Military Structures," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1993, p. 352.

⁸Rein Taagepera, Estonia – Return to Independence (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., c1993), pp. 221-225.

⁹The European Council is an international political cooperation founded in 1949 aimed at promoting European unity and focuses on development of democracy and surveillance of human rights.

¹⁰Archer, 87, and Asmus, p. 131.

¹¹The Nordic model referred to is the cooperation within the Nordic Council. See this chapter, pp. 74-76.

¹²Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States, Latvia, 1996, and Archer p. 87.

¹³Archer, p. 87.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁵Archer, 89, and Hans Garde, "European Security and the Baltic Challenge," RUSI Journal, April 1995, p. 21.

¹⁶Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande (Copenhagen: The Danish Government, June 1997), p. 60.

¹⁷Archer, 88, and Asmus, p. 122.

¹⁸Asmus, p. 123.

¹⁹The NATO Treaty's article 5 says, "an armed attack against one or more of them [NATO members] in Europe and North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

²⁰Archer, pp. 91-92.

²¹Ibid., p. 90.

²²Ibid., p. 91.

²³Ibid., pp. 91-92.

²⁴Ibid., p. 92. The NATO study on enlargement was published in September, 1995, and is mentioned by Clive Archer.

²⁵"A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania," The White House, January 16, 1998, and "Baltikum-aftale underskrevet", DPA, Washington, the newspaper Politiken, January 17, 1998.

²⁶Troels Frøling, "Investeringer i Baltikum er investering i sikkerhed," the newspaper Børsen, February 2, 1998.

²⁷Archer, p. 89.

²⁸Throughout history, Poland has been a nation on the move. For over half a century Poland's western border to Germany has followed the line of the Oder and the Western Neisse rivers as the border was fixed by the victorious allies in 1945. Poland acquired territory that historically was German, five million Germans had to move, and the Poles from the regions lost to the Soviet Union moved in. In 1990, Germany in a declaration emphasized that the formal border between Poland and Germany remains final.

²⁹Unwin, pp. 51-53 and pp. 58-59.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 65-66.

³¹The Homepage Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997.

³²Birgitte Vestermark, "Ud af Ruslands Skygge," the Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende, June 27, 1997.

³³Unwin, p. 66, and Vestermark.

³⁴Boleslaw Balcerowitz, "Poland's View of Military Cooperation and its Prospects in the Baltic Sea Region" in Military Cooperation and Its Prospects in the Baltic Region (Finland: Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence College, Finland, 1997), p. 57, and Unwin, p. 66.

³⁵Unwin, p. 66, and Vestermark.

³⁶The Visegrad Cooperation was founded in October, 1991, as a political cooperation between Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic.

³⁷Balcerowitz, pp. 60-68.

³⁸Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States, Lithuania, 1996. Poland seized Vilnius and the surrounding territory in 1922.

³⁹Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States, Lithuania, 1996.

⁴⁰Wøhlk, p. 13.

⁴¹Borch, p. 22.

⁴²Borch, p. 22, and Arne Olav Brundtland, "Nordic Security at the End of the Cold War: Old Legacies and New Challenges," in Arne Olav Brundtland and Don M. Snider (eds.), Nordic-Baltic Security: An International Perspective (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, c1994), p. 26, and Erik Olsen, "Nordic Harmony: Northern Neighbors Coordinate their Defense," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1995, p. 14.

⁴³Borch, p. 23.

⁴⁴Brundtland, p. 12, and Johann Rapp, "Parties Take Sides in (Sweden's) Neutrality Debate," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 August 1995, p. 34.

⁴⁵Sikkerhedens aktører 2 ("Den nye sikkerhed"), Atlantsammenslutningen, 1996, p. 125.

⁴⁶Sweicicki, Jakub, Östersöen – säkerhet och samarbete (The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Fall 1996), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷Sweicicki, p. 11-14, and Hans Mouritzen, "Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era: The Salient Action Spheres" in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 46, and Archer, p. 90.

⁴⁸Brundtland, p. 13.

⁴⁹Interview with the Finnish Defence Minister, Jane's Defence Weekly, no. 3, January 27, 1998.

⁵⁰The Nordic Balance, see Chapter Four, p. 38.

⁵¹Brundtland, p. 14.

⁵²Mouritzen, pp. 38-39.

⁵³Tim Glodan, "Helsinki Defends Independent Stance," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 August 1995, p. 27.

⁵⁴Brundtland, p. 20.

⁵⁵Borch, p. 19.

⁵⁶Borch, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁷Brundtland, pp. 15-16, and Erik Olsen, "Nordic Harmony: Northern Neighbors Coordinate their Defense," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1995, p. 14.

CHAPTER SEVEN

TRENDS IN CURRENT DANISH SECURITY POLICY

Introduction

This chapter will examine current Danish security policy and show how it has dramatically changed from a passive to an active stance. The chapter will further examine Denmark's increasing role in Europe via the European Union, its changed attitude towards NATO activism, and its regional impact on its neighbors, to include rivalries and cooperative ventures. Denmark's surprising increase in the use of its military is also examined to convey a sense of the significant changes in Danish security policy.

The European Focus

The security situation for Denmark improved remarkably with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Iron Curtain which had divided Europe. The direct military threat to Denmark had disappeared. Relations with Poland and the Baltic states were quickly established. These changes, which took place after 1989, have changed Danish security policy in both form and content from a tame, compliant, and low-key policy to one of proclaimed active internationalism. Danish foreign and security policy have changed in terms of both the proclaimed policy and the actual policy implemented.

Changes in Danish foreign policy have manifested themselves in the most important aspect of that policy: security. Post-Cold War Danish foreign policy is closely focussed on Europe, specifically on the EU, which is no longer seen merely as an economic organization.¹ The development of the European focus has been called the "Europeanization" of Danish foreign and security policy.² However, Denmark has yet to take part in the security dimension of the EU and has not joined the WEU.

After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and Germany was unified in 1990, Denmark faced the prospect of a strong domineering Germany, without a regional British and Russian counterweight in the Baltic. A nationalistic Germany was not what Europe wanted, and the solution was to bind Germany through the European Political Union to the EU. This proposal to deepen the EU was made by Germany and quickly seconded by France. Ironically, Denmark could not pursue the same degree of integration as Germany because of the Danish populace's skepticism towards the EU.³ Thus, Denmark requested exemptions from the EU, and German dominance has resurfaced within the EU.⁴

The Danish attitude toward the European integration process has changed dramatically. Cooperation with the EU was originally seen solely as economic cooperation, but Danes today see the EU as a means to achieve wider political cooperation. Major changes in Central and Eastern Europe were one factor for this new Danish perception, which has been achieved grudgingly. Retracing the Danish ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which established the EU, testifies to this.⁵ The Danish referendum in 1992 rejected the Treaty, and it was only after Denmark obtained the Edinburgh Decision, which exempted Denmark on certain

areas, that a majority of voters accepted the Treaty in another referendum in May 1993.⁶

The four exemptions obtained in Edinburgh deal with the Economic and Monetary Union, the Union Citizenship, incorporation of internal affairs in the daily decision-making of the Union, and defense policy cooperation. Danish skepticism about the EU is deeply rooted and hard to explain, and has to do with the element of federalism in the Union. Danes perceive federalism as centralism in contrast with, for example, Germany where federalism means decentralization. This perception led the Danish people to believe that the Maastricht Treaty would result in a closed and threatening European super state. This had a negative effect on Danes who remain skeptical of power and the exercise of power. The fear of being dominated by Germany within a centralized EU caused the Danish populace to initially reject the treaty and to demand exemptions to certain clauses prior to signing it.⁷

Denmark's EU policy has been dominated by an attempt to avoid domestic political conflicts. The decision-making process concerning EU policy includes an approval of all governmental decisions by parliament, which gives the parliament a strong hand in EU questions.⁸ The Danish populace now has a more positive attitude and a better understanding of the EU, since the EU has become an international power. Today, Danish foreign policy to a large extent functions within the framework expressed by the EU's common foreign and security policy.⁹ The break-up of the Warsaw Pact and transformation of Central and Eastern European countries have also changed the Danish viewpoint, and

Denmark willingly supports the EU's promotion of political and economic reform in these countries.

When it comes to the defense of the EU's interests externally, in the worst case with military power, Danes still question the process. According to polls taken in 1996, there is a large minority against an extension of the EU's security and defense policy, and a majority who want Denmark to stand firm on its exemption towards a common defense policy and common defense.¹⁰ Danish reluctance towards WEU membership is based on the Danish position adopted in the 1980s. Back then, the Socialist wing of the Danish parliament opposed the right wing government and was able to heavily influence Denmark's NATO policy. The socialist wing mirrors a general reluctance of the Danish populace to integrate themselves into a centralized federal European union. This reluctance is difficult to explain, but certainly is grounded in a generally skeptical attitude towards centralized power in the Danish population. This skepticism does not seem as strong as it was, but still, it explains Danish refusal to join the WEU.

Danish exemptions to the Maastricht Treaty, granted by the Edinburgh Treaty, hindered efforts by Europe's leaders to bind Germany as closely as possible to the EU. However, one should know that Denmark was a marginal player in the process, and its position on Maastricht did not have a significant effect on Germany's deepening its integration into the EU.¹¹ Yet, there is paradox on this point. It is in Denmark's best interests to influence and bind Germany to Europe and to ensure that Germany does not reemerge as a great autonomous power in a multilateral Europe. But, Denmark can influence German policy by tying Germany to the European integration process, only if Denmark fully

participates in the EU. One must recognize that parliamentary support for popular acceptance of complete European integration will not come overnight to Denmark. Recent trends in Denmark seem to indicate a gradual shift towards integration. One should remember the Danes do not support sudden and drastic changes, but prefer slow iterations.¹²

A Changed Attitude Towards NATO

As a long time NATO member Denmark does not view NATO's evolution with skepticism and is actively taking part in the major changes being made in the organization. Denmark supports the enlargement of NATO with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the first round and believes that a door must be kept open for all European countries. In the work on a new command structure in NATO and the implementation of the CJTF concept, Denmark desires substantial tasks be assigned to the NATO headquarters, BALTAP, which is commanded by a three-star Danish officer. However, there are disagreements on the future roles of this command. Most of the great powers in NATO do not want forces permanently attached in peacetime, and primarily see the subregional commands as planners of specific operations.

Denmark wants to establish PfP staff elements at subregional headquarters, like BALTAP, which would allow Denmark to bind states with a Baltic coastline to NATO's command structure. The question has not been solved yet, and it seems that the expected support from the U.S. has vanished.¹³ The Danish idea was to strengthen regional security but also consolidate the Danish position, and ensure that an important NATO command remains in Danish hands.

Denmark has managed to keep BALTAP under strong Danish influence, which Danes believe works to their advantage.

The BALTAP command is important for Denmark in several ways. First, it enables Denmark to continue its close, integrated, and constructive military cooperation with Germany. This enables Denmark to influence Germany and bind it to NATO's structure. Second, the BALTAP is important in incorporating Poland into NATO's command organization. The Danish-German-Polish cooperation already initiated can be continued with a prospect for considerable Danish influence on the general military integration of Poland and the restructuring of its armed forces. This is important in long term perspective because Poland is likely to become a considerable power just south of Denmark.¹⁴ Third, the command gives Denmark a key military post at the entrance to the Baltic Sea and positions Denmark to influence the Baltic region at the military level when PfP exercises are conducted.

Denmark did not manage to convince its NATO partners that the subregional commands should have permanent PfP staff elements attached.¹⁵ This is a setback for Danish efforts because it would have created close cooperation with the armed forces from most or maybe all of the countries with a Baltic coastline. It would be in Denmark's best interest to continue to promote this proposal because it would improve the ways and means of influencing the region and keep Denmark in an advantageous position.

In the post-Cold War period Denmark has been more loyal to NATO at any other time in the past.¹⁶ Danish support for NATO goes hand in hand with tying Germany to the EU and ensuring a continuing role for the U.S. in Europe. A

pamphlet published by the Danish Foreign Ministry states: "In a Danish perspective the continued U.S. commitment to Europe and the alliance cooperation within NATO is the natural starting point for any considerations on the military aspects of European security."¹⁷ It was Danish popular resistance to the EU and especially the WEU that has made increased NATO support even more important than in the past. This position improves Denmark's status in the eyes of its neighbors as it begins to exercise increased regional activism towards the East in the Baltic area.

The Regional Focus

Completely new elements in Danish foreign and security policy have emerged in the immense engagement in the Baltic region. This effort can be termed a "Regionalization" of Danish foreign and security policy.¹⁸ Alongside the change to these two areas of focus an increased use of military means has emerged.

Security is no longer indivisible as during the Cold War. Consequently, Denmark has become much more active in regional affairs. Denmark quickly exploited the new possibilities for cooperation that arose in the Baltic region after the Cold War. In the area of regional security assistance, Denmark has assumed a leading role in setting up military cooperation agreements with Poland, the three Baltic states, and Russia.¹⁹ Denmark, alongside Iceland, was the first country to recognize the Baltic states when they reclaimed independence, a process which Denmark has firmly supported.²⁰ These policies would have been unthinkable during the Cold war. This new policy of regional activism was daring

and enduring. Danish recognition of the Baltic states has made a difference and affected other EU countries' postures towards the Baltics.²¹ There was a great deal of prestige in being among the first to recognize the Baltic states, and this realization played a role in the decision as well as the desire to do so ahead of Sweden.

Denmark's economic support to the Baltic states, Poland, as well as the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad areas in Russia, is substantial. In 1995, Danish aid to Central and Eastern Europe consisted of little less than 0.1 percent of the GNP, which made it the largest contribution among the states in the Baltic region.²² Aid to the Baltic states was 44 percent of the total aid, and aid to consisted of about 14 percent.²³ A large amount of the total Danish aid is concentrated in the Baltic region. This stems from a genuine desire to help Denmark's neighbors but also to maximize the benefit for Denmark in such areas as the region's natural environment. Moreover, the higher priority of aid to Second World countries with a Baltic coastline also has to do with the influence Denmark can obtain in these countries.²⁴ The fact that Denmark is firmly affixed in the EU and NATO constitutes a basis for its Baltic policy.²⁵ On one hand, this represents a safety net and a security reassurance. On the other hand, these linkages offer an important perspective for the Baltic states.²⁶

Denmark's self-image has changed. Before the end of the Cold War Denmark characterized itself as a small state in official papers, but this image has evolved due to the new Danish activism.²⁷ In a governmental booklet on Danish efforts in Central and East Europe, the big lettered cover proclaims: "DENMARK AS A PIONEER COUNTRY" ("DANMARK SOM

FOREGANGSLAND").²⁸ Denmark is no longer a frontline state in the Cold War and there is virtually no direct military threat to Denmark today.²⁹ Danish frontline cautiousness has obviously disappeared.³⁰

Danish policy on NATO's enlargement is clear. The Permanent Secretary of the Danish Foreign Ministry, Henrik Wøhlk, has asserted: "To Denmark, it is clear that no country or group of countries with a stated interest in NATO membership should be excluded from membership in advance. This also applies to the Baltic countries"³¹ Actually, due to Danish efforts the Baltic states were indirectly mentioned in a paragraph in NATO's 1997 Madrid Declaration: ". . . we recognize the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members."³² Through its NATO and EU membership Denmark is in a position from which it can influence the Baltic states. As applicants to the EU and NATO these countries have to fulfill certain membership criteria, for example institutionalize democracy and human rights, Denmark as a long time member of these organizations can assist the progress of application.³³

Denmark recognizes that the U.S. has a leadership role to play in Europe and supports that position. Denmark has performed missions for the U.S. and other leading NATO nations in the former Soviet republics, where for example, the U.S. presence would upset sensitivities in Russia. The Danish Defense Minister has said, "From a Danish perspective the U.S. kind of leadership is positive. I can hardly see that we can do well without the Americans."³⁴

The risk of an adverse Russian reaction to Western security support to former Soviet Republics would be much greater if the major NATO powers

attempted to undertake them. Denmark is a “natural” for such missions because its presence in the region is more natural and more acceptable to Russia.³⁵ Denmark’s low profile and efforts to lower superpower tension during the Cold War are working to Denmark’s advantage today.³⁶ Since there is only one security organization left which can provide “hard” security in Europe, namely NATO, and since Denmark is one of the few NATO members that does not arouse alarm in Moscow, one can expect the Danes to continue to play a leading role in security matters with the former Soviet republics.

Denmark shares many of the values and interests that the U.S. does. Improving U.S.-Danish ties enables Denmark to harness U.S. power to export their shared values region-wide. Danish-U.S. ties were strengthened during President Clinton’s visit to Copenhagen in the summer of 1997. The Danish Defense Minister Hans Hækkerup has stated, “Denmark and the U.S. do not agree on everything, but fortunately on one subject we are in accord: the Baltic states.”³⁷

In sum, Denmark has an immense interest in and derives advantages from an active policy agenda which is fundamentally different from the century old policy of adopting a low profile through regional inactivity. Historically, Denmark has tried to be invisible, but recognizes today that there are apparent advantages to taking the lead and—more importantly—receiving the credit. With an increasing part of Danish policy negotiated in international organizations, Denmark has obtained advantageous results mainly because its security policy actions have increased Danish influence and status.

Denmark's regional policy expresses a certain division of labor between its partners in the EU and NATO respectively on a basis of considerations of interests. As a small state, Denmark can argue the case for the Baltic states against a possible Russian resurgence, which is a clear example of the increased power of small states and the far-reaching changes that have taken place in the international situation in the post-Cold War period. Yet, the fact that the great Western powers will not let the independence of the Baltic states interfere with their relations to work with Russia, in general, has affected the relative freedom of action that Denmark and the other Nordic countries can exercise.

Nordic Rivalry

The aim of Danish policy in relation to Poland and the Baltic states is to stabilize the region, bind the countries closer to the West, foster Western values, and to prevent Russia from dominating the Baltic region in particular.³⁸ Denmark's relative power among the Nordic countries seems to have increased at Sweden's expense. The pattern of Nordic cooperation has been one marked by Swedish initiative and inspiration up until 1991. Sweden seems to have lost some of its self-confidence over the past decade, while Denmark has gained in prestige, thanks to its comparatively better economic performance and membership in NATO and in the EU.³⁹ Relations between the two countries have become more balanced. Still, Denmark does not possess the resources to be the leading influence of the Baltic states. It shares the responsibility with Sweden and Finland.

Rivalry among Denmark, Sweden and Finland for influence in the region has spurred each country to unprecedented action.⁴⁰ Denmark's leading role in the world's criticism of China's lack of human rights compliance in 1997 and its criticism of France's nuclear bomb tests are examples of the new active Danish foreign policy that this rivalry has promoted. Denmark has even gone so far as to support U.S. threats of attacks on Iraq during the 1998 UN-Iraq crisis. This support is considered historic because in the past Danish international initiatives have always been in the name of peace. In this case Denmark supported planned air strikes which were also supported by large parts of the international community and could not be carried out under a UN resolution.⁴¹ Sweden—then a member of UN's Security Council—reacted negatively to the Danish prompt response.⁴²

Another example of the competition among the Nordic countries occurred during the enlargement negotiations at the 1997 NATO summit in Madrid. Denmark received credit for ensuring that the Baltic states were mentioned in the official declaration as a compensation for exclusion from the first round. Norway and Denmark had jointly fought for admission of the Baltics, but at an early stage the Norwegians backed down. Afterwards, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Thorbjorn Jagland, took credit for inclusion of the Baltics in the Madrid Declaration. But internal sources and U.S. Secretary of State Albright confirmed that only Denmark deserved the credit.⁴³ Danish and Norwegian efforts were relatively minor in this case, although, these instances show that competition exists and affects the Nordic countries' policies.

Use of Military Means

Another significant trend in Danish policy recently has been the increased and extensive use of military means in foreign policy.⁴⁴ In proportional terms, the Danish contingent to the UN forces in Yugoslavia, now NATO led, is one of the largest, when Denmark's population is taken into consideration. In addition, these soldiers are some of the more heavily armed units of the force, and not merely administrative troops. The establishment of the Danish Reaction Brigade also expresses Danish willingness to take responsibility and participate in more far reaching operations.⁴⁵ In other words, Denmark has realized that armed conflicts far from its borders can escalate and affect it.⁴⁶

Danish military support and cooperation with the Baltic states and Poland is extensive. Baltic platoons have been integrated into Danish battalions in the former Yugoslavia as a step in building up a Baltic peacekeeping battalion.⁴⁷ This initiative has increased Danish-Baltic interoperability and is a sign of close military ties. Danish cooperation with Poland has been aimed at transforming the relatively modern Polish military according to Western standards and at preparing Poland for its admission into NATO⁴⁸.

Smaller states like Denmark sometimes take a surprisingly large share of the burden in this time of constrained resources, when larger states refuse to assume responsibilities that they normally would have in the past. This activist Danish policy increases Denmark's influence not only in the near term but also opens channels to future relationships. These policies enjoy broad political support, which reflects public agreement with Denmark's new military stance.⁴⁹

¹For an explanation of the Danish relations to the EC during the Cold War, see Chapter Four, p. 36.

²The term "Europeanization" describes Danish efforts to further and widen EU integration in order to reduce the problem of a dominant Germany and is used in Danish and European Security (Copenhagen: The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, 1995), p. 6, and Hans-Henrik Holm, "Denmark's Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constraints," in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 66 and p. 68.

³The so-called Edinburgh Decision in December 1992 exempted Denmark on four points from future cooperation. In 1993, a majority of Danish voters accepted the Treaty in a referendum. The exemptions deal with an extended economic and monetary union, union citizenship, incorporation of judicial, and other internal affairs in daily decision-making, and participation in defense policy cooperation. See Chapter Four, p. 41, for further details.

⁴Hans Mouritzen, "Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era: The Salient Action Spheres" in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 34-35, and Holm, p. 68.

⁵The background for the Danish exceptions, see Chapter Four, p. 41.

⁶Nikolaj Petersen, Danmark og den Europæiske Union, Atlantsammenslutningen, 1993, pp. 16-17.

⁷Danish and European Security, pp. 26-27.

⁸Holm, p. 62.

⁹Dansk sikkerhedspolitik, Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, November 1996, p. 17.

¹⁰Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 167 and p. 169.

¹¹Mouritzen, p. 35.

¹²Petersen, pp. 16-17, and Danish and European Security, p. 27-28.

¹³Det nye NATO, Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, August 1997, pp. 20-21, and Jørgen Dragsdahl, "Vision skudt i sænk," the newspaper Weekensavisen, December 4, 1997, and Simon Andersen, "Dansk NATO-plan i fare," the newspaper Det Fri Aktuelt, August 14, 1997, and Non-paper on the Establishment of PfP Staff Elements at Sub-regional NATO Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Denmark, July 1997, and Rapport vedrørende etablering af et PfP Staff Element på PSC-niveau eksemplificeret ved etablering af et PSE ved BALTAP, The Danish Ministry of Defence, July, 1997.

¹⁴In 1996, Poland continued to make good progress in the difficult transition to a market economy. In 1992 Poland became the first country in the region to resume economic growth with a 2.6% increase. Growth advanced to 3.8% in 1993, 5.2% in 1994, 6.5% in 1995, and 6.0% in 1996. Most of the growth since 1991 has come from the booming private sector, which now accounts for more than 60% of GDP according to the Homepage Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997.

¹⁵Dragsdahl and Andersen.

¹⁶See Chapter Four, pp. 37-38, on the historical perspective on Danish NATO policy.

¹⁷Dansk sikkerhedspolitik, Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, November 1996, p. 7 (the author of this thesis' translation).

¹⁸The term describes the part of the Danish foreign policy that stresses the importance of the Baltic region for Danish interests and is used in Danish and European Security, p. 7, and Holm, p. 66.

¹⁹Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," Survival, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1996, p. 132.

²⁰Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande, The Danish Government, June 1997, p. 57.

²¹Danish and European Security, pp. 27-28, and Mouritzen, p. 43 and p. 45.

²²Sonneby, Peter, Lieutenant Colonel, Nordisk-Baltisk säkerhet i et dansk perspektiv (Speech held at Försvarshögskolan in Sweden, 1998), p. 7, and Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande, The Danish Government, June 1997, p. 48.

²³Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 156-157.

²⁴Mouritzen, 43, and Dansk sikkerhedspolitik, Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, November 1996, pp. 23-24.

²⁵For background on Danish memberships, see Chapter Four, pp. 36-38.

²⁶Mouritzen, p. 44.

²⁷Mouritzen, pp. 46-47.

²⁸Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande, the Danish Government, June 1997. (The author of this thesis' translation).

²⁹For an introduction to the Nordic Balance, see Chapter Four, p. 38.

³⁰Mouritzen, p. 36 and p. 45.

³¹Henrik Wøhlk, "The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy in 1996," in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 15. The issue of Baltic membership is also emphasized in Det nye NATO, Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, August 1997, pp. 10-11.

³²Carsten Svensson, "NATO-topmødet i Madrid den 8.-9. juli 1997," Militært tidsskrift, August 1997, p. 240, and Ib Faurby, "NATOs topmøde i Madrid – set fra pressecentret," Militært tidsskrift, August 1997, p. 249, and "Det nye NATO," Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, August 1997, pp. 32-33, and Troels Frøling, "investeringer i Baltikum er investering i sikkerhed," the newspaper Børsen, February 2, 1998.

³³Mouritzen, pp. 42-43, and Holm, p. 64, and Dansk sikkerhedspolitik, Udenrigsministeriets Temaserie, November 1996, pp. 18-19.

³⁴Paula Larrain and Michael Kuttner, "Europa har brug for en storebror," the newspaper Berlingske Tidende, July 5, 1997.

³⁵Mouritzen, p. 37 and pp. 46-47, and Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," Survival, vol. 38, no. 2, Summer 1996, p. 133.

³⁶Danish NATO policy during the 1980s, see Chapter Four p. 39.

³⁷Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, "NATO er mere end en forsikringspolice," the newspaper Politiken, July 11, 1997.

³⁸Danish and European Security, pp. 28-29, and Mouritzen, pp. 42-43.

³⁹Mouritzen, pp. 40-41.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 44 and p. 46.

⁴¹Henny Christensen, "Danmarks store Drømme," the newspaper Aktuelt, February 13, 1998, and Simon Andersen, "Historisk dansk skridt," the newspaper JyllandsPosten, February 13, 1998.

⁴²"Sverige kritiserer Danmark," Bjarne Steensbeck, the newspaper Politiken, February 2, 1998, and "Stålsatte svenskere," Gitte Merrild, the newspaper Det fri Aktuelt, February 20, 1998.

⁴³Flemming Rose and Jacob Vinde Larsen, "Balterne satser på 1999," the newspaper Berlingske Tidende, July 10, 1997, and Thomas Lauritzen, "Balterne vil foran i køen," the newspaper Det fri Aktuelt, July 10, 1997 and Michael Seidelin, Ib Faurby, Hans Drachmann and Christian Schmidt, "NATO kommer balterne i møde," the newspaper Politiken, July 9, 1997.

⁴⁴Holm, p. 54, p. 59, and p. 66.

⁴⁵Due to the political agreement in 1993 which emphasized possible international employments the Danish Reaction Brigade, designed to meet international operational demands, was established.

⁴⁶Dansk sikkerhedspolitik, p. 4.

⁴⁷The BALTBAT Project, Documentation from the Danish Ministry of Defence, February 1997. The initiative was taken by the Baltic states in November 1993. It is expected that the first battalion will be ready for its first full operational tour early in 1998.

⁴⁸Den udenrigspolitiske indsats for Central- og Østeuropa, herunder de baltiske lande, The Danish Government, June 1997, p. 60. According to Trilateral Defence Cooperation Denmark-Poland-Germany in 1997, Documentation from the Danish Ministry of Defence, December 1996, the framework consists of three connected elements: PfP excersises, exchange training among military units, and peacekeeping excersises.

⁴⁹See Danish and European Security, p. 38.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined changes in Danish security policy since the end of the Cold War. It has shown that over the last eight years, Denmark has demonstrated a significant shift in the security arena to a policy of international activism. The shift has been away from passive acquiescence to "active internationalism." Denmark harbors no ambitions for regional preeminence, but desires only to serve as a bridge to a larger Europe and the U.S. that can facilitate "soft" security in the Baltic region.

Despite the Danish populace's reluctance to endorse the level of European integration called for at Maastricht, Denmark's foreign and security policy has evolved over the 1990s along EU guidelines. This evolution is largely grounded in a changed Danish perception of what the EU is about. Danes no longer see the EU strictly as an economic organization. Denmark sees the security advantages of having a reunited Germany deeply integrated into the EU's political process. Unfortunately, Denmark has not embraced deepening EU integration, despite the country's own security interests to do so. This is because Danes are cautious of centralizing power in any institution, to include the EU.

Danish reluctance to embrace EU integration has forced Denmark to deepen its relationship with NATO. The EU's weakness in security and defense

matters has made this a necessity. The Danish populace seems to be more comfortable with NATO than the WEU. It is in Danish interests to keep the United States tied to Europe, because the United States shares many of the same objectives in the Baltic region. Denmark has broken a decades long pattern of passive and non-provocative policy in the Baltic region by recognizing and providing substantial support to the Baltic states. Danish initiatives have favorably shaped the policies of many EU countries towards the Baltic states, and have assisted the Baltic states with integration into European institutions.

Denmark has assumed a leadership role among the Nordic countries in its efforts to support and influence development in the Baltic region. This role has put Denmark on equal footing with Sweden which has traditionally been the regional leader in many contexts. This does not imply that Denmark occupies a dominant position in the region. It merely reflects the skillful policy Denmark has been able to adopt vis-à-vis Russia in promoting Baltic independence. Denmark's neutral activities and non-aggressive stance during the Cold War allow it greater latitude in former Soviet republics than any of the Western powers. The U.S. recognizes this and has totally supported and encouraged Danish policies in the region. Denmark and the other Nordic countries have recognized that the security of the Baltic states is an important part of their own security. Denmark's unique status as a NATO and EU member has allowed it to take a leading role in the region. Denmark's status and influence compared with the other Nordic countries have increased, generally at Sweden's expense. For many years Denmark was second to Sweden, and in many instances followed Swedish policy, but in the past decade a more balanced proportion of influence and power

in the area seems to have prevailed. Despite Denmark's leading role in regional issues, one should not expect it to become the dominant player in the region. It has neither the resources nor the will to be a regional power. Danish activism has instead promoted healthy competition among the Nordic countries, which has not spoiled regional cooperation, and has increased the effectiveness of support to the Baltic states. Denmark's activist policies of engagement with the Baltic states, coordination and cooperation with Poland (EU and NATO membership preparation), and strong support of NATO policies in the former Yugoslavia make it the defacto policy leader in the region. However, Sweden joined the EU in 1995 and appears to be ready to challenge that status. With Sweden's reputation as a neutral during the Cold War and with its formidable economic prowess, Sweden may soon resume its role as the regional policy leader.

Denmark's foreign and security policy has challenged Russia over the last decade and has supported non-reformists in Russia to a certain extent. Danish efforts in the Baltic states and Poland have angered Russian nationalists and revanchists. Denmark's size and resources, compared with Russia, limit its ability to directly influence the Baltics. However, it is in Denmark's best interest to promote the positive democratic tendencies that prevail in Russia today, and an extension of Danish-Russian cooperation seems a viable solution. If the democratic process is set back in Russia, such a reverse would affect Danish security policy immensely, especially in relations with the Baltic states, where Denmark would have to conduct a more cautious policy. This would not be in Denmark's interest. In addition, if Denmark wishes to maintain a leadership role

in the region, improved relations with Russia would be a very sound foundation to build them on.

The Baltic states' cooperation with Denmark is merely a stepping stone to membership in NATO and the EU. In other words, there is clearly a limit on how extensive the security cooperation can be, and in long-term perspective, the Danish role will decrease if the Baltic states are ever admitted into NATO and the EU. Still, a history of close relations with a state can be valuable for future endeavors in many areas, and Danish NATO membership could cause increased military cooperation.

Clearly, the fall of the Iron Curtain allowed the Baltic Sea countries to reestablish historical links with their neighbors, most notably Denmark. The question is, whether these new relations have resulted in a regional security system? At present, there is no Baltic organization to deal with "hard" security issues, and for the future, there is no organization aimed at forming a common security and defense policy for the countries in the region. However, extensive cooperation among the countries in, for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the institutionalized five-plus-three meetings between the Nordic countries and the Baltic State Council, constitutes a system which deals with "soft" security issues. The next question the region faces will be whether it is realistic to build an institution that deals with "hard" security issues. The Baltic states do not seem to want such a system because they wish to join the EU and NATO in order to obtain "hard" security protection from the great Western powers in Europe. The Baltics view the existence of a Baltic regional security organization as detrimental to their chances of getting into NATO or the EU. Yet,

so far the West has been reluctant to provide "hard" security guarantees, so the Baltic states have to be content with gradual changes that improve their security environment. The Baltic states have not enlarged Nordic cooperation. The three states are merely forming their own cooperation among themselves and with their neighbors. The Nordic countries do not have the economic nor military resources to establish a regional security institution to deal with "hard" security issues. The desire to do so among the Nordic countries is not present.

With all its promise and potential pitfalls, this is the situation the Danish security policy now confronts in the Baltic region. Since the end of the Cold War, chance has been the rule, and chance has led to a new dimension of creative and constructive engagement in Danish policy. Thus far the "new activism" has redounded to the benefit of Denmark and its neighbors, and, indeed, to the benefit of the larger community of nations. Perils persist, but engagement provides grounds for an active—not reactive—resolution of political difficulties. Denmark has used the last eight years to its and the Baltic region's best advantage. The trend seems to indicate solidly that Denmark has opted for engagement rather than isolation or selfish self-absorption. So much the better for the future.

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