
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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DUMAS CRITICIZES SDI, HAILS EUREKA AT WEU MEETING

AUO41602 Paris AFP in English 1546 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] Paris, Dec 4 (AFP) -- French proposals on Eureka, the European high technology project, and on military aviation could lead to West European mobilisation over "major military technology," Foreign Minister Ronald Dumas said here today.

Addressing a Western European Union (WEU) parliamentary session, Mr Dumas sharply criticised the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), otherwise [known as the] "star wars," project.

Recalling that France had expressed reservations over SDI, Mr Dumas said that "it appeared to us that the manner in which debate on SDI was launched," could lead, among other factors, to widespread division among West Europeans.

"Technology," he said, "cannot guide strategic choices," but added that although Eureka was not a military project it shared the context of speedy technological development.

On the recent Geneva summit, Mr Dumas expressed satisfaction over resumed U.S.-Soviet dialogue after a six-year interval.

"But," he added, "East-West relations are not reducible to dialogue alone between the superpowers."

/9365 CSO: 5200/2573

Elevanor Communication

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ABE SPEAKS ON SDI RESEARCH, RELATIONS WITH USSR

OW100641 Tokyo KYODO in English 0625 GMT 10 Dec 85

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 10 KYODO -- Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said Tuesday Japan has yet to decide whether to participate in the research phase of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), arguing that Tokyo needs to know more about the nature of the proposed space-based antimissile program. "The time is not yet ripe" for the government to make a decision, Abe told a news conference at the Japan National Press Club. He said Japan needs more time to study the nature of the SDI, insisting that "there is no time framework" for Japan to reach a decision on the matter.

The Government's current position on the SDI is that Japan "understands" President Ronald Reagan's rationale on the project, without saying one way or the other whether Tokyo will join in the research phase of the project, more popularly known as "star wars."

Abe's comment came just four days after Britain signed an agreement Friday with the United States offering British participation on the research of the SDI project.

Abe defended Japan's position by citing political considerations stemming from Japan's war-renouncing constitution and a Diet resolution which commits Japan's space efforts exclusively to peaceful purposes.

Touching on Japanese-Soviet relations, Abe said Japan hopes to sign a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union during Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's scheduled visit to Japan next month. He said Japan is placing high hopes on Shevardnadze's trip, hoping it will signal a breakthrough in Japan-Soviet relations and an exchange of visits between top leaders of the two countries, including a visit to Japan by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev "has shown great interest in Japan," Abe said in suggesting the possibility of a Gorbachev trip to Japan.

On Japan's protracted territorial dispute with the Soviet Union — a principal source of Japan's strained relations with Moscow — Abe said he plans to put Japan's case during Shevardnadze's visit. However, Abe also pointed out that Moscow has "its own position" over the territorial dispute, a veiled indication that Tokyo does not want the territorial issue to sidetrack improvement in Japan's ties with the Soviet Union. He said the recent U.S.-Soviet summit in Geneva had improved the atmosphere of Japanese-Soviet relations.

/9365

CSO: 5260/024

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

GORBACHEV MENTIONS PRC POSITION—Moscow, 27 Nov (XINHUA)—Speaking at the regular Supreme Soviet meeting held here today, Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said that his talk with Reagan was an important part of the Geneva summit, and that "the talk was sometimes very sharp as well as very frank." He stressed that if the United States proceeds with its Strategic Defense Initiative program, the Soviet Union cannot but improve the efficiency, accuracy, and power of its own weapons to check the U.S. efforts to make space weapons for Star Wars. Touching on the situation of the Asian-Pacific region, Gorbachev said: "We welcome the PRC's position to oppose the militarization of space and its statement of not being the first one to use nuclear weapons." [Excerpts] [Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1522 GMT 27 Nov 85] /9365

CSO: 5200/4013

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE: WEINBERGER REMARKS 'SABOTAGE' SUMMIT

PM101700 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Dec 85 First Edition p 4

[Editorial article: "What Is C. Weinberger Driving at?"]

[Text] A few days ago U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger again made slanderous attacks on the USSR. What was chosen as the occasion this time was the deployment in the Soviet Union, in full accordance with the provisions of the SALT II treaty, of the RS-12m mobile ICBM, which is a modernized version of the RS-12 missile (known in the West by the index number SS-13), which has long existed and is taken into account in the treaty.

What then are the complaints that C. Weinberger is making about the Soviet Union?

First of all, the fact that this Soviet missile is mobile. He claims that the mobility of the Soviet ICBM is a "source of serious concern" to the United States.

However, the SALT II treaty permits mobile ICBM's on the understanding that they must be counted toward the overall total level of strategic arms permitted under the treaty. The treaty even provides for special rules for counting mobile ICBM's which take into account precisely this property of them. Under the protocol to the SALT II treaty, whose period of validity was laid down as extending through 31 December 1981, the sides agreed not to deploy both mobile ICBM's and long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The period of validity of the protocol has expired. The United States ignored the pledge envisaged by the SALT II treaty to hold talks with the Soviet Union regarding the facilities covered by the protocol. At the time it did not agree to hold alks on the questions that the protocol envisaged would be subject to joint examinaion, but began the mass production and then the introduction into combat service (vvod v boyevoy sostav] of long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, which it had pledged not to deploy under the protocol to the SALT II treaty. Therefore, in deciding its future actions with regard to mobile ICBM's and in response to the U.S. actions, the Soviet Union is entitled to act as it sees fit in order to maintain its defense capability at the requisite level.

The deployment of the RS-12m mobile ICBM is being carried out in the Soviet Union in full accordance with the provisions of the SALT I interim agreement. As the RS-12m missiles are deployed in the Soviet Union an appropriate number of stationary missiles are withdrawn from service [snimayetsya s vooruzheniya] while observing all the necessary procedures, and the Soviet side regularly informs the United States about this at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The Pentagon leader, as the compilers of reports on so-called Soviet "violations" of arms control treaties and agreements have

repeatedly attempted to do, is again stating, without any foundation, that the RS-12m missile being deployed in the Soviet Union is not a modernization of an existing missile, but a "totally new missile." Mr C. Weinberger does not bother to offer any proof to corroborate this thesis. If you examine the actual situation, no grounds can be adduced for such a claim. The Soviet Union unswervingly fulfills the pledges it assumed under the SALT II treaty.

As is well known, this treaty permits the modernization of ICBM's within certain limits. It is precisely within these permitted limits that the modernization of the Soviet RS-12 missile was carried out. The Soviet representatives informed the U.S. side in the SCC of this promptly and in detail. They quoted the relevant technical data about this, which clearly show that in terms of its weight characteristics, size, number of tages, and type of fuel -- that is, of all the parameters regulated by the treaty's ovisions -- the RS-12m missile falls completely within the framework of modernization envisaged by the treaty.

Both the missile in its original form and the modernized version of it have one warhead. The fact that the missile has become mobile in no way changes its fundamental characteristics and does not give grounds for regarding it in its modernized form as some kind of new type of ICBM, as the U.S. side is attempting to do.

In general on the question of mobile ICBM's, representatives of the U.S. Administration occupy a manifestly inconsistent position that is at variance with their previous statements on this score. During the SALT II talks the United States subscribed to the viewpoint that the mobility of ICBM's contributes directly to the survivability of this part of the strategic "triad" and consequently leads to an increase in strategic stability. Similar remarks were also made on the U.S. side at the SALT talks held in 1981-1983, that is, under the present administration. These statements also correspond to the United States' practical actions at that time. The United States was then gambling on deploying a mobile variant of its new MX ICBM. However, having failed to overcome the technical difficulties in deploying a mobile variant of this missile or for some other reason, the United States decided to deploy it in silos. At the same time it embarked on the development [sozdaniye] -- with a combat deployment [razvertyvaniye v boyevoy sostav] deadline of the end of this decade -- of the new Midgetman missile, for which a mobile basing mode is envisaged. It is impossible not to see that the current attacks on making ICBM's mobile is an opportunist ploy by the Pentagon manifestly designed to attempt to delay or even prevent the deployment of mobile ICBM's in the Soviet Union insofar as such deployment increases the survivability of the Soviet strategic forces and makes them less vulnerable to a first strike against them on the part of the United States.

The statement by Mr Weinberger -- a well-known supporter of a so-called "tough" line toward the Soviet Union and of the continuation of the arms race and an opponent of the SALT II treaty -- adds nothing new to his position, and the U.S. defense secretary's latest anti-Soviet outburst could be disregarded were it not for the timing of this statement. A mere 3 weeks have passed since the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President met in Geneva and recorded in the joint statement on the results of the meeting the two sides' readiness and intention to move toward the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, the prevention of military advantages for the Soviet Union and the United States over each other, the prevention of an arms race in space, and the termination of the arms race on earth. The need to seek the strengthening of strategic stability and the reduction of nuclear arms was reaffirmed. All this is evidently not to Mr C. Weinberger's liking.

It is well known that the U.S. President, who had set off for the Geneva meeting, was pursued by a letter from C. Weinberger in which he attempted to persuade the President not to take in any circumstances any steps which would ease tension between the USSR and the United States and, in particular, would signify a readiness on both sides to adhere to the provisions of the SALT II treaty. Weinberger is now continuing the same line in an attempt to cast the USSR in an unfavorable light in terms of compliance with this treaty, compromise the Soviet Union's position with respect to arms limitation commitments, and thereby align the administration in general against the achievement of any accords with the Soviet Union on ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space.

This line aimed at sabotaging what was achieved in Geneva is not in keeping with the U.S. people's interests either. As public opinion polls conducted in the United States show, most Americans advocate that the positive achievements resulting from the Geneva meeting be further developed and that subsequent Soviet-U.S. summit meetings, contacts at other levels, and the talks between Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva lead to specific accords promoting the lessening of nuclear confrontation in the world, the lessening of the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, the prevention of an arms race in space, and the ending of the arms race on earth.

This mood is in tune with the aspirations of the Soviet people and all the world's peoples. The Soviet Union is prepared to do everything incumbent upon it to see that these aspirations of the peoples are translated into concrete measures for detente and the improvement of the international situation. But, for all this to be resolved certain circles in the United States should not follow the path of sabotaging the process initiated at the Geneva meeting. What is now required is to promote the development of positive approaches to disarmament questions and observe existing treaties and agreements.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1189

SOVIET LITERARY PAPER REVIEWS MAIN ASPECTS, IMPLICATIONS OF SUMMIT PM101235 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Dec 85 pp 1, 2

[Burlatskiy, Yu. Izyumov, and A. Frenkin report: "Geneva: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow"]

[Text] Geneva, Moscow -- Moment of Truth

In every intelligent person's life, sooner or later a moment comes when he wants to stop, look back on where he has been, and understand the meaning of his life on earth. That moment of truth can often overturn everything in his mind and make him reexamine the supposed values by which he has lived and turn to the true values, the only values of significance for existence.

Now such a moment of truth is arriving for all mankind. Let us recall once again M.S. Gorbachev's words: "At the turning points in history, it can happen that moments of truth are as necessary as the air itself. The international situation has become too dangerous because of the intensified arms race and too many fables are woven about it, intimidating people. A real need has arisen to dispel this mist and test words against deeds."

We were at the press conference, which everyone remembers, when these words were spoken. We will probably never forget our sense of the significance of what happened in Geneva during the days of the meeting between the leaders of the two great powers.

The situation -- simple and piercing -- is that our world has reached the very brink of the abyss. Practical, very practical people in the United States and throughout the West, people harnessed to the chariot of day-to-day life, managers, generals, and scientists, are creating more and more new military toys every month, every day. They push aside the thought of when and how these toys will be put into practice and used. No doubt many of them would shudder if they were to clearly picture in their imagination that every new nuclear charge they create contains half a million human lives. How many of these toys have been accumulated in the 40 years of rivalry started by the United States under Harry Truman and foisted on us and many other countries? Some 50,000 atomic charges! Is that not enough? Is that not sufficient to guarantee the total destruction of every living thing on earth? Or do we have to take with us the neighboring planets, other worlds which have hitherto been inaccessible to the malicious will of human genius?

The sinister realities of the nuclear age do not allow further progress on the path of military confrontation, total political confrontation, along which aggressive circles in the United States and other capitalist countries seek to lead the world.

That is why the world awaited the Geneva meeting with tremendous hope. Now, analyzing its results, politicians and the press in many countries associate the success of the talks with the Soviet leadership's new approach to foreign policy problems. This approach is realistic and dialectical at the same time. Of course, nobody had any illusions about the U.S. side's readiness to resolve in a businesslike way the main questions — disarmament and the renunciation of the militarization of space. But we could be waiting many more years for the viewpoints to come closer together. We must not delay. We must take any opportunity to make peace more reliable.

This position accords with the aspirations of reasonable people in all countries. Appeals for talks to take place reached Moscow from everywhere.

And the Soviet Union did everything in its power to make the meeting a practical success. The ending of all nuclear explosions, the unilateral moratorium on testing antisatellite weapons, clear and concrete proposals on disarmament and other vitally important questions, and, lastly, restraint in polemics were major positive preconditions for the dialogue between the two countries' leaders. We were not guided by narrow interests in this; we were acting in the name of all mankind's future.

We remember a typical episode: On 19 November M.S. Gorbachev received representatives of U.S. antiwar organizations at the Soviet mission. They brought a peace petition with 1.5 million signatures. Looking at the countless boxes containing signatures, Mikhail Sergeyevich said:

"How many human hopes!..."

In his report at the USSR Sepreme Soviet session M.S. Gorbachev said: "A dialogue between top leaders is always a moment of truth in relations between states."

A moment of truth, a moment of insight... The words which all mankind needed were found, were pronounced by our country's leader, were spoken directly and frankly to the U.S. President in one-on-one conversations. In the program very little time was allotted for these conversations, but in practice they took up a large part of the time allowed for the talks, some 6 hours in all. This annoyed the President's entourage, who for some reason were afraid to let him out of their control. Journalists heard how, before the first such meeting, Reagan Jr., who was present in Geneva as a correspondent, looked at his father and asked worriedly: "Are you ready, Dad?"

Since the content of the two leaders' conversations was not publicized, the reporters sought any kind of indirect evidence about the atmosphere. Everyone agreed that at each new meeting the mutual greetings were warmer. "The ice is broken" — that phrase was repeated in newspapers in the most diverse countries. Businesslike contact had been established between the leaders of the world's most powerful countries. And although people's satisfaction at this was even then laboring under the burden of very serious concern about U.S. plans for putting weapons into space, people were keen to hope for a triumph of reason. They were glad to learn that after a walk in the park near the U.S. President's villa, the interlocutors entered a little house on the shore of Lake Geneva and sat by a blazing fire. As though they hoped that the chill in relations would be lessened by the fire...

Reassuring reports reached the press, but the conversations themselves, as M.S. Gorbachev said later, "were extremely blunt at times. Nonetheless, it seems to me, they were also to a certain extent, productive."

After the final meeting a member of the U.S. delegation summed up:

"It seems that in some respect you have convinced our President a little."

The chief gain from the meeting lay in the recognition by the leaders of the two great powers that nuclear war must never be unleashed, that there can be no winner in such a war, and that neither of the two countries will seek to achieve military superiority.

The tremendous, purposeful work on our part had not been to no avail. The hopes of millions of people were not disappointed.

"Can you explain how your people managed to include the phrase about preventing an arms race in space and stopping the arms race on earth in the joint statement?"

 Λ U.S. correspondent of our acquaintance practically flung this question at us immediately after the statement was issued.

That question is not surprising if you recall what was being written and said in the United States on the eve of the Geneva meeting and what results were predicted. The only thing in no particular doubt was the possibility of agreements on cultural and scientific exchange, consulates, and air communications. "The SDI is not open to discussion, the time has not yet come for disarmament," representatives of the administration said, "but we will speak at the top of our voices about human rights and Soviet interference in various regions." There will be no joint communique, official White House spokesmen warned. The President himself, according to the U.S. press, believed it would be considered a great success if it proved possible to even agree to continue holding meetings.

As for reactionary political forces -- which, unfortunately, are extremely influential at present in the United States -- they were against holding the talks at all and did everything they could to wreck them.

In light of all this, the actual course of the meeting appears an undoubted achievement in itself.

"What is the first reaction in the United States to the results of the meeting?" We asked prominent U.S. journalists. Their answers amounted to the following. The reaction is twofold. Some people rejoice, together with the whole world, at the changes for the better and hope that more will be achieved in future. Others are perplexed: How could this man who is famous for his anticommunism spend 6 hours alone with the communists' leader and even find something to agree with him about?

"You must understand," one of our U.S. colleagues said, "everything you have heard Reagan say before about your country, about socialism and communism, was an expression of his true convictions, and at his age it is not easy to shake such convictions. If he has realized that communists are people like everyone else and that you can hold talks with them and reach agreements, that is tremendous progress."

The following instance may give some idea of the difficult nature of the work done prior to Geneva and at the talks themselves. THE NEW YORK TIMES, speaking of the preparation of the agreement on contacts and exchanges in the sphere of science, education, and culture, wrote: "In order to conclude the agreement, U.S. and Soviet representatives have met 65 times in the last 15 months. Their talks lasted more than 200 hours."

The Psychological Climate

We would like to stress the value, for its own sake, of the psychological breakthrough in Western public opinion during and after the Geneva meeting. The correspondent of one of Britain's leading newspapers described how his father telephoned him from London: "Something quite unbelievable is happening, the whole of Britain has spent 1 and 1/2 hours listening to the Soviet leader's press conference. Speeches by our own country's leaders or the leaders of any other Western country have never been listened to so attentively. I think it is an unprecedented new phenomenon in our attitude to the Soviet Union, its policy, and its leader."

All of the press unanimously noted the importance of the work of our group of experts, diplomats, and journalists in explaining the Soviet position. In the quest for first-hand information, the major television and radio companies and the press from the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, Switzerland, and other Western countries gave them generous air time, published long interviews, and asked them to comment on every problem discussed at the talks.

Suffice it to say that each of the experts (among them one of the authors of these lines — F.M. Burlatskiy) gave at least 20-25 interviews. Now representatives of the Western press are themselves looking with surprise at what they call an "unprecedented boom" in Soviet information and propaganda, especially in the conditions of the decision, taken on U.S. initiative, to report nothing about the progress of the talks themselves.

Here is what the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU wrote about this: "In terms of the quality of the work done with the public, the Soviets clearly beat the Americans. A delegation of highly qualified experts arrived in Geneva a week before the meeting — state officials, scientists, and military men, who immediately started holding press conferences and willingly gave interviews... The Americans were simply disheartened by the Soviets' sudden superiority in the struggle for public opinion. They tried to create a similar information system in a short space of time, but it did not work. However, in any case it would have been difficult for the Americans to select a team of highly qualified experts who could successfully 'sell' the 'star wars' program. When the Swiss organizers of the meeting offered to place the U.S. press center in the Hall of Congresses next to the Soviet press center, the Americans refused, preferring isolation in a fashionable hotel. The Soviets accepted the Swiss side's proposal and only gained by it; the journalistic battles were now mainly played out in the Geneva conference center."

In any event, a substantial breach has been made in the Iron Curtain with which the Western mass media carefully conceal from the masses the truth about our country and its foreign and domestic policy. Western journalists apparently felt the need for dialogue with our representatives, a dialogue which would be a continuation and reflection of the dialogue at the level of the top leaders of the two great powers. It is hard to say how long this mood on their part will persist.

Soviet scientists and journalists, for their part, see it as their task to continue the energetic activity in the spirit of Geneva to improve Soviet-U.S. relations and the entire international climate.

The Weinberger Detective Story

Practical conclusions must now be drawn from the joint acknowledgement of the impossibility of war between the United States and the USSR. The main conclusion is that it is time to end the military rivalry which is murderous for both sides and lethal for all mankind. Has this truth been fully grasped by our partners, their allies, and public opinion in their countries? That is the question we would like to answer in reviewing the responses to the Geneva meeting.

Examining these responses, you cannot help having mixed feelings. On the one hand, the predominant opinion everywhere is that Geneva was a major event in international life and that it is capable of laying the foundations for the process — albeit prolonged and difficult — of improving Soviet—U.S. relations and for more fruitful talks on limiting the arms race. Yes, we heard a sigh of relief from all over the world, because everyone is fed up of the acute confrontation and this dancing on the brink of the abyss. People are tired of living with the fear of nuclear explosions and the nuclear winter. And politicians have to reckon with this, one way or another. But on the other hand — and we have no right to close our eyes to this — we see that those who advocate continuing the military rivalry are not for a moment renouncing their objectives and their plans.

Readers already know that on the eve of the summit meeting a letter from U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger to President Reagan appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES. Immediately after the publication of this apparently strictly confidential message became known, we set off for the U.S. press center in the Intercontinental Hotel.

squirming in front of newsmen. Their attempts to prove that the Weinberger letter had gotten into the newspaper accidentally, as a result of some kind of "information leak" caused a burst of laughter in the hall. Even then, it was clear to everybody that the publication of this letter on the very eve of the talks was a move in a game designed to show the Soviet leader what "pressure" the U.S. President was under and how difficult it would be for him to travel "his mile" toward the Soviet side.

The article "Stolen Letter" which has now been published in the same NEW YORK TIMES adds a few new details to the so-called "leak" story. It reports that Weinberger had striven with all his might to be taken to the summit meeting in Geneva, but three officials — Regan, Shultz, and McFarlane — attempted to exclude him from the delegation. And the President agreed with them. The publication of the letter was Weinberger's countermove, so to speak. On board the presidential aircraft en route to Geneva one White House staffer said in response to a question from journalists about whether the Weinberger letter was designed to undermine the summit meeting: "Without doubt." As for the President himself, he is said to have been indignant merely about the fact that the letter had gotten into the press, not about the actual content of the letter. The Pentagon chief, the newspaper concludes, is almost invulnerable since he has been cooperating with Reagan for 20 years and enjoys his complete trust.

Ultimately, the crux of the matter does not lie in how Weinberger's letter got into the press or why. The crux lies in the letter itself and the nature of the "warnings" it contains. At the very beginning of the letter Weinberger warns the President on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against any encroachments on the "strategic modernization program" announced in October 1981 and also on the modernization of conventional forces and enhancement of their combat readiness. He warned the President particularly resolutely against, first, agreeing to continue to observe the SALT II provisions and, second, officially agreeing to restrict SDI research and development [razrabotka] solely to that said to be allowed "on the basis of the most restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty"; and, third, he opposed the inclusion in a communique or statement of provisions proposed by the Soviet Union concerning the importance that the sides attach to the observance of accords (meaning all previous treaties concluded between the USSR and the United States relating to the arms race limitation process).

To conclude this detective story let us cite the words of Weinberger himself about the summit meeting. He said: "I am very satisfied with the outcome of the Geneva meeting... As the President has said, it was a fresh start and augurs well for the future." A very

alarming statement! It transpires that he is particularly gratified that the President's research program "will be unswervingly continued."

The Pentagon held a news conference a few days ago. A number of photographs illustrating the progress of work under the "star wars" program were shown. This news conference was manifestly an attempt to prove that the program is worth the billions of dollars being appropriated for it. Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, leader of the organization for the implementation of SDI, stated that research is progressing very rapidly. However, many people in the United States believe that in practice such assertions are merely an attempt to get Congress to allocate more appropriations.

What Course?

Congress greeted the President with an ovation when he arrived in the United States following the end of the talks. But some people were overjoyed at what was achieved in Geneva, while others were overjoyed that there was no progress on the main problems.

"No" is a favorite word among rightists when it comes to Soviet proposals. They are now already concerned about the leaders' next meeting and have begun to bring powerful pressure to bear on the administration well in advance. Shultz has been chosen as the target for criticism. The extreme rightists are "blaming" him for the positive changes in Geneva.

The not unknown Brzezinski rushed to "justify" Reagan, stating that he was and remains an anticommunist and was unable to display the "firmness" expected of him in the talks merely because of his emotions.

Judging by his statements, R. Reagan himself does not want to spoil relations with any side. When addressing the public at large he stresses his contribution to ensuring that the danger of war has now diminished. But, he placates the rightists by saying the SDI project will be implemented.

The great complexity of U.S. political life is well-known. It is also well-known that there is no unity among the President's closest entourage: McFarlane's resignation immediately after Geneva is confirmation of this. Therefore, any conclusions must be drawn on the basis of actions, not words.

Unfortunately, the Soviet-U.S. joint statement included neither references to the ABM Treaty nor many other important provisions capable of reversing the arms race process.

Speaking in Congress on 21 November, R. Reagan said: "It was a constructive meeting. So constructive that I look forward to welcoming and receiving M.S. Gorbachev in the United States next year. And I have accepted his invitation to visit Moscow the following year."

That is what one aspect of his speech in Congress looks like. But there is also another aspect, which preserved almost untouched previous prejudices and destructive arguments. The President stressed that he adheres firmly to the line aimed at "strengthening our defense capability and alliances."

This means an intention to continue to implement all military programs planned by the United States and, first and foremost, the SDI program.

The President did not omit touching on the question of "Soviet expansionism in a number of regions of the world." But, he added an optimistic note, saying: "Nevertheless this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was a good start; and now our byword must be: 'firmly continue to follow the same course.'"

"But what course? The course of continuing military rivalry and the arms race and taking weapons into space? Or the course of ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space, as the Soviet-U.S. joint statement again reiterated? Despite the way it is depicted in the White House, these are not one and the same course, but two different courses.

Therefore, along with many sober-minded people throughout the world, we say: "Yes, it is good, very good, that a direct and frank dialogue has finally taken place between the leaders of the USSR and the United States and that important decisions were taken. But the moment of truth, the moment of enlightenment must come not only for us, but also for our partners and for all governments and peoples. That moment will come when the senseless and pointless arms race is finally ended."

In both the United States and other Western countries the acute struggle around this question is continuing and will maybe grow. The Soviet arguments have made a strong impression everywhere.

fhe leaders of Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, and other capitalist countries have made a unanimous positive assessment of the results of the Geneva meeting.

But when you read and ponder closely the point of the most positive reactions to Geneva, you can see how full they are of diverse nuances and often opposing judgments. There are also politicians expressing particular satisfaction over the points on which there was no narrowing of the gap between positions, primarily on the questions of limiting the arms race and preventing the militarization of space. There are a considerable number of expressions of concern about the future progress of talks on key problems of limiting the arms race.

There is nothing more dangerous for a new truth than an old delusion, Goethe wrote. The This applies completely to those who to this day are inclined in the struggle to strengthen national security to rely not on joint actions to limit arms, but on the unfurling of a further arms race. This applies primarily to the supporters of the SDI program, which, according to the general view, has become the main obstacle to ending the military rivalry.

In his report to the USSR Supreme Soviet session M.S. Gorbachev said: "...We are justified in saying that the overall balance from Geneva is positive... I wish to state that for its part the Soviet Union intends not to slacked the pace, but to strive with all States for the curtailment of the arms race and a general improvement in the international situation. We hope that the same kind of approach will also be displayed by the United States. Then, I am confident, the work done in Geneva will yield its real fruit."

Thus, the main things still lie ahead. As is known, the best attitude to the truth is expressed in its application in practice.

/9274 CSO: 5200/1189

SOVIET COMMENT ON RESULTS OF REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

'Meaningful Conversation'

LD042037 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 4 Dec 85

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Prominent politicians are constantly returning to the subject of the Geneva meeting. Much is still being written about it in the press. The U.S. President himself, speaking in [name indistinct] stated that his conversation with the Soviet leader was meaningful if only because the decision was made at it to hold fresh meetings. The President emphasized that the summit meeting gave rise to hopes for an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union although he also recognized the existence of deep problems between the two states. Yes, we know the Geneva meeting engendered a certain optimism. It opens up ways toward the conclusion of important agreements, including an agreement on reducing the danger of an outbreak of war in Europe. There is a 50 percent chance of this being signed next year, at least this is what prominent U.S. experts maintain.

At the same time, increasingly frequently one hears that the very fact of the meeting and the progress achieved in Geneva were only possible because the United States has been seriously arming itself in the last few years. Of course, this is not so. It was by no means U.S. strength that induced our country to go there for the dialogue. And the assertions of those who think the Soviet Union can be frightened at all are naive. In agreeing to the meeting, we proceeded from the highest interests of humanity, averting an arms race in space and curbing it on earth. Meanwhile, the United States is doing everything to charge the situation. It is arming itself in earnest and pushing its NATO allies toward dangerous steps.

UN Committee Begins Discussions

LD040022 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Dec 85

[Boris Andrianov commentar]

[Text] The First Committee of the UN General Assembly has begun discussion on the complex of questions of international security. As is pointed out here to these delegates from many countries, the peoples are vitally interested in the implementation of the positive results of the Geneva summit between the leaders of the USSR and the United States. The news commentary is by Boris Andrianov:

Big things are best seen from a distance. This political aphorism involuntarily comes to mind as time gradually moves on from the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva. This event is being evaluated by the world public in an increasingly definite and precise way. And it is perfectly clear that the results of the meeting are being appraised throughout the world as generally positive.

The Geneva meeting allowed mankind to breath a little more easily. After all, the Soviet-U.S. summit dialogue definitively confirmed that the opportunity to return to the policy of detente, of achieving agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States about a radical reduction in the arms race has not been wasted. These thoughts were reflected in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement. Established here were not only general understandings of the situations of prime importance for the cause of peace; also defined in this document were the tasks of joint action in the main directions for strengthening strategic stability. The direct and frank talk in Geneva made it possible to reveal the common ground that may become the starting point for improving Soviet-U.S. relations. And that common ground is based on the recognition of the fact that nuclear war is impermissible and that there can be no victors in it. For this reason, the time has come when it is necessary to learn the art of living together in order to avoid a total nuclear catastrophe.

Such an objective is attainable; but for this, real results are necessary in the main issue: the resolution of the problem of war and peace. It is necessary to stop the arms race on earth and not to permit its being carried into space. This is the most important problem of the current age. All the peoples of the world are interested in its solution. However they are confronted by the mighty forces of imperialism which are by no means interested in detente, in the liquidation of the arms arsenals, in a breakthrough for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations. And these forces are represented primarily by the U.S. military-industrial complex. This means that the peoples of the world have most dangerous opponents, and that in order to repulse them active joint efforts are necessary. A real basis for uniting these efforts does exist: it is the constructive and consistent policy of the Soviet Union. The course of our country is clear. It is necessary to hold talks and not to rattle the saber. It is necessary to get down to relaxing tensions rather than accumulating the means for annihilating mankind. But in order to implement such a course, mutual trust is necessary. And it is not possible to create this on words alone. For this reason, now, everything depends on what specific responsive measures come from the U.S. side.

The main thing now remains to implement the spirit of Geneva, not to waste the chance for a real improvement in the political atmosphere in the world in the interests of all mankind.

'Broad Positive Response'

LD051656 Moscow TASS in English 1652 GMT 5 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow, December 5 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov writes:

There was hardly any other political event in the recent years which would evoke such a broad positive response as the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva. United Nations Secretary General Perez De Cuellar noted that he welcomes the spirit of the joint Soviet-American statement, specifically the readiness to seek common ground for the solution of existing problems. The very fact that there was a dialogue between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gor-

bachev attests to an accord to the effect that there will be no war, said Speaker of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress Thomas O'Neill.

We welcome the resumption of a dialogue between the USSR and the USA, said French Minister of External Relations Roland Dumas. He said France hopes that the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit will exert a beneficial effect on the process of the improvement of the international situation that has been started. The dialogue that opens great hopes, this is how the results of the Geneva forum were assessed by Italian President Francesco Cossiga. These and other such pronouncements which there were many, reflect the attitudes and aspirations of the international public at large which would like the world to take a wide road of peace, detente, and mutually advantageous cooperation, rather than the road of confrontation and the arms race.

Politicians and public figures in various countries, prominent scientists, and prestigious press bodies are united in the opinion that the Geneva meeting has become a major political event of the international life, and that the frank and open Moscow-Washington dialogue held during the meeting, which in itself is a stabilising factor in the present complex situation, was necessary, that its results which made it possible to compare the stands of the sides are useful, that they can serve as a basis for enhancing the level of confidence between the USSR and the USA. An extremely important result of the Geneva forum is the fact that its participants proclaimed in a joint statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Both sides recognised the importance of preventing any war between the USSR and the USSR, whether nuclear or conventional, and pledged themselves that they will not seek to achieve military superiority. And these facts are of principled importance.

The Soviet Union, true to its principled policy of peace, declared and declares in favour of everything positive that has been achieved in Geneva to be developed further, and the sooner, the better. And proceeding from the view that the cardinal task of the present is to avert the threat of nuclear self-destruction, the USSR advances an all-embracing complex of measures blocking all the roads to the arms race, be it in space or on earth, be it the race of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons. Naturally, we are realists, and we say outright that even though vast work has been carried out in Geneva, the solution of the most important questions connected with the main problem, that of ending the arms race which has swept the world, has not been found. Major differences on principal matters between the USSR and the USA persist.

But noting this fact, we emphasise with full reason another thing: The results of the meeting must be used to speed up the talks on nuclear and space arms on the basis of the joint Soviet-U.S. statement of January 8, 1985, now confirmed at the summit level. It is ever more necessary to achieve such a speeding up since the proposals of both sides have points of contact and open an opportunity of the quest for mutually acceptable solutions on radical reductions of nuclear arms under the condition of a ban on the development of nuclear space arms.

The United States plans connected with the militarisation of space, Washington's so-called Strategic Defence Initiative, represents the main obstacle to the curbing of the arms race. The Soviet and international public, naturally, have not overlooked the fact that certain circles of the USA continue banking on the preparation for "star wars", that since the Geneva meeting attempts to justify that dangerous line have been made by the President of the United States and a number of other representatives of the Washington administration — The White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, director of the Arms Control And Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman, Advisor to the President Edward Rowney, Under Secretary of Defence Fred Ikle, even though it is more than obvious that such a

course can only block the opportunity for terminating the nuclear arms race. And yet we shall hope that the Americans have not had their final say.

A long-term significance of the Geneva meeting can be manifested only in practical deeds, if Washington shows responsibility and readiness to act in the spirit of the joint statement adopted in Geneva. As to the Soviet Union, its allies and friends, they are determined to continue doing their utmost to uphold peace. The international public expects and demands that the positive results of the Geneva meeting should be strengthened and that further advance should be made.

Need for 'Living Together'

PM021657 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 30 Nov 85 p 3

[Political observer Yuriy Kornilov "View of Events": "The Great Science of Living Together"]

[Text] Among the many facts reported by the international press during the Geneva meeting was the following: During one of the demonstrations held in Geneva by participants in the U.S. "Peace March" antiwar organization, Chicago teacher (Devilla Rid) and her friends — to the applause of hundreds of people — enthusiastically performed in Russian the song "Let There Always Be Sunshine, Let There Always Be a Sky." Is this just a detail? Yes, a detail, but a typical detail and to a certain degree symbolic. To remove the nuclear threat and preserve a clear sky above the planet! This is the will and the demand of millions of the world's people, irrespective of whether they live on the banks of the Potomac, the Moskova, the Thames, the Seine, the Rhine, or the Danube.

The results of the Geneva meeting and the report by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the USSR Supreme Soviet session are the focus of attention of the international public and press. Prominent statesmen, public figures, well-known scientists, and the mass news organs of various countries note that the Soviet Union -- in stepping up to the utmost its peace-loving policy in the broadest range of international relations -- persistently calls for everything to be done to ensure that the forces of militarism and aggression do not prevail and advocates the development of equal, correct, and civilized relations between states. It is stressed that the Geneva meeting was a major political event in international life and that the direct and frank dialogue between Moscow and Washington, which took place during it and which in the current complex situation is of itself a stabilizing factor, was essential. Its results, which have made it possible to precisely compare the sides' positions, are useful and are capable of serving as a basis for increasing the level of trust between the USSR and the United States and exerting a positive influence on changing the planet's political and psychological climate for the better.

The UN Secretary General P. de Cuellar noted he welcomes the spirit of the Soviet-U.S. joint statement, particularly the readiness to seek common ground to resolve existing problems. "The Geneva meeting ended in a good atmosphere," French President F. Mitterrand stated. "The very fact that R. Reagan and M. Gorbachev held a dialogue is evidence of agreement that there should be no war," T. O'Neill, speaker for the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, stressed. "A dialogue which inspires great hopes" is how Italian President F. Cossiga described the results of the Geneva meeting. These and similar comments — and it is easy to provide more of them — reflect the new political realities of our day, dictated by the very spirit of the time and the special features of the situation that has taken shape in the world. There are so

many Mont Blancs of weapons stockpiled on the planet that, if they were put to use, the very destiny of human civilization would be in jeopardy. The development of events has reached a line at which particularly crucial decisions are required and when it is necessary to take literally every measures to remove the threat of nuclear self-immolation.

An exceptionally important result of the Geneva meeting was the fact that its participants stated in the joint document that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there could be no victors in it. The acknowledgement by both sides of the importance of averting any war between the USSR and the United States, either nuclear or conventional, and the proposition that they will not strive to secure military superiority are of fundamental significance. But is not the fact that the USSR and U.S. leaders stressed in Geneva the need to improve Soviet-U.S. relations really not of paramount political significance?! After all, these are countries which account for virtually one-half of world industrial production; countries which control the lion's share of the nuclear missile potential; two permanent members of the UN Security Council. All this, of course, does not give the USSR and the United States any additional rights or privileges, but places special responsibility on them for the fate of peace and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe.

Back on the eve of the Geneva summit meeting, the Soviet Union started to create a favorable atmosphere for it, putting forward a comprehensive package of measures to close off all paths for the arms race, whether in space or on earth, whether nuclear, chemical, or conventional weapons.

We favor a total ban on space strike weapons, because their emergence could turn the present strategic balance into strategic chaos, trigger off a feverish arms race in all directions, and undermine one of the most important bases for limiting it — the ABM Treaty. Our country proposes further, given a total ban on space strike means, to reduce by 50 percent all existing USSR and U.S. nuclear means capable of reaching each other's territory and to limit the overall number of nuclear charges for them to a ceiling of 6,000 for each side.

Of course, all this is by no means the ultimate goal: The Soviet Union is ready to go further still, right up to the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Of course, we are realists and we say bluntly that, although tremendous work was done in Geneva, this meeting did not manage to find solutions to the most important questions connected with the key task of today — halting the arms race — and major differences still remain on fundamental questions between the USSR and the United States. But, while stating this fact, we have every ground for stating something else too: The clearing of obstacles in the way of improving the international climate has started and this positive process — so the international public hopes and believes — will be continued. The Soviet Union has always believed and still believes — and this was particularly stressed at the recent CPSU Central Committee Politburo session — that the meeting's results must be used to accelerate the talks on nuclear and space weapons on the basis of the Soviet-U.S. joint statement of 8 January 1985, now confirmed at the highest level. This principled, consistent, and, at the same time, dynamic line of continuing dialogue on the key problem of today is actively welcomed by the international public.

Yes, the outcome of the Geneva meeting was welcomed by all who are aware that in our nuclear-space era -- when it is a question not just of the confrontation between two social systems, but of the choice between survival and mutual destruction -- a new

approach is needed, with a new look at many aspects of foreign policy. But there was a different, directly opposite reaction to the meeting in the camp of the militarists, the military-industrial complex bosses who make billions producing instruments of death and destruction. Right-wing Republican Party figures and influential representatives of the "war hawks'" headquarters, the Pentagon, obsessed by their insatiable imperial ambitions, have joined ranks with the "weapon kings." As is known, on the eve of the Geneva meeting Pentagon chief C. Weinberger sent the White House incumbent a letter in which, essentially trying to arrange for the summit meeting to be sabotaged, he recommended that he adopt a "firm stance" at the Geneva talks and not agree to any arms control measures that would jeopardize U.S. military programs. Now the Weinberger types are trying to utilize the very fact of the talks as a justification and cover for the arms race, attempting to neutralize the content of the Geneva meeting, and continuing to entertain illusory expectations that the United States will be able to secure military superiority by "outflanking" the USSR in electronics and computers. In Washington one still hears pronouncements aimed at legitimizing the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons, although it is patently obvious that this course can only block any possibility of halting the nuclear arms race.

One of the fundamental axioms of politics is that all words and all statements are verified by practice; the long-term significance of the Geneva meeting will only be revealed, of course, in concrete, practical deeds. Time will tell what flesh the leaders of the Washington administration can put on their statements about "devotion to peace and arms control" and what value can be placed on their assurances that the United States will not seek military superiority. As for the Soviet Union and its allies and friends, they are fully determined to continue to do everything to uphold and strengthen peace on the basis that, although the needle of the international political barometer is not yet pointing to "fair," it is more obvious today than ever before that it is possible and so necessary, in collaboration with the United States and other countries, to prevent that needle from moving toward the fateful "stormy" mark. "There is no denying that the differences between us are enormous," M.S. Gorbachev said at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. "But in today's world our interconnections and interdependence are just as great. The acute nature of the current situation leaves the USSR and U.S. leaders and the USSR and U.S. peoples no alternative but to master the great science of living together."

NEW TIMES Editorial

PM060941 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 48, Nov 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Geneva Summit"]

[Text] There was no dearth of prognostications ranging from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic. To what extent did they materialize in Geneva? Some expected more. Others may say that the results exceeded their expectations. If the big, serious job of work done in the two days of the summit is evaluated by objective criteria, if it is borne in mind that the positions of the sides and their approach to the summit meeting itself and the issues before it were widely different — in some cases diametrically opposed — it must be said that the dialogue was business-like, useful, constructive. It was not simply an opportunity for the two leaders to make each other's acquaintance, not merely the noncommittal "fireside chat" official Washington at first intended to make it. Problems relating to the termination of the arms race on earth and preventing it in outer space, which some wanted to relegate to the background, also figured in the talks.

First of all, the very fact of the establishment of direct contact and the exchange of views at the highest level on the cardinal problems of our time was in itself important, considering that six and a half years have passed since the previous summit and that the present U.S. Administration did not at once agree to the holding of such meeting. The understandings arrived at on the holding of another summit, on the prospects of bilateral cooperation in a number of spheres, and the agreement reached on contacts and exchanges in the spheres of science, education and culture are evidence of a positive step towards putting Soviet-American relations on an even keel. Constructive too is the agreement to give a positive impulse to the Geneva talks on the entire range of nuclear and space weapons.

In a word, bearing in mind both the natural and the artificial obstables (in no way attributable to the "hand of Moscow") to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. meeting each other halfway it may be said that perhaps the maximum of what is possible to achieve in the present circumstances and with the present alignment of political forces in the U.S. and in particular in its top echelons, was achieved in Geneva.

Opposition in the U.S. to holding the Geneva meeting, and even more so to the possible achievement of agreement on issues of global importance relating to the checking of the arms race, was considerable. Its aim was if not to torpedo, then at least to depreciate the value of the dialogue by capitalizing on the absence of unanimity in the U.S. Administration on the problems to be examined. The ultra-right quarters would like to exclude from U.S. political pratice the conclusion by presidents of agreements with the Soviet leaders on arms limitation. They once again trotted out the contention that "the Soviet Union always ends up gaining the upper hand in bargaining with the U.S."

The Soviet Union has never regarded summit meetings as a jousting ground where one side is bound to win and the other to lose. It is convinced that they are meetings of equal partners at which the only winner can be statesmanlike wisdom.

Proceeding from this standpoint, Moscow tried to do its utmost to ensure the success of the meeting. "We propose," Mikhail Gorbachev said on the eve of the Geneva meeting, "very clear and simple things: reducing the comparable nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States by half; closing tight the door to the deployment of weapons in outer space; halting and reversing the accumulation of nuclear missiles in Europe."

But even very clear and simple things, regrettably, are not yet grasped by some Western holders of responsible office. Their political thinking is still at the level of the prenuclear age, despite their predilection for the ultra-modern "star wars" strategy.

Thus, there is no need to wonder why the White House incumbent missed a truly historic opportunity -- the opportunity to crown the Soviet-American summit with an agreement in the spirit of the understanding reached by the two countries on January 8 this year to the effect that they would make it their aim to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it from spilling over into outer space.

Not all the expectations materialized. Not all the hopes were justified. Nevertheless the meeting was much needed. Needed in order to ease the tension in the international arena and in relations between the two biggest powers in the world. Needed so that the world should once again see who stands for what, who is ready to stop the arms race and who still hesitates to do so. Needed, in order to realize the necessity of still more resolute and vigorous struggle for peace and disarmament.

'Disappointment' Over Continuing Arms Race

LD300026 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Text] This week the USSR Supreme Soviet, meeting for its regular session in Moscow, considered the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva. Although the summit has failed to produce concrete solutions on disarmaments, the overall balance sheet at Geneva was positive, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev told parliament. Our observer Yuriy Reshetnikov comments on this connection:

The Soviet leader, thus appraising the summit meeting, did not attempt to gloss over the difficulties faced by our delegation at Geneva. He pointed out that reluctance of the U.S. leadership to renounce its "Star Wars" program did not allow reaching a concrete agreement on real disarmament and primarily on the central issue of nuclear and space weapons. As a result the arsenals of accumulated weapons on both sides have remained intact following the summit and the arms race continues unabated. That is, of course, a matter of profound disappointment for the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev openly said so to Soviet parliamentarians.

Meanwhile the assessments of the Geneva summit results given this week in Moscow seem to be regarded in the Western news media nearly as a retraction of what had been said at the summit meeting itself, and a hardening of the Soviet position. It is suggested that perhaps what was said privately at Geneva was meant for Western public consumption, while the harder line in Moscow was allegedly meant for domestic consumption. Nothing can be further from the truth, however. The Soviet position on curbing the arms race, as expressed in Geneva and this week in Moscow, remains unchanged. The Soviet Union made no secret of the fact that it went to Geneva to seek solution to the burning issue facing the world today: how to prevent nuclear war and curb the arms race. That was, in the Soviet view, the essence of the meeting itself and that was supposed to determine its results. It was made abundantly clear that the rigid U.S. position with regard ot its "Star Wars" program has been the main stumbling block on the road towards arms control, and that is not only the Soviet view. As is known, a number of Washington's close allies have refused to participate in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative that has been fiercely promoted by the U.S. administration.

Given the role they play in the modern world, the Soviet Union and the United States share unique responsibility before the rest of the world for the course of international events and their consequences. And the world is entitled to expect practical progress along the road charted in Geneva. This is precisely what the Soviet Union intends to work for in the meantime prior to the next summit meeting.

Both at the summit meeting in Geneva and in Moscow it was stressed that this country is prepared for drastic reductions in nuclear weapons and is ready to go its half of the way. But to resolve this issue it is absolutely necessary to keep the lid tightly closed on space strike weapons. Without it, drastic reductions in nuclear arms are impossible.

U.S.-Soviet Friendship Council

LD110521 Moscow TASS in English 2124 GMT 10 Dec 85

[Text] New York, December 10 TASS -- The National Council for American-Soviet Friendship has come up with a statement which stresses the significance for the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva. The meeting is a milestone on the way to consolidating international peace and security, to normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It set the beginning of a positive process. The favourable opportunities that have emerged should not be missed, the statement says.

However, no agreement was achieved in Geneva on the most important problem -- the termination of the arms race. The so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" which is stubbornly defended by the U.S. Administration remains the principal obstacle on the way to it, on the way to international peace, the statement stresses.

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CSO: 5200/1189

USSR ATTACKS REAGAN SPEECH IN FALLSTON

'Impermissible Attacks'

LD041909 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1734 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] Washington, 4 Dec (TASS) -- President Ronald Reagan made a speech today at Fallston (in the State of Maryland), in which he referred to the recent Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva.

I left for Geneva, he said, to begin a dialogue in the name of peace. The differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are based on opposing philosophical outlooks and values, but we wanted these talks to make it possible to sow seeds of hope in our relations — hope which one day could become genuine peace and lasting peace. A start was made in Geneva. We agreed to strive to achieve shifts in the spheres of armaments control, where there are points of contact, particularly for the purposes of achieving deep reductions in nuclear arsenals.

At the same time Reagan left no doubts that the Washington administration intends to continue with the program to militarize space, saying that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not be an "object for bargaining" at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments. In his speech the U.S. President permitted himself to make impermissible attacks on the Soviet Union's state system. [Moscow TASS in English at 1916 GMT on 4 Dec in a similar article on Reagan's speech omits the preceding sentence.]

Disguises 'Unconstructive Position'

LD051607 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 5 Dec 85

[Text] Washington, 5 Dec (TASS) -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan made a speech in Fallston (Maryland) in which he returned again to the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva.

When we set out for the Geneva meeting, R. Reagan said, we were in a realistic mood. "The United States and the Soviet Union are as different from one another as any two countries can be. Our differences are based on totally diverse philosophies, values, and ideals. It is impossible to imagine deeper and more basic differences. For this reason we expected no miracles, but we wanted the talks, if possible, to sow the seeds of hope in our relations, which will perhaps, one fine day, blossom and turn into

genuine and lasting peace. The Soviet people have a truly ardent aspiration for peace. I was filled with resolution to ascertain," the head of the White House said, "whether we could begin to settle some of our differences and even come to some agreements in those areas in which we found a common language. And for this reason we had quite a good start."

The head of the U.S. Administration recalled that he had several lengthy meetings with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. "He seemed to me to be a decisive person, but also a person prepared to listen," the President stressed. "He is profoundly attached to the system in which he grew up. He believes in it and puts his trust in it."

The President went on to repeat that "a nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be waged." For this reason, as he put it, he set off for Geneva in order to set out a course of achieving lasting peace. "And although I cannot say that this path is already distinctly seen," he stressed, "M.S. Gorbachev and I agreed to make persistent efforts in thos spheres in the area of arms control in which we found a common language, especially with the aim of achieving radical reductions in nuclear arsenals. We shall continue to discuss divergences in views between us in relation to regional problems."

We will continue, the head of the U.S. Administration said, the dialogue started in Geneva with a view to achieving agreements on cardinal reductions of nuclear arsenals under conditions of their strict observation, in order to help put an end to regional conflicts which carry within them the seeds of more major wars.

R. Reagan admitted that words alone are not sufficient to overcome the existing distrust between the USSR and the United States and get down to effective measures in the area of disarmament. "For this we need something more than mere words; deeds are required of us both in order to show that we really want to get on with each other," he said.

At the same time, the President reaffirmed his adherence to plans for the militarization of space which are called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) in Washington. This, as is well known, is aimed at ensuring for the United States the possibility of inflicting a first nuclear strike with impunity and it is the main obstacle and barrier on the path to curbing the arms race. He left no doubt the fact that his administration will not make any concessions at all in this area. SDI will not be an "object for haggling" at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, the President stated. Disguising his unconstructive position on this question, the head of the White House repeated his proposal to "open up" the scientific research laboratories of both countries engaged in scientific space and military research. Since the United States refuses to ban space strike weapons, this path, as is well known, will not lead to preventing an arms race in space, but is basically an invitation to monitor the progress of such a race.

In his speech Reagan tried to accuse the Soviet Union of the striving, as he put it, "to be 'number one' in military terms", attributing to the USSR the policy of the U.S. Administration, aimed at breaking the existing approximate balance and at achieving military superiority. He also noted that the United States "still has not made a decision" regarding the extension of the term of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty -- one of the barriers to the escalation of the arms race.

The head of the U.S. Administration paid significant attention to the prospects of bilateral exchanges in the sphere of culture, education, science, and technology between the Soviet Union and the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1189

USSR: 'REVEALING' SPEECH BY REAGAN IN SEATTLE ASSESSES SUMMIT OWO50955 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1115 GMT 4 Dec 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by Farid Seyful-Mulyukov]

[Text] In reflecting, together with you, on the results of the Geneva summit, I want to note that neither Moscow nor Washington are lapsing into euphoria, but are realistically assessing these results.

U.S. President Reagan's address in Seattle, Washington, on 2 December this year is revealing in this regard. President Reagan stressed: I set out for Geneva as a first step. I did not expect miracles, but I expected progress, a beginning, the first opportunity to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and I, Reagan added, talked frankly for many hours. I was satisfied with the results of our talks, the U.S. President noted. This was the new beginning that we wanted.

In the same speech, Ronald Reagan cautioned against ignoring problems that exist between the two great powers. He also did not refrain from groundless accusations of expansionism directed at our country. This is the inertia, so to speak, that prevents the Washington administration from understanding the essence of our policy, a policy of peace and mutual cooperation between all countries.

However, the Geneva meeting itself was a most powerful blow to the malicious myth about a Soviet military threat. In reality, the world is threatened by the militaristic ambitions of the United States, which are most strikingly embodied in the "star wars" program.

The Reagan administration does not intend to curtail this program. The plans of developing [sozdaniye] and deploying [ravertyvaniye] space strike weapons is the brainchild of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Going into space is destined to ensure orders for U.S. military concerns for at least the next 30 years, the West German journal SPIEGEL writes. The speed of space militarization is determined by 12 major U.S. military concerns, including Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Rockwell International, and others.

Major U.S. capital, thanks to its power and influence, is striving to firmly program the "star wars" program during President Reagan's stay in the White House and not to permit talks on this issue with the Soviet Union. For major U.S. capital, Spiegel stresses holding talks with Moscow on this program would be an even greater absurdity than, for instance, holding debates on the subject of how to blow up Wall Street.

Therefore, a lnog and difficult struggle lies ahead to prevent the militarization of space. Our country is ready for this struggle.

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CSO: 5200/1189

ANTHOLOGY OF SUMMIT-RELATED MATERIALS PUBLISHED

PM071921 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Dec 85 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "In the Name of Peace on the Planet"]

[Text] The anthology "The Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting" has been published. It contains documents and materials of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Geneva 19-21 November 1985, a report on the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact states' top leaders 21 November 1985, M.S. Gorbachev's report "On the Results of the Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting in Geneva and the International Situation" at the USSR Supreme Soviet session 27 November 1985, and the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Results of the Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting in Geneva and the International Situation."

The anthology is published by the Political Literature Publishing House.

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CSO: 52-0/1189

SOVIET COMMENT ON EARLY DECEMBER NATO MILITARY MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS

U.S. 'Overt Pressure'

LD032233 Moscow TASS in English 21128 GMT 3 Dec 85

[Text] Brussels, December 3 TASS -- Questions of the build-up of NATO strike forces, use of the latest technology in armies of the member-countries of the North Atlantic alliance were discussed by a meeting of NATO's military committee at the NATO Head-quarters in Brussels. The meeting in which chiefs of general staffs took part was held in conditions of overt pressure by the United States on its allies. The Pentagon's representatives have been publicizing the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" in an effort to compel West European countries to the participation in research programmes for the militarisation of outer space.

'Concentrated Pressure'

LD042221 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1144 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] Brussels, 4 Dec (TASS) — The session of the NATO Military Planning Committee at the level of defense ministers ended here today with calls for stockpiling nuclear and conventional weapons for the North Atlantic bloc. The participants in the session reaffirmed their intention to continue the deployment of new U.S. first-strike missiles in a number of Western European countries, which is dangerous to the cause of peace, and to implement actively the plan for the development of NATO armed forces for the current year and the 1986-90 period.

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger tried to gain from the bloc partners a new increase in military expenditure and unconditional observation of obligations adopted in the sphere of nuclear and conventional weapons. He also continued his "treatment" of NATO partners, trying to gain their participation in the program preparing for "star wars."

The Pentagon chief and NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington subjected the Netherlands to concentrated pressure, trying to achieve a rejection of the decision to reduce the fulfillment of part of the tasks placed on it by the bloc leadership in the sphere of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Despite the pressure, Netherlands Defense Minister J. de Ruiter reported his intention to adhere to the adopted decision.

The session's final communique includes a pretentious pronouncement on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting with an expression of hope for "a most rapid achievement

of progress at the Geneva talks." However, the document does not contain a constructive reply to Soviet peace initiatives, and the extensive list of various military measures in the NATO framework in which the extensive communique abounds indicates the North Atlantic bloc's intention to continue its course toward whipping up tension.

Greece and Denmark expressed a particular position in relation to the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe, refusing to support the relevant sections of the communique. Greece also opposed plans for the militarization of space. The representative of Spain, whose government has "frozen" the process of military integration into NATO, reserved his position on the whole text of the final communique.

Military Bodies End Winter Meetings

LD041501 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Text] The NATO military bodies have ended a series of winter meetings in Brussels. The defense ministers of 14 countries, with the exception of France and Iceland, gave key attention to problems of building up conventional arms. The United States and certain of its allies were displeased with the statement made by a representative of Holland who said that the country withdraws from a number of its commitments on the use of its air force in the event of a nuclear war. Observers believe that the decision was taken under pressure of the antinuclear movement which has assumed large scale proportions in Holland. It follows from the communique that only Great Britain has responded favorably to the insistent calls of Washington to take part in the "star wars" program.

'Externally Peaceable Rhetoric'

LD041621 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Text] A numer of executive NATO military bodies have just held sessions in Brussels. What was characteristic of these meetings of NATO defense ministers, national military leaders of member countries, and executives of a number of commands of this military alliance? There can be only one answer: a further rise in militaristic preparations and a line for building up tensions, writes our commentator Aleksandr Pogodin.

For one, the meeting of the defense ministers was actually reduced to twisting the arms of the Dutch Government. The leading NATO countries, which have already forced the Netherlands to agree to the deployment of new American first-strike missiles on its territory, are now simply indignant that the Dutch have decided to go back somewhat on their commitments in other spheres of nuclear armaments. The North Atlantic leaders have again displayed their open unwillingness to consider the clearly expressed will of the people of one NATO country which is opposed to its participation in the nuclear arms race. Their aim is obvious — to expand their nuclear arsenals in Europe, which is already crammed with weapons of mass annihilation, to a highly dangerous limit.

The line to step up the siting of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe has been reaffirmed in a communique issued by the so-called NATO Eurogroup. That was done contrary to objections by Denmark and Greece, which refused to support these exceedingly dangerous preparations. Whipping up the nuclear arms race, the NATO leadership

far from forgets either about the race in those types of arms that are usually called conventional, but which cannot be regarded at all as harmless. The desire expressed at the meetings in Brussels both for increasing the amounts of these arms and for improving them in quality can only lead to a further rise in the extent of the war threat.

Of course, the substance of these meetings of the NATO military bodies is not changed by the numerous long-winded assurances of a desire for peace and for a search for accords with the Warsaw Treaty countries. That externally peaceable rhetoric was accompanied by statements to the effect that for any talks to succeed, NATO should constantly build up its military might. That amounts to continuation of the same old policy from a position of strength, which has long proved to be completely untenable and to run counter to the persistent requirements of the present-day reality.

Communique Issued

LD031313 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 3 Dec 85

[Text] Brussels, December 3 TASS -- A one-day session of NATO's Eurogroup, the opener of the winter "Atlantic marathon" of meetings by leading bodies of the North Atlantic bloc, has been marked by the policy of a further buildup of nuclear and conventional armaments.

The session was attended by defence ministers from 12 Western European member states except France and Iceland which are not members of the NATO military structure.

The session's participants in a final communique stressed that the Western European NATO member states should play in full their part in maintaining the strength and cohesion of the alliance and reaffirmed their intention to continue holding talks with socialist countries from the position of strength.

The communique includes a declarative statement giving a positive assessment of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva and expressing the hope for possible progress in this direction. The heads of the military departments, however, accompany the clause in the communique with a detailed list of measures in the military field which attest to the contrary — the intention to contine the course towards heightening tension in Europe in order to thwart the chances of reaching arms control agreements.

The communique reaffirms the intention to continue the deployment of American first-strike nuclear missiles on Western European territory. The final document expresses satisfaction over the f_{act} that the missile deployment is being carried out according to schedule in all the countries concerned. Greece and Denmark, which stick to a special position on the question, refused to join this clause of the communique.

Simultaneously, strong pressure was brought, apparently on instructions from across the ocean, on the Netherlands whose government, in connection with the adoption of the decision to deploy 48 American cruise missiles on its territory contrary to the will of a majority of the population, now seeks to reduce somewhat the tasks in the field of tactical nuclear armaments imposed on it by the NATO leadership.

The defence ministers devoted much time to the discussion of plans on building up and modernizing conventional armaments. They confirmed the implementation of the plans to augmenting the bloc's arsenals with new types of armaments, munitions, and the estab-

lishment of additional infrastructure. Thus, 900 new tanks and armoured carriers, 100 heavy guns, 250 combat planes, about twenty warships and great quantities of other hardware will enter service 1986. The Ministers stressed the intention to continue efforts at standardization and modernization of new types of armaments.

The final communique welcomes the efforts to invigorate the activity of yet another military-political grouping -- the Western European Union, as NATO's "European support."

Many of the problems discussed at the session of the NATO Eurogroup will be discussed at the two-day meeting of the NATO Military Planning Committee with the participation of defence ministers of the Western European states to be joined today by the heads of the military departments of the United States and Canada.

'Old Militaristic Course'

LD031907 Moscow TASS in English 1813 GMT 3 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow, December 3 TASS -- TASS political news analyst valerity Vavilov writes:

The defence ministers of the twelve West European NATO member-countries have adopted at a meeting of the alliance's Eurogroup in Brussels a comunique welcoming the results of the Geneva meeting of Makhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, expressed support for the efforts to improve East-West relations and come to an agreement on considerable cuts in nuclear weapons. The ministers expressed the hope that it would be possible to ensure impressive progress by developing the results reached at the summit meeting.

It is a good statement. One may be led to think that the NATO defence ministers have realized that nuclear war shell never be fought, understood the importance of preventing any war, whether it be nuclear or conventional, that one should not strive to achieve military superiouity. It might seem that the NATO defence ministers have also realized their responsibility in the effort to preserve peace, and intend to act in the "spirit of Geneva".

But the positive impression left by that paragraph in communique is instantly gone as soon as one begins reading the next point of the communique. The NATO strategists are stubbornly following the old militaristic course — that of a buildup of the nuclear arsenal, of a considerable increase in the number of conventional weapons, a modernization of offensive weapons, introduction of increasingly sophisticated new types of death-carrying weapons.

The ministers point out with satisfaction, the communique says, that the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, which are first nuclear strike weapons) is done in all the European countries concerned on schedule. And this is going on despite the Soviet Union's confirmation of its striving to deliver Europe completely from the nuclear weapons — both medium-range and tactical ones.

Continuing the policy of ensuring military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries, the ministers have decided to increase next year the number of their tanks and other armour by 900 units through the latest types "Leopard-2" and "Challenger". The NATO troops will get 250 new planes "Tornado" and "F-16", numerous missile launchers. The Navy will get a new aircraft carrier, destroyers and submarines.

It is hardly necessary to carry on listing the new weapons and material to be supplied to NATO in 1986, new measures to strengthen NATO, including an increase in military spendings and creation of an infrastructure. All of them are evidence of one thing: The NATO countries are determined to carry on the old policy of building up tensions.

Morever, the supporters of the U.S. "star wars" programmes were trying to add to it at the Brussels meeting "their own European defence initiative". Manfred Woerner, FRG defence minister, proposed at the Eurogroup meeting that the possibility be studied of joint work be the West European countries to develop outer space-based anti-ballistic missile systems designed for deployment in Wester Europe. This happened despite the fact that the Soviet-American agreement was reaffirmed at Geneva on the need to carry on a search of ways to prevent arms race in outer space and put an end to it on earth.

This is hardly a way to ensure "impressive progress" as a follow-up to the Geneva meeting.

'Serious Differences'

PM061446 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 85 Morning Edition p 4

[V. Antonov report: "NATO: Along the Path of Military Preparations"]

[Text] Brussels--In NATO Headquarters in Evere, meetings of this organization's military organs have taken place.

The military ministers, chiefs of general staff, commanders in chief of the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc countries, and top NATO military leaders have held meetings within the framework of the "Eurogroup," the Military Committee, and the Military Planning Committee.

The meetings in Evere graphically demonstrated NATO's intentions of further pursuing the dangerous course of increasing militarist preparations and forcing the pace of the nulcear and conventional arms race. The session of the Military Planning Committee was a clear example in this respect. In the final communique on the results of the session its participants confirmed their willingness to continue the deployment in West Europe of U.S. first-strike nuclear missile weapons in accordance with the schedule adopted in NATO, to implement the "strategy of nuclear deterrence" agreed on by the bloc, to reinforce their arsenals of "classic types of weapons" using the latest technological achievements, and to strive to increase real military expenditure.

At the same time the session of the Military Planning Committee also revealed serious differences between the United States and its West European allies, primarily in the sphere of nuclear weapons. Thus, Greece has stated its opposition to U.S. nuclear strategy and Washington's plans to militarize outer space. The Danish representative reserved his country's position on the question of intermediate-range missiles.

During the NATO meetings massive pressure was brought to bear on the Netherlands, which recently announced its decision to reduce its obligations within the framework of the bloc with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. It is a question of the Dutch Government's intention to reject the use of nuclear ammunition on F-16 and Orion aircraft which patrol the North Sea coast. At the press conferences held here, foreign journalists literally showered NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington and U.S. Secretary of

Defense C. Weinberger with questions concerning the pressure on the Netherlands. Lord Carrington was forced to admit that the Pentagon chief and the defense ministers of a number of other bloc countries had expressed their "extreme displeasure" to their Dutch colleague, J. de Ruiter, concerning the decision of the Dutch Government, and that they had demanded it be reviewed. Local observers note in this connection that the pressure on the Netherlands will be continued at the session of the NATO Council, in which the bloc's foreign ministers will participate and which will take place in Evere 12-13 December.

'Stale, Militarist' Spirit

OW060905 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 4 Dec 85

[From the "Novosti" newscast; commentary by Aleksandr Serikov]

[Text] Meetings of the leading organs of the North Atlantic bloc have begun at NATO Headquarters in Evere. Here is our television news commentary:

[Serikov] Hello, comrades. It has become a tradition for leaders of the North Atlantic alliance to hold winter meetings. The spirit of the current series of meetings, judging by the first sessions, is also traditional; it is stale and militarist.

Of course, the results of Geneva are forcing the NATO strategists to formulate their bellicose statements more carefully, to camouflage them with peaceful rhetoric. However, the essence of NATO's strategy — intensified military preparations — will not change as a result. The first official documents of the meetings of the Eurogroup, the Military Committee, and the Military Planning Committee have shown this.

For example, the communique of the Eurogroup notes the NATO allies' intention to pursue, as before, a position of strength against the socialist countries. With this aim, the aspiration to continue deployment of U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles on the territory of Western Europe was reaffirmed.

The current meetings in Evere are also traditional in the sense that they confirm the discord within NATO. For example, Greece and Denmark, which adhere to a special line on the question of U.S. nuclear missile deployment in Western Europe, have once again expressed their opposition to Washington's nuclear strategy. Spain signed the document conditionally, while the Netherlands, which has decided to reduce its nuclear obligations in NATO, was subjected to unprecedented pressure.

The winter meetings of the NATO military leaders show that the main aim of their strategy, to build up the West's military potential, remains unchanged.

Shultz Trip Coincides Buildup

LD100037 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2012 GMT 9 Dec 85

[From "The World Today" program presented by Georgiy Zubkov]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz sets out today on a trip around Europe. He is to visit Belgium, Britain, and West Germany, where he will

continue his con-

sultations with the foreign ministers of the NATO countries which were begun by President Reagan during his return trip from Geneva after the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. These are the official reports. Shultz has made no detailed statements on his coming conversations with his West European colleagues, unless we take into account his statement on state frontiers in postwar Europe. The essence of this statement was an aspiration to review these frontiers and thereby to violate the reality of the contemporary European continent.

The trip by the U.S. secretary of state coincides with a series of traditional December sessions of various NATO organizations. Let us note that the Military Planning Committee and the NATO Eurogroup -- these are some of the organizations -- gave a positive evaluation in their final communiques of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva. That's very nice. But, unfortunately, this sensible judg ment was in no way developed in the final documents.

Quite the contrary, NATO's practical plans remain as before. In the sums given to military allocations, in the amounts of armaments, a trend can be clearly observed not towards a decrease in military confrontation on the continent, but towards an aggravation of it, towards a further growth in NATO military potential in Western Europe. Here is a fact. At the session of the NATO Military Planning Committee, Weinberger demanded that the West European countries increase their military expenditure annually by 3 percent on real terms, that is without taking into account inflation. It is worth recalling that , this year, the NATO countries spent \$357,740 on the arms race. And in the past 5 years they have spent \$1,831,925. Again there is a fresh increase in allocations for military purposes. A modernization of armaments is being planned. Next year there will be 900 new tanks and armored cars in Western Europe, as well as hundreds of airplanes and dozens of warships. The modernization of warheads for heavy artillery weapons and tactical missiles in proposed. It has not been excluded that the shells and warheads will no longer be atomic, but neutron. According to NATO statistics, there are now 5,709,000 men under arms in the bloc countries. But, as we see, all this is not enough for the NATO leaders.

Shultz' trip around the West European capitals coincides with the more active involvement of Washington's partners in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Last Friday, the first of the United States' Western European allies — London — gave its official agreement to participate in the militarist space program. Discussion on this question began today in Bonn. A 2-day public hearing opened in the Bundestag.

I shall conclude my talk about George Shultz' trip to Europe by mentioning that he intends to also visit Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia for, as it was stated, familiarization purposes.

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cso: 5200/1189

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER CLAIMS NATO MILITARY PLANS, BUILDUP THREATEN SECURITY PMO41809 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Dec 85 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General M. Proskurin: "What Lies Behind the 'Rogers Plan'"]

[Text] "Autumn Forge-85" -- the very large-scale 2-month maneuvers by NATO allied and national armed forces -- ended in November. The entire territory of Western Europe from northern Norway to Turkey and the waters of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean were turned into a gigantic military test range. Over 300,000 servicemen representing all branches of the armed forces of the bloc's countries, using a large quantity of military equipment and weapons, rehearsed "battles" following the scenario planned in NATO for a new world war.

The bloc's strategists do not conceal the fact that they are seeking to use these actions to bring psychological pressure to bear on the civilian population and servicemen, to force them to believe in the "Soviet military threat," and to persuade them of the need for the further buildup of NATO's military preparations. Everywhere the militarist rehearsal was accompanied by additional fuelling of anti-Soviet military hysteria.

The NATO maneuvers, taking place in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the USSR and the other socialist community countries and under conditions close to a real combat situation, were of a graphically expressed provocative nature. Here measures to train the troops, naval forces, and administrative organs were carried out on a scale that could ensure they developed into wide-scale aggression.

During the maneuvers, the foreign press has reported, there was a practical verification of the aggressive concepts and plans for the strategic and operational deployment of troops and their entry into war and questions of the use of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction — nuclear and chemical. Special attention was paid to the rehearsal of the delivery of an in-depth echeloned strike in accordance with the NATO "follow-on force attack" concept. The Western press also calls this "the Rogers plan," named for its creator, the U.S. General B. Rogers, NATO supreme allied commander in Europe. The NATO command envisages introducing all provisions of this plan into the combat and operational training of the bloc's allied armed forces in the eighties.

Its thrust consists of creating military superiority over the Warsaw Pact states in conventional armaments and favorable conditions for conducting combat operations with a view to defeating opposing armed forces in the initial period of a war without using nuclear weapons. The NATO military leadership, the Western press emphasizes,

believes that at the very start of a war its armed forces would succeed in simultaneously destroying the Warsaw Pact countries' troops' fire weapons through the full depth of their combat formation, including second echelons and reserves, even before they are brought into battle. According to Rogers himself, the destruction of the Warsaw Pact troops' second echelon should take place "by using ultramodern electronic reconnaissance facilities and new missiles with conventional loading, but with exceptionally high technical specifications." Therefore, it is planned to train NATO troops to conduct highly mobile offensive operations.

The main power of the imperialist bloc — the United States — has exerted and is continuing to exert decisive influence on the formation of NATO's coalition military strategy and its concepts. The Pentagon has a firm hold on the main levers of control of the NATO military machine. Its concept of the "air-ground operation" in a somewhat altered content and under the name of the "follow-on force attack" concept has migrated to the NATO staffs. They are both links in the U.S. strategy of "direct confrontation with Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Bourgeois propaganda tries to depict the "Rogers plan" as though the Pentagon's chief representative in NATO were counting on conventional weapons and trying to weaken the West's dependence on nuclear weapons. This is nothing but a crudely fabricated propaganda play. Rogers himself admits that nuclear weapons are still the main means of armed struggle and the NATO command "will make first use of them if the relevant situation takes shape." The modernization of conventional weapons should be viewed as a substantial addition to the improvement and buildup of the bloc's nuclear potential.

Rogers has frequently set forth his views on the use of general forces and nuclear weapons in a war in Europe. Thus, in an interview with THE WALL STREET JOURNAL he insists on improving the NATO "flexible response" strategy, including in it the concept of delivering strikes against the second echelons and reserves of the Warsaw Pact countries at the earliest possible stage of development of hostilities. It is also emphasized that in any war variation — nuclear or conventional — it is planned to conduct hostilities only on the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries. This is one more obvious testimony to the aggressive nature of NATO's strategic premises.

Inasmuch as the attainment of military superiority over the Warsaw pact countries in conventional armaments is a condition of the implementation of the "Rogers plan," the NATO leading organs have adopted a long-term (through 1995) program for building the bloc's allied armed forces. The foreign press notes that the program provides for their equipment with new, highly effective armaments, the modernization of existing models, and the development of complex automated systems of reconnaissance and troops and weapon control and electronic warfare means. Based on the latest achievements of scientific thought, these weapons have colossal destructive force and in terms of their destructive properties come close to tactical nuclear weapons. The implementation of the measures in the long-term program, in the estimation of NATO specialists, will make it possible in the event of mobilization to rapidly (within 48 hours of starting it) change the correlation of the sides' forces in terms of personnel and combat equpment in NATO's favor.

Special priority in the development and production of new types of armaments is given to high-precision weapons with a large capacity for resolving fire missions without increasing the numerical strength or fighting strength of their troops.

What specific types of high-precision weapons does this mean?

The U.S. magazine DEFENSE ELECTRONICS describes the new types of weapons of this kind, primarily the location-strike complexes. The precision location-strike system (PLSS) is designed to effectively locate and deliver massive strikes against enemy targets equipped with radar stations and communications facilities to a depth of 500 km. According to Western military specialists' figures, up to 15 targets can be destroyed simultaneously. Western Europe plans to have several PLSS complexes.

Tests have been completed on location-strike complexes of the assault breaker type designed to destroy enemy armed groupings at a depth of up to 200 km from the front line.

The Pershing-2 missile and ground-, air-, and sea-launched cruise missiles with conventional charges are designed to deliver strikes against deep enemy targets including stationary targets. All these missiles have a sufficiently high degree of accuracy. It is planned to use the F-16, Tornado, and other tactical aircraft with highly accurate guided missiles and bombs for the same purposes.

With a view to placing a material foundation beneath the "Rogers plan," measures are being taken to improve existing NATO combat equipment. For instance, the ground forces' fire and strike power is being increased and their mobility is being enhanced.

According to foreign specialists' reports, the modern Abrams, Leopard 2, and Challenger tanks with which the NATO countries' armed forces are equipped and considerably superior to previous generations of tanks in terms of their combat qualities. New types of munitions are being created and their range, accuracy, yield, and area of destruction are being increased. These types of munitions include high-explosive munitions [boyepripasy obemnogo vzryza], missile salvo fire systems, and others.

The "follow-on force attack" concept is virtually a component of U.S. strategy which, according to a statement by Pentagon chief C. Weinberger, is aimed at achieving "total and undisputed U.S. military superiority." These dangerous designs are based on fallacious calculations. An explicit and clear statement is made on this score in the report on the meeting of the Warsaw Pact states' top leaders at which M.S. Gorbachev provided information on the course and results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva. "The Warsaw Pact states," this report says, "state once again that they are not seeking military superiority, but they will not allow such superiority over themselves either."

The party will seek consistently, the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program states, to ensure that the process of the consolidation of security, trust, and peaceful cooperation in Europe started at the Soviet Union's initiative and with its active participation develops, deepens and encompasses the whole world. The broad, constructive program of measures aimed at the halting of the arms race, disarmament, and the safeguarding of peace and the peoples' security — a program upheld by the CPSU and the Soviet state — provides, together with other measures, for the limitation of conventional armaments and the halt of the creation of new types of such weapons which in terms of their destructive force are close to weapons of mass annihilation.

But, it must be considered that the continuing adventurist gamble on force accompanied by the unbridled buildup of both nuclear and conventional NATO armaments cannot fail to increase the threat to peace. This fact obliges Soviet servicemen to enhance their political vigilance and to be in a state of constant readiness to repel any intrigues of the aggressor.

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CSO: 5200/1189

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NATO REVIEWS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

AU281743 Paris AFP in English 1719 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Text] Brussels, Nov 28 (AFP) -- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members are reviewing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe in the light of the recent Soviet-American summit in Geneva, diplomatic sources at NATO headquarters here said today. The sources said the two superpowers had reached a tentative "interim agreement" which would cut and set a ceiling on the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles and equivalent U.S. missiles deployed in Europe. NATO defense ministers, who are to meet here early next week, will probably discuss the issue, which will be on the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of experts of the special consultative group.

The sources said the issue, part of wider Soviet-U.S. negotiations that also touched on a proposal to halve the superpowers' strategic arsenals and on the controversial U.S. "star wars" space-based defense research program, would also figure prominently at a meeting of foreign ministers of the 16-member alliance next month. NATO's European members, which are directly threatened by the Soviet SS-20's, are said to be studying the interim draft agreement with interest mixed with caution. Western experts said the Soviets' opening position was "unacceptable", first concerning their definition of medium-range weapons and second because they want to include the British and French strategic arsenals, a suggestion firmly rejected by Paris and London.

The United States has meanwhile proposed to cut to 140 the number of missile launchers available to each side for a total of nuclear warheads set at between 420 and 450. NATO maintains that the Soviets have deployed 441 SS-20's, each fitted with three warheads, although Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced during a visit to Paris in October that the number of such missiles targeted on Western Europe would be cut to 243. NATO has since last March deployed 1.34 U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. That figure has now been exceeded, but no details are available.

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CSO: 5200/2572

RELATED ISSUES

EUROPEAN DEFENSE MINISTERS CONGRATULATE REAGAN

AU021825 Paris AFP in English 1819 GMT 2 Dec 85

[Text] Brussels, Dec 2 (AFP) — European defense ministers meeting as the Eurogroup today "welcomed the results achieved" by U.S. President Ronald Reagan in summit talks in Geneva with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The group said in a statement that it gave "full support for the efforts of the United States, in closer consultation with its allies, to reach agreement with the Soviet Union to make significant cuts in nuclear weapons and to reduce tensions in East-West relations." The European ministers of the Atlantic alliance are also expecting to hear details here of a West German proposal for developing a sophisticated European defence system against Soviet short-range missiles, reliable sources said.

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Canadian Deputy Defence Minister Harvie Andrew will meet European defence ministers here tomorrow and Wednesday at a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Defence Planning Committee. The meeting is expected to focus on the outcome of the Geneva summit and to adopt a key document on the future of NATO conventional defence until the year 2000.

The Europgroup said today that Europe should "make a positive and constructive response" to the U.S. Congress project to devote 250 million dollars to trans-Atlantic cooperation within NATO for future conventional weapons.

/9365 CSO: 5200/2572

RELATED ISSUES

JAPAN'S ROLE IN WORLD PEACE DISCUSSED

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Oct 85 pp 24-43

[Article by Shigito Tsuru, editorial consultant, ASAHI SHIMBUN]

[Text] Introduction

Today's subject is "Japan's role in the world peace." Let us start with a practical problem; what ought to be Japan's role, now, in the midst of world tension.

No matter how we look at today's world, one cannot say that the world is in a satisfactory state of peace. Wars are being fought in a number of areas. In Central America, the guerrillas are seeking to topple the Nicaraguan Government forces. In the Middle East, fighting persists between the Israelis and Lebanese. There is also the war between Iran and Iraq. I am sure all of you are well informed of these happenings. In addition, occasional fighting takes place at the border of Vietnam and Cambodia. All of these conflicts are taking place among medium to small countries. Fundamentally, world peace is now threatened by the tense relations, which may be likened to the cold war, between the Soviet Union and the United States. Let us now consider what role Japan ought to play in the midst of such a tense world situation. This will be the introduction to my presentation today. Before getting into part 1, I will give you a quick overview of my presentation.

In Part 1, I want to talk about the problem associated with Japan's constitution, particularly, Article 9. Today, Japan's constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are in the state of a tug-of-war. The consitution side tends to be passive, dragged along according to the movement of the security treaty. In short, the constitution is losing the battle in this tug-of-war. This point will be elaborated later. In part 2, I will discuss why the constitution must not be allowed to lose the battle with the security treaty and how it can be avoided. In part 3, I will discuss whether Japan's security can really be obtained if the constitution wins the tug-of-war. It is good that under Article 9 of the constitution, Japan renounces war and is not allowed to maintain war potential. The critical issues I am going to discuss today are whether Japan's security will be sound and how we can protect Japan's constitution while maintaining the national security, should the institution defeat the treaty in the tug-of-war.

I will roughly divide today's presentation into three parts in this manner and follow through in sequence.

Part 1 Tense World Situation

Tug-of-War Status of Japan-U.S. Security Pact

Lately, Prime Minister Nakasone has said "Japan is in a military alliance relationship with the U.S." Prime Minister Suzuki, on the other hand, simply used the term "alliance relationship," and this is in contrast to the expression "military alliance" used by Nakasone. The then director general, Japan Defense Agency, Kurihara said "It is my duty as a politician to make the Japanese people conscious of the threat of the Soviet Union." In other words, this is to say that the Japanese Government is becoming one with the United States in taking a basic position which is hostile to the Soviet Union in the midst of world tension. But it is not correct to say that Japan has completely joined the United States. One of the reasons is that the Japanese people do not approve of the tug-of-war between the constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The constitution provides the brakes to prevent Japan's military expansion. There are four concrete elements to note in this aspect of the constitution. First, the Japanese people have experienced the horrors of war and in general people strive for peace. Secondly, there are "three anti-nuclear principles" for refusing the nuclear weapons: (1) Do not produce, (2) Do not possess, (3) Do not introduce into Japan. Thirdly there is our peace constitution (Article 9) which prohibits maintenance of war potential. Fourthly, even if defense activity is to be carried out under the name of self-defense, ignoring the intention of the constitution, the defense spending is to be limited to less than one percent of the GNP.

These four brakes to prevent Japan's military expansion give a picture of the dominant current of the people's mood. This "brake" is not forced upon the people by foreign countries but is a consensus grounded in a democratic atmosphere.

At the other side of the tug-of-war is the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. This treaty was signed by Japan and the United States at the time of signing of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty to guarantee the meaning of Japan's disarmament and the renunciation of war. The contents of the treaty state that Japan will not rearm, but will renounce war. The United States will protect Japan, and it does not include Japan's military expansion. Certainly, at the time of signing this treaty, the United States intended to use Japan as a pivot point in formulating the Far Eastern strategic plans against the Soviet Union. Therefore, this treaty contained a strong element of a one-sided contract (in which one party assumes all of the responsibility for a given issue).

First, Japan has the obligation to provide military bases to the United States, but it was not clearly stated that the United States has the obligation to protect Japan. The reason is as follows: Since Japan has the obligation to provide military to the United States, the occupation of Japan by the U.S.

forces constitutes sufficient deterrence to invasion from other countries. Thus, it was not felt necessary clearly to point out in the treaty the obligation of the United States to protect Japan. Secondly, the real purpose of the U.S. forces to stay in the Japanese bases is to protect the peace and security of the Far East. As a result, Japan does not have the right to check the defense activities of the U.S. forces for the Far East. Thirdly, the treaty also contained a statement that the U.S. forces assumed the responsibility to suppress internal disorder in Japan as needed. This particular passage did not make sense for a treaty between two sovereign nations.

Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

In order to correct that strongly one-sided security treaty and make it more equal, negotiations were initiated at the beginning of 1960. Within a few months, the draft revision was agreed upon. Those who are old enough will remember 20 May 1960, when the Lower House forced passage of the revision. A month later, the new security treaty was accepted by automatic approval without being put to a vote in the House of Councillors.

The main points of this revision are as follows: first, the revision declares that in the case of a common threat to Japan and the United States, both countries shall take joint action. Second, in order to avoid arbitary action by the U.S. forces in Japan, this revision includes provisions which require prior consultations with Japan concerning important decisions involving changes in equipment and deployment of the armed forces. Recent issues concerning this kind of prior consultation are based on this revision. Third, this revision clarifies that the Security Treaty shall control the issues pertaining to any disagreement between Japan and the United States on international economic policies. Recent efforts to negotiate concerning economic friction are most likely to have been derived from this revision.

In this manner, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty which started out as a one-sided treaty, as a result of mutual cooperation, turned out to be a balanced treaty which respects Japan's integral role. Thus, from this point on, the idea of strengthening Japan's defense forces was initiated in compensation for the U.S. role in defending Japan.

The original Security Treaty did not contain any logic for strengthening the defense forces or for military expansion. However, as a result of the 1960 revision, Japan was aksed to strengthen her defense forces in return for United States assuming the role of defending Japan. At that time, the international situation was relatively stabilized, and it was not in the state of cold war. In 1959 1 year before the revision of the Security Treaty, Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposed, at the UN General Assembly, a three-step four-year approach for comprehensive arms reduction. Following this, Eisenhower and Khrushchev met at the summer resort of Camp David and agreed to try to solve international problems by peaceful means.

The following year, in January 1961, Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy in the presidency. Eisenhower delivered a well-known farewell speech: "I have

been a soldier. I am familiar with how the military people think. I also know that the military people and the civilian industry together can be carried away with an enthusiasm for military expansion. Mr Kennedy is young. He is not too familiar with military matters. I sincerely hope that the military expansion would not take place as a result of a misguided military-industrial coordination which transcends national policies." This is the kind of political climate in which the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was negotiated. The situation at that time was quite different from that of today's cold war.

In 1979, 10 years later, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was automatically extended. From this time on, as you recall, the world situation started to become dangerous. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This incident not only marked the beginning of a sudden deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, but gave birth to various forms of friction between other Western nations and the Soviet Union. Still fresh in our memories is the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics in which the United States, Japan, and a few other Western nations refused to participate. Then the Soviet Union and some of the Soviet Bloc nations refused to participate in last year's Olympics held at Los Angeles.

Transformation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

As mentioned at the beginning, Prime Minister Nakasone made comments on 21 February 1984 at the Budget Committee of the Lower House: "Internationally, the Japan-U.S. relationship is in the state of military alliance." Even more important were the comments made to the Upper House by the then Foreign Minister Sonoda in June 1981: "The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is not to be looked upon as the treaty limited to Japan and the United States. It is a part of the global strategy of the United States which seeks peace for the free world. In this sense, Japan is to make its contribution by support of mutual interests." When this comment was made, not much attention was paid to the significance of the statement. In retrospect, however, it was an extremely important statement.

Accepting the fact that the Security Treaty is not simply between Japan and the United States, but is "an integral part of the global strategy for achieving the world peace," we are presented with a troublesome situation. The comment made by Sonoda at the House of Councillors, "an integral part of the global strategy," created quite a commotion in the Diet. So much so that, Sonoda finally ended up correcting his statement by saying, "I used the wrong words." The fact that Sonoda's correction was not really what he meant was proved in the eighties when it became apparent that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is, indeed, intended to be an integral part of the global strategy of the United States.

Throughout the past some 30 years, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has undergone a steady transformation; a dynamic development-transformation of the logic of the treaty naturally occurring in the midst of the development of American policy.

I would like to remind you that the earlier mentioned four "brakes" on military expansion in connection with the constitution were all passive. But our position regarding the Security Treaty has been active. In a political tug-of-war it may be natural that the passive party is likely to concede in the end. For this reason, the scope of interpretation of Article 9 of the con stitution has become extremely broad. Turthermore, the Japanese Government became passive by not making a commitment to the non-possession of nuclear arms. It also seems they may try to review the "brake" which keeps depense spending less than 1 percent of the GNP. Forty-five Liberal Democratic Party members who form the Defense Subcommittee support the 1 percent level but they are also in the process of proposing 1.4 percent.

Especially under Prime Minister Nakasone, the Japanese Government took a more active than passive role in the tug-of-war, and the government itself took a positive attitude to relax the "brake" on military expansion. The steady accumulation of faits accomplis are seen in declarations such as "Defend 1,000 nautical miles sea lanes," "Establish the policy of blocking the three straits," "Assume a role as a member of the Western nations."

The danger of these faits accomplis is well remembered by those such as I who experienced 15 years of war ranging from the time of the Manchurian Incident through the end of World War II. At this juncture, even if we wanted to turn back, what has already been done is a mighty barrier, and to cross it would be a Herculean task. Modern Japan, in the midst of a tense world situation based in the U.S.-Soviet axis, has come to play its role following the U.S. lead. We must, first of all, solemnly understand this point.

As mentioned before, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has seriously deteriorated since 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. A more important issue is what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided about that time, Toward the end of 1979, NATO agreed to accept the installation in Western Europe of the Pershing II (developed by the U.S. as mid-range nuclear missile) which is regarded as a first strike weapon, and the cruise missile. The Soviet Union has deployed in Eastern Europe the SS-20 (a medium range nuclear missile developed by the USSR). Compared with this kind of line up, the U.S. nuclear strategy has taken a big shift in its direction.

Shift in Nuclear Strategy

Until about 1979, the United States followed the nuclear strategy called "Mutual Assured Destruction," abbreviated as MAD. This can be translated in Japanese in several ways. But I would like to translate this as "inevitable mutual destruction." The "inevitable mutual destruction" theory explains the situation as follows: Regardless of who strikes first, the other party is likely to strike back in retaliation, and as a result, mutual destruction is likely to take place. Since it is almost impossible to annihilate completely the other party's nuclear arms, neither is likely to initiate the first strike. Thus, deterrence works because of self-restraint.

At the end of 1979 NATO agreed to the U.S. proposal to install Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. From that time on, America seems to have believed that it is possible to win a limited nuclear war. The idea that a limited nuclear war can be won came into prominence. This is an extremely dangerous idea. I am not really familiar with military secrets, but I understand that the cruise missiles deliver nuclear bombs with remarkable efficiency by low-flying carriers which escape radar detection. According to the limited nuclear warfare theory, after the first strike, "inevitable mutual destruction" does not take place, and it is possible to win the limited nuclear war. Furthermore, this theory assumes that the self-control stage associated with the "inevitable mutual destruction" has been transformed into a stage allowing a first strike. The previous nuclear deterrence theory has been transformed.

Two years ago, in 1983, at the summit meeting held at Williamsburg, the heads of the Western nations made a military declaration toward the Soviet Union. I would like to quote the following summary: "We maintain military power strong enough to deter any aggression and to resist any threat so as to maintain peace." This is an extremely hawkish line. The need for military expansion is to provide sufficient leverage for obtaining arms reduction. This uses, indeed, a very strange logic. This logic, one may say resembles the U.S. Government's position taken during the Vietnam War in which the United States said that the bombing of North Vietnam was essential in order to bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table.

In the midst of the height of the U.S.-Soviet tension, today's Japanese Government is behaving as if Japan is in almost complete agreement with the Reagan political line. That is to say, one must say that Japan's constitution is losing the tug-of-war with the Security Treaty. I believe that this kind of situation contributes to the increase of the tension.

Six years ago, in 1979, ASAHI SHIMBUN held an international symposium commemorating its 100th anniversary. On that occasion, Kiichi Miyazawa of the Liberal Democratic Party responded to the keynote report of Yoshikazu Sakamoto of Tokyo University: "Mr Sakamoto mentioned that Japan is not taking the initiative in reducing the East-West tension or in arms reduction. I believe, the fact that we have been trying to follow the constitution and implement it in real life is an eloquent manifestation of our initiative." But from the peoples vantage point, has the Japanese Government been "practicing the peace constitution?" On the contrary, it is public opinion and the opposition party which have been opposing the movement for detrimental amendment of the constitution. As a matter of fact, Japan has never been at the frontier of the arms reduction movement in the world arena.

The deputy chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, Seijiro Kawashima, was sent as a special ambassador to the 10th anniversary of the AA Conference held in Jakarta in April 1965. After returning home from the conference, Kawashima commented: "The fact that Japan does nto maintain armed forces is looked upon as an asset. If Japan had strong military forces, it could not be relied upon to act as a mediator for peace. Because Japan does not have military forces, 'peace issues should be left for Japan to solve'. This kind of thinking is occurring among the Southeastern Asian nations." (YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 28 April 1965).

Is the Japanese Government incorporating such eye-opening statements as Mr Kawashima's in its policy formulation? Do the government leaders nowadays have enough confidence to repeat the statements of Mr Miyazawa or Mr Kawashime? I doubt it.

Section 2 Two Feasible Policy Directions Open to Japan

Do Not Participate in the Great Powers' Struggle for Hegemony

Now let us change the subject and talk about Japan's role in achieving world peace. Exactly what are the things that Japan can do, and should do, for world peace? I will now present to you my thinking on this subject.

First, I believe that Japan should not be a partner in any undertakings by the hegemonical great powers (U.S. and Soviet Union). Second, Japan should take the lead in the nuclear abolition movement which is the role expected of a country uniquely experienced in suffering nuclear destruction. In other words, I would like to emphasize strongly that Japan's constitution should never lose the tug-of-war with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

In concrete terms, under the Reagan administration, it is becoming increasingly clear that Japan is being embraced by overall American military strategy as a result of America's broadened demands over the provisions in the Security Treaty. Under such a political climate, Japan can either trail in the wake of America, or actively revive the binding power of the constitution and reverse the passive situation of the peace constitution. I believe that we should take the latter course. This, indeed, is the way Japan can make a contribution toward the world peace.

The time limit for effectively making such an important choice may be shorter than we realize. Unless we make our position clear within the next 2 to 3 years, we may gradually but certainly move into the direction indicated by what has already happened.

These two choices are interpreted by the people as the realistic approach and the idealistic approach. Movement together and within the American strategy of the Reagan government is viewed as the realistic approach. Trying to bring the "peace constitution" out of its present passive status to actively display its power to control is viewed as the idealistic approach. And the only grounds for the realistic approach is simply the threat of the Soviet Union; there is no other basis for argument.

Arguments for the Soviets' Threat

Let us now discuss the Soviet threat,

First, if Japan were not a front-line base for the U.S. Forces, there would be no reason for the Soviet Union to threaten Japan. This point has been confirmed in the past by high level U.S. military officials. For instance, the former Commander of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Lt Gen) Ginn stated on 3 February 1982 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "It is not quite conceivable that Japan will be singled out for attack by the Soviet Union. A limited offensive against Japan is conceivable only within the context of the global encounters between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Also, the former CINCPAC commander, Admiral Gayler commented: "There is practically no threat of a Soviet amphibious invasion of Hokkaido." But I would like to remind you that this comment was also made in 1982. When talking about blocking the three straits, particularly the Soya Strait, the Soviet Union might try to occupy the northern part of Hokkaido as part of its strategy against the United States. If the Soya Strait is blockaded, the extremely important exit for the Soviet Navy in Vladivostok is sealed off. For this reason, the Soviets might try to occupy the northern part of Hokkaido depending on the situation.

It has been reported that, to prepare for such a situation, reinforcement of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force in this region is being planned. The U.S. Forces also are clearly planning for the prepositioning of heavy armaments, such as tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery to the northern Hokkaido region to prepare for emergency deployment of the 25th Infantry Division which is now stationed in Hawaii. In fact, it is well known that Japan-U.S. joint military training is currently carried on at Mutsu Bay in Aomori Prefecture.

As you can see from these examples, the real situation of the Soviet threat to Japan is that the U.S. treats Japan as the front line opposing the Soviet Union and as the main objective of the U.S. Forces which is strengthening all types of military dispositions. In regard to a situation in which Japan totally ended military cooperation toward America, I think, as a practical problem, a Soviet attack would be inconceivable. Examining symbolic events that have taken place in the past, in 1956, the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration promised that Habomai and Shikotan were to be returned to Japan as soon as the peace treaty is signed. Then the Soviets broke the promise after seeing the status of the 1960 revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. About the time when the new security treaty was to be signed in Washington, ASAHI SHIMBUN on 21 January 1960, published the following comments in its editorial column: "The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is not meant to be limited to guaranteeing the security of Japan. The truth is that Japan's security is to be obtained through achieving peace between the East and the West, namely between the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, in order to achieve stable security for Japan, the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union must be further strengthened."

I think this judgment was correct then, and is correct today. Strengthening the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union is a sure way of achieving Japan's security. If that is the case, the first thing Japan should do for its own security is to work to relax the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. If, however, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorates, Japan's security cannot be realized no matter how many security treaties we might have. If we are not adroit, it will be like a double-edged sword, and if that ever happens, even the survival of Japan may be at stake.

"Nuclear Umbrella" Theory

There is a theory which holds that the constitution is not losing the tug-of-war with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. As briefly introduced earlier, Mr Kiichi Miyazawa has the opinion that the constitution is not losing the ba-tle. However, some big chnages in political scene have been taking place in recent days. For instance, let us look at the "three principles of non-nuclear policy." The first time the three principles became an issue in the Diet was 1960, 25 years ago. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi promised in his speech in the Diet: "Japan is a country which will not use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, even if Japan is threatened or even attacked. Also the United States, which has armed forces in Japan, is not a country which will use nuclear weapons." This kind of fundamental decision led to a subsequent Diet resolution of the "Three non-nuclear principles". In answering the opposition party's question, Kishi promised: "I am planning to follow through exactly that way."

If we were to follow through on the "three non-nuclear principles" exactly as spelled out, it is obvious that the "three principles" are incompatible with the "nuclear umbrella" theory. If Japan does not have nuclear weapons there can not be "nuclear umbrella." If we interpret this theory to mean that "Japan's security is guaranteed by the U.S. nuclear umbrella," this implies it is possible that the U.S., if compelled, can use nuclear weapons to protect Japan. The principle of "no introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan" can not be realized in practice. It is really not possible to find out if the United States maintains nulcear weapons in Japan. This is because the refusal to clarify possession is effective as a deterrent. Thus, the Japanese Government is forced into a position to have to repeat, "Since America has not consulted our government as to bringing in nuclear weapons yet, America has not brought in any nuclear weapons," and be content with the situation. Figuratively speaking, the situation is similar to a faithful wife who has assurance from her husband, "My dear wife, whenever I fell like cheating on you, I will always consult you ahead of time." Since the husband never made prior consultation with his wife, she does not worry because the husband must never had cheated on her. In the case of defense of a nation, the situation is far more serious than that of the grateful wife. The problem of the "nuclear umbrella" theory contains an extremely dangerous element.

However, today the expression, "no introduction of nuclear weapons," has become meaningless. The reason is that lately the U.S. Pacific Fleet has been equipped with nuclear missiles, such as Tomahawk, which can be launched from the surface or under the sea. Unlike the land based missiles, these sea based missiles are very clandestine. As a result, it is very hard to clarify whether or not nuclear weapons have been brought into Japan.

A more important matter is that the land based missiles can not be fired unless the U.S. President pushes the button. But in the case of the sea based missiles, commander of the ship has the authority to make a decision to launch. When retired Rear Admiral LaRoque visited Japan, he explained this point, and it is, indeed, fearful and dangerous. Warships carrying nuclear weapons can come very close to Japan and launch nuclear missiles from the

surface or under the sea without having to dock at a Japanese harbor. The indispensable communication system and command post for ship movements are possibly based at one of the U.S. bases in Japan. Perhaps such facilities have already been established.

America has decided to station F-16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa Air Base. Without doubt the Soviet military tacticians consider these F-16 fighter-bombers to be the emergency counterattack nuclear force very much like the F-16 fighter-bombers stationed in West Germany. Misawa, then, will become one of the first targets in case a nuclear war takes place.

Mr Nakasone said to the Diet that Japan is the shield, and the United States is the spear. Japan is bound to be at the enemy's spear point in case a war breaks out between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Balance and Deterrence

Two years ago Mr Nakasone made a statement at the press conference held at the Williamsburg Summit: "In agreement with other countries, we fundamentally believe that war can be avoided by a nuclear balance and deterrence." Among specialists there is a serious doubt about this theory which says a collision between the United States and the Soviet Union can be avoided by nuclear balance and deterrence. Even a layman can appreciate the difficulties involved in assessing the nuclear balance of power. What is meant by "balance of power"? In addition to the number of nuclear weapons, there is the problem of quality. How do we account for the differences in the launching bases? How do we separate the first-strike weapons from others? comparison of the power is not that simple. Let us now consider a hypothetical case in which a nation has sufficient nuclear power to destroy the earth 4 times and another nation has sufficient power to destroy the earth only 3 times. Does this mean, then, there is no "balance of power"? This really is a foolish mental exercise. According to customary theory, for the sake of truly deterring each other, both the United States and the Soviet Union can afford to reduce their nuclear weapons to one fifth of the present level.

Deterrence theory has made the arms race permanent and has increased the danger of the nuclear war. In reality, lately America is shifting her strategic direction toward the survival strategy and away from her previous thinking that the nuclear war can be avoided through the idea of "inevitable mutual destruction." After succeeding in the ICBM interception attack testing which opens the road to space defense weapons, America started talking about the ability to reduce the danger of retaliation which invites preemptive nuclear attack. Nowadays, it seems that the U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation is even more unstable.

In 1981, U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger mentioned, "America has the right to bring Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella." What Weinberger meant is that under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, America has the right to launch nuclear weapons either from Japan or from nearby waters.

After presenting my analysis this far, I really believe that we have to have a serious second look at the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. I am not suggesting that we should abolish the security treaty at a single stroke. If the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty may be the reason for Japan's constitution to lose the tug-of-war, we should seriously re-examine the Security Treaty.

Promote Nuclear-Abolition Movement

Let us now discuss the second policy. What are, then, the things Japan must do to maintain world peace under the present international situation? As previously mentioned, Japan should take the lead in arms reduction and take the initiative for the nuclear arms abolition movement. The abolition of nuclear arms is mankind's highest priority task. If, beginning with the two super-powers, every nation in the whole world takes the first step towards arms reduction, it will mean that the climate to resolve international conflicts by means other than military power has strengthened. As a result, it will heighten the actual effectiveness of Japan's peace constitution.

In January of the year before last, former Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, Munenoti Akagi, explained by Japan can not be protected by the "nuclear umbrella" as follows: "Today's nuclear missile technologies have reached amazing sophistication. Whether this is good or bad, the single key to Japan's security is the worldwide pursuit of arms reduction and nuclear arms abolition." I believe, this is a very profound statement. Several policy approaches are being sought efficiently to implement the "three non-nuclear principles." More and more local community organizations are making non-nuclear declarations. In 1980, Micronesia's Palau (now, Palan Republic) adopted non-nuclear policy in its constitution. In 1976 Latin American countries decided to create a nuclear-free zone by signing the Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. The idea of establishing non-nuclear zones is now being discussed among the Scandinavian and Northern European countries.

Thus, sensible people of the world have come to realize the importance of arms reduction, and Japan has the trump card to play in the sense that Japan has the peace constitution. Japan should spearhead this task. Japan must display more active leadership in promoting arms reduction which includes the abolition of nuclear arms. I believe this is the contribution Japan should make toward world peace.

Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Security of Japan

Let us now discuss the third problem.

I do not intend to advocate the abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty at one stroke. Instead, I would encourage improving one step at a time dangerous situation such as now exist. If we say that we should re-examine the security treaty, American may very well say, "Well, if that is the case, Japan is free to do as she wishes. But then we will not guarantee Japan's security." If Japan spearheads the nuclear abolition movement, America may say, "Japan denies the deterrent power of nuclear arms." Then the really serious question of how to protect Japan's security naturally arises. This

question is now actively under discussion even among the European nations. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and recently Holland, are all seriously groping to establish non-nuclear zones in their region. It is always a question whether such a movement can, indeed, guarantee the security of a country. Every country advocating nuclear abolition is activley discussing whether the nuclear abolition and their own country's security can be accomplished together. I have thus far proposed that "This is what Japan's role for the world's peace ought to be." Then how can we guarantee Japan's security? I feel obliged to propose an answer to this question.

It is a matter of common sense to realize that defense of a country is not limited to the military dimension. In a discussion of Japan's defense power in a BUNGEI SHUNJU magazine article, Mr Yoshihiko Seki aptly pointed out to Mr Michio Morishima that there is a distinction between "hardware" and software," and nowadays the tendency is to rely on the software. This is because hardware such as tanks and missiles do not defend a nation; the nation is protected by software such as diplomacy, the economy and cultural exchanges. Defending a nation is conceptually understood as defending the country and the people. But there is no clear cut agreement as to exactly "what" is to be defended, and this becomes a source of confusion. Simply continuing to discuss defense in terms of "by what approach," namely, only the methodology, without defining "what" is to be defended, does not get us anywhere.

Thus, "what" and "how" should be discussed together when talking about the defense. There is a very close relationship between these two. For instance, "what" can be changed according to "how."

According to Admiral Tatsuo Chikushi, superintendent of the Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff Officers School, commented that the policy of the SDF to defend the nation's territory and not necessarily to proect the lives and property of the people. This demands that protecting individual lives and their properties is really a job for the police and the fire department rather than the SDF. According to this line of reasoning, the SDF is to defend the territory of the country and peoples' lives and properties are different. I would like the SDF personnel to consider seriously what is really meant by defense forces; defending what, self-defense in what sense?

Safeguarding the nation means, of course, protecting people's lives and property, and it means striving for stability of the socio-political system so that the individual citizens enjoy democracy and freedom, and achieve a life which is stable under this concept of how it ought to be. It is precisely protecting this national character. That, I think, is the important point at issue when we ask "what" it is that is meant by safeguarding the nation.

For Japan, it is important to protect the territory of the country, but it is more important to make Japan a country in which it is worthwhile to live. To achieve such a goal it is essential to actively encourage worthwhile activities. This is how to "protectthe country."

Part 3 Five Point Proposals for Building a Country of Human Respect

Establish a World Medical Center

At this point, we really have to re-examine the question of "what" from the fundamental standpoint. Its keynote should be "human respect" and people's patriotism should be emulated. I would like to propose the following five points for explaining how to make such a country of human respect:

Point 1: For achieving human respect, peoples' lives should be respected, health should be given importance along with the quality of life and the work environment. Thus it makes sense to push these issues to the point that Japan is to be made into a "world medical and health center." Some of you may think my proposal for a "world medical and health center" is out of the question in view of the inadequate medical services available today in Japan. Of course, improving public health is important, and my plan is no more than to broaden to the world the perspective of the process which will continue to strive to improve the public health service area.

Today, Japanese medical technology and the development in medical equipment have progressed to the world level. Several patients requiring difficult heart surgery and other operations have come to Japan for treatment. For instance, we have the CT scanner (computer tomography equipment).

The CT scanner provides trnography of the entire human body, not just the head. It is expensive equipment costing more than 100 million yen. Japanese industry is now offering it at the lowest cost in the world, about one-third of the cost in the United States. The Central Research Laboratory for Medical Radiology of the Science and Technology Agency developed positron computer tomography to diagnose brain apoplexy and brain tumors. I believe that emphasis on the research and development of medical equipment is appropriate means for Japan, a country of peace. Japanese nurses are noted for their unconditional dedication to their "vocation" unrivaled by any other country. In other countries, Catholic nuns have been recognized for their religious dedication to the nursing profession. Japanese nurses consider nursing as their calling and have a very strong sense of moral mission toward public health.

With this kind of national character, Japan is a natural candidate for a world medical and health center, a world Red Cross center, where patients with difficult-to-cure diseases can come for treatment. Then the people in the medical profession throughout the world are bound to work with more emulation and inspiration. Without question, it would heighten the spirit of personnel in medical-related professions.

World's Health Resort

Point 2, evolving from Point 1, is to establish a world's health resort and tourist resort for people from all over the world utilizing natural scenery and hot springs.

Fortunately, Japan spans 3,000 km from north to south providing variety of climate and weather. Japan is blessed with four pleasant seasons, beautiful scenery and hot springs. For instance, "The Inland Sea is recognized as a region of matchless beauty not only in Japan but throughout the world. It is a treasure house of fishery resources, and the benefits derived from such resources should be passed on to all of the people and to the next generations." (Article 3, Special Measures, Setonaikai Preservation). Multipurpose national parts and resorts can be established in such a setting. It is a national jewel. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say "It used to be a jewel." During the post-war high growth period, more than one third of the Inland Sea shoreline has been filled in with man-made shorelines. Before we knew it, the growth reached enormous scale. In this national partk the steel industry capacity compares to the combined production capacity of West Germany and France. The oil refinery and petrochemical capacity is comparable to the total production capacity of all England. As a result, the Mizushima accident and the red tide damage occurred.

During the high growth period, Japan went through the process of "destroying the garden to enlarge the kitchen." Yet, this land still has beautiful spots everywhere which can be engaged as resorts. Compared with resorts in other countries, they have limited facilities, or are in poor taste and many lack the concern necessary for multipurpose resorts. Nevertheless, in this matter in particular, we must develop concrete measures so that the people of the world can enjoy the benefits of this truly superior aspect of the land of Japan.

International Cultural Exchange.

Point 3: We should make special efforts to promote international cultural and artistic activities. Japan has many cultural occupations which appeal to Westerners. One example is ceramics. Bernard H. Leach, 1887-1979, an English potter who helped introduce Japanese ceramics to the Western world, commented: "Throughtout my life, I have been a messenger between the East and the West. The two human cultures are mutually complementary. I believe the interaction and the marriage between the two are the curtain raiser in completing the union of the human race." The cultural traditions of Japan which respect the esthetic sense in the stage setting of all aspects of everyday life is now putting up the (stage) scaffolding for international cultural exchange.

It is perhaps not widely known to the public, but recently Japanese musical instruments have conquered everything in Europe. European orchestra musicians desire Japanese instruments very much. A musical instrument fair is held annually in Europe and on that occasion, statistics are given for the percentage of which instruments come from which country. According to the statistics, lately the Japanese instruments are more than 50 percent.

The reason Japanese instruments have such a good reputation, according to performers, is: "Japanese instrument makers come to us and listen well to our comments and needs. Then they go back and improve the instruments as ordered and strive to get the good sound." On the other hand, for example, in West Germany, there is a "meister" system and those who are

qualified as "meister" are very proud. So, even if a performer places an order, the meister may not pay attention to the performer's request. This is a hindrance to good instrument making. It is very hopeful that Japan is able to make meaningful contributions to the musical culture and the sensibility to sound.

It is also only the Japanese who can respond to a pro golfer's need for custom fitting of such golf equipment as a driver, shaft, and the head, within one day. When there is a pro golf tournament in America, Japanese pitch a tent and open a store. Then somebody like Jack Nicklaus comes along and asks: "Today this head seems to be off a little, I'd like to get it fixed." The Japanese store does a splendid job of fixing the head by the next day, it is said, and they have a very good reputation.

With this kind of technology, we should make every effort to deepen the international exchange of culture and art.

Boosting of the United Nations University

Point 4: I would like to propose a rapid increase in Japan's share of support of the UN University, especially making the university a world center for education, reserach and technical development which contributes to socio-economic progress of the Third World countries.

Today, Japan's share of the financial support for the university is the largest of all the countries. But other leading nations do not seem to be serious about this matter. As a result, Japan is bent over (from the burden). Although the UN University was especially invited to Japan because of ideals, it has not lived up to the original expectations. Instead of getting diverted by a funding equalization theory, Japan should decisively increase its own funding contributions in an attempt to create a unique, a truly international university. It would also mean more effort to develop the university so that people of the Third World nations will be provided with opportunities for education, training, and technology exchange.

In 1970, 15 years ago, when UNESCO established the UN University, it identified three problem areas concerning what the UN University is supposed to do. First is the study of war and peace. In other words, study of how to achieve arms reduction, how to prevent war, and how to solve conflicts. Second, are the problems of economic cooperation of all peoples of the world and of social security. It is the question of how to reverse the impoverishment of the world. Third is the problem of earth's resources and technology. Accepting the supreme value of human lives and nature, and further accepting that science and technology exist for improving these values on earth, this is the problem of studying how to utilize science and technology to interface with the social structure.

These three elements are becoming more and more of vital importance nowadays. Research and education in these three focal points can not be carried out efficiently in a regular university. I believe that the United Nations University especially can give full play to this function. The fact that

an international university is presently located in Japan gives a unique chance to implement the plans presented here today. Nevertheless, the fact is that the university is located in a narrow ten story rented building inside the Tokyo loop (rail) line. While the United Nations University was lured, at great trouble to Japan, can this really be called a university? One feels like saying, "What in the world is this?" Professors from other countries feel the same way. Recently, the old Aoyama car barn was donated to the United Nations University. I would like to see that the bringing along of this university be included as part of national policy.

Increase Foreign Aid

Point 5: While following through the policies outlined above, allocate foreign aid funds developing nations and to the Third World based on a percentage of the GNP of Japan which will be a higher percentage than any other country in the world.

At the 3d UNCTAD (UN Trade Development Conference) conference, held in May 1972, as an international goal of economic cooperation, it was resolved to strive to increase government development funds to 0.7 percent of the GNP by the mid-seventies. But the track record shows that by 1977 Japan's ratio was 0.21 percent and only in recent years the ratio increased to 0.3 percent which is far below the 0.7 percent in the UNCTAD resolution. More than anything else, Japan should reach the 0.7 percent as fast as possible. But what is the current status? For last year's budget, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to reach that goal, and asked the Ministry of Finance for a 22 percent increase over the previous year's budget in the foreign aid program. But the foreign aid budget proposal was not even accepted as an item to be considered by the Ministry of Finance, saying it would get no increase or even a reduction in funds. I believe this kind of problem should be treated more carefully, then the budget.

I really do not know what the situation will be like in the 21st Century, but for now these five proposals are what I believe to be the way to guide Japan in the nation-building which it now confronts.

Conclusions

I do not think I am dreaming in making these detailed proposals with the peace constitution as their "backbone" and human respect as the keynote. It certainly is a project which will take time to implement. But what is important for now is to shift the center of gravity of national policy in a different direction.

As mentioned earlier, Japan should be very serious about actively carrying out the peace movement: to take the lead in the arms reduction movement including the abolition of nuclear arms; for building up the country, to build a world medical health center, to build a health resort where people can some from all over the world and have a memorable time while appreciating nature's beauty, to build up Japan's reputation as the center of culture and art through cultural exchange, to upgrade the UN University from its sad

existence to a level where it can really function as a true international study center to respond to the needs of the Third World countries, and to increase the aid to poor countries to help tens of thousands of starving people. If Japan becomes such a model country for this reason al ne, the people's consciousness for the need to protect the country will really take root. At the same time other countries will undoubtedly realize how inhuman it would be to invade Japan militarily. Then there will be enough constructive tasks for the young generation to carry out with serious spirit, and as a result the sense of patriotism will naturally spring forth.

We have briefly discussed earlier "what to protect" when we talk about protecting the country, and the "what" is this kind of motherland. Once "what" is defined in this manner, the "how" becomes easy to answer. It is definitely not by making one's arms thicker and heavier. "What" automatically contains the "how."

Of course, some money will be needed. At present, about 10 percent of the GNP, 3 trillion yen, is spent on the defense. What we need to carry out my proposals is about 300 billion yen, corresponding to 10 percent of the defense budget. I can not tell you exactly to what extent my five plans can be carried out given the 300 billion yen. One thing I am sure of is that the equipment for death is expensive but equipment for life is inexpensive. I would like to see our efforts combined to manufacture equipment for life instead of equipment for death.

[Postscript] (16 August 1985)

This manuscript is a transcription of short hand lecture notes of the summer school lecture, Prefectural University sponsored by Toyama Prefecture Education Council. Months and years were corrected to correspond to 1985 as the reference point. Otherwise, the transcription is as delivered. Since it has been more than a year since the delivery of this lecture, I decided to add a postscript to include more recent events.

1. Bringing Nuclear Arms Into Japan

It has been suspected that the U.S. warships calling at Japanese ports carry nuclear arms and that some nuclear weapons are located in U.S. bases in Japan, but there has been no way to confirm it. However, now 30 years after being issued, a directive of General Maxwell Taylor, Commander of U.S. Forces Far East, "Standards for Nuclear Operations Procedures in the Fast East" dated 9 June 1955, was declassified along with the revised document of the following year by General Taylor's successor, General Lyman Lemnitzer. On the eve of the 1960 Security Treaty, Japan was given a role of storage and transportation of nuclear arms, as the documents describe in detail. According to these documents, a War Area Joint Operations Center of the Far Eastern Forces Command to carry out nuclear warfare was to be established in the Far East Command Headquarters. There were 13 bases in Japan with a "manager" to receive, control, and transport nuclear weapons to other bases as needed.

There were 10 bases equipped with "nuclear arms handling capabilities", for emergency use of nuclear arms and for disposal of the nuclear arms by disassembly. Bases having both capabilities were: Ikeko, Kadena, Yokosuka, and Sasebo.

Based on the declassified documents, "America has been deceiving Japan about the issues concerning atomic bombs" wrote Walden Pero, Peter Hayes and (Tyuba Giruski) (NEW STATESMAN, 9 August 1985, and for more details, refer to same magazine, September issue, "Nuclear Dispositions Confirmed"). These writers further inferred that during the second Taiwan crisis of 1958, the use of nuclear arms against China was very close to reality. (In August of that year, the U.S. 7th Fleet was under combat ready conditions in the Taiwan Strait).

2. Japan Is Being Dragged Into the American Military Strategic System

Especially since last fall, joint training of the SDF and the U.S. Forces has been intensified both in quality and quantity. (Refer to editorial in the 21 November 1984 issue of the ASAHI SHIMBUN). This trend was first officially indicated in the "Japan-U.S. Joint Operations Plans" signed by uniformed personnel of both countries last December. But it was in the middle of January of this year, which is after the signing of the joint operations plans, that the Diet clarified the situation and provided the explanation to the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry had "protested" to the Japan Defense Agency: "This is a matter pertaining to the implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and consultation prior to signing is to be expected." This is clearly outside the framework of civilian control. Mr Yazaki, director of the Defense Bureau (of the Japan Defense Agency), explained "Since this joint operation plan is highly confidential, it is not possible to present it to the Diet.

There has been some new developments this year. As stated by the American officials from time to time in the past, Assistant Secretary of State Armitage (in charge of the international security problems) made comments at the National War College Pacific Symposium held on 22 February 1985 at Honolulu: "Japan is no longer simply the cornerstone of the American policy on the Far East. She has now become our important partner on the world stage." Vice President Bush explained the need for strengthening Japan's defense power at the anniversary ceremony of the end of World War II held aboard the carrier Enterprise docked at San Francisco Bay on 14 August: "The days of American military dominance in the Pacific are over. We have to work together to preserve peace, protect freedom, and deter aggression to resist the everincreasing threat in the Pacific.

It has been reported that from the beginning of this year there have been continuous large-scale joint exercises between Japan and the United States. Particularly in Okinawa, the residents were placed in great danger from the end of January through the middle of February, because the U.S. Forces carried out atomic artillery range exercises, clandestine raid exercises, and amphibious assault exercises. (21 February 1985, ASAHI SHIMBUN). More importantly, the trend to escalation of military cooperation with the United States is pregnant with the possibility of moving into the right of collective

defense which is forbidden by the constitution. Without going into detail, I will summarize some of the developments that have taken place during the recent months. (1) U.S. Fleet-Sat (fleet communications satellite) "will be used jointly in case of need." (2) Prime Minister Nakasone confirmed that it is possible that a U.S. naval vessel may use a nuclear weapon during joint use with the SDF (29 February). (3) On the subject of technical cooperation for the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Japanese Government decided that even if nuclear weapons are included in the SDI, that is not contrary to the three non-nuclear principles. (4) Last June, the Japan Defense Agency decided to bring in OTH (over-the-horizon) radars (which can do surveillance at super long distances over the horizon), making it clear that Japan is an important link in the U.S. strategic and tactical intelligence net. (5) The 1,000 nautical mile sea lane surface defense system defense target is "area" rather than "band". Coupled with the OTH, one can point out that serious consideration is being given to the purchase of two of the newest missile escort vessels (at a cost of about 1.4 billion yen each, the so-called Aegis ship) which were developed by the United States.

The American Congress passed legislation intended to keep an eye on Japan to see if the 1,000 nautical mile sea lane defense system is completed by 1990. This is, indeed, interference in Japan's internal affairs by the United States. Perhaps the Japanese Government has assumed an active pose to fulfill its supporting role in American strategy in such a way that we have not even perceived the situation as interference in internal affairs.

3. The Issue of 1 Percent of the GNP

When Gaston Sigur, special assistant to the President, visited Japan last January, Nakasone told him: "I understand that the government policy of keeping defense expenditures within 1 percent of GNP is taken as a refusal to bear our responsibilities according to our ability in international society, and that this is criticized as unfair by the United States and others. I will personally make sure that Japan's defense spending goes beyond the 1 percent constraint because there is no logical basis for the figure '1 percent'. We are not trying to avoid our responsibility." In February, the prime minister commented "We really ought to get out of the 1 percent constraint," at a round table meeting with highest LDP advisors. Miki, former prime minister, protested and the debate became heated. Then Prime Minister Nakasone made no comment and the meeting was adjourned, it is said.

It does not mean, however, that Prime Minister Nakasone changed his view. Nakasone followed the policy of giving the impression to the public that perhaps the advice of third party specialists was responsible for advocating the abolition of the 1 percent constraint. Nakasone made use of reports of a private advisory organ, the "Peace Research Institute" (director, Masaaka Takasaka, professor at Kyoto University). The "Peace Research Institute" was at first divided into two groups of opposing opinions; one for the "removal" and the other for "maintaining" of the 1 percent constraint. But

after the prime minister's appeal for "removal," the institute unified its direction toward "removal." (Refer to "Collapsing of 1 Percent Constraint" 16 August 1985, ASAHI SHIMBUN). ASAHI SHIMBUN's editorial of 19 October 1984 read "It is rather strange that the public's wide range of opinion is to be summed up by a private advisory organ whose members are handpicked by the prime minister." This reminds me of similar political tactics used by Prime Minister Nakasone before. The private advisory organ of Fujinami, chief of the Cabinet Secretariat, the "Cabinet Round Table for Worship at Yasukuni Shrine" opened the way for the reality of official worship by stating "Memorial services and mourning by the prime minister and the cabinet members for the people who gave their lives for the country follows the feelings of the people. Using this kind of background setting, Prime Minister Nakasone felt comfortable saying "If there is no such place as Yasukuni, who will offer his life for the country?"

Even within the Liberal Democratic Party, there are voices saying to keep the 1 percent constraint. One of them is Mr Hyosuke Kujiraoka, deputy chairman of the International Association for the Promotion of Arms Reduction, who wrote "The '1 percent constraint' is the symbol of our country's commitment to peace, and this issue is a matter of grave seriousness for the people who aspire for peace and for all of us politicians including both the government and the opposition party members. If we were to proudly advocate the 1 percent constraint all over the world when things go smoothly, but start talking about its "removal" when things get difficult, credibility of the country's commitment to peace is at stake. This is what I am afraid of." (ASAHI SHIMBUN Editorial Platform, 28 March 1985)

As a matter of fact Prime Minister Nakasone has consistently advocated the self-defense theory since the defeat in World War II. When Nakasone was the director general of the Japan Defense Agency, he told Mr Laird, then Secretary of Defense, "We intend to maintain superiority in the sea and air around Japan." Now, he even goes further, "We ought to carry our share as an international nation." It is as though Prime Minister Nakasone is not conscious of the unique peace constitution possessed by the people of Japan. Perhaps our prime minister has embraced the feeling of obligation to side with the arms expansion side of the tug-of-war between Japan's constitution and the Security Treaty.

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