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**PAINTING VICTORY:  
A DISCUSSION OF LEADERSHIP AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE**

by

**RICHARD J. HOFFMANN, LCDR, USN  
B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1987**

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**1998**

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

**PAINTING VICTORY: A DISCUSSION OF LEADERSHIP AND ITS  
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES** by LCDR Richard J. Hoffmann, USN, 113 pages.

This study reviews leadership theory and application, and it assembles a heuristic model of leadership's macrocosm. It intends to inspire an appreciation of the broad spectrum of leadership styles and their varied effectiveness. Moreover, it outlines leadership's creative processes to further understanding.

Considering the fundamental principles of leader theories, this research examined their application in team building, organizational management, and goal-setting methods. The literature review encapsulates the dominate theories and practices relating to leaders, groups, and goals.

The analysis abstracts a broad expression of leadership as the art of guiding a group toward a goal. From this expression, it perceives the fundamental elements of leaders, groups, goals, and guidance. Then it designs a model that incorporates those elements and illustrates how they interact. Finally, a historical discussion guides a demonstration of the painting-leading model. In this way, theory is linked to the model, then the model is linked to application, completing a bridge from theory to application. Reviewing Admiral Horatio Nelson's victory at Trafalgar and General George Patton's victory at Bastogne, this study describes the creative process of leading groups towards goals by creating cohesion, purpose, and productivity.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply indebted to many people for their lessons. With this broad study of leadership, my teachers came from all walks of life, but foremost are my father and mother, the leaders of our tight-knit and proud Hoffmann family which includes eight siblings. Their moral guidance and example taught me my first lessons in leadership.

I also owe thanks to several coaches who stood out as shining examples of leadership and helped me mold my own philosophy. Charismatic football coach Tony Severino taught me the power of positive reinforcement, and quiet boxing coaches John Brown and Emerson Smith taught me the power of individual goal setting. Each coach led me to athletic championships with different but effective styles.

As one of my Petty Officers, Forrest Walker, once told me, "Sir, you're smart because you're stupid, but you *know* you're stupid." I owe much of my knowledge of leadership to the men and women I have had the joy to lead. Of those, three stand out: Chief Petty Officer (SEAL), Larry Jung, and SEAL Petty Officers, Scott Swan and Pat Dellen. Along with others, they confidently guided my development as a Naval Officer with their expertise and repute.

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I must acknowledge my research committee who guided my academic efforts, LTC Robert Schwartzman, USA, Dr. Ronald Cuny, and MAJ John Smidt, USA. Their patience and encouragement was invaluable considering my writing skills. I must also include CDR Elizabeth Holmes, USN, Ph.D. Psychology, for her help in guiding my research at the U.S. Naval Academy, and historian Bill Lind, author of *The Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, who continues to provide me interesting perspectives on military operations and developments.

Finally, I conclude my acknowledgments with my wife, LCDR Paige Hoffmann, USN. This work is dedicated to her, an inspiring Naval Officer, an insightful teacher, a tireless mother, and a selfless wife. She has taught me more about leadership than all the other experiences of my life combined.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Assigned to the U.S. Naval Academy as a leadership instructor in 1994, I was uncertain what my job was. When someone approached me at a cocktail party and asked, "What do you do?," I found myself fumbling to explain what a leadership instructor actually does. After eleven years in the Navy holding positions of great responsibility, I had a pretty good idea what leadership entailed. But what is leadership? How is it defined academically? The ambiguous and abstract nature of leadership frustrated my quest for a clear description of my job.

### The Problem

Surveying the literature that discusses leadership, I was comforted by the fact that I was not alone. Nearly every book I have studied on leadership begins by describing the ambiguity surrounding its definition. James MacGregor Burn's *Leadership* describes how "leadership as a concept has dissolved into small and discrete meanings," citing a study which turned up 130 definitions of the word.<sup>1</sup> Bernard Bass's *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership* adds, "The many dimensions into which leadership has been cast and their overlapping meanings have added to the confusion."<sup>2</sup> Warren Bennis's *Why Leaders Can't Lead*, John Gardner's "The Cry for Leadership" in *On Leadership*, and even the U.S. Military Academy's *Leadership in Organizations* similarly describe the confusion surrounding leadership. So, while there is an enormous volume of thought concerning leadership, no single structure or definition guides its study.

From the ambiguity and confusion scholars have wandered in countless directions searching for tangible data. There are volumes of surveys, studies, and theories scientifically analyzing leadership, traits, skills, and effectiveness. As well, there are mountains of essays and books describing philosophies and beliefs about leadership. Professors from virtually every academic discipline from sociology to theology have studied and brought different insights to the subject.

Moreover, in an effort to clear the confusion surrounding leadership, researchers have inundated the subject with scientific studies and analytical data that have ignored its emotional and artistic nature. The latest textbooks used at the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Military Academy describe leadership as a scientific process rather than a creative art. Bernard Bass's anthology of leadership theories also uses the scientific process description. This scientific-process characterization focuses leadership studies on complex data, formulae, and behavioral processes rather than on simply creating accomplishments. Pondy concluded in *Leadership is a Language Game* that "the fundamental flaw of all leadership theories [is] the failure to recognize the creative unboundedness of leadership acts."<sup>3</sup>

### The Research Question

My personal experience with leadership includes several rich episodes in which a leader inspired me to endure broken bones, pain, stress, and fatigue to accomplish a goal. I had coaches who could describe their vision of victory so passionately, that I would leave the locker room intoxicated with motivation. I had tremendous commanding officers who exuded confidence, strength, and courage. Receiving orders from them was

a privilege, and accomplishing their missions was very rewarding despite the pain and sacrifice. These leaders were artists, masters of the English language who could craft visions rich with values and inspiration, make insightful decisions at just the right moments, and guide groups toward proud accomplishments. These experiences drove me to my question and the purpose of my research: How can the theory and application of leadership be linked in a model?

In order to investigate this question and build a model, this research must first answer some basic subordinate questions. What is leadership? How can it be described in terms of both research and practice? First, I will deduce the elements and actions of leadership, their significance, and how they interact. Then I will formulate an analogy of leading from an inductive inquiry. The answers to these questions will serve as the building blocks for my model.

#### Limitations and Scope

My research is limited by two significant factors: time and the sheer volume of existing studies of leadership. As a leadership instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy for three years, I investigated a broad selection of resources from business management seminars to athletic coaching clinics and certain theologies. This research, coupled with a more focused one-year Master of Military Art and Science investigation of leadership literature, will still touch only a portion of the works published.

In order to economize my efforts and focus my study I have developed two parameters for my research. First, I will concentrate on outlining the macrocosm of leadership and how it could be represented with a model. Though I will consider some

detailed studies, this parameter will keep my research from delving deeply into the studies of personality interactions, management systems, and other theories that prescribe how leaders should lead. Additionally, this parameter will allow my model to remain general, include various leadership styles, and yet not endorse one method of leading over another. As Thomas E. Cronin put it, “Society today rewards the expert or the super specialist--the data processors, the pilots, the financial whiz, the heart surgeon, the special team punt returners, and so on. Leaders, however, have to learn to become generalists.”<sup>4</sup> My second parameter will keep my research focused on building a model that describes one view of leadership. It will not directly refute other views or theories of leadership which will keep my study from becoming polemic. These two parameters will enable an open and macrocosmic study of how to model the elements and actions of leadership.

#### Significance of Study

The significance of this study is its unique focus on the macrocosm of leadership and the implications the model might have on the practical application of leadership. A study which provides an understanding of leadership as an art in a concise model could provide a logical structure to filter confusing subject matter. Additionally, it could provide leaders a clearer understanding of their role and improve their efforts to lead. Finally, an understanding of the artistic and creative requirements of leadership could help leaders balance their day-to-day routines with inspiring subordinates toward a vision.

This study is unique because of its unusual focus on the entirety of leadership in an effort to discover a way of describing it macrocosmically. While most leadership research is focused on detailed analysis of specific criteria, this study will attempt to

describe the essence of leadership. Rather than detailing some personality interaction between a leader and a follower, I will attempt to convey the overall nature of leadership. This overall description will possibly provide a clearer understanding and ideally erase the confusion surrounding the study of leadership.

A structured view of leadership could provide a foundation for its study. From this foundation an accepted set of standards for assessing past and present leaders could be derived. A model might identify the basic elements, how they interact, and what they produce. This structure would guide its study and the development of future leaders. By providing structure, a model would organize the volumes of research and explain their significance and relationship to the application of leadership.

Moreover, a model might also illustrate how the various theories of leadership could be further studied and applied practically. Using an analogy, a model could draw a parallel relationship between the abstract and intangible actions of leading and the practical and tangible acts of some more familiar subject. Though this model might over-simplify a complex phenomenon, it could provide the intellectual revelation that sometimes inspires students to further study and improve their abilities.

A simple and concise model might also serve as a general reference. Buried deep in the analysis of some Myers-Briggs Type Indicator personality test or trekking through a Total Quality flowchart, students often become confused and wonder what their study has to do with leadership. A simple model could allow them to step back, view the big picture, and gain a relative perspective on their efforts. This general reference could apply to the application of leadership as well. Buried in administrative paperwork and daily

chores, leaders often become distracted from their duty to inspire. This dilemma is the subject of Warren Bennis's *Why Leaders Can't Lead*. Again, a simple model might help leaders define their roles and duties, maintain a focused set of priorities, and keep minutia from clouding their vision.

James MacGregor Burns summarizes a gap in leadership theory and points to this study's potential significance. "The crisis of leadership today is the mediocrity and irresponsibility of so many of the men and women in power, but leadership rarely rises to the full need for it. The fundamental crisis underlying mediocrity is intellectual. If we know all too much about our leaders, we know far too little about *leadership*. We fail to grasp the essence of leadership that is relevant to the modern age and hence we cannot agree even on the standards by which to measure, recruit, and reject it."<sup>5</sup> If this study is successful, it will provide a model of leadership that may serve as a macrocosmic reference, a standard, and a bridge from abstract thought to practical application.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The ambiguity surrounding the concept of leadership is not for lack of research. There are over 8,000 studies cited in the *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*.<sup>6</sup> Add to that number the volumes of historical biographies of great leaders, the management systems of group productivity, political science theories, teaching methods, and coaching philosophies. The result is an enormous heap of competing studies discussing who a leader is, what leadership is, and how groups are led.

#### Leader Theories

Historians began the leadership debate by studying great leaders. Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Buddha, Alexander the Great, and Napoleon have all been studied in an attempt to discover their secrets. Early theorists took these examples from their historical contexts and formulated theories about their behavior. Thus emerged trait theories, the notion that leadership is manifested through an individual's physical and personality traits. William James's 1880 great man theory is one of the earliest leadership theories. It became popular in the early Twentieth Century and subsequently spawned numerous studies into the heredity, education, and demeanor of past great leaders.<sup>7</sup>

These trait theories led to the idea that leaders are born not made, that "at birth, one's ability to be a leader is already decided."<sup>8</sup> Examining height, weight, skills, personality, etc., researchers tried to ascertain the source of leadership ability. However, over the course of this century, as the sciences of psychology and sociology matured, so



did research into trait theory. Advances and rigorous research led to the currently accepted conclusions that leaders are not born, that they are developed in their environment, and that their particular traits are significant factors in effectiveness, but not determinate.<sup>9</sup>

Although trait theories' explanations of the origins of leaders are suspect, their conclusions about the effectiveness of certain traits has kept them popular. The U.S. Marine Corps' Basic School in Quantico, Virginia, teaches each officer to develop, foster, and emulate their fourteen traits of leadership: integrity, justice, enthusiasm, bearing, endurance, unselfishness, loyalty, judgment, tact, initiative, dependability, decisiveness, courage, and knowledge.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the Marines perpetuate trait theory through U.S.M.C. history lessons at both their officer Basic School and enlisted Boot Camps.

The U.S. Naval Academy shifted from a management-based leadership curriculum to a character-development, trait-theory curriculum in 1995. This shift marked Superintendent Admiral Larson's "back-to-the-basics" approach after several years of Admiral Lynch's transactional and Total Quality methods.<sup>11</sup> Emphasizing values and ethics in the curriculum and removing some of the policies that restricted leadership creativity preceded dramatic improvements in midshipman performance.<sup>12</sup> Personally fostering leader traits instead of mechanically processing themselves through a training system resonated with midshipmen.

Another example of trait theory's popularity is evident in military performance evaluations. The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps each evaluate their officers by rating their appearance, character, skills, and individual efforts. In each

service's performance report, little space, if any, is devoted to evaluating the performance of a leader's *subordinates*. The priority given to evaluating leader traits rather than his influence on his group, demonstrates a belief in the utility of trait theory.

Examining historians views of leadership traits and behaviors, I discovered an exceptional book. John Keegan's *The Mask of Command* is an excellent historical analysis of Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, General Ulysses Grant, and Adolf Hitler. His analysis of these leaders describes the social and military settings and how these leaders behaved according to their abilities and situation. In it, Keegan makes a poignant point about leadership theories borne from historical studies, "Trait studies...Behaviour studies...Both are the methods of social scientists and, as with all social science, condemn those who practise them to the agony of making universal and general what is stubbornly local and particular."<sup>13</sup> He contends that the traits and behavior of leaders cannot be taken out of their historical context. The effectiveness of their traits and behavior is inextricably linked to their situations. Keegan thus points out a fundamental flaw with trait theories.

Pure trait theories of leadership fail to address the roles of followers and goals.<sup>14</sup> This inadequacy has led some researchers to draw links between the leader and their groups. From trait theories evolved some type theories. Type theories contend that styles of leading vary with group relationships. Admiral Stockdale's model of seven types of leadership asserts, for example, that military commanders must be prepared to behave as a steward in one situation and a disciplinarian in another.<sup>15</sup> Another type theory posits that personalities fall into distinct categories and that knowing which category matches your

personality enables better relations with the group. This claim arises from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator typology.<sup>16</sup> These theories demonstrate researchers' more recent attempts to characterize leader types and analyze their effectiveness with their groups.

While some researchers have concentrated on categorizing leaders, others have attempted to categorize their behavior. Various studies examined how leaders typically behaved in accordance with their relationships to their groups. For example, determining whether someone behaved in a laissez-faire or charismatic manner, researchers then examined the effectiveness of these different styles of behavior. Four dominant categories of behavior are participative leading (allowing groups to participate in decisions), directive leading (dictator-like or autocratic leadership), task-oriented leading (focused on group productivity), and relations-oriented leading (focused on group cohesion).<sup>17</sup> Studies of these behaviors sought to reveal which one is most effective.

As with every leadership study of effectiveness, once a trend is discovered that leads to the conclusion that one style or trait is consistently more effective than others, glaring exceptions are cited. Although one study might conclude that participative leadership encourages better decision making than directive leadership, one could cite General George Patton's directive leadership during the Battle of the Bulge and its success as a glaring exception. Where as one study might assert that relations-oriented leadership enhances performance, one could cite Dallas Cowboys football coach Tom Landry and his unquestionable success as a task-oriented leader.<sup>18</sup> These discrepancies highlight much of the ambiguity of the numerous theories that have attempted to prove the effectiveness of one particular trait or behavior.

In response to these discrepancies, Fielder's contingency model of leadership emerged. In this theory, Fielder classifies leader behavior and analyzes their effectiveness in certain situations. One of the greatest attributes of this theory is its recognition of the adaptability of a leader for various situations. Problems with testing which behaviors were most effective for which situations include the infinite number of variables and the varying significance of those variables. Additionally, the wide divergence of correlation coefficients from empirical data taken in studies of the model confuses the validity of the conclusions. Schreiesheim and Hosking concluded: "When the relevant studies are critically examined, and a distinction drawn between those that constitute adequate tests of the model and those that do not, the results are far from encouraging. Examining both the size and direction of the correlations in each of the eight octants of the situational favorableness dimension, reveals that Fielder's model really has little empirical support."<sup>19</sup> This problem of quantifying leader behavior and empirically testing predictions is common, and correlating statistical results with predictions is challenging at best. Despite the contingency theory's questionable validity, Fielder's model does represent an acknowledgment that leader effectiveness varies from situation to situation. His conclusions--that relation-oriented leadership is most effective in moderate situations, and that task-oriented leadership is most effective in extreme situations--marked a shift in leadership research away from categorizing individuals.<sup>20</sup>

One of the latest and most widely accepted studies on leader behavior is Bernard Bass's 1985 theory of transactional and transformational leadership.<sup>21</sup> This study represents the maturing of leadership study. It provides a thorough examination of leader

behavior by linking it to group satisfaction and goal accomplishment. In it, Bass identifies two types of leadership behavior, transactional and transformational. Transactional leaders exchange rewards for group performance, while transformational leaders appeal to the values of their groups and inspire them to higher aspirations of performance with a compelling vision. Bass's theory is rooted in James MacGregor Burns's 1978 theory and earlier studies of charismatic leadership.<sup>22</sup>

Earlier studies of leader-follower relationships discuss transactions between leaders and individual followers. In these studies, leaders supposedly motivate performance by satisfying some of the group's needs. How leaders exchange rewards for performance can be determined by the group's perceptions or the leader's perceptions. Vertical-dyad linkage, theory X and theory Y, social exchange theory, and others center their studies on the leader-follower exchange.<sup>23</sup> Burns extended the leader-follower concept beyond an exchange and examined leaders as either transactional or transformational. In Burns's 1978 theory, "the transformational leader asks followers to transcend their own self-interests for the good of the group, organization, or society."<sup>24</sup> Bass then extends Burns's theory by asserting that transformational behavior augments transactional behavior. In other words, leaders are not one or the other, but both transactional *and* transformational. In his model, leaders follow a path-goal process for transactional leadership, and they supplement their behavior with charisma and elicit heightened motivation.<sup>25</sup>

Bass's contention that leaders are both transactional and transformational addresses some of the confusion about the concept of leadership. In their efforts to label and categorize people, researchers have drawn a distinction between leaders and

managers. Further, they try to identify leading behavior and managing behavior.<sup>26</sup> The confusing point here is that leading behavior and managing behavior is very similar. I explained the distinction to my students in this manner,

While managers emphasize supervising and correcting mistakes, leaders focus on motivating and applauding innovations. Where management deals with maintaining minimums, leadership inspires people to exceed maximums. Often times the differences between a manager and a leader are confused because both use the same tools, much like a house painter and a muralist. The difference is their purpose. A house painter is painting--systematically performing a task for the purpose of accomplishing his task. A muralist is creating a vision--using shades and hues to inspire others. Both the house painter and the muralist paint walls, but while the painter is merely finishing a task, the muralist is winning admirers, fans, and followers.<sup>27</sup>

Bass's theory asserts that managers and leaders both influence groups to accomplish goals, but transformational leaders influence groups with charisma in a manner that wins admirers, fans, and followers.

With transformational leadership, leader behavior is linked to group relations and goal accomplishment in a comprehensive manner. Further, Bass's theory incorporates the concepts of values and charisma and addresses their application in varying situations. It takes inspirational behavior out of its historical context, and it explains the general process that transpires. Effectively, it gives the "universal" explanation that historian John Keegan argued is "stubbornly local." Although it is widely accepted,<sup>28</sup> the data from tests of Bass's theory are not compelling. Psychologist John Miner contends, "the effects of transformational leadership have been exaggerated."<sup>29</sup> Even after Bass has conducted over a decade of elaborate and extensive testing of his theory, he cannot quantitatively verify his concept of leadership with persuasive validity.

## Group Applications

Two of the most important factors determining the effectiveness of a leader's behavior are the cohesiveness and productivity of the group. It is from the group that a leader draws her power. It is with the group that a leader accomplishes her task. Whether the group is a functional, task, or interest group may effect how it perceives the guidance of a participative or directive leader.<sup>30</sup> The group's cohesion and productivity is the single most determinate factor in evaluating leadership. If a team does not win, the coach gets fired. If a business losses money, the Chief Executive Officer gets fired. If a crew runs its ship aground, the captain gets relieved. In addition to surveying leadership literature, I also examined literature concerning the application of leadership, group management, and various method use to create group cohesion and productivity.

The theoretical basis of most group applications owes to Maslow's hierarchy of needs and French and Raven's taxonomy of power. Maslow's 1954 hierarchy of needs categorizes and prioritizes human needs from physiological to self-actualization. From this hierarchy, researchers studied how leaders create motivation in groups by satisfying these needs.<sup>31</sup> French and Raven's 1959 taxonomy of power identifies five powers--expert, referent, legitimate, reward, and coercive--that a leader uses to influence a group. A leader's expert power comes from the group's perception of his expertise; referent power comes from the group's admiration of the leader; legitimate power comes from the leader's position within an organization; reward power comes from a leader's

ability to reward; and coercive power comes from a leader's ability to punish.<sup>32</sup> Together these two theories have survived decades of examination and still guide most notions of group motivation and influence.

An additional categorization that has guided leadership application is Fielder's 1967 contingency theory. In it, leadership behavior is characterized as task-oriented, relation-oriented, directive, and participative leadership.<sup>33</sup> This contingency theory considers a leader's interaction with the group and its goal, and as stated earlier, concluded that certain styles of leading were more effective in certain situations. Considering the notions of motivation, influence, and leadership styles, I examined some of the applications of leadership upon groups.

#### Team Building

As a leadership instructor at the Naval Academy, I commanded a company of ninety midshipman through their indoctrination during Plebe Summer training. The focus of my efforts as the company officer was to teach the upperclass midshipmen how to properly indoctrinate the incoming freshmen. We began with a goal of developing a company of confident, enthusiastic, and proud plebes who work as a team. To lend academic credibility to my guidance, I researched team building literature and found Andrew Dubrin's table in his *Leadership: Research Findings, Practice, and Skills* (1995):



## LEADER BEHAVIOR THAT FOSTERS TEAMWORK

1. Defining the team's mission.
2. Developing a norm of teamwork.
3. Emphasizing pride in being outstanding.
4. Serving as a model of teamwork.
5. Using a consensus leadership style.
6. Designing systems and structures to overcome the we-they attitude.
7. Establishing urgency, demanding performance standards, and providing direction.
8. Emphasizing group recognition.
9. Challenging the group regularly with fresh facts and information.
10. Encouraging competition with another group.
11. Encouraging the use of jargon.
12. Initiating ritual and ceremony.
13. Soliciting feedback on team effectiveness.
14. Minimizing micromanagement

Figure 1. Source: Andrew J. Dubrin, Leadership: Research Findings, Practice, and Skills (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 192.

Figure 1 encapsulated the positive behaviors I experienced in my training experiences and served as an excellent reference. Defining missions, developing teamwork, establishing urgency, and emphasizing group recognition, jargon, and ritual are hallmarks of military indoctrination. We had to creatively work “consensus leadership” (#5) and “soliciting feedback” (#13) into our time-constrained methods, but generally the literature’s theory was very consistent with standard military instruction. However, our military procedures were not based upon theoretical research, but rather upon experience and after-action reporting. As U.S. Navy Senior Chief (Sea, Air, Land (SEAL)) Dave Albonetti often put it, “these procedures are written in blood.”

In addition, I consulted with several Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeants who had recently completed duty as Drill Instructors before reporting to the Naval Academy. In those discussions we ferreted out the broad milestones we would strive for in the Plebe

Summer training. The first stage of indoctrination seeks to break down recruits and subdue their egos and individuality. With identical shaved heads, new uniforms, and rigid schedules, new recruits quickly develop group identity and norms.<sup>34</sup>

To reinforce their group identity, instructors are encouraged not to single out individuals for punishment. Instead, if one recruit makes a mistake, everyone is punished. For example, if one individual is late for a formation, the entire group of ninety recruits is punished with twenty-five push-ups. This technique of group accountability is especially effective in Naval Special Warfare's Basic Underwater/SEAL (BUD/S) School in its "vetting process." The group pressure on those who fail to perform to standards tends to drive them out and group cohesion increases as performance improves. This notion is demonstrated best during the fifth week of BUD/S, called Hell Week, where typically thirty percent of trainees drop out of the course.<sup>35</sup>

What emerges is a group of trainees with an immense sense of cohesion and identity, epitomizing the BUD/S credo, "Be someone special." This cohesion-attrition phenomenon is explained theoretically by Mossholder, Bedeian, and Armenakis in their 1982 study, *Group Process - Work Outcome Relationships*. In their study, as group cohesion increases, the performance of those with low self esteem rises to match those with high self esteem.<sup>36</sup> After losing poor performers from attrition early, group performance rises. Consequently, after early attrition, cohesion increases. After trainees graduate from BUD/S and become SEALs, they typically become careerists--Naval Special Warfare consistently has one of the highest enlisted retention rates in the Navy.<sup>37</sup>

After recruits are bonded into teams during the early stages of indoctrination, their confidence grows along with their hair, and they are assigned positions and given more responsibility. Even as recruits are assigned as squad leaders, platoon leaders, and other roles, drill instructors condition them to organization and discipline. Once they have completed their indoctrination, military personnel move on to advanced training and acquire various specialties. Then they report back to a military unit's organization and work to assimilate as they did in their indoctrination. Effectively, leadership weaves them into the organization.

The military example of team building follows the general methods of athletic indoctrination as well--group exercise, individual skill/position development, then group organization. Youth football teams begin each season with two-a-day conditioning practices where each player wears uniform shorts and half-shirt, and each player performs the same drills. Similarly, basketball, volleyball, soccer, baseball, and other team sports begin with rudimentary and uniform drills to build cohesion, introduce players to each other, and establish an identity.<sup>38</sup> Once basic skills and conditioning are developed, players can then split into their individual positions and roles develop independently while retaining the team identity they established earlier. Finally, individuals are organized back into a team for scrimmages, practice games, and competition. They gain team identity, develop individual skills, then learn team organization and teamwork.

Contrary to sports and the military, many businesses disperse their new recruits in apprenticeships, internships, and management understudy training. Individually, trainees learn to fend for themselves as they assist more experienced workers who are often

untrained at teaching. Though these on-the-job training methods may impart more specialized and technical knowledge, they do little to develop cohesiveness. What little orientation or indoctrination new employees may receive is usually packaged in video's and handbooks which are briefed in a day or less. The cost of group orientations normally precludes their use, but some corporations like RCA have tried group programs and found them effective.<sup>39</sup>

To improve cohesiveness after employees have assimilated, some businesses and civil organizations have attempted to replicate military and athletic team building experiences through adventure training, "ropes" courses or group off-site exercises.<sup>40</sup> Absent a physical or life-threatening competitive urgency, businesses struggle to develop cohesiveness amid individuals' competition for raises, promotions, and bonuses. Rather than instituting indoctrination programs, some companies have sent their management teams to adventure schools. The Presidio Adventure Racing School puts corporate students through kayaking, rock climbing, orienteering, and other adventure skills training. Then the students are divided into five-man teams and tasked to complete a thirty-six-hour race against the other teams. The ideal result is a group that has worked together through fatigue and pain to complete the course. Although they may instead discover one member not inclined toward teamwork.<sup>41</sup>

In general, each of these team building approaches--military indoctrination, pre-season practice, and corporate orientation--is directed toward developing group cohesion. Once the group is formed and cohesive, it is usually expected to accomplish something. The next sequence in applying leadership to a group is managing productivity.

## Organizational Management

Despite the distinction between leaders and managers, leaders manage as well as lead, as Bass noted in his transactional and transformational leadership theory. In view of this point, I researched management applications. Of these, I studied the Quality Movement which has manifested itself as Total Quality Management or Leadership, Total Army Analysis, ISO 9000, and other labels. I also studied Reengineering, Lou Tice's Pacific Institute methods, and Management By Objectives (MBO). Additionally, I practiced the Navy's methods of Materials Maintenance Management (3M), and I have completed three predeployment training cycles with my SEAL platoons to attain specific unit capabilities before each deployment. There also exist numerous informal methods of goal setting, evaluation, and feedback that athletic coaches learn in clinics and practice with their teams. Each of these management methods are systematic processes designed to assess and improve group productivity.

The Quality Movement essentially is an elaborate system crafted by Dr. W. Edwards Deming to formally implement participative and task-oriented leadership. In TQM, a company's Executive Steering Committee (ESC) tasks a Quality Management Board (QMB) to correct a problem. The QMB then forms a Process Action Team (PAT) that brings shift workers from various departments together to analyze processes from their diverse perspectives. Then the PAT forwards their suggested improvements up to the QMB for implementation. For ISO 9000, an international quality standard, the TQM processes is extended to include publishing explicit procedures and detailed

documentation. The Quality process was designed to empower employees to help improve the company and focus them on producing a quality product--participative and task-oriented leadership.

Have these elaborate systems worked? "In a survey of 500 American companies, for example, only a third saw TQ as contributing significantly to their competitiveness. Many TQ programs that began with fanfare and high hopes have been discontinued because of lack of results."<sup>42</sup> Though it has worked for many manufacturing firms, a potential source of failure may be seen in TQ's misapplication in organizations that predominately train people. At the Naval Academy under Rear Admiral Thomas Lynch, midshipmen were formed into PATs and empowered to make changes in training. The result was a general relaxation in the rigor and restrictions for the midshipmen. In effect, the leadership at Navy had empowered the product to alter its production process. If a factory that manufactures widgets formed the widgets into PATs and asked what they would change, one might expect the widgets would want to eliminate the stamping and heat-tempering stages of the manufacturing process. When Admiral Larson arrived, he removed the midshipmen from the TQ process, de-emphasized its employment, and re-instituted the rigor and restrictions. This was part of USNA's back-to-the-basics approach in 1995 as a result of the misapplication of TQ for training.<sup>43</sup>

Theoretically, the problems with TQ may rest with its perception by the employees it is supposedly empowering. Because the TQ structure is so elaborate, complete with extensive jargon and acronyms, instead of fostering initiative and innovation, it requires conformity and shackles ideas. Ideas are not free to rise up to management; instead they

are boxed in the rigid TQ structure. Moreover, management may appear disingenuous when a PAT's participation and suggestions are rejected by a QMB and not implemented. A QMB could be faced with a "you asked for it, you got it" problem of alienating their work force and eroding cohesion if they reject a suggested improvement.

Other factors that appear to hamper TQ's effectiveness are its rigid procedure and foreign jargon. In team building, groups are encouraged to use their own jargon to establish and reinforce their own group identity. Then along comes some TQ with its own PAT-QMB-ESC structure and "Quality" jargon to challenge the group's identity. Moreover, according to Dr. Deming, the TQ process must be strictly adhered to for sometimes years before the results of "the Deming Change Reaction" are realized.<sup>44</sup> This can't-turn-back-now commitment and its jargon often leads to TQ's characterization as a management cult or fad that threatens employee trust and group identity.<sup>45</sup>

Reengineering is another management application that involves changing processes toward improvement. However, with reengineering, the process is not merely improved; it is tossed out and reinvented. For example, instead of building a better mousetrap, reengineering would develop a better way to kill mice.<sup>46</sup> This method has dramatically improved businesses like Kodak, IBM, and Ford by encouraging ambitious creativity.<sup>47</sup>

One drawback to reengineering is its risk, which often leads management to hire consultants. The consultants increase management's comfort with dramatic change, but their external nature eats at employees trust in the change, and as with TQ, it erodes cohesion. Scott Adams captured the money-saving, downsizing, and dangerous aspects of reengineering in his explanation: "Reengineering a company is a bit like performing an

appendectomy on yourself. It hurts quite a bit, you might not know exactly how to do it, and there's a good chance you won't survive it. But if it does work, you'll gain enough confidence to go after some of the more vital organs, such as that big red pumping thing."<sup>48</sup>

In addition to these business methods, I studied other popular applications. In November of 1994, I attended a Lou Tice Pacific Institute seminar. At this week-long course we learned how to establish a long-term goal. Then we followed a process of writing personal and group affirmations, self-evaluating, and reaffirming or adjusting our affirmations according to our long-term goal. At the Naval Academy this practice is used by the crew, basketball, and lacrosse teams--all teams with consistent winning records.

Another popular method is Management By Objectives (MBO) which the championship women's soccer team at the University of North Carolina and several companies use.<sup>49</sup> Where the Pacific Institute teaches individuals to personally evaluate their performance, MBO calls for the leader to sit with each individual and agree upon objectives. Then the leader evaluates and periodically gives feedback to the individual. In this application, a leader can use objectives to motivate, evaluate, and guide individuals. One limitation, however, is the extensive time involved in personally evaluating and counseling each individual member of a group. If a group is large and time is short, evaluations lose accuracy and counseling may become abbreviated.

At the Naval Academy I observed a similar problem with their counseling policy. As an academic-year company officer, I commanded 140 midshipmen, and by policy, I was required to formally counsel each midshipman three times each sixteen-week



semester--assessing their performance, setting goals, and discussing any problems. Figuring about 30 minutes for each session, I did the math and discovered it would take nearly six weeks to fit one cycle of counseling into any company officer schedule. The first semester, counseling sessions were rushed and perceived as artificial concern. To correct this artificiality, I delegated the counseling to each midshipman's immediate midshipman superior, and I held those immediate superiors accountable for their subordinates' performance. This adjustment was designed to give midshipmen greater ownership of their training duties and increase their motivation to succeed. "Quality of Life" and "Climate" surveys indicated greater satisfaction in the company, although that satisfaction's correlation to the ownership strategy is questionable.

Other management methods I have practiced in the Navy are the Materials Maintenance Management (3M) program and the predeployment training cycle. 3M is a documented system of periodic maintenance and inspection of equipment from flashlights to steam plant turbines. It is designed to insure the thorough combat readiness of ships and units. Moreover, for complex nuclear and steam power plants, the process guarantees their safe operation. A less explicit process is the Navy's predeployment training cycle. Guided by the capabilities required in Fleet Exercise Publication SIX (FXP-6), each SEAL platoon progresses through a flexible nine-month training schedule. As the schedule is completed, each platoon is inspected in an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) and tactically evaluated in an Operational Readiness Exercise (ORE). This cycle insures taht

each SEAL platoon deploys administratively sound with similar operational capabilities. Together, these Navy management applications represent general quality assurance cycles that have successfully persisted for decades.

The final application I observed and studied was the Navy football team's process of game preparation. Each Sunday the coaches analyze videos of their opponent and design a game plan. Then they break down the game plan and set practice objectives. Each practice is videotaped and analyzed, noting good play and mistakes. The next practice, position coaches discuss individual mistakes privately, and the head coach, Charlie Whetherbie, highlights the improving players amongst the entire team. On Saturday, the game plan is executed. During the game, a more compressed cycle of improvement is used. A panel of coaches analyzes each play from the press box, radios opponent tendencies and team performance to the field, and the head coach adjusts his play calls accordingly. On Sunday, they start the process over for their next opponent. This cycle of assessing and adjusting the Navy football team's performance enables them to flexibly adjust and improve their performance.<sup>50</sup>

The common thread through these management applications is their feedback loops between the leaders and the groups. The processes of evaluating and improving performance vary from leader to leader and group to group, but their objectives are generally similar--a better product. This bottom-line focus of managing has pitfalls. It threatens employee trust, participation, and efficiency when management applies excessive controls or artificial systems. In summary, managing challenges a leader to balance group cohesion with the demands of productivity.

## Goal Methods

After the leader and the group, the third element of leadership is the goal, and as Bass puts it, “Without a doubt, the group’s purpose or goal is the predominant norm of a group.”<sup>51</sup> With the goal lies the greatest demand for a leader’s creativity. How vividly she forms a goal, communicates its necessity, and guides its attainment will determine how well the group accepts it. A colorfully presented goal that is tied to common values inspires a group in the way James MacGregor Burns described transformational leadership--“appealing to followers’ values and their sense of higher purpose.”<sup>52</sup> In contrast, a mundane goal that only satisfies shallow needs may fail to elicit compliance. With this point in mind, I examined various methods for perceiving and creating goals.

Goal setting begins with a leader’s perception of a situation, market, conflict, or competition. Previously I described group applications and some management methods. Quality assurance processes predominately focus inwardly on group behavior. In contrast, leaders involved in goal setting focus outwardly on a situation. In other words, a manager inspecting a process in a factory focuses inwardly on what the group is doing; a leader analyzing market shifts and growing demands focuses on where the group should go. Hammer and Champy describe this out-of-the-box thinking as inductive, versus inside-the-box, deductive thinking. They attribute the radically innovative nature of reengineering to inductive thinking.<sup>53</sup> In the military, concentrating on the immediate threats and fighting the enemy wherever they appear is referred to as attrition warfare. In contrast, looking beyond the immediate threats and formulating a plan focused on the

enemy's center of gravity is characterized as maneuver warfare. The lightning left hook of the 1991 Persian Gulf 100-hour ground war was maneuver warfare. Inductive perception examines a situation from all perspectives and asks "why" instead of "how."

Once leaders locate the source or cause of a situational influence--a center of gravity, for instance--it can be efficiently targeted. Rather than fighting through front-line forces, a military operation may more quickly circumvent resistance and thrust straight toward a center of gravity with little loss of life — *avoiding* a battle instead of seeking one. Rather than grinding through a sequential design process, Kodak shifted to a parallel design process and cut their production time in half.<sup>54</sup> Open-minded, free, and outward thinking helps leaders perceive these innovative solutions. Once solutions are envisioned however, the leader must then formulate goals and sketch out a plan toward them.

Though there are numerous scientific studies on the effectiveness of goal setting, decidedly there is little written in academia about how to create a goal. The foremost theory of goal setting effectiveness was authored by Edwin Locke in 1984. He concluded that "specific, difficult goals lead to higher performance," and several subsequent researchers confirmed his findings to be true about ninety percent of the time.<sup>55</sup> The questions that Locke's study has inspired are centered around how to create these "specific, difficult" goals. Who should determine goals? The group or the leader? Will groups set difficult goals for themselves? Will groups accept difficult goals when they have not participated in their creation? Can participative leadership be applied in time-sensitive situations? Locke's simple point is that vivid, ambitious goals inspire group

motivation. The dilemma is trying to set a specific, difficult goal through a group process for consensus, or trying to gain acceptance of a specific, difficult goal that arises from a directive, task-oriented form of leadership.

### The Military

For the military, leadership is generally directive and task-oriented, and it may seem ridiculous to discuss how commanders gain compliance from their groups. Obedience is required by law. During World War I, a noncompliant soldier could have been shot for desertion. Nevertheless, soldiers may appear to obey orders, while they discreetly disobey the spirit. A security squad may patrol an area, but instead of seeking out enemy intruders to defend the group, they may selfishly avoid the enemy at all costs.<sup>56</sup> Considering the speed and decentralized nature of modern war, thorough compliance is especially critical. Luckily the armed forces today are all-volunteer and more loyal to their leadership than the conscripted forces of the Civil War, the World Wars, Korea, and Viet Nam considering today's higher retention rates and lower desertion rates. Yet, compliance remains a paramount challenge for military commanders.

Operationally, the military addresses this dilemma with a well-established process of planning and goal setting. With a predominately directive and mission- or task-oriented command culture, the dilemma is in gaining acceptance of a commander's operational mission taskings. To prepare for potential crisis, military planners begin with general guidance from the National Military Strategy. Taking this general guidance, operational commanders analyze their regions and identify potential flashpoints that might require the deployment of military force. Then planning staffs exhaustively develop plans

to confront these flashpoints through an approximately eighteen-month process with the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Commanders meticulously inspect and test these contingency plans and then shelve them until needed. When a crisis arises, the plans then serve as a basis for a more pertinent and detailed Operation Order. This general process of perception, abstraction, and design is referred to as the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).<sup>57</sup>

Because of the time-intensive environment of a military deployment, there is little time for group participation from deploying units in the JOPES. Instead, deploying units follow the JOPES plans during exercises, evaluate the plans, and suggest improvements in after-action reports. Exercise debriefs and lessons learned are at the heart of group participation in the JOPES. In debrief forums, subordinates are encouraged to criticize and challenge procedures. In the Marine Corps, marines are not only encouraged to challenge, they are *instructed* to in their doctrine. "Each subordinate should consider it his duty to provide his honest, professional opinion--even though it may be in disagreement with his senior's. . . . Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their rank insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal advancement--the behavior of 'yes-men'--will not be tolerated."<sup>58</sup> This practice of gaining feedback from the group generates trust in the military planning process and a sense of ownership in its procedures. This trust, coupled with the potentially historic rewards of glory and admiration, serves to create compliance and motivation for JOPES plans. Thus, trust helps maintain cohesion during the process of refining purpose, even if direct group participation is not always feasible.

Administratively, military commanders establish general policy instead of detailed, explicit operation orders. Granted, military commanders already possess detailed service regulations to govern behavior, but leaders also must develop a vision to guide their units toward improvement. Any soldier, sailor, airman, or marine can survive by merely existing within the regulations. A commander's challenge is to motivate a subordinate who has guaranteed job security and income to exceed minimums and rise above the status quo.<sup>59</sup> An original and creative vision may inspire innovative thinking and guide the development of subsequent goals and objectives, but there is no elaborate process for developing vision like JOPES. Group participation may or may not be employed in its creation. Instead, policy development and administrative goal setting in the military is largely a free and imaginative process.

#### Business

The business community also follows a general process of goal setting. To secure financial backing, breed confidence, and proceed in a calculated direction, businesses create a business plan. Unlike the military, the business planning process varies considerably from company to company based upon their industry--manufacturing, transportation, service, engineering, etc. However, business plans generally include the same elements: an executive summary, company information, market analysis, a product description, a sales and promotion plan, and a financial plan. In comparison, this parallels a military operation order which includes a mission statement (executive summary), a situation paragraph (company and market information), an execution plan (product and

sales plan), and a logistics paragraph (financial summary). Similarly, business literature that discusses planning also emphasizes the innovative and creative requirements for corporate success.<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, business also struggles with the dilemma of creating ambitious goals and eliciting compliance. In Malcolm W. Pennington's "Why Has Planning Failed and What Can You Do About It?," he outlines several mistakes business planners consistently make that subvert group cohesion, alienate employees, and dissolve acceptance of their plans.<sup>61</sup> While the military must inspire compliance with a plan's spirit absent any financial or job security influence, businesses must inspire compliance in their goals absent any historic significance or potential for glory. A soldier might run through gunfire to defeat an enemy with high notions of duty, honor, and country, but a businessman would hardly risk his life to make a sale. Instead, businesses often rely on profit-sharing schemes, bonuses, and commission incentives to motivate groups.<sup>62</sup> Research has shown that monetary rewards are largely effective in improving performance and compliance, though there are some potential drawbacks. Jealousy, stress, and distrust may arise in individuals who feel slighted.<sup>63</sup> In summary, though military and business groups differ significantly, their leaders both grapple with the same dilemma of setting demanding goals and eliciting motivated compliance.

### Sports

My father once taught me, "Coaches are masters at stating the obvious." As Al Davis, owner of the Oakland Raiders football team said, "Just win, baby." Nevertheless, game planning is intellectually taxing. Further, coming up with an original, heartfelt pep



talk to excite compliance after games and games of pep talks requires an astute knowledge of the players' feelings and values. For athletic coaches, composing a unique, pertinent pep talk that imaginatively incorporates purpose and guidance is a formidable challenge for their creativity.

Another challenging aspect of team sports is maintaining cohesion while giving individual praise, incentives, or promotions. The selection of starting players may be subjective and generate perceptions of favoritism. To counter this problem, coaches often post statistics to communicate the objective criteria a coach is evaluating. A baseball player cannot argue against his spot on the bench if the starter on the field has the highest batting average, lowest number of errors, and highest number of home runs. Generally, the solution for perceived favoritism is detailed, open, and forthright communication between a coach and her players. Insuring players understand why decisions are made and what the coach values, helps the team understand his demands, support each other, and build a cohesive momentum toward the team's goal--winning.<sup>64</sup>

Though sports goals are fairly obvious, teams often will hold meetings at the beginning of a season to set subsidiary goals. These meetings are an attempt at participative leadership and task orienting. In them, players discuss and write down group goals that will lead them to a successful season. For instance, the Navy crew team decided on certain ergometer milestones each boat crew would strive for. The Navy basketball team set field-goal and free-throw percentages they felt would bring them a winning season. The Navy football team set yardage, sack, and other statistical goals. This team-goal method helps build cohesion, generate interest, and improve morale.<sup>65</sup>

In 1996, when head coach Charlie Whetherbie was hired to lead the Navy football team, he brought a unique identity and style. He confidently declared three specific, difficult goals: "A winning season, beat Army, and a bowl bid." Then, while previous coaches sought to relieve some of their players' academic and military pressure, Whetherbie reinforced players' academy identity. Mandating that players meet all standards and attend all obligations, he set his style apart from other coaches. This unique style gave the team identity and built cohesion. Next, he added cohesion with a positive charisma that greatly contrasted with previous head coach, George Chaump's style. This charisma brought the players together to not simply beat opposing teams, but to demonstrate a moral superiority against much larger opponents in a David-and-Goliath fashion. This charisma augmented his detailed game planning process of video taping, game planning, preparing and adjusting during practice, and playing and adjusting during the game. It led the Navy team to their first winning season in over a decade and to an Aloha Bowl victory over the University of California. Essentially, Charlie Whetherbie demonstrated Bass's transactional and transformational leadership theory. He built team cohesion, implemented a system to manage productivity, and transformed individual values into a higher team purpose with his charisma.<sup>66</sup>

In general, each of these goal methods represents a process of perceiving situations, abstracting goals, and designing a plan toward those goals. For the military JOPES, this process incorporates after-action reporting and debriefs to gain participation from the group and acceptance of goals. In business, companies analyze markets to perceive, abstract, and design business plans. Then they use incentives, promotions, and

commissions to elicit compliance. In sports, coaches analyze videos to perceive, abstract, and design a game plan. Then they use either the reward of glory or the shame of defeat for motivation. Overall, these methods illustrate the struggle to apply the theories of leadership to groups, build cohesion, manage productivity, and set vivid and challenging goals.

### Summary of Literature Review

To summarize the findings of my literature review, I have listed the common observations of researchers, business managers, military commanders, and coaches below:

#### 1. Goal Methods:

- a. the group's goal is the predominant norm of the group.
- b. the goal process is perception, abstraction, and design.
- c. the goal process is a function of imaginative, inductive, outward thinking.

#### 2. Group Applications:

- a. group cohesion and productivity are the most significant determinates in evaluating leadership.
- b. team building develops cohesion.
- c. team building is a function of identity, trust, and purpose.
- d. management develops productivity.
- e. management is a function of deductive, inward thinking.

#### 3. Leader Theory:

- a. the academic concept of leadership has evolved over a century of thousands of scientific studies into currently, its most accepted form, Bass's theory of

transactional and transformational leadership.

- b. within the enormous volume of leadership research, virtually every theory lacks empirical and quantitative validity.

My analysis in chapter 4 will begin by addressing what I have identified as the primary source of ambiguity and confusion in conceptualizing leadership--the study and classification of leadership as a science.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

This study addresses the confusion surrounding leadership and develops a model that links its various theories to application. This study examines what leadership is, how it is practiced, and how to describe that which is “stubbornly local and particular” in a “universal” manner. Its intent is to inspire more creative and productive leadership.

My methodology began with an extensive review of the macrocosm of leadership and its application. I surveyed leadership theories and examined their findings and conclusions. I studied management methods and evaluations of their effectiveness including visits to the Sparrows Point Bethlehem Steele Plant in Baltimore, Maryland and the Sikorsky Helicopter Assembly Plant in Bridgeport, Connecticut. I followed the Navy football team, soccer team, lacrosse team, basketball team, and boxing teams through two seasons of coaching, and I observed their varied methods of planning, preparing, and playing their competitions. Finally, I considered the military methods of planning, preparing, and executing missions. This review gathers a comprehensive perspective of leadership from theory through application and accomplishment.

From the literature review in Chapter 2, I outlined the outward leadership process of perceiving, abstracting, and designing goals and the inward process of guiding, evaluating, and providing feedback toward improving productivity. Considering how various leaders in the military, business, and sports create group cohesion, productivity, and purpose, I observed a general link between their success and Bernard Bass’s

Transactional and Transformational Leadership theory. Tracing the historical development of Bass's theory, I observed what I believe is the source of this study's stated problem, the confusion and lack of correlation between leadership theory and practice.

In chapter 4, I analyze this problem and inductively surmise a solution. This solution is manifested in a definition of leadership and a model that further clarifies its application. Assembling conclusions from various theories and observations from various applications, the model conceptualizes leading and incorporates both the outward process of creating purpose and the inward processes of developing cohesion and guiding productivity.

In chapter 5, the model guides an analysis of Admiral Horatio Nelson and General George Patton's leadership in battle. Through this analysis, the utility of the model is revealed. It demonstrates the role originality, imagination, and skill play in leading, and it provides examples of the creative process of leadership.

Chapter 6 presents my conclusions and recommendations based on this study's findings. It also provides recommended directions for future research, study, and leadership development.

The strength of this study is its broad examination of both theory and application including planning methods. Maintaining a macrocosmic scope prevented any confusing digressions while openly regarding studies from sociology, psychology, military, history, political science, theology, athletics, business, ethics, art, and others. Considering theories and philosophies from these various sources, common themes appeared and were

generally observable in applications for the military, business, and sports. These observations revealed the general inward and outward processes of leading and their relationships to the leader, the group, and the situation.

The weaknesses of this methodology were its limited sampling of leadership theories and applications, and the precision of its analysis. Though I guided my survey of leadership theories with anthologies like *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership* and Hughes, Ginnet, and Curphy's *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*, I could not thoroughly examine every theory within the limitation of time. Moreover, my sampling of management, military, and sports literature and practice was abbreviated for the same reason. The arguments I derived from my observations of these sources consequently lack precision.

To counter these weaknesses, I buttressed my arguments with examples of similar reasoning by accepted scholars like Carl Von Clausewitz and Stephen Covey. I guided my analysis by paralleling their thought processes, and I provided practical examples to lend validity to my observations.

In conclusion, this methodology followed a progression from problem analysis to a proposed solution: the painting-leading model. This model is designed to build a heuristic bridge from the ambiguity of leadership theory to its application.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### The Problem: What is Leadership?

From the Great Man Theory of 1880, to the Transactional and Transformational Leadership Theory of 1986, social scientists have attempted to make “universal” what historian John Keegan observed is “stubbornly local and particular.” From over 8,000 studies there have arisen over 130 different definitions or conceptualizations of leadership. Of these many studies, few, if any, can be empirically supported with scientifically persuasive quantitative evidence. Why is there so little consensus, and why is there so much divergence? The answer has been simply more research and theories.

Few of these theories survive the test of applicability. TQ was theorized to promote participation, task-orient groups, and improve productivity. Often times it is skeptically viewed as a fad, develops separate “quality” groups, and amounts to an inefficient use of personnel. Management By Objective was theorized to encourage relation-oriented leadership, but when applied to large groups, a leader’s ability to honestly and fairly evaluate each individual degenerates into a check in the box. If a leader attempts to mimic a trait not fully developed, a group will see right through it and label him an actor. Where some were angered by Admiral Hyman Rickover’s micro-management, others were inspired by his drive for perfection. Where some considered General George Patton reckless, others deeply admired his audacity and passion. The spectrum of leadership and its application is so broad, how can anyone define it?



## A Different Perspective

In analyzing this problem of ambiguity and confusion, I invoked the philosophy of inductive thinking. From the *Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*, consider Steven Covey's explanation of inductive versus deductive thinking in terms of managers and leaders,

You can quickly grasp the important difference between [leaders and managers] if you envision a group of producers cutting their way through the jungle with machetes. They're the producers, the problem solvers. They're cutting through the undergrowth, clearing it out.

The managers are behind them, sharpening their machetes, writing policy and procedure manuals, holding muscle developing programs, bringing in improved technologies and setting up working schedules and compensation programs for machete wielders.

The leader is the one who climbs the tallest tree, surveys the entire situation, and yells, "Wrong jungle!"

But how do the busy, efficient producers and managers often respond? "Shut up! We're making progress."<sup>67</sup>

Reviewing the last century of leadership research, I saw a busy platoon of social scientists gathering data, and theorists taking that data and sharpening it, developing programs, bringing in improved technologies, etc. Adhering to the macrocosmic scope of my research, I did not grab a machete and start hacking (actually, I did at first). Instead, I decided to climb a tree and see where leadership research is, and we are in the wrong jungle! We are in the *science* jungle. Leadership is in the *art* jungle.

In the early nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz analyzed war in an effort to develop his comprehensive theory outlined in *On War*. In his arguments, he concluded that war is art based upon these two premises:

“The object of science is knowledge.”

“The object of art is creative ability.”<sup>68</sup>

Following his argument, I argue that leadership is art. The object of leadership is creative ability. Leaders perceive, abstract, design, and guide in a creative process. They labor to create cohesion, purpose, and productivity in their groups.

Classifying leadership as an art explains why the confusion and ambiguity exist. In John Canaday's *What Is Art?*, he explains, “We are not going to arrive at any single answer to the question, What is Art? Art has so many aspects, takes so many directions, serves so many purposes in such a variety of ways.”<sup>69</sup> From Andy Warhol's painting of a Campbell's Soup can to Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel, art spans as broad a spectrum as the human imagination. From Rap music to symphonies, people respond differently to different styles of art. Leadership is viewed in the same way. The variety of styles, groups, and goals of leadership is infinite. So in attempting to define leadership, I will only describe it in broad terms, rather than purport some specific process or style.

However, with my description, I will place certain criteria on leadership. First, in classifying leadership as art, the behavior is elevated above mere transactions. My description places a requirement of transformational behavior for the behavior to qualify as leadership. Herbert Reid's *Encyclopaedia of the Art's* provides a relevant perspective, “art is the application of skill to various modes of expression, where the intention is to please or perhaps terrify, to effect some emotional response, to rouse some degree of feeling.”<sup>70</sup> From this argument, I assert that leaders must rouse some degree of feeling or emotional response for their behavior to qualify as leadership.

Leadership must also guide a group toward a goal. This criterion comes from all the previous theories of the last century, and it follows Bass's definition, "leadership is the process of influencing a group toward a goal."<sup>71</sup> By using this definition, I am figuratively throwing out the murky, scientific bath water, and keeping the theoretical baby. In other words, Bass was very close with the transactional and transformational theory, so there is no need to throw it out. Instead, I simply clarify his conceptualization as an art. From this argument, I describe leadership with the following expression:

**Leadership is the art of guiding a group toward a goal.**

This is not a polemic argument. By classifying leadership as art, I am not arguing that science is not a part of leading. The term "guiding" is purposely a sufficiently broad term to include both managing and leading, deducing and inducing, transacting and transforming. Yet the term "guiding" is more descriptive than Bass's term "influencing." "Guiding" includes managing, but it also implies direction and intent. Conversely, "influencing" may be unintentional and random. With "guiding," the expression includes science, but it more specifically describes leading.

Bass's definition is an academic one, designed to include fringe behaviors that may qualify for study--like supervising, tasking, and administrating. I contend that characterizing leadership as the "art of guiding" is more compelling to would-be leaders than defining it as a "process of influencing." The art expression also serves application better by providing a more specific criterion for behavior. Researchers should not consider the "art" requirement too exclusive but remember they are still free to study fringe behaviors. Moreover, they should appreciate how a more specific definition guides

the application of leadership. Applying Edward Locke's 1984 findings on goal effectiveness, theory should lead application with "specific, difficult" goals. Therefore, leadership is better defined as the "art of guiding" which requires direction, intent, and an emotional response.

This expression also implies that some group cohesion and purpose must exist. The direct object of guiding is "group" which requires cohesion. The phrase "toward a goal" describes where guidance is directed, which requires purpose. All together, the expression requires that a leader intentionally create group cohesion and purpose for someone to consider it leadership.

One element of leading that is not included in the expression is productivity. To include productivity in the expression, one would change the phrase "toward a goal" to the phrase "to a goal." That description implies accomplishment, and places an overly exclusive requirement on the behavior. For example, Martin Luther King, Jr's leadership might be excluded because his group never reached his dream of a promised land. This exclusion is clearly invalid, thus the phrase remains "toward a goal."

This argument also prioritizes the concept of productivity. Instead of categorizing productivity as an element of leadership, like cohesion and purpose, it categorizes productivity as a consequence or reward. Regarding the creative process of leading, leaders inwardly create group cohesion and purpose, and then guide them toward productivity. Outwardly, leaders guide a group's perception of a situation, abstraction of goals, design of a plan, and accomplishment. In both creative processes, the result is productivity.

In review, leadership is the art of guiding a group toward a goal. For behavior to qualify as leadership, it must intentionally create a degree of cohesion within a group, it must create a purpose that guides the group, and it must elicit some degree of feeling or emotion toward the accomplishment of a goal. Although this definition has certain criteria for leadership, it remains broad enough to include the entire spectrum of styles and methods. An enraged autocrat who uses hate to drive an army into battle qualifies as a leader, just as a priest who uses love to inspire a congregation to selfless giving does. This expression begins to answer the problem, what is leadership?, but its brevity only clarifies the concept partially. To describe leadership further, I offer a model that incorporates the elements, processes, and objectives of leading.

#### Modeling Leadership

Clausewitz viewed the relationship between the theory and practice of war as being somewhat analogous to the relationship between theory and practice in painting, music, or architecture. Theory and practice were interactive and mutually enhancing.

Thomas M. Huber, C610 Syllabus/Book of Readings<sup>72</sup>

Following Clausewitz's reasoning, I set out to create a model that links the theory of leadership with its practice. Keying on his painting analogy, I discovered an uncanny parallel between the two arts. Both employ certain tools and media while following an outward process of perceiving a situation, abstracting goals or images, designing a plan or sketch, and finally, applying skill to create art, painting or leading. With painting, the tools and media are brushes, paints, and canvas. With leading, the tools and media are power, guidance, and a group. As I looked even deeper, I found more parallels which I assembled to construct the following model (Figure 2).

## THE PAINTING-LEADING MODEL

<b>TOOLS</b>	
Fine Brush Medium Brush Broad Brush Dabbing Scraping	Expert Power Legitimate Power Referent Power Rewarding Coercing

<b>MEDIA</b>	
Paint - Oil - Pigment  Canvas - Threads - Weave - Stretching	Guidance - Communication - Values  Group - Individuals - Organization - Training

<b>PROCESSES</b>	
Perceive Situation Abstract Images Design Sketch Paint	Perceive Situation Abstract Goals Design Plan Lead

<b>OBJECTIVES</b>	
Abstract Sketch Picture	Vision Plan Accomplishment

Figure 2

## The Tools

The basic tool of painting is a brush. Artists use brushes to apply paint onto a canvas. Further, by using different types of brushes, painters may paint fine lines or broad strokes and vary their effects. Painters must clean and prepare these tools, and they must understand their character. Is the fine bristled brush firm enough to make a smooth line, or will pressing it result in a smudge? Is the broad brush coarse and abrasive, or are its hairs soft enough to create uniformly textured brushwork? Understanding the characteristics and different types of their brushes, painters are able to better employ them and create the effects they seek.

The basic tool of leadership is power. Leaders use power to give their guidance to groups and influence their compliance. The intangible behavior of power in leading follows the same general pattern that the tangible action a brush follows in painting. There are various types of power just as there are various types of brushes. A painter may use a fine, medium, or wide bristled brush just as a leader may use expert, legitimate, or referent power. These various tools allow a leader to impress certain points upon a group and affect their actions. Moreover, power must be cared for and prepared or developed just as brushes are prepared for painting. Leaders must establish their relative expertise, receive legitimate power from their organizations, and earn referent power from their groups. And leaders who lack expert power or referent power are limited like an artist with only one brush. Their creativity is constrained by the quality and abilities of their tools.

### Expert Power--the Fine Brush.

Expert power is a function of a leader's knowledge and experience. It acts like a fine-bristled brush in painting in that it enables a leader to express details. With expertise, a leader can give explicit instructions and assess performance with greater credibility.<sup>73</sup> Skill in the application of expert power requires precision and a thorough knowledge of the situation. Just as Michelangelo conducted detailed studies of his subjects' anatomy before actually painting them,<sup>74</sup> leaders who wish to give detailed guidance should conduct detailed studies of their situations.

A leader who is skilled with expert power provides more clarity to a group's performance. In contrast, a leader who is less confident with details may not create accomplishments as vivid. Leonardo Da Vinci's vivid style and realism contrasts with Claude Monet's soft impressionistic style in a similar manner. Da Vinci's sharp, distinct lines of oil paint leaves little to interpret, while Monet's blended watercolor shades are more implicit.

There also lies a drawback with excessive expertise and detail because it limits interpretation and personality. Paintings with detail and realism were greatly admired in times before photography, but audiences today look for unique and original styles for inspiration. Leadership that is too detailed and explicit is sometimes criticized as micro-management and oppressive. It rarely leaves room for the group to display initiative and motivation . With each detailed line a painter draws, there is less room for broad strokes



of color, and with each detailed instruction a leader gives, there is less room for initiative. Thus, the use of expert power should be balanced with the other powers in accordance with the situation.

#### Referent Power--the Broad Brush.

Referent power is a function of a group's admiration for a leader. It is derived from the leader's relationship with the group and its perception of him.<sup>75</sup> Referent power enables a leader to credibly emote, spreading values and broad strokes of pride thoroughly across a group. By embodying commonly respected qualities and developing loyalty and trust, a leader is able to give guidance that is popular and accepted throughout the group. This ability is similar to the qualities of a broad brush that an artist uses to make broad strokes of color. Setting tone with wide swaths of color, the broad brush creates wide areas of common color just as referent power inspires common feelings of purpose and direction.

One drawback of referent power is its limited ability to enable a leader to explicitly control a group without damaging the power itself. Because of the untrusting nature of detailed control, it is difficult to give precise orders without churning up resentment. Instead, referent power is best used in applying initial strokes of broad purpose and finishing strokes of motivation. Like an artist who spreads a base coat of tone, a leader may spread a base coat of vision and purpose to set the tone of her guidance. Once detailed plans and preparation are completed, a coach will often use referent power in an inspiring pep talk just prior to leaving a locker room. This action parallels an artist's applying a final glazing to a painting to strengthen and enhance its color's brilliance.

### Legitimate Power--the Medium Brush.

Legitimate power is a function of a leader's position within an organization. This power is drawn from the organization and the role of the leader. Relative to expert power which is derived from the leader's knowledge and referent power which is derived from the group's admiration, legitimate power is derived from both the group and its organization.<sup>76</sup> Consider legitimate power the medium-bristled brush of my model.

This analogy illustrates how legitimate power enables leaders to make various decisions based upon their appointment as a leader. Legitimate power enables a leader to make organizational policy decisions, but it is more versatile still. Though a leader may not be the expert, she may give detailed guidance based upon her position. Moreover, she may not be particularly admired, but she may provide the group's broad purpose solely because of her role in the organization. In painting, the corner of a medium brush can make fine lines, and repeated strokes of a medium brush can make a broad area of common color. Though the medium brush is not the optimum tool for painting fine lines or broad strokes, it may suffice. Similarly, legitimate power is not the optimum tool for providing explicit instructions or motivating consensus, though it may suffice.

### Reward and Coercive Power--Dabbing and Scraping.

Two lesser-known techniques of painting are the loaded-brush technique of dabbing and the grattage technique of scraping. Dabbing is used by painters to create texture and make certain areas of the canvas stand out. This technique builds up thick dabs of paint and serves to highlight areas and draw attention to them.<sup>77</sup> Similarly in leadership, reward power is used by a leader to build up exemplary performance and

recognize it for others to appreciate. The other lesser known technique in painting, scraping, is also used to create texture or to eliminate mistakes. A scraper may remove mistaken applications so that an artist can correct it, or it can provide interesting characteristics to an image with the gramage technique that creates valleys and crevices.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, a leader may use coercive power to correct a mistake or create fear and intimidation. The two techniques in painting are related in the way they create texture, but their methods are polar opposites. Dabbing builds up while scraping digs down. In leadership, reward and coercive power create texture in groups, but their methods are polar opposites as well. While reward power brings individuals to the forefront, coercive power causes individuals to recoil. These techniques of dabbing and rewarding, scraping and coercing match up and refine the shape of the model.<sup>79</sup>

Extending this analogy also illustrates the limitations of rewarding and coercing. In painting, scraping too deep can severely damage a canvas, ripping open a hole, and causing threads to fray. In leading, coercion can severely damage a group, destroying the group's unity, and causing loyalties to fray. While carefully applying coercion in appropriate situations may help control a group and correct misbehavior, subjectively pressing too hard is destructive. The dabbing technique also has its limitations. Dabbing excessively onto a canvas diminishes the significance of other textured areas of the canvas, and spreading paint too thick may cause the canvas to sag. The rewarding correlation holds to this analogy. Rewarding too many individuals in a group may diminish the

significance of the rewards, and rewarding too frequently may create complacency and laziness, causing a group to settle with the status quo. So with these analogies, the limitations of rewarding and coercing fit the model and further refine it.

Drawing from French and Raven's Taxonomy of Social Power, the tools of leadership follow the tools of painting in a manner that links theory to application as Clausewitz reasoned. Expert, referent, and legitimate power are used to brush guidance upon a group as paint is brushed upon a canvas. Leaders also enhance the character of their leadership with rewarding and coercing, giving texture to their guidance as a painter does with dabbing and grattage. The creative employment of power to create inspirational guidance follows the similar use of brushes to create art.

#### The Media

Media in art are the materials an artist uses to express their visions. The media of painting are canvas and paint. A painter uses brushes to manipulate paint onto a canvas and create a two dimensional image. These materials serve to display a painter's skill and creativity, and a painter must understand this media and its characteristics. Paint is pigment suspended in oil. It provides color, creates tone, and adds significance to a picture. An artist layers strokes of paint upon a canvas, mixing shades and hues to create shape and image. Canvas absorbs the paint and displays the artist's vision. Before painting, a canvas is prepared and stretched so it may better absorb the paint. Through canvas and paint, an audience is able to appreciate an artist's expression and originality.

After examining these media, I examined the media of leadership and compared their characteristics. Paint is the substance of painting, and canvas absorbs paint and displays its qualities. But what is the substance of leadership and what displays this substance?

#### Guidance--Paint.

Leading is guiding, and guiding a group involves making decisions and communicating direction. This guidance is the substance of leadership. Through verbal and nonverbal communication leaders apply their guidance to a group. Values are the substance of guidance, suspended in a leader's communication.

Values are the basis of decisions and they give guidance significance. They create tone and motivation within a group. With this analysis, values match up with pigment in the model. Leaders mix values to create shades and hues of motivation and purpose for their guidance. Guidance that lacks value is like an artist's monochrome sketch.

Conversely, value-based guidance is colored with purpose and greater significance.

The medium of values is communication. While oil suspends pigment and carries it to a canvas, communication contains values that are expressed to a group. Additionally, there are different types of oils, slow drying or quick drying. A slow-drying oil like linseed oil requires patience, but allows an artist time to make adjustments. A quick-drying oil like an acrylic provides fast results and dries with more permanence, but its mistakes are more difficult to correct. Similarly, there are different types of communication from slowly absorbed nonverbal exemplary actions to quickly distributed electronic mail. As different oils are better suited for broad strokes or detailed dabs, different types of communication are suited for broad motivation or explicit direction.

Electronic mail is rarely appropriate for applying coercive power, and nonverbal gestures are hardly appropriate for detailed instruction. The type of communication a leader chooses effects the acceptance of her guidance by the group, just as the type of oil a painter chooses effects the absorption of his paint into the canvas.

This analogy may also model a hierarchy of values. Paint colors are created from three primary colors, red, yellow, and blue, and they are bounded by two extremes, white and black. From these primary colors, complementary colors are created. Mixing yellow and blue gives an artist the color green; blue and red yields purple, and so on. Similarly, values may be derived from core values. For example, the U.S. Navy acknowledges three core values: honor, courage, and commitment. From these core values naval officers derive complementary values of loyalty, accountability, mission accomplishment, and so on. This analogy models a spectrum of values used to guide a group similar to the spectrum of color used to paint.

Artists also layer oil paint just as leaders may layer their guidance. Figure 3 shows an example of the underpainting and overpainting techniques that painters often use to create depth and warmth in their paintings. Underpainting broad layers of tone first, then overpainting semi-opaque layers of more detailed color, painters manipulate their images and create a three-dimensional impression.<sup>80</sup> Leaders also may layer their guidance. Beginning with broad purpose, like duty, honor, country, a leader may add layers of training objectives, schedules, and competitive feedback. With each layer, leaders mold their guidance and clarify their intent.





Figure 3. Underpainting and Overpainting Techniques of Layering Oil Paint.  
 Source: Leonard E. Fisher, *The Art Experience: Oil Painting* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1973), 16.

### Group--Canvas.

Groups behave as a canvas behaves in painting. They accept and then display the values of guidance in the same way a canvas absorbs paint and displays its pigment. When the crew of a Navy ship diverts from its mission and stops to rescue boat people on the high seas, it demonstrates the captain's values of compassion and empathy. When soldiers don their uniforms and march smartly through an exercise, they demonstrate their commander's values of discipline and pride. These values are communicated in whatever way is best absorbed by a leader's particular group, either through writing and speaking, or through actions and example. Additionally, a group should be organized, trained, and made cohesive, just as a canvas is woven, prepared and stretched. Inculcating core values in training is like laying a base coat of background color onto a canvas. From this base coat of core values, leaders may shade or highlight and create tone or purpose.

The styles of guiding groups are as varied as the styles of painting canvases, and originality is as important in leadership as it is in painting. Moreover, a leader's style may depend upon the organization of the group just as a painter's style may depend upon the weave of the canvas. A coarsely woven canvas may require thicker paint and limit an artist's ability to create a vivid image. Similarly, a group trained to a rudimentary level may require more explicit guidance and limit a leader's ability to create a convincing accomplishment. So an artist must appreciate the unique characteristics of a canvas just as a leader must be aware of the unique qualities of a group.



More than just painting on a canvas, artists may wash, stretch and mount, a canvas onto a frame, preparing it for painting. Though some artists simply buy a canvas already prepared, understanding how the canvas is prepared helps a painter appreciate the qualities of different canvases. Analogously, leaders sometimes are simply assigned to some unknown group. Spending time to talk with and understand the individuals of a group helps a leader understand their unique abilities and potential. For example, cotton is groomed and spun into thread; the threads are woven into canvas; and the canvas is stretched and mounted onto a frame. In the military, individuals are indoctrinated in basic training, given technical skills in preliminary specialty training, and organized into military units. The tighter the weave of the canvas, the smoother the surface is for painting. The tighter the organization of the unit, the more smoothly it may accept guidance. Moreover, the diversity and qualities of the individuals of a military unit strengthen its integrity, just as a weave of blended fabric is strengthened by its diversity. In many ways the weaving of a canvas parallels the structure of a military unit. Its weaving and tightening match the organizing and training of military units.

### The Objectives

The objective of painting is to create a two-dimensional image of paint on canvas. Often the subject matter of the image is studied and sometimes modeled. Pablo Picasso was known to sometimes have drawn hundreds of sketches of his subjects before applying any paint to a canvas. Michelangelo and Leonardo Da Vinci's studies or sketches are displayed in museums just as their resulting paintings are displayed. Their sketches were

not their objectives, but still testify to their careful preparation. The artists' objectives were the final paintings. From this observation of painting arises the question, what is the objective of leading? What do leaders create with their guidance?

#### An Accomplishment--a Picture.

Viewing leadership as the art of guiding a group toward a goal, one may logically conclude that a leader's objective is a group that has reached a goal--an accomplishment. The purpose of their efforts is to study a situation, determine a goal, guide the group to that goal. Though I reasoned earlier that for behavior to qualify as leadership, the group does not necessarily have to reach the goal, their objective remains accomplishment. There are several examples of artists whose work has not been completed but is still considered art. In fact, incomplete images are sometimes used to inspire audiences to imagine their final form. In leadership, Martin Luther King Jr.'s dream is an example of an unaccomplished goal that inspires others to drive towards its realization. Business leaders often use lofty goals of excellence and quality to drive their corporations through several cycles of improvement. In sports, coaches are able to focus on a more definite goal, victory. In athletic competitions teams are judged by the simple standard of victory or defeat, but coaches aspiring to build dynasties may impose additional standards of quality to drive their teams beyond simply winning. These additional measures prevent complacency. In military leadership, commanders focus their efforts on preparing and leading their units toward victory in battle. This purpose is easily studied and planned for in times of war, but during peace, the subject becomes blurry.



Figure 4. Leroy Neiman's *Nolan Ryan*. Source: Leroy Neiman, "Nolan Ryan," [Online] Available <http://www.doubletakeart.com>, 22 February 1998.

Like artists who study waves crashing on a beach and attempt to paint this elusive, fluid image of motion, military leaders in peace have difficulty studying elusive, mobile enemies. This metaphor illustrates the dynamic subject of military leadership, the enemy. Given a submissive model who will sit still or a stationary landscape, a painter is able to create a vivid and detailed image, but with a subject in rapid motion, paintings often become less detailed. Leroy Neiman's popular paintings of athletes in motion are examples of an artist's use of broader strokes to capture motion in an image (Figure 4). A military commander uses a broad "commander's intent" to help decentralize a unit's execution and enable it to capture an enemy in motion. This broader guidance is the hallmark of the maneuver warfare style of leadership.

#### A Plan--A Sketch.

Sketches and studies are the basis for a painter's brushwork. These preliminary drawings help a painter visualize the final product. During a battle, military leaders base their guidance on plans. Military plans are limited studies of an enemy, its capabilities, and how victory may be achieved. Although the execution of a plan may not follow the precise details of its goals, the details of planning do serve as the basis of a leader's decisions. Similarly, a painter's detailed sketch may not be precisely replicated with paint. Eugene Delacroix's *The Death of Saradnapalus* and its accompanying study (Figure 5) show the guiding nature of his fine-penciled study.<sup>81</sup> He used the study to guide his final strokes of paint onto canvas and create an impressive image. Matching this tangible example of detailed sketching followed by broader painting of a subject illustrates the limitations of military plans and their execution toward the defeat of an enemy.



Figure 5. Eugene Delacroix's Study and Painting *The Death of Sardanapalus*.  
Source: Eugene Delacroix, "The Death of Sardanapalus," 1827, Musee du Louvre [Online]  
Available <http://www.sunsite.unc.edu>, 22 February 1998.

Plans offer a study of a leader's goal and path toward its achievement. By challenging goals with a thorough study of their feasibility, leaders and groups clarify their purpose, even though their execution may not be so clear. This clarity enables initiative and vigor to shine through battlefield confusion and market fluctuations. Further, as modern painters often simplify their subjects with thorough analysis, modern leaders often simplify plans into distinct phases that shape their accomplishments. Pablo Picasso's extensive study of his painting, *Girl with Ponytail*, reveals this simplification through analysis: "One of the well-known paintings, depicting a young girl with her ponytail, was the result of a long and continuous filtering process. This development of his ideas can be followed through the first thirty or forty pencil drawings of this girl, which represent realistic research-like (sic) analysis of the subject; progress and development of the theme can then be traced through more than twenty canvases. Each canvas followed the others in order. In each the artist abstracted a step further from the original, reducing to essentials the image of the young girl."<sup>82</sup> Picasso's preparation allowed him to minimize his final efforts in the way thorough military planning with the JOPES, business planning with market analysis, or game planning allows leaders to minimize their efforts during execution. Here planning credibly supports and guides their efforts in a calculated manner that economizes their resources.

#### A Vision--an Abstract.

The basis for an artist's sketch, which serves as the basis for her painting, is her mental abstract of what she observes, what she perceives from her subject.<sup>83</sup> The basis of a leader's plan is his vision of some end state, what he perceives from his situation. In

both cases, they observe their subject or situation and perceive an abstract or vision. Drawing from their experience, abilities, and imaginations, both predict how their abilities can influence their media and ultimately create their picture or accomplishment.

Through his perception a painter takes a three-dimensional subject, abstracts its significant characteristics, and creates a two-dimensional representation of what he sees--an abstract. Similarly, a leader examines a situation, and through the process of perception, abstracts its significant characteristics, and formulates vision. To further explain perceiving and abstracting, consider the following: "The artist abstracts, or "takes out," of his world that which is to him important--the essentials of things and events--and sets them down for others to see. Through this process of abstraction he distills and thereby intensifies the character, mood, and spirit of his responses to his environment. For his own purposes and by personal choice he may simplify, distort, accent, fragment, and reassemble, according to his views of the world and reality. In this sense, abstraction has a universal meaning and applies to all artists."<sup>84</sup> The personal nature of abstraction is what separates leading from systematically managing. Abstraction breeds originality and innovation. How a leader personally takes a task, makes it her own, and then formulates her guidance accordingly is instrumental to the art of leading.

Consider how Leonardo da Vinci and Pablo Picasso perceive the human form in their own different and unique ways in the following illustrations (Figure 6). In da Vinci's *Virgin of the Rocks*, his subject is vividly represented and glorified as a natural beauty with embellished realism. In contrast, Picasso's *Portrait of Uhde* is a mutated depiction of what he chose as Uhde's significant features.<sup>85</sup> In comparison, consider Adolf Hitler's

perception of world domination during World War II versus the Allies' perception of peaceful coexistence among legitimate nations. What artists or leaders perceive and how they "simplify, distort, accent, fragment, and reassemble" them into their abstracts or visions distinguishes them all as artists.




Figure 6. Leonardo da Vinci's *Virgin of the Rocks* and Pablao Picasso's *Portrait of Uhne*. Source: Reid Hastie and Christian Schmidt, Encounter With Art (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), 148.



In summary, the creative objectives of leading, a vision, a plan, and an accomplishment, parallel the creative objectives of painting, an abstract, a sketch, a picture. Visions and abstracts represent each artist's perception of reality as Max De Pree states in his book, *Leadership is an Art*, "The first responsibility of a leader is to define reality."<sup>86</sup> From their perceptions, they design plans or sketches, and then create pictures or accomplishments. With their creative objectives, these two genres of art are linked.

### The Processes

Painting and leading are linked by their similar creative processes. A painter outwardly perceives, abstracts, designs, and paints just as a leader does before leading. Comparing Theo van Doesburg's eight studies and subsequent oils of *The Cow* (Figure 7) with General Norman Schwarzkopf's Desert Storm reveals the similarities between the two processes in the context of modern art and modern war.<sup>87</sup>

Though the simple image of colored rectangles appears easy to create, understanding the process of abstraction helps viewers appreciate its simplicity. In correlation, Operation Desert Storm has been criticized by some critics as too easy to serve as a credible example of warfighting. However, when the extensive planning and preparation are considered, the immense effort to simplify the Iraqi enemy into a 100-hour ground war reveals its tactical beauty. Modern warfare is often discounted as push-button and mechanical, just as modern art is often criticized as sterile and simple. But understanding their exhaustively creative processes, one sees their artistic credibility and significance.




Figure 7. Theo Van Doesburg's Sketches and Paintings of *The Cow*. Source: Reid Hastie and Christian Schmidt, Encounter With Art (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), 135.

With the outward process of perceiving, abstracting, designing, and painting or leading goes the inward processes of painting and guiding. As a painter strokes paint onto a canvas, steps back and evaluates its appearance, compares it to his subject, and then strokes additional paint, so too does a leader issue guidance to a group, evaluate its performance, compare it to the goal, and then issue additional guidance. A painter manages his paints, brushes, and canvas just as a leader must manage her guidance, power, and group.

The inward processes of painting and leading are generally similar, but here is where the model diverges. While a canvas is inanimate, a group is alive. This difference is the compelling challenge of the art of leading. Not only does a leader's creative ability involve outwardly perceiving reality like a painter, but he must also orchestrate the performance of the group like a maestro. Balancing the demands of maintaining cohesion, creating purpose, and developing productivity, leaders create images like a visual artist and choreograph production like a performing artist. These broad, creative demands are what make leadership so exciting. Moreover, leaders may draw expertise, additional perspectives and suggestions from the group by eliciting participation in both the outward and inward processes. This two-way relationship with the media of leadership is what makes the art so complex.

#### Summary of Analysis

As Clauswitz states, "the object of art is creative ability." With that premise, leadership may be examined in full view of its entire artistic range, from love to hate, from perfectionist to laissez-faire. Bringing leadership's elements together in a model that links

theory to practice shows how they interrelate to create accomplishment. The model takes the findings of research and explains the lack of consensus and inconsistencies. While a group may be drawn together with a unique identity and purpose, it may fray with uninspired, cookie-cutter guidance. While productivity may enthusiastically exceed expectations, it may also tenuously hover at a complacent minimum. Artistic creativity elevates leadership above mere managing and brings cohesion, purpose, and productivity together.

Analyzing historical examples of leadership through the painting-leading model, one may better appreciate their originality, creativity, and style. My following chapter will discuss the leadership of Admiral Horatio Nelson and General George Patton in an effort to further link the theory of leadership with its application.

## CHAPTER 5

### DISCUSSION

In my analysis I reasoned a definition of leadership and constructed a model to further describe the behavior. This analysis took the theory of leadership and linked it to the painting-leading model. My discussion now completes the link to application. This discussion links the model to historical applications, and it demonstrate how theory is linked to application despite a lack of empirical, quantitative correlation. The unique styles, imaginative designs, compelling visions, and creative guidance of Admiral Nelson and General Patton cast leadership as an ever-changing, imaginative art form, not a recipe of methods and procedures to be replicated. Moreover, one appreciates the challenge each leader faces when he approaches a new situation with a new group just as a painter approaches a new subject with a fresh canvas. The challenge to uniquely create cohesion, purpose, and productivity.

#### Admiral Horatio Nelson's Victory at Trafalgar

England expects that every man will do his duty.

Admiral Horatio Nelson, Nelson<sup>88</sup>

On 21 October 1805, Admiral Horatio Nelson of England's Royal Navy painted one of the greatest naval victories in the history of military art. Remembered for its boldness, simplicity, and overwhelming success, this battle serves as a leadership masterpiece. Imbuing his British fleet with confidence, courage, and purpose, Nelson led sailors into his final battle of tactical creativity with a level of compliance and spirit rarely, if ever, seen in history. Slashing through the normal conventions of naval maneuver, his

Meléeist style<sup>89</sup> created fear and chaos in his subject enemy and portrayed his fleet as the superior force. At the conclusion of the battle, Nelson was dead, but he left behind a canvas that depicted the Royal Navy as the world's greatest navy. Examining Nelson's brilliant leadership tools, his memorable guidance, and the care he devoted to his canvas, one better understands how he was able to create such a resounding victory.

### His Tools

The quality of Nelson's tools as the Admiral commanding England's Mediterranean fleet were unparalleled. He developed his expert power over thirty-five years of experience with the sea. A midshipman at the age of twelve, he passed his examination for lieutenant early at eighteen, and was given command-at-sea as a captain at the early age of twenty. With command, Nelson developed his management skills and acquired his deft ability to fund, provision, and train his crews. Coming off of decisive victories at Aboukir Bay and Copenhagen, his brilliant tactical expertise was reaching its zenith as his showdown with the French Admiral Villeneuve at Trafalgar approached.<sup>90</sup> While some of his earlier breaks from conventional tactics were considered dangerous and brash, his recent string of victories built admiration for his planning ability and Meléeist style. By the time he arrived at the Cape of Trafalgar aboard the *Victory*, his sharp expert power enabled him to credibly apply the finest details of command.

From the respect for Nelson's maritime expertise rose his referent power. The courage and dedication he demonstrated in past battles built upon this professional respect and expert power. Missing his right arm from the battle of Tenerife and wearing a glaring scar over his injured right eye from the siege of Calvi, sailors respected his war fighting

experience at the sight of him.<sup>91</sup> By 1805, his reputation as a national hero preceded his commands with recollections of the boarding parties he personally led and his hands-on combat leadership. His fair and unique concern for his crews and their morale complemented his demonstrated bravery.<sup>92</sup> When he boarded the flagship *Victory* and joined his fleet before the battle of Trafalgar, one of his officers, Captain Duff, commented on the “Nelson Touch” that characterized his morale-building effect, “He is so good and pleasant that we all wish to do what he likes, without any kind of orders.”<sup>93</sup> Even his enemies admired him (Napoleon kept a bust of Nelson in his home).<sup>94</sup> With his renown, Nelson wielded an impeccable broad brush of referent power.

Nelson’s legitimate power was that of Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean fleet, in charge of twenty-seven ships of the line, five frigates, one schooner, and one cutter. In 1805, England was facing a threat from Napoleon, who had mounted an invasion force in Boulogne, France, just across the English Channel. Nelson’s mission was to prevent the allied French and Spanish fleets from massing an attack in the English Channel and transporting Napoleon’s army to the shores of England.<sup>95</sup> From this noble tasking, Nelson was empowered with the legitimacy of the Royal Navy’s organization and duty to protect the sovereignty of England.

Armed with expert, referent, and legitimate tools, Nelson was able to brush his guidance with versatility. His expertise and experience imbued confidence in his detailed instructions. His heroic reputation inspired broad and thorough spirit throughout his fleet, and his rank gave his guidance the legitimacy of the entire nation and its navy.

## His Media

Nelson's canvas was the British Mediterranean Fleet, an organization of ships woven neatly together under his command. However, before he task organized them for his plan at Trafalgar, these war fighting threads were first spun by their captains. Though Nelson did not directly train each crew, he did expect them to perform to superior standards, inspect their progress, and learn their strengths and weaknesses. Just as cotton is picked, ginned, combed, and spun into thread, so too where Nelson's sailors recruited, indoctrinated, organized, and trained into crews.

Nelson's leadership inspired crews that drilled to exceed expectations. This fact was manifested in their pursuit of the French fleet across the Atlantic and back in early 1805. The French escaped from Nelson's blockading fleet and sailed to the West Indies in thirty-four days. Nelson followed initially in the wrong direction but quickly made up the lost time. The British fleet crossed in only twenty-four days and later trapped the French fleet in Cadiz.<sup>96</sup> Along with seamanship, the British crews were superior at fighting their ships. Their gunnery, boarding parties, and close maneuvers were all well rehearsed and timed, strengthening their confidence and discipline. With these well spun threads, Nelson then prepared to weave his canvas.

When Nelson joined his fleet on 28 September 1805, his canvas was not quite as tightly woven as he liked.

Nelson believed that his arrival affected the fleet 'like an electric shock.' Certainly the special powers with which he believed he could imbue his sailors needed to work quickly, for most officers serving under him were neither veterans of previous long campaigns nor old compatriots who could quickly recreate the old relationship. Only eight of his captains had served with him before and of those



only Hardy and Berry had been with him since 1803. Only six had been in command of a ship for more than two years. Only five had commanded a ship of the line in battle.<sup>97</sup>

So Nelson set out to weave his officers together and tighten their relationships with confidence and consensus. Extraordinary for those times, he frankly discussed his plans for destroying the combined French and Spanish fleet rather than simply issuing a decree. His unique method of confiding in his subordinates and debating their upcoming maneuvers served three purposes. First, it allowed his captains to share their tactical insights. Second, it generated understanding, consensus and cohesion in the fleet. Finally, it bred confidence in an otherwise young corps of officers. From these meetings they emerged as a tightly woven “band of brothers,” and Nelson in turn, became very familiar with their abilities.<sup>98</sup>

Nelson’s paint was the value-laden guidance he suspended in his verbal and nonverbal communication. Upon his fleet, Nelson brushed bold shades of bravery, duty, and honor with a varnishing of references to historical immortality. He expressed his guidance in forms of communication from personal example to written memorandums and flag-hoisted signals. His appearance was riddled with the battle scars of his experience, his dress uniform was decorated with the spoils of his bravery, and his bearing “was of a man so active in person, so animated in countenance, and so apposite and vehement in conversation that little else was recollected.”<sup>99</sup> His enthusiasm communicated urgency and purpose to his being. His language, written, spoken and signaled, never shied from dramatizing his orders. In his famous signal to the fleet just prior to engaging the Combined Fleet at Trafalgar, his language linked their actions to King and country,

“England expects that every man will do his duty.”<sup>100</sup> Moreover, his language was often positive and optimistic. As the *Royal Sovereign* turned to earnestly become the first ship to engage at Trafalgar, Nelson commented, “See how that noble fellow Collingwood takes his ship into action, how I envy him!”<sup>101</sup> Here, Nelson’s confidence in his fellow captains and his thirst for victory infected his crew. Surveying the various first-person accounts of Trafalgar in literature, it is impossible to ignore Nelson’s enthusiasm for battle and glory. His guidance and values pervaded the entire fleet through his presence and language.

### His Victory


Nelson set out to create his victory at Trafalgar from a vision he abstracted over the course of years of experience combating the French Navy. He wanted to annihilate them. More than simply capture more ships of the line, Nelson wanted to destroy them entirely and overwhelmingly. He would not be satisfied with destroying anything less than half of the combined fleet. This vision followed his previous victory at Aboukir Bay, Egypt, 1 August 1798, where he destroyed or captured thirteen of seventeen French ships in a surprisingly bold and innovative victory.<sup>102</sup> Nelson wanted to replicate that victory on a grander scale. He began shaping this vivid image of a historically immortal victory off the coast of Toulon, France, where he had the French fleet blockaded in July of 1803.<sup>103</sup>

Earlier in Egypt, Nelson had surprised the French by braving the uncharted shoals surrounding the bay, cutting across their line of anchorage, and attacking from the landward side of the French line. His actions so surprised the French that their landward guns were not even prepared for battle.<sup>104</sup> This was a dangerous tact, and to repeat it in Toulon would have been suicide since surprise would have faded with repetition. So

Nelson resigned to loosely guard the French fleet with his ships poised over the horizon in order to lure the enemy into open waters. With these actions, Nelson tried to isolate and position his enemy, and shape his vision as a painter might manipulate her subject to abstract the correct lighting and mood.

As time passed, his vision began to evolve into a series of actions and studies. The French fleet under Admiral Villeneuve managed to escape from Toulon while Nelson was provisioning in Italy. Nelson then chased them to the West Indies and back to Spain where the French joined a Spanish fleet and were cornered in the port of Cadiz. Here Nelson dispatched a squadron to blockade them while Nelson went to England to correct his early mistakes and refine his sketches, developing his final plan for Trafalgar.

In his Meléicist style, Nelson sketched a plan to disrupt Villeneuve's formal and predictable line of battle maneuvers once he lured him to open waters. Knowing the French and Spanish Admirals found comfort in their ordered methods, Nelson sought to break their confidence and create a "pell mell" battle where the English could rapidly exploit their superior seamanship and gunnery.<sup>105</sup> Normally, opposing fleets would sail in parallel courses and engage in a formal ballet of broadside gunnery duels. For Trafalgar, as with Aboukir, Nelson planned to cut into the enemy fleet's linear formation on a perpendicular course, divide their line of battle, and throw his ships quickly alongside the enemy (Figure 8). This plan massed the English ships in a concentrated manner so they could team-up and destroy the enemy's larger ships-of-the-line piecemeal.



Plan of Nelson's approach: the position of the two fleets at noon on 21 October 1805, showing the ships of the line and the Euryalus frigate. (By kind permission of Rear-Admiral A. H. Taylor, C.B.)

Figure 8. Admiral Nelson's Plan for Trafalgar. Source: Oliver Warner, *Nelson's Battles* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 191.

One drawback to this bold maneuver's speed was the lack of control Nelson would have over his force once they were engaged. Signals would be difficult to see and futile, so after designing this plan, Nelson set out to underpaint layers of his guidance in advance. He issued his guidance first in a written memorandum, and then refined its details over several dinners aboard his flag ship with his captains. His captains, in turn, absorbed his guidance, and it flowed from them into their crews through their drills and battle preparations.

His artful technique of painting guidance was "peerless."<sup>106</sup> First, he employed his referent power and stroked a broad base coat of his vision and core values to set the tone. This stroke is evident in his message to his senior Vice Admiral Collingwood:

I send you my Plan of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the Enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect. We can, my dear Coll, have no jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our Enemies, and getting a glorious Peace for our Country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you: and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend NELSON AND BRONTË.<sup>107</sup>

After setting the tone of his guidance, Nelson then took his legitimate power and issued his "Secret Memorandum" which outlined his orders to his fleet. Finally, he took his expert power and detailed his guidance during wardroom dinners aboard the *Victory*. Here he earnestly worked to educate his captains with the minutia of his intent through discussion and debate. These efforts allowed his canvas to absorb his fine strokes of guidance through the underlying layers of broad and legitimate guidance. His vision and

plan effectively issued to his fleet, all that remained were his final maneuver signals and a broad stroke of varnish to seal the brilliancy of his guidance. This varnish was his famous “England expects . . .” signal that was his last stroke of trust upon his fleet.

Because he worked so hard to familiarize himself with his canvas, his guidance was rapidly and thoroughly absorbed. “It was new--it was singular--it was simple!”<sup>108</sup> exclaimed an officer upon hearing the plan. The decentralized nature of his plan conveyed a profound trust in his commanders, and it bestowed a compelling duty upon their crews. His guidance appealed to their highest values, and it ignited their common aggressions.

With their final guidance, all that remained was the battle. On 21 October 1805, off the Cape of Trafalgar, the English fleet of twenty-seven ships-of-the-line, five frigates, one schooner, and one cutter displayed Nelson’s guidance vividly in their execution of his plan. The resounding defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleet virtually eliminated their navies. Facing a larger enemy force of thirty-three ships-of-the-line, five frigates, and two brigs, the English fleet destroyed them in less than four and a half hours. Eighteen enemy ships surrendered, only eleven enemy ships were able to limp away from the battle, and only three of those ships ever sailed again. The British fleet did not lose a single vessel. 4,530 sailors from the Combined Fleet were killed, 3,573 were wounded, and several hundred were captured. The English only lost 449 killed and 1,214 wounded; however, one of the dead was Admiral Nelson.<sup>109</sup>

With Nelson’s death went some of the spirit of the English Navy. He embodied England’s virtues and inspired their fleet’s victory with his mastery of the art of leadership. “The size - indeed the fact - of the victory was directly attributable to the quality of

seamanship in the fleet under Nelson's command. As the two columns approached the Combined Fleet, both had come under heavy gunfire which they were unable either to return or avoid. Yet they sailed unhesitatingly onward with neither the spirit nor the efficiency of their crews impaired. That was a tribute to the courage of Nelson's sailors and to the faith they had in themselves, not least because of the faith Nelson had in them."<sup>110</sup> Learning over years of leading boarding parties and commanding ships in battle, his leadership skills had reached their peak for this historical encounter. Timing could not have been better. With his maritime expertise, his management acumen, and his innovative style, Admiral Horatio Nelson was able to creatively mix honor, courage, and commitment with his guidance and paint a masterpiece victory at Trafalgar.



Figure 9. Admiral Nelson Touring *HMS Victory* Before Battle. Source: Roy Hattersley, Nelson (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1974), 171.

Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Victory at Bastogne

I'm going there in a minute to kick someone's ass.

General George S. Patton, Patton: A Genius for War<sup>111</sup>

In December of 1944, the Allied forces in Europe were in dire need of inspiration. After landing on Normandy in June, they had to struggle bitterly to break out of the stubborn German defenses. Once a fissure appeared in the German's western flank, Patton squeezed his Third Army out and rapidly enveloped the Normandy beach defenses. Then the Allied Army Groups under Eisenhower's direction spread out along a broad front and began pushing the Germans out of France. The two southern Army Groups moved with relative ease, but the Allied 21st Army Group in the north had suffered severe losses during Operation-Market Garden in September when its light airborne divisions were routed by Nazi armor in the northern Ruhr River basin. By December the Allied advance began to slow as they approached Germany's homeland defense and morale was falling with a rising desertion rate.<sup>112</sup>

Capitalizing on the allies' lull and the deteriorating weather, Hitler counterattacked on 16 December 1944. Concentrating twenty divisions along a sixty mile front in the rugged Ardennes, the German forces overwhelmed a dispersed force of four U.S. divisions and created a deep bulge in the Allied front just north of Patton's advancing Third Army. Within the bulge, the 101st Infantry division was trapped in Bastogne, surrounded by the 200,000-man German counteroffensive. The terrain was densely wooded with steep ridges and valleys, the roads were a morass of mud, and the Germans were advancing. Patton had anticipated the German's possible counteroffensive and had planned three



contingencies. So when General Eisenhower asked when Patton could launch a counter attack, Patton boldly responded. "The morning of December 21, with three divisions."<sup>113</sup> Then he proceeded to outline his plan for painting what Winston Churchill proclaimed was "the greatest American battle of the war."<sup>114</sup>

### His Tools

Patton took exceptional care to develop and hone his leadership tools. Foremost, he earnestly endeavored to build his expert power. At West Point, he boasted he was preparing to become a great general, and was regarded as the best soldier in his class by the Tactical Department there.<sup>115</sup> As he grew in rank he engulfed history books and advanced courses in strategy and tactics. While he was an aide for both General Leonard Wood and later, General John Pershing, he studied each decision and analyzed their commands. Throughout his career he studied the art of war and history fanatically.

From his education, he developed his leadership style and application expertise. Gaining combat experience early in Mexico as a Lieutenant, he became one of the first tank brigade commanders in World War I. There he learned the value of bold initiative in the Battle of Meuse-Argonne, and he was also shot in the hip.<sup>116</sup> As the U.S. entered World War II, he commanded the I Armored Corps to victory at Morocco and then took command of II Corps after the recent loss at Kasserine. He turned the II Corps around and led them to victory at Tunisia. Afterwards, he was promoted and commanded the Seventh Army to victory in Sicily. By the time he took command of the Third Army, he had amassed an unparalleled record of experience destroying enemy forces. His outstanding individual efforts had honed his expert power to its finest point.

Patton's referent power was legendary, and it was no accident. He deliberately cultivated it. With his victories came national and international notoriety and media attention. Patton consciously delivered flamboyant interviews, made controversial speeches, and colorfully kept his opinions and hero stature popular in the press. For his units, he created an unforgettable image of pearl handled pistols, polished riding boots and a shiny helmet. An Olympic athlete, he possessed a tall and well-built physique that he embellished with his proud mannerisms. Then he displayed himself throughout the front line in his armored jeep announcing his presence with a siren and large stars everywhere. His showmanship was effective. As one account recorded, "The sight of their general sent a wave of confidence surging through the whole division, and as his jeep passed the tanks and half-tracks, the mobile guns and truckloads of soldiers, their wild cheering was for victory already won because they trusted him."<sup>117</sup>

Patton's legitimate power was that of the Third U.S. Army Commander, but it was more complex than Admiral Nelson's legitimate power. While Nelson was fighting an isolated battle at sea, Patton fought in France surrounded by allied generals in a concerted effort against Germany. His immediate superior officer was General Bradley, 12th Army Group commander, and General Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander. Next to Bradley and underneath Eisenhower was British General Bernard Montgomery, 21st Army Group Commander. On Patton's left flank in France was General Hodges, First U.S. Army Commander, and on his right flank was General Patch, Seventh U.S. Army Commander.<sup>118</sup> This beehive of generals meant Patton had to coordinate his efforts and confine his creativity within the organization of the Allied command.

Commanding the Third Army in December 1944, put Patton in charge of three army corps: ten divisions amounting to approximately 275,000 soldiers<sup>119</sup> As the situation stood on 19 December 1944, his army was positioned just south of the Ardenne forest where the German army had mounted their counteroffensive and formed their bulging salient. Foreseeing this possible enemy tact, Patton had already formulated three possible plans to counterattack. So the morning in Verdun when he met with Eisenhower and Bradley to discuss their response, he was fully prepared to pitch his plans and convince Eisenhower of their feasibility. It was “a brilliant effort.” At first, Patton’s plans were ridiculed as braggadocios, but as Patton spelled out the details of his vision, the staff and generals were thoroughly impressed.<sup>120</sup> Patton left the meeting at Verdun with the legitimate power of his Third Army and a commission to paint a victory at Bastogne.

One peculiar characteristic to Patton’s leadership tools is the conscious and deliberate effort he took to earn them. His powers were not a natural occurrence. He was not simply born with them, though some have referred to him as a natural leader.<sup>121</sup> Considering his overt showmanship, his well-schooled expertise, and his shameless pleads for command, I argue that he knew what tools were required for leadership, devoted his life to acquiring those tools, so that when opportunity knocked, he was armed with the finest brushes of World War II.

#### His Media

Patton’s canvas was the Third Army. Upon this army he stroked his guidance and in turn, it displayed his creativity. This canvas was woven of the threads of army units trained and prepared under his command. Patton’s training demands were aggressive

before World War II,<sup>122</sup> but once the war began, his ability to directly effect improvement in his units' capabilities was limited. Instead, he resorted to a less direct, but a more uniform method of spinning his thread. He focused on improving their discipline in hopes that their attention to mission accomplishment would follow, and it did.

Patton strictly demanded uniform standards beyond those of any other units in the European theater. He ordered that helmets, leggings, neckties, and polished boots would be worn at all times, from the rear-echelons to the front. This unusually strict standard immediately alerted every soldier that Patton was their commander, and reminded them of it everyday they woke and dressed. Moreover, Patton reminded them of it as well. During his front line visits he frequently corrected infractions personally with a passion. His thinking was that if soldiers were disciplined to obey the mundane details of uniform standards, they would be disciplined to earnestly obey their battle commands.<sup>123</sup> This discipline quickly revived his soldiers' military bearing, and it provided him strong and uniform threads to weave into an army.

By the time the Third Army reached the Saar River, where they would launch their Bastogne attack, they were somewhat frayed. In fact, the cold weather and unrelenting pace at which they advanced across France had stretched their supplies and worn their enthusiasm. Patton realized their fatigue after their string of success, and rather than pressing his canvas until it ripped, he relaxed his uniform standards for the winter. His headquarters staff, corps commanders, and division commanders were also now accustomed to his leadership and warfare styles, and they could anticipate his orders and

quickly execute his instructions. In other words, over the last five months of Patton's leadership and their rapid success, they had grown into a tightly woven, cohesive canvas that quickly absorbed Patton's guidance.

Patton's paint was especially colorful and versatile. He knew when to be stern and curt, and he knew when to be effusive. But most of all, he knew what language best spoke to his soldiers. An enthusiastic vulgar diction was Patton's trademark medium. Perhaps because his voice was squeaky, he felt it necessary to compensate with coarse language. Whatever his reasons, few can forget his speeches. For an example, I have chosen his prebattle speech to the Third Army just before the landing at Normandy. In it, one sees Patton's genius--his ability to subordinate a soldier's fears to his values, reassuring and inspiring them. This speech, stroked with Patton's broad brush of referent power, served as the base coat of guidance that set the tone for his entire European campaign.

Men, this stuff we hear about America wanting to stay out of the war--not wanting to fight--is a lot of bull-shit. Americans love to fight--traditionally! All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. When you were kids, you all admired the champion marble player, the fastest runner, the big league ball players, the toughest boxers. Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans play to win all the time. I wouldn't give a hoot in hell for a man who lost and laughs. That's why Americans have never lost and will never lose a war, for the very thought of losing is hateful to an American.

If he isn't, he's a goddam liar! Some men are cowards, yes, but they fight just the same, or get the hell shamed out of them watching men fight who are just as scared. Some of them get over their fright in a minute under fire, some take an hour, and for some it takes days. But the real man never lets fear of death overpower in honor, his sense of duty to his country, and his innate manhood. All through your army career you men have bitched about what you call, "this chicken-shit drilling." That is all for a purpose--TO INSURE INSTANT OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS AND TO CREATE ALERTNESS. I don't give a damn for a man who is not always on his toes. You men are veterans, or you

would not be here. You are ready! A man, to continue breathing, must be alert at all times. If not someone, sometime, some German sonofabitch, will sneak up behind him and beat him to death with a sockful of shit.

There are four hundred neatly marked graves somewhere in Sicily, all because ONE MAN went to sleep on his job. But they are GERMAN graves, for we caught the bastard asleep before they did. We have the best food, the finest equipment, the best spirit, and the best men in the world. Why, by God, I actually pity those poor sons-of-bitches we are going up against. This individual heroic stuff is a lot of crap. The bilious bastard who wrote that kind of stuff for the Saturday Evening Post didn't know any more about real battle than he did about fucking.

My men don't surrender. I don't want to hear of any soldier under my command being captured unless he is hit. Even if you are hit, you can still fight. That's not just bull-shit either. The kind of a man I want under me is like the Lieutenant who, with a luger against his chest, swept aside the gun with his hand, jerked his helmet off with the other and busted hell out of the Boche with the helmet. Then he picked up the gun and killed another German. All the time this man had a bullet through his lung. That's a man for you!

All the real heroes are not storybook combat fighters either. Every single man in the Army plays a vital part. Every job is essential to the whole scheme. What if every truck-driver suddenly decided that he didn't like the whine of those shells and turned yellow and jumped headlong into a ditch? He could say to himself, "They won't miss me--just one guy in thousands." What if every man said that? Where in the hell would we be now? No, thank God, Americans don't say that. Every man does his job. Every man serves the whole. Every department, every unit, is important to the vast scheme of things. The Ordnance is needed to supply the guns, the Quartermaster is needed to bring up the food and clothes for us--for where we're going there isn't a hell of a lot to steal! Every last damn man in the mess hall, even the one who heats the water to keep us from getting diarrhea, has a job to do. Even the Chaplain is important, for if we get killed and he is not there to bury us we would all go to hell. Each man must not only think of himself, but think of his buddy fighting alongside him. We don't want yellow cowards in the Army. They should be killed off like flies. If not, they will go back home after the war, goddam cowards, and breed more cowards. The brave men will breed more brave men. One of the bravest men I saw in the African campaign was the fellow I saw on a telegraph pole in the midst of furious fire...I stopped and asked him what the hell he was doing up there at that time. He answered, "Fixing the wire, sir." "Isn't it a little unhealthy up there right now?" I asked. "Yes, sir, but this goddam wire has got to be fixed." There was a real soldier...you should have seen those trucks on the road to Gabès. The drivers were magnificent. All day they crawled along those sonofabitchin' roads, never stopping, never deviating from their course with shells bursting all around them. We got through on good old American guts. Many of the men drove over forty consecutive hours.

Don't forget, you don't know I'm here at all. No word of that fact is to be mentioned in any letter. The world is not supposed to know what the hell they did with me. I'm not supposed to be commanding this army. I'm not even supposed to be in England. Let the first bastards to find out be the goddam Germans. Some day I want them to raise up on the hind legs and howl: "Jesus Christ, it's that goddam Third Army and that sonofabitch Patton again!"

Sure we all want to go home. We want this thing over with. But you can't win a war lying down. The quickest way to get it over with is to get the bastards. The quicker they are whipped, the quicker we go home. The shortest way home is through Berlin! Why if a man is lying down in a shell-hole, if he just stays there all the day the Boche will get to him eventually, and probably get him first! There is no such thing as a foxhole war anymore. Foxholes only slow up the offensive. Keep moving! We will win this war, but we will win it only by fighting and by showing guts.

There is one great thing you men will be able to say when you go home. You may all thank God for it. Thank God that, at least, thirty years from now, when you are sitting around the fireside with your grandson on your knee and he asks what you did in the great World War II, you won't have to say. "I shoveled shit in Louisiana."<sup>124</sup>

This broad, colorful, guidance--littered with various hues of patriotism, duty, courage, loyalty, honor, teamwork and immortality--sent the Third Army into France inspired to Patton's image of everyone's grandson admiring them.

Patton's other notorious medium of communication was his appearance. An Olympic athlete, standing over six feet, he perpetuated his heroic reputation with a thrown out chest, a stern stance, a flamboyant dress, and dramatic gestures. His showmanship exuded enthusiasm, almost to the point of being disingenuous. However, when his devotion to his army is considered, his showmanship is believably honest.

Finally, Patton's written and official guidance was concise and purposeful. He rarely wasted a word in his orders, and he expected initiative in their execution. Even though he frequented his corps and division headquarters, he did not interfere. His rule of thumb was, "never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will

surprise you with their ingenuity.”<sup>125</sup> His self-control with this decentralized leadership technique is particularly impressive considering his exceptional expert power. While he could have easily and credibly given detailed instructions, and explicitly outlined steps for their execution, instead, he trusted his commanders and relied on their imaginations to rapidly surmount the details. I believe this technique of rapidly and broadly brushing objectives was the trademark of Patton’s victorious paintings of speed and maneuver. Though his orders were not precisely detailed, they did artfully capture their objectives, and he left their explicit interpretation open for his commanders.

In summary, Patton’s media--the Third Army and the guidance he gave them--were carefully conditioned and cared for. By 19 December 1944, his canvas was fully prepared to receive his rapid strokes of leadership brilliance and counterattack to Bastogne.

### His Victory

Patton’s victory began with his vision of defeating the German army in a dramatic envelopment. He developed this vision after learning the advantages of piercing the enemy’s defense and encircling their rear supply lines during his experience in the Meuse-Argonne Battle twenty-six years earlier in World War I. After years of attrition warfare across long static lines of trenches and machine gun nests, the U.S. Army under General “Black Jack” Pershing--with then Major Patton as his aid and later a tank brigade commander--arrived in 1918, and they aggressively attacked the German lines in a piercing manner.<sup>126</sup> Patton had argued with Eisenhower to repeat this aggressive tactic back in



August 1944. Instead, Eisenhower opted for a broad front of four army groups which grossly taxed supply lines. Patton was then forced to improvise and press rapidly forward when opportunity knocked.

On 16 December, opportunity not only knocked, it kicked down the door, and Patton was prepared. Restricted by Eisenhower from pressing through German defenses on a narrow armored front, Patton could not cut across their soft rear areas and gobble up whole divisions as he wished. However, once the German Sixth, Fifth, and Seventh Armies penetrated deep into Allied territory, Patton could effect the same slicing effect with Eisenhower's blessing. As Patton put it during a press conference on 1 January 1945, "If you got a monkey in a jungle hanging by his tail, it is easier to get him by cutting his tail than kicking him in the face."<sup>127</sup> This was Patton's vision, to defeat the German armies in a rapid and bold advance around their rear, minimizing U.S. losses with maneuver rather than grinding it out along a broad front.

Patton began sketching his plan for his counterattack on 9 December, one week before the German's even created the Bulge, and ten days before he briefed it to Eisenhower at Verdun. On the ninth, Patton's intelligence officer, Colonel Oscar Koch identified Germany's build-up in the Ardennes forest in front of the First Army. Upon hearing Koch's brief, he ordered them to prepare contingency plans for a counterattack north if they did attack in the Ardennes, though they were already planning to attack east across the Saar river on the nineteenth.<sup>128</sup> Here, the efforts of Patton's superior staff to help prepare his guidance are impressive. Their flexibility and thoroughness were instrumental in Patton's planning.

The Third Army's plan was bold and flowing (Figure 10). It envisioned pulling the 80th, 4th, and 26th divisions from the Saar front, turning them ninety degrees north, and moving them to the shoulder of the Bulge in two days along three possible axes. It was an especially daunting proposition considering the logistics, terrain, and weather, but the Third Army was accustomed to surmounting these details during their rapid advance from Normandy. On 19 December, during a conference with Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Tedder, Bedell Smith, and Francis de Guingand, Patton was the only one prepared with a detailed counter to the German's offensive. The response to Patton's plan was initially skepticism. Although, once Patton outlined his preparations, the response grew to an electric astonishment. "Simply put, it was perhaps the most remarkable hour of Patton's military career."<sup>129</sup>

Before his plan was even briefed at Verdun, Patton had already begun painting his victory. He had the 80th Infantry Division moving due north to the shoulder of the Bulge, and the 4th Armored Division followed by the 26th Infantry Division moving to Arlon in preparation for an advance to Bastogne.<sup>130</sup> After Verdun, Patton moved to Nancy where he commanded Third Army without his staff. On 20 December, he visited seven divisions, fine-tuned their orders, and furiously drove them forward. Though he issued uncharacteristically detailed guidance throughout this day, the weather, urgency, and mobile scope of their task demanded it.<sup>131</sup> To enhance their attack, Patton coordinated with the VIII Corps commander, General Middleton, to pull back and draw more German forces into the Bulge before the III Corps cut them off and the XII corps broke their shoulder. By 0600 on 22 December, the Third Army was poised for its attack.<sup>132</sup>




Figure 10. General Patton's Third Army at Bastogne, 1944. Source: Hubert Essame, *Patton: A Study in Command* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), 17.

The attack began slowly because of the especially wet weather and the thick terrain. Patton was disappointed and drove the forward divisions relentlessly for 48 hours. Exhausted, the 4th Armored Division fell back temporarily from a German counter stroke, then rebounded. Patton took responsibility for this withdrawal, blaming his continuous pace for fatiguing his forward division when the exploitation of surprise was already exhausted.<sup>133</sup> On Christmas Day, the 80th Infantry Division and XII Corps broke the German's shoulder with overwhelming artillery and the III Corps stagnated, but continued to mass forces in reserve. On 26 December, "the Day of Decision,"<sup>134</sup> 4th Armored Division sped forward and opened a corridor to Bastogne, relieving the 101st Airborne Division which had been trapped there since 18 December. Bastogne was soon retaken, and the Third Army then pressed north to Houffalize where they linked with the First Army on 16 January 1945.

Portions of Patton's masterpiece at Bastogne have been criticized as "untidy" or "flawed."<sup>135</sup> However, considering the speed and boldness of the Third Army's improvised effort on short notice, no one can refute its success. German losses were estimated at 100,000 while the Third Army lost 50,630. Moreover, the German losses were irreplaceable, and the Wehrmacht spirit was broken. Patton credited his soldiers, "the Third Army moved farther and faster and engaged more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States--possibly in the history of the world."<sup>136</sup>

Each decision was a stroke of Patton's genius upon his Third Army canvas. Painted with brilliant and bold colors of duty, honor, and country, Patton created a victory with his urgent maneuver warfare style. His enemy, Field Marshall von Rundstedt, said

after his capture: "Patton, he is your best"<sup>137</sup> In a 30 December 1944, *Washington Post* editorial. "It has become a sort of unwritten rule in this war that when there is a fire to be put out, it is Patton who jumps into his boots, slides down the pole, and starts rolling."<sup>138</sup> Studying the German Army, Patton abstracted a vision of envelopment. When the opportunity arose, he sketched out a meticulous plan. Finally, he magnificently guided his army through tremendous obstacles and led them to victory.



Figure 11. Oil of General George S. Patton. Source: "California oil of General George S. Patton," [Online] Available <http://www.yorktown.com>, April 16, 1998.

### Summary of Discussion

Will there ever be another Patton? Another Nelson? No, just as there will never be another Picasso or Michelangelo. They were masters at the art of leading with their own original styles. Their soldiers and sailors identified with their visions, accepted their guidance, and performed beyond expectations. No other navy had ever annihilated an opposing fleet as thoroughly as at Trafalgar. No other army had ever moved as many men and equipment so far and so fast than the Third Army's move to Bastogne. At times, Patton was directive and task-oriented, but he also encouraged initiative, participation, and admired his troops. Nelson was participative and relation-oriented, but he also held a clear vision for battle and could forcefully direct battle maneuvers. Together these two commanders used their versatile skills to creatively guide their groups to victory.

These men were not born leaders. They labored earnestly to develop their expertise, hone their images, and master their positions. Reviewing their extensive training, experience and preparations provides insight to the demands of the art. Their leadership was calculated, intended, and directed toward the creation of a historically significant victory. It was not some unintentional, random influence that drove the British Navy and the Third Army through a hail of enemy fire towards victory. It was heartfelt guidance colored with shades of honor, courage, and commitment. Patton and Nelson carefully perceived their visions, abstracted goals, designed plans, and guided resounding victories. Their examples epitomize the art of guiding a group toward a goal and serve as an inspiration for commanders who imaginatively strive to create victories with their own unique styles and attributes.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

This study began with a search through leadership theory and application. I examined goal setting methods in the military, sports, and business, and I discovered practical applications of the process of outwardly perceiving, abstracting, and designing plans, goals, and vision--developing *purpose*. I examined organizational management methods that inwardly strive to influence groups towards goals--develop *productivity*, and I examined team building--developing *cohesion*. Reviewing leader theories, I traced the evolution of leadership research from the Great Man Theory to Bass's Transactional and Transformational Theory, and I discovered an inability to empirically validate even leadership's most widely accepted theories.

From these discoveries, I questioned why theory cannot be validated in practice. Analyzing the disconnect between theoretically predicted outcomes and practically produced inconsistencies, a revelation occurred to me. Researchers cannot universally predict who will effectively lead. Considering the practical distaste of leadership recipes and Quality systems that package decisions in a process, I induced the missing ingredient that links Bass's transformational leadership to successful application--original, creative thinking. Genuine values, heartfelt concern, and inspiring guidance cannot come from an outside, paint-by-numbers approach to leadership. Leaders must internalize their taskings

and abstract their own version of purpose, create trusting relationships with their groups, and genuinely demonstrate their values. Then they are able to elevate their behavior from “the process of influencing” to the “art of guiding.”

This revelation answered the question, “what is leadership?”--the art of guiding a group toward a goal. From this expression I assembled the team building process of developing cohesion; the inward process of guiding, assessing, and improving productivity; and the outward process of perceiving, abstracting, and designing purpose. Together these three processes are represented in the painting-leading model.

The painting-leading model simplifies the complex and overlapping processes of leading into a simple model of three distinct processes — weaving a canvas, brushing paint, and perceiving an abstraction. Its simplicity encourages understanding with some acknowledged shortfalls. The model simplifies the complex, dynamic relationship between the group and the leader, and it segregates the elements of cohesion, purpose, and productivity, when they actually overlap and intermingle. Common purpose helps build cohesion and inspire productivity; productivity builds confidence and pride which reinforces cohesion and develops momentum for purpose; and cohesion breeds pride in productivity which reinforces purpose.

Despite the painting-leading model’s weak links between cohesion, productivity, and purpose, it does encapsulate the broad spectrum of leadership and orients its processes and elements. It explains why different styles are appealing to different groups, and where values, reputation, expertise, position, and communication fit in the overall process



of team building, planning, and leading. The model also incorporates the science of leading into an art characterization while it appreciates leadership's entirety as predominately a creative, personal behavior.

### Recommendations for Further Study

Wrapping up my analysis with a discussion of Nelson and Patton, one might view the painting-leading model as a version of the Great Man Theory which purports that leaders are naturally born to lead. Instead, I am trying to link the perception of who leaders are to the perception of painters. Painters are not born to paint. They learn to paint and develop their own unique style over years of training and practice. Drawing after drawing, sketch after sketch, and painting after painting, artists refine their skills at art schools and studios. At the Naval Academy, Military Academy, and Air Force Academy, students refine their skills while they experiment with their assigned plebes and subordinates. These institutions develop leadership skill much in the same way art schools develop painting skills. This comparison leads me to my next question: How can leadership curriculums better develop perceptual skills for creating purpose, refine skills that guide productivity, and improve team building?

Briefly reviewing my art references, I discovered art theories, studies, and courses addressing the process of perception and abstraction--Allport's Event-Structure Theory, the trapezoidal window frame experiment, the Basic Course of the Bauhaus, McFee's Perception-Delineation Theory, and Read's theory of visual and personality characteristics.<sup>139</sup> These theories dissect and structure the perceptual process and help guide artists through their abstractions. Would some of these visual art principles improve

methods of mission analysis or problem solving? Their concepts of viewing reality with an open mind are broad enough. How artists structure their abstractions with realism, surrealism, expressionism, and constructivism may lend insight to more creative ways of structuring plans and leadership vision.

The cognitive and sensory skills artists develop in perceptual training could also parallel leadership training. Practical exercises that develop tactical analyzing skills like those found in *The Maneuver Warfare Handbook* may prove more significant when compared to the abstraction exercises used at art schools. Developing a leader's skill in perceiving, abstracting, and designing a creative crisis action plan with case study exercises may prove as useful as perceptual exercises where art students are encouraged to radically portray the image of an apple (Figure 12). Innovative and creative thinking that molds, simplifies, and restructures reality in imaginative ways may breed more productive leadership.

Other areas of additional study may lie with how art interacts with technology. How have photography and computer graphics influenced painting? Have they enhanced artists' abilities, diluted their significance, or substituted for them? Conversely, how have computers and multimedia influenced leadership? With the advent of photography and its depiction of reality, representative painting became less revered. Instead, modern art and styles like cubism became popular. With the advent of the tell-all news media, can people revere another fallible human as a charismatic leader? Has a modern art of leadership developed? Are the practices of spin-doctor public affairs and psychological warfare similar to Picasso's mutations of reality--his personalization of the truth?





Figure 12. An Apple and The Essence of an Apple. Source: Reid Hastie and Christian Schmidt, Encounter With Art (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), 127 and 132.

The questions keep coming. The parallels are endless. With so much history and so many leaders, it is harder to come up with new and interesting ways to lead and inspire. Embracing the imaginative nature of leadership and developing creative skills to meet that challenge may improve people's ability to create cohesion, purpose, and productivity with confidence, enthusiasm, and pride.

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

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
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