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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No 4, Oct-Dec 1986

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's Speech at Ceremonial Presentation of Order of Lenin to Vladivostok (pp 3-21) (not translated)	
* 'Neoglobalism' Viewed as Source of Tension in Asia, World (pp 22-33)....	1
* 30 Years Since Restoration of USSR-Japan Diplomatic Relations (pp 34-43) (V.V. Aleksandrov, V.N. Arsenyev).....	13
Sino-U.S., Sino-Soviet Relations Analyzed, Contrasted (pp 45-57) (B.N. Zanegin).....	23
* Evolution of Pacific Cooperation Ideas (pp 57-69) (A.O. Bogomolov).....	38
* Imperialism Said Forming New Blocs in Asian Pacific Region (pp 70-80) (D.V. Petrov).....	51
* Economic Reform in Chinese Towns Discussed (pp 81-90) (A.V. Ostrovskiy).....	62
Commander Zhu De: Early Career (pp 91-100) (I.Ye. Pozhilov) (not translated)	
* Chinese Red Army's Long March Marked, 50 Years Later (pp 100-111) (M.F. Yuryev).....	72
* Propaganda of Marxist Philosophy in China During 1930's-1940's (pp 112-121) (V.G. Burov).....	84

* Translation taken from English-language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 1, 1987.

CONTENTS (Continued)

USSR Study and Translations of Chinese Literature (pp 121-129) (N.T. Fedorenko) (not translated)	
Eyewitness Account of Soviet Russia (Essays by Zu Taofen) (pp 130-137) (S.R. Belousov) (not translated)	
* Restructuring of Enterprise Management in China (pp 133-137) (B.N. Basov).....	94
* State Policy Toward Religious Organizations in PRC Described (pp 138-148) (P.M. Kozhin).....	99
Eastern Physical Culture (Some Aspects of General Outlook) (pp 150-159) (L.V. Shchelkina, A.G. Shchelkin) (not translated)	
Book Reviews	
* Book on U.S. Policy in China, Soviet Diplomacy Reviewed (pp 149-151) (V.V. Arunov).....	110
Book on Russian Explorer/Ethnographer of Amur-Ussuri Region (pp 162-164) (Ye.F. Kovalev, A.P. Shurygin).....	113
Japanese Author on Japan's Relations in Asia-Pacific Region (pp 164-166) (O.L. Ostroukhov).....	117
* Book Describes U.S. 'Neocolonial' Policy Toward S. Korea (pp 151-153) (V.I. Andreyev, V.I. Osipov).....	121
* Book on Cambodian Revolution, Pol Pot's 'Experiment' Reviewed (pp 154-157) (Yu.M. Ryakin).....	124
Review of 'Toyotomi Hideyoshi' by A.A. Iskenderov (pp 172-174) (V.S. Myasnikov) (not translated)	
Proceedings of Manila Symposium Opposing U.S. Bases Issued (pp 175-176) (Yu.G. Zharkikh).....	128
Review of 'Japanese Art: An Album' by N.A. Vinogradova (pp 177-179) (N.S. Nikolayeva) (not translated)	
Conference in Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences (pp 180-181) (V.S. Adzhimamudova) (not translated)	

* Translation taken from English-language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 1, 1987.

CONTENTS (Continued)

Conference on Chinese Language (p 182) (Ye. Puzitskiy) (not translated)	
Report on 30th European Conference of China Specialists (pp 183-185) (V.F. Sorokin, L.M. Gudoshnikov).....	132
In Memory of Marshal of the PRC Ye Jianying (pp 186-187) (not translated)	
Index of Articles Published in 1986 (pp 188-190).....	136

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'NEOGLOBALISM' VIEWED AS SOURCE OF TENSION IN ASIA, WORLD

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The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has become a milestone in the development not only of the CPSU and Soviet state, but also of international relations. With great zeal and enthusiasm the Soviet people have been working to implement the impressive plans for economic and social development charted by the Congress. The CPSU and the Soviet state have been bending every effort to normalise the international situation, exclude war from the life of world community, create the conditions for the further economic and social development of the USSR and other socialist countries, and bolster the position of the democratic and progressive forces of our planet. History has demonstrated that socialism acts as the principal real force capable of protecting humankind from thermonuclear war.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community is directed at accomplishing this task, which is of paramount significance for all countries and peoples. The problems of war and peace are now the problems of our civilisation's existence.

In delivering the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress M. Gorbachev said: "Socialism is continuously improving social relations, multiplying its achievements purposefully, setting an example which is becoming more and more influential and attractive, and demonstrating the real humanism of the socialist way of life. By so doing, it is erecting an increasingly reliable barrier to the ideology and policy of war and militarism, reaction and force, to all forms of inhumanity, and is actively furthering social progress. It has grown into a powerful moral and material force, and has shown what opportunities are opening up for modern civilisation." Socialism rejects wars as a method of settling political and economic conflicts and ideological disputes between countries. "Our ideal," Mikhail Gorbachev continued, "is a world without weapons and violence, a world in which each people freely chooses its path of development, its way of life."

Today at a time when, through the fault of imperialist quarters, the international situation remains highly complicated and tense, this formula for peace is of great importance. It has become the bell of peace which sounds a summons and an alarm. The Soviet Union and countries of the socialist community have been fighting indefatigably for an improvement in the complicated and tense international situation. Since the beginning of 1986, the USSR has come out with a number of constructive foreign policy initiatives which are justly assessed everywhere as amounting to a peace offensive by socialism.

A statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15, 1986, contains a programme for the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century. At the 27th CPSU Congress the idea of creating an all-embracing system of international security was promulgated. These two initiatives were followed by concrete proposals that would further the chances for an agreement on removing medium-range missiles from Europe. To help bring about progress in the Soviet-US negotiations in Geneva the USSR proposed an intermediate variant of the approach

to the reduction of nuclear arms which would in fact mean not to use the right to pull out of the ABM treaty for at least 15 years, while limiting SDI research to the laboratory conditions, i. e., to a point in the process the US has already reached, and to limit the strategic offensive armaments (intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines and heavy bombers) to an equal level. As for the problem of medium-range armaments capable of striking the other party's territory including long-range land-based cruise missiles, it should be dealt with separately.

Last May the Soviet Union prolonged its moratorium on nuclear testing for the third time. In June 1986, at the meeting in Budapest of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty proposals were made on reducing the levels of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. The members of the Warsaw Treaty proposed NATO considerable reductions in ground forces, and attack tactical aircraft. Were these proposals accepted, by the beginning of the 1990s, the armed forces of both alliances would be reduced by 25 per cent, that is, by one million officers and men all in all.

These major initiatives by the Soviet Union and the other socialist states have been exerting a growing influence on the entire course of events and the mood of the world public. In this connection foreign press, for example, some US and Japanese periodicals emphasise that, under the impact of the Soviet initiatives, increasing pressure is being brought to bear on the US administration by the public and that Soviet strategy is aimed at breaking the deadlock in Soviet-US disarmament negotiations.

The Soviet programme of nuclear disarmament is winning ever more proponents. For example, a former assistant to the chief of the US Air Force has stated that a reasonable assessment of the proposals set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986 reveals that they provide promising opportunities for halting the deployment of new types of weapons, reducing and stabilising the colossal destructive potential of the two sides, which can annihilate each other many times over, and creating an atmosphere conducive to improving relations between the two powers. The former assistant called on the US administration to switch from words to deeds in reducing armaments, saying that the Russians have covered more than halfway. Today even Washington's most loyal NATO allies are in disarray because they have become convinced that their constant connivance to American hawks have had a pernicious effect. Reflecting these sentiments, the London-based *Guardian* writes that if Europe has any influence at all, it will fight for the preservation of the SALT-2 Treaty and do everything it can to encourage further efforts towards reducing armaments. This struggle, the paper added, must not be evaded or carried out haphazardly.

The White House has encountered serious opposition in its own country and in other parts of the world, and this has compelled it to pass over to the defensive and use the most unseemly methods. By resorting to lies and manipulation of the mass media, and whipping up a chauvinistic psychosis inside the country, the US administration, in seeking to please reactionary elements, has been trying to camouflage its attempt to break up the military parity between the USSR and the US, which is the foundation for strategic stability in the world, and justify all it is doing by saying that the Soviet Union has been allegedly violating its contractual commitments. However, these are nothing but fabrications from beginning to end, a fact well known to all unbiased and informed observers. The Soviet Union has never violated any provisions of the agreements it has made with the USA, and Washington is well aware of this. More than once, the USSR has used facts to expose attempts by the White House to make false accusations against the Soviet Union. Even the West German

newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* has felt compelled to say: "The world public, particularly in Western Europe, opposes the arrogant American military build up."

The new edition of the CPSU Programme stresses: "*The most acute problem facing mankind is that of war and peace.* Imperialism was responsible for two world wars that claimed tens of millions of lives. It is creating the threat of a third world war."

Twice during the 20th century militaristic forces pushed humankind into the abyss of world war. In both cases people had an option: peace or slaughter, and in both cases the forces of militarism gained the upper hand over the forces of reason. Today a qualitatively new threat to the humankind has emerged, and people must choose between peace and the annihilation of mankind. Now, as never before, each statesman, and the broadest strata of public, each human being, need to assess soberly the processes occurring in the international arena, draw the appropriate conclusions, and determine the role they can play in keeping the world from sliding towards a new war.

The Soviet Union has drawn the appropriate conclusions. It holds that an improvement in the international situation is necessary. Proceeding from this premise, the CPSU and Soviet government decided to take a number of major and fundamental foreign policy actions. In his statement of January 15, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: "Their objective is maximally to promote an improvement in the international situation. They are dictated by the need to overcome negative, confrontational tendencies which have been mounting in recent years, to clear the way towards curtailing the nuclear arms race on earth and averting it in outer space, achieving a general reduction in the danger of war and establishing confidence as the inalienable component of relations among states."

Yet another major peace initiative by the Soviet Union—the Programme for Ensuring International Security and Peaceful Interaction in the Asian-Pacific Region, formulated in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok—has provoked exceptional interest everywhere.

Soviet foreign policy in the Asian-Pacific region is a component of the general programme of the CPSU international activities, elaborated by the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress. The all-embracing system of international security favoured by the 27th Congress is inconceivable if the situation in such a vast area as Asia and the Pacific Ocean, where dozens of states with populations numbering in the hundreds of millions are located, is not normalised. Of the complex problems facing the countries of that region, as well as any region of the world, the most acute is the problem of peace, of averting the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union calls for the solution of this problem.

The USSR is not only a European but also an Asian and a Pacific country. In this region it has friends and allies, as well as interests stemming from its responsibility to ensure international peace and security. The Soviet Union cannot but feel alarmed by the fact that imperialism, and US imperialism above all, is accelerating the arms race in the Asian-Pacific region, and is now trying to steer the future developments in that vast area of the planet towards confrontation and a buildup of military might. US militarism is going out of its way to erect barriers to mutually beneficial cooperation between the states there. In its Statement of April 23, 1986, the Soviet government emphasised: "If such a course of events in the area where the interests of many countries merge continues, it may bring about a grave exacerbation of tension in the Asian-Pacific region."

The principal problem facing humankind today is the problem of survival. It is equally pressing for Europe, Africa, America and Asia, in

short; for every part of the world, for every corner of our planet. Time insistently demands that a new approach be taken to the current situation vis-à-vis the development of civilisation and international relations.

Life itself calls for a radical departure from many of the usual views on foreign policy questions, principally those concerning the problems of war and peace, the security of sovereign states, as well as the international security in general. The Soviet Union continually comes out with new approaches to these vital global problems. Major radical Soviet initiatives and proposals such as those concerning the elimination of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction in this century—are eloquent evidence of this. In his answers to questions put by Zdeněk Horěni, Editor-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak newspaper *Rudé Právo* Mikhail Gorbachev stressed: "We shall continue to take advantage of any opportunity for fruitful dialogue, to move towards limitations on and reductions in stockpiles of armaments, as well as opportunities to settle regional conflicts, and develop international cooperation in all urgent areas."

The Soviet Union also takes a responsible stand on the problems of the Asian-Pacific region. The USSR does not look for any special rights or privileges there. Moreover, it seeks jointly to create a fundamentally new and just system of relations between countries in that part of the world, as well as in all others. The socio-economic and political development of large areas of the planet and the processes that characterise relations between countries will largely determine the future of universal peace.

One should bear in mind that it was in Asia, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that US imperialism committed a nuclear crime. Two aggressive wars—in Korea and Vietnam—were unleashed in Asia, and this continent has seen the biggest number of so-called "small" military conflicts. Imperialism has not abandoned its attempt to expand the network of military bases in Asia, bring nuclear weapons there and draw various countries in the region into military preparations.

At present the US is applying pressure to ensure the creation of a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul "triangle". Militarisation and the threat of war in that part of the world are mounting at an alarming rate. The Pacific region is in danger of becoming an arena of military-political confrontation. This is what alarms the peoples most of all, including the Soviet people, in part due to their concern for the security in the Asian part of the USSR. It should also be borne in mind that while the Helsinki Accords facilitate the search for ways of strengthening mutual understanding and security in Europe, the Asian-Pacific region is covered by no such accords.

The militarisation of the Pacific has not yet reached European levels but it is mounting rapidly, and the consequences may prove extremely dangerous. It is not too late to thwart such a course of events and prevent Asia and the Pacific from becoming an arena of military-political confrontation. The necessary prerequisites for turning Asia and the Pacific into a region of peace and neighbourliness exist, and the Soviet Union calls for the realisation of this idea.

When speaking in Vladivostok, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that in implementing the principled line of the 27th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union will seek, first and foremost, to attach dynamism to its bilateral relations with all countries in the Asian-Pacific region without exception. It will do everything it can to strengthen friendship and invigorate the diverse ties it has with the socialist countries of the region.

Socialism, which is the bulwark of universal peace, occupies a solid position in Asia. The USSR, Vietnam, Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other countries have on more than one occasion made concrete proposals which would, if adopted, improve the political

climate in the region and increase the opportunities available for preserving and strengthening world peace.

History has entrusted the peoples of the USSR and China with a highly responsible mission. The conditions needed to see it successfully carried out exist and must be used to the full. The CPSU and the Soviet people are sincerely striving to establish better relations with our neighbour, socialist China with whom we share the longest common border in the world.

In recent years Soviet-Chinese relations have improved considerably. The Soviet Union is ready, at any time and at any level, earnestly to discuss with China additional measures towards creating an atmosphere of neighbourliness. It is inconceivable that peace and security could be ensured in the Asian-Pacific region without the active participation of the People's Republic of China. It is gratifying to note that two nuclear powers—the USSR and the PRC—have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and both of them oppose the militarisation of outer space. The opportunities for expanding Soviet-Chinese cooperation are numerous, and their implementation would undoubtedly promote security in the region. A number of important Soviet-Chinese documents were signed in Peking in September 1986, during an official visit of the Soviet delegation. They are aimed at further expanding and improving trade and economic cooperation between the two states. During the talks much attention was devoted to the prospects of developing economic, trade, scientific and technological ties, as well as to the search for new forms of the mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and the PRC.

The practical developments show that reserves for expanding mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in all spheres are extremely broad. At present, the Soviet Union and the PRC are engaged in solving similar priority tasks of accelerating their socio-economic development. The ties between Soviet and Chinese economies, which have been shaped historically, contain impressive possibilities for the development of economic relations, including in the border areas. That is why the urge for deepening cooperation in the implementation of their respective plans where it will obviously be in the interest of both sides, is quite natural.

The talks in Peking and the documents signed there give a fresh impetus to the progress in the Soviet-Chinese cooperation.

In the Pacific the Soviet Union also borders on the United States. There is no question that the problem of security and cooperation in that region cannot be solved without the US. Regrettably, however, Washington has not yet displayed any readiness to take such steps. Moreover, it has not even considered engaging in serious talks on the subject.

The Soviet Union is pressing to have the Asian-Pacific region included in the general process of creating an all-embracing system of international security. In doing so the first matters which must be addressed are those relating to regional settlement. An end should be put to interference by the USA and several other countries into the internal affairs of Kampuchea. An improvement in the situation in Southeast Asia could be promoted by the normalisation of relations between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN. The possibility exists not only to eliminate the dangerous tension on the Korean peninsula, but also to begin solving the national problem facing the entire Korean people. The proliferation and building up of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific must be impeded. The Soviet Union has suggested that talks should begin on curbing the activities of navies in the Pacific, primarily of ships armed with nuclear weapons. Negotiations on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace must be resumed. Armed forces and conventional arsenals in Asia must be radically reduced to reasonable limits.

The Soviet Union has proposed that a Helsinki-like Pacific conference in which all countries of that region would participate be convened in the not too distant future, perhaps in Hiroshima. It would be wonderful if the city which was the first victim of atomic evil became a Helsinki for Asia and the Pacific.

Nor in the past have the peoples of Asia distanced themselves from international problems. The Bandung principles or those of "Pancha Shila" serve as just one example. At present, too, the Asian countries are continually making proposals on matters like economic cooperation. Such plans should not be imposed from outside and should have nothing to do with the notorious "bloc strategy".

It was in Asia that the concept of nonalignment first appeared. Since then it has gained in strength, and is now a movement embracing over a hundred states. The great India is the recognised leader of that movement. The friendly relations that exist between the USSR and India are a stabilising factor of international import.

The Soviet people are pleased to note that relations between the USSR and Japan seem to have taken a turn for the better. The cause of peace stands to gain if this occurs. The USSR is ready to expand its ties with Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and other countries. It will meet any country's attempts to strengthen peace and cooperation with understanding and support.

The new Soviet initiative is realistic. It contains concrete proposals on settling regional conflicts in Southeast Asia; on prohibiting the proliferation and build-up of nuclear arsenals in Asia and the Pacific; on curbing the activities of naval forces in the Pacific; on reducing the size of armed forces and conventional arsenals in Asia; on making the discussions on the confidence-building measures and the non-use of force in that region less abstract and more concrete. The announcement of the return from Afghanistan of six Soviet regiments was positively greeted throughout the world. This act is part of the political solution of the situation around Afghanistan which is consistently favoured by the Soviet Union. Of course, this should imply discontinuation and non-resumption of the imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The Soviet proposal concerning the inclusion of the Asian Pacific area in the general process of creating an all-embracing system of international security is another convincing evidence that coming out with initiatives which are of strategic importance for normalising the situation in the world was and is a key feature of the foreign policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet government. The Soviet programme of eliminating nuclear weapons, the proposals aimed at preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space, the policy of working to create a truly peaceful climate in Europe and other parts of the world are features of that programme.

For more than a year now the Soviet Union has unilaterally adhered to a moratorium on nuclear testing. All those who hold dear the future of mankind in the nuclear age heartily support this action, while the wave of indignation over Washington's persistence in nuclear testing is mounting throughout the world.

As a matter of fact, at every crucial stage in the development of the nuclear capability—the testing of the atomic and then the hydrogen bomb, the creation of heavy strategic bombers, atomic artillery ammunition, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, MIRV'ed warheads, the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles and so on—Washington has always been the first to launch the new generation of weapons.

Since nuclear weapons first came into being, the USSR has never threatened to use them, whereas the USA has made this on more than

one occasion. The fact has long been known that right after the Second World War American political and military leaders calculated how many Soviet cities should be destroyed by nuclear bombing in the name of implementing their crazy plan to "roll back communism", and gave serious thought to using atomic weapons during the developments in Korea and Indochina.

It is Washington's fault that for many years now the mechanism of disarmament negotiations has not worked and a number of negotiations have been frustrated. One after another the White House produces doctrines and concepts on the admissibility of "limited", "protracted", etc., kinds of nuclear wars, because on their basis the corresponding directives are worked out, whose ultimate goal is to achieve military superiority or, in other words, destroy the approximate military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States which ensures world stability. All these doctrines and practical measures have as their basic premise that the US will deliver a first, crippling strike.

The Star Wars programme advanced by the current Republican administration became a climax of sorts in the unlimited plans for military preparation. One of the most sinister aspects of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is that it intensifies the aggressiveness of the military-industrial complex, which inculcates in the minds of Americans the idea that a nuclear war is thinkable and winnable. It is no accident that in recent publications on the Star Wars programme the Heritage Foundation, the "think tank" of the ultra-right circles in the USA, has been propounding the thesis, that if the USA were to succeed in "defending itself from Soviet missiles with a space shield", a nuclear war might be won.

Ruling quarters in the US are going out of their way to place the economy and science at the service of Star Wars. Experts have calculated that by the end of the century the SDI programme will have cost one thousand billion dollars.

Following the highly dangerous course of "neoglobalism," and imperial ambitions, the US administration shuns practical solutions to problems bearing on the destiny of the world. Washington is seeking to abandon the ABM treaty. The series of nuclear explosions in Nevada and the unprecedented size of the military budget for 1987 (about \$300 billion) testify to the sinister nature of US military designs. This policy is unjustifiable because it threatens peace and security throughout the world. That is the opinion of millions people on all continents. Washington's recklessness in playing with fire in the international arena is causing increasing concern among US allies as well, for they are unwilling to risk their own security for the sake of their senior partner's imperial ambitions.

In characterising the main trends in world politics today, Mikhail Gorbachev, during his talk with Tetsuzo Fuwa, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan, noted that there still exist two approaches to the most urgent problems of the present time. One of them consistently followed by the Soviet Union and supported by the various forces sincerely interested in buttressing international security, consists in a sincere effort to bring about the discontinuation of the arms race and confrontation, and in the transition to disarmament and broad international cooperation on the basis of the recognition of the legitimate interests and rights of all peoples, and the adoption of a realistic approach to assessing civilisation's prospects from the viewpoint of the nuclear threat. It is precisely this approach that determines the Soviet peace initiatives and those by other socialist countries advanced in recent months, primarily after the 1985 Geneva summit. The other approach adopted by the circles favouring the use of force to solve world problems, who ignore in doing so the possible consequences, consists in

an unlimited arms race and its transfer to outer space, in continuation of the confrontation. Pursuing openly selfish ends, these forces have no intention of laying down their arms.

The aggressive policies and actions of the Reagan administration, as well as its Star Wars programme, are striking evidence of the imperial ambitions of the United States which is seeking to establish its world domination. The numerous nuclear tests staged by the Pentagon are nothing but a challenge by US imperialism to the world public. The nuclear explosions in Nevada are a challenge to all people everywhere because they demonstrate stubborn unwillingness of the US to abandon its adventurous policies aimed at attaining military superiority over the socialist world. The debilitating arms race, which Washington has imposed on mankind, increases the danger of an all-out war. At the same time it has failed to consolidate the moral, political, military and strategic position of the US in the world. It was stressed by the 27th CPSU Congress that "aggressive international behaviour, increasing militarisation of politics and thinking, contempt for the interests of others—all this is leading to the inevitable moral and political isolation of US imperialism, widening the abyss between it and the rest of humanity."

Irrefutable facts show that concrete, clear-cut, cardinal and far-reaching proposals by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries directed at finding a way out of the vicious circle of the arms race are, in fact, obstructed. Numerous pretexts and reservations are given, but their sole aim consists in frustrating progress towards solving this, the most urgent problem facing mankind. It is hard to imagine that there are people who deem it reasonable to turn the dialogue at the negotiating table into a monologue of nuclear explosions. However, this danger exists, and it is being created by the reckless policy pursued by the most reactionary and bellicose imperialist circles. Therefore there is every reason to regard the push for further militarisation and the acceleration of the arms race, for which imperialism is fully to blame, as the most substantial and dangerous form in which the aggressiveness of the imperialist policy is displayed in our day and age.

Of exceptional importance in this connection was the televised Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev on the prolongation of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. As an event of tremendous significance it was studied and discussed throughout the world. After making a thorough and careful examination of the "pros" and "cons", an examination in which they were guided by their sense of responsibility for the destiny of the world, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government decided to prolong the unilateral moratorium up to January 1, 1987. This decision takes as its foundation the unanimous will of the Soviet people.

People around the world highly evaluate and hail the USSR's new political initiative. The complete elimination of weapons of mass annihilation is the only true path towards peace. The Soviet programme for eliminating all these weapons by the year 2000 fully meets the needs of this age. Over a year ago the USSR was the first to take a courageous and wise step towards that goal—it unilaterally introduced a moratorium on nuclear testing. This decision signified the beginning of a new stage in the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, halt the arms race and improve the international situation.

What was the response in the United States to the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev? It can confidently be said that the response was positive among the American public and many Congressmen. At the same time it was negative among the members of the administration and the closely allied military-industrial complex. Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his answers to the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Rudè Pràvo* that the res-

ponse to his statement among the ruling circles in the US was indicative in that it showed that "at least the people around the President, who did not even try to conceal their irritation this time, are not yet giving serious thought to eliminating the nuclear threat. That is why the prolongation of the moratorium caused displeasure there. Apparently, in face of new Soviet proposals these circles felt uncomfortable. Apparently, they found it very difficult to justify their position in the eyes of the world and the American public".

It was not difficult to predict this reaction. Still some changes were noted. The basis of support for the moratorium as well as for the complete banning of nuclear testing has expanded and consolidated considerably.

Senators Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts) and Paul Simon (Illinois) have come out for the banning of nuclear tests. Even if they had been against it, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in their respective states (several cities in Massachusetts and Illinois have declared themselves nuclear-free zones) would make them change their position. Speaking recently in Congress, representative James Jaffords, a Republican, noted that in his conversations with voters of Vermont the latter had almost invariably expressed themselves in favour of the moratorium. He said that in his state troubled citizens had held a press conference and called on Congress to support the banning of nuclear testing. More than seventy members of the state legislature signed the second resolution calling on Washington to join the moratorium. Given this state of affairs the opponents of the moratorium feel increasingly uncomfortable. The theory that the moratorium is a "tactical propaganda move by Moscow" does not hold water. Cardiss Collins, another representative, says that many people believe that the Soviet action is smokescreen and a propaganda ploy meant to deceive the world. She added that if this were true there would be no better means of exposing it than agreeing to the moratorium. Regrettably, this idea has not met with sufficient support.

It is no accident that the question of immediately discontinuing nuclear testing has been raised. First and foremost, it has been prompted by the fact that the discontinuation of nuclear testing is now at the centre of attention of the whole world. However, Washington stubbornly refuses to agree with the Soviet Union and stop all nuclear tests, thereby failing to carry out its international commitments and ignoring the will of the world community.

The US made a commitment to work to halt nuclear testing in the preamble to the treaty that brought about a partial banning of testing (1963) and in Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Soviet Union has made concrete proposals to help translate this commitment into reality on more than one occasion. To break the deadlock over this matter the USSR introduced a unilateral moratorium on August 6, 1985, which was prolonged up to the end of 1986. However, the USA has failed to follow this good example. On the contrary, it has done everything it could to ensure that a solution to this crucial problem was not found.

Initially the White House sought to justify its unwillingness to discontinue nuclear testing by saying that there were no reliable means of verification. This was, of course, a subterfuge. The Soviet Union long ago declared its readiness to agree to verification by international observers and to on the spot verification. The USSR has demonstrated its readiness by agreeing to station US seismic equipment near Semipalatinsk, where the Soviet Union carried out its nuclear tests. This principled and clear-cut position was confirmed by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress: "We have declared on several occasions that the USSR is open to verification, that we are interested in it as much as anybody else. All-embracing, strictest verification is perhaps the key element of the disarmament process. The essence of the matter, in our opinion, is that *there can*

be no disarmament without verification and that verification without disarmament makes no sense."

As a result, the White House, which was thus deprived of room for manoeuvring, had to admit that, in the final analysis, its refusal to discontinue nuclear testing had nothing to do with the problem of verification. According to *The New York Times*, the official line of the Defence Department no longer consists in the premise that the US cannot be confident that the Russians are not carrying out tests in secret. Rather, it is as follows: the United States is compelled to continue its own tests as long as it must rely on its forces of nuclear deterrence. Later this was confirmed by an official spokesman of the US State Department who, in response to a request to comment on the Mexico Declaration, stated that the moratorium would neither strengthen stability nor reduce the risk of a new war. Instead, he declared, acceptance of the proposal would increase the dangerous imbalance created by the massive Soviet build-up of nuclear arms and would undermine efforts aimed at achieving a more stable strategic balance.

Washington's persistent desire to continue nuclear testing at all costs is flagrantly at odds with humankind's desire to deliver itself from the nuclear threat, and even with the official assurances of the American administration that it is working to achieve the same goal. All this clearly demonstrates Washington's unwillingness to embark on the road of nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, the clear and consistent stand on nuclear disarmament taken by the Soviet Union has won approval and support throughout the world. For example, the well-known American scientist von Hippel has said that the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, introduced by the Soviet Union, is of exceptional significance and has had an immense impact on world opinion while demonstrating the growing confidence of the Soviet Union in a new way of thinking. A programme for building a star peace was presented in the United Nations as an alternative to the Star Wars programme. The principles of an all-embracing system of international security formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress were the most generalised expression of the new approach to foreign policy.

The year-long moratorium has clarified many things. First, the onslaught of the forces of peace grew in strength. A considerable and authoritative part of the world community became more active. Political and public leaders, private citizens and organisations from many countries, including the US and other members of NATO, sent messages to Moscow asking that the Soviet moratorium be prolonged, thereby giving those who continue to insist on nuclear testing another chance.

On the other hand, the year-long moratorium has enabled the world to see who stands for disarmament and who has become insanely enamoured of the arms race. It has also made it possible to compare socialist morality with the money-bags "principles". The long silence at the Soviet nuclear testing sites and more than twenty explosions in Nevada is a contrast which cannot be glossed over by any verbiage. The proponents of nuclear arms were deprived of the excuse that testing could not be verified. Through their demonstrative disrespect for world opinion and the "answers" they gave at the testing site in Nevada to the Soviet peace initiatives they hope to provoke us and draw us into new rounds of the arms race. However, today (and Washington should keep this in mind) building relations between countries on the illusion of achieving superiority in weapons of mass destruction amounts to suicide.

The Soviet people know whom they are dealing with. That is why the security of the USSR is sacred to us and we shall spare no efforts to ensure it. The entire history of the Soviet Union attests to its ability quickly to find an answer to any challenge. The nation across the ocean

should analyse yet again the real value of its new military programmes from the point of view of American interests, of its security and the prospects for the Soviet-US negotiations as well as the interests of universal peace. We believe in the reason of the American people and are confident that discontinuation of nuclear testing meets equally their interests and furthers the security of all nations.

The Soviet Union is confident, that an agreement on discontinuation of nuclear testing and disarmament could be reached in 1986. The whole world has been discussing the outcome of the Soviet-US summit in Reikjavik. It became a major political development in international affairs, in the struggle against the arms race, for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for delivering humankind from the war threat. The consequences of Reikjavik will long tell on international relations.

At the summit meeting the Soviet Union concentrated on the principal issues of world politics, i. e., the discontinuation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. It tabled a package of measures which, if they had been adopted, would have ushered in a new era in the life of mankind, the non-nuclear era. This is the essence of Soviet proposals, whose translating into life would be tantamount to a cardinal change in the world situation. The possibility for this was obvious and realistic.

The Soviet stand in Reikjavik was honest and open. It was based on the principles of equality and equal security, taking into account the interests of both sides, of their allies, and the peoples of all countries. The Soviet compromises at that meeting were a concrete expression of a fresh approach to the burning issues of our day and age and of new thinking.

These are courageous and non-standard proposals designed to get the cause of nuclear disarmament out of the deadlock, with an eye to liquidate completely nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The Soviet Union has been convinced that it is imperative to place this process under a most strict control, and our country favours any forms of the latter.

In the course of sharp disputes in Reikjavik, the Soviet side, in a bid to reach a mutually acceptable compromise, made tangible concessions. As a result, an accord was reached on both strategic armaments and medium-range missiles. However, it proved impossible to translate this accord into abiding agreements due to the obstinate unwillingness of the US administration to create conditions for their implementation through consolidating the ABM regime and taking commitments equally obligatory for the two sides.

It was precisely on this issue that a true clash of the two approaches in world politics to such pressing problems as discontinuation of the arms race and the banning of nuclear weapons, took place in Reikjavik. The American side insisted that the United States has a chance to develop and test everything relating to the SDI not only within laboratories but outside the latter, including outer space. Thus, the Washington administration demonstrated that, having been convinced in its technological superiority, it still hopes to reach the unreachable, i. e. to ensure military superiority over the Soviet Union, steering towards militarisation of outer space through the SDI.

Nonetheless, the Reikjavik summit was useful. Much work has been done there and immense experience has been acquired. Today no one can act as was the case before. The meeting has prepared a possible step forward towards a real shift for the better. Now it is the turn of the US. The package deal proposed by the USSR is a historic chance for a cardinal solution of the problems of war and peace. Everything should be done to make use of this chance in the interests of the peoples and the whole of mankind.

It is possible to stop the slide towards nuclear war and achieve a radical reorientation in international relations towards detente and a general normalisation. This exceptionally important task must be accomplished. Mikhail Gorbachev has stated that by its actions and initiatives the Soviet Union is striving to strengthen the hope nations harbour that the situation can be changed and that a realistic alternative to confrontation exists. "I think", he said, "that we have already entered the second phase of the global anti-nuclear process which presupposes not only hopes but also realistic plans and ensuing concrete actions. Socialist countries, the entire progressive public and all who work for peace are firmly convinced that security for all states and peoples and peaceful conditions conducive to their development and progress can be secured by political means, through the joint effort of all states and peoples."

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30 YEARS SINCE RESTORATION OF USSR-JAPAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

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[Article by V.V. Aleksandrov and V.N. Arsenyev]

The signing of the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration thirty years ago, on October 19, 1956, opened a new stage in the history of relations between the two neighbouring countries. In addition to declaring cessation of the state of war and restoration of peace among them, this historic document objectively laid down a solid foundation for the subsequent establishment of neighbourly, friendly relations between the USSR and Japan.

The preamble of the Declaration states that the Soviet Union and Japan are in full accord that the restoration of diplomatic relations between them will serve the development of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries in the interests of peace and security in the Far East. In accordance with the agreement, diplomatic and consular relations were restored. The two sides confirmed that in their relations they would be guided by the principles of the UN Charter and resolve their disputes by peaceful means so as not to threaten international peace, security and justice; refrain in their relations with other countries from the use of force or the threat of using it in defiance of the territorial inviolability or political independence of any state or act in any other way incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations. The USSR and Japan undertook not to interfere, directly or indirectly, in each other's internal affairs on any basis—economic, political or ideological. The USSR supported Japan's request to be admitted to the United Nations, and also released to Japan those Japanese citizens convicted in the USSR. The two sides abandoned, on a reciprocal basis, all claims that had emerged as a result of war. In this connection the Soviet Union gave up all reparation claims on Japan. Viewing this document as the very first step towards settling a whole number of problems in bilateral relations, the USSR and Japan stated in the Declaration their consent to enter into negotiations, as soon as possible, to conclude agreements or treaties to place their trade relations, including those involving transport by sea and other commercial mutual relations on a solid and friendly basis. Furthermore, the two sides agreed in the Declaration to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations. This treaty went unsigned at that time due to Japan's illegal territorial claims on the Soviet Union.

In examining the Joint Declaration today, the historic importance of the document, which laid legal foundations of bilateral relations between the USSR and Japan and gave a powerful impetus to their subsequent development, should be stressed. The document unquestionably met the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, and its signing was a step in a right direction. This is precisely why it is being properly assessed in the Soviet Union.

It should also be pointed out that the very fact that the Hatoyama Government signed the Joint Declaration at a complicated point in Japan's history, despite the pressure brought to bear on it both within the country

and without clearly testifies to the political wisdom of that statesman, who was primarily guided by national interests. This action also demonstrated that Tokyo made a serious attempt to give its foreign policy a more independent character, invigorate its diplomatic efforts in the international arena, which, of course, would be incomplete without normal relations with the USSR. These changes were also reflected in a number of concrete measures effecting the Soviet Union adopted during the first years after the restoration of diplomatic relations. On the whole, Soviet-Japanese relations took a positive turn at that time and Japan displayed certain readiness to see them improve and expand still further.

True, during those years, too, the development of bilateral relations was frequently interrupted by anti-Soviet campaigns and was negatively influenced by US policy. The Japanese side put off finding solutions to many problems and erected artificial barriers on the road to mutually advantageous cooperation. Nevertheless, it proved possible to achieve tangible positive results and accumulate useful experience in mutually beneficial cooperation.

For example, the two sides concluded a number of treaties and agreements which established a solid legal basis for the further development and expansion of ties. They included the Trade Agreement, the Consular Convention, the Agreement on Air Communication, and the Agreement on the Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Political contacts, including parliamentary exchanges were also developed to a certain extent. Considerable progress was attained in the trade and economic spheres, in particular in fishing and scientific and technological cooperation. Broad ties were developed in sports and the arts, as were ties between public organisations.

The situation changed considerably in the mid-1970s. It was precisely at that time that clear signs pointing to Japanese foreign policy's decreased independence and its subordination to US global interests appeared. Japan began increasingly to take US interests into account in its relations with the USSR, openly declaring Japanese-Soviet relations to be sort of a mirror of US-Soviet relations. In this connection, the Soviet side stated on more than one occasion that Soviet-Japanese relations are an independent entity, and should be viewed primarily in terms of the national interests of the USSR and Japan. There is scarcely any need to prove that this is the only correct approach, which the other side should also display if it sincerely seeks to make the principles proclaimed by the Declaration a reality.

Regrettably, the above-mentioned tendency in the Japanese policy was not short-lived. For a number of reasons Japan succeeded in becoming the second economic power in the capitalist world. Its share of world production increased considerably.

As Japan's economic might grew so did Tokyo's foreign policy ambitions. Its ruling quarters set itself the task of enhancing the country's political role in the contemporary world and making it as big as its economic role. However, they saw the main means of attaining this goal in the further strengthening of the country's military-political alliance with the US, and this was in full accord with the designs of the American government, which sought to draw Japan into its global strategy. This resulted for Japan in a tangible military buildup and the strengthening of militaristic trends in its policy. Military spending has been growing at a fast pace, and in recent years it has risen on average, by 6.5 per cent a year, i. e., a rate twice that of the West European countries. According to the estimates of some American specialists, Japan ranks sixth in the Western world in military spending which, according to the method of calculation adopted by the NATO countries, amounts to 1.4 per cent of its GNP. It spends over \$1 billion annually only on the maintenance of

US bases. Japanese leaders and the country's ruling party are displaying an increasingly lax attitude towards the provisions of the Japanese constitution, in which the country renounced the right to wage war and to create armed forces. Nonobservance by Tokyo of the so-called antiwar principles once adopted by the Japanese Diet and the government, including the banning of the arms sales and the "three non-nuclear principles", have given rise to apprehension in Japan and around the world. A different assessment is difficult to be given to numerous facts of the calls by US warships armed with nuclear weapons to Japanese ports, the Japanese-US agreements on the purchase by the Pentagon of the latest Japanese technology, which can be employed in US offensive and strategic systems, or the shipping of arms to third countries. A qualitatively new manifestation of this tendency is the Japanese government's decision to participate in the US Star Wars programme. It is only natural that this policy causes alarm among Japan's neighbours, as well as among other countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

When examining the negative aspects of Japanese policy, it should also be noted that Japanese diplomacy has, as we see it, taken on a military slant, and is clearly affected by a tangible shift to the right in domestic politics in tandem with the growth of nationalistic and sometimes even revenge-seeking sentiments. In particular, reactionary elements have long claimed that if Japan fails to become a militarily powerful state, it can hardly succeed in becoming as important politically as it is economically.

Of course, one can understand the desire of Japan, one of the world's big powers, to have its voice clearly heard not only in the world economy, but also in world politics. However, it should be borne in mind that the role and prestige of any country is determined by the extent to which its actions correspond to the broad interests of the international community.

These trends in Japanese politics, which are closely interconnected both globally and regionally, could not but have an influence, for obvious reasons, on relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. There lie the roots of the fact that during the years that have elapsed since the signing of the Joint Declaration these relations have from time to time experienced difficult periods, were artificially frozen and sometimes even suffered reverses. Moreover, each time Japan has attempted to describe the situation in such a way that the Soviet Union must bear all the blame. Is this true?

Since the signing of the Joint Declaration the Soviet Union has developed its relations with Japan on the basis of commonly accepted principles of neighbourliness and cooperation. It has not taken any steps that would damage bilateral relations.

Naturally the Soviet Union cannot ignore the aforementioned negative and sometimes alarming aspects of Tokyo's policies. At the same time, Soviet-Japanese relations determine the political climate in the Far East and Asia as a whole to a large extent. Taking this into account, and basing its actions on the interests of the peoples of the two countries, the Soviet Union's policy of maintaining normal relations with Japan and developing them in every way on the basis of mutual confidence and genuine neighbourliness remains unchanged. This policy has been confirmed by the decisions of CPSU congresses and statements by Soviet leaders. It was not and could not be subjected to time-serving vacillations. The Soviet Union holds that the development of ties in the direction of confidence-building broader contacts and, where possible, joint consideration of the urgent issues of our day will meet the vital interests of the two countries, the interests of peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region.

It should be added that the Soviet people have always given the Japanese people their due for their industriousness, talent and the achievements they have scored. Soviet people take considerable interest in Japa-

nese culture and have never felt hostile towards the Japanese people. More than once Soviet leaders have expressed their willingness to promote mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and Japan, and this has always been supported by the Soviet people who want to live in peace and friendship with their great Far-Eastern neighbour. All the objective prerequisites for this exist, the principal one being the reciprocal desire for peace.

The Soviet Union has always bolstered its principled policy towards Japan, which is based on neighbourliness and mutual cooperation, with concrete actions. Numerous Soviet initiatives have served as the basis for building Soviet-Japanese cooperation in trade, the economy, science, technology, culture, fishing and other spheres of bilateral relations.

At the end of the 1970s the Soviet Union looked at ways of comprehensively expanding its relations with Japan and came out with important new proposals aimed at opening a new stage in mutual relations between the two countries. The USSR stressed the need to build a solid foundation for the development of friendly relations over a long period of time. In appeals to the Japanese government it emphasised that a further consolidation of the contractual-legal basis of the countries' relations could serve this purpose. The Soviet side proposed that a treaty on neighbourliness and cooperation between the USSR and Japan be signed. It also suggested that they discuss confidence-building measures in the Far East on a bilateral or multilateral basis, that an agreement be concluded which would legally formalise the USSR's commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Japan, and the latter's commitment to the three famous "non-nuclear principles", including that of not deploying nuclear weapons on or near its territory. As far as trade and economic ties are concerned, the USSR proposed to start long-term economic cooperation. The Soviet Union is also in favour of elevating cooperation between the two countries in culture and science to a higher level.

Thus, the Soviet Union has come out with a comprehensive and far-reaching programme meant not only to bring about a considerable improvement in bilateral relations but also to elevate them to a new level. However, not a single one of these proposals was accepted. Moreover, Japan subsequently took steps which resulted in a worsening of relations between the two countries. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, under false pretexts, Japan actually cut short the political dialogue with the Soviet Union and moved towards limiting political ties. The so-called economic sanctions were introduced: Japan restricted the granting of new export credits, refused to hold a regular session of the Commission for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and interrupted the holding of annual consultations on trade. It would not be out of place to note that such actions were an obvious violation by the Japanese side of the provisions of the existing treaties and agreements between the two countries.

Obviously this turn of events not only poisoned the atmosphere of Soviet-Japanese relations but also had a strong negative influence on many practical spheres of the bilateral cooperation, which has developed considerably during the postwar years. It was trade that suffered most, and, as a result, Japan which had ranked second on the list of Soviet trading partners in the developed capitalist world dropped to fifth or sixth place. If one were to characterise Soviet-Japanese relations during that period, it could be said that Soviet-Japanese cooperation and neighbourliness, which were built up through the joint efforts of the two sides during the first years after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956, were actively dismantled.

Of course, Tokyo's unfriendly actions were evaluated in a principled and objective manner and it was frankly said that any attempt to deal with the Soviet Union from positions of strength or to wrest unilateral

concessions from it was doomed to failure. The initiators of such attempts will not profit by them; rather they will only damage their own economic interests and political prestige.

It was evident that such a situation could not by any means be considered satisfactory, as it was neither in the immediate interests of Soviet-Japanese relations nor was it conducive to the relaxation of tensions in the Asian-Pacific region. The Soviet Union drew Japan's attention to this fact. Moreover, in full conformity with the provisions of its peaceable foreign policy, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to take steps to improve relations provided Tokyo also opted for peace and neighbourliness. It should be pointed out that the Japanese leaders seem to have realised that continuing to pursue the policy of confrontation would lead nowhere, and began to realise the need to extricate its relations with the Soviet Union from the state of stagnation they were in. More and more often high-ranking Japanese officials made statements emphasising the need to place relations with the Soviet Union on at least an even keel, and stressing the importance of bolstering and expanding dialogue with the USSR in order to make bilateral ties stable and fruitful. In addition, most sober-thinking politicians in Tokyo were well aware that the absence of normal broad ties with the Soviet Union and the lack of political dialogue could hardly contribute to the international prestige of Japan, which was increasingly subjected to criticism even by Western countries for its total orientation towards the US.

1984 and 1985 saw a slight revitalisation in bilateral ties. The parliamentary exchanges were resumed, the trade and economic ties were invigorated, and the cultural exchange was expanded. All this has paved the way for a general qualitative improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, provided there is good will and mutual interest (and this is the only approach capable of furthering the development of relations).

Of paramount significance was the conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Yasuhiro Nakasone, Prime Minister of Japan, on March 14, 1985 in Moscow. During the meeting Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised that the Soviet Union is ready to develop mutually beneficial ties with Japan in various areas, and favours neighbourly relations between the two countries.¹ Of course, the above-mentioned changes have not come about by accident. A move forward, rather than stagnation or retreat, should be the natural state of affairs for Soviet-Japanese relations and determine their development. This is dictated by a number of objective factors, including geographic proximity, the mutually supplementary nature of the structure of the Soviet and Japanese economies, the two countries' great interest in each other's life and culture, and many others. Today, in the nuclear age, when the thoughts of all honest people on earth are directed towards creating an insurmountable obstacle to a destructive war, there is yet another extremely important factor determining the need for broader cooperation between the Soviet and Japanese peoples. It is linked with the task of bringing all peaceable states and peoples together in the struggle for peace, international security and the elimination of the most lethal of arms.

A comprehension of these factors, which are both bilateral and global in nature and testify not only to the expediency but also to the need to build Soviet-Japanese relations on the basis of peace and neighbourliness, are of great importance in evaluating the prospects for ties between the two countries. Some people in Japan try to justify or, at least, explain the cooling in bilateral relations that set in early in the 1980s by saying that the general worsening in the international situation could not help but affect Soviet-Japanese relations. We do not challenge the thesis that

¹ See *Pravda*, March 15, 1985.

the situation in the world and the level of ties between individual states are interrelated: no country can "fence itself off" from international developments. Soviet-Japanese relations are unquestionably influenced by the world situation. However, they themselves can, to the same degree, have a truly constructive influence on the world situation in the interests of the two countries. This can only be achieved through progress, which lays the foundation for interaction on a broader spectrum of issues, including those relating to the most urgent international questions. It is self-evident that such a joint contribution by the USSR and Japan to the improvement of the world situation would be properly assessed by all the peoples.

The official visit to Japan of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on January 15-19, 1986, became a milestone in the development of the Soviet-Japanese relations and the search for ways of bringing about serious improvements in them. In the course of the visit detailed talks were held between Eduard Shevardnadze and the Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, leaders of the most important political parties, prominent businessmen and civic leaders. A number of Soviet-Japanese agreements providing for broader cooperation and exchanges in various areas were signed.

It is indicative that the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister to Japan began on January 15, 1986, when a Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev containing fundamentally new, major initiatives opening the way to eliminate nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction was published in Moscow. The Soviet proposals, which attracted great interest in Japan determined the tone and to a large extent the very subject of the negotiations.

During his press conference at the Japanese Journalists Club in Tokyo on January 19, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister outlined results of his visit to Japan and stated: "Of positive significance, above all, is the very fact of the resumption of the political dialogue which, the two sides have firmly agreed, will be continued."² The visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe to the Soviet Union on May 29-31, 1986, served as just such a continuation. In the course of negotiations the two sides noted their mutual interest in the further development of Soviet-Japanese relations, and their joint quest for greater mutual understanding and interaction in the interests of the peoples of the two countries, and in the interests of the security of the Asian-Pacific region. Soviet-Japanese ties were enriched by a new, cultural agreement. In addition, it proved possible to find common ground in the two countries' approaches to specific issues, which are of particular interest to Japan, and to agree on developing commercial, economic, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges. The Japanese invitation to Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Japan and the Soviet invitation to the Prime Minister of Japan to visit the Soviet Union demonstrate both countries' urge to expand further the political dialogue at the highest level. Thus, the exchange of summit visits was put on the agenda.

The Soviet Union sincerely wishes to see an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations and the signs of such a change can be seen of late. The potential of ties is extremely broad, and only by actively working for its full realisation can relations between the USSR and Japan truly be made neighbourly. What are the most promising and important directions relations can take to produce the tangible results needed by the peoples of the two countries?

The most important one is linked with the progress of a constructive dialogue on the problems of war and peace, and interaction in order to

² *New Times*, 1986, No. 5.

eliminate the danger of nuclear destruction now threatening the planet. It is absolutely clear that on this vital issue the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Japan cannot but coincide. The broad response given the Soviet programme of disarmament by the Japanese public and politicians vividly testifies to this. The enormity of the task of delivering mankind from nuclear arms is understood by the people of Japan, the country which experienced the horrors of atomic bombing. The Soviet Union, too, is ready to cooperate with Japan in promoting progress of the noble task of nuclear disarmament and the buttressing of the security of nations. In addressing the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "The Soviet programme to build a world without nuclear and other types of weapons by the end of this century is meant for everyone because no one can remain indifferent in the face of the common threat. We make our appeal to Japan, too".³

It should be pointed out in this connection that the regular meetings between the foreign ministers of the USSR and Japan at the sessions of the UN General Assembly play an important role in the exchange of opinion between the governments of the two countries on the most pressing international issues. Such a meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and T. Kuranari, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, was held in New York in September 1986.

Of course, the approach the Japanese leaders take to global problems is far from simple. Some of Tokyo's actions in the international arena give rise to justifiable apprehensions not only in Japan itself but outside it as well. This is particularly true of the recent decision by the Japanese government to participate in SDI, an openly militaristic programme. Clearly, the decision to join the US in Star Wars plans cannot but have an effect on how Japan's foreign policy intentions are seen, and on Soviet-Japanese relations. The statement made in this connection to the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR by the Soviet Foreign Ministry notes that such step cannot but be regarded as evidence of Japan's further involvement in US military strategic plans. At the same time, the Soviet side expressed the hope that Japan would draw practical conclusions which would confirm the statements it has made in favour of strengthening peace and limiting the arms race.⁴

There is no doubt that if Japan is interested in consolidating peace and security in its own region as well as in others, it will be able significantly to contribute to improving the international situation, a contribution which will be in accordance with its economic and political potential. The Soviet Union is ready for a dialogue with Japan on a broad range of Asian and Pacific problems. The initiatives aimed to ensure international security and peaceful cooperation in that vast area of the world put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, serve as a good basis for such a dialogue. The comprehensive programme of action aimed at including the Asian-Pacific region in the process of creating an all-embracing system of international security is a most topical item for a useful and imperative exchange of opinion between the USSR and Japan. This dialogue has the aim of promoting efforts towards discontinuing the spread and build-up of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific, restricting the activities of naval forces, limiting armed forces and conventional arms, discussing confidence-building measures and, finally, convening a conference of Pacific countries, like that held in Helsinki over a decade ago. Given their weight and influence in the region, the USSR and Japan could do a great deal towards furthering these aims.

In its turn, Tokyo has stated its readiness to expand the exchange of

³ *Pravda*, Feb. 13, 1986.

⁴ See *Pravda*, Sept. 12, 1986.

opinion with the Soviet Union on Asian problems. The need for such contacts is self-evident as the problem of ensuring security and bolstering cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region affects all countries concerned without exception. As for Japan, within its system of foreign policy priorities it places special emphasis on enlivening its Asian diplomacy, and standing apart while the other countries in the region move towards a durable peace would hardly suit its purposes. However, with regard to idea of jointly working out comprehensive solutions that will consolidate security in the Asian-Pacific region and of convoking a special conference, Japanese officials often make certain reservations; without rejecting the idea outright they claim that it is not feasible for a number of reasons. Here they make use of the theory concerning the allegedly destabilising influence of the "Soviet military build-up", although those who promote this "theory", apparently realise the glaring inconsistency between the claims made about the "Soviet threat" and the real military-strategic situation in region. Moreover, while insistently advising the Soviet Union to eliminate various types of armaments from the eastern portion of the country, they do not demand that the US destroy the corresponding types of weapons they possess, including those pointed at the USSR from the territory of Japan and its coastal waters.

A question arises: if obsolete stereotypes are discarded, what can Japan find that is unacceptable in the common quest to lay the foundations for security in the region? In its proposals the Soviet Union works for joint effort to achieve common aims, for cooperation and full respect for the right of each people to live as it chooses and solve its problems as it sees fit. In the course of discussions—both bilateral and multilateral—the existent framework may be augmented, and promising new concepts may emerge. It would not be out of place to recollect in this connection the "pancha shila" principles of peaceful coexistence and the ten Bandung principles, for in creating them the Asian countries laid the basis for future work. As is well known, Japan was a participant in the Bandung Conference (1955) and approved its documents. Today, 30-odd years after the Bandung forum, it could make a weighty contribution towards strengthening Asian security. In particular, the "non-nuclear principles" proclaimed by the Japanese government—not to possess nuclear weapons, not to manufacture them and not to deploy them on its territory—could win world acclaim and serve as an example for many other countries, of course, if the world is convinced that Japan strictly abides by them.

Thus, there are a number of lines along which a constructive dialogue between the USSR and Japan can be conducted. This in turn shows how promising the efforts being made in the name of better mutual understanding and broadening the sphere of interaction are.

All this does not relate to the political sphere of Soviet-Japanese relations alone. Events have shown that a great potential for accelerated development of trade and economic ties between the two countries exists. At the present time, however, this potential is not fully exploited. This fact cannot be explained by the restructuring of Japanese industry, to which Tokyo sometimes refers, because similar processes are under way in other countries, including the Soviet Union. It is vital that relations in this sphere become more stable, diverse, extensive and invulnerable to the influence of time-serving factors. Efforts by both sides, based on the principles of equality and equal interest in broadening mutually beneficial cooperation hold the key to expanding these ties. No other approach is possible in this case.

The Soviet Union believes that the signing of an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation and the development of a long-term concrete programme on the basis of those principles will play an important

part in stabilising and consolidating bilateral ties. Corresponding proposals have been made at the meetings with Japanese representatives but Tokyo has so far refrained from giving a positive answer. Of course, the Soviet Union has no intention of imposing its will but that both sides will derive a tangible benefit from a possible conclusion of the above-mentioned agreement is evident. Moreover, this is confirmed by the history of implementing similar agreements between the Soviet Union and a number of West European countries.

It is necessary to emphasise the importance of several Soviet-Japanese agreements signed recently on a number of issues pertaining to trade. For example, the foreign ministers of the two countries reaffirmed their countries' desire to promote a further broadening of mutually advantageous commercial and economic ties between the USSR and Japan. The contractual basis of these relations has been reinforced and the corresponding documents—the Agreement on Trade Turnover and Payments for the Period from 1986 to 1990 and the Convention on Averting Double Taxation relating to income taxes—have been signed. The level of annual intergovernmental consultations on trade and economic issues has been raised. One such series of consultations was held between the USSR Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade and Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister in Moscow in March 1986.

The 10th Joint Conference of the Soviet-Japanese and the Japanese-Soviet Committees on Economic Cooperation, which were set up back in the 1960s, was held in Moscow in April 1986. It also demonstrated great interest both parties have in extending business ties. The big number of the members of the Japanese delegation—about 250 heads of leading companies came to Moscow—also testifies to the interest the Japanese business community has in developing mutually beneficial ties with the USSR. The quest for new forms for cooperation, as well as for ways of enhancing their effectiveness was the main question addressed to the Conference. Other useful steps have been taken, including the Japanese Industrial Fair which was held in Moscow in October 1986.

The Soviet Union takes a constructive approach to the development of economic cooperation with Japan. In his Vladivostok speech Mikhail Gorbachev specified directions this cooperation might take in the future. Of mutual interest is economic cooperation primarily in the littoral areas. The question of setting up joint enterprises in the adjacent areas of the USSR and Japan can also be discussed. The study and comprehensive utilisation of the ocean's untapped resources are a promising area of long-term cooperation as are joint programmes for the peaceful exploration of outer space.

The achievement of the agreement to strengthen cooperation in the scientific and technological sphere was an important moment in the history of ties between the Soviet and Japanese governments. Gury Marchuk, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology, visited Japan in September 1986. The Soviet-Japanese Intergovernmental Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation resumed its sittings after a break of many years: in September 1986 that Commission held its 3rd Session at which it discussed the specific forms ties might take, the expansion of advanced technology exchanges, the strengthening of contacts between scientists from the two countries and improving cooperation in fundamental research. The useful nature of these positive developments is beyond doubt because the two countries, each of which has attained a high scientific and technological level can learn much from one another. In this age of scientific and technological revolution contacts between Soviet and Japanese organisations, research centres and scientists could substantially

help to reveal promising new forms and directions of cooperation for the benefit of Soviets and Japanese peoples, and humankind as a whole.

A qualitatively fresh impetus was given to the development of Soviet-Japanese cultural ties, which are always advancing due to the great interest the peoples of the two countries display in each other's cultural heritage. An agreement on cultural ties between the governments of the USSR and Japan was signed in Moscow in May 1986. It provides for the further expansion of cooperation in that sphere: exhibitions, the exchange of publications, and a number of other measures designed to deepen mutual understanding and confidence between the peoples of the USSR and Japan.

It should be stressed, however, that the Soviet and the Japanese governments take differing stands on quite a number of problems affecting bilateral relations. In particular, this pertains to the problem of strengthening the contractual basis of relations. Today the positions of the two parties concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty do not coincide, as Japan is quick to point out. In view of this, the Soviet side proposed back in 1978 that a treaty on neighbourliness and cooperation be concluded, which, without replacing a peace treaty, would provide the necessary basis for those spheres of relations which are ready for it. This idea could hardly be called unconstructive, but Tokyo failed to respond positively to the Soviet proposal. Moreover, while insisting that a peace treaty must come first, the Japanese side makes the satisfaction of its illegal territorial claims on the USSR a *sine qua non* of such a treaty. In this connection the Soviet side has made it absolutely clear that, while favouring a peace treaty, the Soviet Union is against weighing it down with problems which were solved as a result of World War II. The USSR adheres to the principle of inviolability of borders, and the latter which have evolved between our two states are a historical fact. That is why the existing realities must be accepted if an improvement in relations is desired.

However, the above-mentioned differences should not be over-dramatised. At present the task facing the two sides is to move forward step-by-step, achieving tangible progress in those spheres where it seems possible. A good basis for this has already been laid down. However, it is quite clear that the existing opportunities can be implemented only if both sides make the effort, and much here will depend on the Japanese side, and in particular on how consistent it will be in its readiness to take effective steps to further relations.

The Soviet Union would like to view the future of relations with Japan with optimism. As Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised: "The objective position of our two countries in the world is such that it demands profound cooperation on a sound realistic basis, in a tranquil atmosphere unburdened by the problems of the past."⁵

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⁵ *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

SINO-U.S., SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ANALYZED, CONTRASTED

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 86 (signed to press 20 Nov 86) pp 45-57

[Article by B.N. Zanegin, doctor of historical sciences: "American Imperialism and China"]

[Text] The date of 28 August 1984 marked 200 years since the day that the first American trading ship, the "Empress of China," arrived in the southern Chinese port of Quanzhou. This event is usually considered the beginning of direct contacts between the United States and China. On the eve of his visit to Beijing in April 1984, President Reagan showed perceptible interest in this event, stating in an interview with Chinese journalists in the White House that "friendship between our two peoples has an old history. It originated 200 years ago when an American clipper entered China and the development of trade began." Dealing with this subject in a number of other speeches, the President invariably strove to represent American-Chinese relations during this relatively long interval of time in a rosy light, thereby making a personal contribution to the attempts by a certain section of current American historiography and sociopolitical journalism to whitewash Washington's "Chinese" policy. In practice, American-Chinese relations were distinguished by complications and ambivalence. According to the assessment of certain American historians who by no means belong to the "revisionist" school, arrogance, contempt, distrust, and open hostility largely prevailed in the American side's approach toward China.¹ However, even this description of the U.S. "Chinese" policy seems to be an embellishment if one bears in mind the attitude of U.S. ruling circles toward revolutionary China; that is, if one focuses on the period that began at the end of the 19th century, distinguished in world history by the formation of imperialism, which encouraged a powerful upsurge for national liberation and a generally revolutionary movement that in China specifically concluded with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. In this regard one must frankly say that revolutionary China had no enemy more consistent, intransigent, and brutal than U.S. imperialism. And this comes as no surprise: "Imperialism is an age of financial capital and monopolies, which bring everywhere a striving not for freedom, but for domination. The result of these trends is reaction all along the line and under all political systems and also an extreme exacerbation of contradictions in this sphere. National oppression and the striving for annexations--that is, for violations of national independence--are also

particularly exacerbated (because annexation is nothing more than a violation of the self-determination of nations)."² V.I. Lenin described the policy of imperialism in this way and although the American foreign policy strategy in China differed in certain features from that of other colonial powers, its social nature, exploitative goals, and reactionary essence were invariably determined by the imperialist aspirations of U.S. ruling circles.

In other words, it is not legitimate to abstractly view and assess the U.S. attitude toward China in general. What is substantive and relevant is the stance of the American ruling circles concerning the new, reborn, and revolutionary China.

The chronicle of the actions of American imperialism, from active involvement in crushing the people's uprisings of the Taipings (1864) and the Boxers (1900) to attempts to suffocate the People's Republic of China with the noose of an economic blockade and with the policy of "containment and isolation," has been well studied.³ It is natural that no apologetic phraseology, whether it is prescribed by far-reaching plans or considerations of the moment, can erase this cardinal fact in the history of American-Chinese relations. To no less a degree than in any other period, this is confirmed by an analysis of the Reagan Administration's "Chinese" policy, which represents the most militant circles of American imperialism. Not confining themselves to preaching the idea of social revanche, these circles see their task in the international arena as the utmost activation of world reaction for the struggle against the forces of socialism and progress in all corners of the earth, no matter where it develops. Socialist China is no exception in this sense, although, of course, the specific tasks of U.S. foreign policy and methods of diplomacy are given concrete expression in light of the current features of American-Chinese relations.

During the detente between the West and East, a concept was widespread within the U.S. foreign policy establishment based on the premise that centrifugal trends were predominating in world politics at that time, which reflected a weakening of ties between "centers of power" and partner countries, and that a process of the shaping of a "multipolar" world was under way. The authors of this scenario recommended that U.S. ruling circles abandon a harsh confrontational course in favor of a flexible combinational policy in the spirit of the traditional American concept of a "balance of forces" and help to establish the "autonomy" of states which, according to their foreign policy precepts, could be useful to Washington in maintaining the international balance that it required. In this sense the attention of American theoreticians and politicians was drawn to the Chinese Government's foreign policy stance that developed in the 1960's and 1970's toward confrontation with the Soviet Union, which according to the notions of American reaction, personified "the main communist danger," the "evil empire." Having borrowed this concept from the liberals and furnished it with certain conservative characteristics, the Nixon-Kissinger administration made it the basis of its "new foreign policy strategy." Having been bogged down in the "dirty" war against the Vietnamese people, whose main goal was the "containment of communism," American reaction waited for confirmation of its assumptions. The armed conflict on the Soviet-Chinese border in March 1969 dispelled the last doubts.

As H. Kissinger notes in his memoirs, up to that period American-Chinese relations were at a deadlock. "The new administration," he writes, "had motives, but there was not yet a strategy for the Chinese direction.... The opportunity arose when Soviet and Chinese troops clashed in the cold Siberian tundra by a river whose name none of us had ever heard. Ambiguity disappeared from that moment, and we unhesitatingly moved toward a most important change in global diplomacy."⁴ For the Nixon Administration the normalization of relations with the PRC was primarily of current significance. In the opportunities opening up in the Chinese direction it saw a means of solving the most acute problem of the time--a way out of the Vietnamese deadlock. However, as the ruling elite in Washington assessed all the aspects of the disproportion that arose between the U.S. foreign policy course and the new international realities and as new geopolitical bases of foreign policy strategy developed, relations with the PRC acquired long-term significance for the weakening international positions of the United States.

The geopolitical speculations of H. Kissinger, which served as the basis for the myth of a "deideologization" of states' foreign policies, made a noticeable impact on the development of American political thought in this direction. Rejecting, in particular, the social determination of the PRC Government's foreign policy or assigning it a secondary role, supporters of "geometric" schemes in international relations reduced the motives of the Chinese side to a guarantee of maneuverability within the U.S.-PRC-USSR "triangle." Explaining the complications in Sino-Soviet relations by geopolitical constants and, on this basis, predicting the stability of their conflictive nature, American political thought held that within the current "triangular" situation, the Chinese side's interest in American guarantees of security was inevitable. The conclusion was made from this premise that Beijing was more interested than Washington in the development of American-Chinese relations and, therefore, the United States had no need to accommodate its Chinese partner too much. Moreover, as the practical experience of recent years has shown, it seems that Washington is convinced that for this reason the Chinese side will for a long time, if not forever, have to abandon a number of its national goals, particularly the restoration of sovereignty over Taiwan. In this regard, in their forecasts and recommendations, the supporters of the geopolitical concept proceed on the basis of the notions that American diplomacy supposedly possesses key levers to influence the foreign policy course of the Chinese Government. It is supposed that given certain common "geopolitical interests," it is enough to provide some advantages to the Chinese side (the sale of certain modern equipment or weapons, and so on) so as to force the PRC to play a role in international relations that is desired by the United States. From that time the category of a "Chinese factor" ("Chinese card") appeared in the American political lexicon, which reflected the notion of China as a convenient target for the foreign policy combinations in world politics being planned in Washington. All American administrations have proceeded on the basis of this notion; in this sense, the current U.S. administration is also no exception.

However, the situation within the framework of USSR-PRC-U.S. relations did not remain stable. The activation of the struggle of U.S. reactionary forces against detente with the East and the whipping up of anti-Sovietism have not

only complicated American-Soviet relations, but have also prompted the American reaction toward quests for international reserves of anti-Sovietism. An exponent of this trend was the Carter Administration (1976-80), in which the President's national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski, actively developed the anti-Soviet concept. Taking into account the slogan of organizing a united anti-Soviet front, which was put forward in Beijing at that time, it departed from the combinational ("equidistant") policy of Nixon toward an attempt to establish a coalition with the PRC as part of the policy of "containing" the Soviet Union.

On the part of the PRC side, the process went in a reverse direction--in a direction of a more considered foreign policy line. "Strategic"--that is, long-term global political--motives began to be supplemented, then largely replaced by the PRC's interest in economic, scientific-technological, and cultural ties with the United States aimed at accelerating the country's modernization. As a result, the mutual inclination toward "strategic" partnership gave way to unilateral attempts by the United States to involve the PRC in active confrontation with the Soviet Union, to which the Chinese leadership began reacting negatively. At the end of the presidency of J. Carter--namely, during the visit to the PRC by Defense Secretary H. Brown, at which point it seemed to the American leaders that the broadest prospects were opening up for American-Chinese partnership on an anti-Soviet basis--differences in the strategic outlooks of the sides made their presence felt for the first time. As M. Oksenberg, specialist on the problems of China in the U.S. National Security Council, writes, it was precisely at this time that the "Chinese reached the conclusion that the galvanization of Soviet-American tension did not necessarily correspond to China's interests: It could accidentally involve China in an undesirable conflict. In short, the Soviet action in Afghanistan reminded the Chinese of the risk of the PRC's indentifying too closely with the United States."⁵

This line was reflected later in PRC political statements and in sociopolitical literature. In particular, well-known Chinese political figure and scientist Huan Xiang wrote in one of his works pertaining to 1983: "Relations between such states as China and the United States must have their own importance and their own logic. The development of relations between China and the United States will be of major benefit to the progress of the economy and culture of both countries. The continuous development and strengthening of these relations creates favorable conditions for peace and prosperity throughout the world. Herein lie the long-term interests of both countries."⁶

This position was expressed even more definitely by Zhao Ziyang, premier of the PRC State Council, in an interview published in the LOS ANGELES TIMES in May 1984: "Unquestionably, we (the PRC and the United States--B. Zanev) have common interests in the sphere of security because of the threat from our neighbor and fears in the United States concerning the expansion of the Russians. However," Zhao Ziyang stressed, "this is not a sufficiently reliable basis for long-term relations. The true basis for our relations lies in the sphere of economics, technology, education, and culture...."

The signs of changes in China's international position that appeared at the beginning of the 1980's were reflected in the directives of the 12th CCP

Congress (September 1982). Its materials stressed the CCP's loyalty to the ideas of socialism and pointed out the interrelationship between economic reforms, foreign economic policy, and the program of national modernization as a whole; it also pointed out the plans of socialist construction in the country and the correlation of domestic and foreign policy (ensuring peaceful international conditions for the country's modernization), stressed the independence of PRC foreign policy from the two "superpowers," and emphasized the importance of developing countries in the cause of strengthening the PRC's international position. The congress materials and subsequent political documents no longer put forward the task of forming a "united international front" against the Soviet Union. Moreover, desires began to be voiced about the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

All these directives were reflected with increasing definiteness in the PRC's international position and in the foreign policy practice of the Chinese Government. On this basis there were open differences in the PRC and U.S. foreign policy stances on a number of international problems (the Middle East, South Africa, South Korea, the entry of U.S. Navy ships carrying nuclear weapons into New Zealand ports, the militarization of outer space, and others). The Chinese mass media began to criticize more widely and sharply American capitalism and U.S. foreign policy; in particular, the American aggression against Grenada and then against Libya were denounced. At the same time, beginning with the documents of the 12th CCP Congress, in the form of political statements, in foreign policy propaganda, and in the content of mass demonstrations, a critical attitude began to develop in the PRC toward the militarist course of Japan. The opposition to the militarization of Japan and the revanchist actions of Prime Minister Y. Nakasone (the visit to the Yakusuni shrine) primarily draws attention. By the middle of the 1980's criticism intensified of Tokyo's trade policy, which resulted in China's deficit reaching 6 billion dollars. The Japanese side is accused of being unwilling to make purchases in the PRC, to provide China with the necessary technology, and to invest capital in the Chinese economy (Japan's exports to the PRC are approaching one-fourth of the Chinese foreign trade turnover, while capital investments in mixed enterprises are a little over 5 percent of all foreign capital investments this year).

In accordance with the directives of the 12th CCP Congress, the CCP Central Committee began the process of normalizing relations with communist parties, having resumed contacts with, in particular, the communist parties of France, Italy, Great Britain, Brazil, and others.

Finally, the Chinese responded to the initiatives of the Soviet Union with practical measures, having begun political dialogue and the simultaneous development of mutually beneficial business relations in the sphere of economics, science, culture, and education.

Taking into account the strategic position and international role of the PRC, the specific stance adopted by the Chinese Government after the 12th CCP Congress has had a substantial, although not always obvious impact on American-Chinese relations. Having taken the course toward firmly establishing independence in the foreign policy sphere, the Chinese Government began

eliminating the disproportion in its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, which goes against the plans of American reactionary circles to use the "Chinese factor" in the interests of imperialist strategy. This circumstance deprives the prospect of China's relations with the United States of certainty: American ruling circles, who have not yet, it seems, completed their evolution to the right, are following carefully and disapprovingly the changes in the ideological and political stances of the Chinese leadership.

Here, however, it should be pointed out that certain incentives for interaction in the political ("strategic") sphere continue to operate. From the American angle these incentives are determined by the imperialist nature of U.S. foreign policy and its orientation against the revolutionary and progressive forces of the contemporary world, primarily against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Chinese leadership, having withdrawn the appeal to form a united anti-Soviet front, also continues to adopt positions on certain international problems (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Japan's territorial claims on the USSR), which objectively help to fulfill the foreign policy goals of American and world imperialist reaction. It is precisely this circumstance that brought about the fact that the rightwing conservative forces, which came to power in the United States and which treat people's China with mistrust and hostility, took the step of developing cooperation with this country in an attempt to maintain relations with the PRC at a "strategic" level.

From the middle of the 1970's, as the American anticommunist reaction consolidated, the concessions to liberalism made in the sphere of foreign policy by President Nixon and his supporters became unacceptable and U.S. foreign policy came under the ever-increasing influence of a conservative concept that reflected the views of militant imperialist circles. The national psychological stress produced by these events, such as the defeat in the war against the Vietnamese people, the fall of the pro-American regime in Iran, and the loss of superiority over the Soviet Union in the strategic sphere, accelerated the return by U.S. ruling circles to traditional conservative postulates, which restored the messianic-hegemonistic stereotypes of U.S. behavior in the world arena.⁷ In this regard it is necessary to stress the phenomenon already noted in Soviet literature--that the conservative leaders of present-day America single out ideological aspects as a factor determining the nature of international relations. All international situations are viewed through the prism of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁸ Proceeding on the basis of notions that detente between the East and West was an anomaly which became possible as a result of supposedly invalid concessions to the Soviet side, the supporters of this concept, which are represented by the Reagan Administration, see the task of U.S. foreign policy as building up American military might, as the struggle for the capitalist orientation of developing states, as the binding of nonaligned countries to imperialist blocs, and as establishing American control over the world's raw material resources. Measures designed to break the strategic parity are accompanied by attempts to weaken the opposing camp by applying various forms of pressure, imposing the arms race, utilizing differences, uniting anticommunist forces, and exploiting anti-Soviet prejudices. Against the general backdrop of a growth in the

aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism, U.S. ruling circles are paying increasing attention to the Pacific region, which in accordance with the rightwing conservative tradition is defined as a most important regional foreign policy orientation, equal in importance to the North Atlantic orientation. In this regard the policy in the Asian-Pacific region, which was based on the Nixon doctrine, has been replaced in recent years by the precept of developing all elements of the political and power structure, which is designed to ensure absolute U.S. domination there.

Under the influence of conservatism, the nature of American diplomacy has also changed. The policy of building up military capabilities is consolidating the superiority complex natural for conservatives, which in turn entails a disdainful attitude toward the interests of allies and fellow travelers, the transformation of inequality into a norm of interstate relations, the shaping of patently exaggerated notions of the possibilities of American diplomacy, and a loss of realism in the assessing of partners. This context also shapes the Reagan Administration's "Chinese" policy.

The Reagan Administration has maintained the general concept of the U.S. "Chinese" policy worked out by its predecessors, namely the notion of the possibility of using the "Chinese" factor for American interests. At the same time, certain changes have been made in the approach to relations with the PRC: The "deideologized" policy of Nixon-Kissinger, with its task of introducing the "Chinese factor" in the trinomial equation of American-Soviet detente, did not correspond to the rightwing conservative postulates of the Reagan Administration. The precept of the Carter-Brzezinski strategy to develop "quasi-ally" relations with the PRC by renouncing the retention of Taiwan within the sphere of U.S. strategic interests and ending military-political support to the Kuomintang regime there also turned out to be useless.

One of the essential features of the formation of the U.S. "Chinese" policy at the end of the 1970's and the start of the 1980's was the return to active political life by the conservative grouping, whose views are genetically connected with the foundations of the "Chinese" policy of Truman and Dulles. The frontal offensive by reaction in U.S. sociopolitical life drew anti-communist dogmatists, opponents of "Chinese communism," former diplomatic and military functionaries of "detering and isolating" China, and former activists of the "Chinese lobby" into the foreign policy decisionmaking process. In the conditions which had arisen they began to exert a noticeable influence on the Reagan Administration's approach to relations with the PRC. Without completely abandoning the idea of making use of the "Chinese factor," this section of the U.S. ruling grouping continued to hold its former position as regards its approach to the PRC as primarily a "communist country," hostile to the system of values and way of life of the "free world" and to the anti-communist aims of American reaction. Together with ideological considerations, the incompatibility of the interests of the United States and the PRC in the Pacific basin is pointed out, as is the potential military threat to the United States and to its allies, particularly in connection with the PRC's possession of nuclear missiles. This group's uncompromising position on the Taiwan question is determined by ideological and strategic reasons.

The political line based on such arguments calls for the preservation of a clear ideological position on "Chinese communism" and not simply the maintenance of close ties with the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan, but also continued American control over the island as an indispensable condition for maintaining relations with the PRC. In essence, this system of views provides for the preservation of the basic features of the policy of "detering" the PRC as part of the broad strategy of "detering communism."

Among the most striking representatives of American militant reaction is President Reagan himself, whose political views on the outside world were formed in the 1950's, during the period of McCarthyism's struggle against the liberal "appeasers of Chinese communism." Being more dependent than any other president on the arrangement of domestic political forces, R. Reagan was forced to pay attention to the standpoint of supporters of active utilization of the "Chinese factor," who had gathered strength in Washington during the terms of the Nixon and Carter administrations. Thus arose a paradoxical situation where Washington's official "Chinese" policy combines two essentially incompatible lines--that of maintaining and developing relations with "communist China" and with the anticommunist regime in Taiwan.

The Reagan Administration did not even attempt to overcome the rightwing conservatives' inherent anticommunist suspicion of "Red China," which in fact received additional impetus as a result of the changes which the 12th CCP Congress made in the PRC's international position. At the same time, complete ideological and political loyalty to the Kuomintang was maintained, and the Taiwanese component of Washington's "Chinese" policy was subordinated to the task of keeping the island under American influence.

In connection with this, having established Japan's status as the principal U.S. ally in the Asian-Pacific region, the Reagan Administration somewhat lowered the strategic significance of relations with the PRC and made them dependent on the Chinese leadership's readiness to accept as a condition the continuation of specific "unofficial" relations with the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan, including guarantees of the island's "security" which were fixed by American legislation, arms supplies, economic cooperation, and so on.

This is the cause of the dual nature of the present administration's "Chinese" policy. Afraid to "lose" China again, but reluctant to renounce Taiwan, Washington has demonstrated a readiness to supplement its business (economic and scientific) cooperation with the PRC through the intensification of China's military potential, agreeing to supply certain types of military equipment, technology, and weapons and motivating the Chinese side to display an interest in such possibilities in the hope that it will adopt an understanding attitude toward the Taiwanese question and revive an interest in the strategic aspects of Sino-American relations.

Reagan has formulated the general direction of his "Chinese" policy in messages to Chinese leaders. To be specific, in a letter of 5 April 1982 to Deng Xiaoping, R. Reagan wrote: "I am addressing you because it seems important for the leadership of both our countries to renew the broad forward advance to which you have made such an important contribution. This is

especially important today, when we are facing a growing threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites all over the world. Although our interests and, thus, our political lines do not correspond, your nation and mine come up against unconcealed and direct aggression in Afghanistan and Iran, in Southeast Asia and in my own hemisphere, and in the sphere of nuclear weapons, and this must move us to seek firm foundations for cooperation." In a message to Hu Yaobang of 10 May of the same year, Reagan again called on the Chinese leadership to develop its relations with the United States on an anti-Soviet basis, specifying that what was involved was not only bilateral ties, but also the deepening of "strategic cooperation."⁹

As it appears from an analysis of political statements by American leaders, the goals of Washington's current strategy in the Chinese area are to convince the Chinese leadership to postpone the solution of the Taiwan problem indefinitely and to make a full return to the idea of a "united anti-Soviet front," or at least to set in motion "parallel" activity at points where "strategic interests" coincide. American diplomacy also strives to forestall the development of lines in the PRC's foreign policy which it assesses as unfavorable for U.S. interests. It is above all from this that the task of hindering the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations arises. Washington especially fears that even in the course of this, the "strategic" component which still exists in the relations between the United States and the PRC and which provides the basic sense of American policy of assisting China's industrial, scientific-technological, and--especially importantly--military development, will be eroded. Substantial significance is also attached to making the Chinese side renounce its approach to the United States as a "superpower" pursuing a hegemonist course and to preventing the PRC's policy from interfering with American policy in developing countries. Speaking recently at the American National Council for Promoting Sino-U.S. Trade, W. Lord, the present ambassador to the PRC, stated without diplomatic equivocation that the American side does not like it when the United States is put on a level with the Soviet Union as a source of world evils. W. Lord attempted to intimidate the PRC by stating that when it acts in this way, it is placing in doubt the prospects for bilateral relations with the United States. He reproached the PRC for criticizing American policy in developing countries. "It may be the China's main audience is the Third World, but the American people and our Congress are also listening attentively," he stressed meaningfully. The ambassador went on to explain how the Chinese side could win the favor of the United States. He advised it to lower the cost of housing and administrative accommodation for foreign businessmen in China, to lower the duty on imported equipment for foreign entrepreneurs, to bring Chinese statistics into line with American ones, to reduce exports of Chinese textiles to the United States, not to quarrel with Japan, to adhere to parallelism with the United States in its approach to a number of international problems, to support the American military presence in Asia, not to object to American-Taiwanese ties.... Judging by everything, the present ruling bosses in Washington consider these goals attainable.

The American side is counting on making use of China's acute interest in developing constructive relations with the United States in order to accelerate the development of its national economy, science, and education, as an

effective channel for direct and swift influence over the Chinese Government's policy. By providing various privileges, by using promises for manipulation, and by revealing various prospects, Washington strives to maintain and develop the Chinese side's interest in cooperation with the United States and the capitalist West, with the aim of gaining concrete political concessions from Beijing. By binding the PRC with a system of "common interests," economic dependence, and at least fragmentary "strategic" cooperation, the United States proposes to create conditions for manipulating the "Chinese factor" in world politics.

However, some American interpreters of Chinese activity go further, deriving prospects for a Sino-American alliance and a radical change in the correlation of world forces to the advantage of imperialism from the possibility of not only a political, but also a socioeconomic rapprochement between the Chinese social system and the capitalist West. In this connection, as well as largely tactical plans for the use of economic levers to influence the PRC's foreign policy in a direction congenial to the United States, it is longer-term and essentially strategic considerations which give rise to the attention which American political circles pay to business cooperation with the PRC. Certain influential representatives of bourgeois political thought attempt to interpret the economic experiments in the PRC (in particular, a certain expansion of opportunities for private enterprise, and also the admittance of foreign capital into the Chinese economy) as a "turn toward capitalism," and they argue the possibility and even probability of convergence--the gradual transformation of "market socialism" into capitalism.

This idea, which is alluring for the ideologists of capitalism, has been taken up in the U.S. foreign policy mechanism and is used to lend a purposeful nature to "economic diplomacy" in the Chinese sector. By expanding its ties with the PRC on a considerable scale, especially through exports of commodities, capital, and technologies to the Chinese market, American diplomacy intends to gradually draw China into the system of capitalism's world economic ties, to make China's national economy dependent on the capitalist market, to expand the field of activity of transnational monopolies in China, and to promote the development of a private capitalist structure through economic measures and by means of political pressure and the spread of bourgeois psychology and ideology, with the final goal of eroding socialism and turning China into a reserve of world capitalism.

At the beginning of 1986 American interests in the PRC were characterized by the following data: Commodity turnover amounted to about 8 billion dollars, or 10.8 percent of the PRC's foreign trade; U.S. capital investments reached 2.1 billion dollars, taking second place after Hong Kong. The PRC only occupies 16th place among U.S. trading partners. According to the information of the American ambassador in Beijing, there are branches of 250 American firms operating in the PRC. When one takes into account the scale of the economic organisms of the PRC and the United States, the volume of economic interaction does not seem significant at all, but U.S. business and political circles nevertheless consider that the "open door" policy and the readiness shown by the Chinese side to improve the conditions for foreign monopolies operating in the PRC open up possibilities for a steady expansion of U.S. economic

positions and for their sublimation in American influence over the political and ideological situation in China.

A no less important role in American calculations is played by other aspects of bilateral Sino-American relations, and specifically by exchanges in the sphere of culture and education, with which Washington connects its hopes for ideological shifts favorable to capitalism in Chinese society. One should note in particular the significance of the large-scale American measures to prepare specialists for the PRC's national economy, science, and higher education. The number of Chinese students and specialists who receive training at American universities, scientific institutions, and enterprises remains at a constant level of 10,000 or more. In addition, academic centers established and run by American specialists operate in the PRC, while American teachers lecture and hold seminars in Chinese higher academic institutions. Washington does not consider it necessary to conceal the fact that this area of Sino-American relations is in accordance with the ideological goals of America's ruling circles. Commenting on the agreements in the sphere of culture and education which PRC President Li Xiannian signed in Washington in July 1985, Charles Wick, head of the U.S. Information Agency (the principal U.S. government propaganda organ), stressed that the accords which had been achieved "will assist the modernization of China while, at the same time, inculcating democratic ideals in Chinese citizens, thanks to their study in American schools." It is true that the United States has accumulated considerable experience in cultural aggression.¹⁰ The educational system which the Americans created for the Chinese in the first quarter of this century gave rise to the appearance in Kuomintang China of a narrow but influential stratum of the intelligentsia which took in the American teachers' lessons. In order to describe the situation here, it is enough to state that by 1939, 56.2 percent of the leading posts in China's government, military, economic, social, and academic institutions were occupied by people who had received an education in an American academic institution.¹¹ Bearing this experience in mind, there are grounds for supposing that the plans of the present ideologists of American expansionism include the formation of substrata in the PRC which have been educated in the spirit of the American way of life and bourgeois values and which are capable of hindering the establishment of a socialist way of life, psychology, and ideology and of serving as an instrument of American ideological and political influence over Chinese society.

A second aspect of the Reagan Administration's "Chinese policy" is the maintenance of close political and military-political relations with the Kuomintang administration of Taiwan as virtually an independent state. Since the American Government has recognized Taiwan to be an integral part of China, American-Taiwanese relations take an unofficial form in terms of protocol. The basis of this approach is largely made up of military-political considerations: the recognition by conservative U.S. political and military circles of Taiwan's key role for U.S. defense on the "forward line." This issue arose as far back as on the eve of the victory of the people's revolution in China. A memorandum of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 24 November 1948 contained an appraisal of the strategic consequences which the transfer of "Formosa and the adjoining islands, including the Pescadore archipelago, to communist control" would have for U.S. security. The

American generals saw the strategic value of Taiwan in the fact that in wartime the island could serve as a basis for troop concentrations, strategic air operations, and control over maritime lines of communication. In this connection it was recommended that the American Government block the return of Taiwan to the jurisdiction of China's new people's government. As American researcher G. Hsiao rightly notes in his commentary on this document, recommendations which were dictated by a desire to turn Taiwan into an American military base, served as the cornerstone of U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue in subsequent decades.¹² In actual fact, since that time U.S. military thinking has given this island the role of a connecting link in the system of forward-based American armed forces in Japan and South Korea on the northern flank, and in the Philippines to the south of Taiwan. On its part, American diplomacy ensures that Taiwan is kept under U.S. control within the context of developing relations with the PRC. While forced to withdraw its military contingents from Taiwan and to dismantle its military installations there, Washington compensates for these lost positions by increasing the combat readiness of the Kuomintang armed forces, providing them with the latest weapons, ensuring the training of officer cadres, assisting in the organization of military production, and as may be supposed, agreeing on situation appraisals and plans for military cooperation in the region. According to the information of the American press, the United States is continuing to use Taiwan as a basis for carrying out military-political reconnaissance against the PRC.

Apart from that, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is determined by such factors as ideological and political closeness to the Kuomintang and the tradition of many years of alliance between American conservatives and the Kuomintang in the struggle against communism, and specifically against the PRC. One should also bear in mind the homogeneity of the Taiwanese and American socioeconomic systems, the community of interests of American capital and the rapidly growing Taiwanese capital, and finally, the conviction that the Government of the PRC is too interested in developing relations with the United States to allow the Taiwanese problem to hinder this process. U.S. economic interests in Taiwan are also great: In 1985 American-Taiwanese trade turnover came to about 20 million dollars, exceeding U.S. trade with the PRC by a factor of 2.5; Taiwan occupies sixth place among the U.S. trading partners; private capital investments in the Taiwanese economy alone amount to about a billion dollars.

The Reagan Administration has introduced an element of instability into the international situation in the Asian-Pacific region because, fearing that "loss" of control over Taiwan would make a breach in the system of "holding back" communism, it takes a hard-line position on the Taiwan question, and in particular does not display any practical readiness to reduce and halt arms deliveries to the Taiwanese regime, as the joint American-Chinese communique of 17 August stipulates. This aspect of Washington's "Chinese" policy contributes to the preservation of a hotbed of militant anticommunism in the Far East, blocks the solution of the Taiwan problem by peaceful political means, and conserves the situation where China is divided and there is a constant threat of an international crisis in the Taiwanese straits.

The American Government's contemporary foreign policy course represents a highly distinctive alternative, each variant of which necessarily corresponds

to the imperialist motives of U.S. ruling circles to a greater or lesser extent. The minimum plan, which largely derives from consideration of specific features of the PRC's foreign policy course--namely, Beijing's interest in developing relations with the West--provided that the American and Chinese standpoints on a number of international problems coincide, consists in creating and utilizing levers of influence to draw the PRC into the politics of "balance of forces," with the aim of reinforcing Washington's international and strategic positions. In this case, Taiwan would keep its place in the American system of "holding back communism." The maximum plan, which, it must be noted, meets with distrust in certain circles within the United States itself, draws on ideas about the PRC's socialist socioeconomic system undergoing an erosion which will supposedly lead to the development of something like capitalism and bourgeois democracy developing in China. To be specific, hopes of this sort have been expressed by Secretary of State G. Shultz in an article for the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1985). "China's long road to a free market is a truly historic event: A great country discards obsolete economic doctrines and frees the energy of its talented people," he stressed. It is natural that U.S. ruling circles are prepared (and attempt) to contribute to changes which seem to them to be promising from the point of view of capitalism and that for this purpose they use their rapidly increasing economic, scientific, cultural, and military ties with the PRC. Other American politicians consider that if this trend could readily be developed, Taiwan would play the role of "showcase of capitalism" for the PRC, and the Taiwan problem would, having lost its social aspect, simultaneously lose its significance as the principal obstacle in the development of Sino-American relations.

The 200-year-old history of Sino-American relations has reflected all the features of U.S. foreign policy, such as mercantilism, militant chauvinism and racism, Americanocentrism and hegemonism, and an inclination toward aggressive actions. At the same time, specific features which distinguish Washington's "Chinese" policy and its motives from other regional areas of its foreign policy developed and, in the period of imperialism, took firm root in the approach of U.S. ruling circles over this long period. Recognizing China's significance in the light of its geostrategic location, contemporary American bourgeois political thought and foreign policy practice perceive this significance as an instrumental passive factor in international relations. The U.S. attempts to apply the concept of "balance of forces" within the system of Sino-American-Soviet relations are based on this premise.

In recent years the Chinese Government's orientation toward the development of relations with the West and its efforts to attract capital, equipment, technology, and management experience from capitalist countries for the reconstruction and development of the national economy have also contributed to the appearance of U.S. hopes for the restoration of favorable conditions for American monopolies' economic activity in the PRC and for their interaction with the Chinese economic structure. However, for all the attractiveness which the economic and social consequences of such cooperation hold for the U.S. ruling classes, and despite the certain amount of practical significance which this cooperation holds for the United States, the main motive force of Washington's "Chinese" policy continues to be the aspiration to utilize the "Chinese factor" in U.S. global policy.

Attempts to realize this aim by developing the Chinese side's interest in American participation in the modernization of China, and also be striving to create conditions for a Sino-American political rapprochement directed against the progressive forces of the contemporary period, are combined by U.S. ruling circles with crude interference in the PRC's sovereignty, attempts to influence the internal socioeconomic and political situation in the country, and measures to create means of forcible pressure on the PRC.

The Reagan Administration is among the most reactionary government of America in recent times. Its policy in the Asian-Pacific region, and more specifically its policy toward socialist China, confirm with factual information the assessment of imperialism made at the 27th CPSU Congress.

The aggressive policy of American imperialism is in obvious contradiction to the PRC's national, social, political, economic, and strategic interests and to the political line of the 12th CCP Congress, it acts as an obstacle to the formation of a healthy, constructive basis for Sino-American relations, it blocks the development of positive international processes in the Asian-Pacific region, and it introduces an element of instability in world politics.

FOOTNOTES

1. In: J. Thomson, "A Cycle of Cathay," AMERICAN HERITAGE, vol 23, N.Y., 1972, No 5, pp 4-5; H. Isaacs, "Images of Asia: American Views of China and India," Cambridge, 1958.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 419.
3. See Liu Danian, "History of American Aggression in China," Moscow, 1953; Wu Xiuquan, "On U.S. Armed Aggression Against China," Moscow, 1950; Hu Sheng, "Aggression of Imperialist Powers in China," Moscow, 1951; Qing Ruji, "History of American Aggression in Taiwan," Moscow, 1956; Qing Ruji, "History of U.S. Aggression in China," Beijing, 1954; and others. The basic research of Soviet authors includes: A. Kantorovich, "America in the Struggle for China," Moscow, 1935; G.N. Sevostyanov, "The Active U.S. Role in the Creation of Hotbeds of War in the Far East (1931-1933)," Moscow, 1953; V.K. Popov, "The Failure of U.S. Aggression in China after World War II," Moscow, 1955; A.A. Fursenko, "The Struggle for the Division of China and the American Open-Door Doctrine," Moscow-Leningrad, 1956; A.M. Ledovskiy, "The USSR, United States, and the People's Revolution in China," Moscow, 1979; G.V. Astafyev, "U.S. Intervention in China, 1945-1949," Moscow, 1985; and others.
4. H. Kissinger, "White House Years," Boston, 1979, p 171.
5. M. Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol 61, N.Y., Fall 1982, No 1, p 191.
6. Huan Xiang, "The World Along Vertical and Horizontal Lines," Beijing, 1985, p 317 (in Chinese).

7. G.A. Trofimenko, "Basic Postulates of U.S. Foreign Policy and the Fate of Detente," SSHA: EPI, 1981, No 7, pp 3-14.
8. A.Yu. Melvil, "Soviet-American Relations: Ideological Aspects," *ibid.*, 1982, No 5, pp 15-26.
9. "Sino-American Normalization and Its Policy Implications," edited by G. Hsiao and M. Witunski, N.Y., 1983, pp 277-278, 280.
10. Liu Danian, *Op. cit.*, pp 126-133.
11. S. Shantanov, "The Education of Chinese in the United States," in the book "The Nationalist Policy of the Mao Zedong Group and the United States," Moscow, 1968, p 140.
12. "Sino-American Normalization and Its Policy Implications," pp 30-31.

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EVOLUTION OF PACIFIC COOPERATION IDEAS

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[Article by A.O. Bogomolov]

The Asian-Pacific theme is a comparatively new feature in foreign scientific and socio-political literature. The profound economic processes taking place in the vast Asian-Pacific region and in their sum total, capable of bringing about a substantial reassessment of the entire system of world economic ties and their transformations, has failed until recently to attract the attention of researchers they merit. In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was an upsurge of interest in the Pacific region that was accompanied by allegations by representatives of the political and business circles on both sides of the Atlantic about a "Pacific challenge" made to Atlanticism, about the shift of the "world centre of power" to the Pacific Ocean and, finally, the onset of a "Pacific era".

The terminology used by foreign authors imparts a certain element of sensationalism to the vast Pacific theme. Meantime, the economic and political processes in that region, based on objective laws of world economic development, had been taking shape and gaining momentum for many decades. Yet the sources of this phenomenon which is called today the "Pacific boom" are much closer to us in time and belong to the post-war period. To speak roughly, it was then that the three factors that determine the Pacific region's special role in the present-day world began to form. The first, which is most popular with foreign authors is the development of two Pacific imperialist powers—the United States and Japan which account for more than a third of the gross world product and the complex of their economic, political and strategic relations. The second factor is the economic growth of the former Asian colonies that came after their political liberation, the turning of a part of them predominantly with imperialist assistance into a model and symbol of the "advantages" of the capitalist road of development for the entire Third World, the origination in the region of economic and political integration with their participation and on their initiative. The third point which is gaining importance with every year but is deliberately ignored by foreign researchers is the economic achievements and economic development strategy of socialist states which also belong to the Asian-Pacific region and have there their own unquestionable economic and strategic interests.

Determined by the overall influence and interconnection of these factors, the growing importance of the Pacific region in world affairs is the topic of a discussion, now in its third decade, about the future of the Pacific Ocean, its place and role in the system of global economic and political relations, prospects of deepening the economic interdependence of the region's states and organising economic cooperation among them on a broad regional basis. The origination and evolution of the Pacific community concept can be viewed as one of the most substantial results of this discussion.

It should be admitted that despite its entire present vagueness this idea is by far not so groundless, especially in view of the objective internationalisation of economic life in the region and the integration tendencies among a number of countries located there.

On the other hand, this concept is not all that harmless considering not only the obvious attempt by certain quarters to limit the possibility of a more active integration of socialist countries into the system of world economic ties but also the imperialism's plans to militarise the Pacific Ocean, set up there under cover of economic association, a sweeping NATO-type military-strategic grouping, and to create a Pacific Theatre of Operations within the framework of the global anti-communist strategy. Since the question of institutionalising a Pacific economic forum, a supranational one by its scale, is, for several objective reasons, a matter of a still distant future, it is exactly from this strategic viewpoint that one has to consider various theories of Pacific economic cooperation (PEC).

The Pacific community concept originated in the evolution of ideas of Pacific economic cooperation, its specific feature being that for many years it has been developed actually in three separate spheres: business, academic, and official, both on the national level and within the framework of various international consultative forums; such a complicated structure hinders the development of a single approach to determining the essence and purposes of the future community which results in that this concept still remains extremely amorphous.

In the discussion on the prospects of Pacific regionalism, the official quarters of most Pacific states are biding their time, such a cautious stand can be partly explained by the questionable possibility of deriving benefit from the participation in the projected grouping of the region's small countries as well as by the desire of such powers as the United States and Japan to conceal for the time being their true strategic plans.

On the other hand, it is a widespread view among the business circles that the Pacific community already exists de facto. This view is based on the premise that the quantitative growth of such economic factors as foreign trade, international flows of capital, direction of short- and long-term investments, exchange of managerial and technological knowhow leads to such a level of interdependence of countries in the Asian-Pacific region that testifies to the existence of a large-scale economic association despite the absence of an institutionalised structure. What remains open to question, however, is the choice of a criteria for determining the moment of the qualitative growth of a simple economic interdependence into an economic community. But the solution of this question has been handed over to the academic circles which, in their turn, cannot arrive at a consensus either on a general definition of what a "community" is or on its individual characteristics or ways of its institutionalisation.

The search for an already existing or the creation of a new institutionalised structure necessary for the fulfilment of the plans of a Pacific community in one form or another, is compounded by the difficulty in formulating this idea on the conceptual level.

There exist two main approaches to defining the essence of the concept of a "community."¹ The first of these, the "economic" one, interprets it as a state of increased economic interdependence between countries of the Pacific region. The second approach is the "strategic" one. From this point of view the community is a result of a so-called strategic balance in the Pacific region. The principle and legitimate nature of the economic approach are sufficiently logical and well-grounded although the quantitative growth of the indicators of interdependence is not yet evidence of qualitative transformations on the road to a community of Pacific nations. The strategic approach, supported mostly by American experts, is accepted by representatives of the region's develop-

¹ *Pacific Region Interdependencies: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, 1981.*

ing countries and, to a certain extent, of Japan with reservations because it is, in fact entirely based on the global strategic ambitions of the United States which, naturally, do not accord with the interests of countries located in the Pacific region. Besides, as it is rightly indicated by some specialists, strategic considerations undermine the objective possibility of forming a single Pacific economic association on a broad regional basis because they presuppose a differentiation of its potential members in accordance with the principle of their "political alignment".²

The next problem is the question of what is to be taken for the "basis" of the community and what are the criteria for defining it. In other words, what states are to be viewed as the most probable candidates for membership in the "Pacific Club"? Three criteria are usually proposed to make such a choice—geographical, economic and political.³ But neither separately nor in their total can these criteria solve the problem of membership. From the geographical point of view the Soviet Union, which is painstakingly deleted from all "lists" has no less if not more grounds for membership in the projected community than, for instance, some ASEAN countries. The broad economic approach requires the inclusion in the community of all countries trading in the region and this once again raises the question of the participation of socialist countries. Doubts are also being voiced about the functional effectiveness of such a "super grouping". The narrow economic approach singling out the group of countries with the so-called market economy is tantamount to splitting the region politically. Although this is desirable for the United States, the developing countries fear the destabilising consequences of Washington's policy of politically polarising the Asian-Pacific region. The rigidly defined pattern of the Pacific community fails to gain full support in Japan as well because it puts serious limitations on Tokyo's global economic ambitions.

All the concepts of PEC are this way or another associated by their authors with tasks of ensuring regional security.⁴ On the one hand, this points to the growing awareness by the peoples of Asia of the fact that the road to peace and stability in the present troubled international situation lies through cooperation. But it is exactly the manipulation with this concept that allows certain quarters to politicise the idea of the Pacific community for leading it away from the solution of the pressing economic problems of the Asian and Pacific states, exploiting the existing contradictions and mistrust between them and turning this concept into a tool of imperialist strategy in the Pacific Ocean. The "security" factor in combination with the measures suggested to safeguard it serves as yet another criteria for classifying the PEC ideas developed by foreign experts.

Proceeding from this approach one can single out three models of the community. The first is the concept of an "open" community combining states with a "market" and "plan" economy, the stability and mutual trust of which are to be ensured by the development of peaceful economic cooperation. On the other pole is the so-called model of "cultivated" security, the membership of which is restricted to "market"-oriented countries and territories (the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, ASEAN). Their economic interdependence, shored up by their ideological and political closeness, is inevitably bound, as the supporters of this theory believe, to end up in a defence association. Quite naturally, such a community should be based on the already

² *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1982/83, No. 4, p. 667.

³ *Pacific Economic Cooperation: Suggestions for Action*, Ed. by Sir John Crawford, Australian National University, 1981.

⁴ M. S. Frost, "Security Models and the Concept of an Asian-Pacific Community", *Asia Pacific Community*, Fall, 1984, No. 26, pp. 1-15.

existing US military and political commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. The third model, that of "binding deterrence", holds a place in between the other two and is based on a compromise between the interests of the United States (because it excludes socialist countries from the community's membership) and the developing countries (because it does not raise the question of institutionalising a new large-scale defensive alliance and regards Washington's existing commitments as sufficient). In this case security in the region is achieved allegedly as a result of deepening economic cooperation and stimulating development, this being in line with the notions of ASEAN countries that their instability is rooted in economic backwardness and disproportionate distribution of boons.

The question whether the new regional organisation will be a forum exclusively for an exchange of information and mutual consultations or whether it should vigorously implement the ideas it set forth is yet another important problem in the discussion of the prospects of Pacific cooperation. The view that organisationally and functionally the Pacific community should be based on the experience of OECD is quite widespread among Western specialists. At the same time economists from Southeast Asia believe that the redistribution of economic booms in favour of the region's less developed countries should be the community's prime function. The "distributive approach" suggested by them implies quick transfer of technology and marketing knowhow and the rendering of any other assistance to Southeast Asian countries with a view to speeding up the rates of their industrialisation.⁵

So the question of the Pacific community's functional designation boils down to the problem of combining the concepts of "security" and the economic interests of such giants like the United States and Japan, the Asia-Pacific newly industrialised countries and the least developed countries of the region.

Right to the second half of the 1970s Japan held the initiative in developing the ideas of Pacific cooperation.

In the early 1960s they were based on the realities of the post-war arrangement in Asia, first of all on such a military, political and economic power in the Pacific region as the United States. The very appearance of the term "community" in inter-imperialist relations bore evidence to the growing influence among Japanese supporters of PEC of those who believed it necessary to embark on a course of consolidating Japanese-American relations within the framework of their regional policy. It was this that ultimately enabled the Japanese monopoly capital to infiltrate virtually unopposed the economy of most Pacific countries under the cover of American military and political might ensuring the retention of the vast Asia-Pacific region within the sphere of imperialist influence.

The specificities of the post-war arrangement in Asia prompted Tokyo, as different from Washington, to devote its main attention in its Asia-Pacific policy to economic diplomacy. That is why the economic criterion is the central element in the Japanese variants of the Pacific community. The best known among these are the "Pacific Free Trade Area" (PAFTA) proposed by K. Kojima in 1966, the "Organisation for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development" (OPTAD) that was proposed in 1968 and is a modification of the PAFTA concept, the "Concept of Co-

⁵ *The Pacific Community Concept: Views from Eight Nations*, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 57-66; 72-76.

peration in the Pacific Ocean Basin" worked out by a Japanese team of researchers (1980), and the "ASEAN-Pacific Forum", a subregional variant of OPTAD proposed by K. Kojima in 1981.

The "Nakasone Doctrine", outlined by the Japanese Premier during his tour of Oceania in January 1985, is formulated in the same spirit. Already the first point of this document, designed to retain Japan's central place in the Pacific system, says that cooperation in the Pacific basin should be conducted only in the sphere of economy and culture and not spread to the military-political field. Meantime the United States emphasises the latter in its desire to consolidate its monopoly position in the Pacific.

It would be wrong however to exaggerate the differences in Tokyo's and Washington's strategic approach to the ideas of Pacific regionalism. The Nakasone approach reflects only the caution of the Japanese ruling circles, their consideration for the present unpopularity of strategic integration among several region's states, primarily the ASEAN ones. In practice Japan and the United States demonstrate their common stand on the main questions of regional cooperation and this was confirmed by the meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Los Angeles in the early 1985. The Japanese leaders hold that the further development of the PEC ideas should be based on the principles of "strengthening the unity of the Western camp" and loyalty to treaty obligations to the United States. There is no doubt that in terms of long-term strategy Tokyo is interested in the overall strengthening of the imperialist bloc in the Pacific region and the weakening of the forces of socialism. Japan's militaristic quarters are the most outspoken supporters of the plan of their country's participation in the Pacific grouping. Membership in the Pacific community would give them an argument in favour of a "flexible" interpretation of the national constitution and a pretext to present the growth of Japan's military might as a contribution to the security of the other members.

Whereas the ideas of creating a Pacific economic association were widespread in Japan already several decades ago, in the United States, which relied more on the "power" methods of its regional policy, the theme of Pacific integration was discussed for a long time only in a narrow circle of specialists and became popular only when Japan turned into a world economic power. The US participation in the discussion of PEC concepts boiled down mostly to the activity of a limited number of persons on the business and academic levels. But it was the initiative of American business, which had substantial economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and those sections of the scientific community that are involved in politics that played an important role in drawing Washington's attention to this topic. The American variant of an association of Pacific nations was presented in a report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Senate. It was written by P. A. Drysdale, a specialist from the Australian National University, and Professor Patrick of Yale University. The Patrick-Drysdale programme suggested the creation of an Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) meeting the following requirements: it should be an inter-governmental organisation with membership granted to governments of individual (non-socialist) Pacific countries; the role of leaders in OPTAD should be played by the United States and Japan with the participation of Australia, South Korea, the ASEAN states and some other countries; the organisation's administrative apparatus should be compact; all questions should be solved by working groups specially set up for the purpose; OPTAD's activities should be mostly of a consultative nature.

The roots of Washington's increased interest in the ideas of Pacific cooperation should be sought in the substantial transformation of the

internal and external conditions of the development of capitalism in the United States. Under modern conditions, the main manifestation of the law of uneven economic and political development under capitalism is the process of the weakening of America's international positions, its loss of leadership in a number of important economic fields and the disappearance of differences in the levels of economic, scientific and technological development of the leading capitalist powers. The economic, financial, and technological superiority the United States had over its nearest rivals until the late 1960s has been put to a severe test. In this connection, the last decades of the century see new outbreaks of inter-imperialistic contradictions and the emergence of new forms and trends.⁶

So the Pacific region inevitably found itself in the centre of attention of the United States if only because the United States encountered there in the person of Japan not only a strategic ally but also the most aggressive rival in the struggle for economic influence in the world. It is exactly in the Asia-Pacific region that the ambitions and international prestige of the United States met with the biggest setbacks during the past decade. The serious military-political problems arose against the background of a vigorous Japanese offensive against the positions of the American monopoly capital in that part of the world.

In terms of the Asia-Pacific region Washington regards the planned community first of all as a treaty of "collective security" with the same role to play as NATO. In fact the United States wants to put the USSR and other socialist countries inside an unbroken ring of military bases and aggressive military blocks. This was bluntly stated by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Armacost. He said that a powerful American strategic presence in East Asia directly helps European security by confronting the USSR with a prospect of waging war on two fronts.⁷ The "spirit of cooperation" which the United States is promoting in the Pacific region has nothing in common with the idea of a fair economic cooperation of states with different levels of development; it rather deals with Washington's attempts to make the Pacific countries shoulder the burden of its military expenditures. Here the White House pins its main hopes on Tokyo which serves as a conduit of American policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is interesting to note that the ideas of a new international Pacific organisation, that are thought to have been suggested by Tokyo and strongly advocated by it and which have wide currency in Japan, got Japan's official support only after the Pacific Economic Council met in Los Angeles in 1979 and recommended the pursuance of a policy leading to the creation of a Pacific economic community. In other words the United States gave its consent to the fulfilment of the Japanese idea and thereby demonstrated once again the extent of its interest and influence in the Pacific region. Yet the implementation of the Japanese-Australian initiatives in 1979-1983 failed to produce any tangible progress in the realisation of the ideas of a Pacific economic community. The United States gave its assistance but preferred to stay out of the limelight.

Moreover, it was still when Premier Ohira was in office that the definition "economic" was quietly withdrawn from the concept of the Pacific economic community while since Nakasone replaced him hardly any mention is being made of the term "community". So the Pacific community concept has thus returned to its generalised abstract initial variant—Pacific cooperation. Tokyo's hopes concerning Japan's ability to play the leading role in forming a community of Pacific nations were

⁶ See *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986.

⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1985, p. 34.

greatly undermined by the existence of profound trade and economic contradictions between Japan and the United States, on the one hand, and between these powers and the developing countries, on the other. Additionally, Tokyo has demonstrated its intent to play a global role commensurate to its economic might and not to limit itself to commitments to some single region. So Japan, in effect, has refused to play an active role in the further development of the PEC ideas. It explained this by the negative response to its proposals from ASEAN without the participation of which, to quote one of the biggest experts in this field Dr. Okita, the idea of the community has no future.⁸

To assess the role played by ASEAN in the evolution of the ideas of Pacific cooperation we should regard the variants of Pacific regionalism formulated in Japan and the United States not only as the results of centrifugal and centripetal forces within the American-Japanese alliance itself but also as an attempt to "put in harmony" relations between developed and developing countries within the framework of a large-scale regional association. From this viewpoint the concept of a Pacific community can be regarded as a variant of arranging both the international economic and political relations based on a regional basis and directed at ensuring the interests of the American and Japanese monopoly capital in what is considered in the West as the most promising part of the capitalist economy and also at undermining the unity of the Third World by strengthening ties with one of the most dynamically developing regions. In short, this is an alternative variant suggested by imperialist powers in response to the demands made by developing countries.

One of the "most desirable characteristics" of such a community, that is the interaction between North and South in the Pacific region,⁹ would thus be lost if the Pacific community would not include the ASEAN countries which are lauded in the West as a model and symbol of advantages of the capitalist road of development and which enjoy political and economic prestige in the developing world.

The problem facing the most interested side in creating the community—the imperialist circles of the United States and Japan which, however, wanted to make it appear that the initiative originated among the region's developing countries—was that virtually all members of ASEAN with the exception of Singapore, have from the very outset shown only a very lukewarm interest in the idea of the Pacific community. Expressing a viewpoint widespread among the Association's leaders, Malaysia's Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie noted that the Pacific community concept, which promises little other than freezing the existing international division of labour and perpetuating the political and military disunity of the developed North, is unacceptable to ASEAN.¹⁰

The restraint displayed by the developing countries of Southeast Asia in respect of the ideas of Pacific integration was based mostly on lack of faith on their part in the possibility of establishing relations of economic justice between "strong" and "weak" partners in the new broad regional association. ASEAN members regarded arguments in favours of the community as a screen concealing the desire of developed capitalist powers to secure access to the region's resources. It was also feared

⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 21, 1979.

⁹ *ASEAN and Pacific Economic Cooperation. Development Paper*, No. 2, U. N., Bangkok, 1983, p. 299.

¹⁰ Tan Sri M. Ghazali Shafie, *Toward a Pacific Basin Community—a Malaysian Perception*, *Conference*, Pattaya, December 12, 1979.

in Southeast Asia that membership in the Pacific Community would be damaging to the principle of "ASEAN solidarity" which would dissolve in the larger grouping.

The revival of interest in this concept since 1983 is explained precisely by changes in the approach by the developing countries of Southeast Asia to assessing the prospects of PEC and the possibility of their participation in it.

First of all the ASEAN countries had to make a serious reassessment of their own economic possibilities. The "development euphoria" stemming from the high growth rates of the GNP in these countries in the 1970s gave way in the early 1980s to a sense of vulnerability and dependence on the economic situation in developed countries and the fluctuation of world capitalist markets.

The drastic decline of growth rates and mass unemployment in industrialised countries resulted in a wave of protectionist measures in world trade. International trade dropped accordingly. So early in the 1980s the ASEAN countries faced tough restrictive quotas and other protectionist measures taken by the leading capitalist countries with the United States at their head.

The sharp increase of international bank rates badly affected the position of Southeast Asian developing countries. Data cited by the World Bank show for instance that the average annual servicing of debts by Indonesia increased in the period from 1970 to 1981 from 2.7 to 8.9 per cent, the periods of repayment dropped from 34 to 15 years, and now even to 14 years, while the grace period was cut from nine to four years.¹¹ The "credibility crisis" caused by a series of debt crises in developing countries resulted in a scarcity of sources of commercial credits and a slowing down of the flow of "aid" in the form of government loans.

Yet another factor can be added to the economic vulnerability, dependence and doubts about the future experienced by ASEAN in the early 1980s. Proceeding from their successes in economic development, their experience of economic "dialogues" with their developed capitalist partners and also the attention that this grouping had drawn to itself in the West by its "Kampuchean" policy, the ASEAN countries hoped that they had become sufficiently strong to conduct successful talks with the capitalist "North" on global issues and to speak whenever possible on behalf of the entire Third World.¹²

But the appeals by ASEAN countries to the leaders of the seven leading capitalist states failed to yield the expected result. The ASEAN countries were also disappointed in their hopes of getting an effective protection of their trade and economic interests in the existing international organisations where the tone is set by imperialist power. This forced some developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including ASEAN, to study the possibility of getting access to the markets of developed countries not on a global but on a narrower regional basis.

The trade conference held in Seoul in 1984 and attended by the ministers of trade of most Pacific countries was an important step in this direction. It discussed the proposal made by Yasuhiro Nakasone in November 1983 to prepare a new round of GATT and the so-called Asia-Pacific approach to liberalisation of trade proposed by the Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke.¹³

In addition to the deadlocked talks of a global nature, in the early 1980s the ASEAN countries encountered the problem of the crisis of their

¹¹ *South*, January 1985, p. 11.

¹² *Indonesia Information Bulletin*, Moscow Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, July 12, 1984, p. 8.

¹³ R. J. L. Hawke, *Address to the Australian-Thai Trade Association*, Bangkok, November 22, 1983.

external economic "dialogues" with the developed capitalist countries. Started in the mid-1970s, these coordination conferences never got beyond the stage of being forums for political rhetoric, mutual claims, and broken promises. The critical assessment of the present state of the "dialogues", made by the ASEAN ministers of economy at their regular meeting early in 1985, serves as an argument in favour of searching for a more effective institutional structure of the Association's relations with its external economic partners.¹⁴

So ASEAN's inability to attain a number of its economic and political aims (although the latter attracted much greater attention of the West to the Association than its quite modest achievements in the field of economic integration) revealed an obvious overestimation by its members of their possibilities and influence, and this inevitably made itself felt in their attitude to the ideas of PEC. A noticeable transformation of the Association's approach to the prospects of Pacific regionalism took place already in 1983 when representatives of ASEAN stated in Bali that it was ready to regard the free association of Pacific nations as a possible forum for solving in its favour such questions as the banishment of trade protectionism, tackling of disputes on the international maritime law, stabilisation of the export earnings of developing countries, transfer of resources and technology, and changes in the pattern of the world energy consumption.¹⁵

A substantial reason determining the transformation of ASEAN's approach to Pacific regionalism was fear that the further evolution of ideas associated with it depended less and less on the formal participation in their development of the Association itself which aspires for the role of the region's leader.

In their desire to influence the development of the PEC ideas the ASEAN countries decided to join the Pacific dialogue, the initiative being theirs at that. In the summer of 1984 there began their multilateral dialogue on the basis of the annual conferences of the foreign ministers of the six Southeast Asian countries with the foreign ministers of the five developed capitalist states of the Pacific basin—Japan, the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

The plan of training specialists for the region's developing countries is their first joint project. In the opinion of ASEAN, the "6+5" conferences should induce its main foreign economic partners to make certain concessions in the fulfilment of regional projects, help to create a "Pacific system of preferences" for commodities from Southeast Asian countries, introduce a mechanism for stabilising prices for raw materials and mineral fuel and set up "free investment zones" for transferring technology to them on easy terms.

The ASEAN countries officially reject the possibility for socialist or developing countries to join the multilateral "dialogue" started by them evidently in the hope of retaining the maximum attention that they are being given by the developed capitalist countries.¹⁶ However, the wave of protectionism sweeping the Western markets and the limited scope of markets in Southeast Asia compel the Association to look for solutions of their economic problems beyond the framework of the "6+5" conferences as well. The European Economic Community is viewed by the members of the Six as a counterbalance to the growing influence of the United States and especially Japan in their region. At the joint conferences of the ministers of economy of Southeast Asian and EEC countries in Dublin and Kuala Lumpur in 1984 and 1985, the representati-

¹⁴ *Asiaweek*, February 22, 1985, pp. 31-32.

¹⁵ *Asia Yearbook*, 1984, p. 18.

¹⁶ *The Korean Times*, July 5, 1985.

ves of ASEAN asked their West European colleagues to be given access to the assets of the European Investment Bank and to increase the flow of capital investments and technology.¹⁷

In their search for additional export markets the members of the Association have to overcome their traditional mistrust of their northern neighbour and were forced to take a new look at the problem of economic ties with China. Following the example set by Singapore which concluded its first trade agreement with Peking already in 1979, some other ASEAN members have also begun to directly trade with China. They have thus made a step of fundamental importance towards including the PRC in the system of Pacific cooperation. Yet relations between them remain quite cool. For instance, political leaders in Malaysia and Indonesia continue to express apprehensions not only about possible American-Chinese strategic or military cooperation but also about any policy facilitating the PRC's economic progress.¹⁸

The initial Japanese-American variants of PEC for a number of reasons did not spell out clearly the question of China's role in Pacific cooperation. But whereas Tokyo, whose attitude to the ideas of PEC can be characterised as "open regionalism" has been traditionally regarding the problem of the PRC's participation in regional integration processes first of all from the viewpoint of the Japanese monopoly capital's interest in the Chinese market, for the United States and ASEAN this question also has other aspects as a result of which their stands turned to be more susceptible to change. Indeed, in the first half of the 1980s, American officials began to recognise China ever more frequently as an inseparable part of the Pacific economic system and stimulate in every way possible its interest in the Pacific movement. This could not but influence ASEAN. In Washington's mind, the integration of China in the community of Pacific nations should bolster Peking's "open doors" policy and, by the same token its policy of developing relations predominantly with the "free world". As they ever more openly hint that they would like to see the PRC a member of the planned Pacific community, the American strategists hope to isolate it from ties with the USSR and other socialist countries of the region and undermine the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. As it was cynically admitted by a high-placed representative of the American military establishment, if China and the Soviet Union were to bury the tomahawk of war this would greatly impede the pursuance of America's current Pacific strategy.¹⁹

China's implementation of its current economic strategy involves a thorough study of possibilities of increasing trade, economic, scientific and technical, cooperation with other countries. Having a long Pacific coast border with 14 adjacent big cities where the "open doors" policy is being consistently carried out, the PRC is objectively interested in strengthening its economic ties with countries of the Pacific basin. Competent White House representatives note as a positive moment China's increased interest in and knowledge about the activity of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and ASEAN's "6+5" dialogues.²⁰ But no matter how extensive the research into Pacific issues is, the Chinese leaders are showing restraint in formulating China's attitude to the PEC ideas.

The PEC ideas are becoming now an ever more prominent point in the strategic thinking of some other Pacific states. Early in the 1980s, South Korea tried to play the role of an "honest broker" in relations be-

¹⁷ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 22, 1985.

¹⁸ *The Washington Post*, July 12, 1984.

¹⁹ *Proceedings*, August, 1985, p. 34.

²⁰ *Banker*, July, 1985, p. 20.

tween the developing and developed countries of the Pacific region because of the certain decline of interest in the Pacific community caused by the wary attitude to its creation displayed by Washington, which wanted to conceal its true intentions in the region, Japan's visible decline of enthusiasm about this idea and ASEAN's reluctance to serve as a raw material appendage or a "front line of defence" for imperialist powers.

At the June 1982 Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), the head of the South Korean regime came up with an initiative that was received favourably in the United States and could have been a result of direct American influence.²¹ The proposed draft "Pacific Conference" was similar to the conferences of the "Big Seven" or the British Commonwealth and stated support for the already existing subregional organisations. The purpose of the latter was to make this idea attractive to ASEAN.

Seoul regarded South Korea's participation in a big regional association first of all as an important step in the direction of overcoming its international isolation and getting direct access to major regional markets, including the Chinese one. Simultaneously Seoul has ambitious plans of rivaling the Japanese economic expansion in Southeast Asia. Meantime, in its efforts to secure orders for various construction projects in ASEAN countries the South Korean business has lost to Japanese capital in 53 instances out of 60 in the period from 1979 to 1984. With the support of national financial institutions, Japanese exporters can offer their services at prices that on the average are 23 per cent lower than what is asked by their "colleagues" from South Korea. For this reason South Korea is working out a number of measures designed with direct governmental support to place relations with ASEAN on a sounder long-term basis regardless of whether a formal "dialogue" is started between them or not.²² Banking on ASEAN's desire to diversify export markets and reduce its economic dependence on Japan, Seoul intends to increase its investments in Southeast Asia, including joint ventures, increase its import of prime products from ASEAN (perhaps by reducing its import of American farm produce) and join ASEAN's plan of developing manpower resources in the region.

But in terms of strategy the policy of strengthening ties with ASEAN is hardly a priority for Seoul. It was noted in a report drawn up by the Korean Development Institute, one of the leading and most influential research establishments in South Korea, that cooperation between South Korea, Japan and China must be intensified in order to bring closer the age of "Pacific welfare".²³ It is symptomatic that a similar view was expressed also by R. Fairbank, the leading White House expert on problems of Pacific cooperation.²⁴

The formal discarding of the term "community" as applied to Pacific regionalism as a notion, on the one hand, that lends itself with difficulty to a conceptional definition that would be acceptable to all of its potential members and which as yet does not have a sufficient material base and, on the other hand, as a notion of obviously imperialist origin fraught with undesirable political and strategic military consequences for most countries of the region, can be regarded as one of the substantial results of the evolution experienced by the ideas of PEC in the first

²¹ *Asian Perspective*, Spring-Summer, No. 1, p. 9.

²² *The Korean Times*, Sept. 5, 1985.

²³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1985.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1985.

half of the 1980s. This happened, however, against the background of continued attempts by the imperialist powers, mostly by the United States, to draw Pacific countries as deeply as possible into the orbit of their influence with an eye to creating in the future an economic and political alliance of the region's capitalist and developing countries to oppose the USSR and the socialist countries of Indochina. Fully counting on the support of its main ally in Asia—Japan which has common strategic interests with the United States notwithstanding certain contradictions and differences in matters of tactics, Washington is not abandoning hopes for a gradual transformation of the economic dependence of Pacific countries on the United States and Japan into a military-political one.

Starting with the 1980s Washington is constantly emphasising not so much its economic as its "defence" interests in Asia. Its policy in Asia in the field of "security" is an inseparable part of the broader policy of strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies. For this reason the United States pays special attention to the development of relations with those countries in the Pacific region with which it has treaties of military and political nature.

Proceeding from the system of already existing political treaties and military bases in the Pacific, the United States believes it sufficient as yet to deepen economic "interdependence", to be more exact, the one-sided economic dependence of other Pacific countries on the United States and Japan, and to achieve with their participation an "alliance without a treaty" of a clearly anti-Soviet and anti-socialist character. That is exactly why Washington tries to give its Asian strategy the appearance of a policy of developing cooperation in that part of the world and at the same time does its utmost to prevent the Soviet Union's participation in it. The main arguments in these attempts are references to the growing Soviet "military threat" to the Pacific countries and claims that the Soviet Union is not interested in Pacific ties and is opposed in principle to the idea of a Pacific economic community. All this contradicts both common sense and the USSR's official position outlined in numerous important documents.

Fulfilling massive tasks of accelerating the socio-economic development, the Soviet Union pays paramount attention to the regions of Siberia and the Far East—a part of the Asian-Pacific region. The growing industrial and agricultural potential in the eastern part of the country objectively provides additional significant material prerequisites for a more active participation of the USSR in the international division of labour, trade-economic and scientific-technological cooperation with the Asian and Pacific states.²⁵

To counterbalance the imperialist plans of consolidating the established inequality in the interstate trade and economic relations in the region as well as the attempts to oppose some states to others, the Soviet Union proposes to start bilateral and multilateral consultations for solving disputes and thus enabling the joint search for constructive solutions to the problems faced by the countries of the region. The convocation in prospect of an Asian forum and a separate meeting of the Pacific states would become a significant step on this road.

Like most Pacific countries, the Soviet Union has rejected the concept of a Pacific community. Nevertheless, it is not at all biased against the currently discussed idea of PEC. In his speech in Vladivostok, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out, "We... are ready to join in the deliberations on possible foundations of such cooperation, of course, if it is conceived as not following a bloc-oriented, anti-socialist pattern imposed by someone, but

²⁵ See *Pravda*, April 24, 1986.

as a result of a free discussion without any discrimination whatsoever. A sufficiently vast arsenal of scientific and political ideas on the issue of establishing a new world economic order and the experience of integration in the West and the East could become a solid foundation for such discussion."²⁶

In this context, the future of PEC ought to be viewed as a component of the task aimed at establishing a comprehensive system of international economic security which would equally protect any state from discrimination, sanctions, and other attributes of imperialist, neocolonialist policy. In conjunction with disarmament, such a system could form a reliable basis for international security altogether.

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²⁶ *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

IMPERIALISM SAID FORMING NEW BLOCS IN ASIAN PACIFIC REGION

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[Article by Professor D.V. Petrov: "Imperialism's Military-Bloc Policy in the Asian Pacific Region"]

The growing importance of the Asian Pacific region in the global system of international relations highlights the need to search and find ways of improving the situation there through a comprehensive peace and security mechanism. As Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said last summer, "we stand for including the Asian Pacific region in the general process of creating a comprehensive system of international security."¹

In recent times, however, certain political quarters in the United States and Japan have been taking active measures to knock up new military blocs and enhance confrontation between states with different social and political systems. Evidently, those quarters "do not see the future of the Asian Pacific region in any form other than opposition of various nations."²

That policy not only affects the interests of the Soviet Union as a major Asian Pacific power and of other Asian Pacific socialist countries, but is clearly at variance with the hopes and expectations of all Asian nations.

ASIAN PACIFIC REGION IN IMPERIALIST STRATEGY

The Reagan administration has openly declared a course to upset the existing strategic alignment of forces in Asian Pacific, and the formation of a "second front" against the socialist countries there, as a policy guideline. US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, indicates that US government, "in the last two years has recognised the increasing importance of Asia, particularly of Japan". He calls this a major development in the orientation of US foreign policy.³

Washington is increasing the military potential of its own forces in Asian Pacific and is using more and more extensively the material, manpower, scientific, and technological resources of its allies and of other nations linked with the US by various agreements.

In November 1981, the Pentagon started deploying a qualitatively new Trident weapons system on Ohio nuclear-powered submarines (the first Ohio submarine had been launched a short time before). Each Ohio carries 24 Trident-I missiles, each equipped with eight 100-kiloton nuclear warheads. By the fall of 1986, the United States had eight Ohio submarines, and plans to complete the formation of a squadron of 10 submarines by 1990, to be permanently stationed in the Pacific.

The US general-purpose force, deployed in the Pacific region, is second in strength only to the West European one; the Pacific force comprises 474,000 personnel, 149 warships, and over 1,100 combat aircraft.

¹ *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

² *Ibid.*, April 24, 1986.

³ See *The Reagan Administration Views on Appropriate US Defense Policies Towards Japan. Statement to the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Economic Policy by Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, June 12, 1984, p. 1.*

The US 7th Fleet operating in the Pacific comprises 3 aircraft carriers, 20 submarines, and 37 other vessels. It can be reinforced any time with ships of the 3rd Fleet deployed in the Eastern Pacific (4 aircraft carriers, 29 nuclear submarines, and 130 other ships).⁴

In June 1986, the modernised battleship *New Jersey* was included in the 7th Fleet in the Pacific. That battleship is equipped with nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles.

THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

In the first half of 1986, the United States sharply invigorated its activity in Asian Pacific. President Reagan visited Indonesia and Japan and had talks in Washington in April with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan and Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia. In April-May, State Secretary George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger visited Tokyo, Manila, and Seoul. In contrast with the Soviet government's course at eliminating military blocs and alliances, the United States opted for more active efforts to build new blocs. World-affairs analysts point out that "Washington seeks again to strengthen the strategic security axis in Asian Pacific, which would run from Tokyo and Seoul, via Manila to Jakarta to Canberra".⁵

The imperialist system of military blocs in the region is now quite complex, comprising pacts that vary in the number of signatories, the nature of commitments involved, and the degree of legal formalisation. Apart from bilateral and multilateral military blocs and alliances, greater prominence is given to non-formalised military-political links, as well as to joint or parallel actions, concerning certain military-political problems.

Among its bilateral agreements, the United States gives top priority to the military alliance with Japan, based on the "security treaty" of January 19, 1960. Formally, it was concluded for a term of 10 years, but each year it is automatically prolonged since neither of the signatories declares its intention to abrogate it.

Under that treaty the United States has the right to build military bases and to keep an unlimited amount of troops on Japanese territory. At the end of 1986, the United States had 127 military installations in Japan: air and naval bases, radar, posts, barracks, air fields, testing grounds, hospitals, etc., with 45,800 personnel, of which four-fifths were of the air force and the marine corps. The composition of those troops indicates that the US bases in Japan are regarded as the forward edge of the US global strategic mechanism. The marine units in Okinawa, for instance, are part of the rapid deployment force and can be airlifted to any "explosive spot" around the world.

The Pentagon attaches great importance to promoting military links with South Korea, on the basis of their termless mutual-defense treaty of October 1, 1953. That treaty has enabled the United States to turn South Korea into a major bridgehead in Asia, in close proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. There are now 41,000 US personnel in South Korea. What aggravates the danger even more is that South Korea is now an Asian nuclear base of the Pentagon, with nuclear weapons of various types and purposes whose power totals 13 kilotons. It was reported that the United States plans to build another 36 nuclear arms depots.

Washington hugely stakes on the regime of President Chun Doo Hwan, who is regarded a reliable promoter of US security interests in the Korean

⁴ *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, London, 1985, pp. 11, 14.

⁵ *Sankei Shimbun*, March 23, 1986.

Peninsula.⁶ At its 18th meeting in Seoul on April 1-3, 1986, attended by US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the US-South Korean Security Council decided to coordinate their plans to deploy binary chemical weapons in South Korea and to provide the South Korean air force with nuclear-capable F-16 fighter-bombers.⁷

The Seoul regime's army, currently totalling 622,000, is the largest in capitalist Asia and is now under direct control of the United States. In 1984, South Korea's military spending amounted to \$4.5 billion, or 27.9 per cent of the regime's budget. The percentage is higher than the corresponding figure for any other capitalist country in Asia.⁸

A third military accord—the mutual defense treaty signed with the Philippines on August 30, 1951—gave the US the right to set up bases on that country's territory and obliged both sides to build up their military potentials. The Subic Bay naval base and the Clark Field air base in the Philippines, the two largest in the Far East, are the backbone of the US forces in Asia.

As the corrupt regime of President Marcos was replaced by the Corason Aquino government on February 25, 1986, the United States did all it could to retain its positions in the Philippines, and to prevent any steps that might restrict the applicability of the military treaty or curtail its right to use the bases on Philippine territory. A number of US officials then visited Manila, one after the other: the Chairman of the Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee S. Solarz (March 5, 1986), Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs G. Sigur (March 26), Defense Secretary C. Weinberger (April 6), and State Secretary G. Shultz (June 7).

Washington emissaries tried to combine political pressure with promises of extensive economic and military support for the new regime. The United States then decided, for instance, to increase its aid to the Philippines—in 1985 that aid totalled \$236 million, including \$38.3 million spent on munitions. The United States also reached agreement with Japan, the Philippines' number-one financial donor, on coordinating all loan and credit programmes for Manila, so that they could be used to serve best the interests of Washington and Tokyo.

The treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are the basis for the strategic machinery of the United States, ensuring its military presence in Asia and posing an immediate threat to Asia's socialist and non-aligned nations.

The significance of those bilateral agreements increased in the light of the current crisis of the present Asian system of multilateral military alliances: The SEATO military bloc, set up on September 8, 1954, on the basis of the treaty of collective defense of Southeast Asia, was dissolved on June 30, 1977, soon after the failure of the US aggression in Vietnam. The ANZUS alliance, the second in the region that involves the United States, set up on September 1, 1951 when the US, Australia and New Zealand concluded a tripartite security treaty, is now on the verge of collapse, too.

In October 1984, the Labour Government of New Zealand prohibited the ships that are nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed to visit the country's ports. As the US flatly refuses to indicate whether or not its surface ships or submarines are carrying nuclear weapons when they come to foreign ports, New Zealand's decision actually barred all US warships from its ports.

⁶ *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 2, 1986.

⁷ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 2, 1986.

⁸ *The Military Balance, 1985-1986*, London, 1985, p. 127.

The blow on Washington's imperial ambitions was all the heavier since only a few months before, on June 24, 1984, Paul Wolfowitz, the then Assistant Secretary of State for East-Asian and Pacific Affairs, stressed the significance of the ANZUS alliance, saying it was just as important as NATO. He said that a strong NATO served as a deterrent on the global scale, promoting the interests of ANZUS. But likewise, he went on to say, the health of ANZUS was of vital importance to the global Western alliance, especially in the light of the growing significance of both Australia and New Zealand.⁹

In response to Wellington's decision, Washington cancelled a previously scheduled joint exercise, refusing to share intelligence with Wellington and to train or act jointly with New Zealand military personnel. US officials then threatened that they would no more regard New Zealand as an ally.¹⁰ State Secretary George Shultz told a Senate Committee on February 21, 1985 that New Zealand had actually pulled out of ANZUS.¹¹ After the talks with Australia held in San Francisco on August 10-11, 1986, Shultz said the United States considered itself free from its commitments before New Zealand concerning defense, thereby confirming in fact that ANZUS had actually ceased to exist as a tripartite alliance.

In the light of the Asian nations' growing reluctance to join military blocs and thereby expose themselves to the danger of involvement in a direct confrontation with socialist states, Washington has been, in the past few years, using indirect methods of including those nations in the imperialist military system. These methods are: providing military aid, selling weapons and technology or sending them free to nations with which it has no formal military treaties or agreements. In his message to the US Congress in connection with debates on the federal budget for 1986, State Secretary Shultz wrote frankly that investments into the foreign nations' aid paid tremendously, which was especially evident in East Asia and the Pacific.¹²

Following the course of building military blocs and alliances in this or that form, the United States pursues far-reaching goals that have nothing to do with the vital interests of the Asian nations. Those goals are:

- to broaden strategic opportunities for and the geographic sphere of operations of the US armed forces by building military bases in Asian countries, thousands of kilometers away from US territory and in close proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries;
- to use the military and economic potentials of the Asian states, involved in military blocs, for enhancing the overall combat power of the imperialist world;
- to get US allies involved in a confrontation with the USSR, thereby ensuring freedom of political and military manoeuvres for the United States; to shift on them the burden of local wars which will divert the resources of socialist states and, at the same time, undermine opportunities for social progress in the countries engaged in combat operations;
- to increase the dependence of US allies, leaning on US military presence on their territories or on deliveries of military hardware; to restrict their diplomatic and military initiative and ensure their moral and political support for Washington's military and political course;
- to keep the countries involved in military treaties within the world imperialist system, to strengthen the positions of the ruling élite

⁹ *Washington Times*, Feb. 25, 1985.

¹⁰ *U. S. News & World Report*, Feb. 18, 1985, p. 9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹² *Asahi Shimbun*, Feb. 23, 1985.

and prevent any radical social and political changes in those countries;¹³
— to hinder establishment of mutually advantageous and equitable cooperation between nations, dependent on the US in terms of military engagement, and socialist countries; to preclude development of friendly relations between them and expansion of the socialist nations' influence, globally or on regional scale;
— to promote the interests of the US military-industrial complex by expanding arms markets on the basis of links within military blocs, thus ensuring growing profits for manufacturers of military hardware.

NEW PHENOMENA IN THE POLICY OF BLOCS

The final goals and purposes of the imperialist policy concerning military blocs in Asian Pacific remain unchanged, though the policy itself has now acquired some new typical features.

First of all, Japan now plays a much more important role both in the alliance with the United States and in the global imperialist military system, as its military potential grows rapidly. Japan's military spending increases faster than that of the NATO countries. In 1960-1982, the United States increased its military spending by 290 per cent, the Federal Republic of Germany by 910 per cent, France, by 510 per cent, and Japan, by 2,380 per cent.¹⁴ This gap in the rates of military spending growth still remains. In 1982-1985, the military budgets of the West-European NATO countries grew by 8 per cent, while Japan boosted its own by 29 per cent. In 1986, Japan allocated 3.3 thousand billion yen (\$16.7 billion) for military purposes, which exceeded the 1985 figure by 6.6 per cent. Military spending for 1987 is planned to exceed 3.5 thousand billion yen (which equals about \$23 billion, according to the current exchange rates).

Polls show that 70 per cent of Japan's population favour strict observance of the 1976 provision restricting the country's military spending to one per cent of its GNP, which is a certain guarantee against Japan's extensive militarisation. But despite objections from the public, the Nakasone government approved on September 18, 1985 a five-year military buildup programme that fixed the country's military spending in 1986-1990 at 18.4 thousand billion yen (\$92 billion), i. e. 1.04 per cent of the GNP, so the one-per cent quota will be exceeded for the first time. Inflation and the need to raise pay for Japanese servicemen will make the figure considerably bigger. Besides, while military plans were formerly worked out by the National Defense Agency and regarded as recommendations, now the military programme, for the first time in the postwar years, is given the status of a government decision and is obligatory for all government agencies. The rapid military buildup, the Japanese press justly indicated, means that "Japan's peaceful course, proclaimed on the basis of a self-critical approach to the lessons of World War II, is falling to pieces".¹⁵

As Japan's military potential grows, its armed forces acquire an increasingly important role in the US strategic system in Asia. Japan has assumed the commitment to secure anti-aircraft and anti-submarine ope-

¹³ The US-Japanese "security pact" of 1951 stipulated, for instance, that US units could be used to put down major internal riots and disturbances. In 1960, that pact was replaced by a "security treaty" in which this provision was not included as formulating Washington's right to interfere directly in Tokyo's internal affairs in excessively frank terms; but the presence of US bases and troops on the territory of Japan and other US allies always leaves a possibility that they may be used as a police force under the cover of "a request" from the ruling quarters of this or that country.

¹⁴ *The Military Balance*, London, 1973, p. 75; 1985, pp. 168, 172.

¹⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 14, 1985.

rations in the North-Western Pacific, in close coordination with the US Navy and Air Force. It has undertaken the task of mining the international La Pérouse, Tsugaru, and Korea Straits, in an effort to blockade Soviet vessels in the Sea of Japan and to seal off their passage into the Pacific. Also, the Japanese government decided to put its navy units on patrol missions, 1,000 miles off Japan's coast, which includes escorting US nuclear-armed ships.

At the 16th US-Japanese consultative conference on security, held in Honolulu on January 16-18, 1986, the US delegation presented new demands to Japan—those of installing beyond-the-horizon radars on Japanese territory, which would be part of a US radar surveillance network designed to cover the entire airspace from the Sea of Okhotsk to the South China Sea.

US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage stressed the exceptional role reserved for Japan by the plans of Pentagon. He said Japan remained the cornerstone of US strategy of forward-based defenses in the Asian Pacific region.¹⁶

Apart from cooperation in building the armed forces and ensuring their combat training, Washington now attaches growing importance to Tokyo's assistance in military policies and military technology.

Of special significance here is the Japanese government's decision, taken on September 9, 1986, to join the US "strategic defense initiative" programme envisaging the extension of the arms race to outer space.

The US expects Japan to provide assistance in developing computers, fiber optics and lasers. The Pentagon also wishes to obtain from Japan the technology of millimeter-range communication systems which would make it possible to transmit large quantities of information to space with exceptional precision and speed, and to coordinate operations of satellites equipped with laser and particle-beam weapons. The press in Japan pointed out that the Japanese communications technology will be the core of the "nervous system" of the US war machinery.¹⁷

There was some information in the press on certain companies taking the first steps in that direction. It became known, for instance, that a super-powerful magnet block built by Hitachi Metals is being used at the US military laboratory in Los Alamos to develop space-based laser weapons. Being small in size, the block creates the magnetic field 5 to 7 times stronger than that produced by normal magnets.¹⁸

In February 1985, the opposition in the Japanese parliament raised the question of a special heat-resistant ceramic, manufactured by the Kyosera company, being extensively used in US rockets and spacecraft.

In June 1985, Japan received an official request from the United States to produce technology of an extra-precise missile-homing system.

Japan's decision to join the SDI programme is inevitably causing justifiable concern in neighbouring states, for it promotes the arms race and its extension to outer space, which will entail most baneful effects for the world's future. The governments of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have strongly condemned the decision. The Soviet Foreign Ministry's statement emphasised that "the consent to commit the Japanese economic, scientific, and technological potential to the Star Wars programme cannot be regarded otherwise than as an indication of Japan's further involvement in the military strategic plans of the United States. The Japanese government is respon-

¹⁶ *The Reagan Administration Views on Appropriate US Defense Policies Towards Japan*....., p. 6.

¹⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Feb. 10, 1985.

¹⁸ *Asahi Evening News*, June 21, 1985.

sible for possible dangerous consequences of such a policy. This, of course, cannot but have a negative effect on Soviet-Japanese relations."¹⁹

The second major new feature in Washington's policy concerning military blocs is the course to establish close links between NATO and US allies in Asia, with a long-term goal of building a single global system of imperialist blocs.

Persistent efforts are being made to drag Japan closer to the North-Atlantic alliance. The annual survey of the US Defense Department published in Washington on January 31, 1983 openly states, for the first time that, as a military ally, Japan is as close to the United States as the NATO countries. The survey stressed the need to build "a collective security system" in Asian Pacific, with Japan as a component part of "the Western alliances joint defenses". The Japanese press has commented on that call, indicating that Washington seeks to "put on Japan as much military responsibility as the NATO countries have".²⁰

In accordance with the course towards closer links with NATO, Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, while touring Western Europe in March 1983, said that Japan would like to join NATO as an "associate member". Though that *démarche* was countered by strong protests from France, Japan keeps on vigorously expanding its contacts with the NATO countries. Agreement has been reached, for instance, on military information exchanges. In 1984-1985, Japan conducted intensive talks with the Defense Ministers of Federal Germany, Britain, and France.

When they met in Tokyo in early October 1985, the FRG Defense Minister Manfred Werner and the head of Japan's National Defense Agency Koichi Kato discussed, for instance, participation in the Star Wars programme, ways of enhancing the two countries' "defense potentials" and "building up Western solidarity". Werner then said that, in this opinion, "there are no major obstacles for defense cooperation between the FRG and Japan".²¹

A third direction in US policy consists in attempts to build new military blocs in Asia, reanimate the existing ones, or increase the number of their members.

The major problems in the ANZUS alliance's operation, stemming from New Zealand's suspension of membership, made the Pentagon take steps towards expansion of military links with Australia.

At the same time, attempts are being made to bring Japan closer to that bloc. Washington believes that Japan's regular participation since 1980 in the Rimpac biennial naval exercise was a major step in that direction. That exercise involving Japanese navy, together with that of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, is the biggest in the Pacific.

The 1986 Rimpac exercises started on May 18, lasting six weeks, and it was special because British naval units also took part. The Japanese press pointed out that "due to the participation of British ships, the manoeuvres will grow global in significance" and that the United States hoped "to demonstrate thereby the unity of the Western camp and the effectiveness of the great alliance of opposition to the USSR, from the Pacific to the Atlantic". The press indicated that Japan's participation in these exercises was especially dangerous, "since this will be another step towards turning the Japanese-US alliance into an offensive-defensive bloc like NATO".²²

Though the purposes of the exercises were clearly provocative, Japan's participation was more extensive than ever before: its squadron there in-

¹⁹ *Izvestia*, Sept. 12, 1986.

²⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, Feb. 1, 1983.

²¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Oct. 8, 1985.

²² *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 10, 1985.

cluded 8 destroyers carrying anti-submarine helicopters, and for the first time—a submarine; the squadron was second only to the US force participating in the exercise.

The US plans give a high priority to the establishment of a tripartite alliance involving Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, on the basis of the United States' bilateral military treaties with Japan and South Korea. Exchanges of visits between the chiefs of the military establishments and other high-ranking military delegations of South Korea and Japan have been regular since July 1979. Japan sends observers to the annual US-South-Korean exercise code-named Team Spirit, the biggest in Asia. It has been announced that the states have agreed to start exchange visits of warships. The Japanese-South-Korean parliamentary council on security, set up in April 1979, coordinates the two countries' general stands on military affairs.

Considerable impetus was given to Japan's relations with South Korea by Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Seoul in January 1983. Despite the numerous official statements that Japan did not intend to establish any military links with South Korea, there were press reports saying that Prime Minister Nakasone and President Chun Doo Hwan "discussed the situation in the Korean Peninsula and exchanged views on security problems", and "agreed in principle on the future distribution of military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States".²³ The talks were continued during Chun Doo Hwan's return visit to Tokyo in September 1984. Further expansion of links was later discussed at a ministerial conference in Seoul on August 29-30, 1985.

When the Japanese-South-Korean and South-Korean-Japanese cooperation committees, whose members are politicians, businessmen, and scientists, held a joint session in Tokyo on July 30, 1986, the South-Korean delegation called for "consolidation of bilateral military cooperation". They said that Japan's constitution should be revised and argued that, since Japan and South Korea had military treaties with the United States, "it would be proper, first on the non-governmental level, to pursue negotiations on effecting the same type of cooperation between Japan and South Korea".²⁴

The huge economic aid coming from Japan is a factor of paramount importance for the development of the South-Korean military-industrial potential. When Tokyo decided to honour Seoul's request for loans and credits worth a total of \$4 billion in early 1983, *The Wall Street Journal* daily, reflecting the views of US businessmen, commented that Japan's decision was an indirect commitment to support South Korea's defenses, giving impetus to the promotion of its unsteady economy and strengthening the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul axis.²⁵

There are quite a few political obstacles that impede formal establishment of a military bloc involving Japan and South Korea. But the promotion of links between the two countries' military establishments and Japan's extensive aid to South Korea, largely used for the development of its military-industrial potential, indicate that certain practical steps are being taken towards the formation of a tripartite alliance.

A special role in Washington's foreign-policy strategy in Southeast Asia belongs to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). President Reagan has called ASEAN the main support of the US policy in Southeast Asia.²⁶ The White House seeks to expand military links with the ASEAN member-states, with the ultimate goal of enhancing the Asso-

²³ *The Daily Yomiuri*, Jan. 12, 1983.

²⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 31, 1986.

²⁵ *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 17, 1983.

²⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 12, 1986.

ciation's military aspects and then joining it to other imperialist military blocs, using, for instance, the US-Philippine military alliance.

Thailand is another country that has close military links with the United States. There has been no military treaty between the two countries since the formal dissolution of SEATO, but there are two bilateral documents that still remain in effect: the joint communique of March 6, 1962, in which the United States assumed the commitment to render military aid to Thailand, and the agreement of June 24, 1964, including Thailand into the system of US military aid. In its efforts to make Thailand its number-one henchman in the struggle against the socialist nations of Indochina, Washington increased its military aid to Bangkok more than three-fold, from \$32.4 million in 1979 to \$102.3 million in 1985, and then to \$140 million in 1986.

That aid plus Thailand's own huge military spending (\$1.6 billion in 1984) are used to maintain an army of 235,000 officers and men, and to build up the country's military potential, by purchasing the latest weaponry from the United States. In 1973-1977, Thailand imported \$310-million worth of weaponry; in 1978-1982, its munitions imports totalled \$1.1 billion, a 260-per cent increase over the previous five years. It was announced in June 1985 that Thailand would be the first Southeast Asian country to receive 12 latest F-16 fighter-bombers from the United States.

The Thailand's army follows the US pattern. Hundreds of Thai officers are trained in the United States every year. The two countries regularly conduct joint military exercises. Their biggest joint exercise, code-named Cobra Gold '86 was conducted in July 1986, involving some 15,000 officers and men. They carried out mock landing operations, the mining of sea lanes, in areas adjacent to the border of Kampuchea.

When US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger visited Bangkok in April 1986, one of the issues discussed was the construction in Thailand of strategic arms depots, which exist so far only in the FRG and South Korea.

The United States is also a major supplier of the latest types of weapons to Indonesia; the White House approved the selling of F-16-100 fighter-bombers to that country. Indonesia plans to form a squadron of 36 F-16-100 aircraft, with 8 of them ordered in 1986.²⁷

The US Defense Department has established extensive links with its counterpart in Singapore, whose location in Southeast Asia is of major strategic importance. The Singapore government's permission issued in mid-1978 allows US warships, including nuclear-armed vessels, to visit the port of Singapore. The government also permits the Ten Tenga airfield to be used by US reconnaissance planes flying missions over the Indian Ocean and by military transport planes for stopovers. The United States and Singapore regularly conduct joint naval exercises.

Expanding its links with Australia is another way by which Washington seeks to get the ASEAN nations involved in its military system. In 1982-1984, a number of agreements on regional cooperation in the military field were concluded, under which Australia now trains military officers, provides military experts and various types of weapons for ASEAN countries; they also conduct joint exercises. Singapore now has permission to use military training centres in Australia.

Fresh proof of Washington's growing interest in the ASEAN countries was provided by President Reagan's four-day visit to Indonesia (April 30—May 3, 1986). Reagan had talks with President Suharto and also with ASEAN Foreign Ministers who gathered on Bali Island.

The plans to get the ASEAN nations involved in the US military mechanism in Asia are directly linked with the idea of forming what has

²⁷ *Financial Times*, March 10, 1986.

been termed "a Pacific community", "which, in future, can be transformed into a closed regional group, into another militaristic bloc".²⁸

During their talks in Los Angeles on January 2, 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan decided that, considering the obvious reluctance of the Southeast Asian nations to get involved in the new bloc, the United States and Japan should step aside and feign indifference, leaving the initiative to the ASEAN member-states. Neither Washington nor Tokyo, however, discarded their long-term goals concerning the establishment of a "Pacific community".

A major role in the system of imperialist blocs is reserved for joint or parallel actions, based on common interests in specific military and political problems, to be organised through "strategic consensus" and "tacit understanding" with countries that have no formal allied relations or military-aid agreements with the United States. This includes deliveries of "dual-purpose" technology and goods, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

The US ruling quarters pin certain hopes on the possibility of so-called "strategic partnership" with the People's Republic of China. To make the hopes come true, the United States will evidently try to use the 1983-1986 agreements on deliveries of "dual-purpose" and military technology to the PRC. When Yang Dezhi, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army of China, visited the United States in May 1986, one of the decisions taken authorised the previously banned delivery to the PRC of aviation electronic equipment worth a total of \$550 million; the possibility of the PRC's obtaining military equipment and technology from the United States was one of the issues also discussed.

The first steps towards establishing contacts with the PRC in the military field are being taken by Japan. There have been comments in the press that "discussions concerning possible Sino-Japanese cooperation in defense-related matters have been on the increase ever since Chinese Defense Minister, Zhang Aiping, visited Japan" in July 1984.²⁹

The return visit to the PRC of the Deputy Director of Japan's National Defense Agency, Haruo Natsume, on May 9-14, 1985 was a major step in this direction. During his talks with the PRC's top military officers, agreement was reached on exchanging visits of warships. Natsume said at a press conference that "a joint military exercise" was possible.³⁰ Another decision taken at that time was to "continue the dialogue between the Japanese and Chinese armed forces".³¹

In pursuing those agreements, the PLAC's Chief of the General Staff, Yang Dezhi, visited Tokyo on May 19-22, 1986, where he had talks with Japan's top officials informing them about the results of his visit to the United States. Soon after that, on June 8, Yang's deputy Xui Xin came on an official visit to Japan. He stayed one week, visiting Japan's military installations and discussing further links with the National Defense Agency leaders.

In the comments on the covert motives of the Pentagon's plans concerning military cooperation with the PRC, political analysts in Japan point out that "the United States certainly seeks to promote the growth of the PRC's military might proceeding from its anti-Soviet strategy". They also indicate that Japan must, by no means, permit itself to get involved in the policy of confrontation with the USSR. "If we seek to promote military cooperation with China following that strategy," the press pointed out, "that will be an extremely dangerous choice for Japan." Also, a warning was made that "promotion of cooperation in the military field between

²⁸ *Pravda*, April 24, 1986.

²⁹ *Mainichi Daily News*, April 15, 1985.

³⁰ *Asahi Evening News*, May 15, 1985.

³¹ *Mainichi Daily News*, May 12, 1985.

Japan and the PRC may cause a sharp negative reaction from the Southeast Asian states".³²

The military blocs policy pursued by the United States and other imperialist powers, as well as the course at upsetting strategic parity through deployment of new types and systems of weaponry, is the main factor destabilising the situation in Asian Pacific. That policy leads to a deeper confrontation between countries with different socio-economic systems, speeds up the arms race and aggravates the danger of a nuclear conflict.

In these conditions, special significance is acquired by the Soviet proposals to develop a comprehensive approach to the problems of security in Asia. The essence of that approach, as formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is in "pooling the efforts of all Asian states, irrespective of their social systems, in the name of a lasting peace and stability".³³

In other words, the Soviet Union proposes seeking the road to peace not through increasing the number of military blocs, which invariably entails aggravation of confrontation between the opposed forces in Asian Pacific, but through negotiations, with careful consideration for the interests of all states, large and small. The halt of the arms race, development and introduction of confidence-building measures, gradual lowering of the level of opposition, and elimination of the danger of nuclear war would fully meet the interests of not only Asian nations, but would be a major contribution to the consolidation of world peace.

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³² *Tokyo Shimbun*, May 30, 1986.

³³ *Pravda*, Aug. 30, 1985.

ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINESE TOWNS DISCUSSED

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[Article by A.V. Ostrovskiy, candidate of economic sciences]

The current economic reform in China began in the late 1970s. First, it involved the countryside, scoring by the mid-1980s tangible results in raising the output of farm produce and peasants' incomes. Then it spread to towns. In fact, the economic reform in towns has become a necessary condition for further progress in the countryside and a requisite for carrying out long-term economic plans.

The economic reform in towns was gradual. In the beginning, it involved as few as three towns: Chongqing (Sichuan province), Changzhou (Jiangsu province), and Shashi (Hubei province). Then a decision was made to use the experience and gradually to spread it to other Chinese towns. That meant that different approaches to the problem were to be taken. In some towns the reform could be comprehensive, in others partial, involving individual economic sectors at first and then spreading to other sectors when the conditions were ripe. This pertained primarily to major cities (subordinated to the central government), such as Peking, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Chinese officials have repeatedly told me that by the year 1985 the comprehensive economic reform was most successful in Changzhou, Chongqing, Shashi, and Wuhan.

In 1984-1985, I was a probation student at the Institute of Labour Economics of the People's University of China (in Peking). During the probation period, I was given the chance to get a closer look at the way the economic reform was being effected in Peking, Shanghai, Wuhan, Changzhou and Suzhou, to visit more than 20 enterprises and organisations and exchange views with Chinese officials on progress made so far in various localities. The people I talked to included local government officials in towns, enterprise directors and private entrepreneurs. The city of Wuhan (the capital of Hubei province in Central China) was among those which has scored most marked successes in implementing the economic reform. The city's population is 5,940,000, including the suburbs. It spreads on the banks of the Yangtze river and comprises three rather isolated districts: Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankou. Wuhan, one of the biggest Chinese cities, is fourth in the country in population, the volume of gross industrial output and the value of fixed assets.¹

Soviet people know well the revolutionary traditions of Wuhan. The great Chinese revolutionary-democrat Sun Yatsen lived and worked there. Major economic projects were built in Wuhan with Soviet assistance, such as the giant double-deck bridge over the Yangtze river and the big iron-and-steel works. These projects are still important for China's economy.

I went to Wuhan in early 1985. What struck my eyes first were rows of small stores, workshops, street pedlary stands, snack-bars and other private sector outlets and establishments that sprang up during the course of the economic reform and now their brisk trade is virtually non-stop. But these were but outward manifestations of the reform under way in Wuhan since the autumn of 1984.

¹ See *Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1984*, Beijing, 1984, p. III-69.

The decision to launch an economic reform in Wuhan was made in May 1984. A few months later, in September, a programme was approved for a comprehensive reform of the city's economic system. The reform pursued the following objectives: (1) to change the system of economic management in order to revitalise enterprise activities; (2) to enhance the role of economic levers, such as taxes, credit and prices; (3) to reorganise the system of *ganbu* (experienced workers) selection and hiring labour force at enterprises.² It is not fortuitous that Wuhan was selected in March 1985 as a venue for the all-China meeting on the economic reform in towns. I visited three types of enterprises in the city: a state-sector enterprise (No. 2 cotton-printing factory), a collective-sector enterprise (the washing machine plant), and private-sector businesses in Hanzhengjie district.

Before my visit to Wuhan enterprises, I was received at the local government office and advised at length on the economic reform then in progress in the city. The principal aims of the reform were as follows: (1) to spur enterprise activity; (2) to link up the city's three isolated districts; and (3) to set up trade centres which would ensure the timely selling of manufactured goods.

The reform granted enterprises the right to deal with production problems at all the four levels: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. Directive plan targets were reduced from 270 to 60, whereas indicative targets were increased. Four types of prices were fixed on all types of products. Subsidised products were given fixed state prices. A certain part of products had "floating" prices which could be either raised or reduced by the enterprise by 20 percent depending on the market situation. The enterprise could fix its own prices for output produced over and above the plan. These are "commission" or contract prices. The enterprise could fix market prices for 160 small items of its commodity range.

The transition of enterprises from the system of income deductions to taxes brought about certain changes in relations between enterprises and the state. At the first stage of the transition, enterprises had to pay income tax and "regulating" tax to the state budget. At the second stage, they had only to pay one tax, a "combined" one, established on the basis of the total profit received by the enterprise over the past three years. After paying the tax, part of the profit is retained and used for extending reproduction, paying bonuses and social insurance. The enterprise has the following sources of finance: (1) state capital investment which have to decrease each year; (2) bank credits; and (3) depreciation fund, of which 70 percent is retained by the enterprise.

Widespread in Wuhan are various forms of collective enterprises: collective enterprises proper, cooperative enterprises, etc.³ As distinct from state enterprises, cooperative enterprises shoulder all responsibility for their profits and losses and are not included into the state's wages fund (the wages fund of such enterprises is formed exclusively on the basis of the profit received). Some collective enterprises use primarily the system of cooperative share investments as a source of accumulation, while workers and employees at such enterprises receive "labour dividends" (*laodong fenhong*) at the end of each year based on the end result of the enterprise production activity depending on the investment made. The workers and employees of these enterprises are the owners of the means of production because they have invested their savings in production. They can with-

² See *Jingjixue zhoubao*, December 24, 1984.

³ Various forms of collective enterprises are dealt with in greater detail in *Renmin ribao*, January 18, 1985 (Run Wenzuo, "Various Forms of Economy and Methods of Production Management Are to Be Developed"); *Jingji ribao*, November 29, 1984, Zheng Shiming, Zhou Silin, "Let's Talk about the Reform at Enterprises".

draw their share as money if they so desire. At the end of the year the share holders receive dividends. The fund accounts for not more than 15 percent of the enterprise's income in accordance with the investment made. All the other forms of income depend on the labour input of individual workers and employees. In this way a worker receives, apart from his wage, an additional annual income which is directly proportional to his investment in the enterprise's fixed assets and its annual profit. The average income of workers and employees amounts to 120-150 yuan a month. All in all, there are from 1,200 to 1,300 such enterprises in Wuhan, each employing several dozen people.

During the course of the reform, changes have been made in the system of hiring labour. Wuhan has a plan for hiring labour, but the system of contract hiring is also used within its framework. After making a "labour wanted" announcement, the administration of an enterprise jointly with the city's labour and personnel department arranges exams. If the applicants fail at the exams or are short of points, they are again, if they so wish, eligible for the state job assignment programme and through it may get jobs at a collective or private enterprise. If admitted to a state-owned enterprise, the workers sign a five-year contract with the administration. If they prove competent, the contract may be prolonged for another five years, if not, it is terminated. Six months after signing the contract, the workers take a qualification exam. Depending on the result, their wage rate is established. Subsequently, the workers must take another exam every two years. The planners want to increase the number of "contract" workers and reduce that of "permanent" workers. It is believed that by the year 2000 "contract" workers will predominate at Wuhan enterprises. Today, however, their share is small. In 1983, there were 4,400 "contract" workers, but in 1984 the figure jumped to 10,000. Every year seasonal workers from villages are also hired by enterprises, their number ranging from 10 to 15 thousand.

Wages played a prominent role during the reform. Before the reform, time wages were predominant, accounting for 61 per cent of the city's aggregate wages fund. The share of piece wages was 13 per cent, and that of other forms 26 per cent. "Floating" wages (paid depending on the profit) were not used. As a result of the wages reform, from 1984 on, all enterprises were given the right to use a free wages fund which provided for "floating" ratings for 20 percent of workers and employees. To raise their rating, the workers have to pass a qualification exam. Their personal contribution to the enterprise's production activity, attitudes towards labour and other such factors are also taken into consideration. As a result of the reform, the following structure of wages set in at Wuhan enterprises in early 1985: (1) basic wages established on the basis of existing tariff rates (when the worker is transferred to another job with lower rates, the former wage is taken into account); (2) additional wages; (3) bonuses; (4) allowances (for work under the ground or in hot workshops); (5) overtime pay (this cannot exceed two percent of the basic wages).

The system of labour insurance has also changed as a result of the reform. The labour insurance fund at enterprises is formed from three sources. The first one is the state fund of social insurance, accounting for 11 per cent of the aggregate wages fund. It is taken into account when the product's cost is calculated. The second source is the pension fund and the temporary disablement fund formed as a tax-exempt part of the enterprise's social insurance fund. The third source is a part of the profit received through the sale of output, this part being retained by the enterprise.

A disablement allowances reform was carried out in Wuhan. Before the reform, workers and employees whose work record exceeded eight

years, received a sick-leave allowance equalling 100 percent of the wages. During the course of the reform 24 percent of the city's enterprises changed the system of paying disablement allowances. According to the new procedure, workers and employees whose service record exceeds 20 years receive an allowance equalling 90-100 per cent of the wages, whereas those whose service record is less than 20 years are only paid a part of the wages depending on that record.

The procedure for using the pension fund has also been changed. The lowest pension rate is the sum needed to maintain the worker's lowest living standard (some 20 yuan a month for one person). During the course of the reform, pension rates were raised by 5 per cent. The amount of the pensions received by workers and employees is established on the basis of their wages paid during the year preceding their retirement.

Collective enterprises have a system of labour insurance similar to that at state enterprises. Yet, social insurance at collective enterprises is limited by the fact that the only source of labour insurance there is the part of the profit retained by the enterprise after paying taxes.

In Wuhan, I visited enterprises in all three sectors: state, collective, and private.

The first was the No. 2 State Cotton-Printing Plant. Built in 1928 and reconstructed in 1975, the plant, employing 1562 workers and employees, has five production lines and produces 67 million metres of cotton annually, valued at 200 million yuan. The plant's income is 10 million yuan, its taxes 8 million. In 1984, the plant fulfilled its annual plan one month ahead of the schedule. The plant's management said that was due to the reform, specifically, due to the fact that their enterprise was the first in Wuhan to switch over to the system of production responsibility.

Prior to the reform, the plant was managed by a party committee. During the course of the reform management was given over to a director appointed by a higher-up body. In 1984, the director was given the right to appoint personnel to various jobs and make decisions independently. In everyday activities, the director relies on the standing management committee elected at a meeting of workers' and employees' representatives.

As regards the system of profit distribution, it has remained as it was at the first stage of the transition to taxation. The income tax accounts for 55 per cent of the plant's profit, the combined tax 33 per cent. Twelve percent of the profit is retained by the enterprise. All taxes are computed on the basis of profit indicators in 1983. Interestingly, this correlation will remain for seven years. In case the 1983 indicators are exceeded, the amount of taxes is left unchanged, whereas the surplus combined tax is divided into 10 parts, of which three parts go to the state budget and the remaining seven are retained by the enterprise. The income tax on this part of the profit becomes a combined tax.

The remaining profit is divided into five parts. These are: the production fund, the production development fund, the reserve fund, the social insurance fund, and the bonus fund. The social insurance fund is used to build creches, canteens, housing, etc. Bank credits are the main source of capital investment in fixed and current assets, though fixed assets are also extended through self-financing in the form of local and departmental investments and the enterprise's own finance.

On the basis of instructions from the Ministry of the Textile Industry, fixed prices are established for the plant's output. Yet the prices may also be "floating": 25 per cent higher or lower than the fixed price. But the plant has not as yet adopted the system of "floating" prices.

According to the administration, labour productivity at the plant is rather high: 136,034 yuan per one worker annually, which is almost 600 per cent higher than the country's average in the textile industry. I visited

the workshops and saw for myself that production efficiency is high and the plant in general is very much like similar plants in the USSR. The plant has not hired labour since 1981. It does not use "contract", "temporary" or seasonal workers, except in the "both-worker-and-peasant" system in housing construction.

There are 402 workers and employees (out of the total of 1,562) who are referred to as "workers of collective property". As distinct from the main body of personnel, by way of experiment they receive their wages depending on the results of the plant's production activity, rather than from the state wages fund.

The level of education of the plant's personnel is rather high, with 60.5 per cent of its workers and employees (1,064 people) having a complete secondary education and 30.4 per cent (535 people) an incomplete secondary education (9 grades). The workers and employees raise their level of education by attending supplementary courses, (work being discontinued) (51.8 per cent), through self-education (36.3 per cent) or by studying in the evening, without discontinuing work (11.9 per cent).

The reform has left the system of wages at the plant practically unaffected. As a rule, apprentices receive their wages depending on the length of their work record. The wages of workers involved in production directly depend on their rating determined in accordance with the established 8-rate tariff scale. The same tariff scale and a system of special contracts are used to pay the wages of workers who are not directly involved in production.

Each year the director has the right to raise the qualification ratings of 3 per cent of the workers and employees. For this, the applicants have to pass a qualification exam. Their attitude to work is also taken into account. In 1984, the ratings of 47 workers were raised. Today, use is made of the system of self-financing the wages fund through the part of the profit retained by the enterprise. Preparations are under way to establish a "floating" wages fund which would depend on the plant's profit. This fund will be used to raise qualification ratings. Plans are being worked out to introduce a system of wages which would make it possible to tie up the wages of experienced workers (*ganbu*) and employees with the result of the plant's production activities. The employees' salaries are composed of four parts: basic salary, service record allowance, post allowance, and "floating" salary.

Meetings of workers' and employees' representatives have been acting at the plant since 1975. On May 12, 1984, the rights of this body were expanded to include the right of inquiry, approval, decision-making, and election of director and assessment of his performance. The rights of the meeting of workers' and employees' representatives are extended to the sphere of production. At that particular plant, however, the director was not elected by the meeting of workers' and employees' representatives, but rather appointed by a higher-up department (as is the case with most of state-owned enterprises). A committee elected at a representatives meeting is in charge of everyday activities. It organises the work of four executive groups: the group of making inquiries to the director, the group of making analysis and assessment of personnel activities, the group of social insurance, and the group of production management and new technology.

In the period between meetings of workers' and employees' representatives organisational matters are dealt with by the trade union. The trade union committee resolves organisational problems and prepares draft decisions to be considered at the representatives' meeting. The trade union and the meeting of workers' and employees' representatives differ in that the latter does not have a higher-up body, whereas the former is subordinated territorially and to higher-up trade union organisations.

I also visited the *washing machine plant* and now have a good idea of what enterprises in the *collective sector* are like.

Before 1979, the plant turned out Dongfeng machine tools, which fell short of the state standards and sold badly. The plant was reconstructed in the fourth quarter of 1979. The Ministry of the Light Industry subsidised one million yuan, and the local government gave another 1.5 million. The plant launched the production of Lotus (Hehua) washing machines. In 1980, the plant was exempted from taxes. The government subsidised 127 yuan for making each washing machine. The plant's output and income increased markedly in a few years. In 1981, it produced 60,000 washing machines and its profit exceeded 480,000 yuan, production tax exempt. In 1984, the plant turned out 210,000 washing machines, the value of its aggregate product was 38 million yuan, and its income reached 3.5 million yuan. All the taxes were then collected in full.

The Wuhan washing machine plant is a large collective enterprise. As distinct from state-owned enterprises, the plant itself is responsible for its profits and losses, and all production decisions are made by the meeting of workers' and employees' representatives, rather than by the director.

In 1984, the plant began to issue shares and each worker and employee could make investments in fixed and current assets whose sum was not to exceed 50 yuan. In 1985, however, this limitation was lifted and the plant's workers and employees may now invest any sum, though they cannot either buy or sell their shares. They began to receive dividends depending on the investment made. It is believed that such measures would stimulate workers' activity. Yet, the annual sum of dividends cannot exceed two-month wages and salaries and 25 per cent of the investment made.

Collective enterprises have "indicative", i. e., guiding, planning, which is their important distinction from state-run enterprises. Under "indicative" planning, only two indicators are mandatory: profit and units of output, the 12 other indicators being "floating". They can deviate either side from the plan targets, sometimes rather substantially. The enterprise ensures production growth and seeks to receive a maximum profit which would markedly exceed the planned figure, and ensure an increase in the funds of social insurance, bonuses and production expansion. Before the reform, the plant, having paid the income tax (55 per cent of its profits), spent 20 per cent of the profit for housing. The remainder was distributed among its various departments. After the reform, the plant, prior to paying taxes, has first to pay back the loan, then to pay 55 per cent of the income tax from the planned profit and 50 per cent of the income tax rate from the profit in excess of the plan. One per cent of the plant's realised profit can be used to run in new types of product. Following the approval of new technology and new products by the local science committee, the plant is exempted from taxes for one or two years. All the profit received by producing new types of goods goes to the production development fund.

After paying taxes, the remainder of the plant's profit is used to develop production (25 per cent), to supplement the current assets (25 per cent), for social insurance (38 per cent), and for "earned dividends" (12 per cent). The plant finances all social insurance expenditures. The plant's profit is the sole source of finance for the social insurance fund.

Beginning in 1983, the plant was granted the right to announce tenders for purchasing equipment and machinery it needs. Heavy industry enterprises exhibit their samples, and the plant administration carefully selects the sample it considers the best and signs a contract with the relevant enterprise. The plant holds annual fairs of its production. In 1984, for instance, such fairs were organised in 17 Chinese provinces. The participants included 170 representatives. As a result, the plant received or-

ders for more than 600,000 washing machines, but contracts were signed for only 310,000 units for 1985.

The commercial department handles the wholesale realisation of the product. The plant has the right independently to establish prices for its product, but they have to be approved by the price department. To ensure the fulfilment of the profit plan, the average prices of the product cannot be lower than the plant's prices during the period of commodity circulation.

The reform has given enterprises the right to sell their products for export. Manufactured goods are realised through the state-owned export-import company. Part of the hard currency earnings can be used by the plant to buy foreign technology.

A system of production responsibility began to be actively promoted at the plant since 1984. It ensures both the plant's responsibility before trading organisations for the fulfilment of delivery contracts and responsibility at various management levels inside the plant.

There are 1,159 workers and employees at the plant. Besides, it employs 40 "temporary" workers. In the future, the plant is going to hire contract workers only, so the share of "permanent" workers will go down every year. Prior to the reform, the labour and personnel department assigned workers to the plant. Today, this hiring procedure is supplemented with additional requirements: they have to pass exams and undergo a medical check-up.

The plant pays much attention to personnel training. It has a vocational school, with 40-50 people graduating each year. There is also a group of students who raise their level of education. Fifty people study for three months, leaving their jobs for the period. Other forms of study are also used, such as sending workers (experienced and otherwise) and employees to the TV university or evening training courses. At present, 30 people are studying.

After the reform, the plant was given the right to discharge workers independently. Over the past year, several people were fired for violations of labour discipline, disobeying management orders, absenteeism or crimes.

The reform has brought about some changes in the system of wages at the plant. At present, basic wages (which are a form of time wages) account for 70 per cent of the workers' overall wages. The remaining 30 per cent is composed of "floating" wages and piece-based bonuses. The plant's monthly fund of wages is distributed among workshops depending on the output. Workshops' funds of wages are "floating", 5.5 yuan being paid for each washing machine if 18-20 thousand units are turned out monthly, 5.4 yuan if the output is 20-22 thousand, and 5.2 yuan if it is 22-24 thousand. The salaries of the administrative personnel are also "floating" and depend on the fulfilment of contract obligations. The salaries of engineers and technicians include "post bonuses". For example, the director and his deputies additionally receive 35 yuan, team leaders 12 yuan, and heads of workshops 25 yuan. In auxiliary workshops, such as drilling and polishing, piece wages are used.

Each year, 25 per cent of the fund of "floating" wages is spent to update the tariff rates. This is the money from the plant's profit, and it is not part of the product's cost. Besides 5 per cent of the plant's aggregate wages fund (this is included in the product's cost) is also spent on raising the tariff rates. Workers willing to have a higher tariff rate must make a tangible annual contribution to the plant's production activity (they must rationalise production, invent new production methods, and use advanced methods of labour). Each year, the plant names 10 front-rank workers and 10 best experienced workers, engineers and technicians. All candidates are approved by the presidium of the meeting of workers'

and employees' representatives. At present, the basic wage at the plant averages at 51.3 yuan a month, while the aggregate wage is 86 yuan a month, bonuses and all other allowances included. In 1985, workers' total wages went up and averaged at 130 yuan a month, provided the production plan was fulfilled.

An apprentice system is in use at the plant, with the training period ranging from two to three years. An apprentice's wage during the first year of training is 29 yuan, which is then increased to 38 yuan. To become a worker, the apprentice has to take an exam. In case the exam is not passed, the apprentice has to go on training for another year. A repeated failure entails firing from the plant.

The meeting of workers' and employees' representatives is the highest body of authority at the plant. It is held twice a year. The meeting discusses and resolves production problems and elects a director for the term of three years from amongst contestants for the post. Once elected, the director resolves all the problems of personnel placement personally. All major issues pertaining to plant management are tackled with the participation of the meeting of workers' and employees' representatives, which approves annual and long-term plans. The meeting also considers all administrative and structural changes.

The plant's trade union is a working body of the meeting of workers' and employees' representatives. In the period between the meeting's sessions, it is responsible for current activities aimed at raising the general educational and professional level of workers and employees, organising a socialist emulation and cultural work, and introducing innovations and rationalisation proposals. Not all the workers and employees at that particular plant are trade union members (1,009 out of 1,162). Any worker or employee can apply for union membership, except for the "temporary" workers.

There is a standing production management committee at the plant. It is made up of the director, secretary of the party committee, secretary of the Komsomol committee, trade union leader, chief specialists (chief production engineer, chief engineer, chief accountant) and front-rank workers. The director chairs the committee. Its purpose is to generalise and analyse production development problems and assist lower structural units in dealing with everyday problems.

My stay in Wuhan ended with my visit to Hanzhengjie district, the site of various *enterprises in the private sector*. There were some 100 private enterprises in 1979. In 1984, their number jumped to 1,024. They employed 2,024 people, including 60 per cent men and 40 per cent women. Of this, 40 per cent was made up of young people waiting for work assignments. Part of the private entrepreneurs (40 per cent) have a complete or incomplete secondary education (from 9 to 12 grades of secondary school). Another 40 per cent have a primary education.

A considerable part of private entrepreneurs are engaged in trade (46 per cent) and catering (20 per cent). In industry, craftsmen account for 11.3 per cent, the service and maintenance sphere 10 per cent, transport 3 per cent, and other spheres 0.7 per cent.

Twenty percent of individual craftsmen hire a labour force (apprentices and hands), in most cases for a season (three or four months). These are, as a rule, former villagers, retired workers and employees, and the unemployed. Hired workers receive from 80 to 100 yuan a month on the average, which often exceeds the wages of workers employed at state-owned and collective enterprises.

Hanzhengjie district developed rather rapidly in recent years. In 1984, the fixed and current assets of all of its private businesses amounted to 10 million yuan. Commodity circulation increased at an especially rapid rate. In 1982, commodity turnover in the district totalled 16.5 million

yuan, whereas in 1983 it amounted to 32.75 million, and in 1984 to 73.5 million. Industry had a comparatively high rate of growth. In 1984, the district's handicraft industry involved 228 people working at 130 workshops. The fixed and current assets of all of its industrial enterprises added up to 390,000 yuan, i. e., 1,710 yuan per person on the average. Clothing and textile undertakings predominate in the district.

In Hanzhengjie, I visited a workshop making collars for sweaters. The staff comprises 10 people: five are family members and the other five are hired. They are all from village and are employed for three months when they do not have to do their farm work. Their monthly income is some 300 yuan. The workshop's fixed and current assets total 10,000 yuan. The head of the family valued his fixed assets at three or four thousand yuan. The workshop has four looms, each making some 400 collars daily. Each collar sells at 0.5 yuan. So, each worker's daily labour productivity is worth 200 yuan. Raw materials are purchased in town. The whole family is involved in selling the product nine months a year (after the hired workers go back to their villages to do farming).

To become a private entrepreneur, one has to submit an application to the local district committee, which then passes it over to the town department for approval. To get a license for opening a business, the applicant must comply with three requirements: (1) residential permit; (2) no permanent occupation; (3) ability to do business.

Private entrepreneurs did not pay taxes in the period between 1979 and 1981. Each business made a monthly payment of three yuan to cover management expenses. Beginning in 1982, three types of taxes were paid: (1) everyday management tax (3 per cent of the sales income); (2) income tax (0.5 per cent); and (3) administrative expenses (1 per cent). As a result, the average monthly income in the private sector was 300 yuan in 1984. Zuo Feng, the 66 year-old head of the association of private handicraftsmen in Hanzhengjie, is one of the most successful entrepreneurs in the district. Before 1979, he dragged out a miserable existence and his household was termed "difficult". He opened his business in 1979, having 400 yuan as seed money. Zuo Feng sells stockings, fishing-line, hooks, and other such things. In 1984, his capital amounted to 13,000 yuan, and monthly income to 300-400 yuan. In the family of ten, six people are engaged in production, one is a pensioner, and the others are children. The family has a TV set, a washing machine, a bicycle, a motorcycle, a sewing machine. Everyone has a wrist watch. The income of the rest of the family employed in the state and collective sector is 70 yuan a month. The family gives money to the state within the framework of various state loan programmes. Specifically, between 1982 and 1984 Zuo Feng acquired state loan bonds worth 1500 yuan. He gave 400 yuan for irrigation work on the Huangxiaohu river (the city of Wuhan) and 200 yuan for the children's fund.

The development of the individual sector in Hanzhengjie resulted in the setting up (in 1983) of a credit cooperative, the first of its kind in the PRC. Actually, it is a collective organisation of private entrepreneurs. The cooperative has a joint-stock council made up of private handicraftsmen. The cooperative staff includes eleven people, of which nine are retired employees and two are people waiting for work assignments. At present, 260,000 yuan of free capital is in circulation, 1.3 million yuan is debt capital and 1.4 million yuan is loan capital. In a 3.5-month period, net income totalled 9,000 yuan, investment rent being 0.8 per cent and credit payments 0.9 per cent. The cooperative performs the following operations: receives deposits, grants credit, transfers money, opens deposit and current accounts, deals with insurance, performs trust operations, issues bills of exchange for credit, and gives loans to individuals when the sum exceeds 3,000 yuan. In 1984, loans averaged at 10,000 yuan. The

credit cooperative's employees receive a salary (50 yuan a month) and bonuses (10 yuan a month). During the probation period their salary is 30 yuan.

All the employees in the credit cooperative have their shares in the bank and receive dividends made up of two parts: 25 per cent of the net profit on their bank investments and 5 per cent of the net profit on their labour input. Besides, 50 per cent of the profit is used to supplement fixed assets and 20 per cent goes to the social fund. At present, 165 families of private entrepreneurs make bank deposits for their old age insurance.

My visit to Wuhan may be summed up as follows. The state sector apparently continues to determine the main trends and nature of economic development in the PRC. The changes that have occurred in Wuhan during the course of the economic reform affected only slightly the enterprises in the state sector both in the sphere of production and that of management. State-owned enterprises do not make extensive use in their everyday production activities of the four interim decrees adopted by the PRC State Council in 1981-1983 on the meetings of workers' and employees' representatives, on the work of directors, on the work of party organisations at all levels, and on the state industrial enterprise. State enterprises still have a great number of plan indicators, including major ones, such as the total number of the employed, the planned range of goods, and the aggregate wages fund.

The private sector in towns is making rather rapid headway. Industrial production and commodity turnover are expanding rapidly there. In the biggest trading district of Hanzhengjie, the expansion of the private sector has resulted in the appearance of China's first credit cooperative, granting loans and credits to individual entrepreneurs. The latter's income is continuously growing and is markedly higher than that of workers and employees at state and collective enterprises. At the same time, the private sector in towns is not yet strong enough economically to pose a threat to the socialist basis of China's economy. First, labour productivity at such enterprises is extremely low, and the share of the private sector in gross industrial output and retail trade turnover is too small. Second, their activities are under constant control by trade and industrial administrative bodies which can always put pressure to bear on them by using price and tax levers.

Enterprises in the collective sector seem to warrant most attention. Today, such enterprises are extremely varied, ranging from associations of small individual entrepreneurs to big enterprises which are essentially very much similar to state-owned enterprises as far as the character of production is concerned. Moreover, the economic reform is most successful at collective enterprises, especially in regard to such measures as "guiding" (indicative) planning, "floating" and commission prices, the system of responsibility for profits and losses, the "floating" wages fund, the system of share investment in the fixed assets of an enterprise and the payment of dividends at the end of the year depending on the investment made.

To sum up, the economic reform has made most rapid progress in the collective and private sector, which may have a marked long-term effect on economic planning when collective enterprises are gradually excluded from the sphere of state planning. In all probability, however, this process will be complicated, at times contradictory and may drag on for years.

CHINESE RED ARMY'S LONG MARCH MARKED, 50 YEARS LATER

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[Article by M.F. Yuryev, doctor of historical sciences]

A significant factor in China's contemporary political history, the army was particularly all-important in the decade between 1927 and 1936 marked by a civil war between the Communist-led revolutionary forces and the right-wing nationalist government of the Guomindang. The Guomindang attacks on the Soviet regions¹ and counter-attacks by the Red Army of China were chief forms of armed struggle. After beating off three attacks, the CPC units were partly defeated during the fourth onslaught and had to withdraw west from the region at the junction of Hubei, Henan and Anhui provinces, to Shenxi and Northern Sichuan.

By the beginning of the fifth Guomindang attack (October 1933), there were three main Soviet regions in the Yangtze Valley: the Central region incorporating portions of Jiangxi and Fujian provinces (1st Front of the Red Army), the Sichuan-Shenxi region (4th Front), and the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou region (2nd Army Group also known as the 3rd Corps). The main strike was directed against the Central Soviet region. On recommendation from German military advisers, the Guomindang was using the blockhouse tactics, with 500,000 government troops closing in slowly on the 100,000-strong 1st Front of the Red Army and consolidating their advance by lines of blockhouses (there were several thousand of them built all in all). Pressed by the vastly superior enemy and hamstrung by errors on the part of the CPC leaders, the Red Army failed to cope and had to withdraw from the Central Soviet region, fighting its way out of encirclement.

To relieve the main forces, the CPC Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) launched two operations. In August 1934, the 6th Army Group (AG) broke through westward from the region on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces and three months later linked up with the 2nd AG, thereby forming the 2nd Front of the Red Army of China under a RMC subcommittee comprising He Long, CPC Central Committee members Ren Bishi, Guan Xiangying and Xia Xi, as well as Xiao Ke and Wang Zheng. In the course of 12 months of fighting in Western Hunan, the 2nd Front (17,000-strong by the autumn of 1935) regained and expanded the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Soviet region.²

¹ Bodies of revolutionary-democratic power were called Soviets between 1927 and 1936.

² Xiao Ke, "The Period of Link-Up of the 2nd and the 6th AGs of the Red Army", *Jindaishi yanjiu*, No. 1, 1980, pp. 6-10; Zhang Goqi, "Raising the Red Army in the Period of the Second Civil Revolutionary War", *Jindaishi yanjiu*, No. 4, 1981, pp. 100-101.

In July 1934, the 7th AG led by Xun Huizhou marched north from the Central Soviet region and three months later, following several bloody engagements, linked up with the 10th Corps operating in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border region. Together they formed the 10th AG commanded by the Military and Political Council under Fang Zhimin. Intended against the Japanese, the 10th AG (numbering between 10,000 and 15,000 troops), designated as the anti-Japanese vanguard column, was moved north and subsequently routed by a vastly superior Guomindang force in January 1935 (there were 7-8 enemy soldiers for each Red Army serviceman). Fang Zhimin and column commander Liu Chouxi were taken prisoner and executed.

Operations by the 6th AG, the 7th AG and the 10th Corps improved chances of the 1st Front and enabled it to rally for a break-through of the encirclement and to retreat west with the purpose of preserving manpower and setting up a new territorial base. This move was all the more necessary since the situation left no hopes of victory, should the defense of the Central Soviet region be persisted with.

On instructions from the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Otto Braun, the military adviser sent by the Comintern to assist the Chinese Red Army Command, drew up a plan of action for August, September and October 1934. Approved by Zhou Enlai, member of the CPC CC Politburo and chief political commissar of the Red Army, and, in an amended form, by the Standing Committee of the CPC CC Politburo, the plan provided for a break-through of the blockade of the Central Soviet region. The chief political slogan of the day was mobilising all forces in the Central Soviet region and the masses all over the country to fight against the Japanese aggression. The immediate task was to emerge from the encirclement, link up with He Long and Ren Bishi, and create a new strong base in the west, in the Hunan-Guizhou border region. The 1st Front had to cut through four lines of fortifications encircling the Central Soviet region³.

By October 1934, the Red Army had between 280,000 and 300,000 officers and men, of whom about 90,000 were in the Central Soviet region (between 10,000 and 30,000 under Xian Ying, Chen Yi and Zhang Dingcheng stayed back to conduct guerilla warfare). By the time of the break-through of the Guomindang blockade, the 1st Front consisted of five army groups.

Members of the Central Committee and Soviet government, and the cadres were marching with the troops. Each was carrying a fortnightly supply of rice and salt. Later food had to be bought from the population. Commanding the assault force, composed of the 1st AG (Lin Biao) and 3rd AG (Peng Dehui), was the Red Army Chief of Staff Liu Bocheng.

Before the march started, the 1st Front troops were covertly massed at Changding and Ninghua (Western Fujian) and Ruijing and Yudu (Southern Jiangxi). The Red Army took the field as a combat-ready force.

The march was launched on October 16, 1934, from the village of Tongluowan (Southern Jiangxi). On October 21, the Red Army broke through the first line of Guomindang fortifications between Anyuan and Xinfeng, crossed the Zhangshui River and straddled the Ganzhou-Nanxiong highway. The break-through came as a surprise for the enemy (the line was manned by Guangdong troops, a weaker contingent than Chiang Kaishek's Nanking force) who retreated westward. Hot on his heels, three columns of the 1st Front broke the second line of forti-

³ Shi Ping (Chen Yun), "The Heroic March", *Communist International*, No. 33-34, 1935, p. 27; *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 2, 1954, p. 86; Otto Braun, *Chinese Notes, 1932-1939*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 104-105.

fications between November 2 and 5, and seized the towns of Rucheng, Guidong and Chenhou on the border between Hunan, Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces. In so doing, they routed two Hunan regiments and captured large quantities of ammunition. On 15 and 16 November, they broke the third fortified line protecting the Guangzhou-Hankou road and straddled the Zhuzhou-Shaozhou highway. All attempts by Hunan units to check the Red Army advance were beaten back. On November 24, the newly reunited Red Army units crossed the Xiaoshui River.

Now Chiang Kaishek's plan was to push the Red Army to the Xiangjiang River, encircle it and crush it between two Nanking divisions and the Guangdong troops. But the plan was foiled, too. Though the crossing of the Xiangjiang had claimed numerous casualties, the Red Army broke the fourth (the last) line of fortifications. Of much help to it were the local population, who gave it guides and reinforcements. For example, due to the efforts by the Communist underground, over 400 builders of the Guangzhou-Hankou railway, working near the town of Yizhang (Southern Hunan), joined the Red Army.⁴

Behind these successes were the military skills, loyalty to the revolution, high morale and political awareness of officers and men. But there might have been fewer casualties had it not been for an excessive loss of time during decision-making and execution of orders, squabbles between military and political leaders, intelligence blunders, and mistakes committed in forming new units, which were overburdened by noncombatants and trains carrying the arsenal equipment, printing presses, and money-printing machines. There were 5,000 persons engaged in hauling this property. The cumbersome train held the Army back and it happened sometimes that the rear guard lagged 10 days behind the advance guard.

So, by mid-December 1934, two months after it had taken the field, the 1st Front had cracked four lines of fortifications, fought its way through 500 kilometres of difficult ground and dozens of engagements, won three major battles, and was now free to make strategic decisions. Chiang Kaishek's plan to crush the Red Army within the circle of blockade, suggested by his German military advisers, was defeated.

After it crossed the Xiangjiang River and emerged from the encirclement, the 1st Front headed north-west toward the junction of Hunan, Guizhou and Guangxi. During one of the halts, the Military Council reorganised the 1st Front, with the 8th AG and the 22nd Division being disbanded and their personnel used to bring the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th AGs to strength. There were no less than 45,000 servicemen in combat units. The noncombatant columns—the train and the staff—were trimmed, something improving the combatant ratio (6 : 1 instead of 3 : 1) and increasing the Army's ability for mobile warfare.

In December 1934, the 1st Front captured the town of Liping in Guizhou and crossed the Qingshuijiang River. A Politburo meeting at Liping decided to go deep into Guizhou Province protected by weak units of local warlords.⁵ After routing the Guizhou troops of General Wang Jiale, the Red Army occupied a number of towns in the Wujiang River Valley. Lacking as it did boats, the 1st Front had to cross this wide river flowing between high rocky banks. From the north it was guarded by the troops of the Guishou warlord Hou Zhidan; advancing from south-east was a Nanking force under Xue Yue. Delay was impermissible. Liu Bocheng was in charge of the operation. On January 4, 1935, the 4th Red Army regiment leading the advance guard crossed

⁴ *The Long March of the 1st Front of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Reminiscences*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 38-40, 114-169, (in Russian); Shi Ping, *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; Xiao Ze, *A Diary of the Long March*, Shanghai, 1979, pp. 1-26 (in Chinese).

⁵ Liu Bocheng, *Memoirs*, Shanghai, 1981, p. 5.

the Wujiang on rafts, and seized a beachhead, with other units following. One regiment had crossed some way upstream and launched a strong attack on the enemy flank. Due to its tactical skill and selflessness of the personnel, the Red Army successfully accomplished the crossing and defeated General Ho Zhidan, whose decimated troops retreated to the town of Zongyi, but failed to consolidate the ground. In the first two weeks of January, the Red Army captured Meitan, Zongyi, Tongji and other towns in Guizhou and Sichuan. Thus, following a 300-kilometre march from Liping to Zongyi, it got a respite.⁶

At Zongyi, in January 1935, the CPC Central Committee Politburo held an extended meeting attended, along with CPC CC members, by heads of the General Staff, and commanders of army groups and divisions. CPC Central Committee General Secretary Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Zhou Enlai, who delivered reports, explained away the Red Army's defeat and its forced withdrawal from the Central Soviet region mostly as a consequence of imperialist and Guomindang might. Yet the resolution on the results of resistance to the fifth Guomindang attack, while acknowledging the political line of the CPC Central Committee as correct, qualified mistakes in military strategy as the main cause of the defeat. Mao Zedong was coopted to the Central Committee Secretariat acting as the Standing Committee of the Politburo. A month later Zhang Wentian replaced Bo Gu as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, with the overall military leadership passing to a group comprising Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang⁷. Chinese historians say the Zongyi meeting considered military and organisational matters, without touching political issues. Yet its resolutions signified that Mao Zedong was put in charge of the 1st Front, something that predetermined his subsequent lead in the CPC.

After the Zongyi meeting the Army made an attempt to cross the Yangtze. It moved northward, but, once in Sichuan Province, it ran into a superior enemy force. The troops crossed the Chishuihe (a tributary of the Yangtze), but subsequently had to retreat to Zongyi again. For a month the 1st Front was gyrating in a limited area at the juncture of Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunan provinces, but never managed to cross the Yangtze. For its part, the enemy had massed numerous troops in the area and was seeking to encircle and rout the Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek⁸ himself arrived at Guiyang (the administrative centre of Guizhou) to direct operations. Nevertheless, on their way back to Zongyi, the Red Army routed two Guizhou divisions (Wang Jiale had to quit the post of Guizhou governor) and a column of the Nanking Army led by Zhou Hunyuan. Following a new occupation of Zongyi, the Central Committee reorganised the Army again, with the 15th Division of the 1st AG and the 6th Division of the 3rd AG being disbanded to make up for the losses the other divisions had incurred during the march northward, toward the Yangtze. The troops failed to unite with the 2nd Front units.

In March and April 1935, the 1st Front was moving through Southern Guizhou and Eastern Yunan. After destroying aircraft and airfield equipment near Guiyang, it turned westward in a bid to give the enemy the slip and cross the Qingshuijiang (as the Yangtze is called in the upper reaches). The officers and men were suffering tremendous hardships. To avoid engagements, the troops were zigzagging, doubling back and moving in circles. They forced the Beilanjiang River and the rocky mountains on the border between Guizhou and Yunan. Food was dwindling.

⁶ Liu Bocheng, *Op. cit.*, p. 6; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 124-127; *The Long March of the 1st Front of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army*, p. 204; Xiao Ze, *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-42.

⁷ *Lectures on the CPC History*, Peking, 1984, p. 161 (in Chinese).

⁸ Liu Bocheng, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

The Army was melting, decimated by diseases and frequent enemy bombing raids. According to Otto Braun, only some 22,000 troops (including newly-arrived volunteers) managed to reach the Qingshuijiang, which means that after Zongyi the Army lost two-thirds of its personnel. Yet it preserved its high morale and discipline⁹.

In early May 1935, a ruse helped it force the Qingshuijiang, with the enemy being misled as to the place of the crossing. The advance guard commander Liu Bocheng wearing a Guomindang officer's uniform managed to obtain boats from a Sichuan unit guarding the northern bank and ferry across a Red Army battalion. The Sichuan garrison was then forced to surrender. The Red Army was crossing for several days near Jiaochedu (northeast of Yuanmou). Everything was over before the arrival of Chiang Kaishek troops. The way to Sichuan for a link-up with the 4th Front was open.

The 1st Front was facing one more difficult task—the crossing of the Daduhe River. A Politburo meeting, held prior to the operation in the vicinity of the town of Huili (the Army had failed to capture it), decided to march on into North-Western Sichuan to link up with the 4th Front and set up a large Soviet region there.

On its way to the Daduhe, the Red Army had to cross the territory of the Yi (Lolo) tribe known for their hostility to the Chinese, a result of the chauvinistic Guomindang policies. But the Red Army coped with this, too. It fell back on the experience of the 9th Corps commanded by Lu Binghui, a native of Yunnan, which had carried out extensive propaganda work among the Miao and the Huizu, the two tribes inhabiting the area on the border between Guizhou and Yunnan, with the effect that several thousand young Miaos and Huizus had joined the Red Army.¹⁰ In planning the march to the Daduhe, the Command detailed an advance group comprised of the 1st Regiment under Yang Dezhi and some auxiliary units, with Liu Bocheng (commander) and Nie Rongzhen (commissar) in charge of it all. Cashing in on their knowledge of local customs, the group coaxed the Yi into acceptance of the Red Army. Liu Bocheng (who came from Sichuan) even struck a blood alliance¹¹ with one of the chiefs. After they grew convinced that the Red Army had nothing to do with Guomindang, and, in fact, was fighting it, they gave it guides, thereby facilitating its march to the Daduhe.

On May 25, the Red Army captured the town of Anshunchang on the Daduhe. Under the cover of rifle and machine-gun fire, an assault group of 17 Communists and YCLers crossed in two boats to the northern bank, attacked and routed an enemy battalion, and captured a beachhead, thereby ensuring a crossing by the Red Army's entire advance group. But other units would come too late to Anshunchang to cross before the arrival of superior forces of Sichuan warlords, the Red Army Command deciding to stage a crossing at another spot, near Luding. For this, it was necessary to seize the Luding bridge, the only one on the Daduhe, which was a system of 30 iron chains covered with a planking of boards. When the Red Army, moving from Anshunchang westward along the river, approached the bridge, it came out that the enemy had removed half of the planking to prevent the Red Army from crossing. On May 29, the main forces of the 1st Front came to the Luding bridge from the south and the advance group that had crossed at Anshunchang—from the north. It engaged a Sichuan unit guarding the bridge, while 22 volunteers attacked the bridge from the south. As they advanced,

⁹ Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 142-148; *The Long March...*, pp. 255-280; Shi Ping, *Op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

¹⁰ Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-162; *The Long March...*, pp. 53-57, 343-345.

¹¹ *The Long March...*, pp. 92-93; *Druzhba*, Dec. 30, 1956.

clutching to the chains, soldiers that followed after them, were laying boards. When the assault group reached the middle, the enemy set the remaining part of the planking on fire. But it was too late. Smoke and fire notwithstanding, the soldiers crossed the second half of the bridge (some 15 metres) in running, pelted the Sichuan troops with hand-grenades and seized their positions on the northern bank. The Luding bridge was now in the hands of the 1st Front and its crossing was ensured. That spelled the collapse of Chiang Kaishek's plan to rout the Red Army near the Daduhe, where the Taiping General Shi Dakai had been defeated in 1863.

Now the way for a link-up with the 4th Front was clear. After negotiating the snow-covered Qionglaihan Mountains, the 1st Front occupied the towns of Tianqian, Lushan and Liujiashou and defeated the Sichuan General Yang Seng. After passing the summits of the Jiajinshang, they reached Mougong.¹² The 4th Front was heading there, too.

After being informed, somewhere in late May or early June, that the 1st Front had crossed the Jinshangjiang, the 4th Front Command ordered the 30th Corps under Cheng Shicai to go to the Daduhe River via Minjiang and Mougong. The rest of the units were massed in the Beichuan-Meixian area (the 9th and the 31st Corps) and at Songpan (the 4th Corps). While they were engaged in heavy fighting with Sichuan troops and Nanking divisions under Hu Zongnan, the 30th Corps linked, in the Mougong area, on June 16, 1935, with the 1st Front units which had, by various estimates, from 10,000 to 20,000 officers and men, both combatants and non-combatants.

The link-up made it possible to preserve the 1st Front which had suffered heavy losses, both in personnel and equipment. During the arduous march, in forcing rapid rivers and snow-capped mountains, the men had suffered hunger and diseases.

A meeting of the CPC Central Committee Military Council was held at Fubian on June 22, 1935. Chaired by Mao Zedong and attended by Zhang Wentian (General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee), Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Zhu Deh, Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu) and Liu Bocheng, it confirmed the earlier Politburo decision (adopted in the absence of Zhang Guotao) to impose the Military Council's control over the combined forces of the Red Army, including the 4th Front, to appoint Zhang Guotao a deputy chairman of the Military Council, and to go on with the march northward. Yet, in late June, at Lianghekou, Zhang Guotao, supported by other leaders of the 4th Front whose strength (50,000 troops) was vastly superior to that of the 1st Front, obtained a reshuffle in the Red Army Command. The post of General Political Commissar of the Red Army, held by Mao Zedong after the Zongyi meeting, was handed over to Zhang Guotao, with Zhu Deh becoming Commander-in-Chief, Liu Bocheng—Chief of General Staff, and Zuo Quan and Ye Jiangying—his deputies. Zhou Enlai, who was gravely ill, and Wang Jiaxiang, who was wounded, temporarily withdrew from military and political leadership.

On June 28, 1935, at Lianghekou, and on August 5, at Maoergai, the CPC Central Committee Politburo confirmed the decision to move the 1st and the 4th Fronts northward in order to set up a Sichuan-Gansu-Shenxi Soviet region.

The situation in the Madergai region, where the units of the 1st and the 4th Fronts had spent nearly a month, was complicated. A poor and sparsely populated locality, it was ill-suited to feed 70,000 troops. The situation was further compounded by rivalry between Mao Zedong and

¹² Liu Bocheng, *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 162-163; Yang Dezhi, *The Crossing of the Daduhe River. Reminiscences*, Peking, 1985, pp. 262-269 (in Chinese).

Zhang Guotao, which continued unabated despite earlier compromises. So, it was decided that the united Red Army would divide in two columns and march toward Southern Gansu by different routes. The right-hand (eastern) column under the 4th Front leaders Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao and Deputy Chief of General Staff Ye Jianying included units of the 4th and the 30th Corps of the 4th Front and the 1st and the 2nd AGs of the 1st Front. Travelling with this column were CPC CC Politburo members Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Mao Zedong, Qin Bangxin, and Zhou Enlai. It was to go to Banyou via Maoergai and Sogpan. The left-hand (western) column led by the General Political Commissar Zhang Guotao (Politburo member), Commander-in-Chief Zhu Deh and Chief of General Staff Liu Bochong was made up of the 9th and the 31st Corps of the 4th Front, and the 5th and the 9th AGs of the 1st Front. It was to march from Zhuokeji eastward, to Gansu.

After August 20, both columns set out separately northward with an eye to linking up in the Banyou area north of Songpan. In all evidence, the decision to divide the troops had been taken in order to reduce the frictions and avoid a split. Yet it was vulnerable both from the military (the enemy could rout both columns piecemeal) and the organisational and political points of view and, in fact, was conducive to a split in the Red Army.

The crack Guomindang troops commanded by Hu Zongnan sought to crush the right-hand column, but in the course of a pitched battle fought near Bazuo Cheng Shicai's 30th Corps reduced the 49th Division of the enemy and cleared the way to the north. Both sides lost between 4,000 and 5,000 men in fighting in the Songpan area. At the same time, the left-hand column led by Zhang Guotao and Zhu Deh was moving somewhat up west to the north. With torrential rains causing floods, it failed to cross a tributary of the Mazhu River and had to return to Shuangjinsi. On behalf of the united command Zhang Guotao radioed the news to the leaders of the right-hand column and ordered all troops to halt until a decision was made on further action. Yet, Mao Zedong led the 1st and the 3rd AGs to the north, along with Zhang Wentian and other Politburo members. A few days later Zhang Guotao ordered the left-hand column south, to Zhuokeji, with the 4th and the 30th Corps under Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao moving to the same destination. The 5th and the 9th AGs occupied the Mougong area to secure the advance of the main forces southward. That spelled the break-up of the united Red Army.

On October 5, 1935, after all units remaining under the command of Zhang Guotao had massed in the Zhuokenji area, he called a conference of leading functionaries. The participants in the conference (except Zhu Deh) denounced the command of the 1st and the 3rd AGs for having broken away to the north and resolved not to recognise the powers of the CPC Central Committee Politburo. In keeping with the resolution, they formed a Provisional Politburo with Zhang Guotao at the head. It included Zhu Deh (though he was against a break with the former Politburo) and leaders of the 4th Front. That step finalised the split in the Party leadership and the CPC armed forces.¹³

The units of the 1st and the 3rd AGs led by Mao Zedong (as Chairman of the Military Council) numbered between 9,000 and 12,000 servicemen, including between 7,000 and 10,000 combatants. Peng Dehui was appointed Commander-in-Chief (instead of Zhu Deh who had remained

¹³ Xiao Ze, *Op. cit.*, p. 105; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 171-187; A. S. Titov, *From the History of Struggle and Split in the CPC Leadership 1935-1936*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 57-84 (in Russian); Huang Zhenxia, *Op. cit.*, pp. 278-279.

with the 4th Front) and Yang Shankun—Commissar (later he was replaced by Mao Zedong). The 1st AG (Commander Lin Biao, Commissar Nie Rongzhen) was made of two (the 1st and the 2nd) divisions having two regiments each and numbered between 4,000 and 5,000 servicemen. The four regiments of the 3rd AG (3,000-4,000 servicemen) were subordinated directly to Peng Dehui. The united staff column, complete with a military school, the guards and civilian offices, was 2,000-3,000-strong. These troops were designated as the Shenxi-Gansu column.

A Politburo meeting held north of the village of Baxi not far from the border of Gansu on September 9, 1935,¹⁴ discussed the further course of action. After debates it unanimously approved the proposal to go to Shenxi.

According to Otto Braun, it was unbelievably difficult to overcome the comparatively small distance from Baxi to Southern Gansu. They had to go down to the bottom of canyons, cross the Bailongjiang River, negotiate the Minshan mountains via passes partly covered with snow and climb rocks. On September 16 and 17, the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division occupied Lazikou in the Minshan mountains, the gate from Sichuan to Gansu, protected by three enemy regiments (Lu Dachang troops). After entering Gansu and winning several engagements with local units and the 1st Guomindang Army under Hu Zongnan, units of the Red Army's 1st Front entered the Mingxian county¹⁵ in late September.

Near Mingxian they met messengers of the 25th Corps of the Red Army, who told them about the situation in Gansu and Shenxi. In the autumn of 1935, Northern Shenxi had a relatively stable Soviet region defended by the 15th AG of the Red Army, which had been set up following the arrival there of the 25th Corps. This unit had been formed in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui region following the retreat of the main forces of the 4th Front to the west. It was referred to as the Young Pioneer Corps because most of its personnel were young people. Between late 1932 and the autumn of 1934, it had conducted guerilla warfare against Guomindang troops, whereupon, led by Xu Haidong, Wu Huanxian and Chen Jihua, it took off to Southern Shenxi. Its combat operations, supported by revolutionary-minded locals, had made it possible to set up the Hubei-Henan-Shenxi guerilla base. Between November 1934 and July 1935, it had destroyed 6 enemy regiments and contained another 37 regiments. In May 1935, the 25th Corps broke through the enemy encirclement, crossed the Qingling ridge and reached, in June, the Yinjiajie area in Southern Shenxi, not far from Xian, its intention being to march further south-west for a link-up with the 4th Front. On learning that the 4th Front units had left the Shenxi-Sichuan Soviet region, the Command of the 25th Corps decided to break through Gansu to Northern Shenxi. It forced the Weihe River in Southern Gansu near the town of Tianshui, and after defeating the Lu Dachang troops and later the "Muslim General" Ma Hongbing, reentered Shenxi and linked up, at Anding, in September 1935, with the 26th Corps under Liu Zhidan and Gao Gang, which had been operating there for several years. These units and He Jinnian's 27th Corps formed the 15th AG under Xu Haidong (Commander), Chen Jihua (Commissar), Liu Zhidan (Deputy Commander), and Gao Gang (Chief of the Political Department). The 15th AG (10,000-12,000 troops) was firmly in control of several counties and a vast stretch of the countryside. Its victory over units of Zhang Xueli-

¹⁴ Qin Sheng, "Once More About the Time of the Baxi Conference", *Jindaishi yanjiu*, No. 1, 1985, pp. 300-305.

¹⁵ *The Long March...*, pp. 440-447; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 188-190; Huang Zhenxia, *Op. cit.*, pp. 210, 440.

ang's North-Eastern Army helped it strengthen the Northern Shenxi Soviet region.¹⁶

Operations by the 25th Corps facilitated considerably the final leg of the 1st Front march. Moving through the Gansu-Shenxi border region, it routed, in mid-October, an enemy cavalry brigade and linked up, on October 19, 1935, near the village of Wugizhen (the eastern bank of the Lohe River in the Basan county, in the west of the Northern Shenxi Soviet region), with a detachment of Liu Zhidan's 26th Corps.¹⁷

The end of the 1st Front's passage from the Central (Jiangxi-Fujian), Soviet region first westward and then northward, to Shenxi, had important consequences. Preserving the core of the Red Army's 1st Front was a major positive result. The CPC managed to increase its troop strength in the Shenxi-Gansu Soviet region, something that made it possible to beat back the enemy attacks and even to widen the CPC's territorial base near the border with Mongolia and the USSR.

An item by the Chief of the Political Department, Zhu Rui, published in the New Year (1936) issue of the *Zhanshi bao* (Soldier) contained the following data on the results of the 1st Front's year-long march: it had passed through 11 provinces, covering 25,000 li (12,500 kilometres),¹⁸ crushed counter-revolutionary troops numbering a total of several hundred thousand (including regular units, the Mintuans, the Tufeis, and local reactionary forces), occupied 54 towns, seized several million yuan, recruited 4,000 new troops, founded several hundred local Party organisations and bodies of power, and armed part of the revolutionary-minded civilians.¹⁹

The CPC literature refers to the redeployment of the main forces of the Red Army to North-Western China as the Long March. For many years its participants formed the core of the leadership of the CPC and its armed forces.

Following the redeployment of the 1st Front and its link-up with the 15th AG, the CPC raised new units and reorganized its forces. The 1st Front units that came to Northern Shenxi numbered between 7,000 and 8,000 troops, including between 4,000 and 6,000 regulars. With the addition of the 15th AG, its numbers rose to between 15,000 and 20,000. Confronting it was a 200,000-strong army.

Soon after the march, the 1st Front had to be committed against Guomindang troops attacking the Soviet region in Northern Shenxi. Though inferior in strength, the Red Army was skilfully exploiting the enemy's weaknesses—its overly extended front and rivalry between the generals. It encircled and routed, on November 18, off Zhilozhen, the 109th Division of the North-Eastern Army and took prisoner its commander. It also crushed a regiment of the 106th Division (near Heishushi). The 108th and the 111th Divisions of the enemy were forced to retreat. The military situation was stabilised.²⁰

In the meantime, the 4th and the 2nd Fronts of the Red Army went on with their redeployment. After the 1st and the 3rd AGs had gone northward in October 1935, the 4th Front with the 5th and the 9th AGs of the 1st Front moved to the south in two columns. In October and November, they captured from the enemy a number of towns in Western Sichuan. In late November or in December there was a battle near Bai-

¹⁶ *The Long March...*, pp. 546-547; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 191-192; Huang Zhenxia, *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

¹⁷ Xiao Ze, *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁸ *The Long March...* (p. 527) says that the 1st AG marched 18,000 li from Tonglwan in Jiangxi to Wugizhen on the border between Shenxi and Gansu. Otto Braun (*Op. cit.*, p. 198) writes that the units of the 1st Front covered 10,000 kilometres.

¹⁹ Xiao Ze, *Op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

zhangtuan between Red Army units under the overall command of Xu Xiangqian and the main forces of the Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang whom Chiang Kaishek had appointed Commander-in-Chief of the "anti-Red troops", with both sides suffering heavy losses in killed and wounded (up to 10,000). Somewhat later the Red Army struck at the Sichuan troops of Liu Wenhui, crossed the Yajiang River near Tianquan, occupied the town of Yongjin and launched an offensive southward, posing a threat to Chengdu, the administrative centre of Sichuan.

In this way there emerged a vast Soviet region in Western Sichuan with its centre at Baoxing, where a Provisional Sichuan-Xikang Revolutionary Government under Zhou Chunquan and a CPC committee were set up. The overall leadership belonged to Zhang Guotao.²¹ Yet it could not present any serious competition to the North Shenxi centre, its sphere of influence being limited to the Sichuan-Xikang area.

The 4th Front and the 5th and the 9th AGs held out in the area for three-four months. At the request of the Sichuan warlords, Chiang Kaishek sent them 6 divisions and a number of aircraft to the Yaan-Tianquan-Lushan region. According to Guomindang statistics, the 4th Front lost 8,000 servicemen killed and 2,000 taken prisoner in heavy fighting in December 1935 and January and February 1936. In March 1936, its units withdrew from the rich rice-growing region to Xikang in the west, where they captured the towns of Daofu, Luhuo and Ganji. The latter, situated on the Yalongjiang River in Northern Xikang, became the residence of the first Tibetan popular government headed by the "Living Buddha" Gheda.²² In Xikang, the starved 4th Front troops requisitioned food from local civilians, something that caused disaffection. The lack of sanitation sparked off epidemics.

The 6th and the 2nd AGs found themselves in a difficult situation. After they had linked up, the 2nd Front established its base in the eastern counties of Guizhou. The difficult food situation and considerable enemy superiority (40,000 troops) forced the Command to withdraw to Western Hunan where He Long was on good terms with the locals and the enemy had only 10,000 regulars and militiamen.

In Western Hunan, the 2nd Front units conducted mobile warfare for a year and set up a support base, something that made Chiang Kaishek send reinforcements there. This helped the 1st Front operations on Hunan-Guizhou border. Between October 1934 and October 1935, its strength grew from 8,000 to 21,000 due to new levies and recruitment of POWs. The enemy lost over 10,000 in killed and wounded and over 10,000 rifles.²³

Yet, still the 2nd Front was finding life difficult. Despite losses, the enemy forces were steadily growing due to reinforcements. The first attack on the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Soviet region (January-March, 1935) involved between 40 and 50 regiments, and the second (May-August, 1935)—80 regiments. This unfavourable alignment of forces was compounded by "leftist" mistakes during land redistribution (middle peasants were often listed as *kulaks*, landowners were deprived of all land, while *kulaks* were given only bad plots). The Command's policy of disarming the vagabonds and shooting their leaders prompted them to cooperate with landlords' militias. The ground (the Dongtinghu Lake in the east, the rivers Yuanjiang and Lishui in the south and the Chongshan ridge in the north-west) prevented the Red Army from using the mobile tactics. Considering these circumstances, the Command decided to leave Western Hunan to save manpower.

²¹ A. S. Titov, *Op. cit.*, pp. 84-86, Huang Zhenxia, *Op. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

²² *Tibet*, Shanghai, 1954, pp. 42-43; *People's China*, 1956, No. 12, p. 17.

²³ Xiao Ke, "The Period of Unification of the 2nd and the 6th AGs of the Red Army", *Jindaishi yanjiu*, No. 1, 1980, pp. 12-15, 22; *The Long March...*, p. 560.

On November 19, 1935, the Red Army set out south-east from the town of Sangzhi, crossed two lines of blockade, forced the rivers Feishui and Yuanjiang and occupied several towns in Central Hunan. The Guomindang Command sent considerable forces in pursuit of the 2nd and the 6th AGs, but they veered westward and turned up, at the juncture of 1935 and 1936, near the town of Zhijiang (close to the Hunan-Guizhou border). In February 1936, they established a foothold in Western Guizhou near the border between Yunnan and Sichuan. There they had a month's rest and took new levies (over 5,000 soldiers). At the same time, the enemy had massed troops possessing a 10-fold superiority over the 2nd Front. In mid-March, the 2nd and the 6th AGs moved from Guizhou to Yunnan, fighting a running battle against Guomindang troops.²⁴

At Pangxian (Yunnan) the commanders of the 2nd and the 6th AGs got a telegram from Zhu De and Zhang Guotao with an order to force the Jinshijiang River and head northward for a link-up with the 4th Front. Until then, the units commanded by He Long and Xiao Ke had moved about Yunnan and Guizhou, engaging the enemy, or evading him. In late April, 1936, they crossed the Jinshajiang, made a difficult pass through the Tibetan-populated mountain region on the border between Yunnan and Xikang and marched in two columns through Xikang. Their losses due to fighting and hardships amounted to half their manpower. On July 2, the 2nd and the 4th Fronts linked up at Ganji.²⁵

By that time, steps were taken to overcome the split in the CPC and the Red Army, this being done with the participation of Zhang Hao, member of the Chinese delegation to the 7th Comintern Congress.

At Ganji, the leaders of the 2nd and the 4th Fronts decided on a plan of action for the future. Keeping their independence, they were to march in two columns to Gansu. In July 1936, after a month's rest, both columns moved to the north, toward the 4th Front's deployment area. A month later, after a difficult march through marshland and snow-capped mountains, they entered the Songpan area. Thence the 4th Front took the route that the 1st Front had made previously, while the column of the 2nd Front described a circle eastward from Lazikou. It had to beat off fierce enemy attacks. On October 22, 1936, the He Long troops (10,000) linked up with the 1st Front at Jiangtaibo (the area of the town of Huining, Gansu Province, south-east of Lanzhou). Some time before that, on October 8, 1936, a few corps of the 4th Front that had beaten off attacks by Ma generals, as well as the 5th and the 9th AGs of the 1st Front, had come there, too. But under pressure from Zhang Guotao, a conference held at Gongwen (in Gansu, south of Huining) resolved not to remain in Southern Gansu, where large Guomindang forces were on their way to, and not to go to Northern Shenxi, but to cross the Huanghe and go to Xinjiang. The attempt to implement the decision culminated in only 3,000-4,000 soldiers of the 4th Front managing to reach, in December 1936, Baoan, the then capital of the Soviet region. Due to objective (the correlation of forces) and subjective (the lingering consequences of the split and strategic mistakes) reasons, the Western Army was routed in the winter of 1936-1937, losing between 15,000 and 20,000 servicemen killed and taken prisoner.²⁶

²⁴ Xiao Ke, *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-30; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 237-238; Huang Zhenxia, *Op. cit.*, pp. 463-464; *Jindaishi yanjiu*, No. 4, 1981, p. 101; Warren Go asserts that only between 4,000 and 5,000 soldiers of the 2nd Front reached Ganji.

²⁶ Zhi Bi and Dun Hanhe, "Some Questions of History of the Western Direction Army", *Shehui kexue*, Lanzhou, 1980, pp. 68-73; Otto Braun, *Op. cit.*, pp. 239-245; A. S. Titov, *Op. cit.*, pp. 99-104; Huang Zhenxia, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55, 56, 83, 93, 146, 201, 245-246, 273, 289, 372, 451, 452.

But despite the defeat and tremendous sacrifices suffered during the Long March, it was of an outstanding importance for the future of the Chinese revolution. The core of the CPC and the Red Army remained intact. The Chinese Communists went along with the historic resolutions of the 7th Comintern Congress (July-August 1935) on the policy of united front in opposition to fascism, imperialist aggression and military danger. For the CPC this meant the need to work out a new course creating prerequisites for a nationwide resistance to the Japanese aggression and helping the Communist Party become an influential political force capable of leading the working masses.

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PROPAGANDA OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY IN CHINA DURING 1930'S-1940'S

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The ideological life of Chinese society in the 1930s-1940s was ridden with complex and contradictory processes. Pressing national and social problems lent special importance to the questions of world outlook and philosophy. The ways and means of revitalising China were being tortuously groped for, various programmes for its development and delivery from semi-colonial dependence were born as a result of deep soul-searching. China's socio-economic peculiarity, the complexity of its class structure engendered many contrasting, sometimes similar or conflicting doctrines, conceptions, ideas.

The picture of ideological life was strikingly motley and diverse: "As for us [China.—V.B.], the times are changing really fast. Just over the past forty or fifty years we have jumped several centuries, and continue to dash ahead at a surprising speed. As we run very fast while old things have not disappeared yet, there are sprouts of new phenomena in our society... there are also old things; new things; semi-new but not old; the old under the false mask of the new; something new but still not free from the vestiges of the old, etc., etc."¹

Basic changes were taking place not only in ideology but also in public consciousness, in morals. Serious social problems (famine, poverty, unemployment, bankruptcy) compounded the tragic situation for the majority of the population: exploitation carried on not only in a class but also national form; Japanese aggression, the conflict between the Guomindang and the CPC that finally turned into civil war. All of that resulted in a complex and contradictory gamut of sentiments and moods in people's minds and psyche—fear for the future, pessimism and despair. Various types of orientation in life became starkly apparent: the striving for creature comforts, the race for money; the renouncement of mundane problems, departure into one's personal world, a kind of social escapism; a heedless enthusiasm for everything foreign, especially for American culture, ideas, etc.² Such a diversity of conceptions was due to the intricate nature of inter- and intraclass relations in the socio-economic multi-structure of Chinese society.

This complex situation, on the one hand, contributed to a proliferation of various bourgeois philosophical and sociological doctrines, with feudal teachings still retaining much influence. On the other hand, propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas, of Marxist philosophy was developing and getting stronger. If reactionary ideologists enjoyed full support of the ruling circles, often determining the Guomindang's official planks, that was not the case with the followers of Marxism. Naturally, they were not favoured with the authorities. The number and circulation of works by Marx-

¹ Hu Sheng, *New Philosophic World Outlook*, Shanghai, 1937, pp. 58-59.

² See *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 60.

ist authors were much below those of the books disseminating views of bourgeois and feudal ideologists.

Under conditions of the time, Chinese Marxists insisted on the necessity of a "new world outlook", a "new philosophy" that would, firstly, provide a scientific explanation of social processes, and secondly, be a guide to action for a revolutionary transformation of the country. The term "new philosophy" meant to them a complete break with both: all the "old" philosophical doctrines of Chinese origin, Confucianism in the first place; and bourgeois ideological schools of western origin. Speaking of a "new philosophy", they implied Marxist philosophy, the "philosophy of dialectical materialism",³ "materialist dialectic", "dialectical materialism".

The 1930s-1940s witnessed publication of books and booklets by Ai Siqi, Xu Deheng, Wu Liping, Hou Wailu, Luo Keting, Chen Baoxin, Chen Weishi, Shen Zhiyuan, and others. Most of these publications were of a popular nature. They set forth the main principles of dialectical and historical materialism, subjected to critical analysis doctrines of bourgeois philosophers and sociologists, discussed historico-philosophical subjects. The ranges of problems and the way of their presentation indicated a certain familiarity of Chinese Marxists with the main achievements of Marxist thought. During the period under discussion, translations were made of such works by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin as *Capital* (Vol. I), *The Poverty of Philosophy* (translated by Xu Deheng), *Critique of the Gotha Programme, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Theses on Feuerbach, The Civil War in France, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Socialism: Scientific and Utopian, Anti-Dühring* (translated by Wu Liping), *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, "Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder, The State and Revolution, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Karl Marx, On the Question of Dialectics, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, and others.

Besides, G. V. Plekhanov's following works were published in Chinese: *The Basic Questions of Materialism, Materialist Understanding of History, Militant Materialism, A History of Modern Materialism*, foreword to A. M. Deborin's book *Introduction to Dialectical Materialism, From Idealism to Materialism, A Monistic View of History*, and others.⁴

First publications were also made in China of translations of Soviet textbooks and educational materials by Soviet philosophers: Fingart and Shirvindt, Shirokov (translated by Li Da). Publications of this series accumulated the first results of the work of Soviet scholars.

Undoubtedly, that circumstance was of a positive nature. That was also true of the familiarity with the works of Soviet authors. Of course, not all of them were equally valuable, some works could not boast a sufficiently high theoretical level. It should be noted that in those years Soviet philosophy, as a discipline, was just in the making. Still familiarity of the Chinese philosophical circles with the achievements of Soviet scholars, all shortcomings notwithstanding, had on the whole a positive effect.

The questions of the penetration, dissemination and perception of Marx-

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴ For more information see Zhang Jinglu, *Chronology of Publications of Major Works, by K. Marx and F. Engels in China*, *Xin Jianshe*, 1953, № 5, pp. 20, 21; Zhang Yunhou, "Chronology of V. I. Lenin's Works in Chinese", *Lishi yanjiu*, 1960, № 4, p. 48. Mention should also be made of the translations of Marxist classics made on the USSR territory (See A. V. Pantsov, *From the History of Training in the USSR of Marxist Cadres of the Chinese Revolution*. In *Revolutionary Democracy and Communists of the East*, Moscow, 1984, pp. 290-330).

ism-Leninism, of the creative mastering of the theory of scientific socialism in China are addressed in a number of works by Soviet authors.⁵ We would like to continue this tradition by analysing the strictly philosophical aspects of the problem. At the same time it should be noted that the creative mastering of Marxist philosophy in China was preceded by a period of accumulation of information on scientific socialism, of first translations of Marxist literature during the preceding two decades.

Far from all publications in China on the problems of Marxist philosophy were equally valuable. There appeared works suffering from oversimplification and vulgarisation.⁶ Their authors claimed the necessity of popularising the "difficult" and "incomprehensible" points of the classics among the ill-prepared Chinese readers, unable to understand *The Poverty of Philosophy*, *Anti-Dühring*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, and some other works. Given such a popularisation, the true meaning of many points of Marxist philosophy disappeared. A number of works were nothing but compilations. Popular books were to be found that lacked elementary logic due to their authors' poor knowledge of theory. Such was the case, for example, of Chen Baoyin's⁷ book *On the Method of Studying Social Sciences*, which presented a mixture of ill-matched pieces of information on Marxist philosophy culled from some dubious sources. There were also publications that carried little material on Chinese reality, the history of Chinese philosophy. Still on the whole the literature on Marxist philosophy played an important informative and ideological role.

The works of Chinese Marxist philosophers addressed to this or that extent and at different theoretical levels such problems as the essence and stages of the world socio-historical process, the basic causes of social transformations on a global, regional and local scale; the role of national, class, religious and personal motives in the history of separate countries; methods and principles of cognizing social and natural phenomena; relationship between thinking and being, between subject and object; historical conditions of the emergence of different philosophical and sociological systems and conceptions, etc. All these questions were analysed within the conceptual framework of dialectical and historical materialism. As a result the Chinese society was viewed as a part of a single process of world history and this helped to understand the character and specifics of social laws operating in China as reflecting the universal laws of development of human civilisation. As an example of practical application of such a new philosophical approach the polemic about the character of the social order of ancient and medieval China can be cited.⁸

Thanks to the works of Marxist philosophers and sociologists wide circles of Chinese intelligentsia were able to get to know the basics of Marxist philosophy. This gave them the possibility to rediscover the his-

⁵ See V. G. Burov, Li Da and Marxist Sociology in China. *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1986, No. 1; L. N. Borokh, *Social Thought in China and Socialism (Beginning of the 20th Century)*, Moscow, 1984; L. P. Delusin, *Argument about Socialism in China*, Moscow, 1980; A. V. Pantsov, *From the History of the Ideological Struggle in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement of the 1920s-1940s*, Moscow, 1985; K. V. Shevelev, *The Formation of the Communist Party of China (1917-1922)*, Author's abstract of the dissertation for the degree of candidate of science (Hist.), Moscow, 1974; F. B. Beleiubsky, *The Great Ideas of the October Revolution and China*, *World Economy and International Relations*, 1967, No. 10.

⁶ For example, Chen Weishi's work discussed on a primitive level such a serious problem as the future of the Earth (Chen Weishi, *Popular Lectures on Dialectics*, Shanghai, 1936, pp. 122-123).

⁷ See Chen Baoyin, *On the Method of Studying Social Sciences*, Shanghai, 1935.

⁸ See A. G. Krymov, Discussion on Pre-Capitalist Relations in China in the 1920s-1930s. In *Problems of Pre-Capitalist Societies in the Countries of the East*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 95-126.

tory of their own country, the genesis and dynamics of development of Chinese reality of the time.

Chinese Marxists analysed a wide range of problems, from the subject-matter of philosophy to the interpretation of the essential, class nature of various systems of morality (feudal, bourgeois and socialist). The causes and essence of divergence of philosophical trends and methods, the origin and essence of cognition, the difference between man and animal, the ways and means of interpreting the world, the laws and categories of dialectics, the essence of truth and its criteria, the structure of social order, society and nature, the basis and superstructure, the origin and essence of classes, the class struggle and the state, the role of popular masses and the individual in history, the process of socialisation of the individual, material and spiritual culture, the essence of revolution and war, the contents of various types of value orientation and ethical motives—such is a far from complete list of problems discussed on the pages of the Chinese Marxists' works. In the main, their judgments reflected the achievements of world Marxist thought.

Chinese Marxists devoted much attention to historico-philosophical problematics, including the main stages of the formation of philosophical knowledge, analysing this process from the viewpoint of the struggle between materialism and idealism. The Chinese reader got to know the Marxist interpretation of the world historic philosophical process, the meaning of various philosophical trends, such as rationalism and empiricism, positivism and pragmatism, ancient naive materialism and mechanistic, metaphysical materialism, the basics of the teachings of such celebrities of philosophy as Descartes, Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach. Speaking of the history of Marxist philosophy Chinese Marxists emphasised that its emergence was due not only to socio-economic shifts in capitalist society but also to the development of all preceding philosophical thought.⁹

The successive character of Marxist philosophy was also stressed in the treatment of the history of materialist dialectics. Describing Hegel as a direct precursor of Marx and Engels, Chinese Marxists noted that Hegel, in his turn, proceeded from the philosophical tradition of the past.¹⁰ Speaking of the essential traits of Hegelian dialectics they, naturally, pointed out its difference in principle from Marxist dialectics in as much as the latter is of a materialist character.¹¹ Rightly giving credit for this to Marx and Engels (usually they cited Marx's well-known pronouncements from the foreword to *Capital* and Engels's in *Anti-Dühring*), Chinese Marxists devoted much space to the explanation of V. I. Lenin's contribution to the development of materialist dialectics and Marxist philosophy in general: "In the sphere of philosophy Ulyanovism [in some works, because of censorship, Lenin was named by his real name.—V. B.] is the development of Marxist philosophy in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution", wrote Shen Zhiyuan. "Ulyanov filled the contents of modern materialist philosophy with a new revolutionary practice: he uncovered a new stage of development of capitalism, the laws of imperialism; he gave the most outstanding example of a dialectical unity of theory and practice, solving questions of practice, strategy and tactics he used the dialectical teaching; simultaneously, relying on practical experience he filled theoretical material with it, striv-

⁹ See, for example, Shen Zhiyuan, *Critique of Modern Philosophy*, Shanghai, 1937, p. 99.

¹⁰ See Shen Zhiyuan, *Op. cit.* p. 57. He wrote that having used the elements of dialectics from previous philosophers, Hegel developed them and created on that basis a new teaching—dialectical logic (See *Ibid.*, p. 78).

¹¹ See, for example, Shen Zhiyuan, *Op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

ing to make theory dash ahead. Such are the features of the Ulyanov stage"¹².

The contents of the Lenin stage in philosophy, in the opinion of Chinese Marxists, amounted to the following; first, explanation of the principles of Marxist world outlook, of materialist dialectics; second, enrichment of Marxist philosophy with new elements (in this connection they mentioned, in particular, Lenin's theory of reflection and his emphasis on the struggle of opposites as an inner source of development); third, demand for a concrete approach to life's phenomena; fourth, consistent championship of the role of practice and the principle of close linkage between theory and practice;¹³ fifth, use of dialectics in analysing the phenomena in the epoch of imperialism;¹⁴ sixth, uncompromising struggle against idealism and revisionism.¹⁵

Chinese Marxists pointed out such a distinctive feature of Marxist philosophy as its militant, partisan character, as proved by its open siding with the proletariat and the cause of socialist construction in the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Chinese Marxists paid special attention to the explanation of the essence and principles of materialist dialectics. It was viewed by them more than just a method of cognizing natural and social phenomena. According to Chen Weishi, dialectics is objective truth, the soul of all things resides in them, the objective world itself is dialectical.¹⁷ The dialectical method is a means of explaining the world; a dialectical world outlook, wrote Chen Weishi, makes it possible to foresee the future, proceed from practice, see life as a natural process, instill in people civic responsibility for the destiny of society.¹⁸ Stressing the link of materialist dialectics with the objective dialectics of things and phenomena Shen Zhiyuan noted: "We must understand that the teaching of dialectics is itself dialectical. That is natural, since the teaching of dialectics (i. e., subjective dialectics) is a reflection in the human mind of natural dialectics (i. e., objective dialectics, or the laws of development of objective reality). The origin, development and change of objective reality (including nature and society) are dialectical: therefore the teaching of dialectics, pertaining to the sphere of human thinking, is in itself dialectical, too."¹⁹ At the same time materialist dialectics was often regarded as a universal remedy for major social problems, as a "miracle cure" for all China's ills. Such an approach, of course, was nothing but a vulgarisation of dialectics, distorting the role it should play.

Propaganda of dialectics among the scientific community, emphasis on its revolutionary-critical role, and, strange as it may seem at first sight, apology of its "might", caused a stormy and, naturally, negative reaction from the official circles, among intellectuals siding with the Guomintang. Dialectics was portrayed as something dangerous and horrid, as a "smuggled-in commodity" manufactured by "foreign devils", the word itself was subject to anathema.

Under the circumstances Chinese Marxists deemed it their duty to refute the assertions of critics alleging the unhistorical and anti-scientific character of materialist dialectics, explain the history of its formation, the nature of the cause-and-effect connection between dialectics and

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 225-226.

¹³ See *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

¹⁴ See Xui Deheng, *Shehucixiue jianhua* (Lectures on Sociology), Peking, 1936, p. 226.

¹⁵ See Shen Zhiyuan, *Op. cit.*, p. 185. True, it was also asserted that Marx, Engels and Lenin did not tackle dialectics as such (See Chen Weishi, *Op. cit.*, Shanghai, 1936, pp. 25-27).

¹⁶ See *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁷ See Chen Weishi, *Op. cit.*, pp. 161-162.

¹⁸ See *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

¹⁹ Shen Zhiyuan, *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

scientific knowledge. "Today many people in China are literally scared when hearing the word 'dialectics' as for them it connotes only Marxism, the bloody class struggle, the communist party, etc.," wrote Shen Zhiyuan. "They have no inkling that even though Marx did use dialectics to study the process of historical development and created the teaching of scientific socialism, he took it over from Hegel, that it is only a methodology, representing universal laws, deduced on the basis of all sciences, universal laws deduced in the process of development of all spheres of reality (nature, society and human thinking)".²⁰

Chinese Marxists also subjected to critical analysis the ideas of bourgeois sociology known in China from translations of books of a general nature and works by bourgeois sociologists themselves.²¹ A book by Deheng appraised from a Marxist point of view various trends of modern bourgeois sociology, beginning with its founders A. Comte and H. Spencer—the bio-organic school (P. Lilienfeld, R. Novikov, A. Schefle, R. Warms), the social-Darwinism school (L. Gumplovich), "the imitation theory" (H. Tarde), the psychological trend (F. Giddings, L. Word, Ch. Ellwood), the geographical trend (Huntington), the cultural-anthropological school (M. Weber, O. Spengler, M. Scheler), neopositivism (E. Durkheim), etc. It should be noted, however, that Xu Deheng had inadequate ideas of the views of some bourgeois sociologists. Thus, for example, he presented Small and W. Sumner as the apologists of the American psychological school. If it was true of the former with certain reservations, because he was influenced by L. Word, then as regards the latter it was not correct, as he was above all a social-Darwinist.

Xu Deheng pointed out the inconsistency of bourgeois sociological conceptions from the viewpoint of methodology for they viewed social laws either as equivalent to natural laws or, on the contrary, as something absolutely different, ruled by "human spirit". Philosophically, they represent either idealistic or dualistic teachings, and as for their class basis, they have a bourgeois character.²²

Here is how he defined the subject of sociology: "Study of the structure of human society, its existence, development, change, and interrelationships of these processes; analysis of various factors making up social life, the character of these factors, their interaction and interrelationship; analysis of the cause-and-effect relationship and principles of social change with an eye to understanding and foreseeing it."²³ Hence, wrote Xu Deheng, it is just historical materialism that constitutes a true sociology.

His book also set forth the Marxist view on such philosophical problems as the correlation of sociology and other social sciences, the nature and character of operation of social laws, target-setting and its difference from telology, the correlation of social and natural laws, the connection between cause and effect, necessity and chance, necessity and freedom, possibility and reality, etc. The range of problems under discussion and the quality of their solution qualify Xu Deheng's work as a textbook on dialectical and historical materialism.

The question of the objective character of social laws was important in principle since bourgeois philosophers, as, for example, Zhang Junmai, completely denied their existence.

Chinese Marxists faced difficult tasks—they had to give not only an adequate idea of Marxist philosophy but also a convincing demonstration

²⁰ Shen Zhiyuan, *Op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

²¹ Translated into Chinese, in part, were the works of E. Durkheim "The Division of Social Labour", "The Rules of a Sociological Method".

²² Xu Deheng, *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

of the applicability of Marxism's general tenets to the concrete conditions of China.²⁴ The point is that official propaganda, bourgeois-feudal ideologists did their best to present Marxism as an alien element in Chinese society. Apprehensive of their dominant positions in public life under conditions of looming revolutionary events, they propounded an isolationist course. Proponents of these views stressed "China's national spirit", the country's "specifics", and denied the existence of universal laws of human history. They asserted that Chinese society could develop only in accordance with its own specific laws which had nothing in common with the laws governing the history of other countries. "It is just for this reason, wrote a notable Chinese Marxist, Ai Siqu, that the revolutionaries strongly insisted that China go ahead, overtake advanced states, learn from them, learn their revolutionary theory, as well as their revolutionary experience and lessons, the best results of their achievements in science and culture, and all of that in order that China could sooner and more successfully make revolution".²⁵

The opponents of radical changes and any innovations used most diverse arguments in order to put road-blocks to progressive ideology, Marxism in the first place. Proponents of "China's national specifics" declared a sharp contrast between China and the West: the first is agrarian, the second industrial, the first is spiritual, the second materialist, the first is Confucian, the second Catholic. It was alleged on this ground that China was no match for other countries' science, culture and revolutionary experience. The borrowing of certain elements of western culture was allowed only as an accessory to spiritual values of Chinese origin. In fact, it was a revival of the well-known formula of Zhang Zhidong, a 19th century politician and ideologist of feudal orientation: "The Chinese teaching is essence (qi), the European teaching is a function (yong)". Some conservatives even said that any borrowing was pointless because "such things" had long been known in China, including the ideas of democracy and socialism.²⁶

Of course, the arguments of reactionary ideologists were selective, their barbs were directed against the ideas of scientific socialism, against certain elements of bourgeois culture. But they did not object to a westernisation of China on the basis of conservative, anti-humanistic traditions and doctrines.

Refuting assertions of the incompatibility of Marxism with conditions in China, Chinese Marxists pointed out that Marxism had a basis in the very socio-economic development of the country, as proved by the struggle of the proletariat.²⁷ For proofs of a universal nature of Marxism they turned to the history of Chinese philosophy. The presence of elements of dialectics in such monuments of ancient Chinese thought as *Yi jing*, *Dao de jing*, *Zhuang-zi* (the recognition of change in nature, the existence of opposites, the ideas of intertransition of life and death, the principle of development, etc.) was testimony, in their opinion, that in China itself there was ground for materialist dialectics.²⁸

Naturally, while defending the universal character of Marxism's general ideas, Chinese Marxists by no means denied the peculiarities of development of Chinese society, they came out for a creative use of scientific socialism in the concrete conditions of China. Ai Siqu, for example, point-

²⁴ See Shen Zhiyuan, pp. 88-89.

²⁵ Ai Siqu, *The Peculiarities of China's Social Development and Others*, 1946, pp. 60-61.

²⁶ It is noteworthy that similar views were expressed by a 19th century Chinese thinker, Zheng Guanyin (See *Selected Works of Progressive Chinese Thinkers of the New Time (1840-1898)*, Moscow, 1961, p. 140).

²⁷ See Ai Siqu, *Op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

²⁸ See Chen Weishi, *Op. cit.*, p. 176.

ed out that "when we in China use Marxism in practice, we must also take into account the distinguishing features of Chinese society, examine concretely Chinese society. We only object to the desire to fence oneself off from other countries in ideology and under the pretext of "mastering specifics" repudiate scientific laws, scientific rational study of Chinese society, the study and use of progressive ideas".²⁹

Speculating on China's national specifics during the 1930s were also the Trotskyites (alleging that China's history did not agree with the laws of social development of European countries), one of outstanding Trotskyites, Ye Qing, called for a "sinicisation" of Marxism in order to use it in China. By that he implied changing (biangeng) the form of Marxism: "It must change its form so that a new thing could appear, a Chinese thing, unlike the old one. That's what is called sinicisation".³⁰

Such a position made Trotskyites exaggerate the national at the expense of the international. Indeed, in any country, China included, Marxism is ought to be used with an eye to the concrete historical situation. But it is wrong to say that there is a "sinicised" Marxism. This, in fact, is tantamount to a rejection of the international character of Marxism, to tearing Marxism to pieces and dragging them into "national apartments". Trying to justify the opposition of the national to the international by the fact that Marxism originated in Europe, the Trotskyites discarded general laws of history, equally inherent in the history of all countries, including China.

Chinese Marxists took on the whole a correct position in this question. Marxism, they pointed out, is international by its very essence. This means that Marxists in different countries have a common theory, common views on problems and a common method of solving them. Besides, all Marxists in the world, no matter how different their ways, have a common goal—communism, their interests are interconnected. According to Chinese Marxists, "the mastering of specifics" meant "the mastering in concrete conditions of China of specific manifestations of the general laws of social development".³¹

The truth of Marxism is determined by the fact that it is a scientific theory revealing the laws of development of an objective world, of society and social transformations. And although these laws manifest themselves in various specific forms in specific countries, this circumstance does not belittle the universal truth of Marxism, said the works of Chinese Marxists. At the same time they stressed that Marxism constitutes a scientific method, a guide to an objective, concrete analysis of problems, to examination of concrete conditions in a specific country. In this connection they cited a well-known pronouncement by V. I. Lenin in his work *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, pertaining to the methodology of Marxist theoretical principles: "Marx's theory is to investigate and explain the evolution of the economic system of certain countries, and its 'application' to Russia can be only the *investigation* of Russian production relations and their evolution, *employing* the established practices of the *materialist* method and of *theoretical* political economy."³²

Chinese Marxists also used the term "sinicisation" of Marxism, and with two meanings: first, it meant the teaching of Marxism in a language understandable by common Chinese people and with the use of Chinese historico-philosophical material and events of modern Chinese reality;³³

²⁹ Ai Siqi, *Op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

³⁰ Quoted from Ai Siqi, *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

³¹ Ai Siqi, *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

³² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 266-267.

³³ See, for example, Hu Sheng, *Introduction to Dialectical Materialism*, Shanghai, 1939. Foreword, p. II.

second, it implied the use of general Marxist ideas with an eye to concrete conditions of China, its specifics. An example of such "Sinicisation" was thought to be the use by the CPC in its revolutionary struggle of Sun Yatsen's three popular principles and the thesis on the leading role of the proletariat in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is quite obvious that such an interpretation of the concept of "Sinicisation of Marxism" was not erroneous at all. Speaking of the application of Marxism to the concrete conditions of Chinese society, Chinese Marxists emphasised that it was necessary to rely on general principles worked out by Marx and Engels, the scientific methodology of dialectical and historical materialism.

Still, some nationalist-minded CPC members had a different understanding of the "Sinicisation" of Marxism, as giving Marxism a national form before its application. They distinguished an abstract and concrete Marxisms (the latter meant a Marxism in a national form). At first sight it may seem that there is no difference in principle between the concepts of "applying general ideas of Marxism to the concrete conditions of China" and "giving Marxism a national form". However, if in the first case it is a matter of creative use of Marxism in the conditions of each country, i. e., a matter of taking into account the relationship of the general and the particular, then in the second case it is a matter of opposition of the national and the international, of rejecting the universal character of the general ideas of the theory of Marxism.

Dealing with the perspectives of socialist revolution in the country, Chinese Marxists had first of all to work out such problems as ways and stages of revolutionary transformations, political power and economic programme of the transitional period, the limits of a political alliance with the bourgeoisie.

In the late 1930s, the CPC came up with a concept of "new democracy" which meant different things to its different supporters.³⁴ For instance, in works of a number of Chinese Marxists it meant a transition of society from capitalism to socialism. At that stage the development of capitalist production relations was not banned, given the leading role of the socialist sector of the economy. "In the process of construction of a new democratic society, wrote Shen Zhiyuan, the socialist element (the state economy) is gradually acquiring ever greater positions while the share of private capital is gradually decreasing and the whole of society is moving ever nearer to the gates of socialism."³⁵

The system of political power must represent an alliance of all democratic forces, including the national bourgeoisie (small and medium entrepreneurs). But the leading role ("political leadership") in this alliance and, consequently, in society, must belong to the proletariat.³⁶ Shen Zhiyuan put "new democracy" in China on a par with "people's democracy" in Eastern Europe. Evidently, such an approach was of a creative nature, it aimed at providing a historical perspective to the united front of democratic forces (constituting an alliance of different classes and social groups) that came into being during the anti-Japanese war. The striving to fill the slogan "new democracy" with a new meaning,

³⁴ See a series of works by D. A. Smirnov. Characterising the role of the slogan of "new democracy" at the turn of the 1930s-1940s, M. F. Yuryev wrote the following: "The putting forward of the conception of "new democracy" was double-edged. On the one hand, it was an attempt to create a special theory, fitting, in Mao Zedong's opinion, China's conditions... On the other hand, it pursued a directly pragmatic objective of splitting the national and petty bourgeoisie from the Guomindang, in order to isolate the latter and contribute to the CPC's future victory in the struggle for power". (See M. F. Yuryev, *The Communist Party of China—A Short Historical Sketch*. In *The People's Republic of China in 1981*. Moscow, 1985, p. 212).

³⁵ Shen Zhiyuan, *Shehui xingtai fazhan shi*, Shanghai, 1949, p. 54.

³⁶ See Shen Zhiyuan, *Xin zhengzhi xue di ziben wenti*, Shanghai, 1949, p. 41.

to bring its interpretation closer to the concept of "people's democracy", constitutes the most progressive tendency in the ideological situation of the 1940s.

Works of Marxists not only helped disseminate the ideas of Marxist philosophy, but played an important role when it came to exposing the unscientific character of bourgeois sociology. Widely popular among the intelligentsia in the 1930s-1940s were the views of Hu Shi, who propounded, in part, the idea of slow and gradual ("drop by drop") reforms, with a reference to Charles Darwin: "Darwin's evolutionary teaching is a tremendous lesson to us. Such an understanding of evolution as changes in nature and artificial selection constitute changes drop by drop, therefore any complex phenomenon cannot be created at one go. Positivism, which proceeds from Darwinism, holds that only a gradual, drop-by-drop improvement is true evolution".³⁷ Chinese Marxists rightly noted that Hu Shi referred to Darwinism in order to deny sudden leaps, i. e., revolutionary changes in social development.

In the then conditions of China a special role was played by the intelligentsia whose many representatives, close as they were to workers for economic and social reasons, took an active part in the revolutionary movement. This even gave rise to the erroneous view that the majority of Chinese intellectuals were revolutionaries.³⁸ However, Chinese Marxists fully realised that the intelligentsia cannot play an independent role in a revolution, or guide it, the latter role can be shouldered only by the proletariat. Their ideas on the dictatorship of the proletariat were on the whole in the framework of Marxism. They emphasised that the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat was not in violence but in the construction of socialism.³⁹

In conclusion, an important point had to be stressed. The works of Chinese Marxist philosophers under discussion were mainly published in regions controlled by the Guomindang. For this reason their influence was largely limited by the circles of intellectuals, students, young people. A major part of the party cadres was then beyond the reach of those publications. Under the military and political conditions of China at the time their contents could hardly become immediately known to party members working in the liberated regions. That, undoubtedly, put a limit on the dissemination of Marxist philosophy.

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³⁷ Hu Shi, *Wencun (Collection of Works)*, Shanghai, 1925, Foreword.

³⁸ See Wu Liping, Ai Siqu, *Weiwu shi guan*, 1939, p. 79.

³⁹ Wu Liping, Ai Siqu, *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

RESTRUCTURING OF ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT IN CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 133-137

[Article by B.N. Basov]

The economic reform now under way in the People's Republic of China is in its eighth year, and has involved China's main economic sectors. According to *Renmin ribao* (May 1986), "consolidation, mastering, supplementation and improvement" are the essence of the reform in towns. "Improvement" in China stands for the technical retooling of the national economy, the improvement of the management system, and the expansion of enterprise independence.

According to the Chinese press, the reform of the management system is primarily aimed at enhancing enterprise independence, getting rid of petty tutelage from above and optimising the structure of direct management by way of introducing a "system of director responsibility". To this end the terms of responsibility of party committees and directors are to be reconsidered. According to *Gongren ribao* (June 7, 1986), in the course of the reform party secretaries at enterprises must realise the need to grant enterprise directors full authority in regard to production management, and to understand that party committees' functions are those of control and moral support rather than administration. The newspaper reports that as of now, the system where directors have assumed personal responsibility, is effective at over 20,000 enterprises participating in the economic experiment. Experience has shown, the newspaper concludes, that this system "makes it possible to ensure strict production management and effective overall administration at enterprises as a whole, under the conditions of deeper division of labour and specialisation in production, higher technical and production requirements, more complex cooperative links and other factors".

The Chinese press and leaders at all levels view the system of director responsibility as an "instrument for effecting the reform comprehensively inside enterprises". As *Gongren ribao* wrote on June 7, 1986, the management system reform now under way is at a turning point of "replacing the old structure with a new one"; the old structure still continuing to "perform its role, while the new one is yet imperfect". Economic restructuring is a dynamic and complex process. A search for new, more rational structures is made in the process, and enterprises which constitute, as the newspaper put it, the "primary cells of the socio-economic organism" are now in the focus of the reorganisation.

Gongren ribao quotes some directors complaining that it is rather difficult to perform administrative functions in a situation where the management system is being restructured while its legal basis has not yet been straightened out. But these difficulties, the Chinese press notes, are only natural and can easily be explained. The system of "collective leadership by party committees" has for many years been in operation in the country. The switch-over to the system of director responsibility, as *Gongren ribao* commented on June 11, 1986, is an immense, large-scale reform involving not only regulated distribution of authority and respon-

sibility among higher-up organisations and enterprises, but also improved management and administration within enterprises. This is a lengthy and complex process which cannot be speeded up by decrees exclusively. In its commentary on June 11, 1986, *Gongren ribao* said that many enterprise directors complained that although there were more than 30 provisions in the State Council's decrees regarding enterprise management reorganisation and the expansion of enterprise independence, only as few as seven or eight such provisions were implemented in a way they should. Higher-up bodies, the newspaper explains, "let go of authority, as people let go of a kite, leaving the string in their hands". Many old attitudes toward management "have struck deep roots at enterprises and continue to exert an influence". In this setting, the newspaper says, "views and ideas are primarily to be changed drastically", if the system of director responsibility is to be effected.

Many articles have appeared in the Chinese central press recently which generalise the experience of introduction of the director responsibility system and its positive results. A commentary in *Renmin ribao* (May 5, 1986) under the eye-catching headline: *There Is No Way Back! Go Ahead by Introducing the System of Director Responsibility!*, analysed the situation at a number of Peking enterprises following the beginning of the experiment. Today, the system is active at 155 Peking public-owned industrial enterprises. One-third of city industrial plants, they provide over 60 per cent of its gross industrial output and tax revenues. The enterprises involved in the economic experiment are more efficient as compared with other plants. According to *Renmin ribao*, in 1985 the aggregate value of industrial output of all Peking's enterprises participating in the experiment increased by 15 per cent as compared with the previous year, and tax revenues were up 9.4 per cent; the corresponding average figures for other enterprises were 4.6 and 2.61 per cent. Extending its full support for the experiment, *Renmin ribao* writes that each year the contribution of the participating enterprises grows bigger, as does the income of workers and employees, which is in keeping with the interests of all: the state, the enterprises, the workers and employees.

A *Renmin ribao* observer writes that the preliminary results of the experiment show that the "system makes enterprises more viable and enhances their technical level and economic efficiency". Chinese economists believe that, if introduced, the system will make it possible to carry through a "comprehensive internal reform at enterprises". The experiment is to be extended during this year to involve another 100 enterprises. As a result, "this system will embrace more than half of the public-property enterprises in Peking".

Chinese press reports indicate that the results of the introduction of the system are assessed in other major cities as well. The Zhengzhou city committee held a seminar of enterprise directors and party committee secretaries to discuss how to effect the system and solve problems that it involves. The newspaper writes that over the past two years the system of management has been reorganised at more than 90 local enterprises, which has boosted production and increased enterprise efficiency.

Information on the positive aspects of effecting the system of director responsibility at individual enterprises has been appearing rather frequently in China's central newspapers in recent months. Specifically, on June 10, 1986 *Gongren ribao* published an article on the "successes of the Second Radio Components Plant in Tianjin". After the system of director responsibility had been introduced at the plant, its income over the past year increased 60 per cent as compared with the previous year, while its hard currency earnings from exports went up 100 per cent. In the second ten-day period last May, the plant was given three bonuses for

the best articles produced in the industry. The newspaper says that this was largely due to better management, above all because "decisions are now made and implemented quickly". Formerly, many valuable suggestions were simply buried in protracted discussions. The newspaper gives an example: when making a business trip to study market opportunities, the plant's director signed during the course of several days only, a number of profitable agreements on producing two million variable capacitors jointly with local enterprises. Formerly, this would have taken many months. The next day (June 11) *Gongren ribao* carried a lengthy feature story and a commentary on introducing this system at the cement plant at Bengxi (Liaoning Province).

In future, the responsibility of enterprise directors is going to be expanded, extending their rights to new spheres, so that they can be used more effectively. Thus, *Renmin ribao* wrote on May 5, 1986, by way of experiment measures were taken at 29 Peking participating enterprises to tie in wages to economic efficiency. A system of floating wages has been introduced at most of such enterprises, which, according to the newspaper, "has markedly boosted the production activity of workers and employees".

The system of directors' personal responsibility primarily affects and changes the current pattern of selecting and placing personnel. Formerly, the selection of personnel was exclusively the prerogative of enterprises party committees and higher-up bodies. Today, the party committees exercise control functions only. The directors of most of the enterprises participating in the experiment have adopted the following procedure when appointing or dismissing medium-level managerial staff: the director selects a candidate and gives the name to his deputy responsible for personnel to check the person's professional competence. Simultaneously, the director asks the party committee to give their recommendation and considers the question at a workers' meeting attended by senior representatives of the enterprises administration, party and trade union organisations. The procedure concludes with a ruling made by the enterprise director. This procedure, notes *Renmin ribao*, has made it possible for the overwhelming majority of the participating enterprises to appoint to medium-level managerial posts people who know their trade, are actively involved in enterprise activities, shoulder their responsibility, have high moral standards and, as a rule, fulfil their duties with competence and success.

According to *Gongren ribao* (June 10, 1986), the deputy directors and heads of major departments at the Second Radio Components Plant were selected by the director and appointed by order for a one-year period. "Formerly", the plant director admits, "candidates for such posts were selected and appointed by higher-up bodies. We were compelled to hire even those who were unable to fulfil their duties."

Chinese press reports indicate that the redistribution of authority between party committee secretaries and directors and the establishment of new relationship between party committees and administrative bodies are the most serious problems arising when introducing the system of director responsibility. The Chinese press spotlights the experience of party committee secretaries who back up the reform, change their views and attitudes. Characteristically, *Renmin ribao* (June 11, 1986) frontpaged an article headed "A Party Committee Secretary Supports Vigorously the Introduction of the System of Director Responsibility", which dealt with the practical experience of the cement plant at Bengxi (Liaoning Province). Formerly, the newspaper wrote, "the party committee secretary would interfere with virtually any trifle. Today, he is primarily involved in ideological and party work and ensures control over the activities of the administration". Many, the newspaper went on to say, did not under-

stand the secretary's behaviour and why he voluntarily gave up administrative authority, and even reproached him. The newspaper viewed the party secretary's position as conforming to the general policy line of the CPC leadership, as a positive example to be followed by other secretaries. The article reported how the party committee helped the administration to tighten up labour discipline and resolve other production problems.

The reform of enterprise management system seems to encounter more serious difficulties in provinces than it does in the capital, where, as *Renmin ribao* wrote on May 5, 1986 the party committee secretaries of the enterprises participating in the experiment "enthusiastically carry out the necessary work and earnestly support the directors". Party committees are mainly engaged in organisation and propaganda activities. *Renmin ribao* notes that it is essential for the party work to "permeate the entire process of economic activities, but party activists must not get involved in direct economic activities". When dealing with key production problems, the newspaper says, party committees must take the initiative in organising people, thus ensuring the fulfilment of economic objectives.

Renmin ribao gives the example of "correct activities" by the party committee of the medical appliances plant in Peking. To speed up the rate of production expansion, the plant director decided to give over the manufacture of some simple parts and standard equipment to other enterprises. Part of the workers and employees did not understand how important and profitable that decision was. Confronted with that problem, the newspaper writes, the party committee explained the advantage of and, consequently, the need for the division of production and for cooperation with other enterprises. In doing so, it relied on old-timers among the technical and administrative personnel. As a result, the newspaper concludes, the director's decision was implemented, yielding definite benefits.

The changed pattern of relations between party committees and directors, especially in dealing with personnel matters, is the chief element of the system of directors' personal responsibility. As *Renmin ribao* notes, relations between party and administrative bodies take on a new form ensuring a decisive role for managers in production.

Many administrative and economic decisions, especially regarding strategic matters, writes *Renmin ribao*, are not taken exclusively by the directors of enterprises participating in the experiment. Active part in drafting most decisions is taken by experts, party, trade union and other public organisations. Specifically, *Renmin ribao* reports that a "scientifically based, rational system of decision-making" has been developed and adopted at the auto engine plant in Peking. The director outlines a problem and sets objectives. His deputies set up working groups to study and analyse the problem together with their entire production units. These units work out possible variants drawing up relevant technical and economic documents. The administration, party and trade union organisations in turn give their analysis and assessment of the draft, and make inquiries. The final decision is made at a production meeting chaired by the director. It is clear, *Renmin ribao* writes, that this method of decision-making preserves the system of director responsibility, yet there is no need to worry that the director may make an important decision individually.

Chinese press reports and statements by PRC leaders indicate that the introduction of the system of director responsibility now extends beyond the stage of experiment and is turning into an important component of the general reform of economic management. According to *Renmin ribao*, on March 15, 1986, Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the PRC State Council, addressed a standing session of the State Council discussing the results of the State Council-sponsored First All-China Workers' Meeting on Implementing the Structural Economic Reform in Towns. He called

for practical measures to "implement the system of production responsibility, to develop further the initiative of experienced workers and employees". The Chinese press also notes that the documents of party and administrative bodies regarding the Seventh Five-Year Plan adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress held in the spring of 1986, reaffirm the need to improve the system of management, specifically to introduce the system of director responsibility.

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STATE POLICY TOWARD RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PRC DESCRIBED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 138-148

[Article by P.M. Kozhin, candidate of historical sciences]

The policies the CPC and the PRC leadership pursue towards religion and religious organisations have been shaped throughout the entire history of the PRC. Three main organisational and functional levels can be outlined in the relevant activities. These are, first, the activity of government, above all legislative, bodies, the CPC CC and the leadership of the United Front. Second, this is the work of the officially recognised religious associations, institutions and organisations directly engaged in running definite spheres of religious activities. Third, the operation of the various religious communities themselves. The first of the two above-mentioned levels are described in detail in scientific publications and the press whereas the third can be described mostly on the basis of indirect data which are difficult to verify.¹

In the 1949 Provisional Constitution of the PRC all problems were reduced to the attitude of people's power to the religions of national minorities. Article 53 said: "All national minorities are free to develop their languages and dialects, preserve or perfect their customs, traditions and religious practices".

The attitude to religion is formulated in the Constitution of 1954 (Article 88): "Citizens of the PRC enjoy freedom of creed". So, on the one hand, freedom of creed applied to all citizens of the country but, on the other hand, the wording of this article was abstract.

Article 28 of the 1975 Constitution dealt with a package of democratic freedoms (speech, correspondence, assembly, organisation, procession, strikes, etc.) including the provision "on the freedom of professing a religion and the freedom not to profess a religion but to promote atheism".

In the 1978 Constitution this provision is singled out in Article 46, a sign of increased attention to religious issues. It was exactly when this Constitution was in force that patriotic religious organisations, contacts with religious circles abroad and contacts between religious associations inside the country began to be revived.

It was also during the period of this Constitution that the Criminal Code of the PRC was introduced. It contains articles directly dealing with religious issues. Article 99 provided for punishment for "the use of feudal prejudices and sectarian organisations in pursuit of counterrevolutionary activity", while Article 147 said that "government officials unlaw-

¹ In *Religions and Societies in Asia and the Middle East*, Ed. by C. Caldarola, Berlin, New York, Amsterdam, 1982, pp. 551-577; H. Waldenfels, *Religion in China*, *Eindrücke von einer Chinareise*, *Stimmen der Zeit*, 1983, T. 2, s. 95-109; G. Evers, *Die christliche Kirche der Volksrepublik China*, "Herder Korrespondenz. Monatshefte für Gesellschaft und Religion", 1984, Juli, Jg. 38, s. 325-329; F. Kürschner, *Mit Christus für das Neue China*, "Junge Kirche" (Bremen), 1982 Jg. 43; H., 6, s. 297-299; L. Ladany, *Ultimas novedades sobre la Iglesia en China*, "Criterio" (Buenos Aires), 1982, v. 27, pp. 232-234; J. Charbonnier, *Catholiques de Chine en Communion de foi*, "Information Catholiques Internationales", No. 578/15, Sept. 1982, pp. 3-9, 46.

fully denying citizens' freedom of creed and violating the customs and mores of national minorities" are subject to punishment. Article 165 said that punishment is to be meted out to "sorcerers and witch doctors who use prejudices to disseminate absurd rumours and extort property".

Lastly, Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution says: "Citizens of the PRC are free to pursue their religious faith. No state institutions, public organisations or individuals are permitted to coerce citizens to profess religion or not to profess religion. Discrimination against religious citizens and non-religious citizens is not allowed. The state protects normal religious activity. Nobody is allowed to use religion for activities directed at undermining public order, causing harm to the physical health of citizens and at obstructing the system of state education. Religious fraternities and religious forces shall not be subject to foreign influence". This article shows that the attitude to religion has been substantially reconceptualised in the period since the adoption of the previous constitution. The number of publications on matters related to religion has also grown. Press reports covered the following subjects: 1) correlation between the concepts of "religion", "religious prejudices" and "vestiges of the past" (the term "religions" refers to big religious systems that have found expression in relevant official documents and are embodied in either national or regional associations with their own governing bodies); 2) instances of violence against individuals when the latter choose their values or general regulations concerning freedom of conscience; 3) facts testifying to damage to the health of citizens (for instance, by sorcerers, and also in instances envisaged by articles 99, 145, and 17 of the PRC's Criminal Code of 1979); 4) correlation between religious rites and ethno-cultural customs (the press warned against confusing them); 5) condemnation of the activity of a number of Catholic organisations that refused to recognise the authority of the "patriotic Catholic church" and recognised the right of the Roman Curia to "interfere in the country's internal affairs". Some research conducted at the time was also reflected in a number of special publications.²

At the same time the CPC CC was working out a principled approach "to evaluating the role of religion in a socialist country".

Yang Jingren, Head of the United Front Department under the CPC CC, said in the middle of 1983 that Hu Yaobang had endorsed a document concerning these problems. The ideological directives of the CPC CC concerning religious activity under socialism were recorded in Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution. A detailed commentary was offered in the open editorial "Our Party's Guiding Principles in the Question of Religion Under Socialism"³. The organ of the CPC CC stated first of all that some religious teachings had existed in China for millenniums. Chinese Buddhism is more than 2000 years old, Taoism—over 1700, Islam—1300, whereas Catholicism and Protestantism had appeared mostly after the Opium Wars.

Believers are few among the present Chinese people, especially among the Han population, *Hongqi* noted. But in the case of more than a dozen ethnic minorities some religions embrace a considerable portion of the population.

In China, during the feudal, semi-feudal and semi-colonial epochs, all religions were under the control of the ruling classes. Later, the Catholic and Protestant churches found themselves under the control of foreign colonialist and imperialist forces.

² In Niu Xinfang, *Spirits and Feudal Prejudices*, Shijiazhuang, 1981; "Dictionary of Religion", Shanghai, 1982 (in Chinese), etc.

³ *Hongqi*, June 16, 1982, No. 12, pp. 3-8.

After the emergence of the PRC the religious situation has changed radically, *Hongqi* points out. The elimination of social relations connected with exploitation of man by man turns the contradictions determined by religion into contradictions within the working people themselves, that is, deprives these contradictions of an antagonistic nature. But religious questions do not lose their importance in the field of attaining the internal spiritual unity of society, in its socialist transformation.

Religion, *Hongqi*, continues, belongs to phenomena that are inevitable in certain epochs of social development, is a product of class society and is used by the ruling classes as an "instrument of the spiritual enslavement of the masses".

Under the socialist system "the class foundations for the existence of religion are in the main removed. But customs cannot be fully uprooted within a short period of time. Internal causes for their preservation in the modern socio-economic development also exist. This explains the Party's attention to questions of religious life because it is unrealistic to think that religion will wither away quickly with the coming of socialism and its further development in the economy and culture. The view that religious ideas and activity can be suppressed by force is even farther away from Marxist precepts concerning religion. It is totally wrong and extremely dangerous", *Hongqi* states.

Further on, the article contrasts, the correct course of the CPC in respect of religion to the "left" mistakes in this field during the period of the "great cultural revolution" by Lin Biao and the counterrevolutionary group of Jiang Qing "which destroyed the Party's entire work in the field of religion". This counterposing can be presented in the form of the following table (see page 141).

One of the main duties of the CPC at the new historical stage, *Hongqi* writes, is further resolute policy of the freedom of creed, of strengthening and expanding the patriotic and political ties of religious groups, educating them in the spirit of patriotism and socialism, inducing their positive elements to struggle for building a new mighty socialist state, for uniting Taiwan with the PRC, for strengthening universal peace, etc.

Further, the editorial in *Hongqi* says that the Party continues to encounter obstacles and difficulties—consequences of the "leftist" course—and that overcoming them will depend on the conscious attitude of every party functionary to religious issues. The Constitution has established the freedom of conscience and it is the Party's cause to protect this freedom. "It is a long-term policy of our Party to respect and protect religious freedoms. This is a policy which must be pursued until religion finally withers away naturally".

One should not forget, however, the editorial continues, that religious freedom implies personal choice for each citizen and this presupposes also a whole number of conditions determining relations between religious organisations and the state: 1) the principle of separation of religion and the state; 2) under no conditions can religion interfere in the policy of the state, in juridical activities, in school education or universal education; 3) under no circumstances can the privileges of religious feudalism, the system of religious enslavement be revived; 4) religion shall not be used to oppose the leadership of the party or the socialist system, to violate national unity, or to conduct under religious camouflage propaganda against Marxism-Leninism or the "thought of Mao Zedong". The Party must pay more attention to the selection of personnel and the education of religious workers and show special concern for their patriotic sentiments.

There are eight patriotic religious organisations in the PRC: the Chinese Buddhist Society, the Chinese Taoist Society, the Chinese Islamic Society, the Chinese Catholic Society, the Chinese Catholic Administra-

Table 1

Successes the Party scored in religious work after the proclamation of the PRC	Destructive activity during the period of the "cultural revolution"	Activity to correct the mistakes (after 1976)
<p>1. "We have eliminated the forces of imperialism operating within the church and asserted the correct direction of independence (dissemination, administration and self-maintenance). So the Catholic and Protestant churches, previously instruments of abuse by imperialism, became an independent movement of Chinese believers."</p> <p>2. "We have removed the privileges of religious feudalism and its oppressive system, and also exposed the reactionary and negative elements who used religion as a camouflage, so Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam have been freed of domination and exploitation by reactionary classes."</p> <p>3. "We have achieved the freedom of creed. The masses of religious people not only experienced the transforming political and economic liberation together with the entire people but also began to rejoice in the right of religious freedom."</p> <p>4. "We also wanted to win over, unite and educate believers sponsoring a big groups of patriotically-minded people among believers."</p> <p>5. "We helped them promote international ties and imparted to these ties a positive form."</p>	<p>"Their use of violence against religion resulted in a situation when some counterrevolutionary and negative elements turned against the revolution in an anti-constitutional way under the pretext of protecting religious 'rights'."</p> <p>"They destroyed national unity by classifying certain customs of ethnic minorities as religious prejudices and by forcibly banning them."</p> <p>"They went so far as to forcibly forbid religious people to exercise their usual religious rites and destroyed or shut down places of worship."</p> <p>"They [the 'Gang of Four' — P. K.] destroyed patriotic religious organisations and groups of positive elements who accepted socialism."</p> <p>"They treated patriotic believers and the masses of believers as 'objects of dictatorship' and most flagrantly subjected religious circles to unjust and false trials."</p>	<p>See point 5</p> <p>"With the aim of continuing and implementing the policy in respect of religion we have reopened temples, mosques, churches and places of worship."</p> <p>"We have revived the activity of patriotic organisations and, having united them, won them over to our side and are educating the masses in religious circles."</p> <p>"We corrected the unfair decisions and resumed international friendly religious ties while coming out at the same time against the destructive influence of hostile foreign religious forces."</p>

tive Commission, the Chinese Catholic Collegium of Bishops, the Chinese Protestant Movement for Three Types of Independence and the Christian Council.

"It is the task of each of these religious patriotic associations strictly to observe the interests of the Party and government while exercising freedom of conscience, to continuously assist the broad masses of believers in achieving a high level of patriotic and socialist consciousness, to ensure the believers' constitutional rights, and organise the broad popular masses belonging to religious organisations to carry out normal religious

work... All patriotic religious organisations must accept guidance by the party and the government. The cadres should conduct talks and joint work with representatives of religious organisations in a well-wishing manner, give them assistance in the attainment of their own tasks and not interfere in what is within their competence. This is how a correct functioning of religious associations can be attained and only in such a way can they vigorously conduct their necessary work within the framework of the constitution and legality, become truly full-fledged religious organisations and exercise functions of liaison, making it possible for the Party and the government to win over the masses of believers to their side, to unite and educate them."

There is a strong need in the country to provide believers with places where they could worship and engage in normal religious activity, *Hongqi* goes on. "As to the religious activities carried out there—glorifying Buddha, reading of suras, burning of incense, as well as services, prayers, reading of the Gospel, sermons, masses, baptisms, monk initiations, religious holidays, religious rites performed at home, etc—all this should be carried out by religious organisations and the believers themselves under the protection of laws. Nobody shall interfere in these matters. All places of worship are run by the State Bureau for Religious Cults. The religious associations and their staff members are under its jurisdiction. It goes without saying that no religious actions can violate public order and production activity. Nobody shall conduct atheistic propaganda in places of worship and start discussions with masses of believers on issues of faith or atheism. But neither shall religious organisations and believers preach outside places of worship, seek new converts, spread religious treatises and writings that have not been approved officially. Well-known temples, mosques and churches are not only places of worship but have a big historical and cultural importance and should be protected in the full meaning of this word. Both the structures and their environs should be in good condition. Silence must be kept around because they are meant for historical sightseeing.

It is impermissible to use religious organisations as a cover for anti-government political activity. This, as well as the dissemination of feudal prejudices, the activity of reactionary sects, witch doctors and oracles is punishable by law. All forms of deceiving people and inflicting material damage on them with the help of prejudices are punishable by the authorities. In the event of a recurrent violation of laws the offenders, already punished for this earlier should be convicted again".

Two directions should be distinguished among the PRC's religious organisations connected with foreign circles, *Hongqi* points out. The first comprises the organisations that have "big importance for strengthening China's political influence" while the second one includes those functioning in accordance with plans of foreign reactionary forces influencing China's religious circles. For this purpose, in particular, questions of creating an underground church, a "church of the catacombs" in the PRC, of missionarism, etc., are being discussed.

Work with believers is a substantial part of the work with the masses with firm reliance on Marxist-Leninist theoretical guidelines. Thus, a scientific criticism of idealism must be conducted and more attention given to the atheistic education of the people, especially the younger generation. One should not forget that membership in the party rules out the right to profess any religion. True, here one must bear in mind the living conditions of the national minorities, with the bulk of population professing either Islam or Lamaism. In this case special consideration should be given to the problem of attitude to religion by party members of the specific nationality. But among the Han population Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism and Protestantism have no relevance for nationality.

On the whole, the *Hongqi* editorial concludes, problems of religious life are deeply linked with social life and should be under constant and close Party control.

There are only four large-scale religious organisations that unite religious communities and through them the masses of believers: Buddhist, Taoist, the Catholic Society and the Protestant Movement for Three Types of Independence. The other organisations listed in *Hongqi* are various governing bodies of Christian societies. One should bear in mind that there is a lengthy gap in the study of the activities of religious communities in the period from 1966 to the late 1970s when religious activities in the PRC could be carried out only clandestinely.⁴ The forms of religious activity officially permitted by the leadership (even so starting only with the 1970s) were limited to religious ceremonies on the occasion of international meetings with representatives of countries where religion carries much political weight.⁵

Using official terminology all the above-mentioned organisations are patriotic associations. Their functions are determined as follows. First, by their nature they are the bodies which promote instructions of the party and government among the believers. Second, by virtue of their intermediate position between the mass of believers and the direct leadership of religious groups and communities, on the one hand, and the state (Directorate for Religious Affairs of the State Council) and also party bodies (United Front Department) dealing with religion, on the other hand, they create a possibility for implementing the principle of non-interference by party and state bodies in the affairs of a religious community. Third, they represent the interests of religious communities and guarantee the loyal activity of their relevant religious organisations. Fourth, they serve as liaison between Chinese patriotic religious organisations and international forums of the given confessions or generally religious ones, and represent Chinese religious communities on the international arena.

In 1983 the Peking magazine *Zhongguo jiankuang* briefly described the state of affairs in the various religious communities now existing in China. It also dealt with time and historical conditions of the origination of their institutes and assessment of the present situation of the relevant religious patriotic societies. The number of publications on religious matters has now sharply declined in the central Chinese press. This can be explained by the separation of internal religious life with those of its manifestations that might have international importance. A steady order in listing religious organisations persists in these publications.

The Buddhist Society, set up in 1953, has been operating since late 1980 after the 4th Conference. Zhao Puchu, a poet, scholar and specialist on the history and theory of Buddhism, was elected president of the Society. All trends of Buddhism existing in the PRC, including Lamaism and Mahayana, the biggest branches of the Buddhist teaching in China, are united in the Buddhist Society. The Buddhist academy in the Fayuanxia temple in Peking resumed its activities in December 1980 when 40 students were enrolled. A one-year school for some 200 students ranging in age from 18 to 40 was opened at the Jixia monastery near Nanking in the autumn of 1982.

⁴ In A. Sovik, *Religion, Religious Institutions and Religious Possibilities in China*, "China Notes" (New York), 1979, Vol. XVII, No. 2, p. 63.

⁵ In R. C. Bush, *Religion in Communist China*, Nashville, 1970; W. Eichorn, *Religion in China*, Stuttgart, Berlin u. a., 1973, S. 385-400.

A two-year school for Buddhist monks was opened in Peking in March 1985. A graduation ceremony was held in Shanghai in September at the local two-year Buddhist school. Of the 22 graduates 12 were sent to the main temples of Shanghai while the rest will continue their education at the Buddhist academy. A special relief fund came into being in June 1982 to assist in spreading Buddhist culture and education in China. The startup of 10,000 yuan was donated by its honorary president and 15,000 yuan by the Japanese Buddhist Society.

A celebration meeting devoted to the 30th anniversary of the Buddhist Society in the PRC was held early in December 1983 during the 2nd Session of the 4th Conference. The president of the society made a report in which he set before Chinese Buddhists the tasks connected with the new phase of the development of Buddhism in the PRC. It said that Buddhism should uphold the interests of the socialist society because only the PRC has given Chinese Buddhists full equality. Buddhists, the report stressed, should help central and local bodies of power in implementing religious freedoms and for the good of the country. It was also noted that the Buddhist Society is called upon to serve as a bridge between the government and believers and that any deviation from Party's instructions inflicts damage on Buddhism.⁶

Work to restore Buddhist holy places in Tibet is now directly connected with religious life of the population. More than 10,000 lamas and other Buddhist clergymen gathered in Lhasa early in June 1984 to celebrate the anniversary of Buddha. Forty five Buddhist monasteries have been reopened by now. The main monastery in Lhasa annually gets donations amounting to tens of thousands yuan.⁷ A whole number of reports was devoted to the question of Dalai-Lama's return to China.⁸ A delegation of Chinese Buddhists attended the 14th Buddhist World Conference in Sri Lanka in August 1984.⁹ In October 1985, the PRC was visited by a delegation of the leadership of the Buddhist Association of Singapore. In February 1985, it was decided to prepare a new edition of the 220-volume Buddhist canon in the coming decade.

The Islamic Society was formed in 1953. After the 4th Conference (April 1980) it was headed by Zhang Jie (Honorary President Shihedi Burkhan). A delegation of 16 Chinese Moslems visited Mecca in 1979 and since then groups of up to 20 people make such trips annually. The Institute of Islamic Theology is attended by 40 students. It was founded in 1955 but there were no classes in the period from 1966 to 1982. In March 1982, ten Chinese students were sent to study at the Higher Islamic School in Cairo. There has been a new publication of the Chinese translation of the Koran (with parallel texts in Arabic and Chinese). Moslem classics have begun to be published again. Thirty four young Moslem clergymen completed six-month courses in Ningxia, the autonomous region of Chinese Moslems, in 1983. Some 2,000 imams are very advanced in age, so there is a strong need to train new ones. The Institute of Islamic Theology was formed in Ningxia in September 1985 and enrolled 20 students for a five-year course of training.

In connection with preparations for the international Islamic conference in Karachi (Pakistan) in 1984 the leadership of the society published materials confirming freedom of creed in the PRC. According to data cited by the President of the Society Haji Mohammed Ali Zhang Jie, Islam is professed by 10 of the PRC's 55 ethnic minorities, or about 14 million people (seven million Moslems live in Xinjiang alone). There are

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 7, 8, 1983.

⁷ *Ta Kung Pao*, June 28, 1981.

⁸ *China Aktuell*, 1984, Juni, S. 310; September, S. 489.

⁹ *Buddhists for Peace*, 1985, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 52.

20,000 mosques. With improvements in transport the number of pilgrims travelling to Mecca has sharply increased. There were about a thousand of them in 1984, or thrice as many as in 1983.¹⁰ According to the same data, more Chinese pilgrims have visited Mecca in the years of the PRC's existence than throughout the entire previous history of the Moslem community in China. The press reports mass attendance of religious ceremonies by Chinese Moslems and the positive attitude the authorities show. On July 1, 1984 more than 150,000 Moslems in Peking took part in the concluding festivities of Ramadan. A reception was held at the Palace of Culture of Nations attended by Saifuddin, Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

The first translation of the Koran into the Uighur language was published in Xinjiang. The translation was done in 1983 by the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.

The Taoist Patriotic Society was founded in 1957 and resumed its work in 1980. At first its activity was on a limited scale. It held meetings in Peking on December 3-10, 1984 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Society's first establishment. Topics of patriotic work of Taoists were discussed.¹¹ At present there are almost a hundred Taoist monasteries in China. The training of Taoist clergy has been organised at the Baiyun temple in Peking. Sixty students have been trained there in the past two years. The Baiyun temple is the main national sanctum for the quanzhen ("protection of truth") Taoist sect which is also one of the leading Taoist organisations in Taiwan. But the historical centres of this sect are naturally on the mainland and their invigoration is remarkable. The Baiyun temple in the south-western part of Peking has been restored and opened to visitors—tourists and believers. Statues of Laozi and other Taoist saints have been reinstated for public display. The first stage of restoring the monastery on Mount Maoshan (Jiangsu) has been completed. It is one of the four main Taoist centres. The trend represented there reflects, it is said, the elaboration of "the forms of man's interaction with forces of good and the possibilities of extending human life", and it is also widely represented in Taiwan. The restoration of this huge complex pursues several aims: to increase the influence of the Taoist patriotic society on the broad masses of people, to create a new tourist centre devoted to the traditional culture of China and the way of life of Taoists, and to attract the attention of "overseas Chinese" to the traditional Taoist religious centres. Local authorities have been very helpful. Many of the local clergymen there have had a special education while two of them are trained in Peking. The monastery receives up to a thousand believers and visitors a day.¹² A film about the Xiuenmiao (Suzhou) temple devoted to Taoist rituals has been made mostly for foreign audiences. Taking part in the film are 19 old priests (the film lasts 205 minutes), guardians of the ancient traditions of Taoism. The film is of interest not only to Taoists. In the opinion of specialists, it is a major ethnographical and historico-cultural document. A considerable part of the work by the Taoist patriotic society is directed at foreign circles interested in Taoism and at foreign tourists who come to the PRC for educational purposes.

Confucianism does not have its own religious organisation. It is studied by the Institute of the History of World Religions of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences. A symposium on Confucianism, held in April 1983 in Qufu, the home town of Confucius, attracted 180 participants.¹³ A material has been published on the living offsprings of Confucius.

¹⁰ *China Aktuell*, 1983, Mai, S. 276; 1984 Mai, S. 250; Juli, S. 273.

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 11, 1984; *China Aktuell*, 1984, Dezember, S. 712, 713.

¹² *Ta Kung Pao*, April 26, 1984.

¹³ *China Reconstructs*, 1983, No. 8, p. 31.

Christian societies and organisations are represented in the PRC in several forms. The patriotic organisation of Catholics consists of the Chinese Catholic Society, the Chinese Administrative Commission and the Chinese Collegium of Bishops. There are two similar Protestant organisations: the Chinese Protestant Movement for Three Types of Independence and the Christian Council.

Among Catholic organisations only the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Society is truly mass scale in nature. It was revived in 1980. A theological Catholic seminar numbering 60 students (supervised by Bishop Du Shihua) was opened in Peking in September 1983. The students were chosen from among 200 applicants sent by Catholic communities and churches. The six-year seminar studies Catholic theology, history of the church, ethics, rituals, etc. It is intended to modernise instruction because it has been found that the former missionary textbooks translated from Latin contained many "mistakes". It has been announced that the seminar has the support of both religious and government quarters. Another two seminars have been opened in Shanghai and Shenyang, and a third was opened in October 1984 in Xian.

Western observers have repeatedly stressed the complexities in the relationship of the PRC's Catholics with the Vatican. When speaking at a ceremony in May 1983 devoted to the memory of two Italian missionaries who perished in Guangdong in February 1930, the Pope noted that a dialogue with the Chinese church is possible.¹⁴ But the Chinese patriotic Catholic church refuses to recognise the Vatican's administrative, political, organisational and ideological authority.

A delegation of the Chinese Christian Council headed by the Anglican Bishop Ding Guangxun visited Britain, Sweden, Finland and the FRG in October 1982. On this occasion even such a critically inclined commentator as Brunhild Staiger (FRG) stated: "The fact that foreign and even ecumenical contacts are becoming possible for Chinese Protestants is a further indicator of the success of the steps taken in previous years to rehabilitate the church in China".¹⁵ Subsequent events, however, showed that this question is much more complicated.

The attitude in the PRC to Chinese Christians is determined mainly by concern about possible interference in the country's internal affairs through international Christian institutions. Hence, in particular, is the different approaches of the authorities to organisations of Protestant churches that were united in 1951 into the so-called "movement for three types of independence" ("self-government, self-reliance, self-propaganda") and to organisations of the Roman Catholic church.¹⁶ Beginning in 1979, the leaders of China's Protestant organisations are regularly drawn into work to develop cultural ties with corresponding foreign circles. In December 1983, the PRC was visited by Archbishop of Canterbury Christopher Runcely. In an interview to the Hong Kong weekly *Dagongbao* after the visit he expressed hope of further developing religious freedom in the PRC.

The situation within the Catholic church turned out to be much more complicated.¹⁷ The country's leadership sought to wrest the Catholic community away from the Pope's power, to make it self-governing as the Protestant movement. It was already in February 1951 that a conference of the Vatican's bishops decreed that an independent Chinese Catholic

¹⁴ *China Aktuell*, 1983, Mai, S. 267; September, S. 546.

¹⁵ *China Aktuell*, 1982, Okt. S. 565.

¹⁶ I express my deep gratitude to L. M. Gudoshnikov for kindly supplying material on the PRC's relations with the Vatican. (A. Halimarski, *Stosunki ChRL—Watykan w latach 1979-1982*, *Srpawy miedzynarodowe*, Warszawa, 1983, No. 10, s. 39-53).

¹⁷ In P. Y. K. Tchao, A. Lazzarotto, *Cattolicesimo*; P. Y. K. Tchao, *Cristianesimo, La Cina contemporanea* (Roma), 1979, pp. 124-127; 274-288.

church would be a dissentient organisation. This opinion was upheld by Pope Pius XII. Subsequently, however, this rigid position was softened and repeated attempts were made to settle relations.

More than 20 bishops not approved by the Vatican were appointed in 1958, a year after the creation of the Chinese patriotic society of Catholics, and by now their number has reached 50. Actually it was already in the 1950s that the Catholic church in the PRC split into the patriotic church and the "church in the catacombs", the "church of silence". The latter's activity, especially as regards Jesuits, was banned. In March 1983 a group of Jesuits was accused of collaborating with foreign representatives, unlawful activities and attempts to threaten state's sovereignty and peace. It is noteworthy that nothing was said about what functions priests had performed and where. In this connection note should be taken of the remarks by Father Ladislav Ladany that at present there is no single and monolithic "church of catacombs", that only separate autonomous organisations of this type exist and that this "church" does not have a well-elaborated hierarchy.¹⁸ Hans Waldenfeld, a Jesuit who visited the PRC in 1982, expressed the Vatican's intent to establish contacts with Catholics in the PRC. He recalled that such ideas had been expressed by Pope John Paul II in connection with the 400th anniversary of the arrival in China of the first Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci "who succeeded in creating a bridge between the church and Chinese culture".

The Archbishop of Marseilles, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray spoke harshly about his visit to the PRC in February-March 1980. He alleged that the patriotic Catholic organisation "toes the line of the authorities", has few followers and is of minor importance whereas the "church of the catacombs" is very strong. He insisted on the unification of both churches. It is believed that the case of Bishop Dominique Tang Iming, a Jesuit, was an attempt to find an internal settlement of relations among Chinese Catholics and "new forms" of contacts with the Vatican. In November 1980 on doctors' advice Dominique Tang Iming left for Hong Kong for treatment. On arriving in Hong Kong he announced his loyalty to the Pope and thence went to the Vatican where the Pope approved him as Archbishop of Canton (1981). Peking, naturally, declared this appointment unlawful and qualified it as interference in China's internal affairs.

In accordance with the directives of the CPC CC and the PRC government all unlawful actions connected with interference of foreign powers into the country's internal affairs including actions taken under the guise of religious ones are punishable criminal offences. With support from the authorities the patriotic Catholic community in the PRC, its Administrative Commission and the Collegium of Bishops assumed in the person of their guiding bodies the responsibility for preparing and initiating new bishops. This has been practiced in the PRC since 1958. Two new bishops (Li Xide and Jin Luxian) were initiated in Shanghai's main Xujiahuei cathedral on January 27, 1985.

Hong Kong remains so far one of the permanent conduits for contacts with the Christian church in the West. After the agreement on the future of this British colony the Vicar General of the Hong Kong diocese was among the 200 guests invited to attend the celebrations on the occasion of the PRC's 35th anniversary. During the Hong Kong delegation's visit to Peking in September 1984 it was officially announced that freedom of religion would be preserved there after 1997 as well. In 1984, for the first time after the "cultural revolution", Chinese leadership displayed interest in the memory of prominent Catholics of the past. The graves of three early Christian missionaries—Matteo Ricci, Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest—in the Christian cemetery in a Western suburb

¹⁸ In L. Ladany, *La Iglesia en China*, Criterio, 1982, No. 1881.

of Peking have been restored. The cemetery was badly damaged during the "cultural revolution". At the same time the Vatican is taking a tougher stand in respect of the Chinese patriotic Catholics. On February 28, 1984 Pope John Paul II received seven Catholic bishops from Taiwan together with a group of Chinese who live in Rome and addressed them with a speech in which he spoke against the "patriotic Catholic church" in the PRC. He stated that the Catholics of Taiwan are a church community maintaining "ties" with Catholics on the "mainland", that is in the PRC.

The Patriotic Protestant Church. Celebrations on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the movement for "three types of independence" (self-reliance, self-education, self-propagation), that is for the full autonomy of the Chinese Christian church in all matters of its internal life, for its independence on external sources of income, political doctrines and congregation imposed from the outside was held in Peking's Palace of Culture of Nations on August 5, 1984. The movement came into being and developed within the framework of the Protestant church in the PRC.¹⁹ This idea began to be implemented by the patriotic Catholic church in the PRC as well. At a conference in Peking in 1984 the Chairman of the Chinese Christian Council Ting Guansun said that the Christian faith enjoys freedom in the PRC, that 1,600 churches had been reopened (about 2,000 as of February 1985), that Christianity had become firmly established on Chinese soil, that there were three million Protestants in the country, who actively participate in socialist construction and that their faith was not a target in the campaign of struggle against "spiritual pollution". There are seven Protestant theological seminaries in the country.

Most observers and experts on problems of the Christian church in the PRC stress the PRC leadership's desire to include Christian patriotic organisations into the system of planned international contacts.

A well-elaborated system of legislative and administrative rules governing relations between people of various denominations and state bodies and socio-political organisations was created in the PRC in the period from 1979 to 1982. The overall approach of the country's leadership to believers is based on an assessment of the latter's participation in social labour and the formation of new social relations, in the strengthening of the country's socio-economic base. Loyal to the state, the believers ensure their constitutional right to freedom of creed and the non-believers their right to atheist propaganda. At the same time, in conditions of separation of the church from the state society as a whole and its main institutions get a number of additional educational possibilities in respect of representatives of the religious circles because clergymen of all denominations are educated in a patriotic spirit. Besides, it has become easier to establish international contacts with friendly organisations of believers. Believers are also drawn into efforts to maintain and restore those national monuments of culture which are simultaneously holy places of individual religious denominations and communities.

These provisions are being implemented throughout the 1980s with due consideration to the specifics of the present stage of socialist construction in the PRC.

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CSO: 1812/130-E

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 6, 1984.

BOOK ON U.S. POLICY IN CHINA, SOVIET DIPLOMACY REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 149-151

[Review by V.V. Arunov of book "Kitayskaya politika SShA i sovetskaya diplomatiya, 1942-1954" [U.S. China Policy and Soviet Diplomacy, 1942-1954] by A.N. Ledovskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1985, 287 pages]

The reviewed monograph continues the study of current and in many respects new subjects in Soviet historiography, first approached by the author in his earlier book¹. Essentially, it was the first Soviet publication dealing with the struggle waged by Soviet diplomacy against the US imperialist policy towards China in postwar years.

With an eye to recent materials, Ledovsky's new study compares the China policies the USSR and the USA pursued during World War II and in the first postwar decade. These are very significant periods in China's contemporary history and are most grossly distorted by the US historiography.

Interestingly, the author approaches this problem on a tripartite basis which involves the USSR, the USA and China, while traditionally, other authors focus on bilateral relations. This technique is used to analyse major foreign policy activities, documents and materials of that period. A special emphasis is placed on China-related problems that have not yet been analysed or need more in-depth study.

To do so, Ledovsky, introduces new scientific data from the USSR Foreign Policy Archives. The author uses many documents of the US State Department and Congress and various publications that appeared in the United States, China and other countries. Very helpful here is his personal experience of diplomatic work in China and the USA during the reviewed period, including his participation in many international events.

The author's analysis of these documents reveals radical differences in the role and place of the USSR and the USA in China's

¹ See A. M. Ledovsky, *USSR, USA and People's Revolution in China*, Moscow, 1979.

destiny, in their attitudes towards Japan's aggression in China and the struggle the Chinese waged against the Guomindang for the victory of the popular-democratic revolution and socialism.

Claims by the US bourgeois historiography, its official quarters and propaganda, that in relations with China the United States was invariably guided by the ideals of friendship and caring for the good of the Chinese, are invalid. Facts testify that Washington always tried and persists in its urge to make China junior partner in its aggressive policies in the Far East and to subordinate China's economy to its monopoly interests.

The author makes it clear that the US continues its strategic policy towards China in a traditional manner. To reach its goals the United States chose any means and took advantage of any difficulties confronting the Chinese as it was most apparent during Japan's aggression in China. Up until the attack on the Pearl Harbor, the US had been the principal supplier of arms, aircraft and other military hardware as well as strategic technology to militarist Japan. Concurrently, Washington denied assistance to China that fell a victim to the aggression. The US refused to sell arms to China even for cash money, turning down its request for loans, credits, etc.

At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the US and Britain flatly refused to send its troops to China against the Japanese. They failed to engage in local operations in Burma as they promised earlier to help open the way to China through its territory. Later developments demonstrated that the US evaded its obligations formalised in the Cairo Declaration, including re-establishment of China's sovereignty over Taiwan, Japan's reparation payoffs, China's participation in occupation after its surrender, etc.

Under the pretext of fighting against Japan's occupation and speculating on China's difficulties, Washington insisted that all Chinese armed forces be subordinate to its Supreme Command. The US wanted the unrestricted right to use China's material and human resources to establish its complete power in China and to win domination in the Far East after the war. As China refused to comply, the US kept away from military operations for the rest of war, apart from very limited, primarily intelligence operations, of aviation stationed in China. Both the US and British command ignored China in offensives against the Japanese.

As the People's Republic of China (PRC) was formed, the US grew emphatically hos-

tile to China. Overt confrontation, threats, blackmail, economic blockade, gross pressure on other countries were used to discourage them from recognising the PRC and to isolate China on the international arena. The US blocked the re-establishment of China's legitimate rights in the UN, prevented liberation of Taiwan and forced many countries into "two Chinas" policy.

When the US staged its aggression in Korea, it officially announced the establishment of its military control in Taiwan, brought in its 7th Fleet into China's territorial waters, made several attacks on Chinese objects, tried to expand aggression from Korea to China's territory, and made threats to use nuclear arms against it.

These features basically underlied the US political behaviour towards China during the Guomindang rule and after the PRC's formation. In the late 1960s-early 1970s the US changed its policy of harsh confrontation with China for rapprochement: however, its imperialist nature and basic goals were retained.

Radically different from the US imperialist course was the USSR's policy based on principles chartered by Lenin. The CPSU and Soviet Government gave China continuous support and allround assistance throughout its protracted and hard struggle.

From the beginning of Japanese invasion in 1931, the Soviet Union was the only state to resolutely condemn Japanese aggressors. It called on countries who cared for peace in the Far East to stop them by collective effort. The USSR then gave China enormous and versatile aid, including credits, deliveries of arms, aircraft, volunteer pilots, military advisers, etc. The Soviet Union's internationalist policy promoted the growth of China national-patriotic forces in the struggle they waged against those who called for surrender and a deal with Japan.

During World War II and in postwar years, the USSR's approach to the Chinese issue was also in harsh contrast with the US stance. At the Cairo Conference, for instance, the US and Britain voted against direct military aid to China while at the Teheran Conference, held almost concurrently with the Cairo forum, the Soviet Union agreed to join the war against Japan as soon as Hitler's Germany was defeated. The USSR reaffirmed its promise at the Crimea Conference where it signed the Yalta Treaty on the Far East.

A vivid testimony to Soviet goodneigh-

bour policy was given by the bilateral Agreement on Unity and Friendship signed on August 14, 1945 and by a series of other Soviet-Chinese accords. Chinese progressive public assessed it as the most just agreement ever in China's history. It vouched for driving away the Japanese invaders, opened new vistas for postwar cooperation, guaranteed China security from new foreign aggression.

Joining the war against Japan, the Soviet Union did not only brought about China's emancipation from Japanese colonial enslavement, but also foiled the ominous plans at a deal with the Americans, the Japanese and the Guomindang nurtured at the end of war.

After Manchuria's liberation from Japanese invaders the USSR was involved in a tense struggle against US interference in China's home affairs, to withdraw US troops and Japanese from China, to ban their involvement in Civil War, and to democratise the political life in the country. Instrumental to these objectives were: a special declaration introduced by the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain (December 1945); the resolution of the 1947 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, bilateral meetings and talks between the leaders of the USSR, the USA and China, the USSR's efforts in the UN, and many other Soviet foreign policy actions which strongly supported China's struggle against the US intervention.

At the final stage of the Civil War the Soviet Union helped the CPC and the popular-democratic forces to frustrate US plans to broaden direct military intervention. The Americans admitted that the Soviet-Chinese accord and the presence of Soviet troops in Port Arthur area were a weighty warning to the United States.

The meaning of the USSR's internationalist support and assistance to the Chinese people grew emphatically after the PRC had been formed. In response to the US blackmail and overt threats, on February 14, 1950, the USSR signed the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation with China. The Soviet Union granted it concessional loans, sent thousands of its specialists, helped it launch industrialisation and to lift economic and political blockade and guaranteed the PRC's security.

The analysed documents show the spirit of genuine internationalism that underlied the relations between the Soviet Union and China. Using its broad ties with other coun-

tries and its international authority the USSR and its diplomacy did everything in its power to consolidate the international positions of the PRC. It waged a resolute struggle for re-establishing its rights in the UN and for Taiwan's expulsion from this organisation, against "two Chinas" policy.

During the US aggression in Korea, the Soviet Union both actively supported North Korea and rendered allround assistance to China. It covered it from US air raids, discouraged Washington from expanding war to China and protected it from nuclear strikes.

The USSR and its diplomacy played a decisive role in bringing the war in Korea and Indochina to an end by providing for convocation of the Geneva Conference. The USSR succeeded to have China participate in the conference on an equal basis with other great powers. The USSR's contribution to the peaceful settlement in Korea and

Indochina was highly esteemed by governments and peoples of China, North Korea and Vietnam, by all peaceloving states.

After the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Government continued to help new China's peaceful construction. The USSR decisively repulsed all US provocations against China and its attempts to build up tensions in the Strait of Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula areas; and foiled the US-Chiang Kaishek "return to the continent" plan.

A. M. Ledovsky's book demonstrates the dynamics of tireless and effective struggle waged by Soviet diplomacy against US imperialism in China. It gives an adequate answer to those who try to falsify the realities of contemporary historical development. Indubitably it will help popularise the Leninist Soviet foreign policy as applied to one of its major functions and protect it against various falsifications.

BOOK ON RUSSIAN EXPLORER/ETHNOGRAPHER OF AMUR-USSURI REGION

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 86 (signed to press 20 Nov 86) pp 162-164

[Review by Ye.F. Kovalev, doctor of historical sciences and professor, and A.P. Shurygin, doctor of historical sciences and professor, of book "Vladimir Klavdiyevich Arsenyev" by A.I. Tarasova, edited by V.S. Myasnikov, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1985, 344 pages, illustrated]

[Text] Vladimir Klavdiyevich Arsenyev is one of Russia's great scientist-travelers along with N.M. Przhevalskiy, N.N. Miklukho-Maklay, and P.P. Semenov-Tyan-Shanskiy. As a result of his 30 years (1900-1930) of geographic, ethnographic, and archaeological studies of Maritime Kray, V.K. Arsenyev left a most valuable legacy of documents and literature. During his lifetime, 20 of his books and brochures and more than 60 of his articles and reports were published (p 5). His scientific-art books--"Traveling Through the Ussuri Territory," "Dersu Uzala," "In the Wilds of the Ussuri Territory" and others--testify that V.K. Arsenyev was a talented writer as well as a prominent explorer. A.M. Gorkiy commended V.K. Arsenyev's books and described them as a synthesis of science and literature. In a letter to the author, M. Gorkiy said: "You are a combination of Brehm and James Fenimore Cooper."

Two sets of Arsenyev's collected works--in two and six volumes--were published posthumously. In all, the published works of the outstanding scholar number more than 120. V.K. Arsenyev's books have been quite popular in our country and abroad. His book "Traveling Through the Ussuri Territory" was published 17 times between 1934 and 1983; "Dersu Uzala" was published 70 times between 1934 and 1984; "In the Wilds of the Ussuri Territory" was published 20 times between 1934 and 1983, etc. (pp 5-6). V.K. Arsenyev's life and works have been the subject of many essays, articles and memoirs, five books (footnote 1) (see N.Ye. Kabanov, "Vladimir Klavdiyevich Arsenyev, Traveler and Naturalist. 1872-1930," Moscow, 1947; N. Rogal, "V.K. Arsenyev. Criticism and Biography," Khabarovsk, 1947; M.K. Azadovskiy, "V.K. Arsenyev--Traveler and Writer," in the book "V.K. Arsenyev's Life and Adventures in the Wilds," Moscow, 1957; and others), and three candidate's dissertations (footnote 2) (see V.K. Putolova, "V.K. Arsenyev and His Literary Works," Leningrad, 1954; A.I. Tarasova (Vasina), "V.K. Arsenyev--Researcher of the Ethnography of the Far Eastern Peoples (His Work as a Historian and His Use of Sources)," Moscow,

1975; I.S. Kuzmichev, "The Writer V.K. Arsenyev," Leningrad, 1978). This list has now been continued and supplemented substantially by A.I. Tarasova's monograph. The author collected, processed and studied documented information about V.K. Arsenyev for many years. Arsenyev's personal papers were first put in order by the author in 1972 and are now kept in the archives of the USSR Geographic Society in Leningrad. Her exceptional knowledge of the documents and literary sources gave A.I. Tarasova the ability to write an impressive book about V.K. Arsenyev.

The monograph consists of four main sections. The first is an exhaustive survey of the literature about Arsenyev. With her knowledge of her subject matter and on the basis of documented information, the author subjects the errors and confusion of some authors to valid criticism.

The second section describes the documentary legacy of V.K. Arsenyev. The author points out the fact that many of his important personal papers disappeared during the years of intervention. A.I. Tarasova discusses the extant papers of Vladimir Klavdiyevich in detail.

The third section of the monograph, describing the expeditions led by V.K. Arsenyev, is of great interest. A.I. Tarasova discusses them in detail, describing the members, results and aims of these expeditions. V.K. Arsenyev's travels took him to the Sikhote Alin mountain range, the coast of the Sea of Japan, the lakes near the lower and middle Amur, Lake Khanka, and all of the rivers in Maritime Kray. He conducted studies of Kamchatka, part of Sakhalin, the Gizhiginsk region on the Okhotsk coast, and the Komandorskiye Islands.

V.K. Arsenyev's ethnographic, scientific-pedagogical, and social activities are discussed in the final section of the work.

Almost all of Arsenyev's works are connected with ethnography (p 259). He was a natural materialist and dialectician, A.I. Tarasova notes, and although he was also influenced to some extent by the ideas of prerevolutionary bourgeois ethnography, this does not diminish the general scientific value of his research (p 288). He was the first to write scientific and artistic descriptions of the life and customs of the Orochi, Udegey and Nanai ethnic groups and of the Russian long-time residents of the Far East.

V.K. Arsenyev was active in the Geographic Society, was the director of the Khabarovsk Regional Museum (1910-1919 and 1924-1925), and headed the ethnography section of the Vladivostok Museum (1921-1924). According to Norwegian explorer F. Nansen and ethnographers L.N. Shternberg, B.F. Adler and S.M. Shirokogorov, the Khabarovsk Museum then became one of the best museums in East Siberia and the Far East.

Arsenyev was one of the organizers and lecturers of people's universities in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, a professor at the Pedagogical Institute imeni Ushinskiy, and a docent at the Far Eastern University in Vladivostok, where he taught courses in primitive culture, archaeology, anthropology, and ethnography. He was the author of the first Soviet VUZ course in the "Theory and Practice of East Siberian Exploration" and one of the first VUZ courses

in Far Eastern ethnography. At the time of the Japanese occupation of Maritime Kray, V.K. Arsenyev advised the Technical Committee of the Military Council on the location of partisan bases in the Ussuri taiga (p 279). Just before the People's Revolutionary Army entered Vladivostok in 1922, the White Guard urged him to leave Russia. He resolutely replied: "I am Russian. I have worked and will work for my own people. I have no reason to go abroad" (p 275). V.K. Arsenyev remained a loyal son of his people and his motherland.

As an authority on the kray, Arsenyev advised several central and kray organizations. In 1922 he participated in the organization of the first congress on studies of the Ussuri territory, in 1925 he participated in the festivities commemorating the 200th anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Leningrad and Moscow, and he worked in the ethnographic section of the Pacific Committee of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He also took an active part in the work of the Committee for the Assistance of Northern Peoples of the Far Eastern regional ispolkom and was in charge of the restructuring of the life and customs of the taiga ethnic groups.

A.I. Tarasova describes V.K. Arsenyev as an outstanding citizen, humanitarian, and internationalist-democrat. He treated the Far Eastern nationalities with respect and affection. He first met the Nanai Dersu Uzala in August 1906 (p 22). The meeting with Dersu Uzala, who became V.K. Arsenyev's reliable guide in his expeditions through the Ussuri taiga, marked the beginning of a long business relationship and amazingly warm friendship between these people from completely different social milieus. Arsenyev had the same kind of relationship with Zhang Bao, a Chinese member of his expeditions (p 124).

The author of the book under review stresses that V.K. Arsenyev must be given credit for "one of the first attempts to delineate the periods of Ussuri history" (p 256) and, in our opinion, to inform the public of the natives of the region, the ethnic origins of these nationalities, and the history of the exploration of the Far East by Russians. In V.K. Arsenyev's opinion, even in the distant past the Far East was never an uninhabited part of Asia. Underscoring the aboriginal origins of the Ussuri nationalities, especially the Udegeys and related ethnic groups, the author of the monograph cites V.K. Arsenyev's assurances that the large local population of the region had its own form of government and unique culture even in the Middle Ages. The region fell into decay between the 13th and 17th centuries as a result of Mongol invasions, the devastating raids by the Manchurians, epidemics, etc. In the 17th century Russian explorers V. Poyarkov, Ye. Khabarov, O. Stepanov and others found only a few local tribes here that were not under the jurisdiction of a government. When the Russo-Chinese border in the Far East was finalized, the region which had been developed by Russians for more than two centuries finally became part of Russia in 1860. A.I. Tarasova makes the justifiable comment that "this historic moment was of tremendous progressive importance to the entire future of the local ethnic groups and the territory itself" (p 257).

V.K. Arsenyev's first ethnographic study, "The Chinese in the Ussuri Territory," published in 1914, is significant in the context of the periods of Ussuri history. Its significance stems primarily from the fact that

V.K. Arsenyev arrived at a valid conclusion: The native inhabitants of the territory were the Orochi, Nanai and other ethnic groups. Prior to the official inclusion of the cis-Amur region in Russia, only isolated Chinese migrant workers were seen in the territory, and even these were seen only rarely. They had been coming here since the 1820's and 1830's to work in the ginseng and fur trades and returned to China whenever cold weather set in (p 260).

The author of this book stresses one of the important reasons for V.K. Arsenyev's expeditions--the discovery of the exact names of geographic locations. As a result of this, he arrived at the important conclusion that "Far Eastern place names are of a local Tungus-Manchurian nature, and the substitution of Chinese names for some aboriginal place names occurred just lately, in the second half of the 19th century, when Chinese migrant workers made their appearance in the territory" (p 131). V.K. Arsenyev determined the absence of a single Chinese name on the maritime territory maps based on 1857 surveys.

The informative appendices in A.I. Tarasova's book also warrant attention.

What Arsenyev dreamed about has come true--the ethnic groups of the Far East have embraced the socialist way of life. The Baykal-Amur trunkline now runs through the places where Arsenyev walked with his friend Dersu Uzala. The city of Arsenyev was named in his honor, a monument to V.K. Arsenyev stands on Ualna Hill at the entrance to the city, and a portrait of Dersu Uzala has been carved in a granite cliff.

This monograph represents a qualitatively new, substantial, and serious advance in the study of the life and works of V.K. Arsenyev and makes a great deal of documented information about Arsenyev available to the scientific community for the first time. The informative appendices in A.I. Tarasova's book also warrant attention. A.I. Tarasova's book received the highest commendation at a general meeting of the cis-Amur (Khabarovsk) branch of the USSR Geographic Society in October 1985 in Khabarovsk.

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JAPANESE AUTHOR ON JAPAN'S RELATIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 86 (signed to press 20 Nov 86) pp 164-166

[Review by O.L. Ostroukhov of book "Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change" by Masahide Shibusawa, London, 1984, 196 pages]

[Text] Japan's role in the Asian Pacific region and the region's significance in Japanese foreign policy activity have recently undergone noticeable reassessment in the Japanese political and scientific communities. One of the studies of this process is the subject of this review.

Its author, prominent Japanese political scientist Masahide Shibusawa, has been a member of the Trilateral Commission and an executive director of an East-West seminar in addition to occupying several other important positions. In this book he examines the broad range of problems arising in the Asian Pacific region since the end of World War II and the main features of postwar Japanese foreign policy.

Shibusawa assigns great importance to U.S. influence in the evolution of postwar Japanese foreign policy. The author reviews the main phases of the history of Japanese-American relations throughout the last four decades. He notes that the main feature of these relations was and is Japan's dependence on its senior partner. It is true that the Japanese researcher believes that Japanese foreign policy departed at times (in the early 1960's and the early 1970's) from Washington's line (pp 22-23, 92), but it is probable that even then Japanese foreign policy merely underwent slight adjustments for the purpose of avoiding the hazardous involvement of Japan in the most dangerous politico-military U.S. ventures (such as, for example, the war in Vietnam), and that Tokyo was merely striving to secure the interests of Japanese capital.

In a discussion of current Japanese-American relations, the author asserts that they have become so important to Japan that any reduction of its cooperation with the United States could have the most undesirable implications, including a drop in the exchange rate of the yen and the dramatic reduction of economic stability and political security (p 162). For this reason, in Shibusawa's opinion, Japan will continue striving for stronger Japanese-American relations. The Japanese researcher expresses worries, however, about the U.S. approach to American-Japanese relations, which consists, in his words,

in a situation in which "the United States is kind and generous as long as Japan is small and weak, but becomes angry and takes brutal action when Japan becomes big and strong" (p 163). The author is also displeased that Japan's dependence forces it to accept all of Washington's demands, although they frequently "do not take the distinctive features of the Japanese postwar economic structure into account" and because they are sometimes not of an economic nature, but "seem to be punishing Japan for its hard work and technological superiority" (pp 163-164). In this way, M. Shibusawa underscores two tendencies in Japanese-American relations. On the one hand, Japan intends to continue its close cooperation with the United States; on the other, it is less and less satisfied with the status of a dependent junior partner. Now that Japanese capital has occupied strong economic positions, it has recently been striving for leading positions in global politics. This is the reason for the more frequent appeals by Japanese ruling circles for "efforts to bring Japan's political influence in line with its economic strength."

Japanese ruling circles regard the expansion of political and economic influence in the Pacific countries as the first step in the attainment of this goal. Shibusawa assigns his analysis of Japan's relations with these countries the most prominent place in his book. In this analysis, the Japanese political scientist displays a narrow nationalist, bourgeois-class approach to his subject matter. In the belief that the development of relations between Asian Pacific countries and other countries in the world inhibits the consolidation of Japanese influence in the region, Shibusawa makes every attempt to minimize the importance of these relations. The growing prestige of the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries in the states of the region arouses the greatest fears in the Japanese political scientist. In an attempt to stop this process, the author repeats the hackneyed maxims about the notorious "Soviet and Vietnamese threat," asserts the unacceptability of socialism as a model of economic development (p 6), and praises the anti-communist policy of several countries in the region, discerning a "desire for independence" in it (p 39). In an attempt to isolate the developing countries of the Asian Pacific region from other "Third World" countries, the Japanese author defames the movement for nonalignment, "which has descended," in his words, "to the level of idealism at best, and to a tool of communist forces at worst." The author praises the regionalism of the ASEAN as an alternative to the ideals of the movement for nonalignment (p 5). The stronger influence of the American partner-rival in the region is also undesirable for Japanese ruling circles, and this is why U.S. policy in Asia is also criticized by the Japanese author. In particular, he mentions several negative implications of the close attachment of developing countries to the aggressive U.S. policy (pp 33-34).

At the same time, the researcher tries to substantiate the "indisputable" advantages of close cooperation with Japan for the developing Asian Pacific states, and argues that Japan's aims coincide with the interests of these states (pp 46, 148-156). The propaganda of the plans for the creation of a "Pacific community" is assigned a special role in this context. Taking advantage of the desire of small states in the region for cooperation for the purpose of solving domestic problems and citing the development of inter-governmental trade and economic relations within the region as an example,

Japanese ruling circles are striving to make use of the proposed structure for their own purposes, primarily for stronger Japanese economic and political influence in the developing Asian Pacific countries.

People in the young states see this prospect as a threat. Even today, as Shibusawa has to admit, "dependence on Japanese capital is one of the fundamental features of the regional economy" (p 148). But after all, the active penetration of these countries by Japanese capital began a relatively short time ago. According to the author, the process began gathering strength in the second half of the 1960's (pp 41-46). By the beginning of the 1970's, however, there was a wave of protests in the young states of the region against the threat of Japanese economic dominion. Demonstrations and campaigns to boycott Japanese goods swept through the entire region from 1972 to 1974 (pp 73-78). Shibusawa says that they "shocked" Japanese ruling circles and forced them to consider the demands of the people in these countries. Nevertheless, serious problems still exist in Japan's relations with the Asian Pacific countries, including Japan's refusal to import more goods from the developing countries of the region, the reluctance of Japanese monopolists to negotiate the stabilization of prices on the export goods of young states, and the threat of the growth of Japanese militarism (pp 149, 150-151, 175).

It is therefore not surprising that even the ASEAN countries, which have come quite far in the development of capitalist relations, responded to the Japanese idea of creating a "Pacific community" with a great deal of caution. In this connection, M. Shibusawa makes a not overly optimistic prediction about the future of the planned organization: "It is obvious that the tremendous cultural and political heterogeneity of the Pacific countries will keep them from forming a closely united economic group like the EEC. Even the problem of membership alone, including the difficult question of Chinese-Taiwanese representation, is unlikely to be surmounted" (p 148). Nevertheless, Japan, in the author's opinion, "will remain the determining factor in regional economic development in the 1980's and later. The reliance on Japanese capital for more intense development, particularly in the processing of raw materials and the completion of large-scale industrial projects, will grow" (p 156).

The possibility of intensifying the expansion of Japanese capital in the PRC has aroused great interest in Japan. Shibusawa writes with unconcealed pleasure about the intensification of Japanese-Chinese contacts (p 157). The Japanese political scientist is particularly hopeful about what he interprets as the Chinese leadership's departure from socialist principles (pp 6, 109).

Shibusawa believes that the unification of Hong Kong, with its market economy, with the PRC will result in further advances in this direction. The destabilizing effects of this move on the PRC could be quite substantial (p 128). The Japanese political scientist also has extremely optimistic views regarding the prospect of the PRC's rapprochement with Japan and other countries of the "free world" in the politico-military sphere. He recalls, for example, the PRC leadership's positive stance on the plans for the buildup of Japanese military strength and the reinforcement of its military alliance with the United States. Shibusawa writes about the PRC taking the side of the West in

the event of a military conflict between the two opposing groups in Europe as a real possibility (pp 134-135).

As far as Shibusawa's position on Japanese security is concerned, its extremely contradictory nature warrants mention. On the one hand, the Japanese political scientist feels that Japan's exceptional vulnerability would make the conduct of military operations senseless and therefore believes that the emphasis should not be on the buildup of military strength, but on a struggle "for peace and stability, the maintenance of the system of free trade, and guaranteed access to vitally important natural resources" (pp 165-167). On the other, he speaks of the need to correct the "onesided" distribution of U.S. and Japanese military commitments in the Asian Pacific. In other words, he insists on a more important role for Japanese armed forces (pp 169-170).

Shibusawa is just as inconsistent in his discussion of the threat the USSR poses to Japan. On the one hand, he repeats the groundless arguments about the existence of a "Soviet threat" to the Asian countries (pp 134, 169). On the other, he declares that "the USSR is not the main threat to Japan," that "Japan does not share the American point of view regarding the inevitability of Soviet aggression in South and Southeast Asia" (p 166), and that the USSR Armed Forces in East Siberia are intended not for the invasion of Asia, but for its neutralization in the event of a world war (p 135).

This contradiction seems to stem from the fact that the author is taking into consideration the general public opposition to the intensification of militarism in the country but is also adhering in general to the platform of the current Japanese cabinet, which regards the buildup of military strength as a means of "enhancing Japan's role on the global level" (p 170). In an attempt to minimize the significance of the Japanese peace movement, Shibusawa calls it one of the opposition's "ruses" in the struggle against the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The author must admit, however, that the LDP policy of building up Japanese military strength could lead to the return of the prewar militarist autocratic form of government (pp 93-94). Shibusawa speaks of the PRC leadership's support of the military plans of Japanese ruling circles as a factor seriously weakening the peace movement's position (p 95). The Japanese political scientist also speaks of the serious worries the militarization of Japan is arousing in the developing Asian Pacific countries, including the ASEAN states (p 175).

In spite of the tendentious interpretations of several events, M. Shibusawa's book will be of interest to researchers of Japan and the Asian Pacific region. The work provides some idea of the main trends in contemporary Japanese foreign policy strategy. The book is all the more interesting because the author's position is close to the official Tokyo position.

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BOOK DESCRIBES U.S. 'NEOCOLONIAL' POLICY TOWARD S. KOREA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 151-153

[Review by V.I. Andreyev, candidate of economic sciences, and V.I. Osipov, candidate of juridical sciences, of book "Neokolonializm SShA i Yuzhnaya Koreya" [U.S. Neocolonialism and South Korea] by A.A. Proshin and A.A. Timonin, Moscow, Nauka, 1985, 190 pages]

Emergence of socialist states in Europe and Asia, the growing national liberation movements and the impending collapse of the colonial system stirred by the defeat of Hitler nazism and Japanese militarism in World War II, made imperialism search for new ways of oppression, specifically in neocolonialist policies. Imperialists wanted, on the one hand, to preserve and consolidate the power of their monopolies in the newly-free countries, and, on the other, to block up socialism by countering it with a "third model" of political and economic development.

The United States, leader of neocolonialist policies, set its sights on the Korean Peninsula. Washington has always tried to present South Korea as a "showcase of free world", an outpost for "rolling back" communism in Asia. It was in this part of the world that imperialism made its first attempt to change the alignment of forces by arma-

ments. But the far-reaching plans of aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1950-1953) resulted in a total fiasco.

In the current complicated international situation the role played by South Korea in imperialist plans has been growing. The southern part of the Korean Peninsula is now the last US bridgehead in Asia which is being turned, following the schemes of the Pentagon strategists, into a US "front-line defense zone".

The monograph under review investigates the process of subjugation of South Korea under Seoul regime to imperialist interests. Making use of a wealth of documents, the authors examine interconnection between South Korean domestic economic, political and social development and US policies. "Throughout the entire existence of South Korea," the authors contend, "neocolonialism primarily sought to preserve it" within the political and economic realm of capitalism (p. 3).

Under pressure from and with direct participation of US monopolies, an export-oriented economy, based completely on foreign investment, was built in South Korea. Legislation "favourable" for foreign monopolies, US above all, grants the right of duty-free import of machines and equipment for

the construction of enterprises, and of getting unlimited profits. And these profits are far from being small. The average wage of a South Korean worker in the early 1980s stood at 13 per cent of the average US worker's wage.¹ After five years of operating in South Korea, foreign firms are totally exempt from tax payments. The "law on guarantees of credit repayment" passed in 1972, envisages the Seoul administration's responsibility for private foreign firms' solvency. The South Korean government guarantees full security for private property owned by foreign entrepreneurs.

The authors cite many facts to expose the attempts made by bourgeois scientists to use the "South Korean model of the export economy" as an example to be followed by the developing countries and prove that this model is wholly untenable since it is in the grip of neocolonialist transnationals. Giving Seoul the lion's share of capital, the USA and Japan have now tied its hands by a huge and ever increasing debt. According to some estimates, in late 1984 South Korean external debt totalled \$43.1 billion, while in 1985 the country had to pay \$6 billion of interest alone.

With labour force being relatively cheap in South Korea, US and Japanese monopolies transferred labour-intensive and ecologically harmful enterprises there, and penetrated deep into South Korean economy which in itself is a form of neocolonialist exploitation (pp. 43-45). They set up industries with incomplete production cycle, manufacturing the final product in other countries, and thus tangibly influence South Korean foreign economic relations.

At the same time, the authors stress, "favourable foreign economic situation that had existed until 1973, allowed South Korea to create its own industrial potential and go over to the building of some branches in heavy industry" (p. 158). The country also created highly concentrated capital and formed large-scale capitalist economic sector.

The salient features of South Korean big capital are its close alliance with foreign monopolies and proliferation of economic and political interests beyond the borders. This can be explained by the fact that large-scale capitalist economy has always relied on export-oriented production and foreign trade.

The contradictory and intricate process

of South Korea's socio-economic development affected the regime's ideology and policies which have become the quintessence of the Seoul rulers' economic outlook.

The chapter which deals with little studied ideological platform of the regime of Park Chung Hee is quite interesting in our view. Every phase in the economic development of South Korea was accompanied by a certain political-economic doctrine which performed a specific social function.

The book exposes "modernisation", "administrative democracy", "Koreanised democracy", and other theories which were bound to provide an ideological backing for socio-economic policies pursued by Park Chung Hee. It is not by chance that imperialist ideologues put together the theory of "modernisation" and the concept of "industrialisation" which, according to bourgeois economists, could only be accomplished "under strong political guidance". The proponents of Seoul regime claimed that "only guidance from above will ensure order in the country and provide vigorous industrialisation" (p. 99). This makes it evident that back in the first years of Park Chung Hee in office (since 1961), steps were taken to substantiate the need for a "strong leader" who could establish "order".

The next step the regime made towards laying down political and ideological foundations was implementation of the doctrine of "administrative democracy". This theory reflected "the desire of South Korean leadership to create a political system which, while tolerating some elements of bourgeois democracy, would give an opportunity of transforming the regime further to the right" (p. 101).

Such transformation took place in the early 1970s. Disorder in the economy of the South and the absence of ordinary bourgeois democratic freedoms threatened the autocratic rule. Opposition to Park Chung Hee grew and became especially acute during the 1972 elections to the National Assembly when the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) lost an absolute majority in parliament. The mounting crisis of power was alleviated by South Korean regime, in close alliance with world imperialists, by means of "surgery".

In October 1972, Park Chung Hee announced the "state of emergency"; he disbanded the parliament and all parties except for the ruling one, banned all political activity, and introduced strict censorship over the mass media. The so-called Consti-

¹ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1982, p. 105.

tution of the October Renaissance (Yusin) was introduced. The new Constitution extended president's jurisdiction, reducing simultaneously the prerogative of the National Assembly. Constitution granted unlimited rights to the president, including the right to disband parliament and to appoint one-third of the MPs. President was elected by indirect voting conducted by the so-called National Unity Conference which included Park Chung Hee's supporters.

In 1973-1975, the domestic situation in the South became even more tense. The regime resorted to new draconic measures, banning any criticism of the administration or president, or the Constitution of the October Renaissance. Prominent opposition figures—former president Yun Bo Sung and Kim Tae Joong who rivaled Park Chung Hee during the 1970 presidential elections—were brought to trial and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

In October 1977, new anti-government riots were suppressed. The ruling regime had to manoeuvre and look for some additional ideological grounds that could justify its existence; the concept of "Korean democracy" gained currency at the time. Rejecting European democracy as inconsistent with historical conditions of South Korean society, the regime's ideologues praised authoritarianism to the skies, as, according to them, it was the best means against communism (p. 143). This approach stems from traditions of Korean nationalism which were characteristic of the development of Korean feudalism. The ideas of "national originality", and national subjectivism along with subjective-idealistic trends in American political science exerted direct influence on Park Chung Hee regime's ideological tenets. (pp. 131-135).

However, the situation in South Korea was not developing in accordance with the scenarios. The government crisis, economic slump and dissent within the society doomed the dictator and his regime (1979).

The coming of Chun Doo Hwan in place of Park Chung Hee to power has scarcely changed the situation in South Korea. Moreover, Chun's regime inherited much of the ideological package of his predecessor. The monograph notes in this connection that "repeating Park Chung Hee's slogans, Chun Doo Hwan is constantly stressing the need to establish 'Koreanised democracy' and to indoctrinate the masses with the sense of national originality" (p. 165). The ruling elite also includes social demagoguery in its ideology and uses it enthusiastically to extend the basis of the regime. The authors correctly note that "similarity between official ideology and methods of political rule of the two regimes is largely due to continuity of the key trends of South Korea's social and economic development, before and after 1979" (p. 167).

The US-assisted "renovation" of South Korea's political façade has not improved its situation; the South still hinges completely on the US. At the same time we can see the attempts the US is making to involve the Seoul regime into its aggressive schemes in Asia and to set up a new military-political structure there which will rest on the trilateral Washington-Tokyo-Seoul alliance.

The conclusions the authors of the monograph arrived at go, perhaps, beyond the framework of South Korea and can be applied to a whole group of developing capitalist-oriented countries which often tread the paths it has already traversed. This fact undoubtedly enhances the scientific and practical value of the study which is addressed to a broad stratum of readers interested in present-day problems facing the socio-political and economic development of the Third World.

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BOOK ON CAMBODIAN REVOLUTION, POL POT'S 'EXPERIMENT' REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 154-157

[Review by Yu.M. Ryakin of book "Kampuchiya. Osobennosti revolyutsionnogo protsessa i polpotovskiy 'eksperiment'" [Cambodia. Distinctive Features of the Revolutionary Process and Pol Pot's "Experiment"] by D.V. Mosyakov, Moscow, Nauka, 1986, 166 pages]

The reviewed monograph outlines principal stages of the revolutionary process in Kampuchea since the beginning of the organised struggle against French colonialism in 1946 up to the late 1970s, when the anti-popular Pol Pot regime was overthrown. It is worth mentioning that the author attempted to solve an entirely new and complex task which adds to scientific and practical value of his work. This study focuses on the emergence and subsequent development of social ideological and political motives behind the phenomenon, such as the Pol Pot "experiment" which put the Kampuchean people on the verge of national disaster. Such comprehensive study is the first of its kind.

During the period covered by the monograph Kampuchea was an underdeveloped country characterised by many survivals of feudalism and immature socio-economic relations. At that time, the Kampuchean bourgeoisie fell into 3 distinct categories: the

compradore (comprised mostly of Chinese ethnic bourgeoisie, which were sort of go-between for the foreign capital and local rulers); the "bureaucratic" consisting of Khmers, government officials; and the national, which included owners of artisan and small industrial shops and services (p. 11).

Workers comprised a small portion of Kampuchea's population and even that consisting predominantly of migrating peasants who were employed in industries when they were free from farming. Traditional peasant mentality held sway among workers.

Peasants, as an overwhelming majority of the country's population, deserve particular attention. Most belong to a traditional category subjected as they were to feudal exploitation (taxes, rent and usury). According to 1963 data, poor peasants with land plots less than one hectare accounted then for 30.7 per cent, with only 5.2 per cent of all ploughland at their disposal. A stratum

of parcelled peasantry included those in possession of 1-2 hectares of land almost unfit for crop farming in the outlying regions which produced only 0.7 to 0.8 ton of rice per hectare. Owners of such plots, unable to provide sustenance for their families, had to look for additional income either through land lease or hired labour. Ruination and disintegration of peasants coupled with the overall growth of debt in the countryside (p. 10).

Compulsory marketability of peasants' farms, due to high rent or tax rates, caused widespread anti-market sentiment among peasantry. Patriarchal lifestyles confined peasants' worldview to the narrow village environment: the city was something they knew nothing about and, viewing it as a collective exploiter, they understood little of what was happening outside the village. "The more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably lend particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices, i. e., to national egoism and national narrow-mindedness," Lenin wrote.¹

Triggered by the collapse of the traditional society, the social and economic crisis grew still more acute during the US aggression against Kampuchea in 1970-1975. The crisis spurred traditional peasantry to turn all way back to patriarchal mode of life, to the ideas of absolute equality in property, to the creation of social insurance and support system which would rule out bankruptcy, etc. Egalitarian ideas were especially popular with paupers who increased sharply in number during American aggression. Another factor to be taken into consideration is the low level of socio-economic development, illiteracy and ignorance about life outside the village which made peasants completely unable to adequately express their needs.

At this point it is interesting to analyse Mosyakov's "Khmer Buddhist Socialism" programme, advanced by the country's leadership with Norodom Sihanouk at the head. Ideologically, the author points out, this programme was a rather odd combination of non-proletarian socialist ideas and Buddhist ethics. It purported, on the one hand, to encourage the development of national capital and, on the other, to prevent tradition-

al peasantry from ruination, thus preserving them as a social basis of the regime. To achieve this, the state, avoiding radical changes in patriarchal relations in the countryside, tried, among other measures, to re-channel surplus labour and masses of ruined peasants to develop virgin and desolate areas in the country's Northeast and Northwest (p. 16).

Towards the end of the 1960s, ideas of "Khmer Buddhist socialism" came into clash with the altered alignment of social forces. The programme could no longer mirror interests of broad urban strata which found themselves involved in the orbit of capitalist relations. By contrast, in the countryside where social evolution was much more stagnant, the slogans advanced by "Khmer Buddhist socialism" continued to enjoy wide popular support. This is why after the reactionary coup perpetrated by Lon Nol in 1970, many of these slogans were used by national liberation forces fighting against pro-American Lon Nol regime.

In hard conditions progressives led by the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) conducted a protracted struggle to implement people's aspirations. In defending the interests of broad sections of the population, they fought vigorously to break down old, feudal-bureaucratic state machinery, to carry through progressive socio-economic reforms, and against the negative effects of Norodom Sihanouk's rule, such as persecution of progressive forces, growth of authoritarianism, corruption, etc. In addition, Communists spoke in support of neutrality policies the Sihanouk government pursued which were anti-imperialist on the whole and met the interests of Khmers. This policy was invariably attacked by imperialism and right-wing reactionaries. Under such intricate circumstances, Kampuchean Communists were to elaborate an extremely accurate political course bearing in mind all social, class and specific-historical conditions, both at home and abroad.

In late 1950s such political figures as Hu Yun, Hu Nim, Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot, Ieng Sari, and Son Sen came out against PRPK policies. All of them were under strong leftist, Trotskyite (later Maoist), and nationalist influence. The Pol Pot group took the lead in the struggle for leadership within the PRPK. Relying on the most backward sections of peasantry, who served as the basis for their political orientation, the Pol Pot clique adapted its programme

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 150.

to the egalitarian, pseudo-socialist outlook and to extremist sentiment which gained momentum among the poorest peasants as a result of rapid ruination.

In this connection it will be useful to focus on the author's indepth analysis of the concepts expounded by close associates of Pol Pot such as Hu Yun, Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan, ideologues of the Kampuchean Communist Party (the name it adopted under pressure from Pol Pot in 1963). These concepts have not been elucidated so far in scientific studies on Kampuchea, so Mosyakov is the first to lay them bare. This fact notwithstanding, it will become clear to readers that Pol Pot and his ilk are in no way a unique phenomenon, for their preaching reproduces the well-known Maoist doctrines.

Since the author of the review is not in a position to give a detailed analysis of Pol Pot ideology in his article, he draws the most characteristic and explicit pronouncements of its protagonists. According to Hu Yun, poor peasants (patriarchal parcelled peasantry) are in fact the most revolutionary class. The following features, in Hu Yun's opinion, are inherent in the poorest peasantry:

"This class does not suppress anyone and is characterised by high morality and ethical norms. Bad, anti-humane habits and lies are alien to it.

"This class has accumulated experience in production, agricultural labour and in fighting natural calamities.

"This class is motivated exclusively by noble and honest aspirations" (p. 54). Clearly, this is an example of idealisation of the poorest peasantry, unscientific and distorted assessment of its driving motives, role and place in the revolutionary process. All ideologues from among Pol Pot's associates voiced similar ideas on the poorest peasantry.

Having pinpointed the growing category of landless and poorest peasantry caused by the disintegration of the Khmer countryside, Hu Yun identified the following reasons behind this process: usury, unequal distribution of incomes between city and countryside, and peasants' inability to withstand unfavourable climatic conditions. Needless to say, Hu Yun's conclusions expressed, in the final analysis, the spontaneous views of patriarchal peasants who rejected marketability in favour of self-reliant farms and preached anti-urbanism ("the city exploits and strips bare Khmer villages"). In fact, Hu

Yun advocated a throwback in social development to the "golden age" of universal patriarchal equality (p. 60).

The key direction along which socialism should be built in Kampuchea was, in Hu Yun's view, through creation and extensive proliferation of peasant cooperatives "where there will be no class differences, no personal profit and everyone is driven by common interests" (p. 63). This list of principles underlying cooperative movement shows graphically Hu Yun's adherence to the ideals of traditional communal peasantry. Generally speaking, egalitarian views of Khmer peasants were central to the whole cooperative programme.

Hu Nim's approach towards major domestic development problems was much the same as that of Hu Yun. However, the former, in projecting Kampuchea's transformation, relied more on domestic forces, since, he alleged, such a way can rapidly push the country from backwardness to world standard. This proposition suggested isolation of the country or autarchy. Hu Nim rejected any type of foreign assistance and wanted to reduce to the utmost foreign trade, for it is through trade that "imperialists penetrate the country and trample it underfoot" (p. 71). The author shows that there is also something else to Hu Nim's thesis that building socialism is only possible in isolation from the rest of the world. The point is that Hu Nim and his supporters sought, by divorcing themselves from the world, to create "ideological vacuum" in Kampuchea to be subsequently filled with their own commandments. This scheme was later put to practice by the Pol Pot clique (p. 73).

Khieu Samphan viewed the building of socialism as a complete socialisation of peasants' property and labour. He conjured up the country as a communion of cooperatives (this is what Pol Pot attempted to realise on coming to power) (p. 76).

Members of the Pol Pot team prepared little by little to seize power first in the CCP and later in the National United Front of Cambodia (NUFC was set up in 1970). At the same time two newly-emerged factions opposed each other within the Khmae Krohom ("Khmer Rouge" as it was called in the West) grouping. "Moderates" were headed by Hu Yun, while "extremists" came under Pol Pot's control. This fact has not until now been studied adequately in literature, so Mosyakov is the first to attempt it. Despite all the similarity between provi-

sions advanced by "moderates" and "extremists", their platforms had distinct differences. For example, Pol Pot and his group thought the agrarian programme proposed by Hu Yun went only halfway, without completing socialisation process. Pol Pot agreed with Hu Yun's thesis about exploitation of the countryside by the city, but unlike him, Pol Pot preached full eradication of cities. While Hu Yun only counterpoised the self-reliant (or "natural" as he put it) economy to the market economy, Pol Pot tried to practically implement the absolute dominance of natural economy. Hu Yun did not put away the money system, whereas Pol Pot and his group denied it altogether (pp. 101-102).

On April 17, 1975, the situation in the country allowed the Pol Pot clique to take full power in their hands. In effect they got a chance of trying in practice the premeditated "experiment": to build new society ignoring objective laws. The experiment turned into liquidation of cities and city residents, disruption of economic structures, abolition of money, trade, transport means and abrogation of natural forms of human communication. It was done through establishing a militarised society comprised of isolated farm communes where everybody, dressed in identical clothes and living in identical houses, work hard while receiving little with no personal property whatsoever. Egalitarianism in its most absurd expression was the basis for Pol Pot's socio-economic policies (pp. 107-108).

The author puts forward an important idea about Pol Pot's intention to use, despite the seeming rupture with Khmer traditionalism, some elements of traditional Khmer ideology. This related above all to organisation and functions of state power made into a truly despotic force. One point differed it from the traditional Khmer idea of state power: the "tsarist" consciousness of peasants with a supreme being as the target of their worship was replaced by the idea of a "people" and Angki (organisation) which had unlimited power over the life of an individual (pp. 101-102).

In Kampuchea under Pol Pot, this teaching resulted in an attempt to assert the power of ruling elite (the Pol Pot clique) which could decide about the destiny of Kampucheans. People were assigned the role of guinea pigs for the Pol Pot "experiment". In implementing the experiment, Pol Pot wanted to perpetuate peasants' political and

overall ignorance so as to sponge on it later. This also found its reflection in the policy of isolating Kampuchea from the rest of the world and in severing ties with other countries (with exception of China). Simultaneously, the clique adopted an extremely hard line towards all its neighbours, primarily towards the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Pol Pot's socio-economic programme

which ultimately proved to be a policy of genocide, invoked resolute resistance from Kampuchean people. Shattered by wide-ranging popular unrest under the guidance of genuine revolutionary forces, the anti-popular regime fell through, bringing an inevitable collapse to the infamous Pol Pot "experiment".

PROCEEDINGS OF MANILA SYMPOSIUM OPPOSING U.S. BASES ISSUED

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 86 (signed to press 20 Nov 86) pp 175-176

[Review by Yu.G. Zharkikh of "United States Military Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Scenarios," Proceedings of the 14 August 1985 Symposium Sponsored by the International Studies Institute of the Philippines and U.P. Manila College of Arts and Sciences, edited by Lolita W. McDonough, 1986, 145 pages]

[Text] The aggressive policy of the Reagan Administration is being resisted more and more resolutely by the public in many Asian states, including the Philippines. Sociopolitical groups, members of the scientific and cultural communities, and representatives of the church in this country are reassessing their views on the security of not only the Philippines, but also of Asia and the entire world, and are realizing the need to fight against Washington's militarist policy. The subject of this review, an anthology of papers presented at a symposium in Manila on 14 August 1985, is indicative in this respect. The symposium was sponsored and organized by the International Studies Institute of the Philippines and the Manila College of Arts and Sciences of the University of the Philippines. The people who spoke at the symposium and then became the authors of this collective work are academic and sociopolitical voices of authority in the Philippines and the region: R. Simbulan, former head of the sociology department of the Manila College of Arts and Sciences; M. Magalonna, professor of law at the University of the Philippines and director of the International Studies Institute; J. Adaza, member of parliament; J. Diochno, jurist; A. Pimentel, member of parliament and minister; and others.

The work is an investigation of some aspects of U.S. Asian policy, especially in the Philippines. The authors present a brief but informative survey of the events leading up to the effective occupation of the Philippines by the United States and the consolidation of American dominion in the Philippines and analyze the postwar and contemporary phases of Philippine-American relations.

For example, M. Magalonna explains the legal aspects of the establishment of American military bases in the Philippines. He stresses that the question of the establishment of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was settled a year before the declaration of independence (1946). The negotiations took

place in the United States, and not in the Philippines, and the so-called joint resolution No 93 was signed by a "government in exile," which is known to have been supported by the Truman Administration and to have served as Washington's puppet. This was, as M. Magalonna points out, a concrete example of American blackmail diplomacy (pp 57-58). J. Diochno goes further by asserting that the agreement on the bases was illegal from the very beginning because it was not secured by Philippine congressional legislation and was not submitted to the Philippine people for discussion and approval. Therefore, the Philippine jurist concludes, the agreement was ratified without the consent of the Philippine people (pp 118-120).

Revealing the essence of Washington's policy in Asia, the authors stress that in its attempts to secure its "vital interests" in Southeast Asia, the United States has completely ignored the sovereignty, national dignity, and right to independence and freedom of whole countries and nationalities. In this connection, R. Simbulan makes an indicative reference to a book by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Hilsman, in which the latter cynically sums up the results of the "main lessons" of the American aggression against the Philippines at the beginning of the century. The Philippine scholar reports the regrettable fact that these "lessons" reduced the population of the Philippines by one-sixth. In other words, R. Simbulan concludes, the Americans received advance "training for Vietnam" in the Philippines (p 3).

The compilers of the anthology pay special attention to the establishment and maintenance of the largest American military bases in the Philippines: Subic Bay and Clark Field. These bases, the authors stress, represent extremely important American military structures in the western Pacific, are part of the Pentagon's global strategic system, and are intended primarily for the implementation of "first strike strategy" (pp 3, 7, 8, 11). Representatives of the Philippine public are well aware that the alliance with the United States poses a direct threat to the country's national interests, and that Washington's continued attempts to keep the Philippines within its sphere of influence could have a catastrophic effect on the latter.

For example, R. Simbulan says in reference to American foreign policy strategy that the United States regards Southeast Asia primarily as an exceptionally rich reservoir of raw materials, including strategic resources (rubber, chromium, titanium, manganese, platinum, etc.), representing a guarantee of the stability of the American economy. This means, the author goes on to say, that any changes or even potential changes in the region (and they are regarded in Washington as nothing other than Moscow-inspired developments) are interpreted in the United States as something against its "vital interests" (p 10). The latter, according to the logic of American strategists, must be defended by maintaining the so-called "military balance," developing a network of American military bases, using the airports, harbors and port facilities of countries in the region as transfer points for U.S. "rapid deployment forces," etc. All of this is done on the false pretext of the "Soviet threat" and is aimed, in the final analysis, against any signs of a national liberation movement in the region and serves U.S. interventionist goals (pp 90-92).

Realizing the danger the existence of American military bases in the Philippines could pose to the Philippine people, especially the nuclear weapons stored there, and analyzing all of the possible ways in which these installations could be used as ground elements of R. Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative," R. Simbulan arrives at the only correct conclusion: If a global conflict should break out, the Philippines will become Washington's nuclear hostage (pp 17, 69).

As R. Simbulan stresses (he cites a secret document of one of the American agencies investigating security issues), the United States has no intention of giving up its economic, political, and military hegemony in the region in the future (pp 25-38, 40, 41). Moreover, it is doing everything within its power to keep a "democratic" regime (that is, one loyal to Washington) in the Philippines and, of course, to keep its bases (p 19). As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs P. Wolfowitz announced, the United States is fully resolved to prevent any "rebel" threat to American military installations in the Philippines. R. Simbulan justifiably interprets this position as a plan for American intervention against the Philippines (p 20).

Professor M. Magalonna cites conclusive documented evidence of the Pentagon's intentions to use the American military bases in the Philippines and the entire Philippine archipelago primarily against the USSR for the purpose of destroying targets in the Asian and European parts of the Soviet Union. As M. Magalonna stresses, Washington has no idea that the Philippine people should somehow be informed of these plans. The author illustrates his conclusion with a remark by American Ambassador W. Sullivan, who said that "problems connected with nuclear weapons cannot be an item of discussion with Philippine representatives" (p 66).

Stressing repeatedly that the existence of American bases with large quantities of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons within the territory of the Philippines is dangerous in itself, M. Magalonna cogently demonstrates that this danger tends to grow constantly in connection with the reckless behavior of American military personnel and their numerous violations of rules of discipline. In view of this, the Philippine scholar concludes that the only correct line for a state released from colonial domination consists in independent economic and political development, the affirmation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a policy of nonalignment (pp 108-109).

The conclusions drawn by the speakers--people with different political outlooks--are quite unequivocal: Washington's politico-military pressure and imperious policy of diktat and bribery have turned the Philippines into a U.S. military-strategic testing ground (p 111). Articles 6 and 7 of the so-called agreement on the bases leave no doubt at all about the accuracy of this conclusion. Speakers J. Adaza, R. Simbulan, and A. Pimentel logically reveal the falsity of the allegations associating the existence of American bases in the Philippines with the defense of the latter against the "external threat" (pp 110, 127, 128, 130).

The authors conclude the work by convincing the reader that the American bases in the Philippines pose a direct threat to the Philippine people and

that genuine independence, freedom, and sovereignty are incompatible with shackling politico-military alliances and agreements. The politico-military and economic "Americanization" of the Philippine society is a form of neocolonialism.

This work is an extremely useful publication, containing documented and therefore particularly conclusive proof of the colossal threat American imperialism poses to developing countries. The concrete and diverse information and the convincing arguments of the authors are indisputable merits of the work. It seems to be a valid expression of the feelings of the Philippine public, which is deeply disturbed by Washington's aggressive behavior.

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8588

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REPORT ON 30TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF CHINA SPECIALISTS

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[Report by L.M. Gudoshnikov, doctor of juridical sciences, and V.F. Sorokin, candidate of philological sciences, on 30th Sinologists' conference in Turin from 1 to 6 September 1986]

[Text] The 30th Sinologists' conference was held in Turin (Italy) from 1 to 6 September 1986. It was attended by around 120 people, or approximately the same number as at the last conference in the West German university town of Tübingen in 1984. The host country was the leader in the number of conference participants, followed in order by the FRG, France, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries. The European socialist countries were represented by delegates or observers from the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. A delegation (of three members) from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences attended the conference. The Soviet delegation consisted of Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V.M. Solntsev (delegation head), Doctor of Historical Sciences V.S. Myasnikov, Doctor of Juridical Sciences L.M. Gudoshnikov, Doctor of Philological Sciences V.F. Sorokin, and Candidate of Economic Sciences S.S. Razov.

Around 40 reports on various Sinological topics were presented at the conference's two plenary meetings and eight section meetings. Two meetings were chaired by Professors V.F. Sorokin and L.M. Gudoshnikov, members of the Soviet delegation.

Four reports were presented by the Soviet delegation. A report by V.F. Sorokin, who has been the vice president of the European Sinologists Association (ESA) for several years, was presented at the first plenary meeting. His topic was the place of the Yuan drama in the history of world drama. He compared a number of West European, Chinese, and Japanese plays from the 13th to 17th centuries to demonstrate that the Yuan zaju drama has some of the features of European medieval, renaissance and even later drama and has no direct parallels in other theaters of this era.

The other reports by Soviet speakers were presented at section meetings. V.M. Solntsev's report on "Monosyllabic and Polysyllabic Words in the

Contemporary Chinese Language," dealing with an extremely complex linguistic issue, aroused the interest of the section meeting where linguistic reports were discussed.

Conference participants paid close attention to the report by V.S. Myasnikov on "The First Chinese Scholars of Russian Affairs of the Qing Period," raising a topic which had never been the subject of special studies previously. L.M. Gudoshnikov's report also aroused the interest of conference participants. It was entitled "From the History of the Establishment of the Contemporary Legal System in the PRC" and compared one of the present PRC law codes with its first draft of the 1950's, which is virtually unknown to Western researchers of Chinese law.

Conference participants observed a minute of silence in memory of the renowned Soviet Sinologists M.I. Sladkovskiy and V.A. Krivtsov.

The delegation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences presented two reports at the end of the conference. The history of the Japanese aggression in China from 1900 to 1945 was described in quite pointed terms in Zhang Zhenkun's report on "Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations." During the subsequent discussion, some delegates tried to conceal the expansionist nature of Japanese policy. Several Western delegates of Chinese origin said that past negative episodes in the relations between the two countries should be forgotten for the sake of their present relationship. Another Chinese delegate, Zhou Xiaoliang, presented a report on "The State of Affairs in the Classification and Republication of Old Books" (the term "old books" was used in reference to literature published prior to the 1911 revolution). The report was informative and was supposed to underscore the great interest in this work in the PRC. At the end of the report the speaker said that "our colleagues in Taiwan are also making an effort in this field," thereby "contributing to the assimilation and development of national cultural traditions." One of the conference speakers was Zhu Hunyuan, a lecturer at the Modern History Institute in Taipei who studied for his doctorate at Cambridge. He chose the strictly neutral topic of the state of Sinology in Great Britain.

Delegates from the European countries spoke in various sections. Professor E. Muller from the GDR presented an informative survey of recent Chinese literature, singling out some basic thematic trends, stylistic currents, and regional schools. She remarked that despite the campaign against "spiritual contamination," it is clear that Chinese writers, especially the young ones, have been influenced by Western modernist currents. This influence, according to the speaker, is still confined to form, and has not affected ideology. R. Mauritz, another scholar from the GDR, explained his view of the origins of philosophy in China, according to which the first philosophical ideas arose as a result of the observation of the natural environment by the ancient Chinese. A report by another scholar from the GDR, H. Peters, dealt with China's postwar development in 1945-1947. Hungarian scholar O. Juhas made some observations of common interest on several aspects of the reform in China.

The reports of Western speakers were mostly factual and were frequently confined to relatively narrow topics. It must be said, however, that they

attested to definite achievements in the accumulation and analysis of Sino-logical information and will make a perceptible contribution to the development of world Sinology.

The most noteworthy of the reports by Western historians were those by Cambridge University Professor M. Lowe on the latest archaeological discoveries in China and Cambridge Professor S. Taylor on the technology of iron production in ancient China. Italian researcher R. Fracasso presented an analysis of various editions of the main reference work on ancient Chinese geography, "Ranhaijing," making an interesting attempt to explain the illustrations in the revised texts in the Middle Ages and in Qing China.

Some reports dealt with the history of social thought and science. Swedish Sinologist T. Luden presented a report on "Dang Zhen (1724-1777) and the Social Dynamism of Confucian Thought," in which he stressed the radical nature of the views of this philosopher, who vehemently opposed the "repressive" essence of orthodox neo-Confucianism but did not depart from the general premises of Confucian ideology. The speaker concluded that Confucianism could be used in some ways for the modernization of Chinese society. In a report entitled "'Nanzi,' or Why the Heavens Did not Punish Confucius," R. Ptach (FRG) analyzes specific incidents in the biography of this thinker and concludes that ancient Chinese historians deliberately denigrated women rulers because they believed in male supremacy.

The head of the Soviet delegation, V.M. Solntsev, participated in the discussion of all the linguistic reports and commended them as a whole. The linguistic reports presented at the conference on the contemporary, medieval and ancient Chinese language were of considerable interest because they were based on new research findings.

The original conference schedule included two special meetings on literature--one on the classical drama of the Yuan period and one on contemporary Chinese literature. Most of the scholars who expressed a wish to speak at these meetings, however, were unable for various reasons to attend the conference. Three reports were presented on this subject matter. Two of them--the reports by V.F. Sorokin and E. Muller--were already discussed in this report. The third, by Professor V. Idema (Netherlands), also dealt with the Yuan drama, the play "Orphan Zhao." Analyzing the different extant versions of the play and other works with similar plots, the speaker concluded that after the ascent of the Ming Dynasty the court writers revised the plays of Yuan authors to reinforce the Confucian ideology. The history of literature was also discussed in a report by Keiko Kokkum (a Japanese woman working in Sweden) on "Liang Qichao's Years in Japan." Describing the spiritual evolution of this renowned Chinese thinker and politician who lived in Japan from 1898 to 1912, the speaker underscored the influence of Japanese writers on Liang Qichao's beliefs about the utilitarian purpose of literature. In the discussion following this report, the head of the Chinese delegation, Zhang Zhenkun, felt the need to say that after the speaker had mentioned the progressive elements in Liang Qichao's views, she should have mentioned his later move to a reactionary position.

At a meeting of the board of the ESA, held at the time of the conference, 50 new members were admitted to the association, including the well-known Sinologists from the Soviet Union, Doctors of Sciences M.L. Titarenko and V.S. Myasnikov.

On 3 September the ESA General Assembly elected a new association board of 24 members, representing Sinology in 17 countries. Professor G. Malmquist, the well-known Sinologist and linguist from Sweden, was elected president of the ESA, and Professors L. Lanciotti (Italy) and L.M. Gudoshnikov (USSR) were elected vice presidents. The members of the board from socialist countries are N. Ananiyeva (Bulgaria), E. Muller (GDR), N. Silna (CSSR), M. Stefanska-Matushin (Poland), and O. Juhas (Hungary). Other members of the board are Sinologists from Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the FRG, Finland, France, and Switzerland.

The new board accepted the invitation of the Sinologists of the GDR to hold the 31st ESA conference in Weimar in 1988. The next meeting of the board will also be held in the GDR in September-November 1987.

In general, the conference was businesslike and constructive. Much was said during meetings and informal gatherings about the desirability of broader cooperation among European Sinologists and the exchange of research findings.

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8588

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INDEX OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 1986

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 86 (signed to press 20 Nov 86) pp 188-190

[Text] Gorbachev, M.S., "Speech at Ceremonial Presentation of Order of Lenin to Vladivostok," No 4 (60)

27th CPSU Congress

"The CPSU on Socialism's Historic Mission," No 1 (57)

Editorials

"The 27th CPSU Congress and the Program of Common Security," No 3 (59)
"'Neoglobalism'--a Source of Tension in Asia and the Entire World," No 4 (60)
"Strategy of Peace and Progress," No 2 (58)
Kovalenko, I.I., "Cooperation, Not Confrontation," No 2 (58)
Tikhvinskiy, S.L., "Study of Chinese Culture in Russia and the USSR," No 2 (58)

Politics and Economics

Aleksandrov, V.V. and Arsenyev, V.N., "USSR-Japan: 30 Years Later (On the 30th Anniversary of the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations)," No 4 (60)
Arkhipov, V.A., "Historic Milestone in the Fraternal Alliance of the Soviet and Mongolian People," No 2 (58)
Bereznoy, A.V., "Behind the Facade of the 'Export Miracle,'" No 1 (57)
Bogomolov, A.O., "Evolution of the Idea of Pacific Cooperation," No 4 (60)
Verbitskiy, S.I., "Japan in the Trilateral System," No 1 (57)
Goncharov, S.N., "Overseas Chinese and the Program of 'Four Modernizations' in the PRC," No 3 (59)
Demchenko, M.V., "Japan: The Movement for Friendship with the Soviet Union," No 1 (57)
Zanegin, B.N., "American-Chinese Relations Today," No 4 (60)
Kim, Roy, "Pacific Community: Myth or Reality?" No 1 (57)
Kovalenko, I.I., "The Comprehensive Approach to the Issue of Asian Security," No 1 (57)
Kuznetsov, A.P., "USSR-PRC: Trade and Economic Relations," No 2 (58)
Mosyakov, D.V., "Solutions to Food Problem in Cambodia," No 3 (59)

- Myagkov, Ye.B. and Fedorov, B.G., "Liberalization of Credit System in Japan," No 3 (59)
- Petrov, D.V., "Imperialism's Military-Bloc Policy in the Asian-Pacific Region," No 4 (60)
- Portyakov, V.Ya. and Stepanov, S.V., "The Special Economic Zones in China," No 1 (57)
- Sevastyanov, I.S. and Smirnov, V.V., "Some Aspects of the Creation of a Material and Technical Base for Socialism in the MPR," No 3 (59)
- Ukraitsev, M.S., "Important Visits," No 2 (58)
- Shipov, Yu. P., "Japan Challenges the United States," No 3 (59)

Economic Reform in the PRC

- Avremov, V.Ye., "Changes in Planning System," No 3 (59)
- Wang Jiye, "The Reform in China," No 2 (58)
- Manezhev, S.A., "The Use of Foreign Capital," No 3 (59)
- Ostrovskiy, A.V., "Economic Reform in Chinese Cities," No 4 (60)
- Sarafanov, I.I., "Changes in System of Organizing R&D in China," No 2 (58)
- Stepanov, S.V. and Portyakov, V.Ya., "The Sixth 5-Year Plan in the PRC: Results and Problems," No 2 (58)

Ideology

- Perelomov, L.S., "Criteria of Personality Assessment in Traditional Chinese Culture," No 2 (58)
- Svetlov, G. Ye., "Seicho-no Ie: 'True Existence' and Chauvinism," No 2 (58)

Criticism of Bourgeois Sinology

- Larin, A.G., "U.S. Sinologists on American-Chinese Relations," No 1 (57)
- Maslov, P.Yu., "American Political Scientists Assess Future of PRC Foreign Policy," No 2 (58)

History

- Glunin, V.I. and Meliksetov, A.V., "The Communist Party of China Turns 65," No 3 (59)
- Kukushkin, K.V., "The 30th Anniversary of the Eighth All-China CCP Congress," No 3 (59)
- Latyshev, I.A., "Japan Before and During World War II," No 1 (57)
- Mamayeva, N.L., "Sun Yatsen's Political Program," No 1 (57)

Fighters for Popular Causes

- Akatova, T.N., "Su Zhaozheng--Prominent Figure in the Chinese Labor Movement," No 2 (58)
- Galenovich, Yu.M., "Prominent CCP and PRC Activist Lin Boqu," No 3 (59)
- Leshchenko, N.F., "Eitaro Noro--Marxist Revolutionary," No 1 (57)
- Lin Li, "Memories of My Father," No 2 (58)
- Mirovitskaya, R.A., "Song Qingling--Prominent Chinese Statesman and Public Spokesman," No 3 (59)

Pozhilov, I.Ye., "Commander Zhu De: Early Career," No 4 (60)
Tikhvinskiy, S.L., "Sun Yatsen: Great Chinese Revolutionary Democrat and
Friend of the Soviet Union," No 3 (59)

From the History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement

Yuryev, M.F., "The Long March of the Chinese Red Army (50th Anniversary),"
No 4 (60)
Myasnikov, V.S., "N. Ya. Bichurin's Valaam Exile," No 1 (57)

From the History of Domestic Oriental Studies

Myasnikov, V.S., "N.Ya., Bichurin's Valaam Exile," No 2 (58)

Science and Culture

Burov, V.G., "Propaganda of Marxist Philosophy in China in the 1930's and
1940's," No 4 (60)

Philosophy

Feoktistov, V.F., "The Methodology of Studying Chinese Philosophy," No 3 (59)

Literature

Ba Jin and Jiang Kejia, "Memories of Lao She," No 3 (59)
Sorokin, V.F., "Changing Reality Reflected in PRC Literature," No 1 (57)
Sorokin, V.F., "Changing Reality Reflected in PRC Literature," No 2 (58)
Fedorenko, N.T., "Study and Translations of Chinese Literature in the USSR,"
No 4 (60)
Fedorenko, N.T., "A Scholar's Labor, a Poet's Talent," No 1 (57)

Art

Kuzmenko, L.I., "Folk Art," No 2 (58)

Episodes in Scientific and Cultural Relations

Belousov, S.R., "Eyewitness Account of Soviet Russia (Essays of Zu Taofen),"
No 4 (60)
Borodin, B.A., "Russian Cultural Community's Views of China," No 3 (59)
Matyayev, V.Ya. and Syalov, G.S., "Mutual Interest, Broad Horizons," No 3
(59)
Stepanov, Ye.P., "Delegation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Visits the Soviet Union," No 3 (59)

Scanning the Foreign Press

Basov, B.N., "RENMIN RIBAO on Economic Reform in China," No 2 (58)
Basov, B.N., "The Restructuring of Enterprise Management in China," No 4
(60)

- Basov, B.N., "The Development of Intersectorial 'Horizontal' Ties in the PRC," No 3 (59)
Vasilyev, V.A., "Contents of Mongolian Journal QUESTIONS OF ORIENTAL STUDIES," No 2 (58)
Olshanskiy, I.O., "Chinese Views on Developing Countries," No 3 (59)

Publications

- Aquino, Benigno S., "Traveling Through Russia," No 3 (59)
"Episodes from the History of Cooperation by USSR and PRC Railroad Workers," No 2 (58)
Hu Sheng, "From the History of the Imperialist Powers' Aggression in China," No 1 (57)

Surveys, Reports, Essays

- Andreyev, V.I. and Osipov, V.I., "The Friendship and Cooperation of the People of the USSR and DPRK," No 3 (59)
Gorenko, S.N. and Koloskov, B.T., "China and Southeast Asia: Scanning a Collection of Documents," No 1 (57)
Yegorov, K.A., "Results of NPC Session," No 3 (59)
Kozhin, P.M., "The State and Religious Organizations in China," No 4 (60)
Petrov, O.V., "Soviet Union-Vietnam: Fraternal Cooperation," No 1 (57)
Fedorov, K.Yu., "Centers for Soviet Studies in the PRC," No 2 (58)
Shlyk, N.L., "USSR-DPRK Economic Relations," No 1 (57)
Yakovleva, M.A., "ASEAN Countries' Trade and Economic Cooperation," No 1 (57)

People, Customs, Traditions

- Shchelkina, L.V. and Shchelkin, A.G., "Eastern Physical Culture (Some Aspects of General Outlook)," No 4 (60)

Book Reviews

- Andreyev, V.I. and Osipov, V.I., "RODONG SINMUN on the Soviet Union," No 1 (57)
Andreyev, V.I. and Osipov, V.I., "Seoul in the Neocolonial Trap," No 4 (60)
Arunov, V.V., "Soviet Orientalists' Achievement," No 3 (59)
Arunov, V.V., "U.S. Policy in China and Soviet Diplomacy," No 4 (60)
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