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/1986

CENTER-DEMOCRAT PARTY ELECTS MIMI STILLING JAKOBSEN LEADER

New Leader Gives Views

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Nov 87 p 7

[Interview by Per Lyngby and Ole Dall]

[Text] The Center Democrats will be holding their national congress in Ringsted this weekend, where the party chief is still called Erhard Jacobsen but where it is equally certain that his successor will be his daughter, Minister of Social Affairs Mimi Stilling Jakobsen.

The Center Democrats are ready for the annual cousins' dance.

The attitude of the members of the Center Democrats toward the national congress to be held over the weekend in Ringsted bears witness to a sense of self-irony within the party. A party that does not have many members, where there is always plenty of applause at the national congress and where father and daughter head the movement, which does not spend its time on the adoption of platforms and resolutions.

The Center Democrats is a party with few committed voters. The party has been gaining and losing supporters in the elections ever since it was started in 1973. In the most recent election last September, the trip was short--and it went in the right direction. The Center Democrats is the only party to increase its support, and it gained an additional seat in the Folketing.

Erhard Jakobsen is still in control, and when he has had enough of it, it will be his daughter's turn.

"One day somebody suddenly asked me what I would be doing in 5 years. I then sat down, thinking: Do I really want to take the responsibility, for, if so, it will be up to me until the Center Democrats become bankrupt. But I am ready to take the responsibility," says Mimi Stilling Jakobsen-- the Minister of Social Affairs and the most certain future party leader in the Kingdom.

The party bases itself on the right to say the right things at the wrong times.

[Question] Most of the founders of the Center Democrats came from the Social Democratic Party, and it probably never was the intention that the Center Democrats were to become an integral part of the nonsocialist bloc. When shall we anew see the Center Democrats in a permanent cooperation with the Social Democrats?

[Answer] You will, at any rate, not see the Center Democrats leave the present government, for we feel extremely well at ease within that government. It is my feeling that this holds true of the membership as well. But it is clear that we have, and certainly did have, frequent discussions as to why the Center Democrats participated in that government since we are former Social Democrats, and we discussed the question whether we should drown as a small party. However, the election result showed that it works after all.

If the Social Democratic group in the Folketing were composed of the various mayors around the country, there would be no need for the Center Democrats.

To this comes that new cards have been played with the composition of the Folketing. We welcome new efforts on the part of the Social Democrats. They have to stop their sulking now. It is too bad for such a large party to merely come up with ritual statements once a month.

[Question] In the election campaign you said "eliminate the real estate and land taxes," even if the Minister of Finance established that the country cannot afford any tax cuts. Were you not a bit unrealistic in that respect?

[Answer] No, I do not think so. For the government has actually promised to put a ceiling on the land taxes, but the majority instead wanted a bottom. There was no end to the promises made by other parties, for example to pensioners, but we were steadfast and did not promise them anything.

[Question] At their national congress meeting, the Conservatives steered a center course. Is there actually a need for the Center Democrats as an independent party? What is the difference between you and the Conservatives?

[Answer] As long as we are in the same coalition government and have the very close and good cooperation with the Conservatives and the other parties within the coalition, there is not much difference.

Incidentally, the Center Democrats will never become a big party. That is not the intention either. Good Lord. If we have 10-20 seats, we probably are the right size.

But it is my feeling that there are a number of voters who like certain things about the Center Democrats. They like our position on the EC and NATO--it is true that the Conservatives have the same position on this question--and, then, they like the idea that we sometimes say the right

things at the absolutely wrong times. That is extremely important for the Center Democrats.

Our objects clause ought, indeed, to stipulate: This party bases itself on the right to say the right things at the wrong times.

For that is part of our image. It was, for example, 100 percent right for our party chairman, 2 weeks prior to the municipal elections, to make a comment on South Africa which not very many others in this country will make.

There is very, very little difference in my opinions and those of Palle Simonsen (Conservative Party) on the situation in Denmark today.

We are a middle party which does not agree with the Conservative Youth Group and the right wing of the Conservative Party. I disagree, among other things, with the Conservative Youth Group on their privatization ideas. On that issue I am much more in agreement with Palle Simonsen. He and I could today be in the same party. There is very, very little difference in my opinions and those of Palle Simonsen on the current situation in Denmark.

And there are also a lot of Social Democrats with whom I could be in the same party. If the Social Democratic folketing group were composed of the various mayor types they have around the country. Indeed, my goodness, then there would be no need for the Center Democrats.

I miss Britta Schall Holberg, Grethe Fenger Møller and Elsebeth Kock-Petersen in the government.

We are in the zone of the left-wing Conservatives and the right-wing Social Democrats. After all, that is where we came from.

[Question] There were four female ministers when the Four-Leaf-Clover government started: Britta Schall Holberg, Grethe Fenger Møller, Elsebeth Kock-Petersen and you. The other three have now been removed. What is your reaction to that?

[Answer] I miss them. That is one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is that they cannot really avoid me, for the Center Democrats is a small party. I should, indeed, have welcomed more women in the government, for I found that we had lots of fun.

Actually, it was good for the government to have several female ministers. That makes for a good atmosphere and balance. We were the ones who did a bit of cementing and who told Prime Minister Poul Schluter that we really ought to have a dance and things like that.

It is exciting and interesting to have my father participate in the government.

[Question] It has gradually become a family affair for the Center Democrats to participate in the government. What is it like to be in the government with one's father?

[Answer] It is very exciting and interesting. It provides an entirely new and interesting dimension when we are in a government meeting and I know that he cannot escape speaking up on a certain issue.

I also find that his manner is a strength for the government. For one thing because he commands respect on account of his great experience. And, then, like Prime Minister Schluter, he will sometimes make jokes which will make people burst with laughter.

The interview with the Minister of Social Affairs in Slotsholmsgade is now over. Mimi Stilling Jakobsen will now be going to a cousins' dance. A cozy, purely Center Democratic atmosphere in Ringsted.

Melchior on Security Policy

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Nov 87 p 4

[Text] The willingness of Danes to become drafted will have to be increased, the Center Democrats state. The party wants to make the military more visible in the population so that one may feel security and national pride. The party is ready to postpone a new defense agreement with the Social Democratic Party.

We need more military vehicles and more conscripts in uniform in the streets, so that the population may see them.

The above statement was made by Arne Melchior, group chairman and political spokesman of the Center Democrats, at the national congress of his party in Ringsted.

He is chairman of the defense committee of the Folketing and is a member of the group that negotiates a defense agreement with the Social Democratic Party.

"The willingness of Danes to become drafted will have to be increased. We need more conscripts, and we need to see more of them use their uniforms--also in their spare time. In order for the population to feel security, satisfaction and national pride at seeing its military vehicles and its military men," said Arne Melchior.

He rejected the proposal on the part of the Social Democratic Party for a zero solution in a new defense agreement. For that is no solution, he said.

"About 30 years ago, Denmark received 6 billion kroner worth of arms aid from the United States in current prices at the time. Those arms have now been worn out, and the Social Democratic Party is well aware of that. The arms will have to be renewed, otherwise we lose considerable combat force."

Arne Melchior added that war will not be avoided through weakness and absence but through strength and presence. He is prepared to postpone the

adoption of a new defense agreement in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome.

"I prefer a good defense agreement at Easter to a meager agreement at Christmas," he stated.

Actually, a new defense agreement ought to have been reached by Christmas, since the present defense agreement expires on 1 January 1988.

National Congress

Arne Melchior could not resist telling off the parties which reject the idea of an increased defense budget:

"The signal issued by the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party is the same signal that traveled through Europe in the thirties. At the time, it was brought about by the hope that Germany, too, would reduce its armed forces, but, as is well know, the exact opposite happened. The Center Democrats do not want to share in this kind of defeatism."

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FINN THORGRIMSON ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF LO AT CONGRESS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Nov 87 Sect III p 2

[Articles by Berit Andersen and Bente Linnea Friis]

[Text] Finn Thorgrimson was yesterday elected the new chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions. Hans Jensen was elected the new deputy chairman. The women left the congress in disappointment. The Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers, however, was pleased to retain its chairman, Jørgen Eiberg. The Union of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters is more or less ready to appoint its new chairman.

At 9:55 on Friday morning, Finn Thorgrimson, deputy chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, looked clearly relieved, giving one of his rare, big smiles. It happened when the speaker announced from the rostrum that he had been appointed the new chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions. With a support of 808 votes, he had his life's ambition fulfilled, while his opponent, Jørgen Eiberg, chairman of the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers, with his support of 445 votes ascertained that he would remain in his seat of chairman of the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers.

The empty seat of deputy chairman left by Thorgrimson has been taken by Hans Jensen, who till yesterday was chairman of the Union of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters. He was named the favorite candidate throughout the congress, but at one point during the congress he was nearly defeated by his opponent, Lisa Dahl Christensen, deputy chairman of the Danish Municipal Workers' Union. The distribution of votes among the two ended in a relatively minor victory for Hans Jensen. He got 727 votes against her 547 votes.

While the newly elected male chiefs of the Federation of Trade Unions smiled, many female delegates to the congress showed disappointment.

The fact that Lisa Dahl Christensen was defeated was regarded as a major defeat for the women's cause. Not least by the chairman of the Union of Domestic Workers, Margit Vognsen, who "invented" Lisa Dahl.

"We now have to give serious consideration to the idea of introducing sex quotas in the trade union movement," she said. "It cannot be right that we have to be twice as good as men in order to obtain equal terms."

Lillian Knudsen, chairman of the Women's Workers Union, however, did not take an equally pessimistic view of the outcome of the election. She interpreted it as a victory for "the women's rebellion," finding that the time has now come for positive discrimination. "In the executive committee of the Federation of Trade Unions, I shall soon start a discussion on the composition of the many committees of the Federation of Trade Unions. We simply cannot accept the idea of having no committees without the representation of women after this congress."

Eiberg Remains

The consequence of Jørgen Eiberg's defeat in the election of chairman will no doubt be that he will remain chairman of the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers. He had feared that it might become necessary to convene an extraordinary meeting of the executive committee to discuss whether his defeat and he himself had become a too big liability to the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers. But judging from the attitude on the part of many delegates of the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers, Jørgen Eiberg seems to have no reason to doubt his support within the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers following the congress of the Federation of Trade Unions. "He has our full support, and he is well aware of it. But it is understandable that he was nervous what would and might happen," several people state.

Within the Union of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters, the consequence of Hans Jensen's election to the post of deputy chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions is also quite clear by now.

The Federation of Trade Unions will hold its extraordinary meeting on 5 December in Odense. And a majority within the executive committee have nominated the deputy chairman throughout 6 years, Jørn-Oluf Olsen, to become the new chairman.

Strong Combination of Chairman and Deputy Chairman

It is predicted that Finn Thorgrimson and Hans Jensen will make an excellent combination of chairman and deputy chairman within the Danish trade union movement. The chairman of the Danish Employers' Association finds that the employers will have a difficult time. Thomas Nielsen, the former chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, believes that the two men will provide the Federation of Trade Unions with the needed extrovert trait.

A new pair of chairman and deputy chairman have been introduced within the trade union movement. The names are Finn Thorgrimson and Hans Jensen. A strong combination, was the verdict yesterday, a few hours after their election.

"It is a strong combination. We shall not have an easy time," Hans Skov Christensen, managing director of the Danish Employers' Association, states, and he adds: "They are two men who are able to supplement each other. We have known Thorgrimson for many years, and as far as Hans Jensen is concerned,

it appears that he has the qualifications for the post of deputy chairman," says Skov Christensen, who, moreover, draws the attention to the difference in age--the chairman is 52 and the deputy chairman 42--as well as their different backgrounds.

Openness

Finn Thorgrimson started as a worker who was active within the trade union movement in Kastrup, where he became the local chairman of the Semi-Skilled Workers' Union in 1967. The chairman at the time, Thomas Nielsen, caught sight of him, and in 1970 Thorgrimson was appointed work environment secretary. The following year saw him as a member of the executive committee of the Federation of Trade Unions. And in 1982 he became its deputy chairman. It is rumored that Thomas Nielsen at the time had preferred him as chairman instead of Knud Christensen. But Thorgrimson chose to respect the seniority status and did not want to become nominated for the post.

Today Thomas Nielsen says:

"There is some truth to the claim that I would have preferred Finn as chairman. Largely, because Finn likes openness and extrovert people. However, that may have been somewhat concealed in his solid work habits and thoroughness. In addition, it ought to be remembered that Finn was deputy chairman under an unobtrusive chairman, and that has an effect on others," says Thomas Nielsen, who finds the elections good and right. Finn Thorgrimson is familiar with the internal work, has a good grasp of many issues, as well as the desire to be open--while Hans Jensen is extrovert.

"And I have missed extrovert people within the Federation of Trade Unions of recent years," says the former chairman.

Jesper Due, cultural sociologist and researcher, also believes in the two men.

"Thorgrimson represents the steady and pragmatic, while Hans Jensen proved the critic. He was very direct at the congress. It is many years since the public has seen such a large degree of self-criticism from such a high level. If Hans Jensen's talk goes beyond the rhetoric, the two will be able to supplement each other well."

Thorgrimson's and Jensen's virtues coincide. They are both loyal, industrious and hardworking. But they are different when it comes to temperament. Thorgrimson is not a person to go off the deep end. That cannot be said of Hans Jensen either--and still.

In his capacity of chairman of the Union of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters, Hans Jensen has been known for his temper with his counterpart, viz. the Danish Association of Heating and Sanitary Engineers, where, incidentally, he is highly respected. Director Flemming Preisler says:

"Hans Jensen has a modern attitude toward trade union politics. That shows, among other things, in the way he says things. He would, for example, never use the term of 'industrial democracy' and would instead use the term of 'participation in the decision-making process.' New technology is to him a 'joint interest' and does not represent the possibility of employers to fire people," says Flemming Preisler, who refers to him as an outspoken person, "but not in the manner of a sailor."

The 42-year-old plumber and pipe fitter is the son of a plumber who even was a member of the executive committee of the Union of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters.

Hans Jensen became secretary in the union in 1973, 4 years later he became deputy chairman and in 1981 he became chairman, which, of course, has taken much of his time. He arrives at his desk at 8:30 in the morning, and he is more or less the one who turns off the lights and closes the door of the office of the union at the end of the day.

The employees are, no doubt, happy that Hans Jensen has become deputy chairman but sad to see him leave. He is comfortable with his people at the lunch table. In his capacity of "employer," he is honest and straightforward. If Hans Jensen is satisfied or dissatisfied, he will let it be known.

Hans Jensen spends his leisure hours in Stenløse. His wife works in a child day-care center. They have two daughters of 14 and 18, respectively, with whom he loves to play a game of table tennis.

Federation of Trade Unions Will Not Have Positive Discrimination

"The trade union movement will be given a new structure. I have no doubt about that. And I am also quite certain that it will be long before the Employers' Association."

With these words, the newly elected chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, Finn Thorgrimson, rejects the widely held opinion that "nothing will ever come of the idea of a new structure."

"We have been preparing a new structure for many years. The Employers' Association has just started. And if we have problems arranging things, this is nothing compared to the problems of the Employers' Association."

"However, I would like to point out that it takes a positive attitude--from all sides."

The Federation of Trade Unions today comprises 32 unions and upwards of 1.4 million members. And if it is up to the new chairman as well as the new deputy chairman, the federation will, in the future, take the offensive to a far greater extent than in the past.

"We need to be a step ahead all the time. And the congress has provided us with all of the opportunities for this through the many progressive measures that have been adopted."

Equality

Finn Thorgrimson does not agree with the criticism that women are insufficiently represented within the leadership of the Federation of Trade Unions.

"Three unions are solely, or almost solely, unions of women, at the same time as they have female chairpersons. All three chairpersons are members of the executive committee of the Federation of Trade Unions. I thus find that we have exploited the possibilities at the maximum."

"I do not support either sex quotas or positive discrimination. If the women force through such a measure, they will hurt their own cause. Equality will have to develop by itself through equal work. Our experience in the efforts for equality within the Federation of Trade Unions has shown this to be true."

The election of Finn Thorgrimson as the next chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions was for many years regarded more or less as a matter of course. It did not, however, become quite as self-evident when Jørgen Eiberg last spring suddenly announced that he, too, would be a candidate for the post of chairman in the election of the next chairman at the congress in November.

Many people regarded it as a criticism of Thorgrimson. But Thorgrimson himself did not.

"Eiberg did not at any point criticize me, and I regarded his candidacy solely as a desire on his part to infuse fresh blood into the leadership of the Federation of Trade Unions."

Thorgrimson has lately often been described as colorless and boring. However, he does not find that description to be entirely fair:

"The election campaign between Eiberg and me did not take place on entirely equal terms. During the illness of Knud Christensen, in my capacity of acting chairman, I felt bound by a strong sense of loyalty, and that inevitably had a restraining effect on my activities."

"The reason is thus not that I am boring."

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REACTION TO KOIVISTO, GORBACHEV PROPOSALS ON NORTHERN SEAS

Nordics React to Koivisto

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Nov 87 p 35

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Koivisto's Sea Speech Stirs Debate; Sweden Believes Attention Must Also Be Paid to Importance of Ground Forces Near Nordic Countries"]

[Text] In October 1986, Finnish President Mauno Koivisto gave a speech in which he called for a curb on arms buildup, especially in the northern seas. The Swedish government in particular responded positively to the idea. After all, similar problems had been discussed in Stockholm for a long time.

Now in November 1987, the reaction of all the Nordic capitals to Finland's participation in the northern seas debate has been recorded precisely and broadly in a thorough survey.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT visited Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Oslo in October/November to find out what security policy experts other than government officials really think of the northern seas initiative.

Our western neighbors' unofficial response to President Koivisto's official address on the northern seas boils down to this:

It is fine for Finland to focus attention on the dangers of an arms race in the northern seas.

It is nevertheless very difficult to restrict the naval buildup in such a way that the measure is evenhanded in the eyes of both military alliances. Mere naval disarmament near the Nordic countries would right now benefit the Soviet Union more than the United States.

There is thus little chance that Finland's current viewpoint as such will catch on. Perhaps the northern seas initiative could be expanded and made more specific so that the relative strength of ground forces near the Nordic countries is taken into account.

Sweden's General Assessment

The Swedish government has stated publicly that "naval disarmament in regions close to us must occur with the balance of the superpowers' total military capacity in mind."

An official source in Stockholm described the situation to HELSINGIN SANOMAT in this way:

"The reason for the increased strategic significance of the Nordic countries is essentially one of naval warfare: the decision to start building a submarine fleet that is equipped with nuclear missiles and that uses mostly the Kola Peninsula as its base.

"On the whole, the Soviet navy and air force have grown stronger in the Nordic region. Norway for its part has taken steps to make sure that it can get NATO reinforcements to its territory quickly during a crisis.

"We naturally wish that this strategic development had never occurred. But now that there's talk about a (possible) change in the current situation, the naval buildup cannot be examined as a separate entity.

"The areas close to the Nordic countries are dominated by the eastern superpower's ground forces and, to a certain degree, its air force. On the other hand, the western superpower's navy is stronger. When an arms limitation (near the Nordic countries) is weighed, then naval, air, and ground forces must be viewed as a single entity."

Furtive Glances at NATO

In addition, Danes and Norwegians often emphasized to HELSINGIN SANOMAT that the Nordic countries in NATO do not want to adopt any measures for limiting arms without first studying the matter carefully with their western allies.

Typical but unusually blunt is the statement of bourgeois politician Kare Willoch to the Norwegian newspaper AFTENPOSTEN in March 1987.

In the opinion of Willoch, who represents the Conservative Party, it is a bad idea to let Finns and Swedes resolve an issue which is fundamentally important to Norwegian security.

"One of the countries even has a defense and friendship treaty with the Soviet Union," said Willoch.

By his statement he opposed the joint Nordic task force which a while ago began to work out the details for creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Willoch's outburst may also be in keeping with Norwegian thought about a naval buildup, even though the Labor Party's present minority government is unwilling to express that view as pungently.

"Norway definitely mustn't do anything which makes a bad impression on NATO," stressed Oslo interviewees to HELSINGIN SANOMAT in November.

Support and Reservations

In Stockholm, Koivisto gets clear support from the Social Democrats now in power. "Sweden is trying to launch negotiations on restricting sea-based weapons. Why,

one third of all the nuclear weapons in the world are floating around in different seas," said a Social Democratic representative of the Swedish Parliament.

Carl Bildt, head of the Moderate Conservative Party, finds it "remarkable" that Koivisto mentioned changes in naval strategy that would only cause the Nordic countries "additional problems." Koivisto's view is very close to the Swedish assessment of the situation, says Bildt.

Yet he also has significant reservations. "We have to be careful not to limit freedom of the seas. That freedom is important to Sweden in the Baltic.

"It's a mistake to think that the Norwegian Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Barents Sea can be divided into zones by lines which are drawn on and below the water's surface. We Swedes know from experience that monitoring the movement of submarines isn't as easy as people think," said Bildt to HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Stockholm.

However, the frankest opinion was offered by a semiofficial Nordic source. "To put it bluntly, I don't feel that this northern seas initiative has been thought through.

"First Sweden talks for years about curbing the naval buildup, and Finland gets the mistaken notion Sweden has discussed this thing carefully. Then Koivisto broaches the problem, which causes a big stir among Swedes who say, 'Aha, this is important,' and the issue takes wing."

Zones and Sea Speech

Interviewees in both Stockholm and Oslo told HELSINGIN SANOMAT that the Koivisto initiative reminds them of the 1960s, when President Urho Kekkonen proposed the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries.

The goal was not so much to create a nuclear-free zone as to prevent NATO from bringing into the Baltic Sea multinational naval units whose armaments included nuclear weapons.

At this moment there are "certain grounds" for concern that elimination of the superpowers' medium-range missiles from Europe may lead to an increase in sea-based nuclear weapons. By sending out distress signals, it is possible to try to raise the political price of a naval buildup on the northern seas.

"The question to be asked--especially when Finland takes the initiative in security policy--is whether the proposal is meant to be carried out or whether it has another purpose," said one expert. "To be honest, I don't know how things stand now. Some Finns think we should try to implement the northern seas initiative, and others think we shouldn't."

Polite and Quiet Diplomacy

It is striking that nearly all the Nordic officials and politicians interviewed by HELSINGIN SANOMAT stress that they do not want to say how good or bad the Finnish initiative is.

Foreign ministry officials in both Sweden and Norway repeated nearly word for word that "it isn't customary to grade" the content of other Nordic countries' foreign policy. A similar attitude was reflected, somewhat more informally, in the views of the Danish foreign ministry.

The rule was to use restraint when you expressed an opinion in public. Even the least sensitive issues should be discussed at the unofficial level.

"Nordic stability would be destroyed if we started criticizing our Nordic neighbors either openly or secretly. On the other hand, we can give our own opinion. To draw a conclusion from it is an altogether different thing," said a typical Scandinavian official.

The basic approach is to believe in the fixed "harmony" of Nordic security, in the maintenance of which each Nordic country has "its own role."

There is thus a desire to debate foreign policy in a deliberately subdued manner. The goal is to respond to changes in national security or global strategy with decisions--peculiar to each Nordic country--that do not undermine the present situation.

In other words, officials in Nordic capitals try not to do anything which could enhance one superpower's position in Scandinavia at the expense of the other giant.

So Koivisto's northern seas initiative is officially interpreted by other Nordic countries as the expression of a preliminary and deliberately "unpolished" opinion alongside which they are ready to place their own tentative viewpoints.

Gorbachev Speech Stimulates Responses

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Nov 87 p A23

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Nordic Countries Listen to Gorbachev; Murmansk Speech Arouses Interest But Also Suspicion"]

[Text] Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's Murmansk speech in October has stirred genuine interest in all the Nordic countries. The interest is mixed with a generous dose of the traditional suspicion with which Scandinavia still judges everything the Soviet Union does.

The suspicion smolders especially in those practical-minded circles which attach importance to the number and deployment of existent weapons and try to infer the firepower's potential use.

But Gorbachev has consistently churned out such pleasant-looking proposals for arms limitations that even the most skeptical critics are starting to say that the party leader might be serious after all.

Ambassador's Metamorphosis

The Murmansk speech--in which the Nordic countries were offered a cooperative hand in economic and security matters--was preceded by Soviet diplomats' nearly unqualified conversion to the new openness, which seems to have begun with the wave of a magic wand.

"The conduct of Soviet ambassador Boris Pankin has changed completely," said Bengt Westerberg, leader of the Swedish Liberal Party and representative of the nonsocialist opposition, to HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Stockholm.

Sweden's Social Democrats have noted, for their part, Pankin's MOSCOW NEWS article (number 41/1987) in which the Soviet ambassador praises Sweden to the skies.

"Isn't it about time to admit boldly that the (Swedish) course of action has achieved remarkable success...and to examine thoroughly and critically the 'Swedish model' as well as borrow from our northern neighbor's experiences everything that we (in the Soviet Union) might need?" wrote Pankin.

Andersson Cautious

It sounds fresh and positive, particularly when you consider how inflamed Swedish-Soviet relations have been for years because of the submarine incidents. It is Pankin who, as the Soviet Union's representative in Stockholm, has borne the brunt of the harshest accusations.

Swedish officials have not been visibly affected by the flattery. Sten Andersson, foreign minister in the Social Democratic government, responded very cautiously to Gorbachev's Murmansk speech.

Andersson said only that neutral Sweden "welcomes with satisfaction Soviet interest in limiting weapons and increasing trust in the northern seas."

Sober-minded Swedes' interpretation of the speech was expressed by right-wing newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET. It claims Gorbachev offered to "radically reduce Soviet military presence in the Nordic region" by recommending establishment of a nuclear-free zone and negotiations between the military alliances for curbing naval activity in the north.

According to the newspaper's interpretation, what we have here are old Soviet proposals partially decked out in new phrases.

"They either unilaterally promote Soviet military interests or seek to alienate Denmark and Norway from the other NATO countries." The basic purpose is to wrench Western Europe from the United States and Canada.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET focuses special attention on the fact that in the proposal for limiting naval activity Gorbachev does not mention the Barents Sea or the Kola Peninsula, site of important Soviet military bases. Waters important to NATO are mentioned, of course.

The aim is thus to assure "Soviet supremacy in the north" by restricting America's opportunities to act. The Soviets also want to make it hard for NATO to bring reinforcements across the Atlantic during a crisis, say Swedish skeptics.

Danish Doubts

It is interesting that much the same standpoint was expressed to HELSINGIN SANOMAT by foreign ministry officials of NATO country Denmark. "Generally speaking, the question is whether regionalization of security issues is advantageous to Europe," said Copenhageners.

The impression remains that in principle Denmark looks distrustfully at Gorbachev's friendly gesture. In the background lurks the fear that the Soviet Union will manage to reach an agreement with the Nordic countries which infringes on NATO's interests.

Oslo and Military Alliances

Officials in Oslo voiced the same distrust to HELSINGIN SANOMAT. They place particular weight on the proposal in Gorbachev's speech for talks between the military alliances.

NATO country Norway believes Gorbachev has now acknowledged "the importance of the military alliances in the Nordic region," said Thorvald Stoltenberg, foreign minister in the Social Democratic minority government, to the bourgeois newspaper AFTENPOSTEN.

Stoltenberg has made it clear in other statements that the Norwegian government hopes the "signals" received from Moscow portend a new easing of tensions.

For his part, Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst has said, "If Gorbachev's proposal includes acknowledgment that the Soviet Union's naval buildup increases the security problems of countries around the Norwegian Sea, then I consider it a significant step forward."

Norwegian skeptics are most clearly represented by Kare Willoch, former Conservative prime minister and current chairman of Norway's Foreign Affairs Committee. "The Soviet Union's military presence in the North Sea is at least a challenge," said Willoch recently, according to AFTENPOSTEN.

"It's important that a united NATO deal with these issues and that no NATO country feel tempted to go it alone," added Willoch.

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ROCARD ON FOREIGN, DOMESTIC POLICY: GORBACHEV, TERRORISM

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Autumn 87 pp 7-24

[Interview with Michel Rocard, deputy from Yvelines, minister of planning and development of the territory (1981-1983), minister of agriculture (1983-1985), author of works including: "Parler vrai" (Le Seuil, 1978), "A l'épreuve des faits" (Le Seuil, 1986) and "Le coeur a l'ouvrage" (Odile Jacob, 1987), by the POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE staff; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mr Rocard, you are now a presidential candidate. We would therefore like to hear your views on the major international issues at the present time. Let us begin with East-West relations, if we might. In your opinion, is "Gorbachevism" essentially a creation of the media or does it correspond to a profound evolution in the Soviet system?

[Answer] Neither. I would say rather that it simply expresses a determination to change certain aspects of the Soviet system. It is clear that Mikhail Gorbachev has a relatively innovative view of how to handle his country's difficulties, but no one can say whether that will suffice to make any substantive changes in Soviet realities.

What we do know is that Gorbachev has intensified his tours, speeches, symbolic actions and measures affecting the heart of the internal system in the USSR. Now then, no leader takes the considerable risk of endangering his career and the destiny of the political officials who are his electors without valid reasons. And those reasons are simple: Gorbachev has understood that the USSR has enormous difficulties in making economic progress, that its planning is stymied and that for the past few years, the rate of growth of the gross domestic product is lower than predicted. That is why, in order to get things moving, the new general secretary places so much emphasis on the financial autonomy of enterprises. One may certainly have doubts about the application of this concept in a system of artificial prices. But this is an important key to the deblocking of the Soviet economy and it may be that Gorbachev is giving himself 15 to 20 years so that very gradually, prices will return to a greater coefficient of veracity compared with costs. And finally, what is 20 years after all? Barely less time than Great Britain took to go from a per capita income one-third greater than that of France to one a quarter lower than that of France. Gorbachev is working with time and he is right because it is on his side.

[Question] It would therefore be his ambition to improve the Soviet system rather than bring it into question.

[Answer] Absolutely. Gorbachev is a real Leninist, a Leninist living in 1987.

[Question] In your opinion, what concrete signs are there of a real evolution in the USSR?

[Answer] I have just told you: We will not be able to speak of an evolution for a few years. By the end of that time, there will be small, marginal signs. Politically speaking, for example, we have already observed some changes. In 3 or 4 percent of the election districts, several candidates have been authorized to run for the same post. This is a factor of flexibility that may be cumulative, for by the time Soviet opinion starts to think for itself, to choose one candidate over another, this will have an effect on the system. Likewise, we have observed greater freedom of cultural expression in recent months. Filmmakers with whom I spoke were the first to shake my skepticism on this point.

[Question] And what about the field of foreign policy?

[Answer] Here the signs are probably more difficult to register and tabulate because their execution generally depends on negotiations, on the consensus of the "other one." Nevertheless, we have an initial major sign, which is the expression of a desire for disarmament going much further than the USSR was accustomed to proposing previously, particularly in the area of control.

[Question] Concerning human rights, the number of emigration visas granted has dropped significantly since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power? On this side of the iron curtain, is there not a tendency to be misled by an unduly optimistic rhetoric?

[Answer] Probably, but one has to verify one's information very closely. An Israeli friend just told me that the specific emigration of Jews to Israel from the USSR is now double the monthly rate of last year. That would have to be confirmed. Having said that much, Gorbachev does not personally handle every visa and we have here a problem of the sociology of the machinery. Did the old Brezhnevian members of the diplomatic apparatus not block a certain number of things? How long do measures taken at the very top take? It is normal for Gorbachev not to have all the controls at his command and not have absolute loyalty everywhere. In this connection, I have seen a new term in a number of organs of the press: "Khrushchevization"! Analysts are now suggesting the idea of a Gorbachev in the process of weakening within his own machine, the victim of the concern he has created in the military establishment and in danger in the end of being recalled by the Central Committee. I must say that I do not share this view of things. On this point, I believe the USSR has its conformisms. It has a cultivated class of leaders that at one time was ashamed of Khrushchev, of his lack of profound reasoning, his frequently questionable public behavior. The Soviets' national pride was hurt, while with Gorbachev, one has completely

the opposite. And the new general secretary may well play on that support to reduce resistance within the structure.

[Question] How should Westerners react to their new interlocutor?

[Answer] First of all, you must remember that there does exist a dignity of the original Soviet hope, which was a society of fairness. That hope was paid for at an extremely high price, cutting off freedom to achieve equality. We reject that principle with all the fiber of our being, but still remain capable of analysis. It was an attempt that is foreign to us, but which had its share of respectability. That being the case, the cumulation of Russia's history and communist eschatology makes the Soviet purpose expansionistic. And Gorbachev, who wants the USSR to have more influence and be more competitive, is visibly not ready to give up the two basic keys of the system: the single party and generalized collective ownership of the means of production and trade. Whatever happens, the West must not let down its guard. One must retain a distrust in principle, while playing, through negotiation, the card of organized and increasingly controlled peace.

[Question] Should the West take advantage of the current openings practiced by the Kremlin to try to bring about a desatellization of the Eastern countries?

[Answer] I believe that the first mission of our Western societies is first of all to ensure the effectiveness and influence of their own form of civilization. One can only hope for a liberalization of the people's democracies, but I do not believe that, in the management of East-West tension, it is wise to manifest an intention to destabilize the Soviet empire. It would be better to proceed in a different manner. Actually, the more relaxed central systems are, the more easily countries under their control will breathe. We must therefore avoid useless attitudes that would only cause the USSR to harden.

[Question] Like Samuel Pizar, do you believe that trade is a "weapon of peace" that would tend to liberalize Eastern societies in the long run?

[Answer] In that field, I have always thought that my friend Samuel Pizar went a bit too far. Trade is naturally one of the elements of life in peacetime. It sometimes creates bonds that one has a bit more trouble destroying in the name of warring intentions, but let us not make him say more than he is actually saying. The East-West conflict is based on an ideological differentiation, on a way of viewing life and social organization. The West is betting on the freest possible society, sometimes forgetting that in the most complete freedom, it is the strong that oppress the weak.

[Question] More precisely, let us get to the military aspect of the confrontation. Do you favor the so-called "double zero option"?

[Answer] Yes, definitely. I regret that on this subject, the West has almost found itself on the defensive, finally accepting this double zero

option after hesitation and under conditions that leave Gorbachev the political bonus of having proposed it, when the idea originally came from the West. We are in a situation in which, from the pistol to the thermonuclear strategic weapons, there is practically no hole in the range of arms of all types, all calibers, all powers. Now then, such a battery does not correspond to any rationally viewed need. The two superpowers have the possibility of blowing up the planet several dozen times over. We have reached absurdity. Under such conditions, the first zero option, withdrawal of missiles with a range of 1,000 to 5,000 km, seems to me to take nothing away from the necessary response to excessive pressure from a potential adversary. Moreover, it enables Westerners to give a pledge of peaceful good will to their public opinions. The prospect of budgetary savings would call for wider disarmament. As for the second zero option, it actually concerns only 72 weapons belonging to West Germany, but whose nuclear warheads are American and whose firing is under dual control. They are outdated and will be obsolete in 4 or 5 years and, furthermore, there were no plans to replace them. The Soviets have about twice as many of these as we do. There is consequently no military disadvantage in doing away with them (because the USSR would, in this case, have to make a greater effort than we would). This is a unilateral German decision, moreover, and does not depend on formal negotiations. That is why I am happy about the agreement between the Americans and the Soviets, but I think that Europe's leap is essential.

[Question] Do you not fear that there might thus begin a process of denuclearization of Europe that is potentially dangerous?

[Answer] It is a fact that nuclear weapons have brought something new to the history of the world. Henceforth, there are weapons whose use horrifies all political leaders. Given the fact that Europe, victim of its passion for war for centuries, has known peace for over 40 years, the nuclear factor is essential. If the agreement on the double zero option were signed, there would still remain three categories of nuclear weapons: strategic weapons, weapons in the NATO theater of operations with a range of under 500 km and the prestrategic weapons of the third powers. The existence of this last category of weapons should particularly relieve the German concern because we shall thus retain instruments that can reach the rear of the potential field of battle. In this, I now see one more reason to revive French-German cooperation and reflection.

Whatever the case, we are far from a denuclearization of Europe today and, given Gorbachev's initiatives, we do not have the right simply to say "No" and to be generally distrustful. On the other hand, there is the problem of the long-term strategic perspective opened up by these negotiations. Gorbachev is probably seeking the denuclearization of Europe. But to leave only conventional weapons in Europe would in the end make war less unlikely, which is an unacceptable hypothesis. And yet, balanced and verified disarmament is definitely our objective. Consequently, far from taking a coldly defensive posture, the West must firmly manifest: 1) its determination to pursue disarmament; 2) its rejection of denuclearization; and 3) its intention, based on accords corresponding to the double zero option, to open up negotiations on the gradual disarmament of conventional forces.

It is, in fact, in this domain that one can remedy the real, current imbalances: achieving significant budgetary savings; reassuring young people and public opinion in our countries by visible signs mainly affecting military service; and testing the reality of Gorbachev's intentions concerning the extent of disarmament as well as political control of his soldiers. Europe must be capable of standing firm in this effort.

[Question] Do you have the feeling that the United States wishes to limit its commitment in Europe and yield to the positions of the unilateralist school that would not have America be restricted by its alliances?

[Answer] One of the difficulties of the Atlantic Alliance with respect to Gorbachev's proposals has to do with the antinuclear connotation of President Reagan's speech on the IDS. In that speech, Reagan actually spoke like the German Greens, leading one to think that basically, denuclearization was a valid objective, which created a dreadful ambiguity. I returned from my recent trip to the United States with only one compensatory conviction: The American secretaries of Defense, State and the Treasury know perfectly well that once the double zero option has come into being and in the absence of other rapid phases in the area of disarmament, it would be necessary to improve conventional forces and that it would be expensive to do so. They have no illusions about a possible reduction in the military budget. I found that those men had a real strategic awareness of the world, even if they too often tend to see it only in terms of their own interests. Now that does not mean that the United States, without speaking of disengagement, would not like a more balanced Alliance. Let us not forget that the American defense budget amounts to some \$300 billion, or 6 to 6.5 percent of the gross domestic product.

No other country in the Alliance makes such an effort. What is more, a significant part of that enormous military budget concerns the defense of others and the United States' total budget deficit is also precisely about that amount. Therefore, when the Americans observe that the Japanese invest some 1 percent of their GNP in defense and that the Germans invest only 3.5 percent, when they see that they are forced to borrow part of those two countries' surplus to finance their own deficit, they legitimately wonder about the validity of the system. It is an untenable situation which is less and less presentable to an informed public opinion and one that does not always understand why its own security should depend on that of the Europeans!

[Question] How is one to achieve that necessary rebalancing of the Alliance?

[Answer] A European concept of defense must emerge as quickly as possible. This is a very difficult affair because the strategic choices differ from country to country. Great Britain remains attached to special ties to the United States and the undeniable movement it is now making toward Europe is taking place with reasoned slowness.

Germany, whose sovereignty in these matters is limited by international treaties, approaches them with a concern for compromising nothing about inter-German relations.

Italy does not want to spend more and prefers to take shelter behind American protection to solve problems on which it has little influence.

France has chosen to ensure the autonomy of its own deterrence, but it committed the blunder of doing so in a language that was sometimes irritating to its partners.

[Question] Do you support the extension of the French nuclear guarantee to West Germany?

[Answer] That is now a dangerous formula. Nuclear deterrence is credible only when based on a very firm national determination. By widening its field, one risks weakening the will. But France has already said that its vital interests were not confined to its borders. That should suffice and it does in fact suffice for the time being.

In addition, German public opinion, which knows well that one cannot avoid the problem but scarcely likes to be told so, is even more sensitive to the uncertainty that we allow to affect our commitment alongside Germany in the case of tension and, consequently, the conventional aspects of defense. That is where one must begin, in my opinion, so that there will gradually emerge a European concept of defense which, in the long run but with difficulty in the early stages, will embrace the nuclear field.

[Question] What measures should be taken so that the European defense of which you were speaking can one day emerge?

[Answer] What is lacking in this field is first of all reflection. In my opinion, one would have to call a conclave lasting several months and made up of 15 or 20 political officials and 15 or 20 generals of all nationalities in the Alliance with the task of drafting a European defense concept. Given such a possibility, it will be indispensable to respect the rules of a conclave: secrecy at meetings, then a ban on revealing the authorship of any given suggestion. The media would have to be urged to be discreet and forego any sensationalism. One can imagine a kind of chain reaction. The Americans would tell the British: "We view you as Europeans; our IDS will mainly concern our territory. You must manage your European solidarity yourselves; that will not affect our privileged relations."

The British and the French would next come to an understanding, with the arbitration of those unjustly referred to as the "little and medium-sized Europeans": the Belgians, Dutch, Italians and Spanish. All that is possible. The debate has already been opened up in Great Britain on the timeliness of buying French vectors rather than Tridents. Other talks are underway.

For the first time since the war, the National Assembly Defense Commission received representatives of the Chamber of Communes Defense Commission. We must continue along that path.

[Question] It is often said that any European defense concept will remain illusory as long as Europe does not express a single will. Do you believe in a politically unified Europe?

[Answer] Can one seriously speak of defense, of a revival of the dialogue with the South and of determination facing the United States and Japan in the economic and financial domains if one does not believe in a politically unified Europe? Let us be lucid: The stakes of the men of my generation are to bring about a political Europe after economic Europe is built. If it were otherwise, I would fear the judgment of our youth.

[Question] Do you favor a "Europe at different speeds"?

[Answer] I do not like the expression. Europe is not a matter of speeds but of construction. I prefer the expression "Europe in several stages," like a rocket. The engine--I am thinking here of the French-German team--needs all the other parts. One can build several stages apparently independent from one another, but the goal is to create a harmonious, well-balanced edifice.

[Question] What role could Europe play in the construction of a better international monetary system?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to recall that Europe played an important role in a very serious period for our system. Construction of the SME [European monetary system] is not only the business of experts, for without it, areas of uncertainty would have been greater for our enterprises at a very time when, I dare say, our American friends were losing their financial responsibility.

In the future, Europe must wage triple action: building the place of the ECU [European currency unit] in the monetary system and making it a real tool of international trade; reviving the dialogue between debtor and creditor countries; and helping, in relation to the United States, balance the growing place of Japan which, for structural reasons, will long be the world's creditor. Without a powerful, imaginative and attractive European pillar, the United States will also have trouble withstanding the Japanese pressure. In the international financial domain, excessive imbalances between partners result in a disorganization that is harmful to all.

[Question] Did the expansion of Europe to Spain and Portugal seem timely to you?

[Answer] Yes, first of all because, as I said, Europe is a political will and it was not possible to keep two old and prestigious European nations out of the Community, nations that in addition fought to regain democracy. Next, because Europe must be a link with the Southern nations. Alongside France, Spain and Portugal have an undeniable world dimension. Finally, because one must not resist challenges and I know this all the better because I know our agriculture. Technically speaking, the joining was well done. I do not deny that problems remain here and there, but the essential part is done. Henceforth, it is all a matter of adaptation, flexibility and imagination.

[Question] What should one expect of the establishment of the "great market" in 1992?

[Answer] The best and the worst. It is not just a stylish clause. I am a resolute supporter of freedom when the rules of the game are clear. On the European level, trade and initiatives were still too constricted. The great market is a goal. It must also mean an approach and our diplomacy must see that the enormous European bargaining does not lose sight of the final goal: indispensable economic revival in Europe.

So I come to the worst: If everything is not perfectly orchestrated, Europe will risk being even more penetrated by non-European products. That is why the great market must be accompanied by firm determination to approach together all commercial negotiations with our other partners, Japan and the United States in particular.

[Question] Let us now leave Europe and talk about the Near East. Do you accept the idea that Lebanon's fate must necessarily take Syrian ambitions into account? In other words, by insinuating that Lebanon is but a kind of appendage of Syria, does not one go back to the spirit of Munich, which on the eve of World War II, made Czechoslovakia into an appendage of the Reich?

[Answer] I greatly fear that that analysis is correct. And yet, the underlying nature of Lebanon contains something completely opposed to Syrian reality. If Lebanon exists and flourishes, it is through the coexistence of communities that recognize one another and each other's worth. Syria, in contrast, despite its religious diversity, has an extremely monolithic conception of power.

Unfortunately, now that many powers have taken advantage of the situation in Lebanon to revive distrust and maintain the lack of understanding and war, since the Westerners have withdrawn, only one element is left to maintain order and that is Syria.

[Question] Should the Westerners have helped the legal Lebanese Government to restore its authority over the entire territory, even militarily?

[Answer] There have been many periods in the history of Lebanon when it would not even have been necessary to resort to military means to back Lebanese civilian authorities.

[Question] For you, are the Christians in Lebanon privileged allies for France?

[Answer] Certainly, and I am not very proud of certain aspects of Arab policies followed by our country for 40 years. We had an eminent responsibility to the Maronite community in Lebanon. The very first consulate of France was set up by Saint Louis in Alep. It was closed for reasons of budgetary savings. Obviously, France mistreated its friends and I would like to condemn here an erroneous interpretation of the diplomatic intuition according to which our country needs to have an Arab policy of openness. We were too quick to

sacrifice the interests of the Maronite Christians in Lebanon in order not to clash with the Arab world. That is a pure strategic mistake, but also a psychological mistake. The Arab world is a world of the word, a world of interpersonal dealings rather than the rationale of dossiers. The worthiness of one's interlocutor is decisive and one who abandons his friend is not worthy, even if it is to please you. In the case of Lebanon, France did not make itself look better by making excessive concessions, concessions that were sometimes not even asked for.

[Question] If you had been in high office at the time the French hostages were taken, what would your attitude have been? Would you have sought to negotiate at any price?

[Answer] It goes without saying that I have thought a great deal about the hostage problems. I have come to a very simple conclusion: More than anything else, this is a problem concerning which political leaders must never engage in discussions. One cannot say a single thing that will not affect the treatment of the problem. You cannot say, "I will never negotiate" or "The return of the hostages is my priority." Those who take hostages must remain in absolute uncertainty as to your degree of freedom and the counterviolence you are willing to exercise to bring him to reason.

[Question] Concerning the fundamentalist wave or the communist threat, which of these two perils do you think most directly lying in wait for the Middle East?

[Answer] Both are perfectly real and yet, I do not think the West has to resign itself to that. It is still capable of intelligent, concerted action and of thinking far ahead, never forgetting that here, Islam is an unavoidable reality. Moreover, there is no reason why that Islamic reality should be defined on the whole and eternally by hostility to the West.

[Question] Nevertheless, would you not say that the USSR has launched a pincer operation on this region of the world, acting in Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan?

[Answer] There is visibly a Soviet plan, but likewise, there is a Western design that consists of remaining present in the area, even if one must regret it does not manifest itself more vigorously. We are involved in a competition that must remain peaceful.

[Question] Does resolution of the problem in the Middle East depend on the establishment of a Palestinian state endowed with all the attributes of sovereignty?

[Answer] My first conviction is that the powers outside the Israeli-Arab conflict have worsened it rather than helped resolve it. Having said that much, it is very clear that one of the keys to a peace process is the affirmation of an interlocutor that can express itself on behalf of the Palestinians and express their will to see their national identity affirmed in a government structure. For the Arabs, the problem is to make an institutional vision of the future and the national identity of the Palestinians compatible.

[Question] Are you optimistic about the chances of organizing an international conference on this point?

[Answer] Relatively so. The Israeli Labor Party, based on half of Israeli public opinion, favors holding such a conference, provided that it leads to bilateral negotiations between those involved: Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon and especially, Israel-Jordan.

Whatever the case, I think it is essential for Western diplomacy to serve the negotiating procedures. Is an international guarantee desired? We would be willing to give it. Is diplomatic coverage of the discussions necessary? We would be available to provide it.

[Question] Do you see in the PLO the only true representative of the Palestinian people?

[Answer] It is surely not up to us to give an opinion on that matter! The problem of the representative nature of the PLO is to be decided by the Arab states in pre-negotiations with Israel. Let us keep our place. The first service the international community can render is to help the protagonists come together. Once again, I wish to emphasize that these problems have been polluted by irresponsible remarks by powers that should not be involved in the conflict. They are not the ones taking the risks; they are not the ones weeping for the dead.

[Question] To whom do you attribute responsible for the Iran-Iraq war?

[Answer] It cannot be denied that initially, the hostilities were set off by Iraq. Since that time, the observation of a nearly balanced ratio of forces the the impossibility of either country of forcing a decision have "objectively" created the conditions for a peace that Iraq seems to want. But the same conditions have led Iran to stubbornly refuse any prospect of negotiating. Naturally, for us Westerners, Shiite fundamentalism is even more remote than an Iraq that has never been aggressive with respect to our values, even if it does not respect them at home. For my part, I hope an end will come to the conflict as soon as possible, with respect for the balance. The best possible solution would be for there not to be a winner or loser, but if I am not excessively optimistic, I believe that the mediating efforts of the secretary general of the United Nations will not always be futile.

[Question] Does France's support to Iraq seem to you to be satisfactory, both in principle and intensity?

[Answer] We were dragged into the action by contracts signed with Iraq before the hostilities began. In that Arab world where, as I told you, one's given word is probably the essential sign of respect, our word, albeit commercial, would have been besmirched for good if we had used the fact that Iraq was at war as an argument to get out of our commitments.

[Question] Nevertheless, must one preserve ties with Iran in order to prepare for the post-Khomeyni period?

[Answer] Yes. I favor France's being respected by the two parties to the conflict and for it to take a position so that its mediating influence may one day be recognized.

[Question] Should France in particular and the Western camp in general go so far as to "destabilize the destabilizers"? What did you think of the American raid on Tripoli and Benghazi in the spring of 1986 in this connection?

[Answer] Even if one accepts this type of principle, one never announces it in advance. In the case of Libya, they have totally neglected the fact that this type of action was probably the most effective method of solidifying the Egyptians, Jordanians and all moderate Arabs around the Libyan people. Basically, by supporting Hissein Habre in Chad and respecting our commitments there also, we weakened Colonel Qadhafi more than the Americans did with their bombing.

[Question] Along the same line of ideas, do you not think that the West should give more aid to movements that fight communist governments in the field? For example, UNITA in Angola, the Contras in Nicaragua, the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan and the Cambodian Nationalists?

[Answer] You get me into problems in the Third World in a most bizarre way! But so be it; I will answer your question.

My strongest concern does not concern that precise question, but rather, the one asked before: that of ascertaining why, when an oppressed peasantry, a people falling victim to a dictatorship, wants to gain liberation, they are led to obtain generally Czech, Bulgarian or Soviet weapons rather than from the West. Just look at Nicaragua. Somoza's troops, which one day wanted to take a town, one day emptied a hospital of all the wounded found there. They lined them up in the street and drove a tank over their bodies. After their victory, the Sandinists had to clean out the volcano found 20 minutes away from Managua to remove the roasted remains of the resisters whom Somoza's men had thrown in alive. From the standpoint of human rights, the West did itself harm by tolerating the Somoza regime and it should have armed the guerrillas who sought to overthrow him, or at least not arm their adversaries. If we had acted in that fashion, there would be no problem with communism in Nicaragua today.

[Question] Given all the errors already committed by the West, if you can only support an authoritarian dictatorship, whose reversibility history has proved, or open the way to the establishment of a new communist regime, what would you choose to do?

[Answer] My attitude is empirical, case by case, country by country, with one objective: democracy. Let us remember Egypt, which proved to us that it was possible to go back on privileged civilian and military ties with the Soviets. Let us take the example of former Mozambican President Samora Machel who, shortly before his death, expressed his intention of introducing into his regime a counterbalance to the Soviet influence which he deemed to be too heavy. Let us also think about the approach of Cory Aquino or Raoul Alfonsin. We must encourage such moves.

[Question] Should France therefore maintain the best possible relations with Nicaragua?

[Answer] On the diplomatic and economic levels, yes. Furthermore, the international community is already doing so. The IMF recently granted a new loan to Nicaragua.

[Question] Should we not be more alarmed in observing that the Sandinists criticize Solidarnosc or the Camp David Accords indiscriminately, while supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

[Answer] Obviously, they pay for the military and economic aid they receive from the USSR with diplomatic subservience. But one has to keep a cool head. I went to Nicaragua twice. I understood a number of things, but one has to agree that the American attitude is quite singular, consisting of having a disproportionate fear of that small country of 3 million inhabitants! The Americans should reason better. The problem is that they went astray and got caught in an impasse. If they confront the Nicaraguan regime more openly, they will provoke a reaction of solidarity of the rest of Latin America in favor of the Sandinists.

[Question] Beyond the geostrategic interests of both sides, do you not have the impression that the Third World has now "gone out of style" in our Western societies?

[Answer] If that is so, it is without a doubt the best thing that could happen. There is nothing worse than fads for handling problems! I believe that in order to approach the question of the Third World properly, one has to agree that half of the problems it experiences are internal to each nation: misappropriation of funds, bad government, inability to accept the priority of agriculture. Furthermore, they too often forget that development can only come about in an ascending manner. By that I mean that one does not "parachute in" development. The bankruptcy of a dozen dictatorships in the past 5 or 6 years, their collapse due to mediocrity, is definitely proof that development is a complex process that cannot be handled by an excessively simplistic regime. Democracy has shown that it was not only the best value ethically, but also the only one compatible with a need for effectiveness.

[Question] How do you view France's specific role in Africa?

[Answer] To deny that France has a special responsibility in Africa would be absurd. I know the African Continent very well. I can measure the risks and especially the disturbing spiral of underdevelopment in many countries.

France was a colonial power there. That page has been turned. Our administrative structures have not always perceived this. Nor have our African friends sometimes.

France must therefore remain present, but rechannel its modes of action. It is all a matter of dialogue with the African nations and more generally, with African societies and their cultures.

[Question] Concretely speaking, in what way can Western countries help the Third World?

[Answer] Above all, we must make a certain number of observations. First of all, the debt is eating away the export revenue of some 100 nations.

Second, over a long period of time, prices for export products, be they energy, minerals or agricultural, are deteriorating with respect to the price of equipment and industrial products which Third World nations must buy from developed nations.

Third, throughout the world, financial investment and speculation are more profitable than productive investment, which poses serious interest rate problems.

Fourth, India has become self-sufficient in milk by paying its peasants double the price per liter of milk one would buy on the Community market. It took 25 years, but today, 70 million Indian peasants live thanks to that system and all of India is self-sufficient in milk.

On the basis of these observations, I argue that one cannot deal with the debt without speaking of conditions that might ensure the allocation of export resources to internal growth. I argue that it is not possible to think "aid to development" without solving the problem of world interest rates. I say that one cannot try to stabilize the trade of Third World countries in a lasting manner without including that determination in our general trade rules. I would add that one cannot avoid the need for those countries to resort to protectionism from time to time. The only way that would not be dangerous is to set in advance the limits by international accords making it conditional and temporary. What is certain is that in order to succeed, it is indispensable to grant absolute priority to long-term rather than short-term goals and to create places of strategic reflection where all of these problems will be taken into account in their interrelations.

[Question] Where would you place public aid to development in that overall scheme of things?

[Answer] It has its place, which is rather modest. In 6 months of dropping coffee and cacao prices, the Ivory Coast lost the equivalent of 4 years of public aid. That example applies to dozens of countries. Actually, rather than the volume of aid, one must ask about its nature. In the area of public health, we help to build large hospitals for which there will be no equipment, that will not be maintained, that will not have enough competent personnel. Rather, we should choose to encourage bush medicine and improve basic hygiene in order to bring down infant mortality rates.

In the field of justice, we build courthouses, when it would be better to teach a little modern law to common law chiefs. Concerning education, we have given our cultural priority to abstraction and the literary or legal disciplines rather than train veterinarians, bush doctors, engineers and above all,

agronomists. A critical investigation into the content of public aid is the condition for its upgrading. There is here an immense adventure for our young people. Imagine the national department of cooperation truly devoted to that type of task, with as a bonus training in simplicity, listening to others. It is a unique, magnificent chance that we must not let slip by.

11,464

CSO: 3519/0013

POLL SHOWS LE PEN LOSING SUPPORT

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Nov 87 pp 1, 10

[Article by Alain Rollat and Paul-Jacques Truffaut; first four paragraphs are LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] Jean-Marie Le Pen's audience seems to be distinctly on the decline, and the National Front's stands are being increasingly rejected by public opinion: 78 percent of the French now say they oppose its stands, compared to only 57 percent in November 1984, 67 percent in October 1985, and 67 percent last May. Those are the main lessons to be learned from the poll conducted by SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] for LE MONDE and the RTL [Luxembourg Radio and Television System].

The change is due basically to the drop in the number of people with "no opinion." As they learn more about the National Front's stands on immigrants, security, justice, and so on, the French are rejecting them in increasing numbers.

But Le Pen still has a hard core of supporters which SOFRES estimates at 8 percent. It is crumbling, however, since it totaled 9 percent in May 1987 and 10 percent in October 1985.

That trend is confirmed by the BVA poll, in which 935 people were surveyed between 15 and 20 October and which will appear in the next issue of PARIS-MATCH: in that poll, 7 percent said they intended to vote for Le Pen, compared to 12 percent in the preceding poll.

Le Pen is losing momentum on all fronts. Overall, the influence of the ideas defended by the National Front is diminishing: only 18 percent of those polled expressed agreement with those ideas, and that percentage of favorable opinion is down 6 points from May and 8 points from November 1984. At the same time, the percentage of unfavorable opinion is up: 78 percent of the French now say they disagree with its ideas, and that is an increase of 11 points over October 1985 and last May and of 21 points over November 1984.

This increasingly unfavorable trend for Le Pen is due essentially to the drop in the number of people with "no opinion," their number having fallen from 17

percent in 1984 to 10 percent in 1985, 9 percent in May 1987, and only 4 percent this October. It is thus confirmed that as they learn more about the National Front's stands, the French are opposing them openly in increasing numbers. For example, 63 percent (+9 percent from May 1987 and +20 percent from May 1984) now disapprove of the front's anti-immigrant program, 56 percent (+8 percent and +23 percent) disapprove of its stands on security and justice, 65 percent say they disagree with its fight against communism (+5 percent and +28 percent), and 67 percent condemn the National Front's criticisms of the RPR and the UDF (+2 percent and +25 percent).

Generally speaking, young people between 18 and 34 years of age (81 percent) are least receptive to Le Pen's ideas. In professional circles, on the other hand, it is the craftsmen, merchants, and businessmen who--relatively speaking--are most favorable (28 percent), as are the workers (24 percent).

Le Pen's loss of ground over the space of 6 months is patently obvious in all components of the electorate, with the exception, of course, of the hard core on the extreme right. The drop in favorable opinion varies according to party allegiance, ranging from -6 points among communist sympathizers to -8 points among socialist sympathizers, -5 points among the UDF's supporters, and -12 points among the RPR's supporters.

The "affair" of his statement concerning the "point of detail" during an "RTL-LE MONDE Grand Jury" program clearly harmed the chairman of the National Front, since 88 percent of those polled disapproved of his statements concerning the existence of gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps. Only 2 percent approved of those statements.

Increasingly Dangerous

It appears, incidentally, that the ideas of the so-called revisionists are having little success in France. In the opinion of 89 percent of those polled, there is no possible doubt that the Nazis did use gas chambers to exterminate millions of deportees. Only 1 percent of the French said they doubted it, and no one said that gas chambers were "never used by the Nazis."

The image of the National Front and of its leader is therefore deteriorating steadily in the eyes of public opinion. Of those polled, 65 percent now feel that Le Pen and his party represent a danger to France, whereas that opinion was held by only 55 percent last May, 50 percent in October 1985, 43 percent in May 1984, and 38 percent in October 1983.

The penalty is equally definite: 77 percent of the French say they are "sure" that they will not vote for Le Pen in the presidential election. That same certainty was already being expressed by 73 percent last May and by 71 percent in May 1985. And the number of those who, on the contrary, say they are "sure" or almost sure ("probably") that they will vote for him is now down to only 8 percent, compared to 9 percent in May and 10 percent 2 years ago.

Sixty-two percent of those polled even consider it "desirable" that the leader of the extreme right not obtain the 500 signatures required to be an official

candidate in 1988. The National Front's political horizon therefore seems cloudy. According to these poll results, Le Pen has clearly failed in the effort to attract support which he undertook after entering the National Assembly in 1986. That effort was aimed at giving his group a "presentable" parliamentary facade thanks to reinforcements from circles other than those on the extreme right. Not only has his audience not grown, but his stands are helping to send him back to the fringe where he started.

That failure explains in part the dissensions that have been shaking his party over the past few weeks. It turns out that the supporters of a moderate line and of rapprochement with the majority--Olivier d'Ormesson, for example--have been incapable of holding their own against the fundamentalists surrounding Jean-Pierre Stirbois.

Electoral Nuisance

But while Le Pen has lost, for the moment, the few advantages gained from his entry into the National Assembly, he continues to have a "hard core" among the voters: about 8 percent say they intend to vote for him, and his current difficulties take nothing away from his party's predominance in its bastions in the Mediterranean area, where its foundation remains very solid.

Moreover, while 82 percent of the French do not want Le Pen to "become a minister after the presidential election" (compared to 75 percent in 1985 and 72 percent last May), 55 percent of them nevertheless feel that the chairman of the National Front "is the only one saying out loud what many of the French are thinking to themselves," compared to 34 percent who feel the opposite.

In any case, the position of the majority's candidates for president of the republic is not made simpler by the lessons of this poll. Even though it is declining, the Le Pen effect is an electoral nuisance as far as they are concerned. The reason is that the drop in the number intending to vote for Le Pen is not in proportion to the faster deterioration of his image, and the attitude of his voters will be no less crucial in the second round of balloting in the elections of 24 April and 8 May 1988.


By a great majority, the French are opposed to any electoral agreement with Le Pen: 57 percent (53 percent of those supporting the RPR-UDF) reject the idea of any withdrawal agreement with Le Pen in the second round, 69 percent (67 percent of those supporting the RPR-UDF) condemn any agreement of that kind with the National Front when it comes to forming a government after the presidential election, and 62 percent (53 percent of those supporting the RPR-UDF) are opposed to local agreements with that party in connection with future municipal elections.

And by a majority of 56 percent, the French, mindful of the "useful vote," feel that "a vote for Le Pen would be a lost vote" because "he has no chance of being elected."

This poll will probably help Barre and Chirac update their electoral trajectories, but it will not provide them with a solution to the dilemma

still being presented to them by a National Front which, although weakened and on the defensive, is standing the test.

Is Le Pen a Danger to France?



Support for Ideas

[Question] Would you say that you are completely in agreement, more or less in agreement, more or less in disagreement, or completely in disagreement with Jean-Marie Le Pen's ideas?

Answer	SOFRES-LICRA Poll		LE MONDE- Antenna 2- SOFRES Poll		LE MONDE- RTL-SOFRES Poll	
	Nov 1984		Oct 1985		May 1987	Oct 1987
Completely in agreement	4		4		5	2
More or less in agreement	22	26	19	23	19	24
More or less in disagreement	18		18		19	18
Completely in disagreement	39	57	49	67	48	67
No opinion	17		10		9	4
Total	100%		100%		100%	

Ideological Setback in 6 Months

[Question] Would you say that you agree or disagree with the ideas upheld by Jean-Marie Le Pen?

	Apr 87	Oct 87
ENSEMBLE DES FRANÇAIS (1)		
- D'accord	(2) 24	18
- Pas d'accord	(3) 67	78
- Sans opinion	(4) 9	4
SYMPATHISANTS PCF (5)		
- D'accord	(2) 17	11
- Pas d'accord	(3) 76	85
- Sans opinion	(4) 7	4
SYMPATHISANTS PS (6)		
- D'accord	(2) 14	8
- Pas d'accord	(3) 79	89
- Sans opinion	(4) 7	3
SYMPATHISANTS UDF (7)		
- D'accord	(2) 26	21
- Pas d'accord	(3) 71	77
- Sans opinion	(4) 3	2
SYMPATHISANTS RPR (8)		
- D'accord	(2) 39	27
- Pas d'accord	(3) 54	69
- Sans opinion	(4) 7	4

Key:

- | | | |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. All French | 4. No opinion | 7. UDF sympathizers |
| 2. Agree | 5. PCF sympathizers | 8. RPR sympathizers |
| 3. Do not agree | 6. PS sympathizers | |

Support for Le Pen Ideas Among Voters as a Whole

[Question] Do you approve or disapprove of the stands taken by Jean-Marie Le Pen on the following:

	Total	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Immigrants	100%	26%	63%	11%
Security and justice	100	26	56	18
Fight against communism	100	16	65	19
Gas chambers described as a detail of World War II	100	2	88	10
Criticisms of RPR and UDF	100	11	67	22
Criticisms of political class	100	15	65	20
Defense of traditional values	100	25	54	21
Criticisms of Chirac government	100	12	66	22
Attitude of National Front group in the National Assembly	100	11	72	17

Voting Intentions

[Question] Which of these sentences best expresses your thoughts about the next presidential election?

Answer	LE MONDE- Antenna 2- SOFRES poll Oct 1985*	LE MONDE- RTL-SOFRES poll May 1987	October 1987
I am sure I will vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen	3%)	2%)	3%)
I will probably vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen, but I may change my mind) 10) 7) 9) 7) 8) 5
I will probably not vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen, unless I change my mind	9	12	10
I am sure I will not vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen	71	73	77
No opinion	10	6	5
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

* In October 1985, the question concerned the legislative elections of March 1986: "Which of these sentences best expresses your thoughts about the next legislative elections?"

Question of Alliances

[Question] Do you or do you not want the RPR or the UDF to:

	All French			RPR-UDF sympathizers		
	Yes	No	No opinion	Yes	No	No opinion
Conclude a withdrawal agreement with Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front for the second round of the presidential election?	22%	57%	21%	32%	53%	15%
Conclude a political agreement with the National Front to govern the country together after the 1988 presidential election?	14	69	17	23	67	10
Conclude local agreements with the National Front to administer a certain number of cities jointly after the 1989 municipal elections?	19	62	19	34	53	13

Gas Chambers

[Question] What is your personal feeling about the debate concerning the use of gas chambers by the Nazis during World War II?

	Percent
You are sure that the Nazis used gas chambers:	89
You think that their use by the Nazis is very probable:	8
You doubt that they were used by the Nazis:	1
You think that they were never used by the Nazis:	0
No opinion:	2
Total	<u>100</u>

Technical Data on Poll

Dates of poll: 17 through 21 October 1987.

National sample of 1,000 persons representative of the entire population 18 years of age and older.

Quota method (sex, age, occupation of head of household by socioprofessional category) and stratification by region and class of city.

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CSO: 3519/12

POPULARITY POLL SHOWS GONZALEZ, SUAREZ NECK-TO-NECK

35480020b Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 11 Oct 87 pp 6-7

[Text] Former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez stands out as the main competitor of the Socialist leader and current government prime minister, Felipe Gonzalez, whom he has virtually equalled, in the popularity ranking. At the same time, his party, CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], is the group that has undergone the greatest growth in the electorate's preferences. These are the data from an opinion poll taken by Emopublica & Associates, commissioned by DIARIO 16.

Madrid--The president of the Social Democratic Center Party (CDS), Adolfo Suarez, has now practically caught up with the government's prime minister, Socialist Felipe Gonzalez, in the popularity index, according to an opinion poll taken by Emopublica & Associates, Inc, directed by DIARIO 16.

In a rating made by the readers (who gave the main leaders between 1 and 10 points), only Gonzalez and Suarez received a "grade" above 5, that of the former being slightly higher, amounting to only 9 hundredths more than the Centrist leader: 5.93 points, compared with 5.84.

The third-ranking leader based on the votes of those polled is the Alliance head, Manuel Fraga, although 8 months have already elapsed since his replacement in the party presidency by Antonio Hernandez Mancha; who must be content with sixth place, nearly half a point from the former, and more than 1.5 points from Gonzalez and Suarez.

The number two man from the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), Alfonso Guerra, achieves a significant fourth place, with 4.61 points, preceding the president of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol, who is the best positioned leader of an autonomous entity.

Two other autonomous leaders, PNV's [Basque Nationalist Party] Jose Antonio Ardanza, president of the Basque Government, and Carlos Garaicoechea, president of Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), attain a better score than another national leader, Gerardo Iglesias, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), ending the popularity ranking.

On this chart, one notes the meager score, in absolute terms, received by the leaders (only two of whom "pass"); which could mean the existence of a crisis of social significance among the political leaders.

Voting Intention

The Emopublica poll also shows the voting intention recorded at present (see Chart 1 on the next page). According to this poll, the Socialist Party would win the elections again today; although one observes a considerable decline in its share of the electorate.

The direct intention of voting for PSOE is 27.9 percent which, according to the calculations made by Emopublica, would result in a weighted voting intention of 41 percent. This means that PSOE has by now lost 4.3 points from the electoral results accrued in last June's general elections.

The leading party of the right, Popular Alliance [AP], also shows a decline in comparison with the June 1986 elections. With a direct voting intention of 14.8 percent, its weighted voting intention is set by Emopublica at 25 percent; which represents a decline of 1.1 percent.

The Suarist CDS, on the other hand, has undergone a considerable rise. The direct voting intention (12.7 percent) now exceeds its share of the electorate in 1986; which does not occur in any other instance. And, according to Emopublica, the weighted voting intention stands at 13 percent; in other words, 3.9 points above the results 16 months ago.

According to these data, Adolfo Suarez' party has grown in electoral expectations by over 40 percent. Its growth is the largest recorded in recent months; greater than that attributed to United Left (IU) which, according to the weighted vote, could win up to a maximum of 1.4 percent.

Convergence and Unity (CiU), the coalition headed by Jordi Pujol, firmly maintains its electoral percentage, even tending to improve; which indicates that, for the present, it is not threatened by any problems for preserving the government in Catalonia.

The weighted voting intention is procured from the direct intention, applying a corrective formula wherein the recollection of vote expressed by the one polled and the distribution of results included in the section "don't know/no answer" intervene, among other data.

The poll also includes the direct voting intention for other parties (not included in the chart). Of them, the one most "voted for" is the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), with 1.1 percent, exceeding EA, with 0.3 percent; Herri Batasuna (HB) [Popular Unity], with 0.7 percent; and Euzkadiko Ezquerra (EE) [Basque Left], with 0.7 percent.

Charts 2 and 3 on the next page show the indexes on rejection and sympathy affecting the leading parties. Prominent therein is the good "atmosphere" surrounding CDS. It is the party with the lowest index of rejection, and ranking second in sympathy.

It is, however, noteworthy that this is not translated proportionately into voting intention. While being the second party which "would have some chance of being voted for" by those polled, in fact it ranks in third place, more than 2 points from Popular Alliance. This may perhaps be due to the fact that its president, Adolfo Suarez, has not yet procured among the electorate a degree of confidence parallel to the level of the image he enjoys.

The fact that CDS receives high percentages among PSOE and AP voters (one out of every five would be willing to vote for it) is significant; indicating that the Suarist party has chances of increasing on its left as well as on its right.

The United Left voters, on the other hand, do not appear to be fertile territory for CDS, contrary to what has at times been claimed; because only one out of every 20 voters from this coalition would be willing to cast his vote for Suarez. The CDS voters confirm the distance at which both groups lie; because neither of them would vote for IU.

AP, Rejected

The most rejected party is Popular Alliance, owing to the high indexes that it receives among voters from PSOE (62.3 percent) and IU (88.4 percent). Those from CDS favor it, with only 17 percent rejecting it. It is telling that, according to these data, the voters of this Centrist party are further removed from PSOE than they are from AP.

Nevertheless, CDS appears as a very balanced party because, insofar as the "sympathy index" is concerned, its voters are equally distributed between PSOE and AP, but maintaining a high degree of loyalty to their own party.

PSOE and CDS have managed to position themselves in the center of the political gamut. PSOE receives the highest index of sympathy (34.4 percent), thanks to the good scores given by CDS and IU, and a low index of rejection. CDS benefits from the PSOE and AP voters, and receives very slight rejection among them, and even among IU voters.

Popularity Ranking (rating of the political leaders by those polled, between 1 and 10)

Felipe Gonzalez: 5.93; Adolfo Suarez: 5.84; Manuel Fraga: 4.66; Alfonso Guerra: 4.61; Jordi Pujol: 4.54; A. Hernandez Mancha: 4.25; Jose Antonio Ardanza: 4.14; Carlos Garaicoechea: 3.86; Gerardo Iglesias: 3.60.

Key to Chart 1:

1. Chart 1: Voting Intention
2. Supposing the general elections for Parliament were held tomorrow, which party would you most likely vote for?
3. Direct voting intention (%)
4. Weighted voting intention (%)
5. June 86 election results (%)
6. Will not vote
7. Would vote blank
8. Don't know/no answer

9. The weighted voting intention is obtained from the direct voting intention, through a correction wherein, among other data, account is taken of the abstention shown by the poll (section "don't know/no answer").

CUADRO 1: INTENCION DE VOTO (1)

Suponiendo que las elecciones generales al Parlamento se celebrasen mañana mismo, ¿qué partido votaría usted con toda probabilidad? (2)			
	(3) Intención directa de voto (%)	(4) Intención de voto ponderado (%)	(5) Resultados elecciones junio-86 (%)
PSOE	27,9	41	44,3
AP	14,8	25	26,1
CDS	12,7	13	9,1
CIU	4,1	5-6	5
IU	3,6	5-6	4,6
No votará (6)	8,5		
Votará en blanco (7)	1,7		
NS/NC (8)	21,4		

La intención de voto ponderado se obtiene a partir de la intención directa de voto, mediante una corrección en la que, entre otros datos, se tiene en cuenta la abstención mostrada por el sondeo (apartado «No sabe/No contesta»). (9)

Key to Chart 2:

1. Chart 2: Rejection Index
2. Supposing the general elections for Parliament were held tomorrow, which parties would you not vote for in any case?
3. Based on direct voting intention
4. The rejection index could be used to learn the image of each political group; interesting information for calibrating each party's chances for growth and the most expeditious means for its penetration into other electoral circles.

CUADRO 2: INDICE DE RECHAZO (1)

Suponiendo que las elecciones generales al Parlamento se celebrasen mañana mismo, ¿qué partidos no votaría en ningún caso? (2)					
	Total	(3) Según intención directa de voto			
		PSOE	AP	CDS	IU
PSOE	17,4	-	42,6	31,4	18,6
AP	32,3	62,3	-	17	88,4
CDS	5,5	7,7	7,9	-	9,3
IU	30,4	22	70,2	47,1	-

El índice de rechazo puede servir para conocer la imagen de cada formación política, dato de interés para calibrar las posibilidades de crecimiento de cada partido y las vías más expeditas para su penetración en otros círculos electorales. (4)

Key to Chart 3:

1. Chart 3: Sympathy Index
2. Supposing the general elections for Parliament were held tomorrow, which parties would have some change of being voted for by you?
3. Based on direct voting intention
4. The sympathy index is also an indicator of image which proves useful for discovering each party's political frontiers and its changes for growth at the cost of its neighbors' voters.

CUADRO 3. INDICE DE SIMPATIA (1)

Suponiendo que las elecciones generales al Parlamento se celebren mañana mismo, ¿qué partidos tendrían alguna posibilidad de ser votados por usted? (2)

(3)

	Total	Según intención directa de voto			
		PSOE	AP	CDS	IU
PSOE	34,4	92	6,2	19,6	18,6
AP	20,7	3,3	94,4	19,6	—
CDS	24,9	20,8	23	94,1	4,7
IU	6,3	7,4	0,6	—	95,3

El índice de simpatía es también un indicador de imagen que se muestra útil para descubrir las fronteras electorales de cada partido y sus posibilidades de crecimiento a costa de los votantes de sus vecinos... (4)

What Are the Voters Like?

This chart includes the basic features of the voters for the four leading political bidders, based on the opinion poll taken by Emopublica & Associates, Inc.

Women comprise the majority among Spanish Socialist Workers Party voters, but men predominate among the voters for the other parties.

The PSOE voters are mainly young (although there is a high percentage of persons over 60 years old); while those of Popular Alliance show greater age, and those of the Social Democratic Center Party are middle-aged. United Left gleans a high percentage of votes among the youngest.

PSOE appears to have more success in the urban areas, while AP is more successful the smaller the size of the population. The Centrist voters are distributed rather regularly, and IU enjoys more influence in medium-sized cities.

The right wing voters have better academic training: the levels of intermediate and advanced schooling are high among them. PSOE, on the other hand, has many voters with primary schooling.

Key to Chart:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Voters' Profile | 16. Agriculture |
| 2. Sex | 17. Professional businessmen |
| 3. Age | 18. Skilled wage-earner |
| 4. Habitat (1,000's of inhabitants) | 19. Manual wage-earner |
| 5. Level of schooling | 20. Inactive |
| 6. Occupation | 21. Far left |
| 7. Political self-positioning | 22. Left |
| 8. Direct voting intention | 23. Left of center |
| 9. Men | 24. Center |
| 10. Women | 25. Right of center |
| 11. 500 or more | 26. Right |
| 12. Primary | 27. Far right |
| 13. Vocational training | 28. Don't know/no answer |
| 14. Intermediate | |
| 15. Higher | |

PERFIL DE LOS VOTANTES (1)

	(8) Intención directa de voto	(2) Sexo		(3) Edad			(4) Habitat. (miles hab.)					
		(9) Hombres	(10) Mujeres	18-30	31-45	46-60	(11)					
							+60	-10	10-50	50 a 500	500 o más	
PSOE	27,9	26,7	29,1	30,1	30,0	23,4	30,2	25,6	24,9	31,5	29,0	
AP	14,8	16,2	13,4	11,9	12,0	17,7	18,2	20,1	13,9	13,3	10,4	
CDS	12,7	14,5	11,0	9,9	14,8	15,1	8,9	13,5	10,1	13,3	13,1	
IU	3,6	5,1	2,1	4,8	4,1	2,3	3,1	3,2	4,6	2,5	4,6	

(5)

	(5) Nivel de estudios				(6) Ocupación					(7) Autoposicionamiento político							
	(12) Prima.	(13) BUP-CCU	(14) Medios	(15) Super.	(16) Agri.	(17) Empr. Profes.	(18) Asal. Cualif.	(19) Asal. Manua.	(20) Inact.	(21) Extr. Izda.	(22) Izda.	(23) Centro Izda.	(24) Centro	(25) Centro Dcha.	(26) Dcha.	(27) Extr. Dcha.	(28) N/C
PSOE	31,5	22,5	25,9	22,4	8,9	12,7	30,5	35,3	28,5	41,7	50,7	54,0	17,8	7,6	6,5	14,8	19,0
AP	13,7	13,0	21,2	20,1	35,6	22,0	10,8	9,5	15,7	4,2	1,4	0,5	10,4	32,6	61,3	55,6	4,3
CDS	12,6	15,2	4,7	13,4	17,8	19,5	13,9	15,4	9,6	4,2	2,3	12,6	28,6	18,8	9,7	3,7	5,6
IU	2,6	5,4	4,7	3,7	2,2	3,4	5,8	3,0	3,2	25,0	13,4	3,0	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,4

Suarez Reaffirms His Leadership

Although Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez is slightly ahead in the popularity ranking, former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez is reaffirming his leadership considerably. His stated goal of returning to Moncloa may still be valid, because his Party, CDS, is the one making major progress; while his image as a candidate has become consolidated. This is revealed in the chart published below, the data on which suggest this comment.

1. Suarez shows a heavily supported leadership among his voters. He is the leader receiving the highest score among his own voters, exceeding the credit (actually also great) enjoyed by Gonzalez among his voters.

2. Suarez is the only leader "approved" by the voters from all parties, with very similar scores. Gonzalez has been "dropped" by the AP voters; Manuel Fraga and Antonio Hernandez Mancha are dropped by those of PSOE and United Left; and Gerardo Iglesias is by all those not voting for him.

3. Fraga still retains electoral clout, although it has been over half a year since his removal. The high score that he attains among AP voters is surprising, particularly when compared with that of his successor, Hernandez Mancha. The AP voters obviously prefer him to the latter. If he should decide to return, he would be well received.
4. Although his score has dropped to 7.17, Iglesias still holds significance among his electorate. Despite the rumors citing certain attempts by Communist militants to replace him, he has greater popularity among his own people than does Hernandez Mancha himself among AP voters. He is also the non-Socialist leader most favored in the Socialist voters' preferences, after Suarez.
5. Gonzalez, who is keeping his leadership in effect, far above that of Alfonso Guerra (who also receives a highly positive score), is, rather, considered equally among CDS and IU voters; and the "dropping" of AP is not so low as that experienced by Fraga and Hernandez Mancha in PSOE.
6. A significant fact is that Jose Antonio Ardanza exceeds Carlos Garaicoechea in score. In this instance, the leaders' acceptance parallels the parties' electoral gains; because the Basque Nationalist Party is ahead of Eusko Alkartasuna, according to this poll.
7. Despite his entrenchment among Socialist voters, Guerra is still being severely rejected. He is the politician with the worst ratings from the AP electorate (worse than the Communist, Iglesias), and rated second worst among the Centrist electorate. He is considered worse than Fraga by AP, and worse than Hernandez Mancha by PSOE.
8. Although he is "approved" by Suarist voters, Gonzalez does not manage to reach the level attained by Fraga among the CDS electorate. To compensate, the AP voters give Suarez a high score, which is not consistent with the enmity with which the former Alliance president regards him. There are interchangeable voters between AP and CDS.
9. In fact, CDS has chances of winning voters from all parties, provided, of course, that its leader's good image ends up being translated into votes in a directly proportionate manner. For the present, this is not happening; because, while Suarez holds second place in the popularity ranking (in fact, a shared first place), his political group is still third, and at an appreciable distance from AP. But he receives a very good score among PSOE and IU voters; which is something to be assessed with an eye to the future.
10. Noteworthy is the fifth place attained by Jordi Pujol, a very short distance from the third spot held by Fraga. He maintains a very balanced level of acceptance among voters from the four parties, without being obviously rejected by anyone. The acceptance that he receives among the PSOE and IU electorate is greater than that attained by Fraga and Hernandez Mancha. Strangely enough, this does not hold true of the CDS voters, who seem to prefer the Alliance leaders, albeit by a slight margin.

A final note on the situation depicted on the chart: It appears evident that the data show an evolving, not a static picture. Therefore, between now and the electoral convocation (1989-1990), things could change greatly.

Key to Chart:

1. Popularity Ranking
2. Rating of political leaders by those polled between 1 and 10
3. Based on direct voting intention

RANKING DE POPULARIDAD (1)

Calificación de los líderes políticos por los encuestados entre 1 y 10 (2)		Según intención directa de voto (3)			
		PSOE	AP	CDS	IU
Felipe González	5,93	8,18	4,58	5,26	5,30
Adolfo Suárez	5,84	5,59	5,47	8,32	5,31
Manuel Fraga	4,66	3,17	7,99	5,32	2,66
Alfonso Guerra	4,61	7,11	2,64	3,57	4,55
Jordi Pujol	4,54	4	4,89	4,92	4,15
Antonio Hernández Mancha	4,25	3,27	6,97	5,04	2,22
José Antonio Ardanza	4,14	3,87	4,23	4,31	4,06
Carlos Garaicoechea	3,86	3,82	3,20	3,80	3,78
Gerardo Iglesias	3,60	3,91	2,81	3,31	7,17

Technical Record:

National scope (except the Canaries)

Universe: individuals 18 years old and over, with a telephone

System: telephone poll

Size of the sample: 1,200 interviews

Error in the sampling: ± 2.9 percent

Distribution of the sample: proportionate to region and habitat

Random selection of sample points

Selection of the individual by sex, age, and occupation

Date of field work execution: 5, 6, 7 October 1987

Implementation of the field work and data processing: Emopublica & Associates, Inc

Design and direction: DIARIO 16

2909

POLL SHOWS DISSATISFACTION WITH ECONOMY, PUBLIC SERVICES

35480020a Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 18 Oct 87 pp 8-9

[Text] The majority of Spaniards complain about the tax rate maintained by the government, while expressing dissatisfaction with public services. Three of these public services, fundamental to the society (health, justice, and education), are cited as those operating worst in Spain. Simultaneously, Spaniards indicate that they do not share the government's optimism regarding the improvement in the economic situation.

Madrid--An overwhelming majority of Spaniards think that the taxes paid in our country are very high, while the public services received in return are very wanting. This is underscored in an opinion poll taken by Emopublica & Associates, Inc, commissioned by DIARIO 16.

One out of every three Spaniards over age 18 (33 percent) thinks that taxes are "very high." To be added to this group is the 40 percent who consider taxes "rather high." Both groups comprise a large majority of 73.6 percent, compared with only 22.7 percent of Spaniards regarding taxes as "normal," and an irrelevant 1.8 percent who deem taxes "rather low," or "very low."

At the same time, Spaniards express dissatisfaction with the services that they receive from the state in return for their taxes. Only one out of every 12 Spaniards (8.1 percent) considers public services "very adequate" or "rather adequate"; while nearly two out of every three (59 percent) note that the services are "rather inadequate" or "very inadequate." Only 28.5 percent rate the public services received as "normal."

As for taxes, Chart 1 on the next page shows the breakdown of responses, based on occupation of those interviewed, age, and voting intention expressed (see poll published last Sunday, 11 October, in DIARIO 16). According to these data, a slightly higher percentage of skilled wage-earners consider taxes "normal," but a large majority of them (71.8 percent) voice dissatisfaction. This point, and the fact that the tax rate is also rejected by 77.6 percent of manual wage-earners, projects a serious criticism of the tax policy: Not only do the better situated professionals reject it, but the wage-earners with lower income do also; indicating that the progressive nature of taxes is non-existent, from the citizens' standpoint.

More than 80 percent of the Popular Alliance (AP) and Social Democratic Center (CDS) voters (83.1 and 80.4 percent, respectively) express opposition to the level of taxes paid by Spaniards. It is significant that two out of every three Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) voters reject the tax policy, making this problem one of these attaining the most consensus among the citizens.

Not a single AP, CDS, or United Left (IU) voter dares to claim that taxes are "very low." As many as 65.2 percent of the most leftist voters declare that taxes are high.

Services

The public services offered by the state (see Chart 2) receive a very low grade. Only 28.5 percent claim that they are "normal" (this percentage would drop by several points if no account were taken of the PSOE voters, who in this case give the government strong support); while only 8.1 percent claim to be satisfied with the services received.

Only the PSOE voters combine in a large number to rate public services as "normal" (43.6 percent), as opposed to 41.8 percent claiming them to be "inadequate." Among the other groups of voters, the rejection is overwhelming. The right wing voters (AP) call them "rather inadequate" or "very inadequate," by 73.6 percent; the centrist voters (CDS), by 66 percent; and the leftist voters (IU), by 67.4 percent.

Also significant is the meager backing that the state's action receives among the PSOE electorate. Only one out of every ten claims that the services seem "very adequate" or "rather adequate"; a percentage very close to that recorded among the right and left.

As for what is operating worst (among the state's poor services), those polled underscore health, justice, and education: precisely the three services that are usually cited for their shortcomings. In this instance, there is an exact coincidence between the political discourse and the popular perceptions. Services associated with transportation and the television monopoly are voted next in order.

The Economic Situation

The Emopulbica poll also asked those interviewed to define the economic situation based on their own personal economy. The results accrued (see Chart 3) indicate that Spaniards are not aware of the improvement in the economic situation proclaimed from government platforms.

A total of 55.8 percent of Spaniards think that the situation has not changed during the past year; while the percentage of those considering it worse is larger than that of those claiming that it has improved. In fact, 26.5 percent of those polled claim that the present economic situation is "rather worse," or "much worse" than that a year ago; while only 17 percent maintain that it is "much better" or "rather better."

Again, the Socialist voters help to improve the results insofar as possible; because 25 percent of them have noted an economic improvement (compared with only 12.9 percent of the right, 11.8 of the center, and 16.3 of the left). But it is noteworthy that 60.2 percent of the Socialist electorate declare that the economic situation has not changed.

What Operates Worst in Spain

Health: 42.1; justice: 16.7; education: 15.3; municipal transportation: 7.9; highways: 6.6; RENFE [Spanish National Railroads]: 5.0; TVE [Spanish Television]: 4.3; don't know/no answer: 23.4

The National Disaster

Those interviewed were asked: "Which two services operate worst in the country?" This limit to two answers explains the low percentages recorded. The 5 percent received by RENFE means that 5 percent of those polled consider RENFE "one of the two services operating worst," but not that "only" 5 percent think that RENFE operates poorly. Others polled might have cited the railroads if three or more answers had been possible.

Key to Charts 1, 2, 3:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Chart 1: Taxes Paid | |
| 2. On the whole, do you view the taxes that we Spaniards pay as (in %)... | |
| 3. Occupation | 27. Chart 3: Services Received |
| 4. Age | 28. Compared with the taxes that we Spaniards pay to the state, the public services received from the state are (in %)... |
| 5. Based on voting intention | 29. Opinion on taxes |
| 6. Agricultural businessman | 30. Very/rather high |
| 7. Professional wage-earner | 31. Very/rather low |
| 8. Skilled wage-earner | 32. Very adequate/good |
| 9. Manual | 33. Rather adequate/good |
| 10. Inactive | 34. Rather inadequate/poor |
| 11. Very high | 35. Very inadequate/poor |
| 12. Rather high | |
| 13. Normal | |
| 14. Rather low | |
| 15. Very low | |
| 16. Don't know/no answer | |
| 17. Chart 2: Economic Situation | |
| 18. Consider your economic situation a year ago, and the current one... How would you rate the present one compared with that a year ago (in %)? | |
| 19. Agriculture | |
| 20. Professional businessman | |
| 21. Manual wage-earner | |
| 22. Much better | |
| 23. Rather better | |
| 24. The same, hasn't changed | |
| 25. Rather worse | |
| 26. Much worse | |

CUADRO 1. IMPUESTOS PAGADOS (1)

(2) ¿Considera usted que en conjunto los impuestos que pagamos los españoles son... (en %)																			
		(3) Ocupación					(4) Edad				Según intención de voto (5)								
(11)	Total	Empre. (6)		Asal. (7)		Asal. (8)		(9)		(10)		18-30	31-45	46-60	60 +	AP	CDS	PSOE	IU
		Agri.	Profes.	Cuali.	Manua.	Inact.													
Muy altos (12)	33,6	37,8	39,0	27,4	39,3	31,5	24,4	34,4	37,1	40,1	42,1	37,3	25,8	23,3	41,0	43,1	39,2	41,9	
Bastante altos (13)	40,0	33,3	38,1	44,4	38,3	40,6	41,0	41,3	41,6	32,8	15,2	16,3	31,5	34,9	1,1	0,7	2,1	0,0	
Normales (14)	22,7	22,2	20,3	23,3	17,9	24,9	29,5	21,1	18,2	23,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,0	
Bastante bajos (15)	1,4	0,0	0,8	3,1	2,0	0,6	1,6	1,6	1,6	0,5	0,6	2,6	1,3	1,6	2,6	0,6	2,6	0,9	0,0
Muy bajos (16)	0,4	0,0	0,8	0,4	1,0	0,0	1,0	0,3	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
NS/NC (16)	1,9	6,7	0,8	1,3	1,5	2,4	2,6	1,3	1,6	2,6	0,6	2,6	0,9	0,0					

CUADRO 2. LA SITUACION ECONOMICA (17)

(18) Piense en la situación económica que tenía usted hace un año y en la que tiene hoy... ¿Cómo califica a la actual con respecto a la de hace un año? (En %)																			
		(19) Ocupación (20)					(4) Edad				Según intención de voto (5)								
	Total	Empre. (21)		Asal. (22)		Asal. (23)		(24)		(25)		18-30	31-45	46-60	60 +	AP	CDS	PSOE	IU
		Agri.	Profes.	Cuali.	Manua.	Inact.													
Mucho mejor (26)	2,7	2,2	3,4	3,1	1,5	2,6	3,8	1,9	1,6	4,2	1,1	2,0	4,5	2,3	11,8	9,8	20,5	14,0	
Bastante mejor (27)	14,3	20,0	16,1	15,2	16,9	12,2	21,8	13,9	10,6	9,9	42,7	54,9	60,2	60,5	34,3	29,4	12,5	23,3	
Igual, no ha cambiado (28)	55,8	55,6	49,2	52,5	52,7	59,8	59,3	53,9	54,8	52,2	8,4	3,3	1,5	0,0	1,7	0,7	0,9	0,0	
Bastante peor (29)	22,2	15,6	24,6	26,0	22,4	20,7	11,9	25,2	27,0	24,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
Mucho peor (30)	4,3	6,7	5,9	2,7	5,5	4,0	1,9	4,7	5,5	5,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
NS/NC (16)	0,7	0,0	0,8	0,4	1,0	0,8	1,3	0,3	0,5	1,0	1,7	0,7	0,9	0,0					

CUADRO 3. SERVICIOS RECIBIDOS (27)

(28) En relación a los impuestos que pagamos los españoles al Estado, los servicios públicos que recibimos del Estado son... (en %)									
		(29) Opinión sobre los impuestos				(5) Según intención de voto			
(32)	Total	(13)		(31)		AP	CDS	PSOE	IU
		Muy/bastante Altos (30)	Normales	Muy/bastante Bajos					
Muy adecuados/buenos (33)	1,2	0,9	2,2	4,5	1,7	0,7	1,2	2,3	
Bastante adecuados/buenos (34)	6,9	5,9	10,6	9,1	9,6	7,8	9,8	11,6	
Normales (13)	28,5	25,5	39,8	22,7	14,0	23,5	43,6	16,3	
Bastante inadecuados/malos (35)	42,2	44,6	36,5	45,5	49,4	46,4	35,0	55,8	
Muy inadecuados/malos (36)	16,8	19,8	8,0	18,2	24,2	19,6	6,8	11,6	
NS/NC (16)	4,3	3,3	2,9	0,0	1,1	2,0	3,6	2,3	

A Majority of Spaniards Think That UGT Is Right

A majority of Spaniards (35.7 percent) vindicate the General Union of Workers (UGT) in its confrontation with the government; a confrontation that is not considered real by another wide majority (see charts in columns on the right). The government's position is backed by only one out of every 10 queried (11.5 percent).

UGT wins even among the PSOE voters, although they try to tone down their view (31.7 percent) by coming out in favor of both sides; while an appreciable percentage (7.3) deny that either is correct.

The Socialist union receives the greatest backing on the left (up to 69.2 percent of the IU voters are on its side); but the percentages of those vindicating it in the center and on the right are also quite high (40.4 and 36.4, respectively).

Breaking down the section pertaining to both, the government, with 11.5 percent direct support, is largely defeated by UGT.

As for who is right in the government-UGT controversy, the United Left voters are the ones coming out most in favor of the union (69.2 percent).

Key to Chart:

1. In your opinion, which is right in the UGT-government confrontation?
2. Based on voting intention
3. The government
4. Both
5. Neither
6. Don't know/no answer

¿Quién tiene razón, según usted, (1) en el enfrentamiento UGT-Gobierno?					
(2)	Según intención de voto				
	Total	AP	CDS	PSOE	IU
UGT ... (3)	35,7	36,4	40,4	30,1	69,2
El Gobierno	11,5	22,7	10,5	13,8	7,7
Ambos (4)	27,2	13,6	28,1	31,7	7,7
Ninguno (5)	9,8	13,6	8,8	7,3	15,4
NS/NC (6)	15,7	13,6	12,3	17,1	0,0

The Government Has Lost Credibility

Spaniards do not share the government's claim that the economy is improving at a strong pace. And they hold this view considering their own personal budgets, which are an unavoidable gauge. And yet the economic indicators show a positive change. What is happening?

It must be difficult for some of those interviewed to admit that we are emerging from the crisis when they recall their inevitable depletion at

the end of the month. That is understandable. And we must not forget either the record on unemployment or the fact that the lowest wage bracket is still very wide in Spain. It is the uppermost classes and the new ruling class that have been first to gain prosperity.

But this discrepancy proves, in particular, the distance lying between social opinions and the government's messages. One notes the phenomenon most clearly on the charts reproduced at the end of this article.

The government has stressed its intention of cutting taxes; In theory, this is good news for those who are annoyed at an aggressive fiscal policy. Well, two thirds of those queried bet that taxes will not decline.

And it is not only the voters from opposition parties that express skepticism at the report. Over half of the Socialist voters claim not to believe the government that they themselves support.

Something similar holds true when those polled are asked about the UGT-government confrontation. There are more who do not believe in such a conflict or, in other words, those who suspect that there is a great deal of fiction in it.

In this instance, we must also have recourse to the suggestive information provided by the PSOE voters. Not even they give credit to the dispute. Although by a slight difference, there are more who suspect the sincerity of the confrontation (38.6 percent) than there are of those believing in it (36.5 percent).

The data are conclusive. The government enjoys but little credibility among the citizens. One might infer from this that Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez' famous capacity for convincing has become depleted. There is no doubt that we are living amid too many concoctions and government mixups (the patronage, abandonment of convictions, and the imposition of an idea and a manner of viewing life); that ends up with a price to be paid. For the present, the price is called a loss of credibility.

Key to Chart:

1. The Government's Credibility
2. The government has recently stated that it will cut taxes. Do you think that taxes will really decline?
3. Based on voting intention
4. Yes, they will decline
5. No, they will not decline
6. Don't know/no answer
7. It is claimed in the news media that there is a confrontation between UGT and the government. Do you believe that this confrontation really exists?
8. Yes

EL CREDITO DEL GOBIERNO (1)

El Gobierno ha declarado estos días que va a bajar los impuestos. ¿Cree usted que realmente los impuestos bajarán? (2)					
(4)	(3) Según intención de voto				
	Total	AP	CDS	PSOE	IU
Sí bajarán.....	20,8	14,0	20,3	31,2	18,6
No bajarán (5).....	65,5	72,5	73,2	56,1	76,7
NS/NC (6).....	13,7	13,5	6,5	12,8	4,7

Se dice en los medios de comunicación que existe un enfrentamiento entre la UGT y el Gobierno. ¿Cree usted que este enfrentamiento existe realmente? (7)					
	(3) Según intención de voto				
	Total	AP	CDS	PSOE	IU
Sí (8).....	29,5	24,7	37,3	36,5	30,7
No.....	43,0	52,8	47,1	38,6	60,5
NS/NC (6).....	27,5	22,5	15,7	24,9	9,3

Technical Record:

National scope (except the Canaries)

Universe: individuals 18 years old and over, with a telephone

System: telephone poll

Size of the sample: 1,200 interviews

Error in the sampling: \pm 2.9 percent

Distribution of the sample: proportionate to region and habitat

Random selection of sample points

Selection of the individual by sex, age, and occupation quotas

Date of field work execution: 5, 6, 7 October 1987

Implementation of the field work and data processing: Emopublica & Associates, Inc

Design and direction: DIARIO 16

2909

SELENIA RELEASES DETAILS ON 'IDRA' MISSILE

35280037 Rome AERONAUTICA & DIFESA in Italian Sep 87 pp 50-51

[Article by Luciano Castro; first paragraph is AERONAUTICA & DIFESA introduction]


[Text] First details of Selenia's new fire-and-forget missile, successor to the Aspide.

Studies toward the realization of an "Improved Aspide" were initiated as far back as 1982-83, immediately following the entry into service in Italy of the familiar Aspide anti-aircraft missile produced by Selenia. But the Italian firm's program (which the firm had expected to be able to launch officially around 1985) unfortunately ran aground in a sea of uncertainty on the part of our Armed Forces as to acquisition of a new air defense weapons system.

The Defense Ministry authorities concerned, in fact, had not yet decided whether to commit themselves to a program of national origin (thus backing the development of the Idra), or whether to opt for similar programs under study in the United States, Europe, and even within NATO. And still, as of today, no choice has as yet been made.

The top management of Selenia's Defense Systems Division, for its part, does not deny a certain disappointment as regards what it terms this "interlocutory time," even though it foresees that by the end of this year (or at most by the middle of 1988), this stalled situation must end. In any case, the firm is maintaining intact the industrial capacity that would enable it to begin delivering the first Idra units in 1993-94. On the other hand, should the choice be for the international alternative, the studies Selenia has carried out to date for the development of its new missile will facilitate a good position for Selenia in the industrial consortium that will have to be formed.

But let's have a look now at the characteristics of the Idra. This missile (exhibited in the form of a mockup at the recent Le Bourget Aerospace Show) and the Aspide have in common their dimensions and weights, even though the Idra has undergone notable improvements in power plant, hence range, in its avionics, and in its ECCM [electronic counter-countermeasures] capabilities.



Above photo shows the Skyshark's lateral-ejection system for submunitions.

This will render the Idra a valid multipurpose missile for defense against planes and helicopters, as well as against incoming missiles in the 1990's and beyond. The particular characteristics designed into the new solid-fuel engine will provide increased acceleration during the final phase of the intercept trajectory, suiting it to the engagement of targets characterized by high maneuverability. Incorporating fire-and-forget capabilities, as it does, the Idra can be used in the same configurations as the Aspide (air-to-air, ground-to-air, and sea-to-air), utilizing initially the same launch and control systems.

The type mission of the new missile consists of an initial phase (called the "midcourse phase"), with inertial guidance and updating of target data by the launcher's radar system. This phase is characterized by an initial boost of the rocket motor, which will enable the launch and acceleration of the missile. This phase is followed by a transition-to-terminal phase during which acquisition and direct tracking of the target is taken over by the Idra's homing system. Lastly, preceded by a second boost (this characteristic being the reason for the motor's "dual-boost" designation), the terminal phase begins and ends with the engagement and destruction of the target.

At the Selenia plant in Rome, the prototype version of the new missile is now at an advanced stage of development, with ground and flight tests expected to start very soon. Development of the Idra is thus continuing on a private-venture basis, pending clarifying decisions by the Defense Ministry.

[End of main body of article; boxed information p 50 follows]:

Selenia 'Idra' (Improved Aspide) Characteristics

Multiple-role anti-aircraft missile (air-to-air and surface-to-air). (For data undisclosed as yet, comparative reference has been made to data for the Aspide 1A. In this regard, see AERONAUTICA & DIFESA No. 8).

Power Plant: One SNIA-BPD composite-fuel, dual-boost motor, with reduction of combustion exhaust fumes (Aspide: Weight approximately 57 kg).

Dimensions: Length 3.650 m; diameter 0.204-0.212 m; fixed-anterior-wing span 0.644 m; mobile-posterior-wing span 0.680 m.

Weight: 210 kg at launch.

Warhead: Fragmentation type, with "diced" tungsten chips (Aspide: Explosive weight 33 kg).

Guidance System: Inertial, with target data updating during initial flight phase, and active J-band radar during terminal phase of interception. ECCM capability against ECM 1990's development and beyond.

Performance Characteristics: Hypersonic speed, both air-to-air and surface-to-air (Aspide: Maximum speed Mach 4.4; range over 50 km).

9238

CASMU DISPLAYS STEALTH STANDOFF WEAPON 'SKYSHARK'

35280037 Rome AERONAUTICA E DIFESA in Italian Oct 87 pp 54-56

[Article by Lberatore Foscolo; first paragraph is AERONAUTICA E DIFESA introduction]

[Text] With the CASMU [Multipurpose Expendable Ordnance Dispenser Consortium], a consortium comprised of Aeritalia and SNIA-BPD, Italian industry, as well, now offers a standoff weapon for area bombing.


For several years now, aerial weaponry has been evolving towards highly sophisticated systems that have witnessed the decline of conventional and nuclear bombs in favor of "intelligent" munitions (incorporating a homing capability), standoff weapons (with a long-range capability, to enable the attacking aircraft to remain at a distance beyond the range of enemy defensive fire from the target area), and submunitions, designed to enhance the possibilities of hitting the objective with the most suitable ordnance.

In Italy, this evolution of weapons systems has two mainstays--the Tornado and the AMX--the fighting effectiveness of which is tied inseparably to new types of ordnance. In this regard, the Air Force has already acquired the British 277-kg Hunting BL-755 Mk 1 submunitions dispenser, and has evaluated the MBB Mehrzweckwaffe MW-1 multipurpose bomb launching systems, for the Tornado. And it is now evaluating offers relative to a standoff weapon which essentially is an evolution of the MW-1 concept. In fact, while the latter weapons system is an integral part of the airplane, various glider and self-powered systems are currently under development that will carry the warhead to the target after the attacking plane is already well into its evasion route.


One of these systems is the Skyshark SWD (Standoff Weapon Dispenser) developed by CASMU, the consortium comprised of Aeritalia and SNIA-BPD.

The concept underlying the CASMU dispenser is its modularity. This weapon, with its flattened cross-section and mobile tail surfaces, looks very much like an auxiliary fuel tank, and is offered in two main versions: A glider version and a self-powered one. Both versions can utilize a broad variety of submunitions, either free-fall or "intelligent." The Skyshark is equipped with a lateral-ejection module controlled by an auxiliary system that regulates the launch time in relation to the target to be covered.

LENGTH: 3650 mm
DIAMETER: 204 mm



A model of the new air-to-air/surface-to-air Idra was exhibited for the first time at the Selenia stand at the Le Bourget Aerospace Show. Above: First drawing of the official Idra configuration, released by the Rome-based Selenia company, which is continuing work on the development phase of this advanced variant of the Aspide, with fire-and-forget capability, on an exclusively private-venture basis.



The Skyshark, the new submunitions dispenser system developed by CASMU, the Aeritalia/SNIA-BPD consortium, was exhibited at the Paris Air Show, mounted under the wing of an AMX, and has now begun flight and in-flight- detachment tests mounted under the Tornado. Above drawing illustrates its operational configuration and the various types of submunitions it uses.

Notably, this weapon is one of the first Italian realizations to make use of "stealth" techniques (low radar detectability) involving careful design of surfaces and shapes to reduce radar reflection, and the use of radar-absorbent materials.

Both versions have a low-level-launch guidance and flight control system that enables their use at speeds up to Mach 0.8.

The system can be used on the AMX and the Tornado, as well on the A-4, A-7, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-111, Mirage, Jaguar, and many other planes.

The system is designed to compete with various other international systems and with a similar weapon developed under the aegis of the Agusta Group.

A "cruise" version of the Skyshark, propelled by a jet engine, is also under study. The dispenser is suited to three fundamental types of mission: Anti-airbase, interdiction, and antitank. In the first case, the targets are runways, interchanges, and parking ramps--that is, the "hard" areas of an airport--and involve the use of anti-runway bombs and mine dispensers. The second type of mission is against troop concentrations, fuel dumps, port installations, beachheads, and vehicles, and involves the use of mine dispensers, antitank mines, APAMB submunitions, and single-warhead dispensers. Antitank missions involve the use of APAMB submunitions and antitank mines.

CASMU Skyshark Characteristics

Air-to-ground glider and self-propelled submunitions dispenser.

Propulsion System (if used): SNIA-BPD rocket engine of undisclosed type and power.

Dimensions: Wing span 1.500 m; length 4.757 m; section 0.394 m².

Weights: Glider version 1,050 kg at launch; self-powered version 1,170 kg.

Ordnance Payload: 745 kg.

Performance: Maximum speed at launch Mach 0.8; range 6-12 km (depending on launch speed and altitude); 20-25 km for self-powered version.

9238

BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENT, PLANS FOR SUBMARINE FLEET DISCUSSED

35480017 Bonn TECNOLOGIA MILITAR in Spanish Sep 87 pp 14-25

[Article by Pere Redon i Trabal: "The Spanish Submarine Branch"]

[Text] In 1968, when the first rings of the "Delfin" (S-61) submarine went on the shipway, hard times, when the submarine branch's existence had been waning dangerously as a result of the shortage of vessels of this type, began to be a thing of the past.

The present time, with eight modern vehicles of its class at the Cartagena base, will unquestionably be a milestone in the unit's history; because, although the number of submarines available is not the highest in Spanish naval history, the power and threat that they could represent to a hypothetical enemy of Spain in the geographical area of the Western Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar, and its Atlantic waters, are the greatest.

The base, fleet, and submarine school complex is one of the most spectacular installations located at the Cartagena Arsenal, the leading one in the Mediterranean Maritime Zone (MMZ).

Physically, it occupies the arsenal's northern dock, and the adjoining areas, where the three anchorages, two wharves, and command and school buildings are situated.

The latter and the shops occupy a solid old building erected in 1775 to house the primitive arsenal's carpenter shop and mold loft. A few years ago, a modern section was built in its vicinity, used to receive the simulators of the modern Series 60 and 70 submarines; and to contain other sections, equipped for instructional tasks. Since the creation of the submarine branch, and with the passage of time, the homogeneous complex has undergone the necessary remodeling to gear it to the current requirements, always in keeping with the budget potential.

Organization of the Submarine Branch

As stipulated in Article 24 of the Organic Law on the Navy, the submarine branch, owing to the nature and specialization of the human and mechanical

elements comprising and using it, is a special force. Hence, it is subordinate to the Admiral-Chief of Staff of the Navy (AJEMA) and, at the latter's delegation, to the Captain General of the Mediterranean (CAPGEMED), to whom the base, fleet, and school are consequently subordinate; just as the logistical, administrative, and legal areas come under his jurisdiction. It is also stipulated that the chief's position in these three agencies is incumbent on one and the same person, with the rank of ship captain and submarine specialist, having held the command of one of these. He will be responsible for:

Maintaining the fleet at the highest degree of human and ship preparedness, always ready for combat;

Directing the training:

Coordinating the cooperation with other forces;

Assigning the missions to be carried out by the submarines; and,

Proposing the security doctrine in immersion, and overseeing its fulfillment on board.

The chief of the submarine branch also serves as chairman of the Submarine Warfare Doctrine Board (JUSUB); and, to discharge this mission, based upon his assignment, he has the support of various commands of the unit itself and of others of a discretionary nature.

Of the areas into which the headquarters is broken down, a large number of responsibilities are assigned to the:

Submarine Base:

Maintenance and repair of the vessels;

Rendering of services to the submarines, such as mooring, charging batteries and compressed air, distilled water supply, and loading of torpedoes and mines, as well as any other mechanical element for the vessels' use; and,

Rendering of services to the crews: lodging, maintenance, religious and health services, paymaster's service, laundry, etc.

Submarine School:

Holding of submarine courses for officers, petty officers, and seamen;

Training of the crews in the use of simulators; and,

Compilation of submarine-related technical information.

Submarine Warfare Doctrine Board:

Proposes to AJEMA the doctrine on organization, use, and support of the submarine force, as well as on its backup structure and the updating of the doctrine.

The chief of the submarine fleet has backing from a staff, the chief of which is, in turn, second chief of the unit, and the one backing him with regard to operations, communications, logistics, organization, and intelligence. He is an officer with the rank of frigate captain, who must have been certified in naval warfare and have been a submarine commander.

The complex making up the base, fleet and school consists of 1,100 men, some 100 of whom are chiefs and officers, 200 are petty officers, 600 are seamen, and 200 are civilians, as contracted personnel. Of all of them, 60 percent are personnel on board, the rest being engaged in work involving maintenance, administration, instruction, and other backup tasks.

The Submarine School (ESUB)

This component of the submarine force is intended to train submarine personnel of the various categories and origins. To carry out its mission, ESUB has the necessary personnel, divided into teachers and instructor aides, who perform their duties organized into the following two organic squadrons:

Management-Command/Administration;

Departments of Instructors/Services

The first of these is responsible for drawing up the study plans, programming the different courses, and implementing the training doctrine stipulated, as well as the special directives from the Naval Instruction Management (DIENA), to which the ship captain, commander-director of the submarine squadron is directly subordinate in the instructional area. This echelon also performs the pertinent administrative tasks.

The Departments of Instructors/Services, numbering eight, are associated with a similar number of submarine functional-technical areas:

Tactics; electronic warfare; submarine detection (courses and laboratories in acoustics); weapons and photographic laboratory; general aspects and ship management; machines and services; electricity and internal security; logistics (supplies/maintenance/health).

Each one of these departments is comprised of chiefs and/or officers coming from the different submarine series.

There is a Technical Secretariat, organically and administratively linked with the Ocean Submarine Squadron (ESUBOC), which is used jointly by the base, fleet, and school.

Assigned to this Technical Secretariat are the general library, the technical library, and the instruction aid office.

Courses Given at ESUB

In this context, the submarine school's activities consist of providing the following courses:

Basic courses:

Submarine specialization for officers of the special registers, naval reserve, and complement;

Submarine fitness for petty officers from the navy petty officer corps basic register, naval reserve, and navy complement, and specialist corporals;

Short submarine fitness courses for future seamen corporals, electricians, torpedo operators, mechanics, and cooks, from compulsory recruitment.

Special courses:

Training of submarine commanders, "power plant chief" petty officers, etc.;

Reaccreditation of submarine fitness for petty officers who, having achieved it in the corporal rank, must board submarines in their new assignments;

Specialization and fitness for personnel from foreign navies;

Training of new native and foreign crews of newly constructed and purchased submarines.

The school has the necessary facilities to engage in all these activities, distributed between two buildings, the first of which provides the necessary classrooms in which theoretical courses are taught, while the second contains the simulators and other more specialized classrooms associated with them.

Simulators

ESUB has the simulators which are so necessary (from a practical standpoint), since live practice is impossible aboard the submarines, such as that on emergencies involving leaks, structural damage, etc. The use of this equipment also represents enormous material and economic savings, as will be noted in the description of the simulators in the control and maneuvering rooms of the "Delfin" and "Galerna" class submarines.

The first of these instruction aids used by the students is the helmsman training simulator (for vessels of the "Delfin" class), in which the future helmsmen are "broken in," because, at first, the handling of these controls is complicated. This simulator, utilized by all the men stationed in the control room, reproduces the horizontal, vertical, and transverse movement

depending on the condition of the sea that is introduced in the fictitious maneuver. The equipment physically reproduces the prow and stern rudder controls.

The school also has a propulsion control station simulator (the location from which the engines are controlled on the submarine), for the "Galerna" class.

Using this simulator, operated by means of a computer, all the maneuvers associated with the propulsion drive are practiced. It has all the battery coupling and uncoupling panels (over 300 on each vessel), the snorkel control, that of the thermal (diesel) engines, the electrical generators (the power from which is used for propulsion and to recharge the batteries), etc. In addition, any type of alarm, shutdown, generator breakage, or reduction in engine power can be reproduced, in order to check the controls, couple the ammeters, taking them to zero, restore power again, and practice any other emergency situation.

Another means used, the security and immersion training simulator, relates to the "Delfin" class submarines, and presents, in a cross-sectional form, the control room of one of the vessels of its class. It has the helmsman's station, with the prow diving rudder, the stern rudder (on the left), and the vertical rudder (on the right). It also includes the control consoles associated with the maneuvers for bailing, change and maintenance of elevation, change of speed, jettison of emergency lead, snorkel situation, and silence, etc. As actually occurs, this room is independent of the tactics, although it is adjoining.

The security and immersion training simulator for submarines of the "Galerna" class, which is also a longitudinal section of the control room, is far more complex than its counterpart for the "Delfin" class. In addition to the command and control panels, it also reproduces all the boards and consoles located portside, including the balancing (trimming) controls, safety valves, and ship's course table, as well as a fictitious representation of the radar operator's console, the electronic counter-measures station, and the observation periscope with its shaft.

These two security and immersion training simulators for submarines of the "Delfin" and "Galerna" classes have been manufactured by Etablissement des Constructions et Armes Navales [Naval Construction and Arms Establishment] (ECAN), of Ruelle, and are controlled by Matra 15 and Metra 125 computers from the French company SEMS.

All the officers and petty officers assigned to submarines are subjected to them, and return to them regularly, making use of the vessels' stays at the base, in order to keep current on their information and the necessary skill to ensure high levels of safety for the crews. Emergency drills are on the agenda: lashing of rudders, leaks, loss of control, fires at vital locations, light and sound alerts, etc. All the maneuvers and resultant orders are taped in the program, so as to make subsequent criticism.

In the realm of costs of the equipment at the school's disposal, we cannot fail to mention that the simulator for the "Delfin" class submarines represented an investment of 100 million pesetas, and that, with its use, the Navy has already saved 450 million based on lower fuel expenses, and less incidence of damage on submarines and from the standpoint of man-hours. Whereas the simulator for the "Delfin" class has, to date, put in 5,600 hours of simulation, its counterpart for the "Galerna," which cost 230 million pesetas, was used for 3,700 hours of simulation; and the savings from its use exceed the figure given for that of the "Delfin" class.

Other Classrooms

Among the specialized classrooms contained in ESUB, stress should be placed on those for elementary acoustics and advanced acoustics, in which the sonar specialists and all personnel serving in the control room attempt to become used to the submarine noise, and learn to distinguish between it and that originating in mechanical elements, such as engines of electrically propelled submarines in clear immersion, and turbine propelled warships. With these courses, the ear of the crews is educated, so that they may recognize the proximity of any type of vessel when the submarine itself is submerged.

Current Status of the Submarine Force

Since the end of 1985, when the "Tramontana" (S-74), a French type "Agosta," also referred to as a unit of Series 70, was turned over to the fleet, the Navy's submarine branch has had eight modern submarines, built during the 70's and the first half of the 80's.

Although the number of units is obviously insufficient for wartime, in the current peacetime the unit is equipped to carry out the missions assigned to it, to train the crews, and to cooperate with the other Navy ships and those of the allied countries.

All these vessels are being constantly modernized, going through, at the pace noted in the pertinent table, the "Great Careen" phase, estimated as lasting about a year, which takes place at the Cartagena shipyard of the Bazan National Military Naval Construction Enterprise, Inc (E.N. Bazan).

The purpose of the work, which includes the installation of new equipment and a general review of all the installations and hull, at a cost that currently ranges between 1.3 and 1.6 billion pesetas, is to ensure the full operativeness of the vessels during the coming years.

Of the four "Delfin" class submarines (French type "Daphne" or Series 60), to which the "Delfin" (S061), "Tonina" (S-62), "Marsopa" (S-63), and "Narval" (S-64) belong, the first three have already undergone two "Great Careen" inspections, with the "Narval" (S-64) the last of its class, currently in the second of them.

The Next Generation of Spanish Submarines

From what one infers from the talks held with the unit's chief and with any of the crew members with whom one could converse, the next generation of submarines should go into service in the mid-to-end portion of the 1990's, that is, within about 10 years, in order to replace the current ones of the "Delfin" class, which will soon have over 25 years on their rings. The new submarines, which are in the design stage, will have to be vessels with a displacement of about 2,000 tons, to enable them to engage in ocean sailing.

It would be very useful if they were to have a single hull and a tear shape, so as to have more pressurized useful space, fewer corrosion problems, less chance of detection by enemy sensors, and lower production and maintenance cost. The internal distribution should be like that of the nuclear propelled submarines, with larger space for batteries (such as a minimum of 900 cubic meters, instead of the current 300). The acoustic stiffness should be greatly reduced, so as to go unnoticed, and the command and control should also be far more automated, so as not to increase the personnel (30 men seems a reasonable number).

As for the detection systems, they should be equipped with a tuggable sonar, another alongside, and still another with low frequency.

In the weaponry aspect, they should include wire-guided torpedoes, antiship missiles, and a minimal blaster with six launcher tubes. The speed in immersion would have to be at least 25 knots and, on the surface, from 10 to 11; with a range in immersion of from 500 to 600 miles, at 6 knots, and a maximum of 20,000 miles, equivalent to 75 days at sea.

It is obvious that the possibility of the next generation of Spanish submarines' being nuclear-propelled has been precluded; an issue that has been widely debated in the news media recently. Nevertheless, the new series, owing to the requirements that will intervene in the design, will be clearly pre-nuclear; making it possible, when the substitution of the Series 70 vessels, which will occur about the year 2005, is proposed, to decide that the replacements will be propelled by nuclear power.

Spain does not currently have the necessary resources to undertake the construction of a submarine with such features. From an economic standpoint, and more because of the cuts in the defense budget for the next few years, it would be impossible to have the huge amounts of money required for allocation to this area.

Its achievement seems impossible at present, from a technical standpoint, although the estimates made note that, by the end of this century or the beginning of the next, the technical-industrial capacity will have progressed sufficiently to undertake the project, even with minimal foreign aid.

Final Comment

To supplement the detailed visit paid to the base, fleet, and school, the author of this article had occasion to take a long trip at sea on the "Tramontana" (S-74) submarine, for the purpose of holding a torpedo launching drill and testing a new communications antenna installed by E.N. Bazan.


The target of the torpedo launch was one of the "Descubierta" class corvettes. The torpedoes were of the E-18 type, manufactured by the French firm, Societe Francaise de Materiels d'Armament, S.A. [French Weapon Hardware Company, Inc] (SOFMA).

During the drill, the dragnet vessel "Ciclope" (A-13) operated, with the mission of picking up the training torpedoes without warheads, as did a Hughes 500 helicopter from McDonnell Douglas/Hughes Helicopter, Inc, belonging to the Sixth Squadron, which carried out the mission of locating the torpedoes.

During the sail, a test was made of a floating antenna 300 meters long, which can be recovered using a coil system, and which is being installed in the "Galerna" class submarines; enabling them to receive and issue communications in a submerged situation, using any broadcasting band.

The degree of preparedness shown during the long sail and following drills proved the quality of the instruction received by the crews, the quality of the equipment placed at their service, and the spirit inspiring the unit: a truly elite force of the Spanish Navy.

(1) Desarrollo del Arma Submarina de la Armada de España de 1915 a 1987




Key to Graph 1.

1. Development of the Spanish Navy's Submarine Branch From 1915 to 1987
2. Number of submarines
3. Type
4. Incorporation
5. Years

Misiones desempeñadas por la Flotilla de Submarinos en 1986

- (1) Flotilla de Submarinos en 1986
- (2) Actividad total (100%)
- (3) = 740 días de mar
- (4) = 10.104 horas de inmersión



A = Actividades propias de los submarinos (7)
 B = Colaboración con otras Unidades de la Armada (8)
 (Con siete submarinos operativos). (9)

Key to Graph 2:


1. Missions Performed by the Submarine Fleet in 1986
2. Total activity
3. 740 days at sea
4. 10,104 hours of immersion
5. 404 days at sea
6. 336 days at sea
7. Individual activities of the submarines themselves
8. Cooperation with other Navy units
9. With seven operating submarines

Key to Chart:

- | | |
|---|----------------------|
| 1. Chief of the submarine base | |
| 2. Second chief of the base | |
| 3. Basic equipment, school and fleet | |
| 4. Religious service, base, school, and fleet | |
| 5. Health service, base and school | |
| 6. Chief of maintenance, hull, machines and electricity | |
| 7. Chief of weapons maintenance | 15. Electricity shop |
| 8. Chief of electronic maintenance | 16. Machine shop |
| 9. Electronics shop | 17. Paint shop |
| 10. Chief of supplies | 18. Carpentry shop |
| 11. Major aide | 19. Assembly shop |
| 12. Control and planning | 20. Casting shop |
| 13. Demarcation | 21. Masonry |
| 14. Chief of shops | 22. Boilerworks shop |

- 23. Moving
- 24. Equipment storage
- 25. Chief of services
- 26. Electricity service
- 27. Water service
- 28. Air service
- 29. Internal conservation service
- 30. Ship backup service
- 31. Paymaster
- 32. Kitchen
- 33. Barber shop

- 34. Tailor shop
- 35. Shoe repair shop
- 36. Pantry
- 37. Laundry
- 38. Security and supply
- 39. Seamen services
- 40. Lodging
- 41. Storerooms
- 42. Transportation
- 43. Parking
- 44. Recreation



Submarine School Courses

Type of course	Students' Position	Duration
Submarine specialty	Officers	1 year
Submarine fitness	Petty officers and specialist corporals	6 months
Submarine fitness	Future seaman corporals	45 days
Submarine fitness	Cooks	3 months
Power plant chiefs	Petty officers	20 days
Submarine reaccreditation	All positions	3 months
Training of new personnel	All positions	6 months
Submarine case study	Officer specialists in submarine weapons	1 month
Initiation of passive detection	Petty officers	1 month
Command chiefs	Officers	8 weeks
Helmsmen	First corporals	4 weeks
Power plant electrician	First corporals and petty officers	2 weeks

Submarine School Training Activities

	For training in:	Average occupation (in hours/week)
Simulators		
SIMPRA	"Galerna" class submarine personnel	20
SISMA	and Submarine School students	
ECA	Helmsmen for "Delfin" class submarines	10
SIENDA	"Delfin" class submarine personnel and Submarine School students	20
Detection Classroom		
	Fleet submarine personnel	20
	Corvette personnel	
	Frigate personnel	
	Submarine School students	
	Submarine Weapons School students	
	Antisubmarine Battle Instruction Center students	

Course of the Maintenance Plans

First maintenance plan, "Delfin" class submarine:

5 weeks operational; 4 weeks scheduled maintenance; drydock every four scheduled maintenance periods; "Great Careen" every 3 years

At the crucial time of the republic's establishment, the submarine fleet had the four original type "A" units, six of type "B," and another six of type "C," which, combined with the "Kanguaro" submarine salvage vessel, comprised the unit. Virtually all these vessels were used in the Morocco campaigns.

In the early 1930's, steps were taken to remove the four type "A" units; and, in 1932, the construction of three new type "D" vessels, designed completely in Spain, was ordered. When the Spanish Civil War broke out (1936-1939), the submarines numbered 12, three of which were sunk, and another seven destroyed in port during those troubled years. Added to those which began the conflict on the Nationalist side were two more of the "Torricelli" class (the "General," "Sanjurjo," and "General Mola"), purchased in Italy, owing to the concern for providing this type of weapon.

At the end of the Civil War, and as a result of the international isolation, the submarine branch weakened to the point that, by the end of the 1970's, it did not have even a single vessel of this class in operational condition.

The entry into service of the five submarines of the "Balao" and "Guppy" type, of U.S. origin, and the start of the project for construction of the Series 60, the French type "Daphne," to be built at the shipyards of the Bazan National Military Naval Construction Enterprise, Inc, in Cartagena, gave a new impetus to the submarine branch, even with the particular shortage of resources available for reinforcing it.

The Series 70 project, with its four French type "Agosta" submarines ("Galerna" class), was to complete, during the early 1980's, the program called for in the Navy General Plans associated with that special force.

These latter vessels replaced those of the "Guppy" class, and afforded hope for the future of the fleet during the times to come.

Statements by Ship Capt Felipe del Rey Sanchez, Chief of the Submarine Base, School, and Fleet:

During the lengthy stay at the submarine base facilities and departments, Pere Redon i Trabal (special correspondent for TECNOLOGIA MILITAR) had occasion to hold an interview with Ship Capt Felipe del Rey Sanchez, chief of the submarine base, school, and fleet, focusing his questions on the Navy's submarine force and its future. Following are the results of this conversation:

TM: Being considered a special force, the submarine force is subordinate to the admiral chief of staff of the Navy (AJEMA). Who appoints the chief of this force, and who can be a candidate to hold this command post?

CN del Rey: Article 24 of the Navy's Organic Law states: "Special forces will be interpreted as those requiring a unique preparation, by reason of their essential, differentiated, features." And it adds: "The command of each of the special forces will be directly subordinate to AJEMA, and will be responsible for their preparation and, when so decided, for their use."

As for the members of the JUSUB, there is a distinction between:

Members by reason of their position:

The chief of the EMA Submarine Section;

The frigate captain, second chief of the submarine fleet;

The frigate captain, chief of staff of the submarine fleet;

The frigate captain, chief of studies of the submarine school

Staff members:

Three submarine chiefs (two of them from the General Corps, certified or qualified to command submarines, and another for machines)

Elected members:

Those deemed necessary, in an undetermined number;

Personnel for certain jobs based on their knowledge of the subject

There is also a standing commission, comprised of:

The chairman;

Staff members; and,

Members residing in Cartagena

The JUSUB Secretariat is under the command of a frigate captain who has held the command of submarines.

TM: Generally speaking, during this visit to the Cartagena naval base, we have observed the limitations in the number of personnel and facilities, as well as mechanical elements participating in the instructional work. As chief of the school, do you also have these shortages?

CN del Rey: There are limits on personnel, as in any other agency of the Armed Forces in general, and the Navy in particular. As for facilities and equipment for instruction, they may be considered good and nearly complete; although anything can be improved.

TM: How many vessels remain active at the same time?

CN del Rey: The eight submarines comprising the fleet undergo a maintenance plan specified in "Great Careen" (GC) inspections (12 to 15 months out of service), after 4 years of activity; and scheduled maintenance (P) periods (lasting 5 weeks), after 12 weeks of activity.

The scheduling of the GC is incumbent on the Navy chief of logistical backup (JAL), and that of the P, on the arsenal. An attempt is made never to have more than two submarines in a GC situation (one from each series); or more than two submarines in P.

TM: What would be the ideal number of vessels to carry out the missions assigned to the fleet at present?

CN del Rey: The ideal number of vessels is something not yet officially determined, although it is the general consensus that it should exceed eight units. Because of financial limitations, the Navy has limited itself to those eight; and it assigns missions on the basis of those available. It is the same thing that holds true of salaries and family requirements. With eight submarines, we cover the minimum; if we had more, we would accomplish other things that are desirable but not essential.

TM: How many men comprise the submarine branch, including chiefs, officers, and specialists? Are they the ones really needed to keep the unit in full efficiency?

CN del Rey: The fleet staffing is virtually covered, at 100 percent. There are about 500 men, only 25 of whom are replacement seamen. The school and submarine base are 80 percent complete.

TM: Isn't it very risky to concentrate the Spanish Navy's entire submarine branch at a single base, such as that at Cartagena?

CN del Rey: For economic reasons, the fleet's organization does not advise decentralization.

TM: What technical problems does it pose for the submarine branch to depend on a single supplier?

CN del Rey: Theoretically, it is better to depend on a single supplier than on several. Constructing consecutive generations of submarines with the same philosophy has obvious advantages for the shipyard, personnel, maintenance, users, and spare parts (many of the latter are used in all the submarine series).

TM: How would the units of the "Delfin" and "Galerna" classes operate in a conflict located with a hypothetical enemy south of the peninsula? How would they be used if this conflict were with the Warsaw Pact? In the two instances, in which geographical areas would both types of vessels operate?

CN del Rey: For selecting a new submarine, a basic requirement has always been its capacity to operate in the Atlantic and Mediterranean waters; which directly affect Spain's security and its maritime trade. In a NATO/WP conflict, our submarines would operate within the Alliance, I supposed, in accordance with the guidelines emanating from the latter. In a limited or

crisis conflict, they would operate in accordance with the guidelines of the political authorities, since they are, precisely, a special force.

TM: What would be the ideal time to start considering a submarine intended to replace the current ones? On what date should the keel be installed on the first Series 80 vessel?

CN del Rey: Several years ago, we began considering the submarine that would have to replace the current "Daphne" type, during the mid-1990's. At present, the basic features that it must have are totally determined, and there are two options. First, to purchase the plan from another country and build it here, or to design it in Spain with foreign technical collaboration, and build it later (which would take from 10 to 12 years of work). Both options will depend on the budgetary provisions, and the administration's decision on what is most feasible from a political, economic, and technological standpoint.

TM: Should the replacement be a nuclear-propelled submarine, or could we continue to use the conventional type?

CN del Rey: The adoption of nuclear propulsion is not just a policy decision per se, but depends on third countries. Spain lacks sufficient technology over the short and medium term, as well as potential for manufacturing the fuel. Moreover, there is the problem of training the personnel on all levels, and of the necessary infrastructure on land for the maintenance and management of the reactors. And, in view of all these problems, it is virtually impossible for nuclear propulsion to be applied to our future Series 80 submarines (unless they are purchased directly, and have been maintained in the selling country for some time).

TM: What other features should the Series 80 vessels have?

CN del Rey: These new units must be more silent, inconspicuous, and speedy than those belonging to the "Galerna" class. Their weapon system will have to be in keeping with the technological advances of the time.

TM: Commander, we thank you very much for having answered our questions.

Ship Capt Felipe del Rey Sanchez:

Joined the Navy in January 1952; promoted to ship captain in June 1984.

Most important assignments:

Commander of "Navia" minesweeper; second commander of S-22 submarine; first commander of "Narval" (S-64) submarine; chief of staff of the submarine fleet

Military courses /rank:

Friend/enemy identification (FEI) radar, in Great Lakes (U.S.) /ship lieutenant; submarine command in Toulon (France) /corvette captain; naval warfare /corvette captain; certified in joint staffs /frigate captain; high command in Lisbon (Portugal) / ship captain

Current assignment: chief of the submarine base, school, and fleet
2909

FUTURE OF NATION'S ARMS INDUSTRY UNCERTAIN FOLLOWING SCANDAL

Bofors, Saab Cooperation Jeopardized

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Oct 87 p 8

[Article by Bjarne Stenquist; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Sweden's politicians and military leaders are hard pressed as they consider crucial decisions worth billions of kronor to the defense firms. At the same time, smuggling scandals are hindering cooperation between Bofors and Saab. But at Bofors in Karlskoga, the "company spirit" in arms work both for the Swedish Armed Forces and for export is being strengthened.

The Swedish defense industry is waiting for several decisions concerning arms procurement for the Armed Forces in the shadow of the Bofors scandal. Those decisions will determine the future of important sectors of that industry. There is considerable uneasiness at both Bofors and Saab. Can Sweden keep two missile manufacturers?

The first of those decisions will be made within the next few weeks.

There were deeply furrowed brows everywhere when DAGENS NYHETER spoke with a number of people connected with the Defense Commission, the Ministry of Defense, the Office of the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces], and the various defense firms.

The Defense Commission, which submitted its report last spring, made a very extensive classified analysis of the situation in the Swedish defense industry. It pointed out that important problems might arise in connection with missiles, guns, ammunition, and so on because the latest defense decision assigns priority to the Air Force and Navy.

The acute lack of money that hit the Army last summer also led to a 60-percent cutback in appropriations for new weapons development, with the result that the appropriation has dropped from 500 million to 200 million kronor per year for the coming 5-year period.

Pessimism

In his 1988-1992 program plan, the OB is pessimistic: "Orders from the Swedish Armed Forces for guns and ammunition are currently at a low level.... In our planning work, it was not possible to find room for further development orders for Swedish defense.... The consequences of that planning work may therefore be serious as far as the possibilities for maintaining competence in all areas for the development of light missiles, guns, and the related ammunition are concerned."

Most of the attention is focused on Bofors, which is the largest Army-oriented defense firm. That company is in a paradoxical situation.

Production facilities in all three of the firm's divisions--guns, ammunition, and missiles--have enough work to keep them busy into the early 1990's. The Indian order for Howitzer 77's, which is worth 8 billion kronor (half of it for ammunition), has led to new hiring and new jobs throughout Bergslagen.

The missile plants also have a full work load thanks to the new BILL antitank missile. The firm's backlog of orders totals an unprecedented 14 billion kronor.

But if one talks to the approximately 800 people working in research and product development, the picture is completely different. By the end of the year, a great many of them will be without any paid development assignments from the Swedish Armed Forces. Those people are Bofors' most important asset. It is the work they do today which will provide jobs in the plants 5 years from now. Without development contracts, Bofors will be forced to make cutbacks and eventually to close down sections of the firm.

Anything like that will cause great concern in hard-hit Bergslagen, especially with next year's election coming up. Bofors is Bergslagen's largest employer.


Yearend

The most serious situation is in the missile division. By the end of the year, development work on the night version of RBS-70 will be complete, and there is nothing to follow it. The feeling at Bofors is that the firm can keep its engineers going by artificial respiration until the middle of 1988. After that, it may have trouble keeping key personnel. The situation is similar in the ammunition division.

Saab is right in the middle of its JAS project. The JAS is one of Sweden's biggest industrial projects of any kind. At a total cost of 25 billion kronor and thanks to the efforts of 3,000 people--one-tenth of the personnel that would be required by the big international manufacturers--Saab has designed the world's first fourth-generation fighter plane. What that means is that the aircraft can be reprogrammed in just a few minutes for interceptor, attack, or reconnaissance roles.


Crucial Choice for Defense Industry

Heavy Antiaircraft missile




Bofors 703 or
U.S. Hawk

Battalion antiaircraft missile




Bofors or
purchase abroad

Smart artillery shells




Saab/FFV Strix,
Bofors Bonus, or
purchase abroad

Bombs for JAS



Glide missile
from Saab or
parachute bomb
from Bofors

Two-seat JAS



Saab the only
manufacturer

Jewels

Both in the military command and at the Ministry of Defense, the mood concerning the JAS is almost one of exhilaration. That project is the jewel in the crown of Swedish technology--even better than what the United States can do. The possibilities for export are also considered to be a great deal more favorable than in the case of the Viggen.

In several quarters, and especially at Saab, the pressure is on to make the most of the JAS. A key problem is to equip the plane with Swedish armament. The crucial issue is whether that aircraft will be armed with a Swedish radar-guided air-to-air missile called the RBS-73.

That will be a project costing on the order of 7 billion kronor. The goal is to come up with a missile better than the best that U.S. industry can produce.

The decision on the RBS-73 will be made at the start of the 1990's. Saab recently completed its development of the RBS-15 heavy antiship missile. Saab's management vigorously maintains that the firm must have a missile project to work on while waiting for the RBS-73. Otherwise, as is true at Bofors, its key personnel will disappear, and they are absolutely necessary for the development work.

It is against that background that one should view the materiel procurement to be decided on in the near future:

1. Long-range heavy anti-aircraft missiles.

The situation now, especially in Norrland, is that there will be a "hole" in air defense if the Swedish air bases are knocked out.

Hawk

In his program plan, the OB committed himself to the purchase of U.S. Hawk missiles at a total cost of about 900 million kronor. The Hawk has a range of about 40 km and is available immediately.

Last summer, however, Bofors hastily injected its 703 project into the discussion. The 703 is based on a further development of the RBS-70, which has a range of 3 km. With the addition of one more propulsion stage, its range could increase to 10 or 15 km.

But so far that missile exists only on paper. It will cost between 500 million and 1 billion kronor to develop, and it could not be in production for another 5 years. So far, the OB has been emphasizing openly and vigorously that the RBS-703 is neither operational nor economically worthwhile.

But the OB has nevertheless postponed the final decision to purchase the Hawk so as to have time to evaluate the 703. That evaluation is in full swing, and the first results will be presented in a week or so. It will then be decided

whether to allocate money for a so-called feasibility study. At that point, the project may be put on the back burner pending a final decision.

2. New Battalion Antiaircraft Missile

This is the simplest, shoulder-borne type of anti-aircraft missile. Bofors' argument is that if it cannot get the 703, it should at least be allowed to develop the battalion anti-aircraft missile. But the OB's plan calls for purchasing that type of missile directly from abroad, and even that will not happen until the early 1990's.

3. Heavy Bomb Armament for JAS

To be able to blow up bridges and other invasion routes, the JAS will need new armament. Here Saab and Bofors are in direct competition with each other.

Glide Missile

Saab wants to develop and manufacture a glide missile, which can be likened to a cruise missile without an engine. It views the glide missile as an absolute precondition for being able to proceed with the RBS-73.

Bofors is introducing a simpler but cheaper variant: a heavy parachute-drag bomb. A decision is to be made before the end of the year.

4. Smart Artillery Ammunition

The Army wants shells with homing devices that can recognize and steer toward their targets, chiefly tanks. Here again, Saab, together with the state-owned FFV [National Industries Corporation], and Bofors are direct competitors.

Saab/FFV is fighting for the "Strix" shell, while Bofors is pushing the "Bonus." A simpler version of the Strix is already being developed for mortars at a total cost of 350 million kronor. Bofors says it needs a decision on the Bonus by the middle of next year. But the military command wants to wait another 2 years.

The final decision may very well be to purchase that type of ammunition abroad for economic reasons.

5. Two-Seat Trainer Version of JAS

The cost has rapidly risen from 1.5 billion to 2.3 billion kronor. There is no room for this project in the current defense appropriation.

A two-seat version is considered necessary, however, in order to be able to export the JAS and improve the overall economics of the project. If the JAS can be exported, there is at least a possibility of continuing to produce fighter planes in Sweden after the year 2000. The decision is to be made before the end of the year.

The government and the military command are hard pressed to adopt a stand on the following questions:

1. Shall Sweden have two missile manufacturers: Saab and Bofors?
2. Must resources be consolidated to provide Swedish armament for the JAS?
3. Is Sweden capable at the same time of pursuing development of the Bofors anti-aircraft missile 703? Is an export version of the JAS necessary to the survival of Sweden's aircraft industry? How are ammunition development and gun maintenance going to be kept inside the country if there is not enough development money for both Bofors and the FFV?

The government's solution to those problems is to trim the defense industry and consolidate it through cooperation and mergers among the firms concerned. But the Bofors scandal has created a climate in which cooperation between Bofors and Saab is impossible.

Morale in Industry Hurt

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Oct 87 p 8

[Article by Leif Norrman]

[Text] Karlskoga--The guys working in the armory at Bofors are annoyed with the mass media.

They say: "What's the matter, don't you have anything else to write about?"

Some are downright mad, while others are merely warily evasive.

We twist things around so much in the newspapers and on TV.

At the plant office, people are friendlier now. They admit the mistakes that were made and hope that such things will not happen in the future.

Three years of scandals and unfavorable press have left their mark in the community that used to be famous for its company spirit.

Neighbor

"Who wouldn't be mad? People feel that their jobs are threatened with the press running in here four times a week," says Gert Malmberg from where he is standing on one of the field howitzers that will go to India once it has been tested.

"I was born somewhere around here," he says, waving his hand around the assembly plant that was newly built to handle the giant order from India.

"Down here on the shore were the workers' shacks: Nya Backa. One room and a kitchen. All our dads worked for Bofors. That guy over there was my

neighbor," he said, pointing at Johnny Ericsson, assistant head of the Information Department.

That is just the way it is at Bofors. High or low, the ties are strong.

Closer Together

"We stand beside plant management now even more than we did 3 years ago. That is what all those articles have done for us," says Lennart Akeson, chairman of the metalworkers local. "We don't want to defend the mistakes that were made, but things have gone too far when our workers are threatened and harassed during their vacations elsewhere in the country. Just because they work for Bofors!"

He is not happy, however, to see the "company spirit" growing even stronger as the workers are offered convertible and fund shares and bound even tighter economically to the community's only large employer.

"Now the first thing they do in the morning is turn to the stock pages. But if the union calls up to ask for information, it doesn't get much. It's the new spirit of the times," says Akeson with a hint of hopelessness.

The wheels are turning faster than they have for a long time at Bofors. The giant order for India, which amounts to over 8 billion kronor and is providing jobs for 5 years, even means that there will be new hires. And what do accusations of Indian corruption and domestic political games matter when you are assured of being able to put a lunchbox in your briefcase every morning?

Wondering About it

"Of course, one sometimes wonders about it," says Stig Carlsson as he stands in the old gun factory dating back to 1883 and ensures that the long, gleaming gun barrels are rifled on the inside.

"Of course, one sometimes wonders how these will be used," he says as he pats the barrel sitting in the lathe. "One can hope that it will be for defense. This work has moral aspects. But they are more talked about outside Bofors than here. The most important thing for me is that this is a good job."

Stig Carlsson can currently handle one barrel a day. But there no time to lose, and India wants its guns, so now another guy will be added to the machine. They will then be able to handle two barrels a day.

Gleaming Barrels

Yes, Stig Carlson stands by his oil-dripping, gleaming barrels. Will they be used against Tamils or Pakistanis? Who knows? You can shoot 18 miles with them and still hit your target.

One can also view them as precision products and feel proud of one's occupation.

"Sometimes one wonders, of course," says Stig Carlson. "But we don't talk about it much."

In the assembling plant, the young new employees defend what they are doing: "You can't think about it that way. If we don't do this job, someone else will." On their collars, they wear buttons reading "Bofors Is Needed," and their cars are adorned with decals reading "Sweden Needs Bofors."

Bofors Day was held a while back. Over 11,000 people turned up and watched Minister of Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson on a giant TV screen as he urged them to be proud of the work they were doing. "There is nothing to indicate that confidence in Swedish disarmament policy has declined," he assured the thousands of workers who produce weapons for export day in and day out.

It is not certain that people here worry much about confidence in the disarmament policy. But it has been known for a long time that what is good for Bofors is good for Karlskoga.

Industry Facing Key Choices

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Oct 87 p 8

[Article by Bjarne Stenquist]

[Text] The Bofors scandal has put a chill on cooperation talks among Swedish defense firms. But those talks are more necessary than ever. The lack of development contracts is now threatening to knock out parts of the industry.

The military command and the Ministry of Defense are aware that the defense industry is facing a change of generation. The center of gravity is shifting increasingly toward such electronics-based sectors as command and liaison systems, homing weapons, and electronic warfare. The JAS project, for which Saab is the principal contractor, symbolizes much of that change.

Unlike the electronics involved in domestic appliances, those systems are becoming more and more expensive to develop. If Sweden is going to keep those priority sectors within the country, it is likely to do so at the expense of development appropriations for the more traditional areas such as guns, ammunition, and light missiles--of which Bofors is the chief supplier.

The picture is not improved by the fact that the latest defense decision gives priority to the Air Force and Navy and that the Army has run into an acute shortage of money. The result has been a sharp cutback in development appropriations by the Army.

No Contracts

If worse comes to worst, the result will be no new development contracts for Bofors in the areas of missiles and homing ammunition. The consequences of that are hard to assess. The firm maintains that integration among its three

production areas (guns, ammunition, and missiles) is very close. Removing one will threaten the entire firm.

That is a very worrying prospect for the government and the military command for several reasons:

1. Sweden must maintain its own ammunition production. In addition, all the stored artillery ammunition requires regular maintenance (to replace fuzes, for example).

The Swedish Army currently has more than 1,000 Bofors guns in service. They require continuous maintenance and modification to keep pace with developments in weapon technology. Sweden's credibility would be seriously harmed if we were forced to send artillery shells and guns to some NATO country for maintenance.

No More Materiel

2. The 1992 defense decision will give priority to the Army. And then Bofors know-how will be needed again. But without development contracts now, there will be no Swedish materiel to buy 5 years from now. The Armed Forces will then be forced to buy abroad whether they want to or not.

3. Bofors is Bergslagen's largest industrial employer. Following the government's heavy-handed cutbacks in mining and the steel industry in Bergslagen, there is a reluctance to go into next year's election campaign with decisions threatening the future of Bofors.

From the government's standpoint, a lot would be gained if the industry itself would undertake a necessary restructuring and planned cutbacks. In that way, the most important know-how would survive, at least in one firm.

The Defense Commission and the government have pointed out that coordination is needed in the following areas:

1. Between Saab and Bofors in the development and production of missiles.
2. Between Bofors and the FFV in the production of ammunition and gunpowder.
3. Between Bofors and the FFV in the production of torpedoes and naval mines.


The biggest problems are presented by missiles. Decisions will soon be made on a new heavy anti-aircraft missile, which will either be developed by Bofors or purchased directly from the United States, on a glide missile for the JAS, and on the very large upcoming investment in a Swedish radar-guided air-to-air missile (see Sunday's DAGENS NYHETER).

Nobel Industries is also strongly interested in a restructuring. Bofors currently accounts for only 20 percent of the group's turnover but consumes more than 50 percent of the group management's working hours.

Where the State Wants Coordination

Missile production

between Bofors and Saab
Karlskoga (Bofors)
Linköping & Göteborg (Saab)




Gunpowder production

between Bofors and FFV
Karlskoga (Bofors)
Akers Ordnance Plant
(FFV)




Ammunition production

between Bofors and FFV
Karlskoga & Lindesberg
(Bofors), Karlstad, Karlsborg,
Eskilstuna & Östersund (FFV)



Torpedoes and naval mines

between Bofors and FFV
Karlskoga (Bofors)
Motala (FFV)



Handicap

The smuggling scandals and the charges of bribery that are galloping through the mass media are a severe handicap to the entire chemical group. The chairmen of subsidiaries in other areas of business complain that group chairman Anders Carlberg does not have time to deal with their problems.

Bofors is currently very profitable--it is definitely Nobel's most profitable subsidiary. To a large extent, that is due to the large advances received on the deal with India.

But when the Indian order runs out in the early 1990's, the situation may be different. Nobel may again find itself with a heavy responsibility for employment in Karlskoga, which makes its living entirely from Bofors. Bofors may find it difficult to compete with Saab, Ericsson, and other more electronics-oriented firms for development money. If Bofors does not land some new development projects for missiles and ammunition, layoffs of salaried personnel may begin as early as next year.

Position of Strength

Carlberg therefore wants to use today's strong employment situation and profitability to negotiate with Saab and the FFV from a position of strength. His idea is to set up jointly owned companies for the production of missiles, ammunition, and so on.

But Carlberg's proposals have been curtly rejected by Saab. The very thought of becoming mixed up with the sullied name of Bofors is enough to send cold shivers down the backs of Saab's people. No one knows yet how many corpses are hidden in Bofors' closets--for example, whether RBS-70's were sold to Iran.

What Saab fears most of all is getting involved in a new violation of the U.S. embargo regulations on high technology. Sales to Iran would constitute such a violation.

The three Wallenberg firms--Saab, Ericsson, and ASEA [Swedish General Electric Corporation]--were the chief culprits in the smuggling of U.S. high technology to the Soviet Union by Datasaab and ASEA some years back. They have been struggling very hard to regain the trust of the United States and safeguard their access to key U.S. components.

Saab also claims that Sweden is not big enough for more than one missile firm. The development of armament for the JAS is going to swallow up a lot of funds. If there is no money for developing Army missiles, the problem is not going to be alleviated by bringing Saab into the picture. People at Saab's main office in Linkoping say that Bofors has a number of capable engineers who can very well go to work for Saab in Linkoping if there are no jobs in Karlskoga.

Skeptical

People at Saab are concerned that regional policy considerations with respect to Bergslagen and Bofors will tip the scale when it comes to allocating defense appropriations.

Saab's people are also skeptical of the way in which Nobel/Bofors is owned and managed. It is not good for one of Sweden's most important defense firms to be owned by one person--Erik Penser--who, moreover, lives abroad. Penser has also sold large blocks of Nobel's shares to all the top executives at Nobel. Nobel's group management owns all the stock--worth several tens of millions of kronor--in its own company.

That can create a climate in which private economic interests take precedence over industrial interests. It is especially unfortunate in a firm which has so many shady business practices to be investigated, says the Wallenberg-schooled guard at Saab.

The state-owned National Industries Corporation (FFV) does not see any urgent need for cooperation with Bofors. The FFV is buoyed by two big orders that will keep its plants busy through the end of the 1980's: the U.S. Army has

purchased 250,000 AT-4 antitank grenade launchers, while the FRG and Holland have purchased 250,000 antitank mines. Those two orders add up to a combined total of more than 2 billion kronor.

The FFV's products are simpler than Saab's and Bofors' and do not require as much in the way of development costs. With its big export orders, the FFV expects to be able to finance a large part of its development work on its own.

This means that it will be able to manufacture its own competitive products under its own steam pending the 1992 defense decision, when the Army will, among other things, assign priority to weapons for use against reactive armor, an area that the FFV specializes in.

Government Will Decide

The situation is that neither Saab nor the FFV is willing to enter into extensive discussions on cooperation with Bofors. First they want the entire Bofors scandal over and done with. They also want to see what kind of development contracts Bofors will get. That will be crucial in determining the balance of power among the firms.

So in the long run, it is the government that will have to decide which parts of the industry are going to survive by the way it distributes the hotly desired development contracts.

11798
CSO: 3650/23

EAST EUROPEANS SEEK ADJUSTMENTS IN EC TRADE POLICY, FREE TRADE AREA

The Hague NIEUW EUROPA in Dutch 3 Sep 87 pp 113-116

[Article by W. Rybowski, associated with the University of Gdansk, Poland:
"The EEC and Trade with East Europe"]

[Excerpt] An EEC-CEMA Agreement?

Describing the major institutional factors limiting European commerce can help explain the problems of EEC-CEMA trade. The question arises whether these problems can be solved in the framework of an EEC-CEMA agreement which would involve establishing a non-preferential trade agreement or an agreement between the EEC and separate CEMA members. In my opinion, however, the impact of such an agreement on trade would be limited. In exchange for political recognition of the EEC, the socialist countries cannot expect real concessions. CEMA and the socialist countries can only expect unilateral and superficial liberalization by gaining access to the EEC market. [Original unclear. The preceding sentence is an approximate translation.] In accordance with GATT regulations, the liberalization granted by the EEC would only eliminate discriminatory quotas. In addition, complete cancellation of export restrictions or their possible substitution by "voluntary" export restrictions is not likely given the excessive costs of unilateral sector-by-sector liberalization and the speed with which these concessions could be implemented (the EEC is already liberalizing all quotas with its autonomous trade policy). A non-preferential trade agreement between the EEC and CEMA, and consequently the non-acceptance of any agreement whatsoever on a mutual or preferential liberalization of trade, would only slightly increase EEC-CEMA trade or trade between the EEC and CEMA partners.

Consequently, it seems justified to conclude that only preferential trade agreements can benefit both the EEC and CEMA. In accordance with GATT principles, such preferential agreements between countries with a relatively high level of economic development have to assume the form of a free trade zone. This is an essential condition before a substantial reduction of EEC import duties on all products can be reached. A free trade zone would also increase the competitiveness of socialist country exports and reduce trade diversion effects. A mutual liberalization of EEC-CEMA trade would obviously produce restructuring costs in the socialist countries. However, these costs would remain limited because of the relatively high complementarity of the production structures of the EEC and CEMA and because of the existence of an

efficient production potential in the socialist countries. (Footnote 2) (The higher the complementarity of production methods, the lower the restructuring costs produced by free trade.) The EEC cannot avoid being interested in such a solution. (Footnote 3) (For socialist countries levying real import duties--such as Hungary and maybe Poland in the near future--reciprocity consists in the acceptance of quantitative import obligations comparable to those accepted by some socialist countries should they become GATT members.) The economic interest in such preferential and mutual trade agreements with CEMA or separate CEMA countries for the EEC results from its weakened competitive position in world trade (especially on the OECD market) and the necessity of developing export markets for its new high-tech products and expanding its non-EEC markets. In general it can be said that the EEC is highly dependent on trade. The EEC should acknowledge the benefits of increased exports of industrial products to East Europe. In exchange, the EEC would be guaranteed a regular supply of raw materials, energy, and certain semifinished products from CEMA countries.

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ECONOMIC GROWTH EXPECTED TO SLOW EVEN FURTHER

Lowest Among EC Countries

Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 29 Oct 87 p 7

[Text] Denmark will next year operate at a rock-bottom level. The growth rate will be negative, the unemployment rate will increase. Only the opening of the internal market of the EC will provide the possibility of an increase in the growth rate.

The Danish economy will be operating at the absolutely lowest level within the EC in 1988. The growth rate will become negative at 1.2 percent, while most of the other EC countries will achieve a positive growth rate, the Economic and Social Committee of the EC predicts.

The Economic and Social Committee is traveling to its various membership countries and, on that occasion, has revealed part of the report to be published by the Economic and Social Committee later in the year.

The figures for the Danish economy are based on the report of the Council of Economic Advisers of last spring, and there have been no major changes in the economic conditions since then.

Operating at Rock-Bottom Level

"The Danish economy will be operating at a rock-bottom level, and the unemployment rate will increase. It is true that the unemployment rate has not increased as much as had been expected for 1987, but we adhere to our prediction that the unemployment rate in 1988 will increase by at least 35,000-50,000 unemployed," says J. Søndergaard, an economist with the Council of Economic Advisers, who has been advising the Economic and Social Committee.

The Economic and Social Committee is composed of employers, salary-receivers, and wage-earners as well as a group of people from agriculture and the liberal professions. Michel Collas, France, who represents the French Employers' Association, is spokesman for the group.

The Internal Market

"The road for both Denmark and Europe out of the depression leads via the opening of the internal market of the EC. Europe will not be able to cope without that market in the competition with the United States and Japan," says Michel Collas.

In particular, he finds a coordination of the European interest rates a major objective and a coordination of taxes and indirect taxes a necessity.

"I am well aware of the fact that Denmark has special problems of coordination within the very area of taxation. However, that is not the most urgent objective. We are merely able to provide some general guidelines, and each individual country will then have to apply the guidelines that suit that country," he says.

He says that the research efforts of the European countries are a clear example of the reason why it will be necessary to achieve a better European cooperation.

"In general, we do not spend less funds in Europe on research than they do in the United States or Japan, but the European research efforts are often not too well coordinated, and that is why we lag behind our large competitors. If we coordinated our efforts better, we should be in a stronger position," he says.

Industrial Activity Down

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 87 Sect III p 10

[Article by Vøgg Løwe Nielsen and Kristian Hjulsgaard]

[Text] The turnover of the industrial sector dropped in the first half of the year by 3.5 percent. There are no indications that this trend will be reversed in the second half of the year.

The reversal in the industrial activity which occurred in the second half of 1986 has continued throughout the first half of 1987.

Even if the influx of orders from the export market has increased lately, it is by no means adequate to outweigh the decline that has taken place in the domestic demand.

Sales

In order for Danish industry to maintain its present--after all--fairly good activity level, the volume of industrial exports will have to increase quite considerably.

The entire turnover of the industrial sector (excluding the shipbuilding industry) of own goods and services--adjusted for price trends--was in the

first half of 1987 3.5 percent below the turnover in the first half of 1986.

As will appear from the graph, only the paper and graphic industries experienced a continued growth in their activities. Developments during recent months, however, were not quite as favorable as during the entire first half of the year.

The other major trades and industries have all had a turnover that is below the level for the first 6 months of 1986.

The largest decline in volume--by 11 percent--took place within the stoneworking industry, the pottery industry and the glass industry, which is viewed as a result of the marked slowdown within the building sector.

For the first 8 months of this year, commenced construction projects in terms of square meters declined by approximately 14 percent. The most marked decline (31 percent) took place within the housing construction sector. The construction sector comprising production and administrative buildings declined by well over 1 percent only.

Enterprises within the textile and clothing industry also experienced a marked decline in their turnover in terms of volume. For the first 6 months of 1987, their turnover was thus less than 9 percent below the turnover during the same period in 1986. A trend which, among other things, is closely connected with the slowdown and change of demand within the private consumption sector.


The Table

An examination of the main industrial groups, as shown in the table in this article, will show that the largest reduction in turnover has taken place in the enterprises which mainly produce means of production in the form of fixed assets. The investment goods industry thus experienced a decline in its turnover in terms of volume of nearly 7 percent.

The slowdown in the investment goods industry should be viewed in the light of the fact that the investments of the trades and industries reached their peak level following the marked increase in both 1984, 1985 and 1986.

In terms of fixed prices, investments in industrial enterprises with 20 or more employees were thus 13 percent higher in 1986 than the previous year. A growth rate which will hardly be reached in 1987, even if there will still be a pretty good expansion of the production machinery according to the preliminary investment study for 1987.

The market study for the third quarter showed a slight downward trend in the investment plans of Danish enterprises.



Only within the paper and graphic industry was the turnover in terms of volume, involving a moderate growth rate of 0.8 percent in the first half of 1987, above the level during the first half of 1986. The turnover in terms of volume of the entire industrial sector, excluding the shipyards, was 3.5 percent below the turnover during the first half of 1986.

Key:

1. Industrial turnover in terms of volume.
2. Changes in the first half of 1987 in percentages.
3. Paper and graphics.
4. Chemical industry.
5. Wood and furniture.
6. Food, drink and tobacco industries.
7. Iron and metal industry.
8. Textile and clothing industry.
9. Stoneworking, pottery and glass.
10. Total industrial sector.

Export Orders Improving

Main trends:

1. During the first half of 1987, the influx of export orders showed a more favorable trend than the influx of orders from the domestic market.
2. However, on account of the decline in economic activity among our most important trade partners, it will be necessary for us to gain new market shares or develop new markets to achieve an increase in our industrial exports.
3. The total turnover of the industrial sector, excluding the shipbuilding industry, measured in fixed prices, was in the first half of the year 3.5 percent below the level during the same period in 1986.
4. Among the main industries, only the paper and graphics industry experienced an increase in turnover during the first half of the year.
5. The most recent market study shows a slightly downward trend in the investment plans of Danish enterprises.

The trend in the volume of orders received by the industrial sector from abroad is more favorable than in the case of the domestic market.

Danish industry is now experiencing a more favorable trend in the influx of orders from the export market than in the case of the domestic market.

Seen in relation to the balance of payments, this is a positive trend. In the long run, it will become absolutely necessary for us to shift the emphasis of the industrial sector from domestic outlets to export markets.

Right now the marked slowdown in the sales in the domestic market causes an actual decline in the turnover of the industrial sector as well as a reduction in the employment rate.

By the end of July, the total employment rate within the actual industrial sector had thus dropped to 393,600 persons, which is a decline of 6,400 from the end of July 1986.

The Graph

The graph shows the change in percentages in the volume of orders received throughout 1986 and during the first half of 1987.

The figures of the graph have been computed on the basis of the volume of orders received in terms of current prices. The graph thus shows the change in percentages in the values of the orders received for each period of 2 months in relation to the same period of the previous year.

Throughout the entire 1986, the trend of the total volume of orders received (domestic market + export market) exceeded the trend of the volume of export orders received. However, as the tightening of the economic policy--among other things, the indirect taxes on energy in connection with the Easter package--took effect, this was reflected in a decline in the volume of orders received from the domestic market. The simultaneous small volume of orders received from the export market resulted in a marked decline in the total volume of orders received.

A rather favorable trend during the 4 months from March to June brought about an improvement in the volume of export orders received during the first half of 1987. During the latter part of the period, the volume of orders received was on a level with the volume of orders received during the same period in 1986.

Trend

It will be interesting to see if the volume of export orders received will remain at the same level as during the first half of the year. In the light of the developments in the economic activity of our major trade partners, it will be necessary for us to gain additional market shares on account of the general international economic stagnation.

The most recent uncertainty with regard to stock prices internationally may result in financing difficulties for the individual enterprises and thus lead to a further slowdown in investments. If so, this will result in a decline in the economic activity of the leading countries. As a result of which the Danish export enterprises will be operating in markets where the demand is at a lower level.

The Danish statistics on market trends are still behind schedule as a result of the Prosa [expansion unknown] strike within the Department of Statistics earlier in the year. It is therefore still difficult to evaluate the current activity within the business sector.


As far as the industrial sector is concerned, the most recent evaluation of the economic trends for the industrial sector includes the expectations of the enterprises with regard to the third quarter, which has now elapsed.

The weight given to the evaluations of the enterprises corresponds to their share of the total employment within the industrial sector.

In the study, the enterprises have indicated that after adjustments for seasonal fluctuations, they expect a fairly unchanged level of production but a lower level of employment.

With regard to the volume of orders received, it is interesting that 23 percent of the enterprises expect an increase in the volume of orders received, 13 percent expect a decline. And 64 percent expect the volume of orders received to be on a level with that of the second quarter.

The study, moreover, shows that large sections of the enterprises have ample capacity to cover even a sharp increase in the volume of orders received. A total of 23 percent of the enterprises thus indicate that, by the end of June, they had more than sufficient production capacity, and only 4 percent of the enterprises indicated that their production capacity at the time was inadequate.



The figures representing the volume of orders received by the industrial sector show that it is primarily the slowdown in the domestic demand that causes the decline in the activities of the industrial sector. The trend of the volume of export orders received lately has thus been more favorable than in the case of the domestic market.

Key:

1. Volume of orders received by industrial sector.
2. Change in percentages in relation to the same period of the previous year.
3. Total volume of orders received.
4. Volume of export orders received.

(1)

Industriens ordre- og omsætningssituation

(2) Procentvis ændring af 1. halvår 1987
i forhold til samme periode året før

(3) Faste priser	Omsæt- ningen	Ordre- udgangen	Ordrebe- holdningen
Investeringsgod industri (7) (Ekskl. værfter)	(4) - 6,7	(5) - 5,6	(6) - 10,8
Mellemproduktindustri (8)	- 1,2	- 1,2	+ 1,8
Forbrugerindustri (9)	- 3,7	- 3,5	- 3,6
Hele industrien (Ekskl. værfter) (10)	- 3,5	- 3,4	- 5,5

Key:

1. Volume of orders and turnover of industrial sector.
2. Changes in percentages during the first half of 1987 in relation to the same period of the previous year.
3. Fixed prices.
4. Sales.
5. Volume of orders received.
6. Volume of orders in hand.
7. Investment goods industry (excluding shipyards).
8. Semimanufactures industry.
9. Consumer goods industry.
10. Entire industrial sector (excluding shipyards).

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CSO: 36130019

HOME RULE GOVERNMENT Pawns FACILITIES IN WORST FISCAL CRISIS

Collateral for Large Loan

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Nov 87 p 4

[Article by Susanne Hegelund]

[Text] The economy of Greenland has been upset of recent weeks. But the 1988 budget operates with a surplus of 200 million kroner, and in the long view the economy has good prospects, says Hans-Pavia Rosing of Siumut.

"It is a shame for us to experience that Greenland is now pawning its things," is the comment made on the crisis in Greenland by Otto Steenholdt, the Greenland member of the Folketing for Atassut.

Greenland is undergoing its hitherto worst economic crisis, and during the last few days, the discussions in the rainy streets and lanes of Nuuk have concentrated on the quite unusual situation that the schools, among other things, have been pawned.

A mortgage-credit loan of 500 million kroner, mortgaging Greenland buildings and power plants will rescue the home rule government from an imminent fiscal crisis.

"But note that it is the most serious, but also the first economic crisis of the home rule government," says Hans-Pavia Rosing, Siumut. Till last month he was minister of finance of the Greenland government but was elected into the Folketing in the general election.

"In the long view, the economy of Greenland is quite sound. We are in the midst of a rapid development, in particular within our fishing industry, which was in a poor state when we took over the government from Denmark. The current liquidity problems are acute, and in the long run we shall not need to raise loans to the extent that we are now experiencing," Rosing says.

The reason for the liquidity crisis is the fact that Greenland did not earlier in the year avail itself of the possibility of raising loans for industrial purposes. Instead, the Greenland treasury was drained for its liquid assets for purchases and the renovation of trawlers and factories until the banks started complaining.

Greenland has, moreover, not succeeded in reaching an agreement on advance payments of the block grants for 1988 from Denmark.

The next step on Greenland's road to solve its economic problems will be foreign loans. The problems of the Greenland government so far have been that it has been difficult to ascertain who was raising the loans. The Greenland minister of finance has thus not always been aware of the fact that funds were borrowed from South Denmark.

"Certain people have probably been rather slick and clever," and "some mistakes have been made," sources state on the Greenland economy during the last couple of years.

Even if the Greenland treasury has been almost drained for liquid funds, the Greenland budget for the coming year is optimistic. A unanimous Greenland parliament has just adopted a budget for 1988 which has working profits of 200 million kroner and the possibility of raising loans of 400 million kroner at a maximum.

Paper Comments on Problems

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Nov 87 p 10

[Editorial: "Greenland in Difficulties"]

[Text] The Greenland home rule government is broke--to such an extent that there must be serious problems behind it. It is not an everyday event for a country to be broke several months before the end of the budget year. That does not seem to indicate that the financial planning works.

The important question in the evaluation is, however, whether it is a question of acute liquidity problems, which merely have to be solved, or whether it is also a question of structural and organizational economic problems which require drastic changes and long-term solutions. In the case of Greenland, it is a question of both.

The home rule government had predicted liquidity problems at the end of the year. They had also contacted local financial institutions to solve the problems. This solution was expected to have worked until the refinancing by means of foreign loans, which was under preparation, had been arranged. In a sense, the liquidity problem is thus not too serious, although a more vigorous economic leadership ought, of course, to have prevented it from arising.

It is worse, however, that the great need for loans apparently is associated with an impossible economic leadership form. The incomes of the home rule government are spent on operation and expansion of the public welfare system, such as schools, roads, etc. But, in addition, a net grant is earmarked to cover the deficit from the operation of the various industrial enterprises of the home rule government. This applies, for example, to the fleet of trawlers and the factories. The industrial enterprises are operated with a fairly high degree of independence from the home rule government. The enterprises are thus free to finance their investments in expansion by way of loans, as long as their investments yield profits and may be depreciated. Whatever may be the reason for these stipulations, they are a reflection of a wide gap in the economic policy, which is bound to lead to economic ruin. The desire for growth and expansion is understandable, but it may readily lead to a loss of the sense of the realities of the situation. And it is no secret that the experts have shaken their heads at the uncoordinated and ambitious Greenland venture in the industrial area. The fact that it, so to speak, takes place on the side of the state budget is quite untenable.

With the introduction of home rule in 1979, Greenland was furthermore given the task of arranging its own priorities, and the country was given the funds for it. The amounts to be earmarked for operation and expansion of the public welfare system will have to be weighed in relation to the need for industrial development. The development of the housing sector, where they are currently working with equally ambitious objectives as within the industrial sector, will also have to be included among the priorities. And here the failure of Greenland's efforts is actually similar to that of South Denmark--if that is any consolation.

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CSO: 36130032

BOOK: END OF WELFARE STATE IN SIGHT AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS MOUNT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 29 Oct 87 p 5

[Article by Hanne Dam]

[Text] The network of the Danes has collapsed with the result of new social problems--the researchers Jacques Blum and Michael Porsager have written a gloomy book on "The Other Denmark."

The Danish welfare society, referred to by the politicians, no longer exists. And will not exist at all by the year 2000 if the trend continues, Michael Porsager, a theologian, and Jacques Blum, a cultural anthropologist, claim.

They have together written the book "The Other Denmark," a social chronicle, which will appear in a few days from the Politiken Publishing House. The book provides a number of topical, gloomy facts, among other things, on our consumption of medications and alcohol. Our use of psychiatric help, our suicide rate, and our increasingly violent society:

One out of every seven Danes uses a sedative every day.

On the average, every Dane above the age of 14 each day consumes 2½ alcoholic drinks. According to official studies, the Danes today consume 2½ times more alcohol than in the sixties.

One out of every six Danes will in the future be registered as "psychologically ill."

An average of 40-60 people each day attempt suicide. Denmark has the second highest suicide rate in Europe.

One out of every nine Danes has experienced violence--actual or in the form of threats.

Just to mention a few examples.

The authors, who do not conceal the fact that they have written the book as a warning to the politicians who merely "talk money" and avoid dealing with the very issues, find that they have provided proof that we have developed a new social character in this country.

This appears most clearly among the young people, who are increasingly developing into narcissists. During the last 15 years, there has been a drastic increase in the two official diagnoses which, popularly translated, classify the narcissists. And, then, it is only the tip of the iceberg that is being registered, several psychiatrists state in the book.

Narcissists are people with very composite pathological pictures--with identity problems as a common trait.

Happiness is Many Things

A major American study recently appointed Denmark the world's happiest country. High incomes, social security, a high standard of housing and the absence of natural disasters were some of the factors which decided the outcome.

"On the basis of these measurements, the American researchers probably were right. On the basis of other factors, one may reach other results. It is our opinion that behind the pretty and idyllic fronts covered with hollyhocks is a different Denmark. It does not merely comprise the lower-class Denmark referred to by Svend Auken, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party, in reaction to Prime Minister Poul Schluter's statement to the effect that 'It goes without saying that things go incredibly well in Denmark.'"

"In the final analysis, 'the other Denmark' comprises all of us," Michael Porsager and Jacques Blum write in their book.

According to the two researchers, the abuse of medications, substances and alcohol is no longer an indication that the person concerned belongs to a particular class. The long-term unemployed, the single mother on reduced welfare payments or the young person who is unemployed are no longer the only ones accounting for such abuse. It also comprises the successful, young advertising agency chief on a high salary who keeps up his nerve-racking tempo by means of amphetamines. As well as the middle-aged attorney who may have been on the boards of corporations several times and who drinks excessively. "And it comprises all of the rest of us," the authors write.

And, Then, the Figures Are Even Higher

The exact figure of the number of people who actually swallow pills, drink alcohol or consult a psychiatrist is unknown. The official figures are on the increase, but to this comes the group of private patients who make payments to avoid being registered. At a meeting with the press yesterday on the occasion of the publication of the book, Jacques Blum stated that on the basis of inquiries among psychiatrists in private practice, the researchers estimated that 30,000 Danes consult private psychiatrists.

On the abuse of alcohol, it is known that it is the well-educated and the affluent who drink the most, but that it is the poor and those with the least education who are treated in outpatients' clinics and in psychiatric institutions.

Families Being Dissolved--Friendships Disintegrating

As reasons for the changed Danish social character, Michael Porsberg and Jacques Blum mention the changed set of standards in the society. The dissolution of the chief supports in the development of the human identity: the dissolution of the family and the disintegrating friendships.

The Danish network has collapsed. There is much to indicate that the family only to a minor extent provides support when the individual member needs it.

The individual person is left alone, with the result that his feeling of loneliness and emotional vulnerability will increase and develop into an enormous social problem.

An increasing number become mad or are on the brink of madness--not sufficiently to be confined but sufficiently mad to need professional help in order to cope.

"I will venture the claim that no professional help can replace a friend. The difference is the warm heart," Jacques Blum says.

"It ought to alarm any society if its citizens are unable to cope with their crises in life without professional help," says Michael Porsager.

An Increasing Number in Treatment

He says that the reports provided by the psychiatric wards of Denmark show that the country is in a state of crisis: An increasing number of Danes are undergoing treatment in some form or other. The number of commitments to mental hospitals has dropped, and the number of commitments for 24 hours has been fairly constant during the last 15 years.

However, the number of commitments for a number of hours, treatments in outpatients' clinics and consultations with psychiatrists in private practice has increased markedly.

"Adults are stressed and feel a need for success at work--otherwise, they will experience a real depression, as indicated in "The Other Denmark."

The aged "enjoy" their old age in old-age homes.

And the children spend the major part of their awake state in infant day nurseries and recreation centers.

If the trend which is in progress in this country continues, the projection made by Michael Porsberg and Jacques Blum shows, among other things:

"That no less than 12,000 Danes will be diagnosed as alcohol abusers under the psychiatric system by the year 2000. Well over 44,500 people will be treated at outpatients' clinics for alcoholics. That is an increase of 50 and 100 per cent, respectively, in relation to today.

An increasing number of abusers will be women, who will thus be paying the rather stiff price for their higher degree of equality. Women today account for 20 percent of the alcoholics treated in outpatients' clinics for alcoholics, but the percentage will be 30 percent by the year 2000, the projections show.

"That an increasing number of young people will be committed on account of psychological disturbances--as a result of the departure from the standard patterns of conduct and sex roles--including changes in the educational structures and authority."

"That an increasing number of young people will commit suicide."

"And that the intake of tranquilizers has increased to such an extent that it must be regarded as forming an integral part of our culture."

"I do not recall that the politicians have ever discussed values. We hope that they will do so after having read our book," Michael Porsager and Jacques Blum state.

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POLL REVEALS PREFERENCE GIVEN TO PRESTIGE OVER MONEY

Lisbon OLA/SEMANARIO in Portuguese 24 Oct 87 pp 37-43

[Text] Prestige? Power? Wealth? Which is most important and attractive for disguising the weakness of Man? In the course of the history of humanity power has been the basis for world conquest, wealth, happiness. Fortunately, however, everything leads one to believe that times have changed and that, in Portugal, this change in values has taken root. At least that is what we are told in a new opinion poll taken of the public opinion of the male population on the order of importance of these values: Prestige, Money and Power.

Money is More Important for Oportans than for Lisboans

Oportans list their values in the following order: first, and thus most importantly, Money (62 percent); second, Prestige (27 percent) and finally, Power (9 percent). On the other hand, there was a surprise: Lisboans, as usual more formal, listed Prestige first (54 percent), Money second (33.5 percent) and Power last (11.9 percent). Curiously, these statistics are constant for all ages of the interview subjects (except for those between 25 and 35 years, who list Money first). All are in agreement in placing Power last on their hierarchy of values. It is also clear that Lisboans as well as Oportans deny that power is a prerequisite for finding one's place in the sun. Prestige is, overall, the most efficient method of achieving this, according to Lisboans, as opposed to the opinion of Oportans, who retain their faith in money as the means of realizing all their dreams. Despite the contrasts between the two, Oportans (78 percent) and Lisboans (53 percent) believe that money will bring them happiness (Table II).

A house of one's own, a car, and vacation trips to the south would be the first great conquests dreamed of by the less fortunate, if they had money. Married men as well as the oldest (between the ages of 35 and 54) revealed that with more money they would prefer to buy a car. That is, of course, after having satisfied their dreams of traveling and buying a house.

A Rich Man is Happier, More Powerful and More Envied

Almost 55 percent of Lisboans polled believe that a rich person is happy and 75 percent of the Oportans agree. They also believe that power and wealth

always go together. What's more: Both provoke envy. Contrary to public opinion, a rich man is not necessarily "hated," state 48 percent of those polled between the ages of 25 and 44 years. However, he is "miserly," say 58 percent of those polled, while only 26 percent regard him as "generous."

With or without defects, that is, "miserly," "powerful" and "envied," what is certain is that a scarce 20 percent of those polled think that "money" does not bring happiness.

But we have spoken of "wealth" and of "being rich" without yet having defined what that means for our Portuguese men.

That is because opinions vary. Among those polled, 33 percent believe that to be rich is to have "more than 500,000 escudos per month," while for 26 percent it is enough to have "more than 200,000 escudos." And if some 10 percent would be rich with more than 100,000 escudos per month, 20 percent would only consider themselves satisfied with over a million.

In Oporto, however, there are more people who consider it necessary to have an income of more than 200,000 escudos per month to be rich. At least that is what 46 percent of the northerners state, while among the Lisboans only 19 percent declare themselves to be of that opinion. This does not mean that in Oporto people are less conformist, but in reality, while in that city only 3.5 percent would consider themselves rich with more than 100,000 escudos per month, in Lisbon some 12 percent of those polled would consider that income as indicative of wealth.

To be Well Known is a Sign of Prestige

As Dali said, "...they speak ill of me, but at least they speak of me..."

To have prestige is synonymous with being well known, admired. That is what the northerners (67 percent) and the Lisboans (72 percent) say.

"To have power over others" is another of the conditions which all unanimously declare to be essential in order to have prestige. Oportans, the young, and the single (some 38 percent), in particular, believe that. "To have a nice house," "to have a car," "to dress well," or "to have jewels" do not mean anything for our Portuguese men in terms of prestige (between 2 and 7 percent), with the exception of the lower middle class, for whom to have a "nice house" or "to be in the Guinness record book" are indicative of prestige.

And it is in the question of choices involved in having wealth and prestige that we find surprising responses: the majority (55.3 percent) prefer "to be poor with prestige" than to be "rich without prestige." This is as pronounced among Lisboans (57 percent)--Oportans are less clear in this respect, since only 46 percent prefer to be rich without prestige--as among the lower middle class (63 percent).

"If I Had Power, I Would Help Those Less Fortunate"

That's the truth. And that is the intention of some 30 percent of those polled as to the manner in which they would employ their power if they were to find themselves in a situation of authority; they would help other people. Could it be that all of this depends upon the good intentions of the conditional: "if I had..." "when..."?

The great truth, whether we like it or not, is that the essence of all that has been proposed, argued and discussed, is in other words the following: Money, power and prestige are the ideas which move and incite man at all times and throughout the course of his history.

That is without taking into consideration the fact that power has served, and for many still serves, as a means of self-affirmation, of masculinity. Keep in mind that power brings money which in turn brings authority and prestige. Who among us would deny these as values? You?

(1) **QUADRO I**

Entre o dinheiro, prestígio e poder, qual é para si o mais importante?

	(2) CIDADE			(3) IDADE			(4) CLASSES		(5) ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	(6) Solteiro	(7) Casado/Outros
(8) 1.º Lugar										
(9) Dinheiro	41.9	33.5	62.8	41.5	43.0	41.5	37.5	47.2	40.8	42.5
(10) Prestígio	46.6	54.5	27.1	49.3	39.6	49.4	48.2	44.8	44.4	47.8
(11) Poder	11.0	11.9	8.8	9.2	16.7	8.7	13.6	8.1	14.2	9.4
(12) S/Opinião	0.4	—	1.4	—	0.7	0.4	0.7	—	0.6	0.3
(13) 2.º Lugar										
Dinheiro	38.5	45.0	22.3	40.4	31.8	41.3	38.9	37.9	41.3	37.0
Prestígio	35.6	31.2	46.5	33.8	39.5	34.2	35.3	35.9	38.1	34.2
Poder	25.0	23.4	28.9	25.2	28.7	22.8	24.5	25.5	20.2	27.5
S/Opinião	1.0	0.5	2.3	0.6	—	1.7	1.2	0.7	0.4	1.3
(14) 3.º Lugar										
Dinheiro	17.8	19.5	13.6	18.1	20.6	16.1	20.3	14.9	17.3	18.1
Prestígio	17.1	14.3	24.1	16.3	20.9	15.4	15.8	18.7	17.1	17.1
Poder	62.6	63.9	59.3	65.0	55.8	65.3	60.9	64.5	64.1	61.8
S/Opinião	2.5	2.3	3.0	0.6	2.6	3.2	2.9	1.9	1.5	3.0

Key:

- | | | |
|--|------------------|------------------|
| 1. Table 1, Between money, prestige and power, which is the most important to you? | 6. Unmarried | 13. Second Place |
| 2. City | 7. Married/Other | 14. Third Place |
| 3. Age | 8. First Place | |
| 4. Class | 9. Money | |
| 5. Status | 10. Prestige | |
| | 11. Power | |
| | 12. No Opinion | |

(15) **QUADRO II**

Qual o rendimento mensal para se considerar uma pessoa rica?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(16) Mais 100 c./mês	9.7	12.2	3.5	12.2	12.3	7.1	3.6	16.9	11.7	8.7
(17) Mais 200 c./mês	26.8	19.1	46.1	30.3	26.5	25.4	19.3	35.7	25.9	27.3
(18) Mais 500 c./mês	33.5	32.4	36.4	35.5	28.3	35.6	37.5	28.9	38.6	30.9
(19) Mais 1000 c./mês	19.9	23.8	10.1	12.6	24.0	20.8	28.9	9.2	12.9	23.5
(20) Milhares contos	9.2	11.6	3.2	9.4	8.9	9.3	10.0	8.3	10.9	8.3
(21) N/Respondem	0.9	1.0	0.7	—	—	1.8	0.7	1.0	—	1.3

Key:

15. Table II. What monthly salary is necessary in order to be considered rich?

16. Over 100,000 escudos

17. Over 200,000 escudos

18. Over 500,000 escudos

19. Over 1 million escudos

20. Over millions escudos

21. No opinion

(22) **QUADRO III**

Considera que com mais dinheiro seria mais feliz ou menos feliz?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(23) Mais felizes	60.6	53.3	78.7	70.1	68.2	52.0	54.5	67.7	65.6	57.9
(24) Não mais felizes	37.9	46.2	17.1	26.8	31.8	46.3	42.7	32.3	32.7	40.6
N/Respondem	1.5	0.5	4.2	3.2	—	1.7	2.9	—	1.7	1.5

Key:

22. Table III. With more money you would be more happy or less happy?

23. Happier

24. Not happier

No opinion

(25) **QUADRO IV**
O que faria se tivesse mais dinheiro?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(26) Viajavam	55.6	61.5	40.8	43.5	58.6	59.3	62.1	48.0	53.1	56.9
(27) Compravam casa	52.4	53.3	50.1	52.5	65.8	44.8	50.8	54.2	52.8	52.2
(28) Compravam automóvel	31.4	33.9	25.2	42.8	28.8	27.8	30.9	32.1	42.1	25.9
(29) Vestir-se melhor	19.0	21.7	12.4	22.6	21.2	16.2	17.6	20.8	19.9	18.6
(30) Compravam jóias	7.6	9.0	4.2	6.0	4.7	10.0	8.8	6.2	2.9	10.0
(31) Desposit./Amealh.	30.1	28.7	33.6	25.2	19.1	38.4	30.0	30.1	22.8	33.9
(32) Bon. Restaurantes	15.0	18.4	6.7	9.2	18.4	15.7	17.0	12.7	11.5	16.9
(33) Investimento	8.3	6.0	14.0	19.6	6.4	4.3	5.3	11.9	16.3	4.1
(34) Compravam livros	0.7	0.3	1.6	1.1	0.7	0.4	1.2	—	1.9	—
(35) Divertiam-se	1.0	1.0	0.9	—	—	1.9	1.8	—	—	1.5
(36) Compravam iate	0.2	0.3	—	—	0.7	—	0.4	—	0.6	—
(37) Mesmo de agora	1.9	2.7	—	—	—	3.9	0.9	3.1	1.4	2.2
(38) Maior conforto	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(39) Outras	5.7	6.1	4.6	3.2	4.1	7.7	6.8	4.3	4.4	6.3
N/Respondem	1.3	1.2	1.6	—	—	2.6	2.4	—	—	2.0

Key:

- 25. Table IV. What would you do if you had more money?
- 26. Travel
- 27. Buy a house
- 28. Buy a car
- 29. Dress better
- 30. Buy jewelry
- 31. Save
- 32. Eat out
- 33. Invest
- 34. Buy books
- 35. Have fun
- 36. Buy a yacht
- 37. No change
- 38. More luxuries
- 39. Other
- No opinion

(40) **QUADRO V**

Em sua opinião, quais as características de uma pessoa rica?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	CI	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(41) Feliz	61.0	55.1	75.7	67.1	75.3	50.2	57.0	65.7	69.1	56.8
(42) Infeliz	20.6	24.8	10.3	16.7	12.8	26.8	20.1	21.2	15.9	23.1
(43) Generosa	26.7	27.8	24.0	19.5	25.7	30.6	25.6	28.0	20.8	29.9
(44) Avara	58.8	57.7	61.5	69.5	64.3	50.9	55.6	62.5	70.2	52.8
(45) Poderosa	58.3	57.5	60.2	66.6	58.2	54.6	53.9	63.5	63.8	55.4
(46) Corrupta	28.8	31.0	23.4	24.6	29.9	30.1	31.3	26.0	30.6	27.9
(47) Prestigiada	21.8	21.4	22.9	17.9	20.4	24.4	22.4	21.2	20.6	22.5
(48) Invejada	70.6	71.3	68.8	80.0	73.8	64.6	69.1	72.4	77.5	67.0
(49) Amada	34.7	36.3	30.5	30.4	48.4	28.8	28.8	41.5	37.9	33.0
(50) Odiada	45.0	43.1	49.6	52.9	37.2	45.9	46.5	43.2	48.3	43.2

Key:

- | | |
|--|-----------------|
| 40. Table V. In your opinion, what are the characteristics of a rich person? | 45. Powerful |
| 41. Happy | 46. Corrupt |
| 42. Unhappy | 47. Prestigious |
| 43. Generous | 48. Envied |
| 44. Miserly | 49. Loved |
| | 50. Hated |

(51) **QUADRO VI**

Quais as condições essenciais para que uma pessoa tenha prestígio?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	CI	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(52) Ser conhecida	51.0	53.0	46.1	44.4	48.4	55.5	51.0	51.0	46.6	53.3
(53) Apare. jornais/TV	18.6	16.7	23.3	12.1	15.9	23.1	19.6	17.5	12.1	22.0
(54) Ser admirada	70.7	72.0	67.6	81.1	72.7	64.9	69.3	72.3	79.7	66.0
(55) Ter uma boa casa	7.4	6.5	9.6	0.6	10.1	9.0	3.6	11.9	3.9	9.2
(56) Ter bons automó.	2.5	1.7	4.6	0.6	2.5	3.4	2.4	2.6	0.8	3.4
(57) Vestir bem/jóias	3.8	4.4	2.4	1.5	5.8	3.8	4.7	2.8	2.4	4.6
(58) Poder s/outros	23.2	18.6	34.5	38.0	22.7	16.7	23.4	22.9	36.1	16.4
(59) Estar «Guinness»	6.0	7.2	2.8	8.1	1.9	7.3	3.2	9.2	4.8	6.6
(60) Outras	2.7	3.1	1.6	1.6	2.7	3.2	3.3	2.0	2.6	2.7
N/Respondem	2.4	2.3	2.7	3.2	2.6	2.0	2.6	2.2	2.7	2.3

Key:

- | | |
|---|------------------------|
| 51. Table VI. What is necessary in order for a person to have prestige? | 56. Have nice cars |
| 52. Be well known | 57. Dress well/jewelry |
| 53. Newspaper, TV appearances | 58. Power over others |
| 54. Be admired | 59. Be in "Guinness" |
| 55. Have a nice house | 60. Other |
| | No opinion |

(61) **QUADRO VII**

O que é mais importante para si?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(62) Rico s/Prestígio	41.1	38.9	46.6	43.8	46.7	36.7	47.1	34.0	47.4	37.8
(63) Pobre s/Prestígio	55.3	57.5	49.6	53.6	51.2	58.3	48.7	63.0	50.7	57.7
N/Respondem	3.7	3.6	3.9	2.6	2.2	5.0	4.2	3.0	1.9	4.6

Key:

61. Table VII. What is most important for you?
62. Rich without prestige
63. Poor with prestige
No opinion

(64) **QUADRO VIII**

O que significa ter poder para si?

	CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
	Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(65) Ter dinheiro	12.4	9.5	19.6	14.9	12.2	11.4	12.5	12.2	12.5	12.4
(66) Ter autoridade	38.8	37.2	42.9	35.1	40.7	39.4	36.5	41.6	33.3	41.7
(67) Responsabilidade	10.2	13.6	1.8	10.0	4.8	13.3	11.2	9.0	7.1	11.8
(68) Tudo o que deseja	3.5	4.3	1.7	1.6	5.4	3.3	4.2	2.7	1.7	4.5
(69) Impor-se outros	5.3	7.2	0.4	3.6	7.3	4.9	7.5	2.6	9.6	3.0
(70) Fazer o que quer	13.2	12.2	15.6	14.2	20.7	8.5	14.9	11.1	15.8	11.8
(71) Ser alguém	2.2	2.9	0.4	2.2	6.1	—	1.4	3.2	4.2	1.1
(72) Prestígio	1.4	1.3	1.9	3.7	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.7	3.0	0.6
(73) Ser independente	7.0	3.1	16.9	17.0	2.8	4.9	6.0	8.3	12.2	4.3
(74) Ter saber	0.8	1.0	0.4	2.2	—	0.6	0.8	0.8	1.4	0.5
Outras	12.9	15.1	7.4	8.7	10.4	16.2	11.2	14.8	10.6	14.1
N/Respondem	4.1	4.4	3.4	4.3	6.3	2.7	4	3.7	2.4	4.9

Key:

64. Table VIII. What does it mean to have power for oneself?
65. Have money
66. Have authority
67. Responsibility
68. Anything one desires
69. Command over others
70. Do anything one wants
71. Be someone
72. Prestige
73. Be independent
74. Wisdom
Other
No opinion

(75) **QUADRO IX**
Se tivesse poder o que faria?

		CIDADE			IDADE			CLASSES		ESTADO	
		Total	Lisboa	Porto	18 a 24 Anos	25 a 34 Anos	35 a 54 Anos	A/B	C1	Solteiro	Casado /Outros
(76)	Ajudava pessoas	23.8	22.5	26.9	28.6	11.6	28.5	17.8	30.7	23.0	24.2
(77)	Melhorar o mal	9.3	11.8	3.2	10.0	4.6	11.7	11.3	6.9	8.7	9.7
(78)	Viajar	0.4	0.5	—	1.6	—	—	—	0.8	1.1	—
(79)	Vivia melhor	11.1	8.8	16.8	8.3	16.9	9.1	9.4	13.1	9.7	11.9
(80)	Subjugava outros	3.5	4.2	1.6	3.6	5.3	2.4	5.8	0.7	5.7	2.3
(81)	Orient. p/melhor	14.1	16.8	7.2	11.9	16.6	13.6	17.0	10.7	13.9	14.2
(82)	Vingava-se	1.5	1.8	0.7	—	5.3	—	0.7	2.4	2.1	1.1
(83)	Não mudaria	2.4	3.3	—	—	2.7	3.2	3.4	1.2	2.2	2.4
(84)	Melhor Ed./Saúde	0.5	0.5	0.7	1.5	0.7	—	1.0	—	1.0	0.3
(85)	Mudar muita coisa	8.6	7.9	10.3	4.4	7.1	11.4	7.1	10.4	3.0	11.6
(86)	Acabar c/armas	1.4	1.8	0.4	5.4	—	0.5	1.3	1.6	2.4	0.9
(87)	Exercia-o	4.8	5.7	2.4	7.2	0.7	5.9	3.9	5.8	6.5	3.9
(88)	Ser independente	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.5	1.4	—	1.4	—	1.5	0.3
(89)	Viver à rica	3.5	4.7	0.4	5.4	4.6	2.0	1.8	5.4	5.3	2.5
(90)	Não sabe	11.3	9.0	16.9	17.9	9.6	9.3	10.8	11.9	14.00	9.9
	Outras	8.4	5.9	14.5	7.5	13.0	6.2	9.9	6.6	8.6	8.3
	N/Respondem	1.3	1.5	0.7	—	3.9	0.4	2.4	—	—	1.9

Key:

- 75. Table IX. What would you do if you had power?
- 76. Help people
- 77. Improve the bad
- 78. Travel
- 79. Live better
- 80. Lord it over others
- 81. Be a better person
- 82. Get even
- 83. No change

- 84. Better education/health
- 85. Change many things
- 86. Abolish weapons
- 87. Exercise it
- 88. Be independent
- 89. Live rich
- 90. Don't know
- Other
- No opinion

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CSO: 35420011

POLL SHOWS GROWTH OF SOCIETAL VIOLENCE, AGGRESSIVENESS

35480027 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 5 Oct 87 pp 16-22

[Article by Victor Steinberg, with information from Jose Manuel Huesa: "Spaniards, Increasingly Violent"]

[Excerpts] A poll taken for this magazine agrees with the latest report submitted by the state's attorney general: We Spaniards are becoming increasingly violent and aggressive. Why?

The statistics are horrifying. During the last century and a half, someone has killed another person every minute. The information relates to the civilized West, and includes the victims of war, police action, accidents, and crime. But since 1930, during a period wherein the natural life expectancy has tripled, the figures on violent death have shot up: one death every 20 seconds.

According to the report from the state's attorney general, violence is increasing every day in Spain. The number of criminal proceedings initiated during 1986 for causes involving crime was 1,393,938; representing a 6.9 percent rise over the previous year. Crimes against property rank in first place, with 918,438 actions, 68.88 percent of the total.

The criminality category contains a particularly alarming sector: that of crimes committed against property with physical violence to individuals. In 1986, they totaled 131,506. In Madrid, according to a report prepared by DIARIO 16, one out of every three citizens admits to having been a victim of citizen's insecurity, and 50 percent say that they have been subjected to some type of street holdup. The report from the Attorney General's Office notes: "The social evil of citizen's insecurity bears a direct relationship to its frequency."

A total of 94 percent of Spaniards think that there is much or considerable violence in Spain, and 63 percent are of the opinion that it is greater now than 20 years ago, as a poll taken by DYM for CAMBIO 16 has disclosed.

Of the 2,000 persons polled, 40 percent associate ETA terrorism with the notion of violence, and 12 percent believe that the greatest manifestation of violence lies in the attitude of rejection voiced in a radical tone. Eleven percent of

Spaniards associate the idea of violence with robberies, holdups, purse-snatching, and larceny; while 10.8 percent associate it with crime, murders, death, bloodshed, and knifing.

Sociologist Amando de Miguel claims: "The fact that 75 percent of those polled associate violence with the four aforementioned categories indicates that people consider as violence the situations or acts conveyed by the news media, especially television; because, with the exception of attitudes of rejection, the other three responses do not stem from their personal experience."

The factors which usually cause disputes divide the opinions of those polled. According to 16 percent, differences in political ideas are the main cause; 15 percent think that it is unemployment; and 14 percent blame conflicting ideas in general. Only 13.6 percent regard the cause as money; and 12 percent, as drugs.

The highest level of intolerance for the ideas of others is represented by ETA terrorism, capable of killing anyone opposed to the armed group's principles; whether he be a former ETA member, such as "Yoyes," or the society as a whole, represented by Hipercor's customers in Barcelona.

What neither illiterates nor university graduates can forget is the ETA attack upon Hipercor. When queried about their recollections of violent acts, 57 percent spontaneously cited the Barcelona massacre, in which 21 persons were killed, burned by napalm; while 28 percent of those polled replied that their images were those of ETA attacks, without specifying them. Nearly 90 percent of the responses link the Basque terrorist organization with their recollections of violent acts.

Robberies and holdups hold third place, with 11.2 percent, among the spontaneous memories of violent acts. According to sociologist Enrique Gil, citizen's insecurity is caused by just one social sector: Young males, between 16 and 25 years of age, who failed in school, and who come from the working-class sections of large cities, and are doomed to unemployment."

Javier Moscoso, the state attorney general, offers a terrifying item of information: "A total of 90 percent of the juvenile delinquent population consume drugs, and 31 percent of them are addicted to heroin."

There have never been so many young males in Spain. This is a result of the so-called "baby boom," of the 1960's. The society cannot absorb them, rejects them, and alienates them. These unintegrated youths behave like alienated people: savagely. To be a lover of law and order, it would appear necessary to have a family and property to defend.

Of the 300,000 deaths occurring in Spain annually, violent deaths amount to over 16,000; in other words, 55 per 1,000 fatalities. In 1980, to consider a bad year in all respects, there were 124 victims of terrorism; a figure to

which must be added 13 ETA members killed; while victims of fatal traffic accidents numbered 5,017, with over 100,000 injured.

Since 1968, the year when ETA began its blood bath, murdering commissioner Manzananas, deaths resulting from terrorist acts have totaled 733, plus 124 terrorists killed in the confrontations. During the same time period (1968-1987), over 110,000 citizens died in traffic accidents, and the number of injured was nearly a million. According to data from the General Directorate of Police, during the last year counted, murders totaled 294; a more acceptable number than the 537 of the previous year. Suicides in 1983, the last year with published statistics, totaled 1,881.

Not all the violence ends in death, or involves crimes. Violence also exists in daily life. A total of 59 percent of Spaniards think that to threaten an employee with dismissal if he misses work again represents using much or considerable violence; while insulting someone for his differing opinions on a subject is assessed as very or quite violent by 54.7 percent of those queried. Only 19.5 percent believe that slapping a child who is behaving badly at home is using much or considerable violence.

With 3 million unemployed, the possibility of sending a worker out to swell the ranks of the jobless has become the most violent attitude possible in daily life. On the other hand, an insult, with a very high assessment from the standpoint of violent content, is considered by many intellectuals an escape valve toward which one must be tolerant.

Spaniards accept certain types of violence as necessary. Street protests against a government law are approved by 46 percent of those questioned, and only 23 percent consider them unnecessary. Conversely, violent police repression against a street demonstration is regarded as totally or quite unnecessary by 53 percent.

As for terrorism, 91 percent of Spaniards think that it is always reprehensible, regardless of the origin, and what its purposes may be; while 67 percent go further still: they do not consider it a legitimate method for fighting, not even against a dictatorship.

Among the national average, the terrorism of fascist groups (50.5) is regarded as being as reprehensible as that of the far left (45.6); but in the country's north central section, which includes the Basque Country, 42.2 percent consider the blue terrorism more reprehensible than that of the opposite type. Only 24 percent believe the terrorism of the extreme left to be more reprehensible. In the north, the overall condemnation of terrorism, regardless of its origin, amounts to 71 percent.

Televised films are usually mentioned as one of the main reasons for the violence in Spanish society: 61.9 percent of those interviewed think that the films shown on TVE [Spanish Television] actually have a great influence in this respect.

Nevertheless, all world literature, including that for children, fairy tales, and even lullabies, have violent themes; from Ulysses to Shakespeare, and including Little Red Ridinghood. And, in any event, it is not evident that the ETA members watch much television.

In the general attitudes regarding the issue of violence, 77 percent of Spaniards are of the opinion that no one is entitled to take justice into his own hands. Nor do they think that the national interest justifies a war. But 54 percent back the death penalty for crimes of terrorism. On the latter point, there has been a radical shift in public opinion, from 10 years ago.

It is possible that the change of views concerning the death penalty coincides with the ETA assessment that the enemy has ceased to be the system or the state, and has become the entire society; a society that feels completely threatened, and among whose members some are reacting by demanding the death penalty.

But the advocates of the "law of retaliation" are still in the minority. Only 42 percent of Spaniards think that the country's problems would be solved with a harder line, as opposed to 46 percent who think the opposite. And what is even more telling: half of the population declares "even though I may be right, I don't want to argue."

Key to Chart 1:

1. Violence and Society
2. Does violence exist in the present society?
3. Much or considerable
4. Little or no
5. Don't know/no answer
6. There is more or less violence in the society now than 20 years ago
7. There is much or considerably more
8. Same as before
9. Considerably or much less
10. Which factors are usually a cause of violent disputes between two persons or groups of persons (spontaneous response)
11. Politics
12. Unemployment
13. Opposing ideas
14. Money
15. Drugs
16. Envy
17. Soccer
18. Intolerance
19. Alcohol
20. Other responses
21. Note: The percentages total over 100 percent, since more than one response was allowed

(1) VIOLENCIA Y SOCIEDAD	
Existe violencia en la sociedad actual (2)	
Mucha o bastante (3)	94
Poca o ninguna (4)	4
No sabe-no contesta (5)	2
Existe hoy más o menos violencia que en la sociedad de hace veinte años (6)	
Hoy mucho o bastante más(7)	63
Igual que antes (8)	18
Bastante o mucho menos(9)	10
No sabe-no contesta (5)	
Qué factores suelen ser causa de disputas violentas entre dos personas o grupos de personas (respuesta espontánea) (10)	
La política (11)	16
El paro (12)	15
Ideas contrarias (13)	14
Dinero (14)	14
Droga (15)	12
Envidia (16)	5
Fútbol (17)	4
Intolerancia (18)	4
Alcohol (19)	4
Otras respuestas (20)	18
No sabe-no contesta (5)	14,2
NOTA: Los porcentajes suman más del cien por cien al admitirse más de una respuesta (21)	

Key to Chart 2:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Situations Associated With Violence | 14. Fear |
| 2. Spontaneous responses | 15. Social injustice |
| 3. Terrorism | 16. Unemployment |
| 4. Rejection | 17. Other responses |
| 5. Robbery | 18. Don't know/no answer |
| 6. Crime | 19. Note: The percentages total over 100 percent, since more than one response was allowed |
| 7. Fighting | |
| 8. Citizen's insecurity | |
| 9. Drugs | |
| 10. Rape | |
| 11. War | |
| 12. Street violence | |
| 13. Licentiousness | |

(1) HECHOS ASOCIADOS CON LA VIOLENCIA	
(2) (Respuestas espontáneas)	En %
Terrorismo (3)	40
Repulsa (4)	12
Robo (5)	12
Crimen (6)	11
Peleas (7)	10
Inseguridad ciudadana (8)	8
Drogá (9)	5
Violación (10)	5
Guerra (11)	5
Violencia callejera (12)	3
Gamberrismo (13)	3
Miedo (14)	3
Injusticia social (15)	3
Paro (16)	2
Otras respuestas (17)	7
No sabe-No contesta (18)	8

NOTA: Los porcentajes suman más del cien por cien al admitirse más de una respuesta. (19)

CASOS DE VIOLENCIA RECIENTE (1) QUE RECUERDE	
(2) (Respuesta espontánea)	%
Atentado de Hipercor (3)	57
Atentados de ETA (4)	28
Robos (5)	11
Terrorismo (6)	8
Asesinatos (7)	6
Peleas en la calle (8)	5
Otras (sucesos internacionales, otros atentados de ETA, fútbol, etcétera) (9)	42
No sabe-no contesta (10)	17

NOTA: Los porcentajes suman más del cien por cien al admitirse hasta tres respuestas (11)

(1) VIOLENCIA Y MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION			
Cómo considera el tratamiento informativo de los sucesos violentos (2)			
(6)	Excesivo	Correcto	Insufic.
En televisión (3)	20	39	35(5)
En radio (7)	12	53	21
En periódicos (8)	14	51	24

Las escenas de violencia en los telefilms influyen o no en el actual nivel de violencia de la sociedad (9)

Mucho o bastante (10)	62
Algo (11)	17
Poco o nada (12)	16

NOTA: Diferencias hasta el cien por cien en cada pregunta corresponden al no sabe-no contesta (13)

Key to Chart 3:

1. Cases of Recent Violence That You Recall
2. Spontaneous response
3. Attack on Hipercor
4. ETA attacks
5. Robberies
6. Terrorism
7. Assassinations
8. Street fights
9. Others (international incidents, other ETA attacks, soccer, etc.)
10. Don't know/no answer
11. Note: The percentages total over 100 percent, since more than one response was allowed

Key to Chart 4:

1. Violence and News Media
2. How do you regard the news treatment of violent incidents?
3. Excessive
4. Correct
5. Insufficient
6. On television
7. On radio
8. In newspapers
9. Do the violent scenes in television films influence the current level of violence in the society or not?
10. Much or considerably
11. Somewhat
12. Little or not at all
13. Note: Differences up to 100 percent in each question relate to the "don't know/no answer" category

Key to Chart 5:

1. Issues for Confrontation
2. Usually end in dispute
3. Produce more violent attitudes
4. Being fans of different soccer teams
5. Having contrary opinions on politics
6. Dispute between husband and wife over jealousy
7. Dispute over labor agreements
8. Disputes over traffic situations
9. Having different religious beliefs
10. Someone trying to get ahead of us in line
11. A neighbor bothering us with noise
12. Dispute between parents and children over poor school grades
13. Don't know/no answer

(1) TEMAS DE ENFRENTAMIENTO		
(4)	(2)	(3)
	Suelen terminar en disputa	Dan lugar a actitu. más violentas
Ser hinchas de distintos equipos de fútbol	51	59
Tener opiniones opuestas en política (5)	59	35
Discusión por celos entre marido y mujer (6)	39	31
Discusión de convenios laborales (7)	44	25
Discusiones en temas de tráfico (8)	41	20
Tener creencias religiosas distintas (9)	31	7
Que alguien pretenda adelantarnos en una cola de gente (10)	38	6
Que un vecino nos cause molestia por ruidos (11)	37	5
Discusión entre padres e hijos por malas notas en el colegio (12)	38	5
No sabe, no contesta (13)	4	7

Key to Chart 7:

1. Necessity for Violence to Prevent Greater Evils
2. Is or is not necessary
3. Totally or quite necessary
4. Somewhat necessary
5. Not very or not at all necessary
6. Hypothesis
7. Police violently repress a street demonstration
8. An armed group is formed to combat a dictatorship
9. A driver reacts violently toward another preventing his passage with his improperly parked vehicle
10. Police prevent a workers' lockup of a company affected by reconversion
11. Street demonstrations are held to protest against a government law
12. A person reacts violently toward a treasury inspector who threatened to fine him for fraud in his income declaration
13. A person reacts violently toward another who has just insulted him
14. A husband (or wife) reacts violently toward the spouse who is unfaithful to him or her
15. Note: The 100 percent complement in each response relates to the "don't know/no answer" category

(1) NECESIDAD DE VIOLENCIA PARA EVITAR MALES MAYORES (2)			
(6) Supuesto (3)	Es o no necesaria		
	Total o bastante necesaria	Algo necesaria (4)	Poco o nada necesaria (5)
Que la policía reprima violentamente una manifestación callejera (7)	18	21	53
Que se forme un grupo armado para combatir una dictadura (8)	30	17	41
Que un conductor reaccione violentamente ante otro que le impide el paso con su vehículo mal aparcado (9)	9	20	67
Que la policía impida un encierro de trabajadores en una empresa afectada por la reconversión (10)	11	17	60
Que se hagan manifestaciones callejeras para protestar contra una ley del gobierno (11)	45	23	24
Que una persona reaccione violentamente ante un inspector de Hacienda que le amenazó con multarle por fraude en la declaración de renta (12)	11	16	65
Que una persona reaccione violentamente ante otra que acaba de insultarle (13)	13	26	55
Que un marido (o esposa) reaccione violentamente hacia su cónyuge que le es infiel (14)	23	19	52
NOTA: El complemento del cien por cien de cada respuesta corresponde al no sabe, no contesta. (15)			

Key to Chart 8:

1. Level of Violence Associated With Different Hypotheses
2. Level of violence
3. High or considerable
4. Some
5. Little or no
6. Hypothesis
7. Threatening an employee with dismissal if he misses work again
8. Insulting a person for his differing positions on some topic
9. Punishing a son or daughter with not going out on the weekend for poor school grades
10. Responding to an insult with a threat
11. Turning the radio on high volume, knowing that it bothers the neighbors
12. Insulting a driver who has just gone through a red light
13. Demonstrating publicly on the street to complain of some injustice
14. Prohibiting another person from smoking in a closed place, claiming to be bothered by the smoke
15. Slapping a child who is behaving badly at home
16. Note: The 100 percent complement in each response relates to the "don't know/no answer" category

NIVEL DE VIOLENCIA ASOCIADO A DIVERSOS

(1) SUPUESTOS (2)

(6) Supuesto	Nivel de violencia (5)		
	(3) Mucho bastante	Algo (4)	Poco o nada
Amenazar a un empleado con despedirle si vuelve a faltar al trabajo (7)	57	17	22
Insultar a una persona por sus actitudes contrarias en algún tema (8)	55	25	18
Castigar a un hijo sin salir un fin de semana por malas notas en el colegio (9)	31	24	42
Responder a un insulto con una amenaza (10)	51	27	18
Poner la radio a gran volumen, a sabidas de que molesta a los vecinos (11)	48	26	24
Insultar a un conductor que acaba de cruzar un semáforo en rojo (12)	34	38	28
Manifestarse públicamente en la calle para reclamar por alguna injusticia (13)	18	19	59
Prohibir que otra persona fume en un local cerrado, alegando molestias por el humo (14)	16	24	57
Dar un cachete a un niño que se está portando mal en casa (15)	20	21	58

NOTA: El complemento al 100 por 100 de cada respuesta corresponde al no sabe, no contesta (16)

(1) OPINIONES SOBRE EL TERRORISMO

(3)

Key to Chart 9:

(2)	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo
	El terrorismo es siempre condenable, venga de donde venga y cualesquiera que sean sus fines (4)	91
Es más condenable el terrorismo de grupos fascistas (5)	51	36
Es más condenable el terrorismo de grupos de extrema izquierda (6)	46	41
El terrorismo puede ser un método legítimo para luchar contra un gobierno injusto o dictatorial (7)	21	67
El terrorismo también puede ser un método legítimo para conseguir fines políticos (8)	15	72

NOTA: El complemento al 100 por 100 de cada opinión corresponde al no sabe, no contesta (9)

1. Opinions on Terrorism
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Terrorism is always reprehensible, regardless of its origin and whatever its purposes may be
5. The terrorism of fascist groups is more reprehensible
6. The terrorism of extreme leftist groups is more reprehensible
7. Terrorism can be a legitimate method for fighting against an unjust or dictatorial government
8. Terrorism can also be a legitimate method for attaining political goals
9. Note: The 100 percent complement in each opinion relates to the "don't know/no answer" category

(1) PENA DE MUERTE, GUERRA, REPRESION	(3)	(4)	(5)
(2) Acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes frases	De acuerdo	En desacuerdo	NS/NC
Debe existir la pena de muerte para delitos de terrorismo (6)	54	36	10
La violencia sólo sirve para engendrar más violencia (7)	88	8	5
La guerra por motivos de interés nacional está justificada (8)	20	67	14
Nadie está legitimado para tomarse la justicia por su mano (9)	78	17	5
Si es necesario el Estado debe recurrir a la represión para mantener el orden (10)	41	45	14
No importan los medios con tal de conseguir los fines propuestos (11)	14	74	12
Los pacifistas nunca conseguirán nada (12)	28	51	22
Si es necesario hay que llegar a la violencia para defender una causa justa (13)	33	57	10
La violencia soluciona algunas cosas en la vida (14)	26	67	7
Sería totalmente incapaz de pegar a otra persona (15)	47	44	9
Aún en caso de sufrir un gran perjuicio nadie debería recurrir a la violencia (16)	52	36	11
Si es necesario hay que recurrir a la violencia para hacerse respetar (17)	25	68	7
En caso de conflicto la opinión del marido debe imponerse a la de la esposa (18)	18	75	7
Si hay que pegarle una bofetada a alguien no dudo en hacerlo (19)	24	68	8
Los problemas del país no se resolverían con más mano dura (20)	45	42	13
Aunque tenga razón prefiero no discutir (21)	50	45	5

Key to Chart 10:

1. Death Penalty, War, Repression
2. Agree or disagree with the following statements
3. Agree
4. Disagree
5. Don't know/no answer
6. The death penalty should exist for crimes of terrorism
7. Violence serves only to beget more violence
8. War for reasons of national interest is justified
9. No one is entitled to take justice into his own hands
10. If necessary, the state should resort to repression to maintain order
11. The means do not matter, provided the proposed ends are attained
12. The pacifists will never accomplish anything
13. If necessary, one must resort to violence to defend a just cause
14. Violence solves some things in life
15. I would be totally incapable of striking another person
16. Even if I should suffer great harm, I should never resort to violence
17. If necessary, one must resort to violence to gain respect
18. In case of a dispute, the husband's opinion should prevail over that of the wife
19. If I had to hit someone, I would not hesitate to do so
20. The country's problems cannot be solved with a harder-line policy
21. Even though I may be right, I don't want to argue

(1) EXPERIENCIA PERSONAL (2)	
Personalmente ha sido víctima de alguna agresión en los últimos cinco años:	
(3) Si	12
No	88
Que tipo de agresión física ha sufrido (a quienes contestaron «si» en la anterior pregunta): (4)	
Atraco (5)	36
Pelea (6)	20
Le pegaron (7)	14
Cargas policía (8)	5
Discusión por tráfico (9)	2
Otras respuestas (10)	4
No sabe, no contesta (11)	25

Key to Chart 11:

1. Personal Experience
2. Have you, personally, been a victim of an attack during the last 5 years?
3. Yes
4. What type of physical attack have those who answered "yes" in the foregoing question suffered?
5. Holdup
6. Fight
7. They hit him or her
8. Police action
9. Traffic dispute
10. Other responses
11. Don't know/no answer

Technical Record of the Poll:

Universe: Individuals between ages 16 and 65, residing in municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants. Sample: 1,955 personal interviews in domicile. Field work: from 6 to 20 July 1987. Execution: DYM Institute, exclusively for CAMBIO 16.

2909

YOUTH SURVEY SHOWS NO PARENTAL INFLUENCE ON IDEOLOGY

35480031 Madrid YA in Spanish 9 Nov 87 pp 18-19

[Text] Spanish youth claim to be more independent and responsible, even while living in their parents' homes, according to a study made by Sigma-2 in an exclusive poll taken for YA on occupation and family among young people. The study focuses on parent-child relations and the parents' intervention in the choice of their children's occupations, work activity, relations with the opposite sex, and attitude toward an annoying act.

The poll classifies the population into adolescents (between 14 and 18 years old), youth (from 19 to 24), and adults (from 25 to 30); as well as making a distinction between steady worker, temporary worker, unemployed, housewife, and student. Another point covered in the study is whether the young person lives in the parents' home or independently.

Most of those queried (37.6 percent) think that, in the relations with their parents, sexual topics are of little or no concern to them. The males and females think alike, although adolescents feel slightly more affected. Among those residing with their parents, only 7.6 percent claim that they are affected "greatly." Most of the latter also consider themselves "little" affected in the relations with their parents because of the latter's strictness; which goes to show that parents' attitudes today are more understanding toward the problems of children and youth as a whole.

The economy is another important feature. When it is time to express an opinion on the way in which the money at their disposal concerns them, most of the adolescents and youth respond, "little," while 29.8 percent of the same population, if unemployed, say "greatly."

Work or lack of work also wields a considerable influence on the relations between parents and children. In a state of massive unemployment such as our country is experiencing, the poll shows that 42.8 percent of the unemployed youth feel very much affected personally; while the majority of those with jobs consider themselves "not at all" affected.

Political Ideas

The parents' positions on politics and trade unions do not influence the relations with their children. The percentage of those believing that their parents may think as they deem most fitting is 58.3, while a similarly high rate also believe that difficulties in communicating with them affect them "little" or "not at all."

Contrary to the widespread view that parents usually have a decisive influence on the choice of their children's occupation in most instances, a considerable majority respond that their parents have not intervened when it was time to select their occupation. In the classification by male and female, the percentages are similar (66.1 and 66.3, respectively); while 63.8 percent of adolescents claim that there was no intervention, and 71.7 percent of the youth hold the same opinion.

The poll discloses an atmosphere of freedom for children to make a choice. The percentages are significant, and all the more so when two thirds of the children live in their parents' homes. Living under the same roof, which presupposes economic dependence, has not deprived them of freedom to choose.

Money Counts

The economic aspect of a job counts completely in the selection of the activity. Generally speaking, 56 percent are of the opinion that the money earned in a job counts "greatly" when it is time to choose; and 37.8 percent think that it counts "considerably," while only 4.4 percent claim that it counts only a "little."

In the comparison between the sexes, males have a slightly more money-oriented feeling. The percentage of males who feel more influenced by money is greater; but, when the numbers for "greatly" and "considerably" are combined, males and females are alike.

A good working environment affects 56.02 percent of those polled "greatly," when they must select a job. Females consider this factor more important than males do. Together with the good environment, interesting personal relations crop up with the larger percentage when it is time to choose a work activity, as does the opportunity offered them for having free time. The males value this to a greater extent than the females; and, strangely enough, the unemployed more than those who have employment.

Stable Couple

A total of 58.8 percent respond "yes" to the question as to whether they think that the stable couple is the best type of relationship with persons of the opposite sex. Among housewives, the "yes" rises to 80.3 percent. Nevertheless, the majority think that, when one has a relationship as a couple, contact with the usual friends is lost.

Finally, 44.2 percent forgive their parents more readily than they do their siblings. Friends come after parents.

Technical Record

Universe: youths aged from 14 to 30 years

Scope: Spain

Sample: 800 interviews, distributed according to municipalities. The maximum statistical error of the data procured in this sample is ± 3.5 percent, for a confidence level of 95.5 percent, and $p/q = 50/50$, according to the Arkin and Colton tables.

Selection of units according to the following procedure:

Multi-age random routes within each zone, to determine the interview site.

Also random selection of the individual to be interviewed at the meeting place. This selection has been supplemented with the corrective system of quotas based on sex, age, and occupation, according to the real population.

Interviews: held personally, at sites selected randomly.

Control and supervision: A dual control was carried out during the field work: assistant supervision by various team leaders, and checking of data consistency through the use of a program of their own.

Date of field work: 21 and 22 October 1987

Implementation: Sigma-2

Direction: Carlos Malo de Molina

Key to Tables 1 and 2:

1. Do you believe that when one has a couple relationship he loses contact with the people with whom he usually associated?
2. Sex
3. Age
4. Occupation
5. Do you live with your parents?
6. Male
7. Female
8. Years
9. Steady work
10. Temporary work
11. Unemployed
12. Housewife
13. Student
14. Yes
15. No, would maintain the same
16. No, would also have hers
17. Don't know/no answer
18. Do you think that a stable couple is the best relationship for you with persons of the opposite sex?

(1) ¿Crees que cuando uno se relaciona en pareja pierde el contacto con las personas con las que habitualmente trataba? (5)

	Total %	Sexo (2)		Edad (3)			Ocupación (4)					¿Vives con tus padres?	
		(6) Homb. %	(7) Mujer %	14-18 años %	19-24 años %	25-30 años %	(9) Trabajo fijo %	(10) Trabajo even. %	(11) Parado %	(12) Ama de casa %	(13) Estu- diente %	(14)	
												SI %	NO %
Si (14)	38,7	41,1	36,2	39,4	39,0	37,5	41,8	41,2	47,7	33,2	34,4	39,5	36,4
No, mantendrá las mismas (15)	28,2	32,2	24,3	32,5	24,4	27,7	24,6	31,9	24,0	21,7	31,2	28,7	26,9
No, contará también con las de ella (16)	30,8	24,5	37,1	24,6	34,5	33,6	32,0	26,0	26,4	42,5	31,2	29,6	34,3
NS/NC (17)	2,3	2,3	2,4	3,5	2,1	1,2	1,5	0,9	1,8	2,6	3,2	2,3	2,5

(18) ¿Crees que la pareja estable es la mejor forma de relacionarte con personas del otro sexo? (5)

	Total %	Sexo (2)		Edad (3)			Ocupación (4)					¿Vives con tus padres?	
		(6) Homb. %	(7) Mujer %	14-18 años %	19-24 años %	25-30 años %	(9) Trabajo fijo %	(10) Trabajo even. %	(11) Parado %	(12) Ama de casa %	(13) Estu- diente %	(14)	
												SI %	NO %
Si (14)	58,8	57,6	59,9	56,7	57,0	63,0	58,1	52,4	61,2	80,3	56,6	57,7	61,8
No	37,2	37,9	36,4	37,4	38,1	36,0	40,8	41,5	36,0	19,7	37,5	37,1	37,3
NS/NC (17)	4,1	4,4	3,7	5,9	5,0	1,0	1,1	6,1	2,8	—	5,9	5,2	0,9

(1) ¿Han intervenido tus padres al elegir tu profesión? (5)

(15)	Total %	Sexo (2)		Edad (3)			Ocupación (4)					¿Vives con tus padres?	
		(6) Homb. %	(7) Mujer %	14-18 años %	19-24 años %	25-30 años %	(9) Trabajo fijo %	(10) Trabajo even. %	(11) Parado %	(12) Ama de casa %	(13) Estu- diente %	(14)	
												SI %	NO %
Si, positivamente	23,1	23,3	22,8	23,7	22,1	23,4	25,3	21,2	20,3	21,4	23,9	22,7	24,1
Si, negativamente (16)	7,6	6,9	8,2	6,8	4,2	12,0	11,0	5,4	12,8	15,6	3,6	7,3	8,2
No	66,2	66,1	66,3	63,8	71,7	62,9	61,5	72,4	63,7	63,1	67,9	66,5	65,5
NS/NC (17)	3,1	3,7	2,6	5,7	2,0	1,6	2,3	1,0	3,5	—	4,6	3,4	2,2

Key to Table 3:

1. Have your parents intervened in choosing your occupation?
2. Sex
3. Age
4. Occupation
5. Do you live with your parents?
6. Male
7. Female
8. Years
9. Steady work
10. Temporary work
11. Unemployed
12. Housewife
13. Student
14. Yes
15. Yes, positively
16. Yes, negatively
17. Don't know/no answer

(1) A la hora de elegir una actividad laboral, ¿cómo te afecta? (5)

		Total %	Sexo (2)		Edad (3)			9) (10) Ocupación (4)					¿Vives con tus padres?	
			(6) Homb. %	(7) Mujer %	14-18 años %	19-24 años %(8)	25-30 años %	Trabajo fijo %	Trabajo even. %	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14) SI %	NO %
										Parado %	Ame de casa %	Estu- diente %		
QUE (15) SE GANE DINERO	Mucho (16)	56,5	62,8	50,3	56,3	51,8	61,9	58,5	60,3	62,6	51,7	53,3	56,7	56,1
	Bastante (17)	37,8	32,1	43,4	36,3	42,4	34,4	36,4	36,5	32,9	46,7	39,1	37,3	39,2
	Poco (18)	4,4	3,7	5,1	5,3	4,8	3,1	3,8	3,2	3,8	—	6,1	4,6	4,0
	Nada (19)	0,8	1,3	0,3	1,6	0,7	—	1,4	—	0,8	—	0,9	1,1	—
	NS/NC (20)	0,5	—	0,9	0,4	0,4	0,6	—	—	—	2,6	0,5	0,4	0,7
EL BUEN AMBIENTE (21) LABORAL	Mucho	56,0	51,9	60,0	52,7	61,2	53,8	55,1	58,0	54,7	59,1	55,6	58,2	49,7
	Bastante	38,3	40,6	36,0	41,7	34,0	39,3	39,1	34,2	37,4	36,8	39,8	36,7	42,7
	Poco	4,8	6,5	3,0	5,2	4,1	5,0	4,8	6,4	7,1	1,8	4,0	4,6	5,3
	Nada	0,6	1,0	0,3	0,4	0,4	1,2	1,0	1,4	0,8	—	0,3	0,4	1,5
	NS/NC	0,3	—	0,6	—	0,4	0,6	—	—	—	2,6	0,3	0,2	0,7
QUE TE OFREZCA (22) RELACIONES PERSONALES INTERESANTES	Mucho	40,0	39,2	40,9	35,9	43,1	41,2	40,0	39,6	40,9	43,4	39,4	40,2	39,7
	Bastante	39,6	40,9	38,3	42,4	40,1	36,1	32,7	43,5	36,9	38,9	42,6	40,4	37,5
	Poco	15,8	15,3	16,4	18,5	12,1	17,1	20,9	13,2	14,3	15,1	14,9	14,8	18,7
	Nada	3,8	4,2	3,5	2,8	3,8	5,0	6,4	3,7	6,4	—	2,5	4,0	3,4
	NS/NC	0,7	0,5	0,9	0,4	1,0	0,6	—	—	1,5	2,6	0,6	0,6	0,7
(23) QUE SEA EL TRA- BAJO AL QUE TE HAS PREPA- RADO PROFE- SIONALMENTE	Mucho	63,2	57,5	68,8	62,2	66,2	61,0	62,9	59,8	53,3	56,0	68,8	63,1	63,5
	Bastante	25,9	30,8	21,2	27,3	23,1	27,3	21,8	28,6	31,5	33,1	23,8	26,8	23,3
	Poco	7,9	9,3	6,5	8,0	8,3	7,3	8,9	9,3	11,1	5,8	6,3	7,5	9,1
	Nada	2,7	2,4	3,0	2,0	2,5	3,7	5,7	2,3	4,0	2,6	1,0	2,5	3,4
	NS/NC	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,4	—	0,6	0,7	—	—	—	2,6	—	0,2
QUE TE (24) OFREZCA TIEMPO LIBRE	Mucho	48,5	50,7	46,3	48,0	47,4	50,2	47,5	49,8	54,7	48,1	46,6	48,7	47,8
	Bastante	42,4	40,4	44,5	43,6	43,4	40,2	47,6	36,7	32,0	41,8	45,7	42,0	43,7
	Poco	6,7	7,1	6,3	6,4	6,5	7,2	4,9	10,3	8,1	6,2	6,2	7,0	5,8
	Nada	1,7	1,6	1,7	1,2	2,0	1,7	—	4,2	5,2	2,5	0,3	1,6	1,9
	NS/NC	0,7	0,3	1,1	0,8	0,7	0,6	—	—	—	2,6	1,2	0,7	0,7
QUE TE ABRA OTROS (25) CAMINOS PROFESIONALES	Mucho	55,9	54,3	57,5	52,6	54,1	61,5	58,2	61,3	61,3	63,4	53,4	52,1	66,7
	Bastante	35,1	37,4	32,9	38,2	33,5	33,6	37,9	34,4	38,3	24,7	34,9	37,6	28,3
	Poco	6,3	6,3	6,2	6,4	9,7	2,4	4,0	4,4	6,0	6,8	7,9	7,2	3,6
	Nada	2,0	1,2	2,8	2,0	2,1	1,9	—	—	4,4	2,6	2,6	2,4	0,7
	NS/NC	0,7	0,8	0,6	0,8	0,6	0,6	—	—	—	2,6	1,1	0,7	0,7

Key to Table 4:

1. What influences you when choosing a work activity?
2. Sex
3. Age
4. Occupation
5. Do you live with your parents?
6. Male
7. Female
8. Years
9. Steady work
10. Temporary work
11. Unemployed
12. Housewife
13. Student
14. Yes
15. Earning money
16. Greatly
17. Considerably
18. Little
19. Not at all
20. Don't know/no answer
21. Good work environment
22. Offering you interesting personal relations
23. Is the work for which you have been trained occupationally
24. Offering you free time
25. Opening other occupational careers for you

(1) ¿Cómo te afectan personalmente a ti en las relaciones con tus padres?

		(5)												
		Total %	Sexo (2)		Edad (3)			Ocupación (4)					¿Vives con tus padres?	
			(6) Homb. %	(7) Mujer %	14-18 años %	19-24 años %(8)	25-30 años %	(9) Trabajo fijo %	(10) Trabajo even. %	(11) Parado %	(12) Ama de casa %	(13) Estu- diante %	(14) SI NO % %	
SU RIGIDEZ (15)	Mucho (16)	19,4	16,3	22,6	22,2	17,2	18,9	18,4	23,9	13,8	13,2	21,4	21,3	14,3
	Bastante (17)	22,5	20,4	24,6	22,7	22,6	22,1	19,0	31,2	18,5	17,9	23,5	24,1	17,8
	Poco (18)	33,3	36,9	29,7	37,1	33,8	28,5	30,0	28,0	38,0	31,1	35,3	34,9	28,7
	Nada (19)	23,9	25,5	22,3	17,3	26,0	28,7	30,8	16,9	29,7	37,8	18,6	19,2	36,9
	NS/NC (20)	1,0	1,0	0,9	0,7	0,4	1,9	1,9	—	—	—	1,3	0,5	2,2
LOS TEMAS SEXUALES (21)	Mucho	7,3	8,6	6,1	5,6	5,8	10,9	9,6	8,2	9,6	2,6	6,1	7,6	6,6
	Bastante	19,0	15,0	22,9	20,9	20,3	15,5	14,3	20,9	13,2	19,4	22,4	21,0	13,4
	Poco	34,5	37,2	31,9	35,6	36,7	31,0	30,9	35,4	31,4	21,2	39,2	35,7	31,4
	Nada	37,6	37,5	37,7	35,5	36,2	41,3	43,3	34,5	45,0	56,8	30,2	34,1	47,2
	NS/NC	1,6	1,7	1,4	2,4	1,1	1,2	1,9	1,0	0,8	—	2,1	1,6	1,5
LAS RELACIONES PERSONALES (22)	Mucho	18,7	18,2	19,3	18,1	20,4	17,6	15,9	13,1	20,5	14,0	22,1	21,2	11,9
	Bastante	31,3	30,5	32,2	29,3	32,5	32,1	30,8	40,7	24,7	27,3	31,4	32,5	28,1
	Poco	28,3	28,2	28,3	31,5	24,0	29,4	26,1	33,2	27,3	32,9	27,3	27,7	30,0
	Nada	20,8	22,2	19,5	20,2	22,6	19,6	25,2	13,0	27,5	25,7	18,2	18,2	28,2
	NS/NC	0,8	0,9	0,8	0,7	0,6	1,2	1,9	—	—	—	1,0	0,5	1,8
LOS HORARIOS DE ENTRADA Y SALIDA (23)	Mucho	15,3	10,1	20,5	20,5	13,7	11,4	11,4	9,8	19,8	9,6	18,4	19,4	4,1
	Bastante	17,3	15,4	19,2	21,6	18,4	11,4	9,3	17,8	19,2	5,6	22,3	20,6	8,0
	Poco	25,6	25,2	26,1	33,6	26,8	15,8	17,7	29,2	16,2	18,9	32,4	29,9	13,8
	Nada	40,4	47,7	33,2	22,8	40,4	59,6	59,7	41,3	44,7	66,0	25,3	29,3	71,4
	NS/NC	1,3	1,5	1,1	1,5	0,7	1,9	1,9	1,9	—	—	1,5	0,8	2,7
EL DINERO DE QUE (24) DISPONES	Mucho	21,6	20,6	22,6	22,0	22,8	19,9	12,4	20,5	29,8	10,7	25,5	25,6	10,6
	Bastante	24,4	26,8	22,1	33,4	24,3	14,8	10,5	13,1	35,9	8,8	33,4	29,2	11,2
	Poco	25,4	23,5	27,2	27,6	30,3	17,5	26,9	25,5	19,8	22,4	26,9	29,0	15,3
	Nada	27,3	27,9	26,6	16,2	21,2	46,0	47,3	38,1	13,7	58,1	13,6	15,2	60,9
	NS/NC	1,3	1,1	1,5	0,7	1,4	1,9	2,9	2,7	0,8	—	0,5	1,1	1,9
EL TRABAJO O LA FALTA DE TRABAJO (25)	Mucho	21,3	23,3	19,3	19,2	20,0	25,1	11,6	19,8	42,8	18,9	19,8	24,7	11,9
	Bastante	23,4	24,7	22,2	24,9	28,0	16,9	21,5	26,9	32,5	5,7	23,4	27,5	12,1
	Poco	21,0	18,9	22,2	26,9	22,8	12,8	16,2	21,7	12,8	17,8	26,4	22,8	16,1
	Nada	31,6	30,1	33,1	24,6	27,3	44,0	48,8	30,8	12,0	57,6	25,8	22,7	56,7
	NS/NC	2,6	1,9	3,2	4,4	2,0	1,2	1,9	0,9	—	—	4,7	2,3	3,4
LAS APTITUDES POLITICAS, SINDICALES, (26)	Mucho	5,2	5,7	4,7	3,0	5,5	7,2	7,8	4,4	6,2	1,3	4,5	5,0	5,6
	Bastante	11,2	10,8	11,6	9,0	8,4	16,6	14,6	16,4	14,4	5,8	7,9	11,9	9,3
	Poco	23,6	22,4	24,9	21,3	25,9	23,7	20,9	27,4	18,4	28,0	24,7	23,6	23,7
	Nada	58,3	59,1	57,5	63,1	59,8	51,2	54,8	50,9	61,0	65,1	60,1	57,7	59,9
	NS/NC	1,7	2,0	1,5	3,6	0,4	1,2	1,9	1,0	—	—	2,7	1,8	1,5
LAS (27) DIFICULTADES DE COMUNICARSE CON ELLOS	Mucho	16,2	14,8	17,6	18,9	15,8	13,8	11,3	13,8	21,5	15,1	17,7	19,5	7,0
	Bastante	19,6	18,6	20,5	20,7	19,0	19,1	18,5	21,6	21,0	13,5	20,0	20,5	17,1
	Poco	28,8	28,5	29,2	23,9	31,9	30,9	30,2	33,8	22,4	33,0	28,0	28,0	31,1
	Nada	33,5	35,7	31,4	34,3	32,0	34,4	37,4	30,8	35,1	38,4	31,2	30,4	42,1
	NS/NC	1,8	2,4	1,3	2,3	1,4	1,9	2,5	—	—	—	3,0	1,5	2,7

Key to Table 5:

1. How are you personally affected by the relations with your parents?
2. Sex
3. Age
4. Occupation
5. Do you live with your parents?
6. Male
7. Female
8. Years
9. Steady work
10. Temporary work
11. Unemployed
12. Housewife
13. Student
14. Yes
15. Their strictness
16. Greatly
17. Considerably
18. Little
19. Not at all
20. Don't know/no answer
21. Sexual matters
22. Personal relations
23. Schedules for entering and leaving
24. The money that you have available
25. Work, or lack of work
26. Political, trade union capacities
27. Difficulties in communicating with them

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END

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