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Southeast Asia Report

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SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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DAILY HITS U.S. ON NUCLEAR TREATY REJECTION

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 9 Feb 87 p 8

[Editorial: "America's Pacific Mistake"]

[Text]

IT IS said that Mr Shultz and the US State Department were not entirely hostile to the Rarotonga Treaty. But sadly, the arguments against the treaty easily prevailed in Washington, and relations between the US and the Pacific's island states will be further frayed. Washington's reservations are obvious. The treaty is directly aimed at the nuclear testing program of France, one of America's most important allies. The US is concerned about doing anything that may encourage less sensitively worded nuclear-free zone treaties in strategically more important parts of the world. The Defence Department is said to have also objected that signing the protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty would restrict America's strategic options in the region.

Clearly, there were to be costs to signing the treaty. But they were greatly exaggerated, while the benefits — the most important being better US relations with the developing nations of the region — seem to have been given very little weight. Never particularly alive to the sensibilities of the region's absurdly small states, Washington has rejected the

Rarotonga treaty with inadequate thought.

The Soviet Union has signed the protocols, getting in just ahead of China. The Russians, of course, are outrageous opportunists, and signing the protocols would have got them nowhere had the US also signed. It is by rejecting the treaty — by rubbing the island states' noses in their unimportance to Washington — that the Americans have turned the Russian's transparent opportunism into a genuine propaganda and diplomatic victory.

The Soviet Union's relations with the region are warming while the US treats the region with frequently baffling contempt. First, it was the interests of the American Tunaboat Association that were paramount in Washington. And while the US was imposing economic sanctions against the Solomons (for arresting a US fishing boat), the Soviet Union was quietly offering the poorer Pacific states substantial royalties for the right to exploit their only significant resource — the fish migrating through their exclusive economic zones.

It took the Americans an unbelievably long time to reach a simple and sensible settle-

ment of the fishing-rights question; time which the Russians put to good use. Kiribati, one of the poorest countries in the region, took the offer up; Vanuatu followed suit. Now, to destroy any repairs to US-Pacific relations, comes the rejection of the Rarotonga treaty. Again the Russians can be expected to press their advantage. The island states are democratic to a fault, mostly conservative and pro-Western, but in many cases dreadfully poor. The need for foreign exchange, and the emergence of younger politicians, less tied to the West, will make the nations of the Pacific increasingly willing to listen to Soviet offers of trade and closer relations.

The US Government's careless diplomacy will help remove a crucial political barrier in the region to closer relationships with the Russians. While the Russians, of course, are on their best behaviour, capitalising on America's mistakes, but never pushing their luck. Surprising Russian subtlety, combined with infuriating American clumsiness, are rapidly transforming the South Pacific. No longer is it a tranquil ANZUS lake.

AUSTRALIA

GOVERNMENT LEGISLATES NONPROLIFERATION SAFEGUARDS

BK310515 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0430 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] The federal government has proclaimed its nonproliferation safeguards legislation which places strict controls on all nuclear materials and associated items throughout Australia. The legislation, which takes effect from today, formalizes Australia's international obligations to nuclear nonproliferation.

This includes the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Australia's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Australia's bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements with 10 individual countries and the European Community.

The energy and resources minister, Senator Evans, says the legislation shows the government's commitment to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons as well as its work toward disarmament.

/8309

CSO: 5100/4310

CHANGE IN ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPLAINED

BK200703 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0530 GMT 19 Mar 87

[Article: "The Change From the State-Financial Management Mechanism to the Application of Goods-Money Relations"]

[Text] Dear listeners, before you understand the change in the state-financed management mechanism to the application of goods-money relations [kan phouaphan ngeunta], let us examine the following outstanding characteristics of the state-financed management mechanism: The state is responsible for acquiring fixed capital and the bulk of circulation funds for factories, offices, and organizations; supplying materials, equipment, machines, and spare parts; paying salaries to cadres and state employees in accordance with the level of their knowledge; capabilities, and specialized knowledge; and ensuring social welfare for members of society, such as free schooling and medical treatment. Factories must give all products, revenues, and profits to the state. The cost of production means and materials and equipment serving the administrative branch, which are fixed and calculated by the pricing committee at the center, have been maintained for several years and separated from world prices and from the outside world. With all these special characteristics, factories have to carry out plans mapped out by the higher levels and are supplied with materials, equipment, and machines, including technology, at minimal prices. As for poor quality products, they will be accepted by the state. Losses are shouldered by and profits given to the state.

The operation of business enterprises in this fashion has been consistently maintained in recent years. Nevertheless, it also shows certain shortcomings to a certain extent. Generally speaking, such shortcomings are not very obvious nor serious. This is because in the past numerous favorable conditions for economic development still prevailed. Most of factories strictly followed the above-mentioned procedures, were adequately supplied with necessary materials, and gave all products to the state. The method of giving credits by the state to the factories with regard to materials and equipment and the handing over of products to the state by the production centers have become the most outstanding feature of the state-financed management mechanism. By applying this method, goods failed to command prices at the appropriate level.

Fixed capital means funds which must be used as a basis for fixing the prices of goods. All expenses incurred by economic units were borne by the state through banking services. The factories would try to find ways to reduce the quantity of goods to be given to the state. Certain factories produced more goods than the quantity they were supposed to give to the state. They kept part of the goods to sell at prices agreed upon so as to acquire more income. Offices and cadres were authorized to purchase goods for the state. They were entitled to exercise their rights to the fullest extent if they felt that the factories put pressure on them. As a result, a state of bureaucracy emerged.

Because of the afore-mentioned negative characteristics, socialist countries have tried to gradually do away with the state-financed management mechanism, moving in the following fundamental direction: They have changed the price policy in accordance with the price-fixing procedure. Generally speaking, at present in the socialist countries, two sets of prices prevail. They are fixed by the business enterprises and by the consumers. State-fixed prices are set either through direct or indirect channels. The number of goods whose prices are fixed directly by the state is decreasing while that of those fixed indirectly is increasing. The state also fixes the lowest and highest prices for certain types of goods. The types of rotation prices [lakha mounvian] jointly fixed by the producers and consumers also include a demand price [lakha prasong] which is agreed upon by both parties and remains effective only for a certain period of time. A free price [lakha seli] is the price amiably agreed upon by the seller and buyer.

The two types of prices mentioned above are closely interrelated. State-fixed prices are always the basis for goods circulation and for defining rotation prices. At the same time, rotation prices must correctly reflect the conditions for fixing prices, which are related to the conditions of business production. Therefore, the state and factories must inform each other of any changes by relying on reality in appraising the status of business production and controlling fixed prices at an appropriate level. Another important principle in doing away with the state-financed management mechanism is to change from the system of paying cash to using credits and to change from the system of supplying materials and accepting all products to applying a trading system. In the past, all fixed capital and rotation funds of the factories were supplied by the state. But now, factories must borrow a large amount of these funds from the bank by sharing profits according to the interest rate so as to encourage efficient utilization of these funds, to rapidly rotate them, and to oppose any form of delaying the rotation of funds.

In the past, the prices of materials supplied by the state were low. At present, in many cases factories have the right to directly sign trading contracts with unanimously agreed upon prices. In the past, products turned out by the factories were given directly to the Ministry of Material Supply or trading services. But at present, the factories have the sole right to sell their products to other factories at agreed upon prices.

The important change in this phenomenon is the exchange of goods on the basis of appropriately agreed upon prices. It is aimed at promoting the interests of both the producers and consumers who have the rights to contribute to the development of goods circulation with the complete characteristics of both the buyer and seller, the development of (?the rotation of funds), and the value of goods, and it is also aimed at preventing waste and losses.

/12624

CSO: 4200/452

TIMBER PROCESSING, EXPORT GOALS DISCUSSED

Tselinograd FREUNDSCHAFT in German 3 Mar 87 p 3

[Text] The forestry and wood processing industries of Laos are among the sectors of the economy which are developing with particular intensity. The necessity of a maximal increase of productivity in the plants of this sector and the greatest possible expansion of production were underscored at the 4th Party Congress of the Laotian Revolutionary People's Party. The greater share of products of the Laotian wood processing industry, consisting primarily of rare and valuable timber types, is destined for socialist fraternal countries.

At the moment, a reorganization of management practices is taking place in Laotian plants; a new economic mechanism is being introduced; plants are phasing over to economic full accountability system. Based on these measures, it is foreseen that this year a total production of 250,000 cubic meters of wood will be achieved, that shipments to export organizations will be increased and the quality of products improved.

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CSO: 4620/24

BRIEFS

SRV GEOLOGY DELEGATION DEPARTS--Vientiane, 28 Mar (KPL)--A delegation of the General Department of Geology and Mining of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam left here on March 26 after attending the 2nd conference of geological cooperation among Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea held in Vientiane from March 24-25. The delegation was led by Pham Quoc Tuong, first deputy head of Vietnam's General Department of Geology and Mining. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0910 GMT 28 Mar 87 BK] /12624

BORDER MARKERS WITH VIETNAM--Vientiane, 30 Mar (KPL)--The Lao PDR and the SRV have successfully carried out the reparation of border-markers between Savannakhet and Binh Tri Thien provinces. The one-month reparation work was undertaken by the Lao-Vietnamese border coordination commission of the Lao province of Savannakhet and its twinned Vietnamese province of Binh Tri Thien which share a common border of 192 km. There are 34 border-markers along this stretch of land delineating the boundaries of the two provinces territory. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0914 GMT 30 Mar 87 BK] /12624

PRK GEOLOGICAL DELEGATION LEAVES--The geological delegation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea left here on March 28 after attending the 2nd conference on geological cooperation among Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea held in Vientiane from March 24-25, 1987. The delegation was led by It Prang, deputy-minister of industry of Kampuchea. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0915 GMT 30 Mar 87 BK] /12624

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AID--Vientiane, 30 Mar (KPL)--The Lao Red Cross has received an aid worth 50,000 francs from the International Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The aid consisted of anti-Malaria medicine, medical equipment and 15,000 hygiene posters. It was handed over here yesterday by Seevaratnam Kingsley, regional director of the International Red Cross for South-east Asia and the Pacific, to Dr. Vannalet Ratjpho, deputy-minister of public health of the Lao PDR. The International Red Cross and the ICRC are expected to help Laos in taking measures to prevent floods in 17 provinces later. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0916 GMT 30 Mar 87 BK] /12624

PHOUMI VONGVICHIT RECEIVES INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR--Vientiane, 31 Mar (KPL)-- Bambang Soemantri, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the Lao PDR, this morning, present his credentials to Lao Acting-President Phoumo Vongvichit. On this occasion, the acting-president congratulated the new Indonesian ambassador and wished him success in the execution of his diplomatic mission here so as to contribute to the development of bilateral relations between the Lao PDR and Indonesia. Also present on the occasion was Deputy Foreign Minister Souban Salitthilat. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0858 GMT 31 Mar 87 BK] /12624

FORESTRY COOPERATION WITH GDR--Vientiane, 25 Mar (KPL)--The Lao Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Irrigation and Cooperatives will standardize the curriculums of its Dongdok Forestry School to International level. The standardization of the forestry course is to be undertaken in 1989 with material and professional support from the GDR. According to the minutes of talks signed here today between officials of the two countries, the GDR will supply the Lao PDR with equipment and specialists to carry out this work. It will also help train Lao cadres specializing in forestry undertakings. At present, the Dongdok Forestry School is conducting a three-year course with help from GDR forestry experts. In 1989 the duration of courses will be extended to four and a half years. The curriculums will also be modified and ameliorated to meet the international standard. There are three other forestry schools located in northern Luang Rabang and central Bolikhamsai and Savannakhet Provinces. Also with the GDR's assistance, these schools have opened middle-level courses. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0904 GMT 25 Mar 87 BK] /12624

SOVIET LECTURERS' DELEGATION LEAVES--Vientiane, 26 Mar (KPL)--A lecturers' delegation of the CPSU CC led by U.P. motiachev, adviser to the Propaganda and Training Board of the CPSU Central Committee, left here on March 25 after a nine-day working visit. The lectures given in Vientiane, Savannakhet and Champassak Provinces centered on the process of restructuring of the Soviet society being underway since the planary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in January 1987. Issues concerning ideological and economic work and educational reforms were also raised. [Text] [Vientiane KPL in English 0910 GMT 26 Mar 87 BK] /12624

NOUHAK PHOUMSAVAN MEETS SAVANNAKHET CADRES--Vientiane, 31 Mar (KPL)--Nouhak Phoumsevan, Politburo member of the LPRP CC, first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, recently spoke to cadres at production bases in Songkhon District, the southern Savannakhet Province. In his speech, Nouhak Phoumsavan emphasized the need to promote production and socio-economic development in the country. He said that one of the most important tasks to be discharged during the transitional period to socialism is the building of the material and technical foundation fo socialism, and the introduction of industrialization to expand the national economy. It also means transforming an economy based on handicrafts into a mechanized and semi-automated one. This, in turn, will help to solve the food problem on the basis of an all-round development of agriculture. He said that to solve the food problem is the country's priority in the socialist transformation of industry and a central issue in the implementation of the resolution of the 4th party congress. He also spoke of the need to promote the leading role of the state economic sector, develop the cooperative work and the socialist trade with the aim of raising the living standard of the Lao people of all ethnic groups.

/12624

CSO: 4200/451

MEASURES TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTORS TAKE EFFECT

Noumea LES NOUVELLES CALEDONNES in French 28 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Franck Depierre]

[Text] Begun in July 1986, the government policy for relaxing foreign exchange controls was taken a step further in November by a new series of measures affecting firms, banks, and individuals. In New Caledonia, those measures did not become legal until 20 January, when they were published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA NOUVELLE CALEDONIE. That delay was due to the fact that in some cases, other signatures besides that of Edouard Balladur (that of Bernard Pons, for example) were necessary to put the decrees into effect among us.

So the territory has also begun benefiting recently from the opening of the floodgates to relieve what has sometimes imposed a real restraint in the past: foreign exchange controls.

Since the main purpose of this dismantling of exchange controls was economic in nature, the measures applying to the firms are very important. One example is the elimination of administrative controls on commercial transactions, which relaxes the administrative and commercial procedures involved in import-export operations.

The most eagerly awaited change was probably the one affecting foreign exchange forward cover. Forward cover enables firms which import or export to protect themselves from exchange risks due to devaluations or revaluations. For example, setting up a foreign exchange forward cover enables a French firm that imports products from a country whose currency is rising in value to pay later at the rate in effect when the order was issued. That saves the importer from having to pay out larger sums than expected when payment falls due.

Previously, that foreign exchange forward cover was very strictly regulated to prevent financial powers from engaging in a form of "hedging"—that is, speculating on foreign exchange—a practice that could possibly place the franc in difficulties if it were especially weak. The foreign exchange forward cover was originally limited to 15 days, then to 1 month, 2 months,

and so on. As a result of these latest government measures, its duration is practically unlimited.

This should encourage small firms (which were afraid to export because they feared exchange variations) to invest more in foreign markets. It is obvious that in order to benefit from that cover, they must provide evidence of their contracts with foreign purchasers.

Freedom for Individuals

Individuals will also benefit greatly from the removal of foreign exchange controls.

Credit card holders can now use those cards abroad with complete freedom. There is no longer a ceiling. But the opening of accounts abroad remains strictly prohibited.

The procedure for transferring funds abroad has been simplified. One can now send money abroad with no need to supply documents in proof and as often as one wishes, provided that the amount does not exceed 54,545 CFP francs.

In the case of transfers requiring documents in proof, the upper limit formerly imposed on certain transactions has now been eliminated. This means, for example, that it is now possible to buy an apartment abroad.

Another change of interest to individuals is the one concerning transactions involving unlisted investment securities.

It is now possible to buy shares in foreign companies not listed on the Stock Exchange without prior authorization. (Previously, only the purchase of listed securities was permitted, the purpose being to control the volume of investment.)

Since January 1987, moreover, the purchase of foreign shares, listed or not, has not required payment in currency certificates, which are more expensive than "normal" currency because they are acquired in a closed market.

Measures Affecting Banks

Banks are the last category affected by these changes in foreign exchange controls. They are now authorized to lend francs to nonresidents, provided that the amounts loaned do not exceed the amount in francs that they hold on behalf of nonresidents (for instance, rental income earned in Noumea by a property owner living in Australia).

That relaxation of the rules promotes the free flow of money sought by investors. In this territory, therefore, it might generate transactions making it possible to start new activities and create jobs.

As a result of these recent government measures, foreign exchange control has lost many of its constraints. New Caledonians certainly remember the measures

adopted by the Socialist government when the amount of foreign currency allowed for trips abroad was limited to 36,363 CFP francs per year and a log book was required.

It is true that foreign exchange controls have not disappeared completely, and they never should. But the measures adopted by Edouard Balladur are completely in line with liberalism. It is felt in certain financial circles that they constitute an act of faith in the French currency and, consequently, in the economy which that currency reflects. By increasing the free flow of capital, the government is betting that foreigners will feel the same confidence and that this will lead to investments, greater wealth, and new jobs. It is a program which one can only hope will succeed.

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CSO: 4219/19

PRIME MINISTER, SENATOR EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH U.S.

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 6 Feb 87 p 9

[Text]

Prime Minister David Lange yesterday expressed "deep disappointment" at the United States' decision not to sign the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty protocols.

"The United States response is the more disappointing in that intensive consultation took place with the United States authorities over the treaty and the protocol, and considerable efforts were made to heed United States concerns."

The US Administration had stated its decision was based on its global security interests and responsibilities, Mr Lange said.

"New Zealand deeply regrets that the interests of the South Pacific region do not appear to have been given more weight by the United States Government in reaching its present position."

The US had been made fully aware of the importance South Pacific nations, including New Zealand, attached to US support for the treaty through ratification of its protocols.

The Treaty of Rarotonga involved a major security commitment for nations of the South Pacific and represented a solemn step in contributing to both regional and global security, Mr Lange said.

The US announcement demonstrated that adherence to the respective protocols by all nuclear weapon states would be neither a speedy nor a simple process.

That had been clear from the length of time it took the nuclear weapon states to determine their positions on the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone.

"The obligations set out in the treaty and protocols demand a sincere and earnest assessment of the commitment undertaken by parties to the treaty and by the prospective parties to the protocols."

Mr Lange said he hoped the US and other nuclear-weapon states that had not

signed the protocols would not do anything inconsistent with the treaty's provisions.

"Indeed, it is clear that the United States proposes to observe the requirements of the treaty in a de facto liaison. I hope that in due course an appropriate formal commitment will be possible."

● Australia should "secede" from the United States in response to the US decision not to sign, Australian Democrats Senator Norm Sanders said yesterday.

Senator Sanders, the American-born peace and environment spokesman for the Democrats, said the Reagan Administration was acting like a bunch of schoolyard bullies who wanted everything exactly their way.

"For months they have been stealing our grain markets, and for years Australia has been their military playground," he said.

"For the last two years they have been trampling all over New Zealand for attempting to safeguard its harbours against nuclear accidents.

"And now, when faced with a Treaty which does nothing to inhibit their military operations in the South Pacific, they refuse to sign."

Senator Sanders said this was an act of spite against the small countries in the region, which did not like superpower interference in their affairs.

"It is also an attempt by the US to gain unrestricted rights to station nuclear weapons on Australian soil in the future," he said.

"Most of all, it demonstrated that the Reagan Administration just can't stand to lose.

"Instead of acting like the supine 51st American State, Australia should secede and stand on its own two feet as an independent nation." — NZPA-AAP

/9274

CSO: 5200/4307

LANGE DISCUSSES LAW BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BK121026 Hong Kong AFP in English 1001 GMT 12 Feb 87

[Text] Wellington, Feb 12 (AFP) -- New Zealand's proposed law banning nuclear weapons from its territory, port and waters was a restriction on the arms race, Prime Minister David Lange told Parliament Thursday.

The arms race "can only end when real and serious limits are placed on building, testing and deploying nuclear weapons", Mr Lange said.

The government bill was "a real measure of arms control" but still allowed the naval vessels of allies "to be welcomed to New Zealand", he said.

Washington has cut defence links with Wellington because of anti-nuclear policies and a ban on U.S. warship access to New Zealand ports.

Mr Lange said U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz made it clear that nuclear weapons "would come to New Zealand from time to time" on U.S. ships.

The Lange government has refused entry to all such vessels because of a U.S. refusal to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons.

"Only when there is a willingness to replace nuclear defence with conventional defence will there be any hope of an end to the arms race," the New Zealand prime minister said.

He rejected opposition claims that he had lost the battle over nuclear policy to the left wing of his Labour Party which was seeking non-aligned status for New Zealand.

Opposition leader Jim Bolger said the nuclear-free bill was "the formal opting-out legislation from the Western alliance".

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CSO: 5200/4307

WELLINGTON DAILY HITS RESUMED U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR TESTS

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 25 Feb 87 p 6

[Editorial: "Missed: Nuclear Opportunity"]

[Text] At any moment now the world may hear that a nuclear device has been exploded at a testing ground in the Soviet Union. In August 1985, Moscow declared a moratorium on such experiments and extended it four times, until authorities scrapped it at the beginning of this year. During all those months, the Kremlin urged the United States to follow its example. Even now it says it is willing to stop the tests it is about to resume if the United States will desist.

Washington will have none of it. During the Soviet moratorium it exploded between 20 and 30 test nuclear devices. Why either country needs to carry on experimenting when each already possesses the nuclear strength to wipe out the other many times over is a question that continues to baffle the layman.

The Russians and Americans are not the only ones with nuclear-testing programmes. Britain, France, China and probably others are in the business, too. A test-ban agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would not necessarily inhibit any of them. Nevertheless, with Washington's rejection of the Soviet overtures, and the Soviet Union's intention to start blasting again, it does seem that somehow mankind has missed a great opportunity.

/9274

CSO: 5200/4306

3000 ANTINUCLEAR DEMONSTRATORS RALLY AT CLARK, CITE CHARTER

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 p 37

[Text]

A notice of eviction written on a huge placard was installed before the entrance to Clark Air Base while the effigy of Uncle Sam and a make-believe US missile was burned during a 3,000-strong anti-nuclear and anti-bases rally held here last month.

The rallyists called on the United States Government to respect the will of the Filipino people for a nuclear-free country as expressed in the recently ratified 1986 Constitution, while at the same time, calling on the Philippine government to ensure the implementation of the nuclear-free provision of the charter through the formation of a monitoring team which will conduct periodic inspection trips inside American military facilities in the country.

The move, according to former "nationalist bloc" commissioner Pons Bennagen, who had attended the rally, was premised on the United States position of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear arms in the US Naval Base at Subic, and at Clark Air Base, both located in Central Luzon.

Bennagen also asked President Aquino during the rally to use her executive powers in forming the monitoring team that would be composed of multisectoral representatives and nuclear physicists.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD) revealed that in 1985 alone, 16 nuclear-powered attack submarines of the US entered

Philippine territorial waters and visited Subic Naval Base in Olongapo City, undertaking 39 trips to the Philippines, in a total of 388 days.

Also, the NAJFD warned the Filipino people on the possible steps the United States Government would take to stop the people and the government from ensuring the nuclear-free Philippines provision of the constitution, citing the experience of New Zealand after it had assumed a similar anti-nuclear position.

Lastly, the rallyists staged a two-minute die-in to dramatize the effect of nuclear destruction as they were met outside the perimeter fence by the Clark Air Base Command (CABCOM) in full anti-riot gear. More than a dozen were armed with rifles.

/9317

CSO: 4200/428

BAGUIO COLUMNIST HITS MILITARY 'MASSACRES', U.S. AID

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 14 Feb 87 pp 4, 11

["The Occasional Chair" by Arthur E. Galace: "Body Count"]

[Excerpt]

IT'S CLEAR NOW. The "sword of war" is "unsheathed". Cry havoc and let loose the dogs of war, as an ancient sage once put it.

In last Thursday's TV talkshow *Straight From The Shoulder*, guest Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos revealed that the military in the countryside were ordered to "Hit them, and hit them hard!" He was referring to the rebels, whose hideouts and strong holds the military came to know about as a result of the recently terminated 60-day ceasefire.

In issuing policy guidelines for the resumption of military operations and the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, President Aquino said that government troops must "conduct themselves with honor and humanity against the enemy, and utmost solicitude for the safety of our people."

General Ramos echoed this when he reminded his troops to "strictly adhere to and respect human rights and the rule of law." Ramos emphasized that "care must be especially taken to avoid casualties among civilians who may be caught in the crossfire."

In connection with the stepping up of armed operations, the military recently announced that at Lupao, Nueva Ecija, in an encounter between soldiers and communists rebels, 28 people had been killed: 15 rebels, 12 civilians, and a certain 2Lt Edgar Dizon. It turns out that, as was very common during the Marcos years, the military report was wrong. We use the word "wrong" euphemistically.

An investigating team sent by the *Manila Chronicle* reported that, based on interviews of villagers and witnesses, there was no "encounter", the civilians were not "caught in the crossfire", but that there was a massare by the soldiers. Three houses were completely razed. Seven people, two of them children, were burned beyond recognition. Total body count: 17 civilians and Lt. Dizon (not 28 as reported by the military). Among the dead were six children and an octogenarian couple.

According to the *Chronicle* report, witnesses said soldiers did not recover any firearms from the slain civilians or from the houses' ruins. They said the civilians, with raised arms, begged the soldiers not to shoot. "Civilian kami, sir", they cried.

A survivor, Jovita Lacasandile, 25, told the *Chronicle* the soldiers fired on them, who were "like sitting ducks". She said the soldiers herded them into their houses and ordered them to sit. Then the soldiers opened fire with Armalite rifles.

The soldiers also set three houses on fire by firing tracers bullets into its cogon roofs and bamboo walls, she said.

Lupao Mayor George Castaneda insisted that no New People's Army guerilla was killed in the so-called encounter. "*Wala namang napatay na NPA dito*," he said. "*NPA ba iyong mga bata at dalawang 80 anyos na mag-asawa na napatay nila?*" ["No NPA were killed here," he said. "Were those children and the octogenarian a couple of NPA's?"]

This must be what Ramos meant when he said to "Hit them hard."

When the US was in Vietnam trying to save the world for their concept of democracy, their troops had a curious way of determining whether or not they were leading in the guerilla war: the body count. Vietnam was the original killing fields, what with massacres like My Lai, and the use of "search and destroy" and "free fire zone" tactics. The theory was, the more people killed, regardless of whether or not the dead were the enemy, the better you appeared. I think the term was "kill ratio". Needless to state, the US is out of Vietnam, kicked out by a ragtag, tatter-demalion army of pajama-clad peasants.

Coming close to the Mendiola massacre, where 18 civilians were killed, this last carnage does not bode well for the coming months. We must remember that our own military is armed by US "military aid." Alongside such military aid must also be advisers who came directly from Vietnam, or Nicaragua, or El Salvador.

If you were a resident of Lupao, how would you feel? Reports the Chronicle: "*There was*

fire in the eyes of the young men whose fathers and mothers were among those who lay inside the wooden coffins."

I thought the idea was to win the hearts and minds of the people. If military actions like these continue, we will be back to when the military was alienated from the greater bulk of the populace.*

THE MASSACRE a few days ago here when a soldier ran amuck at Camp Allen and killed his fellow soldiers, after which he fled towards Mount Crest Hotel and shot up a taxicab killing one civilian and wounding others, underscores what we have saying, all along about the proliferation of firearms in the City. Why should heavily armed soldiers go about blithely in the heart of Baguio? Even mere "civilian informers" or "assets" or "agents" tote unlicensed firearms because they have mission orders by a lieutenant or some such authorizing them to be menaces. When will we have tougher firearms control? When will we have a higher body count? *

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CSO: 4200/428

PNB OFFICIAL ON ACCREDITATION, ELECTION, AQUINO SLATE

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 pp 3-7

[Excerpts of an interview with Alan Jazmines, secretary-general of the Partido ng Bayan, by Jun F. Sibal: "Newcomer in the Arena"; no date or location given]

[Text]

Its founding last August sent shock waves of anxiety and alarm through Metro Manila coffeeshops where politicians congregate to gossip about wealth and power. Since then, Partido ng Bayan has gathered strength and the US Embassy, it is said, has been getting frantic calls from Washington officials worried about the growing influence of the progressive, anti-imperialist movement on the Philippine scene.

Although a newcomer in electoral politics, PnB is determined to make its presence felt in the forthcoming congressional polls. The following are excerpts from an interview with one of the most outspoken and hardworking leaders of the left-wing political party, PnB Secretary-General Alan Jazmines.

Partido ng Bayan's application for accreditation was initially denied by the COMELEC. How did the poll body vote on your petition?

Of the seven votes cast, three recognized outright PnB's right to participate in the elections. One commissioner initially voted

to reject the Party's petition for registration unless it complied with a technical requirement — the inclusion in its by-laws of statements to the effect that the Party commits itself to the attainment of its political objectives through parliamentary and democratic processes and not through violence, and that it shall abide by the fundamental law of the land. Three other commissioners voted against the Party's petition.

Was Chairman Felipe among those who voted against PnB's accreditation?

Yes, and we have been reliably informed that Chairman Felipe actually railroaded the COMELEC into rejecting PnB's petition for accreditation. The three who readily recognized PnB's basic right to recognition resisted Felipe's move. In fact, Commissioner Haydee Yorac even denounced Felipe's irregular action in the media.

Last January 23, we filed a motion to defer action on the Party's petition — to give us time to comply with the COMELEC's technical requirements. But Feli-

pe did not even refer the motion to his colleagues and, in fact, that same day suddenly announced a supposed COMELEC decision rejecting the Party's petition for accreditation. The dissenting commissioners were not given enough time to submit their dissenting opinions. We were not given a copy of the supposed decision either.

Could you tell us how each of commissioners voted? You mean

You mean when they first voted on our petition?

Commissioners Yorac, Anacleto Badoy and Leopoldo Africa voted in favor of accreditation. Commissioner Andres Flores at first cast a negative vote. Those who strongly rejected our petition were Chairman Felipe, Commissioners Dario Rama and Tomas de la Cruz. They continued to oppose our accreditation in spite of the fact that we had already complied with their requirements.

Commissioners Felipe, de la Cruz and Rama are said to have opposed your registration as a political party because prominent leftists like Bernabe Buscayno and Juliet de Lima-Sison were on your roster.

I believe the COMELEC erred in taking judicial notice of and making a judgment on the cases of Bernabe Buscayno and Juliet Sison, over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

Were there forces outside of the COMELEC that influenced its decision not to grant accreditation to PnB?

Aside from the bigotry exhibited by Felipe, Rama and de la Cruz, reactionary forces outside the COMELEC were factors in the decision. . . Basically, the elite, the landlord-comprador

class, whose rule the Partido ng Bayan now challenges, feels threatened by the emergence of the Party because it takes a firm class stand in favor of the majority classes of peasants, fishermen, workers, urban poor, indigenous peoples and the middle class.

The hysterical fear that grips the reactionary elite is evident in the attitudes of KBL politicians like Yniguez and Dimaporo, who insisted that if Partido ng Bayan is to be accredited, the New People's Army should first be disbanded.

The other institutions of the elite, especially the military, are up in arms against PnB — literally. They have been harassing the Party, its officers, members and constituencies all over the country, dispersing its meetings, blocking its marchers, arresting its members.

I suppose one of PnB's foremost enemies is the US government.

The US has been keenly interested in keeping the Party out of the parliamentary arena. The Partido ng Bayan has, in fact, become one of the three major concerns of the US in regard to the Philippines, the other two being the US bases and the insurgency. Thus, it was not surprising that the US-instigated coup plot, "Oplan Noel," had the paralyzation of the Party and its disbarment from the electoral arena among its major objectives.

How did you get accredited anyway?

Commissioner Flores shifted to a "yes" vote after the Party complied with the COMELEC requirements. His vote tilted the balance in our favor.

Would you say that if PnB hadn't complied with the COM-

ELEC's technical requirements, it would never have been accredited?

Actually, we were confident that the government had no choice but to approve our petition for accreditation. Had the COMELEC insisted on rejecting it, the poll body would have made a mockery of the multi-party and politically pluralist system espoused by the Aquino government and the 1986 Constitution.

The case of the COMELEC chairman and the two commissioners against us had no validity at all. Their position showed blatant discrimination against the Party since the COMELEC had accredited the PDP-LABAN, the Liberal Party, UNIDO and a number of other parties although, in their internal documents, they never formally renounced violence or expressed adherence to the Constitution. Significantly, those political parties which were established during the Marcos dictatorship never recognized the Marcos Constitution nor ruled out the use of force.

The rejection of the Partido ng Bayan's petition for accreditation would have been seen, too, as a form of political persecution not only against the Party and its officers but also against the majority classes. Most, if not all, of the existing political parties are parties of the elite. This is the first time in about 40 years that the toiling masses and the middle class have put up their own party in competition with the parties of the elite. Not allowing us to do so would have violated the Bill of Rights that the three reactionaries in the COMELEC invoked against us.

Supposed you had been denied accreditation?

We would go on insisting on our right to participate in the coming electoral contests.

Will PnB field candidates for the forthcoming congressional elections?

Our party will certainly field candidates for both the congressional and senatorial elections — men and women with a sterling record in the struggle for national freedom, genuine comprehensive land reform, popular democracy, human rights and workers' rights. There are many such prospective candidates in Partido ng Bayan, in BAYAN, in the cause-oriented movement in general.

Who will be your candidates for the Senate?

The Party will decide when it holds its National Council meeting early this month.

It seems that one of the problems of PnB is that it lacks candidates of national stature. Are you, therefore, open to the idea of entering into coalitions?

It is not entirely true that our party lacks candidates of national stature. The cause-oriented movement has developed many leaders of national stature — more than enough for several complete senatorial slates. Our principal problem as far as fielding a senatorial slate is concerned is finances.

Even if PnB may have enough leaders of national stature, we would still favor a coalition with other groups — to broaden the appeal of our slate, to promote allies whom we can depend on in basic alignments and to firm up our working relations with these allies. In fact, our party actively

seeks to establish alliances and coalitions with all nationalist and progressive groups and forces.

There were strong speculations that (Customs Bureau chief) Bobby Tañada of BAYAN and even (former Labor minister) Bobbit Sanchez might run under the banner of the PnB. How come they were drafted instead in the Lakas ng Bansa?

Bobby and Bobbit were actually drafted not in the Lakas ng Bansa party, but in the mixed Aquino slate. Bobbit is running under the PDP-LABAN party while Bobby is running under BAYAN.

We are open to supporting them and perhaps some other candidates too, but since we shall be finalizing our slate only at our national council meeting, our final decision on who to support shall also be determined at that meeting.

As I said earlier, it seems that the PnB has a lot of problems, especially concerning the shortage of personalities and finances, and that fact that it is a newcomer in the electoral field and its opponents on the Administration's side have the blessings of a popular president. How do you intend to overcome these obstacles?

Most of what you said are accurate. But Partido ng Bayan, in joint efforts with BAYAN and other nationalist and progressive groups, hopes to surpass all the stumbling blocks you mentioned by relying on the mass movement to make for a more than two-million strong campaign machinery. This machinery may not have been honed enough for the electoral struggle but it is certainly a tremendous beginning. Our party expects to galvanize this mass movement with a relevant program and the new politics that we will seek to introduce into the parliamentary arena.

Could you explain what this new politics is all about? Is this what makes you distinct from traditional parties?

Partido ng Bayan differs substantially from other political parties in that the issues that our party takes up dwell not on trivialities or on personalities but on substantive issues, especially issues that address the root causes of suffering and backwardness among the Filipino masses.

This, in fact, is the essence of our new politics — politics based on programs and critical issues, not on demagoguery and empty talk; politics of national and popular concerns and public service, not of personalities; politics of the majority classes, not of the elite; politics on a high level, not the dirty politics of the gutter.

Let me go back to the Aquino slate. In terms of their class backgrounds and their commitments to articulate the interests of the underprivileged sectors of our society, how would you describe the President's "Chosen 24"?

Most of the candidates in the Aquino slate are traditional politicians or come from propertied families. Worse, a number of them are recycled Marcos henchmen. A lot of them are CIA agents or, at least, are US boys. I cannot count more than a couple who really carry the interest of the more oppressed and exploited sectors of our society. Except for a couple or so, therefore, the Aquino slate is expected to serve only the US and local feudal and comprador interests instead of that of the people.

All throughout its existence, the old Congress was dominated by the elite, especially those representing landed interests. Do you predict a revival of the

dominance of the elite in the emerging Congress?

Many pundits of traditional politics are skeptical of our chances of winning, especially now that the two main elite formations are consolidating their ranks and are trying to reinstitute the elitist two-party system in the country.

But even if we may expect the traditional parties and politicians to continue lording it over Philippine politics for now, we feel confident in competing effectively against them in areas where our hard work and struggle during the dark years brought us closer to the people. In these areas, we believe our *guts, goals* and *grassroots* will prevail over the guns, goons and gold of the elite.

The present balance of forces still favors the traditional parties and politicians in the country, such that the new Congress would still be dominated by the elite. However, we estimate that, together with BAYAN, we shall be able to gain at least 20 percent of the congressional seats in the coming elections. This constitutes only a beachhead, but one that is significant enough to crack the elite's control of parliament. We can further our gains by combining and coordinating our work well within the halls of parliament and the parliament of the streets.

Should the PnB gain seats in the new Congress, what would be its priority concerns?

Our party's priority concerns are along the following lines: the establishment of popular, participative as well as representative democracy; the breaking up of large agricultural estates and their free distribution to peasants coupled with a progressive compensation scheme to be shouldered by the State in the form of industrial bonds; the creation of jobs and over-all progress of our national economy through the development of national industrialization; the promotion and defense of human rights and the dismantling of the remnants of the fascist dictatorship within and outside of the present government and military; the promotion of the people's welfare; recognition of the right to self-determination and the granting of genuine regional autonomy to the Bangsa Moro and Cordillera peoples; the end to a policy of war and the pursuit of just and lasting peace by holding a political consultative conference with all revolutionary forces, cause-oriented groups and political parties; the end to rampant graft and corruption in the government; the termination of the US military bases by 1991; and the re-assertion of the freedom of the media and protest against the government's repressive media policy. [M]

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CSO: 4200/428

MILITARY SPONSORS ANTICOMMUNISM PROGRAM

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 pp 36, 37

[Article: "Captive Audiences"]

[Text]

Three-hour long military-sponsored anti-Communist teach-ins have apparently sprouted on the campus of Laguna College (LC), San Pablo City, Laguna, as LC college and even high school students were made to attend the series of lectures by school administrators, according to *Philippine News and Features* (PNF).

Classes were scrapped as students were sent to the LC auditorium where an officer from the Southern Luzon Command spoke on the "evils of Communism" and "manipulation" by Communists of student and labor groups in the effort to destroy "military credibility." The students were practically a captive audience as their ID cards were deposited with the security guard, thus preventing them from leaving as LC regulations strictly pro-

hibit students from moving around the campus without their IDs.

LC students also said that their field trip to government departments in Manila last month was also an anti-Communist activity. College students said officials who received them gave anti-Communist lectures aside from discussing department functions. Pamphlets authored by Drs. Fred Schwarz and John Whiteball, international anti-Communist ideologues, branded the militant Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) trade union center and the League of Filipino Students (LFS) as "Soviet front organizations."

Similar anti-Communist teach-ins were conducted among students by the military such as in the Laguna School of Arts and Trades (LSAT) and other

high schools in Santa Cruz, the provincial capital.

Such teach-ins were also held by the military in Batangas province as early as last year. Students of Western Philippine Colleges, Lyceum of Batangas and Lipa City Colleges had attended anti-Communist symposia which were disguised as anti-drug abuse seminars.

As this developed, the groundwork for the setting up of right-wing youth organizations in the Southern Tagalog region has been started with the Gabay ng Bansa in Batangas, a rightwing youth federation which allegedly replaced the Marcos-sponsored Kabataang Barangay. Gabay ng Bansa has organized anti-Communist lectures among the youth and its activities are reportedly encouraged by local politicians and government officials.

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CS0: 4200/428

WEEKLY HITS 'DOUBLE STANDARD' IN MENDIOLA FINDING

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Double Standard"]

[Text]

The presidential commission tasked with investigating last January's Mendiola massacre, in which more than a dozen peasant marchers were killed, recently came out with its findings and recommendations.

It recommended the filing of sedition charges against Jaime Tadeo, peasant leader and former constitutional commissioner; criminal charges against 12 unidentified lawmen who were found to have fired at the demonstrators; and "administrative sanctions" against seven police and military officers for alleged violation of the 1985 Public Assembly Act.

Even before the commission's report could be formally submitted to the President, the police were already filing sedition charges in court against Tadeo and four other demonstration leaders.

Sedition is punishable with a minimum jail term of six years and a maximum of 20 years. What is the punishment for criminal acts committed by persons who cannot even be identified? What are the "administrative sanctions" against alleged violators of the Public Assembly Act?

Part of Tadeo's mistake may have been in speaking in Tagalog, which has a tradition of apocalyptic rhetoric that is alien to the civilized ears of our English-speaking elite. But his chief mistake was in marching at the head of unarmed peasants demanding land reform.

If he had led armed soldiers in a coup d'etat or in a naked attempt to overthrow the government, if his followers had demanded the return of a fascist dictator, if they had waved the banner of anti-communism, if they had physically occupied and made a shambles of a piece of private property, if they had sworn in Tadeo as president of the Republic in the presence of braless starlets in body-hugging T-shirts and jogging shorts, Tadeo would have had a better time of it.

His followers would not have been massacred by the military, and he himself would have gotten off with nothing more strenuous than thirty pushups or a pledge of allegiance to the Cory constitution.

No wonder Tadeo is decrying the double standard used by the government to deal with peasant dissenters and military dissidents.

It seems compartmentalized justice has not gone out with the Marcos regime.

It seems the mills of the gods grind exceedingly swift when it is the wretched of the earth being pulverized. [M]



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CSO: 4200/428

NORTHERN LUZON COLUMNIST HITS MILITARY RECORD

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 7 Mar 87 pp 4, 12

["The Occasional Chair" by Arthur E. Galace: "Guerilla War"]

[Text]

GUERRILLA warfare by an Asian people against a foreign power did not originate in Vietnam. In Leon Wolff's *Little Brown Brother* is chronicled the armed guerilla struggle of our people at the turn of the century against the American colonialists. Anti-American feeling is not a new thing in our country.

One reads in Wolff's annals of the Philippine-American Insurrection (they did not like to call it a war) how the Americans developed and refined their counterinsurgency procedures, such as the use of torture – the water-cure, now called Nawasa treatment, was first spawned here – and divide-and conquer tactics.

In that protracted war, among the songs the American soldiers sang was one entitled: "*The Monkeys In Zamboanga Have No Tails.*" Another marching song carried this derogatory verse: "*Damn, damn the Filipino, / Kbaik-clad ladrone, / Underneath the starry flag, / Civilize him with a Krag, / And take me back to my beloved land.*" One gets the point that we were not exactly the best friends of the Yanks.

Among the gifts the Americans bequeathed to us is our very own AFP, which first blossomed as the Philippine Constabulary, used by the US against the *insurrectos*. Thus, we see that the AFP was not conceived as an armed force to fight foreign invaders, but to fight brother Filipinos. After more than fourscore years, is that not what it is still doing now?

Another legacy is the counterinsurgency methods of the Americans, which did not work in Vietnam, nor in those Latin American banana republics that the US takes such an interest in. The principal feature of such counterinsurgency practices is the mailed fist. The principal victims are the civilians, e.g., Lupao, Nueva Ecija.

In 1965, with not a single NPA when President Marcos stepped into office, his mailed fist policy made the NPAs grow to several thousand, 28,000 at last AFP estimate. The mailed fist policy enabled the insurgents to expand from a ragtag army of college drop-outs and peasants to a fighting force to contend with. Honed by 20 years of ceaseless struggle, the guerrillas have learned their lessons well not only from their own experiences but from established guerilla tactics everywhere.

Take the case of Mao Zedung, whose guerilla army overcame China. He said: "The people are the water, and we are the fish that swim in the water."

Or consider these four principles of Mao via the ancient Chinese tactician Sun Tzu: "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble him; when the enemy seeks to avoid shelter, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue."

Has the military also forgotten the avowed aims of the so-called people's war and what the protagonists seek to attain? At the start, the insurgents were on "strategic defensive", with "tactical offensive" maneuvers. Then they embark on "strategic stalemate", which, some say, is the present situation. Eventually, they hope to be on "strategic offensive", and let us pray that that day does not come soon.

In all of these "strategies", it is the help of the people that the guerillas cultivate.

In their counterinsurgency tactics, the military seems to have forgotten the people.

Again we can look to the incident at Lupao. And, lately, and closer to home, the one at Brgy. Nalames, Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte, where some farmers were reported missing by the Northern Luzon Human Rights Organization (NL-HRO), through its Ilocos Norte Chapter, believed to be the victims of a massacre perpetrated by the military.

Now comes my former boss, Col. Honesto "Nes" Isleta (PMA Class '58), AFP spokesman, who uttered a typical military knee-jerk reaction that it was actually the NPA who gunned down the farmers, with the NPAs dressing up as soldiers. This statement was issued even without an investigation being conducted and even as the NBI, tasked by the PCHR, was just beginning its investigation.

Latest reports from Laoag have confirmed that four of the farmers are actually in the custody of the military, held without charges. I suppose Col. Isleta will now have to retract his statement.

But the bigger, more fundamental issue here is the manner by which the civilians are being antagonized and alienated by military counterinsurgency operations. Let me just quote a characteristic observation (Letters, *Inquirer*, March, 6):

"In many instances, the military has blamed the failure of its counterinsurgency campaigns upon the uncooperative civilian population. How can they expect the civilian population to cooperate with them when they behave like occupation forces? In the countryside, the members of the military are generally more feared than the armed rebels. While the insurgency problem has been with us for 18 long years, nobody has accused any armed rebel of raping anyone or committing ordinary crimes that offend the dignity of the human person. The same cannot be said of ordinary soldiers in their search-and-destroy operations and during custodial investigations."

We have yet to see on paper a comprehensive counterinsurgency program which is not entirely is socioeconomic, there should be a counterinsurgency approach which is mostly, predominantly civilian. The continuation of the peacetalks under Ka Pepe Diokno's guidelines of "food and freedom, jobs and justice" would have been a good start, but Secretary Ileto seems to have slammed the door on that solution.

Shall we have another years of guerilla war? *

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CSO: 4200/428

SISON ANALYSES: FACTORS FAVOR REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 pp 19-23

[Article by Jose Maria Sison: "Philippine Currents and Prospects"]

[Text]

"The armed struggle is supported by 10 million people under organs of political power and in mass organizations. And the reactionary government cannot really claim as mass support for counter-revolutionary violence the people who participate in such voting exercises as plebiscites, referenda and elections."

To comprehend the main political currents and prospects of the Philippines, it is necessary to have a bit of background on the nature of Philippine society and the chronic socio-economic and political crisis that afflicts it.

The society is semicolonial. After imposing direct colonial rule from the beginning of the century, the United States granted only nominal independence to the country in 1946 but continued to exercise indirect colonial rule through unequal treaties, agreements and arrangements.

The society is semifeudal. Since the beginning of its domination of the Philippines, the US has imposed monopoly capitalism on domestic feudalism and transformed the feudal society of the 19th century into the semifeudal society of the 20th century.

US monopoly capitalism or imperialism did away with the system of sheer colonial plunder run by an old type of colonialism, that of Spain, and exported surplus capital to the Philippines to expand agricultural production for export as well as mineral ore production for the same purpose.

The expansion of raw-material production for export and the unequal exchange of Philippine raw material exports (mainly agricultural) and foreign manufactured imports have raked in superprofits for the US and spawned a native and permanent resident comprador big bourgeoisie.

This class is at the peak of the social structure and determines the semifeudal character of the economy. Though relegated to a lesser position as an exploiting class, the landlord class remains powerful and widespread, especially outside of the large commercial cities. The big compradors in the cities are often big landlords in the countryside.

These exploiting classes are mere fractions of one percent of the Philippine population. They appropriate the surplus product created by the basic exploited classes -- the proletariat and the peasantry, which are respectively 15 and 75 percent of the population.

The intermediate social strata are the middle bourgeoisie, which comprises about one percent of the population, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, comprising eight percent or even less because of the erosive effect of the intensified socio-economic crisis.

Semifeudal Philippine society, be it during the colonial or the semicolonial phase of US domination, has always been in a state of chronic crisis. Two monsters, foreign monopoly capitalism and domestic feudalism, continue to suck the blood of the working people.

Exploitation is done under conditions of ever increasing surplus labor which cannot be absorbed by an economy that is basically agrarian and pre-industrial, having some negligible light industry dependent on imported equipment and raw materials but absolutely without such fundamentals of modern industry as enterprises producing basic metals, basic chemicals and capital goods.

In the many decades since the start of US domination, spontaneous peasant resettlement in the land frontier had served to relieve the land problem and absorb surplus labor. But towards the end of the 1960s, the land frontier had been exhausted. The process of land accumulation by landlords, government officials and agri-corporations overtook the poor settlers and dispossessed them of tillable public land.

Old and new settlements all over the country turned ripe for peasant war. The tokenistic and fake land reform programs of the big comprador-landlord government could not solve the land problem, but on the contrary aggravated it.

Throughout the 1960s, the US pushed in the Philippines an absurd policy of discouraging local industrialization and assailing even those import-dependent light industries established in the 1950s. So, every outlet for surplus labor would be blocked.

At the same time, the agricultural and extractive export products of the Philippines were getting a beating in the world capitalist market. Thus, the deficits in foreign trade and balance of payments resulted in a grave economic

and financial crisis that would necessitate increasingly large amounts of foreign loans.

Under the stress of the worsening socio-economic crisis, the ruling system became more wracked by a political crisis — the intensified bitter conflict among factions of the same exploiting classes marked by an increasing tendency to form armed groups and inflict violence on each other. The then ruling US-Marcos clique took the most initiative in unleashing violence against its intrasystemic rivals as well as against the restive toiling masses and the resurgent armed revolutionary movement.

Clearly manifesting the inability of the ruling classes to settle their differences nonviolently and rule in the old way, Marcos took advantage of his presidential position and declared martial law in 1972, imposed a fascist autocracy on the Philippines, and used official terrorism on a wide scale to suppress his political rivals, the progressive mass organizations and the broad masses of the people.

The Marcos fascist dictatorship was the outgrowth of a semicolonial and semifeudal system already disintegrating from within and challenged by resolute forces of armed revolution from without.

The open rule of terror could be maintained by the US only with large doses of foreign loans. These loans were incurred not only to cover deficits from the slump in prices of raw material exports but also to finance infrastructure and other non-productive projects, make way for a rapid military buildup, and encourage high consumerism and bureaucratic corruption.

What resulted has been the aggravation and deepening of the crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal system. As soon as international credit tightened, the basic ills of society became even more exposed. Marcos was driven into desperation and committed the most intolerable mistakes, such as the brazen murder of his chief political rival before the eyes of the world.

The Marcos autocracy fell as a result of the convergence of forces against it. The armed revolutionary movement fought the hardest and longest as its growth in strength accelerated from year to year. Forces of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal orientations became the strongest anti-fascist forces and delivered unremitting blows against the regime. The majority of the big compradors and landlords increasingly turned against Marcos after foreign credit had dwindled, and they openly rejected him after the Aquino assassination and the unprecedented upsurge of the mass movement.

After supporting Marcos for a long time, the US and the Catholic Church junked him, not because they had become progressive but because they had remained counter-

revolutionary, driven by fear that the armed revolutionary movement was being hastened by Marcos' persistence in power. And, of course, Enrile and Ramos, together with the US-instigated Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), had the same motivation of preempting the revolutionary movement aside from that of saving themselves and furthering their personal ambitions.

The US and Filipino reactionaries, including those who had shifted from a pro-Marcos to a pro-Aquino position, have touted the ascendance of Mrs. Corazon Aquino to the Philippine presidency as a "pre-emptive revolution" (a peaceful "revolution" preemptive of an armed revolution) and have gone so far as to spread the wishful thinking that the national democratic movement had permanently destroyed itself with a boycott policy in the snap presidential election and had absolutely nothing to do with the downfall of Marcos in February 1986.

The truth is that the national democratic movement called for a national strike movement well ahead of Mrs. Aquino's call for a civil disobedience movement. It also readily agreed with her on the need for mass uprisings, and comprised a significant portion of the organized forces at the core of the people's uprising at EDSA (in the vicinity of Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame, the AFP and PC General Headquarters respectively), as well as the bulk of the organized forces around Malacanang Palace. Organized forces of the national democratic movement also took part in the crucial seizure of the government radio-TV station, in the Angeles City uprising that stopped enemy tanks from the North and in the nationwide mass uprisings.

But certainly, the level of armed strength of the revolutionary movement could not as yet allow it to seize political power. The movement could only further strengthen itself by taking advantage of the bitter strife of the reactionaries.

At any rate, the replacement of Marcos by Mrs. Aquino has not rooted out the fundamental causes of fascist dictatorship, has not solved the crisis of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal system, and has kept the ground fertile for social unrest and armed revolution. Marcos, after all, left a bankrupt government and a depressed economy.

Soon after the fall of Marcos, amidst the ever worsening socio-economic crisis, the aggravation of the political crisis of the ruling system has become starkly evident in the factionalization of no less than the main component of the State — the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Marcos-Ver and Enrile-Ramos factions had become a public fact in the days of February 22 to 25, 1986. By becoming

president and AFP commander-in-chief, Mrs. Aquino also gained the opportunity to form her own faction in the AFP and further split the Enrile-Ramos faction into two factions.

The emergence of armed factions of the same ruling classes inside and outside the AFP portends more violent strife within the ruling system even as a blatant fascist dictatorship has been removed for the time being.

Since the beginning, the Aquino presidency has been keeping itself within the parameters of foreign and feudal domination and has remained pro-US and reactionary, despite its wish to restore the pre-1972 liberal-democratic embellishments on the big comprador-landlord state and its actual efforts to undo some of the worst features and effects of the previous fascist regime.

The key positions in the Aquino cabinet, like those of the ministers of national defense and the economic agencies, have always been held by rabid pro-US and reactionary personalities. Only the secondary positions have been given to bourgeois-nationalist and liberal-democratic elements. These are now in the process of being reduced due to US pressures and dictation.

In terms of economic and social policies, the Aquino government has been no different from the fallen Marcos regime. It represents the same class interests — those of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class — and is utterly subservient to the policy dictates of direct US agencies as well as US-controlled multilateral agencies like the IMF and the World Bank.

The Aquino government follows the line that the Philippines should provide more privileges to the foreign monopoly firms, avoid genuine and thoroughgoing land reform and shun national industrialization, concentrate on agriculture and agricultural export production despite the relative glut and depression of the price of agricultural commodities in the world capitalist market, liberalize imports to smash whatever remaining Philippine industries there are, retain anti-labor decrees and press down wages, increase the domestic tax burden, and keep begging for loan rescheduling and for new loans to pay for old loans.

What has excited many people, including the progressive forces, to sympathize with and support Mrs. Aquino is her anti-fascist stance and her role as a justly avenging widow. She has maintained popular support against the challenges posed by the Marcos and Enrile factions. But this popular support is eroding because of failure to solve the country's socio-economic problems and render justice to the victims of the fallen fascist regime, and because of the increasing atrocities and abuses of an unreformed Armed Forces of the Philippines. Increasing numbers of people

condemn the retention by Mrs. Aquino of notorious fascists in the AFP and the emergence of new cronies around her, even before Marcos and his set of cronies could be punished and compelled to restore their loot to the people.

But most alarming of all has been the success of the US in using Enrile through a series of sham coup threats to shake down the Aquino government into yielding to US demands. As early as the morning of November 10, 1986, before her departure for Japan, Mrs. Aquino is believed to have been compelled to agree to a US arranged compromise in which Enrile would resign together with the entire cabinet and she would be able to install General Ilieto, who is simultaneously a pro-US and pro-Aquino man, as defense minister. In addition, she would cut down the number and influence of the nationalist and liberal democratic elements in her cabinet and consolidate the entire executive branch of her government for the extension of the US military bases beyond 1991, for the implementation of a vicious two-faced campaign of counter-insurgency, and for the prompt compliance with the policy dictates of the IMF and the World Bank.

The ruling US-Aquino clique is now in the process of rapid consolidation. The executive is being consolidated as an instrument of US policy. The Aquino faction is now formally and really dominant in the AFP and is seeking to unify it. The Aquino constitution has now been ratified, and the elections for local executive offices and for the legislature will be held soon.

There are six major parties of the ruling classes. Three support the Aquino government and three oppose it. Those in support are PDP-Laban, UNIDO and Liberal Party (Salonga), while those in opposition are the KBL (Marcos' party), Nacionalista Party (Enrile) and Partido Nacionalista ng Pilipinas.

Since August 31, 1986, the Partido ng Bayan (PnB) has emerged to truly represent the national-democratic interests of the people and breach the monopoly of the electoral and other open political processes by the comprador-landlord parties. It has grown from a charter membership of 50,000 to more than 500,000 in only four months and has outstripped the Aquino party, PDP-Laban, which has a membership of 200,000.

Fearful of the growing strength of the PnB and the probability that it would get at least 20 percent of the local executive and legislative seats in the forthcoming elections while the six pro-US and reactionary parties would be divided against themselves, the US and the local reactionaries have waged a vicious campaign of slander against this political party of the working class, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie.

Not satisfied with this futile campaign, they have been conducting a campaign of terror, including the kidnapping, torture, mutilation and assassination of no less than the Partido ng Bayan chairman Rolando Olalia; and death threats, kidnapping and selective killing directed against PnB leaders and organizers at various levels. CIA operatives are directing and utilizing AFP personnel to carry out the campaign of terror and are trying to whip together the military followers of all the reactionary factions along the line of rabid anti-communism.

In an attempt to simplify the Philippine situation for itself, the US is pressing for a return to the two-party system monopolized by the comprador-landlord classes. It is pushing the Aquino clique to form a monolithic party, Lakas ng Bansa (Strength of the Nation), with PDP-Laban now headed by the president's brother as the core. It is also pushing the reactionary opposition parties to band together under the signboard of the Nacionalista Party.

However, even if the reactionaries were to be simply divided into two political parties, the crisis of the ruling system will continue to deepen and generate violent strife between them. The scheme to eliminate the PnB from the electoral field will serve only to expose the rottenness of the system and underscore the logic of the armed revolutionary movement.

In its capacity as a national united front organization, the National Democratic Front has negotiated and forged a ceasefire agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of facilitating further negotiations for the solution of such fundamental problems of the people as US imperialism and domestic feudalism.

But the Aquino regime has been consistently interested only in upholding its political authority, constitution, laws, institutions and processes; offering concessions of a narrow kind to the revolutionary forces; and skirting fundamental issues. The negotiations between the NDF and the Manila-based government have therefore been predictably futile.

For failure to at least spell out a patriotic and progressive orientation regarding foreign and feudal domination, Mrs. Aquino has already disappointed the politically advanced section of the people and an increasing number of the middle section.

The January 22 massacre of peasants and other demonstrators exposes the antagonism of the Aquino regime to the people demanding genuine and thorough-going land reform. Mrs. Aquino did not only refuse for the fourth time (since becoming president) to meet with the peasant representatives of Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas

(KMP), she even surrounded herself with police and troops poised to fire at the peasant demonstrators and their supporters.

Since the second quarter of 1986, the KMP has submitted to the Aquino government a comprehensive and deep-going proposal for land reform. But this has been ignored by Mrs. Aquino. Instead, she has engaged in tokenism and press gimmickry reminiscent of Marcos to obscure the land problem and uphold landlord class interests.

The readiness of AFP troops to kill people last January 22 is part of the US scheme to destroy the national democratic organizations. The assassination of Olalia by AFP agents was an act calculated to terrorize the entire national democratic movement because Olalia was not only chairman of Partido ng Bayan but also chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and vice-chairman of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN).

Because the Aquino regime is obviously determined by its big comprador-landlord character not to solve the basic problems of the people or cooperate with progressive forces in solving these problems, the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of Philippine society will remain, the political and economic crisis will continue to worsen and plague her regime, and the armed revolutionary movement will continue to march forward.

Under these conditions, it is utterly impossible for the Aquino regime to build a liberal democratic state or even only to retain the liberal democratic embellishments of the comprador-landlord state for a long time. As a matter of fact, these embellishments have dropped off in a big way because of the January 22 massacre.

It will become rapidly fatal for the Aquino regime to imagine, after going through the motion of negotiating for peace, that it can maintain a liberal-democratic facade by openly seeking to isolate and destroy the revolutionary movement.

Mrs. Aquino has so often made the threat that she would "unleash the sword of war" against the revolutionary movement if negotiations would not go her way and she would then have the "moral basis" for counter-revolutionary violence. This counter-revolutionary rhetoric of Mrs. Aquino conceals the fact that the Armed Forces of the Philippines has intensified its military campaigns of suppression in the countryside since the downfall of Marcos, that it has miserably failed, and that the NPA netted 1,500 rifles from March 1 to July 30 last year.

The Aquino regime cannot expect to do better than the Marcos regime in seeking to suppress the revolutionary movement by any combination of violence and deception.

Mrs. Aquino is faced with widespread social unrest and

is running a depressed economy and bankrupt government. In contrast, Mr. Marcos enjoyed huge amounts of foreign loans and was able to build up the AFP rapidly in the 1970s when the New People's Army was still small and weak.

The Aquino government is now faced with reactionary opposition groups with far greater financial and military resources than the anti-Marcos reactionary opposition ever had during the 1970s. But more significantly, it is also faced with an armed revolutionary movement far stronger than that which the Marcos regime had to face.

The popularity of Mrs. Aquino is overrated by the US and the US mass media. Moreover, this "popularity" has been manipulated for counter-revolutionary purposes and is bound to be spent very soon. The bloodbath on January 22 has already exposed the Aquino regime as being not fundamentally any different from the fallen Marcos regime. Even only on the issue of fascism, Mrs. Aquino has grossly failed to render justice to the victims of the fallen Marcos regime and has retained the fascists in the military. It is clear that the US-Aquino regime is bent on using the same military that Marcos used for counter-revolutionary violence.

The rapid consolidation of the Aquino regime which is now taking place may keep it in place for one or two years. But if she allows herself to be used by the US in the scheme to wipe out the legal democratic forces, the revolutionary movement is in a position to expose and thwart her counter-revolutionary role and accelerate the downfall of her regime.

The scheme of the US is to use her as the sugarcoating on the killing blade of the military. But she is now responsible and accountable for retaining the fascists in the military, for allowing them to commit the January 22 massacre in front of Malacanang Palace and for failing to speedily take any disciplinary or punitive action against the perpetrators of the massacre.

The US-Aquino clique isolates itself by continuing the same counter-revolutionary violence and deception used by the erstwhile ruling US-Marcos clique against the people. Posing as the center, reminiscent of Marcosian rhetoric, the new ruling clique strains to attack and suppress the progressive forces, even as the threat to itself from rival reactionary factions runs ahead of the possibility of the victory of the armed revolution or even only of the attainment of a strategic stalemate.

Even if she were to successfully control the AFP for one or two years by increasing the pay and attending to other requirements of the troops, the socio-economic crisis

will only worsen and encourage a group within the AFP to stage a coup d'etat in two or three years' time.

Such a military group could raise charges of corruption and failure to quell the armed revolution in order to ride to power. Even now, a new set of cronies supposedly headed by Mrs. Aquino's own brother and other close relatives has gained notoriety. And, of course, the armed revolution shall have gained further strength in two to three years' time.

The Aquino faction is now on top of the Marcos and Enrile factions in the AFP and has expressed determination to do away with factionalism. But the AFP will remain fractious due to the already deeply entrenched factions, the virulence of the social crisis and the growing armed revolution.

The current balance of forces between the armed revolution and the armed counter-revolution indicates that the revolutionary forces can reach strategic stalemate in three to five years, a time allowance that is more than sufficient.

The NPA has 10,000 full-time guerrilla fighters with automatic rifles, tens of thousands of part-time guerrillas with inferior firearms, and hundreds of thousands of militiamen — against the AFP's 40,000 combat effectives in 80 to 85 maneuver battalions, 120,000 support troops, 50,000 policemen and 75,000 paramilitary personnel.

The armed struggle is supported by 10 million people under organs of political power and in mass organizations. And the reactionary government cannot really claim as mass support for counter-revolutionary violence the people who participate in such voting exercises as plebiscites, referenda and elections.

The strategic stalemate is no longer just a dream for the armed revolutionaries. It is within sight and within the range of planning, especially because the possibility of a coup d'etat and the further deterioration of the ruling system runs ahead of it. It has also become realistic to expect that the revolutionary movement can win total victory in the next decade.

The scheme of the US to cut down the vulnerable legal forces of the national democratic movement through terror tactics, exclude the PnB from the electoral and other open political processes, and maintain a monopoly of these processes by the exploiting classes, further justifies the armed revolutionary movement and is bound to further incite the people to rise up in arms.

While the Manila-based reactionary government can arrange voting exercises every so many years to create the illusion of democracy, the rural based people's revolutionary government is being built and expanded on a daily basis by the revolutionary forces. **M**

CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE HOLDS 3RD CONGRESS IN BAGUIO

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 28 Feb 87 pp 1, 2

[Text]

BAGUIO CITY — The Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA) proved itself a force to contend with in the Cordillera and reaffirmed its commitment to regional autonomy with the holding of its Third Congress at the St. Vincent Gym, Baguio City last February 23-25.

The Congress, attended by some 300 delegates from 130 people's organizations, represented an estimated total of 39,000 individual CPA members from the five Cordillera provinces (Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Ifugao, Benguet, Mt. Province), Baguio City, Nueva Vizcaya and Igorots in Metro Manila, boosting the CPA's claim to be the largest federation of Igorot organizations in the Cordillera today.

The three-day gathering was part of the celebrations by cause-oriented groups of People's Power Week marking the first anniversary of the February EDSA uprising. Carrying the theme "People of the Cordillera: Strengthen our Unity, and Continue the Struggle for Genuine Autonomy, Peace and Socio-economic Development," the congress included

speeches, cultural numbers and open discussions, expressing the CPA's position of continued protest over the lopsided policies of the Aquino government.

"One year after the February uprising, economic and political power does not yet reside in the majority of the Filipino people, but continues to be confined in the hands of a few capitalists and landed families," Etta Rosales, congress guest speaker and director of the Popular Struggles Commission of BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), said in her address. "Our economy is controlled by big business and foreign capital while land as the source of livelihood of millions of peasants is owned by big landlords. The Cory government perpetuates the structures which allow continued foreign domination and monopoly ownership of land," she said.

Reports by provincial speakers also revealed that recent military troop movements in the Cordillera indicate a build-up of military presence and an intensification of coun-

ter-insurgency operations. Two Army battalions are reportedly soon to be deployed in the Mt. Province while in Luna, Kalinga-Apayao, military operations by the 17th and 48th IB using chemical warfare continue. Ifugao representatives also reported that new PC-INP detachments are being set up in several barangays in the province.

"We fear the intensification of militarization in the Cordillera which will bring more sufferings and violence in our communities," the delegates said.

Also mentioned many times over as a pressing problem facing the alliance was the recent emergence of new groups, specifically the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, Cordillera Bodong Administration and the Cordillera Broad Coalition (CPLA-CBA-CBC), which "are attempting to grab the political gains of the mass movement of the indigenous people of the Cordillera." The emergence of such groups was analyzed to be part of the "Low Intensity Conflict" strategy of "Total Warfare at the Grassroots level" of the United States in Third World countries like the Philippines, which the CPA said, is a strategy to fan conflicts among the people and to sow disunity in the grassroots as counter-insurgency measure. This strategy was allegedly used by the US government to try and subvert

the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Appraised of this situation, the CPA Congress laid down a program of action for the year 1987. Foremost among their plans is a campaign to work for "genuine peace, autonomy and socio-economic development through multi-sectoral and sectoral mass movements" among the Cordillera workers, farmers, youth and students, professionals, women, urban poor and other groups. The Congress also resolved to demand the withdrawal of military troops from the Cordillera. Organizing efforts of the alliance will continue to further broaden the federation and to promote their program.

A new set of officers of the alliance was elected on the last day of the congress. Fr. Eduardo Solang, Anglican priest, replaced Atty. William F. Claver, OIC Governor of Kalinga-Apayao as chairman of the CPA, Human Rights Lawyer Atty. Romeo Astudillo of Abra was chosen vice-chairman and Joanna Carino was voted Secretary-General. Other elected members of the CPA Executive Committee are Petra Macliing, Leonard Banganan, Vice-Mayor Crisencio Bernal of Lacub, Abra, Mayor Ramon Dulnuan of Hingyon, Ifugao, James Balao, and Daniel Ngayyan, chairman of the Cordillera Bodong Association (CBA)*CNF/02.27/01

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CSO: 4200/428

CORDILLERA ALLIANCE ELECTION PARTICIPATION RESOLUTION

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 7 Mar 87 pp 1, 11

[Text]

THE Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA) will actively participate in the coming national and local elections by supporting progressive candidates of other political parties, by fielding its own candidates, and by launching its own campaign to coincide with the electoral campaigns.

In a resolution passed by the CPA congress last February 25, the broad federation of Igorots in the Cordillera, said that it would participate in elections to "protect the gains in our fight for self-determination" and to "promote a new kind of politics based on issues, programs and principles."

Claiming to present an alternative to the "traditional politics based on personalities, wealth, and warlordism," the CPA has thrown its support behind the *Partido Kordilyera* (PK), a regional political party which was launched last February 22. "We have supported the PK from its inception to its formal launching and we

intend to support them and their candidates in the coming elections," the resolution said.

However, officers of the CPA clarified that the PK is not a member of the CPA or vice versa. Fr. Eduardo Solang, newly-elected CPA chairman, said in an interview with *CNF* that "there may be some members of PK who are also members of the organizations of the CPA, though not all of them are." He said that CPA is an alliance of organizations while PK is composed of individual members. "But because of PK's commitment to genuine regional autonomy in the Cordillera, we work closely with them," he said.

The CPA said that it still has to decide on whom to support among the congressional candidates in the Cordillera.

OIC-Governor of Kalinga-Apayao William F. Claver, past chairman of the CPA, has been chosen administration congressional candidate for his province. * *CNF/03.06/05*

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CSO: 4200/428

CORDILLERA PANEL SPLITS OVER AUTONOMY ISSUE

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 7 Mar 87 pp 1, 7

[Text]

THE Cordillera Broad Coalition (CBC) composed of professionals, businessmen and urban-based Cordillerans and the Local Government Units recently withdrew its support for the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA) in disagreement over the draft of the Executive Order to be submitted to President Corazon Aquino demanding the creation of the Interim Cordillera Autonomous Region (ICAR).

According to CBC Secretary Fernando Bahatan, the decision was made during a meeting of the CBC Council composed of Augustos Saboy of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao Vice-Governor Evelyn Dulnuan, Benguet Board Member Tomas Dampac, Mountain Province Board Member Dalog, Moises Cating of Baguio City and Ilocos Sur Deputy Governor Alan Moreno.

In crucial meetings held by the CBC and LGU representatives, Fr. Patricio Guyguyon, Vice-Mayor Rene Cortes and Sister Teresa Dagdag with CPLA Chairman Conrado Balweg and members of the

Military Commission and Cordillera Bodong Administration officers Mariano Agosto and Candido Basbasan, it was explained that the CBC and LGU feel that the demand for an administrative region through the creation of the Cordillera Regional Development Council should be first and foremost.

The CPLA and CBA meanwhile feel that a political solution is necessary to ensure the Cordillera people's defense of their homeland and right to self-determination.

"If we do not pursue a political solution in the Cordillera, we may end up like the American Indians", warned Balweg.

Meanwhile, CPLA and CBA officials will visit Manila to address various forums on the Cordillera issue.

A meeting is also being scheduled with President Aquino to follow up the demands submitted. These include the creation of ICAR; the recognition of the CPLA as a peace-keeping force in the Cordillera; and the recognition to the CBA as a government.*

CNA/03.07/02

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BAGUIO EDITORIAL REGRETS LAG IN CORDILLERA PEACETALKS

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 7 Mar 87 p 4

[Editorial: "Nowhere...?"]

[Text]

ALREADY TWICE POSTPONED, the Cordillera Peacetalks seems pointed in the same direction the government's negotiations with the National Democratic Front went, arousing wonder over what was gained, and by whom, in the "sincere" exchange of pronouncements during the past several months.

The government gained time, to be sure. Time to have the Constitution ratified in the most peaceful poll exercise ever. Time to set in place its loyal OICs down to the barangay level. Time to plan, reorganize and establish control over a machinery that was previously held with dictatorial hands. The tempo and momentum gained has been geared for national and local elections within the next six months.

The rebel negotiators and their forces have also gained time. To consolidate their units and organizations. To expose what they advocate and demand. To expand linkages and alliances with others. Time to plan, reorganize and establish control over their respective courses of action which, only over a year ago, were geared at toppling the dictatorship that in turn, by its flight, forced new realities upon our national situation.

The peace talks and negotiations were a welcome pause, a suspension of disbelief made refreshing and revitalizing by the raised hope that another way could yet be found away from the predicted violent and bloody revolution. Two more elections, no doubt, will keep that raised hope from fast erosion.

But what has happened to the peace talks has kindled sparks of doubt. Where before there was hopeful rejoicing, now there is spreading the suspicion that the February Revolution was ab initio fake and fraud.

So where are we all now?

No matter the variance of adversarial assessment, if there is but one percent of hope that a peaceful solution could be forged, the slimmest of possibilities must not be disregarded. It is the duty of all true Filipinos to follow and keep alive that hope.* *jnl*

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CSO: 4200/428

COLUMNIST ANALYZES NDF TALKS RESUMPTION GOAL

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 7 Mar 87 p 5

["Counterpoint" by Peppot L. Ilagan: "Peacetalks During the Campaign?"]

[Text]

AS THE DRY SEASON sets in and trails and streams in the forests become less dangerous, expect more firefights and encounters between the AFP and the NPA. Both sides expect this. Both are prepared for this. And because of the electoral campaigns for congressmen and senators, this may yet be the bloodiest dry season our country will ever experience since the now dimly remembered, if yet revered, Falls of Bataan and Corregidor.

There is little change in the position of the NPA towards the electoral processes in our country. They continue to question the fact that it is only a few select who are to be candidates. The added factor in this election, however, is that there is now a Left-leaning political party participating, the *Partido ng Bayan*, and various cause-oriented political groups are endorsing candidates and actively joining the fray. With the new party-list system mandated in the new Constitution, the Left can expect several spokesmen in the congress. This early we predict that many voters will vote for the PnB, or its affiliates among the sectoral groups accredited by the Comelec. We are sure several million will so vote.

This is why the National Democratic Front is willing to resume peacetalks. Even if no ceasefire on the national level is agreed on, so long as some negotiations continue and thus draw media coverage, then the propaganda gains of the NDF during the aborted talks last January can be consolidated towards support for candidates sympathetic to the Left. The resumed peacetalks would thus serve as a focal point upon which issues in the campaign can be translated to an educative drive to make the people more conscious of the national situation as analyzed by Left.

The Cory Aquino government has been put into a difficult position. Should it not resume peacetalks, the NDF wins points as this could be presented as a lack of sincerity on the part of government. If the peacetalks resume, then the NDF has a forum of criticizing the policies and program of government at a time when the administration's candidates are wooing votes. Thus, the hedging on the part of government negotiators, even if the resumption of peacetalks could also gain some points for the administration.

The agenda of "jobs and justice, food and freedom," as enunciated by the es-

teemed Ka Pepe Diokno, would really define what President Cory Aquino's government has accomplished in the past twelve months. Jobs are still scarce. Many injustices and human rights violations are once again emergent. Food prices are expected to rise with the international oil price hike. And as for freedom, the transition from a "revolutionary" period to a Constitutional mandate will take its toll before some stability is instituted.

Underlying this, the NDF proposal to include "*land and liberation*" telegraphs the punchline of the Left, so to speak. At the crux is the continued demand for a land reform program will really work. This can work only if it is acceptable. And it will only be acceptable, to the

NDF — that is, if the program is not sabotageable by Congress and the Senate which the Left, even as early as now, expects to be dominated by protectors of the landed and prevailing economic interest groups. It is an anchor point of the Left that without genuine economic emancipation, no true political freedom and democracy can be won.

As the government attempts a sustainable economic recovery and institutionalizes a new Constitution, and as the Rightist forces of the deposed dictatorship try to win back positions of power, the Left advances both its armed and legal struggle to win the people's support.

Juan dela Cruz thus graduates to a higher level of conflict in the continuing Philippine revolution. * 6 March 1987

/9317

CSO: 4200/428

IFUGAOANS SEEK MILITARY REMOVAL FROM NUEVA VIZCAYA

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 28 Feb 87 p 12

[Article: "Heavy War Materiel Posted To Scare Reds"]

[Text]

LAMUT, Ifugao — Combined troops of the Army Scout Rangers and the PC/INP installed three high-powered cannons at the Villaverde Municipal Hall in Nueva Vizcaya last February 17 pointed towards the direction of Brgy. Ocapan and Cabaluan. This signalled the beginning of military operations at the boundary of Kiangan, Ifugao and Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.

Residents are reportedly alarmed over the presence of the said cannons and are seeking the help of concerned groups to have the military hardware and troops removed from the area.

In response to this request, the Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA-Ifugao) recently passed

resolutions demanding the withdrawal of all military combat troops presently deployed in Ifugao and denouncing the continued militarization of the Cordillera.

Other groups are being urged by the barangay residents to form fact-finding groups to investigate the situation in the said areas.

Meanwhile, Luisito Maringan, a native of Lamut, Ifugao has allegedly donated land for the construction of the barracks of the engineering battalion of the Philippine Army in Lamut purportedly to maintain order in the locality. Residents however are questioning the need for such military presence in their midst.* CNF

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CSO: 4200/428

KMP CALLS FOR END TO 'LANDLORDISM', 'FOREIGN DOMINATION'

Baguio City THE GOLD ORE in English 28 Feb 87 p 12

[Text]

"Landlordism must be abolished and foreign domination of agricultural lands should be eliminated if genuine land reform is being sought for," Ka Memong Patayan of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (MKP) explained in a lecture series at the U.P. College Baguio grounds last February 23.

Patayan discussed several points that relate to the land problem in the country, stressing that the new constitution does nothing to alleviate the farmers' plight. He also clarified that 40-60 sharing scheme with foreign landowners is obviously to the farmers' disadvantage.

"The minimum program of the KMP regarding land reform was rejected by the government. Economic recovery hinges on the progress of the farms in the countryside. If the basic demands of the farmers are truly considered in a nationalist agto-industrialization stance, land to the landless tillers is the first step — land and not amortized payments," Patayan explained.

He further said that foreclosed lands, idle lands and se-

questered crony lands should be distributed among the landless tillers and not demand amortized payments again.

"The government appears to be the landlords' agent. Why pass on the burden of payment for these lands to the farmers?", Patayan pointed out.

While the government pledges a fair deal on the distribution of abandoned and sequestered lands, Patayan specified that it is in fact just compensation for the landlords versus amortized payments where the farmers are burdened with payments which is very difficult for them to sustain. He added that this has become a vicious cycle which the government simply refused to break in favor of the farmers.

When asked about the progress of the Mendiola investigations, Patayan said the entire exercise is futile.

"It's hopeless — the military men are immaculate people, they're sinless. It would just have to be as if we marched down and fed ourselves to their guns." *CNF*

/9317

CSO: 4200/428

MANEUVERING FOR BAGUIO CONGRESSIONAL SEAT REPORTED

Babuo City THE GOLD ORE in English 7 Mar 87 pp 1, 7

[Text]

WHO IS Felipe Ramos?

This question rang out in coffeeshops and other gatherings around town after COMELEC Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Rodolfo Tabangin said over radio station *DZBS* that one certificate of candidacy for the lone congressional seat of Baguio City had been received by his office.

A late Friday afternoon check with COMELEC records showed that this 52-year old businessman filed his candidacy just before the close of office hours last Thursday, March 5. Ramos is the first candidate to file his papers with COMELEC and until presstime remains the only one to have done so.

Representing the "Independence Party" (IP), Ramos swore to his certificate of candidacy before Tabangin, accompanied by a handful of supporters. Ramos is a longtime resident of the city, born on June 11, 1935 and lives in Dagohoy Street, Baguio City. He is

married to the former Teodora Dioquino, and is a registered voter in precinct 117. He stated in his candidacy papers that he is an alumnus of the Baguio Colleges Foundation where he claims to hold a degree in Bachelor of Arts in Education. His papers also revealed that he completed his masteral study in 1971 in the same school, earning a Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT).

Ramos also said he has been a barangay official "for many years since the declaration of martial law." His most recent income tax declaration, attached to his candidacy papers, showed his profession to be "tanod." He included in his sworn statement a long list of his key areas of concern including, squatting, peace and order, sanitation, sports development, beautification, and the under-equipment of the local police.

Meanwhile, his opponents are not yet as decided.

UNIDO stalwarts Honorato Aquino and Pablito Sanidad

have not arrived at a clear agreement as to who will run and who will withdraw and endorse the other. Discussion between these two continue and observers have not ruled out the possibility of only one emerging as the official UNIDO candidate. The matter has been elevated to President Corazon Aquino after arbitration by UNIDO President Doy Laurel.

In the new opposition camp, all seems certain that former PTA General Manager Bernardo Vergara will become the standard bearer of a rumored "grand alliance of all opposition parties." All but lawyer Conrado Bueno have endorsed Vergara who has long begun oiling his brand new political machinery assembled during the heydays of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).

Deadline for the filing of candidacies for the Lower House was set by President Aquino on March 23. No one in Baguio is believed aiming for the Senate. * *JRD/03.06.03*

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CSO: 4200/428

ALBAY NPA, MILITARY, RESIDENTS' ACTIVITIES, VIEWS REPORTED

Quezon City VERITAS in English 1-7 Jan 87 pp 18, 19

[Article by Lorenzo B. Ziga: "Christmas in a Ceasefire Zone"]

[Text] In Albay, children once kept an unending feud with the crow. The crow is a born thief pecking at ripened guavas and papayas off the boughs before the children could hurdle property lines to get at the fruits.

But for years now, the green foliage has provided cover and camouflage for a ranging guerrilla war that, among other things, has kept children from venturing out to their favorite wild guava clump. In some town centers, few dare move about as soon as darkness settles.

After 18 years of warfare, the guns on both sides were silent this Christmas. Bishop Concordio Sarte noted that for the first time in years, the churches were packed for the misa de gallo [Midnight Mass]. Even with minor irritants, he noted that the ceasefire was holding well.

For most Albay residents, the ceasefire brought hope for a genuine and lasting peace. Salvador Camata, barangay [village] captain of San Antonio, Tabaco, says: "I hope that both sides will come together and agree on those crucial points. After all, we still have to work with each other."

The CPP-NPA claimed that it had ordered all its units to suspend all tactical and offensive operations by December 5. It had also asked a group of professionals, Principled Peace Initiatives (PII), to help ensure the success of the ceasefire.

Brig Gen Eduardo Taduran, RUC V commander said that there are 1,138 NPA rebels in the region. He estimates its sympathizers to be almost 115,000. The rebellion affects 2,019 out of the 3,452 barangays of the region. In Albay, most of the affected barangays are those adjacent to the southernmost Camarines Sur towns and the northernmost towns of Sorsogon.

The first NPA squad in the Region, led by the Jallores brothers, first operated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. One of the Jallores brothers, Kumander Tangkad [Commander Tall and Slender], drove the fire truck that rammed through the gates of Malacanang during the Battle of Mendiola in 1971.

In the interior barrios of Polangui, barrio folk on their way home from the Christmas Midnight Mass were surprised to see men and women with firearms slung on one shoulder, strumming guitars and singing carols in the winding mountain road. Civilians and guerrillas warmly exchanged greetings even as they shivered from the cool mountain air.

Political work and "armed propaganda," as the rebels refer to encounters, took a Christmas break. NPA guerrillas passed the time over a few rounds of chess, puffing at Marlboros donated by the masa [masses].

In the Bicol Region, the Christmas weekend was particularly crucial for both the government and the National Democratic Front as both sides threshed out last-minute obstacles to the formation of the Regional Ceasefire Committee. The NDF had earlier objected to some of the nominees of the military to the five-man committee as being "too conservative and pro-government."

The Regional Ceasefire Committee is tasked to monitor violations of the ceasefire agreement at the local level.

Ka [Comrade] Aldo, Camarines Norte NPA command's representative to the peace talks, has not seen his family for two years now. But after eight years in the movement, he has learned to live with the pain of being separated from his loved ones.

[Siyempre, may sentimental value rin ang mga pangahong ito. Pero nawawala na rin ang lungkot kahit paano kapag nasa piling ka ng masa dahil ang turing nila sa iyo ay hindi na rin iba," Ka ["Of course, times like this have sentimental value. But no matter how intense the pain is, it goes away when you're very close to the masses because they regard you as one of their own," Comrade] Aldo explains.

After four years as a peasant leader operating above ground, Ka Aldo became "hot" and had to leave his 15-hectare riceland to his sons. He became a full time revolutionary. At the time he left home, his youngest daughter was just a month old. His wife however understood what he had to do. His wife is in the movement herself.

"Magandang paraan ang ginawa ng Pangulo na iyong mga mayor na problema ay puwedeng pag-usapan," ["The President presented a marvelous solution: that major problems can be discussed,"] says Comrade Aldo. He adds, however, that the military may attempt to discredit the CPP-NPA in the eyes of the people.

Ka Willy is 18 years old and has been a full-time guerrilla for the past two years. A rebel unit is camped five towns away, and he regroupes with his comrades in Albay's third district. To go up the gentle curves of the mountain road, he takes a jeepney crammed to the roof with passengers, chickens and hogs.

The lamps were lighted and the guerrillas were playing chess when Ka Willy arrived at the campsite. They were staying at the home of a farmer who had given way to the kasamas [comrades] for the past four days. Ka Sani, the

leader of the unit, expressed her disappointment that Ka Willy arrived too late for their cultural program commemorating the 18th anniversary of the CPP.

The group had earlier prepared pancit bihon and pan de coco [transparent Chinese noodles and coconut bread] for visiting comrades from nearby units and some civilian guests.

In the kitchen, some women comrades were preparing nilagang baboy [boiled pork] for supper. In the open fire by the yard, under a young mango tree, a big potful of rice cooked in the embers.

The lights from nearby houses glimmered in the darkness. In the open fields however, the remaining daylight shone on the paddies. Fireflies flitted among the trees. The clear sky was awash with stars.

The early evening was spent exchanging views about the direction of the revolution. One of the guerrillas strummed a guitar while another sang a revolutionary song.

Ka Sani is a former political detainee. She has been with the revolution since the First Quarter Storm, peak of student unrest in January 1970. She is married to a comrade, by whom she has two children. While she misses them for Christmas, she looks instead to the things that must be done for the guerrillas' cause.

"The NPA is different from the military because we are the army of the people. It is a cardinal rule among all of us that we shall not take anything without the knowledge of the masses or without paying for it. We have to cultivate the support of the masses for without them how do you think can we survive."

Even with the ceasefire, which they monitor closely through the radio, their main source of news and information aside from the occasional newspaper, the NPA cadres continue their surveillance and maintain a guarded posture.

Ka Sani admits though that with the ceasefire, "bawas ang tension," [the tension is lessened,] They have devised three levels of preparedness. Brown alert means that the enemy is still far off. Blue alert means that one has to be ready since the enemy is drawing closer. Red alert means that the comrades should be ready with their guns and knapsacks at all times.

By nine in the evening, the comrades are ready for lights out. Sleeping arrangements are assigned and those in the unit are dispersed to the other houses nearby.

The norms of conduct for the NPA cadres have changed and have been relaxed throughout the years. Before, the cadres were not allowed to drink or smoke or to attend social dances in the barrios under their control. Marrying outside the movement was forbidden.

The fighters are now allowed to attend these dances since they are an occasion for mixing with the population and for the young men to get to know other

people their age. As the ban on smoking eased gradually, the guerrillas initially smoked Rosalina matamis [sweet cigarette brand Rosalina] and other cigarette brands popular with the elderly. They have since switched to Champion, one of the cheapest brands. Marlboros are for special occasions. Drinks are refused unless the "masa" ["masses"] insist that they join a round or two. The comrades are constantly reminded that at all times, the good of the collective takes precedence over individual comfort.

In Camp Bagong Ibalon in Legaspi City, the military command organized dancing contests for the young and amateur singing contests exceeded by some of the local radio talents. Camp personnel were divided into two groups that would take their Christmas and New Year breaks alternatively.

Despite the ceasefire, the camp is on red alert and nightly inspections are routine. For the duration of the misa de gallo [Midnight Mass] season a brass band paraded around the camp to summon the faithful to Mass at the camp chapel.

Pat. Mila Javier, 33, says the Christmas bonus granted by the government this year is the biggest she has received so far since she worked for the government five years ago. Still, she says, her Christmas won't be entirely happy: she will spend it away from her family as she has for the past eight years.

Her father was a military man who was befriended by the man who was to become her husband, T. Sgt Nestorio Javier. Her parents like the young soldier enough to urge their daughter to marry him.

She bore him two children. The eldest, Benjamin, has indicated that he wants to enter the Philippine Military Academy and become a soldier like his father. Mrs Javier has so far refused to approve of her son's ambition although Benjie has threatened to join the Army anyway.

"Tama na siguro ang dalawang sundalo sa aming pamilya mismo." ["I think that two (2) soldiers in our own family is (more than) enough."] She recalls the fears she suffered when her husband was assigned on a mission in one of the rebel-infested areas in Bicol. She could not function properly in the office and had rosary beads in her hands until she learned he was safe.

Another soldier, a former member of the Presidential Security Command under the previous regime, misses some of the comforts of his previous assignment. He was assigned the chore of guarding Elizabeth Rocka, sister of President Marcos. He remembers how the former Ilocos Norte governor, who died of Alzheimer's disease recently, wept as she watched television reportage of her brother's last days in power.

"Dati ang dami talagang pata ng hamon ang ibinibigay sa amin tuwing Pasko. Ngayon, Kahit paano maaalala mo rin raman ang mga taong pinagsilbihan. At saka nakatulong din naman sa akin ang dati kong puwestong iyon." ["In the past, there were really lots of legs of ham given to us every Christmas. Now, you see, no matter what has happened, one can still remember the people that one has worked with. And in addition, my former job has indeed helped me."] He talks of how his job enabled him to send all his children to school. Of his eight children, four are now working in the United States.

The officers feel that they are now given a better chance of promotion, by merely proving themselves. Maj Percival Enverga, Command public information officer, says that during the previous regime their own advancement was at a standstill because the deposed President considered certain officers indispensable,

"At least today there is fair competition. Your career and destiny is in your hands," Enverga says.

Albay, as well as the rest of the Bicol peninsula, is a land made fertile by the number of volcanoes and the abundant rainfall all year round. Most of the rice lands are irrigated and a network of roads connects farms to the commercial centers.

It is also a land of great poverty. The patron-client system is, for the most part, intact. Majority of those who can afford tertiary education are those with some form of steady and regular income, such as landholdings or business. There is hardly any industrial activity to speak of. Even the farmers have to contend with the number of typhoons that annually visit the region and the volcanic eruptions that wreak havoc on the people's meager incomes.

In 1984, Mayor Volcano erupted and the newly-constructed bridge in Lidong, Sto. Domingo was buried under tons of mud from its slopes. Two years later, vehicles from Legaspi to the province's seaboard have to contend with the heavy rainfall as the course of the river changes with each heavy downpour and mudflow. Hundreds of hectares in the slope of Mayon, prime residential and agricultural areas, have been declared a danger zone.

General Services Minister Victor Ziga says that because of the neglect Bicol suffered during the previous administration, the region, and particularly the province of Albay, needs "considerable and substantial support from the Government."

"The Bicol Region is virtually a forsaken region," he said.

He points out that among the areas that need immediate attention is the reduction of power rates or the introduction of reduced or special rates for the people of Albay and the region, considering that both the Bacon and Tiwi geothermal plants are situated in the province. Ziga feels that this ample energy source should be a potential come-on for industrial investors.

Local Governments Deputy Minister Ciriaco Alfelor says that investors must be enticed to invest in the region because of the rich mineral deposits found in the province. He says that the Ministry of Natural Resources could perhaps map out a program for this purpose.

These projects, Albay Governor Crispin Rayala points out, would be crucial to the uplift of the living standards of the people in Albay. The province has one of the highest population growth rates in the country and opportunities are required to tap this vast potential. Rayala sees the need for more farm-to-market roads to complement the government efforts to improve the life of the people of the region. Rayala admits that the rebels exert a great deal of influence in a significant portion of the province.

The cause-oriented groups in the region have also come out in support of the peace initiatives. It is through the effort of the cause-oriented groups that most of the people have become more active in political activities in the area.

PPI's Romeo Gaveria, also regional chairman of Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Bicol Chapter, said the group will be conducting a massive educational drive on the Constitution.

Meanwhile, the families in the barrio have opted to remain in their places, harvesting their crops of palay [unhusked grains of the rice plants], and drying out the crushed sugar cane stalks in the roadsides. For years, the government and the rebels have vied for these families' loyalties.

Those who live in the barrios where the NPAs have made their presence felt swear that somehow, a certain discipline has seeped into the people's lives. One barangay captain notes that whereas before they could not have a pabayle (a community benefit dance) without a scuffle breaking out, when people sense that the NPAs had come into the barrios, now even those who were known to be rowdy bodies have started to behave themselves.

One negative effect of this has been the rise of a number of groups who have purported to be NPA. In Tabaco town, a former policeman was liquidated by the NPAs during the wake for his mother after the NPAs allegedly found out that he was the leader of the dreaded Doce Pares gang, a bang of tulisan [thieves].

After 18 years of gunfire, barrio folk can greet their friends from both the military and the Neps without the thought that later in the day, these friends would have died in an encounter.

As traditional Christmas festivities unfolded throughout the country, the NPA cadres in the hills sang carols to the barrio folk of Polangui. In the military camps, soldiers' families organized programs and skits to celebrate the spirit of the season.

It was after all the advent of the first ceasefire.

There were no encounters between the Neps and the military for Christmas. But while waiting for the hour they had to move to their next camp, this reporter engaged a rebel in a quick round of chess. After a few moves we had each lost one bishop and one knight, and Ka Sani said it was time to go.

I left an unfinished game of chess out there in the war zone. It was too early in the game for me to tell whether I was winning.

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CSO; 4211/25

REBEL WOMEN GROUP'S MAIDEN PRESS CONFERENCE

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 21 Jan 87 pp 16, 17, 42

[Article by Juaniyo Arcellana: "A Meeting With Amazons"--"The first-ever MAKIBAKA press conference is held on a hillside in Quezon Province."]

[Text] All press conferences should be held like this. A six-hour bus ride over bumpy roads, almost like a roller-coaster. Three and a half hours on a rain-soaked trail, hiking through groves studded with fireflies, shirting ravines, tracing the face of God on the hillsides. Greeted by men and women cadres with eyes ablaze, because this life of theirs has given them the gift of seeing in the dark.

"This is hysterical," Daniela the foreign correspondent said. This is her first exposure trip to underground country, having spent the past so many years based in London. The MANILA CHRONICLE's Tess Villanueva injures her foot on the rugged terrain; she is aided by a couple of burly photographers.

"Tuturuan mo ba akong humawak ng baril?" ["Are you going to teach me how to handle a gun?"] Nona Ocampo of the PHILIPPINE TRIBUNE asks Ka [Comrade] Belen, as the entourage takes a breather at a water station. The water here tastes different. The air smells of wet earth. Even after several hours of journeying, one is still capable of clear thinking.

I am reminded of college fraternity initiations where at the end of the ordeal one is greeted with open arms. Among the welcoming committee are Ka Sarah, whose bearing recalls a friend from university days; the goofy Ka Mike and the energetic Ka Brian. Very ordinary human beings, they, far from the picture of desperate terrorists imbedded in our minds by the martial law years.

Since it is ceasefire time, we are told that the Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (MAKIBAKA), the militant women's group which began as an adjunct of the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), will hold its coming out presscon. Once we are settled in the camp, slices of sweet cassava bibingka are passed around. It is more or less an appetizer to the dinner of mountain rice, stewed vegetables, and a pork and chicken dish with potatoes and peppers. The fare is laid out on a long, rectangular table, where the hungry company eats standing up.

It is about ten o'clock at night in Quezon Province. In the background, a guitar and amplifier blare out nationalist songs, the sound similar to those heard in traveling carnivals. There is a small stage, above which hangs a banner that reads: "Isulong ang kilusan sa pagpapalaya ng kababaihan at sambayanan," ["Advance the movement for the freedom of women and the general public,"] A reporter named Chi from REUTERS is slumped in a chair nearby rubbing alcohol on her feet.

The conference starts at eleven, with Ka Letty as moderator. The panel consists of Ka Rosenda (some hear her name as Ka Roselda), who has a little girl beside her; MAKIBAKA national spokesperson Victoria "Bicbic" Justiniani seated in the middle; and organizer Ka Merle. Ka Letty reminds everyone that a relaxed atmosphere should be maintained during the question-and-answer portion as well as during the other parts of the program.

Justiniani, who has fine Middle Eastern features and is wearing a headdress, could be mistaken for an older sister of Cristina Crisol. She reads out the MAKIBAKA statement very carefully, at times even repeating herself for emphasis. When she is introduced by the moderator, the press learns that Bicbic has been in the movement for fifteen years. A Negrense, she has spent most of her underground days in the volcanic province of Kanlaon. She is 31 years old and has three kids.

Bicbic stresses that the primary aim of MAKIBAKA members is the liberation of the Filipino people from foreign domination and feudalism. The liberation of women is their second aim. They want to establish a national coalition government, and in the process give full participation to women in government. Special attention should be given to women's demands. There must be nationalist industrialization and extensive land reform. Ultimately, they say, there will be an equal democratic relationship between men and women.

A little bit of history is also recounted. MAKIBAKA was founded in April 1971. The fifteen founding members were students and professionals. The group later expanded to include workers and the urban poor. They reaffirmed their opposition to beauty contests because these portray women as mere objects of pleasure and exploitation. In 1972, they went underground when martial law was declared. For eleven years, the organization grew and operated on the barrio level, until 1983, when a national leadership was formed.

MAKIBAKA members are not confined to minor roles in the movement. They serve as couriers and also as medics. Ka Merle says that the women's group was formed because "hindi pantay ang tingin sa kanila ng mga lalaki," ["the men didn't treat them as their equals."] As organizer, Ka Merle indoctrinates the masses on how women are discriminated against, and how women can and should assert their basic rights in the common struggle.

Then there is a cultural program. A boy named Ka Jojo declaims a poem which ends: "...ang sagot ay digmaang bayan," ["...the answer is civil war."] A lola named Ka Gemma sings a song whose first line goes, "Ang rebolusyon ay hindi laruan," ["Revolution is not a toy,"] while at the same time stressing that "disiplina ang ating patnubay," ["discipline is our guide."] The women red fighters perform a skit, with Ka Sarah doing a pantomime. Afterwards

there is a photo session, with the women revolutionaries posing beside miniature exploding volcanoes.

MAKIBAKA members are one in saying that the "Women of the Year" selected by TIME is not the same Cory Aquino who ran for president. They bewail the fact that contrary to Cory's election promise, Hacienda [the large plantation] Luisita has yet to under the land reform knife, and that during her term the RP-US bases treaty will most likely be extended.

"Mabilis mag-iba si Cory at mas lalong tumitindi ang pasismo," ["Cory changes very fast and fascism is now more intense,"] their national spokesperson says.

Ka Sarah is twenty-three years old and very pretty. She is also a mother of two children whom she gets to see, as rebel custom goes, only every six months. She has been in the movement for seven years, having started out as a cadre when she was sweet sixteen. Why did she join MAKIBAKA?

"Nadala na ako sa pagsasamantala," ["I was motivated by the opportunity,"] she says.

I asked her about her M-16, and if she's ever used it on a man before. She says that at the start she was very nervous, but not anymore. She does not believe in anting-anting [amulets]. She says that all men and women are equal when it comes to the firing line. She wears a disguise whenever she has to make a trip to Manila. Her husband is also a rebel soldier based in Quezon.

Ka Belen is twenty years old and kind of cute. She has been a MAKIBAKA member for five years, having been initiated into the movement when she was a restless fifteen. She was in the propaganda staff in '81-'83, then was involved in mass work the next two years. In case the ceasefire falls through, "tuloy pa rin ang pakikibaka," ["the campaign against evil still continues,"] she says. She admits that she's not too used to carrying a gun and fighting, just like the rest of the young amazons in this group, with possibly only a few exceptions.

Has life in the underground been kind to her?

"Sanay na ako sa buhaybundok," ["I'm already used to life in the mountains,"] says Ka Belen.

Bicbic Justiniani worked extensively in southwestern Negros, specifically the "Chicks" area (named after the first letters of towns), from '73 to '85. Prior to joining the revolutionary women's group, she was a student at Silliman University. She was a red fighter from '73 to '78, before being promoted to an administrative rank in the guerrilla movement. "Wa siya masyado kasa-bot," ["She doesn't fully understand it,"] she says of her Tagalog-er-Filipino.

Asked if the first MAKIBAKA press conference was held in Quezon because this was the place where the legendary Lorena Barros of the UP, an original founding member, spent the last years of her life, Bicbic said that this wasn't

intentional. Justiniani says that they will most likely continue with the struggle--because the Aquino government supports the very things they are fighting against: imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

The townsfolk seem very much at home with the presence of the armed rebels. An old woman says that the camp has been here longer than she can remember. The night is filled with the memory of guns and guitars. With the adrenalin going, the cultural show goes on till early morning. I take my place in the social hall an arm's length away from BUSINESSDAY MAGAZINE's Barbara Mae Dacanay, because I promised her that I'd not resort to my crawling tactics as the night wore on.

The way back can be a different story. Riding logs in the river flow, playing piko [hopscotch] on the rocks and stones, thinking of the young women armed to the teeth, wondering if one day we'll read in the papers that, after a burst of gunfire, their heads of hair have been bashed in with sunlight. The fireflies are all asleep, Huwag matakot. [Don't be afraid.]

/9274

CSO: 4211/25

FORMER MEMBER CHARGES NPA ASSASSINATES INNOCENT RELATIVES

Dipolog City THE MINDANAO OBSERVER in English 16 Feb 87 pp 1, 5

[Press Release by 91 CMOST, CMOB, Dipolcg]

[Text] Sicayab, Dipolog City--A former member of the Sandatahang Yunit Propaganda [Armed Propaganda Unit] of the CPP/NPA movement fearlessly made revelations about the misdeeds of their organization in two separate information drive being conducted recently by the Army's 1st Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Francisco T. Jucutan Jr, NAFF.

The shocking statement he made to the public in Manukan and Barangay Sitog, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte was "WALA MOILA ANG NPA UG PARYENTE SA KALIHUKAN." ["The NPA did not recognize the relatives of the movement."] He almost cried in making recollections in the killing of his innocent cousin and unjustified house burning of peaceful families, some of them are relatives in the two barangays of Carupay and Siroan, of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte last February 4, 1986.

Known as Ka EVER, WINNIE or EBING, he has served the NPA underground for almost three years before opting to surrender. He also informed the audience that they have been deprived of their rights and cannot do things without the consent of their superior.

"Usahay dili kami makakaon tungud niini, maghimo mi ug pangawat sa mga hayop ug mga butang sa mga tawo para lang mabuhi," ["Sometimes we don't get enough to eat because of this; we are forced to steal livestock and the villagers' belongings in order to survive,"] he further disclosed.

In the same instance, Ka EVER also revealed that the people are now matured, the fact that supporters to their cause are now fearless and even resorted to fight against them.

Furthermore, he said, the government and the NAFF is sincere in helping our people, particularly the most needy.

"I was given excellent treatment and never been inflicted any harm by the soldiers," he added.

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COLUMNIST COMPARES AQUINO JUSTICE TO MARCOS ERA

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 pp 46, 47

["Vantage Point" by Luis V. Teodoro: "Ignoring Past Lessons"]

[Text]

One of the jokes middle-class Filipinos used to make about Ferdinand Marcos was that, in every major assault by government instrumentalities, his close associates, or his relatives against the people's lives, liberties, or property, he could always find someone else other than the culprits to blame. His scapegoats included not only the victim's kin and friends, but also the victim himself. His constitutional oath might have bound him to do justice to every man, but Mr. Marcos almost made it a matter of policy to do the opposite, thus raising the meaning of oppression to new, dizzying heights. He gave the word injustice a significance some said you had to go back to the Japanese regime to find an equal for.

Martial rule was of course the prime example. Mr. Marcos, as his former defense minister revealed in 1986, engineered the series of bombings and ambushes of government officials that were the immediate justifications for his declaration of martial law. Blaming these bombings on almost everyone who had opposed his regime, he had thousands arrested — all in the name of the democratic rights he was suppressing.

In one near-celebrated instance, Mr. Marcos' regime actually filed charges against the victims of a military atro-

city. Several young men in Negros, who, during election day in 1984 for the Batasang Pambansa were almost certainly killed by military elements, were actually sued for rebellion not too long after they were dead and buried.

And there was of course the Aquino murder, which very few Filipinos believe was not at least approved by him. In the course of the hearings being conducted by the fact-finding board he had created, it became clear that the government's witnesses would blame the victim for getting in the way of the bullet that killed him, implying that he deserved to die by characterizing him as a murderer, an enemy of the state, a subversive, a friend of communists, and so forth.

If Mr. Marcos had gained, by 1986, the near-universal enmity of Filipinos, his record of consistently doing injustice to every man not his associate, relative, or cohort had much to do with it. He certainly alienated most of the middle class because he constantly did violence to one of their most cherished beliefs, taught to them by their civics courses and all those books on political science — all authored by Americans, of course — that they had read in the colleges they graduated from: the state

was supposed to be an impartial instrument of justice. Mr. Marcos had made it into his own instrument, not by pushing its elite assumptions to their logical conclusions, of course, but seemingly through his determined effort to transform it into something else.

At least one close Marcos adviser was thus moved to remark, in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination, that Filipinos, though they could forgive nearly everything, would not forgive the Marcos regime for being so blatantly unjust.

Mr. Marcos has since fled the country, and a new government has taken power. But could it be that the state has remained the same, its habits being intact, and its class biases as strong as ever?

With its "new" police and "new" Armed Forces, the new government has decided to file sedition charges against Jaime Tadeo, chairman of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, some of whose members (the others were workers) were among the 19 people killed at Mendiola last January 22. The government claims that he incited people to sedition by making those supposedly incendiary remarks (uttered during an interview) about "blood flowing" if the demand for land reform was ignored by the government. Police and military officials, whose men did the shooting but could not be identified, would be subject to "administrative sanctions," on the other hand.

About a week before the Mendiola Commission issued the above recommendations — about which Mrs. Aquino was reported to be so elated she immediately ordered their implementation — Mrs. Aquino was in Lupao, Nueva Ecija. There she told survivors of the February 10 massacre that what happened — the killing of seventeen men, women and children — was "an accident" and that relatives should not "seek vengeance."

The notion of justice as merely a form of vengeance is a particularly dangerous one to statecraft, and is perhaps best left to philosophers to discuss. But the dispensing of justice is certainly indispensable to state governance, although there is a view among some government officials that the Aquino government is so popular it can choose not to prosecute coup plotters, human rights violators and mass murderers, and instead sue leaders of mass organizations like the KMP for sedition, or perhaps even for not having a rally permit. These officials believe that the people, especially the middle class, which has lately felt a restirring of its traditional adherence to law and order, will cheerfully approve.

They may be right, of course. The middle class, whose commitment to liberty and role in the February, 1986 uprising political scientists and even expatriate teachers of literature are currently celebrating, approved of martial rule when it was first imposed because it meant their children and spouses would have to be home by midnight. Its supposed commitment to liberty apparently did not find adequate expression till much, much later. Its tendency to approve of authority — *any* authority, even a fascist one — is something you can't lose money on if bets were being taken.

Those who underestimate the Filipino people, especially the middle class, may have something. No one, after all, is so far objecting to Mrs. Aquino's determination to sign an investments code that would benefit multinationals and big business, while she leaves the drafting of a genuine land reform code to the discretion (or lack of it) of a Congress whose dominant membership is likely to be composed of her own people. No middle-class socialist is objecting to her effort to assuage the griefs of those who lost entire families in Lupao by giving away cans of sardines and Cory dolls there (in the manner of US Civic Action troops in Viet-

nam, who, in the Sixties, would visit the hospitals where the children maimed by American bombs were confined, to give them toys and candy). No one from the hundreds of middle-class rightist organizations disguised as centrist has protested the absurdity of the decision to sue Tadeo while letting the police and military off with a light rap on the knuckles.

As a consequence, the state is not even pretending to *appear* just, ensconced in the popularity of Mrs. Aquino and the deadly indifference of the middle class to the fate of peasants and workers whom many of them feel are getting what they deserve for daring to demand anything from a government they so wholeheartedly approve of. They think anyone who talks about problems now, and who wants solutions to them, must be a wet-blanket who wants too much too soon.

What it all amounts to is that there is a growing belief among many of its officials that the government can pretty much do what it wants, with hardly a protest from the freedom-loving middle class, which in contrast to peasants and workers, want too little too late. Shielded by middle-class illusions, with an ever-ready excuse for such atrocities as Mendiola and Lupao, and both by sheer inertia as well as instinct unprepared to dispense the justice so crucial to civilized governance, the government, these officials believe, can last its term, in blissful indifference to the lessons of the past.

We all know, however, what Santayana said about those unwilling to heed the lessons of history. Some of us still remember that Mr. Marcos was elected twice to the presidency, the second time by a landslide. He too was popular, and his government too seemed invincible. **[M]**

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CHURCH-LINKED LETTERS HIT MENDIOLA, BALWEG, SIN

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 pp 40, 41

[Letters to the Editor]

[Text]

What did these peasants want that they were meted such harsh punishment? They wanted the implementation of the support price for palay; cheaper and more irrigation; better marketing facilities; reasonable prices of fertilizer and pesticides and reasonable interest on loans; a stop to militarization; an effective voice in agrarian reform affairs; and land through a genuine land reform program.

These, to us, are very reasonable demands. These are basic things that our poor peasants deserve, that would raise them from the quagmire of their poverty, and protect their human and political rights.

National Executive
Committee
*Promotion of Church
People's Rights*

We appeal to Her Excellency, President Aquino, to meet the farmers in an honest to goodness dia-

logue since they constitute the majority of our population and have a vital role in building our economy. If she can sit down and have a dialogue with the Cordillera people, the MNLF, and the NDF then we see no reason why she can't have it with the farmers. We believe that the lives sacrificed were more than enough to merit the President's attention and act promptly in response to their legitimate demands.

Bishop Rafael Lim, DD
*Bishop Chairperson
Inter-Regional Board
Basic Christian Community*

**OPEN LETTER
TO BALWEG**

When I heard the news that you took arms against the US-backed Marcos dictatorship, I was all smiles, believing that it was a positive step, a great service to the oppressed and exploited Filipino people, especially the people of

the Cordillera. I made you then my "guide." While inside the seminary, I always argued with my Soc-Dem classmates about the futility of exercising absolute non-violence and reconciliation (ANVR). Instead, I said that only through the armed struggle, at least on the theoretical level, can the basic ills of Philippine society be eliminated.

When I heard the news that you broke away from the mainstream of the genuine revolutionary path and formed the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), I was saddened.

The CPLA claims to be the "only" legitimate group that can negotiate with the Aquino government because it "already controls 75 percent of the Cordillera areas." This time, I know that there is another Arturo Tolentino! How could a group of 300-400 armed men and women, with a mass base restricted to a few muni-

icipalities along the borders of Abra, Kalinga and Mt. Province represent the whole Cordillera people and their interests?.

I suggest two things, my CPLA brothers and sisters. One, if you really want to serve the interests of the Cordillera people, you better rectify yourselves. Two, better join the military (which you have already) in frustrating the people's efforts for genuine regional autonomy, national liberation and genuine democracy.

Nappy R. Manegdeg
*Deputy Secretary General
Northern Luzon Ecumenical
Forum for Church
Response (NLEFCR)*

IN GOD'S NAME

Cardinal Sin recently denounced the use of church funds by "radical" groups. The denunciation apparently aims to cut off foreign and local funding from institutions, pro-

grams and organizations suspected to be "conduits" of finance for the Left. The Cardinal also condemns "radical" church people for their supposed advocacy of violence.

What does Cardinal Sin have to say about Vatican investments in the manufacture of armaments and contraceptives, to name just two, as researched by David A. Yallop in his book *In God's Name*? What of the laundering of money and massive flight of Italian capital which led to the issuance of arrest warrants for Archbishop Paul Marcinkus, Vatican Bank president, and its two other executives for fraudulent bankruptcy? What about the Marcinkus connection with the Mafia?

Now, who is really financing violence?

Judith Dimasupil
*Christians for National
Liberation
National Capital Region*

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NATIONAL WEEKLY VIEWS 'NUMEROUS ROLES' OF MANILA PRELATE

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 18 Mar 87 pp 34, 35

[Article by Carlos G. Novenario: "The Many Faces of Sin"; "His Eminence as Revolutionary, Humorist, Prognosticator, Intermediary, etc."]

[Text]

During the euphoria that came in the aftermath of the February uprising last year, Jaime Cardinal Sin was "baptized" as the "Cardinal of the Revolution" (see *Sunday Inquirer Magazine*, April 13, 1986).

Does His Eminence seriously believe that he is the "revolution's" foremost exponent in the Roman Catholic Church? What the people recall about his "opposition" to the Marcos regime was that it was sort of lukewarm. Blowing neither hot nor cold, he took refuge in what many consider as the convenient recourse, "reconciliation." And this can be said to be true even now.

His "lukewarm" stance brings to mind the words of Apocalypse, Chapter 13, verses 15 to 16: "I know thy works; thou art neither cold nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I am about to vomit thee out of my mouth."

But, in fairness to the cardinal, he admitted after the February upheaval that he received some ₱1 million from Imelda (or Ferdinand) but had since given

the amount to charity. He has also played numerous roles, as culled from the interview in the *Sunday Inquirer* and some news stories and photo-release captions in the course of time. Here they are:

1. *Humorist* — "While we were having the closing rites (of the Marian Year) at the Luneta (last December 1985), Cory was having her retreat in the Hemady monastery of the Pink Sisters. When I arrived back here (his palace in Mandaluyong), Cory was here, and she said to me, 'I am going to run.'

"I asked her, 'Are you going to run around the Luneta?'"

2. & 3. *Political matchmaker and prognosticator* — After he gave Aquino his "blessings" and assured her she was going to win, Sin further relates: "The following day, Laurel came. He said, 'I want also to run.'

"I said to him, 'Well you are not very attractive, Cory is more attractive than you are, and if you run, you will lose. First of all, you should unite. 'All right, Cardinal.' he said, and a drop of tear came down (sic), a sign that

there was an internal struggle, 'if that is *what you like*, I'll run as a second (sic).'

"I blessed him, and told him, You will win. I had that premonition that they were going to win. *I was the only one who had that premonition.*"

4. *Would-be mass-suicide instigator* — A wacko of an American evangelist induced, cajoled and otherwise forced his followers to drink "Kool Aid" spiked with cyanide in Guiana some years ago. Sin nearly played a similar role which he narrates: "When Betty (Belmonte, former co-chairman of the *Inquirer* but now of the *Star*) was calling me about Enrile and Ramos, Ramos and Enrile also called me and they told me, 'Cardinal, help us because in one hour we will be killed.'

"The first thing I did was to call the contemplative Sisters. We have three in Manila — the Poor Claire Sisters, the Pink Sisters in Hemady and the Carmelite Sisters. I said to them by phone: Come out from your cells. Go immediately to the chapel and before the exposed Blessed Sacraments (sic) with outstretched arms you have to pray, and prostrate before God on the floor. And you should start fasting tonight, and you should not eat solid food until the time when I will tell you because we are in battle and you are the powerhouses. And the moment we do not win the battle, *you will have to fast until the end of your life.*"

5. *Armchair, remote-control revolutionary* — Interviewer Doreen G. Yu asked Sin what he was doing during the four days (in February 1986) of the "revolution" and Sin said: "I did not leave the house because I was monitoring (the February events). Every hour I say some-

thing (over the radio). . . My security (people) told me not to go there (EDSA) because there are still loyalists who might hit me. *But the people heard my voice; that is enough.*" Actually, many of those who went to EDSA who are still debating in their minds whether they went there out of a blinding hatred for Marcos and his regime and gladness that Enrile and Ramos had, at last taken a defiant stand against the dictator or were propelled there by Sin's voice.

6. *Marcos suicide thwarter* — "I went to my room and prayed for Marcos. I prayed for him because usually dictators, the moment they are deposed, commit suicide. And I was praying to God that he would not do so."

7. *Global presidential consultant* — "Two nights ago, President Reagan called me by phone and told me that Marcos called him, requesting him if he could talk to me so that he (Marcos) could be transferred to Honduras (from Hickam airbase in Honolulu, Hawaii). And I said I will consider that. Then the President of Honduras spoke to me. He said, 'Cardinal, we are already decided not to receive him (Marcos). However, when you say something, I will *immediately abide by what you say* because we are Christians.'

"All right, I said, I will talk to your consul (in the Philippines). And the consul came (to Sin's palace) and I talked to him."

8. & 9. *Casino donee and anti-casino advocate* — Sin received ₱200,000 indirectly from the PAGCOR last June but was later reported railing against casinos which "foster gambling."

10. & 11. *Failed Cory-Johnny mediator and soothsayer* — A Reuters story datelined Singa-

pore last mid-November said: "Cardinal Sin, leader of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, said yesterday (November 16) he was able to 'bridge the gap' between President Aquino and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. . .

"Sin insisted the communist rebels would surrender after the 'Constitution of the Poor' is ratified and added: 'Until now, my predictions have never been a failure.'"

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12. *Intermediary for Imelda's brother* - "The Presidential Commission on Good Government has denied a request by Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin to lift the travel ban on Imelda Marcos' brother, Alfredo 'Bejo' Romualdez who is afflicted with a blinding eye disease, according to PCGG spokesman Abe Mojica." (Lead paragraph of *Inquirer* story by Jerry Esplanada dated December 19, 1986.) [M]

THAILAND

SUKHUMPHAN FEARS ARMS DEPOT COULD INVITE ATTACK

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 9 Feb 87 pp 20, 21

[Article by MR [Royal title--FBIS] Sukhumphan Boriphath: "Thailand, the United States, and the Arms Depot Issue"]

[Excerpt] Establishing an arms depot in Thailand will increase the likelihood of Thailand being drawn into international disputes between the United States and other countries and lead to problems in the future (if the United States uses weapons from the arms depot in Thailand in carrying on operations).

As for the location of the arms depot, if it is located at Takli, it means that this arms depot will benefit the United States more than Thailand. Stockpiling weapons at Takli is inconvenient for Thailand. To make things more convenient, Thailand would have to build a new road for transporting weapons to the border, which would be very expensive.

On the other hand, stockpiling the weapons at Takli will be very beneficial to the United States. Because if the United States should need to deploy forces rapidly, it will be able to send aircraft to Takli to pick up weapons and transport them to wherever they are needed. But if the weapons are stockpiled at Utaphao or Sattahip, this will benefit Thailand. In those areas, the communications routes to the border are very convenient. Furthermore, if the United States establishes an arms depot near the border, that will help guarantee security. This would be like a small trip wire. Thus, the location of the arms depot is very important.

Another important issue that needs to be considered is the fact that Vietnam is incapable of waging an all-out war against Thailand. Thus, Thailand should make preparations to deal with a border war, which could become more violent than at present. What this means is that we don't need large tanks or fighter aircraft. What we need are artillery shells or explosives that will enable us to fire long-range artillery shells. We also need mortar shells and machinegun ammunition.

These things are easy to find, Thailand needs them, and they are relatively inexpensive. If we allot a suitable amount of money, Thailand will have its own materials, and we will not have to tie ourselves to anyone else. This is an important point. And if Vietnam should happen to launch a lightning

attack, the United States will not be able to sit by idly. The United States will have to help us, because the reputation of the United States is at stake. Thailand's survival is very important as far as the international political prestige of the United States is concerned.

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THAILAND

WRITER SEES ARMS DEPOT FOR U.S., NOT ASEAN; ASKS SAFEGUARDS

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA in Thai 1 Feb 87 pp 20- 23

[Article by Surachat Banrungsuk: "The War Reserve Stockpile (Arms Depot): a Few Ideas"]

[Excerpts] Changes

Looking at the reports that have appeared about the establishment of a war reserve stockpile, or arms depot, it seems that the form of the arms depot as provided for in the agreement signed on 9 January is very different from that originally envisaged by Gen Saiyut Koetphon, who wanted this to be a joint arms depot of ASEAN. (The United States might provide support in establishing the arms depot. It was not necessary that this be located in Thailand, but it should be located in this region in order to facilitate use by members of ASEAN.) Based on the reports that appeared in 1986, people speculated on the establishment of such a joint arms depot, because a memorandum on joint logistics was signed in October 1985. There was even the possibility of establishing several such arms depots located in several places to facilitate the logistics operations of Thailand.

But now that the establishment of the arms depot has been announced, it turns out that there are to be two depots. One will belong to the United States, and the other will belong to Thailand. (No details were provided on how many depot sites each side have or where the depots will be located. These data are classified.)

Thus, it is clear that the arms depot that has been established is very different from that originally envisaged by Gen Saiyut. Instead of being a joint ASEAN arms depot, it will be a Thai-U.S. depot. And instead of being a joint arms depot, there will be separate arms depots for the two sides. These changes may have resulted from the idea that by separating the arms depots into Thai and U.S. depots, if Thailand uses all the weapons in its depot, it will be able to obtain weapons from the U.S. depot. In short, Thailand will have an additional weapons stockpile instead of just its own stockpile.

A question that many people are asking is, in which subdistricts will the arms depots be located. The military's response is that this is classified information and that disclosing the locations of the depots would benefit the

enemy. This could lead to weaknesses, because the enemy could carry out acts of sabotage. Thus, the location of the arms depots is highly classified. Thus, the reports that have appeared stating where the depots will be located are just guesses. Some predict that an arms depot will be established at Sattahip, because this is a deep-water port that was used to transport U.S. materials and weapons during the Vietnam War. Other reports have said that the depot will be located at Korat, because this served as a U.S. ammunition depot during the Vietnam War. Others think that the depot will be located at Takli, because that would make it easier for U.S. aircraft to come pick up weapons. Some feel that it will be located near Aranyaprathet, because that will facilitate logistics operations in support of military operations along the Thai-Cambodian border. But all of these are just "guesses." As for where the depots will actually be located, we will probably have to wait until construction is completed before we know for sure.

Expenses

The statement issued by Supreme Command Headquarters said only that about \$10 million worth of war materials will be stockpiled each year for 5 years. Thus, the war materials stockpiled will be worth a total of about \$50 million. As for what weapons the two sides will stockpile, the Information Office of Supreme Command Headquarters revealed only that two governments will discuss this at a later time.

A question that was not answered in this statement issued by the Information Office was, in providing land and building areas to serve as arms depots for Thailand and the United States, who will pay for this? Even though it was stated that the United States will build its own depot, the question is, will the United States pay for the land or will Thailand, as the host country, pay this expense?

However, these expenses may not be a very important issue. Because in the view of those implementing this project, these costs may not be very great when compared with the military benefits to be gained by having an arms depot. Furthermore, the cost of transporting weapons from U.S. sources to Thailand, the cost of maintaining the arms depots, and the cost of safeguarding the weapons and war materials are much greater. Each country will pay the costs to maintain its depot.

Even though these things have not been explained, it is believed that they are discussed in the draft agreement signed by the two countries. It's just that these are details that have not been revealed.

Nuclear Weapons

Ever since reports first appeared about the actions taken to establish a war reserve stockpile in Thailand, there has been great public concern that the United States will stockpile nuclear weapons at this arms depot. However, the statements issued on 9 April 1986 and 9 January 1987 stressed that it has been definitely agreed that the United States will not stockpile nuclear weapons at the arms depot in Thailand.

It must be admitted that the United States has no real reason to stockpile nuclear weapons here. The United States can store these weapons with its naval fleets in the Indian and Pacific oceans. For example, its aircraft carriers are a good place to stockpile these weapons. If it stockpiles nuclear weapons at arms depots in foreign countries, there must be a good security system to ensure that these weapons don't fall into the hands of the enemy and that international terrorists can't get their hands on these weapons in order to use them as a political bargaining chip with the target countries.

Thus, it is unlikely that the United States will stockpile nuclear weapons in Thailand. It must also be admitted that the bulk of the war materials stockpiled at the arms depot here will be ammunition (both ammunition for the rifles used by infantrymen and artillery shells of various sizes) and parts for various weapons used by the Thai military. Besides this, there will be other types of military equipment. However, this is something else that the Thai military considers to be highly classified. Revealing what is stockpiled at the arms depots is tantamount to revealing military secrets to the enemy.

Reaching an agreement with the United States on establishing an arms depot means that Thailand's weapons and logistics systems are "standardized" based on those of the United States. Thus, it is hoped that in emergencies, having the same weapons standards will mean that Thailand will not have to worry about encountering problems in the use of the weapons received. Because with the same standards, the soldiers who use the weapons will already be familiar with the weapons received from the United States and will be able to use them immediately. At the same time, such a system will enhance the military capabilities of the United States, because the United States will be able to carry on joint operations with its allies using these weapons.

Also, it is felt that the establishment of this arms depot will enhance Thailand's military capabilities. This will increase our defense capabilities. Because if fighting breaks out, the Thai military will have a definite source of weapons support, and it will be able to obtain weapons very quickly. It will not have to wait for weapons to be shipped from abroad.

The United States will benefit from having an arms depot in another country. Because at the very least, this will give the United States another arms depot in this region besides the one in the Philippines. And this will facilitate U.S. military operations in cases in which it becomes necessary to obtain weapons for use in an emergency in the Middle East.

It is also thought that this will reduce the economic pressure on the military. Because the military will not have to spend huge sums of money to purchase weapons. Thus, the establishment of an arms depot will help lighten the burden on the military. This will increase the military's capabilities based on the principle "spend little, obtain many weapons." That is, a relatively small sum will be invested to get the United States to stockpile U.S. war materials in Thailand. This will also commit the United States to providing support in defending Thailand. This is something that Thailand has wanted very much ever since the United States withdrew from Southeast Asia in 1976.

Effects

The establishment of an arms depot will necessarily move Thailand even closer to the United States. The logistics system of the Thai military will become more like that of the United States. When purchasing or importing weapons in the future, greater importance will be attached to U.S. weapons system than to those produced in other countries, because the use of U.S. weapons will be in accord with the logistics system that was put in place as a result of establishing the arms depot.

The military feels that having an arms depot will increase Thailand's defense capabilities. But at the same time, this may reduce our flexibility in trying to reduce the tension stemming from the confrontation between Thailand and Vietnam. One of the reasons frequently cited for establishing the arms depot is that Vietnam poses a serious threat to Thailand. Vietnam is supported by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union has military bases in Vietnam. The establishment of an arms depot here is a sign that there is still great tension between Thailand and Vietnam.

Conclusion

In the above discussion about the establishment of an arms depot, some of the details may have been omitted, because the agreement that was signed must be ratified by the U.S. Congress. And Thailand's name must be included in the U.S. law before the U.S. administration can establish an arms depot as called for by this agreement. We will have to wait for the details on this.

Thus, this article cannot draw any conclusions. It's purpose has been to help clarify this matter. The question that must be considered is what effect this will have on Thai-U.S. relations in the future.

11943

CSO: 4207/151

ARMY SECRETARY COMMENTS ON PRK 'DECLINE'

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 23 Jan 87 pp 1, 15

[Excerpt] At 1000 hours on 22 January at Supreme Command Headquarters, Maj Gen Narudon Detchapradit, the secretary of the army, talked with reporters about the situation along the Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Lao borders. He said that the change in the top leadership of the Heng Samrin government at the beginning of December 1986 stemmed from the administrative failures on the military, political, economic, social, and foreign affairs fronts. It has been 8 years since the Heng Samrin faction gained influence and formed a government in Cambodia with Vietnamese support. But it has failed to improve the living conditions of the Cambodian people. Instead, the situation, particularly the economic situation, has just grown worse. Besides the fact that there is not enough food to meet the needs of the Cambodian people, a portion of the yields must be shared with the Vietnamese living in the country. As a result, the Cambodian people have had to suffer privation and shortages, and they have experienced countless problems. Militarily, even though the Heng Samrin faction has adequate combat forces and war materials because of the support received from Vietnam, it has not been able to defeat the patriotic forces of Democratic Kampuchea. It has constantly suffered defeats and heavy losses. On the political and foreign affairs fronts, so far, the Heng Samrin faction has failed to gain the recognition or trust of the world community as the legal government of Cambodia, and it has failed to gain a seat in the United Nations. Instead, it has lost votes each year. The leaders of the People's Republic of Kampuchea have failed to bring socialism to the country and the Cambodian people.

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CSO: 4207/156

THAILAND

PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED TRADE WITH VIETNAM REPORTED BRIGHT

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 18-24 Feb 87 pp 32-34

[Unattributed report: "Open the Door to Thai-Vietnamese Trade, Another Way To Expand Export Markets"]

[Excerpt] Looked at superficially, Vietnam is a rather aggressive country. The war in Vietnam ended only recently, and so most of the people are part of the nation's military forces.

Viewed from the standpoint of businessmen, it is rather difficult to do business with Vietnam. Many countries view Vietnam in this way. But Japan, France, Singapore, Indonesia, and several other countries that hold to the principle that trade leads political ideals have done everything they can to open up markets in Vietnam. Vietnam is a large market, because it has a large population and domestic production cannot satisfy demand. This was made clear during Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress held in December 1986. Those attending the congress called for economic reforms and stressed increasing production, particularly investments in fishing and forestry.

This indicates that the Vietnamese want to open up the country. This probably stems indirectly from the fact that the Soviet Union, which has constantly supported Vietnam, has changed its policy and plans to reduce its military and economic aid to Vietnam.

Thailand should take advantage of this favorable opportunity to penetrate the Vietnamese market even though the present value of Thai-Vietnamese trade is quite low. In 1983, the value of trade was 24.1 million baht. This jumped to 212.9 million baht in 1984. In 1985, the value dropped to 24.8 million baht, and for the first 9 months of 1986 the value of trade was 99.5 million baht. These are straight trade statistics. But the fact is, Thai exporters often establish companies in Singapore and Hong Kong in order to ship Thai goods to Vietnam. This is how they get around the obstacles to trade posed by official regulations, particularly those concerning strategic goods. This is true even though the number of strategic goods has now been reduced.

What Do Vietnamese Markets Need?

Based on 1986 statistics, Vietnam purchased raw sugar, cloth, steel pipe, electrical equipment, laundry detergent, fresh cream, eggs, canned food, cigarettes, pork, duck, chicken, fresh milk, sweets, paint, radios, and televisions. Most of the goods that Thailand sells to Vietnam today are basic consumer goods that Thailand produces for domestic use. Very often, such goods are produced in excess of market demand. This is evident from the fact that merchants compete for sales by lowering prices, distributing items, and giving bonuses. If trade with Vietnam is restored to normal, the production of consumer goods for export will increase greatly.

At the same time, Vietnam's economy is undergoing a major reform, and production is being improved. Thus, Thailand may be able to sell certain types of equipment and machinery that it no longer uses or plants that cannot cover investment costs. We may be able to sell these to Vietnam and replace these items with modern equipment and tools that make greater use of technology. It is well known that Japan is trying to expand investments in Vietnam. But as far as Vietnam's public services are concerned, it is not ready to set up large, modern plants. Thus, in the present situation, Thailand should be able to sell certain types of plants to Vietnam.

What Does Thailand Buy From Vietnam?

The goods purchased by Thailand from Vietnam consist mainly of vegetables, animal skins, forest products, marine products, and scrap iron. Vietnam has many other natural resources that Thailand could import, particularly marine products, of which there are an abundance in Vietnam's territorial waters. Thailand is presently experiencing a shortage of such goods. If trade returns to normal or there are joint Thai-Vietnamese investment projects, Thai fishermen won't have to risk being arrested by the Vietnamese. Because in the past, large numbers of our fishermen have been arrested.

Thai are very skilled fishermen, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand and nearby areas. In opening up Thai-Vietnamese trade, consideration should be given to investing jointly in fishing activities, which would benefit both countries.

However, Vietnam may lack foreign currency. Trade between Thailand and Vietnam could be carried on in the form of countertrade. For example, we could send them rice in exchange for being allowed to fish in Vietnam's territorial waters. Or we could sell consumer goods in exchange for timber. In this way, trade between the two countries would proceed well. Part of the debt could be paid for in foreign currency and part could be paid for in kind.

Benefits of Thai-Vietnamese Trade

If trade between Thailand and Vietnam returns to normal, we will benefit as follows:

1. Thailand will be able to increase the export of consumer goods, of which there is an excess on domestic markets. In particular, electrical goods such as radios and televisions are in great demand in Vietnam.
2. Vietnam purchases agricultural goods, particularly rice, from Indonesia. But today, Indonesia cannot sell sufficient quantities because of production problems. Thailand should sell rice to Vietnam in order to expand its export market. Today, Thai rice exports are encountering much competition from the United States.
3. Carrying on normal trade will help reduce the political problems between Thailand and Vietnam.
4. Joint Thai-Vietnamese investments in fishing activities will provide Thailand with raw materials, of which there is now a shortage, for supply to the factories so that we can export seafood to world markets.

Possible Disadvantages

The possible disadvantages can be summarized as follows:

1. Because Vietnam lacks foreign currency, it might not be able to service its debts.
2. Even if Thailand and Vietnam invest jointly in fishing activities, this would not guarantee the safety of our fishermen. Because today in Vietnam, administration of the various zones is independent of the center. Thus, if we are to reach a mutual agreement, an understanding must be reached with the local officials, which might be difficult to do.
3. This could lead to an international political conflict. This might displease neighboring countries that are already trading with Vietnam, because this would affect their trade profits. This is particularly true of Singapore and Indonesia, which have normal trade relations.
4. From past experiences, Vietnamese businessmen are not very "straightforward." Thai investors and businessmen must be very careful.

In conclusion, expanding trade between Thailand and Vietnam would be good. This would benefit both countries on the international political and trade fronts. What is most important is that during a trip to Vietnam, Thai academics had a chance to talk with Mr Pham Van Dong, the Vietnamese prime minister. He asked them to tell Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the Thai prime minister, that Vietnam is ready to trade with Thailand. This is a sign that relations between the two countries may improve in the near future.

Goods Imported by Thailand from Vietnam

Unit: baht

Order Item	Jan-Sep 85	Jan-Sep 86
1 Unplated steel sheets less than 3 mm thick	--	15,612,712
2 Sea and freshwater shrimp, fresh and frozen	--	8,880,893
3 Cow hides, raw and salted	--	3,501,567
4 Water buffalo hides, raw and salted	--	960,665
5 Vegetables	1,063,764	541,998
6 Other cow and buffalo hides	98,597	345,596
7 Frozen fish (besides fish meat)	--	219,197
8 Goods on which there is a monopoly based on Thai commitments	36,264	215,724
9 Timber, excluding pine trees and logs	4,153,261	--
10 Prepared tortoise shells and items made from tortoise shells	402,487	--
11 Anthracite	--	--
12 Personal items brought in by owners	64,480	--
13 Hair pins and other such items	7,395	--
14 Combs	10,000	--
Total	5,836,248	30,278,352

Source: Customs Department

Thai Goods Exported to Vietnam

Unit: baht

Order Item	Jan-Sep 85	Jan-Sep 86
1 Raw sugar	--	43,739,668
2 Imported goods that are reexported	108,053	15,911,513
3 Goods on which there is a monopoly based on Thai commitments	187,291	2,190,231
4 "Berdding" and "canilrick" fabric made of 85 percent cotton	--	2,000,614

5	Other types of fabric made of 85 percent cotton	--	1,365,873
6	Tubes and pipes made of cast iron	--	781,860
7	Rubber sheet rolling equipment	--	400,719
8	Cloth made of less than 85 percent synthetic materials and cotton	--	272,938
9	Electrical components of machinery and appliances	--	208,197
10	Fresh cream	19,195	206,276
11	Laundry detergent	128,754	179,040
12	Office equipment	--	--
13	Other	6,075,263	1,930,340
	Total	6,518,556	69,187,269

Source: Customs Department

Thai-Vietnamese Trade Unit: baht

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Jan-Sep 1986
Value of trade	247.6	249.2	448.2	276.0	18.0	34.7	24.1	212.9	24.8	99.5
Exports	245.4	239.1	435.7	254.1	9.5	15.5	20.7	197.8	8.8	69.2
Imports	2.2	10.1	12.5	21.9	8.5	19.2	3.4	15.2	16.0	30.3
Trade balance	243.2	229.0	423.2	232.2	1.0	-3.7	17.3	182.6	-7.2	38.9

Source: Customs Department

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COLUMNIST BLAMES SRV, PRK FOR REFUGEE PROBLEM

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 9 Feb 87 p 2

[Small World column by Kanching: "Khao I Dang"]

[Excerpt] Khao I Dang, a Cambodian refugee center that was looked after by the Thai government and the United Nations for so many years that it became a symbol of refugees, is now a part of history.

The Cambodian refugees will go to a new camp that is controlled by the anti-Vietnamese Khmer coalition. This new camp is located very close to the border. The refugee camp has been moved because third countries are accepting fewer and fewer refugees for resettlement, and the number of Cambodians fleeing from Cambodia is increasing, making it impossible for us to accept all of them.

However, looked at from a humanitarian standpoint, there is nothing wrong with moving the camp. This is because the camp controlled by the Khmer coalition will be inspected by UN officials in accord with a recent agreement. Besides this, the fact that they will be cared for by fellow Cambodians may give these people greater psychological comfort.

The Heng Samrin government in Cambodia, a puppet government that is manipulated by Vietnam, has issued a statement inviting the refugees to return and start a new life in Cambodia. It has also charged that moving these refugees has put these refugees in an even worse position than before. But the Heng Samrin government has overlooked the fact that these people fled because of the Vietnamese invasion and the government's situation.

As a neutral country and as a buffer state in this region, Thailand is in the position of having to shoulder humanitarian responsibilities and deal with Vietnam's verbal war. Moving the Khao I Dang camp was not a political matter, and it did not cause any trouble. It was a normal matter that had to be done. It was certainly better than invading another country!

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CSO: 4207/156

WEEKLY FAULTS USSR FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON CAMBODIA

Bangkok KHAO PHISIT in Thai 4-10 Feb 87 p 5

[Editorial: "What the Soviet Union Should Do: 'There Should Be More Besides Trade Proposals'"]

[Text] The Soviet Union probably knows that no progress can be made if Vietnam continues to act stubbornly as in the past. Even the proposal by Romanian President Ceausecu on having Vietnam negotiate with the Khmer coalition through Prince Norodom Sihanouk was strongly rejected by Vietnam. It seems that what Vietnam is trying to do in the case of the Cambodian problem is "extend the time."

The attempt to find a solution to the Cambodian problem has turned into a "diplomatic war." But the suffering of the Cambodian people continues to grow worse. It seems that the great powers that are involved in this matter care very little about the fate of the Cambodian people.

It is well known that there is no way to build an "atmosphere of friendship" in this region until the Cambodian problem has been solved satisfactorily. The Soviet Union is waging a "political and diplomatic offensive," and it has made trade proposals. But it has avoided discussing the Cambodian problem in a serious manner. Because of this, its offensives on these other fronts will fail. The Soviet Union denies that it has any real role to play in the Cambodian matter. But it cannot deny that it has sufficient leverage to force Vietnam to act less aggressively. The Soviet Union and Vietnam are allies, and so it has an opportunity to exert pressure to bring about a more constructive attitude toward this region.

Unfortunately, except for the statement that they "would be happy to improve relations with the ASEAN countries," Heng Samrin and Vietnam have not done anything to enable this statement to bear fruit in this region. Instead, Vietnam's image has continued to deteriorate. This will also affect the Soviet Union's image among the countries in this region.

The fact that the Soviet Union is taking a more constructive attitude toward the peoples of the world is welcome news. It's possible that this change is more than just a tactic even though it is still too early to tell how sincere they are. As for the view of Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia toward the Soviet Union, it is clear that there will not be any change unless the Soviet Union puts the Cambodian problem at the top of the agenda in trying to improve relations with the countries in this region.

THAILAND

PAPER VIEWS UNCERTAINTIES IN PRC INTERNAL CHANGE

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 9 Feb 87 p 8

[Editorial: "The Direction of the Wind in China"]

[Text] Politics in China has been rather tense ever since students in several large cities began holding demonstrations and demanding democracy and freedom at the end of last year. This has now generated a great backlash following a moment of hesitation by Chinese officials.

Several important pro-Westerners in China have lost their positions. This includes Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, who likes to dress in smart Western clothes and who once taught Chinese that it is "more hygienic to eat with a fork and spoon than with chopsticks." Others who have been pushed aside include well-known intellectuals and writers. China insists that it has no intention of closing its doors to Western progress. But it has begun criticizing pro-Western Chinese. There is an internal conflict. This is worth watching.

As for the mystery of politics in China, it is quite possible that there is still a split within the Chinese leadership between the conservatives, who oppose opening the door to anyone, and the reformists, who have opened the door to modernization, which will undoubtedly pollute communist ideology, the backbone of the administrative system in China.

No one knows how long this conflict among Chinese leaders will drag on. But China has constantly said that it will not close its doors or return to the extreme leftism of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. And that is probably true. Opening the doors has given China something that it wants. That is, it knows what it what and knows what must be done in order to improve the lives of the Chinese people. But even so, the countries that have dealings with China are watching this conflict with great interest and apprehension.

Today, relations between Thailand and China are friendly, and the two countries have very close ties to each other. This is the result of China's opening its door after very great efforts were made just before Mao Zedong died. The effects of these shifting political winds have not yet affected our relations with China, because what is happening is an internal affair of China. But this does not mean that we should ignore what is happening,

particularly in view of China's potential concerning this region and the situation along Thailand's border, which requires that we rely on China to exert pressure or determine things temporarily.

Doing what is in the best interests of the people instead of adhering to plans that are in disarray seems to be the best course that Thailand can take at a time when Chinese politics is in state of turmoil and great uncertainty.

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GENERAL MONGKHON PROFILED, SEEN AS PREM'S 'BRAIN'

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 27 Jan-2 Feb 87 pp 10-13

[Unattributed report: "Keep an Eye on the 9th Division, a Rumor Operation"]

[Excerpts] Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, and Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the RTA CINC, are not the only people who play a decisive role. The security team of of Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, the secretary general of the prime minister, plays an important role, too. There is also a young officer who commands an important unit. Maj Gen Mongkhon Amphonphisit, the commander of the 9th Division, had a hand in the formation of the Prem 5 government, too.

It probably isn't necessary to say anything about the lack of power of the political parties. They do not play a decisive role in the country's affairs.

Keep an Eye on Big Mong, the Junior Conciliator

Last October, Maj Gen Mongkhon was appointed commander of the 9th Division, which is based in Kanchanaburi Province. He had been serving at Ban Sisao [Prem's residence] since October 1984, when he was promoted to major general and attached to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, away from his 9th Division power base.

He was transferred to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense in order to keep him out of danger during the Athit period and to give him time to work closely with Ban Sisao.

He had worked closely with Gen Chawalit, Big Chiu, in the past. Ban Sisao entrusted him with the task of coordinating political matters with the political parties. Thus, people came to regard Maj Gen Mongkhon, or Big Mong, as the "brain" of Gen Prem, the role that Gen Chawalit played in the past.

Maj Gen Mongkhon began playing a more and more important role. Finally, during the formation of the Prem 5 administration in August 1986, he played a part in allotting quotas to the political parties in the government. At that time, Gen Prem took a neutral position, remaining in Korat, and Gen Chawalit, in his capacity as RTA CINC, had to be careful and prevent this from affecting his policy of keeping the military out of politics.

A news source at Ban Sisao said that the personality of Maj Gen Mongkhon is similar to that of Gen Chawalit. Both are excellent stratagists. During the negotiations on the formation of the Prem 5 government, he used very effective bargaining tactics. He also gives the appearance of a "military tough," which he uses to put pressure on those with whom he is negotiating.

Now that Gen Chawalit has so much work to do in his capacity as RTA CINC, Maj Gen Mongkhon is serving as the "junior conciliator" who coordinates things between various factions in place of Gen Chawalit. He even coordinates things between Gen Chawalit and Gen Prem.

Even though Maj Gen Mongkhon has now been given a command in the army, the road from Kanchanaburi to Ban Sisao is not too long. On several occasions when serious political events have affected the government and prime minister, Maj Gen Mongkhon has been called in to provide help.

CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy] Class 9, the New Power Base

An army news source said that in view of the fact that Maj Gen Mongkhon was promoted to major general in October 1984, he has sufficient seniority to be appointed commander of the 1st King's Guard Division, the No 1 division in the army, next year in place of Maj Gen San Siphon, who will undoubtedly be promoted.

The news source said that it is Gen Prem who has planned this for Maj Gen Mongkhon, an officer who has worked closely with him and whom he trusts. Similarly, Col Chettha is in line for the position of commander of the 9th Division.

Increase Prestige in Army to Bolster Political Role

As mentioned above, the fact that he has been appointed commander of the 9th Division does not pose any obstacle to the political role of Maj Gen Mongkhon in his capacity as the "brain" of Ban Sisao. After being appointed commander of the 9th Division, Maj Gen Mongkhon played a role in solving the problem involving sugarcane growers in Kanchanaburi Province, an important problem that had a serious effect on the government's stability. The Democrat Party has recently passed through a crisis and will probably continue to experience problems until parliament convenes in April. How great an effect this has on the government remains to be seen. In this crisis within the Democrat Party, Maj Gen Mongkhon has played an important role since the very beginning.

It seems as if Ban Sisao has given Maj Gen Mongkhon a divisional command in order to increase his prestige as a means of bolstering his political role in his capacity as the representative of Ban Sisao. In effect, this will help maintain the stability of Gen Prem.

Democrat Party Crisis, Plan Within a Plan from Big Mong

After the Democrat Party began experiencing internal problems as a result of the allocation of ministerial portfolios in the Prem 5 government, the party

split into two factions, the Chaloephan-Wira faction and the Phichai faction. Initially, the Chaloephan-Wira faction lacked the strength to topple the Phichai faction, which held positions both within the party and in the government. But then the list of names of potential ministers submitted to Gen Prem by Mr Phichai Rattakun during the formation of the government was disseminated throughout the Democrat Party. Looking at the list, it was clear that the names of certain people had been removed before the list reached Gen Prem. This immediately affected the internal position of Mr Phichai, and the faction of Mr Chaloephan Siwikon and Mr Wira Musikaphong began to grow stronger. Mr Chaloephan has said that the person who gave him this list was Maj Gen Mongkhon Amphonphisit.

A news source at Ban Sisao said that Maj Gen Mongkhon and Mr Chaloephan have met frequently ever since the government was formed. Almost everything that Mr Phichai tells Gen Prem is passed on to Mr Chaloephan. This is tantamount to giving the Chaloephan-Wira faction the green light to go ahead and shake the position of Mr Phichai.

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POLICE, RAILWAY BLAMED FOR CROWN PRINCE ACCIDENT

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 24 Feb 87 pp 1, 6

[Excerpt] A train hit one of the cars accompanying the crown prince. This was the fault of the local police and SRT [State Railway of Thailand] officials. The commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has established a committee to investigate the chief inspector and and traffic inspector at the Bang Khen Police Station, who have now been transferred to the Commissioner's Office of the Metropolitan Police. The assistant station master at the Bang Khen train station has been transferred, too. The SRT is conducting studies and making preparations to build a train overpass to solve the traffic problem.

The accident occurred because of carelessness in protecting the crown prince. This occurred during the period 1954-2000 hours on 19 February. The fourth car in the entourage of the crown prince, who was riding in the fifth car and who was on his way from his Nonthaburi residence to attend a concert at the National Theater in place of the king, was struck by freight train 501 from Bangkok to Ubon Ratchathani as it attempted to cross the railroad tracks on Ngamwongwan Road at the Bang Khen intersection. An official in the Volvo and Police Lt Col Niti Charucharit, a police officer assigned to the Royal Household, were injured in the accident. Besides this, the car, which was totally destroyed, smashed into a guard kiosk nearby, which collapsed, injuring Mr Thoem Taphianathong, a villager who was waiting there to meet his daughter, and his son, Nam Fon.

The report sent by Police Lt Gen Samnao Withitsawonkan, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, to the prime minister, the minister of interior, the minister of communications, and the senior officials concerned stated that he had questioned Police Lt Col Sarayut Praphawat, the traffic inspector at the Bang Khen Police Station, Mr Prasan Suwannakat, the engineer of the train involved in the accident, Mr Non Manchin, the assistant station master at the Bang Khen Train Station, who was serving as station master at the time of the accident, Mr Fuong Khlaisikaeo, the switchman, who gave a green signal to the freight train, which was coming from the Bang Su Train Station, Police Lt Col Niti Charucharit, the police officer assigned to the Royal Household, and Mr Thoem Taphianthong, who was injured in the accident, as was his son. Mr Somphong Phromwichit, the crossing guard, fled and had not returned to duty as of 23 February.

In his report, Police Lt Gen Samnao stated that based on the results of the initial investigation, it appears that the accident occurred as a result of carelessness on the part of police officials at the Bang Khen Police Station, who failed to coordinate things with the SRT officials who had the authority to issue orders. Instead, they coordinated things with a low-ranking official (the crossing guard), who did not have the authority to issue orders. Besides this, senior police officers, that is, the traffic inspector and the chief inspector at the Bang Khen Police Station, were on duty there, but they failed to make the correct decision, which led to the accident.

As for the mistakes made SRT officials, when the crossing guard was contacted by a police official and informed that the entourage of the crown prince was approaching, he contacted the assistant station master but did not receive any response. He thought that the way was still clear for the train and so he did not make any further contact. And he did not give the signal to close the crossing to allow the train to pass. If he had done so, there probably wouldn't have been an accident.

Mr Thoem Taphianthong, who was waiting to meet his daughter at the guard kiosk, said that before the accident, he had been talking with Mr Somphong for about 20 minutes. He said that he saw the traffic policeman (name unknown) who was controlling the traffic signal beneath the Loi Bridge, Bang Khen, cross Wiphawadi Road and approach the kiosk where he and Mr Somphong were talking. The police official told Mr Somphong that the prince would be passing this way and asked him to inform the station master immediately. Mr Somphong telephoned the station master, but Mr Thoem did not know what he told the station master. After that, Mr Somphong came out of the kiosk and said to Mr Thoem, "Hey, why has the station master given the green signal instead of the red signal? He has given the train the signal to pass by. The train is going to hit one of the cars." Mr Somphong then ran out of the signal house toward the station. He asked Mr Thoem to hold the lamp and turn on the red light. Mr Thoem looked around and saw the train turn on its light as it approached the Bang Khen station. Mr Somphong raced back, took the lamp from Mr Thoem, and tried to signal the approaching train. But Mr Somphong did not move the guard rails into place to block traffic along Ngamwongwan Road.

Mr Non Manchin, the assistant station master, who was serving as station master that evening, was negligent in carrying out his duties. A witness confirmed that the crossing guard, Mr Somphong Phromwichit, had informed him that the crown prince was going to pass by. He knew that the crossing guard had not put the guard rails into place and yet he still signaled the train to proceed through the crossing. If he could not signal the train to stop, he should have had the crossing guard put the guard rails in place. But he did not do anything to prevent the accident.

A news report stated that in view of the mistakes made by police officials, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has relieved the chief inspector and traffic inspector at the Ban Khen station of their duties. They have been transferred to the Commissioner's Office of the Metropolitan Police. A committee will be established to investigate the actions of these two police officers and recommend disciplinary action. Doctors have released Mr Thoem Taphianthong and his son, Nam Fon, and they have now returned home. Police

officials at the Bang Khen station have been ordered to visit them and render them whatever assistance they can. The State Railway of Thailand will pay all their medical expenses.

The investigation committee has determined that four SRT officials were involved: Mr Non Manchin, the assistant station master, who was on duty at the time of the accident; Mr Akhom Wannalak, the mechanic; Mr Prasan Suwannakhom, the engineer; and Mr Fuong Khlaosikaeo, the switchman. The investigation determined that the SRT must share the blame for this accident. The problem is that the police do not know very much about SRT operations and so they ordered the guard rails lowered. The SRT has transferred Mr Non Manchin. What action to take against the others is still under consideration.

The news report stated that this road section has had problems for the past 10 years because of mistakes made in building the road. Also, traffic has increased greatly. The road has been expanded from a two-lane to a six-lane road. Tens of thousands of vehicles pass by here daily. The SRT coordinated things with the Department of Highways in order to build an overpass so that the road does not have to be closed when trains pass by. But no agreement was reached. Thus, the SRT has conducted studies in order to build a train overpass from the Hua Lampong station to Don Muang. Work on this project is now being carried on from the Yamarat Bridge to Bang Su.

Yesterday morning at 1030 hours, the crown prince left on an official visit to the People's Republic of China in place of the king. Reporters reported that the police implemented strict measures to protect him. The Commissioner's Office of the Metropolitan Police mobilized 800 policemen from the northern and southern Bangkok Metropolitan Police and the Thonburi Metropolitan Police to line the Wiphawadi Rangsit highway from the Din Daeng junction to the Don Muang military airport beginning at 0700 hours. Besides this, a tow truck, a fire truck, and an emergency unit were stationed beneath the Loi Bridge, Lat Phrao. Clearly, very strict measures were taken to provide protection.

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CSO: 4207/159

STUDENTS OPPOSE CHAWALIT ON COUP REMARKS

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 6 Feb 87 pp 1, 15

[Excerpt] At the Government House on 5 February 1987, Mr Sombun Chawana, the president of the Ramkhamhaeng University studentbody organization, and Mr Chare Nakmun, the secretary general of the Ramkhamhaeng University studentbody organization, talked with reporters about the statement made by Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the RTA CINC, who said that "if I stage a coup, I must ask permission from the people first." They said that students are strongly opposed to anyone staging a coup or revolution. That is not the duty of the military. The duty of the military is to defend the country and help preserve democratic government. In the past, the governments that have been formed as a result of a coup or revolution have never accomplished anything. The military should state its position clearly based on a democratic system.

The president of the Ramkhamhaeng University studentbody organization said that just after Gen Chawalit became RTA CINC, he said that the "military will not become involved in politics." But later on, he changed, which shows that his statement was not based on a firm position. Also, he has engaged in activities based on his powers. Thus, Mr Sombun called on those who are trying to preserve democracy and who have come from democracy to do everything they can to oppose this. The country does not want a government that has been formed as a result of a coup or revolution.

Mr Sombun Chawana also said that the fact that Gen Chawalit made such a statement shows that the government is not the power center. Rather, the power center consists of outsiders who are not part of the democratic system of government. He called on the democratically elected officials, particularly MPs, to oppose this, because the country does not want leaders who have gained their positions from a coup or revolution. Before the present government was formed, one person formed a mass base in advance. When the time arrived, there were demonstrations just as in the past. Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the present prime minister, should do something. If possible, he should resign and allow an elected leader to take over and prove his worth. Mr Sombun said that he hopes that all factions will take a definite position and express their real intentions.

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CHAWALIT CLASSMATE GENERAL SOMKHIT PROFILED

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 16 Feb 87 p 5

[DAILY NEWS Square column by Nanthana: "Lt Gen Somkhit Chongphayuha, the Chief of the Army Field Forces Department"]

[Text] Lt Gen Somkhit Chongphayuha, the chief of the Army Field Forces Department, was born on 27 January 1930 in Krom Thahan, Den Chai Subdistrict (at that time it was a subdistrict; now it is a district), Sung Men District, Phrae Province. He is the son of Col Luang Chongphayuha (Khongsotthichan), the commander of the 9th Infantry Regiment, Phayap Army, which fought at Chiang Tung, the capital of the Shan State (now a part of Burma). The Phayap Army won a victory and so the Thai government appointed Col Luang Chongphayuha commissioner to the United Thai States (Shan state). Later on, this area was returned to England, because Burma was a colony of England. His father is a native of Tak Province. His mother, Niam Rangsiyanon, is from Chiang Mai.

Lt Gen Somkhit has five sisters and three brothers. He is the sixth in the family.

He began school at the Wat Noi Nopkhun School in Bangkok. He attended secondary school at the Nakhon Ratchasima Withayalai School, where he completed lower secondary school. He completed upper secondary school at Bangkok Christian School in 1947. He wanted to be a soldier like his father and so he took the entrance examination to attend the Preparatory Academy, Class 8. After 1 year, he entered CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy] as a member of Class 1, where he took the 5-year curriculum. Fellow classmates included Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the RTA CINC, and Gen Wanchai Ruangtrakun, the army chief of staff.

In 1954 he was commissioned a sublieutenant and stationed at the Lopburi Infantry Center. In 1960 he was transferred to an infantry battalion with the 31st Regimental Combat Team. After being promoted to captain, he attended the Army Command and General Staff College in 1960. He attended the college for 1 year as a member of Class 4. Fellow classmates included Lt Gen Wichai Phoemsap, the former chief of the Office of the Army Comptroller, and Lt Gen Aphitthep Intharaphithak. After graduating from the Army Command and General Staff College in 1961, he was promoted to major and appointed operations officer with the 13th Regimental Combat Team in Udon Thani Province. Eight

months later, he was transferred to Bangkok and made chief of the SEATO Planning Section, Directorate of Operations, Bangkok. Two years later, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and made a section chief with the Planning and Policy Division, Directorate of Operations, where he served until 1966. In 1967 he was awarded an army scholarship to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He attended this school for 1 year together with Gen Wanchai Ruangtrakun, Lt Gen Isaraphong Nunphakdi, and Lt Gen Charuai Wongsayan.

After returning to Thailand, he was made an operations officer with Thai forces in Vietnam, where he served for 1 year. He was then promoted to colonel and made an instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College. Three years later he was made a staff officer with the Directorate of Operations. In 1975 he was promoted to special colonel and appointed operations chief, 4th Army Region, Nakhon Sithammarat. During his three years there, the 4th Army Region had two commanders, Gen San Chitpatima and Gen Pin Thammasi.

In 1978, the army, which was then headed by Gen Soem Na Nakhon, appointed him assistant military attache to Indonesia. He was attached to the Thai embassy in Jakarta. He served as the assistant army and air force attache. He speaks the Indonesian language fluently even though he did not learn the language until he was stationed there. He used his free time there to meet people and travel about the country, which is composed of 27 provinces. While serving in Indonesia, he had a chance to welcome Gen Prem on three separate occasions. The first time, Gen Prem went in his capacity as the assistant RTA CINC and deputy minister of interior. The second time, he went as the RTA CINC and minister of defense. The third time, he went as the prime minister. Lt Gen Somkhit served in Indonesia until 1980.

When he returned to Thailand, he was appointed deputy chief of staff, Institute of Army Academies. He was promoted to major general and appointed commander of the 9th Infantry Division in October 1981. The 9th Division was sent to Prachinburi Province to defend Thai territory along the Cambodian border. About a year later, the division returned to its base at the Kanchanaburi Camp.

In October 1983, there was trouble along the Thai-Burmese border in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province, which is a jungle area. Foreign troops entered the area and gained influence there. Gen Athit Kamlangek, the then RTA CINC, appointed Lt Gen Somkhit commander of the Surasi Force. He led forces from the 9th Infantry Division, thahan phran irregulars from the 1st Army Region's Lat Ya Camp, Border Patrol Police, and provincial police to eliminate the influential people and criminals who were smuggling goods, trafficking in narcotics, and felling trees illegally. The influence of these people was reduced so that officials could carry out their duties efficiently. At the same time, the foreign forces were expelled from the area. The headquarters of the Surasi Force was located at Wing 53 in Muang District, Prachuap Khiri Khan Province. After the situation returned to normal, the forces withdrew to the Kanchanaburi Camp in February 1984.

Lt Gen Somkhit is married to Nomrudi Nikhomphakdi, a level-8 instructor at the Suan Dusit Teachers College. She is a native of Loei Province. They have one son, Lt Witchayut Chongphayuha.

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CSO: 4207/146

THAILAND

GENERAL WICHIT SUKMAK PROFILED

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 16 Feb 87 pp 5, 12

[DAILY NEWS Square column by Nanthana: "Lt Gen Wichit Sukmak, the Chief of the Territorial Defense Department"]

[Text] Lt Gen Wichit Sukmak, the chief of the Territorial Defense Department, was born on 10 June 1933 in Nonthaburi Province. He attended primary and lower secondary school at the Kalahom Uthit School in Nonthaburi, graduating in 1947. He then entered the Preparatory Academy as a first-year student. Because he was an excellent student, placing first in his class, he received a scholarship to attend West Point, where he graduated in 1957. In 1958, he attended the Armored Platoon Leaders School at Fort Knox, and in 1961 he attended the Armored Platoon Leaders School at Fort Knox [as published]. He graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College as a member of Class 4 in 1966. In 1975 he attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.

Important positions include the following: instructor with the Education Division, Armored Cavalry School, Cavalry Center, 1959; tank platoon leader, 5th Tank Battalion, 2d Cavalry Regiment, 1960; instructor with the Education Division, Cavalry School, Cavalry Center, 1963; acting staff officer, CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy], 1966; assistant chief of intelligence, Vietnam Volunteer Division, 1st relief, 2d group, 1970; attached to Directorate of Army Intelligence, 1971; liaison officer attached to the UN Headquarters, Korea, 1972; chief of intelligence and operations, 1st Cavalry Division, 1973; instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College, 1975; deputy commander of the 3d Cavalry Regiment, 1976; acting staff officer to the commander, 1978; and assistant army attache to the United States, 1979. The last position that he held before being appointed chief of the Territorial Defense Department was commandant of CRMA.

He served in Laos in 1966, in Vietnam in 1970, and in Korea in 1972. In 1973 he was engaged in terrorist suppression operations with the forward cavalry division in Nan Province, and in 1977 he engaged in communist terrorist suppression operations with the forward cavalry division. Special duties: He served as assistant army attache to the United States during the period 1979-1981. He was appointed royal aide-de-camp in 1982. He is married to Chintana Sukmak, a teacher. They have three children.

Gen Prem once called Lt Gen Wichit a very talented person. That was when Lt Gen Wichit went to study in the United States.

THAILAND

REPORT ON ARMY RICE BUYS, LOAN ARRANGEMENTS

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 12 Feb 87 pp 1, 15, 16

[Excerpt] At 0830 hours on 11 February at the Lopburi Military District, Lt Gen Arun Priwattitham, the director of the Army "S.R.K.", and his team went to inspect the troops engaged in purchasing paddy from farmers. Maj Gen Suthip Iamchun the commander of the Lopburi Military District, welcomed them and told them what was being done based on the government's policy of having the army purchase paddy from the farmers for use within the army. This program got underway in January 1987. The Lopburi Military District has been allotted 2 million baht for this. It can help the farmers by raising the price of rice from 2,500 baht to 2,600 baht per kwian [1 kwian equals 2,000 liters]. The army's action has achieved results, because merchants have begun paying more for the paddy. There is much concern about the rice prices paid to farmers.

Lt Gen Arun told reporters that the inspection provided information on the activities of officials. The fact that the army is purchasing paddy does not mean that the army is cutting the price of merchants or trading in rice. The policy of the RTA CINC is to help the farmers. The army pays 2,600 baht for 5-percent rice, 2,550 baht for 10-percent rice, 2,450 baht for 15-percent rice, and 2,400 baht for 25-percent rice. The lowest price is 2,300 baht. The Lopburi Military District, in coordination with rice mills, is purchasing the rice directly from the farmers in the villages. As a result, many farmers are prepared to sell their paddy to the army. One future problem is that because many farmers pledged rice to the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, there will be problems in May if the farmers don't have money to repay their debts.

Lt Gen Arun said that the army must help the government. The government has loaned 120 million baht from an allotment of 200 million baht. This loan is interest free and must be repaid by 30 September 1987. After that, interest will be charged. Many farmers have pledged to sell rice to the army. The army uses much rice. In particular, the Lopburi Military District uses 2,500 gunny bags of rice a month. What is worrisome is that rice prices fluctuate. The government should implement measures to keep farmers informed about when rice prices will rise and fall. Everything is being done in accord with government's policy of having the military help the farmers, said Lt Gen Arun in conclusion.

At the Ministry of Commerce on the evening of 11 February, a news report stated that the ministry will revise its method of purchasing rice from private individuals. Exporters sometimes make little effort to export rice. Instead, they wait to sell rice to the ministry, because they can get a higher price. The measures are being revised to prevent this. The measures will be discussed this week by the minister of commerce, Mr Montri Phongphanit, the under secretary of commerce, and officials from the Department of Foreign Trade. Rice will be purchased on a proportional basis based on the amount exported by each exporter during the period December 1986-30 January 1987. The stocks of each exporter will be inspected to determine how much they can sell to the ministry.

The news report stated that the ministry has purchased a total of 390,000 tons on five occasions since the end of December. It has also purchased 200,000 tons of "kwaen" rice. Today, there are orders for 700,000 tons, which will be delivered during the next 2-3 months. The ministry must deliver at least 180,000 tons a month by April 1987. The rice sales by the ministry will bring in cash to enable the ministry to purchase approximately 70,000 tons of rice from the second rice crop in March 1987. Large numbers of exporters will ship rice in the next 2 months.

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CSO: 4207/156

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' INSTABILITY, POOR PROGNOSIS VIEWED

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 22-28 Feb 87 p 13

[Article by Sakda Nopketu: "The Stability of the Financial Institutions, Warning From Academics"]

[Text] Studies conducted by scholars at Thammasat agree that Thailand's financial institutions, including the commercial banks and finance companies, are in a critical and worrisome position.

The studies show that the financial position of at least one commercial bank is similar to that of the commercial banks that experienced problems in the past and that the financial positions of at least three other commercial banks are unclear when compared with the financial positions of the commercial banks that experienced problems in the past.

Besides this, it was also found that in the case of at least five commercial banks, the ratio of loans-borrowing-foreign borrowing to bank capitalization is abnormally high. Thus, there is a great bad debt risk. This is because banks have tried to gain a greater share of the market by extending large amounts of credit. This concerns asset and debt management. What has happened to the Asia Trust Bank and the Thai City Bank since 1976 provides an example. In the end, they collapsed, and the government had to provide support.

As for the finance companies, the scholars from Thammasat mentioned that of the companies that are in the 4 April 1984 program, to which Bangkok Bank recently provided support, 75 percent of the companies are in a very weak position. As for finance companies outside this program, approximately 30 percent are on the verge of collapse. Thus, taken as a whole, one out of every three finance companies is in a critical position, which could lead to a crisis of confidence just as happened in 1983.

This warning by scholars is no joking matter. During the past 4-5 years, the financial institutions have encountered one problem after another to the point where the people feel numb. In the period immediately following the Second World War, Thailand's financial institutions did not experience too many problems. In 1959, the Bank for Agriculture, in which the Ministry of Finance was a major shareholder, experienced problems. Later on, this became the Monthon Bank. And in 1963 it became the Krung Thai Bank.

In 1970, the Thai Development Bank experienced problems. Officials sent representatives, as did various commercial banks, to provide support. It became the Metropolitan Bank in 1977. And just 2 years later, in 1979, the Racha Finance Company collapsed, which generated much discussion in financial circles.

And then, beginning in 1983, one financial institution after another encountered problems. Officials finally decided to withdraw the operating licenses of six finance companies. Using the 4 April 1984 program, officials provided support to finance companies on condition that they transfer 25 percent of the shares to the government and find assets to cover the bad debts. Officials were sent to supervise things. That same year, the operating licenses of another nine finance companies were revoked. Also in 1984, the Asia Trust Bank collapsed and the owner fled abroad leaving behind debts totaling around 7 billion baht. The government had to step in, transforming this into the Siam Bank.

In 1985, the government revoked the licenses of five more finance companies and established the Fund for the Rehabilitation and Development of Financial Institutions. In 1986, the Bank of Thailand used its powers under the law to order capital reductions and increases at the Metropolitan Bank and sent officials to monitor the bank's operations. New shareholders helped manage operations. In 1987, the Bank of Thailand ordered capital reductions-increases at the Thai City Bank, which is now undergoing rehabilitation.

It can be seen that during the past 5 years, 21 finance companies and 3 commercial banks have encountered such great problems that the government has had to step in and solve the problems. This shows the great instability of the financial institutions.

The Thammasat scholars feel that these problems are linked to the economic recession. For example, the incomes of the farmers have declined, there is a trade deficit, there is a foreign debt problem, and the government has a budget deficit. This economic situation has had a great effect on the stability of the commercial banks. In 1980, the profits-to-capitalization ratio of the commercial banks was 23 percent. But this dropped to only 11.8 percent in 1985. During the period 1979-1985, the economic recession led to a 25 percent decline in bank profits.

Based on this, these scholars said that if Thailand's economic recession continues for another 4-5 years, Thailand's commercial banking system will face a serious crisis. And if that day comes, the best guess is that many more commercial banks, which are already experiencing problems, will suffer the same fate as the Asia Trust, Metropolitan, and Thai City banks. Because of the instability of the financial institutions, the people are beginning to lose confidence. This is a good indication of the government's ability to solve the economic problems.

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CSO: 4207/148

THAILAND

BRIEFS

SMUGGLING TO PRK--Police Maj Gen Thirachai Riancharoen, the commander of the Marine Police Division, learned that smugglers were going to transport a shipment of war materials to Cambodia through the Ka Pong Gulf in Tha Som Subdistrict, Khao Saming District, Trat Province. At 1000 hours on 24 February 1987, the officials saw a green 13-meter fishing boat approach their position and so they intercepted it. When they searched the boat, they found a large quantity of war materials, including 500 small sacks and 50 large sacks of rubber sandals. On the side of the sacks were the words, Ma Dao Company (of Thailand Ltd), 100/5-6 Phetkasem Road, Bangkok Metropolitan. They also found 2 disassembled Honda motorcycles, 2 National radios, a large sack of Jeans, and 50 boxes of dried salt with 50 packets of salt per box. Altogether, the goods were worth approximately 500,000 baht. During the interrogation, the three suspects confessed that a merchant, name unknown, had hired the boat, the Ekka Udomsap, to transport the goods from Trat Province to Kong Island in Cambodia. They were paid 2,000 baht per trip. Police Lt Col Naret Saengchanthai notified Mr Manop Chawiwan, the customs officer at Chalaep Port, Chanthaburi Province, for further handling of the case. [Excerpts] [Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 25 Feb 87 pp 1, 15] 11943

U.S. WAR RESERVE STOCKPILE CONCERN--On 19 February 1987 at parliament, Mr Phiraphan Phalusuk, a Democrat Party MP from Yasothon Province and the spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, revealed that at a subcommittee meeting, in his capacity as a representative of the Ministry of Defense, Maj Gen Sithichai Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya, the deputy director of logistics, spoke about establishing a joint Thai-U.S. war reserve stockpile. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to send a representative to speak before the subcommittee on this matter. Mr Phiraphan said that the subcommittee is afraid that this will affect the zone of peace policy and the ASEAN's neutrality, because the establishment of this stockpile will entail policy commitments. This agreement is now being considered by the U.S. Congress. Mr Phiraphan said that at the meeting, the representative from the Ministry of Defense said that the other members of ASEAN support this. However, the subcommittee observed that the policy of Indonesia and Malaysia is to maintain their neutrality. The matter should be considered very carefully before the U.S. Congress approves this. Thus, it is recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discuss this matter with our allies in this region. [Text] [Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 20 Feb 87 p 2] 11943

NEW THAHAN PHRAN IRREGULAR UNITS--There have been reports that the thahan phran irregular forces will be cut back or eliminated completely. But in fact, the thahan phran irregular, or TPR, forces are being expanded to form a "new army." Recently, the army staff line recommended establishing another 21 TPI battalions. But the army has approved the formation of 19 battalions during the course of the 5-year plan. The formation of these units is tantamount to expanding the thahan phran irregulars by another five regiments or two divisions. There have also been reports that the navy will expand its TPI forces, too. At present, the navy has TPI units subordinate to the Marine Corps. They are serving with the Chanthaburi-Trat Force. The operations of the "Chalam Khao" TPI-marine forces along the coast have achieved good results. The forces must be expanded, because the situation from Pailin to Khao Wong in Cambodia is growing more and more serious. [Text] [Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 5 Feb 87 p 9] 11943

CSO: 4207/148

HENG SAMRIN GREET'S LAO PARTY CC ON 32D ANNIVERSARY

BK250722 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 25 Mar 87

[Text] Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee, sent the LPRP Central Committee a message of greetings on its 32d founding anniversary. The message reads:

During the past 32 years, carrying on the valiant struggle of the Indochinese Communist Party, the LPRP led the people of Laos' various nationalities in waging a resolute and dogged struggle while overcoming all difficulties and making great sacrifices to defeat the French colonialists, Japanese fascists, and U.S. imperialists and to frustrate all maneuvers of the reactionaries of all stripes to invade and topple the LPDR.

In building their country in the advance toward socialism, the Lao people under the leadership of the LPRP have scored great successes in all fields, steadily consolidating the situation in Laos and thereby contributing to the enhancement of the special solidarity of the three Indochinese countries and to the common struggle of the world's people for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress.

It is my firm belief that under the correct and enlightened leadership of the LPRP with Comrade Kaysone Phomvihane as general secretary, the fraternal people of the various Lao nationalities will score more and greater achievements in the cause of building and defending their fatherland in the advance toward socialism in accordance with the implementation of the resolutions of the Fourth LPRP Congress.

On this glorious historic occasion, it is my wish that the special militant solidarity and all-round cooperation between the Cambodian and Lao parties and peoples will be incessantly strengthened and developed.

/12624

CSO: 4200/451

BRIEFS

DRY-SEASON RICE PLANTING--Phnom Penh, 24 Mar (SPK)--According to statistics of the Agriculture Ministry, by the 2d week of this month, over 66.75 percent of dry-season rice planting had been achieved. Kompong Speu Province exceeded the plan by 25 percent and Kratie Province met its target. The Provinces of Takeo, Kandal, Kompong Cham, and Prey Veng have respectively fulfilled more than 76, 57, 57, and 54 percent of the plan. Some provinces, such as Takeo, Kompong Speu, and Kandal, have started harvesting their early rice planted at the beginning of the season. [Text] [Phnom Penh SPK in French 0402 GMT 24 Mar 87 BK] /12624

RUBBER PLANTATION--Phnom Penh, 28 Mar (SPK)--So far, 37,846 hectares of rubber trees have been planted throughout the country, or 92 percent of the quarterly plan and 88 percent of the annual plan. Over 3,810 metric tons of latex have been treated, representing an increase of 88 percent compared with the same period last year. [Excerpt] [Phnom Penh SPK in French 0400 GMT 28 Mar 87 BK] /12624

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION--Phnom Penh, 28 Mar (SPK)--By mid-March, peasants in Moug Russei District, Battambang Province, had planted more than 160 of the planned 250 hectares of dry-season rice. By the 2nd half of March, almost 10,000 metric tons of paddy had been sold to the state by peasants in Svay Rieng Province. By the beginning of March, Kandieng District in Pursat Province and Stoeng Trang District in Kompong Cham Province had respectively sold to the state almost 2,000 metric tons and 1,960 metric tons of paddy. [Summary] [Phnom Penh SPK in French 0402 GMT 28 Mar 87 BK] /12624

PHNOM PENH ON KPRAF SUCCESSES--During the past week, the KPRAF, in close cooperation with the Vietnamese Army volunteers, put out of action 315 enemy elements of all stripes, including 201 killed on the spot and 62 others captured. We seized 164 assorted weapons and a large quantity of war materiel. We also persuaded 52 enemy soldiers to desert their ranks and return to our national society. [Excerpt] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 12 Mar 87 BK] /12624

RADIO REPORTS KPRAF SUCCESSES--During the past week, the KPRAF and the Vietnamese Army volunteers made brilliant feats by putting out of action 142 enemy elements of all stripes, including 80 killed on the spot and 9 others captured. We seized 91 assorted buns and a large quantity of war materiel. We also persuaded 53 enemy soldiers to desert their ranks and return to our revolution and people. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1200 GMT 26 Mar 87 BK] /12624

GDR GIFT TO KAMPUCHEA--Phnom Penh, 28 Mar (SPK)--The Red Cross of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) has donated 5.5 tons of medicines and medical equipments as gift to the Kampuchea Red Cross. The gift was handed over to Phlek Phirun, president of the Kampuchea Red Cross, in Phnom Penh Friday by Rolf Dach, GDR ambassador to Kampuchea. Also present on that occasion was Mi Samedi, secretary-general of the Kampuchea Red Cross. [Excerpts] [Phnom Penh SPK in English 1122 GMT 28 Mar 87 BK] /12624

POLISH MEDICAL AID--On 30 March, the third secretary of the Polish Embassy in Phnom Penh presented more than 5 metric tons of medical equipment, a gift of the Polish Red Cross to its Cambodian counterpart. [Excerpt] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 31 Mar 87 BK] /12624

AID DISTRIBUTION--The Cambodian Red Cross recently distributed more than 20 metric tons of rice and over 400 kg of canned food, a gift from Australia and Bulgaria, to 434 families in Kirivong District, Takeo Province. [Summary] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 31 Mar 87 BK] /12624

CSO: 4200/451

TASKS, POWERS OF MARKET MANAGEMENT UNITS REPORTED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 Jan 87 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Tasks, Powers of the Municipal, Ward, District, and City Market Management Units"]

[Text] As has been reported, beginning on 5 January 1987, throughout the city, the municipal, ward, district, and city market management units began carrying on activities. We are publishing the next installment concerning the tasks and powers of the various echelon market management units.

The market management units are full-time forces whose job is to manage the municipal, ward, district, and city markets.

The market management units are responsible for:

Controlling things to ensure that the state-operated, collective, and private organizations adhere to the state laws concerning the circulation of materials and commodities and concerning commercial business activities, food and beverage business activities, and service activities at the markets.

Discovering and eliminating speculation, smuggling, the production of bogus goods, and illegal activities that disrupt the markets, encroach on socialist property, and damage the legal interests of citizens engaged in commercial and service activities.

The market management units do not replace the other organizations at the markets that have state management functions, for example, the commercial organizations (registration of industrial and commercial activities, organization of the markets, and control over the reform of private commerce), the commodity price organizations (control over the implementation of the management systems and registration and posting of prices), tax organizations, customs organizations, forestry organizations, quarantine organizations, public health organizations, and cultural organizations (elimination of superstitions and decadent culture). The market management units are responsible for supervising the organizations and individuals carrying on business activities at the markets in order to ensure that they obey the regulations of the state agencies mentioned above. They are involved with the

circulation of materials and commodities and with commercial and service activities. They must coordinate things well with the sectors in discovering and prosecuting violators.

The market management units have the following powers:

1. They can require the state-operated, collective, and private organizations engaged in commercial, food and beverage, and service activities at the markets to show their business permits and other required papers based on state stipulations concerning market management.

2. When they discover that someone has committed a violation, together with the state's control forces (tax, customs, economic police, and other forces), they can inspect the sales site, means of transportation, materials, and commodities. When necessary, they can inspect places where materials and commodities are being produced in secret.

3. In cases in which laws have been violated:

The units can prepare a record on the spot and compel the party concerned to stop engaging in the illegal activity.

They can seize the material evidence and means of transportation used to conceal things and in accord with the stipulated procedures, turn over the commodities and other evidence seized to the organizations responsible for handling such matters.

They can issue warnings and impose fines on the spot in cases involving illegal business activities in accord with the powers stipulated.

They can recommend that the control agencies shut down the business activity and withdraw the business permit.

They can impose fines ranging from 100 to 500 dong.

In cases that are outside the jurisdiction of the market management units, they must turn over the files to the ward, district, or municipal people's committee and let them handle the matter (if a ward, district, or municipal market management unit) or to the municipal market guidance, reform, and management committee (if a municipal market management unit). The matter must be examined and procedures established for turning the matter over to the sectors that have jurisdiction.

The market management unit cadres are strictly prohibited from doing the following:

They must not use their position and authority to conceal the activities of violators, extort money, harass people, or confiscate the assets or commodities of citizens that are not material evidence or that are not connected to the violation in question.

They cannot arbitrarily promulgate control regulations or impose penalties contrary to the law or contrary to the specific regulations of the Municipal People's Committee on market management.

They cannot arrest people unlawfully or search the goods, houses, or postal matter of citizens unlawfully.

They cannot trade, barter, or make unlawful use of the fines or material evidence seized pending prosecution.

When carrying out their tasks, the market management cadres and personnel must wear uniforms and proper insignia and carry market management control cards.

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CSO: 4209/310

BRIEFS

HANOI TROOP RECRUITMENT--As of 18 March, some 100.67 [figure as heard] percent of youth union members in Hanoi Municipality had joined the Army in the first phase of 1987 troop recruitment. All the new recruits were cordially received at various Army units. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 25 Mar 87 BK] /12624

HA BAC INDUCTION TASK--Ha Bac Province has completed its 1987 first phase of troop delivery, fulfilling set plan norms quantitatively and qualitatively. This year the province carried out this task in accordance with the principle of recruiting soldiers at their native places and delivering troops to assigned units to lessen difficulties for localities receiving troops. Thanks to this new method, 16 districts and towns of the province have achieved remarkable results. All districts and towns completed their troop deliveries in 1 day and without problems. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 29 Mar 87 BK] /12624

HA NAM NINH INSPECTS LAND UTILIZATION--The Ha Nam Ninh provincial land management committee recently coordinated with various echelons and sectors to inspect land utilization by localities throughout the province. There have been 7,152 cases of land violation in the province so far. About 663 hectares were illegally and wastefully used. Most of the violations involved unauthorized distribution of land and illegal occupation, purchase, and sale of land belonging to collectives. The main cause of these violations was due to loose management and negligence of cadres. After this inspection drive, the provincial land inspection steering committee designed measures to deal with these violations. It recovered 142 hectares of land for cultivation, fined and took back 11.6 million Dong and 290 metric tons of paddy. The steering committee also recommended disciplinary action against some cadres and expulsion from the party those members who seriously violated state policy on land utilization. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 26 Mar 87 BK] /12624

CSO: 4209/369

PAPER DISCUSSES IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTIONS OF 1986 CONGRESSES

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 1 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Entering the New Year with a Renewed Spirit"]

[Text] The year 1986 was a very memorable year. It was a year of concentrated self-criticism and criticism, a year of various-echeclon party congresses, and the year of the 10th Municipal Party Organization Congress. These were all major political activities. The entire party and all the people had a chance to engage in democratic discussion in order to reach a high degree of unity concerning the situation. They looked at the achievements and shortcomings and then discussed things and contributed ideas concerning the common tasks. Finally, the "key" was the Sixth National Party Congress. The congress mentioned four major lessons, and with new viewpoints and a new way of thinking, put forth practical targets and solution systems in order to hit the targets. The Sixth Party Congress was an important step in the process of taking control and making innovations in the party's political, ideological, and organizational leadership.

The year 1987 is the first year for implementing the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress and the resolution of the 10th Municipal Party Congress. Just because the congresses have concluded does not mean that everything will automatically run smoothly. There are still many difficulties. However, it can be said with certainty that the path ahead has been illuminated. We have even greater confidence in the country's three major economic programs (production of food, consumer goods, and export goods). The municipal party organization has decided that the capital's economic structure, including industry, agriculture, services, and foreign economic activities, must be arranged efficiently and that efforts and measures must be concentrated on the two key problems: providing jobs for the people and fulfilling the urgent requirements concerning life, particularly food. Along with this, much attention must be given to building the new man, solidifying national defense, and strengthening order and security.

In order to hit the above targets, there must be an all-round and synchronized system of measures, from having a rational investment structure, making good use of the economic elements, improving the management mechanism, manifesting the power of science and technology, and having suitable socioeconomic levers to carrying on cadre work, building the party, strengthening the

effectiveness of the authorities, and manifesting the strength of the mass movements.

These are the problems that the party organizations, authorities, and laboring people of the capital are determined to solve as they enter 1987 imbued with this spirit of renewal. Based on the resolution on the 1987 socioeconomic development plan recently adopted by the National Assembly, the Municipal People's Committee will formulate the capital's plans. The tasks and targets will have a revolutionary, scientific, and practical nature. The congresses of the mass organizations, from the primary level up to the municipal level, must determine what their roles and functions are, thoroughly understand the lesson of "using the people as the source," improve the mobilization formulas, adhere firmly to the rights of the masses, and manifest the collective ownership rights of the people. The party committee echelons must continue to make innovations, reinforce the cadres, and improve leadership capabilities along with making preparations for and implementing the movement to purify the party and eliminate negative phenomena. The laborers in the capital must make full use of their talents and strengths to produce and support production. Regardless of the sector, whether state operated, collective, family, or individual, everyone must create many products for society using his or her labor strength. People must not be parasites or engage in illegal activities. This is what it means to be a good person worthy of respect.

In 1986, the party organizations and people of Hanoi strove to overcome the difficulties. They underwent many tests and scored important achievements. At the 10th Municipal Party Organization Congress, Truong Chinh gave us encouragement and said that the advances made by the capital have brought joy to the entire country. He also said that we must manifest a spirit of initiative and creativity and strive to move ahead.

The new year, the year following the Sixth Party Congress, has brought a new way of looking at things, a new vitality, and a new confidence. Under the leadership of the CPV Central Committee, the entire party organization and all the people of the capital must strive to fulfill the tasks in accord with their position in the country's revolution.

11943

CSO: 4209/309

PEOPLE'S COUNCIL MEETING DISCUSSES ACHIEVEMENTS, 1987 PLAN

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 14 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "On 13 January, the Municipal People's Council Opened the 8th Session of the 9th Term; Hanoi National Assembly Delegates Reported Results of the 12th Session of the 7th Term of National Assembly; Municipal People's Committee Reported on the Tasks and Guidelines in the Socioeconomic Development Plan and 1987 Budget; Nguyen Thanh Binh Attended and Made Speech"]

[Text] On 13 January at the Giang Vo auditorium, the eighth session of the ninth term of the Municipal People's Council got underway. Nguyen Thanh Binh, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee and the secretary of the Municipal CPV Committee, attended the meeting. Also attending were delegates from the Hanoi National Assembly, representatives from the Office of the National Assembly, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers, representatives from the political parties, mass organizations, committees, and municipal sectors, and chairmen of the ward, district, and municipal people's committees.

To open the meeting, Tran Vi, the chairman of the Municipal People's Committee, stated that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss tasks and guidelines in the 1987 plan and a number of problems concerning organization, specifically, the election of a number of people to the Municipal People's Committee and the election of people's assessors for the new term of the Municipal People's Court.

Based on a spirit of making innovations in work style, those presiding at the meeting included a number of committee chairmen and heads of People's Council delegate sections.

On behalf of the Hanoi National Assembly delegation, Tran Kiem Ly, a legal expert, reported to the People's Council on the results of the 12th session of the 7th Term of the National Assembly.

After that, Pham Si Liem, the deputy chairman of the Municipal People's Committee, discussed the guidelines and tasks in the city's socioeconomic development plan.

As for the implementation of the 1986 plan, the report by the Municipal People's Committee stated that the city encountered many difficulties in 1986. Under the leadership of the CPV Central Committee and the Council of Ministers and with the help of the ministries and neighboring provinces, the Municipal CPV Committee and Municipal People's Committee implemented many policies and guidance measures in order to stabilize production and life. The sectors, echelons, and production installations strove to manifest a spirit of dynamism, exploit the potential, and link the economy in order to expand production and stabilize living conditions. Industrial production fulfilled 100.7 percent of the 1986 plan, an increase of 11.3 percent as compared with 1985. In this, local industry fulfilled 103.2 percent of the plan, an increase of 12.2 percent. Small industry and handicrafts production fulfilled 104 percent of the plan, an increase of 16.6 percent as compared with the previous year. All 16 wards and districts showed an increase.

Even though the weather was often unfavorable, agricultural yields were still higher than those in 1985. Grain yields for the year reached 417,390 tons, an increase of 1,639 tons as compared with 1985. In Dan Phuong, Phuc Tho, and Thach That districts, the rice yields were more than 8 tons per hectare. Yields for potatoes, vegetables, and soybeans and the production of pork, beef, and poultry increased.

In capital construction, attention was given to investing in water conservancy, and good results were achieved. The state plan for housing construction was fulfilled.

Efforts were made to carry out the other tasks, such as looking after living conditions, maintaining order and security, solidifying national defense, and expanding cultural and social activities. The drafting of youths into the military fulfilled 100.7 percent of the norms.

The weaknesses in implementing the 1986 plan were: industrial production increased slowly, there was no increase in export goods, economic results were not good, and little progress was made in improving the quality and make-up of the goods. The results achieved in agricultural production did not match the potential. Although production expanded, purchases were low. Exports did not fulfill the planned norms. State-operated service activities did not expand, and some services even declined. Consistent policies were lacking in order to stimulate and control private services. In capital construction and communications and transportation, the plans were not fulfilled, and there was a decline as compared with 1985. As for providing jobs, organizing life, expanding educational and public health services, and maintaining order and security, there are still problems that need attention.

The main reason for these weaknesses is that the city's sectors and echelons lacked a spirit of initiative and creativity in implementing the party's resolutions, particularly in the sphere of improving the economic management mechanism, and they were slow in changing their way of thinking and working. The work style was still bureaucratic and far removed from reality.

As for the tasks and targets in the 1987 socioeconomic plan, the report by the Municipal People's Committee stated that the main target of the 1987 plan is

to stabilize the socioeconomic situation, including living conditions, production, and order and security using synchronized measures. The city will give attention to carrying on the country's three major programs (food, consumer goods, and export goods) and coordinate solving the two central problems, that is, jobs and living conditions. The value of industrial and small industry and handicrafts production must reach 14,290 million dong, an increase of 12.3 percent as compared with 1986. In this, the value of small industry and handicrafts production must reach 3,046 million dong, an increase of 14.9 percent. Grain yields in paddy equivalent must reach 450,000 tons, an increase of 7.8 percent.

In 1987, the city must implement the motto "use the people as the root." Conditions must be created so that the "people know, discuss, work, and control."

On behalf of the Municipal People's Committee, Nguyen Tien Duc, the deputy chairman, gave a report on the 1986 budget and the 1987 draft budget.

Nguyen Thanh Binh, the secretary of the Municipal CPV Committee, spoke to the People's Council delegates. He discussed the results of the Sixth Party Congress and explained the viewpoints and guidelines of the Municipal CPV Committee and a number of major policies and measures for implementing the 1987 plan. He appealed to the cadres and people of the capital to face the truth squarely, make a great effort, show great resolve, have correct ways of thinking and acting, use the viewpoints of the Sixth Party Congress as a compass, constantly elevate their spirit of the revolutionary offensive and their self-reliance, make changes in their thinking and behavior, and make innovations in cadre organization in order to fulfill the state plan.

To conclude the morning session, the People's Council listened to Le Sau, the deputy chief justice of the Municipal People's Court, who gave a report on the sector's work last year.

In the afternoon, the delegates worked in sections. Today, the People's Council will continue the meeting.

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CSO: 4209/310

HANOI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES

BK240631 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] On 23 March, a team of the Hanoi deputies to the Seventh National Assembly met to review its performance at the end of its term of office. Attending were a large number of representatives of various political parties, departments, sectors, and mass organizations as well as the representatives of voters of 16 wards, districts, and towns throughout the municipality.

The team of Hanoi deputies to the Seventh National Assembly has made active contributions to various general activities of the National Assembly and participated in enacting many important laws for our state. Members of the team have arranged among themselves to take turns holding regular meetings with the people every Thursday at their head office at (Quynh Anh) and at other suburban places to receive the complaints and denunciations as well as suggestions and aspirations of their constituents. They have also made regular contacts with the representatives of their constituents prior to every National Assembly session in order to bring their constituents' aspirations to the attention of the National Assembly.

In general, throughout their recent term of office the Hanoi deputies to the Seventh National Assembly firmly maintained their role as deputies and accomplished their assigned mandate. However, the team of Hanoi deputies to the Seventh National Assembly, in a serious mood, admitted its failure to carry out satisfactorily its supervisory functions over the activities of various administrative echelons. It was still slow in solving complaints and denunciations from constituents and not much was done as its participation in the building of various socioeconomic projects in the capital was small.

Those representatives of the constituents participating in the meeting held by the Hanoi deputies to the Seventh National Assembly to review activities enthusiastically gave their views, asking that those deputies to the next National Assembly stay closer to their constituencies and that the National Assembly promulgate a statute governing the holding of all contacts with the people if National Assembly deputies are to work effectively to truly become representatives of the people, and to develop the people's right to be masters.

/12624

CSO: 4209/369

EVALUATING STATE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS

Hanoi GIAO DUC LY LUAN in Vietnamese Nov 86 pp 24-28, 44

[Article by Professor Nguyen Ngoc Minh: "Building the State Management Mechanism"]

[Text] The Resolution of our Fifth Party Congress stated, "The problem of building the management mechanism is one of extreme importance in strengthening organization of party resolution achievement, and raising the management effectiveness of the state.(1).

This is a burning problem which our party and state are presently giving much attention to solving. It is also a new problem about which all of us must seek careful understanding.

With these initial thoughts, I wish to present a number of opinions on three issues:

I. Concerning the State Management Mechanism Concept

State management is understood here in its broad meaning: the management of all fields: politics, security, economy, society and culture, science and technology, internal affairs and foreign relations. Of these, an extremely important theme is economic management.

The mechanism concept encompasses the following fundamental integral factors:

1. The apparatus. To speak of a mechanism is to speak of an apparatus consisting of many or extremely many components operating together in accordance with one definite order. A tool or a machine operates in a single, separated and isolated fashion and does not form a mechanism.

The state management apparatus is an extremely complex mechanism. There are upper echelon agencies, lower echelon agencies; elected agencies (the National Assembly and people's councils at all levels), and executive agencies (the Council of Ministers and people's committees at all levels); agencies with general authority and those with individual authority; agencies organized in accordance with the local area and territory, those organized in accordance with the economic and technical sector, etc.

Because the apparatus is so large and complex, the work of state management itself is a big job, comprising extremely many fields in which the socialist state must give concern and has management responsibility.

If the integral components do not have a close-knit relationship, they do not form a mechanism. There can be many components arranged close to one another but if the close-knit relations are lacking, they still do not form a mechanism.

2. General objective. A mechanism must have a general objective. If not, there is no mechanism. No one allows an apparatus to run freely without an objective. The general objective may be large or small depending upon the period of the revolution and upon the specific mission set forth by the party and state for the country during that period. For example, during the period of transition, an extremely important general objective of state management is to establish a new order. Socialism. This is an objective that must be achieved over a period of many years, or even several decades in succession. The general objective can be to eliminate bureaucratic and centralized management and state subsidization, and to achieve democratic centralized management, a burning objective during the immediate years in our country at the present time. The objective could be market management with the purpose of stabilizing prices. These objectives clearly are restricted to one definite field. Between these objectives, there is also a close-knit relationship. Many small objectives contribute toward achievement of a large objective. They form one objective system.

Whether large or small, with a general objective, all components of a mechanism are oriented toward it, each component operates in accordance with its assigned function and mission, and one component cannot have actions contrary to the objective which would eliminate or limit the results of other components. If each component had only a parochial outlook and aimed at only its own superficial goal, a mechanism could not be formed and the mechanism would be disrupted.

3. Motive force. Every mechanism must have a motive force to operate. The motive force of the state management mechanism ultimately is of two types: spiritual-ideological and material. The spiritual and ideological motive force is to build socialism for the happiness of the people, using the people as the supporting base. This great lesson was profoundly explained and discussed by General Secretary Truong Chinh, "Our forefathers have thought and acted like that since ancient times. In the present era, from the first uprising to the August Revolution, the wars of resistance against the French, the Americans and the Beijing expansionists, our party acted like that. To reach socialism at this time, it is also necessary to act like that."(2)

The material motive force is the laborer receiving the fruits of his own labor, following the law of distribution in accordance with labor and social equality. Neglecting any of these aspects will cause the mechanism to operate with poor results. Neglect of the spiritual motive force will cause man to fall into lowly and selfish objectives. Neglect of the material motive forces will cause a fall into idealism and illusion without a material basis for

achieving noble ideals. We are presently being forced to pay for our mistakes in not properly recognizing this motive force.

1. A mechanism must operate in accordance with the law and definite principles. With the defined objective and the accurately selected motive force, the state management mechanism must operate in accordance with the law and definite principles. Concerning the great lesson in objective law and its application to reality, Truong Chinh wrote, "More than the past 10 years have shown that to change the socioeconomic situation, it is necessary first of all to change perception and thinking, especially economic thinking. Marxism-Leninism presented general principles of a universal nature. However, how these principles can be applied to the Vietnamese environment is something that we must ascertain; no one can do it for us. To do so, we must begin with Vietnamese reality, with specific Vietnamese individuals, the specific development conditions of history and the economy, social conditions, and Vietnamese traditions."(3)

The state management mechanism must operate in accordance with definite principles. In the case of our country, it must operate in accordance with the following primary principles:

--Under the conditions of one party in power, state management must be placed under the leadership of the party. The line of the party is the soul and foundation for every activity of the state. The state manages primarily to turn the lines and positions of the party into reality. Separating the leadership of the party from the management activities of the state would probably result in lost direction. Conversely, the party leads primarily to strongly develop the role of the state, and to develop the collective ownership rights of the people. Therefore, the state management mechanism is held within the composite mechanism: "The party leading, the people controlling, and the state managing."

--One major principle of state management is democratic centralism. For several decades, there have been theoretical debate and experience gained from actual practice. The correct trend at the present time as defined by many is that a socialist state must firmly maintain democratic centralized management (not bureaucratic centralism), centralizing those things that should and must be centralized (to define a strategic course, to maintain a major balance in the national economy, to define the economic structure, major investment structure, etc.), and simultaneously to set aside autonomy and creativity in many aspects for the local areas and basic units.

--Another indispensable principle is the need to completely develop the role of the state management agency (comprising all the elected agencies), while simultaneously attracting a majority of the masses to state managed work. The state apparatus must have skilled and systematically trained specialists. State management today has become a science and management work cannot be spontaneous, arbitrary or inexperienced. On the other hand however, it is necessary to recognize that in an age of strongly developed science and technology as at the present time, management cannot be the exclusive right of a number of individuals. Because the people are present in every location and at all times, the effect of supervision in state management is extremely

great. On the other hand, because the masses are those directly benefiting from or are directly the victims of the erroneous policies and laws of the state, they can have many opinions and contributions for supplementing and perfecting state policies and laws.

Delving further, there are probably other principles. Only a few of the primary principles have been mentioned here.

5. An extremely important factor of a mechanism is the operating cadre. A mechanism can be correct but without a skilled operating cadre, its effect cannot be developed. Operating cadres must be trained. To operate a rudimentary tool, training of the operator does not require much effort. However, operating a modern machine demands much greater effort in training. Operation of an entire mechanism naturally demands systematic training. The state apparatus--as stated above--is large and complex. It is impossible to arbitrarily place individuals in operational positions who do not have a good knowledge of the work. The consequences of erroneous operations must be borne by the people. In other countries, operating cadres in the state management mechanism have been standardized. In our country, I think we must advance toward the same procedure.

II. How Should This Mechanism Be Constructed?

Actively constructing a mechanism from the very first step in a period of history has been difficult: there must be a proper concept of the mechanism, proper definition of the objective, search for a motive force, a visualization of how the apparatus will operate, preparation of operator personnel, and a number of other conditions.

However, renovation of a mechanism is doubly difficult because a number of obstacles are encountered. The first obstacles are the old mechanism, the old apparatus and then the old ways of thinking and working, old operators and old methods. However, other major obstacles are the ideological changes of a number of individuals who must give up old positions, and the number of difficulties encountered by a number of new people sitting in new positions.

One thing for which precautions must be taken is that under the guise of renovating the mechanism, the old mechanism, old ways of working, etc. are maintained. In this manner, the results attained surely cannot be many.

To build a new mechanism, the following things must be achieved:

1. First of all, thinking must be renovated. Faced with the new situation, beginning with the revolutionary mission, based on summarization of state management work, recognizing what has and what has not been done, and based on the actual conditions of our country, ways of thinking must be renovated before suitable methods can be found, advancement to the front be made, conservative and inactive ideologies be overcome and the old ways avoided.

2. The objective must be accurately defined. Objective definition must be based on the nature of the period: we are presently in the first stretch of the transitional period; on the development level of our economy at the

present time; on the requirements of the nation, and simultaneously the actual capabilities, and on the possibly exploitable potentials; on the specific Vietnamese individual; on the assistance and cooperation of fraternal countries, etc.

3. A motive force in the new mechanism must be found. A proper motive force will strongly change the entire mechanism, stimulate the laborer to bring all his enthusiasm to production and work, and make the contributed spiritual motivation increasingly greater and better. This motive force must gradually improve the material and spiritual lives of the laborer, and achieve social equality under the specific conditions of the nation. It must repel laziness, irresponsibility and indiscipline, and gradually eliminate from society the ideologies of exploiting, being a parasite and not working but still wanting to benefit.

Accurately defining the objective and finding the motive force are two extremely important tasks in building a mechanism. The strength of a mechanism is primarily in that. During the past, we have not given the proper level of concern to these issues, have even committed mistakes, and therefore have had to pay.

4. A mechanism must operate in a synchronized manner. The effect of each and every component must be developed in the direction of the general objective. One component that is not synchronized or operating in the right direction will adversely affect other components and possibly the entire mechanism. When basic units renovate but upper echelons do not, desired results cannot be attained. If one sector renovates but others do not at the same rate, one will destroy the other. The state management apparatus is one with many crisscrossing mutual relationships and operations and renovation must therefore be synchronized before the desired results can be achieved.

5. Special concern must be given to the proper arrangement of operating personnel. An operator must have a proper perception of the mechanism and the function and mission of the field for which he is responsible, receive prior training, have the necessary knowledge in that field, have qualities and ethics, and have a spirit of service to the people. Along with operators, concern must also be given to the ranks of achievement cadres. These ranks must be properly educated and trained in order to grasp their job and to work with a high sense of responsibility and a good spirit of service.

No matter how good the mechanism is that is achieved by an operator and achievement personnel whose ethics are poor and do not thoroughly understand the job, the operation cannot be smooth.

Naturally, it has not taken a short period of time for us to acquire sufficient conditions in personnel to install our entire state management mechanism. Our nation had to make long-term projections in the training of skilled management ranks. State management is a science. It cannot be conducted in accordance with continuous empiricism.

III. Evaluating Effectiveness of the State Management Mechanism

1. To evaluate the effectiveness of a mechanism, it is necessary to examine it in operation, that is while it is "running." An apparatus that does not operate, even though an extremely ingenious structure, is a dead apparatus. A state management apparatus is the same. To say that it is effective is to say that it "runs well." "Running well" consists of the following primary themes:

--An order transmitted from a command center (for example the Council of Ministers) to other locations must be swiftly and promptly implemented. If it arrives slowly and in an untimely manner, the order lacks effectiveness right from its point of origination. These days, when an order is stipulated in a country from one echelon to another for implementation, it must arrive in a matter of hours. Consequently, the organization of communications and liaison (by every means) must be regular and thorough.

--An issued order must be strictly implemented. Broadly speaking, all laws of the state must be strictly implemented. This is the discipline of the socialist state, the "socialist state order," and socialism as stated by Lenin. In our country at the present time, through a number of sociological investigations that we have conducted, the proportion of orders swiftly implemented is only about 50 percent while those implemented slowly account for 30 to 35 percent and those not implemented at all comprise 15 to 20 percent. Thus, our state management effectiveness is still poor.

--State management is highly dynamic. Therefore, shortcomings requiring correction or outmoded things that must be abandoned will be discovered during implementation. Only by this method can state management constantly maintain close contact with life.

2. The effectiveness of state management must also be measured by the degree of objective completion. For example, an important objective of our state management at this time is to stabilize the lives of the people. All sectors and echelons must be oriented toward that. In a mechanism however, each component has a definite function and mission which each must properly complete, and all directly or indirectly must be oriented toward the common objective of stabilizing life.

3. The effectiveness of a mechanism is also measured by its sensitivity. No matter how perfectly constructed a mechanism is, this or that and occasionally an extremely serious difficulty will be difficult to avoid during operation. Sensitive management is in the prompt discovery of obstacles and when discovered, a swift search for methods to overcome them. Failing to do so will reduce mechanism effectiveness. An extremely common example is as follows: To create conditions for the convenient circulation of goods and to avoid abuses en route, our party and state have issued preventative directives forbidding riverbank markets and several tax collections en route but such actions still occur. Many other illegal occurrences violating the collective ownership rights of the people are reflected in the party newspaper and on the radio but correction is extremely slow and occasionally these actions occur many times and are still not corrected. All of these things prove that the apparatus lacks sensitivity.

4. Another standard of state management effectiveness is the need to examine the price of results achieved. In the daily press, we uphold the slogan of: productivity, quality and effectiveness. State management work must also achieve these slogans. These days in fraternal countries, even the effectiveness of promulgated laws is calculated. In this field, there are results evaluated by quantity and expenditures but also those that can be evaluated only by the influence of spiritual, ideological and psychological aspects on society, the effects of contributions made toward development of the society, educating the new socialist man, strengthening socialist state order, etc. This is a special feature that must be grasped when evaluating the effectiveness of state management in particular, as well as the achievements of social science in general.

1. Proceeding of Fifth National Congress of Delegates, Vol III, Su That Publishers, 1982, p 90
2. Speech of Truong Chinh at Cadre Conference To Review Draft Political Report of Sixth Party Congress, see NHAN DAN, 26 Jul 86, p 1
3. Ibid.

7300

CSO: 4209/339

HO CHI MINH CITY STRIVES TO INCREASE PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Striving To Achieve Resolution of Sixth Party Congress, Ho Chi Minh City Shifts Strongly to New Mechanism; Concentrates Material Supplies, Raw Materials for Production Since First of the Year, Mobilizes 60 to 70 Percent of Production Capacity, Strives to Increase Industrial Output by 15 Percent Over 1986; Swiftly Renews Technology, Produces Many Consumer and Export Goods"]

[Text] During 1986, Ho Chi Minh City encountered many difficulties in material supplies, raw materials, electricity, etc., but due to development of the production and business autonomy of basic units, gradually and boldly improved the management mechanism, and many plants, enterprises and cooperatives are renovating working methods and shifting strongly to the production of new products closely connected with domestic and export consumption requirements. Much progress has been made in product quality due to the active application of technical advances. For example: the production of cloth of various widths, improvement of the starching and dyeing steps, use of five-layer cardboard for export packaging, production of agricultural drill frames, the manufacture of many varieties of treatment drugs from domestic raw materials, the production of white cement, the D6 diesel engine, etc. Many locations unable to receive sufficient materials have shifted rapidly to consignment. Nevertheless, because the management of raw material sources is not yet good, there are too many intermediate links, foreign trade work is not yet closely connected with production, and procurement and consignment prices are still inconsistent, laborers have not been truly stimulated to enthusiastically produce. The increase in 1986 industrial output over 1985 was insignificant.

Implementing the Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress, the city is preparing the 1987 socio-economic plan, determinedly joining the entire nation in actively untangling difficulties in the management and policy mechanism. From the reality of test production and business autonomy achievement in accordance with (draft) Resolution 306 of the Political Bureau, the city will compete with the central government in methods of correcting the mechanism consistent with an objective of stimulating production, especially the production of consumer goods, considering this a program of foremost importance to the city.

During 1987, the city will shift even more strongly to the production of export goods, achieving in-depth investment aimed at renewing technical equipment and trade regulations, and improving the quality of export goods. Investment will be strengthened in the machine sector, especially machines supporting agriculture in the rural areas of the city and in the provinces of the Mekong Delta, production and repair machinery, communications and transportation, construction, forestry, and marine products. In the field of small industry and handicrafts, in conjunction with production reorganization and production relations transformation, there will be continued achievement of Resolution 34 of the city to stimulate the development of family economy.

The city during 1987 will strive to achieve a total industrial output value of 39.7 billion dong, an increase of 15.1 percent over 1986; to achieve 3.2 billion dong in export goods output; to complete consignment contracts for socialist countries in ready-made clothing, the production of shoe tongues, sponge sandals, rubber gloves, etc.; and to rapidly develop cooperative programs with other countries, such as the repair of ocean-going ships and vehicles, and electronic assembly. Efforts will be made to increase the production output of the city to from 60 to 70 percent of present equipment capacity. Moreover, the city has a plan to import raw materials for consignment to state-operated enterprises; and has suggested that direct trade and business relations be expanded with the import-export corporations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, first of all with the far eastern region of the Soviet Union.

Concerning agriculture, the city will continue to construct the food belt, ensure on-the-spot self-equilibrium in grain, increase the supply levels of meat, fish, vegetables and fuel for the inner city and swiftly increase the resident source of export goods. Regions specializing in the raising of vegetables, industrial crops and high-yield rice will be fixed and the raising of milk cows will be expanded.

In trade, the city will strive to gradually reestablish distribution and circulation order, eliminate irrational intermediate steps, reorganize goods procurement and sales, ensure that the state controls all the products of state-operated enterprises and a majority of agricultural, forestry, marine and small industry and handicraft products, and strengthen market and price management. Efforts will be made to achieve a retail sales level in state-operated and cooperative trade of 8.5 billion dong.

Concerning science and technology, the city will have incentive policies to promptly reward valuable initiatives, swiftly conduct joint enterprise and association with other countries in electronic assembly, establishment of a ship repair sector, the production of monosodium glutamate, etc.

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CSO: 4209/313

RETIRED CADRE FAVORS PARTY MEMBERSHIP FOR YOUTHS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Ha Ky Ngo, retired cadre in Da Nang: "Developing Many Young Party Members"]

[Text] There are presently not a few youths working in agencies, enterprises, schools, etc. with sufficient levels and standards of culture, knowledge, ability, health and energy, who are engineers, doctors and teachers trained in socialist schools, who have worked for 5 or 10 years or even longer, and constantly maintain high qualities, ethics and a spirit of responsibility, but have still not been admitted to the party, or have not been placed among those being developed for advanced training, motivation and admission to the party. This is a great loss for the party. It must be fully recognized that through many years under conditions in which our country was poor and many difficulties and privations were encountered in material life, many of these youths continued to maintain their qualities and ethics without wavering, competing with each other in mediocre addictions, or freely engaging in undisciplined actions, but were tireless in learning and demanding progress, and have already been challenged. All that is required is for party chapters to have the proper attitude and perception and concern for advanced training and our party would have an additional group of young cadres with good standards, abilities and health.

We suggest that party committee echelons clarify this problem, overcome deviations in the perception of party members and institute methods of supervising and guiding truly good achievement of party development work.

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GREATER CONTROL URGED FOR ERRANT CADRES, PARTY MEMBERS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Tam, Ha Tuyen: "Firm Cadre, Party Member Management Mechanism Needed"]

[Text] During the recent phase of political activity, many party organizations and chapters conducted fairly good self-criticism and criticism. People in the villages and subwards were extremely concerned about the problem of building the party and sincerely contributed many opinions to party members on actions such as corruption, theft of collective property, bearing grudges, usurping land, etc.

A problem of concern is the cadre and party member management mechanism. For example, in the city of Tuyen Quang, a provincial party committee member and director of the communications and transportation service abused his authority to use state materials and equipment to build a house. He had a home in the city but requested materials from the agency and mobilized state workers to build another. Besides his home in city, his father had one in Bac Quang District but he greedily purchased and requested materials to build an additional two-story house for his father and an another house in the city for his son who was about to return home from abroad. Many other localities have had similar occurrences. Many party members responsible for important tasks and directly supervising an agency or party organization have also been criticized for an ideology of special privileges and interests. They must be severely disciplined. Many party members have been purged and fired from agencies and plants.

Worthy of attention is that for a long period of time, agencies, party committees and chapter committees all knew about the erroneous actions of party members with position and power but continued to feign ignorance or offered critical opinions that were lacking in resoluteness and thoroughness.

In the near future, a campaign will be conducted within the party to purify and raise the combat strength of party organizations, to purify and raise the management effectiveness of the state apparatus, and to repel and eliminate negative occurrences in society.

We think that in the organizational aspect, it is necessary to overcome instances of dispersion in party member management, especially concerning those party members who are leadership and management cadres. A firm and effective management mechanism is necessary with clearly defined responsibility and a regular exchange of ideas between the party chapter and cadres responsible for managing party members, and with the committee and administrative echelons of locations where those party members reside. The shortcomings and mistakes of party members must be promptly halted by this method. Allow absolutely no one to cover up and when a party member makes a serious mistake, discipline must be truly severe and prompt.

Once every 6 months, party organizations and chapters must hold a phase of political activity for party members to study and review the work done and whether their ideology was right or wrong. On these occasions, organize the people to contribute their opinions to the party members. Upper level agencies must have methods to protect those are straightforwardly striving in order to avoid a grudge situation.

7300

CSO: 4209/313

SPITEFUL PERSONAL HISTORY EVALUATION CRITICIZED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Thanh Ly, Ha Bac: "Grudges Not Permitted in Personal History Evaluation"]

[Text] There are still many occurrences of bearing grudges against the masses and bullying party members by nonobjective personal history evaluation. There have even been cases in which, due solely to a contradiction in interests or an inability to usurp a piece of land or building, anger and indignation have been held for many years and when "power" is attained, the personal histories of party members, party member children or the people have been downgraded from good to bad! Children are unable to attend school or work simply because of a question about their personal history. This is truly wrong. Party members with position and authority often perform these wretched deeds with a clear conscience.

It is hoped that basic party committee echelons, for the great undertaking and for the future of our children, will be fair and objective when evaluating personal histories. They must not, for a private reason or grudge, record things in a personal history that are not so, or change red to black or good to bad.

7300

CSO: 4209/313

FARMERS CALL FOR DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AGAINST PARTY MEMBERS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Doan Van and a number of farmers in Nam Chan Cooperative, Ha Nam Ninh Province: "Disciplining Degenerate, Deviant Cadres"]

[Text] Through a phase of implementing Directive 79 of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee, the party chapter of Nam Chan Cooperative, Hong Quang Village, Ha Nam Ninh Cooperative, listened to many critical opinions from the masses concerning each party member. Many problems were inspected and defined. The masses hoped that the criticism would be accepted and the shortcomings of the party members would be gradually corrected in order for the party chapter to become increasingly stronger. To the present time however, incidents such as violations of collective property and of the collective ownership rights of the laborers have still not been handled.

Nam Chan was previously a model of the district and province in intensive rice cultivation as well as outstanding stock raising and the entire village was awarded three Labor Medals, First Class, one Labor Medal, Second Class, and many certificates and commendations from the state. During the past few years however, the people have been extremely distressed because a number of party members with position and authority have become degenerate and deviant despite wholehearted assistance from the party member collective. A number have taken advantage of joint enterprise and economic contract policies to work with dishonest merchants and a number of deviant cadres in state agencies to slip goods to the outside for sale and division of the profits. One party member traveled to southern Vietnam to buy chicken feed, resulting in a loss of tens of the thousands of dong for the collective. A number of party members conspired with individuals of the Chau Thanh chicken farm located in Nam Hung Village to steal 50 tons of soybeans for sale at a profit which they placed in their pocket. They once took glutinous rice and pork up to Hanoi and lied that it was exchanged for corn when actually, it was exchanged for 38,600 packs of cigarettes to sell to private operators (purchased at 5 dong per pack and sold at 10.4 dong). Four hundred kilograms of insecticide stored for the 1986 winter-spring production plan, equal to 12 warehouse issue vouchers, was given by a work site deputy chief to a relative to take home. The relative sold 170 kilograms on the outside and divided up the money with the deputy chief. This incident resulted in serious consequences: the fifth-month--spring rice had just begun to head when it was infested by brown

planthoppers. The sprayers lacked fertilizer, the planthoppers did not die and the crop of this cooperative alone was lost. Besides that, a number of deviant party members used food and agricultural products to bestow gifts, sell at a cheap price, pilfer and join each other in many shady deals.

Concerning the material and technical base of the cooperative: the construction machinery area since its establishment with an area of nearly 2 sao has had constructed six warehouses and six shop buildings, all made of brick and roofed with tile. Around the machine area is a protective wall. Nevertheless, party members with position and authority have arbitrarily sold goods without approval from the cooperative member congress. They have many times engaged in corruption but no one has disciplined them, only transferring them or conducting a cursory review. Consequently, violations of collective property continue to occur, no conclusions are made, and no one is forced to make compensation. Specifically: a deputy director signed a contract order for the rental of a vehicle to haul sand, the equipment was not ensured, the driver had no license, and an accident resulted in the vehicle overturning and three people killed. A night acquisition of gasoline resulted in three warehouses, containing gasoline, oil, plows and harrows, being burned down. An acquisition of 15 tons of nitrate fertilizer resulted in a loss of 1.3 tons, etc. The production units have therefore also been stealing collective property: Unit 2 raised its output but misappropriated 3,000 kilograms of paddy. A production unit in Mong also secretly raised its output from low to high in order to steal paddy from the cooperative members. These are serious incidents but no one has been disciplined with only step 1 of Directive 79 being read and that's all. The confidence of the masses in the party organization has declined. The previous fine traditions no longer exist.

The Sixth Party Congress raised the issues of "using the people as the supporting base" and "the people knowing, the people discussing, the people doing and the people inspecting." We, extremely enthusiastic and confident laborers, are waiting for progress by the Nam Thang party chapter. However, to this time the party members have continued their carefree ways, their deficiencies are still being protected by an "umbrella," and the people are extremely concerned.

We suggest that the Ha Nam Ninh Provincial Party Committee institute methods of actively assisting the party organization of this village to advance in accordance with the Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress. Party members with position and authority must know how to repent. Only after suitably disciplining the degenerate and deviant party members will the production emulation movement of this village successfully advance.

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COLUMNIST URGES ORGANIZATIONS TO RESPOND TO READERS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 1 Jan 87 p 4

[A Story a Day column by "Builder": "Rapid Innovations Must Be Made"]

[Text] The final page on the 1986 calendar has been removed, and we have entered a new year. On this occasion, "Builder" would like to review one of the issues in which readers were interested during the past year, that is, the responses to the letters and ideas that readers sent, through the newspaper, to the echelons, sectors, and agencies responsible for making proposals, examining matters, and solving problems.

In 1986, of the 1,000 letters received, the newspaper received 129 replies, which included 29 official letters accepting criticism and 100 official letters of response. Many organizations obeyed the laws rather strictly, carried out their tasks with a lofty sense of responsibility, and responded to readers' letters quickly. Such organizations included the Office of the Municipal People's Committee, the Hoan Kiem Ward People's Committee and public security force, the Ministry of Interior, the Municipal Posts and Telecommunications Office, the Thanh Tri and Ba Vi district CPV committees, and the Thong Nhat Bus Corporation.

After reading critical articles in the newspaper or receiving letters passed on by the newspaper, a number of units immediately came to the editor's office in order to discuss ways to accept readers' criticisms. Based on readers' letters, a number of units took steps to solve the problems and handle things. By sending official letters to encourage and remind the agencies and units to respond to the ideas of readers, the Office of the Municipal People's Committee stimulated the organizations to take action on readers' letters.

However, the number of such "responses" was quite small. Because approximately 90 percent of the letters passed on to organizations did not elicit any response. Some units and newspapers responded with "reminders" but did not really reply. Some agencies involved in legal work did not obey the laws or deal with the complaints.

Changing ways of thinking and work methods is one of the themes that must be implemented in 1987. "Builder" thinks that the matter mentioned above must be changed quickly, too. We cannot accept slowness in carrying out the tasks. People cannot continue ignoring the laws or the collective ownership rights of the people like this.

When readers do not understand something and they ask, they must receive an answer. The things about which readers are concerned must be examined, and action must be taken. Isn't the purpose to have the "people know and discuss things, take action, and control" our work?

BRIEFS

NGUYEN VAN LING GREETES JAPANESE LEADER--Comrade Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee, on 29 March sent a congratulatory message to Comrade (Nosaka Sando), honorary chairman of the Japanese Communist Party Central Committee on his 95th birthday. The message said: The Vietnamese Communists and people profoundly respect you, comrade, the great friend of the Vietnamese people who has made many contributions to the unyielding and glorious struggle of the Japanese party and working class against imperialism and militarism for the independent, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous Japanese nation. We have highly valued the great contributions of the Japanese Communist Party and of yourself to the consolidation and strengthening of the tradition of militant solidarity and friendship between our two parties and nations. I wish you, comrade, good health and further achievements in your lofty mission. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 29 Mar 87 BK] /12624

CSO: 4209/369

HANOI'S INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SERVICE TASKS IN 1987

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 1 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Hanoi 1987"]

[Text] In industry, concentrate on producing consumer goods and expanding the food processing industry and give attention to the four main export programs: hats and shoes, woven goods, ready-made clothing, and the assembly of electronic goods. In agriculture, build a food belt and form a number of concentrated areas for producing food and export goods. Give attention to external economic activities and have policies to encourage expatriates abroad to participate in building the capital. Promote services, have policies to stimulate the individual and family economies, and encourage the localities to bring in goods and sell them in Hanoi.

In 1987, the first year of implementing the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress and the resolution of the 10th Municipal Party Organization Congress, the cadres and people of the capital are concentrating on implementing the following guidelines, tasks, and measures:

I. Industry

1. The economic structure must be rearranged. In this, industry must concentrate on producing consumer goods, which is the No 1 priority of the textile, leather, sewing, and dyeing sectors. At the same time, a great effort must be made to expand the food processing industry.
2. The industrial sectors that support exports must be expanded. In this, particular attention must be given to the four main programs: hats and shoes, woven goods, ready-made clothing, and the assembly of electronic goods.
3. Attention must be given to heavy industry, particularly the machine industry, in order to enable Hanoi and the entire north to become an industrial center and then expand and link the economy to the other provinces in the country.

In order to carry out these tasks in industry, attention must be given to three aspects:

The scientific and technical advances that have been affirmed must be applied to production in order to make innovations in products, improve quality, and strengthen labor productivity.

The new mechanism in industrial management must be implemented seriously and resolutely in accord with the spirit of Political Bureau Resolution 306 and Council of Ministers Resolution 76. In particular, attention must be given to maintaining the initiative of the production installations. At the same time, the production installations must fulfill their obligations to the city and country.

The inefficient sectors must be rearranged in a practical manner.

II. Agriculture

1. The crop allocation must be arranged in order to provide part of the grain and build the city's food belt. Based on this guideline, attention must be given to several types of crops: rice, corn, soybeans, and potatoes.

2. Main goods for export must be arranged in order to increase the export value for rural agriculture. In particular, attention must be given to improving vegetables for export to the Soviet Union, peanuts, and other crops.

3. A number of concentrated raw materials zones must be formed. In this, attention must be given to tobacco and jute.

In order to carry out the above tasks in agriculture, synchronized policies must be provided, and things must be organized in order to handle the relationship between the state and the peasants well. The interests of the peasants must be ensured. The responsibilities of the city and districts must be clearly recognized in the relationships with the peasants. In this, the city and districts must fulfill their obligations to each other, with the districts bearing responsibility for the peasants. Management at the agricultural cooperatives must be improved, the use of science and technology must be promoted, and the contract mechanism must be perfected.

III. Much attention must be given to external economic matters, particularly with Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Moscow, and the capitals of other countries. Exports to Asian markets must be expanded in order to create sources of raw materials and materials for industry and agriculture. The policy of encouraging expatriates abroad to participate in building the capital with their favorable conditions concerning abilities and capital must be applied.

IV. Service activities for production and life must be promoted. The city will implement policies to encourage the laborers in all the sectors, including the state-operated, collective, and individual sectors, to contribute to production and perform services. The city will prepare and issue policies on the individual and family economies and allow them to engage in legal activities in many production sectors and service spheres. The city will also implement policies to encourage localities throughout the country (loaning installations, granting tax exemptions, and so on) to bring food and other commodities and sell them in Hanoi.

11943

CSO: 4209/309

SMALL INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS TERMED VITAL ECONOMIC ELEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Exploiting the Strength of Small Industry and Handicrafts in Consumer Goods Promotion"]

[Text] Along with state-operated industry, the small industry and handicraft forces, with more than 1.8 million laborers, more than 20,000 tool machines and hundreds of thousands of special use machines, play an important role in assisting to achieve the three major economic programs of the party, especially those programs dealing with consumer goods and exports.

During the past few years, despite many difficulties caused by a management mechanism that has still not been truly renovated and contract price and production consumption policies that have not yet stimulated production, the small industry and handicrafts sector has annually produced more than 50 percent of the consumer product volume, and contributed nearly 20 percent of the export value. This reality on one hand expresses the great capabilities of small industry and handicrafts and on the other also shows that to the present time, these capabilities have not yet been truly properly exploited. Only about 30 to 40 percent of the production capacity of the entire sector has been mobilized.

The Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress clearly stated that light industry and small industry and handicrafts have a mission of answering the requirements of the people in various types of common goods, ensuring the requirements of agricultural, forestry and marine product processing, swiftly increasing the production of consigned export goods other export items and simultaneously expanding the amount of commodities to answer the diverse requirements of the consumer. In order to successfully achieve the consumer goods production program, all echelons, sectors and local areas must implement effective methods aimed at mobilizing and exploiting every small industry and handicrafts production force, including the collection economic area and the individual family craftsman. Under conditions in which small-scale industry is still universal, small industry and handicrafts have many advantages in maintaining close contact with market requirements, making flexible product changes, primarily using domestic and on-the-spot raw materials, and investing at not a large scale but creating swift returns. According to calculations of the small industry and handicrafts sector, under the conditions at the present

time, if the fundamental element of raw materials is successfully resolved and proper production and circulation policies are present, without the need for much new investment, the entire sector can still double its output, both developing new trades and restoring and developing the traditional trades.

In the production organization and management work, it is necessary to immediately renovate the policies for raw material supply and prices, create favorable conditions for basic small industry and handicrafts units to exploit material supplies, raw materials and discards on the spot, and to establish stable agricultural product raw material regions. Basic units must receive incentives in self-acquired capital, borrowed capital and the capital of overseas Vietnamese in order to invest in renovating technology, increasing labor productivity, improving the quality of present products and producing additional new products of high value.

Basic collectives in small industry and handicrafts must be strengthened, first of all properly implementing the accounting and business mechanism and ensuring autonomy in production. Profit sharing within cooperatives must be consistent with the principle of distribution in accordance with labor; and that the income of the craftsmen is truly dependent upon work results, on the effort and capital they contribute, and generally speaking, corresponds to the income of trade sectors of the same type in the state-operated economic area. Regarding those engaged in individual small industry and handicrafts, production requirements must be used as a basis for mobilizing those needed for entry to collective production, precisely in accordance with the principle of being both voluntary and also earning a profit. At the same time, those laborers still engaged in private work must be assisted and guided to develop production, especially in the unique arts and traditional crafts. Exploit all the capital capability and technical and management knowledge of individual economic elements in order to develop production in a number of specific trades in necessary locations with the purpose of creating jobs for laborers and creating many products for society. Properly implement contract joint enterprise and association between local areas, state-operated facilities, collectives and the family economy in accordance with the principles and laws of the state and the rational regulations of the local area. Organize product groups by production labor assignment, ensure the interests of the participants, and truly support each other in stimulating production and improving product quality. Institute a policy of suitable compensation for craftsmen. Encourage the swift introduction of scientific and technical advances to small industry and handicraft production through renovation of the necessary equipment, promote the movements of "improving product quality and creating new sample products" and "traditional spring examinations," and cause small industry and handicraft products to become increasingly diverse and more skillfully manufactured.

For a stable and developed economy following the course of the Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress, let all small industry and handicraft forces compete to produce many products of high quality to meet the daily requirements of the people.

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TARGETS, TASKS OF MARINE PRODUCTS SECTOR REPORTED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 14 Jan 87 p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the Conference To Discuss 1987 Tasks: Municipal Marine Products Industry Strives To Deposit Fish on 6,400 Hectares and Increase Fish Yields to 5,300 Tons; Marine Products Federation and Thanh Tri Fishing Zone Sell 2,000 Tons to the State"]

[Text] Recently, the Hanoi Federation of Marine Products Enterprises convened a conference to review the implementation of the 1986 plan and discuss the 1987 tasks.

Nguyen Thanh Binh, a member of the Political Bureau and the secretary of the Municipal CPV Committee, and Cong Tan, a member of the CPV Central Committee and the deputy secretary of the Municipal CPV Committee, attended the conference.

In 1986, the federation encountered many difficulties concerning weather and materials for producing fry and raising mature fish. But with the leadership of the Ministry of Marine Products, the Municipal CPV Committee, and the Municipal People's Committee and with the help of the sectors concerned, it received and supplied materials on time, raised many new high-yielding species of fish, and invested 6.5 million dong to build the Nhat Tan and Thanh Tri fingerling farms and a system to supply well water. Because of this, notable achievements were scored.

A total of 6,127 hectares were used to raise fish, 4,912 tons of fish were harvested, and 1,800 tons were sold to the state. As compared with 1985, the area increased 2.1 percent, yields increased 7.4 percent, and products were 2.5 times greater. In this, the enterprises in the marine products federation delivered 510 tons, exceeding the plan by 2 percent and exceeding the 1985 figure by 17.5 percent. Thanh Tri District sold the state 1,200 tons, an increase of 7.2 times as compared with 1985, when it sold 166 tons. However, as compared with the 1986 plan, the norms concerning area, fish yields, and products sold to the state were not fulfilled. The reason is that not all of the water area was used, there was a shortage of feed and fry, and the species, capital, labor, and technology were not boldly invested in raising fish. The marine products federation did not provide all-round guidance and did not coordinate things closely with the districts in expanding the

pisicultural movement in the collective sector. The state-operated pisicultural enterprises were not the activists in raising fish intensively. The city failed to send product plans to a number of districts, state farms, and stations. Although the policies regarding expanding production and purchasing fish showed much progress, they were still not satisfactory. Capital construction was weak, and some places did things too slowly. Little attention was given to producing export goods or to selling live and fresh fish.

Based on the experiences gained in 1986, this year, the entire city will raise 6,400 hectares of fish and strive to sell 5,300 tons of fish to the state. In this, the Marine Products Federation and the Thanh Tri fish zone will sell 2,000 tons. As compared with 1986, this is 104.4 percent concerning area, 107.8 percent concerning yields, and 111 percent concerning sales to the state.

In order to fulfill the above norms, the conference actively discussed a number of the state's procedures and policies regarding the pisicultural cooperatives, fish trading principles, and measures to expand the area, increase yields, and purchase products on time and in accord with the contracts.

At the conference, Nguyen Thanh Binh spoke about the principle of equality between collectives and individuals. There must be close coordination between the state, collective, and private sectors. Production, circulation, and distribution must be related to each other. They have a close relationship and cannot be separated. He reminded the city's water conservancy sector that it must implement separate projects for raising fish. And the state marine products enterprises must cooperate closely with the collectives located along the lakes and ponds in order to protect the schools of fish.

11943

CSO: 4209/310

NHAN DAN ON FISHERY DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH

BK241515 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 17 Mar 87 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "The Southwestern Sea Area -- a Large Key Area for Developing Fisheries"]

[Text] Our country has large sea areas and numerous bodies of water that can be used for the rearing, cultivation, and exploitation of marine products, of which the sea and riverine area in southwestern Nam Bo is the largest key area.

The riverine, marshy, coastal, and sea waters there possess many favorable conditions for marine production. The area is little affected by the seasonal northeasterly winds and is virtually free from storms. It is very rich in marine resources, having numerous large fishing grounds with a high reserve of fish and shrimp of valuable species. It also has many river estuaries, streams, and islands, making it convenient for the navigation of ships and boats and for the building of large fishing wharves, processing plants, and fishery logistics centers. The area can produce annually 450,000 to 500,000 metric tons of marine products, including 30,000-35,000 metric tons of shrimp and 10,000 metric tons of squid. The water surface suitable for fish and shrimp rearing there totals about 175,000 hectares, including 60,000 hectares of salty or brackish water.

With more than 50,000 highly experienced and skilled laborers specializing in fishery, the area has long had many large marine products establishments and developed the rearing, cultivation, exploitation, and processing of marine products and special products.

For many years now, despite the enforcement of various measures aimed at stepping up fishery production there, we have failed to fully exploit the diverse potentials of the sea and the various fresh and brackish water areas. The production output realized still remains very low, about 160,000-180,000 metric tons a year, with shrimp accounting for 10 percent of the total. With the promotion of the movement to rear shrimp for export, the water surface left fallow has grown smaller, but the annual marine production output still remains low, about 30,000 metric tons, including 2,000 metric tons of shrimp. Since we have used only naturally available sources of marine products and feed and have not yet taken the initiative in applying modern technology to large-scale production, productivity is low and economic efficiency is poor.

The southeastern Nam Bo sea area is drawing various marine production forces from different localities and establishments nationwide, but the operating fleets and production branches have yet to be organized and arranged in accordance with a rational and long-term division of labor, thus resulting in disputes and chaotic trading activities. Trawlers and fishing grounds are not regulated, and marine resources are subjected to serious destruction.

Generally speaking, the marine production forces in the area are weak and do not develop in a homogeneous manner. Fishermen's traditional and highly productive activities (trawling for white herring, mackerel, and so on) have been in serious decline. Virtually all the remaining fleets of trawlers are concentrating on catching marine life, especially shrimp, in the coastal waters. Although there exist many processing and refrigeration plants in the various localities, they are not distributed rationally and still fall short of the demand for production, especially at large fishing wharves and on the various islands. We have not yet paid attention in full to developing the various traditional branches involved in the processing of marine products. The sources of fish sauce from Phu Quoc and various types of dried marine products, shrimp pastes, and fish meal have not yet been restored and developed.

Implementing the three major economic programs set forth at the sixth party congress for the years 1986-90, the marine products sector should strive to achieve comprehensive development wherever possible, with attention given to key areas having large quantities of marketable products for domestic consumption and export. The sea and water surface area in southwestern Nam Bo is a large key area that requires appropriate concentrated guidance. The fundamental approach to rapidly increasing the quantities of marketable goods is to liberate all existing production capabilities and exploit latent possibilities while constantly strengthening production forces and building and consolidating the socialist production relations. An important task is to reorganize the operating fleets and branches, acquire more means of fishing, and expand the area used for the rearing and cultivation of marine products. Efforts must be made to consolidate and develop state-run marine products enterprises and increase investments in the expansion of repair and processing facilities so as to provide good logistical services to fishery. At the same time, it is necessary to consolidate collectivized production organizations under flexible forms that consider economic efficiency as the goal, and to help in the development of the household economy so as to create new conditions for integrating the various economic components to strengthen production forces and increase the output of marine products.

Efforts must be made to increase fishery output in the area to 350,000 metric tons a year, including 50,000 metric tons for export. Exploitation forces suitable to the characteristics of marine resources should be reinforced and developed even more vigorously so that they will be fully able to operate in distant sea areas having a depth of 30 meters and more; and it is necessary to apply the watchword of combining exploitation with protection of resources. The area for rearing and cultivating marine products should be enlarged to 125,000 hectares, including 40,000 hectares for shrimp rearing based on technical processes. In addition, strong

investments of capital, supplies, and technology should be made to ensure high productivity.

Reorganizing fishery production and building new fishing villages in southwestern Nam Bo is a great undertaking that will have a decisive impact on the development of fishery nationwide.

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CSO: 4209/369

REPORT ON 10-DAY AGRICULTURAL REVIEW

BK310649 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Agricultural Review for the Past 10 Days]

[Summary] "According to the Statistics General Department, over the past 10 days northern provinces have completed the first and second weedings of all 5th-month spring ricefields while more than 40 percent of the cultivated areas are being weeded for the third time. It is noteworthy that harmful insects are spreading on the winter-spring ricefields of the northern provinces. The ground beetles, brown planthoppers, stem borers, and cotton leaf rollers are spreading across vast areas. Besides Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh provinces which have been ravaged by ground beetles, other provinces such as Ha Nam Ninh, Thai Binh, and Hai Hung have also been threatened by harmful insects."

Various localities must urgently take measures to eradicate these harmful insects. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry has urged various provinces to strive to eliminate these insects and protect the 5th-month spring rice. It has also supplied more insecticide and spraying equipment to Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh provinces to effectively fight against ground beetles.

In the northern provinces more than 12 percent of the total rice acreage faces threat from the current drought. As a result, the electricity and water conservancy sectors must integrate their efforts to help the agricultural sector overcome these difficulties.

"Southern provinces have gathered more than 265,000 hectares of winter-spring rice, achieving 97.7 percent compared with the corresponding period last year. Preparations for summer-fall rice cultivation have also been carried out quicker than last year. Plowing, for instance, achieved 140 percent of the target."

"Regarding subsidiary food crops, the country has so far planted more than 398,000 hectares, or 15 percent more than the previous year. The northern provinces have exceeded their plan norm by 16 percent while the southern provinces have planted only 95 percent of their cultivated area."

The country in the past 10 days has also planted short-term industrial crops on various areas exceeding last year's total by 5 percent. Peanut and tobacco took the lead this year, exceeding plan norms by 18 and 12 percent respectively.

BRIEFS

CAO BANG CHECKPOINTS--On 19 March, the Cao Bang provincial people's committee completed disbanding four checkpoints on various interprovincial and interdistrict roads. Meanwhile, three other check points have ceased operation. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 25 Mar 87 BK] /12624

SOUTHERN CHECKPOINTS REMOVAL--According to bus drivers and passengers traveling on various roads in the eastern Ham Bo and Trung Bo regions, almost all checkpoints along these roads have been removed. In the past, it took a bus more than 2 days to travel from Ho Chi Minh City to Danang because it had to stop at dozens of checkpoints or tax stations along the road. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 26 Mar 87 BK] /12624

SONG BE CHECKPOINTS REMOVAL--On 20 March, the Song Be provincial forestry sector removed all checkpoints along various communications lines in eight districts and cities in the province. Shortly after the decision to dissolve all checkpoints was issued, the province sent cadres to all districts and cities to direct the dissolution of these checkpoints. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 26 Mar 87 BK] /12624

KIEN GIANG ELIMINATES CHECKPOINTS--Implementing the Council of Ministers' decision on eliminating unnecessary checkpoints, the Kien Giang provincial people's committee recently suspended operations of 17 checkpoints on various transportation routes. The elimination of these checkpoints has been welcomed by the people. It has also helped in speeding up the delivery of goods to various destinations. The provincial financial, tax collecting, industrial, and business sectors are striving to improve the tax collection system so that industrial and business taxes can be collected at production establishments or warehouses while at the same time trying to oppose speculation and smuggling. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 23 Mar 87 BK] /12624

LAM DONG ELIMINATES TWO CHECKPOINTS--The Lam Dong provincial people's committee has decided to eliminate two checkpoints on Highways No 20 and No 11 of Ta Oai and Don Duong Districts respectively. In addition to eliminating these two checkpoints, the province has also stopped checking trucks carrying goods along various routes in the province. To strengthen

marketing, the province has launched a movement to encourage the laboring people to exercise their right to collective mastery, while urging cadres responsible for market management to improve their work to effectively serve the people. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 23 Mar 87 BK] /12624

NGHIA BINH ELIMINATES CHECKPOINTS--Implementing the Council of Ministers chairman's decision No 80-CT, Nghia Binh Province eliminated all checkpoints as of 0000 local time on 20 March. The provincial people's committee has issued a directive to various sectors asking them to implement this decision. The business, tax collecting, and market management sectors have jointly formulated a concrete plan to purchase more state control goods in localities. The province has also sent more cadres to districts and cities to help officials and people implement the Council of Ministers' decision. [Summary] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 23 Mar 87 BK] /12624

HA NAM NINH CHECKPOINTS REMOVAL--According to a cable from HA NAM NINH paper Reporter (Nguyen Tuc Tuong), seriously implementing Decision No 80-CP of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, on 17 March the people's committee of Ha Nam Ninh decided to remove all checkpoints on various communications lines in the province. As of 23 March, seven intersector checkpoints on routes 1-A, 21-A, and 10 had been removed. Thanks to this timely measure, various kinds of goods, especially agricultural products and foodstuffs, have been circulated smoothly. During the same period, all 20 districts, cities, and towns of Ha Nam Ninh simultaneously registered various state-run, collective, and private economic establishments to allow them to engage in service business. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 24 Mar 87 BK] /12624

OVERSEAS LABOR RECRUITMENT--Based on information provided by the Labor Service, in 1986, the city sent 1,533 people to engage in cooperative labor abroad, exceeding the norm by 33 people. Because of actively fulfilling the norms, urgently establishing files, giving physical examinations, and making inspections, the quality of the recruitment was better than before. This year, according to the norms issued by the state, the city must recruit almost 2,000 people to engage in international cooperative labor. Specifically, 150 people will be recruited to go to Bulgaria, of whom 50 will be women (seamstresses) and 100 will be men (builders). These people will leave during January 1987. The city will recruit 1,500 people to work in the Soviet Union. The phase 1 target is to give physical examinations during January and send 600 women (weavers and seamstresses). Of these, half will be state workers and civil servants, and 180 will be skilled workers. People will be notified later of the time of the phase 2 selection examinations. Besides this, the city will send 200 people to work in Czechoslovakia. It will accept files and make preparations for sending 500 cadres and workers (who have a Hanoi household registration) from central organizations. [Text] [Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 Jan 87 p 1] 11943

CSO: 4209/310

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Nguyễn Bá [NGUYEENX BAS]

Chairman of the People's Committee, Nghe Tinh Province; his article about the three major economic programs in his province appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 31 Jan 87 p 2).

Phạm Ngọc Ban [PHAMJ NGOCJ BAN], Colonel, deceased

Member of the CPV: born in 1924 in Ha Chau Village, Phu Binh District, Bac Thai Province, he was retired and lived in Phu Luong District, Bac Thai Province at the time of his death on 3 Feb 87. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Feb 87 p 4)

Trưởng Chinh [TRUOWNGF CHINH]

He ceased to be General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee at the 6th Party Congress. (NHAN DAN 19 Dec 86 p 1).

Phan Văn Chấn [PHAN VAWN CHOWN]

*Member of the Standing Committee of the Quang Ninh Party Committee; *Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Quang Ninh Province; in Nov 86 he attended an industrial statistics conference in Hon Gai Village. (THONG KE Dec 86 p 32)

Hoàng Thọ Đan [HOANGF THOJ DAN]

Director of the Public Security Service, Ha Nam Ninh Province; his article on using people as the base to ensure political security and social order, appeared in the cited source. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 2 Dec 86 p 2).

Trần Thanh Diên [TRAAF THANH ZIEENJ]

*Deputy Editor of the statistics journal THONG KE; his name appeared on the masthead of the journal. (THONG KE Dec 86 inside front cover)

Nguyễn Sơn Diệp [NGUYEENX SOWN ZIEEPJ], Colonel, deceased

Member of the CPV; Deputy Director of the Military Science Bureau, 7th MR; born in 1927 in Dien Hoa Village, Dien Ban District, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, he died after a sudden illness on 19 Jan 87 at the 175th Military Hospital in Ho Chi Minh City. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Jan 87 p 4)

Minh Dũng [MINH ZUNGX]

*Deputy Director of the General Affairs Department, State Planning Commission; his article on a 5-year plan for economic and social development appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA Dec 86 p 5)

Trần Hữu Đắc [TRAAF HUWUX DAWCS]

Vice Chairman of the CPV Central Control Committee; his name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Nguyễn Văn Đức [NGUYEENX VAWN DUWCS], *Colonel

His article on Party documents on the resistance against French colonialism appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Dec 86 p 32)

Phạm Giảng [PHAMJ GIANGR]

*SRV Counselor to the SRV Embassy in Belgium; on 25 Jan 87 he attended a New Year's party for Vietnamese in Belgium. (NHAN DAN 4 Feb 87 p 1).

Võ Nguyễn Giáp [VOX NGUYEEN GIAPS]

Member of the CPV Central Committee; Vice Chairman of the Council of Minister; on 14 Jan 87 he welcomed the Director of the Soviet Institute of Sciences visiting Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 15 Jan 87 p 1).

Võ Văn Hiến [VOX VAWN HIEENF]

*Member of the Central Committee; his name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Tô Hoà [TOO HOAF]

Editor-in-chief of the Ho Chi Minh City daily newspaper SAIGON GIAI PHONG; on 11 Jan 87 he attended a meeting for readers who had sent in letters for the column "Contributing Opinions To Party Congress". (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 13 Jan 87 p 2)

Vũ Thị Hồng [VUX THIJ HOONGF]

Vice Chairman of the Control Commission of the CPV Central Committee; her name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Huỳnh Đắc Hương [HUYNHF DAWCS HUWOWNG]

Vice Minister of War Invalids and Social Welfare; his article on social welfare appeared in the cited source; (NHAN DAN 4 Feb 87 p 3).

Nguyễn Văn Khiếu [NGUYEENX VAWN KHIEEUS], Colonel

Director of the Artillery Officers School; his article on training artillery officers appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 16 Feb 87 p 3).

Đặng Kinh [DAWNGJ KINH], Lieutenant General

Deputy Chief of Staff of the VPA; on 12 Feb 87 he attended the 40th anniversary of the Militia and Self Defense Forces. (NHAN DAN 13 Feb 87 p 1).

Trình Văn Lâu [TRINHJ VAWN LAU]

*Vice Chairman of the CPV Central Control Committee; his name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Trần Kiên [TRAANF KIEEN]

Chairman of the CPV Central Control Committee; his name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Nguyễn Văn Linh [NGUYEENX VAWN LINH]

*General Secretary of the GPV Central Committee; recently he was elected to this position at the CPV 6th Party Congress. (NHAN DAN 19 Dec 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Vũ Lộ [NGUYEENX VUX LOOJ]

Vice Minister of Home Trade; his name was mentioned in an article on merchandise distribution in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh SAIGON GIAI PHONG 11 Feb 87 p 1).

Nguyễn Lức [NGUYEENX LUWCJ]

Publisher and Editor-in-chief of the statistics journal THONG KE; Deputy Director of the Statistics General Department; his name appeared on the masthead of the journal and his article on science statistics appeared in the cited source. (THONG KE Dec 86 inside front cover)

Huỳnh Mui [HUYNHF MIUF]

*Deputy Editor of the mathematical journal TAP CHI TOAN HOC; his name appeared on the masthead of the journal. (TAP CHI TOAN HOC Sep 86 inside front cover)

Phạm Quang Mỹ [PHAMJ QUANG MYX]

*Deputy Director of the Inquiry and Investigation Department, Ministry of the Interior, his article on criminal investigation appeared in the cited source. (PHAP CHE XA HOI CHU NGHIA N°5 [Dec] 86 p 13)

Phùng Minh Nam [PHUWOWNG MINH NAM]

Deputy Chief of Cabinet, Council of Ministers; on 24 Jan 87 he attended a party in Hanoi to welcome overseas Vietnamese and their spouses visiting Vietnam. (HANOI MOI 27 Jan 87 p 1).

Phạm Quang Nhuận [PHAMJ QUANG NHUWOWNGJ]

*Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Nam Dinh municipality; his article on improving people's well being appeared in the cited source. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Nov 86 p 2).

Hoàng Phùng [HOANGF PHUWOWNG], Lieutenant General

His article analyzing the victory of the resistance against the French as a basis for victory against the U.S. appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Dec 86 p 24)

Nguyễn Thanh Quát [NGUYEENX THANH QUAATS]

*Member of the CPV Central Committee; Secretary of the CPV Provincial Committee, Ha Bac Province; on 1 Feb 87 he welcomed Truong Chinh who was visiting Ha Bac (NHAN DAN 6 Feb 87 p 1).

Hoàng Bích Sơn [HOANGF BICH SOWN]

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; Director of the Overseas Vietnamese Department of the Central Committee; his article on overseas Vietnamese appeared in the cited source. (DAI DOAN KET 1 Feb 87 p 6).

Nguyễn Ngọc Sơn [NGUYEENX NGOCJ SOWN]

Deputy Director of the Statistics General Department; he addressed a statistics conference on materials and property in Ho Chi Minh City in October 86. (THONG KE Dec 86 p 33)

Nguyễn Công Tân [NGUYEENX COONG TANJ]

*Member of the CPV Central Committee; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi Municipality; on 14 Jan 87 he gave a speech at a meeting in Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 15 Jan 87 p 1).

Trình Quang Tân [TRINHJ QUANG TAAN], Colonel

His article on the new social system and the fighting strength of the armed forces appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Dec 86 p 45)

Đuông Cửu Tâm [ZUWOWNG CUWJ TAAMR], Lieutenant General

Deputy Commander, 7th Military Region; on 23, 24 Jan 87 he attended a meeting held by his unit. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 25 Jan 87 p 1).

Lê Văn Toàn [LEE VAWN TOANF], Professor

*Director of the Statistics General Department; he gave the opening address at the 2nd Science Statistics Conference. (THONG KE Dec 86 p 3)

Nguyễn Hữu Trí [NGUYEENX HUWUX TRIS], Colonel

Deputy Chairman of the Military Draft Council in Ho Chi Minh City; recently he was interviewed by the Ho Chi Minh City daily SAIGON GIAI PHONG; (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 10 Feb 87 p 2).

Đỗ Thanh Tuyên [DOOX THANH TUYEENF]

*Member of the CPV Central Control Committee; his name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Đỗ Thanh [DOOX THANH]

*SRV Charge d'Affairs to France; on 31 Jan 87 he attended a New Year's Party for Vietnamese in France. (NHAN DAN 4 Feb 87 p 1).

Vi Xuân Thanh (VI XUAAN THANG)

*Member of the CPV Central Control Committee; his name was on the list of the Central Control Committee that appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI CONG SAN Jan 87 p 11).

Nguyễn Đình Thi [NUGYEENX DINHF THI]

Secretary General of the Writers Association; he spoke at a conference on humorous poetry in socialist countries. (VAN NGHE 7 Feb 87 p 16)

Đinh Đức Thiên [DINH DUWCS THIEENJ], *Colonel General, (deceased).
aka Phan Đình Dinh [PHAN DINHJ ZINH]

Born in 1913 at Nam Van village, Dinh Dinh District, Ha Nam Ninh Province;
*Vice Minister of National Defense; Member of the Fourth CPV Central Committee;
former Member of the Military Commission of the CPV Central Committee;
former Minister of Heavy Industry; former Minister Communications and Transportation;
former Minister in charge of the Oil and Gas General Department;
former Deputy head of the State Planning Commission; former head of the Rear Service and Technical General Departments; he died in a car accident on
20 Jan 87 (NHAN DAN 22 Jan 87 p 1).

Hoàng Thế Thiên [HOANGF THEES THIEENJ]

Vice Minister of War Invalids and Social Welfare; recently he attended a meeting for the war invalids in Nam Dinh. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 5 Dec 86 p 1).

Hồ Thọ [HOOF THOJ]

Director of the Science and Technology Department, Ministry of Marine Products; his article on marine products appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 12 Feb 87 p 2).

Nguyễn Minh Thông [NGUYEENX MINH THOONG]

Vice Minister of Food Industry; on 10 Feb 87 he signed an agreement with Cuba on the development of sugar industry; (NHAN DAN 12 Feb 87 p 1).

Phạm Huy Thông [PHAMJ HUY THOONG]

Editor-in-chief of the archeology journal KHAO CO HOC; his name appeared on the masthead of the journal. (KHAO CO HOC N°4 [Nov] 86 p 80)

Đinh Thuận [DINH THUAANF], Colonel

His article on teaching national defense to students in general education schools appeared in the cited source. (TIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 2 Feb 87 p 3).

Phạm Chánh Trực [PHAMJ CHANHS TRUWCJ]

*Head of the Prosylitizing Department of the CPV Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 22 Jan 87 he attended a meeting held by the Ho Chi Minh Youth Organization to review their work in 1986 and set tasks for 1987. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 24 Jan 87 p 1).

Hoàng Tuy [HOANGF TUYJ]

*Editor-in-chief of the mathematics journal TAP CHI TOAN HOC; his name appeared on the masthead of the journal. (TAP CHI TOAN HOC Sep 86 inside front cover)

Lê Tu' [LEE TUW], aka Nguyen Van Cat [NGUYEENX VAWN CATS], Colonel, deceased

Member of the CPV; former Director of the Inspector Generals Office, VPA; born in 1923 in Ba Dinh Ward, Hanoi, he was retired at the time of his death at the 108th Military Hospital on 5 Feb 87. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 7 Feb 87 p 4).

Phan Văn Tu' [PHAN VAWN TUW], Colonel, deceased

Member of the CPV; former Director of the Rear Services Department, Technical General Department; born in Phuc Tho District, Hanoi, he died after an illness on 17 Feb 87 at the 108th Military Hospital. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 19 Feb 87 p 4)

Trần Văn Văn [TRAANF VAWN VANX]

Deputy Chief of the Propaganda and Training Department, Ha Nam Ninh Province; his article on ideology and organization work appeared in the cited source. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 2 Dec 86 p 2).

Bùi Cát Vũ [BUIF CATS VUX], Major General

Deputy Commander, 7th Military Region; on 11 Feb 87 he gave a speech at a ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Militia and Self-Defense Forces; (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 12 Feb 87 p 1).

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