

JPRS-EER-90-159  
29 NOVEMBER 1990



# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## HUNGARY

### Anti-Semitism, Mutual Grievances, Political Context Analyzed

91CH0142A Budapest HITEL in Hungarian No 22,  
31 Oct 90 pp 20-22

[Article by Gabor Balog: "The Trap"]

[Text] I watch and listen to TV news, I read the newspapers. The remark "soapbox for the Jew(s)" heard in Parliament will not become a court case after all, because indications are that the famous-infamous remark was not even made.

It appears that we narrowly escaped an unpleasant, demeaning affair.

And the Hungarian judiciary escaped from having to pronounce judgment in a perfectly absurd legal situation.

Who would argue about the following: The subject of this court case would not have been the fact that someone bestowed on another person the title "soapbox orator." In this parliament after all, the cabinet had been called a follower of Horthy already, and the foreign minister was told that he was stupid. In turn, the opposition was called demagogic and marxist. "Jew" would have been the offensive word. Not the linking of this word with the qualification of being a soapbox orator, but the fact that this adjective was used to qualify a person or a group.

Anyone who calls another person a Jew in today's Hungarian society will be regarded almost automatically as an anti-Semite. Accordingly, the infamous exclamation would count as a moral offense. As Gabor Mihalyi wrote in one of the MAGYAR HIRLAP Saturday supplements: "From the Jewish viewpoint we must condemn as an anti-Semite anyone who himself undertakes to determine the identity of Jews in his milieu, and who wants to force others to accept this judgment, irrespective of the criteria used to make this judgment."

But a judicial pronouncement along these lines would prohibit the very use of the word "Jew." Consequently, anyone could call only himself a Jew, no one else. In other words, the court would eliminate the name of an existing community from the vocabulary, it would prevent society from using a word which defines a community. A community which has a church, a culture, many kinds of associations, a periodical, and its own life. A rabbi or the faithful going to the synagogue could not be called Jews. This is absurd.

But an absolution would be equally absurd, because it would be contrary to the accepted moral standards of society.

The origins of these norms are well known to all: The discrimination that has existed ever since the Holocaust—one is a Jew, the other an Arian—conjures up terrible memories, and because of this fear it is "improper" to call anyone a Jew.

Improper? As the incident in parliament, and as Gabor Mihalyi's opinion indicates, we have come close to turning this impropriety into an open prohibition. Hungarian mass media carried the debate concerning Sandor Csoori's HITEL article for weeks. This is the source of the quotation attributed to Mihalyi, and in this debate one could also hear clear-cut statements saying that "Jewry: quite naturally, this kind of thing no longer exists except in the form of a heading in statistical reports. And I am not aware of this term, if it still exists by chance." (Imre Kertesz in MAGYAR HIRLAP 25 Sep 90). Peter Esterhazy's opinion in the same matter: "Csoori states that one should know who is and who is not a Jew in order to orient himself in this world. This is not true. One should know who is who." (NEPSZABAD-SAG 1 Oct 90.)

As these quotations show, the passage of time has changed the Holocaust syndrome to an extent that it no longer regards discrimination as a direct threat, but views exclusion from the society which adopted Jews as the chief problem. Sentences like the following sound almost like a refrain: "I will not tolerate preemption of my individualism" (Imre Kertesz); "Is it acceptable if one compares the Hungarian Jewry with the Hungarian people?....The truth is that in a modern civil society the assimilation of the Jewry continues despite all the anti-Semitism and persecution" (Gabor Mihalyi).

Permit me to draw a general conclusion without quoting the rest of the participants in the thicket of this debate: The Hungarian Jewry regards itself as an integral part of the Hungarian people, one that is no different from its Catholic, Protestant, perhaps Moslem or Buddhist compatriots.

This is a respectable view. Anyone daring to deny the right of a community to voluntarily dissolve itself in another community commits a grave moral offense.

And yet, opposite views still exist, particularly regarding dissolution. I read the following passage in Peter Hanak's article concerning the Csoori affair, in which Hanak indirectly called Csoori an anti-Semite (NEPSZABAD-SAG 29 Sep 90): "....by what criteria will Hungarians be judged, if the European character of Romanians is mainly judged by the criteria of how they conduct their minority policies and how they respect the rights of Hungarians?"

No error was made here, this is a direct opposite of the above views. And on top, this is not the view of just one person. I do not wish to make reference to the Jewish identity disputes which erupt periodically. I will only remind the reader of the time when the rights of nationalities were the subject of parliamentary debate. At that time there was serious talk about recognizing the Jewry as a minority. And another reminder: The Lauder Javne school was just opened in Budapest. Its goal is to encourage the development of "Jewish personal identity

consciousness" in the children of those who removed themselves from the community. (MAGYAR NEMZET Oct 90.)

The fact that several views exist within a community concerning the community itself is not unusual, of course. But the question of whether diverse views are able to coexist, or if willingly or unwillingly they counteract each other is not that self-explanatory.

As a starting point one should accept the fact that the assimilating group will protest in vain, because judging by the statement and instant success of the Lauder Javne school there indeed exists a Jewry in Hungary, moreover it exists in a framework which exceeds the limits of a religious community.

The ever-recurring need expressed by the intellectual elite of this existing entity is that Hungarian society apologize for the horrible crimes committed against the Jewish community during World War II. No one will argue of course that Hungarian society shares guilt for the Holocaust, just as almost every nation in civilized Europe shares that guilt, including the French, the Polish people, and the Swiss. Yes, but the demand for an apology essentially includes a declaration of "we and they," in the context of other parts of society. The basic situation of "we" request "you" appears even more pronounced in an interview given by Istvan Mihaly Schwartz. In this interview Schwartz raised the possibility of returning to the Hungarian Jewry as a whole the Jewish property that was stolen and taken away at the time of the Holocaust (MAGYAR NEMZET 13 Jul 90).

Let us go a bit further. In his argumentative article against Csoori, Hanak presents a larger historical essay concerning the way the situation of Jews in Hungary evolved. I was shocked to take note of the fact that "those 1950's" were simply missing from the story. (I was shocked and perplexed: Would Hanak be the one to forget that part of the story?) The Jewry contributed countless valuable persons to Hungarian intellectual life, but it also contributed the clique composed of Rakosi, Gero, Mihaly Farkas, Revay, and Gabor Peter. Although enough is being written on this subject these days, I feel pressed to ask one question. How would the Hungarian Jewry react if some people asked them to apologize from the "rest" of the Hungarian people for Rakosi? In response to this question it is easy to recite the number of our Jewish compatriots who suffered during the 1950's, and that many Jews played a significant role in overthrowing the system. But the answer to this question is also valid in the reverse: many non-Jewish Hungarians suffered under the Arrow Cross terror, and many non-Jewish Hungarians turned against the insanity of that terror. On what basis should we, do we, distinguish in this respect?

This same matter also has another side. On the one hand, we consistently demand that Arrow Cross criminals be held to account. On the other hand, however, we pass by the small and large mass murders of the Rakosi and the

Kadar eras with chaste silence, claiming that the statute of limitations has expired, and that we should not be consumed by the past; we should build the future instead. One is able to learn the names of members of Arrow Cross commandos, of camp commanders and of Arrow Cross party leaders from the Hungarian press, complete with the sentences they received. The Finta trial continued in Canada as late as last spring. But a benign veil covers the identity of AVH [State Security] officers, the commanders of concentration camps, and of those responsible for the volleys fired at Kossuth Square, Magyarovar, etc. And whoever is alive from among these people picks up a high pension and enjoys a "respectable" old age. Aren't their crimes of the same kind?

There should be no misunderstanding. The nationality of these offenders is of no interest. I am certain that a majority of these people were "Christian"(?) Hungarian. The question is this: Should we qualify criminal acts on the basis of whether the number of victims they claimed might be expressed by a five-digit or a six-digit number? Or could it be that the identity of the victims may give rise to discrimination? Why is it that an ever-increasing number of Holocaust memorials are erected in Hungary, while not a single stone plaque reminds us of Trianon? What is the difference between the captivity of Babilon, Titus' conquering of the Palestine, and the Holocaust—and Muhi, Mohacs, and Trianon?

Another matter. A few years ago a rather vulgar poem by Gyorgy Spiro trampled the larger part of the Hungarian intelligentsia into shit, to use the word Spiro used. This matter faded away after a few weeks of grumbling. But a huge outcry followed Istvan Csurka's radio statement around New Year's Day last, when he marched into the china shop. His statement could be interpreted in several ways. In the course of this outcry at least two editors severed their ties with the incriminated program. And at present Sandor Csoori's pen has produced a series of thoughts with an offensive edge. At least half a dozen people quit the Writers' Association as a result, and Csoori himself was prompted by the outrage to resign the dignified post he held in the same association.

These matters are obviously disproportionate. The double standard is obvious, and so is the explanation. The spirit of universal human rights demands that minorities enjoy special protection, and minorities have rights different from those the majority has. Hungarians beyond our borders endeavor to achieve more or less the same when they want to be free to use their native language and to have their own school system.

Having recognized these phenomena, one could not even raise questions about these matters, were it not for the fact that the practical manifestations of these phenomena frontally clash with the also practical existence of the other perception. The same entity which in one instance clearly conducts itself as a minority, identifies itself only and exclusively as a spiritual community in another instance—a spiritual community which seemingly does not even have members. This community has

a religious organization, but that organization is not the same as the community, and mainly not the same as the social leadership of that community. This community pursues cultural self organizing activities, but these activities attract only a fragment of the community. On the other hand, this community has no interest representation, no political movement, and does not even want to establish such representation and movement. No organization which professed itself to be Jewish appeared either in the parliamentary or the local elections. Integrated within the framework of societal institutions and parties, this community regards itself as an undistinguishable part of these institutions and parties. At this level the prohibition to designate members of this community is no longer a mere implied prohibition. Jewish members of the present Hungarian political elite regard even the faintest attempt to identify them as Jews as a matter of racial prejudice, and appeal to the public on an international scale. In essence this is why the "soapbox orator" case in parliament exploded.

To express myself even more clearly: We are witnessing something that is similar to a situation in which Hungarians of Transylvania or Slovakia tried to fight for the improvement of their lot while regarding anyone who called them Hungarians as a manifestation of anti-Hungarian hatred.

No one will think that I am a genius as a result of this line of thought. But the apparent conflict between the "we-they consciousness" on the one hand, and the "we are no different from anyone else" principle on the other, does not permit me to rest my case.

The number of things that were added to the Jewish question in Hungary during the past half century is commonly known. The guilt feeling for the events of 1944-45, and the hatred those events sparked; the Rakosi era mentioned already; some benevolent, dumb, or malicious biases on both sides. And yet, I do not believe that the present situation evolved from these phenomena rooted in the past, but from the failure to resolve the contradiction I just described.

There are frequent calls for "talking out" the tensions that have accumulated in us during the past period. Dialogue would be needed in order to cease hostilities. But any dialogue requires two parties, and it is hardly possible to discuss matters if one of the parties alternates between identifying itself with, and differing from, the other party. This can only cause schizophrenia on both (or is it all the same?) sides. It cannot resolve matters.

In writing this article I am overcome by fear which has existed in me latently existed from the beginning. I wrote down the word "Jew" at last, a word subject to moral prohibition. I did not take sides against Sandor Csoori or Istvan Csurka. True, I did not take sides against Gabor Mihalyi or Peter Esterhazy either, but this will hardly serve as an excuse for viewing me as part of the Csoori

group, because I failed to distance myself from Csoori's views. Anyone who reads newspapers will be aware of the consequences.

And yet, I would like to ask those who wish to respond to this article—if there be such people—to consider not only whether my logic is true or flawed, but also to discern whether the subject of debate indeed pertains to the Jewish question.

When and how did this series of controversies start? It began in late 1989, early 1990, immediately after the Communist dictatorship was toppled in Czechoslovakia and in the German Democratic Republic. At that time it became obvious at last to Hungarian political parties then in the opposition, that they would gain power in the upcoming elections.

By then these parties were far beyond the stage of initial cooperation. The popular referendum of November catalyzed polarization and designated the lead actors of future political life. The new structure was built on the intelligentsia, because during the Kadar era the intelligentsia was the only stratum which enjoyed relative intellectual freedom. At the same time this also meant that the new organizations were formed along the line which traditionally divided the Hungarian intelligentsia. The fact that the "liberal" opposition was recruited from among the urbanites, and the leading ruling party came from the "populist-national" camp, is no news.

These two forces became the presumptive holders of power. But the still ongoing tests of strength between the two could not become the subject of program debate, as would have happened under normal circumstances. Insofar as fundamental societal and economic issues were concerned, the self-definition of the two large parties remained uncertain for a long time. The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] began shifting from its early radical liberalism toward social democracy, while the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] found its present right-of-center, conservative place after some flirtation with the idea of representing the middle of the road. Statements made by these parties in the course of mutations were hardly suitable to permit public assessment, not to mention the fact that differences between the two parties remained meaningless or incomprehensible to the average citizen.

The urban-populist conflict of the distant past offered itself to fill this gap. Based on this conflict it became possible to rather clearly define the identities of the parties. This is how the most recent anti-Semitism debate could erupt in conjunction with the already mentioned Dodonian oracle uttered by Istvan Csurka, the continuation of which we are witnessing today. It is hard to tell who started this debate, but this is of no importance anyway.

In my view, the "Jewish question" became part of the arguments in a political controversy as a result of this regrettable, but logical process. It also brought along its fundamental system of conditions. The prohibition to

designate remained in force. From the standpoint of debate this means that the party accused of nationalism and anti-Semitism is unable to retort with the opposites of these concepts (devoid of nationalism, cosmopolitan). Or if the accused party retorts nevertheless, it will immediately provoke the already established charge of anti-Semitism.

The available opportunity was too enticing for the parties not to become involved. While the ruling parties emphasize the national line, an unceasing struggle against "exclusion" became the definitive element in the strategy of the parliamentary opposition. This unceasing struggle was the motivating force behind the Csurka affair, the stand against elective religious education, the no-confidence motion against the foreign minister, the Csoori case, and the soapbox orator story. Success proved this attempt to be on the right course: An increasing number of known public personalities discover and join in protest against anti-Semitic manifestations in the ranks of the ruling party. I am viewing the roster of editorial writers, the authors of the letter signed by 100 persons: Geza Ottlik, Peter Esterhazy, Gyorgy Litvan, Kalman Benda, President of the Republic Arpad Goncz himself, and so many others.

Meanwhile the party under attack feels as if it was snared, because it must fight an opponent who enjoys a more advantageous situation as a result of being in the minority, while the same opponent prohibits identification. Not even Sandor Csoori was able to take note of the fact that this conflict represents a simple partisan political maneuver, and not a conflict between Jews and non-Jews. Thus Csoori put on paper the sentence which has become infamous since: words about the Jewish intelligentsia which intends to assimilate Hungarian culture into its own image. At the same time Hungarian public life, also failing to recognize the background, turned against the outstanding writer with a mixture of amazement and shock.

I am reassured by reading that the president of the republic calls for a cessation of debate in a matter which also he views as self-destructive. If I understand him correctly, the president also views this battle as substitute action which veils fundamental economic and political issues.

Since I do not hold any political post or office, all I ask for is permission to comment on the same matter in somewhat more detail.

It is apparent that by using the adjective "self-destructive", Arpad Goncz called attention to the well-known threat of destroying Hungary's international prestige, if the anti-Semitic affairs continue. In my view, not only the country, but any participant in this odd game, will not be able to leave the arena as a winner.

The fact that the ruling parties have paid a high political and moral price already, because there always has been a person unable to continue with the futile defense, is well known. But despite all the initial success, the opposition

will also turn out to be a loser. If someone ceaselessly and emphatically undertakes to advocate a cause, the public eye will identify him sooner or later with that cause. In vain will the SZDSZ remain a program party in the classical sense of that term, people will recognize it as something else. Still in the "happy days of peace" (at the beginning of the Csurka affair), Sandor Csoori advised leading SZDSZ representative Imre Mecs to watch out, because they will be viewed as Jews as a result of continuously leveling charges of anti-Semitism. If I were in the SZDSZ' place, I would not be as pleased with the local election results as they are. On a nationwide basis, insofar as the first round of elections is concerned, 1.5 million of the 5 million voters cast their ballots for the "liberal" side. At this time 3 million people voted, and of these 40 percent cast their ballots for the SZDSZ and the Association of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], (but even this constitutes an exaggeration—take a look at the hedge hopping in the villages). This amounts to 1.2 million votes. Despite the cabinet, which struggles with a declining standard of living, a disintegrated economy, and industry, and which makes an occasional mistake, and despite the fact that the opposition is strongly supported by the mass media, the "liberal" side caused people not to vote for the "other" side. The numbers demonstrate that they did not vote for "this" side either. The opposition did not lure away voters. They scared away the voters, primarily because of the continuous "excluding" game, in my view.

And yet, the Hungarian Jewry will incur the greatest loss as a result. The more venomous the dispute, the more certain it becomes that a basic position of "we" and "they" will come about. The assimilated group tries to prove, and to make people accept, its own assimilation by waging a wild fight against anti-Semitism, while identifying itself by using the same definition of "Jew" which they elevated to the height of acquiring an exclusionary meaning. And that's not all. While their elite seeks the solidarity of society as a whole, they are not removing Csurka or Csoori from the Writers' Association. The ones who quit the Writers' Association are the likes of Imre Kertesz and Judit Fenakel, supported heavily by the mass media, thus sentencing themselves to the punishment of exclusion, something they wanted to avoid. Something similar is going on at the TV news, around the group headed by Andras Bano.

Society hesitates to pledge solidarity to a group which is incapable of comprehending whether it is, or is not, part of society. Thus the political struggle turns into a trap for those in whose name the entire matter has begun. The longer the dispute over exclusion continues, the greater the need will be: Decide where you belong, at last. And this need itself constitutes exclusion. Exclusion, moreover, amid passions that went loose, passions which sympathizing writers and public figures will not be able to calm.

Indeed, this controversy must immediately cease.

**Local Government Institutions Defined, Compared**  
*91CH0133A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG*  
*in Hungarian 22 Sep 90 p 5*

[Unattributed article: "Small Dictionary"]

[Text] **Mayor** (council chairman). After the elections the mayor who takes the place of the present council chairman will be the chairman of the representative body of local autonomous governing bodies. The mayor will convene the meetings of the representative body. The authority of the employer over the mayor is exercised by the representative body. It determines the mayor's salary within limitations provided by law. Voters in communities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants may elect their mayors directly, while in communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants the representative body elects the mayor.

**Town Clerk** (executive committee secretary). Town clerks will take the place of executive committee secretaries after the elections. Town clerks will not be elected. The authority to appoint town clerks rests with the representative bodies. Such appointments must be made on the basis of competitive examinations, and the town clerk's appointment will be for an indefinite period of time. The mayor directs the office of the mayor through the town clerk. Adjacent municipalities within the same county, with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants may establish offices of a circuit town clerk to perform their administrative functions.

**Representative body** (council body). The representative body will take the place of what has been thus far the council body. The representative body is entitled to exercise authorities incumbent to autonomous governing bodies. The authority of representative bodies includes for example the creation of local ordinances, the calling of local referendums, the establishment of the local budget, and the determination of local taxes. The decisions of the representative body within the scope of its autonomous authority (e.g., at the time when a local administrative plan is approved) are not subject to appeal, nevertheless challenges seeking judicial review on grounds of illegality may be entered in courts. Representative bodies will meet at least six times a year, and may be convened as necessary. Representative bodies must be convened upon the motion of one quarter of the local representatives. In general, the meetings of the representative bodies are open, but representative bodies themselves may order closed meetings.

**Local representative** (council member). The members of representative bodies are called local representatives. They will take the place of the present council members. In communities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants local representatives are elected on the basis of "small slates," (all nominees for representative appear on these slates, and the nominee who receives the largest number of votes from among the representative who could be elected, will become the elected representative). Two

rounds of elections will take place within the administrative districts of Budapest and in communities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. In one round a ballot form will be used to elect individual nominees for district representative, while the other ballot form will be used to cast votes for slates. The Budapest general assembly is a peculiar representative body. It takes the place of the Budapest council body. Each representative body in the 22 administrative districts of Budapest elects one member of the Budapest general assembly. An additional 66 members are directly elected to serve in the Budapest general assembly. (The term "general assembly" is also used to designate the representative bodies of counties, and of cities exercising the authority of counties.)

**Delegate of the Republic** A new official, the delegate of the republic provides legal oversight to autonomous governing bodies. The delegate of the republic will be appointed by the President of the Republic based on the prime minister's recommendation. Each of the eight delegates of the republic will oversee one of eight regions, and each region will cover two or three counties. Budapest constitutes a separate region. The delegate of the republic takes action to cease conditions which violate laws. If in response to his call an autonomous governing body fails to take the required action, the delegate of the republic may request the Constitutional Court to take action provided that an ordinance of a local autonomous governing body is involved. Otherwise he may seek judicial review in courts. He may also make initiatives to convene local representative bodies.

**Roster of Ambassadors as of 31 August 1990**  
*91CH0114A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG*  
*in Hungarian 1 Sep 90 p 9*

[Text] President Arpad Goncz said farewell to the newly appointed foreign service mission heads on 22 August. They occupy their respective posts in late August, early September. On this occasion the new list of ambassadors was made public. In many places the leading diplomat had been recalled already, in others the new ambassadorial nominee had not been questioned by the parliament. In regard to others posts designation of the new ambassadors is in progress.

| Post        | Ambassador as of 31 Mar 90 | Ambassador as of 31 Aug 90 |
|-------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Addis Ababa | Dr. Sandor Robel           | Dr. Sandor Robel           |
| Aden        | Endre Galambos             | Endre Galambos             |
| Algiers     | Zoltan Zsigmond            | Dr. Tamas Horvath          |
| Ankara      | Jeno Gyenis                | Jeno Gyenis                |
| Athens      | Dr. Laszlo Kincses         | Dr. Laszlo Kincses         |
| Baghdad     | Tamas Varga                | Geza Palmay                |
| Bangkok     | Peter Trunk                | Peter Trunk                |
| Beijing     | Ivan Nemeth                | Ivan Nemeth                |
| Belgrade    | Istvan Oszi                | Istvan Oszi                |

| Post                  | Ambassador as of 31 Mar 90 | Ambassador as of 31 Aug 90 |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Berlin                | Dr. Erno Lakatos           | Dr. Istvan Horvath         |
| Bern                  | Janos Hajdu                | Dr. Laszlo Odor            |
| Bogota                | Dr. Vince Koczian          | Dr. Vince Koczian          |
| Bonn                  | Dr. Istvan Horvath         | Dr. Istvan Horvath         |
| Brasilia              | Gabor Suto                 | *                          |
| Brussels              | Gabor Gobolyos             | *                          |
| Bucharest             | Pal Szuts                  | Erno Rudas                 |
| Buenos Aires          | Laszlo Major               | Laszlo Major               |
| Cairo                 | Zoltan Pereszlenyi         | Zoltan Pereszlenyi         |
| Canberra              | Dr. Zoltan Juhar           | Laszlo Pordany             |
| Caracas               | Dr. Janos Domeny           | Dr. Janos Domeny           |
| Copenhagen            | Dr. Laszlo Demus           | Dr. Laszlo Demus           |
| Damascus              | Dr. Andor Egyed            | Dr. Andor Egyed            |
| Dar es Salaam         | Janos Zengal               | Janos Zengal               |
| New Delhi             | Dr. Andras Balogh          | Dr. Andras Balogh          |
| Djakarta              | Istvan Debreceni           | Istvan Debreceni           |
| The Hague             | Dr. Istvan Csejtei         | Dr. Istvan Csejtei         |
| Hanoi                 | Dr. Oszkar Szurovszky      | Dr. Oszkar Szurovszky      |
| Harare                | L. Istvan Szabo            | Gaspar Tamas Gal           |
| Havana                | Bela Bardocz               | Bela Bardocz               |
| Helsinki              | Arpad Hargita              | Bela Javorszky             |
| Islamabad             | Andras Dallos              | Andras Dallos              |
| Kabul                 | Mihaly Golub               | Mihaly Golub               |
| Kuwait                | Balint Gal                 | Baling Gal                 |
| Lagos                 | Dr. Adolf Szeles           | Dr. Adolf Szeles**         |
| Lisbon                | Dr. Sandor Argyelan        | Dr. Sandor Argyelan        |
| London                | Dr. Jozsef Gyorko          | Tibor Antalpete            |
| Luanda                | Dr. Jozsef Nemeth          | Gabor Toth                 |
| Madrid                | Dr. Attila Gecse           | Dr. Attila Gecse           |
| Managua               | Istvan Soos                | Istvan Soos**              |
| Maputo                | Mihaly Terjek              | Mihaly Terjek              |
| Mexico City           | Antal Solyom               | *                          |
| Montevideo            | Janos Kiss                 | Bela Szabo                 |
| Moscow                | Sandor Gyorko              | Sandor Gyorko              |
| Nicosia               | Dr. Imre Uranovitz         | Dr. Imre Uranovitz         |
| Oslo                  | Janos Kisfalud             | Dr. Gabor Nagy             |
| Ottawa                | Dr. Rezso Banyasz          | *                          |
| Paris                 | Dr. Gabor Nagy             | Dr. Janos Szavai           |
| Phenjan/Sandor Pataki | Sandor Pataki              |                            |
| Phnom Penh            | Lajos Tamas                | Lajos Tamas                |
| Prague                | Miklos Bority              | Miklos Bority**            |
| Rabat                 | Istvan Dobos               | Bela Benyei                |
| Rome                  | Dr. Gyorgy Misur           | Dr. Gyorgy Misur           |
| Santiago              | No ambassador              | Lajos Nagy                 |

| Post       | Ambassador as of 31 Mar 90 | Ambassador as of 31 Aug 90 |
|------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Seoul      | Sandor Etre                | Sandor Etre                |
| Sofia      | Sandor Simics              | Sandor Szabo               |
| Stockholm  | Dr. Jozsef Hajdu           | Dr. Jozsef Hajdu           |
| Teheran    | Erno Horvath               | Erno Horvath**             |
| Tel Aviv   | Dr. Janos Gorog            | Dr. Janos Gorog            |
| Tirana     | Dr. Mihaly Komidesz        | Ferenc Poka                |
| Tokyo      | Andras Forgacs             | Andras Forgacs             |
| Tripoli    | Laszlo Fehervari           | Laszlo Fehervari           |
| Tunis      | Sandor Pamuk               | Sandor Pamuk               |
| Ulan Bator | Sandor Szapora             | Miklos Jaczkovics          |
| Warsaw     | Istvan Roska               | Akos Engelmayer            |
| Vatican    | no diplomatic relations    | Dr. Sandor Keresztes       |
| Vienna     | Janos Nagy                 | Dr. Denes Hunkar           |
| Vientiane  | Alfred Almasi              | Alfred Almasi              |
| Washington | Dr. Peter Varkonyi         | Peter Zwack                |

\* Designation of ambassador in progress

\*\* Recall has taken place, return in progress

### Emergency, Disaster Management Capabilities Discussed

91CH0073A Szolnok JASZ-NAGYKUN-SZOLNOK  
MEGYEI UJ NEPLAP in Hungarian 26 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview reprinted from RFE press review No. 7859 with Interior Ministry Administrative State Secretary Imre Verebelyi by Illes Szabo; place and date not given: "What Is Frightening Is What Man Has Created"]

[Text] [Szabo] Mr. State Secretary, you have a Ph.D. in law, have taught at the ELTE [Lorand Eotvos University of Sciences] for over a decade, and have written textbooks on organizational theory....

[Verebelyi] True....

[Szabo] .... and, still, it is your responsibility now to show what would happen in a crisis situation in Hungary and what safeguards would be possible to avert it...

[Verebelyi] Still...? You mean that I am a layman. Well, yes, I was given this responsibility two months ago, and I have since then been denounced by the experts. For instance, a high-ranking commander of the Fire Department wrote that he feels that laymen are trying to interfere with affairs of experts, and what would this lead to...?

[Szabo] What was your reaction?

[Verebelyi] I wrote him a letter, saying that he was absolutely right and had a correct assessment of the situation, but it is good the way it is, for it is laymen, not



experts, whom disasters hit. It is their children, their wives, and their assets that are endangered, and it would not hurt if they finally took control of their destinies and began thinking about what should be done in case—God forbid—a disaster were to occur. After all, they are the ones to lose, are they not?

[Szabo] Truly, what would happen in case of a disaster today in Hungary?

[Verebelyi] It would be a disaster.

[Szabo] There have been earthquakes, floods, big fires here. We coped with them quite well.

[Verebelyi] You are mentioning natural disasters. Earthquakes, floods, draughts, fires, extreme weather, animal invasions, epidemics. And, although I cannot say that things could have gone even better, you are right, the citizens and the responsible organizations did live up to expectations. You know, everyone cooperates after the first shock. And then, mankind has thousands of years of experience in the area of natural disasters. It is easier to prepare for them—except for an earthquake, but that is not very frequent in this part of the world. But the floods and epidemics....One can predict ahead of time these days. It is not nature I am really worried about.

[Szabo] What about then?

[Verebelyi] About what man has created. It is natural at the present stage of civilization for factories and plants to produce and for people to commute. It is natural that accidents might happen, including catastrophic accidents, if many people commute. It is also natural that many plants use dangerous materials. I am not thinking of nuclear reactors here, that is a different chapter, for which, I think, we are prepared. I am thinking of chemical plants and those plants which use materials in the process that are dangerous to the environment and to man. I am very, very worried about factory and traffic accidents.

[Szabo] Are we not prepared for these?

[Verebelyi] No.

[Szabo] Would you cite some examples?

[Verebelyi] There was, for example, the mass accident on the M1 freeway. Traffic was stopped for a very long time, and rescue operations dragged on because Hungary has only two fire engines with cranes that are suitable for lifting a truck. They arrived from far away, through the capital.

[Szabo] We would need more mobile cranes....

[Verebelyi] At least one in each county. But this is not the only concern. We also lack the tools with which we can successfully rescue hurt people from the vehicles. That is, we have them but they are not efficient enough, people in the West use much better ones with which they can work three times faster. My nightmare is a mass

accident in which the freeway is bottlenecked in both directions. At a time, for instance, when many people would be going home from Lake Balaton and spectators of the Form 1 race would be leaving from Budapest. How can one reach the site of the accident? Only with helicopter and motorized units. And we do not have these, at least not well-equipped ones.

[Szabo] And the plant accidents....?

[Verebelyi] Let us continue with traffic accidents. Even more serious things can happen there. Hungarian roads are used by trucks hauling poisonous liquids. Let us suppose that one of these trucks has an accident and the ethylene is spilled on the road. Poisonous gases are generated which may kill many people. And if the gases reach the clouds and then enter the ground with precipitation....They would poison the underground water table in a very large area. This would be a real and immense disaster indeed.

[Szabo] Can't the spilled ethylene be neutralized?

[Verebelyi] Yes, if we are there, it takes only a short time to avert the danger. But how are we going to get there? A truck is turned over, and it takes time until one of the drivers take notice that there is big trouble there. Emergency alarm, getting there, assessing the situation, transporting the necessary equipment. Which means time, time, time.

[Szabo] Why do not experts accompany dangerous shipments?

[Verebelyi] Because the experts do not know the trucks' whereabouts because their routes are secret. Some time ago, certain people decided not to reveal where the ethylene goes. And the ethylene is transported on our highways—which is the better case—as well as on the streets of big cities.

[Szabo] This is incomprehensible.

[Verebelyi] To me, too. We are devising detailed strategies in case NATO would launch a nuclear attack against Hungary. Satellite pictures can show exactly where missile bases are, where they move, what they do. But we do not know where such a truck is located. We are talking about shipments which might endanger the life of tens of thousands of people!

[Szabo] This should be changed.

[Verebelyi] Not only this but many other things should also be changed. The plant accidents! Fortunately, not too many have happened, but they could have. They could have happened because executives of Hungarian enterprises and plants do not pay enough attention to safety. While a western firm that produces dangerous materials spends at least 20 percent of its investment funds for safety, Hungarian firms spend much less because they lack the attitude of ownership. A capitalist also has a personal interest in spending much more on the safety of his workers, and this is not a lost expense because he can deduct from his tax the amount of expense for safety. In addition, he also pays more attention to fire regulations as it is his own property that is

exposed to danger, and so it is not likely to go up in flames. Just look at the greater severity with which a Western employer will punish his employee for violating regulations.

[Szabo] How would you alleviate a catastrophic situation?

[Verebelyi] A much more efficient strategy of accident prevention must be worked out. This is the task I was given two months ago. It was still the Nemeth administration which issued a very good order, namely, that the Fire Department and Civil Defense must be put under the authority of the Ministry of Interior again. Three factors made this possible. First, our philosophy changed in that the priority was shifted from war to civil disaster. Second, the law of self-government provides more autonomy to local interests. Third, there were economic reasons.

[Szabo] What do people in Civil Defense and the Fire Department think of this?

[Verebelyi] They do not think this is good. Both organizations would like to maintain their autonomy, and for good reason: The prestige of an office is higher at an autonomous organization. They say that this order is undemocratic. This is true, but democracy also has its limits. If the issue is to prevent and avert disasters, then I am not democratic.

[Szabo] What experiences can you rely on?

[Verebelyi] There are not too many. Not because I used to be a university professor but because the Ministry of Interior did not deal with this issue previously. Thus, I had to rely on foreign literature and common sense.

[Szabo] What is your concept?

[Verebelyi] Decentralization is the main issue. A disaster must be averted—with responsibility and expertise—where it happens. How could I say from above what should be done in a given emergency situation?

[Szabo] what would the new structure look like?

[Verebelyi] We can divide disasters into three categories according to their level of danger. The smallest is the micro-disaster. Something like a larger highway accident, a serious fire, or an overturned truck hauling a dangerous liquid. Of course, police and paramedics are also available, but it is primarily the fire fighters who would be responsible for the rescue operations. Indeed, not so much fire fighters but rather special task forces with units to deal with fires as well as with cutting apart and taking away demolished cars or with neutralizing chemical materials if needed. Everyone would be doing his own task, but the commander, who must really be an expert in everything, would be taking personal responsibility for the decisions.

[Szabo] And in case of a bigger disaster?

[Verebelyi] In case of a regional disaster, county and municipal organizations would take command. The chief commander would be the local chief of civil defense under the mayor's supervision. This man could not be just anyone because he would be responsible for everything. He would command units of the army, the fire department, the police, and the volunteers. He would make personal decisions on everything. Well, how could I tell him from above what he should do?

[Szabo] And what about disasters even bigger than that?

[Verebelyi] That would be not only disaster but an emergency situation in which the government would take command.

[Szabo] You have mentioned volunteers....

[Verebelyi] The population must be involved. Those people who would be willing to take training in their free time. Believe me, many people would be glad to test themselves in emergencies, to find out what they can do. It would be better for young people to use their extra energies this way instead of forming gangs and causing trouble. And they, the average people, are the ones to be most directly affected. But I emphasize that the most important thing is organization and the commanders' responsibility. I do not need any plans! Anyone can make beautiful statements from behind a desk. But he or she should practice, organize, supervise, and think. And, if needed, should put on a helmet and help the others. Like a man, sensibly, with a clear head. And then, the equipment....Even intrepid courage and heroism would be worth little without proper equipment.

[Szabo] Money, money, money.

[Verebelyi] I know, everyone would want to milk the Treasury. Of course, central aid is also needed, but we have much more reserves than we think. In the new system of autonomy, it must be decided locally how money should be spent. I believe people would be willing to make sacrifices for their own safety. I have already mentioned the factories; there, it is taxes which must be handled judiciously. Another topic related to taxes is that insurance companies would also be happy to make contributions if they could be written off their taxes. And then, we can also procure equipment from the West. Their shrinkage is still state-of-the-art technology in Hungary.

[Szabo] You mentioned the economic benefits of cooperation...

[Verebelyi] Yes, take, for instance, the bomb shelters of civil defense. They do not provide much shelter against modern bombs, and they can accommodate less than 6 percent of the population. You know what? For me, this kind of shelter is no shelter. It would be much better to use these shelters for peaceful purposes and not for a supposed nuclear attack. Let us lease them as warehouses or for growing mushrooms, and let us use the money for buying crane trucks or other essential rescue equipment.

[Szabo] If your concepts come true, when will be the time when you can say that the situation is not catastrophic?

[Verebelyi] In a year. Of course, we cannot just sit still until then. Because one reason a disaster becomes a disaster is that we do not know when it will strike.

## POLAND

### German Minority, Expellee Tensions Rising

#### Border Tensions Intensifying

91EP0055A Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 26 Oct 90  
p 5

[Article by Ilka Piepgras: "A Wall Along Oder and Neisse"]

[Text] Frankfurt/Oder, in October—Between Frankfurt and Slubice the Oder is about 50 meters wide. Murky, brownish water is flowing underneath the huge bridge which links Germany and Poland. About 200 people have gathered on the Slubice side of the bridge. Some of them are carrying banners. They would like to cross over to Frankfurt, but are not allowed to do so because Polish citizens now need a visa to enter Germany. The young people are demonstrating on behalf of the unlimited right to cross the border.

A small group of protesters has gathered on the German side as well. One of the protesters unfurls a sign the front and back of which reads "No Wall Along the Oder and Neisse" in German and Polish. The Germans, carrying GDR identity cards, are allowed to cross the border. As they march across the bridge with their sign to support the Poles demonstrating on the other side people yell after them, "communist pigs."

Following the demonstration, Uli Goedecker, a member of the New Forum in Frankfurt, hangs the bilingual poster up in the kitchen of his cramped, rundown apartment. It is shameful, he says, that it was the Polish and not the German government that reopened the border for GDR citizens on 6 October. "A people that was locked up for 40 years should not allow this to happen," says Goedecker, who works at an energy plant. He is disturbed by the "troubled relationship between Germans and Poles" in the border region. The Poles always were the whipping boys, he says. "People here think less of the Poles than of anyone else."

The biased attitude of the Germans toward the eastern neighbors is well known. They are considered to be lazy, sly, and dishonest. Instead of doing honest work they earn a living by haggling and black marketeering. Such prejudiced opinions can also be heard in Frankfurt. Goedecker has a fat notebook full of items documenting the sad state of German-Polish relations, including a letter to the editor of MAERKISCHE VOLKSZEITUNG of 10 February which says "I welcome the closing

of the border because it has at long last put an end to our being plundered and bought out by the Poles."

One of the reasons for animosity on the part of the Germans is that the Poles used to hoard goods such as children's clothing at heavily subsidized prices in the GDR and sold these items for hard currency in the West. "They bought it all up," one Frankfurt woman says. She still remembers a sad occurrence at the Central department store. A woman in the late stages of pregnancy had been waiting for hours to buy a baby carriage. But a Pole, ahead of her in line, bought up the last 10 carriages right in front of her nose. Currency union and reunification have turned the situation around completely: now it is the East Germans going to Poland by the thousands and buying things at bargain prices.

Worry about the future on the part of former GDR citizens even results in violence sometimes. When a commuter bus carrying Polish workers came rumbling across the Oder bridge two days after reunification, excited Germans threw rocks at it and teenagers yelled "Poles, get out!" Marian Kunik, the spokesman of the Polish workers at the semiconductor plant, says there is a "lot of tension" in the workplace. The plant is fighting for survival; 8,000 jobs are in jeopardy. There are 500 Poles working at the plant; most of them have been on the job for 20 years. The German workers' reaction was unequivocal. If anyone gets fired, the Poles should be the first to go, they demanded. The situation is less tense now that the work force has been given the assurance that all jobs are safe until the middle of next year.

#### Letter to the Pope

Klaus Baldauf, the city official responsible for international cooperation, agrees. He, too, feels that relations between Poles and Germans are "intolerably strained." Baldauf is a member of Frankfurter Bruecke [Bridge], an association dedicated to "promoting understanding between Poles and Germans." The association's goal is to build friendship step by step with the help of German-Polish youth activities, sports events or a joint symphony orchestra. Baldauf expressly went to Kehl [a town on the Franco-German frontier] to see for himself "how erstwhile archenemies Germany and France manage to live together along the border in harmony."

Karl-Ludwig von Klitzig, a doctor at the district medical center who is one of the founders of Frankfurter Bruecke, even sent letters describing the goals of the association to foreign ministers Genscher and Skubiszewski as well as the Pope. Klitzig, a man in his mid-fifties, seems not to know what to do; he cannot keep his hands still. As a citizen of the GDR, he always felt like a "second-class human being" compared to his brothers and sisters in the West. Most likely, he says, that is the way the Poles feel now that the full shopwindows of the West beckon to them right across the border. "Poland must become a part of the new economic system," he says. Speaking of his friends in Slubice, he

notes that "the Poles are not afraid of a Greater Germany but of being locked out of Europe."

### Shocked by Hatred

Rolf Henrich, a lawyer who was an early critic of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] regime and a cofounder of the New Forum, is another founding member of Frankfurter Bruecke. "Last fall," he says, "the citizens of the GDR were hailed everywhere as the new men and women but now we are ugly; we have shrunken in size and have lost our self-confidence." The East Germans' self-esteem has been shaken, he adds. That is why they are putting up a wall between themselves and their still impoverished neighbors to the East.

Genuine reconciliation between Poles and Germans cannot be had for money. It does not help for the German government to "send over 15 billion marks," Henrich says scornfully. First, associations like the Bruecke have to establish a cultural basis for it. Above all, the national frontier must be transformed into a mere administrative dividing line. Henrich paints a somber picture of Eastern Europe's future. "The Soviet Union is on the verge of collapse," he says. "What if the citizens of the Soviet Union start moving westward?" The enormous pressure which a migration of such magnitude would exert on the Western systems could only be mitigated, if the doors to the East were opened and support for economic cooperation were forthcoming.

An association with similar goals was recently called into being in Goerlitz, a divided city on the Neisse River. It is called "Via regia" and that very name is expressive of its program. In the Middle Ages, the "high road" served as the link between the Holy Roman Empire and the Slavic East. The Goerlitz association aims to "perpetuate the Neisse River as the German-Polish border but to make this dividing line as permeable as possible for cultural exchange and communication."

Reinhard Melzer, a founding member of Via regia, is a priest from Magdeburg. When he moved to Goerlitz a few years ago, he was "shocked by the hatred of the Germans along the border." In his view, the former GDR government is to blame for the abuse, insult and everyday chauvinism directed against Poland. "Cultural exchanges and mutual visits took place on orders from above," he says. But when the regime collapsed, the outer trappings fell away and it was plain to see how little the propaganda of the fraternal nations had achieved.

The policies of the eighties were especially destructive. At that time the GDR government closed down the border crossings out of fear of the Solidarity bacteria and systematically curtailed contacts between Germans and Poles. Just prior to the big change Melzer had still pleaded with the authorities to grant permission for a visit by a Polish churchman. It never was granted. In front of the bookcase in his office Melzer put up a strip of negatives to remind him of the time of oppression. The negatives show hundreds of pages from *Pastoral Care in Prison*, a book that once was banned.

These days, the traffic across the border presents problems of a different sort. Automobiles are illegally parked among the trees and benches of the Goerlitz municipal park because the regular parking spaces are all taken up by the early morning hours. There are regular processions of people streaming across the "bridge of peace" from Goerlitz to Zgorzelec. On the way back, they push their bicycles across the bridge and carry baskets and plastic bags of varying sizes filled with food. One-half pound of butter costs a mere 50 pfennigs on the Polish market. The transit traffic also runs across the bridge of peace in Goerlitz. On some days the line of waiting passengers cars and trucks stretches as far as the neighboring village of Loebau, 25 kilometers to the west. The people living alongside the "highway of peace" which leads to the border are plagued by exhaust fumes and noise. As a consequence, they rarely open their windows any more.

### Reconciliation Efforts Lagging

91EP0055B Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
29 Oct 90 pp 80-85

[Unattributed article: "Sacrifice Without Compensation"]

[Text] DER SCHLESIER, a purportedly "independent, all-German weekly" published in Recklinghausen, carries advertisements for "many-colored pillboxes" picturing the Breslau city hall for DM9, "navy blue ties for men" bearing the Silesian coat of arms for DM25 and a bilingual "city directory" of the onetime capital of Silesia for DM5. A 288-page book "with 50 illustrations" dealing with "the criminal expulsion of the Germans" may also be ordered for DM 38 from the weekly which bills itself as the "newsletter of the Association of German Unity for the Eastern Provinces and the Sudetenland."

Editorially, DER SCHLESIER refers to the Day of German Unity as a "day of mourning for Germany," issuing a call to tough it out. "We Silesians are not prepared to accept the ceding of our German homeland to the Polish robber nation—this super-Versailles."

The unification of "West and Central Germany," the weekly thundered last week, "this second capitulation" is being paid for with the loss of the homeland, "a give-away of 104,000 square kilometers of land" and the property of the expellees. The weekly attacks the "capitulation ideology" of the politicians in Bonn, permits rightwing historian Hellmut Diwald to rant about "politically coerced agreements" and, most recently, has even called CSU [Christian Social Union] chief Theo Waigel a "renunciation politico" because he considers the frontiers throughout Europe "increasingly permeable" and thus "more and more meaningless."

"Can the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] really do without hundreds of thousands of votes?" the weekly ominously asks.

Of course not. Helmut Kohl clearly seems worried that his party might suffer, if the expellees did not vote for it in sufficient numbers in the 2 December election. That is why he was unwilling to put his signature to a "comprehensive treaty" with Poland prior to the Bundestag election so as to be able to make the projected "new start" with Germany's eastern neighbor after unification.

It was not until the foreign ministry compromised the chancellor publicly by pointing out to him that Poland might ask the victorious World War II powers to remind the Bonn government of the obligations it entered into in the two-plus-four negotiations that he agreed to have the talks on a border agreement and a comprehensive good neighbor treaty, as promised by the Bundestag and the People's Chamber, start on 30 October in Warsaw.

The chancellor has slowed down the pace of the negotiations by informing his Polish partners much to their chagrin that the agreements will not be ready for signing until to April 1991. After all, Polish political life is also being dominated by an election campaign. As for labor leader Lech Walesa, a promising candidate in the presidential election scheduled for 25 November, he is viewed by the chancellor's office as an "unpredictable partner with whom we expect to have some fun yet."

Although the chancellor moved rapidly on unification, he continues to drag his feet both with respect to the Poles and the expellees who have long since become totally insignificant. On the one hand, he tells them that the parliamentary resolution sends the "unmistakable message that the present border between Poland and Germany is permanent. It is not being put into question by territorial claims by us Germans either now or in the future."

On the other hand, he lets his oldtime sympathizers have their way. Hartmut Koschyk, the general secretary of the expellees organization, rails against the "sacrifice of East Germany without compensation." Expellee boss Herbert Czaja, a CDU member of the Bundestag, wrote in his government-financed DEUTSCHER OSTDIENST [German East Newsletter], that the unification treaty "heedlessly made an advance payment" of one-quarter of Germany's territory. In eastern Silesia, Czaja and his cohorts are fostering the illusion that the former eastern territories would now be incorporated in the new Germany following unification.

For some time now obscure expellee functionaries have taken the German minority in eastern Silesia under their wings. The reunification of "expellees and stay-behinds" has long since been accomplished, as DIE ZEIT has written.

Horst Teltschik, Kohl's adviser, is therefore convinced that his archrivals at the foreign ministry headed by FDP [Free Democratic Party] Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher have failed and have allowed the expellee bureaucrats to take over on the scene. "Koschyk acts the part of the King of Silesia there," Teltschik says. He rails

against the "forced Polonization of the Germans." Koschyk and oldtime expellee leader Herbert Hupka are calling for obligatory German lessons at Silesian schools and above all for a "right to a homeland and to return," whatever that means.

Given these omens, the Bonn government is faced with delicate treaty talks. On 8 November Kohl will meet in Frankfurt/Oder with Poland's Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki whom he would prefer to have stay in office. Alfred Dregger, the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary caucus wants to make it known beforehand that agreement on relations between the two countries according to international law should not create "the false impression" that the Germans are prepared to condone "the expulsion," one of the "worst crimes in the history of mankind."

The curt call for an "overdue conciliatory gesture" has provoked counterreactions in Warsaw, e.g., the outstanding compensation of Polish forced laborers during the Nazi era. According to Bonn insiders, this would call for payments in the double-digit billion range. If Walesa were to play the anti-German card, "we will run into major difficulties," a Poland expert at the foreign ministry says.

To forestall this eventuality, the Bonn government decided to make a concession when it agreed in coalition talks to postpone the introduction of mandatory visas for Poles until the end of the year—against the rhetorical opposition of Bavarian Interior Minister Stoiber.

Stoiber's resistance came too late, however, because his CSU party chief, Theo Waigel, whom the expellees accuse of being a "renunciation politico" had already voiced agreement with Kohl call for "open borders."

## **POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup**

91EP0046A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 41,  
13 Oct 90 p 2

[Excerpts]

### **National News**

[passage omitted]

Wojciech Jaruzelski in an interview for RZECZPOSPOLITA: "The president can neither be a figure head nor a dictator. As regards situating the president in the tripartite division of power, it seems that the most appropriate model lies half way between the Italian and the French ones.

The Office of Monopoly Breakup has ordered the Automobile Factory in Warsaw to reduce prices beginning on 8 October 1990 to the levels of June 1990. A Polonez will cost 42.5 million zloty instead of the current 57-61 million. The factory has appealed to the courts and claims that if the decision goes against it, it will halt production and go into liquidation.

The Ministry of National Defense announced that it is interested in obtaining spare parts left by the former army of the GDR to T-72 tanks, MiG-29 aircraft, rocket launchers and rockets, helicopters, and ships.

The Senate made changes in the Sejm law changing the criminal and misdemeanor law. It decided to increase the rate for converting imprisonment into fines to 20,000-40,000 zloty per day (the Sejm, 10,000-30,000 zloty). The Senate proposed reducing the level of punishment which a collegium or policemen can exact to 100,000 zloty (in the Sejm law 250,000 and 200,000 zloty).

In a letter to A. Drawicz, president of the Radio and Television Committee, Archbishop Bronislaw Dabrowski, secretary of the Episcopate, protested against the one-sided, according to the Episcopate, report in Teleexpress and Wiadomosci on the subject of the antiabortion law. "The television reporters cannot treat television as their own media and create the impression that they and the programs they broadcast represent the opinion of all of society."

GAZETA WYBORCZA (3 October 1990) prints a long article "An Apartment for a Minister," which ends with this conclusion by Pawel Smolenski, the author: "Let the ministers explain." Since the beginning of the Mazowiecki government, 28 official apartments have been assigned; 13 belong to the positions held; the officials retained their apartments outside of Warsaw, but they live in the apartments during their term in office. Four individuals have received permanent apartments, because until they entered office they had no apartment of their own (A. Bentkowski, Anna Grzymislawska, Helena Chodkowska, and Wojciech Sawicki). Eight individuals received official apartments, but gave up their own ("however as a rule, smaller apartments were given up for larger ones"). Three individuals did not give up their apartments, but assigned them to their children. There are names.

In the press. M.F. Rakowski is directing the monthly DZIS, the first issue of which will appear in the middle of October. It will cost 9,000 zloty. NIE, a critical and satirical weekly, edited by Jerzy Urban has appeared; it costs 2,600 zloty. Thanks to financial support from the Ministry of Culture, the second issue of the quarterly REGIONY, edited by Wieslaw Mysliwski, has appeared. The issue contains fascinating "Letters from a Maid Servant in the Palace at Lancut" and a story and sketches by Wacław Solski, a recently deceased writer who lived in the United States from the end of the war. The price of an issue is 5,000 zloty. The first issue of TYGODNIK KATOWICKI—GONG has appeared; among the editors are former staff members of the defunct TAK I NIE, including the editor in chief Kazimierz Zarzycki. Price 1,500 zloty.

Four socialist groups the Polish Socialist Party [PPS] of J.J. Lipski, the Polish Socialist Party Abroad [PPS na O],

the Polish Socialist Party Provisional National Committee (PPS TKK), and the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution (PPS-RD), have adopted a joint position on the antiabortion law. The proposed senate law invades the rights of women, and the punishment of medical personal will cause illegal operations. The socialists demand a social program that would reduce the number of abortions.

Senator P. Andrzejewski sharply criticized the Liquidation Commission of the Worker's Cooperative Publishing House, in particular, for not giving the press titles to journalist cooperatives which sought them. "The arbitrary use of the law as a command and distribution directive with an implied set of cloakroom political deals is unacceptable."

The Christian Citizens' Movement, which considers itself a part of the political right, has been formed. It supports L. Walesa's candidacy for the presidency. It demands ZYCIE WARSZAWY be awarded to the opposition. "Neither the right nor the center has a national daily. In that situation, the election campaign will be a fiction," claimed W. Bogaczyk, a member of the Council of the Christian Citizens' Movement [ChRO].

The price of gasoline has increased. Beginning 5 October 1990, 94 octane will cost 3,700 zloty instead of 3,200 zloty. [passage omitted]

TRYBUNA has published an open letter from a group of higher officers of the Polish Army in defense of the memory of Marshal M. Rola-Zymierski and Gen. K. Swierczewski. Among other things, it says: "The comments of the Ministry of Justice and of the prosecutor general on television on 10 September 1990 disqualifying morally, among others, Marshal of Poland Michal Rola-Zymierski not only display a poor understanding of the law and reflect poorly on the sense of responsibility of the minister, but they also opened the way to such scandalous comments as the title of a note in GAZETA WYBORCZA of 11 September 1990 entitled "Walter and Rola—Murderers." Among the signatories of the letter are Gen. Arms Zygmunt Huszcz, Jozef Kaminski, and Franciszek Ksiezarczyk. [passage omitted]

The fare for a regular bus or street car in Warsaw is 600 zloty. The Council of Warsaw made the decision at the request of the Municipal Transportation Establishment. The fare for express and suburban routes will be 1,200 zloty; the night fare is 2,400 zloty. The fares go into effect on 2 November 1990. [passage omitted]

### Opinions

[passage omitted]

*Jaroslav Kaczynski, leader of the Center Accord:*

(From a comment during a meeting in Nowy Sacz, GAZETA KRAKOWSKA 2 October 1990)

"I blocked the broadcast of the [television] program "100 Questions For" in which I participated because of

another blatant interference by the authorities of the Radio and Television Committee with my comments. This time all elements critical of Adam Michnik were "cut out." ... In order to oppose GAZETA WYBORCZA, the propaganda forum of Citizens Movement—Democratic Action (ROAD), we are seeking to gain control of EXPRESS WIECZORNY. We have received initial assurances that this daily will be given to us."

*Bishop Adam Lupa:*

(NIEDZIELA 7 October 1990)

"Other actions by some journalists augmenting the information woolliness is their excessive emphasis in the mass media on the voluntariness of catechism at school, the fact that it is an elective. One gets the impression that the most important thing in the return of religious instruction to schools is that it is not obligatory. To be sure, the complete voluntariness in deciding to participate in catechism at school was guaranteed. Nevertheless, that does not mean that religious instruction in schools is totally outside of the realm of duty or is beyond duty. It is not a 'non-duty' in every respect! A Catholic's participation (solid, responsible) in catechism is a moral duty of great importance. A true teaching does not excuse pupils from their duties and is not afraid of duty. A teaching fazed by a duty is not a teaching, but an entertainment in education. An flustered teaching leads over time to a permissive society, in which there are no limits and everything is possible.

"Thus, the issue of duty cannot be completely excluded from considerations of catechism in schools."

## YUGOSLAVIA

### **Tudjman on U.S. Visit, New Croatian Constitution**

91BA0091A Split NEDELJNA DALMACIJA  
in Serbo-Croatian 7 Oct 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, by Josip Jovic; place and date not given: "I Do Not Lose My Nerve in a Difficult Situation"]

[Text] During his entire trip through America, where for 12 days he led the Croatian state delegation on a visit to political representatives of the United States and Canada and to Croatian emigres, Dr. Franjo Tudjman was not only the big star and main figure, but also a person of absolutely the best physical condition, he did not complain in the least of fatigue in spite of the strenuous trips, constant speeches, conversations, and maximum concentration. Such fitness, I believe, is possible only in people with military discipline, involvement in sports, and profound belief in what they are doing.

Assuming nevertheless that even the president is a man exhausted at the very end of his trip and that on his return there would be a press conference waiting for him

in front of the TV cameras, on the flight from Zurich to Zagreb I asked him to answer four or five of my questions. He said I could even make it six, and as it turned out there were more than that. An important function of the visit to America was to mark down the new Croatia on the diplomatic maps of the world, that is, to become directly involved in international political relations. These were pioneering steps of Croatian foreign policy. At the beginning of the interview, I asked President Tudjman to evaluate his visit to the North American continent from that standpoint.

"I think it is no exaggeration to say that we achieved more than we could have anticipated under the circumstances. It should be mentioned that we registered complete unity of the Croatian emigre community and the new government in the effort to build a new Croatian state. It was also important to familiarize the world public with Croatian and Yugoslav problems. We were pleasantly surprised by the conceptions of our situation held by representatives of parliamentary and government life in both Canada and the United States. Likewise, by the support to the democratic government of Croatia and its effort to establish a democratic system."

[Jovic] In America, our people really perceived you as a new "father of the homeland," to the last man. I wonder how you perceive that role, is it not too heavy?

[Tudjman] Well, there is no question that it is a heavy one, that responsibility flows from it, but it also offers me an opportunity to speak openly even about very delicate matters, to point to certain things which are unreasonable even when it seems that the time is not right. And when 95 percent of our people feel this to be correct, then I feel it to be both a satisfaction and a pledge that we will have the support of the people in solving the economic and all other problems and in the development of democracy.

[Jovic] In America you were constantly dogged by bad rumors about the situation in Croatia. Was this not also related to your visit on the other continent and diplomatic activity?

[Tudjman] This is only a continuation of the scenario of destabilizing power in Croatia by creating unrest and by provoking the necessity of military intervention. In this case, the provocations were intensified even more in order to cast a shadow on democratic power in Croatia and to provide grounds for hegemonistic-unitaristic regulation of future relations, but even for disintegration of Yugoslavia to the benefit of Serbian expansionist programs. This evoked great bitterness and concern on the part of our emigre community as well as in official American circles. It was in fact the initiative of the emigre community that we should undertake to create volunteer detachments to defend democracy if democracy and Croatia are threatened. I hope that that will not be necessary. But if such provocations continue, if Croatian sovereignty and integrity are threatened, then such movements of the Croatian emigre community



would be important not only in the sense of direct aid, but they would also arouse the public there to support democracy and the defense of the freedom of people and the nationality.

[Jovic] In spite of the disturbing news, you did not interrupt your stay in America, which means that you were not excessively worried by all the reports reaching you?

[Tudjman] I do not have a habit of losing my nerve in a difficult situation. Incidentally, we had been told that the attempt at destabilization, which began in Knin, would be carried from one place to another. Accordingly, this is not anything new; that was also an attempt to divert attention from the events in Kosovo and to portray the system in Croatia in a wrong light at a moment when we are explaining to the world the real nature of the changes that have occurred in our homeland.

[Jovic] After you, Bush also received Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, who on that occasion stressed the interest of a unified Yugoslavia.

[Tudjman] The American position is clear, it was also stated to us. They are in favor of the Yugoslavia we agree on, but they are against any solution imposed forcibly. The fact that we were received by Bush and placed a wreath in Arlington Cemetery, where wreaths are placed only by chiefs of state, signifies that they recognize us as a state and that any forcible resolution of the problem and imposition of solutions that went against us would be taken as aggression against a sovereign state. When Jovic expressed his position in favor of a unified Yugoslavia, Loncar corrected him, saying that the reference here was to unity in a geographic sense. As far as the meeting of Jovic with Bush is concerned, I want to say that the American President first refused that visit, which Jovic explained by saying that he had to return to the country, and then this was followed by protest to the American ambassador about our being received, and Soviet diplomats intervened because they want to see a unified Yugoslavia in view of the tendencies of their own republics to separate.

[Jovic] The new Croatian Constitution, according to certain announcements, introduces the presidential system as an essential element of the new constitution?

[Tudjman] It is not a presidential, but semipresidential system on the French model. This is a system which has shown itself to be the most effective in the European context. And we have no need to seek any sort of specific solution or to go down any pseudodemocratic roads as has been the case up to now. We want the kind of democracy we are familiar with in Europe, the kind that is seen in France, Germany, Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and so on. We want a constitution that will be a lasting one. By involving our experts, the broad public, and foreign specialists, we will adopt the constitution that will respond to this moment of history. Allow me to mention that there are those who naively think that we should arrive at the constitution by absolute consensus,

which has never been the case in any country. The constitution will be an expression of broad public debate and will express the will of the majority. This is not the constitution of a multinational country, but the constitution of one republic. There may be differing opinions of parties, groups, and individuals, but ultimately there must be the majority will of the people. The will of the majority is at the foundation of democracy, but along with protection of the minority.

[Jovic] The specific historical situation of the creation of Croatian statehood has, I believe, led to the conception of a semipresidential system, as you call it, or was at least an additional reason for that.

[Tudjman] Well that is also true. The French system also arose out of that situation and a period which bore the imprint of the goal, but it has also proven to be absolutely suitable and effective for other conditions as well.

### Serb Writer Sees 'Dark Days' if Milosevic Wins

91BA0029A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 2 Oct 90 pp 20-22

[Interview with leading Serbian intellectual Bogdan Bogdanovic by Jelena Lovric; place and date not given: "A Life Encircled by Lies"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] An architect and writer, one of the leading Serbian intellectuals, on the deception of children, on anticommunists as Bolsheviks turned upside down, on monuments and names as monuments, on paying homage to Islam and to the Jesuits, on withdrawing into pre-Balkan, universally human times, on rewarding denouncers, on Milosevic as the executor of the Memorandum, on the nation that knows that things are slipping into war with Kosovo.

Bogdan Bogdanovic, one of the leading Serbian intellectuals, an architect and writer whose books will probably be as enduring as his monuments, an artist of worldwide renown, lately has had no room for his work, precisely at a moment when he was supposed to be completing several important manuscripts being awaited by publishers on this side of the border and beyond. He has been rudely expelled from the studio that he had in an old school in the town of Popovic, in Belgrade district. Today, he is moving all that he cannot do without into an inconvenient, smallish Belgrade apartment. But this is not the only reason for our interview. We have just marked the three-year anniversary of the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, during which Bogdanovic wrote a letter to the leadership of his then-party, providing an early glimpse of the spirit of Orthodoxy, which then exploded onto the political scene with unprecedented fury and exclusivism, like the type of fanaticism that used to be wielded in religious and internecine wars. Because of this brilliant political text, this man—who in terms of his family lineage and personal baggage is unquestionably a



national eminence—has experienced numerous problems, which are apparently not over yet.

[Lovric] Three years ago, you told me in an interview that “there is no time left for anything other than the truth.” Does it not seem to you that the need for the truth is even greater today than it was at that time?

[Bogdanovic] Politics has developed an entire system of delusions and semblances, and two years ago I concluded my book *Mrtvouvize* [Dead Threads] with the statement that we are heading into a civilization of lies. Unfortunately, at this moment we are already in a subcivilization of lies; I am thinking especially of the setting in which I live, but I believe that we are not the only ones. It is strange the extent to which nothing is what it is presented as, how much not even one fact is certain, not even one news report is completely accurate. Right now, I am looking at the debate surrounding the Serbian Constitution, and every position disguises some form of deceit. We Serbs are being impudently, shamelessly served up a monarchical, reactionary constitution under the guise of democracy and national diversity. This is going so far that people are simply refusing to look, to read. The other day, at the parties’ round table, the representative of a nationalist party, talking about who was against Serbs in the last war, mentioned Tito, Bakaric, and Frane Supilo. For crying out loud, what ignorance! They know nothing, they lack normal schooling. But this superficial, quite conspicuous class of lies will then be followed by a profound class of lying, where lies become increasingly subtle, increasingly sophisticated, they lay siege to the intellect, to human souls, they affect the world of emotions. What worries me in particular—because I have spent my entire life with young people, with school children—is the dangerous influence of this corrosion of lies on children. They are confused, they do not know anything else. They are surrounded by execrable and absurd packs of lies, they are forced into the worlds of concocted history, of some reshaped national memory, and I will not use the word myth, because myths are too serious and deep-seated for what is besieging us.

[Lovric] Precisely because your assessment does not apply only to Serbia, why do you think there is this incursion of lies, and where does it come from?

[Bogdanovic] If I were to return to the vocabulary of the Bolshevik days, I would say that today nationalism is the last resort of Bolshevism. It is telling that at the moment when this extreme, I won’t say utopianism, but rather extreme monstrous design of the world is beginning to crumble, its most stubborn believers are ending up in even more virulently extreme positions, in a religious and national frenzy. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems to me that the nationalism found throughout the entire Eastern bloc is being set in motion primarily by former NKVD [People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs] officials, by the police, from those centers of orthodoxy, from the most inflexible nucleus. I don’t know whether this has been consciously arranged as a possible final

defense of these absurd theories or if it is spontaneous, but in the final analysis it is of no consequence.

[Lovric] You mention Bolshevism. To make sure there is no misunderstanding here: Is it possible to speak of Bolshevism within that which presents itself as anticommunism?

[Bogdanovic] Of course. We are talking here about models of thinking. Even if it has been turned inside out—there has been no fundamental change. One must change the way of thinking, constructions, language, images, metaphors; in short, one must be a different person. And that is by no means easy. This is why the anticommunists are simply Bolsheviks turned upside down. They are simply like sleeping bats: The head is at the lower end, but everything else is absolutely the same. They even have the same style, the same vehemence with which they attack and defend things, the same feeling of superiority, the conviction that faith is on their side, the ideology that gives them the right to aggressively defend their ideas and to tear down others. The mental, characterological type has not changed, it has just gained a different insignia. We live in a dreadful time in which there is no place for skepticism, for irony, for distance. In the past, you could not question the value of social postulates, and now you cannot call into question the value of national eminences. The attitude towards history is symmetrical to the previous attitude towards class. History has been hypostatized, you can’t make fun of it or make jokes about it at the expense of national heroes. Nations with great histories laugh at everything and everyone from their own past. A nation that does not have the strength to stay at a distance from history, that cannot adopt an ironic attitude towards it—that nation should not have a history, because history will be dangerous to it. In that case, history is poison.

[Lovric] In a certain sense, your architecture is linked to history—your monuments are inspired by the people’s liberation struggle. You once told me that there are around 12,000 different monuments and landmarks to the people’s liberation struggle in Yugoslavia and that a large part of these will not withstand the test of time.

[Bogdanovic] I think that a fair number of them from that time have already become decrepit. Whether or not people will start violently tearing them down remains to be seen. Ever since my first monument, to the Jewish victims in Belgrade which I have been building for 50 some years, I have been aware of the relative nature of monuments. They have never been what the generation that erects them thinks, stubbornly hoping to leave behind their own signature, a mark of their performance, of their image of themselves. Afterwards, the monument becomes something else, it has its own life, and only indirectly indicates its pretext and original inspiration. This is true of church architecture as well. When I arrive in Samarkand, I can’t help but pay homage to Islam. I like Baroque, and when I recall that this is a Jesuit style, I take off my hat to the Jesuits as well. The language of architecture and the meaning of shapes are different

from what is generally thought when one sets out to build monuments. One must wait for this fever of challenges to pass, perhaps 10 years or so, and that part of them that is nonetheless worthwhile will endure as the form, will remain as the monument, and will only indirectly bear witness to the intentions of those who erected it, while at the same time it will in a certain sense be something more. As we say about those before us: They have created beautiful things for us. Last year, when I received the Piranezj Prize for the monument in Vukovar, I think that the international jury didn't even ask what that monument denotes, they only looked at what it connotes. And while we are talking about denotation and connotation, it is once again a general sickness of our time that we want to give a denotation to everything and arrive at a single meaning. But everything has multiple meanings.

[Lovric] Do you think that these monuments in the new age must create a new legitimacy according to which they can endure?

[Bogdanovic] Absolutely. But they can create this legitimacy only by force of what they communicate, through their internal logic of signs and symbols, through which they fit into what would be called anthropological memory. As far as they touch on the continuity of human remembrance—to that extent they will find their place in time. As far as my monuments are concerned, I have been aware of this from the outset, and for that reason I have continually searched for archaic figures, symbols, figuring that our Yugoslavia is so complex and complicated that it is better to turn to some pre-Balkan, universally human times. For my own needs, as an apology for my monuments, I have constructed an expression of anthropological remembrance. The majority of my monuments are linked to real execution sites, to cemeteries, to actual places where victims suffered, while all monuments, monuments that are associated with the act of death, also talk, on some second or third level, about this extrahistorical, superhistorical fate of man, about his birth, life, and death and about his distinctions between good and evil.

[Lovric] Precisely because the majority of your monuments are linked to tragedy of victims, I think that you are the right person to tell what you think about the renaming of Victims of Fascism Square in Zagreb.

[Bogdanovic] It is incomprehensible to me. There must be discussion about the meaning of this syntagma and about this space, the topos that was symbolically labeled with that name. It is a monument, regardless of the fact that it is defined by words. The concept of fascism in our country, like numerous other things, has been narrowed down; it still existed—not to offend those who fought against it—but it was simple: The death of fascism meant freedom for the people. But it was in fact the horrible evil of the 20th century that extended long tentacles into the human soul and human understanding. Entire generations are victims of fascism. My friends from school who gave up their lives, some as Chetniks,

some as Ljoticites, some as partisans—all of them were victims of fascism. Its victims also included the young men at Stalingrad. This is why I do not see how the normal human brain can take back a name like that, to say nothing of certain implications that could arise only then. I do not understand that. And furthermore, I do not think that it's good to fool around with a city's toponymy. As far as I know, that square got its name completely peacefully, spontaneously, a name that historically speaking was obviously well-established in a certain sense. Changing it now is not good as far as the principle is concerned either. For years I have fought in Belgrade for the preservation of the toponymy, which has bothered some people to a certain extent. But these names are inviolable, they are just as solid as monuments as are those that are made of stone. As president of the Belgrade Assembly, I said in an interview with OKO that it bothers me that there is no Viceroy Jelacic at Republic Square in Zagreb. I even played with it a little: Why not him if Belgrade can have a King Michael? I propose that the people of Zagreb could regard their Jelacic with the same sweet, good-natured irony with which we regard our Michael. This opinion was censored, it was not published. And this is the same story and the same mistake: Just as Viceroy Jelacic is inviolable, the Victims of Fascism Square should not be done away with. But I hope that this decision will be revoked, because I do not see how it can remain in force.

[Lovric] Are you afraid for your monuments in this destructive era? There have been proposals to tear some of them down. Right now, you have no studio, which has in fact made it impossible for you to work. How do you explain what is happening to you? It is probably not coincidental.

[Bogdanovic] It cannot be coincidental. It dates from the Eighth Session, from the letter that I wrote to my party at the time. Since then, there have been judgments, letters, name-calling—for example, one mentally unbalanced woman demanded in the newspaper that I be exiled from Belgrade, that was a little before Raskovic. If I tell you that she is now the manager of a factory in Mladenovac, then it all becomes clear. For the most part, attacks on me have been rewarded. Well-paid. Apartments have been meted out for letters to the editor: Blazo Perovic, who was among the first to spit at me, was paid with 150 square meters. I have been very expensive to my homeland, my immediate homeland and my city. If you add up everything that has been paid to people who have denounced me, it is an enormous amount. In a certain sense, I could be proud of this, but this money could have been used more sensibly. I think that this outlay corresponds to that which would be necessary to publish my collected works.

[Lovric] It is obvious that the people who ordered this have their own priorities. We are talking now exactly three years after the Eighth Session, which is the landmark event in the destruction of Yugoslavia, and around three years since you wrote your letter to the Central Committee of your former party as your sort of squaring

of accounts with them. You said at the time that you had to write that letter in order to defend your own personal honor. It seems to me that at the same time, by presenting the bitter truth, you also splendidly defended the honor of the nation of people to whom you belong. Although you were not gentle, I think that the nation to whom you wrote can be happy, because it is better off than those people who do not have the authority to tell the truth about themselves. But I actually want to ask you how you now, three years later, regard everything that happened then.

[Bogdanovic] Thank you for these words, they are precious to me, because my motives were in part patriotic, although they were primarily personal. That letter helped me a great deal. For the first time I addressed my party on a personal level, eye to eye, and perhaps my nation as well. Everything else is in fact a result of this initial outspokenness. That letter for me was like discarding certain acts, discarding certain compulsions forced on me in behavior, in thought. It's funny that I myself am talking about it, but that is the strongest argument that they can use in these years, and after that letter I was 10 years younger, I found myself, I was able to talk to myself more gently and with greater certainty. I think that it was later and later that I became stirred up by that act of liberation.

And as far as the Eighth Session is concerned, I am among those who were lumped together at the time into the—as they have often called us since then—defeated forces. But today one should look at who the actual defeated forces are. Today, it is likely that defeat has been suffered by those who at the time started dismantling Yugoslavia. The defeat is being suffered by those who for three years have done nothing, but instead have made everything dreadfully worse. If that Eighth Session had not taken place, our situation in Kosovo would in any event be more auspicious. There was the basis and disposition for some more reasonable solution. To say nothing of the fact that there would not be this baneful isolation of Serbia, this spiritual, intellectual isolation, because you know that our psyches today—I say our, because even now I must still include myself here—are sequestered, we have isolated ourselves. And that is what our young people will be forced to endure, they will bear that load. But unlike in past years when the anniversary of that session was marked, the then-victors are no longer mentioned now. Because now it is not easy for them to remember it. That extremely rigid Marxist line from that time—now, as Socialists, they are construing something different. If their recitals at the time about saving the achievements of the revolution are compared with what they are saying now, then it is a frightening somersault defying explanation. In principle, they are telling the same story, they have just skipped over a few words while everything else is the same. As far as I can see, this Socialist Party of Serbia has gathered together the acme of the nomenclature, the *creme de la creme* of the party apparatus, which means party careerists.

[Lovric] What do you think of the idea that the Memorandum line carried the day at the Eighth Session?

[Bogdanovic] That is more or less clear. I think that some day, when the causes of the Serbian tragedy are being discussed, the culprits will include more writers than politicians. Writers can and must write what they want, they have rhetoric at their disposal, but once irresponsible and fantastic rhetoric starts to flow into politics, the result is a catastrophe. Milosevic is the number two culprit, the number one culprits are those who have provided him with his intellectual base of support. If we turn to fascism, looking for its roots, then we will find them just as much among intellectuals as among its executors. Milosevic is in some measure the executor. He is unoriginal. He is like a talking political being—because we cannot speak of him as a thinking political being—the product of the Memorandum climate, Memorandum philosophy, and even the direct Memorandum apparatus.

[Lovric] What is your view of the possibility of resolving the Kosovo question?

[Bogdanovic] Today, it is clearly high time for someone who has authority in the Serbian nation—if such a person exists—to tell the truth about Kosovo, to say what we can do there, what we cannot do, what we may do, what we may not do, so that we can adopt a common position towards this question like any normal contemporary nation adopts a position. You are now seeing praise for this migration of Serbs. It is still very unclear what they are being told, what is being related, there is once again talk of some drama, some tragedy, as we Serbs are and have been somewhat heavily hit by the fate of curses and blows of history, and as we left impoverished Kosovo to go into richer regions and began to displace, say, Hungarians. We need some things to give rise to elementary historical justice; yes, we left Kosovo 200 or 300 years ago, but we settled regions where we were not in the majority. This means that there is some balance. And it should in fact be explained to the people that Kosovo is where the pawns of our national identity are, our talismans, but the Greeks' talismans as well are primarily outside of Greece, in Asia Minor, from Alexandria to Syria. This must be placed in a contemporary context. Knowing Albanians to be a proud people, I am confident that they—if we did not feud with them, if we were not now undisguised enemies to them—would not only protect these sacred places, but that perhaps some other solution could be found as well, some sort of enclave, oasis, a sort of Holy Mountain.

[Lovric] You are not the first person to talk to me about someone who should tell the Serbian nation the truth...

[Bogdanovic] Yes, we should have someone like de Gaulle. But where do we find him?

[Lovric] ... but at the same time you add that such a man would probably be condemned at the very outset?

[Bogdanovic] I think that he would be terribly assailed, stigmatized, devastated, but that everyone would listen to him and feel relieved. I believe that relief would be felt even by those who maintain that Kosovo will be resettled by Serbs, who are carried away by senseless things, and that relief would be felt most of all by the nation, because it, after all, feels that things with Kosovo are sliding into an ever-worsening situation, towards war. We are already talking about war. There is already talk in Serbia about war. The nation knows this. But the nation also knows that if it comes to civil war or a real war, the ones killed will not be the people wearing military caps and cockades and singing songs in the coffee houses; rather, the ones killed will be the children, who are always killed in wars. This is why I believe that such words would bring relief, but right now that has gone so far that it is hard to fathom. But that is how it must be brought to an end, no other way is possible. What Milosevic is doing right now in Kosovo is hopeless, because most of all he is doing nothing, he is simply cracking heads and sending in the police. Thus, there are no prospects for us.

[Lovric] But doesn't Milosevic's last statement, which was very conciliatory, in fact constitute a move towards that type of resolution?

[Bogdanovic] If it is a move towards that type of resolution, he is not a man who can put it into effect. He has nothing more to seek there, and he himself knows that. It is true that the statement was enigmatic, I wouldn't know how to interpret it, perhaps he is aware that his policy has failed or is simply maneuvering with regard to some further negotiations in Yugoslavia. Blood has been spilled, and the man who has permitted blood to be spilled and who has continually called for more blood-letting cannot now offer a conciliatory hand. It would be necessary for him to read all of Slobodan Jovanovic in order for him to see the entire farce of the Serbian political struggles and that which Jovanovic called little big people. Even before him, Serbia has had little people who were placed in a situation in which they were supposed to act like big people, but are unable to.

[Lovric] Times like these are not propitious for reasonable people, to the extent that the need for them is greater. You have said that intellectuals have in fact not distinguished themselves in this sense and this is common to all our surroundings. In your opinion, is there any intellectual force in Serbia that could shoulder the responsibility and put forth a peaceful resolution?

[Bogdanovic] I circulate in a circle of like-minded people who have been very vocal, but we are a minority. Writing the letter three years ago, I made a mistake by showing in its entire tone that I rely on the intelligentsia of Belgrade. But there you have it: They beat Mirko Kovic's head in, the man even died, before that Pekic was beaten, and before that they beat up Micunovic. My country is fond of beatings, on the level of King Milos, the Milos who primarily beat up literate people—and no one raises their voice. This is something that cannot be explained.

We all know that intellectuals are in various ways dependent on the authorities, but this type of indolence is unacceptable.

[Lovric] Do you have a very pessimistic disposition?

[Bogdanovic] It's alternating optimism and pessimism. The optimism amounts to the hope that there will in fact be an end to the screeching and singing, but without gunfire, while pessimism says that war is inevitable. Pessimism with regard to the Serbian domain also amounts to fear that when all is said and done we will find ourselves with the very minimum through Milosevic's policy, that we will actually end up as a Belgrade pashaluk. Things with Vojvodina are not going and will not go like he thinks, Kosovo is beyond consideration, and with Montenegro things will likewise not go according to his plan, and we will find ourselves with a national minimum. Milosevic will be guilty of the national catastrophe, and I emphasize national. You know, I am in a strange situation: As my struggle against nationalism continues, I increasingly feel certain nationalistic impulses inside me, I am increasingly concerned about the fate of my nation, and I am increasingly aware of its tragedy. I feel some sort of suffering, anguish because of what my Serbian nation is shouldering today, a burden that is essentially being loaded on by minor, aggressive politicians.

[Lovric] Some time ago, you said that the possibility of a repeat of the Romanian tragedy cannot be ruled out in Serbia.

[Bogdanovic] Many people think that. Three countries in the Balkans—all three, coincidentally or not, Orthodox—are today perplexed and confounded by the same model: Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Whether this is part of some greater world pattern that we do not understand, the roots and origins of which we cannot decipher, I don't know, but if Milosevic carries the day now—and I assume that he will carry the day—then there are dark days ahead as we face the evil Serbian 19th century. I think that this nationalist, populist drama of Serbia began long before Milosevic, it began with the victory of the radicals in Serbia, when they subverted the progressive party and the party of industrialists. Then there is the eternal Serbian dilemma between East and West, which has its roots in the Middle Ages and in the last century was reflected by the two dynasties, one turned towards Central Europe and the other Russophile. This division still exists, not only in tradition, but also in human souls. It is not pleasant to find yourself in the same bloc as Romania and Bulgaria.

[Lovric] Through your letter you wanted to shake up your nation. You did not succeed. A final question: Don't you think that the Serbian nation right now is still not very shaken up by everything that has happened to it in recent times?

[Bogdanovic] If you say that this is the final question, then I must give a final response as well. I have thought about this for a long time, but you have to clench your

teeth, gather up your courage, and say it clearly: I am afraid that the Serbian nation will not sober up until after the catastrophe. Some Serbian catastrophe. I no longer think that the lunacy of a wrong-minded Serbian policy, in fact Milosevic's policy—because I don't want to link him with Serbs, and in the end I have the right to question whether or not he is even a real Serb—can throw all of Yugoslavia into chaos. But that it can do that to Serbia—of that I have no doubt. Serbia could be pushed into a civil war with the Albanians, or even into a general war with the Albanians. That is dreadful. These are horrifying prospects, but I am afraid that this will be the only possible way to sober up. Whether you deem this too drastic for publication... Let it be said nevertheless, because ultimately it will no longer be permissible to remain silent.

### **Programs of Serbian Candidates Presented**

*91BA0088A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 2 Nov 90  
pp 34-36*

[Article by Toma Džadžić: "This Is What We Have To Recommend Ourselves"]

[Text]

### **Favorites and Stepchildren of the State**

**Zivan Haravan, president of the Social Justice Party, Belgrade**

Our party program is actually a somewhat updated reincarnation of the demands of the 1968 student movement and is based on social welfare policy, since certain social strata have always been on the margin of society's attention. These are individuals whose social welfare is threatened, all disabled persons (except military disabled), private farmers, production workers, the unemployed, intellectuals who did not serve the ruling party, pensioners.... In our program, we offer specific solutions for changing the attitude of the state toward each of these social strata.

We see the solution in an altered order of priorities. The state has had its stepchildren, but also its favorites such as the state bureaucracy and political bureaucracy, the entire apparatus from local communities to the republic administration. Veterans, for example, have been favorites of the state as a separate category of citizens privileged under the Constitution. These favorites, as we see it, would have to become poorer so that the standard of living of other strata of society might improve.

In that rigorous alteration of social relations, in reducing the cost of the state, that immense apparatus supported by the workers and peasants, we see a way of restoring the faith of both production workers and peasants, faith in the state, thereby bringing about conditions for a rise of productivity, economic efficiency....

The principal premise on which we base our program is the fact that the state owes every citizen elementary

conditions for his existence and guarantees him the dignity of a human being. Today, however, there are already people going through garbage cans....

As for our political position, the first sentence in our section about the State of Serbia differs essentially from the way Article 1 of the Serbian Constitution reads. We see Serbia as the national state of the Serbian people, which is the only historically justified and fair way to put it. But Serbia is also the state of its citizens, who are equal before the Constitution and the law.

As we see it, only Serbs would vote on issues of direct interest to the Serbian people, which has its own state. For example, if a leader of our party became president of Serbia, we would hold a referendum in which only the Serbian people in Serbia would vote on whether they want a monarchy or some other form of rule.

The present statement contained in Article 1 of the Constitution to the effect that Serbia is a state of citizens is a transparent maneuver of the ruling party to represent itself in the eyes of Europe and the world as a civilized and progressive party even if it does so at the price of a withering away of the state of the Serbian people. Under the Serbian Constitution, the Serbian State no longer exists.

As for the system of government, if Yugoslavia remains a federation, which we doubt, we accept the present borders. But if a confederation comes into being or certain federal units secede, we demand revision of the borders between the units.

The Republic of Serbia, as we conceive it, is a sovereign state with two autonomous cultural entities—Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina.

We are in favor of professional service in the armed forces after the regular military service, but at the soldier's free choice, the entire purpose being to create a capable and responsive human military potential with a continuous supply of equipment.

In our programs, the courts are a completely independent and self-sufficient institution (this is also true of the other sensitive departments with specific activities and powers), and conditions would be brought about in Serbia so that citizens could publicly state their personal experiences with the practice of all those departments without fear for their own personal integrity if any of them has in any way been witness to the improper or immoral action of those institutions.

We perhaps take a layman's view of solving economic problems, but if the government took a different attitude toward the privileged strata of society on behalf of those others, conditions would be created for restoring faith in work, in creativity, in productivity, in economic efficiency....

### **The Largest Possible Importation of Capital**

**Vladimir Marjanovic, president of the "Davidovic-Grol" Democratic Party, Belgrade**

Our party's main goal is to achieve the classic freedoms in all areas of life.

The party preaches Yugoslavism, it takes the position that the Army should be unified for the entire country, but depoliticized, since parties change, and the Army remains and should preserve the country.

We are in favor of a federal system. Although the party has a Yugoslav orientation, we feel that Serbs should nevertheless stand up and be counted and be prepared, since the times are uncertain.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, we favor rigorous application of the principle of a law-governed state, and that immediately. All leaders in Kosovo should be replaced if they have shown even the slightest indication that they are separatists. All Albanians who have moved in since 1941 should be deported if they have not legally taken citizenship. And all property taken away from anyone in Kosovo should certainly be returned as soon as possible.

In the case of those separatists who for one reason or another we cannot deport, we would demand that the state set them apart and bring them under the law, and in any case it should move them somewhere outside of Kosovo-Metohija: to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Sumadija.... The only Albanians we should talk to are those who have committed themselves to Yugoslavia and Serbia.

As for the economy, we favor both private and government property, but most of all we favor the largest possible importation of foreign capital so that we can open up new jobs here and begin to bring back our workers from abroad.

### **A Flow of Manpower in the Opposite Direction**

**Jovan Cebic, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Socialist Democratic Party, Belgrade**

Our program is actually a renaissance of democratic socialism in Yugoslavia: We are fighting for preservation of Yugoslavia on the federal principle as a state of the fraternal nationalities and ethnic minorities within it. For us, the basis of the system is actually man, the citizen, not the nationality or ethnic minority.

We are against the deposits of the past: bureaucracy, tyranny, bribery, corruption, and we are in favor of humane democratic socialism in Yugoslavia. We are also in favor of forming a people's court in order to condemn the harmfulness of the personality cult and all those who maintain the cult of Josip Broz.

We feel that the National Liberation War and revolution were honorable and honest and that the revolution was magnificent and belonged to the people. That is why we

are demanding that the personality cult be separated from the personality and also the personality from the masses, that is, that followers of the personality cult be separated from the masses.

We are interested in the development of small business, especially in rural areas. An infrastructure should be built for that purpose in rural areas: roads, outpatient clinics, the electric power network, telephone service.... This is the way to turn the flow of manpower in the opposite direction back toward rural areas and toward Mother Earth. The land is the state's greatest capital resource.

We also favor development of small business in the city, but only that small business which brings a quick profit.

By contrast with a majority of the other parties, we favor development of all forms of ownership, including social ownership. That is why we are against the program of Ante Markovic, who wants social property sold off. To us, social property is public property or state property, since this is the property of all creators and all producers of Yugoslavia's material and cultural goods.

We want the person who has done the most to produce and create material and cultural goods to bear the least taxation and also to have benefits in importing production supplies.

We favor the development of science and formation of separate institutes at state expense and also the financing of gifted school children and university students who would take jobs in those institutes instead of going abroad.

Under our program, all nationalities in Yugoslavia are equal, and the citizen is the basis of everything. Under those conditions, we hope that there will neither be ethnic conflicts nor bickering, and even the Albanians in Kosovo will not be demanding a separate republic.

### **We Provide Immediate Help**

**Tomislav Krsmanovic, general secretary of the Movement for Protection of Human Rights in Yugoslavia—Human Rights Party of Yugoslavia, Belgrade**

The Movement for Protection of Human Rights in Yugoslavia is a political party for human rights in Yugoslavia. Our basic goal is protecting citizens whose rights are threatened. We offer protection immediately. We hope that we will be much more effective if one of us is elected to representative bodies. Our principal task there will be to investigate every complaint of a violation of human rights and to help, so that they do not end up in the wastebasket as has been the case up to now. We also want to make it known that human rights are being violated on a large scale. The privileged political minority in Serbia is exploiting and disenfranchising the Serbian majority which does not belong, but it is cleverly trying to conceal this. It is using even the sufferings of the Serbian nationality in Kosovo, Croatia, and elsewhere to

divert attention to this from the serious social situation and rampant violations of human rights and to represent itself as the protector of the Serbian people, while in reality it is exploiting it and in the general melee dealing with anyone who challenges it. A large number of "saviors" and "messiahs" of the Serbian people from another nationality are emerging, but they do not speak about how the Serbian people has been disenfranchised by its own bureaucracy. They are silent about this, unfortunately, out of careerist motives or they are prevented from seeing this by their own bank accounts, handsome villas, luxury apartments, positions, and titles.

It is time to put on the agenda the issue of the Serbian people menaced by other nationalities and its own bureaucracy.

The movement has an up-to-date program which covers the following sections: General Principles, Human Rights and Freedoms, The Nationality Question and Kosovo, The Political System and System of Government, The Economic System and the Economy, Education and Culture, Social Welfare Policy, The Environment, Woman and the Family, Children and Young People, The Birth Rate, and so on. The movement has been protecting individuals since 1975 and is made up of people of diverse occupations—from university professors to workers and peasants; 85 percent are Serbs. The movement played an important role in development of the fight for human rights. Other parties have also written down human rights, but through reforms, which could take a while. The movement helps people immediately—they are not able to wait.

#### **A Condition of Survival**

**Dr. Vladimir Kilibarda, professor, National Concord Party, Belgrade**

The National Concord Party makes its appearance on the political stage following several decades of Stalinist monism.

The main objective of the National Concord Party is constant concern about harmony and the manifold benefit, above all of citizens of the Republic of Serbia and other regions inhabited by the Serbian nationality, as well as all the other nationalities and ethnic minorities which have made a social and moral decision to live with the Serbian people in sincere relations of tolerance, mutual understanding, solidarity, and respect of each other's right to be different.

The National Concord Party is a party that brings nationalities (and citizens) together, which helps to shape and reconcile the authentic and strategic interests of peoples and citizens, a party which without discrimination brings together that human and ethnic potential that looks toward the most competent and effective handling of ethnic and social affairs, a party which is fighting against the current hysteria that is nationalizing the people's identity and the citizen's rights and freedoms. The National Concord Party despises the

pathology of statesmen looking to nationalistic resolution of the nationality question, and it conceives the right to equality exclusively as the right of free and equal people to be different.

In that sense, the National Concord Party is turned toward man and open to every citizen, establishing a respectful attitude toward all other political parties, striving in its practice of free political communication to prove the superiority of its program. Openness to the differences in the ethnic characteristics of its members so as to bring them together without discrimination is an expression of the belief of the National Concord Party that ethnic freedom is only a prerequisite of the true freedom of man as a citizen. The all-encompassing character of the National Concord Party is an expression of a desire to impart to the present ethnic, social, and party conflicts and exclusiveness a maximum of reasonableness, goodwill, historical intelligence, and a desire for harmony as a condition of survival.

#### **The Serbian Center of the World**

**Slobodan Mitic, president of the Alliance of All the World's Serbs, Belgrade**

Our party favors creation of a Serbian state that is economically, culturally, politically, and militarily strong. A precondition is the unification and activation of all Serbian manpower and educational, cultural, and political forces within the country and abroad. To that end, we want all those who feel themselves to be Serbs or friends of Serbia and the Serbian people, regardless of whether they are Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic, atheist, or Macedonianized or Albanianized Serbs, to answer the appeal for unification. Political commitment is not essential, but the desire to unify Serbs and Serbian lands. That is our basic goal.

We feel that the very idea of unification of Serbs is a sacred idea and must be above personal, religious, and political ideals.

We consider those who are not Serbs and who live in Serbia to be friends of the Serbian nationality and believe that they should enjoy the same rights as all other citizens of Serbia. We want the ethnic minorities to have all the rights that they have everywhere in the civilized world, but no more than that.

We believe that for every Serb, wherever he lives, Serbia should be the center of the world, just as Jerusalem, say, is for the Jews.

Aside from economic progress, Serbia must also become stronger as a military force, since only a Serbian national army has the ability and can be relied on to defend Serbia and its interests and never again allow genocide against the Serbian people to occur anywhere.

In Serbia, only Serbs would serve in the armed forces, and members of the minorities if they wish, although Serbia is the state of the Serbian people and ethnic



minorities. If a member of some ethnic minority has not served in the armed forces, he would neither have the vote nor the right to be elected.

In our program, we foresee the integration of all Serbs, wherever they live in the world. That is why everything must be done for them to be informed about everything happening in Serbia. A certain number of Serbs from abroad would participate in the proceedings of the Assembly of Serbia as people's deputies. After all, if they can come to vote, why would they not also be able to come to sessions. There are rich Serbs abroad who are both able and willing to become part of political life in Serbia. Aside from that, they could bring capital here, new technologies, a new attitude toward work...and they would restore to all Serbs in the world the confidence that they can come back to their homeland.

Our party will be in favor of a law whereby the political leaders and candidates for the highest office in politics and the Army would not only have to be Serbs, but also individuals with a stable family background, and they would have to have proof that they are mentally and physically capable of holding responsible positions in politics and government.

We are for a law-governed state above all. We will be demanding that Albania renounce territorial claims against Serbia and return to Serbia Scutari and environs. We will demand from Slovenia compensation for industry taken away, plus revalued interest, and from Croatia war damages for the Serbian churches and homes destroyed, as well as for the genocide against the Serbian people.

### **Bloodless Victory**

**Vera Djurovic, authorized member of the provisional body of the Democratic Women's Movement, Kragujevac**

We do not give special emphasis to the "question of women," since we are in favor of peace, freedom, and the hope of the entire society, but in studying the programs of a majority of the parties we concluded that the issues of the woman's emancipation, her position, and the position of the family and children have remained on the margin of their interest or have been touched on as a mere formality.

We favor a new society, but not just in name, but one that is more progressive than the old one and the present one; we favor emancipation of all people from various kinds of exploitation.

We do not recognize a right to vote which forces us to be manipulated, we want to give our vote to those who are offering a progressive and humane society.

We want women through equal competition in all institutions from local government to the top level of the state, women with prestige and knowledge and the moral qualities that enhance a progressive individual.

We favor building the family as a community of equal individuals, the nurturing of social tolerance, reconciliation with all those who are innocent and against revanchism, dictatorship, and false values. We want work to be satisfying, not an imposition, but we are against all those who in economic difficulties see the woman's place in the home.

We will be voting for wise leaders who will win a bloodless victory. We give our vote to them: Let us unite around young people!

### **An Unprecedented Manhunt**

**Zaharije Trnavcevic, president of the Party of Yugoslavs, Belgrade**

The Party of Yugoslavs advocates and will fight for Yugoslavia's continuing to be a federal state and community of all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin and religion. Citizens (not nationalities!) are the source of sovereignty, and they want to live peacefully and decently from their labor in a law-governed state with a modern system that guarantees them equality in enjoying democratic freedoms and ethnic rights.

We feel that the economy is the crucial area for Yugoslavia's survival and progress. It has fallen into unprecedented difficulties mostly because the so-called vanguard, which had seized all the power, was not up to conducting an effective economic policy. Immense resources were borrowed and squandered on factories built on the basis of political rather than economic criteria. We know from history that politics is only the "handmaiden" of the economy. In our country, it is the other way about, and that is why even our offspring will be feeling and suffering the consequences of this capital error.

There is every reason for the Party of Yugoslavs to support the program of Ante Markovic. So, we also advocate reprivatization of the social sector, an open, free, and unified market, and a strict monetary policy. This government has shown in a short time that it knows how to pull the country out of the economic and political crisis. But an unprecedented campaign is being waged against it and is doing everything to prevent its program from being carried out. This is dishonorable, since it is contrary to the interests of ordinary people, who want more than anything else to live better tomorrow and in harmony with other citizens of Yugoslavia. If the economy is restored to health, to the great sorrow of all the nationalists, that nationalistic insanity will begin to weaken in which the national political bureaucracies which have already taken power or preserved earlier power, with the help of their own obedient press and media, have been sowing distrust and enmity between nationalities.

In this country, there have been and still are intelligent people who did not have power and authority. At the same time, we have had people in power who did not have the intelligence nor the honor to put the interests of



the people first. That is why the people have suffered and paid a high price, and in the elections, we are convinced, they will place their confidence in honest and able candidates.

### **Speculation on Breakup of Slovene Demos**

91BA0029B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 2 Oct 90  
pp 24-25

[Article by Zoran Medved: "Will Demos Break Up"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Apparent changes in the power structure within the ruling coalition have opened up room for another party, about which information is semiofficial, miserly, and a little conspiratorial.

Experts on Slovene political conditions were recently surprised to receive the news that "Slovenes from Belgrade," which are still led by a current vice president of the federal government, Zivko Pregl, intend to found a new social democratic party in their republic, with an even more leftist orientation. Among those observed at the initial talks held under rather conspiratorial circumstances at the Holiday Inn in Ljubljana, were, besides the aforementioned Pregl, the ambassador in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Ivo Vajgl, Rado Bohinc of the Economic Chamber of Slovenia, well-known Slovene sociologist Dr. Veljko Rus, and among other well-known Slovene managers, Pavel Brglez of Lesnina and the former minister for industry and energy and now manager of Rudise, Pavel Kunc.

Two of the people from this circle attracted particular attention. Zivko Pregl, because he is known by the Yugoslav public to be one of the leading figures in the so-called Markovicite party, the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia. As we know, he is considered by the public, both here and abroad, to be one of the indisputable authorities on Yugoslav economic reform, a close advisor to Markovic, and judging from the commentary following the press conference at the headquarters of the American television company CNN, a genuine media star as well. The owner of CNN, as we know, is Ted Turner, the man who deserves credit for the fact that Atlanta will be the site of the centennial Olympic Games in 1996, and Pregl was a guest and the Yugoslav representative at a meeting of CNN employees from around the world. On that occasion the Americans were fascinated not only by his good knowledge of the English language, but also by his ability to describe our reforms using simple and most of all "non-self-management" terminology, whereby—as those present testified—he came up with a quick response to every question. Pregl's popularity was also corroborated in a promotion by the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia at the Belgrade House of Youth, when his arrival in the auditorium was met by a mass ovation by those present. In this context, Slovenes are most intrigued by Pregl's statement to the effect that Markovic's party is not completely lacking in

prospects in that republic and that in connection with this there could be a surprise in Slovenia before long.

In any event, the other person was the well-known Slovene sociologist Dr. Veljko Rus, who recently interrupted his peaceful academic life with an open letter to the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia and of Demos, Dr. Joze Pucnik. In his exchange with Pucnik, Rus presented himself as a sympathizer and potential voter for the Social Democratic Party, even though the letter in question mostly contains sharp criticism of its activities thus far within the framework of the ruling Demos coalition. The dispute with Pucnik attracted a fair amount of attention from the Slovene public, in part because Dr. Veljko Rus is not known for frequent public appearances, while the impression is that in the present-day stories about a new party he wants to remain more on the sidelines, or at least avoid media interest in his political views.

### **Catholic Democracy**

In order to grasp the dimensions of Pregl's and Rus' commitment to founding a new party, one should at least know the little bit about it that has been learned so far, for the most part unofficially. The new party will not be part of the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia, which does not mean that it could not be associated with it in individual actions. Its orientation, as we have already said, would be social democratic, but more on the left wing of the spectrum of parties that view themselves as social democratic, which—at least initially—would have to be read as: left of Pucnik. Links with business executives would probably have to be understood as an attempt to bring the new party close to the authentic program premises of European social democracy, especially since they are already now condemning Pucnik's social democrats for devoting more attention to political questions, while ignoring social questions.

What is confusing is the emergence of a realignment of parties on the Slovene Left, the result of which could be a situation where that republic has as many as five social democratic parties. The first would be Pucnik's existing party, the second Pregl's, two more could emerge from the breakup of the existing LCS [League of Communists of Slovenia]-Party of Democratic Changes after its congress in October (and both currents in it regard themselves as social democratic), while the fifth party of the same orientation could be Markovic's Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia, which Zivko Pregl himself has called social democratic before foreign and domestic reporters in Belgrade.

The disintegration on the Slovene Left is directly linked to the change in the power structure within the ruling coalition. Following the election, Peterle's Christian democrats significantly increased their influence and power within Demos, and insofar as they would join together with the Slovene Peasants Alliance, which is already being widely discussed in public, this new formation would become the strongest political party in

Slovenia. Dr. Veljko Rus contends that "in Slovenia as well, Christian democrats are reestablishing the vision of the Catholic Slovenia of yesteryear, and are justifying it with the original sin of Slovene Bolshevism, while other parties in Demos—especially the Social Democrats—are working on solving the concrete economic and social problems in which the Slovene nation is drowning." If one enters the phase, Rus continues, "in which in the name of Christian morality the question of the survival of the opposition and even of the rule-of-law state is raised, then it will be very difficult to even continue speaking of democracy and of Demos, the essence of which is indeed the affirmation of lawfulness and of legal protection of an opposition. In this way, we have found ourselves at the borderline between a political system and an illiberal culture, which is as characteristic of Bolshevism as it is of Catholicism. It must be clear to all of us, and especially to Demos deputies, that neither Bolshevik nor Catholic democracy is possible. That has been obvious to you (directed at Dr. Joze Pucnik—Z.M.) for some time now, which is why this problem should be legalized as soon as possible if you do not want Social Democrats to become the first victims of this new Catholic 'democracy.'"

In his exchange with Pucnik, Rus also sharply criticizes Slovene foreign policy, condemning its excessive reliance on regional cooperation with Slovene minorities, which in his opinion leads to provincialism in culture, academics, and economics. Rus also condemns the excessive reliance on cooperation with the Vatican and Italy, meaning in accordance with the Christian democratic line. Particularly interesting is his assertion that Dr. Dimitrij Rupel is the right person to conduct Slovene foreign policy, but that he has the feeling that Rupel is "completely paralyzed by the international activity affirmed by his government colleague, Dr. Janez Dular. Specifically, Dular's international activity is not in conformity with postcommunist strategy," as Rupel calls it, "in its very spirit of explicit anticommunism. The focal point of his activity is to link and integrate the New Political Emigration (NPE) to the mother country. Moreover, it is obvious that Dular is exceptionally fast and exceptionally efficient, because in realizing his international policy plan he is relying on the extensive network of Catholic clergy in overseas countries."

Veljko Rus blames Pucnik for the fact that the Social Democrats have not been clear enough in distancing themselves from this type of policy, and feels that five conditions should be set out for the coalition partners in Demos for further joint activity. The first is a moratorium on the return of property seized after the war until Demos defines and makes operational the criteria for fairness and injustice with regard to this action. As a second condition, Rus sees the formulation of a concept pertaining to worker-held stocks. In his opinion, Social Democrats are most qualified to defend the interests of employees, and should oppose the idea of state-held stocks and demand that at least one-third of current state ownership be converted to worker-held stocks. The third

conditions should be the institutionalization of neocorporativism, meaning the status of all forms of labor organization; the fourth is the introduction of a basic citizen's income which would guarantee a minimum of economic security for all adult citizens. As the fifth condition, Dr. Veljko Rus proposes ties with countries in which social democracy is strong. Rus notes that the ties of the current Slovene government with the Vatican and Italy will probably allow an influx of Catholic capital into Slovenia, but he recommends ties with Scandinavian and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries.

### Worthless Markovic Shares

The chairman of Demos, Dr. Joze Pucnik, clearly understood his professional colleague's message, but is aware of the fact that he must at the same time take into account pragmatic political interests. Not one of the parties in the ruling coalition has renounced its autonomy, and not one of them is abandoning its party's program, Pucnik contends in his response to Rus, adding: "Not one of the parties in Demos is able alone to realize these program items without the help of others. Each of the parties in Demos by itself is too weak, has too few deputies in Parliament, and for this reason has too little political influence to be able to forego the support of the other parties. This is the basis of the political connection between the parties of Demos, which, of course, arises from the dedication to the content of the election platform."

In order to demonstrate the independence and distinctness of the program strategy of his own Social Democratic Party, Pucnik immediately notes that they have always been against the ideologization of property, that this is an economic category, and that "the economic efficiency of property in every context of economic activity is of fundamental importance." For social democrats, according to Pucnik, it is self evident that only a social market economy can be considered, with wage autonomy and strong, genuinely democratic labor unions.

Pucnik does not support the idea of worker-held stock and openly charges Rus with having been duped by the thinly veiled self-management demagoguery of the now former minister in the Croatian government, Drazen Kalogjera. He feels that such a transfer of ownership does not ensure its economic efficiency, neither on the basis of Markovic's internal stocks, nor in Kalogjera's model of transferring ownership to employees, whereby Pucnik observes sarcastically that Markovic's internal stocks before long will not even be worth the paper on which they are printed!

The chairman of the Slovene social democrats also does not support the proposal on a basic citizen's income, because in his opinion this type of figure can be introduced only in societies with a high level of productivity, standard of living, and work ethic, while in Slovenia, Pucnik says, we have perhaps only the last of these.

Pucnik warns that one cannot skip over historical development with good ideas, and that what is decisive is the real economic situation and the related system of motivating people. For this reason, he proposes that the rights of workers be protected through the establishment of a minimum personal income, that the transition to economic rent be effected gradually, and that socially threatened groups of the population have a guaranteed personal income. Moreover, he supports a separate law regulating payments to labor union officials. The current situation whereby these officials are in practice paid by the enterprises is unacceptable because in this way it is impossible to establish a front between those who are struggling for better working conditions and the structures that want to safeguard their economic efficiency right now by lowering the costs of the labor force.

From all of this, it is obvious that Pucnik, unlike Rus, sees the political commitment of Social Democrats as the top priority right now, because he himself recognizes that within a year or two, three at the very most, his party will be facing the question of minimum pay, labor union conditions for old-age insurance, and others. However, through their exchange, the two of them have established the framework that no other pretenders to the social democratic orientation will be able to ignore.

Leftists in the opposition and all new parties that may emerge on the Slovene political scene are for now in a subordinate position. This applies most of all to the LCS-Party of Democratic Reform, which with the reported split into two parties would definitively disappear from the political scene. Such a conclusion may sound paradoxical and blunt, but one must not forget that the new political reality is also imposing entirely different conditions for popularity among the voters. We are not talking here only about the conspicuous revanchism that is still very much alive, but also about an age-long feeling that one should never return to the old, regardless of the dissatisfaction with which one regards the new. Only political practice will show whether the four-year electoral cycle is an adequate time period for the formation of a new identity for the opposition, freed from all the recidivism of the past. In the meantime, potential voters could ridicule the trumped-up invocation of the social democratic tradition and the pretence of exclusiveness in that position, which could be disastrous to the fate of the opposition. The paradox could be even greater if it is known that in fact today's opposition, through its gradual and often clumsy descent from power (for which it should not be reproached, since this is, after all, the first time!) has definitively made it possible to carry out profound democratic changes, which still

cannot nullify accusations for mistakes made in the past. In Slovenia, whether or not one chooses to acknowledge it, this very opposition is an essential factor of political and parliamentary stability, of which other parts of the country clearly cannot boast. After all, has Croatia itself not demonstrated what the potential consequences of smugness by a new government are, where the emergence of a marginal political group, Raskovic's SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] has nearly destroyed any real political buffer zone as well as, according to election results, the authentic advocate of Serbian interests, the LCC [League of Communists of Croatia]-PDS [Party of Democratic Changes], through which the republic has been led to the brink of civil war!? This mistake, which Tudjman managed to correct at the last minute through some brilliant moves, is definitive proof that the electorate, like a sunflower, always turns towards the government and that it recognizes only that which that government also recognizes. Everything else is only a matter of elementary responsibility.

#### **Blackmail of Partners**

In this context, it is very interesting to note Dr. Veljko Rus' observation that the traditional breakdown into left and right is meaningless today and that it would be more appropriate to divide parties into progressive and conservative, meaning on the basis of their attitude towards the past. Thus, Rus lumps the Christian Democrats and Communists together into "yesterday's world," the Social Democrats and the Slovene Democratic Alliance [SDZ] into "today's," and the Greens into "tomorrow's world."

In his latest television appearance before Slovene viewers, Dr. Dimitrij Rupel had the opportunity to respond to this position, and for many this response came as a surprise. Even though he too proceeded from the assumption that there will not be any "solo action" within the framework of Demos, Rupel decidedly placed his Slovene Democratic Alliance in the democratic-liberal bloc, "which is exceptionally important to the stability of political life in Slovenia." Asked whether a merger of, say, the SDZ and ZSMS [Slovene Youth Federation]-Liberal Party would be possible in the future, Rupel, in an exceptionally good-humored tone of voice, emphasized that cooperation would be possible with a part of or with individuals from the ranks of the Liberals, as well as the Communist reformers and Socialists. And he even hinted that among the opposition there are shifts and attempts under way to establish new political formations, but it was obvious that in his party they would be waiting patiently for the final configuration of these new parties.

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

**European Reconstruction, Development Plans Detailed**

91CH0076A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET  
in Hungarian 10 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by (zsubori): "Jacques Attali on Western Capital Influx: The Goal Is To Enhance Development"]

[Text] One of the main goals of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank is to irreversibly abolish, and forget forever, Europe's division—we learned about this appealing endeavor from Jacques Attali, the bank's equally charming acting president, at his press conference yesterday. It was Francois Mitterrand who proposed to set up this financial institution, and his proposal was ratified by the European Community's ministerial council in November 1989. The ceremonial signing of the document took place in Paris 29 May 1990. Preparations are under way at present, and the actual operations will begin next March, after the ratifications by the member states' parliaments. However, the acting president—who is, incidentally, one of the French President's advisors—would like to present complete plans and concepts of investment by that time; this was one reason for his two-day visit to Hungary, which ended last Tuesday in Budapest.

During his very tight schedule, Jacques Attali met not only with President Arpad Goncz and economic officials but also with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall who expressed Hungary's interest in setting up a separate fund for restructuring—and averting the crisis of—the economies of East European countries.

Four main issues were discussed during the talks in Budapest. First of these was training, the second was the establishment of institutions of the market economy. The third was the exploration of possibilities of the bank's involvement in infrastructural investments and in developing the private sector in every area, e.g., in tourism, banking, transportation and telecommunications, shipping, and environmental protection. Finally, during the visit the partners looked into the possibilities of establishing close relations between Europe's two sides in order to eliminate its divisiveness. Thus, beyond establishing political relations, the basic task was to examine the ways and areas in which such a bank could contribute to making the process of democratization irreversible.

Jacques Attali pointed out that the Gulf crisis, the draught, and the instability of Hungary's Eastern partners make this process very difficult; this also proves not only how closely connected the problems are world-wide but also that it is in every country's interest to aid the development of another country.

The fundamental goal of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank, which is—as its president repeatedly emphasized—the first European institution

whose membership includes every country, or at least every country that is either democratic or is moving toward democracy, is to assist the process of changing to an open and market-oriented economy and to aid the development of the private sector and the initiatives of enterprise in those Central and East European countries which are not only committed to but also apply the basic principles of a multiparty democracy, pluralism, and the market economy. The bank's allowed capital stock is 10 billion ECU's [European Currency Units] (about 12.2 billion dollars) with a 30 percent payment ratio which the member countries must pay in five years in five equal installments. The so-called favored nations' share of capital stock is 13.45 percent, that of Hungary being .79 percent. This corresponds to 79 million ECU's, i.e., about 98 million dollars. Thus, a payment of 4,740,000 ECU's must be made every year for five years.

The bank will offer 60 percent of its financial means to private ventures, using the remaining part for aiding the development of enterprises that belong to the state sector as well as individual infrastructural programs. The bank's main office will be located in London, but it may set up institutions or regional offices in the territory of any member state. Hungary is also among the candidates. Each one of the bank's member states will delegate a director and a deputy director to the council of directors.

In answering questions, Jacques Attali said that, according to their estimates, about 2,000 billion ECU's would be needed to raise the capital efficiency of every East European economy—including that of the Soviet Union—to the Western level. Of course, this would be a long-term process, and this sum may change for many reasons. The president also said that, on the one hand, the bank wants to provide credit and, on the other hand, it wants to acquire capital shares as a joint venturer, without interfering with the countries' balance of payments, meaning that the bank should not be expected to ease their credit burdens directly.

Jacques Attali gave a rather enigmatic answer to the inquiry about onetime Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth's chances of becoming a vice president. As he said, the appointments of the four or five vice presidents will be jointly endorsed by the member states on the basis of the president's proposal. He has already revealed the names of two candidates to the press, but Miklos Nemeth's name was not among them. He also has an idea about the persons for the other three positions but, if the questioner would allow, he would like first to inform the member states. But it is a fact that he also met with Miklos Nemeth during his visit.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Writers Discuss Slovak National Identity**

91CH0054A Bratislava ROMBOID in Slovak No 9,  
Sept 90 pp 3-18

[Roundtable discussion; place and date not given: "The Slovak Question Today"]

[Text] The roundtable discussion published here came about on the initiative and the soil of the Independent

Authors Club [KNS] (the word soil is used figuratively, since the KNS presently has no soil of its own). It is the first in a series of roundtable discussions that the KNS hopes will contribute to the study of the ethnic and cultural identity of the Slovak people, its relations with surrounding peoples, and the future and tasks facing Slovak culture under the new conditions of posttotalitarian Europe.

The issues being discussed by European authors, when taken in a broad context, share the issues brought up in this discussion. We will publish an abridged record of these discussions elsewhere. Signed: Editorial office.

#### Rudolf Chmel

We have gathered to talk about the meaning, or the reality, of the Slovak question today. From the past, particularly the most recent past, we are harboring more than one illusion. How is one to reflect on this question in a situation that reminds one of a katzenjammer? When someone says Slovak question, we of course think first of the Slovak-Czech and Slovak-Hungarian question. For us, you see, as is often the case with peoples with trauma in their past, the Slovak question has always implicitly been a question of relationships. Not because the question did not have its other aspects, but because we have lived in a historically and geographically limited, defined space. How, for instance, did a Slovak become a nationalist? Laco Novomesky wrote in 1937, "The will to be an independent people; that will is enough for a people to be a people. Slovaks had this will even before the revolution, and the fact that it changed to nationalist passion, even to chauvinistic preoccupation, is mainly the fault of the ideal of Czechoslovak unity and its practical postrevolutionary activity." The German historian Eugen Lambert almost acknowledges that he is right when he states that Hlinek's success undoubtedly came about because Slovaks could not identify with a state ruled by Czechs. Also valid are Novomesky's words spoken some 30 years before when, speaking to be sure about the problems of literature, but also the bigger picture: "The questions of Czech and Slovak literature are common questions. Nothing is completely Czech or completely Slovak. When half of a house is on fire, it is very likely that the other half will catch too. Whether the issue is progressive or reactionary, there is no completely Czech or completely Slovak issue." I could also cite Minac and paraphrase his idea that Hungarians are the fate of Slovak policy, that our relations with the Hungarians have not only formed our national fate, but also the consciousness and soul of the people. "For many decades", wrote Minac, we existed mainly as reflections of the Hungarians. It was the litmus paper of our existence. "We want, though, to think about the Central European and European dimension of our existence, because this new pan-Europeanism could probably help us overcome old nationalist conflicts of which we clearly have a heritage. Being a citizen

of Europe should no longer be in conflict with also being a Czech or a Slovak patriot.

I am speaking here of pan-Europeanism, but society is dominated by the opposite: sometimes called patriotism, other times nationalism, and frequently chauvinism. Except that everything is distorted, Europeanism as well as patriotism. Many have had a hand in this, including we intellectuals, historians, writers of history and geography books, and teachers.

What then is the model of our people in history and literature? Vaguely cultural, i.e. oriented to language, character, culture, rather than sociopolitical. The Slovak intellectual has not yet posed the fundamental question used by Jan Patočka, What are the Czechs?, to title his profound and basic thoughts, or the question, What is a Hungarian?, posed by the poet Sandor Csoori. Nor has a Slovak even posed Kundera's question about the Czech lot, i.e. a question about the lot of the Slovaks, or the older Czech question from the 1920's, "What kind of people are we?," which was first posed by Milan S. Durica, history professor at the University of Padua (though he was not credited with it in the title of an article published recently in VEREJNOST by the editorial office itself).

What then is the story with our model of the people and the Slovak question? The Slovaks indeed are a small people geographically, but does this mean they are small historically as well? Of course, Great Moravia was the vanguard, and not only for we Slovaks. We did not have kings, to follow Minac, but does this make our history plebeian? It is true that in modern times we have tried to reconstruct it from the ground up, first from the culture of speech, very recently from the schools, education in the broadest sense of the word, and still later from politics, without which of course there is no history at all. Since we lacked a higher, i.e. an upper class, our development took the form of unifying differentiated classes: the rural population, bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia. Our history had, to paraphrase Patočka, "a small Slovak component" (he also speaks of a small Czech component), namely that which is tied to the basic maintenance of the existence of a people, preventing it from thinking about the large problems of Europe. The "small" in our case for a long time was identified with the preservation of language, speech. One can understand the Slovak question only comprehensively, i.e. not only in terms of its small Slovak content, but also in the context of European development, especially that of Central Europe. While the Czechs want to be comprehensively reflected in the context of Western Europe, for us it is rather, I think, a Central European problem, specifically a problem of the relations with Czechs and with Hungarians. Because the Hungarians, Austrians, Poles, and others were, until the Second World War, so-called "baronial peoples", in contrast to the Slovaks and in part the Czechs, they received their decisions from above. For this reason the democratic experiment in Central Europe after 1918, as Jacques Rupnik has written, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, did not have great

success, because it introduced into primarily agricultural states a system based on the values and institutions of the French Revolution. These states were then inclined mainly to rightwing regimes, a situation compounded by unresolved nationalities problems which, if not resolved, always force regimes into rightist positions.

The problem facing us, and it is not only a Slovak problem, but one faced by all posttotalitarian regimes, is whether the pan-European or the nationalist line will predominate. The one that predominates will determine both the national and sociopolitical outcomes. For the desired return to Europe the Slovak, and Czechoslovak model would be most appropriate, in which both lines, the pan-European and the nationalist, coexist in a certain symbiosis.

#### Jan Stevcek

Only one of the questions raised by Rudolf Chmel seems to me central and that is the position of the Slovak intellectual to the question of Slovakness, Slovaks, their fate and their present.

We understand the concepts "Slovak" and "Slovakness" just as a Hungarian understands "Hungarian" and a Czech "Czech", as a value statement, filled with historical meaning which a certain subject, let us say a Slovak intellectual, wants to define in relation to others. Professor Eugen Pauliny once asked me if I would choose to be a Slovak if I could be born again. I said yes, and he added, "Me too." The satisfaction with which he spoke helped me to realize that, as the author of the history of the Slovak literary language, he had grappled with this question more than once. On the way home I thought about the question some more and my excessively flip-pant and light hearted answer seemed to me inadequate to the seriousness of the problem. For instance, today it would be culturally very comfortable to be a Czech, I imagined, to have at your disposal a structured culture with defined values, with a perfected "language that makes poems"; to be situated in Europe, and not have to attend a lecture and introduce yourself by saying "I am a Slovak. Slovakia is part of Czechoslovakia. An independent people lives there with its own history, its own literature about which I will now say a few words..." "Slovakness" means even today, from the intellectual's viewpoint rather a burden than intellectual satisfaction from maturity, from synthesis. Rather it is something that hurts us, bothers us and with which we have to struggle every day. It is more than a national-social problem, but also an existential one, a problem of personal identity with its own intellectual, moral world, with its own conscience, its own position in relation to others. Once we understand the problem as existential we have to think most of all about the twist of fate in modern Slovak history, which I would call a tendency to national and personal schizophrenia. One finds this schizophrenic element in Dohnany's *History of the Slovak Uprising*, about the revolution of 1848. When you read this work today you find out that Dohnany analyzes

the Pest revolutionary slogan "Freedom-Equality-Brotherhood" but above all emphasizes the [word omitted] but with a Christian tone. The Christianity was as if to atone for the fact that we dared to stand alone against the overall progressive direction of European development in 1848. The historic fate of the Slovaks after the Austro-Hungarian agreement is well known. We paid bitterly for Demands, for Memorandum.

A second period of great historical and existential tests came after 1918. After due consideration, we must acknowledge that Slovaks received their new position to a large extent as a gift, and we all know the old proverb, "Beware Danes bearing gifts." Everything that history provides for free comes at a brutal price later on. Slovaks lived in a new democratic structure, the first Czechoslovak Republic, with great social problems, nationalist pressure, the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the appearance of the Slovak Republic. Again the schizophrenia of the Slovak intellectual, who realizes that the formation of the Slovak state was relatively necessary from an international political viewpoint, yet at the same time feels that we are riding the wrong wave of history and will again experience the collapse of historical awareness and conscience.

The third example may cloud the issue, but repeats the same model, the same situation. It happens in 1968. In 1988 I read in an Austrian newspaper an article titled, "The Real Victors in 1968: The Slovaks." The article cites economic facts, governmental and political realities, legal characteristics (federation, which the Austrians consider from an international legal point of view great progress), and points also to the appointment of Slovaks to important positions, etc.

How can one move from these historical contradictions to a formulation of such a high level problem as "Slovakness"? We will never come to grips with this internal conflict until the deeper meaning of history reaches the point where a man can admit to Slovakness as a value category that gives him status both as a Slovak and as a mature man capable of transcending his national situation and being a world citizen.

The current situation of Slovaks is, I think, such that in the course of history they have acquired a kind of internal justification for claiming Slovakness without schizophrenia, and the last development we experience we hope will end with a less problematical and less conflict-laden concept of Slovakness.

This feeling of possible balancing and liberation can lead to the development of another question, namely the relationships to Czechs and Hungarians. At the moment when the Hungarian, and especially the Czech intellectual, who is on the average very mature, recognizes the situation of the Slovak intellectual as authentic, real, and humanly poignant, the international situation of Slovaks will change.

**Jozef Klimo**

My approach as a legal historian will be more angular, modular, weighted more to the didactic side. Let's begin with rudimentary questions. Every people strives without a doubt to achieve a national existence (we will not stop to analyze the level of sovereignty), and an ethnic identity. This is the first step. It takes a long time to come to fruition and is modified by various realities. One cannot ignore the well-known fact that our geopolitically sensitive location at the intersection of both European and global lines of force has always brought with it a highly variable security and has placed high demands on adaptability, which understandably has frequently assumed tragic forms. Slovaks have in their history had relatively few opportunities, but it must be stated that they have always behaved pragmatically and gotten their foot into half-opened doors. I fully agree with Professor Stevcek, that Slovaks have received many things as gifts. This is not to say, though, that we have not paid for our part in things; we have paid our share in our relations with the Czech people too. Documenting this would require some thorough statistical research, which is not appropriate here.

Geopolitical relations will continue to have an impact. The reality of the new look of Europe will have a negative impact on us, and face us with the question of the future orientation of our development. When we speak of the integration of Europe, we see two conflicting streams, nationalism and Europeanism (I see in this Europeanism a certain cosmopolitanism, which irritates me especially in Slovak intellectuals, who are lukewarm to the question of Slovakness, and would like to skip a stage and leap right to Europeanism). Our position has so far been traditional. After the victory of the Allies in the First World War, France emerged as super power number one. When this orientation proved untenable by historical events, the second alternative was an orientation to the Soviet Union. The third alternative is currently very broad and uncertain, but is still very important for future development. This will clearly be related to the issue of future political and politico-economic development, and affected also by higher level phenomena as well. I am not attempting to sketch a more precise line. I am rather in the position of a man who is searching for additional facts and arguments. I agree with Mr. Stevcek that we must form our relations with neighboring countries, especially those to the south, where the situation is all the more sensitive because Trianon has not yet been recognized, not to mention the bare fact of the countersignature in 1920. These issues will open once more in certain circumstances, for instance the minorities question, the problem of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian confederation will still have to mature, but I think that the future lies rather in the European context than in seeking bilateral forms resembling the Little Entente.

We are reaching a stage that moves forward at a snail's pace, but still moves. We already have symbols that we have never before achieved. Now we just have to act on

them to bring them into line with social and cultural developments that will take place in Europe after resolving the basic issues related to the German question.

**Milan Lasica**

"The rub", as the Czechs say, lies I think in the very thought expressed by Jan Stevcek, that Slovaks have received things as gifts and then have had to pay dearly for those gifts, sometimes in excess of their worth. This began in our splendid generation, with the Sturovites, when we first sat on the wrong horse. There have been many explanations for why this happened and why it had to happen that way. What is interesting is that this situation has recurred many times in our history, which raises for me the question of whether there have simply been historical circumstances that do not allow us to behave differently, or whether there may be a certain, not very positive, characteristic at work. Because we got on the wrong horse again in 1939, when we formed the Slovak Republic right on the grave of the Czechoslovak Republic, and in 1968 when we effectively won ourselves a federation on the grave of the Prague Spring. These are the traumas and nightmares that terrorize and bother the Slovak intellectual. I know that there are rational ways to explain every such instance, but it is one thing to be able to explain something rationally, and another thing that it bothers you.

I have had many discussions with Ladislav Ballek about nationhood. Nationhood is in a way the culmination of national identity. Periodically I ask myself what our attitude to nationhood is, and it seems to me that we think of it quite sloppily, that we do not take it very seriously, that we think it doesn't really apply to us or that it is our business. We have a tendency to behave like a mediocre orchestral player that the director considers an idiot, not because he is a mean director, but simply because he is the director. Comparisons can distort this, but do not change my feeling that we do not have the proper attitude to nationhood. This also has its reasons and it would be interesting to research why it is so.

I would also like to comment on Minac's idea, paraphrased here by Rudolf Chmel, namely that our national consciousness derived from the Hungarian. It also derived from the Czechs, but it seems to me that this was for no very profound reasons, but mainly out of habit. This is a negative principle, because deriving from something can also mean striving to minimize the importance of that from which you are derived while accentuating the native. It is also possible to derive positively, meaning allowing yourself to be inspired and not derive laterally, but as much as possible onward and upward.

It is also worth noting another significant part of our mentality, namely our attitude to authority. Our relationship to authority has on the one hand always been one of opposition, but on the other hand servile.



**Julius Satinsky**

Back to the present and I will tell you what weighs most heavily on these legs which drag around a bent Slovak intellectual. It bothers me that more than six months have passed since November and we still do not have a normal daily paper for adult Slovaks; not for intellectuals, but for normal adults, for young people. I would be most happy if I stopped playing, took over a building, surrounded myself there with typesetting equipment and all of you, and started to publish a newspaper. I subscribe to LIDOVE NOVINY, where every paragraph, every line addresses an adult European. Then when I buy one of our dailies at rush hour, I'd rather not say which one, I realize that we are in year zero. This bothers me a lot.

A second thing that annoys me is young people. The minds of youth are complete blanks. They lack a basic knowledge of the Bible, of Greek mythology, as well as of contemporary history. Recently I read in Masaryk's *Kmeni* an article titled *Russia and Europe*, where on a single page is everything, excuse me, about Bolsheviks. It is year zero, we should therefore begin by copying this page and sending it to all gymnasiums [schools]. This would at least be one small plus.

If I spent the time to think, I would probably come up with other things, but I wanted only to let you know the main things that annoy me.

**Ladislav Ballek**

While I have never considered applause and anticipation as one of my personal, and still less a public obligation, public troublemaking has been OK. I want to mention, in line with today's theme, mainly the questions that disturb me the most. I do not want to say, though, that this will exhaust the dissatisfaction, both private and public, that I feel today.

I have, as my friends will attest, a specific, inherited, and possibly fatal tie to the question of national borders, matters of people and the nation. It is a relationship similar to the feeling of the son of a lighthouse keeper for the evening light. I am devoting a significant part of my personal attention, however unqualified, to this issue, and while this attention consumes almost my entire life, I also recall that as recently as a year ago this question had no more than a marginal place in private conversations, quite the contrary, just as mentioning the creation of the Czechoslovak nation and its founders, T.G. Masaryk and M.R. Stefanik, evoked no response in the above conversations. It was not tactical, I am ashamed to say, to speak about them just as today is not tactically wise not to mention them. My usual question as to which republic we would have revived after World War II, if the first republic had not arisen after World War I, typically hangs in the air like the spirit over the waters...

While I had, one might say, enough reasons during a childhood on the border to see the harsher side of the national identity and sovereignty issue, as an adult and especially after August 1968 the reasons only increased.

The generation of which I am a member, from childhood through its adult years, has been forced to be emotionally attached to the space between Kamchatka and the Berlin wall. In this gigantic space, an almost psychoneurotic space for a person from the Subcarpathians, in a space where there was really only one legitimate international movement of generally supranational goals and objectives, small peoples and their countries were so irrelevant that they truly did not exist. How, in this international camp, these varied and diverse peoples felt is evident today and we will see tomorrow what has been lost and gained by it. What is also certain is that they used nationalism to fight for their position, either consciously or unconsciously. So they were ruled by insecurity, but its clearest manifestation, nationalism, does not allow them, as they say, to take in stride or without problems enter the new, more natural unit being forced on them by Europe and the outside world. The East never got around to a natural unit even though the potential existed for decades, and did not get around to it precisely because it was not forced to do it naturally, but rather unnaturally coerced not to do it. Possibly, I think now, the East blew its chance, even though I know that everything is more complicated than that. One additional complexity is that the smaller nations from this part of Europe failed to build their historical projects at the right time. This is true of us, the Czechs and Slovaks, and of us, the Slovaks, and it can be stated more precisely that we have never had the chance to be masters of our own history, and maybe we don't even realize this yet. How so? We have almost always simplified it, depopulated it, depersonalized it, and forcibly proletarianized it. And what of our feeling of national identity? Simply put, it never matured, and how could it have? I have always been fascinated by the question of what exactly unites us. What else was there besides language, culture, and land? Maybe we are linked by our joint tribal and national consciousness. What else is there, after centuries as the axis of our national life? It is just that without a complete knowledge of our own history and a deep compassion for it we will scarcely be able today, to say nothing of tomorrow, of governing ourselves sensibly and intelligently as a collective...

In my introduction I spoke of my dissatisfaction. All of us are aware that we are losing our former official ideology. This leaves a vacuum, a state that dominates others, draws from others, a state with an exceptional self fulfilling force. What fills this space under pressure? New emotionality? New rationality? Or, as we hope, new thinking, thinking that is a true revolution? And what if the first thing to fill it is that which our official ideology attempted, in vain, to suppress? Won't all our personal and collective atavism rush in this direction with the force of its long time emotions. How can these emotions, long suppressed, unfulfilled, unfinished and incomplete, hope to come close to establishing social order and organization?

I am saying—admitting, simply, as an aside—that we are a people that is confessional and ideological rather than



political. I have come to this conclusion after a personal analysis of our habits, the concepts we use, our statements, the soul of our most personal and collective faiths, the spirit of our internal discipline. Or can we think that we are a political people? Are we so immersed in rational political matters as the fastest, most effective and intelligent way to achieve our national and nationwide goal, which we consider to be our entry amongst the developed countries, that we are in fact drowning in thoughts of guilt, sin, conscience, deception, and penitence? And what about our constantly proclaimed return here and there, when "Things have to go forward"? I am not against these thoughts, on the contrary, but just as I gladly view them as an essential part of our being, I am less happy to see them divorced from this being and placed above it. Notice, for curiosity sake, how we evaluate a politician who switches parties. We treat him like a priest who has converted to another faith. A politician is not like a priest. The party seeks his talent and program just as a poet looks for a publisher and the publisher a reader, like every other professional looks for a fulfilling job. W. Churchill, we know, bolted from the conservatives to the laborites, then went back. Despite this, the English did not lose him. On the contrary he became a national and nationalist idol. Politician and cleric, the man who conducts his life transcendently are, if you will, two sides of the same coin, at least what once was one. Churchill, Englishmen... I am not their uncritical fan but I admit that I gladly pose the question of how many statesmen could tell their people so openly what awaits them? And as we get to know each other we will not need much to throw the gun away and escape on private robber paths. This part of our national character applies to us only in guilt.

Another problem that disturbs me stems from the ever more obvious fact that we have lost the last four, and especially the last two decades. I am thinking that both of our peoples are completely exhausted emotionally, and our November revolution also cost us something in this area. The Czechs seem to me to be more exhausted than the Slovaks, but I will return to this thought later on.

In our emotional exhaustion we, I think, are closer to apathy, to a different type of personal and group selfishness. Just as apathy is a state of severely repressive barbarity, so selfishness is a state of impatience that is difficult to control. In this nation we are dealing with the most serious questions of our future, including that of Czech-Slovak coexistence. I contend that we should first analyze in depth all historical, political, defense-security, economic, ecological and intellectual reasons for which we at one time decided to coexist and to continue to live together. I would only add that we should adopt the same approach to all aspects of our current life, so in our revolutionary enthusiasm we make sure to take account of everything that is viable that we have built so far, because not everything that we have built here deserves to leave us for, how should I say it, eternal rest.

I do not intend here to speak at length about all the main reasons for our Czech-Slovak coexistence. This would be

beyond my strength and the time limits allowed by this joint discussion of ours. I would be pleased, though, to speak even if fleetingly about the reason, the cause that I will refer to as the intellectual. The culture of the Czechs and the culture of the Slovaks—I am thinking about them in the broadest sense, from all sciences to all conceivable arts—are two of the closest cultures on the planet. It is not difficult for one person to be immersed in both cultures from childhood and to acquire both profoundly and without difficulty. In this way our soul grows, if only through our observation of the differences and likenesses of refined thoughts. I have already stated that our greatest characteristic, of which we are proud and in which we frequently believe, is that we have intentionally and without ostentation bowed before both national spiritual springs. This has made it easier to step over the contemporary spiritual horizon, for example to see more clearly the political landscape of the world of the East and that of the world of the West. T.G. Masaryk and M.R. Stefanik were such people, truly Czech-Slovak personalities, leaders with national, spiritual and moral authority. The nation missed them in its fateful hours, before its betrayal, during and after the war. Before stopping for a moment for our first president I will make another comment: One cannot ask directly, and certainly not insist, but Czech-Slovak politicians, I think, should more or less naturally strive for Czech-Slovak spiritual dualism because, and we can cite plenty of examples, even exceptional political gifts do not assure an understanding for the subtler problems of our entire joint homeland.

T.G. Masaryk was completely swept from the schools of my generation, and when he was mentioned it was usually in connection with the idea of Czechoslovakism, which was unpopular in Slovakia. Time has passed judgement on this idea, and it should be added for fairness that in its time there was a serious international argument for the creation of a Czech Socialist Republic [CSR]. It should be mentioned that this idea became only any office idea for Masaryk and his followers, even though the idea itself was solid; it arose with, and lingered mainly with the people. When we gladly reconstruct the dictionary of our generation, we use the term in the "report" that they gave us about our new president: "The God and land in him were Slovak and Moravian, and the intelligence was Czech." After the second world war, when my parent's friends, and mainly my father's colleagues, border guards, frequently discussed the war's outcome, it was evaluated almost unanimously: The president would never have ordered our troops to withdraw from the national boundaries; nor would a general from the Bradian grave ever have given the order! However we judge the world view and international perception of our fathers, even if critically, once we get to the strength of their national and republican loves and hopes, we can only catch our breath: The Lany snows are there!

When I asked later what made our fathers believe that President T.G. Masaryk would never have withdrawn

from the borders, they gave me an answer that for a long time seemed too simple. The former president considered this country first as the home and land of the people, and secondly as a place for industry, and understood this land, the land of people, their beliefs, loves and hopes much more profoundly than E. Benes behind the windows of his office....

I have noted that the Czechs appear to have come out of the last few decades of our history more exhausted than the Slovaks. Why do I think so? It has to do with the well thought out but not very prestigious question that I have been considering for some time, namely which of our two peoples is older and more cultured. I think, you see, that each is in its own way both old and cultured. What I consider important when studying their age and cultural level is how they are and can be an incentive for each other to go beyond their own national spiritual life on both the horizontal and vertical axes. If there is a certain difference between Czechs and Slovaks, I see it as being an obvious Czech superiority in organizing society, in culture and education. In other words the difference between us is in the area of civilization. I must emphasize, though, that this civilization and culture and even the age is not always clear; it is enough to compare Spain with the United States. After the fall of Great Moravia our peoples had to evolve, against their wills, by themselves, in different places, we would say in a different historical space and time. When they came together again in 1918 in a joint nation, Slovakia was 30 to 50 years behind the Bohemian lands in all phenomena of civilization. This difference, despite all our efforts and Czech assistance, has remained to this day. The shock of the August and post August events which threw us backward like a wave had a more profound and bitter impact on the more culturally mature Czechs than on Slovakia. Nor is the slightly different Czech and Slovak understanding of matters of the East and West irrelevant. We have not merely a common, but also a moderately different heritage. But what is most important in the recent decades in Czech-Slovak relations is the issue of federation! Let us admit that federation, even if it was illusory, and very short, had a significant impact on Slovakia, as it is generally acknowledged. In that tragic and on the whole destructive moment in our history, both for the people and the nation, Slovakia was offered what was, to be sure, compensation, but nevertheless a solid and integrating element, something of a national roof. The Czechs, if we look at the situation objectively, did not even have that. And when they found themselves in great national difficulties, and got the impression that we forced the federation on them in these difficult times, they came to suspect that a kind of Slovak-Warasaw Pact dominion existed over their national territory. This suspicion, very understandable from a human point of view, born of a pervasive sense of desperation in Bohemia, is only slowly dispersing on the other side of the Morava river today.

We Slovaks are criticized for, putting it simply, federalizing at a time when we should have been cooperating to

democratize our Czech-Slovak joint society. Yes, that task was pressing, the time for it had come, demanded it extremely urgently. The question arises, though: when should we have federalized? I contend that it should have been after the war, in the 1940s, the 1950s at the latest. And when we realize what happened in these years, and especially in the 1950s, to the Slovak question, the need arises in our soul to ask ourselves: Who among us is without guilt?

Perhaps we should, or could, more frequently recognize the fact that questions of Czech-Slovak coexistence are being constitutionalized. At least we are doing so in moments of great historical importance for both peoples, in the context of exceptional international, European, and world events. We should put our affairs in order with a clear conscience. And we need coexistence. Neither European nor world history has yet rested on its laurels. Just as we have not been among the militarily strongest or politically most influential countries, so too will we not be among the economically most successful, at a time when, as we see, the axis of the world is becoming economics. And economics is glad to garner laurels at another's expense. The techniques and forms of acquisition change, but the logic does not.

I spoke a moment ago about our certain civilizational backwardness in relation to the Czech lands, which is still more evident the farther west you go, and also mentioned that in some ways we are not culturally backward. No, even that is not a good term, though it is difficult to find any term at all, since culture cannot be weighed or measured. Nor is it the kind of terrain where one can speak of overtaking. Then something else, and since I have begun to speak about it, unfortunately we can scarcely avoid a completely new thought that I have put forth on this theme for the radio.

I will justify my lack of modesty by saying that I feel no sense in myself of any kind of national cultural backwardness. I call Slovakia a human land with an ancient culture, a land with a conscience which never spontaneously goes to extremes. I would say that within us live relatively tolerant faith and love. We are not basically inclined to those extremes, as I have said, that give birth to heretics. Our greatest burdens have not been our faith, our conscientiousness, our plans, nor our own God (in our imaginations he appears as beneficent) so we have, in simple terms, saved him. We have never forsaken him. Yet when such a beneficent and well intentioned God has not prevented us from acquiring certain teachings or knowledge, even our most extreme enlightenment has not ostracized him. This enlightenment, I think, and excuse me, quite ironically, collides with our current official ideology.

It is usually asserted that we differ from the Czechs in our greater orientation to the East than the West. I think, though, that our preferred direction is rather to the South. We have gone along not only the Danube path, but also the Amber Road. We prefer to look in the direction of our rivers, to the warmer oceans. Anyone

who takes close note of the architecture of our Zahoria region will see it comes mostly from the Mediterranean areas. We adopted, I contend, a friendly character, a hedonist ethic, as if we, explaining things to ourselves privately, survived our ancient times without difficult winters, with good doses of light and sun, and possibly without serious famines. We are, it seems to me, basically hedonists. Even though to the north we are inclined to asceticism, even there no one is a died in the wool puritan. Northerners are only bothered, and I say this only to aggravate Petr Jaros a little, somewhat more in their conscience for their sins than we are, because we have learned to accept loans on that more human side of the Slovak world....

#### Peter Jaros

Milan Lasica has stated that Slovaks in the past have taken a few steps for which they should feel shame or guilt. I personally, either justifiably or unfortunately, have no such feelings. Regarding those frequently mentioned year of 1848 and the position of Slovaks in it, I understand it as does the historian Daniel Rapant, that the Hungarians behaved in a counterrevolutionary manner towards the Slovaks. This is shown by their actions in succeeding decades, by their attempt at totally assimilating the Slovak people, a policy that culminated with the Appony laws of 1906. The paradox is that the Slovaks probably were thankful for a world cataclysm like World War I.

Let us look at 1918 and the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. I think that from the beginning we should not have entered Europe as a united Czechoslovak people but as Czechs, Slovaks, and as Czechoslovakia. This is how our nation was named until 1920, under the Pittsburgh accords when, under bureaucratic pressure, Benes began to call for Czechoslovakia. The second time this name was used was from 1938 until 14 March 1939, this time under German or other pressure to meet Slovak demands. Professor Stevcek has stated that Slovaks received some false gifts when they entered Europe, and had to pay for them later. I would say that they received gifts other than they should have. They should have received their due, namely being able to enter Europe as a people of equal standing with the Czechs.

Now let us go to the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1939. This is a sensitive event that can be explained in different ways. I think that this is the main cause of the schizophrenia that has been mentioned, because the Slovak nation was created during a wave of German nationalism, which was tied to our, I would say positive, Hlinek nationalism. This person, later on to be sure, after his death, was associated with Nazi ideology, and therefore not only intellectuals, but many Slovaks had the schizophrenic feeling that they had gotten what they had wanted for some time, their own nation, but at the price of the unacceptable Nazi ideology.

Let us also recall 1968, when the Slovaks were pulling at the short end of the federation, while the Czechs were

pulling in the direction of democratization. This has been mentioned more than once and there are different views on this as well, from both the Czech and the Slovak viewpoint. I think that an inseparable, and primary component of democratization and democracy was the federalization solution, because only then will it be possible to speak of a democratic nation. The resolution of these issues that took place in the next 20 unfortunate years pushed the Slovaks somewhat ahead, while the Czechs, who had no such needs, only went backwards during this period, as mentioned already by Ladislav Ballek. This means that in 1989 we again encountered the Czechs on the starting line of a level playing field. In the future it will be necessary to resolve the economic content of the federation, and confederation if this seems appropriate.

#### Ivan Slimak

What are we, as Slovaks, at the present time? We are heavily weighed down by the past, but the times demand of us that we be clear about what we want to pursue. Do we still feel that our efforts to build a future are threatened, or that we will be able to pursue it spontaneously, without the drag of relations with Hungarians or Czechs?

One involuntarily compares the fate of the Slovaks with that of other European peoples. My own professional interests lead me to comparisons with Lithuanians and Estonians. These people have been threatened, quite simply, with biological extinction. Before World War II Estonians were 90 percent of the population of their country; now they are 62 percent. The question is whether the Slovaks were threatened in this way after 1918 or whether, despite all the Czechoslovakism and other "isms", we nevertheless deepened our national identity step by step. I think, in spite of all the complications of our development, that we are slowly but inexorably reaching a point where our national existence is not threatened. And it seems to me that our need to constantly compare ourselves to Hungarians or Czechs attests to a complex that does not correspond to the movements of the contemporary world.

People returning from international conferences say that after 1993 a person who does not know three world languages will have trouble moving around in an integrated world. What then will we Slovaks mean in such an integrated world? What will the basic trends in this world be? Will national characteristics become less evident and humanity become more and more uniform (a certain type of culture spreading here would support this), or will the opposite happen. Will new political and economic problems, despite all their complexities, tend to be generalized through the greater integration, giving peoples and smaller units an opportunity to make a name for themselves?

It seems to me that the great peoples have exhausted themselves by governing. Today the ancient Greeks and Romans no longer exist, but the Ethiopians, who have never ruled anyone, have been around for 2,000 years.

Slovaks have never made decisions affecting the fate of the world, have never initiated or been the agents of historical events, but could have been rather the agent of cultural development for humanity. We make a mistake, however, by remaining fixated on that which occurred on our Slovak territory, and not recognizing sufficiently that this territory was a cultural space in which the influences of European cultures intersected. These cultural movements have not been adequately researched and this has even obscured the ethnogenesis of the Slovaks. In different interpretations it looks like the Slovaks fell into Hungary in the 18th century.

I see a second reason for our smallness complex in our inability to integrate our history with what actually happened. We are constantly looking for a justification for our actions. In the FRG, for instance, there has been a concerted effort to come to terms with what happened. Jaspers has written about guilt and as a result a person born after 1945 accepts Hitler as a part of his history, while Russian nationalists in the Soviet Union still today are tirelessly looking for external scapegoats: the Jews taught them to drink, the Freemasons are responsible for something else. In short they are incapable of integrating their own history. The Slovak people can easily integrate all aspects of its history. They do not have to constantly look for excuses. It is understandable that the political representatives of a people always make mistakes. We cannot evaluate history only on this basis.

There is one danger here. Because of their education, intellectuals and the scientific community are capable of "packaging" every historical concept. The classic example of this is what has been done to the history of the Slovak National Uprising in 1945. There are at least four interpretations, and there will certainly be a fifth in the near future. When Julius Satinsky speaks of a darkness or emptiness in the brains of young people, it is a totally logical vacuum, because young people have for some time felt that everything is a lie, even though this is not the case.

Ivan Klima wrote in Student Letters that we are absolute masters in damning what has already occurred. He of course is basing the comment on Czech history, but his statements apply to Slovaks as well. Every period is influenced by what has gone before. We are incapable of a continual overview, of creating an authentic, true picture of what has come even immediately before, that we have directly experienced. We damn it rather than study it.

#### Milan Lasica

I want to address a brief comment to Peter Jaros. I did not intend my words to mean that we should discount certain historical facts or have feelings of guilt. I am only concerned that we call by their correct names certain things that we have not spoken openly about for decades.

Ivan Slimak spoke of a feeling of being threatened, which was appropriate during the second half of the last century. It seems to me though that this feeling of being

threatened has given rise to a national characteristic that has been carried over to a time when the threat was much less or nonexistent. We became accustomed to being threatened and continue to think in this frame of mind.

#### Peter Jaros

I am in favor of calling a spade a spade, but cannot agree that taking refuge in reaction or the formation of a counter movement is a permanent national trait of Slovaks. We all know that in 1848 the Slovak and Hungarian revolutions went hand in hand, and it was only when the Slovaks broke ranks over the question of their autonomy within Hungary that the Hungarians began to behave in a counterrevolutionary way towards them and tried to suppress the Slovak revolution. I also think that the Czechs after 1918 did not behave in a counterrevolutionary way towards us, but rather undemocratically, in the sense that they did not give us what we were entitled, but something else. They gave us Czechoslovakism, not Slovakness. I do not even consider the 1968 desire for an independent state under a federation to be a deviation stemming from a national trait, but as a completely obvious wish.

#### Tomas Janovic

I want to digress from the theme for a moment, then return to it indirectly. I am not afraid that, say, the Czechs or the Hungarians might take our nation away in the near future. I am rather afraid that the denationalization will take place through a phenomenon that I have called "satellite subculture". This has begun to overrun us whether we like it or not. If it at least would teach us to speak English well it would be all right, but I am afraid that it will not only make us stop speaking good Slovak, but stop us from speaking, or even thinking at all.

If we want to enter Europe as a unique society we will have to do so by waging a daily battle with the satellite subculture, a battle led by values that we ourselves create. Otherwise we will chop the legs off of our own national table, right before our eyes.

#### Jan Stevcek

I don't know if we are aware that we are speaking the languages of three cultures. The first of these is the mythic-epic, spoken by Ladislav Ballek and Peter Jaros. It is optimistic, logically, because it must both synthesize and look for conflicts in everything. It brings out that which had value in the past and prospects in the future. The second language is political-pragmatic; Mr. Klimko speaks this language. It is expressed with legal precision and restricts itself to facts. The third language is the intellectual-spiritual, and is the tongue I attempt to speak.

Let's talk about our current problem: How do we enter a contemporary Europe on the verge of integration? Do we enter by making Slovakia an empty cultural space, or do we enter as a people that has already been formed intellectually? If we enter Europe as an empty cultural

space we are lost, because we will simply disappear in a sea of immense cultural pressures, or in a sea of subcultures, as described by Tomas Janovic.

A comment for Ivan Slimak. We do not want of course to impose a Jasper-like guilt. Our task today must be to define the situation in which we find ourselves precisely. If we fail to do this, we will again pay a price. I think that our situation is such that an immense amount depends on us, the Slovak intelligentsia. The position that we, the Slovak intelligentsia, adopts on this general historical problem is of immense importance. I, for instance, am skeptical. I do not think that the Slovak intelligentsia as a class is culturally-nationally conscious to the extent that it can serve as a base for a wider, European discussion. Individuals maybe, but as a group, no. We do not have our own program. Based on conversations I know that both the Czech and the Hungarian intelligentsia have programs. While the Hungarians and Czechs are prepared, aware, even hyperaware, to enter, as intelligentsia, into the current European political, moral, and legal context, we Slovaks are not. We cannot simply empty our space ahead of time for the great European ideas, because these ideas would simply not know where to move. We would be dumb, and culturally anonymous. Today every last little plant has a right to exist in the cultural ecology, but not if it is a people five million strong. If we miss this historical moment, though, which is very short, if we do not grow up very fast both pragmatically-politically and culturally, if we do not develop a cultural program for ourselves, we will be lost because there will be great cultural competition. There is a great difference between entering Europe passively and doing so actively. I think that from the European perspective it would be a shame to lose a certain color that would enrich the overall spectrum.

#### Ivan Lehotsky

Allow me to contribute to this discussion as a Swiss theologian who feels and thinks as a Slovak. I am not a follower of any emigrant political party and practically from the beginning of my emigration in 1968 I have distanced myself from all Slovak emigrant associations. As a Slovak sympathizer abroad it bothers me that no one knows anything about Slovaks. It makes me angry when *The Thousand Year Bee* and the Assistant are considered Czech films and Bratislava Slovan as a Czech soccer team. There are hundreds of such examples. The question arises of why the Slovaks are not as well known in the West as the Czechs, who are invited to international forums and have their say there.

Regarding the Slovak emigration, it is not a dried up, but drying up twig. Maybe my horizons are too narrow but I have encountered only three Slovaks who I respect: Dr. Kruzliak in Munich, Stano Dusik in Florence, and, as a realistic politician, Dr. Braxator, who lives between Switzerland and Spain. These are three people who I respect and who have something to say to Slovaks both

abroad and at home. This fact should stimulate discussion of what can be done to create a Slovak identity, as well as for the popularity of the "image" of Slovaks abroad.

#### Milan Lasica

I think that just as a study of the past provides a picture of how we are today, so the emigration is a certain picture or reflection of what exists at home. When a Slovak work of art or soccer team is presented as Czech abroad, we are accustomed to blame Czechs for this. I do not agree with this view. Recently a Mr. Uhrík from the United States appeared on television. He had thought hard about the situation at home and urged us to do something so that the world knows about us. He probably challenged the right people, because if our fairly numerous emigrant community in the United States has not been able to do this, the fault probably lies at home.

#### Karel Horak

The number of problems that have accumulated here over 40 years are such that their solution is beyond the power of this discussion. I want to contribute a recent, personal experience in French-Czech relations. I had returned from a trip by an amateur theater company to Bordeaux, where we had struggled with problems similar to those we are discussing here. There, after a three hour interview they still introduced us as a Czech company, but we knew we could rise above this slight after comparing our product with that of Czech companies doing similar things. I would be glad to note as well that the interest in us in Europe, which is evident in part by the invitation to the festival, is seasonal and derives from the recent political changes. Once we can meet this interest with excellent performances we will not have to feel inferior in comparison with the West. We are capable of more than they expect from us.

Considering the past 20 years I think that the situation in the 1970's and 1980's has not yet been adequately described, particularly in regard to young Slovak culture. This culture entered this period weighed down with certain atavisms, divorced from the European context, and had to make corrections. The result is an absurd situation that I can again illustrate with a personal example. When a person arrives in France, he can touch the development of surrealism in the 1960's and 1970's and immediately realizes that Severed Hands had been severed as early as the 1950's. The fact that criticism completely neglected this situation seems absurd, for instance, to a student of French literature in the 1990's. If we are to accelerate the maturation of the Slovak intelligentsia we need to do so in these blank spots that have developed in Slovak culture.

#### Roman Polak

I don't think the Slovak intelligentsia should enter Europe before I make a few comments. It will demand an immense amount of energy to resolve all the complexes that have accumulated in this intellectual space. I admit

that I do not understand. You mentioned Estonians. I worked for a time in Estonia, and never met an Estonian who had as many complexes, and there are only one million Estonians, as the four million Slovaks. Estonians have no doubt that they belong to European culture, although they belong to the Soviet Union, whereas we have been discussing for a thousand years whether we belong or do not belong, whether we should include ourselves in it or not. From the time that Leonard Z. Unicov in 1457 wrote the first couplet in Slovak, we have belonged to European literature. The question is not whether or not we belong, but the place that we occupy within it. I also think that it is not a matter of creating a program or filling a vacuum. No vacuum exists, just ability or inability. And I think that we have already demonstrated our abilities more than once.

The problem in my opinion is not how to integrate ourselves into Europe, but how to integrate within ourselves. How, for instance, can isolated, sterile Bratislava integrate itself into Slovakia. Bratislava, after all, is not Slovakia, even though its intellectual trust has gathered there. Why, for instance did civic forums arise in Eastern Slovakia? Or consider that many Easterners work in government offices in Prague, but have no special ties to Bratislava. I worked for three years in Kosice, and know that when the Hungarians occupied Kosice they sent the best artists there immediately, and over four years so Hungarianized Kosice that we have not succeeded in Slovakizing it again in the past 40 years. The fault probably lies with the Slovaks that we have been unable to export our culture not to the world, but only as far as Brezno, that we have failed to produce a culture that the inhabitants of Brezno can comprehend. Frantisek Svanter or Timrava certainly appreciate the core of the Slovak tradition, but can we say that the Slovak people comprehends it, has been able to absorb it? Can we say that Slovaks appreciate the fine irony of Janek Jesensky or the folkloric irony of Kukucina? If we want to move against Europe. let's do it, but who will we have behind us? We have proclaimed our creative connection to popular traditions. Or are we only a skeleton, as Bratislava is a skeleton, and the entire intellectual core of the nation. It would be enough for the pope and five additional clerics to come and would we all be manipulated? This I see as the main problem.

Despite all I have said I am proud to be a Slovak, even though one of those primitive Slovaks as I learned from a conversation with a Dane at the Moscow airport. When I said I am a Slovak he responded: You are a little towards the Balkans. Yes, I answered, we are those Slovaks who gladly get drunk, get in a fight, and are in the Balkans. But this does not mean that these primitive, folkloric Slovaks cannot have some culture within themselves, cannot have their own intellectual peaks, and cannot excel at something.

#### Ladislav Ballek

I think that we are facing a somewhat broader task, namely looking at what we call the character of the

nation in a much more exhaustive way than ever before. This can be roughly determined, or so we maintained in our student days, by a deep understanding of national history and biography, i.e. the diaries and lives of people.

Since in my first, longer statement, I noted mainly what bothers me, I will remain faithful to this theme now. One of these has recurred for some time: What in our national lives and existences are we losing and building, that we should not be losing or building?

If I understand our current existence as an arc, I can divide it into three sections, or periods, dominated in turn by a primary, secondary, and tertiary sphere. I have already mentioned the first briefly, so now a few words about the second. This second phase did not turn out well for us. While other peoples used it to improve themselves, then crowned their efforts with nationhood and rapid industrialization, ours almost ended with a death knell. Even though we passionately fought for our existence we were very close to becoming extinct. Our physical and psychological state of that time dogs our efforts to this day. If in the tertiary sphere expectations are met and human intellect and culture is decisive, the human capacity for association, negotiation, and understanding through collectively determined strategies, then we should be able to rid ourselves of all these evil complexes and bad dreams. This is the only way that I think about them, as if they did not exist.

As an old and wise Jewish proverb states he who lives and survives by his memory submits to penitence. Memory is a kind of penitence, as well as a refusal to go anywhere, but especially into an exile with no return. Today I have already learned something about our memory. I think of it happily because it is thanks to our memory, and mainly because of it, that we are still here. Even though I joked that the Northerners are closer to asceticism than the Southerners to whom I belong, justice demands admitting that perhaps because of their heightened awareness of conscience and consciousness, actually memory, we are still here. Using the terminology of an older American sociologist, we have been and continue to be a people that is internally motivated. I have already stated that we almost with pleasure raise questions of morals and conscience. Are we moral? Do we have a conscience? I repeat that I consider such questions important, but I also have to pose the somewhat heretical question of whether too great a concentration on such questions makes it more difficult for us than for others to adapt to modern trends. I think that the more difficult it is for us to adapt to new trends, the more trouble we have letting go of our past, the more difficult it will be to rid ourselves of the burdens of our heritage.

#### Vladimir Petrik

I want to speak about the theme of an independent nation, about nationhood. This problem is closely related to Czech-Slovak relations and is especially

pressing today. We have a political movement or movements that have put the existence or struggle for an independent Slovak nation in their election platforms, though camouflaging it. These movements have many followers. They justify these platforms by saying that every people has the right to its own nation. This is surely true. "Peoples clearly have the right to their own national life." This is quoted from Ladislav Novomesky's article in 1946. Novomesky continues, "Even the Slovak people has this right. Our uprising confirmed the decision of the Slovak people to have their own nation in common with the Czech people. It confirmed this because only in such a nation, more than in any other national entity, lies the sure possibility for developing the ideals that make Slovaks Slovaks...." Novomesky here builds on the fact that the Slovak uprising in 1944 declared a joint nation of Czechs and Slovaks, i.e. a Czechoslovak Republic. Political representatives of the current Slovak state cannot forgive the uprising for "isolating" the Slovak Republic. Why did this happen? Leaving aside the international aspect of the problem, which is important, we have available one explanation (to say nothing of the common cultural tradition and historical events generally): for 20 years after the overthrow, despite everything, and I have in mind here the unacceptable idea of Czechoslovakism, our national society had become accustomed to the democratic institutions of the First Republic and remembered them. The Slovak nation smacked too much of totalitarianism and associations with German fascism. Where should we have returned at the historical moment of the worldwide struggle against German fascist aggression, if not to the first Czechoslovak Republic? To be sure, it was to be another republic, new, built on a new foundation. On foundations of equality for the two peoples and Slovak nationhood, of which Novomesky spoke. The principle of "equals among equals" was, to be sure, proclaimed in the Kosice government program, but was not provided for legislatively, for instance by federalizing the joint republic, and thus was invalid. After 1948 everything became invalid, even formal equality, because in a totalitarian regime "unity" was again the word, but on different ideological foundations. All differences and differentiations had to be wiped out or at least concealed.

What bothers me about today's separatists is that the independent Slovak nation they advocate is the same one we had between 1939 and 1945. I, for one, have neither heard nor sensed that they have strictly distanced themselves through a full criticism of everything inhuman and antidemocratic in that republic; or heard them put forth another, more free, democratic model. This makes it an anachronism; actually a double anachronism, a return to a form of totalitarianism and separation at a time when Europe is integrating. Certainly we have to enter this new Europe as a sovereign entity, but this should be provided by our own nationhood within an "authentic" federation, as the term is used presently. The conditions for this relationship between two equal republics are to be created by the democratic institutions

under which we have been living now for six months. Democracy will be necessary mainly at a later date, when we will be resolving our problems ourselves in Slovakia. What good would Slovak nationhood be to us if we felt manipulated within it? We cannot take the nation as a fetish. It has always depended, and will continue to depend on the type of regime through which that nationhood is implemented, on the system in which we live and will continue to live. This directly affects all of us. And this is where we will show who and what we are.

## HUNGARY

### Implications of Soviet Stock Purchase Plan Analyzed

91CH0129E Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
1 Nov 90 p 9

[Article by Karoly Balogh: "Hungarian-Soviet Joint Enterprises: Stock in Exchange for Debts?"—first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Excerpts] There is not much hope that the Soviet Union will compensate for losses incurred in Hungarian-Soviet trade as a result of the transition to dollar-based settlement. On the other hand, the Soviet party envisions an opportunity to purchase stock in Hungarian enterprises. This proposal is stunning at first glance. The author presents the details of the proposal.

In terms of both number and the volume of assets, joint enterprises established in Hungary with the help of Soviet capital constitute only a negligible part of all joint enterprises. At the same time, however, from among the CEMA partners only the Soviet Union established joint enterprises in Hungary. The Soviet Union has controlling interest in almost every one of these. Whether these joint enterprises will be able to maintain their exports to the Soviet Union when trade transactions are settled in dollars is of decisive significance. Such exports make up a respectable part of the total production value of these enterprises. Changes made in Hungarian regulations governing joint enterprises do not present a threat. Even thus far these joint enterprises had to comply with Hungarian rules and regulations.

### Realistic Chance

A standard application of Hungarian law will mean that beginning in 1991 Soviet enterprises will have the same opportunity to invest in Hungary as their Western counterparts have—provided that an intergovernmental agreement signed in 1986 loses force. The expected increase in Soviet inclinations to invest will be encouraged by two factors. One of these is the growing number of opportunities presented by the independence of Soviet enterprises. The other is based on a mutual endeavor to enable Hungary to pay (or that Hungary pay) in the form of stock issued by Hungarian enterprises for its expected losses incurred as a result of exchange rate differentials. The Soviet side is yet to give its official



blessings to this solution, nevertheless it treats the matter as a realistic alternative. So much so that the Soviet daily press makes regular reference to this possibility. One may assume, however, that unexpressed Hungarian thoughts which serve as a foundation for this proposal (if these thoughts were defined already) significantly differ from Soviet hopes and expectations relative to investments in Hungary.

Already at present, most Soviet firms endeavor to acquire the stock of relatively well managed enterprises, the way this could be expected to happen in the framework of normal investment processes. This is appropriate relative to investments based on realistic capital contribution which involve risk taking and the placement of actually available resources. Such investment will be characteristic of the reviving Soviet enterprise sphere.

In contrast, however, even though Soviet enterprises are the beneficiaries in this regard, in the final analysis losses incurred as a result of exchange rate differentials constitute state obligations, because in the end, based on its monopoly over foreign exchange the state will issue a ruble credit to the shipper for the value of goods delivered. This was the case at least at the time when the agreement on prompt collections was in force, which characterized the ruble era. But since the time that both sides agreed in principle to adopt the dollar as the basis of our financial settlements beginning in 1991, the Soviet Union introduced an import licensing system applicable to Hungarian machine industry products. Some assume that the new licensing rules apply to all Hungarian products. This Soviet measure is consistent with the practice followed in Soviet trade relations with capitalist countries.

Accordingly, as a result of administrative intervention the Soviet partner will still be able to control the way the global balance of payments takes shape under the new conditions, and will be less and less inclined to make advance payments in rubles for [Hungarian] exports delivered (not yet paid for). Accordingly, our indebtedness will not be that simple in the Soviet relationship either....

#### **A Deficit Beginning in 1992?**

Based on all this, how would possible Soviet stock purchases fit into Hungarian economic policy, and into the system of economic relations between the two countries that were placed on new foundations? Without going into the details of offsetting and settling an expected Hungarian negative balance of payments, we may state that the impact of Soviet stock purchases will not be significant, thanks to the 1990 Hungarian surplus calculated on the basis of the 0.92 multiplier applied to the dollar/ruble conversion process, and thanks to endeavors to improve the Hungarian export structure. This is particularly so as long as we are able to reach an

agreement with the Soviet side to regularly take advantage of a technological credit fund of between \$100 million and \$200 million.

Beginning in 1992, however, the shortfall will be greater if we continue to procure most of our raw materials and energy resources from the Soviet Union. (Failing to do so would not be in our interest.) Accordingly, at that point the significance of Soviet stock purchases will increase. Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, a larger part of investment decisions will still depend on the central government (including specialized ministries). For this reason, the chief directions such investments should take will continue to be defined in the framework of governmental negotiations, at least for the next two or three years. For this reason, Hungarian economic management should soon develop a concept as to the appropriate spheres of the economy, and the conditions to be offered to the Soviet Union for purposes of buying stock in exchange for defraying part of the payments we are obligated to make to the Soviet Union. This concept should closely follow our privatization goals.

Accordingly, stock will be purchased in exchange for indebtedness incurred as a result of losses created by the exchange rate differential. As compared to the previous year, at the level of the national economy the foreign exchange value received for this stock will not constitute added income, because all of the value received for stock will have to be expended for goods imported from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this situation may provide supplemental income to enterprises whose stock is sold abroad in the framework of privatization. Such enterprises may obtain forints by using revenues realized from the sale of imported goods, provided that the state is willing to invest these funds with the enterprises in question. In this way then, enterprises may obtain developmental resources after they succeed in stabilizing their respective financial situations.

This money could be used in part to purchase machinery, equipment, materials, etc., from capitalist countries. This then will represent a debit against our balance of payments in convertible currencies. The indebtedness-stock purchase transaction may exert an unfavorable impact on the balance of payments under yet another scenario: If profits are withdrawn by the Soviet Union. For this reason an interstate agreement should provide that such profits be reinvested in Hungary for a three to five year period. This condition would not apply of course to profits realized by Soviet enterprises which at their own initiative invest operating capital.

#### **Compensation**

It is apparent that insofar as Hungary is concerned, the transaction described above amounts to the surrender of stock. Another important element of this transaction is closely related to the settlement of the present volume of more than 1,300 billion forint [domestic] indebtedness of the state.



Many recommendations were made to the effect that since this indebtedness of the state was incurred mostly as a result of subsidizing inefficient activities and enterprises operating at a low efficiency rate, it should be "allocated" to the individual activities and enterprises involved. This means that certain amounts to be determined on the basis of empirical criteria should be debited over a long period of time to "loss-generating" enterprises. [passage omitted]

In the course of intergovernmental negotiations the above described sale of stock was presented as a Soviet contribution to the development of the respective enterprises involved, whereas it should be apparent that to a large extent, this transaction serves to provide additional compensation to the Soviet Union for losses incurred in the course of trading with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, it would be beneficial to define the Hungarian concept also in this regard....[passage omitted]

#### **Industry, Commerce Ministry Organization Discussed**

91CH0089A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
11 Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with Ministry of Industry and Commerce Administrative State Secretary Henrik Auth by Erzsebet Eller; place and date not given: "The Organization Exists Already"—first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] The original concept of an economic super-ministry did not come about as planned. There is instead a ministry which supposedly cooperates with four other organizations of equal weight. Where does the Industry and Commerce Ministry fit in the distribution of labor among these organizations, we asked Administrative State Secretary Henrik Auth.

[Eller] I was prompted to ask what tasks are being performed by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, because, so far as I know, there still exist disputed areas and overlaps primarily in regard to the Ministry of International Economic Relations [NGKM].

[Auth] We succeeded in separating functions particularly in regard to the NGKM in my view. We are able to say what their functions and what our functions are. In other words, the truly debatable issues, such as the development of customs duty policies, the licensing of joint enterprises, export and import licensing, and the evaluation of competitive export proposals clearly came within, or remained within, the NGKM jurisdiction. Most of these functions were performed previously by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and as far as competitive export proposals were concerned, they were evaluated jointly by the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Industry.

[Eller] Should I understand this to say that in regard to these issues you yielded the decision-making authority to the other ministry?

[Auth] Let us not simplify this matter. The No. 1 ministry which has responsibility for these matters is the NGKM, but we agree in every instance, because they do not deny the fact that for example customs duty policies and industrial policy must be our starting point.

[Eller] You said that reorganization took place in an exemplary manner at the NGKM. In contrast, I heard conflicting statements from the staff. Specifically, that people were assigned to tasks for which there were others much better trained who would have access to the appropriate technical equipment....

[Auth] It comes as natural, and I will not deny this for a moment, that every reorganization is accompanied by small and large conflicts. I also heard that there were frictions in regard to the distribution of technical equipment, but we must transcend these matters, because this is not of the essence.

[Eller] In the end, what does the organization of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce look like?

[Auth] Consistent with our original plans, a functionally oriented organization was established. It consists of four major blocs: the economy, industrial policy, commerce, and energy. The fact is that treating the energy-related matters as an independent bloc is not logical. The issues related to energy supplies, energy dependence, or independence, the matter of having multiple sources for energy, constitute not only economic, but also political issues, and there are rather few state institutions which have authority in this regard. For this reason it would be appropriate to have a separate, independent staff within this Ministry. We would like to relieve the trusts which function in this field (I am talking about the National Crude Oil and Gas Trust [OKGT] and the Hungarian Electrical Works Trust [MVMT]) from making decisions not based on efficiency considerations, from functions which should be performed fundamentally by governmental authorities....

[Eller] Do experts in the Ministry manage the trusts on the basis of "hands-on" management?

[Auth] That's not the issue. Energy must be dealt with as a central issue, because on the resource side of matters—the causes are known—there exists an extremely large uncertainty. And further, one cannot tell the way in which energy demand will take shape in the wake of the structural transformation, diversification of industry, moreover, of the entire Hungarian economy. And the transformation of the large organizations, including the trusts I mentioned before, are still ahead of us. We plan to establish two state holding corporations. This will take place in a way that between the producers of electrical energy on the one hand, and coal mining on the other, there will come about a merger in terms of ownership. This will take place after the transformation of the coal mining industry, because that has to come first.

[Eller] As you mentioned, commerce is another independent bloc within the Ministry, and this is not synonymous with domestic commerce.

[Auth] This is true, this unit has the task of helping to build the market, and to intervene on behalf of the state where market conditions so demand....

[Eller] In what instances for example?

[Auth] Today this would be drought and related concerns. Commerce is still dominated by a certain outlook based on counties, and we must change that situation. It will be necessary to do away with some significant monopolies such as the Heating Fuel and Construction Materials Enterprise [TUZEP]. At the same time privatization of the retail business sector places great demands on the staff.

[Eller] Let us not discuss this matter, because it would significantly divert attention from the original subject of our discussion. This problem is well known from other writings. But as I understand the matter, the theoretical development of privatization falls within the sphere of the economic division—bloc, if you will.

[Auth] We also established a division for the coordination of tasks related to privatization and enterprise organizational matters. We did so, because an organizational structure based on functions presumes a constant partnership between the various units, in order to eliminate many parallel functions and duplications. Thus, this bloc dealing with the economy performs the task of reconciling industrial policy considerations and consequences, among other matters, with labor affairs considerations and consequences. If, for example, we recommend placing a given enterprise under state administrative supervision. A labor affairs unit was also established within the bloc. Under no circumstances does this unit intend to function as a mini-Ministry of Labor Affairs. It prepares forecasts regarding expected tensions related to employment, and provides indications to the Ministry of Labor Affairs. And finally—perhaps I should have started with this one—our experts who examine macroeconomic contexts and try to formulate industrial policy within macroeconomic contexts work within the bloc that deals with the economy. This was necessary because as a result of liquidating the National Planning Office, there came about a temporary vacuum in examining the effects of macroeconomic contexts on industry. The Finance Ministry performs only part of these functions.

[Eller] We have not yet discussed the industrial policy bloc, the organizational unit closest to the former Ministry of Industry. What is the difference between the functions of this unit, and of the former Ministry of Industry?

[Auth] I would rather tell you what the functions of this unit are: It forecasts the situation of individual specialized branches, provides guidance and concepts to privatization. Such guidance pertains for example to the

direction developmental projects should take, what capital it would be worth using to realize such projects. Accordingly, this is the unit which must represent the state as the real owner, if state property is involved. Quite naturally, the market determines potential partners in the individual specialized branches, but strategies are needed for the development of the individual specialized branches. Well, we established the organization to develop strategy, but the strategy itself is still missing. Specific work began in four areas: In regard to the iron foundry industry, the petrochemical industry, the electronics, and the aluminum industries. The machine industry is still on the "waiting list," but within that, progress was made in the vehicle manufacturing industry with the beginning of the bankruptcy reorganization of Ikarus and the Csepel Auto Works. We may expect to see an invitation for competitive bids for the sale of a functioning vertically integrated [business].

[Eller] Let us not go into detail about the fact that fortunately the Reorganization Fund was large enough to reorganize Ikarus and the Csepel Auto Works, and having accomplished that, no more funds are available. The fact that you intend to use part of the state revenues derived from privatization for shoring up certain bankrupt state enterprises is known. Instead of discussing this matter, let me ask the following question: In what way does the Ministry intend to deal with technical development in the future? I understand that the National Technical Development Committee [OMFB] survived the organizational changes and continues to exist under the authority of a minister without portfolio.

[Auth] Technical development within the Ministry will also be dealt with by the industrial policy bloc. It is hoped that the financial resources we may use for purposes of technical development will not be reduced. We would like to utilize these funds in a way different from what we did before. We would place the money in an open foundation, and this foundation could receive the already respectable volume of foreign offerings. And certainly, the foundation's board will be better able than our own staff to integrate the various considerations that play a role in awarding the funds. Contestants for the funding of developmental projects would receive the money from banks, thus making recovery of those funds the primary consideration. The question is whether an independent institution alongside the Academy To Coordinate Research and Development is justified in a country where no substantial basic research is being pursued. Examples exist in other countries for both situations. But in Hungary, the OMFB will indeed remain for the time being.

[Eller] No mention was made of the following matter for a long time, but I learned that oversight of the construction industry will also be a function of this Ministry.

[Auth] Indeed, the decision to place the oversight function for the construction industry with this, rather than with the Environmental Protection Ministry was made later. From a practical standpoint, this function is being

transferred to a single bloc, because the truth is that the leadership of the Ministry is only now becoming familiar with the kind of work involved in overseeing the construction industry. Accordingly, we took the function together with the people—whoever was willing to take these jobs—from the other ministry.

[Eller] Is it fair to say that the present state apparatus—including your Ministry—operates in a more centralized fashion than the old state apparatus?

[Auth] It is true that the state apparatus is more centralized, but that is not necessarily a mistake. The previous apparatus did not provide any direction, and the relationship between the ministries and business organizations through whom information was exchanged, was totally disrupted. At this point professionals from the ministries are seated in enterprise councils. I acknowledge the fact that from the standpoint of form this constitutes a greater degree of centralization, but we told all of our professionals not to interfere in local conflicts. Their task is to ensure that all sides are informed.

At first glance, the placing of certain firms under state administrative management also constitutes a strong intervention in the lives of enterprises. But the only purpose this measure could have—and we said this many times—is to prepare for subsequent privatization. To provide you with an example for the opposite of centralization: We discontinued the military division. We did so, because in this new situation military deliveries must also be performed by enterprises on the basis of business considerations. The fact that a military industry, as a separate branch of industry no longer exists is well known. Enterprises went entirely or half bankrupt as a result of reduced military orders. Therefore, this industry will be monitored by a small professional core within the Ministry.

### **Enterprise Council Functions, Election Framework Described**

91CH0130B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 15 Sep 90 p 5

["What's Their Function"—supplement to an article describing the renewal and reelection of enterprise councils]

[Text] The cabinet decree concerning state enterprises defines enterprise councils as the general executive bodies which provide for the autonomous management of enterprises. Their authority includes:

- approval of the enterprise's financial statement and determination of the final balance, as shown in the financial statement;
- significant changes in the scope of the enterprise's activities;
- significant decisions regarding investments made by the enterprise;

—determinations to change the enterprise into an independent enterprise, or to authorize the enterprise's significant participation in a business organization;

—determination of the enterprise's organizational and operating rules;

—significant decisions regarding the workforce;

—determination of the principles by which the surplus income of the enterprise will be distributed;

—election, dismissal, qualification, evaluation and hearing the report of the president; the exercise of the authority of the employer over the president;

—transfer of the general management of the enterprise to the general meeting of workers, or to the meeting of worker delegates;

—determinations concerning the breaking up of the enterprise, the joining of, or merging with another enterprise, the changing of the enterprise into a business organization or a cooperative, acceptance of merger proposed by another enterprise.

The membership of enterprise councils consists of the workers' elected delegates, representatives of enterprise management, and of a person designated by the founding agency. The vote of each member of the council counts as one vote. Enterprise councils may not have fewer than six members, or more than 50 members. Half the number of enterprise council members is elected by workers. The number of workers' delegates does not include the chairman of the enterprise council elected from among the workers' delegates. The other half of the number of enterprise council members consists of representatives of enterprise management and of the person designated by the founding agency. The president of the enterprise designates at most one third of the representatives of enterprise management. Except for close relatives, the president may designate persons not employed by the enterprise as members of the enterprise council.

Enterprises under the general direction of enterprise councils must reconstitute their enterprise councils by 15 September 1990, and must decide within 15 days thereafter regarding the confirmation of the president in his post. This decision shall be made by the vote of a two-thirds majority of the enterprise council cast by secret ballot. In the event that the enterprise council fails to confirm the president in his position, this act shall be regarded as terminating the president's employment relationship in the form of relieving the president of his duties. If the president of an enterprise is not confirmed in his position, an invitation for competitive applications must be announced within 30 days from the date of the related enterprise council decision.

**Enterprise Councils: Prolongation Condemned**

91CH0130A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 15 Sep 90 p 83

[Editorial by HETI VILAGGAZDASAG reporter  
Gyorgyi Kocsis: "Simulators"]

[Text] It may perhaps suffice for a circus show, but this much is certain: The mandatory reelection of enterprise councils will hardly produce more bread. The institution of enterprise councils is one of the absurdities of socialism.

Economic historians may call the 1980's in Hungary the age of simulations. In this "exemplary country," dozens of economists conjured up artificial "regulatory systems" supposed to symbolize the chief conditions which exist in developed market economies. Enterprise councils were supposed to "simulate" capitalist, because the fact that the state proved to be unsuitable to play this role had to be recognized. And just like the rest of the "simulations," the enterprise councils also proved themselves to be dead end streets, fakes, that they lead nowhere and that they did not replace the original. This is so, because advocates of enterprise councils expected the impossible from these organizations: to simultaneously enforce the on occasion conflicting interests of capitalist and employees.

The fact that the present government provides legitimacy to this institution is more than incomprehensible. It does so by ordering new enterprise council elections, and by pretending it had plans for the future of enterprise councils while aware of the above described capitalist-employee relationship and while placing the ideal of a market economy above everything. One wonders whether ignorance, lack of familiarity with greater contexts, or sheer demagoguery supports statements which claim that "the people will elect the appropriate professionals." Indeed, the people are not stupid, and this is proven by oft-repeated demands made on television and in press reports, according to which there is a need for enterprise councils which "represent the workers' interests." Except for this question: What constitutes the

workers' interest? Job security, a good income, appropriate working conditions—i.e., everything a decent trade union would fight for. Would it be in the interest of workers to shut down their plants, to be laid off, or perhaps to be forced to retrain, or to be replaced by modern, more efficient and less costly equipment? Would it be in the workers' interest to make requirements more stringent? No. All these matters are in the owner's interest. Enterprise councils do not represent a clear-cut interest, they are only semblances of an institution. Accordingly, a good enterprise council does not exist, at best we may have some which are not as bad as the others. Therefore the conclusion suggests itself: Any statement which fosters the belief that in principle enterprise councils are good institutions, except that they were constituted in an improper way—because they were elected under political pressure, etc.—have the same roots as the old dogma which holds that socialism is fundamentally good, except for the fact that thus far it has been implemented improperly. Accordingly, it is possible to reelect enterprise councils, but it is not worthwhile to reelect them.

Instead of reelecting enterprise councils it would be worth our while to privatize: as soon as possible and as fast as possible. And from this standpoint, the engendering of illusions relative to enterprise councils, the incitement of passions and the avalanche of complaints concerning the "squandering" of state property belongs to the same bouquet of demagogic weed. Long-term capital interest opposed to short-term employee interests can be enforced only by "nationalizing" and "unbuying" ["vetetlenitese"—obscure term] of ownership. This, and not the amount of revenues to be collected as a result of a sale is the main, if not the only purpose of the so frequently talked about privatization process. Expert calculations indicate that even the sale of a lion share of Hungarian industrial capital would produce only a fraction of the state's indebtedness. The sooner capital is placed into private hands, the faster we may prevent the further squandering of capital, and the sooner may we have hope for repaying the state's indebtedness. Accordingly, whoever slows down privatization because he is afraid that someone will strike a "cheap" deal and acquire property is wasteful, because he enables the continued uncontrolled functioning of capital.

## HUNGARY

### Assault on Wife of Csoori's Critic Disputed

91CH0135A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
25 Oct 90 p 5

[Article by Gy. Attila Fekete: "No Trace of the Alleged Attacker"]

[Text] "As of now we are unable to find any reasonable cause to believe that a criminal act has been perpetrated," the head of the Budapest Police Command criminal division Colonel Dr. Janos Bodracska told NEPSZABADSAG. Upon instructions received from the chief of police on 19 October, Bodracska personally directed the on-site inspection and investigation at the home of Katalin Hanak. She claims to have been attacked twice.

It may be recalled that the wife of the well known historian was first attacked on 30 September. At that time two unknown men paid a visit claiming that they brought a message from her husband. But once the door was open they whipped her in the face with a belt.

On 19 October, a few minutes before 1330 hours, Mrs. Hanak informed the police officer on duty that an unknown man bent in through the window which opens to the court yard and stabbed her.

This being the second complaint, and considering the political storm the first incident whipped up, the Budapest police command committed significant forces to investigate the matter. But all that was in vain. It turned out, however, that on the same day, at 1130 hours Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Janos Lazar, chief of the second district police command, paid a visit to Mrs. Hanak relative to the previous incident. The lieutenant colonel left a few minutes before 1300 hours. Accordingly, the person who inflicted the stab wound could have arrived only thereafter. But witnesses residing in the building unanimously claim that they did not see a stranger enter or leave the building between 1300 and 1400 hours. One of these residents was repairing his car in front of the entrance, while the other cared for his flowers in the court yard.

Dr. Endre Buza, an adjunct at the trauma division of the Janos Hospital attended the wounded Mrs. Hanak. In response to questions raised by police he reported that the complainant gave him the impression that she was under strong medication. Speaking of the wound the physician unequivocally stated that it could not have been caused by a knife. At best it could have been caused by a knitting pin or a ball point pen, and that the wound was barely deeper than one millimeter.

Considering the fact that Mrs. Hanak was lightly wounded, and that the wound will heal within eight days, the police decided to forward the investigative record to the court so that the court may decide whether it requires or rejects further investigation.

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