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**Yazov, Lizichev, Komsomol Aktiv Discuss
'Non-Regulation Relations'**

*OW3110021088 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2230 GMT 29 Oct 88*

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program—Army General Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; and Army General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, speak to the Army and Navy Komsomol Aktiv meeting held 28 October at the Soviet Army Central House on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Komsomol; also present at the meeting was Viktor Mironenko, Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol [VLKSM] first secretary—recorded]

[Text] A meeting between the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Army and Navy's Komsomol Aktiv was held on the occasion of the VLKSM's 70th anniversary at the Soviet Army Central House. Representatives of districts, fleets, and army groups came here to air their problems and put forward specific proposals on restructuring the military Komsomol's work. [video shows officers and enlisted men entering the conference room and taking their seats. Yazov, Lizichev, Mironenko, and an unidentified lieutenant colonel, are seen seated on the rostrum] Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, began the discussion.

[Begin recording] [Lizichev] Comrades, please be seated. We are pleased to note that many of you present here today have made contributions to ensure that our Komsomol is actively participating in questions relating to increasing the quality of military training, and are also actively participating in the main issue, the main task which the army is entrusted with—qualitative growth in all areas.

Even though we have gathered here to mark a jubilee and it seems that on such occasions it is customary to speak only of the good things, nevertheless today—as Vladimir Ilich Lenin taught us and as the party's Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee's general secretary, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, teaches us now—we should focus our attention primarily on shortcomings. That is why I would like to see our talk today be concerned with how the following problems are being solved: How does our Komsomol perform on the spot, in restructuring, in increasing the quality of military and political training, in the influence that the Komsomol has on nonparty youth and its ability to lead the youth? I would like to see you clearly and succinctly share your opinions on the way you are being entrusted with the solution of certain tasks, your responsibilities, the way you are being assessed as leaders of the Komsomol, for your ability to work and lead the youth.

[Sergeant M. Soldatov—identified by caption] I was sent to Afghanistan straight from a training unit. I fired my weapon only twice during training. I threw a grenade

once. What sort of a soldier am I? That is my question. I am by no means alone in this. Speaking about being a sergeant: My personal experience leads me to believe that it would have been better to pick them from among the better-trained privates in the unit because, for example, when I came to my unit, I did not know anyone. I did not know them as people. I had to become part of the collective, which is a lengthy process, to get to know them so that I could lead them effectively. I am also concerned that we are poorly prepared before call-up—very poorly.

[Sergeant Major M. Torekhanov] I read and heard about nonregulation behavior—physical insults, hazing, and abuse—even before serving in the Army. I have been serving in the Army for 2 years and my time is nearing its end. I can truly say that such behavior is very rarely encountered—I mean when a person is severely beaten up, or something like this. I have never seen anything like this, but we have to face the facts that such nonregulation behavior does occur, even among soldiers of the same intake, on ethnic grounds. In my opinion, nonregulation behavior presently manifests itself because of that.

[Unidentified sergeant] We have studied your answer at a Komsomol meeting to a letter written by a number of servicemen that deals with nonregulation behavior, and have unanimously agreed that unless all soldiers and NCO's actively participate in the solution of this problem, it will not be solved. Similarly, there should be some way to encourage servicemen—perhaps issue them an appropriate reference, or even make an entry into their military records. This way, when we are discharged—and once we leave the forces we are all equal—then, if I have served well while he served just so-so, nobody knows of this except the military authorities of the unit that he served in.

[Sergeant I. Khovrin—identified by caption] Sergeant Khovrin, Moscow Military District. I was present at the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS newspaper's presentation, which was held at the wonderful Palace of Youth. Strange as it may be, one of the questions discussed at this meeting was that of nonregulation behavior. We fully understand the importance of this problem, but nevertheless I was offended when the question was raised. Mud was poured on the Armed Forces openly from the podium, on the officer corps, and indirectly on us, the enlisted servicemen. I have a proposal: Let a meeting be held in the Central Committee—this is quite possible—and in the presence of soldiers let us discuss with the representatives of the mass media their policy and the Komsomol press' policy towards the Army.

[Lieutenant V. Golyanov—identified by caption] Comrade Minister of Defense. Comrades. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to raise two problems which give us military pilots concern. The first problem is related to the fall in the prestige of the profession of defender of the motherland. Unfortunately this problem has touched the flyers as well. This can be judged by the

drop in competition for entrance into military academies, including flying schools. [end recording]

[Voice of the announcer] Then Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and USSR defense minister, spoke. He said:

[Begin Yazov recording] A young man becomes aware of his responsibilities when he enters the Armed Forces. Restructuring is unfolding and deepening in the Armed Forces, as in the rest of the country. This means essentially that every soldier should increase his workload, improve the performance of duties that he is entrusted with, and more fully utilize all the opportunities made available to him by the motherland and develop his professional and spiritual potential so as to increase his level of military preparedness.

Certain changes for the better have been noted during the 3 and ½ years of restructuring. The number of crimes have decreased by approximately a third compared to 1985. However, the main task set by the party's Central Committee—to ensure the fundamental strengthening of the Army's and Navy's military discipline—has been proceeding until now at a slow pace. This was pointed out to us at the 13 October Politburo meeting.

One of the most important tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by the Central Committee is to master and be fully governed by the defense doctrine. One of the main tasks of this doctrine is the prevention of war, followed by the maintenance of military readiness, repulsion of aggressive intrigues, and so forth.

How can war be prevented? This is our main task and this problem should constantly occupy us. Let us take a look at why we are being criticized. If the criticisms are just, then we should take due notice of them in our practical activities and avoid them in the future. If the criticisms are leveled with the aim of belittling the dignity of the Armed Forces, if the criticisms are unjust, then nothing prevents us from speaking out, just like Comrade Sergeant Khovrin spoke. However, not all people think the same way as Comrade Khovrin does. If there are things about us that are negative, do they then have the right to criticize us? Yes, they do. One of the aspects of restructuring is to ensure that there are no organizations or aspects of the government apparatus which can be outside criticism, outside glasnost. I will say it again: If we are being criticized unfairly, let us speak out through the very same journals and newspapers. I feel pain, perhaps more pain than you, when we are being criticized. However, if we are being criticized justly, we have to correct the situation rather than try to brush the criticisms aside.

The heroic deeds of Soviet fighting men in rendering international aid to the Republic of Afghanistan is an example of the highest form of internationalism and, if you wish, even patriotism. During the cleanup following the Chernobyl AES disaster, in the mastering of space, in

harvesting, and in the fulfillment of other tasks, the Lenin Komsomol and, as a rule, the Army Komsomol, has always been in the forefront. Just think of it: We, the Armed Forces, are by far the most organized part of Soviet society. When a disaster strikes—say in Bologoye, Arzamas, or Sverdlovsk—it is a tragedy, a sorrow for the people there. Who then should be the first to come help? The first on the scene to render help to the people should be the servicemen. Who were the first on the scene at Chernobyl? The servicemen, as they should have been. Therefore the servicemen are simply discharging their duties, because we are performing our duties in the interest of the people, for the people, in the name of the people. The people respect and love their Armed Forces. [end recording]

Yazov: Politburo Discussed Military Discipline in October Meeting

PM2410104188 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[TASS report on 22 October Moscow meeting between Defense Minister Yazov and Komsomol activists: "The Army Komsomol and Restructuring"]

[Text] A meeting devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Komsomol was held in the M.V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army in Moscow 22 October between Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, and Komsomol activists from leading military units and ships. The meeting discussed progress in restructuring the work of the Army and Navy Komsomol.

Those present were addressed by Army Gen D.T. Yazov. Our party firmly links the irreversibility of the process of restructuring with young people's active creative participation in it, he said. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference stressed the need for a strong and integrated state policy toward the younger generation. The kind of policy that will enable young people to become independent as early as possible, display their abilities and realize their life's objectives as fully as possible, and be optimally prepared to promptly assume economic, political, and moral responsibility for the fate of the motherland.

The restructuring and renewal of society have entered a new phase. The Soviet people now have a better knowledge and understanding of their past and present and are looking to the future with hope and firm confidence. The policy of restructuring, detailed in concrete socioeconomic programs, is becoming the practical cause of millions of people. Restructuring has radically changed the moral and political climate in the country and won the support of the masses, who are joining increasingly actively in its implementation.

This also applies fully to the Armed Forces. The 3 and ½ years of restructuring have seen positive changes in the life of troops and naval forces. Changes for the better are gradually embracing all aspects of our Army reality.

Military councils, commanding officers, political organs, and party organizations have begun to operate with greater initiative. The tempo of combat and political training has become more precise, and modern weapons and combat equipment are being mastered more efficiently.

Practical steps are being taken to democratize Army and Navy life. Servicemen's increased sociopolitical and professional activeness has become an important indicator of the process of restructuring. This was demonstrated particularly graphically during the September "Fall-88" exercises, where the majority of formations and units displayed a high degree of combat maturity and persistence in reaching qualitatively new heights in combat readiness. Landing force soldiers and many Komsomol servicemen from the Odessa and Carpathian Military Districts, Air Defense Forces and Air Force personnel, and naval landing force servicemen from the Black Sea Fleet all performed excellently.

Through their feats of arms and successful resolution of the tasks set them in the course of the competition for a fitting welcome to the 70th anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol, nine of the best units and ships won the right to bear the honorary title "Named for the 70th Anniversary of the Komsomol."

The heroic history of the Armed Forces is inseparably linked with the history of the Lenin Komsomol. Entry into the ranks of the Komsomol was and remains tantamount to voluntarily assuming a commitment to come to the defense of the socialist fatherland at any moment. The youth league's links with the Army and Navy in our day take the form of the conscientious fulfillment of military duty, the internationalist assistance rendered by Soviet servicemen to the Republic of Afghanistan, the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident, the conquest of space, the gathering of the harvest, and thousands of other examples from the daily military life of young servicemen.

The positive changes in the course of restructuring have also affected Komsomol organizations. The basic contradictions and problems which built up in the Army and Navy Komsomol during the stagnation years have been uncovered. On the basis of party decisions and the ideas of the 20th Komsomol Congress, Komsomol organizations have taken the first steps along the path of reviving the independent democratic and creative nature of their activity. On this basis young people's interest in the quality of military service is gradually growing and the Komsomol's influence on all aspects of troop collectives' lives is intensifying.

At the same time, if we are making a principled assessment of what has been achieved, we cannot fail to note that the process of change both in the Army organism as a whole and in Komsomol organizations is finding the going uneven and difficult. The deep-rooted causes of retardation—shirking responsibility, hoping to

automatically obtain rights, benefits, and privileges, constantly looking out for instructions from above, being concerned for form to the detriment of content—have still not been overcome. All this lessens the effectiveness of the Army Komsomol's work to a considerable extent. There is only one remedy here: the more active involvement of Komsomol organizations in practical matters.

The molding in young people of a constant interest in military service must become the main avenue of the work of Komsomol committees and bureaus. The collective nature of modern weapons and combat equipment and the conditions of their use make severe demands not only on servicemen's individual skill but also on the combat cohesion of subunits, units, and ships. In order to become a real master of a military speciality it is important to love your weaponry and equipment, to have pride in them and firm faith in their reliability and power. The lessons of the Great Patriotic War, the actions of our servicemen in Afghanistan, and the experience of exercises show that, without this, you do not get a real soldier and officer in the real sense of the term. The overwhelming majority of young men drafted into the Army possess an ardent desire to become real soldiers; it is a matter of masculine honor and pride for them. Yet we are not always able to make full use of this potential.

There is broad scope for activity by Komsomol organizations here. The Army and Navy Komsomol can and must be more active, first and foremost in work to achieve excellent results in combat and political training and good class ratings. Komsomol committees and bureaus determine to a considerable extent whether every young servicemen is affected from the first days of his service by a deep sense of responsibility to study the weaponry and equipment entrusted to him and make effective use of every minute of training time. It is important to motivate young people to master military-technical knowledge and play an active part in invention and rationalization work, to develop more widely the competition for the title of best Komsomol team and crew, and to conduct combat skill contests among young officers, ensigns, and warrant officers—all things that make combat training interesting and creative and promote the achievement of a high degree of professionalism.

The correct action is being taken by Komsomol activists in leading units in the Turkestan and Belorussian Military Districts and the Baltic Fleet, who have switched the center of Komsomol work to the training grounds, firing ranges, and vehicle pools. Competitions, contests, and healthy rivalry have become the practice here.

Komsomol committees are called upon to make their contribution to enlivening socialist competition, increasing the level of glasnost and objectiveness in it, and actively introducing and disseminating advanced experience. This applies first and foremost to units and ships bearing the name of the Lenin Komsomol and other honorary titles. Unfortunately, far from all of them are leading units today. In the Navy, for example, only one

in four crews of ships with a Komsomol title have excellent indicators in combat training to their credit. We cannot accept this. They must be brought up to the mark and become beacons of competition by entitlement.

Komsomol organizations must resolutely join in the struggle against attempts to gloss over the state of affairs, ostentation, slackness, oversimplification, and the detachment of servicemen from combat training. Young people need to feel that they are responsible for the country's defense. This responsibility should determine what needs to be done to ensure that Komsomol work is a training for young people in self-assertion and self-expression, and that the years of Army service are a time to gain maturity and military and moral tempering. Such activeness by the Komsomol will always be understood and supported by commanders and political workers at all levels.

We have now entered the final period of the training year. It will show how the party's directives for improving the quality of combat training have been received in practice in the Army and Navy. We now need real breakthroughs in carrying out the set tasks and in improving the quality of troop and naval force training. At this stage Komsomol organizations must mobilize all young servicemen to work with complete devotion and strive for the highest results in combat training, socialist competition, and the fulfillment of their military duty.

Dwelling on certain questions of Army and Navy life, the USSR defense minister said that a special role is played by military discipline in bringing about a qualitative improvement in the Armed Forces. High levels of organization and statutory order are at one and the same time the condition, means, and guarantee for restructuring and renewing military life. Statutory order guarantees for servicemen, as full Soviet citizens, the implementation of the rights and freedoms granted them in conjunction with the duties of military service imposed on them, respect for individuals' dignity, and attention to their interests, needs, and requirements. This was stressed yet again at the 13 October CPSU Central Committee Politburo session.

That is why Komsomol organizations' most important function in protecting the interests of Army and Navy young people can and must be reflected in joint activity with commanders, political organs, and party organizations in instilling strict statutory order. In resolving this important task the Komsomol has been assigned a specific and quite definite area—the eradication of mockery and taunting among young people, and the strengthening of friendship, cohesion, and military camaraderie. This task has not yet been finally resolved either by the political command staff or by the Komsomol.

A paradoxical situation is emerging. We can inspire our young people to carry out feats, to be self-sacrificing, and to do strenuous and dangerous work, yet in certain units

we cannot inspire them to combat barracks-room hooligans and negative phenomena. What has happened is that commanders, political workers, and party organizations have mounted an offensive against nonstatutory relations, yet many soldiers, mainly Komsomol members, have "kept their heads down" and not declared an honest and open war on this moral disease.

One of the deep-rooted reasons for this situation lies in the fact that many Komsomol organizations have failed to create a healthy climate in their ranks or to foster genuine communist morality in young people. One thing is clear now: It is not possible to resolve the problem of eliminating negative phenomena by administrative and prohibitive measures alone, without the active help of all Komsomol members and the entire public. That is why we want to actively involve the Komsomol in this responsible task.

The resolution of the task of rallying military collectives is intimately bound up with the need for Komsomol organizations to switch more resolutely to questions of interethnic relations in Army and Navy collectives. Army service is a real schooling in international education. The overwhelming majority of the country's young people go through it. And the future of our multinational motherland will largely depend on what this schooling is like.

Army Gen D.T. Yazov went on to note that the period of renewal makes it necessary to study Lenin's legacy more fully and in greater depth. It is in the Komsomol environment that young people should develop a natural desire to check their deeds against Lenin's behests. Komsomol organizations, through their creative, inherently youth-centered forms of ideological influence purged of formalism, are called upon to help servicemen in acquiring political knowledge.

In educational work Komsomol committees and bureaus still rely only poorly on the unfading spiritual power of combat traditions and the military oath. Yet these constitute the source that makes it possible to channel Komsomol organizations' creative potential into developing in young servicemen the right ideas about honor, dignity, comradeship, and friendship, fostering patriotism and internationalism, and asserting the high prestige of conscientious military service and unshakable loyalty to military duty.

The preparation of young people for military service provides broad scope for practical work by the Army and Navy Komsomol. We promote the activities of military-patriotic associations and clubs. But this will not fully resolve the task if each Komsomol organization does not strengthen its ties with young people preparing to enter the services, and with the collectives rearing future servicemen. We must increase access to military units for young people, satisfy their interest in equipment more fully, and mold love and respect for the Army.

The resolution of the complex and responsible tasks facing Komsomol organizations, the USSR defense

minister said in conclusion, also requires qualitative changes in the content of party leadership of the Komsomol. This process is based on the principled directives of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Political command cadres and all Communist leaders are obliged to express their full confidence in young people and approach their initiatives, criticisms, and demands attentively; to base relations with the Komsomol on the principles of comradeship, respect, mutual demands, and active collaboration in resolving tasks; and to make it possible for Komsomol organizations to operate without hindrance, resolutely and boldly, combining independence with responsibility for the task entrusted them.

The meeting was addressed by Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and V.I. Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Yazov Intervenes Directly in Bullying Incident
PM2510142188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Oct 88 Morning Edition p 6

[N. Sautin article: "Soldier on the Run Received by the Defense Minister at IZVESTIYA's Request"]

[Text] Private S. Goleguzov went AWOL from a military unit. He made his way to the IZVESTIYA editorial office in Moscow and declared at the reception desk: "I'm not going back. I'm scared."

What had happened?

Sergey Yuryevich Goleguzov was born in 1970. He comes from Orenburg, where his father and mother are workers in the No. 3 Maintenance and Construction Administration. He also worked there until he was called for active military service in the military construction units.

The first few days of army service began with his direct commander, Junior Sergeant Kutushev, forcing the young soldier to do the dirtiest of jobs. This was done without authorization, over and above the established work schedule. And when Goleguzov tried to question the junior sergeant's orders, he was cruelly beaten. Having undergone a lung operation before joining the army, Sergey ended up in the medical unit as a result of the beating. Kutushev was summoned by the superior commander. And he was... ticked off. They were already lying in wait for the soldier when he was released 2 days later: He was beaten up again immediately on his return to his platoon.

Zh. Otdelenova, deputy chief of the IZVESTIYA reception desk, spent several hours trying to reach by telephone anyone in the USSR Defense Ministry in a position, and duty bound, to intervene in the private's affairs. Without success. She then telephoned the minister's reception desk....

Two officers from the military construction unit appeared in the editorial office the next morning. Waving a photograph of Goleguzov and shouting: "We

are looking for a dangerous criminal. Where is he hiding?" At that very moment the escaped soldier was being received by Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister. We do not know how much time the minister gave him, or the content and tone of their conversation. But Colonel of Justice V. Gerasimov, chief of the Ministry of Defense Reception Desk Letters Section, announced that D. Yazov gave instructions to officers from the Military Prosecutor's Office, jointly with a USSR Ministry of Defense commission, to urgently organize a thorough investigation of the state of affairs in the military construction unit where Goleguzov and other servicemen were being taunted.

So Lieutenant General B. Popov, chief military prosecutor, reported to the minister on the results of the inspection. It was established in particular that, 2 days before Goleguzov's unauthorized departure, "Private K.M. Nazarov, cook and military construction worker, beat up his fellow military construction workers Privates S. Goleguzov, A. Novitskiy, V. Savchenko, S. Melnikov, and G. Paradna at 1300 hours in the unit's dining room, forcing them to perform drill exercises in the food issue hall.... Criminal proceedings have been instituted against Nazarov on the basis of evidence of crime as provided by Article 244, Paragraph 'b' of the RSFSR Criminal Code. There was confirmation of the information contained in Goleguzov's report that squad commander Jr Sgt Kutushev ordered young soldiers to sweep premises out of their turn."

The chief military prosecutor also announced that, on the basis of the joint inspection's results, the USSR deputy defense minister for construction and the billeting of troops issued an order dismissing unit officers V. Pishchulin and V. Momot from their duties. Officers I. Tsvetkov and N. Novikov were warned about failing to fully meet service requirements.

It goes on: "The information contained in Goleguzov's report concerning other instances of non-regulation relations will be comprehensively checked in the course of the preliminary investigation which is being monitored by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office."

S. Goleguzov is now undergoing checks in hospital. According to the physicians' preliminary diagnosis, his state of health is unlikely to allow the soldier to continue his service. This is the information we obtained from the Political Directorate of Military Construction Units. But we think that it is still too early to consider the case closed. We hope that this directorate's chief, Colonel General N. Kovalenko, in his reply to the editorial office, will be able to convince our readers that the minister's intervention has not only helped S. Goleguzov's fellow servicemen but has also, if only slightly, improved the situation in military construction units. It is not every day that "AWOL" privates manage to reach the defense minister's reception desk....

This incident brings to mind the following sad thought. There is no longer any secret about instances of evasion of military service and absence from barracks by soldiers tormented by the cruelty of senior soldiers and of junior and senior commanders. Desperate mothers of enlisted men in hiding somewhere come to IZVESTIYA's reception desk. Who can help these 18-year old soldiers, who have lost all faith in justice and are embittered with the whole world, who are already classed as criminals following their unauthorized departure from their unit? On whose door are they to knock? Until now, the only door has been the wide-open gates of disciplinary companies and battalions....

A recent session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo gave special attention to discipline in the Armed Forces and to the enhancement of commanders' and political organs' responsibility for educational work with personnel. The Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate have yet to publish specific measure to impose proper order in the Army and the Navy according to regulations. But today there is

hardly any point in expecting military chiefs, in a single flash of inspiration, to produce a method for improving in one fell swoop the situation in an army with millions of servicemen. It is impossible to manage with secret directives, instructions, or orders. The problem, long driven deeper inside, has now infected the entire army organism. It needs more than just surgical intervention by the Military Prosecutor's Office. It must be solved jointly, by the whole of society, because it was created by the whole of society.

To eradicate red tape, indifference, and the traditional boorishness of seniors toward juniors in the army, to finally perceive the soldier mainly as a man rather than as a living robot that marches, crawls, shoots, and shouts "Hurrah!"—is this not the only effective measure for strengthening discipline? And a conscientious discipline at that. This is what perturbs not only the worker Goleguzov family from Orenburg but all fathers and mothers whose sons are either serving in the Armed Forces or are preparing to don military uniform.

**Militarism Inherent to Imperialism,
Demilitarization of Economy Possible**
18010455a Tbilisi KOMMUNIST GRUZII in Russian
No 6, Jun 88 pp 83-87

[Article by L. Levin: "New Realities and Militarism"]

[Text] There probably was no event in international relations of recent decades that was of such great importance for the destiny of the world as the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington. An agreement was reached for the first time on eliminating two classes of nuclear arms, and this marked the beginning of the real disarmament process. This historic document already is having a beneficial effect on the planet's political climate, it is increasing the mutual trust of states, and it is strengthening hope for a triumph of realism and reason in today's complex, contradictory and interrelated world.

The signed treaty was the result of determined, principled and flexible foreign policy activities of the CPSU, the Soviet state and the socialist countries, the result of joint efforts of all peoples. The path to the treaty began with the Soviet program for eliminating nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction before the end of the 20th century as set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986.

In realistically assessing today's situation one should note that for now only the first steps are being taken in building a really safe world. Many more obstacles have to be overcome along this path, the principal ones being the stereotypes of previous thinking according to which a country's strength was in its arms.

It is common knowledge that plans for final arming or so-called compensation for the nuclear missile "breach" allegedly forming in Europe are being worked out in NATO bloc states in response to the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. Preparations are under way to build up nuclear arms not subject to elimination as well as conventional arms.

The fact that the trend toward militarization of society's life has steadily grown over the last decades arouses special concern. Militarism today has become enemy number one for mankind and the struggle against it has developed into the most pressing task for all healthy forces of the world community.

In his work "Voinstvuyushchiy militarizm i antimilitaristskaya taktika sotsial-demokratii" [Militant Militarism and the Antimilitaristic Tactics of Social Democracy], written 80 years ago, V. I. Lenin formulated the now classic definition of militarism: "Modern militarism is the result of capitalism. In both its forms it is a 'living manifestation' of capitalism: as a military force used by capitalist states in their external clashes . . . and as a weapon in the hands of ruling classes serving to

suppress all kinds of movements (economic and political) of the proletariat" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 17, p 187).

sw;8.7q Militarism arose in the precapitalist period, but capitalism introduced a number of new points to its development. The scale and depth of society's militarization and its influence on economics and politics changed with the progress of military technology and the creation of mass armies. F. Engels noted over a hundred years ago in "Anti-Duehring": "The army has become the main purpose of the state and an end in itself; the peoples are only there to provide and feed the soldiers. Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 20, p 175). Mass production of weapons that were more and more refined and costly became a powerful factor of the bourgeois economy, accelerated the militarization of science and led to profound changes in financial and tax systems. Military rivalry began to play no small part in peacetime politics inasmuch as the arms race became not only part of preparations for war, but also a specific doctrine for blackmailing, pressuring and economically undermining the enemy.

The imperialist stage of capitalism's development also expanded the territorial bounds of wars to the maximum extent, making them worldwide. Modern wars mixed up the concepts of front and rear which had formed through the ages, sucked enormous masses of people into their bloody vortex, and immeasurably increased human sacrifices. While 3 million persons died in Europe in wars of the 17th century, over 5 million in the 18th century and almost 6 million in the 19th century, World War I alone took around 10 million and World War II 55 million human lives. Over 25 million became victims of the approximately 150 local wars and military conflicts which have taken place since the end of World War II.

But even these figures are beyond comparison with the sacrifices which mankind would have to suffer in case of a nuclear conflict. The power of the planet's modern nuclear arsenals is equivalent to 55,000 megatons of TNT, 10,000 times greater than the sum of all explosives used in World War II.

Militarism is being used as a popular means of whipping up the economy. A certain connection between the economic crisis of overproduction and war is unquestionable: militarizing the economy and heating up business conditions by means of the arms race is a method of supporting the business activities of capitalist countries in the present stage. As M. S. Gorbachev noted in the report "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," a number of countries have begun to "relieve" the strain on the economy by pumping funds into the military-industrial complex under the pretext of the "Soviet threat."

The growth of militarism is dictated both by an aggravation of inter-imperialist rivalry under conditions of the scientific-technical revolution and by the narrowed sphere of imperialist domination. Scientific-technical rivalry has sharpened, the struggle for foreign markets has intensified and there are sharp clashes in the currency and financial sphere among the three main centers of imperialism. Western Europe and especially Japan have substantially closed with the United States in the level of economic development and have left the United States behind in some indicators. The competitiveness of American goods has dropped and in a number of cases foreign firms are crowding them not only from foreign markets, but from the domestic market as well. Under these conditions the American administration sees a strengthening of the military machine as one of the means for countering countries of Western Europe and Japan.

Imperialism also does not wish to be reconciled with the trend toward a stronger political role of socialist countries in the world arena. The U.S. turn to a policy of escalating militarism is linked with the desire to use the arms race to wear down the USSR's economy, to compromise socialism's social objectives and thus to change the correlation of forces in favor of the United States. Imperialist states headed by the United States make wide use of militarism as a tool for conducting a policy of neocolonialism, suppressing the national liberation movement of peoples, and preserving and strengthening their own economic, political and military-strategic positions in the developing countries. The conclusion of the CPSU Program's new wording in which the inner dynamics and motives for a growth of imperialistic militarism are revealed is of fundamental political and theoretical-methodological importance: "The more strongly imperialism's positions are eroded by the course of historical development, the more hostile the policy of its most reactionary forces becomes to the interests of peoples. Imperialism is offering fierce resistance to social progress and is making attempts to halt the course of history, undermine the positions of socialism and gain social revenge on a worldwide scale."

Modern imperialism, the class nature of which has not changed, differs greatly from its previous forms and varieties. After World War II the center of militarism shifted from Europe to the United States, which assumed the role of world gendarme and pretender to world domination. U.S. militarism relies on a powerful military-industrial complex which accounts for approximately 70 percent of the volume of NATO's entire military industry including up to 64 percent of the production of warplanes, around 70 percent of the production of main battle tanks, over 57 percent of military expenditures, around 90 percent of nuclear potential and almost 48 percent of the strength of armed forces.

It is common knowledge that during the postwar period (up to the beginning of the 1980's) three military strategies alternated in the United States: "massive retaliation" (1945-1960), "flexible response" (1961-1970) and

"nuclear deterrence." Now changes again are being made to U.S. military doctrine because of a number of factors. American imperialism created an enormous military machine. Around 6.5 million persons are serving in the Armed Forces, in other military departments, in the Department of Defense and the defense industry, including three million in the regular Army and around one million in organized reserves. At the present time there are almost 1,600 U.S. military bases and installations in 34 countries with over 500,000 personnel.

The unprecedented scale of the arms race and the growth of military expenditures of all capitalist countries without exception is a specific manifestation of militarism. For example, in the postwar period U.S. military expenditures reached almost three trillion dollars, including over two trillion just in the period the Reagan administration has been in power. The sum of military expenditures of NATO countries exceeded four trillion dollars. Over the last five years military expenditures in the United States have been growing 15-17 percent per year, in Great Britain 14-20 percent, in Italy 20-25 percent, in France 17-18 percent and in Turkey this indicator is reaching 70-75 percent.

The latest achievements of the scientific-technical revolution are being used for military purposes, the military arsenal is being augmented by the latest nuclear-missile and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and these weapons are being built up quantitatively and improved qualitatively. Thus for many years American ruling circles have been placing special emphasis in their aggressive plans on creating [sozdaniye] qualitatively new weapon systems.

Strategic offensive forces have been established in the United States numbering 2,315 nuclear weapon delivery platforms which in one launch (sortie) can take up over 12,000 nuclear warheads, each with a yield of from 50 KT to 10 MT. Up to the end of the current decade, however, the Pentagon plans on adding to the inventory another 100 MX ICBM's with 1,000 nuclear warheads (the development [razrabotka] and production program costs \$21.5 billion), 100 B-1B bombers capable of taking up to 3,000 nuclear munitions in one sortie (a cost of over \$28 billion), 5-6 "Ohio"-class nuclear-powered missile submarines which can deliver around 1,200 warheads to targets with one launch of Trident-I and Trident-II missiles (the program is figured at \$53 billion), and several thousand long-range air-launched, ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. The pursuit of military-technical supremacy and an attempt to create [sozdavat] increasingly "efficient" weapons dictate the high science-intensiveness of military production and the intensive development of military R&D.

At the present time more than 500,000 persons or approximately 25 percent of all scientific personnel are engaged in scientific research and development in the military sphere. According to data of American economist V. Perlo over 75 percent of U.S. federal budget

funds earmarked for financing scientific research and development goes for militaristic purposes. This share exceeds 87 percent in the FRG and 92 percent in Great Britain. According to official data, Pentagon expenditures for military R&D rose from \$23.1 billion in 1984 to \$42 billion in fiscal year 1988.

A trend can be traced toward the globalization of militarism. The internationalization of military interests leads to the formation of a transnational military-industrial complex and to the active involvement of liberated states in imperialism's military preparations. Transnational military-industrial corporations are establishing unique private-capital industrial empires. For example, 15,000 firms from six countries took part in creating [sozdaniye] the Boeings. A similar situation took shape in development [razrabotka] of the American Shuttle spacecraft system project. A second major military-industrial center consisting of leading countries of the Western European region is forming and expanding on the heels of the United States within the framework of the NATO military-economic structure, but this hardly means that transnational militarism is capable of smoothing out the sharpening inter-imperialist contradictions. The 27th CPSU Congress noted that no class closeness, no incentive for unification of forces, no military, economic or political integration, and no scientific-technical revolution can eliminate these contradictions. The new wording of the CPSU Program emphasizes in particular Lenin's thesis that "those very means which capitalism puts into play with the objective of strengthening its position inevitably lead to an aggravation of all its deep-seated contradictions."

The question of whether or not capitalism can exist today without militarism is assuming special vital significance for mankind under present-day conditions. The reality of creating a comprehensive system of international security based on principles of disarmament depends largely on this. A reliable answer can be given to the question only by the new political thinking, which takes into account the growing responsibility of all states for the fate of the world and realities of the atomic era and the scientific-technical revolution.

Inasmuch as militarism is a direct result of imperialism it cannot disappear completely. It is another matter that real opportunities to block militarism exist and are growing in the present phase of world development.

First of all, the policy of total opposition and military confrontation has no future in the present interrelated world. The critical level of destructive power of modern weapons, which are a threat to all civilization, makes the urgent rejection of that policy necessary.

Secondly, the USSR's authority and prestige have grown colossally in the eyes of the entire world as a result of the radical restructuring of international relations and of the process we have begun for reinterpreting what has been achieved and developing a program of action. Under the

new conditions rightist forces in the United States and in countries allied to it are finding it more and more difficult to maintain previous antisoviet stereotypes in public opinion: the image of the "evil empire," the myth of a "military threat" from the USSR and so on. The need for resolving the global problems facing mankind makes an alliance of socialist and capitalist states possible based on the experience of the past anti-Hitler coalition.

Thirdly, militarism and the arms race also are unacceptable economically because of the tribute which has to be paid by all mankind. The financial and economic costs of the Reagan administration's course toward an unchecked acceleration of military expenditures are being felt more and more appreciably of late. It is becoming more and more obvious that the administration is incapable of further maintaining its given rates and scale of increase of military appropriations without extremely negative consequences for the national economy and social programs. In the report "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues" M. S. Gorbachev said (and science confirms this): "We are convinced that with the present level of technology and organization of production a reconversion and demilitarization of the economy are possible. At the same time this also will be a vote for peace."

And so can capitalism renounce militarism or not? Voluntarily no, but such a prospect is realistic if capitalism is forced to do this by economic and political realities and by the resistance of all peaceloving forces. That conclusion conforms to Marxist-Leninist teaching. It was Engels who wrote that "militarism carries in itself the seed of its own destruction," that militarism will collapse "by the dialectic of its own evolution" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya," Vol 20, p 175). No matter how great the threat of a new war stemming from aggressive circles of imperialism, there is no fatal inevitability of such a war. It is possible to safeguard mankind against a nuclear conflagration. Herein lies the historic calling of socialism and of all progressive, peaceloving forces.

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Defining Prerequisites of State Security in Light of New Thinking

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[Article by Vladimir F. Petrovskiy, doctor of historical sciences, deputy minister of foreign affairs USSR, member of bureau of Scientific Council for Studying Problems of Peace and Disarmament of the USSR Academy of Sciences, specialist in the field of international relations and foreign policy of the USSR, author of a large number of studies and scientific articles on this subject including the monographs "'National Security' Doctrine in U.S. Global Strategy" and "Disarmament: Concept, Problems, Mechanism": "International Security: Comprehensive, Universal, Common to All Mankind"]

[Text] There are two scenarios of international security by the year 2000 which essentially reflect pre-nuclear and new political thinking. In answer to the question "What is to be done?" traditionalists who cultivate strength (above all in its military form) propose a military-technical solution—building up arms and preparing for different options of nuclear and conventional wars. But the ancient formula "If you wish peace, prepare for war" clearly did not work either in Ancient Rome or in subsequent stages of historical development, and its application is suicidal under present-day nuclear-missile conditions. There is no doubt for those thinking in the new way that the nature of modern arms leaves no state with a hope of defending itself by military-technical means alone. They view assurance of security as a task which can and must be accomplished by *political means*.

With respect to the parameters of security, traditionalists confine it to a military and political framework. Those who think in non-orthodox categories believe that security cannot be assured by efforts only in the military and political spheres of international relations. Economic, ecologic and humanitarian fields cannot remain outside the limits of security. In other words, security must have a *comprehensive character*. It must represent a unified system extending to all spheres of international relations without exception. One cannot build security in isolation—only in the military sphere, only in the political sphere, only in the economic sphere and ecologic sphere or only in the humanitarian sphere. Plucking one component from this set means dooming the entire system to failure.

Finally, in answer to the question "What is to be done?" traditionalists are guided by an egocentric approach, they place the interests of national security above the interests of international security, and they attempt to ensure their own security at the expense of the security of other peoples. New political thinking rejects that approach. It proceeds from the assumption that supreme wisdom does not lie in thinking exclusively about oneself, let alone to the other party's detriment; everyone must feel that they have equal security. If we take international relations as a whole, *security can be only universal*, and if we speak of relations between the USSR and United States as historically formed political and military poles of two social systems, security can be only *mutual*.

Realism and responsibility for the destinies of peoples dictate a choice not in favor of traditionalist thinking, but in favor of the new foreign political thinking.

In today's interdependent and interrelated world a first nuclear strike, should someone still dare deliver it, would become an act of suicide and would be a final act. Radioactive death and the "nuclear winter" know neither state nor geographical nor ideological boundaries. The threat of destruction has equalized states and social systems, linked them inseparably by a common destiny, and made survival the principal task of our days. In the

nuclear-space era it is impossible to build security infinitely only on the fear of retribution. The rejection of reliance on strength (above all in its armed form) as a means of ensuring security is dictated by more than just the devastating power of modern weapons; a number of other political and economic factors operating toward a cessation of the arms race also are probably no less important. For example, there is a great danger of the unintentional outbreak of nuclear war in a crisis situation when any actions of a military nature by the other side (including random, unsanctioned actions) are perceived with heightened suspicion and when there is an escalation of tension. Under such conditions a unique resonance of military-political interaction of the sides may appear, fraught with their involvement in war despite initial intentions.

Under present conditions of global interdependence among states security cannot be assured even by the settlement of all military and political problems. The threat of violence also springs from a lack of resolution of economic and humanitarian issues. An aggravation of global problems challenging man's biological capacity itself to adapt to the dangers, tempos and stresses of modern existence is occurring before our eyes.

Therefore the only sensible scenario of mankind's peaceful future is a security that is comprehensive, universal, based on trust, and equal for all.

Of course the establishment of such a system will not automatically eliminate all existing complexities and contradictions in international relations. Their dialectics always has been and will be formed from a combination of opposition and cooperation. But a system of comprehensive security creates conditions to ensure that cooperation permitting the peaceful, nonmilitary resolution of any problems that arise dominates in this dialectical interaction and that opposition is not of an irreconcilable nature. This would ensure mankind's survival in the nuclear era.

As we know, explorations of ways to ensure international security were undertaken previously as well. For example, the concept of collective security is widely known. The *system of comprehensive, universal security*, however, is a *qualitatively different concept* which does not simply absorb and concretize but, most important, develops ideas of collective security as applied to the nuclear-space conditions of our time. This is a *new and highest stage of the philosophy of world politics, characterized by the preeminence of interests common to all mankind*.

First of all, there is the turn to a multilateral aspect. The world literally is saturated with diverse interests. It is necessary to work together to find their balance, which then will be the foundation for comprehensive security.

It is necessary to work together for a radical improvement of the international situation. The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that the UN Charter is the model for assuring the security of the international community with consideration for the national interests of all states. We see the task as one of making this model effective and reliably guaranteeing it under the new nuclear-space conditions in all regions of the globe and on all scenes of world politics.

Secondly, collective security was created by one group of states against another, the potential aggressors. The present security is aimed not against any one state, but against a common threat to all mankind—nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, collective security recognized military conflicts as inevitable and so placed emphasis on stopping aggression. The new security concept proceeds from the unacceptability of wars both nuclear and conventional. Along with the creation of material and legal obstacles to the use of violence, the new security concept attaches exceptionally great importance to measures of a prophylactic, preventive nature.

The concept of a comprehensive security system contains preconditions for materializing a conclusion of vital importance for the destiny of mankind, which is that in the nuclear-space era all states and peoples without exception and mankind as a whole have a single path not involving the risk of suicide, the path of rejection of power methods of resolving international issues and their settlement exclusively by political means.

Thus in accordance with the new concept of security it is a question of constructing a positive peace, to use the terminology prevalent among politologists.

The following features distinguish the concept of comprehensive and universal security.

Comprehensive approach. The new concept requires a restructuring of all spheres of international intercourse so as to exclude from them the methods of war, violence and diktat. Nonmilitary means of resolving all international issues would become the principal component of a comprehensive security system. Herein lies the key to reducing the level of states' military opposition on the basis of mutually acceptable arrangements, resolving global problems, settling regional conflicts, eliminating international terrorism, and adjusting cooperation among states in the humanitarian sphere. While security previously reduced basically only to the military and political spheres, now it is linked with a restructuring of states' interaction in other spheres as well—economic, ecologic, humanitarian. Herein is one more manifestation of proper consideration of the interdependence of the modern world.

Dynamism. The new concept does not represent a static model. To the contrary, establishment of a comprehensive

security system is a constantly evolving process of international interaction, a process characterized by a gradual, phased transition from simpler to more complex forms of state interaction. The essence of this process is that both the climate and substance of international relations will change as the process evolves. A very specific principle operates here: the deeper this process develops, the greater the extent of states' obligations.

Realism. This concept has the objective not of making mankind "happy" with a utopian system imposed on it but of embodying the fundamental interests of all states and peoples—large, medium, small, nuclear and non-nuclear, developed and developing. This concept springs from international practice and has no "Made in . . ." marking. It presents in a concentrated form the views of sober-minded forces of all countries, regardless of their political and ideological orientations, on problems of war and peace in the nuclear-space age. It is an alloy of ideas of the numerous antiwar and antinuclear social movements, the "New Delhi Six," the "Palme Commission" and proposals of socialist countries about a non-nuclear, safe world.

The new concept does not substitute for existing international documents and mechanisms which were created in the prenuclear era; to the contrary, its objective is to strengthen them with consideration of the new conditions as well as the experience of states' cooperation under these conditions. The detente of the 1970's called to light a large number of documents and mechanisms which strengthened the system of relationships among states.

No one loses from adopting the concept of a comprehensive and universal security, and the entire world community will be the winner.

Humanism and high morality. Concern for the survival of mankind, i.e., concern for man as an absolute value and reliable assurance for him of the very first right, the right to life, is made paramount. It is for the sake of this that peaceful coexistence must become the supreme universal principle, a principle taking priority over class, ideological, national and other considerations.

Democratism. Under conditions of comprehensive and universal security there will be no place either for a nuclear club of the chosen or for a military-space vassalage. There will be a democratization of the process of decisionmaking on problems of war and peace. The atom and space—mankind's common property—will serve the common good.

The concept of a comprehensive system of international security has as its basis a *policy of peaceful coexistence*, which in the nuclear-space era has become the imperative for all countries and peoples. Elevation of this policy to be the *supreme principle of international relations* reflects the priority importance of a rejection of war as a means of settling disputes, including the historical dispute between socialism and capitalism. The concept sets

the task of preserving civilization above bloc, national and other interests and above political, economic, national-ethnic or cultural differences. It considers it inadmissible to extend ideological contradictions between the two systems to the sphere of interstate relations and it rests on the fundamental conclusion that objective conditions have formed in which the opposition between capitalism and socialism can take place only and exclusively in the form of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry.

The concept of comprehensive security is linked integrally with the transformation of peaceful coexistence into a *universal norm of international life*. This means an international order in which not military force but good-neighborliness and cooperation would predominate, and in which there would be a broad exchange of achievements of science and technology and of cultural values for the benefit of all peoples. This order would encompass relations of all states without exception. Countries which have taken the path of independent development would be protected against encroachments from without, which would facilitate their movement along this path. Favorable opportunities would open up for resolving global problems through collective efforts of all states. The need for adjustment of cooperation on a worldwide scale and for close, constructive interworking of the majority of countries is a categorical demand of the time in which we live. Peaceful coexistence, a positive peace, and a comprehensive system of international security meet the objective interests of all countries and all peoples.

The *critical importance of the time factor* must be considered to the full extent in solving the problem of creating such a system. The development [razvitiye] rates of military technology are so high that, as shown by events of the late 1970's and early 1980's, they considerably outstrip the process of talks on limiting and reducing arms. The situation which took shape by the mid-1980's demanded new, bold and radical approaches to disarmament and arms reduction. It is impossible to delay further, otherwise such refined weapon systems will appear that it will be generally impossible to come to an agreement on controlling them.

The demand of social forces—acceleration of the movement toward peace in place of the arms race—is quite reasonable under these conditions.

Now we will briefly set forth our ideas on security in each of the spheres of international relations.

Military security is being filled with new content. It must be based on the principles of nuclear powers' rejection of war (both nuclear and conventional) against each other or against third states; a ban on the arms race in space; cessation of all nuclear weapon testing and total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century; the

banning and destruction of chemical weapons; and renunciation of the creation [sozdaniye] of other weapons of mass annihilation. Military security further must include a strictly verifiable reduction in the level of states' military potentials to the limits of reasonable sufficiency; the disbandment of military groupings and, as a step toward this, renunciation of their expansion and of the formation of new ones; and a proportionate and commensurate reduction of military budgets.

There is now a real opportunity to take a radical turn from the dangerous and ruinous arms race to phased disarmament. An agreement was reached for the first time in history between the USSR and United States on eliminating two classes of their nuclear arms—intermediate and lesser range missiles. It must be followed by an understanding on reducing the sides' strategic arms by half with preservation of the ABM Treaty. The ability of states to make a conscious choice in favor of restraint and self-limitation in the most sensitive sphere of their relations and proceed to security through disarmament, nuclear disarmament above all, has been demonstrated once again.

Life itself rejects nuclear deterrence. Can a better substitute for it really not be found in the modern world? Yes it can if we are guided by the new thinking and we proceed from a multilateral basis. The political declaration of the 8th Conference of the heads of states and governments of nonaligned countries in Harar noted: "The idea that peace can be preserved on Earth by means of nuclear deterrence (a doctrine which is the basis of a continuation of the quantitative and qualitative build-up of nuclear arms and which has led in practice to an unprecedented reduction of security and a decrease of stability in international relations) is the most dangerous myth that ever existed."¹

Preservation of that situation has a negative effect on the moral-psychological atmosphere in the world. On the one hand it generates the fear of nuclear war in millions of people—a unique global stress situation that inevitably will intensify with a continuation of the arms race. On the other hand a different psychological effect also exists which was noted in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission)—an underestimation of the danger of nuclear war and indifference to the present situation. "This trend is especially noticeable among many in the military, diplomats, scientists and political figures who because of their profession handle problems connected with the nuclear danger daily. Not one person can plan nuclear weapon employment options in full recognition of those consequences to which such plans might lead. The human intellect which protects man's state of rest gives a picture of nuclear war that is incomplete or has a distorted form. . . . That very same psychological mechanism may lead those who view nuclear war as a possible instrument of national policy to a significant underestimation, even for themselves, of the potential consequences of planned actions in extraordinary situations."²

As Austrian philosopher H. Anders notes in his book "The Atomic Threat," there exists a clear-cut trend "to cover the fear of the atomic threat by other fears . . . which is welcomed by certain political and military circles." As a result "the absolute threat presented by atomic weapons becomes relative and becomes at least one possible threat among other threats, and a new threat arises consisting of being oblivious to the threat."³

In essence the amorality of the existing situation is that mankind becomes more and more a hostage of nuclear destruction. The doctrines of restraint or deterrence invented to justify and perpetuate that situation have been used for several decades now to justify imposing an unceasing race of nuclear and other arms on the world. Under the distorted logic of these doctrines it turns out that the more weapons there are and the more realistic and monstrous the threat of their employment, the firmer security is.

As Soviet and many foreign scientists have persuasively shown, the strategic defense initiative [SDI] leads to the arms race unfolding in an increasingly broad spectrum of directions. M. Gorbachev emphasized that "the principal harm of SDI is that it undermines prospects for talks and broadens the zone of mistrust. Herein lies the whole problem, which is no less political than it is military."⁴

It appears that in its military-strategic and political consequences the deployment of space attack arms may be of no less importance for military relations of the late 20th and early 21st century than the stockpiling of nuclear arms was for the decades since World War II. It is a question above all of the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM system. In advertising the plans for such a system its supporters endeavor to prove that from a military standpoint America will be guaranteed survival as a result of its creation. As Soviet and many foreign scientists persuasively prove, however, there are no effective defensive weapons in a nuclear war and their creation is practically impossible. It is no accident that the U.S. administration's practical actions now are concentrated on the accelerated development specifically of a "first strike" potential. Such a "defensive weapon" can provide almost nothing to a country subjected to a surprise mass attack inasmuch as it clearly is incapable of defending the overwhelming majority of the populace. The use of ABM weapons specifically most suits the attacking side since, having complicated the task of deterrence and having made it more indefinite, use of ABM weapons will increase the dependence of survival and damage limitation in a nuclear war on the delivery specifically of the first strike in order then to cover up with the help of an echeloned ABM system against the retaliatory strike of the country subjected to attack.

American ABM weapons can be viewed as one of the means of supporting a first strike also because the United States refuses to pledge not to employ nuclear weapons first.

Within the framework of the SDI program some 50 percent of all appropriations are oriented toward creating [sozdaniye] various information equipment: reconnaissance, target designation, navigation, communications and control, including with the use of an artificial intelligence system. According to Pentagon concepts, this equipment also can be used even before the end of this century for other military missions including "low intensity conflicts" even if the SDI program proper does not outlive the Reagan administration in its initial concept. Thus in addition to creating [sozdaniye] space attack weapons the "star wars" program is giving additional impetus to the race of ground-launched, sea-launched and air-launched nuclear and conventional arms. This circumstance also has to be taken completely into account.

The above considerations explain why the "star wars" program, named the "strategic defense initiative" by the American administration, appears as a symbol of obstruction to the cause of peace, as a concentrated expression of militaristic concepts, as a lack of desire to remove the nuclear threat hovering over mankind, and as the embodiment of a short-sighted, narrowly egotistic approach to the problem of international security.

Calculations on ensuring substantial superiority in the political let alone the military sense with the help of SDI are illusory; they are a dangerous delusion. No less illusory are hopes of success in provoking the Soviet side to realize a similar program and drawing it into a ruinous arms race in a new and most costly form.

Many scientists including Americans note that the Soviet Union can neutralize any echeloned ABM system relatively easily by a broad set of already existing and potential means of counteraction, means considerably cheaper than a space ABM system. Among these means are "space mines," ground-based high-power lasers, various obstacles which can be placed in the movement path of combat stations, electronic warfare equipment and so on. In one way or another the Soviet Union will be capable, as its leadership declares, of ensuring a powerful potential of an answering retaliatory strike under all conditions. M. Gorbachev repeatedly noted that in case the American side refuses to prevent an arms race in space "our response will be effective, less costly, and can be carried out in shorter time periods,"⁵ and not necessarily in space. This response will depreciate the "star wars" program.

There is no doubt that the military-strategic balance will be preserved as a result of new and increasingly complicated rounds of the arms race, but at the same time its stability inevitably will be degraded and in the end may reach that limit where even parity will cease to be a factor of military-political deterrence.

The new political thinking brings to the foreground the question of reducing states' potentials to the limits of *reasonable sufficiency*. It is a question of each side having

those armed forces which would be able to carry out only defensive operations in defense of their own territory and territories of members of their alliance and would have no capability to threaten invasion of the other side's territory. Consistent and complete realization of the principle of reasonable sufficiency presumes total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere, but on the path to this objective it will be necessary to pass through several stages based both on the composition of parties and on the inclusion of arms; at every stage and throughout this entire process there must be a steady strengthening of security and an increase in *strategic stability*. At intermediate stages of such progress there should be understandings at the very least about the *reasonable sufficiency* both of nuclear and conventional arms and about maintaining strategic stability at the lowest possible level of this sufficiency. The means and procedures for verifying compliance with the corresponding understandings must be improved as the principle of reasonable sufficiency is realized with respect both to nuclear and conventional arms.

The means of verification and regime of corresponding understandings must be such that—let us take an extreme hypothetical case—any camouflaged and surprise breach of understandings relative to nuclear arms ceilings determining the potential of minimum deterrence could not lead to a qualitative change of the situation in favor of the party breaching the understanding.

The question of military doctrines and concepts is acquiring more and more significance for evaluating the actual intentions of military-political groupings as well as of individual states. It is necessary to take up this question in order to remove the mutual suspicion and mistrust which have built up over the years and to thoroughly understand each other's concerns on this question as well. Such categories as military supremacy, calculation on victory in a nuclear war, and global hegemony have outlived themselves and turned into chimeras fatal for all mankind. Military concepts and doctrines of military alliances must be based on defensive principles in the interests of security. For their part the states parties to the Warsaw Pact made a pledge in Berlin in May 1987 according to which they "never under any circumstances will begin military operations against any state or alliance of states if they themselves have not become the target of armed attack . . . and never will be first to employ nuclear weapons."⁶ This pledge also presumes maintenance of a balance of military forces at the lowest possible level and a reduction of military potentials to limits of sufficiency necessary for defense.

The content of **political security** also is considerably enriched. Its starting base is unconditional respect, in international practice, of the right of each people to sovereignly choose the paths and forms of their development.

The question of excluding any kinds of conflict and crisis solution of issues from international relations assumes

special significance. On a practical plane it is a question of eliminating the already existing conflict and crisis situations on a regional and global level and preventing new ones.

In order to settle a particular conflict or crisis by peaceful means with complete and fair consideration for the legitimate interests of all parties, it is necessary to have a political basis of settlement that does not infringe on these interests. An adequate negotiation mechanism also is needed which would provide the opportunity of moving to a constructive dialogue with respect to a given specific instance. Two approaches are possible to the settlement of conflict and crisis situations: a radical approach, i.e., immediate cessation of the dangerous development of a situation, and a phased, partial approach not immediately supported in everything but still effective enough for a gradual de-escalation of conflicts and crises.

It is important not only to eliminate existing crises, but also to do everything to prevent the appearance of new centers of military danger. For this it is necessary to supplement the comprehensive security system with an appropriate system of international law and order which would ensure observance of generally recognized principles of the civilized conduct of states in the international arena such as nonuse of force, noninterference in internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for sovereignty. Measures of a preventive nature also are needed. The process of settlement and prevention above all must be aimed at finding a balance of all parties' interests and at eliminating those factors which could lead to the use or threat of force.

Both the United Nations and other international forums have spelled out political platforms for a fair settlement of almost all of the present crisis situations. Suitable negotiation mechanisms exist or can be created.

To put this potential to use it is necessary above all to change states' policy and make it conform with demands of the philosophy of a safe world. This means using exclusively peaceful, political means of deciding issues and realizing that there are no unsolvable problems. In order to free the world of centers of aggression and armed conflicts it is necessary above all to put an end to interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and other countries of Central America, to the undeclared war against Afghanistan, and to aggression against Arab states; to present the Arab people of Palestine with an opportunity to establish their own state; and to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist Republic of South Africa regime and to the activities of American and Republic of South Africa mercenaries in Angola and Mozambique.

At the same time, the development of fundamentally new actions is on the agenda for shaping political security: a set of measures aimed at building confidence among states and creating effective guarantees against an

attack on them from without and guarantees of the inviolability of their borders. Development of effective methods for preventing international terrorism and assurance of the safety of international land, air and sea routes are of great importance.

Thus the concept of a comprehensive security system is full of specific material content in the political sphere as well and forms the necessary base for states' joint efforts.

Attempts to make progress in the sphere of military security dependent on the state of affairs in the sphere of political security and vice versa create a false dilemma. One need not doubt that in principle one is impossible without the other, but two opposite conclusions are drawn from this fact. One conclusion reduces to the assumption that there is a closed circle from which it is impossible to escape. As a result the world community is doomed as it were to inaction both in the first and the second sphere. The other conclusion—drawn by adherents of the new political thinking—consists of an admission of the need for practical actions simultaneously along all routes leading to a safe world. In the military sphere it is the realization of disarmament measures and in the political sphere it is the elimination of already existing conflicts and prevention of new ones. It is obvious that progress in one direction would contribute to movement in the other direction, revealing outcomes here and there and on the whole creating preconditions for building confidence and reviving a relaxation of international tension as a necessary stage along the path to comprehensive security.

A comprehensive system of international security additionally must be based on generally recognized principles of the interworking of states in the economic sphere. For example, the establishment of a new world economic order guaranteeing equal **economic security** to all states and ensuring the stable, predictable development of world economic relations would play an important role.

A UN study on the relationship between disarmament and international security emphasizes: "The majority of world countries view the establishment of a new international economic order as a component of stronger international security. For them significant progress in the direction of ever-increasing equality including a reduction and in the final account elimination of the gap between developing and developed countries is part of the process of strengthening security."⁷

Elimination of all measures of discrimination from international practice, renunciation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions, and a joint search for ways of a fair settlement of the problem of debt inevitably must become the bases for security in the economic sphere. Stopping the expenditure of material and intellectual resources for creating [sozdaniye] weapons of mass destruction opens up the most realistic prospect for freeing up resources for assisting the developing countries. On the whole, development of the principles of using these

resources for the good of the world community, and the developing countries above all, inevitably must become one of the supports of comprehensive security.

Finally, security in the economic sphere is called upon to create conditions for rational use of the planet's resources as property common to all mankind to solve global problems touching the very foundations of civilization's existence. This requires a unification of efforts, the summation of national capabilities on a world scale, and the adjustment of effective international procedures and mechanisms. International cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space and development of a materially saturated program of joint actions of states in this area with this objective could become one of the bases of security in the economic sphere. Its realization would permit mankind to enter the 21st century possessing not a suicidal arsenal of "star wars" weapons, but a reliable material, legal and organizational base for a "star peace."

What is new under conditions of the nuclear-space era is not only an economic, but also a **humanitarian dimension of security**. It is necessary to develop a long-range program of states' cooperation for establishing a humane, civilized world of the 21st century by assuring the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms everywhere; by democratizing the internal life of states in accordance with their features, historical experience, and tasks which they set for themselves for the future; and by establishing confidence, agreement and cooperation among them on this basis.

The United Nations and its organs are called upon to play an important role in this matter.

It is necessary to concentrate especially on *strengthening the existing system of states' undertakings in the sphere of human rights and humanitarian cooperation*, particularly by all states' accession to fundamental international treaties in this sphere. National laws and administrative rules in the humanitarian sphere must be made to conform everywhere with international undertakings and rules.

It is generally recognized that wars originate in people's minds, and it is specifically in man's awareness and in his psychology that it is necessary to instill a profound aversion for aggression and introduce an understanding of the criminality and inadmissibility of any doctrines and actions stemming from the possibility of unleashing a chain reaction of nuclear attacks. Is it really possible to speak of reliable security without having gotten rid of a stereotyped consideration of states as potential enemies? The "image of the enemy" creates that moral-psychological atmosphere which makes elementary confidence in international organizations impossible.

The unity of the world and the interrelationship and interdependence of all its components reveal themselves most fully in nature and the environment, preservation of which appears more and more as a part of common

human efforts to create comprehensive security. An annual accounting by governments about their nature-protection activities and about ecologic incidents which occurred and which were prevented on the territory of their countries must become a generally accepted rule. A need has matured for organizing international cooperation in questions of developing [razrabotka] and introducing resource-conserving and energy-conserving technology as well as wasteless, ecologically clean technology.

One of the tragic paradoxes of the nuclear-space era is that, having discovered a colossal power over the forces of nature, mankind was brought face to face with the threat of global destruction. In what way will the world dispose of the achievements of human intelligence in the final account? Will they be used for the good of people or be turned against mankind itself?

It would seem that human intelligence should provide an unequivocal answer: the choice is in favor of creating, in favor of strengthening security. But the fundamental differences of the two systems—socialist and capitalist—stood out in special relief in the approach to this dilemma. Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress convincingly demonstrated the indivisibility of socialism and peace and formulated a new political concept of a fair and safe world.

The idea of comprehensive security advanced by a group of socialist countries in the UN was permeated with the desire to support and strengthen the process of a positive development of international relations on a multilateral basis. Its principal significance was finding, through collective efforts, a balance of states' interests and the optimum correlation of national interests with interests common to all mankind.

This is no simple or easy matter. Comprehensive security must be founded on generally recognized human values. Back at the beginning of the century Lenin expressed the idea about their primacy over the tasks of a particular class. The process of a joint search for a balance of different and contradictory but real interests of the contemporary community of states and nations demands supreme responsibility, objectivity in perceiving the opinion of others, consideration of their positions, collaboration, and an acute sense of what is new.

No one has ready-made prescriptions. No one holds in his hands the thread which would help find a way out of the labyrinth of today's contradictory world. We ourselves are searching and we invite others to seek together the ways of building universal security.

Our approaches to intensifying the multilateral process and to internationalizing efforts to ensure security in a concentrated form were set forth in M. Gorbachev's article "The Reality and Guarantees of a Safe World" and in his book "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Restructuring and the New Thinking for Our Country and for the Entire World], which essentially present a comprehensive and

all-embracing initial draft of a possible new organization of life in our common planetary home in accordance with UN ideals and on the basis of its Charter; that organization under which security of all would be a guarantee of the security of each one.

The in-depth discussion which took place at the 42d UN General Assembly Session in which delegations of more than 70 states took part concluded with the adoption, at the initiative of socialist countries, of a resolution on creating a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The principles of the new political thinking were embodied for the first time in a UN resolution. This important document contains a call on all states to concentrate efforts on ensuring a unified, universal security by peaceful political means on an equal basis and in all spheres of international relations and to study ways and means acceptable to all for ensuring such security in accordance with the UN Charter and with consideration of realities of the nuclear-space era. The UN Secretary General was charged with assisting in arranging an international exchange of opinions on this question.

Thus the concept of comprehensive security which was discussed at the 27th CPSU Congress became, by UN resolution, a starting point and the framework of a broad international dialogue. Finding specific ways and means of forming a security system along all avenues of international relations in the process of this dialogue is on the agenda.

Footnotes

1. UN Document A/41/697, p 18.
2. "Common Security. A Program for Disarmament," Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by (and with Foreword by) O. Palme, Moscow, 1982, p 77.
3. Quoted from VOPROSY LITERATURY, No 10, 1986, p 156.
4. "Zayavleniye Generalnogo sekretarya TsK KPSS M. S. Gorbacheva po sovetskomu televideniyu 18 avgusta 1986 goda" [Statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev on Soviet Television 18 August 1986], Moscow, 1986, p 13.
5. "Sovetsko-amerikanskaya vstrecha na vysshem urovne. Zheneva, 19-21 noyabrya 1985 goda" [The Soviet-American Summit Meeting: Geneva, 19-21 November 1985], Moscow, 1985, p 40.
6. PRAVDA, 30 May 1987.
7. "U.N. General Assembly. Thirty-Sixth Session. A/36/597," 19 November 1981, p 25.

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Large-Scale Drug Use Among Soldiers Asserted
PM2710120188 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Oct 88 p 12

[Article by Boris Kalachev, lecturer at the Moscow USSR MVD Higher Militia School: "No Room for This in the Ranks"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] A recent CPSU Central Committee Politburo session examined the question of how party resolutions on strengthening military discipline in the Army and Navy are being fulfilled. It was noted that, despite a number of positive changes for the better, the main task—to radically improve military discipline in the Soviet Army—demands additional measures. We would like to see serious attention being paid to the problem discussed in the article we publish in the course of the elaboration of these measures.

Does the problem of drug addiction exist in our Armed Forces? Unfortunately it does.

Let us cast our minds back to last May. While under the influence of stupeficients, Captain A. Bogomolov, a military construction worker by profession, behaved scandalously in the main cabin of a TU-154 on the Alma-Ata-Arkalyk-Moscow route, and before actual takeoff threatened to blow up the aircraft, in which he alleged a bomb had been planted. On this occasion his fellow passengers suffered nothing more than a bit of a scare. Once the officer came back to his senses he tried to turn his action into a joke, after having delayed the flight by 2 hours.

But events developed in a much more tragic fashion last year, when internal troops servicemen actually made an attempt to capture and hijack an aircraft, an incident which aroused a broad public response. Three of the four bandits, armed with rapid-fire combat weapons, proved to be drug addicts (in other words people unable to live without the constant use of drugs) who had been diagnosed as such even before being drafted into the army. Does this mean that the military commissariats which posted them to serve and defend the motherland were ignorant of this fact? And generally speaking, how long ago did this problem start worrying us? If we were to believe articles published in the past, it must have happened almost literally yesterday. But in reality this is certainly not the case.

It was way back in the late sixties that psychiatrists Ye.B. Kagan, N.D. Kuznetsov, F.A. Saburenko, and others bluntly raised the question of numerous instances when they had detected drug users among conscript soldiers, especially those serving in Central Asia. For example, Ye.B. Kagan estimated that 20 percent of soldiers actually started using drugs in the military units. "In our conditions," he wrote in one of his articles, "we do not encounter any cases of people giving up smoking [drugs]

as a result of medical measures, not even after a long stay in the hospital." On this basis, he drew the conclusion: Long-term drug addicts should not be drafted into the Army.

Does this mean that the Army had faced up to the problem of drug addiction as far back as 20 years ago? Were the experts' warnings heeded? Here is a document of "historical" importance which came into being only 4 short years after the psychiatrists' conclusions. It is a reply, from a Moscow rayon military commissariat, to a request by the same rayon's internal affairs administration, asking the commissariat to watch out for drug users of draft age and to identify them during their examination by medical commissions. The military commissar replied that they keep no such records and, generally speaking, "drug addiction is no bar to service in the ranks of the Soviet Army...."

Here is the evidence from random sociological studies conducted in 1987 in three of the country's regions—Moscow, Kiev, and Krasnodar Kray—and covering more than 3,000 people. Some 26.9 percent of students from some 20 VUZ's who admitted to using stupeficients for nonmedical purposes proved to be young men who had started using them in the Army. The following alarming pattern emerged: The worse a region of the country is affected by drug addiction, the smaller the number of young men who first use drugs in the barracks—since they have been able to do so at home—and vice versa. Hence, the proportions were: almost one-half of Kievans, 14.3 percent of Muscovites, and just 6.2 percent of young men from Krasnodar. An even smaller proportion of those who acquired the habit in the Army was found among persons who had stood trial in the past and had been drafted into the Army after serving sentences in places of detention.

Consequently, this is not an exclusively "army" or "civilian" problem. The struggle against such a persistent negative phenomenon must be actively waged both in military units and outside them. So far, however, there has been a dangerous alliance of passivity.

The following extremely disturbing facts also came to light. It was respondents who had been through the school of Afghanistan (among those who admitted to having experimented with drugs) who indicated on the questionnaire that they knew of the existence of heroin and LSD. Here is how anonymous interlocutors tried to explain the "drugs-war" relationship in private conversations after the poll. Of course, they said, soldiers did not always take them in combat conditions, but this did happen.... The young men attributed their liking for the drug to its ability to ease nervous stress prior to combat operations, during nighttime guard duty close to bushman positions, and other circumstances. Generally speaking, contacts with them made it clear that they had no problem in obtaining hashish, opium, or other drugs from the local population....

After this poll of young people, the pollsters themselves started asking questions.

Afghanistan is one of the most ancient countries in the Orient, where the use of drugs as a way of life has historical roots among the local population. This fact was pointed out even by Academician N.I. Vavilov, who traveled in those places back in the twenties. But apart from the famous scientist's observations, there is also the practical knowledge available both abroad and in our own prerevolutionary past, which convincingly proves the validity of the following law. Whenever military subunits live alongside the population of countries (in the continent of Asia, as a rule) where drug addiction is deeply rooted as a way of life, this naturally leads to contacts between servicemen and local residents and the adoption of negative and antisocial habits, traditions, and rules of behavior.

Back in the last century this resulted in the appearance of drug addicts and opium smokers in a whole series of European countries. Suffice it to recall Napoleon's unsuccessful expedition to Egypt, when the remnants of the French Army returned home with their backpacks filled with hashish. And how about the alarm sounded by America in 1944 as a result of the spread of drug addiction among soldiers stationed in Burma, India, and Iran, and its demands to curb the sowing of the opium poppy in the aforementioned countries, where drug addicts even constituted up to 75 percent of the police? Finally, this is also indicated by the lamentable experience of the U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam when, thanks to organized crime, the use of drugs spread to the U.S. Army and later developed into a real calamity not so much for a limited number of U.S. citizens living outside their country as for the whole nation, for the entire U.S. people.

It does not matter whether the drug users are soldiers from an enslaving army or a liberation army. The consequences are the same. They are particularly exacerbated if organized crime gets involved. According to data from the DRA Sarandoy (people's militia), more than one-third of a tonne of heroin, more than 5 tonnes of opium, and 21 tonnes of hashish were confiscated from the local mafia in Afghanistan's territory in 1987 alone. In the Soviet Union, a country far larger than Afghanistan in terms of both territory and population, 4.2 tonnes of narcotics were withdrawn from criminal circulation in the same year. Therefore it appears that there were 0.015 grams of narcotics per capita in the USSR (according to population figures for 1985), against 1.6 grams in the DRA, which is 100 times more.

Is there any confirmation of such frightening forecasts? First, the results of the aforementioned random sociological studies. Second, the records of numerous criminal cases instituted against servicemen over drug-related crimes committed either while in the Army or after demobilization, in the "civilian world." Third, the actual

cases of Soviet customs officers detaining entire containers crossing the Soviet Union in transit. Undoubtedly the gravity of the problem will be described in letters from readers who have themselves directly or indirectly come across drugs in the Army. Targeted sociological studies conducted in military subunits will also produce an updated answer. It is evident that equally weighty information could be supplied by customs organs: Has there recently been an increase in the number of cases of confiscation of drugs from soldiers, sergeants, officers, and military personnel of other ranks?

So, since this issue directly affects our children and relatives, as well as the moral and physical health of the growing generation, we are entitled to ask the competent persons responsible for our Armed Forces: What preventive and other measures have been taken by the Army command to ensure that there is no room for the problem of drug addiction among servicemen? What is it doing while an all-union campaign to combat drug addiction is being conducted outside military units?

I am writing this article for the sole purpose of ensuring that glasnost helps in the struggle against this terrible evil.

Low Public Perception of Military Profession Viewed

*18010102 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jul 88 p 1*

[Article by Gds Capt N. Belitskiy, 1st Class Military Pilot, Northern Group of Forces: "A Conference Delegate Has the Floor: The Prestige of Military Service"]

[Text] My comrades gave me instructions in sending me off to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The majority of the instructions naturally concerned various aspects of our day-to-day life. Among the parting words also was the following: If I should have occasion to speak at the conference, raise the question of the authority of the Motherland's defender, the prestige of military service.

I did not mount the rostrum of the Palace of Congresses, but in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA I wish to share something urgent that is in keeping with a provision of the party conference resolution about the qualitative parameters of defense organizational development.

It is said that any comparison leaves much to be desired, but sometimes we cannot get by without it. When I entered military aviation school four or five persons were vying for one slot. I know that about 20 years ago the competition was about twice as high. But now? In the words of graduates, there is a little more than one person per slot. If we take into account that not all candidates

pass the rigid medical commission, then almost all comers essentially are accepted. It is not surprising that chance people turn up among cadets and later among officers.

During the days of the party conference's work I had occasion to exchange opinions with various people: military leaders, junior commanders, and those who are creating a base for a reliable national defense capability at the machine tool and on the kolkhoz field. I will not conceal the fact that many of the people with whom I spoke emphasized with concern that the prestige of the officer and of the military person in general had fallen during the time of stagnation in society. I did not make a slip—specifically in society, on a state scale. This is no simple question and as we know it is not limited to a departmental framework or to some special interests of the Ministry of Defense. We have become accustomed to the phrase: the Armed Forces are an inalienable and far from least important institution of the political system. In the words of M. V. Frunze, they are a copy of society. This means it is far from a matter of indifference as to who will swell the ranks of defenders tomorrow and assume responsibility for the country's security and fate.

I often ask the questions: Why does one sometimes see bored faces at meetings with war veterans? Why isn't it considered shameful for men to squirm out of service in the Armed Forces under any pretext? And why, finally, are boys not playing at being Chkalov, Gromov and Chapayev? Are the boys different? No, it is a different upbringing. This includes heroic-patriotic upbringing, where ostentation has substituted for meticulousness and system and where the latter have been stifled by formalism. This is an echo of those years when priorities were changing in the youth environment; when there was a reappraisal of values and essentially a reversal and vulgarization of such high concepts as allegiance to duty, courage, and patriotism; and when a lack of spiritualness, materialism, and superficiality in evaluating current events and phenomena advanced to the fore more and more.

In my view, under conditions of restructuring an acute need arose, within the scope of an integral state policy toward the youth, to elevate military-patriotic indoctrination to a qualitatively new level and to purge it of serious deficiencies which have built up in recent decades. A major role in this is given to the family, the school, the Komsomol and DOSAAF. It was rightly noted at the All-Union Party Conference that good preconditions now have been created for restructuring the activity of public organizations as applied to the new conditions. It would appear that an improvement in the effectiveness of mass defense work must become one of the mandatory directions of such activity.

It is easy to notice how the press, radio and television are referring more and more vigorously to the life of the Armed Forces. This can only please, but one circumstance greatly troubles me. What do young lads read and

hear about the Army and how do they see it? The clinking of orders and medals and the magnificence of shoulderboards on parade uniforms on the one hand, and vivid descriptions of "something antiquated" on the other hand. In the best instance there are movies where gallant lads run dashing and demonstrate unarmed combat techniques, catching armed bandits in an off-hand manner. The film ends and leaves emptiness in one's head and heart. There were neither genuine problems with which the Army lives nor living people with their not-so-simple concerns, joys, and grief.

But I repeat, this is still in the best instance. A film called "Assa" now is popular. It also has the following segment: people in a health resort restaurant beat up a most loathsome individual in military uniform with major's shoulderboards and flight collar tabs very heavily and then toss him into a fountain to the accompaniment of the song "VVS—Air Forces." True, later it turns out that this is not at all an Air Forces major, but either a swindler or a criminal with a "leaning" toward aerospace. I do not undertake to judge the extent to which this image is successful on an artistic plane or how much it "works" for the concept of the movie. But how they beat the military airman with "relish" sinks deeply into one's memory. Judging from the reaction of the hall, it is not only in aviators' memories. The fact that the pilot is "not real" somehow retreats and fades into the background.

I am convinced that the more people know the truth about the Army, the higher its authority will be—only not a truncated, narrowly directed truth, but a fuller truth, including about nonregulation relationships, about drug addicts coming to us in the Army, and about other negative phenomena. Unfortunately many authors of newspaper items do not make even the slightest attempt to find out from whence these negatives have been introduced to the Army environment and what are their roots and reasons. It is our common misfortune and it must be treated like a disease and not sprinkled with salt.

Let us be completely frank. Restructuring prompts us all to take an attentive and I would say captious look at ourselves. It prompts us to honestly answer the difficult questions posed by life: Are we servicemen doing everything to see that the officer's prestige is high in the country? Do we always go all out in service and are we always models of discipline? What is the end result of our labor by which people judge us? The fact is that constant day-to-day combat readiness of the Army and Navy is not an abstract concept, but a fully specific one. Someone only has to dawdle with something or let something slip, as they say, and this immediately receives the widest and, alas, the most negative repercussions. That is the price of our every step, both in the direct and figurative meaning.

A steadfast opinion existed in our society that if a person is an officer, he is without fail a highly educated, highly cultured person. But where does culture come from?

From upbringing, in the family and in the school. It is also suggested that "in the military school" be added here. But let us look truth in the eyes. In the schools they teach and teach well much that is necessary in service, except for just a little—ethics, the ability to behave oneself with people, the culture of intercourse.

People may say that we have self-education for this, and that knowledge received by cadets elevates the individual. That is so but, alas, the culture of a future officer as well as of a representative of any other profession cannot be instilled within the framework of a specific curriculum. Who for example shapes future officers into people who are truly cultured, pointedly polite, well-mannered, gallant if you like, who can conduct themselves in any society with brilliance, i.e., officers in the full meaning of this word? No one, it seems.

Again I foresee an objection. With the present complexity of military affairs there is allegedly no time for this. The modern school is extremely specialized, computerized and robotized, and not an infantry ballet school. And professionals, masters of military affairs are trained here and not, pardon me, fops and dandies. That is all true, but it is also impossible to close one's eyes to the following things. Once in a bus I saw a lieutenant sitting in the presence of standing women. Have we become accustomed to this? If yes, then it should be distressing and shameful for all of us. Well, what is a seat in a bus! I was told indignantly how an impudent person who had had one too many was pestering passers-by before the eyes of two indifferent officers. Do you think they put him in his place?

I brought this up with a comrade, and what do you think? They acted properly, he said. Why raise a scandal? A person does not know how it would end. Then there would be no end to the troubles.

But how about the officer code of honor?

In speaking of the prestige of officer service we rightly focus attention above all on duty, valor and the romance

and we are often silent about the other aspect of the matter, but in vain. Take those same housing and everyday conditions of officers. For many Soviet citizens they are associated not without reason with the sadly familiar "a serviceman's family will take the apartment..." If it was only an apartment! How much has been written and rewritten about officers' wives. They patiently share all adversities with their husbands. The majority of them either sit around without work or do whatever comes along, forgetting about their beloved profession and their own talents. Do you think the young people do not see and understand this? They see and understand and draw conclusions.

I am convinced that there cannot be a genuine officer without a love for the chosen profession and without dedication to it. In this connection I cannot in any way get out of my mind the aforementioned competition for the military aviation school and one candidate per slot. Here is what I was thinking: Why not establish a school with an aviation bias according to the Suvorov type? The sailors have a Nakhimov school! So let us also have a Chkalov or Gagarin school—the name isn't the point. The important thing is that it exist, that people be trained for the profession of military pilot from the schoolbench. I am sure that on getting a taste for the sky and feeling the strength of their wings, boys would not exchange this career for anything.

Some may ask: Doesn't a military pilot, flight commander, and party conference delegate have any problems more important? Combat readiness, for example, or technical training and discipline. I should have talked about qualitative parameters of defense organizational development.

That is what I am talking about, because I am sure that the future not only of the Armed Forces but also the future of our Motherland depends on who will come into the Army and Navy tomorrow and what attitude is fixed in society toward people in military uniform.

Disposition of Officers from INF Missile Units
*PM2110143088 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 20 Oct 88 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Colonel General V. Mikhalkin, chief of the Ground Forces Missile Forces and Artillery, by Maj S. Popov under the rubric "Interview on a Topical Theme": "After the Explosions at Saryozek: Missiles for Scrap. But What About the Missile Men's Future?"—date, place of interview not stated; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the first explosions have been heard in the areas where the missiles are being eliminated. But where and how will the people who controlled these weapons continue their service? At the request of the editorial office, Colonel General V. Mikhalkin, chief of the Ground Forces Missile Forces and Artillery, told us about this.

[Popov] Vladimir Mikhaylovich! First, the main point that concerns many of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers: Will all the officers serving in the missile units whose weapons are due for elimination remain in service?

[Mikhalkin] Yes, we are trying to maintain in full the personnel of these units—after all, they are officers with a high standard of professional training. Moreover, even the few men who, for various reasons, expressed a desire to be discharged into the reserve before the expiration of their term of service have in fact remained in service. They are valuable specialists and good officers, and we managed to convince them of the need to continue to serve.

[Popov] Is there any justification for comparing the present moment in the Army's life with the reduction of the Armed Forces that took place in the late fifties and early sixties?

[Mikhalkin] Despite the outward similarity in the situations, there is a fundamental difference here. Today the question of the future service of each officer and ensign is being resolved on an individual basis. In those days, and I say this from my personal observations, the principle: "Every third man to leave the service" was implemented more or less mechanically. Many talented commanding officers, political workers, military engineers, and technicians were forced to leave the Army. And at the same time those who remained were sometimes far from the best. In my view conclusions have been drawn from the lessons of the past. Today the Ground Forces cadre directorate, the districts' cadre organs, and our directorate's cadre group, headed by Colonel V. Novoselov, are working responsibly and in coordination. This work is far from simple.

[Popov] What is being offered to the officers?

[Mikhalkin] We are talking about the specialists who controlled the shorter-range missiles. These missiles will

no longer exist. But missile complexes with a range of up to 500 km remain. We are sending some of the officers to these units and subunits. Others will continue to serve in the tube and rocket artillery. Naturally, I am talking about commanding officers. As for the political workers, truck drivers, communications operators, in other words, officers who are not "tied" by their speciality specifically to the missile forces—some of these are being sent to other categories of troops and even other branches of the Armed Forces.

[Popov] Is it easy for a missile man to transfer to the classical artillery, if I can put it like that?

[Mikhalkin] A certain amount of professional and psychological restructuring is necessary. But in our educational institutions, and especially the military academy, officers are trained to serve in both missile and artillery units. We try correspondingly to alternate their service in the troops. I myself, for instance, commanded an artillery regiment, then served in command posts in the missile forces, and then in the artillery again. And that is a common phenomenon.

Nonetheless all the missile officers who have had to change the nature of their service have been retrained. They will improve in the process of systematic commander training.

[Popov] What problems have emerged in the course of resolving cadre questions?

[Mikhalkin] Enough, of course. They emerged from the time of the withdrawal from GDR and CSSR territory of the missile units that were stationed there in December 1983. They were to return to their former stations, where the housing stock and the training base had formerly been mothballed. But.... It transpired that in the military districts, these camps were already being used to some degree. The commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces had to intervene. Things were put right very quickly.

But most of the problems are human problems. People feel hurt, disappointed. But these problems are not at all associated with the elimination of a whole class of arms. We military men have the same thoughts and feelings as the whole people. It is a matter of people's personal lives.

Among the missile forces command personnel (depending on the missile complex that is in the unit's armory) there are differences in the official category, where salaries are the same. This is what happens. An officer has, for instance, been in a post classified as "captain," he has coped with it successfully, and in his new place he is offered a post classified one step lower. There is no material loss to him, but his prestige is affected. In some cases, as I have already mentioned, people have gone so far as to request a discharge into the reserves. In such situations reproaches and lectures are pointless. Sensitivity, humanity, and good advice from your seniors are much more important.

[Popov] How does the picture look in general as regards the redeployment of officers?

[Mikhalkin] I will take as an example one unit that has returned to the territory of the Baltic Military District. Two-thirds of the officers are continuing their careers in that district. Eleven men, among them Major V. Lomakin and Captains V. Polovinkin, S. Mironov, and Kh. Gaynulin, have entered higher posts. Lieutenant Colonel A. Chashin, Major A. Savinkin, and Captains N. Nazipov, and V. Kvasovka have become students at the military academy. All the others have taken equivalent posts. Four commanders were appointed to posts with lower official classifications. In all cases this was with their official consent. It is a question of very young officers who have their entire career ahead of them. How have the officers sent to other districts been used? One was promoted, and one was appointed to a lower-ranking post. The others are serving in posts equal to their former positions.

We also seek where possible to take the officers' personal requests into account. Lieutenant Colonel A. Yedunov, who has an apartment in Kaliningrad, was sent to the oblast military commissariat. Lieutenant Colonel V. Granovskiy and a number of other officers were sent to artillery units, at their own wish....

[Popov] The newspaper TRUD recently published a letter from the wife of a missile officer about the difficult living conditions at her husband's new place of service....

[Mikhalkin] Of course difficulties of this kind exist. They are characteristic of the Armed Forces in general. It would be nice if an officer could receive, together with his appointment to his new post, the keys to a new apartment. But alas.... That is not likely to happen in the near future. We have sometimes had to billet families who did not have apartments in barracks, training blocks, and hotels refitted as hostels. The premises are divided into rooms and equipped with furniture. The conditions are acceptable, but you cannot call it luxury.

[Popov] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, could you clarify the situation specifically involving Senior Lieutenant Sh. Khayrov, whose wife complained about domestic troubles?

[Mikhalkin] First, one point: It is not Senior Lieutenant, but Captain Khayrov. This conscientious officer received the higher military rank in accordance with the post he now holds. At the garrison to which Khayrov and his unit returned after their withdrawal from GDR territory and where his family were provided with two rooms, there was no post with the official rank of "captain." An equivalent was found in another unit, where the housing situation is indeed critical.

In general, much, in my view, depends on attentiveness toward the missile men in the districts to which they were sent to continue their service. And here not everything is being resolved fairly. At one garrison, for

instance, they built an apartment block specially for these officers, and have begun to build another. But the district promptly took some of the apartments for its own needs. It is hard to accept that.

[Popov] One last question. Has the missile men's prestige suffered, in your view, as a result of the elimination of two types of missile arms?

[Mikhalkin] I think the competition for entries to our military academies acts as a kind of barometer here. This year it remains approximately the same as it was before.

Unit Commanders Discuss Problems Revealed in Belorussian MD Exercise

*18010202 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Sep 88 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Col A. Smolyanko and Maj O. Vladyskin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondents: "From a Military Exercise Area: On Belorussian Soil"]

[Excerpts] A military exercise in the area of Dubrovo, Shatsk, Berezino and Ulma constituted a proficiency evaluation for soldiers of the Belorussian Military District. Their activities were observed by representatives of 26 states—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—who were present at the invitation of the Government of the USSR in accordance with the Stockholm Conference document.

First and Foremost—Work

What member of the armed forces does not know that modern battle is fast-moving and intensive [skorochnyy]. Yes, that is so. Powerful equipment and effective weapons make it possible to resolve combat tasks in an extremely compressed timeframe. But this is preceded by a tremendous amount of preparatory work. Especially in defense, where every soldier literally must create his own fortress for himself.

Right now we find ourselves on an absolutely level sector of terrain where a "fortress" is being built. Senior Lieutenant Igor Zaritskiy, the commander of a motorized rifle platoon, is pointing out with short motions of his hand what will be positioned where.

"Of course, we were helped by soldiers from the combat engineer company," the senior lieutenant explains. "They delivered prefabricated sections beforehand for strengthening the walls of emplacements and trenches and for slit trench covers. We worked together. But basically the soldiers of our platoon did the work."

Zaritskiy says firmly that the strongpoint will fully meet the requirements of regulations and corresponding instructions within the designated time period. It is possible that one of its features will be a novelty. An

observation stand made of wooden boards and painted with a camouflage color has been laid out in a perfect square in the very center of the strongpoint. Especially for foreign observers. There also are stands like this in the strongpoint of one of the companies and next to the battalion command post, which are preparing for defense. This is a feature, so to say, of the times. . .

After the Battle

And so the first battle of the military exercise is a thing of the past. The battalion that sustained the main strike of the attackers is almost completely "destroyed." Its remnants were forced to withdraw from the positions they occupied.

There was a pause in combat operations, and we, taking advantage of the lull, went out to meet those who had just been conducting them. We are now sitting in a tent of the "southerners," and we are conversing with three officers about what, in their view, the ongoing exercise will give to the troops. What kinds of problems it has already brought to light. Guards Maj G. Chernyy, battalion deputy commander for armaments, is talking, naturally, about equipment. Its good working order is the first condition for success in modern battle. Once again we became convinced: if before a battle you do not spare energy and time in servicing equipment, then there is a lot of trouble and anxiety that you will have eliminated for yourself afterwards.

But then Guards Capt V. Startsev, commander of a motorized rifle company, is not so optimistic. He, an officer who had served in Afghanistan and who was decorated with the Order of the Red Star, is concerned that in the new unit he continuously encounters the literally exhausting guardianship of senior officers. Under real combat conditions they assigned him a task, he was given time to think about it, and afterwards they listened to his solution. He was able to prove that he selected the most optimal variant, and he was told to execute it. But here it sometimes approaches absurdity. Startsev proposed questioning Guards Capt V. Smazilkin, the commander of another motorized rifle company, about a recent incident. He, not without hesitation, agreed.

. . . According to the exercise plan, Smazilkin's company was on the point of attacking and was supposed to execute a maneuver with two platoons. But suddenly a general from higher headquarters who was inspecting the course of preparations for combat operations demanded that the forward [krayniy] platoon be commanded during the attack not by the company commander, but. . . by the regimental commander. He was charged with the responsibility for maintaining direct communications with the commander of the platoon and to guide him to the conclusion of the battle. More than one reason had to be given by many officers in order to get the general to change his mind.

Incidentally, not all exercise participants think that repeated review of possible operational variants is harmful. Let there be consideration even of those which at first glance contradict the logic of existing rules, asserts, for example, Maj S. Vladimirov, commander of a motorized rifle battalion. Training, they say, is training—truth is born in the search.

Khatyn

Khatyn, who does not know this place, where 45 years ago the Hitlerites burned the entire village together with its inhabitants. An endless stream of people come here. They come in order to pay respectful tribute to those who died, to strengthen their courage, and not to forget, or to allow a repetition of the tragedy.

On one of the days of the military exercise, a bus drove up to the stop at the memorial site. Strapping young men in military uniform came out of it. In mournful silence they went to where the sad voices of the bells rang out over the women, men and children who were burned alive.

After, when the tank crew members had laid flowers, we heard Pvt Yu. Sposobov, a driver-mechanic, say quietly:

"And the fascists also burned my grandfather Ivan in the village of Selyavshchina near Vitebsk. It is terrifying."

Today's defenders of the motherland remember at what price a peaceful life was given to all of us. They remember, and therefore they know very well why they hold weapons in their hands.

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BTR-80, Armored Fighting Vehicle

81440043 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in
Russian Jul 88 pp 28, back cover

[Article by Col G. Korotov and Col (Res) V. Knyazkov]

[Text] What is this armored fighting vehicle [AFV] like? For a general description of it we will turn to the specialists' strict technical definition: the BTR-80 is a wheeled amphibious fighting vehicle that has armament, armor protection and high mobility; is intended for employment in motorized rifle subunits of the Ground Forces; and is capable of following tanks and crossing emplacements, trenches and water obstacles from the move.

And so fire, armor and maneuver are three fundamental combat qualities which fully support successful operations of the BTR-80 combat team in any kinds of combined-arms battle. This combat team is not so small: the AFV is equipped with 10 places for the squad (vehicle) commander, driver-mechanic, gunner and 7 motorized riflemen to sit and to function.

The basis of the BTR-80 armament is a turret machine-gun mount which specialists categorize as enclosed and self-contained. It accommodates two coaxial machine-guns: a PKT—7.62-mm Kalashnikov tank machinegun, and KPVT—14.5-mm Vladimirov tank heavy machine-gun. We will remind the readers that KPVT bullet weight is 64 g. This essentially is a small projectile, one that is moreover accelerated in the barrel to a considerable velocity—945 m/sec. This is why the machinegun is intended for conducting fire for the destruction and neutralization of lightly armored targets.

We will also recall that maximum sighting range of the PKT is 1,500 m and that of the KPVT is 2,000 m, and that the KPVT can engage airborne targets at a range up to 1,000 m. The laying angles of the machineguns are 360 degrees horizontally, and vertically from a depression angle of -4 degrees to an angle of elevation of +60 degrees. They have cartridge belt feed. The BTR-80 unit of fire is 500 rounds for the KPVT machinegun (10 boxes) and 2,000 rounds for the PKT machinegun (8 boxes).

But this is not yet all the armament concentrated aboard the AFV. Its combat team has two 7.62-mm PK Kalashnikov general purpose machineguns with a supply of filled ammunition boxes (12), 8 assault rifles (AKMS or AK-74), and 9 F-1 hand grenades.

Combat team members can conduct assault-rifle and machinegun fire directly from the BTR-80. For this the designers provided small hatches with ball-and-socket bearings in the armored hull side plates. Of these the two front ones (right and left) are for firing the PK machineguns and there are four more for assault rifle fire. The two rear ones (right and left) are mounted in the upper flaps of the side hatch doors. There is also a small hatch with ball-and-socket bearing immediately in front of the commander in the hull front plate for firing the assault rifle. The very same kind of small hatch is located to the right in the sloping hull plate by the single seat for the seventh motorized rifleman. Finally there is the capability of conducting assault rifle fire against high-up targets, for which one small round hatch is installed in each cover of the upper boarding hatches of the fighting compartment.

The motorized riflemen will employ a handheld antitank rocket launcher if it becomes necessary to enter into single combat against enemy armored vehicles including tanks. They engage enemy aircraft and helicopters with surface-to-air missiles from two handheld surface-to-air missile systems.

Now a word about the BTR-80 armor hull, which accommodates the crew and mounted personnel, armament, ammunition, machine units and mechanisms. It protects them from being hit by small arms fire; from the effects of thermal radiation, shock wave and penetrating radiation of a nuclear burst; and from dustlike radioactive substances and toxic agents.

The hull resembles a boat welded from steel armor plates. It consists of a hull nose, sides, rear section, roof plate, hull

floor and engine compartment bulkhead. Of course overall the hull also determines the vehicle's dimensions: length 7,650 mm, width 2,900 mm and height 2,350 mm (with full weight and 475 mm clearance).

It should be noted that in creating [sozdaniye] the BTR-80 specialists fully applied efficient design methods. For example, each unit volume of behind-armor space was used with maximum benefit. The fact is that in addition to the models of armament and the unit of fire already enumerated, the power plant, monitoring and control mechanisms and members, observation devices, centralized tire air pressure regulation system, water-jet propeller, electrical equipment, communications equipment, means of protection against weapons of mass destruction, firefighting equipment, camouflage means, life support system and bilge-pump equipment are "squeezed" inside the hull. And place still was found for three containers of drinking water, ten rations, three life jackets, ten personal packs and the vehicle ZIP [set of spare parts, instruments and accessories].

At the same time, there are work stations outfitted for observation and fire for all ten members of the combat team and comfortable conditions have been created within the closed living environment facilitating the successful accomplishment of combat missions in different geographic regions and climatic zones, at different times of year and day, essentially in all weather conditions.

The BTR-80 has excellent "eyes"—refined observation and aiming devices. For example, the commander has four observation devices at his disposal, including one combination (day and night) device which provides night vision for up to 300-400 m. The driver-mechanic work station also has four devices. If necessary, a night vision device with a range of vision of 60 m under nighttime conditions can be installed in place of the central device. There are another three devices with the gunner in the turret: immediately in front of him is a sight, on his left is an observation device, and there is one more in the turret roof. And finally there are six devices at the motorized riflemen's work stations, including two at the small hatches for firing the PK machineguns.

The AFV crew has the R-123M VHF radio for external communications and the R-124 intercom (for internal communications) for five users: commander, driver-mechanic, gunner and two motorized riflemen with the PK machineguns.

Maneuver is the third component among the aforementioned most important combat qualities of the contemporary armored vehicle. It largely is determined by parameters of the AFV power plant and running gear. The basis of the BTR-80 power plant is a four-stroke eight-cylinder liquid-cooled diesel engine with guaranteed output of 260 hp (191 kw). The running gear meets

contemporary rigid requirements: eight wheels—all driving, tubeless pneumatic tires, and independent suspension. A torsion bar is used as the flexible element. There are eight of them, one for each wheel.

The BTR-80 has good maneuver capabilities. Weighing 13,600 kg, the vehicle is capable of moving along dirt roads at a speed of 20-40 km/hr and maximum highway speed reaches 80 km/hr. The AFV confidently negotiates natural and manmade obstacles: maximum angle of ascent along a mountain or hill slope is set at 30 degrees, and the angle of heel is 25 degrees. The vehicle will not be stopped even by a ditch 2 m wide—with a base of 4,400 mm it will crawl over this obstacle like a myriapod, and it will jump over an emplacement or trench practically without reducing speed. A vertical wall 0.5 m high also is easily negotiated.

It seems a paradox that a heavy vehicle weighing a little less than 14 tons is capable not only of staying afloat, but also moving at a maximum speed of at least 9 km/hr using the water-jet propeller and crossing rivers, ditches, water reservoirs and other water obstacles from the move (just so wave height does not exceed 0.75 m).

We will emphasize that the BTR-80 has a very large fuel range: it averages 223-480 km on dirt roads, 600 km on the highway, and 12 hours afloat under average operating regimes.

We will also note the vehicle's good agility (this capability is of very great significance when fighting in the woods and in populated points). The designers made not


only the first but also the second wheels turnable, so in controlling the AFV the driver-mechanic easily turns the four front wheels in a particular direction at the same time. The turning radius based on the track of the outside front wheel on land is no more than 13 m and the tactical diameter on water at a speed of 6-7 km/hr should be no more than 20 m.

The BTR-80 can be moved by military transport aviation, by the AN-22 and IL-76 aircraft.


At an important moment in battle the AFV crew can employ a smoke-grenade launch system by which a smoke screen is laid down concealing the BTR-80 against enemy visual observation. The basic parts of the system are six launchers and a control panel. The launchers are accommodated on a special bracket welded to the turret, and the control panel is within the turret on the gunner's left. Loading is done manually through the muzzle face. By rotating the turret the gunner can lay a launcher in any direction within 360 degrees, and the vertical laying angle is constant (45 degrees). A smoke screen formed by one grenade with a surface wind velocity of 2-5 m/sec is 10-30 m wide and 3-10 m high. Grenade smoke formation time is one minute and the distance for laying a smoke screen is 200-350 m.

On the whole the BTR-80 AVF has a sum total of excellent performance characteristics and is capable of accomplishing the most varied and difficult combat missions.

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
Left front view



BTR-80 turret mounting

Key:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Sight | 2. Retracting mechanism retaining spring |
| 3. TNPT-1 vision device | 4. Smoke grenade launcher |
| 5. Cartridge-case and used-link container | 6. Retracting mechanism handle |
| 7. Used-link container | 8. Traverse mechanism |



Right rear view

Retired Lt Gen Critiques System of Training, Rating Pilots

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[Interview with Candidate of Military Sciences retired Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Katukhov, conducted by Colonel A. Garavskiy: "Numbers... are Helping to Train, or What is this 'Pilot Rating'?" first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] "While talking with a squadron commander from one of the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District aviation units I found out that they are using expressions called "pilot rating" and "flight mission difficulty rating" Our meeting was very brief so I was not able to ask about this terminology and what was behind it. Could you give us a little about this in the newspaper?"

Aviator V. Kuts telephoned the editor with this request. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Garavskiy met with Candidate of Military Sciences retired Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Katukhov who had brought this concept into a scientific and practical use.

[Garavskiy] You have long been involved with improving the quality of military training among Air Force and Air Defense personnel through the use of a quantitative evaluation criteria for pilot professional skills. What pushed you toward this exact area of research, Sergey Sergeyevich?

[Katukhov] Life. My command experience. But if you want something specific, it was an event in the distant past. When I was commanding a major PVO unit a senior chief reproached me during a conversation. "What is going on. After a brief break you assigned a lyetchik-snayper [a rating assigned to a military pilot of exceptional skill] more than 20 duel-control check out rides under difficult meteorological conditions. And he has still not flown his combat aircraft—he is waiting for better weather. This is how you can take a long time to redevelop skills. So you have developed a methodology."

I explained what was going on, but was not able to contain myself and heatedly blurted out, "It is not we who have developed a methodology, but rather you people who have written the base documents."

"And you are approaching it intelligently and subjecting it to science...."

At first I was offended, but after I thought about it I inwardly agreed. It was not right to reproach subordinates who had acted in accordance with the base documents. It was then that I thought about the need to transition to a system for redeveloping the skills of class pilots, a system that was independent of weather conditions. And it certainly had to take into account the level

of their actual training before the break, i.e., there had to be some differential. You cannot approach training for an ace in the same manner as you do training a junior pilot.

Then, as now, we evaluated the professional training of pilots and their admissibility to missions of various flying complexity in a subjective manner and used qualitative expressions such as "more" and "less," "best" and "worst" and so forth. But you run into the problem of one commander evaluating a pilot as "good" while another commander rates him as "average." Or take interceptions under difficult weather conditions, day or night. There is a difference, but what is it specifically?

[Garavskiy] But the class rating is the criterion for evaluating a pilot's profession skills. The allowable time for a break in the various types of training for 3rd, 2nd and 1st Class Military Pilots has been established in accordance with this class rating.

[Katukhov] A class rating in the pure sense, without considering the pilot's actual training, is a relative evaluation, but is not an absolute indicator of skill. It specifically does not take into account the frequency and duration of breaks in flight status. And flight mission difficulty is very arbitrarily taken into account. It is possible to compare them when there are known indicators for pilot skills and for the difficulty level in the missions that they are carrying out, and all of this can be expressed in mathematical form. When I came to this conclusion, there was, as the saying goes, only one more step to the idea of using that specific data to develop an algorithm that would allow us to more qualitatively plan flight training and strengthen flight safety measures.

[Garavskiy] If you could, be more specific about this.

[Katukhov] The methodology about which we are talking allows us to record changes on the actual training level of each pilot on a daily basis, plan flight missions for personnel in squadrons and regiments at the optimum, and I stress optimum, level of difficulty and also redevelop quality that has been lost in a methodologically skillful manner, without excessive caution and without over-evaluating the professional skills of flight personnel. Or, in other words, to introduce pilot rating into aviation units.

[Garavskiy] In the dictionary this term is a translation from English and means "evaluation" or "technical capacity" or even "individual coefficient." What interpretation is most precise and means the most to you, Sergey Sergeyevich?

[Katukhov] A pilot rating is an evaluation of pilot's skills expressed in numerical or letter form and naturally may be an individual coefficient. It considers the frequency and duration of breaks in flight status, the complexity of flight missions and the individuality of pilots. As you

know, the mathematical equipment for determining ratings was initially developed to evaluate the skill of chess players. And it is being used in a number of other sports. When the concept of ratings as related to flight personnel became clear, I began to think about how best to transform it into reality. I attempted to work with a schematic, but what I got was long and unwielding. I finally succeeded in developing and creating a special calculator.

[Garavskiy] And how does it work?

[Katukhov] Based on the principle of comparison and on how the pilot's rating corresponds to the optimal rating of flight mission difficulty, externally the calculator resembles the navigator's slide rule that is well-known to flight personnel and that is used for navigational calculations. The special calculator is exceptionally simple, inexpensive to make, easy for practical use, can be constructed in the regiment and squadron and presents no difficulties.

[Garavskiy] I know that experts who have observed the practical experiment are speaking well of your methodology and the special calculator itself. In brief, what are the results.

[Katukhov] The experiment was conducted in two fighter regiments. There were 1560 flights and a total of 936 hours during the two and one-half months of the experiment. As the official record shows, more than 90 percent of the pilots maintained their combat readiness at the 0.7 to 1.0 level which is testimony to the high combat readiness as a whole. There were no flight accidents or flight incidents that precede such accidents that were due to the fault of flight personnel. And there was a significant savings in fuel and other resources associated with flight support..

And this, as the saying goes, is the official evaluation of the experiment. The ratings were approved earlier during a three year period in units that were under to me. This was done under the direct leadership of now Deputy PVO Commander Lieutenant General of Aviation A. Morin. At that time we discovered and reoriented approximately 14 percent of the non-productive, and what one would consider idle flights, associated with safesiding our evaluation of pilot skills because of our fear of accidents. And we know how expensive one hour of flight time in a jet fighter is. We were able to totally eliminate flight incidents and the gross preconditions for them that were associated with forcing flight training, i.e., over-estimating pilot skills and assigning them exhausting missions.

[Garavskiy] In our age we have automation and electronic and computer equipment and suddenly we have a special calculator, a "slide rule." Is this still progress?

[Katukhov] You have a reasonable question. At the present time this methodology has been transferred to a combat training center so that the algorithm can be fed into a computer. And the special calculator is seen as an intermediate step in the transition from a non-automated evaluation methodology to an automated one. As we all know, the introduction of the latter is a long, labor-intensive process. And as you say, during its development the use of the "slide rule" allows us to more fully understand the concept and the essence of how the algorithms for planning optimum flight mission difficulty function. It is a dialectic. We are advancing from the simple to the complicated. And further. The rating does not replace the existing method of qualitative evaluation, but operates parallel to it. Their interdependence allows us to eliminate the shortcomings that are inherent in each,

[Garavskiy] And now tell us about the practical application of the special calculator. How much time does it take to master it, Sergey Sergeyevich?

[Katukhov] The experiment indicated that one has to first study problem theory and spend a minimum of four hours on exercises with all flight personnel, staff officers and command post crews before the calculator can go into practical use. Then there is some training in practical solutions of flight methodology problems using objective criteria and formulas. At the same time, over two or three work shifts two experts recompute the current qualitative evaluation of the actual pilot training level as indicated in flight books and also the complexity of flight exercises, putting all of this into quantitative terms. And finally algorithms for optimal flight planning per shift are written for the specific airplane. As an example, all of this took one week in the unit where officer V. Otletov is serving.

[Garavskiy] Apparently one can already review this and come to conclusions?

[Katukhov] Yes. First—calculating the rating allows us to substantially reduce accidents caused by assigning flight personnel exhausting missions. And, I must to say, subjectively underestimating and overestimating flight personnel are potentially fraught with dire consequences. We have calculated that at the present time these are the reasons for more than forty percent of the flight accidents in aviation. Second—empty flights are totally eliminated and calculations have shown that these comprise from seven to seventeen percent. This leads to significant savings in fuel, lubricants and other resources. Third—the time needed to train flight personnel for combat operations is being reduced. And finally, there is the possibility of developing the new methodology and special calculator and using them in all types of aviation. By the way, they can also be used in other branches of the Armed Forces.

USSR Navy Composition Statistics Cited

PM2810163988 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 44, 29 Oct-4 Nov 88 (signed to press
27 Oct 88) p 8

[Editorial reply to reader's request for publication of Soviet Navy statistics—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] I read in our press that the Soviet Union has handed to the United Nations official data on the composition of the USSR Navy. I think the information would interest Soviet people too. Could you publish the figures?

S. Lapushkin, Miass.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy did indeed, in his speech at the UN General Assembly First Committee, read out figures on the USSR Navy (as of 1 July 1988) which had been submitted to the United Nations. The figures are as follows:

1. Aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiye korabli]—4.
2. Submarines—376.
3. Cruisers, destroyers, missile frigates—96.
4. Escort (frigates) and small ASW ships—174.
5. Combatant craft and minesweepers—623.
6. Amphibious warfare ships and landing craft—107.
7. All combat ships—1380.
8. Combat aircraft and helicopters—1142.
9. Naval infantry (thousands)—12.6.

Underway Refueling Capabilities Improved

18010111 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Aug 88 p 2

[Article by Lt Capt V. Almatayev; "Replenishment at Sea"]

[Text] Recently the replenishment ship Dnestr returned to its home port after an extended cruise. For the crew of the supply ship, this approach was not altogether ordinary. Before leaving port the captain of the Dnestr, V. Urbanovich proposed that the sailors conduct actual expedited replenishment of diesel fuel for warships.

The idea to expedite the refueling of the ships was first proposed by the tanker's most senior pumpman, Yu. Afanasyev. He also proposed the concrete steps to the solution of the problem: to reequip the fuel transfer line and, instead of the regular hoses, use the ones which are normally used as heavy fuel oil [mazut] lines.

In a short time the Dnestr's crew reequipped the diesel fuel transfer line and the very first transfer showed the effectiveness of Yu. Afanasyev's suggestion. An unprecedented speed of replenishment was achieved during the transfer of fuel to the missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov (while the average speed of transfer of diesel fuel turned out to be three times higher than the stipulated norm.)

Back in the home port a surprise awaited the returning crew: the unit commander gave the captain about ten radiograms in which the ship commanders praised the work of the tanker and requested a reward for the sailors. UD/336

Lack of Experience, Poor Quality of Naval Instructors Noted

18010105 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk: "A Look at a Problem: Dead-End Position"]

[Text] Many naval officers began their path into the Navy with first-term service, with the training subunit. In this respect my career is no exception. Twenty-three years ago I left the traffic control point of the submarine navigation training detachment with a tightly crammed duffelbag behind my shoulders (full sailor's certificate). I took a farewell glance backward full of gratitude: here we draftees of 1964 were given a ticket into life with a capital "L." My memory still preserves the names of my first mentors: Maj Kuzmin, Capt 3d Rank Kotlovskiy, Capt-Lt Bakhtyukov, Capt Buryakovskiy.

Officer-instructor is a key position in training subunits, but specifically who are those officers assigned the role of indoctrinators, if it can be thus expressed, in the middle naval school? I have asked this question more than once of myself and my companions during recent TDY trips to training detachments.

Before being appointed to his present position Capt 1st Rank V. Orlov, deputy training detachment commander and chief of the training department, had a major naval career. After completing the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov he was a command department head aboard an ocean minesweeper for three years and was a division specialist, then he headed up the crew of an ocean minesweeper. Valentin Dmitriyevich also has special milestones in his service record: he took part in combat sweeping of the Suez Canal and was on TDY as a military adviser to a friendly country. The officer did not leave the ship's deck for an overall total of more than 20 years. Later he also gained experience in commanding a shore unit. In short, his service and life qualifications are very substantial. But this is a deputy commander, second person in the detachment. How about the chiefs of schools and commanders of training companies and platoons? What does this permanent party category have behind them?

Valentin Dmitriyevich was forced to admit:

"Certain officers have no experience in serving aboard ships and in naval units."

We will clarify this. There was a time when the number of such subunit commanders approached 20 percent here, but here is how matters stand with similar statistics in certain other training units. For example, in the Northern Fleet training detachment almost every fifth one of those who presently prepare specialists to be personnel afloat has not served aboard ship at all. Around eight percent of officer instructors have no experience of shipboard duty in the Training Detachment imeni Adm F. S. Oktyabrskiy (Black Sea Fleet).

But this is not the only problem, as far as can be judged. Experience shows that despite the requirements of guidance documents proper attention is not always paid to people's job and moral qualities in selecting instructor cadres. As an example let us take the training detachment where Capt 2d Rank Yu. Livshits is deputy commander and training department chief. In 1985 12 of the 17 officers who came into the unit were appointed with a demotion in position. This could be categorized as a coincidence, but statistics indicate the reverse. In the following year another 10 officers came into the detachment who had taken leave of their previous position because of omissions in service and personal lack of discipline. As of today a very alarming situation has shaped up in the collective: all platoon commanders and instructors of specialized disciplines without exception at one time had severe punishments. One of the platoons is commanded by an Academy graduate who had been given punishment.

According to just what principle is the command and instructor collective of training detachments formed? The reason for an assignment here may be, for example, a state of health which precludes duty aboard ship, family circumstances, a transfer from remote areas because of replacement and, as already noted, demotion in position. It is not surprising that officers who are quite far from the pedagogic calling sometimes become instructors. By this I do not wish to cast a shadow on everyone who puts his soul into the indoctrination and training of seamen and petty officers. Take Capt 3d Rank V. Ostankov for example. When he was a lieutenant he was forced to leave shipboard duty because of health. Now he commands an outstanding cadet company. Family circumstances also brought Capt 2d Rank A. Perkovskiy here. In this same detachment I became acquainted with Capt 2d Rank A. Lugovskiy, who himself was a cadet in the past. He remained on extended duty, finished higher naval school by correspondence and received an engineer's diploma. Anatoliy Mikhaylovich was decorated with the Order of Red Star for conscientious service.

But here is what is remarkable. Everyone with whom I chatted adhered to the same viewpoint: an officer for whom duty aboard ship is going properly never will go to a training detachment of his own good will—there is no future. It was difficult to disagree with them. For example, in the training detachment where Capt 1st Rank V. Orlov is deputy commander almost half of the officers have been serving in the same military rank for a long

while beyond the usual time period. It is the very same picture in the Training Detachment imeni Adm F. S. Oktyabrskiy. A third of the company commanders have been in the position more than five years. Capt 1st Rank Orlov called them "people with dimmed vision."

And there is the following nuance. An officer who has ended up serving in a training detachment or naval school experiences the feeling that an armored door has been closed tightly behind him—the path to the Navy has been cut off! Capt 1st Rank Orlov showed me the personal file of one of the platoon commanders who has been displaying a persistent desire for several years in a row to serve aboard ship. The Pacific Fleet personnel directorate responded with a refusal "in connection with the absence of vacancies," but it would appear that the motives of the personnel officers were set forth more frankly in a resolution one echelon addressed to another: "Examine the question of the possibility of an assignment, but cautiously. People are not appointed to the training detachment simply"

As a matter of fact, there is a statement in the graduation certificate of the lieutenant, who completed school with high marks, that he took part in social life poorly, was capable of rash initiative, and was subject to seasickness. But a guarded attitude of personnel organs to the transfer of officers from training detachments to ships and units also was manifested in other instances. The argument often is used that allegedly an officer who has served in a training detachment loses the skills of shipboard duty. This is not always borne out by experience. Take just the following examples.

In 1985 Capt 3d Rank Ya. Fabyarovskiy, a training detachment senior instructor, headed up the engineering department of a large ASW ship. Now he still serves there and has become a captain 2d rank. Recently one other school officer, Capt 3d Rank S. Zaretskiy, was appointed division [divizion] officer aboard a large ASW ship.

For the sake of fairness it still has to be noted that an officer's service in a training detachment is fairly well detached from the Navy despite TDY on ships and in units. In the opinion of many officers who train specialists for the Navy, restructuring processes also must touch on this sphere. At the very least the contact of training subunits with ships must be more intrinsic.

6904

Old-Fashioned Security Methods a Drain on Manpower

18010276 Moscow KRSNAYAZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jul 88 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Capt 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk: "Who is Absent at Classes?"]

[Text] Baltic Fleet—On Thursday, the eve of the beginning of the summer training period, the telephone was

constantly ringing at the correspondent point: despite all instructions from higher up, personnel afloat continued to be diverted from performing their immediate duties. Corresponding facts also were cited, such as that the clearly increased number of shore guard details for shipboard specialists still had not been reduced. People also were being diverted to take part in various kinds of work.

I visited this garrison on the following day. When the marches had died away at short meetings on occasion of the beginning of summer training, I rode over to see the deputy garrison commandant. Officer N. Pilipenko briefed me:

"Today a guard subordinate to Sr Lt S. Znobishin is on duty. It was detailed from a division [divizion] of third rank ships. Count them, half of the subunit's navymen are here. The fact is there was a time (true, it was long ago) when ship crews were not used to perform duty in the garrison on such a scale."

Unit commanders also complained about the constant diversion of personnel from daily training.

"Imagine, five guards have been detailed from us in a month," said the commander of a unit of landing ships. "And this is with the crews being very small. We have to scrape the bottom of the barrel, as the saying goes. Here is another example..."

The officer handed me a book of telephonograms. Written there black on white was the following: "You need to assign 20 persons for opening the heat-supply system of boiler room No 3. The dates for performing the work are the 2d, 3d, 6th and 7th of July." Yes, it is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that ship personnel are bearing unjustifiably heavy loads to the detriment of combat training, but just where is the solution to the situation?

I had occasion to hear different opinions on this score, including that the approach to organizing military installation security is largely obsolete. Is it possible to speak of any kind of qualitative parameters where no small number of installations are guarded as of old only by a "person with a rifle"? Modern electronic systems requiring fewer people to man them are being introduced slowly or not at all. Guard dogs are not being used. The Fleet is even experiencing an acute shortage of barbed-wire for protecting installations. Thus little is being done for now to sensibly reduce the number of people engaged in guard duty, and some are not beyond even adding to the number of all kinds of duty personnel.

These considerations are worth some thought; nevertheless, what is important is to materially strengthen shore subunits which could assume those obligations borne by personnel afloat.

These were the thoughts evoked by the first days of summer combat training.

6904

Maj Gen Yevstafev Compares British, Soviet Inspections of Chemical Facilities

*18010453 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jul 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Baberdin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Shikhany: Proving Ground of Trust"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Upon invitation of the Soviet government, a British delegation, including military experts, diplomats, scientists and reporters, recently visited the chemical troops unit (chast) and military installation at Shikhany, located in the steppe on the right bank of the Volga, 150 kilometers from Saratov. This visit is in response to one made in May of this year by Soviet military experts and diplomats to the British military installation at Porton-Down where chemical weapons activities are conducted.

We are at Sheremetyevo Airport. Our group (Soviet and British journalists) is invited to embark. We just have time to get seated comfortably on the plane when we hear the announcement: "Our Tu-134 aircraft is making a special flight from Moscow to Bagay-Baranovka. We will be in the air one hour and twenty minutes for the 840-km journey." After a powerful surge on the runway, the aircraft sharply gains altitude...

Bagay-Baranovka is the airport in the vicinity of the Shikhany military installation. This is the third day now a delegation of representatives from Great Britain has been working there. Headed by Mrs. T. Solesby, ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the delegation includes Brigadier General U. Bittles, military attache to Great Britain's embassy in Moscow, Doctor G. Pearson, head of the military chemical installation at Porton-Down, prominent military chemical experts and diplomats.

Scheduled activities fill the visit to the Soviet military facility to the limit. They include obtaining extensive information on the structure and orientation of the installation, gaining familiarization with its technological laboratories and listening to presentations by Soviet personnel on problems related to chemical weapons. Scheduled for the following day is a demonstration of chemical weapons systems and mobile units for destroying chemical ammunition. This will be followed by familiarization with means and methods of personnel and equipment decontamination. There will then be a fly-over of the site and inspection of any areas requested by British representatives...

It turned out, however, that literally from the first day forward, from the very first steps our guests took at the proving ground, the working schedule was completely disrupted and revised. The British experts were interested in everything, not just chemical weapons. They even requested to take a look at the motor pool and repair shops. Questions and questions... Soviet officers

listened patiently to them and tried to provide exhaustive answers to the extent possible. It was not a simple matter, however, to satisfy all the demands of the guests, their inquiries being so extensive.

"You know," comments Major General I. Yevstafev, representative of Soviet chemical troops, "our first demonstration day lasted well beyond midnight." Neither the abundant flow of information nor the awful, intense heat of the Volga steppe tired our guests. Even in the shade thermometers showed temperatures rising above the 30-degree mark and at several points during the demonstration guests had to don special outfits and equipment—protective masks and suits.

"I counted more than 300 questions from the British experts at that point," Maj Gen Yevstafev continues. "For the sake of comparison, when we visited Porton-Down, we agreed to limit our questions during the first days of the orientation to 60. But here we deliberately went out of our way to satisfy the curiosity of our colleagues from the British Isles to the extent possible. We must strengthen and expand the balance of trust."

"Still another aspect of the demonstration should be emphasized," Lieutenant General A. Kuntsevich, deputy chief of chemical troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense and academician, joined in the conversation. "We expanded the visit program through good will. At the Porton-Down facility we were given the opportunity to select any part of the installation for inspection. Here at Shikhany we afforded our guests the right to designate 10 sites for inspection after overflying the entire area. Essentially, we played out in miniature a methodology for conducting an inspection on demand. This was a valuable experience which I hope will allow us to resolve a number of technical issues during the process of discussing and drawing up documents for a future convention on banning chemical weapons."

A question to Kuntsevich: "What aim was being pursued in showing the chemical troops training unit?"

"At Porton-Down we were shown certain combat training segments personnel undergo in a chemical defense subunit, also some of the combat procedures performed by a chemical defense specialist alone and by the crew of a combat vehicle. We went further than that and decided to show the entire set of elements involved in the combat training of chemical troops and their operations as seen against a realistic tactical background. Hundreds of items of military equipment were put into operation, as were dozens of decontamination units."

Why was this done? In order to graphically demonstrate the complexity of the problem of protecting military personnel from chemical weapons. To show things on a realistic scale sufficient for the politicians, diplomats and experts conducting negotiations in Geneva. This was a demonstration of troop operations—but what if all this were directed against a civilian population lacking such

highly prepared and organized structure? We want to mention again that chemical weapons are truly weapons of mass destruction against people and they must be outlawed.

"The inspection of the Shikhany military installation is over," stated ambassador and representative of the

Soviet Union in Geneva Yu. Nazarkin in a briefing, "but we are not saying farewell to the British delegation, for we are to meet again in Geneva on 6 July for the next round of talks on banning chemical weapons."

9768

Military Construction Plan Fulfillment for First Half 1988

*18010210 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Aug 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "In the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Military Builders Respond to the 5-Year Plan"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy have summed up the results of the socialist competition of military builders for the first half of 1988. It was noted that the state plan for capital construction has been fulfilled: in the activation of production capacities, projects and structures, by 100.2 percent; in putting into operation aggregate dwelling unit space, by 103.1 percent, and in volume of construction-erection work, by 102.8 percent.

The entire growth in the volume of construction-erection work has been achieved owing to an increase in labor productivity. Economic indices have improved, and above-norm stocks of building materials have been reduced.

The highest results in the socialist competition were achieved by the initiator-military builders of the North Caucasus Military District. Collectives of the building directorates of the Moscow and Belorussian Military Districts, the Northern Fleet and organizations managed by comrades A. Bitukov, V. Dukhin, F. Kapura, V. Kopylov, A. Motyga, V. Mikhaylov, A. Novosadov, V. Petrishchev and A. Chernyshov completed the half-year with good production indices, and also enterprises of the building industry headed by comrades V. Grishchenko, V. Gorokhov, V. Kutsenko, V. Kutsyuruba, V. Mineyev, N. Nekrasov and V. Chervonenko.

Collectives managed by comrades S. Voynov, V. Kolesnikov, N. Pershin, S. Kozhurin and V. Zaleskiy were winners in the socialist competition of design organizations.

The collectives headed by comrades Yu. Zhegin, A. Vygovskiy, I. Kitov, V. Ponomarev and V. Kopylov achieved the best indices among organizations and enterprises of apartment operations agencies.

At the same time, the rates of restructuring in capital construction do not yet meet current requirements. The struggle to achieve high end results does not yet have a proper effect everywhere. Many organizations did not fulfill tasks and socialist obligations with respect to putting production capacities, dwelling units and social, cultural and community facilities in operation, and also a number of other indices. The building directorates of the Transcaucasus, Siberian, Turkestan and Ural Military Districts, the Moscow PVO District and organizations managed by comrades I. Akhmedov, V. Bozhko, I.

Golovko, A. Korytko, A. Makarov, G. Rumyantsev, V. Savchuk, P. Fedchenko and N. Chukanov did not fulfill the plan in individual indices.

The builders of the Volga Military District and the organizations managed by comrades A. Brisnyuk, V. Iosipenko, V. Imnadze, G. Merenkov, Ye. Tomilov and O. Chernyavskiy seriously lag in fulfilling planned tasks and socialist obligations.

The problem of the quality of construction-erection work remains, new technical solutions are being introduced slowly, and the financial condition of a number of organizations and enterprises continues to be unstable. The available capabilities for improving the organization of production and for increasing the effectiveness of utilizing construction equipment and motor transport are being employed poorly. Enterprises of the construction industry are not being utilized everywhere to full capacity, and their technical re-equipping is going slowly. The fight for strengthening military and work discipline and the creation of safe working conditions in construction has not yet brought the needed results.

The immediate task of commanders, political workers and engineering personnel, and party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, is to carry out urgent measures on the absolute implementation of decisions of the party and government on the restructuring of planning, organization and administration of construction and improvement in pay for labor.

The times require that the existing practice of the organization of competition be evaluated more exactly and self-critically, and that competition be given a business and purposeful character and genuine competitiveness and liveliness. It is necessary to create conditions everywhere for demonstrating initiative and the fuller utilization of the educative possibilities of competition.

The main task remains the preparation of all construction industries and enterprises of the Ministry of Defense for a transition to a collective contract, self-supporting [samookupayemost] production and self-financing in 1989. Energetic efforts are needed to put the achievements of scientific and technical progress into practice in construction and to concentrate forces and means on the most important directions and starting projects. Priority attention should be given to the fulfillment of the annual program for putting housing and social, cultural and community projects into operation.

A task of paramount importance is to increase the efficiency of the work of commanders and political cadres, political organs, and party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, in strengthening military and work discipline, improving the style and methods of their organizational and educational activity, and strengthening exactingness at all levels.

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The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the central committee of the trade union of workers in construction and the construction materials industry express confidence that the personnel of military construction units and in construction, design research and scientific and technical research organizations, industrial enterprises

and apartment operations agencies which are persistently putting into practice the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will fulfill the industrial plans and obligations for 1988.

13052

New Leadership of DOSAAF Central Committee
PM2410131588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Oct 88 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Colonel N. Kalmykov: "DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] A USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum yesterday analyzed the progress of the defense organization's practical work in fulfilling the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Lieutenant General V.A. Demin, first deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, delivered a report.

The report and the speeches delivered by the plenum participants noted that since the 19th party conference and the 10th USSR DOSAAF Congress, mass defense and military-patriotic work has been markedly activated in the society's organizations and it has become more specific and effective. At the same time existing opportunities for the broad restructuring of the society's activity are not being fully realized, and a number of committees and organizations are operating in the old way, are allowing dilatoriness, and as a result are failing to ensure tangible quality indicators in work.

The plenum discussed ways of further intensifying restructuring in the DOSAAF organizations.

The plenum examined an organizational question. Colonel General N.N. Kotlovitsev was elected chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

I.A. Larin, first deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department, took part in the work of the plenum.

Tajik Premier Questioned on Problems of Predraft Training
18010219 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 88 p 2

[Interview with I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, by Lt Col A. Ladin: "On the Path to the Military Formation"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has recently discussed problems of predraft training for the youth of Tajikistan ("Words Cannot Take the Place of Action," 18 Jun 87, and "Break Down the Barrier of Habit," 2 Mar 88). What is the situation in the republic today? A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent interviews I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

[Question] Izatullo Khayeyevich, since we have agreed that our interview will be mainly about problems of predraft training for the youth, permit me to begin it with some specific facts. I have before me a report prepared by Tajikistan's Komsomol CC on the state of general education, including initial military training for

the students of secondary schools. Let us put it this way. The picture is far from bright. Particularly in certain rayons. The study of the Russian language continues to be an urgent matter. At the same time, the rayons have not been prepared to accept all of the Russian language instructors applying from various parts of the nation, and more than 300 teachers have indicated in response to the republic's request that they would like to come and help the local schools.

[Answer] You have brought up some difficult problems troubling the republic's leaders today. Briefly stated, many things are being held up primarily by a shortage of schools and housing for the teachers. Incidentally, it was precisely the absence of housing which prevented us from accepting all of the applicants to teach the Russian language of whom you speak.

This year the republic Council of Ministers has taken a number of major steps to accelerate the construction of schools in remote areas of our mountain region. Overloaded educational institutions, obsolete facilities or even a total lack thereof and poorly trained teachers are all typical of the republic's rural school. Until these matters are resolved—thoroughly resolved—it would be difficult to expect any significant changes in the training of predraft students in the general education schools.

With respect to the predraft training of our youth, it should be frankly stated that many local party and soviet leaders need, figuratively speaking, to face up to the matter. This applies also to a number of republic ministries. Some of them speak eloquently from speaker's platforms about the importance of this training but do little to see that the youth are prepared morally and physically to fulfill their military duty in a worthy manner. By the way, this attitude was discussed in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article last year: "Words Cannot Take the Place of Action." It dealt with problems of predraft training for the youth in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. Improvements have taken shape in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, among others, however. A total of 260 athletic centers and obstacle courses and 57 gymnasiums have been built in Tajikistan during the past 3 years. Swimming pools have been built in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube and in Pyandzhskiy, Dzhirgatal'skiy and Ayninskiy rayons.

Substantial funds have been allocated for building defense and sports health camps, and 20 camps fully meet the requirements. This summer they received regular students and students from SPTUs [secondary vocational and technical schools]. Advances have also been made in medical support for the youth. While there were 64 medical offices for adolescents 2 years ago, there are now 76. We can already say that we have a functioning specialized medical service in the republic, which makes it possible to detect various illnesses in adolescents in the early stages and therefore to cure them before they are drafted.

I would mention also the gratifying fact that many ministries and departments have stopped economizing

on predraft training for the youth and have gone from words to action. The Dushanbe Fittings Plant imeni S. Ordzhonikidze, for example, has mastered the production of components for athletic centers, and these are urgently needed by the schools, SPTUs, tekhnikums and VUZs.

[Question] Izatullo Khayeyevich, out in the forces one still most frequently finds young Tajiks in the military construction units though. There are few in the other units, and they ordinarily do not perform the duties of leading specialists.

[Answer] The situation is clearly not right and needs to be changed. The republic's envoys must be trained to the point that they can serve where the main missions involved in ensuring a high level of combat readiness for the troops and naval forces are performed: at the control panels of the Rocket Troops and Air Defense Forces, around the combat aircraft and ships, in motorized rifle and tank units. What is preventing this? The main causes have already been mentioned: a poor knowledge of the Russian language, gaps in general education and inadequate physical conditioning.

I would mention something else which is no less significant. Many of our youth do not have adequate technical skills, particularly in the field of radio electronics, radio and computer technology. There are more than 2,000 various technical groups in the republic today, including groups with an applied military focus. That is not very many. In any case, there are several times more people with a desire to learn the technology than are accommodated by these groups. The trouble is that the equipment of many of the groups cannot meet any sort of critical test.

The youth are especially interested in electronic computers. Computers are requested by schools and SPTUs, young technicians' centers and youth clubs. We can give them nothing, however, because we have only individual computers in the republic. How many sets of computer equipment for training do you think the nation's enterprises were supposed to provide last year to meet the needs of public education in the republic? A total of 29. We did not receive a single set, however.

In order somehow to deal with this situation, we are setting up mobile demonstration classrooms in buses. One such unit is already operating, and 1,500 students from remote towns and villages have had the opportunity to study in it. With the help of ministries and enterprises we might scrape together the equipment to set up another three or four mobile classrooms. This is a drop in the bucket, however. Technical schools and clubs must be set up in each city and each rayon center, and we are prepared to do that. We do not have enough equipment at this time, however, or the required number of instructors capable of teaching the youth in this field. This is the reality.

[Question] It seems to me that the DOSAAF organizations are not doing a thorough job. On average in the nation

every third draft-age youth acquires a military specialty in the defense society's training organizations, while only every eighth one does so in Tajikistan. And your republic is among the most youthful with respect to the average age of its residents. It has many heavily populated rayons, but the DOSAAF technical sports clubs are poorly developed there, and there are few DOSAAF schools. Even where they exist, they do not have the proper facilities for normal training of the students.

[Answer] Yes, many of the defense society's rayon, city and oblast organizations do not deserve any praise. We also have important complaints about the leadership of Tajikistan's DOSAAF Central Committee. It is slow in correcting the shortcomings pointed out at a meeting of the republic's party aktiv on improving the military and patriotic indoctrination and the predraft training of the youth. Especially troubling is the fact that a calm and unhurried life not burdened with job pressures and concerns suits some of those in charge. Apparently, some of them have simply reconciled themselves to the shortcomings. And I repeat: There are many of them. Today only a portion of the DOSAAF training organizations located in Dushanbe and Kurgan-Tyube have normal facilities for training specialists for the Armed Forces. The rest have a shortage of dormitories, and the messing of the students is not well organized everywhere.

Far be it from me to reproach the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee alone for all of the problems. A great deal should be done by the local authorities. Furthermore, the mass defense work is not an alien or a secondary matter for the ministries and departments. And we do try to help the republic DOSAAF organizations. This is the problem we face, however. Funds are frequently available for the construction or repair of facilities, while there are not enough allocated materials.

Today it is a matter of making the best and most effective use of available possibilities for working with the youth. One of these is the active involvement of reserve fightingmen in the work, particularly those who have fulfilled their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan. This is a great force, which could universally alter the situation for the better.

[Question] Unfortunately, not all of the local leaders share this opinion. I can attest to the fact that letters are still frequently received from fightingmen-and-internationalists complaining about disregard for and indifference to their initiatives on the part of local authorities, republic Komsomol committees and DOSAAF. What can you tell us about this?

[Answer] I would say that things are now improving in this respect. The situation changed perhaps after K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party CC, met with the leaders of patriotic associations and clubs at the beginning of the year. And the reserve

fightingmen themselves, with their inherent persistence, have demonstrated to many of those in charge that they are capable of performing the most complex tasks pertaining to the military and patriotic work and the pre-draft training of the youth. The Desantnik, a defense sports club, has functioned on a self-financing basis in Dushanbe for several years now. The Alfa-Rubikon, Pogranichnik and Inkidob, teenage military and patriotic associations, are highly popular with the youth. They are directed by fightingmen-and-internationalists. There is no question that the number of associations and clubs will grow. We have an agreement with the command element of the Central Asian Military District on the allocation of military training equipment and athletic gear to the DOSAAF rayon committees for the councils and clubs of the reserve fightingmen.

Here is another gratifying sign of the times. In many places fightingmen-and-internationalists have been elected deputies to village, rayon and city soviets of people's deputies, and Komsomol leaders. All of this is injecting new vigor into the work with the youth.

Since we are on the subject of reserve fightingmen who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan, I want to say that a great deal is being done in the republic to provide them with their rightful benefits and to improve their social and living conditions. The families of disabled and dead servicemen are a special concern of ours. For example, four of 17 disabled individuals needing improved housing or an apartment in Dushanbe received it during the first 6 months. Apartments were also allocated for the families of seven dead fightingmen.

Similar steps have been taken in Kurgan-Tyube, Lenina-bad and Kulyab Oblasts and in rayon directly subordinate to the republic.

[Question] Yes, I have heard a great deal about such examples of genuine concern for the fightingmen-and-internationalists and their families. I can also say that I have heard many good things about the republic's Communist Party CC and its government from officers. They and their families can feel the concern and attention of the authorities, particularly with respect to the provision of housing. The fightingmen-and-internationalists frequently encounter indifference and callousness, however. The ordeals of reserve servicemen have already become commonplace at certain republic airports, and Aeroflot officials are not responding to them at all. On the other hand, there is a flourishing of "services" by speculators who have found a common language with the ticket agents of the air transport service. The central press has written about this.

[Answer] The case described in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA made us think seriously about what is happening at our airports. The internal affairs agencies have

been instructed to step up their campaign against every sort of "purveyors" of airline tickets. Those fond of easy profits who set up shop at Aeroflot ticket offices will be held accountable.

The blame for what happened lies with the leadership of the Tajik Civil Aviation Administration. The old habit of not burdening oneself with extra concerns took over. The situation has now been corrected. The management of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation has established the possibility of reserving seats for fightingmen-and-internationalists over and above existing quotas.

Let me tell you my own personal opinion. It always pains and offends me when the fightingmen of our Armed Forces encounter indifference. The army enjoys the love and respect of all the Soviet people, including the people of Tajikistan. We view it not just as our armed defender but also as a support in our daily life. When we have natural disasters we turn first for assistance to the fightingmen. And they respond immediately.

We try to repay them in kind. The republic leadership feels that no difficulties or adversities are an excuse for reducing our concern for and attention to the fightingmen who have performed the difficult duty of guarding the Soviet State's sacred borders.

The unity of the people and the army is a product of the great friendship existing among the multinational peoples of our entire nation. Our sons, the best representatives of the Soviet youth, serve in the ranks of the army, the navy, the border and internal troops. And we must all work together to see that every young person fulfills his military duty with honor and dignity.

11499

Pricing Violations Endemic to DOSAAF Organizations

18010122 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 36, Sep 88 (signed to press 1 Sep 88)

[Article by B. Orekhovskiy, state inspector of the USSR Goskomtsen Main Administration of Price Control: "Instead of a Satirical Article. Price Juggling. Illegal Profits at DOSAAF Enterprises"]

[Text] EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA has already written about serious shortcomings in the activity of some voluntary societies, in particular such a large-scale organization as Rosokhotrybolovsoyuz [Russian Hunting and Fishing Union] (No 24, 28 and 32). And recently the Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices] inspected another voluntary society—USSR DOSAAF. And it came to conclusions that are not comforting. Why?

Well, because infractions of the procedure for applying prices, for example, were revealed in half of the inspected DOSAAF enterprises and organizations. And

they were inspected throughout the country. But especially notable were the enterprises of the Moscow city committee of DOSAAF and the DOSAAF central committee of the Armenian SSR. Here, 100 percent of the inspected enterprises were among the violators. As they say, this is an unprecedented situation. On the whole, about 3 million rubles of illegally obtained profits was collected and transferred to the state budget.

But, you will say, what about departmental inspection? That is precisely the problem. It turned out to be virtually zero—less than 3 percent of the organizations are inspected annually. The “zig-zags” of pricing led to overcharging of both the population and state enterprises.

Some DOSAAF organizations, even though they are headed by people who are very familiar with military discipline, do not treat orders, to put it mildly, even in a civilian way. At times, to them even the central committee of USSR DOSAAF is not an authority.

Thus, on the order of 1 ruble from each adult and 50 kopecks from a child was collected as an admission charge to see a contest in all of the inspected organizations of the society in the Latvian SSR. This is at a time when a rate of 10 kopecks was established for children by an order of the DOSAAF central committee. The responsible fellows of just six organizations in this republic overcharged 35,000 small children, depriving them of an opportunity to buy ice cream or go to a movie once again.

Many DOSAAF organizations are trying as much as they can to snatch just a little more at shooting galleries, swimming pools and stadiums. The training and sports center “Chayka” of the UkSSR DOSAAF central committee, for example, collected 10 kopecks above the established price. It would seem that this is not much. But, this is for each hour for each spot at the shooting range.

But in truth the price increases of the motor vehicle schools and the sports-technical clubs attained the height of art. I will explain why the inspectors came to this conclusion.

In addition to payment for training, which by the way is not small, an entrance fee of 1 ruble and a membership fee of 3 rubles (allegedly for membership in the motor vehicle enthusiasts’ club) are collected here from the future motor vehicle enthusiasts. As a matter of fact, nobody submits an application for acceptance into the club, the management does not make any decision at all regarding acceptance, and membership cards are not issued. And as soon as anyone declares that they will not pay, they are immediately reminded: “On the whole, it is difficult to get a driver’s license, many people want one, and, indeed, our examinations are complicated.” And everyone then and there understands who has the upper hand, and they lay out hard earned money. After completion of the training, the motor vehicle enthusiast is

automatically stricken from the club’s membership registration list. Having the license in hand, who would want to pay another 3-ruble note for membership in a club that gives so little?

Representatives of DOSAAF could not say anything intelligible at a meeting of the price committee with respect to the simple mechanism of extracting additional unearned income. They say that is the tradition. And Yu. Markov, deputy chairman of DOSAAF’s MGK [Moscow city committee], in general denied that this is a financial infraction.

B. Morozov, chief of the planning and financial administration of the DOSAAF central committee, in turn, although he acknowledged isolated cases of infraction, attempted to convince the Goskomtsen representatives that the cases “are not typical.”

In actual fact, it turns out that there is nothing more typical in many DOSAAF organizations than the “isolated” cases. Let us say, like this “isolated” case. In selling visual aid road signs, the Moscow DOSAAF production association (V. Nikitin, director) earned an illegal profit of 320,000 (!) rubles in 1986-1987 alone. This did not seem to be very much. They also began to sell trademarks of their system at increased prices. As a result they added another 164,000 rubles to the previously received illegal sum.

And here is still another “isolated” case, but now with a purely criminal nuance. V. Burkov, chief of the Moscow naval school of DOSAAF’s MGK, collected almost 3,500 rubles from the TsB [central bureau] of the ASU [administrative management system] of the USSR Minmedbioproma [Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry] (it is now part of the NPO [scientific production association] “Medbioekonomika” [probably medical and biological economics]. And for what? Allegedly for teaching bureau employees the computer operator profession.

The inspectors queried the managers of NPO “Medbioekonomika” what and how the naval cadets of V. Burkov’s naval school taught their subordinates. It turned out that not one of the students designated in the naval school order even heard of such a thing. It is perfectly clear that no one trained on a computer either.

Another case from the life of the naval school, established in an inspection, has the same kind of shady coloration. The training of cargo truck operators [mashinist avtopogruzshchik] for motor transport enterprises provided for 390 hours of lessons. Actually, there was two to three times less. Nevertheless, the full amount was collected from the enterprises for the training.

The USSR Goskomtsen sent a representation to the office of the public prosecutor of the Leningrad Rayon of the capital about the abuses. The DOSAAF central

committee was told to bring order to all of the remaining disclosed infractions.

It is clear that the illegally acquired money did not go into the pockets of specific persons, but was spent, one would like to think, for the benefit of all. But this is no

justification. Everyone is obliged to act within the limits of the law. Irrespective of official affiliation. Including the organization of the voluntary society for assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy.

13052

Developments in Western Military Equipment Noted

EC-20 EW Aircraft; Test Model Completed

18010228 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Article under rubric "In Arsenals and At Test Ranges":
"Electronic Warfare Aircraft"]

[Text] The American firm "Gulfstream and Aerospace" has completed construction of the EC-20 electronic warfare test model aircraft that is supposed to replace an aircraft of a similar type, the ERA-3B, which is now in the inventory of the U.S. Navy.

It cannot be ruled out that it will also be introduced into the NATO countries. Besides accomplishing basic tasks, the EC-20 will also be employed for training electronic systems operators.

As the journal "Flight International" notes, the aircraft was developed on the basis of the administrative support aircraft of the "Gulfstream" type. It has a swept low wing whose design uses a supercritical profile (a 27-meter span), and the ends have airfoils that substantially improve its characteristics at cruising speed and ensure a reduction in fuel consumption. The tail section of the fuselage has two bypass turbojet Rolls-Royce "T" 610 ["Tey" 610] engines with a thrust to 5, 360 kgs [kilogram weight]. The EC-20 differs outwardly from the civilian version by the presence under the fuselage of a long pod with electronic equipment. The maximum takeoff weight is 33 tons.

Bell OH-58D Light Attack/Recce Helicopter Enters U.S. Inventory

18010228 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Article: "Multipurpose Helicopter"]

[Text] The U.S. Army has begun to receive Bell OH-58D light attack/recce helicopters in its inventory. These helicopters (a total of about 600 of these craft have been ordered) will enter squadrons of the so-called special-purpose forces. The formation of similar subunits began in 1980, and their mission is to conduct sabotage operations, electronic warfare, fighting terrorists, etc.

The OH-58D helicopter will become part of the 160th special-purpose "Night Stalker" air group located at the base in Fort Campbell in the state of Connecticut. It is a modification of the OH-58A "Kiowa" helicopter, and it has a 4-blade main rotor with a diameter of 10.7 meters; one gas turbine engine with a power of 650 horsepower produces a speed of 230 km per hour, and its flight range is 460 km. It has a 2-man crew, and the cabin can accommodate three passengers. Its maximum takeoff weight is 2,500 kg.

The distinctive feature of the new helicopter is the ball-shaped pod with reconnaissance equipment and sighting systems which is located over the hub of the main rotor. As a result, the helicopter can conduct target searches from behind natural cover.

Unguided 60-mm caliber projectiles in pods along the sides of the fuselage, 12.7-mm caliber machine guns and four "Hellfire" ATGM's are used as armaments. Also, two "Stinger" guided missiles, designed for the destruction of helicopters and subsonic aircraft, are placed on board.

13052

IZVESTIYA Notes Spanish Local Opposition to Air Show Near Zaragoza

18010206a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Sep 88 p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Vernikov under rubric "Reports from Abroad": "Returning to a Previous Subject: Authorities Insisted on Having Their Own Way"]

[Text] Madrid—The tragic events at the American air base in Ramstein (FRG) when three fighters collided and plunged to the ground (one of them right on the people) as a result of a catastrophe during demonstration flying unexpectedly received a stormy response in Spain. By the way, was it really unexpected?

The fact is that under an arrangement planned long ago, the official ceremony activating one of the Spanish Air Force subunits equipped with F-18 aircraft purchased in the United States was to be held at one of the military airfields near Zaragoza on 19 September. At the conclusion of this ceremony, according to the plan of its organizer, the Spanish defense ministry, several tens of aircraft of the air forces of Spain, France and England as well as that same Italian "Tricolor Arrows" Squadron which cut a poor figure in the FRG were to demonstrate their proficiency in the sky of Zaragoza in a show similar to that at Ramstein. Strictly speaking, had the catastrophe not occurred there the public of Zaragoza and the entire autonomous region of Aragon hardly would have demonstrated such insistence in attempting to cancel the "acrobatic flights." It is no secret that they have been held in Spain more than once now for other reasons.

But now the situation has shaped up clearly not in favor of those in military uniform who love acute sensations. Hipolito Gomez de las Rocas, chairman of the autonomous government of Aragon, sent a letter to Spanish Minister of Defense Narciso Serra in which he expressed "the uneasiness of area residents over the upcoming flights since no one can guarantee that an accident will not occur and in this situation it is impossible to avoid risk to onlookers." He demanded cancellation of the flights.

The wave of enemies against holding the dangerous air show has been gathering strength all these days. Zaragoza Mayor Antonio Gonzales also expressed his "uneasiness" over the upcoming flights and was joined by the chairman of the regional parliament. Participants of the peace and disarmament movement began a campaign to gather signatures for cancellation of the demonstrations, calling on the city populace not to go to the vicinity of the air base where they were to occur. Deputies of almost all political parties represented in the Aragon autonomous parliament demanded a revision of the defense ministry's previous decision.

And here is the result. As the newspapers reported, the minister still remained of the opinion that the demonstrations would take place. True, it was promised that certain safety measures would be taken to avoid a repetition of the Ramstein tragedy. The newspapers note, however, that all this was done more for soothing public opinion, the voice of which just was not heeded. It remains only to hope that this time everything will work out.

6904

Safety Factor in U.S. Biological, Chemical Weapons Research Discussed

*18010206b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Aug 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by B. Fedorov: "The Facts Exposed: Behind the Cover of 'Biological Protection'"]

[Text] Not long ago U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense T. Welch encountered a difficult problem. He had to take part in hearings on the safety of military department research programs held in late July by the Senate Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee.

The fact is that back in mid-May subcommittee associates and experts prepared a report which emphasized that during work involving chemical and bacteriological materials numerous violations were being committed which were fraught with serious consequences. Their number had increased fivefold since 1980.

The document directed special attention to "flawed instructions, instances of a negligent attitude toward safety measures, as well as other documented deficiencies." Greatest alarm of the experts was caused by the situation at installations connected with biological weapons. The report's authors noted that the Pentagon was not even requiring its subcontractors to conduct regular safety procedure checks.

It must be said that the United States at one time signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Weapons. Now all work in this sphere is being done by the American military department under the guise of

"assuring biological protection" of troops. People in the Pentagon give assurances that it is necessary to grow cultures of deadly microorganisms.

The deputy under secretary of defense decided to act simply: he refuted the numerous accusations against his department. There allegedly was no doubt that all work in this area was absolutely safe both for the surrounding terrain and for the populace. The Pentagon, declared Welch, takes "strict and necessary precautionary measures."

It is true that with respect to the biological research program Welch admitted that compliance with strict requirements previously was no more than a recommendation. Now, however, he promised that all requirements for control spelled out by government establishments would fully apply to this program on a mandatory basis.

But Welch's speech did not convince attendees at the hearings.

"The Defense Department's capability to conduct an effective program for ensuring research safety is generating more and more concern," emphasized Subcommittee Chairman Senator Levin. He announced that subcommittee associates had analyzed the situation in 14 laboratories working under the direction of the U.S. Army Chemical Research Center in Aberdeen, Maryland and concluded that almost none of their spaces met necessary safety requirements.

The Senator noted that matters were even worse in research centers and laboratories working on "biological protection programs." The very same opinion also was expressed by Doctor N. Levitt, a specialist in microbiology. He previously worked in the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the Pentagon's leading center for developments [razrabotka] involving biological weapons. Levitt told the Senators that in 1981 around two liters of a substance containing a dangerous fever virus were lost. In Levitt's words, the fate of the missing substance is still unknown.

Attendees at the hearings also were able to familiarize themselves with a report of the Congressional General Accounting Office which noted the potential danger stemming from numerous Pentagon laboratories and research centers. The document emphasized that 10 percent of research within the scope of the "biological protection program" involved genetic engineering. This work caused special fears inasmuch as there is the risk that modified viruses and bacteria which for now are impossible to fight would be created and enter the environment.

By admission of the journal BUSINESS WEEK, the latest genetic engineering methods being used in Pentagon programs permit "manufacturing in large quantities without significant expense antibodies, toxins and other substances capable of making biological weapons more effective."

Numerous laboratories and science centers operate on the country's territory under Pentagon aegis in which experiments are conducted with extremely dangerous bacteria and viruses. Research in the sphere of virology and biological agents is being done by 19 government research centers, 50 private laboratories and over 80 American universities and colleges.

Fort Detrick is the Pentagon's chief stronghold. Research involving the conduct of biological warfare is carried on underground there in an atmosphere of strictest secrecy. Major developments for creating [sozdaniye] new types of deadly weapons also are being carried out in the Army's Walter Reed Research Institute in Washington.

A special center for studying toxins—substances of bacterial, plant or animal origin causing illnesses and death of people—has been established with Pentagon money under Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia. The U.S. Defense Department allocated \$1.7 million to the Mark Collett Corporation for development and mass production of a deadly virus of a rare galloping fever at its enterprise in the state of Minnesota.

An example of research of this nature is cited in one issue of the American journal PROGRESSIVE. The subject is a biochemistry laboratory at Brigham Young University in the city of Provo, Utah where work is being done under a Defense Department order to obtain a vaccine against anthrax. The Pentagon figures on obtaining an especially stable virus of this disease at the same time. "The vaccine will be used for injecting American soldiers before the anthrax virus is used against enemy troops," the journal writes. Last year the Pentagon directed a total of several dozen projects for creating various kinds of bacteriological weapons.

Pentagon plans to establish a new supermodern complex at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah for testing biological weapons are generating special concern in Americans. Although the details of this project are being kept top secret, it is known that its basis will be a special facility for experiments with extremely dangerous viruses and bacteria. The military department intends to spend \$5.4

million on constructing the installation, which should be completed in 1991.

John Van De Camp, attorney general of California, a state neighboring on Utah, recently came out with sharp criticism of the planned construction. He learned of the Pentagon's truly monstrous intentions of sending highly toxic substances to its complex in Dugway by ordinary mail. He noted that postal employees would not even guess the danger of the Pentagon "parcels" being sent by them. He emphasized that "the slightest accident or careless handling of the parcels containing deadly bacteria and viruses can cause epidemics of such illnesses as anthrax, tularemia and encephalitis among residents of California and other states."

Pentagon work in the sphere of bacteriological and chemical weapons is causing growing unrest among the American public. A campaign protesting the use of scientific achievements for military purposes is widening in the country. Among its active participants is the "Committee for Responsible Genetics," which includes American scientists. A press conference of its representatives was held in the American capital.

At the present time, announced Jonathan King, a professor of molecular biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Pentagon is requesting \$300 million for work in the sphere of creating biological weapons.

King completely refuted Pentagon attempts to justify research under the "biological protection program" by the fact that it allegedly is being done only for defense purposes. "Creation of vaccines within the scope of the program for protection against biological weapons differs in no way from their production for offensive purposes," he pointed out.

In the scientist's opinion, the only means of protection is strict compliance with the international agreement banning such kinds of arms. It is difficult not to agree with this viewpoint.

Prospects for Afghanistan After Soviet Withdrawal

18010115 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 17, 1988 (signed to press 11 Aug 88) pp 47-49

[Article by L. Shershnev under the "Modern World" rubric: "Afghanistan: What Lies Ahead?"]

[Text] This is a question that many are asking in our country and abroad now. It reflects hope and anxiety. Hope is inspired by the Geneva agreements on settlement of the Afghanistan problem and the beginning of their implementation by the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan. Anxiety is being aroused by the attitude toward obligations which Pakistan and the United States have taken upon themselves and actions by the opposition they support which jeopardize the achievement of peace on Afghan soil.

Just how do we assess the situation with respect to the Afghan settlement as a whole? E. Shevardnadze, the USSR minister of foreign affairs, responded this way during a recent visit to Kabul: "As a whole, positively. The Afghan settlement is firmly on the tracks of the Geneva agreements and is moving on them. There are attempts to undermine it, of course, to derail it, but both we and the Republic of Afghanistan are doing everything to ensure that the settlement "train" arrives at the destination station. We are firmly confident that this will happen without fail."

This will happen because the agreements reached in Geneva, by establishing an international legal basis for resolving all the foreign policy aspects of the Afghan conflict, gave impetus to positive processes in internal policies.

This will happen because they have become an organic part of the aspirations common to all mankind which predominate today, and they have in turn had a salutary effect on their movement toward the desired goals. Isn't it really significant that the trends of settlement, in one national or regional modification or another, became apparent after Afghanistan in other conflicts which had appeared to be never-ending?

This will happen because the settlement is taking place in the name of the United Nations, which demonstrates so expressively its ability to be an effective instrument of peace. By signing the "Geneva package" in the presence of the UN secretary general and his personal representative, the sides gave their word not only to their peoples, but to the entire world community.

This will happen because the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan are keeping their word. The withdrawal of Soviet forces has been begun and is proceeding as planned. By mid-August we did not have any subunits in 25 provinces and half of the Soviet troops had been withdrawn from the country. We have no doubt that the troop withdrawal will be completed by the date planned...

Nevertheless, the situation in Afghanistan continues to be tense. The steps undertaken by the Afghan leadership to implement a policy of national reconciliation are meeting with the opposition's fierce resistance and are not achieving the results desired. As before, the leaders of the opposition are not meeting the state authorities halfway at all and categorically refuse to cooperate with the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. Under these conditions, the policy of national reconciliation, despite its vital importance, objectively has no chance of success until new mechanisms are found for a coalition with the opposing side, which is roughly equal in strength.

What will happen to Afghanistan after the Soviet troops leave there? It is impossible to answer this question unequivocally. There are too many unknown quantities in the highly complicated equation of the problems represented by the Afghan settlement.

In an interview with a correspondent of the DAILY TELEGRAPH newspaper, Afghan President Najibullah, when asked whether he was confident of his regime's survival without the Soviet presence, responded: "Yes, if interference from outside is stopped." But if it is not stopped? After all, it is already obvious now that the United States and Pakistan are counting on encouragement of the opposition's extremist antigovernment actions after the withdrawal of Soviet troops is begun as well. For this reason, we cannot expect that the regime most favorable to a people's government will be established by those who sought to remove it for 10 years. The PDPA and the national democratic revolution have to defend themselves, the program of political and socioeconomic reforms and the policy of nation reconciliation under conditions of continuing and even increasing interference, obvious or secret, from outside. These are the realities.

In the final analysis, the outcome of any struggle for power depends on the correlation of forces—social and political, military, moral and spiritual and other forces. The advantage is on the government's side in Afghanistan today. It has nearly 500,000 armed fighters, helicopters, airplanes, tanks, and artillery. The enemy has one-third as many persons in armed formations and no heavy combat equipment. But this is today.

The opposition has literally larded Afghanistan with weapons in recent years. Gigantic warehouses of them, the American magazine NATION writes, are located on Pakistan's territory adjacent to Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from areas along an entire strip of the Afghan-Pakistani border, as well as the redeployment of Afghan units and subunits from the border to the country's interior, the leaders of the opposition forces are carrying out a large-scale transfer of their warehouses, bases and training centers to Afghan territory. And tomorrow all this can turn up in the hands of those who will support the opposition, which can drastically change the correlation of forces.

The influence of the side opposing the state authority encompasses a vast expanse of territory, primarily in rural areas. The opposition has established a structure of military, political and ideological control that is quite strong over the population in these regions. The foundation of its social base is the peasantry, which provides for replenishment of the rebel ranks, the basing sites, and the food supply. According to estimates, 75 percent of the opposition's armed formations are peasants. At the same time, this attests to the weak influence of the revolution and the PDPA on the illiterate, backward and oppressed peasants, who have an extremely low level of political consciousness. Party organizations of the PDPA exist in only 900 kishlaks [villages].

The sections of the population who are refugees living basically in Pakistan and Iran also have to be taken into account. There are roughly 4 to 5 million of them. A mechanism for their return to their homeland has been defined within the framework of the Geneva agreements. In seeking to facilitate this process, the Afghan leadership has withdrawn border units from the places where they crossed the border. However, despite expectations this withdrawal has not led to an increase in the refugee flow. It looks as if the opposition is carefully regulating the return and resettlement of the refugees. Not many of those who wish to return manage to break through into Afghanistan past the covering forces of the Pakistani troops and the rebels.

Many years will be required to resolve the refugee problem and considerable resources will be required to restore the regions where they live. Problems in locating and feeding them and providing them with jobs may engender a great deal of dissatisfaction among the returnees and incite them to extremist anti-government actions.

Much of the ensuing alignment of forces will depend on whether the government will succeed in ensuring the trustworthiness and loyalty of those armed opposition units which have come over to its side (705 detachments comprised of 41,000 men), as well as of those territorial troops formed of Afghan tribes and nationalities. It is also extremely important to find a means of reconciliation with roughly 3,000 kishlak self-defense formations which neither support nor oppose the government but which have been called upon to protect the village's traditional way of life and its property. These formations may become a support for the government, but they also may strengthen the opposition.

One of the features of civil war is clearly demonstrated in Afghanistan; in the words of V. I. Lenin, "it differs from ordinary war by the immeasurably greater complexity, uncertainty and indefinability of those who are fighting—because of the shifts from one camp to another..." ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], Vol 13, p 72). So there are already examples, in regions where Soviet and Afghan military units have been withdrawn, of a number of territorial formations repudiating their obligations to

the authorities and shifting to the opposing camp. Cases of opposition detachments shifting to the government side are not infrequent, either.

But there are two main factors on which the fate of the national democratic revolution and the state authority will depend: the processes in the PDPA, first of all, and secondly, the status of the armed forces.

The PDPA now has over 200,000 members. An impressive figure. But the processes of strengthening and developing the party, as acknowledged by its leaders themselves, are taking place slowly and inconsistently. The struggle for unity in the party ranks remains a pressing problem. The opposition is skillfully making use of conflicts between two factions in the PDPA—the Khalqi and the Parchami—to discredit the party and reinforce their own positions.

Tremendous efforts will have to be undertaken to increase the army's fighting effectiveness. The Afghan troops have operated basically together with Soviet troops all these years, even if they were only represented to a limited extent, to provide air cover and engineering reconnaissance, to conduct explanatory work and provide different forms of assistance to the population, for example. The Republic of Afghanistan's Armed Forces are assuming these functions with the withdrawal of Soviet forces. They are accumulating experience in carrying out military actions independently. They recently repulsed an enemy attempt to seize the provincial centers of Qalat and Meydan Shahr and inflicted heavy losses. Measures to further improve military development and the country's defense as the most important objectives in the policy of national reconciliation in the current stage of development of the party and the state were discussed in June this year at the PDPA Central Committee plenum. The Army and the party will be strong only when the opposition meets the state halfway, for reconciliation.

It should be pointed out that the opposition is also disunited. It is a conglomeration of parties, tendencies and organizations which represent the different branches of Islam (Sunni, Shia, Ismaili, fundamentalists and traditionalists) and national and ethnic groups of Afghan society. The opposition's basic strength comes from the seven Islamic parties united in "The Alliance of Seven."

A so-called "transitional government" was formed recently in Peshawar with the help of the Pakistani authorities, although it has not received support among the rebels either within the country or abroad. One of the reasons is that they "forgot" to include the commanders of their detachments who are operating in Afghanistan's territory. Serious differences have emerged in the upper echelons of the opposition because of this. However, the conflicts arise for political motives as the result of leader aspirations [vozhdizm] and efforts to expand their possessions as well as because of the sharing of loot, personal hostility, blood feuds, and so forth. The rebels incur

incomparably higher losses in armed skirmishes with each other than they do in battles with government troops. Under these conditions, it appears, there are not many chances that a capable united leadership will be established by the opposition forces. Each one of the groupings is rushing to increase its own opportunities to secure its own interests in the internecine struggle that is spreading.

The opposing sides are now preparing themselves for the critical struggle for power after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The opposition, by relying on help from outside, may impose a protracted war on the Afghan people. Everything will depend here on how quickly and in what form a sufficiently powerful socio-political and military organization can be formed, one which is capable of uniting the separate and opposing elements of Afghan society around itself.

A definite integrating role may be played in national reconciliation by the traditional forms of social organization and contacts, when the instinct of self-preservation and survival forces Afghans to seek contacts with Afghans and to accept compromise solutions. At the same time, as apparent from the PDPA's experience in interaction with religious circles, the peacemaking function of Islam has been far from exhausted. I think that this is precisely what D. Cordoves, the UN secretary general's representative, had in mind when he recently told Afghan refugees in Pakistan that a peaceful and stable government may be established in Afghanistan only on the basis of "traditions which enable the Afghans to overcome the crises which they have encountered in their history."

And finally, how will relations between the USSR and Afghanistan take shape after the withdrawal of Soviet forces? They will undergo changes in both form and content, in any event.

The Soviet-Afghan joint communique on results of the talks between E. Shevardnadze and Afghan President Najibullah, Prime Minister M. H. Sharq, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Wakil, and other members of the Afghan leadership notes that the ties between our two countries are being developed to our mutual benefit and have great potential.

An important new document was recently coordinated between the Soviet and Afghan governments—the draft of a Long-Term Program for Economic, Technical, and Trade Collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan for the period up to the year 2000.

The program is oriented toward an upsurge in the Afghan economy and the restoration, modernization, reconstruction and construction of mining, processing, power engineering, transportation and agricultural projects, including projects in the social area.

Joint Soviet-Afghan enterprises are being planned. Increased attention is being devoted to collaboration with the private sector, whose representatives traditionally make a large contribution to building trading bridges between our countries. Direct ties will be extended and consolidated between our union republics and the provinces of Afghanistan, between the cities in our countries, between ministries and departments, and between enterprises and production collectives.

Training of Afghan national personnel who will enter the republic's economy, culture and science will be conducted as before, but on a broader scale. Construction of a complex of scientific institutions—an entire city of institutes of the Afghan Academy of Sciences—is planned. The Soviet Union has extended a sizable state credit to Afghanistan for carrying out planning and surveying and top-priority operations. A joint Soviet-Afghan space flight will take place in the near future. Contacts in culture, art, science and education will be stimulated significantly.

Afghanistan is posing more questions than can be answered today. It is important to look for such answers in the spirit of the new political thinking, which has ruled out a military solution to the Afghan problem and followed the path of a political settlement in Afghanistan in accordance with the Geneva agreements. We do not seek a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, but we do not want a pro-American one either. We support a free, independent, nonaligned, neutral Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is prepared to assist it in every possible way in eliminating the aftereffects of the war, in strengthening the economy, and in developing the good traditions of friendship consecrated by history.