

A Survey To Determine
How The Media Affected Operational Security
Of The 1st Armored Division In Bosnia

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the
W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Journalism
Marshall University

By
Captain Stanford E. Angion
December 9, 1996



19980626 057

PLEASE CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BLOCK BELOW:

-AO# _____

_____ copies are being forwarded. Indicate whether Statement A, B, C, D, E, F, or X applies.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B:
DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ONLY; (Indicate Reason and Date). OTHER REQUESTS FOR THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE REFERRED TO (Indicate Controlling DoD Office).

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C:
DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR CONTRACTORS; (Indicate Reason and Date). OTHER REQUESTS FOR THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE REFERRED TO (Indicate Controlling DoD Office).

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D:
DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO DoD AND U.S. DoD CONTRACTORS ONLY; (Indicate Reason and Date). OTHER REQUESTS SHALL BE REFERRED TO (Indicate Controlling DoD Office).

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT E:
DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO DoD COMPONENTS ONLY; (Indicate Reason and Date). OTHER REQUESTS SHALL BE REFERRED TO (Indicate Controlling DoD Office).

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT F:
FURTHER DISSEMINATION ONLY AS DIRECTED BY (Indicate Controlling DoD Office and Date) or HIGHER DoD AUTHORITY.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT X:
DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OR ENTERPRISES ELIGIBLE TO OBTAIN EXPORT-CONTROLLED TECHNICAL DATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH DoD DIRECTIVE 5230.25, WITHHOLDING OF UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL DATA FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, 6 Nov 1984 (Indicate date of determination). CONTROLLING DoD OFFICE IS (Indicate Controlling DoD Office).

This document was previously forwarded to DTIC on _____ (date) and the AD number is _____.

In accordance with provisions of DoD instructions, the document requested is not supplied because:

It will be published at a later date. (Enter approximate date, if known).

Other. (Give Reason)

DoD Directive 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents," 18 Mar 87, contains seven distribution statements, as described briefly above. Technical Documents must be assigned distribution statements.

Stanford E. Angion June 8, 1998
Authorized Signature/Date

Stanford E. Angion
Print or Type Name
DSN 490-6029/7004
Telephone Number

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | | Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. | | | | |
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 2. REPORT DATE June 17, 1998 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Thesis 1996 (Dec) | | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A survey to determine how the media affected operational security of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia | | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Stanford E. Angion | | | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Marshall University, Huntington, WV | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army | | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER | |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT | | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE | |
| 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) | | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS | | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES | |
| | | | 16. PRICE CODE | |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | |

Thesis was accepted as meeting the research requirements for the master's degree



Harold C. Shaver

Harold C. Shaver, Ph.D.
Director and Professor of Journalism and Mass Communications
W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications
Thesis Advisor

Dec 13, 1996

Date

Robert N. Bickel

Robert N. Bickel, Ph.D.
Professor of Educational Leadership
College of Education and Human Services
Thesis Committee Member

Dec 13, 1996

Date

Carl P. Burrowes

Carl P. Burrowes, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Journalism
W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications
Thesis Committee Member

Dec 13, 1996

Date

Ralph J. Turner

Ralph J. Turner, Ph.D.
Professor of Journalism
W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications
Thesis Committee Member

Dec 13, 1996

Date

Leonard J. Deutsch

Leonard J. Deutsch, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

Dec. 17, 1996

Date

Acknowledgments

First and foremost I thank God for giving me the strength and will to conduct this research. Second, I wish to thank the following people for their contributions to this project.

Athenia Marie Angion, my wife, for her consistent support and encouragement. Her love and faithfulness to me has made this entire project easy.

Dr. Harold C. Shaver, professor and director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communications, and chairman of my research committee, for teaching and guiding me throughout this entire project. Dr. Shaver's guidance and support provided the common thread that held this research project together.

Dr. Robert N. Bickel, professor of educational leadership, for providing me with instructions and advice to help analyze and interpret my data.

Dr. Carl P. Burrowes, associate professor of journalism, for helping me to develop the theoretical framework for this research and providing me with valuable feedback throughout the project.

Dr. Ralph J. Turner, professor of journalism, for teaching me the art of copy editing and also providing me with valuable feedback throughout the project.

Maj. John E. Suttle, public affairs officer of the 1st Armored Division, who distributed and collected the surveys for me.

I will always be in debt to those named above and to many others for assisting and supporting me in this research project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| I. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| Background and Problem Statement..... | 1 |
| Purpose..... | 5 |
| Significance..... | 6 |
| Research Questions..... | 7 |
| Hypotheses..... | 7 |
| Data-Gathering Procedures..... | 10 |
| Theory..... | 10 |
| II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE..... | 12 |
| The Relationship Between the Military and the Media..... | 12 |
| A Survey About Operational Security During the Gulf War..... | 13 |
| America's Team: The Odd Couple..... | 14 |
| Conflict and Public Opinion: Rallying Effect of the Persian Gulf War..... | 18 |
| Censorship and Television News Coverage of the Persian Gulf War..... | 19 |
| The Significance of the News Media to Soldiers..... | 20 |
| Summary..... | 21 |
| III. DESIGN OF THE STUDY..... | 23 |
| Method of Research..... | 23 |

| | |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Source of Data..... | 23 |
| Procedures for Gathering Information..... | 24 |
| Explanation of Survey Instrument..... | 25 |
| Hypotheses/Question Correlation..... | 26 |
| Pilot Study..... | 26 |
| Treatment of Data..... | 27 |
| IV FINDINGS..... | 28 |
| Respondents' Profile..... | 28 |
| Findings..... | 30 |
| Hypotheses..... | 33 |
| Hypotheses 1-3..... | 34 |
| Hypotheses 4-6..... | 41 |
| Findings of Significance..... | 45 |
| V DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..... | 47 |
| Demographics..... | 47 |
| Non-Hypthesis Findings..... | 49 |
| Hypotheses..... | 49 |
| Hypotheses 1-3..... | 49 |
| Hypotheses 4-6..... | 50 |
| Findings of Significance..... | 51 |

| | |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Implications for the Knowledge Gap Theory..... | 52 |
| Recommendations..... | 53 |
| Executive Summary..... | 54 |
| APPENDIX A..... | 55 |
| Soldiers' Comments..... | 56 |
| APPENDIX B..... | 59 |
| Survey Cover Letter..... | 60 |
| APPENDIX C..... | 62 |
| Survey Instrument..... | 63 |
| APPENDIX D..... | 68 |
| Survey of Population..... | 69 |
| REFERENCES..... | 71 |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background and Problem Statement

“While it is often said that it is wrong to begin new wars by re-fighting old ones, it is the practice of the military and the media to do so,” (Katz, 377).

War reporting has been the source of great controversy between the military and the media throughout American history (Gersh, 7). A major area in which the media and military often clash involves the issue of operational security. The clash is based on the premise that, during wartime, a clever enemy can analyze a mass of unclassified, seemingly innocuous information, both from press and military sources, and make an accurate assessment of U.S. capabilities and intentions, including attack plans (Aukofer and Lawrence, 23). Therefore, the military seeks to control distribution of such information to prevent compromise of its secrets and strategies to the enemy.

The clash arises as the military seeks to control information for operational security purposes and the press attempts to gather and accurately report news from the battlefield in a timely manner. The press wants to tell the story and the military wants to win the war and keep casualties to a minimum. The press wants freedom and the military wants control (Aukofer and Lawrence, vii).

“The military and the media never understand each other very clearly,” according to Steven L. Katz, counsel, Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. Katz quoted one veteran war correspondent as saying, “The military makes it difficult because it wants it to be difficult.” Katz says the military-media tension is caused by differing priorities, strong feelings, cultural differences, and confusion on both sides. Although each

staunchly maintains that it defends and preserves democracy, they are often at odds with each other (Katz, 377). The clash may be related to the views that each have of its mission.

Military Views

To protect and defend the United States against its enemies, both foreign and domestic, the military must be able to maintain secrets and deny vital knowledge to the enemies about its plans and operations. For this reason the military seeks to control the distribution of information that could compromise operational security.

In his article, "Press Responsibilities and Lessons from the Gulf," Marty Linsky, a teacher at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, said it is the job of the military to see that its press relations are in sync with the war efforts: suppressing anything that would risk national security or might give away vital information to the enemy; stimulating public confidence and support in the war effort; and limiting information which might shake public confidence, strain public patience, or restrict military options (Linsky, 6).

Military personnel live and work in environments where they must constantly practice operational security measures both in peacetime and during war. Not only must they be careful not to reveal classified material to personnel outside the military, they must also know who in their unit is and is not authorized to have access to the material based on their rank and security classification level. Troops are trained to be very careful in their treatment of information and as a regular practice, to withhold material from unauthorized personnel (Aukofer and Lawrence, 24).

In an article by staff writer William Matthews, in *Army Times*, the media are listed as a possible danger to U.S. troops in Bosnia along with mines, snipers, cold and wet days, dangerous roads, Serbs and Muslims (Matthews, 9). Williams said like the land mines, the media are likely to turn up anywhere in Bosnia.

To fend off possible disasters, Williams said the Army's 5th Corps has given soldiers headed to Bosnia a handy "Media Reference Card." It has 13 recommendations on how to deal with the media and five answers that can be used in response to practically any question.

Advice the Army offers troops includes:

- Don't make off-the-record statements to reporters.
- Don't allow yourself to be badgered by the media. If necessary, politely end the interview and contact your commander or the public affairs officer (PAO).
- If a reporter comes to your unit and is not escorted by a public affairs officer or other escort, refer the reporter to the Joint Information Bureau (JIB).
- Never lie to the media.

Having said that, the Army also suggests a number of answers soldiers can feel safe giving inquisitive reporters which include:

- We are trained, ready and fully prepared to conduct peace enforcement operations.
- We are a disciplined and trained force. We understand our mission and the rules of engagement.
- U.S. forces are confident in our trained and competent leaders. We have pride in our leadership, from the president on down, and full trust in their decisions.

The struggle between the right to know and national security is unrelenting and complex. In the Persian Gulf War, the latest chapter in American war history, news of the war was filtered, delayed, and pooled, all in the interest of national security. Plagued with the "sensitivities that govern access decisions," the military stands accused of acting as news assignment editors for the nation (Gersh, 7).

In a response to the question "Is media coverage forcing us to alter our approach to operations other than war?" General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "The answer is a near-certain yes when it comes to peace-making operations, a

more hesitant yes in the case of more benign peace-keeping operations, and probably a no in the humanitarian operations, unless we talk of places like Bosnia, where all three are intertwined.” He said the answer is yes in peace-making operations because the “security and safety of the troops are at stake.” Shalikashvili said he thinks the age of instant, global communications has forced the United States military to consider the media’s presence and impact during its operations other than during a time of war (Hernandez, 14).

Media Views

Journalists believe that the First Amendment guarantee of a free and unfettered press is absolutely essential to American democracy, and applies to the nation’s military operations as it does to the actions of every other government institution (Aukofer and Lawrence, vii). Journalists perform the important function of gathering newsworthy information and presenting it to the public in a highly accurate and timely manner. In fact, the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights intended the press to be a watchdog for government affairs as well as to provide a free and open forum for citizens to express their opinions (Aukofer and Lawrence, vii).

Also, in his article “Press Responsibilities and Lessons from the Gulf,” Linsky made these points concerning what the press can learn from its coverage of the Gulf War:

- The mainstream establishment should not make agreements with the government that bind the entire press corps to a set of rules that may serve the interest of some better than others.
- The press must second guess the military on what is vital and what is not. It is the function of the press to test limits set by the government, to challenge them and, if necessary, to breach them. One of the cold realities of the Gulf War was that none of the mainstream news organizations was willing to confront the government in courts of law or public opinion when it might have made a difference (Linsky, 8).

In a commentary in *U.S. News & World Report*, Joseph Galloway said, concerning the military's security reviews of journalists' stories during the Gulf War, that the truth was "wounded by an information directorate bent on controlling the words and images that flow from the battlefields" and "clogged a vital artery leading to America's brain."

Concerning the Pentagon's handling of the press during the Gulf War, Steven Manning of *Scholastic Update* said, "Politics and propaganda became criteria in news coverage of the U.S. at war. Reporters acknowledge that restrictions are necessary in wartime, but alleged the Pentagon went beyond legitimate security concerns and attempted to present the American public a sanitized version of war," (Manning, 22). Manning said Americans have a right to know if they are being told the truth (Manning, 23).

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to survey the commanders and public affairs officers who were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia in 1995 with the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division as part of Operation Joint Endeavor, for their views about how they think the media affected their units' operational security. Many articles have been written concerning the adversarial relationship between the military and the media, but little scientific research has been published on the effects of the media on military operational security during times of conflict. This study will build on the research previously conducted by Capt. John B. Snyder and Capt. Kenneth D. Payne, as part of a survey and analysis of Military Public Affairs Officers who served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They found that six of ten public affairs officers were aware of reports published by the media that may have compromised military operations. Such reports can add to the fears and myths of commanders that media personnel cannot be trusted and if given the opportunity will sacrifice the lives of Americans troops to publish a "hot" story (Snyder and Payne, 42).

Significance

The military's concern for operational security is one of the primary reasons why it seeks to control reports by media personnel from the battlefield during times of conflict and war. This has been a source of tension between the media and military throughout history (Aukofer and Lawrence, vii).

However, the military and media are refining their understanding of each other and experimenting with ways to accommodate each other while accomplishing their missions. Recently, a year-long study, on the relationship between the military and the media, was completed by Frank A. Aukofer, Washington bureau chief of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, and William P. Lawrence, vice admiral of the United States Navy, Retired. Aukofer and Lawrence released a book, "America's Team: The Odd Couple," which lists 12 recommendations for media and military personnel to improve their relationship (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). The Center for Military History (CMH) in Washington D.C. has completed a detailed study on the relationship between the military and media from 1962 to 1973. The study has been published in two volumes, from 1962 to 1968 and from 1968 to 1973, respectively.

To improve its relationship with journalists, the Pentagon is developing a new doctrine on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate reporters on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools, and field combat exercises now include training on how to work with journalists (Gersh, 17). For example, the United States Army sends selected public affairs officers to civilian universities to obtain a masters' degree in journalism and mass communications in an effort to improve its relationship with the media.

This study is unique in that it will provide some immediate feedback to Army officials concerning the effects the media are having on operational security (information about the unit's personnel, equipment and/or plans that if obtained by the enemy could adversely affect the mission) in Bosnia. It can also be used by the Army as a source of information

to help with the ongoing efforts to improve its relationship with the media. The research questions for this study are listed below.

Research Questions

1. How do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia think media coverage affected their unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor?
2. Do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia think they can trust news media personnel?

Hypotheses

The hypotheses below were developed in part from findings of Snyder and Payne's survey of military public affairs officers who served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and from other literature (see Chapter II) concerning the relationship between the military and media.

Their study focused on the performance of military public affairs officers in four areas, one of which was operational security. Snyder and Payne indicated that operational security results were perhaps "the most important, and disturbing," of their findings. They reported that six of ten public affairs officers stated they were aware of reports by the media that may have compromised military operations. One in four officers knew of information released by other military public affairs officers that may have compromised military operations.

Hypotheses for this study will focus only on respondents' knowledge of reports by the news media that may have compromised operational security and their trust of news media personnel. Also, respondents for this study will be commanders and public affairs

officers, rather than just public affairs officers, as were surveyed in Snyder and Payne's study.

H1-3 Knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have compromised military operations decreases as rank increases during:

- (1) mobilization phase
- (2) deployment phase
- (3) mission phase¹.

These are suggested in part by the findings from the study conducted by Snyder and Payne, which showed that personal knowledge of information released by military public affairs personnel that may have compromised military operations, correlated negatively at a statistically significant level, with rank, months of public affairs experience and military public affairs schooling. Also, rank was chosen as a variable in hypotheses 1-3 because of the significance placed upon it in the military.

Rank separates members of the military by levels of responsibility and consequently by social, financial, and educational status. For example, officers of higher rank usually are afforded more privileges to receive information. For example, most field grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels) receive education at military schools on a higher level than most company grade officers (lieutenants and captains). Also, their duty positions often allow them access to more information than most company grade officers. This access coupled with the several years of experience that field grade officers have over company grade officers will allow them to be more informed about media operations.

Capt. Janelle B. Roberts, in a study of soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, found that "as rank increased, the use of television, radio and newspaper to get immediate

¹ The mobilization phase is the period of time from which the unit was officially notified of its mission to departure of its first troops to Bosnia. The deployment phase is the period of time from which the first soldiers departed the 1st Armored Division enroute to Bosnia until the official assumption of mission in

knowledge on big news events increased. Conversely, as rank decreased, the use of television, radio, newspapers and magazines, 'for being my friend when I am alone and to find interesting or unusual stories that I can tell others' increased." Roberts explained these differences by age, education level, time in service and maturation. She found that the "lower ranking soldiers were younger, their education level was lower and their time in service was less. On the other hand, the higher ranking soldiers used media resources to stay informed about big news events. This reflects a more mature soldier with a higher education level and the need to understand the bigger picture," (Roberts, 68).

H4-6 Commanders and public affairs officers' trust² of news media personnel increases as rank increases during:

- (1) mobilization phase
- (2) deployment phase
- (3) mission phase.

Also, these hypotheses were developed, in part, due to the findings of Snyder and Payne's study. They found a significant correlation between rank and news media coverage. "The higher the rank, the more positive their attitudes were that the news media provided fair and accurate reporting during Desert Storm. Senior ranking officers also were of the opinion the news media provided excellent coverage during the Gulf War," (Snyder and Payne, 27).

Additionally, because of the increase in knowledge and experience that field grade officers may have over company grade officers, it is presumed that they will have a better understanding of the news media and recognize the need to build a positive relationship that will help meet the needs of both the media and the military.

Bosnia. The mission phase is the period of time from which the 1st Armored Division officially assumed the mission until they were officially relieved.

² Trust is measured in terms of correct and impartial reports published by the news media.

Data-Gathering Procedures

The proposed methodology used for collecting the data was a mail survey with a verbal frequency scale and a Likert scale for responses. The goal was to survey only commanders and public affairs officers who were mobilized, deployed, and participated in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia.

Theory

The knowledge gap hypothesis is used to develop the theoretical framework for this research. It states that those with higher socio-economic status (SES) would acquire information from the mass media at a higher rate than those with lower SES (Fredin, Monnett, and Kosicki, 176). In 1970 when Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien introduced the hypothesis, it predicted that increased media publicity will exacerbate knowledge differentials between the “haves” and the “have-nots” over time (Gaziano, 3). The hypothesis stated:

As the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease (Gaziano, 4).

Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien emphasized their hypothesis concerned growth of differential knowledge, stressing that “have nots” do gain knowledge but “haves” acquire it at a greater rate. The relative gap between them grows, as a result. They presumed 1) growth of human knowledge is irreversible under the period of time they studied and 2) points of diminishing returns, or ceiling effects, either had not been reached or else occurred at varying rates for different SES groups during the periods (Gaziano, 4).

Cecilie Gaziano, in her paper “A Twenty-Five-Year Review of Knowledge Gap Research,” credited the Tichenor-Donohue-Olien team and ensuing critiques and controversy with spurring the rapid development of knowledge gap investigations.

Gaziano estimated that there were about 92 studies conducted since Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien's research in 1970.

This study will use the knowledge gap hypothesis as a basis to explain the differential in opinions between lower ranking officers and higher ranking officers in regard to the effect of the media on operational security of units in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia. The rationale is that most higher ranking officers (field grade officers), are provided with a higher level of military schooling such as the Commanding Generals Staff College, which is open to selected majors and the Army War College, which is available to selected lieutenant colonels and colonels. In general, higher ranking officers usually receive more pay and privileges than lower ranking officers, including easier access to media information (Compart, 18).

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Security of operations is one of the greatest concerns of the military when working with the media. A military commander's major concern is that an enemy will know of his attack plan in advance. A soldier's greatest fear is that his unit will be ambushed (Aukofer and Lawrence, 24). The remainder of this chapter looks at studies which relate operational security issues to the relationship between the military and the media. These studies are the military and the media, from 1968 to 1973; a survey and analysis of Military Public Affairs Officers who served in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm; America's Team: The Odd Couple, a study on the relationship between the military and the media; "Conflict and public opinion," a research report on the media's involvement in covering the Persian Gulf War; "Censorship and television news coverage of the Persian Gulf War," a research report on the relationship between censorship and the emotional and critical tone of television news during the Gulf War; several studies that show the significance of the news media to soldiers. Finally, a summary will follow the literature review.

The relationship between the military and the media

The Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, D.C., has completed a detailed study and publication of the relationship between the military and media from 1962 to 1973. The study is significant in that it provides the military and the media the opportunity to review and analyze operational security measures during the Vietnam war.

A survey about operational security during the Gulf War

A survey and analysis of Military Public Affairs Officers who served in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was conducted by Capt. John B. Snyder and Capt. Kenneth D. Payne, of the United States Army, as part of a research project at Marshall University, in July 1992. The results of their study showed that six of every ten public affairs officers who participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm said they were aware of reports published by the media that may have compromised military operations. One in four officers knew of information released by other military public affairs officers that may have compromised military operations (Snyder and Payne, 42).

PAOs stated that unit locations, further operations, operational readiness of units/equipment, and identification of local towns was the information most often improperly released. PAOs, news media, and other military officers (e.g., operations officers and commanders) shared in the release of this information that may have compromised military operations (Snyder and Payne, 43).

One respondent reported that an entire unit battle plan was briefed to pool members by the unit PAO, operations officer, and commander three weeks prior to the assault into Iraq. Fortunately, according to the officer, the information was never released by the media (Snyder and Payne, 43).

PAOs believe that if ground rules are established early and everyone follows those rules, then operational security will improve. The issue of security at the source was raised often. But one Army officer said, "Don't say anything you don't want to read in the newspapers or see on television," (Snyder and Payne, 43).

Another recommendation by PAOs related to the basic concept of training. Both the media and PAOs require operational security training. There was too much confusion regarding what was considered sensitive information by both sides (Snyder and Payne, 43).

Snyder and Payne said that fear of release of sensitive operational information may explain why some commanders and senior officers are reluctant to have the news media or even public affairs officers within their area of operations (Snyder and Payne, 42). They also said the knowledge of possible security compromises by reporters and PAOs may explain why public affairs officers generally still do not trust the media. It may also explain why the public affairs officers are not overwhelmingly favorable about the experience level of fellow public affairs officers (Snyder and Payne, 43).

America's Team: The odd couple

In an effort to improve the relationship between the media and the military, John Seigenthaler, chairman of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, asked Frank A. Aukofer and William P. Lawrence to work together on a plan that “might end the long-standing hostility and ease the never-ending tensions between the news media and the military in the United States,” (Aukofer and Lawrence, v).

America's Team: The Odd Couple is a year-long study researched and written by retired Navy Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence and veteran journalist Frank A. Aukofer at The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center in Nashville, Tenn. They brought together a cross-section of colleagues from each side of the cultural conflict. Their leadership turned those sessions into productive and positive exchanges. Honest concerns and suspicions on both sides were brought into the open (Peterson, 1).

The report says journalists need to be better prepared to cover future military operations. The military, meanwhile, is often secretive and bent on managing the flow of news, according to some journalists quoted in the report.

Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, is one of 60 people interviewed for the report, including six secretaries of defense, all the current directors of public affairs, and numerous journalists. Many of the military people expressed outright

contempt for journalists, and some journalists were equally critical of military leaders (Peterson, 1).

Gen. Shalikashvili, said, “There are reporters...today who wouldn’t know a battalion from a company, who wouldn’t know one airplane type from another. They have a responsibility to become more professional and to get to know their job. We have a responsibility, too, and a self interest in making sure they are knowledgeable. It isn’t just knowing the piece of equipment, but to really help them understand what they’re seeing, and then let them reach their own conclusions on the issues.”

John Seigenthaler, chairman of the First Amendment Center, observed, “There are obviously a number of areas of conflict; mistrust, alienation and sometimes outright hostility....The current work of Lawrence and Aukofer represents an effort to bring about a greater understanding” between the two groups.

Based on recommendations by Congress and Gen. Shalikashvili, the Pentagon’s various war colleges and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, in 1994 began accepting private-sector civilians as students. As evidence of its commitment to upgrading coverage of military affairs, The Associated Press agreed to Susanne Schafer’s suggestion that she be nominated for study at the National War College. While both the media and the military said for years that more training for journalists is desirable, trailblazer Schafer probably will not be a trendsetter. It represents such a big commitment by the AP, says Aukofer. Few outlets could afford to be without their military reporters for a year.

Conversely, Aukofer says local media leaders should engage in similar activities. He also proposed a media-military office could fund and coordinate “military training for news people... to get them out on training exercises. It could also put some combat commanders in newsrooms to see how we operate.”

At the end of a panel discussion in June, 1995, in Arlington, Va., Aukofer concluded: “Since undertaking this report, we’ve each worried and wondered if it was possible to get a process whereby coverage of future conflicts could be improved.” Lawrence says, “The

key is start talking now, because if we don't plan in advance, everybody loses—most of all, the public,” (Peterson, 5). At the end of the study the following recommendations were made as steps to ending the tensions between the military and media in the United States:

1. The Department of Defense should consider adopting an overall policy of “security at the source.” That would mean an end to field censorship. It would also mean that escort officers would be used only to facilitate access for reporters and photographers.
2. News media representatives should recognize that there may be extraordinary circumstances in the future when civilian or military defense leaders might want to exercise some temporary censorship in the interest of operational security or saving lives. Guidelines for invoking that limited censorship should be developed.
3. Because of rapid advances in communications technology, news media and military leaders should jointly engage in a study of the security issues posed by real-time reporting from the battlefield.
4. Building on the concept of the Department of Defense National Media Pool, which should be continued and improved upon for temporary use in secret operations, the news media and the military should jointly establish the Independent Coverage Tier. The system allows commanders to determine how many members of the news media they could accommodate with units on the battlefield. For the news media, it would provide guaranteed access, with proper support and protection, and without censorship.
5. In major conflicts, such as Desert Storm, the secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider assigning an officer of general rank in the combat theater to coordinate the news media aspects of the operation under the commander of U.S. military forces.

6. Foundations, including but not limited to such news-oriented organizations as The Freedom Forum, the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Knight Foundation, should jointly establish an office of military media relations. The functions of the office would include maintaining the institutional memory for the combat pool and tier systems, facilitating discussions of real-time battlefield reporting, and developing education and training programs for journalists and military men and women.
7. News organizations must make a better effort to cover military affairs, beginning at the local level with coverage of National Guard, Reserve and ROTC units.
8. Where journalism schools and ROTC programs share campuses or geographic locations, they should seek each other out for class visits or joint programs aimed at increasing their knowledge and understanding of each other.
9. News media education provided by the professional military education system needs to be improved through an integrated, building-block approach throughout the five levels of the system.
10. The secretary of defense should consider expanding to other service colleges and programs, which allows news media personnel to attend courses at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
11. The armed forces should continue efforts to expand news media training as part of field-training exercises and war games, affording the press the maximum opportunity to participate.
12. The military services should continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness, prestige and career attractiveness of public affairs officers.
13. The Department of Defense should abandon efforts to establish regulations defining the qualifications of news media representatives.

Conflict and public opinion: rallying effects of the Persian Gulf War

The media's involvement in covering the Persian Gulf War was both necessary and important to a successful military strategy and operation.

In the months before the Persian Gulf War, media analysts discussed at length whether the American population would support military actions against Iraq. Many analysts wondered whether the scars from the Vietnam War would create a public reluctance to engage in another war on foreign soil (McLeod, et., 20).

There is considerable reason to believe that external and internal conflicts are an important driving force behind the tides of public opinion. In fact, internal and external conflict tend to have diametrically opposite effects on social dynamics. Ultimately, the dynamics of social forces affect the composition of public opinion (McLeod, et., 21).

Internal conflicts, such as the Los Angeles riots in the aftermath of the trial of police officers accused of beating Rodney King, tend to have a centrifugal effect. Internal dissension tends to splinter various parties in the conflict, ultimately eroding the social consensus.

By contrast, external conflicts such as the Persian Gulf War tend to have a centripetal effect. Conflicts between one social group and an external group tend to increase cohesion. External conflicts overshadow internal dissension, building the internal consensus among group members. As extremely salient external conflicts, wars between nations are particularly strong in mobilizing support behind objectives determined by the power-holders within the system. When a major external conflict such as a war has been initiated, formidable internal opposition to the conflict rarely exists. Typically, it takes a long time for oppositional forces to evolve into a legitimized power base within the system. Moreover, attempts at opposition are likely to be inhibited by agents of social control such as mass media (McLeod, 20).

In their study *Conflict and Public Opinion: Rallying Effects of the Persian Gulf War*, McLeod, Eveland, Jr., and Signorielli examined the dissipation of "rally effects" in the

aftermath of the Persian Gulf War using data from a panel of 167 New Castle County (Delaware) respondents interviewed during the war and one year later. Public support for the war and confidence in the President, Congress, and the Military declined significantly. Hostility toward anti-war protesters also diminished. The study combines the “rally around the flag” literature from political science and functional conflict theory from sociology to explain the impact of this major external conflict on support for government institutions and intolerance for elements perceived as a potential threat (McLeod, 20). The results of this study provided evidence consistent with dissipation of rally effects, supporting the theoretical proposition that feelings of solidarity and support for established authority peak during external conflict and declines thereafter.

Censorship and television news coverage of the Persian Gulf War

The canons of American journalism suggest that governments are not to be trusted, and official attempts to restrict the free flow of information are the bane of a free press. This adversarial depiction of the press suggests an actively critical role for journalists that should be reflected in the content of their news. In time of war this presents a tension between the professional responsibility to communicate the truth regardless of its effects on the source and the allegiance to homeland. Throughout much of the Persian Gulf War, the foreign press was allowed to report from Iraq—from behind enemy lines—and a frequent criticism of their coverage was that due to tight controls journalists were being used as propagandist tools (Newhagen).

The Persian Gulf War provided a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between censorship and the emotional and critical tone of television news. Coverage of the war was unique, not because censorship was taking place, but because news stories were clearly labeled by disclaimers when they were aired. A total of 424 television news stories broadcast during the Persian Gulf War were content analyzed for the presence or absence of censorship disclaimers, the censoring source, and the producing network. The stories

also were rated for emotional valence and intensity, and critical tone of the story toward the source. The results are discussed in terms of both production-and-viewer-based differences (Newhagen, 32). Stories that contained disclaimers tended to be more negative, more intense, and more critical than stories that did not, regardless of the producing network. On the surface this seems to refute a set of hypotheses that predicted successful censorship would result in a muted emotional tone (Newhagen, 40). Additionally, contrary to the prediction, differences did emerge among networks. CNN stood out in particular, airing stories that contained more disclaimers and that were more positive, less intense, and less critical of sources than the other networks. The idea that the United States tended to receive more positive, less intense, less critical coverage than Iraq was supported for all five networks (Newhagen, 40).

The significance of the news media to soldiers

Several studies have shown that the media play a valuable role as a source of information for soldiers during times of conflicts. A Survey of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) Soldiers who deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy, was conducted by Captain Janelle B. Roberts to determine the importance, availability and use of news and media resources. The purpose of Roberts' study was to determine the value of news to the soldiers and how much, how often, what kind, for what purpose and by what avenue they received news.

Among other things she found that while deployed, soldiers primarily used media resources for surveillance of the environment, primarily to find out what was happening back in the U. S.

Two other studies related to Roberts' study were conducted by Captain Joseph Piek and Major John Suttle, United States Army.

Piek's study, of which Roberts' was a replication, surveyed enlisted Gulf War veterans to determine the importance and availability of news. The most important information

gathered from his research was that enlisted soldiers became significantly more interested in international and theater of operations news while they were deployed in support of a mission (Piek, 63).

This highlights even more why the military is not only concerned with ensuring that soldiers are kept well informed, but also that the information they receive shows the public's confidence in the military and their support for the war effort.

Major Suttle's study, the *Command Information Function in U.S. Army Maneuver Battalions During the Gulf War*, found that 63% of the commanders said information lag negatively affected their ability to provide troops with adequate information (Suttle, 63). Also Suttle's study showed that 57% of the commanders surveyed were dissatisfied with the command information products available (Suttle, 68).

Summary

The literature reviewed above clearly indicate there is still some friction between the military and the media. The main issues for the military seem to be the effect that media coverage could have on safety and security. Using examples, Gen. Shalikashvili said, "We all know the cases: the bright lights on the beach of Mogadishu as Marines are attempting a night amphibious landing; the hundreds of reporters awaiting in Port-au-Prince the night of the airborne assault, called off just hours before the sky was to have been filled with paratroopers," (Hernandez, 14).

Shalikashvili said, in Haiti, there was "the fear that the sky would have been illuminated by a thousand white lights, making glowing ducks of our soldiers." He added, "What is less well known is that all major U.S. networks agreed to use night vision devices instead of white lights and to delay broadcasting for some time until the troops were safely on the ground. So, perhaps we are more tolerant of each other's needs than is generally believed, but we must continue to work at this issue," (Hernandez, 14).

According to former Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, the military has taken on the task of improving what it must provide to journalists. The Pentagon is developing new doctrine on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate reporters on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools, and field combat exercises now including training in working with journalists (Gersh). However, much tension still exists between the military and news media.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Method of Research

Primary research for this study was conducted using a mail survey. The survey was made up of a series of statements designed to answer each research question and accept or reject the hypotheses. Statements were included to determine the overall atmosphere of the relationship between the 1st Armored Division and the media in Bosnia. Similar statements were grouped. Verbal frequency and Likert scales were used (see appendix C).

The surveys were mailed to Maj. John E. Suttle, the 1st Armored Division's Public Affairs Officer (PAO), who agreed to distribute and collect the surveys.

Major Suttle, a Marshall University graduate in journalism and mass communications, initially confirmed via the Internet, April 1, then again via letter April 20, 1996, his intent to conduct the survey. He proved to be a valuable source of support because of his position within the 1st Armored Division. Also, he conducted a similar research study while a graduate student in Marshall University's School of Journalism and Mass Communications, three years ago.

Source of Data

The 1st Armored Division deployed to Bosnia in December, 1995, as part of a peacekeeping mission. Approximately forty-six company commanders (Captains), eighteen battalion commanders (Lieutenant Colonels), six brigade commanders (Colonels), and the division commander, were the key leaders in command of troops. Leaders in those key positions along with three division public affairs officers will

comprise the population for this study. The goal was to survey the entire population and receive an 80% return rate. However, a 66% return rate was received.

This population, although small in size, was chosen because of their position and the integral role they play in the unit. Commanders at every level in the Army control personnel and resources. In fact, every soldier in the Army falls under the command of an officer. Commanders are responsible for everything their soldiers do or fail to do, which includes breeches in informational and operational security (OPSEC). As a result, commanders may conduct briefing about how to safeguard against OPSEC violations, hand out media reference cards, and restrict the entrance of personnel, who may pose a threat to OPSEC, into their unit area. Therefore, commanders were chosen because of their position of authority and access they have to information that the average soldier is not privy to. Public affairs officers were chosen because their job is to interface with media personnel to help ensure that the reporters' needs for gathering the news are met, while making sure that the military is represented fairly.

Procedures for Gathering Information

An initial research proposal for this study was submitted to Dr. Harold C. Shaver, professor and director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communications, April 22, 1996. Corrections were made in accordance with advice received from Dr. Shaver and a copy of the submitted to each member of the research committee. After receiving advice from committee members and making appropriate adjustments, a copy of the survey was mailed to Maj. Mark Wiggins, at Ft. Bragg, N.C., for a pilot test.

After receiving the results from the pilot study, the researcher discussed them with the committee chairman, Dr. Shaver, and made the necessary adjustments to the survey instrument. About 100 surveys were packaged, inventoried, and mailed to Maj. Suttle by registered and certified mail, on June 28, 1996.

The following items were mailed:

- An inventory sheet of all contents shipped
- A letter of instructions and appreciation to Maj. Suttle
- 100 copies of the survey
- A proposed schedule for collecting the data

Maj. Suttle received the surveys on July 10, distributed them to the designated units, and collected them upon completion. Some units completed the surveys faster than others. So, Maj. Suttle mailed the surveys to the researcher as he received them from the units. A deadline of August 30 was established for collection of data. After that, the data were submitted to a research technician, who entered the data into the computer using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-X).

The researcher interpreted the results of the survey with the help of Dr. Robert N. Bickel, professor of educational leadership at Marshall University. A draft of the report was submitted to members of the research committee October 4, 1996. Adjustments were made to the report upon advice from the committee members, and the final draft was submitted to the committee and Dean of the Graduate School on December 6, 1996.

Explanation of Survey Instrument

The survey is a five-page questionnaire located at Appendix A. There are 29 questions on the survey: 18 three-point verbal frequency scale type questions; three Likert scale questions; and eight questions to gather background information on each subject. The breakdown of questions and their subjects:

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Q 1,3,9 | Awareness of compromises in operational security during mobilization, deployment, and mission phases. |
| Q 6,7,11 | Support for members of the news media. |
| Q 2,10,14 | Working relationship of military and media. |

| | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Q 4, 5,8,12,13 | Trust for media personnel. |
| Q 17,18 | News media personnel's knowledge of military. |
| Q 15, 16 | News media's respect for the military's mission. |
| Q 19,21 | Overall assessment of the news media. |
| Q 20 | Importance of the media's mission. |
| Q 22,29 | Demographic information |

Hypotheses/Question Correlation

The questions in the survey are designed to get responses that support or reject each of the hypotheses in this study.

Hypotheses 1-3. *Knowledge of reports published by news personnel that may have compromised military operations decreases as rank increases during : (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase. questions 1, 3, 9, 13, and 19 apply.*

Hypothesis 4 - *Commanders and public affairs officers' trust of news media personnel increases as rank increases. questions 4, 5, 8 apply.*

Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted using four public affairs personnel from Fort Bragg, N.C., who had been deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. The purpose of the study was to survey personnel who had participated in the mission to determine whether the research design and methodology were relevant and effective (Wimmer and Dominick, 478). The pilot study was handled by Maj. Mark Wiggins, who deployed to Bosnia as a public affairs detachment commander.

The researcher talked to Maj. Wiggins by telephone May 13, 1996, and he agreed to conduct the test with his five-man public affairs team. Approximately 10 copies of the survey were sent to Maj. Wiggins about June 14, by priority mail. He received the

surveys and distributed them to the respondents. Once the surveys were completed by the respondents Maj. Wiggins returned copies by facsimile to expedite the delivery. Four of the five surveys were returned. The surveys and personal observations received over the telephone from Maj. Wiggins were reviewed by the researcher and committee chairman, and then, some minor adjustments were made to the survey instrument.

Treatment of Data

Frequency and percentage distributions are used to graphically display and compare responses from verbal frequency and Likert scales on appropriate questions. Also, the mean values of each dependent variable will be rank ordered for the purpose of comparison.

Correlation analysis was used to determine whether a statistically significant relationship existed between rank and previously specified dependent variables to help form a basis for accepting or rejecting the established hypothesis. Also correlation analyses were conducted to compare age with specified dependent variables.

CHAPTER IV

Findings

Respondents' Profile

The following information was collected from a survey of the commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia. The data were collected from the respondents between July 10 and August 30, 1996. An individual survey was distributed to the 71 officers in the population. Forty-seven surveys were returned to the researcher, and 40 of those were acceptable for analysis. Seven surveys were rejected because they were completed by respondents outside of the designated population. Therefore, the response rate was 66 percent, but the amount used was 57 percent of the total surveys distributed. Table one shows the number and percentage of survey responses.


Table 1. Survey response rate

| | population | distribution | surveys returned | surveys used | surveys not used |
|------------|------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| number | 71 | 71 | 47 | 40 | 7 |
| percentage | | 100% | 66% | 57% | 10% |

Rank. Officers surveyed for this study were lieutenants (Lts.), Captains (Capts.), Majors (Majs.), lieutenant colonels (Ltcs.), and colonels (Cols.). The designated population consisted of 45 Capts, 2 Majs., 18 Ltcs., and 6 Cols. As shown in chart 1, the number of surveys returned by rank were 8 from Lts., 25 from Capts., 3 from Majs., 3 from Ltcs., 1 from a Col., and 7 were completed by noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The surveys completed by NCOs were not used in the analysis of this study.


Ages. Ages for the respondents are from 24 to 44 years-old. The mean age for respondents in this study was 30.6 years. The mean ages by rank are Lts., 26; Capts., 30.2; Majs., 34; Ltcs., 41.5; and Col., 43. Chart 2 graphically displays the respondents' years of age by rank.

Chart 1. Survey responses by rank.



*Lts. are generally not company commanders, but usually hold the position in the commander's absence.

Chart 2. Average age by rank.



Gender. There were five female and 36 male respondents whose surveys were used as part of this study. The gender for one respondent was not identified on the survey. Table 2 shows the distribution of respondents by gender.

Table 2 shows respondents by gender.

| Males | Females | Unknown |
|-------|---------|---------|
| 34 | 5 | 1 |

Findings

The results in this study were prepared for analysis by coding all information gathered from the survey instruments and entering the data into a computer using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-X). The scales used to record the responses of the respondents were the verbal frequency and the Likert. The verbal frequency scale contains five words that indicate how often an action has been taken. Advantages of the verbal frequency scale include the ease of assessment and response by those being surveyed. The number of opportunities to perform the action is automatically assumed within the question. The Likert scale also uses five words to measure the respondents' responses. But, unlike the verbal frequency scale, the Likert scale states the issue or opinion and obtains the respondents' degree of agreement or disagreement. A major advantage of this scale is the ability to obtain a summated value. Examples of the verbal frequency and Likert scales are below.

Verbal frequency scale

| | | | | |
|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |

Likert scale

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |

All data were entered into the computer by a single research technician, then analyzed by comparing frequency and percentage distributions, and mean values of the variables. Hypotheses were tested using correlation analysis. The remainder of this chapter will present the findings of this research study.

Non-Hypotheses Findings

The majority of mean scores for survey questions shown in tables 3 and 4 indicate a positive relation between the commanders and public relation officers of the 1st armored Division, and the media. In questions 1, 3, and 9, the mean scores indicated that respondents were aware of some compromises in operational security. Mean scores for questions 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 14 indicated they were frequently supportive and cooperative with media personnel. Questions 4, 5, 8, 12, and 13 indicated that they frequently trusted news media personnel. Questions 15 and 16 indicated that news media personnel infrequently interfered with meetings or training to conduct interviews. The respondents, in questions 17 and 18, neither agreed nor disagreed that news media personnel understood the military's need for operational security or that they had adequate knowledge about military operations to know what they were reporting. Finally, in questions 19 and 20, respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that news media coverage did not risk their unit's operational security, or that the media's mission was just as important as the military's.

Table 3. Survey questions 1-16 ranked from most positive to least positive responses using the verbal frequency scale.

| Survey Questions | Percentage of Positive Responses | Average Mean |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Q7. When answering news media personnel questions about my unit's operations, I always provided correct information. | 85 | 4.20 |
| 2. Q11. When media personnel requested access to my unit's area to interview soldiers, it was granted. | 79 | 3.95 |
| 3. Q12. My soldiers were provided with media reference cards to deal with news media personnel. | 78 | 3.90 |
| 4. Q6. When asked questions by news media personnel, I was able to provide answers quickly enough to satisfy the needs of media people, including their deadlines. | 77 | 3.85 |
| 5. Q2. News media personnel were cooperative and easy to work with. | 76 | 3.79 |
| 6. Q3. I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations | 74 | 1.28* |
| 7. Q10. I welcomed members of the news media into my unit area. | 73 | 3.67 |
| 8. Q5. The information in news media reports about my unit's operations were correct. | 70 | 3.48 |
| 9. Q14. News media personnel displayed a real concern for the well being of soldiers in my unit. | 67 | 3.34 |
| 10. Q4. News media reports were impartial. | 65 | 3.27 |
| 11. Q8. I know of an instance (or instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record. | 65 | 1.75* |
| 12. Q16. News media personnel interfered with important meetings seeking interviews with soldiers. | 65 | 1.76* |
| 13. Q15. News media personnel interfered with training seeking interviews with soldiers. | 63 | 1.86* |
| 14. Q13. Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security. | 54 | 2.28 |
| 15. Q1. I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission. | 51 | 2.44 |
| 16. Q9. Did media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security. | 49 | 2.53 |

*Questions were negatively worded and the preferred answer is closer to one.

Table 4. Survey questions 17-21 ranked from most positive to least positive responses using the Likert scale.

| Survey Questions | Percentage of Positive Responses | Average Mean |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Q20. The media's mission is just as important to society as the military's mission. | 58 | 2.90 |
| 2. Q17. News media reporters seemed to have adequate knowledge about military operations to know what they were reporting. | 58 | 2.88 |
| 3. Q18. News media personnel seemed to understand the military's need for operational security. | 55 | 2.73 |
| 4. Q21. The military-media relationship has improved since the gulf war. | 54 | 2.70 |
| 5. Q19. Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor. | 48 | 2.42 |

The questions in table 3 and 4 are listed from most positive to least positive responses. Column one shows the percent of respondents who provided positive responses to the question. Column two shows the average mean response to each question. The mean scores are interpreted using the verbal frequency scale for Table 3 and the Likert scale for Table 4.

Hypotheses. Each hypothesis was tested by correlating the previously designated survey questions (dependent variables) with rank (independent variable) to measure the association between the two variables. "Correlation is based on covariance, or movement of the variables together. Correlation analysis generates a single value (the correlation coefficient) that shows how much the two variables move together. The correlation coefficient, is symbolized by the letter r . It ranges from a value of zero, indicating there is no relationship between the variables, to a plus or minus one, indicating a perfect linear relationship. If the correlation is positive, the two move in the same direction. If it is negative, they move in the opposite direction. The plus or minus sign indicates a direct or

an inverse relationship between the two variables. The proportion of shared variance is indicated by the square of the correlation coefficient, and is called the coefficient of determination, symbolized by r^2 or abbreviated as RSQ," (Alreck and Settle, 197).

H1-3. Knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have compromised military operations decreases as rank increases during:

(1) mobilization phase

(2) deployment phase

(3) mission phase

Survey questions 1, 3, 9, 13, and 19 were designed to collect information to test hypotheses 1-3. The survey questions and results are as follows:

(1). Question 1. *I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission.*


The results from Table 3 indicate that 21 percent of the respondents had no knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of the unit's mission. Other responses indicated that 33 percent of the respondents had

Table 5 shows responses to question 1. *I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission.*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | percentage |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|------------|
| Never | 7 | 9 | 9 | 8.3 | 21% |
| Infrequently | 13 | 11 | 16 | 13.3 | 33% |
| Sometimes | 12 | 12 | 10 | 11.3 | 28% |
| Frequently | 7 | 7 | 5 | 6.3 | 16% |
| Very Frequently | 1 | 1 | 0 | .7 | 2% |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

knowledge of such reports infrequently, 28 percent of the respondents had some knowledge of such reports, 16 percent of the respondents had knowledge of such reports frequently, and 2 percent of the respondents had knowledge of such reports very frequently. Chart 3 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 1.

Chart 3. Percentage of responses for question 1. *I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission.*




(2). **Question 3.** *I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations.*

Results from Table 6 indicate that 76 percent of the respondents have no knowledge of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations during Operation Joint Endeavor. Other responses indicate that 19 percent have knowledge of such acts occurring infrequently, 3 percent have knowledge of such acts occurring sometime, and 2 percent have knowledge of such acts occurring frequently. Chart 4 displays the average percentage of each verbal frequency category for question 3.

Table 6. Responses to question 3. *I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations.*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | Average percentages |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Never | 32 | 30 | 30 | 30.7 | 76% |
| Infrequently | 6 | 9 | 8 | 7.6 | 19% |
| Sometimes | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3% |
| Frequently | 1 | 0 | 1 | .7 | 2% |
| Very Frequently | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

Chart 4. Percentage of responses for question 3. *I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations.*



(3). **Question 9.** *Did media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security?*


Results shown in Table 7 indicate that 28 percent of the respondents had no knowledge of media personnel asking questions that could not be answered without risking their unit's operational security. Other responses indicated that 18 percent had knowledge of media personnel asking such questions infrequently, 18 percent had knowledge of media personnel asking such questions sometimes, 25 percent had knowledge of media personnel

asking such questions frequently, and 3 percent had knowledge of media personnel asking questions that could not be answered without risking their unit's operational security very frequently. Eight percent of the respondents did not answer question 9. Chart 5 graphically displays the percentage of responses for verbal frequency category for question 9.

Table 7. Responses to question 9. *Did media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security?*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | Average percentages |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Never | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11.3 | 28% |
| Infrequently | 6 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 18% |
| Sometimes | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 18% |
| Frequently | 11 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 25% |
| Very Frequently | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1.3 | 3% |
| Missing | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3.3 | 8% |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

Chart 5. Percentage of responses for question 9. *Did media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security?*




(4). **Question 13.** *Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security?*

Results shown in Table 8 indicate that 30 percent of the respondents did not think the presence of media personnel in their units were a threat to operational security. Other responses indicated that 27 percent thought they were a risk infrequently, 29 percent thought they were a risk sometimes, 4 percent said they were a risk frequently, 7 percent said they were a risk very frequently, and 3 percent did not answer the question. Chart 6 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 13.

Table 8. Responses to question 13. *Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit area was a threat to operational security?*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | Average percentages |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Never | 13 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 30% |
| Infrequently | 9 | 11 | 12 | 10.7 | 27% |
| Sometimes | 12 | 10 | 13 | 11.7 | 29% |
| Frequently | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1.7 | 4% |
| Very Frequently | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2.7 | 7% |
| Missing | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1.3 | 3% |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

Chart 6. Percentage of responses to question 13. *Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security?*




(5). **Question 19.** *Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor.*

Results shown in Table 9 indicate that 8 percent of the respondents strongly agree that overall, news media coverage did not risk their unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor. Other responses indicated 60 percent agreed, 17 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, 13 percent disagreed, and 2 percent strongly disagreed. Chart 7 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 19.

Table 9. Responses to question 19. *Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor.*

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|-------------------|-----------|------------|
| Strongly agree | 3 | 8% |
| Agree | 24 | 60% |
| Neither A or D | 7 | 17% |
| Disagree | 5 | 13% |
| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2% |
| Total | 40 | 100% |

Chart 7. Percentage of responses to question 19. *Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor.*



Test of hypotheses 1-3. Correlation analyses were conducted between rank and each designated dependent variable (questions 1, 3, 9, 13, and 19) to test for associations of statistical significance at the .05 level. The results shown in Table 10, indicate that no statistically significant associations were found between rank and the dependent variables in any phases of the deployment.

Table 10. Correlation coefficients between rank and the designated dependent variables below.

| Dependent Variables | Mobilization | Deployment | Mission |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------|---------|
| 1. I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission. | .2354 | .2974 | -.0090 |
| 3. I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations. | .0356 | .0450 | -.0156 |
| 9. Did news media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security. | -.0510 | -.0548 | .0281 |
| 13. Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security. | .0163 | .0131 | .0484 |

P < .05 for all calculations

Therefore, hypotheses 1-3, are not supported. They stated *Knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have compromised military operations decreases as rank increases during; (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase.*

Hypotheses 4-6. *Commanders' and public affairs officers' trust of news media personnel increases as rank increases during;*

(1) mobilization phase

(2) deployment phase

(3) mission phase

Survey questions 4, 5, and 8 were designed to collect information that would either support or reject hypotheses 4-6. The survey questions and their results follow.

(1) Question 4. *News media reports were impartial .*


Results shown in Table 11 indicate that 9 percent of the respondents thought news media reports were never impartial. Other responses indicate that 10 percent thought they were infrequently impartial, 31 percent thought they were sometimes impartial, 40 percent thought they were frequently impartial, 8 percent thought they were very frequently

Table 11. Responses to question 4. *News media reports were impartial.*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | Average Percentage |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Never | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3.7 | 9% |
| Infrequently | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 10% |
| Sometimes | 9 | 13 | 15 | 12.3 | 31% |
| Frequently | 19 | 15 | 14 | 16 | 40% |
| Very Frequently | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 8% |
| Missing | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2% |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

impartial and 2 percent did not respond to the question. Chart 8 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 4.

Chart 8. Percentage of responses to question 4. *News media reports were impartial .*



(2). **Question 5.** *The information in news media reports about my unit's operations was correct.*

Results shown in Table 12 indicate that 5 percent of the respondents thought the information in news media reports about their unit's operations was never correct. Others responses indicated that 7 percent thought they were infrequently correct, 31 percent thought they were sometimes correct, 45 percent thought they were frequently correct, 10 percent thought they were very frequently correct, and 2 percent did not respond to the statement. Chart 9 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 5.


(3). **Question 8.** *I know of an instance (instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record.*

Results shown in Table 13 indicate that 56 percent of the respondents never knew of an instance (instances) when news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record. Other responses indicated that 17 percent knew of instances

Table 12. Responses to question 5. *The information in news media reports about my unit's operations was correct.*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | Average Percentage |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Never | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5% |
| Infrequently | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 7% |
| Some | 12 | 9 | 16 | 12.3 | 31% |
| Frequently | 18 | 21 | 15 | 18 | 45% |
| Very Frequently | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 10% |
| Missing | 1 | 0 | 1 | .7 | 2% |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

Chart 9. Percentage of responses to question 5. *The information in news media reports about my unit's operations was correct.*




infrequently, 17 percent knew of instances sometimes, 5 percent knew of instances frequently, 3 percent knew of instances very frequently, and 2 percent did not respond to the question. Chart 10 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 8.

Table 13. Responses to question 8. *I know of an instance (instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record.*

| | Mobilization Phase | Deployment Phase | Mission Phase | Average Response | Average Percentage |
|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Never | 25 | 22 | 21 | 22.6 | 56% |
| Infrequently | 5 | 7 | 8 | 6.7 | 17% |
| Sometimes | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6.7 | 17% |
| Frequently | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5% |
| Very Frequently | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1.3 | 3% |
| Missing | 0 | 1 | 1 | .7 | 2% |
| Total | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 100% |

Chart 10. Percentage of responses to question 8. *I know of an instance (or instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record.*



Test of hypotheses 4-6. Correlation analyses were conducted between rank and each designated dependent variable (questions 4, 5, and 8) to test for relationship of statistical significance at the .05 level. Results shown in Table 14 indicate that no statistically significant relationships were found between rank and the dependent variables in any phases of the deployment.

Therefore, hypotheses 4-6, are not supported. They stated *Commanders and public affairs officers trust of news media personnel increases as rank increases during; (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase.*

Table 14 shows the correlation coefficients between rank and the designated dependent variables below.

| Dependent Variables | Mobilization | Deployment | Mission |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------|---------|
| 4. News media reports were impartial | -.1444 | -.1426 | -.1849 |
| 5. The information in news media reports about my unit's operations were correct. | -.0332 | -.0151 | -.1650 |
| 8. I know of an instance (or instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record. | .1530 | .1823 | .1213 |

P < .05 for all calculations

Findings of Significance

Although no findings of significance were discovered when rank was correlated with each survey question, five statistically significant relationships were found when age was used.

Table 15 shows that all five correlations are positive, which means that they move in the same direction. Three of the relationships were found with question 4, *news media reports were impartial*. Two of the correlations were significant at the .01 level, in the mobilization and mission phase. The third one was at the .05 level, in the deployment.

The other two correlations were also significant at the .05 level. One was found with question 1, *I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission*, during the mission phase. The second was found with question 10, *I welcomed members of the media into my unit area*, during the mobilization phase.

Table 15. Correlation coefficients between age and the designated dependent variables below. The level for significance was set at $\geq .05$

| Dependent Variables | Mobilization | Deployment | Mission |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------|---------|
| 1. I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission | .0517 | .0145 | .3576* |
| 4. News media reports were impartial | .4528** | .4867** | .3406* |
| 10. I welcomed members of the media into my unit area. | .3292* | .2522 | .2594 |

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to survey the commanders and public affairs officers who were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia with the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division as part of Operation Joint Endeavor for their views about how they think the media affected their unit's operational security.

Overall, the responses of commanders and public affairs officers were positive toward media personnel in the area of operational security and trust. The remainder of this chapter will discuss demographics, hypotheses, findings of statistical significance, non-hypothesis findings, implications for the knowledge gap theory, and recommendations.

Demographics

Survey population and response rate. Population size for this survey was 71 respondents (see appendix D). The respondents were mostly company, battalion, and brigade commanders of the 1st Armored Division.

Sixty-nine percent of the survey population returned their surveys and 59 percent were used in the survey. The 10 percent not used were completed by noncommissioned officers, who were not serving in a command or public affairs positions. The response rate was expected to be about 80 percent because the unit was somewhat centrally located and because the person collecting the information had prior experience conducting a similar study. Officers with the lowest survey response rates were the colonels and lieutenant colonels. Each returned about two percent of the surveys. The low response rate among field grade officers may have occurred for at least two reasons.

First, there were severe time constraints. The total time available for distributing the survey and collecting data was about two months. This was difficult because it took approximately two weeks for the surveys to arrive in Bosnia and about the same time for

them to be returned to West Virginia from Bosnia. This allowed the data collector only about 20 days to distribute, collect, and return the data (see schedule at appendix A, p2).

Second, commanders and PAOs may have been too busy. This may be true, because not only are commanders concerned with the usual task of taking care of their soldiers and accomplishing the mission, but they are also challenged to maintain the morale of soldiers who are thousands of miles away from home. Additionally, the high visibility of the mission and possibility that one mistake could be seen on news around the world in a short time may increase the commanders' work load. PAOs, undoubtedly, have their hands full with regular responsibilities, plus additional tasks such as publishing unit newsletters and planning for regular visits with dignitaries from around the world.

Rank. There was a noticeable difference in the response rate of company grade officers (Capts. and Lts.) and field grade officers (Majs., Ltcs., and Cols.). Company grade officers returned 73 percent of the surveys, while field grade officers returned only 27 percent. One explanation for the difference in response may be related to the levels of responsibility. For example, a captain commanding a heavy armored company has an authorized personnel strength of 63 troops. Whereas, a lieutenant colonel commanding a heavy armored battalion has an authorized personnel strength of 552 troops, and a colonel commanding a heavy Armored brigade has an authorized personnel strength of 2,028 troops (Staff, 149). Therefore, as rank increases responsibility increases, which may be one reason why fewer field grade officers returned their surveys.

Age. There is about a four-year difference between the average ages of the various ranks. Although there appears to be a positive relationship between age and rank, correlation analysis shows no significant relationship exists in this study. This might be due in part to the wide range in ages for each rank. For example, in this study the average age for captains is 30.2 years and the average age for majors is 34 years. However, the age of captains range from 28 to 34 years-old and majors' ages range from 32 to 34 years-old.

This shows an overlap of about two years between majors and captains, which may help explain why there is no significant relationship between age and rank.

Gender. Over 85 percent of the respondents to this survey were male. This difference is due to the small number of females who are assigned to the 1st Armored Division. Females generally are not allowed to be assigned to positions within the combat arms branch. The female respondents in this study were mostly from combat service support units.

Non-hypothesis findings

The overall responses of commanders and public relations officers of the 1st Armored Division to statements about the media's risk to operational security and their trust of news media personnel were positive. However, a comparison of the responses to statements on the survey, shown in Table 3, reveal that respondents think news media personnel sometimes risked the operational security of their units' mission. Also, three of four questions related to operational security received the least percentage of positive responses. Additionally, the study indicated that news media personnel frequently published reports that were impartial and contained correct information. Such positive reports indicate the trust respondents have in the news media. Finally, the responses indicated that military and media personnel were frequently cooperative and supportive of one another's mission. This indicates a positive step in the military and media's effort to improve their relationship.

Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1-3, are not supported. They stated *Knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have compromised military operations decreased as rank increases during; (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase.* There were no correlations of significance found to exist between rank and the dependent variables

tested. The correlation coefficients ranged from slightly negative (-.0548) to moderately positive (.2974), but none reached the .05 level of significance.

The rejection of the above hypotheses was not consistent with what the researcher expected to find based on related research conducted previously by Snyder and Payne. Their study found that “personal knowledge of information released by military public affairs personnel that may have compromised military operations, significantly correlated, negatively, with demographic variables of rank, months of public affairs experience, and with military public affairs schooling.” (Snyder and Payne, 38).

There are at least three possible explanations for why this study’s results differ from those of Snyder and Payne’s. First, the gap of knowledge among ranks may have been significantly reduced since the Gulf War, as it relates to the military-media relationship. Also, this may indicate that the military-media effort to improve their relationship is paying off (Aukofer and Lawrence, v). Second, the differences may be because of the small population size of the study. Finally, the low response rate of senior ranking officers may have affected the results.

Hypotheses 4-6, are not supported. They stated *Commanders and public affairs officers trust of news media personnel increases as rank increases during; (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase*. There were no relationships of significance found between rank and the dependent variables tested. The correlation coefficients ranged from slightly negative (-.1849) to slightly positive (.1823). Although there were more negative than positive correlations, none reached the .05 level of significance.

As with hypotheses 1-3, the results in hypotheses 4-6 were not consistent with what was expected, based on Snyder and Payne’s research. In addition to the findings discussed earlier, also Snyder and Payne found that rank significantly correlated with positive views of news coverage. “The higher the rank, the more positive their attitudes were that news media provided fair and accurate reporting during Desert Storm,” (Snyder

and Payne, 27). The differences in the results of this study and the findings of Snyder and Payne may be due to the same explanations given earlier for hypotheses 1-3.

Findings of Significance. Although no findings of significance were discovered when rank was correlated with each survey question, five statistically significant associations were found when age was used. With question one, *I know of reports published by the media that may have risked the operational security of our mission*, there was a statistically significant relationship found in the mission phase only. The relationship is positive, which means that the two variables move in the same direction. Therefore, as age increases, knowledge of reports published by the media that may risk operational security of the mission increases.

Statistically significant relationships between age and question 4, *News media reports were impartial*, were found to exist in all phases of the operation. In mobilization and deployment phase they were significant at the .01 level. All three relationships were positive, which means that older respondents were more aware of news reports published by the media that were impartial. Therefore, they were more likely to trust news media personnel.

Finally, there was a statistically significant relationship between age and statement 10, *I welcomed members of the media into my unit area*, during the mobilization phase only. The relationship was positive, which means that as age increased the respondents were more likely to welcome news media personnel into their unit areas. Therefore, older respondents were, according to their self-report, more friendly to news media personnel.

These findings, however, present somewhat of a paradox. That is, while older respondents are more likely to know of reports published by the news media that may have risked operational security, also they are more likely to trust and be friendly to media personnel.

Possible explanations for this paradox require a brief discussion about each of the findings above. First, older respondents may be more likely to know of reports published by the news media that may have risked operational security because they usually have more time in military service than younger soldiers. Also, they may have more experience working with the media. Therefore, they may recognize more readily reports published by the news media that may have risked operational security than younger and perhaps lesser experienced soldiers. Second, trust in this study is measured in terms of correct and impartial reports published by the news media. Therefore, questions concerning trust are not necessarily related to operational security. For example, the news media may publish a story that correctly identifies the location and activities of a unit, however, if the information is obtained by enemy personnel, it could pose a risk to the unit's operational security. Third, being friendly is probably the right thing to do. Also, many officers are aware of the importance of the media and may seek to build a positive relationship with reporters.

Implications for the Knowledge Gap Theory

The knowledge gap theory which formed the theoretical basis for this study was not supported. The theory says "as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease (Gaziano, 4).

The purpose of using the knowledge gap theory was to help explain the expected differences in opinions between lower ranking officers, and higher ranking officers as proposed in hypothesis 1-6. However, the results of the study indicated that no statistically significant relationships were found between rank and the dependent variables designed to test the hypotheses. Therefore, hypotheses 1-6 and the knowledge gap theory were not

supported by this study. Possible explanations for these findings were given earlier in the chapter when discussing hypotheses 1-3.

Recommendations

This study clearly shows that the respondents think a positive relationship exists between the commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division, and the media. However, in most of the open-ended comments in appendix A, respondents say that publication of unit locations, strengths, and movement routes are their main concerns about the media and operational security. These statements along with findings in this study indicate that continued efforts to improve relationships between the military and media are necessary.

Further research of value to this study would be to conduct a similar study to obtain the views of media personnel who covered stories in Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor. This would help to give balance to the findings of this study. Also a replication of this study using a larger population may provide a better picture of the relationship between rank and dependent variables. Finally, it may be of some value to conduct a similar study that focuses on age as the independent variable.

Executive Summary

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to survey the commanders and public affairs officers who were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia with the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division as part of Operation Joint Endeavor, for their views about how they think the media affected their unit's operational security.

Research Questions

The research questions were:

- 1) How do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia think media coverage affected their unit's operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor?

- 2) Do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia think they can trust news media personnel?

Demographics

- **Survey response rate.** Sixty six percent (40/71)
- **Rank.** There were 33 company grade officers (25 captains and 8 lieutenants) and 7 field grade officers (3 majors, 3 lieutenant colonels, and 1 colonel).
- **Age.** The age of respondents ranged from 24 to 34 years-old. The ages by rank were Lts. 26.1, Cpts. 30.2, Majs. 34, Ltcs. 41.5, and Col. 43. The mean age was 30.6.

Findings

The overall responses of commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division to statements about the media's risk to operational security and their trust of news media personnel were positive. A comparison of the mean scores for responses to statements on the survey reveal that respondents think media personnel infrequently risked the security of their units' mission. Other finding included:

- Hypotheses 1-6 were not supported. There were no correlations of significance found to exist between rank and the dependent variables tested.
- When age was used as an independent variable there were five statistically significant associations found. The relationship was positive, which mean they move in the same direction. Dependent variables affected were Questions 1 (mission phase), 4 (mobilization, deployment, and mission phases), and 10 (mobilization phase).

Recommendation

Further research of value to this study would be to conduct a similar study to obtain the views of media personnel who covered stories in Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor. This would help to give balance to the findings of this study. Also a replication of this study using a larger population size and perhaps gathering more samples may provide a better picture of the relationship between rank and the dependent variables. Finally, it may be of some value to conduct a similar study that focuses on age as the independent variable.

APPENDIX A

Soldiers' Comments

Soldiers' Comments

At the end of each survey the respondents were given the opportunity to respond to the following question. *What are the main concerns you have about how the media affect your unit's operational security?*

Survey 1: "I believe the media has developed more responsibility toward OPSEC. I think the media needs to be more aware of how unconfirmed stories can affect morale, i.e. redeployment."

Survey 6: "If we were in combat, I would definitely be more concerned and less excited about the media's presence."

Survey 7: 1) "Camera shots of security arrangements" 2) "Names of soldiers—telling where they are from and where their families live" 3) "Talk about movement plans, routes, and times"

Survey 09: 1) "The operational readiness and/or capabilities during mobilization and deployment stages." 2) "There are times when the reports are more subjective than what they otherwise should be."

Survey 10: "Changing the context of comments made by soldiers to suit the purposes of the media."

Survey 12: "Media creating a false perception of military strength, mission orientation and capabilities."

Survey 17: "Unit locations and strengths in Bosnia. For example, the *Star & Stripes* published, twice, all base camp locations by name, units, and strengths. S&S constantly published stories concerning morale that an adversary could use. The major media tracked the SAVA RIVER crossing that an enemy could have used to hinder an already fragile operation."

Survey 24: “My main concern is the JIB did little, actually nothing, to sell the Task Force’s story to the media. My other concern is that two of the three MPADs in this operation essentially failed in their mission. Neither was held accountable—SHAMEFUL!”

Survey 25: “Not so much the media as compared with having PAOs operate as PAOs without the necessary training or skill sets! Not 1AD PAO! Only referring to mobilized reservists. Your survey assumes that the media are the problem. I think the military needs to look at its own PAO development program.”

Survey 26: “That they understand I have a job to do and they let me do it —and I’ll let them report what the public should know within operational constraints.”

Survey 28: “Because almost none of the journalist have spent a day in uniform, they don’t understand operational security. Without the experience there is no understanding.”

Survey 29: “With regard to mobilization, it was not comforting to see *Stars and Stripes* outline (with maps) exact routes and camp locations. The situation when we arrived, was uncertain at best. Anyone interested knew exactly where we would be before we got here. The possibilities for this information are endless.”

Survey 30: “None, well prepared leaders and soldiers can turn the media into a “combat multiplier” for a unit. Ill prepared leaders and soldiers will certainly suffer from media coverage.”

Survey 32: “Not enough exposure! The local nationals should see/hear news about the Apache, and should know that we can see them day/night, record it, and bring proof of what we see.”

Survey 36: “I want to be able to assist the media, but sometimes I feel that my mission as a PAO and my mission to support the brigade is at odds. There are so many checks and balances I have to go through before I can assist the media that I often feel ineffective at my job.”

Survey 37: “Redeployment rules, dates, and times—family expectations rise—and OPSEC is totally compromised.”

Survey 42: “During deployment and mission they (the media) became bored quickly and therefore looked for something sensational to get their story noticed by the wire. *Stars & Stripes* disappointed me the most. It is not the same paper it was during my experiences with it in the 80’s when the personnel were a good deal of ex military who knew what they were dealing with. Now they just are an out of context and out of touch group of reporters.”

Survey 44: “Tell half truths, erode the morale”

Survey 47: “Knowing what will be reported, how events will be interpreted by the media — they could unintentionally compromise OPSEC.”

APPENDIX B

Survey Cover Letter

Marshall University

W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications
320 Smith Hall, Huntington, West Virginia 25755

June 28, 1996

Major John E. Suttle
Public Affairs Officer
HQS 1st Armored Division
Operation Joint Endeavor
APO AE 09789

SUBJECT: Survey for thesis project

Hello Maj. Suttle,

How are you and the troops of the 1st Armored Division? I hope all is well. I try to keep abreast of the news about your mission by reading the newspaper and watching CNN.

Enclosed with this letter are approximately 100 copies of the research survey. From the information you sent me earlier I estimated the survey population to be about 85 personnel. However, if you need additional survey forms please make copies of one of the enclosed surveys and I'll reimburse you for the cost.

The survey population includes the company, battalion, and brigade commanders and public affairs officers from the following units:


1st AR BDE
2nd AR BDE
4th BDE (AVN)
DISCOM
DIV ENG
DIVARTY
Separate Units

After the data have been collected for the entire population or for as many participants as you can get, please send the surveys to me at: 6200 Curry Ave. Apt.#1, Huntington, West Virginia 25705.

I will reimburse you for mailing the information to me as soon as I receive the cost from you.

Thank you very much for your help. Without your assistance this project would have been nearly impossible to accomplish as a graduate student here at Marshall.

A proposed schedule for collecting the data is enclosed for your information.


STANFORD E. ANGION
CPT, IN
Project Officer

A proposed schedule for collecting the data is as follows:

- Apr. 22 Submit survey to Dr. Shaver
- May 06 Receive survey from Dr. Shaver and make corrections
- May 13 Submit corrected copy to research committee members and Dr. Bickel
- May 13-31 Research committee members and Dr. Bickel review survey and provide feedback.
- June 1-10 Make corrections from research committee members and Dr. Bickel findings.
- June 11-12 Review corrected survey with Dr. Shaver.
- June 14 Send copies for pilot test to Maj. Wiggins Ft. Bragg (priority mail)
- June 17 Maj. Wiggins receives information and conducts survey.
- June 20 Maj. Wiggins provides initial feedback by phone and send completed surveys researcher by mail.
- June 20-24 Researcher discusses results from initial feedback with research committee members and make appropriate changes.
- June 24 Researcher receives completed surveys from Maj. Wiggins and reviews them.
- June 24-25 Researcher confers with research committee and makes changes based on results from pilot surveys.
- June 26 Researcher prepares survey package for Maj. Suttle.
- June 27 Researcher mail survey package to Maj. Suttle
- July 5 Maj. Suttle receives survey package
- July 8-29 Maj. Suttle distributes packages and collects data
- July 30 Maj. Suttle mails surveys to researcher
- Aug. 6 Researcher receives surveys and analyze and interpret data.
- Sept. 3 Researcher submits first draft of thesis report to research committee members

APPENDIX C

Survey Instrument

Appendix A

Please DO NOT put your name on this survey.

This survey is part of a study to determine how commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia think media coverage affected operational security during mobilization, deployment, and the mission while in Bosnia. The survey is to be completed by company, battalion, and brigade commanders and public affairs officers who deployed to OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR.

Please do your best to answer each question accurately. Your answers will help provide some immediate feedback to Army officials concerning the effects that the media are having on troops in Bosnia. It may also be used as a source of information for the 1st Armored Division's ongoing mission in Bosnia.

You will not be identified with the answers on this survey.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Operational security - Information about the unit's personnel, equipment and/or plans that if obtained by the enemy could adversely affect the mission.

Mobilization Phase- Period of time from which the unit was officially notified of the mission up to the time of departure of the first troops.

Deployment Phase- Period of time from which the first soldiers departed the 1st Armored Division enroute to Bosnia up to the time of official assumption of the mission.

Mission Phase- Period of time during which the 1st Armored Division assumed mission.

News Media- Civilian television, radio, newspapers, magazines, etc...

Directions: Please use the following numerical frequency scale when responding to questions 1-16 only. Circle your response. Be sure to respond to every item. For example, for question one, you will circle a response for mobilization, deployment, and mission phases.

| | | | | |
|--------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| NEVER (1) | INFREQUENTLY (2) | SOME (3) | FREQUENTLY (4) | VERY FREQUENTLY (5) |
|--------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------------|

1. I know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission during ...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 1. Mobilization Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Please go to next page.

2. News media personnel were cooperative and easy to work with during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 4. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

3. I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 7. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

4. News media reports were impartial during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 10. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

5. The information in news media reports about my unit's operations were correct during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 13. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 14. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 15. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

6. When asked questions by news media personnel, I was able to provide answers quickly enough to satisfy the needs of media people, including their deadlines during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 16. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 17. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 18. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

7. When answering news media personnel questions about my unit's operations, I always provided correct information during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 19. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 20. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 21. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Please go to next page

8. I know of an instance (or instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 22. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 23. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 24. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

9. Did news media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 25. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 26. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 27. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

10. I welcomed members of the news media into my unit area during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 28. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 29. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 30. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

11. When media personnel requested access to my unit's area to interview soldiers, it was granted during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 31. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 32. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 33. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

12. My soldiers were provided with media reference cards to deal with news media personnel during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 34. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 35. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 36. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

13. Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 37. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 38. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 39. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

14. News media personnel displayed a real concern for the well being of soldiers in my unit during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 40. Mobilization phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 41. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 42. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Please go to next page.

15. News media personnel interfered with training seeking interviews with soldiers during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 43. Mobilization Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 44. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 45. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

16. News media personnel interfered with important meetings seeking interviews with soldiers during...

| | Never | Infrequently | Some | Frequently | Very Frequently |
|------------------------|-------|--------------|------|------------|-----------------|
| 46. Mobilization Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 47. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 48. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Directions: Please use the following agreement scale to answer questions 17-21 below.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly agree | agree | neither agree nor disagree | disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |

17. News media reporters seemed to have adequate knowledge about military operations to know what they were reporting during...

| | SA | A | N | D | SD |
|------------------------|----|---|---|---|----|
| 49. Mobilization Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 50. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 51. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

18. News media personnel seemed to understand the military's need for operational security during...

| | | | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 52. Mobilization Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 53. Deployment Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 54. Mission Phase | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

19. Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit's operational security during OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

20. The media's mission is just as important to society as the military's mission.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

21. The military-media relationship has improved since the Gulf War.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

Please go the next page.

Background Information

The following questions are confidential and will be used for group statistics and comparative purposes only.

22. What is your rank?

⁽⁵⁸⁾ CPT MAJ LTC COL other (Please specify _____)

23. What is your job title?

⁽⁵⁹⁾ Co. Cdr BN Cdr Bde Cdr other (Please specify here _____)

24. What is your branch?

⁽⁶⁰⁾ AR FA EN IN QM other (Please specify here _____)

25. What is your gender?

⁽⁶¹⁾ Male Female

27. Did you command a unit while in Bosnia? *Please circle yes/no.*

⁽⁶²⁾ If yes, how many months were you in command during the period from mobilization until now? _____.

28. Please indicate the following military operations you have participated in:

Desert Shield _____ job title _____

Desert Storm _____ job title _____

Haiti _____ Job title _____

Not applicable _____

29. What is your age? _____

⁽⁶⁴⁾

30. What are the main concerns you have about how the media affect your unit's operational security?

⁽⁶⁵⁾

STOP

Please return this survey to Major Suttle, the 1st Armored Division Public Affairs Officer.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND SUPPORT

APPENDIX D

Survey Population

Date: Wed, 15 May 1996 11:53:00 -0700 (PDT)
From: TFE PAO MAJ Suttle <paoaic@TFMAIN.1AD.ARMY.MIL>
To: angion2 <angion2@MARSHALL.EDU>
Subject: RE: Research Survey

69

Here is who we came with. Most are still here. I think only a couple of battalion commanders have changed out. It will be no problem to get a forwarding address on them. You won't have to rely on the good graces of the little old ladies at each branch to provide addresses like I did. I hope this helps.

Suttle

COMMAND GROUP

Commanding General MG William L. Nash
ADC-M BG Stanley F. Cherrie
ADC-S BG James P. O+Neal
Chief of Staff COL John M. Brown III
SGS MAJ Hoyt E. Roberson
DCSM CSM Jack L. Tilley
Aide-de-Camp CPT Vernie Reichling
HQ Cmdt MAJ Joseph F. Clegg
CG+s Secretary Ms. Bertha Ramirez
C/S Secretary Ms. Diane van Dunk
Protocol Officer Ms. Michele Johnson

71

PRIMARY STAFF

G-1 LTC Steve M. Poet
G-2 LTC Melissa Patrick
G-3 LTC Edward M. Kane
G-4 LTC Gary R. Addison
G-5 MAJ Scott Dick
G-6 LTC Randolph R. Strong

SPECIAL STAFF

RMO LTC Davis S. Welch
PMO LTC Samuel J. Hernandez
SJA LTC Christopher Maher
DIV SURGEON LTC William S. Besser
IG LTC Thomas E. York
DIV CHEMO LTC Robert J. Launstein
CHAPLAIN CHAP (LTC) Scott McCrystal
ALO AF LTC Richard L. Jones
PAO MAJ John E. Suttle

PAO = 3

1ST BDE CDR COL Gregory Fontenot
3-5 CAV CDR LTC Anthony A. Cucolo III
2-67 AR CDR LTC Michael Jones
4-67 AR CDR LTC Walter N. Anderson

$4 + 9 = 13$

2ND BDE CDR COL John R.S. Batiste
3-12 In CDR LTC Gene C. Kamena
4-12 IN CDR LTC William F. Briscoe
2-68 AR CDR LTC Oscar R. Anderson

$4 + 9 = 13$

4TH BDE(AVN) CDR COL William L. Webb III
2-227 AVN CDR LTC Allen D. Swain
3-227 AVN CDR LTC Thomas R. Burnett

$4 + 9 = 13$

7-227 AVN CDR LTC Robert E. Cox, Jr.
 1-1 CAV CDR LTC Gregory A. Stone

DISCOM CDR COL James H.
 47 FSB CDR LTC Paul W. S
 123 MSB CDR LTC William V
 127 ASB CDR LTC Thomas M
 501 FSB CDR LTC Anthony V

$$5 + 8 = 13$$

DIVENG CDR COL Steven R.
 23 ENG BN CDR LTC Todd T. Semonite
 40 ENG BN CDR LTC William J. Seymour

$$3 + 4 = 7$$

DIVARTY CDR COL Alan W. Thrasher
 2-3 FA CDR LTC Peter S. Corpac
 4-29 FA CDR LTC Jeffery W. Hammond
 A-94 FA CDR CPT
 C-333 FA CDR CPT John W. Hallam

$$3 + 6 = 9$$

SEPARATES

5-3 ADA CDR LTC David R. Wolf
 141 SIG BN CDR LTC Randolph R. Strong
 501 MI BN CDR LTC Kevin D. Johnson
 501 MP CO CDR CPT Christopher R. Gosselin
 HHC 1AD CDR CPT William D. Hibner

V CORPS UNITS

16th Corps Spt. Grp. Col. Bennie E. Williams
 205th Military
 Intelligence Bde. Col. Charles J. Green
 18th MP Bde. Col. Steven J. Curry
 30th Medical Bde. Col. Thomas I. Clements
 22nd Sig. Bde. Col. James D. Culbert

INTERNATIONAL UNIT COMMANDERS

RUSSIAN BDE

Commander Col. Alexandr Lentsov

NORDBRIG

Commander

Brig. Gen. Finn Saermark-Thomsen (Den)

Deputy Commander

Brigadier Jan Bergstrom (Swe)

Deputy Commander

Col Wtodzimierz Sasiadek (Pol)

Chief of Staff

Col Kjell Grandhagen (Nor)

TURKISH BDEurkish Bn.

Commander Col. Ahmet Berberoglu

 From: angion2

To: paoic

Subject: Research Survey

Date: Monday, May 13, 1996 2:50PM

References

- Alreck, Pamela L., and Settle, Robert B. "**Correlation Analysis.**" The Survey Research Handbook, 2nd ed., 1995, p297.
- Aukofer, Frank and Lawrence, William P. America's Team the Odd Couple, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995.
- Compart, Andrew. "**Army Times pay chart.**" ArmyTimes, September 30, 1996, p18.
- Defleur, Melvin and Ball-Rokeach, Sandra. "**The agenda-setting function of the press.**" Theories of Mass Communications, 5th ed., 1989, p264.
- Galloway, Joseph L. "**Who's afraid of the truth.**" U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 4, 1991, p49.
- Gaziano, Cecilie. "**A twenty-five-year review of Knowledge Gap research.**" Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (50th, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., May 21, 1995).
- Gersh, Debra. "**The press in Somalia.**" Editor and Publisher. January 23, 1993, p.11.
- Gersh, Debra. "**New guidelines for war coverage in place.**" Editor and Publisher, June 6, 1992, p17.
- Hammond, William M. "**Prologue.**" Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, Washington, D.C., 1990, p3.
- Hernandez, Debra. "**The media's impact on the military.**" Editor and Publisher, May 13, 1995, p. 14.
- Katz, Steven L. "**Ground Zero: The Information War in the Persian Gulf.**" Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 9, Num. 4, 1992, pp. 375-408.

- Linsky, Marty. **"Press responsibilities and lessons from The Gulf."** Media Ethics Update, Spring, 1991, p. 1, 6-8, 12.
- Manning, Steven. **"The press vs. The Pentagon."** Scholastic Update, November 1991, p21-23.
- Matthew's, William. **"Media danger in Bosnia."** The Army Times, Feb. 19, 1996, p. 9.
- McLeod, Douglas, Eveland, William, Jr., and Signorielli, Nancy. **"Conflict and public opinion: rallying effects of the Persian Gulf War."** Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1994, p20-31.
- Newhagen, John. **"The relationship between censorship and the emotional and critical tone of television news coverage of the Persian Gulf war."** Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1994, P.32-42.
- Peterson, Tricia. **"New report seeks to combat 'odd couple' disagreements."** The media and the military, August 1995.
- Piek, Joseph J. **"A Survey of Enlisted Gulf War Veterans to Determine the Importance and Availability of News."** MAJ thesis. Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia, November, 1993.
- Roberts, Jenelle B. **"A Survey of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) Soldiers who Deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy to Determine the Importance, Availability and Use of News and Media Resources."** MAJ thesis. Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia, November 27, 1995.
- Snyder, John, and Payne, Kenneth. **"Survey and Analysis of Military Public Affairs Officers who served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm."** Research Report, Marshall University, 1992.
- Stockwell, David. **"Press relations: lessons learned."** The Army Times, January 29, 1996, p51.
- Staff Officer's Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data (Field manual 101-10-1/1), Headquarters, Department of the Army, vol. 1, October, 1987, p149.

- Suttle, John E. **"A Survey of the Command Information Function in U.S. Army Maneuver Battalions During the Gulf War."** MAJ. thesis, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia, November, 1993.
- Wildermuth, R.E. **"Does media coverage of war promote understanding of the issues?"** Taking Sides, 1995, p120.
- Wimmer, Roger D., and Dominick, Joseph R. Mass Media Research, 4th ed. Wadsworth, Inc., 1994.