

131109

JPRS-NEA-88-021
23 MARCH 1988



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

Near East & South Asia

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

19980625 123

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 6

10
36
AΦ3

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-88-021

CONTENTS

23 MARCH 1988

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL

- Egyptian Foreign Policy Advisor Offers Views on Uprising 1

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

- Deported Palestinian Leader Describes Nature of Uprising [*AL-QABAS, 15 Feb 88*] 4

EGYPT

- Moscow Reportedly Studying Peace Proposal [*AL-TADAMUN, 6 Feb 88*] 8
AL-AHRAM Editorial Denounces Israeli News Blackout 8
President's Office Director Affirms Support for Palestinians 8
Mubarak's Attitudes Towards 'Egypt's Revolution' Case [*AL-MUSTAQBAL, 12 March 88*] 9
Article Criticizes President Mubarak for Police Abuses 9
Pro-Nasirists Discuss 'Egypt's Revolution' Actions [*AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI, 8 Feb 88*] 10
Opposition Leaders Voice Support For Palestinian Uprising 12
Commentary Calls For Clear, Honest Party Policies 13

LIBYA

- Libya Detains Crew of Tunisian Fishing Vessel [*AL-DUSTUR, 7 Mar 88*] 14

MOROCCO

- World Bank Economic Experts Draft Alternative Forecasts
[*JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE, Jan 88*] 14

SAUDI ARABIA

- Study Evaluates Recent Economic Recovery [*AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL, Jan 88*] 17

TUNISIA

- Reactivation of Nuclear Studies Center Urged 20
Experts Discuss Nation's Population Growth Rate 21
Fishing Industry Development in South Urged 22

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

- Uttar Pradesh Farmers Confront Authorities 24
Farmers Organize Like Trade Unions
[*Nirmal Mitra, Kuldeep Kumar; SUNDAY, 28 Feb-5 Mar 88*] 24
New Farmer Leader [*SUNDAY, 28 Feb-5 Mar 88*] 28

IRAN

- Bazargan Urges Prosecution of Interior Minister [*London KEYHAN, 25 Feb 88*] 29
IRI, Israel Reportedly Holding Secret Talks [*London KEYHAN, 25 Feb 88*] 29
Seven Executed Following Bomb Explosion in Tehran [*London KEYHAN, 25 Feb 88*] 30

NEPAL

Japan To Provide Assistance [THE RISING NEPAL, 24 Feb 88]	30
First Woman Ambassador [THE RISING NEPAL, 20 Feb 88]	31

PAKISTAN

Technical Cooperation With Libya To Expand [MORNING NEWS, 15 Feb 88]	31
Economic, Cultural Exchange With Libya To Increase [MORNING NEWS, 14 Feb 88]	31
Leader Criticizes Govt 'Interference' in Azad Kashmir [THE MUSLIM, 8 Feb 88]	32

REGIONAL

Egyptian Foreign Policy Advisor Offers Views on Uprising

44040123a Jerusalem AL-QUDS 18 Jan 88 p 7

[Interview with Egyptian foreign policy advisor Usamah al-Baz by Amirah Hasan: "Preserving the Continuity of Peace between Egypt and Israel Depends on the Attainment of Peace between Israel and the Palestinian People"]

[Text] Dr Usamah al-Baz, director of President Husni Mubarak's office, spoke in an exclusive interview about general Arab issues, peace and Egypt's historic role in the region, and said:

"Egypt's Arab role, and role in the region as a whole, was already in existence, because relations between Egypt and most Arab countries existed and were not severed, although recent thinking, since the Amman conference, has been distinguished by the restoration of diplomatic relations in an official form. We believe that our basic role is first of all founded on the basis of adopting the basic national causes related to Arab existence and the Arab nation's rights and strategic interests. Alongside this, we believe that our role is to establish peace and we believe that it is in the benefit of the Arab nation and in the benefit of all the peoples of the region that we should all orient ourselves toward peace, because the continuation of the state of war and the state of armed conflict in various parts of the Middle East is a plague on us all which no one profits from, even those extremists, and people who are not conscious of this fact are in an illusion.

"This requires the establishment of a comprehensive, real peace between the Arabs and Israelis, and also means that we should end the war going on in the Gulf and establish a state of peace there as well, so that we can prevent threats, instability and the presence of tension in the whole Gulf area. We want to establish equal relations in general in the region, so that there will be no calls for hegemony, regional expansion or domination of influence in the region. We also want to strengthen relations among the Arab and non-Arab countries in the region on a sound basis. There are three non-Arab countries in the area, Israel, America [sic] and Iran. I am not putting them on an equal footing. Each one has its different circumstances. We want the Middle East to be a region of peace in every sense of the world. We want to drive away the specter of war and the danger of nuclear and chemical weapons. We do not want the Middle East to become a region of oppression of a group of people."

[Question] How can Egypt exploit the events in the occupied territories to support the peace process?

[Answer] We have said, and we repeat, that the preservation of current conditions is an impossibility, because the current situation, founded on Israel's occupation of

Arab lands and the attempt to impose Israeli hegemony on these lands by force against the desire of their people, repress their rights and strip away their rights to self-determination, is a fraudulent false situation and cannot be preserved, no matter what laws of force and Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory in the bank and the Gaza Strip Israel uses. That is something that is against peace, in the full sense, and against peace between Israel and Egypt, because the peace we began between Israel and Egypt is part of the comprehensive peace process and is not separate or partial. Therefore, every Israeli must realize that if he wants to preserve the peace between Egypt and Israel he must try to realize peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. Therefore the recent events have proved the Egyptian theoretical premise, that we are propounding the importance of talk aimed at peace between the Palestinian people and Israel. Some people have said that the peace process is difficult and that the conditions have not yet ripened for this; there are Arab relations and intense relations in Israel and the international position is not devoted to serving reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians. However, this uprising has proved the falsity of these allegations. It has proved that the Palestine cause cannot be put on the shelf, in terms of the contacts between the two great powers or the thinking of people in the region.

On the other hand, it has proved that the preservation of the present situation is an impossibility from which violence will result, and we have seen with further sorrow the violent style by which Israel has acted in this uprising. It is not a matter of excesses but the notion itself. The belief that Israel has the right to face a demonstration by gunfire, even against children, minors, women and old men, is a process which will guarantee that it will lead to a rift in the peace process and cause it to place new obstacles before it.

Dealing with the Palestinian people from the premise of repression and on the basis of subjugating them by force is an approach opposed to peace and everyone proceeding in the orbit of this policy is voting against peace and saying that he wants relations between Israel and the Arabs to be established on the foundation of violence. Violence begets violence and there is a reaction to every action. The meaning of this is that Israel is becoming insecure, because however much the Israelis may think that they can give themselves insurance by the use of force, this will be a weak point in Israel in the future. The Israelis must take a long view as to how the distribution of the population will be in what was Palestine, in the land of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Will Israel be able to preserve its rule and control over the occupied Arab territories, maintain hegemony and impose annexation, whether that is de jure or de facto annexation, if it insists on swallowing up Palestine Arab territories? The meaning of this is that Israel in the near future, within 25 years, which is a short period in the life of nations, will have to choose one of two alternatives: either blatantly to abandon democracy and deal with the

Arabs in the Arab territories as persons who have no rights, or to abandon the Zionist dream, and become a non-Jewish country, rather become a country of numerous nationalities and a country of a dual identity, a Jewish-Arab country. The contradictions which will arise from these contradictions are great and they portend the most grievous consequences for individuals and society. There is supposed to be a vision on the part of those who take the initiative to assume responsibility in Israel and look to the future. These conditions cannot continue as they are; this is not acceptable in the Palestinian, Egyptian and international contexts.

[Question] Is it possible to say that Israeli-Egyptian relations today are at a turning point?

[Answer] There is no doubt that Israel's conduct with our brothers in the occupied territories is reflected on the nature of Israeli-Egyptian relations and it is not right that anyone should imagine that Egyptian-Israeli relations are proceeding in isolation from Israel's policy toward the other Arabs and specifically toward the Palestinian people, because I as I have said did not offer a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. Rather, we started a comprehensive peace process, and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty was the first step in it, with the consideration that the remaining steps would follow in succession. If we look at the development of Egyptian-Israeli relations in their totality since the signing of the peace agreement, I believe truthfully that that event constituted a positive development, and we are endorsing it in behalf of all the other parties. The important point in this regard for us in Egypt and throughout the Arab world is that all the rising forces in Israel are oriented toward peace. If this premise is sound, we must take into consideration the growth of the role and the magnitude of the peace movement in Israel. I believe that the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel helped add to this current and strengthen and support it.

We consider the peace movement in Israel, in all its branches, as a basic movement. The more its role grows, the deeper becomes the orientation toward peace. This movement serves Arab goals as much as it serves the Israeli goal, and it does not constitute a threat to anyone. Indeed, it represents the road toward a new future. Therefore, our evaluation of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship is that this relationship has been used and can be used in greater degrees in the future to strengthen the approach toward peace by protecting Arab interests specifically and Palestinian interests and protecting the goal for whose sake we are striving, which is the preservation of peace.

[Question] Today you are the second man in Egypt (he interrupted me and said that was not true). [You] had an important role in restoring Egyptian relations with the Arab world and in the recent moments there have been early signs of the restoration of Egyptian-Syrian relations. What kind of relations are there between Egypt and Syria today?

[Answer] Realistically, I believe that it is difficult to imagine the restoration of relations or the resumption of relations between Egypt and Syria. Some Arab brothers intervene spontaneously and consider that the dispute between Egypt and Syria is not one over strategic visions of Arab conditions and interests but is a dispute over style and a difference in views. It is not a dispute in the literal sense of the word but it is possible to narrow the asperity of this dispute in the future, especially if we can put credence in the statement the Syrian brothers are propounding, that they are striving toward peace and they are in agreement on the holding of an international conference. If we accept this, the meaning of this is that a basic dispute or major contradiction does not exist between Egypt and Syria. There is a dispute over platform. Does this dispute or style make this mutual alienation inevitable? We say that this is not necessary, indeed harmful, but we cannot impose this on the leadership in Syria. They say that the only road toward improving relations between Egypt and Syria is Egypt's abrogation of the peace treaty and we say that we will not accept conditions from anyone. In addition, abrogating the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will not bring good to any of the Arabs, to the Palestinian people or to Syria; rather, it will guarantee the removal of the establishment of a sound basis for conciliation between the Arabs and Israel.

The preservation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and at the same time Egypt's adoption of the Palestine cause and Palestinian demands and the adoption of the cause of peace between the Arabs and Israel are in themselves the best guarantee of the establishment of a state of peace and stability in the region and the inhibition of notions and the resistance of notions of Israeli expansion and hegemony and foreign acts of intervention in the region. We do not want this region to be a stage for foreign countries. The countries should establish a balance among themselves and establish regimes which will guarantee that no party will be drawn into conflict with another, so that there will be no security vacuum to be filled by the presence of foreign forces.

[Question] What is your evaluation today of Egyptian relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization?

[Answer] Our relations now and consistently are excellent because we consider that there is a communality in interests between the Egyptian and Palestinian peoples. Our goal is the same, in the direction of peace and toward the termination of the occupation of the territory, toward the establishment of a sound basis for peace. Peace must be founded on justice and on respect for rights, not on occupation. The Palestinian people have been partners of ours throughout history. We have always had a very special relationship between the Egyptian and Palestinian people. We are neighbors. Neighborliness between us has been constant. Interests are the same and views are also the same. Our relations with the organization are sound and very healthy. At some period they were subject to some convulsions as a result of

foreign acts of intervention or as a result of the tendency of some Palestinian leaders to take specific positions for tactical reasons, not for strategic reasons. However, we are transcending these positions rapidly, because the unity of goal is stronger than all these disputes.

[Question] What is your view of Israel's condemnation of the reopening of the Palestine Liberation Organization's offices in Cairo?

[Answer] Our answer is that we will not pay attention to this condemnation, because Israel does not have the right to interfere in the formulation of the relationship between Egypt and in particular the Palestinian people and their representatives. Our policy has been holding and will continue to hold that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and Israel does not have the right to interfere or comment on this, and Egypt will not allow Israel or anyone else to interfere in regard to it.

[Question] Is Egypt today demanding more concessions from the Liberation Organization in terms of recognition of [Resolutions] 242 and 338?

[Answer] The issue is not the demand for concessions, because we are not a party that is obtaining such concessions. All we are saying is that we consider that a specific pace is appropriate in the peace process. It is not proper that we should take things silently and leave events to move on grounds that a solution or sound settlement will come on a golden platter. That will not come about. Every event has an originating force. If we abandon things to proceed by momentum, this will pave the way for us to become spectators and the effective forces will be those which assess conditions and determine their form. In order for us to be active forces we must take the initiative and not leave others to move. Sometimes there are objective circumstances which help the shift toward peace. If we shirk from seizing this opportunity the course of peace might collapse, until the extremist events inside Israel increase — events which call for negativism and the failure to move, nihilism, a tendency toward nihilism. We state all this to the parties. We have demands of Israel also, and not just of the organization, in the presence of the adoption of a clear position toward peace and the abandonment of the deterioration which exists now, because this will bring grievous consequences upon Israel, and it will have bad repercussions. It is also our duty to act. We do not want to impose concessions on one party or another. Rather, we have a single demand, that we should all move toward peace, because the lack of movement means that the others should be left, and what moves in these cases is the anti-peace tendency within Israel or in some Arab circles. If the tendency calling for peace is beleaguered and the anti-peace tendency advances, that will guarantee that another wave of violence will occur in the region and it will assume serious dimensions which will make the peace process take decades.

[Question] Years have passed since the Camp David agreements, and the sections of the treaty have not yet been applied. My question is, where does autonomy stand? Where are the elections in the occupied territories?

[Answer] The lack of success of the autonomy negotiations in the context of Camp David was attributable to Israeli stubbornness. Israel was stubborn over the stipulations cited in Camp David. Its interpretation of the powers and authorities of the autonomous Palestinian government was narrow. Israel continued establishing new settlements and expanding the existing ones, and instead of taking some measures to build trust in the occupied territories and build the appropriate climate for establishing peace, instead of that, it followed the policy of iron and fire and followed the policy of the iron fist. All this resulted in the aborting of the establishment of Palestinian rule in the occupied territories. Autonomy must be viewed as a stage and not as a solution, a stage preceding the settlement and the negotiations bearing on self-determination. That Israel is in such a state of stubbornness does not mean abandonment of the peace process.

[Question] Is there an Egyptian army fighting with Iraq against Iran today?

[Answer] We believe in Arab solidarity. We believe that Egypt has fixed interests in settling conditions in the Arab world and the Arab countries in the Gulf away from instability, and there is a specific threat arising from the policy Iran is following at this stage. So that we can rid ourselves of this situation, we want the termination of the war and the termination of the Iranian threat to the interests of the Arab countries in the Gulf. We are working in this direction by every means. Israel committed an extreme error when it imagined that if it helped the war go on and gave Iran arms aid which would enable it to increase its military efforts, it would thus be weakening the Arab front. What weakening of the party that Israel considers to be an enemy? This is a premise and these are the notions of extremists and the enemies of peace who do not want real peace with the Arabs and Israel. The people who want peace must abandon the notion of "my enemy's enemy is my friend" and of stirring up regional wars in the area.

We are not thinking about sending Egyptian forces to Arab or non-Arab areas, because that is not the solution, and no Arab country, neither Kuwait nor Iraq, has asked us. Indeed, we cooperate within the limits in which we can strengthen security and the feeling of stability. We are offering technical expertise, expertise in military matters. As to the sending of Egyptian forces here and there, that is not the solution.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Deported Palestinian Leader Describes Nature of Uprising

44040122a Kuwait AL-QABAS 15 Feb 88 p 24

[Interview with Alfred Tubas, former Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee member, by Rakan al-Majali: "The Resistance Now Is Domestic; Where Is the Support From Outside?"]

[Text] The deported Palestinian Dr Alfred Tubas wondered about the reason the Palestinian uprising has not received Arab support, saying "For a very long time the people inside heard that they had to resist, and they are now resisting. Where is the Arab support?" In a conversation with AL-QABAS, he added that what is desired is action to hold an effective international conference able to adopt and carry out decisions.

He added that if the Iraqi-Iranian war ends, the whole Arab world will be fully occupied with the Palestine cause.

Dr Tubas' interview follows. He also was a former member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's executive committee.

[Question] What are the real causes which led to the uprising?

[Answer] 1) The occupation in itself. The Palestinian people do not want the occupation; they want independence, freedom and their independent country.

2) The length of the period of the occupation.

3) The feeling of the people under occupation of the desire to take the initiative to resist, so that they can attract the attention of the whole world, especially the Arab world, to their problem, in order to make them all take the initiative toward serious, effective action to put pressure on Israel to withdraw in the occupied homeland.

Since this withdrawal is to take place as a result of the Palestinian people's continuous struggle in all its forms, it has caused the people, who have been won over to this thinking, to show the world through this revolutionary uprising that they want independence and the end to occupation and that the forces that are influential internationally must work to put this desire of theirs into general application.

4) Their feeling that the world, especially the Arab world, must not shrink from using all means available to them to put pressure on responsible persons in the world who are able to put pressure on Israel, especially the United

States of America, to give the Palestinian people their rights in full (I am not saying the legitimate ones, because there are no legitimate rights and illegitimate rights; all rights are legitimate).

5) Their conviction in their responsibility in reviving the Palestine cause on its own territory, and in beginning, by themselves, to take the initiative to begin the resistance on the nation's territory to get their cause in the international tribunal to progress.

(How often have they heard talk from brothers, why isn't the resistance from within? This is how it has become — a fierce revolution from within. Let us hope for suitable reactions.)

6) The unification of most of the forces of the Palestine revolution, the nucleus of the nation, independent and effective within the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 18th unificationist session. Unity gives them strength and organization, and this helps lengthy effective, organized resistance.

7) Their feeling that there is hope in the foreseeable future for the resolution to the Palestinian problem in a just manner through an international conference, which could be held with the presence and participation of the Palestinian people's sole representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization.

8) In order to influence Israeli public opinion, in order to split it and get in movement the front and forces in Israel which are opposed to the occupation, favor coexistence with the Palestinian people and are prepared to recognize their rights and agree to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (although their number now is relatively small).

9) The bad economic conditions, their sufferings in their everyday life and the practices of the occupation forces and authorities in terms of arbitrariness, expropriation, bombings, terrorism, prisons, torture, arrest, deportation and the application of unjust laws.

All these domestic reasons have given the people the determination and strength to continue the struggle and uprising to show to the whole world its alienation from their just cause.

10) The high spirit of morale among people, with the success of the hang-glider and other operations in bold guerrilla military operations against the enemy in southern Lebanon and northern Palestine by the Lebanese and Palestinian nationalist forces fighting against the Zionist occupation of Palestine and the annexation of other Arab territories — the Syrian Golan, southern Lebanon and so forth.

[Question] Weren't these causes present during the past 20 years?

[Answer] Yes, most of these causes were present and existed. We might point out that a number of uprisings, demonstrations, strikes and operations occurred, as part of the means for resisting the occupation. These were ongoing demonstrations, but they were short-term and sporadic.

[Question] What is the development that led to the permanent uprising?

[Answer] 1) The Palestinian masses' conviction that Israel was aborting all serious efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution to the Palestine cause, supported in this by the American government, which is dominated by the Zionist lobby.

2) These masses' conviction that Israel's goal was the continued occupation of all Palestine and imposition of its will on the people in order to make them submit and surrender to its schemes, through which it wanted to make the Palestinian people subordinate to it economically, in terms of livelihood, life, work and labor.

This uprising has in effect proved to Israel that it could not continue the occupation and imposition of its will on the Palestinian people and maintain tranquility of mind and enjoyment of the bounties of good Palestinian land, and that these masses must receive their political, economic and social freedom.

3) These Palestinian masses' conviction that the time is now right for activating world public opinion toward the holding of an international conference and their hope that their cause will have a just resolution through this conference and that this world public opinion will be mobilized against the attempts of Israel and America to give this conference the coup de grace or make it a token, ineffective one.

4) The great media coverage internationally and the elevation of the Palestine cause to the priorities of the world's concern.

5) The acquisition by the masses within, especially the young people and children, of experience in facing the occupation and its odious forces, now that most of them have been subjected to arrest, prison and torture.

6) The domestic population's awareness of the anti-occupation movements in Israel and the attempt to influence them to disrupt Israeli public opinion and increase and strengthen these movements.

[Question] Do you believe that there are forces behind the uprising or that it is spontaneous?

[Answer] I believe that the question in this form is unrealistic!

As to whether there are forces behind the uprising or it is spontaneous, the situation is not in this form. The Palestinian people are prepared psychologically to do everything they can, through all means and by all sacrifices, and they will continue to do so until they receive their freedom in full and establish their independent nation.

As to the straw that broke the camel's back, the spark which set the people off was the incident in which an Israeli vehicle ran over four youths from Gaza. It touched off the people's feelings and they started demonstrations. The people learned that it was the opportunity they had been waiting for by which to express their feeling against the occupation. In the course of it all forces, organizations and groups and all members of the people formed a bloc and all people's opinions were unified behind these demonstrations and strikes. All Palestinian contacts were organized and coordinated domestically and abroad, and thus the uprising occurred and continued.

[Question] Do you believe that the uprising will strengthen effective local leaders?

[Answer] The local leaders exist, and this uprising will add to their strength, expertise and organization through their pursuit of struggle on the ground of actual conditions and through their daily life in the context of the harsh circumstances they are subjected to. In addition, it will cause them to be influential in opinion and action, but they will not be leaders divorced from the leaders outside politically or in terms of action. Everyone is in one direction, and everyone has a single opinion regarding the desire to get rid of the loathsome occupation, determine their destiny on their own territory and receive their legitimate rights in full. I do not doubt that self-determination will lead to the establishment of the independent Palestinian state. Also there is their conviction and consideration that the Palestine Liberation Organization is their sole legitimate representative.

[Question] How far will this uprising go on?

[Answer] It is hard to make a prediction on that. That depends on Arab and international developments and reactions. However, the current circumstances give good signs of Arab and international attention to this uprising (although that is less than the desired level, especially on the part of some brothers). Therefore, when the masses under occupation feel the world's attention to their cause and their hope for a just solution close at hand, and their continuation of the struggle is a real possibility, they will therefore continue with this uprising, even if it is vacillating. That does not mean that they will despair if they do not attain a just solution now. Rather, to the contrary, the uprisings will be repeated until they receive their legitimate rights, like the peoples of the world.

[Question] Are Arab and Palestinian circumstances able to exploit this uprising politically?

[Answer] It is necessary to exploit this uprising politically as quickly and strongly as possible.

Palestinian conditions are good now, especially after the 18th unification conference of the National Council. It is to be observed that they are being politically exploited by the organization and the Palestinians in general throughout the world in a good manner.

As to the political exploitation of this uprising by the Arabs, I am not content with this. I hope to be more optimistic, and I believe that it is in the power of many Arabs to work more and faster, and more than they have done so far, to exploit this uprising in favor of the Arab cause in general and the Palestine cause in particular.

Would that the Iraqi-Iranian war would end! Then the whole Arab world would be devoted full time to the Palestine cause. The unity of Arab ranks we saw at the summit conference in Amman (the conference of reconciliation and agreement) has been a good initiative and gives us hope that it is possible for the Arabs to reach agreement, at which time their statement will be influential and important internationally, and the forces opposed to our cause will be forced to listen to us and meet some of our just desires.

[Question] Has the uprising led to the creation of a new state where Arab demands, especially the holding of the international conference, come to transcend political positions?

[Answer] Yes, the uprising has led to the creation of a new situation and the feeling that Arab demands will be heard. I believe that Arab conditions now will not permit more than the demand for the holding of the international conference.

However, by means of this conference, and as a result of the uprising, it is now possible to adopt a stronger decision in behalf of the Palestinian people, especially since I believe that this uprising has caused the opportunities that were present for reasonable stage-by-stage solutions, which Israel and America rejected, to slip by. I also believe that this uprising has supported the organization's position and its legitimate demand that it be present with an independent delegation on an equal footing with the other delegations at the international conference.

[Question] Do you have fears of Israel's exploitation of the uprising to use people to hit one another and to starve them?

[Answer] Of course Israel will try to exploit the situation by using people to hit one another, but I do not have any fear that it will be successful in this, because the uprising has brought together all the ranks of the Palestinian people under the occupation and outside it in solidarity, and has unified all Palestinian forces, and hitting and starving people will not affect that.

[Question] What is the future of Palestinian political action and the future of the Palestine cause?

[Answer] 1) Palestinian political action must exist through the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is recognized in the Palestinian, Arab and international context as a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

2) Palestinian political action must begin first of all domestically and in the Palestinian context.

A. Action to eliminate the remaining intra-Palestinian disputes.

B. Broadening the scope of unification of all Palestinian organizations and influential persons and assimilating all the Palestinian masses within the PLO.

C. Contact with all members of the Palestinian people, wherever they may be, assimilation of all members of the Palestinian people through committees, organizations, boards and federations domestically and abroad, and concentration in particular on the effective, independent forces.

D. Emphasis on Palestinian territory as a basic, major arena for confrontation of the Zionist occupation, the effort toward organization and unity of the Palestinian masses domestically in the context of mass committees and groupings under the banner of the PLO in contexts of unity and fronts, and emphasis in particular on the independent effective forces on Palestinian territory.

3) The effort, through America's friends in the Arab world, to make greater exertions to demand that America stand alongside Palestinian and Arab rights, with my belief that it is in their ability to be positively and greatly influential through this activity and stand, in a more active manner than it has been so far.

4) The demand of the fraternal oil countries to use the oil and petrodollar weapon to exert pressure in behalf of the Palestine cause.

5) Mutual understanding and strengthening of the relationship with the Islamic world and the nonaligned countries to stand more forcefully on the side of Palestinian and Arab rights and sever their relations with Israel, as they sever them with South Africa, Israel's ally and brother in terrorism, racial discrimination, Zionism and fascism.

6) The strengthening of relations and mutual understanding on behalf of our cause with friends, particularly the socialist system, headed by the Soviet Union, and feasible coordination with them to continue support for our cause in international circles, conferences and women's and social gatherings.

A. The effort to strengthen relations with all fraternal Arab countries.

B. The refusal to enter into Arab disputes.

C. Total cooperation as far as possible and coordination with neighboring fraternal Arab countries, in particular Jordan.

7) Serious action now with the European countries, especially Britain and France, in particular with the change which has occurred recently in the British position, because it is in their ability to put pressure on America to stop its support for Israel domestically, and internationally, to exert more effort now to contact them to continue this neutral position of theirs.

8) Continuation of the demand for the holding of the effective international conference which can take decisions and work to carry them out.

9) Continuation of agreement to the United Nations Organization resolutions in toto, including the Security Council resolutions, starting with the 1947 resolutions and ending with those of 1988.

With respect to Resolution 242 alone, for acceptance of it we stipulate the addition of a sentence or paragraph on the preservation of their rights for the Palestinians, guaranteeing them the right of self-determination on their territory.

10) The application of these resolutions in practice requires execution in stages, beginning with the presence of international forces on the occupied territories and the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces, and up to the establishment of the independent Palestinian state.

11) There is nothing to prevent the continued study of formation of a Palestinian government in exile, with all its positive and negative features; may the positive spirit be the dominant one. This will give hope of the imminence of a just solution and hope of a solution in the foreseeable near future. In my opinion it will raise the spirit of morale and consequently the struggle will escalate in all its forms, politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily in its various forms.

The formation of a government in exile must occur through a decision by the Palestine National Council. I also believe that it would be better that the acceptance of an invitation to attend an international peace conference be by the decree of the Palestine National Council (or at least in either case by the central council).

[Question] What is the future of the Palestine cause?

[Answer] It now appears clearer than it was in the past. It is proceeding on the road to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian territory, but this requires great struggle and effort on the part of the Palestinians and all the Arabs and friendly socialist and European countries.

I do not doubt that after the establishment of this independent state, even in an hour, the factor of unity and unification of the neighboring Arab countries will begin with the demand for a union of confederation with the fraternal country of Jordan.

[Question] What scenario do you present for dealing with the uprising?

[Answer] Supporting the uprising materially, especially the workers on strike against working in Israel, because this will destroy the Israeli economy, and supporting the camps.

Adoption of the decision of civil disobedience for application to possible areas without harm to people, through carefully studied stages, however, and through the creation of means of present support for persons who have been harmed in order that they may be able to resist and continue.

Solutions of the Palestine cause:

The adoption of resolutions by the international bodies, from the international conference, the United Nations and the Security Council, on liberation, self-determination and the attainment of the Palestinian people's (legitimate) rights, and getting the world to understand that we are a people who love life and peace, and peace can take place only on the basis of rights and justice.

[Question] What is the world's attention to this uprising?

[Answer] The world gives attention when it hears a loud voice.

This voice can be the voice of cannons and machine guns or the voice of fighting men and guerrillas, the voice of people resisting occupation and demanding their rights, or the voice of the people in demonstrations and protests, or even the voice of stones.

Here, in this blessed uprising now, after the world has heard all the previous voices, it has now heard the voice of the masses in combination, rising up against oppression and occupation, and the voices of stones, aside from which they have nothing to make the world hear their voices. They are demanding their rights and fighting against occupation in order to be able to establish their independent state on their territory.

They have made the world hear that there is no place for them to live in except their nation and their territory, where dignity, freedom and a well known future exist, after all the oppression and dispossession they have suffered.

The revolution of the armed masses and faith in their cause in confronting a colonial band heavily laden with destructive weapons, in which young people and children are in the forefront, persevering heroically in the face of all forms of oppression and terror.

11887

EGYPT

Moscow Reportedly Studying Peace Proposal

45040072c London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
6 Feb 88 p 7

[Text] AL-TADAMUN has learned from diplomatic sources in Moscow that the Soviet foreign ministry is studying ideas contained in Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's initiative regarding conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian problem in general. The sources observed that Moscow will not publicize its opinion on the initiative before it studies the reactions of specific parties, especially the reactions of the PLO, Syria, and Jordan. In this regard, the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow, Salah Basyuni, following his delivery of the official text of the initiative to the First Deputy of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Yuliy Vorontsov, stated that "there was agreement that it would be beneficial under these circumstances, in light of the positive changes on the international scene brought about by the uprising in the occupied territories, and the forced reopening of the file on the Palestinian question both inside the UN and elsewhere, to take advantage of the current situation so as to prompt political action and guarantee that the Palestinian people in the occupied territories can pursue their political rights, to find an international mechanism which guarantees the preservation of and pursuit of these rights, and to move towards convening an international conference to establish the Palestinian people's right to self-determination."

In related developments, diplomatic sources note the official announcement in Moscow of a visit by an Israeli delegation to the Soviet capital in the next several days in order to examine the activity of the Israeli interests section in the Dutch embassy. This visit is considered the first of its kind since the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Israel following the June 1967 aggression. It takes place at a time when a Soviet consular delegation is continuing its visit to Israel which began last summer with the objective of inspecting the property of the Russian Orthodox church in Israel and the travel documents of Soviet citizens in Israel, as announced by Moscow at that time. It should be noted that the meeting held in Helsinki last August between

representatives of the Soviet and Israeli consular delegations ended a half hour after it began because of the Soviet delegation's refusal to discuss the issue of the immigration of Soviet Jews and bilateral relations, and because of Israel's request to dispatch an Israeli delegation to Moscow in exchange for allowing the Soviet delegation to visit Israel.

13286

AL-AHRAM Editorial Denounces Israeli News Blackout

NC050822 Cairo MENA in Arabic
2325 GMT 4 Mar 88

[Text] Cairo, 4 Mar (MENA)—The AL-AHRAM newspaper has denounced Israel's imposition of a total news blackout on its repressive measures in the occupied Arab territories. It says that through this policy, Israel is attempting to convince the world that nothing is actually happening that is worth publication, follow up, investigation, or questioning by at least those who possess a living conscience.

In an editorial appearing tomorrow, in Saturday's edition, the paper says that the Israeli rulers want to delude the world into believing in their innocence merely by drawing the curtain down over what they are doing and that they wish to remain alone on the scene for 3 months, believing that such a period is sufficiently long to quell the honorable revolutionary uprising.

The paper adds that actual facts prove that the abyss of deterioration is bottomless and that those who are falling believe, in an excess of arrogance, that they are rising. It recalls that history has witnessed the demise of many who were struck by the fever of invasion, occupation, and expansion only to be burned eventually by the same means.

In conclusion, the paper warns of the perils of Israeli practices following the imposition of the news blackout policy. It says now that thousands have had their bones smashed, that citizens have been burned and dropped alive from planes, and that nothing remains except the use of gas chambers.

President's Office Director Affirms Support for Palestinians

PM151419 Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 6 Mar 88 p 1

[Salim ibn Rashid al-Na'ibi report: "Usamah al-Baz in Lecture at Culture Club: Egypt Backs Popular Uprising in Occupied Territories; Intensive Arab Contacts To Coordinate Positions"]

[Excerpt] Dr Usamah al-Baz, director of Egyptian President Muhammad Husni Mubarak's office and Foreign Ministry first under secretary, has spoken about the developments in the Middle East problem, the international peace conference, and the efforts being made to settle the issue.

In his lecture yesterday at the Culture Club Al-Baz said: The Middle East problem is an imprecise term coined by the West and subsequently taken up by international bodies and organizations.

He said: The Arab-Israeli conflict is the result of a number of factors, such as the fact that the Palestinian people used to own most of the land of Palestine whereas the Jews owned just a tiny part of it.

He also pointed out that the Arab protest against the Jews was caused by the setting up of a Jewish state on Arab land.

When the Austrian Jew Hertzl came along, he called for a solution to the Jewish problem.

He noted that one of the factors which helped the setting up of the Jewish state was Nazi persecution of the Jews during World War II, although the extent of the persecution is exaggerated, since the Nazis not only persecuted the Jews but we find that their victims in Russia totalled over 20 million people and that Yugoslavia likewise suffered.

He pointed out that the 1973 war shattered the Israeli theory that Israel was militarily invincible.

He stressed that the idea of a peace conference goes back to 1973, when the Geneva peace conference was held following the October war.

He said that Egypt is living with its Arab brothers in the same trench; that Egypt supports the Palestinian cause and the heroic stands of the Arab people in the occupied territories and the Gaza Strip; and that the Camp David Agreement has not eliminated it from the battlefield. Furthermore, he said that Shultz' current trip to the region will not produce any results worth mentioning.

He stated that there are continuing contacts between Egypt, Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon, and added that contacts are continuing between Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO. [passage omitted]

Mubarak's Attitudes Towards 'Egypt's Revolution' Case

*45000030 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic
12 March 88*

[Text] Well-informed Arab diplomatic sources reported that President Husni Mubarak informed some Arab circles that he "cannot do anything" about future developments in the case of "Egypt's Revolution" organization, especially after the Attorney General of Egypt has asked for the death penalty for eleven members of the organization and Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir is at the top of the list. The members are accused of "committing violent acts" against American and Israeli diplomats in Cairo. According to the sources, Mubarak informed these circles that "the matter is out of my hands", and

high Egyptian officials mentioned that "high level Americans are giving great importance to this case." Also, well-informed Western diplomatic sources reported that an American fact-finding mission visited Cairo secretly a few weeks ago and exchanged "information" with some Egyptian officials on this case. It is the opinion of a renowned Arabic source that the Egyptian authorities "prefer" that Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir remains outside the country and does not return to Cairo, because his return and appearance before the Egyptian legal system—as he was advised to do by some of his friends—would cause an "uproar" on the Egyptian scene.

Article Criticizes President Mubarak for Police Abuses

45040083a Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 Feb 88 p 12

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus]

[Text] In his latest address to the Police Academy, President Mubarak has criticized the pens that attack the police agency. In my view, there is a big difference between criticizing the agency itself—criticism which we reject because we fully respect and appreciate this agency's officers—and opposing the mistakes of a few of the agency's officers and officials. It is totally unreasonable to conclude that we criticize the agency itself when we criticize these people.

I must frankly underline a regrettable fact in this regard, namely that I consider the president of the republic primarily responsible for the police's excesses. It is true that the minister of interior bears direct responsibility. But the ultimate responsibility lies with the president in his capacity as the ruler. On this occasion, I recall 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab's immortal words: "By God, if a mule stumbles in Iraq, I would consider 'Umar responsible for it because of his failure to pave its path." One should remember that what is stumbling here is not a mule but human rights.

My worst fear in this regard is that a gap exists between the reports presented to the president and the reality. Such a gap means a catastrophe not only for the ruler but for Egypt in its entirety. The most serious thing that could happen to the president of the republic is for the president to be isolated from his people, not knowing what is happening to the people and, consequently, embarking on a series of mistakes. I utterly refuse to believe that such a thing has happened to President Mubarak—even though it did, regrettably, happen to every ruler before him and was the reason behind all the catastrophes and tribulations.

With my hand on my heart, I address these perplexed, but specific, questions to the president on the police's excesses:

Is the president aware that use of the emergency law has been vastly expanded and that this law has gone beyond its *raison d'être*, namely to combat armed terrorism?

Isn't this expansion in conflict with the primary accomplishment President Mubarak has made for the people, namely democracy, and doesn't this expansion erode the president's credit?

Is the president aware that the police forces suppressed the latest demonstrations which were staged in support of Palestine in a way that rivals the manner in which the Israeli forces suppress the occupied territories? Does such suppression please the president?

Has the president heard of the hostage-taking system which is most damaging to his regime? This offense is summarized by arresting the family of an absconding politician wanted by the law, even if the approach means arresting women.

Has the president asked for a list of the political detainees and reviewed their cases personally to make sure that they have not been done an injustice? Has he been alarmed by the court decisions—the latest of which is the decision concerning the video case in Ambabah—which condemn the torture practiced by his administration?

Has the president heard of his interior minister's abuses, revilement, and words against people? Doesn't the president's silence mean that he condones these methods?

Finally, is the Ministry of Interior's activity subject to the ruler's control or has the president given the minister of interior a free hand, thus leading to ugly mistakes? What makes matters worst is for the president not to be aware of the mistakes. I submit these perplexed questions from the ordinary Egyptian to President Mubarak.

08494

Pro-Nasirists Discuss 'Egypt's Revolution' Actions
45040075 Beirut AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI in Arabic
8 Feb 88 pp 23-25

[Article by Nada al-Qassas]

[Excerpts] The violent incidents which captured attention in Egypt recently have been varied. Operations against persons who are symbols of Egypt's existing regime took the form of numerous assassination attempts, such as those against two former ministers of the interior, al-Nabawi Isma'il and Abu-Basha. Assassination attempts were also made against other senior officials and journalists loyal to the regime. Specific operations in that mode were also mounted against Israeli intelligence (Mosad) agents, Israeli diplomats stationed in Cairo, and American intelligence agents.

Despite differences in outlook, these incidents set the scene for an investigation and an analysis of the "Egyptian violence" whose deep-set political roots have been growing. These incidents had taken a clear political turn in the aftermath of an announcement made by "Egypt's

Revolution," an organization led by Khalid Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. "Egypt's Revolution" had declared responsibility for the most prominent of those incidents whose impingement upon the Egyptian regime's security and stability had been most significant.

In the wake of the confusion which set in on the Egyptian scene and in political clubs as well after the Egyptian regime's campaign against violent incidents reached a peak, numerous questions were being asked about the legitimacy and the objectives of what was happening. We turned, therefore, to a group of politicians and intellectuals who could put this matter in its proper perspective for us. We wanted to move away from attempts made by official and loyal media agencies to implicate Egyptian nationalist forces in these operations and make various charges against them stick.

This matter may be acquiring extraordinary importance because it coincides with the 2-months old growing and spreading uprising in the occupied land. This uprising is giving Egyptian nationalist forces new momentum for opposing the existing regime's campaign against them. This is a political report from Cairo about this subject, which is still the topic of conversation at various clubs and organizations.

We turned to Dr Husam 'Isa, professor of economics at 'Ayn Shams University and member of the secretariat of the Nasirist Arab Socialist Party, and we asked him how legitimate the use of violence against Zionists might be. Without pausing to reflect upon his choice of words, Dr 'Isa replied, "If violence against Israel inside the occupied land is legitimate, it is just as legitimate outside the occupied land. It is also legitimate on every inch of Arab land from the ocean to the gulf. Israel attacks the Arab homeland from Tunisia to Baghdad, and its violence is aimed every moment at every inch of Arab territory. Israeli violence kills Arab scientists. We still remember Dr Yahya al-Mashad. Israel is killing Palestinians inside and outside the occupied land.

"Israel's attacks on Arabs and their interests continue, and those attacks are not restricted to any one place. There is no doubt that it is legitimate to oppose Zionism everywhere. And that cannot be construed as violence, but rather as resistance against Israel's violence, which has continued for 40 years."

Maj Gen Tal'at Muslim, an Egyptian expert on strategy said, "It is my right to resist normalization and the Zionist presence. Our problem in Egypt is the absence of a consensus on normalization. If all Egyptians were to agree to reject normalization, then violence may be used. I, of course, oppose the presence of an Israeli Embassy, and I oppose normalization. I think the popular resistance of boycotting the Zionist presence in Cairo has succeeded to a large degree.

"I do not, of course, object to the use of violence against a foreign power, particularly if that foreign power were forced upon us. But we must be very careful in selecting the target, and we must impress upon those who are trying to normalize relations with us that they are unacceptable.

"But if we have confirmation of the presence of Israeli intelligence agents, those agents must be opposed by means of popular resistance and an armed struggle."

Resisting Israel Is Acknowledged by the UN Charter

Amin Iskandar says, "The 1968 UN Charter regards an armed struggle against all forms of colonialism as an acquired right of national liberation movements."

This national writer, who is also a Nasirist leader, adds, "We thus find that from an international standpoint national liberation movements are subject to two criteria. The first is the presence of a colonial power engaged in numerous activities which are incompatible with national sovereignty and the people's right to enjoy stability and life. The second criterion is that such a movement must be a national one, and that means those who are involved in the resistance must be citizens of the country and not mercenaries. It means that only colonialists and their interests are to be the targets of such a movement's activities. When these conditions are met, we have what may be called a national struggle. I think this does apply to the resistance Egyptians and Arabs are putting up against the Zionist presence. Egyptian and Arab territory is still under Zionist occupation, and that is affecting the economy, culture, and politics not just in Egypt, but also in the Arab homeland from the ocean to the gulf. Since the enemy is still there and since his aggression continues, resistance is a matter of religious, political, and national duty. Therefore, all forms of resisting the Zionists, including armed struggle, are legitimate."

What Peace?

Amin Huwaydi, former minister of war and member of the Secretariat of the Nasirist Arab Socialist Party, had this to say about the peace agreements and whether they might constitute an obstacle to the legitimate resistance against Israel. "All my studies are based on the use of strength in politics. Strength is a neutral factor; whether it is just or unjust depends on the purpose for which it is being used. Politicians can exercise strength in many areas, and they would never rule out its use. There is scientific and cultural strength, strength in the media and the economy, and military strength. And all these areas require total consciousness and planning so that the resistance plan itself can be legitimate. Poor agreements make that necessary.

"How can Israel, using false peace as a slogan, maintain its occupation of Taba, Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon? Do we talk about normalization at a time

like this? The equation for peace has been clearly defined: the causes of the conflict are to be removed, and normalization would come along. But if relations are normalized and the causes of the conflict are not removed, that would not be peace at all."

In this regard Dr Husam 'Isa adds, "No one opposed an Egyptian who killed British soldiers even though the 1936 treaty had legitimized the British presence in Egypt. At that time such an Egyptian was considered a hero. Why are standards different now?"

It Is Neo-Nazism

Dr Husam 'Isa goes on to say, "In the thirties, a young Jewish man killed a German officer in Switzerland. Nazi media agencies launched a vicious campaign against Jewish violence, and Jewish propaganda responded by describing the incident as a legitimate resistance operation spurred by the fact that Nazis were harassing Jews and trying to eliminate them. Resistance, therefore, became the Jews' only recourse. Israel is still hounding and killing Nazis, especially in Latin America, and it is still doing this even though it does not represent all Jews."

Resistance, Not Terrorism

We moved to another point. Is the use of an armed struggle in resisting Zionists classified as a terrorist activity or as an activity of national liberation movements?

Dr Ahmad al-Sawi, assistant professor at the College of Archeology at Cairo University answers that question. "Terrorism, a word which was coined by Americans and made known by Zionists, is used to describe any action against American policy. It is used to describe the activities of leftist organizations like the Red Brigades. Then the word was used to include the activities of liberation movements in the Third World: in Latin America, Asia, or the Arab homeland. This usage basically expresses a western point of view and does not, of course, include activities carried out by racist, right-wing groups or by U.S. and western intelligence. Nor does it include repressive activities carried out by pro-western governments against their own people.

"Recently, the activities of liberation movements have not been limited to those countries which the movements are trying to liberate. That is due to the blatant intervention by the United States and the West in those countries' affairs and their open support for dictatorships and military regimes. It was no coincidence that western intelligence assumed the lead in moving the conflict over liberation outside the territory whose liberation was being sought. This was accomplished by assassinating members and symbolic figures of liberation movements while they were in Europe." Dr al-Sawi adds, "Terrorism has become an international characteristic of the activities which are carried out by the

Palestinian Resistance inside and outside Palestine. This is being done to obliterate the rights of Palestinian people and to portray their leaders as gangs of terrorists. Arab governments have been led into using the word, terrorist, to describe those who resist or even demonstrate against the Zionist presence."

Maj Gen Tal'at Muslim explains, "There is official terrorism, which is practiced by states, and there is terrorism which is carried out by individuals." He adds, "The United States and Israel head the list of countries practicing official terrorism. This was best exemplified and illustrated when the United Nations decided in its recent session to convene an international conference on terrorism. Only two countries objected: the United States and Israel. But if a fighter were to attack a colonialist country's camp located inside or outside his country, his attack would not be considered terrorism. Even an attack against a colonialist country's embassy would not be considered terrorism as long as weapons are used against the intended target and not against innocent people."

The Qur'an Urges Us To Fight Them

Dr Ahmad al-Sawi affirms that armed resistance against Zionists is legitimate by saying, "Normalizing relations with Zionists may be the only activity for which more than one legitimate justification for the use of violence exists. From a religious standpoint the Qur'an urges us to fight Jews wherever they are. God Almighty says, "Kill them wherever you find them" [al-Baqarah: 191]. Muslims have fought Jews throughout history. Rulers issued no orders forbidding Muslims from fighting Jews, and religious scholars issued no opinions declaring such fights impermissible, as long as Jews were threatening Muslims' safety and committing forbidden acts against them. The violation of forbidden acts has no specific geographical boundaries. All Muslims are obligated by what the Qur'an says to fight anyone who attacks Islam or Muslims anywhere, even in the most remote corners of the world. All Muslims are obligated to kill such an attacker without the least hesitation. No one can describe Zionist practices and say that they do not constitute the kind of aggression against which Muslims are required to fight. The position of the Egyptian church does not differ from that of Muslims. The orthodox church did not absolve the Jews of Christ's death. In the national sense an attack on any Arab country is in fact an attack against the entire Arab nation, especially when the Zionist enemy does not conceal his aspirations. Zionists want to sieze more Arab land, and they boast about their plan to dominate the Arab homeland."

Camp David: Exceptions to the Rule

Al-Sawi adds, "From a constitutional and cultural standpoint anti-Zionism is the backbone of public opinion in general. There is nothing in Egypt's constitution or in the constitutions of all the countries in the Arab homeland

banning the use of armed force to resist Zionism anywhere in the world. Camp David created a situation that is exceptional and unprecedented. It violates all the constitutional traditions of the Arab people as well as their psychological and cultural tendencies."

Amin Huwaydi, who headed Egypt's General Intelligence Agency under 'Abd-al-Nasir, concludes this discussion by saying, "Going after espionage networks and their accomplices inside and outside Egypt, especially those which are affiliated with the enemy, is not only legitimate but also a matter of duty. When I was head of Egypt's General Intelligence Agency, spy networks were uncovered, and expatriation, imprisonment and execution were used as methods sanctioned by law for dealing with such cases. In espionage cases the only penalty is execution. Israeli spy networks were uncovered, and members of those networks were actually executed at that time. We pursued those networks abroad and inside the country. After pursuing a group and determining for certain the kind of activity it was involved in, we would deal with the situation according to circumstances."

We asked Amin Huwaydi, "Was physical elimination one of those methods you used to deal with a situation?"

He replied, "Of course. We used all methods, including physical elimination, to deal with such situations."

08592

Opposition Leaders Voice Support For Palestinian Uprising

45040078b Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
25 Feb 88 p 6

[Text] Justifying the Ministry of Interior's refusal to permit peaceful demonstrations and processions in support of and in solidarity with the Palestinian people's uprising in the occupied territories, and in protest of the barbaric Israeli practices against the oppressed Palestinians, some sources in the NDP have said that demonstrations and chanting are no longer the proper civilized method befitting the modern age, not to mention the security authorities' fear that some contentious elements may infiltrate such demonstrations and exploit them for other objectives, and these authorities' general concern for public security.

Despite the Ministry of Interior's position, the opposition party leaders had previously tried to stage such peaceful demonstrations and processions. But they quickly abandoned this approach, though continuing to seek other means and methods that would enable them to support this uprising.

What role can the political parties and forces play to support the Palestinian uprising?

In NPUG, the leftist opposition party most concerned with the uprising, Dr Rif'at al-Sa'id said that the support has taken the form of material support through the collection of donations that enable the Palestinian people to continue their uprising in light of the strikes, the closing of shops, and the virtual disruption of economic life. This guarantees those participating in the uprising a degree of steadfastness in confronting the Israeli pressure. The support has also taken the form of moral backing, reflected in further expressions of support for the uprising and in the mobilization of popular efforts to voice support for this uprising so that the occupied territories' inhabitants will not feel isolated.

Rif'at al-Sa'id said that NPUG has urged all the national forces to form committees to support the uprising. An invitation has also been issued to the trade unions and federations to support the ship of return. These efforts must be continued.

Al-Hamzah Da'bas, deputy chairman of the Liberal Party, says, "We have supported the uprising. Before the uprising, our party withdrew its approval of Camp David. The Liberal Party proposed that a demonstration be staged in support of the uprising and in rejection of the Israeli oppression. But the government turned down the proposal, even though it called for the demonstration to be staged under the auspices of the opposition parties' leaders and to be organized and protected by the security forces.

"The opposition leaders have been surprised by the government's rejection of their demand to stage demonstrations even though such demonstrations have been staged in Europe, the United States and even Israel itself. However, we have supported President Mubarak's initiative to get things moving, using this uprising as a point of departure. Some people in the Liberal Party have even gone further and collected donations to support the Palestinian people's uprising."

Siraj-al-Din, the head of the Wafd Parliamentary Committee: "Support should not be confined to the moral and propaganda aspects or to statements, speeches, and conferences. It must be crowned with material support by having all the organizations, unions, and parties join together by collecting all the material and cash donations they can find and delivering them to the Palestinian uprising through the Red Cross or through other international organizations.

"The rich governments must also move to provide aid and support for the struggling fraternal people.

"Such support will perhaps prolong the uprising which, if it continues to confront the brutal suppressive measures, may turn into a sweeping revolution.

"I believe that international public opinion is now ready and that this development in international public opinion, which has become sympathetic to the Palestinians, can be utilized."

Ahmad Mujahid, the Labor Party deputy chairman: "As the opposition, we view this uprising with great interest, we believe that it must be supported, and we object to any efforts which include attempts to calm the situation.

"Instead, we believe that the Palestinians must be encouraged to escalate their protests and their objections to the inhuman conditions, considering that all the efforts made over the long years to change these conditions have failed.

"Every effort to support this uprising, regardless of how small or symbolic, reflects the Egyptian people's true support for the uprising. It is very important that the Egyptian people support the Palestinians' demand for their rights.

"Therefore, the Egyptian government must realize that the political parties' and forces' efforts to mobilize material and moral support are not aimed against the government but against the Israeli tyranny and oppression."

08494

Commentary Calls For Clear, Honest Party Policies

45000029 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 29 Feb 88 p 12

[*"Fikrah"* column by Mustafa Amin]

[Text] The call for a conference convening all the parties bodes well, but I fear that this call will not succeed because the opposition parties have stipulated that the discussion begin with the repeal of the emergency law. This is a reasonable demand, but I have learned that there is a faction of NDP members that considers the emergency law to be one of the gains of the revolution which cannot be renounced. It is thought that the government would not remain in power for 24 hours if it repealed the emergency law. We have said a thousand times that this conjecture has no foundation. Before the revolution many ministries governed without recourse to martial law, and Egypt did not experience martial law except during the occupation. During World War II war was declared at Britain's request and on the basis of the treaty of 1936. Martial law was once again declared on the occasions of the Palestine War in 1948 and the burning of Cairo in January 1952.

More important than this is that each of our parties hold a conference in which it defines its policy and is bound by it. It is absurd that some of our parties have become "fish, milk and tamerinds" [an indigestible mixture]. You do not know if they are capitalist or socialist, with half of them cursing the minister of the interior and half

of them welcoming him with open arms. Some of them support Dr Fu'ad Sultan, the minister of tourism, and some of them applaud Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub. A party has some who support 'Abd-al-Nasir, some who support Anwar al-Sadat and some who support Husni Mubarak! Even the Cabinet itself must hold a conference to agree on a unified policy. It is absurd that some NDP deputies attack the minister of tourism because he implements the policy which the Cabinet has established. We look for the prime minister and we find that he has no influence!

It is absurd that Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub, vice president of the NDP, has a policy contradicting that which President Husni Mubarak, president of the NDP, has announced.

We demand clarity among our parties, for democracy means that the parties are active, that they work in Parliament and in the street and make their opinions known on every important issue. It means that they discuss what they want and, after that, issue a decision by which all of the party members are bound. However, we notice that some members of the parties "use the party for their own ends", i.e., they are secretly opposed and openly supportive or secretly supportive and openly opposed. They pursue their personal interests, advocate them fervently and pay no attention to the interests of the party or the community. This is a danger to the parties when public opinion begins to feel that the parties have no important role in fashioning the nation's policy, that the important decisions take the parties by surprise or that they learn of them by reading the newspapers.

We want to give the parties back their self-esteem and we want the press to work with the opposition parties as a national press, not a government press whose mission it is to defend the government party, whether it is wrong or right. We believe that the opposition is able to play a basic role in guiding the government, and therefore it is necessary that we facilitate their task by informing them of the facts and giving them a share in the decisions. It is necessary that we set aside time for them on radio and television, as well as in the newspapers. It is absurd that the editors-in-chief of the opposition papers do not participate in the important press conferences and then are blamed because they did not publish the truth. The opposition parties are not a knife in the government's back; they are a sword in Egypt's hand.

LIBYA

Libya Detains Crew of Tunisian Fishing Vessel *London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 7 Mar 88 p 3*

[Text] The Libyan Navy surrounded a Tunisian fishing vessel a week ago and escorted it to the Libyan port of Zuwarah. When AL-DUSTUR got in touch with Libyan circles to ask them about the details, the answer was that this was merely a mistake and that things would return to

normal. However, the Libyan authorities have not released the detained fishermen as of yet. Will this incident become a new problem in the normalization of Tunisian-Libyan relations?

MOROCCO

World Bank Economic Experts Draft Alternative Forecasts

45190031 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE in French Jan 88 pp 22-24

[Article by Hassan Ziady: "Two Scenarios for Morocco for the Year 2000"]

[Text] In its most recent annual report, the World Bank estimated that Morocco is in the process of emerging from the adjustment stage begun in 1983 and is about to embark upon the path of gradual but regular growth. However, another report from that same institution, in this case a confidential one, described the pursuit of the adjustment strategy until 1995 as inevitable. After a detailed analysis of recent Moroccan economic performance, this report defines the guidelines of an economic strategy for the medium-term (1985-1995) based on structural adjustment. On that basis, the experts set forth two scenarios. One involves a rapid rate of growth and the second a more moderate one.

The World Bank explained that the general economic strategy must be based on four determining features—liberalization, mobilization of domestic resources, withdrawal of the state and new method of managing public finances. Thus the experts insist on pursuit of the process of liberalizing trade and promoting exports. While substantial changes have already been made in this direction (elimination of certain quotas, reduction of import duties), it is necessary, in their eyes, to rationalize the customs protection system. The current quotas in the sectors which are not very competitive, such as automobile assembly and steel, should initially be replaced by duties, pending the full reorganization of the sectors directly threatened by imports. In a second phase, all the duties should be eliminated, being replaced by a low single tax, inasmuch as the goal is to limit the protection of local industries to a 25-percent maximum, or a third of the average current rates. For the farm sector, improvement in the terms of trade requires realistic prices and the protection of local producers against dumping, but also against the distortions caused by the sale of subsidized imported food products (in particular, the decline in the income of the peasants).

Unlike the current situation, in which development is oriented toward the domestic market and the replacement of imports, and in which the state and public sectors play a determining role, the new economic policy is designed to favor an increase in exports (multiple incentives are planned) and in the participation of the private sector. This is the approach of the World Bank experts, who recommend a whole series of measures

designed to step up the mobilization of local resources. Domestic savings are to increase from the present 12 percent level to 18 percent of the gross domestic product. To achieve this, the state must undertake a vast fiscal reform, the purpose being to improve the yield of domestic taxes through an extension of the TVA, the elimination of exemptions and the creation of new taxes for the categories which have heretofore borne a small tax burden or none at all—real estate promoters, large farm producers and other stock- and shareholders.

In order to balance the budget, which showed a deficit of 9 billion dirhams in 1986, a major reduction in state expenditures will be needed. These expenditures came to 8.5 percent of the gross domestic product in 1970 and reached 16 percent in 1980, before dropping again to the current 11 percent. Although real wages have declined in the past 3 years, the experts favor limiting them in order to contain state expenditures in this sector. Also, the elimination of jobs in national education is to be extended to all sectors of the civil administration. The government is also expected to encourage investments, allocating priority to agriculture, the manufacturing industries and all the export sectors, and to reduce the tax on profits from its current maximum of 51 percent in order to liberate private enterprise. The state will thus have to relinquish its role in activities of a commercial nature and draft a program for transferring certain public enterprises to the private sector. The relations between the state and the public enterprises, of which there are 600 at present, accounting for more than 20 percent of the gross domestic product, will have to be redefined through sectorial restructuring. The report explains that "the disinvestment program will have to be pursued on a case by case basis, and should involve all of the enterprises in which the state is involved, even in a minority or indirect role," with special attention being paid to the manufacturing sector. It was specified, in addition, that successful transfers to the private sector will require "development of the capital market, deregulation of the sectors transferred to the private sphere and regular auditing of the public enterprises."

It is on the basis of these main guidelines that two scenarios showing projections for the decade between 1985 and 1995 have been drafted.

The first and more optimistic scenario is believed to be the more probable one, as well. It predicts that the high rate of growth will be maintained and that the reform policy will encounter no major obstacles. The foreign partners of Morocco (the IMF, World Bank and the Clubs of Paris and London) will contribute their support to the kingdom, the financing needs of which are estimated at \$4.6 billion for the period between 1986 and 1990. The annual growth rate will be 4.1 percent until 1990, and 4.8 percent beyond that. This makes it possible to foresee a 1.5 rate of increase in per capita consumption, in real terms, despite the elimination of subsidies in 1990.

To achieve these goals, gross domestic savings, which represented 12 percent of the gross domestic product in 1985, should reach 14.2 percent in 1990 and 17.4 percent in 1995. Oriented mainly toward agriculture and the manufacturing industries, private sector investments would reach 12.7 percent of the gross domestic product, while the state portion should drop to 4.1 percent by 1990. This would make it possible to increase the proportion of manufactured products in domestic exports from its present 20 percent to 22 percent in 1990 and 26 percent in 1995. The budget deficit (9 billion dirhams in 1986) will be reabsorbed, and the surplus made available in the balance of payments will make it possible to consolidate foreign reserves, to eliminate back payments due and to reduce the level of the foreign debt by more than \$1 billion annually. The debt service ratio will reach a peak in 1990 (46.5 percent) before being gradually reduced to 24.4 percent of the export income by 1995. The payments balance, which was negative in 1985 (-\$859 million), will rise to a positive \$187 million in 1990 and \$525 million in 1995.

Within the same period, Morocco will be able to improve the structure of its foreign debt thanks to the surpluses, and without recourse to a rescheduling of the debt falling due in 1988. Sustained growth in income from tourism and transfers from workers from abroad is also foreseen. The state will continue to encourage the development of exports and to limit the increase in imports through its exchange rate policy (devaluation of the local currency). Among the hypotheses established in connection with these projections were a price of \$18 per barrel for oil in 1990 and \$41 per ton for phosphates, as well as an average rate of growth in the OECD countries of 3.9 percent until 1995.

The second and less favorable scenario is based on a more gradual implementation of the adjustment program in the event that "domestic blockages" develop or if foreign support is weak. A more rapid deterioration in the terms of trade and a decline in exports of phosphates could intensify this slowdown and delay the implementation of the reforms urged. The reduction in deficits, the development of exports and general growth would then be threatened, and Morocco would have to have recourse to special sources of financing. The increase in the gross domestic product would in such a case be 1 percent below that shown in the first projection. The increase in per capita consumption would be almost nil and the financing needs would have to lead to the rescheduling of 90 to 95 percent of the debts owed to the Clubs of Paris and London and falling due in 1989. This scenario involves a very slight expected decline in investments, which would represent only 16.7 percent of the gross domestic product in 1990, with exports leveling off at 24.5 percent of the gross domestic product in that same year. In the view of the experts, "Such a period of economic stagnation and austerity with limited concrete results would give greater credibility to those who reject the liberalization in progress and are urging a return to

	1980-1985	1986-1990	1990-1995
Gross Domestic Product	3,0	4,1	4,8
Agriculture	1,0	6,2	3,2
Industry	1,3	5,5	6,0
Services	4,7	2,5	4,7
Consumption	2,7	3,8	4,1
Investments	- 3,1	3,9	8,4
Exports	4,5	6,0	5,4
Imports	- 1,2	4,6	5,4

Scenario No 1—Strong Growth Hypothesis

	1980-1985	1986-1990	1990-1995
Gross Domestic Product	1,0	3,2	3,8
Agriculture	1,0	5,8	2,5
Industry	1,3	3,8	5,0
Services	4,7	2,0	3,4
Consumption	2,7	2,9	3,1
Investments	- 3,1	3,0	7,4
Exports	4,5	5,4	4,1
Imports	1,2	5,8	4,5

Scenario No 2—Weak Growth Hypothesis

	1985	1990		1995	
		High	Low	High	Low
Ratio of debt service to exports	30,7 %	46,5 %	47,4 %	24,4 %	26,2 %
Balance of payments result (in millions of dollars)	- 859	187	227	525	374

Debt and Balance of Payments

strict control of the economy by the state." And "This will put social cohesion—which has already been subject to considerable pressure during the last 4 years—to a severe test."

The experts add, however, that this scenario would have limited consequences if the Moroccan government were to pursue the strategy currently being applied in the realm of structural adjustments.

The first 2 years of implementing this strategy have yielded widely varied results. For example, in 1986, the gross domestic product reached 39 billion dirhams,

indicating an exceptional 5.8 percent rate of growth, and the trade deficit was reduced by 4.5 billion dirhams. These achievements came about thanks to two factors—an excellent farm season and a very clear reduction in the oil bill.

The year just ended, for its part, was less favorable. The first estimates on 1987 performance point to a slowdown in growth, which in all probability will not exceed 3 percent in real terms. The farm season was a disappointment (-45 percent in comparison to 1986), and the phosphate and by-product markets deteriorated again, with sales down 5 percent.

Moreover, income from tourism and transfers from workers abroad, which are the two main sources of foreign exchange, practically stagnated. This will make it impossible to correct the deficit in the balance of payments (2 percent expected for 1987). However, the Moroccan government obtained excellent results in reducing the budget deficit is concerned, as well as the rate of inflation, which was brought down from 8.8 percent in 1986 to 3.5 percent in 1987. The reduction in the subsidies on goods of first necessity (1.4 billion dirhams in 1987), pending their total elimination in 1990, somewhat weakened the situation of the most disadvantaged categories. The government should plan for specific actions to favor them, on pain of seeing the already tense social climate deteriorate. But the principal satisfaction in the year just ended was provided by the development in the private sector. With a more favorable environment, private sector investments increased by more than 20 percent, to the level of the goals set in accordance with the World Bank strategy.

This fact merits noting for the additional reason that it is the guarantee of future development. Is it not true that according to the established formula, today's investments are the growth of tomorrow and the jobs of the day after that?

5157

SAUDI ARABIA

Study Evaluates Recent Economic Recovery
44040130 Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jan 88 pp 49-51

[Article: "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Improved Oil Sector Reflects Positively on Economic Activity"]

[Text] The Saudi economy has continued to adapt to a low activity level resulting from the continued recession in several sectors and from the slowdown in economic activity.

The policy of streamlined government spending, enacted in the wake of the decline in oil revenues and in revenues from foreign investments, has led to a change in the entire economic activity throughout the past 3 years. The fourth 5-year development plan for the 1985- 1990 period focuses on diversifying the sources of revenues through the development of other sectors, such as agriculture, mining and industry. The plan seeks to reduce reliance on the oil revenues, to reduce imports, to enhance self-reliance and to create work opportunities for the growing number of Saudis joining the workforce annually.

Changes in Most Significant Economic Indicators

Last year, Saudi Arabia continued to be influenced by the change in the world economy's oil supply and demand. The Saudi gross domestic product dropped from \$108 billions to \$96 billions, or 8.6 percent, in the 1984-85 period.

The sharp decline in economic activity brought about a drop of nearly three percent in the inflation rate in 1986. This drop was helped by the reduced number of commodities and services used to determine consumer prices, taking in consideration that many of these commodities and services are government-subsidized and that the decrease in the size of the domestic market reduced the kingdom's foreign labor, thus reducing the demand for goods and services in general and alleviating the inflationary pressures.

Public Financing and Fiscal Procedures

In 1987, the kingdom's fiscal year was changed and the Christian calendar replaced the Hegira calendar previously in effect.

The 1987 budget can be summed up as follows: The total 1987 revenues are estimated at 117.2 billion Saudi riyals, including 65.2 billions from oil revenues, based on a price of \$18 per barrel and a production of 3.87 million barrels daily. The appropriation of 170 billion riyals exceeded the actual expenditures even though it was below the 200 billion riyals allocated for spending in the preceding year's budget (see Chart No 1). This shows that Saudi Arabia plans to increase spending and to use a major part of the current spending to pay contractors who completed their work in past years.

The deficit is expected to amount to 52.72 billion riyals, most of which will be covered from the reserves which are estimated at \$80-\$100 billions.

The deficit figures may be exaggerated, considering that the government is expected to collect the oil revenues of a production of 4.5 million barrels daily. According to the latest figures published by SAMA [Saudi Arab Monetary Agency] in its 1986 annual report, the government oil revenues in the fiscal year ending in March 1986 amounted to 87.7 billion riyals compared to the 61.2 billion riyals set by that fiscal year's budget.

Non-oil revenues amounted to 43.8 billion riyals, falling 16.5 percent short of the figures set in the budget.

Total 1985-86 spending amounted to 181.5 billion riyals, including 26.6 billions for projects and 119.9 for current expenditures. This means that the first type of spending fell 55 percent short of the figures set in the budget, i.e. 111.7 billion riyals, whereas the second type exceeded by

nearly 36 percent the figure of 88.3 billion riyals appropriated in the budget. This difference in the current spending figures is due to shifting the fiscal year from the Hegira calendar to the Christian calendar, as already noted.

The deficit in the 1985-86 fiscal year amounted to 50 billion riyals which were covered from the kingdom's reserves.

Latest Developments in Banking Sector

Like the other economic sectors, the Saudi banking system has gone through a period of adjustment to the new economic circumstances and has witnessed a sharp decline in its activities as a result of reduced government spending.

The sector has also recorded a sharp drop in profits due to the allocation of supplies for bad debts.

The banking system's assets rose by 1.3 percent, amounting to 154 billion riyals in fiscal year 1985-86. Capital and reserves also rose by 9.4 percent, amounting to 13 billion riyals whereas payments due in the private sector dropped by 1.2 billion riyals, amounting to 586 billions. The loans advanced for industrialization, for remanufacturing and for varied other sectors also decreased.

The branches of the 11 banks in operation rose to 617 branches in 1985-86, compared to 570 branches in the preceding year. Most of the newly-opened branches are located in the western and southern provinces. The cumulative net profits of the 11 banks dropped to 599 million riyals in 1986, compared to 1,122 millions in 1985 and nearly 2,161 millions in 1984.

The initial profit figures published by a number of banks for the first half of 1987 indicate a continued drop in profitability as a result of the appropriation of further supplies for bad debts.

Debts due to be repaid amount to 30 percent of the debt purse of the 11 banks, a purse amounting to 58 billion Saudi riyals. The total provisions appropriated for bad debts amounted to 1,785 million riyals in 1986, compared to 1,575 millions in 1985.

An arbitration committee formed of 3 specialists to settle the banking disputes was expected to initiate its activities in October 1987 to consider the cases referred to the Business Disputes Settlement Committee or to the Shari'ah courts.

It is evident that in the past 2 years, the banks have followed a cautious and strict policy of advancing credit facilities to their clients and have implemented the strategy of reduced spending and of curtailed new development plans. The banks have also tried to curtail the increased appropriation of provisions for bad debts.

So far, SAMA has not provided clarifications on the provisions the banks are required to appropriate. Some bankers fear that the estimates for the appropriation of debt provisions will be unsound. However, these bankers are undoubtedly aware that SAMA is concerned with and constantly watches the banks' positions and that it has provided low-cost deposits to two commercial banks which had suffered from liquidity problems. As for the major banks, their strong capital will enable them to face any emerging difficulties.

Development in Oil Sector

Saudi Arabia is one of the world's biggest oil producers. It is also the most important member of OPEC. It has reserves which, at the current production level, will last 200 years.

Since 1972, Saudi Arabia has played the role of the flexible producer within OPEC so as to maintain the organization's production within the allocated quotas.

In September 1987, OPEC's oil production amounted to 18.5 million barrels daily, compared to 19.9 barrels per day in August. This means that OPEC's production is still higher than its production ceiling, set at 16.6 barrels daily. In September, Saudi Arabia's production amounted to 4.5 billion [as published] barrels daily, including the Neutral Zone's production which is estimated at 150,000 barrels daily. This shows that Saudi Arabia did not exceed the production ceiling set for it by OPEC at 4,343,000 barrels daily. The official price is estimated at \$18 per barrel.

In contrast to the above strategy, Saudi Arabia recently changed its mind about resuming its role as a flexible producer to curtail OPEC's surplus production. Moreover, it will not use its influence with other producers to persuade them to adhere to their production quotes. But Saudi Arabia will continue to exert efforts to maintain OPEC's fixed price and its production ceiling, set in June 1987 at 16.6 million barrels per day for the second half of the year.

In 1985-86, Saudi Arabia's oil revenues amounted to 87.7 billion riyals, falling 27.7 percent short of the preceding year's revenues and compared to 329 billion riyals in 1981. Revenues from domestic investments and local revenues amounted to 131 billion riyals, compared to 172 billions in the preceding year.

Balance of Payments and Reserves

In 1985, the trade balance registered a surplus of 24 billion riyals, compared to a surplus of 31 billion riyals in 1984. This drop is due to a decrease of 28 percent in oil revenues, as already noted. Imports also registered a drop of 26 percent, compared to 16 percent in the preceding year. Meanwhile, exports of non-oil products rose by 52 percent.

A drop of 23 percent in the trade surplus is considered an improvement when compared with the 34 percent drop in the preceding year. This improvement is due to the improvement in the activity of the services and remittances sectors.

The net payments for services and remittances decreased by 26 percent, amounting to 66.9 billion riyals. This decrease reduced the deficit in payments for all services, excluding the "other special services" which witnessed an increase as a result of the remittances made in payment to foreign contractors and foreign labor (see chart No 2).

The current account is estimated at \$12.965 billion in 1985, at \$8.7 billion in 1986 and at \$9 billion in 1987. Even though foreign purchases decreased in 1986, the sharp drop in oil prices caused revenues from foreign currency to remain low.

The status of foreign assets continued to deteriorate in 1986 and in part of 1987. Even though imports decreased, a variety of payments for insurance, shipping, training contracts and other unexpected items affected these reserves.

The above is in addition to the decrease that has recently developed in investment revenues as a result of a general drop in international interest rates.

As we have already noted, the deficit in the government budget was covered with withdrawals from the reserves which were estimated at \$128 billion at the end of 1982. But these reserves decreased to nearly \$100 billion in March 1986 and were estimated at \$80 billion in October 1987. One half of these reserves is in U.S. dollars and the other half is in German marks, Japanese yens and special drawing rights. But the main problem continues to be how to enhance the liquidity of these assets.

Summary

Even though the Saudi economy has gone through a phase of adjustment to the drop in oil revenues, it seems that conditions are improving and that the economy is no longer suffering from recession.

Increased oil production and oil prices, stabilized at \$18 per barrel, must inevitably lead to curtailing the current account deficit and to reducing the foreign assets which have been used to tackle the liquidity problem.

Moreover, this condition will help the government encourage domestic economic activity, thus reducing the drop in the gross domestic product in real figures for the previous years.

Furthermore, the signs of improvement which the economy has begun to witness will help the banking system to overcome some of the problems resulting from bad debts, will enhance the system's profitability and will permit it to appropriate the provision requirements for next year with ease.

Chart No 1, Saudi Budget for 1985-86 and 1987 (in Billion Saudi Riyals).

Category	1985-86	1985-86	1987
	Actual Budget	Draft Budget	Draft Budget
Budget Type			
Total revenues	131.500	200.000	117.275
Oil revenues	87.700	145.250	65.195
Non-oil revenues	43.800	45.750	52.080
Total spending	181.500	200.000	170.000
Capital spending	61.600	111.700	50.000
Current spending	50.000	—	52.725
Deficit	50.000	—	52.725

Chart No 2, Balance of Payments Estimates (in Billion Saudi Riyals)

Category	1402-03	1403-04	1404-05	1405-06*
1. Commerce (F.O.B)	91.948	47.383	31.237	23.978
A. Oil exports (excluding supply fuel)	203.929	151.840	117.845	85.258
B. Other exports	3.356	3,762	4,073	6,143
Re-Exports	(2.474)E	(1.757)E	(2.222)E	(2.132)
C. Imports	-115.337	-108.219	-90.651	-67.423
2. Services and remittances	-88.391	-105.342	-90.178	-66.881
A. Revenues	70.134	65.858	60.162	55.920
Investment Revenues	53.969	51.204	44.677	42.756
Oil sector (supply fuel)	0.975	0.611	0.384	0.258
Miscellaneous	15.190	14.043	15.101	12.906
B. Payments	-158.525	-171.200	-150.340	122.801
Shipping and Insurance	-20.761	-19.479	-16.317	-10.788
Oil sector's investment revenues	-17.450	-10.319	-11.872	-8.396

Chart No 2, Balance of Payments Estimates (in Billion Saudi Riyals)

Category	1402-03	1403-04	1404-05	1405-06*
Other Special Services	-33.882	-34.060	-32.347	-36.093
Other Government Services(A)	-67.500	-89.489	-71.259	-49.577
Special remittances	-18.737	-17.853	18.545	-17.947
3. Capital movement and reserves	-3.557	+57.959	+58.941	+42.903
A. Oil sector and other capital activities (net)	+31.409	+5.394	+9.680	+11.242
B. Miscellaneous(b)	-34.966	+52.565	+49.261	+31.661

Footnotes:

* Initial estimates

M: Reviewed

E: Estimates (A): Including official remittances and contributions, subscription of regional or international organizations to capital and some government revenues. (B): Including short-term private capital, corrected estimates and errors, changes in the net foreign assets in commercial banks and in official capital and reserves.

08494

TUNISIA

Reactivation of Nuclear Studies Center Urged *45190025c Tunis LE TEMPS in French 12 Jan 88 p 3*

[Article by S. Ben Hamadi]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1960s, a general atomic energy commissariat was established in Tunisia. This structure, which was entrusted with the development of this energy resource, immediately set about carrying out its task as best it could, and within this framework, it achieved success with several important projects, including the establishment of the nuclear studies center in Tunis-Carthage in 1965. But in the wave of reforms our country has experienced since then, these two institutions were incorporated in other bodies and their own activities became diluted.

Now, at a time when nuclear physics has become the pivot of modern science and its applications underlie all of the great technological innovations, it is at the very least strange that Tunisia is doing without an autonomous nuclear research institute, when it already has two conditions which favor the launching and development of such a project—a qualified scientific and technical community, and the raw material needed for nuclear research and industrial establishments, i.e., uranium.

In fact, the general atomic energy commissariat had studied and undertaken projects involving prospecting for the raw materials needed for the nuclear industry in

Tunisia in the 1960s, and a team jointly organized by this commissariat and the Office of Nonmechanized Mineral Prospecting determined that there were favorable indications that uranium could be found in our country.

Generally speaking, the results obtained were promising.

Tunisian phosphate does in fact contain uranium. The content assessed by the CEA was low, but the overall quality was tremendous.

In view of the importance of phosphate production in Tunisia, the extraction of this uranium by means of an organic solvent was envisaged at that time. A plan for a pilot plant was under study, but it never saw the light of day.

And in 1980, it was decided to extract almost 120 tons of uranium a year in France from Tunisian phosphate. At that time, three foreign parties (French, American and German) submitted proposals for carrying out this project.

The experts estimated that the proven uranium resources in Tunisia represented the equivalent of 140 nuclear reactor fuel elements.

These fuel elements, if used in the plutonium chain, would supply our country with the equivalent of the current production of the Tunisian Gas and Electric Company (STEG) for 300 years.

In addition, the prospecting department at the nuclear studies center in Tunis-Carthage had a nuclear physics section employing a substantial number of young researchers, including theoreticians and experimental scientists, and it was equipped with a 14 MEV neutron generator.

The principal activities of the facility in Tunis-Carthage included the study of nuclear reactions induced by rapid neutrons and the applications of radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine and industry.

The atomic energy commissariat also studied the possibility of a nuclear installation for the production of electrical energy and sweet water from sea water in the southern part of Tunisia.

Projects pertaining to the use of solar energy to desalinate water, for processing, to produce ice and to transform solar energy into electrical energy were other aspects of the center's program of activities. As can be seen, it was an ambitious program, 100 percent scientific and adapted to the needs of the country.

When interviewed about his assessment of the activities of the nuclear studies center in Tunis-Carthage, a former director of the center refused to comment, saying that "This is a matter which is no longer of interest."

5157

Experts Discuss Nation's Population Growth Rate
45190025a Tunis LE TEMPS in French 19 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by S.B.R.: "Will the Tunisian Birth Rate Decline?"]

[Text] Some researchers are counting on a speedy decline in the Tunisian birth rate to establish a balance between the economic growth and the demographic growth of the country by the year 2016.

Promoting a rapid decline in the birth rate with a view to achieving a balance between economic and demographic growth in the country by the year 2016—this was the main concept developed by M. Skouri in his report entitled "Demographic Prospects (1986-2016)," developed within the framework of the family-planning seminar sponsored at the Sofitel Diplomat Hotel on 15 and 16 January 1988 by the National Family and Population Office.

Mr Skouri developed a number of hypotheses and projections derived from the data provided by the National Statistics Institute, which in turn were based on the hypotheses for the development of the main determining population factors, i.e., the birth rate, the death rate and migration.

Thus the 1984 census served as the basis for the drafting of demographic projections for the period of the Seventh Plan and until the year 2021.

Birth Rate Emphasized

While the author of this document emphasized the birth rate as the determining factor in population, he neglected the other two factors mentioned—the death rate and migration.

In fact, it must be said that the birth rate was the target of his remarks.

He said that the trend in the birth rate has led to three hypotheses, based on three rates of decline. The first hypothesis postulates a birth rate which remains steady, the second a rate continuing the slow decline, with a reduction from an estimated 2.24 in 1986 to 1.85 by the year 2001. This hypothesis represents the middle path of variation, and was adopted for the Seventh Plan. The third hypothesis is based on a rapidly declining birth rate, with a reduction from 1.5 in the year 2001 to 1.11 by the year 2016.

This hypothesis represents the ideal variation toward which we should work.

It goes without saying that this last hypothesis reflects the birth-rate situation in the developed countries, which serves just to guarantee generational replacement.

With these figures in mind, it is to be noted that the second hypothesis was adopted, without, however, abandoning the ideal goal represented by the third hypothesis.

However, the achievement of this goal in the long run remains dependent upon a number of other social and economic factors, to the extent that it is true that a speedy decline in the birth rate requires a whole strategy in the realm of family planning, with the participation of all of the parties concerned.

But what would the changes in the age structure of the population be, given either of these two hypotheses? The following table clearly shows a change in trends.

Age	1986	2021	
		H1	H2
0-4 years	14.46	11.46	8.05
5-14 years	24.72	20.78	17.54
15-59 years	54.10	59.10	64.37
60 and over	6.72	8.66	10.04
Total	100	100	100

With both hypotheses, we see the aging of the population, more clearly, of course, given the second hypothesis than given the first. This would ensure a balance on both the economic and demographic levels.

Changing Attitudes

According to the various surveys which have marked the implementation of the family-planning program, one must wonder what must be done to reach the target public, i.e., the women of childbearing age, basically those who live outside the cities.

A change in attitude remains in fact a primary factor, because the rural women of Tunisia have not yet been freed of their concept of their primary purpose.

Although the results seen in the development of the attitudes of the rural people in connection with family planning are not negligible, the women, and more particularly the men, remain reluctant, indeed stubbornly adamant, regarding all contraceptive methods.

In order to deal with these problems, any deviation in the family planning sector should be avoided. To achieve this goal, we need revolutionary measures which will attack not only the outdated traditions of the procreating couple, but also the economic environment, which is still incapable of meeting the needs of the population.

5157

Fishing Industry Development in South Urged
45190025b Tunis LE TEMPS in French 19 Jan 88 p 2

[Text](TAP)Gabes—The national conference on fishing and aquaculture in the southern part of Tunisia completed its work here on Saturday, with Minister of Supply and Housing Sadok Ben Jemaa presiding. The recommendations of this conference stressed the need to safeguard marine life in the Gulf of Gabes, to develop the fishing fleet and to encourage young people to engage in fishing activities.

The participants in this conference, which was organized by the Office for the Development of the South in cooperation with the General Fishing Commissariat, expressed their satisfaction with the interest shown by the chief of state, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in the development of the South.

They also recommended the establishment of incentives to encourage development in this sector, rationalization of the assignment of fishing fleet units to the various ports of the republic, and development of coordination with the specialized technical structures in connection with establishment of the opening and closing dates for the fishing season.

The conference also provided an opportunity for noting the danger of pollution posed by the dumping of phosphogypsum on the Gabes coast.

The participants insisted, moreover, that the ports of Gabes and Zarzis be provided with the needed technical equipment.

They also recommended that the construction work on the ports planned along the southeastern coast, in the governorates of Gabes and Medenine, be speeded up.

Within this context, an appeal was made to developers and investors to establish processing units for the canning of fish, the development of aquaculture and the encouragement of young people to go to work for themselves in this sector.

Minister Sadok Ben Jemaa noted the concern expressed by the president of the republic for the southern regions of Tunisia and his concern with the consolidation of their development. He also recalled the efforts made by the government to promote the basic infrastructure for the fishing sector and to guarantee the maintenance of the equipment available, and thus their sensible use.

The minister praised the suggestions and recommendations made by the conference, and he appealed to the officials in the fishing sector to take the necessary practical steps to protect the halieutic assets against pollution, and to prevent anarchic fishing, particularly in the prohibited zones.

Minister Sadok Ben Jemaa urged the banks and financial institutions to increase their participation in the effort to develop the fishing sector, in particular through increased financial support to the benefit of young people, in view of the importance of the mission which falls to this sector in the national economy and employment.

In conclusion, he urged the participants to work to win the export battle in this vital sector and to guarantee control of the distribution circuits and the quality of our production.

Maintaining the Ecological Balance

In the course of a conference held on the 16th of this month on the subject "Relaunching Fishing and Aquaculture in Southern Tunisia," the approximately 300 participants stressed the importance of the infrastructure established and focused attention on the problems which are still preventing optimal use of the considerable fishing resources in the Gulf of Gabes.

Boasting 400 km of coastline and major lakes such as Boughrara and El Bidane, the southern part of Tunisia was provided with resources enabling it to make fishing a basic economic activity capable of contributing to the development and upsurge of the southern regions in the country.

In fact, during the 1970s, major investments were made in this sector by the state.

Thanks to an investment allocation of about 151 million dinars, this sector currently boasts five ports (Gabes, Zarzis, Houmt Souk, Zarat and Ajim), a number of unloading points, and 11 processing units, which have made it possible to develop and diversify production.

Thanks to the development of the port infrastructure, 1,780 coastal vessels, tuna boats and trawlers were able to produce 20,637 tons, representing 22.2 percent of the total national production, by the end of 1986.

The fishing sector in southern Tunisia, which employs more than 13,000 persons, will benefit, within the framework of the provisions of the Seventh Plan, from an investment allocation of 13.5 MD for the strengthening and modernization of the port infrastructure. Another allocation of 8 MD will also be earmarked for the purchase of 345 new fishing units. This sector is expected to produce 30.8 thousand tons by the year 1991.

The operators and officials in this sector believe that such a goal is within the realm of the possible, taking into account the importance of the halieutic resources in the southern region. However, achievement of it presumes the resolution of certain problems, such as the difficult weather conditions, which are not, moreover, the sole obstacle to the development of the sector, but which in the long range pose a veritable threat to the assets the Gulf contains.

Among the problems inherent in the infrastructure and production, the participants stressed:

—The increasingly evident incapacity of the present ports to accommodate and shelter a constantly growing fleet, because of which it is necessary, and in some cases urgently so, to establish unloading ports so as to increase the accommodation capacity, both on the Gabes and the Medenine coasts.

—The still limited capacity for producing ice for the storage of the product.

—The difficulty in obtaining spare parts and the lack of heavy equipment for use in repairing trawlers and small craft.

With regard to the marketing of production both at home and abroad, the participants emphasized the imperative need to reorganize the circuits for distributing maritime products on the domestic market. They noted that the major hindrance to the development of coastal fishing, particularly for bluefish, is the incapacity of the traditional distribution circuits to handle the steadily increasing volume of production.

To achieve the double goal of ensuring food sufficiency and consolidating exports, the participants appealed to both fishermen and industrialists to increase the production of certain species of fish suitable for processing, to achieve better control over processing costs, and above all, to improve the quality of the product exported.

Another major problem noted by the participants is the pollution caused by the toxic refuse dumped into the sea by the chemical industry units in Gabes.

In this connection, the unlimited quantities of toxic materials such as phosphogypsum and phosphoric acid which are dumped into the sea pose a direct threat to the maritime flora, the nutritional environment for the fish species living near the coast. This is a threat which will affect the ecological balance along the coast, involving a number of species of fish, and will also cause other species to migrate to the ocean depths.

To remedy this situation, the participants appealed to the public authorities to take energetic action in order to establish a system for purifying waste water and using the phosphogypsum in the production of construction materials (plaster, asphalt).

They also recommended additional state incentives for the development of fishing in the South, the launching of family aquaculture projects and encouragement of bank investments in this sector.

INDIA

Uttar Pradesh Farmers Confront Authorities

Farmers Organize Like Trade Unions

46000101 Calcutta SUNDAY in English
28 Feb-5 Mar 88 pp 35-41

[First paragraph is introductory and is printed in italics. Words in italics as published.]

[Text] *Mahendra Singh Tikait has emerged as the new messiah of the farmers. And his movement, more on the lines of trade unionism, may see the start of a potentially dangerous phase in government-farmer relations.*

It has taken him just under a month to become a national figure. On the evening of 27 January, one lakh farmers gathered in Meerut's dusty Civil Defence Accounts (CDA) grounds to launch a *dharna* to emphasise an 11-point charter of demands. The mass movement aroused some interest, partly in its demands, but mainly in Mahendra Singh Tikait, the rough-hewn six-footer who the farmers held up as their leader.

As the *dharna* continued, the tension mounted. Educational institutions in Meerut were shut down and life in parts of the city came to a halt. On 13 January, Tikait called for a militant non-cooperation movement. "If government officers come to the villages to collect revenue," Tikait told his followers, "then you should trash them." By mid-February, the violence, that had till now been implicit in the agitation, came to the fore. On 16 February, farmers agitated on the Rajabpur to Jaya section of the Delhi-Moradabad highway. Police opened fire. Seven died. On 17 February, students and farmers began damaging state transport buses in the Hapur bus depot and set fire to two police jeeps in Ghaziabad. Police opened fire again. By the next day, a general alert had been sounded all over Western Uttar Pradesh as the agitation threatened to go out of hand. While both UP chief minister Vir Bahadur Singh and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said they would not give in to Tikait, there was no doubt that the dishevelled, ambling, farmer's leader had hit the big time.

He was on the covers of several national magazines and headline writers vied with each other for terms to describe him. And yet nobody seemed quite sure of just what Tikait represented or what he would metamorphose into. Some compared him to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, others drew the more obvious parallels with Sharad Joshi, still others thought that he was the logical inheritor of Chaudhary Charan Singh's rural constituency, and some even made far-fetched comparisons to Mahatma Gandhi.

As his agitation gathered momentum and his fame spread, Tikait made it clear that no politician with an eye on UP could afford to ignore him. And as his followers began to call him a messiah and compare him to Ram and Krishna, the farmers' leader beamed, pleased with all the attention.

Agrarian unrest has finally visited northern India. After four years of relentless drought, a storm is flowing across Western Uttar Pradesh. It is a storm that has brought the farmers no water, but has brought them something they regard as nearly as important: hope. For the first time since the Green Revolution transformed Indian agriculture from being a subsistence exercise into a commercially viable activity, the farmers are beginning to organise themselves—just as the industrial workers have done—and demand a better deal. They want water and power on time (essential for the high-yielding varieties of seeds introduced during the Green Revolution); and they want lower prices for inputs (seeds for instance) and higher prices for outputs. And their rhetoric is chillingly reminiscent of trade union militants. "These are not our demands. These are our rights," proclaims Bhopal Singh, a prominent Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) leader and Mahendra Singh Tikait's brother.

There were reverberations of the unrest in the south: the Karnataka State Farmers' Association (KSFA) decided to launch an identical stir to press the demands of farmers in Karnataka and sent a delegation to Meerut to consult Tikait on the strategy of their movement. According to the KSFA leader, Prof. M.D. Nanjundaswamy, one of the similarities in the demands of farmers in Karnataka and UP was the payment of electricity arrears over the last four years. The government's unscientific pricing policy had been costing them crores of rupees in losses every year, he said. He even argued for giving up the policy of granting subsidies to farmers, and instead, offering scientific prices for their produce. The same methods used for calculating industrial prices should be used for fixing the prices of farm produce. In Hyderabad, the Bharat Krishak Samaj (BKS) demanded a "revolving calamity relief fund" to assist farmers in times of distress and also that agricultural prices should be directly related to input costs.

The BKS had earlier claimed that nine cotton farmers in Andhra Pradesh's Prakasam district had committed suicide on account of the drought—a claim that was never verified. But it did give the Congress(I) another stick to beat NTR with. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, while attending a BKS convention in Hyderabad, promptly directed Governor Kumudben Joshi to file a report on the suicide incident. This prompted even the CPI, which is hostile to the Telugu Desam government, to come down heavily on the PM. Said the state council secretary of the CPI, N. Giri Prasad: "The PM's instructions to the Governor seriously violate democratic norms..."

Realising the potential of the Meerut agitator to spread to other parts of the country, the Prime Minister announced a package of concessions during an address

he delivered to the BKU convention on 15 February: the collection of penal and compound interest on crop loans would be deferred; wherever accumulated interest exceeded the principal amount, interest would be waived; repayment of short-term loans in areas which had two successive years of drought could be made over seven years, and in areas which had three years of drought, over ten years. But that was all. As for the demand to raise the price of sugarcane, the PM said that sugar mills might not be able to buy the high-priced cane, and increasing government subsidies and support price too much would hit the economy, and rebound on farmers themselves. "Already, losses from irrigation alone amount to nearly Rs 700 crores every year," Rajiv Gandhi told the convention. "Hundreds of crores more are being lost by electricity boards, banks and other institutions." Although it was important to subsidise agriculture, it was irresponsible to demand that electricity bills should be written off, he said.

Reacting to the announcement, the leader of the Shetkari Sanghatana in Maharashtra, Sharad Joshi, called it the "babble of a child." He questioned the utility of deferring or even waiving interest payments, and delaying repayment of loans for farmers who tilled the land to survive: "The farmers cannot make both ends meet even when the rains are good. So what happens to them in such years?" He said that remunerative prices were the central issue for farmers anywhere, and was sure that the government would never increase them despite its promise: "Rajiv," he said, "is a part and parcel of a neocolonial system based on the exploitation of farmers." While he frequently offers incentives to industry for increased production, the farm sector, which is the most productive, is ignored, Joshi pointed out.

But on 20 February, Rajiv Gandhi flew to Lucknow to announce a massively increased drought relief assistance to Uttar Pradesh. The Prime Minister told a modest-sized gathering at the Begum Hazrat Mahal ground that remunerative prices would be paid to farmers and everything would be done to help them in their hour of crisis. Refusing to write off electricity bills or raise the price of sugarcane, the Prime Minister said he was ready to consider legitimate grievances, but would have nothing to do with irresponsible demands.

And in Meerut, Tikait called off his 21-day agitation, though he said the non-cooperation movement—non-payment of bills—would continue. Tikait had got what he wanted. The government had been forced to come forward with a positive response.

The agitation in Meerut, Joshi said, had not achieved its objective because farmers there had failed to cash in on their "economic clout." Any agitation, to succeed, "must at least constitute a political threat to the powers that be." During the onion agitation in Maharashtra, which he had spearheaded a few years ago, the prices of onions had shot up and this itself had forced the government to make up its mind. The Assembly of large numbers of

people at a spot and undertaking *satyagraha* for long periods was not enough, he felt. While *satyagraha* was good, what the farmers need to resort to, Joshi said, is "guerilla *satyagraha*." Also, Tikait's agitation should have been directed at specific areas rather than a generality of demands, he said.

The farmers' movement in Uttar Pradesh is not the first of its kind but the latest in a series of agitations that have rocked different regions since the mid-Seventies, when the pressures of commercial agriculture began to be felt. This was the violent aftermath of the Green Revolution. The first to hold the banner of the small farmer aloft was Narayanaswamy of Tamil Nadu in 1976-77. Then came the Shetkari Sanghatana movement led by Sharad Joshi in 1980. In 1982-83 Rudrappa of Karnataka led another peasant's movement in the south. The Patels of Gujarat rose in revolt in 1983-84. And Mahendra Singh Tikait came up in 1987-88. The demands in most of these agitations have been similar: remunerative prices, subsidised inputs, and a moratorium on payments of debts. All of them have involved an assertion of "peasant power." What sets Mahendra Singh Tikait apart from the others is his distaste for political associations.

One common factor in all these movements is that they have taken off from trends which were officially promoted since the mid-Sixties, as part of the new agricultural strategy to usher in the Green Revolution. The Green revolution multiplied food production in the Seventies and early Eighties, but has not shown signs of evening out. The thrust of the new agricultural strategy was a technological upgrading of farming, along with price incentives to farmers producing marketable surpluses. If self-sufficiency in foodgrains is anything to go by, the strategy was a success. But the last four years of drought have given rise to other vital questions: how useful has the Green Revolution been, really? For one thing, it has been limited to certain regions with developed irrigation facilities and to a class of farmers who have the land and means to engage in commercial farming, against other farmers who are engaged in subsistence farming.

If anything, the Green Revolution has accentuated disparities in the countryside. That only a small fraction of the peasantry has drawn dividends from commercial agriculture is obvious from the fact that only 10 per cent of agricultural households today own 55 per cent of agricultural land, while 50 per cent of irrigation facilities are under the control of about 13 per cent of households which have more than four hectares of land each, 59 per cent of households with less than one hectare of land each have access to only 9.5 per cent of these facilities.

The number of wage-earners in the rural economy has gone up by 60 per cent since the advent of the new agricultural strategy. These workers do not have any land of their own and the so-called "remunerative prices of farm produce" are actually an extortion from them. According to the report of the sub-committee of the

parliamentary consultative committee attached to the ministry of labour, which was set up to make recommendations on the problem of unorganised agricultural labour, "it is an undisputed reality today that a population of over 70 million, who earn a major part of income by sale of labour power in the activities connected with agriculture, remain unprotected. They are primarily dependent on job opportunities offered by the landholders." The report goes to point out that the basis for fixation of agricultural prices needs to be studied because it directly affects the economic position of this deprived class: "The low price of agricultural produce and in some cases distress sale of crop along with tardy land reforms adversely affect the living conditions of the rural and agricultural labour force."

Who does Tikait stand for, and how justified are his demands? Said Kadam Singh, block president of the BKU in Tikait's village, Sisoli: "Even poor farmers and landless labourers are with us. From Khatauli even rickshawallas had gone to Meerut. There were slumdweller from Delhi, landless labourers from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and other parts of UP. There is no state whose people do not back us. And our supporters are from all social strata." That was obviously a boast. According to Arvind Chaudhury of the Congress Seva Dal in Bijnor, a Scheduled Caste dominated district where Tikait's writ is supposed to run, "The BKU is a Jat union, a *lath dal* (a gang of ruffians). It is an organisation based on caste." He says that the BKU provides a share of leadership to subdivisions of the Jat community, called Khaps and Gotras (like Tomar and Malik). The Khaps have their own *panchayats*, and of the 365 Khaps in the country, the 18 most important ones are in Western Uttar Pradesh. So it is these subdivisions which the BKU speaks for, more than anything or anyone else. By the same token, hardcore BKU followers are extremely contemptuous of lower castes.

"Tikait has not had any effect on *kisans* as such, but middle-level Jat farmers who own tractors, trolleys, tubewells and cane crushers," said Babu Kishan Lal, a former MLA and general secretary of the district Congress(I) committee of Bijnor. "They oppress Harijans, backwards and Muslims who form the bulk of agricultural labourers here." He went on: "Most of them fight with the lower castes for the most obscure reasons: over the use of toilets, grazing lands, and wells for drinking water." In the field, he said, "agricultural labourers are treated as bonded labourers who have to work either in the Jat's plots or in their homes all the year round. They do not have a choice because they are paid for the whole season together. Many of them are also in debt to their masters."

The story of Yameen, a labourer from Muzaffarnagar, who had to move to Haryana to survive, is telling enough. He and his five brothers lived in abject poverty in Uttar Pradesh. The family was able to obtain a bank loan to buy a horse-cart, but had to sell it off when they ran into debt. They had no land of their own. With the

money from the horse-cart, Yameen and his brothers bought a buffalo. But, as luck would have it, the animal died. Eventually, the entire family migrated to a village near Panipat. Said he: "This season has been very difficult. The landlords have cut our wages. They pay us Rs 2,000 for the whole year to break our backs on their land, and in their homes. Before the drought, the rates were higher. And we have to pay for our own food, too." Yameen has three children and a wife to look after. And he hasn't been paid yet. So, he has to visit Panipat to find work as a construction labourer to survive.

But even if it is accepted that the BKU's is the voice of the *Kulak*, how is the government to deal with the rage of the big and middle farmer who wants to be treated on a par with industry? How is the government to tackle the economic and commercial ambitions of the upwardly mobile rural landowner?

According to Chaudhury Chandra Bir Singh, BKU leader in Shamli, the BKU's original demands related to power: the movement in its initial stages was a protest against the electricity department's failure to restore supply after local transformers had burned out in many places, irregular power supply in others, the increase in the power tariff in 1987 from Rs 22.50 per horse power (HP) to Rs 30 per HP, and irregularities in electricity bills. Said Singh: "Very often a person who had paid his bill was given another, and when he went to plead with the authorities that it must be a mistake, they wouldn't listen and cut off his line." Thus started the BKU's non-cooperation movement. People stopped paying irrigation and electricity bills and house tax.

The first major flashpoint of the BKU's year-and-a-half long movement was at the village of Karmo Kheri, near Shamli, where a large number of people collected to offer *satyagraha* on 3 March, 1987. The *satyagraha* was to be held the previous day, but police set up barricades at several places to cut off entry to the village. The villagers clashed with the policemen and the police fired on the crowd, killing three farmers, Akbar Ali, Jaipal Singh and Manoj Kumar. The three are now hailed as martyrs. Other *kisan* rallies have been organised since then and units of the BKU have been set up "in every village."

In August 1987, a BKU rally was held in Sisoli. The UP chief minister, Vir Bahadur Singh, arrived to address the farmers. But he was shouted down. The crowd treated him with contempt, and he made no attempt to appease them with assurances. He said that some of the demands could be looked into in Lucknow, but nothing could be done about the others. The DM of Muzaffarnagar was also there.

"On their request, we decided to give the government more time to deal with our demands," Chaudhury Chandra Bir Singh said. But when no action was taken, the farmers went ahead with their movement. Rallies were held all over Western UP and even in Mathura, Amethi, Faizabad and Panipat—where representatives from

other states were present, too. Said Bhopal Singh: "Each one of our rallies brings lakhs of people. But we never bring out posters and pamphlets to publicise them." The secret, according to him is that when the BKU decides to hold a meeting, word gets round, and people join in. What need is there for publicity when the union is actually one large clan?

It was after the Panipat rally that the BKU, which began holding meetings of its working committee on the 17th of every month in Tikait's house in Sisoli, decided to gherao the Meerut commissioner on 22 January, 1988. A meeting was held in the village of Ramola near Meerut, where an ugly incident occurred. Even as BKU representatives were holding negotiations with Lok Sabha Speaker Balram Jakhar in Delhi, a couple of senior police and administrative officials went to the village to arrest Tikait. Said a BKU activist: "The intention was really to provoke violence, and make it look like Tikait and his men had tried to kidnap the officials, because initially they went without a big force." As the officials, including the SDM of Sardhana and the *tehsildar* of Baghpat, reached the house where Tikait had gone to settle a family dispute, the inmates locked the doors and windows, took positions on the roof and fired warning shots.

The crowds which had collected in Ramola made their way to Meerut for the BKU's biggest *satyagraha* movement on 27 January, 1988. Some of the farmers' major demands are:

- Raising the price of sugarcane from Rs 27 a quintal to Rs 35 a quintal;
- Withdrawal of all false cases lodged against *kisans* after the Shamli incident;
- Writing off last year's electricity bills;
- Tax relief for farmers on account of the drought;
- Fixed power tariff in relation to the depth of the groundwater table;
- No penalty for non-payment of electricity bills;
- Immediate repair of defective transformers;
- Twelve hours of power every day;
- No disconnection of power lines for agricultural pumpsets;
- Reservation of government jobs for children of farmers;
- Pension for farmers above 55 years of age;
- The right of farmers to cut down their own trees.

The full list of 35 demands is much longer and many of the demands are repeated. But the similarity with an industrial trade union is unmistakable.

To what extent do Tikait and the BKU represent the grievances of farmers? There's little doubt that the terms of trade have shifted against agriculture. Government figures make it clear that farmers are paying more for inputs and getting less for their produce. The wholesale price index increased by 5.93 per cent in 1986-87. But the index for foodgrains prices showed a *decline* of 0.53

per cent. The prices of pulses went down by 8.28 per cent. And even in the case of agricultural products that showed an increase in price, it was lower than the increase in the wholesale price index. For instance, sugar went up by only 1.72 per cent and wheat by even less: 1.53 per cent.

In its policy document, *Agricultural Price Policy—A Long Term Perspective*, (brought out in November 1986), the Government of India accepted that there was a need to provide "stable and remunerative market prices to the farmers." *The Economic Survey* of 1986-87 also pointed out the rise in the production of sugar and oilseeds—both cases had involved the government's declaring minimum guaranteed prices in advance long before the time of sowing. And yet, despite such statements and instances, the farmer has continued to lag behind, ending up paying more and earning less.

So, when Tikait asks for more remunerative prices, he is neither demanding anything outrageous nor saying anything new. Why then has he been so successful in articulating these demands? After all, the Kisan Sabhas, led by the two communist parties, had made similar demands. And in fact, the first *dharna* at the Karmo Kheri power house was organised by the CPM-led Kisan Sabha in 1985. Even the Lok Dal has voiced similar demands.

One possible reason is that the other parties did not take advantage of the traditional infrastructure provided by the most fundamental organisational unit of Indian society—caste. Tikait has been able to revive such moribund traditional structures as Khaps, and make use of them for the farmers' movement. Much of his authority is drawn from his position (hereditary) as head of the Baliyan Khap.

While this is a strength, it is also a disadvantage. Says Rampal Singh, secretary of the CPI(M)'s Bijnor district committee: "Some of Tikait's demands are genuine. We support the demand for the hike in the sugarcane price. But when it comes to demand regarding electricity, the fact is that in Bijnor district, only 10 per cent of the farmers have electricity connections. It is only in Muzaffarnagar and Meerut districts that 60 per cent of the farmers have electricity." Singh's point is that "Tikait is the spokesman of a particular group of rich farmers who has got somewhere because the Congress(I) government in Uttar Pradesh would rather appease him than deal with the Lok Dal which would turn such a victory into an election winning issue. Since only Tikait could get the demands accepted, farmers have momentarily turned away from political parties and their *kisan* organisations," he says.

Others suggest that the caste basis of Tikait's organisation will restrict its long-term appeal. Says Chhote Khan, a Muzaffarnagar milkman, "Even among the Jats in his movement, he gives more prominence to those from his

Baliyan Khap. He never takes up the demands of landless labourers and Harijans. When Raj Kumar, a Jat advocate, was killed, he condemned the killing and demanded a CBI inquiry but when 11 Muslims were dragged out of buses and slain by fanatic Shiv Sena activists last year he did not utter a word. How can Muslims join such a leader?"

So, what ultimately does this awakening of peasant power represent? Is Tikait a Sharad Joshi-like figure who will merely articulate the economic grievances of the peasantry? Or is he heir to Charan Singh's constituency? The distinction is important because Joshi and Charan Singh, though both farmers' leaders, took very different tacks.

Ajay Singh, a Lok Dal MLC in Uttar Pradesh, was a close associate of Charan Singh's. In 1982, the Chaudhary sent him to Pune to spend several days with Joshi and find out what he really believed. Ajay Singh's conclusion was that while Sharad Joshi and Charan Singh agreed on most things, they differed on one major issue—politics. Joshi had an aversion to politics: Charan Singh believed implicitly in it. Recalls Ajay Singh, "The two leaders met at Charan Singh's Delhi residence in August 1984 and Charan Singh explained why he did not favour a limited agitationist approach. The demands for remunerative prices were just but their gains are limited without effective political power. If the government gives remunerative prices, it takes away the gains by hiking the cost of agricultural inputs. So unless a pro-farmer government comes into existence, the problem will remain unresolved."

In many ways, despite his Jat background. Tikait's approach is closer to Joshi's than to the Chaudhary's. But while Joshi is an intelligent, erudite man with an understanding of agrarian economics. Tikait is essentially an agitator. His methods, the threat of violence implicit in many of his statements, and his insistence on framing basically economic demands suggest that his true counterparts may be among urban trade-unionism. And in many ways, he is reminiscent of today's non-ideological trade union leaders like Datta Samant who are not interested in seizing power but care only about seizing an economic advantage. And just as it was once said of Samant, that he was being encouraged by the Congress to beat the politicised unions (mainly communist-dominated), so it is being said of Tikait, that he is being used by the ruling party to infiltrate the Lok Dal's vote-bank.

If this is in fact the case, then Mahendra Singh Tikait's emergence may signal the start of a new and potentially dangerous phase in government-farmer relations. Because the farmers no longer want rhetoric and reassurance. They want concrete economic results. And they want them now.

New Farmer Leader

*46000101 Calcutta SUNDAY in English
28 Feb-5 Mar 88 pp 38-39*

[Words in italics as published]

[Text] The contradictions abound. He is a son of the soil, a true farmers' leader but owns an electrical goods shop in Jyoti colony, Shahdara, Delhi. He calls his movement nonpolitical but keeps lines open to the likes of Balram Jakhar and Rajesh Pilot. He likes to regard himself as a man of peace but is always surrounded by gun-toting bodyguards. He regards his movement as non-violent but does not utter a word to condemn those who burn cars and destroy property. His followers regard him as a great and sensible leader but he has a history of mental illness and has been admitted to the Agra Mental Hospital more than once. His sycophants compare him to Ram and Krishna; instead of contradicting them, he periodically announces that he receives direct communication from God.

Of such contradictions is a farmers' leader made in today's Uttar Pradesh. And Mahendra Singh Tikait is certainly the most important agriculture spokesman to have emerged in that region over the last two decades. Born to Muktiari Devi and the late Chaudhury Chahal Singh, Tikait lives in Sisoli, a village in Muzaffarnagar. He is the hereditary head of the baliyan Khap of the Jats which is spread over 84 villages around Sisoli. The Jats are divided into 365 Khaps or *gotras* of which Desh Khap is the largest. These Khaps have their own *panchayats* and their head wields enormous influence. Till Tikait came into prominence, the role of Khaps was entirely social and cultural but his example shows that they can be used to create a formidable political structure.

Tikait's position today is that politicians have no credibility and that he represents an alternative to them because he is apolitical. But in fact, the 'apolitical' routine is a recent development. He first became politically active in 1978 when he took part in a pro-Charan Singh agitation. He will admit now that he was a Charan Singh supporter but maintains that his disillusionment with politics began after Charan Singh fell ill. By the time the Chaudhary died, it had progressed to the level where he could describe all politicians as 'thieves.' And now there are indications that he has outgrown even his loyalty to Charan Singh. At Kamarwal village near Baghpat in Meerut district a few months ago, Tikait made derogatory remarks about Charan Singh from the dais at a public meeting. He was hooted by the audience, abandoned his speech and later apologised for his statements.

It is tempting to dismiss him as a nut who happens to be in the right place at the right time—what with his history of mental illness—but it is instinctive to recall that Bhindranwale was also dismissed in this way till it was too late. And while the Bhindranwale parallels seem

inapt—as yet—there are certain similarities. Like the late terrorist, Tikait too moves surrounded by gunmen. He too has started dispensing justice and intimidating those who do not obey him. He too issues diktats to police officers and nobody in his area is allowed to lodge a report at any police station without his prior permission. And he has been known to claim that he is an incarnation of God.

/12913

IRAN

Bazargan Urges Prosecution of Interior Minister *46400091 London KEYHAN in Persian 25 Feb 88 p 3*

[Text] The Freedom Movement, headed by Engineer Bazargan, issued a communique in Tehran demanding that the authorities of the Islamic Republic prosecute 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the interior minister of the Islamic regime.

Considering the recent statements of Mohtashemi describing all political parties in Iran, including the nationalists, as despised traitors, the Freedom Movement demanded an investigation of the past record of 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi.

Recently, in a seminar of governors general in Mashhad, he said: "Political parties in our country are weak and are not trusted by the people, because in the course of the history of the past 40 years they have left the people and their destiny with bitter experiences." He added: "Most of all, the nationalist parties turned their backs on the nation, and their bid to attain positions and high offices was supported by the enemies of this country. Hence, our people despise them and have rejected them."

This was the harshest attack by 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the interior minister of the Islamic regime, against the National Front and the Freedom Movement, the leaders of which worked to bring the Islamic regime to power and who established the first government in Iran after the Islamic revolution. Mohtashemi also asked the Ministry of Information and the judicial branch to investigate the past records of the National Front and the Freedom Movement in order to make clear what they have done before and since the revolution.

In its indictment against Mohtashemi, the Freedom Movement writes: The question must be asked: Which Islamic standards permit a person with a questionable past in the struggles of the Iranian nation to claim that all political parties of the past, including the Freedom Movement of Iran, the Islamic Republican Party, the coalition committees and the Islamic Fedais, have foreign affiliations? Are such persons as Ayatollah Taleqani, Engineer Bazargan, Dr Sahabi, Dr Chamran and Dr Shari'ati affiliated with foreigners, and are persons such as the interior minister nurtured by Mary and

formed by Jesus? Were parties that, upon the instructions of the leader, of the revolution were supported financially from religious taxes and operated by the fellow ideologues of Mr Mohtashemi affiliated with foreigners?

The communique of the Freedom Movement further states: We have frequently asked the officials of the judicial branch to defend themselves against the creation of an atmosphere, accusations and rabble-rousing against the Movement in regards to the accusations made by loud-mouthed, impious persons, but thus far no one has taken steps in this regard. Everyone knows the past records of these elements; there is nothing vague in their report cards.

Engineer Bazargan adds: But the question which is raised here is, Who knows about Mr Mohtashemi's past, a person who was a child during the oil nationalization and a youth on 15 Khordad [5 June]? Where and in what arena was he active? Where was he educated? Where did he gain experience? And what right does he have to consider himself the custodian of the people? It might be answered that he is trusted by the prime minister and some of the officials. But was the same not also true of the Shar' magistrate of Lorestan Province, who was later known to be an Afghan and an incompetent individual who was to be discarded? Were Mr Keshmiri and Mr Kolahi not trusted by the officials?

In conclusion, Engineer Bazargan expressed in this communique his astonishment at the silence of the officials of the Islamic Republic in regards to Mohtashemi's statements and demanded the prosecution and trial of 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. In reaction to the communique of Engineer Bazargan, the leader of the Freedom Movement, last Sunday, in a gathering of the inspectors for the elections of the third Majlis, 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi said: "We will by no means allow a person or a group to make a candidate for the people." He added: "Foreign minigroups have concentrated their propaganda bugles on the elections, intending to disrupt them."

It should be pointed out that the interior minister of the Islamic regime has prevented the election meeting of the Freedom Movement and officials have arrested a number of people who had gone to participate in this meeting.

10000

IRI, Israel Reportedly Holding Secret Talks *46400092b London KEYHAN in Persian* *25 Feb 88 p 12*

[Text] In its secret news section, the French weekly NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR writes that secret talks between the Islamic Republic and Israel are underway in

a European country. The aim of these talks is for the Islamic Republic to create facilities for the migration of about 30,000 Iranian Jews to Israel in exchange for weapons from that country.

The French weekly does not give any more details. But Austrian newspapers wrote some time ago that in the talks between the officials of the Islamic Republic and Israel the decision was made that 5,000 Iranian Jews will migrate to Israel via Austria, facilitated by the Islamic government.

Thousands of Iranian Jews migrated to Europe, the United States and Israel after the establishment of the Islamic government in Iran. At the same time, the government of Iraq announced that last Thursday, the anti-aircraft guns of that country shot down unmanned Israeli aircraft in the border area between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Iraq then claimed that unmanned aircrafts were gathering information for the Islamic Republic and disrupting the air defense system of Iraq. Iraqi newspapers also write that Israel regularly helps the Islamic government with its resources and equipment. The organ newspaper of the Ba'th army of Iraq writes that Israel and Iran are cooperating closely in threatening the security of the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region and destabilizing the regimes of these countries.

The spokesman of the Israeli army denied Iraq's report concerning the crash of an unmanned aircraft from that country near the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border. This is the first time since the bombing of the Tamuz nuclear center by Israeli airplanes in 1981 that the government of Baghdad has reported another clash between itself and Israel.

10000

Seven Executed Following Bomb Explosion in Tehran

46400092a London KEYHAN in Persian 25 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] Following two bomb explosions in north Tehran and the discovery of two other bombs in Reza'iyyeh and Tehran, a new wave of executions began in the Islamic Republic.

The Supreme Judicial Council of the regime held a session on Sunday, 2 Esfand [21 February], and approved the execution ruling of seven persons accused of participation in bombing in Tehran and issued orders for their implementation.

The Supreme Judicial Council presented these seven members as agents of the Iraqi regime in Iran and accused them of having a hand in the bombing on Ferdowsi Square.

In this bombing incident, explosives concealed in a car killed or wounded more than 40 people.

In the course of the past week, two cars packed with explosives exploded in the streets of north Tehran, around the residence of Ayatollah Khomeyni, wounding 14 people and causing a great deal of damage to homes and stores in the vicinity, according to the news agency of the Islamic regime.

The Islamic regime claimed that last week two other powerful bombs were also discovered and disarmed. One of these bombs was placed on Vanak Square in north Tehran and the other in a gas station in Reza'iyyeh. The Islamic regime did not announce the number of those killed and wounded in the recent explosions in Tehran. These explosions on the streets of north Tehran, one week after the commemoration of the anniversary of the coming to power of the Islamic regime, angered officials of the Islamic regime.

The Ministry of Information and Security of the regime blamed the agents of the oppressors and the Ba'th government of Iraq for these bombings. The regime generally uses the phrase "agents of the oppressors" to refer to its opponents.

In a communique, the People's Mojahedin organization denied involvement in the Tehran bombings.

10000

NEPAL

Japan To Provide Assistance

46000103a Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 24 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] Kathmandu, 23 Feb—Japan has provided a grant assistance of about Rs. 37,600,000 (thirty-seven million six hundred thousand), equivalent to Japanese yen 223,795,000 (two hundred twenty-three million seven hundred ninety-five thousand), in lieu of repayment of debt during the period of last one year.

Finance Secretary Lok Bahadur Shrestha and charge d'affaires at the Japanese Embassy Hojun Kikuchi signed the letters of exchange Tuesday on behalf of the governments of Nepal and Japan respectively.

According to a Finance Ministry press release, the grant assistance will be utilized for the purchase of development goods like cement, steel bars, fertilizers, petroleum products, and irrigation, transportation and communication equipments from the countries mutually agreed upon.

At the signing function, Mr Shrestha noted with appreciation the Japanese assistance in fields like agriculture, water resources, telecommunications, health, industry and others.

He disclosed there were many projects under consideration for possible Japanese assistance and expressed the hope that Japan would extend financial cooperation for Arun III project.

Mr Kikuchi expressed the hope that the grant assistance would be fully utilized to secure commodities for various development programmes of Nepal.

He also gave the assurance that Japan would continue to extend all possible cooperation to Nepal in uplifting the living standard of the Nepalese people and expressed the confidence that the cooperative relations existing between the two countries would be widened and strengthened further.

/9604

First Woman Ambassador
46000103b Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL in English 20 Feb 88 p 7

[Text] Kathmandu, 19 Feb (RSS)—The newly appointed Royal Nepalese Ambassador to India, Mrs Bindeshwari Shaha is the first Nepalese woman to become an ambassador.

Mrs Shaha, 52, was joint secretary in the Foreign Ministry before her appointment as ambassador and was in charge of the Europe and America desk.

She has provided 27 years of service in the Foreign Ministry, also worked as charge d'affaires at the Royal Nepalese Embassy in Dhaka.

Mrs Shaha has been decorated with the Gorkha Dakshin Bahu (Second Class) and Trishakti Patta (Third Class).

/9604

PAKISTAN

Technical Cooperation With Libya To Expand
46000102c Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 15 Feb 88 p 10

[Text] Islamabad, 14 Feb—The foreign minister of Libya, Mr Jadallah Azzouz A. Talahi said today "my visit has been a step forward in strengthening brotherly ties between Pakistan and Libya."

"The two countries are strongly linked by the bonds of Islamic faith. We are bound together as brothers by our religion," he told newsmen at the Islamabad Airport before leaving for Karachi on his way back home.

Expressing his satisfaction with the talks he held with Pakistan leaders and officials he said "I am very happy with the results of our discussions" and added "the other side agrees with me."

The Libyan foreign minister said that social security agreement signed by him during his stay was very important as it would help Libya meet its need of experts and technicians from Pakistan. At the Joint Ministerial Commission meeting "Pakistan and Libya have agreed to enhance cooperation in technical field."

The foreign minister of Libya said about 20,000 Pakistani personnel were working in his country. "Many of them are usefully contributing to higher education and health sectors."

Asked to comment on reported difficulties being faced by some Pakistani workers in Libya, Mr Jadallah Azzouz A. Talahi said "I am not aware of it but if they have any problem they should inform us about them."

He further stated "we are considering exchange of delegations to enable Pakistan and Libya [to] expand technical cooperation.

Asked about the topics of discussions he held with Pakistani officials, he replied "these included bilateral matters, Afghanistan, Palestine and Iran-Iraq war."

The Libyan foreign minister said he held very useful talks with President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, prime minister, Mr Mohammad Khan Junego, minister of state for foreign affairs, Mr Zain Noorani and other Pakistani officials.—APP

/9604

Economic, Cultural Exchange With Libya To Increase
46000102b Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 14 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, 13 Feb—The 10th session of the Pak-Libya Joint Ministerial Commission which was held here from 10-13 February, has reached a broad agreement on a number of proposals aimed at enhancing economic, cultural and commercial exchanges between Pakistan and Libya.

Special agreements were also finalised on social security, cultural agreement and protocol and equivalence of diplomas and degrees.

Talks between the two sides were held in a cordial and brotherly atmosphere.

The Libyan delegation was led by Secretary of the People's Committee of the Popular Bureau for Foreign Liaison of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamhuriya, Mr Jadallah Azouz al Talhi. The Pakistan side was led by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Zain Noorani.

Mr Jaddalah Azouz al Talhi, who is also the foreign minister of Libya called on Prime Minister Mr Mohamad Khan Junejo today who later held a banquet in honour of the visiting dignitary.—APP

/9604

Leader Criticizes Govt 'Interference' in Azad Kashmir

46000102a Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
8 Feb 88 p 6

[Text] Muzaffarabad, 7 Feb—The vice-president of Jammu & Kashmir Tehreek-e-Amal Party, Major Rafiq Choudhry has, in a press statement, expressed his serious concern on the reported decision of the government of Pakistan to transfer AK's deputy inspector general of police, Sardar Hamidullah Khan and appoint him as OSD in Pakistan's Interior Ministry, and in his place post Mr Abdur Razaq Khan, DIG, Sargodha as DIG, Azad Kashmir. The TAP leader has further said that Azad Kashmir is neither a province of Pakistan nor a colonised territory where Islamabad could send its officers at will. "This is unjust to say the least as in this way the legitimate rights of the indigenous employees are militated against."

Major Rafiq says "we would have no objection if an AK DIG is posted to Sargodha or for that matter anywhere else in Pakistan and in his place a Pakistan DIG is sent to Azad Kashmir, but it would be considered a highly unjust action if only Pakistani senior 'bosses' are transferred to Azad Kashmir without any replacement from there."

The Tehreek-e-Amal party leader while pointing out that the government of Pakistan has been claiming to be impartial in the on-going political crisis in Azad Kashmir, has criticised what he calls "unwarranted interference in the administrative affairs of the State." "Does this prove," he asks, that the administrative machinery of the AK government has collapsed, and if it has, he adds, then the government of Pakistan should suspend the remove AK government and arrange fresh polls in the Azad territory.

Meanwhile, vice-chairman of Jammu & Kashmir Awami Ittehad has, in a press release, expressed similar views about the posting of a Pakistani DIG in Azad Kashmir.—PR

/9604

10

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated. Those from English-language sources are transcribed, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names which are rendered phonetically or transliterated by FBIS/JPRS are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in 8 volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Africa (Sub-Sahara), Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically. Current JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcovers or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. DOD consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate

command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.) For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (703) 527-2368, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.