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Near East & South Asia

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EGYPT

Defense Minister Compares Defense Budget with Israel's

45040072b London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
16 Feb 88 p 9

[Text] Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim al-Ghazalah, General of the Army, Deputy Prime Minister, Egyptian Minister of Defense, and General Commander of the Forces, in meetings which he has held with members of parliament and the consultative council, has striven to clarify the dimensions of the issue of military expenditures raised by the opposition from time to time in the course of its discussion of the government's program and the state budget. According to a study prepared by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense regarding this subject, Abu-Ghazalah stated that Egypt's military budget is 2.2 billion Egyptian pounds annually, which is 8.5 percent of the national income, and the average contribution per person is \$20 per year; meanwhile, Israel's [military] budget is 6.5 billion [pounds], which is 30 percent of the national income, and the [average] contribution per person is \$1,093 annually.

Based on this study, and the observation and evaluation of the military expenditures of the Middle Eastern countries surrounding Egypt, the Egyptian defense budget must not be less than 5 billion Egyptian pounds annually.

13286

Factories Develop Long Range Surface-to-Surface Missiles

45040072a London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
8 Mar 88 p 4

[Text] Informed Arab sources in Cairo report that Egyptian weapons factories are currently supervising the implementation of the final phases of a program to develop a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 800 km, which will be called Condor 3. The development of the missile was financed by Arab sources and technically assisted by Argentina. The missile program, which began five years ago, is within the framework of the desire of Egyptian authorities to effect a strategic balance with Israel, in which the new missile would be tantamount to a response to the Israeli Jericho 2 missile, especially since the Condor 3 can carry nuclear warheads.

The disclosure of this program led to dissatisfaction on the part of the British government, in view of Argentina's desire to possess a number of these missiles and use them to threaten British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

13286

ISRAEL

Budget Deficit Much Less Than Anticipated

44230004a Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
8 Dec 87 pp 1, 11

[Article by Gad Li'or and Gid'on Eshet: "Surprise! Budget Deficit Only 1/2 Billion Instead of 1.25 Billion—The Treasury Concealed This Information for Fear of Creating 'A Sense of Cash Surplus'"]

[Text] Surprise! Fiscal Year 1987 ended with a deficit of 1/2 billion shekels, instead of a deficit of 1.25 billion shekels.

That is the assessment today in the Ministry of Finance, which, as yet, remains unpublished, in order to prevent a sense that "everything is working out all too well," and that there are, as it were, excess monies in the State treasury.

The positive difference in the State budget for the year will be in the enormous amount of 730 million shekels—an amount almost equal to the entire State budget cut that was recommended by the Ministry of Finance for the coming fiscal year (1988)—755 million shekels.

The Deputy Minister of Finance, 'Adi Amora'i, explained yesterday to Yedi'ot Aharonot that "the excellent results of the budget implementation and the improved deficit forecast are mainly linked to an increase in the collection of taxes from the public, from improved enforcement of tax authorities, as well as a great consumption that brought the Treasury to revenues higher than anticipated from taxes."

Moreover, Deputy Amora'i said that for the coming fiscal year such a bright future is not forecast, since even if all of the planned cutbacks are implemented, the deficit will amount to 1.230 billion shekels—an amount identical to that planned for the current fiscal year.

Economists at the Bank of Israel caution that the State's budget for the coming year will not result in a lowering of the rate of inflation and that under certain conditions it could even cause a devaluation of the shekel, even though such a devaluation is not currently unavoidable.

The Bank's economists prepared a series of working papers containing an analysis of Finance's suggestion for the State's budget for the coming year. The main findings are as follows: (1) Finance is misleading the government in its determination that the proposed budget does not increase the budget deficit. The deficit will increase by a factor of 5, and it will add up to an amount approximately equal to 3 percent of the GNP, instead of this year's 1/2 percent; (2) The budget heralds a worsening in the realm of the infrastructure, especially in the area of roads. According to calculations, the government will invest in the infrastructure approximately half of the

amount invested before the Yom Kippur War. A bottleneck will result in the economy as a result of the lack of a sufficient physical infrastructure; (3) There will be no improvement in the State's foreign-currency accounts, despite the fact that imports are expected to increase slightly in the coming year, following a cumulative growth of almost 25 percent in the past two years; (4) The standard of living will increase in the coming year by approximately 2 percent. The rate of unemployment will remain at a level similar to the present, approximately 100,000. Growth will be at its lowest level in four years.

Economists at the Bank claim that this budget will bring the momentum of the economic program to a halt and that the Ministry of Finance must be content with retaining the status quo instead of attempting to attain additional improvements.

13438

New B/CW Mask Developed

*44230008e Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
6 Jan 88 p 7*

[Article by Raz Yusif:]

[Text] A modern B/CW mask, which will fit 95 percent of the soldiers, was developed in Israel recently.

A perpendicular "sealing edge," which makes complete impermeability of the mask possible for all head sizes, is mounted in the new mask. In the future the mask is to replace the four types of masks existing today. It was learned that a similar mask was also developed for civilian use.

11439

Automation in IDF Engineering Corps

*44230008d Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
16 Dec 87 p 6*

[Article by Raz Yusif]

[Text] The engineering corps will soon be equipped with personal computers, which will make computerized recording and reporting from a mine field possible. BAMAHAHE has learned this.

Terminals will be distributed to company commanders, who will feed the computer data on the mine field, such as the field angle, its length, number of mines, and so forth. The data will be concentrated and plotted on a special graph. So far recording has been done on paper.

11439

KUWAIT

Interior Ministry Official Discusses Security Measures

44040105 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Jan 88 p 5

[Interview with Brigadier General Muhammad al-Qabandi, Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs, by AL-QABAS correspondent in Kuwait—date not given]

[Text] Brigadier General Muahammad al-Qabandi, Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs, has asserted that Kuwaiti security organs have been able to deal with and curb terrorist actions by virtue of the security men's solidarity and the Kuwaiti people's steadfastness in the face of tribulations and crises. He said that long-term strategic plans for a comprehensive security development are linked to material elements such as economic, political, and social matters and the concomitant residential communities.

He added that modernization of the organizational structure of the Interior Ministry's branches is aimed at concentrating efforts in one single central administration.

Regarding the ministry's future plans for maintaining security in the provinces, he said that in view of geographical expansion and of existing conditions, future plans have been prepared with the aim of maintaining security both on the general level and in each province separately.

The assistant deputy denied that the ministry might reduce the number of non-Kuwaitis working in the police force or gradually dispense with the services of guards. Regarding the suspension of sending men on scholarships abroad, he affirmed that the ministry has not stopped doing so but that it has altered its policy in this regard which is in accordance with decisions taken on the general level of the state, including that of the Ministry of Interior. Regarding the employment of females in the Ministry of Interior, Brigadier General al-Qabandi said that previously the employment of females was restricted to departments directly involved with women but that this has now been expanded to include employing them in the administrative sector on a larger scale.

The assistant deputy minister said that the Ministry of Interior cooperates in security matters with institutions and companies by providing training for those employed by them in the field of public security. Speaking about the new police law, the assistant deputy said that the proposed new rank in the police law, namely "assistant" [musa'id], enables the holder of such rank after attending a training class to be promoted to officer.

This came in an exclusive interview which AL-QABAS conducted with Brigadier General Muhammad al-Qabandi, assistant deputy minister of interior for Police Affairs, of which the following is the text:

[Correspondent] In recent years policemen in Kuwait for the first time had to face terrorism. Do you believe that they understand the nature of dealing with such actions?

[Al-Qabandi] Terrorism is a phenomenon, a crime that has begun spreading through the world. We often see it occurring in the advanced countries. Thank God, in Kuwait this phenomenon is not so widespread if compared with other countries.

Kuwaiti police has been able to deal with it and to gradually curb it because of the solidarity of its men and the steadfastness of the Kuwaiti people in the face of tribulations and crises.

[Correspondent] How can scientific thinking in planning methods in the security sector be developed?

[Al-Qabandi] This can be realized only by making available the principal elements of advanced technology and monitoring efficiency, something which the Ministry of Interior is seeking to achieve in its various security departments.

[Correspondent] How can long-term strategic plans for comprehensive security development be devised?

[Al-Qabandi] Comprehensive security development and its long-term strategic plans are linked to the material elements such as economic, political, and social matters and the concomitant expansion of residential communities, the spread and evolution of crime in the world, and the complexities of life.

[Correspondent] How can the planning effort be funneled into one single central administration?

[Al-Qabandi] The organizational structure of the Ministry's departments has created the administration in question which in turn defines and channels planning trends into an integral planning course.

[Correspondent] What future plans have you prepared for maintaining security in the provinces?

[Al-Qabandi] In view of the geographical increase of population density in the provinces, the variety of crimes, and the existing conditions a future plan has been prepared in order to maintain security in the country on the general level and in each province in particular. The principal requirements for such a task will be made available in order to maintain comprehensive security at present and in the future.

[Correspondent] It has been rumored that the number of non-Kuaitis in the police force has been reduced and that the guard service will gradually be eliminated. How true is this?

[Al-Qabandi] The fact of the matter is quite different. Some of the police cadres have left because of certain rules such as reaching retirement age, being discharged from service or other matters that are defined in the police force regulations. This covers all positions regardless of nationality.

With regard to elimination of the guard service, this too is contrary to the state of affairs in the police force and to the fact that this service provides manpower support for the force.

[Correspondent] How are you raising the standard of education among policemen?

[Al-Qabandi] We do so by sending police cadres on scholarships and encouraging continuing education at various levels, granting educational leave, and holding training courses locally and abroad.

[Correspondent] Why was the promotion of officers last year postponed?

[Al-Qabandi] Promotions have been determined in the context of economic conditions and the redrawing of the state general budget in accordance with existing conditions. This is in addition to the policy of evaluating military ranks.

[Correspondent] How can plans be made in order to enlighten the public on cooperation with the police based on new premises?

[Al-Qabandi] The current policy in the area of enlightenment is good and will play its role fully as enlightenment on both sides increases. We hope that this policy will bear fruit in the near future. Considering the wide gap and the lack of achievement in the past it was necessary to intensify efforts in this regard. All this has led to clear improvement of the situation. And thanks to the efforts of those in charge of the police department, and the citizens, the picture will become even clearer. We should not forget the role of the public relations administration and the police departments in enhancing the educational plan in its various forms.

[Correspondent] Why has the sending of men on scholarships abroad been suspended?

[Al-Qabandi] Sending men on scholarships abroad has not been suspended. Rather the policy on this matter and decisions pertaining to it on the general state level, of which the Ministry of Interior is part, have been altered.

[Correspondent] How can preventive and remedial efforts be combined with repressive efforts in combating crime in Kuwait?

[Al-Qabandi] This can be achieved only by heightening the sense of security and the use of modern scientific equipment and sophisticated means in combating crime and inculcating this in the police mentality.

[Correspondent] Why are you not using more women in the Ministry's departments?

[Al-Qabandi] Women are being used in the Ministry's various departments. At the beginning they were used only in departments directly involved in women's affairs. But now we see women working in the administration department and in larger numbers. Social considerations and conditions were previously the main reason for the restricted employment of women.

[Correspondent] What do you mean by "system dynamics" in security planning and did you apply it?

[Al-Qabandi] System dynamics refers to a sophisticated scientific system based on the use of computer technology. The Ministry, which is seeking development, has begun adopting this system and its effects will be felt in the future.

[Correspondent] How do you cooperate with the public institutions that wish to employ guards of their own?

[Al-Qabandi] The policy of cooperation is now in effect. It is evident in the holding of training courses for those working in the field of public security.

[Correspondent] What is your opinion regarding imposing the rule of law on everybody without ignoring economic considerations?

[Al-Qabandi] Safety and security can be achieved only by imposing the rule of law without exception.

[Correspondent] Are there any intentions to retire some elderly senior police officer shortly?

[Al-Qabandi] The police force regulations have established the age of retirement. This standard applies to all police positions.

[Correspondent] It is being said that the police academy has inadequate space for the students.

[Al-Qabandi] The policy of attracting police cadets does not come from thin air. The number of students accepted is not primarily determined by the police academy as such. Rather, it is determined by the Ministry's future plans. It is the need for capabilities that determines the policy of acceptance and the number of people required.

[Correspondent] What are your plans to develop the police academy?

[Al-Qabandi] Development is underway. It involves developing the academy's various administrative and scientific departments, including developing the policies of training and education and staffing the academy with qualified educators. One example is to equate the academy diploma with a university diploma.

[Correspondent] According to the new police law there are two new ranks: assistant [musa'id] and lieutenant general. How can an assistant be promoted to become an officer?

[Al-Qabandi] The new police law is under consideration by the appropriate parties; it has not yet been passed. The two ranks in question are among the proposed ranks. In case they are approved there will be minimum requirement before an assistant can be promoted to the rank of officer, including the completion of a set of tasks and a journeyman level which will be determined by the new police law.

[Correspondent] What is the system for rewards and punishments in the new police law?

[Al-Qabandi] Rewards and punishments will be commensurate with developments in the police force and with the conditions and work shouldered by security men.

[Correspondent] What are the most prominent points in the new police law that you would like to clarify?

[Al-Qabandi] The new police law is comprehensive. It is suitable for the present and future conditions in the police organ. Its contents will become clear after a review of its various aspects has been completed.

[Correspondent] Are you suffering from shortage in vehicles?

[Al-Qabandi] Shortage in vehicles is not so great compared to what it used to be in the past. The Ministry supplies its various departments with vehicles in accordance with the allocations made in the state general budget.

[Correspondent] It is said that the vehicles that breakdown need several days to be repaired, thus causing delay for the men involved.

[Al-Qabandi] The department concerned with vehicle maintenance equips, maintains, and repairs vehicles in accordance with resources available to it. There is no significant delay at present.

[Correspondent] Can the police department influence the behavior of individuals and get them to act in the public's interest and in order to preserve their lives?

[Al-Qabandi] A policeman, like any ordinary citizen, has responsibilities and duties as well as rights. His high profile and relations with the public require that he behave appropriately. If he deviates from appropriate behavior he will receive just punishment. Special police cadres have been assigned to ensure appropriate behavior.

[Correspondent] How can the interests of individuals be combined with the public's interest without jeopardizing liberties.

[Al-Qabandi] This is possible if the slogan which the Amir of the country raised is applied, namely "we are all for Kuwait and Kuwait is for all of us."

[Correspondent] How in your opinion can discipline be brought to the street in Kuwait in order to eliminate crime of all forms?

[Al-Qabandi] When everybody believes in the sanctity of the law.

[Correspondent] How are cadets selected for the police academy and other police institutes?

[Al-Qabandi] Selection is done in accordance with the Ministry's future plans, its police needs, and the policies established for this purpose.

[Correspondent] Do you believe that police work should be separated from politics?

[Al-Qabandi] Police work deals with and is linked to various aspects of life, including the political aspect. The police law prohibits policemen from becoming involved in politics.

[Correspondent] How can the standard of living of policemen be improved?

[Al-Qabandi] This can be realized only by creating material and moral incentives commensurate with the difficult conditions under which they work.

[Correspondent] How many police PHD's are working in the Ministry of Interior.

[Al-Qabandi] The existing number of PHD's and those who will graduate with a doctorate degree will meet the Ministry's needs for such qualifications in the coming stage. Future plans will determine the degree of need.

[Correspondent] What is the system of martial courts in the Ministry of Interior and what are their objectives?

[Al-Qabandi] The Amir's decree on disciplinary punishment has defined the policy for martial courts. The martial courts administration implements what the decree says.

[Correspondent] What are your plans to develop police stations?

[Al-Qabandi] We plan to staff them with qualified police and to provide them with material requirements needed for administrative development and combatting crime.

[Correspondent] Relations between the citizen, the resident [alien], and the police station are not what you had hoped they would be. How can such relations be improved?

[Al-Qabandi] This can be done through intensifying relations between the citizen, the resident [alien], and the police station and promoting such relations through the media in order to facilitate matters and uphold the principle that "every citizen is a guard."

[Correspondent] What are in your opinion the red lines that you draw for policemen and which they should not cross?

[Al-Qabandi] In order to attain the ideals in all aspects of civilian and police life goals must be set in order to reach the objectives.

[Correspondent] How can you deal fairly with the policemen working under contract and those working in administration?

[Al-Qabandi] By granting those working on contract psychological incentives that would encourage them to work under this system.

[Correspondent] Are there imminent promotions?

[Al-Qabandi] Recently promotions were made to certain police ranks.

13305

LEBANON

Ja'ja' AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI Interview
*NC191105 Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Feb 88 pp 7-21*

[Interview with Lebanese Forces Commander Dr Samir Ja'ja' by Jubran Tuwayni, Nabil Braks, and Johnny Munayyir; date and place not given]

[Text] [AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Some people prefer to have Samir Ja'ja' seen in 'Ayn al-Rummanah in civilian clothes, not in military uniform, and to have Samir Ja'ja' assure the people in 'Ayn al-Rummanah by saying: "I have come to assure you that the war which started in 'Ayn al-Rummanah is over." Why did you wear your green uniform in 'Ayn al-Rummanah? Was this a message to the people there or a message to the other party?

[Ja'ja'] First, there is a simple reason, more simple than all political considerations. I began my political life militarily.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will you remain a military man?

[Ja'ja'] No, never. But in some circumstances of a military nature...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Sorry, but what does "no, never" mean?

[Ja'ja'] About remaining a military man? I will certainly not remain a military man.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What does this mean? What role are you seeking?

[Ja'ja] My role is certainly a political one.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are the limits of the political role you wish for yourself?

[Ja'ja'] They are infinite.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you mean as a deputy? A minister? Is there a course which you will follow, or will you jump directly to higher positions?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily. But I tell you that I will seize immediately any political position that falls into my hands.

When I Was Young

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you mean: fall into your hands? Is there a difference between falling or your taking it?

[Ja'ja'] Look, Jubran, when I was young I listened to Lebanese politicians. When every person was asked if his ambition was to become a deputy, he would say: "No, no, I do not want anything, I am only working for the public interest." When the time came to form a government, correspondents would ask someone seeking to become a minister: "Will you become a minister?" He would answer: "No, no, that is not my intention." When the time for presidential elections came, they would ask the one seeking to become president: "Are you a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic?" He would answer: "No, I? God's mercy. I do not want the Presidency of the Republic."

Any politician who is true to himself must aspire to reach the highest political positions possible so that he can implement his ideas through them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In the end, these military uniforms remind us of 'Arafat, who stood with an olive branch in one hand and a rifle in the other.

[Ja'ja'] I do not like comparisons, because every person, every society, and every political group has its own conditions and characteristics that differ from those of others. This is not my way at all. It is just that I was a military man during this war. It is certain that I will again play the role of the military man if war returns. This is natural. This, then, is the first reason. The second is that 'Ayn al-Rummanah is the land of steadfastness.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But the military uniform is a message to whom?

[Ja'ja'] By God, it is not a message to anyone.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why did you decide to wear the green uniform in 'Ayn al-Rummanah?

[Ja'ja'] The night before, I thought: How will the atmosphere be in 'Ayn al-Rummanah tomorrow? I thought it would be an atmosphere of military resistance in its most noble sense. I know 'Ayn al-Rummanah and lived there. It was better than going in civilian clothes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did you also plan your speech on the basis of how the atmosphere of 'Ayn al-Rummanah would be, or was it based on political strategy?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly the speech was based on political strategy, but within the 'Ayn al-Rummanah atmosphere. This is the language of 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This means that there is...

[Ja'ja'] This means that the talk during the television interview was a hint...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us talk about the 'Ayn al-Rummanah speech. It indicated that the presidential elections pass through 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

[Ja'ja'] True.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you still adhere to that speech, or do you agree with George Sa'adah that the presidential elections pass through the Chamber of Deputies?

[Ja'ja'] Does this entail a contradiction?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No. The purpose of the question was to clarify matters, because the problem in the eastern area is a political one between George Sa'adah and "the Lebanese Forces."

[Ja'ja'] Not true, not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There is no problem? Yet two attitudes appeared...

[Ja'ja'] Also not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you regard 'Ayn al-Rummanah and the Chamber of Deputies as being on the same level?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily. George Sa'adah says that the way to the presidential office passes through the Chamber of Deputies. Is that not so? When I say it passes through 'Ayn al-Rummanah, does this mean holding elections in 'Ayn al-Rummanah? This is a figure of speech meaning that the elections which will take place in the Chamber of Deputies should take into consideration events in 'Ayn al-Rummanah. It does not mean that we should move the venue of the elections to 'Ayn al-rummanah. No.

Will You "Wreck" the Game?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us go back to your political ambition. You said that you have political ambition. For the sake of this political ambition you think you can shuffle all the cards.

[Ja'ja'] I shall interrupt you. The issue is not one of political ambition. I believe that...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A political role.

[Ja'ja'] It is not a question of a political role. I will clarify the idea further. I believe a person can assume any political position. Indeed, he must assume it because he will then be able to implement all his theories and principles.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This political role which you say he must assume, do you think Samir Ja'ja' can assume it, just like any politician or normal person? Can he assume it by normal means, or is Samir Ja'ja' allowed to assume it by irregular means, by wrecking the game and turning over the table?

[Ja'ja'] You pose a theoretical question which I cannot answer in a general manner. But should you ask me about a specific position, I would give you an accurate answer.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] For example, if a government emerges and Samir Ja'ja' aspires to be a minister but is not appointed minister, would he dismantle the whole government?

[Ja'ja'] No. This is not the criterion on which we base our stand toward a specific government in terms of who forms the government, who it includes, its program, or what it will do.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us say that Samir Ja'ja' wants to be president, or maybe a Chamber deputy to start with.

[Ja'ja'] Not deputy; I do not want that.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Deputy, no.

[Ja'ja'] No.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean you are past the point when one would want to become a parliamentary representative?

[Ja'ja'] (laughting) That is it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] All right. Ja'ja' wants to be president but does not become so. What will he do if this happens? Would he throw a fit?

[Ja'ja'] No, why should he?

Iddah and Sham'un

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us assume that Raymond Iddah is running against Ja'ja' and that Iddah wins with so many votes and Ja'ja' loses with so many votes. What will happen?

[Ja'ja'] The issue is not Ja'ja' acceding to the Presidency, it is that of the Presidency not falling in the hands of somebody who would ruin the country.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Great. Let us say Ja'ja' is running for president and that another candidate who is also acceptable to the "Lebanese Forces" enters the presidential race and wins...

[Ja'ja'] If this guy were acceptable to the Lebanese Forces, we would first contemplate who would be the best candidate to represent us in the race, and we would let this person run.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose this candidate decides to stay in the race?

[Ja'ja'] Is this still hypothetical?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No, let us say it is real. Dany Sham'un has decided to run for president, right? Would Samir Ja'ja' remain in the race?

[Ja'ja'] It is too early to decide.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Say the presidential elections are next week...

[Ja'ja'] You cannot say that. Why not say the elections are tomorrow, and this is it? This is not the case. We are talking about definite elections taking place sometime this summer, in July or August.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] We are thinking of some scenario. Is there a possibility that you would run for president?

[Ja'ja'] Everything is possible.

[AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI] Those who will not run are saying so now. Are you among those people who are definitely not going to enter the presidential race?

[Ja'ja'] No, no. Everything is possible.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You may run?

[Ja'ja'] Everything is possible. I may or may not run. Anything can happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI] You may run, then?

[Ja'ja'] Anything can happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI] Great. Then you may run, and Dany Sham'un is already in the race and has no intention of withdrawing.

[Ja'ja'] If I decide to run, I will have to consult with Dany first. Either he stays, or I run instead.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who will convince whom?

[Ja'ja'] That will be decided by me and Dany; no problem.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How would that be decided?

[Ja'ja'] With the means through which...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Hopefully not through another uprising?

[Ja'ja'] (laughing) I should think not.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Through peaceful means then?

[Ja'ja'] More than peaceful.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But there is a problem...

[Ja'ja'] If this problem is between me and Dany, consider it solved.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But if the problem is between you and someone other than Dany?

[Ja'ja'] Like whom?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] [Army Commander] General Michel 'Awn should he run for president.

[Ja'ja'] We will also talk, and we will see. But according to my information, General 'Awn is not running.

[AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI] But today, and according to the Lebanese Constitution, every person has the right to be elected president of the Republic, without being a declared candidate.

[Ja'ja'] Has the right?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Has the right. Let us say, for example, that the Chamber of Deputies had met. You went to bed expecting a certain outcome and awoke to find something different happening; election of a president of the Republic who was unacceptable to you. Say Speaker Husayn al-Husayni had gathered the Chamber of Deputies...

[Ja'ja'] You are theorizing things that should not happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The Chamber of Deputies speaker has the right to fix the venue for the Chamber session, wherever he wants. Right?

[Ja'ja'] Right.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] He chooses Shtawrah as the venue for the session to elect the president. What will the Lebanese Forces do?

[Ja'ja'] We will use all possible means to see that the session is not held in Shtawrah.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] All right. The session is held in Beirut. The deputies enter the Chamber and elect Raymond Iddih president of the Lebanese Republic. They had promised you something outside the Chamber, but when inside certain code words circulate, and Raymond Iddih is elected president. What will you do?

[Ja'ja'] This is theoretical.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Yes. What will the Lebanese Forces do?

[Ja'ja'] I cannot draw up a plan of how I will act in a 100-percent theoretical situation which has not a 1-percent chance of happening.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why? Is there not a 1-percent chance Raymond Iddih will become president of the Republic?

[Ja'ja'] In the way you are proposing? For the elections to be held normally and then have Raymond Iddih become president is a theoretical supposition.

No to Raymond Iddih

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Can Raymond Iddih be the Lebanese Forces' candidate?

[Ja'ja'] Never, never.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There is no way? Not even if Raymond Iddih says: I call for the withdrawal of all foreign armies from Lebanese territories?

[Ja'ja'] We would discuss it then; but now, there is no way.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No way now? Why?

[Ja'ja'] Because Raymond Iddih lives outside the problem and outside the whole game. In fact, he is not in the game. There must be discussions before he enters the game. He is now completely out of it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Since we have started listing a few names...

[Ja'ja'] I do not want to discuss it now.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There are a number of names being proposed now?

[Ja'ja'] I prefer not to discuss them. It is still early.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How are your relations with Dany Sham'un?

[Ja'ja'] Excellent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But in a statement by the National Liberal Party [NLP], Dany Sham'un opposed executions.

[Ja'ja'] This is not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] It is true. A statement was issued by the NLP.

[Ja'ja] You must see how the statement was issued.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A statement was issued. A debate took place in the party, and Sham'un opposed executions.

[Ja'ja'] You must read the statement published in the press.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Anyway, Dany Sham'un opposed executions. We met Dany Sham'un today, and he told us he opposes executions.

[Ja'ja'] It is unlikely that Dany Sham'un would have an opinion different from ours.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] We are asking.

[Ja'ja'] This is Dany's opinion.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Well, you have executed two persons. What were they accused of?

[Ja'ja] High treason.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] High treason; but there was no murder. In other words, they were executed for intent and not deed.

[Ja'ja'] No. They committed a deed.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What deed?

[Ja'ja'] The deed of passing maps and detailed military information to the enemy. On the basis of this information, the enemy could have penetrated any front. This was done according to the military laws of the Lebanese Forces.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you think one person has the right to decide to execute another?

[Ja'ja'] First, this is a big institution, covering the entire homeland. Second ...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you mean, covering the entire homeland?

[Ja'ja'] They are operating and have organization and branches; they have influence on the political and military game, which has an impact on the entire homeland.

Second, any individual who joins any institution must abide by its laws. The Lebanese Forces have explicit laws. They have a military penal code, just like any other army.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is a person who joins the Lebanese Forces immediately informed about these laws?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, absolutely. Only if one is a traitor or goes about with one's shirt unbuttoned is one punished. If one steals or avoids military service, his punishment will be thus, etc.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Was there any contact between you and the judiciary or justice minister after the operation?

[Ja'ja'] With the justice minister? We had no contact with the justice minister in the good old days; you expect us to have contact with him now?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did your enthusiasm for executions arise after the justice minister carried out executions in his area?

[Ja'ja'] No, no. It had nothing to do with that. These constituted a serious danger to the security of the free areas because information was leaked, not because of intent. They passed information. They delivered maps marked with the military positions of the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you not think this was part of the political struggle?

[Ja'ja'] Absolutely not. You could then regard everything as part of the political struggle. You could place a car bomb and say this is part of the political struggle. Consequently, it would be impossible for one to do anything.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean you support executions?

[Ja'ja'] In cases like these?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Yes.

[Ja'ja'] A six-member field tribunal was formed and made this decision.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did Bkirki [the Maronite patriarchate] contact you, as usual? I am asking this because after 27 September [1986, when pro-Hubayqah forces attempted to penetrate the eastern areas] contacts were carried out after corpses were found in the streets. So, did Bkirki contact you after the two executions, or was there no reaction from the church?

[Ja'ja'] This issue is completely different from the events of 27 September. This is a different story.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why, then, did Dani Sham'un object? What explanation did you get from him about the real cause for his objection to the executions?

[Ja'ja'] This is his stand on the military penal code in general. He believes there should be no capital punishment, in any society.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Dani Sham'un has seemed recently to be on a different wavelength from the "Lebanese Forces" and the "Lebanese Front," whose meetings he usually attends; and perhaps he will not attend the next meeting (tomorrow).

[Ja'ja'] I do not share this opinion. I mean, I am not inclined to think so.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] All right, why then did Dani Sham'un criticize the Army's handling of the helicopter issue?

[Ja'ja'] He did not criticize the Lebanese Army. His view was that it would be better to keep things quiet and avoid an escalation. He favored ending the helicopter issue quietly. He did not criticize the Army.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] He spoke of the besieging of a whole community on the mountain.

[Ja'ja'] He said he opposed escalation in general and believed the issue did not merit such an escalation, that other means could be found to deal with the issue.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No, he said he opposed the besieging of a whole area and innocent people.

[Ja'ja'] He acts in accordance with his belief that there must be no escalation.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you think this is connected with the presidential elections and his nomination?

[Ja'ja'] I do not think so. I do not think so.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you not think he is opening channels of communication with Walid Junblatt?

[Ja'ja'] I do not believe so. I mean, if one wants to theorize about such things, perhaps one may say so. However, I do not believe so. Dani, like so many people these days, wants the situation to remain calm.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then you do not think Dani Sham'un's statements have any electoral connotations?

[Ja'ja'] Sometimes a person's positions might be unconsciously influenced by his actual status. However, I still do not think Dani adopted those positions for this reason. He has a particular view of some issues. For instance, when the question of where to bury former President Sham'un arose, the presidential elections issue was not yet in the cards. Still, Dani insisted on burying his father there [in Dayr al-Qamar, in the Druze-controlled Al-Shuf area].

Halat

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] About the Halat Airport issue. Everyone knows that Beirut Airport was reopened after contacts were carried out between Dani Sham'un and Walid Junblatt.

[Ja'ja'] True.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] All right, Beirut Airport was reopened, and Halat Airport remains closed.

[Ja'ja'] Yes, so? Walid lied to Dani Sham'un.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] When you asked Dany Sham'un about this, what did he say? He lied to me?

[Ja'ja'] Yes. He says Junblatt lied and that his circumstances would not allow him [to fulfill his promise]. The Syrians are pushing him around, not allowing him to do everything he wants openly and overtly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] He promised to open the Halat Airport in return for [the reopening of] Beirut Airport?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, absolutely.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There was a promise from Junblatt?

[Ja'ja'] Absolutely.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How did you know? Was there a written promise from Walid?

[Ja'ja'] The promise was conveyed to us by Dany Sham'un and other persons.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Such as?

[Ja'ja'] Persons.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Politicians or businessmen?

[Ja'ja'] We do not want the man to die tomorrow. [as published]

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What were the conditions?

[Ja'ja'] None. We would allow Beirut Airport to operate, and then, 15 days later, Halat Airport would be opened. Junblatt formed a committee that started working before the reopening of Beirut Airport.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is it true that contacts were made for Walid to become a partner in a particular company that would manage the Halat Airport?

[Ja'ja'] No. This matter was never proposed to me, at any time.

If the Front Nominates Dany

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you believe there are no political differences between you and Dany Sham'un now?

[Ja'ja'] None.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then Dany Sham'un's presidential program is the same as that of the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] The program has not been proposed in its final and definite form. Dany has asked me repeatedly to sit down and study together such a program. I believe Dany Sham'un will submit a program to the Lebanese Front before submitting it to public opinion.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are the odds that this program will be in line with the Lebanese Forces' program and that the Lebanese Forces will adopt Dany's candidacy?

[Ja'ja'] This is up to the Lebanese Front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If the Lebanese Front decides to nominate Dany Sham'un, and the Lebanese Forces disagree, what will happen?

[Ja'ja'] The Lebanese Forces cannot differ with the Front. Does one differ with oneself?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean you are the front?

[Ja'ja'] No, never.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But?

[Ja'ja'] But in the end we abide by the decision made by the Front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If the Lebanese Front's decision is to accept Dany Sham'un?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, so?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose Dany Sham'un's program differs from yours?

[Ja'ja'] That cannot be. Basically, Dany Sham'un's program does not differ from ours in fact.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If it changes; suppose it changes?

[Ja'ja'] That cannot happen. You are making a supposition. Will Dany Sham'un change?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then Dany Sham'un's program is identical that of the "Forces"?

[Ja'ja'] It is very close to the program of the "forces."

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that if Dany Sham'un says in the Lebanese Front in the future: I am a candidate, and this is my program, you would accept him?

[Ja'ja'] We would debate the matter. We would also reassess the calculations of the campaign upwards and downwards, left and right, and in the light of this reassessment we would make a decision, according to the majority.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] When will you declare your candidate?

[Ja'ja'] I believe this needs more time.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How soon before the elections [will you announce your candidate]?

[Ja'ja'] Maybe 1 day before.

The Secret Word

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you think there will be presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] They always used to speak about a secret word about the presidential elections, whether from America or any other country, coming on the last day or the last week.

[Ja'ja'] Not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I mean that during the days of Raymond Iddih, Fu'ad Shihab, and Camille Sham'un, the American secret word came to elect Fu'ad Shihab. During the days of Sarkis and Raymond Iddih, the secret word also came, I do not know from where. A secret word remains secret. However, the word must have come from the United States or the Soviet Union. Who gives you the secret word?

[Ja'ja'] This theory is absolutely incorrect. The basic secret word is the one that is passed by the active parties existing in the Lebanese arena. Rather, I will say the opposite: The major powers and states take into consideration the stand of the active forces in the arena and base their stand on this.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Have contacts with these major states taken place?

[Ja'ja'] Yes. Views were exchanged among all the major states.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What indications did they give you? What did you glean from them?

[Ja'ja'] Individuals do not interest them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What interests them?

[Ja'ja'] The Americans, for example, are concerned that no candidate has leftist leanings.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If America and Syria agree...

[Ja'ja'] If America and Syria agreed, nothing would happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] ...and you differ with both of them: What would you do?

[Ja'ja'] We will not necessarily differ with both of them. However, America does not have a candidate. In other words, it cannot say: This is our candidate.

Syria

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] That is to say, Syria can now again be committed to the Lebanese issue. What is your stand?

[Ja'ja'] We are clearly against that. In addition, this is not right.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What proof do you have to corroborate this?

[Ja'ja'] I have every proof to indicate that no one has committed Syria to Lebanon.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Proof, information, or conclusions?

[Ja'ja'] Proof, information obtained through our foreign contacts. What proof or information do you have that anyone wants to commit Syria to Lebanon? What is the proof? there is none.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What will Syria's role be in the coming presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] Regrettably, Syria will have a role.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A role of imposition or rejection?

[Ja'ja'] It will first try imposition.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are its chances of imposing a president?

[Ja'ja'] No chance.

Franjiyah

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There is some talk about former President Franjiyah being a candidate. Now, seriously, are you for or against this?

[Ja'ja'] According to what I have heard, former President Franjiyah is not a candidate.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But circles around him say he is a candidate.

[Ja'ja] According to our information, he is not.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are there any contacts between you and former President Franjiyah?

[Ja'ja'] I beg your pardon?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are there any contacts between you and former President Franjiah?

[Ja'ja'] The barest minimum.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you mean by "the barest minimum"?

[Ja'ja'] I mean at low levels, not high-level.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How? Are there military and political contacts, personal relations? Or are there serious contacts?

[Ja'ja'] There are contacts at the level of officials.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are these contacts about?

[Ja'ja'] They deal with various political, military, and security matters.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are they in depth or simply a channel of communication to be maintained?

[Ja'ja'] No, in depth and detail.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Have these contacts so far achieved any positive and tangible results?

[Ja'ja'] They have achieved such results on some points, but not in connection with others.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Give us an example. On what issues have the contacts achieved results, and on what points have they not?

[Ja'ja'] With regard to the military situation on the northern front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean there is military coordination between you and former President Franjiah on the northern front?

[Ja'ja'] We cannot call it military coordination in the technical sense. However, we can say there is coordination and an understanding not to create tension on the northern front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are there any pro-Hubayqah personnel on the northern front?

[Ja'ja'] No, none at all.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that the entire northern front, Al-Batrun and Jubayl, is free of pro-Hubayqah personnel?

[Ja'ja'] Hubayqah does not have a single man on the northern front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And do you believe such contacts with former President Franjiah can lead to a reconciliation between you and him?

[Ja'ja'] I doubt it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There will be no reconciliation between you and Franjiah?

[Ja'ja'] At the present time I doubt it, because former President Franjiah is not free to make his own decisions, not so long as the Syrian Army is present in the North.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Former President Franjiah believes you participated in his son's murder.

[Ja'ja'] Yes, he believes so now. However, I imagine if the Syrian Army evacuated the North, he would believe differently. For example, before President al-Asad sent for him, former President Franjiah considered the tripartite agreement stillborn and said: "If the tripartite agreement is the holiday gift to the Lebanese people, then no thanks are offered to the giver." Later, when he met President al-Asad, his position changed to "blessed are the hands which signed the agreement."

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did Elie Hubayqah participate in the Ihdin operation?

[Ja'ja'] I prefer not to talk about this subject.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did he or did he not participate?

[Ja'ja'] I prefer not to talk about this subject.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that you are covering up for Elie Hubayqah?

[Ja'ja'] [Laughter] That is not true. But you know that each one of us still holds true to a modicum of honor and ethics, regardless of his political stand.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean the military ethics the two of you share?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You therefore still believe that the string between you and Elie Hubayqah has not been cut forever?

[Ja'ja'] No, it has been cut. But there is an ethical standard involved with regard to what happened before that.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there any possibility of a reconciliation with Hubayqah?

[Ja'ja'] Never.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Even if Hubayqah comes and says that he is no longer interested in politics and that he wants to live in Juniyah or Kasrawan?

[Ja'ja'] We have had enough of Hubayqah's crimes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that a death sentence has been passed against him?

[Ja'ja'] If you want to say so.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Was the death sentence passed by you or by many other sides?

[Ja'ja'] He knows better than I do.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you think?

[Ja'ja'] I believe it has been passed by many parties.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Such as?

[Ja'ja'] Ah!!!

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does he still have relations with Israel?

[Ja'ja'] You should ask him.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What does your intelligence say?

[Ja'ja'] I think he still has some kind of relations.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How can you explain his relations with the Syrians if he still has some kind of relations with Israel?

[Ja'ja'] It is up to you to understand that.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Elie Hubayqah said on television that he will return to East Beirut to blow up...

[Ja'ja'] Listen to me, Jubran, Hubayqah could not stay at the time when he had all his military power, security forces, financial and economic potential, Syria's support, the tripartite agreement, and all the support from the Amal Movement and the socialists. Now how could he return to East Beirut when he has lost all his military power, security forces, economic potential, the tripartite agreement, and all the support he had in the past? He just could not stay here.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let's create some scenarios. The situation in Lebanon is now linked to certain persons more than to the general state of affairs.

[Ja'ja'] Regrettably yes. The situation in Lebanon is linked to some aspects of the general state of affairs.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us give some examples. Let us suppose Samir Ja'ja' has disappeared?

[Ja'ja'] We cannot make such a supposition!

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why, what will happen then, God forbid?

[Ja'ja'] (laughing) This is an incorrect supposition.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us suppose 1 day Samir Ja'ja' decides not to remain in the arena. What will happen?

[Ja'ja'] This is an improbable supposition.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose a vacuum occurs in the eastern area? What happens if Samir Ja'ja' disappears from the lebanese arena?

[Ja'ja'] I cannot answer this question. I leave the answer to the observers.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] As a responsible person, you are supposed to have taken into consideration the possibility of your disappearance from the Christian arena. What will happen, in your opinion?

[Ja'ja'] I act on the premise that the Lebanese Forces will continue, with or without Samir Ja'ja'.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are the Lebanese Forces a one-man establishment?

[Ja'ja'] They are the first military-political conglomeration in Lebanon, not a one-man establishment.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Whom do you consider qualified to succeed you?

[Ja'ja'] This is a difficult and delicate matter. There are a number of establishments, each of which stands on its own, from the national fund to the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, to the military establishment. When did the Lebanese Forces have establishments of this size? When did the Lebanese Forces have a chief of staff of this caliber? Correct or not? When was there an information official of this caliber? When was there a finance official of this caliber? When was there a secretary for interior affairs of this caliber? When were there security officials of this caliber?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] So you are not afraid of a vacuum in the event of your absence?

[Ja'ja'] It will be a bit longer before there will be no fear of any vacuum. In the final analysis, no one will replace anyone. For the time being, we want these establishments to run independently, so that if one disintegrates, the others will continue to function.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In the case of an absence of the president of the Republic, what will happen? What will you do?

[Ja'ja'] (laughing) You are embarrassing me.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What would you do if B'abda were without a president? Would the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies be in charge?

[Ja'ja'] No, the Cabinet as a whole.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But the Cabinet has resigned.

[Ja'ja'] No, it has not, because another government has not been formed. So long as it is a caretaker government, it would be in charge.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What would your stand be?

[Ja'ja'] What would our stand be?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I mean, what kind of a statement would you broadcast on the evening television news?

[Ja'ja'] We would immediately call for presidential elections.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who would move toward B'abda?

[Ja'ja'] No one; not necessarily.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What would you do militarily?

[Ja'ja'] We would fortify our areas, so that no one could penetrate them to reach B'abda.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If the Army moved toward B'abda?

[Ja'ja'] I do not think the Army would move toward B'abda.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose the army moves.

[Ja'ja'] If it moves to defend B'abda, yes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Moves to defend it, or in a coup.

[Ja'ja'] Here the army does not carry out coups. It is not for this purpose.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If it carries out a coup, demands the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and calls for a dialogue, what will you do?

[Ja'ja'] At such a time we would adopt a position in accordance with what happens.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If this exact event takes place, I mean if the army issues communique no. 1, asks all foreign forces to withdraw immediately, requests a meeting of the UN Security Council, asks the Lebanese people to not make any military moves, calls for a reconciliation...

[Ja'ja'] We prefer to have the same thing happen through presidential elections. There is no need for this to happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If it happens, what will you do?

[Ja'ja'] We prefer that something like this does not happen. Our view is the following: Presidential elections should take place and a president should come.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And if the army assumes control and gives a 1-month deadline for all these things to happen and for presidential elections to be held?

[Ja'ja'] So, what will happen?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will you support the coup?

[Ja'ja'] It will not be a coup if the army sets a date for electing a president.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A transitional period, a military take-over so that they can hand over power to the civilians later on.

[Ja'ja'] Why can presidential elections not take place immediately?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who would call for presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] The existing government.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This means that you would support such a government, which would be coming to power for the first time?

[Ja'ja'] No, we would not support it, but there would be no other way out of the situation, nor any other constitutional alternative.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If such a government called for presidential elections but no elections took place, what would happen?

[Ja'ja'] In such a case, each party would do what it wanted. It calls for presidential elections but none take place. Why?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] They do not take place, for example, because of certain security developments, or the intervention of a fifth column.

[Ja'ja'] Excellent. In that case, each party has the right to make the decision it finds appropriate.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What decision would you make?

[Ja'ja'] According to... (laughs) You are offering hypothetical situations. It would be according to what would happen then. What actually happens, for example, if one party wants to attack another?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then you believe that if a presidential vacuum occurs, disorder will ensue?

[Ja'ja'] Undoubtedly. The situation will enter the realm of the unknown. It will be a jump into oblivion. However, in order to emerge from this state of the unknown, we call for the election of a president. A new president would be elected and we would continue.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And what if a president comes tomorrow and asks for the disbanding [dabdabat] of the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, what?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What would you do?

[Ja'ja'] What does ask for the disbanding [dabdabat] of the Lebanese Forces mean? And what is the basic issue?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I mean the deployment of the Lebanese Army in greater Beirut.

[Ja'ja'] Within which plan?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] As part of regaining greater Beirut at present.

[Ja'ja'] Which greater Beirut?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Administrative Beirut.

[Ja'ja'] Specifically East and West Beirut, and the Lebanese Army deploys there.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Yes.

[Ja'ja'] I am for that 100 percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What if a new government were formed today on this basis? In other words, what if a new or transitional government were formed tomorrow and called for an administrative and neutral Beirut in preparation for the presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] Let me ask you a question. In your view, what is the specific problem in this country? One who calls for such a thing must ask what and where the problem is in this country.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you know what the country's problem is?

[Ja'ja'] The country's problem is clear: Syria's presence.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And Israel's presence?

[Ja'ja'] And Israel's presence, in addition to the Palestinian and Iranian presence. However, we are talking about the main issue. The Iranians are not the ones preventing the president from ruling.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then you do not treat occupations the same way. You put one before the other.

[Ja'ja'] Certainly. Every occupation has its own weight.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The Syrians believe that dealing with all occupations the same way is a problem.

[Ja'ja'] It is their problem, not mine. I give an account of reality objectively, as I see it. At present, I do not believe Iran is the party preventing the president from forming a government here. Syria is doing that. The Palestinians are not the ones impeding democracy. When everybody was having fun with Palestinians in 1975, we were fighting them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And now?

[Ja'ja'] We still adhere to the same stance: an absolute no to an armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But you support the Palestinian cause.

[Ja'ja'] How? Who said that? I do not understand. How did you take my words to mean that we support the Palestinian cause?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I am asking.

[Ja'ja'] That is different.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] We will discuss this later.

[Ja'ja'] Let us discuss it now, if you wish.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No. Let us continue with the issue of the presidential elections. Is there communication now between Husayn al-Husayni and the Lebanese Forces to create a favorable atmosphere?

[Ja'ja'] No.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There are no contacts?

[Ja'ja'] No.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why? Have you tried to make contacts?

[Ja'ja'] There is no particular reason. The main reason is that Al-Husayni has no freedom of opinion or expression. He cannot do what he wants or what he thinks of doing. He cannot fulfill any plan which could be negotiated.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are you saying that there is no possibility of holding presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] Yes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This is also the opinion of Elie Hubayqah. What do you base your opinion on, and what does Elie Hubayqah base his on?

[Ja'ja'] You should ask Hubayqah for his opinion.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In your opinion, is this Hubayqah's own talk, or has someone asked him to say it?

[Ja'ja'] This is a Syrian talking. Elie Hubayqah has nothing to do with it. Let's not bother with this issue at all.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why do you believe there can be no elections?

[Ja'ja'] Because Syria will obstruct them first.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] Syria will obstruct the elections if there is a candidate who opposes it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And second?

[Ja'ja'] Second, if a Syrian-backed candidate is nominated, we will use all our means to prevent his election.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you mean by all means?

[Ja'ja'] All means.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are they? Are they military or political?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, yes. All possible means to prevent this candidate from being elected.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose he is elected. Then what would you do?

[Ja'ja'] That would not be possible.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose the Chamber of Deputies decides, after the sorting of votes, that the Syrian-backed candidate has won. What would you do?

[Ja'ja'] It will certainly not reach that stage.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] Because we will use all means to prevent his election.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You said at the beginning of the interview that they have participated...

[Ja'ja'] (Interrupting) We will not talk about everything now. They will not win if they bring us a Syrian-backed candidate.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] At the end there will be a logic of revolution and a logic of legitimacy. Does the election date represent an opportunity for the legitimacy to come in line with the revolution?

[Ja'ja'] This is the last chance for the legitimacy to [word indistinct].

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is it the last chance for the Chamber of Deputies?

[Ja'ja'] To be legitimate, yes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Or there will be a coup?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily, but it will remain illegitimate.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What would happen? Will it continue like this?

[Ja'ja'] And we too. (laughing) It will remain so and we will remain so.

Between Kafr Shima and Al-Madfun

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How much are you convinced of your initial proposal from Kafr Shima to Al-Madfun?

[Ja'ja'] Actually, that was not my initial proposal. This is false, which is our problem with the media. I said if we organize our potential...When I propose something, I do so without any shame. Actually, I did not say from Kafr Shima to Al-Madfun. What would happen to my village if I said so? What would I do with my entire region? Does anyone leave his region? But they are repeating the word like parrots. What I said is, that since we can move freely between Kafr Shima and Al-Madfun, and if we organize all the potential in our grasp that exists between Kafr Shima and Al-Madfun, it would be enough to liberate all of Lebanon. They used this incomplete expression and became furious.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you believe in unity? Does Samir Ja'ja' believe in unity?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly, 100 percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And coexistence with Muslims and...

[Ja'ja'] One hundred percent. However, coexistence with Muslims does not come "out of the blue." Neither does it come through the 1943 formula, democracy by numbers [of representatives], or any of those other haphazard proposals. A specific approach must be adopted in order to bring about coexistence. Imam Musa al-Sadr used to give a very beautiful example, a peerless one. He used to say...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] (Interrupting) Pardon me. What is peerless, the example or Musa al-Sadr?

[Ja'ja'] Both, the example and Musa al-Sadr. He used to say: If you wanted to combine two different things, like oxygen and hydrogen, you would have to use specific proportions under specific conditions and in a specific atmosphere so that you can create life. Otherwise, you will end up with nothing. Both elements would either remain as they are, or explode.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In which stage are we living now?

[Ja'ja'] The explosive stage.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Explosive?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, because we combined the elements at random. How can we achieve coexistence? You have to put the two elements together correctly in order for them to merge amalgamated.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you say no to partition?

[Ja'ja'] I certainly say no to partition.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] Just like that.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] How do you ask why?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If they say to you: Samir Ja'ja', this is the state of Maronistan. Rule it. What would you say?

[Ja'ja'] I would not believe in it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] For geopolitical, historic, and economic reasons. Yes, there is a [Maronite] people.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does that mean that such a state would be unviable?

[Ja'ja'] Of course it would be unviable.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why? What would happen??

[Ja'ja'] There are groups in Lebanon which have common interests. They have things in common. Lebanon's existence has become a historical fact. It is a fact in international politics and a geopolitical fact. Why do we not make use of all these factors and establish one state under a federation?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And if things "do not go well," they demand an Islamic republic there [in West Beirut] and a Christian one here!

[Ja'ja'] No. If they propose an Islamic republic there, I will propose a decentralized republic here.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How?

[Ja'ja'] It is a question of beliefs...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What is a decentralized republic?

[Ja'ja'] First and foremost, this will not happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will not happen?

[Ja'ja'] As long as we control Lebanon.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And if you do not control it?

[Ja'ja'] This will also never happen.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Everybody said that Bashir al-Jumayyil's proposal on Lebanon's 10,452 square kilometers was buried with him with the advent of Samir Ja'ja'.

[Ja'ja'] Who said that?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Everybody.

[Ja'ja'] Not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] So I take it that you are still holding to this proposal, to Bashir al-Jumayyil's dream?

[Ja'ja'] I certainly am.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is this your long-term goal?

[Ja'ja'] Through a clear political program, yes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A political system under Maronite rule, or a political system...?

[Ja'ja'] Coexistence in the real sense of the word.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If a president of the republic is not re-elected, what will happen?

[Ja'ja'] Here?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Yes. Do you support the renewal or extension of the president's term of office?

[Ja'ja'] Neither renewal nor extension are plausible.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] The Constitution does not mention this, and the president of the republic has no inclination to do it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In case the issue of renewal or extension is raised, what will you do?

[Ja'ja'] What I am saying is that this is not even being contemplated.

Transitional Government

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose the president changes his mind.

[Ja'ja'] The Constitution does not provide for this.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose he is asked to renew, such as during the days of [President] Sarkis when he was asked to renew his term. Suppose the Chamber of Deputies meets, amends the Constitution, and renews the president's term. What will your attitude be?

[Ja'ja'] I imagine that the best solution would be to hold presidential elections.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Suppose no presidential elections could be held. As you said, there is a big problem. The Syrians can reject any candidate they do not like, and you can do the same to any candidate sponsored by the Syrians. Therefore, one solution would be to extend the term of the current president.

[Ja'ja'] There are other solutions.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are they?

[Ja'ja'] A transitional government.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are you going back to the idea of the tripartite agreement, which calls for a presidential council?

[Ja'ja'] What has this to do with that?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A transitional government chaired by whom?

[Ja'ja'] A transitional government chaired by a Christian.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who?

[Ja'ja'] No problem.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Whoever he may be?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly not whoever he may be.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you veto anyone? Suppose they appoint Raymond Iddih as head of the transitional government?

[Ja'ja'] Why? Is Raymond Iddih here so that he may be appointed head of the transitional government? Will they take Lebanon to France?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This means that you even have conditions when it comes to a transitional government?

[Ja'ja'] Naturally.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you want? An actor, or a head of government you approve of?

[Ja'ja'] We want a head of government who possesses the minimum qualifications needed to enable him to govern during the transitional period.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are the qualifications, and what is the duration of the transitional period?

[Ja'ja'] No one can determine the qualifications.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What happens if the transitional period continued forever and became a permanent situation?

[Ja'ja'] It must not continue.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How long will it last?

[Ja'ja'] I can not determine that now because I do not know what the circumstances of that stage will be.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In your opinion, what is the acceptable duration of the period so that it does not go on forever?

[Ja'ja'] No more than 2 or 3 months.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will it be rejected if the duration is longer?

[Ja'ja'] It must not. I repeat that the whole affair is difficult.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You have always been drawing red lines. What is the red line for the transitional government, and what will it involve?

[Ja'ja'] The red line in this whole game is to prevent a Syrian candidate from being elected president of the Republic. Anything else can be accepted and allowed.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There is a saying: No to Syria's candidate in Lebanon; yes to a candidate who has an understanding with Syria.

[Ja'ja'] On what issues is his understanding with Syria? If he has an understanding with Syria on its withdrawal from Lebanon, the answer is yes. If the understanding with Syria is on the tripartite agreement, we are certainly against him. If he has an understanding with Syria to offer it the territory under its control in Lebanon, we are again surely against him. If he has an understanding with Syria on a timetable for its withdrawal from Lebanon, we are with him. After all, it depends on whether these are mere slogans or not.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you want one or two portfolios in the transitional government?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily. There should be a transitional government which preserves the entity of the state and its independence and freedom.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What if the present government turned into a transitional one?

[Ja'ja'] This government is not qualified to be a transitional one.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why not?

[Ja'ja'] Because it does not possess the required specifications.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What is it then?

[Ja'ja'] It is a government of Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Including the Christian ministers?

[Ja'ja'] Which Christian ministers have remained in it?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Minister al-Hashim, Minister Qasir, and Minister Skaf.

[Ja'ja'] Minister Skaf has resigned.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then Ministers al-Hashim and Qasir.

[Ja'ja'] They are met by five ministers, all of which are for Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In other words, it is Syria's government in the ratio of 5 to 2?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, definitely Syria's government.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] On the basis of 2 to 5?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, 2 to 5. It is indeed Syria's government.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] So you have not set any condition for taking a portfolio in the transitional government?

[Ja'ja'] No, never.

No Fighting

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What is the possibility of resumed fighting between the two areas?

[Ja'ja'] I do not believe there is any possibility of a military escalation at this stage or in the foreseeable future. I do not believe that any group can tolerate the burden of a military flare-up, and there are no reasons for one.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that you are opposed to a military flare-up?

[Ja'ja'] Opposed to it 100 percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are there any contacts between you and other Lebanese movements and parties to avoid a military build-up?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, through the security committee.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Through the security committee alone? What are your expectations of initiating a dialogue prior to the presidential elections? In other words, Nabih Birri says "no elections before reconciliation" and the Forces say "no reconciliation before liberation." What are you doing?

[Ja'ja'] We will keep working until we realize our goal of liberation. We can then start reconciliation. It is unrealistic to talk of reconciliation while alien armies are present on your land. When they held elections in France in the presence of the Germans, 80 percent of the French voted for the Vichy government. And when the French called for elections in Algiers, the FLN was against them. The French won 85 percent of the Algerian votes. We all know that the Algerian people are against a French presence in Algiers.

You cannot speak about voting or elections through a referendum, a reconciliation, a political proposal, or a decision, as long as there is a foreign army in your land.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] It has been said that you tried to open channels of communication with Syria.

[Ja'ja'] That is not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you not want a dialogue with Syria?

[Ja'ja'] If it is a serious dialogue which may lead to...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you mean by a serious dialogue with Syria?

[Ja'ja'] I mean a serious dialogue unlike those which used to go on. A serious dialogue means that we discuss the Syrian presence...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What happens if the Syrians say they are ready to receive a delegation for negotiations?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, provided that there is a timetable.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And if they say come and we will discuss the timetable?

[Ja'ja'] We will discuss the timetable.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will you go to Damascus to discuss it?

[Ja'ja'] Why not?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And if the Syrians ask that you send representatives to talk about the timetable?

[Ja'ja'] We will talk about the timetable.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Have there been any contacts to discuss the timetable?

[Ja'ja'] No.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No contacts at all?

[Ja'ja'] Not once.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there a possibility of making such a contact before the presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] I doubt it, I doubt it.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why do you doubt it?

[Ja'ja'] Because we insist on our stand and so do the Syrians.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there no understanding with Syria?

[Ja'ja'] There can be no understanding with Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In other words, this is a deadend and there is no hope of a solution?

[Ja'ja'] Does the solution have to come through Syria?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If Syria objects, will there be a solution?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How?

[Ja'ja'] By continuous confrontation.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This is not a solution.

[Ja'ja'] Why not? This is the only solution. Without this solution, the only recourse would be to share Lebanon with Syria, and this is rejected.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There is talk about sharing Lebanon between Syria and Israel?

[Ja'ja'] I have no information to this effect.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And in practice?

[Ja'ja'] At least in the way things are going now this is indirectly the practical result.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean dividing Lebanon between Syria and Israel?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, indirectly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If Israel requests special relations with Lebanon in return for withdrawing from Lebanese territory, what will Samir Ja'ja's position be?

[Ja'ja'] If Israel requests special relations... Let us resolve our primary issue first, and then we will discuss other issues.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If Israel had been the party to propose the tripartite agreement to Lebanon, what would the position of the "Lebanese Forces" have been?

[Ja'ja'] It is not acceptable for Syria or for Israel to interfere in our political affairs.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] So, if Israel attempts to impose an Israeli-Lebanese tripartite agreement in return for its withdrawal?

[Ja'ja'] This is rejected.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will you carry out a new uprising if someone comes and accepts the idea?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly, because this is rejected. Do you want us to reject something if Syria proposes it and accept it if Israel proposes it, or vice versa, accept it if Syria proposes it and reject it if Israel proposes it? Whether it is Israel or Syria which proposes an occupation, both are rejected.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Your dispute with Syria. With whom or with what is it specifically, a dispute with the regime, with President al-Asad, with Khaddam, or with whom?

[Ja'ja'] With the Syrian regime.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What I mean is, who can change Syrian policy in Lebanon?

[Ja'ja'] By God, the steadfastness of the Lebanese people can change it. I mean with determination and will power. All this can have an effect.

The USSR

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Today there are relations between the "Lebanese Forces" and the USSR. The USSR supports Syria's policy. How is this justified? You talk with the Soviet Union. Do you not raise this issue with it?

[Ja'ja'] Yes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How does the USSR justify it? What does it say?

[Ja'ja'] With regard to the Lebanese crisis?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] With Syria.

[Ja'ja'] The Soviet Union's view is a little different now from what it was in the past few years.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Meaning?

[Ja'ja'] Meaning it does not adopt Syrian policy 100 percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does the USSR support a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon?

[Ja'ja'] The USSR is of the view that we should arrange things with the Syrians in a friendly way.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How did they explain to you, as commander of the "Lebanese Forces," the concept of a friendly way?

[Ja'ja'] How did they explain that to me! They said: If you can reach an understanding with the Syrians, an understanding about the Lebanese issue, how to contact

them, how this and that and that... We told them: Judging by the points and working papers which the Syrians have so far put forward, reaching an understanding is out of the question.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What did they say?

[Ja'ja'] They said: You must keep trying.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And matters stopped there.

[Ja'ja'] Matters stopped there.

The United States

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And the United States?

[Ja'ja'] No, the U.S. position is different.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Meaning?

[Ja'ja'] Much more subtle. The United States opposed the tripartite agreement.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is it true that Bartholomew [former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon] opposed the tripartite agreement?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, that is true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who learned of this?

[Ja'ja'] Numerous Lebanese political figures.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did they inform you of this situation?

[Ja'ja'] They told Elie Hubayqah and Michel al-Murr.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] They told them that they opposed the tripartite agreement?

[Ja'ja'] Of course.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And they would do everything in their power to thwart it?

[Ja'ja'] They do not have the power to thwart it. Others have that power.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Were you contacted to thwart the tripartite agreement?

[Ja'ja'] No, not at all, contrary to what many people believe. Not at all.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The Americans had no knowledge of the dispute [between you and Elie Hubayqah]?

[Ja'ja'] Not at all.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But they were not angry either.

[Ja'ja'] They were not angry.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Afater that, contacts took place and they told you we can cooperate with you now.

[Ja'ja'] Yes. After that, we began to discuss upcoming events and general developments.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you believe that the United States will work to resolve the Lebanese issue and reunite Lebanon? How serious is it in this respect?

[Ja'ja'] Nobody can be serious about this except the Lebanese. The Americans will not sacrifice their policy in the Middle East, nor some of their resources, in order to unite Lebanon and provide prosperity and comfort for its inhabitants. We should banish this idea from our heads. Neither the Americans nor any others will do this. No society uses its resources and efforts in order to secure another society's freedom and safety. This is something that the Lebanese have to do. Only then will foreign parties come to help them. If we keep waiting for a foreign state to liberate and unite Lebanon, nobody will come.

The Lebanese Forces and The Eastern Area

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Frankly speaking, if a referendum is held in the eastern area tomorrow, how many votes will Samir Ja'ja' get? Do you believe all the people love you and are pleased with the "Lebanese Forces"? Or is there criticism and a kind of friction between the Forces on the ground and the people?

[Ja'ja'] First, you know that there are several political forces in the arena. Some of these political forces, especially the traditional ones, do not really stomach the "Lebanese Forces." This is because we are two different generations, with different sets of logic and different political plans. Despite the positive plans adopted by the Lebanese Forces, there are traditional political groups that prefer not to support us. However, this does not prevent us from saying that in the past 2 years there has been a dramatic, and I dare say drastic and complete, change in the view of the public toward the Lebanese Forces. This is thanks to the practices and reforms of the Lebanese Forces.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Two years ago, what was the percentage of the supporters of the Lebanese Forces in the eastern area, and what is their percentage today?

[Ja'ja'] Regardless of who is with or against, it is my opinion that the Lebanese Forces are a continuing necessity.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If we divide the society in the eastern area into the rulers, the older generation, the middle class, and the poor, what is the percentage of the rulers and the order generation supporting you?

[Ja'ja'] We cannot depend on these calculations.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Approximately.

[Ja'ja'] I do not want to receive any support from them. They like to appease too much.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The middle class and the poor?

[Ja'ja'] I take them all.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you consider them your supporters?

[Ja'ja'] One hundred percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you not think that when you check the revenues of companies and send forms to be filled out about employees and their salaries...?

[Ja'ja'] This is not true.

Free Economy

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But you do send papers and forms?

[Ja'ja'] This applies only to foreign employees.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you not believe that the presence of Samir Ja'ja' has scared away businessmen who could invest their money in Lebanon?

[Ja'ja'] I do not believe so.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you support free economy?

[Ja'ja'] One hundred percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is it because you are accused of being leftist, socialist, progressive, and revolutionary?

[Ja'ja'] Revolutionary, I understand; progressive, correct; but socialist?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And leftist?

[Ja'ja'] It depends on what sense of leftism you are talking about.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In what sense are you a leftist and in what sense are you not a leftist?

[Ja'ja'] I am leftist in the sense that I continuously transcend reality to reach something better. I am not leftist in the sense that I do not emulate the "progressive" and leftist parties.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that you do not accept socialism and communism?

[Ja'ja'] Absolutely. I will support the free enterprise until the end. Nothing can build societies except free enterprise. Furthermore, there are certain components which we should consider as principles in this particular society, such as free medication, free education, guarantee of housing, and guarantee of other social services. All these should be rendered to all the people and a free economy should be built. Only then would we have an ideal society.

The Islamic System

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let's stop talking about Lebanon for a while. What do you think of the current Arab issues, and also the Iranian issue and the Islamic republic concept?

[Ja'ja'] If you are asking for my ideological opinion on this particular subject that is one thing; if you are asking me about the possibility of its success that is something else. First of all, I will give you my opinion. I will give you a brief definition of the Islamic republic. Islamic republics are established republics and societies in which the rule of the Koran and sharia prevails. These societies will not progress in history and, consequently, man cannot achieve any progress under such societies. Let us take, for example, the Iranian revolution in Iran. In Iran there is the Iranian regime and there is also the Iranian revolution. The revolution believes it has done its duty toward God in Iran. This means it has done everything it has been asked to do in Iran: to build the regime to apply the sharia as stipulated in the Koran, and nothing else. What we call man's progress and development, his increasing culture and know-how, his overcoming nature and himself, and so on make him into a small god on earth. All this does not exist there.

What is suggested is to establish an Islamic republic and to apply the systems as stipulated in the Koran and sharia, and that's all.

First of all, we are not thinking of applying such systems to non-Muslims. Second, if we apply them to Muslims, it would freeze man and the Muslim society in a specific period of history. This means that man would not be allowed to develop or progress ideologically.

[Ja'ja' continues] On the possibility of the exporting or not of these republics, I believe that the Islamic Republic in Iran has just begun the second half of its life. In other words, the countdown toward the Islamic regime's demise in Iran began before we could even talk about its expansion outside Iran.

The way the Khomeyni regime has acted destroyed its entire potential in the first 5 years. It clashed with all peoples, with the arch-satan and small-satan—the foreign and Arab countries—leaving nothing for itself. Consequently, it has exhausted all the revolution's human and material resources. We can say that the Iranian revolution has reached the halfway point of its life. This does not mean the ruling regime in Iran will collapse in a year or two, but we can safely say that this regime is going downhill. Because of the nature of the political forces in Iran and the presence of an opposition, the present revolution may collapse in 5 or 10 years.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why 5 or 10 years?

[Ja'ja'] Just an estimation.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you believe that Iraq can still take another 5 or 10 years?

[Ja'ja'] The Iraq-Iran war has certainly climaxed at this point. From now on, we can expect nothing but a trend toward further pacification. If events do not take the course of peace between the two countries, then at least they will tend toward freezing the status quo.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who will undertake these peace efforts?

[Ja'ja'] A number of factors, mainly the depletion of the warring parties' human and financial resources. Add to this the existing balance of powers. I expect a further diminishment of the Gulf war, contrary to present appearances.

Now and for the next month or two, an attack may occur here or there, but that does not mean that the war will flare up again.

The Uprising in the West Bank

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] There is an uprising against Israel today in the West Bank. Are the Lebanese Forces for a or against the Palestinian cause?

[Ja'ja'] That depends on what you mean by the "Palestinian cause." The Palestinian cause is one thing...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What I mean is: Are you in favor of the Palestinian people's cause and their right to have a land and an independent homeland?

[Ja'ja'] We are in favor of the right to self-determination for all the people of the world. We support the freedom of self-determination.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then you support what is taking place in the West Bank?

[Ja'ja'] As a means. What is happening in the West Bank is not easy to carry out.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you mean by "as a means"?

[Ja'ja'] I mean as a method for liberation. What is happening is not easy at all.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You are talking from the military point of view. We are talking...

[Ja'ja'] I mean politically. What is going on in the West Bank is something which can not be taken lightly. It is worthy of respect.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why did you not support the strike?

[Ja'ja'] For other reasons. First of all, nobody asked us to support the strike. Besides, there are other calculations to reckon with.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did you refrain from supporting the strike for reasons that have to do with Lebanese politics, or out of a regional conviction on the issue under consideration?

[Ja'ja'] We want to take into consideration the balance of powers on the level of the Middle East as a whole. We can not take intellectual considerations into account.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Meaning?

[Ja'ja'] We have to take everything into consideration.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In other words, you rejected the strike.

[Ja'ja'] Do not forget that we have a long-term and broadly based problem with the Palestinians. Do not forget that between 1969 and 1975 the Palestinians were the underlying cause of the outbreak of war in Lebanon.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What does the Palestinian of the West Bank have to do with that?

[Ja'ja'] Is there a difference between the Palestinians of the West Bank and other Palestinians? Can we separate the Palestinian issue?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean that you support Israel today against the Palestinians in the West Bank?

[Ja'ja'] I do not mean that. We have had a problem with the Palestinians since 1975.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] That problem is in Lebanon. It is not a regional one. There is a regional issue; there is an uprising in the West Bank.

[Ja'ja'] Is that uprising in the West Bank isolated in terms of time and place from all events going on in the Middle East, or is it part of the Palestinian cause and the

PLO and all its efforts? We have a major problem with the PLO. The after effects of that problem have gradually worn away with Israel's entry into Lebanon and with the armed Palestinian presence coming to an end.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The after effects wore away, as you say, after Israel's entry.

[Ja'ja'] When our views and the PLO's views on the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon become identical, and when we arrive at an understanding with them on Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, and independence, only then can we specify our stand on everything that has to do with the Palestinian cause.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] 'Arafat has said that he is in favor of disarmed Palestinians in Lebanon, provided that the camps are internationalized.

[Ja'ja'] Great. We agree with him on internationalizing the camps.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What about the uprising in the West Bank?

[Ja'ja'] I have no doubt that the events in the West Bank, regardless of whether we are against them or for them, are worthy of respect.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The United States has condemned the Israeli practices.

[Ja'ja'] And is it necessary that the United States condemn the Israeli practices?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I am asking you. Do you support or do you condemn the Israeli way of handling the uprising?

[Ja'ja'] I can only respect the move which has taken place in the West Bank. It expresses commitment to the cause and a defense of the cause. Regardless of my views on this particular cause and its dimensions, I am compelled to respect the people carrying out the uprising.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Where will the events in the West Bank lead?

[Ja'ja'] In my opinion, this will be a very important penetration into Israel's political, security, and military belt, provided the Arabs know how to exploit it...

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If you were the planner for the Arabs today, what would you have planned?

[Ja'ja'] What would I plan? I would place all my weight in the uprising and in the means to keep it going.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How?

[Ja'ja'] All my material weight, which is the most important thing. I would use all my resources. I would stop emphasizing the buildup of Arab and Palestinian armies outside Palestine. I would stop financing plans here and there and put all my financial weight in the West Bank. This is because it has transpired that Israel's weakness lies in the West Bank. The Arabs have tried everything with Israel. They tried military and militia wars inside Palestine in 1947, but they did not succeed. Then they tried military confrontations between armies, and they did not succeed. They also tried the surprise war against Israel, without success. They even tried with aircraft and through international terrorism, but also failed. They tried through fedayeen operations, but they did not succeed. The Palestinians managed to exploit Israel's weak point. This is illustrated in the moves the Palestinians have been carrying out for the last 2 months.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And what is the second step?

[Ja'ja'] This step is alone capable of shaking the whole situation.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What will happen?

[Ja'ja'] If this step continues, Israel will eventually tell the Palestinians: Let us see what you want. Is that not what the Palestinians are looking for?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Shamir is in trouble. It is being said that he is looking for way to move toward peace or toward war. In your opinion, what will happen?

[Ja'ja'] The problem lies here. Had he managed to move toward war, he would have done so. This is the problem. If the uprising continues, he would only be able to move in the direction of peace.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you believe this is impossible.

[Ja'ja'] If I were in the Arabs' shoes, I would have placed all my potentials at the disposal of the uprising in the West Bank.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If this was your feeling, how would you explain the intensive coverage of the uprising by the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation [LBC] over 47 days!

[Ja'ja'] There are no instructions in this regard. The LBC is an objective information means that airs world events.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] But the coverage is tremendous?

[Ja'ja'] The LBC covered the Olympic games in Syria, regardless of our position toward Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Regarding Yasir 'Arafat, a revolutionary person, do you wish you were in his place today?

[Ja'ja'] I hope our people will be in the Palestinian peoples' place one day. I believe that the Arabs should realize the value of what is taking place.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Would you be pained if the Arabs did not take the step you are talking about?

[Ja'ja'] They would miss a chance.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why do you not say this publicly?

[Ja'ja'] I am saying it publicly.

Possibilities of War

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You believe that Israel cannot go to war?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, and hence the delicacy of the current situation. If Israel goes [to war], will it be to kill civilians?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No, no, a regional war.

[Ja'ja'] It will not stop the uprising.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] So, that it will return through...

[Ja'ja'] Regional war, where, and against whom?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I am a journalist, and you have the information: a regional war. Instead of the war being continued in the West Bank, it will be bigger and wider in scope ; in other words, a Middle East war.

[Ja'ja'] Let us examine a certain scenario. The only possible war Israel can launch is against Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are possibilities for such a war?

[Ja'ja'] At present, 10 percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why 10 percent.

[Ja'ja'] Because this is my information. These are the facts.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Based on what?

[Ja'ja'] Based on the information I have about the situation in Syria, in Israel, and in the region.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How long will Israel be able to stand in the face of the new situation in the West Bank and Gaza?

[Ja'ja'] I believe another 4 or 5 months. If there is some more violence, Israel will find itself compelled to sit with the Palestinians at the negotiating table. This is very clear if we merely read the events.

If these events should continue, and Israel decides to go to war, what will it do? It cannot send more soldiers than it has sent so far. If it were to send more soldiers, it could not exceed a certain limit, because it would find itself facing the option of killing all the people. I do not believe it will do this.

Therefore, Israel has no alternative but to turn toward peace. Let us suppose that it wants to attempt a regional war and consequently launches a war against Syria. War with Syria is not a joke, because it requires serious study.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] It will be a costly war; it will require planning and work. Furthermore, if war breaks out between Israel and Syria, it will have no effect on the events in the West Bank. The uprising will continue despite the Israeli-Syrian war. What will Israel have done? It will have added its war with Syria to its problems in the West Bank.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If the uprising continues for another 2 or 3 months, what will happen?

[Ja'ja'] I say that the Israeli rulers will be put in a very tight corner.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What will they do?

[Ja'ja'] They will be put in a very tight corner.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How?

[Ja'ja'] If this activity continues in a serious and overwhelming way, they will find themselves compelled to enter into negotiations with the West Bank Palestinians. They will accept an international conference. They will be compelled to sit with the Palestinians.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What will be the reaction to this in the Lebanese arena?

[Ja'ja'] I imagine it will be positive, in the sense that one of the problems of the region will become less severe. This will have positive effect on the situation in Lebanon. However, all of this depends on the Palestinians' future course of action: Mark my words: all this talk will be premature if they do not continue [their uprising].

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Has there been any contact between you and Palestinian officials?

[Ja'ja'] No.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] No contact at all?

[Ja'ja'] There are contacts at intelligence levels.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there not any political consultation or dealing as is the case with the rest of the Arab countries?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, there is. However, these contacts are not comprehensive and are limited.

Relations With Israel

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] As regards the ties with Israel of which you were accused, in 1981 Bashir [al-Jumayyil] was asked to sign a document committing himself not to deal with or to stop dealing with Israel.

[Ja'ja'] All of those who are demanding that there be no dealing with Israel are doing so because Israel is an enemy and occupier, etc. However, the enemy and the occupier now is Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you have any relations with Israel?

[Ja'ja'] I would not hesitate for a moment to establish ties with any foreign element that could help resolve the Lebanese issue.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Including Israel?

[Ja'ja'] I am generally speaking in principle.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is this applicable now?

[Ja'ja'] No one knows.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You know.

[Ja'ja'] [Laughing] But I do not have to say everything I know.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] On what basis do you deal with Israel?

[Ja'ja'] Who told you that I am dealing with Israel.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is this cooperation with Israel the same that exists with the Arab countries?

[Ja'ja'] As regards the interests of states and communities, there is no room for passions. Let me tell you something: When King Husayn struck the Palestinians in 1970, the Palestinians in Jordan fled to Israel, to the [West] Bank where Israel exists. Let us not discuss this.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If you were to "cooperate" with Israel to liberate the country from Syria, and Syria subsequently left Lebanon but Israel remained and laid down its conditions, would you then cooperate with Syria so that it would return and drive Israel out?

[Ja'ja'] We are not children who would have one problem and then fall in another one.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Yes. The Phalangists appeared like children when they brought the Syrians in to evict the Palestinians in 1976. They got rid of the Palestinians and became involved with the Syrians.

[Ja'ja'] I do not wish to return to the past.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] To the future?

[Ja'ja'] When we reject Syria's presence here, reject a tripartite agreement from Syria, and reject distinguished relations with it, we will also not accept these with Israel. Proceeding from the same principle, what is rejected with Syria is rejected with the United States and with Israel and with any other foreign country.

The International Conference

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In your opinion, what are the possibilities of convening an international peace conference before the end of President Reagan's term of office?

[Ja'ja'] Slight before the end of President Reagan's term.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you not believe that Reagan is eager to make any step?

[Ja'ja'] I believe that it is the Soviets who are hasty, not Reagan. Therefore, I am doubtful, and I do not believe that the possibility of convening such a conference before Reagan's departure is better than 30 percent. I believe that part of the U.S. stand toward the West Bank events is an attempt to pressure Israel into participating in the international conference.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] This means that the United States supports the international conference?

[Ja'ja'] "Although you do not understand them," each minister makes declarations. I am speaking about the Administration's attitude as an administration, and disregarding some politicians. I imagine that we are proceeding toward an international conference because they [not further identified] want to pursue steps leading to reconciliation.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will Lebanon have a say, chair, or seat at an international conference?

[Ja'ja'] Absolutely. Absolutely.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Lebanon will then be represented by the new president-elect if the conference is convened after 1988?

[Ja'ja'] Yes, naturally.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If there is no president by then, Lebanon will be represented by the head of the government?

[Ja'ja'] By the government. However, I consider the possibility of convening such a conference as remote.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You say that the current Israeli attitude cannot be maintained for more than 3 months?

[Ja'ja'] Then they will expedite matters so as to talk to the Palestinians or find another formula. However, remember that these are expectations based on the assumption that the incidents will continue.

Who Killed Kan'an?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us return to the Lebanese arena before we conclude this discussion. What is the extent of the coordination between you and other Christian parties?

[Ja'ja'] It is a full coordination.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Amin al-Jumayyil, Michel 'Awn, and the issue of Khalil Kan'an. The Army commander clearly said in this respect: "I have asked the Lebanese Forces to place the dossier of Kan'an's assassination at my disposal. I am still waiting. They have not helped me and have done nothing to help me." This indicates that relations between the Army commander and "the Forces" commander are tense.

[Ja'ja'] They are not tense, but I do admit that they are cool. Despite this, however, what you see on the ground yourself is what matters.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What about the Khalil Kan'an case?

[Ja'ja'] In the Khalil Kan'an case, the Army, its security and intelligence organs, etc., have asked us for our information. The operation was carried out where the Army was, in Al-Hazimiyah or Al-Fayyadiyah [in East Beirut]. I gave them the information about it. Besides, if I have information, why should I hide from them? This case should not be used as an excuse.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who do you believe killed Khalil Kan'an?

[Ja'ja'] I cannot consider this; I cannot analyze as I did with regard to the West Bank and speculate. There is an accusation here. I cannot accuse anyone if I do not have proof and evidence. I want to ask here: seven Army officers, most of them from Al-Biqa', have been killed in the past 2 years. All of these officers have been forgotten. One officer is killed in mysterious circumstances here near the Defense Ministry and they are going around and

around, beating around the bush, and going back and back again to Khalil Kan'an. They are not carrying out an investigation to ascertain the identity of those who killed him.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that the Lebanese Forces were not involved in the killing of Khalil Kan'an?

[Ja'ja'] The Lebanese Forces were certainly not involved. We have done something that goes beyond the case of Khalil Kan'an and have said so. [sentence as published]

Karami?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who, in your opinion, killed Rashid Karami if you are not responsible?

[Ja'ja'] [laughs]

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What information do you have?

[Ja'ja'] We have very little information about the killing of Rashid Karami. Ask me about all kinds of expectations, but not about accusations in assassination cases. We must not accuse a particular side as our information does not allow us to point the finger at anyone. If we get enough information, we will make it available.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You have benefitted from Karami's death?

[Ja'ja'] In an indirect way, certainly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] Because one of the principal pillars of Syrian policy in Lebanon had disappeared.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You have been indirectly accused because you have benefitted from his absence?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily, not necessarily.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You have benefitted in an indirect way. Who else has benefitted?

[Ja'ja'] Many.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Such as?

[Ja'ja'] The Palestinians, for example.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] For the same reason. Another reason is that he had provided the cover for the Syrians to eliminate the Palestinians in Tripoli and to repeal the Cairo Agreement. We know of a third party; namely, the [Islamic] Unification Movement in Tripoli, which is not at all

insignificant. There were political frictions between Rashid Karami and them, and he thus let the Syrians enter Tripoli to eliminate them. Huge massacres took place as a result of this.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you consider the coordination taking place in the eastern areas to be proceeding well today?

[Ja'ja'] At a minimum level, at least.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Meetings with key figures are continuing at the Presidential Palace?

[Ja'ja'] They are continuing.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you consider them to be positive or negative?

[Ja'ja'] Positive and necessary.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Where could they ultimately lead?

[Ja'ja'] They will lead to a single concept and to a united stand on all the debatable issues, such as forming or not forming a government and its composition.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Could they lead to a single candidate?

[Ja'ja'] It is very possible.

The Others

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us look at the other parties. With which of the opposing parties can you, as the Lebanese Forces, agree with?

[Ja'ja'] With any Lebanese party that adheres to Lebanon.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] With Walid Junblatt?

[Ja'ja'] Walid Junblatt is a liar. His problem is that he is a liar.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us forget his lies. What about his true convictions?

[Ja'ja'] I do not know if he has any convictions.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Then there is no agreement at the present?

[Ja'ja'] If you ask me what his convictions are, I tell you that I do not know. If you know them, please tell me.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Nabih Birri?

[Ja'ja'] The problem with Nabih Birri is that he is 100 percent in the hands of the Syrians. If he has any beliefs, he does not stand for them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] It seems you are nicer to Birri than to Junblatt.

[Ja'ja'] Walid Junblatt is a liar, unfortunately. There is no problem for someone to have adversaries. But when these adversaries are dishonest, it is a catastrophe.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What did he lie about?

[Ja'ja'] He lied about the Halat Airport; it was a sheer and outright lie. Furthermore, you cannot figure out what he stands for.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah?

[Ja'ja'] I respect him very much, although I disagree with him 100 percent.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How do you think his problem can be solved?

[Ja'ja'] He has to take the other communities living in Lebanon into account. Lebanon is not made up of Muslims only.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] He proposes the Islamic republic as a political system, like capitalism?

[Ja'ja'] My answer is that as a political system it fits the Muslims only. To apply a political system that derives its laws, type of society, and social dealings from the Koran and the sharia on non-Muslims is out of the question.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How about Muhammad Shams al-Din?

[Ja'ja'] At the same time I respect Fadlallah very much. I hope that Shams al-Din acts like Fadlallah; that is, not to try to reach the same goal by devious means. My opinion is that what Nabih Birri, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah want is one and the same. The difference between them is that Fadlallah says what he wants directly, but Shams al-Din covers it by using the notion of numerical democracy. What does he mean by numerical democracy? He means that the Shi'ites, who represent the majority, should be in power in Lebanon, thus leading us into an Islamic regime. So, he wants the same thing that Fadlallah wants, but the latter speaks more frankly.

Nabih Birri presents it in a democratic and more Western and sophisticated way, calling for the abrogation of political sectarianism. He says: "What is this? Is there

any longer a country that lives under political sectarianism"? Look who is talking about sectarianism. What does Nabih Birri want to achieve by abrogating political sectarianism?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Mufti Khalid?

[Ja'ja'] I have all respect, love, and good feelings toward Mufti Khalid.

Conflict Among the Christians

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Some predict a grinding conflict between influential Christians in the eastern area and the area's leaders because of the presidential elections. Will Amin al-Jumayyil return or not; the Phalangist Party, the "Forces," and Samir Ja'ja' will all interlope. Can the eastern area absorb them all?

[Ja'ja'] It can absorb them easily; it can even absorb five times as many. As long as "the Lebanese Front" exists, everybody will be in it. The matter does not need that much [explanation].

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What if Amin al-Jumayyil returns to the arena?

[Ja'ja'] Contrary to what some believe, I say: If a conflict over power is going to occur, it would have occurred now or a short time ago, but not after Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil's term of office ends. The conflict would have taken place now. On the contrary, I expect the disputes to recede further.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that after the elections, Amin al-Jumayyil will become a Christian leader?

[Ja'ja'] Undoubtedly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will he have a role in the Christian arena?

[Ja'ja'] I imagine so.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You have no problem should Al-Jumayyil return energetically to the Christian arena?

[Ja'ja'] No. Let him return. Definitely. Can we prevent, especially President al-Jumayyil, from returning to the Christian arena?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this mean that the Christian arena can accommodate President Al-Jumayyil, Dany Sham'un, and...

[Ja'ja'] Definitely. But they should all come under one framework; namely, "the Lebanese Front." Thus, they would consult each other within one controlling body,

agree on unified stands, and reach an understanding on the principles. Then come the daily incidents such as the plane story, the execution story, and other minor stories.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are you against the existence of more than one voice in the eastern area?

[Ja'ja'] One voice by all and not necessarily the voice of one person.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The voice of one person.

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily, but one voice within the framework of a front like the "Lebanese Front."

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] That is an organization. Are you for or against there being one ruler?

[Ja'ja'] Does not "the Lebanese Front" have a leader?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Certainly.

[Ja'ja'] Therefore, he represents "the Lebanese Front."

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Who is the leader of "the Lebanese Front" at present?

[Ja'ja'] Dr Sa'adah.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How did you elect him?

[Ja'ja'] He holds this office by virtue of the fact that he was the deputy leader of the Front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why don't you elect a new leader of the front?

[Ja'ja'] This will happen within the next 2 months.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You might elect a new leader?

[Ja'ja'] Yes.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is Edward Hunayn still a member of "the Lebanese Front"?

[Ja'ja'] No, he has left the Front.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Why?

[Ja'ja'] For several reasons, primarily the generational struggle. We harbor every love and respect for Edward, but he belongs to one generation, and we to another. He has his own logic and we have ours, but we agree 100 percent on the fundamentals.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there no political disagreement?

[Ja'ja'] Absolutely not. Edward's stands are well-known. They are firm patriotic stands, despite some of the changes which have occurred. We cannot but respect Edward.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] At the end of this discussion, do we understand that nobody who is against "the Forces" can become a president of the Republic?

[Ja'ja'] A person who supports Syria and is against the "Forces" cannot become president?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are the red lines [safety limits] for a candidate?

[Ja'ja'] The red lines are that the candidate be a toy in the hands of Syria. These are the red lines.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What if he is a president who does not support Syria but differs with the "Lebanese Forces" over the issue of decentralization?

[Ja'ja'] We try to promote a president who is not for Syria and whose political program provides for decentralization.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How can "the Lebanese Forces" participate in the democratic game if they are not represented in the institutions which play this game?

[Ja'ja'] I believe we have contacts with the elements and members of these institutions. We also have a network of relations with them that permit us to hold continuous deliberations with them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does this argument mean that it is not true that there can be no president in 1988 if he is against the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] As a whole, this is not the argument which the "Forces" propound.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A person could become a president of the Republic even if he is against the argument propounded by the "forces."

[Ja'ja'] It depends. It is not necessary that a person should have the same outlook as that of the "Forces" on all points in order to become president. I tell you that the main red line, which is not a joke, is that he be a toy in the hands of Syria.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there a specific generation you prefer for the presidency of the Republic?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily. However, we do prefer the young generation which can realize the required change on the level of the state's institutions—a change which will end their failure, corruption, and inability to carry out any role required of them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Whom would you prefer, a technocrat or a politician?

[Ja'ja'] A politician.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] As opposed to the technocrat.

[Ja'ja'] Each one has a role to play.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A politician or a military man?

[Ja'ja'] It depends on the program; it does not matter.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean that [Army Commander] Michel 'Awn could one day become the candidate of the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] According to my information, Michel 'Awn is not a candidate.

A stalemate

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Have you not agreed within the Lebanese Front to nominate somebody?

[Ja'ja'] We cannot force it on anyone.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] I mean from the list of the candidates?

[Ja'ja'] What about them.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Dany Sham'un or George Sa'adah, for instance?

[Ja'ja'] I have no idea that Geoge Sa'adah is a candidate. However, it is stil premature.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What do you expect will happen?

[Ja'ja'] That we will pass through a state of stalemate.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] That is what [Syrian Vice President 'Abd al-Halim] Khaddam said yesterday.

[Ja'ja'] That is the reality.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] By a stalemate you mean a static situation from now until the elections?

[Ja'ja'] No, a static situation on the political level in general. As for who the candidate will be and what his programs will be, this is another matter.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you think there is a plan and a policy to Balkanize and fragment the region?

[Ja'ja'] How, and who drew that policy?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] As part of the Israeli policies, for example. Sectarian entities: an 'Alawite entity, a Christian entity; a Druze entity; etc.

[Ja'ja'] What is this talk? These are not implemented policies but sayings that we must wipe out from our heads. They are untrue, myths. The fact is that the key powers in the region initiate events toward a certain course, after which the foreign countries come and ride the wave. Despite its weight after World War II, Britain exerted efforts with several states, other than Iraq, to revive the Baghdad Pact. However, it failed to persuade them to join it. The United States tried to revive CENTO, but only Pakistan and Turkey joined it.

Bashir and Hastiness

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What if bargaining started with Samir Ja'ja' over the presidential elections to make concessions in return for the post?

[Ja'ja'] There is no bargaining over the presidency.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is it true what some people have said; namely, that there is a parallel between your speech and the speech of Bashir al-Jumayyil at the Phalangist Party's celebrations when he outlined the characteristics and program of the president? He should be tall, bald...

[Ja'ja'] [laughs] And a sportsman too.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] These are your characteristics?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you wish to be the president of the Republic?

[Ja'ja'] It is not a question of wishing. If necessary, I can be a president of the Republic and much more than that.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What does, if necessary, mean?

[Ja'ja'] If there is scope, I will be 100 presidents. Do we joke in politics? You can achieve much more in the position of a president of the republic than you can from present positions.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Can you be a president of the Republic today?

[Ja'ja'] Why not?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] That is, you can be so after 8 months?

[Ja'ja'] No one knows. It is still too early for the elections.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Some people say that Bashir al- Jumayyil was very hasty and should not have become president of the Republic?

[Ja'ja'] Hm.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] If someone tells you: Do not be too hasty to become president, what will you tell him?

[Ja'ja'] Hasty in what way? Everybody knew when Shaykh Bashir became president, and everybody inside and outside the country were happy, because he was carrying a plan for a solution.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you mean that the country will be happy if Samir Ja'ja' becomes president of the Republic?

[Ja'ja'] I think so. [laughs]

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The entire country or only this area?

[Ja'ja'] Most of the country because no one can satisfy all the people.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Nabih Birri said in his private councils after the 15 January celebrations that Samir Ja'ja' has not emerged as a political leader but as the architect of a political program who knows and implements what he wants. What is your opinion?

[Ja'ja'] True, and this is one of the few times when I agree with Nabih Birri. [laughs]

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Regarding the presidential elections, you have said that this stage will be the start of the safety road for Lebanon?

[Ja'ja'] I do not believe that this will be the first event in Lebanon. There is no doubt that the task exists to activate the internal situation and we should not think that this will be the last event witnessed by Lebanon.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Will Lebanon remain united or not?

[Ja'ja'] It must remain united.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Must is something, remain is something else?

[Ja'ja'] No. It is not going... It must. When we know that there is a necessary job, then we raise the seven figure (victory sign) [the arabic figure 7 corresponds to a v letter] in that direction. We must concentrate all our efforts on it. Lebanon must remain united.

Taxes

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Let us return to the fund. The people are now paying taxes. The people believe that this 1 percent can help them survive. You said that this is necessary to operate the jeep. Should the people tell you: Forget about the jeep?

[Ja'ja'] First, I believe that the people will not say that. Second, I am not talking only about the jeep, but also about the bus that transports people. I am also talking about educational assistance because we have accommodated everybody in schools.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] The people are paying taxes to the state and taxes to the "forces."

[Ja'ja'] Where are the state taxes and the "forces" taxes? In areas where state taxes exist, no taxes are paid to the "forces," except at a minimal level. Therefore, the level of taxes the people pay is necessary for an organized society, and a society which has services. All the people ask for services. They want health services. How can we provide these? Every open-heart surgery costs from between 1 to 3, and even 4 million pounds. Where can they get the money from? The other organizations are linked to the Gulf states or to Syria. As for us, where can we obtain money? Much is required from us, but in the end nobody is prepared to make even a little sacrifice. If a car blows up, they ask: Where are the "Forces"? If an attack takes place, they ask: Where are the "Forces"? If they wanted us to propagandize for our cause abroad, they ask: Where is the "Forces" office? You know how much only one "Forces" office costs. The other organizations secure money from foreign states. As for us, where can we get money? Our people are the basic source of funds. We, the people, are paying. The services they get also come from the people.

In Lebanon, there are no taxes, but some meager aid to enable us to carry out some work on the general and comprehensive level.

No Invasion

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] It has been said that the Forces recent statements have been escalatory?...

[Ja'ja'] What statements are escalatory? To say that we do not accept a president imposed by Syria? If this is escalatory, then we are the first to escalate.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you possess the ability to defend your statement that "no Syrian candidate will win"? On what do you base your statement? On the youth alone?

[Ja'ja'] On our intrinsic resources, our institutions, and our diplomatic contacts.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Reliance on the youth is great, but what states are allies of the "Forces"?

[Ja'ja'] They are too many. It is not at all a trivial matter that the British foreign minister should say 2 months ago that Syria cannot stay in Lebanon and that President al-Asad should reconsider the presence of his forces in Lebanon. For French officials to say that France has evaluated its contacts means that neither the "Lebanese Forces" nor Lebanon are alone.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you consider this enough?

[Ja'ja'] This is definitely not enough, but it is an indicator.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Have any in-depth contacts be held on the basis of this indicator?

[Ja'ja'] Positively.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] And there has been reaction?

[Ja'ja'] Yes. There is a considerable coordination with international and regional forces.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does an incursion into the eastern areas constitute a red line?

[Ja'ja'] It constitutes a red line.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Can you reassure the citizens?

[Ja'ja'] It constitutes a primary red line.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Under any circumstances or equation?

[Ja'ja'] Most certainly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Before and after the elections?

[Ja'ja'] Of course. What defeat do you want for Syria that would be bigger than the abrogation of the tripartite agreement. Nothing happened after that defeat. On the contrary, the security situation has become far better than that which existed when the tripartite agreement was dying.

A President for the Muslims

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] MacFarlane says that the situation in the Middle East, including the Lebanese situation, has been shelved for 3 years. Does this mean that there will be no solutions?

[Ja'ja'] A stalemate might prevail, but nobody can say it will last 5 or 6 years. This depends on the variables. Nobody knows for sure. Nobody knows what will happen in Iran.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In the television debate, you explained why the Muslims cannot have a president?

[Ja'ja'] Yes. I hypothesized why they have no right to the post of president of the Republic.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is there a certain system that would allow them to have their own president?

[Ja'ja'] It is not a matter of a president. Perhaps there will be no president, and in that case all the Lebanese communities will be represented in the way they want.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Does that mean you agree with [member of Chamber of Deputies] Butrus Harb on the rotation?

[Ja'ja'] No, I do not think only of one step. There was no rotation in 1943. This is not a solution. I am talking about a change in the entire system.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Are you in favor of a presidential council?

[Ja'ja'] Perhaps, but I am talking about a clear-cut decentralized system, and not a rotation under the 1943 formula. Otherwise, we would not be doing anything. What I mean is a decentralized political system.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do the Lebanese Forces have a system ready?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What is it?

[Ja'ja'] We talk about it. But we have to discuss its details with various factions in order to work out its fine points.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Do you mean that you have introduced changes in the Christian draft solution?

[Ja'ja'] Not at all. Does the Christian draft solution contradict the principle of political decentralization? It is a political plan for a certain stage, the current stage.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] You mean a red line?

[Ja'ja'] True. A red line that cannot be crossed. It is a minimum. But in order to work out a system for the future, the entire political structure must be changed.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Walid Junblatt has accused you of working for partition?

[Ja'ja'] Look, Walid Junblatt is the last one to talk about partition.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How about Lahd's visit to the eastern area?

[Ja'ja'] Lahd's home is here. Does he not have the right to visit the eastern area?

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Did you talk to him about the situation east of Sidon?

[Ja'ja'] Certainly we talked about it, as well as several other things, including political topics, the general situation, the South, Beirut, and all the Lebanese areas.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What are his views?

[Ja'ja'] He says hello to everyone. (laughing)

Accord and Division

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] A question to religiously devout Samir Ja'ja', the strong Christian in the arena: We hear of Christian accord but feel the existence of Christian division. Raymond Iddih is in one valley, Franjiyah in another. The same applies to Michel 'Awn and the president. There are Al-Matn forces and northern forces. There are also other forces. There are youths who were in one rank, but are now scattered and divided. What has Samir Ja'ja' done to unite the Christian ranks, especially with regard to the youths in Zahlah, although Hubayqah had committed a sin?

[Ja'ja'] I will give you my theory about Christian unity. When we speak about Christian unity, we do not speak about Raymond Iddih, because he is outside the whole game; we also do not talk about Franjiyah because he is in Syria's hands 100 percent. In the past, Franjiyah tried to shift away from Syria a little, and because of an error, the Syrians instigated the nationalists in Al-Kurah against him, driving him out of there.

Therefore, let us first outline the framework in the liberated areas because these are the only areas in which you can adopt the stand you want.

We cannot take into consideration the groups which are outside the game and which have fallen under Syria's domination. Therefore, the Christian spirit only exists here.

As for Christian unity with regard to Hubayqah and his group, the door is open to Hubayqah's group to return to the eastern area any time they wish, naturally, after a minimum investigation about them. They are allowed to return to the eastern area. The best example of this is that Hubayqah's personal aide, Elie Karam, who returned to the eastern area 1 year ago, is now living

there freely and comfortably. Many of them are here and are doing fine. Therefore, there is a great difference between Hubayqah and those who are with him.

As for the situation at home, take the Israeli situation, for example. Even the Labor Party and the Likud have not yet agreed on the future of the West Bank. This does not mean that Israel has disintegrated. They also have not yet agreed on an international conference—you are aware of their differences. Each minister makes a different statement. In France, for example, Chirac and Mitterrand agree on France's policy toward Iran and Syria. However, 6 months ago, Chirac tried to reach an understanding with Syria. Mitterrand made a statement however that upset the whole operation for Chirac. This does not mean that France will disintegrate. This is not true. Christian unity means that the parties and influential people in this area agree on the basic principles and the broadlines. Furthermore, every party and political force has freedom of movement and might have a stand that is different from the others. This is not a problem. We must get accustomed to respecting each other and each other's views. Unity does not mean one view with regard to all issues at all times. However, there must be one view on the basic principles and constants. On this basis I say that there is a minimum extent of Christian unity and a greater extent of recognition of each other and of others and of the others' freedom of tactical action.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] On the eve of these developments, should there not be one hand steering?

[Ja'ja'] The Christians have united stands that are steering matters, unless you mean one head, one person. Not just anyone can do this. You must wait for historic men at historic periods, and these rarely materialize. Hence, we must substitute them with a broadly based policy—the country's public policy. This is why we have, for example, united stands with regard to the Syrians' entry into West Beirut, the opening of Halat Airport, the Syrian presence in Lebanon as a whole, and other fateful issues. The issue of the helicopter is, for example, the best proof that differences on some matters are allowed, even normal. My opinion was similar to that of the Army commander; namely, that this helicopter should be returned. But it is not a catastrophe that Dany Sham'un had a completely different view.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] In the same way that we [participants in interview] have assured the Christians that there will be no Syrian invasion of the [Christian] areas either before or after the elections.

[Ja'ja'] This is no joking matter!

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Can we assure them, too, that there will be no new battles among the Christians, neither before nor after the presidential elections?

[Ja'ja'] Neither before nor after. I do not understand why this issue is always raised. There will be no invasion, no battle, nothing of the sort. We will march toward increasingly stronger unity. Relations among the Lebanese Front members now are much better than last year. Relations with all the key Christian figures are much better than last year, too. The process is going from good to better.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is the Christian intelligentsia isolated from the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] That is not true.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] How can you assure the Christians of Zahlah, Ba'labakk, and other Christians?

[Ja'ja'] I am assuring not only the Christians in this area, but all of Lebanon's Christians, as well as non-Christians because if the Christian community is well then the others will be well. Our hope is growing that we will all be well.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] What is the Lebanese Forces plan for your people in Bsharri, Zahlah, Judaydat al-Fakihah, and western Al-Biq'a?

[Ja'ja'] The plan I have spoken of.

[AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI] Is it for these areas alone?

[Ja'ja'] I am talking about Christian unity as a tool so that we can achieve the broader political plan that involves all of Lebanon.

LIBYA

Libyan Refusing Military Conscription Exiled to Sweden

36500012 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
16 Oct 87 p 19

[Article by Ann Axelsson: "Libyan Critic Deported"]

[Text] A Libyan man who has refused to do his military service in his home country and who has openly criticized his country's leader, Qadhafi will now be deported from Sweden to Libya.

The Amnesty International office in Stockholm is very upset.

"We feel as if we are constantly banging our heads against the wall. Our reports on adverse conditions in various countries don't appear to have any effect when an actual case is involved," Ingrid Falk of Amnesty says.

The man came to Sweden in May 1984 and since then has sought to gain political asylum. He left Libya after refusing to do his military service and he was also involved with a political discussion group which criticized Qadhafi.

Been Noted

Since coming to Sweden, he has retained his critical attitude, something which has been noted by the Libyan People's Office.

"The matter essentially involves to what country will he be deported. We are wholly convinced that his refusal to do his military service will be sufficient to lead to his arrest when he returns to Libya. And if he is arrested, reports on his opposition to the regime will become known, and this can very well lead to his execution," Ingrid Falk continues.

At Amnesty people are both incensed and amazed at the government's decision to deport the man. Libya is considered so infamous that any risk for an arrest upon his return should counteract deportation.

Respite

"I think that this is proof of incompetence on the part of those handling the matter," Ingrid Falk says. "They apparently don't understand how great the risks are."

The matter has already been considered twice by the government, and thanks to appeals from Amnesty and his doctor the man has been granted a final respite, until today, Friday. One possibility is to convince the government at least to send him to some other country.

The Immigration Board does not wish to comment on the matter, except to say that a refusal to do military service has apparently not been considered a sufficiently good reason to allow the man to remain in Sweden.

The man is in the Kronoborg penitentiary. Ever since he came to Sweden, he has said that he would rather commit suicide than to return to Libya. Both his lawyer and the psychiatrist with whom he has been in contact take this threat seriously.

"The man is desperate at the thought of having to return," the doctor says. "I think that the whole business is very remarkable."

06893/7310

SAUDI ARABIA

Drug Crisis Viewed As Foreign Conspiracy Against Islam

44040109 Riyadh AL-DA'WAH in Arabic
18 Jan 88 p 43

[Article by Dr 'Adil al-Sayrafi: "A World Drug War
Against Our Young People"]

[Text] Are we laboratory mice?

Ever since the June 1967 defeat, no Arab has been able to avoid this question. As soon as the 6 Day War ended, the two strongest countries in the world today, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, told us that in light of the results of the Arab-Israeli war, they had decided to begin developing their conventional weapons immediately!

The Arabs fought with Soviet weapons, and their enemy, the usurper of the Holy City of Jerusalem, fought with American weapons. We are not saying that American weapons were victorious. What we are saying is that Soviet weapons were defeated. Those who had used them had been lost in the desert far from God Almighty for some time. They had thought that their fortresses were impregnable, and that they didn't need anything from God. The land, which had been so welcoming, became cramped, and it became easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a refuge to flee Sinai and the Golan Heights. They had turned their backs, showing no inclination to fight and siding with no group. Therefore they were visited by the wrath of God Almighty—the set-back and the relapse.

Long, bitter years passed, and the believers prepared for their enemies as best they could. However, military strength in numbers and equipment alone is not enough. There must be a return to God. God's straight path must be followed, so that everything can be in order. The cry "God is Great" proved to be the best way to shake the enemies of God in their impenetrable strongholds. Once the believers embraced God, they were victorious. God welcomed them with open arms and gave them victory, after they had been brought low, with bowed heads, broken hearts, and wounded dignity, about to be swept off the face of the earth.

The enemies of God were amazed, not just because they had been defeated by the Arabs for the first time, but also because the Arabs' attack was victorious by virtue of their return to God. Once the enemies of God saw that this great danger would inevitably surround them and lead to their inescapable fate, they started thinking and hatching plots, perplexed as to how the Islamic awakening could be gaining new ground each day.

Faced with this situation, what are they doing? They have hatched a plot which was woven on an evil night. They have decided to destroy the Arab world with

something stronger than weapons and soldiers; something stronger than invading territory, crushing armies and occupying land—a lethal weapon which weakens the will, scatters resolve, shatters the rock of determination, turns the Muslim away from his Lord and his work, shreds all of his affairs, destroys his entire life, and splinters his family and social relations—the detestable drug weapon, with which they are waging war on this country's young people and their future, in order to break their will, sap their determination, and block the way to their return to God Almighty.

There is no better way to prove their wicked intentions, corrupt designs and despicable schemes than to cite figures and statistics. The conference of Arab Interior Ministers, which met in Tunisia recently under Arab League auspices, examined this extremely grave danger. It discussed figures and statistics showing that over the past 7 years, from 1980 to 1987, 438 tons of hashish, 624 kilograms of hashish oil, 1,702 kilograms of opium, 358 kilograms of heroin, and more than 500,000 narcotic pills were seized in 14 Arab countries. Furthermore, in these countries there were 53,860 drug cases involving 103,468 persons.

More than 100,000 persons have been arrested on charges of smuggling or possessing these deadly poisons. Our enemies have dumped hundreds of tons on our Arab world from all directions. By God, our enemies have declared a fierce world war against us. Are we aware of it, and of its dangerous short- and long-term consequences? We pray to God that we are.

8559

SYRIA

Ministry of Economy Issues Guidelines for Revitalizing Local Industries

44040106b Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
1 Feb 88 p 4

[Text] A Syrian Arab News Agency correspondent has learned that a number of economic and financial decisions and measures, taken during the last meeting of the Committee for the rationalization of Imports, Exports and Consumption chaired by Prime Minister Mahmud Zu'bi, have focused on important issues related to productivity and exports, providing exporters with various facilities, securing the availability of necessary equipment for a number of local industries which contribute to meeting the needs of the country.

Seeking clarification about the executive orders for these measures and decisions, a reporter from SANA met with the minister of economy and external trade. The minister confirmed that his Ministry issued the required guidelines, noting that the main objective was to boost local industries so that they would contribute to the development of the national economy; to enhance cooperation between the public and private sectors; and to

expand directly and more effectively the export of national products. Dr al-'Imadi added: The recent decisions and measures have all focused primarily on higher productivity in industry and agriculture in order to ensure the availability of consumer goods in the country, encourage the export of surplus industrial and agricultural products, and to increase the hard currency earnings of the country, while at the same time providing the material and equipment needed for production projects.

The minister said that the measures taken include the following points: First, tractors with a capacity of up to 50 horse power, mowing machines, hoes, tractor tires, insecticides, agricultural grains are allowed to be imported with credit facility for up to 180 days without payment of any loan to the Syrian Commercial Bank, and without payment of any brokerage fee to the Monopoly Agency. Import of machines, equipment and material needed for agricultural purposes, and of various types of fodder and concentrates from Lebanon has been permitted as an exception to the regulations on direct importation from the country of origin. Fodder and concentrates imported until 1 January 1980 amounted to more than 20 million Syrian pounds. The volume of tractors and other agricultural machines imported until 1 January 1988 is as follows: 2622 tractors; 1312 ploughs; 201 mowing machines; 300 threshing machines.

Second, the import of vehicle-mounted rotary well-drillers has been permitted with a 180-day credit facility provided ownership is not transferred within 5 years from the date of arrival in the country.

Third, to take advantage of the productive capacity of public sector factories, the private sector has been permitted to finance credit deals that are necessary for the importation of various material required for the manufacture of plastic greenhouses, metal supports, pipes, heating systems, burners and plastic pellets. Such products, however, would be manufactured for the private sector by the public sector in accordance with procedures determined jointly by the Ministry of Industry and the Syrian Commercial Bank.

Fourth, to help increase industrial production, meet the needs of the local market and achieve surplus for export, guidelines have been issued to implement the prime minister's decrees that allow industrial and professional establishments with recorded assets to import raw materials, replacements, and items required specifically for their area of production. Credit facilities will be available provided that 50 percent of the value of such imports is paid in local currency to the Syrian Commercial Bank upon receipt of shipping documents. Furthermore, such imports have been exempted from loan payments.

Fifth, the private sector has also been allowed to import a number of raw materials, replacements, machines and equipment and items required for agricultural and industrial production, as well as laboratory, scientific

and medical equipment with a 180-day credit facility. Owners of washing machine factories, whose assets are recorded, have also been allowed to finance the importation of raw materials required for the manufacture of two-speed electric motors by the public sector in accordance with procedures determined by the Ministry of Industry in coordination with the Syrian Commercial Bank.

Sixth, to increase industrial production and to export surplus products for the purpose of securing the hard currency needed for importing raw material used in industry, the prime minister's decrees, as well as the instructions of the Minister of Economy and External Trade, have allowed the owners of private sector industrial companies to keep 50 percent of their hard currency export earnings—in accordance with export contracts signed by them—in special accounts referred to as "export earnings accounts." Such earnings would then be used to pay for their imported raw material, replacements and industrial machines.

Seventh, exporters from the private sector have been allowed to keep 75 percent of their earnings from industrial and agricultural exports as defined by Decree No 279 which specifies certain import material and products.

Eighth, owners of ready-made clothing factories have been allowed to take advantage of the prime minister's decree No 1953 and its amendments and can import, with a 180-day credit facility, textiles equivalent to half their productive capacity as estimated by the Ministry of Industry or by its authorized regional offices, and as covered by customs regulations 4-51, 7-56, and 9-55.

This is an exception to the imports embargo, but will be subject to regulations laid down by the Ministry of Industry. Such imports will be exempt from loan payments to the Syrian Commercial Bank. Furthermore, clothing manufacturers will be allowed to take advantage of the prime minister's decree No 595 and the Ministry's decree No 279 that would allow them to export their products and keep 75 percent of their export earnings to pay for their imported textiles.

13136/12913

Scientific Cooperation Agreement Signed With Bulgaria

*44040106a Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
31 Jan 88 p 5*

[Excerpt] Damascus-SANA—A scientific cooperation agreement in the field of mechanical and electrical engineering was signed yesterday between the University of Damascus and the Higher Institute for Mechanical and Electrical Engineering in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The agreement was signed at the University of

Damascus by Dr Zyad Shuwayki, the president of the University, and Dr. Kamin Felcon, the head of a Bulgarian scientific delegation currently visiting Syria.

experts between the two countries. It also contributes to improving cooperation between the two sides and opens new doors for cooperation in advanced scientific areas.

The agreement, which is in implementation of the 1988-1990 Syrian-Bulgarian scientific and cultural agreement, provides for the exchange of scientific scholarships and

13136/12913

INDIA

Urdu Papers Reject Alternatives to Congress (I)

46240011 New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 6 Jan 88 p 4

[Text] The Urdu papers have expressed their opinion on the subject of the opposition parties and their leaders. In Lucknow daily Azaim writes, "During the debate on the no-confidence motion against him, the prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, made a thoughtless remark which became the special subject for condemnation and criticism in the meeting of the non-Congress (I) chief ministers. Referring to the dismissal of the Punjab government, the prime minister had thoughtlessly suggested that the Punjab government had been dismissed for its anti-national actions. In politics this kind of talk cannot be pardoned; neither does anyone care to enter into the argument over how such a thing could have been said. Therefore, if the chief ministers of the opposition governments have described this remark as a proof of Rajiv Gandhi's dictatorial mentality, they are in no way to blame for it. In politics anyone who operates thoughtlessly and carelessly has to pay for it. The exact definition of enmity to the country and the nation has always been a subject of controversy among the common masses, the opposition parties, and the party in power. The matter becomes really critical when the ruling party tries to brand the opposition or any other group as anti-country and anti-nation. At that time it forgets the basic distinction that enmity to the ruling party does not mean enmity to the country and the nation."

According to the Calcutta daily AKHBARE MASHRIQ, "The leftist parties have described their Delhi demonstration as being equivalent to the creation of an alternative to Congress (I). On one hand, the leftist parties are dreaming of becoming an alternative to Congress (I); on the other hand, the leaders of the Janta, Congress (S), Lok Dal, and the popular front have gathered and declared themselves as the alternative to the Congress (I). To prepare a plan and program for the 'national alternative' of these parties, a coordination committee has been constituted. This committee which consists of four members, Unnikrishan, Subrahmaniam Swami, Arif Mohammed Khan, and Yashwant Sinha, will try to promote good relations with both the communists and BJP. Of these four members, Arif Mohammed Khan and Dr Swami have been associated with the Jan Sangh. Perhaps that is why the coordination committee has announced that it does not regard the BJP as a communal party. The committee of the so-called national alternative has given a clean bill of health to the BJP; it will also establish contacts with the communists and will invite them too to join this alternative. It is clear that the communists will not join this national alternative because for them it would be tantamount to political suicide. The teachings of Marx and Lenin indicate that communists should not make any political alliance in which they play a secondary instead of a leadership role. When Chandershekar and Vishwashnath Pratap Singh

have already established themselves as the leaders of this so-called 'national unity,' how can they accommodate Jyoti Basu, who is dreaming of becoming prime minister?"

According to the Bangalore Urdu daily PAASBAN, "It is said of the leftist parties' demonstration in Delhi that nothing like it has been seen before. All the four parties that organized this demonstration are restricted to a few particular regions. The Marxist Communist Party is most influential in West Bengal and Tripura. Only recently has this party taken part in Kerala's coalition government. The remaining two parties are also limited to West Bengal and have no lease in the other states of the country. The question is what is the message of the Delhi demonstration? This demonstration called upon other parties to join the leftist parties in looking for an alternative to Congress (I). Also, some other parties, which are nominally all-India parties but whose circle is limited to a few states, among which may be included the Janta Party, Lok Dal and also Telgu Desham, are in no sense all-India political parties. The popular front which was organized by the former finance minister, V.P. Singh, has bogged down with difficulties. Rashtriye Sewa Sangh and the BJP tried to jump on the bandwagon of the national wave that V.P. Singh created in the first stages of his campaign against the Congress (I) government. Under pressure from certain quarters, V.P. Singh got rid of the BJP and Rashtriye Sewa Sangh, at which point V.P. Singh's wave also began to flag. Now it is possible that the non-communist parties and the Popular Front may jointly try to create a common platform with the leftist parties."

According to the Calcutta daily AZAD HIND, "What Raja Vishwashnath Pratap Singh had done to the Finance Ministry during his tenure can be gathered from the inquiry report which Justices Thakur and Natranjan submitted to the government after months of investigation. In this report it is said that the condition of the Finance Ministry had become intolerable. Secretary Vinod Pande and the Director Bhure Lal were operating lawlessly. V.P. Singh had left everything in their hands which allowed them to do whatever they pleased. Without informing the government and without the knowledge of the prime minister, the officers obtained the services of an American espionage firm, Fairfax, who's head, Harshman, had links with the CIA. Thus, V.P. Singh put national security in jeopardy. Having bungled all this V.P. Singh left the government screaming that Rajiv Gandhi is corrupt and that he is not prepared to tolerate honest people like himself. 'I catch those who hoard black money and Rajiv gives them protection.' V.P. Singh left no stone unturned in the defaming and character assassinating of Rajiv. V.P. Singh was dreaming of toppling Rajiv Gandhi through defamation and to become the prime minister in his place. His castle in the air has been demolished by the commission of two supreme court judges. Will those people who by branding Rajiv Gandhi as corrupt and who were and still are

demanding his resignation as a proof of their own honesty and fairness, now demand punishment for V.P. Singh, whom the commission has found guilty?"

According to the Bombay daily INQLAB, "Just as the relatives of the leaders of the Congress Party laid hollow the foundations of Congress, the same kind of example can be found in the Telgu Desham Party. Until now, Anti Ramrao's record has been unblemished; although, ever since his son-in-law, Chanderbabu Naidu, began managing the affairs of the party, unrest in the party has grown. So far only two legislators of the Telgu Desham have announced their resignation from the party. If Ramrav does not immediately clamp down on his son-in-law, more members of the Vidhan Sabha could create problems for him by leaving his party. Recently he has also been charged with becoming involved in nepotism."

To save his own skin, Ramrav has appointed an inquiry commission which is conducting an investigation. Until the commission's report becomes public, he has time to assess the damage done by his son-in-law; first of all, he should remove Chanderbabu Naidu from the party office. In case Anti Ramrav succeeds in rectifying his position, it is certain that his public standing will improve. It is not as though Anti Ramrav is unaware of the charges levied against his son-in-law. On the contrary, he knows fully well that Naidu's modus operandi is in correct. It is on this account that Ramrav is facing difficulties at every step. Ramrav is also aware that he stands between the two legislators and Congress (I); between the two of them they will spare no effort to defame him. It is a fact that during its five years rule Telgu Desham has done a yeoman's service to the masses of Andhra Pradesh.

12286/12913

Commentary Examines Opposition to Congress(I)
46240010 New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 8 Jan 88 p 4

[Excerpts] In Gorakhpur, Vishwashnath Pratap Singh has indicated that his Four-Group Front can be converted into a political party. In this Four-Group Front, one section is a regional party and the other section has only a nominal following. Ajiot Singh's Lok Dal carries importance only in Uttar Pradesh. With the departure of Shasd Pawar, the Congress cannot even claim this. Only two parties remain in the four-Group Front which can prove useful in the formation of one party. The Janta Party does not have much of a base in Uttar Pradesh but it has the advantage of being a national party and in Karnatak it has its own government; whereas in Orissa, because of Biju Patnaik, the Janta Party is the biggest partner in the government. Vishwashnath Pratap Singh does not have any organization which can command widespread or effective power, but he has become so personally popular in many parts of the country that when faced by him, many well-entrenched politicians begin to falter. If the Popular Front and Janta Party

leaders are trying to marry popularity with a widespread organization, then changing the Four-Group Front into a party could prove to be fruitful.

Initially this front had been formed with only Uttar Pradesh in mind. Were it not so, Vishwashnath Pratap Singh would have chosen Devi Lal's Lok Dal over Ajit Singh's Lok Dal. This party, which is known as Bahuguna Lok Dal, has a popular base only in Uttar Pradesh; after Devi Lal's victory in Haryana, it has made a mark in national politics. In Uttar Pradesh, although Mulayam Singh Yadav may not boast of a powerful base comparable to that of Ajit Singh, he can claim support across caste lines and a regional bases more than that of Ajit Singh. In Bihar there is no answer to Karpoori Thakur. If, despite all this, Vishwashnath Pratap Singh has sought an alliance with Ajit Singh, it could be that in Uttar Pradesh, he needs Ajit Singh's powerful base more than Mulayam Singh Yadav's extensive following and moreover he can manage a popular following. On the other hand, Chandershekhar's Janta Party can provide him with an organization of workers. Because this party does not have such a powerful presence in Uttar Pradesh, in order to obtain its support, Vishwashnath Pratap Singh may have to pay a big price. It is only on the expectation of these advantages that Vishwashnath Pratap Singh decided to merge his Four-Group Front to form a single political party.

How Chandershekhar, who was the severest critic of Vishwashnath Pratap Singh, has changed his position to become an ally is not a political mystery. Chandershekhar's and Vishwashnath Pratap Singh's political bases and political personalities differ. Vishwashnath Pratap Singh is emerging as a popular leader and can be useful to any party as a vote getter, but his acceptance among common politicians may not match his popularity among the masses. Vishwashnath Pratap Singh may face the same kind of problems that Jagjivan Ram did in 1977 in his bid to secure leadership of the Janta Party. Chandershekhar feels that in a similar situation, he may be found more acceptable than Vishwashnath Pratap Singh for the office of the prime minister, but he may not be able to stake his claim in the capacity as a leader of the Janta Party alone because the Janta Party, by itself, does not have the power to emerge as the number one party of the country. Although, possibly with the help of Vishwashnath Pratap Singh, it may make it.

The potentialities and limitations of both leaders have brought them closer together. Vishwashnath Pratap Singh feels that his biggest limitation is the lack of a base of workers. His popularity is attracting many people, but a strong political organization cannot be built on the basis of such a nomadic gathering. Such an organization needs experienced and weathered workers. In this context, Vishwashnath Pratap Singh needs a party which has workers with political experience and astuteness but whose allegiance is not limited to any one leader or caste. The Janta party fulfills these conditions perfectly because its 1977-79 complexion remains more or less

intact. It has a diversity of membership who are steeped in non-Congress political idealism. They don't have any great commitment to any one personality, caste, or region. That is the reason why outside of Karnatak and Orissa, the Janta Party continues to shrink.

If the Four-Group Front is converted into one party, it can emerge as a political center of power in the Ganga-Jamuna valley at the least. This is exactly what Vishwashnath Pratap Singh and Chandershekhar both desire. In the Ganga-Jamuna valley they will have to face the challenge from Bahuguna's Lok Dal and the Bhartiya Janta party. They feel that if they can be successful in getting a Vishwashnath Pratap Singh movement underway, then they may not get hold of Haryana, but in the pure Hindi belt, they can push both Bahuguna's Lok Dal and the Bhartiya Janta Party into the background. After that the only question that remains is whether Vishwashnath Pratap Singh uses Chandershekhar to reach the office of prime minister or whether Chandershekhar takes advantage of Vishwashnath Pratap Singh. For the time being, both have left it to the future. This is why they are thinking of converting the Four-Group Front into a political party.

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IRAN

Khomeyni's Decree Said To Pave Way for Dictatorship

46400075 London *KEYHAN* in Persian
28 Jan 88 pp 1, 3

[Text] The Friday imams throughout the country set up a quick seminar to explain the decree of the theocratic ruler. Reports from Qom and Tehran indicate that following the recent decrees of Ayatollah Khomeyni, wide differences of opinion between the various groups affiliated with the regime and followers of some nongovernmental clerics have erupted.

This report further adds that during last week in opposition to the recent decrees of Ayatollah Khomeyni, both in Qom and Tehran's bazaar people were shouting: What's happening to Islam! And they described the new decrees contrary to the religious laws of the traditional Islamic theocratic rule. In the public notices and night-letters which have been circulating in Tehran and some other cities, absolute authority given to the government by Ayatollah Khomeyni, has been likened to a despotic and dictatorial rule and people have been asked to take a position against these decrees.

Here it should be noted that Ayatollah Khomeyni in response to Ayatollah Khamene'i's letter, described the rule of government in Islam as the highest source which will have the right to resort to any and all possible measures and put any kind of law into execution in order to protect its very existence.

The Freedom Movement of Iran under the leadership of Engineer Bazargan published a declaration in which it called Ayatollah Khomeyni's decree as a preamble to the formation of an absolute dictatorship in Iran. In the declaration of the Freedom Movement it is reflected that with these decrees long strides have been taken to create an autocratic government for the theocratic ruler. Engineer Bazargan and his associates have asked the people not to remain silent and express their opinion versus the absolute theocratic rule.

Following these reactions, particularly the opposition of the first rate non-governmental clerics towards the decrees of Ayatollah Khomeyni, the Islamic Republic convened a rather hurried seminar entitled "Explanation of Theocratic Views of Iman Khomeyni" and the absolute theocratic rule, which was held with participation of the Friday imams throughout the country, so as to explain the new decrees of the leader of the Islamic Republic. At this seminar—which lasted two days in Tehran—in addition to the Friday imams from throughout the country, the representatives of Ayatollah Khomeyni at his office and other parts of the country, several members of the Theological College of Qom, some members of the Guardians Council and the supreme Judicial Council were also present. At this seminar the speakers tried to equate the significance of these decrees with the very basis of the Islamic revolution and creation of the Islamic government.

Ali Meshkini, Friday imam of Qom and director of the Assembly of Experts said: The issue of theocratic rule and government is one of the most important edicts of Islam. He further added: Today if a nation wants to run its own affairs it needs a government, and if a government wants to last it ought to follow the example of Ali's orders to Malek-e Ashtar.

Musavi Ardebili with regard to the significance of governance in an Islamic regime stated: The importance of the recent decrees of the imam from the viewpoint of influence and consequence can only be equated with the basis of the revolution. He pointed to the outcry of the opposition and said: We must clarify the subject in a manner which will be understood by the whole nation. We've some problems in many areas such as the issues of unbuilt urban plots, bank loans and work laws. The matter ought to be resolved in such a fashion so as these issues are given priority.

Taheri, Friday imam of Esfahan stated: This action by the imam is not inferior to the basis of the great revolution. The revolution had to continue its advance and develop, however the imam waited long enough to carry out his revolution and now it's your turn to continue its further development.

Further examining the decree of Ayatollah Khomeyni, Taheri also said: The Islamic Republic must get to a situation to discourage the advance of the arrogance and encourage the oppressed.

Falsafi pointed out: From the very height of Islam until now Iran is the only country which has adopted an Islamic government, and the recent decrees of imam can resolve our society's social, economic and political problems.

Javadi Ameli emphasized that people have the right to express their views in certain issues and through election of a representative they delegate him to express those views; however, in certain areas people have no right to express their vies such as explaining the divine decrees, and they ought to accept the views of the theocratic ruler.

At this seminar Mir Hoseyn Musavi also defined the authority of the theocratic ruler as unlimited and said: Only the Islamic government can resolve and answer the needs of the human beings.

At the end of this seminar a seven-article communique was issued, in part of which it is reflected that the clear decree of Ayatollah Khomeyni has created a new revolution and a fresh movement throughout our system which will affect further generations. Also in this communique a warning has been given to the inner opposition group and other who have made an outcry against the regime: All the responsible officials of the opposition organs of the country and other individuals must refrain from deviational interpretation with regard to the clear and concise letter of the great leader, and try not to taint his decrees with their own interpretations.

12719/9738

PAKISTAN

Political Parties' Stance on Idea of Federation Examined

46560021a Karachi AMN in Urdu 19 Jan 88 p 3

[Column 'From Jumma Khan's Pen': "Disintegration Process Among the Political Parties that Believe in Federation"]

[Excerpts] The central committee meeting of the Sindi, Baluch and Pashtun Front which was held in Karachi under the chairmanship of convener, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, has issued its resolutions. In these resolutions, while repeating the demand for a confederal system, they stated that all four nationalities comprising Pakistan should be granted equal status and rights; Every nationality should enjoy independence and sovereignty in its own region and should be given a guarantee against any violation of such status. The central committee has also expressed the viewpoint that the pro-federation parties are rapidly disintegrating; whereas, the nationalist forces are constantly and speedily becoming popular. This proves that the people do not accept the centralization of power and a rule based on the supremacy of only one nation.

The parties that believe in a federation can differ with the confederal system, but no realistic person can disagree with the analysis of the Sind, Baluch, and Pashtun Front, that the process of disintegration continues among the parties that believe in the federation. The ruling party is comprised of many politicians who have been constantly switching parties; they have never been ideological politicians. General Ziaul Haq is very well aware of this fact. He has stated that the politicians joining the Muslim League are such that during any trial period they might leave the party. This analysis of his is not incorrect. The non-ideological politicians are only after their own self-interest. They worship the rising sun, and they move along with the wind. It makes no difference to a party whether they join it or leave it. Today's Muslim League can only be called a parliamentary party because it is confined to the assemblies alone. Up until now, it has been unable to have itself recognized on any national or international issue outside the assemblies.

From the day of the enforcement of the martial law the People's Party is considered to be the major opposition. It still maintains this status. No other party has been able to surpass it. Some office holders and workers have quit the party, and Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi is one of them. He formed the National People's Party by bringing together people from other parties. So far, this party has been unable to perform any heroic deed on the political front. It has remained among the ranks of only those parties that are restricted to the politics of bungalows and hotels. If Mr Jatoi left the People's Party merely to achieve political power, he could have benefitted by joining the official Muslim League. As long as the NPP exists, he would not be able to acquire power in a democratic manner; the sole reason for which is that his party has been unable to represent the people. It would not be able to achieve an extraordinary success on any level in any election.

Recently, Mr Asghar Khan's Tehrik-e Istiqlal also has passed through a process of large scale disintegration. Several central and provincial officeholders have deserted this party. So far, it has been unable to take roots among the people. It is not competent enough to find suitable candidates for the national and provincial assemblies. As far as the Awami National Party is concerned, for the time being, it is neither engaged in any political tasks that are visible, that could be publicized for doing an ideological task nor is it busy with the ideological training of its workers. To some extent, therefore, it has remained protected from the process of apparent disintegration.

The Jamiat Ulama-e Islam has already been divided into two parts. Several leaders and many workers of the Jamiat Ulama-e Pakistan have left the party. The Jamaat-e Islami has been successful in safeguarding the top leadership, but on the workers' level, it has already received an irreparable loss. This entire situation can be reflected in the results of the local elections.

The parties believing in a federation suffered a greater loss due to the martial law and the policies of the military regime. The policy of this government was not to have any strong political rival. Therefore, under this policy, a split was created in every major party which was harmful. The outcome of this could only be that the nationalist and regional parties gain strength. These parties in their respective regions are now becoming a tremendous challenge for the pro-federation parties. Under the current economic situations, it is no longer possible for any party to effectively advance the federal political process. It is becoming more and more difficult to correctly operate the organizations of the four provinces and to maintain an organized control over them. The circumstances and interests of each province differ from each other. It is not easy for the federal party to maintain a close contact with every unit in every province. For months the leaders of the federal parties failed to tour the four provinces. Therefore this direct contact with the provincial and district office holders weakens day by day. The regional parties, working within the limits of nationalities, are taking advantage of this situation, and the significance of the provincial politics is increasing in the provinces.

After the termination of martial law and the establishment of an official Muslim League, claims were made that complete democracy and basic rights had been restored. The new administration disliked having any strong political enemy; continued its effort to bury the opposition. Practically speaking, there has been a party rule established in the entire country which could be termed as the worst form of dictatorship; the best proof of which is that in the official means of communication, especially Radio Pakistan and Pakistan TV, when it is forbidden to mention the name of any other political party except the Muslim League. No news is broadcast about the People's Party, the Tehrik-e Istiqlal, the Awami National Party, the Jamaat Ulama-e Islam, the Jamaat-e Islami and the Jamiat Theri. There is a blackout on the political activities of the rival political parties. Nothing can be mentioned about the most vital social activities of the politicians. Voice of America, BBC, All India Radio, and other foreign radios broadcast the important news about the opposition party in Pakistan. However our country's democracy does not recognize the existence of the opposition party. This ridiculous situation has inflicted great harm upon all the political parties working on the federal level.

The strange thing is that so far the MRD and other political parties have not launched a single campaign of protest against the nondemocratic attitude of the radio and television. Regarding this matter, they have not felt the need to initiate a struggle to achieve their democratic political rights. Recently the leader of the Refugee National Movement, Mr Iltaf Hussain, strongly criticizing the attitude of the radio and television with regard to the local elections, gave the ultimatum that if on the day of the elections of the mayor and the deputy mayor for the greater municipal Karachi there were a boycott of

their swearing-in ceremony, for the MQM, the walls of the TV station would not prove stronger than the walls of the Karachi jail. As a result of this ultimatum, the following day when the mayor and the deputy mayor took their oaths-of-office at 9 pm a detailed film of this ceremony was shown on the national news.

The demand of the Refugee National Movement was utterly lawful, and it has the power to have its lawful demands recognized. The major political parties are not weak. However they have demonstrated reluctance in uniting and utilizing their political strength. It is not necessary that by utilizing the "street power" first the jail walls would be destroyed, and then by giving an ultimatum to the television, its direction would be correct. Is it impossible to initiate movements that increase pressure through peaceful means?

9779/12913

Report Questions Usefulness of MRD
46560019a Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
16 Jan 88 p 9

[Article by Tariq Warsi]

[Excerpts] The MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy], which can undoubtedly be declared as the country's most effective opposition, this time held its meeting in Rawalpindi. This meeting was attended by the leaders of all the opposition parties except Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo; Benazir Bhutto was there; so was Maulana Fazlur Rahman. Qasur Gardezi was quite busy in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Malilk Qasim, generally speaking, is always active. During Ayub Khan's regime when he was the secretary general of the Convention League he was very busy. Those were the days of pomp and glory for Malilk Saheb. Now it is different, he is no longer in government service nor is he a member of parliament. This occasion had a special attraction of its own. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was also in Islamabad. He had come here after a long time. He reminded his countrymen that it was not only the MRD that was facing a crisis but that all of Pakistan was in a critical condition. It was believed that he had brought some poems to Rawalpindi, but the desire of the poets of the capital was not fulfilled. Statesmen usually write good poems only while they are in prison. Even if one is not a poet, after being put behind bars the zeal for writing poems returns all by itself. If one is already a poet, then the element of maturity in concepts increases and with maturity, rhyming ability also improves.

We were talking about the MRD. During this meeting the building a permanent structure for the MRD was discussed; later this idea was abandoned because everything under the sun is transitory and as such there is no need to draw up a lasting frame. The People's Party talked about a special status for itself in the MRD. However among the resolutions passed in the final session, the most significant and important resolution

was to start a violent campaign against the government and that the largest party of this alliance would not repeat its demand for special status. Furthermore it was decided that common differences would be settled on the basis of understanding, and through mediation by the convener of the MRD and that for the sake of maintaining contact with the people in accordance with the program for general meetings throughout the country the first meeting would take place at Mochi Gate in Lahore on 12 February.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan attended the current session. During his stay he disclosed that the division of India was really directed at dividing the Muslims. In other words what he was saying was that all the Muslims of the subcontinent should have remained slaves of the Hindus. Khan Saheb does not seem to have recovered from the anguish arising from the fact that 100 to 120 million Muslims have somehow achieved independence. Khan Saheb is the master of his subject and his stability and firmness is admired and envied even by the spirits. Before the session, a number of rumors were discussed, but rest assured all this was limited for news only. On the public level, no interest was shown with regard to this session. In fact, even the site of the gathering there was no group of ardent well-wishers attempting to catch a glimpse of the leaders. In this gathering, except for a few notables, the majority consisted of workers who seemed familiar from their appearances and were busily engaged in trying to give the gathering extraordinary luster and elegance. There were speculations that Benazir Bhutto, because of the size of her party, would get her demands accepted, but what actually happened was that in the course of participation in the meeting she accepted the position taken by Malik Qasim. It was also said that the People's Party experimented with participating in the municipal elections solely in the hope and belief that all her candidates would be successful. When the results turned out to be contrary to expectations, the co-chairman of People's Party changed its tactics. Now they have learned that although other parties are smaller, they must go along with them. This mode of thinking was expected because after marriage instead of individualism one gives more importance to consolidated activities. This can also be explained in another way: This time an attempt was made to somehow defeat the Jatoi plan. People's Party is very much against the National People's Party joining the MRD. The PPP has therefore put the issue of weightage [i.e., the Parties' influence relative to their size] on the back burner with the aim of rejecting any such proposal. If the MRD were to be given a permanent structure, Benazir would be its leader; but Jamiat-ul Ulema-e Islam objected to this point saying it was not prepared to accept a woman as a leader. From the situation arising after this session, it seems there is a possibility that the People's Party and the National People's Party may unite again but no new decision has been made during this session and all decisions have been postponed.

After the current session it became known that a campaign would be started for maintaining contact with the

people. From reports appearing in the newspapers the next day it became known that a protest would be started against the government. It appears that the MRD does not have an information secretary who could fill the information gap. The people should have been informed whether there would be a movement for maintaining contact with the people or a protest against the government. It seems that the MRD does not know the difference between a movement and a protest although the two processes differ from one another. If a movement is started for maintaining contact with the people then the MRD will have a lot to deal with; if high prices are discussed, the people will flock to their meetings; because of the drought farmers and landowners are out of jobs. Because of the shrewdness of the people, we can say the voters have started evolving and they are not prepared to depend 100 percent on the upcoming meetings. They care for discipline and organization and want a charter. The MRD has not given any importance to place its unanimous charter before the people, nor are any of its component parties well organized. As such the policy of meetings and processions will no longer be of any worth. Now they will have to come with their ideological goals and explain their charter and constitution to the people. Whenever slogans were the rule of the day, shortening ['ghee'] and flour became much more expensive. One must also keep in mind that whenever the opposition started protests, businessmen and industrialists suffered. In other words, it would not be wrong to say that the opposition is, to a large extent, responsible for today's prevailing high prices. When Mr Bhutto started to protest the prices of shortening, then flour shot up. The rise in the price of shortening and flour was a sequel to the national movement against Bhutto. Banaspati, i.e., vegetable shortening that once cost seven rupees is now available for not less than 35 or 36 rupees. The democratic chariot run by the opposition brought about a considerable hike in the prices of basic, human necessities; this is the miracle of the opposition's economic experts. They could not save the people from economic and social pressure during the movement of political pressure. Now the people will not have confidence in such wise guys any more. Just as it is the duty of the government to control high prices and help to improve the economic conditions of the common man, so also it is the duty of the opposition to present to the people an unambiguous program for reducing the prices; merely pointing out the existing costs by itself is no extraordinary feat.

Referring to the MRD's meeting the people have been calling them expert adventurers of seasonal politics. Such people do not have any interest in formulating a policy for the country with an eye on the total picture. They do not insist upon running the country's administration according to any law; in other words why should people listen to them? On the other hand, in government circles excessively large landlords and industrialists have united. Within the rank and file of the MRD there are top notch nawabs and landlords. The course of action for both sides is more or less similar. Neither side represent

the laboring and poor classes. While the middle class and the poor form the majority in a population of 100 million people, landlords constitute only a minority. Under these conditions the MRD did not take any revolutionary steps which would make the people look up to them with hope.

The educated people, that is the intellectual circles, were full of hope and expectation with respect to the MRD. In other words, people were saying that it is essential to listen to the opposition about the democratic system; they are ashamed that in a poor country like Pakistan there should be an opposition inside parliament and another outside it. In this way, the party in power appears to be party oriented, but the opposition party lies outside the parliament. This situation has made our political system a target of criticism and mockery not only inside the country but also abroad. World democratic societies have been making strange assessments about Pakistan. Common men have been saying that if the MRD had shown a little more flexibility in 1985, and had participated in the non-party elections, when the non-party parliament turned into a party parliament there could be toplevel parliamentarians today and the members of parliament would be dividing the wealth in the government treasury in a different manner. Now the condition is such that there is very little difference in the rank of a parliamentarian and a member of the district council. Although this mode of talk is somewhat poignant, since reasons and spectacles are present, how many people can you silence? We can ask the MRD that if the workers of the People's Party and other parties can participate in municipal elections under the present political system and can fight elections for senate seats, why didn't they take part in the 1985 elections instead of creating a 'soap opera' situation? Different views have been expressed about the MRD's meeting. Some have said that this meeting has helped in moving misunderstandings. According to some, the opposition has become active. As far as demands about the dignity and security of the nation and the country are concerned, the MRD meetings did not benefit them. Can you tell if the MRD as a party has ever expressed any serious and complete views with respect to these issues? All the people are engaged in the struggle for the survival of the MRD. When will they take part in the struggle for the survival of the nation and the country? In our country differences between the government and the opposition never seem to end. The government is trying to protect itself and the opposition is faced with the crisis of its own existence. A 40 year period of valuable time has been wasted in a run-around pursuit, and the people have been grappling with their problems. No one can escape. Work is certainly being done but it is of such a nature that it is dragging everyone backward.

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Regime's Record on Human Rights Assailed
46560021b Karachi AMN in Urdu 25 Jan 88 p 3

[Column 'From Jumma Khan's Pen': Political Prisoners Are Not Being Released, But it is Claimed That Democracy Has Been Restored"]

[Excerpts] The prime minister claims that the Muslim League administration has reinstated basic rights, and that the purpose of establishing Pakistan was that the law should have the upper hand! If basic rights were restored, there would have been no political prisoners in the prisons of the four provinces. It must be requested that the president study the reports of the Amnesty International, the Human Rights Commission, and the U.S. Congress report concerning the situation of human rights in Pakistan, so that he can perceive the other side of the picture. Most of the political prisoners are those who raised their voices against the military dictatorship. They were engaged in a full struggle for the restoration of democracy, a crime for which they were imprisoned. They were sentenced by the military courts because they opposed the military regime and wanted the restoration of democracy. Their sacrifices and struggle resulted in the termination of the martial law. Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo had the opportunity to become the prime minister, while his Muslim League also gained an opportunity to rule. Regrettably, the reward being given for the favors done by the sons of the beloved country, through whom this change took place, is that they are still in prison. The prison doors should have been opened for all political prisoners on the very day when it was announced that the sun for complete democracy had risen, so that the people could have believed in the termination of the martial law and the restoration of democracy. The cases of any political prisoners who were accused of very severe crimes could have been presented for a review to the ordinary law court, but Prime Minister Junejo's regime failed to do even that. Indeed those few political prisoners who were freed earlier, have been returned to prison by entangling them in mysterious types of cases; an example of which can be cited is the case of Mr Masrur Ahsan. The hearing of his new case has been postponed for months because there is no judge available in the court. Similarly, Dr Aslam Jan of the Awami National Party has been locked up in the Karachi jail for one year. The hearing of his case has not been started yet, nor has his bail been accepted. Is all this termed as the restoration of basic rights and the superiority of the law?

There have been demonstrations throughout the country for the release of political prisoners. In Karachi a hunger strike by students continues. However, the rulers are saying that the basic rights have been reinstated and the law has the upper hand.

Prime Minister Junejo states, "Pakistan was founded so that a right system would remain in effect and that the law would have superiority." Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo, however, is well aware of the fact that he was the

minister of communications in the cabinet of Ayub Khan, who imposed the first martial law in the country, and that during the era when martial law was imposed by the present army chief of staff, after winning the elections, during his reign of presidency, he became the prime minister. Now he should decide for himself whether the martial law can be called the true system, and whether the law remains superior during the martial law era. Any person who keeps the signs of the martial law alive cannot claim to be in favor of democracy.

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Commentary Sees Danger in India's Naval Plans

*46560019b Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
16 Jan 88 p 10*

[Editorial by Tariq Warsi: India Dangerous Increase in Naval Strength]

[Text] A foreign ministry spokesman during his routine weekly press briefing said that the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines by India proves that it is increasing its military strength considerably. He said that their build-up of missiles, aircraft, artillery, tanks, and weapons all point to the same thing. In reality, India is determined to dominate this region. Although its leaders do not care whether the common man is able to get enough food, India is determined to get the most sophisticated weapons. According to the latest report, India will be receiving four nuclear powered submarines from the Soviet Union at a cost of 30 billion rupees. The fact is that India does not need nuclear powered submarines for its legitimate defense because neighboring coastal countries do not jointly constitute any challenge to India, but India has been building up its military strength beyond its needs without any logical reason. Only recently another aircraft carrier was added to the Indian Navy and now, after it receives nuclear powered submarines, the Indian navy will become the biggest aggressive force in The Indian Ocean region, and the area stretching from the eastern coast of Africa and the mouth of Persian Gulf will be within the reach of the Indian Navy. Once the Indian nuclear powered submarines are commissioned in the Indian Ocean, the United Nation's efforts to make the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone will meet with disaster. The success of the guiding role Pakistan that has been playing in this connection will become doubtful. A superpower like the Soviet Union should realize that by giving nuclear powered submarines to India it is jeopardizing the balance of power to a dangerous level and a sense of insecurity is visible among India's neighboring countries. India has already plucked the courage of its smaller neighbors. Only recently India, in the name of establishing peace, militarily intervened in Sri Lanka which gave an impetus to its expansionist aims and it is making full preparations to come to grips with Pakistan. There is no doubt that all of India's military preparations are directed against Pakistan. At the same time other neighboring coastal countries should also be aware of India's designs. In this connection Iran,

Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries should feel the danger and jointly make plans to obstruct Indian imperialism. It is an established, historical fact that the Arabs were successful in propagating Islam in faraway lands on the basis of their naval strength. One reason for the decline of Islamic rule is that European countries advanced far ahead of us in shipping and the Islamic world lost control of large areas of land as a result of neglecting its naval power and thus became vassals of European colonialists. Although in the current science of war, naval power is third in line of importance after air and land forces, the fact is that even today superpowers are busily engaged in dominating other countries on the basis of naval strength. It is time for the Islamic world to wake up from their negligent dream and become aware of the dangers surrounding them. It is doubtless that Pakistan is not falling behind in what it can do by itself. All the same it must be remembered that Pakistan's resources are not limitless. President General Ziaul Haq, speaking during a ceremony of the Pakistan Navy, advised the officers and men of the Navy to be aware of the conditions in the region. He asked them to be prepared at all times to meet any kind of challenge because Pakistan cannot remain unconcerned with regard to the conditions surrounding it, especially its naval borders. It is essential that full-scale preparations should be made to meet the aggressive designs of the Indian navy along Pakistan's naval borders. In order to defeat the adventurous designs of the Indian navy it is also essential that there should be an unprecedented unity and unanimity on a national level so that the enemy does not have the courage to turn towards our borders. There is no doubt that the Hindu mentality has never sincerely accepted the establishment of Pakistan. We should nevertheless not leave anything to chance, but make every effort to defend the security and unity of the God-given state of Pakistan. We can defend our national existence only if our country is free and independent and we can only survive by defending our freedom. Here we should also take into account the Soviet line of action. The Soviet Union on the one hand is offering treaties of friendship to Pakistan while on the other hand it is providing India with nuclear powered submarines which are endangering the safety and security of Pakistan. India is an eternal enemy of Pakistan and the Soviet Union is not unaware of India's designs to destroy Pakistan. Under these conditions, providing nuclear powered submarines to India can only be construed as animosity towards Pakistan. The Soviet Union on the one hand claims to restore friendly relations with Pakistan by its plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan but on the other hand is determined to destroy the balance of power in the region by supplying nuclear submarines to India. It is difficult to understand this inconsistency in the Soviet policy. Pakistan should draw the Soviet government's attention to its incompatible attitude and try to convince Moscow to stop tampering with the balance of power in South Asia and to change its policy of intimidating Pakistan through India.

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