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Near East & South Asia

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REGIONAL

GCC Governments Give Purchase Priority to National Products

44000044 Dammam AL-IQTISAD in English
Oct 87 pp 66-67

[Text] Following is the full text of the Council of Ministers Resolution No 139 dated 25.6.1407H (February 23, 1987) endorsing the Unified Principles Giving Priority in Government Purchases to National Products and Products of National Origin in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab countries.

The Council of Ministers hereby and upon viewing the attached dossier received from the Prime Minister's Diwan under No 257, dated 14.5.1407 (January 14, 1987) containing letter telegram dispatched by HE the Minister of Finance and National Economy under No 3/2049 dated 2.3.1407 (November 4, 1986) and addressed to the Prime Minister's Diwan, in which His Excellency states that his Ministry had received letter No 23125/1/849 dated 13.3.1407 (November 15, 1986) from the General secretariat of the GCC advising the ministry of the resolution passed by the GCC Supreme Council in its 7th session held in Abu Dhabi in the period 30.2. to 3.3.1407 and which had ratified the unified principles for giving priority in government purchases to national products and products of national origin in the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, AND in consideration of the Minister's request for the Royal sanction on the said principles, and upon reviewing Recommendation No 46 dated 16.6.1407 submitted by the General Committee of the Council of Ministers; the Council of Ministers hereby resolves the following:

The Unified Principles for giving priority in government purchases to national products and products of national origin in the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council as formulated in the attached text shall be enforced with effort from 3.7.1407 (March 3, 1987).

President of the Council of Ministers.

Unified Principles Giving Priority In Government Purchases to National Products and Products of National Origin in the GCC Arab Countries

Article 1: Definitions:

(a) National product; any product that has been produced in any of the member states and that has been considered as a national product under the laws of that state.

(b) Products of national origin: those products in which the ratio of the added value resulting from its production in any of the members states represents at least 40% of its

final value at the end of its production and when the production facility is at least 51% owned by citizens of the GCC states as evidenced by the production facility.

Article 2:

(a) National products shall be given a price priority of at least 10% over equivalent foreign products and a price priority of not more than 5% over products of national origin (in the event of the inavailability of national products, products of national origin shall be given a price priority of 10% over equivalent foreign products).

(b) When national products are not available in quantities sufficient to meet the full governmental requirements of a particular product, these requirements shall be met with products of national origin, and, subsequently, by foreign products, taking into consideration the rulings of Clause (a) of this Article and the conditions of quality and terms of delivery.

(c) For purposes of priority stated in Clause (a) above, prices shall be calculated on the basis of delivery at buyer's warehouses. Where imported foreign products are exempted from Customs duties or any other charges these duties and/or charges shall be added when calculating the price of the said foreign products for the purpose of price comparison.

(d) National Products, products of national origin and foreign products shall conform to the standard specifications of the GCC Standard Specifications Organization sanctioned by the purchasing state or those standard specifications applied in the said state if such are in force, otherwise the products shall conform to international standard specifications.

Article 3: All governmental bodies (ministries, public organizations, governmental corporations and companies in which the government owns at least 51/

of the capital) shall undertake to secure all its purchase requirements from national products and products of national origin including mineral, agricultural, animal and industrial products whether in its raw state or in any subsequent state of preparation or manufacture, provided always that conditions or price, quality and delivery are observed.

Article 4: All governmental organizations shall, at the formulation of contracts for supply, public, works, operation or maintenance, include an explicit term committing the supplier, contractor or caterer to buy all his requirements of materials or fittings from national products or products of national origin as per Article 2, Clause (a) above. Any violation of this commitment shall be deemed as a violation of the contract and shall be subject to a fine penalty of not less than 20% of the value of the purchases made, in addition to application of the other rulings stipulated in the terms and conditions of the contract and other pertinent official regulations.

Article 5: All governmental bodies shall observe, when concluding contracts with consultants for preparation of designs, specifications and general and special terms and conditions in respect of governmental projects, shall observe the stipulation of an explicit term in the texts of the forms of contracts and specifications of the work required whereby procurement of all required materials shall be made from available national products and products of national origin which serve the intended purpose. In executing this term, the consultant or the technical department in the respective governmental body, shall be committed to formulate the technical specifications of contracts in such a manner as to conform to the specifications of available national products or products of national origin. Any violation of this stipulation on the part of the consultant or contractor shall be deemed as a violation of the contract terms and shall be subject to the rulings specified by the contract or by statute regulations in respect of infringement of contract commitments.

Article 6: Foreign contractors and subcontractors executing government projects shall not set up any production units to provide the project with structural supplies and shall be obliged to purchase all requirements from national products or products of national origin when available. This term shall be included in the text of all forms of contracts concluded by governmental bodies. Any violation of this term shall be subject to the same penalties referred to in Article 5 above.

Article 7: In all advertisements published by governmental bodies soliciting tenders for supply of materials, execution of projects or provision of operation and maintenance services and in all forms of contracts concluded for these purposes, the said advertisements and contract forms shall be rendered subject to the rulings of the unified principles of purchase priority in favour of national products and products of national origin.

Article 8: Contracts signed between governmental bodies and suppliers, contractors or caterers may, and without prejudice to any other penalties, be rendered as null and void in the event of commitment of such suppliers, contractors and caterers of fraud and malice by presentation of incorrect data concerning the products purchased, including the affixation of markings pertaining to national products or products of national origin to foreign products. Member states shall be notified with the action taken and governments of countries in which the certificate of origin were issued shall also be notified for the purpose of inflicting the appropriate penalties on fraud and malice.

Article 9: In each of the member states, one of the government departments shall be assigned the task of implementing these unified principles and shall be responsible for supervising the compliance of all concerned with the said principles.

Article 10: The Financial and Economic Cooperation Committee shall have the jurisdiction to interpret and amend these principles.

Article 11: The above principles shall be in force after the elapse of four months after receiving the approval of the Supreme Council

/9274

EGYPT

Egypt's Role in Gulf War, Arms Manufacture Assessed

*45040055a London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
15 Jan 88 pp 26-27*

[Text] There are many indications that Egypt's role in the Gulf is being urgently discussed at conference tables in Cairo and several other Arab capitals. Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu-Ghazalah's visit to Kuwait, and the related, intensive activity connected with the visit by an Egyptian military delegation prior to Field Marshal Abu-Ghazalah's visit, have both contributed to this impression.

AL-HAWADITH discussed this matter, and the extent of Egypt's role in military matters and arms manufacture, with several Egyptian strategists.

Egyptian Defense Minister Field Marshal Abu-Ghazalah's visit to Kuwait revealed the broad outlines of Egyptian strategy vis-a-vis the Gulf war, as well as the scope of Egypt's role in this most vital and strategically important part of the world. It can be said that this course of action is not taking place in a vacuum, since in recent statements Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and senior Egyptian officials have stressed that an organic link exists between Gulf security and Egyptian security within the framework of unified Arab security. Cairo has made similar statements on other occasions, the most recent being the president's declaration that Cairo is willing to assume its national responsibilities towards the region provided that the other countries assume their responsibilities as well. If this indicates anything, it shows that Cairo is becoming increasingly aware of the perils which the Iraq-Iran war poses for Egyptian national security.

Professor of Strategy and National Security Dr Ahmad Shawqi al-Hanafi says, "In their modern manifestations, threats are by no means strictly limited to military threats, as was the case during the Second World War. There are economic threats, political threats, and technological threats. Therefore, we are discovering that Egyptian national security is threatened. For example, the Red Sea becomes worthless if there is trouble or tension in the Arabian Sea, the Sea of Oman, or the Indian Ocean. Movement in the Red Sea is longitudinal, not latitudinal. The Red Sea and the Suez Canal are

important because they are connecting links in international trade, and they both lose their value if their entry points and outlets are imperiled."

National Strategy Researchist and Former Faculty Member at the Nasir Military Academy Maj Gen Dr Nabil Ibrahim Ahmad adds a new dimension to the dangers of the Iraq-Iran war when he says, "We cannot discount the danger that the revolution, instead of just ideas, will be exported."

Head of the Military Studies Unit at the Strategic Studies Center Maj Gen Tal'at Musallim emphasizes another point, saying, "It is common knowledge that the principles at stake are interests—long-range interests. Therefore, when I speak of confronting the effects of the Gulf War, I am not talking in slogans; I am speaking about interests—established interests, not incidental ones. Any danger to the Eastern Arab world threatens us with a strategic change in the region, and therefore threatens Egyptian interests in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula." Dr Ahmad Shawqi al-Hanafi brings up another factor which Field Marshal Abu-Ghazalah has mentioned several times: Egyptian workers in the Gulf. He says, "The war has drained the resources of the entire region, as a quick comparison between economic conditions during the Seventies and present conditions clearly shows. It has also obviously affected the incomes of Egyptians working in the Gulf, which have dropped sharply due to present circumstances in Gulf countries."

AL-HAWADITH sees two important axes along which Cairo is considering moving in order to influence the Gulf war.

The first axis is the manufacture of arms, which brings up the subject of the Arab Industrialization Organization.

The second axis is a limited military role, which includes loaning Egyptian military experts and advisors to any Arab state which requests them, particularly the Gulf states.

The first axis is multi-dimensional. The 1979 decision to dissolve the Arab Industrialization Organization [AIO] was never translated into actual policy by either Egypt or the Arab states. Thus Egypt managed the organization throughout the long years of the rupture, so as to maintain the organization's capital, entity and framework until the Arab partners returned. For example, the number of technicians at the AIO rose from 15,000 to about 25,000 workers, engineers and experts. The organization's production capabilities were also diversified to include rockets and rocket-propelled bombs such as the "Hawkeye" rocket system and the "Swing Fire" anti-tank rockets; airplanes, since the AIO manufactures and assembles "Alphajets," "Alphazeals," and "Tocanos," as well as some components of France's huge Mirage 2000 and the "Super Bomber;" and armored vehicles and electronic equipment. The AIO has not

withheld its products from any Arab country, and its experiment at providing weapons to Iraq, particularly rockets, is still going on openly.

AL-HAWADITH has learned that in December 1987, the AIO's status was thoroughly evaluated during a surprise meeting of its supreme committee, which has not met since 1982. AIO Chairman Lt Gen Ibrahim al-'Arrabi assessed its activities up to the end of the 1986-87 fiscal year, and the final accounts for 5 years, which had not been approved earlier, were approved. The organization's projected budget and its work plan for the next fiscal year were decided on, and those at the meeting discussed the AIO's standing from several angles.

1. Does Egypt want its Arab partners in the organization to return, and do they want to return? Or might there be cooperation in other areas, such as marketing, with the AIO entering into arms sales to Arab states as an Arab entity?

2. In case the Arab partners do not return, could some kind of cooperation be established between the AIO and the Gulf weapons manufacturing project, which was set up by the Gulf states after the Camp David agreements? The leaders of Saudi Arabia have said that they welcome the idea of cooperating with any Arab party in any way. Dr Nabil Ibrahim Ahmad told AL-HAWADITH that Saudi Arabia is now producing the 762 rifle, and that Saudi Arabia and Brazil are now negotiating the assembly of the "Tocano" training plane, which is an AIO product. Maj Gen Tal'at Musallim points out that the establishment of a Gulf weapons manufacture organization is still under study, and that no steps have been taken to implement it. It might be only natural to set up some weapons factories in the Gulf states, particularly in Saudi Arabia, but the question of the availability of a technical labor force might be an obstacle to establishing an organization the size of the AIO.

3. How should the organization's frozen Arab funds, which some people estimate at somewhat less than US\$1 billion, be handled? In light of the recent visits to Egypt by United Arab Emirates President Shaykh Zayid and Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdallah, and the success of Egypt's exposition in Kuwait, AL-HAWADITH feels that the AIO will continue to exist, and the Arabs will once again participate in it. Dr Nabil Ibrahim Ahmad does not discount the possibility that international influence, such as that exerted by armament companies, has played a large part in obstructing the AIO's return to its former status. As he puts it, the AIO was a true conceptualization of the strategy of unified Arab action. It would have standardized the training systems used in the Arab states, met the Arab states' needs for certain types of weapons, and put the Arabs on the threshold of the arms industry, which is a complicated technology. Furthermore, distributing the AIO's factories throughout the various Arab countries would have provided greater security for the Arab world. We might note that "close

friends" have always been behind the abortion of Egypt's attempts to manufacture weapons. The Soviets did this during the Sixties, and the Americans are doing the same thing now. Dr Nabil speculates on what the status of the AIO might have been now, after 13 years, if the Arabs had succeeded in settling their political differences in this most vital area. The Arab partners' return to the AIO would apparently resolve one important crisis, marketing, and would help overcome the other obstacle, choosing who is to manufacture what, which would be agreed upon by all the Arabs.

The second axis along which Cairo is considering moving is intervention, coordination, or various kinds of military participation.

Maj Gen Tal'at Musallim says, "I don't think that the Gulf countries are short of weapons, and if they are, they can get them from more than one source, including Egypt. The same thing goes for expertise. But the real shortage is in manpower. In recent times, this has been the only reason for Arab cooperation. Egypt's role must not stop at supplying weapons and expertise, no matter how important these are. There must be a willingness to contribute through manpower, which must be preceded by preparations or an agreement on the following important principles.

"First, the circumstances and conditions governing the role required of Egypt must be defined.

"Second, the Egyptian forces must be support, assistance or reserve forces.

"Third, cooperation must not be restricted to the military aspect. According to the joint defense treaty, this cooperation must extend to economic cooperation. The two areas are inseparable.

"Fourth, a command system covering political and military aspects alike must be established. War is not a purely military action; it extends into politics. A decision to enter into a conflict must be made after consultation among the cooperating states, but the decision must be implemented by a single command responsible for defense."

Referring to a different tendency, Brig Gen Ahmad Shawqi al-Hanafi says, "There must be careful study before Egypt enters into any military role, and this intervention must be carried out in the context of what we might call 'regional security.'"

He suggests that the Egyptian role come under the heading of defending regional security, and that it consist of training missions, advisors, or assistance from both branches of the Egyptian armed forces.

Dr Nabil Ibrahim says, "If certain technical specialists are required, why not train them in Cairo? If there are advisors present for training purposes, care must be

taken to make sure that they are not too far away from the combat zone. Consider what happened when the Sudan invited the Egyptian war college after the 1967 war, as well as the Arab forces' token participation in the 1973 war, well away from the combat zones."

One last question remains. Considering the polarization and conflict between the two Gulf states, does America want Egypt to have a role? Will the Soviets concur? Maj Gen Tal'at Musallim says, "As a matter of principle, I do not agree that the United States permits or forbids an Egyptian role. It cannot do that. However, if it agrees, things will be easier, and if it refuses, things will be hindered. The regional will is still an effective element in conducting the battle. It would be natural for America to disapprove of an Egyptian role which goes beyond its own conception and its own interests, but this does not mean that the Egyptian will should be paralyzed in the absence of American approval."

As Brig Gen Ahmad Shawqi points out, "In the Arab Gulf war, there is an international factor which, by supplying arms, is behind the continuation of the war. Neither of the combatant countries manufactures arms, and their economies depend on oil. Right now, 4 million barrels of petroleum are looking for buyers every morning. Since oil is Iran's means of continuing the war, if the world stopped buying petroleum from Iran, the end of this war would be ensured. With respect to this international dimension, we ask: does Egypt's emergence coincide with or conflict with the interests of the two superpowers? Whichever superpower approves of Egypt's role will support it, while the other side will oppose it and hamper it. Right now, the superpowers want to protect their own interests without making use of regional entities."

8559

JORDAN

Report Indicates Status of Major Exports
4400045 Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 4-11 Feb 88 p 9

[Text] Amman (Star)—Upon evaluating the value of Jordanian exports, on a sectoral basis, between 1986 and 1987, the following observations are hereby presented:

—Leather products: exports from this sector rose considerably in one year, from JD 674,502 in 1986 to about JD 2.5 million in 1987.

—Remedial products: exports decreased in 1986 by JD 1.2 million from 1986.

—Plastic products: exports increased from JD 905,335 in 1986 to JD 3,620,025 in 1987.

—Chemical products: exports increased by 30 percent in 1987 reaching JD 28,186,480, as compared with JD 21,600,393 during 1986.

—Cosmetics: exports decreased from JD 17,276 in 1986 to 5,991 in 1987. It has been noticed that major exports from this sector were to the US.

—Electrical and mineral industries: exports increased by 50 percent in 1987 reaching JD 9,417,710, as compared with JD 6,481,046 in 1986. Major exports from this sector were to North America, Europe and Asia.

—Furniture, kitchens and doors: exports decreased slightly in 1987 reaching JD 3,330,260, as compared with to JD 3,964,692 in 1986.

—Construction industry: exports decreased sharply in 1987, from JD 11.6 million in 1986 to JD 4.6 million in 1987.

—Printing, paper and office supplies: exports from this sector decreased from JD 2.5 million in 1986 to JD 1.6 million in 1986. The decrease in this sector's exports are not realistic, given the fact that a few printing institutions started producing cardboard boxes which have been enlisted in the packaging sector.

—Food products: exports increased by 30 percent in 1987, reaching JD 8.8 million, as compared with JD 6.7 million.

—Woven materials: exports from this sector increased sharply in 1987, from JD 4.5 million in 1986 to JD 15.1 million in 1987. Jordan has witnessed major developments with regard to the female and jeans outfits after entering the US markets.

—Packaging and wrapping: exports increased by 300 percent in 1987, from JD 3.9 million in 1986 to JD 9.1 million in 1987.

—Agricultural industries: exports decreased during 1987 reaching JD 29.7 million as compared with JD 51.2 million in 1986.

According to the geographical distribution of Jordanian exports, the following is observed (in percentage terms): total exports: (1987) JD 131,412,164.

Iraq 51.67, Saudi Arabia 14.86, North American countries 6.52, Asian countries 4.93, Egypt 4.31, Syria 2.67, Bahrain 1.68, UAE 1.58, Kuwait 1.49, North Yemen 1.16 and Tunis 0.94.

/9274

LEBANON

Economic Disaster Blamed on West; Islamic Republic Seen as Only Hope

44040097b Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 22 Jan 88 p 11

[Article by Shaykh Ja'far al-Muhajir: "An Islamic Approach to the Problem of Development"]

[Text]The subject of industrial development is a very serious one. In fact, it is the most serious area in the problem of development.

As we begin to deal with this issue, we should point out that the problem of industrial development involves two factors, pulling in opposite directions:

—A psychological factor, which can be summed up as the prevailing feeling of humbleness and inferiority toward the industrialized West, which is advanced, wealthy, and powerful because it is industrialized. This feeling pushes in the direction of assimilation to industrial societies. As we shall see, this feeling has to a great extent been poorly exploited.

—A historical factor, or one that can be described as historical because of its great and continual influence since more than a century ago: namely, that the virtually complete collapse of local industry occurred because of the depredation of European industry and its unfair colonial competition with local industry. In this field, colonial policy sought to accomplish two things: plundering raw materials to supply European industry, and depriving local industry of customs protection. As a result, the local markets were inundated with manufactured goods imported from the West, and local industry was deprived both of raw materials and of the opportunity to reach the consumer.

For these two reasons, and sometimes for one of them, the historically renowned steel and textiles industries, for example, became very quickly extinct, so much so that the composition of what is known in the West as "Damascus steel," and locally as "jewel steel," became a secret that nobody knows, even in its original homeland, although it had once been a flourishing industry. It was the same with the ancient and exceedingly beautiful arts of weaving. Thus the natural base enabling spontaneous industrial growth was lost forever, and local expertise was completely cut off.

Today, for the same reason and for other reasons that will later become clear, industrial development seems to be a goal beyond the resources of current political systems. Because they are well aware of this, they in practice exclude it from their aspirations. The imperial West inherited the mantle of the colonial West, but the core of its policy related to the region remained the extraction of raw materials (oil, phosphates, cotton, etc.) and the capturing of markets. The function of all other elements in the policy of the West was to serve these two

strategic goals. There is no doubt that imperialism will do anything to punish any local regime that thinks of rebelling against its policy or opposing it. It will make that regime an example to others; and the [local] regimes are well aware of this.

We must emphasize that the real problem that prevents industrial development from arising lies in the historical disruption of the local occupational structure, which became lost in the context of a defective and involuntary amalgamation into the international capitalist market. This is the core of the problem. However, we must never forget two other things: the fall into colonialism and Great Power domination, and the state of spurious wealth that the presence of oil in such immense quantities provided. The truth is that the two both are two sides of the same coin. Although oil is the wealth of the Islamic World, as some love to repeat with pride, nevertheless in terms of its extraction, processing, marketing, consumption, and even its protection, it is above all outcome of complete domination by the Great Powers.

Merely for the sake of comparison and speculation, without considering it an example that one must follow, we say that Japan's experience of an amazing industrial renaissance presents to us, with its requirements and dazzling results, a face utterly opposite to our sad historical experience. Japan succeeded in becoming an industrial power competing with others more deeply-rooted than her in this field and much stronger in material resources, and her success took place on the same base whose absence among us was a cause of collapse and backwardness.

I mean:

1. Because of Japan's geographical and historical isolation from the European center, it did not fall into the circle of colonialism and Great Power domination.
2. Strict customs protection was applied, making it impossible for imported goods to compete with local production. One should also point out that Japan's distance from the centers of capitalist production was a great obstacle to the flooding of the market with commodities.
3. The country's lack of natural resources needed by capitalist producers was a factor that saved the country from becoming colonized. On the other hand, it gave the Japanese no choice but to turn toward production relying on imported raw materials, which is still their practice.
4. The tremendous wealth of occupational skills, especially precision skills, upon which Japan's rich and renowned technical production relied during its long history—when the country turned toward industrializing, these skills became the best base for the new resurgence. We must not fail to point out the connection

between these refined technical traditions and skills and Japan's present excellence in manufacturing precision equipment whose production requires advanced manual skills.

When we turn our gaze toward the Islamic World, we see nothing but the opposite of these conditions in every way: countries that colonialism thoroughly mastered and from which it ostensibly departed only after having dismembered them, deformed them, and sown them with mines. Then colonialism set up protectors to whom it entrusted the care of its "achievements"—indeed, they were to take them even further than they had already gone. We see countries rich in raw materials necessary for the industrial countries, especially oil, whose uninterrupted flow to them the industrial countries watch over without regard to any interest its owners may have in extracting it in tremendous quantities that will lead to its exhaustion. We see an ancient and brilliant heritage of occupational skills on which people prospered for centuries destroyed or nearly destroyed. We see markets thrown open to East and West, guaranteeing that any local production is choked off. And in education, information, and politics, we see many other tools, justifications, and preparations for what is going on.

Industrial development is a delusion unless it is practiced within its own requirements and the requirements of the Islamic world. Industrial development imitating the Western model cannot succeed. The attempts we hear about, especially from the official propaganda apparatus, are doomed to failure. They are like trying to make a tropical tree bear fruit in a polar region.

It is in fact very difficult to discuss and evaluate these industrial development plans, especially in the Arab oil countries, because they are not related to any school of thought on development and offer no acceptable analysis of what is happening. Their goal is a superficial one, aimed at administering a placebo to a public dazzled by modernity and Western industrial production, a public that sees in any step in the direction of imitating that model something to make it imagine that it is on the right road toward the paradise of industrial production. Their plans are also aimed at providing good material for the state propaganda apparatus. You see government figures traveling from place to place, camera lights following them, pushing the buttons to start operations in a factory or laying the cornerstone for some temple of technology. The spectator is left filled with an overflowing feeling of contentment and satisfaction, not realizing that the real function of what is going on before his eyes is to recycle the money the West paid as the price of oil, so that it goes back to its source. As for the temples of technology, only dust and rust will be worshiped in them.

Thus, the petro-dollar societies are abandoning their only opportunity for progress and their only means of subsistence, with the complete assent of the political

regimes and the educated elite, and with the applause and cheers of the masses. Thus, the plundering of the Islamic world continues to go on as it did even before the age of colonialism.

It is impossible to ignore the exhausting process of development undergone by the peoples that preceded us in the field of industrialization. It is nonsense to believe that the West will give us the secrets of "technology" just because we have the money to pay. It is a mistake to think that the development of our peoples is a free operation, not monitored, and not carefully controlled by the West through its agents present in the highest decisionmaking circles among us. It is therefore vanity for us to dream of a powerful future founded on becoming rich and escaping from the humiliation of poverty, before we liberate our political will and restore the lost connection between the local culture and creative style, on the one hand, and production, on the other.

We do not categorically reject industrialization nor do we cast doubt on its importance and even its necessity—provided, however, that it be dignified with correct ethics which are based on care for nature, the mother, and maintenance of the balance that its Creator, may He be blessed and exalted, gave it, all of which is an inseparable part of its being made subject to man; provided, also, that nature be free from intentions to dominate, grow arrogant, and exploit that have been the hallmark of Western style of industrialization since its inception. At the same time, we categorically reject, even passively, the operations of plunder and deception against our peoples under the pretext of achieving an industrial society.

The last topic to be discussed in our work of criticism relates to the formation of armed forces—the policy problem, which will be readily apparent to the careful reader. Discussion of this problem appears in this article as a result of the consistency of the critical method in this study. In fact, the military establishment is not development-related, nor is it established for the purpose of development. Nevertheless, the results of progress or lack of progress in various fields are manifested in it; and, in any case, unity of critical method holds first consideration for the writer.

The story of the formation of armed forces in the Islamic countries is the story of one of the most damaging deals in our modern history. In it, it becomes apparent again and again how ignoring the cultural element led to the loss of nearly everything, with no measure succeeding in compensating for the loss. On the contrary, the ceaseless measures taken led to a chain reaction like the one we observed in our criticism of agricultural development plans. In what follows, we shall point to the most prominent aspects of this.

Initially, and in the context of "modernization" of the military establishment—meaning, in practice, the imitation of Western models, styles, and even uniforms—the

Muslim soldier was divested of the spirit of jihad [holy war]. Thereby, he lost his only cultural motive for fighting and martyrdom. One knows, of course, that the armies of the entire world, however different their military creed, take as much care to provide their soldiers with a lofty motive for fighting, one that will prepare them to give their lives freely and with a calm conscience, as they take to provide them with weapons and training in the arts of fighting.

To provide an alternative and fill the vacuum, there were hasty attempts championed by a tremendous number of Westernized intellectuals calling for a creed of "fighting for the homeland," i.e., for the "homeland" in its new political borders that had been designated by the colonialist states. The same idea emerged in the West in the context of a well-known historical development completely different from the development of our history and from the aspirations of our peoples and culture.

In the context of the same goal—the modernization of armies—our politicians resorted to importing weapons from Western countries. Importing weapons, as everyone knows, is not purely a commercial question. The seller, in particular, takes into account strategic and political considerations that enter into his policy toward the region he is supplying with weapons. On the other hand, the ownership of weapons does not end the armaments problem for the purchaser. For there are ammunition and spare parts; and the decision to export these will be made only on the basis of the seller's policy and interests, irrespective of the need of the buyer, or sometimes his lack of need.

Thus, the armed forces of the Islamic peoples were divested of the only creed appropriate to their cultural character, namely jihad. Then political decisionmaking regarding fighting and consequently political decisionmaking itself became hostage to the forces of international hegemonism. Let us search among these plain facts for the great secret behind repeated military defeats, defeatist political decisions, and submission to international humiliation, etc. Let us remember again that all these frustrations began at one basic point that provoked an inevitable reaction: the abandonment of the Muslim's creed in battle, i.e., jihad.

Through this multi-faceted critique, the author wanted to bring home to the reader the thesis that development without consideration for the people's culture is not only impossible, but also destructive. It is not a matter of modesty for me to say that my only contribution in all I have written here has been in this brief sketch that has elucidated, through a historical presentation, the disadvantages of separating culture from development. I mean, that is to say, that I have contributed nothing new at the theoretical level. A well-known and famous principle among specialists on the subject is that development is a cultural question, prior to its being a technological one; that the cultural element must in practice be respected in any development plan; and that the goal of

development is finally to strengthen the people's culture, not impair it. The question that now draws our attention is: Why is this held and put into practice in the entire world, but not among us? Is this part of a campaign of intellectual isolation for the purpose of isolating Islam among the Muslims themselves?

While trying to obtain an answer to this question, the writer noticed a separation. Our writers interested in the development problem from one angle or another are of one of two kinds. There is the technological writer, who sees only the purely technical side of the matter. He is so immersed in that side that he loses the ability to see anything else. He is like the technician absorbed in designing weapons and who is interested only in perfecting them, without seeing the destruction and killing that he will cause for his fellow human beings. On the other hand, there is the "progressive" writer who writes from his ivory tower and therefore thinks that descending to the level of the masses, the culture of the masses, and anything related to this, detracts from his lofty status. Can the reader recall the name of a single one of our writers interested in this subject or similar subjects who talks about our people as a people having a distinctive character fully entitled to be taken into consideration—a writer, that is, who speaks about our people realistically? As for me, I know of no one deserving this honor. This is one of the strangest phenomena in the world. It shows us the extent to which intellectual activity has been falsified among us, as well as its long-range political goals. There is no doubt that this is not happening unintentionally or accidentally. How few things happen unintentionally or accidentally in the shadow of the domination of the powers of international hegemonism!

The experiment now in full progress in the Islamic Republic offers us a model completely opposite in all respects to what we have just finished criticizing. Our plan is not to examine the details of this experiment, for we believe there are others who are more entitled and more suited to doing so. I speak from the position of a committed observer, maintaining the right of the committed specialist, or, at least, one who is neutral.

Why is the Islamic Republic succeeding in its development experiment, notwithstanding the difficulties, at a time when its counterparts around us spawn only disasters, despite generous foreign funding, equipment, experts, studies, and aid?

I believe the entire secret lies in one basic matter; anything else, no matter how important it may appear to us, is minor. This secret is commitment to the human being, connectedness to him, to his prevailing culture, his experiences, his creativity, his life style, etc. It lies in avoiding and guarding against the attempt to impose development on him from above. As a result, he trusts that development is taking the same direction as he himself is taking, and that it seeks to strengthen his identity, not cancel it. The truth is that this is not a position that can be acquired by artifice, the way a

skilled actor puts on the act needed for the role he is playing. It begins with a fundamental point: man's trust in the government and its initiative. The public bestows this trust only in one circumstance, and in no other: when the government is the practical embodiment of the idea of legitimacy as the public believes in it. There is a world of difference between an authority that takes its legitimacy from its people's creed and its lofty values and ideas, and one that imposes its authority by force. Add to this the fact that in the shadow of the domination of the international powers of hegemonism a strategic decision of the size of a development plan free from subservience is not left to the local government, so that it may take the steps it regards as best for the interests of its people without attention to the interests of the powers of international domination. It is clear that this analysis finally raises the necessity of an Islamic state and its being a precondition even for successful solutions to problems some people are trying to persuade us are technological, neutral problems with no identity. These people are speaking grandiosely about what they do not know. Unbeknownst to themselves, they are suffering from the same disease as the government. Zealous for our people and its progress, they fill the world with noise and then give birth only to proposals for subservience, Westernization, and transfer of wealth.

(Part of a study published in the latest issue of the magazine AL-MUNTALAQ.)

12937

Editorial Urges 'Caution' in Dealing With Russians

44040097a Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 22 Jan 88 p 1

[Editorial by Mustafa al-Husayni: "The Soviets and the Arabs and Jews"]

[Text] There is no doubt that Soviet-Israeli relations are witnessing some degree or another of improvement.

This improvement deserves to be watched by the Arabs, both governments and national progressive forces, with two closely connected feelings: a certain amount of understanding, and a certain amount of caution.

Progressive Arab national forces must not allow themselves to face this improvement in relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv by denying its existence. They would then be allowing some interested Arab governments to exaggerate the improvement on the one hand and to use it as justification for policies not in the national and pan-Arab interest on the other hand.

This is not the place to ponder the circumstances surrounding this improvement; they are public and obvious to anyone who wants to know and anyone who wants to observe.

What is needed, again, is understanding and caution. These two things imply that the progressive national forces have the responsibility of warning the Soviets of the consequences, if the improvement extends beyond the exigencies that may have made it necessary. As for understanding, we should acknowledge two things:

First, that the international Zionist movement has through relentless efforts succeeded in turning the Soviet position supporting the Arabs in their conflict with Israel into an internal Soviet problem.

To go back to the beginning: ever since the spring of Soviet-Arab relations began (it is now over, or nearly so) with the 1955 arms deal with Egypt, the Jews in the Soviet Union have been active in placing in question the legitimacy of Soviet aid to the Third World in general. Since Soviet support of the Arabs was the centerpiece in this aid, Soviet Jews played off this aid to the Third World against the demands of raising living standards in the Soviet Union. They asked, "Who is more entitled to the loaf, the neighbor or members of the family?"

It was the right contrast to find ears ready to listen among ordinary Soviet citizens.

This Zionist activity within the Soviet Union began to take a form more connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict after the 1967 war.

Since that time, the Zionist movement has activated its cells within the Soviet Union around the problem of emigration to Israel. It is a delicate problem for the Soviet system because it raises the problem of the right of Soviet citizens generally to emigrate, a problem that had never been imagined in the ideology of the system. Raising the problem opens doors not limited to the Jews and threatens to shake the demographic structure in certain Soviet regions. It threatens to drain off talents the Soviet system believes it has the right to keep, having expended the effort and sweat of Soviet workers on their formation. Also, the emigration question raises the security issue, since those who want to emigrate are usually highly educated and talented people, who believe their opportunities as individuals will be better in other societies.

In addition, the Zionist movement knew that the question of Jewish emigration was particularly useful as a wedge between the Arabs and the Soviets, since the Arabs would consider Moscow's permission for Jewish emigration to Israel to be support for Zionist power against the Arabs.

The Zionist movement developed the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union in order to make it the epitome and criterion before the entire world of the extent of the Soviet regime's respect for human rights. Indeed, it made it the epitome and criterion of the same issue for not a small segment of the Soviet cultural and scientific elite.

In the most recent period—since, that is, the "liberal element," if one may use the expression, became clear in Gorbachev's policies—the Zionist movement has readjusted its activity within the Soviet Union so as to welcome this element in this policy and to present the Soviet Jewish Zionist leaders as being in the forefront of its supporters. One can discern two goals of this movement: making this "liberal element" stand only for more freedom for Soviet Jews, and translating the rapprochement between them and the new policies into positions on Israel and the conflict between it and the Arabs.

To summarize: what one must understand is that the Zionist movement has succeeded in turning the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli conflict into an internal Soviet problem and into a problem related to the image of the Soviet regime before the world, and that the Soviet Union has the right to try to solve the two problems on the basis of its interests.

But what one must guard against is having our view of the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli conflict restrict itself to "political questions"—i.e., saying that as long as Moscow does not change its "political" position on our struggle against Israel, other questions such as that of Soviet Jewish emigration do not matter. For if this emigration is allowed in large numbers, it will be considered a change in the content of the Soviet position on the conflict; and if it is allowed to include individuals capable of increasing the strategic capabilities of the Zionist state, it will be considered a change in the substance of this position.

We must realize that as much as we understand the Soviets' need to solve the two aforementioned problems, any solutions that increase the strategic capabilities of Israel will be considered incompatible with the Soviet political position supporting the Arabs.

As a matter of understanding, we should acknowledge that Soviet-Arab relations were never in a state of equilibrium and were never built upon the satisfaction that is born of trust. They were in a state of equilibrium neither in their spring nor in their fall. In their spring, there was a Soviet feeling—with some justification—that they were giving the Arabs more than what the Arabs were giving them. Relations were not marked by trust because some of the Arabs used their special relations with the Soviets as a bridge to build special relations with their rivals, the Americans. Once this bridge was erected, or once some of the Arabs imagined it had been, they hastened to bite the hand the Soviets had extended to them and followed this with public revilement. We all know these events. Relations were not marked with trust because many of the Arabs felt and still feel that the Soviets abandon or are ready to abandon Arab issues for the sake of a reasonable amount of detente or easing of tensions with their American rivals—although the facts in this respect are debatable, to say the least.

These two elements—lack of equilibrium and distrust—were cards in the hands of the Zionists and their supporters within the Soviet Union. The two elements even had their effect on the opinion of not a few Soviet experts in international relations and Arab affairs.

In this regard, one must be cautious lest Soviet policy in its current direction toward review and modernization give these two elements more than their weight. We must guard against saying to ourselves, "They are right. What did they get from their support for us except problems and ingratitude?"

We—and I am not talking about governments—must remind the Soviets and remind ourselves that, even assuming lack of equilibrium, weakness of confidence, and the ingratitude of some, the Soviets have gained and are gaining from being on our side. For without this position supporting our causes, the Soviets would not have been able to be present as an international political weight in this region that is the real center of the international conflict.

Caution and warning are needed lest Soviet policy gradually be led by all the preceding factors to shortsighted policies that say, "This being the case, let us maintain a minimum of positions; let us agree to formulas that preserve forms and formalities, while tending to our more important interests by agreement and reducing tensions with our great rival."

Soviet policies are not free of shortsightedness. At least concerning this subject, they have a precedent whose effect is still felt. During the forties, [Soviet policy] looked at the establishment of Israel from the perspective of contrasting pro-Western reactionary Arab monarchies against the Zionist "democratic socialism" being established on the soil of Palestine.

One must therefore warn against shortsightedness, especially in periods of transformation and change.

12937

SYRIA

Nation's Electricity Production, Waste Problems Reviewed

44040088a Damascus AL-THAWRAH10 Jan 88 p 7

[Article by Ahmad Maradini] "

[Text] Tangible attention on the government's part to solve the problem of electric power has been given concrete reality through the meeting headed by Mr Mahmud al-Zu'bi, the prime minister, and attended by the two deputy prime ministers, the ministers of electricity and information, the minister of state for Council of Minister affairs and a number of specialists and technicians concerned. This has had the goal of studying the

organizational structure of the General Electricity Organization, cases of loss in the electric systems and all matters related to the production, transmission and distribution of electric power, as well as the organization's financial situation, the anticipated projects for meeting the deficit realized in current power generation, various bottlenecks, the difficulties and obstacles facing the organization's projects and the use of the existing generating plants and transmission and distribution systems.

These matters were discussed thoroughly and everyone produced a number of decisions which we will address ourselves to after pausing to consider important points bearing on electric power in the country and the most important contents of this discussion.

The Condition of Electric Power

Before entering into the details of the discussions which took place at this meeting, which were held on basic subjects raised via a number of memoranda, it is necessary rapidly to address the current condition of electric power and what is being planned for it in the future.

We will not dwell here in order to convince the reader that we are in a crisis which we have been suffering from for a number of years, because rationing is still under way and we can be subjected to sudden blackouts at any moment. It is necessary to mention that the total rated capacities of the thermal and gas plants in the country are about 1,150 megawatts, in addition to the Euphrates Dam plant's rated capacity of about 800 megawatts. Thus full rated capacity comes to about 1,950 megawatts, matched by about 1,500 megawatts as the rated capacity of the country's total need at peak hours. Thus we have about 450 megawatts as surplus in rated capacity, which is enough to cover the country's need in theory up to 2000, if used in a proper way.

Through a simple process of arithmetic our colleague As'ad 'Abbud arrived at in a previous article published in the form of a file, which is that the thermal plants produced about 4,196,000,000 kilowatt hours in 1986 and that out of their actual, not rated, production capacity about 1,924,000,000 kilowatt hours were lost, these stations were thus operating only at a rate lower than 70 percent of their actual capacity, and much less than that if we calculate that on the basis of their rated capacity.

This of course is a great sign of the presence of waste in operation, transmission and consumption combined, and is something I wanted to begin with, because the discussion of the employees in the Ministry of Electricity concentrated on waste in consumption first and transmission second, while, as we have seen through the figures, operating also bears a large part of the responsibility for the waste.

This is on the one hand. On the other, the Ministry of Electricity has set out a number of plans to limit the electric power shortage through a number of important projects such as the October thermal plant (Widyan al-Rabi'), with a capacity of 400 megawatts expected to be built in the next 2 years, and the expansion of the Mhrada plant with the addition of 2 complexes whose capacity is 330 megawatts, expected to be built in the first half of this year, in addition to the project to expand the Baniyas plant by adding two complexes, whose capacity is 340 megawatts, expected to be built in the early part of 1989, and the al-Suwaydiyah project, with a capacity of 150 megawatts, expected to be constructed this year, and in addition other groups in the al-Ba'th dam, the Hums refinery and the al-Tim field in Dayr al-Zawr.

Thus the total rated capacities which will be ready as is planned in the Ministry of Electricity at the beginning of 1990 will come to about 1,300 megawatts, a large figure, especially if we add to it the 450 megawatts of surplus in rated capacity which is not used, which in other words is wasted in operation and perhaps before it, so that the total will become 1,750 megawatts in addition to our current need, which comes to 1,500 megawatts.

For honesty's sake, it is necessary to point out that one of the members of the People's Assembly referred to what was cited above in his discussion of the ministerial statement, asserting the need to create an immediate solution to the electricity shortage, limit waste in it in all its forms and seek successful scientific means for operating the plants available to us before attempting to construct more plants. Perhaps some people have said that we need these new plants as a step in the direction of planning for the future, when power consumption will increase. Here we state, this is correct, but not to that extent. It would be more worthwhile for us in reality to make actual use of what is in our possession, because we will therefore be saving the hard currency we need for the process of construction and development in other areas. In addition, through our failure to make optimum use of the available capacity in our possession, we are helping to burn millions of dollars a day to no end. This is a phrase on which the prime minister concentrated a great deal when he pointed to the existence of a great disruption in regard to the use of power and waste which is unparalleled in any other country.

If to that we add something else related to the repeated shutdowns in the plants, we will find that that is a serious matter which has contributed greatly to the existing shortage. The most important reasons for these breakdowns may include the failure to carry out the necessary maintenance at the right time. There is a view which holds that the reasons for that include the failure to prepare domestic personnel to perform proficient technical maintenance, since the plants are built and installed by experts and delivered by the turnkey method, and therefore our technical personnel continue to be at the mercy of foreign experts. In addition, it is not

possible to provide the replacement parts the plants require since they are from various sources and getting them takes a long time, as people wander about searching for their sources.

Why the Meeting?

This all as a consequence has led to the situation we are in with respect to electric power. I believe that it is a negative consequence which requires more attention and followup on the part of the bodies concerned. As we have stated it, Mr Mahmud al-Zu'bi is chairing this meeting to study the actual state of electricity in the country. As to the most important matters discussed here, we will deal with that in detail.

The Organizational Structure

The first memorandum submitted for discussion dealt with the organizational structure of the General Electricity Organization. In it it was stated that the current structure was set out in 1965 and that the organization's activities have expanded and enlarged; consequently the memorandum recommends the creation of three organizations instead of one, provided that the activity in them be broken down in a manner which will result in facilitating things without creating any conflict in powers or confusion in accounting activities between production, distribution, construction and so forth, especially since the number of subscribers has increased several times over what it was upon establishment, and provided that this expansion reduces the waste in power.

The prime minister's view was that the government intended to merge the organizations and not expand them and that it was possible to label the directors and assistant directors persons in charge of these areas of specialization for which they were demanding that organizations be established, performing the administration of the work and directly supervising the branch departments in the electricity departments in the governorates. Thus the problem the memorandum referred to would be solved.

The two deputy prime ministers supported this view that combining the work was preferable to fragmentation, so that the control and administration process would be assured, because the parent organization had the documents and information related to them by which it would deal with any problem that arose in them and lead the job in all departments and technical and administrative fields.

The assistant minister of electricity recommended that in the event other organizations were not established, companies subordinate to the General Electricity Organization be created. The prime minister's response was that this itself was the problem, since costs would increase to no end, work would be fragmented, and confusions would occur which one could do without.

The only solution was for local administration to play a greater role and for the ministry to bear more responsibility toward the tasks assigned to the central directors in it.

Thus the solution would lie in modifying the organizational structure of the organization and not expanding the establishment of additional organizations.

Also in having a committee formed which would be responsible for everything the organization required in the central department and the departments in the governorates, until the decree on the modification was issued, provided that the members of the committee be appointed, along with its tasks, in detail; this as a result would have the goal of improving and developing the work.

As for accounting matters, statements have been issued with regard to them which confer power and work flexibility, as interests require, and consequently there was no problem from failing to establish companies, as cited in the recommendation.

Mr al-Zu'bi stressed the need to adopt the measures which would bring about success in work, because the laws were not rigid. Rather, they came into being for the sake of realizing the public benefit and interest. He expressed his sorrow over the letters he received from the Ministry of Electricity, which contained "a request for a statement and guidance from me." Such letters were ignored and not acted upon, because they were not responsible, and each of us must bear his full responsibility and set out responsible recommendations, solutions and measures. The board of directors must study such things and give powers to the directors and employees in accordance with their areas of specialization, and their accountability must take place within the limits of these powers. He expressed his amazement on this occasion over his failure to hear any participation from anyone, except the minister of electricity, and asked them to hold a discussion with him so that everyone would arrive at a total conviction of everything he was concerned with.

He referred to the need to assign engineers to field jobs and for them not just to content themselves with their office work, because the field engineer raised the level of the vocational workers, and it was necessary to increase these, because they were an assured guarantee of the success of the job. He stressed the need that all the directors of the electricity branches in the governorates be engineers and be well qualified.

Waste

The second subject which was discussed was waste. That is a large category and deserves a large pause for contemplation, in an attempt to find a solution to it, especially since one third of the power produced is wasted. The memorandum prepared for this matter dealt with waste,

referring to the presence of a type which is considered not waste but rather internal consumption of generating plants which is internationally recognized. There is waste in the transmission lines, which is called technical waste. As to commercial waste, that results from errors and breakdowns in meters, the manipulation of meters and the thefts to which they are subjected through acts of trespass against the system. The memorandum called for the need to offer aid to unearth such acts of trespass and limit them, especially those that are to be found in industrial installations, which consume relatively large power. The memorandum also called for the need to provide the meters and cables necessary to cover the applications of subscribers who resort to theft when they do not get their requirements by installing meters for them.

After the question on practical recommendations for reducing the waste in power, a number of directors presented some recommendations, for instance increasing the sources of power in Damascus, whose lines are bearing more than their capacity and consequently result in waste of about 45 percent, and also the provision of capacitors, which will help alleviate this shortage and reduce the waste which has occurred by approximately half.

The recommendations also included the construction of 220 and 66 [volt] plants to break power down and consequently reduce waste.

The contributions made also included the point that the recognized international waste is 13 percent while here we find that it is more than 23 percent, about 7 percent of which is in the form of thefts which enter into the category of commercial waste. For example, Damascus and the rural areas of Damascus have more than 50,000 homes which obtain electricity in an irregular manner in large quantities, since they do not pay the tariff for it.

This contribution also asserted the need to provide meters and cables to respond to the subscribers' applications, in addition to the provision of low-voltage condensers and condensers in plants, modification of the operating system of the transformers and replacement of circuit breakers in the old systems in some towns to limit waste.

With respect to the southern region, one director considered that the matter of power there would be solved only through the operation of the Widyan al-Rabi' plant, because this area accounted for about 40 percent of the country's total consumption! Consequently, it was necessary to construct it at the specified time. He pointed out that the system of Damascus would be threatened next summer because of the violations of inhabitants adjacent to the bearing lines where cases of drawdowns occurred which would cause serious accidents, especially in the line of the 'Adra-al-Qabun route, under which residential buildings a number of stories high were

constructed which were in violation, and also the Dammal-Hammah line, which threatened the region because of the presence of installations and residential buildings. This confused operations, caused power waste and prevented the performance of any modifications in the routes.

Here we must point to the need to work with the local authorities to eliminate these violations or reduce them at least, to save citizens' lives. As to the question of meters and cables, that was a matter of the utmost importance, and it was necessary to find a solution to it because we would thereby be helping to reduce the waste of much power, in the millions of pounds per year, and thus the provision of these meters and cables would realize profitability for the organization on the one hand and reduce waste on the other.

In addition to that, it was necessary to point out that gas generators were very costly, since the cost of producing a kilowatt hour came to 2.5 Syrian pounds, as compared with 25 piasters in the thermal plants. Therefore, it was necessary to restrict the operation of them to cases of maximum necessity only and keep them as reserve stations. On this matter, the minister of electricity considered that the gas plants should cover the need of the Damascus region for electric power and that they consumed much fuel when they were shut down and put back into operation. Therefore, it was not possible to dispense with them in Damascus. In the remaining governorates of the country, however, the operation of the Mihradah plant would eliminate their role and consequently they would become a reserve.

Electricity Projects

After that, the discussion moved over to the electricity projects in the country and dealt with generation and transformer stations. The most important of these are the Mihradah plant project, the al-Suwaydiyah project, the October plant project, the Latakia plant project, the new Baniyas plant project and the 400—230 kilovolt transformer plants.

The most conspicuous of the difficulties in these projects were the equipment company's hesitation as far as responding to some commitments was concerned, and delay in construction with respect to the Mihradah plant project. Contact was made at the site of the meeting with the company management and it was immediately recommended that the necessary credit for this project be opened as far as the equipment company was concerned.

With respect to the al-Suwaydiyah project, the odd aspect in the presentation of the difficulties was the failure to assign a civil engineer to supervise the civil works there and accompany that with the grant to the civil engineer to be assigned of additional compensations similar to those which engineers working in the Syrian company alone obtain.

It was the prime minister's view that every company or organization had work circumstances which differed from others. The earnings from oil differed from those from electricity, and therefore it was not reasonable that we should ask for such earnings and set them out as a basic condition for the work of a civil engineer in that location. We state that it is not at all logical that this matter should be one of the obstacles which have slowed down the performance of work on such an important project. Where is the role of the management of the Electricity Organization, indeed the Ministry of Electricity? Is it reasonable that it should be incapable of assigning a civil engineer to perform this work?

As to the incentives, they are without a doubt necessary but within the circumstances of the Electricity Organization and in accordance with the statutes and laws regulating that.

Invoices

The final subject discussed was that of subscribers and the issuance of invoices and repeated breakdowns in the computer. The strange recommendations which one of the directors in the organization presented included the imposition of a sum of 5 pounds instead of 10 piasters on invoices as compensation for their preparation and the price of paper. Of course the recommendation was rejected by the prime minister, with the assertion that in the light of the computer we of necessity saved the wages of many employees and much paper. For us to impose this sum as a contribution in limiting loss was unreasonable, because we would not make the citizen defray the mistakes which were committed in administration or in technical matters.

Concerning the computers used, which were constantly subjected to breakdown, he recommended that the organization obtain some intermediate-cycle computers, like other organizations. At this point the response of the people working in the organization was that they had repeatedly tried and not succeeded. Of course, a department like the Department of Electricity, which had failed to receive what it was owed from the equipment company, would not succeed. How will it be able to do so here?

With respect to recorders who did not read the meters as they should at the specified times, Mr al-Zu'bi stressed the need to warn them and impose the most severe penalties on them, because errors in this area were very many. He also referred to the grant of some incentives to them to perform their job. The strange thing here also was that the number of recorders in the city of Damascus was just 50, a small number if we compared it to the number of subscribers here.

It appears that the role of internal auditing in the Electricity Organization was relatively weak, especially since the measures taken here were almost limited. Why weren't the citizens' complaints and what was written in the papers, which was very voluminous, answered? Why

weren't the mistakes committed remedied and deterrent penalties imposed upon people who were derelict, especially if the errors were related to the lives of citizens, like what happened recently in Al-Mazzah, where some citizens were subjected to a terrible accident because of the neglect of technicians in the organization? Why weren't the invoices payable by citizens collected for more than a year in a number of areas, especially in the rural area of Damascus? Was it true that the absence of levying centers was the reason? Of course it had a connection, but it was not the main reason, because neglect and dereliction were behind such delays, and what business was it of the citizen's if he paid very large sums at one time, after more than a year in which he had not paid any invoice?

Decisions

As a result of the meeting, everyone produced a number of decisions, which were:

1. A review of the organizational structure of the organization in the light of Decree 18, which would result in specialization, use of all capabilities and resources, a reduction of waste and an increase in work productivity.
2. Solution of accounting problems, to strengthen the role of the competent departments and underline their economic and financial activity, which would make it possible to issue independent budgets in them in the context of the organization's general budget.
3. Stimulation of the role of the board of directors, to solve citizens' problems and complaints.
4. Distribution of powers and responsibilities among the various departments and pursuit of the principle of accurate, decisive accountability.
5. Followup of the execution of organization projects in accordance with the plans and programs set out, pursuit of all effective systems and methods, acceleration of the performance of them and their entry into execution, and the treatment of prominent obstacles with all possible speed.
6. The provision of necessary staff as of now for these projects so that they would be ready when they were put into operation.
7. The adoption of the measures necessary to reduce commercial and technical losses of energy so that that may reach an acceptable level.
8. The setting out of a basic task for officials in the electricity sector for the training and accreditation of new personnel and the better use of new technicians.

9. The improvement of means of imposing fees and the work of recorders and the adoption of necessary measures to eliminate the causes of citizens' complaints in this area, by intensifying the surveillance of personnel working in this area.

10. A rise in the level of maintenance of plants and systems in order to reduce the loss of electricity on the one hand and protect the lives of citizens on the other and adoption of deterrent measures against people who are derelict and negligent.

Finally

These are decisions which were issued as a result of the meetings and their like as directives bearing on the provision of the necessary materials and equipment for the organization, with concern for the resources available and their use for optimum operation through surveillance, followup and the provision of incentives for initiative.

However, it remains to be stated that the presence of red tape and bureaucracy in the electricity sector has become obvious. Before we seek out waste in electric power, we must seek out waste in the human resources working in this sector. There is no doubt that the organizational structure needs modification, as stated in the resolutions of the meeting, but the management also needs modification—indeed radical modifications. It is not reasonable that there should be people with such an amazing red-tape mentality in charge of an important, vital sector such as the sector of electricity. Here we can only point out what was cited in the government statement, which emphasized the issue of holding people who are derelict and do harm to account, developing management and limiting red tape and bureaucracy. If this is the situation, let us begin with this sector, because it is the one to which this statement best applies, through the data we have presented in the course of our article, through the discussions which have taken place, and the level of recommendations and solutions which the people working in this area have presented.

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Reasons for Asad Romanian Visit Discussed
44040070a Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic
5 Dec 87 p 22

[Article by Marwan al-Muhayini]

[Text] Observers are compelled to make a connection between the visit to Romania begun last Monday by President Hafiz al-Asad, and the sum total of events which preceded and coincided with the visit. These events began with the extraordinary Arab summit in Amman, and ended with the recent visit by Romanian President Ceausescu to Cairo, and included trips made by King Husayn as well as a delegation of Palestinian leaders to Bucharest. President Asad and President

Ceausescu have exchanged visits every two years since Ceausescu's first visit to Damascus in 1974. This time, however, Asad's visit has assumed additional dimensions, coinciding with Israeli threats against Syria following the daring commando operation on the eve of the summit between the U.S. and Soviet leaders.

President Asad in fact lauded, upon his arrival in Bucharest, the atmosphere of international detente as well as the U.S.-Soviet summit, declaring that he welcomes every step toward eliminating nuclear weapons and promoting worldwide disarmament; such an effort is a step toward the peace sought by the peoples of the world. President Asad pointed out, however, that the explosive situation in the Middle East is not in the interest of international peace and security; rather, it constitutes a focal point which is liable to explode because it reflects "the continuation of Israeli aggression against the Arab nation, Israeli occupation of Arab lands and usurpation of the rights of the Palestinian people, all of which is the result of the obstacles placed by Israel in the path of any true effort to bring about peace in our region." While in Bucharest, President Asad focused on the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet summit, stating that "peoples have rights, concerns and problems which result from aggression against them, or from external attempts to control them." He emphasized that world peace will not be achieved as long as these rights, concerns and problems remain disputed. He stated that "people will not relinquish their rights, bargain over their concerns, or accept oppressive solutions to their problems." President Asad indicated that "the concept of peace in the mind of Israel and its supporters clearly contradicts the true meaning of peace. As long as this enigmatic concept of peace persists, the goal of peace in the Middle East will remain elusive and the Arab struggle will continue to liberate Arab land, and restore Arab rights." President Asad emphasized "Syria's unequivocal rejection of the attempt to turn the international conference on Middle East peace into an international umbrella under which separate agreements would be concluded to confer legitimacy on Israel's greed for Arab land." He said "Israel wants us to forget Palestinian rights, the Golan, Jerusalem and Southern Lebanon. We completely reject this, for the recovery of Arab lands and the restoration of all Palestinian rights are matters which cannot be conceded or bargained over."

Diplomatic circles in Damascus view the visit by President Asad to Romania from the standpoint of the Middle East crisis, which stands out as a major issue among the regional problems which concern the two superpowers, confronting them with serious obligations, and threatening to cause a clash between them. There is as yet no U.S.-Soviet agreement on how to deal with the Middle East and what goals must be attained. Those circles, however, believe that the superpowers' examination of this crisis has made the subject of an international peace conference one of the major avenues in the process of searching for a solution in the region. These circles set out to base their evaluation of the visit's significance and

its timing on the fact that, at this stage, the Arabs have a crucial need to popularize their opinions, and to add weight to their demands so as to counterbalance the heavy weight of the American alliance with Israeli opinion on the international scale which has begun to seriously search for a solution to the Middle East problem—a solution which may not provide the minimum acceptable to the Arabs. Thus, these circles view Asad's visit to Romania as a regional and international attempt to complete the tasks undertaken by the Amman summit. An official Syrian source stated to AL-MUSTAQBAL that "Damascus, which is extensively cooperating with present requirements, and which has enabled the Arabs to emerge from their state of isolation and factionalism and to reach a level of solidarity and consensus, sees Asad's important visit to Bucharest as a national mission, especially because the Amman summit achieved a positive outcome when it affirmed adherence to the goals and principles defined by the resolutions made by previous Arab summit conferences with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the struggle to reclaim Arab rights and land, and the establishment of a strategic balance with Israel through effective Arab solidarity."

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TUNISIA

President Holds Meeting on Role Played by Press
45190018d Tunis LE TEMPS in French
31 Dec 87 pp 1-2

[Excerpt] In addition, and in view of the important role played by the media through all their agencies in promoting dialogue and a consensus between the government and the public, in defining and expressing the aspirations and expectations of the citizenry, as well as in determining the level of support in various social strata for the decisions adopted by the government in the interests of the national community, the president of the republic presided at a working session attended by the prime minister and other cabinet members to pursue the study of the mass media question. The meeting was devoted to the following issues:

- The drafting of the revised press code;
- The reorganization of the journalistic profession, in particular through the creation of an organization with journalists as members, and at the same time, publication of a code of professional ethics;
- Improvement of access to sources of information through the reactivation of news bureaus in the ministerial departments and the granting of rights to these bureaus which will favor the rapid circulation of information;
- The drafting of a continuous program for the training of and refresher courses for journalists; and

—Reactivation of the Association of Press Enterprise Directors.

During this working session, the following measures were approved:

1. Establishment of the 7 November Prize for the best journalistic production.
2. Creation of a national communications council.
3. Introduction of advertising on radio and television, beginning next 1 January, in order to make domestic products better known.
4. Adoption of incentives of a sort to encourage regional reporting of the news.
5. Reopening of the foreign offices of the Tunis-Afrique-Presses agency.

Concerning transport for journalists carrying professional cards, the following measures were approved:

—A 50 percent reduction in the rates charged on the Tunis-Air company lines for journalists on foreign assignment, when such assignments are approved by the Ministry of Information;

—Free transport on SNCFT lines;

—Free transport of newspapers on these same lines; and

—A 25-percent reduction on rates for hotel stays.

This working session provided an opportunity for the chief of state to emphasize the need to raise the level of the press, to demand respect for professional morality and to guarantee the accomplishment of the journalistic task in clear and responsible fashion.

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Foreign Minister Meets With CPC Delegation *45190019c Tunis LE TEMPS in French 9 Jan 88 p 2*

[Text] Mr Mahmoud Mestiri, a member of the Political Bureau of the PSD and minister of foreign affairs, met yesterday afternoon at the department headquarters with the delegation representing the Chinese Communist Party which was headed by Mr Zhu Liang, a member of the Central Committee and foreign relations director of the CPC.

The interview provided an opportunity for an examination of the status of the cooperation which has developed between the two countries and the means of further intensifying and expanding it.

On this occasion, Minister Mestiri analyzed the main aspects of the foreign policy of Tunisia and the development of the situation in the country since the historic 7 November change.

Among the others present were Mr Sadok Fayala, the foreign relations official at the PSD headquarters, and Mr Zhu Yinglu, the Chinese ambassador to Tunisia.

The Chinese delegation also had an interview with Minister of National Economy Slaheddine Ben Mbarek.

In the course of this meeting, the minister reviewed the friendly relations existing between Tunisia and the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and the Destourian Socialist Party and the CPC on the other.

Messrs Ben Mbarek and Zhu Liang expressed their satisfaction with the development of bilateral cooperation in the various sectors, in particular industry and trade, as well as craft work, and they voiced their joint desire to develop this cooperation, which constitutes a living example of South-South cooperation, further.

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Prime Minister, French Naval Commander Discuss Cooperation *45190019b Tunis LE TEMPS in French 9 Jan 88 p 2*

[Text] Cooperation between the Tunisian and French Navies was the main focus during the interview granted by Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche Thursday afternoon to Vice Admiral Alain Duthoit, the commander of the French Mediterranean Fleet, at the government headquarters in the Casbah.

Present at the meeting were Minister of State for National Defense Slaheddine Baly, Rear Admiral Habib F'dhila, chief of the General Staff of the Tunisian Navy, and Mr Jean Bressot, the French ambassador to Tunisia.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Vice Admiral of the Fleet Alain Duthoit said he was honored to be so warmly received by the prime minister. He noted that the cooperation between the navies of the two countries is close, not only because of the training opportunities France has provided to the Tunisian Navy, but also due to the joint training potential for the two navies.

Mr Baccouche also granted an interview to British Council Director Richard Francis, who is currently paying a visit to Tunisia with a view to strengthening cultural relations and artistic cooperation between Tunisia and Great Britain.

The meeting provided an opportunity for studying questions pertaining to the exchange of experience, in particular in the realms of art and cadre training, the teaching of the English language and civilization in Tunisia, and the development of tourist exchange.

The director of the British Council, a body concerned with cultural affairs in Great Britain, expressed satisfaction with the ideas put forth by the prime minister and the government officials with whom he met with regard to the establishment of a broader field of cooperation between the two countries based on friendly and privileged bilateral relations.

Present at the interview were Secretary of State at the Foreign Affairs Ministry Ahmed Ben Arfa, who is in charge of international cooperation; Hamadi Khouini, the Tunisian ambassador to Great Britain; and Stephen Peter Oay, the British ambassador to Tunisia.

Mr Hedi Baccouche also granted an interview at the government palace in the Casbah yesterday afternoon to the Mauritanian ambassador to Tunisia, Mr Mohamed Lamine Ould Yahya.

During this interview, bilateral cooperation and the situation in the Arab Maghreb were reviewed.

At the end of the afternoon yesterday, Mr Hedi Baccouche also granted an interview in the Casbah to the ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Tunisia, Mr Zhu Yinglu, who conveyed to the prime minister the congratulations of his Chinese counterpart on the advent of the new era in Tunisia and the confidence placed in him by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

During this meeting, Mr Hedi Baccouche and the Chinese diplomat reviewed the development of bilateral cooperation and the excellent friendly relations existing between the Tunisian and Chinese peoples.

The prime minister and secretary general of the PSD also met yesterday afternoon at the government palace in the Casbah with the delegation representing the Chinese Communist Party which is currently visiting Tunisia. The delegation is headed by Mr Zhu Liang, a member of the Central Committee and foreign relations director of the CPC.

In a statement made to the TAP agency, the head of the delegation expressed "the pleasure and honor accorded the delegation by the meeting with the prime minister and secretary general of the PSD." He recalled the visit Mr Hedi Baccouche made to the People's Republic of China in 1985, at the head of a delegation representing the Destourian Socialist Party. Mr Zhu Liang said that this visit contributed to strengthening the bonds of friendship between the two peoples and the two countries and raised the relations between the PSD and the CPC to a better and higher level.

He added that the interview, which was characterized by a friendly and cordial atmosphere, provided an opportunity to discuss what the Chinese delegation had seen in

the course of its travels in Tunisia, including the great achievements which have been strengthened during the era of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, chief of state and head of the PSD.

Mr Zhu Liang noted that the two parties have shown a firm determination to promote the relations between the two parties, the two peoples and the two countries further.

Those present at this meeting included Mr Mohamed Karboul, the member of the Political Bureau of the PSD in charge of foreign relations, and Mr Zhu Yinglu, the Chinese ambassador to Tunisia.

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Prime Minister Meets With Italian Foreign Trade Minister

45190018c Tunis LE TEMPS in French 23 Dec 87 p 2

[Text]Tunis (TAP)—Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche granted an interview at the government headquarters in the Casbah Monday evening to Italian Minister of Foreign Trade Renato Ruggiero. Minister Ruggiero is in Tunisia on an official visit, at the invitation of Minister of National Economy Slaheddine Ben Mbarek.

The Italian minister has reported that the interview concerned an assessment of the excellent cooperative relations existing between Tunisia and Italy, and he emphasized the desire of both parties to strengthen this cooperation further in order to make the economies of the two countries truly complementary.

He explained that the interview also provided an opportunity for a discussion of financial cooperation and the possible ways of directing Italian financial support to Tunisia for use in projects generating more jobs than others, within the context of mixed Tunisian-Italian enterprises.

Messrs Slaheddine Ben Mbarek and Claudio Moreno, the Italian ambassador to Tunisia, among others, were present at the interview.

Joint Meeting

Messrs Slaheddine Ben Mbarek and Renato Ruggiero had conducted an earlier meeting which was attended, on the Tunisian side, by leading officials of the API, OCT and CEPEX, and on the Italian side, by members of the delegation headed by Mr Ruggiero, which is presently visiting Tunisia.

This meeting, which was also attended by Secretary of State at the Ministry of National Economy Mondher Zenaidi, the official in charge of industry and trade, was devoted to identification of the activities to be undertaken by the pertinent bodies in the two countries in order to develop trade and industrial cooperation.

In this connection, Messrs Ben Mbarek and Ruggiero recommended that the two delegations proceed as soon as possible to make the projects approved in connection with the cooperation a reality.

Documents Signed

On Tuesday, Messrs Slaheddine Ben Mbarek and Renato Ruggiero signed a report on the bilateral talks held during the official visit paid to Tunisia by the Italian minister.

The document signed mentioned the joint desire of the two parties to develop bilateral cooperation further on the basis of the complementary functioning of the two economies and the interdependence of their economic interests.

On the subject of trade cooperation, according to the document, the two ministers expressed satisfaction with the development of trade exchange and agreed on the need to raise the level of this trade on the basis of the existing potential.

In addition, they stated their conviction that the development of closer industrial cooperation, in particular through the implementation of joint projects in Tunisia, oriented among other things toward exports, could ensure strengthening trade between the two countries, as well as its diversification and greater permanence.

In this same connection, the report emphasized the agreement of the two parties on making administrative procedures more flexible in order to facilitate the better use of the Italian credit line.

With regard to future credit lines, the two parties agreed on the desirability of a more accurate listing of the products which should benefit from such credit, based on their priority in terms of the economic development of Tunisia and their technological aspects. At the same time, they agreed to simplify the administrative procedures for the use of these credit lines.

With regard to cooperation in the fishing sector and the development of aquaculture and the maritime products processing industry, the two parties agreed on the timeliness of strengthening technical cooperation, in particular in the vocational training, technological transfer and research aid sectors.

With regard to industrial cooperation, the report noted the agreement of the two parties to use every resource to promote the implementation of joint-venture undertakings and direct Italian investments in Tunisia.

Details Provided on State Budget Estimates

45190018b Tunis LE TEMPS in French 13 Dec 87 p 4

[Text] Tunis (TAP)—The estimates pertaining to the general state budget as set forth in the report delivered to the Chamber of Deputies Friday were established in the light of the major guidelines and overall indicators of the Seventh Plan, based on the figures contained in the economic budget for 1988. Among other things, they call for an increase of 2.5 percent in the gross domestic product at constant prices, keeping the current deficit in the balance of payments within the limit of 380 MD, or about 4.4 percent of the gross domestic product, an increase in imports and exports at the rate of 5.5 percent at constant prices, an increase in consumption at the rate of 2.2 percent, and an increase in investments, which should reach 1,880 MD in current prices, making it possible to create more than 42,000 jobs in the nonagricultural sectors.

Three fundamental principles governed the drafting of the state budget estimates:

—Reliance mainly on our own resources and an effort to achieve a relative decrease in the budget deficit by limiting recourse to foreign indebtedness;

—Limitation of operational costs to the greatest possible extent, while at the same time safeguarding the capacity of the state to cover its obligations, in particular the acceleration of the development process; and

—Better mastery of the allocation of the investments for which the equipment budget provides, so as to continue the implementation of current projects and to avoid the initiation of new projects unless they are demonstrably profitable economically.

With these considerations in mind, the state budget was established at 2,960 MD for expenditures and income, an increase of 168.5 MD, representing 6 percent of the 1987 estimates.

I. Resources

The ordinary resources of the state for 1988 are estimated at 2,360 MD, thus showing an increase of 5.3 percent over the resources estimated in the finance law for last year.

Development resources are estimated at 518 MD, as compared to 529.5 last year. This figure represents the surplus of ordinary income over ordinary expenditures.

Ordinary resources are the total of fiscal and nonfiscal receipts coming basically from oil income, royalties received on gas passing through the pipeline, treasury gains, special account transfers, etc.

Thus fiscal income will show an increase of 97.2 MD, representing 6 percent of the estimated income. This rate falls below the rate of increase in the gross domestic product at current prices, which will make it possible to reduce the rate of fiscal pressure. It should be noted in fact that the estimates proposed are not based on any new measures in the fiscal realm, but are the product of an optimistic attitude about the expected economic recovery and the increasing awareness of the citizens subject to taxes about the need to pay off their debts following the tax amnesty measures recently adopted by the government and the reduction of the tax rates on the registry of real estate transactions.

Direct taxes will represent 20.3 percent of fiscal income as compared to 20 percent last year.

Nonfiscal income, on the other hand, will total 633.5 MD, showing an increase of 79.3 MD as a result of the implementation of the new measures and the adjustment of prices for hydrocarbons.

Equipment budget resources, for their part, will come to 1,118 MD, thus showing an increase of 3.6 percent.

Self-supplied resources are estimated at 50 MD in connection with the Title I contribution, and 518 MD in connection with Title II.

Within this context, and within the framework of the efforts designed to limit the budget deficit, recourse to loans has been limited to 550 MD, including 250 MD for domestic loans and 300 MD for foreign loans.

There will, however, be no recourse to the international financial market.

II. Expenditures

Ordinary or operational expenditures will account for an increasing part of the total expenditures, estimated at 62.2 percent as compared to only 61.3 percent in 1987.

If expenditures pertaining to repayment of the public debt are set aside, we will see that the operational expenditures show an increase of 7.2 percent.

This rate falls below the expected development of the gross domestic product, reflecting the desire of the government to control the development of operational expenditures.

As to the distribution of operational expenditures among the various ministerial departments, the key feature is the priority accorded the departments of a social nature, which will receive 55 percent of the allocated expenditure funds, confirming the socialist nature of the Tunisian policy, consistent with which the state assumes expenditures of a social nature.

It should also be noted that the state will continue to be active in the economic and social sectors on the basis of the special treasury funds, for which the budget allocates subsidies of about 326 MD, including 183 MD for the general compensation fund. Consistent with this line of thinking, an increase in the subsidies granted to the local collectives will follow.

Where expenditures for development are concerned, they are characterized in particular by the approval of a certain number of projects selected on the basis of economic profitability; the special support granted to the farm sector, which will benefit from 17.5 percent of the payment expenditures; the major contribution made to the national effort to develop exports; and the attention which will be paid to the need for regional balance.

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Transfer of Gabes Military Airport Planned *45190018a Tunis LE TEMPS in French 13 Dec 87 p 2*

[Excerpt] Moreover, President Ben Ali held a working session with Minister of State for National Defense Slaheddine Baly at which Mr Hedi Baccouche was present.

On this occasion, the chief of state decided to transfer the Gabes Military Airport, which is located within this city, to another location outside the city limits.

The activities of the new airport will include both the military and civilian sectors.

The area on which the airport is situated at present will be used for urban expansion projects made necessary by the rapid development the city of Gabes is experiencing.

President Ben Ali also decided to distribute the land on which the Kef Military Airport is located to the farmers in the region, which will make it possible to cultivate an irrigated area of 165 hectares.

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Prospects for Credit Extension in 1988 Discussed *45190014a Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Dec 87 p II*

[Article by M.R.: "Will the Banks Grant Further Credit in 1988?"]

[Text] Considerable numbers of economic operators are asking whether the valve controlling bank credit for investments and operations will be open wide in 1988.

The most recent measures for the purpose of "relaunching investments" justify confidence in this resumption of bank aid at a steady rate.

What is the real situation? Can we speak of a blockage of this credit in 1986 and 1987, followed by a planned resumption in 1988?

Concern About Financial Balance

The economic situation in the last 2 years has been characterized by an aggravation of the general imbalances in public finance, which has had unfortunate effects on the balance of payments situation. The imbalances were due to a combination of endemic, endogenous and exogenous factors. The domestic causes were the natural result of the recession in the rates of growth in certain sectors of economic activity and the disproportionate increase in domestic demand. The external considerations had to do with the unforeseeable drop in the price of oil, the surprising monetary fluctuations and the protectionist policy pursued by the countries which are the main traditional markets for our exports of farm and textile products. The resumption of increases in the value of imported equipment, for its part, caused the value of investments made to exceed the total allocation for which the Sixth Plan initially provided.

The Economic Recovery Plan adopted in August 1986 called for urgent economic redeployment measures. The structural reforms undertaken affected the parity devaluation of the Tunisian dinar, the gradual liberation of prices in the competitive sectors, the rationalization of public and private investments, the restructuring, indeed conversion of certain public enterprises in difficulty to the private sector, and incentives for export and agricultural activities. Foreign resources were mobilized to finance this program. Similarly, the domestic monetary and financial markets were reactivated in order to draw off the largest possible deposit total, with compulsory loans, liberation of bank interest rates and the launching of new savings products.

The crisis was offset. But this rescue operation was effected to the detriment of certain key sectors of capital socioeconomic dimensions—construction, the mechanical industry and domestic trade.

The "recovery measures" decided upon last October were designed to restore dynamism to the activities disadvantageously affected by the crisis.

Asset Development Consistent With Needs

In order to be able to sustain the growth effort in the priority sectors and the recovery of others which had been to some extent neglected, the financial system would presumably be capable in 1988 of operating more effectively thanks to the various forms of aid to the economic operators.

Simultaneously, it must work to ensure that liquid assets develop consistent with the real needs of the economy, because an excessive injection of liquid assets would exert inflationary pressures on prices.

In this connection, the favored strategy of developing the monetary mass is based on the achievement of four main objectives. The first imperative is to keep the increase in the monetary mass within the 8.5 percent limit in 1988, thus producing a rate of growth below that of the PIB (9.3 percent).

Similarly, the economic liquidity rate should be reduced to 46 percent of this monetary mass, as compared to 46.5 percent in 1987. The second goal has to do with improvement in the structure of the monetary mass itself, through a sustained effort to strengthen the collection of stable deposits and through a slowdown in the rate of monetary circulation.

The actions to be undertaken to achieve these ends should make it possible to guarantee just and encouraging compensation for these deposits and to diversify savings products (accounts falling due, investment accounts, land and renovation savings).

The third requirement has to do with strengthening the role of the banking system in the mobilization of foreign resources, consistent with the general balance structure adopted. This role will be mainly assumed by the development banks, which are called upon to provide 146 MD out of the 166 MD total of foreign credit required.

The fourth and last consideration involves adaptation of the structure of financial system activities to its resources. But how can this adaptation be achieved?

Adaptation of Resources to Use

The planned resumption of bank aid must be adapted to these balance principles, while at the same time providing an adequate volume of credit for the use of the economic agents, in particular those involved in the activities assigned priority.

On this basis, the planned volume of loans for 1988 would be up by about 790 MD. Investment credit would be increased to 528 MD, representing 28 percent of the financing resources for the projects to be undertaken.

The short-term credit, which is basically provided through the monetary market, would for its part be up by about 225 MD. The total amount outstanding in this category of credit would increase by 9 percent.

This trend toward an increase in the volume of credit, despite the urgent need to control the development of the monetary mass, will be made possible by measures to be implemented as of the month of March 1988. They provide for a ratio for "priority activities" equivalent to 10 percent of the resources of each bank, a parallel reduction in the ceiling for the compulsory underwriting of national loans by the banks, a reduction in the cost of credit of 1.5 to 2.2 points, and more consistent investment bank activity in the financing of certain priority

sectors, such as agriculture (17 percent of the activities of these banks, as compared with an average of 8 percent during the Sixth Plan period) and small and average enterprises.

The "less priority" sectors will certainly benefit, either directly or through the subsequent effects, from the resumption in investments and bank credit.

Other auxiliary measures to resolve the specific problems in financing these activities are expected. What might they involve?

5157

Promotion of Sahel Olive Growers' Income Planned

45190014b Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French
9 Dec 87 p 4

[Text](TAP) Sousse—The season for harvesting olives began on 20, 23 and 25 November last in the governorates of Monastir, Mahdia and Sousse, respectively, giving life in each of these regions the impetus which is traditional at this season of every year.

While the additional increase in production prices, established by the state this year at 1,250 millimes per kg of superior quality oil and 1 dinar per kg of ordinary oil, an increase of 150 and 130 millimes per kg, respectively, led to a certain improvement in the domestic market situation, some factors, on the other hand, are continuing to slow the revaluation of the olive crop as the main source of income for the farmers in the Sahel.

These factors include some of a sociopsychological nature, which led, above all during the first 2 decades after independence was won, to the disaffection of the young people where working the land was concerned. There are also some factors of an economic nature, such as the protectionism on the European market, which led to the devaluation of oil crop production subsequent to the increase in the cost of production.

In this connection, the director of the regional section of the National Oil Office in Sousse has made it known that the estimated cost price of a kg of oil is no more than 850 millimes, while the increase granted to the farmers per kg of refined oil is 1,250 millimes.

However, the fact that the official cost of harvesting a kfiz, established at 11,500 millimes, is in practice exceeded takes into account the expenditures required for the transportation of the product, the pruning of the olive trees, guarding of the property, cultivation of the surface and, in depth, all that the farmer is required to do twice a year.

Also, the gradual aging of the olive groves in the Sahel, where there are currently 2.6 million old olive trees in the three governorates, as compared to 800,000 new

plantings and 8.5 million productive olive trees, has also made the farmers' costs higher and substantially increased the cost of production.

Renewal of the Olive Groves

The aid provided by the National Oil Office to the farmers wanting to renew their groves, within the framework of the agreements signed with the governorate councils, has made it possible to renew 46,000 olive plantings in the Sahel. It is expected, moreover, that the incentives provided to the oil-crop growers will develop in the direction of a national olive-growing promotion program.

Farmers raising oil crops remain at the mercy of rainfall, however, and precipitation was not favorable during the farm season just past and the beginning of the present one, particularly in the southern and western regions of the Sahel. This factor could not fail to affect this season's harvest, which is estimated at 16,000 tons of oil, as compared with 20,000 for the preceding season.

It is the governorate of Mahdia which has been most seriously affected by inadequate rainfall.

The harvest there is estimated at only 2,000 tons of oil, as compared to 11,000 last year.

The olive groves of the continental delegations have suffered the most, and this fact led the pertinent national and regional authorities to launch a large-scale irrigation operation to save 25,000 olive trees from the effects of the drought.

These effects have also had an impact on the oil-crop harvest in the governorate of Monastir, where a harvest equivalent to 3,200 tons of oil is expected, as compared to the earlier estimates of 4,000 tons. Only the governorate of Sousse was spared, as it has had two successive rainy autumns. There a relatively good harvest, estimated at 11,000 tons of oil, is expected.

The oil-crop harvest in the governorates in the Sahel is estimated at only 16,000 tons of oil, which is the equivalent of 70,000 tons of olives. This is well below the pressing capacity, which is estimated at 156,000 tons of olives. As a result, plans call for opening only half of the 500 oil-pressing facilities available in the region.

Reuse of Residues

Very special efforts will be devoted to the production of superior quality oil for the purpose of increasing the value of our oil exports and improving producers' income in an economic sector which is vital to the recovery the government has taken laudable steps to achieve. Thus the price of oil per kg has increased from 551 millimes in 1981 to more than 1,200 at present.

Moreover, other undertakings to ensure the reuse of olive residues have been launched, involving olive-oil cakes and the leaves and branches, which can be used to produce large quantities of additional fodder. This will alleviate the fodder shortage which exists on a national scale, more particularly in the central and southern regions of the country, and will resolve the peripheral pollution problems created.

A working document issued by the national symposium on the reuse of olive residues held in Monastir last February urges, among other things, incentives for oil crop production, improvement of oil-extraction procedures, control of production costs and optimal use of all olive residues.

The document says that olive residues can yield no less than 300 million fodder units on the national level annually.

This quantity, estimated to be worth about 70 million dinars and to have a nutritional value equivalent to that of 600,000 tons of hay, would suffice to feed 300,000 sheep.

In this connection, the National Oil Office has undertaken to implement the recommendations of the symposium.

This office has in fact purchased equipment for converting olive residues into a concentrate. This will serve to increase the income of the olive growers substantially, to rehabilitate the olive groves in the country, in the Sahel in particular, where the growing of olives dates back to the Punic and Roman eras, and to promote the profitability of domestic olive growing, a sector in which annual production averages no more than 110,000 tons of oil, while the domestic market demand for oil comes to about 140,000 tons.

5157

Government Educational Reforms Listed
45190014c Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French
11 Dec 87 p 2

[Text] President of the Republic Zine El Abidine Ben Ali met with a number of cabinet members, including Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche, at the Carthage Palace yesterday afternoon to study problems pertaining to education.

With a view to guaranteeing greater efficiency in the educational system, raising the level of teaching and improving its yield, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali adopted the following decisions:

1. The University of Tunis will be divided up into three sectorial universities, as follows:

—The University of Sciences, Technology and Medicine;

—The University of Law, Economics and Business Administration; and

—The University of Letters, Arts and Humanities.

On the other hand, to encourage and strengthen the orientation of the universities toward the economic environment, it was decided establish close links between sectorial professionals (industrialists, bankers, farmers, etc.) and the university, institute and higher educational school administrations.

In addition, the methods of implementing double sponsorship will be decreed by the Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research and the various departments involved.

2. The university deans and heads of departments will henceforth be elected by the teaching bodies on the basis of methods to be established by the legislative text which will replace the law dated 9 August 1986.

Similarly, student representation in the faculty councils will be provided through free elections and on an expanded base.

The directors of the schools and higher educational institutes will continue to be administrative appointees.

3. A regional education office will be established in each governorate. The task of these offices will be to deal with all of the problems pertaining to primary and secondary education within the context of broad decentralization.

4. Measures designed to improve the drafting, publication and distribution of school manuals and paraschool documents have been decreed.

5. Improvements will be made in the assignment of schedules for primary teaching, without however changing the total schedule volume. This will be done in connection with the next school year.

The chief of state entrusted the Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research with the task of preparing, as soon as possible, the draft legislative and regulatory texts for the implementation of these decisions.

5157

Seminar on Business, Job Situation Organized
45190014d Tunis LE TEMPS in French 8 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by A.B.A.]

[Text] Yesterday morning, Minister of Economy Slaheddine Ben Mbarek inaugurated a seminar on the business and job situation attended by the governors of Tunis and Ben Arous, API President and General Director Ali Hedda, and a large number of professional people, administrators and university faculty members.

Since the complex of problems to be discussed by the five commissions during this seminar have to do with making our enterprises healthy and efficient and developing them, all of the main enterprise aspects are on the agenda. They include identification of projects, administration-enterprise relations, winning markets, present and future investment sources, and finally the adaptation of training to employment. Minister Slaheddine Ben Mbarek pointed during his opening address to the need to create an atmosphere favoring prosperity and the blossoming of our enterprise activities. The results seen at the end of the Sixth Plan and the challenges which must be met during the Seventh Plan, in order in the end to promote the process of development for our business sector and thus to consolidate the Tunisian industrial fabric and reduce the unemployment rate make it necessary, according to the minister, to redouble and, above all, to coordinate efforts.

Combating Bureaucracy

In fact, as the Seventh Plan is about to begin, Tunisia finds itself with a rather alarming unemployment rate. The potential for absorption, estimated at only 240,000 jobs with an investment volume of 10.4 billion dinars, must be compared with an additional demand for about 34,000 jobs.

The steps which have already been taken to benefit industrial enterprises (new industrial investment code), as well as agricultural enterprises, and in particular those producing for export, will make them more efficient and increase their production capacity (currently at only 60 percent). In fact, the simplification of administrative procedures, the gradual liberalization of imports and sale prices—add to this the tax amnesty, expansion of the financial market, elimination of prior Central Bank authorization for obtaining credit—come within the context of the government's desire to establish a firm foundation on which the economic launching of Tunisia can be built. "Other measures will follow," the minister gave assurance, "and soon." Craftwork and small artisans' enterprises, as well as export enterprises, will be affected.

"We are declaring war on bureaucracy, which has for a long time constituted an obstacle which is a serious handicap to each enterprise both prior to and at the time of its establishment, as well as throughout its development." And, he added, "Every means of making our domestic enterprises competitive will be made available to the promoters."

In order to improve the precarious status of the domestic industrial fabric and to consolidate the advance toward economic independence, an atmosphere of confidence must soon come to prevail between the administration and business, the minister concluded. The work of the five commissions will, after being submitted to the pertinent authorities, thus serve to provide basic documents for very probable measures to encourage and provide incentives for Tunisian businessmen.

Alarming Figures

Mr Ali Hedda, president and general director of the API, for his part, stressed the importance of the efforts made in the investment sector to support business and to create more jobs. However, there are still some gaps, and the number of unemployed persons continues to increase. This phenomenon is the more tragic since the new job applicants are typically holders of diplomas. This group accounts for 45 percent of all job applicants, according to the Seventh Plan figures, as follows:

- 45,000 holders of vocational school diplomas;
- 1900 higher technicians with industrial and service specialties;
- 4500 industrial and service engineers;
- 3400 higher health technicians;
- 14,000 holders of industrial technology diplomas;
- 4000 holders of economic technology diplomas;
- 1100 agronomical engineers and 650 assistant agronomical engineers;
- 10,000 holders of licentiates (economic and social sciences); and
- 3500 doctors, pharmacists and veterinarians.

These figures reveal a situation which can be said to be tragic, at the very least. How can the job challenge be met, particularly for the young holders of diplomas? What strategy should be adopted and what specific measures should be implemented to guarantee the adaptation of the supply to the demand? All of these are difficulties which the Seventh Plan will have to surmount.

"Are our domestic enterprises, at their current state of development, capable of meeting such an impressive demand?" This was the question asked skeptically by Mr Ali Hedda. If the existing enterprises which generally produce substitution items are to be consolidated, others must be created, in this case in the components sector. All that is needed is to make the proper choices and to move toward the highest levels.

Selling Before Producing

One cannot identify projects and make economic choices without reference to the overall problem of the transfer of technology. That which has not been planned or is haphazard or improvised will no longer meet the needs of our enterprises. On the contrary, the mastery of projects and their techniques is indispensable. All methods are good, Mr Hedda said, even technical espionage pursued through the products themselves, as well as scientific and technical periodicals, fairs and exhibits. Our project heads must undertake serious studies before plunging in, so as to master enterprise management, to understand the product perfectly and to study target markets. Certain reflexive actions must be eliminated as soon as possible, and a new financing or stocking policy and increasing interest in maintenance and follow-up must be envisaged.

And Mr Hedda concluded on an optimistic note. "The path is risky and full of difficulties, and the undertaking is not only exciting but promising as well." The work of the commissions began on the morning of 7 December and will continue through tomorrow afternoon.

5157

Automotive Assembly Plants Close Due to Losses *45190019a Tunis LE TEMPS in French* *9 Jan 88 pp 1-2*

[Text] The chief of state presided yestersay at a working session attended by the prime minister, a number of other government officials and also leaders in the industrial sector.

The meeting was devoted to an examination of the situation in the automotive vehicle assembly industry in Tunisia.

In light of the information on developments in this sector which was discussed during this working session, in particular regarding the high cost of vehicles assembled in Tunisia, the exorbitant expenditures in strong currencies resulting therefrom, the cumulative losses which have reduced the balances of the assembly companies and their indebtedness to the banks, it was established that this activity is not profitable on the economic and financial levels.

It was for this reason that it was decided to abandon the assembly of light vehicles in Tunisia.

The chief of state recommended that suitable and speedy solutions be found for the workers in the sector, so as to promote their reincorporation in the economic circuit, with the state committing itself to maintaining their present income level in the meantime.

The president of the republic also recommended that steps be taken to ensure the use of the existing equipment in the assembly sector to to promote activities of which the usefulness to the national community is certain.

Reasons for the Closure

For the second consecutive year, the activity in the automotive assembly industry has shown a substantial decline due to the slump in sales on the domestic market, which is, moreover, its main outlet.

The most recent issue of the periodical *CONJONCTURE*, which is published by the Ministry of National Economy, reported that it was the restrictions on the granting of credit for the purchase of vehicles and above all the increase in their price as a result of the devaluation of the dinar which gave rise to this most unfavorable situation.

At the end of the first 9 months of 1987, the number of vehicles assembled was down 53.4 percent for industrial vehicles (316 units) from the total of 679 for the comparable period in 1986. The decline was 96.3 percent for tractors (52 as compared to 1,402 units), 43.7 percent for light vehicles (1,660 as compared to 2,948 units) and 2.3 percent for motor coaches and buses (125 as compared to 128).

It should be noted that these declines are in reality particularly serious because the comparison is with a period (the first 9 months of 1986) which itself showed a decline from the 1985 figure.

Moreover, President Ben Ali met yesterday at the Carthage Palace with Vice Admiral Alain Duthoit, commander in chief of the French Mediterranean Fleet, together with Minister of State for National Defense Slaheddine Baly and Mr Hedi Baccouche.

At the conclusion of this meeting, at which Rear Admiral Habib F'dhila, chief of the General Staff of the Navy, and Mr Jean Bressot, the French ambassador to Tunisia, were also present, Vice Admiral Duthoit stated that it was his very great honor to be received by the president of the republic. He said: "I view this honor as a symbol of the excellent cooperation between the Tunisian and French Navies, cooperation which is evidenced in a number of ways. They include, first, the aid France has granted to Tunisia for the training of its cadres and its sailors, and also the numerous exercises we carry out together every year, to the mutual benefit of our two navies."

Vice Admiral Duthoit added that "These exercises have been very useful for the French Navy, which lacks resources in the Mediterranean at this time, since the Tunisian Navy has small units, in particular rapid missile-launching patrol boats, which the French Navy does not yet have."

5157

INDIA

Gandhi Speaks to Public Sector in Awards Ceremony

46001234 Madras *THE HINDU in English*
20 Jan 88 p 9

[Text] The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, today reiterated that wage hikes in the organised sector should be linked to productivity.

Reading from a prepared text after presenting the annual Shram Awards 1987, instituted by Union Labour Ministry for public sector workers for outstanding contribution to productivity, the Prime Minister was emphatic that yielding to demands for more wages without concern for productivity would lead to greater industrial sickness and ultimately was not in the interest of either labour or the nation.

Added significance: Though Mr Gandhi had voiced similar views earlier, particularly in the first half 1987, today's repetition assumes added significance in the light of agitations from every segment of public sector workers for higher pay. The services sector, consisting of institutions like banking and insurance, is also not exempt from the unrest for more wages.

The Prime Minister, who devoted much of his speech to the imperative of raising productivity, said India was the first country to guarantee the fundamental rights of workers long before industrialisation and was determined to adhere to this principle. It was in the process of safeguarding the interests of workers that the nexus between productivity and remuneration had been broken. "Can we pay ourselves more than we earn?", Mr Gandhi asked and said that while in the short-term it might work in the long run, it would be detrimental to the economy.

Complaining that industry and managements did not show any interest in improving the productivity of workers Mr Gandhi said by involving workers in management quicker results could be obtained. Only by ensuring the participation of workers in management, could one get at the root of hurdles to productivity.

Overall growth rate poor: Calling for a quantum leap in the overall growth of the economy, the Prime Minister said while the industrial sector had performed satisfactorily in recent years with an estimated nine per cent growth, the overall economy was stagnant, around a three to five per cent growth rate. Measured against the population growth rate of two per cent the overall growth rate came down to two to one per cent. Measured against the population growth rate of two per cent the overall growth rate came down to two to one per cent. rate came down to two to one per cent.

Higher growth rate needed greater resource mobilisation. With internal sources tapped to the hilt, the only option left was external sources which meant compromise with basic principles. The options of resource mobilisation are limited. It is in this context we have to see how to get more out of the existing resources. The challenge before the nation is to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people by increasing the modest growth rate, the Prime minister said.

Increasing productivity and innovations were the only alternative. Mr Gandhi lamented that the ratio between investment and output was the lowest in India even in comparison to the developing countries. There was enormous scope for higher productivity without higher investments and workers had a role in this.

Speaking on the condition of unorganised workers the Prime Minister said nothing had been done for their welfare. 'It is a striking anomaly of our economy and social system that we have done much to promote the organised sector while nothing has been done for the unorganised sector'.

He appealed to workers in the organised sector to suggest steps for the amelioration of the lot of their less fortunate brethren on the basis of their experiences. The National Commission on Labour would try to improve the working conditions of these sections.

In his welcome speech Mr Vasant Sathe, Union Minister for Energy, said that while the tempo of growth of the economy was steady, adequate returns should be ensured to the investment sector. About Rs. 50,000 crores had been invested in the public sector over the years but the returns were not adequate.

Culture of cooperation needed: Mr Sathe said labour and management should strive for resource generation. A culture of cooperation between the two was needed and the award winners were the best examples of such cooperation.

Eight workers were given the Shram Vir and four the Shram Shri and one the Shram Devi awards. Apparently, no worker has qualified for the Shram Ratna and the Shram Bhushan awards. The Shram Ratna carries Rs. 1 lakh and a citation; the Shram Bhushan Rs. 50,000 and citation; the Shram Vir awards Rs. 30,000 and citation and the Shram Shri/Shram Devi awards Rs. 20,000 and citation.

The Shram Vir awardees are Mr M. M. Reddy (Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad), Mr Ram Krishan Kaul (National Fertilizers Limited, Nangal), Mr Mehboob Alam (National Thermal Power Corporation, Korba), Mr Kadiam Murali Krishna (BHEL), Mr Arjun Kumar Singh, Mr P. P. Nayak, Mr S. N. Dewangam and Mr Habil Lakra (NTPC, Korba).

The Shram Shri/Shram Devi awardees are Mr K. S. Kampaiah (BHEL, Bangalore), Mr M. Tamang (North-Frontier Railway, Guwahati), Mr Anil Kumar Singh (Bhilai Steel Plant), Mr P. Karunakaran (Salem Steel Plant) and Mrs Narbada Devi (BHEL Jhansi).

07310

Chowdhury Denounces CPM Policies in Northern W.B.

46070002a Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 20 Dec 87 p 5

Editorial: Basu is carrying on anarchy in the state with the help of party cadres.]

[Text] Mr A.B.A. Ghani Khan Chowdhury, former minister of the central government has called for a sacrifice of blood to free West Bengal from anarchy. Last Saturday, at a large mass meeting in Uluberia organized by Congress, Mr Ghani quoted Netaji Subhash Chandra as having said, "Give me blood, and I will give you freedom." I am also saying to you today, give me blood and I will free you from the anarchy of Jyoti Basu's government.

On 9 December a Youth Congress worker, Mr Mantashir Rahaman, was murdered in Uluberia. As of today, no one has been arrested in connection with this murder. The Congress Party has accused the officer-in-charge of the Uluberia Police Station of collusion in this murder and has demanded his suspension.

Anticipating a large gathering of protesters belonging to the Congress Party, a large contingent of armed police was mobilized. There was also a very large number of reserve police equipped with guns, tear gas, shields etc., mobilized both inside and outside the office of the district magistrate.

At the meeting to pray for the departed soul of Mantashi, one minute's silence was observed. Referring to this murder, Mr Barkat said that it was not in Uluberia alone; CPM cadres were killing people all over the state of West Bengal in full cooperation with the police. The chief minister, Mr Jyoti Basu, wants to establish a reign of terror in the state. Mr Basu has made the state bankrupt; now he dreams of capturing the ministry in New Delhi with the help of other non-Congress ruled states. It must be impressed upon Mr Basu that Delhi is far away. No matter how much he might conspire, he could never reach it.

A very large group of marchers from Udainarainpur also participated in this rally. Their demand was to save Howrah by immediately completing the lower Damodar River Valley project. Mr Barkat Ali congratulated the marchers by saying, "When I was the minister-in-charge of irrigation, I started the work on the lower Damodar River to save Howrah, Hooghly and other neighboring areas from flood. The left-front government of the state

has stopped the project. The proper response to this action would be to bring the Congress Party back in power by supporting the Congress Party candidates in the coming village council elections.

Referring to the situation in Darjeeling, he said, "Mr Jyoti Basu is scared stiff of Mr Subhas Ghising. Mr Basu is so scared that he does not even go towards Darjeeling." He is requesting additional police reinforcement from the central government again and again for Darjeeling. At the same time he is spreading anarchy all over the state with the help of the cadres of his own party.

Mr Ghani strongly criticized the left-front government and demanded its resignation. At the same time, he emphasized the need to strengthen the Congress Party in the state.

At this mass meeting, he kept asking rhetorical questions in a dramatic manner, and the crowd heartily responded. He asked, "Can you snatch away the rifles from the police?" The crowd responded, "Yes, we can." "Can you drive Mr Jyoti Basu from his power?" The crowd responded, "Yes, we can, we can."

It was Mr Barkat Ali's fourth meeting in this region. None of the leaders of the district Congress committee were present. However, there were a number of leaders and workers of the Student Council and the Youth Congress present. Many came from faraway villages. Mr Somen Mitra could not be present. But Mr Bhola Sen, a member of the Legislative Assembly, was there. In his speech he described Mr Barkat as the architect of new Bengal. He said, "After going through considerable suffering and prolonged soul searching, I have decided to follow Mr Barkat's path. He is going from village to village to bring people to their consciousness. I have also adopted this course of action. To destroy the domination of Mr Jyoti Basu's cadres, we have to bring revolution in the state by making the mass conscious about this fact."

12195/12913

Foreign Sources of Terrorism in India Analyzed

46240008b Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi 5 Dec 87 pp 24-25

[Article by Bhupendar Kumar Sanhi: "Foreign Resources of Terrorism in India"]

[Text] "Terrorism in India is wholly imported. Its style, technique, and tactics for attack are foreign." This is an opinion of an observer. Foreign observers have called the modern terrorism 'urban terrorism' and the terrorism in India is exactly that. What are the sources of it?

There are four major countries that can be called the resources for terrorism in India. These are: The United States, Canada, England, and West Germany.

London's "Television Network" has accused in its news bulletin that 8 million pounds are remitted from England to help the terrorists in Punjab every year. It is obvious that most of this money is spent on weapons. This television report also said that gurudwaras in Britain were now controlled by terrorists. There are about 120 gurudwaras in England.

About 500 thousand Sikhs live in England. Of these about 500 could be called terrorists or extremists. The Indian Government has given a list of some prominent terrorists to the Scotland Yard. How much do the Sikhs support the terrorists and Khalistan? An opinion poll taken around London and Southall areas showed that most of the Sikh were against terrorism and Khalistan.

Britain is rich in communication media. "Desh-Pradesh" [Home and abroad] is one such newspaper. Last year a book, External and Internal Threats to Sikhism by S.S. Dharam was published. This is a very dangerous book.

A new tension has emerged during the last 2 or 3 years between moderate and extremist Sikhs. The extremists have not only taken control of gurudwaras, they have also started putting various kind of pressure on moderate Sikhs. Leaders of moderate Sikhs have also been physically attacked.

A new technique adopted by the extremists has emerged. They contract hired guns to kill their opponents. This makes the police believe that attacks were carried out by racist elements and these extremists are not suspected.

When rules were tightened in England, the extremists moved to West Germany where they found rules rather easy to break. It takes about 2 years to process a political asylum application. During this period the applicant is paid 5 marks per diem for personal expenses in addition to free room and board.

In 1986, about 4500 Indian Sikhs applied for political asylum to West Germany. Most of these applicants live around Cologne. It is believed that contacts with the British extremist groups are made from here. An official of the International Sikh Youth Federation visited West Germany in 1986 to help the political asylum applicants.

According to a recent study the time is not far when terrorists will be using atomic weapons. The possibility of 'atomic terrorism' is increasing. However, no incident involving atomic weapons has happened so far. Perhaps the modern terrorists are behind this report issued from Washington. After all the United States has been a haven for terrorists for many years.

One chapter of the U.S. terrorism can be attributed to India. Serious terrorism emerged in India in 1985 when a conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi while visiting the United States was revealed. Frank Campers school to train terrorists was also discovered. According to an

observer, the United States is the best place to raise money, get training, and establish connections. Canada is just next to the United States. Sikh terrorists are very active there.

However, it is very difficult to enter the United States. Smart Indians found ways to enter the United States via Canada and Mexico. A new method they are using is to marry an American citizen to obtain American citizenship. According to some U.S. sources 141 Indian nationals were deported for staging false marriages to obtain visas. Each of these false marriages costs \$10,000.

7997

Commentary Questions Basu Honesty, Integrity
46070003a Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 31 Dec 87 p 4

[Article by Ashish Ghoch]

[Text] Recently a copy of the statement made by Mr N.T. Rama Rao, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, reached us. He presented this statement before the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly. The statement is a fairly long one, 97 pages. In this statement he responded one-by-one to all major and minor charges. He has also enclosed copies of all supporting official documents. He has added a preface to the statement which stated, "The members of the Legislative Assembly have requested a truthful response to the many charges brought against me. I feel the best way to remove all suspicion is to provide in full all information in complete details." Some of the charges brought by the opposition are really serious, but some are indeed ludicrous. Each charge has been answered. Many of the answers are very reasonable and convincing; however, some are very flimsy. Many may not agree with his answers, but even his enemies would not be able to complain that he has avoided responding to any charges.

Many politicians make fun of him behind his back as being undiplomatic and a bit wacky. Ram Rao has ascended the throne of the chief minister of a state directly from the movie industry without going through the benefits of any political orientation. Presentation of such a lengthy statement before the members of the State Legislative Assembly from a person like him will certainly remain a landmark in the annals of the state. It should be. The members of the opposition, the Congress Party ministers may question his responses, but no one will be able to accuse him of being too embarrassed, too scared to face the charges, or to be running away from the accusations.

Recently in this state, some members of the Congress Party have brought charges against Mr Jyoti Basu, chief minister of the state. The president of the state Congress Party, Mr Priyaranjan Das Munshi, has brought serious, clear-cut charges against Mr Basu concerning his travels to Switzerland. According to Mr Munshi, Mr Jyoti Basu

took with him to Switzerland one of the owners of John Brown and Co of Great Britain, and a top executive of Kuljian Corporation, another foreign firm. Did Mr Basu make this trip to Switzerland to deposit money in a Swiss bank account after completing his "deals" in Great Britain? John Brown and Co received 300,000,000 rupees in excess of the bid amount for the gas turbines purchased by the state. Mr Munshi's allegation was that Mr Basu did not account for his foreign travel to the Reserve Bank of India, which he was supposed to have done automatically, as required by law. In the presence of thirty to forty people, in broad daylight, in clearly understood language, Mr Munshi brought his charges against Mr Basu. Mr Munshi is not only a leader of the opposition party, he is also a minister of the central government.

Just because the non-political Mr Ram Rao has responded to the charges against him, should a veteran Marxist chief minister also respond in similar manner to charges of dishonesty? He did not even utter a single word. On his behalf, response came from Mr Biman Basu, a leader on the state level. He totally disregarded all allegations in one simple statement, "They are all outright lies." Mr Munshi lies all the time; it is known to all. The chief minister, Mr Basu, has submitted all accounts and details before the State Legislative Assembly. "Thereafter Mr Biman Basu brought a ludicrous counter charge, "Has Mr Munshi given a detailed accounting of his travels to Tanzania at the Lok Sabha [Parliament]?"

Either Mr Biman Babu has lied in full knowledge, or he does not care to be informed. Mr Ashim Dasgupta, the finance minister of the state, made a statement on 27 October regarding Mr Jyoti Basu's travels abroad. In his statement he mentioned Mr Jyoti Basu's eleven foreign trips during the past nine years. Mr Ashim Babu has indicated that the cost of transportation alone was approximately 300,000 rupees, which was paid for with government funds. However in that statement, he did not make any mention of the disputed travel to Switzerland. He has only mentioned that in 1981 the chief minister went to Great Britain, France, and Switzerland on "personal" business. The statement does not mention anything about his traveling companions or whether anyone was with him at all during those trips.

Regarding his expenses, the finance minister has revealed that the chief minister personally paid for all expenses. This was not an official visit. Biman Babu should have done himself a favor by giving a very casual look at this statement.

The finance minister's statement was made in response to an inquiry made by Mr Sudip Banerjee of the Congress Party. The enquiry was along these lines: During the past 10 years how much money did it cost the government for Mr Jyoti Basu's travels abroad; who were his travelling companions; What were the purposes of these trips? This inquiry was made at a considerable

period of time prior to the beginning of the past session of the legislative assembly. However, this inquiry was not allowed to be raised in the legislative assembly for discussion. Only one printed statement was distributed on the last day of the session at almost the closing hours of the session. Most likely this was done to ensure that there would be no commotion about it. The Congress Party members of the Assembly did not have any opportunity to ask any question about Mr Jyoti Basu's travel to Switzerland, its cost, and who accompanied him. It is not known whether Biman Babu knew about these details. As for the statement issued by the finance minister, Mr Jyoti Basu's travel was "personal." On the other hand, Priya Babu had been to Tanzania to represent the central government. Did not Biman Babu know that a full accounting of that travel must be submitted to the central government? Under the circumstances, why would he raise such a ludicrous counter charge to cover up Mr Jyoti Basu's "personal" trip?

The truthfulness of this accusation brought by the Congress Party is not known. It is difficult to gauge how much of this allegation is the product of pure imagination and much of it is substantive. It is quite possible that Mr Jyoti Basu's went exclusively to enjoy the natural beauty of Switzerland at his own expense, or by money provided by his son, or his party. That is not the question. The question points to his attitude. Some time ago another long list of charges was brought against the chief minister and his son. Mr Basu still has not paid any attention to those charges. At the time he only said that if his son had done anything wrong, he should be arrested. It may be recalled that when there was considerable agitation over the scandal concerning the gas turbine project, the chief minister in the state assembly asked if we had become so agitated because the matter had been written about in the ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA? During the past 10 years, Mr Basu has been the absolute ruler of the state; he is the party and the government as well. Why does a veteran politician of Mr Jyoti Basu's stature demonstrate such an attitude towards the charges from the press and the opposition party? Just because he has an overwhelming majority in the assembly, should he ignore all allegations? This attitude is prevalent everywhere. The emblem of the Calcutta Corporation printed on the wedding invitation of the son of the Mayor of Calcutta demonstrated the same attitude.

At almost all public meetings Mr Basu says that the Congress Party has been the source of all corruption. It should be noted that the complaints of open corruption is not as prevalent in this state as it has been in other states governed by the Congress Party. It only proves that either most of the persons involved in this administration are really honest, or that this government is an expert in suppressing news about corruption. No communist government operating under the bourgeois system can claim a 100 percent corruption-free government. Naturally we are at a loss to comprehend why such corruption is either condoned or kept under cover.

Whenever and wherever disclosure of any kind of corruption at any level of the government is made, very meticulous efforts are made to suppress such news. Has there been any difference in this administration? Has the corruption subsided? What is the day-to-day experience of the common citizens?

The purpose of these remarks is not to make Mr Basu appear to be a corrupt person. After a long political career, he has been able to maintain an untarnished image. There are not too many people like him in the whole nation. However, by totally disregarding all charges against him, isn't he keeping all suspicious against him very much alive in the minds of the people? Would he be able to quiet the voices of the population by his own shouts alone? People are not only talking about the affluence of his son, they are also pointing to his relatives. From this perspective one particular statement made by Saroj Mukherjee has increased the depth of our suspicions. Even before Priya Babu raised these charges, Mr Mukherjee spontaneously said that the central government has been investigating Jyoti Babu's foreign travels. The chief minister has also admitted that the central government has engaged spies to uncover corruptions committed by him. On the other hand, Mr Rajiv Gandhi told the leaders of the state Congress Party that the complaints made by Mr Jyoti Basu are true, "Why should the Central Government appoint spies?" Nobody knows who is telling the truth. At the same time, completely out of the blue, why should Saroj Babu raise his apprehensions about the chief minister's foreign travel when nothing has even been indicated? There must be some reasons for such apprehensions. Though the ruling party has the strength of the 251 member majority, and the landslide victory in Shyampur, would it be possible for them to suppress the opinions of the masses?

Let me reiterate, the question is about attitude. I do not have the audacity to suggest that a veteran politician like Mr Jyoti Basu should take his lessons from Mr Ram Rao of Telegudasam. All we are requesting is that the chief minister should satisfactorily answer all charges brought against him and his relatives. Furthermore, why is he encouraging the gossip mongering against him by the supporters of the Congress Party? 12195/12913

IRAN

Preparatory Measures Taken for Khomeyni's Passing

46400069 London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jan 88 p 7

[Text] In the previous issue through reliable information which I had obtained from a close relative of Ayatollah Khomeyni with regard to his health condition I informed the dear readers of KEYHAN about his situation, now that I have one more week time to stay in Europe, I would like to broach upon the subject and talk about the precautionary measures which are being considered for

Khomeyni's passing. Here I would like to call the attention of dear readers to the fact that these writings are not hypothetical and they are all based on a very reliable source.

Before talking about the precautionary measures I would like to mention that Khomeyni is terribly worried about his illness, debility, and his imminent death, and contrary to the former days when he would not take his doctors' advice very seriously, now he is getting ever more closer to them and even after the regular checkups he engages in conversations with them, further telling them about his debility and weakness. Formerly all the necessary descriptions would be given to the doctors by Ahmad [his son] and the doctors were normally content to carry out a quiet examination. Furthermore, until now no serious effort was made to change Khomeyni's team of doctors and as of the date of doctor Ma'sumi's departure from the Cardiac Hospital of Queen Mother—where Khomeyni was hospitalized before residing in Jamaran—the team of his doctors has remained almost unchanged. Some of the doctors, even after a change from administrative to operative status have continued their practice of medicine in Jamaran. In a similar fashion, although some of the doctors have political differences with some of the executive leaders or those of the government, nevertheless they normally remain devoted and faithful to Khomeyni, even in their very own close and private gatherings.

The sources close to the responsible Tehran officials believe that news of Khomeyni's death will remain unannounced for 6 to 12 hours and within this time period all the security and precautionary measures which have been organized under the supervision of Rafsanjani will be put into execution. At this time, the armed forces will be put on alert and will remain in a red alert situation during that period.

A handful of individuals are aware of the details of the alert project, however in the general alert project the necessary precautions have been taken to defend/neutralize any probable armed riots, street fightings and foil coup attempts or other acts of rioting and demonstrations. In addition to the armed forces, the civil organizations of the regime have also been given specific responsibilities. The Oil Co., the Water Organization, the Ministry of Energy, the Center for Blood Transfusion, the Red Crescent Society, the War Support Staff, and the special staff which has been formed in the office of the prime minister and which was formerly managed by Gholamreza Aqazadeh, present minister of petroleum, are some of the organizations which have been given predetermined duties. The security branch of the alert project will be supervised by the Tehran Security Organization—generally, this staff is influenced and managed by the Guards Corps.

Akbar Rafsanjani has prepared a particular plan, which apparently constitutes part of the secret general project, but in reality it serves his personal objectives. According

to the sporadic statements of his close associates, the possibility of events after the death of Khomeyni and the necessity for precautionary measures with regard to watching and observing several of the leaders of the regime and even arresting of a few of them have necessitated the aforementioned plan. Rafsanjani's agents in the Guards Corps will be the executors of his special plan. The security branch of the Guards Corps—which is in charge of safeguarding the regime's officials—will be responsible for carrying out a significant part of this plan. Rapid presence in the communications centers and other radio and TV headquarters constitute part of the special plan. Apparently, the special plan will contain no undecided point and as it was mentioned before it is part and parcel of the alert project; however, part of the general alert plan is so unique that it almost indicates the existence of a top secret project.

From the viewpoint of the responsible officials of Tehran's regime the significance of the first few hours after the death of Khomeyni is much more foreboding and ominous than the results of blowing up the office of the prime minister by Kashmiri or that of the office of the Islamic Republic Party at Sarchemen in Tehran by Kolahi. After the first above-stated incident Iran was without any leading authority or executive power for 8 hours and in the second instance Iran was practically paralyzed for 24 hours. Nevertheless, in the wake of those two incidents as a result of a lack of further destructive or invasive plans no other come-off aiming at the integrity of the regime came about. However, during the first few hours after the death of Khomeyni until the official transfer of power—for reason of predictability of the incidents—there is always the possibility of serious dangers from the viewpoint of the responsible officials of the regime in Tehran. For this reason a confidential alert plan for general security and another top secret plan for encountering other predictable incidents have been worked out. The first such plan has been studied at the security council meetings of the city and the second secret plan has been investigated by Rafsanjani's special team.

According to the close associates of Rafsanjani, Ahmad Khomeyni is fully aware of the existence of the secret plan and the necessary coordination will be considered through his direct participation. It has been said that Khomeyni's will will be unsealed at the joint meeting of the Experts and the Islamic Consultative Assembly by Ahmad Khomeyni. Thereafter, the Council of Experts will form a separate session with Rafsanjani in attendance and during the course of brief negotiations the text of the will is going to be considered as a program for work. The sanctioned regulations of the Experts, based on the text of Khomeyni's will, will be put to discussion at Majlis and the results thereof will be immediately announced by the public media.

At the time of Khomeyni's passing all the communication links of Iran to the outside world will be resolutely controlled and yet there is always a chance of some

disruption as well. Right now several additional transmitters are in place to be used for disrupting and creating static on the radio waves of the opponents. Some other details of the general and particular responsibilities of the radio and TV even deals with the recitation and playing of pre-recorded tapes of certain verses of Koran in the first few moments after the death of Khomeyni. The funeral procession for Khomeyni will not start from Jamaran. If all the security problems are resolved, his funeral will begin from the Shah's Mosque in Tehran and he will be buried in Behesht-e Zahra. The suggestion has been rejected for leaving his body at the Tehran University overnight. Perhaps because Taleqani's body was first taken there!

The Islamic Republic predicts that some foreign delegations will come to Iran for participating in the funeral ceremonies.

The reading of Khomeyni's will will be carried out after his burial. For this reason, in addition to the observation of certain religious necessities, Khomeyni's burial ceremonies will not be carried out more than 24 to 36 hours after his death and for reasons of security and transfer of power and/or selection of the successor, maximum haste will be applied.

Because of the important responsibilities given to Khomeyni by the article 110 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic, Khomeyni by virtue of several secret orders has assigned his responsibilities to some other officials of the regime. This precaution has been taken so as during the time period after his death until the selection of his successor, the intermittent power vacuum will not cause any problems. This command will be announced by Ahmad Khomeyni. A major part of these orders pertain to the designation of commandantship of the Armed Forces.

It has been predicted that Ayatollah Golpayegani will perform the ritual prayers at the funeral. Apparently, Golpayegani is not very happy with his assignment. It should be noted here that Golpayegani himself is suffering from certain physical weaknesses and there is the possibility that he might even pass away before Khomeyni. Furthermore, Khomeyni has prepared a personal will that has to do with the obligation of his family members, their financial situation, funeral ceremonies and other religious observances.

This will has been written by Khomeyni and is retained by himself. Ahmad Khomeyni is obligated to put the text of Khomeyni's private/personal will into execution.

The existence of two wills might cause certain minor differences, however insignificant. At any rate, the second will of Khomeyni is considered to be very important, although so far there has been no mention as to its existence.

The Islamic Republic is not very interested in the presence of foreign delegations whether political or those from the press, for participating in Khomeyni's funeral, it would rather see the members of foreign embassies in Tehran take part in the ceremonies on behalf of their countries. The main reason for this is the urgency of the occasion and other precautionary security measures which need to be observed during the period of power transfer. Notwithstanding, it is expected that some delegations from Syria, Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, and Lebanon will attend the ceremonies. The presence of non-Muslim representatives—particularly from the Eastern bloc nations—for reasons of religious observances is not possible and this is one of the impediments for entertaining foreign delegations.

I will desist from mentioning further details—which usually are related by knowledgeable sources of the regime and which need to be yet finalized—and rather focus on the results of Khomeyni's death:

1. The issue of Khomeyni's succession is one of the most significant perils which is threatening the very existence of the regime.

2. The outcome of the war with Iraq—which occupies a major portion of the existence of the regime—is indisputable. The continuation of the war with Iraq in the absence of Khomeyni is as much detrimental to his successors as its total cessation. For this reason this hypothesis has found some credence among some of the claimants of power to see if possible, find certain solution for resolving the war so far as Khomeyni is alive so that after his death they won't feel the burden on their shoulders. For this reason we will further witness extensive incursions and inroads into the Iraqi territory so far as their military capability allows.

3. The forces opposed to the regime—who are getting ready to overthrow Khomeyni's successors, particularly the leftist forces—have arranged extensive and coordinated invasions which will be put into execution in the first few hours after Khomeyni's death. Part of this plan include merging of the civil guerrilla warfare with street riots and demonstrations.

4. There will be a resurgence of the people's dissatisfaction from the continual failures of the regime. After Khomeyni's death the dissatisfied masses will find the courage to express their anger with harshness. Likewise, the brusqueness of Khomeyni's successors for calming the public will further aggravate the situation and doubly infuriate the people.

The weak point of the successors, in the first place will be their lack of self-confidence and their doubt with regard to the shallow roots of their own power!

5. The internal differences between the governing bodies—which has been hushed or quieted in order not to provoke Khomeyni's anger—will resurface and particularly those individuals who have lost in their competition games will go after the successors tooth and nail. There will be a chance for squaring one's account. The relative authority base of Khomeyni in comparison to any one of his successors is so great and the relative commanding authority among his successors is so insignificant which can be likened to the situation where a four-star general steps aside from his command and in the presence of some other minor commanders one little captain steps in to rule the herd! Here we should not forget that in the world of Shiites of Iran, the religious rites are as boresome and lifeless as those of the military rules.

6. Khomeyni's successors in order to forestall the threats of the religious radicals, will have to resort to extreme measures in a very short time and this harsh reaction will further weaken their traditional base and thus increase their vulnerability.

7. The chance for carrying out a coup d'etat will increase inside the regime. During Khomeyni's presence the chance for the failure of any coup is as much as the chance for its success during his absence, on condition that all the preliminaries are duly in place.

8. With the death of Khomeyni the very spirit and sanctity of the Islamic Republic will be buried. The successors of the regime will face the reality of their action and will invariably hear the voice of opposition from among their own followers far beyond the borders.

9. With due regard to the religiosity essence of the regime each and every other remaining great Ayatollahs will battle it out. Thereafter, the issuance of religious decrees by any of such Ayatollahs, in the face of any decision or action by the regime, will be a serious danger for it. The youngest of these Ayatollahs is Sadeqh Ruhani in Qom and the oldest one is Ayatollah Kho'i in Najaf who have their personal viewpoints which—from many aspects and not only from the viewpoint of religious laws or that of political point of view—drastically differ with those of the regime's. These differences and antagonism, particularly after the defeat of Ayatollah Shariatmadari—who after Khomeyni was considered to be the most politically active—came to a halt. However, after the death of Khomeyni there will be a resurgence of these antagonisms. The Ayatollahs will once more feel the urgency of the religious obligation.

10. Foreign countries, as a result of their lack of confidence toward survival of the regime and their doubt about the stability of Khomeyni's successors will deny their support. This support, especially from the West has so far saved Khomeyni's regime from serious dangers many times; however in his absence the story will be different. The West is only interested in defending its interests for the long-term and the presence of the

greatest western naval fleet in the Persian Gulf does not seem to be only for the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. The western naval fleet has come to the Persian Gulf to defend their own interest. The death of Khomeyni and the probability of the instability of Iran after his death and the prediction of the United States with regard to our northern neighbor or its leftist followers in the country, all have forced the West to protect its interests by mobilizing a large naval force in the Persian Gulf, and in case of need abort further intention of adventure by its rival! At any rate, Khomeyni's death will once again jolt Iran and for reason of its strategic significance, the whole world will likewise be affected by the incident.

12719/09599

Amnesty International on Iraqi Treatment of Adversaries

Poisoning Hostile Kurds

*46400068b London KEYHAN in Persian
21 Jan 88 pp 1, 11*

[Text] Last week the Amnesty International transferred three anti-Iraqi government Kurdish guerrillas to London at its own expense so as to be treated as the result of drinking yogurt soup laced with arsenic.

The Amnesty International has accused Iraqi authorities of mixing poisonous talium with yogurt in a Kurdish community so as to get rid of some of the combatant Kurds of Iraq. Talium is generally used as rat's bane. This poison is both odorless and tasteless and a few hours after it is consumed its effect will appear in the victim, whereby it damages the lungs, heart, liver, kidneys, and also causes hair loss. Apparently, as the result of consuming this kind of poison, six Kurdish combatants have lost their lives and more than 30 others have become seriously ill.

The Amnesty International while putting out a communique to that effect asked the Iraqi government to pay attention to the reports regarding mixing of arsenic with yogurt in a Kurdish community of Iraq and after due investigation report its findings accordingly.

Hozhabr-e Teymurian, political commentator of LONDON TIMES, wrote: The Human Rights Organization is so much worried about the health of poisoned Kurds that it has housed two of them in an anonymous residence in London and put a third one who is seriously ill in a hospital. The aforementioned commentator further wrote: In an interview with Sami Soroush, a 37 year old Kurd who has become sick as a result of arsenic consumption said that a Kurdish woman who gained admittance into the hideout of the guerrillas and acted as their cook, laced combatant guerrillas' yogurt with arsenic. The aforesaid cook escaped from the hideout after poisoning several Kurds. Pertinent investigations indicate that the said woman was an agent of the Iraqi Security Organization.

A spokesman of the Amnesty International in a communique announced that in the past it has also received reports regarding various other ways of punishment by the Iraqi government for the anti-government Kurds. Apparently these sorts of punishments included beheading, hanging, and poisoning of the Kurds. In another report, the Amnesty International accused Iraqi authorities with regard to their harsh treatment of the children whereby in 1985, it [Iraqi government] kidnapped 300 children. To all appearances 29 of the children were hanged and their bodies were sent to their parents.

With regard to arsenic poisoning, the INDEPENDENT wrote: Some of the poisoned Kurds have been sent to Tehran for treatment. Since the necessary facilities for the treatment of poisoned individuals were not available in Tehran, three of the Kurdish victims were sent to London at the expense of Amnesty International.

Political Enemies Poisoned

46400068b London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jan 88 p 3

[Text] The Amnesty International accused the Ba'thist regime of Iraq of savage and barbarous torturing of its political opponents. According to a proclamation of this world organization, the Iraqi regime during last year poisoned 40 of its political opponents by its security agents and thus caused the death of three such individuals.

According to the report of Amnesty International about 2 months ago some Iraqi agents mixed yogurt with arsenic and forced 13 opponents of the regime to eat the yogurt. Three of those individuals died on the spot and 10 others fled to Iran and three of them were sent to London for treatment. The Amnesty International has accused the Ba'thist regime of Iraq of savage and barbarous torturing of its opponents. Likewise, the Amnesty International has on several occasions severely condemned the Islamic Republic regime of similar mistreatment of the war victims.

12719/09599 599

Oil Pipe To Connect Reserves to Turkey

Ahvaz Pipeline

46400070 London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jan 88 p 4

[Text] Once more the Islamic Republic becoming worried about the relentless air attacks on the Iranian oil installations and tankers has sat down in negotiation with the Turkish officials with regard to construction of an oil pipeline for the transfer of Iranian oil to the coasts of the Mediterranean or that of the Black Sea.

Allen Koval, political commentator of NEW YORK TIMES quoting Turkish government officials and other oil authorities of that country, wrote: The Islamic Republic delegation will soon visit Ankara so that after participating in various discussion meetings and

exchanges of opinion, study the final stage for the transfer of the Iranian crude oil through Turkey and probably reach an agreement with the officials of the said country.

The aforementioned newspaper further added: The Islamic Republic's strategy is similar to Iraq, whereby the responsible officials of the oil industry are making every effort to construct an oil pipeline through Turkey so that they can transfer part of the oil to the world market without worrying about the attacks by Iraqi war-planes. At present, the Iraqi government transfers a significant portion of its crude oil through two pipelines to Turkey and on to the Mediterranean shores and delivers the same to its buyers at the port of Iskenderun. The oil experts estimate that Iraq exports about 1.5 to 1.55 million barrels of oil thru its two pipelines every day. This is about 65 percent of the total oil export of Iraq in 1 day. The two abovementioned pipelines transfer the Kirkuk oil resources to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea.

The NEW YORK TIMES commentator in part of his article wrote: The Turkish officials denied the reports concerning the willingness of the Islamic Republic with regard to the construction of an oil pipeline to the port of Trabzon on the Black Sea coast.

The aforesaid commentator added: Construction of an oil pipeline for the transfer of Iranian oil to the port of Trabzon in comparison with the other pipelines to other ports will need less expenditure and also the length of such a pipeline will be much shorter. Moreover, this pipeline will cross certain regions which will create no political problems nor will it have any strategic conflict as far as the Iraqi pipelines are concerned.

Many of the international experts on energy believe that the construction of an oil pipeline which can transfer the Iranian oil to the shores of the Mediterranean or that of the Black Sea, can have a telling effect on the Iran-Iraq war; furthermore, the construction of such a pipeline can decrease the importance of the Persian Gulf as well. In the course of recent years Iraq has tried to put pressure and threaten the jugular vein of Tehran by intensifying its air attacks on Iranian oil installations and tankers, thereby by limiting the oil export of Iran, depriving the Islamic Republic from access to more foreign exchange revenues. The Islamic Republic, in order to increase its needed foreign exchange to finance the war, has leased 20 to 25 large tankers for transferring oil from Kharg terminal to the islands of Sirri, Lavan, and Larak. The storing of oil in floating storages near the three aforementioned islands has decreased the vulnerability of Iranian oil export to a certain degree. Many of the buyers of Iranian crude oil would rather avoid the Iraqi air attacks on their tankers in the Persian Gulf and send their vessels to the islands of Sirri, Larak, and Lavan for taking delivery of oil.

The NEW YORK TIMES commentator in one part of his report wrote: In response to the Iraqi air attacks, the Islamic Republic has put into effect its attack on oil tankers belonging to neutral countries, thereby it has created the opportunity for the presence of the naval fleet of the United States, that of western European countries and the Soviet Union's.

NEW YORK TIMES quoting a Persian Gulf naval transportation expert, wrote: Despite the military presence of the United States, the Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf with large concentration of troops and more than 80 warships in the waters of this region, not only the tankers' war has not come to a halt but on the contrary it has further intensified during the past recent months. Statistics indicate that in the past several months the attacks by the Islamic Republic's forces and those of the Iraqi warplanes on tankers have increased unprecedentedly.

Attack on 178 Vessels

In the middle of last week the central office of Lloyds International Insurance Co. in London announced that in 1987 a total of 178 oil tankers and commercial vessels came under attack by the Islamic Republic forces and those of Iraq. During last year as a result of Iraqi air attacks on Iranian oil tankers 108 seamen lost their lives. Lloyds Insurance Co. put the number of oil tankers which came under attack in 1986 and the total of the casualties as the result of those attacks at 80 and 52 respectively.

Allen Koval, NEW YORK TIMES commentator quoting Turkish government officials, wrote: The subject of constructing an oil pipeline for the transfer of Iranian crude through Turkey has been discussed several times in the recent decade.

Last October a Turkish delegation while visiting Tehran discussed the construction of an oil pipeline with the responsible oil officials of the Islamic Republic, and following that meeting in the month of November a special mission from the Turkish government company in charge of constructing the pipeline travelled to Tehran. The members of the special mission [of Butas Co.] returned to Ankara without gaining any results.

The Turkish officials have also announced that the negotiations which were carried out during November, mostly focused on the feasibility of construction of an oil pipeline between the oil reserves of Ahvaz and that of Dortyol terminal near the port of Iskenderun. The length of this pipeline will reach 2,100 kilometers.

Pipeline Project Signed

46400070 London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jan 88 p 3

[Text] The draft of the project for the construction of an Iranian oil pipeline through Turkey was signed in Ankara between the deputy petroleum minister of the Islamic Republic and the economic director general of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mohammad Javad Asemi-pur, deputy oil minister after signing this draft told the Islamic Republic's correspondent: The final agreement will be signed during a meeting of the prime ministers of the two countries in the future in Tehran.

Construction of the pipeline will last 3 years and thereafter Iran will be able to export 1 million barrels of oil to the European countries every day.

The cost of construction of this pipeline has been estimated at about 4 billion dollars. The total length of this pipeline will be 1,860 kilometers of which 1,020 kilometers will cross Iranian territory and another 840 kilometers will pass thru Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea.

12719/09599

Political Conflict Intensifies Before Elections

460400008 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
10 Feb 88 pp 12-17

[Article by A. R. Sadiq; "Intensification of the Political Struggle Before the Elections"]

[Text] The election campaign which is aimed at choosing members of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) has begun at a time in which Khomeyni has been guarding his status as "al-wali al-faqih" [the jurisconsult ruler] in an obvious manner over the legislative authorities in the Parliament of Iran. In a statement which he issued a short while ago, Khomeyni indicated that the state has the right to take any steps which it considers necessary, and that the government has unlimited powers to reach beyond the legislative authority of the Majlis. Khomeyni announced in a statement about the duties of the government that "the government has priority over religious rites." He added that "the ruler is able to close or destroy the mosques at any time that he sees fit, and the government is capable of abrogating its contracts and obligations, even unilaterally, with regard to the masses at any time." During this announcement, Khomeyni clearly indicated that the government's powers, according to his personal opinion, should have precedence over the legislative authority of the Majlis, belittling the worth of the Iranian Parliament on the eve of the election campaign.

In this atmosphere of confusion and doubt about the role of the Majlis in ruling the country, the campaign to choose 270 deputies began, and the upcoming special elections to the third Iranian Parliament took on a special importance for analysts both within Iran and abroad, who are looking at their results as an indicator of the country's future after the death of Khomeyni. These experts give reasons for the elections having taken on a special importance:

1. Contrary to parliamentary organizations in other nations, there is no official political party or parties in Iran which offer a platform on their viewpoint or ideas permitting a group of voters to know the policies for

which they are voting. Considering the nonexistence of political parties which confront each other over problems and political issues, the one place which enables various unofficial political groups and factions to express themselves is the Iranian Parliament itself. In the wake of the abolition of the Hezb-e Jomhuri on the orders of Khomeyni last year, obtaining a voice in Parliament became the main goal for various factions which believe that the political form of Parliament after the elections will reflect the spread of power and influence among the various competing political factions and groups. The point of view of these groups was reinforced by President 'Ali Khamene'i, who stated in a speech which he gave a short while ago that "in spite of the fact that the main duty of Parliament is legislative, the political form of the state will be brought out in the next Parliament."

2. The decline in Khomeyni's health has increased the importance of the next Parliament as a major arena of conflict over political power in the future after his death.

3. The political faction or group which enjoys the greatest support among the elected deputies will be in a strong position in the competition for power after Khomeyni's death.

4. In the present atmosphere of continual conflict over political power behind the scenes, the first duty of the new Majlis will be a vote of confidence on the present prime minister and his government and a subsequent vote on a likely new prime minister. These votes are of extreme importance.

On the basis of the Iranian Constitution, Parliamentary elections are conducted every four years. This constitution also stipulates that 270 deputies will be chosen from different parts of the country. Prospective elections have thus far been postponed three times due to the intensification of the struggle for power among the various groups in the regime, and the determination of an exact date was not subsequently announced in official form. On the basis of a communique issued by Iranian Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the election of Majlis members will take place in the second week of April.

The responsibility for organizing the Iranian Parliamentary election lies on the shoulders of the interior minister. The Council of Guardians will supervise them, consisting of 12 men in the regime appointed by Khomeyni. The council has appointed a central committee of five members headed by Mohammad Imami Kashani, the official spokesman of the council.

The Council of Guardians was formed in order to confirm that the draft laws which the Parliament had ratified are congruent with the initiatives and laws of the Iranian regime. This council several times rejected reform projects voted on by Parliament and openly changed them on the pretext that they contravened the regime's constitution. This situation led a few weeks ago

to Khomeyni's direct intervention in order to go beyond the council's ruling and give the government absolute authority in amending laws which had been passed.

In anticipation of corruption and falsification of election results on a large scale, some of the leading members of the government have made speeches warning of the dangerous weaknesses resulting from such practices. This matter also indicates the extent of sensitivity and importance attached to the coming Parliamentary elections. The Interior Ministry has demanded that all prospective candidates offer their resignations from the government posts which they now hold and send their requests for candidacy to the committees supervising the elections in the various regions. This was done to confirm that all of the prospective candidates embrace political points of view acceptable to the ruling clique. In spite of the fabricated uproar about the intensified security procedures and the equitable elections, high-level sources have explained that, in addition to some of the candidates and their supporters who would use every objective means at their disposal to ensure their election, some organizations also will use their influence to fix the final results of the elections. These organizations include all of the leaders of the various provinces and their offices, the committees of the regime, the Guard, the security police forces and the local police, and in addition the most influential of all, the pulpits and rostrums in various parts of the country.

These powerful organizations in their turn are under the influence of the various factions involved in the struggle for political power or which are working to achieve their interests. Among the most important of those taking part in this continuous struggle for power going on behind the scenes, which began to escalate gradually and come to light during the past few months, are Iranian President Khamene'i, Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, President Mir Hoseyn Musavi and Khomeyni's heir apparent Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri.

There are other important competitors for power, but they have lesser influence, such as Interior Minister Mohteshami, Guard Minister Mohsen Rafiqdust, Attorney General Kho'iniha, Supreme Court chief Musavi-Ardebili, head of the radical movement Mahdavi-Kani, head of the Assembly of Experts Meshkini, Parliament deputy and publisher of the influential newspaper RESALAT Azari-Qomi and the influential deputy Va'ez Tabasi who publishes some of the Tehran press.

However, the two main personalities concerned in the power struggle are Rafsanjani and Montazeri, in spite of the fact that the former is also confronting President Khamene'i and Prime Minister Musavi on all fronts. Rafsanjani, who stands out as the strongest personality among the men of the regime, is seemingly winning the support of the Guard Minister Rafiqdust, Mahdavi-Kani, Ahmad Khomeyni, the head of Savak Reyshahri, a large number of deputies in the Parliament and some

members of the government. According to some local sources, Rafsanjani, who is a former businessman, also enjoys widespread strong support among the bazaar merchants.

Rafsanjani's "cleverness" and his "pragmatic" policy has helped him in regaining his reputation over most of the disclosure of the Irangate scandal, in which he was one of the major characters. In addition, the open friendliness which Khomeyni's son Ahmad is showing him has helped, even to the point of circulating his name as one of the likely candidates to succeed Khomeyni. It is also believed that he is gaining the support of the powerful Guard mechanism through his alliance with Mohsen Rafiqdust, the aforementioned minister of the organization. Stemming from his position as Khomeyni's representative in the Supreme Defense Council, Rafsanjani played an active role in the war effort which permitted him gather support among the Army and the Guard participating in the war against Iraq. From another side, Rafsanjani enjoys an excellent propaganda podium in his position as Majlis speaker; his entanglement in the Irangate problem gained him wide ranging press coverage on the international level and also gave him prominence on the same level.

The main competition for Rafsanjani is Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri. The latter was chosen successor to Khomeyni after Beheshti's murder. He is considered strong thanks to his base as the leader of the network of preachers spread throughout the country, which permits him to have influence in every city, town and village in Iran. He supervises all of the activities connected with the regime's exports abroad. His reputation was affected last year as a result of the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi, one of his very close kinsmen, and his execution on the charge of committing crimes and corruption. A large number of observers believe that this affair was planned by Rafsanjani to expose Montazeri and shake confidence in him. However the latter was able, in a striking manner, to regain Khomeyni's favor when Khomeyni changed his will in December. Analysts believe that Montazeri will use his influence to gain a larger number of supporters in the next Majlis and that this support will give him a larger base after Khomeyni's death, ensuring him his position as Khomeyni's successor.

Rafsanjani is also facing President 'Ali Khamene'i as a serious competitor who threatens his aspirations for the future. The second term of Khamene'i's presidency will end in a few months and he may not nominate himself again for the presidency according to the provisions of the Iranian Constitution. The rumors circulating in Tehran during the last few months indicate that Rafsanjani aspires to the presidency of the Republic in order to support his position inside the present pyramidal succession in Iran.

Khamene'i's position has been weak lately, after Khomeyni made a public announcement on his corruption and his explanation of the government's role in Iran. In

spite of his pardon afterward by Khomeyni, observers think of this incident as a victory for Rafsanjani on the eve of the election campaign to choose members of the Majlis. Rafsanjani subsequently made a speech at the University of Tehran praising the Iranian president. The analysts' opinion of this speech is that it was a skillful political maneuver on the part of Rafsanjani.

Khamene'i's political future is considered uncertain. However, rumors say that he will nominate himself and plunge into Parliamentary by-elections after his presidency ends in order to then become speaker for the Majlis. For this reason alone, it appears important that his followers achieve a major victory in the coming elections. He will gain his position by force and the support of the members of his former Hezb-e Jomhuri, who make up one third of the present Majlis. They have eight members on the Council of Guardians who enjoy great influence, in addition to the senior judge Musavi-Ardabili.

The last major personality on the political stage is the prospective president and relative young man, Mir Hoseyn Musavi. To be truthful, it is believed that he is a competitor to Khamene'i more than to Rafsanjani. In regard to the opposition which he has faced in the Parliament both directly and indirectly from the deputies, and the rejection of some of his reform proposals, such as the laws on agricultural reform and on employment or service, by the Council of Guardians on the basis that they contravened Iranian law, the president on numerous occasions has tendered his resignation. Each time, Khomeyni has intervened in his favor and he has agreed to continue in his post. Some sources say that his last threat to tender his resignation came after the Council of Guardians turned down a large number of draft laws that he had presented in connection with economic reform. Musavi threatened that his whole administration would resign, which would lead to the toppling of the government. Khomeyni intervened in Musavi's favor, which bolstered his position in a critical period.

Musavi desires to have a large number of adherents after the coming elections in order to gain the confidence of the deputies and bolster his present position in the Iranian pyramidal succession.

Besides these four competitors in the political arena in Iran, there are other less powerful personalities, but they are influential and will have their say in the future of the country. One of these personalities is Interior Minister Mohtashemi, who came to prominence recently after he had served in the post of Iranian ambassador to Syria. He was brought to the government supported with recommendations from both Rafsanjani and Ahmad Khomeyni. In addition to the repeated assertions that he is a strong personality, Mohtashemi creates a balance among Rafsanjani, Khamene'i and Musavi by playing an intermediary role at the level of power and authority. In this, he enjoys Khomeyni's complete backing.

Mohtashemi, as interior minister, exerts the greatest amount of influence on the electoral process. When he occupied Nateq Nuri's position at the head of the Interior Ministry, he replaced all of the governors-general in the provinces with hand-picked men. He now enjoys influence over the Police organizations and committees. Some observers are looking at him as one of Rafsanjani's likely competitors for power and influence.

The Iranian attorney general Musavi-Kho'iniha is considered a personality who excites controversy. He is the one who led the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran and held the hostages in 1980. He is also considered the most leftist of the members of the ruling clique, and still enjoys influence in the student circles which participated in the occupation and who now occupy high state positions. He hopes that some of his sympathizers will be elected to the new Majlis. As for Mahdavi-Kani, he heads the "fighting men" movement, in which he leans toward supporting Rafsanjani. His influence in the aforementioned organization may permit some of his adherents to be elected to the Majlis.

The most well-known, publicity-seeking deputy is Azeri-Qomi. He owns the RESALAT newspaper, which sometimes criticizes the government. He exerts some influence over the communications and publication organization, which is a group composed of the regime's men. He is a deputy and is certain of reelection. He hopes to gather more support within the new Majlis among the newly elected deputies.

Va'ez Tabasi is considered the most influential of his sort in Iran. He effectively rules both northern and eastern Khorasan. Tabasi owns a newspaper which continually criticizes the government, and especially Rafsanjani. On numerous occasions he has challenged the government's power in administering the rural provinces. Observers believe that most of the deputies elected from Khorasan in the coming elections will do the same thing relying on his support.

However, the one legislative opposition movement permitted in Iran is the one led by Mehdi Bazargan, the first president in Iran. As head of the "liberation movement", he has announced his readiness to participate in the coming elections. In spite of the fact that his adherents have been subdued by violence on the part of some of the mercenaries, Bazargan is considered to enjoy widespread support in middle-class and educated circles.

Khalkhali is considered to be a publicity-seeking personality who is seeking to reelect himself. He is known as the "butcher of Iran". It is thought that he is gaining support from the radical terrorist group responsible for the assassination of former Iranian political leaders.

One of the personalities who is thought to exert great influence in the field of conducting daily affairs in the country is Ahmad, the son of Khomeyni. It is said that he

has a prominent role in some Iranian gatherings. Regarding the deteriorating health situation of his father, it is thought that he is the one who conducts daily business in his place. It is supposed that his political position will remain enshrouded in secrecy until the death of his father. Rumors say that he will become an important personality on the political stage in Iran after Khomeyni's death and will become directly concerned with the struggle for power, perhaps being appointed prime minister.

In spite of the present atmosphere, which is distinguished by political stability and economic chaos, observers see no likelihood of events changing radically on the levels of the political structure and the socio-economic framework in Iran as long as Khomeyni remains alive.

Despite the recent statements issued by Khomeyni, especially on the role of the government, in addition to his various decrees on the important problems of the nation, it appears that he still enjoys absolute power in all matters. The question now is what has induced Khomeyni, considering his age and health, to increase his immersion in political affairs. Taking into consideration the wave of violent suppression facing the population, not to mention the socio-economic difficulties resulting from the government's incompetence, and the eight years of war with Iraq, analysts expect a "popular uprising" in Iran upon the death of Khomeyni leading to changes in the form of rule.

Given these circumstances, some observers expect an increase in the sharpness of the struggle for power, a struggle which will reach its peak after the death of Khomeyni, but to what extent will it change things? In which direction will Iran move? This is what will bear some watching.

Velayat-e Faqih Beginning New Phase

46400067 London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jan 88 p 11

[Text] Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i, president of the Islamic Republic in his second letter to Ayatollah Khomeyni announced that he follows Ayatollah's instructions and that he has accepted all of his previous advice.

Two weeks ago after his speech at the Friday prayers, regarding the realm of authority of the Islamic government, Khamene'i was strongly censured and criticized by Ayatollah Khomeyni. In response to the first letter of Khamene'i who had asked Khomeyni's opinion regarding his speech at the previous Friday prayers, Khomeyni had advised him that according to the theocratic rules the government takes precedence over all the other branches of religion including the daily prayers, fasting and Hajj [pilgrimage to Mecca], thus the president was being rebuked, and Khomeyni emphasized: From your speech at the Friday prayers it seems that you do not believe that the government to be the absolute ruler; here

it should be noted that any other kind of interpretation of the government within the framework of God's precepts would be contrary to my statements.

Following the publication of the text of Khomeyni's response there were many rumors about Khamene'i's resignation, particularly a few days after the publication of the harsh response of Ayatollah Khomeyni, Khamene'i desisted from attending some ceremonies and similar gatherings.

Last week Khamene'i sent another apologetic letter to Khomeyni and announced that he accepts all the criticism of the imam regarding his statements at the Friday prayers and fully condescend to his comments. In answer to Khamene'i's letter, Khomeyni expressed his satisfaction and described him as a powerful arm of the Islamic Republic.

Following the publication of Khamene'i's second letter and Khomeyni's response to the same, Hashemi Rafsanjani in the open session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly announced that the president had been subjected to pressure for a few days and thus was forced to apologize. Furthermore, some of the Majlis representatives in a letter to Khomeyni expressed their satisfaction with regard to Khamene'i's apology. In the meantime, last Wednesday Ayatollah Safi, secretary of the Council of Guardians met with Ayatollah Khomeyni and while expressing his condescension with regard to the statements of the leader of the Islamic revolution, announced that whatever has been said concerning the theocratic rule and the government decree by Ayatollah Khomeyni is fully accepted by the Council of Guardians.

Pursuant to all the letter writings, the Islamic Republic devised a march which was arranged by the Islamic Societies, university students and workers and started from the Tehran University to the previous location of the American Embassy and then on to Jamaran.

The marchers continued as far as Niavaran avenue which is the beginning of the security gates of Jamaran. Because of this march the Ministry of Education postponed school examinations for a few days and closed down a large number of the schools so as to let the students participate in the snowy and cold weather together with the rest of the marchers.

The first part of Khamene'i's second letter to Ayatollah Khomeyni, disregarding the usual salutations, goes on like this: Your blessed letter in response to mine was received with delight. I, equally enjoyed and benefitted from your guidance—which always depicts a clear picture of Islam and your interpretation of the theocratic rule, and which I've previously learned from you many years ago.

The points mentioned in your letter are undisputable facts and I, personally accept all of them. What I meant during my Friday prayers' speech with regard to the limits of the religious law was something which will be properly discussed if need be.

In response to the apologetic letter of the president, Khomeyni wrote: Your letter was received with much satisfaction. In the years before the advent of the revolution I had close contact with you and, God willing the same closeness exists today and I consider you as a powerful arm of the Islamic Republic who seriously defend the government of the theocratic rule. I regard you as a person fully devoted to Islam and the Islamic precepts and you are a rare individual who shines like the Sun. It is based on this belief that the Islamic Republic and its respectable leaders are being harassed and tormented by the propaganda system of the world. For instance, if we say "the sun is shining," the world propaganda will misinterpret our statement and condemn the Islamic Republic and its followers. However, at times as a result of their lack of proper familiarity with Islam and our devoted nation, the Islamic Republic benefitted from their adverse propaganda. Of course here it should be mentioned that we do not expect them to accept our posture which states: Neither the East nor the West.

Ayatollah Khomeyni, at the conclusion had asked all the clerics, including Khamene'i to reiterate the issue of theocratic rule in their Friday prayers' sermons so that as he puts it: all those who are not clear about the issue understand it better and those who are enemies of Islam will shut their mouth.

Following the publication of Seyyed Ali Khamene'i's apologetic letter, the Islamic Republic Radio announced that Safi, secretary of the Council of Guardians had gone to Jamaran to meet with Khomeyni and reiterated that whatever Khomeyni had said with regard to theocratic rule and government's order was fully accepted by the council and he personally had no doubt about its validity and considered himself a subject of the government's orders.

Once more, Ayatollah Khomeyni who in his first letter to Khamene'i had censured the Council of Guardians, expressed his confirmation and sought to console the members of the said council. From all the 12 members of the Council of Guardians Safi is the only one who met with Khomeyni. Members of the Council of Guardians during recent years have not accepted many of the laws which have been approved by Majlis. In the predetermined march the demonstrators repeated the motto: The decree of the religious jurisprudent [Khomeyni] is an order from the Prophet and those who are opposed to it will be the enemies of the revolution.

On the other hand, Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani, member of the Council of Guardians in a press interview stated: Following the recent judicial decree of

Ayatollah Khomeyni, it is expected that the Council of Guardians reconsider many of the laws which it had previously rejected. He also added: The new instructions of Ayatollah Khomeyni makes the approval of this law a possibility.

Some political experts believe that hereinafter members of the Council of Guardians will be obliged to accept the laws which are going to be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and thus the parliament will enjoy a little more freedom. Many of the laws which have been rejected by the Council of Guardians have been described as contrary to Islamic laws.

Knowledgeable political observers give great significance to the recent transformations which have transpired a few months before the third round elections of Majlis.

12719/09599

Students Not Going to Fronts Lose Study Privileges

46400068a London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jan 88 p 2

[Text] All the eligible students who are admitted to the university must spend 6 months of a school year in the war-fronts, since the continuation of their higher education will be dependent upon possession of a certificate which indicates their attendance at the fronts.

The eligible students who do not present themselves to the appropriate centers at the stipulated time will be considered as absentees and they'll be treated as deserters and/or AWOLs. Generally, according to the regulations pertaining to the dispatch of students to the fronts, no university degree will be issued for students who do not possess a certificate indicating their participation at the war-fronts.

The responsible officials from the Ministry of Education stated that for the female college students there is a separate set of regulations in the process of enactment which would require them to serve at the rear of war-fronts. According to the pertinent regulations regarding students' participation at the fronts, the following eligible students can be exempt from military service: Those students who possess a military service certificate and those students who have been granted legal exemption at the stipulated time for each eligible group of college students. Furthermore, those students who during their course of study in the university spend at least a minimum of 6 months at the fronts, as well as those students who hold a scholarship from the Peace Forces of the Army or those individuals whose military service status have been decided one way or another by the law can be exempt from military service.

Those students who pledge a 5-year service in the Guards Corps, can use the 6-month military service towards their 5-year period of service and they can benefit from

all the applicable privileges during the 6-month of service. It is planned to dispatch the students to the fronts at two separate occasions: Once from August 23 to February 20 and the second phase from February 20 to September 21 of the following year. The students will be given 1 month of military training which can be considered as a credit course of their curriculum. It is stated that consideration will be given to the pertinent course of study of the students during their military service.

12719/09599

PAKISTAN

Move To Increase Trade With USSR Strongly Supported

46560018a Karachi AMN in Urdu 3 Jan 88 p 3

[Editorial: "Possibility To Promote Trade Between USSR and Pakistan?"]

[Text] A new mutual trade agreement was signed between Pakistan and USSR recently according to which the two countries will exchange 33.5 million dollars worth of goods during 1988. The agreement signed between the two countries for barter trade includes such goods as urea, manure, cotton, and various kinds of machines that were not included last year. It is expected that still more goods will be exchanged during the current year.

Pakistan has been urged for sometime to transact more trade with socialist countries as compared with capitalist countries, because trade with socialist countries has been more beneficial to the country; one reason being that socialist countries maintain a trade balance, provide goods at low prices, do not impose unfair trade conditions on other countries, and their conditions are basically milder. Unlike capitalist countries, socialist countries do not take away with one hand what they give with the other hand. The biggest limitation of the trade agreements that Pakistan has signed with the United States, West Germany, Japan, France, and Great Britain is that they buy raw materials from Pakistan and other third world countries at minimum cost and then sell manufactured goods made from the raw material to Pakistan and other countries at high prices. Poor countries in their eagerness to sell their raw material at the earliest opportunity do not care about the artfulness with which they are being exploited. Among the trading socialist countries, the People's Republic of China leads all other countries. In commercial relations with Pakistan, China has proved to be of extraordinary assistance. In bilateral trade with the Soviet Union, Pakistan's relations are increasing; this is a welcome sign. Soviet assistance in Pakistan's many major projects, for example Pakistan steel, and Guddu Thermal Station, constitute a milestone in the history of economic cooperation between the two countries. In addition to this, there has been an increase in trade in the private sector; particularly the consumption of Pakistan's cotton products in

the Soviet Union is increasing. Only recently high level officials of a Soviet economic and trade mission have offered long-term technical and other assistance to industrialists and capitalists in Islamabad and Karachi. The Soviet government has also expressed great enthusiasm in jointly establishing factories in Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

The discussion that the deputy minister of Soviet foreign trade had with Dr Mahboub-ul Haq, federal minister of trade, development, and planning, included among other things, assessing the possibility of providing Soviet textile machinery on credit. Views were also exchanged to determine which of the development schemes of Pakistan's 7th 5-year plan the Soviet Union could help to complete. To promote further economic cooperation, it was decided to send a high level delegation to the Soviet Union in the first 3 months of the current year.

The assistance extended by the Soviet Union in exploring oil and gas besides setting up steel mills, electric stations and its current offer of economic and technical assistance, indicate that there will be a further increase in economic and industrial cooperation between the two countries. A trade agreement was signed only a few days earlier leading to cooperation in the fields of trade and development. The Pakistan government should try to take advantage of the proposals basically put forth by the Soviet government which include providing technology. The most important proposal could help to set up a strong foundation to establish heavy industries for manufacturing most modern equipment in Pakistan.

09315/09599

Tactics To Delay Shariat Bill Denounced

46560018b Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 6 Jan 88 p 3

[Editorial: "Shariat Bill and the Government"]

[Text] The foundation of this country is Islam. When Quaid-e-Azam wanted to give a practical shape to Allama Iqbal's conception of Pakistan he said that two nations live in the subcontinent in which Muslims have their own separate identity, culture, and that their religion encompasses an accomplished condition of life. He said that we are asking for a separate homeland so that Muslims are able to freely practice their religion and have the opportunity to spend their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam. Quaid-e-Azam died without being able to prepare a constitution for Pakistan. After his death, the process of making the constitution was suspended and Liaquat Ali Khan's government could not proceed with writing the constitution after approving the aims and objects resolution. The political turmoil that followed Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination did not allow the politicians to accomplish the task of rapidly preparing a constitution. Mohammed Ali Bogra tried to accomplish this unfinished work in 1954 but Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed obstructed him and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The new Constituent

Assembly, which was formed after the Sind chief court's decision, began the work all over again. The 1956 constitution was approved and enforced under the leadership of Chaudhry Mohammed Ali but the aims and objects resolution, which was the basis of the Islamic constitution, did not become a part of the constitution. It was given status in the preface of the constitution. The aims and objects resolution was not made an integral part of the constitution, which was later prepared and implemented by Ayub Khan. The 1973 constitution met the same fate. President Ziaul Haq, at the end of his prolonged martial law, made the aims and objects resolution an integral part of the constitution by passing the eighth amendment and it was hoped that the democratic government would soon start implementing Islamic law.

But the government formed on the basis of non-party election did not give priority to enforcing Islamic law, and, therefore, a separate bill was introduced which started the process of implementing Islamic law. Though the bill was passed by the senate, the government obstructed its passage in the National Assembly under the pretext that all schools of thought were not in unison of the separate Shariat bill. This issue has been deadlocked for the last 2 years and despite the formation of several committees and the overwhelming public demand that Islamic law be enforced as soon as possible, there has been no progress at all in this direction. Now that the National Assembly is to resume its session, Waseem Sajjad, the federal minister for justice and parliamentary affairs, said that it was unlikely that there could be a debate on the separate Shariat bill during the Senate session due to begin on 8 January. The committee formed during the last session, in order to approve the bill unanimously, has been deadlocked. The meeting of the committee, held 2 weeks after the senate session was postponed, could not make progress due to the fact that the co-sponsors of the bill, Maulana Samiul Haq and Qazi Abdullatif, could not attend the meeting. In order to obtain the cooperation of these two members who did not attend the meeting, the special committee communicated with them in writing and contacted them personally, but both the senators have still failed to respond. If this is correct, then we can ask why the co-sponsors did attend the meeting and what action was taken by the government because the minister did not take the trouble to explain it.

We would like to draw the attention of the government to the fact that the enforcement of Islamic law is an issue that concerns all the people of Pakistan and the quicker this problem is resolved the better because the general impression is that the government is trying to evade this question and to make excuses. It is also believed that the government, besides making verbal claims, does not have the serious intention of introducing the Islamic Shariat. The situation has become unbearable for the general public. It is the duty of the government to take the necessary measures to approve the Shariat bill without any further delay by passing the ninth amendment. If

the government does not introduce the Islamic Shariat then the people of Pakistan will become convinced that the current government does not wish to enforce the Islamic Shariat.

09315/09599

Overseas Embassies Said To Be Overstaffed
46000088 Karachi MORNING NEWS in English
4 Feb 88 p 8

[Text] Islamabad, Feb 3—Chairman Public Accounts Committee Sardarzada Mohammad Ali Shah has observed that Pakistan embassies specially in USA, UK and Saudi Arabia were over staffed and the efforts to determine the extent of overstaffing in the embassies proved abortive mainly because of vested interests.

In the report submitted to the National Assembly few days back it was pointed out that Chairman PAC after his visit to above mentioned countries had also submitted a report to the Prime Minister with certain practical proposals in this regard. The report clearly indicates all the superfluous posts in the three missions. It also suggested to constitute a high level committee to identify the surplus staff in Pakistan missions abroad.

The PAC was of the view that the job creation especially in the higher grades should be effectively controlled by the Government and no new jobs should be created until and unless they are supported by scientific studies of staff requirements carried out by O and M Division. The report observed that there was a sharp rise in expenditure on services and overheads during last two years and a lot of economy can be made without impairing the efficiency in this sector.

The report further said that money is being lavishly spent on seminars and workshops etc but their utility and output is at times doubtful, the report observed that the Government had not carried out any exercises to see how far the expenditure incurred on these services and overheads was really productive and necessary and how much of it a waste and how to minimise and contain.

The PAC in its report felt that the formulation, preparation and approval of development schemes has almost become a mockery. It suggested that the standards of formulation, preparation, approval and management of developments projects should be improved substantially.

The committee further suggested that the Government should carry out objective exercises to develop ways and means to eliminate and minimise the wasteful and unproductive expenditure in all the areas.

/9274

Commentary Examines Unrest in Sind
46000080e Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
14 Jan 88 pp 9-10

[Text] All sections of society in Pakistan's volatile province of Sind speak of the fear of further unrest there; as law and order breaks down, Sindhi nationalism grows and new militant ethnic and sectarian parties appear. In 1983, an insurgency was only put down after more than 600 people were killed and Sindhi anger has been simmering ever since.

Two students have been shot dead in demonstrations and 150 arrested since the arrest of the 84-year-old veteran Sindhi nationalist leader, Mr G.M. Syed, on 9 December. Mr Syed, who had been released recently after 20 years under house arrest, openly advocates independence for Sind and an end to what he calls 'Punjabi domination.' His party Jiye Sind is now gaining popularity in the Province's growing middle class, which blames the Punjab for dominating the army and the bureaucracy, suppressing Sindhis and the lack of job opportunities.

Sindi nationalism has been traditionally articulated by its waderas and received support from students, but the most prominent 'wadera' party, the Sind-Baluchistan-Pakhtoon Front (SBPF) which last month won surprising successes in local elections, also now claims support from the urban middle classes. "We want a loose federation with equal rights for all nationalities in Pakistan," SBPF leader Abdul Hafeez Pirzada told Viewpoint. "The longer this regime stays, the sooner there will be an insurgency and there is already a total collapse of the administration in the interior. Sind is heading for an East Pakistan situation," Pirzada said.

Hafeez Pirzada

Pirzada, a former Minister in the Pakistan Peoples Party Government, was recently released from a year in jail and still faces nine charges of sedition. The Front swept the polls in the Karachi District Council and won other district council seats in northern Sind. Pirzada claims that 40,000 Sindhi teachers in the province have been influenced by the Front's policies and read its pamphlets. Most Sindhi nationalist politicians are now gearing their campaigns to win over key sections of Sindhi society who have influence and a voice in Sind's troubled cities.

Sindhi moderates like Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, another former PPP leader who now heads the National People's Party, admits that moderates are losing ground. "I tell the Sindhis there is injustice but they should not burn their own house to get justice. However, nationalist feeling is growing," he said.

The Government's main strategy has been to keep the dozen or so militant Sindhi parties divided and so far it has worked. Sindhi nationalists are divided between

Sindhi pro-independence parties like Kiye Sind, nationalist parties demanding more autonomy, and Leftist parties like the Awami National Party which believe primarily in a socialist revolution.

The inability of these parties to act together and the Government's tactics of packing them off to jail one at a time is recognised by officials as, only a stop-gap solution. Government officials in the interior admit that they are having a difficult time trying to cope with the growth of Sindhi nationalism and this feeling is even more acutely felt among Sindhi bureaucrats, who are quickly labelled as traitors by the nationalists. The bureaucracy and the police are still heavily dominated by the Punjabis who do not know the Sindhi language or the cultural and sociological make up of the province which makes them increasingly vulnerable when they have to deal with the complexities of Sindhi politics.

No Single Leader

There are now efforts by all the nationalist parties to get together on a common minimum platform of greater autonomy for Sind. What they lack is a single leader.

One aspirant is Khaliq Zaman. Son of the influential spiritual leader, the Pir of Hala who has one million disciples, Zaman is a former President of the Sind PPP. Young and with obvious charisma, he is disappointed with Benazir Bhutto for not speaking up for Sindhi rights.

Bhutto's PPP was once viewed as the only party that could stem the flood of Sindhi nationalism. "People may vote for her once in Sind in a national election, but when they see she cannot deliver the goods, there will be bloody violence," says Zaman. The Makhdoom group swept the local elections in the Hyderabad District Council.

Although Zaman combines political activism with the spiritual halo of his family, he is viewed with distrust by other feudals and the Left parties. Another aspirant is Mumtaz Bhutto of the SFPP. However, Bhutto's primary weakness is his past record with the PPP in the 1970s and the fact that militant students still view him as a wadera rather than a man of the people. The real leadership crisis within the Sindhi nationalist movement remains because of sharp personality conflicts, individual egos and the fact that none of the potential unifying leaders has a national status in Pakistan.

Militant Sindhis now view the PPP as no longer capable of being the buffer between the army at the Centre and the nationalists, and they see Bhutto as pandering to the army and the Punjab. Even Sind's PPP Treasurer Aftab Shabaan admits that "the federal parties are getting weaker in Sind because of this Government's policies."

PPP Failure

The failure of the PPP in the local elections has radically altered the nationalist's view of the Benazir Bhutto factor. Earlier, they believed that the PPP would certainly come to power before long but she would be unable to placate Sindhi nationalism or deal creatively with the autonomy issue. The collapse of a future PPP government would then unite the Sindhis for a fresh struggle against the Centre. However, now there is an overwhelming belief that the PPP's electoral chances in any national election have disappeared and the next round will bring the nationalists into direct conflict with the Punjab and the army. They are also aware, but not deterred by the fact that this time, compared to 1983, they will get little support from opposition fronts like the MRD.

The Government is now having to rely more and more on the army to control Sind. Some six new military cantonments are being built in Sind, some on agricultural land which has angered Sindhis. The army is also massively deployed along the Indus and northern Sind to curb the dacoits but this has also increased Sindhi resentment who view the army as an occupation force rather than a national army protecting Sindhi rights. The fact that there is still little recruitment into the army from the interior of Sind has not helped the military's image.

However, officials point out that there are only four cantonments in Sind compared to 18 in the Punjab: and with the threat from India, there is every justification for building more in Sind. Whatever justification the Centre gives for the building of more cantonments, the fact remains that the ground swell of Sindhi popular feeling is averse to an increase in the army's presence in the province.

Political polarisation in Sind has also escalated after the sprouting of yet more ethnic and sectarian-based parties. The Mohajir Quami Mohaz (MQM), which only came into existence in October 1986, swept local elections in Karachi and Hyderabad last month. Its leader, Altaf Husain, who is still in jail facing 34 sedition cases, is called "the Quaid" or the leader by his militant supporters. 'Quaid' has traditionally only been added to the name of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founder.

The MQM represents the Urdu-speaking migrants from India and refuses to include within its fold migrants from East Punjab. "There are accepted Muhajirs and the unaccepted Muhajirs. Those from East Punjab are not real Muhajirs because they are now part of the system of oppression," said an MQM leader.

Although the MQM has an unspoken alliance with some Sindhi nationalist parties, Sindhis resent the MQM because of its aim to get the Mohajirs recognised as a separate nationality in Pakistan. All Sindhi nationalists

admit that a short-term alliance to get rid of the present Government is possible with the MQM, but a long-term alliance is impossible because Sindhi and Mohajir interests are in direct opposition to each other. The sudden rise of the MQM is worrying the nationalists because they see the MQM's only way out of its present political isolation is by eventually doing a deal with the Government.

At present, the MQM has refused to do any such deal and the ruling Muslim League says armed MQM members have been terrorising their winning candidates in Hyderabad.

"We are no longer sheep for the slaughter. Now we have our own muscle and we will use it," Aftab Sheikh, President of the Hyderabad Bar Association, told VIEW-POINT. As he and other MQM members took the oath of office as district councillors in Hyderabad, police were baton charging a demonstration outside by MQM supporters, demanding the release of Altaf Husain. MQM militancy is now compounded by the free flow of arms in Sind and MQM youth are learning how to handle guns as well as training in karate and other forms of unarmed combat.

The crisis in Sind has been further increased by the total breakdown of law and order. In the past two years, there have been some 5,000 kidnappings in Sind and at least 1,000 people and 50 policemen have died in dacoit-related violence. There is increasing evidence that young, educated but unemployed youth are now also joining the dacoits which could radicalise the bandits.

Student Dacoits

Many of the dacoits are students, unable to get jobs, who first turn to the Sindhi nationalist parties and then end up as dacoits to make a living. Ghulam Husain, with a master's degree, who has been jobless for eight years, says some of his M.A. friends are now dacoits. "We are jobless only because we are Sindhis," he says.

Law and order has broken down to such an extent in Sind's northern districts that the Government's development programmes have come to a standstill, industrialists with factories in Sind never move out of Karachi, and the wealthy only travel in daylight with armed bodyguards. Karachi's industrial magnate Suleman Dawood who was kidnapped last year is rumoured to have paid Rs. 2.5 million for his release.

With Sindhi nationalism in the countryside and MQM militancy in the cities, the political polarisation in Sind has become the most pressing domestic crisis that the Government faces, and there is no long-term solution in sight.

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