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Army Missions for the Twenty-First Century: Peacekeeping and Beyond

David R. Segal
University of Maryland

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David R. Segal

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Center for Research on Military Organization
Department of Sociology
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20740-1315

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This report discusses a research program on peace operations that used documentary evidence to study changes in the nature of multinational peacekeeping over time, interviews to analyze the ways in which soldiers experience and interpret peacekeeping, and surveys to identify the ways in which soldiers and their families adapt to peacekeeping. Five phases of United Nations peacekeeping are identified. The ways in which soldiers impose meaning on peacekeeping are discussed. The adaptation of reserve component personnel and their families to peacekeeping is described.

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ARMY MISSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PEACEKEEPING AND BEYOND

INTRODUCTION

Major changes have taken place during the past decade in the role of multinational peacekeeping operations in international relations, and the role of the American military in these missions. These changes and their implications are discussed in Segal and Eyre (1996).

During the Cold War, antagonisms between the two super-powers, and the fact that each had veto power in the Security Council of the major organization of nations in the world, the United Nations, prevented the UN from extensive peacekeeping activity. Indeed, during the first two decades of the existence of the UN, only fifteen peacekeeping missions were initiated under the auspices of this organization. The easing of super-power tensions in the 1980s, and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, freed the UN from the constraints of a bipolar world system, and it became more active. In the past decade, over twenty peace operations have been initiated under UN auspices. These have been larger operations, and have more frequently involved the force of arms, than was the case with early UN missions. Thus, the United Nations became a more active agent in international relations.

The role of the United States in peace operations also changed. International peacekeeping doctrine as it evolved during the Cold War years established a norm of impartiality of nations contributing military forces to multinational peacekeeping operations. These forces were to be disinterested honest brokers.

The bipolar organization of the global system, with each of the super-powers having an extensive network of international alliances, the most important of which defined the bipolar nature of the world system--viz., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact--and each super-power being widely perceived as having imperial designs of at least an economic nature, made it unlikely that troops from either power would be seen as disinterested honest brokers in any conflict that erupted anywhere in the world. The use of super-power troops would at least be perceived to violate the norm of impartiality. Thus, peacekeeping doctrine came to preclude super-power military participation in multinational UN peacekeeping operations.

The United States did participate in two early--and small--UN peace observer missions in the late-1940s, before the norm of super-power non-involvement crystallized. The U.S was one of the nine nations participating in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established to monitor the cease fire after the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, providing 17 of the mission's 220 personnel. And until 1954, the United States was one of the eight nations providing the 39 person United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) stationed in Kashmir in 1949 to monitor cease fires.

After these two early small observer missions, the United States disengaged from active multinational peacekeeping participation until the end of the decade of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, starting with the United Nations Transition

Assistance Group (UNTAG), deployed in 1989 to oversee Namibia's transition to independence through free and fair elections. Starting in 1991, the United States provided 13 of the 1123 personnel of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established to monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border after the end of the Gulf War, and 30 of the 324 personnel of the United nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), established to verify the cease fire between the Moroccan Government and liberation movements. In 1992, the United States provided about 900 of the 40,000 United Nations troops of the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, and participated in the United nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and in 1993 contributed to the 7,500 person United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), to deal with a civil war that had gone on for a decade and a half. More recently, large numbers of American personnel have participated in a widening range of missions, including Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

American military personnel had been precluded from participation in United Nations peacekeeping during much of the Cold War, and at a time when most nations use their military forces primarily as symbols of sovereignty or for internal social control, the United States still defines the world in Clausewitzian terms, and sees the primary function of the Army as war fighting. Thus, the American soldier is a relative newcomer to multinational peacekeeping, and may view the role of peacekeeper as incompatible

with the role of soldier as it has been taught to him or her. This research program was undertaken to develop a better understanding of how the nature of peacekeeping has changed and evolved during the last four decades through the analysis of documentary materials, and to analyze the adaptation of American soldiers and their families to peacekeeping through surveys and through interviews. This report presents the results of this research program.

CHANGES IN PEACEKEEPING

Analysis of U.N. peacekeeping operations between 1946 and 1994 revealed five distinct phases of peacekeeping, varying markedly in the number and nature of missions in each phase. The phases are characterized primarily by the nature of relations between the super-powers at each point in time. The personalities of world political leaders also had an impact. The results of this research were published in Segal (1995). This paper is attached at Appendix A.

The first phase was the first decade of the United Nation's existence. During this period (the Stalin era), there was overt hostility between the United Nations and the USSR. Only four missions were initiated during this period. They were unarmed observer missions. During this period, the norms of impartiality and host party consent evolved.

The second decade of the United Nations constituted a second phase. There was a new, flexible Soviet leadership, Dag

Hammerskjold as Secretary General brought new vitality to the U.N., and eight missions were initiated.

The next two decades constituted a third phase. The Cold War got hotter. Only three missions were initiated.

The late 1980s constituted a fourth period. The two superpowers began to cooperate, the Cold War became less intense, and a democratic revolution swept through Eastern and Central Europe. There were five new U.N. missions in a relatively brief span of time. These included activities that had previously been avoided: curtailing communism and intervening in our hemisphere.

The fifth phase is characterized by the survival of only one super-power. There have been a record number of missions. They are larger, on average, than earlier U.N. missions, and the nature of the missions has shifted from peace observation towards peace enforcement. The norms of super-power non-involvement, minimal use of force, and host-party consent have all begun to erode.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PEACEKEEPING

Given the increased participation of American soldiers in peacekeeping during this fifth phase, we undertook research to help understand how soldiers recruited and trained for war fighting experience and understand peacekeeping. Building on earlier work by Segal, Segal, and Eyre (1992), interviews were held with American soldiers who had served with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai in support of the Camp David Accords, and with soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division who had served in

Somalia. This research has been reported in Segal (1996), which follows this discussion as Appendix B.

It was clear from our interviews that soldiers interpreted the peacekeeping role in more martial terms than are generally used in lay discussions of peacekeeping. This helped them make sense of the fact that as American soldiers, they were being asked to be pacific. This martial interpretation of peacekeeping may affect not only interpretations, but also the ways in which American soldiers play the role of peacekeeper. Another element of soldiers' perceptions of peacekeeping was that it was more like police work than soldiering, that if soldiers were to do it, military police would be more appropriate than infantry, and if infantry were to do it, they should get more training in skills that they regarded as more central to the military police than to the infantry role.

ATTITUDES OF RESERVISTS TOWARD PEACEKEEPING

As the U.S. Army gets smaller in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War in Europe, and as the number of peacekeeping missions, and America's involvement in them, increases, the role of using soldiers from the reserve components to man peacekeeping missions is being studied. One dramatic example was the use of a composite unit drawn from both the active and reserve components of the Army to man the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai in support of the Camp David Accords in 1995. Since 1982, the United States has sent two infantry battalion task forces to the Sinai for

six month rotations each year. The existence of the MFO is not a transitional state as a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is being negotiated. Rather, it is written into the treaty. It is a mission that will not go away in the foreseeable future.

The MFO has been studied extensively as a major sociological test-bed for understanding the impact of peacekeeping deployments on American soldiers and their families (Segal and Segal, 1993). As part of this research tradition, we collaborated with scientists from the Army Research Institute in research on the composite battalion.

One element of this research is an analysis of three waves of survey data collected from reservists who volunteered for the 28th MFO rotation. The data deal with the citizen-soldiers perceptions of the likelihood of American forces being deployed on a wide range of missions over the next decade, attitudes toward foreigners and foreign experiences that might affect adjustment to operating in multinational environments, and attitudes toward the peacekeeping role. An article presenting the findings is in press (Segal and Tiggle, 1997). The manuscript for this article appears at Appendix C.

Like earlier active duty soldiers who have served in the MFO, our respondents regarded stability operations to be more likely than high intensity warfare in the future. However, their estimates of hostilities were higher toward the end of their deployment than prior to the deployment. We did not find an emergence of transnational orientation among the soldiers. They

did not value working among people of other nationalities. There was a considerable degree of change in their attitudes toward the various components of the peacekeeping mission. Although a majority of soldiers supported the basic peacekeeping norms or minimal use of force and reduction of conflict, the size of the majority decreased through the six-month deployment, and a strong majority of the soldiers denied that peacekeeping could be performed by unarmed personnel.

THE FAMILIES OF PEACEKEEPERS

The U.S. Army is a married army, and military deployments are stressful for soldiers' families. Peacekeeping deployments are no less stressful than war fighting deployments, and may be more so, both because peacekeeping is more ambiguous than war, with several recent peace operations having involved fire fights, and because the national interest is not as clear in peace operations as in wars, raising questions about the justification for the sacrifices that soldiers families are asked to make when the soldiers deploy for peacekeeping duty. Supporting soldiers' families during peacekeeping deployments may become more difficult if we use reservists rather than active duty soldiers for peacekeeping. Reservists' families are likely to be more geographically dispersed, not proximate to a military installation, and reservists' spouses are less likely to be familiar with the Army than are the spouses of regular soldiers.

As part of our collaborative research on the composite

battalion that served in the Sinai MFO in 1995, we studied the families left behind by the reservists. A paper reporting this research was given at a professional conference, and is currently under review by a professional journal (Segal, Bell and Rice, 1995). A copy of this manuscript is at Appendix D.

The families of soldiers who served in the primary National Guard division represented in the unit, or who lived in neighboring states, found it easier to get information about the deployment than did families who lived further away. Families who lived further away were associated with soldiers who volunteered later for the mission, and who therefore had less time to prepare for separation. These latter families had more difficulty interfacing with the unit's family support system, but overall the support system worked very well, and the unit had few family support problems.

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APPENDIX A

FIVE PHASES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: AN EVOLUTIONARY TYPOLOGY[1]

DAVID R. SEGAL
University of Maryland at College Park

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Peacekeeping and Peacekeepers

In his classic volume, *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz (1960) argued that in an age of nuclear and other high-lethality weapons, the era of total war had ended. He proposed that we think in terms of constabulary forces rather than military forces. Constabulary forces are characterized by rapid deployability in the face of an international crisis, and commitment to the maintenance of viable international relations rather than military victory. One form of constabulary operations, multinational peacekeeping missions, evolved from the Great Power Conferences of the nineteenth century as vehicles for seeking international security through peaceful means, first under the auspices of the League of Nations, and then under the United Nations or regional supranational bodies (Segal and Waldman, 1993).

Janowitz recognized that military men would oppose this redefinition of the military role, and more than two decades after introducing the constabulary concept into military analysis, he reported that "military personnel have rejected, or at least resist, the concept of a constabulary because to them it sounds too much like police work" (Janowitz, 1983). The concept has not been embraced by the academic community either, resisted especially by these who more broadly have opposed the establishment of the study of peace as a scholarly field (e.g., Kagan, 1985). And it has been challenged by scholars who claim that the deployment of military forces on constabulary, or peacekeeping, missions does not contribute significantly to peace (see e.g., Diehl, 1987). However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union at the dawning of the 1990s produced a reorganization of the international system that has already led to a marked increase in

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[1]Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1994 World Congress of Sociology, the 1993 meetings of the American Sociological Association, and the 1993 meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society. I am grateful to Shawn P. Huey and Ryan Chapman for assistance in developing the data base for this analysis, and to Robin M. Williams, Jr., for his comments. This research was supported in part by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under Contract No. MDA 90393K0017. The views in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Army Research Institute, the Department of Army, or the Department of Defense.

peacekeeping activities under UN auspices. This paper describes the pattern of these changes.

The Five Phases of UN Peacekeeping

While a wide variety of military activities have taken place under the label "peacekeeping," there is not yet a conventional typology of these missions (Segal, Segal and Eyre, 1992). Diehl (1993), for example, differentiates between peace observation missions and actual peacekeeping, while Mackinlay and Chopra (1993) identify nine categories of peace operations, from observer missions to high intensity conflict. These latter scholars focus on "second generation" missions, suggesting that temporal change in peacekeeping is a dimension to which we should attend. In this paper, I describe the evolution of peacekeeping in the post-World War II period to identify changes in both the international system and the nature of peacekeeping, and the relationship between them.

The end of World War II saw the emergence of the United Nations and the substitution of its principle of "peace through strength" for the League of Nations' principle of "peace through democracy." Between 1945 and 1970, during the early and mid-Cold War period, there were twelve United Nations peacekeeping missions. Fabian (1971) saw these twelve operations as spanning three generations of UN Cold War peacekeeping preparedness. These three generations, and two subsequent ones, all defined by changes in the role of the United Nations, events in the international system, and particularly relations among the superpowers, which in turn affected the pattern of UN peacekeeping, are reflected in Table 1, which was derived from an historical data base being developed on UN peacekeeping missions.

TABLE 1. FIVE PHASES OF UN PEACEKEEPING: 1946-1994

PHASE	CONDITIONS	CHARACTERISTICS
1. 1946-55 Evolution of Peacekeeping Norms	•Overt hostility between UN and USSR (Stalin) •Low preparedness •No peacekeeping constituency	•Four missions •Unarmed observers •Host country consent •Impartiality

2. 1956-65 Potential for Peacekeeping Preparedness	•Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold •New flexible Soviet leadership •Cold War less intense	•Eight missions •Soviet opposition to ONUC shattered consensus
3. 1966-85 Retrenchment	•Cold War hotter •Recognition of importance of superpower approval	•Three missions •Unilateralism •Lack of formal structure
4. 1986-9 Superpower Cooperation	•Democratic revolution in USSR and Eastern Europe •Cold War less intense	•Five missions including curtailing communism and intervention in our hemisphere
5. 1990-94 One Superpower	•Collapse of USSR •Increased global instability	•Fifteen missions •Shift toward peace enforcement

During the half-century covered by the periods in Table 1, the UN initiated 35 peacekeeping operations. These operations are presented in Figure 1. Both the nature and the frequency of these missions changed over time, and the change was not linear.

Phase 1. The first phase, 1944-55, was characterized by overt hostility between the Soviet Union and the United Nations, rooted, in part, in the domination of the UN by the West and, in part, by Stalin's leadership style. Chapter VI of the UN Charter provided for means of voluntary dispute settlement, and Chapter VII had empowered the Security Council to use armed forces to enforce peace, but had assumed consensus among the permanent members in support of that power. The term 'peacekeeping' did not appear in the Charter (and did not gain currency until two decades later), and the assumption of Security Council consensus was inoperable by 1947 (Blodgett, 1991). During this period, there was no clear international constituency for UN peacekeeping preparedness, and the level of such preparedness was low. Basic norms for Chapter VI peacekeeping operations evolved during this period: impartiality; host country consent; no use of force. Only four

UN peacekeeping missions were initiated during this phase, although two of them became long-term operations. The other two have received little attention in recent analyses of peacekeeping.

FIG. 1. UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: 1946–1994



These first four operations were unarmed observer missions, responsible for monitoring cease-fire agreements and performing related services. All had the consent of the host nation or the parties to cease-fires. Because they did not involve the use of force, they did not require unanimous approval of the permanent Security Council members. They include the following:

•The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), a fact-finding mission initiated in 1947 to ascertain whether communist nations north of Greece were infiltrating her borders.[2] This was the only UN peacekeeping mission in which participation was limited to members of the Security Council;

•The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), to monitor the cease-fires after the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Participation was initially limited to United Nations members that had consular representation in the area of operations;

•The United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) in 1949.[3] Again, participation was limited to members with consular representation in the area;

•The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), stationed in Kashmir in 1949 to monitor the status of cease-fires. This was the first UN peacekeeping mission in which all members states were invited to participate.

Phase 2. In 1953, the stage was set for the advent of the second phase of UN peacekeeping. Josef Stalin died, and Dag Hammerskjold was elected UN Secretary-General. The second phase, 1956-65, was the only one prior to the fourth to begin with any promise for peacekeeping preparedness. The new Soviet leadership was more flexible, the Cold War was less intense, and Hammerskjold built a middle-power constituency for peacekeeping preparedness from the expanding membership of the United Nations. In addition, he enjoyed the active support of the United States, and initially, the passive acquiescence of the Soviet Union, a resource that his predecessor, Trygve Lie, had lacked. During this decade, eight UN peacekeeping missions were initiated: twice as many as in the previous decade.

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[2]Interestingly, although Fabian includes UNSCOB among the earliest UN peacekeeping missions, it does not appear in more recent reports based on UN data (Department of Public Information 1985; MHQ 1992),

[3]Likewise, UNCI is reported by Fabian but does not appear in more recent documentation.

•The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) headquartered in Gaza to supervise the withdrawal of invading forces and to act as a buffer after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 and after Israel, Britain, and France intervened. UNEF I was mandated by the General Assembly to bypass potential vetoes by France and/or Britain in the Security Council. In contrast to the unarmed missions of the first phase, it authorized peacekeeping personnel to use their weapons for self-defense. It introduced the blue helmets now worn by all UN peacekeeping contingents, and it set the pattern for all subsequent Cold War UN peacekeeping operations;

•The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), established in 1958 to prevent arms, personnel and material infiltration from Syria;

•The United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC), deployed in 1960 to preserve territorial integrity and independence in the face of a military mutiny, Belgian intervention, and civil disorder;

•The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority/United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea/West Irian (UNTEA/UNSF), deployed in 1962 after fighting broke out between Indonesia and the Netherlands;

•The United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), deployed in 1963 after Egypt and Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen's civil war;

•The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), initiated in 1964 to help prevent violence between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities;

•The Mission of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), established in 1965 to monitor the cease-fire between rival government factions;

•The United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), established in 1965 to consolidate cease-fires along the international border south of Kashmir.

The Cold War proved to be a major constraint on the effectiveness of military forces to contain or control, rather than to wage, conflict. Five of the eight second-generation missions were very short-lived. Soviet opposition to the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, the largest and costliest of the international body's peacekeeping operations, shattered consensus. By 1966, Soviet opposition to a Canadian peacekeeping proposal immobilized the Secretary General and his middle-power constituency.

Phase 3. The third (and longest) phase of peacekeeping preparedness, from 1966 to 1985, was distinguished by the recognition of the importance of superpower approval for any plan to build a true international peacekeeping force. In part a reversion to the first phase, this stage was characterized by a high level of superpower antagonism, a low level of UN activity, unilateralism, a lack of formal structure, diffusion, and experimentation. Only three missions were authorized during this two decade period. There were three distinct stages in phase three. The 1966-1973 period was one of complete UN peacekeeping dormancy, with no new operations authorized or implemented (Wiseman, 1983). However, hostilities between the superpowers notwithstanding, the mid-1970s saw a brief "resurgent period," with three new peacekeeping operations mounted. These were all in response to the crisis in the Middle East, which has become the crucible of peacekeeping.

- The Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), deployed in 1973 to the Suez Canal, interposed between warring Egyptian and Israeli forces after threat of a superpower confrontation;
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), deployed in 1974 to oversee an uneasy truce between Syrian and Israeli forces in the Golan Heights;
- The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), deployed in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Subsequently, during the early 1980s, tensions in the Middle East remained high, but Cold War superpower hostilities constrained UN operations, and there was a return to UN peacekeeping dormancy. During this period, two additional multinational peacekeeping operations were mounted in the Middle East, but they were under auspices other than the United Nations: the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon, which was manned by troops from four NATO nations, initially deployed during the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Lebanon, itself withdrawn, and then redeployed after the massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai which monitored the return of territory and cease-fire between Israel and Egypt established by the Camp David Accords, drew on personnel from twelve nations, and reported to a newly invented civilian directorate in Rome (see Segal and Segal, 1993).

On the basis of the first twelve UN operations, Fabian (1971) suggested a program for the establishment of a United Nations Fourth Generation peacekeeping capability which focused largely on the

relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The program required that the United States and the Soviet Union reach consensus on issues regarding the exercise of broad political responsibility for peacekeeping preparedness, that the superpowers share this responsibility, and that their role in day-to-day peacekeeping activities be minimized, with the states actually involved in peacekeeping being broadly representative of UN members, including Third World and Eastern European states. The nonparticipation by superpowers in actual peacekeeping activities had, by this time, become part of UN peacekeeping doctrine, and limited the activities of both the USA and the USSR.

Phase 4 . The democratic revolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s might itself have set the stage for the achievement of Fabian's conditions and ushered in a full new phase of UN peacekeeping efforts as he envisaged them under consensual superpower support, had the Soviet Union survived the upheaval. In 1986 the Soviet Union began to pay its arrears in UN peacekeeping assessments, and began to vote with the other permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union and the United States began to agree on peacekeeping operations (Campbell and Weiss, 1990). This was reflected, for example, in agreement between the US and the USSR, after considerable negotiation, on UN Security Council action after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, the USSR proposed a range of increases in the use of UN personnel such as establishing observation posts and fact-finding missions, stationing observers along frontiers, and establishing standby UN land and naval forces. These expansions included possible use of Soviet military personnel, funding, and training resources (Johansen, 1990). Five new UN peacekeeping initiatives were launched at the end of the decade of the 1980s, and involved activities that the UN had in the past eschewed because of the superpower balance: participation in curtailing the spread of communism, and intervention in our hemisphere. These might be viewed as a new phase as anticipated by Fabian, albeit a short one due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The five UN initiatives of the 1990s included the following:

•the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), to monitor mutual non-interference, return of refugees, and withdrawal of Soviet troops;

•The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), deployed in 1988 to oversee cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War;

•The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), deployed in 1989 to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola;

•The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), deployed in 1989 to oversee Namibia's transition to independence through free and fair elections. West Germany sent border police to participate in this mission as a means of complying with post-World War II restrictions on the use of her military forces while at the same time playing a role in multinational peacekeeping;

•The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), deployed in 1989 to help verify the cessation of aid by governments in the region to irregular military forces in other nations.

However, the destruction of the Soviet Union after the attempted August 1991 coup made superpower relations — and Fabian's blueprint for peacekeeping success — irrelevant factors. If the late 1980s reflected a new phase, it was a brief one.

Phase 5. At the dawning of the decade of the 1990s a new phase did evolve, but it was different from what Fabian had envisaged. Most impressively, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, United Nations peacekeeping activity has reached unprecedented levels. Of the total of 35 peacekeeping missions ever launched under UN auspices since 1946, 15 of them — 43 percent of the total — were initiated in 1991 or later. These new missions are geographically diverse, spanning Southwest and Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central Europe, and include the following:

•The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), to monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border after the end of the Gulf War;

•The UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), to monitor the cease-fire after the end of a sixteen-year civil war. The 1991 truce broke down in less than two years, and the 700 person UN force was not able to disarm the combatants;

•The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), to monitor agreements between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN liberation movement;

•The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), to verify the cease-fire between the Moroccan government and liberation movements in a disputed territory;

•The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which paved the way in late 1991 and early 1992 for the UN Traditional Authority in Cambodia;

•The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was projected early in its deployment to be the most ambitious peacekeeping undertaking in UN history, with 22,000 civilian and military personnel to oversee a cease-fire by four warring factions, help administer the country, and bring about free elections. The summer 1993 elections went more smoothly than anticipated, although the establishment of a coalition government in the wake of the elections has not been easy;

•The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, to secure a cease-fire and humanitarian relief. This is currently projected to be the UN's largest peacekeeping mission, with more than 28,000 personnel;

•The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), to monitor a cease-fire among rival warlords after governmental collapse, and to ensure security of humanitarian relief supplies;

•A military mission of 7,500 personnel to Mozambique (ONUMOZ), to deal with the 14 year old civil war there, approved in December 1992, which seems to be experiencing some success in disarming the combatants;

•An extension of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), formally established in March, 1993, with a multinational force of more than 24,000 troops from about two dozen countries. UNOSOM II, with an initial mandate of six months at a cost of more than $800 million, replaced the American troops who had been maintaining security and trying to insure the delivery of humanitarian aid. It was to operate throughout the country and to monitor cease-fires among warlords and disarm them, sponsor peace talks, rebuild local police forces and civil governments, enforce a UN arms embargo, prosecute Somalis who attack relief columns or otherwise violate international law, oversee the repatriation of refugees, and possibly prepare the way for elections. There were fire fights between UN personnel and the forces of Somali warlords and in winter 1995, UNOSOM was withdrawn;

•The UN Observer Mission to Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR), approved in June 1993 to monitor the border between these states;

•The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), to help control violence in the former Soviet Republic;

•The UN Operation in Liberia (UNOMIL), approved in September 1993;

•The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was to oversee the transition to democracy after a military coup. It was initially a short-lived and unsuccessful mission, but is scheduled to resume activity in 1995;

•The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), approved in October 1993.

In addition, as reflected in Figure 1, five earlier UN peacekeeping missions were continuing: UNTSO in the Middle East, UNMOGIP in Kashmir, UNFICYP in Cyprus (from which Canada has withdrawn its forces and which is likely to wind down in the mid-1990s without resolution of the conflict), UNDOF in the Golan Heights, and UNIFIL in Lebanon. In all, a total of about 60,000 military personnel were deployed worldwide in 1993 wearing the blue helmets of the United Nations. And five other operations terminated in 1990 or later: UNGOMAP, after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal (March 1990); UNIIMOG, after confirming withdrawal of forces after cease-fire (February 1991); UNAVEM I, after confirming the withdrawal of the last Cuban troops (May 1991); UNTAG, after independent Namibia joined the UN (April 1990); ONUCA, after assisting in the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance. If UNPROFOR reaches its planned strength of up to 50,000 heavily armed peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, and UNOSOM II reaches is projected strength of 28,000, the UN will have more than 100,000 troops deployed in blue helmets worldwide in 1994. The UN peacekeeping budget reached $8.2 billion in 1992. Clearly, the 1990s began as the decade of United Nations peacekeeping.

What remains to be seen is whether this level of activity will persist, with the UN truly assuming a new role in the international system, or whether the operations of the fourth and fifth phases, occurring as they did largely along lines of tension between the major Cold War adversaries and their allies, simply reflect a "straightening up" after the Cold War (Loomis, 1973). Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) clearly had the former alternative in mind in his analysis of means to strengthen the UN's capacity for preventative diplomacy and peacekeeping. Among his suggestions was the establishment of a UN standing force, or a standby force, with each UN member providing up to 1,000 troops on 24 hours notice. As an alternative, Urquhart (1993) has argued for the establishment of a UN volunteer military force. Other analysts have called for an active military posture for the UN. Rikhye (1993), for example, has argued for a greater UN role in civil

wars that threaten regional stability, and for UN peacekeeping intervention even in the absence of consent of the parties in a conflict.

In September 1992, in an address to the UN General Assembly, then-President Bush both endorsed the expanded peacekeeping role of the United Nations, and pledged to enhance US participation in peacekeeping activities. However, he also ruled out keeping US troops on standby for the United Nations or assigning them to a permanent UN peacekeeping force. The Clinton administration showed an early willingness to reconsider this issue, particularly if a regional organization, such as NATO, provides the military coordination. The recently issued revision of the US Army manual for operations, which specifies combat doctrine, for the first time contains a section on "Operations other than War," and includes both peacekeeping and peace enforcement among these. A new army field manual on Peace Operations has recently been published. However, military setbacks in peace operations in Somalia and Haiti have caused the Clinton administration to reconsider yet again, and Presidential Decision Directive 13, which defines America's policy regarding UN peacekeeping, was changed and delayed.

The end of the Cold War had implications beyond the United States as well. The military units assigned to UNPROFOR included a Russian battalion: the first participation of a Russian military unit in a UN peacekeeping operation. The perception that this unit, stationed in Croatia, favored the Serbs in the conflict, highlighted one of the doctrinal reasons for the exclusion of military personnel from the superpowers during the Cold War: the fact that superpowers are likely to be seen as interested parties, rather than as honest brokers, in whatever conflicts they become engaged. While the United States is participating widely in fifth phase operations, this perception is likely to affect the legitimacy and credibility of UN peacekeeping, balanced to some extent by the countervailing perception that in the absence of US participation, the military effectiveness of multinational peacekeeping operations is likely to be limited, particularly if the situation requires the threat or application of force to restore the peace.

As noted above, the United States had participated in two first phase observer missions before emerging peacekeeping doctrine precluded superpower participation: UNTSO and UNMOGIP. The absence of American participation in the second and third phases, followed by participation in Namibia in the fourth phase (UNTAG), and in many of the fifth phase missions established to date, might be

regarded by some as a return to pre-Cold War patterns. However, while the persistence of the early missions in which the United States was involved might carry a lesson for peacekeeping in the years to come, i.e., that American involvement may contribute to the tenacity of a peacekeeping operation, the emergent pattern of peacekeeping, which seems to be required to contain socio-political cleavages with deep historical roots, is no mere return to history. Both the level of UN peacekeeping activity and the level of United States participation in it are without historical precedent. Rather, we are seeing at least incremental changes in the definition of military institutions and the military profession as nations move away from the conscription-based mass armed forces, oriented toward the achievement of military victory which characterized the height of the Cold War. In their place, we are seeing the evolution of more professional military forces oriented, albeit somewhat reluctantly, to the reestablishment and maintenance of viable international relations: the change the Janowitz anticipated three decades ago.

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APPENDIX B

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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PEACEKEEPING BY U.S. SOLDIERS*

David R. SEGAL

THE FUNCTION OF ARMED FORCES

Armies are instruments of national sovereignty and have historically fulfilled the major functions of internal social control, defense of national territory, and projection of force beyond national borders in support of national policy. While armed forces have frequently been called upon to execute other kinds of operations, these three functions have provided a sense of meaning to soldiers regarding their mission. The mission was to prepare for, and if necessary to fight and win their countries' wars. This role has been reinforced by historical accounts, by children's games, and by literary and visual media interpretations. In periods characterized by absence of internal threats, external enemies, and justifications for force projection to protect allies or national interests, soldiers have felt that they didn't have a mission, and nations have questioned their need for standing military forces, and have frequently demobilized (The cycles of mobilization and demobilization in the United States are described in Segal, 1989).

In the modern world, the function of armies in many nations has been transformed. The technology of modern warfare has carried us beyond the era of total war and into one of constabulary military operations aimed at controlling or containing conflict (Janowitz, 1960). While almost all nations maintain military forces, in many cases these have become largely

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symbolic of sovereignty. During the Cold War period, high lethality tactical and strategic weapons, and countermeasures against these same weapons, became so expensive that few nations felt they could afford even those to which they had technological access. In addition, the threat of strategic wars fought with these weapons, which no nation could truly win, contributed to a period of international stability maintained by a balance of technological power between the superpowers, and a decline of the mass armies that had characterized Western democracies since the American and French revolutions (Kelleher, 1978; Martin, 1977; Van Doorn, 1975).

In the post-Cold War period, with no obvious threats to the territorial integrity of most nations, little need to project force beyond national borders, and internal social control functions being assumed by police agencies that are structurally differentiated from the armed forces, the maintenance of large standing forces prepared for war is increasingly uncommon. However, the major powers in the world, because of their role in the world community, and nations which feel that they still haves enemies at their borders, because of their need for national survival, do maintain fighting armies, in which forward deployment is a common occurrence, and in which the role of soldier is that of national warrior. The changing nature of military missions in the stormy post-Cold War world may be particularly problematic for such soldiers.

CHANGING MILITARY MISSIONS

The end of the Cold War presaged three interrelated major changes for the military forces of the industrial democracies of the West, and perhaps those of Eastern and Central Europe as well, quite apart from organizational retrenchment driven largely by inability to maintain Cold War levels of defense expenditure.[1] First, the deterrence of a military confrontation between two major ideologically-defined power blocs — the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those of the Warsaw Pact — had become the primary mission for military forces on both sides, and the end of the Cold War left them wondering what their mission would now be. Second, freed from a Euro-centric focus that been driven by concern with a superpower confrontation, the developed nations became increasingly sensitive to conflicts in the less developed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as at the periphery of Europe itself (Brown and Snyder, 1985). Third, the decline in superpower antagonism in the Security Council of the United Nations freed the UN to

seek a more active role in the quest for international security, and permitted greater direct superpower participation in such activities. For example, of the thirty-five total United Nations peacekeeping missions initiated during the five decades of UN operation, more than forty percent began in the few years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and almost sixty percent began after the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.[2] Of twelve UN peacekeeping operations in which United States military personnel participed, only two preceded the rapprochement (Segal, 1993). Burk (1993) proposes peacekeeping as a major mission for 'post-modern' military forces.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOLDIER

When Janowitz (1960) first introduced the concept of a constabulary force, he noted the resistance of professional soldiers to the peacekeeping role because it sounds too much like police work to them. Almost a quarter of a century later, although American troops had been involved in UN observer missions in places like the Middle East and Kashmir, and had been deployed in larger formations in the Sinai and Lebanon, he reported that the American military still rejected the peacekeeping concept (Janowitz, 1983). Segal, Segal and Eyre (1992) suggest that this is understandable, because peacekeeping is an inherently ambiguous process, because there is no pre-service socialization (and little in-service training) for the role of peacekeeper, and because American soldiers therefore interpret these new missions in the light of their socialization and training for the role of war fighter. Analysts have not settled on a typology that captures the diversity of activities performed under the rubric of 'peacekeeping'. Among recent conceptualizations, Diehl (1993) distinguishes between peace observation and peacekeeping, Mackinlay and Chopra (1993) identify two generations of multinational peacekeeping, and Segal (1993) discusses fives phases of UN peacekeeping. Given this ambiguity, the theoretical perspective of social constructionism is useful understanding how soldiers impose meaning on and make sense of a peacekeeping mission.

Systematic attempts at peacekeeping are both relatively recent and relatively infrequent innovations, at least as compared with far more traditional war-making activities. As a result, each peacekeeping effort has a fundamentally ad hoc character. There are few common understandings about peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is not yet established as an idea, as a diplomatic process, or as a military mission. The

successful accomplishment of peacekeeping activities, therefore, is dependent on the way that soldiers, families, organizations, and larger social institutions such as churches and particularly the mass media, construct the meaning of the activity. This is particularly important in the American case, because both international peacekeeping doctrine and superpower tensions minimized the role of U.S. military personnel in UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War.

Social constructionism, while acknowledging the power of society to shape our behavior, emphasizes that these forces are not separate from human activity, but are rather the product of human behavior. The label 'social constructionism' emphasizes a central insight into the basic nature of society. Human beings are not merely acted upon by disembodied social facts or distant social forces, but rather are actors constantly shaping and creating their own world in and through interaction with others. Berger and Luckmann (1966: 60) argue that 'however massive it may appear to the individual, [the social world] is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity... it does not acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it'.

From a social constructionist perspective, all human behavior, although it may be influenced by biology or socialization or reward and punishment, is most immediately shaped by the meanings and beliefs which individuals use to understand a situation. To understand individual behavior in any situation, we must view it from the standpoint of the actors and develop an understanding of the 'common-sense-meanings' — the internal experiences — they carry.

The social constructionist perspective argues that the world is essentially 'absurd', or without meaning (Camus 1955, Lyman and Scott 1989). Meaning and belief are neither fixed nor immanent in the world, but are themselves constructed through ongoing interaction. This analytical assumption of meaninglessness focuses our attention on the processes through which the common-sense shared meaning upon which social action depends is constructed and maintained.

In general, the rights and obligations of a citizen to a nation, and the role of an army (Schwoerer, 1974; Janowitz, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), are socially constructed in an extremely elaborate process. If we are to understand the performance of soldiers in peacekeeping missions, we must understand the meanings they bring to or take from these missions. If a peacekeeping mission has a meaning which 'makes

sense' to soldiers, if families understand and share these meanings, if society at large shares and reinforces these meanings, then soldier motivation and performance are high. Moreover, if the parties to the conflict that produced the mission share this meaning, the mission is more likely to gain their consent and to require only minimal force. If, however, there is a gap; if for example an operation calls for greater sacrifice than a soldier's definition of the situation deems appropriate, or if definitions of the situation shared by the family are at odds with those promulgated by the army, then morale, motivation, and performance suffer. And if indigenous parties to a conflict do not share the soldiers' meaning, then consent for peacekeeping operations is likely to be withdrawn.[3]

Traditional approaches to the study of society have taken shared meanings as objective representations of society, and have focused on the effects they have on people. The social construction perspective adds a recognition that even when shared meanings are accepted as real, people still contribute to the ongoing reinforcement (and potentially the remodeling) of the meaning of the situation.

Redefinition of the situation through the situationally specific construction of meaning is most likely to occur in relatively rare situations — particularly those where inconsistencies between prior definitions and current perceptions of the situation make meaning ambiguous. Swidler (1986) notes that some situations are highly 'factive' and their reality is taken for granted (e.g., marriage, work) while others are highly tenuous (e.g., love, blind dates). The latter are subject to continuing interpretation and elaboration of meaning, while the former become central, stable elements in our daily plan for life. One does not change the meaning of marriage by oneself; a vast social apparatus constrains the meaning of marriage. Love and blind dates, however, are more elastic and their meaning and scripts are subject to substancial idiosyncratic, individual remodeling. For military personnel and their families, a peacekeeping deployment is more like a blind date than a marriage. The relative rarity of peacekeeping operations, the historical variety among operations, and the relative inexperience of many military forces in such activities, preclude any standard definition of the situation from emerging and makes the peacekeeping context one liable to frequent and continuing social reconstruction.

PEACEKEEPING AND WAR-FIGHTING

Because war has been a nearly universal characteristic of human social life, the warrior role has become commonplace, and is the foundation of the definition that soldiers bring to peacekeeping operations. In American, and in most modern societies, the vast majority of people have a sense of what soldiers, sailors and airmen do in times of war. War is a newsworthy event, and receives a great deal of media attention. Indeed, most people get most of their information about the military from the mass communications media (Segal, 1975; Shaw and Carr-Hill, 1991). More generally, the media play a major role in the social construction of the political world. At the same time, the media view of the political world is 'underdetermined', leaving ample room for construction and elaboration by social actors (Gamson *et al.*, 1992).

Young men (military service is gender-stereotyped) are socialized to the role of soldier as war-fighter through books, motion pictures, television portrayals, and children's games. History courses depict wars as critical events in national epochs. Soldiers are shown as major dramatic actors in these portrayals. Thus, when people are conscripted or volunteer for service, they enter an established organization, serving a specific nation, with an established mission. Even when it is deplored, military service is meaningful.

By contrast, systematic attemps to keep the peace, particularly by international organizations, are more recent social innovations. Even during the recent period, relative to wars, peacekeeping attempts have been smaller, infrequent events. And when they do take place and are successful, they seem to be neither newsworthy nor noteworthy. This is part of the political world left underdetermined by the media. Peacekeeping operations are not portrayed in children's games. Their utility is questioned within both the military and academic communities. And while some nations such as Canada, the Nordic nations, and Fiji, have incorporated frequent participation in peacekeeping operations as one of the major functions of their military forces, the use of military personnel from superpowers in this process is more recent and more rare.

Unlike war, which is recognized in international law and in the charters of international organizations, there is no clear legal or cultural definition of peacemaking or peacekeeping. Indeed, there is no clear definition of peace, except as the absence of war. Peacekeeping is fundamentally a problematic concept. Beyond a vague reference in the

preamble, it isn't directly mentioned, let alone defined, in the UN Charter. This failure has resulted in conflicting views as to whether such operations are properly considered coercive or non-coercive techniques for the maintenance of international peace and order (Jordan, Taylor and Korb, 1989). The machinery of peacekeeping is provided for in few standing international arrangements. It is fundamentally an institution sui generis (Wainhouse et al., 1973). Given this lack of common meaning, the fact that a peacekeeeping mission, when undertaken, may be interpreted by some observers as merely efforts to disguise the pursuit of national interest, while other observers challenge the mission as completely failing to serve the national interest, should not be a surprise to any observer.

The peacekeeping label has been applied to a wide range of activities, from treaty verification, through intervention in domestic politics, disarmament efforts, interposition between potentially hostile forces, and even to activities involving actual combat. These activities may involve the participation of military personnel and military units in multinational operations in pursuit of collective security goals such as those envisaged in the charter of the League of Nations or the United Nations, and conducted under the auspices of these bodies. 'Peacekeeping' is neither clearly established as an idea nor as a process. As a label, it has been applied to a broad range of acitivities sharing little but the label.

American inexperience and the wide variation in the international practice of peacekeeping contribute to the ambiguity of the peacekeeping role, and make the social constructionist approach to understanding peacekeeping useful. The role of American soldier as peacekeeper is still being written, by and for the army, the soldier, and society. In the early 1990s, peacekeeping was doctrinally defined simply as a form of low-intensity conflict.[4] In 1993, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian assitance were identified (for the first time) as 'Operations other than War' in Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations.* The Army's manual on *Peace Operations,* FM 100-23, is currently in its sixth draft and (as of this writing) has not yet been published.

Research on Soldiers

The process of constructing meaning for peacekeeping missions has been studied both with regard to American soldiers serving with the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai during the 1980s and, more recently, with soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division who served in Somalia.

American soldiers in the Sinai

Making sense of the peacekeeper role has not been a simple task for soldiers in the Sinai MFO, a mission assigned to the 18th Airborne Corps, with the plurality of battalions rotating through the Sinai during the past twelve years being drawn from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and all others from light infantry divisions. The social construction process has been reflected in interviews, surveys, and field observations conducted over the history of the mission (Segal and Segal, 1993).

Traditional conceptions of the soldier role, which are particularly central to paratroopers, emphasize the need to face challenge and confront danger, and a willingness to sacrifice in the service of their fellow soldiers and their country. Service in the Sinai has proven to be, with only the rarest exceptions, very much the opposite, with tours marked primarily by boredom and routine, and with no clear or direct contribution to American interest. Paratroopers assigned to the first rotation of this mission, when its nature was unclear, worried before the mission that they had not been issued sufficient ammunition to successfully execute it. These same soldiers claimed, after the fact, that the mission did not require their skills, and could have been performed more appropriately by military police. By the late 1980s, when the mission had become routinized, soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) claimed that there was no mission there at all.

The external environment of the MFO effort provided unique challenges to soldiers' understandings of the situation. Little activity took place in most of the area of U.S. responsability, except for the local Bedouins who moved freely through the desert. There was no border to guard nor enemy to watch. American soldiers frequently see scuba divers in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Agaba. Tourist activity near the U.S. post on the Mediterranean Sea is even more common. The beaches there are popular with European tourists, many of them female, some of whom wear topless bathing suits. Scuba divers and tan-seekers are not normal features of military deployments.

In order to make sense of situations such as these, soldiers seek to both acknowledge their incongruities, and establish continuities with other situations. Such a process of 'normalization' is a critical step in making sense of a new or different situation. The way in which they do so is captured in an often repeated phrase: 'It's not a soldier's job, but it takes a soldier to do it'. Peacekeeping is, for most soldiers, interpreted not as part

of a soldier's job, but as requiring qualities that only soldiers possessed: most particularly obedience and discipline. They also interpret elements of their environment in terms of their more routine training, socialization, and expectations. Thus, soldiers in the first American battalion to serve with the MFO, seeing a column of Bedouins on camels in the distance at dusk, initially thought they were seeing a column of tanks.

Stories told by an infantry battalion after it returned from the Sinai illustrate the way in which soldiers normalized their situation. Recounting a relatively rare incident involving casualties — soldiers in a vehicle hit a mine, resulting in one soldier receiving major injuries — a major emphasized that the soldier who ran for aid from the disabled vehicle 'stayed in uniform, with his [helmet] chin strap fastened, all the way back to the base'.

Other stories emphasized the need to maintain order and appearance at distant, primitive outposts that were subject to rare surprise visits, and the need to maintain wapons in case of the need to defend the outpost. Similarly, soldiers complained that the weapons allowed them were insufficient to defend themselves, should the need arise. This was interpreted by the soldiers as the result of a political compromise, which put them at risk, rather than as an acknowledgement that use of weapons was not essential to the accomplishment of the mission. The need for land navigation skills was also mentioned as a prerequisite for the operation. Soldiers telling all of these stories emphasized that only soldiers could put up with these conditions and perform the mission to required standards. Thus, although peacekeeping did not fit into their idea of a soldier's mission, soldiers were able to make sense of their activities by emphasizing the need for discipline, that most soldierly of qualities, thus making sense of their situation. Significantly, battalions deploying to the Sinai have frequently interpreted the activity as a 'relief in place', a phrase normally used to describe the replacement of one unit in a defensive position by another unit. Although the emphasis is different from the soldiers' meaning, both efforts normalized the situation by reconstructing the unique and problematic into the familiar and taken for granted.

American soldiers in Somalia

While the Sinai MFO quickly became routinized into a peaceful interposition mission, the attempt to render humanitarian assistance and bring peace to Somalia in 1992-94 was a very different experience for American soldiers. As one dramatic example, on October 3-4, 1993,

soldiers from the 2/14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light), who had deployed to Somalia with an expectation of providing humanitarian assistance to starving Africans, were called upon to rescue U.S. Army Rangers who had been trapped while trying to arrest senior leaders of one of Mogidishu's warring clans. They became involved in the most intense firefight in which American soldiers have participated since the Gulf War.

These soldiers returned to Fort Drum, N.Y., in December 1993, and, with colleagues, I interviewed 55 of them the following month. The consensus among the soldiers was that they had not been in an 'operation other than combat'. They had been in combat. They had expected to be busy escorting convoys, protecting food distribution points, generally helping people, and doing so in concert with other national contingents. Instead they felt they spent most of their time being bored, and that the boredom was punctuated by duties that were more martial than pacific: conducting cordons and searches, clearing areas, quick reaction against hostile activity, facing effective fire, operating as mechanized infantry. Most claimed never to have seen a starving Somali. And most said that they did not operate effectively with UN forces. While they took great pride in being well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers, who did well what they were asked to do, the mission reinforced their self-concept as war-fighters. Upon returning, they suggested that their performance of the non-combat elements of the mission would have been more effective if they had equipment that is routinely issued to military police but not to infantry, and if they had been given more training in military police functions such as cordons and searches prior to deployment, rather than learning them on the job. They also thought it would have been more appropriate for these tasks to be performed by military police, rather than infantry simulating military police.

The effect of peacekeeping on military families

Soldiers may see peacekeeping as an activity calling for soldierly qualities and therefore appropriate, and the army may make sense out of peacekeeping by labeling it part of the spectrum of conflict. However, soldiers and the larger Army are not the only parties which must make sense of peacekeeping efforts. Families of deployed soldiers must also interpret their experience and make sense of it. The performance and retention of soldiers is affected by their spouses' attitudes toward the military organization and mission (Segal and Harris, 1993). The problems of peacekeepers' families are unique. Their soldiers are deployed away

from home for a long period of time, a situation similar to war, but they can routinely call home, something no one expects in the middle of a shooting war. And conversations with spouses contribute to the soldiers' definition of the mission.

For the families of the deployed, the absence of the soldier is a hardship and a sacrifice, yet, at least as shown by the general absence of media coverage and political rhetoric if the peacekeeping is successful, no major national interest is being served. Questions are raised about whether the sacrifice the family is being asked to make is warranted. On the other hand, if the mission evolves into something more akin to combat, then, as happened at Fort Drum, some spouses are likely to ask why soldiers have been told their mission is humanitarian, only to find themselves in harm's way. Thus, families must decide whether the effort is meaningful service or meaningless sacrifice. Family support groups can play an important part in this process. They are intended to offer emotional support and the opportunity to discuss problems. They may also serve forums for the development of a common understanding of the situation. However, those families who are most isolated from the military may be the very ones whose understanding of the situation is most in conflict with that of the organization.

Discussion

Nothing in the social construction perspective denies that there is a reality within which soldiers execute their mission. Indeed, it acknowledges that in institutionalized contexts, meaning is largely received by, rather than constructed by, participants, although even here, new construction goes on at the margins. Although marriage is both objectively and socially real, no two marriages are exactly alike. The more ambigous and less institutionalized the situation, the more new construction is likely to go on, as participants make sense of the situation in which they find themselves by drawing upon their fund of knowledge of past situations. It should come as no surprise that soldiers who are trained and indoctrinated to believe that their mission is to prepare for, and if necessary to fight and win their nations' wars, when they find themselves of foreign soil with angry iron flying through the air, define other people there, who are neither Americans nor allies, as enemies.

Such constructions are more likely to take place in armies that have major war-fighting missions, viz. the military forces of major powers which do not have traditions of participation in peacekeeping, or in the

armed forces of smaller nations that feel threatened. By contrast, soldiers from nations that do not feel threatened in the world community, from nations that have a tradition of participation in peacekeeping operations, or from nations whose armed forces have a major internal social control function in which citizens with whom they interact when deployed are not the enemy, may have a fund of experience upon which to draw to construct less belligerent meaning for peacekeeping operations.

For much of the history of United Nations peacekeeping, through the Cold War period, international peacekeeping doctrine largely precluded superpower military participation in peacekeeping operations. Many analysts came to believe that this was due to the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the demise of the Soviet Union, both the United States and Russia have participated increasingly in peacekeeping, but this participation has not been without problems. It may be that their doctrinal exclusion was appropriate not because of their hostility, but rather because of the definitions that they brought to the mission, as well as the meaning that others constructed regarding their participation.[5]

NOTES

[1] The size of the American military stood at 2.17 million people in 1987, before the end of the Cold War. Under the current drawdown, it reached 1.72 million in 1993, and is scheduled to reach 1.62 million in 1994: the goal under General Colin Powell's initial 'base force' concept. Under President Bush's plan, it then would decline to 1.56 million in 1999. In the light of ex-Defense Secretary Aspin's 'bottom-up review', President Clinton proposed to bring it down to 1.4 million by 1999, with greater reliance on the reserves. This would involve reducing the Army from 14 active divisions to 10, with an additional 5 divisions in the National Guard. The Navy would be reduced from 443 ships to 346 ships, and from 13 to 11 aircraft carriers in the active fleet, supplemented, for the first time in American history, by one Naval Reserve carrier. The Air Force would be reduced from 16 to 13 active fighter wings, and from 12 to 7 reserve fighter wings. The Marine Corps would be reduced from 184,000 to 172,000 people, with no reduction in the Marine's 42,000 person reserve force.

[2] Five new UN peacekeeping initiatives were launched at the end of the decade of the 1980s, and involved activities that the UN had in the past eschewed because of the superpower balance: participation in curtailling the spread of communism, and intervention in the western hemisphere. These were:

- The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), to monitor mutual non-interference, return of refugees, and withdrawal of Soviet troops;
- The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), deployed in 1988 to oversee cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War;
- The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), deployed in 1989 to oversee the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola;
- The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), deployed in 1989 to oversee Namibia's transition to independence through free and fair elections;
- The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), deployed in 1989 to help verify the cessation of aid by governments in the region to irregular military forces in other nations.

At the dawning of the decade of the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, United Nations peacekeeping activity has reached unprecedented levels. Fifteen new missions were authorized in 1991 or later. These new missions are geographically diverse, spanning Southwest and Souuutheast Asia, Africa, Latin American, and Central Europe. They are:
- The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), to monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border after the end of the Gulf War;
- The UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), to monitor the cease-fire after the end of a sixteen-year civil war;
- The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), to monitor agreements between the Salvadorian Government and the FMLN liberation movement;
- The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), to verify the cease-fire between the Moroccan government and liberation movements in a disputed territory;
- The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which paved the way in late 1991 and early 1992 for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia;
- The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was projected early in its deployment to be most ambbitious peacekeeping undertaking in UN history, with 22,000 civilian and military personnel to oversee a cease-fire by four warring, help administer the country, and bring about free elections;
- The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, to secure a cease-fire and humanitarian relief. This is currently the UN's largest peacekeeping mission;
- The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), to monitor a cease-fire among rival warlords after governmental collapse, and to ensure security of humanitarian relief supplies;
- A military mission of 7,500 peersonnel to Mozambique (ONUMOG), to deal with the 14 year-old civil war there, approved in December 1992, which seeems to be experiencing some sucess in disarming the combatants; and
- An extension of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), formally established in March, 1993, with a multinational force of at least 28,000 troops from about two dozen countries. UNOSOM II, with an initial mandate of six

months at a cost of more than $800 million, replaces the American troops who had been attempting to maintain security and insure the delivery of humanitarian aid.

- The UN Observer Mission to Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMOR), deployed to monitor the border in June 1993;
- The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), deployed in 1993;
- The UN Operation in Liberia (UNOMIL), deployed in September 1993;
- The UN Mission in Haiti (UNOMIH), deployed but quickly withdrawn in September 1993; and
- The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), deployer in October 1993.

[3] The construction of meaning is even more complex in multinational operations, where different national contingents must develop a shared meaning if coordination is to be effective.

[4] See for example the joint Army Field Manual 100-20/ Air Force Pamphlet 3-2, *Military Operations in Low Intensif Conflict.*

[5] At a minimum, the world community does not regard the superpowers as disinterested parties anywhere in the world, and perceptions of their being interested parties rather than honest brokers puts into question their adherence to the peacekeeping norm of impartiality. This issue, for example, has been raised with regard to Russian peacekeepers in Bosnia favoring the Serbs.

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APPENDIX C

ATTITUDES OF CITIZEN-SOLDIERS TOWARD MILITARY MISSIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD[1]

David R. Segal and Ronald B. Tiggle

University of Maryland Army Research Institute

BACKGROUND

Changes in the structure and missions of the American military in the post-Vietnam War era, and particularly in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, ending the Cold War in Europe, have significantly changed the nature of the reserve components. The United States raised a military force for the Vietnam War through conscription and voluntarism, and did not mobilize its manpower reserves on a large scale. After the war, this decision was hypothesized to have contributed to the estrangement between the American people and their Army that increasingly characterized American civil-military relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In part as a response to this perception, in 1973, the promulgation of a "Total Force" policy made the reserve components full partners with the active forces in a structure that guaranteed that the active forces would not deploy without

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the reserves.[1] During this same period, the United States became increasingly sensitive to non-European missions at the low end of the conflict intensity spectrum, including peacekeeping missions.[2]

Budgetary pressures in the late 1980s led to a reduction in the size of the active force beginning in 1987 that increased its dependency on the reserves. By 1989, reserve personnel serving in units became a majority of the total manpower of the Army for the first time since World War II.[3] When the United States deployed to the Arabian Peninsula in 1990 in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, nearly 50,000 reserve personnel were called to active duty.[4]

The draw-down of the American military was suspended during the Gulf War, but began again thereafter. This down-sizing involves over 500,000 active duty positions, reducing the force by about twenty-five percent between 1987 and 1997, with most of the reduction having been accomplished by 1993.[5] At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in Europe freed the United Nations and other international bodies to engage in a wider range of 'peace operations' than it did during the Cold War, and the United States, which had been doctrinally precluded from most UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, became a more frequent participant in multinational peace operations.[6] Indeed, in 1992, for the first time, the Army explicitly included a range of "Operations other than war" (OOTW) in its basic field manual. Thus, as the Army got smaller, the

types and numbers of missions and deployments increased. The service literally was called upon to do more with less.

THE USE OF CITIZEN-SOLDIERS AS PEACEKEEPERS

One response to this situation has been to explore the use of reserve components to execute missions that in the past have been the responsibility of the active forces. One example is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) stationed in the Sinai Desert in support of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. The United States has participated in the 12-nation MFO since its inception fourteen years ago by contributing an infantry battalion and a logistical support unit. Two battalions from light infantry divisions in the active force have been deployed to the Sinai each year for six month rotations.[7]

Other countries have used reservists in peacekeeping missions.[8] Indeed, the first American component to the United Nations Mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 1991 was comprised of reservists mobilized for the Gulf War, and the Navy used reservists to serve in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. However, prior to 1995, U.S. Army participation in peace operations was largely limited to regular forces.

In 1993, the Army staff began planning for a composite battalion drawn from the active and reserve components (AC/RC), to be rotated to the Sinai MFO in 1995. In mid-1994 the battalion, designated the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry

Regiment (4-505 PIR), was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with 20 percent of its personnel coming from the active Army, and the remaining 80 percent coming from the reserve components. The battalion leadership was drawn half from the active Army and half from the reserves. The great majority of the enlisted personnel were volunteers from the Army National Guard.

This paper presents analyses of the attitudes of enlisted soldiers from the reserve components who volunteered for this mission. Previous research has shown substantial change in the attitudes of active duty soldiers during the course of peacekeeping deployments, as they reinterpret the mission in terms of their broader understanding of their military role.[9] We seek to explore the degree to which the attitudes of volunteer reserve soldiers, who have no mission on which to focus except the one for which they volunteered, are characterized by change or stability during the course of the mission, and the degree to which there is a stable structure to these attitudes.

Our data are based on three waves of surveys conducted during the deployment as part of a larger assessment of the use of a composite AC/RC unit for this mission. The first wave was a survey of 300 soldiers conducted during the battalion's pre-deployment training. The survey was conducted in October 1994, shortly after the soldiers reported for active duty, and before 4-505 PIR was officially activated.[10] The second wave was conducted in February 1995, a month after the battalion deployed

to the Sinai. In this administration, we collected attitude data from 173 personnel.[11] The third wave was conducted in May 1995, a month before the battalion returned to the United States and was deactivated, and included 276 soldiers.

ATTITUDE DIMENSIONS

We focus on three sets of attitudes that we believe bear on the way citizen soldiers are likely to play the role of peacekeeper: perceptions of the likelihood of American forces being deployed for a range of missions over the next decade; attitudes that might affect adjustment to operating in multinational military environments; attitudes toward the peacekeeping role.

Perceptions of future missions.

In the late 1970s, Blair and Segal had surveyed the chains of command of 45 brigade-sized Army units and had obtained baseline measurements of estimates of the likelihood of a range of missions during the following decade.[12] The same items were administered in 1982 to a sample of soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division who served in the first American battalion to be assigned to the Sinai MFO.[13] When surveyed prior to deployment, the paratroopers, like the baseline sample, thought low intensity operations (peacekeeping and guerrilla war) were more likely than high intensity (nuclear or large scale conventional) conflicts, and seemed not to differentiate among

scenarios between these. They also had consistently higher estimates of the likelihood of each of the scenarios than the baseline measurements. They were surveyed again mid-deployment and after they had returned from the Sinai. While there were no significant changes between the first two measurements, their expectations of the likelihood of a strategic nuclear exchange decreased significantly by the end of the mission. Somewhat larger changes took place in the attitudes of soldiers in two comparison units who did not deploy to the Sinai.

Meeker and Segal hypothesized that the kinds of missions that soldiers experienced affected their estimates of the likelihood of specific conflict scenarios, and that soldiers who had deployed on peacekeeping or combat missions would make finer distinctions among intermediate scenarios.[14] Their analysis of five airborne infantry units with different training and deployment experiences showed that soldiers in units with peacekeeping and/or combat experience made finer distinctions in estimating the likelihood of different conflict scenarios than units that deployed for training or remained in garrison during the same periods of time.

The questions were also asked of a sample of light infantrymen who were deployed to the Sinai MFO from the 7th Infantry Division in 1987. Like the paratroopers, they were surveyed before, during, and after their deployment. Like the previous samples, they assigned higher probability estimates to low-intensity than to high-intensity scenarios. Their estimates

were consistently below both the baseline estimates and the paratroopers' estimates.[15] Interestingly, unlike the paratroopers, they seemed to distinguish more among mid-intensity scenarios prior to deployment than after they returned. For each scenario except peacekeeping, likelihood estimates declined in the course of the peacekeeping mission.

Because of the enlarged set of missions explicitly included in current Army doctrine, our respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood of 11 different scenarios occurring during the next decade on a four-point scale, from very unlikely to very likely. The missions were peacekeeping, guerilla war, limited conventional war, large conventional war, tactical nuclear war, tactical chemical war, tactical biological war, strategic nuclear war, humanitarian assistance after a domestic disaster, restoration of order after a domestic disturbance, and overseas humanitarian assistance. The pattern of responses is presented in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The pattern in the first wave of data is in some ways similar but also somewhat different from what has been observed in previous units. First, the addition of a larger set of OOTW shows them to be perceived as the most likely missions. Large majorities of our respondents expect the United States military to be involved in peacekeeping, in humanitarian missions both foreign and domestic, and in the restoration of domestic order during the next decade. The latter is, of course, a standard

National Guard mission, but it is impossible to ascertain from these data whether this clustering is a function of changes in Army doctrine reflecting changes in the global order, or whether it reflects the fact that our respondents are primarily National Guardsmen. Second, at the other end of the intensity continuum, it has been common in the past to observe higher estimates of the likelihood of tactical than of strategic nuclear war. In these data the estimates are lower than has been observed in the past and are roughly equal. Estimates of the likelihood of war involving tactical chemical and biological agents are higher than estimates of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and roughly equivalent to estimates of the likelihood of a large-scale conventional war. Estimates of the likelihood of more limited conventional war or guerilla war are higher than estimates of the likelihood of these more lethal conflicts, but lower than estimates of the likelihood of OOTW.

In earlier data from the 7th Infantry Division, estimates of all scenarios declined from the pre-deployment to the early deployment survey. Our respondents reported declines for all scenarios except tactical chemical and both tactical and strategic nuclear war. Most of these changes were very small.

The pattern changed markedly in our third wave of data collection. The decline in estimates of likelihood continued in three of the four scenarios involving operations other than war (peacekeeping, overseas humanitarian missions, and restoration of order). For the fourth OOTW scenario, domestic humanitarian

missions, there was a slight increase. However, for all other scenarios, estimates of conflict likelihood increased, and with the exception of guerrilla war, the increases were to levels higher than those observed in the pre-deployment survey.

We factor analyzed these data to determine the degree to which the clustering of the soldiers' perceptions of these missions reflected Army operational doctrine. The Army defines Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Warfare (NBC), Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), and Operations other than War (OOTW) as doctrinally distinct. Exploratory factor analysis of the correlations among the likelihood estimates revealed two distinct factors. These became stronger and more inclusive across the three survey waves, and deviate somewhat from operational doctrine. The basic structure of these factors is presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The most powerful factor accounted for between 27 and 33 percent of the variance in each of the three waves. In waves I and II it was composed of nuclear (both tactical and strategic), biological and chemical conflict scenarios, and large-scale conventional war: the high lethality scenarios viewed as least likely. The existence and strength of this factor suggests that soldiers felt that if large-scale war occurs, the belligerents will use the most lethal weapons available to them in pursuit of victory, and that even among citizen-soldiers selected for peacekeeping duty, high intensity war was seen as central to the

Army mission. As noted above, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare are doctrinally related. The inclusion of large scale conventional war in this factor reflects a cognitive map that deviates slightly from doctrine. As Table 1 shows, the basic structure of this factor was maintained when we analyzed the third wave data, although the importance of large-scale conventional war increased, and limited conventional war was added to the set, suggesting a general war-fighting factor.

The second factor, accounting for between 17 and 22 percent of the variance in the matrices in each wave, reflected relationships among expected incidences of operations other than war: the most likely scenarios presented in Figure 1. The scenarios loading on this factor were humanitarian assistance, both overseas and domestic, restoration of order after a domestic disturbance, and peacekeeping, although peacekeeping did not load on this factor in the first wave. The importance of peacekeeping increased in the second and third waves, although it had the lowest loading on this factor. The importance of peacekeeping increased between the second and third waves, and the loadings for humanitarian assistance (both domestic and foreign) increased across the three waves. This factor reflects the doctrinal cluster of operations other than war (OOTW). Given that the majority of our respondents are in the National Guard, the existence of an expectancy constellation that includes not only the traditional domestic National Guard missions of social control and humanitarian assistance in disaster situations, but

also overseas humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, reflects the central role that the range of operations other than war has assumed in soldiers' views of the American military mission.

Orientation toward foreign operations.

Participation in peace operations usually involves deployment to strange countries, commonly requires interacting both with foreign nationals and with military personnel from other nations represented in a multinational force, and is likely to be facilitated by a transcultural orientation that might help in adapting to foreign cultures and foreign military personnel.[16] Prior research on soldiers' views toward working with foreigners or eating foreign food revealed great variation from unit to unit.

Our respondents were asked six questions to tap transcultural orientations. This is a larger set of items than had been asked of previous units. Asked whether it is much more difficult to work with foreign nationals than with people from the United States, in our first wave of survey data, about 38 percent agreed or strongly agreed (17 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed). The comparable figure for soldiers in the first unit to go to the Sinai had been 34 percent.[17] Agreement dropped to 26 percent in wave II (and disagreement increased to 30 percent), but increased to 42 percent in wave III (when disagreement dropped to 22 percent).

Asked whether you can trust foreign nationals as much as you

can trust people from the United States, only 16 percent of our respondents agreed in wave I, and this remained fairly stable (13 percent in wave II and 17 percent in wave III). Asked whether most people from most countries are pretty much alike, only about a quarter agreed in wave I, and the figure increased very marginally, to 27 percent in waves II and III. Pluralities ranging from 40 to 43 percent disagreed.

While evaluations of foreign people did not seem to be high, three quarters of our respondents said they liked to try foreign foods in the first wave. The comparable figure for soldiers in the first unit sent to the Sinai was 80 percent. The 4-505 PIR figure dropped in wave II (64 percent) and wave III (56 percent), but a clear majority still took this position.

Asked whether they liked to travel, 97 percent of our respondents said yes in wave I. This too declined, to 92 percent in wave II and 81 percent in wave III. In wave I, 97 percent said that they looked forward to new experiences. This too declined slightly, to 95 percent in wave II, and 80 percent in wave III. The picture that emerges of our reservists is one oriented toward foreign experiences (with the attraction diminishing somewhat during the deployment) but not necessarily foreign people.

Factor analysis of these data produced two factors that reflected this picture. This factor structure was sustained across the three waves of surveys. The first factor, accounting for about one-third of the variance, was defined by a taste for

travel, looking forward to new experiences, and liking to try foreign foods. The second factor, defined by perceptions that you cannot trust foreigners as much as you can trust people from the United States, and that people from different countries are not necessarily alike, accounted for about a quarter of the variance. Perceptions that it is difficult to work with foreigners did not load on this factor. This factor structure is reflected in Table 2. The correlation between these two measures was very small and not statistically significant.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Attitudes toward the peacekeeping role.

The use of force. One of the norms of peacekeeping that evolved early in the development of UN peacekeeping operations, when peacekeeping operations were generally treaty verification missions with the consent of the host countries, was that there should be no force used, or only minimal force when necessary in self-defense.[18] Indeed, the first UN peacekeeping missions were unarmed missions. More recently, however, the peace operations in which the UN and the US have been involved have taken place in the absence of peace treaties or cease fires, and sometimes without the consent of host nations.

The Sinai MFO is a traditional verification mission, with a peace treaty in place and host party consent. However, 4-505 PIR deployed while US forces were engaged in OOTW in Macedonia and Haiti, and with less pacific operations in Somalia and Rwanda

part of the recent past. We were thus interested in the views of our respondents on the use of force in peacekeeping.

Paratroopers in the first battalion to deploy to the Sinai MFO had been asked whether they agreed that a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job if he could not use force except in self defense. About 62 percent of the soldiers surveyed pre-deployment had said yes. That figure increased to 82 percent in a mid-deployment survey, once the soldiers had actual experience with the mission. In a study of light infantrymen going to the Sinai in 1987, prior to deployment, 77 percent of soldiers surveyed said that the mission could be performed without the use of force, and there was no significant change when the unit was surveyed mid-deployment. These soldiers appeared to have learned from the experience of earlier deployments.

We asked the reservists in our sample if "soldiers can be effective in peacekeeping even if they cannot use force except in self defense." On a five-point Likert scale, about 74 percent of the soldiers agreed or strongly agreed. This is similar to the active duty soldiers previously surveyed subsequent to the first Sinai deployment. Unlike earlier deployments, the figure declined to 70 percent by our second wave data collection and to 59 percent in our third wave. Asked whether "the primary mission of peacekeepers is to contain or reduce conflict without the use of force," 82 percent agreed or strongly agreed prior to the deployment. This had declined to 76 percent early in the deployment, and to 62 percent in the third wave. Asked whether

"soldiers on peacekeeping duty should be unarmed," 89 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed prior to the deployment, and this had increased to 91 percent early in the deployment, but declined to 77 percent in the third wave. Nonetheless, these soldiers seemed to be starting to question whether peacekeeping was a benign mission.

Impartiality. A related peacekeeping norm is impartiality. Indeed, one of the reasons for the exclusion of the super-powers from military participation in UN peacekeeping during the Cold War was a perception that they were unlikely to be disinterested participants. More broadly, in one of the first studies of UN peacekeepers conducted, Moskos found that a majority of the soldiers serving with the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) whom he studied credited their participation to national self-interest.[19] Our respondents were somewhat less equivocal about the norm of impartiality. Asked prior to deployment whether "a peacekeeping force should be impartial in a conflict situation," 53 percent agreed or strongly agreed, and a third would neither agree nor disagree. Early in the deployment, 58 percent agreed and only a quarter were undecided, but by the third wave of surveys, late in the deployment, responses approximated the pre-deployment figures: 55 percent agreed and about a third were undecided. While the norm of minimal force was declining in this unit, the norm of impartiality was fairly stable.

Boredom. Boredom has long been recognized as a major problem on peacekeeping missions.[20] The more successful a peacekeeping

mission is, the more boring it is likely to be. Harris and Segal noted that in the first battalion of American paratroopers to deploy to the Sinai, 13 percent of the soldiers expected to be bored when they were surveyed prior to deployment.[21] At mid-deployment, 41 percent said they were bored. The light infantry soldiers who were surveyed by Segal, Furukawa and Lindh six years later again seemed to have learned from the experiences of prior deployments. Their expectations of boredom were higher than those of airborne infantry units that had been among the first to participate in the Sinai MFO.

The expectations of our reservists did not reflect the same learning prior to deployment. Only 12 percent of them agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "peacekeeping duty is boring" prior to deployment: a figure similar to the pre-deployment figure for the first unit to participate. About a third of the reservists disagreed or strongly disagreed. Over half were undecided. However, early in the deployment, 41 percent agreed that peacekeeping was boring, and 40 percent were still undecided, and by our third wave survey, half of the soldiers agreed that it was boring, and only 12 percent disagreed.

Professional and career considerations. Another set of attitudes with which we were concerned dealt with views toward preparation for peace operations, and the appropriateness of these missions for soldiers and units. Soldiers in the first battalion of paratroopers assigned to the Sinai MFO were asked

prior to their deployment if a soldier who is well trained in basic military skills requires additional skills for peacekeeping. Eighty-one percent said yes. By the time that unit returned from the Sinai, only half felt that peacekeeping requires special skill training. Light infantrymen who went to the Sinai in 1987 reflected even higher pre-deployment feelings that peacekeeping required special training for well-trained soldiers, and unlike the paratroopers, this feeling increased during the deployment, to 87 percent. While this perception decreased somewhat when the light infantry returned home, 78 percent of the soldiers still felt that peacekeeping requires special training.

Our citizen-soldier respondents were asked the same question prior to deployment, and 83 percent agreed that well trained soldiers need additional training for peacekeeping: a figure very close to the active duty soldiers previously studied. Seventy-five percent still felt this way early in the deployment, but only 60 percent agreed in our third survey. While this is still a majority position, there was a marked decline in perceptions that peacekeeping requires special training.

Soldiers in the first deployment to the Sinai had also been asked whether that mission was appropriate for their unit (the 82d Airborne Division). Over three-quarters of them had said yes prior to the deployment. By the time they returned, only 55 percent still agreed. By contrast, the light infantry studied in 1987 started out feeling that the mission was appropriate for

their unit, and showed no significant change in this dimension during the course of their deployment. The pre-deployment feelings of our reservist respondents were much more uncertain that peacekeeping operations were appropriate. Slightly more than half (51 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that the mission was appropriate for their unit. Since these soldiers were initially surveyed relatively shortly after they came on active duty, and prior to the official activation of 4-505 PIR, it is possible that their referent in responding to this question was their reserve unit. However, a month into the deployment, only a small majority (54 percent) agreed, and by our third wave of surveys, only a minority (37 percent) agreed.

Prior to deployment, two-thirds of the soldiers in the first battalion sent to the Sinai believed that peacekeeping assignments helped a soldiers career. This figure decreased to less than 50 percent after the deployment. The pre-deployment figure for our reservists was likewise two-thirds, and reflected a likewise decline, to 54 percent early in the deployment and to 37 percent by our third wave of surveys. This item is one of two that prior research showed to be central to soldiers' attitudes toward peacekeeping.[22]

Peacekeeping personnel. One of the emerging issues in peacekeeping is who should do it. We asked our respondents a series of questions regarding the characteristics of appropriate peacekeeping forces. Our respondents were asked whether they agreed that "A professional soldier is able to perform

peacekeeping missions and war-fighting missions equally effectively."[23] Almost three-quarters of them agreed or strongly agreed prior to the deployment, and 71 percent still agreed both early and late in the mission. They were asked whether peacekeeping missions should be performed by civilians rather than soldiers. Almost 80 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed prior to the deployment, and this declined to 63 percent early in the deployment and to 54 percent by the third wave. They were asked whether peacekeeping missions should be performed by military police rather than by infantry. Prior to the deployment half disagreed or strongly disagreed and about a third were undecided. Fewer than 20 percent agreed. This distribution had not changed markedly early in the deployment. However, by the third wave, only 36 percent disagreed, and 28 percent agreed. They were asked whether reservists can perform peacekeeping missions as well as regular military personnel. About 87 percent agreed or strongly agreed prior to deployment: this too remained fairly stable early in the mission, but declined to about 73 percent in the third survey wave. And reflecting the finding of earlier research, they were asked whether peacekeeping assignments are hardest on soldiers with families. While over 57 percent agreed both pre-deployment and early in the deployment and the figure had declined 51 percent in wave III, these figures are well below the range observed in prior Sinai deployments. This may reflect the fact that fewer of the volunteer reservists in this unit were married than is common

in an active duty infantry battalion.

There was considerably less stability over time in these items than there had been for expectations of future conflict scenarios or for attitudes about foreign experiences, and we did not expect the factor structure to be as robust as we had found in these other domains. This expectation presaged experience.

Factor analysis of the relationships among these attitudes in the pre-deployment data produced two factors in each wave, accounting for between 20 and 30 percent of the variance in inter-item correlations. The factor structure was unstable. This structure is reflected in Table 3. The first factor in wave I reflected perceptions of who should do peacekeeping: whether it should be done by civilians rather than by soldiers, whether it should be done by military police rather than infantry, and whether professional soldiers could perform peacekeeping and war-fighting missions with equal ease. The first two of these appeared as the core of factor 2 in the second and third wave surveys. To them were added evaluations of whether peacekeeping was boring and, in wave III, whether it was appropriate for their unit.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The second factor in wave I was weakly composed of soldiers' judgements about whether peacekeeping was appropriate for their unit and good for their careers, and whether the goal of peacekeeping was to contain or reduce conflict. These attitudes then became central to the first factor in waves II and III. To

them were added judgements about whether peacekeeping could be performed without the use of force, whether a professional soldier could be both a peacekeeper and a war-fighter, and whether reservists as well as regular soldiers could perform peacekeeping.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis of the attitudes of soldiers in the first U.S. Army peacekeeping unit to be manned primarily by reserve personnel yields some interesting patterns. Like earlier active duty soldiers who have served in the Sinai MFO, our respondents regarded operations other than war to be considerably more likely that high intensity warfare in the future. Also like earlier units on this mission, their estimates of the likelihood of OOTW declined over the course of the mission. Unlike the pattern observed in earlier deployments, however, their estimates of the likelihood of American involvement in actual hostilities, ranging from guerrilla war to strategic nuclear war, was higher toward the end of the deployment than it had been before the unit went to the Sinai. We suspect that this was due to their awareness of ongoing conflicts in the world, and particularly in Bosnia, rather than a result of their peacekeeping experience. The data clearly show that participation in a successful peacekeeping mission does not necessarily impose on soldiers a more pacific view of the world than they held previously.

Factor analysis of expectations of diverse combat scenarios

suggests the development of a cognitive schema that reflects the doctrinal grouping of Operations other than War. This is not surprising, since the Sinai MFO mission is such an operation. This analysis did not suggest comparable schemata for other areas of American combat doctrine such as Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare, or Low-Intensity Warfare, although prior research led us to expect the emergence of such factors.

The emergence of a transcultural orientation among these soldiers was similarly not found in these data. Most of these soldiers did not regard foreign nationals as trustworthy, disagreed with the idea that people are pretty much alike across national boundaries, and by the end of the mission, over two thirds of the soldiers said that it was more difficult to work with foreign nationals than with Americans: a considerable increase from the position they had taken before the deployment.

More of the soldiers seem to have been motivated to volunteer for this mission by a desire for travel and new experiences than by a desire to work with and among people of other nationalities. However, during the course of the deployment, the percentages of soldiers who said they liked to travel, liked foreign food, and looked forward to new experiences all declined. Factor analysis of these data suggested two independent dimensions, one experience oriented, and one people oriented.

The analysis of soldiers' attitudes toward various components of the peacekeeping mission showed a considerable

degree of change. Although majorities of soldiers supported the basic peacekeeping norms of minimal use of force, and reduction of conflict, the size of the majorities decreased through the mission, and strong majorities denied that peacekeeping could be performed by unarmed personnel. Majorities of the soldiers agreed with the peacekeeping norm of impartiality, but the majorities were not large.

Majorities also agreed that peacekeeping requires special training, but the size of the majority declined markedly during the deployment. Soldiers' judgments that peacekeeping assignments were appropriate for their unit and good for their careers also declined.

There were also declines in majority judgments that professional soldiers could perform peacekeeping and war-fighting missions with equal effectiveness, that civilians could not do peacekeeping, and that reservists could perform peacekeeping missions as well as regular soldiers. Taken together these trends suggest a growing disaffection with the mission. This has been a common pattern in research on soldiers involved in peacekeeping, and is reflected in the fact that while very few soldiers expected the mission to be boring prior to deployment, a majority found it so.

We had expected to find a cluster of attitudes reflecting constabulary norms. However, factor analysis of our attitude data produced a weak structure that was unstable over time. The first factor in our wave III analysis approximated what we had

expected to find. It included items on minimal use of force, impartiality, and the goal of minimizing conflict. However, it included career, personnel, and family matters as well and does not have a clear interpretation. The lack of structure in these attitudes supports our sense that the nature of peacekeeping has not been well defined, even for the soldiers who do it.[24]

Overall, while the attitudes of these citizen-soldiers differed from those of active duty soldiers who have previously served in the Sinai MFO, what is most notable is how minimal these differences were. Indeed, the views of members of our research team and of other observers of the Sinai MFO were that this unit performed the mission effectively and was indistinguishable from active duty units that have served in the Sinai. To the extent that the Unites States will continue to be called upon to serve in peace operations with a down-sized force, and that roles must be found for reserve forces that are mandated by the Congress, the use of reserve component personnel in missions like the Sinai MFO remains a viable option.

Endnotes

1. See David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, "Demographics of the total force." Pp. 207-223 in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Eds.), The United States Army: Challenges and Missions for the 1990s. Lexington: D.C. Heath: 1991, and Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and reserve forces." Pp.183-201 in Joseph Kruzel (Ed.), American Defense Annual: 1991-1992. New York: Macmillan, 1992.

2.See Stephen T. Hosmer, "Low-intensity conflict operations in the 1990s." Pp. 55-71 in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, (Eds.), The United States Army, and Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr., "Low-intensity conflict: the strategic challenge." Pp. 207-222 in George E. Hudson and Joseph Kruzel (Eds.), American Defense Annual: 1985-1986. Lexington: D.C. Heath: 1985.

3.Frederick J. Brown, "The evolving total force." Pp. 87-99 in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, (Eds.), The United States Army.

4. Sorley, "National Guard and reserve forces."

5.Mark J. Eitelberg, "Military manpower and the future force." Pp.135-153 in Joseph Kruzel, American Defense Annual: 1993. New York: Macmillan, 1993.

6.David R. Segal, "Five phases of United Nations peacekeeping: an evolutionary typology." Journal of Political and Military Sociology 23 (Summer 1995): 65-79.

7.David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, Peacekeepers and their Wives. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993.

8.8. See C. Bricker, Canada's Reserves and Peacekeeping: A Workshop Report. York University Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Downsview, Ontario, Canada, 1989, and C. Lohwasser, "Selecting for the Austrian contingents on UN-peace-keeping missions." Paper presented at the 29th International Military Psychology Symposium. Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1993.

9. See Charles C. Moskos, Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, and Segal and Segal, Peacekeepers and their Wives.

10.This led to the unanticipated problem that when we asked questions that referred to the soldiers' unit, we do not know whether the referent for them was 4-505 PIR, which was what we intended, or the reserve units from which they came.

11.The decrease in sample size reflected difficulties of collecting data from soldiers widely dispersed in the desert. Infantry squads rotated between their base camp and observation posts. At the time of the second wave, we had not determined the best way to conduct surveys at remote sites. We found no differences in attitudes among units, and there is no reason to believe that representativeness was affected. We improved our data collection techniques by the third wave survey. The research was designed as a panel study, and since we sought cpmplete coverage, there was some overlap of respondents among our three waves. However, in this analysis we focus on aggregate change rather than individual change.

12.John D. Blair and David R. Segal, Perceptions and Evaluations of the Army Training System. Washington: Army Training Study, 1978.

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14. Barbara F. Meeker and David R. Segal, "Soldiers' perceptions of conflict intensity: the effects of doctrine and experience." Journal of Political and Military Sociology 15 (Spring 1987): 105-115.

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16. See C. Roach, Communication and Culture in War and Peace. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1993.

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23.This is a variant of the second question that Segal and Meeker ("Peacekeeping, warfighting, and professionalism") found to be central to the organization of soldiers' attitudes toward peacekeeping. The earlier item was "A soldier is a professional and does any job he is given with equal professional skill."

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FIGURE 1. CITIZEN-SOLDIER'S ESTIMATES OF CONFLICT LIKELIHOOD



TABLE 1. FACTOR STRUCTURE OF COMBAT SCENARIO EXPECTATIONS

Wave	Wave I	Wave II	Wave III	Wave I	Wave II	Wave III
Factor	War	War	War	OOTW	OOTW	OOTW
Scenario						
Lge Con	.552	.634	.711			
Tac Nuc	.759	.765	.778			
Tac Chem	.825	.786	.833			
Tac Bio	.843	.793	.849			
Strat Nuc	.732	.735	.732			
Lim Con			.515			
Dom Hum				.758	.786	.853
Dom Ord				.680	.436	.667
O'seas Hum				.672	.744	.814
Peacekeeping					.500	.596
Eigen-value	2.938	3.116	3.586	1.915	1.641	2.429
% Var	26.7	28.3	32.6	17.4	14.9	22.1

Varimax Rotated Matrix: Reserve Component Personnel

TABLE 2. FACTOR STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN EXPERIENCES

Wave	Wave I	Wave II	Wave III	Wave I	Wave II	Wave III
Factor	Exper.	Exper.	Exper.	People	People	People
Attitude						
Like Travel	.975	.869	.828			
New Exper.	.744	.786	.889			
Foreign Food	.431	.508	.648			
Work w. Foreigners						
Trust Foreigners				.800	.506	.769
People are Alike				.474	.670	.522
Eigenvalue	1.999	2.087	2.268	1.503	1.336	1.602
% Var	33.3	34.9	37.8	25.2	22.4	26.7

Varimax Rotated Matrix: Reserve Component Personnel

TABLE 3. FACTOR STRUCTURE OF PEACEKEEPING ATTITUDES

Wave	Wave I	Wave II	Wave III	Wave I	Wave II	Wave III
Factor	Factor I	Factor I	Factor I	Factor II	Factor II	Factor II
Attitude						
Minimum Force		.499	.498			
Boring					.444	.438
Reduce Conflict		.405	.566	.417		
Appropriate		.555		.400		-.455
Career		.639	.499	.585		
Hard on Families			.414			
Professionals	-.431	.616	.496			
Reservists		.502	.660			
Unarmed						
Civilians	.789				.654	.694
Military Police	.604				.594	.732
Impartial			.511			
Training						
Eigenvalue	1.999	2.087	2.268	1.503	1.336	1.602
% Var	33.3	34.9	37.8	25.2	22.4	26.7

Varimax Rotated Matrix: Reserve Component Personnel

APPENDIX D

FAMILY ISSUES IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESERVISTS TO PEACEKEEPING DUTY

Mady W. Segal

University of Maryland

D. Bruce Bell Rose E. Rice

U.S. Army Research Institute

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Family Issues in the Assignment of Reservists

to Peacekeeping Duty

INTRODUCTION

The 1979 Camp David Agreement signed by President Carter of the United States, President Sadat of Egypt, and Prime Minister Begin of Israel returned control of the Sinai desert from Israel to Egypt. This treaty was to be enforced by a newly created 11 nation organization, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The U.S. contingent to the MFO is based at Sharm el Sheik, Egypt.

Since the mission began in 1982, the U.S. has staffed its control sector by deploying a battalion sized task force of up to 529 individuals for six-month intervals from Active Component (AC) light infantry units. Since 1990, AC light infantry soldiers have also been deployed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS/S) in Kuwait, Operation Restore Hope (ORH) in Somalia, and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti and countless training exercises. The desire to lighten the demand for AC light infantry soldiers and to increase the number and kinds of missions for the Reserve Component (RC) led to a decision to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of having RC soldiers participate in the MFO by including them (on an experimental basis) in the 28th MFO rotation.[1]

The 28th U.S. rotation (MFO 28) was carried out by the specially created 4-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (4-505 PIR) , which was a composite force: 20% AC and 80% from the RC.[2] Half of the NCOs and officers were AC; all of the junior enlisted soldiers were from the RC. Most of the AC soldiers came from Fort Bragg, NC, and most of the RC soldiers came from Virginia and Maryland. However, some AC and RC soldiers came from other states, particularly those who joined the unit in September 1994, 30 days or less before the soldiers reported to Fort Bragg to start training for the MFO mission.

This experimental unit provided an opportunity to study families of RC soldiers who were volunteers on a peacekeeping mission. One of the more challenging aspects of this deployment was the family support system (FSS) for this unit. It not only had to provide services to the two components but also

to families located across the United States.

Our research consists of observations, interviews, and surveys and covers family experiences during the 28th MFO rotation and the organization of the FSS to meet family needs. This paper is restricted to married RC soldiers. Specifically, the analyses focus on the differences in family characteristics, experiences, and outcomes that were present for those in the "**Division Area**" (i.e., Virginia or Maryland) as compared to those who live in one of the "**Outlying States**" (i.e., not Virginia or Maryland). This latter group was of great interest since prior research has shown that they are the most difficult group to serve in this type of deployment.[3]

In this paper, family support issues in other RC deployments and in past MFO rotations are discussed to put the current finding in perspective.[4] Then, we address characteristics of soldiers in the two subgroups, their attitudes about the Sinai mission, their perceptions of deployment effects on their families, problems they experienced, and their perceived social support. Finally, we describe the FSS and make recommendations for future deployments of RC soldiers.

FAMILY SUPPORT ISSUES IN PRIOR RC DEPLOYMENTS

The literature on how RC families adapt to the stresses of military deployments is extremely limited. There were six major studies during ODS/S: four in the Army, one in the Navy, and one in the Marine Corps. As a part of the current project, limited interviews were conducted with service providers associated with two battalion size groups of National Guard engineers who undertook six-month road building training exercises in central America.[5]

Army studies

The 1991/1992 mailed Survey of Total Army Military Personnel (STAMP) included soldiers from the AC and RC. Of specific interest here were the over 4,000 National Guard (NG) soldiers in the sample.

particularly the over 500 NG soldiers in STAMP who deployed to ODS/S.[6] The most frequent problem among NG enlisted soldiers in this study was that they were worried about their families.[7] Other problems that affected at least 20% of the families were: problems communicating with the soldier, problems getting household items or cars repaired, and children's behavior problems. Elig also reported that most families were worried about their soldier and the war. Most soldiers had a "confidant" in the unit with whom they could discuss their problems. Soldier morale dropped during ODS/S and had not yet returned to pre-war levels at the time of the survey. Elig also noted that units were more likely to have had an active Family Support Group (FSG) (80%) during ODS/S than after the war was over (44%). Overall, most (52%) RC NG families of soldiers deployed to ODS/S managed well or very well during the deployment.

Griffith and Perry conducted soldier surveys just before and just after ODS/S with over 3,000 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers.[8] They compared responses of those who did and did not deploy to ODS/S. Their most relevant major findings are: (1) Most families were supportive of their soldiers' participation in ODS/S; (2) The extended absence had a negative impact on spouses' attitudes toward participation in the USAR; (3) Many junior enlisted felt that extended mobilization had been a problem for their families; and (4) Spouse attitudes toward the USAR were related to soldier willingness to remain in the USAR.

Rosenberg studied 236 RC soldiers who deployed (mostly to Saudi Arabia) during ODS/S. Although the sample was not random, it provided some insights into deployment issues among the RC.[9] For example, like the AC, they reported that deployment events were more stressful than life events; and spouses were more likely to turn to family and friends than to military or civilian agencies. They made more use of services located at or near the local Armory than those at AC posts which, for 40% of them, was 100 or more miles away.[10] They coped with the deployment, but they were not happy about it.

Interviews were conducted (summer 1994) with personnel associated with family support for two National Guard road building (training) exercises in Central America ("Fuerte Caminos" or "Strong Roads"). The main family "agency" in the first deployment was the unit's FSG. The main family agency for

the second unit was a five person task force of soldiers that operated out of the state National Guard headquarters. The main family support service for the first deployed unit was calls and letters to "waiting wives" on their birthdays and wedding anniversaries to make them feel better about the deployment. The main family support service for the second deployed unit was a toll-free number that was staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week to handle possible family emergencies. Both units felt that the ability to help families located outside the "home state" of the deployed unit and its support system needed the most improvement..

Navy studies

Caliber Associates' study of RC sailors who were deployed during ODS/S was conducted in St. Louis, MO and San Diego, CA.[11] The most relevant portion came from focus group discussions of family support system operations in St. Louis. Apparently the St. Louis Center did not have any family support programs prior to the deployment. Once the deployment started, a single NCO took on the family support mission as his own. Local families made some use of the Center, but the Reserve Center had problems supporting families that were geographically dispersed and far from the center. Spouses worried about the safety of their sailors and the sailors worried about the problems spouses were having taking care of children. RC sailors who had high paying civilian jobs often lost income when deployed.

Marine Corps studies

Caliber's study of RC Marines came from site visits to three Marine Corps bases in the United States.[12] Written surveys were received from a non-random sample of 73 married Marines, and telephone interviews were completed with a non-random sample of 29 RC Marine Corps spouses. The researchers also interviewed leaders and family support service providers at these same locations.

The findings from this study were quite similar to those reported elsewhere for the AC.[13] The

Marine families that were least prepared and experienced the most stress during ODS/S were young, newly married, and not experienced with deployments. The experiences that seemed to cause the stress were: missing the absent family members, problems communicating, increased role demands (e.g., being a single parent), and news reports. Having supportive leaders, good/timely information, and good family support services reduced stress. The services most wanted by families were: child care, legal and financial assistance, and chaplain/religious services. However, the majority of families did not report that they needed services. Families were more likely to turn to their extended family and friends than to agencies for help. Service provider interviews showed that the family dispersion made serving them difficult.

The effects of advance notice/distance to services

Most AC and RC service members had little advance notice of the ODS/S deployment. Those who had advance notice used it to handle financial, legal, family, and job-related matters. In fact, the degree to which families and military personnel had their personal/family affairs in order was largely a function of how much notice the service member received.[14]

Distance to local Armory or mobilization sites was found to be related to attendance at family briefings, service use, and attitudes toward the deploying unit.[15] Distance and lack of current addresses affected the ability of both RC and AC facilities to provide family services during ODS/S.[16]

FAMILY SUPPORT ISSUES IN PRIOR MFO DEPLOYMENTS[17]

Family support for the first (1982) rotation of MFO peacekeepers deploying to the Sinai began with a pre-deployment briefing (held in the brigade's chapel) with an individual from each of the on-post service agencies describing valuable services and indicating a willingness to help. All MFO families were enrolled in the family medical care program ahead of the existing waiting list.

A rear detachment (RD) unit was available to assist spouses with problems they encountered.

including contacting the finance office to correct pay errors, helping wives mail packages to their husbands, and transmitting information to and from the deployed soldiers.[18] The wives of company and battalion leaders set up telephone chains, and the battalion sent all families a newsletter. Several activities took place during the deployment. The experiences of family support during the first MFO deployment served as the origin of FSGs in the Army, although many of the recommended characteristics were altered in the process.

All 141 spouses in the first MFO rotation were given an information package describing Army services that were available to them during the deployment. Service use was tracked by weekly reports of agency contact with unit families. These records indicate that the most used agency was finance (10%). It was the finance agency's impression that these contacts would have been made even if the deployment had not taken place. The second most frequently used agency was the Judge Advocate General's office, contacted by 5% of the families. The most common problem presented was families trying to deal with Powers of Attorney. The remaining family agencies (Army Community Service, American Red Cross, school, military police, and the Inspector General's office) had even less contact.[19] Although contact with the RD was not tracked in the same way, it was the most frequently used helping resource.[20]

The second Fort Bragg contingent that deployed to the MFO resulted in changes in the way Fort Bragg provided family services. The post had six-months advance notice of this deployment. During that time, certain "key wives" in the unit established a steering committee to discuss and coordinate family support activities and services.[21] The activities they engaged in reflect what FSGs typically do today.

The battalion's FSG and RD made an effort to reduce the complexity of the Army support system by recruiting a single representative from each of the 12 most relevant offices and agencies on post. These 12 persons agreed to be the first POC for MFO wives within that agency and to meet periodically with the FSG and RD to plan and coordinate services. Although some providers resisted it, the unit spouses felt that the coordination group worked quite effectively.[22]

METHODOLOGY

Sampling and Project Design

The family portion of the overall MFO research project design called for a series of surveys of all unit members at their place of duty and as many of these members' spouses as possible via mail out - mail back surveys. This strategy was followed because there were so few unit members, in general (592 soldiers who were ever in the unit), and even fewer married soldiers (199), of whom 111 were married RC soldiers.

The initial soldier survey was administered to the NCOs and officers in early August, 1994 and then combined with the instrument given the enlisted soldiers shortly after they joined the unit in October, 1994. A second survey was administered to the unit's soldiers deployed in the Sinai in May, 1995. Table 1 shows the number and basic representativeness of the sample along two critical dimensions: soldier rank and location of soldier spouses. Chi square analyses conducted on these data indicated that the sample is representative of the unit as a whole on these dimensions.

Insert Table 1 about here

The Surveys

The initial questionnaire on family issues contained 133 items and took about 30 minutes to complete. The second questionnaire contained 193 items and took about 35 minutes to complete. We also had access to additional questions (e.g., soldier characteristics) asked by other scientists on the research team.

The first questionnaire[23] focused on soldier and family characteristics; extent of social support networks; attitudes toward the Army, mission, and family; and anticipated problems and support available during this deployment. The second questionnaire focused on actual problems encountered; support and communication systems; evaluations of how effective support efforts had been and how well the soldier and

family were adjusting to the deployment; and some of the same attitudinal questions as on the first survey to determine if opinions had changed.

Interviews and Observations

Our understanding of the working of the unit's FSS came from interviews, observations, and reviews of unit products. Our interviews included personal interviews with: leaders, battalion staff, and soldiers of the 4-505 PIR; the unit's FSG leader at Fort Bragg; and key family service providers at Fort Bragg. We also conducted telephone interviews with 17 National Guard State Family Program Coordinators (NGSFPC) who had soldiers participating in this deployment. FSS questions were included in both the unit formation and deployment questionnaires.[24] Additionally, there were two types of interviews with soldiers wives: a series of in-depth, one-on-one interviews: five face-to-face interviews with "**Division Area**" RC wives and three telephone interviews with "**Outlying State**" wives; and two group interviews with AC spouses at Fort Bragg.[25]

The Survey Analyses

Most of the analyses involved comparing soldiers from the Division Area and those from Outlying States. This was done by a chi square or t-test, as appropriate. For comparisons involving changes between the time the soldiers completed the initial questionnaire at Fort Bragg and when they completed a second questionnaire at the mid-point of their deployment in the Sinai, analysis was done using a repeated measures analysis of variance.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In each analysis, RC families who lived in the Division Area were compared with the families who lived in the Outlying States. Although this comparison was based on geographical location, it was probably a more complex phenomenon, including factors such as whether they knew other families "in the same boat" or whether the NGSFPCs in the Outlying States knew what the 28th rotation was about.[26]

The Structure and Functions of the 28th Rotation's FSS

Like the unit, the FSS was a composite structure that combined both AC and RC components. The main **AC parts** were: (1) the RD, (2) the deployed unit, (3) unit-based FSGs at Fort Bragg, and (4) family support agencies at Fort Bragg. The main **RC parts** were: (1) the state NGSFPCs in each of the states that sent soldiers and (2) the RC units closest to the soldier's family or the one to which the soldier belonged prior to joining the 4-505th PIR.

The Active Component Agencies

The Rear Detachment. The 4-505th's RD consisted of a commander, a Family Assistance Officer (FAO), and a representative from each of the five 4-505th's companies. Their main family support function was to assist the families at Fort Bragg and to operate a 1-800 number that was used by the non-Fort Bragg families to get information and to resolve family problems. This phone was staffed 24 hours a day in the unit headquarters by someone in the RD. The FAO was appointed shortly after he reported in July 1994, and thus, he got to know the families and the agencies that would help them long before the unit was deployed in January 1995.

The RD was also responsible for the publication and distribution of the unit Family Support Handbook[27] and the unit newsletter, The Panther Paw, which was written by unit leaders and staff. The logbook of RD family support activities showed that the RD was quite active in such areas as: getting Identification Cards, enrolling families in the Dependent Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS), sending American Red Cross messages, acknowledging births and deaths, resolving financial difficulties, and corresponding with various NGSFPCs.

The Deployed Unit. In addition to keeping in touch with the RD, the deployed unit also provided family services to the soldier. It had its own finance officer, lawyer, psychologist, and chaplain. The chain of command also helped families by providing leave, advice, and access to family services.

The Unit Based FSG at Fort Bragg. The 4-505th PIR FSG was designed to operate as a single group with representatives from both the battalion and company levels. Prior to the deployment, it sponsored mostly social events. During the deployment, the meetings became more informational in nature. Attendance was greater at the social events than at the informational meetings. The FSG leader, who was the 4-505 PIR commander's wife, attended unit functions outside of the Fort Bragg area, such as the pre-deployment family orientation meetings for NG families held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Family Support Agencies at Fort Bragg. Army Community Service (ACS) supplied materials used in constructing the unit's Family Support Handbook. The RD also made use of post agencies to resolve family problems that came to them through the RD's 1-800 number. The RD log suggests that AC families living at Fort Bragg also made use of these services.

The Reserve Component Agencies

The National Guard State Family Program Coordinator. Each state and U.S. territory has within its NG state headquarters an individual who is responsible for coordinating family services for all Army families living within that state. Both the National Guard Bureau and the 4-505 attempted to notify all affected NGSFPCs that this MFO deployment was taking place and that families in their state might need assistance. A follow-up ARI interview study showed that not all NGSFPCs had been notified by January, 1995, and that some of those who had been notified were not clear what the 28th MFO rotation entailed. Some of the NGSFPCs not only knew about the 28th MFO rotation, but also had provided family services to its members. Typically, this service consisted of "information and referral" about services being provided by other agencies.[28] The most frequently requested services were information about AC benefits and services and help (i.e., referral or personal intervention) in resolving Army pay problems.

Two NGSFPCs, the ones from Virginia and Maryland, were actively involved with MFO 28. Both had extensive programs for the MFO family members living in their state. These programs included:

conducting sessions at the Fort Belvoir pre-deployment orientation, organizing regional family workshops, setting up a teleconference at an Army facility in their state for family members to talk with soldiers in the Sinai, and talking at least once a week with the 4-505's RD.

RC Units. Interviews with different sources (NGSFPCs; the 4-505's leaders, RD personnel, soldiers and spouses; and the National Guard Bureau) all indicated that some RC units were actively involved in providing support. Some spouses used the local armory to get in contact with their soldiers or to get into the Army helping system. Some spouses also continued to meet with local FSGs, even though their soldiers were not "technically" still members of that group.

Interviews with all types of sources suggested that the 4-505 and most RC units and agencies involved in the rotation were quite active on behalf of families. In fact, the majority of the unit's soldiers recommended that the next RC or Composite MFO rotation adopt the main features of the 4-505's FSS for their rotation (see table 12, below).

Survey Results

Family Resources

The four aspects of family resources for coping with the deployment are: (1) characteristics of the soldier, (2) characteristics of the marriage, (3) informal networks and (4) anticipated Army help. These variables are labeled as resources because many of them have been found in prior research to be associated with soldier and family adaptation to the stresses of deployments.[29]

Table 2 shows the characteristics and attitudes at the time the unit was formed for the two groups of married RC soldiers, those whose families lived in the Division Area and those who did not. Rank, educational level, and home ownership of these married soldiers were comparable to that of other MFO deployments.[30] The percent of soldiers with a friend in the unit on whom they could count for help with a personal or family problem was equal to that found among RC soldiers during ODS/S.[31]

Satisfaction with Army life and the extent of positive feelings about going to the Sinai were quite high, suggesting that the soldiers, all of whom were volunteers, were looking forward to this assignment. Fewer than half of the soldiers expected MFO service to have negative effects on their marriage (43%) or relationship with their children (28%).

Soldiers from Outlying States had more civilian education and were more likely to own their homes. These findings suggest that the group from the Outlying States was less likely to experience problems, as higher education levels have been associated with greater family preparation for deployments and fewer problems during the deployment.[32] Having financial problems prior to the deployment has also been found to be related to having additional financial problems once the deployment starts.[33]

The presence of a "confidant" in the unit has been shown to be associated with successful soldier adaptation to the stresses of deployment during ODS/S.[34] We expected to see a difference between the two groups of RC soldiers, since the Division Area group was drawn from the same division and the others were not. However, no such difference appeared. There may have been a difference when the unit first formed, but by eight or more months after most soldiers arrived there is no difference.

Soldier attitudes towards the Army, the Sinai mission, and the possible effects of MFO duty on their families and children seemed to be generally quite positive, especially regarding family effects, though we have no exactly comparable data.[35]

Insert Table 2 about here

Three aspects of marriages that may be related to family adaptation in this deployment are duration, spouse support for the MFO mission, and various strengths of the marriage itself (Table 3). While only 35% of the soldiers had been married for more than five years, marital duration was at the expected level for a unit with that type of rank structure.[36] Soldier reports of spouse support for the MFO mission were quite

high. The measures of marital quality (i.e., satisfaction with the marriage, family ability to deal with stress, marital quality, and risk the marriage will break up) were all positive. In fact, the level of satisfaction with their marriages was higher than that seen among RC soldiers during ODS/S.[37] There were no significant differences between the soldiers whose families were in the Division Area and those from Outlying States on these measures.

Insert Table 3 about here

Married soldiers in MFO 28 were asked the extent to which they felt that their wives could count on non-Army sources of help if they experienced a personal or family problem. Most felt that their spouses could count on a variety of sources of help (Table 4). As in Operation Restore Hope (in Somalia) spouses, the source most likely to be counted on were their parents or other close relatives.[38] There were no differences between the two groups of RC soldiers on these variables.

Insert Table 4 about here

As expected,[39] soldiers were less likely to feel that their wives could count on Army sources (Table 5) than on their friends and neighbors for these same types of personal or family problems. The exception to this result was the level of confidence soldiers place in a leader(s) in the local (RC) unit, which was noticeably higher. Part of the explanation for this pattern of findings may be in when the measures were taken. These RC soldiers were in their first few days at Fort Bragg -- before they had really gotten to know how supportive Army resources might be. Again, there were no differences between the two groups of RC soldiers.

Insert Table 5 about here

Experiences During the MFO Deployment

The percent of married RC soldiers in this MFO deployment who experienced commonly seen family separation problems (Table 6) can be compared with previous deployments, as most of these questions were asked of married AC and RC ODS/S era soldiers and the spouses of soldiers who deployed to ORH. Compared to the ODS/S veterans' responses, more of our RC soldiers appeared to be concerned about their families' safety, children's problems, and getting household repairs done. The two groups were roughly equal in terms of the percentage experiencing "communications" and "financial" problems.[40] There were three differences among MFO RC troops. Those who were from outside of the Division Area were more likely to be concerned about their families' health, families' safety, and getting cars/household items repaired.

Insert Table 6 about here

Table 7 shows the extent to which RC soldiers said that their families participated in various unit and NG activities that could reduce the stress of deployment by providing them with needed information, an enlarged circle of friends, or a better feeling for how the importance of the mission justified the discomfort they might feel while the unit was deployed. The most popular events were the ceremony to mark the activation of the unit, the pre-deployment orientation activities held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the FSG meetings held outside of Fort Bragg. Attendance at other activities (NG workshops, MFO teleconferences, and the Fort Bragg FSG meetings) was much lower. The lack of attendance at these activities did not mean that they were not valuable or needed. Rather, relatively few of the respondents were physically close

enough to participate. Prior research shows that families want these types of services and activities to exist in case they need them, even if they never attend any of them.[41]

Insert Table 7 about here

Division Area families were more likely than families who lived elsewhere to attend the MFO pre-deployment orientation. This difference is not surprising, since the orientation was held in the center of the two states making up the Division Area. The timing of the orientation was also a factor; most soldiers from outside the Division Area were not given an opportunity to volunteer for the 4-505 until after these meetings were held. Although we expected to see geographical differences in attendance at other family support activities, since Division Area NGSFPCs were more likely to be sponsoring these types of events than were other states, the data do not support this expectation. Family responses may include attendance at NG events that were not specifically for MFO families.[42] Similarly, the fact that one lives in the Division Area does not mean that the events were close or convenient. The events that were relatively well attended are those which were either close (a non-Fort Bragg FSG) or government subsidized (a trip to Fort Belvoir or Fort Bragg).

The only comparative data available are for RC soldiers deployed to ODS/S.[43] During the deployment, fewer RC families of MFO 28 soldiers (27%) were attending FSG meetings than were their counterparts during ODS/S (59%). However, their attendance was higher than that of ODS/S soldiers' families prior to their deployment (11%).

Table 8 shows the extent to which the unit and the NG were able to get family support information to all the families of its married soldiers. The handbook and newsletter were generated by the unit. The main impediment to delivering the handbooks and newsletters to the families was the lack of current addresses. The handbook was not mailed out until January 1995. By that time, 7% of the unit spouses had

changed addresses. An additional 14% changed addresses by the time we surveyed the unit in May 1995. In fact, 24% of RC spouses relocated between the time the soldiers joined the unit and the May survey. The NG flyers and letters not only had the problem of mobile families, but they were also not routinely sent to all families. Some states waited until the family contacted them before sending information. Spouses who lived in the Division Area were more likely than others to receive NG flyers. There were no other intra-sample differences.

Insert Table 8 about here

Soldiers and their families were most likely to use Army services which were most readily available to them (Table 9). Thus, we see relatively high use of the agencies that deployed with the soldier (i.e., legal services, the chaplain, and financial services). There is also high use of those "agents" which were geographically close to the spouse (i.e., the RC unit, AC/RC spouses, and the FSGs). Agencies located at Fort Bragg were unlikely to be used. The exception to this rule was the MFO's RD which was readily accessible via its 1-800 number.[44]

Insert Table 9 about here

The one difference within the 4-505 PIR families was the greater use of Army spouses by families located in the Division Area than by spouses living elsewhere. This difference suggests that the spouses outside of Division Area had less access to this source of support due to their dispersion and perhaps lack of information about the presence of other Army spouses in the area.

The most comparable data come from Elig's study of NG soldiers who deployed to ODS/S.[45] Those NG soldiers made much greater use of FSGs, other military spouses, the RD, the Army Community Service.

and chaplains than was seen here. The reason for this higher use may be that they were experiencing more difficulties than the MFO troops.[46] However, the 4-505 made much greater use of Army services than did the first MFO rotation in 1982.[47]

Previous research[48] has shown greater use of informal or personal supports such as families, non-Army friends, and members of church or social organizations than of Army services for help with everyday problems encountered in this type of deployment. Although married RC soldiers and their families were more likely to turn to these sources (Table 10), their use of friends and neighbors, church members, and extended family was much less than was seen among NG soldiers in ODS/S.[49]

Insert Table 10 about here

Very few married RC soldiers in the MFO report that they or their families used non-Army agencies (Table 11), which is consistent with the nature/extent of problems experienced during this deployment and with what we have seen in other deployments.[50] There were no Division Area - Outlying State differences.

Insert Table 11 about here

Of the 19 suggestions on the survey regarding what the next RC unit in the MFO should have its FSS do for families, the majority of the married RC soldiers agreed with 16 (Table 12). The three that were endorsed by less than 50% of the soldiers were: providing spouses with child rearing advice, restricting future MFO recruiting areas to four adjacent states, and holding FSG meetings at Fort Bragg. There were no Division Area versus Outlying States differences. The fact that most of these suggestions were accepted suggests that the soldiers felt that what the unit was doing was right. The suggested changes that the soldiers endorsed were in the spirit of improving, rather than radically changing, the system. More and

cheaper ways of communicating with the people back home was a popular area of suggested improvement.[51] Another area of possible improvement was making the unit publications and meetings more specific and timely.

Insert Table 12 about here

Family and Army Outcomes

We analyzed how six aspects of the soldiers' marriages and relationships with children (seen in Table 4) had changed by the fourth month of the deployment to the Sinai (Table 13).[52] There was no location (Division Area vs. Outlying States) difference or time difference. All of these aspects of the marriage remained essentially the same during the deployment.

Insert Table 13 about here

The degree of financial strain during this deployment was much less severe than we saw during ODS/S or ORH.[53] During ODS/S we saw 30% of the enlisted families saying that they had very serious financial problems. During ORH the comparable figure was 10%. Here we estimate that the figure was closer to 2%. In fact, 41% of our sample said that they gained financially by participating in the MFO (Table 14).[54] The fact that so many soldiers were gaining financially was not surprising, given the large percent of the RC soldiers who were students, part-time workers, or unemployed and that these soldiers all volunteered for the mission.

Insert Table 14 about here

We are used to seeing AC families (particularly the families of junior enlisted personnel) moving during a major deployment.[55] NG leaders did not expect this would happen here, since the RC families tend to already living in their home towns. Nonetheless, 25% of the RC wives had relocated by the time of the second soldier survey in May, 1995. The fact re-location of so many spouse was a problem for the Army in its attempts to deliver family services, and it must be planned for in future RC deployments.

Only about a third (32%) of the married RC soldiers felt that their marriage had helped them accomplish their mission. This was probably related to the soldiers' perception that their spouses' support for the MFO mission (particularly among those from Virginia/Maryland) dropped and to the problems the soldiers and their families experienced (e.g., receiving disturbing calls/letters and having problems communicating with their homes).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to draw hard and fast conclusions based on the 28th MFO rotation experiment. There was only one unit, our comparative data are generally not very comparable, and the sample size precludes complex analyses. However, certain things are apparent.

At the start of this deployment, there were few differences between soldiers whose families lived in the Division Area and those who lived in Outlying States. Those from Outlying States had more coping assets but less time to prepare the family for what was to come. The soldiers from Outlying States were more likely to have post-secondary school educations and were more likely to own a home. However, they were very unlikely to have had more than thirty days notice between their acceptance into the MFO and when they had to report for duty.

These facts led to **mixed** predictions about how these families would fare during the deployment. The presence of the coping assets suggest that, as a group, soldiers from Outlying States would have **less** trouble than the soldiers from the Division Area. The lack of notice prior to the deployment suggests that

they, as a group, would have **more** trouble. The soldiers with families living in Outlying States were more worried about their families' safety and health and about their families' ability to get needed car/household repairs accomplished. They were also less likely to have received some "services" that may have helped: information at the pre-deployment orientation, NG flyers, and emotional support via other military spouses.

However, our data show that the problems were not due to lack of notice. The greater family concern expressed by soldiers from Outlying States is likely to be due in part to their lower levels of receipt of helpful information prior to and during the deployment, as well as their wives lack of access to what we know to be a very good primary support system: other military spouses. Pre-deployment orientations and a continued flow of information help to reassure both soldiers and spouses that they will be all right during the separation. Being around other Army spouses before and during the deployment not only serves as a source of information on how to cope, but also serves to define the separation as more "normal".[56]

The FSS for this unit was very active. They had their own toll-free phone line, their own full-time and highly motivated Family Assistance Officer, and a network of family support and Army professionals in all of the states: the NGSFPCs and the RC units. The soldiers' recommendations to the next unit all reflect that the 4-505 and its family support allies did a commendable job of trying to support these families. The suggestions for improvement fall into the realm of fine tuning the system, rather than making major changes. The soldiers want more help in communicating with their families (particularly at lower costs) and more explicit family support information. They want to ensure that the system can accommodate them close to home, rather than being only at Fort Bragg or restricted to a few states. Although the soldiers from Outlying States had more apparent problems, the unit as a whole had few family support issues. From a family support standpoint, we would say that this deployment was a success.

Notes

[1] For factors affecting how the experiment was structured, see David R. Segal and Angela Manos, "Two Paths to the Rainbow Battalion: Organizational Dynamics in Configuring an Experimental Force" (paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1995); for the criteria for selecting RC soldiers, see Dale R. Palmer and Michael G. Rumsey, "Selecting Army National Guard Personnel for Peacekeeping Duty," (paper presented at the 103rd Annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New York, NY, August 1995); for attitudes of the RC soldiers towards peacekeeping duties, see David R. Segal and Ron Tiggle, "Reservists' Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping Operations," (paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1995); and for economic consequences of participating in the MFO for RC soldiers and their families, see Hyder Lakhani and Elissa Tartak-Abod, "The Micro Economic Life Course Analysis of Peacekeeping in the Sinai- Preliminary Results," (paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1995).

[2] 72% were from the National Guard and 8% from the Army Reserve.

[3] The problems of providing services to the families of AC soldiers who were not near the family service facilities are discussed in D. Bruce Bell, Mary L. Stevens, and Mady W. Segal, *How to Support Families During Overseas Deployments: A Sourcebook for Service Providers* (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1687, 1996).

[4] For a more general discussion of family support systems and issues during wartime deployments see Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families.*

[5] Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families.*

[6] Timothy W. Elig, *1991/1992 Surveys of Total Army Personnel (STAMP): ARNG Officer Responses,* unpublished manuscript (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1993); Timothy W. Elig, *1991/1992 Surveys of Total Army Personnel (STAMP): ARNG Soldiers Responses,* unpublished manuscript (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1993).

[7] Elig, *ARNG Soldiers Responses.*

[8] James Griffith and Shelly Perry, "Examination of Soldier Perceptions of Employer and Family Conflicts with USAR service, Perceptions of Quality of Unit Activities, and Perceptions of Individual and Unit Preparation for Combat," (paper presented at the 101st annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada, August 1993).

[9] Florence R. Rosenberg, "Spouses of Reservists and National Guardsmen: A survey of the Effects of Desert Shield/Storm" in *Peace Operations: Workshop proceedings*, ed. David R. Segal (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1670, 1994).

[10] In Elig, *ARNG Officer Responses;* and Elig, *ARNG Soldiers Responses, 28% of* Army NG soldiers who deployed to ODS/S lived 100 or more miles from the nearest military installation. For a sample of U.S. Marines who deployed to ODS/S, the figure was 22%, see Caliber Associates, *Study of Impact of Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) on Marine Corps Families and Effectiveness of Family Support Programs in Ameliorating Impact: Volume II: Final Report*, Contract Number: N00600-91-D-0364 (Fairfax, VA: Caliber Associates, 1993).

[11] Caliber Associates, *Study of Impact of Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) on Navy Families and Effectiveness of Family Support Programs in Ameliorating Impact: Volume II: Final Report,* Contract Number: N00600-91-D-0364 (Fairfax, VA: Caliber Associates, 1993).

[12] Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Marine Corps Families.*

[13] Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families.*

[14] Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Marine Corps Families;* Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Navy Families.*

[15] Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Marine Corps Families.*

[16] Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families*; Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Marine Corps Families;* Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Navy Families.*

[17] For additional information on family support during MFO rotations see Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families.*

[18] David R. Segal and Mady W. Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1993).

[19] E. W. Van Vranken, Linda K. Jellen, Kathryn H.M. Knudson, David H. Marlowe, and Mady W. Segal, *The Impact of Deployment Separation on Army Families* (Washington DC: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Report NP-84-6, 1984).

[20] Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives,* 138-139.

[21] Charlene S. Lewis, *A Supportive Structure for Waiting Wives,* unpublished manuscript (Washington, DC: Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1984).

[22] Lewis, *A supportive Structure for Waiting Wives.*

[23] The questionnaires and their psychometric properties are discussed in D. Bruce Bell, Walter R. Schumm, Mary L. Stevens, P. Michelle Schuman, and Rose E. Rice, *Deploying a largely Reserve Component Task Force to the Sinai for Peacekeeping Operations: Descriptive Results for Soldiers and their Spouses,* unpublished manuscript (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1995).

[24] D. Bruce Bell, *How to Support Families during Peacekeeping Missions: Some Preliminary Findings,* unpublished manuscript (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1995).

[25] None of the unit's four females were married at the start of the deployment. Therefore, all soldiers' spouses were wives.

[26] An early hypotheses was that the differences between the Division Area and Outlying States were due to the amount of time these families had to prepare for this deployment. More Division Area (46%), than Outlying state (25%), soldiers had at least 30 days between acceptance into the unit and when they had to report for duty. However, this factor was not related to any of the differences observed in the data.

[27] Desert Panthers, TF 4-505, *Family Support Handbook* (Fort Bragg, NC: Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1995).

[28] D. Bruce Bell, *Support Families during Peacekeeping Missions,* 1995; Joan Harman, *Interviews of National Guard State Family Program Coordinators,* unpublished manuscript (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1995).

[29] Soldier rank, years of marriage, education of soldier and spouse, years in the military, and prior AC service were all found to be related to family preparedness for deployments (e.g., having a current will and power of attorney) among both U.S. Marines (Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Marine Corps Families*) and U.S. Air Force personnel (Caliber Associates, A *Study of the Effectiveness of Family assistance programs in the Air Force during Operations Desert Shield/Storm* (Fairfax, VA: Caliber Associates, Contract number F49642-88-D0003, 1992). These same general characteristics have also been shown to be related to successful family adaptation to the stresses of deployment among AC families (Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families*). However, many (40% to 55%) RC families during ODS/S had never been physically separated for 30 days or longer prior to ODS/S.

[30] Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives*; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *FY93 Summary, Official Guard and Reserve Strengths and Statistics* (Washington, DC: Author, 1994).

[31] Elig, *ARNG Officer Responses*; Elig, *ARNG Soldiers Responses*.

[32] These findings are reported for the Army in several deployments [D. Bruce Bell, "The Impact of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm on Army families: A summary of findings to date" (paper presented at the 53rd annual convention of the National Council of Family Relations, Denver, CO, November 1991); D. Bruce Bell, Walter R. Schumm, Timothy W. Elig, C. Elizabeth. Palmer-Johnson, and John Tisak, "Helping Army Families Cope with Deployments: Lessons learned from Desert Storm" (paper presented at the 101st annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada, August 1993)]; and the U.S. Air Force reserves (Caliber Associates, *Effectiveness of Family Assistance in the Air Force during ODS/S.*), U.S. Marine Corps (Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Marine Corps Families),* and the U.S. Navy during ODS/S (Caliber Associates, *Impact of ODS/S on Navy Families*).

[33] D. Bruce Bell, "Impact of ODS/S on Army families"; R. F. Helms and J. Greene, *Army Family Support Requirements: Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm; Vol.1* (Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute, 1992).

[34] Bell, Schumm, Elig, Palmer-Johnson, and Tisak, "Helping Army Families Cope with Deployments"

[35] Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives,* 71, 79 report generally positive attitudes toward the Sinai mission. Almost 90% of soldiers in the initial battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division expected the mission to be interesting or exciting and about two-thirds were positive regarding the effect on their careers. For the Light Infantry unit, 56% expected the mission to be interesting or exciting and 39% anticipated positive career effects.

[36] Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives,* 138-139.

[37] Elig, *ARNG Officer Responses*; Elig, *ARNG Soldiers Responses*.

[38] D. Bruce Bell and Joel M. Teitelbaum, "Operation Restore Hope: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Army Spouses at Ft Drum, New York" (paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore, MD, October 1993); D. Bruce Bell, Joel M. Teitelbaum, and Walter R. Schumm, "Family support 'Lessons Learned' in Operation Restore Hope (Somalia): An Army Mission Other Than War," *Military Review* (in press).

[39] Bell and Teitelbaum, "ORH: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Army Spouses at Ft Drum."

[40] The relatively high levels of concern shown here may be due to when the measures were taken. ODS/S soldiers, (in Elig, *ARNG Officer Responses* and Elig, *ARNG Soldiers Responses*) said that their level of worry about family was higher during ODS/S (61%) than after (31%). Our survey was asked while the soldiers were still in the Sinai, whereas Elig's was administered after the soldier had returned to the United States. Compared to AC spouses of ORH soldiers, we find more of our RC soldiers reporting problems with children, disasters, legal matters, and having pregnant wives. They were about equally likely to have financial and household repair problems. They were less likely to be lonely or have problems communicating back home, see Bell and Teitelbaum, "ORH: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Army Spouses at Ft Drum." Table 14 has data about finances.

[41] Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families*.

[42] It is also possible that soldiers did not report accurately what their families were doing. However, this interpretation of the data would not explain why the phenomenon only occurred in the part of the sample from Outlying States.

[43] Bell, Stevens, and Segal, *How to Support Families*.

[44] Florence R. Rosenberg, "Spouses of Reservists and National Guardsmen," also noted that Army RC spouses tended to use services which were local (e.g. CHAMPUS) and attend events at the local armory.

Table 1

Representativeness of Samples of Married RC Soldiers

Variable	Unit Records	Surveys	X^2
Rank:			
Jr. Enlisted	55	51	2.26[a]
NCO	34	41	
Officer	10	8	
	100%	100%	
	(N=119)	(N=111)	
Location:			
Virginia	39	36	1.25[a]
Maryland	28	27	
Other	33	37	
	100%	100%	
	(N=119)	(N=100)	

Note. [a] Not significant at the .05 level.

Table 2

Resources for Coping with Deployment Strains: What the Soldier Brings at the start of the MFO

Variable	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=63)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=334)
Characteristics			
Rank (% NCO or Officer)	44%	45%	44%[a]
Education (% Some college)	44%	34%	63%[b]
Home ownership (% who own)	40%	32%	55%[b]
Can count on MFO friend at least a moderate extent*	73%	75%	70%[a]
Attitudes			
Satisfaction with Army life (% satisfied/very satisfied)	81%	82%	79%[a]
Feel positive about going to the Sinai	98%	100%	94%[a]
Expected MFO effect on family:			
Negative effect on marriage	43%	40%	48%[a]
Negative effect on parent role	28%	32%	20%[a]

Note. Difference between the 2 groups (division area and outlying states: [a] Not statistically significant; [b] Significant at the .05 level.

* This variable was measured 5/95, which is 8 months after the unit was formed.

Table 3

Resources for Coping with Deployment Strains: What is in the Marriage?

Variable	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=51)[b]	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=31)
	Characteristics		
Duration of marriage (% more than 5 years)	35%	29%	43%[a]
Spouse supportive of MFO decision	84%	82%	86%[a]
Marital satisfaction before deployment	88%	83%	95%[a]
Family manageability (can cope with demands)	84%	83%	85%[a]
Marital quality good)	83%	84%	82%[a]
Marriage not at risk	77%	76%	78%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level; [b] In this and tables below, some items have smaller Ns than shown because some respondents omitted some items; this is especially true for questions about children since not all married soldiers have children.

Table 4

Anticipated Support from Informal Networks

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=48)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=28)
Extent spouse can count on:			
Parent/close relative	3.1	3.3	2.8[a]
A non-Army neighbor/friend	2.5	2.4	2.5[a]
Church/Social Organization member	2.0	1.8	2.3[a]
A co-worker at her work	2.0	2.0	1.9[a]

Mean scores on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (Very great extent) scale

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 5

Anticipated Support from Army Leaders and Agencies

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=48)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=28)
Extent spouse can count on:			
Local RC unit leader	2.5	2.6	2.4[a]
Army Agency staff	1.7	1.9	1.5[a]
FSG - Ft Bragg	1.9	1.9	1.9[a]
MFO's Rear Detachment	1.9	1.9	1.9[a]
MFO TF Leader	1.8	1.8	1.9[a]
An "Army" friend\neighbor	1.6	1.7	1.5[a]
FSG - not at Ft Bragg	1.3	1.2	1.7[a]

Mean scores on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (Very great extent) scale

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 6

Problems Soldiers and Families Experienced During the Deployment

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=54)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=26)
Percentage of soldiers experiencing these problems			
Loneliness	89%	87%	92%[a]
Family safety	56%	48%	73%[b]
Family Health	53%	43%	73%[c]
Disturbing calls	42%	38%	50%[a]
Children problems	38%	33%	46%[a]
Problems communicating	35%	32%	42%[a]
Household repairs	34%	26%	50%[b]
Rumors	31%	33%	27%[a]
Financial problems	27%	25%	31%[a]
Own safety	19%	15%	27%[a]
Disaster Floods, etc.	19%	17%	23%[a]
Legal problems	18%	13%	27%[a]
Wife's pregnancy	8%	8%	8%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant; [b] Significant at the .05 level; [c] Significant at the .01 level.

Table 7

Participation in Family Support Activities

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=51)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=26)
Activity			
Activation Ceremony	36%	39%	28%[a]
Pre-deployment Orientation	29%	41%	4%[b]
FSG-Not at Fort Bragg	27%	33%	17%[a]
National Guard Workshops	12%	12%	12%[a]
MFO Teleconference	9%	8%	12%[a]
FSG-Bragg	6%	4%	8%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level; [b] Significant at the .01 level.

Table 8

Families' Receipt of Family Support Information Sources

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=40)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=16)
	% of soldier families who received this service		
Battalion family handbook	80%	83%	71%[a]
Battalion newsletter	67%	69%	63%[a]
National Guard flyers	50%	59%	29%[b]
National Guard letters	46%	53%	29%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at .05 level; [b] Significant at the .05 level.

Table 9

Use of Other Army Agencies and Services

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=46)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=22)
% of soldiers (or soldiers' families) that used this service			
Soldier's RC unit	30%	29%	30%[a]
Army Legal Services	27%	24%	33%[a]
AC/RC spouses	23%	30%	5%[b]
MFC Rear Detachment	20%	20%	20%[a]
Army chaplains	18%	16%	23%[a]
Army Financial Services	17%	16%	19%[a]
Family Support Groups	15%	20%	5%[a]
Army Community Services	8%	12%	0%[a]
National Guard State HQ	7%	7%	6%[a]
Army Emergency Relief	6%	4%	10%[a]
Army Social Work Service	2%	2%	0%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level; [b] Significant at the .05 level.

Table 10

Use of Informal Social Supports

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=46)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=19)
% of soldiers (or soldiers' families) that used this service			
Extended family	51%	52%	47%[a]
Non-Army Friends/neighbors	44%	41%	53%[a]
Members: Church/Soc. Org.	20%	18%	24%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 11

Use of Non-Army Agencies

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=44)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=21)
% of soldiers or soldiers' families) that used this service			
American Red Cross	9%	11%	5%[a]
Civilian support agency	5%	7%	0%[a]
Professional counselors	0%	0%	0%[a]

Note. [a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 12

Soldier Recommendations for Next RC Deployment

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=51)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=26)
	Percent of soldiers who agree/strongly agree		
Toll free 1-800 for family help	86%	82%	92%[a]
More free (morale) calls	84%	82%	89%[a]
Encourage RC units to write their soldiers	79%	80%	77%[a]
Help soldiers send videos	74%	75%	73%[a]
Send BN newsletter to families	74%	78%	65%[a]
Help families send videos	73%	75%	69%[a]
Help RC understand AC family system	73%	77%	65%[a]
Have FSG outside Ft. Bragg area	71%	75%	65%[a]
Distribute family support handbook	71%	73%	69%[a]
Have a family assistance officer	67%	68%	65%[a]
Help spouses deal with merchants	66%	67%	65%[a]
Have emergency leave board	65%	67%	62%[a]
Family time before deployment	64%	63%	65%[a]
Improve BN family publications	62%	63%	62%[a]
Speedup Red Cross messages	60%	61%	58%[a]
Leader training on family support	58%	59%	58%[a]
Child rearing advice for spouses	46%	48%	42%[a]
Restrict MFO participation to four contigous states	38%	37%	39%[a]
Have FSG at Fort Bragg	30%	29%	31%[a]

Note. [a] None of the differences between the two groups is significant at the .05 level.

Table 13

Changes in the Marriage/Family

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=41)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=23)
Initial (avg.) Responses			
Marital characteristics:			
Marital stability[a]	1.77	1.76	1.78
Marital quality[b]	2.78	2.78	2.78
Marital satisfaction[c]	5.26	5.16	5.42
MFO impact on:			
your child[d]	3.08	3.00	3.21
your parental role[e]	3.10	2.94	3.25
your relationship with your child[f]	3.21	2.95	3.73
Mid-deployment avg. responses			
Marital stability	1.88	1.89	1.96
Marital quality	2.65	2.67	2.61
Marital satisfaction	5.13	5.16	5.08
MFO impact on:			
your child	2.81	2.78	2.89
your parental role	3.07	3.12	2.94
your relationship with your child	3.07	3.07	3.06

Note: None of the changes from pre- to mid-deployment were stastically significant.

[a] Marital Stability: Marital Trouble: 1=Yes; 2=No
[b] Marital Quality: 1=Very Poor; 5=Very Good
[c] Marital Satisfaction: 1=Very Unhappy; 7=Very Happy
[d] MFO impact your child: 1=Very Negative; 5=Very Positive
[e] MFO impact your role: 1=Very Negative; 5=Very Positive
[f] MFO impact your relationship: 1=Very Negative; 5=Very Positive

Table 14

Changes in Relationship of Family to the Army

	Total	Soldier's home: Division Area (N=53)	Soldier's home: Outlying State (N=29)
Outcomes			
Finances improved since joining MFC	41%	36%	50%[a]
Spouse changed living arrangement	25%	20%	36%[a]
Marriage affect MFC performance positively	32%	37%	21%[a]
Spouse support for the MFC: (% supportive or very Supportive)			
Initially	84%[b]	82%	86%
At mid-deployment	75%[b]	71%	84%

Note: None of these Marital outcomes changed.
[a] Not statistically significant at the .05 level; [b] The decline in support is significant at the .05 level.