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7 JANUARY 1987

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO HALT EROSION THREATENING WEST COAST

Dakar AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 15 Oct 86 pp 22-23

[Article by Sory Balde; "The Sea Against Africa"]

[Text] For centuries uncounted, the coast of West Africa has been slipping into the Atlantic Ocean. The phenomenon was first reported by the colonial authorities and, today, almost nobody talks about it. In Senegal, for instance, Rufisque, Yoff, St. Louis, Joal, and a lot more segments of the shoreline are yielding a few meters each year to the hungry sea. Not so long ago, people still remember, a great many houses in the Yoff section of town had simply slipped into the sea in the course of a single night.

At Rufisque, for some 30 years and more, the people who live here have been struggling against this erosion. The young people are not quite so keenly aware of what is happening as are their elders. Their parents, those who are very old and those who are not so very old, remember that there used to be a broad beach between their houses and the shoreline, a beach where, for years on end, they had played soccer. The young ones have seen that beach disappear, and their elders, despite their many efforts and their fervent prayers, have watch the (inexorable?) inroads of the threat.

In Togo, too, since 1980 the sea has advanced at least 135 meters toward the interior of the continent. Palm-groves have vanished, and so have tourist attractions such as the city of Aneho, the ancient capital of the country—all victims of erosion. The road that runs along the shore has twice been abandoned, while several villages, to avoid being drowned out, have already had to pull back from the advancing tides, and to do so repeatedly. In the capital, Lome, close to the phosphate enrichment plant, 15 meters of the shoreline have been swallowed up.

In Ghana, the city of Keta, which was home to at least 10,000 souls, has slipped into the sea. In Guinea, even though the

damage has not been devastating, the Atlantic has mounted onslaughts on Touguiwondy and Corinthit (conakry neighborhoods). Benin's coast is also under attack, and that is something that must inevitably worry Lagos, which is only a few tens of kilometers from this "cancer of the continent." To put it bluntly, the entire region, from the Gulf of Guinea to San-Louis in Senegal, is affected. The littoral regions of central Africa, too, must start preparations now, because the symptoms of the disease are beginning to be felt.

This erosion is the inevitable and predictable result of man's wanton exploitation of the environment. It is, however, and at the same time, the result of several natural phenomena, such as the inexorable battering of the great swells from the sea, the rains, and the waves. For these natural causes, littoral erosion generally occurs only during the rainy season that lasts from July through September, especially along the Senegal coasts. It is during this season that runoff from the torrential rains mixed with the high surf, devastate all the sandy portions of the shore.

Today it would be no exaggeration to say that it is, more than anything else, the behavior of people that encourages the sea's inroads into the continent. First of all such destructive behavior is negligence: people are not given to face up to danger until it is about to strangle them. Next, and perhaps most of all, is the removal of sand from the beaches for use in building houses, which has marked the path of erosion. Lastly, in the cases of Togo and Ghana, it needs to be pointed out that construction of Ghana's hydroelectric dam across the Volta at Akossombo is the prime cause of erosion in the region.

This dam holds back most of the sediments which, in the old days, used to be deposited along the Atlantic coast where they halted all erosion. To put it another way, there are development problems which were sloppily conceived and which trigger other even bigger problems. Lastly, it must be noted that, in our countries, the habit of expecting "somebody else" to bail us out of our troubles is not very helpful in coping with our difficulties. If indeed, once the erosion problem was identified, efforts to counter it had been undertaken, we should perhaps never have come to this tragedy now being played out with a cast of thousands along our Atlantic coasts.

Now that the powers that be are trying to treat this "cancer," they are once again faced with a disconcerting finding: yet another priority we had forgotten. What is it? The fact that in order to cope efficaciously with this disease, they must come up, right now, with some painfully large sums of money to treat an illness that, while it was not yet this severe, would have called for only a small investment.

In Togo the government has applied to the UNDP, the World Bank, and the European Economic Community, all of which have financed studies. We are still stuck in this stage, even though the scourge has been eating away at the country for at least 15 years. True, we have done better than some other countries where the issue is given the silent treatment. The authorities are aware, though, that there is no more time to waste, they say, because, "if we don't do something about it, within the next year, the phosphate storage and loading docks (phosphate accounts for 50 percent of the country's exports) as well as the processing plant, will have been engulfed."

A race against time will start within the next few months. Already the idea of erecting breakwaters perpendicular to the coast to catch and retain the runoff sediments has been approved to halt the erosion. It will be a herculean undertaking in which countries such as Mali, Burkina, and Niger, which depend for a major portion of their supplies on the Port of Lome, should support. None of these states, though, seems to be aware of the enormity of the destruction of the Togolese littoral by erosion.

In Senegal efforts are already under way to combat erosion. The trouble with all this is that the continent has not stopped inching into the sea. The state of emergency was decreed long ago by the Public Works Directorate, which is leading the fight all along the Senegalese coast against the advancing sea. As for the special case of Rufisque, the zone hardest hit by the invading waters, a number of projects have already been completed. Even today, to continue with its program, the Public Works Directorate will shortly issue a call for bids for a new section of dike extending along 400 meters.

The first portion, 930 meters in length, which cost more than 400 million francs, has enabled the people of Rufisque to look forward with high hopes to what their future will be.

At Public Works headquarters they feel that "the ball is in the government's court now," and that it must make the wherewithal available to us. "Our plan," adds Yaya Badiane, an engineer in Public Works, "will not be operational until we get help from the government." Pursuit of the Public Works project at Rufisque will take only a trifling 400 million francs. If we put it off, it will certainly cost more and, furthermore, it will come too late to save the houses, schools, mosques, and government offices in the prefecture which could not even contemplate standing up against the breakers.

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CSO: 3419/33

STUDY EXAMINES TWO ALTERNATIVE TRADING ROUTES FOR SOUTHERN REGION

Beira-Mutare Route Vital to SADCC

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Nov 86 p 12

[Article by John D'Oliveira]

[Text]

If Zambia and Malawi can use the Mozambican port of Beira for all their imports and exports, they will save almost R600 million in vital foreign exchange.

This, in turn, will mean an equivalent loss of earnings by the South African transport system.

These points are made in the latest monthly bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa by one of the AI researchers, Mr Andre Wilsenach.

He points out that the Beira Corridor — between Beira and the Zimbabwean town of Mutare — is vital to the interests of Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.

Both the Mutare-Beira railway and the port of Beira are handling only a small proportion of their traffic potential.

However, should both be rehabilitated and developed, the route will offer massive savings for Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, all three of which are now heavily dependent on South African railways and harbours.

Whereas Durban is 2 065 km from Harare, 2 571 km from Lusaka and 3 658 km from Blantyre, the distance from these capitals to Beira is 600 km, 1 050 km and 649 km respectively.

Based on the amount of traffic which moves through South Africa from Malawi and Zambia, these countries will save R598 million if they can use Beira instead of Durban.

Mr Wilsenach says that Zambia (40 percent of exports and 70 percent of imports), Zim-

babwe (between 65 and 90 percent of exports and between 65 and 80 percent of imports) and Malawi (50 percent of exports and 60 percent of imports) are forced to use South African railways and ports.

However, Beira harbour is delapidated and ineffective, the railway line is unsafe, freight and insurance rates are high and the movement of ships through Beira is erratic.

This is largely due to the civil war between Mozambican Government troops and Mozambique National Resistance movement rebels during the course of which large sections of the Beira-Mutare railway line have been destroyed and Beira harbour installations damaged.

Troop protection

As a result, only one train a day in each direction can use the line under the protection of an estimated 4 000 Zimbabwean troops who have been sent to protect the corridor from the MNR.

In 1984, Beira harbour could handle only 1,3 million tons of cargo.

Finally, the line from Beira to Blantyre is totally inoperative, and Mr Wilsenach says experts believed that it will be impossible to rehabilitate the line for as long as the war continues.

It is against this background that a massive, international effort is being made to reconstruct, rehabilitate and develop both the Beira-Mutare railway and the port installations at Beira.

In April, a conference was held in Maputo at which a 10-year plan aimed at increasing

the traffic through Beira from 1,3 million tons a year to 5,1 million tons a year by 1995.

The three-phase plan would have cost almost R1 500 million.

In order to raise money for the scheme, SADCC held a conference in Beira recently during which 63 separate projects were presented to a group of "donor" countries and international organisations. Of the 63 projects, 40 involving a total expenditure of almost R600 million were identified as "priority projects".

After two days of discussion, the conference adopted a package of 26 projects which will cost an estimated R350 million.

Finally, representatives from the European Community, the World Bank and the African Development Bank agreed to become involved in the 26 "priority projects" and said they could raise R290 million of the R350 million required.

The SADCC said it would not be a problem raising the additional R60 million.

The most urgent of the projects involves the rehabilitation of Beira harbour where 11 berths will have to be rebuilt at a cost of about R136 million.

The 314 km railway from Beira to Mutare will have to be relaid and its various attendant facilities will have to be rehabilitated and improved.

Major rehabilitation

Once this work has been done, more than five million tons of goods can be moved through Beira every year.

Apart from this major rehabilitation scheme, the Nordic countries have announced that they will become involved in a R450 million project to rehabilitate both the harbour and the railway.

The Reagan Administration has also said that it is considering a R1 300 million development grant for the SADCC countries, aimed mainly at improving the region's transport infrastructure.

Mr Wilsenach says this indicates that the Beira corridor can be developed into a short-cut for Southern Africa.

However, much will depend on how effectively the different contributions can be co-ordinated and whether Mozambique can resolve the military and political differences within that country.

Experts Confident about Tazara's Future

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Nov 86 p 12

[Article by John D'Oliveira]

[Text]

Despite the many, varied and serious problems which have plagued the so-called Great Freedom Railway from Dar es Salaam to Zambia, experts seem "generally confident" about its future.

Writing in the latest monthly bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, Mr Andre Wilsenach says that the Tazara railway has shown that it can be run profitably — and that this has eliminated much of the scepticism over the line.

First conceived in 1924, it was not until Rhodesian UDI threatened Zambian trade links with the south that the project got under way.

In 1967 Zambia and Tanzania signed a joint agreement with China in terms of which China would con-

struct the railway, provide the locomotives and rolling stock and supply the necessary money by way of a R300 million interest-free loan.

Repayments would be stretched over 30 years, starting in 1983.

Construction of the Great Freedom Railway (as it was dubbed by the Chinese) by more than 5 000 Chinese workers started in 1970 and, by 1973 it had reached the Zambian border. Two years later, the line linked up with Zambia's existing rail system.

Workers had laid 1 860 km of track, built 147 stations and 300 bridges, constructed 26 tunnels and dug more than 2 200 cuttings through Tanzania's southern highlands.

The line was designed to carry a freight load of 2.5 million tons a year, including almost all of Zambia's precious copper exports.

However, right from the time the first freight train ran in 1976, the railway was beset with problems. In 1984 it had to be closed for a period of four months and it has never been able to carry more than 65 percent of Zambia's exports and 35 percent of its imports.

Capacity

Nor had it been able to handle more than about 1.2 million tons of freight — less than half its designed capacity — a year.

One of the major problems had been Dar es Salaam's inability to handle Zambian freight quickly and effectively. As a result, storage facilities had to be constructed for Zambian goods and a complaining Zambia was expected to foot the bill.

As a result of the Dar es Salaam inefficiency, Zambian foreign earnings dropped and Zambia was unable to pay for the use of the railway line and of the harbour facilities.

This led, in turn, to serious friction between Zambia and Tanzania and between Zambia and the Tazara Railway Authority.

Apart from anything else, it resulted in Zambia's increased use of

the longer, more expensive (but much more efficient) South African transport system. This further incensed Tanzania and the Tazara Railway Authority, which saw the Zambian use of South African facilities as a Zambian admission that the Tazara railway had failed in its major goal.

Another serious problem was the constant shortage of operational locomotives.

From the beginning the Chinese locomotives had proved underpowered for the gradients in Tanzania's southern highlands. Locomotives frequently broke down in remote places and in May 1978, for instance, only 48 of the 85 locomotives supplied by China were operational.

Of the locomotives provided by China between 1976 and 1979, 35 had broken down completely and were believed to be unrepairable. Another 18 have had to be fitted with rebuilt engines instead of the Chinese engines.

Problems

Tazara officials believed they needed a minimum of 52 locomotives which had had their engines replaced. Alternatively, Tazara could enlarge its fleet of 14 powerful German locomotives to 20.

Apart from these problems, the Tazara authority's rolling stock dwindled from 1 997 wagons in 1976

to 1 750 in 1984, largely because of ineffective maintenance.

During the rainy season, long sections of the track were washed away because of dubious construction methods. Problems had also been experienced with bridges weakened by termites.

However, despite these setbacks, Tazara turned its first profit in 1981/82 and the arrival of the 14 West German locomotives in June, 1983, meant a significant improvement in the railway's operations.

Improvements were made at the Dar es Salaam harbour and, between October 1983 and December 1983 Tazara and the harbour increased the flow of cargo from 50 000 tons to 100 000 tons a month.

In 1984 China sent a team of experts to help with the management of the railway line.

In December 1984, Tazara announced a 10-year development plan involving 22 projects which would cost about R350 million. Emphasis was placed on 15 projects which would be implemented over the first five years at a cost of R105 million.

Mr Wilsenach says that, if Tazara can manage within the next few years to get sufficient funds for the improvement of the railway, it is expected that the Tazara line will, increasingly, provide Southern Africa with an alternative to South Africa's transport infrastructure.

/9274

CSO: 3400/569

CAPE VERDE

FARMING, ANTI-DESERTIFICATION PROJECTS DESCRIBED

Paris AFRIQUE NOUVELLE in French 29 Oct 86 pp 22-23

[Article by Evelyne Sylva: "A Challenge to Nature"]

[Text] It certainly takes real valor to make an arid rock pile productive. This permanent battle has become a daily and community effort. This is the price of survival.

People are often surprised to hear about farming in Cape Verde after years of drought and, moreover, that there are vegetable, fruit and even grain harvests.

Is it just a pretense of production since it is far from meeting the country's needs? Yes, it is. Nevertheless, the markets are full of vegetables, fruits, corn, beans and other cereals.

How does Cape Verde do it, which, with its most unpredictable rainfall, poor soil caused by overuse, unbalanced ecosystem and continuing drought, looks like one of the most desolate landscapes of the Sahelian countries?

The answer is certainly found in this sentence of French agronomist Rene Dumont, "In other countries of the Sahel, people talk about the drought; in Cape Verde, people work to fight it without needing to talk."

The battle against the drought on the archipelago, a real challenge to nature, is made up of several parts. It begins with the protection and restoration of ground cover and pastures. Thus, a large reforestation effort has been made. At the time of independence that were only 3,000 hectares of forests out of a total 400,000 hectares. In 1985, 10 years later, nearly 27,000 hectares were reforested with 13 million trees. Between now and the end of the second development plan, Cape Verdian authorities plan to reforest more than 60,000 hectares. The forest species selected for reforestation

are eucalyptus, pines, cypress for high elevations, prosopis, parkinsonia for ground covering and Angolan peas which have certain drought-resistant qualities.

Water has long been a precious liquid here because of the unevenly distributed, unpredictable and limited rainfall, and many efforts have been made to collect and conserve it.

For example, on the Island of Fogo, the community or individuals dug wells to collect and conserve the limited rain water.

At this level, the main difficulty lies in retaining the water. Studies are under way about providing more drinking water.

Similarly, the country has become involved in the restoration and diversification of water facilities. More than 14,000 dikes were built across the islands to conserve water from torrential rains which otherwise washes much sediment to the sea and impoverishes the soil still more. To save the available water, there are about 642 wells, dozens of canals were dug and efforts were made to desalinate sea water for farming and drinking purposes.

The MDR [Rural Development Movement] officials explained the limited use of fertilizers by the high cost of chemical fertilizers (for the peasants) and their recent introduction into farming. Currently cow and chicken droppings are mainly used.

Scientific research is not ignored. The National Center for Agricultural Research has projects involving varietal improvement (in other words, the development of strains of corn and beans, the basic foods of the people, which are more resistant to climatic conditions).

Quality seed production goes on. There is a 5-year project to improve and increase potato production while decreasing hard currency expenses for the import of seeds. Over 120 hectares are farmed.

If MDR officials are to be believed, truck garden farming is doing well in Cape Verde. "We could even be self-sufficient in vegetables," one of the two told us. The land allotted for this is certainly considerable--300 hectares of tomatoes, pimentos, cabbages, lettuce and cucumbers, and 250 hectares (Santiago, San Antao) for sweet potatoes and manioc. Some islands supposedly even produce a surplus of vegetables. Exportation from one island to another is the bottleneck; it is not always easy and, unfortunately, there are still no real refrigeration facilities for produce. Produce sometimes even spoils in the markets.

This fight against nature is a struggle for survival. Agriculture employs more than 65 percent of the total population. Most of the latter are semi-urbanized and farm during the rainy season. Moreover, as everywhere else, women represent 30 percent of the work force in this sector.

Various types of crops are cultivated on the islands to make these arid lands productive. More than 35,000 hectares, 58 percent, are devoted to non-irrigated crops on the island of Santiago. More than 95 percent of the land is allocated for corn and beans.

Some 200 hectares are irrigated. The farming islands (Santiago and San Antao) split 40 percent of the space. Sugar cane and bananas (for export) take up the most land there, followed by sweet potatoes, manioc and vegetables.

The challenge is far from being won since the country's production is clearly less than the consumers' needs. The food deficit in 1986 was around 13,675 tons of corn and 4,000 tons of beans.

The corn and bean harvests were disastrous in 1985--1,323 tons of corn and 2,130 tons of beans while total consumption needs in 1986 amounted to 43,600 tons of corn and 7,300 tons of beans.

Fortunately, food aid (29,300 tons of cereals, for example) helps reduce food imports which account for an average of 40 percent of the total imports.

The other sector of Cape Verdian agriculture is stock breeding. Curiously, it does not seem much affected by agricultural problems. The advantage lies in the fact that harvest by-products are used for livestock--the white tips of sugar cane, corn husks, dried sweet potato vines and agro-business by-products (the flour mill of San Vincente makes mixed feed for pigs and milk cows).

Finally, agriculture, with its problems, is starting enterprises and production units. The ENAVI [National Poultry Enterprise] raises and markets chicks, chickens and eggs; the Enterprise for the Development of Farming and Stock Breeding produces and markets farm products and livestock. There is also an agro-business complex (Justino Lopes) in Praia which deals in fruit and vegetable production, farm food processing and meats.

This effort to give proper importance to Cape Verdian farming, particularly to raise the people's nutritional standard is embodied in the Monte Gelnebra (Fogo Island) farm. Initially, the purpose was to collect and use spring water (Nona Senhora do Socorro) which flowed to the sea, in the context of an integrated development project on the islands of Fogo and Brava.

Today this farm with a total surface of 60 hectares (16 irrigated) has a considerable fruit and vegetable harvest. Monte Genebra sells 70 percent of its crop directly to the people of Fogo. However, the limited buying power of the people, the lack or inefficiency of refrigeration and transportation facilities and farm-related problems (weeds, fertilizer shortage) limit production. With the coming of the rains this year, the Cape Verdian peasants are confident.

In spite of everything, farming remains the principal resource in Cape Verde for the moment. For this reason, many projects are centered around it.

9479

CSO: 3419/38

ETHIOPIA

EPRP SENDS ENVOYS TO U.S., CANADA, EUROPE

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Nov 86 p 4

[Text] For the first time since it was formed in 1975 the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, the most secretive of the Ethiopian opposition groups, has sent two of its leaders to the United States, Canada and Europe for a public campaign of propaganda and contact. After a two-month tour of North America, the two delegates of the 23-member EPRP Central Committee, who called themselves Marsha and Fisha, spoke to THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER on November 4. They said the movement was now military active in five districts (awraja) of Gondar and Gollam regions, east of Lake Tana. They said their forces numbered "fewer than 3,000 armed men", but said the present economic and political situation favoured the EPRP, given the enormous discontent of the rural population.

At the same time, the EPRP leaders said, the political alliance which the party had formed with the Ethiopian Democratic Union after its 1984 congress had begun armed operations four months ago. The EDU, which up till then had no fighters inside Ethiopia, had launched a guerrilla campaign in Gondar region.

/13104

CSO: 3400/53₆

CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS PROPOSED CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS

Provisions Slated for Amendment Outlined

Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 15 Nov 86 pp 1, 24

[Article by Mutegi Njau]

[Text] A bill seeking to amend the Constitution to abolish the office of the Chief Secretary and to increase the number of electoral parliamentary seats from 158 to 168 has been published.

Appearing in a special issue of the KENYA GAZETTE published yesterday, the Bill also seeks to amend the Constitution to remove the security of tenure for the holders of the office of the Attorney-General and the Controller and Auditor-General.

The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment Bill) 1986, will be tabled in Parliament next week and, if passed, will come into operation on a day to be named by the President through KENYA GAZETTE notice.

According to the Bill, section 22(1) of the Constitution establishing the office of the Chief Secretary will be repealed and replaced by a new section.

The new section 22(1) gives the President powers to appoint a number of Permanent Secretaries that he may determine.

Section 22(2) establishes the office of the Permanent Secretary to the Office of the President who "shall be the Head of the Public Service."

The older section 22(1), which has been deleted, stated: "there shall be a Chief Secretary who shall be the Head of the Public Service and who shall exercise supervision of the Office of the President and general supervision of and co-ordination of all departments of Government."

Section 111 of the Constitution has also been amended in the new Bill by deleting the words "Chief Secretary."

To increase the number of electoral parliamentary constituencies, the new Bill seeks to amend section 42 of the Constitution.

The new section 42 (2) states: "Parliament may prescribe the minimum number of constituencies into which Kenya shall be divided (which shall not be less than 168) and the maximum number of constituencies (which shall exceed the minimum number by at least 20) and until Parliament has so prescribed, the minimum number of constituencies shall be 168 and the maximum shall be 188."

To remove the security of tenure for the holder of the office of the Attorney-General, the new Bill seeks to amend section 109 of the Constitution.

Sub-section (2) of section 109 has been amended by deleting subsection (4), (6) and (8) and inserting a new sub-section (4).

The new sub-section (4) states: "Subject to this section, the Attorney-General shall vacate his office when he attains such an age as may be prescribed by Parliament."

The Bill also seeks to delete sub-sections (5), (6), (7) and (8) of section 109 of the Constitution.

Sub-section (5) of that section will be deleted. It stated that the Attorney-General may be removed from office only for inability to exercise the functions of his office (whether from infirmity of body) or for misbehaviour.

Also to be deleted is sub-section (6), which stated that the A-G may be removed from office by the President if the question of his removal has been referred to a tribunal appointed under sub-section (7), and the tribunal has recommended to the President that the A-G ought to be removed.

Sub-section (7) which will also be deleted, stated: "If the President considers that the question of removing the Attorney-General under this section ought to be investigated, then:

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"The President shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a chairman and not less than two other members selected by the President from among persons who hold or have held office as a

judge of the High Court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some parts of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such court.

"The tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the President and recommend to him whether the A-G ought to be removed under this section."

Sub-section (8), also to be deleted, required that, if the question of removing the A-G had been referred to the President and a tribunal appointed to inquire into the matter, the President may suspend the Attorney-General.

If the Bill goes through Parliament, the President does not have to appoint a tribunal before removing the Attorney-General.

To remove the security of tenure for the holder of the office of the Controller and Auditor-General, the new Bill seeks to amend section 110 of the Constitution.

Sub-section (2) deletes sub-sections (3), (5) and (7) and a new sub-section (3) is inserted.

The new sub-section (3) states: "Subject to this section, the Controller and Auditor-General shall vacate his office when he attains such an age as may be prescribed by Parliament."

As is the case with the office of the Attorney-General, the sections deleted are those requiring that before the Controller and Auditor-General was removed from office, the President had to appoint a tribunal to investigate the question of whether or not to remove him or her.

According to the memorandum of objects and reasons, the enactment of the Bill will involve additional expenditure of public funds, but the amount cannot be estimated.

The Bill is signed by the Attorney-General, Mr Matthew Muli.

A Bill amending the Constitution to establish the Office of the Chief Secretary was published on June 4, 1982. It was later tabled in Parliament where it sailed through.

The first holder of the office was Mr Jeremiah Kiereini, who retired from the Civil Service in July, 1984. Before then there used to be only the office of the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President who was the Head of the Civil Service. The present Chief Secretary is Mr Simeon Nyachae.

Council of Churches Warns On Changes

Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 25 Nov 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mutegi Njau and Pius Nyamora]

[Text] **The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCKK) said yesterday it was "deeply concerned" about the proposed changes in Kenya's Constitution to remove the security of tenure of the offices of the Attorney-General and the Controller and Auditor-General.**

And as the NCKK was "keenly studying" the implications of the Bill the Minister for Labour, Mr Peter Okondo, rebuked the Law Society of Kenya for trying to create false alarm that Kenya's democracy would be in danger if the Bill is passed in Parliament.

In a statement read out to the *Nation* by Bishop Alexander Muge of the Church of the Province of Kenya's Eldoret Diocese the NCKK said the Church was "Keenly studying the implications the proposed changes would have on the constitution and issue another statement to declare the Church's stand".

Bishop Muge was reading the statement on behalf of the NCKK general secretary, Mr John Kamau, and the Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Kenya, The Rt. Rev Lawi Imathiu — who had signed it — following a meeting in Nairobi.

The statement said in part: "The NCKK notes that the Bill published in the November 14 issue of the *Kenya Gazette* seeks *inter alia* to amend the Constitution to remove the security of tenure of both the offices of the Attorney-General and the Controller and Auditor-General."

It said the NCKK was "deeply concerned" about the proposed changes and was studying their implications to the Constitution.

The statement said the NCKK however, was "pleased" that the Bill also seeks to increase the

number of constituencies proportionally so as to ensure wider representation of wananchi in Parliament.

The NCKK statement did not mention the proposal in the Bill to abolish the post of the Chief Secretary.

Rebuking the Law Society yesterday for its opposition to the clauses of the Bill which intend to remove security of tenure of the offices of the Attorney-General and that of the Controller and Auditor-General, Mr Okondo said that security was demanded by colonial settlers who were not sure about their future when Kenya became independent.

"The recent history of Kenya from independence has misled the public to think that the A.G. is permanent, it is not," he said. "The A.G. was made permanent as a bargaining point for independence at Lancaster House."

Mr Okondo said the security of tenure had been demanded at independence by colonial settlers to protect their own future interests.

"The A.G. was made permanent as a bargaining point for independence at Lancaster House."

"The reason was that the settlers, who were here, were afraid that 'if these savages get independence' — that is what they thought of Africans — if Africans got independence, they would not rule by any law."

"And, therefore, the compensation which the British Government had promised them for their farms would not be paid."

"So they wanted an (English) Attorney-General who could not be removed except by a very complicated process. And that is how we got Mr Griffith-Jones as the first A.G."

"The idea was that, because he was British, we could not remove him without a complicated system. Therefore, he would give security to the settlers after independence. This is why the A.G.'s post was made so complicated."

"And because we wanted independence, we were not going to allow a small thing like that to hold it out. So we agreed. And for lack of action, we left the thing going for some time."

"But in political theory, it is wrong. The A-G cannot be permanent. He holds office only at the pleasure of the Head of the Government."

On Saturday, the Law Society strongly opposed the Bill and appealed to Members of Parliament to reject it as "being against the public interest".

The society's chairman, Mr G. B. M. Kariuki, said that if the security of tenure of the office of the Attorney-General was removed, "his independence will come to an end and there will be no guardian of the public interest from factional interests".

He said the "abolition of the Controller and Auditor-General's security of tenure will considerably weaken the accountability of our Government".

"The offices of the Attorney-General and the Controller and Auditor-General," he added, "are part and parcel of the scheme of checks and balances (between the three Government organs — the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary)."

Mr Okondo responded yesterday: "The Law Society's opposition to the proposed changes in the Constitution is inept, foreign in concept and ignorant of history."

He said the A-G's post was entrenched in the Constitution at independence on the insistence of the settlers "to allay their own fears of the dangers they thought an African majority government presented."

"We in turn accepted that entrenchment to expedite independence which was our main goal."

"We cannot live with

expediency for ever, especially since it was unfounded."

Addressing the Press in his Nairobi office, the Minister said that in all democracies, the Attorney-General was a political appointee of the party in power to act as the government's legal adviser and lawyer.

"Obviously the tenure of such an adviser holds only as the party in power wants him," the Minister said.

"Nowhere in the world is the A-G's post permanent. He is only a government lawyer, he is not a judge. He must hold office only as long as his employer, the party power, wants him."

"The idea of a permanent Attorney-General is alien to democracy," Mr Okondo said. "It shows how far ignorance can mislead an earnest person to look like charlatan," he said.

He reiterated: "Whether in the US or in the UK or in other Anglophone democracies, the A-G's post is held by a political appointee... Mr Kariuki should stop misleading the public and giving false alarms."

As for the Controller and Auditor-General, "he cannot hold office when he loses favour with the Government," said Mr Okondo. "All that is important in his auditing job is that he report to Parliament and not to the Government."

"As long as he retains his professional integrity and reports to Parliament, there is no danger."

On Sunday, Shariff Nassir, the Mombasa branch chairman of the ruling party, criticised the Law Society for its opposition.

Backbencher Rubia Demands Clarification

Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 28 Nov 86 pp 4-5

[Article by Muteji Njau, Pius Nyamora, Job Githinji and Irungu Ndirangu]

[Text] **The MP for Starehe, Mr Charles Rubia, yesterday expressed strong opposition to the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill.**

Contributing to the debate on the Bill in Parliament, Mr Rubia accused the Attorney-General, Mr Justice Matthew Muli, of failing to explain to the House why he wants to delete sections of the Constitution requiring that before the Attorney-General or the Controller and Auditor-

neral is sacked a tribunal should be appointed to investigate his activities.

But Mr Rubia's views on the Amendment Bill were vehemently opposed by a number of Cabinet Ministers, Assistant Ministers and MPs who contributed to the debate.

The controversial sections that the Bill seeks to delete are 109 (5), (6), (7) and (8), the same sections which the Law Society of Kenya and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) have criticised.

Amid foot-thumping by backbenchers, Mr Rubia said the A-G had not made any attempt to explain why he wants the sections deleted.

Mr Rubia — a former Cabinet Minister — said MPs should not insinuate any ill motive in his opposition to the Bill. He said the Constitution was a great document that could "lead Kenyans to great heights".

"What is the good reason being forwarded for removing the sections?" he asked.

Why was it difficult to remove the Attorney-General?

Mr Rubia said a former A-G, Mr Joseph Kamere, had been removed from office without any difficulty. The MP, therefore, could not see any explanation for removing the clauses.

He said Kenya was lucky in having President Moi as its leader. He said the clauses the Bill is deleting would remain in operation long after his presidency.

"We are all human beings. We don't live for ever," he said. He asked Mr Justice Muli to justify why he was asking Parliament to remove the security of tenure of the offices of the A-G and the Controller and Auditor-General.

He praised the Law Society chairman for doing much to explain the meaning of the controversial clauses.

He said the House should not be bulldozed into accepting to remove those clauses without any reasons being given.

"I plead with them (the Government) not to do things that we may have to regret in the future," he said.

He was genuinely pained to have to raise the issues with the possibility of being branded this or that, he said, and declared: "For goodness sake, I belong here. Please do not let us do things that we may regret in the future so that we might be forced to ask what did we do in the Nyayo era," he said.

He said he was disturbed by the unwarranted criticism levelled against the LSK and the NCCCK for voicing their views while during the debate on the Law of Succession Act, nobody, including Shariff Nassir, had objected when Muslims opposed the Bill.

Mr Rubia said he hoped Mr Justice Muli would clarify those points when he replies to the debate. He said in his contribution, Mr Justice Muli had acted as if there was a crisis in the Government and that he was defending it from something that he (Muli) did not make clear.

"Are we amending the Constitution simply because it is 23 years after independence?" he asked.

He agreed that the office of the Chief Secretary should be abolished and that constituency boundaries should be increased. But he asked why it had taken 20 years to review the boundaries and said the A-G had not told the House why.

Mr Rubia further said what was important was not the title of the post of Chief Secretary but the functions. The Head of State was the symbol of Kenya's unity and democracy, he said, and asked why the post (Chief Secretary's) was being abolished now and if there had arisen a question of loyalty.

Mr Rubia warned politicians against inviting political turmoil by condemning organisations voicing their views on national issues.

He said Mr Justice Matthew Muli had made a brilliant speech when moving the Bill but ended by creating more confusion as to why it was necessary to bring the amendments in the House.

Mr Rubia said he was disturbed by the fact that most of those debate had taken time to condemn and rebuke the Law Society of Kenya chairman, Mr G.B.M. Kariuki and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) for voicing their views about the Bill.

He stressed that the basic human rights and freedoms were enshrined in the Constitution and politicians should not condemn people for expressing those freedoms.

He said it was disturbing that Mr Kariuki had done much more to explain the sections that the AG wanted to delete in the Bill without giving the reasons why they should be deleted.

Saying that Kenya was lucky in having President Moi as its leader, Mr Rubia asked why

Parliament was being asked to delete the clauses that require the appointment of a tribunal before the two officers were removed.

"We are all human beings, and we don't live for ever," he said, adding: "What are the good reasons that are being forwarded for deleting those clauses? What has been the difficulty in removing an Attorney-General? We had Kamere (Mr Joseph Kamau Kamere a former A-G who was removed in 1983) and he was removed."

He quoted sections 77 and 78 of the Constitution which provide for the freedom of expression and conscience to remind MPs that they were wrong in condemning the NCCCK and the LSK.

Conscience

Mr Rubia reminded the MPs that they had taken an oath to protect and uphold the Constitution and that included the freedom of conscience and the freedom of expression.

He said MPs and the frontbench might disagree with the LSK and the NCCCK, but they should allow them to air their views.

"We are inviting trouble in this country if we muzzle and suppress those freedoms," he said, adding that he was worried that the President was possibly being fed with wrong advice simply because some people held differing opinions.

"I plead on behalf of everybody that people should be allowed to express their political opinions if we are to avoid political trouble."

At that juncture, the Minister for Energy and Regional Development, Mr Nicholas Biwott, interrupted Mr Rubia to ask if it was true that the Government had suppressed the freedom of expression or any other freedom.

Mr Rubia retorted that he had not said any freedom had been muzzled and said Mr Biwott was trying to put words in his mouth.

When Mr Rubia finished, the Minister for Education, Science and Technology, Mr Peter Oloo Aringo, rose and said the constitutional amendment has not been brought about by a crisis either in Government or in Parliament.

Rather, it had been brought about by a need to make the constitution more Kenyan and indigenous. He said this should be done in a democratic manner "that includes dialogue and respect of freedom of expression and conscience as stipulated in the Constitution".

But Mr Aringo charged that some MPs, including Mr Rubia,

had undertaken to harass the Government. He said this could not be allowed to go on.

But this was met with a barrage of points of order by Members, asking him to substantiate his claim.

The MP for Lurambi North, Mr Joshua Angatia, asked him to define what constitutes an harassment of Government. "When was the Government harassed and by whom?" Mr Angatia asked.

Mr Aringo stood up and said: "If you read between the lines of what Hon Rubia said, you will understand that his perception of Government... is to constantly harass Government."

The MP for Butere, Mr Martin Shikuku, on a point of order, said: "He is wrong! Who is harassing who? The National Christian Council of Kenya or the lawyers? Who is harassing who?"

Mr Aringo seemed to ignore the question. He urged the Speaker to allow him to continue with his contributions. He said the Lancaster House constitution was a compromise constitution. He said this had to be so because the Africans wanted to get independence. The compromise was necessary to take care of the various interests represented at Lancaster House, Mr Aringo said.

The MP for Wundanyi, Mr Mashengu wa Mwachofi, rose on a point of order, saying: "He has repeated constant harassment of Government. Can he substantiate?"

An impatient Mr Aringo this time shot back, saying: "The utterances of Rubia are tantamount to harassment of Government."

Mr Shikuku then rose on a point of order and said: "We have a standing order which says you do not impute improper motives in an MP's speech. Is he (Aringo) in order to impute improper motives on the MP?"

Mr Aringo: Mr Shikuku is raising points of arguments. He will have ample time to raise those points.

Mr Shikuku: Standing Order Number 68 demands that he substantiate. Can he substantiate there is constant harassment of Government? In which way was Hon Rubia harassing the Government?

Aringo: Mr Speaker, I am an equally elected Member of Parliament. He makes claims and counter-claims. The Lancaster House constitution was a compromise constitution. It had to take care of the interests of the British Government, the interests of settlers and the interests of the

African nationalists. All of these had to be protected. In the line of compromise we had to suffer a constitution that did not serve our interests as we wished them.

Mr Shikuku: He is wrong. The constitution we have has been amended before. It was amended when the Minister for Constitution and Justice was the late Tom Mboya. This is not the original constitution we brought from London.

Mr Aringo: Mr Speaker, the capacity to listen is very important. I only expressed a historical perspective. I put it in historical context... I want to say this is not the first time we are amending the constitution. We amended it to bring about a unitary state and bring (about) an republican constitution with an executive presidency. All we have here is heckling... like the honourable... I should be protected from hecklers.

The Speaker, Mr Fred Mati, intervened: "You are making... interruptions when Mr Aringo is speaking..."

Mr Aringo said politics of harassment and confrontation would fail. He said the Government was as popularly elected as those MPs harassing it. He had been elected three times to represent Alego constituency with landslide victories, he said.

The Minister said all the MPs had been popularly elected, and the nominated ones have been chosen by the President who had a nationwide mandate to do so.

Mr Aringo said Kenya had more than 20 million people other than Mr Rubia. He said Mr Rubia was enjoying the benefits of an open and free society because of the Kenyan tradition. He said the Government had not suppressed the alternative view. The Minister said the media had carried all the alternative views.

Heckling

This proved that Kenya was a democratic society protecting the freedom of expression and dialogue, he said.

He said "constant harassment of Government" cannot be the basis of democracy. Democracy was consensus of opinion, he said. "We have never suppressed attempts to arrive at a consensus."

The Minister warned against "the introduction of heckling in the House". He said introducing heckling in the chamber would reduce the dignity of Parliament.

There was nothing new in amending the constitution, he

said. Over the last 23 years, there had been a series of amendments to the constitution, he said. He charged that Mr Rubia was deliberately ignoring these amendments in his contributions. He said the amendments had been brought in a unicameral parliament. "We used to have a senate and a lower house. We have unicameral system," he said.

He said the amendments brought in an executive presidency. He said this was because the African tradition demanded that the father be at the centre of things at home. He said the President was central to all that happens in a country and was the most important person in a state.

He said the country has mandated the President to appoint all public servants "and we should not limit his powers at all".

The Minister said security of the jobs being amended did not lie in the constitution. Rather it lay in the political culture being developed in the country. He said that in Britain the chairman of a party who had a scandal resigned because the political culture there demanded so.

Mr Aringo said that at one time someone tried to usurp the powers of the presidency by creating "an alternative centre of power. Thank God his schemes failed. If you looked at the powers of the

Chief Secretary, they were like those of a prime minister. We cannot have a situation with alternative centres of power. Look at the Miller Commission to see what happened when someone attempts to usurp power. Some called it the Njonjo Commission of Inquiry.

"It shows what can happen."

The Minister said that as a result of the creation of centres of power, there was stagnation. No one wanted to make a decision. "When decision making is protracted we can move... Do not limit the powers of the President, since he has powers of state".

He said the Government was the most important organisation in a state, over-riding all the other organisations "like the CPK, scientific unions, chambers of commerce and the like".

The Minister said some churches had chosen to constitute an opposition. He said these churches preached confrontation. "I am worried about a few specific churches. They seem to defend particular, especially certain, ethnic interests. When

there were financial problems, they did not raise a finger. The same churches spoke at Rungiri. Why did they not talk when there were financial problems? At Rungiri they defended so and so. When it comes to the life of so and so they are silent. I do not want to say unkind words at the moment about the need for those churches to identify with the common aspirations."

Mr Aringo said the Bill also intended to raise the number of constituencies. He wondered why nobody was saying it was unconstitutional to add the constituencies.

This, like the amendments on the Chief Secretary's and the Controller and Auditor General's offices, had been brought about by public opinion, he said.

He said there were good reasons to strengthen the offices of the Attorney-General at the turn of independence but these had now been overtaken by events.

The Minister commended the Controller and Auditor-General for the good job he had done. He said the work of the officer has shown that Kenya was committed to the rule of law. "What will hold Kenya together is the evolution of the political culture and also a code of ethics to judge the quality of leadership". These matters had been discussed in the Kanu Parliamentary Group, "where it was agreed the constitution needs amendments," he said.

The Minister for Planning and National Development, Dr Robert Ouko, criticised Mr Rubia for giving "us a lecture on the need for us to tolerate views".

He said the Law Society of Kenya and the NCKK had no authority to speak for people who had parliamentary representatives.

"It is wrong for them to direct Parliament on what to do," Dr Ouko said.

"Those who are elected and those who are nominated by His Excellency the President are the only ones who can speak for others. The rest can only speak for themselves," said the Minister.

Dr Ouko said Parliament was not discussing whether or not the President could remove the Attorney-General. "We are discussing the methodology of removing the A-G. The power of the President is absolute. He has the power to hire and the power to fire."

Answering a point of order from the MP for Lurambi North, Mr Joshua Angatia, on why the security of tenure of the offices of the A-G and the C&A-G were being removed, Dr Ouko said there was nothing in the constitu-

tion to prevent the President from sacking the officers.

Responding to another similar point of order from Mr Rubia, Dr Ouko said: "Even if he (the President) sets up a tribunal, no one will challenge his authority."

Responding to Mr Rubia's comment that "we should not invite trouble", Dr Ouko said: "It would be unfortunate and unwise as leaders in this House always or often to cry 'wolf' or talk about trouble when there is no trouble."

Borrowing a Unesco quotation to end his speech, Dr Ouko said: "Wars start in the minds of men, and it is in the minds of men that search for peace should begin."

The Minister challenged the MPs to tell him in how many countries freedom of expression was thriving as in Kenya. He said the Bill had been discussed openly and none should claim that freedom of expression was not being tolerated.

Interfering

The Minister for Water Development, Mr Paul Ngei, told the Law Society of Kenya to mend its ways before interfering with parliamentary issues.

Mr Ngei said lawyers should be mindful of the welfare of their clients and take care of their money without overcharging instead of meddling with issues that did not concern them.

Referring to the comments of the NCKK over the Bill, Mr Ngei said he had personal experience that prayers could be used to incite the people.

He said that during the struggle for independence he conducted a prayer in Nyeri when the colonialists refused him to address a rally.

The Minister for Finance, Professor George Saitoti, attacked the Law Society of Kenya and the NCKK "for misleading the public over the Bill". He said that 23 years after *uhuru* it was necessary to amend some rules and procedures.

Prof Saitoti said it was a pity that religious leaders had made such utterances about the Bill yet they were held with respect by the public.

"The statement by the NCKK leaves us wondering why they were misleading Kenyans," said Prof Saitoti.

Imaginary

If Mr Kariuki (LSK chairman) was not speaking on behalf of the LSK, on whose behalf was he speaking? Prof Saitoti asked. He accused the LSK and the NCKK of rushing to the Press to create imaginary crises.

An Assistant Minister for Lands and Settlement, Mr Joseph Muturia, criticised the NCKK saying: "The NCKK has annoyed wananchi because of giving a misleading statement that the amendment would endanger our Constitution."

Paying tribute to President Moi, he said: "There is no any other President in the world who lives with people and who helps to build churches except our President. What does NCKK want?"

He said the NCKK should not expect the country to continue having outdated and irrelevant laws.

The Minister for Energy and Regional Development, Mr Nicholas Biwott, said the clauses of the Constitution which were being amended were cumbersome.

He accused newspapers and 'alarmists' of causing false alarm that the amendment would make the holders of the offices of the Attorney-General and that of the Controller and Auditor-General insecure.

The Minister said the appointment of the two public officers was done by the President who is also entitled to fire them. He said there was nothing new.

Referring to a clause which was being amended concerning the appointment of a tribunal to report to the President and recommended whether or not an AG or CAG should be removed, Mr Biwott said that if the President appointed such a tribunal, "do you think their verdict would be substantially different than the intended one?"

He said that in the past, holders of the office of the Attorney-General had been removed, sometimes on the request of MPs, and no tribunal had been appointed to have them removed.

An Assistant Minister for Energy and Regional Development, Mr George Mwigigi, said the amendment was necessary to make the work of the President easier.

Supporting the amendment, Mr Mwigigi said the President was the executive with powers to hire and should also have powers to fire without any complications.

The Assistant Minister said it was not true, as stated by some people, that the amendment was tampering with the Constitution.

The MP for Kwale East, Mr Ali Mwakileo said the amendment was important as the constitution was made during the colonial days.

He said the NCKK was being used as a political weapon by some people.

MOI ON SUPREMACY OF KANU PARTY

Nairobi THE WEEKLEY REVIEW in English 21 Nov 86 p 7

[Text] President Daniel arap Moi last week brought to an end the recent debate over whether the ruling party Kanu, or parliament is supreme. When addressing a fund-raising meeting at the Senior Chief Koinange High School in Kiambu District on Saturday, the president ended speculation when he stated that the ruling party has supremacy over parliament. He went even further to say that the party is also supreme over the High Court.

The question of supremacy arose three weeks ago when an assistant minister for lands and settlement, Mr. Shariff Nassir, called for an amendment to the parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act to reflect the supremacy of the party. Nassir's suggestion drew some opposition in parliament, including a warning from the speaker for Nassir's having discussed parliamentary matters outside the house, but the question of which of the two institutions was supreme remained unanswered for the time.

Nassir's suggestion was prompted by a difference that had arisen between him and the MP for Mombassa West, Mr. Kennedy Kiliku. Kiliku had complained in parliament that the Mombassa district Kanu branch, of which Nassir is chairman, had threatened to discipline him for criticising in parliament the condition of roads in Mombassa town. When Nassir tried to justify the branch's intentions by saying that the branch had a right to correct Coast MPs who were off course, he was reminded by the deputy speaker, Mr. Samuel arap Ng'eny, that, according to the Powers and Privileges Act, it is illegal to challenge an MP for anything said in parliament. Nassir's response was to tell a public rally in Mombassa that the act should be amended to allow the party to discipline MPs who talk loosely in the house. In that way, he said, the supremacy of the party would be reflected.

Nassir found himself under attack when parliament resumed. The issue was that he had discussed parliamentary matters outside the house but the MP for Butere, Mr. Martin Shikuku, made it quite clear that he did not like the idea of Nassir's suggesting that parliament was not the supreme body in the country. Shikuku said that the house should be protected against moves by people like Nassir to "castrate" parliament, adding that Kenyans and the president had full confidence in the parliamentary system.

The issue was not discussed further but, last week, the president noted that some people thought that the party was not supreme over parliament or the High Court. But he himself was, he said, elected as president through the party. "As president of the party", he said, "I appoint High Court judges, provincial commissioners, district commissioners, the vice-president and others." He added, "The party is supreme," giving an example of how this was also the case in Britain, where an MP had filed a court injunction against his party, President Moi said, but the injunction failed because the court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the party.

The president's statement must have been good news for Nassir, coming only a few days after he had been reprimanded by the speaker of the national assembly, Mr. Fred Mati, for taking parliamentary issues outside the house. Following Shikuku's protests, the speaker had promised to make a ruling on the issue and, when he finally did, he said that Nassir did not seem to have distinguished between the separate roles assigned to the party and parliament. It was a form of contempt of the house, he said, for members to continue with debates outside the house, either by discussing matters which are the subject of a pending debate or by answering outside the house specific remarks which have been uttered by members of the house. Such conduct, he said, was detrimental to the dignity of the house and the discipline that members must impose on themselves.

According to the speaker, however, there was no regulation in the Powers and Privileges Act allowing the speaker to demand an apology for such misconduct. He said it was merely his advice to members that it was their responsibility and in their interests to conduct their affairs with courtesy for each other. The speaker did not address himself to the question of the supremacy of either the party or parliament, as he had been asked merely to make a ruling on whether or not Nassir had contravened standing orders by discussing parliamentary matters outside the house. Mati's warning to Nassir was rather mild, however, compared with several instances of sharp criticism by him of MPs who have made similar mistakes in the past. His apparent caution may have arisen from the sensitivity of the issues that Nassir had raised concerning parliament and the party and Mati probably did not want to appear to be taking a stand on an issue that was likely to be addressed at a higher level.

The matter has now been settled, however, even though it had become quite obvious in the recent past that the party enjoyed supremacy over parliament. Nassir's suggestion that the Powers and Privileges Act be amended so that the party could discipline wayward MPs is still pending but, judging from the manner in which the party has continued to stress its supremacy, it will not come as much of a surprise if Nassir's wishes were eventually realised.

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COTU ELECTIONS: PRO-GOVERNMENT V. PRO-WORKER LINE UP

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 14 Nov 86 pp 12-14

[Text] The allegation by the Bahati MP, Mr. Fred Omido, in parliament last week that some trade unions had colluded with the attorney-general's office to frustrate, delay and sabotage the forthcoming Central Organisation of Trade Unions (Cotu) elections, and the subsequent reaction by some six unionists, gave a pointer to the form which the campaigns for the Cotu polls are likely to take. With the day of reckoning already fixed, this latest war of words could be a start of the traditional trade union campaigns, which have often been characterised by serious verbal wars.

As soon as the elections in affiliated unions came to a dramatic end after a presidential directive barring six or so unions, which had not met the end of October deadline, from participating in the Cotu elections, Omido, who is also the secretary-general of the Amalgamated Union of Kenya Metal Workers (AUKMW) and a former chairman-general of Cotu, claimed in parliament, on a point of order, that "there are manoeuvres in the trade union movement to delay, frustrate and sabotage the presidential directive on the elections deadline. Omido claimed that since the presidential directive was issued, there had been circulars from the attorney-general's office extending the deadline. He demanded that the minister for labour and the A-G issue a statement to clarify the situation. Omido's statement drew heavy support from his colleagues with some asking for adjournment so that the issue could be discussed as a matter of national importance under Standing Order No. 20, but the labour minister, Mr. Peter Okondo, challenged Omido to identify the people behind the sabotage plot. Okondo termed the allegation as very serious and asked Omido to give information to the police, himself and the attorney-general about the saboteurs. Okondo explained to the house that the unions which had not conformed to the deadlines had done so due to court cases. Okondo even went to the extent of announcing that the unions which had not yet held their elections should do so by December 30, before the Cotu executive board had decided on its own elections date. As it turned out, however, the Cotu executive board fixed its elections for December 29.

The matter came to an end in the house when the speaker, Mr. Fred Mati, asked Okondo and the office of the A-G to discuss the matter and issue a statement on Tuesday of this week. Outside the house, Omido's statement drew a tough rebuttal from six unionists: Mr. Pious Masika - Electrical Trades and Allied

Workers Union; Mr. Joseph Akhonya - Kenya Chemical Workers' Union; Mr. Wafula wa Musamia - Kenya Quarry and Mine Workers Union; Mr. George Muchai - Kenya Union of Bakers and Confectioners; Mr. Charles Natiri - Kenya Engineering Workers' Union and Mr. Isaiah Kubai - Banking, Insurance and Finance Union. The six said they had not received any other circulars regarding the elections apart from three given by the office of the registrar of trade unions and a directive from the president. They challenged Omido to produce the circulars he had alleged were issued after the presidential directive. They accused Omido, Mr. Rajab Mwondi of the Printing and Paper Manufacturers' Union and Mr. Joseph Ojiem of the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union of misleading the country and workers over the forthcoming Cotu polls. The six said they were aware that campaigns had already begun but felt those vying for positions should not make wild statements as a means of gaining support.

One interesting fact about the verbal war on Cotu polls, though not altogether strange, is that those who have taken sides in the war have not declared their interests in the coming elections. The six unionists avoided making their stands clear when asked whether their reaction had been prompted by some interest in Cotu leadership. The issue at stake, they said, was not who is seeking election in Cotu but to ensure that workers were not misled by "self-seekers who were out to exploit the workers for their own selfish ends". But the fact that nobody has stated his interest, apart from the Cotu deputy secretary-general, Mr. J.J. Mugalla, who has said he will try to dislodge the incumbent Cotu secretary-general, Mr. Justus Mulei, is not strange. Past experiences in trade union elections have shown that people who vie for leadership at Cotu usually set their supporters in the open to fight it out while the candidates control the game from the background. Sources close to Cotu said that one reason why nobody has come up to declare his candidature is because the affiliated unions are regrouping their supporters following the recent national elections in these unions. According to these sources, as soon as the unions have submitted the lists of their delegates who will attend the Cotu polls, to be held at Tom Mboya Labour College in Kisumu, the candidates will emerge. Mulei has asked the affiliated unions to submit the names of the delegates by November 15.

Other sources said that the candidates are already being identified as lineup for Mulei and Mugalla are being identified. These sources argue that in trade union elections in Kenya, what matters is not the person who declares the candidature, but what group he belongs to. The two groups, the sources said, are being dubbed "pro-government" and "pro-workers". The Mulei group has identified itself as the pro-workers group while the Mugalla group is seen as the pro-government group. The Mulei group argue that Mugalla has sought the support of the government and politicians for his bid to oust Mulei and that Mulei is counting on the workers in the race to retain his seat. The anti-Mugalla campaign is reportedly mounting mainly because of his open boats about his presidential pardon, after a pro-Mulei group unsuccessfully tried to bring his trade union career to an end. Mugalla is reportedly exploiting this to claim that he is the government candidate and therefore the issue of who is the next Cotu secretary-general is as good as decided. But the Mulei group has reportedly taken Mugalla's claim seriously and has gone out with full

force to convince delegates that the government is the biggest employer and therefore anybody who claims to have government support would not defend workers' interests effectively.

Another element that has been brought to the campaign is the tribal issue. Mugalla is understood to be relying on the Luhya unionists, who form the bulk of the trade union leadership in affiliated unions. Ironically, however, most Luhya leaders in the trade union movement have openly expressed their opposition to Mugalla. Wa Musamia for instance, who was quoted recently to have expressed his support for Mugalla, told THE WEEKLY REVIEW this week that he was solidly behind Mulei and that no amount of coercion would change his stand. Wa Musamia did not, however, disclose the forces that were pressuring him to change his stand. Other prominent Luhya unionists who are behind Mulei include Masika, Akhonya, Natiri, and Mr. Wasike Ndombi of the Local Government Workers' Union. Added to this list of the Mulei group are several unionists from other tribes who include Kubai, Muchai, Mr. Walter Adell of the Kenya Union of Sugar Plantation Workers, Mr. Ali Mohammed of the Kenya Union of Posts and Telecommunications employees, Mr. George Odiko of the Kenya Union of Journalists who is also the assistant secretary-general of Cotu, Mr. David Matheu of the Kenya Timber and Furniture Workers Union, Mr. Abdalla Mwaruwa of the National Union of Seamen of Kenya and Mr. James Awich of the Kenya Shoe and Leather Workers' Union. Although these are individual secretary-generals of their respective unions, they are instrumental in determining who should be supported by the delegates from their unions when it comes to voting in Cotu, which is based on block rather than individual voting. Each delegate is however, free to vote for the candidate of his choice.

Mulei's group is expected to find opposition in the Cotu chairman-general, Mr. Philip Mwangi, who has made it quite clear that he is for Mugalla. In this camp are the Cotu treasurer, Mr. Were Ogutu, Mr. Johnson Ogendo of the Tailors' and Textile Workers' Union, Mr. Yunis Ishmael of the giant Dock Workers' Union, Mr. Sammy Muhanji of the Kenya Union of Commercial, Food and Allied Workers, Mr. George Ochino of the Kenya Petroleum Workers' Union, Omido and Mwondi. Out of those who have openly supported Mugalla, only Omido, Muhanji and Mwondi are Luhyas like Mugalla. Apart from this tribal element, the campaigns are also expected to bring in the performance of Mulei in the last two years that he has been secretary-general. His detractors have already criticised his style of leadership claiming that Mulei has ignored the Cotu constitution which requires that he convene the executive board meeting once a month and the governing council once every year to administer and review Cotu policies. But Mulei's supporters argue that Mulei, who assumed office following the death of the incumbent, the late Mr. Juma Boy, should be given an opportunity to prove his worth. They say that for the two years that Mulei has been at the helm of Cotu, industrial relations have been relatively calm. His opponents, however, blame Mulei for the spate of strikes, lock-outs and confusion that greeted the five-day working week which he requested on Labour Day and which was granted by President Daniel arap Moi on the same occasion. The move, which received approval by Kenyan workers, however, led to a chain of strikes when employers and employees tried to adjust their working hours to accommodate the five-day week.

One thing that is unlikely to feature prominently in this year's Cotu campaigns is the issue of minimum wages, which has been an important factor in past Cotu campaigns. So far, no unionist has brought up the issue. What will likely be brought up is the issue of banking institutions which have sunk with millions of shillings belonging to workers and the question of whether or not foreign institutions which have interest in Kenya's trade union activities are likely to interfere in the elections. In March of this year, the former secretary-general of Cotu and the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Mr. Dennis Akumu, charged that Kenya's trade union movement has been infiltrated by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As soon as the claim was made, Mugalla issued a statement in which he said that if the CIA had made such a move it was upon the Kenya government to find out.

On Tuesday, Omido was suspended from parliament for three days after he failed to substantiate his sabotage claim and for using the president's name as an authority for making false claims. In a ministerial response to Omido's claims, the attorney-general, Mr. Mathew Muli, said Omido's claim has been based on "distortion of facts and was aimed at misleading and even causing unwarranted panic, apathy and discontentment". Omido found himself in more trouble from the front bench than he has expected when the minister for energy and regional development, Mr. Nicholas Biwott, suggested that it was treasonable to sabotage a presidential directive and demanded that Omido substantiate his claim. Biwott was supported by the vice-president, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, who is also leader of government business in the house. Omido totally failed to support his allegation and was thrown out.

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KENYA

BRIEFS

JOURNALISTS SENTENCED FOR MWAKENYA ACTIVITIES--The head of the Nakuru bureau of the daily newspaper, THE STANDARD, Mugo Thauri Wanderi, was sentenced on November 8 to four years in prison for membership of an "underground movement," apparently Mwakenya. He admitted having given money to the movement after meeting several of its members. According to a report in the London publication INDEX ON CENSORSHIP of last October 28, the Kenyan press has been barred since last July from reporting political trials, or arrests which are "increasingly arbitrary and based on hearsay." The press also no longer has the right to mention Mwakenya by name. INDEX ON CENSORSHIP puts at 200 the number of people arrested since the beginning of the year, including 11 writers, journalists, and publishers, in connection with the campaign against Mwakenya. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWS LETTER in English 15 Nov 86 p 3] /8309

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MINISTERS EXAMINE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, LIQUIDITY, PRIVATIZATION

Monrovia X-RAY in English Nov 86 pp 15-18, 41

[Interview with Paul Jeffy and Amelia Ward, minister and deputy minister of planning and economic affairs; date and place not specified]

[Text]

X-RAY - Mr. Minister, please summarize the major reasons for the present economic problems facing Liberia.

MPEA - Over the past ten-year period from 1974 to 1984, total annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at factor cost in 1971 dollars, fell from \$428 million to \$410 million, a fall of \$15 million or 3½%. During the same period, the annual GDP of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector rose by \$33 million and Government services GDP increased by \$20 million, while mining and quarrying GDP fell by \$54 million or by 40%. This clearly shows that the fall in value of mining and quarrying production is the main underlying cause of the downturn in the economy between 1974 and 1984. And, since this fall may well continue in the future, due to decreasing world export demand for iron ore and the depletion of high-grade iron ore deposits in Liberia, it is imperative to replace this source of national income with a major and continuing increase in the value of production in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector of the economy, especially since this sector will have to become the

country's main source of export earnings and import savings, thus providing the future solution to the country's balance of payments and foreign debt arrears problems.

During the 1974-1979 period, the performance of the Liberian economy was sluggish and total real GDP grew at a rate of only 1.7% a year. This was due to the impact of the rapid increase in world oil prices on the cost of iron ore mining, power generation, and transport in Liberia; the depressed world demand for the country's main exports, iron ore and rubber; the narrow export base of the economy; and expansionary policies pursued by Government services.

All of these 1974-1979 constraints to economic growth continued to apply during the 1979-1984 period, resulting in a steadily deteriorating climate for private sector investment and growth in manufacturing, construction and services. In addition, commercial forestry and fishing production declined rapidly and caused a fall in the average annual growth rate of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector GDP, from 4% a year during the 1974-1979 period to 1.3% a year during the 1979-1984 period. At the same time, expenditures on Government services continue to grow. These factors caused the total average annual real GDP to decrease at a rate of 2.4% a year, falling to \$410 million in 1984, compared to 462 million in 1979 and \$425 million in 1974. As a result of all of these factors, business confidence dwindled, capital flight occurred, a liquidity squeeze developed, and the public sector balance of payments position deteriorated.

- X-RAY - What can you attribute the current liquidity problem to? How can this problem be solved?
- MPEA - The liquidity problem can be attributed primarily to two factors: (a) the

methods used to finance Government budget deficits; and, (b) the growing backlog of public sector debts, requiring offshore payments. The first factor resulted from the fact that Government had been unable to sufficiently reduce its overall budget deficit, that is to reduce the excess of its expenditures over its revenues, and therefore used alternative methods of financing Government expenditures. Such methods included forced borrowing from various sectors of the economy; promissory notes; LPA checks; issuing new coins; circulation of discounted claims on Government; commercial bank excess reserves, etc.

The second factor resulted from a rapid growth in the annual value of principal and interest payments due to the IMF, the World Bank, the IDA, the USA, West Germany, Japan, and other foreign loan sources, on loans made to Liberia throughout the 1970's. This, coupled with substantial annual Government budgetary deficits during the 1979-1985 period, has now resulted in a growing accumulation of substantial debt arrears, which has brought about the postponement of disbursements of loan funds for development programs and projects and disbursements to meet balance of payments needs.

Solutions to these problems are not easy to come by, but Government has already taken steps to address them. Government has reduced, and is continuing to reduce, its budget deficits - the difference between what it spends and what it receives as revenue - through various austerity measures, such as increased taxes on imports; special taxes on salaries, wage earners and self-employed persons; the introduction of a freeze on public sector employment; and, a reduction in public sector salaries and public sector employment. In addition, to restore business confidence in the domestic banking system and enable businessmen to transfer

money out of the country through foreign exchange made available by the Bank of Liberia (Government), the Government has signed a memorandum of understanding with the commercial banks, and is also requiring all exporters to deposit 25% of their foreign exchange earnings with the National Bank of Liberia, in exchange for Liberian coins or local currency.

X-RAY - Liberia now seems to have a de facto currency in the form of the five dollar coins. What are the implications for the country's economy? What is the basis for issuing these coins?

MPEA - The continued issuance of de facto currency, in the form of Liberian five dollar coins, suggests that, at least for an interim period, Liberia can be described as being partly on a U.S. dollar standard and partly on a Liberian dollar standard. While the U.S. dollars in circulation can be readily used for foreign transactions, the Liberian coins can only be used within Liberia. Thus, the system no longer allows external payments to be made as freely as in the past, and commercial banks now operate an informal allocation system, due to an unsatisfied demand, a parallel market has developed, in which the U.S. dollar attracts a premium when it is exchanged for Liberian coins. In addition, commercial banks now charge excessively high commissions for their sales of foreign currencies or U.S. dollars.

The basis for issuing more Liberian coins was to help solve the liquidity problems mentioned above. Faced with this problem, the National Bank of Liberia had no option other than to issue coins, without U.S. dollar backing, to finance Government deficits and meet Government payrolls, and to ease the shortage of cash for private transactions.

X-RAY - The President of Liberia recently expressed optimism that the Liberian economy would improve during the second half of this year. Could you elaborate on the basis of this optimism. What is your Ministry planning or doing to make this optimism a reality?

MPEA - The basis for the optimism expressed by the President recently, that the Liberian economy will improve during the second half of this year, stems from the fact that measures and forces are at work which have already begun to reduce some of the causes of the present economic crisis, and the economy has already begun to respond by showing signs of improvement. As I mentioned earlier, Government has introduced measures which are already reducing the budgetary deficits. And, the retention of 25% of all export earnings is now permitting both the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Liberia to meet some of Government's and private business's off-shore commitments.

With the future privatization of selected public corporations, it is expected that their operational efficiency and effectiveness will improve, thus reducing their dependence on Government revenues and subsidies, which in turn should reduce Government budgetary deficits.

The fall in the world price of oil, and the expected real growth of GDP of about 3% a year in many developed countries in 1987 and 1988, should result in a rise in the demand for steel and automobiles, including tires, which should in turn lead to an increase in Liberia's main exports, iron ore and rubber. Likewise, with the fall of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the currencies of our other major trading partner countries, the U.S. dollar value of Liberia's exports should increase and the dollar cost of imports into Liberia

should also increase, thus encouraging the growth of Liberian exports, as well as the growth of import substitution.

Finally, to further make this optimism a reality, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other Ministries, the IMF, the World Bank, and other foreign aid and foreign loan sources, is currently in the process of preparing an Economic Recovery Program for the nation. This Program will cover the next two years. Perhaps its most important contribution will be to introduce, and to start implementing, a new Government policies for the development of the private sector and for the control of revenue and expenditures in the public sector. The Program will also include development programs and projects in each of the following areas: agriculture, forestry and fishing; industry, energy; transport and communications; water and sewerage; regional and urban development; education and training; manpower development; health and social welfare; housing; and State Enterprises. In selecting the programs and projects, the strategy will be to concentrate the limited financial resources available for development upon those programs and projects that promise to have a good rate of economic and financial return and/or a short payback period.

X-RAY - Some observers believe the lack of coordination among government agencies connected with the economy is one of the biggest problems. What specific problems have you observed in this area? What kind of coordination should exist?

MPEA - Those observers are totally wrong. Like all countries in the world, and Liberia is no exception, functions and responsibilities of Government Ministries and Agencies overlap, and many times, due

to the lack of communication, information flows are not always efficient and effective. This is especially true for developing countries like Liberia. As such, there is sometimes a breakdown in coordination. But, for anyone to portray this as a policy, or as antagonism among Ministries or Agencies, is very untrue. For example, in practically all of our financial and economic discussions, both internal and external, at least the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, the Budget Bureau, and the National Bank of Liberia are present, and among these agencies, the position of Government is organized. True, there is always room for improvement, and so the coordination among Government Agencies connected with the economy could be improved. But certainly the lack of such coordination among Ministries and Agencies is not one of our biggest economic problems.

X-RAY - Mr. Minister, what do you think are the implications for privatizing relatively viable public corporations such as LPRC, LPMC, Telecommunications and LEC?

MPEA - Before looking at the implications of privatizing certain public corporations such as LPRC, LPMC, LTC and LEC which you indicated are viable, let us see what the record shows at this point in terms of the operations of public corporations generally. Available data show that the performance of state enterprises in recent years has been very poor due mainly to the inadequacy of arrangement; the lack of technical skills' excessive staffing; interference in management decision-making; and the existence of unauthorized practices. These and other problems affect inter-enterprise and Government/enterprise short-term indebtedness. This state of Affairs of Public Corporations contributes to the current economic

crisis. When privatized, it is expected that these public corporations will attract funds through private investments in them, thereby providing the liquidity they need to keep them more efficient and productive. This will aid in reducing staffing and management problems. This will also reduce their dependency on Government revenues/subsidy; thereby reducing Government's budgetary deficit.

X-RAY - The Business Community is complaining about the Ten Percent surcharge levied on imported goods indicating that this has helped to slow down the pace of import. Can business people look forward to a solution of these problems in the next few months?

MPEA - Universally, not only the Business Community, but all taxpayers always complain about paying taxes. Even when taxes are reduced, taxpayers will claim that the reduction is insufficient. Government is looking into the matter of taxes generally, including the Ten Percent Surcharge. However, Government has no evidence at all at this moment in time that the Ten Percent Surcharge is one of the causes of the slow-down in the pace of imports. As of now, indications are that the slow-down in the pace of imports is due primarily to the lack of foreign exchange for businessmen to pay for their imports.

X-RAY - There are reports of global oil glut and drop in the price of crude oil. But gasoline prices in Liberia seems not to be affected why? Is it true that LPRC levies a tax of \$1.50 on every gallon sold to the public, which is supposed to be passed on to government? Is this tax burden justifiable?

MPEA - It is true that there is a current oversupply of crude oil on the world

market, and as a consequence the price of crude oil on the world market has fallen by about \$14 a barrel. It is also true that the price of gasoline in Liberia seems to have not been affected by the fall in the price of crude oil internationally. But let me point out, that the price of gasoline in almost all countries, including Liberia, is not influenced by the price of crude oil alone. We are aware of no country as yet where the change in the price of crude oil has produced an equal and proportionate change in the price of gasoline. There have been changes, but not equal and proportionate. There are several other factors, such as local taxes like excise, and local and international transportation costs. In any case, it is expected that this matter will be further studied when the LPRC operation is being audited.

X-RAY - What role has corruption played in bringing about the current economic hardship?

MPEA - I cannot answer this question as I have no knowledge of the extent of corruption in our economic system. What I do know is that our Government has made a policy of eradicating corruption in our society, whether it be economic, political, etc. In addition, I outlined in my replies to your previous questions, the causes and reasons for the present economic situation in Liberia and I did not mention corruption as one of these causes.

X-RAY - What is the status of government's relationship and prospects for aid with bilateral and international financial sources?

MPEA - Due to the economic problems existing in 1984, Government was in arrears in respect of many of its loan and interest payments with several bilateral

and multilateral international organizations such as the World Bank, United States, IMF, EIB, ADB, etc. However, as the economic situation is now improving, Government has commenced clearing these arrears, and as a result, new financial assistance has begun coming in. In short, the Government's relations with bilateral and multilateral international financial organizations is improving steadily.

X-RAY - What new approaches should government adopt to solve the current problems? What role do you see private sector development and consultancy playing in helping to find solutions to the problems?

MFEA - Government is in the process of preparing a two-year Economic Recovery Program, to start solving the current economic problems. This Program will involve a mixture and combination of policies, strategies, and programs and projects, in both the public and the private sectors external and internal, fiscal and monetary, etc. This is so because the reasons for the current economic problems are mixed and varied, and no one approach can hope to solve them. In addition, as I stated earlier, Government has introduced several austerity measures. These include: increased taxes on imports; special taxes on salaries, wage earners and self-employed persons; the introduction of a freeze on public sector employment; a reduction in public sector salaries and employment; and, the introduction of a new Reconstruction Tax. With respect to the role which private sector development and consultancy agencies should play in helping to find solutions to our economic problems, you will recall that I referred earlier to the decision of Government to privatize public corporations. In this exercise, Government will encourage the private sector, foreign and/or local, to take

over the ownership and management (in part or in whole) of Government parastatals, of Government furnished services, and of Government agencies by investing funds in them with a view to making them operationally effective and efficient. Both the private sector development and consultancy agencies can play important roles in the implementation of this exercise as well as provide further studies of possible solutions to our economic problems.

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FIGHT AGAINST HUNGER FIRST PRIORITY OF CHISSANO REGIME

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Nov 86 pp 36, 37

[Article by Jose Rui Cunha]

[Text] "The fight against hunger" was one of the highest priorities elaborated by Joaquim Chissano, the new president of FRELIMO and of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique, in his speech given in Maputo minutes after his name was announced as the top figure in the Party and the State. A tremendous amount of public enthusiasm, which exploded in the streets of the capital when the decision by the Central Committee of FRELIMO was made known, is based upon this great hope. People remember Chissano from his activities in the transition government which followed the Lusaka accords.

Reality is, however, totally different. Samora Machel's charisma is followed by Joaquim Chissano's pragmatism. But can Chissano, in the current critical state of the Mozambican economy, bring about the miracle? Obviously not, if only because in politics there are no miracle workers. But the new leader knows that something must change in Mozambique as soon as possible, and that that will inevitably involve the economic situation. The people yearn for a real offensive, with visible results, against the hunger that now affects almost 5 million inhabitants. The problem is in knowing how to effect these changes in a race against time.

The decision by the FRELIMO Central Committee to designate Chissano as president coincided with popular opinion. Chissano's prestige across the entire country would not have admitted many other solutions. Mozambicans wanted Chissano. They have Chissano. But is it possible that the image that has been created of him really exists? It is asking too much of a man who assumes the leadership in the most critical period for the economy, at a time when "armed bandits" are spreading terror and destruction, and when the powerful neighbor South Africa threatens to play its decisive trump card: the return of 60 thousand Mozambican miners. Considered a "moderate," Chissano is, above all, a man who has always assumed a visible role in FRELIMO, the man whom the country has chosen to delineate Mozambique's political image overseas, the politician who is the most widely accepted by the West.

Chissano is, in fact, a man tested in armed struggle, a defender of the political ideals that guide FRELIMO, a cornerstone of the strategy defined by Samora Machel. He is not a politician given to compromising on fundamentals, but he uses diplomacy as a weapon and is capable of achieving his objectives using means more acceptable to the leaders of the great Western nations. It is during this difficult phase that even stronger efforts must be made, in an appeal to the international community to provide essential goods as urgently as possible to a country in need.

"Let us carefully study the economy of our country, so that we may participate more effectively in the work of our development," the new president stated, adding further, "We must know the history of our country and our society in order to reap the lessons from it that will strengthen national unity."

Chosen for FRELIMO by the prime minister of the transition government during the period spanning the signing of the Lusaka accords and the proclamation of independence, Joaquim Chissano was a man who undoubtedly filled the role which fell to him in exemplary fashion. Extremely capable, he reduced tension, was energetic in containing abuses, and in the end was as agreeable to the colonizers as to the colonized--and all this during a period of upheaval in Mozambique, when the hopes of a people emerged from secular lethargy.

That was the climate during Chissano's transformation. Today, the climate is characterized by renewed hope, and expectations are too high in an environment which has nothing in common with the previous situation. The country is at war, the economy is in danger and reconstruction is lagging behind, because internal and foreign enemies are aware that the economic cycle represents the possibility of concessions. It is difficult, however, for FRELIMO to turn aside from the program to which it has remained faithful, and for its model of socialist society to be called into question.

In a society in which rumors assume an inordinately large degree of importance, it is curious to note that, besides Chissano, another name was put forward as probable successor to Machel. Within the capital city Armando Panguene, the former Mozambican ambassador to Lisbon, was pointed to as the alternative. Justification for the Panguene candidacy, in popular terms, was similar to that of the pragmatic image constructed around Chissano. Apart from the pragmatism common to both figures, other factors, at first glance minor, but important in the context of Mozambican society, were outlined: Chissano is from the south, but is married to a northern woman; Panguene is descended from a southern family, but was born in the north.

In any case, reality has shown that Armando Panguene is a rising star within the RPM. Although it has not yet been announced, he could be the new FPLM Chief of Staff, as a result of a reorganization of the military leadership which took place days before the death of Samora Machel. Panguene is also pointed to as one of those who could succeed Joaquim Chissano for responsibility for the foreign affairs portfolio. During the current period of increasing hostilities, however, it seems more likely that responsibility for Mozambican diplomacy will be given to Pascoal Mocumbi, or even to Oscar Monteiro, the two figures who, a priori, are pointed to as the most experienced in the back-room ways of international politics.

The rise of Joaquim Chissano to leadership of the Party, the State and the Armed Forces will obviously lead to changes in the Maputo government. It seems certain, however, that Mario Machungo will continue to fill the recently created position of Prime Minister. Alberto Chipande will remain as Minister of Defense and the number three man in the Party, and Armando Panguene will lead the Armed Forces, the great prestige he enjoys among veterans of the armed struggle and as Political Commissariat of the Peoples' Liberation Forces virtually assuring him of his appointment to this position. For the transport portfolio, which Engineer Alcantara Santos, killed in the plane crash, held uncontested, there appears to be only one choice: Tenreiro de Almeida, who would transfer to that position from his current one of Secretary of State for Fisheries, where his work has been highly praised.

The New Leader's First Hours

Joaquim Chissano began his first day as leader of FRELIMO by paying homage to Samora Machel at the Monument to Mozambican Heroes, and by appearing at the residence of Graca Machel, with whom he declared solidarity.

Even earlier, in the speech following his election, Chissano guaranteed the family of the former President of the Republic the support of FRELIMO in raising and educating the children. It was, however, the incidents that took place at the representations of South Africa and Malawi in Maputo that most characterized the new president's first day. Mozambican authorities vehemently condemned the destruction of the Embassy of Malawi on Avenida Kenneth Kaunda, and the stoning of the South African trade office on Avenida Julius Nyerere, in front of the Portuguese Embassy building in this capital.

Six people were injured in the incident, including a member of the police force that rushed to the scene of the disturbances. Minister of Security Sergio Vieira declared at the South African trade office, where he appeared in order to disperse a gathering of people, "Do you want to throw rocks? Do so at the border. Do you want to fight the enemy? Go give your names to the Mozambique Youth Organization [OJM] so you can be mobilized." He added, "To break windows and to roll cars is not to be revolutionary. My question at this time is whether this was not a provocation. There are signs here of provocative agents bent on sullyng the name of Mozambique. Agents who create disturbances so that tomorrow it will be said in other countries that Mozambique is a country of rioters. He who wishes to fight the enemy should follow me to the OJM."

The "peaceful" demonstration was organized by the OJM as a form of protest against South African and Malawi support for RENAMO and occurred without incident, until the point at which a group of people resorted to violence. Afterwards, security measures were taken at other facilities belonging to the two countries in the Mozambican capital.

A press release by OJM distributed later lamented the occurrences and affirmed that "they were not representative of the objectives of the demonstration" which was organized to call attention to the death of President Samora Machel.

The government newspaper NOTICIAS, in an editorial, called for watchfulness, stating specifically that "to be vigilant means, in situations like those which occurred yesterday in the country's capital, to be alert and to prevent agitators from achieving their objectives, which are not shared by the majority of the people, nor by our leaders. To be vigilant means also to act immediately to put a stop to acts of vandalism, because they are crimes and must not go unpunished."

South Africa's Most Powerful Weapon

South Africa recently announced that it would not renew labor contracts with Mozambican miners and would not resort to importing labor from the RPM. The South African government knows that the threat constitutes a powerful weapon pointed at the debilitated economy of its neighbor.

Since 1970 the number of Mozambican workers demanding the "Jone" has been diminishing. Originating from the Sul do Save region, the "Magaicas," as the miners are called here, have not yet found an alternative to South African gold mines in their own country. In 1982 the number of Mozambican miners working legally in South Africa was approximately 45 thousand. The number has been decreasing, which has a serious effect on financial remittances to Mozambique. At the same time, the growing strangulation and the armed attacks which destroy locomotives, railroads, bridges, power lines, vehicles and equipment has made the economic structure even more dependent upon foreign countries. According to RPM figures, direct and indirect damages amount to some \$333.4 million, as much as the total value of the country's exports in 1982 and 1983. In addition, there are other damages which are difficult to value, particularly lower production, lack of output, lost harvests, production stoppages and loss of lives.

After floods, drought and war, South Africa knows that cancelling the miners' contracts will cause economic and social convulsions. The number of unemployed in Sul do Save has been increasing and it has not been possible to create the 75 to 76 thousand new jobs needed immediately, with 70 thousand needed in future years. The reduction in the number of miners has resulted in a loss of financial remittances on the order of \$568 million since independence.

Today the RPM is facing the threat of the return of thousands of miners. But up to what point can South Africa afford such a massive release of such an important supply of labor? Time will tell whether the fatal shot will actually be fired, or whether the threat will merely remain hanging as a form of pressure. The precedents, however, are not mere fiction, and the return of the miners has been a constant worry. Up to what point the international community will be able to meet the needs of Mozambique in this critical juncture is a question that only time can answer. Because in Mozambique the time is one of hope, and that hope has a name: Chissano.

13026/9738

CSO: 3442/35

BRIEFS

NORTH KOREANS TO COMBAT RENAMO---London--From what is known in this city among those connected to specialists in African affairs, the number of North Koreans in Angola and Mozambique is increasing, with those in the latter country entering through Zimbabwe. Within the next month another military contingent of 3 thousand men is expected to arrive in Zimbabwe to reinforce the troops of that country who are fighting RENAMO in Mozambique. [Excerpts] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 6 Nov 86 p 23] 13026/9738

BRITISH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM---The British government in September made available more than 819 pounds (some 46 million meticals) for a program of technical assistance to Mozambique. This fact was revealed last month by technical engineer Tim George to the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM) in the British city of Preston, 384 kilometers north of London, the capital. The amount, George revealed, will be used primarily to rehabilitate 300 Land Rovers and 37 Leyland trucks in the city of Maputo. George stated that as part of the technical assistance program, seven Leyland technicians are already in Maputo, two of them rehabilitating the Land Rover jeeps and the other five working at CODAUTO. Leyland, he said, knows Mozambique's needs in terms of transport. He pointed out that this is the most problematic area for the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) states, of which Mozambique is the coordinating member for Transport and Communications. The program also includes supplying major parts for Leyland trucks and Land Rover jeeps, and training Mozambican personnel. Tim George stated that the decision to send the team of technicians to Maputo follows a previous program in which the firm sent 10 technicians to Mozambique in 1983 to spend 3 years. "We want to continue providing technical assistance to Mozambique because we know the difficulties the country is facing," George emphasized. The team was involved in technical assistance for rehabilitation of the cars of the TPU company in Maputo and Beira. It was also involved in the training of Mozambican personnel, with a training school for Mozambican technicians having been created for that purpose in Maputo. AIM was informed that Leyland had provided 100 half-ton trucks over the last two years to the Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN). Leyland, one of the largest automobile concerns in Europe, has 60 years of experience in Africa and in its technical cooperation programs. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 86 p 3] 13026/9738

SOVIETS MOVED TO MAPUTO--Soviet military and civilian personnel living in Maputo suburbs have been evacuated to the capital. The Soviet Embassy fears reprisals on the part of RENAMO and has instructed its officials and personnel to restrict their nocturnal activities in Maputo. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 1 Nov 86 p 56]. 13026/9738

CSO: 3442/35

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

FORMER GNPP POLITICIAN QUIT POLITICS--The chairman and presidential candidate of the proscribed Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, returned to Maiduguri on Monday after a 34-month self-exile and said he was through with politics. Alhaji Waziri whose philosophy was "Politics without bitterness" met reporters at the Maiduguri Airport but declined to comment on current national issues such as SFEM, the ten-year ban on second republic politicians and the just concluded political debate. He said he did not run away from the country following the 1983 coup which terminated the second republic but that he went abroad on business to bring money into Nigeria. Alhaji Waziri said he would invest the money in agriculture and industries so as to contribute to the economic development of the country. He revealed that he was now realising about 1.6 million Naira every month from his frozen fish business in Port-Harcourt. Alhaji Waziri said he single-handedly spent about 20 million Naira to finance the GNPP during the 1979 elections. [By Abdullahi Idris] [Text] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 22 Oct 86 pp 1, 3] /8309

CSO: 3400/527

CLAN AFFILIATIONS OF MILITARY, POLICE ANALYZED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 29 Oct 86 pp 1, 2

[Text]

Africa Confidential has acquired documents from sources close to the Somali government which detail the names and clan affiliations of the leading military and police commanders. Analysis of these military dispositions throws new light on the country's political future, which remains unstable as a result of President **Mohammed Siad Barre's** continuing ill health.

On 15 November the congress of Somalia's ruling party, the *Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party* (SRSP), is scheduled to meet and ratify the choice, made at the end of September by the Central Committee, of Barre as the party's single candidate for the forthcoming presidential election. The congress will no doubt endorse the president despite his failure to recover fully from the car accident of last May. We understand the president does much less work than before and finds it difficult to speak for any great length of time. According to some reports he can work no more than a couple of hours a day; he is still under close medical attention and there are persistent reports that the doctors would like him to go abroad for further treatment. It is widely believed in Mogadishu that he will in any case retire within months of being re-elected. Certainly it is unlikely that he will be able to survive to the end of another seven year term.

Political wheeling and dealing in anticipation of the President's disappearance has inevitably intensified. There is considerable speculation that the president will make it clear during the party congress if he is really prepared to support the efforts of his brother, the foreign minister, **Abdirahman Jama Barre**, to succeed. A preliminary step in this direction would be to appoint Jama Barre to the party's politburo. It has also been suggested that he might be made prime minister and that another relative might be added to the politburo - the president's

eldest son Colonel **Masleh**, the wealthy head of the army's construction department.

A considerable section of the president's immediate family, and of his Marehan clan, has been trying to push the ailing leader in this direction. But there would be great opposition to any such appointments, headed by the first vice-president, Lieutenant-General **Mohamed Ali Samatar**, and the minister of interior, General **Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla**, one of the presidential sons-in-law. They are the two members of the politburo most likely to be affected adversely by any such promotions. We understand they have been co-operating to try and ensure that the president's immediate family, and the Marehan, do not manage to retain the virtually complete hold on power they currently enjoy. General Samatar is, of course, the legal successor as first vice-president but he comes from a despised 'untouchable' clan and has no real clan support. Ahmed Suleiman is from the Dolbahante, which in the past supported President Siad Barre, but is unlikely to offer similar support to his brother or son. Both sides are trying hard to gain support among the major clans - the Isaaq, Hawiye, Dolbahante, Majerteen, Ogaden and Marehan, - and sub-clans. Equally critical will be what support they can muster among the armed forces and police; and to what degree this is likely to depend, as always in Somali politics, upon clan loyalties.

As might be expected after 17 years of President Siad Barre in power, the Marehan hold a very substantial number of top posts as *Africa Confidential's* documents reveal. These include the critical ones of commanders of the second tank brigade and the second artillery brigade in Mogadishu - these are a separate command outside the normal structure of the military establishment, reporting direct to the president - and the commanders of all three of the reserve brigades in Hargeisa in the north of Somalia - the seventh tank brigade, the 11th artillery brigade and the 24th infantry brigade. It is these forces which control the two main towns in the country. Marehan officers also command another 10 of the army's brigades as well as two divisions (the 11th and the seventh), and the 54th sector. The commander there, Colonel **Xuseen Axmed**, recently replaced the Brigadier General **Hussein Hassan**, a Dolbahante, who was sent off to the United States for training earlier this year. In all, about one third of the army's brigade commanders are Marehan.

The next largest element among senior commanders comes from the Ogaden, who until Barre's talks

with Ethiopia's head of state, Col. **Mengistu Haile Mariam**, in January, and the attempted rapprochement with Addis Ababa, had been among Barre's strongest supporters (it is his mother's clan). There are still some 11 brigade commanders from the Ogaden as well as two divisional commanders and the heads of the two smallest sectors, the 60th and the 43rd sub-sector at Kismayu.

Of the other main clans, the Majerteen have the commander of the important 26th sector in the north, General **Mohamed Siyad 'Morgan'**, another presidential son-in-law, as well as the naval commander at Berbera, the main naval base, a divisional commander and four brigade commanders. There are eight Dolbahante brigade commanders and the commander of the 21st sector which is the strongest sector, facing the Ethiopian troops at Balamballe, with two reinforced divisions of five brigades apiece - the 11th and the 8th divisions. The 11th division is one of those with a Marehan commander and two of its brigades, the 35th and the reserve, have Marehan commanders as well.

Of the major clans it is noticeable that neither the Isaaq nor the Hawiye are well represented - this is in part presumably because of Isaaq involvement in the Ethiopian based opposition, the *Somali National Movement* (SNM). Recently there have been growing signs of Hawiye interest in the SNM, though it still remains largely Isaaq based. There are in fact only two senior Isaaq commanders, the head of the naval base at Kismayu and a brigade commander in the fourth division at Galkayo. There are two Hawiye brigade commanders, one in the fourth division and one in the ninth division based at Las Anod; and a divisional commander (the sixth division in the 60th sector). Another six brigades and five divisions are commanded by people from small uncommitted groups, Shekhaal, Barwane, Akishe and so on.

The pattern among the police force is more even. Indeed the Isaaq provide more regional and local commanders than any other major clan - some 24%. Of the others, 15% come from the Majerteen; 12% from the Dolbahante; 12% from the Ogaden; 10% from the Marehan and 9% from the Hawiye. Of the regional police commanders a surprising number (over 25%) come from the Warsangeli, a small clan close to the Majerteen.

Several of the major clans belong to the Darod confederacy, the Marehan, the Dolbahante, the Ogaden and the Majerteen. And certainly the Isaaq see the Darod as a united force opposed to them politically. On that basis the Darod provide over 50% of the police commanders and nearly 80% of the army's sector, divisional and brigade comman-

ders. If the Darod were a united organisation this would be overwhelming. However, this is not the case. The Darod are divided over policies, including the attempt to talk to Ethiopia, and even more seriously over the plans of Barre's immediate family to try and perpetuate their power. Indeed if they persist in this the Marehan run the risk of setting in motion a process that might lead to civil war.

It is a policy that also might have the effect of bringing together a much broader based coalition of interest than the external opposition have yet been able to do, and one that might be able to provide sufficient military strength to offset Marehan control of the armoured units in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. If the latter are prepared, as they apparently were immediately after the President's car accident, to make their own bid for power, civil war becomes a real possibility.

All this presupposes that army commanders will always operate by clan allegiances. This is of course not necessarily the case. The government certainly keeps a close eye on some senior officers such as Gen 'Morgan' (Majerteen) the 26th sector commander. He only moved to his present sector this year but he has already won a good reputation for pragmatic common sense (by contrast with his predecessor, Major General **Mohamed Hashi Gani**, a Marehan, regarded as tough, ruthless and ambitious. In Hargeisa, General Morgan may be rather distant from Mogadishu, but his previous posting was the important 21st sector much closer to the capital and which deploys a very considerable part of the army's firepower and armour. And there is no doubt that he remains popular among his former troops as well as those he now commands. ●

/13104

CSO: 3400/536

MUSEVINI OUTLINES MEASURES TO BOOST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Kampala NEW VISION in English 7 Nov 86 p 20

[Text]

PRESIDENT Yoweri Museveni has disclosed that plans are underway to start assembling tractors from Finland in Uganda.

There are also plans to import 300 trucks through the Ministry of Co-operatives and Marketing and 300 lorries from Sweden.

The President was speaking to the Kabale District Team and Planning Committee earlier this week. He was returning from a one-week visit to Rwanda and Burundi.

Mr Museveni said the Government is concentrating on boosting agricultural production by bulk importation of implements and the rehabilitation of local factories which produce necessary inputs.

He added that the whole transport system in the country will be rationalised to the nearest railway station with truck transport which will increase efficiency and save costs.

On shortage of essential commodities, President Museveni said that this would have been considerably alleviated if some officials handling the trade arrangements followed them up vigorously.

The President was dismayed to learn that security organs like the Police in Kabale District are also involved in smuggling.

He was also disappointed by reports that weaknesses in the judiciary had led to over-accumulation of detainees in prison and the release of well-known criminals which incites the public to take the law into their own hands.

In their memorandum to the President, the District Team and Planning Committee called for the revival of resettlement schemes to ease overpopulation in Kabale district.

They also suggested that the customs department be strengthened by equipping it with transport and communication facilities to stamp out smuggling in the District. They further suggested the setting up of more customs posts at Kamwezi, Rwene, Bigaya and on Lake Bunyonyi.

The meeting was also attended by the ministers of Health Dr Rugunda, and of Constitutional Affairs Mr Sam Njuba. While in Kabale, the President also met members of Resistance

Councils in the district.

He assured them that essential commodities will be available once bad planning which is escalating scarcity is done away with.

On the question of high interest rates on loans from the bank, the President advised the people to opt for agricultural and industrial loans whose interest rates are lower than those for commercial loans.

The President confirmed that the Kabale-Kisoro road will be graded.

On the issue of the people of Kisoro ferrying their produce across the border because of having nowhere else to sell it, the President agreed to the opening up of a small branch of the Produce Marketing Board in Kisoro town.

/9274

CSO: 3400/540

MUTEBI ON POLITICAL ROLE OF BAGANDA

Nairobi SUNDAY NATION in English 9 Nov 86 p 13

[Article by Joseph Makokha]

[Text] It must not be seen as a case of the Baganda versus the rest because we all suffer when there is no peace - Prince Mutebi]

Question: Your return to Uganda almost two months ago was widely reported in the Press and to the surprise of most observers, you are once more on your way out. What are your plans?

Answer: My plan is to go to Britain where I should continue with a law degree which I had started in 1984. The course was interrupted in July 1985 by the lengthy peace process in Nairobi and which I attended. There was therefore no way I could have finished my course. I therefore decided to drop it and pick it up later. This is precisely why I am going back to Britain.

Mind you, I am not the only one whose studies were interrupted by the Ugandan peace process because a lot of young Ugandans were forced to abandon their studies to link up in one way or the other, with the Ugandan historical process of liberation.

Q: What length of time are you left with to complete your law degree?

A: Just over a year. However, what needs clarification here is that this time span should not be seen as another exile as I will be coming home frequently during this period of studies.

Q: Prince Mutebi, it will certainly be of interest to our readers if, by way of summary, you could give an account of some of your experiences, having left the country many years ago and now returning as heir to the abolished Kabaka throne. How do you plan to perpetuate your role as the "Sabataka" (leader of clan leaders)?

A: I should begin by saying that I was in Uganda much earlier this year in January towards the end of the resistance war when NRM (the National Resistance Movement) was controlling most of the southern parts of Uganda. What struck me then was the discipline prevailing within the movement and its army's humane interaction with the people residing in areas it had liberated.

After so many years of complete turmoil under the rule of incompetent politicians and corrupt soldiers, one came across a group of people who were not only highly motivated but also highly educated for the role of leadership.

As far as the institution I inherited is concerned, it is important to point out that, whereas so many people wanted to create the impression that the Baganda institution cannot in fact operate or thrive within the new nation-state of Uganda, that is plainly out of the case.

It is perfectly possible to have a constitutional or social arrangement that would make it possible for this institution, like any other traditional one, to operate in Uganda.

That is perfectly obvious and there should be no debate about it. My impression is that most people who believe in Uganda's future as a heterogeneous society, also accept this can happen. This is more so, when one is dealing with a reasonable government, a government which understands Uganda's future. Basically, this is the impression I got in my two months tour back home.

Q: To what extent did you put this point across to the transitional government of President Yoweri Museveni either as the Sabataka or together with the Baganda elders, and how was this received?

A: The situation at the moment in Uganda is that anybody can put across his or her ideas on anything within the constitutional process. As you may know, the NRM is an interim administration as it paves the way to a constituent assembly and constitutional conference.

In this regard, anybody who has any ideas on this or how Uganda should operate in future can contribute. I now know that the Baganda clan elders, for example, did this in September this year and as a result of which the President accepted to set up a committee to review all issues pertaining to the Baganda institutions. That was one aspect of the democratic process that is going on now. There are also proposals and memorandums to be put to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Government. As you can see, therefore, there are several ways by which these issues are being put across to the relevant authorities for discussion and review.

Q: Are there signs that ideas and proposals on the Baganda institution which you head will be embraced by the general consensus when it comes to the constitutional conference?

A: It is a fairly complicated issue. The Baganda traditional cultural systems and structures have always been there. They

have survived the entire 20 years of turmoil. Clan structures were always there and so were their heads. This explains why me as the inheritor of the Sabataka (leader of clan leaders) was recognised as such though I was out of the country for so long.

What else emerges over and above that and around it, is something to be seen within this constitutional mechanism. So one expects that in this democratic atmosphere that has been created by the current regime pending a constitutional conference, these issues will be debated and thrashed out. It is a new atmosphere of democracy in Uganda.

Q: Some observers have argued that Uganda's political problem revolves around the Baganda. Their premise is that this community was the most developed and politically organised before and after independence and unless there is a division of political roles that favours this group, problems will always persist in Uganda.

A: I do not agree with that assessment of the situation at all. Basically people have had to adopt this kind of thinking as a result of the muddle-headed and tribal policies of the Obote regime. What we should not forget is that there was a time immediately after independence when Uganda was a very politically workable country until Obote got rid of the independence

constitution and imposed his own. From there on, divisions were emphasised and for political reasons that suited him. He employed what you might call a "divide and rule" style of leadership. This comprised clashing one tribe against the other to satisfy his political manoeuvres. This created all these political divisions that now make it so easy for some to say that it was the Baganda who were a stumbling block to peace.

Q: Do you, therefore, dismiss such analyses that see Baganda as a stumbling block to finding a solution to the Ugandan political problem?

A: Don't get me wrong. I think it can be made to be that way. Some people have made it out to appear so, reducing the Ugandan problem to that of the Baganda versus the rest. This is the bad politics Uganda has inherited from the past 20 years. Why should we carry on this kind of politics? After all, the Baganda, Batoro, Bateso, Balango and the others have all suffered during this time of turmoil. Why should we lean back to this kind of bad politics?

Q: And this is precisely the question, Prince Mutebi. One is currently faced with treason cases in Uganda hardly a year since the NRM brought to a stop the muddle-headed politics you are talking about. The unfortunate thing about these cases is that almost all the accused belong to the Baganda tribe. How do you explain this?

A: It is difficult to comment on this as it is a court case.

Q: And there are those suggesting, during this interim administration, that the future constitution of Uganda should be a federalist one, where regional autonomy would be enhanced. Does this approach lie in with the Baganda elders' request for the recognition of their traditional institutions?

A: I don't think that the issue of the preservation or otherwise of the Baganda's cultural traditions should be confused with the wider issue of establishing Uganda as a federalist state. Buganda's heritage has always survived on its own. However, whether Uganda should go federalist or not is out of my purview. It is for the people to decide. But one can say that the federalists do have a case. It was under the federalist constitution in the sixties that Uganda ever experienced peace.

Q: How then do you view NRM's new policy of political education through seminars and village committees. Is there not a likelihood that such education will clash with cultural identities such as the ones the Buganda traditional institutions advocate?

A: Cultural education or identities and political education should not be mutually exclusive. In fact one hopes that the current exercise of mass mobilisation through political education will take into account the cultural diversities of Uganda.

/13104

CSO: 3400/586

NRM PLANS TO SECURE, INTEGRATE KARAMOJA DESCRIBED

Kampala NEW VISION in English 4 Nov 86 pp 6, 7

[Article by Cathy Watson]

[Text]

It's the dry season now in Karamoja. The harvest is over and the villages are quiet. The old men drink and talk, and only the women are busy.

The young men are conspicuously absent. Some are away, taking the cattle on long treks to find pasture, but many are raiding in eastern Uganda and southern Sudan.

It is the season for raids. The warriors can walk quickly through the dry grass, leaving no tracks and often covering more than 100 miles a day.

But while the raids cause suffering along Karamoja's borders, Karamoja itself is safer and more peaceful than it has been for years. For now and for at least two reasons the Karamojong are not raiding each other. With the NRA occupied with the rebels in the north, the Karamojong can raid their neighbours with relative impunity. Also the Karamojong agreed not to raid each other at peace talks in 1982 and since then have more or less kept their word.

The guns which were once so visible in Karamoja have been put away. "Since the NRA arrived in March," said one aid worker, "the Karamojong have really cleaned up their act. You don't see guns or hear shooting anymore."

The fringes of Karamoja remain dangerous - raiders shot and killed two Somali

traders at Iriri on October 25, when they were unlucky enough to run into a returning raiding party. But there are no reports of recent attacks on travellers in the internal areas of Karamoja. "You can walk or drive around at night with no problem now," said a shopkeeper in Kabong.

Despite this, there is a feeling that trouble could be just around the corner. Certain precautions are being taken. For example, NRA soldiers guard the Stirling Civil Engineering team repairing the road between Moroto and Kotido.

"The Karamojong are heavily armed and they know that the NRA plans to get tough with them," said one Karamojong. "The witch-doctors are telling the warriors to raid now while the NRA is busy with the rebels. They say that when the rebels are finished, the NRA will crackdown on the Karamojong."

Douglas Mande, the SDA for Kotido and an NRA commander, confirms that a

firm policy is on the way. "We're going to cool down the Karamojong. I think it will take us about two years."

The NRM's recipe for Karamoja seems to be threefold: political, military and economic.

"The political problem with Karamoja has been the absence of good government," says Mande. "We need resistance committees and a dedicated local administration."

The military solution is ambitious and potentially explosive, but everyone — from NRA commanders to missionaries to educated Karamojong — says it is essential. "We will disarm the Karamojong completely," says Mande. "Then we will seal off the region's internal and external borders — to stop the Karamojong from raiding and to shield them from their traditional enemies, the Turkana of Kenya and the Didinga of southern Sudan."

Once security is good, economic development can start. "The NRM is going to give the Karamojong some productive enterprise. Right now the young men have nothing to do except drink and raid — nowhere for that energy to go," said Mande.

The first RCs were formed in Karamoja on October 22. Mande praised the cadres

who prepared the villages for the elections. "I've six cadres who have been to the political school, all Karamojong. They're fantastic. They walk everywhere and never complain. They just say 'we're going' and off they walk."

The cadres have visited on foot every village in Dodoth and Jie counties and half the villages in Labwor. They withdrew from Labwor last month when rebels disrupted the area.

Mande says that only cadres who are Karamojong can do this work. "I had four cadres from the south. They took one to look at the place and said they had to go back to Kampala for their belongings. I never saw them again!"

Mande and his team have been going to the villages, or *manyattas*, for the first RC elections. In Lonyerep, the first village, the people were doubtful and slow to come forward. At first only four elders gathered. Then the cadres drummed up more people. Another 40 men came but no women. Finally women came but only hesitantly. They sat apart from the men, dressed in goat skins, decorated with anklets, bracelets and necklaces, and some with their faces painted.

The men were also dressed in the traditional way — with just a sheet knotted over one shoulder. Some had lip plugs and feathers in their hair. Others had the Turkana helmet-like hair style, made high and stiff with mud and pieces of metal.

The meeting began slowly. The Karamojong, with their experience, shared with other Ugandans, of brutality at the hands of soldiers, were nervous about Edward and Patrick, Mande's kadogos. Patrick, who was standing almost to attention behind Mande had to be told to sit down and take it easy.

Then the nominations could begin. At first it went well, with Sampson Ilukori, Mande's special assistant and a graduate of the political school at Wakiso, running the meeting. But then another snag arose, the post of secretary for youth. No one wanted it. The warriors

laughed and grumbled among themselves and one by one got up and walked away.

This post and the post of secretary for defence were a problem in a good number of villages. The warriors do not want to be involved with a structure which will tie them down and, in particular, stop their raiding. In several villages old men were elected as secretaries for youth, because all the young men declined.

But eventually in Lonyerep a suitable secretary for youth was found, and Mande and his team could move on. In the next villages, the elections went on smoothly. Word had spread that Mande and his team were well intentioned.

RCs have now been formed in the following villages in Kotido district in Karamoja: in Nakapelimoru subcounty in Jie county, Lonyerep, Kalogwang, Poet, Kalogola, Kaiwata, Lomukura, Lokore, Nasinyon, Mazula, Kolabur, Oyapuwa, Nyakwae, Loru, Kadocha, Potongar, and in Panyangara sub county in Jie county, Lopodot, Ngoletur, Nutumpool, Nalikeret, Rikita, Naregae, Lopotha, Nakadelio, Lopothat, Nawii-Ejok, Ilaa, Rukuruk, Nabilileet, Lorengeawat, Naitakwae, Lojom and Kalosarich.

A total of 15 RC I's have been set up. Many villages had to join with others to create big enough resistance councils. Often too one village would have no one who could read or write well enough to be secretary, — so villages had to join forces to find a secretary.

"The good thing about the Karamojong is that there is no politics," says Mande. And indeed at the RC elections the queries and comments were all practical and simple. "Does the RC chairman need to be an educated man?" "No," said Sampson Ilukori, "as long as you respect him."

In one village they invented a song in praise of President Museveni. "They think Museveni is tough and good. The others, Amin and Obote, were tough and bad," Ilukori explained.

But the main worry in every village was water. At only the beginning of the

dry season, it is already running out. By March the lack could be acute. Seventy-five per cent of the boreholes in Kotido are out of order. The water development team has the pipes to repair them but no transport. The team tells the Karamojong, — you carry the pipes, and we'll walk with you to the village. Now the Karamojong are carrying the pipes on their heads, the water team striding along beside them.

The crisis of water in Kotido was not helped by the disappearance two months ago of the head of the water development team with 2.2 million shillings.

It is not clear how well the RCs will work in Karamoja, but just two days after the first had formed, RCs were bringing problems to the SDA. One RC reported that the warriors in their village had kidnapped a ten year old boy from near Lira and were keeping him to tend cattle.

Graduates of the political school at Wakiso are also helping to improve politics in Karamoja. Almost all the top officials in Kotido district have attended the course at Wakiso, and another six are joining the new intake which begins this week.

The round-up of guns in Karamoja began in August, but was suspended in September when the NRA was forced to move troops across to Kitgum and Gulu to contain the rebels. Nevertheless over 1000 guns were gathered, some handed in voluntarily, others taken by force by the NRA.

One missionary, Father Peter Premarini, who has lived in Karamoja for 16 years, said he thought these represented only 5 per cent of the guns in Karamoja. He also believes that the warriors will not give up their guns easily.

"We have never thought it would be easy," says Mande. The Karamojong are reported to have self-loading rifles, sub-machine guns, and grenade and mortar launchers. Guns began proliferating in Karamoja in 1979 after the fall of Idi Amin, when the Karamojong raided the barracks at Moroto and

also seized weapons from Amin soldiers, who used the route through Karamoja to reach West Nile and Sudan. The same happened this year, although this time the Karamojong were more prepared. They mounted roadblocks, stripping the UNLA soldiers of their uniforms and guns and killing many of them. The frenzy of this year's raids may in part be due to the new influx of arms.

But a military operation to disarm the Karamojong will not be started until the NRA can muster the troops to carry it out efficiently. At present there are two battalions in Karamoja — the 23rd based at Moroto and the 31st at Kotido. The main concern of both seems to be the rebels and not the raiders. One NRA soldier explained why: "The raiders are just after cattle, but the rebels are after the government."

The rebels entered Karamoja in September from their base in Kidepo National Park. They reached the towns of Karenga and Kapedo, where they burnt houses, killed civilians, spoiled boreholes and kidnapped young men to act as porters. According to SDA Mande, their aim was to capture Kotido, but the NRA drove them away. Most appear to have returned to southern Sudan as Kidepo National Park is now almost completely secure.

Small groups of rebels remain active in eastern Karamoja, however, and the NRA has made the area 15 miles to the east of Kotido off limits to traffic.

The economic solution to Karamoja's problems is obviously a long-term undertaking. Always a harsh environment and neglected by all previous regimes, starting with the British, Karamoja has slipped deeper and deeper into poverty since 1979. That year Idi Amin's soldiers destroyed the animal health checkpoint at Iriri, which cleared all cattle for sale outside Karamoja. The government promptly quarantined Karamoja, the cattle markets collapsed and the people lost their only source of income.

The daily market at Kptido, which once boomed with

cattle sales and others, is now shrunk to 4 or 5 vendors, selling a handful of goats here, a small pile of salt there.

Where once a Karamojong could sell 150 animals in a day to a trader from Kampala, he is now hard-pressed to sell one and must sell it within Karamoja, says Terence Okoth, an animal health officer in Kotido.

The NRM intends to reopen the Karamojong cattle markets as soon as animal health can be assured, but that will take some work. Several diseases, most importantly contagious pleural pneumonia, are ravaging Karamoja's goat and cattle population, brought in by sick animals raided from southern Sudan.

The animal health team has the vaccines against the pneumonia as well as rinderpest but has no transport. Its vehicle was stolen in 1983.

In general the facilities for animal health have deteriorated since the 1970s. The two dips in Kotido district, at Abim and Nakapelmoru, have been out of order since 1977, and their iron roofs were looted in 1979. Dips are essential to control four serious diseases carried by ticks.

The alternative to dipping is spraying but there is only one spray pump in Kotido district for its 300,000 heads of cattle. Okoth estimates that only 1000 animals are sprayed a year.

Lack of water is an ever problem for the livestock. "We used to have so many dams. But most are silted up now. The International Labour Organisation wanted to help but withdrew its staff to Kampala in August because it feared the rebels," says Okoth.

Okoth says that the Karamojong could clear the dams themselves but they need the tools. He also stresses that the Karamojong worry greatly about the health of their animals. "They come in everyday saying, our animals are dying. They want to buy antibiotics, but we have none to sell."

Agriculture has fared poorly as well. Major projects at Labwor, Karenga, Iriri and Namalu were destroyed by raids and government armies. Crops in Kara-

moja usually fail every 4 to 5 years due to lack of rain.

Agriculture among the Karamojong is purely women's work. In fact, the word for crops is 'women's cows'. So efforts to increase agricultural output must focus on women's needs, something that has not always happened in the past.

The Karamojong derive most of their nutrition from the cereals grown by the women and relatively little from livestock products. When there is famine, as there was in 1980, it is because crops fail and only secondarily because cattle die.

Human health has also been neglected in Karamoja, with tuberculosis, malaria and gastroenteritis common. The health centre at Kotido lacks food, mattresses, lamps and an ambulance. The ambulance was stolen by fleeing UNLA soldiers in February, says John Bosco Angello, the medical assistant in charge. "I had to take my last emergency case to the hospital in a tipper truck."

The lack of food means he can accept no in-patients. The lack of light means work at night is difficult and hazardous.

Kotido has no generator. "We were meant to get one but it was diverted," says Mande.

The hospital at Kabong is an oasis amid these troubles. Run by Dr Forni, district medical officer for Kotido, it provides a full hospital service as well as community schemes including one for TB patients and another for traditional birth attendants.

The hospital is almost self-sufficient. It grows its own food. A forest of 7000 trees, planted by the hospital staff, provides all the wood it needs for fuel.

Forni says that the Karamojong are extraordinarily healthy, despite their poverty. For example, venereal disease is almost unknown among them. A chronic shortage of food is their main health risk. This shows up most clearly in pregnant women. Whereas a normal woman gains about 11 kg during pregnancy, Karamojong women gain on average only 2 to 3 kg and many lose weight. Karamojong newborns weigh on average 2.495 kg, on the borderline of being dangerously underweight.

Probably the most acute obstacle to plans to help the Karamojong in Kotido is the total lack of transport. Every vehicle in the district was stolen during the last two regimes. "I think most of our vehicles are in southern Sudan now," says Mande, although the former district commissioner's car has been sighted near Gulu.

SDA Mande's pick-up is the only government vehicle in the district. It never stands still: it is used as an ambulance, to bring veterinary drugs from Kampala, to carry district staff to the villages. Even it, however, is unsuitable for Karamoja. It lacks four wheels drive and has a low clearance.

On this score the NRM appears as neglectful of Karamoja as any other regime, particularly in light of the number of vehicles some ministers have been allocated.

Traditionally Karamojong men raid for cattle, for status and to pay the bride-prices of the numerous wives. Dan Nangole, a Karamojong book keeper explains: "These guys are thirsty for cattle because of the bride price. Also with more cattle you climb the ladder of honour." The Karamojong further believe that all cattle belong to them by divine decree.

The pressure to acquire cattle is still strong. An average dowry calls for 50 animals and the family of an exceptionally sought after woman can ask for over 100. But the causes of cattle raiding are now more complex. They include poverty, boredom, too many guns and the violence of

Uganda's past which has criminalised some Ugandans.

Many people believe that criminal or 'bad' elements are to blame for the violence of today's raids. One missionary described the raiders she meets as "ex-UNLA soldiers whose villages no longer want them" and "semi-educated thugs"

She believes that those Karamojong who joined Amin's army and the UNLA were brutalised by the atrocities those forces meted out and are now corrupting the traditional warriors. The Karamojong were particularly heavily recruited by the Lutwa regime which lured them with promises of cattle in Buganda and Ankole.

Other people explain today's raiding by saying it is a traditional custom turned nasty by guns and that the Karamojong are an inherently violent people who now have access to lethal weapons.

There is a leftist analysis which says that many Karamojong want peace and that the raids only benefit a minority who get rich while most get poorer. There is data to show that in some villages a few individuals own unusually large herds while more people than before have no animals at all. But this trend is not seen in Karamoja as a whole.

There is also a theory which links the raids to a business which smuggles cattle through Kenya to Somalia and then to Saudi Arabia. But while some raided cattle may leave Uganda, many remain in Karamoja. Counties like Dodoth last year were almost without cattle but are now well stocked.

When gold and missionaries are added to this theory, it turns into an international conspiracy. There are reports that the NRA caught a helicopter attempting to fly Karamoja gold to Kenya and that it also found gold hidden in sacks of seeds being sent by the Church of Uganda seeds project to southern Sudan. Here there could be a link with the rebels. Perhaps the gold was going to them. Or perhaps

foreign groups are selling the gold to arm the rebels and the raiders.

In Karamoja, however, all sources deny a link between the rebels and the raiders. They point to the long-standing enmity between the Karamojong and the Acholi. They also say that unarmed Karamojong flee when they see the rebels, and that raiders have been known to fight pitched battles with them.

But it is clear that the rebels benefit from the cattle raids in that they stretch the NRA's logistical and political resources. The people of eastern Uganda may eventually feel abandoned by the NRM which promises them protection from the raiders but cannot, because of its commitments in the north, provide it in sufficient strength.

Commander Badru Kiyindi of the 31st battalion believes this is part of the rebels plans. He believes that the rebels waited until the cattle raids were well underway before launching their first attack in August.

But whatever the correct analysis of cattle raiding, revenge is clearly a strong motive for the Karamojong. Since 1971 when Idi Amin launched a crash programme to make the Karamojong wear clothes, directing his soldiers to beat those who went naked, the Karamojong have suffered at the hands of armies.

Under Obote's second regime soldiers killed many Karamojong, including women and children, twice using helicopter gunships against them. The UNLA also used Karamoja as a private meat store, and warriors now raiding villages in Kitgum and Gulu often say they are simply going to get their cattle back.

The warriors also seek revenge on the civilians of the districts bordering Karamoja, who in 1979 formed an armed militia which killed many Karamojong. It was disbanded in 1983 but last week after raids in Mbale there were calls to restart it.

A final bitterness for the Karamojong was their betrayal at peace talks in 1982 with the Itesot at Soroti.

They killed several of the Karamojong delegation and wounded the senior politician in the group, Joshua Akol, then an UPC MP and the deputy minister for transport.

The NRM would do well to note this vicious cycle of revenge and retaliation. It must be broken. The Karamojong must be disarmed, but the steps the NRM takes to do this must be swift, effective, well-resourced and understood by the Karamojong. And as the Karamojong are disarmed they must be helped out of their poverty. Otherwise it will be just another bitter chapter for the Karamojong, and the violence will continue. More guns can always be found.

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REHABILITATION OF KILEMBE COPPER MINE APPROVED

London AFRICA DIGEST in English 22 Nov 86 p 6

[Text] The government is going ahead with the partial rehabilitation of the Kilembe copper mine in the west, despite doubts about its commercial viability.

Water & Mineral Resources Minister Chango Macho recently announced plans for government investment of \$20 million in Kilembe. The rehabilitation will have three phases: restoration of the mine's productive capacity, rehabilitation of the concentrator and erection of a new smelter; erection of new plants to produce cobalt and sulphuric acid, and refining of copper and manufacture of such products as copper wire and cable.

Macho gave no cost estimate. However, total capital costs were put at \$53.6 million in a feasibility study done by the UK's **Seltrust Engineering** in 1982. At current prices, the cost is put at \$100 million.

Additional financing will be difficult to raise, sources say. The project failed to attract external financing in 1983, when the government initially announced a \$20 million investment to re-open the mine. The lack of interest was caused by depressed world commodity prices and the state of insecurity during the five-year civil war.

Prospects for attracting external financing in the near future remain poor. The world price for copper has stagnated in 1986 and there is little chance of a rise, given producers' overcapacity. World cobalt prices have also plummeted this year.

Macho says the decision to go ahead with the project is based on a need to diversify exports away from coffee and to stimulate local industry, including development of small implements industries to produce hammers, nails, beds, bolts and nuts.

Kilembe has been on a care-and-maintenance basis since production ceased in 1979. Four years earlier, the

mine was taken over by the government after former president Amin expelled Canada's **Falconbridge**, which had managed the mine since it was opened in the mid-1950s. Output totalled 8,900 tonnes in 1975, compared with 17,000 tonnes in 1970.

Seltrust put Kilembe's proven and probable copper ore reserves at just over 4 million tonnes, with an average content of 1.75 per cent copper, and possible reserves at 1.8 million tonnes, with an average copper content of 1.39 per cent.

Cobalt reserves have yet to be evaluated, but there is an estimated 1.1 million tonnes of cobalt pyrite concentrate, with a 1.35 per cent cobalt content, stockpiled at nearby Kasese.

Given these figures, Seltrust said the mine could produce 504,000 tonnes of ore annually for eight to nine years. It recommended rehabilitating the Kilembe concentrator to produce 28,000 tonnes of copper concentrates and 36,000 tonnes of cobalt pyrite concentrates a year, as well as reconstructing the filter plant at Kasese and installing equipment to enable copper concentrates to be loaded into railway wagons for export overseas.

Seltrust also suggested a cobalt processing and a sulphuric acid plant be built at Kasese. The former would process 94,050 tonnes of cobalt concentrates a year to produce 2,380 tonnes of cobalt carbonate for further processing overseas in Canada or Europe. The latter would produce 102,700 tonnes a year of 98 per cent acid, transported by rail for export.

Seltrust estimated that the project would take 32 months to complete and require an operating staff of 2,700.

MUGABE ADDRESSES INTERNAL, REGIONAL ISSUES, RELATIONS WITH RSA

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 16, 18, 20, 21

[Interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe by Frederik van Zyl Slabbert;
date and place not given]

[Text]

Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is no stranger to *Leadership* magazine. He was interviewed by publisher and editor Hugh Murray in this journal's inaugural edition nearly five years ago – the first time Mr Mugabe had allowed a South African journalist access since becoming prime minister.

The interview on these pages represents another “first”. Some four years ago, a ban was slapped on prime ministerial interviews with publications and journalists operating out of South Africa. Former PFP leader Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and David Goldblatt (who also took the photographs for the first interview), were granted the interview *Leadership* really wanted to celebrate its fifth birthday.

At the beginning of 1982, a somewhat terse Mr Mugabe talked to *Leadership* about the need for “national reconciliation”. In his later discussion with Slabbert, the level tone suggests that he is much more confident now about his ability to meet this tough objective.

And a separate article on improving race relations in the country (see page 24), written by Professor Marshall Murphree of the University of Zimbabwe in Harare, would seem to bear out such an assessment.

Says Murphree: “In the first five years of independence, the salience of race has declined significantly although the evidence of a residual white racism and its reactive black response remains. Given the contradictions and constraints involved, Zimbabwe is a success story, achieved by a combination of statesmanship, favourable economic conditions and a balance of principle and pragmatism.”

There is an important matter with which *Leadership* would liked to have dealt in the interview: the impact on the region of President Samora Machel's death.

Slabbert conducted the interview before the tragic air crash and the Prime Minister's press office made it clear that a further discussion was out of the question.

Nevertheless, it is certain that Mr Mugabe will take a long time to get over the death of his "bosom friend" and comrade-in-arms. It can safely be forecast that the disaster will impact seriously on efforts to sustain peace in the region.

The destinies of Zimbabwe and South Africa are inter-linked to a very large extent. How do you see the major similarities and differences in the conflicts in South Africa and the former Rhodesia?

Rhodesia was a kind of South African microcosm, with a smaller population than that of South Africa, but with the same racial pattern – whites on the one hand were a minority and still are a minority; blacks on the other were the majority. Here we had the policy of segregation, racial segregation. At one time, during the Federation and before, they tried to call it the policy of "two pyramids". So you had racial separation, and the two races were meant to develop along their own routes upward, with very little inter-action. You had land for the whites, and land for the blacks – and the land for the whites was more fertile, and per capita, much more than that of the blacks; African education and European education; African health, European health, and with social separation as well. The races were not legally prohibited from inter-acting, but socially it was regarded as taboo for whites to mingle with blacks, until the time of the Federation.

Then we had some modification, here and there – where hotels like the Jameson were set aside as multi-racial hotels, and the rest, like Meikles, remained strictly and exclusively white. That pattern you also get in South Africa. But perhaps in South Africa what has really heightened and aggravated things, is the fact that segregation was then embodied and incorporated in law and therefore, by law, Africans may not, say, have the same rights as the whites. And of course, recently they have ameliorated that position in regard to marriages and things like that. But the pattern is the same – residential separation, agricultural separation, and then you have Bantustans. Here, of course, we

had Native Reserves, later Tribal Trust Lands. Now we call those communal lands, but anybody can live in those areas. The fact, however, is that whites really live in urban areas and in commercial farming areas. So you have the same pattern and, in my view, the remedy could be the same as here. I don't see South Africa escaping the same democratic solution that we have had to resort to here.

Given your experience in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, what is your message to black and white South Africans who are locked in conflict?

From my experience here, the fears of the whites in the country were more psychological than anything else. But, of course, when a group has entrenched itself in power, then it regards its rights and privileges as sacrosanct. Then it seeks to make them permanent, one way or another, and raises them above the purely psychological sphere and it wants to build in a kind of heritage for the future. So, what South Africans really are facing is what we faced here. But there is no need for whites to fear that they will be discriminated against if democracy is established.

Naturally, there will have to be some giving, and much more giving by whites than by blacks. Giving and taking will have to take place. There will have to be equal rights to the acquisition of property; equal opportunities in respect of such social services as education and health. A non-racial pattern must evolve. It may, for a start, be repulsive to whites that their children should go to the same schools as blacks. Here it took some doing and we are still getting over the psychological difficulties. But our whites are now used to it and, more and more, we see parents being willing and amenable to their children mixing, even socially, with blacks. So, that is not a matter that should be feared by whites, that blacks will, perhaps, pursue a vengeful policy. But, of course, it depends on how the solution is achieved. If it is

achieved by way of a political solution in which all parties evolve a democratic order, then I don't see the whites losing by it. If anything, they will gain by it. They will gain in the sense that psychologically they will have rid themselves of their sense of racial superiority and their fear of being overwhelmed by blacks.

Those who favour sanctions against the South African government believe they will either bring that government to its senses, or to its knees. What is your view?

Sanctions certainly cannot have the effect of bringing the apartheid regime to its knees. But they are under the additional pressure of the political struggle being waged by the people of South Africa in general. A combination of these forces is what will yield the solution in the end, not just sanctions alone.

What will be the impact of retaliatory sanctions by the South African government against Zimbabwe?

We expect that if we impose sanctions, or if the international community imposes sanctions, South Africa will retaliate. We know they are thinking of it, and one way in which they are going to retaliate is precisely by doing what they demonstrated they could do – impose a blockade and, therefore, prevent the transportation of our goods, imports and exports, through South Africa. That is obviously going to affect us, because all along South Africa has not allowed us to divert our goods on the Mozambican routes. They have supported the MNR in attacking our Mozambican routes on which most of our goods should go. Ian Smith used those routes, by and large, and only a trickle of goods went through South Africa. So, if we had a situation where South Africa blockaded us, we would have to move heaven and earth to get our goods, most of our goods, if not all, through Mozambican routes. Nacala is also a possibility. These are being worked on and we would have to ensure that the Maputo line works.

The Beira corridor is a feasible proposition only to the extent that it can absorb part of the volume of our exports and imports that today pass through South Africa. But the port has limited facilities. It does not matter how much dredging is done, and how much expansion of the harbour facilities is undertaken, there is still a limited extent to which

it can accommodate most of our goods. We would still have to use Maputo.

You have just been elected chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. How do you see NAM making a contribution to bringing about stability in Southern Africa?

The Non-Aligned Movement is not an organisation with a given structure as such, so its platform is mainly political. It is this political platform which it utilizes to bring pressure to bear on situations where solutions are much needed. And hence, in respect of Southern Africa, that is, in respect of apartheid in South Africa and the occupation of Namibia by South Africa, NAM urges sanctions; urges the adoption of a sanctions package, and perhaps a comprehensive and mandatory package of sanctions by the international community. It appeals not only to its members, but also to the international community. Therefore, it is a complementary organization to the United Nations. It hasn't got the structure which enables it to urge action and supervise it in the same way as perhaps the United Nations which is a well-established organization.

What has been your experience of the relationship between government and business in Zimbabwe?

Private enterprise was initially rather suspicious of government and they did not know whether they would be allowed to survive for another five years. Now five years have gone by – they have survived, they are more confident now. But we are aware they are still suspicious. But we say to them: "Go ahead, continue, expand"; if it is agriculture, we say: "Well, there are the incentives given you by government, continue to produce and contribute to the volume of production of commodities that we need in the country, and that we need to export also." And so, there is greater confidence now on the part of business. Obviously we are still committed to our policy of socialism, but we have said to business that our socialism takes into

account our own history and circumstances, and it is obvious that we cannot transform the country overnight. And to the extent that we are not able to transform it overnight, we say to

business: "These are the goals of our nation; these are the targets. Work towards them and we will assist you as much as we can to achieve those targets." Where we undertake to transform the socio-economic system along socialist lines, and should we decide to participate in any enterprise, we discuss this with the relevant enterprises, and obviously we pay compensation for any enterprises that are taken over by government. But sometimes, of course, we also purchase shares in the particular enterprises. However, our mode of operation towards socialism has been by way of creating co-operatives in agriculture, in mining, in industry and in establishing new enterprises. Then, State enterprises work alongside private enterprise and naturally we have gone about this process cautiously, because we need to train people for management. We need also the necessary inputs, technology and so on – and these are not things that you can hope to get overnight. This slows the process, and, to the extent that that process is slow, we must accept co-existence with private enterprise.

How close are you to achieving the goal of national unity as far as the Matabele/Shona issue is concerned?

We have never looked at the difference between ZANU and ZAPU as basically a Ndebele/Shona issue. True, Nkomo is the Ndebele leader and I am a Shona leader. But the break occurred not because Nkomo isn't Shona, and he would be the last man to admit that I quit ZAPU because he is Ndebele. I quit because I did not agree that he was effective as a leader. I wanted a much more effective organisational instrument to bring about change. We were more for the armed struggle at the time than ZAPU was, but, of course, eventually ZAPU also adopted the armed struggle. This was the basic difference. But, of course, in our establishing ZANU, more Ndebele's remained with Nkomo and this made the division much more tribal than it really is. ZAPU also has many Shonas as its followers, and we have some Ndebeles as followers and also in the leadership. So the difference should not be looked at as basically Ndebele and Shona, that is, as a tribal issue.

However, ZANU and ZAPU have started conferring and we believe that unity is within sight. But, of course, we had to define certain parameters and certain fundamental principles. What the main cause of differ-

ence was, or rather the main difficulty in achieving unity, was the view of ZAPU that we form a completely new party and relegate both ZANU and ZAPU to the archives.

And those are Nkomo's words – relegate ZANU and ZAPU to the archives. They have played their part in the history and let's have their names only in the archives. And we said, in retort, that only last year in June we went to the electorate and we got 80% – do you expect us to go back to our constituents and say: "You did well, but the time has now come for us to relegate your votes to the archives?" We couldn't do a thing like that and so it was that area that needed discussion. We have since discussed it, and we are happy that we are moving towards unity, but unity within the framework of the ruling party.

Has the revolution in Zimbabwe benefited women as much as men?

Yes, it has benefited women. You see, women have been subject to more oppressive structures in our society, colonial or traditional, than have men. During settler rule, women suffered the same disabilities as men under colonial rule – they were discriminated against educationally. But within their own society, African women still suffered discrimination by men. We have discriminated against them by virtue of the fact that by tradition they were regarded as inferior and dependants – men's dependants. They are still that, but the war raised the status of women considerably. We had young women in the struggle, some of whom became commanders and members of the General Staff and one or two in the High Command. After Independence, we, ourselves, adopted as a party (and this is also in our two manifestos, the 1980 and 1985 election manifestos) the policy of equality, equal wages, equal opportunities and a commitment to improving the status of women within custom and within the law. This has not been achieved yet.

But across the board now you have young women occupying equal positions with men, with the same salaries, in the civil service and also in private enterprise. I was amused that when we took over, European women in the public service were receiving lower salaries than men, and we abolished it. We found it absolutely unbearable and we did away with it. At the same time, of course, we also raised the status of the African woman, and to us, therefore, a woman can

be a permanent secretary as much as a man. But, because of the handicap they had through custom and tradition, and a slower start in education, there are fewer highly educated women than men. And so, at the moment, you have only one woman permanent secretary, but a number are assistant secretaries. One hopes that as time goes on they will move upwards and therefore help us to correct the present imbalance.

But this is not to say that all is well. Women are still inferior to men by virtue of our system of marriage and custom. We pay *lobola*, and this means, naturally, that a woman becomes the man's possession. It doesn't matter what we try to say, how we try to euphemistically put it, the issue is – if you have paid *lobola* for a woman, then she becomes "yours" and she bears the children. She must bear the children for your family. And the children must bear your name. They are your children. And so what she brings into the family is a womb, as well as her labour. She is a housewife; she is the keeper of the children; she is also the main agricultural worker, and so she still has that burden.

But I wouldn't mind that, I don't think I would ever come to a position where I will agree that men and women must be equal cooks in the home. I believe that the woman is a better cook than the man, although, of course, having been a bachelor for a long time, I can cook for myself delicious food as much as my wife can cook it. So I pride myself on that one, but the issue is: I think the woman is a better nurse for the child. She is closer to the child than the father and one would want to see that continue. I think she also makes a better housekeeper. But the man must also accept his own responsibilities and must not desert the wife and leave her to do, in addition to housework, arduous agricultural tasks, such as weeding the fields.

I am now talking of the traditional woman. So there is that aspect that must be corrected. Then, of course, there is the question of inheritance. We have problems there because of our system of marriage. If the woman comes to your home and she is not really rooted in it legally, then she is not entitled to inherit from you – your children are. She is entitled perhaps to inheritance from her own family, to the extent that she is recognized as the inheritor there, but even in her own home, it is more the men, the brothers, who will inherit. And so this is what we are trying to look at at the moment.

What are your views on such organisations as the African National Congress and Inkatha?

I do not recognize that there is any validity to a political organization or movement which is based on tribe.

And so I do not accept the criteria of a Zulu tribe, or a Xhosa tribe or a Sotho tribe in a context where you are forging national unity. We accept that this is your history, like we accept here, that we have Shonas, Vendas, Ndebeles, Shangani and the various sub-tribes in the country, that this is what we have inherited. But accepting that does not mean accepting that these tribal entities must continue to exist entirely as they are and be accorded political rights on the basis that they are tribes.

I think that is backward thinking, and so to me, Inkatha really should not exist as such. What Chief Buthelezi of Inkatha should do is to cut across. If he had an organization which included Zulus, Xhosas and Sothos, I would be the first to accord him recognition as a national leader. But at the moment he is a tribal leader and it is primitive reckoning on our part if we recognize that he has a political role to play in a situation where the interaction of the tribes towards the creation of national unity, and a South African nation, is of paramount importance.

And this also is true of Afrikaners. They have tried to retain their unity as Afrikaners. One does not want to go beyond that and accord it the right, the political right, to existence. I feel that there has to be an endeavour by all entities in South Africa to create a national entity to which everyone will belong, to which everyone will owe allegiance and of which, therefore, everyone will be a member. So the ANC have a much more correct and valid message than Inkatha. So has the PAC, (Pan Africanist Congress) the UDF (United Democratic Front), and perhaps, AZAPO (Azanian People's Organisation). These are political organizations that are based on the fact that membership is open to all South Africans.

Inkatha is probably just for the Zulus. I may be wrong, but it would appear to be just a Zulu organization. And to really enhance its status is to create a potential situation of conflict in South Africa.

So, I believe that if the people of South Africa want to be effective, they have to belong to a national organization which recognises that they all belong to South Africa,

that they are all one, that they are all equal and that South Africa, as a whole, is their motherland. If they do that united, and avoid tribalism, then they lend efficacy to their struggle. Otherwise, really, they are going to be divided and this will rebound to the benefit of those who would want to see them divided and who would want to see the policy of Bantustans enhanced. And so we are full of praise for organizations like the ANC, PAC and UDF, because of the national approach that they have adopted.

If you had three weeks in which to totally relax, what would you do?

I would certainly not relax in the sense of doing nothing. I cannot do without reading and writing, and so if I had three weeks of relaxation, I would use that to do my own writing, to recapitulate, as it were, past events and therefore to write a bit of history – which I can't get time for at the moment. That would really be relaxation by my standards – away from routine.

/9274

CSO: 3400/571

NATION'S EFFORTS TO ATTAIN NON-RACIAL SOCIETY EXPLORED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 24, 26, 27, 28

[Article by Marshall W. Murphree]

[Text]

No single topic has featured more prominently as a dominant issue in the ordering of human affairs in Africa than race. A variety of voices have attempted to deny this, from the apologists of colonial regimes who have rationalised their racism as cultural distinctiveness to the theoreticians who argue that race is nothing but disguised class. Such arguments have engendered fierce and protracted debates in academic circles, but they are in effect futile attempts to declare as trivial what the general public – both black and white – know to be decisive in everyday life, namely race.

Equally, no mode of human conduct has come under more universal opprobrium than that of racism. Racism is currently recognised as being divisive, exploitative and morally repugnant. In international circles the judgement is uniformly hostile; racism is intolerable and any country permitting its ostensible existence within its borders finds itself a global pariah. Clearly for Africa to live with the rest of the world and with itself, racism must be eliminated from its shores.

Almost without exception, the independent governments of post-colonial Africa have adopted the principle of non-racism as a fundamental aspect of their policies. In part, this espousal stems from a cultural heritage to which racism is foreign. More fundamentally, it arises from a reactive repugnance to the white racism of the colonial era, a repugnance with emotive depths which whites find difficult to appreciate since they have never experienced it.

The espousal of a principle and its implementation in practice are, however, two different things. Independent Africa's attempts to implement non-racism have had their share of failures and this gap between rhetoric and reality has been grist for the mills of their

cynical detractors.

However, the real lessons to be learned from these discrepancies between principle and practice are how deeply ingrained the salience of race is in the structures and cultures of our societies and how the racism of one society can spill over into the racial consciousness of another. Neither national autonomy nor majority rule are sufficient conditions for the abolition of racism, nor can racial salience be diminished solely by legislative fiat or political will.

The endeavour requires a sustained exercise in social engineering carefully orchestrated to achieve cumulative results over time. Under such conditions success is measured by a decline in the significance of race rather than by the absence of any episodic evidence of persistent racism.

Zimbabwe, Africa's youngest independent nation, is a case in point. In the first five years of independence, the salience of race has declined significantly although the evidence of a residual white racism and its reactive black response remains. Given the contradictions and constraints involved, it is a success story, achieved by a combination of statesmanship, favourable economic conditions and a balance of principle and pragmatism.

On its assumption of power in 1980, the ZANU-PF government set as its first and most immediate priority the attainment of a unity which would make the previously divided Zimbabwean state a nation. The party's manifesto made this clear in stating: "ZANU believes that the principle of the paramountcy of the people demands that the national concept and the sense of national belonging be made a dogma that should submerge and destroy tribal, regionalistic and racial animosities." Consistent with this stance, Prime Minister Robert

Mugabe, in one of his first public statements, announced a policy of reconciliation which sought to incorporate whites into the new national unity. There were to be no reprisals for the racist past, no expulsions of racially-defined groups and no expropriations of property on racial grounds. Whites were invited to participate in the building of a new, non-racial Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's whites, who had until then held the reins of economic and political power through racially determined mechanisms, reacted with surprise, pleasure and considerable caution. In some circles, a naive optimism prevailed, with the expectation that things would remain much as they were with the exception that government now had a black face and that racial discrimination in public was no longer acceptable.

This naivety failed to grasp the importance of two imperatives under which the new government had to act, and act quickly. One was the imperative to reassert an essentially African cultural sovereignty in what was after all an African country. Zimbabwe could no longer be a little England on the highveld; it had to be an African nation with an African ethos. The resultant change in prevailing ideological perspective and symbolic statement made whites nervous and insecure, uncertain as to whether they could find a sense of genuine identity in the new cultural milieu.

The other imperative was for the new government to fulfil its promises to its black constituency and to ensure that national resources were redistributed, and seen to be redistributed, in a manner correcting the racial imbalances of the past. The principal focus was on land, employment, education, health and social services.

In respect to education, this meant that whites could no longer expect their children's education to be provided by the State in a privileged and segregated system which in 1975, for instance, had expended \$287 on each white child in primary school and only \$19 on their black counterparts. The system was integrated. Inevitably, and in spite of a tremendous expansion in education's share of the national budget, this meant that per capita expenditure for white children in the system was reduced. Racial integration in the schools did not in itself present great problems and generally proceeded smoothly. What bothered many white parents was what they perceived to be a drop in the quality of education provided. In the case of some formerly all-white schools, this perception was undoubtedly correct. However, the new system is itself far from homogenous, and many government schools currently provide quality education of a high standard. In addition, private and quasi-private racially integrated schools exist and are widely patronized by whites. Zimbabwe's educational policies are still evolving and exhibit the conflicts found in many countries which seek to simultaneously provide both

quality and egalitarianism in educational provision on limited budgets.

In the provision of health services the picture is similar. Much of the country's health budget has been shifted to primary health care, as being a rational and more effective disposition of limited resources. At the same time, high quality professional therapeutic services continue to be provided, especially in the urban centres, through a combination of government and private services. These are available on a non-racial basis; the difference for whites is that they now have to pay more for these specialist services instead of relying on heavy State subsidies to cater for their health needs on a segregated basis.

Land was a major issue in Zimbabwe's struggle for independence, and many whites anticipated large-scale expropriations of white-owned agricultural land for black resettlement after independence. This has not in fact happened, for a combination of reasons. Government's adherence to a "willing-seller - willing-buyer" principle, combined with limited finances for land purchases has restricted its ability to make large-scale acquisitions of this type. A phenomenal increase in agricultural production in the communal lands has been another factor in diminishing pressures for the acquisition of commercial farming land, gross output rising from \$102m in 1979 to \$271m in 1982. Finally, generally good relations between both government and the commercial farming community, coupled with a government concern to maintain output from this sector, have meant that productive agricultural land in the private sector has largely been left alone. In 1980, there were 6 034 large-scale commercial farms in the country; by 1983 this number had dropped to 5 481, that is, by 9%. As with other sectors of the economy, commercial agriculture has been formally de-racialised, and a growing number of black farmers are moving into large-scale commercial agriculture. Their presence in this sector has important long-term implications for commercial agriculture since they will form an increasingly important segment of government's political constituency.

Thus, on the issues of land, health and education, government's policy has been one of de-racialisation coupled with a gradualism and evolutionism which has meant that whites have lost the special privileges formerly accorded to them, but without suffering any critical deprivation by virtue of their racial location. The transition to non-racialism has, however, been more difficult and traumatic for them on the issue of occupational placement, since this was an area in which government could not afford a policy of gradualism. The imperative was for a rapid transformation of the racial composition of the occupational spectrum in its higher echelons with its skewed bias in favour of whites. A slow

evolution towards this goal through non-racial recruitment in the lower ranks was not enough; some Zimbabwean variant of Tanzania's policy of "affirmative action" was required. Ten years earlier President Nyerere had articulated this policy in respect to the Tanzanian public service in the following words: "At the same time, a deliberate policy of Africanisation of the public services was being pursued in the full recognition that this was itself discriminatory. For, before all citizens could be treated equally, it was necessary to rectify the position in which the nation's civil service was dominated by non-Africans, and to make it reflect in some measure the composition of the society."

Zimbabwe followed the same road, not only with the public service but also in respect of all middle and high level occupational placement. Government directives were issued to implement the policy directly in regard to the public service, and indirect pressures were brought to bear on commerce and industry to act similarly.

Three categories of whites were hit particularly hard by this policy. White civil servants were an immediate target and a rapid exodus of whites from this sector ensued. Whites in the clerical, production, sales and service categories were similarly affected since these were positions into which young blacks could be slotted relatively easily. Thirdly, a trend to emigrate among white youth, particularly those without professional prospects, became apparent.

Statistics suggest that from 1981-1985 there was a net emigration (from a base-line population in 1980 of $\pm 180\ 000$) of 41 262 whites. This figure must, however, be seen in the context of the fact that the net emigration of whites in the previous five years (1976 - 1980) was 49 279. In other words net emigration totals for these two five-year cohorts were of roughly the same magnitude. The significant difference, it is fair to suggest, lies in the reasons for emigration, the uncertainties and insecurity of a war situation dominating in the first period, and the occupational insecurities described above, dominating the second.

Affirmative or redressive action policies such as those followed in Tanzania and Zimbabwe carry with them a host of potential problems relating to issues of implementation and performance. They also pose problems of principle since they are, as Nyerere admits in the statement quoted above, a suspension of the principle of non-racialism to achieve immediate and necessary goals.

This dilution of principle with pragmatism must therefore, if it is not to become the base for a new order of discriminatory behaviour, be implemented within specific time horizons and with a vigilance to ensure that the means does not distort the goal and that the expedient does not become the principle. Redressive action tends to be occupation-specific, as I have indicated.

It is also time-specific, relating to periods of transition.

In Tanzania, four years after its implementation, Nyerere was able to suspend the "Africanisation" policy in the public service and revert to, in his words, "a policy of priority to citizens regardless of their racial origin". There are some indications that in Zimbabwe the same reversion is taking place in occupation-specific contexts where racial ratios have been radically altered. An example is the recent appeal by the Minister of Home Affairs to young white Zimbabweans to join the Zimbabwe Republic Police, a force which has become almost entirely black in the past five years. His appeal was based on the argument that the ZRP should contain some whites in order to be truly representative of the larger Zimbabwean population.

There is also some indication that whites are beginning to show more confidence in their occupational futures in Zimbabwe. The statistic quoted earlier of a net emigration of 41 262 between 1981 and 1985, conceals the fact that while net emigration in the first four years of the period was in an order of magnitude of $\pm 10\ 000$ a year, in 1985 it dropped to 1 447. Indeed, provisional figures for the first six months of 1986 indicate a small net gain in migration figures for whites.

This analysis has focused on the structural imperatives which have both impelled and constrained Zimbabwe's government in its programme to create a non-racial society and which have created in varying degrees an "insecurity quotient" in Zimbabwe's whites. But what of the more subjective dimensions of the impact of black rule on white attitudes? Do whites retain their racial prejudices in the new context?

In answer it should be said, first, that whites generally have adapted quickly to the new rules of public social conduct, a confirmation of the old sociological insight that people adjust rapidly to modes of behaviour perceived to be normatively appropriate. Attitudes are far more resistant to change, and many whites continue to exhibit the prejudices of an older era. Public behaviour and private opinion are therefore often at variance. A stroll through public functions in Harare gives the impression that integration is proceeding smoothly and harmoniously. Attendance at private functions in many white homes will give the impression that racism is alive and well.

This does not, however, mean that attitudes are not changing, or prove the old liberal perspective that attitude change must precede behavioural modification. In Zimbabwe, slowly perhaps, the opposite causal sequence is taking place. By being forced to interact with blacks on the basis of equal status, whites are becoming less stereotypic and more individualistic in their evaluation of blacks. In Zimbabwe, behaving differently has

more often preceded thinking differently than vice versa. And, for those whites subjectively equipped to benefit from it, Zimbabwean independence has meant a psychological liberation from the demeaning restraints of racism.

The psychological pilgrimage of the Zimbabwean white has another dimension, relating to his cultural identity. Zimbabwe has chosen a policy of pluralism within a national unity which gives scope for diversity. The ruling party's manifesto, quoted earlier, goes on to say: "The People as a Nation cannot necessarily be homogeneous in respect of their cultural or racial backgrounds, but this diversity of background should become more a source of our cultural wealth than a cause of division and mistaken notions of groupist superiority philosophy." The cultural identity of the white is therefore not under serious threat. The danger is rather that this identity will be allowed to remain an exclusionary mechanism, shutting the white off from a full participation in the new dynamic national culture that is evolving in Zimbabwe.

Another danger to whites is that their cultural distinctiveness will reinforce their image as members of a racially-defined interest group. Given their basic social location, relatively high on the socio-economic scale, whites are highly vulnerable to potential black animosities as long as they are seen to be a discreet, racially organised power bloc within the larger society, acting collectively to further their own interests.

One factor in the contemporary Zimbabwean situation acts in particular to reinforce this image. This is the provision of separate voters' rolls and parliamentary seats for whites, the one residual item of racial legislation which persists in Zimbabwe, forced upon it by the Lancaster House constitution. The segregation of the white electorate carries with it a built-in tendency for whites to act politically in a sectionally defensive manner, as critics of, rather than participants in, the development process in Zimbabwe. The record shows that white interests have not been served by this mechanism. It has given them no substantially effective political voice or veto and has prevented them from contributing as Zimbabweans, rather than as a racially defined constituency, to the Zimbabwean political process. Many whites now perceive this, and there are indications that this vestige of racism will shortly disappear from the Zimbabwean scene.

The disappearance of separate voters' rolls will reinforce a trend which has been the theme of this analysis – the declining significance of race in Zimbabwe. Clearly, and for the reasons stated, race is still a significant factor in Zimbabwe society. But as formal non-racism progressively finds substantive implementation in the structures of Zimbabwe society – health,

education, employment, agriculture, industry and politics – the interests of individuals are being defined less in the context of racial membership and more in terms of other aggregations of interest. These aggregations of interest cut across racial boundaries and will increasingly form the basis for the creation of multi-racial interest groups involved in the promotion of a variety of regional, professional, residential, political, economic and other concerns. And as black and white Zimbabweans find common interests in these concerns, race will increasingly lose its salience since it is no longer coterminous with these concerns.

This is the clearly discernible trend, lying beneath the surface of popular perceptions which rely on the presence or absence of episodic expressions of racial sentiment as indices of racial harmony. Such indices are unreliable and contribute to the tendency, particularly prevalent among Zimbabwean whites, to emotionally oscillate between optimism and pessimism regarding their own futures.

At the same time, these indices are important as a reminder that race is a highly volatile issue in Southern Africa, with emotive roots in a racist past. They are also a reminder that the effects of racism transcend national boundaries and that until racism is eliminated everywhere, no society will be free from its impact.

In this respect, whites in Zimbabwe are rendered particularly vulnerable by the racial conflict in South Africa. As these pages have been written, black demonstrators in Zimbabwe have rioted in the aftermath of President Samora Machel's death in a plane crash in South Africa. Although the focus of protest arises from South Africa's racial conflict, the emotive salience of the event has spilled over into the Zimbabwean context and taken, at least in the minds of some of the demonstrators, the form of a "black backlash" against whites. One banner waved carried the words "reconciliation is dead".

Reconciliation is not, however, dead in Zimbabwe. It is alive in part because it is an essential component in a deep-seated commitment to non-racism by Zimbabwe's leadership. It is also alive because it is an imperative for national unity which transcends racial issues, to cover other divisions in the fabric of Zimbabwe society.

There is thus both an imperative for, and a trend towards, the diminished salience of the racial factor in Zimbabwe. An imperative can, however, be ignored, and a trend can be reversed. It is therefore incumbent on Zimbabweans, both black and white, to maintain the current momentum towards non-racism by the way they act and think. The costs in terms of abandoned patterns of thought and behaviour may be painful, but the prize of a democratic nation freed from the prison of personal and institutional racism is worth the price.

/9274

CSO: 3400/571

BRIEFS

WORK ON IRRIGATION DAM--International Construction were recently awarded the contract for the construction of the Manyuchi dam, which provides water for irrigation for the proposed palm oil project in the Mwenezi area. Work has already commenced on the site establishment and housing for the construction personnel, the access roads to the site, and the drilling and blasting of rock for the dam foundations. Specialist equipment for the construction work is also on order and should arrive in Zimbabwe by the end of December. The work comprises the construction of: --The main double arch concrete dam, 280m, long by 45m high, requiring 46,500 cubic metres of concrete. --Six earth saddle dams involving 260,000 cubic metres of earth fill. --A concrete spillway. --Roadworks. Work is scheduled for completion at the end of 1988. The dam, when filled, will stretch back approximately 15km from the wall.

[Text] [Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 14 Nov 86 p 29] /9274

CSO: 3400/571

RANKS OF POLICE TO BE EXTENDED BY 60 PERCENT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 29 Nov 86 p 4

[Article by Louis Smit]

[Text]

THE ranks of the South African Police are to be extended by more than 60 percent, Mr Louis le Grange, outgoing Minister of Law and Order, said in Pretoria yesterday.

Speaking at a passing-out parade of the Police College, which was also a farewell parade for him, Mr Le Grange said the force would be expanded to 96 300, compared to its present strength of 56 316, to cope with the increasing workload. This would give a ratio of 2,79 policemen for every 1 000 citizens.

Mr Le Grange said statistics for the year ending June showed that there had been an increase of 7,3 percent in murder incidents, 14,4 percent in robberies, 18,2 percent in motorcar thefts, 15,5 percent in burglaries and 6,4 percent in stock thefts. Drug abuse skyrocketed so that for the same period 35 000 people had

been charged with dealing in dagga and 2 000 people were charged with offences related to other habit forming drugs like Mandrax, cocaine, opium and LSD.

Against this increased rate of crime, he said, the expansion of the police force was of paramount importance.

As the force is expanded, the various riot and crime prevention units, along with the Criminal Investigation Department, will be extended to meet the existing needs.

Mr Le Grange said the police force had to be applied to the maximum of its ability to combat terrorism and other forms of crime.

He added that the sharp increase in crime was as a result of various factors, such as the rapid population growth, prevailing unrest, the weak economic situation and unemployment.

"In 1960 South Africa's population totalled 16 million; in June 1985 (with an average annual growth rate of 2,1 percent) it totalled 32,5 million," Mr Le Grange said.

"Despite this 'population explosion' the police are expected to perform their duties."

He said the SAP faced an unenviable, difficult task for which is received little praise and appreciation, and it was a pity that the force which faced such a demanding task should be subjected to constant adverse criticism and attack. Little was ever said about the excellent work done by the SAP.

"I call on the public of South Africa to refrain from unnecessarily criticising our police and other security forces and not let them be influenced by false accusations and propaganda by those hostile to the country."

/13104

CSO: 3400/552

BUTHELEZI DISCUSSES BLACK POLITICAL PROSPECTS, ONSET OF SANCTIONS

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 14 Nov 86 p 75

[Interview with KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi; date and place not given]

[Text]

The *FM* spoke to KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi about black political prospects and the onset of economic sanctions against SA.

FM: Are there grounds for hope, especially following the National Party congresses, that government will start talking to black leaders about a new constitution?

Buthelezi: Quite clearly the issue of fundamental change in the country didn't seem to be a priority, both at the congresses and the federal congress. I personally have defined terms on which I am prepared to negotiate within the National Statutory Council (NSC). I said a non-negotiable was the release of Dr Mandela and Mr Motopeng and other political prisoners. So it seems government is not in the mood to look at that.

What scenario do you have for political change and developments within SA during 1987?

I am a little concerned because it seems to me the relinquishing by the State President of his position as leader in the Cape seems to be a hint that he may well be thinking of retiring, maybe in the next year or so. It seems very likely. If you think that Malan, who was his teacher and mentor, backed out in this way, it would not surprise me if he takes the same route. If he retires, my concern is: is there anyone in the Cabinet more innovative than he? The fact that he has abolished the pass laws, scrapped the Immo-

rality Act, and allowed black participation in the trade union movement, has shown he is very innovative. Any man who can rise above his background like that should be given credit — even if he has failed at the same time to take his courage in both hands, come out boldly and bring about fundamental change in this country.

Government has said that it is already negotiating with a number of prominent black leaders. Are you involved?

I'm so visible in SA that if I was involved, surely it would be known. I don't think I could do this privately. Clearly, there are no negotiations. There are ministers in my government and Mr Botha's government who are very concerned about the fact that he and I have not even come to sit, let alone talk, around the conference table.

Even so, is the NSC a suitable forum for this?

Yes, if it was taken to be an interim thing and if it was understood that the tricameral parliament would have to go. I don't think we can participate in the NSC if it is going to be an instrument, or a ruse, to legitimise the tricameral parliament. If this is understood, it could provide such a forum because, in terms of its objectives, I see nothing repugnant in South Africans of all races sitting down to try and work out a constitution for the country.

Do you think it is possible that Nelson Mandela could be released soon?

As I have already said, one is very pessimistic at present. One must also take into account that P W Botha was the first head of State to even offer his release. In the past, I argued about the release of Dr Mandela with Mr Vorster and he used to tell me point-blank, with a deadpan face, that he was not

prepared to release him as long as he was PM. One must appreciate that Mr Botha is perhaps more flexible on this matter — even though he stated conditions (Mandela's renunciation of violence) which are impossible to fulfil. However, I do believe one cannot say it is impossible. After all, he has been more flexible than his predecessor on this issue.

Do you support the idea of a referendum to determine who legitimate black leaders are?

I do think that there are too many people who claim to be leaders. However, I do admit that any black person, even without a constituency, has a right to speak out, expressing black aspirations and black grievances. At the same time, the term leader has been thrown around loosely, to the extent that it is beginning to lose all meaning. Any strident voice by any person, without any constituency, without any mandate, is taken to be a voice of a leader. I don't know whether I would accept it is the government's right to establish who speaks for which constituency. But I personally wouldn't mind if my own constituency was tested. It is, in any case, tested as I am elected as President of Inkatha and Chief Minister of KwaZulu and chairman of the Black Alliance.

What do you think will happen now that sanctions are upon us?

I can see all the tricks that were learnt during the Smith regime in Rhodesia being perfected and used with more sophistication by South African businessmen. I can see a lot of sanctions-busting taking place, but at the same time I cannot minimise the suffering this is going to cause — especially in those labour-intensive industries like agriculture and mining. I think we can expect thousands of black people are more likely to

lose jobs, both South Africans and blacks from neighbouring states. I am very concerned because already many black people have lost jobs and there is a lot of unemployment.

If this is going to worsen, a person with my responsibilities has every reason to be concerned.

Are you hopeful that the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba's unified government proposals will ultimately be implemented?

Government, which has refused to participate officially, has nominated observers to the Indaba and has already sanctioned a joint executive authority. So there is no reason not to be hopeful. At the same time, one can never predict what may happen because it seems to me government tends to take more seriously than it should some of the noises that are made on its rightwing. Personally, I see the Indaba as a fire escape for the South African government and the country because if it were to be implemented, it would defuse the present sanctions moves. I think there are many people in the West who support the idea of a get-together between KwaZulu and Natal to form a unified region which is multi-racial; where power is shared by all race groups.

The emergency appears to have brought about a superficial calm to the country. What is necessary for a lasting peace?

First of all, I believe, must come the release of all political prisoners.

You cannot rule through an emergency indefinitely. That is not acceptable to us as blacks. But if the government were to release political prisoners, sentence to death the tri-cameral parliament, the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, I would say that this would be very good foundations for a lasting peace.

/9274

CSO: 3400/568

PERCY QOBOZA DEPLORES DEATH OF FORMER LESOTHO MINISTER

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 23 Nov 86 p 8

[Commentary by Percy Qoboza in "Percy's Itch" column]

[Text]

SO they have finally silenced Desmond Sixishe.

The flamboyant and certainly most charismatic former Information Minister in the deposed government of Chief Leabua Jonathan was a man of exceptional qualities.

He did not have an academic outlook to life, but was a down to earth politician – who played his cards so well, it sometimes left his opponents gasping for breath.

He was a man of the people.

Not only did he leave his internal opponents frustrated, but he evoked extreme anger from the likes of President PW Botha and his Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

He was perceived by Pretoria as the major stumbling block to normalising relations with the Basotho kingdom.

He was most vehement and uncompromising on the issue of apartheid and he publicly campaigned against SA on all points.

His hatred for apartheid was in many ways understandable – he was a product as well as a victim of the system.

He was a South African by birth and Mosotho by a strange set of circumstances.

Before venturing into Lesotho, Des was a colleague on the now banned *World*.

As a reporter and as a colleague, I found him most dedicated and talented in whatever story he worked on.

He was never one to adopt a high and mighty stance to his colleagues, in

spite of his obvious talents.

He was one of the boys. Many a night we spent crawling around Soweto's shebeens – always on the lookout for a benefactor or a well-disposed shebeen queen to give us something on tick, payable hopefully on the next payday.

Then came the fateful day. Des was assigned to cover a story in Maseru. He did that all right – with the efficiency we always admired in him.

After phoning through his story we didn't hear from him again.

Weeks later, you could have knocked us out with a feather when we learned he was attached to Lesotho's Information Department.

Later, he climbed the ladder as that department's director.

And before we could catch our breath, Des emerged as personal secretary to former Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan.

In that position he became the PM's trusted confidant and personal advisor – and they formed a formidable team.

Then came the time when the chilly winds of conflict blew from Pretoria across Lesotho.

At the height of Pretoria's insistence on the removal of political refugees from the tiny kingdom, it was Des who spearheaded the resistance to the pressure.

Believing as he did in the sanctity of the Geneva Convention on the status of political victims of conscience, he rallied for the right of Lesotho to give protection to those refugees.

SA's reaction to this position is now a matter of history. Lesotho paid a heavy price. But Des always believed in the morality of the country's stand – and he carried that stamp with him until the time of his death.

Now he is no more. A victim of the vilest of brutal attacks – that saw his wife mercilessly cut down by assailants' bullets. Their assassins may never be known.

Such foul acts are never ever detected – because they are the deeds of faceless men bought with 30 pieces of silver, who jealously guard the identity of the perpetrators as they sip their beer bought with evil money.

Fare thee well, pal.

Another of your friends wept bitterly on the phone when he asked me if I had heard. His name is Desmond Blow.

I know the two of you had some roaring times together in Maseru.

God will one day come back and bring a smile to the faces of the Basothos when a government of the people is once more restored in that kingdom.

Pula, Khotso, Nala will have true meaning again one of these days.

/9274

CSO: 3400/568

OUTGOING NECC SECRETARY DISCUSSES VALUE OF SCHOOL BOYCOTTS

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 28 Nov-4 Dec 86 pp 17, 18

[Interview with outgoing NECC publicity secretary Rev Molefe Tsele by Sefako Nyaka]

[Text]

FOR three years now there have been no exams in some areas. What effect do you think this will have on the future generation?

With thousands of students in detention, and more and more joining the militants' ranks, one can only conclude that the stage is set for another cycle of challenge and confrontation which may subside after a long period.

This obviously bodes ill for the future of our country. For one thing, the student leaders are being schooled in a way that no other system could teach them. They mature instantly and learn to skilfully lead.

We are producing leaders who have little respect for rhetoric and artistic speeches. They are strategists, planners, executors.

However, their followers are affected differently by these conditions. They overreact, radicalise and often step out of the line set by their leaders.

The other long-term effect of this crisis is that by the time this group enters the labour market, in four to five years' time, we are going to witness a new era in labour history. They will enter the market conversant with trade unionism, fearless and sure of their power.

The short-term effect of the situation, however, presents nightmarish probabilities for all parents. These students are going to plunge the community into action, whether it is ready or not. There could be internecine attacks, with parents resisting being involved or involving their children. There may be vigilante groups against the students.

The call for solidarity from students in other education centres will be strengthened and the result will be heightened conflict within the community.

There is talk that the class boycott has been a waste. Have there been any gains to justify it?

Any boycott of education is very costly, both in time and money. A boycott of education is a self-infliction of pain.

Any gains that have been made must be viewed in the context of the sacrifices made. The only gain that can be said to have been made in terms of the demands is the supply of free text books and the abolition of school fees. More than that, the boycott has not made any gains in terms of correcting administrative structures at schools by introducing Parent-Teacher Associations and SRCs. We failed to have Cosas (Congress of South African Students) unbanned, and we failed to have detained students released.

In short, none of the demands have been met. However, the gains achieved in terms of advancing the struggle against apartheid and exposing the fraud in the current system are worthwhile.

Therefore, the boycott was not a waste, nor was it in vain. It has achieved something. The clock cannot be turned back. The DET knows that their system is being rejected. No amount of protestation over the past 30 years has been able to communicate that fact.

There are parents who earn very little and keeping a child at school is for them a real sacrifice. Is the boycott not going to lose credibility for your organisation in the eyes of such people, and in the community as a whole?

The NECC has never called for a schools boycott in its history. It has threatened to call for a united community action.

The difference is that with school boycotts, only students are involved in action. With

community action, not only students but unions, civic associations, mothers and the entire community gets involved in action.

The NECC has, however, not ruled out the boycott strategy for students. It has only insisted that student structures and then the entire community must be consulted. The NECC will not support any boycott call that is sectional and undemocratically called. The NECC is not concerned about losing credibility with parents and the community, as long as that call has community support.

If some parents choose to defy a democratic call, they will not enjoy the support of the NECC. In the same way, if students make unilateral calls, they will not be supported by the NECC.

Obviously very few parents will support any boycott of schools. But faced with the reality of the crisis, like the mass detention of 14-year-olds, the closure of schools and the occupation of classrooms by the SA Defence Force, no parent can remain indifferent.

What has been the effect of the State of Emergency on the education situation?

The State of Emergency has severely effected student structures. They can no longer meet, their leadership is either in detention or in hiding. Most SRC leaders are not back at school because they fear being arrested by the ever-present army.

The harassment of the student leadership has resulted in student masses engaging in action with no reflection or analysis. There is a temptation amongst the masses to equate political relevance with radicalism.

With the student leadership, not all radicalism is taken at face value. What counts is the impact of that radicalism in the broader struggle. The student leaders have also tended to become suspicious of those students who become militant and radical for its own sake. They believe that is the sign of a police agent who has been instructed to pose as radical and relevant.

However, without this leadership, especially when it operates from underground, we find the student body taking unilateral decisions and implementing them without consultation and reflection.

How do you hope to stop this type of action?

The only way to stop this type of action is to begin a process of reproduction of leadership and responsible positions. Out of every three students, let one become a leader. In that way, it will be easy to replace leaders the moment they are taken.

How do you justify the fact that in some areas students have been writing their exams undisturbed since the boycott started? Doesn't this sow division?

The sad thing about the struggle is that not all people pay their dues to the same extent. The same is true with the education struggle.

It should be noted that students in effected areas had no option but to lose the opportunity of writing. Most of them would sit for exams, but they are prevented by prevailing conditions. If no solution is forthcoming, and if they realise that they are going to be faced with another lost year, they are going to demand that, in solidarity, other students from other areas join them.

So far there has not been division amongst students. For instance, students in the western Cape resolved to continue with the exams this year, even after they understood that students in the Transvaal (especially Soweto) were not going to write. Students in Soweto understand that east Rand students will sit for exams, even though they themselves won't.

However, there is going to come a time when practical expressions of solidarity will be called for.

Also, the exams have not been boycotted as such, but appeals were made for them to be postponed for those students who were not ready. This means those who are ready are allowed to write.

In the final analysis, however, it means that once one area is affected, a call will be made for others to join in. As the students say, "Write one, write all; fail one, fail all."

Does the armed disruption of exams in Soweto carry the support of the majority of students and parents?

The majority of students were surely in favour of the disruption of exams by whatever means. The majority of students demand simple justice: "An injury to one is an injury to all."

However, their leaders dissociated themselves from methods that led students to fight one another. They said that what they need in these times is maximum unity. They condemn the authorities who disregarded their appeals and promised protection to those who dissented.

Parents were on the whole opposed to armed disruption. It is unacceptable for a single child to lose his or her life because he or she wanted to sit for exams.

While parents of hundreds of detained children may support the boycott of exams, they oppose armed disruption against fellow students. They believe various methods of persuasion should be used.

What effect do you think the armed disruption of exams will have on parents?

The community needs to be jolted out of its sleep. Parents need to be challenged in a very special way. They can reprimand the students over their

behaviour only when they merit that role.

Schools were closed in Soweto and all that parents did was protest in the press. The army moved into the schools and the parents did nothing. The children were forced to carry "passes" and parents made verbal protestations. They need to be jolted out of their big sleep of indifference, apathy and servility.

Maybe these actions by students will achieve that. I personally think it is necessary. Students are desperate. What they are doing should be taken as a deep cry of anguish.

The parents need to interpret these semi-suicidal actions by students as a desperate call to them to resume their role. I personally believe the students are achieving their goals. Every parent is now asking himself what is wrong with this education system.

That is the starting point for galvanising their support. Initially they might alienate themselves from the children, but the students are not some alien visitors you can choose to ignore. They are our children. In the end, their death is our death.

So the recent actions are a reminder to parents that you cannot expect decency in a time of a State of Emergency. That you cannot expect modesty in an oppressive society, that you cannot rationalise in a violent society.

The fact that children have not written their exams this year is surely a national tragedy. And the fact that the situation may continue into the new year means the nation must stop and think and act anew, for once.

/9274

CSO: 3400/572

BRIEFS

32 APPLY FOR RSA CITIZENSHIP--Mmabatho--Thirty-two Bophuthatswana residents have renounced their citizenship and applied for South African citizenship since the pass laws were scrapped and new identity cards introduced, according to Bophuthatswana's Secretary for Internal Affairs, Mr SI Tire. Asked what would happen if such people were rejected by South Africa, Mr Tire said the law allowed for anybody who renounced Bop citizenship and failed to acquire another citizenship to apply for their local status to be renewed.
[Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Nov 86 p 5] /9274

CSO: 3400/568

10 DURBAN BEACHES TO BE INTEGRATED

Durban THE DAILY NEWS in English 21 Nov 86 p 15

[Article by Richard Compton]

[Text]

TEN beaches stand between Durban becoming an integrated municipality and a city with patches of "local" apartheid left intact.

This is all that remains of petty apartheid in Durban, although obviously there are areas of "grand" apartheid, such as a whites-only municipal voters roll, the Group Areas Act and separate education that remain in force.

But these areas lie outside the control of the Durban City Council.

However the council recently voted in favour of asking the Government to allow the city to scrap the Group Areas Act completely or at worst to allow it to scrap it in stages.

Yet the integration of the Blue Line (white) bus service last week symbolised the near total collapse of petty apartheid in the city — 12 years after the first moves were made by the city in this direction.

And it is almost certain that the remaining racially exclusive beaches will become multiracial in the first half of the new year.

These beaches are: North Beach, Addington,

South Beach, Brighton and Ansteys (whites only), while there are two beaches which are for blacks only (African 1 and 2), two for Indians and one for the Coloureds.

Embarked

In 1974 the then mayor, Mr Ron Williams, embarked on a campaign to abolish petty apartheid in the city highlighting the issue of integrated buses, freedom of social contact between races and equal pay for equal work as the first issues to be dealt with.

(Ironically the first of Mr Williams's aims, the integration of the buses, became the last pillar of petty apartheid to fall.)

By the end of 1974, the first tentative steps were taken by the council when the City Treasurer abolished separate queues for whites and non-whites in the ground floor banking hall of Martin West building. This was followed by "integrating" queues at the City Licensing office and the abolition of separate elevators for whites and blacks.

In what was then described as a bold step, the city decided in 1975 to desegregate public benches and shortly af-

terwards racial signs designating whites-only parks were taken down.

One of the most controversial debates in council focused on the question of integrating libraries and allowing black bus drivers to drive Durban's whites-only Blue Line buses.

Opposition to the former was enormous.

Warnings

"I was mayor at the time and I can't tell you the number of telephone calls and letters that I got. There were warnings that if the libraries were opened to all races whites would catch strange and terrible diseases such as syphilis and diphtheria," said Mrs Sybil Hotz, presently chairman of the Management Committee.

The reference library was the first to drop its racial clause before the rest opened to all races in 1979.

Another highly contentious issue was the proposal by Mr Williams in 1976 to make Battery Beach 2 a multiracial beach.

It was only six years later in 1982, after a fierce public protest, that the Province's Executive Committee

(Exco) gave its consent and the beach was open to all races.

The opening of one beach soon brought further demands for other facilities on the beachfront to be integrated.

Following another public meeting, Exco turned down the city's request and it took another year, in 1983, before Province agreed to it.

But since then reform has continued, and with less public protest.

Toilets, municipal swimming pools, three main Durban beaches — Snake Park, Bay of Plenty and Dairy Beach — and both the Green and Blue Line bus services have since been "de-racialised".

This leaves the remaining beaches as the last racial obstacle for the council to overcome.

Scrapping

Referring to the future Mrs Hotz said: "Scrapping petty apartheid does not just mean changing whites-only facilities to multiracial ones. It also means 'black' facilities have to be open."

But as change accelerated in Durban she said the level of protest had receded.

NGK MODERATOR EXPLAINS CHURCH'S ATTITUDE TOWARD APARTHEID

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 46, 47, 48, 50

[Interview with NGK moderator Johan Heyns by Martin Schneider; date and place not given]

[Text]

It is a reflection on much of white society that in these last days of 1986 a church professing Christianity should still be debating, amid considerable division among members, whether or not apartheid is a sin. The largest Afrikaans church, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), still finds difficulty in expressing itself in so many words, but its Synod in Cape Town recently was nevertheless a break with the past. Cast out by the world reformed church movement and increasingly isolated at home, the NGK has cautiously, and with qualifications, opened its doors to people other than whites; and it has urged its members to "confess their participation in apartheid with humility and sorrow".

But on another level, too, the church has broken with tradition. It has elected as its moderator for the next four years a man of exceptional goodwill. Johan Heyns says he never sought the position. His past outspokenness had alienated him from the church establishment and he seemed to have accepted a lesser role. His first days in office were marked by the most conciliatory statements in the long history of a church which has been viewed as nothing less than the National Party at prayer. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the NGK, with aggressive and politically frustrated hardliners in its congregations, can match words with deeds.

Heyns (58) is head of the Department of Dogmatics and Ethics at the University of Pretoria and is moderator of the NGK's Northern Transvaal Synod. Among the many challenges he faces is the forging of closer relationships with what the NGK

describes as its "young" churches — the Sendingkerk with a largely coloured membership, and its black and Indian sister churches. As he himself says: the NGK has to cross the apartheid divide and come to terms with the people at the receiving end of the system. He was interviewed by Martin Schneider.

What is, in your view, the significance of the October NGK Synod?

There are two particularly important aspects. The first is our relationship with our young churches, the second is our relationships with reformed churches outside the country.

We decided that the NGK and our three young churches are in fact one church and that through discussions and negotiations, structures should be established in which to express this unity. We decided not to prescribe the form the structures should take because such an action would simply be another piece of paternalism.

Regarding our position in the world, we are, of course, completely isolated. We are no longer members of the South African Council of Churches and of the World Council of Churches and a few years ago, we were forced out of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. This is the sad story of our withdrawal from the ecumenical movement. So we have decided that we must now attempt to restore our relationships.

The Synod has, among other things, urged its members to "confess their participation

in apartheid with humility and sorrow" and it has expressed strong opposition to racism. What does this imply in practical terms?

What is very important is that we did in the past give to apartheid a theological, ethical justification. We have completely abolished that and I believe that is a tremendous step forward.

These decisions tell members that the church is the church of the Lord Jesus Christ, that it is not the church of the Afrikaner *volk* or of the white man. These decisions say the church is an open church, that it cannot be closed to people of other cultures. They tell the ordinary church member that there is no such thing as white superiority or black inferiority. They say that all people are equal before God. They say that there may not be under any circumstances a political policy based on oppression, discrimination and exploitation. We must move towards the creation of a community based on the principle of justice. The member who sits in the church and who hears this message, must go out and apply justice in all his relationships. The man who has a domestic servant must ensure that she has a decent place in which to live, that she has a decent wage. The politician must know that he may not enact laws which are not based on the fundamental principles of justice.

And if the politician does pass unjust laws, what must the church do?

I don't think it is the task of the church to campaign against any laws, even if they are unjust. The task of the church is to protest against unjust laws. And the protest must be based on the scriptures. It is also not the task of the church to suggest any form of political structure. It's the task of the church only to emphasize and elaborate on the basic religious, ethical principles in scripture which are applicable in the political field.

The church is only responsible for propagating certain theological, ethical and moral principles which should form the basis for a political system. And the reason for that is very simple. The Bible is not a political handbook. The Bible does not lay down the necessity for apartheid, or segregation or integration. That is not part of the message of the Bible because the bible is not a political handbook.

How does the church then ensure that its belief in justice is expressed in the country's political life?

The NGK functions in various ways. The first is at the local level where the church minister sets out the Word of God for His people and where the fundamental moral principles are enunciated and explained. Then the church functions and acts through its various meetings like this Synod where certain decisions are made. But there is a third level and that involves our personal relationships with government and members of government.

You must appreciate that about 80% of all cabinet ministers and about 70% of members of Parliament are members of the NGK. This is a unique situation in which we have direct access. Therefore, we have a church commission responsible for communications with government.

Commissioners can go to the offices of government members and they can point out where they have problems with government policies. This is not all that well known and that is indeed a pity because this often creates the impression that the NGK is not involved. That is not true. The NGK is involved. But as a reformed church, the NGK does not believe in public demonstrations and campaigns. On the other hand, I do believe the NGK should do more.

We live in a fragmented society. Everyone lives on his own island. The NGK lives on its own island, too.

It does not know enough about what is happening elsewhere. People who live in Johannesburg don't know how people live in Soweto and people who live in Pretoria don't know how people live in Mamelodi. This is a tragedy in the South African community. We are all islands, the Afrikaners, the Portuguese, the Germans, the Jewish community, the black communities. This is one of the deepest tragedies in our land.

That is why I have said so often: we must not build any more walls around the islands. We must build bridges in South Africa, we must link communities and, of course, the NGK is part of this new structure.

One of the islands you talk about is the coloured NG Sendingkerk which is part of

your family of churches. It is becoming strident and highly politicised and it recently elected as its moderator the Reverend Allan Boesak who does in fact lead protests and marches. How do you propose to build bridges linking your two islands?

We will have to appreciate fully that members of that church exist on the other side of apartheid. Whites have implemented apartheid; the Sendingkerk and its people are on the receiving end. Those of us who have implemented apartheid are not always aware of the pain and suffering caused by apartheid with all its discriminatory laws and decrees.

We must therefore have intensive contact with them and engage them in dialogue. At the recent Sendingkerk Synod, Boesak asked us to send out signs of hope. And, indeed, that is what we must do. We must say to them that we are aware, that we do understand something of their pain, that we do want to work with them to improve the situation so that we can all live in a normal society. Our society is not normal. It is drenched with blood and tears. There is great heartsore, and we know this is not God's intention. God wants happy, prosperous people. So we must do everything to build a bridge here, and one that takes traffic in two directions. Then we can go to them and they can come to us and we can clasp hands and work together to normalise the situation.

Does that imply you will have to become more actively involved in political reform in order to create a spirit of unity and partnership with the Sendingkerk?

If political involvement to which you are referring implies that we should act as a sort of political pressure group, then I emphatically say that is not the task of the church. The church must not be a political party. The church must be a force which inspires new norms and structures. It is not in a position to prescribe what political structure should be established. That is precisely what unfortunately happened in the past when the NGK said the political structure which would solve this country's problems should be apartheid. That was wrong and the NGK Synod has acknowledged that. We are not going to try to give to apartheid a theological, ethical justification. That is completely wrong.

By the same token, if it is wrong to give to apartheid a theological, ethical justifica-

tion, then it is also wrong to give to anti-apartheid a theological, ethical justification.

As far as we are aware, the NGK hasn't expressed an opinion about the State of Emergency which was imposed earlier this year. What is your view?

It is tragic when any government has to resort to such measures because it indicates that there must be something radically wrong in society. So I regret it. On the other hand, if circumstances justify it, then it seems to me the State has the right to take such action. The State has a duty to maintain law and order but, of course, to simply maintain law and order doesn't mean that you are making peace. Certain laws are suspended and if you don't obey, then you are taken away and put in jail.

You don't change a man's heart if you take him out of the community and lock him up. And that brings me to the role of the church. The church is there to bring about a change of heart among people. There can be no political solution without a change of heart.

I'm not in a position to evaluate the whole situation, but obviously the State of Emergency will harden attitudes. I can only hope and pray that the State of Emergency will be lifted as soon as possible, that we can return to normality. We are living in abnormal circumstances.

But I must repeat, I am not a politician and the church does not have the information and insight, nor is it competent, to judge whether there should be a state of emergency because that is completely the task of the State. We can only say we hope that it will end as soon as possible.

Given what you described as the NGK's unique access to government, are the politicians carrying out their responsibilities as you would expect them?

I think it is fantastic that the same government which constructed apartheid from 1948, which promulgated so many apartheid laws, should come to the conclusion that it has erred, that it cannot carry on as it was. And they had the courage of their convictions to the extent that they actually did change. Perhaps they should be moving faster, perhaps they could be more effective, but I have the greatest admiration for a government which realises its mistakes, acts on its decision and tries to broaden democracy,

to grant rights to people who had none.

Who cannot be thankful for that? However, once again, perhaps the tempo should be faster. Yet, who am I, as a theologian, or who are we, as a church, to say that the tempo must be faster? I can only say that the sooner we establish a normal society, the better for us all.

The new constitution which established the tricameral Parliament for whites, coloureds and Indians has been widely criticised for excluding blacks. Do you share that criticism?

The new constitution is a start, a meaningful beginning for further development. I can't say how it should be developed further and precisely how blacks should be included, but it seems to me that efforts are being made to give blacks a form of representation. Certainly, the form of guardianship of the past must end. We are now entering a new era of partnership in which all people are regarded as citizens of this country with the right to participate in affairs. But I am not sure about what type of structure should be established to make this possible in such a way that you can still be yourself, that you can still maintain your identity if you so wish.

Does your statement about maintenance of "identity" mean that you favour the retention of such laws as the Group Areas Act?

You must appreciate that the church only suggests basic principles. The Bible does not say there should or should not be group areas, but the Bible also says you should use your common sense. If tension between groups can be removed by having different residential areas, then that is desirable.

Now if the State considered it desirable to repeal the Act prohibiting mixed marriages, then it seems the State is morally obliged to make provision for people who do marry across the colour line. Where must they live? So it seems to me that serious attention should be given to the issue of group areas because, I believe, we must move towards the development of a society based on freedom of association.

If people are serious about living together and making their suburb exclusive, they should have the right to do so. If people want to build a school and make it exclusive, they

should also have that right. That is a basic right. And, of course, I must emphasise that freedom of association also implies freedom of dissociation. It is a question of a delicate balance between people who want to coexist

in a racially integrated atmosphere, and people who want to coexist in a racially exclusive atmosphere.

With four years ahead of you as moderator of the NGK, what are your priorities?

The first, of course, is to build bridges which can link the many islands in this country. But another priority is to improve relationships with the various churches in South Africa, and perhaps even to work towards the establishment of a South African ecumenical council of churches in which all churches can be members, particularly the reformed churches, including the Anglicans, the Methodists and so on. I also have no objection whatsoever to working towards a more definite relationship with the Roman Catholic Church.

Will you formally approach these churches?

Initially, I will make personal contact. I think this is very important because I believe that what is endangered in our country is not a particular church, but Christianity itself.

We should try to acknowledge that and accept our mutual responsibility for defending the moral values of Christianity. These are under great strain at the moment.

Your hopes for the future depend on Afrikaner nationalists' willingness to change fundamentally their approach to politics and society. Won't the right-wing within the church and government scuttle reform?

Since July 1985 South Africa has been under a State of Emergency for all but three months. Ostensibly, the regulations are aimed at curbing revolt and suppressing violence. However, the vast majority of Afrikaners must eventually perceive that the true significance of the State of Emergency is more than that.

At its deepest level it signifies the birth-pangs of a new South Africa, and thus also the birth of a new Afrikaner. The changes against which people protested – even with violence – and which necessitated the proclamation of the State of Emergency have brought the Afrikaner face to face with one of the greatest crises in his history.

Certainly, in Afrikanerdom's far right group there are already disturbing signs of political extremism. These groups show no appreciation of the legitimate aspirations of the non-white peoples, neither do they have any idea of the necessity for a new political dispensation in South Africa and the demands such a new political order will make on the Afrikaner. Part of the far right has little if any contribution to offer: these people concentrate on a policy of restoration which actually amounts to nothing more than a kind of reiteration of the past. Their views, then, need not be taken too seriously.

Another segment of the far right has a clearer vision of the future. They believe the principle of partition must be universally applied as this offers the Afrikaner his only defence and protection. Here, the ideal is an Afrikaner national state situated in its own geographical area, governed by white Afrikaners, with no power-sharing of any kind. Thus the current reforms are a serious threat to the Afrikaner's white exclusiveness and so he is urgently summoned to fight for his freedom.

This fight for freedom is to be waged, not with military weapons, but by subtle methods of infiltration and indoctrination. To this end, true Afrikaners are called on to penetrate existing cultural organisations to gain control of them and to influence their members. The control of schools and parents' organisations is particularly important, to ensure that the children are educated in the right political climate and idiom.

This counter-reformation is not restricted to adults – the youth is regarded as a vital sphere of concentration which involves a lengthy process of preparation and indoctrination. In every town and every region spiritual forces will have to be united while there must be a clear realisation that the Afrikaner economy must not be controlled by alien groups or constructed on foreign labour.

Clearly, this section of the Afrikaner right-wing will not disappear. Without doubt it will continue and, dependent upon the dogged persistence of its members and the suc-

cess they may achieve, perpetuate restlessness, tension, and internecine conflict among Afrikaners.

Naturally, the question is what influence this will have on the nature and tempo of reform. To my mind it would be fatal if these people were to determine either the type or pace of reform. None the less, their very presence and the way they operate will cause wide divergence of opinion in the ranks of those responsible for reform. Some will want to ignore them; others will feel they ought to be heard, which will seriously inhibit the reform process. Yet I believe that the impulse for fundamental reform will be so strong that the right's political influence will not adversely affect its progress to any great extent.

From the Afrikaner's history it may be deduced that he wants to live, and if survival means re-casting basic political ideology he will do so. He is not a slave to his policy, for he realises that there are values greater and more important than political policy. Nor is he enmeshed in a static pattern of social existence, for he knows that Afrikanerdom is a living, dynamically developing organism. It is not a building which is repaired and restored as the years pass, but a tree which grows new branches, flowers and fruit, yet remains essentially the same.

We are now witnessing the most exciting event in the history of the Afrikaner: the birth of the new Afrikaner.

The new Afrikaner is engaged in conquering his exclusivism. Political power is increasingly being shared with people of other cultures; protective legislation is being repealed, and patterns of social co-existence changed. The ward is emancipated, and the guardian becomes the partner of the liberated. The age-old guardian-relationship is being transformed without traumatic upheaval into a relationship of partners. In political, economic, and social spheres this is evident every day.

But will the Afrikaner survive as an independent group in such an integrated society? At present, whites comprise about 16% of the population. By the year 2000 this percentage may dwindle to 12% or even less, of which the Afrikaans-speaking section will probably amount to half or a little more. Seen against those statistics, can the Afrikaner survive? Undoubtedly, because his history has demonstrated a will to survive.

Yet, he must find a cultural home that will unite him as a people. By "culture" I mean

all the material and mental creations, the language, the songs, the art, the games, the politics and the social institutions that distinguish one community from another. It is in these cultural creations that the Afrikaner will have to find his home if he wishes to remain independent and make his contribution to the development of South Africa.

There are already signs that the Afrikaner understands thoroughly the truth that he must have a substantial cultural home. Only once he has discovered his strength and power there, will he face the challenges of the new dispensation. Then this new Afrikaner will not only speak his own language, but the other's language as well. He will listen to the other's music, play with him, admire his art, worship with him and work with him towards a new future.

In all this he will not merely make his own contribution. He will himself be enriched, without losing anything of his own identity as a person, an Afrikaner or a Christian. The new Afrikaner will seek a future South Africa where a variety of people enjoy their own cultures within an all-embracing nation with a common national culture.

/9274

CSO: 3400/565

EXPERT DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO SEPARATE EDUCATION

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 80

[Article by Ken Hartshorne, former state education planner, consultant at the University of Witwatersrand]

[Text]

Assessing education in South Africa today is a risky endeavour because of the extreme complexity of the social, economic and political context, the unresolved and unstable nature of that context, and the rapidity with which situations change.

Education is taking place within an untidy maze of interactions that themselves are volatile and unpredictable and which differ radically from place to place, from situation to situation, often at the whim of State officials, the local security apparatus or youthful activists. In the face of the complexities a neat analysis of the state of affairs is not possible. What can be done is to identify some broad tendencies and to indicate the stances of some of the main actors in the drama, perhaps even tragedy, that is being played out.

In the first place, it is clear that government shows no signs of giving way on the principle of segregated education systems: this is a basic tenet that has been reiterated again and again at the highest levels. It will be more difficult for government to change on this than to free Mandela, negotiate with the ANC or repeal the Group Areas Act, because it lies at the heart of the ideology of separate development. It is no accident that such concepts as "identity", "diversity", "self-determination" are being stressed so strongly.

In recent months the full force of the security apparatus has been brought to bear on buttressing the crumbling edifice of black education in the urban areas. It is ironic that in a system in which there is no statutory compulsory education, the attempt is now being made to force children to school and "make them learn". Efforts have also been made to crush all opposition to the system

through the detention of those voicing it: the latest estimates, in the absence of hard information, suggest that over 700 persons connected with education – teachers, students and pupils – have been detained. Among them have been the leaders of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) and the secretary-general of the African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA), since released.

In the face of an absolutely clear rejection of the education system by a wide range of community organisations, from conservative to radical, the claim is still made that protest is the work of activists or agitators: there is little understanding on the part of government that where children are attending school, this is not a signal of acceptance of the system but rather an indication of the strength of the community's need for education, even if it is not of the kind they wish, and of lack of viable alternatives for their children.

What is known of government's 10-year plan for education suggests that it is based on the principle of "equal but separate", on the assumption of the continuation of segregated systems and that it is concerned principally with issues of numbers, finance and provision. It proposes a real increase in total education expenditure of 4.1% a year leading to an annual expenditure in 1996 of R10 000m (in 1986 rand terms). Priority is to be given to those departments with the biggest backlogs and the major part of additional expenditure is to be spent on increasing the qualification level of teachers, on improving the pupil-teacher ratio and on accommodating the increase in pupil numbers in these departments, including those of the "national states".

In introducing this matter in the House of Assembly, the Minister of National Education, F W de Klerk, said, however, that "the setting of specific target dates and rigoristic norms to obtain this objective (equal educational opportunities) should, however, not be insisted upon" and that the objective could not be fully achieved in the space of 10 years. As a member of the opposition pointed out, this is understandable if one white college of education is to cost R85m at an average capital cost per student place of R38 636, while in the same three years, six black colleges are to be built at a total cost of R42m at an average capital cost per student place of R10 606. It is extremely doubtful whether the real issues of segregation, isolation, relevance and quality are to be addressed in this 10-year plan, although clearly there is to be an improvement in material resources and in the financial position of black teachers.

Perhaps the best illustration of the so-called "non-negotiable" of segregated systems and separate schools is what is happening in the field of white education at present. With the destruction of even the limited democratic base that existed in the provincial system of government, all white education is now controlled very firmly by the central Department of Education and Culture (DEC) (House of Assembly), which has fallen into the hands of ex-Transvaal education administrators fully committed to the tenets of Christian National Education, separate development and fundamental pedagogics. The tensions between this department and National Education are already becoming clear, as the doctrine of "education as own affairs" (sic) is pushed hard by the former, as in the very recent decision to apply a rigorous permit system to the admission of Chinese and Japanese children to white schools.

Of all the debates on education votes in the first session of the 1986 Parliament, that on the DEC (House of Assembly) was without doubt the most discouraging and lacking in reality, certainly from the government side, for anyone concerned with negotiating a positive future for education. The major thrust of the Minister's contribution was to attack the concept of a single department of education and to attempt to prove that "own affairs education" was essential for the preservation of "culture", the rights, identity and self-determination of the white group. When faced with statistics arising from Parliamentary questions showing that there were 205 000 vacant places in white high and primary schools (the equivalent of 5 800, 35-pupil classrooms) and nearly 3 000 in teachers colleges, he replies that policy could not be adapted "solely for that reason, because the principle of education as an own affair, as stated in the Constitution . . . is being impaired".

In looking at the next five years it is absolutely clear

that no fundamental changes within the systems can be expected: segregated, divisive education is to remain. However, there is a greater acceptance for private education, which is to be partially subsidised and allowed more freedom to experiment with forms of education not approved within the formal systems.

Turning to the schools, in particular those of the Department of Education and Training (DET), the picture is one of continuing deterioration in relationships between the department and its teachers and pupils, exacerbated in July 1986 by the introduction of new security controls on the schools, particularly as this was done without any consultation with community, teacher and student bodies or with the NECC. The closing down of schools in the eastern Cape (September 9, 1986) suggests that desperate control measures have not succeeded and that the DET is rapidly losing any authority to influence situations in the black urban townships. Many urban schools have become "no-go" areas for departmental officials. Responsible estimates indicate that at least 250 000 pupils enrolled at the beginning of the year, are now out of school. The re-registration of pupils in July has been described variously by the black Press as "inventive bookkeeping" or "creative administration" aimed at covering up the serious breakdown in attendance.

While over-all in black schools there is a slow but steady improvement in the teacher-pupil ratio and in the drop-out rate, the latter has worsened in DET secondary schools. At the standard 10 level, the position is likely to be as bad as, or worse, than in 1985, when, of the 25 584 pupils enrolled at the beginning of the year, 24 231 registered for the senior certificate examination, but only 10 523 wrote and 4 807 passed (19,1% of the original enrolment). DET enrolments at standard 10 level formed less than a quarter of the total in all black schools, but accounted for 70% of the total drop-out over the year.

More disturbing even than the serious fall-off in attendance at black urban schools, certainly for the longer term well-being of education, is the breakdown of the learning environment in the schools. An official record of 80% attendance in an urban school is no guarantee that learning is taking place: teachers are dispirited, pupils are restless and disturbed by what is going on around them and the general environment is not conducive to learning.

Regular learning habits are breaking down, pupils do not bring books to school, are not prepared to do homework or have their work evaluated by means of tests or examinations. There is considerable lack of trust, for example, in the reliability of the senior certificate examination, and even suggestions in some cases that invigil-

ators at examinations are afraid to exercise the control they should.

Pupils have experienced the heady feeling of power over their teachers and, as with all power that is not accountable, this has sometimes led to youthful arrogance in speech and action. Under the present social, political and educational arrangements it is understandable that a growing breakdown in the learning environment is taking place, but it holds grave dangers for the future. There can be no guarantee, and it is improbable, that even a radical change in the political dispensation in South Africa would restore a positive learning environment in which post-apartheid education could develop. As Lebanang Sebidi has so rightly said: "However instant political *coups d'état* may be, they cannot bring about instant radical educational changes . . . there are no educational *coups d'état*".

A further disturbing factor, which is generally not treated with the seriousness it deserves, is the influence in education of the young people not in school: here one is talking not of the active "boycotters" only, but also of those who have dropped out, failed, and in one way or another been rejected by the system. Included in this group, for example, would be the roughly 250 000 pupils between 1976 and 1986 who completed a full secondary education and then failed the final senior certificate examination.

If one takes in conjunction with this a recent market research survey which indicated that only 16% of urban black youth between the ages of 16-24 were in full-time employment, then the magnitude of the educational and social implications must be apparent. In the urban townships there is a new and different generation of "street children" led by young adults, rejected by the education system, disillusioned by failure and lack of work opportunities, exercising pressures on those who are at school or are using other educational alternatives, pressures that range from those of brothers and friends ("what's the use? where is it going to get you?") to straightforward, organised intimidation. One has to ask in all seriousness whether the schools can succeed, under any dispensation, unless something is done to help these youngsters find their way, through "second-chance", alternative forms of education and training.

In the middle of the ground contested by, on the one hand, the State and, on the other, by pupils, parents and community, stand the teachers, at one and the same time employees of the State and members of the community. The generally negative image of the teacher, to be found even among teachers themselves, is no small contributor to the breakdown of the learning environment. Pressured and criticised from all sides; often for inadequacies for which they are not to blame, treated often by de-

partments, not as professionals, but as instruments of policy (as in recent instructions on security in the schools), it is not surprising that in many areas the morale, confidence and self-image of teachers is at a low ebb. They are in an unenviable position and, that so many, in spite of all the personal and external constraints, still care about their pupils and do their best for them, speaks well of the teachers and the profession to which they belong.

The professional associations, such as ATASA and the Cape Teachers Professional Association (CTPA), are under pressure, particularly from their younger members, to take up a more militant stance of the kind adopted by the newer associations, such as the non-racial National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA).

Involvement in the NECC movement has also brought about a review of relationships with State departments, and during 1986 both ATASA and the "coloured" teachers association have withdrawn their representatives from the SA Council of Education (SACE) and from all departmental committees. The associations have exercised moderation, patience and courtesy over a period of at least 50 years, but are now clearly moving away from the employing departments and much closer to the communities they serve, in the process taking a much firmer stand on the social and political issues that are bedevilling education.

Attitudes on both sides are likely to harden in the next five years, with the position of the teacher in the urban school particularly becoming increasingly difficult. In coping with this situation, teachers' associations will need to strengthen both their links with the NECC movement and with their colleagues in other sectors of education, through renewed efforts to bring about greater unity in the profession as a whole.

Community responses to the continuing education crisis have begun to crystallise in the main around the NECC movement, which developed out of the conference called by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) at the University of the Witwatersrand in December 1985. The NECC movement, in spite of the difficulties surrounding its first meeting at Durban in March 1986 and the later detention of many of its leaders, is of positive significance for two major reasons. Firstly, in bringing together community, political and educational leaders, trades unions, parents, teachers, students and pupils, it has created a powerful negotiating force that government, in spite of its attempt to remove its leadership through detentions, will have to listen to and take into account, principally because, as the DET progressively loses control of the urban schools, the NECC movement offers communities a possible alternative mechanism for running schools and continuing with some form of education.

In the second place, the NECC has moved away from what had become a rather barren exercise, the recapitulation of the failures of "Bantu Education", to a consideration both of the alternatives now and the form and character of a longer-term post-apartheid education system. This thinking has emerged under the banner of "people's education", which has both political and educational content and significance. In the former sense it can be regarded as an expression of the educational consequences of the Freedom Charter, in which it is inextricably bound up with the concept of "people's power". Its broad goals are the setting up of a "free, compulsory, unitary, non-racial and democratic system of education, for all sections of our people", which would be so organised that students, teachers, parents and workers would be able "to participate actively in its initiation and management".

The values to be promoted in people's education would be "democracy, non-racialism, collective work and active participation". The educational objectives, to be reached through the stimulation of critical and creative thinking, analysis and working methods, are:

- The elimination of illiteracy, ignorance, capitalist norms of competition, individualism, stunted intellectual development and exploitation;
- To enable "the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system" and to prepare them "for participation in a non-racial, democratic system";
- To equip and train "all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a non-racial, democratic South Africa".

People's education has brought a new emphasis to the crisis of 1986 compared with that of 1976: its message, particularly in the voices of younger people, is rooted in perceptions of socialist principle. Various free enterprise surveys in recent years have documented black scepticism as to the benefits of capitalism and disbelief in the inevitability of the rewards of economic growth "filtering down" to those economically as well as politically disenfranchised. Even the recent public statements by powerful private sector interests, in which much clearer pressures for change in society and in education are evident, have been received at best with cautious "wait-and-see" attitudes.

The rise of the trade union movement, with its own special feeling for the crucial importance of education, has also led to a greater awareness of the economic, as well as the political factors involved in societal change. Economic as well as political reconstruction is now on the agenda and any consideration of the present or future of education has to take this into serious account.

In people's education, as it is articulated at present, there is the clear presence of an underlying tension be-

tween the statements on critical and creative thinking, active participation and democratic practices on the one hand, and implied alternative ideological pressures, educational controls and "power" issues on the other. It is, for example, crucial that the phrase "our people" in people's education documents should not come to be interpreted in the sense of "*die volk*" of Afrikaner nationalism, as expressing a new sectional nationalist ideology.

As South Africa goes through the inevitable process of moving towards a post-apartheid society, the great issue is whether a new education dispensation can respond to broad social, economic and political goals without continuing to be "politicised", in the sense of being committed to and controlled by a particular political party ideology, not necessarily shared by all the members of the society served by the education system, which is our past and present experience. Will South Africa learn from the lessons of the past? Or is the past so painful and hurtful that it can be exercised only by repeating it under a different ideological banner?

At the same time, it is the height of naivety to expect that "politics can be kept out of education". Education policies, systems and values in any country reflect its political options, its history and traditions, its values and mores and, most importantly, its conceptions of the future. The trap has to be avoided of searching for a purely educational answer to a problem that has social, economic and political as well as educational dimensions.

Education systems are most effective and relevant when they have the acceptance of the user (learner, teacher, parents, community), when the user is involved and participates in the education decisions that are made, and when the user is in broad agreement with the view of man and society that informs the philosophy on which the education system is based. It is this "broad agreement" which has to be sought and negotiated in South Africa, a commitment to a common purpose in education and society, without which, questions of control, power and "excess ideological baggage" will continue to dominate education, to its detriment and that of its users.

It is to this search for "broad agreement", "common purpose", that the proponents of people's education are beginning to make such an important, positive contribution. There is a growing realisation that, in addition to the important issues of philosophy, goals, structures and control, there is no certainty that changes in government and political structures, even if they were democratic in nature, would necessarily lead, for example, to the "democratisation" of education. As Franz Auerbach has pointed out recently, authoritarianism in the schools "reflects ancient and deep-seated authoritarian child-rearing patterns in the homes of all sectors of South African society". These patterns have carried over into the schools, where learning styles will have to change from

passive, rote learning, single textbook, examination oriented approaches, to creative learning and problem solving, through the active participation and involvement of pupils in the learning process, to hands-on experience in the laboratory and workshop, self-study in the library, questioning, discussion, and cooperative working together in groups.

It is therefore significant in people's education statements that emphasis is being laid on "critical and creative thinking, analysis and working methods", "active participation", "collective work", "democratic practices, in the generating and development of knowledge and in its implementation".

New curricula have their part to play in the search for quality and relevance, as people's education concerns with history, economics and English, for example, indicate; but new content can still be taught by authoritarian methods rather than learnt by democratic approaches. There is still the danger of putting new wine into old bottles.

The emergence of people's education has provided a new opportunity – far more powerful, because of broad community involvement, than that lost at the time of the De Lange Report in 1980-'83 – to debate the realities, the relevance, quality and style of education and to negotiate its future for all the people of this country. The common ground, now and in the future, must be a commitment to a non-racial, democratic, equitable and just society, in both the political and economic sense, of the parties to the debate and negotiation.

The process is likely to be painful and laborious in society, because, as Van Zyl Slabbert, has said: "*Jy gaan*

nie 'n demokrasie soos 'n stuk band-aid op hierdie samelewing vasplak nie." ("You're not going to be able to stick democracy on to this society like a piece of band-aid"); and in education, because many of the main actors, pupils and teachers, have seen the learning environment collapse around them and the education system disintegrate. The hurts are deep, emotions run high and the obstacles to understanding and shared debate are massive; but there is also hope, because in spite of the slogans and the rejection of much of what at present is schooling, there is a common appreciation of the fundamental importance of education and what it could contribute to, and in, a regenerated society.

Both the debate on, and the process leading to, post-apartheid education are well under way: they are loaded with complexities, uncertainties and risks, because they are taking place in an unstable and unresolved context, which changes from day to day, from place to place.

In this context, the barriers against fundamental change, in both society and education, are formidable. Some of the alternatives that are canvassed are equally daunting to the educator. But to stand back from either the debate or the process, because of this, would be particularly barren and irresponsible. The choice is not whether it can be stopped or not: the debate on the nature of post-apartheid education and the process leading to its particular character in the future are realities of the present. The choice is rather to hold on to the past and to abdicate from the future, or to enter the debate and commit oneself to the process that will determine the nature and character of both society and education in a transformed South Africa.

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CSO: 3400/570

UCT COUNCILLOR, BUSINESSMAN PROPOSE FAR-REACHING FEDERAL OPTIONS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English Vol 5 1986 No 5 pp 77, 78, 79, 80, 83

[Article by Hans Middelmann]

[Text]

If the nature of the post-apartheid society could be convincingly clarified, apocalyptic fantasies and illusions would give way to realistic hope . . . once a nonracial vision with concrete merits grips the imagination of whites and blacks alike, its difficult implementation will have begun. Better than moral indignation, blind belief in coercive power or illusionary racial deals, a creative political realism will free South Africa from its moral paralysis.

From *South Africa Without Apartheid* by H Adam and K Moodley, 1986.

South Africa is in a deep political and economic crisis. The crisis is not due to external forces over which we have no control; it is self-inflicted. It has come over us because we have neglected to come to terms with ourselves in the changing circumstances of this century.

Our options are now heavily circumscribed by escalating violence on the one hand and by our inflexible political structure on the other. We are in a truly vicious circle.

The government, in its natural desire to put off the day when it ceases to be in sole power, retards and obscures the reform process it has initiated.

The masses in their frustration have added the appalling dimensions of bombs, murder, boycotts and internecine strife.

The resultant lack of confidence in our future, internally and externally, has undermined our economy and the value of the rand more disastrously than any effective sanctions ever will.

The drama unfolding on the South African political

stage now threatens to turn into lingering, terrifying tragedy. This can be averted only if the vast majority of South Africans who support neither violence nor government's policies find a common denominator, allowing them to live together in peace and to pursue their own aims with minimum interference by *any* government.

The common denominator lies in the understanding that a new basis is required for South Africa's post-apartheid political structures and institutions. We must set ourselves free as other successful countries have done. Instead of participating in the present hopeless power struggle between competing political groups, thinking South Africans need to identify and agree on the nature of the laws and organisations that can give *all* citizens equal opportunities in a just and open society. Instead of institutionalising the negative factors that divide us, it is better to use well tested methods to facilitate interaction on an equal basis for the common good.

In recent years I, like others, have felt compelled to make a contribution towards achieving these aims. In discussing and writing about applying the principles and structures of the open society to the South African situation I have had a rewarding response, including encouraging help and criticism from leading academics and many persons of standing in their respective communities. It is clear to me that, overreaching all the factors that are said to divide South Africans into separate groups with irreconcilable objectives, by far the largest constituency is made up of those who share common interests, a love of our country and the wish to see it respected among the nations of the world.

The members of this silent majority of all colours range from the humblest, possibly illiterate, probably

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA


The constitution prescribes universal suffrage and contains a Bill of Rights without any distinctions based on sex, colour, creed or race.

The Federal States.

The Federal Republic contains 8 – 10 federal states, all territorially consolidated, no enclave of one to be found in another.


Each of the states has its own constitution providing for a governor and legislative structure consistent with that of the federation.

• Borders shown on the outline of South Africa do not represent the author's prescription for his proposed federation. They are purely symbolic.



The Federal Legislature and Government

Legislature




The Senate consists of 60 senators, six from each state, elected for six years. One third retire every two years.



This consists of 300 members elected for four years. Of those, 150 are elected by constituencies; the other 150 elected on a proportional vote and state basis, with a minimum of 10% of the state vote.

Government

Presidency



By simple majority vote of the Senate and House of Representatives, the presidency of three (no two from the same party) are elected for a three year period. By rotation, each holds the office of president for one year. The other two are vice-presidents.

Ministers' Council (Cabinet)



The presidency appoints a Ministers' Council whose members need not be members of the legislature, for three years subject to ratification by Senate.

Other Federal State Bodies

Council for Social and Economic Reconstruction

Chaired by the Reserve Bank governor with 15 members appointed by the presidency for five years from names submitted by trades unions and all private sector organisations. Members may not hold state office nor be members of the legislature. They must consider and report on the budget and all bills apportioning federal funds to the states before the bills go to the legislature.

Supreme Court and Judiciary

Appointed by the presidency. This body enforces the Bill of Rights, and has the power to annul laws from the Federal and State legislature if they infringe the Bill of Rights.

Constitutional Council

Chaired by the Chief Justice and made up of past-presidents and 12 members, six each appointed by the Senate and the House of Representatives. Advises on constitutionality of bills and makes proposals for constitutional reform.

underpaid, workers to highly successful professional and business people. They include wives, mothers, teachers, policemen . . . They work for their own benefit and wish to improve their own and their families' position in life. They create the country's wealth, which also supports those who cannot look after themselves. They are Christians, Jews, agnostics, Moslems, blacks, whites; they speak Afrikaans, Xhosa, Portuguese; they are rugby fans or music lovers – collectively they have more common interests than separate ones and they constitute the rich fabric of our society.

The task is to reflect on the interdependence, now and even more in the future, of all these 30m people – and to make a new start by institutionalising what they have in common.

The challenge is to design the framework of our laws and institutions in such a way that all our people, without sacrificing language, religion and culture, can freely interact to mutual benefit. There is no room any more for the artificial distinction between "own" and "general" affairs in South Africa. During the last few years we have in fact overcome the artificial division in many professions and business undertakings, in churches and voluntary associations – even on the beaches. What was thought to be impossible became, sensibly handled, a success or a non-event.

Such a society would flourish under a federal constitution which followed the well-tested structures of the world's leading democratic countries. Under such constitutions majority rule is not unfettered and, in terms of enshrined civil rights, discrimination as between different population groups is unlawful.

The constitution and the administrative, judicial and economic structures are so designed that neither the majority nor a minority can arbitrarily change basic rights. These include common citizenship, equality under the law and the universal franchise. They also incorporate the right of freedom of movement, and of association and expression, including the pursuit by individuals of their cultural, language and religious preferences in the company of like-minded people.

A rigid constitution protects the institutions that secure those individual rights and guarantees the independence of the judiciary.

While it is essential that South Africa remain a unified country, it is desirable that government be decentralised with formal checks and balances by way of a federal structure. This would accommodate the wide variety of regional differences of language, religion and ways of life in our vast country and curb the tendency of central government to interfere in local issues.

The government in its own constitutional reform efforts is not prepared to discuss universal franchise and equality before the law of all citizens. Private attempts to

initiate a National Convention movement have failed in our present state of polarisation. But it became clear from my discussions that a draft of a model South African constitution, based on Western democratic open society principles, could be very helpful in coming to grips with our problems.

What follows, therefore, is such a model for which I accept full responsibility. In drafting it I have had the generous assistance and criticism of many others whose concern for the future of South Africa is deep and genuine. In expressing my gratitude to them all, I should like to single out Professor Marinus Wiechers, whose experience in constitutional matters is probably unrivalled in South Africa.

I envisage a constitution that is rigid. The territorial unity of the State and its federal and democratic nature are entrenched and cannot be amended. Otherwise, amendments require prior sanction by the constitutional council, approval by three-quarters of the members of both houses of the federal legislature and ratification by the legislatures of the federal states. Amendments affecting the boundaries and powers of the component states require ratification by three-quarters of the members of each of the State legislatures involved.

The constitution contains a Bill of Rights which protects individual rights and liberties and secures democratic freedoms such as freedom of expression, association and movement, and safeguards due process of law, independence of the judiciary, free party-political formation and principles of non-discrimination, while also stating the concomitant duties and obligations to respect and obey the rights and liberties of others. It is enforced by a federal supreme court (or a separate constitutional court), charged with the duty of annulling laws and administrative acts of the federal and State legislature if these infringe the Bill of Rights.

The constitution prescribes universal suffrage and entrenches the right to representation and access to office of all adult South Africans without any distinction based on sex, colour, creed or race.

The federation is composed of at least eight, but not more than 10 component states, as constituted by a boundary commission. Each state has its own constitutional dispensation, subject to a basic conformity in the appointment of a governor and a legislative structure consistent with that of the federal legislature. State constitutions can be changed only in terms of the particular state's dispensation and not by the federal legislature.

Component states are territorially integrated and consolidated; under no circumstances will enclaves of one state be found in other states.

The federal legislature is composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Each federal state is represented in the Senate by six senators. A senator must be at least 40 years of age. Election takes place in accordance with the procedure laid down in the State's constitution, which may provide for a special ballot of voters, or indirect election, or a combination of these procedures. Each senator is elected for six years and two of each state's six senators retire every two years. (Initially two senators will be elected for two years, two for four years and two for the full term.)

The House of Representatives has 300 members elected for four years. Half of these members are elected by voters in geographical constituencies as demarcated by a federal commission; the remaining half are elected by proportional vote on a state basis, provided that a political party must obtain at least 10% of the total votes cast in the relevant election in order to qualify for proportional representation.

Legislation may be initiated by either House and requires assent by simple majority, except as otherwise provided, in each House. In the event of deadlock, special combined committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives may attempt to resolve the deadlock, failing which the House of Representatives may override the deadlock by a vote of three quarters of its members.

The presidency consists of a president and two vice-presidents, no two of whom shall be members of the same political party. They are elected by the federal legislature for three years and each member of the presidency acts as president for one year. (A Swiss-type executive is proposed in order, on the one hand, to embody the federal diversity and, on the other hand, to avoid too large a measure of power concentration in the hands of the executive.)

Ministers are independently appointed by the presidency for three years subject to ratification by the Senate. They need not be members of the federal legislature. They can be dismissed individually by simple majority vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Ministers collectively constitute the minister's council and the presidency acts on its advice.

There is one judicial system for the federation; judges are appointed by the presidency and their appointment is ratified by the Senate. Judges are dismissed by the presidency only on the recommendation of the Senate and House of Representatives.

All bills dealing with the appointment of federal funds to State units, including the federal budget proposals, are referred by the presidency to a council for social and economic reconstruction and development for its consideration and report before submission to the federal legislature.

The council of 15 members is chaired by the governor of the Reserve Bank. The members, who may not hold

any state office nor be members of any legislature, are appointed by the presidency for five year terms in their individual capacities from a list of names submitted by the various private sector organisations, including trade unions.

A national emergency may be declared only by the presidency, for a period not exceeding 60 days, subject to ratification by both the Senate and the House of Representatives within one week. Renewals are subject to the same limitations. War may be declared only by the presidency, subject to ratification by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

A constitutional council is established under the chairmanship of the chief justice of South Africa consisting of former presidents of the federation and six members appointed by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The council has the following duties:

- ☐ To advise on the constitutionality of bills before the federal legislature if such advice is requested by either House;
- ☐ To perform a similar function in respect of proposed state legislation; and
- ☐ To make proposals for constitutional reform submitted to it by competent authorities.

To keep this constitutional outline as brief as possible, only the basic principles and main provisions have been covered. They include, although they have not all been spelt out specifically, regular elections and representation based on the principle of a free mandate, free association and popular leadership, all of which are sustained and supported by freedom of expression and, more particularly, by a free Press.

Unfortunately, there is also no room here to outline the important steps required to make South Africa a federal state: decisions on the most appropriate geographic building blocks to form the federation; how the federal states reach their own constitutional settlements; and how the federal states reach agreement on the federal constitution. Some of these constitutional phases will proceed side by side at the same time.

The actual entrenchment of the federal constitution would consist of two steps: first, popular approval by means of referenda in the various states, and, second, empowerment by the present Parliament of the federal constituent body to adopt the federal constitution (after which the present Parliament will finally dissolve itself).

The final mechanism to put the new constitution into operation in the proper sequence will be possible only if the population at large can be convinced that the resulting benefits are clearly more desirable than the present dispensation.

All the provisions follow well-known and established methods of organising State institutions and distributing State powers, which rest on centuries of common ex-

perience, shared values and well-tried mechanisms. Eventually, the terms of the constitution, to command maximum consent, will have to be negotiated by delegates of the main, presently antagonistic groups.

It is abundantly clear that, at present, such negotiations are impossible to conduct. Before considering the way in which a new initiative could be developed, and who could be involved in it, it is necessary to clarify another important issue.

Socialism and capitalism are popularly seen as politically alternative economic systems. This simplistic view is based on the perception that whites are rich and capitalist, while blacks are poor and must look to a socialist dispensation for their salvation. Graffiti which I see on my way to town succinctly proclaims "Fight poverty - build socialism", while a Soweto scholar is reported to have said: "We want everything the whites have." Is it any wonder that large numbers of South Africans express their vision of the future in such slogans, when they are voteless and subject to arbitrary laws not of their own making?

Our present political structure is seen by many merely as an extended capitalist device to keep the masses permanently oppressed. This is coupled with the widely-held belief that only majority rule would set the people free, making them also materially better off through the redistribution of wealth.

A quick glance around the world confirms, however, that nations ruled under arbitrary power structures, whether in the name of a minority or the majority, or in the name of socialism or capitalism are, as a rule, impoverished. Their contacts with the outside world are severely limited. On the other hand, material wealth and also cultural qualities of life coincide on the whole with conditions where State power is limited and decentralised and all citizens are equal under the law - where everyone's freedom is circumscribed only by the need for equal freedom of one's neighbours.

For South Africans to achieve that position would entail equal rights of access to education and training to be able to earn a livelihood; job opportunities open to all; and universal freedom of movement, of residence, and of ownership of property anywhere in South Africa.

In an open society, freedom of association guarantees workers the right to form trade unions whose membership cannot, however, be made compulsory as a condition of employment. Employers, similarly, are not allowed to combine to impose employment conditions on workers throughout an industry. Wage levels and working conditions can be determined only by free bargaining procedures in terms of universally applicable labour laws.

Only the free interaction of the complex components of the economy determines prices and wages in an open

society. There is no better way to achieve the continuous adjustments in production and distribution required to assure the optimum creation of new wealth. No committees, cabinet ministers or top civil servants, however able and well meaning, can ever hope to obtain the information that the market provides continually, or equal its decision-making ability.

It is the duty of the State, in the interests of its citizens, to ensure that this free interaction of all economic factors in the market is facilitated and not hindered either by State manipulation or by power groupings of employers or employees who wish to promote their sectional interests.

In ideal conditions the observance of these general rules, stated here in broad outline, will bring about a far greater creation and equitable distribution of wealth than pertains at present.

However, conditions are rarely ideal. Furthermore, in South Africa in particular, the burden of present and past race legislation and arbitrary State control of the economy have left a heavy legacy of unemployment, inflation and uneconomic activities.

In the circumstances, the State, in an open society, has a second important function, namely to support those who are disadvantaged or have been deprived and to improve their earning capacities. In carrying out this second function any direct State intervention in the economy would be harmful as it distorts and delays the continuous adjustment process indicated through the market. Assistance has to be given by the State directly to those in need.

This support must be financed from general revenue, necessarily obtained by taxation of those who create the wealth of the country. The legislature decides only on the priorities and relative amounts of support to be given. The social assistance has a twofold purpose: to alleviate distress and suffering, and to help those affected to become productive and self-supporting members of the community.

Regrettably, the State's function of helping the disadvantaged and deprived is limited by the availability of funds for this purpose. By not observing this simple truth, many governments around the world, socialist and capitalist alike, have been distributing wealth that did not exist, and have tried to pay for it by inflation, causing impoverishment to the point of bankruptcy.

It is essential, therefore, to be clear on the objectives and limitations of economic policy in an open society. The creation of wealth must precede the distribution of wealth.

To sum up: government makes its greatest economic contribution by upholding and encouraging individual freedom and enterprise, by ensuring that civil law which regulates relationships between contracting par-

ties is universal, clear and enforceable. Furthermore, it is government's duty to ensure stability of the currency and the avoidance of inflation. Only in this way can one foster the formation of savings and capital, which is so vital to all new enterprise. Finally, it is also the State's function to create and maintain fair bargaining procedures between employees and employers as the basis of good labour relations.

Having described the constitutional and economic principles of a new South Africa on the lines of an open society, let us look at the alternatives. Maintenance of the present dispensation is unlikely ever to command the consent of the majority of South Africans and is likely to increase political instability and lack of confidence. The alternative attempt at some kind of forcible take-over is unlikely to succeed; and if it did, it would be equally daunting, because winners of a revolution or coup are people who mostly exercise their forcibly acquired powers even more arbitrarily than those they have replaced. That leaves the option of the open society, the principles of which have been outlined here.

There is evidence that in the unique atmosphere of South Africa today, in spite of many appearances to the contrary, there are vast numbers of people of goodwill and integrity in all sections of the population, political and non-political, who wish to get together to achieve this common objective of working towards purposeful, peaceful change.

How to mobilise this large constituency is the question. A handful of patriotic South Africans could initiate this process now.

Let us remind ourselves that in our present sad state there are still favourable circumstances, such as:

- ☐ A basically strong economy which, given free rein, could generate increasing income for all;
- ☐ Good communication channels between different groups;
- ☐ Compassion and generally harmonious relations in public places;

- ☐ A proven capacity among people without formal training to generate their own opportunities in the informal sector;
- ☐ A virile trade union movement; and
- ☐ Strong religious movements that are tolerant of one another and, within their respective churches, no longer have racial divisions.

Let us remind ourselves also that the rise of a new South Africa would turn our economy round as no other event could. If the Western world could see that we had restructured our society on open society lines, the flow of capital, so much needed for our development, would revive strongly.

The basis for a total reversal of our deadlocked situation is within reach. It needs no more than 10 South Africans of undisputed stature – outside politics – to bind themselves together for this task: to agree on an open society policy and to propagate it. This small group of men and women would come from the diverse backgrounds of, say, trade unions, churches, business and the professions – across the colour line. What would bind them together in their task would be a commitment to the goal of achieving a South Africa in which the people, while retaining their separate language, ethnic and other identities, would be able to work and live together as a nation with a great and humane future.

The persons who could start this task probably already know and respect each other. While holding different views they are cooperating on many issues now. It would need one or two telephone calls between them to begin the process. They all have resources at their disposal that would facilitate agreement on the common objective and how to propagate it. As Heribert Adam says in his recent book: "Once a nonracial vision with concrete merits grips the imagination of whites and blacks alike, its difficult implementation will have begun."

Let us hope that someone will soon take the initiative and pick up the telephone as a first move to put before us all the overwhelming case for a free new South Africa.

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CSO: 3400/570

GERHARD DE KOCK GIVES BROAD VIEW OF STATE OF ECONOMY

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 14 Nov 86 pp 38, 39

[Interview with Reserve Bank Governor Gerhard de Kock by Michael Coulson; date and place not given]

[Text]

This week Reserve Bank Governor Gerhard de Kock, as usual, gives the opening address at the *FM* Investment Conference. His subject: Financial Sanctions and the South African Economy. This discussion with Assistant Editor Michael Coulson takes a much broader conspectus of the state of the economy.

FM: To what extent can we still claim that political factors are responsible for the steady downgrading of growth forecasts for this year, or are there basic economic weaknesses?

De Kock: Economics and politics are now so closely intertwined that it's impossible to separate them. Take disinvestment: it's partly political, but it's true that some foreign firms weren't making high enough profits to justify expansion here. That in turn reflected general lack of confidence and uncertainty.

A lot of economic indicators have turned positive, but businessmen don't have a clear enough vision of the medium term to invest in new plant and equipment on any large scale. Instead, many investors are buying shares on the stock exchange to protect themselves against the erosion of their capital. And they've done well in the past few years, even in real terms.

In the third quarter we grew at an annual rate of about 3%, but we'll only show 1% growth for the year overall. We should get 3% growth next year — which is what I was originally hoping for this year!

Surely, until we get a revival of domestic fixed investment even the little recovery we have seen will not be sustained?

Absolutely. There can be no real growth until real fixed investment picks up. We had a period like this after Sharpeville in the early Sixties. I remember the *FM* had an editorial in George Palmer's days called "The reluctant boom." That was exactly what it was. But then suddenly, two or three years later, real fixed investment jumped by nearly 20% a year two years running as confidence returned.

I don't see that happening again for the moment, because people still don't have enough confidence. It's wrong to think that no entrepreneur ever invests in new plant until he's used up all existing surplus capacity; successful entrepreneurs have always been ones who've anticipated upswings. But for that you need some confidence.

Do you consider the high level of government spending a positive factor?

Yes, in the present abnormal circumstances. You know my view that in the longer term we must curb government spending as a percentage of total domestic spending, and in 1983-1984 excessive government spending was a major cause of our problems. But at the moment, as private consumption isn't rising rapidly and private investment is falling, it's just as well that the government is buying goods and services.

Wouldn't it be even better if government spending was devoted to capital and infrastructure items?

Certainly. This is a Keynesian approach, but I still believe in it, though the danger is that in practice, as we all know, governments find it very difficult to stop spending when an economy picks up again and is threatened with overheating.

In the third quarter we saw a 20% increase in GDE, but only 2%-3% in GDP. What are the implications of this?

Those quarterly figures can be misleading. GDE really just recovered after a sharp decline in the second quarter. But it does include a swing from inventory decumulation to accumulation. I don't know how long this will last, and there was also an element of buying in anticipation of sanctions, but clearly there has been restocking. Interestingly, in the third quarter government consumption spending declined in real terms. **Given the present gold price and exchange rate, what are you now projecting for the BoP for this year and into 1987?**

At the moment we're thinking in terms of a R5 billion-R6 billion current account surplus for this year. While it's very early to talk about next year, we think it will be of similar proportions if gold stays above \$400 and the oil price stays low.

How much of that will go in debt repayments?

In terms of the existing debt arrangements, repayments up to the middle of next year are not substantial. We've just made the last of four repayments of the IMF loan for 1986, of about \$100m, and there'll be four more next year, starting in February. This loan was denominated in SDRs, so the dollar amount fluctuates, but they will be similar.

Outside the net the amounts are not excessive in relation to the current account surplus. So a lot depends on the new arrangements with the creditor banks, in the second quarter of next year. At the moment we're more comfortably placed than at any time in the past few years. We've just released our October reserve figures, which show an increase of well over R2 billion since April. We've even been able to unwind some of the gold swaps. We have adequate dollars for the first time in a long while.

But won't the rand basically remain a weak currency?

We now have enough dollars to intervene more actively in the market and support the rand if we want. We were right in the past not to waste our dollar reserves in trying to maintain an artificial value for the rand, because we didn't have the resources. I'm glad to say that the IMF supports that view. But now it's a different story: touch wood! We've repaid debt, the current account is still in surplus, and the gold price has gone up, so we can exert a greater influence on the exchange rate. We allowed the rand to move up from its low of US37c to US43c-45c, as well as against the D-Mark and the yen. We could have allowed it to go up even more,

maybe to 50c; but we decided we would rather manage the float to ensure a gradual appreciation and at the same time replenish our reserves. We've also started to get complaints from manufacturers and exporters that the rand was moving up too rapidly. We would like to see the rand strong to curb inflation, but if the priority is growth and job creation — which means manufacturing investment — we don't want the rand to move up too sharply.

Isn't the argument that the weakness of the rand was a major cause of our high inflation rate wearing a little thin now the rand has recovered so much?

We've underestimated the time lags. We got it right when the rand fell so much in the second half of last year, and we expected inflation to peak in the first few months of 1986. When the inflation rate fell below 13% annualised in the second quarter and the rand stopped depreciating, we thought, excellent, this is good news. So we were very disappointed when the inflation rate shot up again in the third quarter. We've been trying very hard to get to the bottom of this. Obviously we don't have either demand or wage-push inflation; we still tend to think it's largely the delayed effects of depreciation. The impact on motor car prices, for instance, came late. But there were also other factors. **What about administered prices and food prices — which are falling in most of the world?**

There are special factors, like the drought. And administered prices are also affected by the rand depreciation.

Has the dual exchange rate policy proved a flop?

I wouldn't say that, though it's very difficult to administer a dual exchange rate when the one is a 53% discount to the other! But that doesn't mean that the answer is to abolish exchange controls on non-residents. It would be highly inflationary, for one thing.

I have no affection for exchange controls, but in the present circumstances if you had only one exchange rate, with non-residents seeking to take capital out rather than bring it in, the rand would fall. This would be stimulatory, but the inflationary cost would be too high. Incidentally, we have tighter exchange controls now than ever before in our history.

Finally, monetary targeting. The British are about to scrap it as a policy, largely because M3 is such an imperfect measure. With monetary growth so far below the bottom of the target range, has it not become an exercise in futility here too?

We had the benefit of the British experience. I spent some time in the Bank of England and it was because of their and the US experience that we recommended low-profile monetarism. We made it very clear that our target is a rough guide which will not be taken all that seriously, but we did see some merit in having guideline targets and I still believe they serve a purpose. When month after month we saw money growth falling below the bottom range, that was one of the reasons we saw fit to reduce Bank rate progressively.

By about February, when we get the December figures, we will set the new targets for 1987. It's too early to be sure, but my guess is we'll set them slightly lower than the 1986 range of 16%-20%. The true test will come when the economy moves up so rapidly that money supply tends to overshoot. But we're a long way from that!

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CSO: 3400/566

KROGH DESCRIBES NEW POSITION AS ANTI-SANCTIONS POLICY COORDINATOR

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 14 Nov 86 p 86

[Text]

"My appointment as an 'adviser' to the minister of finance is a non-event," claims Dr Desmond Krogh, the man who says he is *not* Pretoria's newly appointed sanctions buster. Officially, the former Governor of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank is currently deputy chairman of Lifegro and will retain this post until the end of December.

"I can't talk about a position I haven't got; it would be singularly irresponsible," Krogh (55) says. "But if I were a sanctions buster, I'd be in the private sector offering my services and advertising in the newspapers. What I *can* do is advise government on how best to counter sanctions in terms of general policy, trade, fiscal developments, and monetary policy. For me to pose as a sanctions buster would be misleading and a deliberate lie. I'm not a guy for lies and I've got nothing to hide."

He defines the role more closely: "I'll be co-ordinating anti-sanctions policy, which includes non-conventional trading policy, but not practice, and I won't be dealing with individual members of the private sector."

Clearly, Krogh has good reason to choose his words carefully. As one merchant banker put it: "If the guy sticks his nose out of SA now, his every movement will be watched. But most people who know his background aren't in the least bit surprised at government's choice. He's the obvious man; he's got the experience."

Krogh admits that most of his career has been spent "playing behind-the-scenes roles" — and that he's been helping government for some time. His position, he says, is "on a temporary and renewable contractual basis. If sanctions don't increase, my job will become redundant."

How does he see SA coping? "Like anyone else," is his curt reply. He refuses to discuss the lessons he learnt in the seven years he spent in Rhodesia running an "illegal bank" — from 1973-1980 — through three changes in government, in an era dominated by sanctions and war. "The relationship between Zimbabwe and SA is far too touchy today," he notes.

What he will say, though, is that living through the abolition of sanctions is probably more challenging and difficult than living with sanctions: "When sanctions are lifted — and all sanctions are eventually lifted — it happens very fast, whereas the imposition is gradual and takes place over a couple of years."

Krogh angers quickly when pressed on details about his new appointment. "Sanctions are not an important issue right now and have just been blown up by the press," he says aggressively. "They're way down the list of government priorities."

"I've lived through monetary sanctions imposed by the whole world as well as physical policing. And there isn't any comparison between the Rhodesian and South African situation. Government's priorities now are to get inflation under control, to get investment opportunities exposed and exploited, and to engender confidence in the economy."

"Politics and business are related," he reflects, "but both are specialised skills. I don't think politicians make good businessmen and good businessmen usually make atrocious politicians. But talking to each other is what is really important. When I was director of the FCI from 1969-1973, I moved the head office from Johannesburg to Pretoria to make people who didn't want to talk to each other, talk. My greatest contribution as FCI director was in bringing people together who didn't want to talk."

Ironically, Krogh says that today he finds the relationship between politicians and businessmen too close. So perhaps he will be able to apply his skills to bringing together parties who do not wish to do business.

But, he says, "I make enemies wherever I go; that's my unfortunate way of life. I ruffle feathers." As FCI director, Krogh concedes, he made "some real enemies." And earlier this year, as the man responsible for "strategic issues and shareholder relations," he had to bear the brunt of shareholders' anger at the controversial issuing of Lifegro preferential shares to a number of journalists and certain members of government.

Some policyholders who were unable to secure any of the heavily oversubscribed shares felt that the manner of the allocation made a mockery of Krogh's statement at the

time: "It is a gross misrepresentation to claim that our board have not favoured our policyholders. Policyholders were deliberately favoured as a matter of policy — each and every policyholder who applied received an allocation."

A graduate of the universities of Amsterdam, UCT, and Pretoria, the Windhoek-born Krogh has a B Comm degree and an MA in economics. He lectured at the universities of the OFS and Pretoria before heading Unisa's economics department and working part-time for the South African Reserve Bank on financial flow analysis.

He spent a year as economic adviser to Hendrik Verwoerd and from 1968-1969 was seconded as a full-time adviser to the South African Commission on Fiscal and Monetary policy. From 1967 to 1973, he was a member of the PM's Economic Advisory Council and a member of the Private Sector Industrial Advisory Committee to the Minister of Economic Affairs in 1971 and 1972. ■

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HARRY SCHWARZ DISCUSSES PFP'S ECONOMIC POLICY

Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 21 Nov 86 p 60

[Interview with PFP finance spokesman Harry Schwarz; date and place not given]

[Text] PFP finance spokesman Harry Schwarz describes himself as a "social democrat with some old-fashioned Keynesian ideas which will come back into vogue." He does not believe in "unrestricted jungle-type economics."

FM: Many people are unclear about the Progressive Federal Party's (PFP's) economic policy. Could you outline it?

Schwarz: The reason some people seem unclear is that they haven't studied it — or perhaps we haven't marketed it adequately. Our policy document is called "Economic Democracy." Its fundamental concept is that we need both economic and political reform hand in hand. If they are not, one will hinder the other's progress.

Entrepreneurship should be rewarded. We believe in free enterprise in our definition of the term. It can produce the wealth needed for the social services a country should have. Other forms of activity, such as communism, cannot generate sufficient wealth.

We also believe that the marketplace, if left entirely to itself, can degenerate into a kind of jungle. You do need protection to ensure equality of bargaining in the marketplace, particularly in a society like ours where some participants are disadvantaged.

The means of production should not be owned by the State, but by private enterprise. There should be incentives for workers to participate through share ownership, profit-sharing and so on. We do not believe share option schemes should be virtually pushed out of existence by taxation. On the

contrary, we'd like to see a broad spectrum of the society involved.

On the one hand, we support free enterprise in the true sense of the word, but we're not prepared to abandon the necessity to provide social services in a society like ours. So we believe the State has a role, even if not the major role.

Do you see a trade-off between unemployment and inflation?

It's a fallacy that you can cure unemployment only if you're prepared to let inflation run amuck. It depends on the economic system you apply. In any case, the kind of system which fights inflation at all costs, allowing millions to be unemployed, has not even a remote possibility of being applied in SA. It can have a measure of success (and that is open to debate) only in highly developed countries with a social system to look after the unemployed. Ours is inadequate. So to suggest that we could have those policies in SA verges on national suicide.

How would you tackle the problem?

I would like to see instituted in SA a programme I call 'employment to improve the quality of life.' We should plan to employ people not only to build houses, but also the infrastructure — like sewerage, lights and water; and to build parks, clinics and all the amenities white SA takes for granted.

That needs encouragement and money from government. But it also means you're employing private firms to do most of the work. So private enterprise has a major role.

Two purposes are served: creating jobs, and making people feel they are working to improve their own lot. There are other by-products. Money earned is spent on essentials and is, in the main, directed at South African enterprises which will be revived.

You can get a spiral of economic activity going, with little imported inflation.

Do you believe in a minimum wage?

I do personally. But I don't think in the present situation in SA we can have a minimum national wage. It will have to vary from region to region and from industry to industry.

I recognise the argument that it is better to earn something than nothing at all, but I think there's an answer to that: in a competitive world, if the only way entrepreneurs can be in business is on the basis of paying exploitative wages, I'm not sure they should be in business. And if it is an industry with a social purpose that should exist, then the State should play a role.

After all, if the social product is divided into the returns on capital, entrepreneurship, and labour, why should labour make the greatest sacrifice? This is a matter of contention, even within the party. The last PFP congress saw a division of opinion: some felt there should not be a minimum wage since its absence would create more jobs.

What is your attitude to privatisation?

The means of production should, wherever possible, be owned by private enterprise as opposed to the State. Therefore, if there are activities which can reasonably be privatised, I'm in favour.

However, you have to bear in mind certain services, including for instance hospitalisation for lower-income groups. I am very concerned that services — which the white community has for decades received from the State either at very low cost or for nothing — should suddenly not be available to all

on the same basis now that there are moves towards a non-discriminatory society. And I am a bit fearful that privatisation could be used to avoid the cost of social services to which the community as a whole is entitled.

We have to start with what is easiest. For example, the Industrial Development Corporation owns and controls the majority shareholding in two investment companies quoted on the JSE. I see no reason why these should not be privatised. A variety of activities carried on by the private sector in other countries are in the public sector here, and should be privatised.

But it does not solve the privatisation problem to take away a major enterprise from the State and give it to a private monopoly — unless there's universal public participation, as was tried in Britain.

You've been described as a hawk in defence matters. Do you think defence spending is excessive?

If I am a hawk, I'm a hawk with the heart of a dove. I believe that for peaceful change and reform, there must be social stability. And whether you are white or black, you are entitled to be protected against crime. Protection of the individual has been inadequate in SA, particularly in regard to crime. If I want expenditure in order to keep crime to a minimum, that doesn't make me a hawk.

I see defence as necessary to maintain the territorial integrity of the country against aggression. That doesn't need vast expenditure. We should not confuse defence with combating unrest inside SA. Unfortunately, because of the level of unrest, which I think will continue for quite some time, security expenditure will increase.

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SOUTH AFRICA

HUNTING RIFLE, SEVERAL MILITARY WEAPONS DISCUSSED

Musgrave Hunting Rifle Described

Pretoria SALVO in Afrikaans, Jul/Aug 86 pp 8,9

[Article by guest writer Dr Lucas Potgieter: "Sideline Comments on Armscor Commercial"]

[Text] Our ordinary people -- the man in the street or the farmer on his farm -- are not exactly acquainted with Armscor. The little that we do know we pick up from the press, hear on the radio or see on the tube whenever Commandant Piet Marais decides every now and then to tell us about some gun or other or about an Armscor achievement. Our only contact with Armscor is thus through the media or through Armscor's commercial products which we buy at the gun shops. Of course we are also proud when we read that Armscor's G6 shoots further than the Russians' endeavor, but ... but our ordinary people view such achievements from the sidelines, for we do not exactly have room for a 155 mm alongside our 6 mm's. We get very impressed if we hear about one of our own rockets with which you can shoot a cat out of a tree from many kilometers away, but our actual interest is in a .243 cartridge with which you can repeatedly hit a dime at 100 meters. Whenever we see our own helicopters on TV, then we say: "Now our Defense Force is going to shoot the you know what out of them," but actually we don't feel really involved because there are but few people who go hunting in "choppers" in our country. We measure Armscor's achievements by its 9 mm's and not by its 90 mm's. If we can't connect that on the moon" advertising program will not convince us that that 155 mm will hit Table Mountain at five kilometers. But fortunately Armscor has also been walking a proud path in the commercial sphere. I am glad that I can tell about this.

South Africa's new Musgrave hunting rifle was introduced on 29 May 1970. The prime minister at that time received the Vrystaat No 1 while the then minister of defense, Mr P.W. Botha looked on. The public waited in suspense to see what the Musgrave was going to look like. We waited for 12 months. I heard of the Musgrave for the first time again on 19 May 1972 when Dr (now Judge) Henk van Dyk wrote an article about the weapon in the "Jaarboek vir Hengel en Skiet" ["Year Book for Fishing and Shooting"]. I also went and bought me a Musgrave in 30-60 [sic] caliber. The sales brochure made me smile. The rifle's barrel, the brochure said, was 660 mm long and "it is of steel." I

wondered if the Free Staters wanted to insinuate that other barrels were perhaps of plastic. According to the brochure, the rifle had a "genuine Mauser-type action." I could not determine to this day how a "Mauser type" could ever be "genuine."

As for the rifle itself, I was rather impressed. It was a fine rifle, an accurate rifle, and as a first endeavor it was at least equal to the Savage, Parker Hale and Voere which were selling on the market at that time. The name "Vrystaat" was annoying to be sure. I myself am a born Free Stater, but I have always referred to this origin with great modesty. It was already clear those days that Armscor would perhaps later have to look at the action of the Vrystaat model, because whenever you stepped into a sandy environment with the Vrystaat, too many of your cartridges landed in the sand as a result of the fact that the safety catch did not close the bolt. Besides the Vrystaat, there was also an outstandingly accurate RSA target rifle, a deluxe President model and a terribly ugly Veld [Field] model. One day I told Trevor Musgrave: "If you die one day, the Dear Lord will forgive you for many things, but you will never be forgiven for having made the Veld model." But let me say right now, that same Veld model was the most accurate hunting rifle that I have ever yet seen. Today they are sought-after collector's pieces and they have become the favorite rifles of many proud South Africans.

From the start there were a few nasty marketing problems for our commercial products. Firstly, Armscor had to make its products acceptable to certainly the most fastidious target markets in the world. South Africans are gun people. We know the world's top rifles and for years we have been hunting and target shooting with the world's top ammunition. We know how what the best look like and how the best shoot in the world of arms and ammunition. Lower standards will never be acceptable to South African gun people. Secondly, there was from the start great opposition on the part of business. The dealers' margins of profit were higher on imported products than on our own. Consequently it was more profitable to talk a man out of a Musgrave or FMP and into a Winchester or Norma. Thirdly there was perhaps the premise that the market must accept what we make instead of our having to make what the market will accept. Lastly, there is no getting away from the fact that it is a hang-up with us South Africans: we do not want to believe that our own people can make even better products than the Yanks or the English or the Germans. It's the last-mentioned pothole that Armscor already had to pay attention to in the early 1970's. Early in the 1970's a small group of us, headed by Cmdt Piet Marais, went to Houston, Texas. We had decided to go exhibit South Africa's commercial products at the International NSGA Show. There were Musgrave Premier rifles, FMP MOA (Minute of Angle) cartridges, Somchem Magna propellants. the teeth of the legendary elephant Dhulamithi, genuine Bushman bows and poison arrows. There were photos of animal scenes, handmade South African hunting knives and even magnificent saddles and other leather goods. We had gone to press a big gag in the big mouth of a boatsful public. Perhaps after years one can say with tongue in cheek: it was a good investment. Suddenly the South Africans read excellent publicity about their own country's products in American magazines and publications. Writers like Jack Lott, Tom Siatos, John T. Amber, Dick Woolf, John Sundra and Dean Grenell, to mention but a few, referred to our products favorably. The Americans told a fastidious South African public that their products were much better than what

they themselves wanted to believe. But then the political situation changed. Armscor branches' production capacity had to be rearranged in order to give attention to more important needs. The results of this were not in the interests of the commercial side. The name Lyttelton disappeared from the barrels and actions of our rifles -- a name that was becoming synonymous with accuracy and reliability. PMP was no longer the manufacturer of the cartridges with which we brought home the meat. Another manufacturer from overseas furnished the market and PMP and Musgrave only handled the distribution. Unfortunately, the quality of the overseas product was not beneficial to the image of our own industry. What further muddled the whole affair was the fact that our own industry, perhaps necessarily, had to create the impression on the market that these imported products were produced "in our own factories."

Seen from the sidelines, there has been a dramatic change to Armscor's commercial side, especially over the past year or two: new commercial propellants from Somchem's factory, which get our bullets to the buck just as quickly and just as accurately; PMP ammunition with reloadable Boxer primers, fine shell cases and bullet points, and above all, in calibers for which there has been a great need for years. Who could ever have thought that one day South Africa would make its own .375 Holland & Holland, 7x 57, .300 Win Mag, a large variety of components from which he can choose.

A rifle is lying before me. It's a .416 Rigby. It is going overseas to a rich American who, after visiting England and being to all the big and well-known companies, decided that my country and my people can build a better rifle than the famous ones. It comes from Musgrave's factory. Perhaps this rifle tells more about the achievement of our own industry than what I can write in an article. Mr crystal ball says that yet more of these products will go to those countries from which we imported at one time. We know Armscor by its products. It's a good image.

Review of Littleton Products

Pretoria SALVO in Afrikaans Jul/Aug 86 p 12

[Unattributed and untitled article in "Branch Overview" column]

[Text] The name of Lyttelton Engineering Works (Pties.) Ltd may perhaps deceive the layman, but that company continually has the world buzzing about arms which have no equal, and it is regarded by the international arms trade as a unique manufacturer of a broad series of fine products. With products like the G5 and G6 cannons, which have everywhere been described by authoritative military publications abroad as one of the best in the world, LIW [Lyttelton Engineering Works] has made a gigantic input to establishing the Republic of South Africa as a highly reputed international armament producer. The high standard of LIW's capacity is again reflected in the fact that for three successive years it captured the coveted Armscor Chairman's Prize, and last year one of its workers was again in the team that received the award. Some of the products which are being manufactured and factory-reconditioned by LIW are:

Rifles and Mortars

- 7.62-mm R1 assault rifle
- 5.56-mm R4 and R5 assault rifle
- 5.56-mm IM4 and IM5 semiautomatic rifle
- 7.62-mm MG4 machine gun
- 7.62-mm SS77 machine gun
- 60-mm Mi infantry mortar
- 60-mm M2 rear-loading mortar (spare parts)
- 60-mm M4 patrol mortar series
- 81-mm M3 mortar

Rapid-fire

- 20-mm G1-2 cannon
- 20-mm GA-1 cannon
- 76-mm rapid-fire cannon barrel assembly

Artillery

- 90-mm Defa armored cannon
- 105-mm Olifant barrel assembly and conversion
- 155-mm GV5 drawn artillery cannon
- 155-mm GV6 self-propelled gun
- combat turrets

Miscellaneous

- SA Navy spare parts requirement
- SA Air Force requirements

LIW's products are designed, produced and maintained according to the most modern quality concepts and standards. LIW can be considered one of the pioneers in the Armscor group in this field. This has been endorsed by Mr P.A.R. Erasmus, Armscor's former general manager for quality, who on occasion described LIW as the "dean of quality in the Armscor group." However, like all credible companies, LIW had to learn from its mistakes and the school of hard knocks. An upgrading in the quality of production, among other things, was undertaken by Mr Deneys Zeederberg shortly after his appointment as general manager of LIW. This resulted in a quality improvement project called Regberg. The more than 2,000 characteristics of the R4 rifle were among the first to be put under the magnifying glass during this project. Project teams were assigned and use was made of the most modern quality engineering techniques and statistical methods to reach the goal. Jigs and gauges were redesigned and employees from the production floor themselves got the opportunity to solve the problems. The project broadened out further into a streamlining in organizing responsibilities and duties of personnel. Intensive quality training was given to LIW's employees as well as to suppliers and subcontractors, and the success achieved by this has been recognized nationwide by visitors as a giant breakthrough in quality. The good result is an increase in reliability of the already highly performing RF rifle, a decrease in price rises of small arms, renewed motivation and zeal among employees and an improvement in the company's self-image. Armscor congratulated LIW on the pioneering work which has been done to reach the highest possible standard of quality -- which points out LIW's total capacity as designer, manufacturer, production supporter and technical adviser to users of arms.

Artillery, MG'S DESCRIBED

Pretoria SALVO in Afrikaans Jul/Aug 86 p 13

[Unattributed article: "A Few Products Viewed More Closely"]

[Text] GV5 -- The success story of that gun system of 155 mm is already legion, and it is known as a world leader in its class. The GV5 can be employed in all three basic artillery functions; namely: fire attack, counterbombardment and fire support. It can be employed in the operational sphere as a cannon, howitzer and mortar. The GV5's maximum range is 39.5 km. The maximum rate of fire is three rounds per minute for 15 minutes, with a normal rate of fire of one round per minute.

GV6 -- is a doughtier little brother of the G5, with the same ballistic system, which is mounted in an armored turret on a mobile chassis with six wheels. The weapon, which is regarded as a breakthrough in artillery warfare, was described at the time of its introduction in 1982 by General Magnus Malan, minister of defense, as the most sophisticated weapon which has yet come from the Armscor stable. The big advantage of the GV6 is its strategic, tactical and inherent mobility which makes the weapon system so unique.

MG-4 -- is manufactured according to an applied design of the Browning machine gun and is a heavy-duty mounted machine gun which is used mainly as secondary armament in armored and mechanized vehicles. The MG-4 double mounting with a firepower of 1,300 rounds per minute can be regarded as the enemy's match.

SS-77 -- This light, multipurpose machine gun is extremely suitable for use by foot soldiers, paratroopers and vehicle personnel. It can even be mounted on armored vehicles and in airplanes. The machine gun can fire between 600 and 900 rounds per minute with a NATO caliber of 7.62 mm.

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