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This report reflects the results of Phase I of the Institutional/TDA Army axis of the Force XXI Campaign. It provides a historical record of the Institutional Army's efforts to re-invent itself to date to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. It tells the story of almost three years of dedicated analysis based on business process reengineering principles. What emerges is the portrayal of a thoughtful process that has placed a major portion of the Institutional/TDA Army on the path of organizational change.

Effecting institutional change is not easy and requires sustained commitment. Much has been accomplished but more must be done. Readers are encouraged to use this report as a reference point for continued progress. Many creative proposals were generated in Phase I. Some were approved for implementation; others remain for future consideration. It is intended that these ideas serve to simulate further innovation. The transformation of today's Army into Army XXI relies on such constructive effort.

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REDESIGN OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARMY

Phase I

Final Report

Volume I

May 1998

FORCE XXI

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

May 18, 1998

Institutional/TDA Army Axis Force XXI Campaign, Phase I

This report reflects the results of Phase I of the Institutional/TDA Army axis of the Force XXI Campaign. It provides a historical record of the Institutional Army's efforts to re-invent itself to date to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. It tells the story of almost three years of dedicated analysis based on business process reengineering principles. What emerges is the portrayal of a thoughtful process that has placed a major portion of the Institutional/TDA Army on the path of organizational change.

In Phase I, we made important strides toward our objective of institutional redesign. We defined our core competencies, core capabilities and core processes and began the systematic review of the Institutional Army. We now have an established baseline upon which to build in Phase II and beyond.

Effecting institutional change is not easy and requires sustained commitment. Much has been accomplished but more must be done. Readers are encouraged to use this report as a reference point for continued progress. Many creative proposals were generated in Phase I. Some were approved for implementation; others remain for future consideration. It is intended that these ideas serve to simulate further innovation. The transformation of today's Army into Army XXI relies on such constructive effort.

The report in its entirety has been archived at the Pentagon Library. It is also available through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) or may be accessed electronically from the US Army Force Management School web site at www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil.

Robert Bartholomew
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(Force Management, Manpower
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Director, Force Programs

Enclosure

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E.0
Executive Summary

This report provides the results of Phase I of a three-phase effort to reengineer the Institutional Army in support of the Operational Army of the 21st century. Key Functional Area Assessments (FAAs) are highlighted and depict the means by which core Army processes are being redesigned to produce a more efficient, effective institutional force.

E.1 Background and Purpose

The changing strategic environment and presence of major political influences created a requirement for the Army to determine what strategy would be necessary for it to continue to be an effective warfighting force as it transitions into the next century. Included was the requirement to effectively adopt national level guidance emanating from such sources as the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Report of the National Performance Review (NPR) and the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces. A senior defense official noted that the Army would be challenged in responding to policies and recommendations because it had not done as much as the other services in reducing infrastructure and overhead.

The Force XXI Campaign Plan was developed in response to these challenges as an initiative to design organizations and develop capabilities to ensure that the Army was prepared to execute a doctrine of "full-dimensional operations" in the next century. A Board of Directors (BOD) meeting in August 1994, endorsed the requirement to assess the Institutional Army, or sustaining base structure, through the analysis of the core processes which were central to force support. Institutional forces were to be assessed as one of the axes of the Force XXI campaign.

The Secretary of the Army assured the Secretary of Defense that the Army would respond to the CORM recommendations by undertaking a review by which the Army would:

- divest Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) of non-essential functions;
- remove unnecessary layering and expand the power of field commanders;
- eliminate unnecessary duplication;
- consolidate some Army Staff (ARSTAF) and Secretariat functions:
- focus HQDA on policy making, not execution;
- reduce the numbers of major commands (MACOMs);
- reallocate resources in support of core capabilities; and
- explore privatization or outsourcing of administrative support functions.

In January 1995, the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) signed a charter for the Institutional/Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Axis campaign plan that required reduction in the headquarters and its support agencies; reduction in the numbers of major commands; and the seeking of efficiencies for recapitalization. Principles guiding the effort included a recognition that any reorganization would continue civilian control of the military; that the Secretariat and ARSTAF each have important separate roles; and that operational functions belong in the field. Criteria specific to HQDA included:

- satisfying of all Title 10, United States Code (USC) requirements;
- leveraging the benefits of advanced technologies; and
- operating effectively in Congressional, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) environments.

The Force XXI Campaign Plan was comprised of three axes that combined the concurrent review of the Institutional Army with two other segments. One, Joint Venture, was intended to redesign the operational force. The other, the Army Digitization Office (ADO), was to establish information architecture for the Army, streamline acquisition and ensure the assimilation of information age technologies into the operational force. The charter for the Institutional /TDA axis called for a redesigned Institutional Army by the year 2000 through the:

- reengineering of departmental Title 10 processes; and
- redesign of the Institutional Army as part of Force XXI.

E.2 Methodology and Scope

The scope of the Institutional/TDA Axis plan consisted of four efforts.

- Internal reengineering of major commands;
- Functional area assessments;
- redesign of HQDA, its field operating agencies and staff support activities; and
- Umbrella Group redesign (e.g., independent, parallel assessments distinct from proponent efforts).

A three-phased approach was used which coincided with Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycles.

- Phase I had an objective of creating a baseline organization for the Army (POM 98-03).
- Phase II's objective was to provide a revised organization from the Phase I baseline (POM 00-05);
- Phase III's objective concludes the effort by producing a final design in support of Army XXI and a dynamic methodology by which to provide future programmatic response to changing environments.

Phase I consisted of eight FAAs, beginning with power projection in October 1995 and concluding with the Umbrella Group FAA decision briefing to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)) and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) in February 1996 and the CSA in March 1996. FAAs would be continued into Phases II and III as necessary.

The concepts of redesign and reengineering formed the basis for reform of the Institutional Army. These methodologies were highly successful in the civilian sector and were intended to provide radical and dramatic improvements in critical measures of performance such as quality, cost and service. The fundamental reengineering hypothesis for the Army held that an understanding of the institution's core competencies and related processes, combined with key insights from Joint Venture, would allow for the application of information age technologies to creating a better product. Reengineering the TDA would obtain near term structure and budget reductions while a study of TDA requirements would size the TDA over the long term.

Army core capabilities and competencies were identified and served as the basis for the identification of the core processes implicit in Title 10, USC. These processes formed the basis for the review of the Institutional Army. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign, provided a vision and conceptual framework for institutional redesign and discussed the Army's capabilities and core processes in the context of the 21st century. It proffered design principles and models for future command support, while promoting the leverage of strategic elements in seeking a common basis for structural and doctrinal reform.

A Department of Defense (DOD) standard for process modeling and reengineering called the Enterprise Model served to underlie the redesign effort. This model focused on business methods and processes, with the ultimate goal of service to the customer through the activities of providing direction, acquiring assets, providing capability and producing a product.

E.3 Guidance

In order to ensure adherence to the Institutional/TDA Axis goals and to provide relative consistency of presentation, FAA briefing principles and objectives, as well as a common format for presentation were provided. Objectives included identifying paramount elements of each core process function performed, the most effective organization for performing the function and issues and proposed alternatives for resolution. Principles to be applied included the Army's enduring values and imperatives, the inclusion of information age technologies, cost effectiveness and linkage to the NMS.

The most effective organization was to represent three alternatives.

- An organization significantly smaller than the current total Army organization of the function.
- A total revision of the current management structure (i.e., MACOM) for the function Army-wide.
- A "dealer's choice" alternative which would reflect the organization if starting from scratch.

An operating organization to facilitate the progress of the Force XXI Campaign and to allow for senior-level expertise and decision making was established, with specific responsibilities for the Army leadership to assume during the review. The VCSA provided oversight to the entire Institutional Army redesign effort and for approval of major issues and initiatives. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and the ASA(M&RA) were responsible for coordinating the effort and integrating the results of the institutional redesign. The Army Commander's Conference (ACC) provided corporate guidance to the effort and approved recommendations to the SECARMY and CSA. A General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) supervised the development and implementation of the Institutional/TDA Army Campaign Plan; identified and tracked axis studies, assessments, and issues; and prioritized recommendations to the ACC. Proponents (generally MACOM commanders or agency heads) and sponsors (HQDA agencies) presented the FAAs. The Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group (AEPG) was to provide oversight of the analysis and experimentation process used to support key decisions. An Umbrella Group was also established with the responsibility for coordinating all four efforts; scheduling and monitoring FAAs; and providing "out of the box" alternative thinking on all issues.

E.4 Discussion

The following subsections contain a summary of key recommendations for each FAA.

E.4.1 Mobilization/Deployment

US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) addressed mobilization and demobilization, and deployment and redeployment in two sub-FAAs. They recommended enhancement of the power projection process by the reduction of 38 mobilization stations and the creation of 15 power projection platforms (PPPs) and 12 power support platforms (PSPs); establishment of a home station mobilization capability; development of a common mobilization/deployment information system; a revision in reserve component (RC) structure below continental US Army (CONUSA); and fielding of electronic tags and cards to provide visibility of intransit deployment resources. Finally, FORSCOM suggested the Army propose to its sister services the creation of 14 supporting strategic aerial ports and 15 strategic seaports to complement the Army's 15 PPPs and 12 PSPs.

E.4.2 Doctrine/Combat Developments and Leader Development

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) addressed doctrine, combat developments and leader development. They recommended that a single chief of Army doctrine be established to provide a more cohesive and responsive process; consolidation of combat development activities into a single process and a single process owner; streamlining of the TDA documentation process to provide increased control, clarity and efficiency; restructure the Program, Planning, Budgeting and Execution System

(PPBES) process to allow for greater continuity and procedures in programs; use of a combination of active component active, reserve and/or contracted retired officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to manage and execute the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program; a comprehensive training management information system for both military and civilians to cover all course processing and records-keeping; revision of the transients, trainees, holds and students (TTHS) account; a single leader development process owner for both civilian and military personnel; and reduction in training overhead and redundancy by creating a "cluster" concept of training centers and schools based on battlefield functions.

E.4.3 Information Management

The Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4) provided the information management FAA. They recommended that Information Systems Command (ISC) be refocused as a world-wide operational command and major subordinate command (MSC) under FORSCOM; that the headquarters be reduced and redesignated as the Army Signal Command (ASC)/G6, and that it assume responsibility primarily for operational command, control, communications and computers (C4) and information management; transfer non-core responsibilities including libraries, printing and publications, and records management to other Army and defense agencies; changes in the acquisition structure to reduce overhead and enhance interoperability; consolidation of Information Systems Engineering Command (ISEC), Information Software Systems Command (ISSC), and Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency (ISSA) into Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); providing automation efficiencies by accelerating Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System (SINGARS) fielding, early elimination of the VRC-12 radio, validating power projection platform information management (IM) systems, increasing oversight of Directors of Information Management (DOIMs), monitoring IM procurements with Army Audit Agency (AAA) and Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) assistance, and streamlining the IM acquisition and fielding processes; elimination of the ADO within six months of the advanced warfighting experiment (AWE), with residual functions being absorbed by the DISC4 and disestablishment of the Federally Funded Research and Development Center; and return of DOIMs to supported commands.

E.4.4 Recruit and Personnel Management

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) conducted the FAA. They recommended a policy of only one protocol office at a given Army garrison as a more cost effective means of performing those services; a policy establishing one public affairs office at a given Army garrison representing the interests of all organizations and tenants in order to reduce redundancy and produce a higher quality product; the merging of Personnel and Finance Groups at echelons above division (EAD) to reduce overhead, provide for a common automation system, and a standard reporting system for data; establish policies to reduce a first-term attrition rate of 30 percent by 4 percent; restructure civilian and reserve component personnel agencies into US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) as a means of eliminating redundant infrastructure and gaining advantage of common personnel management information systems; combine ROTC, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and selected civilian, special branch, and Army National Guard (ARNG) training into US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) in order to save resources, promote common accession policy, and promote efficiency; determine a way to preserve TRADOC's combat development function for personnel services support, while providing for greater sensitivity to the "personnel" rather than logistics aspects of this function; consider aging the force (i.e., retiring soldiers in their fifties or sixties) in order to retain skills, reduce retirement costs and gain maximum return on personnel investment.

E.4.5 Construct

The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted the FAA. They recommended streamlining the military construction (MILCON) programming and execution cycles from 5 to 2.5 years to increase responsiveness to construction changes and reduce inflationary project costs; simplify access to environmental management so that it will cease to lag behind the life cycle of a construct project; expansion of outsourcing as a means of satisfying facility standards, reducing government ownership and cost savings; pilot test the transfer of the Public Works mission to USACE in view of increased USACE support to the Director of Public Works (DPW); identify a single process owner for the disposal of excess property and eliminate minimum facilities maintenance and safety costs; and increase operations and maintenance, Army (O&MA) and research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) appropriations for construction/modification projects to $1 million and Unspecified Minor Military Construction, Army (MCA) (UMMCA) from $1 million to $3 million to empower installations with greater local authority over the localized acquire and sustain facilities process.

E.4.6 Equip, Supply, Service and Maintain

US Army Materiel Command (AMC) had overall responsibility for the equip, supply, service and maintain FAA. Recommendations included local consolidation of five contracting offices serving the same area from five different locations; use of credit cards for micro purchases in order to reduce purchasing agent time and eliminate need for a purchasing order; implementation of workload benchmarking practices to identify inefficient contracting offices; establishment of central asset management to absorb installation stocks into the wholesale stock fund, thereby providing visibility and enhancing Army-wide redistribution; implementation of the readiness based sparing (RBS)/velocity management (VM) in POM 98-03 for a one-time inventory reduction savings and other savings from order/ship time (OST) reductions; determination of a solution to the fact that peacetime stockage levels will not provide adequate retail or wholesale stocks for wartime or contingencies; modifying distribution of base shop test facilities (BSTFs) between active divisions and RC units; incremental fiscal year (FY) 97 implementation of integrated sustainment management (ISM) which was not possible in POM 98-03 because of automation, funding and ownership issues; privatization of low-risk AMC functions; functional realigning and consolidating all operational and developmental test functions; consolidating additional contracting offices in both continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS); elimination of prescribed load list (PLL); privatization of directors of logistics (DOLs); lack of savings generation from POM 98-03 initiatives that are compatible with the National Provider concept but do not implement it fully; and elimination of Army Research Laboratory (ARL) headquarter overhead (e.g., headquarters) and realigning those functions with TRADOC.

E.4.7 HQDA/Field Operating Agency (FOA)/Staff Support Agency (SSA)

A HQDA Task Force conducted the FAA. Their HQDA staff recommendations included the creation of a Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs (DUSA(IA)) and Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for Program Development (AVCSA(PD)); Office of the DCSOPS restructure; and downsizing of all Army Secretariat and ARSTAF organizations. Other recommendations included the divestiture of all operational functions to the field and the elimination, merging, or transfer of numerous agencies that ultimately resulted in the elimination of 9 SSAs and 26 FOAs (see appendix S). Significant among this was the transfer of the recruiting functions, including USAREC and the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) to TRADOC and the creation of the Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC) as an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) of Space Command, a unified combatant command.

E.5 Decisions

Phase I decision briefings were provided to the ASA(M&RA) and VCSA on February 23, 1996 and to the CSA on March 25, 1996. Of the 148 issues considered by the ASA(M&RA)/VCSA and the CSA, a total of 120 were approved for implementation in POM 98-03; four were approved for further development and possible implementation in mini-POM 99-03; 18 were approved for further development for POM 00-05; and six were disapproved or a decision deferred. The CSA provided additional guidance which included requirements to continue to develop the "specialized command" concept; development of a separate decision briefing on the concept of an "accessions command;" referral of other POM 98-03 issues to the Program Evaluation Group (PEG)/Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PAE); and to proceed with the beginning of Phase II of the Institutional/TDA Redesign Axis. Some of those issues that were considered but not fully developed or approved are identified in the body of the final report and summarized in Chapter 11, Items for Future Consideration.

E.6 Conclusions

The commands and agencies responsible for FAAs generally adhered to guidance to reduce redundancy; create smaller, more efficient organizations; reduce MACOMs; and introduce and enhance common information systems for reporting, tracking and controlling core processes. The FAAs recommended implementation of courses of action which would modify or reduce the size and/or numbers of organizations; introduce information technologies as a means of enhancing core processes; and reduce layering and control in order encourage field responsibility for operational matters. Although cost reductions were not the primary objective of the FAA process, significant recapitalization opportunities were projected within POM 98-03 and resulted mainly from personnel and overhead reductions, divestiture and privatization, process consolidation and merging and restructuring of organizations. Details of these opportunities are provided in the various chapters of the report. These actions provided a sound baseline from which Phase II efforts could begin.

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Phase I Report

1.1.1 Purpose of Report

The purpose of this report is to provide information on Phase I efforts to develop a reengineered Institutional Army to support the Operational Army of the 21st century.

1.1.2 Scope

The scope of the report includes a consideration of the changing strategic and organizational environments, the major Phase I initiatives that were undertaken to redesign and reengineer the Army of the 21st century, and the results of Phase I reengineering briefings and functional area assessments (FAAs).

1.1.3 Report Organization

This report is divided into 11 chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, includes background information on the Force XXI Campaign Plan and the Institutional Force Axis Campaign Plan. Chapter 2 discusses general guidance for reengineering briefings and FAA. Chapters 3 through 9 provide a summation of each reengineering briefing and FAA conducted during Phase I, major issues associated with each, and outcomes realized and decisions made. Chapter 10 presents decisions made by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and chapter 11 outlines areas of interest for future consideration

1.2 Background

1.2.1 The Changing Strategic Environment

The changing strategic environment of the 1980's and 1990's has had vast implications. Global competition created a new enterprise system resulting in refined business processes, more streamlined organizations, operational cost cutting and workforce downsizing. These changes have also affected the government and the Army. For the Army, a major shift in the world order from a cold war environment to one lacking a clearly defined threat raised the critical question of what the guidelines should be for the a warfighting force in the 21st century. The emergence of the information age clearly indicated that the Army of the future would be required to take advantage of new technology in order to develop systems that could provide rapid information, interconnection and coordination across the spectrum of Army missions.

1.2.2 Major Influences

Major influences within the government were providing guidance on how to approach these changes and included many of the major changes noted above.

1.2.2.1 The National Military Strategy (NMS)

Responding to the new geopolitical order, the NMS continued to recognize vital global interests, obligations, and risks, and the need to retain adequate military forces to be employed either in war or in operations short of war. In a shift from the past, the NMS strategy emphasized a reduced forward presence and more dependence upon force projection in executing operations. These reductions resulted in a significant decline in approved defense expenditures.

1.2.2.2 The Report of the National Performance Review (NPR)

The NPR was a six-month effort chaired by the Vice President that sought to change how government works and to reduce costs. It proposed that for government to work better it must put customers first, empower employees, reduce red tape and cut back to basic requirements.

1.2.2.3 The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)

The CORM was tasked to look at how the services could conduct effective military operations in the new strategic environment, how they could be assured of productive and responsive support and how improved management and direction of the forces could be achieved. The CORM recommended strengthening joint doctrine and operations; improving performance cost-cutting by outsourcing activities not required to be performed by the government; improving the processes by which Department of Defense (DOD) is managed in the areas of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); and organizational changes that included personnel reductions, improved career civilian personnel management and reduced numbers of political appointees.

1.3 Force XXI Campaign Plan

1.3.1 Background

In late 1993, a DOD senior official suggested that the Army was feeling the impact of reductions more than the other services because the Army had not made the required installation and overhead reductions or modifications in infrastructure. In March 1994, General Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA, announced his intention to create an Army focused on the national security interests of the 21st century. The plan to accomplish that was Force XXI. He acknowledged that the Army needed to move from the 1990's into the next century in response to the requirements set forth in the NMS and results of the NPR and CORM reviews. He also recognized the need to equip the Army with the latest communications and digitization technology. The Force XXI Campaign Plan (appendix A) was intended not only to meet the demands of a changing geopolitical arena, but also to take advantage of advances in information technology. In November 1994, after conferring with the general officer Board of Directors (BOD) established to provide advice and counsel on Force XXI, General Sullivan issued a message to all four-star commanders with his guidance on a draft campaign plan to reengineer and redesign the Institutional Army (also referred to as the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Army) as part of the Force XXI initiative (appendix U). The Force XXI Campaign Plan had as its objective to:

> Redesign the Army's tactical forces with emerging technology in the form of digitization, while reengineering the Army's institutional force by the year 2000, to be fielded by 2010.

In January 1995, the CSA and the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) issued a charter (figure 1-1) for the Institutional Axis of the Force XXI campaign (appendix B). The objective of the Institutional Axis was to:

- reengineer departmental Title 10, United States Code (USC) processes; and
- redesign the Institutional Army as part of Force XXI.

The Institutional Axis represented an attempt to reengineer the TDA Army as one of three axes that were being coordinated simultaneously under the Force XXI Campaign (figure 1-2). The three axes of effort were:

- Joint Venture (e.g., redesign of the Operating Force) overseen by the Commanding General (CG), US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC);
- Army Digitization Office (ADO) (e.g., acquisition and assimilation of information age Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities into the Operational Force) overseen by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA); and

- Institutional Army Redesign (e.g., creation of a TDA Army capable of supporting the Operational Force) also overseen by the VCSA with Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA)) and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) in direct support.



Figure 1-1. Institutional Army Redesign Charter



Figure 1-2. Force XXI Campaign Plan

Objectives of the Institutional/TDA axis campaign plan included a reduction in Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and its agencies, a reduction in the number of major Army commands (MACOMs), and other efficiencies that could be recapitalized. The VCSA emphasized that the primary effort should concentrate on creating better organizations rather than simply accruing savings.

Accordingly, in October 1995, the SECARMY sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense that outlined his commitment to respond to the CORM recommendations, particularly those focused on restructuring the departmental staff. He indicated the principles that would guide the effort included eliminating unnecessary duplication, divesting functions that were not essential and providing commanders greater autonomy by removing layers in the organization. Fundamental to these objectives were a reduction in the numbers of MACOMs, a reallocation of resources, and the privatization and outsourcing of a number of administrative support functions.

1.3.2 Doctrine

Initial Force XXI efforts had concentrated on the development of the Operational Army and the integration of information technology into a doctrine of full-dimensional operations. That doctrine would significantly influence the way in which the Institutional or TDA Army would sustain the Operational Force. The Army model for the future (figure 1-3) recognized that the common linkage between the Operational Army and the Institutional Army was doctrine. Each contributed to a means by which the total Army was able to execute its fundamental mission of prompt and sustained operations on land.



Figure 1-3. Army Model

1.3.3 Methodology

The Army looked to both the corporate sector and defense to identify a methodology that could properly assess the structure and processes of the Institutional Army.

1.3.3.1 Redesign and Reengineering

The concepts of **redesign** and **reengineering** formed the basis for the revision of the Army. Such concepts were being successfully used in the private sector, which was also undergoing dramatic change. The Army adopted the definition of reengineering from Reengineering the Corporation, A Manifesto for Business Revolution:

> The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance such as cost, quality, service and speed.

1.3.3.2 DOD Enterprise Model

In response to the NPR, OSD created the Enterprise Model, to serve as a foundation for the reengineering and restructuring of business methods and processes within DOD. The ultimate objective of the model was customer satisfaction. When applied to the Institutional Army, the model identified those processes intended to provide direction, acquire assets, provide capability and produce a product for the customer (figure 1-4). The customer in this case was the employed force.



Figure 1-4. Defense Enterprise Model

1.3.3.3 Core Competencies and Capabilities

The 1994 Army Posture Statement stressed the importance of maintaining the Army's core competencies and enduring values and emphasized that they must not change despite the need to redesign the Institutional Army. It stressed that the Army's core competency is to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land—later refined by the CSA and VCSA to be: **soldiers, and those who support them, capable of prompt and sustain operations on land**. The Army's core competency served as the basis for the Institutional Army's core competency **to create, provide and sustain the land component of the Combatant Commander's joint/multinational force**, as well as the Institutional Army's core capabilities to **direct, acquire and resource the force; develop the force; generate and project the force; and sustain the force**. Supported by core processes, these core capabilities became the basic framework for redesign (figure 1-5). These Institutional Army concepts were first introduced at a DCSOPS Force Program briefing to the BOD in July 1995 (appendix V).



Figure 1-5. Framework for Redesigning the Institutional Army

1.3.3.4 Core Processes

The basic responsibilities of the Army as outlined in Title 10, USC formed the basis for the processes to be reviewed. The core processes of the Institutional Army were derived from the core capabilities and included **planning for, directing, obtaining and allocating forces; managing information; developing requirements; developing doctrine; acquiring and sustaining people; identifying and developing leaders; tailoring, mobilizing and projecting land power; supporting organizing organizational training; acquiring, maintaining and sustaining equipment; maintaining and sustaining land operations; acquiring and sustaining facilities; and managing installations** (figure 1-6). Two other, cross-functional processes, were also determined to be financial and information management.



Figure 1-6. Institutional Army Core Processes

1.3.4 Force XXI Literature

Two primary documents guided Force XXI Campaign efforts, TRADOC Pamphlet (PAM) 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and Department of the Army (DA) PAM 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign.

1.3.4.1 TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations

This document outlines a doctrine of **full-dimensional operations** for the new strategic Operational Army. It recognizes an environment absent fixed strategic conditions and one that relies on learning and understanding the principles of war. It serves as a baseline for more definitive concepts and considers scenarios that represent the full spectrum of war.

1.3.4.2 DA PAM 100-1, Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign

This document provides a vision of and conceptual framework for the evolutionary design of the Institutional Army. DA PAM 100-1 defines the institution's core capabilities and related processes and discusses those in the context of the 21st century. It postulates design principles and models for future major commands and institutional support, and promotes redesign and reengineering of the Army to leverage strategic factors and technologies in seeking common doctrine and structural reform. In addition, it provides rationale for eliminating uni-functional MACOMs and MACOM-like field operating agencies (FOAs)/staff support agencies (SSAs).

1.3.5 Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group (AEPG)

The AEPG was a group established to oversee the process of analysis and experimentation of key decisions made concerning Force XXI. It supported the creation of the baseline TDA by overseeing the development of new ideas, concepts and technology and validating those that were consistent with doctrine, organization and technical architecture. The AEPG consisted of a Senior Advisory Group (SAG), comprised of members representing the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) (DUSA(OR)), Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Research and Development (SARD), DCSOPS, TRADOC, Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), and others, as needed.

1.4 The Institutional Force Axis

1.4.1 The Fundamental Hypothesis

The fundamental "reengineering" hypothesis for review of the Institutional Axis was that if the Institutional Army's core competencies and related processes and the insights derived from Joint Venture were understood, then information age technology and management practices for reengineering the processes could be used to deduce an organization that produces a better product.

1.4.2 Objective

The objective of the Institutional Axis of the Force XXI Campaign Plan was to:

> Redesign the Institutional Army by the year 2000 to efficiently and effectively perform Title 10 functions to support redesigned Army warfighting organizations in order to ensure a trained and ready Army, fully capable of doing its part in executing the National Military Strategy, in joint and combined operations, while maintaining timeless Army values and ethics.

1.4.3 Segments of the Institutional Axis

The Institutional Axis required four simultaneous efforts.

1.4.3.1 Internal Reengineering of Major Commands

This effort was already in progress and required MACOM commanders to review their reengineering efforts with the VCSA beginning in January 1995, and annually thereafter, to include their progress in implementing results and any changes or modifications resulting from the Force XXI Campaign.

1.4.3.2 Functional Area Assessments (FAAs)

The FAAs were to be conducted by functional proponents, essentially but not exclusively MACOM commanders, in coordination with department principals **as the primary means of developing and processing redesign issues for Title 10 functions.**

1.4.3.3 Redesign of Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), its Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) and Staff Support Activities (SSAs)

The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (AASA) and the Director of the Army Staff (DAS) were to lead this effort under ASA(M&RA) oversight and were to provide alternatives and recommendations to the redesign effort.

1.4.3.4 Umbrella Redesign Efforts

This was a separate, independent redesign effort under the direction of the ASA(M&RA) and the DCSOPS **to integrate the results of FAAs and interface with the overall redesign and digitization of the warfighting Army.**

1.4.4 Phases of Execution

The charter for the redesign effort called for a three-phase approach, each totaling from 18 to 24 months, and each coinciding with Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development timelines as seen in figure 1-7.



Figure 1-7. Institutional Army Redesign Axis

1.4.4.1 Phase I

This phase commenced with the approval of the Institutional Army Redesign Charter. It established the baseline redesign for the Institutional Army by capturing MACOM reengineer efforts, conducting initial FAAs, redesigning HQDA/FOA/SSA and establishing an umbrella redesign process (POM 98-03).

1.4.4.2 Phase II

Phase II begins when Phase I is integrated into POM 98-03 in the spring of 1996. It will provide integrated results and a revised organization stemming from the Phase I baseline. It continues initial FAA redesign and conducts additional FAAs (POM 00-05). Based on the original Joint Venture Axis, it coincides with the fielding of Brigade XXI.

1.4.4.3 Phase III

Phase III will begin upon submission of POM 00-05 and will produce a final Force XXI institutional design for inclusion in POM 02-07 in the spring of 2000. It will include a dynamic methodology that is programmatically capable of accommodating changing environments well into the 21st century. This was to coincide with Joint Venture's fielding of Division XXI.

1.4.5 Operating Organization

The operating organization structured to manage the Institutional Army reengineering effort is depicted in figure 1-8.

1.4.5.1 The Senior Army Commander's Conference (ACC)

The ACC provided corporate guidance to the Force XXI Institutional Army effort and approved recommendations for submission to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff for approval.

1.4.5.2 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA)

The VCSA provided oversight of the entire Institutional Army redesign effort.



Figure 1-8. Operating Organization

1.4.5.3 ASA(M&RA) and DCSOPS

The ASA(M&RA) and the DCSOPS coordinated the overall effort. The Director, Force Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), reviewed the progress of the campaign effort with the VCSA on a monthly basis as well as scheduled FAA presentations by sponsors and proponents.

1.4.5.4 Board of Directors (BOD)

The BOD consisted of four-star general officers and equivalent Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel who were periodically briefed by each axis and reviewed recommended changes to Title 10 USC and Force XXI Campaign issues.

1.4.5.5 General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC)

The GOSC was co-chaired by the Director, Force Programs and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Force Management, Manpower and Resources. They met bi-monthly and supervised the development and implementation of the Institutional Army Redesign Campaign Plan; tracked axis progress; monitored Force XXI issues, activities, efforts, experiments, studies and assessments for inclusion in FAAs; and prioritized recommendations to the ACC.

1.4.5.6 Council of Colonels (COC)

The COC was co-chaired by the Chief, Force Integration and Management Division and Assistant Deputy for Force Management, Manpower and Resources. It reviewed, developed and prepared alternatives for presentation to the GOSC.

1.4.6 Sponsors and Proponents

The tasks and responsibilities required under the Institutional Army Campaign Plan were to be carried out by a team of proponents and sponsors. Proponents were MACOM commanders with Army-wide responsibility for the function being reviewed. Sponsors were HQDA principals at both the Army Staff (ARSTAF) and Secretariat levels who had policy oversight for a particular functional area. Proponents were responsible for integrating the results of the reengineering effort into Force XXI and in that capacity became an arm of the department. Sponsors were responsible for providing policy guidance and for supporting proponent efforts. A list of Title 10, USC explicit and implicit functions, and their sponsors and proponents are detailed in figure 1-9.

TITLE 10 FUNCTIONS	SPONSORS	PROPONENTS
MOBILIZE/DEMOBILIZE	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	FORSCOM
DEPLOY/REDEPLOY	DCSOPS/ASA(ILE)	FORSCOM/MTMC
DOCTRINE & ORGANIZE	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	TRADOC
TRAIN & LEADER DEVELOPMENT	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	TRADOC
EQUIP/SCIENCE & TECH (R&D)	DCSOPS/ASA(RDA)/DUSA(OR)	AMC
SUPPLY	DCSLOG/ASA(ILE)	AMC
SERVICE	DCSLOG/ASA(ILE)/ASA(RDA)	AMC
MAINTAIN	DCSLOG/ASA(ILE)	AMC
RECRUIT	DCSPER/ASA(MRA)	DCSPER
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	DCSPER/ASA(MRA)	DCSPER
CONSTRUCT	ACSIM/ASA(ILE)	USACE
FINANCE	ASA(FM)	TRADOC
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	DCSOPS/DISC4	DISC4
INTELLIGENCE	DCSINT/OGC	INSCOM/USAIC&FH
SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	TRADOC
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	CIDC
HEALTH	TSG/ASA(MRA)	MEDCOM
HQDA/FOA/SSA	ASA(MRA)	DAS/AA
UMBRELLA REDESIGN	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	DCSOPS
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT	ACSIM/ASA(ILE)/ASA(MRA)	FORSCOM
JOINT/DEFENSE	DCSOPS/ASA(MRA)	DCSOPS

Figure 1-9. Functions and Sponsors/Proponents

2.1 *Functional Area Assessments (FAAs)*

2.1.1 Reengineering Briefings

Reengineering briefings were presented to the VCSA as a prelude to the FAA process. The reengineering briefings represented process improvements undertaken by commands and agencies during development of the 1996 budget, prior to initiation of the Force XXI Campaign. The intent of the reengineering briefings was to link past initiatives to future campaign effort. Not all commanders provided reengineering briefings but the results from those that did served as baseline data for their respective FAAs.

2.1.2 Functional Area Assessments

Eight FAAs were to be conducted during Phase I as shown at figure 2-1.

FUNCTION	PROPONENT	SPONSOR	COMPLETE
MOBILIZE & DEMOBILIZE	FORSCOM	ASA(MRA)/ODCSOPS	OCT 95
DEPLOY/REDEPLOY	FORSCOM/MTMC	ASA(ILE)/ODCSOPS	
DOCTRINE & ORGANIZE	TRADOC	ASA(MRA)/ODCSOPS	DEC 95
TRAIN & LEADER DEVELOPMENT	TRADOC	ASA(MRA)/ODCSOPS	
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	DISC4	DISC4/ODCSOPS	DEC 95
RECRUIT	ODCSPER	ASA(MRA)/ODCSPER	DEC 95
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	ODCSPER	ASA(MRA)/ODCSPER	
CONSTRUCT	USACE	ASA(ILE)/ACSIM	JAN 96
EQUIP	AMC	ASA(RDA)/DUSA(OR)/ODCSOPS	JAN 96
SUPPLY, SERVICE & MAINTAIN	AMC	ASA(ILE)/ODCSLOG	
HQDA/FOA/SSA	DAS/AA	ASA(MRA)	FEB 96
UMBRELLA REDESIGN	ODCSOPS	ASA(MRA)/DCSOPS	MAR 96
HEALTH	MEDCOM	ASA(MRA)/OTSG	
INTELLIGENCE	INSCOM/USAIC&FH	OCG/DCSINT	
FINANCE	TRADOC	ASA(FM)	
SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT	TRADOC	ASA(MRA)/ODCSOPS	
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION	CIDC	ASA(MRA)/ODCSOPS	
INSTALLATION MGMT (BASOPS)	FORSCOM	ASA(ILE)/ASA(MRA)/ACSIM	
JOINT/DEFENSE	ODCSOPS	ASA(MRA)/ODCSOPS	

P
H 2
A OR
S 3
E

Figure 2-1. Functional Area Assessments

All FAAs were to be crosswalked with the Army core processes (figure 2-2).

2.1.3 FAA Objectives

The objectives of each FAA were to:

- identify the basis for performing the function;
- describe the core processes currently employed in performing the function;
- describe the enabling processes that support the core processes;
- identify the skills required to perform the function;
- identify the costs/resources required to perform the function;
- develop standards to assess whether the function is being performed satisfactorily;
- develop a methodology for prioritizing requirements to be resourced;
- define the key drivers influencing performance of the function;
- identify the fundamental programming assumptions and required data and sources for the function;
- determine the most effective organization for performing the function; and
- develop and resolve issues, or propose issue resolution to the appropriate authority.

FAA LEGEND
I = PHASE I
II = PHASE II/III
(Phase II & III TBD based on Phase I decisions)

1 - Direct and Assess
2 - Plan and Develop Policy
3 - Develop Doctrine
4 - Develop Requirements
5 - Acquire, Train & Sustain People
6 - Identify & Develop Leaders
7 - Tailor, Mobilize & Project Land Power
8 - Support Organizational Training
9 - Acquire, Maintain & Sustain Equipment
10 - Maintain & Sustain Land Operations
11 - Acquire & Sustain Infrastructure
12 - Operate Installations

FAA's	PROCESSES											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Power Projection							I (a)	II				
Train/Ldr Devel					I	I						
Doctrine/Org	I		I	I								
Info Mgmt		I										
Pers Mgmt/Recruit					I	I						
Construct											I	I
Equip				I					I			
Sup/Svc/Maint									I-II (b)	I		
HQDA/FOA/SSA	I											
Umbrella	I-II	I	I	I	I	I	I	II	I	I	I	I-II
Health					II							
Intelligence	II	II								II		
Finance	II											
Scty, Law Enf & CI					II							II
Installation Mgmt												II
Joint/Defense	II	II								II		

NOTES: (a) - Tailor will not be covered by the Power Projection FAA. It will be addressed in the Umbrella FAA
(b) - Services will be addressed by the Equip/Sup/Svc/Maint FAA in Phase II

Figure 2-2. Crosswalk (FAAs and Core Processes)

2.1.4 FAA Principles

The principles identified at figure 2-3 were to be employed in reengineering the Institutional Army.

- *Values.* Enduring Army values and ethics as detailed in FM 100-1, The Army, will guide the redesign effort.
- *Imperatives.* The six Army imperatives continue to be the bedrock of the Institutional/TDA Army.
- *National Military Strategy.* Link the Institutional/TDA Army to the National Military Strategy and be consistent with the Army's role as a power projection Total Army that operates increasingly within a joint environment.
- *Conformity.* Redesign efforts ~~will conform to National Performance Review principles~~. Strive to reduce the size of HQDA and ~~reduce the number of FOA and SSA~~. ~~Reduce the number of MACOM HQ~~.
- *Competency.* The Army's ~~core competencies~~ will serve as the foundation of the Institutional Army.
- *Leverage.* Information age technology, management practices and processes, and emerging results from the redesign and digitization of the operational force will be leveraged to improve effectiveness and efficiencies.
- *Shared Vision.* Functional redesign will be within ~~a shared vision of the~~ Total Army leadership.
- *Resourcing.* Functions will be resourced in the most cost effective manner.
- *Manpower Requirements.* Organizations and associated manpower requirements will be established in accordance with these principles and information age management practices. We will capitalize on the strengths of each component -- active, reserve and civilian.
- *Experimentation.* As required, experimentation will be conducted in General Headquarters Exercises and other advanced warfighting experiments to test and refine proposed redesign efforts.

Figure 2-3. Principles

2.1.5 FAA Format

Each FAA was to be presented utilizing a specified format discussed below.

2.1.5.1 Organization

Organization refers to HQDA, intermediate and installation level command. The FAA requirement was to define three alternative organizations for each level with the advantages and disadvantages of each. The following are the three alternatives.

- One alternative must reflect an organization significantly smaller than the current, authorized total Army organization of the function.

- One alternative must represent a total revision of the current management structure (i.e. MACOM) for the function Army-wide.
- One alternative would be "dealers choice" and would reflect what proponents of the function would do if they were starting from scratch.

2.1.5.2 Basis

The aim here was to identify policy, law (in addition to Title 10, USC), directive, custom, or other basis that defines the requirements/work of the function.

2.1.5.3 Skills

Skills encompassed education, schools, programs and any other structure necessary to provide and sustain the proficiency necessary to perform the function.

2.1.5.4 Management

This criterion addressed the required structure to manage the function (related to each alternative noted in the "organization" paragraph above).

2.1.5.5 Resources

Resources consisted of manpower (active component (AC)/reserve component (RC)/civilian/contract), dollars, or other resources that may be used to perform the function, and where one type of resource is required or preferred over another. As issues were developed in the FAAs, resources and manpower were defined and displayed at Program Budget Decision (PBD) level of detail, and, where possible, with appropriate Management Decision Packages (MDEPs) identified.

2.1.5.6 Publications

Publications referred to documentation produced by or required to perform the function.

2.1.5.7 Standards

Standards were the performance measures used to assess functional effectiveness.

2.1.5.8 Priorities

This criterion established the method for prioritizing requirements to be resourced.

2.1.5.9 Issues

Issues equated to recommended alternatives, with advantages and disadvantages, and recommendations for resolution of each unresolved FAA issue.

2.1.5.10 Assumptions

This criterion was defined as assumptions made during the conduct of the FAA that were necessary to be able to perform the function (e.g., the size of the force stationed overseas).

2.1.5.11 Data

Finally, the format called for consideration of data and sources required to manage the function.

2.1.6 Umbrella Group

As a complementary effort to the eight FAAs, an ODCOPS TDA Axis Umbrella Group was designated to assist the VCSA in his duties as the Chair of the Institutional Axis. The group consisted of a small core of HQDA representatives supported by members of industry and ad hoc members on an as-needed basis. The Umbrella Group was tasked with assessing Army core processes and providing an alternative view

and parallel assessment of each proponent FAA area to the VCSA prior to each proponent FAA briefing. The umbrella assessment was to explore unconventional approaches for redesign based on "out of the box" thinking. The Umbrella Group had all of the same general operational objectives of other FAA proponents except that they were also required to:

- synthesize the results of all FAAs;
- provide resourcing recommendations concerning issues to be addressed at the PBD level of detail;
- coordinate FAA briefings;
- synchronize efforts with Joint Venture; and
- facilitate the sharing of ideas from related efforts such as MACOM reengineering briefings and the CORM Report.

2.2 Phase I

2.2.1 MACOM Reengineering Briefings

As noted in paragraph 2.1.1, reengineering briefings were not provided by all commands and agencies. If a reengineering briefing was provided, the substantive information from the briefing was incorporated into the FAA concerned. For the purpose of this report, these briefings are not discussed. Rather, the briefing content has been subsumed in the FAA discussions in subsequent chapters.

2.2.2 MACOM Reengineering Briefing Schedule

During Phase I, 10 MACOM reengineering briefings were conducted. The commands presenting the briefings and the dates of the briefings are noted in figure 2-4.

Command	Date	Command	Date
FORSCOM	7 February 1995	PERSCOM	25 August 1995
AMC	27 February 1995	USAREC	25 August 1995
ISC	23 Mar 1995	USACE	12 October 1995
TRADOC	10 April 1995	MDW	13 November 1995
OPTEC	8 May 1995	USAREUR	Canceled
INSCOM	28 June 1995	MEDCOM	Canceled

Figure 2-4. MACOM Reengineering Briefing Schedule

2.2.3 FAA Briefing Schedule

During Phase I the eight FAAs noted at figure 2-5 were conducted, beginning in October 1995, with the Mobilize/Demobilize/and Deploy/Redeploy FAAs, and concluding in February 1996, with the Umbrella Institutional Army Redesign. Chapters 3 through 9 contain a detailed review of each FAA.

2.2.4 Decisions

At the conclusion of Phase I, the ASA(M&RA) and VCSA made a decision on 148 issues of which:

- one hundred and twenty were approved for implementation for POM 98-03;
- four were approved for further development and possible implementation in mini-POM 99-03;
- eighteen were approved for further development for POM 00-05; and
- six were disapproved or a decision on them was deferred.

A more detailed review of Phase I decisions and outcomes is provided in chapter 10.



Figure 2-5. Summary—Phase I

2.2.5 Recapitalization

Phase I initiatives were projected to save a total $1.5 billion from FAA efforts and $0.4 billion from headquarters redesign, at a cost of $0.5 billion. A total of 3,921 military and 3,644 civilian spaces would be referred to POM 98-03 for recapitalization.

2.2.6 Follow-on Requirements

Sponsors responsible to lead follow-up actions were required to maintain and report the status of all assigned tasks to the Umbrella Group on a bi-monthly basis and in the Army Executive Summary (EXSUM) format. These tasks were also to be reported out in the bi-monthly Institutional Axis GOSCs. Additionally, during the period December 1996 and July 1997, ARSTAF, MACOMs and the Secretariat were required to prepare a report of progress, work yet to be done, and completion of issues addressed and recommended during Phase I FAAs. However, as Phase II began, follow-up reporting was suspended and the conduct of GOSCs discontinued; follow-up actions were managed on an exception basis; Phase II proponents were empowered to conduct required FAAs without the oversight of a HQDA chaired GOSC.

Chapter 3
Power Projection FAA

3.1 Background

US Forces Command (FORSCOM) provided the first FAA that was intended to address the Army's responsibility to **tailor, mobilize and project land forces**. They divided the briefings into two sub-FAAs, one for mobilization/ demobilization and the other for deployment/redeployment. The ASA (M&RA) and the DCSOPS cosponsored the FAA. The proponent for the briefing was the Commander, FORSCOM.

3.2 Objectives

The following were the specific objectives of the power projection FAA.

- Describe the core processes associated with mobilization/demobilization and deployment/ redeployment.
- Identify the supported commander-in-chief (CINC) as the customer of the power projection process.
- Develop and present process deficiencies and shortfalls.
- Present alternative solutions to deficiencies that either improve existing processes or provide for new and reengineered processes.

3.3 Methodology

The methodology used in presenting the FAA focused on a description of the current core processes associated with mobilization/demobilization and deployment/redeployment of Army forces from the point of initiation of readiness review through return to home station. It identified performance issues, improvement opportunities, resource impacts and alternatives for resolution. It concentrated on reengineering of processes, some of which included organizational change. By providing two separate though related process analyses, FORSCOM was able to concentrate on issues concerned with specific functions, while providing a continuum for discussion in those areas where improved policy and procedure or organizational restructuring could benefit the power projection system at large. Technology improvements and new responsibilities were considered central to process improvements for power projection. Experimentation and validation of alternatives was to be an ongoing requirement to be met, in part, by the conduct of exercises.

3.4 Proponent Power Projection Assessment

3.4.1 Mobilization/Demobilization

FORSCOM described the current power projection multi-phase process from mobilization through deployment as depicted in figure 3-1.



Figure 3-1. The Power Projection Process

3.4.1.1 Mobilization/Demobilization Briefing Points

The entire FORSCOM FAA briefing is at appendix C. The main points are addressed as follows.

- The mobilization process contains several redundancies and inefficiencies. There are too many layers in the call-up process and orders chain. There is a need for increased coordination between installations and units.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises to test mobilization procedures are lacking.
- There is a need for mobilization training in service schools.
- Mobilization/demobilization requires creation of 15 power projection platforms (PPPs) strategically located throughout the continental United States (CONUS) at both active unit and RC locations with eight power support platforms (PSPs) located in 1st Army and four located in 5th Army (figure 3-2). Fourteen strategic aerial ports and 15 strategic seaports for small and easily deployable units to support the PPPs are also needed. The number of mobilization stations (38 stations) should be reduced.
- Home station mobilization sites for small and easily deployable units should be created to shorten and expedite mobilization and follow-on movement to aerial port of embarkation (APOE)/sea port of embarkation (SPOE).
- C4I for decision making must be enhanced. There is a need for improvement in the interactivity and sufficiency of automated data processing (ADP) systems, particularly AC/RC standard installation/ division personnel system (SIDPERS) and use of mobilization level application software (MOBLAS).
- Headquarters layering must be eliminated to enhance readiness. RC TDA structure should be reduced at echelons below continental US Army (CONUSA), from 54 state area commands (STARCs) to 10 regional support commands (RSCs).
- A readiness structure for mobilization should be established. Organization alternatives include a readiness command, readiness division, expanded CONUSA, or FORSCOM regional teams.
- FORSCOM responsibilities should be adjusted (e.g., execution of Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) and the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) process; the "flagging" of the TPFDD; RC training; and land movement/configuration).



Figure 3-2. Power Projection

3.4.1.2 Mobilization/Demobilization Process Summary

The mobilization/demobilization process involves a unit or set of units prepared to be validated for deployment or to initiate requisite post mobilization training to restore a unit to their pre mobilization status. The mobilization process is contained in the following four phases of preparation and planning: alert, home station processing, mobilization station training and onward movement.

3.4.1.3 Conclusions

In order to improve the mobilization/demobilization process the following major conclusions were promulgated.

- Reduction of 38 mobilization stations and creation of 15 PPPs and 12 PSPs would enhance readiness.
- RC structure below CONUSA is based on the European scenario and requires revision (e.g., regionalize functions of STARCs/RSCs, reduce/re-mission division (initial training) and reduce/realign garrison support units (GSUs)).
- Home station mobilization would allow for a shortening of the mobilization phase by allowing smaller, more easily deployable units more rapid movement to APOE/seaport of embarkation (SPOE).
- A common mobilization/demobilization information management application is required to provide capabilities not inherent in the new communications carrier for mobilization and deployment called the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

3.4.1.4 Decisions Required

- Reduction in 38 mobilization stations, and creation of 15 PPPs and 12 PSPs.
- Home station mobilization.
- A common mobilization/demobilization information management application.
- Refer to the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff (OJCS), the proposal to designate 14 strategic aerial ports and 15 strategic seaports.

3.4. 2 Deployment/Re-deployment

In the deployment portion of the FAA briefing, FORSCOM described the current four-phase process for deployment that ranged from pre-deployment activities to onward movement as noted in figure 3-3.



Figure 3-3. Current Process

3.4.2.1 Deployment/Re-deployment Briefing Points

As stated in paragraph 3.4.1.1, the entire FORSCOM FAA brief is at appendix C. The main points are summarized below.

- Limited automation, joint requirements and poor TPFDL (time-phased force deployment list) data creates deployment system complexity.
- Poor visibility of intransits, multiple port common user managers and limitation of deployable automation hardware create problems.
- Excess GSUs should be eliminated and the remaining GSUs should be aligned with PPPs.
- Deployment Support Brigades (DSBs) should be aligned with PPPs.
- The 54 STARC movement control centers (MCCs) should be regionalized into 10 regions to support the adjutants general (TAGs) and provide base operations (BASOPS) support to Army National Guard (ARNG) units in a state or territory.
- Movement control is needed between states, and for DOD movements.
- Field automated personnel readiness reader cards are needed to save time in manifest planning and to provide for electronic transfer of manifest and personnel data.
- Field radio frequency tags for personnel and equipment tracking should be implemented.
- Field equipment measuring devices for determining size and weight of equipment should be used.
- Field modular containers for secondary loads are needed to speed equipment uploading and to reduce pilferage.
- Joint Operation, Planning and Execution System (JOPES) should be incorporated into all exercise deployments.
- Deployment procedures for major exercises should be standardized and provide emphasis on training for units and individuals.
- Identify Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) as the CONUS single port and container manager and establish Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), MTMC, or FORSCOM as single process owner of deployment/redeployment.
- A movement validation system is necessary.
- A deployment organization should be created.
- There is no common information system between active and reserve components. A single automated system capable of providing planning and execution and access by multiple users (e.g., units, ports and MACOMs) is needed.

3.4.2.2 Deployment/Redeployment Process Summary

Deployment/Redeployment is the process of providing the capability to move units from mobilization stations to theater of operations and return. The process consists of pre-deployment activities, movement to APOEs/SPOEs, strategic lift, theater reception and onward theater movement.

3.4.2.2.1 Conclusions

The fielding of electronic tags and manpower requirement criteria (MARC) cards would greatly improve the visibility of deploying supplies, personnel and equipment.

3.4.2.3 Decisions Required

The decision to field electronic tags and MARC cards is required in order to enhance visibility of deployment system resources.

3.5 Umbrella Group Power Projection Assessment

3.5.1 Briefing Points

The entire Umbrella Group briefing is at appendix D. The main points are addressed as follows.

- An alternative "push" process to the current "pull" system would increase efficiency, effectiveness and performance. CINC requirements could be anticipated by automatically building doctrinal force packages to serve as a draft TPFDL, and land forces pushed all the way to the assembly area configured for immediate operations. In the capacity of "force provider," FORSCOM would be single process owner. As such, MTMC would be subordinate to FORSCOM to facilitate operational planning and execution. In essence, FORSCOM would package, transport, unpackage and provide a force fully configured to be employed in the gaining CINC's area of responsibility (AOR).
- Integrated automation systems would aid in providing mobilization status and information, design of force packages and selection of units and equipment, and deployment planning and execution.
- FORSCOM recommendations for 15 PPPs, 12 PSPs, home station deployment sites, a common automated deployment system and reduction in numbers of training divisions is supported by the Umbrella Group.
- FORSCOM recommended size of STARCs and RSCs is appropriate but needs further evaluation.

3.5.2 Umbrella Group Conclusions

The Umbrella Group FAA resulted in recommendations similar to those of the proponent. Specific Umbrella Group conclusions follow.

- FORSCOM, as the "force provider," should have overall responsibility for the deployment/ redeployment process.
- FORSCOM should be tasked to work with TRADOC to develop a common TPFDL system.
- MTMC should become a unit command under FORSCOM.
- GSUs and DSBs should be aligned with PPPs.
- GSUs should be aligned with Transportation Terminal Brigades (TTBs) and strategic seaports and satellites and their roles defined in detail.
- Any excess in GSUs, DSBs and TTBs should be eliminated.
- Personnel readiness cards, radio frequency tags, equipment-measuring devices and modular containers should be fielded.
- The Army should be designated container manager but only after this function is defined.
- A common automated container system is needed.
- FORSCOM should be provided the referral authority from the SECARMY to select and mobilize required reserve component unit, once limited call-up or partial mobilization has been approved.

3.6 FAA Issues

After appropriate consideration, the following primary issues resulted from the parallel Power Projection FAAs briefed by FORSCOM and the Umbrella Group.

3.6.1 Power Projection Platforms Issue

As established by FORSCOM, mobilization planning calls for 27 PPPs and PSPs to meet current and future requirements. The DCSOPS has the lead to designate 27 locations (i.e., 15 CONUS PPPs and 12 PSPs) and to eliminate the mobilization mission for 11 current mobilization stations. This mission change would allow former mobilization resources to be recapitalized to other Army priorities. According to FORSCOM estimates, the savings would be 30 military, 20 civilian and $55 million.

3.6.2 Deployment Technology Improvement Issue

To improve efficiency and gain asset visibility on deploying supplies, personnel and equipment, there is a need to mandate the use of electronic tags and MARC cards. Continued development of an automated means to measure unit equipment characteristics for deployment processing and development of modular containers for secondary loads would also improve process performance (figure 3-4). The FAA proponent recommended a policy be established, mandating use of these technology enhancements. Estimated savings would be 30 military, 15 civilians and $12 million. A one-time investment in operational testing of technology would cost $12 million.



Figure 3-4. Deployment Technology

3.6.3 Mobilize Units at Home Station Issue

To provide for more effective mobilization and deployment, selected RC combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) units should mobilize and begin strategic movement at home station. RC general officer (GO) commands would prepare units for mobilization and deployment and validate readiness. This streamlined concept provides for added CS/CSS units in the first 30 days of a major regional contingency (MRC). The Umbrella Group recommended FORSCOM identify units, test the concept and update mobilization plans accordingly.

3.6.4 Reduce RC TDA Structure Issue

There is a need to reduce structure or regionalize functions of STARCs/RSCs, reduce/re-mission training divisions and reduce/realign GSUs, given new mobilization requirements. The size of some of the STARCs and RSCs are disproportionate to the size of their peacetime mission. STARC structure should be subject to standard criteria and excess resources should be recapitalized (figure 3-5). Accordingly, the FAA proponent recommended the ARNG and the United States Army Reserves (USAR) conduct independent studies of TDA structure to establish benchmark criteria for determining excesses.



Figure 3-5. RC TDA Structure

3.6.5 Common Mobilization/Deployment Information Management System Issue

The new GCCS does not have required applications for mobilization and deployment. The Army should support a common (joint) mobilization/deployment information management application to improve effectiveness and efficiency of power projection (figure 3-6). The FAA proponent recommended DCSOPS conduct a study to generate Army input for development of a multi-service mobilization/deployment information management system.



Figure 3-6. Common Mob/Deploy Information Management System

3.6.6 CONUS-Based Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Issue

As a far ranging consideration, the Umbrella Group offered the following concept. In the 21st century, the US Army will be a CONUS based, power projection force. This will reduce the number of forward-deployed ASCCs currently in the force. The Army will require a minimum number of CONUS-based ASCCs responsible for the support of multiple unified commands. An example might be that Third Army would have the responsibility for supporting Central Command (CENTCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and European Command (EUCOM), assuming the Unified Command Plan remains unchanged. The Umbrella Group recommended DCSOPS conduct a concept study, yielding results that could be incorporated into POM 02-07.

Chapter 4
Identify, Train and Develop Leaders; Develop Requirements and Develop Doctrine FAA

4.1 Background

The purpose of the TRADOC FAA was to examine the three Army core processes of **identify, train and develop leaders, develop requirements and develop doctrine**. The TRADOC FAA presentations were cosponsored by the ASA(M&RA) and DCSOPS and can be found in appendices E, G and I.

In addition to the TRADOC FAA, the Umbrella Group, under the sponsorship of the DCSOPS, conducted parallel assessments of **identify, train and develop leaders, develop requirements and develop doctrine**. The Umbrella Group's charter was to review these processes and make recommendations that capture "out-of-the-box" thinking. The findings of this group are presented in section 4.5. Relevant briefings can be found in appendices F, H and J.

4.2 Objectives

The following were the specific objectives of the TRADOC FAA.

- Describe the core processes executed within the functional areas.
- Identify the producers, products and customers within each process.
- Analyze and document process shortfalls and inefficiencies.
- Develop and evaluate potential solutions to shortfalls and inefficiencies that either improve existing processes, or result in new reengineered replacement processes.

4.3 Methodology

The overall study methodology was an evolutionary investigative approach designed to systematically describe status quo practices, identify performance issues, investigate reengineering opportunities, analyze impacts and develop alternatives. TRADOC developed their methodology by concentrating on a concomitant analysis of current business processes and practices contained within each of the core processes. They used, as a framework, the following imperatives that chartered TRADOC to:

- Prepare the Army for war by:
  - providing training in initial and advanced individual skills for enlisted soldiers;
  - recruiting and training officers;
  - developing leaders;
  - training other services and countries;
  - writing doctrine and technical procedures; and
  - providing a force projection platform.
- Serve as an architect of the future by:
  - developing warfighting concepts;
  - developing training strategies;
  - developing support requirements;
  - developing equipment requirements; and
  - designing Army organizations.

By using these imperatives as a guide TRADOC focused its reengineering efforts on providing an Army that is trained and ready (figure 4-1). A series of checkpoints were established in the form of GO/SES Steering Committees to benchmark progress, solicit guidance and develop appropriate paths. In addition, the TRADOC FAA team coordinated their efforts with related FAA efforts (e.g. DCSPER Acquire, Train

and Sustain People FAA, DCSOPS Umbrella Group and HQDA Redesign). The FAA team also provided an overall strategy for a new Army organizational framework under DA PAM 100-1 (i.e., Develop the Force).



Figure 4-1. A Mission Imperative

4.4 Identify, Train and Develop Leaders

4.4.1 Identify, Train and Develop Leaders Process

TRADOC began their FAA briefing with the presentation of their analysis of the training and leader development process (i.e., sub-FAA). The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff presented the briefing for Training. The framework of the presentation centered on TRADOC's roadmap to an envisioned end-state that embraced the following goals.

- Establishment of a training assessment function to produce standardization and feedback analysis.
- Development of a training process to standardize all institutional training.
- Full implementation of the Total Army School System (TASS).
- Use of economies of consolidation where feasible.

After the discussion of the envisioned training end-state, the organizational framework for training delivery was established by aligning all training functions with TRADOC's Force XXI enduring battlefield functions depicted in figure 4-2.

The **identify, train and develop leaders** process is defined as: "the process of identifying and transforming potential leaders into future commanders, staff leaders, noncommissioned officers and civilian leaders for current and future requirements through education, self development, varied assignments and experience." Using this definition, TRADOC addressed two alternative organizational and process structures to deliver the Army's training requirements. The two alternatives consisted of:

- Alternative 1—Process Changes and
- Alternative 2—Total Revision.



Figure 4-2. Enduring Battlefield Functions

4.4.1.1 Briefing Points (Alternative 1—Process Changes)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative one.

- Key enabling investments (KEI) would be required to support process changes which would lead to:
  - increased emphasis on distance learning;
  - completed implementation of the TASS;
  - increased use of digitized courseware; and
  - linkage between the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and the TRADOC schools.
- Manpower and other economies of scale would have to be instituted to achieve savings.
- A monetary investment strategy would have to be initiated which would require a steady stream investment of $45 to $60 million per year to 2010.

Alternative one would still leave the Army short of a fully integrated training institution capable of supporting Force XXI requirements.

4.4.1.2 Briefing Points (Alternative 2—Total Revision)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted under alternative two.

- Establish single, institutional training command that conducts the majority of institutional training. Includes TRADOC, US Army Materiel Command (AMC) schools and other sustaining base schools and is linked to United States Military Academy (USMA), Army War College (AWC), Special Warfare Center (SWC), Army Medical Department (AMEDD), The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) and Inspector General (IG) schools.
- Integrate military and civilian training and reduce redundant functions.
- Support a monetary investment strategy amounting to a steady stream investment of $54 to $72 million per year to 2010.

This alternative would provide the Army a fully integrated training institution capable of supporting Force XXI requirements.

4.4.1.3 Identify, Train and Develop Leaders Process Summary

4.4.1.3.1 Conclusions

- Total revision (i.e., alternative two) of the process is the best course of action for the Army to take to achieve the desired end-state. Army leadership must weigh the investment cost of this course of action to determine affordability. The selection of this course of action would lead to:
  - establishment of a single institutional training resourcer at HQDA for all military and civilian institutional training and leader development;
  - establishment of a single automated training management system incorporating all military and civilian institutional training and leader development;
  - standardization of the training development process;
  - incorporation of all civilian leader development schools in a single institutional training command; and
  - resourcing KEI for Distance Learning/Classroom XXI.

4.4.1.3.2 Decisions Required

The results of the of the above analysis require decisions to:

- determine affordability; and
- submit changes to the budgetary process.

4.4.2 Develop Requirements

TRADOC's second segment of the FAA presentation (i.e., sub-FAA) was the analysis of the **development requirements** process. TRADOC Chief of Integrated Combat Development presented the briefing. The presentation was a discussion of three organizational (e.g., structure) alternatives developed by TRADOC to support the **develop requirements** process in the 21st century. The **develop requirements** process is defined as: "the process of identifying, investigating and developing doctrine, training, leader development, organizations and materiel required improvements and capabilities, focused on the soldier, responding to the Army's vision of future requirements." Using this definition, TRADOC addressed three alternative organizational and process structures to **develop requirements**. Additionally, a sub-FAA on organizing the Institutional TDA Army was conducted. The three alternative concepts were:

- TRADOC XXI—Centers of Excellence;
- Total Revision—Consolidation of all Combat Development Activities; and
- Enhanced TRADOC.

The briefing began with a thorough discussion of TRADOC's current organizational structure, which was then used as a base case organization to evaluate all proposed alternative organizations.

4.4.2.1 Briefing Points (Alternative 1—Centers of Excellence)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative one.

- The concept proposes the consolidation of all Directorates of Combat Development (CD), Battle Labs and TRADOC systems managers (TSMs) at six centers based on " Enduring Battlefield Functions."
- Alternative saves resources which improves horizontal integration and produces a better product.
- Major disadvantage involves the loss of proponent (branch) influence.
- A monetary investment strategy would be initiated to:
  - ensure high speed connectivity within the CD community; and
  - enhance simulation centers.

4.4.2.2 Briefing Points (Alternative 2—Total Revision)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative two.

- The concept proposes the consolidation of all CD activities into TRADOC.
- The alternative saves resources which improves horizontal integration and produces a better product for the entire Army.
- A monetary investment strategy would be initiated to ensure electronic connectivity at all CD sites.

4.4.2.3 Briefing Points (Alternative 3—Enhanced TRADOC)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative three.

- The concept proposes the consolidation of all materiel development in TRADOC to create a command that performs all activities from concept to production.
- Acquisition would remain the responsibility of AMC/Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) structure.
- Organizational and materiel decision authority would be vested in TRADOC.
- The advantages include:
  - all doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS) solutions in one command;
  - enhanced joint warfighting capabilities assessment (JWCA) and joint requirements oversight council (JROC) process; and
  - potential manpower savings.
- The major disadvantages include:
  - major changes in roles and missions of Army MACOMs and
  - diminished responsibilities for HQDA and MACOMs other than TRADOC.

4.4.2.4 Briefing Points Sub-FAA on Organizing the Institutional TDA Army

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in the sub-FAA as goals for organizing the TDA.

- The concept proposed the need to establish deployable TDA organizations which would support the organizational concept of a mix of a Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE)/TDA split-based organizations.
- The TDA **organize** process needs improvements to enhance the requirements determination and justification process while maintaining flexible local mission and workload execution.
- The TDA **organize** system needs streamlining to eliminate bookkeeping procedures that do not add value to the process.
- The TDA **organize** process needs to utilize information technologies (existing and future) to improve effectiveness.

The briefing recommended a two-part solution to achieve the goals stated above. Part I involved the following selected enhancements to the current system.

- Designate one department level organization to be responsible for the manpower management system.
- Establish a single manpower management system which provides:
  - required updates to HQDA data bases;
  - military and civilian distribution for required reporting periods; and
  - a baseline for TDAs.
- Reduce reporting for Command Plans, Schedule Eights and TDA documents.
- Publish manpower guidance to match Management of Change (MOC) windows (there is now only Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) documentation windows per year).
- Consolidate manpower and budget reporting codes (e.g., use Army Management Structure Code (AMSCO)).

- Adopt an on-line TDA system in lieu of installation The Army Authorization Document-Revised (TAADS-R) System (i.e., system currently used by two MACOMs and other organizations with primary cost limited to hardware).

The Part I recommended documentation changes to the **Organize** TDA process are depicted below (figure 4-3).



Figure 4-3. Selected TDA Enhancements

Part II involved the creation of a new **organize** process which was customer and product based. The goals of this proposed change are as follows.

- Define proponents, processes, products and customers.
- Improve resource allocation through linkage to the 12 core processes.
- Improve linkage between operational and institutional organizations.
- Establish measures of effectiveness and performance for products.
- Decentralize execution and reduce bookkeeping.

The recommended Part II documentation changes to the **organize** TDA process are depicted in figure 4-4.



Figure 4-4. Part II—Customer and Product Based Organization Design

4.4.2.5 Develop Requirements Process Summary

4.4.2.5.1 Conclusions

The Army should adopt the following process changes.

- Use the materiel requirements determination process that it has developed over the last two years.
- Support CORM recommendations to restructure the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES); incorporate measures to accommodate documented process.
- Accelerate Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to annual basis.
- Reduce MTOE process to annual basis.
- Eliminate DA review of TOE process; have organization integrators (OIs) attend the Force Integration Support Agency (FISA) Review Board.
- Explore feasibility of combining TOE and MTOE.
- Implement Part I of the **organize** process changes.
- Proceed with Phase II to:
  - plan/implement consolidation of all Army CD activities in TRADOC; and
  - continue detailed study of the following organize functions:
    - mission implications of TOE/TDA mix; and
    - efficiencies in the TDA process.

4.4.2.5.2 Decisions Required

The results of the of the above sub-FAA require decisions to:

- determine affordability; and
- submit changes to the budgetary process.

4.4.3 Develop Doctrine Process

TRADOC's third sub-FAA briefing was the presentation of their analysis of the **develop doctrine** process. TRADOC Chief of Doctrine Development presented the briefing. The presentation was a discussion of three organizational (e.g., structure) alternatives developed by TRADOC to support the develop **doctrine** process in the 21st century. The **develop doctrine** process is defined as: "the process of developing the fundamental principles by which the operating force and the Institutional Army guide their actions in support of national objectives in war and operations other than war." Using this definition, TRADOC addressed three alternative organizational and process structures to develop doctrine. The three alternative concepts were:

- TRADOC XXI;
- Total revision; and
- Significantly different.

The briefing began with a thorough discussion of TRADOC's current doctrinal organizational structure that was then used as a base case organization to evaluate all proposed alternative doctrinal solutions.

4.4.3.1 Develop Doctrine Briefing Points (Alternative 1—TRADOC XXI)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative one.

- The alternative assumes a complete digitized doctrinal library is a reality.
- The concept migrates selected operational doctrine developers to TRADOC.
- Joint and School doctrine developers remain in place.
- The advantages include:
  - central management/decentralized execution; and
  - retention of doctrine developers at the source.
  - The major disadvantage is that resource savings are minimal.

4.4.3.2 Develop Doctrine Briefing Points (Alternative 2—TRADOC XXI Total Revision)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative two.

- The alternative is based on the assumption that a complete digitized doctrinal library is a reality.
- The concept migrates all operational doctrine developers to TRADOC.
- . TRADOC assumes all Army doctrinal responsibilities.
- The advantages include:
  - central management of all Army doctrine; and
  - strengthens integration.
- The major disadvantage is that resource savings are minimal.

4.4.3.3 Develop Doctrine Briefing Points (Alternative 3—Significantly Different)

The following are the major briefing points highlighted in alternative three.

- Alternative assumes a complete digitized doctrinal library is a reality.
- Concept migrates all operational doctrine developers to TRADOC.
- TRADOC assumes all Army doctrinal responsibilities.
- Places all doctrinal developers at centers.
- The advantages include:
  - central management of all Army doctrine; and
  - strengthened integration.
- The major disadvantage is that it separates doctrine from CD/training development.

4.4.3.4 Develop Doctrine Process Summary

4.4.3.4.1 Conclusions

TRADOC recommended the adoption of Alternative 2—Total Revision. The rationale for this recommendation was that this alternative provided for a single doctrinal chief and captured the synergism of the schools, training centers and MACOMs.

4.4.3.4.2 Decisions Required

The results of the of the above analysis require decisions to:

- determine affordability; and
- submit changes to the budgetary process.

4.5 Umbrella Group Assessment—TRADOC FAA

Parallel assessment focused on business process reengineering (BPR) principles including single process ownership, treating process activities like a business and integration of like core processes into the total system to eliminate duplication.

4.5.1 Identify, Train and Develop Leaders Process Summary

The **identify and develop leader** process was reviewed by the Umbrella Group using the DOD Enterprise Model as the focal point. This process was reengineered by first defining the "as is" and then after analysis deducing the "to be" to derive the best **identify and develop leader** process.

4.5.1.1 Briefing Points

What follows reflect the major briefing points highlighted for the **identify and develop leader** presentation.

- The process is not standardized between military and civilian.
- Products are not equal between active and reserve components.
- There are too many process owners and too many hand-offs.
- Resources are not prioritized and therefore not optimized.

4.5.1.2 Training and Leader Development Summary

4.5.1.2.1 Conclusions

The Umbrella Group analysis of the above briefing points resulted in the following recommendations.

- Establish a single process owner (e.g., MACOM) for leader development.
- Standardize training and educational products.
- Establish measures of effectiveness and efficiency.
- Move the operational element of DCSOPS Training Directorate to TRADOC.
- Establish a single MACOM (e.g., Army University) responsible for "education" (as opposed to "training") planning, requirements and resources (paragraph 6.4.2 and figure 6-9).
- Improve the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS).
- Develop a centralized civilian training system.
- Reduce resident training time (i.e., increase distance learning) and therefore the TTHS account.
- Reduce training overhead by consolidating training centers and employing distance learning.
- Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program using Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) model (e.g., military retiree instructor staffing).

4.5.1.2.2 Decision Required

To accomplish the Umbrella Group recommendations decisions are required to:

- determine affordability; and
- submit changes to the budgetary process.

4.5.2 Develop Requirements

4.5.2.1 Develop Requirements Process

The **develop requirements** process was reviewed by the Umbrella Group also using the DOD Enterprise Model as the framework. This process was reengineered by first defining the "as is" and then after analysis deducing the "to be" to derive the best process.

4.5.2.2 Briefing Points

The Umbrella Group analysis determined the following.

- Customers are not clearly defined.
- Products are not clearly defined.
- The process is not a "holistic" TOE-TDA approach.
- Force generation process is too slow.
- Multiple process owners add complexity.
- Multiple "hand-offs" are complicating.
- The process is manpower and time intensive.
- Resources are not tied to product or process.

4.5.2.3 Develop Requirements Process Summary

4.5.2.3.1 Conclusions

The Umbrella Group concluded that there was a need to:

- establish a Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments;
- consolidate all MACOM Force Development functions in TRADOC; and
- move the operational element of DCSOPS Training Directorate to TRADOC.

4.5.2.3.2 Decisions Required

These conclusions require decisions to:

- determine affordability and
- submit changes to the budgetary process.

4.5.3 Develop Doctrine Process

The **doctrine** process was reviewed by the Umbrella Group using the DOD Enterprise Model as the focal point. This process was reengineered by first defining the "as is" and then after analysis deducing the "to be" to derive the best doctrine process.

4.5.3.1 Briefing Points

The Umbrella Group focused on the following concerns.

- Customers are not clearly defined.
- Products are not clearly defined.
- The process is not a "holistic" TOE/TDA approach.
- The process is too slow.
- The force generation process is too slow.
- Multiple process owners are inefficient.
- Multiple "hand-offs" add complexity.
- Resources are not tied to product or process.

4.5.3.2 Develop Doctrine Process Summary

4.5.3.2.1 Conclusions

The Umbrella Group concluded that:

- HQDA should retain responsibility for joint doctrine;
- TRADOC should be designated single process owner for all internal Army doctrine (e.g., both TOE and TDA);
- doctrine should be published "on-line" using a bulletin board system; and
- TRADOC should be responsible for all Tactical Training Packages (TTPs).

4.5.3.2.2 Decisions Required

Further action on the above conclusions requires decisions to:

- determine affordability; and
- submit changes to the budgetary process.

4.6 FAA Issue Sheets

Outlined below is a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by TRADOC and the Umbrella Group. A full explanation, to include PBD detail and implementation guidance, is provided at appendix T.

4.6.1 Doctrine Development Issue

The Army requires a single chief of Army doctrine, able to maintain complete visibility over development of all Army doctrinal products. Under one command, vertical and horizontal integration of doctrinal literature, at all levels and across every functional/mission area, becomes a component of a more cohesive and responsive process. TRADOC considers upgrades to equipment and hardware necessary to facilitate the doctrine development process. A recurring, multi-year cost of $0.5 million per year is anticipated. The FAA proponent recommended TRADOC be single process owner for doctrine development and further recommended DCSOPS be single process owner for joint doctrine development.

4.6.2 Consolidate CD Activities Issue

The FAA review of the **develop requirements** process provided an alternative that would consolidate CD activities into a single process, with a single process owner. Currently Information Systems Command (ISC), Intelligence Command (INSCOM), Medical Command (MEDCOM), Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC), Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC), John F. Kennedy

Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC), ARNG and USAR perform these functions for their organizations and report to various deputy chiefs of staff at HQDA. TRADOC, as the primary Army combat developer, would perform "organize" and "materiel requirements determination" functions with DCSOPS HQDA staff proponents. The FAA proponent recommended all combat developments be aligned under TRADOC (i.e., spaces transfer to TRADOC but may remain in current physical location or migrate to TRADOC Centers of Excellence). Estimated savings would be 57 military and 95 civilian spaces and $8.4 million. A one-time implementation cost of $0.5 million would be incurred.

4.6.3 Streamline TDA Documentation Process Issue

The Army TDA documentation process is extremely complicated and cumbersome and needs to be streamlined to promote improved control, clarity and efficiency. The focus of the streamlining effort should be on a single process owner responsible to customers for: a single manpower system; reduced reporting requirements; a quicker, cheaper, more efficient product (e.g., TDA). The FAA proponent recommended DCSOPS establish a more expedient TDA document process. Estimated savings would be one military and 19 civilian spaces and $1.1 million.

4.6.4 Senior ROTC Staffing Issue

This issue refers to use of a combination of AC, RC and/or contracted retired officers and NCOs to manage and execute the ROTC program. RC personnel could continue to be used on a full-time basis and might even include mobilization-day (M-day) soldiers. Instruction would continue to be conducted at universities. This would release AC officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for operational and institutional force requirements. The Umbrella Group recommended that TRADOC develop a plan, conduct a proof-of-principle test, and implement by fiscal year (FY) 99. Proof-of principle test and associated implementation costs would total $279 million. Estimated savings would be 2,400 military spaces.

4.6.5 Reduce Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) Resident Training Requirements Issue

The process for providing quality people to the Army includes a large overhead investment. Currently the TTHS investment is programmed to be 60,000 or 12 percent of 495,000 active military end strength not available for Army units. However, the actual TTHS account is approximately 13 percent resulting in roughly 4,000 unmanned billets. Minimally, action is required to eliminate the negative operating strength deviation, and, ideally, develop alternatives to reduce the overhead below the historical level of 12 percent. The Umbrella Group recommended that TRADOC reduce TTHS by 4,000 not later than (NLT) FY 00 and find additional reductions for POM 00-05. Estimated savings would be 4,000 military spaces and $120 million.

4.6.6 Single Leader Development Process Owner Issue

Currently military and civilian training and leader development have redundant functions between ASA(M&RA) civilian training, DCSOPS training, DCSPER human resources, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) and TRADOC. Consistent with business process reengineering (BPR) principles, a single process owner for training and leader development is appropriate. The process owner would be responsible for Army military and civilian training and leader development institutions. The Umbrella Group recommended TRADOC develop and implement a plan to assume responsibility for Army leader development organizations.

4.6.7 Reduce Training Overhead Issue

The TRADOC cluster concept reorganizes centers and schools into clusters (e.g., training centers and satellite sites) around enduring battlefield functions. The clusters are suggested to be: maneuver,

maneuver support, fires, sustainment, soldierization and battle command. TRADOC would keep all schools and get limited training overhead savings by using the cluster concept to reduce redundancies. An alternative is to consolidate all Army schools into no more than seven locations possibly around the same enduring battlefield functions and with the long-term goal of closing installations. The Umbrella Group recommended TRADOC pursue the cluster concept with the goal of consolidating schools and identify Army savings.

4.6.8 Single Automated Training Management System (military/civilian) Issue

Currently the Army has several automation systems for training management which cover portions of the requirement but do not include all courses and all military and civilian training. To improve the process of training management a comprehensive automated training management system is required that documents, schedules, records and resources all institutional training requirements and courses for military and civilian personnel. The FAA proponent recommended TRADOC conduct a requirements study and prepare a program submission for POM 00-05.

4.6.9 PPBES in Requirements Process Issue

Consistent with the CORM recommendation to restructure DOD PPBS, there is a need to simplify program management of the **develop requirements** process. The current Army approach for programming resource requirements is diverse. For example, the Army programs resources in a number of different ways across a spectrum of activities like procurement, training and maintenance. This programming is managed through a network of dissimilar MDEPs and resourced in accordance with specific appropriations. Alternatively, the Army might program to resource its core processes (e.g., the 12 core processes) and distribute its resources, in accordance with the various, appropriations, to specific process owners. The FAA proponent recommended Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)) conduct a study to revise PPBES in accordance with the 12 core processes.

5.1 Background

The purpose of the IM FAA was to examine one of the HQDA core capabilities in **directing and resourcing** the force. Figure 5-1 depicts how information management is influenced by leadership and decisionmaking and how it then acts as a link between key management functions in **developing, generating, projecting and sustaining** the force. The FAA was presented by the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communication and Computers (DISC4), assisted by the Commander, ISC and can be found in appendix K of this document.



Figure 5-1. Department of the Army Headquarters Model

5.2 Objectives

The following were the specific objectives of the IM FAA.

- Describe the core processes, environmental challenges, architecture and policies inherent in the IM process.
- Identify the key organizations, technologies and customers within the IM process.
- Identify required improvements and system shortfalls.
- Develop and evaluate alternatives to improve existing processes or enhanced organizations to promote efficiencies.

5.3 Methodology

The FAA built upon recommended alternatives developed as a result of the Secretary of the Army-directed study titled the "Signal Organization and Mission Realignment (SOMA) Relook" in developing FAA recommendations, particularly those for reducing organizations and acquisition and engineering streamlining (figure 5-2).



Figure 5-2. Signal Organization Mission Alignment (SOMA) Direction

The FAA described the historical evolution of current DISC4 responsibilities, current IM processes, and key signal and IM organizations, resourcing, alternatives considered and evaluation criteria. It included consideration of process divestiture and privatization of business processes as opportunities for improved efficiencies and reduced resource requirements. Options development were controlled by a BOD of key signal and information management personnel which coordinated with and directed process action and integration teams, a COC and independent retired GO advisors. A process model (figure 5-3), consistent with the DOD Enterprise model, was developed that provided the basis for analysis and which was subjected to evaluation criteria such as support to Force XXI objectives and enhanced interoperability and "jointness" in arriving at a preferred approach (figure 5-4). Recommendations were referred to those working the SOMA initiative and the FAA for consideration, and were categorized as either allowing for improved IM acquisition, providing power projection capabilities, or strengthening the ability of headquarters elements to provide direction and allocate resources. The process assessment identified recommended organizational realignments to improve support for both Army and joint warfighting missions.



Figure 5-3. The Army Information Management Process Model



Figure 5-4. Information Management FAA Methodology

5.4 *Information Management Process*

The IM process consists of **information technology, handling, integration, and systems acquisition and oversight.**

5.4.1 Briefing Points

The FAA culminated in a briefing that emphasized the following points.

- There is a need to create a joint warfighter division in DISC4.
- Increased emphasis on policy and architecture and configuration control of information systems is necessary.
- A process needs to be developed to provide assistance to Director of Information Management (DOIM) by providing issue identification and publicizing good business practices.
- There is a need to emphasize integration of information across functional and technical lines by aligning the sustaining base and tactical Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Intelligence/IM requirements processes and creating horizontal integration technology cells in Program Executive Officer (PEO), Standard Army Information Management Systems (STAMIS) and PEO Command, Control and Communication Systems (C3S).

5.4.1.1 Information Management Process Summary

Information management involves the management of communications (e.g., signal) and automation (e.g., information) systems. Under the Information Mission Area (IMA) related activities include the functional areas of printing and publications, libraries and records management.

5.4.1.1.1 Conclusions

The outcome of the FAA included conclusions highlighted as follows.

- The IM community needs to divest itself of non-core functions that do not directly support the warfighter.
- Reduction of IM structure would provide significant savings and manpower.
- Increased oversight of DOIM technical and business practices is needed.

5.4.1.1.2 Decisions Required

The FAA results require approval of the following.

- Realign IM functions of library policy, publications and printing operations and policy and records management to other Defense and Army agencies. Retain publications, printing, record management architecture and standards responsibility.
- Eliminate ISC as a MACOM, realign under FORSCOM and redesignate as the Army Signal Command (ASC). Designate the Commander, ASC as the FORSCOM G6.
- Realign Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency (ISSAA), currently under DISC4, Information Systems Software Command (ISSC), Information Systems Engineering Command (ISEC) (less a small element), both currently subordinate to ISC, and the ISC Contracting Office (ISCCO) under Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM).
- Inactivate Information Systems Management Activity (ISMA) and realign its Program Managers to the PEO structure.
- Realign Research, Development, Acquisition Information Systems Agency (RDAISA) from ISC to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and Acquisition (ASA(RDA)) and Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM) from ISC to the US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM).
- Realign the Technology Applications Office under PEO, STAMIS.
- Establish technical oversight of DOIM digital links and capability using ISC (ASC) capability.
- Realign echelons above corps (EAC) combat development to US Army Signal Center (SIGCEN).

5.4.1.1.3 Umbrella Group Assessment

The Umbrella Group conducted a parallel assessment—briefing found in appendix L—resulting in the following findings and recommendations.

- Reduction of a MACOM has merit but funding and manning should be monitored when placed under FORSCOM. Relocate ASC to FORSCOM or eliminate.
- Consolidate ISMA acquisition programs under PEO STAMIS and PEO C3S.
- Consolidate ISEC, ISCCO and ISSAA under CECOM.
- Realign ISC headquarters, the 11^{th}, 1^{st}, 2^{nd}, 7^{th}, 516^{th}, 106^{th} and 1108^{th} Signal Brigades; the 5^{th} Signal Command; and the Single Agency Manager (SAM) in the Pentagon under FORSCOM.
- Consider eliminating ASC and placing DOIMs under supported commands and direct support (DS) signal units under the ASCCs of CINCs to increase efficiency and effectiveness.
- Move EAC combat developments to SIGCEN. Monitor to avoid negative impact on the Director of Combat Developments (DCD).
- Move RDAISA to the ASA(RDA) and PERSINSCOM to PERSCOM.
- Divest Army Publications and Printing Command (APPC) to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
- Realign library policy to Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) and records management policy to DCSPER.
- Increase DISC4 oversight of DOIMs but transfer responsibility for DOIMs to TRADOC. Oversight of DOIMs needs to be more clearly defined and adequately addressed.
- DISC4 should examine additional opportunities for privatization after reorganizations take place.
- Realign the Technology Applications Office from DISC4 to PEO STAMIS.
- Consider combining the ADO with DISC4 and transferring DISC4 PEO responsibilities to the ASA(RDA).
- Automation efficiencies (e.g., Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System (SINGARS)) acceleration and early elimination of the VRC-12 series radio; Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) and Army Audit Agency (AAA) enforcement of automation policy; increased oversight of MACOM automation procurements; better tracking of automation expenditures; and

electronically-transmitted guidance to DOIMs and installation commanders) could provide significant automation savings in the POM 98-03.

5.5 FAA Issues

After appropriate consideration, the following primary issues resulted from the Information Management FAA as briefed by the DISC4/ISC and the Umbrella Group.

5.5.1 ISC HQ and Organizational Changes Issue

ISC requires refocus as a worldwide operational command and MSC of FORSCOM. To achieve this refocus ISC should be inactivated and re-missioned to FORSCOM as an ASC with responsibility for operational C4/IM. As a consequence of this action, ISC headquarters would be reduced by 21 percent; ISC by 19 percent; with a further 5-10 percent reduction potential under FORSCOM. It is envisioned that seven specialized non-core organizational elements would be realigned to other organizations and nine brigade-level tactical units and SAM would be realigned under FORSCOM (figure 5-5). The FAA proponent recommended FORSCOM be assigned the mission of information management with a subordinate ISC as implementing ASC. Projected savings would be $11.25 million, 16 military and 45 civilians.



Figure 5-5. ISC Organizational Changes

5.5.2 Disposition of Non-Core Responsibilities Issue

Improved warfighter focus requires the disestablishment of the IMA and divesting responsibilities for publications and printing, record management and libraries. Digitization architecture and standards for these disciplines remains with the DISC4. Record management and libraries should be placed elsewhere in the Army, while printing and publications are appropriate for realignment to DLA. Figure 5-6 depicts the disposition of non-core responsibilities. The FAA proponent recommended ISC divest non-core responsibilities in coordination with FORSCOM, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), and DISC4. Projected savings would be $11-13 million, 2 military and 112 civilians.



Figure 5-6. Disposition of Non-Core Responsibilities

5.5.3 Acquisition Structure Changes Issue

Acquisition structure changes recommended by the FAA entailed streamlining the acquisition process, reducing overhead and enhancing interoperability. Also, the FAA proponent recommended ISC eliminate ISMA and integrate functions and personnel into PEO, STAMIS, PEO C3S and CECOM as seen in figure 5-7. Projected savings would be $11-13 million, 8 military and 40 civilians.



Figure 5-7. Acquisition Structure Changes

5.5.4 Streamline Procurement and Engineering Issue

This issue addresses the consolidation of ISEC, ISSC and ISSA into CECOM. Reorganization results in a single agency for engineering and procurement, eliminates management layering, and reduces coordination requirements. ISC—under FORSCOM—retains minimal organic engineering element for rapid reaction-type operational requirements. CECOM increases privatization of software engineering for automated systems consistent with battlefield C4I systems and legislative constraints. The FAA

proponent recommended reorganization is seen at figure 5-8. HQDA would realize reductions of 15 military and 84 civilians. Projected overall savings would be $9-11 million, 169 military and 218 civilians.



Figure 5-8. Streamline Procurement and Engineering

5.5.5 Automation Efficiencies Issue

Increased automation efficiencies would result by accelerating SINGARS fielding and early elimination of the VRC-12 radio; validating power projection platform IM systems and requirements; streamlining the IM acquisition and fielding process; increasing oversight of DOIMs; and monitoring IM procurements with DAIG and AAA assistance. The FAA proponent recommended DISC4 promulgate a fielding plan employing best practice automation efficiencies. Given the DISC4 plan to institutionalize best business practices across the Army, projected savings would be $200-300 million.

5.5.6 Rightsize ISC HQ Issue

Headquarters, ISC can be reduced based on missions transfer and subordination to FORSCOM as ASC/G6. ASC will be the end state of ISC transition and will be responsible for strategic gateways; warfighter support; Joint Task Force support; strategic DS/general support (GS); Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) interface for operational matters; and support to the NMS. TRADOC should design the ASC as a deployable TOE headquarters with TDA augmentation based on mission and mission essential task list (METL). The Umbrella Group recommended FORSCOM develop the concept to "right size" the G6 staff. Figure 5-9 reflects the rightsizing process. Projected savings would be $13.2 million, 44 civilians (estimated).

5.5.7 Eliminate ADO Issue

ADO was established to coordinate battlefield digitization acquisition and operations in support of Force XXI and Joint Venture, with a focus on the AWE and Exercise Forces (EXFOR). Within 6 months after the AWE, ADO residual functions will be absorbed by DISC4 and the Army will terminate Federally Funded Research and Development Center and contractor support. The FAA proponent recommended ASA(RDA) establish a termination date for ADO consistent with POM 98-03. Elimination of the ADO would result in a projected savings of $2.5 million, 5 military spaces and 7 civilian spaces.



Figure 5-9. Implementation Strategy

5.5.8 Return CONUS DOIMs to Supported Commands Issue

ISC has responsibility for DOIMs at West Point, Military District of Washington (MDW) and INSCOM, while AMC, TRADOC and FORSCOM DOIMs are part of their commands. Return of ISC DOIMs would allow for total focus on FORSCOM operational missions. Separation of strategic responsibilities of the INSCOM and MDW DOIMs would be necessary before realignment. The ACSIM would provide installation guidance and provide resource advocacy; MACOMs would provide operational oversight; DISC4 would provide policy and standards, privatization advice and support, and technology consulting; and ASC would provide technical oversight, as noted in figure 5-10. The Umbrella Group recommended DISC4 conduct a study and develop an implementation plan for POM 00-05 submission. Transfer of command and control of the CONUS DOIMs would yield estimated savings of 10 military and 15 civilian spaces.



Figure 5-10. DOIM Process

Chapter 6
Recruit and Personnel Management FAA

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 General

This chapter addresses the Recruit and Personnel Management FAA. As outlined in AR 11-40, Functional Area Assessment, the FAA process provided a forum for conducting in-depth investigation of the functional areas of the Institutional Army in terms of reengineering and organizational redesign.

6.1.2 Responsibilities

The Recruit and Personnel Management FAA was conducted in two parts—a proponent assessment and an independent analysis by the Umbrella Group. The proponent for the Recruit and Personnel FAA was the DCSPER. The ASA(M&RA) served in the dual capacity of, not only co-chair of the Institutional Army Force XXI Redesign, but also of HQDA functional sponsor. As such, the ASA(M&RA) was a full partner with the DCSPER for this FAA. The DCSOPS was HQDA staff coordinator for the FAA and the VCSA, in concert with ASA(M&RA), provided ultimate oversight of the FAA.

6.2 Background

6.2.1 The FAA Core Process

As described in chapter 1 (paragraph 1.3.3.1), the Recruit and Personnel Management FAA was based on a BPR approach (i.e., process analysis). A graphic overview of the BPR approach is seen at figure 6-1.



Figure 6-1. BPR Overview

Key to this approach was the establishment of core business processes. The Institutional Army business processes were derived from Service Title 10 functions. Recruit and personnel management had its genesis in Title 10 language that specified recruiting of personnel as a required service function. The recruit function was further refined by the six Army imperatives, which identified quality people as fundamental to a trained and ready Army. The FAA core process reflected the synthesis of these two source criteria. Codified in DA PAM 100-1, *Force XXI Institutional Force Redesign*, the core process for the Recruit and Personnel Management FAA was termed **acquire, train and sustain people**. Figure 6-2 pictorially portrays the synthesis of this core process.



Figure 6-2. Core Process Synthesis

6.2.2 FAA Objective

The objective of the FAA was to analyze the acquire, train and sustain people core process. Explicit in the assessment was the requirement to describe the process in terms of procedures, products, customers and measures of performance and to seek organizational improvement (e.g., efficiency and effectiveness) through analysis and reengineering. The FAA was expected to result in three alternative (e.g., "to be") courses of action for reforming the "as is" personnel management organization.

6.2.3 FAA Methodology

The methodology for accomplishing this objective centered on the DCPSER personnel life cycle. The term life cycle refers to a continuum of six personnel management activities that span the entire course of one's affiliation with the Army, from beginning to end. The six activities are described below.

- **Structure.** This process consists of all those sequential activities that begin with a vision of organizational effectiveness, include recurring process review, and result in periodic restructuring of the personnel community to meet the needs of our soldiers, civilians and their families.
- **Acquire.** This process includes all those sequential activities beginning with the establishment of recruiting criteria and goals and culminating in the acquisition of adequate numbers of qualified personnel to meet the accession needs of all branches and components of the Army, both civilian and military.
- **Train.** This process consists of all those sequential activities that begin with an individual having the requisite entry level skills and physical capacity to successfully undergo initial training and culminates in that individual's completion of all requisite professional training and education called for by his or her specialty, grade and length of service.
- **Distribute.** This process refers to all those sequential activities beginning with the identification of personnel requirements through the reporting of a fully qualified individual for duty at his or her unit.
- **Sustain.** This process refers to all those sequential and concurrent activities that serve to motivate soldiers, civilians and families and enhance the quality of their professional and personal lives beginning with the individual's initial day in the service and ending with his or her separation or through their retirement years.
- **Separate.** This process refers to all those sequential activities beginning with the establishment of separation criteria for soldiers and civilians through the execution of individual separations.

6.2.3.1 Personnel Life Cycle Model

The personnel life cycle provided a conceptual framework for correlating the Force XXI notion of acquiring, training and sustaining people to the Army's personnel management infrastructure. BPR techniques were used to examine the life cycle, resulting in a baseline mapping of the Army's "as is" organization, and, in turn, revealing "to be" redesign opportunities (e.g., courses of action). A model of the DCSPER life cycle is reflected in figure 6-3.



Figure 6-3. Life Cycle Model

6.2.3.2 Personnel Life Cycle Processes

The "as is " processes represented by the life cycle model are seen at figure 6-4 in the form of the actual flow charts that were developed during the course of the FAA. Figure 6-4 is intended to show the complexity of Personnel Service Support (PSS). More finite detail of the life cycle processes is at appendix M.



Figure 6-4. Life Cycle Processes

6.3 Proponent FAA Assessment

6.3.1 Task Organization

As stated in the Institutional Army Reengineering and Redesign Campaign Plan (see appendix A), the Recruit and Personnel Management FAA entailed that part of the Institutional Army axis related to "providing qualified personnel for the Army...(officer, warrant officer, enlisted and civilian) for all components (Active, Guard and Reserve)...both leader and led, in the required numbers and skills both in peacetime and in crises response, under operational conditions including mobilization." Further, it encompassed "all facets of personnel management for all identities (officer, warrant officer, enlisted and civilian), all components (active, guard and reserve) including, but not limited to, assignments (temporary and permanent), pay, promotion, retirement, legal and religious support, safety, public affairs and inspector general activities...enabling administrative systems, associated automation management ...personnel accountability, heraldic services, morale, welfare and recreational services and internal Army postal services...[for] soldiers, their families, retirees and Department of the Army civilians." Within this context, the DCSPER determined that a thorough review of Acquire, Train and Sustain People necessarily involved several Army proponents. Consequently, he task organized the FAA effort into sub-FAAs, aligning specific subject areas according to proponency. The task organization was established as indicated in figure 6-5 below.

Sub-FAA	Proponent
Officer, Enlisted, Civilian and Recruit	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Legal Services	The Judge Advocate General
Inspector General Activities	The Inspector General
Religious Support	Chief of Chaplains
Public Affairs	Chief of Public Affairs
Morale, Welfare and Recreation	Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
Heraldic Services	The Institute of Heraldry
Postal Operations	The Adjutant General Directorate, Total Army Personnel Command

Figure 6-5. Task Organization

6.3.2 Briefing Points

On 23 January 1996, the DCSPER FAA results were briefed to the ASA(M&RA) and the VCSA. Each sub-FAA was briefed as a separate entity within an overall briefing. The briefing, in its entirety, is at appendix M. The main briefing points follow in the form of the recommendations presented to the VCSA by the respective sub-FAA proponents.

6.3.2.1 Officer, Civilian, Enlisted and Recruit Sub-FAA

The Officer, Civilian, Enlisted and Recruit Sub-FAA recommended programmatic (e.g., POM 98-03) manpower and dollar savings from reduction and reorganization proposals as listed below.

- Consolidate all recruiting, except National Guard, under US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC).
- Consolidate all officer cadets under a single authority by combining USMA and Cadet Command. This would include OCS, Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) and a strong linkage to state OCS academies.
- Establish procedures to reduce the annual turnover of Army personnel and program a two- percent reduction in Initial Entry Training (IET) attrition and a 10 percent reduction in all remaining first term enlistment attrition.
- Program a 100 space saving from the integration of the functions and organizations of pay and personnel management.

- Delay PSS doctrine development by separating the Soldiers Support Institute (SSI) from the Deputy Commanding General (DCG), Combat Support, TRADOC.
- Establish a multi-component Personnel Command, which integrates like functions across all components.
- Build a single, integrated, relational, multi-component database to serve the Army into the 21st century.
- Explore the reduction of personnel resources committed to the protocol function.

6.3.2.2 Legal Services Sub-FAA

The Legal Services Sub-FAA reflected initiatives in three areas: automation, personnel innovations and organizational changes. Automation initiatives included:

- digitization of legal references;
- paperless legal offices;
- law office management software;
- voice recognition software;
- video-teleconferencing;
- deployable legal automation sets; and
- distance learning.

Personnel innovations included:

- full utilization of reserve component personnel;
- enhanced inter-service cooperation;
- delegation of responsibility;
- early intervention in the business decision cycle; and
- expanded utilization of paralegal support.

Organizational changes included:

- claims reengineering;
- privatization of claims substantiation;
- establishment of the Claims and the Legal Technology Resources Offices;
- use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR);
- regionalization initiatives; and
- TOE/ TDA consolidation.

6.3.2.3 Inspector General Activities Sub-FAA

The IG Sub-FAA proposed two initiatives aimed at improving IG assistance function and enhancing IG performance at the "grass roots" level. These initiatives were to:

- Modify the IG response to assistance requests within designated categories and allow the screening of requests based on age of the incident and current impact of the issue in question.
- Align IG and Total Army Quality (TAQ) functions at the installation level to facilitate synergy between readiness evaluation and efficiency/effectiveness measurement. At the 23 January 1996 briefing, the VCSA disapproved the recommendation to align IG and TAQ functions at the installation level, stating that the IG should retain its traditional role.

6.3.2.4 Religious Services Sub-FAA

The Army Chaplaincy analysis determined that cost savings could be achieved by:

- increasing use of reserve component support (e.g., using RC chaplains to provide military funeral support for the growing number of military funerals);

- continuing to work with the other services, through the DOD Armed Forces Chaplains Board, to provide joint religious support for selected shortage chaplain faith groups;
- working to develop video capability for some remote site religious services;
- converting the Officer Advanced Course to an eight-week temporary duty (TDY) and targeting the savings for FY 98–03 POM submission;
- leveraging information technology to expand CHAPNET, the Chaplaincy's e-mail and data transfer system; and
- continuing development of the Chaplain Automated Religious Support System, which will track emerging faith group trends as well as the costs of religious activities.

6.3.2.5 Public Affairs Sub-FAA

The Public Affairs (PA) Sub-FAA determined that a robust structure encompassing all current capabilities (i.e., community relations, training, planning, media relations and public information) was necessary to ensure commanders flexible, adaptive, responsive services. Although investment costs would exceed savings, optimal design could be achieved by:

- developing worldwide digital imaging of still and video news releases;
- providing seamless AC/RC support through digital office technology; and
- redesignating administration specialists as editorial assistants.

6.3.2.6 Morale, Welfare and Recreation Sub-FAA

The Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Sub-FAA embraced technology as an "enabler" to support information age, "split-based" operations and recommended submission of reengineering proposals to the MWR Board of Directors for review. Suggested MWR innovations included the following.

- Program partnering and standards development.
- Reengineer common support to reduce the cost of overhead.
- Mitigate dual funding by converting Appropriated Fund (APF) to Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) for execution or, as an alternative, waiving APF processes.

6.3.2.7 Heraldic Services Sub-FAA

Prior to the 23 January briefing to the ASA(M&RA) and the VCSA, the DCSPER determined that the organizational structure of the Institute of Heraldry and the method of providing heraldic services were already optimal. Further reengineering was deemed unnecessary and the sub-FAA was eliminated from the FAA process.

6.3.2.8 Postal Operations Sub-FAA

The Postal Operations Sub-FAA reflected that the small number of personnel involved in TDA postal operations precluded tangible yield from reengineering and recommended that postal processes remain unchanged.

6.3.3 Conclusion

Overall, the sub-FAAs noted that their organizations had already been significantly reduced and could not absorb further reductions without divestiture of functions. All concluded that their functions were absolutely essential to the successful manning of Force XXI but indicated that reengineering would continue, as needed. The VCSA generally accepted the sub-FAA recommendations, specifically directing sub-FAAs to proceed with their FY 98–03 POM submissions and with further study of high payoff recommendations, such as: expansion of USAREC; merger of USMA and Cadet Command; establishment of a multi-component personnel command; and consolidation of all institutional training under TRADOC.

6.4 *Umbrella FAA Assessment*

6.4.1 Conceptual Construct

Like the Proponent, the Umbrella Group articulated the core process in terms of the personnel life cycle functions. Figure 6-6 reflects the Umbrella Group variation of the Army personnel life cycle model.



Figure 6-6. Umbrella Group Life Cycle Model

However, unlike the proponent FAA approach (i.e., task organization into sub-FAAs), the Umbrella Group took a more integrated, holistic view in their analysis. In addition to the life cycle model, the Umbrella Group also focused on acquire, train and sustain people within the broader context of its linkage to the Institutional Army core competency. As explained in chapter 1 (paragraph 1.3.3.3), the core competency of the Institutional Army is to create, provide and sustain the land component of the combatant commander's joint/multinational force. Four core capabilities support this core competency: direct and resource the force; develop the force; generate and project the force; and sustain the force. As seen in figure 6-7, the process of acquiring, training and sustaining people stems from the Institutional Army's capability to develop the force.



Figure 6-7. Core Competency/Capability/Process Linkages

The pivotal relationship of develop the force to acquire, train and sustain people was a further dimension of the Umbrella Group's conceptual construct for deducing a "to be" redesign solution.

6.4.2 Briefing Points

On 8 December 1995, the Umbrella Group FAA results were briefed to the ASA(M&RA) and the VCSA. Consistent with its role to generate provocative ideas and stimulate "out-of-the-box" thinking, the Umbrella Group did not advocate as conventional a course of action as did the proponent.

The central theme of the Umbrella Group FAA was the proposal for creating an Army University and incorporating the personnel life cycle activities into the university structure. The argument for having such a structure was that of unity of command, consistent with the BPR tenet of single process ownership (figure 6-1). Figure 6-8 represents the proposed structure.



Figure 6-8. Army University Structure

Additionally, the case was made that acquire, train and sustain people was an extension of the core capability, develop the force (figure 6-7). As such, the Umbrella Group argued the single process ownership for recruit and personnel management should be aligned under TRADOC. Figure 6-9 depicts this alignment.



Figure 6-9. Recruit and Personnel Management under TRADOC

Finally, the Umbrella Group recommended longer careers and interchangeable military/civilian jobs. This proposal aimed to optimize the Army's ability to meet its skill qualification requirements. By adding flexibility in job placement (e.g., assignment opportunity), quality people would be retained as long as possible and the Army's investment in their training and development could be fully exploited. The complete Umbrella Group briefing is at appendix N. The main briefing points are provided below.

- The Army has at least six separate personnel systems (active military; civilian; ARNG; USAR; Chaplain; Judge Advocate General), equating to:
  - too many process owners;
  - excessive resourcing for personnel management; and
  - inconsistent quality among systems.
- The complexity of multiple personnel systems is characterized by:
  - too many handoffs in the process of delivering trained, ready personnel to units;
  - high attrition between handoffs;
  - 20 percent turnover of trained personnel annually; and
  - over-accessioning to accommodate attrition and turnover.
- The closed system (i.e., select-train-promote cycle from accession to separation/retirement) for meeting the Army's manpower requirements results in:
  - shortages of qualified personnel in specific skills and grades;
  - too many professional development requirements for a 20-30 year career; and
  - too many personnel in TTHS status and not in units.

6.4.3 Conclusion

In principle, the VCSA and the ASA(M&RA) supported the Umbrella Group perspective and directed further analysis and review of some of the issues raised. However, while agreeing with the desirability of single process ownership, the VCSA and ASA(M&RA) did not endorse the notion of an Army University.

6.5 Issues

6.5.1 General

There were eight issues generated from the Recruit and Personnel Management FAAs. Figure 6-10 presents an overview of these issues and figure 6-11 indicates resource implications. Subsequent paragraphs provide a synopsis of each issue.

	Proponent Recommended	Proponent Considered	Umbrella Unique
Near Term (98-00)	Soldier Support Institute Protocol Offices Public Affairs Offices Merge Personnel and Finance Groups (TOE) Reduce First Term Attrition Restructure PERSCOM		Personnel Accessions Command in TRADOC
Mid Term (01-03)			Desired Personnel End State
Long Term (04-07)		Integrate PERSCOM into TRADOC	

Figure 6-10. Issues for Acquire and Sustain People

	POM 98-03				Beyond POM			
	Mil	Civ Savings	$	Cost	Mil	Civ Savings	$	Cost
Protocol Offices	14	13	$3.08M					
Public Affairs Offices	32	100	$24.2M					
Personnel & Finance Groups	100							
Reduce Attrition	750		$54M					
Restructure PERSCOM				$100M				
Personnel Accessions Command	59							
Soldier Support Institute								
Personnel End State								
TOTAL	**955**	**113**	**$81.28M**	**$100M**				

Figure 6-11. Resource Implications for Acquire and Sustain People

6.5.2 Protocol Offices Issue

There are currently about 49 protocol offices in the Institutional Force, and in some cases more than one exists on a given installation based on the size and nature of tenant organizations. A policy limiting the number of protocol offices to one per garrison, which may be augmented with special duty personnel for limited periods of time to accommodate unusual workload, would be a more cost effective process for performing this service. RC protocol personnel could support deployed Operational Force units. The FAA Proponent recommended that the DAS establish a HQDA policy of not more than one protocol office per installation.

6.5.3 Public Affairs Offices Issue

The Army has an obligation to keep the public informed of its activities, both worldwide (e.g., Bosnia) and locally (e.g., unit re-stationing). PA offices are the normal process for meeting this obligation. There are over 200 PA offices in the Army. Frequently, several PA offices are located on a given installation. While the PA function in all offices is the same, redundancy results from the diverse operational interests of the tenant organizations. A policy establishing a common PA office, staffed with the requisite skills to represent the interests of the many tenant organizations on a given garrison would reduce redundancies and result in a more consistent quality PA product. Deployed Operational Force units could be augmented by RC PA support. The FAA Proponent recommended that the DAS establish a HQDA policy of not more than one protocol office per installation.

6.5.4 Personnel and Finance Groups Issue

Two separate groups, the Personnel Group and Finance Group, perform currently two processes—personnel and finance—in the Operational Force at echelons above division (EAD). These groups have some similar functions and provide dual support in reporting personnel and pay data. As similar personnel support functions, they could be merged to the benefit of reduced overhead, common automation systems and single, standard reporting channels and data. This merger would manifest itself in the form of a new TOE Pay/Personnel Support Group organization appropriate for each Army Corps. The FAA Proponent recommended that TRADOC be directed to address the organizational consolidation in the Force Design Update (FDU) process.

6.5.5 Reduce Attrition Issue

Currently 30 percent of all new active component enlisted soldiers attrite from the force before they reach their initial expiration of term of service (ETS); 12 percent of all enlisted soldiers before they complete IET. Reduced attrition, or greater retention, would result in fewer soldiers recruited each year, fewer recruiters, a smaller IET cadre, reduced clothing bag expenses, reduced TTHS and perhaps other cost avoidance. Alternatively, additional retention may require some investment such as success-oriented training or a revised physical-conditioning program. The net effect on the process of retaining soldiers would be a greater return on the investment in accessing quality people while maintaining the same product standard. The FAA Proponent recommended establishing policies necessary to reduce first term attrition by 4 percent.

6.5.6 Restructure US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSOCM) Issue

There are a number of organizations currently involved with managing Army Personnel—active, reserve and civilian. Each includes management infrastructure that performs similar functions. Establishing a single process with a common organization would result in a more cost-effective process by eliminating redundant infrastructure while advantaging common information management support systems. The FAA Proponent recommended that common personnel management (AC, RC and civilian) and associated information management support systems be aligned under PERSCOM.

6.5.7 Personnel Accessions Command Issue

The Army accesses people through a number of organizations/ processes (e.g., pre-commissioning—Cadet Command, OCS, WOCS, State Academies; direct commissions; enlistment—USAREC, State Adjutants General; civilian—multiple civilian personnel offices). The many organizations have a common goal—access quality people—and largely target a common market. Yet, they have separate management headquarters/overhead and budgets (e.g., advertising), to compete with each other for that market. Once military personnel enter the force, they are then provided individual training largely, but not exclusively, by one command, TRADOC. Civilian education is largely decentralized to local organizations to be accomplished at the mutual agreement of employer and employee pending availability

of desired training. Combining these many offices into a common organization under a single process owner would reduce the infrastructure required to support the separate processes. The intent would be to expand USAREC's recruiting mission to include ROTC, all of OCS, selected civilian occupations, special branches and ARNG. An estimated 15 percent savings could be achieved from combining these organizations with USAREC (e.g., Cadet Command and ARNG), thereby reducing redundancies in recruiting effort already resident in USAREC. These multiple processes also represent inefficiencies that result in accession inconsistencies. Alignment of the processes would ultimately result in a uniform force with common capabilities. and could best be accomplished organizationally as part of the Develop the Force MACOM. The Umbrella Group recommended alignment of accessioning (AC, RC and selected civilian) under TRADOC.

6.5.8 Soldier Support Institute (SSI) Issue

Currently the Soldier Support Institute is responsible, within TRADOC, for the full range of combat development, doctrine, organization, and system and leader development for the operating force. The PSS activities are a subset of a complex network referred to collectively as CSS and are therefore integrated into the generic CSS Battlefield Operating System (BOS)/Battlefield Dynamics (reference: TRADOC PAM 525-5) in the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM). Because the preponderance of the CSS is logistics in nature, PSS is becoming primarily "service support" and secondarily "personnel." As "the Army is people" care must be taken to apply appropriate sensitivity to the dominance of PSS vice the more inanimate, logistics-unique service support. The Army should consider alternatives to the current arrangement that preserves TRADOC's role as process owner of the combat development function while applying greater sensitivity to the "personnel" dimensions of PSS activities. The FAA Proponent recommended that TRADOC be directed to resolve issue.

6.5.9 Personnel End State Issue

The Army retires highly talented, skillful, productive people at a relatively early age. Active duty military personnel are eligible, in accordance with Army policy, to retire after approximately 20 years service and must retire after 30 years unless retained under exceptional authority. The RC retirement process is similar. Civilian retirement is more a function of age; remuneration a function of years of service. Soldiers retiring after 20 years service are normally in their mid-40's, are highly trained, are capable of establishing second careers using the skills developed in the Army and may remain retired from the Army for approximately 40 years. An alternative process to retiring soldiers between 30 to 40 years service would be to retain them until ages 50+ to 60+. Skills would be retained longer and retirement costs reduced overall. Physical limitations due to age could be mitigated by technology advances, quality of life improvements and/or adjusting the separate military and civilian programs (particularly retirement programs) such that personnel may be transitioned interactively between the two programs after some period of service. A desired personnel end state for the 21st century should be established in terms of age, experience, required skills, professional development, retention and retirement investment. The process adjustments necessary to achieve this personnel end state should also be developed. Longer, more flexible careers would yield maximum return on personnel investment. The Umbrella Group recommended that the ASA(M&RA) conduct a study of career management alternatives, including cost benefit analysis/conclusions, for manning Force XXI.

Chapter 7
Construct FAA

7.1 Background

The purpose of the Construct FAA was to address the approach the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will take to transition the Army's Title 10 construct function into the 21st century. The FAA cited the vision of the Corps of Engineers (figure 7-1) and the approach toward realizing the vision along four separate, related axes.



Figure 7-1. Vision

The FAA acknowledged certain fundamental guidance from the CSA and used that guidance as the organizational construct of the FAA.



Figure 7-2. CSA Guidance

The scope of the FAA included Army real property management, environmental management and executive agency responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army; it did not include all BASOPS functions, (e.g., contracting, legal services, nor civil works responsibilities).

The following was used as the overall theme of the FAA:

Blueprint for Army installations to house, train, sustain, and project the force

7.1.1 Introduction

By way of introduction the construct function was defined in terms of installation location and ownership (figure 7-3); personnel assigned (figure 7-4); program owners and mix of commands responsible for executing the function (figure 7-5).



Figure 7-3. Installation Location and Ownership



Figure 7-4. Personnel Assigned



Figure 7-5. Program Owners and Execution

7.1.2 Trends

Since FY 1990 the trend has been a continuous diminution of resources invested in the Construct function as defined in this FAA: more than 40 percent in funds and 30 percent in personnel have been cut. But the services, and the standards soldiers deserve, have not changed.

Another trend has been the reduced requirement for real property, resulting in a surplus of approximately 170 million square feet of real property as noted in figure 7-6.



Figure 7-6. Excess Property

7.1.3 Conclusions through FY 2000

Conclusions drawn to date, regarding the transition of the Army's construct function since the end of the Cold War (i.e., 1990) to present, are that the Army is using its capability to outsource some functions smartly, is using excess real property to maximum advantage, has had some success in reengineering its processes and must continue to concentrate on its core processes. While the transition has been able to keep pace with reductions to manpower available to perform the function (e.g., full time equivalent (FTE)), it has not been able to meet the fiscal reductions reflected in the Army's POM.

7.2 Objective

The object of the FAA was to identify how the Corps of Engineers, largely responsible for two core Army institutional processes—**acquire and sustain facilities and manage installations**—would accomplish the following goals:

- support power projection;
- improve existing facilities;
- improve quality of service;
- promote environmental stewardship;
- reduce dependence on government work force;
- leverage private sector; and
- improve construct process.

7.3 Methodology

The methodology employed in the conduct of the FAA was to reengineer the construct function in terms of four separate axes: outsource functions and facilities; excess facilities; reengineer processes; and improve organizations. The FAA offered a discussion of each axis in terms of alternative approaches and the pros and cons of each.

7.4 US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) FAA Process

7.4.1 Outsource Functions and Facilities Axis

7.4.1.1 Briefing Points

The essence of the outsource functions and facilities axis rested upon strategic and operational assumptions as follows.

- Strategic assumptions:
  - there will be no degradation in quality;
  - civilian sector would pick up workload;
  - changes will be more economical/cost effective; and
  - enabling legislation will be available.
- Operational assumptions:
  - for outsourced functions and facilities, those that are:
    - contracted/privatized, there will be 10 percent salary and 100 percent FTE savings, and a 25 percent to 50 percent success rate (dependent on enablers), or
    - divested, there will be 100 percent salary and FTE savings;
  - transfer costs cannot be estimated; and
  - figures include all outsourcing initiatives.

7.4.1.2 Outsource Functions and Facilities Axis Summary

The functions and facilities that may be outsourced, and risk in terms of government control, are reflected in figure 7-7.



Figure 7-7. Outsource Functions and Facilities

Potential savings from outsourcing functions (in terms of FTEs) and facilities (in terms of operations and maintenance Army (OMA) funds) are depicted in figure 7-8.



Figure 7-8. Potential Savings

7.4.1.3 Conclusions

Conclusions regarding the viability of outsourcing construct functions and facilities and the pros and cons of outsourcing are summarized in figure 7-9.



Figure 7-9. Outsource Conclusions

7.4.2 Excess Property Axis

7.4.2.1 Briefing Points

The excess property axis focused on two main points.

- Excesses are at most installations, are growing and represent a maintenance burden.
- Excesses can be an asset if leveraged properly.

7.4.2.2 Excess Property Axis Summary

This axis is summarized in figure 7-10.



Figure 7-10. Excess Property

7.4.2.3 Conclusions

Conclusions regarding the disposition of excess property and the associated pros and cons are summarized in figure 7-11.



Figure 7-11. Excess Property Conclusions

7.4.3 Reengineer Processes Axis

7.4.3.1 Briefing Points

The reengineering processes axis was addressed in terms of:

- programming facilities;
- streamlining military construction (MILCON);
- acquisition practices;
- eliminating multiple layers;
- using information technology;
- improving environmental management, and
- seeking legislation changes.

7.4.3.2 Reengineer Processes Axis Summary and Conclusions

The reengineering processes axis is summarized in figures 7.12 through 7.18.



Figure 7-12. Facilities Programming



Figure 7-13. Streamline MILCON



Figure 7-14. Acquisition Practices



Figure 7-15. Eliminate Multiple Layers



Figure 7-16. Use Information Technology



Figure 7-17. Improve Environmental Management



Figure 7-18. Seek Legislative Changes

7.4.4 Improve Organizations Axis

7.4.4.1 Briefing Points

In the Improve Organizations Axis of the FAA, alternatives were investigated consistent with the guidance provided in the Force XXI Institutional/TDA Axis campaign plan.

- Alternative A—Minimum FTE (significantly smaller organization).
- Alternative B—Installation Command (total revision).
- Alternative C—Director of Public Works (DPW)/USACE Partnerships (unconstrained).
- Alternative C1—USACE Public Works Mission (MACOM feedback suggestion).

7.4.4.2 Improve Organizations Axis Summary

Alternative A (significantly smaller) proposes to privatize/divest all but core Army functions. This alternative, including pros and cons, is summarized in figure 7-19. Key attributes of this alternative are:

- compatible with present structure or DA PAM 100-1;
- construction would be decentralized to installations;
- DPW staffs would be cut to minimum manning levels; but
- proponency of remaining Executive Agency missions must be resolved.



Figure 7-19. Minimum FTE

Alternative B (installation command), including pros and cons, is summarized in figure 7-21. Key attributes of this alternative are:

- there would be no new MACOM;
- it employs the "city manager" concept;
- there would be a single manager; and
- property ownership and programming would be conducted by a single installation MSC.



Figure 7-20. Installation Command

Alternative C (DPW/USACE partnerships) embraces a partnership of similar responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers and those of DPW on installations. The alternative, and its pros and cons, is summarized in figure 7- 21. Key attributes of this alternative are:

- partnership would be optional, based on installation needs;
- support would evolve to a regional configuration;
- partnerships would represent flexible support, tailored to mission;
- technical support could be consolidated; and
- skills and resources could be shared.



Figure 7-21. DPW/USACE Partnership

Alternative C1 (USACE Public Works Mission) is really a hybrid of alternative C. In this alternative USACE assumes responsibility for the installation public works mission. In addition to the attributes of alternative C, in this alternative:

- programming and funding would continue to be an installation/MACOM responsibility;
- USACE would provide all public works services; and
- the installation commander would retain a small DPW staff.

Alternative C1 would have the additional "pros" of focusing core competencies and would likely save twice as many FTE (1000 vice 500) and program dollars ($42 million vice $21 million) as alternative C. Moreover, it would have the "cons" of a cultural impact and would require sensitive rules negotiation to implement.

A summary assessment of the four alternatives is depicted in figure 7-22.



Figure 7-22. Alternatives Assessment

7.4.4.3 Conclusions

Overall conclusions of the improve organizations axis are provided in figure 7-23.



Figure 7-23. Improve Organizations Conclusions

7.4.5 Construct FAA Wrap Up

The wrap-up was presented in terms of the CSA initial guidance outlined below.

- Find smarter ways to do business:
  - Action: Evaluate installation command (alternative B); recommend BASOPS FAA evaluate;
  - Action: Expand USACE services to DPW (alternative C); initiative is currently underway;
  - Action: Public Works mission (alternative C1); recommend USACE and MACOM to be determined conduct a pilot test.
- Streamline our management processes.
  - Action: Implement MILCON streamlining; reduce cycle time from five to two years; initiative is currently underway.
  - Action: Introduce legislative and regulatory changes; ACSIM/USACE to prepare package of proposed changes.
  - Action: Simplify access to environmental technical support; ACSIM/USACE to prepare decision paper.
- Reduce overhead.
  - Action: Manage property as an asset; ACSIM/USACE to prepare decision paper.
- Leverage outside resources.
  - Action: Expand Army-wide outsourcing strategy; expanded strategy initiative is underway.
  - Action: Broaden existing DPW outsourcing expertise; initiative is currently underway.
- Use what we have more efficiently.
  - Action: Annual review of Total Army facilities requirement; ACSIM lead—decision paper to VCSA.

7.5 Umbrella Group Assessment, Construct FAA

A parallel assessment focused on the Army core process **acquire and sustain facilities**. The approach taken in this parallel assessment was to address the core process in three major component parts—**establish direction, acquire assets, provide capability**—and propose alternatives to the current process in each of its components. The resulting briefing can be found in appendix P of this document.

The process itself was treated categorically as a manifestation of the Title 10 function, "the construction, maintenance and repair of buildings, structures and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property to carry out the responsibilities specified in this [3013. Secretary of the Army] section."

7.5.1 Briefing Points

The Umbrella Group defined the acquire and sustain facilities core process as identifying, acquiring, managing, maintaining and ultimately disposing of real property in support of Army requirements for the sustaining base and forward stationed forces. It also acknowledged the process as representing a significant resource investment comprised of: approximately 950 million square feet in inventory, 18 percent (170 million) of which is excess to the Army's needs; manpower approximating 43,000 civilians and 1,000 military; and roughly $12 billion, the largest accounts being Army family housing (AFH) ($1.4 billion), military construction Army (MCA) ($3.1 billion) and OMA ($2.8 billion).

In summary, the Umbrella Group identified several shortcomings with the Army's current process.

- From a "customer" perspective:
  - command expectations exceed resources;
  - ineffective, fragmented information systems; and
  - inflexible, non-integrated procurement.
- From a "process owner" perspective:
  - multiple process owners (e.g., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment (ASA(IL&E)), Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works (ASA(CW)), ACSIM, Chief of Engineers (COE), USACE);
  - multiple hand-offs;
  - process is manpower and time intensive; and
  - resource delivery not tied to requirements.

7.5.2 Acquire and Sustain Facilities Summary

7.5.2.1 Conclusions

7.5.2.1.1 Establish Direction

The Umbrella Group proposed that CW should be divested based on the following criteria.

- not in Title 10;
- not a core competence;
- not a core capability; and
- not a core process.

Discussion of divestiture evolved around the political sensitivity of CW and an acknowledgement that, while not core to the Army it does provide collateral training benefit to Army personnel assigned to the CW mission of USACE. In addition, CW permits the Army to provide a real, tangible, recognizable benefit to US citizens and allies and an associated visibility not offered in any other medium.

Other Umbrella Group considerations follow.

- HQDA determines direction. Demands on the Army's engineering capabilities are manifold but the headquarters, singularly, must assume the responsibility for determining which demands are legitimate given its core competencies, and, of those, their relative priority. This responsibility may not be delegated.
- Merge COE (MACOM (-)) into ASA(IL&E)
  - reduces redundancies of staff;
  - COE becomes a deputy ASA(IL&E) for acquiring and sustaining facilities; and

  - responsibilities vested in single process owner formulating an integrated process.
- Single multifunctional MACOM determines requirements (Force Development Command).

7.5.2.1.2 Acquire Assets

The Umbrella Group assessment concluded that:

- Real property contracting is an Army acquisition process.
- Single process owner for contracting (> $1 million)—SARDA should:
  - design and build through contracting;
  - leverage private capital;
  - adopt build-to-lease arrangements; and
  - privatize to maximum extent.
- Empowerment to local installation (< $1 million local construction) is inadequate.
- Disposal of excess property:
  - establish a real property disposal agent in ASA(IL&E); and
  - coordinate planning for best disposition of excess property.

7.5.2.1.3 Provide Capability

There were two conclusions concerning the **provide capability** aspect of the construct process.

- Single installation management process owner—ASA(IL&E) should:
  - consolidate ACSIM into ASA(IL&E); and
  - be responsible for real property disposal.
- Maintenance/sustainment functions for facilities and properties should be privatized/outsourced to:
  - improve environmental management; and
  - use information management smarter.

7.5.2.2 Decisions Required

The Umbrella Group determined that decisions were required to:

- divest CW;
- merge USACE (-) with ASA(IL&E);
- merge ACSIM (-) into ASA(IL&E);
- establish responsibility for excess property disposal activity in ASA(IL&E);
- establish single installation management process owner—ASA(ILE);
- establish single contracting process owner—ASA(RDA); and
- maximize outsourcing maintenance and sustainment functions.

7.6 FAA Issue Sheets

Some, but not all of the proposed actions discussed above were referred to the ASA(M&RA) and VCSA for decision. Outlined below is a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by USACE and the Umbrella Group, and ultimately presented in the 23 February 1996 decision briefing. A full explanation, to include PBD and implementation guidance, is provided at appendix T.

7.6.1 MILCON Streamlining Issue

To accelerate the MILCON process, it is necessary to streamline current programming and execution cycles. The normal MILCON process can take up to five years before construction is initiated. A reduced process time (e.g., from requirement identification to award of construction) from five to 2.5 years would significantly increase responsiveness to mission generated construction changes and reduce inflationary project cost increases incurred because of the excessive time associated with the current process. The FAA proponent recommended ACSIM coordinate drafting of legislation and a workforce impact statement to streamline the MILCON process.

7.6.2 Environmental Management/Tech Support Issue

Environmental management often lags behind in the life cycle of a construct project because environmental expertise is fragmented across organizational lines and districts, and frequently competes for resourcing. The result is that environmental compliance is often addressed too late in the Real Property development process at additional costs to the process. Simplified access to environmental technical support will result in savings from economies of scale. The FAA proponent recommended ACSIM develop a legislative package and impact statement associated with a simplified technical support process.

7.6.3 Outsourcing Real Property Functions and Facilities Issue

Facilities and construct functions have direct bearing on readiness, quality of life and retention of soldiers. This issue addresses how to determine the best alternative means, through outsourcing, to achieve standards for satisfying facilities (e.g., family housing). This strategy should significantly reduce government ownership and save costs of maintenance, repair, renovations and construction of new facilities. The FAA proponent and the Umbrella Group both recommended ACSIM coordinate and direct compliance with outsourcing strategies. Estimated savings would be 15,000 civilian spaces and $3 billion.

7.6.4 Public Works Mission to USACE Issue

As DPW resources have drawn down, the Corps has been called upon to do more. DPW/USACE partnerships are institutionalizing the trend to provide more USACE support to DPWs. The USACE mission could be expanded to consolidate all construct technical operations and maintenance support to installations under one program governed by installation requirements. Both the FAA proponent and the Umbrella Group recommended further assessment of this issue in the Installation Management FAA scheduled for Phase II. Preliminary estimate of potential savings was 1000 civilian spaces and $168 million.

7.6.5 Single Real Property Disposal Agent Issue

The Army is projected to carry approximately 170 million square feet of excess facilities (minus surge requirements) into the next century. This represents a considerable cost in terms of minimal maintenance (e.g., safety), and lost opportunity in revenue that might be generated by disposing of this excess. The real property management process would be more efficiently managed if a single process owner were designated with the responsibility of expeditious disposition of excess real property. The Umbrella Group recommended ASA(IL&E) pursue development of the single excess property agent concept. Estimated savings of implementation of this concept would be $800 million.

7.6.6 Installation Construction Authority Issue

A significant level of the construction activity at the installation level is under $1 million per project. Increasing the OMA and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation for construction/modification projects to $1 million (from the current $300,000 per project) and Unspecified Minor Military Construction (UMMCA) from $1 million to $3 million (from the current $1 million per project), would empower installations with sufficient authority to exercise almost autonomous control over the localized acquire and sustain facilities process on a given installation—a single process owner. The Umbrella Group recommended ACSIM develop a concept plan and legislative package to increase O&M authority at installation level for construct activities.

Chapter 8
Equip, Supply, Service and Maintain (ESSM) FAA

8.1 Background

The purpose of the Equip, Supply, Service and Maintain (ESSM) FAA was to examine the core processes of **acquire, maintain and sustain equipment**. The ESSM FAA was initially divided into two parts: one, **equip**, was cosponsored by the ASA(RDA), the DUSA(OR) and DCSOPS. The remaining three parts, **supply, service and maintain**, were cosponsored by ASA(IL&E) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG). The proponent for the entire ESSM was the AMC. The lead for the ESSM FAA within AMC was the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland. A copy of their briefing is at appendix Q. It should be noted that early in the AMC FAA process a decision was made by the VCSA to defer addressing the service portion until Phase II of the Institutional/TDA Axis. Therefore this chapter only addresses equip, supply and maintain (ESM) activities.

In addition to AMSAA's ESM FAA, an Umbrella Group, under the sponsorship of DCSOPS, conducted a parallel ESM FAA. The Umbrella Group also deferred the service portion of the ESSM processes. The findings of the group are incorporated in this section; their briefing is at appendix R.

8.2 Objectives

The following were the objectives of the ESM FAA.

- Describe the core processes executed within the functional areas.
- Identify the producers, products and customers within each process.
- Analyze and document process shortfalls and inefficiencies.
- Develop and evaluate potential solutions to shortfalls and inefficiencies that either improve existing processes, or result in new, reengineered, replacement processes.

8.3 Methodology

The overall study methodology was an evolutionary investigative approach designed to systematically describe status quo practices, identify performance issues, investigate reengineering opportunities, analyze impacts and develop alternatives. AMSAA developed their methodology by concentrating on a concomitant analysis of current business processes and practices contained within ESM. AMSAA found that the equip function was divided into a series of interrelated sub-processes composed of contracting, science and technology, and test and evaluation. The supply and maintain functions, on the other hand, were found to involve single macro-processes. A series of checkpoints were established in the form of General Officer/Senior Executive Service Steering Committees to benchmark progress, solicit guidance and develop appropriate paths. In addition, the ESM FAA team coordinated their efforts with related FAA efforts (e.g. TRADOC's Materiel Requirements Determination, DCSOPS Umbrella Group analysis and HQDA Redesign).

8.4 AMC FAA Process

8.4.1 Equip Process

AMSAA started their FAA with the acquire core process of equip. The equip process is defined as "the process beginning with research and development, to production, and through materiel fielding which provides the Total Force the necessary technology and enhanced systems capable of executing warfighting operations today and tomorrow." Using this definition, AMSAA initially addressed four

broad functional areas of the equip process.

- Contracting and procurement;
- science and technology (S&T);
- test and evaluation (T&E); and
- other equip functions (e.g., program management, systems engineering, manufacturing, integrated logistics support and funds management/PPBES-related actions).

Subsequent dialogue with ASA(RDA) and an interpretation of the TDA Redesign Axis Charter, resulted in dropping those functions related to program management, as outlined in the other equip functions noted above, from AMSAA's current efforts. Contracting, S&T, and T&E remained central to the FAA and are addressed consecutively in the sub-paragraphs that follow.

8.4.1.1 Contracting

Within the equip process contracting is a key means of accomplishing work. It involves the use of bids and negotiations at Army installations, activities and offices to procure goods and services.

8.4.1.1.1 Briefing Points

Briefing points pertaining to contracting follow.

- There are multiple, regulatory guidelines, policy instructions and levels of review (e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFAR) and Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS). There are also multiple contracting offices within MACOMs.
- Too many MACOMs have multiple contracting facilities on the same installation, all with different sets of standard operating procedures (SOPs). Consolidation should be pursued (figure 8-1).



Figure 8-1. Local Consolidation Opportunities

- Maximum use should be made of credit cards for micro-purchases. More emphasis needs to be placed on lifting a number of locally imposed restrictions on the use of credit cards (figure 8-2).



Figure 8-2. Micro Purchase Efficiencies via Credit Card

- ADP technology has not been fully leveraged. There is a need to reduce paperwork by better use of electronic data interchange (EDI)/electronic commerce (EC).
- Workload based manpower determination should be used more extensively (figure 8-3).

Contracting Workload & Potential TDA Reduction

MACOM	Actions		$ Awarded ($M)		FY96 TDA	TDA Savings	
	Under $25K	Over $25K	Under $25K	Over $25K		TDA	%
AMC	199,393	21,188	$426	$14,707	3,934	392	10%
ARNG	404,129	2,818	$271	$545	800	69	9%
DISC4	573	821	$3	$578	77	0	0%
DSS-W	14,011	3,046	$51	$1,134	160	0	0%
EUSA	40,988	996	$69	$178	104	0	0%
FORSCOM	317,799	6,060	$363	$895	626	18	3%
INSCOM	5,592	354	$7	$76	33	0	0%
ISC	3,612	1,192	$20	$273	92	0	0%
MDW	39,774	1,102	$61	$142	132	2	2%
MEDCOM	156,171	2,495	$209	$352	271	0	0%
MRDC	21,148	597	$37	$136	82	20	24%
MTMC	6,524	453	$15	$130	99	0	0%
OPTEC	363	196	$2	$66	21	0	0%
SSDC	2,275	1,054	$4	$1,270	71	0	0%
TRADOC	358,644	5,049	$308	$1,020	539	32	6%
USACE	423,686	21,108	$468	$7,161	2,206	260	12%
USARCENT	2,488	54	$6	$56	19	0	0%
USAREUR	101,473	2,015	$172	$415	351	1	0%
USARPAC	25,695	890	$44	$209	105	2	2%
USARSO	18,974	505	$30	$59	52	0	0%
USMA	10,627	335	$18	$56	67	30	45%
TOTAL	2,154,149	72,328	$2,582	$29,457	9,841**	826	8%



Figure 8-3. Contracting Workload and Potential TDA Reduction

8.4.1.1.2 Contracting Summary

8.4.1.1.2.1 Conclusions

Assessment of contracting resulted in the following conclusions.

- MACOMs need to take full advantage of credit card opportunities.
- There are disparities in contracting office resources-per-transactions within MACOMs.
- There are multiple policy layers and potential for local contracting office consolidations.

8.4.1.1.2.2 Decisions Required

In the area of contracting decisions are required to adhere to the following.

- Mandate minimum credit card usage by at least 80 percent for micro-purchases.
- Within each MACOM, identify and implement best practices in contracting to achieve TDA savings identified in workload based manpower determination process.
- Eliminate multiple local policy and contracting offices.

8.4.1.2 Science and Technology (S&T)

S&T has equivalent requirements for maintaining a short term and long term focus, and balancing competing demands for technology transition versus technology insertion into the materiel requirements process. The S&T process is generally scoped as Army 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 funded activities.

8.4.1.2.1 Briefing Points

Highlights of S&T discussion follow.

- Army S&T processes, management, organization and reporting structure have been a major focus of recent, high-level, independent studies (i.e., since 1989).
- S&T community is comprised of the Army Research Office (ARO), the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), and Research, Engineering and Development Centers (RDECs).
- Most of ARL, RDE Command S&T monies are spent external to government organizations.
- S&T are integral parts of the acquisition and sustainment efforts and therefore reduce duplication.
- Integration of S&T with force development may prematurely focus on the "materiel" solution to user requirements.
- Current S&T structure supports multiple TRADOC organizations with no additional process efficiencies under TRADOC ownership.

8.4.1.2.2 S&T Summary

8.4.1.2.2.1 Conclusions

Assessment of S&T resulted in the following conclusions.

- Significant downsizing, consolidation and re-engineering of S&T infrastructure is ongoing.
- Major new initiatives still are being implemented.
- Equipment should be acquired at lowest cost/risk to Army under a "Force Sustainment Command."
- The current S&T process best supports Force XXI system development.

8.4.1.2.2.2 Decisions Required

In the area of S&T decisions are required to:

- Continue ongoing reengineering efforts to achieve the already programmed POM 98-03 savings.
- Discontinue Umbrella FAA look at the S&T area.

8.4.1.3 Test and Evaluation (T&E)

T&E is a collection of distinct processes consisting of testing, measurement, data collection, analysis and evaluation.

8.4.1.3.1 T&E Briefing Points

Discussion of T&E consisted of the following main points.

- Multiple process outputs, as well as a variety of customers demanding tailored and individual products, result in duplication of testing, measurement, data collection analysis and evaluation (figure 8-4).



Figure 8-4. Functional Realignment

- T&E processes should contribute to the development of operationally valuable systems rather than react to emerging systems with destructive pass-fail evaluations.
- Modeling and simulation are under utilized and need to be an integral part of the T&E process. Verification, validation and accreditation (VV&A) are not employed to greatest advantage.
- Resources need to be applied as early in the development program as feasible and directed at areas that constitute the greatest risk to achieving requirements (figure 8-5).



Figure 8-5. T&E Reengineering Roadmap

8.4.1.3.2 T&E Process Summary

8.4.1.3.2.1 Conclusions

Assessment of T&E resulted in the following conclusions.

- Single process, single plans and single product are a gateway to T&E efficiencies.
- Consolidated testing streamlines planning and execution.
- Functional realignment provides the implementation framework to proceed.

8.4.1.3.2.2 Decisions Required

To proceed, decisions are required to:

- functionally realign evaluation functions;
- consolidate test functions under the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM); and
- place T&E funding under process integrator control.

8.4.2 Supply Process

Supply refers to a series of processes involving the acquisition, distribution and maintenance, while in storage, of supplies. Even though there are 10 classes of supply, the AMC FAA process only addressed Class IX (e.g., repair parts).

8.4.2.1 Briefing Points

Supply discussions focused on the following main points.

- Current Class IX supply processes involve excesses and turbulence, large inventories, multiple financial interfaces, excessive cycle times and potential for shortages for contingencies (figure 8-6).



Figure 8-6. Cost Savings through Redistribution of Excess

- Processes must consider elimination of unit level prescribed load lists (PLLs), and refocus on readiness based sparing (RBS) (figure 8-7), velocity management (VM), support for wartime contingencies and redistribution (e.g., central asset management/single stock fund) (figure 8-8).



Figure 8-7. RBS Performance Validated



Figure 8-8. Transition to Wartime Requirements

8.4.2.2 Supply Process Summary

8.4.2.2.1 Conclusions

The assessment of the supply process resulted in the following conclusions.

- Significant potential for cost savings and improved responsiveness can be realized with reengineered inventory levels and redistribution.
- There are potential shortfalls in retail inventory for wartime or contingencies; transition stocks are required.

8.4.2.2.2 Decisions Required

Improving the supply process requires decisions to:

- Test, validate and implement readiness based sparing, velocity management, standard Army retail supply system-objective (SARSS-O) and central asset management;
- invest in additional stocks for wartime/contingencies; and
- test and validate PLL elimination and deployment stock concepts.

8.4.3 Maintain Process

The maintain process consists of a series of functions for sustaining materiel in an operational status, restoring it to a serviceable condition, or updating and upgrading its functional utility through modification.

8.4.3.1 Briefing Points

Briefing points from the maintain segment of the FAA presentation follow.

- Current maintenance processes consist of significant infrastructure, duplication of capability, and inadequate integration of reserve component maintenance. Further, the cost structure for performing maintenance by directors of logistics (DOLs) and depots does not promote cost-effective maintenance decisions.
- Initiatives such as integrated sustainment maintenance (ISM) can reduce duplication of repair, reduce wholesale procurements and reduce repair costs (figure 8-9).



Figure 8-9. Functional Realignments under ISM

- Base Shop Test Facility (BSTF) doctrine and distribution needs to be reviewed and possibly revised.

8.4.3.2 Maintain Process Summary

8.4.3.2.1 Conclusions

The assessment of the maintain process resulted in the following conclusions.

- Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) has demonstrated potential for cost savings and enhanced integration of sustainment maintenance.

- Current integrated family of test equipment (IFTE) BSTF allocation can be modified to improve wartime support and reduce costs.

8.4.3.2.2 Decisions Required

Enhancements to the maintain process require decisions to:

- implement four star review of ISM to achieve $14 million non-TDA savings;
- continue to evaluate ISM options for full integration under national management; and
- do not procure additional BSTF; modify allocation to improve wartime support at a savings of $20.3 million (figure 8-10).



Figure 8-10. Efficiencies in BSTF Allocation

8.5 Umbrella Group Assessment—ESM FAA

The parallel assessment of the Umbrella Group applied BPR principles (e.g., single process ownership, treating business activities like a business, etc.) to the process review and focused on integration of the reserve component supply/maintenance capabilities into the total system to eliminate duplication.

8.5.1 Equip Process Briefing Points

In regard to the equip process the Umbrella Group made the following points.

- Equip is not a process with a single process owner, but a series of independent activities linked by bureaucratic paper.
- The "Force Development Command" (i.e., TRADOC) should be the process owner for acquiring equipment—from research and development, through experimentation, test and evaluation, with a single hand-off to the PEO/Program Manager (PM) for procurement.
- TRADOC should refocus the requirements process to organizations and defer to HQDA to transform organizations into eaches required by Congress/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

8.5.1.1 Equip Summary

8.5.1.1.1 Conclusions

The Umbrella Group assessment of the equip process resulted in the following recommendations.

- Widen the lane by making the "Force Development Command" responsible for future concepts and selection of future technologies.
- Eliminate layers and corresponding multiple decision points by consolidating combat developments, Battle Labs, TRADOC system managers and Army Labs into a single organization that leverages commercial technology.
- Use information technology to manage, not physical locations.

8.5.1.1.2 Decision Required

The Umbrella Group recommendations above require decisions to:

- make the Force Development Command/TRADOC the process owner;
- align Army labs (ARL/ARO) under TRADOC, along with all 6.1-6.3 funding;
- split the RDECs and align the research and development (R&D) portion with TRADOC; and
- consolidate test agencies (TECOM, Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) and Kwajalein) and align with TRADOC.

8.5.2 Supply Process (Class IX)

8.5.2.1 Briefing Points

The Umbrella Group highlighted the following concerns with respect to the supply process.

- The supply process is a complex, segmented structure looking something like a patchwork quilt of supply agencies, joint organizations, services and transportation organizations.
- The Class IX distribution process has multiple performance measures, a variety of automated systems and involves numerous agencies.
- Commercial companies can guarantee overnight delivery within the US, two days overseas; yet, the Army standard is five days for high priority items in CONUS and twice as long for overseas.

8.5.2.2 Supply Process Summary

8.5.2.2.1 Conclusions

The Umbrella Group assessment of the supply process resulted in the following conclusions.

- Army standards for supply are too low.
- There are too many disparate organizations, information systems and performance measures with no one clearly in charge of the process.
- Unpredictability and unreliability in the supply process lowers confidence in the process and generates stockpile/excess.

8.5.2.2.2 Decisions Required

To correct Umbrella Group findings, decisions are required to:

- make the "Force Sustainment Command" (i.e., AMC) the process owner;
- enhance information technology to permit world-wide asset visibility and timely/cost effective stock selections;
- improve transportation availability to move stock quickly and efficiently; and
- place all supply activities above the DS level under the "Force Sustainment Command" national management using a single automated logistics system and a single stock fund. Regional implementation is also feasible, using corps, as a first step.

8.5.3 Maintenance Process

8.5.3.1 Briefing Points

The Umbrella Group presented the following briefing points on the maintenance process.

- Perceived high cost of depot repair drives duplication of depot capability at the installation/retail level.
- Maintenance integration/coordination is difficult.
- Depot pricing policy for cost of maintenance services varies from installation corps for similar services.

8.5.3.2 Maintenance Process Summary

8.5.3.2.1 Conclusions

Umbrella Group conclusions resulted in the following recommendations.

- Identify a single process owner for all sustainment maintenance.
- Identify real costs of doing business at depots, DOLs, and reserve sites; close inefficient operations.
- Integrate the RC into a total maintenance system; eliminate duplication.

8.5.3.2.2 Decisions Required

These recommendations require decisions to:

- designate the "Force Sustainment Command" as the "National Provider" of maintenance support above the DS level;
- implement national level management of maintenance by integrating depots, USAR and ARNG capabilities and DOLs using regionalization;
- tailor multi-functional maintenance capability for support in specific operational areas using active, reserve components, civilians and contractor personnel; and
- establish performance measures at HQDA level that result in pacing items readiness at 95 percent with costs equal to or less than today's cost; set a performance goal to reduce maintenance cost by 30 percent by the year 2000.

8.5.3.2.3 Overall Assessment by Umbrella Team

The Umbrella Group assessment is summarized as follows.

- Equip, supply and maintain initiatives should be compatible with the DA PAM 100-1 model of three integrating MACOMs.
- The "National Provider" concept can be implemented in incremental stages but the largest savings and best process results would be realized from the full concept implementation.
- AMC "out-of-the-box" thinking is reflected in supply and maintain, T&E and contracting but no real forward thinking is evident in S&T/PM support.

8.6 FAA Issue Sheets

Outlined below is a synopsis of each of the issues developed from the FAAs briefed by AMC and the Umbrella Group. A full explanation, to include PBD detail and implementation guidance, is provided at appendix T.

8.6.1 Contracting—Consolidation Issue

There are multiple contracting offices in the same geographic areas. The FAA identified local consolidation at five sites to eliminate redundancy (i.e., Rock Island, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Washington DC, Huntsville, and Fort Huachuca). Additional consolidation opportunities were thought to possible at a later date. The FAA proponent recommended consolidation of contracting offices at the five sites. Estimated savings were 94 civilian spaces and $25.85 million.

8.6.2 Contracting—Credit Card Use Issue

Credit card use for micro purchases reduces purchasing agent time and eliminates the need for a purchase order. Over 68 percent of the Army's FY 95 contracting actions were micro purchases, but only 60 percent of the eligible actions used credit cards. Mandating credit card use reduces manpower requirements. The FAA proponent recommended ASA(RDA) establish a policy mandating use of credit cards for micro purchases. Estimated savings would be 117 civilian spaces and $31.9 million.

8.6.3 Contracting—Workload Benchmarks Issue

By plotting TDA strength versus contracting actions over $25,000 and applying regression analysis, inefficient contracting offices were identified. Within each MACOM, implementing best practices in contracting achieves TDA savings. The proponent FAA recommended ASA(RDA) establish a policy directing benchmarking best practice implementation. Estimated savings would be 826 civilian spaces and $227.15 million.

8.6.4 Central Asset Management Issue

SARSS-O enables the corps Materiel Management Center (MMC) to have visibility of all corps stocks, permitting direction and disposition. Central asset management enables AMC to provide a similar function by absorbing installation stocks into the wholesale stock fund (e.g., single stock fund) thereby providing visibility and enhancing Army-wide redistribution. Operation of a single stock fund eliminates a financial system layer and duplication of materiel and financial management functions. An $83 million investment (an additional FAA issue) addresses potential shortfalls in retail and wholesales stocks for wartime and contingencies. Savings from implementing central asset management accrue through one-time redistribution of excess inventory (i.e., $380 million) and TDA space savings. The FAA proponent recommended AMC establish a central asset management process. Estimated savings would be 203 civilian spaces and $435.8 million.

8.6.5 Readiness Based Sparing/Velocity Management (RBS/VM) Issue

AMC recommended implementing RBS/VM in POM 98-03 for a one-time inventory reduction savings of $384 million and another $120 million savings from order/ship time (OST) reductions. Implementation would require AMC/DA/CASCOM support to MACOMs, corps and divisions to compute and stabilize new stock levels with changes negotiated on an exception basis. SARSS-O, software, other investments reduce net savings. Wartime and contingency support concerns are addressed as a separate issue that proposes to maintain heavy division, light division and brigade authorized stockage lists (ASLs) to augment peacetime stocks. The FAA proponent recommended approval of RBS/VM for POM 98-03 submission. Estimated savings would be $299.9 million.

8.6.6 Repair Parts Stocks for Wartime/Contingencies Issue

Analysis indicates peacetime stockage levels based on operating tempo (OPTEMPO), repair procedures and efficiencies will not provide adequate retail or wholesale stocks for wartime or contingencies. Using National Training Center (NTC), Europe and Korea field experience demand data, a full heavy division ASL, a light division ASL and a separate brigade ASL cost $83 million for Class IX items. Justification for buying these contingency/war reserve stocks uses the three-unit approach. Buying for 10 divisions would break the bank and would receive little support. The FAA proponent recommended approval of $83 million for investment in additional repair parts stocks.

8.6.7 Maintenance-Base Shop Test Facility (BSTF) Issue

AMSAA analysis of wartime workload indicated only 63 BSTFs were required but distribution between active divisions, other units and ARNG/USAR would have to be modified. Seventy-nine BSTFs have currently been procured, with 16 more in POM. TRADOC (e.g., US Army Ordnance School) has an on-

going initiative to modify GS electronic maintenance TOE structure. Sixteen BSTFs would be available to accommodate GS restructure and ARNG/USAR on a regional basis. The FAA proponent recommended AMC reconcile proponent analysis with TRADOC GS redesign for POM 98-03 submission. Estimated savings would be $19.7 million.

8.6.8 Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) Issue

ISM ultimately places all sustainment maintenance under an integrated management structure owned by AMC. Full implementation is not possible in POM 98-03 because of automation, funding and ownership issues, but incremental implementation would be possible in FY97. There are two options (i.e., with or without AMC control of regional sustainment maintenance). These options are pending a four-star review and CSA decision. The FAA proponent recommended AMC/FORSCOM/TRADOC implement ISM in POM 98-03. Estimated savings would be $142 million.

8.6.9 AMC Materiel Management Privatization Issue

Analysis of low risk AMC materiel management functions (e.g., cataloging, log transfers, deficiency/discrepancy management) indicated 459 full-time equivalents in AMC MSCs could be privatized. Assuming at least 10 percent savings, $2.3 million savings/year in labor costs could be generated. The FAA proponent recommended implementation in POM 98-03 with follow-on study for additional privatization by POM 00-05 submission.

8.6.10 Test & Evaluation—Consolidated Test Issue

T&E reengineering proposals, feasible in POM 98-03, include functional realignment with savings 150-300 spaces followed by consolidating all test functions, operational and developmental, in AMC TECOM with an additional 500-700 space savings. With functional realignment, OPTEC's Operational Evaluation Command (OEC) evaluator would plan the total system evaluation and integrate the T&E process. TECOM develops detailed test plans, prepares and executes all tests. Consolidated testing places all test activities under TECOM. Two issues remain: Kwajalein missile range ownership; and TEXCOM ownership. The proponent recommended consolidating Kwajalein with TECOM and continued operation at current POM level. However, the $130 million shortfall over FY97-01 would not be fixed. The proponent recommended OEC as the evaluation integrator, not OPTEC headquarters, and further recommended that TEXCOM be consolidated with TECOM. Estimated savings would be 600 civilian spaces and $165 million.

8.6.11 Test & Evaluation—End State Issue

The T&E reengineering road map depicted four options for evaluation ownership at end-state: a single T&E command under AMC or HQDA; developmental evaluation in AMC; operational evaluation in OPTEC; and all evaluations in OPTEC. DUSA(OR) recommended operation of already approved functional realignment before making a final decision on T&E end-state. The FAA proponent recommended AMC conduct a T&E end state study and report out to the VCSA NLT July 1996, in time to influence mini-POM 99-03. The end state would realize a potential savings of 650 TDA spaces.

8.6.12 Contracting—Follow-on Study Issue

AMC identified additional contracting office consolidation opportunities in CONUS and OCONUS (e.g., Fort Richardson, Fort Shafter, Natick Labs, Fort Hood, Fort Belvoir, Alexandria, Fort Eustis, Little Rock, Fort Gordon, New Orleans, Nashville, Falls Church and Tacoma). Consolidation was recommended at only five sites, with other actions subject to follow-on studies. Additionally Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) costs associated with credit card use is $23 per line item. Issue was identified as an open issue requiring follow-up resolution. Costs associated with credit card use could be

negotiated lower to recognize paperwork reduction and time savings. The FAA proponent recommended ASA(RDA) conduct a follow-on study of contracting consolidation opportunities and DFAS charges.

8.6.13 Prescribed Load List (PLL) Elimination Issue

A FORSCOM Inspector General (IG) report indicates PLL contributes little to unit readiness and is a major source of excess. Analysis of PLL in an armored division (i.e., over 12 months) and XVIII Airborne Corps Company (over three months) indicates ASLs, not PLLs, support readiness. Follow-on tests are scheduled January–November 1996. PLL elimination could save $2-3 million per division (e.g., a one-time savings). The FAA proponent recommended FORSCOM test and validate PLL elimination.

8.6.14 DOL Privatization Issue

In the Equip/Supply/Maintain FAA look across the total Army maintenance function, DOL privatization with savings of up to $54 million/year was considered but recommended for review in base operations (BASOPS) FAA. The "National Provider" concept envisions a single logistics system for both supply and sustainment maintenance (GS level) down to the corps rear, including DOLs. Consequently, all maintenance facilities/capabilities must be considered as part of this single system and not be parceled out to different proponents. The FAA proponent recommended AMC include further analysis of this issue during the Maintain, Supply and Services FAA in Phase II.

8.6.15 National Provider Issue

The ESM FAA provided POM 98-03 initiatives that are compatible with "National Provider" concept but do not fully implement the concept. Consequently, significant potential savings are not generated. Savings include those from consolidating duplicate USAR, ARNG and active maintenance facilities located on or near a post, eliminating redundant maintenance overhead through consolidation and regionalization, DOL privatization, reserve component on-post/off-post support opportunities, full implementation of ISM and depot privatization. The Umbrella Group recommended AMC conduct a study of the "National Provider" concept, to include DOL, ARNG, and USAR considerations, with a view to implementation in POM 00-05 There is a potential for up to 15,000 space savings.

8.6.16 PM Matrix Support from AMC Issue

During the ESM FAA, AMC Commander stated that PMs is paying 11,000 people in the RDECs for program support. The Acquisition Executive Support Agency, a FOA of ASA(RDA) contains 3,167 people. Almost $1billion/year is spent, from procurement dollars, just for overhead and supervision of a process that is actually accomplished by private contractors, implying extensive duplication/overhead. The Umbrella Group recommended AMC conduct a study to support a POM 00-05 submission

8.6.17 ARL HQ Elimination and Directorate Realignment Issue

ARL conducts basic and applied research and analysis. Its major customers are AMC's RDECs and PEOs/PMs. ARL provides personnel to TRADOC's Battle Labs, Combat Developers and Requirements Developers as part of integrated concept teams. ARL has recently been organized under a Federated Lab concept, essentially a partnership between the labs, industry and academia. ARL's principal customer should be the "Force Development Command" (i.e., TRADOC) which is responsible for preparing the Army for war in the future. The "Force Development Command" must direct S&T efforts to ensure evolving technologies/materiel solutions match developing warfighting concepts. The Umbrella Group recommended ASA(RDA) conduct a study to determine the optimum process for linking S&T and Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS).

Chapter 9
Headquarters Redesign FAA

9.1 Background

Geopolitical developments and domestic considerations required the Army to refine its strategic vision, develop implementing concepts and structures, experiment and change. The Army's core values, its unique character and competencies, were expected to remain constant; however, it was recognized that the Army of the 21st century must be smaller, more efficient and more effective. Within the context of achieving a smaller, more efficient and effective Army, the purpose of the HQDA redesign was to examine the Institutional Army core capability of **direct, acquire and resource** the force (chapter 1, paragraph 1.3.3.3).

9.2 Objectives

As stated in chapter 1, the Army was committed to a comprehensive redesign and restructure of its institutional organizations in concert with the Force XXI redesign of operational forces (paragraph 1.3.1). Redesign of the Institutional Army encompassed three separate, inter-related, long-term study efforts.

- In-depth examination of Army Title 10 responsibilities.
- MACOM restructuring, including examination of the number of commands required; and
- Army Headquarters redesign, including SSAs and FOAs.

This chapter discusses the third long-term study effort.

9.3 Methodology

The HQDA redesign study, summarized in this chapter, began with the formation of a Secretariat/Army Staff study team (the working group) in May 1995 and concluded in March 1996 with the submission of redesign input to POM 98-03. Unique to this FAA, the working group and the Umbrella Group worked in tandem to generate a single product. The redesign approach included:

- historical research, benchmarking, data calls and staff discussions—all aimed at developing a baseline for further research;
- comparison of various organizational designs coupled with interviews of staff principals from the Army Secretariat and Army Staff, senior officials from JCS and OSD, and MACOM commanders; and
- Functional Area Reviews (FARs) (i.e., structured staff assessments organized around key headquarters functions).

Central to the study effort was the development of an over-arching conceptual framework, consistent with Institutional Army redesign precepts, which identified essential headquarters' functions, and the relationship of these functions to the core processes resident in the MACOMs subordinate to HQDA. This framework was key to the development of recommendations which were intended to transform HQDA into a leaner, flatter, more focused headquarters structure. Redesign efforts were undertaken to support the Force XXI goals of flexible, capable organizations and leaders, which support the four Institutional Army core capabilities:

- Direct and Resource the Force;
- Develop the Force;
- Generate and Project the Force; and
- Sustain the Force.

Of these four core capabilities, **direct and resource** the force was viewed as work traditionally performed by headquarters (e.g., work associated with formulating policy; providing "corporate" leadership and direction; and monitoring and evaluating performance, programming, and resourcing). Indeed, **direct and resource** the force accurately described the four core processes encompassed in the mission of HQDA. These four core processes were:

- Planning and Policy Development;
- Direction and Assessment;
- Financial Management; and
- Information Management.

With respect to **financial management** and **information management**, these processes were seen as enablers to the entire Institutional Army, thereby cutting across all HQDA staff functions. In sum, the core processes described above formed the framework for the analysis and redesign pursued by the HQDA working group. This framework is depicted at figure 9-1.



Figure 9-1. HQDA Redesign Framework

9.4 Working Group Effort

9.4.1 The Redesign Process

The redesign process focused on establishing a baseline view of HQDA and conducting the FARs. The FARs provided "piece-part" analyses of the various functional elements of HQDA, which were aggregated to produce the overall FAA. The distinct parts of the process are graphically portrayed in figure 9-2.

9.4.1.1 Model Development

As a first step, the working group developed a HQDA model, reflecting Force XXI concepts. The model provided a means for comparing "as-is" staff structure with the ideal model construct.



Figure 9-2. HQDA Redesign Process

9.4.1.2 Zero-Based SSAs and FOAs

In a second effort, the working group conducted a zero-based review of SSAs and FOAs. The outcome of this effort was the identification of redesign opportunities consistent with the principle of divesting non-policy functions from the headquarters (e.g., operational activities). These redesign opportunities included opportunities for:

- eliminating all or part of an office or function;
- contracting or privatizing an office or function as long as mission readiness or security was not impacted;
- right-sizing an office or function based on level of work versus staff required;
- transferring an office or function to a MACOM or other location outside of headquarters; or
- retaining the office or function with or without significant change.

These opportunities were identified based on responses to a comprehensive questionnaire (i.e., data call circulated to all ARSTAF, SSA, and FOA offices), a literature review of studies and legislation and interviews with key staff.

9.4.1.3 FAR Analyses

As a third effort, the working group conducted FARs of the eight functional areas conceptualized in the HQDA model. These FARs were scheduled, structured meetings that brought together Army Secretariat and ARSTAF principals to share perspectives and raise critical issues denoted in the HQDA Model. Moderated by Lieutenant General (retired) Charles Otstott, the FARs provided the opportunity to gain functional guidance for continued study. Each FAR addressed:

- redesign principles;
- the Army response to the CORM recommendations;
- statistical summary of the HQDA redesign data call; and
- graphical representations of current and alternative organizations.

The FARs exposed staff redundancies/overlaps and generated ideas for functional improvement in HQDA. These ideas became the genesis of the working group's final recommendations, ultimately culminating in an FAA product, which was incorporated into the POM 98-03 submission. Summary detail of the eight FARs is provided at appendix S.

9.5 Working Group Results

9.5.1 Vetting of FAR Issues

Upon completion of the FARs in January 1996, the working group initiated the vetting of issues and ideas with the senior Army leadership; then, synchronized their results with other FAAs being conducted in conjunction with the Force XXI Campaign. Their final results are discussed in the sections that follow.

9.5.2 HQDA Bimodal Staff

The issue of a bimodal staff (i.e., the dual staff comprised of the civilian Secretariat supporting the Secretary of the Army and the uniformed Deputy Chiefs of Staff supporting the Chief of Staff of the Army) was a central area of examination with anticipated space savings. The working group's assessment was, however, that the current bimodal structure (i.e., the Secretariat and the ARSTAF) was sound. The group considered the merger and consolidation of the Secretariat and ARSTAF for common functional areas (e.g., personnel, engineering, environment and legal affairs). However, their analysis revealed little or no space saving opportunities and found inconclusive evidence of efficiencies to support mergers. As an alternative space saving approach, the working group proposed a percentage reduction to HQDA, concluding that reducing HQDA by 20 percent would risk essential core function performance. Any greater reduction (i.e., a 30 percent reduction) was not considered feasible. The working group recommended:

- retain the bimodal staff;
- reduce HQDA staff elements by 10 percent and encouraged staff principals to establish additional reduction goals;
- eliminate non-essential functions or "shadow staffs;"
- transfer key policy functions from SSAs and FOAs to HQDA; and
- consolidate like staff functions and responsibilities by standing up two new offices—the Deputy Under Secretary for International Activities (DUSA(IA)) and the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for Programs and Requirements (AVCSA(PR)).

Overall, the working group's recommendations resulted in a six- percent reduction in the size of HQDA, stemming from proposals to:

- restructure the DCSOPS; and
- downsize staffs of the:
  - Secretary of the Army;
  - Under Secretary of the Army;
  - ASA(M&RA);
  - ASA(FM&C);
  - ASA(RDA);
  - ASA(IL&E);
  - ASA(CW);
  - Administrative Assistant;
  - General Counsel;
  - Director, Information Systems Command, Control, Communications & Computers;
  - Inspector General;
  - Chief, Public Affairs;
  - Chief, Legislative Liaison;
  - Director, Office of Small & Disadvantaged Business Utilization;
  - Chief of Staff;
  - Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel;
  - Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence;
  - Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans;
  - Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics;
  - Assistant Chief of Staff for Installations Management;
  - Surgeon General;
  - Judge Advocate General;
  - Chief of Chaplains;
  - Chief of Engineers;
  - Director, Army National Guard Bureau; and
  - Chief, Army Reserve.

9.5.3 SSA and FOA Assessment

Based on their analysis the working group reported the following general findings.

- SSAs and FOAs represent 93 percent of HQDA's authorized personnel spaces.
- HQDA currently has 13 SSAs and 58 FOAs for a total of 37,104 spaces.
- In FY 98, HQDA will comprise approximately 15,000 military and 20,000 civilian spaces.
- SSAs and FOAs vary widely in size and responsibility.
- Many of the organizations appear functionally similar.
- Distinctions between HQDA staff, SSA and FOA responsibilities have blurred.
- Some FOAs resemble unifunctional MACOMs.
- FOA manpower has migrated to OSD, matching HQDA trends in general (e.g., Troop Support Agency (TSA) and US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) were transferred to OSD).
- SSA staffing levels increased with the establishment of the Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency (AAESA) (AAESA brought spaces into HQDA from AMC and PEOs).

The above findings led the working group to identify five possible courses of action concerning SSAs and FOAs. The courses of action were to:

- eliminate some/or all SSA/FOA activities;
- contract or outsource some/or all SSA/FOA activities;
- right-size some/or all SSA/FOA staffs;
- transfer some/or all SSA/FOA missions to MACOMs or other organizations; and
- retain select SSA/ FOS either "as-is" or with functional improvements.

9.5.3.1 SSA Recommendations

Ultimately, the working group recommended eliminating or merging nine of the thirteen SSAs by:

- realigning key policy functions to the HQ Staff;
- transferring operational functions to MACOMs;
- consolidating analysis functions with the Concepts Analysis Agency which becomes the **Center for Army Analysis**;
- downsizing three of the remaining four SSAs by at least ten percent; and
- reducing the AAESA by twenty percent in keeping with budget modernization and acquisition reform streamlining.

These recommendations resulted in an overall 21 percent reduction in SSA spaces, attributable to:

- elimination and/or merger of the:
  - General Officers' Mess;
  - Army Environmental Policy Institute;
  - Military Police Operations Agency;
  - Panama Treaty Implementation Agency Office;
  - Army Environmental Office;
  - Test and Evaluation Management Agency;
  - Sensitive Records Information Agency; and
  - Base Realignment and Closure Office.
- downsizing the:
  - Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency;
  - Intelligence Staff Support Agency;
  - Command and Control Support Agency;
  - Information Management Support Agency; and
  - Concepts Analysis Agency.

9.5.3.2 FOA Recommendations

Regarding the FOAs, the working group recommended elimination or merging 14 FOAs and transfer of 12; thereby decreasing the number of HQDA FOAs from 58 to 32. Specifically, the group proposed to:

- transfer training and education FOAs (e.g., Army War College, Army Management Staff College) to TRADOC;
- consolidate base support functions beginning with the merger of Personnel and Employment Services-Washington (P&ES-W) and Space and Building Management-Washington (S&BMS-W) with Headquarters Services-Washington (HQSV-W);
- transfer environmental policy functions to ACSIM and all environmental policy execution to the Army Environmental Center; and
- downsize the remaining 30 FOAs by at least 10 percent.

Theses recommendations equated to a 54 percent reduction in FOA infrastructure primarily as a result of:

- divestiture of FOA operational functions to MACOMs.
- elimination and/or merger of the:
  - Model Improvement and Study Management Agency;
  - Directed Military Overhire (DMO) Detachment;
  - US Army Civilian Personnel Field Agency;
  - Personnel and Employment Services—Washington;
  - Space and Building Management—Washington;
  - Hometown News Service;
  - Military Postal Services Agency;
  - Army Research Institute;
  - Chaplain Support Agency;
  - US Army Space Program Office;
  - Special Operations Agency;
  - DCSOPS Support Agency;
  - Center of Military History;
  - Army Claims Service; and
  - Army National Guard Finance Service Center.
- transfer of the:
  - US Army Broadcasting Service to OSD;
  - Army Management Staff College to TRADOC;
  - Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency and US Army Recruiting Command to TRADOC;
  - Military Entrance Processing Command to TRADOC;
  - US Army War College to TRADOC;
  - USA Aeronautical Services Agency, USA Nuclear and Chemical Agency, Inter-American Defense Board, Joint Mexican-US Defense Commission and USA Space and Strategic Defense Command to TRADOC;
  - Logistics Integration Agency to AMC; and
  - Army National Guard Professional Education Center to TRADOC.

9.6 Working Group Conclusions

The working group determined that there was no single yardstick for defining or measuring a high performing headquarters staff. However, they noted that organizations recognized as "high performance," "world class" or "industry benchmarks" shared many common characteristics. Compartmentalization and over specialization are discouraged. Cross-functional mechanisms abounded and hierarchical (i.e., top-down) reporting and decision relationships are de-emphasized. Staff elements are product and customer oriented rather than skill or discipline oriented. Then too, expert or "special" staffs are integrated into line functions. Managers are team leaders whose primary responsibility is to coach and problem solve rather than control and direct. Finally, attributes of the "world class" organization itself are viewed as a primary vehicle for achieving competitive advantage.

In this light the working group provided recommendations consistent with NPR precepts (paragraph 1.2.2.2) and met the goals of the Institutional Army Campaign Plan (paragraph 1.3.1). The HQDA redesign FAA resulted in:

- divestiture of non-core functions;
- elimination of layering and duplication;
- empowerment of commanders; and
- re-focus of HQDA on policy making rather than policy execution.

In its final form the HQDA Model, as seen at figure 9-3 and also referred to earlier in figure 5-1, provided a blueprint for the future.



Figure 9-3. HQDA Model for the 21st Century

The working group acknowledged that the current environment of rank, command and control discipline and accountability was integral to HQDA. However, it saw adoption of "high performance" benchmarks as essential to change. The group did not suggest that HQDA should develop new leadership, management, communication, problem solving and recognition/promotion mechanisms that reward innovative ways of reaching goals and achieving success. Rather, its examination of many of today's "world class" organizations indicated change had evolved. Previous to their transitions to process-oriented, flatter organizational designs, these organizations were patterned after more rigid, bureaucratic reporting and decision making models.

The working group concluded that the transition of HQDA over the next few years would depend, not only upon the will of its leaders, but also on a myriad of factors beyond the control of the Army. Waivers of existing regulations and instructions, resource constraints, legislature changes, the growing importance of the joint requirements process and other changes in the DOD community will have an impact on how HQDA changes. What was judged certain was the Army's commitment to meet the challenges of the future by maximizing resources through continuous process improvement. The HQDA Model offered a beginning and the following decisions remain.

- to determine feasibility and affordability; and
- to program changes in budget submissions.

10.1 ASA(M&RA)/VCSA

All Phase I Proponent and Umbrella Group FAAs were distilled and integrated into a Phase I summary briefing presented to the ASA(M&RA) and the VCSA by the Umbrella Group on February 23, 1996. The briefing took the form of a series of issues developed from the results of all Phase I Institutional Army redesign recommendations. There was a process of refinement and not all FAA alternatives were included in the final series of issues briefed on February 23, 1996. Many proposals were referred to proponents for action and coordination through normal staffing procedures. In the end, 148 issues went forward to the ASA(M&RA) and VCSA for action. Appendix T provides a synopsis of all these issues.

10.1.1 Major Approvals

The following were the major decisions approved for implementation in POM 98-03.

- Mobilization/Deployment decisions approved:
  - designation of 15 power projection platforms and 12 power support platforms;
  - home station mobilization processing; and
  - use of MARC cards, RF tags and equipment measuring devices.
- Doctrine/combat developments and leader development decisions directed:
  - TRADOC responsibility for joint doctrine;
  - TRADOC responsibility for the requirements approval process;
  - establishment of a TDA single documentation process owner; and
  - alignment of individual training with battlefield functions.
- Information management decisions resulted in:
  - ISC becoming an ASC under FORSCOM (appendix W);
  - PERSINSCOM transfer to PERSCOM;
  - ISC DOIMs becoming the responsibility of MACOMs;
  - libraries transfer to ACSIM; and
  - records management transfer to DCSPER.
- Personnel management decisions established objectives to:
  - reduce protocol and public affairs offices (e.g., one each per installation for matrix support to local users);
  - reduce attrition;
  - merge PERSCOM/GUARDPERCEN/Army Reserve Personnel Directorate (ARPERCEN)/CIVPERS;
  - transfer (Army Management Staff College) AMSC, USAREC and MEPCOM to TRADOC; and
  - downsize the Judge Advocate General (JAG) School.
- Construct decisions directed ACSIM to:
  - expand outsourcing;
  - divest excess property and buildings;
  - investigate the concept of "installation command;" and
  - pilot test the public works mission to USACE.
- Equip/supply/service/maintain decisions required action to:
  - increase use of credit cards;
  - consolidate contracting offices;
  - retain RDECs with AMC;
  - reduce stocks/PLL; and
  - reduce inventory using concept of velocity management.

- HQDA/FOA/SSA decisions approved:
  - creation of AVCSA and DUSA(IA);
  - retention of the bimodal staff;
  - reduction of HQDA by 42 percent (i.e., elimination of 9 SSA and 26 FOA); and
  - evaluation of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support (DCSBOS) concept.

10.1.2 Disapprovals/Deferrals

The following issues were either deferred or disapproved.

- Transfer of public works to USACE.
- Initiation of a personnel end-state study.
- Reduction in training overhead.
- Core process alignment of PPBES.
- Consolidation of test and evaluation functions.
- Initiation of a test and evaluation end-state study.

10.2 CSA Approvals

Ultimately, the Phase I issues, as modified in accordance with ASA(M&RA) and VCSA guidance of February 23, 1996, were presented to the CSA for final decision on March 25, 1996. Approved issues were subsequently disseminated for Army implementation in the Summer Command Plan Supplemental Guidance, dated July 19, 1996 (appendix T). The CSA made the following decisions.

- Realign the SSDC under TRADOC as the ASCC of SPACECOM.
- Reengineer information management and activate ASC under FORSCOM.
- Realign the AMSC under TRADOC.
- Continue to develop a specialized command concept for possible application to the areas of intelligence, health care, criminal investigation, construction and personnel.
- Develop a separate decision briefing concerning an "accession command."
- Refer other POM 98-03 issues to the PAE/Program Evaluation Group (PEG) process for implementation in POM 98-03.
- Continue to develop DA PAM 100-1 as the 21st century Institutional Army azimuth.
- Begin Phase II of the Institutional/TDA Redesign Axis.

10.3 Resource Summary

As stated in chapter 1 (paragraph 1.3.1), the aim of the Institutional Army redesign was to achieve organizational efficiencies and operational effectiveness through process improvement and technology enhancement. The VCSA emphasized that the primary effort should concentrate on creating better organizations rather than simply accruing savings. Nonetheless, the second order effect of Phase I reengineering was the accrual of significant manpower and dollar savings for capital reinvestment in warfighting capability. Resource recapitalization, realized from Phase I FAA and HQDA redesign efforts and referred to POM 98-03, is depicted in Figure 10-1:

PHASE I EVENTS	MIL	CIV	Approximate Savings POM 98-03 DOLLARS	Approximate Cost POM 98-03 DOLLAR COST
PROPONENT FAA's	3,053	2,084	1.549B	$0.240B
HQDA REDESIGN	877	1,560	0.369B	$0.180B
TOTAL	3,921	3,644	$1.918B	$0.420B

TDA Military reinvested in the MTOE

Approximately $1.5B Savings Overall

Bottom Line - Zero Sum!

Figure 10-1. Savings for Recapitalization

Overall reductions for HQDA are shown at Figure 10-2:



Figure 10-2. HQDA Phase I Summary

Chapter 11
Items For Further Consideration

11.1 Other Issues

During the course of Phase I, a number of issues and recommendations were raised that were either not fully developed, or were considered but not finalized or approved. The following are issues, not referred for consideration during Phase II, may deserve future consideration as Institutional Army reengineering proceeds.

11.1.1 Mobilization/Deployment

The Mobilization/Deployment FAA issues which were not advanced include the following.

- An alternative "push" to the current "pull" system to support CINC requirements;
- the need to increase JCS exercises utilizing JOPES to test mobilization procedures;
- the need to train mobilization and deployment at service schools;
- a possible readiness structure for mobilization and for deployment;
- increase FORSCOM's overall responsibility for deployment;
- designation of Army as container manager;
- FORSCOM and TRADOC develop a common TPFDD/L system;
- reduction in the numbers of training divisions;
- CONUS-based ASCC concept;
- MOBLAS as an RC mobilization system;
- strategic sea and aerial ports for Europe;
- FORSCOM as Executive Agent for mobilization;
- MTMC as joint container and single seaport manager; and
- Modular Force Packaging for MRC and operations other than war (OOTW).

11.1.2 Training and Leader Development

Training and Leader Development FAA issues for future action are the proposals to:

- establish a single education command (e.g., the Army University); and
- restructure PPBES to parallel Army core processes.

11.1.3 Information Management

Information Management FAA issues suggested for reconsideration are the:

- divestiture of APPC to DLA;
- accelerated fielding of SINGARS;
- DAIG and AAA enforcement of automation policy;
- improved monitoring of MACOM automation procurements and expenditures; and
- establishment of a Joint Warfighter Cell in DISC4.

11.1.4 Recruit and Personnel Management

The Recruit and Personnel Management FAA issues that have not been acted on are the recommendations to:

- merge the AMSC with CGSC;
- merge CMH with AWC;
- subordinate PERSCOM to TRADOC; and
- conduct a personnel end-state study.

11.1.5 Construct

The Construct FAA issues which should be re-examined are:

- the concept of an installation management command;
- the DCSBOS concept; and
- Army property leasing options.

A

AAA	Army Audit Agency
AAE	Army Acquisition Executive
AAESA	Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency
AASA	Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
AC	Active Component
ACC	Army Commander's Conference
ACC	Army Component Command
ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
ADO	Army Digitization Office
ADP	Automated Data Processing
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFARS	Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
AFH	Army Family Housing
AMC	Army Material Command
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMOPES	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
AMSAA	Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency
AMSC	Army Management Staff College
AMSCO	Army Management Structure Code
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APEG	Analysis and Experimentation Planning Group
APF	Appropriated Fund
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APPC	Army Publications and Printing Command
AR	Army Regulation
ARL	Army Research Laboratory
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARO	Army Research Office
ARPERCEN	Army Reserve Personnel Directorate
ARSTAF	Army Staff
ASA(CW)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
ASA(FM&C)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
ASA(IL&E)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment
ASA(M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
ASA(RDA)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
ASC	Army Signal Command
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ATRRS	Army Training Requirements and Resources System
AVCSA(PD)	Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for Program Development
AWC	Army War College
AWE	Advanced Warfighting Experiment

B

BASOPS	Base Operations
BOD	Board of Directors
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
BSTF	Base Shop Test Facility

C

C3S	Command, Control and Communication Systems
C4	Command, Control, Communication, and Computers
C4I	Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence
CAL	Center for Army Leadership
CASCOM	Combined Arms Support Command
CBRS	Concept-Based Requirements System
CD	Combat Development
CECOM	Communications-Electronics Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CG	Commanding General
CGSC	
CIC	Criminal Investigation Command
CIDC	Criminal Investigation Command
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CIVPER	
COC	Council of Colonels
COE	Chief of Engineers
CONUS	Continental United States Army
CONUSA	Continental US Army
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
CS	Combat Support
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTC	Combat Training Center
CW	Civil Works

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DAS	Director of the Army Staff
DCD	Director of Combat Developments
DCG	Deputy Commanding General
DCSBOS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DFARS	Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency

D continued

DISC4	Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMO	Directed Military Overhire
DOD	Department of Defense
DOIM	Director of Information Management
DOL	Director of Logistics
DPW	Director of Public Works
DS	Direct Support
DSB	Deployment Support Brigades
DTLOMS	Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizations, Materiel and Soldiers
DUSA(IA)	Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs
DUSA(OR)	Deputy Under Secretary for Operations Research

E

EAC	Echelons above Corps
EAD	Echelons above Division
EC	Electronic Commerce
EDI	Electronic Data Interchange
ESM	Equip, Supply and Maintain
ESSM	Equip, Supply, Service and Maintain
ETS	Expiration of Term of Service
EUCOM	European Command
EXFOR	Exercise Forces
EXSUM	Executive Summary

F

FAA	Functional Area Assessment
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FAR	Functional Area Review
FDU	Force Design Update
FISA	Force Integration Support Agency
FOA	Field Operating Agencies
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GUARDPERCEN	
GO	General Officer
GOSC	General Officer Steering Committee
GS	General Support
GSU	Garrison Support Unit

H

HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HQSV-W	Headquarters Services—Washington

I

IET	Initial Entry Training
IFTE	Integrated Family of Test Equipment
IG	Inspector General
IM	Information Management
IMA	Information Mission Area
INSCOM	Intelligence Command
ISC	Information Systems Command
ISCCO	Information Systems Command Contracting Office
ISEC	Information Systems Engineering Command
ISM	Integrated Sustainment Maintenance
ISMA	Information System Management Activity
ISSAA	Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency
ISSC	Information System Software Command

J

JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFKSWC	John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROTC	Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps
JWCA	Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment

K

KEI	Key Enabling Investments

M

MACOM	Major Army Command
MARC	Manpower Requirements Criteria
MCA	Military Construction, Army
MCC	Movement Control Center
MDEP	Management Decision Package
MDW	Military District of Washington
MEDCOM	Medical Command
MEPCOM	Military Entrance Processing Command
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MILCON	Military Construction
MMC	Materiel Management Center
MOBLAS	Mobilization Level Application Software
MOC	Management of Change
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
MSC	Major Subordinate Command

M continued

MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MWR	Morale, Welfare and Recreation

N

NAF	Non-appropriated Fund
NCO	Noncommissioned Officers
NLT	Not Later Than
NMS	National Military Strategy
NPR	National Performance Review
NTC	National Training Center

O

OCONUS	Outside of the Continental United States
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
OEC	Operational Evaluation Command
OI	Organization Integrator
OJCS	Organization of the Joints Chiefs of Staff
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OOTW	Operations Other than War
OPTEC	Operational Test and Evaluation Command
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OST	Order/Ship Time

P

P&ES-W	Personnel and Employment Services-Washington
PA	Public Affairs
PAE	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PAM	Pamphlet
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PEG	Program Evaluation Group
PEO	Program Executive Officer
PERINSCOM	Personnel Information System Command
PERSCOM	Personnel Command
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PM	Program Manager
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgetary System
PPP	Power Projection Platform
PSP	Power Support Platform
PSS	Personnel Service Support

R

R&D	Research and Development
RBS	Readiness Based Sparing
RC	Reserve Component
RDA	Research Development and Acquisition
RDAISA	Research Development, Acquisition Information Systems Agency
RDEC	Research Development and Engineering Center
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RSC	Regional Support Command

S

S&BMS-W	Space and Building Management-Washington
S&T	Science and Technology
SAG	Senior Advisory Group
SAM	Single Agency Manager
SARD	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Research and Development
SARSS-O	Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SES	Senior Executive Service
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SIGCEN	US Army Signal Center
SINGARS	Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio System
SSA	Staff Support Agencies
SSDC	Space and Strategic Defense Command
SOMA	Signal Organization and Mission Realignment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SSI	Soldier Support Institute
STAMIS	Standard Army Information System
STARC	State Area Command
STO	Science and Technology Objective
SWC	Special Warfare Center

T

T&E	Test and Evaluation
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TAADS-R	The Army Authorization Document—Revised
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAQ	Total Army Quality
TASS	Total Army School System
TDA	Tables of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty
TECOM	Test and Evaluation Command
TEXCOM	Test and Experimentation Command
TJAG	The Judge Advocate General

T continued

TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TSA	Troop Support Agency
TSM	TRADOC Systems Manager
TTB	Transportation Terminal Brigade
TTHS	Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students
TTP	Tactical Training Packages

U

UMMCA	Unspecified Minor Military Construction
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAFAC	United States Army Finance and Accounting Center
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command
USC	United States Code
USMA	US Military Academy

V

VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
VM	Velocity Management
VV&A	Verification, Validation, and Accreditation

W

WOCS	Warrant Officer Candidate School