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## East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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#### ACTIVITIES OF NORTHERN GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES REVIEWED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 22 Feb 83 p 4

[Article by Stanislaw Reperowicz: "A Visit to the Northern Group of Soviet Forces in the Name of the Common Cause"]

[Text] Tomorrow, the Soviet armed forces will be observing their 65th anniversary. Part of the defensive forces of the land of the soviets is the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, which is stationed on Polish territory.

Its history goes back to the first days after the end of the war. Immediately after the victory over fascism, the Soviet Army, in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, began its demobilization and changing over to a peacetime footing. Units that were at that time located outside of the Soviet Union were organized into so-called army groups. On 29 May 1945, directive No 11097 of the Soviet Army Supreme Command was signed. This directive recommended the formation of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces on the basis of the then-existent 2d Byelorussian Front. All problems connected with its presence on Polish territory were regulated in support of the agreement concluded between the Polish and Soviet governments in August 1944 and modified in later years.

#### Hero of Two Nations

At the head of command of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces with its staff in Legnica stood one of the most famous commanders of World War II, a co-organizer of the victories at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, Polish by extraction and Marshall of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Rokossovski.

Following a 30-year absence, Rokossovski greeted his fatherland for the first time in 1944 when, at the head of the 1st Byelorussian Front, he liberated the eastern part of Poland and later, as commander of the 2d Byelorussian Front, brought freedom to the Polish coastal region. He told his sister Helena, who had lived her entire life in Poland, that when in 1945, he found his family domicile in Warsaw, he knelt and kissed the pavement.

He also rode with her to the grave of his father, Ksawery, in the Brodnowski cemetery in Warsaw. His main task at that time was to defeat Hitler's fascism, though. A longer period in which to greet his fatherland came only after the war, when he began his service in Legnica.

Rokossovski's staff realized the difficult tasks of demobilizing older classes of troops and adaptation of subordinate units to peacetime needs. Furthermore, repatriation to the Soviet Union of Soviet citizens, former prisoners of war, concentration camp inmates and forced laborers was organized.

In these new conditions, Marshall Rokossovski, with his extensive war experience and concern for the future and mutual defense of nations having chosen the socialist road to development, directed troop training. Great devotion was given to educational work with the troops and the unbreakable unity of patriotism with internationalism was emphasized. He gave proof of this in practice. The commander's personality had a great influence on his subordinates. At this time, Poland took over its ancient western and northern territories. With difficulty, the young peoples' state dealt with such complex problems as repatriation of the German population and management of the acquired and devastated Polish territories.

Units of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces rushed to the aid of Polish troops. During the first year, these units ploughed and sowed over 750,000 hectares of land and then handed them over to Polish settlers. Soviet units aided detachments of the LWP [Polish Peoples' Army] in the clearing of minefields and rebuilding the transportation system.

#### The Tradition Lives On

Marshal Rokossovski commanded the Northern Group of Soviet Forces for over 4 years, until 1949, when he was named to the post of Minister of National Defense of the Polish Peoples' Republic. The traditions of friendship which were formed at this time, were developed by the later generations of troops. These traditions are also being carried on today by subordinates, such as the 11th commander of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces and former soldier of the II Byelorussian Front, participant in the battle to liberate Poland, Col Gen Yuri F. Zarudin. The memory of the teachings of Marshall K. Rokossovski, first commander and hero of two nations, lives on.

Party-political work in the Northern Group of Soviet Forces has been directed for 4 years by Lt Gen Nikolai A. Lushnichenko, who is a member of the military council and at the same time, chief of the political administration. In conversation with a journalist, he has repeatedly emphasized the need to call forth everything from history that joins our two peoples. "We have to remind young people," said the general, "that A. Herzen spoke up for Polish independence and Polish revolutionaries fought side-by-side with Russians in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. Thousands of Poles defended the Soviet Union from counterrevolution and foreign intervention. Many of them, such as

J. Marchlewski, F. Dzierzynski, K. Rokossovski and others, did great services for the USSR. The outstanding school of internationalism was World War II, in which 7 million Soviet soldiers fought outside of the USSR, on the territories of 11 countries. On their battlefields, the bonds of blood spilled for the common cause has united the action of the Soviet and Polish soldier."

"At the present time," continued the general, "the headquarters and units of our group maintain a close bond with Polish institutions and organizations. In recent years, these contacts have undergone intensification. Meetings have been taking place with representatives of PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] provincial committees, veterans, boy scouts, and work collectives. We have an especially close relationship with units of the Polish People's Army. On the territory of the Silesian Military District and the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, the 'Week of Friendship and Brotherhood in Arms' has just begun. This is an occasion for organization of many joint projects. We anticipate over 100 Soviet officers making appearances in communities of the Legnica Province. There have been organized many exhibits (for example, of Polish books in the officers' club of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces), the showing of Polish films to Soviet units and Soviet films to Polish units, meetings with veterans, exchanges of artistic groups, joint athletic competitions and parties.

#### Friendship Ambassadors

Eight years ago, the museum of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces was opened on Hanka Sawicka Street in Legnica. In the Hall of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR, next to documents about the efforts of the Soviet people in the struggle with fascism, there are, for example, exhibits about the struggle of the Polish people, including among other things, a soldier's uniform from the T. Kosciuszko First Division. The Hall of Victory displays the standard of the Polish Peoples' Army along with those of Soviet units that took part in the liberation of Poland. Among busts of soldiers from units of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces who became Heroes of the Soviet Union, the Hall of Memory has busts of Poles who were honored with this highest Soviet military decoration, i.e., Cpt Wladyslaw Wysocki and the physicist Aniela Krzywon. A special hall was dedicated to the marshall of two nations, Konstantin Rokossovski. Remaining areas of the museum are devoted to postwar years and contain items such as photographs of joint exercises.

The activity of the editorial board of the soldier's paper of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces "Znamya Pobedy" [Flag of Victory] deserve special words of recognition. I have read it for years and have with great appreciation noted that almost every issue contains an item about Poland. The majority of articles are about our history and that of the Polish Peoples' Army. There is, likewise, no shortage of reports from Polish cities, factories, and the countryside as well as papers on Polish culture, excerpts of Polish prose, songs, etc. The editorial board works with all Polish army papers, the effect of which organized joint contests based, for example, on knowledge of Polish-Soviet brotherhood in arms. Mjr Vitali Kolobrov has handled these affairs with unusually positive results for years.

The influence of the paper put out by the political administration on the interest and emotional bond with the country in which we, soldiers of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, are serving, is enormous and, I would say, irreplaceable. Let us remember that its readers are, above all, young boys in uniforms, born and raised so often in a different culture, in towns and villages thousands of kilometers from Poland, as well as in Central Asia and the Far East.

The paper also generalizes the best experiences of Polish-Soviet cooperation. Along with these must be counted the bond that exists between the central Signal Troops Training Center of the Polish People's Army in Legnica and the Soviet Union there. In the beginning they met officially, most often on holidays. Now, they have daily, friendly contact. They alternately organize parties, joint trips, contests, games, amusements and athletic competitions. A year ago, the so-called Friendship Club came into being. This club patronizes all common activities in which a main role is played by the youth organizations ZSMP [Union of Socialist Youth of Poland] and Komsomol and their activists: Lt Andrej Jasinski, Junior Warrant Officer Roman Swojdzinski, Cpt Vladimir Maltsev and Ensign Vasili Mironenko.

#### On Polish Soil

I had the opportunity to become personally acquainted with a large group of soldiers and officers presently serving in the Northern Group of Soviet Forces. Major Vladimir A. Khokhryakov is the political officer in an armored unit, continuing the military tradition of the tankmen that fought in places such as Wroclaw and ended their battle road in Glogow. He is proud of the hall of unit traditions, which teaches both about patriotism and internationalism.

First Lt Yuri M. Kostrub serves as the deputy commander for regimental affairs in a battery of anti-aircraft rockets. His sub-unit is quartered in a new barracks, where laboratory cleanliness and order is the rule. Tasteful green curtains bring out a touch of home. He is known as a demanding superior. I was convinced of this by the way that he knows every one of his subordinates personally and can describe each of them very accurately.

His younger 2d Lt, Igor V. Rojko, platoon commander, is outwardly distinguishable from the others by what we could conveniently call his military efficiency. Every detail of his uniform radiates freshness and elegance. His movements are quick and he formulates his thoughts concisely, clearly and understandably. "This is the result of my education at the Suvorov Academy (military academy for young men)," he said with a smile.

While conducting exercises, he observes that "the socialist state is the main force for the building and defense of communism." His proper political preparation shows itself in that as well. His subordinates, including Sgt 1st Class Viktor Ivaniuk of Chernovets and Cp1 Oleg Zhavoronek of Kursk, belong among the finest troops, although properly speaking, the entire platoon has very good ratings in all of the training disciplines.

I set the reconnaissance company to practicing different methods of close fighting on the training field. I admire the strength, agility and the technical knowledge of defensive tricks among its members: Igor Kulikov, Viktor Kuchuk of Brest, Vladimir Mamonov of Nikolayev and Sereg Tokashev of remote Kazakhstan. Every one of them can break a normal brick with his bare hands, run through fire, jump from a building, parachute, and also fight at close quarters with every type of weapon.

They were taught all of this in a few months by the company assistant commander, Lt Boris M. Ponomarev, who just finished officer training school himself 2 years ago. He married shortly after graduation and his daughter was born in a Polish hospital.

The company glories in its history: it was this unit that captured Field Marshall Paulus 40 years ago in Stalingrad.

#### Cooperation of Allies

The sharp deterioration of the international situation and the mad arms race forced on the world by the imperialistic nations places before the armed forces of the socialist states the task of still tighter closing of the ranks and improvement of the armed cooperation of the Warsaw Pact armies.

This cooperation between the Northern Group of Soviet Forces and the Polish Peoples' Army is being continually enriched with new forms. Thus, joint exercises of homogenous Polish and Soviet sub-units have been organized for several years on Polish and Soviet training fields, alternately. Tank, artillery, and signal troops, pilots, etc., are trained in this manner. This is a very effective and useful method for exchanging experiences in command and operation of army equipment. During the exchanges, the soldiers live, eat and train together, form joint tank crews and artillery batteries and relax together. After a few days, the troops know each other so well that the interpreters have already become useless. Frequently, the friendships that form during this training last a lifetime.

In one area where a mechanized sub-unit was stationed, I found the local Polish authorities grateful to the unit for the help it gave during the harvest. There was also telling how the same soldiers saved the lives and belongings of citizens in Lower Silesia during the last flood.

That is also one of the forms of cooperation of our socialist armss which joins brotherhood in arms.

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#### WEST COMMUNISTS URGED TO INTENSIFY LEGAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

#### West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 31, 25 Feb 83 p 2

 $\overline{/R}$ eport from Berlin: "East Berlin Urges Communists in West to Intensify Their Activities." A translation of the East Berlin STAAT UND RECHT article cited below follows this commentary.

/Text/ STAAT UND RECHT (No 8, 1983), the review published by the East Berlin Staatsverlag, has called on the communist parties in the Western countries to make greater efforts to strengthen their political influence. It is "absolutely necessary" for these parties to consolidate and expand their legal opportunities in the capitalist society. This includes fighting the "innumerable legalistic restrictions" on the activities of the communist parties. Growing at the same time is said to be the need in close liaison with extraparliamentary movements to resolutely fight for representation in the bourgeois parliaments and use the parliamentary opportunities "more emphatically to express the demand for a peaceable foreign policy, social reform and democratic rights for the working people." Representation in parliament will also enable the communist parties "to arouse the consciousness of the working class and all working people with regard to the necessity of fundamental political and socioeconomic changes."

#### GDR Law Journal's Discussion

East Berlin STAAT UND RECHT in German Vol 32 No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 23 Dec 82) pp 115-123

/Article by Prof Dr Karl-Heinz Roeder, Institute for Theory of State and Law, GDR Academy of Sciences: "Political Organization and Class Antagonisms in Capitalist Society"/

/Text/ The importance of the study of present-day political systems arises mainly from the increase in the role of politics in contemporary history. After all, it is a feature of the era of transition from capitalism to socialism that more and more people are actively involved in the profound socioeconomic, political, ideological and cultural upheavals and, therefore, in political life. In the socialist countries the people, led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party, are creating

the new socialist society, free of any exploitation, and are doing so with steadily rising consciousness and plan efficiency. They thus provide an example of the creatuve power of the popular masses. In the extremely complex historical setting of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America more and more people are mobilized by the growing anti-imperialist liberation movements and participating in the far-reaching social revolutionary processes. In so doing they are also increasingly aware of their own strength. In view of the profit-oriented imperialist policy of social welfare cuts, the restriction of democratic rights and the danger of war emanating from U.S.imperialism, many strata of blue and white collar workers, farmers, businessmen and the intelligentsia even in capitalist countries are gripped by the social and political conflicts and involved in the class war. Still, class conflicts are always carried out in the conditions of the political system of the respective capitalist country affected by them and reacting to them. This underlines tge necessity for studying the political system of the capitalist society in order to discover the inevitabilities and developmental trends of this system as well as elaborate the approaches, types and methods of the struggle of the working class and all working people to conquer the rule of capital.

Here we must take into account the fact that the political systems of the capitalist countries display considerable differences. Factors such as unequal economic development, differences in the development of classes and the strength of the classes or the diversity of historical traditions mean that there are wide varieties in the political systems among the countries of state monopoly capitalism, the less developed capitalist countries and the least developed capitalist countries as well as within these groups of countries. The significance of their differences for the concrete conditions of the fight of the working class and other working people must not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, due to the essential nature of the capitalist social order and affected by the international class conflict between socialism and imperialism, general inevitabilities and trends are at work in the political systems of the capitalist countries, entitling us to use the generalizing term "political system of capitalism." It is an important task of historico-comparative studies to contribute to the more profound comprehension of these general inevitabilities and trends.

The nature and development of the political system of the capitalist society can be comprehended only when it is interpreted as the mode of movement and the result of the class war, especially the expression of the antagonism between capital and labor. When praising Marx's paper "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," Friedrich Engels emphasized this perception, realized by Karl Marx when he noted: "France is the country where the historical class conflicts have been fought to the bitter end more than anywhere else, and where--therefore--changing political forms within which they move and their results summarized, are delineated most sharply."2 The specific feature of France's historical development in the 19th Century--the classic emergence of the rule of the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the resolute struggle of the working class on the other--caused the general features in the political system of the capitalist society (to be a form and the result of the class war), to stand out even more sharply. At the same time the political system of the capitalist society is the form and the result of the international class war insofar as the changes in the international balance of power vitally affect the internal situation of the classes

and, therefore, the concrete shape of the political system. Evidently the effects of the changed international balance of power on the classes and strata of the capitalist society are different and contradictory. While the ruling monopoly bourgeoisie uses every means in its power to counter the shift in the international balance of strength against imperialism, and its most reactionary groups even admit the possibility of a nuclear inferno in the mistaken belief thereby to be able to maintain their rule, the working class and all working people are gaining new opportunities for using this shift in the balance of power for their struggle to restrain and conquer the power of monopoly.

Of course the results of the class war-just as the power ratios of the classes existing in society in a certain period of time-are reflected in a relative stability of the political system of the capitalist society and a specific institutionalization of this system. Philosophical studies have long pointed up this connection. The book "Kategorien des Historischen Materialismus" /Categories of Historical Materialism/, for example, says: "The political organization of the antagonistic society is very largely an indicator of the reciprocal relation of the class forces. In this meaning the political organization of the antagonistic society may be defined as the totality of organizations and facilities that express and defend the interests of the classes and nations of this society."

The political system of the capitalist society includes not only the institutions that serve the exercise of power by the ruling class of the bourgeoisie. It also includes institutions of the oppressed classes and strata, that are opposed to the interests of the working class. This interpretation has prevailed in Marxist-Leninist writings.4 In terms of ideology it corresponds to the all-round view of the capitalist society as the struggle and unity of its contradictions. contradiction of the capitalist social order, the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private capitalist type of the acquisition of its results--expressed in the social and political sector, the antagonistic class conflict between capital and labor and the class war -- is reflected also as one of its essential elements in the superstructure of this society, including its political system. It is manifested in the existence and the struggle of the two main elements -- essentially antagonistic -- of the capitalist society's political system, the institutions of the ruling and exploiting class (the bourgeoisie) and the institutions of the oppressed and exploited classes and strata. The totality of public and private institutions by means of which the ruling class exercises its dictatorship, represents one section of the capitalist society's political system. In Marxist-Leninist writings it is generally described as a political or state monopolistic ruling sys-Operative as such are the following: The imperialist state as the decisive instrument of the dictatorship of the monopoly bourgeoisie, the apparatus of monopoly federations and major corporations united with the imperialist state, the parties backing the capitalist system and monopoly rule as well as other public and private organizations that serve to secure this system. The political organizations of the working class and other classes and strata of working people, such as communist and workers' parties, labor unions, youth and women's organizations, and so on, represent the other section of the political system of capitalism. These institutions serve to fight and ultimately conquer the capitalist system of exploitation and oppression.

To be included among the political organizations of the capitalist society in general are all institutions of a political nature, in other words those that express the struggle between the classes, 6 the struggle for power in the state. To cite an example: All the work of parties is by nature political while that of churches, for instance, is political only to a certain extent. The political nature of the respective institution is the definite friterion for its classification as a political organization and its status in this system.

However, we would fail to appreciate the dialectic of the class war if we were to consider the political institutions of the ruling class on the one hand and those of the working class and other working people on the other as static or unrelated phenomena. The political system of the capitalist society is a major battlefield of the class war, and its nature is determined by the struggle for political power. The political ruling system of the monopolies with the imperialist state as the core serves the maintenance of monopoly power. That is its decisive class function. At the same time it is the object of the class war conducted in the capitalist society.

In the struggle for a shift in power, the removal of monopoly rule and the establishment of its political power, the working class carries the class war into the political system of the monopolies and the imperialist state, for example the bourgeois parliaments and the imperialist state apparatus. This statement of fact also serves to draw a clear dividing line with respect to "left" and right opportunist and other bourgeois interpretations of the state, political system and class forces. The "left" political scientist Nicos Poulantzas, for instance, reduces the modern capitalist state to the reflection and condensation of the relation of forces between the classes and sections of classes in society. The state, he claims, is merely "the point of crystallization of the respective specific relation of forces between classes" and "class conflicts permeate the entire state."

He accuses Marxist-Leninist political theory of being "instrumentalist." "The capitalist state is considered a mere object or instrument to be manipulated at will by the bourgeoisie that produced it—it is not conceded any internal contradictions." Marxist-Leninist political theory has never interpreted the state in the manner alleged by Poulantzas and other "left" theoreticians. The political science taught by Marx, Engels and Lenin as well as its further development in the documents of the international communist movement fully takes into account the various social, political and other factors affecting the actual organization of the state. Among these factors is the real internal and external relation of forces of the classes.

Still, by its very nature the state is the main instrument used by the economic ruling class to exercise political power and to make its interests prevail—interests ultimately based on the material conditions of its existence. This fundamental perception is confirmed by the entire history of the class society and its states. Poulantzas declares the capitalist state to be the point of crystallization of the relation of forces of the classes and thus claims the state to be the plaything of various class forces using it in accordance with their respective strength. Basically this represents a "left" reissue of the notion of the neutrality of the state, the negation of its class nature.

By its very nature this opinion coincides with the reformist ideas of "political pluralism" that pronounce the state to be the class indifferent aribtrator in a political system where all forces and groups are claimed to have the same opportunities

for participating in political power. In the theory of "political pluralism" the political system appears as the arena for the settlement of different interests that need to be balanced, synchronized and reconciled by the state by way of standardized constitutional rules of the game. Denied and concealed thereby is the class nature of the political system of monopoly rule and, especially, the class nature of the imperialist state as the main instrument of the class rule of the monopolies.

In actual fact the forces and institutions operating in the political system of the capitalist society obviously do not have the same opportunities for participating, let alone have an adequate share, in the exercise of political power. Employers' federations, for example, were expanded into specific class organizations in state monopolistic capitalism. They help monopoly capital conduct the class war against the working class and, at the same time, force their interests (directed to the achievement of monopoly profits) on the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie. As essential elements of the political ruling system of state monopolistic capitalism they are closely linked with the imperialist state apparatus with respect to aims and organization and, in addition to and with other institutions of this system, ensure the translation of the interests of monopoly capital into the government policies of the imperialist countries.9 On the other hand, in the large majority of capitalist countries, the labor unions in their capacity as organizations of the working class and other working people are refused even the most rudimentary kinds of codetermination, and their hard-won rights are constantly challenged all over again. Contrary to the champions of pluralist doctrines, employers' federations and labor unions do not, therefore, hold equal shares in political power. As organizations of monopoly capital exercising political power and organizations of the working class kept away from political power, they reflect the basic contradiction of the capitalist society. The "diffusion" or "apportionment" of political power claimed by the "pluralists" in fact cannot occur, nor does it. The political ruling system of the imperialist state, the monopoly federations, the parties serving this rule of capital and other institutions were created (and steadily expanded) to ensure the uniform class dictatorship of monopoly capital. The division of labor in accordance with the specific duties between the imperialist state and the employers' federations, between the state, employers' federations and parties is always a division of labor within the framework of the uniform class dictatorship of monopoly capital. At the same time it is a necessary condition for the realization of this class rule and holds an important ideological function, because it conceals the nature and mechanism of monopoly rule behind a sham division of powers.

To make prevail its profit-oriented interests even in the persistent economic crises and the generally worsening reproduction conditions of capital and, at the same time, defray the enormous costs of imperialist rearmament and confrontation politics, monopoly capital and, in particular, its most aggressive circles, exacerbate the class war against the working class and all working people. In social matters this is done by the general attack on the living conditions of the working people, in the field of politics by massive interventions in the democratic rights won by the working class in hard struggles, and in the area of ideology by the crude glorification of the capitalist profit system coupled with unprecedented anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda. The working class and other classes and strata of working people in the capitalist countries are increasingly resisting this exacerbation of the social, political and ideological class war of monopoly capital. This resistance

assumes different aspects in the various capitalist countries, but the trend toward a more intense class war is generally discernible.

The deepening class antagonisms and harder class wars are currently reflected in two basic trends within the political system of the capitalist society: For one in monopoly capital's efforts to protect its ruling system by more authoritarian and antidemocratic types and methods of government as well as by the integration of reformist and opportunist forces. For the other in the deepening and broadening of the anti-imperialist and democratic movement of the working people, displayed in the activism of their political organization and the increasing trend to common action.

Monopoly capital has always used diverse means and methods to prevent workers and all working people from exercising any real influence on state affairs and, especially, the politics of the bourgeois state as well as to hold down or entirely suppress their political activism on behalf of their own class interests. This goal is served mainly by the enormous expansion of the (already) giant state apparatus of repression, control and intimidation of the masses. Reinforced thereby is the trend of imperialist state development as proven and explained by Lenin: The "unusual strengthening of the 'machinery of the state'," characterized by the "unprecedented growth of its bureaucracy and military apparatus in conjunction with the increased harassment of the proletariat."10 Imperialist rearmament serves not only to expand the aggressive potential directed to the outside, against socialism and the national liberation movements. At the same time the most aggressive and reactionary circles of monopoly capital provide themselves with an additional potential for intimidating and, if necessary, forcibly suppressing the resistance of the working people in theæ same capitalist countries. The extraordinary accumulation of material resources by the state organs handling such matters, especially the defense ministries (at \$263 billion in the 1983 budget year the Pentagon disposes of about a third of the entire U.S.budget) further reinforces their powerful influence on the entire state apparatus. At the same time we see a rapid expansion of state surveillance institutions "with the declared goal of intimidating actual and potential opposition."11

A characteristic feature of the policy of monopoly capital is the effort with every means at its disposal to suppress the operations of the communist parties as the come of the revolutionary workers' movement. The ruling circles use the most diverse methods, depending on the internal strength of the classes and the situation of the respective capitalist country in the capitalist system and the international class dispute between socialism and imperialism. Measures range from the outright ban of communist parties or professional bans on communists in the public service to farreaching obstacles to the exercise of voting rights, from spying and arrests to actual physical terror and extralegel juridical practices. This underlines the indispensable necessity for the communist parties to conduct a struggle for the maintenance and expansion (or, in those countries where communist parties are banned, the acquisition) of the legal opportunities for operating inside the political organization of the capitalist society. This includes the struggle against the innumerable juridical restrictions on the work of the communist parties.

Growing also is the need, in close liaison with powerful extraparliamentary movements to resolutely conduct the struggle for representation in the bourgeois parliaments and to utilize parliamentary opportunities for reinforcing the demand for a peaceable

foreign policy as well as social reforms and democratic rights for the working people. However, to be avoided are all illusions about parliament as a class neutral organ. As an institution of the bourgeois state and the political system of capitalist class rule, the bourgeois parliament—an elected body—is directly subject to the operation of the class antagonisms introduced to this organ by the politics of the parties serving the capitalist social system on the one hand and the communist and workers' parties on the other.

In view of the historical command to stop the drift to war and confrontation by the most aggressive and reactionary groups of monopoly capital and check the growing attacks on the social and political rights of the working people, the exploitation of parliamentary possibilities assumes greater importance. Backed by the loyalty of the workers, communists are guided by the need to utilize their status in bourgeois parliaments or other organs of the bourgeois state to obtain some improvements in the situation of the working people as possible in the conditions of capitalism, and at the same time arouse the consciousness of the working class and all working people with regard to the need for fundamental political and socioeconomic changes.

The exacerbation of class antagonisms, especially by aggressive monopoly capital's policy of rearmament, confrontation and social welfare cuts, also helps toward differentiation within the social democratic parties. Influenced by their right wing leaders who actively champion the maintenance of the capitalist system and, whether in government or parliamentary opposition, pursue the goals of imperialist politics, these parties are involved on the one hand in the exercise of bourgeois state power and the political system of monopoly rule. On the other hand representatives of the working class and other working people furnish the social base of the social democratic parties. In these parties conflicts with the right wing leaders therefore arise while the process of differentiation is gaining strength in the current political debate on the issue of war and peace as well as on the problems of social security and the working and living conditions of the working people.

Broad strata of the people, including the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie, are getting involved in the political conflicts of the present time precisely as a result of the exacerbation in the debate on the issue of war and peace. This is reflected in the peace movements that now represent an important factor in the political system of many capitalist countries. Their emergence and activism demonstrate the objective coincidence of the interest in the defense of peace of the classes and strata involved in them. At the same time they demonstrate the trend for the political organizations of the working class and all other working people to unite for joint operations against the politics and rule of imperialism, a rule that is hostile to peace, progress and humanity.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The author considers it necessary to combine the study of the political system of socialism and the political system of imperialism with intensive studies of the politial systems in the developing countries, especially those with a noncapitalist and socialist orientation.

- 2. K. Marx/F. Engels, Collected Works, vol 21, Berlin 1962, p 248; Marx, Engels and Lenin have frequently used the terms political form, political organization and state-constitutional organization of society as having the same meaning\_(see U.-J. Heuer, "Gesellschaftliche Gesetze und Politische Organisation" /Social Laws and Political Organization, Berlin 1974, p 70).
- 3. "Kategorien des Historischen Materialismus. Studien zur Widerspiegelung Gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungsprozesse in Philosophischen Begriffen" /Categories of Historical Materialism. Studies on the Reflection of Social Developmental Processes in Philosophical Concepts/, Berlin 1978, p 229. On the same lines also "Grundlagen des Historischen Materialismus" /Bases of Historical Materialism/, Berlin 1976. Here the concept "political system of society" (not the political organization of society) is interpreted as a category "embracing all political organizations existing in the respective society, with all extant differences and even antagonisms" (p 501). Related to the antagonistic class society, the terms political system of society and political organization of society are applied synonymously in other writings and documents of communist parties.
- 4. For instance in the following publications: "Marxistisch-Leninistische Allgemeime Theorie des Staates und des Rechts" /General Marxist-Leninist Theory of State and Law/, vol 1, Berlin 1974, pp 218 f; "Der Politische Mechanismus der Monopoldiktatur" /The Political Mechanism of Monopoly Dictatorship/, Berlin 1977, p 18; M.N. Marchenko, "Political System of Present-Day Bourgeois Society," Moscow 1981 (in Russian). An overview of the discussion of this topic by Soviet social scientists up to the beginning of the 1970's is provided by N.I. Azarov/V.V. Varchuk/Y.N. Penkov, "The Political Organization of Society," SOWJETWISSENSCHAFT (GB), 1973, pp 501 ff.
- 5. "Marxistisch-Leninistische Staats- und Rechtstheorie. Lehrbuch" /Textbook of Marxist-Leninist State and Law Theory/, Berlin 1980, p 158; M. Schmidt, "On the Development of the Imperialist Ruling System, Theses," IPW-BERICHTE 1972, No 3, pp 6 ff. The treatise "General Marxist-Leninist Theory...," (vol 1, as before) distinguishes between the political organization of the antagonistic class society in the narrower and wider meaning: "The political organization of society in the narrower meaning is the system of state and sociopolitical organizations as well as of social movements of the ruling class and its allies" (p 218). "The political organization of society in the wider meaning...does not agree with the dictatorship of the ruling class...(It) is the reflection of the class structure of society in the system of state organs and social organizations involved in the affairs of state" (p 219).
- 6. See V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol 31, Berlin 1959, p 365.
- 7. See N. Poulantzas, "Die Krise der Diktaturen Portugal, Griechenland, Spanien" /The Crisis of the Portuguese, Greek and Spanish Dictatorships, Frankfurt/Main 1977, p 134.
- 8. N. Poulantzas, "Staatstheorie. Politischer Ueberbau. Ideologie, Sozialistische Demokratie" /State Theory. Political Superstructure. Ideology, Socialist Democracy/, Hamburg 1978, p 232. Critique of the above in "Der Staat im Staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus der Bundesrepublik, Staatsdiskussion und Staatstheorie"

 $\sqrt{\text{T}}$ he State in the State Monopolistic Capitalism of the Federal Republic, State Discussion and State Theory, Frankfurt/Main 1981, pp 142 ff.

- 9. On the role of employers' federations in the political ruling system of the FRG see W. Simon, "Der Polyp, Die Macht der Deutschen Unternehmerverbaende" /The Octopus, The Power of German Employers' Federations/, Berlin 1979, pp 217 ff.
- 10. See V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol 25, Berlin 1960, p 423.
- 11. See J. Schleifstein/H. Jung, "Toward the Surveillance State," PROBLEME DES FRIEDENS UND DES SOZIALISMUS, 1982, p 220.
- 12. See "The Political Mechanism of Monopoly Dictatorship," as before, p 18/

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#### DISSIDENT WRITER HEYM ON FAILURES OF GDR'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

March 120

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch Vol 9 No 12, 11 Mar 83 pp 30-32

[Article by Ton Crijnen, deputy chief editor, DE TIJD: "Stefan Heym, Writer in Disgrace -- 'GDR Is the Country of Missed Opportunities'"; passages enclosed in slantlines. published in italics]

[Text] Having fled from Hitler's Germany to Czechoslovakia, he emigrated from America to the GDR where they have been boycotting him for years. The erratically direct career of novelist Stefan Heym. "Our rulers do not trust their own citizens." Conversation with the Heinrich Boell of East Germany.

"Always at the right moment, he very wisely and decently says what is wrong. He doesn't have to do it, he doesn't do it for himself. He earns enough money, he could also publish his books in the West. The authorities leave him to his own ways; he is old, he has done worthwhile things and he is known in the West..." (Said by Sarah Kirsch, an East German writer who emigrated to the West, author of among other things "De Pantervrouw" [The Panther Woman], in an interview with NRC HANDELSBLAD).

The Comrades had warned me earlier. "We cannot keep you from doing it, but we would not appreciate it." That was one day after I entered the territory of the GDR for a series of official interviews. "Could you also arrange an interview with the writer Stefan Heym?" I had asked the gentlemen of the International Press Center. No, they could not do that. This was followed by the warning not to try it on my own.

The "victim" seemed amused. "For shame. You tried to embarrass the comrades." A bald, flattened head, wreathed with a white mane. Sharp, intelligent eyes. A stooped figure. A slow, ironic voice. "You came to look at the monkeys." And without transition: "But do sit down. Coffee?" Meanwhile, the cat was resolutely ruining my new pants. "Miaow. There's the enemy of the classes."

It was not easy to get the writer to agree to an interview. Testily, he told me over the phone that he had received "far too many" Western reporters already. "And now you." The humble assurance that the interview would not last more than an hour did not meet with a favorable reception either. "Where did you get the false notion that I ever grant anyone more than 50 minutes?" Unexpectedly, the light turned green anyhow. "Come on over then."

#### Own Citizens Mistrusted

The taxi trip from the Friedrichstrasse station to Berlin-Gruenau lasted half an hour. The rustic avenue, full of trees, the small country house with entry in the back, the large green three person bench, the antiques, the old prints and paintings -- everything exudes an atmosphere which seems at odds with the Berlin of Erich Honecker, and yet we really are in the GDR here.

On a chair lies a copy of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, the party newspaper which rarely prints lies and yet never speaks the truth. Heym: "When you look through NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, you can read everything." And nearly casually: "Our rulers don't trust their own citizens. Speaking of national schizophrenia..."

Before the start of the interview, Heym produced a small Sony tape recorder and set it up between us. "I always record interviews, except for strictly personal conversations. This serves a double purpose: it is evidence against the authorities, and a source of inspiration for my books."

He noted with apprehension that the interviewer was not using any electronic aids. He asked whether it was possible to keep up with everything that way, because "I want to be quoted right." The assurance that, based on 20 years of experience, this would work out perfectly, barely convinced him. With resignation: "We'll see."

#### Forfeited Opportunity

"The GDR is the country of missed opportunities. After the war, we had a unique opportunity to build the alternative socialist state; a country which would be fundamentally different from the capitalist West in a positive sense. Where life would be better and more just than in the FRG. We forfeited that opportunity."

[Question] One of your latest novels, "Collins," published in 1979, reflects that disappointment, but this theme already dominated "Five Days in June" (1958/73).

[Answer] For me, the uprising of June 1953, when the workers rebelled against a government which called itself a "workers government," was the major confrontation with reality. The GDR turned out to be the first country within the socialist camp where an open revolt against official falsehoods broke out. It represented my first experience with the dark side of socialism.

[Question] Has there been a great deal of improvement since then?

[Answer] Gradually, yes. The authorities are a sight more sensitive to the moods of the people. They try to buy off dissention materially out of fear of a recurrence of June 1953, but whether one can keep doing that...? Indeed, socialism works really well only when there is democratic control of the party and the government machinery. As long as that is lacking, it will not succeed.

Look, fundamentally speaking matters are the same as they were 30 years ago. The teacher still says different things to his class than he does at home to

his wife. A process of national alienation is taking place here in the GDR, which undermines socialism much more than the cold war rhetoric of Reagan and company.

And returning to his earlier statement: "When I talk about democracy, I don't mean the Bonn type bourgeois-parliamentary democracy where the financial-economic establishment participates in deciding what has to be done. No, I mean that all citizens must be given the right to as much voice as possible in the building of socialism."

#### Psychological Defeat

"In the GDR, rulers and those being ruled think and act from totally different worlds. What the bureaucrat says and writes does not fit in with what the man in the street experiences daily. This gap between appearance and reality is dangerous for two reasons. It makes people neurotic or completely indifferent, and it creates a political risk because it weakens the system."

The /Wall/ came up and the question arose as to whether its construction had been inevitable. Heym: "The Wall represents our defeat in the area of psychological warfare with the West. We did not have enough non-material counter-incentives to offer against the blatantly exhibited "super offer" in the FRG. Actually, this is only partly the fault of our government leaders."

"Socialism is being imposed on the people here; it is not the result of a revolutionary movement; they have received it 'free.' In both parts of Germany, after the war, the social system of the occupation forces was pretty much automatically imposed. In our country it was the socialist system. Some East Germans thought this was great, most of them were sick of it."

"At that time, the rulers had to come up with something to prevent the GDR from being emptied and socialism from falling apart. Hence, the Wall. Its justification was found in the fact that it gave us the opportunity in peace and quiet to develop our own system, which would be able to withstand the competition from the West."

[Question] That did not succeed very well.

[Answer] Partly, it did. On the other hand, we are stuck with that inter-German schizophrenia. Why do 99 percent of all GDR voters support this government in all the elections, while it still needs the Wall to maintain itself? We are confronted daily with this kind of contradiction here.

To ensure that socialism also penetrates the hearts of the people, that it becomes their flesh and blood, you need -- in addition to time -- leaders of a much higher caliber than those who are currently governing us. People like Marx and Engels, instead of the bunch of petit bourgeois we are actually stuck with. Those people meddle in everything; they even think that they know something about art. That leads to disasters.

The GDR is a nation of bureaucrats, of men and a couple of women who think about one thing only: how do I stay in my seat. And then they think that it

is odd that so much cynicism exists among the people, that the young people are no longer interested. This indifference is unfortunate because socialism remains at least worth defending, except not in the form in which it manifests itself in our country. This no longer has any future.

[Question] These are quite different words from what one hears in official conversations. There, the picture is painted of a monolithic farmers and workers state, where everyone, with the glow of optimism, marches behind the red banner to meet the sun.

[Answer] The New Socialist Person, as depicted by official propaganda, does not exist. There are pessimists, sycophants and office seekers here as much as in your country. The rulers pretend that they can solve all the problems, but that is nonsense. The same economic malaise, the same moral upheaval prevails here as it does in the West.

"It is all a question of political and ideological education."

Banggartz raised his voice. "We, the Party, form the driving force,
the vanguard of the masses. Would you want us to come limping behind,
to make it easy for ourselves, to avoid discussions?"

"I want us," answered Witte, "to differentiate between those who can raise their work standard and those who cannot, because the conditions for it are lacking. I want us not to order, but to convince. I want us to at least win the most influential workers in the company over to our cause, instead of antagonizing all of them"

"You find the orders from the party and the government wrong then?"

"One swallow does not a summer make. Perhaps we overestimate the class consciousness of the workers."

"I have asked you a concrete question, comrade Witte. What is your stand in this regard and where do you personally really stand?"

The words hung heavily in the stuffy air.

Witte said: "Perhaps you remember -- only a few days ago, the government and the party declared a whole set of measures as exaggerated, withdrew them, and announced a new course."

"And now you want to beat the retreat over the whole line?"
Banggartz leaned challengingly over his desk. "There was no question anywhere of revoking the raising of standards."

"Retreat... I tell you, this standard raising cannot be achieved through administrative measures. That leads to retreat, possibly even to defeat."

"It is your eternal doubts which lead to defeat if someone falls back when the Party expects firmness from him." (From: "Funf Tage im Juni" [Five Days in June], Stefan Heym -- Munich 1974).

Stefan Heym, born Helmut Fliegel, was the son of a Jewish businessman in Chemnitz, currently Karl-Marx-Stadt. As an 18 year old high school student (1931), he caused a big scandal by publishing a poem in the leftist VOLKSSTIMME, in which he protested against the sending of German officers to China as instructors for Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist army, which was fighting the communists.

(We learn how to murder! We support murder! We export it on a large scale! Yes! The child is happy, the mother rejoices. The faces turn blue from the gas. The instruction officers have arrived.")

The Nazis were furious and Heym was expelled from high school. He went to study in Berlin, contributed to the WELTBUEHNE (the antimilitaristic weekly published by future Nobel prize winner Carl von Ossietsky), and fled, following Hitler's advent to power (1933), to Czechoslovakia. There he wrote for German language newspapers and for magazines for emigrants, usually under the pen name "Stefan Heym."

The Gestapo kept a close watch on him. During an emotional speech before the convention of the GDR Writers Association, which rejected him as a member, Heym recalled that at the time his name appeared in third place on the Nazi list of the nine most wanted individuals. The future East German party leader Walter Ulbricht was listed only in eighth place.

An American scholarship gave Heym the opportunity to escape the German police (1937). However, his communist views quickly clashed with the political reality. "What prevails here is a dictatorship of two party machines, which is financed by big business."

By the end of 1937, after a series of jobs as waiter, dishwasher and book salesman, his income became somewhat more stable with his appointment as chief editor for the DEUTSCHES VOLKSECHO, an emigrant newspaper published in New York. He remained there until 1940, and meanwhile showed himself to be an active anti-fascist.

#### Literary Success

In 1942, Heym published his first novel, "Hostages." (His first books were published in English; later on, he translated them into German himself). The book became a great success. The theme of the novel, the resistance of the Czechs against the Nazi rule, fitted in exactly with the "Struggle for Democracy" being waged by the United States against Japan and Hitler's Germany.

One year later, Heym was drafted. As a sergeant in the psychological warfare division, he participated in the invasion of Normandy and the march to Germany. He ended the war as a lieutenant, an American citizen, and holder of the Bronze Star. They placed the fluent German speaking "Yank" with the editorial staff of the NEUE ZEITUNG, an American newspaper for the people of Munich.

At first, everything went well, but then problems arose. The cold war was taking on increasingly grim forms and did not stop at the offices of the NEUE ZEITUNG. When the editor in chief instructed Heym to write an anti-Russian

piece, he refused. He was called back to the United States and he resigned from the service.

In 1948, his second novel, "The Crusaders," came on the market. The book, a critical epic about the American army in World War II, made him internationally known. Three years later followed "The Eyes of Reason," about the advent to power of the communists in Czechoslovakia. The novel confirmed his reputation as a "red" author, and in the America of communist hunter McCarthy this was bad.

#### Fascist Policy

For Heym, the Korean war was the breaking point with his second fatherland. In April 1951, he returned his war decoration to President Eisenhower, and at the same time he resigned as reserve officer. "I don't want to be a member of an army which wages bacteriological warfare (in Korea) and which uses the services of former Nazis."

Heym returned to Europe and requested political asylum in the GDR. There, an enthusiastic welcome awaited him. A well known Western author who chose to live in the East! In 1952, Heym wrote: "The warlike and fascist policy of the current American government makes it impossible for an honest man to be a writer and to publish his work in the United States."

The Comrades did not lose any time. One year after his return, Heym received the Heinrich Mann prize, the highest literary distinction the GDR can award. It was clearly a politically tinted honor bestowed on a writer who, stylistically speaking, was not the strongest in the German language area, but who, because of his excellent feel for (social) drama and structural tension, none-theless remains an important author.

For years, Heym has been one of the regime's literary showpieces. His column in the BERLINER ZEITUNG is widely read. He has access to the highest political circles, including Ulbricht, and plays a primary role within the East German writers association relative to discussions on "socialist realism" in literature and on the function of a writer in a socialist society.

Heym remains the "difficult" person he has always been. This brings him in conflict with the authorities who, after all the public marks of honor, cannot simply drop him however and have hence decided to tolerate him for the time being. There is also the fact that Heym is cautious in formulating his criticism and that he avoids open conflicts. This is the reason why, for a long time, dissidents such as singer-writer Wolf Biermann and former Marxist ideologue Professor Havemann did not recognize him as a kindred spirit.

I recall a tete-a-tete with Walter Ulbricht, which he opened with the words: "Did you know that, a few days ago, Wolfgang Harich (leader of the 'enlightened' opposition to Ulbricht's Stalinism -- Crijnen) sat in the same chair you are sitting in now?" This was shortly after the 1956 events in Budapest, and Harich had just been arrested that morning, reportedly because he was a member of a group which wanted to overthrow Ulbricht.

I was curious. "Didn't you know, comrade Ulbricht," I said, "that your police were already shadowing Harich at the time you invited him for a visit?" He looked at me, smiling: "It is not my custom to call the police before inviting someone for a talk."

I must admit that I felt somewhat weak in the knees at that moment, but I controlled myself and said: "I assume, comrade Ulbricht, that you have thus raised the question of trust. Let me therefore speak openly with you. There are only two people in this republic who are 100 percent trustworthy."

He was immediately all ears: "Who?" "You and I," I answered. "/You/ know it about yourself and /I/ know it about myself -- we can no longer vouch for the others."

He laughed his well known spluttering laugh and said: "Well, perhaps it is not quite as bad as you have portrayed it..."

(From: "Wege und Umwege" | Roads and Detours] -- Steafan Heym 1980).

Heym's first collision with the regime came when he dared to write a critical evaluation of the Berlin revolt in 1953, the ultimate national taboo. The reportage novel, "Funf Tage im Juni," which was written in early 1954 and submitted for publication in 1958, wondered from state publishing house to state publishing house; nobody was willing to print the book. The subject matter was far too sensitive.

The manuscript reappeared 15 years later in rewritten form, but again nobody dared to handle it. The censors demanded such far-reaching changes that Heym gave up any further attempts to have the book published in his own country. Shortly thereafter, in 1974, "Funf Tage im Juni" was published by Bertelsmann in Munich and became a resounding success. (The book has since been published in a Dutch translation by Van Gennep.)

For GDR citizens, this novel is still taboo to this day, although many of them have read it clandestinely anyway. Rightly so. Because, even though a great deal can be said against the book -- illogical meetings, stylistic mistakes, successive actions which are too artificial --, it remains a captivating work.

In 1959, Heym was still awarded the prize for literature; then came the gradual reversal. In the middle sixties, the writer came into conflict with the writers association (read: the regime). He was accused of expressing "negativistic" criticism of the GDR in Western newspapers. The punishment followed. His books are reprinted ever more sparingly. Two new novels, "Lasalle" (1969) and "Der König Davidbericht" [The King David Report] (1972), were originally not allowed to be published.

Things did not get any better when Heym, after Wolf Biermann's exile (November 1976), took the initiative of writing an open protest letter to party leader Honecker. He barely escaped being thrown out of the writers association. This occurred 3 years later when Heym, without permission from the authorities, had his new novel, "Collins," a strong indictment of neo-Stalinism in the GDR, published in the FRG where it turned out to be a best-seller.

At home, Heym is accused of having violated the foreign exchange act, which was altered especially for this case. He was given a fine of 9,000 marks. Next, during a special meeting of the writers association, he was expelled as member, together with five colleagues who took his side. Heym's defense speech remained unpublished, but his compatriots heard what happened via West German television.

Since then, Heym has been living in semi-isolation on the edge of East Berlin. His mail is censored but not withheld, his telephone bugged but not cut off. Friends are given the advice no longer to keep in contact with him, but it is not prohibited. He is allowed to "go abroad," and in his own country, from time to time a book of his is reprinted (in limited edition). For the rest, he lives on royalties from the West.

The tape recorder was turned off, but the interview continued. "I used to have a very large public in the GDR, people recognized themselves in my work. And my books are still being sold under the counter, in exchange for tickets to the "Komische Oper" [Comic Opera], which is very popular here. But interest has obviously suffered from the government boycott."

"I try as much as possible to keep the ties with my readers intact. One of the few ways of doing this is through my readings in evangelical churches. Those meetings are packed. Malicious individuals have suddenly made me into the spokesman for the religious peace movement. Nonsense. I am nobody's mouthpiece. I do not represent a danger to this state."

When I was leaving, he said: "I am convinced that our system could only benefit if they were to listen to people like me."

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#### SYSTEM OF PREMILITARY EDUCATION, TRAINING OUTLINED

Herford WEHRAUSBILDUNG IN WORT UND BILD in German No 2, Feb 83 pp 67-72

[Article by Franz Prox, master sergeant, FRG: "The Socialist Military Education in the GDR"]

[Text] Socialist military education in the GDR is a model for ideologically indoctrinating youth from the kindergarten up to the enlistment in the National People's Army. This article offers enough material for a number of topics to broaden civic and military general education and for discussions with youth.

#### Introduction

Article 23 of the GDR Constitution commits every citizen of the country to defense service and performance.

The fourth main part of the GDR Youth Law even is devoted exclusively to the "honorable duty of youth to the protection of socialism."

That youth law, among other things, declares "paramilitary exercises" a duty of all youths, boys and girls. That youth law commits all young people in the GDR to "acquiring military-political education and premilitary knowledge and skills."

Though GDR propaganda always accuses the FRG of militarism, we have no comparable or even similar phenomenon of a military-political education and premilitary training for young people as decreed by the state.

In the GDR, however, the citizens' military education, for men or women alike, is being dispensed from the cradle to the grave.

Socialist military education aims at "educating all the citizens of the republic into consciously acting pioneers of the nation and impassioned defenders of the socialist fatherland."

For that, the GDR leaders need an enemy image for their people of course; otherwise no hatred and only a meager defense readiness can be generated.

In 1975, Erich Honecker clearly embraced an ideology that finds its mortal enemy in the West, and there mainly in the FRG, by saying: "We have every good reason not to relax our political and military vigilance even for a minute. Our enemy image is accurate. That image calls for no change because the enemy himself has not changed."

Already in the school textbooks, right from first grade, a child is bombarded with the idea that the NVA serves the protection from the enemy.

Instilling an enemy image must be seen in parallel with instilling hatred. Both factors, according to the SED doctrine, inextricably belong together because "only by hating the enemy, can one fight him" (Army General Heinz Hoffmann, 1974).

The FDJ Statute, for instance, also says: "The FDJ reinforces the young people in the GDR in their implacability to and hatred against imperialism and its reactionary policy."

This indoctrination is to motivate the young person unconditionally to affirm the existence and need of the NVA; it is to awaken his inner readiness to make himself available to the military organs when he is of age.

Military education, based on constant military propaganda, mainly addresses the 16 to 18-year olds. For them, the emphasis lies on premilitary training.

What scope such premilitary training has assumed meanwhile can be seen by the fact that by 1976 eight out of ten NVA recruits had already been given such training. Another report indicates that each year almost 95 percent of the male youth between 16 and 18 years of age takes part in premilitary training in the Society for Sport and Technology (GST).

Socialist Military Education in Kindergartens

Socialist military education already begins with the 3 to 6-year old children. Here one has to remember that in 1978, e.g., circa 60 percent of all GDR children attended a kindergarten.

What they instill in the child there is that the "enemy" plans to attack the GDR and destroy the socialist achievements. The NVA soldiers, however, were there for protection and would prevent it.

While the FRG comdemns war toys and interest groups deliberately and officially oppose "national defense," the GDR makes plenty of, and glorifies militarization, especially when dealing with children. The GDR also denies that war toys foster aggressive behavior in children.

Habitually dealing with weapons, military equipment and soldiers is something that is deliberately undertaken there. A child, e.g., is given a dummy tank to play with while being told that NVA soldiers protect the socialist homeland from imperialist NATO, especially FRG, tanks with real tanks.

Not so infrequently, NVA soldiers come visit and lecture to kindergarten kids.

They make a great deal of instilling friendship with the USSR, especially with the Red Army soldiers. They keep telling the children of the Red Army soldier as a friend and protector from "revanchism and imperialism," and that NVA soldiers stand by the side of the "fraternal army of the USSR."

Visual aids reinforce such education. The child is impressed with that nothing can happen to him as he is being protected day and night by NVA soldiers from "FRG armed forces organized and led by Hitlerian generals and created for the purpose of shooting at GDR children."

This incessant ideological barrage is to take hold of the child, making him trust the armed forces of the socialist camp and accept their existence as imperative.

Influence in the Schools

After the kindergarten, the school takes on military education and propaganda seamlessly to reinforce and extend the idea of the need and value of defense. Some examples from lower and middle level textbooks in the general mandatory school may illuminate that.

The first lessons in the primer, e.g., deal with an NVA soldier's visiting a school. Much is made there of the NVA as a peace army. It says: the soldier "and his comrades see to it that we all can live in peace."

The children's requirement then is: "What shall we ask our soldier?"

The primer also shows pictures of soldiers on border duty, on the firing range, in combat training, or at receiving military medals.

Almost all children between 6 and 14 years of age are members of the "young pioneers" (Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers). Summer vacations are spent in "vacation camps" together. To get them set for that event, theoretical preparation for it is given in the classroom. There they are leading up to the regularly conducted "children's maneuvers," which are made to look like play but have a distinctly military background. During such "children's maneuvers" they even give training in map-reading and the use of the compass, and they use the terms of the military formations such as company, battalion and others. In these "maneuvers," the children have to show already what they know about military matters and how well trained they are. In this they are being counseled and instructed by their homeroom teachers, NVA officers, FDJ functionaries and GST functionaries in military matters. When in their vacation camps, meetings are deliberately arranged between the children and NVA and Red Army soldiers.

To comment on each and every grade in particular is a moot point because military propaganda and education are continuous. But there is one perversion in this propaganda of which a special point has to be made.

It is only logical that the authorities find it hard to talk about the "border" and about "escaping from the GDR." Those ticklish problems are attempted to be explained as follows in fourth grade: "There were no barriers at all in 1959 on the border with the FRG. There were days when over 100,000 persons traveled to and fro. Not all who entered our republic had peaceful intentions. There were agents and recruiters among them. They were supposed to interfere with socialist construction and try to entice physicians, engineers and technicians to come to the FRG and West Berlin. And all the things that were removed: foodstuffs, optical devices, TV equipment and refrigerators. We were literally stripped clean by way of the open border. Therefore we needed our border soldiers because they see to it that no enemy enters our country and disturbs our peaceful construction."

After the basis is laid for the military doctrine in the lower grades and the lowest of the middle grades, it is being reinforced and expanded in the middle and upper grades and in the expanded upper grade.

In a targeted manner, boys are prepared and trained for army service, girls for civil defense service. This is done by their acquiring practical knowledge and skills in basic premilitary training, medical training and civil defense training.

All ninth grade pupils attend a 2-week civil and national defense course once a year. They are trained in the following subjects: first aid, salvage operations, obstacle course, hiking exercises up to 20 km, terrain orientation, alert practice and the like.

This course has 72 hours of instruction. Ninth grade boys can also volunteer for a "premilitary camp." That provides them with rigid military service also including, among other things, formal training and small caliber weapons training.

With the 1978/79 school year, "military instruction" became a mandatory subject for the 9th and 10th grades. Both girls and boys have to attend those courses. Normally that instruction is given in the afternoon. The most important subjects are: (1) The purpose of socialist national defense; (2) the nature of a possible war; (3) the structure of the NVA and the other armed organs; (4) the demands made on soldiers and civil defense forces; and (5) the arms and equipment of the fraternal socialist armies.

It is remarkable that such military instruction was not introduced in the time of the Cold War in the 1950's but not until the starting phase of the detente policy.

At the expanded upper grade, which combines 11th and 12th grade that lead directly to highschool graduation, all pupils must take part in the course, "Principles of Military Policy and the Military Protection of the GDR," which continues through both years. Since September 1981, they have been providing weapons firing and medical training in addition, as premilitary training, in 11th grade. This training also is mandatory and is based on the military instruction referred to. The declared objective is "providing knowledge, skills and facilities for the 'NVA motorized infantry career' and for promoting the defense readiness of male pupils."

School sports constitute another means of military education. "Ready for Work and for the Defense of the Homeland," as the sports medal puts it. To get that sports medal, tests have to be passed in military sports. For those between 14 and 18 years of age, these tests include, along with general achievements in running, jumping and swimming, a 20-km hike in 3 1/2 hours, 11 chinups, 35 situps, a 7.30-meter triple jump, and air gun shooting (5 shots at 10-ring target, with a 35-ring requirement).

The training personnel is under the obligation to instruct the youth "in the sense of democratic socialism" and in the "course of the socialist revolution and the sacrificial struggle for establishing the new society in the USSR and in the other countries of the socialist community." There must be no pedagogic license or, worse, doing away with centralism in structuring instructional and study programs.

To focus all teaching staffs at schools at military education, the party has rigorously purged them of teachers who had not adopted the party line, for the good of the state and the people. The SED does not permit its youth to be affected negatively by the school.

#### The Young Pioneers

After kindergarten, children, in parallel with the school's military education, are taken care of in terms of military education and further influenced by the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneer Organization.

General activities like hikes, compass and map reading also include terrain orientation, camouflage, pitching tents and first aid training. Training in firing weapons also is given. The younger pioneers start with bow and arrow and with the crossbow, the older ones, with air guns. They also practice formal drill with saluting, falling out for roll-call, marching and standing at attention.

As romanticism and adventure find children generally receptive, membership in the Young Pioneers is very popular. Also very important is, of course, that these young people get vacations free of charge. Circa 85 percent of the kids between 6 and 14 years of age belongs to this organization from which the FDJ replenishes itself.

#### The Free German Youth

At the age of 15, the young people get into the FDJ. What had still be fun and adventure among the Pioneers is now conducted under performance requirements. Intensive political-ideological education now is to awaken defense willingness and defense readiness. On evenings discussions are held about matters of military policy, and exhibits and competitions are sponsored on the topic of military ethics.

Other FDJ tasks are: Recruiting soldiers for extended terms; providing FDJ sponsorships for officer candidates and for all soldiers with the border troops; political training and supervision of FDJ members in the NVA; supporting the "innovator movement" in the armed forces (a community that works on

improvement proposals); organizing and conducting the "Hans Beimler Contests"; organizing the FDJ public order groups for their cooperation with the People's Police; and making available examinors for draftees to the draft boards.

Hans Beimler Contests are held annually for pupils between 8th and 10th grade. These contests include: a 2,000-meter obstacle chase in no more than 9 minutes; a multithlon including an obstacle course, hand grenade throwing (30-40 meters), and air gun firing (6 shots, at least 30 rings).

Athletics contests are another discipline. Here one calls for at least eight chinups, an at least 6-meter triple vault, 8 to 10 bends on parallel bars, and knee bends with a 20-kg sand sack in 1 minute (30 to 40 times).

The "military part" of the contests is a 10-km hike with extras such as overcoming obstacles through bravery vaults, terrain movement and camouflage, map and compass orientation in the terrain, ambulance first aid, fire fighting, pitching tents and tabernacles, and living in the field with "building fires and cooking food."

As athletic ambition is more highly developed among GDR youth than our own, owing to the pedagogic principle that a healthy body harbors a healthy mind, the norms called for are often vastly exceeded.

The young people come under a threefold supervision and rating in these contests, by the school, the FDJ itself and the GST.

Society for Sport and Technology

The GST is set up in accordance with military principles. It comes under the Ministry for National Defense and is thus also subject to the relevant laws and decrees.

Its main task is to prepare the young people at premilitary age for their military service so they will understand that as a "class mission" and acquire the knowledge and skills needed for it while in premilitary training. It is a standard component of national defense, a school that directly prepares young people, girls and boys, for their "honorable service" in the NVA.

Training is made up of basic training in the first year and NVA career training in the second.

Basic training includes firing range and terrain, ABC training, medical training, and training in map and compass reading.

Training is provided in accordance with NVA military regulations.

The athletic octothlon calls for 100 meters in 14.8 seconds, 20 situps, a 6-meter triple vault, a 3,000-meter run in 13.30 minutes, 6 chinups, a 5-meter rope climbing in 19 seconds, a hand grenade throw of at least 32 meters, and a 200-meter assault race in 3.10 minutes.

This athletic contest tests the performance readiness and capability.

Girls are tested in the somewhat easier tetrathlon.

In the second year then comes the career training which readies the boys for their later branch of service in the NVA. There are the following specialties: motorized infantry soldier, pilot, tank soldier, paratrooper, sailor, communications technician, chauffeur, medic and others.

To become an NVA officer or NCO, one must have been a member of GST and have taken career training. Anyone who, after having served with the NVA, wants to become an Interflug pilot, must prove a tried and tested membership in GST, too. It is unthinkable in the GDR that conscientious objectors may study or even learn or engage in privileged trades such as teachers, ship's captains, policemen and so forth.

Having taken part in GST training makes it possible for the NVA to provide for combat readiness even in the newly replenished units of recruits and to enhance their fighting value.

As young people can earn certain certificates and patents, such as a driver's license or the glider license, the GST can promote effectively and be a motivator. All GST members wear uniforms on official occasions. Due to the military training given its members, it certainly must also be called a paramilitary association.

A final word should be said about the students.

One can only gain immatriculation in a university if political functionaries have decided in favor of admission. For persons that were not members of the FDJ, GST or NVA admission is virtually impossible. Thus circa 80 percent of all students comes with FDJ membership. During specialized studies socialist military education continues. An extra program always provides for the social sciences, military and athletic training, FDJ meetings, political indoctrination and so forth.


In summer months, the students, under FDJ leadership, are sent into the countryside to help with the harvest. Then they still have only 2 weeks of pure vacation for the rest of the year. The party jargon comments on that: "Not an hour of the students' leisure may be surrendered to the class enemy."

The facts presented here must lead to the conclusion that the GDR is a completely militaristic state. The total involvement of all people in military education, from their early youth, has become a similarly complete system as once in the Third Reich. Only the uniforms are a little different.

<sup>\*</sup>Conscientious objection in our sense is legally impossible in the GDR. One alternative exists: serving without weapons in the NVA engineering units.

The slogan then always says one should have to be ready for the defense of the accomplishments of the workers and farmers democracy. Instilling military socialism without pacifism is the supreme pedagogical motive, because pacifism "paralyzes the fighting strength of the masses and prevents them from actively fighting against unjust wars and from supporting just wars."


Let us FRG citizens use our own defense readiness so that our own children will never have to become members of the FDJ or GST. Let us finally comprehend what it is that we have to defend.



The System of Socialist Military Education: Key:

- 1. Age Groups
- 2. Enterprises/FDGB
- 3. Ministry for Public Education
- 4. Ministry for University & Technical School Affairs
- 5. Ministry for National Defense
- 6. Ministry of the Interior

- 7. Enterprise Kindergarten
- 8. Socialist Kindergarten
- 9. General Education Polytechnical Secondary School
- 10. Young Pioneers/Thaelmann Pioneers
- 11. Youth Consecration
- 12. Basic Premilitary Training
- 13. Enterprise Vocational School
- 15. Basic General Service
- 16. Communal Vocational School
- 17. FDJ Membership
- 18. GST Training (Membership)
- 19. Extended Term
- 20. German People's Police
- 21. Expanded Polytechnical Secondary School
- 22. Advanced Technical School
- 23. Working Class Militia
- 24. Security Alert Police
- 25. SED Membership
- 26. Transport Police
- 27. Civil Defense
- 29. Reservists' Collective
- 30. Career Soldiers



The Sections of the Society for Sport and Technology: Key:

1. Premilitary General Basic Training (14 - 16 years of age)

- 2. Premilitary Special Training (15 16 years of age)
- 3. Weapons' Firing
- 4. Scouting
- 5. Animal Sports (disbanded)
- 6. Motor Sports
- 7. Bicycle Sports
- 8. Automobiles
- 9. Communications
- 10. Telecommunications
- 11. Radio Communication
- 12. Teletype
- 13. Aviation
- 14. Gliders
- 15. Motorized Aviation
- 16. Parachuting
- 17. Navigation
- 18. Diving
- 19. Model Ship Building
- 20. Model Airplane Building
- 21. National People's Army
- 22. General Conscription

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5885

CSO: 8120/1049

#### POSSIBLE ASSAULT ROLE SEEN FOR BORDER TROOPS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Mar 83 p 3

[Article by Rolf Tophoven: "With 'Uncle' Against Frustration and Escape"]

[Text] When the helicopter of the BGS (Federal Border Police) North air squadron approaches the FRG-GDR border at 110 knots flying at 2,000 feet, the GDR forces have long spotted it on the radar screen. The BGS helicopter hovers close to the GDR border obstacles across from the Brocken mountain, with 1100 meters the highest elevation in the Harz Mountains. This mountain is crammed full with electronic reconnaissance systems. But not only Honecker's radar specialists are located there; the Red Army, too, looks and listens.

"The presence of the Red Army in the electronic reconnaissance system along the FRG-GDR border is massive," according to Erik Krassmann, the commander of the North GSK (Border Police Command). He and his command are responsible for protection and security of the 550-kilometer border sector from north of Lueneburg to south of Duderstadt in the Harz Mountains. The North GSK of the BGS guards the longest sector facing the GDR.

Therefore, the reconnaissance results in this command concerning their opposite number, the GDR Border Troops, are correspondingly thorough. Latest finding: Lately there has been the socalled "uncle" system within the companies of the Border Troops, a term jokingly applied by the BGS experts. A complex psychological measure to stir up somewhat the morale of the adversary, which is generally regarded as poor.

The "uncle" is an older, as a rule married, soldier of the Border Troops. A younger border soldier, frequently a conscript, is assigned to him on the basis of a partnership. The mission of the older soldier: to train the younger comrade into a reliable soldier and thus make him less inclined to defect.

During this relationship of sponsorship, the younger border soldier is also invited to the home of his sponsor. Thus the "frustration" among the young border soldiers is to be reduced. For there is absolutely no contact between the Border Troops and the population in the eastern border region. Their contact is limited almost exclusively to the company.

A bad atmosphere, especially in the relationship between officers and their men, is the consequence. A restrictive leave policy heightens the moroseness. These facts are frequently the reasons for defection to the FRG.

Despite the vulnerabilities in the internal structure of the Border Troops, their value as a fighting force should not be underestimated. Krassmann: "In case of an emergency most of them will remain at their posts; the strong link to the overall political system in the GDR guarantees that."

The Border Troop command consists of three sectors: North, Center, and South. The present total strength of the GDR Border Troops is approximately 50,000.

Border Troops Have Status of Soldiers

Since 1974 the Border Troops have not been a component of the NVA (National People's Army), according to a GDR State Council decision. However, the units are led by the ministry for national defense, to which they are also subordinated. The underlying reason for this reorganization was the MBFR negotiations in Central Europe started in Vienna in 1973. The Border Troops are no longer a proper subject of the negotiations in view of their exclusion from the NVA. In possible reductions of troop contingents, they will no longer be counted.

However, logistically the Border Troops are fully tied to the NVA. They have the status of soldiers. Weapons, strength, and organization give them characteristics clearly transcending paramilitary ones.

The equipment of the Border Troops corresponds to that of motorized infantry battalions. "In case of an emergency the GDR is able to create at any time 2-3 infantry divisions from the cadre units of the North and South border commands," according to the assessment of the situation in the border area by Commander Erik Krassmann.

Therefore, the FRG intelligence services and the BGS experts also assume that the mission of the Border Troops in peacetime (obstacles and security installations along the border with the FRG, reconnaissance of the border region, preventing escapes) can be considerably expanded in case of tension or war. According to Western findings, the Border Troop units are definitely capable of carrying out special missions up to a depth of 50 kilometers on FRG territory. Surprise occupation or destruction of strategic terrain positions, command and telecommunications facilities, and destruction of infrastructures would then be the operational targets.

What confronts this GDR border security system, so very costly in terms of personnel, on the West German side from the BGS? If high gross figures are assumed, the comparison in the North border command, as by the way in other commands, is clearly in favor of the GDR Border Troops. About 15,000 of the total 50,000 GDR Border Troops form the direct opponent in the region of the North Border Police command with headquarters in Hannover. The North BGS command numbers 5,000 men.

To put it further in concrete terms, this means by the example of the North GSK: In the sector from north of Lueneburg to south of Duderstadt, six GSA's (Border Police units) protect the border facing the GDR. On paper every unit has an authorized strength of 560 men. But today such figures are mere pipedreams in the BGS.

It is perhaps realistic to assume the effective strength of a GSA to be about 150 men. The remainder of the authorized strength is not available for various reasons: one third of a GSA is constantly in training. In addition, the unit must provide detachments, for example for the West command in Bonn.for the protection of the federal agencies, for individual Border Police duty, for the Lufthansa airline as well as for assignments in foreign countries (protection of embassies).

At the GDR border, the units of the North GSK are not directly located in the border sector but are stationed in the rear area. Each units dispatches three patrols a day (each consisting of three officers) to the border in an 8-hour rotation. This means 54 officers as border patrolmen in the North Command sector.

On the eastern side of the border, the GDR troops safeguard the border on battalion level. This means that the handful of BGS patrols constantly are directly confronted by 15 companies of 60-70 soldiers each.

In Case of Emergency BGS Would Be Overtaxed

Commander Krassmann summarizes the situation as follows: "If the GDR Border Troops were to attack sometime, then they will no longer be a paramilitary organization, but they would be a military force. The BGS would clearly be overtaxed if this situation were to arise."

The fact that such a situation has developed at the boundary that is sensitive on a security level is the result of the internal emaciation and blurring of the original BGS characteristics. In the past few years, the formerly effective organization was reduced step by step to the level of policemen by political measures. Individual officers instead of police officers forming part of an internally compact organization, that was the slogan of the Schmidt/Genscher government for the BGS.

12356

CSO: 2300/175

### RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIAN GUARDS DEFINED

East Berlin GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK in German Part I No 4, 18 Feb 83 pp 42-43

[Official text of "Order on the Authority of Civilian Guard Forces dated 21 January 1983," effective 1 March 1983; signed by Friedrich Dickel, minister of the interior and chief of the German People's Police]

[Text] To guarantee protection and security of the offices of the state organs, combines, state enterprises, institutions and cooperatives, the heads of these organizations, in accordance with their responsibility, will issue necessary regulations and decide on the employment of civilian guard forces.

In agreement with the heads of the competent state organs, the following is being ordered to safeguard the powers of the civilian guard forces:

#### Article 1

This order regulates the powers of civilian guard forces and other suitable forces assigned to the protection and security of offices of the state organs, combines, economic management organs, state enterprises, institutions, and cooperatives (hereinafter called offices, enterprises, and institutions).

#### Article 2

- (1) Civilian guard forces, according to this order, are workers who, according to the tasks agreed to in the employment contract, perform functions for the protection and security of offices, enterprises, and institutions. As identification they wear brassards bearing the legend "Plant Guard" while on duty.
- (2) Other suitable forces under this order are citizens who, aside from existing employment or who for socially justifiable reasons hold no job, fulfill duties for the protection and safeguarding of offices, enterprises, and institutions based on the written agreement with the competent agency head.

## Article 3

- (1) The heads of the offices, enterprises, and institutions can grant the following powers to the civilian guard forces and other suitable forces:
  - a) To check persons who want to enter or leave offices, enterprises, and institutions regarding the required authorization and to inspect items carried by them, containers, vehicles, and the load they contain. The inspection must not include the contents of documents and objects characterized as state and official secrets, nor the containers and conveyances used for this purpose;
  - b) To detain persons to ascertain the facts if they want to enter or leave offices, enterprises, and institutions, remain within them without authorization, refuse inspection of the required authorization concerning the items, containers, and vehicles in their possession as well as their load or have state and official secrets in their possession without authorization;
  - c) To impound products, other objects and documents, except for concrete objects representing state and official secrets, to clarify the facts if they are carried without the required authorization and an immediate clarification concerning the authority to take the items along is not possible.
- (2) To ascertain personal data, the civilian guard forces and other suitable forces, in fulfilling their duties, are authorized to inspect identity cards and other suitable documents as proof of identity.
- (3) According to Article 125 of the Rules of Criminal Procedures, the civilian guard forces and other suitable forces are authorized to detain temporarily persons caught redhanded or following hot pursuit if they are suspected of planning to escape or their personal data cannot be immediately ascertained.

### Article 4

The members of the German People's Police take care of the powers according to Article 3 as regards protection and safeguarding of the offices, enterprises, and institutions.

### Article 5

- (1) This order is effective on 1 March 1983.
- (2) At the same time, the order of 22 December 1970 concerning the powers of guard forces (GBL II 1971 No.2 p 18) is rescinded.

12356

CSO: 2300/172

# 'VULGAR' TENDENCIES IN LOCAL ROCK MUSIC DEPLORED

### West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 47, 26 Mar 83 'iwe-kultur' supplement

[Report from Berlin: "'Vulgar' Rock Lyrics Unwelcome." A translation of the East Berlin SONNTAG article cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] The East Berlin cultural journal SONNTAG (No 13, 27 Mar 83) has taken exception to the "vulgar" lyrics of some rock bands in the GDR, stating that some authors of lyrics evidently subscribe to the view "The more vulgar, the more original and the more folksy." In general the paper noted among most groups a trend away from poetical innuendos toward a straightforward description of reality. The "dying swan" was in fact dead, and one was dealing increasingly with the cares and joys of everyday life. In the process, the authors did "not always find it easy to understand their environment." The paper took a positive view of the fact that GDR rock bands are gradually turning away from "complicated tone collages and also technological gigantomania" and reverting to making dance music.

### GDR Cultural Journal's Critique

East Berlin SONNTAG in German Vol 37 No 13, 27 Mar 83 p 5

["Sixth Free German Youth (FDJ) workshop on Youth Dance Music: Rock With Riff and Baff [names of GDR rock groups]"--Interview with Walter Bartel, chief editor, Berliner Rundfunk [Berlin Radio]; consultant group head at dance music workshop; by Adelheid Wedel; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] In 1972 the FDJ Central Council for the first time issued invitations to an amateur dance music workshop. Since then such a gathering has taken place every couple of years. What sort of development can be noted as regards the sixth workshop in Suhl?

[Answer] Over a series of six workshops and a period of more than 10 years, one can in fact note some developments which, on the one hand, occur not separately from trends in the professional camp and, on the other hand—as

regards the way of making music, for example -- cannot be viewed separately from international developments. It is also striking what has happened in amateur dance music in the past 10 years. When we issued the first invitation in 1972 to the gathering in Frankfurt/Oder, we found that it was hardly possible to take in all that was occurring in this field of artistic popular creation. Nor was it as yet tied to professional music--let alone in accord with it--to the extent that this is the case today. Over the years a rapprochement toward professional musicians has taken place. By this I mean, above all, a great degree of skill and technical qualification. As far as the creative work of composing and writing lyrics is concerned, a standard applicable to professional musicians is being used today. The groups are sure of themselves, knowing full well what they want. The urge to play, the need to express oneself artistically is given precedence -- and thus, not least, the realization that if one does not have anything of one's own to add, the playing of someone else's composition in the final analysis reduces one to the level of musical machine.

[Question] Previously the action was called FDJ Amateur Dance Music Workshop; now it is called Youth Dance Music Workshop. Is there any significance to the fact that the word "amateur" has disappeared?

[Answer] Perhaps "youth dance music" sounds more fashionable; perhaps the reason is that the workshop has been enriched by a large proportion of professional musicians. Even amateurs no longer have to be told how to play percussion instruments. The preparation of bands is such that they come from colleges or music schools and have gone through some years of instruction. The FDJ Central Council, however, puts special store by the participation of professional musicians as advisers. This time Gunther Wosylus (former percussionist of "Puhdys"), Martin Schreier of "Stern Meissen," Emmerich Babernics of "dialog" and lyricists Fred Gertz and Katharina Koch participated. The exchange of ideas with amateurs benefits the professionals themselves. In discussions concerning the staging of events, a number of ideas emerged which concern professionals as well as amateurs. And the special workshops were something that works only in concert: Gunther Wosylus made sound demonstrations, and there were lyrics, composition and arrangement workshops accompanied by a busy exchange of ideas. And not least important was the fact that professional musicians took part in a number of concerts which were a genuine attraction for the young at Suhl--such as a big concert with the "Puhdys" and "Rockhaus" first of all, an international concert with Petra Zeiger and the Smokings as well as a Hungarian and a Finnish band, and the concert "Lenie 6" with new dance music by "Keks," "Scheselong" and Brigitte Stephan and Meridian.

Actually, one is justified to ask whether it is still a pure amateur dance music workshop. In fact the field has expanded to professional musicians who meet with amateurs for a week during which intensive work takes place. To the credit of the professional musicians it should be said that relations

between the groups are extraordinarily good, without envy of what the other gets and also without hero worship, because the amateurs look on their famous colleagues not as idols but as partners who are at their disposal at every opportunity and precisely also on this occasion. There are even examples of the intensification of such connections, such as between "Puhdys" and "Rockhaus," "Karussell" and "Rock Phonie," "Pankow" and "Mona Lise."

[Question] Is there a trend toward the best amateur dance musicians working as professionals within a short period, or do most stick to their status, content with it?

[Answer] Those who appear in Suhl as leading performers must not be confused with those who perform the hard daily work in villages, towns and kreises and play dance music on weekends. For these it remains a leisure occupation. One must realize, however, that what with increasing musical intensity amateurs are forced to make a decision; in the long run this then can no longer be managed as a hobby.

[Question] Is the principle of delegation the same in all bezirks?

[Answer] Evidently such action was taken in highly varying ways. On the one hand, there emerged many young bands whose names we had not known. Other bezirks put their stakes on what they thought would be gold medals, sending veterans of the amateur scene as it were. It certainly was quite a nice trip for them, but they blocked the room for others.

[Question] Do not discotheques compete with them for that room as it is?

[Answer] Discotheques of course are much less expensive and sound more complete than a band, but one cannot permit discotheques doing away with an entire field such as amateur dance music. On that subject there were discussions in Suhl which stressed new possibilities of combined events—that is, discotheques are including bands in their programs. Between dance musicians and discotheques, the previously almost unbridgeable gap has been abandoned in favor of a comradely exchange about how to find the best variant for both sides. There is a natural limit to any explosion of new outfits—the number of possibilities of performances in clubs and youth clubs. Young musicians play to be accepted by the people.

This process, incidentally, takes place independently of the Suhl workshop.

[Question] Are there some promising new groups?

[Answer] "Condor" from Magdeburg and "Baff" from Gera, for instance. The latter came as students from the music college in Weimar. They told about the kind of support they were receiving. But they also complained about weaknesses in practice-related training. The science of rock style is a carefully guarded secret in colleges.

"Passmobil" from Frankfurt/Oder was interesting. It was the talk of the town with Frank Schoebel's "Looky, looky" in a new rock arrangement. "Glashaus" from Karl-Marx-Stadt is also something genuinely new. "Cand" from Leipzig, extremely young-between 18 and 20 years or so-has not reached the top level technically speaking, but has come up with cabaret-style lyrics, such as the Reggae "With Jugendtourist [Youth Tourist Organization] to Jamaica." The "Oriens" from Potsdam made a big impression, and "Riff" from Rostock and "Porto" from Neubrandenburg were also the subject of conversation. In addition groups which played in the Musicians Club in the evening were assessed. There "bromm oss" from Suhl, "Prinz" from Erfurt, "Possenspiel" from Frankfurt/Oder and "Hausmusik" from Berlin made an impression.

[Question] Can one say anything new about contents and about ways of making music?

[Answer] As I have said, amateur music does not live outside the other musical development, and so it has taken note of what is happening around it in music in the GDR and abroad. One can see that there is a trend away from complicated tone collages and also technical gigantomania with a view to professing again one thing--making dance music. This means that the motor element is stressed, tempi are tightened, pronounced bass configurations are added....

There were detailed discussions in the lyrics workshops. Positions of "The more vulgar, the more original and folksy" were called into question. Most lyricists do not have that kind of view of their work, but they try to approach things less allegorically. The dying swan is in fact dead. One deals with what surrounds one, with the irritations and worries, the joy, which need to be expressed. They do not always find it easy to understand their environment.

[Question] There were radio productions with amateurs in Suhl. What was their purpose?

[Answer] Radio has had long experience with cooperating with amateurs. This is true not only of the workshop but also in the period in between. We make assembly-line productions, taping in the Haus der Jungen Talente and outside Berlin. It may be that all is meant well on the stage and in evaluation events, but it is easy to deceive the human ear. In the studio the moment of truth arrives. This opportunity of checking oneself for a change was offered by radio with its mobile studio in the Youth Club in Suhl—not entirely altruistically, of course, since we need music. We made about 20 productions that week. And in Suhl "Passmobil" produced Schoebel's "Looky, looky," which went straight into DT 64 Metronom as a title for evaluation and now occupies eighth place. In other words, it has already been accepted by the listeners.

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#### WROCLAW PROVINCE PARTY ACTIVITIES NOTED

Number, Quality of Party Organization

Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 13 Jan 83 p 1

[Unsigned article: "Session of the Executive Board of the Wroclaw Province"]

[Text] Yesterday a session of the Executive Board of the Wroclaw Province PZPR Committee was held. Its members familiarized themselves with, among other things, the numerical and qualitative status of the province party organization.

During the period between July 1980 and 30 November 1982 many persons had quitted the province party organization. Under martial law the surrenders of party cards gradually diminished in number. Those leaving the party were most often young people with a brief membership record who had been admitted to the PZPR during 1972-1980 when the principle of the quantitative growth of its ranks was being pursued, chiefly by means of the mass recruiting of young workers, members of the Polish Socialist Youth Union ZSMP, who had often been insufficiently prepared for the acute political struggle conducted by the party since the summer of 1980.

After 13 December 1981 a new stage of changes in the status and composition of the province PZPR organization set in. In accordance with the resolution of the 7th Central Committee Plenum, the elimination of ideologically alien individuals, violators of the statutory norms, was commenced. The recovery of the party's authority is evidenced not only by the virtual cessation of the surrenders of party cards but also, despite the tightening of the criteria for admission, the growth of the party's ranks. In the last few months ... number illegible but it is in three digits persons entered the party in Wroclaw and the province.

During the remainder of the session the Executive Board of the PZPR Province Committee examined the materials drafted for the February Province Reports-Programs Conference in Wroclaw.

Plenum on Reports-Programs Conference

Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 25 Jan 83 pp 1,5

[Article by (hsm): "Preparations for the Reports-Programs Conference: Plenum of the Wroclaw Province PZPR Committee"]

[Text] (Own information.) Yesterday in Wroclaw the PZPR Province Committee held a plenary session devoted chiefly to approving the materials for the

province reports-programs conference. The deliberations were opened and chaired by comrade Tadeusz Porebski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and first secretary of the Province Committee.

The participants had earlier received the following written materials for analysis and the drafting of comments and recommendations: a report on the activities of the Wroclaw Province PZPR organization since June 1981; information on the implementation of the resolution of the 21st Province Reports-Elections Conference; and draft proposals on the composition of the recommendations and mandate commissions, the agenda of the conference and the contents of the report.

Comrade Porebski recalled that the proposed members of both commissions are chiefly those comrades who had taken part in the work of the Province Reports-Elections Conference in June 1981. Considering that of the 353 delegates who had taken part in that conference 66 have since lost their mandates owing to deletions and expulsions from the party, resignations of mandates, party penalties, or departures to other regions of the country or abroad, the membership rosters of the two commissions are incomplete at present. It was therefore proposed that other comrades, delegates to the coming conference, be invited to work in them.

In the discussion it was emphasized that the materials for the conference were prepared thoroughly and diligently. No field of interest to the Province rparty organization and echelon, no field of party activity, has been overlooked. Proposals were made to expand some parts of the materials and stress them more or complement them with further statements.

The Province Committee members accepted by a voice vote the materials for the province reports-programs conference. They also accepted the proposed composition of the recommendations and mandate commissions and the conference agenda. In addition to these materials, information is being prepared on the state of the party in the province and Wroclaw, the principal initiatives of the party echelons, the implementation of recommendations made during the current term of office of party authorities in the province and the socioeconomic situation in the province and Wroclaw. Other materials in preparation are a list of Province Committee publications designed chiefly for the basic party organizations POP and a draft resolution concerning the coming 40th anniversary of the return of Lower Silesia to the Motherland.

The Province Committee Plenum confirmed this set of materials for the delegates to the coming conference.

As the next item on its agenda, the Province Committee adopted, following discussion and amendment proposals, the plan of action of the province party organization for the firt half of this year. Among other things, the proposals made by the Executive Board of the Province Committee were complemented with an amendment stating that a plenary session of the province party organization on the subject of education should be held before this year is over.

As the next item on its agenda, in connection with organizational matters, the plenum approved the appointment of comrade Andrzej Wlodarczyk, sector head within the Department of Science, Education and Culture under the Province Committee, to the post of director of that Committee, replacing its previous director comrade Zbigniew Sajkowski who has been transferred to work at the Central Committee.

The Province Committee plenum adopted a resolution confirming the materials for the February conference and setting its date at 7 February.

## Comments of Conference Delegate

Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 25 Jan 83 p 2 [Interview with Jerzy Cebula by (p): "A Consensus Reached: We Speak With Delegates to the PZPR Province Conferences"]

[Text] I found Jerzy Cebula, foreman at the department for the cleaning of castings in the LEGMET Mechanical Works, at the offices of the trade union, whose chairman he is. The trade union has already been registered and Cebula's task now is to organize an election meeting. Soon, in his capacity as the LEGMET's delegate, he will also take part in the Province Reports-Programs Conference of the PZPR in Legnica. This was why I was brought to him.

[Cebula] declared: The party organization at the LEGMET retained its visibility during the years critical to the party. It was then that the party members there resolved to concentrate on calming fevered moods and building a climate of stability at the plant. To a large extent we have succeeded in achieving this. I mean chiefly the strikes. After August no interruptions occurred in work. Of course, this is to the credit of not only the party members but also the maturity of the work force. Our people grasped certain issues. We reached a common consensus for the good of the plant.

[Question] But there was a strike last December, with painful consequences to many workers at that.

[Answer] That lasted just one hour. No party member had participated in that strike, and only a part of the work force had struck, and this precisely appears to be due to the party's work at LEGMET and to its activities during the martial-law period.

[Question] How do you perceive the difference's in the party situation during the period when you were elected the delegate and now on the eve of the province conference?

[Answer] I believe that we have freed ourselves from the quagmire of stagnation. Some of our members quitted the party but those who remain have become greatly consolidated. They took to work with zeal and this is already producing effects.

# [Question] What effects?

[Answer] Above all, we approach very seriously the implementation of the resolution of the 9th PZPR Congress. The activity of the members has increased. It can be stated that the party at LEGMET now participates in the solution of nearly all human problems. For example we attended to the just distribution of scarce goods among the work force and a social services commission has upon our initiative been established at the plant. For a year this commission has been filling the gap left by the dissolution of the trade union. We have organized meetings of the work force at which no topic was taboo and anything of concern to our workers was mentioned.

[Question] You are a party member, a delegate to the conference and at the same time the chairman of a trade union local. Aren't people saying that the new post-Solidarity trade union are directed from outside?

[Answer] During the initial period attempts were made to create such a psychosis, but they failed. After all, party members don't usurp for themselves alone the leading offices in the trade union.

# Secretary Bogdan Kleszcewski's Interview

Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 27 Jan 83 p 2

[Interview with Bogdan Kleszczewski, secretary of Wroclaw Province PZPR Committee, by Henryk Smolak: "The Party is Closing Its Ranks: Interview with Comrade Bogdan Kleszczewski, secretary of the Wroclaw Province PZPR Committee"]

[Text] [Question] Barely a few months ago you had switched from the post of the deputy director of a large enterprise to that of secretary of the PZPR Province Committee in Wroclaw. How do you cope with your job, so different from your previous one? How are you feeling at present?

[Answer] Every transition to a new job has the combined advantage and disadvantage of lugging the baggage of one's own experience and values formed in the previous milieu. As to what part of that baggage is of value and what of harm, only time will show. I was entrusted with this office in October. The 3 months that passed since then abounded in significant political events. It is thus readily concluded that there was not enough time for sufficient adaptation. My co-workers have been and are of great assistance and show understanding, which augments my innate optimism, so that—statistically speaking, I feel fine.

[Question] While a deputy director you too had managed teams of people. Did not this facilitate your work in your new post?

[Answer] In the sense of directing teams of people--yes, but from the standpoint of the functions which this team is to exercise in relation to the province party organization, this is not as unambiguous. Even the largest enteprise with the most complicated economic problems is in a sense a large cog in the economic machine, just a cog after all. Any mistakes and their

consequences at that level have definite limits and scope. But mistakes committed at my present post produce much more severe social and political consequences and cannot always be debited to the "balance sheet of extraordinary losses and profits" as is done at an enterprise.

While directing navigation on the Odra River I had also learned the valuable lesson that the yearly plan of activities cannot be fulfilled smoothly. Management requires continual improvisation which develops valuable skills, but it also is important to resort to it without reducing it to the sole form of management, as then the end-result will be apparent rather than genuine management.

[Question] I understand that the work of the party apparatus must find room for improvisation under the influence of unexpected events, especially in the present times. In this case, what is the importance of the plan to the activity of the province party echelon?

[Answer] It is of basic importance! The party has learned from experience that without a plan the effectiveness of our work is relatively low and party activities are largely of a seeming nature. This is dangerous inasmuch as it weakens the motivation of the individuals committed to that work, and that work itself then becomes of a nature such that the number of measurable criterions of performance is not too large. Whenever possible, we must abandon improvisation in favor of planned work and fit improvisation to the plan rather than vice versa. We work as an echelon based on a many-faceted semiannual plan that is continuously monitored internally.

[Question] Comrade secretary, at the time when you first took over your new post the programs-reports campaign was in full swing within the party. What were the goals that the province party echelon had set itself during that campaign?

[Answer] The paramount goal was the internal strengthening of the party, the enhancement of its political, organizational and ideological cohesion, particularly among its basic elements, and the consolidation of its working class-oriented nature.

During the preparatory period prior to the reports campaign, in many cases, the basic party organizations, implementing that paramount goal, i.e. the enhancement of the party's cohesiveness and unity, deleted from their membership rolls those comrades who had been passive and did not perform their statutory obligations. At the same time, the achievements so far were assessed.

[Question] I would say that only a certain stage of the party's activities had been assessed, because it is difficult to speak of any achievements...

[Answer] I don't accept such a formulation. The program resolved upon by the party at its 9th Congress and at the successive plenary sessions of the Central Committee, as well as the programs ensuing from the own resolutions of party echelons and organizations, do not consist exclusively of long-range

tasks. In addition to these resolutions, several thousand recommendations on various matters are in circulation and it is precisely the reports campaign that provides a splendid opportunity for assessing both the degree of advancement of the programs accepted in the resolutions and the degree of implementation of the recommendations.

[Question] You referred to "strengthening the working class-oriented nature of the party." How do you construe this? It used to be that the PZPR stressed the admission of workers to its ranks, but now, as known, its quantitative growth has slowed down.

[Answer] Yes, this is how I put it and even—in formulating the goals of the reports campaign—placed this in the forefront. This statement refers not to the formal aspect of the problem, that is, to increasing the number of workers belonging to the PZPR—although this is highly important—but to the nature of the party. Its fundamental program determinant will be the growth of the influence of the working class on its policy.

[Question] How has the reports campaign evolved? What chiefly concerns me is whether the POPs have grasped the purpose of the current campaign, which after all is taking place while the country is experiencing a difficult situation.

[Answer] Analyses and evaluations of the course of the campaign indicate that it is precisely within the POPs that the largest qualitative changes have taken place—and these changes are so obvious perhaps because it was within these organizations, which represent the grassroots base of the party, that the demoralization had been the greatest. The POPs understood that they will not cope with the program tasks unless they attain internal unity and enhance their organizational and political cohesiveness.

The reports campaign took place in the course of an acute political struggle which, while complicating planned party work, at the same time engendered among our members the feeling of solidarity, strengthened the POPs internally and conferred a resolute nature on many activities. Most meetings were held on schedule and their attendance averaged nearly 80 percent. The average number of delegates decreased by 15, except in higher schools where the losses were greater.

The course of the reports campaign at that level clearly showed that it had resulted in definite and durable accomplishments one of which is the concretization of own tasks and the recommendations made during the discussions.

[Question] What exactly has been the course of the discussions? What principal topics did it raise?

[Answer] There were no so-called "silent" meetings. The discussions, often tumultuous and critical, took place in the proper political climate, the comments voiced were to the point, and demagogic speeches were a rarity. The number of proposals, postulates and critical comments addressed to the central party authorities had radically diminished. Two currents dominated the

discussions: the intra-party and the economic-social, and they mostly dealt with-especially as regards intra-party matters-the local community and the local party organization.

The course of the discussions with their numerous and pertinent recommendations demonstrates that positive changes are taking place within the party organizations and the statutory and program goals are becoming understood. On a more general scale, one could speak of the formation of an outline of a "system of party competences," the adaptation of problems of party work within certain party elements to the realities and the determination of primarily own tasks tailored to own needs.

[Question] What were the critical comments about, in the main?

[Answer] Most critical comments concerned the problems of decisive influence on the conditions of everyday life. Both the economic and the local administration were criticized. Examples of poor services to the citizens, poor performance of trade, health care and communal economy were presented. The course of the economic reform was criticized with respect to systemic solutions and the direct application of that reform at plants. Much attention was devoted to incentive systems, prices, housing construction, social discipline.

[Question] What main problems arose in the discussion of intra-party topics?

[Answer] In that rich domain the discussion concerned ways and means of strengthening party groups and organizations, streamlining their activities, tightening party discipline, improving the style and methods of work and assuring the purity and development of party ranks. Weaknesses in ideological work and the need to improve party training were pointed out. Attention was drawn to the non-uniform load of party work and the need to operate with individual paty tasks at every level.

At the same time, attention was drawn to—this being a highly important factor—the weakening of the political role of the POPs in certain communities and work establishments. In some cases, during the martial law era, given the then mandatory principle of the personal responsibility of a single individual, the management forgot about the POP and its political role, relegating that organization to a secondary plane in the life of the enterprises. The single—person conduct of economic, personnel and social policies without consulting the POP or upon merely preserving the appearances of such a consultation, caused many party members to feel frustrated. This is all the more deplorable considering that the enterprise managers most often are themselves party members and exercise their duties on the party's recommendation.

Enhancing the importance of the POPs, particularly in the case of the numerically smaller organizations of this kind, in the work establishment and the community is the general recommendation ensuing from this campaign.

[Question] As commonly known, people are irritated and sometimes even outraged by events that conflict with their feeling of social justice.

[Answer] True. This has also been reflected in party discussions, and it points to the presence of a malaise within society which manifests itself with special force during critical periods. The still insufficient effectiveness of methods for eliminating this malaise has continually been criticized. At the same time, attention was drawn to occurrences not consonant with the feeling of social justice within the local work collectives, and especially to the absence of a linkage between the incentive system and the quality of work.

[Question] As you stated, comrade, many to-the-point recommendations were made. What happened to them?

[Answer] They were recorded and then they were reflected in the plans of work of all first-level party organizations and echelons. Some were incorporated in the plan of work of the province party organization for the first half of this year. This does not exhausts all the recommendations engendered by the campaign, because the Province Reports Conference is yet to come (it will take place on 7 February 1983) and should enrich us with a number of new proposals, postulates and initiatives. Only that conference will enable us to assess more thoroughly and comprehensively the accomplishments of our organization and answer many questions better than I have done on the basis of preliminary estimates.

I know for certain that this one statement should be totally incontrovertible: the party at the present stage, following the reports campaign, is the same party but it also is qualitatively different, richer in eperience, conscious of its imperfections but resolutely determined to act in behalf of the socialist renewal.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

Delegate Discussing Current Problems

Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 2 Feb 83 pp 1,5

[Interview with Rajmund Frencl by (H): "A Sack of Problems: We Talk With Delegates to the PZPR Province Conferences"]

[Text] I talk with Rajmund Frencl, grinding machine operator at the ARCHIMEDES Combined Pneumatic Equipment Works in Wroclaw.

[Question] Comrade, you used to be the youngest party secretary in the Wroclaw Province....

[Answer] And now I still am secretary of the branch party organization  $\mbox{OOP}$  at the pneumatic tools department, in my fourth term of office.

[Question] And delegate to the party province conference. What are you taking to it?

[Answer] A whole sack of problems, each heavier than the other. The most serious is the doubts of workers about the current personnel and wage policies. Things are out of kilter when good workers, highly qualified specialists needed, e.g. in my department had to quit the factory and transfer to private enterprises for better pay, because there they are paid 25,000 to 30,000 zlotys monthly. And yet, this is happening, absurd as it may be. On the one hand, the state gives them free training and on the other, it is the

private enterpreneur who profits from it, and they themselves cannot be faulted for choosing more decent living standards.

I myself, after 17 years of hard work, each day must count every zloty, every piece of candy for my child, because, once once exceeds the "limit," one has to pay through the nose: 15 zlotys for a stick of chewing gum, 300 zlotys for a bar of chocolate. Who can afford it? When a man who works honestly, sparing no effort, has to hew to an austere family budget, he is all the more irritated by speculation and by the personal fortunes made by sly individuals just because we are living in a crisis.

[Question] Comrade, do you think the province conference should look into this?

[Answer] Who else? The party's leading role also means that the party is responsible for whatever bad things are happening under its leadership. Thus we must assure that social justice be equal for all.

I'm in favor of severe penalties for speculators (much more severe than at present). I'm also in favor of a tax policy that would finally put a stop to the acquisition of millions of zlotys in personal fortunes by speculators. Private enterprise should not be given such free rein as at present. It is time for the worker, who bears the brunt of the crisis, to be paid according to his labor. Then there will be no shortage of work hands in factories.

[Question] This should be attended to by the mechanisms of the economic reform.

[Answer] So far the reform has resulted in higher prices for everything without increasing the numbers of the work force. There is an overstaffing of administrative and clerical personnel having nothing to do (I'm not speaking here of my factory) along with an acute shortage of charwomen. We used to manufacture 70,000 units of equipment but now we make only 20,000 although they are greatly needed, owing to the manpower shortage. These mechanisms should finally be applied to set the matter aright, because now it is standing on its head. I would like to learn at the conference what will happen in the future in this respect.

[Question] What are the most urgent problems in your factory?

[Answer] The amount of work to do is unimaginable. All plants in the environs work on pneumatic tools imported from England and the FRG. But we are capable of not only meeting the domestic demand but producing for exports. Yet here again we are being hobbled by the manpower shortage.

[Question] What about the party organization?

[Answer] I wish I were not regarded as the symbol of the party and government. Whenever some price increases are decreed without prior consultation in the factories or some other unpopular decision is made by the authorities, people come to me and ask: "Rajmund, well, how are you governing?" And I have to drink this beer even though no one asks me whether I had contributed to its brewing. I would prefer it if the factory work-forces were consulted to a somewhat greater extent before decisions are adopted.

[Question] How is the party numerically represented in your factory?

[Answer] Prior to the 9th Congress my organization was twice as large as it is now. Currently out of the 91 employees in the department 30 are party members. However, they are tried and tested party members. Of the work force of 2,000 there now remain 292 party members compared with 493 before the Congress. But what matters is not how many of us are there but bhat the party should be the nerve system of the factory and that it should be resistant to shocks.

[Question] How did you withstand the shocks of the last 18 months?

[Answer] People still have pretensions against party members and we are still in the crossfire, because people have forgotten, so to speak, how many of their everyday troubles were resolved for them by the party when they turned to it for help. Besides, they also have forgotten that we all more or less uniformly had believed in Gierek, the only difference being that in this sense party members were hit ideologically whereas non-party members—that is, we all—were hit in our wallets.

But it must be admitted that, little by little, the old custom of discussion within a loose group, that includes non-party members, of every decision of the authorities is returning. This is usually done either after or before work, at breakfast, and as a rule 80 to 90 percent of these conversations concern market problems. A topic that is raised again and again is that physical labor should be properly rewarded in order to stop resignations by trained experts. This is something that we at our department or in the factory cannot attend to by ourselves. It is also necessary for the party organization at the factory to receive support: we should be visited more often by comrades from the echelon, from the departments Province Office, not just at meetings but for person-to-person talks. worker should know thoroughly why and wherefore is he bearing the brunt of the He must also know and be convinced that the burden of that crisis is being shouldered equally by the entire society. I think that the province conference should also consider this matter.

## Effects of Party Initiatives

Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 7 Feb 83 p 3

[Unsigned article: "With the Thought of Improving Living and Working Conditions: Wroclaw Party Initiatives"]

[Text] We propose to chronicle, so to speak, certain initiatives of the Wroclaw party organization undertaken following the Province Reports-Elections Conference in 1981. We are doing so on the opening day of the Province Reports-Programs Conference. We intend to present elements of the inspirational, control and directing functions of the party echelon during the most difficult period yet of our postwar political and socio-economic life. This chronicle reflects the

ways, means and directions of action undertaken to strengthen the party ranks and streamline political work in extensive domains of social and economic life.

In 1979 7,000 dwellings were built in the province and city of Wroclaw compared with 280,000 for Poland as a whole. That was the maximum reached in the postwar history of our country: it was greater by a factor of 5-8 than in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Yugoslavia, the GDR, Switzerland, Sweden and Italy. During the years 1950-1979 Poland had gained 2.5 million dwellings with an average surface area greater by 15 sq m that is, practically, with an extra room each. This means that every fourth family received roof over its head.

What are then the causes of the universal critical view of the housing construction in Poland? The reason is that during the postwar period our population has increased by 12 million! The wartime destruction and devastation of Polish housing was greater than that of German. To meet the demand, during all the years past outlays on housing construction should have been twice as high as they actually were. This could not be afforded by a country rising from the ashes and ruins and emerging from historical backwardness. Thus the barriers to the development of housing construction had persisted. This was compounded by subsequent neglect of the building materials industry, the technical and social infrastructure, the potential of enterprises.... Then also there were the strikes, the work stoppages and the relaxation of all discipline in the years 1980 and 1981.

In 1982 140,000 dwellings were released for occupancy in Poland, of which 3,100 in the province and city of Wroclaw. In this important social domain we have retrogressed 15 years, to 1967. And the housing shortage exacerbates social conflicts and causes a mood of hopelessness to spread, especially among the youth. Hence the party cannot tolerate the existing situation.

Sixty Thousand Dwellings by 1990

In April 1982 was established the Party-Economic Team for Construction and the Housing Economy under the PZPR Wroclaw Province Committee. Its members include political and economic activists and the representatives of all worker communities. For half a year they met with the gmina, city, city-quarter and work establishment communities as well as with members organizations and subsector associations. This had resulted in the drafting, in October 1982, of the document "Basic Problems of Construction and Housing Economy in the Province and City of Wroclaw Until 1990." This document was repeatedly altered and revised because its first version was evaluated by the same groups that had participated in its creation. The presented opinions, recommendations and postulates were taken into account. In October, too, a commission for recommendations and resolutions, consisting of representatives of the concerned communities and all social classes and groups, was establish-The final version of that document was drafted following discussion at November Plenum of the PZPR Province Committee. This resulted in a program differing from its earlier counterparts which had the basic flaw of specifying tasks in too technical language which relieved of responsibility

the individuals actually responsible for construction and the housing economy. They had found it convenient to hide behind the shoulders of activists, adopt in their behalf decisions that were not always correct and conduct their own "policies."

That is why the resolution of the November Plenum of the PZPR Province Committee obligates the councilmen who are party members to submit in March 1983 at the Province People's Council in Wroclaw a program for housing construction specifying the tasks of the individual enterprises and institutions, while at the same time it obligates the Wroclaw Province Governor to present a program for the elimination of the backlog in the construction of the social infrastructure. The province party organization will assess the quality and degree of implementation of that recommendation which essentially means that 66,000 dwellings will have been built by the year 1990 in the province and city of Wroclaw, of which 15,000 through the efforts of private citizens with broad aid from the state.

Thus, ever since the 21st Province Reports-Elections Conference in Wroclaw, that is, since June 1981, the inspiring and controlling function of the party is being implemented, in this field as well as in many others.

## Daily Life

It is not long since people stood in queues days and nights for meat and processed meat products. Rationing has to some extent alleviated this inconvenience, but only the registration of ration cards led to the disappearance of queues. That was done on the initiative of the Province Committee. Soon afterward the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services recommended the application of this system nationwide.

On the initiative of the PZPR Province Committee, the lower-level echelons and basic party organizations:

- --The vegetable-fruit market was analyzed in order to determine ways and means of preventing speculative price hikes; a meeting of producers, tradesmen and members of worker services was organized to determine more precisely the principles for supplying fruits and vegetables to the work forces of factories, enterprises and institutions.
- --Supplies for factory stores, canteens and dining rooms were improved.
- --To prevent the hoarding of scarce goods by speculators, special sales of underwear, hosiery, footwear, as well as controlled sales of boots and other manufactured consumer goods in demand were introduced at production plants (in exchange for coupons issued to specified individuals in places of work).
- --In October 1982 the Executive Board of the PZPR Province Committee obligated the Wroclaw Province Governor to take steps so that at least one general grocery store would operate in every settlement and housing project.
- --Various forms of trade controls to counteract speculations were and are being organized.

--The party monitors the implementation of the investment tasks of special importance to the inhabitants of Wroclaw (water supply for Mokry Dwor, the Czechnica EC [Thermoelectric Power Station] and the Lowiecka ECII--heat, the hospital on Kamienskiego Street, the Obornicka Street Terminal of the Municipal Transportation Enterprise [MPK].

--Reports have been drafted concerning the water and gas supply of the cities and villages of the Wroclaw Province; programs for the solution of these acute problems are being prepared.

--Following an analysis of care of the elderly as well as of the living conditions of the disabled and minors, the Executive Board of the Province Committee recommended, among other things, the drafting of a 5- or 6-year plan for the construction of homes.

--In view of the excessive growth of the retail prices of manufactured consumer goods, sessions of plant commissions for prices and costs were held at seven large enterprises with the participation of members of the Commission for the Reform and Economic Policies under the Province Committee; the ensuing recommendations were transmitted to the PZPR Central Committee.

--In addition, the Secretariat of the Province Committee met eight times with the workers of large industrial plants, inhabitants of gminas, and members of occupational groups. These meetings were open to all, party members and nonparty members, and the topics of the discussion were determined by the participants themselves.

### In Behalf of the Reform

Party echelons of the province and city of Wroclaw have also been attending to the economic reform and improvements in efficiency of management. The Executive Board of the PZPR Province Committee has been regularly assessing the introduction of the new system of management. Pursuant to its recommendations, province—wide conferences were held on topics dealing with the financial system, methods of determining prices, exports and imports, incentive systems, and rights and duties of worker self-governments, along with communal meetings of workers of construction, trade and cooperatives.

Representatives of the Province Committee leadership and of the ministries of metallurgy, machine industry, chemical industry, trade, small industry and the Economic Planning Commission met with the worker aktiv of the five largest industrial plants as well as with the foremen at these plants to discuss the nature of the economic reform.

-To popularize the principles of the economic reform, television was used, among other things. The lectures were broadcast by the Wroclaw TV Station and the Province Committee provided consultation for the participants in that course.

--Sixteen consultation-advisory teams consisting of members of the Commission on the Reform and Economic Policies under the Province Committee and the Team of Province Committee Experts on the Economic Reform and Worker Self-Government visited the production plants to provide on-the-spot assistance in the solution of various social and economic problems.

These are just some of the initiatives taken by the PZPR Province Committee to improve the methods and ways of management under the new economic conditions. Following are examples of how the party inspires the activities of the people's councils and the state administration:

--Principles of cooperation between party echelons and representative bodies have been worked out; this is to be implemented through close cooperation between the problem commissions of the Province Committee and the commissions of the people's councils as well as through linkage of the activities of councilmen to the work of worker self-governments.

--Once every three months the Province Committee Secretariat meets with the heads of the Wroclaw Province and Wroclaw City Office to discuss such topics as the repair of housing, the development of services, tire repairs and the recharging of storage batteries.

Improving Intra-Party Work

These and other undertakings would not have come to fruition without improvements in the party's functioning. To accomplish this:

- --Operating rules for the Province Committee and its Executive Board and Secretariat have been worked out, along with the principles for the establishment and operation of Province Committee problem commissions and expert teams and a new organizational structure of the Province Committee; all these documents were approved by the Province Committee Plenum.
- -- Regional party work centers have been established.
- -- The organization of a center for public opinion surveys under the Province Committee is being completed.
- -- Training-and-information meetings of the Province Committee Secretariat with political workers of the province echelon are being regularly held.
- --Once every three months consultation and training-and-information meetings are held with first secretaries of first-degree echelons.
- -- Regular meetings between the Province Committee leadership and the executive boards of numerically small POPs are being held.

This article shows unequivocally that the party tenaciously attempts to solve the important social problems engendered by these difficult times; that it does not drop it hands but counteracts all negative phenomena and struggles to fulfill its program which serves the entire society.

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#### BIALA PODLASKA PROVINCE PARTY ACTIVITIES NOTED

# Two-Year Party Balance Sheet

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 2 Feb 83 p 5

[Collection of articles on a single newspaper page, gathered under the common title: "Two-Year Party Balance Sheet" under the rubric "The [PZPR] Province Reports Conference in Biala Podlaska To Be Held on 5 February 1983"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] How People Get United

Wyczolki is a village in the Piszczac Gmina. Until recently it was a somnolent place. Little happened between one ceremony and another, one field operation and another. For it takes a lot of toil and sweat to make 5th- and 6th-category soils bear fruit and prevent livestock from bellowing out of hunger in the last weeks before the new harvest. To boot, the locality contains those unfortunate bulrushes and weeds instead of grass meadows as over the years nothing could be done about land reclamation in this gmina.

At one time people in Wyczolki shyly mentioned the need for at least building a decent communal hall where on long winter evening one could go to socialize, relax and dance. Twenty-four years ago bricks, lime and boards had even been gathered for this purpose, but nothing came of it. The reason, according to Jan Jacnik, secretary of the Wyszczolki [as published] POP [basic party organization], was the lack of an organizer.

The comrades from the 10-person POP in Wyczolki realized that they could not build the communal hall on their own, that all should be rallied round this issue: the youth, women and other inhabitants of the village. Some experience had already been gained during the building of a road. Danuta Maliszewska, a mmber of the Wyczolki POP reminisced: /"Until 1978 the only way to get here in rainy autumns was by helicopter, so we all in unison took to building the road and did build it. Similarly, people came to keep the road clear of snow even on Sunday."/

On 29 September 1981 a general village meeting was held and the communal construction of the communal hall on a voluntary basis was resolved upon. People spontaneously subscribed various amounts of money for this purpose, depending on income and land owned—from 1 to 10,000 zlotys per farm. Comrade Jan Jacnik, the Chairman of the Public Committee for Building the Communal

Hall, said: /"When I bought bricks with my own money, the others refunded to me 76,000 zlotys within one week. If we party members became so committed to this project, that was because this was our party duty. But Mr. Editor, please be sure to write that we all worked—nearly the entire village, including young people, women and United Peasant Party ZSL members."/
Comrade Danuta joins the conversation: /"For while the world and the country are split, we in our community are united."/

The public committee chairman shows me a thick notebook in which he has recorded in detail the amount of work done by every village inhabitants so far to build the communal hall, the time he spent on it, and the equipment he It turns out that, fittingly enough, as the chairman and as a party member, it was he who made the greatest contribution. Altogether, he contributed 86 days (!) of such volunteer civic work during 1981 and 1982, while at the same time providing his own car for the transportation of Other pages in the notebook mention the work of comrade Wieslaw Maliszewski, who provided for this purpose his own tractor together with two trailers--the so-called cyclops plus a power saw. He contributed 30 days of such volunteer civic work while at the same time operating his own farm of On the pages of this "Construction Memorial" I also find nearly 50 hectares. the names of such other village inhabitants as Tadeusz Kulicki, Stanislaw Frejda, Tadeusz Jankiewicz, Kazimierz and Slawomir Maliszewski, Jan Dedes and his son Wieslaw, Jan and Zbigniew Maksymiuk, and many others. Altogether, so far 520 days of work have been contributed to building the communal hall, which averages to 8 days per statistical adult inhabitant of Wyczolki or more than 9 days per member of the youth set in the village.

The communal hall has by now been largely completed and its ceremonial opening is scheduled for 22 July. Things will finally happen, people say in Wyczolki. The impressive building will accommodate a store with storage facilities and two rooms will be allotted to the Rural Housewives' Circle [KGW].

The comrades from Wyczolki add: /"As soon as spring comes we will also build a road to the milk collection plant."/

We held the conversation in the house of the Maliszewskis. Both Danuta and Wieslaw operate a farm of nearly 50 hectares. Both are PZPR members. Their performance as farmers deserves mention, even if only briefly, even though they note that considerable credit for this belongs to the father of the present owner of the farm, Mr. Wladyslaw. Their progressive farm accommodates 19 milch cows and 62 head of young slaughter cattle. The cows yield on the average 4,500 to 7,000 liters of milk annually each. The two livestock pens are completely mechanized. The farm includes a new BIZON grain combine-harvester, a tractor, and much other machinery and equipment. The structure of plantings is so arranged that in principle mixed feed supplements have to be purchased from outside only in small quantities if at all. Last year the Maliszewskis sold about 2.5 million zlotys of produce from their farm. Such are the members of the POP in Wyczolki.

Medicine--Topic Number One Article by (SW.)

The resolution of the 4th PZPR Province Reports-Elections Conference in Biala Podlaska notes that "more attention should be paid to a more effective utilization of the funds allocated for the construction of health service facilities."

The province party echelon has been giving priority to this matter for the past 2 years. During that period, major reorientations in construction were carried out and /the irreversible decision to complete toward the end of 1984 the construction of the most important facility of this kind in the province—the hospital in Biala Podlaska, was adopted/.

Aside from the construction of housing and schools, other needs were left in abeyance for the time being and, owing to a regrouping of the investment front, a substantial part of the construction potential was concentrated on building the hospital.

Until the end of last year the Biala Podlaska hospital had been financed from the province budget, whereas now its construction is being funded from the NFOZ [expansion unknown]. Calculations show that the project will require about 800 million zlotys. The province authorities are attempting to obtain that entire sum and receive allotments of the needed materials as well. As for the prime contractor, the PBP [Biala Podlaska Construction Enterprise], it has the obligation of establishing good cooperation with its subcontractors and specialized enterprises.

It is worth noting that the pace of this construction has recently become faster and its work-force increased substantially. But even aside from this project, considerable concern for expanding the health care facilities has been shown in the Biala Podlaska Province. /During the years 1975-1981 health centers were built in Debowa Kloda, Koden, Komarowka, Kornica, Piszczac, Platerowo, Sarmaki, Tuczna, Ulana and Wisznice. Additional centers are under construction in Olszanka and Huszlewo. In addition, the building in Suchowola has been adapted for health-care purposes, the health center in Zalesie has been expanded, and the construction of a health center in Podedworze is being planned while the health center in Lesna Podlaska is being expanded./

At the same time, reginal and inter-plant dispensaries were etablished in Miedrzyrzec Podlaski along with two outpatient clinics and a stomatological clinic in Biala Podlaska. Dispensaries are under construction in Radzyn, Losice, Terespol and Miedzyrzec. The work to adapt the former edifice of the PZPR Province Committee to health-service needs is nearing completion.

The working conditions in pharmacies have improved markedly. New comfortable premises were provided to pharmacies in Koden, Komarowka, Lomazy, Miedzyrzec Podlaski, Piszczac and Sarnaki. Likewise the pharmacies in Kornica, Platerowo, Radzyn and Tuczna operate under much better conditions. This also applies to the hospital pharmacy and pharmacies No 1 and 2 in Biala Podlaska.

Of course, mention should also be made of the /hospital in Radzyn Podlaski/, which has been transferred to the health service and currently put into operation. /It is to contain 353 beds/ and provide nearly the full gamut of medical care.

Many of these health care facilities, particularly in the countryside, were built with the broad participation of the public. /Using this as a model, as it were, upon the initiative of the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, the formation of the Public Council for Building the Hospital in Biala Podlaska was proposed. This initiative met with approval from the Presidium of the Province People's Council and the Public Council has already been active for more than half a year./ Its members include representatives of the Biala Podlaska work establishments, public and youth organizations, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON] and the municipal and province authorities. The council influences the pace of construction and solves various problems that arise.

And the modern hospital in Biala Podlaska with 610 beds, an attached specialist clinic, new premises for the emergency ward, and a diagnostic laboratory, will not only place the province among the leading regions of the country so far as the expansion of health service facilities is concerned but also and above all will provide good conditions for the treatment of patients and the work of medical personnel.

Some Figures [Unsigned article]

Following the 4th Programs-Elections Conference the province party organization had 18,561 members and candidate members. Currently it has 14,468. The reasons for these changes are as follows: 3,743 persons were deleted, 47 were expelled, and the remaining 303 persons moved to other regions or are deceased.

Of those deleted and expelled, workers account for 36.1 percent; farmers, 30.7 percent; white-collar workers, 23.5 percent; and others, 9.7 percent.

During the period covered by the report, that is, from 20 June 1981 to 22 January of this year, 59 candidate members were admitted from this year and 52 from the preceding year.

Owing to the decline in the number of party members below the statutory norm and the mergers of some party organizations the number of POPs decreased from 927 to 874. Currently the province party organization consists of: two city committees, four city-gmina committees, two plant committees, 31 gmina committees and 874 POPs, 62 OOPs branch party organizations and 16 party groups.

Work to Serve and Help [Article by (KOCH.)]

Of the several dozen basic party organizations active in the Radzyn Podlaski Gmina the POP at the Plant No 3 of the LZNS [expansion unknown] in Marynin is most often talked about and praised.

The first secretary of that POP, Wladyslaw Chodkiewicz, who has been serving in his post since 1973—at present he also is a member of the Executive Board of the PZPR Province Committee—declared:

"The period between August 1980 and the introduction of the martial law has provided us with a better political education than even the best school. To be sure there was no strike craziness, and no crazy distribution of leaflets, but we had acted as if in a vacuum: few if any people visited me or other comrades from the Executive Board of the POP; no one had anything to do with us. Even so, we had attempted to act rationally, although even the meeting of the aktiv was a problem. During that time we deleted four persons from the list of PZPR members, while four other comrades surrendered their party cards. We also held another election to the executive board."

Little by little, these reasonable actions began to produce results. When did the change begin to make itself felt? Hard to say. Minor and initially isolated actions have led to the current more or less regular status: /the 50-person organization operates normally and again influences the plant's affairs, and the members of the executive board are visited by many persons, whom no one here asks whether they belong to the party,/ and asked for help in various matters because, as one woman employee has declared: /"I know that you are doing good work, so I came to ask your help...."/

Every such visit is a cause for rejoicing, as it demonstrates that /the party at the plant is regarded by people as being of service and help./

This help is not limited to isolated cases. /On the initiative of the POP a social services commission consisting 50 percent of party members has been formed. Thanks to its efforts, the 500-person work force of the plant has been able to buy boots, hosiery and fruits for the winter and, in the plant store, many foodstuffs whose allotments were increased.

At the threshold of 1983 new issues arose. /The work force demanded to meet with the plant director. The party organization handled this./ In November of last year, at an open party meeting, the management reported to the workers on the enterprise's financial status, explained the principles for calculating costs and reported on the implementation of the postulates made earlier: /the repair of the painting department is nearing completion, the final stage of construction of the boiler room is being expedited and a new administrative building will be erected./ It has been agreed upon that such meetings will be held once a month.

/Are the sequels of such meetings always positive? Yes. Following the December meeting the shortage of soap and detergents has been eliminated and the supplies of protective and winter clothing are 100 percent adequate./ The POP has adopted the firm principle that any proposal made during a meeting must be considered and answered even if it is not feasible. In such cases the explanation must be couched in polite terms so that the proposal-maker may know that his good intentions are not disregarded./

Party meetings are now more lively; more comrades take the floor; and memos and empty complaints are fewer. At the meetings most topics pertain to the plant. And the troubles are many: there is a shortage of primer and surface

paints as well as electrodes and the machinery pool is obsolete. Even so, the work force has fulfilled its annual plan 107 percent. /The feats of labor, organized by the POP, and the clean-up and finishing work on the construction of two production rooms have been weighty factors here./

Broad everyday political-advisory and training assistance to this POP is being provided by the Radzyn Podlaskiy City-Gmina PZPR Committee. The members of its executive board take part in the party meetings of the plant organization.

Comrade Chodkiewicz said: /"Ours is not sensational work. It deals with simple everyday problems of the plant. Slowly, we are establishing our position as a factor that counts in the community, an efficient factor that provides the impetus for many undertakings, monitors them, and meets with trust. And if there is anything that even now provides a foretaste of satisfaction, it is the manifestations of that trust, the trust in that we want to, how how and can do at least a little to make life easier and more pleasant for hard-working people."/

"...For the Good of the Work Force..." [Interview with Aleksy Kosko by J. Stan]

His name is Aleksy Kosko. He is middle-aged. A railroader by vocation and public activist by avocation. Since 14 May 1981 he has been first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at the Malaszewicze Regional Directorate of Polish Railroads [DRKP]. Elected democratically during the campaign prior to the 9th PZPR Congress, he has since, as the saying goes, "proved himself." He has been party secretary for nearly 2 years. This is a sufficiently long period of time for reflection and tentative assessment. But at the outset of my talk with him we return to the day of his election:

[Question] What was it like then in the conference room? Had you been approached earlier with any proposals and suggestions regarding yourself?

[Answer] No. No one talked with me earlier, no one coordinated the nominations. That was a truly democratic election. Our names were nominated at the meeting; I was nominated by people from the Malaszewicze Station. They had known me since 1975 when I was the deputy stationmaster here. I was elected by a majority of the voice votes. That was a pleasant suprise, but at the same time I was greatly worried about my ability to cope.

[Question] In that election what mattered was not one's occupation but the personality and what it represents. Hence I'm asking you about your character traits....

[Answer] I believe the decisive factor was that in my relations with subordinates I'm direct. I try to help them out with their occupational and personal problems and be close to the work-force, for better or worse. I employ various methods but I am always close to my subordinates. They appreciate it. This was emphasized at the conference. When I departed to work at the PZPR Plant Committee, my crew bade me goodbye with tears in their eyes. There is no better reward for a leader, I believe...

[Question] Could you tell us briefly about yourself or rather about the part of your life connected with your work and public activities?

[Answer] I'm a railroader by training—a technician—economist. I was graduated from the State Schol of Economics under the Ministry of Transportation. While at school I was active in the Union of Socialist Youth [ZMS]. That organization had suited me. In 1966 I began my work career at the station in Siemianowka, which is a rail junction with the USSR on the Siemianowka-Swislocz line, with transloading of freight as for example in Dorohusek. In 1968 I joined the PZPR. I knew what the party is like and I regarded my decision as a natural continuation of my work in the ZMS. I knew what my role in the party would be like and I dreamed of assuring a better future for my country through the common effort of party members. I learned my first lesson in Lewkow Stary, Narewka Gmina, Bialystok Province. For 16 months I had worked there as the director of the Structural Ceramics Plant. I was 20 and there were 400 people working in my plant. And of course I had dreams of becoming a great manager of "my" plant.

[Question]Did these dreams come true?

[Answer] Unfortunately not. That was a great school of life to me and that is why I had become so committed to the process of renewal after 1980. Even then workers had perceived the flawed nature of our management and the symptoms of the approaching crisis. They rebelled. I was with them and submitted honest reports on their moods to the PZPR Bialystok Province Committee. But the comrades on that committee were of a different opinion and perceived reality differently. I had a confrontation with them and resigned my post and returned to working on the railroad. Some time later I arrived in Malaszewice.

[Question] You became first secretary of the plant party committee during an extremely difficult period, in the presence of a growing political struggle and growing passivity of the party. Did these moods spread to Malaszewice too?

[Answer] I had a very hard time. I was the only regular plant party committee functionary left; previously there had been three. The committee aktiv was 100 percent new. I had to attend to expanding party work and including the new inexperienced aktiv and executive board of the committee in normal party activities. In addition, I had to handle filing and clerical matters, which were neglected. What is more, at that time the party was agitated. The

political struggle had intensified. At Malaszewice DRKP Solidarity was not aggressive at first, and we even cooperated well with it, solving jointly many problems of the work force. It was only later in the fall of 1981 that the party began to be isolated at the DRKP. The psychological pressure was tremendous. Party meetings no longer were held. Party members feared to make their membership known and were being obstructed. Many did not withstand the pressure and quitted the party....Many.

[Question] How many?

[Answer] Between 1 June 1981 and 31 December 1982 the party organization at DRKP Malaszewice lost nearly 300 members. Its membership rolls shrank from 854 to 554.

[Question] During that period did not you ever feel any doubts, hesitations, whether your work had meaning?

[Answer] No. It was difficult, but I believed that the time will come when those who genuinely feel themselves to be party members would sober up. And through frequent contact with the work force I had ascertained that our methods of work during that period were not bad. The work of the party secretary at that time was atypical, arduous, during the then prevailing political struggle.

[Question] What is the current situation at the DRKP? I mean the party.

[Answer] The change is great compared with the situation prior to December 1981. We at the executive board of the plant party committee find that whereas in the past one-half of party organizations performed poorly, now they all perform well. We cannot say of any one of the 28 POPs that it performs poorly and we can say of 12 POPs that they perform well. The party has revived considerably during the reports campaign. We replaced secretaries at 10 POPs with the object of thus making these organizations more active, proceeding from the premise that the quality of the POP secretary affects the performance of the entire POP....

[Question] This statement could apply as well to you as the first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee.

[Answer] Objectively speaking, we have already accomplished a great deal as the party organization at the DRKP, in behalf of the work force. But we also are aware of problems still requiring solution such as housing construction and social services for the work force.

[Question] Can it be asserted by now that the party has regained its authority at your plant?

[Answer] Yes, this can be said. Although in principle we have never lost that authority. We maintained contact with the work force and very many people came to the PZPR Plant Committee with requests for assistance. Now the former members of Solidarity too come to us with such requests.

[Question] One last question. If it were election time now and you were asked to become a candidate for the post of first secretary of the plant committee, what would be your answer?

[Answer] I have been asking myself this question repeatedly. During these last 2 years my health has suffered, I have no time for myself and my family and live on nerves as the saying goes. But for the good of the work force I would answer: I want to act; I accept.

The Secretaries Speak: [Comments of Biala Podlaska PZPR Province Committee secretaries Stanislaw Nowak, Witold Burzynski and Andrzej Szot]

/The PZPR Province Committee presents to the conference delegates an extensive report documenting the activities of party echelons and organizations during the last 2 years. We asked Biala Podlaska PZPR Province Committee secretaries to comment on the pluses and minuses of party activities in discrete fields. Their comments follow./

Stanislaw Nowak: The Party is Stronger Organizationally, Closer to the People

The January session of the PZPR Province Committee found that the province party organization got rid of the weaknesses pointed out in the resolution of the 4th Programs-Elections Conference and has consolidated itself, regaining its strength, and is passing over to the offensive in implementing the tasks ensuing from the program of the 9th Party Congress. At the same time, however, it was pointed out that these are only the beginnings of the organizational efficiency, militancy and effectiveness that we would like to see. Such an assessment of the work of party organizations has been characteristic of the course of the party reports campaign in the Biala Podlaska Province. The critical evaluation of own weaknesses and shortcomings was accompanied by the desire to surmount them and promote the positive elements that emerged during the period. This is yet another proof that, although the number of party members and candidate members in the province has shrunk by about 4,000, the strength of the organization has grown.

We made a major stride forward in the past 2 years as regards expanding the forms of contacts between the party and the province's public and strengthening the related ties. It has been repeatedly stated that in the past years the situation in the Biala Podlaska Province was better than in other regions of the country. It says a lot that the country's first Province Consultation Council for National Salvation and Accord was established precisely in our province, in early 1982. Even so, however, the socio-political and economic crisis has produced a marked imprint on the minds and attitudes of the public and the climate in which party organizations have been active.

For this reason, too, the province party organization stressed developing and expanding contacts with the public, listening to its opinions and views, tackling and solving the problems of most concern to it. This was also reflected in the problems worked upon by the Province Committee and its Executive Board and problem commissions, as well as in the manner in which they prepare their sessions and adopt decisions. At its plenary sessions the Province Committee has examined, among other things, the initiatives of the province party organization intended to alleviate the consequences of the crisis, in the daily life and work of the province's population, as well as the tasks relating to the solution of the problems of young people, the preparation and application of the economic reform and-jointly with the Province Committee of the United Peasant Party-the intensification of agricultural production and improvements in the living conditions of the population. The province party organization has also broadened its contacts with the work forces of labor establishments and representatives of various socio-occupational groups (the youth, the engineer and technician community, teachers, etc.). Through its political workers the Province Committee remains in regular and direct contact with the POPs and work forces of 72 largest work establishments in the province. New forms of contact between the Province Committee leadership and the POPs and work forces of labor establishments have been established.

The province party organization also attaches tremendous importance to a proper response to the problems of citizens, to attending to their grievances and suggestions, both through the local administration and through the party echelons.

Another major accomplishment is the broadening of participation by party members in the work being undertaken by party echelons. This is exemplified by the fact that, following the Province Programs-and-Elections Conference, conference delegates have twice held meetings to discuss the principal political and economic problems of the province. In the 10 problem commissions there work 220 comrades (of whom 98 Province Committee members).

We are aware that all this is only the beginning of what we wish to accomplish in strengthening the party organization and regaining and perpetuating popular credibility.

Witold Burzynski: Transition to the Offensive

The past 2 years confirmed the well-known thesis that ideological-upbringing activities play an immeasurably important role in the whole of party work. Certain forms of ideological-training work in our province became almost completely moribund. In practice, only the lecture departments of the Province Committee and the Evening University of Marxism-Leninism [WUML] continued to function.

Following the introduction of martial law a period of extremely aggressive ideological-upbringing work had set in. The conditions arose for rebuilding the system of party training. The broadest form of that training are ideological meetings of the POPs, which have gained considerable approbation among party members. We again organized seminars for candidate members

entering the party. The WUML and lecture seminars are training party aktiv (at present 171 persons at 6 branches). Province Committee lecturers are coping well with their tasks. The ideological-upbringing activities of individual POPs have been greatly influenced by the universal discussion of the draft declaration "What We Are Fighting For, What Are Our Goals."

Important directions of ideological-upbringing work in the past 2 years included the celebrations of anniversaries and national holidays as well as activities relating to political events. The most important part was the celebration of the centenary of the Polish worker movement. Its culminating point was the popular-scientific session, organized by the PZPR Province Committee, on the history of the worker movement and an exhibition depicting that history.

Party work within the teaching community has been extremely varied in the last 2 years. In 1981 it had been considerably weakened. In an atmosphere of pressure by anti-socialist forces, even strong POPs became less active. But it should be borne in mind that in our province only a handful of teachers had participated in strikes and strike alerts. Following 13 December 1981 the province party echelon took steps to stabilize the socio-political situation and revive party work at schools and educational-cultural centers, on vetting their top administrators. Varied forms of party dialogue with the entire teaching community were developed.

In assessing the current political situation in the educational system it is worth noting that the party is no longer on the defensive but has not reached yet a desirable degree of activism.

Let me mention the activities to improve teaching conditions in the province's schools. School enrollment has risen considerabl at present, especially in cities. Instruction in overcrowded schools is provided in two or three shifts. The situation will be somewhat relieved by the Elementary School No 2 currently under construction in Biala Podlaska—the first two sections of that building have already been opened for use. The decline in the number of schools attached to plants has been halted and all the directions of vocational training have been retained, thus assuring the influx of the needed cadres of skilled workers for the province. In the past years the universality of preschool education has been markedly expanded. Thanks to the efforts of the Province Committee a place has been found in the preschool for every child registered, in 1982, for the first time in the province's history.

The past years also have been marked by intensive work within the cultural community. The activities of cultural centers revived following the replacement of certain top administrators on the initiative of the party organization. A great deal of effort was invested during that period in improving the cultural facilities, strengthening them organizationally and assuring the broader participation of school youth in culture. Even so, however, cultural facilities remain inadequate. What is worse, owing to their condition, each year a number of rural clubs of culture has to be shut down. Compared with 1980, the number of clubs of culture has decreased by 20. The lack of facilities necessitated shutting down 4 GOK [expansion unknown]. Only

the facilities of the main cultural centers in the province are improving, following their acquisition of former fixtures of the Province Office, as are library facilities.

In this province at present we have 264 cultural-educational centers along with more than 100 special-interest teams and clubs. We figure in Poland as a region with a rich tradition of folk art. We will want to strengthen this position of Biala Podlaska culture in the coming years.

Andrzej Szot: We Have Nothing To Be Ashamed Of

In the past 2 years the activities of the province party organization in the socio-economic sphere have been conditioned by the economic crisis. In our province this crisis manifested itself in the decline of industrial and agricultural production which could be halted only in August 1982.

The activities of the province party organization during its current term of office in the socio-economic sphere have been of an exceptionally intense nature. We inspired the drafting of plant programs for surmounting difficulties, the appointment of consultation commissions, social services commissions and plant teams for analyses of production costs and prices. We attended to popularizing the economic reform among party members and entire work-forces and subsequently to providing appropriate conditions for the reactivation of worker self-governments and establishment of the new trade unions.

We inspired the expansion of the production of consumer goods as well as of goods for agriculture upon the utilization of production wastes and local raw materials and pointed to the necessity and possibility of the conservation of raw and other materials, fuels and energy. It turned out that we can manufacture a broad variety of machinery, implements, spare parts and building materials, from nails to grain drills and manure spreaders. The output of wall materials at small cooperative and artisan plants has doubled.

We also initiated broad measures to alleviate the consequences of the crisis to the daily life and work of the province's population.

Concrete accomplishments in the socio-economic field include the opening of the hospital in Radzyn Podlaski and the marked acceleration of the pace of construction of the province hospital in Biala Podlaska. We are not overlooking school construction either.

We halted the decline in housing construction. In 1982 we released for occupancy 297 more dwellings than in 1981. The opening of the house building factory in 1982 is a good sign for the future. We have also been paying attention to expanding the communal infrastructure. Among other things, work on the gasification of Biala Podlaska will begin this year.

But agriculture is the principal sector of the province's economy. Party work in the countryside dealt with—in addition to intra-party problems—chiefly the popularization, among the rural community, of the principles of agricultural policy and the legislation being adopted by the Parliament.

A major field of activity of the PZPR Province Committee was improving the performance of the organizations serving the countryside and agriculture and creating a favorable climate for a broadly conceived rural self-government.

Among the concrete accomplishments of agriculture during the current term of office of the province party committee I would include the good procurements of agricultural produce in 1982. We ranked fifth in the country as regards potato procurements, seventh as regards livestock procurements (130 percent) and 12th as regards milk procurements (104.7 percent). Our production possibilities are greater, and hence the party organization is constantly working to exploit every potential.

In conclusion, it is fitting to note that we have not always been successful in the socio-economic sphere, but on the other hand we have nothing to be ashamed of either, especially considering the conditions under which the province party organization is operating.

Provincial Reports Conference Deliberations

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 7 Feb 83 pp 1,2

[Unsigned article: "In Biala Podlaska: Strengthening the Party's Authority, Tightening the Bonds With the Working Class: Comrade Marian Orzechowski Participated in the Deliberations" under the rubric "Provincial Reports Conference Deliberations"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] (OWN INFORMATION.) On Saturday February 7 the PZPR Province Reports Conference was held in Biala Podlaska. Its deliberations were chaired by Czeslaw Staszczak, first secretary of the PZPR Province Committee.

The participants included: Marian Orzechowski, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee; representatives of the central party aktiv headed by Leszek Jaszczewski, deputy director of the Organizational Department of the PZPR Central Committee; Zygmunt Lakomiec, minister of domestic trade and services; Kaminski, chairman of the Main Board of the "Peasant Self-Help" Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives; Czeslaw Goscilowicz, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Transportation; Col (Retired) Kazimierz Chodelski, plenipotentiary of the Committee for National Defense; deputies to the PRL Parliament, representatives of other political parties, administrative authorities, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON], youth organizations and work establishments, and worker-movement activists.

Ryszard Socha, former first secretary of the PZPR Province Committee was also invited to the conference and took part in its deliberations.

/The province party organization, which includes nearly 14,500 members and candidate members, was represented by 238 delegates./

/During the 9 hours of deliberations the activities of the province party organization in the last 19 months since the reports-and-elections conference were assessed and the tasks for the second half of its term of office were more precisely defined./

The report of the Executive Board of the PZPR Province Committee was presented by Czeslaw Staszczak, first secretary of the Province Committee. (Highlights of the report are presented on p 3 of this newspaper.)

This report, as well as the report of the Province Party Control Commission presented by its chairman, Stanislaw Kepka, and the report of the Province Review Commission [WKR], presented by its chairman Boleslaw Chlipalski, along with materials provided earlier to the delegates, served as the basis for hours-long discussion.

#### Discussion

Summation of 19 months of activity, evaluation, and often also penetrating criticism—such were the main topics of the discussion of party matters.

The truism was repeatedly stated that in the last 2 years the party has passed through a difficult and even historic ordeal. Losses and thinning of party ranks could not be avoided. Stanislaw Kepka, chairman of the WKKP, stressed that those leaving the party were ideologically vacillating, passive and not infrequently opportunistic individuals. This has of course its advantages. The experience gained in political struggle served to regain the party's ability to act, rebuild the weakened bonds with the working class and markedly consolidate the party's ranks ideologically and organizationally. This entails, however, the conviction—expressed during the discussion by, among others, Col (Retired) Kazimierz Chodelski, Stanislaw Boratynski and Marian Kocyk—that even more resolute steps must be made on this path. Complacency is out of question.

The tasks associated with the implementation of political, economic and social reforms outlined at the 9th PZPR Congress require strength, consolidation of unity, concentration of attention, still stronger bonds with working people and a yet greater public trust in the party and in its ability to lead. Kazimierz Krol declared: "Facts must document our programs, considering that the activities of the social services commissions proved that the party can concern itself with the problems of working people." He further stated: "This should be linked to the work of the renascent trade-union movement."

We need more initiatives of the kind undertaken by the POP at the Fruit and Vegetable Processing Plant [ZPOW] where calculations performed by the commission for analysis of production cost and prices prompted the management to reduce by 10 percent the prices of certain of the plant's products.

Much attention in the discussion was devoted to the ideological-moral attitude of the party member. Kazimierz Doroszuk declared: /"Only daily contact with the community in which one lives and works, serving the working people and

modesty combined with activism in the representative and self-government bodies can confirm the mandate for the party's leading role in society."/ Another speaker added: /"The party member should constantly be a creatively dissatisfied individual striving to perform his work more rapidly and better."/

One of the most important conclusions ensuing from the discussion, as stressed by, among others, Erazm Wasilewski, chairman of the Province Provisional Council of the PRON, is that the party must lead in building a broad front of national agreement. The most effective ways and means of winning over to this program all those who are not against it should be incessantly explored. The offensive by the PRON's aktiv should be directed toward rallying round that movement larger numbers of young people and women. But care should be taken to prevent this movement from duplicating state institutions or social organizations.

Much attention in the discussion was devoted to problems of agriculture and food management as well as party activities in the countryside. It was emphasized that the 9th PZPR Congress expedited the strengthening of the party in the countryside. Many comrades have left party ranks for various reasons, but they were chiefly those who, as Antoni Karwacki declared, /"had pulled the party backwards."/ In the Biala Podlaska Province the cooperation between rural POPs and circles of the United Peasant Party and Rural Housewives [KGW] is steadily growing.

In the discussion of rural and food problems critical comments also were not lacking. Thus, it was declared that in many cases the impossibility of building or modernizing livestock premises or the lack of a passable road markedly impedes the growth of production. Although shipments of cement and wall materials to the province have increased, the related demand has not been met as yet.

It should be borne in mind, however—as pointed out by the delegates—that local possibilities have not always been exploited in this respect. For example, substantial strata of clay exist in Lomazy and at one time there operated five privately owned brick kilns in that area. But they have been liquidated and the currently existing single brick kiln is based on a deposit that has already been largely exhausted.

Ludwik Iwaniuk stated: /"Farmers have always worked honestly and hard, and we still wish to produce more and better."/ But in the opinion of the discussants this is not always promoted by the decisions of the authorities, especially as regards procurement prices for farm produce. Kazimierz Doroszuk asked: "How could it happen that last fall the procurement price of one quintal of grain was made equal to the price of one quintal of potatoes? In such a situation, considering the much higher potato yields, the farmers sold their potatoes but kept and fed to hogs the grain that should have flowed to state granaries, mills and feed plants."/

The Biala Podlaska countryside also experiences shortages of means of production, minor tools, boots and work clothing. Hence, the assurances made

by the representatives of central authorities participating in the conference that marked improvements are to be expected in this matter were received with great satisfaction. The participants in the discussion also pointed out that the substantial increases in the prices of means of production should be accompanied by improvements in their quality. In actuality, what happens is sometimes the converse, because goods that can be only regarded as shoddy are allocated to the countryside. Stanislaw Boratynski stated: /"The development of agriculture begins in the iron and steel plant, in the factory, and ends in the field."/

As ensues from the discussion, much has been done in the Biala Podlaska Province to improve management on state farms and at rural producer cooperatives, gmina cooperatives and fruit and vegetable processing plants. A great deal of work in this direction was done by the military operating groups and military commissioners. As stated by Col (Retired) Kazimierz Chodelski: /"We were concerned not only for identifying shortcomings but also for indicating their causes and the ways of eliminating them."/

The discussants pointed to the much greater possibilities for agricultural processing within the province. But there are no industrial plants in the province that could handle, e.g. the processing of potatoes—which grow in such large quantities on Biala Podlaska soil. According to Kazimierz Krol the development of the province's own raw materials base also is needed. He asked: /"Why must we bring in from the Lublin Province currants, cherries and plums? Why should there be a shortage of those willing to establish plantations of these fruits in our province?"/

Agricultural matters also were the principal topic of the speech by Stanislaw Rapa, the governor of Biala Podlaska Province, who informed the delegates about the implementation—by the state administration—of the resolution of the 4th Reports-Elections Conference.

It was observed during the discussion that as regards industry the principal task of all party members is a consistent introduction of the economic reform and the explanation and clarification of its principles. The discussants mentioned the barriers encountered by the reform at individual plants, mismanagement and poor management, losses due to neglect and ways of eliminting them. It was repeatedly emphasized that economic problems must be treated by the party on par with ideological problems. the need to exploit every production potential, including local raw materials, was pointed out.

The absence of an effective incentive system encouraging better and more productive work was mentioned by, among others, Marian Kocyk and Marian Adamiuk. How can people be encouraged to work better and more productively when the repair of 20 freightcars cost just as much as the repair of 40? This question was asked by an employee of the Malaszewicze DRKP who also asked: What should be done with 300 sets of freightcar wheels which cannot be scrapped because they are too good for that but cannot be repaired because of the lack of flanges, which we dispatch to Albania?

These and similar problems which are no abstractions but concrete facts from the life of the plants dominated this topic of discussion.

Much attention was also devoted to the social malaise, stressing that it is the task of party members to combat all its manifestations.

Altogether 18 persons took part in the discussion. They were, in the order of appearance: Antoni Karwacki, farmer from Lomazy Gmina; Kazimierz Krol, employee of the Terespol ZPOW; Stanislaw Rapa, Biala Podlaska Province governor; Kazimierz Doroszuk, farmer from Sosnowka Gmina; Col (Retired) Kazimierz Chodelski, plenipotentiary of the National Defense Committee; Marian Adamiuk, employee of BLAWENA Wool Industry Plants [ZPW]; Tadeusz Jozefczak, chairman of the Province Committee of the United Peasant Party; Ludwik Iwaniuk, farmer from Janow Podlaski Gmina; Marian Kocyk, employee of the freightcar department at the Malaszewice DRKP; Marian Kucyk, employee of the Radzyn Podlaski ZPOW; Boleslaw Chlipalski, chairman of the Province Review Commission; Stanislaw Boratynski, pensioner from Miedzyrzec Stanislaw Kepka, chairman of the Province Party Control Commission; Mieczyslaw Maciejczyk, commander of the Polish Scout Union [ZHP] Troop; Erazm Wasilewski, chairman of the PRON Province Provisional Council; Ryszard Pietniewicz, deputy commander of the province militia; Jan Zdunek, farmer from Tuczna Gmina; and Jan Ludwiczuk, teacher from Losice.

Fifteen comrades submitted their written comments to the minutes of the conference.

During the conference the floor was also taken by Zygmunt Lakomiec, minister of domestic trade and services, who took a position on the problems raised in the discussion and the questions with which he had been "showered" by delegates during the intermission periods. He pointed to certain symptoms of a calming of the market, especially the food market, and stressed that the government intends to gradually further abandon rationing but that this hinges closely on the increase in production.

## Speech of Marian Orzechowski

/During the conference the floor was taken by Marian Orzechowski, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. He started by declaring that during the current period of province reports conferences it is worthwhile to look back at the road traveled by the party and our state during the last 2 years, and especially after 13 December 1981—that day which was a historical necessity. Poland was not the only country to have experienced martial law. According to the Central Committee secretary, if we analyze the experience of other countries we can proudly conclude that our martial law was carried out in the Polish manner, that that decision was made by us and carried out with our own forces—by communists in uniforms, members of the party and of the allied political parties./

/M. Orzechowski further stated that the awareness of the road traveled, of what we have accomplished in the months past and what we failed to accomplish, is necessary for every party member. Also needed are modesty and awareness of the responsibility resting on the party rather than political arrogance and

the mistaken conviction that we already are "sitting firmly in the saddle"—as anything else would again engender arrogance and disregard of popular opinion—in a word, it would threaten a return to the practices preceding August 1980. In its everyday activities the party hews firmly to the line of the 9th Congress—the line of struggle and agreement, the most difficult of the difficult lines but also the one that is most effective./

/Next, the Central Committee secretary presented the tasks of political work awaiting the party this year. This program also includes strengthening the trade unions and worker self-governments, a fitting preparation of the celebration of the First of May Holiday, aid and support to the PRON Movement. The PRON is an element of the construction called socialist renewal. Its authority should be built not by means of slogans but by means of action. The Central Committee secretary also described the economic tasks facing us this year. Answering the question of what should be done so that the party would cope the tasks awaiting it this year, M. Orzechowski said: "We must be the party of social justice, the party of struggle against evil wherever it occurs....The party must be close to the working class, be of the same mind as it and speak its language. And speaking the language of the working class means speaking the truth, even unpopular truth."

Taking a position on the conference's deliberations, the Central Committee secretary stated that the Biala Podlaska party organization has—as ensues from the materials and discussions during the conference—surmounted the crisis and, although it is not numerically the largest of its kind in the country, it has contributed to the positive changes occurring throughout the party following 13 December 1981; its activities confirm the general thesis that the party is the key to the solution of the current crisis./

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In behalf of the commission for recommendations and resolutions, Stanislaw Kepka, the chairman of the WKKP, presented revisions and amendments to the draft resolution submitted earlier by the delegates. Following brief discussion, the draft resolution and the proposed amendments were accepted.

Closing the deliberations, Czeslaw Staszczak, first secretary of the PZPR Province Committee, expressed the conviction that a conscientious implementation of the conference's resolution and the utilization of its accomplishments will be the ambition of all party members in the Biala Podlaska Province.

The conference ended with the singing of "The Internationale."

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The conference was followed by a press conference with the participation of representatives of the central and province authorities—a valuable initiative of the Biala Podlaska PZPR Province Committee, as we are gratified to note. The numerous questions asked by the journalists present at the conference were answered by, among others, Marian Orzechowski, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and Czeslaw Staszczak, first secretary of the PZPR Province Committee.

# Board Report on Party Activities

Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 7 Feb 83 p 3

[Unsigned article: "In Biala Podlaska: Among the People, for the People: Highlights of Reports of the Executive Boards of the PZPR Province Committee Presented at Saturday Reports Conferences"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] From the vantage point of time it must be stated that the party, accustomed as it was to acting in an atmosphere of stability and public tranquiity, could not at once rise to the occasion in the crossfire of the acute political struggle waged in 1981. Always, however, in the most difficult moments, the party aktiv was active among the working class, gave talks and calmed down those most impatient and militant. This produced its effects. /The Biala Podlaska public understood the gravity of the situation and responded appropriately to the appeals of the province authorities for tranquility and did not let itself be influenced by the extremist forces. Acute and open political conflicts never took place in this province./

During the tumultuous period the province party organization consistently implemented the course chosen by the party leadership, perceiving the solution to the crisis to lie in the process of a genuine renewal of our political life, in public and work discipline and in the implementation of the idea of national agreement.

/The activities of the province party echelon during the period covered by the report were focused on the following three principal directions:/

First, the rebuilding of the unity of the party, of its strength and authority.

Second, launching a sweeping drive among the working class, farmers, the entire public, to provide political explanations, propagate the idea of the national agreement and counteract anarchy and the anti-socialist opposition.

Third, alleviating the consequences of the crisis to the daily life and work of the province's population and implementing social and economic tasks.

The events and processes occurring in the province's economy demonstrate that /the mechanisms of the economic reform already have started to operate. More efficient management and improved production and financial performance are being observed./ Many plants have retooled in the direction of producing more for the market and agriculture. The work forces of many production plants, including the railroaders of the Malaszewice DRKP, are working sacrificially. These positive processes do not, unfortunately, extend to all enterprises. Numerous instances of poor management still occur.

The new forms of management require practical implementation of the principle of self-government. Of the 33 autonomous state enterprises active in the province, only three have not yet taken steps to reactivate worker self-government. It is

the party's business to assure that worker self-government start operating in all enterprises.

In the Biala Podlaska Province—despite the considerable progress made last year—/average wages still are below the nationwide average./ However, any further equalization of average wages must be based on a rise in labor productivity.

The Biala Podlaska Province is a significant agricultural producer. Our ambition/--the report states--/is to increase our contribution in this respect. and we have the possibilities for it. It is precisely in the development of agriculture that society perceives a chance for eliminating our backlog compared with other regions of the country. / Biala Podlaska agriculture at present is characterized by a weak infrastructure and limited availablity of agricultural equipment. It is hampered by shortages of the principal means of agricultural production and building materials. /These problems cannot be solved locally within the province alone, but their solution is not being awaited with folded hands either. / The Biala Podlaska inudstrry has undertaken the production of many simple agricultural machines and implements as well as spare parts and building materials. This production is not on an impressive scale, but still it serves to alleviate the shortages. The concern for production problems does not mean that the need to improve the social and living conditions in the countryside is being neglected. In this field, too the Biala Podlaska countryside lags behind the rest of the country.

Next to food the most important human need is housing. /In the province some 15,000 families are awaiting housing and the demand for single-family house construction is considerable./ The housing construction program adopted at the autumn session of the Province People's Council for the period until 1985 provides for building more than 2,500 dwellings in cities along with many health-service, school, trade, etc. facilities. Maximum effort by construction workers is needed in order to implement this program. /Hospital construction also has been designated as a priority task./ In this field the progress is marked. The new hospital in Radzyn already is admitting the first patients. Thanks to the initiatives of the PZPR Province Committee, the construction of the province hospital in Biala Podlaska has been markedly expedited, and the hospitals in Miedzyrzec and Losice will be expanded and modernized in the next few years.

Farther on, the report devotes considerable attention to the /idea of the Patriotic Movmeent for National Rebirth. In the Biala Podlaska Province elements and structures of that movement were among the first to be established in the country./ They are currently expanding their activities, initiating socially and economically important projects. So far, however, it has not been possible to unite within that movement broad masses of workers, farmers and the youth. The female members of the movement also are few.

Pursuant to the Parliamentary decree of October 1982, elements of the new trade unions are being formed in the province—in nearly every enterprise and institution. /Thirty-four trade unions already have been registered and 15 more are waiting to be registered./ Out of the fear of repeating past mistakes, some workers are not joining the trade unions and instead observe their activities and

await their effects. But the effects will be just what will be produced by the trade-union members themselves. To the party it is not a matter of indifference as to whether the new trade unions will gain authority among the working class and how effective will they be in defending the interests of workers. In this situation, no party member may adopt a waiting, passive or neutral attitude.

/An equally important party task is political work with the youth./ The point is not directing the youth organization or school but providing the conditions for all elements of the educational system to serve effectively the cause of socialist education. /The trust of the rising generation in the party and the authorities has to be rebuilt./ Special attention is required by the educational atmosphere in schools, especially in secondary schools. We must help the administration of these schools, teachers and school organizations in the difficult ideological struggle for the youth. The condition of school facilities is poor as regards space. On the party's initiative a program for investments in and renovation of school buildings has been drafted and will be presented at the next session of the Province People's Council.

The above principal tasks of party work will be implemented during the second half of the current term of office of the province party echelon . /Only a strong, disciplined and cohesively acting province party organization can cope with these tasks./ Hence, in the work of all party echelons and elements, great importance must be attached to problems of an intra-party nature and especially to strengthening the party qualitatively. Party work in the countryside needs to be improved and—we read in the report—we must assure a high level of ideological—training work adapted to the needs and conditions.

/The effects of party work largely hinge on the functioning of the echelons and primarily of the elected party authorities./ In accordance with the resolutions of the reports-elections conference, we have enhanced both the decisionmaking and the organizational functions of these elected bodies. The public aktiv is playing an increasingly greater role. But the work of grassroots party echelons must be better organized and more disciplined. The principle of the monitoring and assessment of the performance of party duties also is not being sufficiently followed.

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### TEXT OF SOLIDARITY PROGRAM DECLARATION PUBLISHED

London TYDZIEN I DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA in Polish 26 Feb 83 pp 1, 5

["Solidarity Today": Program Declaration of the Provisional Coordinating Commission of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity"]

[Text] After a year's duration of martial law and after its formal suspension, there can no longer be any doubt that the December coup against our nation's civil and worker rights was the beginning of a new stage in the process of pacification of our nation. The aim of the authorities is to suppress democratic aspirations and to establish a rule based on coercion and general public intimidation on a scale unknown in Poland since Stalinist times. A totalitarian dictatorship is beginning to emerge. The principles of its rule are: shooting at defenseless workers, imprisonment of thousands of people for social activity, and tracking down NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity activists like common criminals. This dictatorship sanctions a system of terror by introducing legislation which is contrary to international conventions and obligations that were ratified by the Polish People's Republic. Lawlessness has become law.

Democratic reforms aimed at improving social and economic relations are a mortal threat to the present system. While ruling by fear, the authorities themselves are doomed to fear an explosion of social hatred. Today, our readiness for concessions will be regarded only as a sign of weakness and will contribute to the consolidation of the repressive system. Our society has no choice—the only way out is resistance to and struggle against dictatorship.

The goal of our struggle continues to be implementation of the program of the First National Congress of Delegates of the NSZZ Solidarity, the program of democratic reforms which are needed to lift our country out of its decline. This program points out the way to the creation of an autonomous republic:

- --in which the guardian of legality would be an independent judiciary;
  --in which the means of production would become true social property, thus assuring the genuine participation of workers in the distribution of produced income:
- --in which culture, education, and mass communication media would serve society.

This program provides that, on the one hand, the improvement of our republic requires radical reforms in our social, economic and political life, and that, on the other hand, Poland's geopolitical situation is the reason why reforms must be carried out gradually, without altering the basic balance of power in Europe. The concept of an autonomous republic is not contrary to the idea of socialism, and its implementation does not have to conflict with the existing international order. Alliances made by Poland cannot be predicated on the existence of a dictatorial government which is universally hated and does not guarantee our nation any prospects for development. Consequently, this situation constitutes a permanent threat to peace in Europe.

Implementation of our program requires the creation of a situation in which the authorities would be forced to seek a compromise with Polish society. Only this would make possible the initiation of a process of reform and would provide conditions for legal activity of independent trade unions and associations which represent our society's interests. In order to make the system of authority in Poland amenable to concessions, and to create a real possibility of reform, it is necessary to initiate actions which aim at bringing about the collapse of the present dictatorship. Today, social resistance to and struggle against dictatorship are focused on the following areas of action:

- -- the rejection front,
- --economic struggle,
- --struggle for independent social awareness,
- --preparations for a general strike.

Initiation of these actions is a task for self-organizing society.

Our main weapon in this struggle is social solidarity. Thanks to it, we achieved victory in August 1980 and we endured repressions during the martial law period. It was born again in internment camps and in prisons, in industrial plants and in churches, in the everyday activity of elements of our movement, and during mass demonstrations. Our strength has been in the awareness that we are together, that each one of us is both a defender and in need of defense. Therefore no victim of repression, whether imprisoned, or beaten, or deprived of his job, may be left unprotected or helpless. This is a moral obligation for each one of us. All communities should publicly demand the release of persons who are imprisoned for their social activity and political views. Whoever contributes to repression of human beings will be condemned by us.

### The Rejection Front

Refusal to participate in deception, lawlessness, and violence is an everyday form accessible to each one of us, of struggle against dictatorship. Through a nationwide boycott of sham trade unions being formed by the authorities, we achieved our common political victory. This boycott has become a referendum which proved every day that our society rejects the existing rule of violence and terror. It also proves that the place of the free trade union movement

will remain vacant until this movement is again legalized, that Solidarity prevails and that it will regain its rights.

The principle, accepted during the period of martial law, of boycotting organizations, institutions, and associations, which:

- --show their support for the present system of dictatorship, --participate in reprisals,
- --are substitutes for delegalized social organizations, and --mimic social and political life (parties, PRON, OKON, FJN, etc.)

ought to become a permanent part of our lives. In this way, we demonstrate our attachment to the gains of August 1980, our striving for truth and dignity, and our repudiation of deception and lawlessness in social and political life. We will no longer consent to participate in a farce of elections to Sejm or people's councils. We will not participate in mass rallies, official demonstrations or celebrations, which are organized by the authorities. We will object to being used in the creation of a fiction of a social mandate for the system of present dictatorship. Let this authority remain in a political vacuum.

We should apply the principle of boycott selectively. We can and ought to take advantage of opportunities to carry on independent activity in those government institutions whose purpose is to meet the authentic needs of society. However, we must make sure that this activity is not used for the validation of lies and support for dictatorship. We ought to create community standards of conduct, in which a selective boycott is accompanied by indications of appropriate areas of social and professional activity.

The rejection front is also a front of active struggle. The authorities will probably try to break this front through blackmail and bribery. Our task is to jointly oppose this. Every area of blackmail should become a public matter. This weakens the effect of blackmail and makes it more difficult to be used in the future. Another form of defense against bribery is represented by regular collections of donations, formation of social aid committees, and by urging the establishment of aid-and-loan societies and employee vacation funds that would be independent of sham trade unions; all these, too, are forms of defense against bribery. We must not allow a situation to emerge in which the dishonor of joining pro-government unions would be the only way out of a difficult financial situation for those who are truly in need.

## The Economic Struggle

After 38 years of the existence of the Polish People's Republic, our society has been brought to the brink of dire poverty. Having to subsist on rationed food, and deprived of medicines, and clothing, we have been reduced to a state of bankruptcy. Our 30-billion dollars foreign debt will burden us for many years. Enormous national wealth is going to waste in idle factories and suspended capital investment projects. Technological backwardness is increasing. Utilization of Poland's economic potential is acquiring traits

of colonial exploitation. Wasteful management of the mining industry has resulted in tens of deaths, in depletion of mines, and in devastation of Poland's mineral resources. Polish agriculture, deprived of funds, is unable to feed the Polish nation. Devastation of the natural environment threatens the nation's biological base.

The martial law dictatorship has implemented a program of enormous price increases, without promising in return any prospects of improvement in the economic situation. Within a year, this program, isolated from the remaining market and organizational mechanisms, has resulted in the drastic reduction of the standard of living by 36 percent. Today, already one-third of worker families are living on the brink of dire poverty. At the same time, Polish society has been forced to assume the burden of maintaining the enormously expanded machinery of repression: hundreds of thousands of members of Security Service [SB], Citizens' Militia [MO], Motorized Units of Citizens' Militia [ZOMO], armed forces, and the party, who are keeping our nation in submission through terror. Another increase in prices has already been announced. Its results will be the further pauperization of our society, greater privation, and the danger of falling below the critical biological minimum. Martial law and its legislation rule out any chances of coming out of the crisis. A reform that was based on the principle of independence. self-governance, and self-financing, has been reduced to putting a new facade on the previous, discredited command-directive resources allocation system and to the militarization of the main sectors of our economy. Drastically curtailed employee rights have created semi-slave working conditions with compulsory employment, administrative ties to the place of employment, and the threat of losing one's job for political reasons. Under these conditions, the economic reform based on self-management has become a sham. Self-management institutions lack the capacity to perform their duties.

We cannot assume responsibility for the state of our economy. We must, however, be concerned about maintaining our economy at a level which will provide the most favorable conditions for its future recovery. We must not consent to a further deterioration of our standard of living. In a program of defense of our basic social and worker interests, the struggle for existence has become our most important struggle. This struggle will be carried on in every industrial plant and on every agricultural farm in our country. We will support every initiative which organizes Polish farmers for defense of their rights.

In industrial plants, we will carry on this struggle through all possible forms of pressure, including:

--utilization of existing law codes for strict enforcement of labor law, employment and wage regulations, occupational safety regulations, technological standards, employee benefit regulation, etc.; --demands for precise information on production decisions and results, distribution of the wage and bonus fund, the activity of social services, etc.; publicity given to wrong decisions, unpopular administrative orders, and instances of waste, incompetence, and reprisals that are concealed by plant management;

--initiation of collective protests, petitions, refusal to work overtime, and boycotts of administrative orders which limit employee rights or create intra-group divisions. The strongest and the most effective form of collective protest is an economic strike;
--utilization of employee self-management where there is a possibility of setting it up in such a way as to make it serve to protect the living standards of the work force and constitute a defense against reprisals. If self-management is deprived of opportunities for action in this area, it is a signal for members of the workers council to resign from their posts and to appeal to the work force to boycott self-management.

The Struggle for an Independent Social Awareness

"Solidarity" emerged from a nationwide protest and from the common struggle and work of various social communities. By creating it, we overcame divisions that the authorities had been creating quite intentionally and for a specific purpose. Continued cooperation of worker, peasant, and intellectual communities is a guarantee of victory. We strengthened this cooperation after August 1980, and since 13 December 1981 it has been the basis of our resistance.

A society which thinks in political terms, knows its history and appreciates authentic culture, and is inured to ideological manipulation, can ward off dangers posed by a totalitarian authority in the areas of social and political consciousness, national education and culture, social morality and civic attitudes. Therefore, our main task for today is to promote independent thinking, to break the state monopoly on the written and spoken word, information and education, culture and scientific research, and political and social thought. A special role here has been assigned to intellectual and creative communities, of which our society expects work for common good. We will support every independent initiative, and we will set up social foundations and scholarships which will make us independent of the dictatorship.

A front of cooperation in support of intellectual independence and authentic development of various communities should link together all strata of our society. Through self-improvement initiatives, expansion of the network of trade union bulletins, independent libraries and publishing enterprises, we should strive to stimulate social thinking in the worker community and to give nationwide publicity to its judgments, opinions, and interpretations. The mandate of social solidarity dictates that all of us must oppose the elimination from public life of those communities and people who are regarded as an inconvenience by the totalitarian dictatorship.

Independent institutions and initiatives, such as: publishing and artistic market, press and radio, independent education, are our common property. We ought to support and protect them, because the existence and growth of this trend gives independence to our society and prepares it for life in a democratic and autonomous republic.

### Preparations for a General Strike

A general strike is the strongest weapon in our struggle. Mass participation in the preliminary actions which are called for is an important stage in the preparation of the strike. The success of the strike depends on many factors, of which the principal ones are:

- -- the extent of social organization and of social determination;
- --nationwide awareness and acceptance of our goals;
- -- the international political situation.

The same factors affect the dictatorship's readiness to suppress striking work forces. Up to now the authorities, being politically ready to use all available means in their struggle against Polish society, have had sufficient force at their disposal to break a strike. They cannot maintain this readiness for too much longer, because its cost, in political and social terms, is too great. A time is coming when the weapon of a strike will again become a viable element of our struggle, and when a decision to use force against striking workers will pose a serious threat to the dictatorship itself.

The prospect of a general strike—which, according to our assessment, is inevitable—does not rule out a program of an evolutionary change in the system. It only points out the way to bring about the collapse of the present dictatorship and to create conditions for initiation of democratic reforms.

In the course of preparations for a general strike we must formulate and coordinate a minimum social program—a set of strike demands that, on the one hand, would guarantee continuation of the process of reform and, on the other hand, would take into consideration limitations resulting from domestic and international political realities.

The Provisional Coordinating Commission of the NSZZ "Solidarity" presents the declaration "Solidarity Today"—the action program of our trade union under present political and social conditions. We draw our inspiration from the legacy of the First National Congress of Delegates—from the program of the "Autonomous Republic." Martial law and delegalization of Solidarity have created a new situation which confronts us with new obligations.

Program discussions were conducted in various communities and in the columns of independent press. For their part, the Provisional Coordinating Commission and local authorities initiated the work of program groups. In the process of their work, the concept of an Underground Society was formed. It pointed out the main courses of action. We have presented them in the program assumptions "An Underground Society" (July 1982) and in declarations of the Provisional Coordinating Commission with regard to the present struggle. The program "Solidarity Today" is addressed by us to the entire Polish society. This program also imposes obligations on the Provisional Coordinating Commission, on local and plant organizational structures. However, it cannot take the place of a vision of a future Poland. This vision must be created by individual social and political programs. We will support such initiatives.

It is our desire that the program "Solidarity Today" may contribute toward the strengthening of the already formed social front of self-defense, a front of resistance to and struggle against dictatorship, for the simplest and the most basic values in the life of a person, of a community and a nation, for the right to truth, dignity, and hope. These goals unite all the people of good will, regardless of their political views and ideological opinions, and all the democratic forces of our nation. Pluralism and openness are the traits of Solidarity, a movement to create areas of agreement and cooperation with all those who feel an affinity with the goals of our movement, with all the currents of social activism whose ideal is a free democratic Poland.

## 22 January 1983

Provisional Coordinating Commission of the Independent Self-Government Trade Union "Solidarity"

Zbigniew Bujak

(Mazowsze region)

Wladyslaw Hardek

(Malopolska region)

Bodgan Lis

(Gdansk region)

Jozef Pinior

(Lower Silesia region)

Eugeniusz Szumiejko

(member of the Presidium of the National Commission [KK])

9577

CSO: 2600/505

## RURAL YOUTH UNION LEADER INTERVIEWED

Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 11-13 Mar 83 p 3

[Interview with ZMW national chairman Leszek Lesniak by Jozef Szewczyk: "Smoothing Over Differences"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] It is exactly 2 years since the first Rural Youth Union [ZMW] National Congress. You are its third chairman. The organization, whose formation was accompanied by great optimism, appears to be more involved in internal disputes than discussions about the future. How do you assess the phenomena taking place in the union and what led up to them?

[Answer] Officially, I am the second chairman. Staszek Kiljanczyk discharged the chairman's duties for only a very short period. Each new sociopolitical movement has to travel a similar road—a stage of internal reevaluations. The hopes, expectations and goals of the people creating it are different. The understanding of the concept that unites people in joint activity is different.

ZMW clubs were formed by people in their home regions. As the result of their meeting in December 1980 an Interim National Board was created in order to give that movement some kind of form and program framework and create conditions for development. At that time, the will to organize the union was enormous. Everyone rejected discussion on the subject of differences and ways of thinking about basic problems—what kind of union was it to be. We were agreed that the ZMW recognizes the principles of socialism, the Constitution and the PZPR's leading role in building socialism. On the other hand, there was no discussion at a lower level, hence we were reconciled because we wanted very much to create the ZMW.

[Question] I also think that the strength and unity in that period was also demonstrated by the number of opponents to creation of the ZMW.

[Answer] Of course. It was necessary to defend our ideals as well as the already existing clubs against various kinds of threats. Most of the people from the so-called apparatus considered that the model of the youth movement was good and that it was only necessary to improve the work methods. On the other hand, we thought that a youth group organization would be necessary as long as there are differences in the basis of individual groups. Thus we

set the equalization of differences between social classes as the first goal, and the individual's need for education and the representation of his interests as a secondary goal.

The time until the first congress was filled by the joyful creation of the organization. Sometimes, the slogan ZMW sufficed for the formation of a club. We had enormous support, the genuine support of many people who remembered the previous ZMW. They as well as youth wanted one thing—the union's coming into existence.

Then came the congress and the first reflections—are all of us thinking about the same thing? Do we want the same thing? The primary interest—creation of an organization of collective effort and thinking about the countryside and working for the countryside won out. We adopted a series of very important and, in my opinion, good documents at the congress. Among others, a democratic charter and a constructive declaration.

It was necessary later to form an organization based on those documents and to put their provisions into practice in everyday life. Then there was a shortage of people. So there was a sort of revindication of interests, a going back to how the groups arose and who formed them. The union did not find itself able here to get into a deep discussion on or to come up with an answer to the question of what different lines of thinking are represented in the organization. What is more, that question roused fear because it could suggest the break-up of the union. For, of course, the ZMW's power inheres in the variety of its activities and its political unity. Unfortunately, a period of questioning, particularly of people, began, because it was considered that the guarantee of observing the charter's rules reposes in people. It was with those features that we entered the period of martial law. Then the divisions also grew larger, and confidence in the leaders of the organization disappeared somewhere, distrust appeared, there were suspicions that someone was carrying out someone's orders, that young peasants' interests were threatened, etc.

[Question] Do you not think that the state of martial law only bared the divergences of the rationales and goals of the various trends—ZMW sympathizers on the one hand, those who regarded peasantry as the holiest of holies on the other, with somewhere in the middle those who looked into the future?

[Answer] That also figured to an enormous extent and it was not good that those interests began to play a decisive role. Ideas are valuable if they organize people to act. When that is to the contrary then they are only a tool in the hands of a group of people. Although not everyone wanted to hear or to understand that, we in the union clearly said that the ZMW would gain an identity through work, specific action and marking its presence by being a political organization that makes judgments, requests and demands. Meanwhile, some people forgot that, thinking that authority would be built just by demands. Hence, there were efforts to build an organization by political means forgetting that one builds through work. Personal rivalries were also played against a political backdrop and not within a context of work dedicated to building an organization. I say that sooner or later

people will properly assess those who put their heart and soul into every deed.

[Question] I have the impression that one additional division existed in the ZMW, although that could also be related to other organizations. At some point, people began to be told the bitter truth—we can afford only as much as we can accomplish by our own efforts. However, some young people came to you reasoning that, since you are supposed to be defending the interests of young peasants, then any problem with tractors will surely be resolved.

[Answer] It was thought that when an organization is already in existence that that means something, without regard to what the organization is like or what it had already accomplished. That also was one of the grounds for arguments between the national office and the organization's lower ranks. If we add to this personality conflicts in the heart of the organization's leadership, then it is clear what a complicated situation we had during the martial law period. Reinterpretations of the charter began at that time.

[Question] Perhaps turning the spotlight on the letter of the charter is a necessity, a reflection of the willingness to practice "pure democracy" that you wrote about in your slogans. Perhaps that might turn out to be a plus in the final analysis.

[Answer] That would be a plus if there was a uniform interpretation and not that of everyone on their own. One needs to tell himself honestly that a charter is the same for everyone from the chairman on down to the member. I believe that everything needs to be done today so that the law in the union is the charter. People expect that, although it does not always reward those who are waiting for a reward, but neither does it punish, although some consider that it ought to. But then the charter is the law.

[Question] The fact is that as the ZMW you are present in practically all forms of government, advisory and consultative organizations. What, however, have you managed to change in the mentality of a young person from the countryside who, coming to plenary deliberations frequently says—we passed a resolution, took a position, and what of it?

[Answer] I think that the ZMW teaches democracy very well. Scores of people actually sit down in these advisory groups and when I talk to them they say that it is very difficult to make decisions, and how difficult it is to take on responsibility. It is one thing to get the draft of a resolution, to read it and to express an opinion, to say that it is good or bad, or to judge something that already exists. That is very simple. When we have to make a decision it is necessary to consider the interests of individual groups. Thus our representatives get an enormous amount of training in these groups and learn how to exercise authority.

We must now get down to the village and the gmina with these values and this process. That is where the political struggle is taking place and decisions are being made on whose appearance influence must be exercised rather than only criticizing them later. Even if the ZMW does not have its representatives in gmina people's councils, or in farmer self-government organizations,

it does know how to reach the representatives of those bodies and how to present its position. Many of our people know that there is a people's authority but do not know how to make use of that authority. ZMW must teach them how to use it.

[Question] You are undertaking various activities in varied fields—if but the formation of a cooperative, a trade services agency, "theatrical activity"—however, don't you have any doubt that this is fragmentary activity, that raising the countryside's level of education and cultural development can take place only through sweeping solutions on a national scale?

[Answer] As one of those who initiated this movement I come to the conclusion that we are building the ZMW with too many institutions and agendas and say too little about how to spread ZMW ideas among our people. For example, the fine idea of cooperatives (they already exist). A cooperative must not be the goal, it must be the medium for bringing up people in the spirit of cooperative self-government and management. That is where future "Peasant Self-Help" and other cooperative workers must grow. We do not fall into a complex that we are some kind of junior cooperative movement.

By the same token, the "People's Scene" cannot be an end in and of itself. It will not eliminate the problems which have accumulated over the years in the arts, but it can protect young people's initiatives so that they do not make mistakes when they subsequently enter "serious" institutions in order to grow into true activists there.

[Question] You emphasize at every turn that you are the voice and conscience of rural youth. Much was heard about youth in the political environment last year. The 9th PZPR KC Plenum and 10th ZSL NK Plenum were devoted to youth. There is the government program for improving the personal and vocational conditions under which young people start out in life in which a couple of paragraphs are also devoted to rural youth. How do you rate the realization of these resolutions and programs at the lowest administrative level, or even by party elements?

[Answer] A program which is not carried out is only a dry scrap of paper. What is this all about? Recent legislative processes are very creative. Everyone there is creating something, forgetting that at the bottom those acts reach a person who shoves them into a drawer. Hence the problem is not in not creating them, but that the youth movement should be strong enough to teach young people to exercise their rights in practice.

Every legal act consists of giving rights and duties to somebody. As a rule, authorities are encumbered with responsibilities while society is given rights. In conjunction with this, the authorities have time to think how to avoid those responsibilities, while society has no time to decide how to exercise its rights. If we want to be a force that assists the democratic process of exercising rights, we must teach that democracy. We frequently talk about how to utilize these resolutions. It is necessary to act somewhat differently, an entire social movement must be created in this area. For

example, a given manager allocates tractors. He can distribute them in the fairest possible way, but if he does that behind closed doors there will be dissatisfaction and accusations of bribery. Let him do it in plain sight—that is social control.

Resolutions have political characteristics, and, depending on the strength of the youth movement, and if it involves itself in their realization, then they will be achieved. This cannot be limited solely to reading only those points in resolutions which are most comforting to us, rather it must entail reading them in their entirety and creating a moral attitude for enforcing regulations.

[Question] Do you think that youth does not have that attitude?

[Answer] It has, but let us say honestly, that youth observes the party's actions with curiosity, however, does it participate actively in the achievement of programs? No, on the contrary, it looks to see whether these programs are achieved. The role of the organization should be to know how to talk about these problems, not to antagonize but to ask—who is in this party, the ZSL? Our parents, of course. Sometimes this has to be a mutual reflection not necessarily at meetings but in the family home.

[Question] In light of the generation conflict, do you believe in such smooth family talks?

[Answer] There is no generation conflict in the countryside. Really, there is not. There are certain differences of opinion but they need not lead immediately to conflicts. An alliance of youth and grandparents has come about in the countryside today. In essence it comes down to—"grandfather, you fought for socialism, and what did my parents make of it?" Thus, it is important to invite the intermediate generation to discussions about the countryside. It is not that that generation perverted it, it wasted its time. Whatever is said, thanks to that generation, youth is starting out in life on a different level and has more time for thinking. That is good, but it must now find a partner in the family with whom to talk about what needs to be done in Poland. Parents must understand that an early political retirement is in store for them.

[Question] I would not be so certain of that...

[Answer] Do you believe that youth will not want to take power?

[Question] They might want to do so, but political power has an appeal regardless of age...

[Answer] That is why I want to say that there will not be a power struggle, but rather a power contest. The ZMW must give a young person an identity to enable him to win that contest. Not on the basis of membership, but because he accomplished something in that organization. No awards, but that he is educated, is an agent of progress, and that he fights for the entire community. To be sure, older people will not permit that everywhere.

[Question] That is, that young people in the countryside have not gone into internal exile and will fight for political power?

[Answer] They are not in any kind of exile, although the question could be raised—ZMW membership consists of 200,000 young people, but there are 2 million in the countryside—as to whether the rest are in exile? I think not. They are standing and looking on. The youth movement must strive to attract them. Not by agitation, but by example. Let us not talk any more of this exile. People will listen, start to think things over, and perhaps emigrate to try and find out what it's all about.

[Question] An example—agreed. However, we have a certain stagnancy in societal activity. Active people are relegated to go further than their own villages. Once a year they put on gmina harvest festivals. They would like to show their achievements to others and have the satisfaction of knowing that they are the best in the province, in the country. The wholesale condemnation of certain activities, competitions, festivals and reviews does not favor being active or mobilize people to work hard.

[Answer] That is my old dilemma. When we criticized everything there was to criticize, we also criticized community action projects. What good does community action accomplish. Rivalry, satisfaction and awards. That is something to talk about. However, it must be worthwhile community action, the kind that does not carry discouraging complexes with it, community action whose only goal is not awards, but which gets something accomplished with respect to a particular problem. We must have several community action projects, but not just for the projects themselves, but to support the work being done by the clubs. Let us take festivals—it is a good thing that these people put on performances in their villages, that older people will get involved and will shout "Bravo." However, active people would like to pit themselves against someone and to compete. We are going to promote and sponsor that this year.

[Question] You have also wrapped up your reports campaign. What are the most important tasks that came out of it?

[Answer] To end the phase of debates and controversies. Another task is going to be the building of united fronts for the resolution of specific problems by the ZMW. That ties in with the idea of national reconciliation. This concerns not only formal participation in Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) elements, but the introduction of specific problems in the gmina forum. An essential matter will also be getting ready for the youth summer vacation activity program. It will decide ZMW's work in the winter time.

[Question] Thank you for the interview.

10433

CSO: 2600/548

#### CEAUSESCU HAILED AS FOUNDER OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Bucharest VIATA MILITARA in Romanian Jan 83 pp 14, 15

[Article by Col Gen Vasile Milea, first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the general staff]

[Text] The nearly 2 decades which have passed since the historic Ninth Congress of the party—a memorable event for the country's destiny and one which inaugurated the most fertile period in our national history—shine an especially bright light on comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's decisive role in laying out the theoretical framework and in providing practical solutions to the vast and complex problems in creating a multilaterally developed socialist society within the fatherland and in placing Romania in a prestigious position among the nations of the world.

In step with the evolution across the whole of Romanian society, in the almost 20 years of the new revolutionary history of our nation, there have been profound changes, as well, in the theoretical and practical approach to the questions of our party and state's military policy. As with the other areas of socioeconomic and political-ideological life, the most fertile period in the realm of ensuring national defense is that which was inaugurated by the Ninth Party Congress. The approach to the major concerns of the national defense in this period bears the imprint of the thoughts and actions of the one who has given his name to the time in which we live; the tried, esteemed and appreciated leader of our party and state, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. A prominent figure in today's times, hardened in the revolutionary activity, dedicated to the cause of socialism and communism on Romanian soil, an especially important thinker and the eminent leader of our country which is on the road to multilateral development, a celebrated and active participant in the solution of the great problems of mankind, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu combines in a stellar fashion the knowledge and appreciation of the glorious history of the Romanian nation and the understanding of its present, effervescent with careful and wellgrounded preparation for the shining future of the fatherland. The secretary general of the party has, at the same time, the historic credit of being the architect of the military doctrine of socialist Romania, of the national system of defense.

Our party and its secretary general are always aware that the socialist construction of the country, the development of our fatherland, takes place under complex international conditions; that in the contemporary world the peril of war, including a devastating world war, still remains. "Hence," comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out at the National Party Conference in December 1982, "we have the responsibility in the development of socialism and in the independence and future of the country to work unceasingly to strengthen the capacity to defend the fatherland."

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's exhaustive approach to national defense harmoniously combines unrestricted knowledge of the contemporary military phenomenon with the revolutionary, initiative-laden and dynamic spirit which marks all the activity of the party, state and people in the period in which we live; a spirit rejecting any dogmatism, a spirit opposed to closed-mindedness and ossification. The elaboration and consolidation of socialist Romania's military doctrine is placed in this context. The new Romanian military doctrine constitutes a link in the chain of profound transformations which, after the Ninth Party Congress, established a watershed in military thought and practice in our country.

In the creative use of the revolutionary traditions of struggle that our people possesses—people who always defended their national existence, independence and sovereignty—and in the use of modern military science, together with the conclusions drawn from a profound analysis of the international political scene and keeping in mind the perspectives of developing Romania along the lines established in the Program of the Romanian Communist Party to produce a many-sided socialist society and to move the country along the road to communism, we see that in the documents of the Twelfth Congress and in those of the National Party Conference our country's current military doctrine represents a harmonious, dynamic and completely open assemblage of the principles and solutions regarding national defense.

Throughout, today's Romanian military doctrine is based on such principles as: the dialectical unity of the work to construct a many-sided socialist society in Romania and to strengthen the capacity to defend the country; a people's character; the mobilization of the entire economic, demographic, technical-scientific and political-moral potential of the country for national defense; the unitary character of organization; the equipping of forces which form the national defense system; the sovereign, inalienable and imprescriptible rights of the national constitutional organizations authorized by the people to make decisions concerning national defense, and to decide on the use of the country's military strength, if need be, and, therefore, the exclusive leadership by the Romanian Communist Party of the armed forces and of the entire national defense system; and the principles of military cooperation with the other socialist countries along with meeting the obligations of mutual military assistance taken on through international, bilateral and multilateral treaties.

Socialist Romania's military doctrine is both a synthesis and a development on a higher plane, on the basis of scientific socialism, of dialectical and historical materialism, of Romanian military thinking worked by the potential of its own national spirit, of our nation's psychological character and of its military experience in life and in struggle for an independent existence, to fulfill its vocation as an element of progress in this part of the world, to always remain itself, and to fulfill its destiny without interruption alongside other nations. This doctrine has, then, a national character, as it is improved and developed by the secretary general of the party on the basis of the entire life and evolution of our country.

The military doctrine of the Socialist Republic of Romania has an essentially political character. Its options are always in step with our party's and state's domestic and foreign policy, with the conclusions derived from a political analysis of the processes and realities of the contemporary world and with the opportunities that devolve from the analysis which the Romanian Communist Party and its secretary general, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, make of international political trends.

Elaborated and demonstrated by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, our military doctrine is above all a doctrine of defense. Its fundamental goal is in complete accord with the socialist nature of Romanian society, and with the peaceful aspirations of our people. This doctrinal goal achieved meaningful expressing in the clear enunciation given it by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, according to which, "Socialist Romania does not pursue and will never pursue aggressive goals against any state," under any circumstances; "the Romanian people will fight only, I stress only, to defend their independence and sovereignty, against any attempt at domination and dominance, to ensure our nation's right to freely develop its socialist and communist society in cooperation with the other socialist states."

In accordance with its social, political and ideological bases, our country's current military doctrine sets forth the principle which governs the overall organization of the Romanian socialist state's defensive capabilities so as to ensure, when necessary, the repulsion of any armed aggressor. This principle expresses all the people's desire and will to fight with all their might, even under the most adverse conditions, in order to force the invader to renounce aggression or, if it is unleashed, to do all that is necessary to defeat it. Our military doctrine does not contemplate a war through capitulation to the aggressor, regardless of how strong he may be, holding such a conclusion inadmissible.

In determining the scope, objectives, methods, organizational structures, means and solutions for carrying out our state's military functions under current conditions, the military doctrine of Socialist Romania defines the nature and the type of response the Romanian people will make to any aggression. In this sense, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu has stated that, "a possible war in the future cannot be anything but a defensive war, a war of the people, in which the entire populace will participate, in tight cohesion, under our communist party's leadership—the guiding political force of the nation and thus also of the fight to defend independence and revolutionary victories."

This fundamental postulation of our military doctrine--defense of the fatherland and by the armed efforts of allthe people by all military and nonmilitary means at the maximum level of the nation's potential--has materialized in the System of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania. This system--the most significant achievement in the sphere of strengthening the defensive capacity of the country and linked also to the name and activity of comfade Nicolae Ceausescu--provides a sufficient organizational framework for solidifying the social dimensions which have been won in Romanian socialist society, "the defense under any conditions, of the revolutionary victories and of the independence and sovereignty of the country."

The military doctrine formulated and substantiated by the president of the country, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the System of National Defense of Socialist Romania, is comprised of the armed forces, including the army—as the primary element—and the troops of the Military of the Interior, as well as the people's defense forces, established on the basis of territorial criteria and places of work—the patriotic guards, training units for young people in the defense of the fatherland, civil defense formations and so on.

The package of principles and concrete directives for the leadership of the national defense occupies a particularly important place in our military doctrine. In the revolutionary concept advanced by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the leadership of the national defense, and of its armed forces, is the inalienable right of the Romanian Communist Party, of the supreme organs of state power in our country. Party leadership of our country's armed forces is an objective necessity which follows from the nature of our socialist order, from the unitary character of society's leadership process and it constitutes a guiding principle of our military doctrine. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, underscoring this fundamental principle of our military doctrine, referring specifically to the leadership of the armed forces—but which is totally valid for the entire system of national defense—pointed out that, "The sole leader of our armed forces is the party, the government, the supreme national command. Only these can give orders to our army and these orders can only be carried out within the Socialist Republic of Romania."

Consequently, the military doctrine of the Socialist Republic of Romania, set forth by the secretary general of the party and the supreme commander of our armed forces, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu--is a system of ideas, principles and directives for the fundamental methods officially adopted and modes of assuring the armed defense of our Romanian nation's socialist victories, of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. It is an expression of the on-going concern of our party, of our secretary general, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, for the destiny of the Romanian people, for the continuous strengthening of the capacity to defend the fatherland. The exceptional fairness and depth of the principles and directives of the doctrinal order with which comrade Nicolae Ceausescu armed the people for defense against any armed aggression, constitutes a powerful stimulus for all citizens of the country, for all who serve under the flag, to work and to be prepared in such a way as to be ready at any moment, upon the order of the supreme commander, "to defend the revolutionary socialist victories, the peaceful work of the nation, its tranquility, to ensure the independence of Romania, repelling any aggressor."

Our country's soldiers, from private to general, paying homage with the same thought and feeling, together with all our country's working people, and including the 50 years of revolutionary activity of comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, and celebrating the birthday of the Romanian people's most beloved son, all salute the supreme commander, his worthy achievements and his firm commitment to do everything to faultlessly fulfill the missions entrusted to him, and direct to him from the heart, with the highest sentiments of respect and admiration, warm wishes for long life, health and continued ability to work as the head of the party and state and the armed forces for the benefit and improvement of our precious fatherland, the Socialist Republic of Romania.

12280 CSO: 2700/144

#### DECREE ON COUNCIL FOR SILVICULTURE

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 96, 1 Nov 82, pp 3-4

[Council of State Decree regarding the establishment, organization and operation of the Council for Silviculture]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1. - The Council for Silviculture is established to ensure the carrying out of the objectives and tasks outlined in the National Program for the Conservation and Development of Forest Resources.

Article 2. - The Council for Silviculture is organized and operates as a deliberative organ having a broad representative character and carries out its activities under the direct guidance of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Article 3. - The Council for Silviculture is responsible for carrying out the party's and state's policies in the field of silviculture and reviews and guides the activities of the Ministry of Silviculture regarding the protection, conservation and development of forest resources, hunting and fishing in mountain waters and the harvesting, processing and use of forest products and other products of the woods, as well as the proper management of pastures and fields in the mountainous zones and the forest perimeter in other regions.

To this end, the Council for Silviculture has the following main attributes:

- a)it periodically analyses and reviews the manner in which the provisions of the National Program regarding the conservation and development of forest resources are achieved, establishing measures for carrying them out, and reports to the party and state leadership on the results that are obtained;
- b) it approves studies, forecasts and programs regarding the future development of silviculture;
- c) it gives opinions on the five year plan with regards to the placement of forests and the highway network throughout all forest resources;

- d) it approves the program for the cultivation, regeneration and use of pastures and fields in the mountainous zones and the forest perimeter in other regions and takes measures to achieve it;
- e) it approves the directions for development and priority programs regarding scientific development in the field of silviculture, forest fruits, pasture and fields improvements, hunting and fishing in mountain waters;
- f) it takes measures to strictly respect silviculture and forest use regulations.

Article 4. - The Council for Silviculture is composed of 71 members and has in its leadership a president, a first deputy vice president and vice presidents.

The president of the Council for Silviculture is a party and state activist.

The first vice president of the Council for Silviculture is the minister of silviculture.

In the absence of the president, his attributes are fulfilled by the first vice president.

Article 5. - The Council for Silviculture is convened in plenary session twice each year or whenever necessary by the president or at the request of at least one-third of its members.

Article 6. - The Council for Silviculture carries out its activities in the presence of at least two-thirds of its members and adopts decisions through an open vote and with the majority of its members.

Representatives of certain public organs and organizations can be invited to sessions of the Council for Silviculture.

Article 7. - The decisions adopted by the Council for Silviculture are obligatory for the Ministry of Silviculture, as well as for the forestry inspectorates and other holders of forestry lands.

Article 8. - The Council for Silviculture in its entirety and each individual member is responsible to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers for all council activities. Each member is responsible to the council and its president for carrying out the tasks entrusted to him.

Article 9. - The collective leadership organ between plenary sessions of the Council for Silviculture is the leadership committee of the council, composed of 31 members.

The leadership committee of the council is composed of a president, a first vice-president, vice presidents and members.

The president of the leadership committee is the president of the Council for Silviculture.

The leadership committee of the council also fulfills the attributes if the collective leadership organ of the Ministry of Silviculture.

Article 10. - The leadership committee of the council meets once each quarter or whenever necessary and is convened by the president or at the request of at least one-third of its members.

The leadership committee of the council carries out its activities in the presence of at least two-thirds of its members and approves decisions through open vote and with the majority of its members.

In the case of disagreement between the president and the majority of the members, the problem where agreement cannot be reached is submitted to the Council for Silviculture or, between its sessions, to the Council of Ministers.

Depending upon the nature and importance of the problems on the agenda, other persons interested in examining these problems can also be invited to the sessions.

Article 11. - The management of the current activities of the Council for Silviculture and the Ministry of Silviculture is provided by the executive bureau, composed of the minister of silviculture, the deputy minister, the secretary of state, the secretary of the ministry party organization and the representative of the General Union of Trade Unions, as well as other personnel in the Ministry of Silviculture or from other subordinate units.

The president of the executive bureau is the minister of silviculture.

Article 12. - The composition of the Council for Silviculture, the leadership committee and the executive bureau is approved by presidential decree for a period of 5 years.

[Signed] Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 1 November 1982 No 398

8724

CSO: 2700/163

DECREE ON NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF LAND RESOURCES

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 96, 1 Nov 82, pp 1-3

[Decree of the Council of State regarding the establishment, organization and operation of the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romanian decrees:

Article 1. - On the date of this decree, the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources is established.

The National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources operates in the direct subordination of the Council of State and is responsible for carrying out the party's and state's policy regarding the protection, use, conservation and improvement of the land resources of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Article 2. - The National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources has the following main attributes:

- a) it is responsible for carrying out in a unified manner those measures regarding the protection and complete and intensive use of the land, the increase in the agricultural area and especially the arable areas, the constant improvement of the production potential of all land resources, regardless of who owns it and the manner of use of the land, and the complete and qualitatively superior carrying out of the national program of land improvement;
- b) it reviews the manner in which the state organs and the land holders ensure the application of the legal provisions regarding the protection, improvement, conservation and use of land resources and it takes measures for the proper management and complete use, on the part of the socialist agricultural units and other land holders, of all land areas, with respect for the destination of production outlined in the plan and for the approved technical standards;
- c) it annually analyzes the status of land resources and makes proposals for its improvement in accordance with the tasks in the sole national economic-social development plan;
- d) it analyzes and gives opinions on systematization studies on land areas and localities:

The National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources approves the obligatory decisions for all state and public organs and organizations having attributes concerning the management of land resources.

Article 3. - The National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources presents to the Council of State, once or whenever it is necessary, reports and proposals regarding the use, conservation and protection of the country's land resources, and the growth of the production potential of these resources.

Article 4. - The National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources has the make-up listed in Annex No 1.

The list of names of people in the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources is approved by presidential decree.

Article 5. - Representatives of certain state or public organs interested in the examination of problems that are to be discussed, as well as specialists from the fields of agriculture, silviculture and water management, can be invited to sessions of the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources.

Article 6. - The National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources, in its entirety, is responsible to the Council of State for carrying out its own attributes.

Each member of the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources is responsible to the council president for carrying out his assigned duties.

Article 7. - Alongside the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources there is the State Inspectorate for the Review of the Use of Land Resources.

Article 8. - The State Inspectorate for the Review of the Use of Land Resources primarily has the following attributes:

a) it exercises throughout the entire country the general review regarding the rational management of land resources and takes measures outlined by law for the conservation and development of these resources, regardless of the landholder.

The State Inspectorate for the Review of the Use of Land Resources can take possession of lands illegally occupied or used, regardless of the landholder, and applies sanctions for those guilty, according to the law;

b) it pursues ensuring the protection and proper management of land resources by way of systematization projects for the land and urban and rural localities, the restriction of the area for building within localities and the areas where building can take place to the strictly necessary amounts, and the simplification and and rationalization of the highway network;

- e) it coordinates the drawing up of the national program of land improvement projects, correlated with the studies on the systematization and organization of agricultural lands;
- f) it takes measures to strictly adhere to legal provisions regarding the prohibition on the occupation and use for other reasons those land areas to be used for vegetal, agricultural and forestry production and on the change of the use of arable land areas to other categories of agricultural use;
- g) it examines and gives opinions on the annual proposals of the ministries and other central organs regarding the temporary or permanent occupation or use of land areas for purposes other than vegetal, agricultural or forestry production, in cases where, according to law, the change in the use of the land is approved by presidential decree;
- h) it reviews and takes measures so that all end-users of investment projects will respect the obligations to recovery and turn over, under the conditions and within the timeframes established, those land areas for which they received to take out of agricultural and forestry production, according to law;
- i) it ensures, together with the ministries and other central organs, the planning and correlated achievement of investment projects in hydrographic basin areas for the purpose of protecting and conserving the land;
- j) it reviews the manner of carrying out investment projects related to the protection, management, improvement and conservation of the land, irrigation projects and other projects for land improvement. Similarly, it reviews the complete and proper operation of irrigation and draining systems and the manner of applying technologies to use projects, as well as other measures regarding increasing agricultural production on managed lands;
- k) it ensures the quantitative and qualitative inventory-taking of all lands and the updating of the general and obligatory documentary system on all land areas on the basis of general land cadastral surveys for the purpose of completely using all land areas regardless of its use and the landholder;
- 1) it works to strengthen discipline and increase responsibility in the management of land resources and to eliminate any type of waste, degradation or inefficient use of the land;
- m) it completes or gives opinions on draft laws, decrees or other normative acts referring to land resources;
- n) it carries out any other attributes outlined by law.

c) it takes measures so that construction and installation projects will be placed and carried out while strictly respecting the norms and documents of systematization;

In cases where it is found that construction and installation projects were placed on land areas without the approvals required by law or without respect for these laws, the inspectorate can, as the case may be, require the demolition or disestablishment of these projects and the punishment of those who are guilty, according to law;

- d) it reviews the manner in which the socialist, state and cooperative agricultural units and all landholders work to fulfill the provisions of the program to increase the country's arable land area and to use all categories of land with increased efficiency;
- e) it takes steps so that the removal of land areas from vegetal, agricultural or forestry production for other needs of the national economy will be done with respect for legal provisions and only within strictly necessary limits;
- f) it checks the manner in which the end-users of investment projects carry out their obligations for the recovery of lands to compensate for those land areas given the approval for permanent removal from agricultural or forestry production, as well as the turning over of land areas temporarily removed from production within the timeframes and conditions that have been established;
- g) it organizes, guides and reviews actions to identify lands that are inappropriate for agriculture and to mark these for the placement of investment projects or to be managed as agricultural lands in order to compensate for those removed from agricultural production;
- h) it takes steps so that the construction of new roads or the modernization of existing roads will be done only of the basis of prior approval outlined by law and with the strict respect for the norms referring to the planning, building and modernizing roads;
- i) it makes proposals to the National Council referring to certain measures that are required for the proper management and complete use of land resources, the improvement of the land's production potential and the achievement of certain irrigation projects and other land improvement projects;
- j) it also carries out those tasks outlined by the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources.
- Article 9. The maximum number of personnel, the specific list of leadership and operational positions and the salary levels for these poeple in the State Inspectorate for the Review of the Use of Land Resources are listed in Annex No 2 (this Annex was forwarded to the interested institutions).

Article 10. - Annex No 1 and Annex No 2 are an integral part of this decree.

[Signed] Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 1 November 1982 No 397

## Annex No 1

The Composition of the National Council for the Unified Management of Land Resources

. —	Council of State	-	vice president
_	Council of Ministers	-	deputy prime minister
_	State Planning Committee	_	president
_	Ministry of National Defense	_	minister
_	Ministry of the Interior	_	minister
-	Ministry of Finance	_	minister
_	Committee for the Problems of the People's		
	Council	_	president
_	Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry	-	minister
_	Ministry of Silviculture	_	minister
_	National Council of Waters	_	president
_	Academy of Agricultural and Silvicultural Science	-	president
-	Bank for Agriculture and the Food Industry	_	president
-	Central Directorate of Statistics		director general
_	State Inspectorate for the Review of the Use		
	of Land Resources		state chief inspector
_	Central Institute of Geodesy, Cartography and		
	Cadastral and Land Resources	_	director general

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CSO: 2700/163

### ACTIVITY OF MILITARY SECONDARY SCHOOL DISCUSSED

Bucharest VIATA MILITARA in Romanian Dec 82 p 12

/Article by Cpt C. Struna: "Cantemirists"/

/Text/ The words spoken by the secretary general of the party, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu at the historic forum of the National Conference of the party still are echoing in our hearts. They were words--flame and incentive; words--beacon and conscience, words--program and action. In those days the students of the "Dimitrie Cantemir" military high school where I am located were, with the desire and deed like all soldiers, at the peak of complete devotion and self-sacrifice characteristic of tender years, and totaly illuminated by the truth of the great victories reviewed at the high communist forum. In the classes and laboratories, along walkways guarded by the wonderful greens of the firs, torches of chlorophyll in this bland December, in study halls, on training fields and in workshops--everywhere where there are students--I sensed a profound and revolutionary commitment, born of their calm souls, like the peace of the seas. It is not so easy to maintain the prestige earned by numerous generations of students, who, with the romanticism snd sensitivity of the age, dreamed, worked and produced on these delightful foothills named Breaza. The Cantemirists of today, like those of yesterday, find in their zest for life and study the strength to continue enhancing the reputation of the high school. Living among them (and recalling the days when I was like them) I can say: Without a doubt, there is room in the heart of a 16, 17 or 18 year old for both the reveries of adolescence and the thirst for culture, their combination being the infinite yearning, the eternal desire of the youth of today to be the heroes of tomorrow!

The formative personalities of these young people are in good hands. A distinguished corps of professors and officers, men with solid specialized training, make student access to the values of science, culture and art easier, stimulate unused creativity, form them in the spirit of socialist humanism, of the heroic traditions of our people and army. "Many of the professors," Deputy Director Jacob Hardirca tells us, "have a level 1 in education and some have made personal contributions in their field to society at the national level. Take, for example, Professors Vasile Baghina and Stefan Marinescu. In the instructional process, we have generalized certain participatory methods: the case study, the problem discussion and the revealing conversation. Above all, the professors have the duty to teach the students how to learn, thus achieving maximum returns from the efforts

expended." It can be said that nothing of what comprises modern education is missing here at the school, the material base and technology of instruction ensuring the basic conditions of complete education.

Among the many laboratories, there is one for electronics where Professor Ion Staicu directs the technical thinking of the young people, preparing them for research activities. From the acumen of the minds of those captivated by the mysteries of integrated circuits, the theories of mathematical graphs or logic (I mention but a few: Student-Corporals Adrian Anghelescu and Laurentin Neacsu, Student-Privates Catalin Dragomir and Marian Petrache, Students Dan Hadirca and Dan Grigore) have come a dual based computer, logic simulators, rectifiers, electronic games, amplifiers, a light organ, slides for visualizing certain concepts in physics and chemistry, and so forth. On the workbench at present is a plan for an electronic clock and a kind of intercom. In the mathematics laboratory, equipped with programmable computers, students are increasing their understanding of the mathematics applied in computer science. A centralized file of exercises allows, by the stepped access method, the mastering of the mechanics of solving complicated problems. The over 40 groupings by objectives, in which absolutely all students participate, have the goal of reinforcing the material taught and identifying particularly gifted students. Invariably, the participants for the olympiads are selected from these. (This year Student-Corporals Polidor Roscu and Amilcar Ionescu received first and second prizes respectively in the country at the olympiads of Russian language and Physics.) There are also groupings for handicrafts, plastics, carting (first place in the country in 1981) and so on. And, a crowning success of the creative effort is the literary-musical club, "Dimitrie Cantemir", directed by Professors Constantin Gerginca and Vasile Ropotica. Through their highly artistic performances given for the National Conference of the party, the club has obtained a well-earned place in the spiritual life of the high school and the judet. (The dance team and the popular and light music groups composed of Student-Corporals Catalin Rugina and Doru Trandafir, Student-Sergeant Marinca Serban, Student-Assistant First Sergeant Dumitru Chiciu, Student Vasile Luca, and so on participated in the boys' chorus which was a laureate of the national festival "Romanian Song.") Of importance is that these good club members publish a long-standing journal, "The Cantemirist"-where anthologies and individual pamphlets are published. (The latest are "Waves at the Seashore" and "Manuscripts", authored by Students Radut Bilbiie and Gheroghe Baciu). They participate in lectures and communications sessions, attracting the interest of the public and of specialists as was the case with the work, "The Image of the Communist in Romanian literature", presented by Student-Corporal Marian Voinescu.

The combining of training and practical experience is also carried out in the schools' workshops where men with hands of gold (I am talking about Warrant Officers Gheorghe Maxineanu and Eugen Visteanu) infuse the work ethic in the students' hearts. At graduation from high school the students have a firm understanding of locksmithing, automobile engines and radio transmissions (in the final year all learn transmission and reception of morse code and some attain adequate proficiency.) The training actively contributes to the students' patriotic education, and to the cultivation of Romanian army traditions and the principles of our national military doctrine, thus

developing a love for the military career. The groundwork of hours of instruction at the front and of instruction in firing infantry weapons have propelled the students into first place in the Sports Contest and in the summer military exercises for military high schools. The greatest honor was winning the "Steaua" cup in target shooting.

The Union of Communist Youth organization at the high school received the "Flag and Honor Diploma of the Central Committee of the U.T.C." Lt Ionel Barbulescu, the secretary of the UTC committee tells us: Every youth organization has become an active factor in bringing new quality in all areas. In the fall during the agricultural campaign, for example, the students earned the "Industrious Cup" for the school. At the National Conference of the party, numerous youth organizations met the conditions recognized as "Model Collectives of Youth who work and live in the spirit of the Code of the Communist Ethic." Also, through patriotic work, they have set up tennis, handball and volleyball courts, they dug a trench 1.5 meters deep and 600 meters long (for irrigation) and they exceeded the plan for recoverable materials by many tens of thousands of lei.

All of this and much more is solid proof of the calibre of the instructive-educative activity. The "Dimitrie Cantemir" Military High School, with each new generation of students, is proving the skills of the cadre and commandants who see to it that these youngest offspring of the military grow up straight and tall.

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CSO: 2700/143

#### BRIEFS

MODIFICATION OF PENAL CODE--The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that article  $302^1$ , with the following content, is inserted after Article 302 in the Penal Code: "Diverting of Funds"--Article  $302^1$ --If the changing of the destination of monetary funds or of material resources without observing legal provisions has caused a disturbance of the economic-financial activity of one of the organizations specified in Article 145 or has had harmful consequences or other serious effects, this act is punishable by a jail sentence of from 6 months to 5 years." [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 21, 30 Mar 83 p 5]

CSO: 2700/181

#### CROATIAN LC PRESIDIUM DISCUSSES INFORMATION MEDIA

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 83 p 4

[Address by Josip Vrhovec and subsequent discussion at the 32d Meeting of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee on 21 February 1983: "Stimulus for More Mobile, Critical and Responsible Reporting"]

[Excerpts] In its 32d meeting, held on Monday and chaired by Jure Bilic, the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee took up the role and tasks of the League of Communists in programming and carrying out the programmed policy in the media. The introductory address was delivered by Josip Vrhovec. He recalled that the meeting was preceded by extensive discussion in the basic organizations of the LC within the media, as well as in opstina committees and the Zagreb City LC Committee.

## Address by J. Vrhovec

"We would like," Josip Vrhovec said, "to call attention throughout this entire action of ours to three basic questions: to the activity of the LC within the media and then to the ideological orientation of editorial policies and to the social relations of self-management in the media, that is, to their openness to society. These topics have not been debated with exactly the same intensity in all quarters; in some places emphasis was put on some problems, and it was placed elsewhere in others. However, as a whole, least has been said about socioeconomic and self-management relations within the media. The Zagreb City LC Committee has taken note that 'although very outspoken in the critical treatment of these issues in other workplaces, party members within the media have said nothing or hardly anything on this occasion about their own situation. Also specific problems which were highlighted in the materials of the Central Committee concerning tendencies of technobureaucratic relations, group-ownership behavior, privatization and usurpation of self-management and the influence of the bureaucratic mentality in their own workplaces have for all practical purposes been evaded in these debates."

#### The LC in Action

Josip Vrhovec said in this connection that it is impossible to give lectures to others and to make an analysis of how others are working and at the same time to grant oneself amnesty from that obligation.

Josip Vrhovec emphasized that the discussion led to the observation that in the media in our republic there have not recently been any general or major problems which would in principle raise the question of their ideological orientation. However, this, too, must be understood in a critical evaluation of many occurrences which have been adverse and which deserve the attention and action of the League of Communists.

He mentioned the weekly DANAS, to which specific discussions have been devoted within the Vjesnik Publishing House, and the presidium of the city committee has devoted attention to criticism of that newspaper as well. However, that job has not yet been finished; for opportunistic reasons it was excessively drawn out, which actually showed that the basic organization of the LC in that newspaper was unable to carry to the end the self-critical evaluation of its own work. It was also evident that the Vjesnik Publishing House was unable to unravel and clear up this problem with its own energies, but rather it came to the point where this is being done by the Presidium of the Zagreb City LC Committee and the Trnje Opstina LC Committee.

As for the discussions of editorial policy in other papers, the conclusion has been reached that the assessments made in the basic organizations of the LC differ quite a bit from the assessments made by organs of the LC. That is, the former assessments are considerably less critical of their own work than what has been pronounced by organs of the LC. Although they have periodically debated the questions of editorial policy, the basic organizations of the LC have not in essence conducted a thorough discussion of editorial policies as such, and the task has accordingly been set for the basic organizations of the LC to take the general and overall orientation of editorial policy as one of the essential questions in its party work.

### Concerning So-Called Guild Solidarity

Tendencies toward privatization, the group-ownership mentality and technobureaucratic management have also been noted. What is referred to as guild solidarity was especially manifested in certain discussions instead of a readiness for clear ideological differentiation. That guild solidarity probably
occurred because the entire action of the LC which is now being conducted in
society toward the media was probably misconceived, which could justify a certain manifestation of guild solidarity. However, the essential thing is that
a tendency to prevent the LC from deeper penetration into this sphere of public life and ideological activity in order to preserve in the future the right
to the "autochthony" of their work was actually expressed through that guild
solidarity.

A climate has begun to be created in connection with this action as though the LC were oriented toward some sort of dogmatic position, as though it had put the news media in the defendant's box, as though it were actually throwing the blame on the news media for many shortcomings which had occurred in society, and so on.

### Critical Evaluation of Work

However, Josip Vrhovec emphasized, the true purpose of the action is for us to give an impetus to party members in the news media to take up themselves this large task of critical evaluation of their work toward the principal goal of equipping themselves in this way so that they can perform their extremely important and significant function still more successfully.

It is evident that in the performance of their function the news media cannot be a force outside and above society, nor can they perform their task in the direction of any sort of elitism, but they have the right to be critical precisely insofar as they themselves are only a function of social criticism of society as such. Nor was it a question of not allowing the right to make a mistake and the right to shortcomings. But the question was raised of whether this is actually becoming an orientation in editorial policy. That is, is editorial policy putting on the agenda and forcing certain goals which are opposed to the goals of our social development and the policy of the LCY.

Another observation that follows from that discussion is that in the news media there is passivity, lack of commitment, neutralism, spontaneity and the absence of everyday and mobile action and struggle for clear definition and conduct of the kind of editorial policy which would then be built into our entire social and ideological-political direction of activity. There was particular slackness where because of certain occurrences the entire action had to be taken to the very issue of responsibility, which was most evident in the case of the weekly DANAS, but also more widely.

### Popular Magazines

In departments of periodicals which are not purely political as a formal matter, but which have an extraordinary impact on the shaping of social consciousness (cultural events, sports and various other departments of popular magazines and the like) have shown, Vrhovec continued, a way of going about things which to a considerable extent resigns itself to promoting and serving up a system of petty bourgeois values which, taken formally, each to itself, is not so noticeable as to call for a clear ideological political confrontation in harsh terms, but which as a tendency, as a conception which constantly runs through these programs, is actually having a very destructive effect, an effect which is very harmful in terms of political ideology. When it comes to those problems there is not enough organization or mobility on the part of editorial collegiums, on the part of the individual departments of the periodicals, or on the part of the League of Communists as a whole.

It is a new thing for the so-called popular newspapers and magazines in Yugo-slavia as a whole to begin suddenly to "become political," and that by beginning to treat the major topics of socioeconomic relations and the major political topics from the positions of the sensationalist press. There have occurred a number of deformations in this sense, either with respect to a completely erroneous approach, destructive in the direction of petit bourgeois attitudes, to the major problems of our contemporary life, or this was manifested in the way in which the topics of our history are treated, or again,

the treatment of certain issues which touch essentially upon Yugoslavia's relations with other countries.

### Bureaus in Other Republics

The bureaus of other newspapers outside our republic which operate within our republic, especially in Zagreb, have also been burdened with all these shortcomings, and they have often been concerned with finding excesses, with finding scandals as attractive subjects to report on in the public life of this republic. This then portrayed in the wrong light the real and true developments and also problems which arise in this republic, and on the other hand they have also resulted in certain impressions in the minds of the public as though it had to do with conflicts of broader importance and not merely of some unsound and irresponsible behavior by certain correspondents reporting from these quarters in our republic. This was manifested most sharply in the stubborn insistence and writing on a number of successive occasions about certain things even when those things were being resolved and when they had been resolved. Certain correspondents reported on the situation in Lascina not once, or twice, but five or seven times, and they even interpreted in a onesided way certain discussions which were held here, which to a certain extent was actually a falsification of what was discussed here, Josip Vrhovec said.

A tendency has also been noted in the media in SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia to give a more critical tone to issues and shortcomings or problems which arise in other communities than to problems in our own community.

## Action Rather Than a Campaign

This action which we have undertaken in SR Croatia and in Yugoslavia, Josip Vrhovec concluded, ought not to be a campaign, but it is already being said that this is a campaign which will pass, and then matters will go back to what they were. The action must be continuous and aimed toward making party members within the media more mobile, making them feel more responsible for the job they do, for the consequences of their job. At the same time the questions of ideological commitment, of ideological orientation of editorial policy and of the social consequences which follow from that policy should be made a permanent topic of their party work and of their party responsibility. The socioeconomic relations which they are building in their own publishing houses should be discussed with much more of their own involvement and critical commitment, they should learn from this and verify their positions and commitments when they undertake such problems in other communities and when they write about them.

As for the impact of society on the news media, matters here have become agitated and (in connection with these discussions) there has been quite a bit of specific involvement of both the social councils and individual founders. Yet this is still not enough, and that process of socialization, which is incidentally one of the essential tasks of our development, ought to be carried out still more fundamentally, comprehensively and successfully.

The Discussion: The Process Has Been Initiated, But Not Completed

Marinko Gruic emphasized that this action is extremely important and that this is how it has in fact been taken by party members at Vjesnik. Two special-topic conferences have been held, and it was emphasized that the party members bear responsibility in their own workplace for their own product. The process, then, has been initiated, but there are no illusions being harbored to the effect that it has been completed and rounded off. It has continued, and it should be supported.

The assessment in Vjesnik is that there is room for self-critical reassessment of every publication which Vjesnik issues as a publisher. Gruic went on to say that he has the impression that the criticism addressed to the weekly DANAS has created a certain "umbrella" and that certain shortcomings which have been arising in other publications have been bypassed. The assessment is that most newsmen are on the course of the LC and are willing to wage a struggle. The main issue, in his opinion, is whether the principal shortcoming lies in the errors committed which we must correct or in creativity and commitment concerning social processes which has not been deep enough? And he immediately made his own assessment: the main problem lies in this latter. And the direction which the action takes depends on the answer to that question.

In connection with the weekly DANAS Gruic recalled that even earlier there had been a demand for people in that collective to be made accountable (the editor in chief and author of the article had received comradely criticism in connection with the "Karlovac case"). At the time when the weekly was started (a year ago) there was not enough readiness on the part of sociopolitical factors to extend their aid to defining the programmatic conception. And what happened happened. Since August the basic organization of the LC has held 20 meetings, the mechanism for calling people the responsibility has been set in motion, and it is constructive that this direction has been taken.

There is ideological pluralism on a broader social scale, it occurs within the LC and also within leadership bodies of the LC, and it has also penetrated the pages of newspapers, Marinko Gruic went on to say. We must do everything to overcome it, but it is an illusion to suppose that we will overcome it in the newspapers if we do not achieve that at other levels as well.

A significant step has been taken toward socializing the news media, but we are from considering this process completed! We are not making enough use of the mechanisms that have been created. For example, there are two members of the LC on the council of the weekly DANAS, the president of the council is a member of the Croatian LC Central Committee, three members are members of the Presidium of the Croatian Republic Conference of the SAWP, and then there is one from SUBNOR [Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War] and the Socialist Youth League. The question is, then, whether we are making enough use of that mechanism?

Clear answers need to be given to the major and essential deviations, Vlado Mihaljevic said, rather than stirring up dust for every trifle, since then the

impression is given that every polemical discussion is undesirable. We must stand in the way of deviations which take the direction of deprecating our society and the revolution. We must win the battle for differentiation along the line of the decisions of the congress and what we have inaugurated in our society.

Attacks should not be made on those who are writing truthfully and objectively, but on those who exaggerate and do not portray the true state of affairs, Ante Milkovic said. "There must be no place in the news media for anyone to attack our revolution," he continued. "The first time he makes a mistake, that man should not be treated too rigorously, but if the errors recur, then it should be rigorous, since the foundations of the social system cannot be attacked. This is not allowed in any social system, including our own. Newsmen should be aided in finding the true measure in the course of their work. This is the task of party members in the work organizations publishing newspapers. It seems that self-criticism here has been rather slack," he said.

## Clear up Occurrences Fully

It has already been emphasized several times that the news media must be at the service and a function of the organized socialist forces, Marijan Kalanj said, and now we should see how that function is being performed; are the media acting along the lines of the program of the LC, are they serving that line. If one makes a detailed analysis and study, it probably would be found that certain newsmen are far from that. Whose job is it now to settle accounts with those individuals, Kalanj asked, and his response was: above all the bodies of self-management, disciplinary commissions, and the organizations of the LC in those publishing houses, which, there it is, have up to now not been doing their job. And let us not give those organizations a favorable assessment unless they have done so.

If, as has been said, the great majority of newsmen are good and honorable and through their work contribute and promote the struggle of the LC and act as mobilizers, how is it that a handful of those who think and do the opposite in that workplace can carry on such a scale of activity that it goes unpunished? What is the great magnitude of that force when accounts cannot be settled with people like that? It is the 11th hour for getting down to the essence of the situation and the problems in the newspaper organizations. The question is what kind of writing is done about the problems which are evident and which people know about, are these things stirred up and accentuated even more, is this brought to such proportions that assessments are then drawn therefrom concerning differences between the LC from one republic to another, and so on. People are asking: Where is this going when we allow things like that to be written?

The responsibility of party members in the news media has been especially emphasized in the congresses and meetings of the most responsible organs of the LC, so why has a situation come about in which we are discussing this, Gordana Kosanovic asked. Probably because there has after all not been enough responsibility in practice.

#### A Clearer Identification

I have the idea, Celestin Sardelic said, that a process is taking place in Yugoslavia, and thereby in Croatia as well, which on the one hand is denoted by the line of the democratization of society and by the line of an ever greater interest in public speech, especially the written word, while at the same time that process is accompanied by a tendency toward liberalistic restoration. The essential thing for the LC at this moment is that it is still not managing to identify altogether clearly where the process of democratization is continuing, where it begins, and where it is being distorted, and where the process of liberalistic restoration is in a way taking place.

We have a principled and critical attitude toward the news media, and this is often perceived as an accusatory, restrictive and all but dogmatic attitude, as a call for control. On the other hand we have the tendency of a kind of liberalistic awe of the news media, which is usually perceived as freedom-loving, democratic, progressive and imbued with the spirit of self-management. This is where the problem now lies of the LC identifying its position and making a definite evaluation at the particular moment and in the particular newspaper as to what tendencies and what are on the scene.

#### Quite Realistic Steps

Stipe Suvar noted that the influence of the news media is growing and that this can be taken as a sign of greater democratization of our public life. The LC must continue to support those intentions and dispositions within the news media which make it still more critical and militant, but as the periodicals of the organized socialist forces and not as some kind of political force which has become independent and which would only expose blots, would call names, would call for the responsibility of individuals, the leadership and institutions, yet itself would serve some kind of group-ownership monopoly and would possibly be an area for those offering and seeking an alternative to the strategy of our development on the foundations of socialist self-management and ethnic equality.

Suvar said that for a long time now real steps have not been taken in our society with respect to the news media, and they have thus remained insufficiently socialized, and that is precisely the reason why they have shown a tendency to behave like a political force which has become independent.

Going on to evaluate the present situation in the news media, he said that the opinion exists in the ranks of newsmen and more widely that a kind of manhunt has been instituted in the party leadership against newsmen, a fishing expedition for errors in order to stifle and throttle the freedom of information. However, it is not a question of any sort of campaign or purge, nor of a conflict; on the contrary, it is a question of the social role of the news media as a very important and responsible factor in the political system of socialist self-management. We have not yet found solutions so that the public opinion presented by the media is turned toward the problems which are really the right ones and so that all of us--from the working class to the scientist, the cultural creator and the professional political worker--are mobilized to

perform the tasks of the present stage of the revolution. It is a question of the media being at the disposition of all the creative forces of society rather than a preserve for the newsmen or an avenue for spokesmen of reactionary tendencies to express themselves.

## Greater Unity in the LC

We hear a great deal the assertion that the news media and what is happening in them today merely reflect the deeper ideological-political conflict in the LCY and indeed in its leadership bodies. I would say that there is truth in this, Stipe Suvar emphasized. That is why a discussion of these media, he said, cannot be entirely fruitful or produce lasting results unless there is greater ideological-political unity within the LC concerning the main lines of our social development and of the present stage. We are all united at the level of swearing allegiance to the strategy of socialist self-management, but we have differing ideas as to what that strategy is. Some people think of it as a revision of the economic and political system, and some a real advancement and deepening of that system. Even those who dream of revision encourage the news media to call names, to call everything into question as a result of the unsuccessful strategy we have been following.

Mika Spiljak observed that an enormous job has been done in organizing this entire action and in writing up these reports, assessments and analyses. A great many documents and materials have been collected, and much has been said. The need now is for precise conclusions and positions on what the LC is to do in the future, on what the role of the basic organizations is here and what others are to do.

### Assessments and Messages

We have still not altogether realized all that is happening here and why it is happening, Jure Bilic said in concluding the discussion. We must seek the roots and causes which bring about those occurrences in society and indeed in the news media as well. If we analyze everything that has happened over the last 10 to 15 years and place it in correlation with social changes and with what has occurred in the news media with the line that has been followed and the tendencies that have been created, one gets the impression that the oppositionist line has been ever more outspoken and aggressive. One must ask why it is more aggressive, and it is that that must disturb us. Why is it that party forums must raise this issue rather than our intellectual and social public offering enough resistance to that line?

The criticism expressed publicly in our society is still fiercer than that in the news media, but the messages in them are different. Can we accept the thesis that differences and differing assessments within leadership bodies of the LC must also be reflected in the news media? This is true, but we can also put the question: Do those differences in seeking solutions signify the road toward real socialism, or, on the other hand, a restoration of the bourgeois economy, or again is this a seeking of the road toward self-management? This must be clearly sorted out both within the LC and within the news media. If that one oppositionist line becomes a deliberate line toward creating a

general disruption in society, which means the advocacy of another line, then it is obvious that this does not reflect the situation in the League of Communists, since to say that unity is lacking within the LC and then to use this to justify one's actions—that simply cannot pass.

Some newsmen now say that politicians are sensitive to criticism, and on the other hand the politicians are saying that the newsmen are sensitive. Which makes it appear that the main problem is whether we are sensitive or not. And when you see the messages which are being conveyed here, then it truly is a question of a far more serious issue than the question of sensitivity. Yes, there is sensitivity, but not a sensitivity about one's position, but about the fate of socialism.

Mentioning the emergence of various committees for protection of human rights, he said that all of this is reminiscent of the KOR and the Petofi clubs. We should not be overconcerned with excesses, but should create a climate and equip personnel for waging the right battle in which there may be mistakes and in which there may be wandering, and there may also be isms, but the basic orientation must be the search for a way out and for solutions, it must be a battle for the development of society along the line of self-management socialism. Otherwise all this will be under a question mark.

Speaking about the newspaper DANAS Bilic emphasized that as a society we have an opportunity to get a serious public newspaper in which polemics and differing views, including oppositionist views, will be published, but always with the appropriate position, view and response. He reproached DANAS for making use of untruths and said that the newsmen on that newspaper had even engaged in intrigue out of a desire to disunite the republic party leadership. The supposed disagreements are already being spoken about in corridors from Osijek and Split to Zagreb.

Finally Jure Bilic proposed that the conclusions and material prepared be sent to all basic organizations of the LC within the news media, to members of the Central Committee and to all those who participated in this action over several months which was initiated by the Central Committee. Conclusions are to be adopted at the next meeting of the Presidium.

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#### CHANGES URGED TO OVERCOME OPSTINA SHORTCOMINGS

Belgrade OPSTINA in Serbo-Croatian No 12, Dec 82 pp 26-36

[Article\* by Dr Borisav Jovic: "The Inappropriate Economic Development of the Opstina"]

[Excerpts] I would not at this point go into enumerating here all the aspects of the role of the opstina in economic development within its jurisdiction and how great its power is, but I would only like to speak very briefly about the fact that over the more than 30 years our communal system of opstinas has been functioning under our socioeconomic and political conditions it has had extremely great power over the economy and it does have extremely great influence on organizations of associated labor. Its decisions made either in social plans or in other documents often predetermine the behavior of organizations of associated labor. Likewise the opstina also has great direct social influence on the flows of social reproduction, on decisions on the use of accumulation in organizations of associated labor, on the choice, if you like, of project plans and programs, and so on, all the way to selection of personnel. Here its role over the entire period has been great and strong, and its social responsibility for what has happened under our conditions is very great.

Over the entire postwar period the smallest transformation in this respect has taken place in the case of the opstinas. We have altered the system in the economic sphere, we have had various systems of expanded reproduction and formation of accumulation by organizations of associated labor. We have been changing the way in which personal incomes were formed and the attitude toward public resources. When we introduced the system of income in the sixties we had what we might call a change in the position of organizations of associated labor with respect to their interest in earning income and creating accumulation and the like. In the seventies we considerably augmented the role of the republics and provinces in economic development. In the meantime the role of the opstina has not essentially changed from the beginning of the fifties to the present day.

Its dominant characteristic over this entire period of time has been that it was and remained not only materially interested, but purely and simply

<sup>\*</sup> The editors of the journal OPSTINA organized on 10 December 1982 a discussion on the topic "The Opstina and Economic Stabilization" in which a number of distinguished scholars and sociopolitical figures participated.

"involved" in the success of the economy within its jurisdiction. I am not thinking here mainly of the agencies of the opstina, of the opstina assembly as a sociopolitical community, which in one period of time was the center for financing all of the life of society (outside the economy) within the jurisdiction of the opstina, but I am rather thinking of everything that is in the opstina from the opstina administration through the health services, the educational system, culture, social welfare, physical education, hiring, housing construction and everything that is an integral part of the functioning of life within the opstina.

So, over the entire postwar period the opstina's economic interest in economic development in its jurisdiction has essentially remained dominant.

I would like to emphasize once again--this was mentioned in passing in the text which was published [an article by the author entitled "Economic Stabilization and the Opstina," published in No 7-8 of the same journal for 1982, was submitted to the participants as the text for this discussion] -- that although the opstina in our economic and social development in the postwar period has played an enormous role in development of individual initiative, in creation of a cohesive social consciousness, and civic activity within its jurisdiction, and although it has had a very large role in development of the productive forces and the like, the more time that has passed, as the productive force of our society has increased, as the number of organizations of associated labor have multiplied, as modern and large technologies and organizations have grown up on a social scale and in the world, it has gradually been transformed, at least in my opinion, into a brake upon the optimum development of our economy. This is because the area of the opstina, unless there is adequate simultaneous creation of mutual integrative ties among organizations of associated labor over the area occupied by several opstinas (and later also because of the obstacles set up to integration of the economy over republic borders), has become small for optimum development of the economy and because at the same time it has retained its maximum interest in economic development that occurs within its jurisdiction. For all practical purposes the opstina has no interest whatsoever (or negligibly small interest) in seeing accumulation pass from its jurisdiction to another jurisdiction, since it has no benefit whatsoever from that other economy.

Over the last 30 years or so we have lived with that socioeconomic position of the opstina such as it was, a position in which its power to localize accumulation and its interest in doing so were predominant to a very great degree.

I would not dwell at length on this, but I would like to say that this has created an enormous number of organizations of associated labor throughout Yugoslavia which are not scaled to optimum capacity, which are set in opposition to one another, which are insufficiently integrated in the framework of logical technological wholes, which face one another competitively and are not sufficiently productive, and which have had to seek protection on their own local market. They have naturally turned to their nearest sociopolitical community, which obtains its living from them and which must protect them, which is why they began to take steps to close off the local markets.

It is logical that anyone incapable of opening up to influences of the unified Yugoslav market must to an even greater extent seek protection against foreign competition. It is natural that in those circumstances it was not difficult to achieve unity among the Yugoslav opstinas and other sociopolitical communities on the matter of protecting such organizations from foreign competition. Which is why, in spite of the proclaimed social policy of opening up the Yugoslav market to the world and the Yugoslav economy to external influences, foreign competition (just as at the same time we had an official policy of building the unified Yugoslav market), we have experienced on the one hand exclusiveness toward the world and on the other the breakdown of the unified Yugoslav market into little pieces.

This is not the only reason why things have happened as they have, but it is a very important one. Of course, at the same time we had a proclamation on the integration of associated labor throughout the entire space of Yugoslavia, which could not be implemented in these circumstances. We had a proclamation of the steady rise of labor productivity, of the efficiency of capital, of the standard of living, and so on. As we know, over the last decade particularly, and indeed even over a lengthy period, there has been a tendency for economic performance to drop off. We have gone to the point where the progress of society is threatened, economic growth and the rise of the standard of living are threatened, and there is even a threat to the normal process of social reproduction.

These are serious reasons why we must ask whether in changing the socioeconomic role and position of the opstina we should alter something quite essential so that it would be in a position of feeling economic motivation not only for economic development in its own jurisdiction, but equally in economic development on a broader social scale, especially in the efficiency of the resources of society in the true economic sense of the word and not a particularistic sense.

I must also say that the problems here are not limited solely to the socioeconomic position of the opstina, nor accordingly to that of the noneconomic entities which derive their living from the economy in its jurisdiction, but to a certain extent they also have to do with economic matters in the economic system which concern the position of organizations of associated labor and which have not been favorably regulated. After all, it certainly could not happen, at least without serious social disruptions and conflicts between, if I might so put it, that sphere of consumption (which is not confined solely to consumption) and the production sphere, if the position of the organization of associated labor in our socioeconomic system were not set up in such a way that it has no economic motivation to hold accumulation within the local area, that is, to develop exclusively or primarily in that local area.

Or, if things in the system were not set up so that it objectively cannot do this under the conditions that prevail in economic relations on our market. It is a fact, however, that it not only is unable to behave in that manner, but to a large degree this even suits it. Correction of the socioeconomic position of the opstina, then, in our political system would not be possible if done autonomously. It must embrace a broader social revision of our economic

system so that all entities in its jurisdiction, including organizations of associated labor, are put in a position of maximum motivation to maximize income on a broader social scale, and not exclusively on a local scale.

The opstina has a vital interest in having economic capacities built within its jurisdiction, even though they may yield small income from a broader social and economic standpoint, and frequently even losses. This is socially unacceptable, but it does occur under the conditions that now exist. Alongside this is the fact that certain basic organizations of associated labor are placed in a social position where it is more advantageous to them to invest their available accumulation internally rather than in some other entity because they would obtain all the income obtained through internal investments. while they obtain only part of the income earned in another organization, a share depending on how much accumulation is created there. The portion of the income for personal incomes, for social services, and for reserves would belong to those organizations and those workers where the income was created. This has tended to maximize the interest of organizations of associated labor to invest exclusively or primarily in their own operations, and it is here that we find the linkup of the interests of basic organizations of associated labor with those of the commune in which they live and operate. This matter must also be corrected in the economic sense if a solution is also to be found for the opstina to have a constructive role with respect to its influence on social accumulation and its use [original reads "need"].

I must say that the problem of the broader social attitude toward accumulation and its use in organizations of associated labor is a major social issue.

It is also from this viewpoint that one should examine the problem of the opstina's functioning and its optimum stance toward economic stabilization, toward changing the economic structure, and toward optimum use of accumulation, and so on, above all from the angle of changing the way in which the commune is financed.

We might say that matters should be so arranged that all the social services in the commune would not be financed exclusively or predominantly from the economy developing within its jurisdiction and from the income which they earn, but many things (in development of the schools, the health service, culture, and so on, including the public services) might be tied to the progress of the community as a whole or at least the republic or autonomous province.

We might to a large extent develop the opstina's interest as a sociopolitical community in the progress of the republic and the country as a whole and at the same time not lose sight of the need for the economy to develop normally within its jurisdiction as well. A social balance of interests would have to be created here. It is a big question whether every opstina should finance its elementary schools, since the elementary schools are an obligation of the entire society. Every child must go through elementary school and should have the same standard and the same schooling throughout the republic, and therefore the entire social economy, and not the opstina, ought to bear the burden of compulsory education of the young generation.

From that standpoint the opstina economy would not be required to create the funds for elementary schools, but this would be done by the entire economy in the republic (province). The question might accordingly be put of a different and more optimum formation of the SIZ's [self-managing community of interest] for elementary education, which would have lower costs. Then the commune might be set up as that entity responsible for scrutiny of the situation, for analysis and programming, for the relationship toward the republic SIZ for elementary education, and for optimum use of those resources, and so on.

Or, let us take the national theater, or certain aspects of health care which are not preventive in nature and in which everyone must have an immediate interest, or some form of culture, and so on.

It is possible, then, in my opinion, for social resources to be found for social overhead and social services which need not be tied to the local economy. Here again, of course, there is the question of how revenues are to be collected and the types of revenues and so on. I would not go into that now, but I would like to say that this social problem of optimum use of accumulation cannot nevertheless be solved solely in that way. It can shift the material interest of the opstina toward the development of society as a whole, but we must be aware that even in these circumstances there remains the problem of the motivation of economic entities (organizations of associated labor) to earn income primarily through their own operations and accordingly to invest their accumulation primarily in those operations.

I think that this is a major social issue that should be seriously discussed. It is a question of the resources of society, of social capital, of social accumulation which because of this course of things, because of this kind of position of economic entities and of their interest to use accumulation within their organization, has taken on the character of group ownership. In what sense? Over a lengthy period of time now we have had very large material problems in economic development which we have been unable to resolve in the way we now go about it.

I would stress two groups of problems. The first is the question of the emergence of a large number of organizations of associated labor or enterprises, that is, of factories, on the small Yugoslav market with a population of 22 million on which there are no conditions for several facilities of a similar kind. One of the examples is the large number of factories making motor vehicles. We do not have the conditions for a large number of automobile factories, since our market is small regardless of what might possibly be exported. We do not have the conditions for a large number of differing technologies for color television sets. We do not have the conditions for several telecommunications technologies, for electronics of various kinds, for computers, for tractors, for combines, and so on. Our market is relatively small, and if from the social standpoint social resources are to be used optimally, then we have to realize that Yugoslavia can select one program for electronic computers and, in division of labor throughout the entire space of Yugoslavia, all those interested within the framework of that one program would find employment, and so on.

It is a question then, of large technologies which do not tolerate small capacities, small production runs, nor accordingly the emergence of a large number of enterprises for the same type of technology. This is a question which demands an answer concerning the social division of labor and concerning selection of technologies for Yugoslavia as a whole. This is a question which is a precondition for optimum use of the resources of society. If we do not tackle this question, we will not be able to resolve more successfully the question of the optimum attitude of the commune and organization of associated labor toward the resources of society.

The other thing I would like to turn to is development of the infrastructure. It is a question of the need for continuous and optimum development of the railroads, highways, the post office, telecommunications, and then of the fuel and power industry and certain other activities which in a way might include ferrous metallurgy and the like (although it might also fall in the first group which I mention). The economy cannot function normally without a normally developed infrastructure. These are not things which we can import whenever the notion takes us. These investments must be planned and must be made continuously so that the rest of the economy can develop without upheavals and disruptions.

We cannot import rail service, which in our country today is unfortunately twice as expensive and twice as inefficient as it is in Europe. Nor can we import electric power whenever it occurs to us; we must generate it ourselves. That also applies to other forms of energy except for those which we lack.

As a rule the flows of the concentration of accumulation have not occurred on a voluntary and economically motivated basis in the activities of the infrastructure, or they have gone into the group of large technologies we have been talking about in an inefficient way. The economic motivations of economic entities—organizations of associated labor and sociopolitical communities, above all the opstinas—to create the largest possible income in their own operations and for themselves, within their own organization and on their own territory, have prevailed. This had to give rise to the problem of group—ownership behavior with the resources of society.

This problem does not exist because they are unwilling to work in the interest of society, but because the socioeconomic system is such that matters have not been regulated from the standpoint of social ownership, i.e., on the basis of the broader social interest, which would have to presuppose the most optimum use of social accumulation.

From this standpoint we must also look upon the commune as a sociopolitical community which should have a vital interest in the progress of society as a whole and not just in progress of its own area and of the entity within its jurisdiction, but we must also realize that it is not a vacuum containing nothing, but contains within it organizations of associated labor which should be given that kind of social position where in operating within the commune and with the commune they work in the direction of broader social interests.

Although we are discussing the commune, in this respect we cannot avoid discussing the organization of associated labor, the social accumulation with which it works, the interest of society, and so on, as well as the fact that group-ownership behavior (which we can label either behavior in local communities or as private-ownership behavior, and so on) is a fact which has resulted from weaknesses in our system rather than from people's wicked behavior. We must discuss what should be changed here so that we can extricate ourselves from this situation.

The way out of the difficulties in which we have found ourselves is certainly not simple. There is no doubt that the situation can in part be improved by increasing the interest of the opstinas in overall social development. This cannot be achieved by establishing equilibrium in financing the social services in the commune from the local economy and the broader social economy.

Along with what we have already said about the need to change the socioeconomic position of the organization of associated labor with respect to the available accumulation, we would have to achieve a reduction of their economic dependence on opstina power and a strengthening of the role of economic laws and of the market in the rationale of the economy. So long as the income of the organization of associated labor is dependent upon the opstina (which today decides on prices, on taxes, on credits, on investment projects, and so on) to such a great degree, it will be difficult to base the behavior of the organization of associated labor on sound economic reasoning.

It would be very important to find a more optimum social solution for the division of labor on the scale of Yugoslavia for large technologies as well as for a more effective financing of the infrastructure, which I spoke about above. With the rest of accumulation it would not be possible to make such investment errors as has been the case up to now. There is no doubt that an optimum attitude toward the resources of society also depends on the attitude which society takes toward those resources. If the system of depreciation is such that a part of it is transferred to income and spent, if the price of capital is so low that one gets rich by borrowing money, and so on, then a change of direction cannot be made toward optimality of its use. Changes in that sector are a necessary prerequisite of broader social changes. And finally, the present unemployment is an objective fact which is pressuring communes to open up new jobs. Creation of conditions for greater geographic mobility of manpower is a serious social problem, one which, until it is solved, will operate as an obstacle to optimum behavior not only on the part of communes, but also on the part of economic entities.

I would like in conclusion to say a few words about how the commune as a sociopolitical community under our socioeconomic and political conditions is an irreplaceable factor in the functioning of our society and our system and that by no means should the critical attitude I am speaking about here be conceived nor taken as a frontal attack on the commune as a sociopolitical community. It is only a question of the fact that its position today is in many respects such that it would have to be corrected on behalf of a more optimum orientation toward the flows of social reproduction in accordance with the goals of economic stabilization.

I must say that the economic stabilization program, as it has been set up in its general conception (although not finally adopted), gives a large space to the role of the commune. I would say a few things that should be borne in mind in this connection. First of all, we are immediately faced with the problem of far more optimum use of all available resources, both those which are related to accumulation and those which are related to consumption.

I would remind you that the stabilization program has foreseen that resources for noneconomic consumption, for the social services and government, are to be reduced from the 35 percent of gross national income in the past period to 30 percent beginning in 1985. This is a very large turnaround for society, one that will require efforts, but those efforts cannot be reduced merely to reducing personal incomes and personal consumption. They must be concentrated on transformation, on changes, on reorganization, on abolishing, on merging, and so on, that is, on a number of changes which must encompass the schools, the health service, culture, social welfare and everything that comes under those activities, since by carrying out an ordinary reduction we would end up with a beggar's staff if we all remain the way we are, if we do not solve the social problems.

What I mean here is that the opstina has a very large role in implementing and preparing the way in which that operation is to be carried out. One of the major tasks is the creation of new jobs as well as development of the small business sector and agriculture. The stabilization program has brought us to the conclusion that we have very large untapped potential for development of the small business sector and for development of agriculture. We have built numerous initial industrial capacities, behind which and around which there does not exist that parallel and ancillary economy which must supply them with various things, from services to small parts and products. Of course, there is an equally large gap in our society—underdeveloped agriculture, which will be set up as an equal economic activity in which money can be earned.

These are areas which by the nature of things are close to the opstinas. Areas which to a large degree can be filled by creating general social conditions, certain incentives and the social attitude which is necessary for these matters to be resolved. Resolving the problems of creating new jobs is also related here.

A major issue in the stabilization program is conservation of all kinds, especially conservation of energy, which demands certain substitutions, replacements, from residential heating to consumption of energy in industry, and so on.

If we take into account only the fact that we have very large tasks on a broad social scale whose performance cannot be imagined without activity of the opstinas as sociopolitical communities, this gives us the idea of realizing that the opstina remains an irreplaceable factor in creation of the conditions and in activities to implement the stabilization program, and nothing can be changed in this regard except the need to demand certain changes in the social position of the opstina and the organization of associated labor within its jurisdiction. Of course, this also applies to the entire organization of the social services and all SIZ's which I have not spoken about on this occasion.

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DATA SHOWS DECLINE IN SERB, MONTENEGRIN EMPLOYMENT IN KOSOVO

Pristina JEDINSTVO in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 83 p 6

[Articles by M. Jevtovic, S. J. and D. J.: "A Practice Contrary to the Political Stands Taken by the Kosovo LC"]

[Text] [Article by M. Jevtovic]

The Wrong Directions Offered by a Policy

The reports, analyses and conclusions both of sociopolitical organizations and also of delegate assemblies and their organs both in opstinas and in the province are agreed in their assessments that a favorable political-security situation has been created in Kosovo and that it is every day more stable, but they are also agreed that the process of the moving out of Serbs and Montenegrins is dying down too slowly. In some opstinas, moreover, it is on the rise.

Both of these assessments are based on arguments.

The Two Sides of a Single Coin

The report of the Executive Council of the Kosovo Assembly states undoubtedly only part of the facts when it says that "the confidence of the working people and citizens in the resoluteness and strength of the League of Communists and bodies of government has grown and is steadily growing" and that "interethnic trust is growing." Also beyond dispute are the arguments that there are fewer and fewer irresponsible and intolerant acts on an ethnic basis; that the number of crimes is dropping; that the law enforcement agencies and courts are more effective and vigorous; and that little room has been left for the Irredenta to advertise itself. It is also well known that only a verdant consciousness and ideological opponents could negate the continuous ideological and political action of the Kosovo LC in the political exposure of Albanian nationalism and irredentism and that that activity is being carried on and its burden borne above all by communists who are Albanians.

The arguments enumerated are beyond any dilemma.

The other side of that same coin is very ugly, since "overall conditions in Kosovo" and "economic development" itself "is being made more difficult ... by

the steady outflow of Serbs and Montenegrins." Last year 4,650 persons moved away from Kosovo, and between September and the end of December alone 223 families with 726 members and another 876 individuals moved out. The datum that in less than 4 months 98 peasant families with 319 members left Kosovo is too indicative, since it is well known that it is a very hard thing for our people to sell their land.

Is there any way to square these assessments, documented as they are, but essentially divergent?

## Spontaneously Answering the Call

It is more than certain that the numbers on the exodus of Serbs and Montene-grins given warning and notice that aside from the causes that have been eliminated, there are causes whose effect on the process of moving out is very strong and that only at first are those causes not detectable, but also that up to now, except marginally, they have not been in the focus of the political action of the League of Communists and the ideological showdown with Albanian nationalism and irredentism, the methodology and forms of its activity and its tactics in realizing the idea of an "ethnically pure Kosovo." At the same time it remains certain that the effect of these causes will be very high even tomorrow unless we denote them without delay and the League of Communists and self-management and delegate bodies, in accordance with their powers and program, operate vigorously. Concretely in each specific place.

Employment policy has itself answered the call as a cause of the first kind.

The provincial bureau of statistics has prepared a statistical analysis of hiring cross related to ethnic composition in the province and by opstinas over the last 8 years, and every comparison based on that structural analysis unambiguously leads toward the conclusion that employment policy both in the province and in the opstinas has been equally burdened with tendencies that represent a direct attack on the policy and political action of the League of Communists; they violate many efforts to stabilize sociopolitical conditions in Kosovo; they tend to encourage the departure of Serbs and Montenegrins; and finally, they truly emphasize the economic and existential reason for moving away as a motive, but not because of the higher and easier income outside Kosovo, but because of the possibility in general of obtaining a job.

In the period from 1 October 1980 to 30 September 1982 15,840 persons found employment either at newly created jobs or vacated jobs: 14,541 of them were of Albanian nationality, 907 Moslem, 432 Gypsy, 199 Turkish and only 208 of Serbian nationality. In that time persons of Montenegrin and other nationalities vacated 380 and 65 jobs (respectively) (this was the negative difference between the beginning and end of the period). Hiring policy is based on the criterion that out of 100 jobs more than 83 would go to persons of Albanian nationality, and only 17 to persons of other nationalities. That criterion established the following relationship in hiring on the basis of the ethnic structure: for every 76 persons of Albanian nationality hired, only 1 person of Serbian nationality would be hired; for every 9 persons of the Moslem nationality, there would be only 2 persons of Serbian nationality. The jobs

left vacant by the Serbs, Montenegrins and members of other nationalities were filled this way: In the 1978-1980 period 62 new jobs were opened in Mitrovica Opstina, but 733 workers of Albanian nationality were hired.

### Continuity

It is not a new tendency, nor is its cause exactly unknown.

In the period from October 1974 to September 1976 the number of persons employed in the province increased by 14,397 persons, distributed as follows with respect to nationality: 10,569 Albanians, 2,863 Serbs, 228 Montenegrins, 162 Turks, 53 Moslems, and 602 members of other nationalities. In the very next 2-year period, October 1976-September 1978, the distribution underwent an abrupt change: of the 17,072 persons hired, there were 14,166 Albanians, 1,577 Serbs, only 17 Montenegrins, 185 Turks, 585 Moslems, 263 Gypsies and 279 members of other nationalities, and then in the period 1978-1980 tendencies with all the characteristics of the operation of these factors or of that consciousness which stimulated irredentism left marked consequences: of the 16,387 jobs, 15,069 were filled by Albanians and 1,311 by persons of all other nationalities together. Ordinary arithmetic shows that for every new vacancy which the job competition awarded to a person of non-Albanian nationality, persons of Albanian nationality received more than 14.

The year before last and last year, as we have already said, received the fiercest blow from these tendencies: the number of employed persons of Serbian nationality in the composition of newly hired personnel fell from 19.9 percent in the period 1974-1976 to 1.3 percent in the period 1980-1982, while the number of persons of Montenegrin nationality dropped from 1.6 to -2.4. The share of others, on the other hand, has been increasing quite rapidly: from 73.4 to 91.8 for Albanians or from 0.4 to 5.7 percent for Moslems, for example.

Attack on the Policy of the LC

There is no difference in behavior between the economy and noneconomic activities. There are, however, differences from opstina to opstina, which, if we take the unprecedented example of Titova Mitrovica, say, reveals to what extent spontaneity, with all the ideological, political, ethnic, group-ownership, nepotistic and many other deviations, has splashed over the field of hiring and the extent to which it is really influencing the general effort and results of political stabilization and creation of conditions for halting the outflow of Serbs and Montenegrins without burdening the policy and political action of the League of Communists, negating what the League of Communists has achieved.

Although there is too little space to draw a full-fledged and differentiated conclusion, and with certain objections based on the incompleteness of the statistical analysis as well, the basic position is in and of itself beyond dispute: the process of the exodus cannot be halted, nor can the assessment as to the political stabilization of social and political processes in Kosovo reflect reality unless equality is established in the sphere of hiring.

Tendencies in hiring policy, it turns out, have seriously infringed on this basic equality which is not based solely on the constitution. The League of Communists, beginning with the basic organization in associated labor, the delegate assembly and the self-management and other bodies cannot analyze this field either incidentally or marginally, and still less can they allow themselves to take the consequences and frame their conclusions in the form of an appeal. After all, an appeal, regardless of what kind, still does not open up the lasting prospects of a job where one lives and in its immediate vicinity.

[Article by S. J.]

Pristina: Jobs and Other Reasons for Departure

It is well known that the statistical data cannot be regarded as absolutely accurate, but it is certain that what is shown by the most recent reports on the trend in hiring in Pristina Opstina provides a confirmation of what has occurred in this area in March 1981 and later. Pristina Opstina is a region which is the most privileged area in the province for migration of rural population into the city, and, in view of the fact that conditions for establishment of employment are considerably stricter thereby, consistent implementation of hiring policy could have considerably greater results. Unfortunately, the opposite practice is exceedingly evident in the recent data on the share of the nationalities and ethnic minorities in the total number of persons employed in this area and especially in the number of new job vacancies in the period from 1974 to 1982.

### [Box] Unnatural Process

The high birth rate and high share of the school population in the composition of the Albanian population have the result that in proportion to their share in the total population of the province Albanians have fewer able-bodied persons than other nationalities, though numerically they are the largest. That accounts for certain data to the effect that five times as many persons of Serbian nationalities apply for job vacancies than persons of Albanian nationality. The quotas take into account proportions based on the share in the ethnic composition of the population in the province.

Hiring policy over an 8-year period has endeavored in a radical way to establish equilibrium between the share in the population and the share in the total labor force. Albanians have moved from 59 percent of the labor force at the end of 1976 to 67.2 percent of the province's labor force at the present time.

It is clear what course that process has taken.

## Numbers and Assessments

A question imposes itself at this point: With respect to the way in which it is conducted and the time it takes to realize it, have we not forgotten that hiring policy is one of the essential elements which can in many respects contribute to stabilization of the general situation in Kosovo?

An affirmative answer is forthcoming after even a cursory examination of the numbers for the last 2 years of the period included in the analysis. That is, in the period 1980-1982 the total number of persons employed in the opstina increased from 52,723 to 66,348. If we break down the number of 13,625, which is the absolute increase in the size of the labor force, we obtain figures which indicate an ever more marked tendency toward reduction in the number of employed persons of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities and a quite considerable increase in the number of Albanians employed and a slight increase in the number of employed Turks, Moslems, Gypsies, and so on. By comparison with the previous period (1978-1980) Serbs dropped from a share of 30.3 percent of the work force to 27.9, Montenegrins from 3.9 to 3.7, while there was an increase in the percentage of Moslems, Gypsies and others employed.

Ever Less Favorable Composition of Newly Hired Personnel

If the figures given above indicate the tendency of an increased number of Albanians in the total makeup of the work force, then the ethnic composition of the total number of persons hired unambiguously indicates yet another dimension which has particular weight in final assessments of the reasons why the Serbs and Montenegrins are moving out of Pristina Opstina. Of the total of 3,625 job vacancies, 3,235 were filled with members of the Albanian nationality, 45 with Montenegrins, and those of Serbian nationality showed a deficit of 238 jobs. This datum becomes still more significant if we compare it to the period 1978-1980. At that time Albanians filled 4,292 of the 4,694 new jobs, Serbs 549, and Montenegrins showed a deficit of 164.

It is obvious, then, that the slogan of "Ethnically Pure Kosovo" has fertile soil with respect to hiring. Whereas, for example, in the period before the counterrevolutionary events broke out in Kosovo the percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins in the total number of newly hired personnel was 8.2 (that is, below their share in the total population), in the period since then, that is, between 1980 and 1982, it has fallen to -5.3. Any comment would be superfluous.

It is more than clear that the general assessment of the situation in Pristina Opstina would be somewhat different if these figures and processes had been incorporated in the analysis. The reasons why people are moving out would have taken on still another notable dimension. After all, if, as the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor explicitly state, knowledge and work ability had a decisive role in selection of applicants for jobs, and not merely ethnic origin, then the causes of the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from this area should be "dyed" its true color.

[Article by D. J.]

Titova Mitrovica: An Unprecedented Practice

The collection of reports from work collectives in Mitrovica Opstina point to the conclusion that hiring policy has been fraught with those tendencies which demand vigorous analysis and action by the League of Communists to halt the effect of their negative consequences on the sociopolitical stabilization of conditions and the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from this area. What the figures reveal about trends in hiring in work collectives is that hiring has been supplying water to the mill of the irredentist idea about an ethnically pure Kosovo in spite of the fact that this place is well known for its revolutionary working class tradition and openness, but also in spite of the fact that the Serbian and Montenegrin populations are numerous in this area.

## Eloquent Figures

One could hardly say that development of the Mitrovica economy has in recent years been such that it could cover the planned rate of growth of employment. The discrepancy is obvious from the very datum that between 1976 and the end of 1982 1,630 jobs became vacant, while the number seeking jobs in that time was several times greater. In the absence of a clearly defined policy, numerous adverse aspects have become manifested in hiring, and they have been especially manifested in the interethnic aspect of hiring.

This is convincingly indicated by the figures.

In the period 1974-1976 2,602 persons were hired: 622 of Albanian nationality, 675 Serbs, 85 Montenegrins, 17 Turks, 33 Moslems and 184 persons of other nationalities. In the next 2-year period there was a serious ebb, since there was even a decline in the total number of jobs in the opstina. It was also in that period that the process began of accelerated departure of workers of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality. Over that time they left 633 jobs, and those jobs were taken by 412 Albanians, 91 Moslems, and so on. The process of the outflow took on much broader proportions between 1970 and 1980, when 686 Serbs and Montenegrins left their jobs. This tendency has decreased in intensity over the last 2 years, but even the number of 191 workers who have left their jobs is certainly very high.

Hiring policy in work organizations, since there is no ideological or political guidance, has not taken into account the consequences that this sudden drop in the number of employed Serbs and Montenegrins could have nor which and whose policy this is aiding. That is why the increase in hiring relative to ethnic composition since 1976 could take on the proportions of a precedent. For example, the number of Serbs employed in the period for 1978 to 1980 dropped all of 10.18 percent [original reads "1,018 percent"] relative to the number of new persons hired, while the number of employed Albanians over that same period increased even more than 11.82 percent [original reads "1,182 percent"].

The collection of reports of work organizations on trends in hiring conveys an indicative and disturbing figure after the last 8 years: At the end of last year the number of Serbian workers employed was down 1,062 from the end of 1976, while the number of Montenegrin workers was down 201. Finally, this datum as well: Only in that period has there been a decline in the number of employed workers of these two nationalities.

7045

CSO: 2800/233

CONCEPT OF 'YUGOSLAVISM' DISCUSSED

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19-20 Mar 83 p 11

[Article by Grujica Spasovic: "Saboteurs in Quotes"]

[Text] In this time of an ever more slender birth rate, it seems that the Yugoslavs are multiplying the fastest! In just one decade—all of 4.5-fold. To be specific: in 1981 exactly 1,219,024 citizens of the SFRY marked the box "Ethnically uncommitted—Yugoslav," as against barely 273,000 in the 1971 Population Census.

Nevertheless, this type of "birth rate" has caused many people serious concern. The "people in quotes" have in turn become the topic of one of the fiercest public debates and a new burden on interethnic relations. The stands taken are exclusive and sharply divided: from those who feel that a great error was made in the census in even allowing the possibility of someone choosing that phrase in quotes, since Yugoslavs—as Dr Jovan Miric on one occasion sarcastically described this view—are a "pure fabrication, intriguers and political troublemakers, all but a group of saboteurs which should be dealt with most seriously, and what is more one should be concerned about the pathological state of the Yugo—organism on which these bastards are growing," all the way to those who see the nationalities as a constant threat to the unity of this country and the commitment to Yugoslavism as a way out for virtually all our social problems.

Symptom of Crisis or of Strength

It is obvious that we find ourselves confronted by an extremely complicated, delicate and important phenomenon which has not yet been adequately explained nor assessed. Applause or criticism? Evidence of strength or symptom of crisis? How is it that in just one decade a million new "saboteurs," who have injected "anxiety and disorder in our sacred ethnic bookkeeping, in the analytics, geometries and arithmetics in which everything can be called into question except the sacredness, unchangeability and eternal nature of the ethnic phenomenon"? Is Yugoslavism commitment or "noncommitment"? Why is it that people are mainly silent about Yugoslavism, and then there has as a rule been an explosion just before and after a census? Are Yugoslavs dominant in political life, or discriminated against? Is this a bugaboo of "Yugoslav ethnocentrism," of the "unitaristic variant of nationalism," of "quiet assimilation of other nationalities," of "supranational integration," or, on the other

hand, an expression of internationalism, resistance to the "banality of nationalism," toward the favoring of ethnic interests at the expense of class interests, toward the view which sees the revolution only over the "horizon of the ethnic"? Finally: What is the place of Yugoslavs on personnel lists in which we are very mindful of equal representation of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities?

The enormous and controversial repercussion from two interviews in the past several days best demonstrates all the extreme views taken toward Yugoslavism and also how deep this division is even among distinguished revolutionaries, scholars and sociopolitical figures. The first was given by Dr Josip Vidmar to TELEKS and the second by Kosta Nadj to the newspaper INTERVJU.

In response to the question about the last population census, in which we "permitted the possibility, which was perhaps a mistake, of someone who did not wish to commit himself ethnically, to choose to be a Yugoslav," Vidmar responded:

"To me that is ridiculous ... there is no Yugoslav nationality. We are all Yugoslav citizens... In my view only someone altogether unsophisticated and those with narrow horizons could do something like that. Uneducated people also. Anyone who makes any examination of the nationalities in Yugoslavia and in the world must realize that they are natural creations of long centuries and of circumstances within individual states..."

It should be said that assessments of this kind are nothing new at all. Yugo-slavism has already been described even as a phenomenon which indicates that "something is wrong in society, since this is not an altogether normal social phenomenon, it cannot be placed in any pure Marxist category," and those who have declared themselves Yugoslavs are "obsessed with fears," or are in this way "resolving their own emotional problems or some other problems."

Kosta Nadj, on the other hand, says:

"Many people have fallen to meditating, have become concerned because today an ever larger number of our people are declaring themselves Yugoslavs. There is nothing disturbing here. This is a kind of protest, and people feel themselves safer and stronger in that large Yugoslav community. This does not mean that a man should give up his nationality. I am not saying at this point that we should create some Yugoslav nationality. No one has that in mind. But likewise it should not be asserted in Marxist terms that today or tomorrow there will be no Yugoslav nationality. It is not important whether that will occur in 10, 20 or 50 years. But it will occur.... And then we will be strong.... Everything that occurs under certain conditions of the social division of labor, as a specific historical socioeconomic and cultural and political phenomenon, is lost under different conditions. That is also the case with the nationality. All of this is developing in such a way that one day, although many people do not believe it, since this is a time of strong national emancipation, the cause of narrow nationalism will give way to the cause of humanity as a whole. Now these national-cultural boundaries which have been set up in narcissoid fashion will inevitably disappear in the face

of strong flows of intensive cultural exchange between the different parts of the world. But that does not mean that we can now underestimate national sentiments. Yea, we must indeed be mindful of them, fighting for a further strengthening of brotherhood and unity."

In his book "Jugoslavenstvo Danas" [Yugoslavism Today] Dr Predrag Matvejevic attempts to answer the question why silence was maintained so long about Yugoslavism. According to him, every segment of our society had its own reasons for not starting the discussion. Matvejevic writes:

#### Reasons for Silence

"In Croatia (we take the liberty of generalizing the views of particular quarters, conscious of the limitation on this kind of generalization) this occurred because of the particular attitude toward unitarianism, our own and in general, toward traditional Croat confrontations with unitaristic Yugoslavism and corresponding ethnic sensitivities. Then on the Serbian side there was the greatest willingness to detour around this question, so that posing it would not be interpreted, as it usually is, as a defense of unitarianism, in which Great Serb nationalism left its mark in nationbuilding. Nor in Slovenia did it seem useful to evoke its own traditionalisms by debating this once again. The other nationalities (ethnic minorities) have their reasons for leaving this topic to one side, first among them probably the fear of that Yugoslavism which denied or did not sufficiently respect ethnic peculiarities."

Valuable data on this topic have been furnished by a survey conducted on the basis of data for Croatia by the Split sociologist Boris Vuskovic and which he published under the title "This Is What the Yugoslavs Are Like" in NASE TEME, a journal issued by the Center for Ideological and Theoretical Work of the Croatian LC Central Committee. Almost three-fourths of the "ethnically committed--Yugoslavs" are people under age 40, more than four-fifths are employed in the socialized sector (in which otherwise barely 46.5 percent of the total Yugoslay work force is employed). By far the greatest differences are in elementary literacy and education. Among the Yugoslavs only 3.46 percent are illiterate (the Yugoslav average is 14.91 percent), and all of 9 percent (Yugoslav average: 2.81 percent) have graduated from a junior or senior postsecondary school. A majority of the Yugoslavs are industrial workers (28.78 percent) and specialists (22.13 percent). And while it is obvious that the Yugoslays have a higher share of organizers of work and production and also participation in LCY membership (6.51 percent), it is a very indicative fact that the share of Yugoslavs is less than one would expect among sociopolitical officials and managers.

### Vuskovic goes on to write:

"When we analyze the leadership structures of the organization of the LCY, beginning with secretaries and secretariats of the basic organization of the League of Communists and going all the way to membership in central committees, we easily notice that the uncommitted Yugoslavs in those bodies do not have representation even close to their participation in membership of the LCY. Indeed, it almost holds as a rule that the higher the body of the LC, the lower the proportion of uncommitted Yugoslavs in that body!

"Thus in 1980 only 4.06 percent of the total of about 300,000 secretaries and members of the secretariats of basic organizations of the LC were uncommitted Yugoslavs. However, among members of opstina committees of the LC the participation was considerably smaller—only 2.06 percent, and then among the highest party bodies of the republics and provinces the share was only 1.04 percent (in four of the highest party bodies of the republics and provinces there was not a single uncommitted Yugoslav, and two of those bodies had only one uncommitted Yugoslav each!). And also in the makeup of the LCY Central Committee following the 12th congress the uncommitted Yugoslavs had a share considerably less than their share in distribution of the membership of the LCY, i.e., 2.45 percent."

Therefore, Vuskovic concludes, it is obvious that the LCY "has never favored ethnic uncommitment as some kind of possible choice 'of its own,' just as it has never identified itself with any ethnic commitment whatsoever. For that reason certain petit bourgeois 'fears' that the uncommitted Yugoslavs are dominant in our political life and have been accumulating enormous social power by controlling vital points of our political system truly have no basis whatsoever."

# Courting and Attacks

Yet it seems that certain basic facts are indisputable in interpreting the present importance and status of Yugoslavism.

Yugoslavism is not a negation of the ethnic or a concealed desire for "quiet assimilation." Yugoslavism—as undoubtedly conceived by the huge majority of those who have opted for it—also contains a demand for complete equality, freedom and identity of all 24 nationalities and ethnic minorities. It is not "supranational integration," since it does not diminish nor attempt to abolish specific features of the parts which make it up, but confirms those parts as a whole. This kind of Yugoslavism not only does not hinder the free development of national languages and cultures, but on the contrary presupposes it.

Yugoslavism is not "uncommitment" or merely protest, but an essential sociopolitical commitment. Even on the eve of the 1971 Census the writer Marko Ristic emphasized in an open letter to POLITIKA that Yugoslavism is by definition an expression of a commitment. It constitutes a NO to all enumeration, to divisions of the working class, of the economy, of information, of culture, of education, to ethnic exclusivism, to ethnogenesis, to counterrevolution, to separatism, to exaggeration of differences and to the minimization of community, but it is in equal measure a YES to brotherhood and unity, to the equality of the nationalities and ethnic minorities, to community, to solidarity, to self-management and to the revolution.

Further, Yugoslavism is not a national-ethnic commitment, but it is a consciousness of community, a consciousness which does not diminish the importance of peculiarities, but does not remain confined within them, a consciousness which in the space from Triglav to Djevdjelija finds the common values to be more significant than all the differences in culture, in language, in history and in religion.

Yugoslavism, at this time and place, is on the one hand under fierce fire from nationalists and separatists, while on the other it is being courted by the unitarists. As Matvejevic notes, we must not allow "it to be appropriated either by unitarianisms nor discouraged by nationalisms."

Just as we dare not underestimate the significance of this phenomenon, it is very dangerous also to favor Yugoslavism as some kind of "beginning of the future." In that sense, like it or not, ethnic commitment comes under suspicion as a "remnant of the past." And that would then be a negation of Yugoslavism as well.

The discussion of Yugoslavism is indispensable. Without exaggerated emotions and burdens of the past. The fact of 1.2 million citizens—younger, better educated and more active in civic affairs—is too serious to be passed over in silence. It would not be wise to wait for a new census with old quandaries.

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DATA ON POPULATION SEGMENT DECLARING ITSELF 'YUGOSLAV'

Zagreb NASE TEME in Serbo-Croatian No 10, Oct 82 pp 1702-1712

[Article by Boris Vuskovic: "Who Are the 'Yugoslavs'? The Fundamental Demographic and Social Characteristics of a Segment of the Population"]

[Text] One of the fundamental characteristics of the Yugoslav social community is that it is multinational, and that fact has manifold vital importance. That is, one of the element prerequisites of Yugoslavia's existence is the equality and deepest political, economic and cultural interlinkage and solidarity of its nationalities and ethnic minorities. At the same time, if the ethnic and the interethnic have vital importance to the Yugoslav social community, then it is quite natural that any nationalism (from unitarianism to separatism), since it threatens that existence, is simultaneously manifested as antisocialism, as a challenge to its self-management, its nonalignment (and other features) as an entity. It is no wonder, then, that an almost seismographic sensitivity has developed in our social space with respect to the ethnic, running from words to deeds. It is in this context that one can get an essential understanding of the recent very passionage polemics over the ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavs (in which I personally became involved because of a certain mark made almost in passing during an interview). 1

The debates about the uncommitted Yugoslavs was originally stimulated by the fact that over the last 10-year period their numbers have increased truly enormously, all of 4.5-fold, i.e., from 273,077 (in 1971) to 1,219,024 in 1981, that is, considerably more than any group within the ethnic composition of the population of the SFRY.<sup>2</sup>

It is evident that this phenomenon, given its scope and possible sociopolitical significance, calls for an explanation without any question. That is, it is obvious that the huge growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs is largely the result of mechanical growth and only to a minor extent has it resulted from natural growth, so that from the standpoint of sociology and political science there is a very interesting question—from which ethnic groups have the uncommitted Yugoslavs "moved," and what are their demographic and social characteristics?

However, the undesirable route which the debate has taken is rooted in the fact that the phenomenon of the exceptional growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs has not primarily been subjected to scientific description and explanation,

but mostly to political evaluation, and that a priori, preceded by a negative sign, including even a mild attempt at psychiatric evaluation ("abnormal," "immature," and so on).

Certainly this has aroused protests which were emotional (but not "silly," which is the free journalistic interpretation put on them in one place), which among other things consisted mainly of insistence on our right and freedom, long ago confirmed, for everyone to be able to make this choice without evoking abusive epithets. Naturally, in the course of events there were reactions to such protests, and a true vicious circle was created thereby: from the inappropriate approach to the phenomenon to the emotional reaction and further enflaming of passions, which was "cut short" by the politically sensible assessment that this kind of debate was inappropriate, since objectively it did not bring us one iota closer to explaining the actual phenomenon which had given rise to the quarrel.

Yet in our judgment this exchange, which is more a quarrel than a debate, has yet been useful in its way. It has pointed up at least five things.

First, that there exists an extremely deep interest in ethnic matters in general and in flexures in the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav population in particular. That is, the quarrel spread as fast as lightning and was recorded or waged almost throughout the country.

Second. The noticeable intellectual and ethical color blindness (obviously of political origin) evidenced in the quarrel must be disturbing. That is, from the social and ethical standpoint, a certain number of participants in the altercation clearly showed that they did not have command of the ABC's of living in this social space: one cannot in the name of the freedom of one's own ethnic identity ever call someone else's into question, so that respect for the ethnically uncommitted is at the same time a necessary prerequisite of the equality, freedom and recognition of every ethnic commitment.

Third. Intellectual color blindness was notably evident in the fact that frustration with the increased number of uncommitted Yugoslavs simply disguised an inability to take note of certain unusual stirrings in the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav population which truly "catch the eye," and that in all census periods. In that sense the flexure of the uncommitted Yugoslavs is not an exceptional phenomenon by any means in the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav population.

That is, if we were to analyze the previous census periods and compare—for example—the variation of Moslems, then we would easily note that between 1961 and 1971 they almost doubled (index number 177.8), i.e., they increased from 972,960 (in 1961) to all of 1,729,932 in 1971!

The change in the number of Gypsies is also illustrative; between 1953 and 1961 they dropped to one-third (index number 37.4), and then in the next census period (1971/61) they increased 2.5-fold (index number 247.8)! But the case of the Vlachs is still more striking; between 1953 and 1961 they dropped to one-fourth (index number 25.8), and then in the next period they also

increased nearly 2.5-fold (index number 232.4). Let us also add to this the exceptional case of the dynamic variation of Turks, who increased more than 2.5-fold between 1948 and 1953 (index number 265.0), which is actually a larger growth than the growth of the uncommitted Yugoslavs in the period from 1971 to 1981, since it occurred in half the time, that is, in a 5-year rather than a 10-year period.<sup>3</sup>

It has become evident that the movements of these groups did not essentially represent authentic movements of those groups, but were peculiar "statistical" movements which often occurred, among other reasons, because of a differing conception of certain ethnic groups from one census period to another. In this sense the case of the definition "Moslem" is illustrative; it has gone through the following metamorphoses: "Uncommitted Moslems" (1948), "Uncommitted Yugoslavs" (1953), "Moslem—ethnic background" (1961) and finally "Moslem in the sense of nationality" (1971).

Of course, these conceptual metamorphoses, which have then resulted in a (statistical) growth or decrease of some group, are by no means a product of statistical idleness, but primarily reflected certain real quandaries related to defining the various ethnic groups, and at certain times and places the particular social atmosphere also contributed its share.

To tell the truth, a majority of the participants in the quarrel certainly were witnesses to the social climate at the time of the 1971 Population Census. It can be asserted without hesitation that at that time the social climate in certain quarters was by no means inclined toward ethnic noncommitment, uncommitted Yugoslavs in particular.

Along with the rest, certain social quandaries about the uncommitted Yugoslavs have probably been manifested in an exquisite way in the fact that in that period uncommitted Yugoslavs cease to be recorded as a separate group in the ethnic composition of membership of the LC! (Certain republic and provincial organizations of the LC ceased to record uncommitted Yugoslavs separately in the 5-year period 1969-1973, and some only in the 3-year period 1970-1972.)

If, then, we honor these facts, and they are indisputable, we have to ask whether the enormous growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs in 1981 over 1971 is at least in part the result of a different or freer climate at the time of the most recent population census, so that people declared themselves to be uncommitted Yugoslavs in 1981 who shrank from doing so in 1971? In other words, if in a way the uncommitted Yugoslavs had not been put in a difficult position in 1971, their growth between 1971 and 1981 would have been relatively smaller, and that would have caused less excitement.

But, be that as it may, it remains symptomatic that in the context of the overall changes in the ethnic structure of the Yugoslav population only the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs has aroused attention and debate, while similar changes of other groups have gone almost unnoticed! Why? This obvious intellectual color blindness can be explained only as a kind of sociopolitical color blindness. Fourth. Perhaps someone might try to justify and explain this intellectual color blindness with the objection that the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs between 1971 and 1981 is being compared to the changes of other groups in older census periods, which, since it is only the past, need not arouse us like the present moment. Now, there are several reasons why that objection would not be justified, but just one is sufficient: even in the most recent population census (1981) we have not only an exceptional growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs, but of certain other groups as well.

Thus, for example, Gypsies over the same period more than doubled (index number 214.3), and there was exceptional growth on the part not only of uncommitted Yugoslavs, but also of two other forms of ethnic noncommitment, and that those who did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the SFRY Constitution (index number 142.5), and still more for those who declared themselves on the basis of region (index number 228.7)!

Why did this exceptionally important fact in the most recent census also escape the field of notice of the participants in the discussion? We are convinced that the reason for this does not lie in the quantitative difference in the growth, that is, in the fact that the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs was greater than that of the Gypsies or those who defined their allegiance in regional terms, but decisively in a certain, mostly implicit, negative sociopolitical assessment of uncommitted Yugoslavism.

Probably there were two sources of the negative evaluation of the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavism, which has placed a screen over the possibility of a more comprehensive and indeed more objective analysis, sources which in their essence are closely related. The first reason is that some of the advocates of a negative attitude toward uncommitted Yugoslavs still equate Yugoslav (un)commitment with the unitarian social concept, but do not dare to say so openly. The grotesqueness of the comparison of the loud pleading for every citizen's right to free choice, including the right to noncommitment, accompanied by "concern" because of the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs and indeed the rude treatment of that choice is rooted in that game of hide and seek. It is strange that the spokesmen of these views do not spot the fact that equating the uncommitted Yugoslavs with unitarianism is just as improper and dangerous as it would be for someone to charge that some of our own ethnic commitments (the author of this article has always been ethnically committed!) were at one time involved in some sort of quisling monkey business (there has been such nonsense here and there).

The riddle of the paradoxical concern about the growth of Yugoslav uncommitment, while at the same time the high growth of regional uncommitment is totally ignored, is rooted in this tacit identification with unitarianism! It is obviously not a question, then, of noncommitment as such, but essentially of a certain kind of noncommitment (which is put in problematical political terms).

Aside from this tacit equating of the uncommitted Yugoslavs with proponents of unitarianism, which is a homebrew based on a certain limited historical experience, the second reason for this negative attitude toward the uncommitted

Yugoslavs in general and therefore toward their growth in particular, certainly lies in the fact that ethnic matters have been approached from somewhat narrow and predominantly academic positions which in essence relate the ethnic in a decisive way to original territoriality and statehood, which in any historical and current social context, and therefore in the Yugoslav context as well, makes the ethnically uncommitted somehow debatable.

That is, if every nationality is rooted in a particular social space with respect to region and government, while ethnic minorities, on the other hand, are rooted in their parent countries, then the question arises: Where is that original space in terms of territory and state that belong to the ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavs?! However, it is obvious that ethnic uncommitment in general and Yugoslav ethnic uncommitment in particular should be measured without bringing the exclusiveness of this territory-state concept to bear. is, ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavism in principle desires to portray itself as a way of belonging to the broader social community that is for various reasons ethnically direct, and by no means as an encroachment on that government community (which has in fact been confirmed by some testing done at the university, where, incidentally, noncommitment has always been higher than the average). Certainly this possible consciousness which uncommitted Yugoslavs have of themselves should not and cannot monopolize the Yugoslav community because of its directness, that is, cannot call into question the Yugoslavism of any ethnic commitment, but on the contrary, that characteristic of the consciousness of uncommitted Yugoslavs, which makes them a different, but again equal participant in the Yugoslav community, must above all make a problem for identifying them with unitarianism, just as ethnically mediated Yugoslavism cannot be equated with nationalism or indeed with some kind of second-rate Yugoslavism suspected of separatism.

Fifth. This predominantly emotional quarrel has shown that we actually have not done enough scientific research, which incidentally is urgently needed, nor have we sufficiently clarified current social phenomena and trends which have vital importance. In this sense we hold that it is necessary to organize with the greatest urgency a thorough scientific study of ethnic noncommitment in general and of the uncommitted Yugoslavs in particular, since they represent by far the most numerous group of the uncommitted. It is in this context that we conceived our contribution to the debate about the uncommitted Yugoslavs primarily as a survey of their basic demographic and social characteristics, which are presented in a comparison with the same characteristics of the total Yugoslav population and also of certain other ethnic groups.

Unfortunately, this comparative survey will be based primarily on the figures of the 1971 Population Census, since most of the data from the 1981 Census have not yet been published, and those which have all but the greatest importance should not be expected any time soon (the occupational characteristics of ethnic groups and the like). In spite of that fact and also the fact that our survey of empirical data can hardly offer an answer to the riddle of the rapid growth of the ethnically uncommitted, which is certainly very complicated; yet we do hope that a presentation of objective data will at least mark out a different approach to ethnic noncommitment.

Basic Demographic and Social Characteristics of Uncommitted Yugoslavs

The age-specific composition of uncommitted Yugoslavs according to the 1971 Census shows that they are slightly younger than the average of the entire Yugoslav population and noticeably younger than Croats, Hungarians, Slovenes and Serbs, but at the same time also older than Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Moslems (we are taking only the eight most numerous groups in the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav population). That is, the youngest age group, i.e., those under age 18, represent 33.12 percent among uncommitted Yugoslavs, while in the total Yugoslav population this age group is only slightly smaller (32.60 percent). In a comparison with the Croats, one of the oldest groups in the Yugoslav population with respect to age-specific composition, the share of those under age 18 among uncommitted Yugoslavs is more pronounced, since among the Croats this group comprises only 30.05 percent.

However, while differences in the share of the youngest group in the uncommitted Yugoslavs are neglible relative to the total Yugoslav population (index number 101.6) or even with respect to the Croats (index 110.2), those differences are considerably greater in the most significant age group, i.e., the group between the ages of 18 and 40. That is, while this group represents 33.93 percent of the total Yugoslav population and approximately the same among the Croats (33.44 percent), among the uncommitted Yugoslavs its share is all of 38.46 percent, i.e., an index number of 113.4 relative to the Yugoslav population (115.0 relative to the Croat population). This, of course, means at the same time that the age group over age 40 is considerably smaller among uncommitted Yugoslavs (28.42 percent) than in the total Yugoslav population (33.47 percent), and especially to Croats (36.51 percent), which in terms of index numbers is 84.91 relative to the total Yugoslav population and 77.84 relative to the Croatian population.

On the basis of the age-specific composition of uncommitted Yugoslavs, then, we might briefly state at least three important conclusions:

First, that the group of uncommitted Yugoslavs is slightly younger than the average age of the Yugoslav population, since 71.58 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs are under age 40, while that same age group has a share of 66.53 percent in the total Yugoslav population (index number 107.6). But that difference in age to the advantage of the uncommitted Yugoslavs is essentially manifested—as we have established by analysis—as a markedly larger participation of the age group between the ages of 18 and 40, since the share of the group under age 18 is almost the same, and the share of the older group is considerably smaller.

Second. By no means can it be concluded on the basis of this age-specific composition of uncommitted Yugoslavs that uncommitted Yugoslavism is an option of age groups which are not sufficiently mature.

Third. It can also be concluded on the basis of the same fact that uncommitted Yugoslavism cannot be an option of the wartime generation to any great degree.

It would, of course, be extremely interesting to learn what happened with the age-specific composition of uncommitted Yugoslavs in 1981. However, the data on the age-specific composition of ethnic groups have not yet been published. To be sure, we might attempt to conclude something by means of the ethnic composition of university students, since these are the only figures we have, but that—certainly—is not sufficient for an authoritative judgment on the entire population. We will, nevertheless, present this datum, since it is interesting in and of itself.

Thus in the academic year 1970/71, in the year, that is, of the census, 27,804 university students declared themselves to be uncommitted Yugoslavs, which at that time comprised 10.79 percent of all university students in Yugoslavia and at the same time 10.18 percent of the entire population of uncommitted Yugoslavs.

The academic year 1979/80, that is, on the eve of the most recent census, showed that the number of university students who are uncommitted Yugoslavs had grown considerably in absolute terms (43,335), but that their share among Yugoslav university students had decreased (9.76 percent), and so it seems that there was a considerable drop in their share in the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs as well (by 3.55 percent on the basis of 1981). On the basis of this datum, which should not be underestimated, nor overestimated either, one should conclude—with the necessary reservations—that the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs among young people probably has not been at the level of the growth of the entire population.

As for sex-specific features, the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs coincided almost absolutely with the features of the entire Yugoslav population; that is, men and women are almost equally represented among noncommitted Yugoslavs. That is, in 1971 males represented 49.10 percent of the total Yugoslav population and had just a bit larger share among uncommitted Yugoslavs--50.41 percent.

If we analyze the urban-rural distribution of uncommitted Yugoslavs according to the last census and according to the results of the most recent population census within SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia, since we possess 1981 data only for our own republic, we will conclude unambiguously that noncommitment in general, and noncommitted Yugoslavism in particular, is a predominantly urban phenomenon. That is, taken in the overall, within SR Croatia's urban settlements uncommitted Yugoslavs make up 11.95 percent of the total population, while in other settlements they represent only 4.40 percent (the average in SR Croatia is 8.24 percent of the total population), so that they have a nearly threefold larger share in urban than in other settlements. On the contrary, it would take into account the ethnic distribution of the population within urban and other settlements among the 20 agglomerations exceeding a population of 50,000 (including the Zagreb urban community of opstinas), then the growth of uncommitted Yugoslavs will be presented to us in all three aspects:

i. in the aggregate of both types of settlements of the agglomerations indicated uncommitted Yugoslavs exceeded their average share in the population of SR Croatia (9.80 percent as against 8.24 percent);

- ii. in aggregate of urban settlements of the agglomerations indicated they also had a higher share (12.33 percent) than in all urban settlements of SR Croatia (11.95);
- iii. in the aggregate of other settlements of the same agglomerations the uncommitted Yugoslavs had a share of 5.11 percent against their 4.40-percent share in all other settlements of SR Croatia.

Certainly the range of differences between the urban and other settlements of these agglomerations is exceptionally great; for instance, in urban settlements of Vukovar all of one out of every 4 citizens is an uncommitted Yugoslav, while in Cakovec it is only one out of every 20, and then again only one out of every 160 in other settlements of Varazdin, and yet one out of every 7 or 8 in the other settlements of Beli Manastir. This clearly shows the ranking of the 10 agglomerations in which uncommitted Yugoslavs are most common, compared with the situation in 1971, 8 and 5 agglomerations in which they are least common.

	Averas	ge <b>,</b> %	1981, %	
Towns	1981	1971	Urban Settlements	Other Settlements
1) Vukovar	21.18	6.13	26.61	10.50
2) Osijek	17.91	2.84	22.10	7 <b>.</b> 75
3) Pula	16.99	4.35	20.55	5.18
4) Rijeka	15.78	4.08	16.93	9.25
5) B. Manastir	15.72	1.86	21.87	13.18
6) Sisak	15.11	2.84	22.10	7.75
7) Bjelovar	13.45	2.62	20.55	9.12
8) Karlovac	11.96	2.48	15.37	3.92
9) S1. Brod	9.70	2.06	15.84	4.32
10) N. Gradiska	9.23	1.63	17.98	5.57

The ranking of the agglomerations with the lowest share of uncommitted Yugo-slavs is as follows: 9

	Averag	ge, %	1981, %		
Towns	1981	1971	Urban Settlements	Other Settlements	
1) Cakovec	1.86	0.30	5.33	0.90	
2) Varazdin	2.99	0.89	6.07	0.61	
3) Djakovo	3.41	0.58	5.07	2.53	
4) Koprivnica	4.31	1.15	7.23	2.80	
5) GZO Zagreb	7.35	2.46	7.97	2.37	

The following basic conclusions can be drawn from our presentation:

First, that the uncommitted Yugoslavs have in relative terms increased at an equally high rate in the agglomerations where they were most common as in the agglomerations in which they were least common. In that sense the increase in the number of uncommitted Yugoslavs is in a way a universal phenomenon.

Second. There are in principle more uncommitted Yugoslavs in places which are not ethnically homogeneous, and vice versa. This conclusion necessarily imposes itself if we analyze the ethnic composition of the population of the first five agglomerations with the highest share of uncommitted Yugoslavs and the five with the lowest share.

That is, within the five agglomerations in which uncommitted Yugoslavs are most common, the share of Croats, the most numerous group in that ethnic composition of the population, ranges from one-third to a maximum of two-thirds of the total population. In the agglomerations where uncommitted Yugoslavs have the lowest share, on the other hand, the ethnic homogeneity of the population is markedly high and ranges from 86.1 percent to 94.7 percent (Croats).

It is difficult to make an authoritative judgment about which ethnic groups the uncommitted Yugoslavs mostly came from, since we do not have figures on migration in these agglomerations. Nevertheless, if we neglect this extremely important factor, that is, if we examine the population in static terms, then we can conclude that the uncommitted Yugoslavs came approximately equally from all the more numerous ethnic groups, which as a factual matter usually means Croats and Serbs.

Thus between 1971 and 1981 in Vukovar there was an almost identical proportional decrease of the two most numerous ethnic groups: Croats (index number 82.1) and Serbs (83.3). The same thing is true of Rijeka and Beli Manastir; only in Pula and Osijek was there a somewhat greater decrease of the Serbs than the Croats, and in Beli Manastir the share of Hungarians decreased more than the other two groups.

As for the agglomerations with the lowest share of uncommitted Yugoslavs, the situation is approximately the same as already described, except that we should mention that the decrease of the Serbs was nevertheless greater in relative terms, but since we are talking about groups that are small in absolute terms, the statistical relations do not have essential relevance.

In the socioeconomic sphere there are several interesting features of the ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavs. First of all, with respect to the distribution of the working population and dependents a certain difference is evident between the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total Yugoslav population, since gainfully employed persons represent 38.44 percent of the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs and 43.32 percent of the total Yugoslav population. However, this difference, which is not negligible, is actually smaller in a peculiar way. That is, in the age-specific composition of the Yugoslav work force 6.14 percent are below age 18 (this applies predominantly to the farm population), while among uncommitted Yugoslavs it is only 3.13 percent, which means that between these two adult populations there are no significant differences in the proportion of gainfully employed persons.

Approximately the same thing is true of dependents. They are incidentally slightly more common among the uncommitted Yugoslavs (52.51 percent) than in the total Yugoslav population (50.63 percent). But within the group of uncommitted Yugoslavs those under age 18 comprise 60.69 percent of the dependents,

while the share in the total Yugoslav population is 59.07 percent, so that the slight difference indicated between the share of dependents in the two populations mainly comes down to the higher share of the age group under age 18 among uncommitted Yugoslavs. It is worth mentioning in passing that there are not any significant differences in age-specific composition between the working population and dependents either.

However, when it comes to other distributions within the gainfully employed and dependent population, then the population of uncommitted Yugoslavs shows quite considerable deviations from the respective distributions of the total Yugoslav population, and most of these deviations are extremely significant from a sociological standpoint.

The first of these large differences is manifested in the distribution of the labor force between employees in the socialized sector and those who are gainfully employed in the private sector. All of four-fifths (80.7 percent) of the gainfully employed uncommitted Yugoslavs are employed in the socialized sector, while that percentage in the total Yugoslav labor force is only 46.5 percent. In the context of the overall larger share of uncommitted Yugoslavs in the employed population it is significant to mention that among gainfully employed women who are uncommitted Yugoslavs all of 84.2 percent are employed in the socialized sector, by contrast with gainfully employed women in the total Yugoslav population, where this percentage is 59.2 percent (for men the respective proportions are 78.6 percent and 50.3 percent). 11

The second of these major differences in socioeconomic characteristics lies in the gap in the  $\rm skill$  differential between employed uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total population of uncommitted Yugoslavs on the one hand and the total Yugoslav labor force and total Yugoslav population (including other ethnic groups as well) on the other.

Even the difference in elementary literacy and education between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total Yugoslav population prove to be extremely significant. According to the 1971 Population Census, the rate of illiteracy was lowest among Slovenes (1.04 percent) and then among uncommitted Yugoslavs (3.46 percent), Hungarians (5.09 percent), and then Croats (9.82 percent), and so on, while in the total Yugoslav population the illiteracy rate was all of 14.91 percent. Another 9.30 percent of the total Yugoslav population had no schooling (but were literate), and this group was smallest among uncommitted Yugoslavs (4.80 percent), followed by the Slovenes (5.51 percent), Macedonians (6.38 percent), Montenegrins (8.03 percent), and so on.

In the total Yugoslav population 8.97 percent have graduated from a school for skilled and highly skilled workers, while that percentage is almost twice as high among uncommitted Yugoslavs (14.73 percent), and this level of skill was more common than that only among the Slovenes (16.07 percent). All of 18.87 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs have finished secondary school, which is threefold higher than the level for the Yugoslav population (6.27 percent), and it is followed at a considerable distance by Montenegrins (10.32 percent), then Macedonians (8.24 percent), and so on. But the greatest difference between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the total population occurs in the area of

the highest levels of education: 9.0 percent of the uncommitted Yugoslavs have graduated from a junior or senior postsecondary school, while this is true of only 2.81 percent of the Yugoslav population as a whole. 12

These major differences in schooling between the uncommitted Yugoslavs and the Yugoslav population and indeed other ethnic groups as well certainly will not level out soon for the simple reason that about three-fourths of the uncommitted Yugoslavs between the ages of 18 and 29 (dependents) are attending the university, while only about 17 percent of the same age group in the Yugoslav population as a whole were attending the university in 1971 (the rate of university attendance is nearly sixfold higher than the general population among women are uncommitted Yugoslavs and less than fivefold higher for men).

It is, of course, easy to conclude from this survey of the schooling of the total population of uncommitted Yugoslavs that the gainfully employed uncommitted Yugoslavs also have considerably higher qualifications than the average for the Yugoslav labor force and also that there must be a sociologically significant difference between uncommitted Yugoslavs and the Yugoslav population with respect to the sociovocational distribution. The two most numerous sociovocational groups among the uncommitted Yugoslavs are industrial workers (28.73 percent) and specialists (22.13 percent), and in both cases they exceed the average proportions of these groups in the sociovocational composition of the employed Yugoslav labor force, especially for specialists (about threefold greater). Like that of the specialist, the share of supervisory personnel among uncommitted Yugoslavs is almost threefold greater than the average proportion of that sociovocational group in the employed Yugoslav labor force, but that higher proportion of supervisory personnel decidedly comes down to a larger share of uncommitted Yugoslavs who are organizers of work and production rather than the administrator type of official or manager. 13

It would be logical to expect on the basis of skill differential and sociovocational characteristics of the membership of the League of Communists that uncommitted Yugoslavs would also have a higher share in its membership than in the population at large. However, this is not the case. To be sure, the uncommitted Yugoslavs do have a somewhat higher share in LCY membership in 1981 (6.51 percent) than their share in the Yugoslav population (5.44 percent), that is, the index number is 119.7. But since employed persons with junior and senior postsecondary schooling and specialists and supervisory personnel represent proportions in the membership of the LCY which are between twofold and fivefold larger than their shares in the total population, we can legitimately conclude that in view of the features of uncommitted Yugoslavs already mentioned, they have a smaller proportion in the LCY than we would naturally have expected.

At the same time, when we analyze the leadership structures in the organization of the LCY, beginning with the secretary and secretariat of the basic organization of the League of Communists and all the way up to membership in central committees, it is easy to note that the uncommitted Yugoslavs do not have a share in those bodies that is even close to their share in the membership of the LCY. As a matter of fact, it is almost a rule that the higher the organ of the LC, the lower the share of uncommitted Yugoslavs in its membership!

Thus in 1980 only 4.06 percent of the approximately 300,000 secretaries and members of secretariats of basic organizations of the LC were uncommitted Yugoslavs. However, among members of opstina committees of the LC their share was already considerably less—only 2.06 percent, and in the highest party bodies of the republics and provinces, their share was only 1.04 percent (in four of the highest party organs of the republics and provinces there was not a single uncommitted Yugoslav, while two of those bodies had one uncommitted Yugoslav each!). In the membership of the LCY Central Committee after the 12th congress uncommitted Yugoslavs have a share considerably below their share in the distribution of the LCY membership, i.e., a share of 2.45 percent.

It is easy to conclude therefrom that the LCY has never favored ethnic uncommitment as some possible choice "on its part," just as it has never identified itself with any ethnic commitment. Thus certain petit bourgeois "fears" that uncommitted Yugoslavs are dominant in our political life and are accumulating tremendous social power by controlling the vital points of our political system truly have no basis whatsoever. Along with all the rest, it is almost superfluous to mention that even if the uncommitted Yugoslavs should have a considerably higher share in membership of the LC and in its bodies of leadership (why them particularly, and only them?!) this would not be a decisive political issue at all, since this simply is not the sole prerequisite for influence on production and reproduction of the life of society as a whole, nor even of political life in particular.

Finally we would like to call attention to one of the essential characteristics of the population of the uncommitted in general and of uncommitted Yugoslavs in particular. That is, both these phenomena are highly related to migration.

According to the 1971 Census, 40.13 percent of the Yugoslav population migrated, while this percentage is quite a bit higher for uncommitted Yugoslavs (57.6 percent), and especially for the regionally uncommitted—75.42 percent (even the Montenegrins with 49.88 percent lagged considerably behind this figure, although they are one of the most mobile ethnic groups). However, we will easily see the true dimension of the migration if we eliminate migration within the same opstina as well as migration from one area to another at the first level and examine exclusively migration from one region to another at the second level, which mostly means migration across republic and provincial borders. Only 19.06 percent of the Yugoslav population migrated in that sense, yet this was done by almost two-thirds of the regionally uncommitted (61.43 percent) and almost half of all the ethnically uncommitted Yugoslavs (42.52 percent). After these two groups comes the third group of the uncommitted (under Article 170 of the SFRY Constitution) with a share of 41.79 percent, and then, with only half the proportion, the Montenegrins (23.85 percent).

Mindful of these characteristics of uncommitted Yugoslavs it is possible to frame a whole series of hypotheses about the relationships between a population's skill, sociovocational, migrational and other characteristics and its ethnic noncommitment. Nevertheless, there is no question that we are dealing with the resultant of a very complicated and mutual relationship among a number of factors, each of which has its own specific weight (it seems to us that

among the many reasons this high involvement of the migrational factor could be the catalyst of ethnic noncommitment). But sound evaluation of the role of any particular factor or of all of them together is obviously a task for a full-fledged and systematic scientific research project. We certainly have not assigned ourselves that role in this discussion (especially since we do not know some of the key characteristics of the present population of uncommitted Yugoslavs, since we do not possess most of the data from the 1981 Census). As we said in the introduction: we felt it desirable to take the discussion from the domain of emotions into the sphere of the rational by presenting certain objective characteristics of uncommitted Yugoslavs, without regarding this option as either a burning problem of our present or the pledge of our future.

### FOOTNOTES

- 1. See the Zagreb weekly DANAS, No 14, 25 May; No 22, 20 July; and No 24, 3 August 1982.
- 2. "Ethnic Composition of the Population by Opstinas," STATISTICKI BILTEN, No 1295, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Belgrade, 1982, p 8.
- 3. Ibid.
- 4. "Population. Vital Statistics and Ethnic and Migrational Characteristics," "Popis stanovnistva i stanova 1971" [1971 Population and Housing Census], Federal Bureau of Statistics, Belgrade, 1974, p 12.
- 5. "Higher Education 1970/71," STATISTICKI BILTEN, No 781, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Belgrade, 1973, p 18.
- 6. "Higher Education 1979/80," STATISTICKI BILTEN, No 1251, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Belgrade, 1981, p 31.
- 7. "Population, Household and Housing Census 1981. Population by Opstinas and Communities of Opstinas in SR Croatia," DOKUMENTACIJA, No 501, Croatian Republic Bureau of Statistics, Zagreb, 1982, pp 32-49.
- 8. "Statisticki godisnjak SRH 1972" [Statistical Yearbook of SR Croatia 1972], Croatian Republic Bureau of Statistics, Zagreb, 1972, pp 254-259.
- 9. Differences are also significant from opstina to opstina within the Zagreb City Community of Opstinas: uncommitted Yugoslavs are most common in the City Opstina Trnje (12.01 percent), and then in the urban settlements of the Opstina New Zagreb 10.28 percent, Pescenici 9.41 percent and Tresnjevci 8.54 percent, and least common in other settlements of the Opstina Zapresic.
- 10. "Population. Vital Statistics and Ethnic and Migrational Characteristics," op. cit., pp 13-15.

- 11. "Population. Economic Characteristics, Second Part, Employed Personnel," op. cit., p 290.
- 12. "Population. Literacy and Schooling," op. cit., pp 11-12.
- 13. "Population. Economic Characteristics, First Part," op. cit., pp 68-72.
- 14. "Population. Vital Statistics and Ethnic and Migrational Characteristics," op. cit., pp 76-77.

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### PROCESSING OF 1981 CENSUS DATA DELAYED

### Introduction

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1680, 13 Mar 83 p. 21

[Introduction to interviews conducted by Jug Grizelj: "Why the Results Have Been Slow in Coming"]

[Text] Under the law on the Population, Household and Housing Census in 1981, the census was to be conducted in the SFRY between 1 and 15 April 1981.

As is well known, in most countries of the world--including our own--population censuses are conducted once every 10 years, and the data obtained from the census is abundantly used by the entire society, the government, science, the economy, which use the statistical data obtained as the basis for all their development plans, analyses and research without which it is practically impossible to imagine contemporary life. Although the very act of the census is the most complicated, expensive and difficult part of any census, it is only a part of that undertaking. After the data are gathered, they are sorted, processed, cross tabulated and published. The main goal of any census, then, is the publication of the data obtained, and that as soon as possible so that better use can be made of them.

Article 17 of the Law on the Census states: "The federal organization competent for matters of statistics shall publish:

"the first results of the census for the SFRY, the republics, the autonomous provinces and opstinas within 30 days from the date of completion of censustaking, and

"the results of the census of interest to the entire country according to the processing program established within the period from 1 December 1981 to 30 June 1983."

By specific decision the Federal Bureau of Statistics committed itself to publish the results of the census in three parts: by 30 June 1982 all relevant data for settlements and local communities, by 31 October 1982 the same data up to the level of the opstina, and by 30 June 1983 all these data arrayed by socialist republics and provinces and for the SFRY as a whole.

Unfortunately, and that is the word which we have been using more and more often, the Federal Bureau of Statistics has not managed to meet those deadlines. That is, only the first results of the census have been published (30 days after the census was completed), while almost all the other deadlines have been missed. Not only that: the actual situation in processing the data obtained offers hardly any chance at all of meeting the last deadline, 30 June 1983, when all the relevant data were to be published at the level of the republics, the provinces and the SFRY, so that the public will soon be informed that the Federal Bureau of Statistics has instituted proceedings before the SFRY Assembly to amend the Law on the Census. According to what is anticipated, the proponent will seek a postponement of the final deadline, and that for either 1 year or for 6 months.

This by no means pleasant news was the occasion for NIN to ask several well-known specialists to explain to the public how this serious disruption could have occurred in carrying out such an important social undertaking.

### Interview With Statistical Official

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1680, 13 Mar 83 pp 21-23

[Interview with Dr Branimir Markovic, deputy general director of the Federal Bureau for Statistics, by Jug Grizelj: "We Are Responsible"; date and place not specified]

[Text] NIN was received in the Federal Bureau of Statistics by Brana Markovic, deputy general director of the Federal Bureau, which under law has jurisdiction over the conduct of the census and the publication of the results.

[Question] For a long time there has been whispering among statisticians, and now it seems to be confirmed, that the Federal Bureau of Statistics will seek an extension of the period for publication of the results, and that an extension of 1 year. Is that correct?

[Answer] It is a fact that there has been a serious lag in processing the census data. We judge that we will not be able by 30 June of this year to report all the data of interest to the entire country. The prevailing opinion is that we should seek a postponement of 6 months.

[Question] Can you explain to us how the lateness occurred in such an important undertaking, one that is undertaken once every 10 years?

[Answer] The delay occurred in processing the data in certain republics and provinces, since the 1981 Census is for the first time in our experience being published on the basis of decentralized processing. We are in a situation where some people have finished all or almost all, as is the case with the Republic Bureau for Statistics of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia, while in certain other republics and provinces there have been serious delays. Of course, we cannot publish data for the entire country until we have all the data from all the republics and provinces.

[Question] If one reads carefully the Law on the Census one finds (in Article 11) that "the census shall be organized and conducted by the federal organization competent for matters of statistics, the federal administrative agencies and federal organizations designated by this law, the competent bodies in the republics and in the autonomous provinces." It is not evident from that legal text that the processing is to be done on a decentralized basis.

[Answer] The census has been carried out in accordance with uniform criteria and a uniform methodology, but the resources for processing the descriptive data were planned and designated on a decentralized basis, i.e., in the bureaus of statistics in the republics and provinces. It has now turned out that some of the republic and provincial bureaus were not furnished either the equipment or the personnel to do that job within the planned periods of time, and that is why we are late. As a matter of fact, at the moment when the census was being prepared, all the republic and provincial bureaus believed that they would have the appropriate equipment, their own or someone else's. Some of those computers used for processing in certain bureaus are not altogether suitable, and in addition differing models of computers are being used, so that it is not possible to prepare the data in a uniform way. The worst is what happened to us in the Federal Bureau of Statistics. That is, we have a 15-year-old computer which instead of operating 20,000 hours, has so far "turned" over 60,000 hours and simply is no longer reliable: at times it performs the entire program fine, but sometimes it skips something and makes a wrong "computation."

At the time when we were preparing for the census we were convinced that we would get a new computer, indeed the funds for the that computer were even envisaged in the census budget. The fact is that the price of a new computer is negligible compared to the possible consequences of tardiness and the errors in such an important national undertaking as the population census. First we received the funds to purchase the computer, and then they deprived us of the opportunity to purchase it, and then the well-known restriction retroactively took back the funds that had already been allocated. We have raised this question countless times, nearly every week, with the federal bodies, and we have always received a promise that "a solution is being sought." Unfortunately, the solution has not been found even to this day.

We have now been given a permit to seek replacement of the computer, but we have not received funds to carry out that replacement. If we had had the new computer in 1982, we would have been able to take over processing of the data of those republics and provincial bureaus which are not able to do so, and the tardiness would not have occurred.

[Question] Is it not unusual for the Federal Bureau of Statistics not to have reported this problem in time to the Yugoslav Assembly and the general public, since if we can invest 135 billion old dinars in an undertaking such as the census, is it not then natural to expect that all the conditions will be ensured for that action to be successful?

[Answer] We did pose the problem to the Federal Executive Council [SIV] in good time. SIV gave consent for the question of replacement of our computer

to be taken up in the SFRY Assembly and for the funds to be allocated to us. We have not yet received the consent of the SFRY Assembly, however. I must say that there is not a single government in the world which does not manage to find the money to modernize its statistical service, since statistics are the life blood of a modern state and a modern economy. You see, the fact that we lack the computer is not causing us difficulties only in connection with the census, but we have been frustrated even in monitoring relevant daily information and especially in the domain of analytics in our economic policy and in foreign trade.

We long ago concluded in the Federal Bureau that we had a duty and that it was indispensable to compile an up-to-date program for mon toring our investments and a program for monitoring foreign trade flows. Unfortunately, we have been unable to do so. You see, we have at this moment in the country about 25,000-26,000 capital investment projects under construction. It would be natural for at least we in the Federal Bureau of Statistics to have complete monographs on those projects or, to state it still better, their complete biographies, for us to know when construction began, how much has been invested in each of those projects, for us to be able to monitor them at any moment and to have a complete picture of all our problems in this domain by simply pressing a button: including who has had cost overruns and by how much, and who is late and why, and what this means for every sector and industry, for every region or area. Unfortunately, the study concerning this program is only our desire.

### Yugoslav Workers Abroad

Republics and Autonomous Provinces	Workers Abroad Temporarily	Family Members (abroad)	Returnees
SFRY	625,065	249,896	282,869
SR Bosnia-Hercegovina	133,902	49,038	67,002
SR Montenegro	9,761	9,062	2,464
SR Croatia	151,619	58,711	97,338
SR Macedonia	57,962	42,957	20,783
SR Slovenia	41,826	11,657	26,190
SR Serbia	229,975	78,471	69,092
Serbia proper	152,932	50,489	54,329
SAP [Socialist Autonomous	•		
Province] Kosovo	28,965	10,469	5,291
SAP Vojvodina	48,079	17,513	9,472

The same is the case with monitoring foreign trade transactions. I am convinced that there is no one in our country at this point who knows our status in various foreign trade transactions. Many transactions began 10 years ago, one person initiated them and turned them over to someone else, and he in turn to a third, and today we do not know at all how we stand with various obligations or rights arising out of those transactions.

[Question] We have gotten a bit off the census. Tell us: now that it is late, it is being noted in certain republics and provinces that they do not

have either sufficiently trained technical personnel or computers, and in some places neither one nor the other. How is it that this could not have been foreseen in time?

[Answer] During the preparations for the census the question was not raised of either personnel or electronics. It was anticipated that the Federal Bureau of Statistics would be able to resolve all the problems with its own personnel and machines if someone somewhere got hung up.

[Question] If the postponement actually does occur, and this is almost certain, that will mean that the results of the census as a whole will be available for use only 3 or 3.5 years after completion of the census. Unless our memory fails us, the results of the 1971 Census were delivered to the public after only 1.5 years, but not the results of the 1961 Census.

[Answer] I can only repeat that the Federal Bureau was convinced when it prepared the census that there would be no problems at all either with respect to deadlines or with respect to the quality of performance. Since our country does have adequately trained personnel, we did not expect that there would be any difficulties in purchasing the computers.

[Question] Fully respecting the principle that decentralization is necessary, could this lateness nevertheless have been avoided?

[Answer] Since everything was done according to a uniform methodology and uniform definitions, classifications and criteria, there was, of course, the possibility of finding a technical solution in the framework of the constitutional institution of an agreement among the republics and provinces, since here we were after all dealing only with technical matters, and all the material could have been processed where the capability existed. This was not done, and only in recent months has a kind of agreement come about spontaneously: as far as I am aware, data for Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo and SR Croatia are now being processed in the Bureau of Statistics of SR Serbia, which managed to buy an up-to-date computer before the census and to prepare first-class trained specialists in time.

[Question] It really is difficult to understand why a computer could not have been purchased for your bureau when at least 50 computers have been imported into the country in the last 2 years. Could the job have been done in any work organization which has a computer?

[Answer] There are minimal technical conditions and prerequisites for use of a particular type and size of computer for processing census data. Small computers cannot do that work. Large statistical jobs can be done only by computers of a certain size and technical characteristics. There is also a certain specialization in computers. There are those which are good for jobs involving exploration, while others are specialized in processing jobs.

[Question] Finally, an unavoidable question: we have conducted the census, we expected that the results of that census would be used for a full range of purposes, and now everything is far behind schedule. Who is responsible for that?

[Answer] Under the law and the constitution the Federal Bureau of Statistics is responsible. The Federal Bureau will do everything to see that the jobs of processing the census and other statistical jobs are done within the deadlines which the available resources make possible. With respect to the responsibility of others for the occurrence of this situation, it is best to let them themselves evaluate the degree of responsibility if anyone feels that he bears any responsibility whatsoever aside from ours, although it is obvious that the Federal Bureau of Statistics cannot solve problems which lie outside its authority.

# Other Statistical Official Responds

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1680, 13 Mar 83 pp 22-23

[Interview with Franta Komel, general director of the Federal Bureau of Statistics, by Jug Grizelj, on 12 March 1983: "What Do We Have Against Statistics"; place not specified]

[Text] Yesterday we asked Franta Komel, general director of the Federal Bureau of Statistics (who was on vacation when this story was being written), to answer just one question for us:

[Question] The news to the effect that the Federal Bureau of Statistics will in a few days seek postponement of the deadlines for publication of the census results will certainly bring forth adverse comments from the public. One can hardly suppose that there will be understanding for the fact that the Federal Bureau of Statistics was unable to obtain a computer, and that precisely during the census. Do you think that the conclusion can be drawn from this that society's attitude as a whole toward statistics in our country is not responsible enough? The opinion is even heard that people and institutions from abroad pay more attention and have more confidence in our statistics than our own government and public structures.

[Answer] As for the foreign institutions and individuals, they turn to our statistics very often. I think that in the world in general the attitude toward statistics represents an international scientific and cultural standard. In our country instead of using numbers people are often inclined to use principles for drawing conclusions which are used more in esthetics than in statistics. We talk about many things and processes on the principle of "I like that" or "I do not like that," or "It is fine" or "It is not good," exactly, that is, as in esthetic matters. People thus avoid the language of numbers, which indicate real relations in society in firm, solid and realistic terms.

Since in the discussion conducted on the basis of numbers and statistical data there is no question of one person outwitting another, but those who are involved in the discussion and decisionmaking can only agree on how the problem is to be solved, we often look with disfavor on this method. In our society discussions are often conducted on the basis of improvisation and on the basis of subjective arguments instead of the most appropriate solutions being sought on the basis of objective figures. The example of the postponement of the

purchase of the computer, precisely at the moment when we were doing the 10-year census, along with many unresolved problems concerning the organization of our statistical service, perhaps show us once again that the importance of the statistical system in general and the importance of statistics for documented presentation of all states and processes in a society is not taken with enough seriousness.

There are even examples where the statistical service has been asked to stop monitoring some phenomenon in the cost of living and production costs out of a conviction that the problem would in that way disappear. Recently there was a demand and proposal for the monitoring of tobacco and cigarette consumption to be omitted from statistics. What was behind that? The intention was to allow the prices of tobacco and cigarettes to be set freely, and then after the prices of these products rose considerably, this would naturally tend to raise prices and the cost of living in general. The simplest solution was found to "solve" the problem: if we omit tobacco from the statistical monitoring program, then, when the price goes up, this will not have an impact toward raising the cost of living—since we will no longer be monitoring this statistically!

# Scholar on Negative Repercussions

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1680, 13 Mar 83 pp 23-24

[Article by Milos Macura, member of the academy: "Serious Harm for the Entire Society"]

[Text] Milos Macura, member of the academy, has been concerned with statistical matters for decades as a public figure and scientist. We asked him to explain the seriousness of the lateness in publishing the data from the 1981 Census.

This is a serious handicap for society as a whole. We are not in a position to publish any serious analyses, either economic, political or sociological, without a statistical base and without fine combinations and cross tabulations afforded by these magnificent censuses. I would even say that irreparable harm has already occurred from the lateness in publishing the data of the 1981 Census. We are drawing up plans for the future development of the country as a whole and of the republics and provinces, we are planning the creation of new jobs, we are seeking the best paths for development of agriculture-wherever you put your finger, everything is based on estimates and assumptions--nowhere is there a concrete datum. I have been working with statistics for a long time, but never until this census has such a long time passed and such a small amount of data been published. As a practical matter 3 bulletins and 16 communications have so far been published, or perhaps a bit more in the past few days, instead of entire books being ready. So, 2 full years have passed since the census, and now all our scientific institutes, government agencies and the general public, thanks to up-to-date technology, should already have been supplied data which they could work from. However, it turns out that the up-to-date technology has not helped us. I make so bold as to

say this with responsibility, since the first book of the population census conducted in March 1948 was published as early as November 1950, complete with a 60-page scientific and methodological analysis, although that census was processed by hand, without any machines whatsoever.

Everything that has been published so far, these have been only the most basic data on the number, for example, of members of the various nationalities and ethnic minorities, the number of people employed abroad temporarily, persons with various levels of schooling, illiterates, farmers, the labor force, and so on. I emphasize: these are only the figures on the total number of persons in these categories, possibly broken down by sex or place of residence. However, we do not even have these elementary data on all the more important population categories. For instance, there are no data on manpower—the economically active population—by occupation, nor data on manpower in various types of activity such as industry, transportation, the trade sector, and so on. These are the most elementary figures which in previous censuses were published relatively soon after the census on the basis of processing a sample.

I might go on enumerating without end the basic data which are not yet available. However, that is not the point, but the absence of the more elaborate information on population, in which each of these categories will be broken down by sex, age, economic and social characteristics, and so on. For example, if the data had been published on population by nationalities and ethnic minorities from which one could see their age, sex, education, occupation, language, and so on, certainly we would have avoided many misunderstandings which occurred in the public almost 2 or 3 months after publication of the first data on the ethnic composition by republics and provinces. Incidentally, NIN published several articles by various authors which were so contradictory -- on the question of the nationalities and ethnic minorities -- that it seems to me that the reader was bound to get muddled. And if, aside from the data already mentioned, data had also been published on births and deaths by nationalities and ethnic minorities, as well as data on migration, only then could our picture of ethnic processes and the ethnic composition be much clearer.

# Population

Republics and Autonomous Provinces	Share of Farm Population in Total Population, %
SFRY SR Bosnia-Hercegovina	20 17
SR Montenegro	13
SR Croatia SR Macedonia	15 22
SR Slovenia SR Serbia	9 25
Serbia proper	28
SAP Kosovo SAP Vojvodina	25 20

Share of Illiterates in the Total Population, in percentage

SFRY	9.5	SR Slovenia	0.8
SR Bosnia-Hercegovina	14.5	SR Serbia	10.9
SR Montenegro	9.4	Serbia proper	11.1
SR Croatia	5.6	SAP Kosovo	17.6
SR Macedonia	10.9	SAP Vojvodina	5.8

Or, take this example: you know how important to Belgrade is the question of unemployment and the influence of migration on unemployment. Our institute is studying this question. We have waited as someone who is shivering waits for the sun for the large input-output table on movement out of all opstinas of Yugoslavia into all opstinas of Yugoslavia so that we could estimate as accurately as possible the effect of moving in and moving out on the growth of Belgrade's population and on unemployment. Unfortunately, that table has also been late. They say that the figures coming in from certain republics and provinces are inaccurate, that they have to be corrected, that that takes time, and so on. I think that that is quite so, it is just that that belief does not help me, since it cannot make up for the data which are not yet available.

And what is happening with our workers employed abroad temporarily? According to the last census, there were 625,000 Yugoslavs employed abroad temporarily with 240,000 members of their families. According to the results of this census, 282,000 people have returned to Yugoslavia and are living here. But several serious statistical problems arise in connection with these figures: first, there is good reason to suspect that there are more Yugoslavs employed abroad temporarily than our census has indicated. If we take the figures on Yugoslavs in western countries from the statistics of those countries, then obviously that number is appreciably higher. However, there could be differing criteria for registering our people abroad, so that a conscientious check should be made of the accuracy of the census data. To do this we need more detailed figures than those we now have available. Second, it is certain that the growth of employment in the western countries has not equally forced all Yugoslavs to return home. Leaving to one side the voluntary returnees, we can assume that pressure on our people to return will be differentiated depending on the time they have been abroad, depending on age, depending on the industry they work in, their skills, education and the like. Of course, regardless of the circumstances we could not obtain optimum data on this matter so that we could say with confidence what we can expect and what we should do to prepare for this in advance. However, the appropriate processing of the information gathered in the census certainly could provide much more information and greater certainty than our present uncertainty.

You see, we have touched upon only some of the important topics, but there remain many others equally important, for example, the study of fertility by age groups, the study of changes in the economic and social composition of the population, migration—domestic and external, literacy and schooling, and so on, and so on. We find ourselves in a maelstrom of tumultuous demographic and social changes which will have a decisive impact on development of our population and society over the next 20 to 30 years. Work is now being done in many quarters in Yugoslavia on long-range conceptions of social development up to

the year 2000. That work contains an important section on population, but so far we have been able to use only those scanty data which have been published and, of course, the estimates based on the 1971 Census.

I understand the public's need to learn whether science could have foreseen that these complications in processing the census would have occurred and whether it could have done something to correct the situation in good time. This is what I would say about that: scientific organizations and individuals were invited to the discussions of the 1981 Census in the preparation phase. The emphasis, of course, was on methodological problems, and, as far as processing of the data is concerned, on the system of tables considered to be the federal minimum. We, of course, made suggestions about the draft, some of which were adopted and some which seemed to me essential were not. At no point was there mention of the technical aspect of processing which has today proved to be the bottleneck. But if anyone had asked me at the time, I certainly would have said that it would be nonsense to process a census on a population of 22 million at 8 different places so that all the rules of statistical procedure and all computer programs had to be prepared by all those 8 places.

For similar large undertakings standardized programs are today prepared in the world for monitoring the basic data, for correcting errors detected, for tabulation of the data, and what is more, even for certain analytical purposes. These data are even used with small adjustments in several different countries, since this is more efficient and economical. But we have done just the reverse: we wanted to do all this in eight different places and thereby to completely negate the technical and economic advantages of up-to-date computers, technology and statistical know-how.

If the procedure which has yielded these poor results in our case was adopted on the basis of certain political criteria, I think that this has been proven groundless, since it is now evident that this procedure has actually operated against the equality and equal rights of the republics and provinces and indeed the nationalities and ethnic minorities—since now rights have been lost by all those who cannot use such a large undertaking as our 1981 Census, which means that we have all been losers, while no one has gained. If we have achieved some equality—that is an equality in having lost a great opportunity to use the data of the census on time.

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