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# ***JPRS Report***

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# East Europe

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### **RUDE PRAVO Says U.S. 'Complicates' Persian Gulf Crisis**

*Prague CTK in English 0720 GMT 25 Sep 87*

[Text] Prague, Sep 25 (CTK)—The situation in the Persian Gulf has considerably sharpened since last Monday as the United States carried out its first military action against Iran, the Czechoslovak daily RUDE PRAVO wrote today about the U.S. attack on an Iranian ship.

"The U.S. entry into the Iran-Iraq conflict further complicates the situation, and it does so most seriously. The U.S. has pronounced itself a guardian of the gulf, which is thousands of kilometers away from u.s. territory. There are thousands of paratroopers aboard U.S. ships who are certainly not there to hunt for mines", the daily said.

"The security of international shipping routes is an extremely sensitive and important matter. When security in the Asian-Pacific area is stressed, it is rightly emphasized that the security of navigation and flight routes in this region is among the prominent aspects of this matter. But it should and must be achieved by the struggle of the international community represented by the United Nations, not by actions like the Monday Gulf incident", RUDE PRAVO stressed.

"It would help the most the security of navigation in the gulf and the vital interests of all the countries on its coast, naturally above all Iran and Iraq, if a curtain closed over the deplorable acts of this tragic conflict, which has entered its eighth year this month", the daily added. [et]

### **Husak Receives, Addresses Vaclavik-Led Delegation**

*LD061958 Prague CTK in English 1856 GMT 6 Oct 87*

[Text] Prague Oct 6 (CTK)—Reliably safeguarded peace is the basic objective of Czechoslovakia's policy, Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary and President Gustav Husak said today.

Gustav Husak was addressing a Czechoslovak Army delegation, led by Defence Ministry Army General Milan Vaclavik, he received on the day of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the 43rd anniversary of the Karpathians-Dukla pass operation.

He said that the joint proposals of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic to create zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in Central Europe were designed to lessen danger on the borders between the two military groupings in Europe. "We support also other proposals to create zones rid of nuclear and chemical weapons in Europe and other regions. This fully applies

to the measures suggested for northern Europe by Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in his recent Murmansk speech."

The Czechoslovak people "welcome the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Washington and particularly the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles which is taking shape and is of great significance also for the security of our state. But the road to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, will yet need much endeavour and a big struggle, as influential forces which try to halt and reverse this process still exist in the world."

Gustav Husak went on to stress the need for strong bonds of alliance of the Czechoslovak People's Army with the Soviet Army and the armies of the other Warsaw Treaty member states based on the Warsaw Treaty military doctrine.

The new demands placed on the Czechoslovak society apply to the army, too. "This requires critical analysis of the entire activity in the army, use of the most efficient methods of management and effort for the best possible results," Gustav Husak said.

## HUNGARY

### **Kadar Visits Beijing, Meets With Chinese Leaders**

**Tian Jiyun, Zhu Liang Meet Entourage**  
*OW100830 Beijing XINHUA in English 0753 GMT 10 Oct 87*

[Text] Beijing, October 10 (XINHUA)—Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, arrived here this afternoon by charter plane for a five-day official goodwill visit at the invitation of Zhao Ziyang, acting general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) Central Committee.

This is Kadar's third visit to China, his first and second visits being in 1956 and 1957.

Among Kadar's entourage are Ovari Miklos, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Kotai Geza, member of the party Central Committee and head of the committee's Foreign Affairs Department, and Medgyessy Peter, member of the party Central Committee and head of the committee's Finance Department.

The guests were greeted at the airport by Tian Jiyun, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and vice-premier, and Zhu Liang, head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee.

A formal welcoming ceremony is scheduled for Kadar and his party tomorrow.

### Meeting With Deng Xiaoping

LD131507 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian  
0820 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] [Announcer] Janos Kadar has continued his discussions in Beijing, whence our special correspondent, Jozsef P. Szabo, sent us this report a short while ago, in the evening local time:

[Szabo] In Beijing today Janos Kadar met three of the five members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the highest Chinese party leadership. After the brief morning wreath-laying ceremony, he was visited by Deng Xiaoping. Deng is the key man of the Beijing leadership and will, without doubt, remain so. However, there is a rumor in Beijing that at the forthcoming party congress he will resign even as head of the Central Advisory Commission, the body consisting of elderly politicians. He would then only retain his post as chairman of the Military Commission.

The 83-, and according to some people, 84-year-old Deng is obviously in good strength and enjoying excellent health. He and Janos Kadar greeted and embraced each other with sincere warmth, and how else should the conversation have begun but with the fact that they had not met for 30 years? Things have happened in the meantime, but it is good that things have now developed in this way, said Janos Kadar. He added: In the past period, it is true, many things have happened which it would have been better had they not happened. Deng, on the other hand, said that it is possible to learn from negative things, as well. Often it is difficult to evade the stumbling blocks. Janos Kadar agreed, but, as he said, the biggest problem is that these evasions of the stumbling blocks consume a lot of time. The meeting of Janos Kadar and Deng Xiaoping lasted 1 and 1/2 hours, but journalists, as is customary at such times, could be present only during the first minutes.

According to the briefing that was later received, Deng gave an exhaustive analysis at the meeting of the past decades and of the present situation, as well. He described the acceleration of the reform process as an important task of the party congress to be held at the end of October. He stressed that it is not only a question of economic reform, but also of the reform of the system of political institutions. The rejuvenation of the party and state leadership is also an important element of the reform. One more remark of Deng's which it is well worth remembering: It must not happen that the bigger and smaller failures should make us lose heart.

Janos Kadar also spoke in detail at the meeting about the Hungarian experience in reform and about the domestic situation in general. He emphasized the prospects for our relations, that there is no obstacle in the way of cooperation, but it is necessary to work in order that we might step further in every field. We must deal not with the past, but with today, and we must look into the future, he said.

At midday, Deng Xiaoping gave a luncheon in honor of Janos Kadar. In the afternoon, in the building of the National People's Congress, [NPC] the parliament, the general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party held exchanges of views, first with PRC President Li Xiannian, and then with Peng Zhen, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, that is, the parliament.

After this, Janos Kadar paid a visit to the Hungarian Embassy, and then, before Chinese and Hungarian journalists, he stressed the political significance of the Beijing visit, and the further possibilities of our settled and well-developing relations. He again expressed thanks for the Beijing invitation and described as extremely useful the discussions he held here in Beijing with the Chinese state and party leaders.

### Talks Follow Wreath-Laying

LD130909 Budapest MTI in English 0820 GMT  
13 Oct 87

[Text] Beijing, October 13 (MTI)—The Tuesday program of Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, began with a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tienanmen Square monument of Chinese people's heroes. A guard of honour lined up at the column with reliefs depicting memorable events of the revolutionary and liberation struggle of the Chinese people when Janos Kadar placed the wreath decorated with the Hungarian national colours.

Following, Janos Kadar started official talks with Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Central Advisory Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, at Kadar's residence in Tiaoyutai guest house.

The meeting was attended, on Hungary's part, by Miklos Ovari, member of the HSWP Political Committee and secretary of the Central Committee, Geza Kotai, member of the HSWP Central Committee and head of the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Department, Peter Medgyessy, member of the HSWP Central Committee, minister of finance and co-chairman of the Hungarian-Chinese scientific Inter-Governmental Committee, Laszlo Ivan, ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic to China, Laszlo Mohai, deputy head of the HSWP CC Economic Policy Department, Jozsef Csikos, subdepartment head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the HSWP Central Committee, and Ivan Nemeth, staff member of the HSWP CC Foreign Affairs Committee.

The hosts were represented by Tian Kiyun, member of the Political Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, secretary of the Central Committee, and vice-premier of the state Council, Chi Pengfei, member of the standing Committee of the CCP Central Advisory Committee, Zhu Liang, member of the CCP Central Committee, head of the CC Foreign Affairs Department, Li Shucheng, alternate member of CCP

Central Committee, deputy head of the CC Foreign Affairs Committee, and Zhu Ankang, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Hungary.

After the talks Deng Xiaoping hosted a lunch in honour of Janos Kadar at the guest house.

### **Zhao Ziyang Calls Visit 'Historic'**

*OW101306 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1255 GMT 10 Oct 87*

[Text] Beijing, October 10 (XINHUA)—Zhao Ziyang, acting general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, welcomed Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party General Secretary Janos Kadar to China today.

Zhao described the visit, Kadar's first in 30 years, as a historic occasion that will promote friendly relations between the two parties and two countries.

Kadar's arrival this afternoon marked the beginning of a five-day official goodwill visit at the invitation of Zhao.

Zhao called on Kadar at the state guesthouse and brought greetings from Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen.

"They are pleased to learn that you have arrived in Beijing and they asked me to convey their best regards to you," Zhao said.

Kadar expressed his thanks by saying he was pleased to have an opportunity to visit China again.

Zhao recalled his visit to Hungary last June and said he was given a warm reception and hospitality by the Hungarian party, government and people.

"Though my stay in Hungary was short, I was deeply touched," he said.

"Our mutual visits have demonstrated that we are willing to enter into friendly cooperation, which conforms to the interests of our two peoples," Kadar replied. "The constant exchanges of experiences between the two parties are very important and beneficial."

### **Zhao Hosts Banquet**

*OW111934 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 1416 GMT 11 Oct 87*

[Text] Beijing, 11 Oct (XINHUA)—Zhao Ziyang, acting general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council, said tonight that the forthcoming 13th National Congress of the CPC will be a congress for accelerating the reform and opening to the outside world in an all-around way.

He said: The 13th National Congress will sum up the practical experience of the last 9 years, continue to uphold and develop the line laid down since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, and define the basic principles for future economic construction, economic and political restructuring, and party building in the course of the reform and opening to the outside world. After summing up our rich practical experience, the congress will make a creative, theoretical summarization of the line and policies to constantly deepen our understanding of socialism.

Zhao Ziyang made these remarks during a banquet in honor of Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, and his group in the Great Hall of the People.

Briefing the guests on the upcoming 13th CPC National Congress, Zhao Ziyang emphasized: "Our party Central Committee will, through the integration of theory with practice, expound a question of great importance, that China is now in the primary phase of socialism. This is the fundamental basis for formulating policies and line." The congress will also elect a new central leadership in accordance with the principle of making cadres more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated, and professionally more competent; and will continue to make new progress in lowering the average age of cadres to further ensure the stability and consistency of our policies. He said: "In short, it will be a congress for accelerating the reform and opening to the outside world to ensure that China will continue to advance on a road of socialism with Chinese characteristics."

On bilateral relations, Zhao Ziyang said: China attaches great importance to Sino-Hungarian friendship, and is convinced that such friendship is conducive to the two countries' socialist construction and reform and helps safeguard world peace. To continuously expand our friendly relations and cooperation is the unswerving policy of the CPC and the Chinese Government.

He said: The CPC sets a high value on the spirit displayed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in skillfully summing up historical experience and lessons, daring to explore, boldly reforming, and continuing to create new things by trusting in and relying on the people. He said: Both the Chinese people and the Hungarian people are upholding reform, and attaching importance to displaying the spirit of seeking truth from facts, daring to pioneer and constantly creating new things in consideration of the realities of their respective countries. Both countries' reforms are in a new phase of deepgoing development and have met with similar problems. We are willing to exchange information and experience with Hungarian comrades constantly, learn from each other, and make mutual progress.

Zhao Ziyang said: Both the Chinese people and the Hungarian people treasure peace very much and are aware that a sound, lasting, stable, and peaceful international environment is essential to socialist construction.

We highly appreciate Hungary's correct proposal that small and medium-sized countries should play a positive role in international affairs. We also highly appreciate the unremitting efforts and positive contributions made by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Hungarian people to safeguarding world peace, promoting relaxation in Europe, and promoting exchange and dialogue between Eastern and Western Europe.

Kadar said in his speech: Hungarian-Chinese relations have been further expanded to involve almost all areas of politics, economy, and social life, and the expansion has been especially rapid in recent years. We are greatly satisfied with the bilateral relations.

He reiterated that it is a firm and permanent part of Hungary's foreign policy to maintain relations with the socialist People's Republic of China. He was convinced that the development of socialist China is not only a cause of the Chinese people but is also in the basic interests of all people favoring social progress and all those striving to safeguard and maintain world peace.

He pointed out: Hungary and China share identical views on major issues that decide the destiny of the world. Both countries hold that world peace can be maintained, a world war can be avoided, and the militarization of space is impermissible. Both countries believe that for the survival of the human race and civilization, it is necessary to reduce and ultimately destroy existing nuclear weapons and other weapons. We welcome any steps leading to this objective.

Kadar said: Relations among communist parties and countries should be developed on the basis of equality, independence, mutual respect, and non-interference in internal affairs. Hungary and China also share identical views in this respect.

On domestic issues, Kadar said: It has been 20 years since we started an all-around reform of the economic management system. We have embarked on a difficult and sometimes tortuous road unknown to the predecessors. Since then, we have felt that our livelihood has constantly put forward some new questions which await solutions but cannot be resolved in conventional ways.

He said: The solution we seek should embody the unquestioned superiority of the socialist society and conform to economic principles. It should also facilitate rational and efficient managerial activities.

He said: "We welcome the stand emphasized by the CPC leaders that they regard as mutually complementary and indispensable the policies of opening to the outside world and reform and the adherence to the four cardinal principles of socialist construction."

Present at the banquet were principal members of Kadar's entourage and Tian Jiyun, Wu Xueqian, Hu Qili, Ji Pengfei, and Huang Zhen.

Zhao Ziyang presided at a ceremony to welcome the distinguished guests from Hungary on the plaza outside the east gate of the Great Hall of the People this afternoon.

**Zhao, Kadar Discuss Party Congress, Objectives**  
*OW121406 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service*  
*in Chinese 1131 GMT 12 Oct 87*

[Text] Beijing, 12 Oct (XINHUA)—Zhao Ziyang, acting general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and premier of the State Council, said today: The point of departure in China's political restructuring is to enable the people to be their own masters and ensure sustained stability of the country, so as to speed up its socialist construction.

When Zhao Ziyang held talks with Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, in the Great Hall of the People this morning, he briefed the latter on the preparations being made for the forthcoming 13th National CPC Congress.

Zhao Ziyang said: The 13th National CPC Congress will place the task of the political restructuring on the party's agenda. The long-term objective of the political restructuring is to build a socialist political system, highly efficient, full of vigor, and with a high degree of democracy and a complete legal system. It will take a long time to realize this objective. The short-term objective of the political restructuring is to overcome bureaucracy and feudal influence and build a leadership system that helps improve efficiency and vigor and brings the initiative of various quarters into greater play.

The 13th Party Congress will discuss such theoretical issues as: China is still in the elementary stage of socialism and it needs to develop a system of planned commodity economy. The recognition that China is still in the elementary stage of socialism is our primary basis on which we formulate our current policies.

With regard to Sino-Hungarian relations, Zhao Ziyang said: There exists a very good basis to develop the friendly relations between the two parties and states of China and Hungary. We hold identical [xiangtong] or similar [jiejin] positions and views on certain fundamental issues. On the question of peace and war, our basic views are identical. Both of us stand for the relaxation of international tension. Both parties hold that each should go about its socialist construction according to its own conditions and are in favor of reforms. We have many common points and views which will work over a long period of time as fundamental factors. It is normal that we should be at variance over some specific issues and they will not have an adverse effect on our friendly relations.

He said: The leaders of the two countries and parties share the desire to develop the friendly relations, which are built on the basis of mutual respect and trust. He

expressed the belief that the Sino-Hungarian relations would develop in a sustained, stable, and all-round way and keep growing to a higher level.

Zhao Ziyang also briefed Kadar on the achievements that China has scored since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee and some of the existing issues in the country at present.

Kadar said: The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party highly appraised the current Hungarian-Chinese relations. Our relations are solid, and our desire is to further strengthen and broaden these relations in various areas.

He said: Both Hungary and China are building socialism and carrying out reforms according to their own conditions. We have encountered same or similar problems in the course of building socialism and therefore it is useful to exchange ideas.

Kadar briefed Zhao on Hungary's achievement in socialist construction and the problems it encountered on its road of advance as well as the situation in carrying out reform in the country.

Both the host and the guest also exchanged views on developing economic cooperation between the two countries, and said that the economic, trade, and scientific cooperation between the two countries should be further expanded.

Also present on the occasion were principal members of Kadar's entourage and Tian Jiyun, Zhu Liang, and Liu Yi.

### Meeting With Deng Xiaoping

*OW131313 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 0854 GMT 13 Oct 87*

[Text] Beijing, 13 Oct (XINHUA)—Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Advisory Committee of the CPC Central Committee, said today: To accelerate construction and bring out the superiority of socialism, it is necessary to carry out economic and political restructuring.

When Deng Xiaoping met with Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse today, he pointed out: Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, China formulated a series of new principles and policies. In the last analysis, all these are aimed at guiding socialist construction in line with the ideological line of seeking truth from facts as advocated by late Comrade Mao Zedong. The central task we put forward is to develop social productive forces. As far as China is concerned, we must, first of all, shake off poverty, otherwise we will never be able to bring forth the superiority of the socialist system. He said: Poverty is not socialism.

Deng Xiaoping said: What we achieve in developing productive forces belongs to the entire people. Therefore, there will be no birth of a new bourgeoisie in the course of our development. There will be some differences in people's living standards, under the principle of "to each according to his work" in distribution, but we encourage people to achieve common prosperity. We will give a profound explanation of the principle both theoretically and practically. With this understanding, China is exploring the right road and right pace for its development. All this involves issues in the political, economic, and other spheres. Therefore, reforms are needed.

Deng Xiaoping said: The open policy is also a part of reform. He said: The 13th National CPC Congress is aimed at quickening the tempo in carrying out reforms. We must not only accelerate economic restructuring, but also list political restructuring on our agenda. To reduce the average age of party and state leaders is also an important project in carrying out reforms.

Deng Xiaoping said: The line, principles, and policies which have been in force since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee were formulated after summing up our positive and negative experiences. He said: Our development was sound during the first 7 years since the founding of new China. Since the second half of 1957, our socialist construction, in fact, ran counter to the line set by the Eighth National CPC Congress. The main trend was "leftist" which led to extremes. That was the "Cultural Revolution." It was during the "Cultural Revolution" that we lost much time.

Deng Xiaoping said: During the historical course of China's revolution and in the early stage of socialist construction, Comrade Mao Zedong did a very good job in integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete realities of China and in creatively developing Marxism-Leninism. We followed the path of the October Revolution, but in a different way, and we fully respected the concrete realities of China. Thus, we scored victories in carrying out democratic revolution, and smoothly entered the state of socialist construction. This is our positive experience.

Kadar said: Hungary has also experienced many changes. We have done away with dogmas; sought truth from facts; and proceeded from actual conditions to build socialism. Hungary is also undergoing all kinds of reforms. Only by carrying out reforms, will it be possible to push forward the cause of socialism. We seek to improve social productivity by proceeding from our actual conditions.

He said: A good relation of cooperation has already been established between the two parties and countries of Hungary and China, and Hungarian-Chinese relations have a bright and reliable future.



Deng Xiaoping said: This is because, first, both of us adhere to the socialist road—that is, both of us adhere to Marxism. Second, both of us hold that various countries must follow their own paths according to their own characteristics. We cannot mechanically copy any foreign model. Still less should we cast aside our own strong points. Leadership by the communist party is our strong point. We must separate the function of the party from that of the government, while the party and the government must interact with each other. Nevertheless, we must have the party's leadership at any rate. Much better than democracy in the West, our system of democratic centralism is also one of our strong points with which it is easier to unite the people. We cannot abandon the superior socialist system, and we must uphold the four cardinal principles.

Also present at the meeting were Tian Jiyun, Ji Pengfei, and others.

**Negotiations Continue Longer Than Planned**  
*LD121126 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian*  
1100 GMT 12 Oct 87

[Text] Hungarian-PRC negotiations have got under way in Beijing with a discussion between Janos Kadar and Zhao Ziyang. The MSZMP general secretary and the acting CPC general secretary met for almost 45 minutes longer than planned. After their meeting, the two negotiating delegations came together.

The PRC press, in reporting the talks, quotes Zhao Ziyang's toast, given yesterday, in which he said in connection with the Hungarian reform endeavors that the PRC has to solve similar problems. The PRC papers stress the part of Janos Kadar's speech in which he welcomes the policy of opening up and renewal in China.

**Tian Jiyun, Kadar at Great Wall**  
*OW121822 Beijing XINHUA in English*  
1601 GMT 12 Oct 87

[Text] Beijing, October 12 (XINHUA)—Visiting General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Janos Kadar toured the Great Wall this afternoon.

He was accompanied by Tian Jiyun, member of the Political Bureau of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and vice-premier.

In the evening, Kadar attended a soiree jointly held by the International Liaison Department of CPC Central Committee and Chinese Ministry of Culture. He was entertained with Chinese songs, dances and Peking opera.

Also present were Huang Zhen, Standing Committee member of CPC Central Advisory Commission, and Zhu Liang, head of the CPC Central Committee International Liaison Department.

**Meets Li Xiannian**

*OW131236 Beijing XINHUA in English*  
1226 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Beijing, October 13 (XINHUA)—President Li Xiannian expressed his hope today that relations between the parties, governments and peoples of China and Hungary would be further expanded.

Li Xiannian, who is also member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, made the remarks at a meeting with visiting General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Janos Kadar here today.

Kadar said that it is the purpose of his current visit to promote the development of the relations between the two countries.

The Hungarian leader said, his country hopes to deepen and expand the bilateral relations, adding that he feels the Chinese side also shares the same desire.

He said his visit has left a very good impression on him, and his talks with the Chinese leaders were proceeding in a frank and friendly atmosphere.

Li and Kadar have met thrice in 1950s.

Kadar said, "In the past 30 years, we have experienced a lot of things." Li continued that there were successes and mistakes in those things.

Li spoke highly of the achievements made by Hungary under the leadership of Kadar and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

Li expressed his hope that Karoly Nemeth, president of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, would visit China. Kadar thanked Li for that.

**NPC Chairman Peng Zhen Meets Kadar**

*OW131615 Beijing XINHUA in English*  
1601 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Beijing, October 13 (XINHUA)—Peng Zhen, chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, said here today that there is still a lot of construction to be accomplished in China and it is important to heighten the people's concept of legality in developing socialist democracy and perfecting the socialist legal system.

Speaking at a meeting with Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Socialist Workers Party of Hungary, Peng said that the socialist legal system should be perfected.

Kadar said that the Hungarian reform started earlier than China's, and the Hungarian party and people have realized through practice that the old methods of the 1950s will not do. "We need to find new ways and accumulate new experiences," he added.

Socialist democracy is an important issue, Kadar said. "to develop socialist democracy is to let the people participate in the process of policy-making," he explained.

"We started the work of bolstering the legal system not long ago," Peng went on. "It is essential to educate all the communist party members in this regard."

The party members should act within the scope of the constitution and laws, he stressed.

## POLAND

### Urban Discusses Bush Visit, Gorbachev Article

*LD221913 Warsaw PAP in English  
1445 GMT 22 Sep 87*

[By Waldemar Janiec and Janusz Zaleski]

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 22—In advance of U.S. Vice-President George Bush's visit to Warsaw, Polish Government about Mikhail Gorbachev's articles on disarmament, International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting, and construction workers' demands—these were main topics of today's press conference of Polish Government Spokesman Minister Jerzy Urban.

### In Advance of George Bush's Visit

Asked whether the itinerary of the U.S. Vice-President's visit to Poland envisages meetings with representatives of the so-called pro-Solidarnosc opposition, Jerzy Urban replied that the Polish side was not concerned with Vice-President Bush's visit private itinerary since they assumed that the fundamental purpose of the visit was further improvement and development of Polish-American relations

At the same time, Urban said that he was aware of the efforts made by the so-called "one million dollar activists" to "rub shoulders" with the American Vice-President.

"In our estimation," Urban said, "These meetings, noisily advertised afterwards by Western media, do not serve well those objectives of co-existence that inspire both sides when organizing official visits to our country by Western statesmen. As a matter of fact," he added, "Nowadays they are meetings, for example, of American politicians with their own clientele, that is to say in fact with representatives of American policy and American interests."

Urban went on to say that the Polish side sees no reason to prevent George Bush from delivering a speech in front of Polish television cameras.

He added then, replying to another question that Poland is willing to exchange ambassadors with the United States in near future.

"I think," he emphasized, "that mutual measures to this effect will constitute a logical consequence of the process of normalization of relations between our countries, of which the official visit to the Polish People's Republic by the United States' Vice-President is a manifestation."

### Polish Government on Gorbachev's Disarmament Concepts

Asked to present the stand of the Polish Government towards the contents of Gorbachev's article on disarmament and on curing international relations published in the "PRAVDA" and the "IZVESTIYA", Urban said:

"...The contents of Mikhail Gorbachev's article are extremely significant. It includes a programme of actions aimed at curing the situation in the world and the entire bulk of international relations. We fully share the premises of the concept of a world secure and free of the threat of nuclear catastrophe, as presented by Mikhail Gorbachev. We support the Soviet Union's efforts aimed at establishing a universal system of international security."

"This train of thoughts," Urban elaborated, "Guides also Polish activities on international arena. We actively participate in the peace offensive jointly carried out by the Warsaw Treaty member-states.

"We are a partner in the dialogue that co-establishes a world of mutual understanding and agreement. We support the efforts of the whole socialist community aimed at solving all major problems of mankind. We also make our own individual contribution into these efforts.

"Polish contribution to the re-building of the international community as proposed by the Soviet leader is the Jaruzelski Plan on reduction in armaments and increase in confidence in Central Europe, which has been recently put forward. It constitutes a continuation of the direction of Polish political thought that was manifested in the fifties by the Rapacki Plan.

"At the foundations of Wojciech Jaruzelski's proposals there lies such understanding of European political and military realities that leads to exposing elements which unite and combine security interests of European countries that belong to different blocs.

"At present, the plan is being consulted on bilateral basis with the states to which the memorandum of the Polish Government has been sent."

"Presently on a visit to New York," Urban continued, "Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Marian Orzechowski will present Polish standpoint towards global problems of the contemporary world when taking the floor at the general debate of 42nd session of the United Nations' General Assembly. On the 30th anniversary of the Rapacki Plan Minister Orzechowski will discuss the values of the Jaruzelski Plan that concern present European realities.

### **Poland and International Monetary Fund (IMF)**

Asked about the specific results of the recent Washington meeting of the executive directors of the International Monetary Fund, in which, among other topics, Polish issues were discussed and in which a Polish delegation headed by Minister for Finance Bazyli Samojlik participated, Urban said that during the meeting a considerable consistence between the Polish Government and the IMF had emerged when assessing the current situation and immediate developmental perspectives of Polish economy.

Urban pointed out that during the meeting a need for talks on an adjustment programme and on IMF "stand-by" credits for Poland had also been discussed. The date for the beginning of talks on the issue was not yet set formally. Along with the progress of work on the implementation of the second stage of economic reform appropriate consultations will be held with the IMF. The consultations will create a possibility to agree on the adjustment programme supported with the IMF credits as early as next year.

### **Stands of Building Workers**

Asked to take a stand on the September 16 decision of the council of the Federation of the Independent Selfgoverning Trade Unions of Building Workers which announced the "Day of Building Workers" as the day of union protest, demanding, among other things, larger rights for persons employed in this branch of the economy, including privileges in receiving flats, Urban denied that the government has not implemented the provisions of the Charter of Building Workers.

The spokesman stated: "The problem of housing is one of the biggest ailments in Poland. It is known that poor results in housing is not only the fault of building workers. However, I think that the government by submitting to the demands and (strike) threats, would act in contradiction to the social sense of justice. I am of the opinion that the Council of the Federation of Building Workers, the most important among several federations affiliating workers of this branch rendered building workers as a whole a not so good service by addressing demands to the government, which in the current building and housing situation are economically and morally unjustified and cannot count on society's approval."

### **Polish-GDR Border in the Szczecin Bay**

Answering a question concerning the Polish-GDR borderline in the Szczecin Bay, Urban said that it was arranged during the recent working meeting of Polish and GDR leaders that Polish-GDR talks will be held in the second half of October of this year, which surely will lead towards the settling of this problem.

### **Alleged Pacifists' Hunger-Strike**

Asked to present his opinion about the recent hunger-strike of military service opponents in Bydgoszcz (North-West of Warsaw), Jerzy Urban said that these noisy actions of a small group of persons were aimed against the security of Poland and her borders, against fundamental national values and traditions.

Noting that alleged pacifists' actions insult the feelings of war veterans and youth who are undergoing military service, Urban said:

"We are striving for a demilitarized world, but as long as this ideal does not come true the obligation to defend the country must and will be executed with all firmness."

### **Attempts To Politically Disturb Religious Ceremonies**

Asked to take a stand with regard to last Sunday's attempts by elements adverse to socialism to take political advantage of religious ceremonies in Czestochowa (Southern Poland), Jerzy Urban said:

"What I know about some aspects of pilgrimages to Czestochowa is nothing new, there is no new quality to it. Antistate elements go out of their way to misuse various religious events for their purposes and to give church rites an appearance of a political rally. Their intentions are part of anti-Polish programmes that work on a broader, international scale."

Stressing next that Western newsmen deliberately magnify incidents of this sort, the government spokesman said that Polish authorities consistently implemented the policy of shaping relations between the state and the church in a way that would match interests of Poland and the people. He noted at the same time that Western newsmen's practices on the discussed issue had also more than on a single occasion aroused protest of trustworthy church sources, including the Vatican after the last papal pilgrimage to Poland.

### **'Perfect' Do Not Play For Opposition**

During the conference Urban entered polemics with Western mass media reports which scented political writing on the wall in the recent performance of the Polish rock group "Perfect" in Warsaw's Dziesieciolecie Stadium.

Urban quoted a letter by band's leader Zbigniew Holdys, in which he protested against such misinterpretations of his group's performance and denied whereby he was in any way persecuted by the authorities or censorship board.

### No Anti-Semitism in Poland

Jerzy Urban contradicted the opinions of Josef Shemi, the author of the article called "Historic Lies" published in Israeli newspaper AL-HAMISHMAR, in which Poland had been accused of conducting an anti-semitic campaign. The government spokesman was personally attacked at that and aspersions were cast on the Polish leader by saying that he tolerated public anti-semitism and anti-semitic publications.

Urban described Shemi's revelations as "a pack of lies and calumnies", displaying at the same time his surprise that the Israeli daily, organ of the Mapam (United Workers' Party), should print attacks of this kind against Poland and Poles.

The government spokesman reminded also that maintaining their principal attitude towards the situation in the Middle East, Polish authorities exercised towards Israel a policy that was based on the appreciation of historic bonds and common cultural background with many of Israel's nationals.

"In order to ensure humanitarian facilitations," he stressed, "sections of interests have been opened: a Polish one in Tel Aviv and Israeli one in Warsaw. Cultural cooperation develops and facilitations extend to include travel to and from Israel."

### Urban Comments on Bush, Vranitzky, Vogel Visits

*LD292227 Warsaw PAP in English  
1845 GMT 29 Sep 87*

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 29: At his weekly press conference at the "Interpress" centre today, Government Press Spokesman Jerzy Urban answered a number of questions concerning a visit to Poland by U.S. Vice President George Bush, a recently concluded visit by Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, and a visit by SDP Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel which started today. Urban also answered questions concerning the state of economic relations between Poland and the USSR.

### On George Bush's Visit

Stressing at the beginning that the visit by U.S. Vice President George Bush to Poland has not ended yet, and that Poland's political and state authorities have not assessed it yet, the government press spokesman said:

"While focusing attention on the content of the official state visit I can say already now on behalf of the Polish authorities that we share the desire and the striving

expressed by the U.S. vice president to further improve relations between our countries. We reciprocate the aspiration to create strong basis for good relations between our governments, as such desire the vice president expressed in his airport arrival statement.

"We consider the talks held by the U.S. vice president and Wojciech Jaruzelski and other state officials to be sincere and constructive in their intentions. We are grateful for the warm words addressed to the Polish people, including the statement that Poland should be strong, prosperous, independent and to play its due role. We view it as worth mentioning that the vice president stressed the the United States did not want to interfere in Poland's internal matters and that it was not the task of the U.S. vice president, for instance, to point out to the Poles what road they should choose."

"With understanding we accept the U.S. vice president's explanation that the United States has payment difficulties itself and therefore it cannot help anybody. We are not asking for help, but we are simply asking that Poland be treated in a normal way in bilateral and international economic cooperation," Urban stressed.

"We hold the opinion that Mr Bush's assertion that the U.S. will no longer cause difficulties in Poland's talks with the Paris Club is the first step on this constructive path. Polish society does not expect American manna from heaven," Urban added.

"We cannot expect help from the U.S. for a country such as Poland which proceeds and will proceed along a different systemic road and belongs to the Warsaw Treaty. However, we want to look for that which joins rather than separates and we expect a departure from discrimination, which caused Poland considerable losses," Urban continued.

"The Polish authorities treat the signing of the agreement on scientific and technological cooperation and the decision on the exchange of ambassadors as important signs of the evolution of mutual relations in a favourable direction," he opined.

Asked to comment on the part of Vice President Bush's statement made on Monday on Polish television, in which he subtly hinted that American help for Poland will depend on "the development of freedom and pluralism", Urban said that he regards this part of the statement as a sign of the American vice president's inconsistency, who in another part spoke of the U.S.'S will of not interfering in Poland's internal matters. At the same time Urban stressed that Poland is a pluralistic country and that it will continue to develop socialist pluralism, meaning such socialism which falls within its systemic boundaries.

Answering another question, Urban informed the journalists that, as far as the exchange of ambassadors is concerned, the Polish authorities have agreed to give

agreement to John Davis, the hitherto charge d'affaires in Poland, with the American authorities similarly treating Jan Kinast, the hitherto deputy-minister of foreign affairs.

Asked to comment on the American side's opinion, according to which Lech Walesa is an important figure of the Polish political scene and asked whether, in the light of the changes taking place in Poland, Walesa could perform some important public role, Urban replied that Walesa could play such a role only in a country where he is so highly thought of, meaning the United States, and that this would agree with one of his past statements in which he said that he was an American.

In a question directed to the government press spokesman, one of the female American journalists, tried to detect a sign of the opening up of the mass media, among others, to the opposition in the decision of allowing George Bush to make a statement on television. At the same time she noted that many of her Polish interlocutors coolly commented the contents of George Hush's address, at the same time praising the government for allowing, in her own words, such a "precedent" to take place.

Replying, Urban said that Vice President Bush's Monday TV appearance can not be treated as precedent since western political and state leaders have spoken on Polish television before. At the same time Urban noted that there is not a day when opinions contrary to the opinions of the Polish government were not expressed on Polish television or radio.

Asked to size up the recent visit to Poland by Austria's Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, the government spokesman said: "We deem it an important event for the development of mutual Polish-Austrian relations and another example of the rise in Poland's activeness in the international arena and in all-European dialogue. In the opinion of both sides, the all-round Polish-Austrian cooperation serves not only Poland and Austria but also creates positive conditions for constructive cooperation of countries with different political systems on broader European scale."

At the same time, Urban stressed that Vranitzky's talks in Poland had confirmed the will of both sides to step up mutual trade and industrial cooperation. He also stressed that several concrete ventures were already being completed. H.J. Vogel in Poland [subhead]

Answering a question on the starting visit to Poland by SPD Chairman Hans Jochen Vogel, Urban said that he would be received still on Tuesday by PUWP CC First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski. "We attach great importance to the visit as a confirmation of our traditional contacts with the SPD that never broke dialogue with us. We expect also a new mandate for the PUWP-SPD

working group to be formulated as it will define further procedure of work and cooperation between both parties." On new forms of Polish-Soviet cooperation [subhead]

Answering a question related to new forms of Polish-Soviet [words indistinct] have created the political basis and conditions for the initiation of work on the restructuring of economic mechanisms and forms of cooperation leading to economic integration within the CMEA.

This concerns both multi-lateral and bilateral relations in an equal proportion. In Polish-Soviet economic relations the realization of, among other things, the "long-term programme of the development of Polish-soviet economic, scientific and technological cooperation up to the year 2000" and "the long-term comprehensive programme of scientific-technological progress" have become the practical consolidation of the phenomena in the sphere of ideology and politics.

The development of mutually profitable specialization and co-production is an important goal of the work being carried out. The development of new effective forms of integration, especially including direct cooperation between Polish and Soviet companies and organizations, the creation of joint enterprises and ad hoc scientific and research teams, as well as participation in the realization of investment projects in both countries, occupies an important position.

The direct cooperation between enterprises and organizations, initiated in 1984, is presently being realized by over 280 pairs of companies and organizations from both countries. as far as the creation of joint Polish-Soviet enterprises is concerned, decisions on the creation of 12 such enterprises have already been made (including 10 Polish and 2 Soviet ones). It is envisaged that the value of operations carried out within the scope of direct cooperation will amount to approximately 20 million roubles.

#### **Former Journalists' Association Will Not Be Reactivated**

Asked to present the stance of authorities concerning the motion from the leadership of the Association of Polish Journalists (SDP), which was dissolved under martial law, to reactivate the organization, Urban said that the decision on the matter would be taken in due time by appropriate bodies of state administration. At the same he defined general attitude of the authorities towards this and similar initiatives and said among others:

"The development of social life in Poland and the socialist pluralism will not take the path of reviving political structures of 1980 and 1981 which have long been dead now, and particularly those which followed

the policy of confrontation and created for the country and the people a dramatic situation that brought about the necessity of martial law.

"I do not think that the inspirers of exhumation of the late SDP cherish any naive illusions as to its revival. This is simply a demonstration held on the eve of the congress of the Association of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic, the organization which was called to life after the political fiasco of the SDP leaders," Urban said.

The spokesman stressed that at present, SD PRL [Journalists Association of the Polish People's Republic—FBIS] associated some 8,500 members that is more than the dissolved SDP ever did.

### On Protest of Construction Workers

Answering the question concerning the conflict between the Ministry of Construction and the Federation of Trade Unions of Construction workers, Jerzy Urban confirmed the will of the government to solve the conflicted issues on the road of talks and at the same time he expressed hope that such talks would soon be started.

### New Statute for Volunteer Reserve Citizens' Militia

26000786 Warsaw MONITOR POLSKI in Polish  
8 Aug 87 Item 190, pp 284-291

[Decree of 15 July 1987 by the minister of internal affairs assigning the organization "Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia" a statute]

[Text] On the basis of art 25 par 1 of the law of 13 June 1967 on the Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia (DZIENNIK USTAW 1987, No 15, item 94) the following is decreed:

#### Article 1.

The organization "Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia" is assigned the statute attached to this decree.

#### Article 2.

The decree of the minister of internal affairs of 28 May 1973 giving the organization "Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia" a statute (MONITOR POLSKI No 26, item 159) becomes ineffective.

#### Article 3.

The decree becomes effective when issued.

Minister of Internal Affairs C. Kiszczak

Attachment to the decree of the minister of internal affairs of 15 July 1987 (item 190).

## Statute of the Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia

### Chapter 1: General Considerations

#### Article 1.

The Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia, hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation ORMO, operates on the basis of the law of 13 June 1967 on the Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' Militia (DZIENNIK USTAW 1987, No 15, item 94), hereinafter called the law and on the basis of this statute.

#### Article 2.

1. The region of operation for ORMO is the territory of the Polish People's Republic.
2. The central authorities of ORMO are located in the capital city Warsaw.

#### Article 3.

1. ORMO is a civic organization actively participating in an organized way in the protection of public order, social property, and citizens' property under the direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in cooperation with the self-government bodies of the residents of cities and rural areas, state institutions, socialized economic units, and cooperative and civic organizations.
2. The members of ORMO conduct operations mentioned in par 1 independently or together with functionaries of the Citizens' Militia or with representatives of other bodies created for the protection of public order.

### Chapter 2: Membership

#### Article 4.

1. Members of ORMO are divided into 1) regular, 2) supporting, 3) honorary.
2. All references in the statute to members of ORMO apply to regular members.

#### Article 5.

An adult citizen of Poland who has an exemplary civic attitude and pledges to perform properly the obligations of a member of ORMO can become a member of ORMO.

#### Article 6.

1. A citizen who intends to join ORMO should acquaint himself with the law and the statute and supply the following documents:
  - 1) an application for membership including a declaration that he has acquainted himself with the law and statute of ORMO,
  - 2) a completed ORMO membership questionnaire,
  - 3) a recommendation from a political, civic, or profession organization or a recommendation by two ORMO members or other trustworthy citizens,
  - 4) two photographs.

2. The resolution to accept the candidate into ORMO will be made by the members of the unit to which the candidate is to be accepted by a public, simple majority vote in the presence of at least half of those entitled to vote. The resolution to accept should be taken within 30 days after the application is made.

3. The individual accepted as an ORMO member will take the following oath:

"I, (full name), promise faithfully to serve the socialist fatherland—the Polish People's Republic—observing the regulations of the law and the provisions of the statute of the Volunteer Reserve of the Citizens' Militia and to perform the assignments for which the organization was formed, in particular:

- 1) to participate in the protection of socialist social relations, state security, and public order,
- 2) to support the operations of the bodies under the minister of internal affairs and to intervene in cases of the disturbance of public order,
- 3) to give citizens essential aid in cases of catastrophe, fires, and other natural disasters,
- 4) by my actions to serve as an example for those around me and to strengthen social discipline,
- 5) to observe organizational discipline, conscientiously to perform the commands of my superiors, and actively to participate in training,
- 6) to act honestly and obey the socialist laws, and to guard the honor of an ORMO member and the good name of the organization."

4. The text of the oath after the signing is placed in the ORMO member's file.

5. The oath may be sworn collectively. The appropriate voivodship civic committee of ORMO will make this decision.

#### Article 7.

1. Transfer of an ORMO member to another unit may occur as a result of a change in his place of residence or work and at the request of the ORMO member.

2. In cases of a change of residence or work, the ORMO member is obliged to inform the commandant of his unit and report to the commandant of the unit in his new place of residence or work within one month.

#### Article 8.

A supporting member may be a physical or legal person supporting the goals of ORMO and providing financial or other aid for its operations.

#### Article 9.

1. A Polish citizen who through his actions has helped develop ORMO can become an honorary ORMO member; the honor of honorary member is given to outstanding members of long standing who cannot perform the organization's assignments directly.

2. The honor of honorary ORMO member is conferred by a resolution of the appropriate voivodship ORMO civic committee.

3. An honorary member is entitled to participate in the meetings of ORMO units, ceremonies, and functions organized for the members and to wear the organization's uniform and insignia.

#### Article 10.

1. An ORMO member has the right in internal organization operations:

- 1) to elect and be elected to the ORMO authorities,
- 2) to express himself at meetings on the operation of the ORMO unit and to make observations and recommendations on the operations specified by the ORMO charter.

2. An ORMO member is obligated in the organization's operations:

- 1) to belong to a particular ORMO unit and participate in its operations,
- 2) to participate in the meetings, training and instructional sessions, and briefings before service,
- 3) to perform his assignments associated with the protection of public order at least 8 hours monthly,
- 4) to report for duty at the unit commandant's order,
- 5) conscientiously to perform his superiors orders,
- 6) during the performance of his assignments associated with the protection of public order to wear the organization's uniform and insignia.

#### Article 11.

1. An ORMO member can be singled out for exemplary attitude and action in the protection of public order:

- 1) by praise expressed verbally or by a diploma or letter,
- 2) a material or monetary award.

2. The commandant of the ORMO unit gives praise verbally, a commandant of an ORMO organization, by diploma or letter.

3. The awards mention in par 1 point 2 are given by

- 1) the commandant of an ORMO organization from funds contributed by supporting members, bequests, or gifts,
- 2) the chief of the appropriate office of internal affairs, from the central budget for the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

4. For particularly active and effective action in the protection of public order an ORMO member can be

- 1) honored by
  - a) an honorary decoration "Merited ORMO Activist,"
  - b) a decoration "For Services in the Protection of Public Order,"
  - c) other decoration,
- 2) nominated for state awards, as outlined in separate regulations.

Article 12.

Punishment of ORMO members who violate organization discipline, socialist principles of community life or whose actions mar the good name of ORMO follows principles outlined in art 22 of the law.

**Chapter 3: Organization of ORMO**

Article 13.

1. The basic element in the operation of ORMO is the local, plant, or special ORMO unit, hereinafter called unit, formed by the appropriate commandant of an ORMO organization at the recommendation of at least six ORMO members and also of the chief of the office of internal affairs or commandant of a precinct or station of the Citizens' Militia.

2. A unit should include at least six members.

3. A unit with less than six members will be dissolved, and its members will be transferred to another unit. The commandant of the ORMO organization can in justifiable cases permit the operation of a unit with less than six members.

Article 14.

Subunits may be formed within a unit (teams, platoons, companies, battalions); their particular structure and number is established by the voivodship ORMO command. The operations of the subunits are directed by leaders under the commandant of the ORMO unit and named by him. The nomination is subject to the appropriate commandant of ORMO organization.

Article 15.

1. The local unit operates in the area of the basic geographical subdivision or a portion of it set by the commandant of the appropriate ORMO organization.

2. Local ORMO units are formed in order to

- 1) protect public order, social property, and citizens' property in cooperation with the bodies under the minister of internal affairs,
- 2) prevent phenomena of social pathology or violations of the principles of community life,
- 3) popularize the legal regulations protecting public order,
- 4) participate in civic functions and rescue operations,
- 5) conduct systematic supervision and guard structures (public offices, institutions, plants, trade outlets, public memorials, and other things requiring protection),
- 6) cooperate with self-government bodies of the residents of the cities and rural areas in maintaining public order in residential areas and villages,
- 7) provide individual care for socially misadjusted individuals.

Article 16.

1. The plant ORMO unit operates within the confines of the plant and within the area functionally associated with the plant (for example, a plant housing area, rail siding), set by the appropriate command of an ORMO organization.

2. Plant ORMO units can be formed to

- 1) perform tasks associated with maintaining order within the plant and in the area functionally connected with the plant and also during functions, ceremonies, or plant outings,
- 2) participate in rescue operations and removal of the effects of accidents, fires, catastrophes, and natural disasters, and providing help to injured individuals,
- 3) react to waste, misuse and lack of proper concern for plant property.

3. The plant ORMO unit cooperates with the plant management, self-government bodies, workers' council, party organization, and plant unit of the Industrial Fire Fighters, or other protection formations.

Article 17.

1. As needed, special ORMO units may be formed grouping members of ORMO according to their qualifications or interests, especially:

- 1) traffic units that
  - a) participate in patrols and traffic operations organized by units of the internal affairs ministry,
  - b) popularize the traffic regulations,
  - c) promote educational actions among road users, including organizing meetings, giving talks and lectures, initiating civic undertakings to build traffic parks, playgrounds and games for children and conducting training for individuals applying for a bicycle licenses,
  - d) cooperate with concerned institutions and civic organizations in the area of safety and order on the roads.
- 2) water safety units that
  - a) cooperate with the units of the internal affairs ministry, the local state administration, with the Volunteer Water Emergency Rescue, and other civic organizations in protecting public order on lakes, rivers, ocean beaches, and areas near water,
  - b) participate in maintaining public order at docks and landings, beaches, bathing areas, and vacation areas near water,
  - c) conduct educational programs to inculcate in people the observance of order and safety on or near water, especially in children and young people.
- 3) railroad units that
  - a) cooperate with units of the internal affairs ministry, the Railroad Security Service and railroad administration in protecting public order and public property and citizens' property on the railroads,
  - b) participate directly in performing service by patrolling railroad areas or serving at stations to prevent accidents among the railroad users,
  - c) participate in rescue operations and removing the effects of railroad catastrophes, fires, and natural disasters and preventing devastation of railroad equipment.



- 4) youth affairs units that
  - a) cooperate with units of the internal affairs ministry, institutions, and civic organizations in preventing juvenile crime and protecting youth from delinquency,
  - b) supervise constantly a particular playground and group of children and youth and areas for youth functions,
  - c) signal family courts, bodies under the minister of internal affairs, and educational authorities of cases of child abuse, of lack of care by parents or guardians, of demoralization or poor situation of children and youth, of truancy from school or work, and also of other conditions contributing to the delinquency of children and youth,
  - d) provide individual care and supervision of morally threatened children and youth and also to organize the provision of advice on child raising.
- 5) prevention units that
  - a) participate in patrol service (foot and motorized) together with functionaries of the Citizens' Militia or independently,
  - b) participate in actions and operations conducted by units of the internal affairs ministry,
  - c) cooperate with units of the internal affairs ministry in assuring order during functions and ceremonies,
  - d) inspect the sanitary and order conditions and prohibitions to sell, serve, or consume alcoholic beverages by retail outlets,
  - e) cooperate with units of the internal affairs ministry in searching for missing persons, materials, and objects essential for the security of citizens, etc.,
  - f) assist in protecting buildings of the internal affairs ministry,
  - g) hold watches in units under the minister of internal affairs, especially in rural stations of the Citizens' Militia.

2. Besides the special ORMO units listed in par 1, other units can be formed depending on local needs, for example to protect nature and the environment, fire prevention units, border protection units, and others.

#### Article 18.

In order to implement the tasks associated with state security and protection of public order among the members of local, plant, and special ORMO units in the appropriate state of health and younger than 50 years of age, close-order subunits will be formed to

- 1) participate in the operations of units of the internal affairs ministry when state security or public order is threatened,
- 2) maintain public order in group patrols in public places independently or with protective formations,
- 3) protect public buildings and the national economy,
- 4) participate in pursuit and blocking operations organized by units of the internal affairs ministry,

- 5) participate in liquidating the effects of natural disasters and catastrophes,
- 6) ensure order at functions and ceremonies.

#### Article 19.

In areas distant from offices of internal affairs, precincts, or stations of the Citizens' Militia, commandants of the appropriate ORMO organization can form independent ORMO offices which will be served by designated ORMO units.

#### Article 20.

1. ORMO units operating in rural townships, cities and rural townships, cities, or city districts form respectively rural township, city-rural township, city, or city district ORMO organizations.

2. Rural township, city-rural township, city, or city district ORMO organizations and units assigned organization rights operating within a voivodship form the voivodship ORMO organization.

#### Article 21.

1. The appropriate local body under the minister of internal affairs supervises the ORMO organization mentioned in art 20.

2. Operations of the ORMO organization are directed by their commandants with the aid of the ORMO commands.

3. The commands mentioned in par 2 are named by the appropriate ORMO civic committees on the recommendation of the appropriate ORMO commandants. They include the chief of staff, deputy commandant, and the members. The number of members of the staff and the division of their tasks is set by the appropriate ORMO civic committee at the recommendation of the ORMO commandant.

4. Representatives of the appropriate offices of internal affairs precincts, or stations of the Citizens' Militia will participate in the work of the ORMO command.

5. The chief of staff will direct the current work of the command.

6. ORMO commands operate on the basis of annual plans confirmed by the appropriate a ORMO civic committees and quarterly schedules confirmed by the commandants of the appropriate ORMO organizations in agreement with the appropriate office of internal affairs or precinct or station of the Citizens' Militia. Meetings of the command will be held as needed, but at least once a month.

### Chapter 4: ORMO Authorities

#### Article 22.

1. The ORMO authorities are

- 1) the National ORMO Civic Committee which provides civic supervision of ORMO,
- 2) the Main ORMO Commandant who directs its operations and represents ORMO to the outside,
- 3) voivodship, city, city district, city-rural township, and rural township ORMO civic committees which

provide civic supervision of the appropriate ORMO organization,

- 4) voivodship, city, city district, city-rural township, and rural township commandants of ORMO organizations which direct their operations and represent them to the outside.

2. The law defines the rights and obligations of the ORMO civic committees.

3. The number of members of the ORMO civic committees depends on the number of members in the ORMO organization; rural township and city-rural township ORMO organizations number from 6 to 8 members, city and city district from 10 to 12, voivodship from 25 to 35, and the National ORMO Civic Committee from 65 to 75 members.

4. Resolutions of the ORMO civic committees will be passed by a simple majority in the presence of at least half of the members of the committee. In cases of a tie vote the vote of the chair will be deciding.

#### Article 23.

1. ORMO civic committees will select from among their number a chair and two deputies at their first meeting.

2. Plenary sessions of ORMO civic committees at all levels will be held no less than twice a year.

3. Members of ORMO civic committees will work in the working groups of these committees. The principles of operation and manner in which they are named are determined by the National ORMO Civic Committee.

#### Article 24.

1. ORMO civic committees are named every four years.

2. The National ORMO Civic Committee will set the electoral calendar for elections of ORMO members to the ORMO civic committees at least three months prior to the end of the term of office and the day of the beginning of the election campaign.

3. If the minister of internal affairs dissolves an ORMO civic committee, the National ORMO Civic Committee will organize new elections in the area of the dissolved committee, setting their manner and regulations. Prior to the election of the new ORMO civic committee, the committee at the next level up will perform its functions.

#### Article 25.

1. Members of ORMO on ORMO civic committees are selected by delegates of the ORMO units and organizations at election conferences.

2. Delegates to election conferences for city, city district, city-rural township and rural township are elected directly by the members of ORMO units at their meetings.

3. The election conferences mentioned in par 2 will elect from among themselves city, city district, city-rural township, and rural township ORMO civic committees and delegates to the voivodship ORMO election conference.

4. The ORMO voivodship conference will elect the voivodship ORMO civic committee from the delegates to the voivodship conference.

5. The ORMO voivodship conference will select from the members of the voivodship ORMO civic committee its representatives for members of the National ORMO Civic Committee, one representative for every 10,000 ORMO members.

6. Elections to ORMO civic committees at all levels and also elections of the chairs of these committees and their deputies and delegates to the election conferences are by secret ballot. The number of candidates must exceed the number of those elected. The method for selecting candidates will be decided at the meeting of members of units and election conferences.

#### Article 26.

1. Only ORMO members may be delegates to election conferences at all levels. The outgoing ORMO civic committee can invite ORMO members to the conferences who are not delegates and other individuals who are not ORMO members with an advisory vote.

2. Only delegates to the conference have an active right to vote; all ORMO members participating in the ORMO election conference have a passive right to vote.

3. During their term in office ORMO civic committees may coopt new members to replace those lost; the number coopted may not exceed one-third of the committee's membership.

#### Article 27.

1. Commandants of ORMO organizations are responsible for their performance to the appropriate ORMO civic committees.

2. Commandants of ORMO units are responsible for their performance to the commandants of the ORMO organization to which their units belong.

#### Article 28.

Within their area of operations, commandants of ORMO organizations

- 1) direct the whole of the organization's work,

- 2) cooperate on a daily basis with the appropriate offices of internal affairs or precincts or stations of the Citizens' Militia,

- 3) are responsible for the discipline and training of ORMO members,

- 4) organize cooperation with units of the socialized economy, offices of the local state administration, civic organizations within areas included in ORMO tasks and are responsible for them,

- 5) present recommendations on ORMO organization structure within their area of operations,

- 6) undertake to popularize ORMO operations among society,

- 7) have the right to reward outstanding ORMO members,

- 8) represent the ORMO organization to the outside.

#### Article 29.

1. Operations of ORMO units are directed by their commandants.

2. Commandants of ORMO units are elected at meetings of the whole membership of the unit in a public vote. The meeting may, as needed, elect a deputy commandant.

3. Election is by simple majority among at least one half of the total membership.

4. The election of a unit commandant requires confirmation by the commandant of the appropriate ORMO organization.

5. Commandants of local ORMO units cooperate with self-government bodies in cities and rural areas.

6. Commandants of plant ORMO units (organizations) must agree on actions to protect the plant with the management of the plant, with the plant unit of the Industrial Fire Fighters, or other protection formations and fire fighting units.

7. Commandants of ORMO units will call a general meeting of the ORMO units at least once each quarter to discuss the actions of ORMO members and to determine the direction of operations.

### Chapter 5: ORMO Honor Courts

#### Article 30.

ORMO honor courts, hereinafter called honor courts, strengthen organization discipline, protect the honor and dignity of ORMO members, contribute to shaping their moral and political attitudes and in implanting and strengthening socialist principles of community life.

#### Article 31.

1. Honor courts are named by the appropriate ORMO civic committees from among the members of the ORMO organization for the term of office of these committees.

2. The number of members of an honor court is set by the appropriate ORMO civic committee in relation to the membership of the ORMO organization.

#### Article 32.

1. Honor courts of rural township, city-rural township, city and city district ORMO organizations examine:

- 1) appeals of ORMO members admonished by unit commandants,
- 2) cases of ORMO members who have violated organization discipline, socialist principles of community life, or threaten the good name of ORMO through their actions,

—except for those that concern the ORMO organizations' commandants, their deputies, or chiefs of staff.

2. Voivodship honor courts of ORMO organizations examine

- 1) appeals of decisions by courts of the first instance mentioned in par 1,
- 2) cases of ORMO organizations' commandants, their deputies, and ORMO chiefs of staff and ORMO members working in the voivodship ORMO staffs, who violate organization discipline, socialist principles of community life, or threaten the good name of ORMO through their actions.

3. The honor court of the National ORMO Civic Committee examines appeals of decisions made in the first instance by honor courts of voivodship ORMO organizations and cases of voivodship ORMO commandants, their deputies, chiefs of staff, and ORMO members serving on the ORMO Chief Commandants' staff.

4. In cases decided in the first instance by the honor court of the National ORMO Civic Committee appeals are heard by a different group of 5 individuals of this same court.

#### Article 33.

1. An honor court begins a case

- 1) at the recommendation of the commandant of the unit of which the accused is a member,
- 2) at the recommendation of a unit meeting,
- 3) due to a victim's complaint,
- 4) on the written recommendation of an ORMO member affected by the case.

2. Action on a case brought before an honor court cannot begin if a criminal case is in process.

3. An honor court cannot begin a case, if a year has passed from the day of the commission of the act violating organization discipline or the honor or dignity of an ORMO.

4. A case brought before the honor court should be heard within 30 days.

#### Article 34.

1. After receiving the recommendation (complaint), the chair of the court will appoint an adjudicating group, a prosecutor and a defender, and inform the accused that the case has been initiated.

2. If the circumstances cited in the recommendation (complaint) provide no foundation for holding a trial, the chair of the honor court will immediately inform the commandant of the appropriate ORMO unit, the recommender, and the ORMO member whom the case concerns.

3. Before the court decides to try the case the adjudicating group will inform the accused of the accusations, listen to his explanations, and after determining that there is a foundation for the honor court to try the case, move to try the case.

4. If despite the honor courts decision that there is no foundation to try the case (par 2), an ORMO member, accused in the case, can request the honor court within seven days of being informed of this decision to try the case. Such a request is binding for the court.

#### Article 35.

1. After of an honor court decides to try a case, the chair of the adjudicating group will

- 1) set a date for the trial,
- 2) summon witnesses to the trial,
- 3) present the accused with the whole of the materials in the case and inform him of the membership of the adjudicating group,
- 4) explain to the accused the rights he has to introduce motions on the evidence and to exclude members of the adjudicating group.

2. A member of the adjudicating group is subject to exclusion from participating in hearing a case, if:
  - 1) the case concerns this member directly or if he participated in the decision of the first instance, or gave testimony as a witness,
  - 2) there is between him and the accused, the victim, or the prosecutor a personal relationship of a type that could cast doubt on the impartiality of this member.

3. The chair of the adjudicating group will determine whether a member of the group is to be excluded, and in the case of the chair of the adjudicating group, the chair of the court will decide.

#### Article 36.

1. An honor court of three judges makes decisions.
2. The chair of the adjudicating group directs the trial and assures it proceeds properly and efficiently, taking care that all the essential circumstances of the case both favoring and damaging the accused are brought to light.
3. After completing the hearing of the evidence, the chair of the adjudicating group gives the floor, in order, to the prosecutor, the victim, the defender and the accused. After listening to the sides, the court will confer.
4. The adjudicating group on the basis of the total evidence brought to light at the trial decides the guilt and sentence by majority vote.

#### Article 37.

1. The adjudicating group makes a decision to punish, not to punish, or not guilty, or decides to discontinue the proceedings.
2. A decision to punish should contain
  - 1) the designation of the honor court that made it, the first and last names of the members of the adjudicating group and the recorder,
  - 2) the date and place of the decision,
  - 3) the first and last names and personal data specifying the identity of the accused,
  - 4) describe the accusation against the accused,
  - 5) describe the act of which the accused was found guilty,
  - 6) the punishment prescribed, including its legal foundation,
  - 7) instructions for the manner and the term of appeal,
  - 8) explanation.

#### Article 38.

The decision made in the trial is announced immediately after the conclusion of the conference.

#### Article 39.

1. The accused has the right to appeal the decision of an honor court to an honor court of the second instance.
2. The appeal is submitted in writing to the honor court that made the decision within 14 days from the date the decision was announced.
3. The honor court will immediately forward the appeal together with the records of the case to the appropriate honor court of the second instance.

4. The honor court of the second instance can:
  - 1) sustain the decision of the honor court of the first instance,
  - 2) take the appeal into consideration and change the decision if it determines a mistake in the determination of the facts by the honor court of the first instance,
  - 3) overturn the decision and return the case for retrial to the honor court of the first instance.
5. There is no appeal of the decision of the honor court of the second instance.

#### Article 40.

1. The decision of the honor court can be overturned in its supervisory mode by the honor court of the National ORMO Civic Committee.
2. A decision to reverse in favor of an ORMO member can be made at any time.
3. A decision to reverse against an ORMO member must be made before more than three months have elapsed from the date of the decision by the honor court and only when new essential facts unknown to the honor court during the trial come to light.

#### Article 41.

1. Disciplinary punishment is removed from the record one year from the date of a reprimand, 3) two years from the date of a reprimand with a warning.
  2. In cases of impeccable service confirmed by the immediate supervisor, a disciplinary action can be removed
    - 1) six months from the date of an admonition and reprimand,
    - 2) one year from the date of a reprimand with a warning.
  3. For showing courage or daring or for an important achievement in the performance of statutory duties, punishments can be removed ignoring the time periods mentioned in par 2.
  4. A decision to remove an admonition mentioned in par 2 and 3 is made by the commandant of the ORMO unit; a decision to remove a reprimand, or a reprimand with a warning is made by the honor court that issued the punishment.

### Chapter 6: Financial Management

#### Article 42.

1. Financial resources mentioned in art 28 par 1 of the law accumulated by the ORMO organizations and units and from gifts in kind can be used on resolution by the appropriate ORMO civic committees
  - 1) to purchase uniforms or parts of them,
  - 2) for training or cultural and educational activities,
  - 3) to purchase equipment,
  - 4) to reward ORMO members,
  - 5) for other purposes to improve the operation of ORMO.

2. In the use of its own ORMO financial resources, the needs of the ORMO organizations and units that provided these funds and the intentions of the benefactors should be observed respectively. In particular payments of rewards from funds supplied to ORMO units can be made only if it is explicitly stated that the given sum is for this purpose.

Article 43.

1. ORMO organizations and units will deposit their financial resources in current accounts of the appropriate local voivodship office of internal affairs or other offices of the ministry designated by the voivodship office; they will also deposit gifts in kind.

2. Units of the internal affairs ministry mentioned in par 1 exercise financial accounting service for the ORMO funds deposited with them, implementing the dispositions of the commandants of the ORMO organization or other individuals authorized by the appropriate ORMO civic committees.

3. Responsibility for the proper management of ORMO funds falls on,

- 1) substantively, the ORMO civic committees and in particular on the ORMO members mentioned in par 2,
- 2) with respect to following the financial regulations, the financial bodies of the units of the internal affairs ministry providing financial accounting services for these funds.

13021

### Prospects for New Church Agricultural Committee Viewed

26000777a Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish 9 Aug 87 p 1

[Article by Slawomir Siwek: "Is Something New Coming?"]

[Text] Last year a decision by the primate concluded the work of the Organizational Committee of the Agricultural Foundation around which various hopes had sprung up. The hopes of rural Poland—that an institution would be established that would strive to help with the hard work of farmers through modern technology.

The hopes of the people who created and supported the committee that joint work by the authorities and society might be possible on behalf of the general good which is the state of the national economy, and especially the agricultural economy.

Finally, the hopes of economists that reform of the economy by putting initiative back in the hands of the people would proceed not only on the paper of successive "assumptions" but in economic life as well.

The church wants to support all those activities by society that make its work more sensible. Becoming involved with the economy is not the job of the clergy

but in the case of the Agricultural Foundation the point was not direct production work carried out by priests, but inspiring us, lay people, to sensible economic activities.

Then the question arises whether along with the collapse of the idea of the foundation the whole thing would be forgotten. Fortunately, that was not the case. By special decree the primate transformed the Foundation's Organizational Committee into the Church Agricultural Committee. An institution within the church which in fact was to be devoted to the same idea as the previous institution: supporting the work of farmers. The committee also took over the foundation's leavings in the form of funds allocated by various public institutions in the West, not amounting to hundreds of millions to be sure, but to millions of dollars. Good use of this money—although limited—could also bring measurable results.

The committee undertook work aimed at using existing resources. Discussions were also undertaken, in a quiet atmosphere, with competent authorities on the subject of organizing foreign assistant for rural Poland.

As a result of the preparations carried out by the Agricultural Committee under the leadership of Prof Witold Trzeciakowski, an idea arose to support the training of agricultural mechanization specialist, conduct continuing education courses for rural housewives and assist public water supply committees in the villages. Discussions with the authorities on delivering technical equipment bought abroad (the point was using the money from the U.S. and the Common Market) brought concrete results this summer in the form of tax and tariff exemptions for goods brought in by the committee.

Institutionalization of a program to improve supplying the villages with water in accordance with federal law remains a serious problem. The progress of discussions on this subject is such that I would not rule out formation of a water foundation this fall.

This undeniably positive and optimistic information provided to the public by the committee appeared during discussions on reform of the Polish economy. Much is being said today about the broader scope of freedom for private economic initiatives. For it is true, and I expressed it in this column, that without changes in the system in this field, it will be impossible to eliminate the economic crisis in Poland.

As a result, the question arises whether "something new is coming" for the economic system. One swallow does not make a summer, especially if it is still sitting in its nest. If the committee is able to use its collected resources fully, the villages will feel the effects and, along with this, further initiatives will emerge without impediments—then one will be able to talk about the arrival of really new times.

If it turns out that there is a willingness to maintain this direction, I will adopt it wholeheartedly.

12776

**Statistical Profile of Catholic Church in 1986**  
26000777b *Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish*  
9 Aug 87 p 7

[Based on information from our own sources, Kathpress agency and Vatican Radio: "The Catholic Church in Poland 1986"]

[Text] The church's administration is comprised of 27 dioceses, 805 deaneries and 8,528 parishes. The size of the dioceses varies greatly. The largest are Warmia, Wroclaw, Koszalin-Kolobrzeg and Chelmno (from 7.8 percent to 5.6 percent) and the smallest are Gdansk, Katowice and Lodz (1 to 2 percent of the area of Poland). The number of deaneries and parishes has grown rapidly in recent years. For example, in 1978 there were 7,566 parishes while in 1986 that number rose by 962 parishes. On the average each parish covers about 40 square kilometers.

Bishops and priests.— In Poland on 14 February 1987 there were 95 bishops. Of these 26 were ordinary bishops (including four archbishops, three of whom are cardinals) and 61 auxiliary bishops (including one archbishop). In 1986 there were 17,217 diocesan priests and 4,670 monastic priests. A total of 21,887 priests, which means that there are 1,600 faithful per priest. The population in Poland is about 37.5 million and it is estimated that about 94 percent are Catholics (meaning baptized). Besides the Catholic religion about 25 other churches and religious communities operate in Poland (including the Orthodox Church with about half a million followers, the Augsburg Evangelical Church with about 100,000 and others with a few thousand to tens of thousands of members.

Convents and vocations.— In Poland 102 women's orders and about 50 men's orders (depending on how we count the Franciscan branch) are developing their activity. The orders count 23,7 professed nuns in open communities, 288 professed nuns in cloistered communities (data from 1985) and 2,725 convents. Within the men's orders are 4,670 priests and 1,569 brothers. The phenomenon of increasing vocations in Poland stands out very clearly in monasteries and convents. Considering the decade from 1975 to 1985 we note a significant increase in the number of novices. Here are the respective numbers and percentages of increase. Male novices—423 to 927, 119 percent; female novices—721 to 1,383, 91 percent. Likewise we note an increase in the number of alumni in diocesan seminaries (1974-1984). The overall numbers and increase are 4,216 to 8,833, 110 percent.

Religious life.— In Poland there are 14,229 churches and chapels and 19,737 catechetical centers. As an example, we offer two facts from religious life in Poland:

The ratio of priests per 10,000 population by province. On the average it comes to 5.8. In all of Poland it varies considerably from 3.2 to 10.1.

Dominicantes in Poland in 1980. Using appropriate research, one can show the number of faithful participating in Sunday mass by diocese (the percentage of those present of church in relation to those obligated, meaning so-called dominicantes). The percentage of dominicantes is rather varied, from 35.3 to 73.2 percent.

12776

## YUGOSLAVIA

**MLADOST Editor on Political Pressure, Youth Press**

28000230a *Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene*  
17 Apr 87 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Vlasta Mijovic, editor-in-chief of MLADOST, by David Tasic: "Labels, Labels, Labels..."]

[Text] [Question] In the last two years, MLADOST has made a lot of progress in all respects—especially in the quality of presentation and the commitment of the articles. This, however, brings with it a certain risk, and consequently MLADOST has been the target of political criticism more and more often...

[Answer] The fact that you are subjected to political criticism or that you are carefully read still does not prove your quality, but in any case it means that you are committed, and have a critical attitude. It is precisely in the direction of uncompromising journalistic commitment that MLADOST, in my opinion, has made the most radical transformation, which is obvious to all its readers. These days, for instance, the one who is most active in the public political criticism of MLADOST's articles and its overall orientation is Savo Krzavac, a well-known columnist and political standard-bearer, who is currently employed by the Information Section of the Serbian Socialist Alliance. At several meetings and sessions he has given us the kind of labels that have not appeared in the postwar history of Yugoslav journalism—and just because MLADOST criticized his inglorious role in the "DUGA affair."

Let me mention one more example, which illustrates how social criticism in Yugoslavia is permitted and tolerated only until it becomes specific. Last fall, I addressed three open letters through MLADOST to the president of the Central Committee of the LC of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Croatian LC, and a member of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee. There was an incredible reaction, especially in the first case, although it could have

been expected in view of our political practice. The Bosnians attacked me, and they suddenly also recalled some previous "malicious" articles directed against that republic, which is after all "mine"; in exactly the same way, Split's NEDELJNA DALMACIJA put me on a sort of blacklist after rapid consideration, and so they stopped the publication of an interview that one of their journalists had done with me before that open letter appeared; it was only in the third case that I was shown somewhat more tolerance, although many politicians—but not Setinc himself, to whom I had written—did not like the fact that some editor and some youth journal had addressed a party leader in an "undignified" manner.

MLADOST directs the edge of its criticism against specific people and bodies; it is not afraid to name those who are responsible and call them to account. They do not forgive this, however, even though they do not have anything to say in their own defense. The criticisms of MLADOST, consequently, are often the result of actions behind the scenes and of the personal displeasure of individual officials. The reactions are not public, and consequently they act against the journal covertly. Public remarks are the easiest to admit or rebut, especially when we ourselves are also aware of our mistake. The biggest problem for us and probably for other journals as well is those behind-the-scenes political messages, which do not consider who is right, but rather who is politically more powerful.

[Question] The varying degrees of toleration of the critical involvement of the press is directly dependent upon the overall level of tolerance in a given political milieu. You are currently working for a journal that has a federal, Yugoslav nature, but previously you were the editor of a republic youth newspaper (NASI DANI in Sarajevo). What are your experiences in this area?

[Answer] To put it bluntly, it is easiest for a journal to operate at the federal level, at least as far as MLADOST and the youth press in general are concerned. This is not because of any real democratic attitude on the part of the federal party, youth, or state leadership (for they set the limits of tolerance), but rather because of their disunity, ineffectiveness, and overlapping jurisdictions. At the republic level everything is much clearer, and so the differences are also more evident. Something that we say in Slovenia or Serbia is not a subject of serious attention, let alone repression, but may be perceived by some other milieux as counterrevolution, as an enemy attack. What I have written and published in Belgrade, as someone from Sarajevo, I could not dream of getting away with in Sarajevo. This is obvious, and we can observe it every day in journals. This, however, does not occur because of any differences in cultural and democratic tradition, although this also has a partial influence, but rather because of different political readings of the Constitution, the LCY Program, and also the criminal code. It is not important what one writes there; what is important is who reads it and how he interprets it. And thus, some

people are tolerant and reasonable; others frown, find fault, and write down the negative points; and yet others are paranoid and see the same enemy behind every bush.

[Question] Where do the pressures you are discussing come from, and through what mechanisms do people try to carry them out?

[Answer] Political pressures against journals and their collaborators are something that we have already become quite accustomed to. It is the same thing as when a soldier says that he is "going for his year of service." This, however, has more to do with a certain secret opinion, than with public opinion. Specifically, there are very few official, documented traces of how information is restricted or how an improper interpretation of it is demanded. The demand for this is a constant one—not to write about something at all, or if one does, to write about it in terms as general as possible. The main channel through which such directives flow lies in the editorial offices themselves, or more precisely: it is the directors and the chief editors. These are mostly allied with certain political leaderships or cliques, so that the pressures actually come from within the editorial mechanisms. This has to do with cases in which we have to deal with corrupted people, absolute careerists, who consider it more important to get into the good graces of someone who has political power than to create a good, honest, and uncompromising journal. Every concession of theirs is later paid for and assessed. On the other hand, if you are deaf to pressures, "advice," and telephone calls, you will become ripe for being shot down. You will pay the price for disobedience. Now it is MLADOST's turn, and mine. I am not a pessimist, but in the present situation, however, it is truly difficult to resist such pressures, especially when they come from the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee.

[Question] And where is the youth presidium here? Since you have already spoken of this, to what extent are cadre policy and specific posts in the press determined by informal circles, and to what extent are they determined by the youth organization itself?

[Answer] Cadre policy is formulated among politicians, but not in official discussions. It is rather a product and consequence of behind-the-scenes agreements. That is how "their" people, who often cannot handle the work entrusted to them, get into responsible posts in the press. A short time ago this happened to the review DUGA: they put some political worker at the head of it, who is more competent for political work, but does not have either the background or the talent for the kind of journalism that DUGA practices. This will destroy the journal.

As far as the youth press is concerned, informal cadre circles have the last word here as well. They push their "own" people in here too, which has been most obvious in the events surrounding Zagreb's POLET. I don't want to make a victim out of myself, but I think that the same

thing was involved in the intrigue associated with my reappointment for the position of chief and managing editor of MLADOST. It would have been logical for me to have been appointed without any problems, since all of the youth leadership's assessments of MLADOST to date have been positive. Youth needs that kind of journal, but obviously someone else does not. Consequently my candidacy is in doubt, and I have even been left without my base (in Bosnia), although in the bodies that have to give a valid assessment of this, no one is citing any official reasons. The leading figures in the LCY Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Bosnian LC have not even become involved this time, and my comrades from the youth organization have bowed down once again. As they have repeatedly emphasized, they would like to "shape their destiny." They would, but only in words. When things get serious, they are nowhere around.

[Question] Although MLADOST is a federal journal, most of the editorial board is composed of Belgrade journalists. Is MLADOST therefore also a Belgrade paper in spirit?

[Answer] This fact naturally influences the image of the journal. Although the editorial board tries to minimize this, it is not possible to get rid of it completely. Of course, this also has its good sides, above all professionally, since Belgrade is the real center of our journalism. Considerably more, however, is said about the negative sides, about how we are subject to the atmosphere and positions of a certain "milieu," in this case the Belgrade one, although which one does not matter. MLADINA is based on the cultural and political tone of Ljubljana, and POLET on Zagreb, and thus MLADOST also cannot be separated from Belgrade. Its status as a federal journal does not give it immunity from a specific milieu, although so far I have not heard of MLADOST being part of the Belgrade press, in the pejorative and very debatable meaning of that term.

[Question] In your opinion, how does MLADOST differ from those journals to which that term can be applied, and which follow political events in Yugoslavia in what we could call a recognizable way?

[Answer] It seems to me that so far MLADOST has not once spoken out along the lines of narrow Belgrade or narrow Serbian views of certain problems. What I mean is that it is not within the circle of the everyday politics that usually dictate those views. Our coverage, however, is usually permeated by "Belgradism," simply because we have thought, and we still think, that at this time such a position is closest to actuality and to the political realities. For example, let me say that we are supporting, and will continue to support, such a solution of the Kosovo problems and the problems in fulfilling the constitutional position of the Serbian SR. If we acquire the "Belgrade" label because of that, it is not our fault, since it seems to me, at least, that that is where the most reasonable proposals and political initiatives for the

solution of these two major problems are coming from. I therefore consider these positions to be my own, the product of my own considerations, and not of a narrow political classification; just as our coverage expresses disagreement with the way in which the struggle against ideological dissidents is being conducted in Belgrade, or with the methods used to "tame" part of the Belgrade press. In that case, we also differ fundamentally from the "Belgrade press" itself, and we distance ourselves from it. I think myself that it is too politically castrated, and that it dangles on a daily political string, especially POLITIKA.

[Question] MLADOST has tolerantly and reasonably discussed individual initiatives from Slovenia, specifically those from the youth organization, even though it has not always supported them.

[Answer] I think that every initiative that comes before the public through legitimate channels and seeks to convince the broadest democratic public must above all be presented in a dignified, timely, and correct manner. Only then can it meet with agreement or disagreement. On the basis of such an approach, I think, we have done the most in presenting those ideas, which other journals have mostly criticized, without presenting them in a credible manner. This seems to me to be incorrect, and in a narrow journalistic sense, unprofessional. Since the future will, unfortunately, bring us more situations like these, we should get used to them; we must learn that in a discussion we must really discuss things, without arbitrarily casting political labels in all directions. Personally, for instance, I might oppose all possible Slovene initiatives, but I would always advocate presenting them fairly to the public and having them discussed in a truly democratic manner, which implies that in the end someone will nevertheless recognize that he is wrong.

[Question] In such a politicized climate, under continual pressures, to what extent is it even possible to involve oneself with a journal?

[Answer] I think that this is precisely the right time for the rise of the press and for the promotion of its creative workers. The air is really electrified, and political nervousness and intolerance have become extreme; this, however, is a consequence of the complex and difficult situation in the country. This is surely a great challenge for the press. To some extent it has utilized it, although nowhere near as much as it could have. Journalists are people too, however. Personal security can also be more important to them than active political involvement. This often saves them personally, but it harms the journal. In my opinion, the better and more well-known youth journals have been the least affected by this. Of course, young people are more willing to take risks, and our time is a time of risks, especially political ones.

[Question] Do you mean that today the youth press is defending the honor of the Yugoslav press in general?



[Answer] Precisely—not in the professional sense, but in any case in the sense of preserving the dignity of Yugoslav journalists and journalism. What in fact does it mean that POLITIKA does not dare to write about the petitions of its own journalists, and then MLADOST does so? What is the significance of the fact that the “big press” constantly ignores certain themes and events, which are later said to be extremely important after the youth press has published them? It means cowardice and servility, since they are not writing about what they know much better and earlier than those who do convey it to the public. When the reader sees this, he loses faith in the press—justifiably.

[Question] According to that logic, the same readers should then become faithful readers of the youth press, which breaks through the political embargo. The circulations of youth journals do not confirm this, however.

[Answer] A committed and honest journal still needs a number of other qualities that will attract circulation and the trust of readers. The youth press, unfortunately, is not meeting many other requirements, and consequently it cannot expect that disillusioned public to turn to it automatically. It seems to me, however, that this aspiration is present, and is becoming more and more pronounced. With further cadre, financial, and qualitative growth, some youth journals could change their semi-anonymous position to significant roles tomorrow. In the final analysis, isn't MLADINA more influential than TELEKS, and wouldn't POLET be ahead of DANAS some of the time?

9909

## INTRABLOC

### **CEMA-Third World Trade 1970-1984 Charted, Prospects Viewed**

*26000775 Warsaw HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY in Polish Mar 87 pp 21-25*

[Article by Zofia Wysokinska: "East-South Trade 1970-84"]

[Text] The development of East-South trade can have significant consequences for overcoming the difficulties with which the socialist countries are struggling today. On the other hand it can be an important factor in the development of many Third World countries. In order to understand the scale of the opportunity and of the tasks associated with this trade, we need to know the starting point, i.e., the current state of cooperation between these two groups of countries.

In this article the analysis of this state is based on the broadest possible basis of statistical data drawn primarily from UN documents like the "Yearbook of International Trade Statistics," "Commodity Trade Statistics," "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics," and "Handbook of International Trade and Development" (published by UNCTAD), supplemented with data from other international organizations and data from statistical annuals and foreign trade annuals of individual countries. The data in national currencies are converted to American dollars using conversion factors published in the "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics." (1)

The study covers the six European socialist countries and the USSR and about 100 developing countries classified by the United Nations in the following six economic regions (2):

1. The developing Near East including the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (excluding Israel) and Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Cyprus.
2. Developing South Asia and Southeast Asia, including all the countries of Asia except for Japan and the four socialist countries: the PRC, the DPRK, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
3. Developing Africa, including all the African countries except for the Republic of South Africa.
4. Developing America, including the Latin American countries.
5. Developing Oceania, including the islands of Oceania except for New Zealand.
6. Developing Europe, including only Malta.

Such a large collection of Third World countries is obviously extremely varied, among other things as regards per capita income. It includes both the poorest

countries (like the Lao People's Democratic Republic where the per capita income in 1981 was \$112) and the richest (like the UAE where the per capita income exceed \$38,026). Table 1 presents a few basic indicators generally comparing the countries of East and South.

The great variation in raw materials, large sales markets for investment goods and processed products (especially in the richest countries of the South), and the favorable strategic, geographic location of many developing countries make them interesting trade partners for both the socialist and capitalist countries. Both of these groups of countries are developing their economic cooperation with the South as the data in Table 2 show.

These data show that the exports of the European socialist countries are more than 10-fold smaller than the exports of the highly developed countries. Nevertheless, the formers' rate of growth exceeds that of the exports of the West to the South. This is all the more important, for if the socialist countries maintain a positive balance of trade with the South (see Table 3), the formers' chances of paying their debt increase.

The rich, oil-exporting OPEC countries play a special role in the East's trade with the South. (3) The socialist countries on the whole run a positive balance of trade with them (see Table 4) and can earn cash credits.

The recent worsening economic situation of the OPEC countries, associated with a significant fall in the price of oil, may contribute to a reorientation of the trade of this group of countries with the socialist countries.

We must also emphasize that the shift by some developing countries to socialist forms of development naturally increases their economic relations with the CEMA countries.

As a result of the mentioned factors trade turnover between the two groups of countries grew throughout the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's. Only in 1982-83 was there a brief decline in trade between the groups of countries under consideration. This was caused by the difficulties experienced by the socialist countries and the general worsening of international trade and the economic crisis which moved from the industrial countries to the Third World. As Tables 5 and 6 show in 1984 the share of the developing countries in the structure of exports by European socialist countries increased again to 16.4 percent, approaching the highest level from 1981 (16.9 percent). Also the share of the South in imports by the European socialist countries increased systematically from 9.8 percent in 1970 to 14.0 percent in 1981; after a temporary decline in 1982, they again began to grow although more slowly.

Among the socialist countries, Romania and the USSR have the greatest share of trade with the Third World. Respectively about one-third and one-fifth of their total foreign trade is with the South. Bulgaria, Hungary, and

Poland also have a significant share of their trade with the developing countries; their index for the year analyzed are: exports—Bulgaria, 17.1 percent; Hungary, 12.6 percent; Poland, 12.2 percent; imports—Hungary, 12.0 percent; Poland, 10.3 percent; Bulgaria, 8.3 percent. The share of trade with the South in the structure of trade for the GDR and CSSR was much lower, and in 1984 it was respectively: exports 6.4 percent and 9.0 percent; imports 6.1 percent and 5.2 percent.

The most import partners for the socialist countries among the developing countries are: Cuba, Libya, India, Iran, Iraq, and Argentina. In 1984 trade with these countries constituted from 1 percent to more than 3 percent of the total value of the European socialist countries' trade (excluding the USSR). Nevertheless, some of these countries have somewhat more intense trade relations with other countries of the South. Thus, for example, Algeria and Turkey occupied important positions in Bulgaria's foreign trade, and Brazil and Angola, in the GDR's. Brazil, Morocco, and Egypt were important in Poland's trade, and Syria and Saudi Arabia, in Romania's.

For the CEMA countries, the structure of the exports and imports is among the particularly favorable aspects of their trade with the developing countries. The data in tables 7 and 8 show that about 70 percent of the total value of the CEMA countries' exports to the South are investment goods and other industrial products; on the other hand, 90 percent of the developing countries' exports to the socialist countries consist of raw materials, fuels, semifinished goods, food, fodder, and stimulants.

The data also reveal an unfavorable trend in the structure, especially of the socialist countries' exports to the developing countries. The share of machinery and transportation equipment and other industrial products (SITC 6 + 8, SITC 7) in these exports systematically declined throughout the 1970's and in 1981-82 (respectively from 17.1 percent to 11.5 percent and from 37 percent to 25.4 percent). Only in 1983 did the share of investment goods and transportation equipment rise to 29.7 percent, while the share of other industrial products (SITC 6 + 8) to total exports continued to decline (to 10.6

percent). There was a significant, systematic increase in the share throughout the entire period only in group 9, products not in the previous groups.

The share of fuels, food, fodder, and stimulants (SITC 0 + 1 + 1 + 3) in exports by the South to the socialist countries grew systematically in the 1970's and in 1981-82 (respectively from 2.8 percent to 23.2 percent and from 45.6 percent to 53.5 percent). In 1983 this pattern stopped and there was a slight decline in the share of both groups of goods (respectively to 22.5 percent and 52.5 percent). However, the share of raw materials (excluding fuels) in total exports by the developing countries to the socialist countries fell from 34.5 percent in 1970 to 13.7 percent in 1982, only to increase to 14.1 percent in 1983.

In conclusion, we must state that the prospects for developing East-South trade on the developing countries' large markets for processed goods and investment goods depends to a great degree on the attractiveness and competitiveness of the socialist countries' trade product assortments, associated chiefly with changes in the management system in these countries and the quality of their marketing adapted to the tastes and needs of the buyers in the Third World.

#### Footnotes

1. Given the lack of complete data, in some cases data from partners has been used as an approximation. This applies chiefly to the GDR and Bulgaria. If the partners' data was also not available, estimations were used. This applies primarily to the GDR. In the case of the GDR, data of total trade published in national statistical sources was divided into exports and imports using available information on the flow of the major goods, export and import totals for whole sectors of the economy, etc. These data obviously should be treated as approximations.

2. See the United Nations Standard Country Code, "Statistical Papers," Series M, No 49.

3. This group includes: Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Gabon, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, and the UAE.

Table 1. Basic Economic Indicators for the East and South in 1984

Category	Unit	European Socialist Countries	Developing Countries and USS.
Area	million km <sup>2</sup>	24.0	66.2
Population	million	386.4	2415.8
Population Density	inhabitants/km <sup>2</sup>	16.5	36.5
Per Capita Income(a)	\$	2629	893
Per Capita Exports	\$	460	195
Per Capita Imports	\$	413	184

a. 1982. Gross Domestic Product for the socialist countries, Net Material Product for the developing countries.

**Table 2. Trade with the South by the East and West (in millions of dollars)**

Category	1970	1980	1984
European CEMA Exports to Developing Countries	4,066	23,353	29,06
Industrialized Countries Exports to Developing Countries	41,356	295,086	265,9:
Developing Countries' Exports to CEMA	2,825	16,514	16,98
Developing Countries' Exports to Industrialized Countries	39,758	391,623	305,683

**Table 3. East's Approximate Balance of Trade with the South (in millions of dollars)**

Country	1970	1980	1984
All European CEMA Countries	+1120	+2771	+735
Bulgaria	+33	+1059	+114
Czechoslovakia	+87	+456	+66:
GDR	+13	+20	+20:
Hungary	-16	+54	+10)
Poland	+79	-323	-326
Romania	+46	-1786	-327
USSR	+879	+3290	+4590

**Table 4. East's Approximate Balance of Trade with OPEC Countries (in millions of dollars)**

Country	1970	1980	1984
All European CEMA Countries	+375	-570	-606
Bulgaria	+26	+652	+737
Czechoslovakia	+57	+376	+298
GDR	+14	-76	+38
Hungary	+11	+155	+93
Poland	+44	-144	+461
Romania	+38	-2096	-292
USSR	+18	+563	-1941

**Table 5. East Exports to South**

Year	CEMA	Bulgaria	CSSR	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Romania	USS.
<b>Value of Total Exports in Millions of Dollars</b>								
1970	30,892	2,004	3,792	4,581	2,317	3,548	1,851	12,80
1975	77,960	4,691	8,356	10,088	6,093	10,282	5,140	33,31
1980	156,928	10,372	14,891	17,312	8,677	16,997	12,230	76,44
1981	159,165	10,684	14,876	19,858	8,712	13,249	12,610	79,17
1982	167,552	11,352	15,694	21,743	8,768	11,174	11,714	87,10
1983	176,627	12,129	16,477	23,793	8,696	10,951	13,241	91,34
1984	177,537	12,850	17,196	24,838	8,563	11,687	10,754	91,64

Value of Exports to South in Millions of Dollars								
1970	4,066	154	370	254	149	292	179	2,6
1975	10,524	618	779	574	427	892	1,046	6,1
1980	23,353	1,576	1,358	1,388	986	1,476	2,371	14,7
1981	26,887	2,063	1,463	1,616	1,107	1,237	3,539	15,8
1982	23,226	2,173	1,483	1,923	1,228	1,319	3,257	11,8
1983	22,774	1,821	1,660	1,781	1,194	1,369	3,160	11,7
1984	29,062	2,202	1,544	1,600	1,075	1,425	3,046	18,1

  

Share of Total Exports to South (in percentages)								
1970	13.2	7.7	9.8	5.5	6.4	8.2	9.7	20.0
1975	13.5	13.2	9.3	5.7	7.0	8.7	20.4	18.0
1980	14.9	15.2	9.0	8.0	11.4	8.7	19.4	18.0
1981	16.9	19.3	9.3	8.1	12.7	9.3	28.1	20.0
1982	13.9	19.1	9.4	8.8	14.0	11.8	27.8	13.0
1983	12.9	15.0	10.0	7.5	13.7	12.5	23.9	12.9
1984	16.4	17.1	9.0	6.4	12.6	12.2	28.3	19.8

Table 6. East's Imports from South

Year	CEMA	Bulgaria	CSSR	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Romania	USSR
Value of Total Imports in Millions of Dollars \$								
1970	30,185	1,831	3,695	4,847	2,505	3,608	1,960	11,73
1975	87,828	5,408	9,106	11,290	7,177	12,537	5,342	36,96
1980	153,927	9,650	15,148	19,082	9,235	19,089	13,201	68,52
1981	155,497	10,800	14,633	20,181	9,125	15,476	12,458	72,82
1982	153,625	11,526	15,397	20,196	8,814	10,204	9,836	77,65
1983	158,998	12,283	16,324	21,524	8,503	9,995	9,959	80,41
1984	159,679	12,714	17,078	22,940	8,109	10,633	7,581	80,62

  

Value of Imports from South in Millions of Dollars								
1970	2,946	121	283	241	165	213	133	1,789
1975	9,565	320	570	578	545	630	745	6,177
1980	20,582	517	902	1,368	932	1,799	4,157	10,90
1981	21,761	703	977	992	852	1,113	3,495	13,62
1982	20,378	891	790	1,133	998	643	2,949	12,98
1983	21,271	937	771	1,326	1,121	794	3,262	13,01
1984	21,709	1,060	881	1,396	974	1,099	2,719	13,58

  

Share of Total Imports from South (in percentages)								
1970	9.8	6.6	7.7	5.0	6.6	5.9	6.8	15.2
1975	10.9	5.9	6.3	5.1	7.6	5.0	13.9	16.7
1980	13.4	5.4	6.0	7.2	10.1	9.4	31.5	15.9
1981	14.0	6.5	6.7	4.9	9.3	7.2	28.1	18.7
1982	13.3	7.7	5.1	5.6	11.2	6.3	30.0	16.7
1983	13.4	8.0	4.7	6.2	13.2	7.9	32.8	16.2
1984	13.6	8.3	5.2	6.1	12.0	10.3	35.9	16.8

Table 7. Structure of East's Exports to South  
(in percentages)

Year	All (SITC 0+9)	Food, Drink, Stimulants (SITC 0+1)	Raw Materials other than Fuels (SITC 2+4)	Mineral Fuels and Similar (SITC 3)	Chemicals (SITC 5)	Machinery and Transportation Equipment (SITC 7)	Industrial Products (SITC 6+8)	Other (a) (SITC 9)
1970	100	7.8	4.5	4.5	4.3	37.0	17.1	24.8
1975	100	10.3	4.7	9.4	6.4	30.9	15.2	23.1
1980	100	7.9	3.7	12.2	5.8	29.9	13.4	27.1
1981	100	7.6	6.0	14.5	6.1	26.4	12.6	26.8
1982	100	7.6	4.7	14.1	5.3	25.4	11.5	31.4
1983	100	5.5	4.0	14.7	5.3	25.4	11.5	31.4
1984	100	7.4	7.6	15.5	5.7	27.6	14.2	22.0

(a) Group 9 SITC includes goods not in groups 0-8. In the case of the CEMA countries, it also includes goods not assignable to the individuals groups in SITC nomenclature but included in the national statistics of the socialist countries using the uniform CEMA nomenclature.

Source: Prepared using data in the "Yearbook of International Trade Statistics" for various years and the "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics," various issues.

Table 8. Structure of South's Exports to East

Year	All (SITC 0+9)	Food, Drink, Stimulants (SITC 0+1)	Raw Materials other than Fuels (SITC 2+4)	Mineral Fuels and Similar (SITC 3)	Chemicals (SITC 5)	Machinery and Transportation Equipment (SITC 7)	Industrial Products (SITC 6+8)	Other (a) (SITC 9)
1970	100	45.6	34.5	2.8	1.6	0.2	14.9	0.4
1975	100	47.7	19.6	19.3	1.9	0.4	9.7	0.6
1980	100	48.8	17.1	21.8	1.6	0.4	9.7	0.6
1981	100	53.6	17.2	18.0	1.1	0.5	9.0	0.6
1982	100	53.5	13.7	23.2	1.0	0.4	7.5	0.7
1983	100	52.5	14.1	22.5	1.1	0.4	8.4	1.0
1984	100	50.2	15.5	21.2	1.3	1.6	9.4	0.8

(a) See comment to Table 7.

Source: As in Table 7.

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## POLAND

### Domestic Trade Minister Justifies Role, Describes Functions

26000780a Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 8 Aug 87 p 3

[Interview with Jerzy Jozwiak, minister of domestic trade and services, by Andrzej Mozolowski: "Who Needs You?"; first two paragraphs are POLITYKA introduction]

[Text] What would happen if we liquidated a few ministries, central offices, and seriously limited others? Would Poland collapse?

POLITYKA's new series "Who Needs You?" concerns reform of central institutions. In number 30, Zygmunt Szeliga proposed a new, limited set of government institutions. The reduction of ministries, central offices, committees on affairs, etc., plus a simultaneous decentralization and increase in the role of the market should improve the management of the country and the economy. In the above mentioned article "The Government—As It Is, As It Might Be," Z. Szeliga asked: "Why, for example, do we need the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services?" We asked Jerzy Jozwiak, the minister of this area, that question. The interview follows.

[Question] Mr Minister, what would happen if as part of a reorganization of the central institutions, your ministry was liquidated tomorrow? Can you imagine this situation?

[Answer] Why not, I have enough imagination. It can also easily imagine the consequences; you, too. But let's stick to life and the facts.

[Question] One obviously does not do such things from one day to the next. But seriously, if a period of preparation, say to the end of this year, were to precede such a liquidation [of the ministry]?

[Answer] Before I answer, let us first consider the functions of the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services. You obviously are not talking about removing the name plate from the building (the two of us could do that in 10 minutes) but of liquidating the functions we perform. You would agree that in managing there are some fundamental, natural I would say, functions that derive from concern for financial stability, market stability, a stable balance of payments, etc. The economy is the total of these objects. And as in an organism, if one organ cannot function, another also cannot, so in an economy individual functions, though separated from each other, must complement each other. Theoretically, we could create one ministry performing many varied functions. The thing is, could it maintain stability between these functions? Only then could it fulfill its proper service function for society. I doubt it could.

[Question] Let us talk about these functions. First, the distribution of goods, of which there are always too few, fairly among the voivodships.

[Answer] This is not the most important function, but so be it. As the supply grows and market principles increase in importance, less and less must be distributed centrally (we euphemistically call it controlling, but it is the same thing). The prerequisites for resigning from this function are good will and also understanding from my side. Suffice it to say that 12 years ago when I became minister, the ministry controlled 107 types of goods; a year later only 57; this year only 28 remained; from 1 January there will be 11, among them meat, butter, coal. Trade is supplanting distribution. Regional markets are forming; some better, some worse supplied with goods, independent of central distribution, but dependent on the energy of the local enterprises, especially on the development of local small-scale manufacturing. Parenthetically, the voivodship authorities who are unable to expand their small-scale manufacturing—on a large scale—are making a serious mistake. They will not meet the people's needs without local production. But returning to the subject: the time will come, I hope, when we will not distribute anything centrally; if the ministry only did this we could calmly liquidate it. But it performs other, more important functions and it is amazing that Zygmunt Szeliga does not see them, judging by what he writes about the Ministry in his article "The Government—As It Is, As It Might Be"

(POLITYKA 30). The ministry chiefly programs the market supplies: it sets global supply, its structure, the mutual dependence between basic markets, quantities, market stability.

[Question] The Planning Commission does not do this?

[Answer] The Planning Commission considers the stability of the economy; it examines it from its point of view. We look at the balance of goods and money, from the point of view of the people, the consumers. Supply, prices, personal income, these great proportions determine market stability, and no one besides us considers them as a whole. The entire consumption policy must remain in our hands. For whose else's hands? Further: who outside of this ministry can care for the most efficient operation of retail trade? For its development, for funds to build stores, shopping centers, warehouses, buy instruments, equipment, improve the miserable material base, whose inadequacies people feel so sharply?

[Question] Let the trade enterprises themselves do it. That is why they are to earn a profit. Their money, their affair.

[Answer] Not only theirs. You are making the same mistake as Z. Szeliga in the above-mentioned article when he writes: "Are there more stores, service outlets, sales personnel, waiters, or goods thanks to the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services?" It would be very bad if the ministry were to occupy itself with waiters, sales personnel, stores, equipment, etc. But it is the job of my ministry to create the economic and financial conditions for the enterprises, in which the number of good waiters, good sales personnel, etc., might multiply. Specifically: this depends, for example on how the official mark-ups are set, for there are official prices, and the taxes they pay. For example: until now they have only partially paid income taxes; this year they are to pay 65 percent. This would absorb the entire increased profit that they are able to accumulate thanks to higher mark-ups, without the ministry's efforts. Without this we could eliminate any opportunity for trade to improve its service for its customers. It would not have the funds. Who could, I ask, and will be able in the future to fight for a change in this situation? For official mark-ups, a decent tax rate, investment credits?

[Question] I would prefer that the activities of the Ministry of Finance did not create the need for such actions. In general one gets the impression that the actions of the government designed to stimulate production, motivation to work better, promote efficiency, etc., are sabotaged by the finance ministry that lays claim in advance to what the enterprises (and their employees) could achieve through better work, thanks to some government resolution.

[Answer] Each ministry has its tasks. Finance is to assure a balanced budget.

[Question] But it considers nothing else, unfortunately.

[Answer] I am to take care of market stability and the creation of conditions for the proper operation of trade and services. Everyone here plays a different role and only the collisions of these positions in the Council of Ministers brings the general position to light. Among other reasons, this is why we have ministries. Further, you say that only the work of trade enterprises should determine whether they have money for development. But they cannot negotiate credit rates with a bank which determines whether they can borrow for development. Nor can they set the rules for construction for trade and services—stores, pavilions—built by housing cooperatives as part of the so-called associated construction. Do you remember this fact: recently a complete impasse was reached in this type of construction; the housing cooperatives demanded sums for this construction that no trade enterprise was able to pay. The ministry had to seek a solution with the National Bank of Poland and found a very good one in the form of long-term, low-interest credits. A similar situation exists now in the rules for crediting cooperative construction. After a long controversy, a solution was found that was beneficial for the construction of trade and service outlets in new housing developments. Supervision, management, distributing through the ministry—this is the disappearing part; the creation of systems of rules of operation, of economic and financial systems for the market—this is increasingly important. Stimulating development. For example, services are still inadequate, they cannot manage by themselves. The ministry's task is to create economic and financial conditions in which they can grow.

[Question] And what of this task and this ministry, not a little one either, if the services that were inadequate still are inadequate.

[Answer] Their inadequacy grew over the years; the crisis added to it; making up for this will take years. But progress has been made. Further, setting rules: concessions for trade and service, giving craftsmen and service providers permits.

[Question] Could we get along without permits? Let everyone who has the desire, money, and the will to take a risk open a shop. This is normal, not an invention. If he chooses poorly, the market will eliminate him. Considering each time whether there is a social need for another tailor or laundry in a place has no sense; it only helps large units to eliminate potential competition.

[Answer] That is not the point. The national councils determine what is needed where. But there are now some categories of trade and crafts that do not require permits though they must register. We see the need to broaden this category as much as possible. But we must specify the qualifications that a candidate for

craftsman or retailer must meet: his professional qualifications, premises, the owner's lack of a criminal record; this is done all over the world. It is an element of the state's economic policy. And how important it has become to define the rules of operation for small-scale manufacturing to stimulate its development! This is not in the least simple. Many new measures in this area have been supported by our ministry which has initiated many systemic measures adopted for small-scale manufacturing. Take, for example, the rapid development of economic activities by social organizations and many production and trade cooperatives.

[Question] And what would you say about this solution: divide all the issues and tasks you have mentioned so far into two categories. Cede one demanding determinations from varied, local conditions to the voivod. Transfer the other demanding negotiations and central determinations to the central representatives of the concerned units: National Union of Consumer Cooperatives Spolem, Peasant Mutual Aid, the Central Union of the Crafts, the Association of Private Trade and Services, etc. Then the ministry would not be necessary, right?

[Answer] An impressive idea, but utopian. The market consists of an unbelievably rich mosaic of vertical structures, organizations, enterprises; as the reform progresses, monopoly disappears, competition develops, their number increases. Their problems occur on different levels: some within branches, some regionally, still others with organizational membership; setting the rules of the game for such a complicated creature like the market requires the existence of a competent state organ responsible for the market to conduct a market policy. The more market oriented our economy becomes, the more important these rules become. I will illustrate this with an example. If, for example, the market "regulated itself," complete freedom, it could reach stability itself with an upward vault in prices. We, however, are for this process-stabilization—occurring while preserving the appropriate proportions among price movements, income, and supply by using such resources as an import or credit policy, etc.

Finally there is the most important sphere: protecting consumer interests—setting rules for returning goods, warranty terms and conditions, rules for the operation of trade that favor the consumers. Only we can do this. Neither the industrial nor the trade enterprises care about this.

[Question] But do you not think that given the removal of commands and the increase in market relations in the entire economy that the leaders in other ministries will defend their existence with similar arguments showing that no changes in central institutions whatsoever are needed?



[Answer] Please ask my colleagues about this; I am responsible for those problems which I must resolve.

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[Question] Perhaps one Ministry of Trade and Industry, like the one before the war, would suffice?

[Answer] The conditions before and after the war cannot be compared, which, however, does not prevent various combinations of the ministries' operations. The Bulgarians, for example, have one ministry that deals with domestic and foreign trade and materials management. The Hungarians have joined trade with tourism. However, in my opinion it is the range of the ministries' operations that is important and not their number. Nothing would be easier than to change all the economic ministries into departments and their departments into sections and create one large ministry, by why? What does this change other than names? Genuine changes are changes in the functions performed. These changes are in full swing, and the second stage of the reform will accelerate them even more.

[Question] But these changes (I am thinking of the disappearance of the functions performed until now by the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Services) reduce in practice, if I understand you well, to limiting central distribution? As if the higher-ups had given birth to a mouse.

[Answer] Not in the least. First, I will repeat what has been added. Formulating a consumption policy and the instruments for implementing it, cooperation in setting the parameters of an economic policy affecting market stability, establishing the rules of operation on the object markets. As concerns small-scale production, editor Szeliga noted it. We are actually giving up distribution and managing the trade units. Much has been done in this area. The law on enterprises, the new law on cooperatives, and several other acts have given independence to trade. The last management function derives from the role of ministry as the founding body which, as you know, names and removes directors, assigns them bonuses (or not), etc. I have consciously resigned from this role. All the enterprises with clearly local natures, over which the ministry stands in this relation and there are nearly 90 of them, I intend to transfer to the local systems. And this will not be the end. Parenthetically, do you think the directors fervently want this? Absolutely not! Only now are they telling me how good I am and how they want to keep me. As you know, the minister in Warsaw is far away, and the local voivodship authorities are next door. But there is no way. I am cleansing the ministry of functions that it should not perform and keeping the essential ones. So that the government can govern and the enterprises manage. This is how I understand reform of the central institutions.

[Interviewer] Thank you for your comments.

### Exporters Discuss Problems in Increasing Trade with USSR

26000780e Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish  
14 Aug 87 pp 7,8

[Unattributed article: "Winning the Soviet Market"]

[Text] Difficulties have occurred in exports to the Soviet Union during the first six months of this year. There were shortages of supplies and delays of shipments of goods. As a result, there was a surplus of imports over exports in Polish-Soviet trade during this period. It was only 36 million rubles, but this is only due to the decline in the value of imports, a result of the significant decline in the price of crude oil and oil products and gas and other raw materials imported from the USSR. The increase in exports, however, was more than 5 points lower than the 9.5 percent increase planned for the whole year.

Awareness of the growing difficulties caused the ministry of foreign trade to call a meeting with representatives of the industrial enterprises, the foreign trade enterprises, and other interested economic ministries. The purpose of the discussion was to uncover barriers hampering an increase in exports to the USSR and finding ways to remove them. The meeting was conducted by Andrzej Wojcik, minister of foreign trade.

As was mentioned during the meeting, Poland also had a negative balance of trade with the USSR during the last 5-year plan. Poland's debt to the USSR was more than 4 billion rubles and \$1.3 billion at the end of 1985. The Soviet Union has agreed, to be sure, to delay payment of this debt until after 1990, but during this 5-year period we are paying interest and a portion of the credits received to partially equalize the balance of payments for 1985-86. In all the interest and principle payments for these 5 years significantly exceed 2 billion rubles. These burdens, given the pressure for imports from the Soviet Union, make it essential to increase significantly exports to that country.

Permanently maintaining a large trade deficit is a potential threat for the proper development of friendly relations with the USSR with which exchange and broadly understood cooperation play an important role in the development of our economy. The proportion of trade with the Soviet Union in Polish foreign trade exceeds 30 percent. More than 70 percent of the imports are raw materials and materials. In many cases they are the chief and even the only sources for supplies for our industry. For example, the Soviet Union supplies 100 percent of the gas and iron ore, 90 percent of the crude oil; 70 percent of the oil products, and 80 percent of the aluminum, iron ingots, and cotton.

During the current 5-year period trade between Poland and the USSR according to the agreement reached at the highest party and government levels should be in balance. The trade agreement indicates, among other things, that Polish-Soviet trade for 1986-90 will be 74 billion rubles (in 1985 prices) including 37.6 billion in exports and 36.4 billion in imports.

In order to meet this difficult goal, we must increase exports to the Soviet Union (in comparable prices) by 51 percent and imports by only 17 percent. The increase in exports should be triple that of imports in order to balance imports and exports by 1988, and in the following years we must create an export surplus to eliminate the deficit from 1986-87.

Thus we are entering a period of a dozen or so years during which exports must predominate over imports, during which increases in imports must be minimal. Such a strategic operation is hard to carry out in any country; it will be all the more difficult given shortages of raw materials and materials and of industrial technology.

About 60 percent of the planned increase in exports is designated for equalizing trade and about 40 percent for paying for the increase in shipments from the USSR. The increase is to consist of about 70 percent of increased shipments of machinery and equipment from Poland. Failure to meet this plan while maintaining the global level of export obligations would require increased shipments to the USSR of other types of goods, i.e., raw materials, materials, food-industry products, and industrial consumption goods, which are in short supply or unavailable.

One of the most pressing problems is increasing the volume of exports. This should be achieved by expanding the range of new products and timely execution of obligations accepted. Reserves should also be sought in changes in the structure of types of products toward more modern higher quality ones. Current implementation of the intention to increase the rate of export growth has depended on offering increased quantities of traditional goods.

Practice shows, however, that our Soviet partner's demand for these products is declining. The hierarchy of import needs in the Soviet Union is changing. The comprehensive changes occurring in the economy give preference to those who want to and can participate in the modernization of Soviet industry. It is essential then to adapt our offers to the changing needs of our partner and thereby become part of the program to develop his economy.

The selective import policy pursued recently by the USSR and the intensifying competition associated with it threaten to eliminate suppliers who offer outdated, low-quality products. Rivals of Polish exporters on the Soviet market are frequently other socialist countries.

Polish producers underestimate this fact. In machinery and equipment, there are, for example, serious delays in exporting new products, and the rapid growth of the percentage of these products was to be the major factor lowering the high consumption of materials and convertible currency. Continuation of this phenomenon could negatively affect the level of shipments planned in this 5-year period and threaten implementation of plans for cooperation with the USSR. This makes it absolutely necessary to exert greater pressure than before on technical innovation.

The change in the trade situation with the Soviet Union currently requires the use of new forms of cooperation. The development of exports based on traditional forms is insufficient. The cooperative and specialization agreements, direct production cooperation by enterprises, and broad scientific and technical cooperation are, among other things, to expand the economic potential directed toward exports to the Soviet Union.

Recently, some progress in the introduction of the most advanced forms of Soviet-Polish cooperation has been noted. Agreements on the principles for forming joint ventures and on direct production and scientific and technical cooperation have been signed. Shifting the brunt of cooperation to the enterprise level is an important systemic change that, however, requires unconventional solutions for difficult questions. Primarily it requires the creation of the foundation for a common economics, that allows the conduct of a uniform accounting of costs and profits, and the determination of the investments of each of the partners and the setting of prices for the products.

These as yet unresolved questions prevent the effects of the increased scientific and technical cooperation between Polish and Soviet enterprises from being fully realized in production and trade; production relationships often involve little more than trade in documents. Limitations in the transfer of new technologies and techniques from the developed capitalist countries is an additional impulse for improving cooperation mechanisms. By combining efforts with our Soviet partner we will create opportunities for accelerating scientific and technical advancement and favorable restructuring of our economy and developing Polish export specialties.

Trade with the USSR is not immune to the typical problems encountered in our exports, especially problems with supplies. Despite the resolution of the Council of Ministers on the principles and organization of supplies of materials and technologies and the determinations by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in May 1987, the lists of processed products, complete projects, and services for export whose production is covered by guaranteed material and technical supplies, producers still complain that they are insufficient both in quantity and quality, and we should expect that a new law on the use of production resources should bring some improvement

in the legal regulation of materials management. The definitive version of this proposal, including the suggestions of the Commission on the Economic Reform, is in the final phase of evaluation by the central authorities. The rules for purchasing and selling domestically produced supply goods intended for the production of finished goods for exports by Polish foreign trade units have been established. These rules also include exports to socialist countries, including the USSR.

Supply problems also include questions of imports of materials and components, especially from the convertible currency area. Exports to the socialist countries are supported by resources from central funds. Many producers feel that this subvention is insufficient. The ministry, however, sees no way to increase them.

Other means of support are also used to stimulate exports to the Soviet Union. Tax relief rates for exports to the USSR are higher than for exports to other CEMA member countries, and for many goods they are identical with those for shipments to the convertible-currency area.

Exports to the USSR are also given preferential treatment in drawing up task contracts. Implementation of these contracts involves financial incentives in the form of premiums from the funds of the minister of foreign trade.

Despite the existing systemic measures for stimulating the development of exports to the Soviet Union, the producers still display, in the opinion of the ministry, too little initiative in overcoming difficulties associated with its intensification and expect direct help from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Meanwhile the rules of the economic game under the reform require the producers and the foreign trade enterprises to independently seek the most effective means for developing exports.

13021

#### 'Igloopol' Cooperation With USSR

26000780c Krakow *ECHO KRAKOWA* in Polish  
3 Aug 87 p 2

[Text]The individual plants of Igloopol will initiate cooperation in the near future with 10 large farms and several food-industry plants in the USSR. These decisions, among others, were made during the recent visit in Debice of Viktor Nikonov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. According to the agreements experts will be exchanged, and a training center will be organized at Igloopol for the personnel of the large Soviet farms and food-industry plants. Soon a delegation from the 50 Years of the USSR State Farm will arrive in Debice. The cooperation between Igloopol and the Soviet Union has also produced a common investment in a plant to process fruits and vegetables and to produce pectins, which is to be built in Jedlinsk near Radom. Igloopol will supply equipment it produces and processing lines. The USSR is interested in

purchasing a dozen or so of these lines. A contract was also signed to ship 30 cold storage doors to the USSR in the coming year. Negotiations to sell tunnel freezers to plants in the Lithuanian SSR are also underway. The Soviet side is also interested in purchasing refrigerated trucks on Kamaz truck bodies and refrigerated trailers on Shap frames. A Soviet proposal to form a common enterprise in Uzbekistan, whose basic task would be to dry grapes, is under study. Igloopol has also proposed to open its own stores in Moscow and some other larger cities of the Soviet Union.

13021

#### 'Igloopol' Export Plans

26000780b Warsaw *EXPRESS WIECZORNY* in Polish  
4 Aug 87 p 2

[Text] Igloopol, located in Debice and known throughout Poland, wants to test its strength in foreign trade on its own. Recently, the plant obtained a concession from the minister of foreign trade to conduct direct export operations. It anticipates exports of fruits and vegetables, processed products from forest ground cover, potatoes, dairy products, culinary products, wine products, and food-industry machinery and equipment. It also intends to exports transportation equipment, furniture, charcoal, and tanning products. The selection of goods for foreign markets is very broad. Simultaneously Igloopol has received the right to process fruits and vegetables and produce animal feeds, packaging, sowing and reproduction materials, and other items needed to implement these exports. The concession includes operations in countries in both payments areas which a specialized bureau of foreign trade with the name Igloopol in its emblem will conduct.

13021

#### 'Miraculum' Joint Venture Update

26000780d Krakow *ECHO KRAKOWA* in Polish  
30 Jul 87 pp 1,2

[Excerpts]The ministry of chemistry has accepted the investment, equipment, and production plan of the International Enterprise—the Miraculum Cosmetic Plant in Krakow. Thus, the undertaking begun two years ago with initial talks is nearing completion. Both sides, Polish and Soviet, will sign the final contract in September. The USSR has decided to cover half of the necessary expenses (in zloty, rubles, and dollars) to complete the investment, modernize the plant, etc. It will also supply a significant portion of the raw materials. In return it will receive 64 percent of the production for its market. These will include, shampoos, creams, emulsions, cosmetic milks, and especially cosmetics for children. The enterprise already has its charter. We know that the director will be a Pole, his deputy a Soviet. Both

partners will have four representatives in the Managing Council that supervises the whole operation, and its chairman will change each year. The functions of the usual Workers' Council will be taken over by an Employees' Council which will include representatives of all socio-political and professional organizations. The official language: Polish. The firm operating on the basis of Polish law will receive export reliefs. The profit will be divided in half. The enterprise will retain the depreciation allowance and convertible currency earnings after taxes. Miraculum will also be able to purchase convertible currency in banks

of both countries. The right to conduct foreign trade independently and to cooperate with other partners is contemplated. The main principle for operations is complete independence, the greatest exports possible. Miraculum anticipates a true revolution. Production (from the new plant in 1991) will increase fourfold, the size of the workforce will double. The plant will have a gas boiler and a modern biological sewage treatment plant.

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## BULGARIA

**Zhivkov Message to Architecture Academy**  
*AU231408 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO*  
*in Bulgarian 22 Sep 87 p 1*

[Greetings Message from Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council, to the Fourth World Biennale of Architecture—INTERARKH'87—in Sofia on 21 September; read by Georgi Yordanov, minister of culture, science, and education]

[Text] Esteemed members of the International Academy of Architecture, ladies, and gentlemen, comrades, it is a pleasure for me to greet you on behalf of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and on my own behalf, on the occasion of the opening of the International Academy of Architecture and to wish you the greatest success in your future work, which involves great responsibility and is inspired by noble humanitarian ideals.

We are convinced that this academy is very useful for the development of international contacts among architects, for architecture worldwide, for the theory of architecture, and also, as regards improving the qualifications of young talents in your field of work.

Since ancient times architecture has been an important factor in the development of national civilizations for the improvement of the people's way of life. Architecture does not need mediators and interpreters in the cultural exchange among peoples in this field.

Architecture plays an important role in our country today in connection with the solution of crucial problems of our working sphere, of recreation, and as regards the everyday living conditions of our citizens, of entire social strata, as well as our society as a whole. Bulgarian

architects are actively participating in the implementation of our comprehensive programs for socioeconomic development in the country. With great enthusiasm they are working on projects for construction that are of tremendous scope compared with the size of our country.

At the same time, however, I would like to point out that we have serious claims on them because we would like their creative work to conform more closely to the new everyday life style of Bulgarian citizens. We would like this work to be in conformity with our people's great architectural traditions.

Esteemed gentlemen and friends, like all human activities, your noble profession needs favorable social conditions, and it needs peace and peaceful cooperation among peoples, above all other things. Under the conditions of military conflicts, the cultural values created by generations throughout the centuries are being destroyed. It is hardly necessary for me to convince you that the results of a nuclear conflagration would be disastrous.

As to its spirit and essence architecture is the antithesis of war.

This is, precisely, why you, the architects have always been champions of peace and disarmament, of friendship and comradeship among peoples.

The Bulgarian Government is conducting a consistent policy of peace and cooperation, supporting all initiatives aimed at banning and fully eliminating all types of mass destruction weapons. We are convinced that this is the only possibility for life to survive on our globe.

Permit me, once more, to express my confidence in the future activities of the International Academy of Architecture.

**END**