209122

JPRS-SEA-87-065 6 MAY 1987

> DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTOR A Approved by a blir contactor Distribution Unitalited

Southeast Asia Report

SPECIAL NOTICE INSIDE

19980610 128



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

SPECIAL NOTICE

Effective 1 June 1987 JPRS reports will have a new cover design and color, and some reports will have a different title and format. Some of the color changes may be implemented earlier if existing supplies of stock are depleted.

The new cover colors will be as follows:

CHINA.....aqua EAST EUROPE....gold SOVIET UNION.....salmon EAST ASIA.....yellow NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA..blue LATIN AMERICA....pink WEST EUROPE....ivory AFRICA (SUB-SAHARA)....tan SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY....gray WORLDWIDES....pewter

The changes that are of interest to readers of this report are as follows:

The SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT (SEA) will be titled EAST ASIA/SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEA).

The JAPAN REPORT (JAR) will be titled EAST ASIA/JAPAN (JAR).

The KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT (KAR) will be titled EAST ASIA/KOREA (KAR).

The MONGOLIAN REPORT (MON) will be titled EAST ASIA/MONGOLIA (MON).

KOREA: KULLOJA (AKU) will be issued as a separate series under EAST ASIA.

VIETNAM: TAP CHI CONG SAN (ATC) will be issued as a separate series under EAST ASIA.

If any subscription changes are desired, U.S. Government subscribers should notify their distribution contact point. Nongovernment subscribers should contact the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in <u>Government Reports</u> <u>Announcements</u> issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the <u>Monthly Catalog of</u> <u>U.S. Government Publications</u> issued by the <u>Superintendent of</u> Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

NOTE

JPRS-SEA-87-065 6 MAY 1987

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

Contents

LAOS

Enemy Sabotage, Technical Problems Plague Hydropower Plant (Oudom; PASASON, 9 Feb 87)	1
Swedish-Aided Repair Unit Wages, Productivity Reported (Kachip Pheung; PASASON, 5 Feb 87)	2
Party Paper Discusses Central, Local Economic Management (PASASON, 7 Feb 87)	3
Plywood Plant Claims Economic Reforms Yield Gains (PASASON, 4 Feb 87)	5
Briefs New Bank Branch Opens Route 9 Asphalting, USSR Aid Savannakhet Tax Collection, Harvest Savannakhet Electricity Production, Earnings	6 6 6
PHILIPPINES	
Wakaoji Case Impact on Relations With Japan (THE MANILA CHRONICLE, 3 Apr 87)	7
Retaliation Tourist Boycott Studied Editorial Charges 'Diplomatic Blackmail'	7 9
Manila Imposes Travel Ban to South Africa (Various sources, various dates)	11
Foreign Office's First Step, by Chay O. Florentino 'No Penalty' for Working in South Africa	11 12
Reportage on NPA Activities, Military Response (Various sources, various dates)	13

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{L}}$

1987 Death Toll 8 Policemen Killed Quezon Follow-Up, by Owen Masaganda U.S., Other Targets Considered, by Cecil Morella 11 Killed in Zamboanga 7 Soldiers Killed in Negros 8 Killed in Camarines Sur 7 Rebels Killed in Davao del Sur, by Romy Chan Iloilo Surrender Reported Holy Week Fighting	13 13 14 15 17 17 17 18 18 18 19
Reportage on Crop, Water Loses, Other Drought Impact (Various sources, various dates)	20
Rice Supplies Assured, Corn Shortage Major Grain Areas 'Spared' Threatens Water Supply in 6 Areas, by Marcia C. Rodriguez Damages Crops in 10 Provinces, by Mike M. Alunan Further Report, by Romy Tangbawan, Butch Fernandez	20 21 21 23 24
THAILAND	
Army, Khmer Rouge Tie in Weapons Traffic Causes Concern (Various sources, various dates)	26
Army Involvement Mooted; Chawalit Responds Paper Wants Army Out of Investigation, Editorial Weapons Seized, Investigation Stymied MOI Asks Army, Defense Cooperation Khmer Rouge Origin Seen, by Ophat Pehngcharoen	26 27 28 29 30
Paper Views Reagan Political Problems (Editorial; SIAM RAT, 7 Mar 87)	32
Background of Chawalit-Khukrit Relationship Probed (SU ANAKHOT, 25-31 Mar 87)	34
Ranking Army, Police Officials View CPM Rebels, Amnesty (SU ANAKHOT, 25-31 Mar 87)	38
Weekly Wants No Confidence Vote on Prem Cabinet (Editorial; SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN, 29 Mar-4 Apr 87)	42
Plight of Landless Laborers in Chonburi (SIAM RAT, 8 Mar 87)	43

VIETNAM

MILITARY

Deputy Chairman of Military Draft Council Interviewed (Nguyen Huu Tri Interview; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 10 Feb 87). 46

- b -

POLITICAL

Swedish Reporter Finds Increasing Openness in Criticism (Ingvar Oja; DAGENS NYHETER, various dates)	49
Minister Explains Quitting Cabinet Officials Skeptical Regarding Reform	49 52
Editorial Discusses Shortcomings in Party Criticism Activity (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 5 Feb 87)	54
Two Negative Aspects of Basic Party Organizations Noted (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 13 Feb 87)	56
Briefs Party Member Recruitment	58
ECONOMIC	
Swedish Aid Projects Seen Overcoming Earlier Problems (Ingvar Oja; DAGENS NYHETER, various dates)	59
Aid Minister Visits Bai Bang Other Aid Projects Succeeding	59 61
Hanoi Issues Regulations on Encouraging Production, Services (HANOI MOI, 22 Feb 87)	64
Strict Implementation of New Regulations Urged (Editorial; HANOI MOI, 22 Feb 87)	66
Amendments to New Economic Policies Recommended (Nguyen Kien Phuoc; NHAN DAN, 20 Feb 87)	68
Resolution of Party Congress Determined Role of HCM City Area (Nguyen Duc; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 13 Feb 87)	73
Changes Made To Develop Overall Economy of City (Ben Nghe; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 10 Jan 87)	76
Adoption of Rational Cash Management Policy Recommended (Tran Thi Hoa; NHAN DAN, 19 Feb 87)	79
Policy on Overseas Vietnamese Contributions Needed (Do Lien Chau; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 10 Jan 87)	80
Insurance Formalities for Overseas Packages Explained (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 10 Jan 87)	82
Role of Science, Technology in Suburban Agriculture Discussed (Nguyen Tan Xe; NONG NGHIEP, 5 Jan 87)	84

- c -

Cuu Long Agriculture Reviewed, New Tasks Set Forth (Nguyen Van Huyen; NONG NGHIEP, 5 Jan 87)	86
Agricultural Production in Long An Intensified (Nguyen Son Nam; NONG NGHIEP, 5 Jan 87)	89
Measures To Develop Animal Husbandry Taken (Nguyen Van Thuong; NONG NGHIEP, 5 Jan 87)	91
Local Inspection of Produce for Export Urged (Vuong Dua; NHAN DAN, 19 Feb 87)	94
Families Encouraged To Grow Coffee for Export (Mai Phong; NHAN DAN, 24 Feb 87)	97
Low Procurement Prices Reduce Sugar Supplies (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 8 Feb 87)	101
Hanoi Youth Coal Enterprise Increases Output (HANOI MOI, 5 Feb 87)	102
Thong Nhat Rubber Enterprise Fails To Fulfill 1986 Plan (HANOI MOI, 4 Feb 87)	103
Hanoi Small Industry Sector Pledges To Attain 1987 Goal (HANOI MOI, 22 Feb 87)	106
Hanoi Small Industry, Handicrafts Production Reported (TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP, 6 Feb 87)	108
Thai Binh Small Industry, Handicrafts Production Reviewed (Ngoc Van, et al.; TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP, 6 Feb 87)	110
Checkpoints Said Still Impeding Flow of Goods (Pham Duc Roan; NHAN DAN, 19 Feb 87)	112
Smugglers Caught Redhanded on Waterway (Le Tien Tuyen; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 10 Jan 87)	113
Work of Lotus-II Television Station Examined (Truong Van Tien; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 5 Feb 87)	114
Briefs Export Increase Exports Encouraged	116 116
SOCIAL ISSUES	
Hanoi To Transfer 7,500 to New Economic Zones	
(HANOI MOI, 11 Feb 87)	117
Ho Chi Minh City Raises Allowances for Teachers (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 6 Feb 87)	118
- d -	

•

ENEMY SABOTAGE, TECHNICAL PROBLEMS PLAGUE HYDROPOWER PLANT

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 9 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Oudom: "Stability of the Se Labam Hydropower Plant"]

[Excerpts] The Se Labam Hydropower Plant was begun in 1966 and completed in 1970. It consist of three turbines, and has been under government control since the national liberation. It is threatened by nature. For example, in the rainy season the water remains at the plant and affects production so that instead of the normal production of 680 kWh, it will produce only 400 kWh. On the other hand, during the dry season there is insufficient water.

Also, reactionaries have tried in every way possible to destroy this plant. Their last attempt was in March 1986, but they were annihilated by our local regional forces. Because of a shortage of equipment, during one period hardwood was used as a replacement spare parts. But later, it was realized that this was unscientific and unreliable. Although it could be done, the local forces realized the possible harm that might be caused if the machines were to break down. As for repairing the dam, the engines are overhanled twice a year and spare parts are ordered from abroad for repairs. Even though the three turbines are still working, the goal is to carry out major repairs of turbunes No l and No 3. As for increasing the power, there is a problem in installation, because the three turbines have only one water pipe to run the engines. While each turbine is able to produce 680 kWh, if all three turbines are operating instead of having full-scale power, the power is decreased because of insufficient water pressure. The problem that needs to be corrected in order to increase the production capacity lies in the water pipe system. If three water pipes are used with the three turbines, it will be possible to increase the production capacity. As it is, the hydropower plant can produce only 1,250 kW of electricity per night to serve the public in Pakse District and the nearby localities.

1

9884/12951 CSO: 4206/80 LAOS

SWEDISH-AIDED REPAIR UNIT WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY REPORTED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 5 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by Kachip Pheung: "The Lao-Swedish Friendshi Repair Factory for Machinery Exceeds the Plan in 1986"]

[Excerpts] Over the period of the past year there has been a satisfactory change in the Lao-Swedish Friendship Machinery Repair Factory. According to Mr Sisavat Boutsamali, chief of the board of directors, "During the past year the factory was able to repair a total of 1,080 cars, which was 108.88 percent over the plan. There was also an increase in the income, and 56,829,000 kip was handed over to the government treasury. Along with carrying out specialized tasks, we also paid attention to the problem of improving the standard of living, implementing various policies, and upgrading the specialized task of our cadres and workers. For example, we set up a store, a restaurant, a nursery and a small hospital within the factory to provide for the cadres so they could become enthusiastic in their tasks and have high sense of responsibility." It is true that, particularly since the transition to the new economic mechanism that began on 15 October 1986, the situation regarding production and all work activity within the factory has undergone a rapid change. The figure for car repairs shows an increase fron 71 car repairs in October 1986 to 84 car repairs in November 1986. The workers' consciousness has been raised and their sense of responsibility has been heightened, resulting in a decrease in absenteeism from work without valid reason. There has also been an increase in work efficiency. The average salary for worker in October was 3,750 kip. This was raised to 5,500 kip in November, and has steadily improved the standard of living for the cadres and workers.

9884/12951 CSO: 4206/80 PARTY PAPER DISCUSSES CENTRAL, LOCAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 7 Feb 87 p 1

["Editorial" Column: "The Central Economy Must Be Closely Coordinated with the Local Economy"]

[Text] In economic management we must consider the importance of promoting the latent capability of the central and local economies. In order to effectively carry out the production structure for agriculture, forestry and industry of our party, it is necessary not only to use many economic work sections, but also to adopt an economic structure wherely some components are directly controlled by the center and some are directly controlled locally. This standard of work allotment is economically reasonable, as the appropriate levels of management should be assigned according to their capability.

The management of work allocation to localities does not mean that the center leaves it entirely up to the localities. On the contrary, the center is still responsible for leadership, guidance and assistance, as well as for guiding, averaging, coordinating, inspecting and improving work nationwide. At the same time that the localities are building and expanding the economy, they must also be responsible for the whole. The primary goals of such work allocation are to promote self-mastery, creativity, independence and self-strengthening of local management levels. This will help to improve the localities, and at the same time the localities will also carry out their obligation to the center. This will help the center to focus its power and directly increase its ability to construct the central economy and to solve strategic problems for the entire nation and on a large scale in general. This allocation of work and levels will also broaden relations and cooperation, including economic cooperation; it will broader the relations between the central and the local economies and among the localities by focusing on the nature of the driving forces in the various localities, the central and local economic grassroots.

In order to dismantle the subsistence, each-for-himself type of economy, our party has encouraged joint business, a relationship that includes joint business relations and international cooperation. These have been attached to the plan in order to broaden production and circulation of domestic goods and imports and exports. These are extremely crucial, for they set a new and complex task in the new changes in making a plan, schedules, policy along with organizing, guiding and inspecting for the central and local guidance organizations in order to promote a spirit of determination and to halt and eliminate discouraging phenomena along the way. The plenum of our party's fourth congress emphasized that by constructing the central economy along with expanding the local economy, we truly apply democratic centralism in economic management in accordance with the actual situation in our country. This is a way to employ the entire latent abilities of the localities effectively, making it possible for the center to focus on solving all the strategic problems so that the entire national economy will prosper.

4

9884/12951 CSO: 4206/80

PLYWOOD PLANT CLAIMS ECONOMIC REFORMS YIELD GAINS

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 4 Feb 87 p 1

[Article: "Lao Plywood Plant Upgrades Its Efficiency"]

[Excerpt] According to a report on production under the new mechanism for the Lao Plywood Plant to a meeting on changing to business nationwide that was opened recently, since September 1986 they plant has been able to increase efficiency by many times, resulting in a rapid increase in production. On the average it produced nearly 60,000 pieces of plywood per month, along with over 50,000 square meters of veneer shuts and 500,000 square meters of logs after the bank is removed. Sawing veneer was also increased by over 900 cubic meters.

Generally speaking, in 1986 the total value of the plant's production increased by over 500 million kip, which was 2 percent over the expected plan, and it was also able to put over 55 million kip into the government budget. The worker's income increased by 50 percent.

By using economic leverage in production, selecting technicians with outstanding workmanship and assigning the work to them, and having the workers work hard and creatively, important gains were made. The indirect producers were reduced from 28 percent to 25 percent. Also the search for production materials is gradually becoming reliable and is being accomplished in time with the need on a fairly good basis.

9884/12951 CSO: 4206/80 LAOS

BRIEFS

NEW BANK BRANCH OPENS--The first state bank branch in Hom District, Vientiane Province, was opened early last week. More than 50 finance cadres from all sections attended the opening. [Excerpt] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 3 Feb 87 p 1] 9884

ROUTE 9 ASPHALTING, USSR AID--According to reports from Savannakhet Province, Route 9 between Km 105 and Km 175 in the Phalan area and connecting with Phin District has been paved with asphalt. By now 75 km have been paved with asphalt. The asphalting of strategic Route 9 began in 1985 with aid from the USSR. In 1986 during the campaign to emulate achievements for the Fourth Party Congress of the LPRP, workers of the Route 9 Construction Company and construction company workers from neighboring Vietnam succeeded in paving 54 km of Route 9 with asphalt. The Lao workers did 29 km of this paving. In 1987 the Route 9 Construction company has organized two asphalt paving companies, and has moved quickly to pave from the Phalan area to Keng Kabao Port, while the Vietnam construction company has paved from the Phin District area out toward Km 200 east of the Sepone District area, in order to fulfill the 1988 plan. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 2 Feb 87 p 1] 9884

SAVANNAKHET TAX COLLECTION, HARVEST--The agricultural tax collection in Savannakhet Province that began in mid-December 1986 has now ended, and over 7,000 tons of rice have been paid, or 80 percent of the plan. The agricultural tax collection in Savannakhet Province was active and met the expected plan more fully than in years past, because the production increased in terms of both quality and quantity. It can be said that the rice production of the farmers in Savannakhet Province in 1986 was better than in the past. Agricultural tax collection is now being carried out throughout Khammouan Province and other places feverishly, and is expected to be completed next month. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 9 Feb 87 p 1] 9884

SAVANNAKHET ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, EARNINGS--In 1986 the Savannakhet Province State Electrification Enterprise was able to distribute over 11 million kWh, which was 2.4 percent over the figure in 1985. The electricity distributed was valued at over 108 million kip. The enterprise was able to hand more than 5 million kip to the government budget. The power line system and the transformer system have been improved, especially the low-and medium-voltage power line system, which was expanded over 2,000 meters. Seven additional transformers were installed, and now many hundreds of people's houses in rural areas have electricity. [Excerpt] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 11 Feb 87 p 1] 9884

/12951 CSO: 4206/80 LAOS

PHILIPPINES

WAKAOJI CASE IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Retaliation Tourist Boycott Studied

HK031311 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 3 Apr 87 pp 1, 7

[Text] In what appears to be retaliation for the Tokyo government's move to keep Japanese travellers away from the Philippines as a result of the Wakaoji kidnapping, the Department of Foreign Affairs [DFA] is thinking of revoking the no-visa privilege the Japanese now enjoy here.

The CHRONICLE has learned from its sources in Padre Faura that DFA officials are scheduled to meet this week with their counterparts from the Department of Tourism, the Commission on Immigration and travel agencies to take up the visa issue.

The Japanese, who top the list of tourists to the Philippines can stay here for as long as 21 days without securing a visa.

The move to review the visa agreement is viewed by some senior DFA officials as (?retaliatory), considering that Japan last month advised its travel agencies to skip the Philippines as a travel destination. The ban was lifted a day after Noboyuki Wakaoji's release Tuesday evening.

The same sources said Filipinos travelling to Japan are required to secure visas no matter how short their stay.

Assistant Secretary Rodolfo Severino of the DFA's Asia-Pacific affairs office denied the Wakaoji kidnapping had strained RP-Japan relations. He said the implementation of stricter immigration rules, under serious study by the DFA, was probably intended to restrict the entry of syndicate members of the Yakuza. A high-ranking DFA official had said that the department would "look into" the Yakuza angle behind the kidnapping.

CHRONICLE sources, however, criticized Japan's handling of the four-month crisis as "harsh and unfair" to the Aquino Administration.

A senior DFA official, speaking on condition of anonymity, believed the kidnapping was an episode in the "corporate war" with Japanese businessmen "washing their dirty linen in the Philippines." For Japan to ban travel to the country and withhold investments, according to the official, was "atrocious."

Another high-ranking official complained that the Wakaoji kidnapping was "one single incident" compared to several reports of abuses committed against Filipino entertainers in Japan to which the Philippine Government has been keeping mum about.

The DFA officials believe the imposition of stricter immigration rules would be resisted by the tourism department and travel agencies. But as the "lead agency" in this effort, the DFA, according to them, would see to it that the review of the agreement would result in a fair implementation of immigration policies.

The diplomatic community, meanwhile, expressed relief over Wakaoji's safe release and at the same time declined comment on the Aquino Government's rescue efforts.

An ASEAN embassy official told the CHRONICLE the Philippines was "caught in the middle of a corporate war" over which it had no control.

The Soviet Embassy on the other hand said Moscow has always been opposed to any kind of terrorism.

"Hostage-taking is a regrettable fact," said an embassy official.

Filipino businessmen, meanwhile, said the release of Wakaoji would spur Japanese investments in the country.

Aurelio Periquet Jr., president of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), said he is glad that Wakaoji was not harmed by his captors.

Periquet said that Wakaoji's release would rejuvenate Japanese business activities in the country.

Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) President Manuel Morales said that the release of Wakaoji would have a good impact on the business climate here.

Msgr. Feliciano Palma, Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) spokesman, said yesterday the country's bishops are "happy" over Wakoji's release and "happier" still that he "had not been harmed and is in good health."

Palma said he hopes that with Wakaoji's release the country "will once again have a good relationship with Japan."

Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin, who earlier told newsmen he had assigned Bureau of Prisons Chaplain Msgr. Ernesto Tespiridion to help gain Wakaoji's freedom, is expected to come out with his official statement this week, his media office said.

Editorial Charges 'Diplomatic Blackmail'

HK031341 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 3 Apr 87 p 9

[Editorial: "Japanese Score a Diplomatic Blackmail in Wakaoji"]

[Text] The truth behind the kidnapping and release, after four months, of the Japanese business executive Noboyuki Wakaoji is yet to be told. For example, it is not known whether ransom was paid, whether the kidnapping was part of a political plot to destabilize the Aquino Government, what groups were responsible for the abduction and for what purpose, and what deals took place in the protracted negotiations for his release.

Maybe the whole truth will take time to surface because the facts are too sensitive. Evidently, the case is a very murky one. But from available facts, a disgusting picture of Japanese diplomatic blackmail on the Philippine Government has emerged.

It would seem that while Mr. Wakaoji was being held hostage, the Philippine Government was being held to ransom by Japan to produce him in one whole piece. To the satisfaction of Japan, Mr. Wakaoji has been delivered sound of mind and body, with his finger, which was supposed to have been cut off, intact. He need not see more surgeons and, upon release, he looked more healthy than the average undernourished Filipino peasant—thanks to his captors' concern for civil amenities. They may have fed him Kobe beef from some of the flourishing Japanese restaurants in Manila.

The kidnapping was not only a cause celebre in Japan. It was a case in which the Japanese Government, with the backing of Japanese business, demonstrated sledge-hammer diplomatic pressure on Manila to secure his freedom. The abduction was the test of whether Japan would continue to aid the economic recovery of this country from the devastation which some Japanese firms, in their sordid kickback deals with the Marcos regime, are partly responsible for.

The squeeze from Tokyo was clear, not to mention, extremely crude. In the immediate aftermath of the abduction, Tokyo imposed a ban on organized Japanese travel--a blow directed at the Philippine tourism industry. Of the 783,000 tourists who visited the Philippines in 1986, more than 120,000 were Japanese. After the abduction, the number of Japanese tourists dwindled by 20,000 from the total 134,261 Japanese who visited in 1986. In the gang-up, Tokyo dragged its feet on the 60-billion yen loan it promised it would study in response to President Aquino's request for a 120-billion yen loan from the Overseas Development Aid fund during her November 1986 visit to Japan. Then came the suspension of plans from a group of Japanese firms to invest \$150 million in Philippine industries.

Mrs. Aquino has not been the Japanese Government's model of a leader it would like to deal with. Although she received a vastly popular welcome from the Japanese people, the official welcome was more correct than warm. Her visit was a disappointment in terms of the amount of aid she proposed. Part of the reason is that many of the Japanese industrial giants were more comfortable with deposed President Marcos. It was possible for them to deal with the corrupt regime and its crony capitalism through which deals involving kickbacks--now being investigated by the Presidential Commission on Good Government--were made.

There is therefore a great deal of uncertainty about whether the Aquino Government is going to play the Marcos game. This is part of the reason for the severe reprisal on the Aquino Government following the Wakaoji abduction on the pretext that business is reluctant to invest in a politically unstable environment.

This pretext is valid to a certain extent, but it is sheer nonsense as an explanation for the diplomatic blackmail exerted on Manila.

Now that Mr. Wakaoji is free, the Japanese Government and the Japanese business community are rejoicing over the removal of the tension between Tokyo and Manila. They cannot even hide their celebration of the success of their blackmail--after delivering crippling blows to the economy.

/8309 CSO: 4200/495

MANILA IMPOSES TRAVEL BAN TO SOUTH AFRICA

Foreign Office's First Step

HK120753 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 12 Apr 87 p 3

[By Chay O. Florentino]

[Text] The Philippine Government has taken another step to firm up its international commitment to isolate South Africa because of that country's practice of racial discrimination.

Foreign Secretary Salvador H. Laurel has ordered Philippine consular offices to stamp on all Philippine passports "not valid for travel to South Africa."

The travel ban, Laurel said, is in line with the Philippine policy to isolate the racist regime in South Africa and in consideration of the Philippines' being a party to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

The Philippines is a founding member of the United Nations Special Committee against apartheid.

Under former President Marcos, the Philippines was seen by members of some international groups as not being serious about its commitment against South Africa's racism.

Famous golf player and South African Gary Player was seen in golf courses with no less than Marcos himself.

Even South African products like peaches and diamonds have made their way into local markets despite a commitment to ban trade with that country.

Recently, the Foreign Affairs office reminded the trade and industry department about the Philippine commitment. As a response, the department said it will see to it that the ban is strictly imposed. Ambassador Nicasio Valderrama, Philippine representative to the United Nations, said that with the advent of a new government under Ms. Aquino, the international community has come to look upon the country with renewed expectations.

The travel ban is the first concrete step the new government has taken.

'No Penalty' for Working in South Africa

HK130733 Hong Kong AFP in English 0710 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] Manila, April 13 (AFP)--The Philippines' Foreign Affairs Department has enforced a ban on travel to South Africa following its discovery that more than 100 Filipinos were working in that country, an official said here Monday.

Starting Friday, Filipino passports were stamped with "not valid for travel to South Africa."

This was in compliance with a ban on travel to South Africa first introduced here in 1975 because of Pretoria's apartheid policies, said Abraham Estavillo, chief of the department's Africa desk.

He told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that many Filipinos were apparently unaware of the ban and that about 100 Filipino professionals--mostly doctors and nurses--were currently working in South Africa.

These people would face no penalties if they returned to the Philippines and it would be up to South Africa to ignore or comply with the travel ban, he added.

In the past, Filipinos who travelled to South Africa usually went through a third country, Mr Estavillo said.

/8309 CSO: 4200/495

PHILIPPINES

REPORTAGE ON NPA ACTIVITIES, MILITARY RESPONSE

1987 Death Toll

HK091216 Hong Kong AFP in English 1159 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Manila, April 9 (AFP)--A total of 797 people have been killed in communist insurgency-related incidents in the Philippines since the start of the year, an average of nine a day, the official PHILIPPINE NEWS AGENCY (PNA) said Thursday.

A total of 277 communist New People's Army (NPA) guerrillas, 238 soldiers, police and militiamen, and 282 civilians were slain in the 88-day period ending April 8, PNA reported.

The 24,000-strong NPA marked its 18th founding anniversary last month with the launching of an assassination and arms seizure campaign directed against police and military in Manila and its suburbs, leaving at least 10 lawmen dead.

The period covered by the NPA report included a lull in the fighting during the whole of January up to February 8, when a 60-day ceasefire between government and rebel forces expired.

8 Policemen Killed

HK081031 Hong Kong AFP in English 1027 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Manila, April 8 (AFP)--Communist insurgents have killed eight policemen, including a police chief, in two incidents, the official PHILIPPINE NEWS AGENCY (PNA) said here Wednesday.

A town police chief and six of his men were killed and three policemen wounded in an ambush by communist rebels Tuesday at Mauban in Quezon Province south of here, the PNA said. Another policeman was shot by a communist rebel Wednesday at Lubao in Pampanga Province, north of the capital, the agency added.

Quezon Follow-up

HK101017 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 10 Apr 87 pp 1, 18

[By Owen Masaganda]

[Text] Mauban, Quezon--Constabulary and Integrated National Police (INP) units and the Philippine Army Light Armour Regiment have sealed all possible exits of a New People's Army (NPA) band suspected of ambushing last Tuesday a 20-man PC [Philippine Constabulary]-police team, killing eight policemen and one militiaman.

PC Rangers, backed up by PAF [Philippine Air Force] helicopter gunships and commando type V-150 and APC tanks, reportedly penetrated yesterday the forested areas in the towns of Mauban, Sampaloc, and Real in Quezon while a Laguna PC-INP force under Lt. Col. Francisco Zubia operated in Cavinti, Luisiana, and Siniloan.

The government forces were expected to reach soon the place where the NPAs were reportedly regrouping for another attack on military installations during the Holy Week.

Reports said that a number of slain NPAs were buried in barangay Lubayat near the boundary of Mauban and Real.

It was also reported that those who staged the ambush last month in Gen. Nakar, Quezon, killing nine PC and INP troopers, including the commanding officer Capt. Efren U. Catapang, and Tuesday's ambush of Major Augusto Bantayan and his men belonged to the same NPA group that participated in the recent peace talks.

The same report said that released NPA detainees participated in last Tuesday's ambush.

The released NPAs were also seen holding teach-ins with farmers and students in Tayabas, Lucban, Sampaloc and Mauban.

Some PC Rangers found medical kits left behind by the NPAs in Mauban, indicating that they treated their wounded companions. They also found abandoned houses inside the forested areas.

The Philippine Army Light Armour Regiment (PALAR), with APC and V-150 tanks, was loaned to the PC-INP operating here.

Brig. Gen. Alejandro Galido, 2d Infantry Battalion commander, said that he will send more men of the PALAR together with the elements of Task Force Lansag under Col. Bernardo Ramos to augment the PC-INP troopers of Recom 4.

U.S., Other Targets Considered

BK111331 Hong Kong AFP in English 1313 GMT 11 Apr 87

[By Cecil Morella]

[Text] Manila, April 10 (AFP)--The communist New People's Army (NPA) has listed a former U.S. general as a potential target of its "sparrow unit" assassination squads, a rebel leader said Saturday.

An NPA leader calling himself Sergio Romero told a clandestine news conference here that "U.S. military and civilian advisers" and Philippine police, military and civilian officials involved in couter-insurgency work were "potential targets" of communist hit squads.

"There are a few prospective targets" among U.S. Government personnel in the country, but the NPA "has not yet decided" on liquidating them, said Mr Romero, who asked that his features and the place of the interview not be described.

Asked if retired U.S. General John Singlaub, reported to have had dealings with right-wing groups here early this year, was among those potential targets, Mr Romero said: "Based on his activities here, based on his work in the counterinsurgency operations here, he is one of the targets."

General Singlaub, a former chairman of the World Anti-Communist League, has been involved in supplying weapons to rightwing Nicaraguan rebels, known as Contras, attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government.

The NPA official said "sparrow unit" squads killed 33 people in the capital with the loss of only one guerrilla since 1984. The NPA was able to step up attacks but did not intend to do so at this time, he said.

The United States, Manila's main trade partner, maintains two large military bases in the Philippines but has denied NPA accusations that it provides military advisers to the Philippine campaign against the 24,000-strong NPA.

The interview was the first time NPA rebels said they might attack U.S. personnel. A rebel leader operating near the U.S. Clark Air Base north of Manila said in December the guerrillas had "other things" to do.

"All U.S. military and civilian advisers, officers and men who engage in the planning, design, funding or implementation of counter-insurgency programs and operations" are "potential targets" of NPA sparrow units, Mr Romero said.

He said Manila's "Alex Boncayao Brigade," a NPA unit named after a labor leaderturned guerrilla slain by soldiers in 1983, had "punished" eight police and military men and 10 informers and bad elements" in Manila this year. He provided the names of an army lieutenant colonal slain here in March and five other police and military men who he said were killed for alleged crimes including drug trafficking, rape, and setting up spy networks. Two others were wounded but survived the attacks, he added.

Most of the killings occurred last month, immediately after the lapse of a 60-day ceasefire between government and rebel forces during which the two sides had tried to forge a political settlement to the 18-year rebellion.

NPA units had killed another 17 people since attacks began in Manila with the assassination of Police Brigadier General Tomas Karingal in May 1984, NPA leader Emilio Trinidad told the news conference. He added the NPA now had bases in 12 city districts.

He would not say how many guerrillas were in the capital, but said only that there were "enough" fighters for current plans. Mr Romero said there was brisk recruitment among urban poor, workers, students, youth and some professionals.

Civilian officials who forced citizens to form "vigilante groups or spy networks," and those who led or organized groups to fight the NPA were also potential targets, Mr Romero said.

Asked if Local Governments Secretary Jaime Ferrer, a vigilante advocate, was among the NPA's targets, Mr Romero said his case was being studied.

He said that one NPA fighter was slain when police and military men attacked a NPA safehouse in suburban Manila in 1985, but that no member under the NPA urban command had been killed or arrested since.

The military had reported the killing on three suspected NPA men in a gunfight in central Manila last week.

Irma Villamor, who confessed taking part in the slaying of a police captain in a Manila suburb after she was captured last week, was not an NPA member, Mr Romero said.

He said the NPA would henceforth announce to the press afterwards all NPA activities in the capital.

Mr Romero said the NPA would only hit police and military officers and men "proven to have incurred blood debts against the people, to be gross violators of human rights and to be actively involved in counter-insurgency."

Meanwhile, a soldier and two policemen escorting a candidate for congress in May elections were reported killed Friday by suspected NPA guerrillas who stopped the candidate's car near the northern town of Tineg.

Lawyer Rodolfo Bernardez, an independent congressional candidate, was returning to the provincial capital of Bangued with his bodyguards when they were stopped by armed men, military spokesmen said. The four were ordered to disembark and lie flat on the ground, but Mr Bernardez was spared by the gunmen, leading investigators to rule out that the attack as election-related, the spokesman told reporters.

At least six people, including two congressional candidates, had been killed in political violence since campaigning began last month.

11 Killed in Zamboanga

HK030203 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Text] Nine NPA rebels and 2 soldiers were killed in an all-night running fire-fight in San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. The fighting broke out Monday night and lasted till early the next day. Several other NPA rebels were reported wounded but they were able to escape with the rest of the rebel band. Seven other soldiers were reported wounded. Commander of the 1st Infantry Division Brigadier General Ernesto Maderato said elements of the 55th Infantry Battalion were on a probing mission when they came across a band of communist rebels some 40 kilometers from the city.

7 Soldiers Killed in Negros

HK070738 Quezon City Sports Radio 738 in English 0700 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Seven soldiers were killed in communist rebel ambushes in Negros Occidental in the past 3 days. Military authorities said the latest ambush occurred yesterday in Barangay Bagroy, Binalbagan where two soldiers from the 6th Army Infantry Battalion died. Two other soldiers were injured in the incident. They were assaulted on their way back to their home base in Isabela aboard a military jeep from Binalbagan.

Two days earlier, five soldiers from the same Army Infantry battalion were killed in another ambush in Carabolan, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental.

8 Killed in Camarines Sur

HK100759 Hong Kong AFP in English 0742 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Manila, April 10 (AFP)--Communist guerrillas ambushed a fire truck killing six policemen and two firemen, the official Philippine News Agency said Friday.

Two other policemen were reported wounded in Thursday's attack near Buhi town, some 290 kilometers (174 miles) southeast of Manila in Camarines Sur Province.

New People's Army (NPA) guerrillas ambushed the fire truck as it passed a village, the agency said, quoting the region's military chief.

It was not immediately clear whether the vehicle was responding to a fire alert or was being used by police patrols. Two NPA guerrillas were killed in a clash with a security patrol in Calabanga town, near Buhi Wednesday, the agency added.

Military spokesmen here could not immediately confirm the reports, which would bring the death toll in insurgency-related incidents this year to 807, giving a daily average of nine dead.

7 Rebels Killed in Davao del Sur

HK131123 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 13 Apr 87 p 14

[By Romy Chan]

[Text] Davao City--Seven New People's Army (NPA) rebels were killed in a clash with government troops on Mt Sinuron, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, last Saturday, a military report said.

A PC [Philippine Constabulary] soldier was wounded in the encounter.

The rebels fled carrying the bodies of six of their comrades toward the slopes of Mt. Apo in Sta. Cruz the 11th Regional Command here said. Only one body was found by the soldiers.

A 50-man NPA band was spotted by Philippine Army soldiers led by Lt. Eduardo Manahan and PC troops under Lt. Rodolfo Armina while they were patrolling Mt. Sinuron.

The encounter lasted for 30 minutes.

The rebels retreated to Mt. Apo as two Sikorsky helicopters bombed them.

Earlier, the rebels had killed two soldiers in Sitio Idong, Rizal, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur.

Iloilo Surrender Reported

HK130505 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0330 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] [Passage indistinct] Details from Tony Valencia:

[Begin recording] Twenty-one persons, including a civilian cameraman, were killed in [words indistinct] insurgency-related incidents throughout the country, reports (?culled) from the Armed Forces joint operations journal today said. Of the fatalities, 13 were government troopers, and the civilian cameraman was identified as Bonifacio (Labiyaw). The dissidents suffered eight killed. (Labiyaw) was one of those killed in the ambush at Barangay (Labawan), Buhi, Camarines Sur, where [words indistinct] were also slain. Government losses in that ambush in Camarines Sur, aside from the fatalities, [words indistinct] M-16 rifles, five .38 caliber revolvers, a .22 caliber revolver, and several rounds of ammunition. In Iloilo City, meanwhile, more than 300 CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines]-NPA supporters from Barangay (Takas), Jaro, Iloilo City, took their oath of allegiance to PC-INP [Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police] chief Major General Renato de Villa at ceremonies held at Camp Delgado in that city. Barangay (Takas), according to Recom [Regional Command] (?region) 6 commander Brigadier General Domingo Rio, is a haven for NPA squads operating [in] Iloilo City. For the past 5 years, Rio added, Barangay (Takas) has been under CPP-NPA influence. The ceremonies were led by [name indistinct], who claims to be a political officer of the dissident movement. [end recording]

Holy Week Fighting

HK160223 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Nine people, including four communist rebels, four soldiers and a militiaman, were killed in separate clashes across the country on the first two days of the holy week. According to military reports, the government also suffered eight wounded in the incidents but state troopers made up for this by wounding two rebels and capturing six others elsewhere.

In Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, state troopers killed two communist insurgents and wounded two others in a 2 and 1/2 hour gunbattle Tuesday. Lieutenant Colonel Romeo (Acud), Ilocos Norte constabulary commander, said the government troops also captured six rebels and (?15) high-powered guns. Three other members of the communist band escaped during the fire-fight.

In Pilar, Bataan, another rebel was killed and a constabulary soldier was wounded during a raid by state troopers on a suspected NPA hide-out Tuesday.

In Calayasan, Negros Oriental, a suspected communist rebel was also killed in a 10-minute gunfight with army troopers.

In (Lekud), Zamboanga del Sur, a militiaman was killed and a civilian was wounded when some 40 NPA rebels stormed the village Monday morning.

/8309 CSO: 4200/495

PHILIPPINES

REPORTAGE ON CROP, WATER LOSES, OTHER DROUGHT IMPACT

Rice Supplies Assured, Corn Shortage

HK161427 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Apr 87 p 2

[Text] The drought plaguing most parts of the country is expected to help ease the rice glut in the country as well as assure enough supply until the traditional harvest months which begin in August arrive.

National Food Authority [NFA] officials said the national inventory for rice as of April 15 stands at 1.6 million metric tons. Based on the average daily rice consumption of Filipinos of 15,000 metric tons, this volume is expected to last for 107 days or until the middle of August without taking into consideration any additional contributions from harvests.

The abundance of rice supply is clearly manifested in the prevailing low prices of the staple which ranges from a wholesale price of from P5.04 per kilo for regular milled and P5.38 per kilo for well-milled. Because of the low price, the NFA is unable to sell its stocks to prevent undue competition to the private sector. The NFA release price is P5.50 per kilo.

On the other hand latest NPA statistics further confirms a shortage of corn, total supply of which now stands at only 191,732 metric tons or only 58 percent of the monthly demand for the feedgrain and food staple which is 331,000 metric tons.

Linda Geraldez of the NFA marketing directorate said that projected supply by the end of the crop year, which is June is 201,000 metric tons which means that the country would still be 40 percent short of demand by this month. The main harvest for corn is in July.

Because of the corn shortage an observed increase in demand for the NFA's imported brown rice has been observed. Since end of February, Geraldez said that 23,000 metric tons of its 72,000-ton inventory have already been purchased by livestock raisers. Brown rice can substitute for 25 percent of the digestible ingredients of corn. The imported brown rice comprise the NFA's previous imports under a grant from the United States public law 480 program. Because of the rice oversupply, the government did not release the rice stocks obtained from imports to protect local farmers and traders from suffering from a further lowering of rice prices. Although sources said that a significant number of farmers had kept themselves from planting rice and corn this crop season to avoid losses from the drought the NFA said that only 1.6 percent of rice production and 5.4 percent of corn are expected to be affected.

The corn shortage, however is already resulting in higher prices of the feed ingredient. As of last week, the Department of Agriculture reported that prices already ranged from a high of P5.60 per kilo in Cebu City to a low of P3.10 in Iloilo, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao and South Cotabato. The support price for corn is P2.90 per kilo.

Meanwhile, the government is keeping a close watch on corn smugglers who have already illegally imported an additional 20,000 metric tons.

Major Grain Areas 'Spared'

HK101513 Hong Kong AFP in English 1459 GMT 10 Apr 87

[Text] Manila, April 10 (AFP)--A severe dry spell now ravaging the Philippines will not cause any shortage in cereals since it has so far spared the major grain-producing areas, Agriculture Secretary Carlos Dominguez said Friday.

He told a news conference that he has visited the Bicol region in the [word indistinct] portion of the country and parts of the central islands, and confirmed that "the drought there is fairly serious" for the residents.

He said at least 10 provinces were now experiencing "some difficulties" caused by the drought, which the weather bureau said was induced by the El Nino phenomenon, an unusual shift in Pacific Ocean currents which can disrupt weather patterns in the Pacific region.

"However, from the point of view of the entire country, since these areas affected by the drought are really not surplus grain producers" I don't think there is going to be any shorage in grains for the entire country," Mr Dominguez added.

In Bicol, an agricultural official has said more than four million dollars' worth of rice and corn, the country's staple cereals, had been destroyed by the lack or inadequacy of rainfall.

Threatens Water Supply in 6 Areas

HK101025 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 10 Apr 87 pp 1, 19

[By Marcia C. Rodriguez]

[Text] Deep wells in six provinces in Luzon are getting drained, resulting in the intrusion of salt water into the groundwater.

A report of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) said the areas experiencing a water crisis are Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, and Zambales. The drought, now on its fifth month, has aggravated the critical supply of water in these areas which had previously been depleted by the overpumping of water, and the destruction of watersheds through unabated denudation of forests.

The indiscriminate stripping of forest cover prevents the soil from absorbing and storing rainwater, the report said.

From December, 1986, to March, 1987, the cumulative amount of rainfall in the country was reduced to less than 50 percent of the normal amount of rainfall. Areas which are seriously to severely affected are the Bicol region, several portions of the Visayas, Western Mindanao, Quezon Province, and the Batanes group of islands.

The LWUA said many deep wells in the six provinces have reduced yield and in a few cases, no water is drawn from the wells.

Groundwater is contaminated by the unregulated drawing of water of industries which facilitate rapid salt intrusion and private owners' abandonment of open wells.

The LWUA had earlier feared that the areas which will be immediately affected by the drought are Zamboanga City, Malaybalay in Bukidnon, Roxas City in Capiz, and Baguio City.

Eriberto Calubaquid, LWUA water resources chief, earlier said these four areas will be affected by the dry spell because their water systems are highly dependent on surface water.

It was estimated that 95 percent of the 300 water districts throughout the country would feel the depletion of water supply.

Meanwhile, a report of the National Water Resources Council revealed that of the six major water reservoirs in Luzon, only the Magat reservoir of the National Irrigation Administration in Isabela has an abnormally low water level.

The water surface level of Magat reservoir, which is operated for irrigation and power generation, is reportedly about 10 meters below the 1986 water level but about three meters above the 1985 level for the same period.

Water reservoirs which are not seriously affected by the drought are the Angat reservoir in Bulacan, Pantabangan in Nueva Ecija, Binga and Ambuklao in Mountain Province, and Caliraya in Laguna.

Damages Crops in 10 Provinces

HK110751 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 11 Apr 87 p 23

[By Mike M. Alunan]

[Text] The long dry spell has ravaged a total of 111,350 hectares in some 10 provinces and caused damage to palay and corn crops estimated at P248.76 million, Department of Agriculture and Food statistics showed.

Agriculture Secretary Carlos Dominguez revealed huge crop losses due to drought after receiving reports from two teams who conducted ocular surveys of 16 provinces in Regions 5, 8, 11, 6, 10 and 12.

Of the 16 provinces, 10 were affected by the drought. These are Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Camarines Sur, Western Samar, Bukidnon, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao.

These 10 provinces account for 22.8 percent of the aggregate area planted to palay and 30.9 percent for corn. The same provinces share 22.4 percent of the national palay production and 38.5 percent for corn.

Affected by the drought were 14,030 hectares of palay with a total production loss of 22,254 metric tons. This amounts to losses of about P77.8 million.

Corn areas affected totalled 97,320 hectares with production losses hitting 48,823 metric tons or 28.82 million kilos. At the prevailing farmgate price of P3.50 per kilo, corn crop losses would reach about P170.88 million.

Dominguez allayed fears, however, of a severe shortage of corn and palay, contending that other unaffected areas have compensated for the losses occasioned by the drought.

In Negros Occidental, 11,000 hectares of former sugar lands have been planted to palay which could produce some 23,100 metric tons.

Another 3,000 hectares in Negros Occidental along 23,000 hectares of marshy lands in Region 12 provinces have also been planted to corn and could produce 31,250 metric tons.

Owing to these compensation factors, the net effect of the drought has been reduced, with production loss estimates lowered to 846 metric tons for palay and 17,573 metric tons for corn.

In short, there would be resulting pockets of shortages and gluts in various areas which could create varying farmgate prices.

Further Report

HK161526 Quezon City ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 16 Apr 87 pp 1, 6

[By Romy Tangbawan and Butch Fernandez]

[Text] Government efforts to offset the effects of the drought through artificial rainmaking are suffering from lack of aircraft, the high cost of the operations and unfavorable weather conditions.

This was reported yesterday by the Department of Agriculture [DAF] even as it noted that more than P400 million in crop damage has been reported due to the drought.

The department said cloud-seeding operations have so far produced rain in eight drought-stricken provinces, but lack of aircraft, the high cost of cloud-seeding and the vagaries of weather are preventing the expansion of the operations.

Agriculture officials were quoted as saying that crops were "being salvaged" in some parts of Camarines provinces in Bicol.

Bothered by the problem, Local Governments Secretary Jaime Ferrer yesterday ordered all local officers-in-charge to draw up their action plans and programs to cope with the dry spell.

"The seriousness of the drought that the country is now experiencing has affected not only the health of our people but our economy as well," Ferrer said.

Noting that low water pressure has aggravated fire hazards, Ferrer also urged OIC [Officers in Charge] mayors in Metro Manila to meet with their barangay captains and officials on how the immediate water problem can be solved. Metro Manila is reportedly losing 65 per cent of its water supply, mostly because of the dry spell.

On the possibility of a rice and corn shortage, the National Food Authority [NFA] said the EI Nino Phenomenon has damaged a significant hectarage of palay crops and may delay the planting of the next crop. But the NFA assured everyone that the country has sufficient stocks to meet normal requirements.

The DAF also reported that palay crop damage has already risen to 74,700 metric tons, while corn losses have come up to 43,700 mt. All in all, Agriculture Secretary Carlos Dominguez said losses have amounted to P414.45 million.

Dominguez expressed confidence that the feared rice shortage will not happen, but added that if rains will not come by May, "we will be in trouble."

The latest inventory of the country's rice stocks by the NFA showed that it has still 655,000 metric tons in its warehouses, plus 281,000 MT of commercial stocks and 686,000 tons of household stocks for a total of 1.6 million MT.

NFA officials said these stocks can supply the country's demand for three months.

NFA Administrator Emil Ong also said any shortage in corn supply for feedmillers can always be filled with stocks of brown rice.

As for Metro Manila's water supply, Ferrer ordered local officer-in-charge to devise appropriate water conservation measures because of the reported abnormal level of water supply in existing reservoirs of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. The OICs were given 15 days to submit their reports.

MWSS officials attributed the inefficient water supply delivery to "antiquated pipe systems, pipe leakages and illegal connections."

/8309 CSO: 4200/495

ARMY, KHMER ROUGE TIE IN WEAPONS TRAFFIC CAUSES CONCERN

Army Involvement Mooted; Chawalit Responds

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 22-28 Mar 87 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Large Quantity of Weapons Seized, There Is Undoubtedly Corrpution"]

[Excerpts] Police Lt Col Cha-on Khlaikhlung, the deputy superintendent of Precinct 1, Highway Police Division, and the head of the Special Affairs Unit, led a force of highway police officials and set up a checkpoint at Km 215 along Phahonyothin Road in Yan Matri Subdistrict, Phayuha Khiri District, Nakhon Sawan Province. The officials sezied a shipment of weapons valued at approximately 20 million baht.

The weapons seized, particularly the shells, were clearly marked with numbers. In particular, the code "Type TS/P1, explosives TWT-A2, batch No 309-5-23" was written on the side of the boxes of 60-mm mortar shells. This indicates that these weapons came from the armory of some military unit and that the officials responsible knew about or were behind the smuggling of these military weapons. Because the people capable of drawing such a huge quantity of weapons without arousing suspicion must be senior officials who are in charge of the unit. After these weapons were seized, news reports stated that senior officers at the armory in Bang Prap District, Phayuha Khiri District, were asked to come see the weapons and that they confirmed that these were in fact weapons from the armory.

If insiders really were involved in the smuggling of this huge shipment of weapons, this would not be the first time that this has happened. In 1981, without authorization, Maj Gen Sawong Pinyo, an aide to Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the then minister of defense, and Maj Wisanukamon, who was attached to the Science Department, purchased a shipment of weapons from abroad in the name of a Thai government unit in order to sell the weapons to another country. These two officers tricked the assistant Thai air force attache in Singapore into thinking that they were defense ministry officials who were authorized to come pick up the weapons purchased from the United States. They asked him to issue a letter that they could show to the Singaporean police certifying that the weapons belonged to the Thai government and that Maj Wiwat was the legal representative of the Thai government with the authority to take delievery of the weapons.

The assistant air force attache in Singapore reported this matter through his chain of command. The army learned of this and investigated these two officers. The reports that men close to Gen Prem were involved in such illegal activities tarnished the image of Gen Prem.

A news report from police circles stated that after the seizure of this large shipment of weapons, senior military officials and officials from the Army Operations Center sent officials to meet with the police officer who seized the weapons in order to find out where the weapons had come from. They asked the officer to provide them with data and a list of all the code numbers on the weapons.

Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the RTA CINC, ordered military officials to go examine the weapons and inform him of the facts. Weapons traffickers are very busy today, because the demand for weapons is very great. "These weapons were probably smuggled in across the border."

The military, particularly Gen Chawalit, must find out who was behind the smuggling of this large shipment of weapons. Because besides tarnishing the military's image, this case will affect our relations with a neighboring country that is fighting minority groups, which receive weapons from these weapons traffickers.

Paper Wants Army Out of Investigation

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 24 Mar 87 p 8

[Editorial: "Let Sawai Handle the Bombing and Weapons Trafficking Incidents"]

[Excerpts] Recently, there have been several serious incidents that fall within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. This includes the bombing of the home of Mr Samak Sunthonwet, the leader of the Thai Citizens Party, the seizure of a shipment of weapons in Nakhon Sawan, the beating of a reporter at the Ministry of Commerce, and the bombing at Ratchadamri trade center.

It is the Police Department that is responsible for investigating these incidents. At present, Gen Prachuap Suntharangkun, the minister of interior, is accompanying Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, on his trip to Europe. Mr Sawai Phattano, the deputy minister, is acting in his place.

A civilian minister is better suited to handling the weapons trafficking case and the bombing of Mr Samak's house. Because according to the initial investigation reports, those involved in these two incidents were soldiers. Thus, in order to ensure the integrity of the military and to honor the investigation officials, a civilian minister should be allowed to handle these cases. This will show people that the military is not trying to use its influence to help subordinates or interfere in administrative affairs. The police issued a report stating that a senior army officer telephoned the police officer responsible for the seizure of these weapons and asked him to consider the government's stability when conducting the investigation. Exactly what he meant by that is still unclear.

These weapons were going to be sold to a minority group along the Thai-Burmese border for use in fighting Burmese government forces. Soldiers were among those who were involved and who were arrested. If the investigation leads to those behind this, this could affect senior military officers. Thus, the stability of the government can be construed to refer to senior military officers who are involved in weapons trafficking. Or this may involve certain officers trying to frame other officers as has been rumored.

This is a weak point that could leave the government open to attack by the opposition after parliament convenes. However, the most important reason for allowing Mr Sawai to carry out his duties is to provide continuity and treat all factions fairly. Police Gen Narong must be allowed to carry out his duties as director-general of the Police Department without having to worry about the military.

Weapons Seized, Investigation Stymied

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 21 Mar 87 pp 1, 16

[Unattributed report: "Another Large Shipment of Weapons Seized, Military Asks Police To Consider Stability"]

[Excerpts] At the Police Department on 20 March, Police Gen Narong Mahanon, the director-general of the Police Department, talked with reporters about the progress made in the case involving a shipment of weapons in Nakon Sawan Province. He said that that morning, he had asked Police Lt Gen Phluk Suwannawet, the commissioner of the Central Investigation Bureau, to meet with him. He said that during this meeting, he enjoined the commissioner to complete the investigation as quickly as possible. He said that the investigation should be completed in the near future. "I have ordered the Suppression Division and the Highway Police Division to find out where these weapons came from."

At 1030 hours, police officials from the Kanchanaburi provincial police station in Sangkhla Buri District, stopped a pickup truck, license No 4K-2345, Bangkok Metropolitan, near the Chong Kalia Junction in Sangkhla Buri District and seized a quantity of weapons. These included 3 AK rifles, 3 RPG rounds, 4 ammunition clips, 77 rounds of AK ammunition, 30 M-79 rounds, 8 bars of RPG propellent, 8 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, and one 9-mm rifle. Officials assume that the traffickers were going to sell these weapons to minority goups along the border of Kanchanaburi Province. A report from the Police Department stated that Police Lt Gen Sawaeng Thirasawat, the assistant director-general of the Police Department, has ordered the Police Department's Parliament Coordination Committee to prepare data on the weapons seized by the highway police in preparation for responding to question by MPs in parliament, which will convene in April.

A high-level news source in the Police Department told SIAM RAT that the seizure of weapons by highway police officials and the bombing of Mr Samak's house has greatly alarmed Police Gen Narong Mahanon, the director-general of the Police Department, because both cases have political ramifications.

As for the weapons, which had army markings, that were seized in Nakhon Sawan, Gen Prem Tinsulanon, the prime minister, called Police Gen Narong Mahanon from abroad and enjoined him to arrest the culprits. The next morning, the director-general of the Police Department received another call, this time from an army general. He was told that in investigating this case, the Police Department should consider the stability of the goverment.

The news source said that Police Gen Narong Mahanon is confused. One faction wants him to catch the culprits behind these weapons trafficking activities while another faction has stressed that he should consider the government's stability.

MOI Asks Army, Defense Cooperation

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 24 Mar 87 pp 1, 16

[Excerpts] Gen Prachuap Suntharangkun, the minister of interior, was interviewed on the morning of 23 March about the various problems that have arisen recently.

Concerning the large shipment of weapons seized in Nakhon Sawan Province, Gen Prachuap said that this is the policy of the Ministry of Interior. He said that the Police Department, particularly the Highway Police Division, is to be commended, because the seizure of these weapons will help improve the well-being of the people. The people involved will be arrested regardless of their position. The weapons seized had registration numbers.

Gen Prachuap said that he met with the RTA CINC and the minister of defense to discuss the fact that soldiers have engaged in activities that have tarnished our image. The army must take steps to ensure that weapons are not smuggled out. It has been charged that these weapons were going to be sold to Karen forces. The army and Ministry of Defense have denied this.

Gen Prachuap said that it is not the government's policy to sell weapons to minority goups. He said that the Ministry of Interior was not involved in this. The police have not found any evidence to indicate that weapons are being sold along the border. The police and military will take steps to prevent people from selling weapons and make it difficult to sell weapons along the border. When weapons are stolen and sold, this poses a great danger. Grenades cost 20-30 baht apiece. If they are thrown into a crowd, they can cause heavy losses.
Gen Prachuap said that he has enjoined the Police Department to suppress weapons within the metropolitan area.

Khmer Rouge Origin Seen

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 22 Mar 87 p 4

[The Remaining Path column by Ophat Phengcharoen]

[Excerpts] Another incident that was just as serious as the bombing of the home of Mr Samak Sunthonwet was the arrest of two suspects with a large quantity of weapons in their possession. The weapons included AK ammunition, RPGs, mortar shells, rifles, and many other items. Some people say that these weapons came from a military armory and that both military and government officials were involved.

People are trying to guess what the results of the police investigation will be. They wonder where these weapons were being taken, to whom they were going to be sold, and who was involved. The opposition parties will definitely make a big issue of this. The government should be prepared to answer the questions that will be posed in parliament.

As a civilian, I would like to talk about this huge shipment of weapons today.

These were war weapons. Only military units have a chance to store and use such weapons. If such weapons are to be transported somewhere, it should be military units that transport them. But the shipment of weapons seized by the police was being transported by civilians, who claimed that they had been hired to drive the truck and that they didn't know anything.

It's possible that these weapons were purchased from Khmer Rouge soldiers fighting along the Thai-Cambodian border. The Khmer Rouge and even the Heng Samrin soldiers want money to buy video tapes, refrigerators, and towels. Thus, they may have sold these weapons, which they received as aid from the Chinese, to Thai civilians. They stamped the codes and numbers on the weapons in order to fool the Chinese into thinking that these belonged to the Thai army. Because if the Chinese found out that the weapons that they had sent to the Cambodians to help them liberate their country had been sold, they might stop sending aid.

Or perhaps they did not sell the weapons. Perhaps the Cambodian soldiers hired Thai to transport these weapons from one base to another base. They may have been afraid of being attacked by Vietnam if they transported the weapons on foot through the jungle and so in the interests of safety, they hired Thai to transport the weapons from one border point to another by traveling through Thai territory. But by chance, the weapons were seized by highway police.

This is the most likely scenario. It's less likely that our soliders were involved. Our soldiers are responsible for defending the nation's sovereignty. Weapons must be guarded well. There is a strict system for drawing weapons. This is a matter of national security. Corrupt people probably have little chance of stealing such a huge quantity of weapons in order to profit. The only possible alternative is that these weapons belonged to the Khmer Rouge. It will be another matter if it turns out that these weapons belonged to "shrimp farmers" or "tamarind growers" who wanted the weapons to suppress the "bugs" attacking their fields."

11943 CSO: 4207/176

5

THAILAND

PAPER VIEWS REAGAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 7 Mar 87 p 8 [Editorial: "A Way Out For Reagan?"]

[Text] President Ronald Reagan of the United States admitted secret arms sales to Iran in exchange for American hostages. He also admitted that the action was wrong; however, Reagan did not admit playing a direct part in the U.S. National Security Council's taking the money from the arms sales to Iran and giving it to the contras, who are the rightist rebels trying to overthrow the leftist government of Nicaragua.

Because of Iran's capture of American diplomats and holding them hostage during the revolution to overthrow the shah, it is known that any arms sales to Iran are illegal; they are considered as assistance to Iran. Due to Iran's action, Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States at that time, passed a law prohibiting arms sales to Iran.

The assistance to the contra rebels also is considered wrong because it interferes with the Sandinista government, a violation of international law. However, there is evidence that the National Security Council, which is directly under the command of the President, had continued this activity although it was wrong. Vice Admiral John Poindexter, former national security adviser, and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, his former military assistant, were aware of this. These two, however, have refused to reveal anything that happened and have resigned.

There are reports that another person who should know well about these things is Mr Donald Regan, White House chief of staff, who was close to the President and who just resigned a few days ago because of pressure from within the Republican Party and from Mrs Nancy Reagan, wife of the President. His resignation may have been part of a plan to clean Reagan's name.

However, it is suspicious that Reagan's admissions in the arms deal is sufficient for him to be forgiven because if we think about it, his admission that it was his fault came more likely because he was cornered. The investigations of the committees appointed by the government and the Congress revealed that the more they investigated, the more they found to verify the incorrect behavior of the President which eventually would lead to "accusations" in the Congress. If it reaches that point, the Republican Party to which Reagan belongs will be greatly damaged and it will not be politically viable.

Now there are demands from many groups for President Reagan to do something to pay for his mistake rather than just admitting it.

Those demands mean that the President should resign from the presidency.

Reagan's resigning is doubtful--it would depend on how much pressure is within the party and how much Reagan thinks about the reputation of the party as a whole.

If Reagan resigns now, the reputation of the Republican Party will be better because Reagan can make the excuse that his resignation is a personal matter and that it was done to help the American people.

In conclusion, the entire affair reflects the goodness of American democracy which has clear and precise rules which preserve the benefits of the nation as a whole.

13216/13046 CSO: 4207/168

THAILAND

BACKGROUND OF CHAWALIT-KHUKRIT RELATIONSHIP PROBED

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 25-31 Mar 87 pp 12-16

[Unattributed report: "Khukrit-Big Chiu, Seeking Common Points, Preserving the Differences"]

[Text] "Everyone must understand that MR [royal title] Khukrit has done a lot for the country. He has made many sacrifices for the country and is willing to continue doing so. Everyone should remember this. I visited him as an old acquaintance. I consider him to be an elder statesman who has done a great deal for the country. I have told my colleagues that Khukrit should not be ignored," said Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the RTA CINC, about his recent visit to see MR Khukrit Pramot at Khukrit's Suan Plu Lane residence. He made this visit during a period when Khukrit was attacking the government in the column that he writes for SIAM RAT.

Gen Chawalit had asked to meet with Mr Khukrit on the evening of 13 March, and so a large crowd of reporters was on hand. But at the appointed time, Col Sonchai Montriwat, a staff officer to the RTA CINC, arrived and asked that the meeting be postponed, which was an embarrassment to MR Khukrit. However, after that, Gen Chawalit arrived and held a secret meeting with MR Khukrit at Ban Suan Plu.

Some say that the reason for the delay was that Gen Chawalit's aide did a poor job in arranging the meeting. Others say that after news of the meeting leaked out and a large number of reporters went there to obtain information, Gen Chawalit decided to postpone the meeting. However, what is certain is that after Gen Chawalit arrived, he explained the matter to MR Khukrit, who was not upset or angry.

One thing worth noting is that Gen Chawalit went to visit MR Khukrit at Ban Suan Plu at a time when MR Khukrit was sharply criticizing the government of Gen Prem. This was also a time during which politicians and the military were engaged in a fierce verbal war on several issues. And this took place just prior to the opening of parliament.

Sweet Tamarind, Blazing a Trail to Suan Plu

Looking at the broad picture, it can be said that during the past year, ever since MR Khukrit decided to resign his position as leader of the Social Action Party [SAP], his once very close relationship with Gen Prem has deteriorated greatly. At the same time, the role played by Gen Chawalit has served to maintain the stability of the Prem administration. Today, the supportive relationship between the army leader and the head of the government is still very strong.

As for MR Khukrit and Gen Chawalit, MR Khukrit wrote that "I am not afraid of him" and published a chart of a presidium. It seems that this is still troubling Gen Chawalit. And at a debate held in Chiang Mai in February, MR Khukrit said: "Don't believe it when others talk about having another democracy with the king at the head and about establishing another parliament and other organizations to govern the country. Because that is the road to disaster." That includes the power of senior military officers who play a role in controlling the political parties when the cabinet is reshuffled and when opposition parties submit a no-confidence motion.

It can be seen that recently, in his battle against the government in his newspaper column Soi Suan Plu, MR Khukrit has aimed his attacks directly at Gen Prem. But he has never touched Gen Chawalit, who is thought to be propping up Gen Prem. In an interview with reporters about the column in which he blasted Gen Prem for "making use of the king's remarks," MR Khukrit mentioned Gen Chawalit, saying that "on the evening of 10 March, Gen Chawalit sent an aide to give me a sweet tamarind from Phrae Province."

Even though MR Khukrit refused to say anymore or clarify this, a senior political figure mentioned Gen Chawalit and his "tamarind" gift, which is like an act of kindness amidst the criticisms being leveled at Gen Prem, and said that this probably had a deep meaning. This helps explain why MR Khukrit has not attacked Gen Chawalit in his writings recently.

"The fact that Gen Chawalit has taken the trouble to visit MR Khukrit regularly or send an aide with a gift has naturally generated good feelings between these men, particularly on the part of MR Khukrit, a senior person who is firmly committed to the old customs and traditions. It's possible that MR Khukrit still has fatherly feelings toward Gen Chawalit--if you don't look too deeply at other reasons, that is, political reasons," said a news source close to Ban Suan Plu.

Soldiers Pressure Samak-Opposition But Don't Touch Khukrit

Mr Samak Sunthonwet, the leader of an opposition party and a bold speaker, is now at war with Gen Prem over the remarks made by the king. As a result, the military radio began launching attacks on Mr Samak. And it is thought that this is what led to the recent bombing of his house. Recently, in the column Blue Corner, Mr Samak wrote that the military radio attacked him constantly but that it didn't dare attack MR Khukrit. Although Mr Samak did not make any observations or try to provide any explanations, it is worth wondering why this is the case. Mr Samak also said that Khukrit's Soi Suan Plu column has criticized Gen Prem in much stronger terms that he has. Gen Chawalit has criticized the politicians and political parties on several issues. But when he was asked about the criticisms leveled by MR Khukrit against the government, Gen Chawalit just praised MR Khukrit, saying that he is a person of great value to the country.

Some people have observed that a clever person like Gen Chawalit knows when to attack and when to retreat. He is well aware of the great influence of Khukrit's newspaper column. And that is not all. MR Khukrit still has great prestige among MPs, other politicians, and senior people in society. If MR Khukrit should reach the end of his fuse, he might destroy things piece by piece. The failure of the plan to revise the constitution in parliament in 1983 and the destruction of the government's acts in parliament in May 1986 are evidence of the influence wielded by MR Khukrit.

Another question that needs to be answered is, at a time when Gen Chawalit is propping up the government of Gen Prem and MR Khukrit is attacking the government, is the attempt to coordinate things with MR Khukrit another crafty move being made by this clever strategist of the army?

Seeking Common Points, Preserving the Differences

In is said that in today's power circles, besides Gen Prem, only Gen Chawalit and MR Khukrit are known as giants of the period. Each of the moves made by these two giants is very complex.

A senior analyst pointed out that the fact that both MR Khukrit and Gen Chawalit have gone to the trouble to show that relations between them are good is an indication that the two sides share certain political points in common and that both sides benefit by being friendly toward each other.

MR Khukrit will certainly continue to attack Gen Prem. The fragile political situation that will exist in April will provide MR Khukrit with an excellent chance to launch a major offensive from outside parliament. Meanwhile, the struggle inside parliament will pose great problems for the government. At the same time, Khukrit's efforts to coordinate things with Gen Chawalit may be part of the operation to drive a wedge between the leader of the army and the head of the government. But it is not likely that there will be an open rupture between Gen Prem and Gen Chawalit. This is because Gen Prem and Gen Chawalit still have much more in common politically than do Gen Chawalit and MR Khukrit.

As for Khukrit's objectives in attacking Gen Prem, a news source close to him said that Khukrit just wants to get revenge for the way he has been treated in the past. What is very likely to happen if he forges a relationship with Gen Chawalit is that this will confuse the political picture concerning the stability of the Prem government.

What Gen Chawalit stands to gain from forging relations with MR Khukrit is a reduction in the criticism concerning his revolutionary line. This will also help prevent a confrontation between MR Khukrit, who has enjoys great prestige, and the present power center. At the same time, this may be a way of

showing his independence and showing that he does not have to follow the government on every issue, particularly in view of the fact that Gen Chawalit does not have any real position in the present government.

Standpoint of the Conservatives, Points of Contention

The thing that Gen Chawalit fears the most today is that he will be attacked for espousing the communist line on a variety of issues. Today, the faction that fears Gen Chawalit's ideas the most is the conservatives, a faction that still wields great influence in Thai society. It is believed that MR Khukrit shares the fears of the conservatives about Gen Chawalit's social revolution. MR Khukrit's attack on the presidium issue is a good indication of this.

There are many who do not believe that Gen Chawalit's line on social revolution is the communist line. Many academics are sure that he is not espousing the communist line. However, the revolutionary line of Gen Chawalit will necessarily affect the interests of the conservatives. Thus, it is no surprise that MR Khukrit vehemently opposes the idea of a national government. In addition, elected politicians have to be opposed to a national parliament composed of people appointed from all occupational sectors.

In short, it will be very difficult for MR Khukrit and Gen Chawalit to find common political ground over a long period, because there are many things waiting to split them apart.

Prem-Big Chiu-Khukrit, Who Is the Tool of Whom?

Gen Prem recently made a 2-week trip abroad. During that period, MR Khukrit stepped up his attacks on Gen Prem. At the same time, he improved relations with Gen Chawalit. This could create much political confusion. But it should not be forgotten that Gen Prem and Gen Chawalit have a hotline to each other. It is thought that Gen Prem was kept informed of Khukrit's criticisms via this hotline. However, concerning Gen Chawalit's visit to Ban Suan Plu, no one knows whether Gen Chawalit reported this to Gen Prem or discussed this with him in advance. Some people believe that this was not discussed in advance or reported to Gen Prem. This was a chance for Gen Chawalit to show his independence.

Politics is politics. There are no real friends or permanent enemies. This is an undeniable truth of power. It is always possible that one of the people in the Prem-Chawalit-Khukrit equation will be used as a tool by one of the others. This depends on the situation and on the timing. But this April, it seems likely that Gen Chawalit will remain on the side of Gen Prem and weather the political storm by taking clever steps to improve relations with MR Khukrit.

11943 CSO: 4207/179

THAILAND

RANKING ARMY, POLICE OFFICIALS VIEW CPM REBELS, AMNESTY

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 25-31 Mar 87 pp 18-20

[Unattributed report: "Order 66, a Lovely Name; Malaysian Communists Continue To Surrender"]

[Text] "In about a week, I will have good news for all of you," said Gen Wanchai Ruangtrakun, the army chief of staff, to reporters during the middle of March. "This stems from the success of the policy used by the army to defeat the communists. The army has been fighting the communists for a long time. I should have more information for you by the end of this month."

"If we are successful, everything will end, particularly the armed struggle waged by the communists in our country. The good news is that senior communist leaders are planning to surrender. They have already contacted the army," said Gen Wanchai in giving a clear hint about this good news.

The press has tried to determine which senior communists, particularly CPT, or Communist Party of Thailand, leaders, have decided to lay down their weapons and surrender to officials in accord with Order 66/23, which would mean the end of the communists' armed struggle in Thailand. However, the newspapers have been unable to find a clear answer.

"We don't know the details about the surrender of CPT leaders. But actually, the CPT's armed struggle has implicitely come to an end today," said Police Maj Gen Kasem Saengmit, the commander of the Special Branch Division. He pointed out that if this is true, it probably has something to do with the health of these CPT leaders. Intelligence officials have learned that many senior CPT leaders, such as Wirat Angkhathawon, Changyan Prasit, and Taphianthong Song Nopphakun are all quite ill.

"There is little that these CPT leaders can do. Even if they don't surrender, there is no way that they can revive the struggle. They have not been able to solve the problems within the CPT. The situation both here and abroad is no longer favorable to this movement," said Police Maj Gen Kasem.

Amidst the good news coming from the army, there were also reports from the Region 4 BPP [Border Patrol Police] Headquarters, Songkhla Province, stating that 89 Malaysian communist guerrillas, or CPM or Communist Party of Malaya rebels, had surrendered recently. This is the first time that CPM rebels have surrendered. Most of these people are Malaysians of Chinese ancestry. Those who surrendered were from the 8th Regiment, Khao Nam Khang Camp, which is located along the border between Nathawi and Sadao districts, Songkhla Province.

"I think that this is the military's good news. This is a sign that the CPM's armed struggle is coming to an end. The CPM rebels have established bases in Thailand and so Thailand has had to spend much money to suppress them. Also, they have caused much trouble for the Thai villagers who live along the Thai-Malaysian border. This has been the case even though this is not Thailand's problem," said a BPP news source.

This may be true. That is, this was an important defection by communists who have waged an armed struggle that has involved Thailand. The surrender by 89 CPM rebels is an important sign that this armed struggle is coming to an end. These communists intended to wage a struggle against the Malaysian government. But in actual practice, this involved Thai citizens and Thai territory. However, it is thought that this stems from the success of the policy to defeat the communists based on Order 66/23, which the Thai military has used with great success against the CPT.

A high-level news source in the Government House said that at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on 3 October 1986, the 4th Army Region proposed using the politics leads the military policy to wage a political offensive against the CPM forces operating along the Thai-Malaysian border. It was pointed out that these CPM activities were affecting the lives and property of Thai citizens. There were clear data showing that most CPM rebels were ready to lay down their weapons and surrender to officials. Like the CPT, they were experiencing many problems. However, because the CPM rebels were Malaysians of Chinese ancestry who were fighting the Malaysian government, the policy of waging a political offensive depended in large measure on the Malaysian government. Also, Thailand and Malaysia had an agreement stating that if CPM rebels surrendered or were captured, Thailand would turn them over to Malaysian officials for prosecution.

Thus, at the meeting, which was attended by representatives from the NSC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Interior, the 4th Army Region proposed exerting pressure on the Malaysian government to implement a politics leads the military policy and a policy of granting political amnesty to the CPM rebels similar to Thailand's Order 66/23. Those attending that NSC meeting passed a resolution approving this proposal.

At a meeting of the Thai-Malaysian Border Committee held in Kuala Lumpur on 15 January 1987, in his capacity as the head of the Thai delegation, Gen Prachuap Suntharangkun, the Thai minister of interior, proposed this amnesty policy to Malaysian officials. The Malaysians said that they would consider this proposal.

While waiting for Malaysia to respond to this proposal, Thailand evaluated the situation and thought it very likely that Malaysia would reject the proposal to grant amnesty to CPM rebels. This was because there were very serious

problems between the Chinese and Moslems in Malaysia. It was felt that the Malaysian government would not dare risk granting amnesty to the CPM rebels. After arriving at this conclusion, Thailand decided that if Malaysia would not agree to grant amnesty, Thailand would accept the surrender of CPM rebels based on Article 17 of Thailand's Anti-Communist Act and Order 66/23. These laws provided the legal basis for doing this.

"The 4th Army Region said that CPM rebels had in fact asked to surrender. The problem was that according to the agreement, Thailand had to turn them over to Malaysian officials. But Malaysia did not have a policy similar to our Order 66/23. As a result, the CPM rebels hesitated. But if Thailand would accept the surrender of the CPM rebels and not turn them over to Malaysia, the CPM rebels were prepared to lay down their weapons and surrender immediately. The 4th Army Region felt that this was the only way to end the war being waged by the CPM and so it recomended that Thailand accept the surrender of these rebels if Malaysia refused to implement an amnesty program," said a news source in the NSC.

The news source also said that the various Thai sectors concerned agreed with this proposal by the 4th Army Region. The 4th Army Region also proposed a way to prevent Thailand from being criticized for allowing CPM rebels to surrender even though they are not Thai by birth or nationality. Thailand's Order 66/23 has been accepted by human rights organizations throughout the world. The 4th Army Region said that mobilizing public opinion on this while accepting the surrender of the CPM rebels would help prevent Thailand from coming under attack on this issue.

At the beginning of this year, two CPM rebels were captured in Hat Yai Province, Songkhla Province. And what happened was that various human rights organizations throughout the world appealed to the Thai government and senior Thai military officers not to turn the prisoners over to Malaysia. Or if they were turned over to Malaysia, the two prisoners should have a chance to fight the case in court, and a Chinese-speaking lawyer should be appointed to represent them in court. This shows that Thailand's human rights image is much better than that of Malaysia.

The news source said that Thailand's actions as manifested by the activities of the 4th Army Region, such as the fact that 4th Army Region officials participated with leading participatants in the development of Thailand in performing the "entering the urn" ceremony, have gained the attention of international human rights organizations, which see how different our policy is from that of the Malaysian government.

The surrrender by almost 100 soldiers of the CPM's 8th Regiment, the CPM's most important regiment, shows the progress that Thai officials have made in implementing their plan of granting amnesty to the CPM rebels. Concerning this, Col Banchon Chawalasin, the spokesman for the 4th Army Region, said that this is the first time since the CPM first established bases in Thailand in 1948 that CPM rebels have surrendered in mass. It is believed that the remaining CPM rebels will surrender to the 4th Army Region in the near future.

"One of the main reasons why these CPM rebels surrendered is that they see no way to defeat Malaysia. And they have great confidence in Thailand's humanitarian policies based on Order 66/23," said Col Banchon.

In this statement, Col Banchon also said that in order to step up the struggle to defeat the CPM, Lt Gen Wisit Atkhumwong, the 4th Army Region commander, has formed a 4th Army Region forward headquarters at the Inkhayutborihan Camp in Pattani Province. Maj Gen Ophat Phothiphaet, the deputy commander of the 4th Army Region, is in command there.

This shows that the 4th Army Region is waging a major offensive against the CPM along with the politics leads the military measures. It can be seen that if senior CPT leaders do not surrender, this and future surrenders by CPM rebels will serve as the "good news" hinted at by Gen Wanchai.

This achievement has enhanced the reputation of Thailand's Order 66/23 throughout the world. Because it has shown that even Malaysian terrorists have such confidence in Thailand's Order 66/23 that they have surrendered and asked to live under the rule of Thai officials.

11943 CSO: 4207/180

THAILAND

WEEKLY WANTS NO CONFIDENCE VOTE ON PREM CABINET

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai 29 Mar-4 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "There Should Be a No Confidence Vote on the Entire Cabinet"]

[Excerpt] Actually, the opposition's motion to open a general debate, regardless of whether to pass a resolution of no confidence against a few ministers or the entire cabinet, will not have any effect in terms of removing any of the ministers from their positions. Because according to the constitution, to pass, a no-confidence resolution requries the support of more than half of the MPs, that is, 174 votes. But at present, the opposition has only 114 votes. In the past, certain ministers resigned their positions even though fewer than half of the MPs voted in favor of the no-confidence motion. Because parties in the coalition government abstained, the number of votes expressing confidence in them did not reach half either. This was a matter of etiquette, and pressure was exerted by influences outside parliament. This was not a victory by the opposition.

It is thought that if the opposition decides to submit a motion asking to open a general debate in order to pass a no-confidence resolution against the entire cabinet, or against the prime minister, Gen Prem may decide to dissolve parliament just as he did in 1983 and 1986 in order to hold a new election. And what is certain is that if the election system and the political party system remain as they are today, no single party will win a majority of the seats in parliament. In the end, it will be necessary to form another coalition government. And it is very likely that Gen Prem would be appointed prime minister again.

In our view, if the opposition parties call for a no-confidence vote, they should call for a no-confidence vote against the entire cabinet. Holding a no-confidence vote against a few ministers and changing certain ministers will not solve the country's problems. This is because in the end, the new ministers will have to administer things based on the policies and with the approval of Gen Prem, the prime minster. During the past 7 years, Thailand's economic, political, and social situation has not improved at all. If parliament continues to place confidence in this administration, in the next general election, the people will know whether they should reelect the parties that make up the present coalition government.

11943 CSO: 4207/180

THAILAND

PLIGHT OF LANDLESS LABORERS IN CHONBURI

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 8 Mar 87 p 6

[Column: "Remarks From the Village"]

[Excerpt] This article comes of cooperation between SIAM RAT and the Volunteer Project of Society, Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University.

Klong Sippaet Village is one of the villages in Khao Chok Subdistrict, Nongyai District, Chonburi Province.

This village's area is contiguous with Wang Chan Branch district, Rayong Province. In the old days, the village on Lion Mountain was a tropical evergreen forest inhabited by much wildlife. The villagers say that during Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's time as prime minister, this area was like a prison camp.

Whoever was brought here had to work very hard; if they tried to escape, they would be hunted down eventually and killed.

This area is a valley which is hot and dry. The landscape includes high plains surrounded by small and medium size hills, about 1,000-1,500 feet above sea level. The mountains used to have dense jungles; nowadays, the mountains are bald because the jungle was cut and burned to clear land for cultivation. Communication with the outside world is via one bus a day which leaves the village at 6:30 am and returns in the afternoon between 3-4 pm.

The villages in this area are heavily populated especially because of the baby boom. It is not possible to conduct an accurate census because of the high level of migration. Most of the land is owned by one or two persons; for example, one person, the chairman of the Sugar Factory Association in Rayong, owns 3,000 rai of land. He sent his son to take care of the land.

Most of the villagers, therefore, do not have their own land to cultivate but have only a small piece, enough to build a house on. They have to rent land from the landlord or be hired hands and day laborers. Some, for example, do not pay rent but take care of the farm for the landlord. Most of the villagers are northeasterners who migrated from Surin and Sisaket. Some of them stay for a long time, others come just to work for a period of time or only seasonally. The major crops cultivated in this area are sugar cane and tapioca. There also are some rice fields and rubber plantations; the normal wage is between 25-40 baht per day. Most of the villagers are in debt; they live a simple and quiet life. There is not much interaction except with people from the same place, family, and relatives because after they have worked for a while, most of them will return to their hometowns.

Most of the children do not have a chance to study because they stay here for a short period of time and school is located far away. Communications are inconvenient, even the villagers' settlements are scattered.

The survey found several baffling problems.

From talks and exchanges with villagers for 13 days last year, it was found that the villagers face a lot of problems in pursuing agricultural livelihoods.

a, 17 ,

1. No ownership of land. As mentioned above, most of the land in this area is owned by one person. The villagers have to rent the land or barter their labor to maintain the farm for the capitalist. All of their crops are sold to the capitalist only. Price-setting, therefore, is determined based on what satisfies the capitalist who usually forces the prices lower than they should be; the villagers dare not argue because they are afraid.

Some of the villagers with too many debts have lost their land and become renters. They are taken advantage of, and lack the will to develop the land.

2. Drought and hardship. The area is hilly with a lot of rocks. Deforestation created drought. There is no seasonal rainfall. This creates water shortages for agriculture. Cultivation of tapioca, morevoer, causes soil deterioration.

The result is that the villagers produce less considering the vast area cultivated.

3. Lack of agricultural and marketing knowledge. The villagers lack knowledge concerning crop selection and the use of proper agricultural equipment. Mostly, they rely on manpower, animals, and small and simple equipment while the capitalist maintains a big investment and large equipment resources which result in high productivity. As far as marketing goes, the villagers do not have the opportunity to know what crops they should plant to get good prices; they are unable to predict the market.

4. The villagers told the author that government policy is not clear. Sometimes the government helps, sometimes it does not. Any crop that sells for a good price will be planted by throngs of people which then causes the price to decrease. Government assistance is not steady, planting low-price crops does not motivate the farmers, they will not want to plant more and will only plant once a year.

Besides, the government has never found sources of water or assisted in irrigation.

5. No public services, including education. There are no schools in the nearby villages; the children have no opportunity to study. For public sanitation, although there is one sanitation clinic with one officer, the villagers complain that it cannot provide sufficient services and that the cost of medicine is high.

Therefore, the villagers do not pay attention to their health. When they are sick, they buy medicine themselves or depend on other villagers.

Other problems are the same, in general, as those in other Thai villages; those are shortages in drinking and potable water, difficulty communicating with the outside world, and the biggest problem, which we almost need not mention, poverty.

High cost, low income, and poverty.

Klong Sippaet Village is so far from civilization that I almost could not believe my eyes when I learned that there was such a village in the most civilized province in the east: Chonburi Province. Most of the people have careers in farming and have to depend on nature, including the land and natural rainfall. They try to select the crops that can tolerate drought, for example, sugar cane, tapioca, rubber, pineapple orchards, and eucalyptus which they plant over many rai.

In those years when the rain does not fall in accordance with the seasons, it spells disaster for the farmers because their lives depend on their crops. This affects not only those farmers who have their own land and renters, but also daily laborers whose wages are forced down or who may not have work in dry years when the crops are damaged. In high production years, pay is high and work is plentiful.

On the average, the villagers in this area farm a large area, but production per rai is very low. This is the result of bad soil. They do not have the resources to clear land for new farms; only the capitalists can clear and expand the land. Also, clearing too much of the forest will result in drought.

Besides working a big farm, the villagers have to hire labor to help, for example, to cut sugar cane and harvest tapioca which must be done in a short period of time. Therefore, there must be an investment in labor. In addition, there are fertilizer, tractor, insecticide, transportation, waterpump fuel, and crop costs.

The majority of villagers have debts between 2,000-20,000 baht.

And they will have incomes of 10,000 to 80,000 baht per year according to the size of the farm or diligence in the case of employees.

13216/13046 CSO: 4207/168

MILITARY

VIETNAM

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF MILITARY DRAFT COUNCIL INTERVIEWED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Feb 87 p 2

[Interview by Hong Son with Nguyen Huu Tri: "An Interview in Response to Readers' Requests 'Concerning Military Recruiting"]

[Text] Editorial Note: on 25 February 1987, youths of the city will leave to join the army in the first phase of inductions. Colonel Nguyen Huu Tri, deputy chairman of the Military Draft Council and deputy commander of the Municipal Military Command, responds below to questions raised by public opinion concerning military recruiting.

Question: "As we know, public opinion is very concerned that the induction of youths be carried out in exact accordance with the law and be fair. Some readers have sent letters to SAIGON GIAI PHONG Newspaper complaining that some families of cadres and well-to-do families have found ways for their sons to avoid fulfilling their military obligation or to fulfill it but at units near their homes. What is your assessment of this situation?"

Answer: "The provisions of the Military Service Law are clear and the law itself is fair, reasonable and strict. However, there have been some shortcomings in the process of implementing this law. The cause of these shortcomings has been the lack of close guidance by the subward, village, precinct and district military draft councils. As a result, some individuals have taken advantage of this situation to do things that are wrong. For the most part, these persons work in jobs related to the registration of youths, the compilation of statistics on youths, medical examinations, the selection of youths for induction and the granting of exemptions. During the first phase of inductions in 1986, a number of villages in Cu Chi concealed some of their forces and conducted medical examinations that were less than thorough. Some able-bodied youths were classified B1 or B2. In the 7th Subward of the 1st Precinct, one family managed to arrange for three of its sons to study overseas and not fulfill their military obligation. Some families--as a number of readers have observed-have gone to training centers and 'greased palms' in order to have their son or daughter assigned to a job near their home. Such was the case with a family in the 11th Precinct.

Allow me to take this occasion to suggest to readers that they actively bring to light and report specific negative phenomena in military recruiting so that they can be promptly dealt with by functional agencies."

Question: "Why are the negative phenomena in the induction of youths not prosecuted publicly? Take, for example, the case of the counterfeiting of papers in Go Vap District to enable youths to evade their military obligation."

Answer: "Many cases have been brought to light by military agencies but legal agencies have been slow to act or not been thorough. Within the scope of its authority, the Municipal Military Draft Council has taken harsh action against a number of military cadres who committed mistakes in the induction of youths. For example, the commander of the military unit of the 19th Subward of the 1st Precinct took a bribe and was prosecuted in court. A 1st lieutenant in the military unit of the 11th Precinct who accepted 2 gold necklaces to arrange for the son of a family to be stationed with a unit near his home was prosecuted and expelled from the army. In the case of the cadres of the Go Vap Military Command who, after proposing that they could do so for a bribe, issued fake discharge papers to youths so that they could evade their military obligation, the 7th Military Region's criminal agency has concluded its investigation and recommended prosecution under the law."

Question: "In the reports reviewing military draft work in past years, it has stated that the youths at agencies were not strictly complying with the Military Service Law. What is the situation today?"

Answer: "The induction of youths is managed by the locality on the basis of permanent census registration without any distinctions as to whether a youth works at a state agency or works on the outside. However, to insure that the needs of economic construction are met, the state still grants deferments to youths who possess a technical skill or are skilled in a manual trade and are indispensable at their agency or unit. However, there have been numerous cases in which agencies and enterprises have used these circumstances as an excuse to request improper deferments for their personnel. For example, the General Southern Grain Corporation requested a deferment for a driver(!) and the municipal Communist Youth Union organization requested deferments for Youth Union secretaries in the port of Saigon.

However, there has been a significant decline in these improper practices since 1986."

Question: "Each year, very many youths complete their military obligation in the standing army and return home. Providing them with jobs is a problem. What are your thoughts concerning this matter?"

Answer: "At present, only one-half of the discharged and demobilized troops returning to their locality are being provided a job. Of course, not all of them can be given jobs at state agencies.

The state has been and is opening many avenues so that the people can develop production, work and earn a living. This is a good direction to take to

provide jobs to military personnel upon the completion of their military obligation. The party, the administration, the various agencies and the mass organizations within the locality must do everything possible to help returning military personnel participate in productive labor along these lines. State agencies, state-operated enterprises, joint public-private corporations, cooperatives and so forth that need to hire labor must give priority to discharged troops."

Question: "Is there anything deserving of attention in this year's induction of youths?"

Answer: "This year, insuring that qualitative standards are met is the issue of foremost concern in the induction of youths. The city will select young, able-bodied persons who are educated and possess a specialized or technical skill. It absolutely will not select illiterate youths and efforts will be made to limit the number of youths whose level of education is too low.

7809 CSO: 4209/353 POLITICAL

VIETNAM

SWEDISH REPORTER FINDS INCREASING OPENNESS IN CRITICISM

Minister Explains Quitting Cabinet

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Mar 87 p 11

[Article by Ingvar Oja: "Vietnam's Crisis Deepens; Party Criticized Openly"]

[Text] Hanoi--"We are now at the bottom of the barrel and we can't go further down. It is now just a question of whether we will stay there or begin climbing up towards the light."

We heard this drastic description of the political and economic crisis in Vietnam from Doctor Duong Quyen Hoa, a former minister who left the government because she was disappointed by the party leadership's inability to tackle the country's basic problems.

I met Duong Quyen Hoa on a visit to Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) where, together with volunteer organizations, she is working in the primary health care system and most particularly with undernourished children, a category of Vietnamese which is frighteningly large.

When Doctor Duong Quyen Hoa left the Hanoi government, it was not the first time she had broken with established society. She comes from a rich upper middle class Saigon family, joined the Communist Party as far back as 1959, and worked underground in Saigon up until the 1968 Tet offensive. Then she was sent out into the jungle, where she became the minister for health care in the revolutionary government and, after the country's reunification, she became the assistant minister for health care in the central government. She occupied that position for only a few years before leaving the government and Hanoi.

Speaks Openly

Doctor Duong Quyen Hoa speaks openly, without lapsing into the usual formal, propagandistic speech which is so trying when conducting interviews in socialist countries.

"It took us 12 years to understand the mistakes and it will take a long time to correct them, but we have to start working immediately."

Doctor Hoa is just one of the many voices of criticism--albeit the most eloquent--I encountered during a two-week visit to Vietnam. In Vietnam today there is an obvious crisi's consciousness. "The man in the street" talks about this crisi's, the party leadership talks about this crisi's, and foreign observers talk about this crisis.

After the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime in 1975 and the country's formal subsequent reunification, the Vietnamese Communist Party lived in a victor's intoxication. All problems were considered solved or said to be small compared with those the country and the party had experienced during decades of war.

"During the long war, the leaders had isolated themselves from the outside world and scarcely knew how a country at peace should be governed," Doctor Hoa said. "The leaders are by no means bad, but they were isolated and had poor advisers."

The Past

Just as others I spoke with, Doctor Hoa wants to come to terms with the past in a radical way. The old war-time leaders must go and be replaced by people who can solve problems, that is, technical and economic experts.

"By all means pay the old fighters, but let the technicians take over the modernization of the country."

These thoughts produced results at the national level, when the sixth party congress proved to be unusually self-critical and "booted" the old tried and true leaders into obscure advisory positions.

This partial dealing with the past was followed by a sweeping government reshuffle. The most astonishing occurrence--but one which was quite in the spirit of many critics--was that defense minister Van Tien Dung got to leave his post. General Dung was the hero of the last major offensive against Saigon in 1975, the offensive which led to the collapse and reunification.

The new thinking is slowly seeping into the party machinery, which was thoroughly shaken by the strong criticism to which it was subjected at the party congress. Today the party leadership is almost speaking with the same breath as the critics. There is talk about bad mistakes, about the impossible bureaucracy, and about laziness on the part of those who are supposed to rebuild the country. At the same time, efforts are being made to ensure that, despite all, the people will have faith in the party and its leadership.

"During the big debate at the party congress, there was no one who called for the dissolution of the party," says one of the country's most powerful men, foreign minister, vice prime minister, and Politburo member Nguyen Co Thach. "That shows that we still have the people's confidence."

It is difficult for a foreigner, on the basis of a short visit, to confirm the extent of the people's confidence. Nevertheless it becomes clear in many discussions, with both party members and critics outside the party, that confidence is not as widespread as the party leadership would like it to be.

It is easy to state that no one called for the dissolution of the party, since such a call is meaningless in a one-party state where there are absolutely no other alternatives. (Besides, what would have happened to the person who openly advocated the dissolution of the communist party?)

The critics are not out to threaten the party's position of power either. They want to reform the party from within, even if some want to do so quickly and drastically.

"What we need today is a revolution within the revolution," said Doctor Hoa.

The crisis which has been deepening year after year since 1975 is due not only to a party leadership which cut itself off from reality. It is due in part to the fact that the party misinterpreted the popular support it enjoyed during the war. As a consequence, the party continues to believe that its war support was ideologically based.

National support for the war effort derived its strength from a powerful surge, a nationalism which happened to coincide with the party's aims. Today people who rallied behind the national colors 10 years ago are nevertheless not as easily mobilized for a self-sacrificing effort for communist society.

Threatening

The voices of criticism are still to be found within bounds controlled by the party, but it would appear that dissatisfaction has already begun to assume a threatening shape for the party.

"There is no organized opposition outside the party, but criticism is so loud and open that today, in contrast to before, you even hear it out 'on the street,'" says a West European diplomatic source.

This attitude of criticism and inclination to oppose can also be heard from some public officials. After a lengthy conversation in one ministry, when I made a complimentary remark about the openness of a high official and said that "something really has happened, despite everything" when problems are discussed without concealing them behind propaganda, a cadre said:

"But that doesn't count. We have to change everything if we're going to get out of this crisis."

However, Vietnamese critics cannot "change everything" since the country is and continues to be a one-party state. But it is still a step forward when such blasphemous thoughts can be heard in ministries.

Officials Skeptical Regarding Reform

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Mar 87 p 11

[Article by Ingvar Oja: "Vietnamese Self-Critici'sm Becoming Empty Ritual; Bureaucracy Impedes Reform"]

[Text] Hanoi--Vladimir Lenin once said: "Ninety percent of communists are not competent enough to carry out their tasks." When landing at Hanoi's international airport, one gets a clear illustration of Lenin's sarcastic remark.

Nowhere else have I observed poorer organization or greater bureaucratic disarray.

When you get to passport control you get the required forms to fill out (in the rest of the world these forms are distributed on the plane) and when you get to the customs inspection booth you get the customs declaration forms which have to be filled out in duplicate. Naturally no carbon paper is available.

When I returned to Hanor after a visit to Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), it took more than one hour to get my suitcase even though I quickly spotted it in the luggage area. I can nevertheless not pick it up since "instructions must be followed."

The airport is of fairly recent construction and according to reliable information a delegation has gone abroad to study how to organize the work in an efficient manner. When I express my astonishment at the chaos which reigns at the airport, my interpreter and guide, somewhat embarrassed, answers with the standard worn-out, meaningless phrase:

"We are a poor country that has been at war for decades."

Mirror

Airports can often be a good mirror of the organizational and bureaucratic condition of a country and this is true for Hanoi's airport as well, since it reflects in miniature the whole colossal bureaucracy in the country. Much of the economic and political chaos reigning in the country is due to a gigantic and rigid bureaucracy. In the shadow of the many long wars it has grown into a hydra and this "monster" can wipe out all the reforms the political leadership has decided on.

"The political leaders want sweeping reforms and the people yearn for reforms. But the big bureaucracy stands directly in the way," said a Vietnamese official in one ministry, an official who despite the now quite open criticism still wished to remain anonymous. "Now we have to clamp down on the bureaucracy to be able to carry out the reforms which were decided on at the party congress."

The official seemed to forget that he belonged to that category of cadres which is to be "clamped down on."

Everyone in Vietnam talks about the bureaucracy. The man in the street heaps abuse on the bureaucracy and cadres who struggle with "instructions" curse the rigidity and the complexity of their own offices. Ever since the storm of criticism of conditions in the country was unleashed in connection with the sixth party congress at the end of last year, it has practically become new dogma that practicing self-criticism is fashionable.

Empty Ritual

Self-criticism is already turning into an empty ritual which does not bode well for all the sweeping reforms envisioned by the new party resolutions. The dutiful bureaucrats are behaving like the Pharisees in the Bible. They acknowledge their sins and faithfully perform the rituals but signs of repentance and improvement are difficult to discern.

A cadre I spoke to in Ho Chi Minh City fully supports the party's plans to scale down the bureaucracy and "streamline work," but at the same time expressed reservations.

"It's almost an impossible task," he said. "What are we supposed to do with all the left-over bureaucrats? There's still a lot of unemployment in the country and they've got to live too."

"Illogical"

As the huge bureaucracy is to be cut down, extensive wage reform is being contemplated which would mean that bureacrats who stay on will receive a salary they can live on. As things stand now, bureaucrats as well have to have other sources of inform simply to be able to scrape by.

"The present wage system is completely illogical," a cadre in Ho Chi Minh City said. "How am I supposed to live on 1,500 dong a month?"

And I understand his rhetorical question one day when I take a walk through Hanoi's central market. To be sure, a number of basic goods are available to public officials at state-supported prices, but despite this, 1,500 dong do not stretch very far (this sum corresponds to about 20 kronor based on the black market rate for the dollar, a rate most people work with in their transactions).

Here are some food prices (per kilogram) Vietnamese encounter in the free market: rice, 75-130 dong; beef, 500 dong; pork, 300 dong; chicken, 500 dong; tomatoes, 25 dong; cabbage, 30 dong; shrimp, 300 dong; fish, 400 dong; onions, 40 dong; eggs, 20 dong each.

After my walk through the market I have a certain understanding of the bureaucracy's unwillingness to exert itself. Why should they exert themselves when everything has only gotten worse for them in recent years?

"Up until 1985 there were certain improvements, but after the catastrophic currency reform which started up the inflation merrygoround everything has gotten worse," said a ministry cadre in Vinh Phu Province in northern Vietnam I talked to.

In recent years things have gotten worse for most people in Vietnam. The question is how long people--and this applies to bureaucrats as well--can put up with misrule before they protest using other methods besides just open criticism.

12789 CSO: 3650/96 POLITICAL

VIETNAM

EDITORIAL DISCUSSES SHORTCOMINGS IN PARTY CRITICISM ACTIVITY

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 5 Feb 87 p 1

[Editorial: "On the Occasion of CPV Day: Understand Fully the Concept of 'Using People as a Base'"]

[Text] "We must bend over backward to create conditions for the masses to take part in party building, contributing criticism, evaluating party chapter activities, controlling party member behavior, and selecting outstanding candidates for party membership. Once a year we must organize a widespread mass movement to criticize party chapters and members." These are the most important points of the political report and resolution of the Sixth CPV Congress, which illustrate the concept of "using people as a base" and which should be understood fully in party building. Known for its traditional attachment to the masses, the CPV in Ho Chi Minh City has, since the liberation, devoted attention to party building by holding conferences to solicit input from the laboring people and various strata of the population. This has enabled its municipal and basic organizations to foster strong points and avert--or circumscribe--shortcomings and mistakes in time.

A look at party building performance vis-a-vis the concept of "using people as a base" in the recent past shows, however, that the important role of the masses was very limited. Critics were scarce and the criticism was not diverse. The input was half-hearted, lacking in boldness and failed to focus on key and crucial issues in party building--political, ideological, and organizational issues. Not many were encouraged or given favorable opportunity to make a resolute and straightforward assessment of the qualifications and behavior of cadres and party members, particularly of those positions of authority. Worse yet, in some places critique organizers erected barriers and even issued threats to frighten people away. In other places, reluctance, and shallowness were displayed. Underlying that situation is the fact that quite a few cadres and party members, including key cadres in some places, were not disposed to their own party chapters, organizations, localities, units, and sectors, or to themselves. In other places they settled for closed-door reviews from which the people were banned, deliberately turning a deaf ear to the constructive voice of the masses. In theory, they held closed-door sessions to right the wrongs; in fact, they did so to forgive and forget and conceal flaws. Since they were unwilling to correct themselves, how could they welcome the people's constructive input? These improper thoughts, views,

and actions exacerbated the tendency to cling to bureaucratism and stay aloof from the masses in some places, widening further the gap between party organizations and members, on one hand, and the people, on the other, and undermining the latter's confidence in the party's determination to purify the ranks of its members. Consequently, party work slowed and mass enthusiasm for taking party in revolutionary activities abated. During the recent self-criticism and criticism drive to encourage the people to trust the party and vice versa, these evils were overcome in part, leading to a clear improvement in the process of collecting popular input; but in general, party building has not yet reached the necessary level of openness. In some places, during the recent criticism campaign to prepare for CPV congresses at various levels, censured officials moved heaven and earth--as soon as their power was consolidated--to get back at these sincere and straight forward critics. Even now, some people are eager to track down the authors of constructive newspaper articles for retaliation. These misdeeds and limitations have damaged party building substantially.

To commemorate CPV Day with realism, party echelons, sectors, and basic organizations should strive to foster their pluses stemming from the recent self-criticism campaign, and should continue to struggle against throughts and actions which are erroneous and contrary to the concept of "using people as a base" in party building. It goes without saying that to make the party truly pure, stable, and strong, internal criticism and self-criticism sessions should be conducted on a regular basis. But this is not enough. Active popular input is required--a must, a sine qua non condition. Only by relying on the people to build the CPV can it become a truly pure, stable, and strong organization and stimulate the people to voluntarily and enthusiastically accelerate the movement of revolutionary activities to implement the resolutions of the Sixth CPV National Congress and the Fourth CPV Municipal Congress.

9213/12951 CSO: 4209/350

POLITICAL

VIETNAM

TWO NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS NOTED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 13 Feb 87 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Two Negative Aspects in the Activities of Basic Party Organizations at Present"]

[Text] Nearly all of the city's basic party organizations organized activities to commemorate the founding of the party on 3 February, but most only read and discussed in order to clarify a number of key matters in the party building work. Many places have not yet discussed and commented on the summary report of the party committee echelon because it was not prepared in time.

By means of direct observations of some activities and investigations of functional organs and the cadres responsible for monitoring and synthesizing that matter, it is possible to point out the following noteworthy points:

A number of party chapters in precincts 1, 10, and 11 invited representatives of the masses to attend their meetings. In addition to attentively listening to them, and seriously and carefully discussing improving the moral quality and virtue of cadres and party members, those chapters closely monitored the development of good points and the correcting the deficiencies in the recent self-criticism and criticism campaign. During the meetings, both the party members and the mass representatives expressed opinions in an open, construction manner. In Precinct 10 a number of party chapters frankly admitted before the masses their deficiencies of not being truly concerned with the lives of the masses and of being bureaucratic and removed from reality, and recommended ways to correct them. In Precinct 3, a number of key cadres at the basic level accepted the view of party members and mass representatives that relations with the people were "still cool," i.e. were not yet truly close, cordial, and intimate. A survey undertaken in a number of party chapters showed that after the "The People Believe in the Party and the Party Believes in the People" self-criticism and criticism campaign, the party members often went to the homes of the masses to understand their lives, and took the initiative of going to the masses instead of waiting for the masses to come to them. A number of precincts and districts concentrated their guidance on the "selected units with negative problems." Those were good signs which many people believe must be developed in the present activity campaign to commemorate the founding of the party.

But there are two problems which been revealed in a considerable number of places during the recent activities:

First, they were superficial and pro forma, even in discussing documents and in criticism. A number of precincts, sectors, and districts, including Binh Chanh District, resolutely guided the places which carried out those tasks in a superficial manner to repeat them, especially in chapters in which there were still negative problems.

Second, many young party members and newly admitted party members have not boldly expressed constructive opinions to the key leadership cadres and the retired party members, which has greatly restricted the democratic atmosphere within the party.

With the spirit of revolutionary renovation, we cannot accept superficial and pro forma work, and the above-mentioned lack of boldness and democracy. Although the stipulated date has passed, the places which have not carried out quidance of the activities must do so strictly and in accordance with the Municipal Party Committee. Places which carried out such activities but did so superficially must carry them out again. Their implementation must be inspected and actual results must be evaluated, so that they can be correct In the activities, the key cadres and party members must play a and serious. key role, and the retired cadres must go all-out in mobilizing and inspiring to the young party members and new party members and mass representatives, and appeal for them to enthusiastically contribute opinions, in order to overcome all restrictions to democracy. The young party members must be bold and frank, and must not be, out of respect for leaders and party members old enough to be their fathers, timid and not dare express constructive opinions.

Only if we carry out with high quality the first step of the Municipal Party Committee's plan regarding this year's commemoration of the founding of the party can we do a good job of carrying out the second step. Thus we recommend that the precincts, districts, sectors, and basic party organizations guide the implementation of, and meticulously supervise, that task.

5616 CSO: 4209/361

BRIEFS

PARTY MEMBER RECRUITMENT--In 1986, Third Precinct recruited 129 new party members, of whom 59 percent were members of the Communist Youth Union and 40.3 percent were women. Workers directly involved in production accounted for only 1.5 percent. While recruiting and improving new party members, the Third Precinct took severe disciplinary measures against 54 party members who had committed mistakes and shortcomings; of these party members, 10 were allowed to retain party membership, 11 were expelled from the party, and 5 had their names struck off the list of party members. Moreover, during the self-criticism and criticism drive, the party control committee in the Third Precinct settled 66 cases out of 88 denunciations filed by the people agains corrupt party members who received bribes and oppressed the masses. [Text] [Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 87 p 1] 9332

/12951 CSO: 4209/316

58

ECONOMIC

VIETNAM

SWEDISH AID PROJECTS SEEN OVERCOMING EARLIER PROBLEMS

Aid Minister Visits Bai Bang

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Mar 87 p 8

[Article by Ingvar Oja: "Hjelm-Wallen In Vietnam: Bai Bang Better Than I Thought"]

[Text] Vinh Phu, Vietnam--"Conditions among the forestry workers are better than I thought."

So said Aid Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen after Sunday's visit to several brigades of forestry workers north of the paper mill in Bai Bang. According to the minister, the debate in Sweden over conditions for the forestry workers had gone awry.

Lena Hjelm-Wallen's visit to Vinh Phu Province, which gave its name to the huge, Swedish-supported multi-billion kronor project, ended up being a good deal about conditions for the forestry workers. She asked the brigades questions about workers' opportunities to leave their work and everywhere she received affirmative answers. In several places she also got precise information as to how many had left their tree-cutting work.

After such a brief visit with so few interviews to judge from, it is next to impossible to confirm whether the answers Lena Hjelm-Wallen received during her jeep trip in the mountains reflect reality. The final impression is nevertheless that there is no forced labor, as was suggested in Swedish debate.

In one brigade I talked to three girls who all worked planting trees. They shared a room in a new house and in this room they had leaned their bicycles up against an unused bed. All three were in their twenties and their parents were farmers not far from the brigade. The three of them had worked on the brigade for three years and thought their working conditions were acceptable.

"At least it's better than farming," one of the girls explained.

Uncomprehending

In another brigade I met a middle-aged couple, both of whom worked on the forestry project. They had a small rice paddy, several buffaloes, and they had recently built a large house for themselves. The man, 55-year-old Dao Van Luu, did not understand questioning about the free choice of work. He said he could not understand at all after the interpreter tried to explain the Swedish debate.

"I've never heard talk about force," said the farmer, who had grown up under a system which always puts the collective ahead of the individual.

The Swedish debate about conditions for the forestry workers has naturally reached the approximately 100 Swedes who are still working on the project. They find it both unfair and misleading that the debate should entirely hide the fact that the paper mill has been in production for several years and already produces 30 percent of all of Vietnam's paper production.

Increase Volume Last year production was slightly above the 30,000 metric ton goal and this year it is hoped volume will increase further.

"They forget that the most important goal--producing paper--has been achieved," said Christer Ehnemark, an investment adviser. Ehnemark also asked the minister why the government always listened to negative criticism while ignoring positive comments about the project. Hjelm-Wallen said that she had been affected by the debate and that was why it was important to see conditions with her own eyes.

Like all Swedish advisers on the project, Ehnemark is not in any way attempting to cover up the many problems still affecting production. These problems will probably worsen after 1990, when Swedish participation is due to come to an end. Neither are the problems covered up by the plant's Vietnamese management, which is surprisingly open and accessible.

"The biggest problem remains the availability of raw materials," said Trinh Ba Minh, the plant's director.

Hard To Reach

And when one travels about in the large forested area north of Bai Bang where the timber is located, one suddenly sees the root of the problem. The roads are poor and the plant is hard to reach up on the mountainside. But the real problem is still not extracting wood from the forest but rather the way in which the forest and the land are being used by the people who live up in the mountains.

Big population pressure is a direct threat to the availability of raw materials, said Anders Olsson, the paper mill's Swedish adviser on raw material supply.

In visits up in the mountains, one also sees empty, cleared hills and everywhere one sees a second cause of the absence of vegetation: burn-beating. Over half of the population of the area where the raw materials are found is comprised of different minority peoples and by traditon they have lived by burn-beating. In the past damage was limited because burn cycles were long enough to permit the forest to grow back. From 40-year cycles the rotation has now shrunk to seven to ten years. The forest never has a chance to renew itself and the soil grows impoverished. City dwellers as well need fuel and conservative estimates put the amount of fuel extracted from the forest at three million cubic meters every year.

Extensive planting is going on in the project but at present it is not proceeding as fast as extractions (every metric ton of paper requires 5.3 metric tons of timber). Many of the young seedlings are gathered as fuel and some are eaten by buffaloes when they are taken out to pasture by village shepherds.

Another impending problem is maintenance for which in all likelihood the mill will need access to several million dollars per year in foreign currency. The mill's Vietnamese management hopes to get some spare parts through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the trade bloc dominated by the Soviet Union. But the mill was constructed with Swedish parts and a number of spare parts are impossible to obtain through COMECON.

The plant's management therefore hopes for exports outside the Soviet bloc, but the paper does not yet possess export quality and Swedish advisers find the extensive plans for exporting somewhat unrealistic.

Vinh Phu does produce paper and every day the project employs 100,000 people. Vietnam is proud of it and has transformed the venture into a model school for technicians from different trades.

Other Aid Projects Succeeding

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 18 Mar 87 p 8

[Article by Ingvar Oja: "Aid To Vietnam: Progress For a Swedish Project"]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh City--Pham Van Binh, the Vietnamese director of a power plant, sits in a reception room with portraits of Marx, Ho Chi Minh and Lenin on the wall. The portraits have been executed amateurishly, and the portrait of Lenin would be unrecognizable if it were not viewed together with the other two.

"We are ahead of schedule, and cooperation with the Swedish advisers is perfect," says Pham as he looks at his Swedish counterpart seated at his side. This statement comes out sounding totally like a courtesy inasmuch as what is really in question is a Swedish aid project in Vietnam.

Swedish aid and the debate it has aroused has been completely dominated by the paper mill in Bai Bang and it has almost become an axiom that aid to Vietnam is riddled with scandals and huge financial miscalculations. Yet there are still other aid projects in Vietnam besides Bai Bang, among them support for the repair of the Thu Dac power plant, where Pham Van Binh is the director, and the two paper mills Cogido and Cogivina. The three projects are located just outside Ho Chi Minh City (previously Saigon) in the area which up until 1975 made up South Vietnam.

Pham Van Binh's statement about good cooperation and the rapid pace of work is no courtesy, though. It is not even an exaggeration. Sten Furbo, the Swedish site head at Thu Duc, who has considerable experience from projects in Vietnam and other developing countries, puts it just as categorically:

"This is perhaps the most successful project SIDA has ever been involved in and we can only hope SIDA will learn from the experience of our work here." Lars Barkman, site chief for the reconstruction and repair of the Cogido and Cogivina paper mills, is of the same opinion.

Willingness To Cooperate

"It's just wonderful how well cooperation is going and what willingness to cooperate and skill the Vietnamese demonstrate. It's a pleasure to see the results from our work."

What is it, then, which makes the projects so successful? To use the Bai Bang paper mill again as a comparison, we can say that the progress in southern Vietnam is the result of a very different philosophy of aid. In the north, work was begun on too large a scale, with equipment which was too sophisticated and in the wrong places without any infrastructure whatsoever.

In the south already existing plants were used which furthermore were located in an industrial area which was in partial operation and with a developed road network. As far as the paper mills are concerned, they too are located in an area having good access to raw materials in the form of bamboo, brushwood and rubber trees. Another important reason, especially relevant in the case of paper mills, is that standard equipment was used, making repairs or replacements with spare parts easier.

Furbo and Barkman are both full of praise for the staff's great professional knowledge.

"Their ingeniousness can help get difficult and complex work done. What we in Sweden would immediately discard as used equipment and simply replace with a new part has to be repaired here," Furbo said. "And the workers we have handle such assignments."

There is yet another reason for the progress of the projects in the south which few talk about--certainly not the Vietnamese administrators--which is the fact that in the south there is an entirely different work discipline and work ethic. In all three projects, most of the pre-1975 staff has stayed on. Certain parts of management have come from the north, Pham Van Binh and Le Ngoc An, the director of Cogido are from North Vietnam, but most of the technicians and all of the workers come from the south. Directors Pham and An are of course party members, but in their roles in the south they act as competent professionals with extensive experience from similar work in the north. Both also say they have no difficulties cooperating with technicians and other staff members who were trained and worked in an almost super-capitalistic system under various South Vietnamese governments.

Better Discipline

"Discipline is better in the south and the labor organizations are better here," Pham says. "There are only 15 people from the north on the work force, because moving people around got to be too expensive."

A source outside the power plant explained that the real reason is that workers from the north are lazy, lack initiative, and would only hold work up. Another source familiar with work on projects in the north added that workers from the south have already been transferred to the north.

"To keep to schedules, some government plants have turned to workers from the south who exhibit an attitude towards their work which is quite different from that shown by people in the north who have lived under the socialist system for so many decades. In southern Vietnam it is also a lot easier to deal with the customs department. The flow of goods through the harbor of Ho Chi Minh City stands in stark contrast to Haiphong, where the North Vietnamese bureaucracy has delayed most aid effort and driven many experts to desperation.

Low Cost

"We take goods to the power plant right away and the customs men come there and check everything out," Pham says. "Then they are on our turf and can't just do as they like. Progress on the project in the south comes as the result of a remarkable combination of good cooperation among Swedish experts and Marxist-schooled specialists from the north, both groups being able to rely on an efficient labor force. In the south work discipline has remained more important than party discipline and for that reason the party in the work place is quite simply a peripheral phenomenon."

And the Swedish price tag for the projects: all told, under 200 million kronor, but the effect on the economic reconstruction of Vietnam is probably greater than the multi-billion kronor Bai Bang project.

12789 CSO: 3650/96 ECONOMIC

VIETNAM

HANOI ISSUES REGULATIONS ON ENCOURAGING PRODUCTION, SERVICES

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 22 Feb 87 p 1

[Hanoi People's Committee regulations on encouraging individual production, the family economy, and the service trades]

[Text] In order to bring into play and develop the potential of all production forces while waiting for the Municipal People's Council to approve official regulations, the Municipal People's Committee has promulgated the following temporary regulations to encourage individual production, the family economy, and the service trades:

1. All citizens, including all present and retired workers and civil servants, are encouraged to develop production and engage in service trades.

If people participating in individual production, the family economy, and the service trades produce ordinary consumer goods or engage in the services on the accompanying list, they need only report to the subward or village people's committee. If they produce other products or engage in other services they must request permission. The subward or village people's committee must reply within 7 days. If the governmental administration does not reply within that time producers or service workers may engage in the work for which they submitted applications.

No matter what product they produce or what service they perform, they must observe the municipal management regulations regarding sanitation, the environment, convenience and inconvenience, etc.

2. The individual producers and people in service trades are obliged to pay taxes in accordance with the state policies. But in order to encourage production and services, during the first year they are exempt from taxes. After paying taxes, the producers and service workers have full rights, which are protected by the state, in using the rest of their income. People who engage in secondary family trades which do not have a specialized commercial nature are exempted from all taxes.

3. Housing rented from the state as living quarters which is also used for individual production, for the family economy, or for services is still taxed as living quarters and not as commercial establishments.

4. Consumer electricity used for individual production, the family economy, or services is calculated at the consumer rate when within the per-household electricity consumption norm. Electricity consumed beyond that norm must be calculated at the producer rate (1.2 dong per KWH), but the regulations regarding the time of use must be observed to avoid interfering with the people's daily lives.

5. State commerce will make all-out efforts to sell materials raw materials and parts to bring into play the leading role of the state economy and to encourage individual production, the family economy, and the service trades.

6. Producers have the right to market their own products. They may sell them on consignment or sell them to state commerce or to marketing cooperatives at negotiated prices. Products produced on a contracted-out basis for state commerce or produced in accordance with the system of selling raw materials and buying finished products must bear the label the production installation.

7. People who produce export goods have the right to use foreign exchange in accordance with the stipulated regulations, in order to import raw materials.

8. Producers may borrow capital and open bank accounts, and are issued cash, according to plan, when necessary to serve production.

9. The municipal services and departments, and the ward, district, subward, and village people's committees are responsible for managing, and creating conditions favorable for the development of, individual production, the family economy, and the service trades. People who contribute to the development of production and services are rewarded. People who violate the regulations and impede production and services will be dealt with appropriately.

List of Individual and Family Products, Services, and Repairs Requiring Only Reporting to the Subward and Village People's Committees

1. Products made from rattan and bamboo.

2. Products made from scrap metal sheeting and stainless steel.

3. Processed food products (except for liquor, beer, fermented bev the legitimate incomes of workers, increasing the material wealth of society are extremely urgent tasks. Therefore, we must renovate our way of thinking and endeavor to cause the collective sector to become a leading force in the city's small industry-handicrafts production and bring into play the superiority and strength of the small industry-handicrafts sector so that it can, along with the state economy, develop the city's socialist economy more and more strongly, and create a motive force for transforming Hanoi's economic-social situation.

5616 CSO: 4209/365
STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW REGULATIONS URGED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 22 Feb 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Strictly Implement New Policies To Develop Production and Be Concerned With Living Conditions"]

[Text] The municipal government recently promulgated the following important regulations:

The temporary promulgation of a number of regulations to encourage individual production, the family economy, and services.

The temporary promulgation of a number of regulations to encourage the application of scientific-technical advances to production.

The temporary promulgation of a number of regulations regarding retired workers and civil servants.

Those are stipulations which are truly related to the lives of many strata of people which are intended to implement the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress and the resolution of the 10th Municipal Party Organization, specifically to open the way for the resolution of the municipality's two principal problems: jobs and living conditions. The spirit that permeates those decisions is to "encourage everyone to, by means of their talent and labor, enthusiastically produce and create many products for society, and enable everyone's lives to become increasingly better." (Resolution of the 10th Municipal Party Commission). They also manifest a spirit of beginning to resolve a number of specific difficulties in the old management mechanism which impede the liberation of sources of materials, labor, "gray matter," capital, etc., which are still latent among the various strata of people. They also express the sense of responsibility of the governmental organs toward the people, especially with regard to matters related to daily life, in accordance with the slogan "make the people the root," of always remaining close to the basic level and listening attentively to the opinions of the people.

The problems dealt with by those documents are urgent problems posed by life which were brought out and deliberated at length by the party congresses and people's representatives. Now the government has codified the specific measures and policies into documents of a legal nature which are universally effective throughout the municipality. Those measures and policies are perhaps not yet complete, but they essentially meet the requirements of the situation and the aspirations of the people, and must promptly be promulgated on a temporary basis, then in view of the actual situation they will gradually be supplemented and filled out. That is an urgent working method which is not perfectionist and does not a matter of passively sitting around and waiting.

The strict implementation of those stipulations is relevant to all services, departments, sectors, and mass organizations from the municipal level down to the precinct, district, city, subprecinct, and basic levels. Liberating production, and enabling the individual and family economies to develop in a varied and rich manner; expanding the circulation of foodstuffs; and meticulous concern for the people's living conditions, in the spirit of the People's Committee documents, demand that the joint management organs and the specialized sectors renovate their thought and work style and endeavor to be equal to their missions. They can no longer guide in the old way, that of bureaucratic centralism, which is nominally "management" but which in that results in red tape and inertia and impedes and holds back production. The relevant services and sectors must rapidly propose specific, detailed measures to organize the implementation of the decisions of the municipal governmental administration, and exercise continuous supervision and oversight so that the new policies can become part of life, be truly effective, and be supported by the masses. It may be said that all actions and work style that are contrary to the new spirit and create impediments and red tape for true workers who want to develop production, or actions which impede the flow of commerce and the movement of grain, agricultural products, and food products into the city and major crimes which must be dealt with appropriately.

5616 CSO: 4209/365

VIETNAM

AMENDMENTS TO NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES RECOMMENDED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Kien Phuoc: "Ho Chi Minh City and the Implementation of (Draft) Resolution 306 of the Political Bureau and Decision 76 of the Council of Ministers: Some Recommended Supplements and Amendments"]

[Text] Resolving difficulties, attaining initial results:

In 1986 many difficulties were encountered in industrial production in Ho Chi Minh City. Materials supplied by the central echelon for industrial, small industry, and handicrafts production met only 35 to 40 percent of the needs. Localities provided 25 percent of the their materials, the city imported 25 percent, and the enterprises obtained about 10 to 15 percent of their materials by using their own funds. Furthermore, the deficiencies in implementing the prices-salaries-money policies seriously affected social production as a whole. There were still many difficulties in distributioncirculation and exporting-importing between the city and the provinces.

In view of that situation, in order to maintain production the city creatively applied the viewpoints and stands of the Party Central Committee, boldly overcame difficulties, mobilized all sources of materials and capital, promulgated a number of decisions to encourage individual and family production, the secondary economy, and the collective economy, and provided employment for more than 14,000 workers.

Although industrial, small industry, and handicrafts output increased by 5.6 percent over the previous year, it was also the first year (since 1981) in which the rate of industrial development increased slowly. Many essential consumer goods did not meet the plan norms, some materials serving agricultural production declined, and the cane sugar, MSG, and tobacco sector fell short of the norms. Capabilities for contracting out the production of hats, shoes, ready-made clothing, and services were very great but were not exploited to any extent.

With regard to the transformation and reorganization of production, in 1986 the city stressed the consolidating and strengthening of the state economy, tied in with the implementation of (draft) Resolution 76 of the Council of Ministers. However, under difficult circumstances with regard to materials, raw materials, and the management mechanism, the state economy was not able to play the leading role. Although 77.4 percent of the workers of the small industry-handicrafts sector were involved in collective production, the sector's quality was not high. The city as a whole organized 82 jointly operated small industry and handicrafts enterprises, 15 jointly operated enterprises to repair transportation facilities, and more than 400 economic installations to improve the living conditions of workers and civil servants. Although the liberation of production began to show results, there were still many limitations, missteps, and negative phenomena.

After the issuance of (draft) Resolution 306 and Decision No 76, the city applied the new viewpoints to the production bases. It selected two bureaus and eight enterprises and enterprise federations to implement them on a trial basis. Now there are 30 installations. Those units fulfilled their 1986 plans, and many enterprises completely balanced their own production plans. In economic activities there arose new features: tying in production with domestic and foreign consumption, directly attracting remissions from abroad, eliminated many intermediate layers, decentralization and production cooperation among units in the same product group, and borrowing foreign exchange to produce export goods. The central industrial installations have a clear tendency to make in-depth investments and hold competitions to select skilled and good director, especially at the Federation of Textile Enterprises.

Although (draft) Resolution 306 needs to be perfected, it has brought about a new vital force for industrial production.

Recommendations from the basic level:

In the course of recent discussions in the city, including work sessions of the cadre group of the Construction Subcommittee to draft an agenda to renovate the central management mechanism and implement the new mechanism at a number of trial locations, the industrial production installations in the city expressed belief that draft Resolution 306 is appropriate and must be further perfected so that it can be in accordance with the spirit of the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress. The actual situation has shown that because the administrative-economic management function has not been clarified, the upper echelons still intervene too deeply in production and commercial management at the basic level. A number of specific stipulations of Decision 76 do not yet correctly manifest the basic level's right of autonomy in production and commerce. For example, because of deficiencies in price management (with regard to all components of production costs), the enterprises could not implement the principle of accepting responsibility for profits or losses, meet their capital, or implement accounting. Therefore, the installations have made the following recommendations:

First, under unstable and abnormal economic conditions, such as those at present it is impossible to have accurate accounting on the basis of the stipulations of (draft) Resolution 306 and Decision No. 76. They recommended the temporary acceptance of commercial accounting or statistical accounting based on the actual situation. When the factors and conditions return to normal, in addition to perfecting the management mechanism we will implement economic accounting, as called for by the draft resolution.

Second, the distribution of benefits is a motive force of foremost importance in stimulating the development of production. There is still a wide disparity between the incomes of producers and those are people in commerce and services. Among the industrial sectors, there is also a difference between Group A and Group B. Therefore, there must be policy to ensure the principle of distribution according to labor. The producers of material wealth must have incomes that correspond to the value of their labor and must be higher than those of people in the distribution and circulation spheres. Only thereby can we create enthusiasm in production and "make production the root."

Third, with regard to the process of concentrating and modernizing production there still exist mechanical viewpoints toward management according to economic-technical sectors, which had led to the isolation, separation, and division of production among the sectors and localities. The actual situation of life has shown that the industrial production sectors cannot be separate, but must ally with many other sectors (in the forms of production federations of many sectors and tying in production with services), and alliances with many localities and foreign countries. Furthermore, the production organizations are on many different scales, concentrate the economic components in the primary axle, the state economy, on the basis of which to form a effective combined mechanism among the state enterprises, joint publicprivate enterprises, cooperatives, and the family economy. Furthermore, there must be a mechanism to tie in scientific-technical activities with production in the form of production-science and technology alliances. On that basis, we must redistribute the research institutes and tie them in with the production sectors, tie in the raw materials areas with the processing industry in the form of cultivation, processing, and export alliances, respect the interests of both parties, and encourage the basic units to create sources of raw materials.

Fourth, because the draft resolution and Decision No 76 do not clearly categorize enterprises, there are still limitations in orienting production and commerce. Therefore, they must be studied and appropriately amended. For example, with regard to enterprises or enterprise federations of an infrastructure nature (electricity, water, or posts and telecommunications), although accounting records must be kept, because of the nature of their production they may not make a profit. Therefore, there must be a policy to make up for deficits so that they can maintain and develop production. It is also necessary to distinguish among enterprises producing production means (machinery and parts), enterprises producing consumer goods. There must be temporary regulations to form alliances and joint operations with socialist countries or capitalist corporations, in accordance with economic contracts. There must be a policy to manage the economic components and a policy toward profit-sharing joint public-private enterprises. It is necessary to supplement the mechanism and create conditions for forming ties with foreign markets, buying and leasing patents and innovations, and using skilled specialists (both Vietnamese and foreign).

Specific policies and regulations:

First, with regard to planning. In the present economic-social situation, the state is not yet able balance all production activities at the basic level. Therefore, it is necessity to give the basic level more authority, and the state must concentrate on the part for which it is responsible. The enterprises must give priority to producing goods for which the state has provided materials, and implement strict economic accounting in the spirit of prices having to closely reflect value. As for the capital and materials they themselves provide, the enterprises must be completely free to decide how to produce and market products with the greatest effectiveness. The state must manage that part of the plan indirectly.

In production and commerce, it is necessary to clarify the right to buy and sell without making vague stipulations. With regard to budgetary deposits, the following recommendations were made:

First, if the national commercial income tax is retained, it should be reduced so that the enterprises can have conditions for developing.

Second, the state income tax should be abolished and the payments that must be made to the state should be consolidated into one. That payment should be stabilized for a certain period of time (perhaps for 2 or 3 years), depending on the type of enterprise and product.

Now, the amount of profits left for the enterprises is equal to its total income minus payments that have to be made to the state. The division of the three funds should be decided by the enterprises, under the supervision of the party, trade union, and Youth Union organizations. Only the minimum ratio to be set aside to develop production.

Second, with regard to prices there were recommendations that they be set in accordance with the principles of prices having to ensure the development of production, of ensuring the purchasing power of money, and of the producers earning prices and being able to determine prices. The state should only stipulate the prices of some principal materials and products which determine the strength of the national. Prices for other products should be set by agreement between the enterprises and the customers, including prices and special production costs. In that regard, the basic units felt that Decision No 285 was appropriate.

Third, with regard to salaries and the distribution of income, at present the ratio of salaries to production costs is very low (and production costs do not correctly reflect value) and the workers are experiencing difficulties with regard to living conditions. Recommendations were made that the control of the bonus and welfare funds as stipulated by Decision No 76 be reviewed.

Fifth, with regard to exporting and importing. In the case of products that replace imports, recommendations were made that the enterprises be allowed to keep 40 to 50 percent of their foreign exchange for a certain period of time (instead of the 10 percent called for by Decision No 76). For example, in the case of production means they should be able to keep 50 percent of their foreign exchange for 3 years, and in the case of consumer goods they should be able to retain 40 percent of their foreign exchange for 1 or 2 years.

With regard to exports, there were recommendations that the enterprises producing export goods be allowed to directly enter foreign markets by using enterprise expense funds. The large enterprises should be allowed to export directly.

Sixth, with regard to scientific-technical activities. Because the incentive bonuses for scientific-technical cadres in the state enterprises are too small, the "gray matter" of those forces cannot be brought into play and they are attracted to the other economic components. Therefore, there were recommendations that the enterprises be allowed to determine the bonuses, on the basis of the economic results brought about by such cadres.

Seventh, with regard to the social aspects of the enterprises' activities, there were recommendations that a law on socialist democracy be studied.

Eighth, although all production-commercial activities must be expressed in the form of economic contracts, it must be clearly stipulated that not all economic contracts must be approved by economic arbitrators. Economic arbitrators only exercise their function when there has been a violation.

5616 CSO: 4209/374

VIETNAM

RESOLUTION OF PARTY CONGRESS DETERMINED ROLE OF HOM CITY AREA

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 13 Feb 87 pp 1, 2

[Article by Nguyen Duc: "Resolution 6 and Our Responsibility: The New Way of Livelihood Becoming Increasingly Clear in Areas Around the City"]

[Text] New Signs

The resolution of the Fourth Municipal Party Congress determined that the economic role of the areas around Ho Chi Minh [HCM] City was to be green becoming a food crops, agricultural products, and export crops belt. That spirit correctly reflects the varied conditions and potential of the six districts around the city: Cu Chi, with peanuts; Hoc Mon, with its specialized vegetable production area; Thu Duc and Binh Chanh, with sugarcane and rice; and Nha Be and Duyen Hai, with shrimp, coconuts, and immense mangrove stands.

After the congress, the party bases around the city added young, enthusiastic people with high educational and scientific-technical levels to the party committees to strengthen their leadership and management ability. Over a period of 3 or 4 months there have been new, encouraging "signs" in activities in area around the city. Duyen Hai District has approved policies regarding the investment of foreign exchange to import fishing equipment for the people, and has mobilized the capital and skills of the people to develop the raising, catching, and processing of aquatic products. The party committees and key leadership comrades of Cu Chi, Hoc Mon, and Binh Chanh districts went to the basic units to grasp the situation and worked with the villages in seeking ways to overcome their difficulties and create upward momentum, especially in the remote villages. Binh Chanh District led the way in taking the initiative in obtaining materials for intensive cultivation, and saved 40,000 dollars of internal capital to import fertilizer for this year's winter-spring season. Hoc Mon District reviewed the quality of agricultural industrialization before consolidating it, and rectified the agricultural cooperatives so that they have service and commercial activities that are in the right direction. After 2 years of activity, although there are still many matters which must be carefully discussed, the Xuan Loc, agricultural cooperative (Thanh Loc, Hoc Mon), has proved the superiority of an agricultural cooperative that knows how to do combined production and commerce on the basis of the of an agricultural-industrial-commercial-credit-serviceand export cooperative model. It is not surprising that in 1986 grain production amounted to 260,000 tons, which surpassed the barrier of 250,000 tons which the city's agriculture had endeavored to break for 11 year. During this year's winter-spring season, thanks to the water provided by the Eastern Canal and a number of pumping stations which were brought into operation, the rice, peanuts, and pineapple areas increased by thousands of hectares. The contracted-out raising of the various kinds of hogs, cows, poultry, and honey bees developed strongly, which both employed some of the surplus labor and contributed to increasing the incomes and improving the living standards of the peasants.

And Urgent Problems

However, when we evaluate the areas around the city from an all-round point of view, we see that there are still many problems which must be promptly resolved. Although it has been confirmed that "agriculture is truly the main front," the policies regarding agricultural production still include many irrationalities. The investment fund and sources of agricultural materials are still far below requirements. During the past year, there were serious shortages of fertilizer and pesticides; the nitrogenous fertilizer provided the the central level was sufficient to meet only part of the needs; and phosphate fertilizer met only 5.8 percent of the needs. Providing pesticides was the responsibility of the localities and peasants. The ratio according to two-way contracts was unsatisfactory and the state purchase prices of the peasants' agricultural products were 10 to 50 percent lower than the outside market prices, which caused the producers to suffer losses no matter which way they turned.

Agricultural transformation and the quality of agricultural cooperativization are also pressing problems. After inspecting the quality of agricultural cooperativization, Hoc Mon District found that, in fact, the area and labor that had been collectivized were far below the figures published in April 1985. In general, the localities in areas around the city the relaxation of management and the lack of democracy are still prevalent in most cooperatives and production collectives. The average and weak cooperatives and production collectives account for more than 50 percent of the total. Only about 20 percent of the cooperatives and production collectives have carried out product contracting in correct accordance with Directive 100. Of the remainder, only about half only contract out on paper and in form, while the mode of livelihood is still individual or solidarity team.

Because the transformation is still weak, and tends to be formalistic, the effects of irrigation and mechanization have not been sufficiently brought into play in soil preparation and in practicing intensive cultivation to increase yields in the fields. The living conditions of peasants in areas outside the city are still far from those in the city proper. There has been little investment in building new rural roads, which are deteriorating to a serious degree. A considerable number of remote villages in Nha Be, Binh Chanh, Cu Chi, and Hoc Mon have neither electricity nor sufficient kerosene for illumination.

Liberate All Existing Production Capabilities So That the Rural Areas Outside the City Can Advance

During the recent Tet period, the districts around the city set aside thousands of gifts, each valued at 500 to 1,000 dong, to give to families encountering difficulties and headless households which we unable to buy Tet goods. Those deeds, under the present conditions, manifest the government's concern for the people. But in order to create stability in economic life and social order in the localities, and essentially resolve the urgent problems of life, the localities must draft production plans and correctly and appropriately apply the economic levers in order to liberate the existing production capabilities.

Recognizing the existence of the different economic components and creating conditions for them to invest in production to produce material wealth, and to enjoy the results of their labor after they fulfill their obligations to the state, is an important measure in liberating production capability.

At the same time, it is necessary to nullify a number of outmoded and irrational stipulations regarding agricultural management based on territorial areas and obstacles to the flow of goods, regarding high tax levels, and regarding state purchase prices of agricultural products which are unprofitable for producers. In the investment structure, it is also necessary to invest adequately in agricultural materials so that the producers can obtain sufficient fertilizer and pesticides for crops, develop intensive cultivation, and increase the number of growing seasons.

During the first days of 1987, although there are still many difficulties, because of the tasks, accomplished by the leadership echelons, confidence in a new way of livelihood among the popular masses has truly been bolstered.

5616 CSO: 4209/361

VIETNAM

CHANGES MADE TO DEVELOP OVERALL ECONOMY OF CITY

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 87 pp 1, 2

[Article by Ben Nghe: "The City after the Sixth Congress"]

[Text] Is there anything new in the city after the Sixth Congress of the CPV? That is the question asked by many people who hope that together with the whole country, the city will continue to contribute most effectively to accelerating the innovative revolutionary process.

Many people have shared the same feeling and made the following similar remark:

After the Sixth CPV Congress, instead of being ebullient or monotonous and quiet the situation in the city is characterized by an earnest and urgent attitude based on careful calculations both in pondering problems and in taking action, as well as on the need to attach importance to actual facts rather than outward appearance, to have an encompassing outlook on all aspects, and simultaneously to peer into important issues, to act, to draw on experiences, to make improvements, and to achieve perfection. Implementation of the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPV and the fourth congress of the municipal party organization has been linked to the solution of impeding problems. Dynamism and acumen rather than thoughtlessness and impetuosity have been developed continuously. In my opinion, this working method not only conforms to the longstanding qualities of our city but also reflects its desire to make positive innovations.

Before, during, and after the Sixth Congress, the party organization and the people in the city have directed their efforts to a strategic problem of primary importance--that is, the question as to what must be done to release productivity and develop production forces in order to help implement at all costs three major economic programs which are the material prerequisites for solving other problems. Before the Sixth Congress, the city issued Decision No 34 to stimulate the development of the household, individual, and sideline economies. To date, despite many remaining problems requiring consideration and solution, the presence of over 4,000 installations employing tens of thousands of people is an indication of the great prospects of this decision. Afterward, the city promulgated Decision No 192 to remove difficulties for the small-industry and handicraft production sectors, to provide encouragement and conditions for collective economic organizations subordinate to this sector

to strengthen themselves and develop, and to exhort laborers in this sector to work ever more satisfactorily. I believe that Decision Nos 34 and 192 have practically and positively contributed to the great success of the Sixth Congress and to the implementation of its resolution. Decision No 192 has been imparted to and carried out by all localities and installations. From the municipal to the grassroots level, committees have been set up to guide and organize its implementation and important regulations have been and are being realized in order to create favorable conditions for this implementation and gradually to overcome difficulties and solve problems arising from the actual situation. In the industrial sector, the directors' club held its working session for the first time since the Sixth Congress and the beginning of 1987 and for the 10th time ever since an initiative was taken to convene it. The recent working session was attended by 150 representatives, including 90 directors of basic economic units, with the objective of reviewing for the first time the implementation of Resolution No 306 of the Political Bureau and Decision No 76 of the Council of Ministers. Participants in this club session dealt with favorable conditions and also with limitations imposed by these documents; all of them expressed the hope that the state will soon enact a system of specific and rational policies based on the realities of production and life and aimed at vesting basic economic units with real autonomy and developing the leading role of the state economy. While congresses were being held at all echelons in the city, all suburban districts and responsible sectors eagerly overcame shortcomings, made concentrated investments in agricultural and fishing production and in regions specialized in cultivating high-yield rice and planting crops and raising domestic animals for export, carried out commercial activities with the aim of promoting production and meeting daily necessities, and gave up the preconceived idea that "without commerce, it is impossible to prosper." In light of the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPV and the fourth congress of the municipal party organization, the subcommittee for rural affairs of the municipal party committee has been implementing more strictly Resolution No 18 and Decision No 21 on the duty of the industrial, scientific, and technical sectors to promote agriculture and comprehensively to develop the suburban rural areas. Fully aware of the Sixth Congress viewpoint on reform, the city and all localities are carefully scrutinizing and verifying the facts and are also accurately assessing the recent industrial, commercial, and agricultural transformation in order to take appropriate measures to develop good deeds and right things and satisfactorily to solve the remaining problems in this are in conformity with sentiments and common sense with the objective of strengthening and consolidating the new production relationships and encouranging individual laborers who do not yet want to join collective economic units or are asking permission to withdraw from these units so that these persons may have peace of mind while working to earn their living. Scientific, technical, and sociological organizations also are preparing to become parts of the production forces. The educational, public health, cultural, and social tasks are also developed in keeping with the common tempo. Another noteworthy endeavor is the fact that the city people have contributed 10 million more dong to accelerate preparations to dam the Dong Nai River current. Back in 1986, the city people and the overseas Vietnamese had contributed 35 million dong to the Tri An hydroelectric project. The city has coordinated the implementation of the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPV and the fourth congress

77

of the municipal party organization with the removal of obstacles in industrial production in late 1986. Through 98 percent of the plan enforced since the beginning of that year was fulfilled, and though 101 percent of the adjusted plan was accomplished, the increase achieved by the entire industrial sector was still far below the assigned norm. The output value of some sectors showed an increase over the past while that of certain important sectors suffered a decrease. Nevertheless, the fact that the value of the 1986 gross industrial output exceeded 34 billion dong represents a noteworthy effort at a time when the situation was fraught with difficulties--ones which could be noticed only by insiders. Considering that society must be the object of economic activities and that any social policy must aim at taking care of human beings, the city deems it "necessary to do immediately whatever is feasible and beneficial to the people" during the forthcoming Tet holidays. Though very busy, the secretary of the municipal party organization has cooperated with some newspapers and reminded the mass media of the need to update their working methods by respecting and speaking the truth and to overcome bureaucracy by echoing the voice of the laboring people. While readers are reading this newspaper article, the executive committee of the municipal party organization is continuing to debate the 1987 socioeconomic plan and is deciding on impeding tasks in order to ensure implementation of the Sixth Congress resolution by the entire party organization and people in the city.

Through not noisy and showy, all these activities have in essence begun to realize part of the gist of innovations recommended in the Sixth Congress resolution. It must be noted that these tasks are helping to create a positive change among the municipal party organization and city people right at the beginning of this year.

9332/12951 CSO: 4209/316

VIETNAM

ADOPTION OF RATIONAL CASH MANAGEMENT POLICY RECOMMENDED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Tran Thi Hoa: "Many Places Are Still Holding Onto Cash"]

[Text] Recently many localities have expanded their service networks, which operate in the "private business" manner. Therefore, such places usually have a great deal of cash.

Every day a store on Hang Ngang Street in Hanoi that sells clothing on consignment takes in a sum of money equal to several savings accounts added together. They keep the money in drawers all week, and sometimes the person whose goods were sold on consignment doesn't come to pick up the money for nearly a month. Meanwhile, the small industry-handicrafts installations and the credit cooperatives must wait a long time and do much paperwork before being able to borrow money from the bank to develop production.

I recommend that the state bank branches promptly adopt a rational policy regarding the management of cash so that it does not pile up excessively at such places and so that there will be money to lend to other places to serve production in a timely manner.

5616 CSO: 4209/374

VIETNAM

POLICY ON OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE CONTRIBUTIONS NEEDED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 87 p 1

[Article by Do Lien Chau, of the Third Subward, Fifth Precinct: "Motivation Overseas Vietnamese To Send Money Home Requires an Appropriate Policy"]

[Text] In his speech at the Sixth National Party Congress, Vo Tran Chi, secretary of the municipal party committee, spoke about tapping the economic potential of over 200,000 families of citizens whose relatives are living abroad so that they may participate in national construction. As one of these families, may we express our joy on hearing of this statement by the municipal party committee secretary. However, we must say frankly that this joy has not yet alleviated our worry about the scarlet letters "T-H" stamped on the back of our household registration certificate. This stamp makes us worry about political and moral discrimination whenever we are required to show our household registration certificate although up to now I myself have never experienced any annoyance in this respect.

Many units in our city have urged people to ask their relatives abroad to send money (hard currency) home through the Nation Bank network. After considering many of these units, I finally chose the Public Health Material Supply Corporation and asked my children to send money home to support our own family and simultaneously to provide foreign currency for this state agency to take care of the people's health. Then my children sent money home and I came to 76 Suong Nguyet Anh to receive Vietnamese currency in exchange. In addition to some homemade medicine the agency gave me as a bonus, I was issued coupon No 3,656 entitling me to buy more medicine in case of need. Some time after, I needed a few capsules of antibiotics and called twice at the agency but could not buy anything, even domestically produced medicine. To date, the coupon had no "effect" whatever as far as my family is concerned. We wonder why it has been "issued," especially why 15 horizontal and 4 vertical lines providing spaces for ordinal numbers, dates of purchase, prices, and signatures are printed on its back. Moreover, the issuance of such coupons must be costly in terms of the personnel required to jot down a few notes on each coupon and to make entries in a register.

How is it that when we needed some medicine, the corporation that needed hard currency and called for the people's help and to whose appeal we had responded failed to reciprocate our good will and to keep the promise made when appealing to us? To make up for the money "lost" when buying the needed medicine on the market, we had to advise our children to stop sending money to the corporation and, instead, to buy jeans, pullovers, and toilet soap and send them home so that we might resell them afterward. We must stress that we did so very reluctantly. The reason is that, frankly speaking, each time we wanted to sell to a trader a few meters of fabric or some bars of soap, we did not feel happy at all because we had to haggle about their selling prices. What a pity!

SAIGON GIAI PHONG once reported that our entire city has only one instrument designed to detect and remove foreign matters from the children's respiratory system, which means that we badly need medical equipment. Many families of the same status as ours are ready to request their overseas relatives to send foreign currency home to help the country even if the amount of money to be sent home is small because it is still better than nothing. Therefore, we hope that an appropriate policy will be promulgated to draw foreign currency from overseas Vietnam provided its implementation is more rational and guaranteed by law in order to avoid causing unnecessary sorrows and moral complexes to these families.

9332/12951 CSO: 4209/316

VIETNAM

INSURANCE FORMALITIES FOR OVERSEAS PACKAGES EXPLAINED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 87 p 2

[Article in readers' column: "Insurance for Goods Sent Home by Private Citizens Residing in Socialist Countries"]

[Text] In recent years, the number of Vietnamese cadres and students going to socialist countries for training and education has increased continuously. The quantity of goods and gifts which these overseas cadres, workers, civil servants, and students have been allowed to send home by our government and those of other countries has also increased continuously. Both the merchandise senders and receivers want safe and rapid shipment from the moment the goods leave the departure point to the moment they reach the recipients' hands.

In response to this legitimate wish, the Ministry of Finance issued Decision No 139/QD-TC dated 28 May 1986 (including regulations and insurance rates) aurthorizing the Vietnam Insurance Company (BAOVIET in short), as of 1 July 1987, to provide insurance coverage for goods and other articles voluntarily sent home by overseas Vietnamese.

The SAIGON GIAI PHONG reporter called on Nguyen Nam Cuong, deputy director of the insurance branch office in Ho Chi Minh City, asked him about insurance formalities and got the following answer:

Responsibilities of the Insurance Company: BAOVIET is responsible for compensating any loss or damage from the moment the goods are entrusted to the shipping company at the departure point to the moment they are delivered to the receiver at the warehouse of the port of arrival. However, the insurance company's responsibilities will not exceed 10 days reckoning from the time the addressee receives a notice of goods delivery, except in case of objective difficulties.

Insurance Premiums and Values of Insured Goods: Insurance premiums are calculated in percentage of the value of insured goods. It is agreed that the value of insured goods is considered equivalent to their purchase prices if they are bought by the state.

Insurance Purchase Formalities: The sender must fill out an insurance application form or send a letter to the recipient to notify him of the gift shipment. Either of these documents must contain the following information: names and addresses of both sender and receiver, copy of the receipt issued by the shipping company or by one which receives goods and takes care of transportation, a detailed list of goods, number and symbol inscribed on the package, volume and weight of the package, names of the ship and port of departure, and dates of departure and arrival of the ship (if the information about the cargo ship is unknown when applying for insurance coverage, the sender may provide it later on when it becomes known to him). The sender must send either of these two documents to the receiver in Vietnam. It must be noted that according to customs regulations, in order to enable the recipient to receive goods, it is necessary to send him a copy of the sender's passport which has been certified by the Vietnamese consulate or embassy. The goods must be carefully packed in accordance with regulations, and their safety will be ensured if they are packed by specialized packing companies (because the insurance policy does not cover any loss due to inadequate packing).

Duty of the Receiver: On receipt of the above-mentioned insurance application form or the notice of gift shipment with the said detailed information from the sender, the receiver must call at the BAOVIET Company to fulfill insurance purchase formalities (including insurance application, payment of insurance premium, and receipt of insurance certificate).

Indeminification Formalities: If any loss or damage is noticed while receiving goods at the port (within 10 days of the date of receipt of the notice of goods delivery), the recipient must immediately notify BAOVIET for assessment of the loss or damage before taking the goods home. BAOVIET will not be held responsible for compensation of the loss or damage if the goods are withdrawn from the port without BAOVIET's assessment. BAOVIET will pay indemnities for loss or damage only in Vietnamese currency and not in kind.

People in Ho Chi Minh City who receive goods sent from the socialist countries must contact the municipal insurance branch office at 26 Ton That Dam Street, First Precinct, phone Nos 94.180, 94.181, and 94.182.

9332/12951 CSO: 4209/316

VIETNAM

ROLE OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY IN SUBURBAN AGRICULTURE DISCUSSED

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 5 Jan 87 p 4

[Article by Nguyen Tan Xe, director of Agricultural Service in Ho Chi Minh City: "Science and Technology Must Serve Agriculture in Ho Chi Minh City Suburbs"]

[Text] In both the near and distant future, we must constantly and thoroughly adhere to the municipal party organization's viewpoint that "each inch of land is worth an inch of gold" because the land in Ho Chi Minh City suburbs is sparce and heavily populated. By all means, it is necessary to apply the intensive cultivation and multicropping method to increase the productivity of crops grown and domestic animals reared on the fields of the limited suburban area (about 14,000 arable nectares) of which over 90 percent is covered with gray, sulfate, and saline soil which requires cultivation to make it productive.

Therefore, we deem it necessary to apply scientific and technological advances rapidly to promote production because this is the quickest way to increase continuously its effectiveness and improve its quality. We hope that scientific and technological topics will be consistently linked to four programs whose implementation has been assigned by the municipal and people's committees to the agricultural sector. These programs deal specifically with the production of grain, foodstuffs, and exportable plants and animals, and with the rearing of dairy cows. Strict adherence to the theme of these programs is precisely the way to broaden scientific and technological activities in the agricultural domain with the objective of developing production and rapidly increasing the yield of agricultural goods by the suburban region so as to achieve the targets set by the current congress of the municipal party organization.

Another major and very important problem is to associate the management of scientific activities with measures aimed at applying agricultural scientific and technological advances to production in order to ensrue that the expenses incurred by the city for these activities are used better and more effectively.

The management of the scientific and technological task of the city must be immediately decentralized and divided into two levels--municipal and sectorial. It is very necessary to decentralize various sectors by assigning to them the task of taking care of expenses and budget and of examining and approving topics related to scientific and technological research and application. These sectors must assume responsibility for their own activities to the city. This way, the development and implementation of research topics will speed up and be accurate. For the agricultural sector in particular, greater attention must be paid to implementing these topics on schedule. It is necessary to avoid instances when the cultivation season has set in but the expenses and topics _______ have not yet been examined and approved, or when the topics have been selected but the expenditures to be allocated to their implementation are not yet made available.

In addition to appropriations for research expenses, the city must allocate a sufficient percentage of the scientific and technological budget to develop and apply scientific and technological advances which have been field-tested and proven beneficial in order to promote production immediately. We raise this problem because there are instances when a good result has been obtained from practical experiments in small areas during several cultivation seasons, but when these experiments are to be expanded to create conditions for application to large-scale production, the allocated expenditures are limited and insufficient to activate these projects and extend them to the entire production region.

To propagate the result of scientific and technical research and application among the masses, we fully agree to the creation of a scientific publishing house in Ho Chi Minh City. Moreover, the scientific and technological committee of the city must allocate sufficient expenditures to stimulate agricultural production by multiplying "performance spots" which are actually model fields where members of production collectives and cooperatives may come for observation and study and will, on their return home, apply their findings to their own production installations.

Appropriate treatment policies must be formulated regarding scientific and technical cadres who are doing their best to serve in the fields. On the other hand, the policy of mobilizing young and capable scientific and technical cadres must be continuously implemented.

The last question to be raised is to formulate a "scientific and technological strategy" for the present and up to the year 2000, and to associate the current 5 year (1986-90) scientific and technological plan with the economic and technological targets indicated in the resolution of the fourth congress of the municipal party organization. Based on the overall project approved by the city for rural districts, each district must specifically delineate village areas specialized in growing certain crop varieties and rearing certain animal species, and must coordinate investments in the building of material and technical bases with the yearly plan to apply scientific and technological advances. The ultimate objective must be to increase the productivity and output of agricultural commodities--especially those of economic value--in order to promote the processing industry as well as exports.

9332/12947 CSO: 4209/307

VIETNAM

CUU LONG AGRICULTURE REVIEWED, NEW TASKS SET FORTH

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 5 Jan 87 p 4

[Article by Nguyen Van Huyen, director of Agricultural Service in Cuu Long Province: "Meeting at the Beginning of the Year: Agricultural Production in Cuu Long Province Between Two Party Congresses"]

[Text] (Editorial staff's note: 1987 is the first year for implementation of the resolution of the Sixth National Congress of the CPV. On the occasion of the new year, the NONG NGHIEP reporter met some directors of agricultural services and discussed this matter with them. Below is the gist of their exchange of views.)

Cuu Long is one of the principal grain-producing provinces of the whole country. Agricultural production, especially grain production, plays an important role in the province's economy.

Despite basically favorable conditions, agriculture in Cuu Long is still faced with great difficulties which have prevented production from meeting the demands made by the third congress of the provincial party organization. From the objective point of view, in the past years, rice fields were frequently threatened by natural calamities--especially waterloggings, floods, drought, leafhoppers, and brackish water overflow. From the subjective point of view, the entire province accomplished the socialist transformation of agriculture but the poor quality of this task greatly limited the application of scientific and technological advances. Despite the assertion in various resolutions that "agriculture is at the forefront," only 18 percent of the provincial budget was invested in agriculture. Therefore, the building of material and technical bases was replete with shortcomings, which made it impossible to help peasants effectively to overcome natural calamities and to develop production.

To overcome these difficulties, we began by examining the internal affairs of our sector to see whether there remained any hindrance. We found that the leadership exercised by our sector from the provincial to the district level was still weak and slow due to the implementation of the bureaucratic and state subsidy system, and that our sector failed to fulfill satisfactorily its advisory role beside the provincial party committee. While relying on higher authorities in all matters, our sector did not fully understand the difficulties experienced by lower echelon people. Therefore, the problem facing our sector was to effect a change, to revamp the organizational structure, to reassign cadres, and, on this basis, to increase the capacity of guidance. The initial result was really heartening. Concentrated guidance was provided for various tasks related to seeds -- such as researching new kinds of seeds, directing the level-2 seed corporation to test the seeds, to draw a conclusion, and to propagate them for the first time, and then sending them to production collectives for large-scale propagation. Close guidance was given to tilling the soil and assistance was given to peasants for on schedule seeding and changing their farming technique. The agricultural materials corporation improved its working method and sent enough fertilizer of uniform quality to the grassroots level. Our sector formulated a special program of action for each zone as well as a special plan for each corporation with the objective of enhancing the role of science and technique. The Phuoc Tho breeding-hog farm set aside 10 percent of its piglets to help districts build their own breeding-hog farms. The rice seeds farm of the province supplied enough new seeds to districts to replace the old varieties which had degenerated. The crop cultivation bureau of the province sent most of its cadres to production installations to review the situation and to find appropriate measures for overcoming difficulties. An important policy was implemented to build a highyield rice area as the mainstay in four districts: Vung Liem, Tra On, Cau Ke, and Cang Long. In this area, high-yield rice was grown on 18,000 hectares in the first year and 22,000 hectares in the second. The result showed that despite a dificit of hundreds of thousands of tons of paddy in other ricegrowing areas but thanks to the compensation made by the high-yield rice area, the province managed to provide enough food for the people and to fulfill its grain obligation to the state.

By exerting such efforts, the agricultural sector in Cuu Long Province achieved the following basic targets set by the third congress of the provincial party organization:

In crop cultivation, the gross output of grain in 1985 was 910,000 tons, including over 900,000 tons of paddy representing an increase of 264,000 tons over 1980. This made it possible to basically solve the food problem for the entire province and to fulfill the grain obligation to the state. In addition to rice cultivation, the movement to grow industrial crops for export--such as coconuts, sesame, and cashews--was also encouraged.

In animal husbandry, the bovine herd totaled 125,000 which was the highest number in comparison with other provinces in the Mekong Delta. Of the total bovine herd, those used as draft animals accounted for 53.16 percent--an increase of 28,000 over 1980. This herd increased 4.7 percent each year. The total hog herd numbered 245,154, ranked third among the Mekong Delta provinces, and increased 7.7 percent each year. The poultry flock numbered about 4 million, doubling the figure for 1980 and including 2 million ducks.

The agricultural sector thus overcame difficulties and fulfilled the threeplants-and-three-animals norm set by the third congress of the Cuu Long party organization. This success was appreciated and rewarded by the bestowal of the Labor Order Third Class in 1984, and the Labor Order Second Class in 1985. In the coming years, the duty of Cuu Long Province to develop agriculture will be as follows: By 1990, the use of land to grow both rice and subsidiary food crops will be rotated 1.8 times or twice to yield 1.2 million tons of grain, most of which will be rice. By 1990, the animal husbandry sector will try to achieve 160,000 bovines, 550,000 hogs, and 15 million chickens and ducks.

To create a prerequisite for strong development of agriculture, the agricultural sector has expanded level-2 rice seed-producing farms, first to provide new seeds to districts, and has set up industrial plant nurseries to produce industrial plant seeds and cuttings. The Phuoc Tho hog farm has played a key role in improving hog species and has helped districts build 12 additional breeding-hog farms to supply breeding hogs to agricultural cooperatives in the future. The farm intends to bring male breeding-hogs to various localities for crossbreeding purposes and, at the same time, to teach hog breeders to apply the artificial insemination method. At both the vegetation protection and veterinary branch offices, the provision of equipment and means and the supply of medicines are being methodically organized. In the near future, both offices will go down to production installations to launch a prophylactic movement to protect crops and domestic animals especially by applying methods which have been tested and proven safe and effective. The province is building a veterinary medicine factory to make it easy to protect domestic animals from epizootics and other diseases. A breeding-duck enterprise has been set up to carry out the province's plan to rear large flocks of ducks for export. The mechanized agriculture branch office in the province has, to some extent, solved the shortage of spare parts and is planning to import more machines to mechanize the planting of short-term crops in fields.

In short, agricultural production in the near future will be a heavy task. However, fully confident in the recent fourth congress of the provincial party organization and in the Sixth National Congress of the CPV, the agricultural sector in Cuu Long Province promises to do its best to overcome shortcomings and tomove forward to successfully achieve the targets set in the resolutions of these congresses.

9332/12947 CSO: 4209/307

VIETNAM

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN LONG AN INTENSIFIED

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 5 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Nguyen Son Nam, director of Agricultural Service in Long An Province: "New Plan, Great Determination"]

[Text] During the past few years, many changes have taken place in agricultural production in Long An Province.

Grain production exceeded the state plan norm by 9 percent and succeeded beyond the provincial authorities' expectation. Over the past few years, each yearly output surpassed the previous one by about 100,000 tons of paddy, the farming area showed an increase of between 12,000 and 15,000 hectares and more, and throughout the province, productivity increased rapidly from an average 22 quintals per hectare in 1981 to about 32 quintals per hectare this year. The area cultivated with two rice crops included 47,000 hectares of high-yield rice with an average output of 42-43 quintals per hectare per crop, as well as about 20,000 hectares of intensive cultivation with an output of 50-55 quintals per hectare per crop. These achievements resulted from the great efforts of a province where the soil is mostly sulfate and saline and lacks fresh water, and which experienced difficulties with draft power and badly needed fertilizers and pesticides.

Peanuts are one of the strong crops in Long An. In the past few years, peanut crops exceeded the planned area, productivity and output because the province concentrated investments in water conservancy, seed improvement and fertilizers, and applied a reasonable pricing policy.

However, after reviewing agricultural development in the past 5 years, we find that there still remain many shortcomings requiring quick solutions. Concerning crop cultivation, concentrated efforts have been made to obtain a rapid and stable increase in the production of rice and some short-term industrial crops such as peanuts, kenaf, rush but no dynamic change has taken place in the production of certain plants such as sugarcane, pineapple, soybean, and sesame. The production of subsidiary crops used as grain and foodstuffs is still unstable. Animal husbandry, including the rearing of hogs, bovines, and poultry, is stagnating and even declining seriously in some areas. Some pricing policies for agricultural products have not been promptly adjusted, and have thus limited production development. The quality of the cooperativization movement has not improved, weak units still account for a large percentage, and the product contracting system is still incorrectly implemented. During the current 5-year (1986-90) plan, the agricultural sector in Long An is resolved to carry out successfully the resolution of the fourth congress of the provincial party organization. Relying on the existent manpower, land, and material and technical bases, the sector will actively exploit all potential to stabilize production rapidly and to create an abundance of material wealth in order to improve gradually the laborers' living conditions. Efforts will focus on overall development of agriculture. Rice cultivation will be stepped up and stabilized while importance will be attached to rapidly developing the growing of short-term industrial crops and other crops for export, especially in new areas in the Dong Thap Muoi region. Coconut and cashew cultivation will be intensified while oleaginous plants will be grown experimentally.

Consolidation of production relationships will be coordinated with the development of production forces, and mechanization will be implemented, step by step, first in the Dong Thap Muoi region. Technological advances will be quickly applied while intensive cultivation and multicropping will be considered the principal task and linked to the expansion of farming area wherever conditions are favorable.

The production of plants, including corn and soybeans, used as animal feed will be stepped up, and the cattle herd and the poultry flock will be rapidly increased to improve the people's nutrition and to contribute to exports.

Honeybee keeping will be widely developed. The cultivation and catching of marine products will also be considered important. Ponds and canals will be fully used to breed shrimp. Labor will be gradually assigned and distributed among the agricultural, industrial, and other sectors in the province while various trades and professions will be broadened to develop the household economy. The agricultural structure will be defined clearly and rationally and the requirement that the land, labor, and capital potentials be used to the best advantage will be met in order to achieve quickly the greatest economic effect.

9332/12947 CSO: 4209/307

VIETNAM

MEASURES TO DEVELOP ANIMAL HUSBANDRY TAKEN

Hanoi NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 5 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Prof Nguyen Van Thuong, director of Animal Husbandry Institute: "Develop Animal Husbandry, Solve the Food Problem during the 1986-90 Period and the Ensuing Years"]

[All of us know that the development of animal husbandry involves the mutation of cultivated crop products--including principal products and agroindustrial byproducts and discards--into principal products of animal husbandry which have a high nutritional value in promoting human subsistence.

To solve the food problem in our country during the 1986-90 plan and in the ensuing years, from the point of view of animal husbandry (excluding the exploitation, breeding, and cultivation of marine products), we must consider it important to develop animal husbandry comprehensively on the basis of a rational composition of domestic animals, and to intensify the rearing of a given breed of cattle or poultry wherever circumstances are particularly favorable to its growth, because we have to conform to the ecological conditions of agricultural production in each region. However, to obtain plenty of food products quickly in a short period of time, attention must be paid to developing those cattle and poultry species which have a high coefficient of reproduction, a great potential for growth, and a quick cycle of productivity. Therefore, the immediately important task is still to develop hog breeding, including hog breeding by individual households; to step up the rearing, especially seasonal rearing, of ducks; to intensify the crossbreeding of commercial hogs and ducks; to increase the weight of hogs ready for slaughter from 62 kg in 1985 to 70-75 kg in 1990, and that of 60- to 75-day-old crossbred ducks to 1.6-1.8 kg; to create hog- and duck-rearing areas in the Red and Mekong River Deltas and along important communication roads in order quickly to increase benefits for society and to obtain an additional amount of pork, and duck meat, eggs, and feathers which meet qualitative norms and export standards. It is also important to carry out the veterinary task properly and to dispense immunizations to adequately protect chickens against New Castle disease and Pasteurellosis in order to reduce the yearly chicken epizootic to the minimum; and to invest capital to develop the breeding of beef cattle by relying on the coastal provinces of Central Vietnam as strong areas to aid in beef cattle breeding in the Central Highlands in accordance

18 8 11

with the formula: "crossbreed commercial beef cattle and slaughter them at the age of 24-27 months to obtain 280-320 kg of beef in which dressed beef must account for about 50 percent."

Beside organizing a breeding pattern for domestic animals and determining a priority order of production as mentioned above, in order to develop and stabilize animal husbandry, attention must be paid to building and stabilizing feed-producing installations. To this end, efforts must be made to achieve a high average per capita output of grain. This output is 1,400 kg in Hungary, 1,200 kg in the United States, and 969 kg in the Soviet Union, and accounts for the great development of animal husbandry in these countries. In our own country, the average per capita output of grain was about 300 kg in the past 3 years. Therefore, wherever and whenever the price problem was favorably influenced, the hog herd would increase and the market would be glutted with pork. If we manage to raise the average per capita output of grain a output of grain to over 350 kg by 1990 and over 300 kg by 1995, animal husbandry will develop and, when this output reaches 450-500 kg, will become a principal production sector.

We must actively organize the production and increase the productivity and output of subsidiary food crops, including corn cultivation which also must receive attention. Of 5 million arable hectares in Hungary, 1.2 million have been set aside to grow corn with an average yield of 5.8 tons per hectare.

After growing corn, we will obtain corn seeds for use as edible grains of high nutritional value. After separating corncobs, we will ensile corn stems with urea to preserve them for 4-5 months for use as additional roughage to feed bovines in the dry season and winter.

Peanut and soybean production must be intensified. Concerning the rations given to hogs and poultry, if corn and soybeans are available, we will be able to reduce the amount of fish meal by 60-75 percent. By reducing the amount of export peanuts and soybeans, organizing the oil-extracting industry, and exporting vegetable oils, we will be able to provide jobs for the people, to maintain the production of export goods, and to acquire peanut and soybean residue and oil cakes to be used as additional feed to provide supplemental protein for domestic animals.

It is necessary to organize fishing, to set aside 30-40 percent of small fish, and to use it together with materials discarded by the canned food industry and by the manufacture of unsalted fish meal to make animal protein to feed domestic animals.

It is necessary to organize the catching and purchase of clams and mussels in coastal and river areas and to process them into mineral supplements to feed domestic animals. With an abundant supply of oil cakes, fish meal, and powdered mineral supplements, it will be possible to save a considerable amount of grain which should otherwise be used to feed domestic animals and develop animal husbandry.

It is necessary to coordiante with the pharmacological industry (or to invest capital to build enterprises) to produce high-grade supplemental feed, such

as coarse lysin, methionine, antibiotics, and vitamins. Once these kinds of feed are produced, a noticeable amount of fish meal can be saved.

In deltas where two rice crops are grown each year, it is necessary to organize tree planting and to build a forest ecological system suitable to deltas in order to create rows of trees to deflect winds, to solve the fuel problem on the spot, and to preserve rice straws to feed bovines.

In the midlands and mountainous regions, it is necessary to transform and build up pastures, to increase the composition of leguminous varieties of grass which grow on pastures, and to coordinate these tasks with afforestation and the planting of tree belts to protect the soil and to obtain grass to feed bovines.

The availability of steady sources of feed is a firm assurance that animal husbandry can be developed immediately and continue to develop in the future to solve the food problem in our country. For this reason, it is necessary to formulate a long-term plan and to make gradual and concentrated investments in the production of feed and in the building of installations designed to steadily provide feed for animal husbandry within the framework of our country's grain and food strategy.

9332/12947 CSO: 4209/307

VIETNAM

ECONOMIC

LOCAL INSPECTION OF PRODUCE FOR EXPORT URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Vuong Dua: "Produce Inspection at the Basic Level, a Measure With High Economic Effectiveness"]

In addition to the contractual requirements regarding the [Text] specifications and quality of merchandise, countries importing agricultural products, especially fresh produce, make the further stipulation that "there can be no insects or diseases injurious to agriculture." Therefore, the exporting nations pay much attention to inspecting agricultural products so that insects and diseases will not "slip through" and to ensure that the standards regarding exports are attained. In our country, fresh produce sold to foreign countries account for an increasingly larger ratio of export goods, and has tended to increase rapidly during the past several years. Our party and state are very much concerned with and pay much attention to the inspection of agricultural products. There are many guidance documents an specific stipulations regarding exporting and importing. The crop protection sector of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, with its function as a specialized organ which has made many contributions to preventing thousands of shipments infected with dangerous insects and diseases that were imported from foreign countries, and has carried out strict inspections in accordance with customers' stipulations, to ensure that our country's fresh produce meets export standards.

However, in recent years produce inspection activities in our country have been limited and have not created close ties between the basic level and the producers. Those specialized activities are only carried out when goods are concentrated at piers and warehouses before being loaded aboard ships. Because fresh produce easily spoil, a difference of 1 day exerts a great influence on product quality. Because many types of goods are concentrated in such areas and the inspection work must pass through specialized technical steps, large amounts of goods are held up for many days without inspection certification being issued so that the goods can be loaded aboard ship. That results in product quality not being ensured.

In order to increase the economic value of export goods and gradually reduce red tape and negative phenomena at the storage yards, and to strengthen the confidence of the basic level and the producers, beginning with the 1985-1986 winter-spring vegetable season the produce inspection activities were reoriented toward the basic level. The sector coordinated with the Merchandise Inspection Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade cooperated with a number of crop protection branches in Thai Binh and Ha Bac provinces and in the municipality of Hanoi in the trial testing of vegetable crops in two forms.

First, the vegetation inspection and testing cadres of the central echelon directly organized and built a specialized network at the basic level to provide guidance to the producers with regard to produce inspection standards and the quality of vegetables and white potatoes for export, while also directly carrying out vegetation inspections and testing at places were goods were concentrated, and issued temporary inspection certificates before they were taken to ports.

Second, provincial vegetation inspection cadres directly guided the prevention and limitation of insects and diseases from the production phase to the harvest phase, and organized a vegetation inspection network and guidance for the production unity with regard to methods of selecting, harvesting, and packaging. Along with the central-level inspection and testing cadres, they filled out vegetation protection paperwork at the concentration points and issued temporary inspection certificates before the goods were sent to ports. Both forms included final inspection and testing at ports before the goods were loaded aboard ships.

With regard to countries with developed commodity production, "crop inspection in the fields" has been carried out for many years. In our country, if that work is to be carried out well there must be complete cooperation among many sectors and between the central and local echelons. The results of trial operations regarding produce inspection at the basic level during the recent period have manifested that cooperation and brought about clear economic effectiveness. In Thai Binh, in the course of the trial application of the new mode, the quantity of vegetables exported increased from 800 tons (1984-1985) to 3,000 tons during the 1985-1986 winter-spring season. In Gia Lam Districts (in the outskirts of Hanoi), the volume of vegetables exported during the 1984-1985 winter-spring season increased from 1,500 tons to 4,270 tons.

The comrades at the Hai Phong Inspection Branch evaluated the implementation of the organizational mode of bringing the inspection work to the basic level as being advantageous in many regards. Goods do not pile up at the port and there are fewer losses while the good are being transported. When the goods arrive at the port they have met the necessary standards to be loaded aboard ship, and do not spoil because they must await inspection. Expenses per ton of vegetables were reduced by from 18 to 20 percent.

Because of those actual results, during this year's winter-spring vegetable season the provinces of Hai Hung and Ha Nam Ninh adopted the policy of implementing that new mode, with a volume of vegetable exports that could amount to tens of thousands of tons.

In order to rapidly increase the export of agricultural products and ensure the quality fresh produce for export, the crop protection sector has adopted the policy of gradually expanding, and improving the quality of, the inspection work at the production basis, with specific contents, to ensure that the specialized technical regulations are observed and are advantageous for the basic level and the produces, and attain high economic effectiveness. At present, the sector is organizing training for cadres and is creating a produce inspection management mechanism extending from the basic level to the With the continued holding of training classes for vegetation basic level. inspection cadres, it is ensured that each province has four to six people who are sufficiently qualified technically to do that work. At the same time, there is unified management according to specialized sector, tied in with territorial management and tight, unified coordination between the central and local levels. In that operational mode, the sector is guiding the localities in strengthening the insurance alliances in areas specializing in growing export crops, and in storing reserve agricultural products and agricultural products for export in warehouses. Both aspects--crop protection and crop inspection--are emphasized. In addition to stepping up investment in equipment and building material bases capable of carrying out vegetation inspection activities, the sector is also urgently drafting a number of rules and regulations and decentralizing responsibility with regard to the authority and rights the echelons and sector participating in produce inspection at the basic level, in order to encourage the production bases to produce many highquality agricultural products for export.

5616

CSO: 4209/374

VIETNAM

ECONOMIC

FAMILIES ENCOURAGED TO GROW COFFEE FOR EXPORT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Mai Phong: "Family Coffee Plots Participate in Export and Consumption"]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1980's, because of the steadily increasing demands of the coffee production cooperation program with the CEMA countries, because the economic development direction of the localities was gradually affirmed, and because of the affect of changes in the prices of goods on the world market, the requirement to develop coffee became even more urgent. Coffee is regarded as an important export agricultural product in our country's economic-social strategy. With rather concentrated investment of both domestic capital and cooperative international capital, added to the positive utilization of the labor and capital of the people, and the proper use of the economic components, during the recent period coffee has undergone solid development. It has increased rapidly every year with regard to area, the volume of commodity production, and the volume of commodity production, and the export index. By the end of 1985, the national coffee area was about 40,000 hectares. During the past 5 years we have planted about 20,000 new hectares, nearly equal to the prior coffee area. The study, surveying, and development planning of the new coffee areas in the nation are being carried out strongly. The regional agricultural organs all believe that the coffeegrowing area in our country could be increased to 160,000 to 180,000 hectares by the end of this century. In the near future, by 1990, we can plant 50,000 new hectares and increase the total coffee area to 90,000 hectares and the coffee bean output to more than 30,000 tons. With that area and output, the state units specializing in coffee production can provide only 50 percent of that amount. Therefore, a problem that has been posed is how to carry out the slogan "The state and the people work together" to attain the great goals that have been set.

Capabilities and Reality

At present, studies show that the coffee area in our country is distributed among the following provinces and management sectors:

Dac Lac, 60,000 to 70,000 hectares; Gia Lai-Kon Tum, 25,000 hectares; Lam Dong, 30,000 to 50,000 hectares; Dong Nai, 20,000 to 30,000 hectares; Song Be,

10,000 hectares; Phu Khanh, 7,000 hectares; Quang Nam-Da Nang, 7,000 hectares; Binh Tri Thien, 7,000 hectares; and Nghe Tinh, 5,000 hectares. Coffee interplanted with forests managed by the forestry sector amounts to 10,000 hectares. Coffee interplanted with rubber managed by the rubber sector and Ben Tre Province totals 10,000 hectares. A number of provinces between Vinh Phu and Lai Chau have a total of 15,000 hectares.

From the actual production situation in the localities it can be affirmed that in our country coffee can be grown on many different types of soil, from the concentrated, specialized cultivation areas in the Central Highlands, eastern Nam Bo, and the central provinces to the areas in which it is grown dispersed among small plots and even interplanted with other crops or under canopies of sparse forests. Coffee is not only grown on red basaltic soil but also on such non-basaltic soil as ancient alluvium and sand-rocky soil, provided that there is a thick layer of soil with appropriate geophysical and chemical properties and the soil can be irrigated. Therefore, in past years we have developed coffee in all three sectors--state, collective, and family-- among which the state forces serve as the hard core. But the setting up of additional state farms and enterprises has also been limited by the need for a relatively large number of management cadres, which we are not yet able to fulfill, and especially the need for a large amount of investment for production and processing. Therefore, according to statistics, at present area managed by the cooperatives and production collectives amounts to 14 percent of the total. The people manage 36 percent of the total, primarily in family plots, which are notable sources of income for hundreds of thousands of workers in our country. Clearly realizing that, the provinces of Dac lac, Lam Dong, Dong Nai,, Gia Lai-Kon Tum, Ben Tre, Binh Tri Thien, and Nghe Tinh promptly adopted policies and measures to promote the development of coffee in the people's sector in many forms, with the support of the provinces and the coffee sector. Thousands of hectares of coffee are grown by families in Dac Lac, Lam Dong, Ben Tre, Dong Nai, etc., with the assistance of the sector with regard to cadre training and quidance in cultivation and tending techniques. Before each season, Ben Tre Province prepares millions of seedlings to supply to the peasants for new plantings or interplanting under coconut canopies on family plots.

Benefits Have Been Affirmed

The coffee-growing movement in the provinces has developed rather strongly, manifested more and more clearly in the fact that the volume purchased from the families accounts for a notable ratio of the coffee exported by the localities. During the 1984-1985 season Dac Lac Province attained an output of nearly 5,000 tons, 1,900 tons of which were grown by the people. In Dong Nai, every year the province harvests 5,000 to 6,000 tons, nearly all of it on family plots. The situation is similar in many other localities. Clearly, the time when the people cut down coffee trees to grow other crops or grain to eat has passed. In places in which the movement is strong, coffee has become a leading crop in the family economy, and in the "VAC" formula it has brought about great effectiveness.

On the basis of the actual situation of the movement, the localities affirmed the great benefits in order to develop the potential of land, labor, and capital of the people with high effectiveness in serving the export of coffee. It is only necessary for each family to plant several hundred trees on their plots to fully utilize the land, enable each square meter to produce products with high value, employ additional idle workers in many age groups, and require less investment than coffee grown in the state or collective sectors. That has allowed the sector to create a large volume of products for export.

The development of coffee growing on people's plots is entirely appropriate to the policy of regarding the family economy as an indispensable part of the national economy. Furthermore, there is still much potential land for coffee growing, in areas in which ethnic minority people still practice shifting cultivation and habitation. If the movement is developed strongly it will also be a solid basis on which to organize fixed cultivation and habitation for the people. In the Central Highlands, the Viet-German Coffee Combine Enterprise, the Dac Lac Province Federation of Coffee Enterprises, and the Drao, E Tun, and Doan Ket coffee state farms have brought in tens of thousands of ethnic minority workers. Those people we family heads who developed the garden economy around the state farms, in which coffee was the principal crop, and whom the state farms and enterprises created favorable conditions for development. That is appropriate to the ethnic policy of our party and state when redistributing labor and population in each area and on a national scale.

Furthermore, growing coffee on family plots is also an effective method for combining agriculture and forestry in each area and in each collective or state unit, and carry out alliances and joint operations between units and worker families, whether peasants, production collective members, cooperative members, cadres, workers, or state civil servants. That method also manifests the slogan, "The state and the people work together" and creates a basis for the process of forming a large, concentrated production sector that is highly specialized in production, processing, and marketing.

Because of the benefits that have been affirmed, during the recent period a number of localities, such as Dac Lac, Lam Dong, and Dong Nai have drafted and promulgated stands and policies to encourage the development of coffee among the people, with the following principal contents: granting and lending land for coffee growing, the area, the time period the land can be borrowed, the right of inheritance, the investment of capital to develop production during both the capital construction and commercial periods, the selling of exchange goods, and purchasing products from the people.

Therefore, the localities must strongly develop the movement for the people to grow coffee and contribute worthily to coffee exporting by the provinces and the state.

Renovate Our Way of Thinking and Working To Attain High Effectiveness

In order to advance the movement for the people to grow coffee from spontaneous forms to an organized program to develop production, with specific steps and goals, there must be concentrated guidance by, and participation of, the relevant sectors and echelons. In seeking to understand the movement, many recommendations have been made:

With regard to goals, it is necessary to effectively use the people's 1. labor, land and capital to rapidly expand the coffee area in many parts of the nation with less investment capital and lower production costs, in order to rapidly increase the volume of coffee exports. According to the common goal, as a whole there must be 180,000 to 200,000 by the year 2000 in the nation hectares of coffee, of which about 120,000 hectares will be grown in the state sector, while coffee grown in the collective and family sectors will amount to about 60,000 to 80,000 hectares, 30 to 40 percent of the total. In that structure, the state coffee enterprises must serve as a strong basis of support in order to step up the pace of coffee growing by the people, on the basis of organizing joint operations and federations, and signing economic contracts, in order to rapidly form a coffee sector in the form of an agricultural-industrial alliance on a national scale.

2. It is necessary to clearly stipulate the development of coffee growing by the people in accordance with a specific program, such as conditions for participation of each family, signing contracts between the state and the people, the commitments made by the articles of state contracts for capital loans from the central bank, corresponding to the cultivated area and capital repayment period, the principal materials the growers may purchase from the state with borrowed capital (seedstock, tree grafts, fertilizer, irrigation pipe, bags, cement for wells and drying patios, pesticides, and grain), exchange materials and goods, and stipulations regarding rewards, punishments, and the reduction of or exemption from obligations when natural disasters are encountered.

3. With regard to organizing and managing the program, there must be an organization to guide and manage the people's coffee program extending from the central level down to the local level. In each locality a state coffee state farm (local or central) may be assigned responsibility for the program in the area around the state farm. The organs managing the program at the basic level must have cadres specializing in economic management and technical matters, and manage contracts, monitor incomes, and verify output. Each area must have state purchasing and processing installations and organize annual conferences of coffee plot owners in each locality.

4. The sectors relevant to coffee, such as the agriculture, banking, and foreign trade sectors, must have annual plans regarding program for the people to grow coffee in order to have plans to supply materials and capital in accordance with contracts signed with the people, and to import and supply equipment in accordance with the state plan and policy.

The state still has not promulgated a uniform policy to encourage the development of coffee in the collective and individual sectors. Instead, those policies have been drafted and promulgated by individual localities, so the movement is still limited in many regards. Within the Federation of Vietnamese Scientific Organizations there should be an association of coffee plot owners to create conditions for rapidly introducing domestic and foreign technical advances into coffee production in our country.

5616

CSO: 4209/376

VIETNAM

ECONOMIC

LOW PROCUREMENT PRICES REDUCE SUGAR SUPPLIES

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 8 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by A.K.: "Due to Unreasonable Prices, Only 1,000 Tons of Sugar Were Procured During Nearly the Entire First Half of the 1st Quarter of 1987; in 1986, 41,205 Tons Had To Be Imported"]

[Text] (SGGP) Although it is nearly mid-February 1987, the Food Industry General Corporation of the Ministry of Home Trade (located in Ho Chi Minh City) has procured only 1,000 tons of sugar. The procurement target for the 1st quarter is 15,000 tons of sugar. The production, processing and marketing of sugarcane have declined seriously in recent months as a result of a number of unsuitable price and circulation policies (output in 1986 equalled only 60 percent of output in 1985). In 1986, the general corporation only procured 8,941 tons of sugar from mills (the plan norm was 14,500 tons) and 8,047 tons of hand-made sugar (the plan called for 30,000 tons). As a result, it was necessary to import 41,205 tons of sugar to meet essential consumer needs of the people. The main cause of this situation was the fact that sugar prices on the market changed eight times in 1986. The general corporation frequently proposed price adjustments but the price agreed to and announced by the state was always far lower than the price on the market. In order to be able to procure sugar from the localities (at prices 20 to 25 percent lower than the localities themselves paid), the general corporation has "padded" its procurement payments with many consumer goods. However, because the supply of goods set aside to compensate for the difference between procurement and selling prices is not large and because these goods lack variety, sugar still cannot be procured from citizens.

7809 CSO: 4209/353
VIETNAM

ECONOMIC

HANOI YOUTH COAL ENTERPRISE INCREASES OUTPUT

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 5 Feb 87 p 1

[Article: "In 1986 Hanoi Youth Coal Enterprise Increased Output By 300 Percent Over 1985, in 1987 Will Mine More Than 10,000 Additional Tons"]

[Text] The foremost mission of the Hanoi Youth Coal Enterprise in 1986 was to consolidate its management of labor, materials, and finance. Because it carried out those tasks well, it made clear progress in enforcing labor discipline and in using materials, vehicles, machinery, and finances, a contribution was made to increasing labor productivity, and the total amount of coal mined increased to 44,500 tons, an increase of 300 percent over 1985. The average daily production of coal increased from 150 kilograms at the beginning of the year to 200 kilograms in the fourth quarter.

Hundreds of unit members continually surpassed the norm by 200 or 300 percent and won "hero" or "valorous chieftain" honors. The truck unit operated well and ensured that 90 percent of the vehicles were always on the scene. In the coal export campaigns, on the average each truck made six or seven trips a day, double the number in 1985.

At present, 80 percent of the enterprise's unit members are Communist Youth Union members. In 1986, 102 people were admitted into the Youth Union; 105 people completed classes for candidate party members and the Marxist-Ieninist theory curriculum; and nearly 100 people were selected to study or work abroad or were employed by state organs.

The material bases and living conditions were improved. The enterprise constructed 120 square meters of housing, raised 20 hogs, released 14,000 fingerlings, grew vegetables, etc., to meet part of its food needs.

In 1987 the enterprise will endeavor to buy a TV set for each collective housing area, complete the athletic field, hold cultural classes, etc. but the enterprise's main goal will still be to contribute, along with the municipality, to fulfilling the export program. In 1987 it is estimated that the amount of foreign exchange owned will be 1.5 times will mine 56,000 tons of coal, an increase of 10,000 tons over 1986. To celebrate the Youth Union congresses at all levels in 1987, the Youth Union members and youths are determined to surpass the plan by from 5 to 10 percent and admit about 200 additional unit members.

VIETNAM

THONG NHAT RUBBER ENTERPRISE FAILS TO FULFILL 1986 PLAN

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 4 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Th. C.: "Why Did the Thong Nhat Rubber Enterprise Fail To Fulfill Its 1986 Plan?"]

[Text] In 1986 the Thong Nhat Rubber Enterprise implemented its productioncommerical plan in accordance with the model of merging with the Hanoi Rubber Enterprise in order to have conditions for developing the potential and strengths of both units. Within the new framework, the enterprise leaders unified their guidance and, along wth the cadres and workers, took many steps to promote production, strengthen management, and do a good job of organizing living conditions.

Unfortunately, those measures did not result in success. At the beginning of 1986 the enterprise drafted a total output plan of 48 million dong, an increase of 5 percent over the same period last year. By mid-year, because of the great difficulties regarding materials, the managing bureau adjusted the plan downward to 45 million dong, equal to 1985. After 9 months, difficulties regarding materials continued to be fierce and the enterprise requested a second adjustment, down to 42.1 million dong. At the conclusion of the 1986 plan year, the enterprise had attained a total output of only 37.947 million dong, 90.1 percent of the plan and only 80.1 percent of the level attained in 1985. The output of crepe-soled sandals amounted to only 45.6 percent of the 1985 level. Although the total output norm was only a guidance norm, it was a basis on which to calculate and implement the enterprise's salary fund and the labor productivity of the workers and civil servants. Thus the enterprise's 1986 salary fund amounted to only 7,433,500 dong, 84 percent of the plan, and the productivity per worker was only 41,427 dong, 90.5 percent of the plan.

Why did the enterprise fail to fulfill its 1986 plan? First of all, there was a subjective reason: a serious shortage of materials. In 1985, while the Ministry of Home Trade was supplying rubber to the enterprise, that task was assigned to the Rubber General Corporation. In 1986 there was another change: the Ministry of Home Trade supplied rubber for the production of consumer goods, while the Ministry of Foreign Trade supplied rubber for the production of export goods. Those continuous changes with regard to the supplying of materials adversely affected the enterprise, which had to cease production from the beginning of the year to May, when it received 60 tons of rubber. Between June and August the enterprise received an average of 20 tons. It received no rubber at all in September, October, and November. On the 31st day of December the enterprise received 30 tons of rubber, by which time it was too late. The second shipment of 34 tons was not received until early in During the 2-year period, the two ministries supplied a total of only 1987. 286 tons of rubber, 80 percent of the plan. The rubber was not supplied in the full amounts, it was not supplied on time, and its quality was poor. Only 31 percent of the rubber was grade 1, while the rest was grades 2 to 6. Some of the rubber was even mixed with soil. Only a small percentage of the various kinds of chemicals was supplied. Most of them had been in storage a long time, which greatly affected the production process and product quality. Because the serious lack of materials and the break-down of much of its equipment, its idle man-days totalled 47,847, 28.3 percent of the total, which not only limited progress in production but also affected the salaries of cadres, workers, and civil servants. Workers laid off at 70 percent of their salaries totalled 33,199 man-days.

How did the enterprise react when confronted with the materials shortage? The enterprise was as dynamic as the other enterprises, and the supply personnel searched everywhere and expanded relationships. Outstanding was the fact that the enterprise, implementing the (draft) resolution of the Political Bureau and the decisions of the Council of Ministers regarding the right of autonomy in production and commerce, entered into an alliance with another unit to receive a considerable amount of materials. Last year the enterprise obtained an amount equal to 10 percent of the total quantity of materials supplied.

The enterprise also formed alliances with the Polytechnical College, the University, the Chemistry Institute, and the Vietnamese Institutes of Science, which provided "grey matter" assistance. The cadres and technical workers boldly researched and replaced materials and chemicals from domestic raw materials, and reprocessed a number of chemicals which did not meet technical standards, so that they could be used in production.

But it is also necessary to mention a subjective reason that is related to management. Rubber is transported from the south. Although it is valuable, the method of supply is lax and the norms not correctly observed. Rubber is left outside warehouses, is supplied arbitrarily, and is wasted. The functional offices do not guide or oversee the accounting of materials, based on final output. Because of the shortage of materials, production has not been tightly organized, the workers do not work full shifts, and the departments do not attain the daily plans. After reorganizing production, the enterprise failed to recapitulate and evaluate effectiveness. There is still much confusion in employing excessive labor, a problem which had not been definitively resolved. The machinery is old and often breaks down and there is a shortage of replacement parts, which creates considerable difficulties for production. Furthermore, the workers are deficient in maintaining and using the machinery, so it breaks down even more, difficulties are encountered in repairing the machinery, etc.

What can be learned from the Thong Nhat Rubber Enterprise's failure to fulfill its 1986 plan? In fact, with the 80 percent of the materials that were supplied and the 10 percent it obtained itself, the enterpirse was fully capable of fulfilling its 1986 plan. It is regrettable that the materials were not supplied regularly or on time. For months at a time there were no materials at all, and during many other months only small amounts were supplied, which caused production to be "hungry" for materials the year around. The most regrettable thing was that the 64 tons of rubber scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1986 did not arrive until the first part of 1987, by which time the enterprise could do nothing more and had to accept failure to fulfill its plan. The Ministry of Home Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade surely cannot but think about the enterprise's failure to fulfill its 1986 plan, and it is certain that in 1987 there will be a revitalization in supplying materials, which will create conditions for the enterprise to fulfill its plan for producing export goods and consumer goods.

As for the enterprise, this year it must revitalize its receiving, management, and use of materials so that they can be effective, and take more appropriate steps to organize production, study and fully utilize domestic raw materials, mass produce goods that have been manufactured on a trial basis, and transform the enterprise's two economic programs into reality.

VIETNAM

HANOI SMALL INDUSTRY SECTOR PLEDGES TO ATTAIN 1987 GOAL

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 22 Feb 87 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Municipal Small Industry-Handicrafts Sector Pledges To Endeavor To Victoriously Attain the Goal of More Than 3 Billion Dong Worth of Consumer Goods and Export Goods"]

[Text] Yesterday, 21 February, the municipal small industry-handicrafts sector recapitulated its 1986 socialist collective emulation movement and pledged to victoriously fulfill the 1987 state plan mission of producing more than three billion dong worth of consumer goods and export goods, an increase of from 15 to 16.1 percent over the amount attained in 1986. Comrade Nguyen Thanh Binh, secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, spoke to the conference.

In 1986, with the gradual renovation of the management mechanism, the implementation of autonomy in basic production and commercial units, and the gradual change-over to socialist economic-commercial accounting, the entire sector took the initiative in overcoming difficulties, produced a quantity of goods valued at 2.625 billion dong (in fixed 1982 prices), which was 100.95 percent of the plan norm and an increase of 17.5 percent over the previous year. The production of consumer goods increased 18.1 percent. Although the state and the customers provided only 50.59 percent of the materials necessary for production, with many dynamic an creative working methods, and by means of joint operations and alliances and organizing its own sources of materials, the sector as a whole obtained and used in production 15,650 tons of raw materials and scrap materials beyond the plan, delivered to the state 80.7 percent of the value of products it produced, and was acknowledged as an economic sector which made many all-out efforts and made progress in delivering products.

In recapitulating the socialist collective leadership movement last year, the small industry-handicrafts federation of the Hoan Kiem, Ba Dinh, and Gia Lam wards and Soc Son District, the alliance of the artistic handicrafts and rushrattan-bamboo cooperative federations, and 69 cooperatives were recognized as outstanding emulation units and were awarded emulation banners. The sector also selected and praised 58 outstanding directors, 29 outstanding chief technicians, and 21 outstanding accountants. Many of the cooperative directors were commended for being both skilled directors and skilled technicians.

With a spirit of renovating its way of thinking and working, and renovating its management structure, to contribute to implementing the three major economic programs and this year is endeavoring to attain the goal of more than 3 billion dong worth of consumer goods and export goods and increase production by 15 to 16.1 percent over 1986. The sector has proposed many measures to rapidly increase output and improve the quality of the principal and traditional products of Hanoi handicraft craftsmen, such as textiles, leather goods, ready-made clothing, bicycle parts, consumer metal goods, and glass, porcelain and pottery, chemicals, rubber, plastic, etc.

When speaking to the conference, comrade Nguyen Thanh Binh, secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, praised the accomplishments and advances by the sector last year, which he regarded as having contributed notably to transforming the economic-social situation in the municipality and creating a new atmosphere of winning even greater victories in 1987. The secretary of the municipal party committee affirmed once again the party's viewpoint regarding the important role and position of small industry-handicrafts production in the national economy throughout the period of transition to socialism: "The viewpoint of the party and state is to regard small industryhandicrafts cooperatives as being as important as state enterprises."

He admonished the sector to develop even more strongly all forms of production organization--collective, individual handicrafts, and family handicrafts--and urged the cooperatives to be loyal to and straightforward toward the state, just as the state respects them and regards them as being equal to the state enterprises. Providing jobs, increasing the legitimate incomes of workers, increasing the material wealth of society are extremely urgent tasks. Therefore, we must renovate our way of thinking and endeavor to cause the collective sector to become a leading force in the city's small industryhandicrafts production and bring into play the superiority and strength of the small industry-handicrafts sector so that it can, along with the state economy, develop the city's socialist economy more and more strongly, and create a motive force for transforming Hanoi's economic-social situation.

VIETNAM

HANOI SMALL INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS PRODUCTION REPORTED

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP 6 Feb 87 p 1

[Article: "In 1987, Hanoi Pursues Four Key Goals: Increase Gross Output Value 14.5 Percent; Acquire 18,000 Tons of Supplies and Find Jobs for 10,000 Laborers; Turn 80 Percent of Low-Level Cooperatives into High-Level Cooperatives Raise Average Wages 10-12 Percent"]

[Text] On 15 January 1987, the board of directors of the Hanoi municipal federation of cooperatives met to review production achievements and other activities in 1986 and set goals and tasks for 1987.

In 1986, the entire sector attained a gross output value of 2,625.634 million dong, representing 100.95 percent of the plan and a 17.5 percent increase over 1985. Thirteen out of 16 urban wards and districts and 11 out of 16 subsectors fulfilled the annual plan. Production of chemicals, rubber and plastic ware increased 119.3 percent; glass and ceramic ware, 114.7 percent; 34 key products, 20 percent; and 14 other products, 200 percent. Compared with 1985, consumer goods increased 18.1 percent; however, due mainly to a shortage of raw materials and a sharp decrease in production demand, the plan for export goods was fulfilled only 95.9 percent.

For 1987, the Hanoi small industry and handicraft sector will exploit and utilize all its production forms properly to contribute to implementing the three economic programs put forward by the Sixth CPV Congress. It will stimulate innovations to improve technology, make the most of supplies and discards to turn out new commodities, create conditions for attracting laborers, raise living standards and find new jobs for the municipal population --two central tasks--continue to strengthen socialist production relationships and consolidate managerial skills so that, along with the state-run economy the sector can dominate and control other economic components. It will research and propose new policies and improve the material and spiritual living standards of small industry and handicraft laborers.

The four key goals are:

--Boost gross output value to 3,046,000 dong, a 14.5 percent increase over 1986.

--Acquire supplies, fully utilize 18,000 tons of discards, train workers, upgrade technical skills, and find jobs for 10,000 laborers.

--Strengthen those cooperatives rated weak in 1986 and resolutely turn 80 percent of them into high-level cooperatives.

--Raise the average wages of small-industry and handicraft laborers 10-12 percent over those of 1986 and properly implement the policy on welfare and social security.

VIETNAM

THAI BINH SMALL INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS PRODUCTION REVIEWED

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 6 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by Ngoc Van, paper and chalk cooperative, Hoang Dieu, Thai Binh: "Thai Binh Reviews 1986 Work, Sets Production Tasks for 1987"]

[Text] On 9 January 1987, the small industry and handicraft sector in Thai Binh Province held a conference of provincial CPV secretaries and vocational cooperative directors to review the implementation of the 1986 state plan and discuss production goals for 1987. Chu Ry, CPV provincial committee deputy secretary and provincial people's committee chairman, spoke at the meeting.

In 1986, in spite of difficulties stemming from a new managerial system which lacked homogenousness, rather strong market fluctuations, a supply and fuel shortage, and typhoon No 5 which hindered small industry and handicraft production in the province, the sector fostered the spirit of creative autonomy and successfully completed its tasks, bringing the year's gross output value to 797,100,000 dong--100.2 percent of the plan and 12.82 percent up from 1985. Seven out of 8 districts and cities raised their gross output 5-20 percent, with Thai Binh City posting 20 percent and the contract weaving and dyeing enterprise, 16 percent.

Although inside-the-plan production received only a little over 50 percent of the expected state-supplied raw materials, 54 of its 96 commodities exceeded norms. Compared with the same period last year, bicycle mud guards were up 595 percent; inlaid silver articles, 250 percent; bicycles to transport merchandise, 830 percent; liquid silicate, 300 percent; and rush rugs, 150 Forty-eight out of 71 outside-the-plan products recorded a similar percent. increase--medical tools, 406 percent and aluminum items and porcelain ware, 378 percent. By attentively renovating the managerial system, the business autonomy of basic installations, and the prerogatives and responsibilities of cooperative directors, the small industry and handicraft sector in Thai Binh moved ahead diligently and vigorously. In 1986, it successfully organized a "spring emulation festival" with the participation of 77 units and individuals involving 246 products. It invested 5 million dong in 21 installations to generate technological improvements, thus helping to upgrade the bicycle steering bar bearings manufactured by Doan Ket Cooperative, maintain the quality of the central bicycle axle produced by Dong Loi Cooperative and raise it from grade 1 to grade 2, and boost the quality of the bicycle pedals made by Phuong Dong Cooperative to grade 2.

While increasing production, the small industry and handicraft sector strictly adhered to all state policies. In 1986, it delivered 39 million dong to the state budget, with the group of specialized cooperatives attaining 132 percent of norms--a 364 percent increase over 1985. In spite of difficulties, the sector has set aside 5 million dong for the cooperatives to repair the damage caused by typhoon No 5.

Following the conference to review party building, the sector accelerated the upgrading effort, enabling small industry and handincraft cooperatives throughout the province to admit 32 new CPV members.

The sector elected 21 outstanding cooperative directors, 1 national emulation combatant, and 4 sector emulation combatants. The small industry and handicraft meeting pointed out flaws lingering from the previous year, particularly those concerning product quality which cried out for redress. It also launched an emulation campaign to provide the greatest achievements to salute Party Day on 3 February 1987. For 1987, the sector is striving to attain a gross output value of 820-825 million dong, a 5-6 percent increase; four districts and cities , a value of 100 million dong; and Thai Binh city, a value of 200 million dong. Against that backdrop, production in support of agriculture is expected to increase 25 percent; exports, 10 percent; and consumer goods, 10 percent.

CHECKPOINTS SAID STILL IMPEDING FLOW OF GOODS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Pham Duc Roan: "The Flow of Commerce Is Sill Being Impeded"]

[Text] The raw materials to produce the principal consumer goods in Thai Binh (as well as in many other localities) are derived from agricultural products, but they are still scarce. In order to develop many consumer and export goods we must rely on sources of raw materials in other provinces. Therefore, the provincial party committee and provincial people's committee have adopted the policy of encouraging the production installations to undertake joint operations and alliances with other provinces to obtain raw materials to serve the development of production. That is a correct policy which enables the production installations to produce many new products.

However, the organs assisting the province, especially the market management organ, have done the opposite. The goods of private merchants and of black marketers, even goods which are monopolized by the state, pass freely and easily. On the other hand, materials and raw materials obtained by the production bases to develop production are inspected, stopped, retained, fined, or partly confiscated.

I recommend that the Thai Binh provincial people's committee take steps to stop those acts and restrict checkpoints which impede the flow of goods, in order to help the production installations develop sectors and trades and produce much wealth for society.

VIETNAM

SMUGGLERS CAUGHT REDHANDED ON WATERWAY

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Le Tien Tuyen: "Forty Tons of Smuggled Goods on Boat 3,272-DT"]

[Text] Early in the morning, people living in the riverine area adjacent to Tran Van Kieu Street, 13th Subward, 5th Precinct, saw numerous traces of wheat flour spilled on the path leading to the wharf. How could wheat flour be found in an area used by ships carrying discarded materials? People felt suspicious about it and notified the responsible organ of their finding.

In conjunction with Tax Station Two in the harbor area (subordinate to the tax bureau of the Fifht Precinct), the municipal economic police followed the wheat flour traces, which led them to freight boat 3,272-DT. Towing a small sampan without registration number, this boat of fairly large tonnage had been seen hanging around the wharf recently. The boat owner was Nguyen Trung Hung, domiciled at Hamlet One, An Thuan Village, Hong Ngu Town, Dong Thap Province. He had to admit that there were smuggled goods on board.

In addition to 7.4 tons of wheat flour--a category of goods falling under the state uniform management--there were in the boat hull as many as 58 other kinds of merchandise, including watermelon seeds, tea, sewing thread, sandals, wooden shoes, glassware, spare parts for bicycles and Honda motorcycles, alum, and liquid acids--all in all about 40 tons. The boat owner declared that private traders entrusted him with carrying these goods to Dong Thap wherefrom they would be sent to Kampuchea in exchange for other kinds of merchandise. There was no invoice or legal certificate to justify these goods. The goods owners in turn declared that they bought them through brokers in the Tan Thanh and Binh Tay markets. Once agreement was reached on prices, the broakers led the buyers to take goods from production installations or private storehouses belonging to shareholders of commercial cooperation shops. These goods were secretly "regrouped" in commercial cooperation shops dealing in discarded materials, and then taken aboard. As for wheat flour, it was loaded onto the boat late at night before the departure day.

This case of smuggling and transport of smuggled goods was thus caught in the act. The amount of 7.4 tons of wheat flour siphoned from state storehouses was confiscated and a fine of 3,370,565 dong of merchandise and wholesale tax was imposed on the illegal long-haul traders.

WORK OF LOTUS-II TELEVISION STATION EXAMINED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 5 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Truong Van Tien: "Lotus II Tv Station--Working Around the Clock"]

[Text] Whenever TV programs in our city are discussed, the Lotus-II TV station is unanimously praised for helping viewers to promptly keep abreast of burning world events, rich artistic activities, and the various motion pictures of our friends on five continents. But, in fact, not everyone understands the toiling difficulties confronting our engineers and technical workers, who are working shifts at the station around the clock.

The first man I met at the station was Dinh Viet Hao, station chief, a man of medium build, light complexion, and a studious look. Knowing that I was there for the first time, he said enthusiastically: "As you know, currently nearly all of the ground stations in the world satellite information networks communicate with each other via satellites orbiting some 35,786 km above the earth.

"To what orbiting satellite is our Lotus-II station hooked up?", I asked.

"From 30 April 1985, the first day in service, commemorating the 10th anniversary of national unification, through the second half of July that year, the Lotus-II station was hooked up to Stationar-5. Then it switched to Stationar-13."

Dinh Quang Trung, deputy station chief, added: "At the Lotus-I station, friendly specialists had to stay on a few years to help us build, assemble, install, and operate equipment and turn the satellite signals into TV programs. At the Lotus-II station, however, their stay was reduced considerably to just a third the time of the previous stay. After that, our engineers and technical cadres were entirely on their own."

Other officials told me about improvements designed to overcome difficulties and technical snags at the station. "Interference" occasionally marred the reception of satellite signals, affecting image and sound quality; however, station personnel promptly solved the problem by adding a "compensator." Station personnel also transformed sound transmitters temporarily into image transmitters for emergency use (Lotus-I has a special image transmitter while Lotus-II has not), thus enabling Lotus-II to air TV programs introducing our city to the world.

To ensure smooth daily contacts with the Vladimir master station in Moscow (Soviet Union), most station personnel must have adequate knowledge of Russian in order to discuss technical matters with friendly specialists. My visit to the station coincided with an exciting exchange of views via satellite in Russian between our personnel and their Soviet friends tens of thousands of km away about transmission quality and upcoming broadcast programs.

While there, I had an opportunity to view "Lomonosov," the latest Soviet film being transmitted to our station.

By seeing with my own eyes the urgent and complex work of our engineers and technical cadres at the station, I came to appreciate better a statement by a municipal TV announcer: "Thank you, Lotus-II for enabling us to have today's TV program."

BRIEFS

EXPORT INCREASE--To date, the export goods corporation in the 10th Precinct has organized the steady local production of export goods, such as dried bananas and artwork, with a yearly output amounting to thousands of tons. The corporation has cooperated with the industrial, small-industry, and handincraft sectors to stabilize the production of export industrial goods, such as readymade clothes, leather shoes, plastic household utensils, badminton rackets, embroidered shoes, and soft sandals. In 1986, the output of small-industry and handicraft goods destined for export was 10.79 times larger than that in 1982. By developing local sources of export goods and by determining the composition of suitable import goods (50 percent of which are the supplies and raw materials necessary to production), the corporation has contributed to stepping up production in the precinct. [Text] [Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 10 Jan 87 p 1] 9332

EXPORTS ENCOURAGED-With the aim of providing incentive for production and increasing the sources of export goods within the locality, the 6th Precinct People's Committee has decided to give basic units that produce export goods the authority to use some of the foreign currency they generate to import materials and equipment with which to expand production, improve productivity and raise the quality of export goods. Instead of only receiving Vietnamese currency, units which produce export goods will now receive in foreign currency from 2 to 7 percent of the total value of the export goods delivered by them to the precinct Supply-Export Corporation. Basic units may use 90 percent of this foreign currency to import materials and components and 10 percent to import consumer goods to improve the living conditions of producers. This decision has encouraged and satisfied the aspirations of the 40 businesses producing exports within the precinct. In 1987, the 6th Precinct Supply-Export Corporation has signed contracts for the production of export goods worth 4 million rubles-dollars, a 60 percent increase over last [Text] [Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 7 Feb 87 p 1] year.

VIETNAM

HANOI TO TRANSFER 7,500 TO NEW ECONOMIC ZONES

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 Feb 87 p 1

[Article: "In 1987 the Municipality Will Transfer 1,500 Households, Totaling 7,500 People, To Develop the New Economic Zones"]

[Text] In 1986 the municipality made many all-out efforts in the work of sending people to develop the new economic zones, with many forms and positive measures, so good results were attained with regard to both quantity and quality. The municipality transferred 1,353 households, totaling more than 6,000 people and 3,240 workers to the new economic zones within and outside the municipality, and created six new economic zone within the municipality. Those zones received special attention with regard to investment in building water conservancy projects and public welfare installations (day-care centers, schools, and clinics), and production directions were determined from the beginning, so the people sent there could produce immediately and rapidly stabilize their living conditions. In 1986, the new economic zones in the municipality attained a total cultivated area of 618.9 hectares, and their output in paddy equivalent amounted to 1,029 tons. Furthermore, they produced a number of agricultural products for export, afforested 180 hectares, and raised nearly 4,500 water buffaloes, cattle, hogs, and poultry.

In the areas outside the municipality, there is an additional new economic zone in Da Oai District (Lam Dong Province). The investment mode as well as the method of transferring people to those locations were renovated. Priority was given to investment in capital construction and investment in the people increased. The administrative apparatus and production management and organization, as well as the mode of production, were instituted immediately. In that zone there are already 267 households and 1,400 workers, and there have been planted thousands of coffee trees. Capital is being concentrated on such capital construction projects as roads and bridges, clinics, schools, and day-care centers so that they can be completed at an early date.

This year the municipality will transfer 1,500 households, totaling 7,500 people, to the new economic zones. The municipality has made survey in order to create a number of additional new economic zones. The Hanoi new economic zone sector is continuing to renovate its mode of operation in the spirit of the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress and the resolution of the 10th Municipal Party Congress, in order to do a better job of fulfilling its mission of sending people to develop the new economic zones.

HO CHI MINH CITY RAISES ALLOWANCES FOR TEACHERS

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 6 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by H.P.L.: "Allowances Raised in Education Sector"]

[Text] On 20 January 1987, the Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Committee endorsed the suggestion made jointly by the Education and Finance Service concerning the allowances paid to the education sector.

In keeping with this suggestion, new overtime allowances have been established: for level I and kindergarten teachers: 20 dong per half-day; for level II teachers: 8 dong per classroom session; and for level III teachers: 10 dong per classroom session. For part-time teachers, the allowances are: level II: 12 dong per classroom session and level III: 15 dong per classroom session. At the Education Management Cadre School and the city's teachers schools, these allowances are: 15 dong per classroom session and 20 dong per classroom session.

In the case of teachers who are providing additional instruction to classes of excellent students as they prepare to take their municipal and national level examinations, the allowance has been raised from 15 dong to 20 dong per classroom session. Kindergarten teachers who teach class on a semi-resident basis will receive an additional allowance of 5 dong per day.

The allowance for travel to the job from home to the school is 25 dong per month for 100 to 250 kilometers of travel, 35 dong per month for 251 to 350 kilometers of travel and 50 dong per month for 351 to 500 kilometers of travel within the city. For teachers travelling from the precincts to the suburbs to work, the travel allowances are 50 dong per month for travel to Nha Be; 60 dong per month for travel Binh Chanh, Thu Due and Hoc Mon Districts; and 70 dong per month for travel to Cu Chi. In the case of teachers who work in a number of distant villages in the districts of Binh Chanh, Thu Due and Hoc Mon that are not served by convenient transportation, consideration will be given to paying an allowance equal to the allowance for travel to Cu Chi.

Students who are the sons or daughters of war dead will receive a 30 dong per month allowance paid once at the start of the school year to purchase school supplies. While receiving additional instruction in preparation for national level examinations, excellent students will receive an allowance of 90 dong per month. Physical culture and sport instructors at general schools will receive a product allowance in the form of a sum of money based on the ceilings and subsidized prices of the state for cadres, manual workers and civil servants.

The Education Service and the Finance Service instructed the schools to put the new table of overtime allowances into effect at the start of the 1986-1987 school year (1 September 1986).

7809 CSO: 4209/353

END