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11 August 1983

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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REGULATION ON PASSPORT RENEWAL, FOREIGN TRAVEL, CURRENCY

Sofia DUZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 28 Jun 83 pp 651-652

[Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regulation on Amendments and Supplements to the Regulation on the Application of the Law on Foreign Travel Passports (DV No 92, 1973)]

[Text] No 1. A new Paragraph 3 will be added to Article 5, to read as follows:

"(3) In coordination with the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs the diplomatic and consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic will issue, expand or extend the validity of foreign travel passports as per the preceding paragraphs."

No 2. The following text will be added to Article 6, Paragraph 3: "The passport will be issued for a period indicated in the department's letter but for no longer than the period granted to the individual to be visited. No visits to people with an assignment of 3 months or less will be allowed."

No 3. New paragraphs 3 and 4 will be added to Article 9, to read as follows:

"(3) Travel by Bulgarian citizens to nonsocialist countries will be allowed once every 3 years through the Shipka Agency of the Bulgarian Automobile Association, and once every 2 years through other tourist organizations or on a private basis, using the foreign currency allocated on an annual basis by the Bulgarian National Bank. An annual trip is permitted to socialist countries. Exceptions will be allowed by permission of the minister of internal affairs or his official representatives.

"(4) Tourist trips may be organized on the basis of the production-territorial principle. The groups may be formed on the territory of a conurbation system by one or several enterprises, establishments or organizations."

No 4. Chapter two, Section II will be amended and supplemented as follows:

II Abroad

Article 11. (1) Ordinary foreign travel passports may be issued to a Bulgarian citizen permanent resident in a foreign country, who has proved

through his behavior his loyalty to the Bulgarian People's Republic, and to his children, providing that they left the country before the end of 1981 or live abroad because of a mixed marriage of 5-year duration.

(2) A foreign travel passport as per Paragraph 1 may be issued in principle for countries stipulated in the petition, unless considerations exist for excluding some of these countries, with a stamp "Permanent resident of....(name of the country)."

Article 12. A Bulgarian citizen who is a permanent resident abroad and is the owner of a foreign travel passport will use said passport for identification purposes during his stay in the Bulgarian People's Republic.

Article 13. (1) A permanent resident abroad who applies for a foreign travel passport or for a new passport because of damage, loss or change of name must submit the following documents to the diplomatic or consular mission of the Bulgarian People's Republic:

1. Petition-declaration in three copies;
2. Three 5x4 photographs consistent with the appearance and age of the petitioner, taken during the last 2 years;
3. Document certifying to paid passport fee;

(2) The diplomatic or consular mission of the Bulgarian People's Republic will send two copies of the petition-declaration and two photographs through the services of the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Travel Passports Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 14. The foreign travel passport of a Bulgarian citizen permanently residing abroad, who has been deprived of or released from Bulgarian citizenship, will be sent to the Foreign Travel Passports Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 15. The diplomatic or consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may extend the validity of passports of permanent residents abroad for a period not to exceed 5 years.

Article 16. Bulgarian citizens who are permanent residents abroad and have a foreign travel passport may visit the Bulgarian People's Republic freely. In leaving the country for a nonsocialist country they must be issued an exit visa by the passport service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs within one day's time without formalities.

Article 17. The diplomatic and consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may broaden the validity of the passports of Bulgarian citizens who are permanent residents in a nonsocialist country and inform of this fact the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 18. The diplomatic and consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may expand the validity of the passports of Bulgarian citizens

residing in socialist countries unless this conflicts with the passport system of the respective country.

Article 19. The diplomatic and consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may extend the validity of passports held by Bulgarian citizens temporarily abroad without the concurrence of the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the following cases:

1. Severe illness and major family or other reasons, for a period of 3 months;
2. Students attending school by permission of the Ministry of Public Education, for the duration of their studies;

Article 20. The diplomatic and consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may extend the validity of the passports of workers, specialists and students and members of their families for other countries without the concurrence of the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the following cases:

1. From one socialist country to other socialist countries;
2. From a nonsocialist country to other countries only in the case of their definitive return to the Bulgarian People's Republic;
3. If the individuals are spending their leave in the Bulgarian People's Republic, for countries along their direct itinerary.

Article 21. Except for the cases stipulated in Articles 17 and 20, requests filed by citizens for extending the validity and expanding the range of countries covered in the passport must be sent with accompanying opinion by the embassy or consulate through the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Travel Passports Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Sofia residents and to the respective okrug administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for residents elsewhere. The other required documents submitted by the citizens must accompany the request.

Article 22. The diplomatic or consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may extend the validity of foreign travel passports held by Bulgarian workers and specialists and members of their families on the basis of a written permission issued by the Foreign Travel Passports Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and an order on the extension of the contract.

Article 23. Bulgarian citizens who are temporary residents abroad and whose passport has been damaged, destroyed or lost must return to the country with a travel card (passavant) issued by the diplomatic or consular mission of the Bulgarian People's Republic.

Article 24. The diplomatic and consular missions of the Bulgarian People's Republic may extend the validity of diplomatic or official passports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for no more than 1 year from the date of their issuance and inform the ministry of this fact.

Article 25. The extension of the validity of official passports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for other countries is based on the procedure stipulated by the minister of foreign affairs.

No 5. In Article 29, Point 1, the words "30 days" are changed to "60 days."

Minister of Internal Affairs: D. Stoyanov.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: P. Mladenov.

5003

CSO: 2200/115

FIFTY PERCENT 'UNDERESTIMATE' PARAMILITARY TRAINING

AU251013 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Jul 83 p 4

[Article by Jaroslav Mesko: "To Intensify Citizens' Paramilitary Training; On Some, Mostly Positive Experiences in Topolcany District"]

[Excerpts] Paramilitary education is an organic component of our citizens' communist education. At present, when we are witnessing the feverish pursuit of armament, U.S. efforts to acquire supremacy in nuclear arms, and the drafting of concepts of deploying them in the vicinity of our state borders, it is assuming particular importance.

In Topolcany District, as in all our districts, paramilitary education represents a complex system consisting of four basic components: moral-political, professional-technical, physical, and psychological. It is supervised by the Commission of the District National Committee's Council for the Standardized system of Paramilitary Education, chaired by the deputy chairwoman of the District National Committee.

Very important is the paramilitary education and training of the adult population. The district committee of the Socialist Academy has trained 229 lecturers to give lessons on professional-political topics and the Union for Cooperation with the Army, the Czechoslovak Red Cross, and the Fire Prevention Union have trained 289 lecturers and instructors for professional-technical guidance. They are in charge of paramilitary training in communities and enterprises. By the end of October, 10,000 citizens in the communities and 9,100 citizens in enterprises and organizations should undergo this training.

In Topolcany District, too, there have been instances, especially on the part of adults, of paramilitary education being underestimated. Also here, the all-Slovak public opinion poll of 1980 proved its validity, within the framework of which about one-half of all respondents expressed the view that not only the psychological training but also the technical training of the population for protection against the effects of mass destruction weapons is useless and almost one-third of those interviewed replied that there does not exist any protection. However, it is precisely due to purposeful paramilitary education that of the 10,000 citizens in the communities of Topolcany District who are scheduled to undergo paramilitary training

this year, 91.1 percent are taking part in it and thus expanding their knowledge of paramilitary affairs and skills. The best results are being achieved in the communities of Klatova Nova Ves, Zabokreky, Velke Uherce, Zlatniky, and Solcany. As regards paramilitary training carried out within the framework of enterprises, the participation is not as high. Some managers release their employees for paramilitary exercises unwillingly, are content with a formalistic course of paramilitary-educational events, and are looking for excuses to prevent conscripts and reservists from regularly taking part in the planned training. It is necessary to speak to them about concrete cases of this sort and, if this does not help, to pillory them by name.

CSO: 2400/394

ROCK BANDS, T-SHIRTS, JEANS FROWNED UPON

AU271512 Bratislava ROLNICKE NOVINY in Slovak 25 Jul 83 pp 1, 2

[Letter to ROLNICKE NOVINY by reader Milan Wagner from Presov: "Let Us Ponder"]

[Text] The forms of ideological diversion against our republic have been considerably strengthened of late. Imperialist centers are trying to exploit all forms of influence, particularly on the youth, in an unambiguous attempt to "brainwash" them in accordance with their ideas, to cast doubts on the accomplishments of socialist construction, and propagate some forms which are totally incompatible with life in our fatherland....

For example, on the pages of RUDE PRAVO, TRIBUNA, and other periodicals a polemic has been going on for a few weeks now about the activity of the so-called music bands, whose very names speak for themselves: Frog Snot, Airplane, Patent, and so forth. The polemic, on the whole, is correct--after all, what good does it do for young people when, for example, on the stage blokes appear in torn jeans, in some cases with chains around their waists, who--accompanied by decibels--shout unintelligible texts which either make no sense or are vulgar? Also in the countryside such bands often have a quite free scope for their activities. Where are the organizers who should see to the observance of approved texts? They are interested in cashing entrance fees and nothing else. Ideological diversion often consists of seemingly inconspicuous things, such as jeans, fashionable T-shirts with emblems of American universities which are also being worn by persons full of "pride," who did not even finish the basic school. Or another example worthwhile mentioning: At the time of most ferocious aggression against Lebanon last summer, I saw in the street three young fellows wearing T-shirts with the word "ISRAEL" on them in big letters. There is no need to stress that what was involved here was a mockery of those progressive people who were siding with a just struggle against aggression.

But I experienced the limit in one coffee shop not so long ago. A friend invited me for a cup of coffee. However, the feeling of coziness in the shade lasted only very briefly: A youth, about 25 years old, cursing and shouting mightily, invaded that quiet and tranquil place. He demanded an alcoholic drink and the personnel succeeded only with a great effort in getting the rowdy out. But all those present could notice his "great"

["svetovy"] T-shirt, with two crossed U.S. flags on it and the inscription "AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE." Thus, the American way of life could not have chosen a better object for its propagation.

Also during the summer vacation season we all should ponder our behavior. We should not become parrots, we should not blindly copy everything that is only a bit reminiscent of the West. Many young people do not even realize that by their naivete they are helping ideological enemies. As if they had forgotten that they live in a socialist country which has given them all possibilities for self-realization and to which they should be grateful for a peaceful and creative life.

CSO: 2400/393

'DISPERSION' OF GYPSIES GENERATES CONFLICT

AU272014 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by PRAVDA staff journalists Jana Drobova and Jan Markovic, and Tomas Balay of the East Slovak CPSL Regional Committee: "Kosice--the Most Dynamically Developing City"]

[Excerpt] More than 9,300 gypsies now live on the territory of Kosice and, in defiance of all difficulties, considerable progress has been made in their education. Of the 4,611 able-bodied citizens of gypsy origin, 3,117 are integrated in the work process. According to the files of the labor section of the Kosice City National Committee, by 1 January 1983 only 18 gypsy men were not regularly employed.

Important headway has also been made in educating the gypsy youth. As recently as the 1978-79 school year, most children were ending compulsory education without completing the eighth or ninth grades. Out of 162 children, only 41 completed the eighth grade and 34 the ninth grade. This year, out of 247 children, as many as 131 completed the eighth grade and 45 the ninth grade. This positive trend has made it possible to place most of the 14 and 15-year-old gypsy children in vocational or secondary vocational schools. Compared with the preceding years, also, the number of gypsies that continue their studies at secondary schools and at institutions of higher learning has increased.

The number of gypsies who discharge their work duties in an exemplary way has increased, which is another positive feature. The improved work morale is also demonstrated by the fact that the gypsies' rate of uncondoned absense is equivalent to that of other citizens. Job-hopping, the frequent change of workplaces, on the other hand, exceeds that of other citizens by three times.

Conflicts in the gypsies' coexistence with other citizens also persist, especially in connection with solving their housing problem by way of dispersion. In Kosice, this dispersion started in the mid-fifties. Several gypsy families were allotted apartments in the city's historical party, mostly families whose fathers were regularly employed. However, at that time the City National Committee made a fundamental mistake in that it did not pull down, after they were vacated, the dilapidated houses in the gypsy

community near today's ice-hockey stadium. These were presently occupied by new gypsy families that moved to Kosice from the surrounding villages or from other districts of the region. So it happened that by 1981 there were as many as 334 gypsy families in the downtown area, compared to only 2 families in 1952. The community near the hockey stadium was not vacated at all; on the contrary, 574 gypsies continued to live there. The principle that material assistance to gypsy citizens should be pegged to their activity fell into oblivion.

Concentration Is No Solution

In this situation, the problem emerged of where to move the gypsy families living in the downtown area. Various solutions were being contemplated. One of them was to build for them separate housing, as part of the Lunik IX housing development. However, that would not have solved anything. We would have just created a new gypsy community, although on a higher social level. This plan was abandoned in good time. Nevertheless, a certain concentration of gypsies occurred at Lunik IX. Today we are implementing in Kosice an essentially correct dispersion of the gypsy population. In practically every section of a housing block, one or two gypsy families at the most receive an apartment. In the downtown area they continue to live only sporadically. Behind the hockey stadium, the last houses are disappearing.

However, because of this dispersion, hard times have come for some citizens: Arguments; night-time disturbances on pay days; and nonobservance of the principles of hygiene in the hallways, elevators, and in front of the housing blocks gravely disturb the citizens' coexistence. It was only after the families moved into the new houses that we found out that, in selecting the families, we did not always proceed correctly. Some families simply are not yet up to this standard of housing.

CSO: 2400/392

DISTRICT CIVIL DEFENSE LIAISON SYSTEM OUTLINED

Budapest POLGARI VEDELEM in Hungarian Jan, Feb, Mar 83

[Article by Lt Col Sandor Timar, chief of the Fejer Megye Civil Defense Staff]

[Jan 83 pp 8-9]

[Text] The command, control and activity of civil defense at every level are regulated by statute. In everyday work, the statutory regulations are used as guidelines. The civil defense organization is accepted and integrated into all areas of state, social and economic life. However, implementation of the central decrees and measures cannot dispense with the creative activity and initiative of the district and local executive organs. The tasks in most cases can be implemented only with the coordinated cooperation of several organs and institutions. During the more than 30 years of civil defense's existence there has evolved in practice a liaison system that shows some variation by districts, but its main features must be present everywhere.

I. Liaison by the Megye Staffs

Mention must be made first of all of the megye MSZMP committee that organizes and directs political life in the entire megye. Naturally, it provides general policy guidance also for civil defense, through the appropriate individuals and organs. In addition to this general policy guidance, the megye defense committee provides more specific professional policy guidance and exercises professional control.

Regular contact with the aforementioned committee and its staff members is very important and, for civil defense, indispensable.

In practice the megye defense committee does not diminish the personal and sole responsibility of the civil defense commander, but it wants reports on the civil defense measures and exercises affecting the entire megye, and periodically it evaluates the work of civil defense.

It is of great help that the megye defense committee sends a representative to the public and restricted programs (conferences, staff command exercises, exhibitions, etc.) of civil defense.

Even though the defense committee is a leading political organ, our specific mutual cooperation and interdependence are the most perceptible at the various defense committee or civil defense exercises. Every exercise of this type presupposes cooperation and exchange of information in the phases of preparation and execution.

In this article I will not dwell on the relations of the megye council's chairman, as the civil defense commander of the megye, with the megye MSZMP committee and megye defense committee, because he is on both committees and cooperates with them on many other matters besides civil defense, and he also participates in the elaboration and formulation of policy questions.

Nor do I wish to discuss the managing and control activity of the megye council's chairman as the civil defense commander of the megye, because this activity is regulated by government-level statutes, and therefore it is unambiguously clear that within the given megye his decisions and orders are binding for the civil defense staffs, as well as for the other public administration, economic and cooperative organs. What is involved here, then, is not so much the question of cooperation and liaison, rather the ability of the megye civil defense staffs to suitably exercise and fulfill in practice the rights and obligations of the megye council's chairman.

Dwelling on party relations, we should note that the relations of the megye civil defense staff--and it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that also the personal relations of the megye civil defense staff's chief--with the municipal and jaras party committees are a very important factor in civil defense work.

The other side of cooperation is specific professional coordination of civil defense tasks. It is gratifying when some elected body within the district places the implementation of civil defense tasks on its agenda. In such cases it is expedient if the civil defense staff's chief or his deputy is present at the elected body's session, aiding its work with advice.

Still on the question of party organizations, it should be noted that the closest must be the relations with the party committee of the megye council apparatus, respectively with the secretary of this party committee.

Incidentally, there is daily contact between the leadership or secretary of the party local and the party committee. The party committee of the megye council apparatus regularly receives reports from the civil defense staff's party secretary, supervises the party and political programs, and sends a representative to the party membership and leadership meetings at the civil defense staff. Already these party relations and control activity indicate how essential for the megye staffs is contact with the party committee of the megye council apparatus. Over and above this activity of the party local, however, I regard close comradesly cooperation with the megye staff command and its military leadership essential also from the viewpoint of our professional tasks. Practically every one of the megye council organizations belonging to this party committee is involved in civil defense in some way or other, and therefore the party committee is able to aid our professional activity at least indirectly. Practice proves that it is not only able but also willing to help. In general it can be said that the megye civil defense staffs have developed very good relations with the megye council's party committee and with its leaders and leading organs.

This fruitful relationship is reflected in that the MSZMP Civil Defense Committee systematically aids the megyes and briefs them on timely questions of military policy. Generally it aids, and recommends to the megye civil defense staffs, the elaboration of topics that lie outside the competence of the megye council apparatus party committee. These party committees not only do not object to such assistance stemming from cooperation; they definitely approve of it.

The megye civil defense staffs enjoy the beneficial effects of the relationship that has developed between the mentioned two party committees over the years. This relationship is reflected in the occasional meetings and discussions of the party leaders.

The leadership of the party committee and the executive committee also recognize the importance of the contacts between the megye civil defense staffs and the MSZMP Civil Defense Committee. An indication of this is the fact that many of the megye civil defense staff chiefs are elected members of the committees. The increasingly broader and more fruitful cooperation is evidenced by the fact that the party committee sends representatives to the more important political programs--reporting party membership meeting, election of the party local's leadership, etc.--of the megye civil defense staffs. Personal meetings and the fostering of personal contacts are the most successful and effective forms of organizing professional matters and political life.

The megye council occupies a special place in the liaison system of the megye civil defense staffs. It is no exaggeration to say that thousands of threads connect the megye civil defense staffs to the council. The council's specialized administrative organs in their turn play a key role in carrying out civil defense tasks. There is hardly a specialized administrative organ that is not involved in some civil defense task. The organization and training of specialized services or even the planning of their deployment cannot dispense with close cooperation between the megye civil defense staff and the appropriate specialized administrative organ. This applies even to specialized departments that are not obliged to establish a specialized service command of their own. For example, the education department. Through civil defense training within the framework of national defense instruction at school, however, it is closely involved with the civil defense staff.

The megye civil defense staff reports to the leadership of the megye council, to the council's chairman as the civil defense commander of the megye. Civil defense work is greatly enhanced when occasionally an elected body, mostly the megye council executive committee, places on its agenda defense work as a whole or some important area within it.

The frequency of reporting varies, but at the megye level at least one report to an elected body every 5 years is unquestionably warranted and justified.

It is to the civil defense staff's advantage if its chief attends the council's other official programs, conferences and sessions, and if the entire staff participates in comprehensive inspections of the subordinate towns and jarases. Here it is worth mentioning that a comprehensive inspection actually covers the entire work of a council, hence obviously also the civil defense tasks of the area in question. Where this is not the case and in practice defense work is not regarded as a part of the council's tasks, there the spirit and letter of the law and pertinent statutory regulations are misinterpreted.

Reciprocity is warranted also for the council's specialized departments. The various programs and exercises of civil defense can be successful only if the invited or seconded council officials honestly live up to their commitments. According to my experience, this reciprocity does exist, as evident from the fact that each year a good many council workers receive decorations or rewards specifically for their civil defense work.

In addition to the manifold relations that have evolved with the megye council, mention must be made of the plants and institutions directly subordinate to the council. They include several institutions at which there is significant civil defense activity.

One such institution, among others, is the megye veterinary health and food inspection station where the megye RBV [radiological, biological and chemical defense] data gathering and monitoring system's command is cooperating with an important base of the specialized veterinary health and plant protection service. Their work in peacetime, preparation and occasional practical activity, is to a large extent identical with the specific activity of civil defense.

Essential is the plant protection station, where an important unit of the specialized veterinary health and plant protection service is operating.

The megye pharmacy center, the megye hospital and polyclinic, and KOJAL [public health and epidemiology station] are each an important base of the specialized medical service. But I could mention also the Food Stores and Catering Industry Enterprise (Elelmiszerkereskedelmi es Vendeglatoipari Vallalat), the Baking Industry Enterprise (Sutoipari Vallalt), the water and sewer works as important basic units of the population's supply that are functioning also as formations and organizations of civil defense.

Perhaps it would be difficult even to list all such organizations of the megye council where civil defense is involved in the peaceful activity of the given plant or institution.

It is desirable for the megye civil defense staffs to establish and maintain good relations with these organs, specifically in the interest of successfully preparing for emergencies.

Civil defense preparations in peacetime are important in every area. But if a distinction can be made at all, such preparations are especially important at these council organs.

It is my personal opinion that on the territory of most councils we have successfully developed the methods of fruitful cooperation. The many civil defense exercises held over the years confirm the validity of this statement.

[Feb 83 pp 4-5]

[Text] Part II

Naturally, the establishment and maintenance of relations with these organs can no longer be handled personally by the chief of the megye civil defense staff. The staff's officers and civilian employees also play an important role in this work. Cooperation must be developed in accordance with their professional assignments.

Dwelling on the council sphere, I wish to note that always the chief of the megye civil defense staff himself should develop relations with the leaders of the lower-level councils. Naturally I have in mind only the heads of the municipal councils and the chairmen of the jaras councils, because direct contact, and regular consultations and meetings on a wider scale would be difficult. But this does not exclude the possibility that occasionally the chief or members of the megye civil defense staff might establish contact directly with the villages.

The question arises as to how frequently and on what topics should the megye civil defense staff consult with the chairmen of the municipal and jaras councils as the local civil defense commanders. It is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to offer a recipe for this. As a rule of thumb one might say that the chief is always expected to deal personally with another chief; in other words, the chief of the megye civil defense staff must deal with the civil defense commander whenever this becomes necessary. This also implies frequent meetings between them are not necessary, and not every minor matter has to be discussed at this level.

Since the civil defense staff has already become an integral part of the district's public life, it is very important to develop relations with the mass organizations. Besides personal contacts, in many instances joint defense tasks link together civil defense and the mass organizations, determining their cooperation.

It is expedient to develop extensive cooperation with the megye KISZ committee on the civil defense training of youths. From the viewpoint of the megye civil defense staffs, I regard cooperation particularly important in organizing and training the Youth Guards as civil defense subunits.

The training of Youth Guards subunits is not only a professional matter, but also an important political task. Each of the armed services is devoting considerable effort to recruit young people, and the establishment of civil defense subunits likewise cannot afford to lag behind. Opening to the public the suitably organized Young Guards competitions and reviews would be good propaganda for civil defense and could attract replacements to some extent.

There are additional areas in which cooperation is possible: participation in each other's programs, and the aiding of related tasks. Just one example. On the regularly held Day of the Defense Forces it is customary to exhibit combat materiel. It is advisable for the megye civil defense staffs to join these exhibitions with smaller civil defense exhibits, as parts of the military exhibitions.

The Hungarian National Defense Association has an important role in defense training, and much can be said about relations with it. Close cooperation developed decades ago, when the association accepted a decisive role in the defense training and education of the civilian population. The area of cooperation at present is not so specific, but numerous ties connect our tasks with theirs. Such areas are the training of reserve officers for civil defense tasks, and also their further training. Here the megye civil defense staff is able to provide professional assistance.

Here too there are the tasks of organizing a joint Day of the Defense Forces and Civil Defense Day, joint exhibitions and other programs. The Hungarian

National Defense Association is able to provide very valuable assistance in the case of civil defense exercises, and it is almost always able to help the various civil defense programs by mobilizing larger masses of people. In our experience, cooperation between the civil defense and MHSZ [Hungarian National Defense Association] organs is fruitful, and relations between them can be said to be meaningful, wherever the forms of cooperation have evolved and the efforts are mutual.

It is desirable for the megye civil defense staff to be represented on the megye advisory committee of the MHSZ, by the chief of the megye civil defense staff or his deputy. This forum provides an opportunity for regular personal meetings and exchanges of views.

The Hungarian Red Cross performs humane tasks that are very close to certain specialized areas of civil defense. Therefore I regard as natural that a close working relationship must develop between the megye civil defense staff and the megye presidium of the Hungarian Red Cross. This cooperation already has traditions of long standing.

The most important and the oldest joint task is the organization and training of civil defense medical teams. Organization has occasionally changed over the years, but basically every activity related to the tasks of the specialized services' formations--these represent considerable strength--is performed jointly.

The activists and organizations of the Hungarian Red Cross are always there at the civil defense exercises and play a leading role in the planning and execution of the medical tasks.

Characteristic of the relationship between the two megye organs is that almost without exception a top official of the megye civil defense staff, its chief or deputy chief, is to be found in the megye presidium of the Hungarian Red Cross, and often in the more exclusive executive committee.

Practice to date confirms that the Hungarian Red Cross--besides its manifold other tasks, each of which is important and unique in its kind--is performing successfully also its civil defense tasks, and that the two organizations are aiding each other's work with a willingness to cooperate.

Merely as an illustrative example of the cooperation between the two organizations, I wish to note that a few months ago, during the election of Hungarian Red Cross leaderships and in the runup to the Congress of the Hungarian Red Cross, the elected members from among the megye civil defense staffs provided much assistance for the Hungarian Red Cross. And recognition by the Hungarian Red Cross of the importance of civil defense is reflected in the fact that many chiefs or deputy chiefs of megye civil defense staffs were able to attend the Congress of the Hungarian Red Cross as delegates.

Although not on the same scale as with the preceding organizations, some liaison to exchange information is necessary also with the megye council of trade unions and with the PPF. With the former, information must be exchanged particularly on the principles, methods and duration of the workers' civil defense training. Of course, it is primarily the task of the megye civil defense staffs to provide information. And the mentioned mass organizations and

movements can contribute to the success of civil defense work in the megye through specific methods of assistance and support. In some areas there is also the task of evacuating the workers of the organs, which requires even closer cooperation on both sides.

I wish to mention here also the relations between the megye civil defense staff and the press and other mass media operating in the megye. Although central directives govern civil defense propaganda in the megye, the content of this propaganda is shaped to a large extent in the course of cooperation. Perhaps the most important is contact with the editors of the megye's principal newspaper, because they can be expected to publish regularly a civil defense column or supplement.

A proven method in the practice of cooperation is that the press sends a delegate to the civil defense propaganda committee who simultaneously edits, and occasionally writes, reports of this kind in the newspaper.

The megye civil defense staff's relations with plant newspapers are less direct, although it is a proven method for the megye civil defense staff to meet with the responsible editors at least once a year or before a major civil defense program in the megye. Such occasions provide an opportunity to brief the editors of the plant newspapers on the state and tasks of civil defense in the megye.

The other branches of the military services are close to the megye civil defense staffs also professionally. Common objectives and tasks require our mutual cooperation.

Civil defense must cooperate with the recruitment and territorial defense command to ensure the reservist strength of civil defense. Coordination of all the related planning and organizing tasks is in the interest of both organizations. But there are a good many joint tasks in other areas as well.

Relations with other organs and formations of the Hungarian People's Army also should be mentioned briefly. I believe that it is expedient to maintain relations with every unit, but the megye civil defense staff can urge cooperation primarily with the garrisoned units. They can be of much help in civil defense work by lending materials and equipment and by providing lecturers. There are wide opportunities for organizing joint programs and exhibitions. Primarily through its contacts with the local councils, civil defense can be of assistance primarily in mobilizing visitors and participants, obtaining premises and providing publicity. Cooperation in the defense training of youths, joint sponsorship of schools, and many other joint tasks also can come into consideration such as, for example, the coordination of rescue work in case of natural disasters.

There has been systematic contact with the megye command of the Workers Guard actually since its very formation. In some areas there are cooperation contracts to ensure fulfillment of the tasks without failure.

Aside from this, however, personal contact in everyday work is at least as important as contracts. In the civil defense training of the Workers Guard the megye civil defense staff can be of assistance by providing lectures, instruction aids and materials. The Workers Guard often uses the training base and exercise grounds of civil defense.

On its part the Workers Guard makes available its shooting ranges and occasionally provides experts for the tasks that civil defense is not equipped to handle. There are joint tasks in preparing plans for emergencies, and in ensuring the continuous operation of the defense committee. Cooperation on both sides can only be praised.

[Mar 83 pp 13-14]

[Text] Part III

Among the organs of the Ministry of the Interior, special mention must be made of the megye police chief's office and megye fire chief's office.

Every megye civil defense staff must establish and maintain good relations with the central police stations. It would be hard to imagine basic provisions for civil defense programs without police support. Just think of the megye, municipal or jaras civil defense exercises. For emergency situations it is exceptionally important to organize, coordinate and put into writing police support of the plans for first aid, rescue, emergency restoration and public security. Joint action might be thrust into prominence in any disaster.

Liaison is made easier by the fact that in every megye police chief's office a designated officer is assigned the police tasks in conjunction with civil defense. Contact by this officer is obviously broader and more frequent than the otherwise indispensable meetings between the megye police chief and the chief of the megye civil defense staff.

Cooperation with the megye fire chief's office is made easier by its dual subordination; in other words, by the fact that in recent years more and more ties have linked this office to the megye council, and also its party local is under the same party committee of the megye council's apparatus.

Nor can we disregard in the course of cooperation what the pertinent statutory regulation specifies: "Under the guidance of the state fire service, the megye council chairmen (or the chairmen of the jaras offices) organize and direct the specialized fire service, with the participation of the council organs, village volunteer fire departments and the population."

In other words, the megye fire chief's office as the specialized fire service provides megyewide direction in this area of civil defense. Doing this, keeping preparations and organization up to date, is a joint task. In addition, there is the peacetime task of first putting out fires during civil defense exercises so that rescue operations may begin. Incidentally, this would be the sequence also under real conditions. The forums within the megye council (the council session, meeting of the party committee, etc.) provide suitable occasions for the megye fire chief and the chief of the civil defense staff to meet regularly. Of course, this does not yet solve the problem of cooperation completely, and far more than this is necessary. Among other things, for example, that the megye fire chief's office be represented in the megye command staff during staff drills and large-scale exercises and that it make recommendations for the command decisions.

There has been cooperation with the fire service ever since there is civil defence. It is felt in peacetime that the two organizations complement each

other, and under exceptional conditions each is merely a "one-armed giant" without the other. Direct contact and cooperation between the entire personnel of the two organizations, and especially between their chiefs, must be developed in full awareness of this.

Another large area within the liaison system is cooperation with the economic organs. Here a distinction must be made between economic organs subordinate to ministries and other central agencies, and other economic organs. In this category I mean specifically the plants and enterprises engaged in productive activity.

This distinction between the two types of economic organizations must be made because the civil defense of the former is not directed by the megye civil defense staff. In spite of this, however, this area demands a place in the megye civil defense staffs' liaison system. The megye civil defense staffs do well to maintain close contact with the larger plants, especially the ones that have independent civil defense staffs of their own. The point is not that the megye civil defense staffs bypass the municipal and jaras staffs and perhaps intervene directly in the civil defense work at these plants. Instead the point is that the megye civil defense staffs be informed of the defense capabilities of the plants employing large numbers of workers, because without such information it would be difficult to draw conclusions regarding the entire megye. And personal experience is one of the best ways of being informed. Naturally, such meetings cannot be held frequently. But if purposefully organized, they can be beneficial for both parties.

The other large group includes the economic organs not subordinate to ministries. Quite a few of them are directly subordinate to the megye council. At these economic organs the megye civil defense staff must direct their civil defense. In other words, on the initiative of the megye civil defense staff or after direct preparation, the chairman of the megye council or its supervising department assigns the plants the tasks stemming for them from central measures. This fact reflects the requirement that it is necessary to know the peculiarities and activity of the plants subordinate to the megye council, and hence also to know their managers. From professional tasks to the financing and inventory management of civil defense, everything demands increased attention and care of the megye civil defense staff's personnel. And good working relations between the personnel and their chiefs can only enhance the effectiveness of civil defense work at such organs.

With several economic organizations whose activity is not specifically production, the megye civil defense staff is linked by special cooperation. Thus with the organs of the Postal Service, by cooperation in maintaining and operating the entire telecommunications complex; with the organs of Volan, by cooperation to ensure the transportation tasks and shipments specified in various plans; and similarly with the railroad. The Power Supply Enterprise installs and maintains the air-raid alarms and performs other activities related to power supply. With the water conservation directorate there is joint activity in the area of radiological, biological and chemical defense. All this is merely a very sketchy and one-sided listing of cooperation. Each of the listed organs has very many civil defense tasks, for which the megye civil defense staff is able to provide the required assistance. With each of the mentioned organs there is practically daily contact, if not at the level of their superiors, then certainly between subordinates. Therefore special care must be devoted to fostering comradely and friendly working relationships.

Cooperatives occupy a special place within the liaison system. Their distinguishing feature is twofold: first, more and more cooperatives are forming and operating; and secondly, cooperatives do not have a professional supervising and directing organ. The megye associations that represent their interests actually do not interfere in their day-to-day operations and internal matters.

Regardless of this, it is expedient to establish contact with these associations and to brief them on the civil defense tasks that can be expected.

On the territorial principle, then, the megye civil defense staff is not linked directly to any cooperative. Because of the large numbers of persons working in the cooperatives, however, it is expedient to establish contact also at this level. Here again, of course, daily or weekly regular contact is out of question, but comprehensive and accurate knowledge can be gained only on the basis of on-the-spot experience. In my experience, every cooperative welcomes our interest and is willing to cooperate with civil defense, the more so because in civil defense preparedness the cooperatives, in my opinion, are lagging behind other economic organs and institutions.

We know that the expansion of our relations can only be beneficial to both sides, and that the resulting advantages serve in the final outcome to strengthen the civil defense preparedness of the megye. Therefore time and effort should not be spared when the cooperatives invite us to their civil defense programs and drills, and occasionally even the chief of the megye civil defense staff or his deputy ought to attend. In the case of cooperatives, perhaps more so than elsewhere, personal contact is more valuable and meaningful than written instructions based on directives and statutory regulations.

The megye liaison system includes many other organizations and institutions that cooperate in some way with the megye civil defense staff, or whose defense tasks require person-to-person discussions. To mention only a few:

The TIT [Society for the Propagation of Scientific Knowledge], MOKEP [expansion unknown], the megye library, the army garrison club, the presidium of the Pioneers, the club of retired persons, the maintenance, repair and service enterprises, the megye banks, museums, educational institutions, public prosecutors, and courts. Space does not allow that we discuss each one of them in greater detail, but the megye civil defense staffs know from experience how important it is, from the viewpoint of fulfilling the tasks of civil defense, to establish and maintain good relations with each and every one of these organizations and institutions.

Among the organs outside the megye it is essential, I believe, to mention cooperation with the civil defense staffs of the neighboring megyes. There can be many specific instances and topics--for example, evacuation, receiving evacuees, rendering assistance--when regular contact is practically mandatory. But even when such specific situations do not arise, occasional discussions, coordination of civil defense tasks and, last but not least, exchange of experience are desirable. Regrettably, the opportunities for such talks have been narrowing in recent years, and such contacts have declined even further since the introduction of the five-day workweek. Some way should be sought to share one another's experience, because it is unnecessary to waste time and effort on the elaboration of something that has already been solved well

elsewhere. However, good methods can be shared successfully only through personal contact, and it is not illusory to strive for this at least between neighboring megyes.

Occasionally the megye civil defense staffs have to contact the officials or department heads in charge of civil defense at the ministries or other central agencies. Here again some major programs might require personal discussions, although there is no general rule on this. The experience in this respect has been favorable. During inspections in the megye, ministry officials gladly drop in on the megye civil defense staff to compare notes. Besides this generally favorable picture, however, there is also some unfavorable experience.

It still happens that enterprises and plants subordinate to specific ministries hold comprehensive civil defense exercises without involving or even advising the megye civil defense staff.

It appears that these enterprises and plants find it adequate to cooperate only with the National Civil Defense Command. Yet it is obvious that in emergencies mutual assistance cannot be achieved without contacting the district civil defense organs, in which case primarily the enterprises and plants would stand to lose.

In addition to the already listed organs within the megye civil defense staffs' liaison system, mention must be made also of the superior and subordinate commands. A detailed analysis, I believe, is unnecessary because the regulations and directives clearly define the forms of both official and personal contact.

Even if we dispense with the aforementioned analysis, the question will certainly be raised as to whether it is at all possible and necessary for the megye civil defense staff to establish, maintain and foster relations with this extensive and numerically by no means insignificant network of organs and institutions. To answer the question briefly: Yes, it is possible. Admittedly, this is not an easy task, for direction and control can be achieved only through purposeful, organized and persistent work.

Such a broad spectrum of relations is necessary because today civil defense is already a task of entire society, implementation occurs here at the district organs, and the megye civil defense staff plays a mostly coordinating and guiding role in this.

1014
CSO: 2500/342

BCP DAILY RUNS BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JARUZELSKI

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 6 Jul 83 p 6

[Article: "Loyal Soldier of the Socialist Cause; On the Occasion of Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski's 60th Birthday"]

[Text] Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, is 60 years old today. His biography is linked with important periods of Poland's most recent history, of crucial importance to the Polish people: The struggle against Hitlerite fascism and the victory and defense of the people's regime and socialism in Poland. His overall activities characterize him as a loyal son of the people, a noted party and state leader of the socialist fatherland, a consistent Marxist-Leninist, a zealous patriot and internationalist and a tireless worker for the unity of the socialist commonwealth and the international communist and worker movements.

Wojciech Jaruzelski was born on 6 July 1923 in Kurow Village, Lublin Voivodship, to the family of white collar workers. His secondary school education was interrupted by the traitorous Hitlerite fascist invaders of Poland in September 1939. He found himself in the Soviet Union where he began his labor career as a worker. He joined the Polish People's Army which was raised on Soviet territory in July 1943 and has honorably worn the military uniform ever since.

After graduating from officers infantry school he was made commanding officer of a reconnaissance squad of the Henryk Dabrowski Second Infantry Division and later chief of regimental reconnaissance. As member of the First Polish Army, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops rushing to the lair of Hitlerite fascism, he took part in the battles of the Vistula, the Magnushevskiy bridgehead on the approaches to Warsaw, the capture of the "impregnable" Pomorski Rampart and the battles for the Baltic coast, the Oder and the Elbe. It was precisely along that road, through the blood spilled jointly by Soviet and Polish troops, that the future of people's Poland was sealed as a free and independent country, within historically just borders and with reliable support -- the friendship and alliance with the USSR and the other fraternal members of the socialist commonwealth.

After the defeat of fascist Germany military duty called Wojciech Jaruzelski to the domestic front against the armed gangs and other class enemies of the now established system of workers and peasants. After that he graduated with excellent marks from the Higher Infantry Military School and the General Karol Szwerczewski General Staff Academy. He held consecutively important command and staff as well as party-political positions. For a while he taught tactics and staff service, was chief of the Military Academies and Officer School Administration, deputy chief of the Main Combat Training Administration and commander of the Armija Ludowa Mechanized Division. In January 1960 he was appointed chief of the Main Political Administration of the Polish Army and in 1962 he became deputy minister of people's defense. He became chief of general staff in February 1965 and minister of national defense in April 1968.

He is a deputy in the Sejm of the PRL. On 11 February 1981 he was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers by the supreme authority of the republic, retaining his position as minister of national defense.

Wojciech Jaruzelski joined the party in 1947. He was elected member of the PZPR Central Committee in 1964 and since 1971 has been a member of the Central Committee Politburo. He was elected PZPR Central Committee first secretary at the 4th PZPR Central Committee Plenum (October 1981).

Wojciech Jaruzelski's name and activities became particularly popular during the country's socioeconomic crisis starting with 1980. He assumed the party's and government's leadership under exceptionally difficult and complex domestic and international situation, and headed the efforts to surmount the crisis and save socialist Poland. A peak moment in these efforts was the imposition of martial law in December 1981. This daring decision can be assessed only as a manifestation of inflexible loyalty to the cause of socialism and a manifestation of a lofty feeling of patriotic and international duty. This blocked anarchy and counterrevolution in the Polish People's Republic. The attempts to use the events in the PRL to the detriment of the Polish people and the socialist commonwealth were blocked.

Even a most fleeting look at life in the party and the country during the last 18 months would confirm the correctness of the steps taken under Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski. This is confirmed above all by the eventual results of the efforts to normalize sociopolitical and socioeconomic life in socialist Poland.

Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski is a great and loyal friend of the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist commonwealth. He has made a significant contribution to the steady development and intensification of Bulgarian-Polish cooperation between our parties, countries and peoples at the present stage, the broadening and improving fraternal interaction within the Warsaw Pact system and CEMA. He has made significant contributions to the struggle for peace and cooperation in the Old World and throughout the earth.

Last May Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski paid a friendly state visit to our country. Favorable prospects for Bulgarian-Polish cooperation in all fields of life were outlined during his meetings and discussions with Comrade Todor Zhivkov, which took place in a friendly atmosphere and with total unanimity

of action. The party and state leaders of the two countries expressed the resolve of our parties and peoples to work for the further strengthening of the fraternal friendship which has strong historical roots and is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

As an expression of Bulgaria's recognition of his services, the State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic presented Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski with the highest award -- the Georgi Dimitrov Order. On the occasion of his 60th birthday the Bulgarian communists and all working people congratulate him most warmly and wish him most sincerely good health, strength, energy and increasingly fruitful work for the sake and the good of socialist Poland and the triumph of socialism and peace and cooperation among the nations.

5003

CSO: 2200/113

RAKOWSKI SPEAKS TO WORKING PARTY YOUTH

AU061434 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 4 Jul 83 p 4

[Report on speech by Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski at the 3 July session of the All-Poland PZPR Meeting of Workers' Aktiws in Gdansk-Oliwa]

[Text] While I was listening to the discussion going on in Gdansk's Olivia Hall, I heard some of you say that the future belongs to you and that it is you who will decide how to shape Poland's future, Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski said. However, I believe that we will still have to work together for a little longer before this happens.

We are now in the company of a very special group of young people, the deputy premier continued, because you are, after all, young party aktiws, and this is why we must discuss the topics which are now of most importance to the party.

The first thing we must do is find a definition for the commonly used term "commitment." My view is that it stands for our approval and defense of the party's policy line and the struggle which has consciously been waged in order to win people over to the party's way of thinking. I cannot agree with the fact that the worst is now behind us and that the majority of our young people support us. We must be assertive in our fight to win them over. Young people become passive and sometimes difficult, particularly in large urban settlements. The seeds of doubt which were sown in this hall two years ago have now borne real fruit...

Today our most important task is to fight on in plants and to oppose subversive views courageously. The civic courage of party activists is a condition for regaining the trust of working people in the party, because even the most admirable propaganda will not win working people over to the party. This will be decided by people who have definite views.

Another matter that concerns us is the problem of how to make workers' collectives more influential in the eyes of a given community. Successes in the struggle to gain people's support depends on our ability to produce real activists, and an activist is a person with specific traits and qualities. We must be able to tell him apart by the bold way in which he expressed his views and the way he stands out in the crowd. He must also be known for his profound and praiseworthy knowledge of all affairs. Such an activist should

also be capable of talking to all sorts of people without the help of a prepared text.

While I was listening to the discussion I heard that you want to "shake up those holding various posts" and "get at the system of bureaucracy." However, bureaucracy is an essential part of the modern state, that is, if it performs its function the way it is supposed to. I am sure there are also many "bureaucrats" here in this hall, many managers at various levels. In Poland we must above all strive to stop saying that "they" did that and "we have nothing to do with this" if anything goes wrong. Socialism hinges on the fact that everybody should be responsible for himself and his own fate.

It was in this light that M. Rakowski stressed the particular responsibility of party members. All the members of a governing party are a governing force, must be aware of this and must be consistent in performing this great duty, he said.

The next issue which M. Rakowski raised concerning the personal traits which should typify an active citizen and party member is the way that rumors are still frequently believed before one looks into the truth of the matter as contained in party documents, materials, and the decisions made by the authorities. The defense of our party's policy line must hinge, above all, on profound political knowledge and this should, indeed, be the crux of our commitment, he stressed.

The deputy premier then tackled the opinions expressed during the discussion by the young activists of the PZPR on a subject which has frequently been mentioned but only in general, that is, the struggle for the younger generation's support. We have, moreover, had too few replies to the questions of how we should fight to obtain this support under real conditions like the ones at factories and in the fields of learning, life, and work. The fight for people's support was not easy and still is not easy today in particular, he said. I would welcome your remarks on how you are conducting this struggle for support and how you are getting your message through to people who are unconvinced or respond passively to our arguments. These questions are of profound importance, since greater tasks are awaiting us irrespective of the progress we make on the road to helping the country emerge from the crisis and in our fight for the support of the people. It will be several years before we eliminate all trace of the political struggle which was instigated by our opponents and which is still ingrained in the consciousness of many of our citizens.

We must all be realists in this struggle, M. Rakowski stressed. This just demand was, he added, made here in this hall too and is assuming particular significance since today myths in Poland have a simply unheard of strength which deters many people from contributing to political and social activities.

M. Rakowski concluded by returning to the affairs of the younger generation among whom socialism was built and is still building a future full of prospects, he said. But in reality, it is up to every individual to take advantage of these opportunities irrespective of the possibilities presented by the political system, and this, I feel I should tell you, is a little

short of what I believe we in Poland are capable of doing. We are capable of making a bigger effort and of having more faith in our strength. This is by no means some sort of slogan, and if someone says that it is tinted with idealism, then I am all for that kind of idealism.

We must finally have done with shouting out the word "crisis" several times a day and on every occasion. Let us talk of progress instead of crisis and of going forward instead of looking back. I think this is probably a good demand to start with, and these are not groundless desires, because if we look at the road we have traversed since the imposition of martial law then there is no way we can overlook the fact that the party scored a success, and this has nothing to do with the propaganda of success...

M. Rakowski appealed to the participants of the discussion, to each of the young activists of the PZPR to try and recruit at least one of their friends or a contemporary to take part in energetic activities for the sake of the country as soon as they leave the discussion hall, someone who has so far remained watching the changes from the sidelines. There would in this way be 4,000 more of us and this is quite a number...

CSO: 2600/1113

WEEKLY VIEWS 'UNDERGROUND' SOLIDARITY ARTICLE

AU081335 Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish 3 Jul 83 p 6

[Jan F. Bogusz commentary: "Legal Action"]

[Excerpts] Not everyone realizes that the slogans on "returning to social contracts of 1980" and on "trade union pluralism"--the oppositional circles are now very noisy about these slogans--conceal no less than a desire to revive the legal activities of the political opposition in the shape of before 13 December 1981.

Antoni Maciarczyk, a notable activist of the Committee for Social Self-Defense KOR who headed the so-called Institute of Social Research of the Masowsze Regional Board of Solidarity in 1980-81 and who is now hiding underground, in his programmatic and instructional article "Legal Action in Favor of Trade Union Pluralism," which was published in a bulletin of underground Solidarity in Gdansk and which was given extensive publicity by Radio Free Europe and other subversive radio stations last June, describes the present aims of the opposition as follows:

"The movement of the social resistance sustained by the delegalized Solidarity trade union is facing the need to make basic programmatic and political decisions. Desperate views can be heard that only underground activities have been left to our people for many years to come--activities that will have to be conducted until the Soviet Union disintegrates.... While people discuss the dictatorship of the USSR and its disintegration, they forget the most immediate and basic aim of our movement, whose achievement would increase our opportunities for more far-reaching activities. This aim is represented by the reconstruction of Solidarity as a legal trade union. The boycott of the trade unions instituted by the Military Council for National Salvation, the maintenance of the solidarity of work forces, an independent circulation of information, and so on constitute the base of activities along this line. However, this is not enough. We need militant activities, exerting political pressure on the authorities, and /the people's political game in favor of our union."/ (author's boldface)

The recent appeal addressed by Lech Walesa and nine other activists of the former trade unions to the Sejm of the PRL in connection of trade union pluralism, was an example of such a "game in favor of trade unions."

"Workers self-management groups are socially important places for legal action," Maciarewicz writes. "We should bear in mind that such groups have the right to pass resolutions on factory affairs and to appeal to the State Council to restore trade union pluralism because more than one trade union should be active in a single factory. Self-management groups can also hold a referendum of work forces on this matter."

Maciarewicz needs pluralism to revive Solidarity and says that this task should be treated as one of many stages, because this is what a sober evaluation of the situation dictates. "That is why," he writes, "it is now inexpedient to concentrate public efforts to support the demand for the immediate revival of Solidarity in its shape before 13 December 1981. The authorities would commit political suicide if they met such a demand. They will not commit such a suicide. That is why if we are going to revive Solidarity in stages, then the first-stage task is to restore pluralism in the trade union movement and to have the authorities abandon the formula of one factory, one trade union."

In his article, which is a collection of instructions, Maciarewicz describes various methods of pressure against the authorities to make them change the resolution passed by the State Council on 12 October 1982 and thus to make it possible to set up "genuine trade unions" (meaning: Solidarity trade unions) immediately. "The best method of pressure," Maciarewicz writes, "is at present an open and legal movement in favor of the pluralism of trade unions, organizing petitions to the Council of Ministers, the State Council and the Episcopate, maintaining close contacts with Lech Walesa, and so on.

"Such lines of action," Maciarewicz concludes, "will be of use in currently reviving the union in factories. They will also increase the number of axes held by Lech Walesa."

I have cited extensive passages from the article in question also to enable those whose vision is blinded by "pluralism" to the true aim of the counter-revolutionary forces in Poland to see again. "Legal action" seeks to overthrow the system in the future as it sought to overthrow it in the past.

CSO: 2600/1115

PROVINCIAL PARTY ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Criticism of Party Obligations

Zielona Gora GAZETA LUBUSKA in Polish 6 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Marian Dlugolecki: "In the Fire of Questions and Criticism" under the rubric "Crucial Issues"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] /Let us speak of the party and of the obligations ensuing from the plenary session of the Central Committee./

/The party is to be the same yet not the same./

It is to be the same--the Polish United Workers Party, to which the Constitution assigns the leading role, and not the same, that is, it performs its function differently compared with the previous period. This is not a casuistical formula, but it seems valid, because it agrees with life itself. The 9th Extraordinary Congress placed the party under the obligation of changing the manner in which it performs its leading role, ensuing from the general premise that in these different times it is simply needful to work differently. The 9th Congress stressed its will to inaugurate changes primarily by working out a new statute, and also by electing to supreme authorities a large group of local activists--including workers. Following the proclamation of the martial law it had seemed that work in the spirit of the 9th Congress and the implementation of its resolution would be hindered. It turned out that the party is strengthening its positions little by little, but consistently.

/The problem now is what to do so as to fundamentally energize the party--its internal and external work. So that the party would always be among people./

/Party members must be open--this is a basic prerequisite, and party meetings also must be open to those individuals who desire a dialogue either within the party itself or with the party./ Self-immurement of party members and the dropping of a curtain of silence over party meetings are the two chief enemies of the party. They are silent, but what are they silent about? What matters are they silent about? What should be done with them? Should they be persuaded and talked with--but about what? And yet nowadays there is something to talk about. Poland is entangled in thousands of big and little problems--problems relating to ideology, politics, economy, democracy, justice, the material situation of working people, education, culture. There is something to consider and attend

to, something--even--to be surprised at. The party no longer has to discuss fundamental principles or issues, whereas it should focus its attention on practical matters. Were this approach to succeed within the party, were such spirit to imbue every basic party organization, then--I believe--the party would no longer have to battle doubts about its own strength. This would have been the second important victory. And observations demonstrate that, in its turn, this victory is within the party's reach.

/The third problem to be mentioned would be that process which has been long since called "answerability."/

Thus, several days prior to its Plenum the party received a report from the economic department on the implementation of the resolutions of the 10th Plenum. This is not the first report of its kind, which proves that we are dealing with a new method. Perhaps this report is not yet as perfect as desired by party members, but the important thing is that it exists. The party can never again make itself liable to the severe accusation that it merely adopts one resolution after another without monitoring their implementation. A unmonitored resolution is an expression of complacency, while a monitored resolution reflects critical, practical work.

/And lastly, there is perhaps the most crucial issue--the dialogue between the members of the party and state leadership and the society./ Formerly there had been the custom that individual members of the leadership stayed in the background and only two spoke out publicly--the first secretary and the premier. Today changes can be seen on this sector too. The members of party leadership do not avoid press interviews and TV appearances and, above all, they do not avoid sharp discussions in work establishments. This is not the place to cite specific instances. It is a fact that the party leadership travel across the country, meet, discuss, explain and even surprise by their visits. There are no prior preparations and people show themselves to be as they are in reality. The leaderships of province party committee also have become active. This is as it should be! Such are the rules that should be mandatory within the party. This current practice demonstrates that every activist must prove himself in the fire of questions and criticism; everyone must demonstrate in person rather than on paper his knowledge, intellectual horizon and views on many complicated matters.

Party's Moral, Political Responsibility

Koszalin GLOS POMORZA in Polish 7 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Tomasz Persidok: "Moral and Political Responsibility" under the rubric "The Party and the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON]"]

[Text] Following its First Congress the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth entered upon the stage of organizational maturity. This means that, following the formative stage of the Movement, which had lasted many months during which its program was evolved, the stage of practical-political activity is now to set in.

Both at the Congress itself and prior to it, the PRON presented itself to the public eye chiefly as a growing group of enthusiasts for a concrete idea. What the public knew about the Movement was chiefly the pronouncements of PRON activists about lofty patriotic principles, while concrete initiatives and accomplishments of the nascent movement were less well known. It would be difficult to deny that the PRON has to its credit many big and little successes. Suffice it to mention the significant contribution of the Movement to the decision to suspend martial law in Poland [as published]. But now--after the Congress--we have the right to expect orderly, systematic and ideologically and politically explicit activity. Much has been written about the possible development variants of the Movement; the speculations also dealt with concrete perils harbored in the model of socialist democracy enriched with a new important element. Thus it is precisely now time for a practical answer to the question of whether this movement of patriotic Poles will gain a lasting place in our reality and play a historic role in conformance with its goals. The chances and possibilities for it exist.

However, in any discussion of the advent of the "era of concrete realities" the factors decisively affecting these realities are worth pondering.

In this context, I refer to the unusually responsible role of the party in the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.

The party is the main political force in the PRON. Consider that it was precisely PZPR members who had, in their time, initiated the formation of citizens' committees for national salvation [OKON] (later, for national rebirth), inspiring the establishment of these provisional PRON structures. The PZPR is--as comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, declared from the Congress tribune--"the spokesman of the interests of the main force--the working class, and it reflects and translates into reality the most ideological and systemic purposes of socialism. This accounts for the special--political and moral--responsibility of the party for the successful development of the Movement, for its significance in the country's social life."

The significance of the fragment cited above from the speech of the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee becomes even more obvious if we consider the fact that workers account for a modest proportion of the PRON's membership. This is rightly disturbing--also in the context of the Movement's future evolution. But the party participates in the Movement and its members are among the Movement's activists. What tasks are they charged with?

Primarily, they should not act to impair that which is valuable and characteristic of the PRON. I refer to the diversity of outlook and political views and the openness of ideological-political attitudes, combined with the common acceptance of the systemic principles of People's Poland and perception of love of the fatherland--here and now--as the highest good.

The Movement may associate virtually everyone--other than inveterate enemies of socialism, whom besides no one is attracting toward the PRON. Potentially, this is a favorable situation for utilization of the Movement by the anti-socialist

opposition. Party members should be prepared for acute political struggle against the enemy. They face arduous, astute and militant political work in milieux which are, to say the least, indifferent and not infrequently inimical to socialism. Thus must be a struggle of arguments--any other kind of struggle has no chance to succeed nowadays.

Of course, in the opinion of the party members belonging to the PRON, this is not just a struggle against the ideological or political enemy, should he infiltrate the PRON. Essentially, it is the other way around: it is necessary to create as many facts as possible that promote an authentic national accord. This concerns attracting to the Movement increasingly broader social circles, stimulating civic initiative and acting to promote the surmounting of the crisis. For the Movement should be a school of thrifty management and a spokesman of good work. It is difficult to overestimate the postulate that the best examples of these virtues should be provided by party members--in factories, schools and institutions. Thus, the party within the Movement bears a special responsibility for the shape, quality, character and image of the PRON. But if the party members within the Movement are to be able to fulfill the tasks posed to them, they should first gain for themselves a position of political and moral authority.

This cannot be done--unfortunately or rather luckily--by any administrative decision, fiat or decree. Here already everything depends on particular individuals.

Essentially thus, the PRON will be an important proving ground and yardstick of the activism, militancy and quality of party ranks.

Party Socialist Line for Renewal

Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 8 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Jurkiewicz: "Essentially, We Ourselves Will Decide" under the rubric "Following the 12th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee"]

[Text] /The line of the socialist renewal of our state, the line of national accord in behalf of Poland's rebirth, and of political struggle against the forces of the opposition pressing to overthrow the country's socialist system of society--this is what has for nearly 2 years outlined the road for all the leadership-exercising actions, the entire organizing effort and all the reform undertakings of the Polish United Workers Party. As is still fresh in our memory, the party selected this line, laid it down and declared its implementation to be its supreme duty as a result of the deliberations and on the basis of the decisions of the 9th Extraordinary Congress./
[printed in boldface]

These days, after comprehensively assessing the socio-political situation and analyzing the ensuing tasks for the immediate future, the 12th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, **declares** most resolutely--on the basis of both the experience of the recent past and the actual opinion of a majority of the world

of work--that the choice then made was proper. More even, the PZPR Central Committee says--as stated in the Politburo report and reiterated throughout the plenary discussions--that this line of struggle, accord and reforms "reflects real social needs, is intended to translate into reality the general laws of socialist construction in a manner commensurate with the conditions and tasks of the building of socialism in our country, and attests to the unity of patriotism and internationalism in the thought and action of our party."

The position spelled out so unequivocally by the 12th Plenum and, through the identification of its ideological-theological premises, so convincingly **deepened** and made more credible, is of immeasurable importance to not only intra-party life itself but also and above all the entire process of restoring its bonds with the working people and building the party's leadership authority on the soil of their trust and support. For it is no secret to anyone that the issue of fidelity to the resolutions of the 9th Congress, consistency in implementing them, and the permanent anchoring of the reformist nature of these resolutions in long-range party programs has been and remains an inflammatory issue leading to the most painful tensions, misunderstandings and suspicions in the relations between the party and the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia.

This is so primarily because the entire anti-socialist opposition has been focusing the attacks by its foreign and domestic apparatus of psychological warfare precisely on this bond fusing the party's policy with the expectations of the nation, and above all, poisoning minds with fabrications about the provisional, seeming, temporary nature of the program for systemic **transformations** and public participation in the system of exercise of power as well as in the reform of the management of the national economy. This is also happening equally because--as the Politburo report emphasizes--the consciousness of the working class, and especially the attitudes of the intelligentsia and the rising generation, have been so affected by all sorts of contradictions and mistakes accompanying the maturation of the new system of society--and particularly by the recent crisis shock--as to become susceptible to hostile agitation and various kinds of demagoguery adapted to the political inexperience of the working people. This is so, finally, because, precisely in the period preceding the 12th plenum, the opposition has intensified with special ferocity its campaign of accusations that the party intends to abandon the policy of accord and reforms. This maneuver was mentioned by Gen C. Kiszczak during the plenary deliberations: "Since this power could not be overthrown by force, attempts are being made to break it up from within, to slander it." This crucial problem of consistency and decisiveness in implementing the resolutions of the 9th Congress was discussed by J. Bednarowicz of the Lodz Electrothermal Power Station imienia Lenin, K. Miniur of the Krakow Iron and Steel Plant imienia Lenin, S. Weglinski of the MURCKI KWK [expansion unknown] and many others. But the issue was recapitulated most **decisively**, because in the form of a directive orienting the work of the entire party in the future, by the Politburo report, which stated that, on the road toward implementing the strategy of socialist renewal, "we shall not lack tenacity in solving all important problems of the working people, in quickening the related activities of state and social institutions, in refining the machinery of state in this respect. We shall not either lack resoluteness in opposing any return to disregard of the special opinion and desires of the working people

as well as slighting of public mood. We shall rebuild the party's leading role by eliminating all the negative factors which isolated the party from the working people and prompted it toward complacency and insensitiveness."

Party Ideological Indoctrination, Propaganda

Bydgoszcz GAZETA POMORSKA in Polish 9 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Marek Trzebiatowski: "A Smooth Rhythm is Indispensable" under the rubric "At Party Organizations"]

[Text] Ideological-upbringing and propaganda activities are an important part of party work. They require good merit-based preparation, proper organization and, lastly, consistent implementation. These requirements, when met, represent the backbone and connective tissue of PZPR elements. But it also happens sometimes that, owing to the mistakes made and accumulating neglect, these important problems are overlooked. Later all this has to be arduously reconstructed and

Work from the Ground Up

is indispensable.

Precisely these conclusions have been reached by the executive board of the Wloclawek Province PZPR Committee in its recent discussion of ideological-upbringing and propaganda activities at the AZOTY Nitrogen Works. The assessments were neither formal nor purely verbal. They were preceded by observations, lasting for more than a month, of the activities of the PZPR Plant Committee and basic party organizations at AZOTY. Members of the Province Committee leadership team attended 17 branch party organization [OOP] meetings at AZOTY. This form of contacts serves to enhance clarity of vision, which sometimes is difficult to achieve at occasional or purely ceremonial meetings.

The principal and most evident need is that of a genuine respect for statutory norms and specified principles of party work. Precisely this recommendation was made by rank-and-file party members, who were clearly fed up with the "interim situation" reigning at AZOTY, that is, with the indefinite postponement of many important questions. In practice, it was not known who should actually resolve the problem of the low attendance of meetings, their inconsistent organization and the absence of both party tasks and the implementation of statutory requirements. To be sure, these are primarily the obligations of the secretaries of branch party organizations, but they have often been helpless in face of difficult and debatable problems. They awaited help from the plant party committee and--as the members of the executive board of the Wloclawek Province PZPR Committee emphasized--that help was lacking. Systematic monitoring on the part of the plant party committee also was lacking. This could not be otherwise, besides, considering that the activities of the plant party committee itself urgently need improvement. Formally speaking, it has been operating correctly. It held sessions regularly and adopted resolutions and recommendations which, however,

Existed in a Vacuum

because not infrequently they were not specifically addressed to anyone. The members of the plant party committee did not either apportion among themselves responsibility for discrete sectors of party work. Hence also, as members of the executive board of the Province Committee emphasized, derived the passivity in face of new socio-political processes. As a consequence, proper support was not provided to the new trade unions, the movement for national accord and the nascent workers' self-government. Resorting to spectacular moves would not be needed, so long as support of the party organizations for these initiatives would be officially declared. The formalist treatment of program documents is demonstrated by, among other things, the agreement concluded with the plant board of the Union of Polish Socialist Youth [ZSMP]. There was written agreement, but somehow no energy, or perhaps no desire, was shown in implementing it as scheduled by the individual elements of both organizations.

No system of regular contacts between the plant party committee and the branch party organizations [OOP] was developed either. This is best exemplified by OOP No 12, which in late 1981 and early 1982 had addressed several specific proposals to the plant party committee. At the latest meeting of OOP No 12, attended by members of the Province Committee executive board, the plant party committee representative was asked outright what happened to those recommendations. He answered that they got mislaid somewhere....

Feebleness of Work

can be perceived from, among other things, the failure of the experiment in public exercise of the functions of the first secretary of the plant party committee. This conclusion was reached by the Province Committee executive board after asking OOP members at AZOTY for detailed opinions. This problem must be considered by the plant party committee at one of its next sessions. Besides, that committee will soon have a great deal of work. For the Province Committee executive board deems necessary a comprehensive examination of all activities of the plant party organization at AZOTY. The style of work of the plant party committee should be improved and based on a coherent program that is fully accepted by all PZPR members. The plant party committee must be an active rather than only deliberative body, and in this context it should, among other thing, intensify its controlling functions with respect to the plant management and the party members holding managerial posts.

It is self-evident that contacts with OOPs must be endowed with a proper form. They must be working contacts, based on analysis and implementation of the recommendations submitted by these elements. Another urgent duty is the allocation of tasks to individual party members and their consistent monitoring. More attention should be devoted to developing party membership and winning over workers and youth for it. The functioning of political information also requires streamlining. It would be expedient--in the opinion of the executive board--to set up a Plant Center for Information, Culture and Learning, assuring an improved coordination and organization of propaganda and agitation activities.

The recommendations of the Province Committee executive board did not devote much space to ideological-upbringing problems. As noted previously, this is a delicate issue requiring appropriate organizational preparation. Thus, first the broken bonds at AZOTY have to be repaired and the plant party committee and its basic elements should establish a smooth rhythm of activity, in order to consistently make up for the time lost in shaping the political countenance of the workforce at AZOTY. It is the members of the plant party committee who know best when this should take place. It will also be their duty to create new forms of party work assuring an efficient implementation of the recommendations of the Province Committee executive board.

Facts, Myths in Party Structure

Katowice TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 9 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Ireneusz Leczek: "Facts and Myths About the Party Apparatus"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] In 1981 at an extremely tumultuous election meeting of a certain party organization, the acceptance of a list of candidates for officers was being voted upon. A resolute shout rang from the audience: **/"I don't agree to placing comrade X. on the list; he was in the apparatus!"/** During open voting those present rejected the candidacy of comrade X. No one even asked him about his personal attitude and past; it was hearsay opinion that decided the issue.

Isolated instances of dishonest or incompetent individuals have been inflated by propaganda so as to overshadow contributions made for many years by honest people, experts, devoted to the party. Persons who should not have worked in the party apparatus have left it, but so also have many who should have remained in it. They are blamed for every evil. Those denying most loudly the need for the functioning of the apparatus have been the very same persons who had at **the same time** organized the efficient staff apparatus of more than 40,000 persons in the former Solidarity.

What Qualifications?

Article 45 of the PZPR Statute specifies: **/"political workers are staff members at party committees."/** Lenin had pointed out that the party apparatus should consist of persons who are qualified, specially tried and tested and confident. From this ensues that two main premises decide the role and place of the apparatus. **/First,/** the need to implement efficiently the party's will; **/second,/** getting the best party members to work in the apparatus.

/The party organization in Katowice Province employes 737 staff members./ Is that many? Statistics indicate that there is **/one staff member to every 373 party members/**. The leaders of the former Solidarity had been prone to talk about the volunteer origin and spontaneous functioning of their organization, but at the same time there was one salaried activist to every 350 members of that organization. These proportions speak for themselves. Part of the salaried positions in the party has not been staffed. The reasons for these vacancies are

many, but the most important is the tightening of the requirements for potential candidates. These requirements include: a minimum of 5 years of membership in the party, a minimum of 5 years of occupational or professional work and a positive recommendation from the candidate's local party organization. Not everyone, especially a young person making a career for himself in his occupation or profession, is willing to interrupt his career for several years in order to work in the apparatus, because resuming a career is always difficult. In their turn, veterans of labor can hardly be more than a small part of the group of political workers. In the current era of the competition among enterprises for skilled workers a job in the party is not a lucrative occupation. The mean monthly wage of a senior inspector at the Province Party Committee has recently amounted to 15,283 zlotys. It is worth noting that the Committee grants neither "14th month" pay nor quarterly bonuses, and neither does it pay for overtime work or dispense allowances in kind. Another discouraging factor is that hours of work depend solely on the needs that arise.

Question About Motives

Why is it then that more than 700 persons in Katowice Province have accepted work in the party apparatus despite the poor remuneration? It is not easy to get a straight answer from those of whom I am writing. After all, this is a personal matter, more or less. But I tried. Comrade Aleksander B. is the secretary of the plant party committee at a mine. He told me: /"For a party apparatus employee, my pay is relatively high, but even so it is much lower than what I used to earn as a mine foreman. I accepted this because I was elected by the comrades. After my term of office is over, I will return to work in the pit. Thus there will be no danger of my becoming a bureaucrat, as Lenin had warned. My material conditions will improve, too."/ Comrade Jan K., senior inspector, declared: /"In exercising my party duties of work in the apparatus, I regard this as a continuation of my professional training. In this way, I learn to understand many problems more broadly and deeply. This will pay off in the future."/ Comrade Tadeusz C.: /"I work here, because the party needed it."/

People sensitive to the color red simply enjoy advocating their ideas of party apparatus. They say: "The apparatus is staffed with persons who warm the seats of their chairs for years, because they have no other career prospects."/ The reality is that /70 percent of political workers in Katowice Province have been working in the party apparatus for less than 5 years/ and 83.7 percent of the comrades elected to work in the party apparatus stay there for less than 2 years. The enemy claims: /"There are no young people there."/ Facts: /nearly one-third of the employees are below the age of 35 and 95.5 percent, below the age of 45./ The enemy: /"The party isolates itself from education and culture."/ Facts: /10 percent of employees come precisely from the world of education and culture./ The enemy: /"The 'apparatchiks' are uneducated people."/ Facts: /41.5 percent of the employees of the party apparatus in Katowice Province are graduates of higher schools./

The figures refute the accusations but cannot reveal the entire complexity of the problems of functioning of the party apparatus. For example, is it good or bad that this apparatus consists largely of young people who do not stay long in it?

It is good, in the sense that the young have enthusiasm, energy and a fresh vision unspoiled by routine. But it also is bad, because youth means lack of experience, which only a more mature age brings. Shortages of experience will be supplanted with theoretical deepening of party experience during training and self-education. Major tasks in this respect face the Inter-Province Party School and the Province Ideological Training Center.

If a definition is to be formulated, even though this is a moot point, it can be boldly stated that political workers of the party apparatus represent that part of the aktiv which--on temporarily suspending their regular occupation or profession--obligate themselves to devoting their skills and energies to party matters.

The status of political workers is of two kinds. Some, appointed through elections, act under a mandate from their comrades. Others, appointed upon a recommendation from the elected functionaries and delegated from their regular jobs, are authorized by a resolution of the Katowice Province party committee to act in its behalf. The scope of that action is not confined to problems of daily work within the apparatus: it is extended to maintaining close contacts with party organizations. A political worker can exercise his function well only when he is conversant with the life of the party and its members. The higher the level in party hierarchy he occupies, the closer his contact with the grassroots should be, because the distance is greater.

Experience but not Routine

The period of exercise of an elected office is limited to the statutory term of office, in the case elected functionaries. The other political functionaries are bound by the principle of rotation. Rotation of cadres should be constant so as to assure a continuous influx of new blood. One must depart before experience and the expertise gained turn into routine drudgery and while one's bonds with his regular occupation or profession are not yet disrupted. Controlled turnover of personnel is extremely desirable for party apparatus. /It is not true that working in the apparatus confers upon a person a patent for becoming a director./ A very large number of comrades resume their previous jobs. Those who demonstrate high professional ability and distinguish themselves by their organizational talents and ideological fidelity occupy managerial posts. For the conduct of cadre policy is one of the basic tasks and rights of the party.

Currently the employees of the party apparatus in Katowice Province are establishing the Union of Professional Workers of the Polish United Workers Party. And although, for fundamental and understandable reasons, their draft statute does not include the right to strike, it articulates specific professional problems of employees of the PZPR. Emphasis is placed, in particular, on the need to define unambiguously the scope of the rights and duties of the employees. Some veterans of the apparatus have had unpleasant experiences in this respect years ago.

Educated, idealistic and efficient political workers are indispensable to the party and considerably influence its image. It is thus worth considering how many difficult problems are involved in those two words: party apparatus.

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WEEKLY CRITICIZES SOLIDARITY, WALESKA, MILEWSKI

AU291344 Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish 26 Jun 83 p 5

[Jan F. Bgousz commentary: "Interviewers (From Intelligence Services)"]

[Text] Radio Free Europe has not stopped giving instructions to the underground and publicizing it. In fact, there is not a single program that does not contain elements of instructions. On 29 May, Radio Free Europe read an interview with Bogdan Lis which had been published in the underground publication SOLIDARITY produced by the former Gdansk chapter. Asked about the underground's stance toward the "legal action" being waged by Waleska for the sake of trade union pluralism, Lis replied:

"In the present totalitarian system...there is no possibility of waging a legal battle for an authentic social representation. ...It is very good that Lech Waleska is voicing slogans about battle for trade union pluralism. In this way he is heading for the same goal as us, only along a different road. ...I stress once again that if the underground collapses, the possibilities of legal activity for the sake of restoring Solidarity will also collapse."

Thus, Lis leaves no doubt as to how the former Solidarity leaders imagine they will return to the political scene. What is more, Lis is convinced that the unions which will emerge in the future will be a straight continuation of Solidarity (or maybe even the same organization.) Therefore Lis gives direct instructions further on in his interview: "It is necessary to make the underground Solidarity pay normal statutory benefits to its members working in plants... What needs to be done in the coming weeks and months is to produce official letters in which individual workers voice demands to their plant managements that the party should not transfer the funds of Solidarity and other unions to the pro-Military Council of National Salvation unions. The motivation is very simple: the trade union law guarantees that in a year's time more than one trade union can be active inside a plant. We want our dues to be transferred to those unions which will emerge in a year's time."

This interview is an example of the atavistic extremism for which Lis was famous, but, and this seems more dangerous, it is also proof that the underground leaders have not drawn any conclusions from the development of the situation in Poland. The conditions Lis states for reaching a compromise

with the authorities are characteristic. What a scenario! First he wants a general strike, the formulation of demands in advance so that there is a basis on which to bargain, and then compromise. "I also think," Lis says, "that we should propose concessions on our part. So my idea is to hold a general strike when the conditions are right. Because of the risk and pressure involved, one should demand more during a strike than would be demanded without this final method of peaceful struggle." And what happens then?, one can ask. But Lis has an answer: "Then we have to present proposals making it possible to emerge quickly from the crisis." This was a variant shared by the extremists in March 1981, during the events in Bydgoszcz. Today they are cursing the fact that they have let themselves be tricked into negotiating with the government. Were it not for the "Warsaw agreement," as the negotiated compromise was then known, a general strike would have brought the authorities to their knees and the opposition would have taken the helm. This is what is said and written today in various leaflets and analyses of the situation.

It seems to me that nothing could be more wrong. It is true that moods reached their zenith in the spring of 1981 and the party was retreating. But one must also admit that the party did have enough strength then, just as it did later when it stopped the counterrevolution. Has this lesson not taught anything?

Probably not. Lech Walesa, widely advertising himself, gave the West German FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE an interview in which he answered a question on the state of the economy as follows:

Question: "Solidarity has been told it will bear the blame for the bad economic situation. Is this true?"

Answer: "The economy used to function considerably better in our day. Those who are demonstrating so often today because they are dissatisfied were still working in our day, and very efficiently."

Is Walesa mocking us? Maybe this time too he is making a fool out of everyone with his methods...

On various occasions, former Solidarity activists are firmly stressing that Solidarity has never adopted an official stance toward the Western sanctions against Poland. But it is generally known that activists both in the underground and abroad support these sanctions and demand that they be escalated. They speak exactly in this spirit at various meetings. On 26 May, Radio Free Europe interviewed Jerzy Milewski, chairman of Solidarity's so-called Brussels Bureau, on the subject of his talks with members of the so-called Helsinki Commission of the United States, whose chief aim, let me add, is meddling in Polish affairs.

"Another question during the talks dealt with the American sanctions against the PRL authorities," Radio Free Europe asks. "Could you tell us your answer?"

"I said that Solidarity has never adopted an official stance toward the sanctions, and I added that we expect our friends and sympathisers all over the world to understand Poland's geopolitical situation and its influence on our activity. I also said that as far as economic affairs are concerned, no doubt the majority of Poles would consider it an act against themselves to support the government and the present authorities in Poland. Giving these authorities unconditional credits, for example, constitutes support for them, or inviting representatives from Poland to visit some international political organizations and do what the Americans call business like usual [last three words given in English and presented as published]. In fact, we cannot perform this business [biznes] as usual with the Polish authorities right now."

I would like to know what the purpose of these reservations is and what the purpose is of saying that Solidarity as a whole did not adopt a stance toward the sanctions and of referring to "geopolitics?" This sounds exceptionally unwholesome. We know that contrary to the feelings of most Poles, the underground and the foreign centers of subversion give themselves the right to determine what is best for Poland. And yet they are not only concerned with Poland, but also with Washington's plans and the carrying out of these plans. Would Milewski and other specialists in Radio Free Europe and other stations like him be so naive as to think that the Poles would believe their noble intentions after they had shed a few crocodile tears?

In his abovementioned interview for the FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE, Walesa calls himself a "man of talks and adjudications." But how can one hold talks with people who have a different opinion every time? At one time they say that they are against street demonstrations, and later they say that they support them. At one time they say that they wish to observe the law on trade unions, and later they say they wish to rebuild Solidarity. They want to rebuild Solidarity the way they are giving interviews right now. If they prefer interviews, then they will become professional interviewers...

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SCHOLAR VIEWS SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS AS NON-MARXIST

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 11, 16 Mar 83 [no pages given]

[Article by Adam Schaff: "A Crisis of Marxism or of Marxists?"]

[Excerpts] It may be interesting to note that in 1956 I wrote an article under a similar title. The interesting thing is not, of course, that I wrote such an article then, but that then, as today, there was a need to address such a subject.

It so happens that, in Polish history, periods of upheaval in the social system caused politically "faithful" people to have breakdowns. This was true in the period following October 1956 as in the present post-Solidarity era. As Marxism officially plays the dominant role in the ideological life of the country, these breakdowns lead to doubts about its value, and this breeds the conviction about a crisis of Marxism. To oppose such convictions would be to go against the tide, which is not an easy thing to do, and it takes courage to contradict public opinion because it must be remembered that Polish society is not exceedingly tolerant, for which the Church and the party hierarchy alike may claim equal credit. But when somebody wants to defend his principles, he has to muster that courage. I remember that things got so bad after October 1956 that, in an excess of self-censorship, editors refused to pass any articles defending Marxist ideology. In fact, I had to appeal to private connections and friendships to have my things published at all. The reason I am writing about it is that I want to show the depth of that crisis--of Marxists but not of Marxism. Today the barriers are different but the crisis is again one affecting Marxists.

Undoubtedly, this is a much simpler and less dangerous phenomenon for the working class movement than a crisis of Marxism would have been. But even the crisis that we have is socially dangerous, especially when it strikes a society afflicted--as Polish society is--by the plague of anarchy. It is therefore essential to start looking at things from the right perspective again, and this applies to ideology as well. There is also the definite need to assemble and mobilize those Marxists whose morale remains intact in order to help out those who have wavered or dropped out.

This is why I stepped out of line after 14 years in "exile" and total silence on the domestic scene, which was largely my own decision. There is no time today to brood over injustice and insults, even if one really suffered from them. In the face of a threat to foundations, a Marxist should step forward

without advancing any preconditions as I did on earlier occasions. I stepped out in the face of a senseless call for a boycott still practiced by a sizeable portion of the intelligentsia, and I call for boycotting the boycott. Anyway, this just was one of the reasons because in the face of the crisis of Marxists this was rather a marginal matter.

The question arises whether the depth of the economic, political and social crisis we have definitely been experiencing lately does not expose the falsehood of the theory on which the transformation of Poland after the liberation was based. Doesn't the Marxist philosophy recognize practice as the criterion of truth, and does not this criterion support the thesis that bad theory exposed the fallacy of Marxism as a theory? Does this not confirm the view that Marxism is experiencing a crisis rather than the Marxists whose souls are torn?

This is false reasoning, at least in such a categorical form. It was not the Marxists but the no-nonsense neo-positivists who formulated the sound thesis that if practice clashes with some theory then either the theory is faulty or it was not properly applied, i.e., the conditions formulated therein were not met, with the outcome being that results obtained departed from theory, but through no fault of the latter. The conclusion is that whenever theoretical assumptions clash with theory, it is necessary to make sure that the specified conditions were met before jumping to the conclusion that the theory was wrong. If a law of physics states that water will boil when heated to 100 degree centigrade, there are at least two conditions to be met--that the atmospheric pressure is "normal" and that the water has no admixture of other substances.

If even one of these conditions is not observed and water will not boil at 100 degrees, this does not prove that the law was wrong--it only shows that the rules were not observed in this experiment. The same can be applied to the operation of social laws, and I say that present Polish difficulties with the functioning of the socialist society not only do not invalidate Marxist theory but, on the contrary, confirm its correctness, quod demonstrandum est.

Even a beginner studying Marxism knows that as long ago as the middle of the 19th century Marx and Engels defined categorical conditions that must be met in order to carry out a socialist revolution, and the sharp-tongued Marx even said that unless these conditions are met, the old trash will return. Although the outstanding student of Marxism Mr Wit Gawrak (whose chronic and acute "Schaffitis" throws him into a state of theoretical dazedness) questioned the authenticity of the quotation (and ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI printed these confessions in April 1982), it was simply out of ignorance. Having once founded, and headed until its dissolution, the highest party school, called the Institute of Scientific Cadres at the Central Committee, I decided that it may be time to set up a Marxist kindergarten at the CC. Eventually I abandoned the idea because I have no patience with infants, but I would like to take this opportunity to notify whomever it may concern that the passage in question may be found in "German Ideology" (DZIELA Vol 3, p 37). There and elsewhere, Marx states that the conditions of success for a socialist revolution are the possibility of distributing wealth immediately after the revolution and the carrying out of revolution simultaneously in the decisive countries (later

he modified the condition regarding the beginning of the revolution but retained its principal contents concerning the universality of socialism). Elsewhere Engels said that the prerequisite for the victory of socialism is the existence of a highly developed working class that would be capable of leading the society and state to meet the requirements of complex contemporary technology.

In the 1920's, after watching the experience of the socialist revolution in Russia, the outstanding member of the Communist Party leadership in Italy, Antonio Gramsci, added one more precondition--the consensus of the masses, i.e., the consent and support of the masses for socialist transformations in practice and not only in official propaganda enunciations.

There is a whole system of conditions that has to be met before Marxism issues its formal consent to carry out a socialist revolution. Obviously, this does not mean there is a ban on all revolutions if these conditions are not met--revolutionaries still have others to choose from--but a socialist revolution would be out of the question; Lenin provided concrete proof of the accuracy of this revolutionary wisdom when he opposed the idea of proclaiming a socialist revolution in 1905 in view of the situation prevailing in Russia at that time.

It is hardly surprising that the failure to fulfill all the Marxian conditions on the part of architects of all socialist revolutions to date was bound to lead to the weaknesses and problems of these revolutions.

This is no fault of Marxism but, just the opposite, of the failure of people to follow its recommendations. Marxism was not invalidated by these negative facts but, on the contrary, it was verified by them. So, what we are dealing with is a crisis of Marxists, not of Marxism. And it is this crisis that has to be analyzed.

If we want to talk about a crisis of Marxists, we must first of all decide whom we shall call by this name. The briefest answer to this question is that a Marxist is one who knows Marxist theory (naturally, various degrees of indoctrination are possible, but I mean elementary knowledge in this respect), who recognizes the correctness of its theses, and identifies his attitude with them.

Obviously, such an identification with some theory may be subject to various fluctuations; it can even be seriously shaken when some new facts, whether from the domain of theory or practice, undermine it. It is also obvious that the less consolidated our knowledge of the subject and the more our convictions are based on emotions rather than on knowledge, the greater the risk of wavering and having doubts. Not surprisingly then, the young have been particularly afflicted with such reactions because of the weakness of their scientific foundations; the intelligentsia suffered the same lot because of its fluctuating social attitude. The same also applies to the phenomenon of the "crisis of Marxists" we are talking about.

We have experienced such a crisis regarding youth after October 1956. The October developments were associated with the revelations of the 20th CPSU Congress regarding Stalin and Stalinism, which caused a veritable ideological earthquake. It is wrong to underestimate the influence of the pressure of the environment and the effect of "fashion trends" in the ideological area. At that time it was the "in" thing to be an anti-Marxist and that is the image young people saw in the mirror of their souls.

Apart from the genuine crisis, this "fashion" also played a role then; this was confirmed by a study of the ideological postures of Warsaw University students made by Stefan Nowak and his associates. The sample was quite large and therefore representative, involving 10 percent of the university population. It turned out that at the university, where 10 percent of the youth were members of the PZPR or the youth organization, only 1.5 percent of Marxism and about 3 percent of socialism. The returns were so incredible that even the "revisionists" at that time did not trust them and decided to verify them in a roundabout way--during entrance examinations they asked prospective students questions on Marxist subjects, assuming the role of "critics" of Marxian solutions which they refuted; the youths as a rule passionately attacked the idealistic solutions the "critics" offered.

The meaning of this was clear: Nowak's study was based on false methodological assumptions. Taking into account the influence of fashion, it was better to ask indirect questions rather than straightforward ones, the way Adorno did in his studies on authoritative personality.

Nevertheless, even if this was only a question of fashionable posturing which was a reaction to the Polish October and the Hungarian developments of 1956, the "crisis of Marxists," which was most extreme among youth but was by no means restricted to them, was evident.

In principle, however, the crisis encompassed only the rank-and-file, leaving the commanding cadres intact. It definitely did not affect the old Communists, but the generation of young "leaders" was not affected either. True, there was a peculiar "revisionism" among them, but what they meant was not a revision of Marxism but--on the contrary--the restoration of its glitter by revising the false policy assumptions of the preceding period.

Divisions into factions and cliques were intensifying but nobody questioned Marxism, even if its deformations were sharply criticized; the "revisionists" remained deeply faithful Marxists and they thought that they alone represented "genuine" Marxism. Incidentally, after a transitional breakdown, this was a fertile period for the development of Marxism in Poland, in all branches of the science. The clashes and disputes between Marxists of different colors were no obstacle but, on the contrary, validly contributed to this development.

So, the "crisis of Marxists" can take such a form as it took them, but it can also assume the more dangerous form of ideological capitulations, as is the case now. The events of 1968 and their ideological consequences were the dividing line in Poland.

There is a beautiful novel by Joseph Conrad about Lord Jim, which is the story of a captain who left his ship in distress, when it appeared certain that a typhoon would inevitably sink it. The ship was mysteriously saved and when the typhoon passed, she sailed calmly into port, without her master, who was eternally disgraced and, naturally enough, lost the right to command ships forever. The rest of his life was a tale of the struggle against the stigma of a man who lost face.

As a matter of fact, this is a story of lost honor of a man without face. Whereas reputation is one thing for which a man is held responsible--the rest usually happens irrespective of his will, and therefore is something he is not morally responsible for.

Conrad's novel superbly corresponds to a phenomenon we have witnessed since 1968 within the scope of the "crisis of Marxists"; what I refer to are those party members who quit the party in times of crisis and, even more so, the Marxists--frequently learned ones--who renounce Marxism at this opportunity.

Of course, I do not mean here those rank-and-file party members who returned their party cards both after 1968 and in 1982, among whom there were disoriented and broken people. There were also those who stopped regarding their party membership as profitable; but occasionally their defection was a protest against a degeneration of the party which, although it is a sad phenomenon, can be understood, and the blame in the latter instance rests with the party itself, which for reasons of internal weakness, recruited the wrong people and was not able to exert an educational influence over them.

Of course, I also do not mean those party members who were expelled in that period (especially during the 1968 campaign), for the most part unjustly, especially the "Zionists" who were awarded this title on an honorary basis. These people are in no way responsible for the phenomenon being examined here, as they are a group of people who have been wronged.

The ones I do mean are the conscious Marxists, often longstanding party members, who deemed it proper to desert party ranks, who became ideological renegades serving forces hostile to communism.

This phenomenon came in two waves. The first of these swept Poland after 1968. Let me stress once again that I do not mean the mass of Jewish emigrants, either non-party people or rank-and-file PZPR members, who were intimidated by the situation and in an indirect way were actually forced to emigrate.

Those I do mean are the other, often devout and frequently learned, Marxists, longstanding party members who occupied positions of ideological significance for a long time or who played the role of leaders of the contesting student movement. Here the question of [Jewish] origin and the hardships connected with it should not play any role--noblesse oblige; a revolutionary conscious of his role does not leave his station when the cold wind begins to blow and privileges are withdrawn. But here (with the exception of several isolated

cases when the people departed because of illness--either their own or their children's) they were afraid of personal risks and they ran away, leaving their troops, who did not have such an opportunity. Meanwhile, the typhoon passed and the ship sailed into the haven more or less uneventfully. And here the tragedy of Lord Jim occurred. It does not take much analysis to understand the grievances addressed to those who stayed--if they had not, the others' defection would not be known, nor would their loss of face. I would not write about this shameful matter if it were not for the fact that many of those people have lately joined a noisy anti-Polish campaign, becoming plain renegades. But from the point of view of the crisis of Marxists, this is not the most important question, although it is spectacular and can be exploited for propaganda purposes.

A much more serious problem from a moralistic point of view is that of old communists (in most cases since pre-war times) who, during the tug-of-war with Solidarity, discovered in themselves so much "democratism" that they quit the party as a form of protest, and some even lost their Marxism on the way. What is the point of all that? Without exception these are old Stalinists responsible for the present shape of Poland. They are people who, until recently, occupied high positions in the party apparatus, behaving in a manner befitting "orthodox" Stalinists, who never before felt an urge to utter a word of protest, acclaiming as they did the worst practices. From where, then, does the sudden eruption of "moral indignation" come? These people are not entitled to it; they have no right to whitewash their past with such cheap tricks. This case is worse than Lord Jim's; these people are broken and would deserve pity if it were not for the fact that they are trying to hide their loss of face under a pretense of virtue.

This lacks credibility, but one has to write about it to protect the younger generation from these false jeremiads. Those Polish Marxists who want a genuine renewal must not only proclaim an anti-boycott crusade, but they must also pass the right--meaning a decisively negative--judgment on those trends and that behavior of the people who are responsible for our difficulties, but who would like to evade this responsibility through the use of cheap tricks. I know many people in Poland think that way; only differences of age and other imponderables stop them from airing these views. I belong to the generation which has the right to say it, whether because of my age or because, in a sense, like all communists from that period I was a Stalinist myself, and for that reason these imponderables do not inhibit me. Therefore, I said what had to be said, because I believe that the "crisis of Marxists" has to be counteracted. But how can this be done?

The most general answer to this question would be that, first of all, the crisis has to be counteracted by rebuilding the prestige of Marxism as a theory and an ideology. Fine, but how can this be achieved?

Jaroslaw Ladosz had an article on this subject published in ARGUMENTY. To my amazement, it passed without notice (I had not decided then to return to political writing). Anyway, while the presentation in that article of the symptoms of crisis in Marxist philosophy was correct, the diagnosis and proposed therapy were quite wrong. Ladosz, who is suffering from the typical disease of an

apparatchik, calls loudly for administrative moves. This faith in the effectiveness of administrative bans and orders is an illusion characteristic of this social group. The futility of this faith was borne out twice in the area of ideological struggle, in 1956 and now. Then what should be done?

First of all, it is necessary to demonstrate in practice that Marxist theory is alive and capable of addressing problems and producing solutions to no less of a degree than other lines of theoretical thought. This is not trifling postulate as it assumes that one has at one's disposal people who can think and who have the suitable scientific background--which we are fortunate enough to have--and that there is a big measure of freedom of thought and clashes of opinion. This is the clue to success because, unfortunately, this freedom is in short supply in this country. In theory, everybody agrees. And yet, with the years of experience I have in this area, I remain skeptical; without that freedom it will be hard to achieve much. Meanwhile that freedom will be lost as long as bureaucracy reigns supreme in this realm. This is a big dilemma because bureaucracy not only fiercely defends its position, it does so with the holy conviction that in this way it will save Marxism.

Yet this will not work at all, and if we want to record any achievements in this domain--and we have to do so or else face bankruptcy--we must give the Marxists the freedom of thought enjoyed by others. Exactly what this means and how it can be achieved should be discussed and agreed upon by representatives of various domains of Marxist thought. However, this discussion must be started without delay and a proper organizational framework must be created for it.

Secondly, it is necessary to set up an institution that would educate young Marxist scientists on a high level. Under these new conditions, which nevertheless bear a strong resemblance to the 1950's, we need a new version of the PZPR Central Committee's Institute for Training Scientific Cadres [IKKN] which later became the Institute of Social Sciences [INS], and which, in its time, solved this problem. But this is an urgent matter which deserves a separate article.

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COMPLETE UNITY OF MOLDAVIANS WITH WALLACHIANS

Bucharest CONTEMPORANUL in Romanian 11 Mar 83 p 9

[Article by Dr Nicolae Stoicescu]

[Text] The Moldavian and Muntenian chronicles have great merit in consolidating and substantiating the awareness of Romanian national unity, both on the basis of promoting traditional sources as well as by placing into circulation the writings of foreign humanists who supported the Roman origin and Romanian national unity. As has been observed, by "substantiating Romanians' self-awareness from a historical and linguistic viewpoint all over the ancestors' land," the chroniclers began "a process of ideological and political clarification, speeding up the final crystalization of national awareness."

The first among these scholars is the Moldavian Grigore Ureche, to whom the idea of national unity is closely connected with that of common Roman origin. As Grigore Ureche said, "there are so many Romanians living in the Hungarian land and in Transylvania and Maramures from the same place as the Moldavians and all of them come from Rim." As has been seen, the idea of Romanian unity is asserted in Ureche also when the Moldavian chronicler finds the identity of interests of the Romanian countries.

Even more plain is the formulated unity of the Romanian people in the work of Miron Costin, who writes: "The thought was for me to explore the type of nation, its origins and the inhabitants of our country, Moldavia and the country of Muntenia as well as Romanians from Hungarian countries; they are all one people and settled at the same time." In order to prove the common Roman origin of the Romanian people and their unity, Costin resorted to linguistic, ethnographic and folkloric arguments (costumes, footwear, haircuts, customs at dinners, at funerals), which give greater scientific bearing to his assertions.

This picture of Romanian unity also comes from the work of C. Cantacuzino, the high steward of scholars, one considered by N. Iorga "a true manual of Romanian unity: But the Romanians are understood to be only those from here (from the Romanian Country) but also from Ardeal, who are even more native, and the Moldavians, and they have this language, even if some words differ due to the mixture of other languages. We consider them still Romanians because they all came from a common origin."

In that same 17th century, the unity of the Romanian people also is affirmed by foreigners. For example, after speaking about the Romanians of Transylvania, which he visited in 1656-1658, Comrad Iacob Hiltensbrandt stated: "both Romanian principalities (the Romanian Country and Moldavia) are inhabited by Romanians or Wallachians, but they have different titles."

As far as the Saxon chroniclers are concerned, and they knew the Romanians well, they assert their unity first through the terminology utilized: the terms of "unsere Walachen"--our Romanians--or "Moldauer Walachen"--Moldavian Romanians--are used very frequently; then by the fact that they support the common origin of all the Romanian people; for example, David Herrmann asserts that the Romanians, "both those from beyond the Carpathians as well as those from Transylvania," got their origin and name and even the Romanian language from the colonists brought by Trajan. In turn, Johann Troster maintains that the Romanians from Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania are all descendants of the Roman colonizers. He reproduces a popular poem heard in Transylvania, which says: "that is how the Romanians in the Transylvanian Country speak, and also in the Romanian Country and in Maramures," a poem which proves the existence of a powerful knowledge of the unity of nation and of language.

A powerful proof of the awareness of national unity in the Moldavians is that they did not name Muntenia the Romanian Country, but the Muntenian Country, and this is because they certainly knew that their country also was a Romanian Country. For example, in his work, Miron Costin speaks many times of the "Muntenian Country; when he says that Trajan settled colonies "where the Muntenian Country is now," or when he affirms that "in the Muntenian Country" he saw the base of the bridge of Trajan, that Mihai the Brave was ruler "in the Muntenian Country," and so forth. We stress that Miron Costin never calls the sister country from the south Carpathians the "Romanian Country," Also, in 1654, Vasile Lupu, former ruler of Moldavia, said that Constantin Serban was ruler in the "Muntenian Country."

This fact is forcefully brought out by Stefan the Great in 1478, when--referring to the Romanian Country--he simply and graphically calls it "l'altra Valachia," that is, the other Romanian Country, of course knowing that Moldavia, too, was "Wallachia," that is, a Romanian Country. As M. Costin points out, Muntenians mean people from the mountains, while Moldavia took its name from the waters of Moldavia.

And Miron Costin wrote, "And under that name (Dacia) these countries lived until the second colonization by Dragos the prince. And now many people call us, our country and the Muntenian Country foreign, Dacia, but the people, the name of the inhabitants have not changed, still Romanus, and then with time and over the centuries, Romans, and then Rumanians up until today." And further: "The truest, authentic name from the first colonization of Trajan, is Rumanian or Romanus, which name this people has preserved until today; that same name is given particularly to the Muntenians and Moldavians and to those living in the Country of Transylvania."

We also should point out that the Moldavians did not define themselves as a people under this name but called themselves Romanians. Here is some proof: we quote from a 1587 report: "The Moldavians"call each other Romans;" the Italian Niccolo Barsi, visiting Moldavia in 1633-1639, noted: "They themselves (the Moldavians) enjoy being called Romanians;: in a memorium about Moldavia from around 1685 it was said: "The Moldavians are Roman colonies sent by Emperor Trajan. In their language they are called 'Rumuni' which means Romans." After approximately one century, the Frenchman d'Hauterive, who lived for a time in Moldavia, stated: "Living in Moldavia are old people who call their country 'the Romanian Country,' while the Moldavians are as proud of their origin as the Italians." Later, in 1829, Gustav Adolf Ramsay, a Finnish officer who had arrived in Moldavia, pointed out: "The Moldavians are proud of their Roman origin. The language is very similar to Latin. You should not tell the Moldavian that is he Moldavian but you should call him 'Romanian brother' (frater Ruman). This proves how much they value their noble origin. Any name other than Romanian insults their national pride."

The information of the Finnish officer reflects a state of spirit which existed at the beginning of the 19th century, one about which the Moldavian boyars speak in a memorium addressed to Napoleon in 1897, which shows that the Moldavians "ne peuvent point souffrir le nom...de Vlachi cu Vlaques, qu'on leur donne, mais ils veulent être appelés absolument Roumouni, c'est à dire Roumains, comme ils se disent entre eux."

Based on the fact that the Muntenians and Moldavians lived for five centuries in different states, some foreign historians still assert that each is a separate nation. According to such logic, this would mean that we admit that the Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians and so forth are not Germans, since they, too, lived in separate states, or that the Venetians, Genoans, Milanese and so forth are not Italians because they, too, have had their own political formations before the unification of Italy.

The last great Romanian humanist of the feudal era, D. Cantemir, clearly expressed the idea of the unity of the Romanian people even in the title of his basic work, "Hronicul Vechimei a Romano-Moldo-Vlahilor," in which he points out that the Romanian Country (meaning Dacia, Romania) "was divided into Moldavia, the Muntenian Country and Ardeal," proving his concept of a unified Romanian country, a common territory for the Romanian people which included all the Romanian countries. "Those above throughout the world are called by the undying name of renowned Romans. They are our grandfathers, greatgrandfathers, as well as those of the Moldavians, Muntenians and Transylvanians as well as the name (calling ourselves Romanians) and the parental language (which comes from Romanian or Latin), an invincible proof."

Another important aspect of the Romanian cultural unity of the 18th century was putting together parallel chronicles of Moldavia and the Romanian Country, some of them carried out on the order of the princes who occupied the thrones of the two Romanian countries. This phenomenon shows that "the history and culture of the residents of the two countries had a single dimension, with their territory being viewed as a single country, belonging to the same nation." Among these chronicles, the most important is the one put together by the Moldavian Vasile Buhaescu, written in two parallel columns--on one, Moldavia, on the other, the

Romanian Country. The idea of the national unity of Moldavians and Muntenians also results from the compilation of chronicles drawn up around 1740 for Constantin Voda Mavrocordat, in which a prince from the Romanian Country alternates with another from Moldavia. The compilation has the title: "Letopisetul Tarii Romanesti si a Tarii Moldovei, de Viata Prealuminatilor Domni Ce-au Stapinit Intru Aceste Doao Tari ce S-au Lucrat in Zilele Lor si a Partilor Streine Care se Megiesesc cu Aceste Tari." So, on one hand, the two Romanian countries together and, on the other, "partile streine," [foreign parts], a clear concept of the national unity of the Muntenians and the Moldavians.

8071

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RULES FOR REGISTRATION OF TYPEWRITERS, COPIERS

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 36, 17 May 83 pp 2-7

[Regulation No 2107 of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs]

[Text] Regulations regarding the information to be communicated to militia organs by socialist units and other organizations for registering copiers and typewriters, for maintaining records, and for safeguarding these machines and the materials necessary for reproduction.

Based on article 31 of Decree No 98/1983, regarding responsibility for copiers, materials necessary for reproduction, and typewriters, the following regulations are issued:

Chapter I. Registration of Copiers

Article 1. Socialist units and other organizations which produce, import, or sell copiers such as Xerox, Gestetners, Shapirographs, Heliographs, and others, must communicate in writing during the first five days of each month, to the local militia within whose territorial area they are located, information regarding the type of the machine, its brand and its serial number, as well as the units which used it during the preceding month.

Article 2. Socialist units and other organizations which produce, import, or sell copiers such as Xerox, Gestetners, Shapirographs, Heliographs, and others, maintain records for this equipment in a form such as the one shown in appendix 1.

Article 3. Socialist units and other organizations which purchase or manufacture copiers for use must communicate in writing within five days from purchase or construction to the local militia within whose territorial area they are located information regarding the device, its brand and serial number, and the unit which supplied it, in a form such as the one shown in appendix 2.

The provisions of paragraph 1 also apply when the copier has been transferred to socialist units and other organizations within the area of the same locality, or within the same unit or organization from one locality to another. Communication to the local militia is made both by the socialist unit or organization which has transferred the equipment, and by the unit or organization which has received it.

Article 4. Socialist units and other organizations will maintain records for the copiers they receive on the effective date of Decree No 98/1983, or for those they purchase or manufacture for use, in a form such as the one shown in appendix 3.

Article 5. Copiers owned by socialist units or other organizations, which have become unusable, will be removed from operation and salvaged according to law. The removal from operation will be communicated within five days to the local militia with which they have been registered so that their records may be expunged, indicating the information stipulated in article 1.

Article 6. Written confirmation from the local militia to the owner unit--in a form such as the one shown in appendix 2--constitutes proof of the copier's registration or deletion from the records.

Article 7. Socialist units and other organizations which own and use materials necessary for reproduction, such as stamps, rubber letters, alloys, mixtures, and polygraphy pastes must establish and maintain records for these materials, in accordance with prevailing legal regulations.

The managements of units or other organizations will take measures so that the materials necessary for reproduction will be used solely in the interest of their units, and will secure these materials.

Chapter II. Manufacturing, Owning, Using, Repairing, and Maintaining Records for Typewriters

Article 8. Socialist units which manufacture or sell typewriters must register them with the local militia in whose territorial area they are located.

Units whose activity is the repair of typewriters must request authorization to operate from the local militia in whose territorial area their shop is located.

The registration or authorization request will indicate: the name of the unit, its location, the object of its activity (typewriter manufacturing, sales, or repair), and the location of the actual unit which performs the activity.

Confirmation of a registration request, and in the case of repair shops, of an authorization request, constitutes proof of registration or authorization.

Article 9. Typewriters are sold to physical persons on the basis of written communications from militia organs, certifying that these persons can buy typewriters.

Article 10. Repair shops will accept only typewriters for which proof of registration or authorization exists.

Article 11. Socialist units and other organizations which own typewriters on the effective date of Decree No 98/1983, must request their registration independently of their condition, from the local militia in whose territorial area they are located, within 90 days from the publication of the decree in BULETINUL OFICIAL.

The acquisition of any typewriter by socialist units and other organizations is communicated to the local militia for registration within five days from acquisition.

Typewriter registration requests--a form such as the one shown in appendix 4--will be accompanied by a nominal list in three copies, containing the brand and serial number of each typewriter, as well as other identifying data (portable, wide carriage, intermediate or standard, electric, and so on).

Socialist units and other organizations will also request the registration of typewriters when these are held for documentary or historical purposes.

Article 12. The moving of any typewriter belonging to socialist units and other organizations from one location to another, as well as from one unit to another, independently of whether these are in the same locality or in different ones, is announced in writing to the local militia within five days of the move. The communication is made both by the unit which has moved the typewriter, and by the unit which has received it, and will include: the name and location of the unit, the information stipulated in article 11 paragraph 3 for the typewriter that has been moved or received, as well as the date of the move.

Article 13. Written confirmation from the local militia organ to the socialist units and other organizations--in a form such as the one shown in appendix 4--constitutes proof of registration or deletion from the records for the moved typewriter.

Article 14. Socialist units and other organizations which according to law own, sell, or repair typewriters, will maintain records of these typewriters on forms such as the ones shown in appendices 5, 6, or 7.

Article 15. Socialist units and other organizations will create files at the beginning of each year for typewriters which they own, and during the year for those which they acquire or repair; these files will contain the graphic imprint of the letters, figures, and symbols of these typewriters, according to the model shown in appendix 8.

The files mentioned in paragraph 1 are maintained by the office for secret documents by the person responsible for records, maintenance and handling of secret documents, or if such a person does not exist, by another person designated by the unit's leader. The consolidated annual files are maintained for five years, independently of whether the typewriter is being used or has been removed from operation.

When a typewriter is moved, it must be accompanied by its files for the past five years.

Article 16. Typewriters that are defective and can no longer be used, will be disassembled before an analysis, counseling, and salvaging commission named by the leader of the socialist unit or other organization, which will also include a delegate of the local militia organ. The letter, figure, and symbol carrying arms of the typewriter will be delivered to the militia worker, and the remaining parts will be salvaged in accordance with the law.

The activities stipulated in paragraph 1 will be covered by a report, one copy of which will be delivered to the militia worker so that the dismantled typewriter will be expunged from the records.

Chapter III. Assuring the Security of Copiers and Typewriters

Article 17. Units which produce, manufacture, sell, own, or repair copiers or typewriters, must take measures to assure their security, so that they may be used or handled only by persons designated for this purpose.

Article 18. The loss or disappearance of any copier or typewriter will be announced by socialist units and other organizations, in writing, to the local militia organ, within at most 24 hours from the time such a fact is noticed.

Minister of Domestic Affairs
George Homostean
Bucharest, 11 May 1983
No 2107

Key to Appendix 1:

- (A) Registration of information about Xerox, Gestetner, Shapirograph, Heliograph, and other similar copiers that are produced, imported, or sold
- (B) Item No
- (C) Type of copier
- (D) Brand
- (E) Serial No
- (F) Date of production, importation, or receipt by commercial unit
- (G) Date and number of communication to local militia organ
- (H) Date of delivery or purchase
- (I) Name of unit
- (J) Location
- (K) Notes
- (L) User unit

Key to Appendix 2:

- (A) Regarding ... *) the copiers in our unit, we advise you of the following information:
- (B) With regard to your communication No ... of ... we advise you that we have registered/deleted the following copiers:
 - *) Indicate registration, relocation, transfer, or deletion as applicable. In the case of transferred equipment, indicate new unit and location, and in the case of equipment transferred within the jurisdiction of the same militia organ, indicate new address.

Key to Appendix 3:

- (A) Registration of information about Xerox, Gestetner, Shapirograph, Heliograph, and other similar copiers that are owned for utilization
- (B) Item No
- (C) Type of copier
- (D) Brand
- (E) Serial No
- (F) Date of purchase or manufacture
- (G) Date and number of communication to local militia organ for registration
- (H) Date of transfer or removal from operation
- (I) Name of unit
- (J) Location
- (K) Date and number of communication to local militia organ for deletion from records of unit (organization)
- (L) Notes
- (M) Unit to which equipment has been transferred

Key to Appendix 4:

- (A) Included, for the purpose of ... *) are three copies of a list of typewriters in our unit
- (B) With regard to your communication No ... of ... we advise you that we have registered/deleted the typewriters included in your list
 - *) Indicate registration, relocation, transfer, or deletion as applicable. In the case of transferred equipment, indicate new unit and location, and in the case of equipment transferred within the jurisdiction of the same militia organ, indicate new address.

Key to Appendix 5:

- (A) Registration of information about typewriters owned by socialist units or other organizations
- (B) Item No
- (C) Type (manual, electric, portable, carriage, characters)
- (D) Brand
- (E) Serial No
- (F) Date on which typewriter was acquired
- (G) Manner of acquisition

- (H) Department (section, office) in which typewriter is used
- (I) Number and date of registration communication to local militia organ
- (J) Date of deletion from records
- (K) Date of removal from operation
- (L) Date
- (M) Unit
- (N) Location
- (O) Number and date of communication to local militia organ, or number of report for removal from operation
- (P) Notes
- (Q) Deletion from records
- (R) Relocated to another unit

Key to Appendix 6:

- (A) Registration of information about typewriters received for sale by consignment stores
- (B) Type (manual, electric, portable, carriage, characters)
- (C) Brand
- (D) Serial No
- (E) Date of receipt in store
- (F) Unit or physical person placing on consignment
- (G) Location or home address
- (H) Number and date of document on the basis of which typewriter is owned (communication for registration or authorization)
- (I) Unit or physical person
- (J) Location or home address
- (K) Number and date of request from socialist organization
- (L) Number and date of communication to local militia organ from physical person
- (M) Date of sale or return
- (N) Notes
- (O) Source of typewriter
- (P) Buyer
- (Q) Document on which sale was based

Key to Appendix 7:

- (A) Registration of information about typewriters in repair shops
- (B) Item No
- (C) Type (manual, electric, portable, carriage, characters)
- (D) Brand
- (E) Serial No
- (F) Date of receipt in shop
- (G) Unit or physical person
- (H) Location or home address
- (I) Proof of registration or authorization (number, date, and local militia organ which issued it)
- (J) Letter, figure, or symbol repaired
- (K) Date received from shop
- (L) Notes
- (M) Owner

Key to Appendix 8:

- *) Socialist units and other organizations must also enter into this file a text of their selection, with lower and upper case letters, to include the entire keyboard.

[Appendices follow]

Unit (Organization)
UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA)

Appendix 1

SEDIUL

Location

(A) R E G I S T R U

privind evidența aparatelor de multiplicat tip xerox, gheșetnere, șapirografe, heliografe și altele asemenea, care sînt produse, importate sau comercializate (L)

| Nr. crt. | Tipul aparatului de multiplicat | Marca aparatului | Seria | Data producerii, importării sau a primirii în unitatea comercială | Data și nr. comunicării către organul local al miliției | Data livrării sau cumpărării | UNITATEA BENEFICIARĂ | | MENȚIUNI |
|----------|---------------------------------|------------------|-------|---|---|------------------------------|----------------------|--------|----------|
| | | | | | | | Denumirea unității | Sediul | |
| (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) | (G) | (H) | (I) | (J) | (K) |
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Unit (Organization)
UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA)

Militia
MILIȚIA

SEDIUL

Nr. din
No of

Location
No din
No of
Către To

Către To

MILIȚIA

UNITATEA

(A) In vederea *)
aparaturilor de multiplicat ale unității noastre, vă comunicăm următoarele date :

(B) La adresa dv. nr. din
vă facem cunoscut că au fost inregistrate următoarele aparate de multiplicat :
radiate

| Tipul | Marca | Seria |
|---------|-------|-----------|
| Type | Brand | Serial No |
| 1. | | |
| 2. | | |
| 3. | | |
| 4. | | |

| Tipul | Marca | Seria |
|---------|-------|-----------|
| Type | Brand | Serial No |
| 1. | | |
| 2. | | |
| 3. | | |
| 4. | | |

(C) Aparaturile de multiplicat provin de la unitatea
..... cu sediul în

CONDUCTORUL UNITĂȚII,
Unit leader

ȘEFUL UNITĂȚII,
Unit leader

Unit (Organization)
 UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA) _____
 SEDIUL _____
 Location

R E G I S T R U

privind evidența aparatelor de multiplicat tip xerox, gheșetnere, șapirografe, heliografe și altele asemenea,
 deținute în vederea folosirii (M)

(A)

| Nr. crt. | Tipul aparatului de multiplicat | Marca aparatului | Seria | Data procurării sau confecționării | Data și nr. comunicării către organul local al miliției pentru înregistrare | Data transferării sau scoaterii din funcțiune | Unitatea la care a fost transferat | | Data și nr. comunicării către organul local al miliției, pentru scoaterea din evidență a unității (organizației) | Mențiuni |
|----------|---------------------------------|------------------|-------|------------------------------------|---|---|------------------------------------|--------|--|----------|
| | | | | | | | Denumirea unității | Sediul | | |
| (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) | (G) | (H) | (I) | (J) | (K) | (L) |
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Unit (Organization)
 UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA) _____
 SEDIUL _____
 Location _____
 Nr. _____ din _____
 No _____ of _____

Către To
 Militia
 MILIȚIA _____

Militia
 MILIȚIA _____

Nr. _____ din _____
 No _____ of _____

Către To
 Unit (organization)
 UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA) _____
 Location _____
 SEDIUL _____

Trimitem, alăturat, în vederea *) _____

La adresa dv. nr. _____ din _____
 vă facem cunoscut că au fost înregistrate radiate mașinile de (B)
 scris cuprinse în tabel.

(A) un tabel nominal, în trei exemplare, cuprinzând mașinile de scris ale unității noastre.

CONDUCĂTORUL UNITĂȚII,
 Unit leader

ȘEFUL UNITĂȚII,
 Unit leader

Unit (Organization)
UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA) _____

ANEXA nr. 5

SEDIUL _____

Appendix 5

Location

REGISTRU

(A) de evidență a mașinilor de scris deținute de unitățile socialiste sau alte organizații

| Nr. crt. | Tipul (manuală, electrică, portabilă, car, caractere) | Marca | Seria | Data dobândirii | Modul de dobândire | Compartimentul (serviciu, birou) unde se folosește | Numărul și data comunicării pentru înregistrare la organul local al miliției | Data radierii din evidență | Radierea din evidență (Q) | | | Nr. și data comunicării organului local al miliției sau nr. procesului-verbal de scoatere din funcțiune | Mențiuni | | |
|----------|---|-------|-------|-----------------|--------------------|--|--|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----|---|----------|-----|-----|
| | | | | | | | | | Data scoaterii din funcțiune | Mutată la altă unitate (R) | | | | | |
| (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) | (G) | (H) | (I) | (J) | | (K) | (L) | (M) | (N) | (O) | (P) |
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Unit (organization)
UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA) _____

ANEXA nr. 6
Appendix 6

SEDIUL _____

Location

REGISTRU

(A) de evidență a mașinilor de scris primite spre vânzare în magazinele de consignație

| Nr. crt. | Tipul (manuală, electrică, portabilă, car, caractere) | Marca | Seria | Data primirii în magazin | (O) Proveniența mașinii de scris | | Nr. și data actului în baza căruia este deținută (comunicarea de înregistrare sau autorizația) | (P) Cumpărător(Q) | | Actul în baza căruia s-a făcut vânzarea | | Data vânzării sau restituirii | Mențiuni |
|----------|---|-------|-------|--------------------------|--|-----------------------|--|------------------------------|-----------------------|---|--|-------------------------------|----------|
| | | | | | Unitatea sau persoana fizică depunătoare | Sediul sau domiciliul | | Unitatea sau persoana fizică | Sediul sau domiciliul | Nr. și data adresei unității socialiste solicitante | Nr. și data comunicării organului de miliție către persoana fizică | | |
| (A) | (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) | (G) | (H) | (I) | (J) | (K) | (L) | (M) | (N) |
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Unit (organization)
 UNITATEA (ORGANIZAȚIA) _____
 SEDIUL Location _____
 Nr. autorizației _____
 Authorization No _____

R E G I S T R U

(A) de evidență a mașinilor de scris din atelierele pentru reparat

| Nr. crt. | Tipul (manuală, electrică, portabilă, caractere) | Marca | Seria | Data primirii în atelier | DEȚINĂTORUL (M) | | Dovada înregistrării sau autorizării (nr., data și organul local al miliției emitent) | Litera, cifra sau semnul ortografic reparat | Data ridicării din atelier | Mențiuni |
|----------|--|-------|-------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|---|---|----------------------------|----------|
| | | | | | Unitatea sau persoana fizică | Sediul sau domiciliul | | | | |
| (B) | (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) | (G) | (H) | (I) | (J) | (K) | (L) |
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File No **F I Ș A** nr. _____

cu caracterele grafice ale mașinii de scris
 with typefaces of typewriter

TIPUL Type _____
 MARCA Brand _____
 SERIA Serial No _____

UNITATEA Unit _____
 SEDIUL Location _____

Keyboard
 CLAVIATURA

â23456789î ^ **
 qwertzuiopă³/
 asdfghjklșt\$
 yxcvbnm,.-

â23456789î ^ **
 qwertzuiopă³/
 asdfghjklșt\$
 yxcvbnm,.-

:"/0&()-'="v
 QWERTZUIOP + 1/
 ASDFGHJKL;§
 YXCVBNM?ç!

:"/0&()-'="v
 QWERTZUIOP + 1/
 ASDFGHJKL;§
 YXCVBNM?ç!

âh2h3h4h5h6h7h8h9hih ^ h''h
 qhwhehrhthzhuhihohphâ³/h
 ahshdhfhghhjhkhllhshth\$h
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DIZDAREVIC DISCUSSES EXPANSION OF FEDERAL ASSEMBLY ROLE

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jun 83 pp 19-22

[Article by Raif Dizdarevic: "What More Is the Assembly Capable of"]

[Text] Raif Dizdarevic, until recently the president of the SFRY Assembly, delivered a long speech in one of the chambers of our supreme delegate assembly at the end of his tenure concerning the experiences he had had during that 1 year. From that thorough analysis DANAS is publishing several selected and authorized excerpts as an extremely interesting contribution to the extensive discussion of our political system.

Since 15 May, when the last convocation of the Assembly began its work, and 1 May of this year, there were 28 meetings of the various chambers of the SFRY Assembly in which 269 agenda items were taken up. The chambers passed 145 laws and other acts of the Assembly. In the Federal Chamber alone more than 270 amendments were passed to the final versions of laws which were before that chamber. The standing committees of the two chambers held 511 meetings over that period, taking up more than 1,500 agenda items, and joint committees held 56 meetings with about 350 agenda items. There were 118 delegate queries put in both chambers over that period. All of this in and of itself indicates the intensive and very ramified work of the SFRY Assembly. I would not on this occasion analyze that volume specifically so that I might be able to speak more extensively about certain important lessons which we have learned in this period. Of course, in no sense were we the first to travel this way, but it is worthwhile to assemble the most important experiences and to put several questions.

Separateness

Did we manage in this period to represent in the Assembly all the interests which exist in the self-managing system and society, and were they present in everything which the Assembly debated and deliberated? I think that over this period of the work of the delegates of the SFRY Assembly, and indeed even in the first year of this convocation of delegates, we might ascertain certain shortcomings. One of the most serious worth pointing out on this occasion is the inadequate linkage between the SFRY Assembly and associated labor

concerning the issues which the Assembly is deliberating and which concern associated labor. That is, one gets the impression that authentic opinions and interests, authentic needs and requirements of associated labor are not sufficiently present in the Assembly. I think that the situation is not a bit better, but is in fact worse, when it comes to the work of the federal administration. I must express my belief and opinion that the federal administration is today by and large operating separately from associated labor, enclosed within itself, without communication with associated labor concerning that which it is preparing, proposing and deciding. I therefore think that in future practice in the Assembly we must establish a mandatory mode of consultation with associated labor concerning certain issues we are debating and deciding on.

We ought to make far greater use of the sound and tested method of visits by groups of delegates from the Assembly to organizations of associated labor in order to consult with associated labor, and we ought to summon representatives of certain segments of associated labor for discussion in the committees of the Assembly far more regularly, as in fact is already being done. Whenever we have done this (for instance, what was done quite recently in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, the discussion of the tourist industry, the debate of the petroleum industry, and so on), it has proven to be very worthwhile and has had a great impact both on the way in which issues were examined and indeed also on the conclusions adopted by the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.

An Anachronism

Do we look at assemblies in general, and indeed this Assembly, in a manner which arises out of its constitutional position? I think that we have not yet achieved that. To be sure, I have no illusion that we can overnight achieve something which constitutes a lengthy historical process. That is why I am not surprised that one still hears--I might almost say "often"--here and there that the assembly ought to resolve this or that issue in this or that way, as though assemblies were transmission belts, and the only thing required is for someone to say which particular matter should be put on the agenda and to say how someone thinks it should be resolved, and then that is how it will in fact be in the assembly. Certainly that sounds anachronistic, even at this level of development of the delegate system, but this does still happen and this is part of a consciousness and of the overall state of relations in which we find ourselves. But I think that assemblies in general, and indeed this Assembly, which is our subject here, must first of all be uninterrupted and in all respects involved so that by its own practice it guarantees its own constitutional status as a body of social self-management and the highest body of government, so that it exercises its constitutional position in such a way as to be open to the broadest influences from society and self-management, but is at the same time independent and resistant to every attempt to prevail upon it to take up anything whatsoever and make a decision on it otherwise than in the manner which the delegate system presupposes, but also toward every attempt to take its constitutional powers away from it and have them exercised elsewhere. Toward every attempt, that is, to displace it.

Recently there has also been quite a bit of talk about the exaggerated normativism in society in general, and therefore in our Assembly as well as in the executive bodies and administrative agencies at the federal level. After all, from adoption of the constitution up to the present day we have passed 609 laws in this Assembly, and the Federal Executive Council and federal administrative bodies have over that period issued more than 5,000 sublegal acts. Now that I have mentioned this, I think that there is a real need for us to concern ourselves to a still greater measure, whenever it is proposed that particular issues be resolved by means of a law, with the question of whether and to what extent that issue should be regulated by law and whether the legislative way of handling issues should go beyond a limit which might restrict development of the self-management system. That is one aspect.

[Box, p 20]

The Assembly and the Bank

The accountability of the National Bank of Yugoslavia to the Assembly should be ensured to a greater degree and still more fully. Progress has been made this year in that regard. However, I have the impression that there are still tendencies (I do not say that these are conscious efforts, but that also occurs under the pressure of large problems) which are very much alive to diminish the accountability of the National Bank of Yugoslavia to the Assembly by trying to turn the National Bank more toward other bodies and to make it accountable solely to certain bodies or to turn it into a subsidiary service of only certain bodies. The constitution laid down the status of the National Bank of Yugoslavia; constitution and law have established its accountability to the Assembly, and we must insist on that accountability to the end. We cannot leave the matter merely at summoning the comrades from the National Bank to the committees and chambers of the Assembly from time to time concerning some particular issue.

Expanded Agenda

I think it was very worthwhile for the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia to propose to the SFRY Assembly that it take up the problems of the fuel and power budget and the situation in which that part of our country found itself. I think it was very good for the Croatian Assembly to propose that the Federal Assembly take up the question of the petroleum industry. I think it would be very good if representatives of associated labor proposed that certain of their problems be placed on the Assembly's agenda. I think it is a good thing for the Presidium of the Federation of Associations of Yugoslav Writers to call upon the Assembly to take up the issues faced not only by those associations, but indeed by our entire society, certain measures which we have adopted in the domain of tariff and postal rates which blocked the circulation of ideas, information and especially works of art. I think that this should be encouraged and that the future lies in an ever increasing number of such initiatives, which should come to this Assembly and should become a part of the content of its work.

A Deluge of Enactments

And second, when it comes to proposing measures and legal enactments, I have a feeling that we do not sufficiently ask ourselves what social consequences will be produced by the measures and laws which we pass, i.e., what their effect will be on the development of socioeconomic and self-management relations, on the conditions for the realization and disposition of income, on the matter of the extent to which the individual regulations we adopt result in excessive administrative influence, and so on. I think that we should not raise our hand in favor of a single enactment until we have thoroughly examined all its social consequences, since it means nothing that the proposed version of the various laws we enact usually state (this is a mandatory part of every brief supporting a proposal, as you know) that the Federation will not bear any sort of financial costs in carrying out the proposed legislative solution if all the other entities in society are liable for the material consequences. Sometimes it would be better for it to bear them instead of all.

I say this because exaggerated normativism and the insufficient attention paid to the consequences of that normativism are creating a situation in which, objectively speaking, there is less room for self-management, and there is quite a bit of feeling on the part of working collectives (I will now quote what they have said to me in certain collectives) "that hard times have come for self-managers," that "self-management decisionmaking exists mainly within the limits of the factory, but from the factory outward there is less and less of it, that there are more and more protests that governments are making decisions about the conditions for the conduct of economic activity without asking or consulting associated labor, that the workers have the feeling that self-management is being done where decisions are not made concerning income, but when it is a question of income and a decision concerning it, then a large number of these matters are dealt with in laws," and so on. I also have the impression from these conversations that we who hold office, including the delegate's office, on the question of the extent to which this normativism prescribes excessive administrative regulation of various kinds, do not have any idea of the kind of administrative nets in which we have entangled both ourselves and associated labor. I am afraid that this is leading us into the channel of a tendency which does not believe anyone; he who legislates believes only in himself and believes in the power of legislation.

Always, then, on every occasion and in everything that the Assembly is supposed to decide on must be preceded by an analysis and an assessment from the standpoint of all the social consequences of what the Assembly is taking up and is deciding on. I think that every report of a committee submitted to a chamber, when it is examining what is being proposed to the chamber, must contain that kind of assessment in the same way as the assessment whether a particular enactment will commit any material resources of the Federation or not.

Certainly we will not be achieving much thereby if we guarantee that this is done only by the Assembly, if it were not to be done by all others as well. I am persuaded that this should also signify a demand on the Federal Executive Council and federal administrative agencies that they cannot adopt a single measure within their authority until in the Federal Executive Council and in

the committees and appropriate bodies of the Federal Executive Council there is first an examination and an assessment from that standpoint, from the standpoint of the social consequences of the measure being adopted, since the huge number of sublegal acts has had and is having a great impact on the conditions for creation of income and on the movement of social income. It is the enormous number of sublegal acts that is bringing with it the vast and broad "administrativeness" in our society, "administrativeness" which has increased the size of the administration and social overhead from the basic organization of associated labor on up.

Professional Competence

When it comes to sublegal acts, there are several questions to which the Assembly ought to pay more attention. I must say that they include, in my opinion, the question of how the Assembly is carrying out what is written in Article 361 of the constitution, which states that the competent chamber of the SFRY Assembly may revoke or nullify an enactment of the Federal Executive Council which is contrary to the constitution, federal law and other enactments. It has not become established practice to inform the Assembly in advance about important acts being adopted by the Federal Executive Council (you yourselves know that more than once we the most responsible officials of the Assembly have learned of very important decisions of the Federal Executive Council from the newspaper), nor has it become established practice to inform the Assembly about the most important acts which have been adopted to implement particular laws, which incidentally is an obligation of the Federal Executive Council set down in the operating procedure. The chambers of the Assembly ought to devote still greater attention to this.

The third aspect of this problem is to what extent we possess the necessary professional underpinning for all these acts which we take up and decide on. We have noted that very often the specialized foundation is extremely inadequate for decisionmaking in which we have full confidence that we know all the facts which we ought to know to be able to make a decision. So long as measures are adopted without specialized underpinning that would indicate more reliably the consequences of what is being proposed and the effect, and until a practice is developed of first checking evaluations in associated labor, we will go on adopting measures in the belief that they will be effective, and they will continue to yield the opposite result from what we expect. I think that we must continue in the Assembly to insist and to insist still more concretely on the specialized underpinning of every proposal which the Assembly takes up, and that a professional underpinning which will show the material effects and all the consequences of what is being proposed or on which the Assembly is to make a decision.

The next question which deserves attention is this: To what extent have we developed the constitutional function of the Assembly not only to set forth the policy governing enforcement of laws and other acts, but also to have direct insight into and oversight over the enforcement of acts and laws which the Assembly adopts. This is an essential question concerning the Assembly's involvement and performance of its tasks in ensuring constitutionality and legality in society. This task is all the more important because, as we have

just recently noted, we are faced with various cases of nonenforcement and violation of law as well as with cases when the established policy is not carried out. This is a part of the large problem of how to get the delegate system involved in the business of carrying out policy and the enforcement of law, an involvement whereby this becomes the business of the delegate base, that is, of all segments of the delegate system and so that matters concerned with enforcement are taken up before the eyes and before the judgment of the public. For us the question of how to ensure that the delegates carry from this Assembly back to where they came from the question of carrying out what they have decided on here.

Over this period that orientation and that endeavor have existed in the Assembly, as they did previously. I think that the efforts which have been made in certain cases have yielded good results and have contributed so that the policy established and laws adopted are carried out. I think that there have been especially useful initiatives by delegates and delegations toward concrete and public statement as to who and in what respect is not carrying out the established policy and particular laws. There have been proposals and demands to that effect, discussions have been conducted on that matter, and some have even led to something very worthwhile. However, this is only part of the truth. If we want the full truth, then let us say that it is precisely here that we are encountering great resistance and that the greatest resistance is to specific examination of who and in what respect is not carrying something out. That resistance is not altogether outside the Assembly; it exists even within the Assembly.

Consensus

As for the conclusion of agreements and reconciliation of views among the republics and provinces within the SFRY Assembly, I am deeply convinced (as far as last year goes) that there exists that general atmosphere which prevails in the country and which comes down to demands for more effective conclusion of agreements and for greater acknowledgment of all the interests which are manifested in the conclusion of agreements, but at the same time for more consideration to what is the joint Yugoslav interest. To illustrate success in performance of the function of the SFRY Assembly in the past year we will say that in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces 71 laws or acts were adopted from 15 May of last year to 1 May of this year on the basis of the consent of the assemblies of the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces. Although the conditions for reconciliation of views were very difficult, since the country's socioeconomic development was confronted by extremely serious problems, although views often had to be reconciled not only in less time than is usually allowed, but indeed against very tight deadlines, it is still a fact that 71 laws and acts were adopted in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces requiring decisions on consent by the republics and provinces and during that year only 3 acts requiring reconciliation of views failed of passage. As you know, there was the technical correction of foreign exchange policy and the payments-balance position for 1981; the second case was the granting of consent to consideration of the proposed law submitted by the Assembly of SR [Socialist Republic] Slovenia, which dealt with the repayment of debts by the National Bank in 1981 and 1982; and the third case was the law on changes in the tariff rates, which was rejected.

These facts, then, show that the conclusion of agreements in the Assembly over the past year has been both successful and effective. Certainly this does not mean that it was not difficult and painful, that there was no confrontation of widely differing views and interests, but responsibility concerning the common interest and an agreement which was a joint act acceptable to all always prevailed.

That being the case, the question is where that "blockage" is in attainment of agreement among the republics and provinces when agreements are arrived at slowly, so that we do not resolve the problems which we have to resolve on the basis of the consensus and consent of all. I think that the greatest "blockages" in arrival at agreement are in the process of achieving agreement among the executive councils and administrative agencies on all matters requiring consensus through this process, even in the preparation of drafts of enactments. I even think that one of the reasons is that this segment of the process of attaining agreement and the reconciliation of views takes place without the influence of the Assembly and the assemblies and without the influence of the public. Often the Chamber of Republics and Provinces has not been informed about this process, although the operating procedure states that the Chamber of Republics and Provinces is to be informed about this process of achieving agreement. The relations between the Assembly and the Federal Executive Council must develop on the foundations of the constitutional definition of the Federal Executive Council as the executive arm of the Assembly and to the effect that the Federal Executive Council, within the limits of the rights and duties of the Federation, is accountable to the SFRY Assembly for the situation in all domains of social life, for the conduct of policy, and for the enforcement of federal laws and other regulations and general acts adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Consequently, since the Federal Executive Council is the executive organ of the Assembly, a part of it, accountable to it, here again accountability should be steadily developed and it must always be borne in mind that the Assembly must show constant concern and responsibility concerning the work of the Federal Executive Council, there must be more joint effort, since we are a single organism, there must be more specific aid to the Federal Executive Council and also specific concern about the content, organization and procedure of the Federal Executive Council and indeed of every administrative agency individually.

How Is It With the Government

The Federal Executive Council faces very serious problems, and these are not the problems solely of that body, nor are they only the problems of the Assembly, these are problems having to do with development of the system and the state of relations in the country as a whole. I will illustrate with a datum which has recently been repeated several times. The federal bodies and agencies in the Federation, executive and administrative, today have 11,000 competencies on the basis of various federal laws. You can well imagine what that enormous number means and what stands behind those 11,000: decisionmaking, adoption of regulations, surveillance, inspection, and so on. You can imagine how enormous is that body of authority and how this looks in the practical operation of the Federal Executive Council and federal bodies and agencies. It

is sufficient to say that during the 4 years of the last term of office the Federal Executive Council had 15,500 items on its agenda in 550 meetings and adopted 38,630 resolutions. Today there is hardly a regular meeting of the Federal Executive Council which has less than 50 items on the agenda. From 16 May of last year to 25 April of this year the Federal Executive Council held 147 meetings, which means one every other day, with 3,833 items on the agenda, it issued 3,500 commissions, adopted about 3,000 resolutions, and so on.

So, the Federal Executive Council now faces the problem of how to free itself of what in a certain period of time, spontaneously and through the pressure of practice in various situations, entered into the content and method of its work and how to achieve the possibility of concentrating on what is its primary constitutional duty and responsibility and to perform that well. This has recently been a topic of many conversations, and there are more and more people who think and agree that changes are indispensable in the organization and method of operation of the Federal Executive Council, especially in the content of its work. I think that the Assembly must show its full interest and must see that the Federal Executive Council succeeds in this effort and endeavor, since if the present situation were to persist, I am deeply persuaded that the work of such an important body of the Federation would be paralyzed, with all the consequences which cessation of the operation of such a body could have. We in the Assembly should be mindful that when it comes to our demands on the Federal Executive Council, we do not push it toward excessive paperwork, we should take care that in its demands the Assembly constantly holds the Federal Executive Council and federal administrative agencies on what is their essential function and what is the most important need of development and implementation of the policy which we have set forth.

Creativity

There is a need here for far more demands and oversight by the Assembly concerning the individual federal administrative bodies. That is, we address most of our demands to the Federal Executive Council, and we call upon the Federal Executive Council for everything. We ought to put more emphasis on that direct communication and responsibility of the Assembly, federal administrative agencies and the direct accountability of federal administrative agencies to the Assembly. If we do not do that, we will not aid development of the work of the Federal Executive Council and will not guarantee that that body does effective and competent work.

In short: Throughout this entire period we have been concerned with the question of what to do so that activity in the Assembly is not reduced solely to making a choice according to what is proposed to the Assembly, but so that things are proposed in the Assembly itself, so that more creative effort is achieved, so that measures are proposed and adopted, since there is a large creative potential in the Assembly. The delegates bring into the delegate body from life a multitude of things which constitute a practical assessment of the situation as it is. The delegates who make up the Assembly include an abundance of people with a great deal of knowledge and experience, which is another reason why there is a large potential for certain solutions to be

arrived at within the Assembly itself, and that from the first phase of the effort to the last.

I personally think that that kind of effort and that kind of involvement of the Assembly are all the more necessary because we still have quite a bit of improvisation and indeed even wandering in the search for concepts and specific solutions to overcome the difficulties we confront in our socioeconomic development. For that reason and also because of the complexity of our problems the question is whether we can just wait for some institution to offer a concept or solution. I do not know what institution that might be, sole and alone. We in the Assembly, in view of all that we have encountered in this past year, know that without broader efforts founded on what the delegates of the Assembly bring in from life, without broader efforts founded on the potential which exists in this Assembly, it is not possible to arrive at a policy which would lead us out of the difficulties and which would create a reliable prospect for emerging from them. I think, then, that we would make a mistake if we continued to wait for someone to make a proposal on which we would make a decision and if in the Assembly we do not create focal points where altogether specific measures are explored and proposed and where the necessary legal solutions are created.

7045

CSO: 2800/372

EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE WORK DISCUSSED

Relations With Civilians Sketched

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1689, 15 May 83
pp 16-18

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic]

[Text] Can the Yugoslav militia be better on the average than the average Yugoslav citizen? That is expected of this service, for we cannot choose our citizens, but we can choose our militiamen.

At least in principle, the facts are irrefutable. For that reason we report that at the "White Button" concert, the song about the young, handsome and armed militia, which does of course "train in discipline so things won't be done willy-nilly," some 10 duty militiamen sang along with 18,000 citizens of Belgrade. Consequently, they were rewarded at the end with the chant "the blue, the blue" [color of militia uniforms].

Yet only a month before that "singalong," two young militiamen from New Belgrade beat up three lads who were driving noisy mopeds. "The blue" had no explanation for their behavior, except that they were angry "because a group of loud motorists had gotten away from them a little earlier." But are these two incidences some sort of average of interrelations, or examples of the extremes? To repeat the conclusion of a previous related story: The assignment of the Service for Domestic Affairs would be unusually easy--if there were no domestic incidents. The simple fact that there are such domestic incidents is the source of some of our Yugoslav problems in the realm we label "security."

A Large and Peaceful City

Although there are contradictory opinions, we Yugoslavs are a society that lives rather peacefully. The opinion has taken hold that, if you are faithful in your marriage, if you do not quarrel over land and a parking place, if you avoid suspicious cafes and isolated places, nothing bad can happen to you! Precisely the fact that we are somewhere in the middle between the developed and the undeveloped countries seems to make for a sort of peaceful existence. The data show that crime flourishes in both the most developed countries and the poorest ones. That is in any case the favorite theme this week, since

today is the Day of the Service of Domestic Affairs. The traditions of that day call for a one-day "truce" that includes those citizens who in their professional circles regard "the blue" as stingers, bullies or thugs.

Some 7 days ago, in a street questionnaire presented on television, a 30-year-old man was asked whether Belgrade was a peaceful city. A hulk of more than 100 kilograms, with two thick gold chains around his bulging neck, he answered unequivocally that Belgrade was a peaceful city, for generally nobody attacked him! In any case, he said that he was concerned by the punks who increasingly carry pistols. Just a day later, in the park at Konjarnik, a group of youths fired wildly from five pistols, and two citizens were wounded. Just 3 days later the militia arrested the shooters, and the public is just now being informed officially of the incident.

Last Wednesday in the center of Belgrade, behind the Moskva hotel a little before 2 pm, a 17-year-old girl was beaten. The reaction to the incident is well known, with everyone asking why there were no militiamen in the center of town, and why none of the passers-by came to help the girl, who was being beaten by two thugs.

Another investigation is still in progress, and probably that is why there is no explanation of an incident at the beginning of the month when a militiaman in civilian clothing, on the edge of the capitol city, killed his partner in an official automobile.

At the same time, the security service has gained general recognition for its effective action in apprehending two would-be assassins of the Turkish ambassador. Naturally, this arrest was made with the full cooperation of the citizenry. The public was also very satisfied with the lightning solution to the armed robbery that was taking place on Obilicev Venac street, where the gangsters were caught in a single day. No one was particularly surprised when the incident in which a bomb was placed under the car of the Iraqi ambassador was quickly ended with the arrest of the criminal. The citizens simply expect that from the security forces.

In these incidents, however, it is possible to discern a different attitude toward the militiamen among the citizens. It moves from general accolades for capturing murderers, to profanities when fined for crossing the street outside of the "zebra" safety zone. A certain condescension toward the regulations and, one might say, a distancing from authority form an essential condition of "freedom" for some Yugoslavs. That is probably the reason for the absolute civil support when the most serious threats to security are present, while support falls close to zero when arrest of a drunkard or a document check of the Roma orchestra is involved. The latter sought to play in the center of Belgrade for May 1 on its own initiative.

In Any Case, Slow Growth Is Occurring

In the discussions as to whether "the militia can be better than we are," people frequently drag out the example of the English bobby, of which only

the name now remains. The bobby received a pistol as part of his uniform (except in rare instances of public appearances, to preserve tradition), and even received 34 other types of weapons to maintain "control." The so-called "humane means" such as the plastic bullets that the bobbies fire in Belfast at less than the regulated distance have caused numerous fractures and blinding of the citizens they hit. That is the reason why specialists expressly declare that simply improving police technology does not automatically bring better security. In France alone during the past 17 years, the number of police has grown by 25 percent, and the most modern equipment has been purchased, but the number of thefts in the same period has grown by 200 percent.

In the new building of the republic Secretariat of Domestic Affairs, which looks like an international airport but which was built on an incline above the Belgrade segment of the main highway ("Autoput"), we learned some statistics on the service's work from Svetomir Lalovic, republic secretary for domestic affairs. Lalovic:

Violations of public order and peace have declined over the years, but last year for the first time they increased by 12 percent. Last year public officials were attacked 572 times by 733 attackers, who 8 times used firearms. That and accompanying data show that in Serbia in recent years, crime has been rising.

Across the street from this building at the Federal Secretariat for Domestic Affairs, we got the data for 1981. In that year there were 1237 attacks on public officials, in which 8 militiamen were killed and 28 were wounded. During the same year, official authorizations were exceeded 125 times resulting in 19 criminal and 106 disciplinary cases against militiamen.

These data gain in significance if we compare them with data on the growth of crime. Compared to the previous year, in Belgrade alone the number of persons committing criminal acts rose by 8.2 percent. In Serbia last year there were fully 7,000 economic crimes, which is 133 percent higher than in 1971.

The militia is the most numerous branch of public security, but there is also the state security branch. The militia personnel are trained in specialized secondary schools in all republics and provinces. The best students continue their studies at advanced domestic affairs schools in Ljubljana, Zagreb and Zemun. Skopje has a Faculty for Security and Social Self-Defense, while in Ljubljana there is a concentration in "domestic affairs" at the Law Faculty.

"Civilians" are also accepted into "the blue" if they have completed specialized unit training in the army. They must then complete a 6-month preparatory course. The people we spoke with indicated that interest in this occupation was growing. As a result of that increased interest, the Yugoslav militia is becoming increasingly younger and better educated.

Production and Rejects

The concern for security begins at the local community, which is the smallest "security sector." It has a definite militiaman who has responsibility for it.

As a rule, a militia station covers the territory of an opstina, and the pyramid continues to inter-opstina and inter-regional services, then to regional, republic and federal levels of the Secretariat of Domestic Affairs. What is not seen in this simplified diagram is the existence of the so-called "opstina militia." Specifically, the personal income and housing of a militiaman depends quite markedly on the opstina in which he lives. In principle, the income in wealthier opstinas can be higher by as much as 40 percent for the same job. Hence average incomes of militiamen range between 11,000 and 21,000 dinars. The exception is Slovenia, where the militia is not based on the opstina, but is republic-wide.

Slavko Strika, a special consultant of the Federal Secretariat of Domestic Affairs, told us that the training and preparation of young personnel of the security forces is modern and adopted to new assignments. Strika:

We strive and in principle succeed in training our militiamen not to represent the state of authority to the citizens in any bad sense. Our lads are held strictly responsible for every mistake. But remember, we are talking about several tens of thousands of people, among whom statistical laws would insist that there be varying natures and behaviors, even with strict supervision. We analyze every mistake and use the results as examples for training.

At the end of our report, it is worth noting that at times the position emerges that the society would be better off if the militia was less "strict" rather than "softer." That happens chiefly in cases where the Secretariat of Domestic Affairs is seen not as a part, and a small one at that, of the Yugoslav system of social self-defense, which in many assessments does not yet function as it should. Rather, the service is seen as the only formula for security.

In answering the question as to whether he was satisfied with the relations between citizens and the militiamen, republic secretary Lalovic said:

Of course I am! The number of violations of official guidelines is small compared to the number of interventions. In Serbia, we used force 400 times in performing our duties, and only 3 percent were improper. As the republic secretary, I am satisfied with "production that has only 3 percent 'rejects.'"

View of Training Exercise

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1689, 15 May 83
pp 16-17

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic]

[Text] "These lads are trained to strike silently, quickly and powerfully, at all dangers that exceed usual assignments." That warning came from a tall police official before our visit to a special action unit.

We were really "lucky." We had just passed the checkpoint at the entrance to the unappealing base when the special team commandant told us that his unit was going on an assignment, for radio contact had just informed him that an apartment

house had been blockaded by a group of terrorists. Thus we received the opportunity to follow at close hand an entire action, which lasted barely 30 minutes counting from the first alarm.

The group of specialists on duty in camouflaged uniforms immediately appeared before us and boarded a personnel carrier of the "Pintzhauer" type, which headed for the heliport at full speed. Hidden in the nearby woods with its engine running, a powerful "Augusta-Well" helicopter was already waiting. It was large enough to hold an entire detachment of militiamen. The "Pintzhauer" suddenly turned aside and braked some 20 meters in front of the aircraft, and the special troops dismounted and ran to the helicopter. There was not a single command or word. Everything was done quickly and deftly, although the members of the team were wearing armor vests that looked bulky to us. The commander told us: "No, we do all our training with vests. We are so used to them that we wear them for dress."

In addition to the "Colts" at their waists, all the specialists in this action carried "Heckler and Koch" automatics on special slings, set up so that they could be fired from during motion. After a 10-minute flight, the helicopter approached the building in which the terrorists were barricaded. The entire surrounding area had already been evacuated, and the suspected windows in the building were already covered by militia snipers. Synchronized with the arrival of the "Augusta," an armored transporter pulled up in front of the building, equipped with a heavy machinegun and a gas nozzle that could temporarily incapacitate people. The "tank" had a "grill" on the front, made of steel and several meters wide, that could be used to eliminate obstacles.

The terrorists fired several rounds at this vehicle, which purposely maneuvered in front of the building to draw their attention. At the same time, a fog of gas was aimed at the windows, driving the attackers back into the room. At that time, from a blind spot, the helicopter flew up and hovered 50 meters above the roof. From both sides of the "Augusta" came ropes, along which the first pair of specialists slid. In seconds they were on the roof unwinding a rope ladder to the window of the room containing the terrorists.

Before the actual attack, special bombs were thrown into the room, paralyzing the terrorists for several seconds. That was enough time for the first members of the team to leap through the window. The others attacked through the door simultaneously. The terrorists were captured with no casualties. The entire action, from the roof landing to finish, lasted several minutes.

In action with their helmets with built-in radios and bullet-proof visors, vests and other equipment, the specialists look like "extra-terrestrials." But that only lasts until they remove their equipment and one sees the lads of 18 to 25 who make up most of the force.

The commandant said: "All are volunteers who have passed rigorous tests before entering this unit." He added that the exercise we observed was merely part of the everyday training they receive in the most varied operations under all conditions and in all environments.

The group's commander added: "You should not interpret their automatism in action incorrectly. They are neither supermen nor robots. Our lads are just trained not to make mistakes, to the extent that that is humanly possible."

Although it was formed somewhat earlier, this unit has received more public notice since the irredentist offensive in Kosovo. Besides the well-known incident at the village of Donji Prekaz, where several members of the units died performing an assignment that was not theirs (their comrades keep pictures of the dead youths on the wall at the base), the special team has performed several dozen dangerous actions successfully, even without using firearms. At the moment, their instructors are training a special unit of the provincial secretariat for Domestic Affairs. Besides the federal unit, the republic secretariats all have similar units.

It is well known that the police forces of the developed countries have similar teams of experts. Quite a bit is known about the British Special Air Service (SAS), the FRG's GSG-9 and the Italian Nuzzleo Operativo Centrale di Sisurezza, called the "leather heads" because they do not remove their ski masks. In principle, all anti-terrorist groups of various countries cooperate among themselves and share experience and data.

As the Yugoslav group's commandant put it: "Nevertheless, there are differences between us. In some of these teams the lads just learn how to shoot as fast as possible. That obviously is not the recipe for us, or at least is only part of the recipe! We exist to perform that part of the assignments in our security system that require the most highly specialized, trained and motivated people. But that is only a part of our system of security.

12131
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PAY FOR OFFICIALS 'BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS' QUESTIONED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1694, 19 Jun 83
pp 16-17

[Article by Zoran Erak: "How To Assign Personnel 'Awaiting Reassignment'"]

[Text] If one is to judge by the support (so far only verbal) which the public is giving to an initiative of Ivica Cacic, federal public defender of self-management law, it is not very likely that the bodies to which it has been sent will be able to avoid the obligation of speedy and effective reaction. After all, it concerns a topic which (perhaps precisely because of the way things are going and because the sensitivities of the ordinary world to all privileges and advantages which do not derive from labor have risen to a fairly high point) cannot be long "pending."

In a letter to the SFRY Assembly as well as to certain other bodies Cacic pointed up the untenability of legal provisions which make it possible for a sizable number of officials, at the end of their term of office or after termination of their tenure for whatever reason, to continue to receive personal incomes (3, 6, and indeed even all of 12 years, for example!) and to retain certain of the privileges which the status of a public official not uncommonly brings with it. It is Cacic's opinion, and it is, of course, not difficult to agree with him, that this is a "right" which is not derived from the constitutional principle that only work and the results of work shall determine a man's material and social position (and thereby that, of course, of officials as well) and that certain other principles are being brought in by the back door.

There are two laws which are under the public defender's "attack": the Law on the Work and Rights of Delegates in the SFRY Assembly and Federal Officials Whose Term of Office Has Expired and the Law on the Bases of the System of Government Administration and on the Federal Executive Council and Federal Administrative Agencies.

"Brkic's Law"

The opportunities which these acts offer have in the Federation in 1982, we are informed by Vojislav Pantelic, leader of the group for federal administration, according to the findings of the professional staff of the office of the

federal defender of self-management law, have been taken advantage of by 28 officials and supervisory personnel! They have been "awaiting reassignment," as it is termed, for between 5 and 10 years. In addition to them, this "right" has been exercised by another 23 personnel (whose agencies or organizations were abolished), and that for periods ranging from 5 to 12 years! For the sake of information, about 7 billion old dinars were paid over the last 3 years to this group of personnel and officials. Newspapermen with a sensationalist bent (as this is sometimes put) immediately suggested to the public what this represented in terms of housing units and certain other commodities that are often by no means easy to come by....

Let it be mentioned on this occasion that in our country today there are about 200,000 persons employed in administrative agencies (all of 42,000 of them in self-managing communities of interest), and let the imagination run free (after all, there are no official and complete data) in ascertaining how many of those who are "awaiting reassignment," but have been paid for "performing" nonexistent jobs. Some less sensitive analysts might perhaps arrive at different conclusions concerning the "numerical size" of our administration, but those who know say that this number falls "within the limits of European standards." Let us take their word for it.

It all began back in 1967 when at the initiative of Zvonko Brkic, who at that time was vice president of the Federal Assembly, the Law on Labor and Rights of Delegates ... was adopted (and therefore came to be called "Brkic's Law"). The purpose of this act was to furnish personnel of a certain age some security until they qualified for pensions if they were not reassigned to any other jobs before that time. Actually this introduced the quite solid institution of "awaiting reassignment," that is, the status of "not being reassigned." By an automatic mechanism which is no rarity in such cases the republics and provinces and indeed even many opstinas incorporated into their enactments the right to personal income after expiration of officials' term of office (for 3 or 6 years depending on the official's years of pensionable service). Thus this law quickly came to have a much broader field of application than its initiators desired. Naturally this "pension train" was also caught by those "who had not been planned on," but it was not easy to put them off.

Who Can ...

The Law on the Work and Rights of Delegates in the SFRY Assembly and Federal Officials Whose Term of Office Has Expired entitles the following to compensation for personal income over a period of 3 or 6 years after expiration of the official's term of office: a delegate in the SFRY Assembly, members of the SFRY State Presidency, officials of the SFRY Assembly and its general secretary, the chairman, members and general secretary of the Federal Executive Council, members of the Council of the Federation and members of the National Defense Council, a federal secretary and chairmen of federal committees, the chief justice and associate justices of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, the chief justice of the Federal Court, the federal public prosecutor, the federal public defender of self-management law, the federal solicitor general and,

states the letter of Ivica Cacic--others ... although they are not required to work during that period of time.

Payment for "Deceased Labor"

Ivica Cacic feels that the grounds for passing this law have disappeared with these 15 years or so that have passed. "That is," states the letter to the SFRY Assembly, "the personnel aimed at when the law was passed have now qualified for a pension either because of their age or pensionable service."

"Toleration of this kind of practice," Cacic told us, "actually means consenting to the scale of certain types of draining off of public funds and allowing the possibility of a certain number of people (regardless of whether they are officials or 'officials') to live outside the standards of this society which are in effect, which also opens up a number of political and certainly moral issues."

(In commenting on evasion of the spirit and intention of this law one colleague noted in his paper that this is actually out-and-out payment not for past labor, but for "deceased labor.")

This would seem to be a good place to recall a portion of the letter of the Presidium of the Croatian Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War to the federal committee of the veteran's organization at the beginning of this year. In addition to fierce advocacy of this law's repeal, it also put a question of which the gist is this: How is it possible that all of a sudden no position or office can be found for the people we nominated and elected to responsible posts on the basis of the highest recommendations, jobs in which they would continue to make a contribution to the development of society?

This question actually opens up a real discussion as to how it is possible for certain "personnel" to be "awaiting reassignment" for so many years. We assume that it is either because someone has been elected to office just to keep him busy or because in its performance he "messed up" so bad that it was simply not suitable to elect him to any other.

Once again the letter of the Croatian veterans: "The personnel who have not proven their value, that is, who in their professional, organizational and other abilities have not been equal to the posts entrusted to them, although they have been resolute and consistent on the line of the League of Communists and our socialist self-managed society, should be told this in frank and human terms and should be sent to positions which are in line with their abilities."

However completely we understand this position, the question remains: Have we actually developed the kind of relations in which truths of that kind can be easily communicated, or does someone have to suffer an utter political "fall from grace" for someone to tell him that he has "not been satisfactory"?

We were not fortunate in our attempt to learn how matters stand in the republics and provinces, how many people "awaiting reassignment" there are, how long they have had this status and why. For some people the communication of such data is all but a matter of state secrecy, they even ask for written questions; some of those in position of responsibility were simply too busy.... Only in Slovenia did we get an answer, one which, however, "is not satisfactory." That is, the responsible official of the Slovenian SAWP says that this problem does not exist in their case. After half a year or at the most 1 year a man whose term of office has expired will (or must) accept the job offered, and there are no persons "awaiting reassignment"! Nor is there any law which "softens" such cases. Once again its those Slovenes!

The Quiet Wait for a Pension

Under the Law on the Bases of the System of Government Administration (Article 249) special protection has been established for officials and supervisory personnel who are awaiting reassignment. They do not lose "the right based on appointment to office or supervisory position" if they have at least 35 years of pensionable service (30 for women) until they meet the conditions the law envisages for mandatory retirement. That means that these people retain the status of officials or supervisory personnel and all the rights that go with that status until they cumulatively fulfill the conditions for mandatory retirement.

Involving the Uninvolved

Incidentally, even certain federal institutions did not furnish the data sought even after several interventions by the public defender (the documentary material explicitly mentions the Administrative Commission of the SFRY Assembly), and some went not a step further than the bare numbers. It is thought by some that the number of people "awaiting reassignment" is as a practical matter much greater. In the search for an opportunity to at least reduce a bit the number of "supernumeraries," very imaginative methods have been developed. It is said, for example, that some officials have been assigned to fictitious jobs, in one sector of the federal administration there is a senior official who is actually the only person employed in that sector....

The officials who are paid even today though they are doing no work include quite a few of those who have rejected practically all the jobs offered, presumably counting on "protection of the law." But it is certain that there are also those to whom no jobs at all have been offered. The public defender of self-management law feels that there are opportunities for such people to be involved in other ways than by mere definition (either in the Council of the Federation or the corresponding body in the republic). Though this must not diminish the importance of these advisory bodies, the question still remains: Have we not gone to absurd lengths when we insist that those who are "not involved" become involved in that fashion?

If adoption of a law was inspired by a concern to protect people of advanced years, members of a generation which at one time gave even more than it was able, it is absurd today to extend its validity in any manner whatsoever. But the appropriate legislative bodies will have the last word on this matter. It is interesting that the constitutional basis of an act should be disputed after 15 years of extensive application, and it is still more interesting that there are those who feel that the time has not yet come for its repeal! The fact that in the meantime various ways have been found of abusing it and of producing new "dead souls" by imagining all sorts of ways of "solving" this problem ought to provide the impetus for urgently finding possibilities for removing this topic from the agenda.

The job of the public defender of self-management law is not to propose specific possibilities and specific solutions, nor to find the advantages of one solution over another possible solution to the question of personnel "awaiting reassignment." Perhaps the reason why his role is interesting is that if his initiative, and in this case it seems that it is justified from several angles, is not accepted, his sole consolation will be that he made an attempt to protect constitutionality as well as public property.

There are too many reasons to believe that this effort of his will not nor can it end with nothing more than consolation.

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CSO: 2800/381

PASIC, OTHERS DISCUSS SOCIOPOLITICAL COMMUNITIES, COUNCILS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jun 83 pp 9-11

[Article by Slavko Curuvija: "Step in the Wrong Direction: The Reasons for the Gap Between the Prescribed and the Actual"]

[Text] It seems that that phase of development of our political (and economic) thought is finally nearing an end in which the assertion dominated that we have a perfect political system, imperfect practice, and bureaucratized and altogether separate social groups which are to blame for everything, since with blood in their eyes and premeditation they systematically oppress the working class and associated labor, mindful only of their own present and future social positions.

Something is finally changing: our system no longer seems altogether perfect, ever less frequently do we so perceive practice as the result of the behavior of people who are insubordinate and no good, and not even our technobureaucracy, finally, is to blame for absolutely everything. Finally, since we are all more or less sick of "freethinking" aimed at an attractiveness which is an end in itself and of the "labeling" which followed thereupon as the antithesis of that kind of free thought.

By all appearance thinkers who like to attract attention and the frowning dogmatists have become rather tired out and are slowly but surely leaving room for thought that is somewhat fresher and more creative.

The refreshing change is coming just at the right time: among the confused and schematized minds an awareness is making its way that what is taking place in our society is after all an entangled and antagonistic process which is creating a specific class structure of Yugoslav society, is shattering many illusions, and is certainly twisting the political system out of shape. It is becoming clear that unsparing and radical criticism, be it even perfectly documented, does not unfortunately cross the border from large-circulation jere-miads concerning the fate of socialism, lamentations with altogether uncertain consequences. As a wise man recently said, theoretical thought which remains within those boundaries may awaken a desire for radical changes, but at the same time it also could lead one to the conclusion that the failure is Sisyphean, a permanent tragedy, and that the social contradictions need "rational resolution," that the project of socialist self-management needs to be postponed for some better time.

A Voice of Protest

We find grounds for this optimism, which we hope to be justified, in several recent public discussions, including one last week organized by the Marxism Center of the Serbian LC Central Committee and the Belgrade Institute for Political Studies.

This discussion was interesting in several ways, but mostly because several well-known political scientists, sociologists and economists tried to raise and debate the issue of the self-management transformation of sociopolitical communities, an issue which Radivoje Marinkovic, who presented the introductory address, said was the key topic, but has for years unfortunately been neglected and given textbook treatment by political science. Marinkovic feels that thinking through the sociopolitical communities actually involves thinking through the entire set of interrelated problems of our society, since within the limits of that issue we encounter the possibility of studying the relations between the state and self-management, between centralization and decentralization, the problem of power and authority, the problem of integration in general, and especially of the regional and functional--and also to study and synthesize all the basic issues of the revolution at the empirical level.

A study by Najdan Pasic, which incidentally is part of a broader study of sociopolitical communities and socialization of politics, in which he carefully traced and analyzed the concept itself, but also the functioning of its basic factors, served quite well in the role of point of departure for the discussion. Pasic's views always command attention, even though they are relatively well known both to specialists and the broader public. Along with an interesting survey of the evolution of sociopolitical communities, Pasic once again insists on the considerable gap between the initial principles and their elaboration in concrete sociopolitical communities. He reproaches them for pragmatism, mechanical adaptation to the daily needs of society in which a man gets lost in institutions, in which relations among people are turned into a relationship among institutions, and especially the fact that they show a pronounced tendency to distinguish themselves in the dimension of statehood instead of tending toward integration, as had been anticipated. Once again he raises a voice of protest against institutionalization of the partial interest, against consensus, that is, against its excessive use even where the concept does not foresee this, against the domination of executive power, the ineffectiveness of assemblies, the incompleteness of the delegate system, against the reconciliation of views within informal coordinating bodies, against their excessively great influence on disposition of capital for expanded reproduction, on personnel policy....

Pasic's views are also interesting concerning the character and lines of integration of associated labor in sociopolitical communities. He notes that the regional principle has attained complete dominance over the production and functional principle. Even the chambers of associated labor, which are the principal form of work-functional linkage and an opportunity for associated labor to have an influence on the process of political decisionmaking, are regionalized within the boundaries of the republics and provinces.

A Negative Definition

The broader public is probably not aware of Pasic's view that there is a "problem in theory" with the social councils. That is, he feels that these institutions are useful and necessary, but that they are not an intrinsically constitutional category. They neither make decisions, nor do they adopt binding legal acts, but concern themselves with achieving uniformity and strive for attainment of prior agreement on major socioeconomic and political issues. Pasic wonders in this connection: "Are the social councils an important supplemental element in the setup of the delegate system, or are elements of the relations of political representation brought in again by the back door through the creation of the councils?" After all, it is a fact, he alleges, that among the agencies and organizations which send their representatives to the social councils actual relations of equal political partnership are established, and this does not go through the assemblies of sociopolitical communities at all. (Pasic writes about a number of other issues in his study, but unfortunately space does not allow us to deal with them separately.)

Professor Balasa Spadijer, one of the participants in this discussion, agrees with the assertion that the issue of sociopolitical communities is the central issue of the political system and stressed that Pasic's study offered undoubted inspiration, but he criticized it for not covering an important level of examination of sociopolitical communities: the sociopolitical organizations and their role.

He also advocated a somewhat different approach to examination of individual sociopolitical communities, since he feels that the differences among them are great, even among those of the same type. In Spadijer's opinion, distinction should be made with respect to many criteria, and in general this issue should be studied in an interdisciplinary way. He feels that even the very concept of sociopolitical communities has not been fully worked out. He also questions the assertion that the Federation has been fully constituted as a sociopolitical community. After all, he says, the Federation has been defined more by saying what it is not, while what it is and should be has remained incomplete. This negative definition of this sociopolitical community after the fashion: "it is not the mechanical sum of the republics and provinces," "it is not supranational," and so on, is not sufficient, Spadijer says, to prevent many misunderstandings. As for the social councils, Spadijer feels that Pasic's assessments can apply only to councils at the federal level, that the situation is altogether different in the republics and provinces, and even more in the opstinas, in which, in his opinion, they have negligible influence. He also advocates a somewhat different approach to criticism of the various, above all republic, statisms, and a fuller examination of the causes of these phenomena. To his way of thinking, that is, the answers to these questions lie more in the sphere of economics than in the sphere of politics. In that context he is not altogether certain even that the role of the stratum of professional political managers is as dominant as is sometimes thought.

Nor is it altogether clear to Bogdan Trifunovic, member of the Presidium of the Serbian LC Central Committee, whether there should be so much insistence on the negative role of the managerial stratum. He feels that this concept is

not sufficiently clear. He wonders: "Is this really the main force confronting associated labor? Who belongs to it? What is the position of the League of Communists on this issue?"

Boomerang Effects

Trifunovic's reflections are very interesting concerning certain theses which are often heard. In connection with the thesis, for example, that self-management has been imposed from above he wonders: "Should we at this point be aggrieved that at a certain moment the state granted self-management to the working class as a gift and has this had, as is asserted, great consequences for the further development of self-management and the role of the state in society?" Trifunovic feels that it is not possible to arrive at scientifically grounded conclusions on this matter. Unless the historical situation and many other factors are brought into focus, he does not agree with the assertions of certain authors to the effect that the anticipation was too great in extent and in time, that is, that they should have waited until "self-management matured" and cleared a way for itself, even though a certain price had to be paid for that maturation.

He also expressed a certain reserve toward the fierceness of the criticism of "polycentric statisms." He feels that even those analyses must pay greater respect to historical factors, especially ethnic factors.

But as for the councils, he is not quite sure, he says, that the actual practice of those councils has justified Pasic's fears: there are several reasons why they have not had the role that is spoken of. First of all because of traditionalism in their performance, the detached operation of sociopolitical organizations, lack of confidence in a new body, and so on.

Trifunovic acknowledges that expressions like the canniness of the bureaucracy, its disguises and mimicry have a certain piquancy and fascination, but he warns that responsibility for our own system may be lost if the results are underestimated and everything is reduced to canniness and camouflage. He also said that discussions of this kind are a valuable contribution to theoretical reflection, but that afterwards specific proposals ought to be worked out and conceived.

Professor Bostjan Markic spoke on this occasion much more emotionally than he has done in many previous discussions. He observed that in the case of the sociopolitical communities we are dealing with "boomerang effects"--one thing was desired, but it turned out otherwise. And that the problem in all this does not lie in politicization of interests, but in negative politicization of differing interests. In his opinion this kind of politicization of interests results from the existence of "paternalistic alternatives," from the bureaucracy's capacity for mimicry, from the great power of executive councils linked to professional management structures in collectives and executive bodies in banks, from the low level of integration of associated labor which is more corporativistic than consistent with self-management, from the pressure on the assemblies and from emphasis on the regional principle. Markic says that today in the sociopolitical communities we face intermediateness, manipulation,

alienation and usurpation. He did not specifically make the case for this view, but he advocated "launching research probes at the republic level as well, not just at the level of the opstina," which brought the remark from someone in the room: "Provided they do not break our probes."

The Social Engineering Spirit

The main question which Professor Dragoje Zarkovic puts for himself might be formulated approximately like this: To what extent is our political system scientifically grounded from the standpoint of its environment and the level we have attained? Within the limits of that question Zarkovic sees several problems. He mentioned, for instance, the question of the "inalienable right" of the workers in basic organizations of associated labor to make decisions on income. Zarkovic feels that the inalienability of that right should be questioned, since, he says, many analyses show that this commitment is a direct expression of special pleading for a group interest concerning the means of production, which then causes drastic interventions by sociopolitical communities in those collectives which apply this literally. He also advocates a somewhat different "approach to self-management." To be specific, he wonders whether we are all competent in all things, do we all have the time, the desire and the will for everything? Can all this be done by the great majority of delegates. He feels that it cannot and that we therefore have the form of self-management in which the technobureaucracy does what it wishes, but is responsible to no one. Unfortunately, he did not say what approach should be taken to self-management in order to avoid this, so that he left a great deal of uncertainty over this previous question. Zarkovic incidentally advocated "bringing the ideas of Boris Kidric up-to-date" concerning vertical integration of labor and workers' councils at the level of industries. That is, he says that Kidric foresaw and issued warnings about the evolution of republic statisms instead of statism at the federal level, which is why he advocated the idea mentioned even at that time.

In connection with Trifunovic's reservations about the arguments concerning exaggerated institutionalization of the political system and self-management imposed from above as the Eastern error, Najdan Pasic said that he still thinks that we have a great deal of social engineering and that this involves many risks and is a source of discrepancy between the normative and the actual, since a system of institutions without corresponding content is transformed into a screen, into a normative fiction--instead of changing relations. Our purpose in this detailed institutionalization was to protect the production relation which had still not been consolidated, but, in his opinion, many questions were opened up in this connection. For example: Which interests are we protecting with this institutionalization? Those supposed interests which do not yet exist, or those which already exist? If we are protecting those which are preferred, Pasic says, then institutions become independent, and the staff itself begins to be dominant in them. Yet as for the interests of associated labor, in Pasic's opinion, they are very complex: there are long-range, historical interests, but also day-to-day, empirical interests, brought about by the position on the market. What do we get, Pasic wonders, when these day-to-day, partial interests are institutionalized and are thus given the status of the interests of associated labor in the sense: Is there

no decision that does not require the consent of all the OOUR's [basic organization of associated labor]? Then these interests become an obstacle to pursuit of the long-range interests.

Pasic feels that there can be no dilemma over the assertion that the managerial stratum is the main antithesis to the process of self-management in our society.

The Withering Away of the State

The criticism concerning the lack of an analysis concerning the place and role of the subjective factor Pasic felt to be justified, but only partly did he honor suggestions to the effect that differences in the nature of sociopolitical communities should be respected, even though he felt them to be justified as well. That is, he feels that those differences do inevitably exist, but he adds that on certain occasions he has criticized the accentuation of these differences, since all sociopolitical communities must be instituted according to a uniform criterion--the interest of associated labor. We have unfortunately neglected this, Pasic said, we have accentuated the differences, and our result is something that is not exactly instituted according to the criterion given.

Zoran Vidojevic, director of the Center for Marxism of the Serbian LC Central Committee, advocated a discussion of the possibilities and preconditions of the withering away of the state and movement of the discussion away from the abstract model of the unified state. He puts the question: "Can the state wither away today in the existing configuration of the mode of production and the balance of power?" He did not say whether it could or could not, but he asserted that reflection concerning this question operates excessively at the level of ideology, institutions and political entities, and that the premises of this problem have not been sufficiently examined. In his opinion the connection between the commodity mode of production and life, the need to overcome the historical necessity for that kind of production and the need for the state to wither away, has not been elaborated in theory. "We neither have true commodity production," Vidojevic said, "nor an appropriate political system which would develop the civilizing function of commodity production." He noted and emphasized the fact that the government is getting stronger where it should not, but it also getting weaker where once again it should not.

In the extensive statement made by Professor Milan Matic, who incidentally chaired the meeting, we single out only two views which seem to us the most interesting. He agrees with the assertion that associated labor's lack of integration favors all kinds of alienation, including bureaucratic alienation, but he emphasizes that there is also a reverse effect: sociopolitical communities operate toward disintegration of associated labor by extending their tutelage over it. He draws from this the conclusion that performance of the functions of sociopolitical communities must be quite considerably altered, even at the price of considerable additions to the system and reforms. He regards the absolute dominance of regional interests as the basic antinomy and most essential issue concerning the conception and practice of the sociopolitical communities.

Judge for yourselves whether this discussion provides grounds for the optimism we expressed at the beginning of the article.

ZAGREB SCHOLAR INTERVIEWED ON COMMENTS ABOUT 'CRISIS'

Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian No 242, 4 Jun 83 pp 12-14

/Interview with Dr Zarko Puhovski, professor of philosophy at the University of Zagreb, by Ratko Knezevic; date and place not specified

/Text /Question At the recent symposium of the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia about the causes of the present situation in Yugoslavia, your lecture, titled "The Limits of Social Change, the Change of Social Limit," drew considerable attention. Professor Puhovski, what is the present situation of the Yugoslav society?

/Answer Before saying anything at all about the condition of our society, it is necessary, in my opinion, to say two things. First, there is the question whether the Yugoslav political and social situation has been constituted at all; second, there is the question which we never pose: is there such a thing as the Yugoslav society?

But let us return to the first part. It is important to say that in Yugoslavia a kind of socialism has been developing which shared some premises with the socialisms in the framework of the so-called "real socialism." These premises are given within the framework of what I call Lenin's turning away from Marx. Lenin was simply forced to realize what the situation was in 1917; a few years earlier and later there appeared the possibility, contrary to Marx's model, that out of a regional, partial crisis of world capitalism something could develop that was not a revolution in Marx's sense but a revolution in Russia. This means that instead of Marx's idea of the first and second stage of communism,... there appeared the idea of socialism. And socialism as an idea, a name for the new society, appeared after Marx.

Marx never calls the new society socialist, and this socialism basically consists in the socialization of the means of production which is most frequently accomplished through the state. When this takes place in a completely undeveloped environment, the subject of revolutionary changes no longer is, as in Marx, the degree of development of productive forces but--to use Marx's categories--this subject is the superstructure, i.e. the state and the party, and in this way the state and the party assume the position of the subject which Marx gave to productive forces. This is an essential turnabout which characterizes the entire modern socialism: the roles of the basis and the superstructure have been reversed--the society, i.e. production, has become the object, and the politics the subject.

Thus a step toward idealism in the formal sense of the word has been made because the party, viz. the state--and they are to such a degree amalgamated in the real socialism that it is hard to distinguish them--has become the subject.

But, at the same time, this political sphere in socialist countries was constituted iliberally, so that it could not make use of its basic advantage and form the society qualitatively in a different way than it formed itself in a prebourgeois way.

The political sphere thus had a society, in the sense of productive forces, that was on this stage of development because it did not need any revolution. Such a society could develop in a bourgeois type of production, too. This political sphere could make out of that society whatever it wanted, but it did not have any other idea than the one that was later on formulated by Stalin, which is the reproduction of the power relations.... Thus the essential production relationship in the real socialism is not the production of material goods and surplus value, but the reproduction of the surplus power. Stalin was the first to understand and apply this. This is the context.

Yugoslavia has been pulling herself out of this context by the model of self-management. Its first consequence, since the self-management model began functioning in the 1950's, was the emergence of a clash between two conceptions. The first conception is contained in the foundation of the self-management model, and the other in the basis of the party position....

Question Isn't the relation between the democratic centralism in the party and the socialist self-management in the society very interesting?

Answer Yes this relationship represents one level, although I think that in the Yugoslav Party the problem does not consist so much in the internal statutory organization or in the democratic centralism as in the assumptions of the practical functioning of the committees. In my opinion, and I will perhaps say later more about this, in Yugoslavia we can expect the rehabilitation of the democratic centralism as a state, not party principle. Democratic centralism means nothing else but the principle of a democratic state. At election time everybody decides, and between the elections those whom the voters trusted decide centrally on the basis of the legitimacy given to them by that trust. This is what, in my opinion, the Yugoslav state lacks.

Question Thus the problem of the internal structure of the Party is smaller than the problem of its external position?

Answer Yes, a greater problem is posed by the external position of the Party, in which it appears not as a group of people who act in self-management organs and who, following their conscience and the party program, gather in order to agree about some principled starting commitments, but as an organization which makes certain things possible or impossible, depending on its positions in various milieus of self-management functioning without being, in fact, influenced by self-management. In spite of all the insistence on self-management, which means a subjectivization of the society, in Yugoslavia, in the last analysis, only the political sphere has been subjectified, which has a number of consequences....

The problem consists in elevating social and production problems to the level of political problems.... This is what real socialism lacks. The other parallel, of course, is the one that follows from the position of the party as the founder and a self-existing entity. Here, too, more in a programmatic than statutory way, the Yugoslav Party made significant shifts in relation to the parties of real socialism. Third, and perhaps the most important point is the fact, and the consciousness of the fact, that our party is independent toward the exterior, while in all the real socialist countries, with the obvious exception of the Soviet Union, there is a foreign, extra-national subject who stands behind the essential decisions, who could be called "the elder protective brother" and "friend."

These are the basic parallels, but something else of essential importance for this discussion must be said.

What Is Yugoslavia?

Question Many people think that a stratocratic, authoritative structure stands today behind the concept of real socialism?

Answer It is an authoritative structure which in fact lives on the basis of the original Soviet revolution. Its legitimation, as introduced first by Stalin, is the power based on the initial revolution. Real socialism has no other subsequent essential achievements, or rather, all its achievements have been realized by the capitalist system with far fewer sacrifices, except, of course, for the socialization of the means of production, which has not been used by socialism to create a new type of relationships and a different, better type of society.

The idea of self-management, on the other hand, in spite of all the difficulties it has encountered, has, in my opinion, a relevance for world history. It cannot be dismissed, in spite of all the difficulties it has had in our case.

I am afraid, however, that Yugoslavia is too small a country to offer an alternative to the world.

Yugoslavia can be a crack in the decline of the real socialist countries and a crack in the capitalist crisis if she does not have her own crisis but she does not suffice as an alternative, and remains, in my opinion, like an island exposed to all the existing sea currents and influences. She has a number of features resulting from the fundamental difference between the self-management model and what stands behind it and behind the Party model, on the one hand, and the question whether the Yugoslav society exists at all, on the other.

There are elementary facts in newspapers every day which show that the Yugoslav market does not function. There is no doubt about that. There is the constitutional, legal and political fact that the Yugoslav federation as a state is immediately efficacious today only through the Yugoslav People's Army. And YPA is the only thing that has remained as an object for the Yugoslav decisionmaking.

Everything else is decided only if there is a consensus of federal units. At the same time, there is a discussion whether a Yugoslav culture exists while it

is obvious that a Yugoslav nation does not exist. Therefore, if one simply presupposes, as it is frequently done, that the Yugoslav society exists, one probably has in mind the fact that we have a surface of 255,804 square kilometers, and that on this surface there is something called Yugoslavia. But this is not sufficient for a serious idea of a society, or for the statement that certain relationships make the Yugoslav society Yugoslav. I did not assert that the Yugoslav society does not exist, not out of shyness but because I am really not sure about it, but I assert that for the time being it is not clear whether it exists and that it is not clear how one should argue its existence....

"Centralism of the Two Alexanders"

Question On the other hand, it is quite clear that there are compact social federal units of the republics and provinces....

Answer Yes, although these federal units are not nationally homogeneous. Slovenia was homogeneous for a long time, but not even this republic is homogeneous anymore. In the federal units there is a closed social functioning--a national market, regardless of the obstacles posed by the counties, with a clearly constituted center of national power, clearly constituted national interest in relation to the other nations, in relation to the federation, and with clearly defined participation of the national or federal-singular unit, so to say. Although counties and communities of counties represent local interests in some instances, in serious situations they are always subject to the influence of the national centers of power. And if this is so, the question can be asked: is the category of the Yugoslav situation an aggregate category, resulting from a number of problems and solutions in single federal units? One should at least ideologically constitute a Yugoslav situation that would have to be solved. It is obvious that the problems we are experiencing today are not common to all the republics.

Secondly, even those services which for technical reasons should function unitedly, as for example the mail or railways, and which should be under a central authority, do not function this way because in Yugoslavia for the last 20 years there has been a great fear of centralism, since under centralism people understand what is in Croatia called the "centralism of the two Alexanders," Alexander Karadjordjevic's and Alexander Rankovic's. People do not see that it is possible and, in my opinion, necessary to constitute a centralism which would follow some technical assumptions of a common existence in Yugoslavia, and which would by this very fact be different from the primitive centralism which scares us so much. Of course, it should be clear that such a new centralism is possible only if together with it the public functions as a watchtower. Without the latter there is a danger which we usually interpret as pan-Serbian hegemonism.

In this sense, when we speak about the necessity to constitute a Yugoslav nation in Yugoslavia, we do not intend to negate the nations of Yugoslavia but to say that the Yugoslav people is the assemblage of citizens who decide about the Yugoslav problems. This is, I emphasize, a political people, *demos populus* (the Croatian word "puk" is very apt here), which incorporates in itself various nations; these nations certainly decide in their territories, in the territories of their federal units.

However, the concept of the Yugoslav people presupposes that I am a citizen of Yugoslavia, but today not only am I not a citizen of Yugoslavia, but neither of Croatia, or of Zagreb, or of the Novi Zagreb County; all of my political rights are reduced to the local community Sopot. I am a citizen of Yugoslavia only as a subject of the military service, because then I defend the borders of Yugoslavia and not those of my local community. In everything else my political rights stop at the level of the local community Sopot. I cannot decide about anything in Belgrade, Sarajevo or Skopje.

What Is Nationalism, What Chauvinism

In my opinion, although one can seldom hear such an opinion, the principle of confederation as we have applied it to a multinational situation in fact makes of nationalism a "legitimate principle" of the political life. Everybody in our country is scandalized when there is a fight at a stadium or in a campus dormitory, but the fact is that I am politically active only as a Croatian. This is what we have brought about, and it has to be distinguished from chauvinism, because under the name nationalism we condemn chauvinism as being an expression of hatred and a menace to the members of other nations, etc. However, the nationalism which we have brought about is not a deviation but a consequence of our political system, in my opinion. Of course, this must be carefully formulated, because in our country nationalism is regarded as an evil, while our situation is obviously such that nationalism represents our fate for a long time. For the last few years it has been tried to channel it in this confederate system, and it must be taken into account that this system has led to the present conditions not only in the political life but also in the economy, where the national system is the decisive one.

The thesis, for example, that a nation should dispose of its surplus value, is in my opinion nationalism, even if it is added that the working class will govern in that nation. Because, if the working class governs in the nation, it is not quite clear why for that working class the nation should be the appropriate framework for the disposal of the surplus value.

Why should not there be a wider level, the Yugoslav one, or perhaps a narrower one, for example the level of a factory rather than that of the nation?

We have traditional differences between various nations which we have inherited, and today attempts are being made to bring them to the political level by means of the subjectivization of federal units. But it is obvious that this has not yet eliminated the traditional charge of nationalism; it appears in a number of manifestations of the chauvinist type which are, however, another matter, and which should be discussed.

The Disintegration of Yugoslavia Is not an Alternative

Question The thesis has been launched in the West that national interests could influence a possible disintegration of Yugoslavia?

Answer The disintegration of Yugoslavia is not an alternative at all. The disintegration of Yugoslavia has been talked about for years in order to scare

various orientations. But we are condemned to Yugoslavia, and this is more than good. Therefore the problem does not consist in the disintegration but in the question how to live in Yugoslavia in such a way that should would be suitable to the various nations, strata and groups.

Secondly, as far as the bureaucracy is concerned, the rather frequent idea of observing the class conflict in Yugoslavia in terms of the opposition between the bureaucracy and working class, or between the class and counterclass, is sociologically not quite correct and valid. Marx defines the working class, as a social stratum, not only as the class of those who are workers in the physical sense and who are exploited, but in the first place as the class of those who are exploited, but who produce the dominant relations of production of an epoch, because the dominant relation of production is the production of power, not of the surplus value. Opposed to that we have the lumpenbourgeoisie which is manifested in our country in two ways: the one that we frequently call bureaucracy, although I think that this name is not particularly good because it should really be called lumpenbourgeoisie, i.e. those who distribute the surplus value but cannot use it for themselves.

There is another layer within the lumpenbourgeoisie, constituted by those who live from the surplus value. They are citizens--from successful craftsmen who have their own businesses to various speculators--who cannot invest the surplus value but either leave it to the banks or spend the money on a larger scale than even much richer people in the West because the latter will rather invest the money than spend it on building homes and tombs, or buying yachts and luxury cars. If this is taken into account, one will understand that this situation is a consequence of the reversal of the basis and superstructure, or of the society and politics, so that the society no longer is a fundamental subject, bearer of the productive relation, because politics has assumed this role. Therefore, with these remarks about the lumpenproletariat and the lumpenbourgeoisie I intend to call attention to a part of the relations that are reproduced from the classical capitalism which Marx had in mind, because it is essential that the production of surplus value should not become the dominant element in the society. Therefore I prefer to speak of the centers of power, rather than of national bureaucracies, and of the lumpenbourgeoisie in the sense that I just explained....

Question For more than a year, politicians and scholars have been debating the question whether Yugoslavia is in a crisis. How would you answer this question?

Answer You'll probably be surprised, but I think that there is no crisis in Yugoslavia. What we have today is an economic crisis, but this is not an essential crisis. The essential crisis in a system is the crisis defined by the criterion of this system, and not by the criterion of some social groups or segments. By the criteria of our system, the crisis is possible only as a political crisis but not in the sense which has already been noted by the newspapers--that some groups in the leadership are not coordinated, that they quarrel, etc., but in the sense that, as I understand, Yugoslavia has had for the last few years as its fundamental political principle the principle of depolitization of all the social subjects.

Question Was this process reversed in the last few years?

Answer In the last few years we have reached the situation in which all the potential social subjects have crumbled and could not reconstitute themselves, not even at the level of federal principles, let alone on the level of Yugoslavia, so that in my opinion the essential crisis for Yugoslavia appears when politicization abolishes the autonomy of the political sphere and makes it impossible for it to function as it has done so far, as a complete subject. I do not see this. I see some elements of politicization in the last few years. Politicization is obviously growing only in marginal environments, and that is why the discontent has spread.

This widespread discontent has as its consequence the doubt in one of the three levels of legitimation of the Yugoslav political system. The first level of legitimation is the level that can be found in every socialist society: the system is legitimized as being revolutionary, and everything opposed to it is called counterrevolutionary. The second level consists in the fact that the system enables the existence of various interests and thus of national emancipation. The third, the most efficient and the most suitable for criticism is the level which legitimized the Yugoslav political system in the following way: nowhere else in the world can one live so well while working so little as here. Our migrant workers have considerably contributed to this third point when they would say upon returning to Yugoslavia: "You don't know what a hard life we have and how good it is here." This third level has now become radically dubious. The other two are not subject to doubt yet, and only when they are can we speak about the Yugoslav crisis.

Thus we now have something I would call an area crisis but not an essential crisis because the essential relationship, i.e. the reproduction of the power relation, functions more or less well from the point of view of those who are the subjects of such a relationship. On the other hand, the prevention of the politicization of the discontent can have one or two consequences: the discontent can be checked in the political sphere until the improvement of the economic situation in the developed capitalist countries is reflected in our country too in an improved standard of living which would diminish the pressure, or they can, because of the closing of some channels and the declines in the standard of living, lead to some explosion which may jeopardize the very foundations of the system of social ownership. This is, in my opinion, the analysis of the present social situation in Yugoslavia and, I repeat, until this other possibility materializes, Yugoslavia is not in crisis.

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FORMER MACEDONIAN LC FIGURE DISCUSSES 'MYTHS OF THE REVOLUTION'

[Editorial Note:] GLEDISTA, monthly journal published by Belgrade University and the Serbian Youth League, included in the latest issue, May-August 1982 (an announcement on the back page says "This issue was printed in May-June 1983"), pp 3-16, an article by Slavko Milosavljević, former Macedonian LC Central Committee Secretary under Krste Crvenkovski, removed with other "liberals" in 1972. The article is titled "Some Problems on 'Mythologizing' the Revolution," declaring the underlying "myth" to be the belief that by eliminating private ownership of the means of production all the problems of modern history and development would be automatically solved. He discusses other parts of Marxist doctrine not verified by history, such as the teachings on the working class, the state, the market, the Communist Party, and capitalism, and concludes with a brief discussion of the inability of socialism to tolerate dissent, noting the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian past events in this regard. "There is the example of Czechoslovakia when Soviet troops turned the course of development in an entirely opposite direction from that which the absolute majority of the nation wanted. Finally, also Yugoslavia in 1968 during the student demonstrations. All these and similar situations have almost always been preceded by assessments that a high level of identification existed between the interests of the working class and the policy of the ruling communist parties." He asserts, finally, that a society based on the realities of unity (i.e., seeing national unity as an ideal but accepting differences in practice) shows itself more capable of overcoming the expected or unexpected obstacles in its development than the "stubborn ideology and practice of an illusory, absolute unity which is created under ideological, moral, and material pressure in socialism and...recognizes only that social interest defined by the ruling group, so that "unity" must be created only around it and in connection with its interest. Then, instead of a natural dialectical unity, we are dealing with a "dialectic" which deepens the differences between various interests to the point of absolute antagonism."

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