JPRS-UIA-87-003

21 JANUARY 1987

USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 4, JULY-AUGUST 1986

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, published six times a year in Moscow by the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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BOOKS IN BRIEF

PUBLICATION DATA

English title	:	THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
Russian title	:	RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR
Editor	:	I.K. Pantin
Publishing House	:	Izdatelstvo "Progress"
Place of Publication	:	Moscow
Date of Publication	:	July-August 1986
Signed to press	:	14 July 1986
Copies	:	9,921
COPYRIGHT	:	"Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir", 1986

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CSO: 1807/27

LINKS BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, STRIKES, PROTESTS EXAMINED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 1986 pp 23-32

[Article by A.I. Belchuk: "The Economic Position of the Workers and the Social Protest Movement"]

[Excerpts] The interconnection between changes in the economic position of broad strata of the population and the social protest movements has long attracted the attention of historians, economists and sociologists. During the course of historical development, popular movements have often been connected with a sharp deterioration in the material position of the population. At moments of social explosions economic difficulties have frequently so dominated in the consciousness of the masses that they have been accepted as the main reason for public movements, whether this has been a question of the peasant riots in the Middle Ages or events from recent and contemporary history. The age of capitalism has introduced into this picture of the historical process many fundamentally new elements, first and foremost the periodic deteriorations or improvements in the material position of the workers as the result of the cyclic development of the economy inherent in capitalism: the constantly alternating upswings, crises and other phases of the cycles. In recent times special attention has been given to the "long cycles," whose crisis phase is now called the structural crisis. When investigating these crises, to a greater or lesser extent it has been found that the effect of the deteriorating position of the workers on the mass awareness and on the forms and scales of social protest is also relevant.

Even a superficial study of the historical process indicates that the link between changes in the material position of the population and mass protest movements is by no means unambiguous. First, it is by no means always that a deterioration in the material position of the workers has been accompanied by an increase in the various forms of social protest. Moreover, in some cases some forms of protest have been been curtailed. The policy of "social revenge" on the part of the bourgeoisie at the present stage is also based on increasing material deprivation with respect to hired labor, while any retreat by the workers at any given moment is depicted by the supporters of the "wave of conservatism" as the irrevocable collapse of the workers' movement. In history, the epicenter of class upheavals has by no means always necessarily been the poorest strata of a population or country, while poverty and hunger have not always been the main "generator of changes." The keenness of social

conflicts has been determined by many factors, not merely the level of poverty or wealth and changes in the material position of the popular masses.

Second, the direction of social protest as the result of deterioration in the position of the workers has been extremely contradictory. For example, in the United States the intensification of rightist chauvinist attitudes among part of youth in the Eighties is taking place at a time when crisis processes have affected the material position of youth particularly strongly.

V.I. Lenin wrote about the complex and contradictory nature of this interdependence when he analyzed the effect of the economic crisis of 1907 in Russia on the position of and struggle by the workers. "There is no doubt that a detailed study of the industrial crisis is of the greatest significance. There is also no doubt that no kinds of data on the crisis, even data of ideal accuracy, are able essentially to resolve the question of whether or not a revolutionary upsurge is close, because this upsurge will depend on a thousand other factors that cannot be taken into account beforehand. Profound political crises are impossible without the ground being prepared by an agrarian crisis in the country and depression in industry; this is indisputable. But once this ground has been prepared it is still impossible to conclude whether the depression will for some time restrain the mass struggle by the workers in general or whether at a certain stage in the unfolding of events it will be the depression itself that incites new masses and fresh forces into the political struggle." [2]

Does this mean that there are no law-governed patterns in this sphere or general points of departure? This article does not claim to analyze the entire extremely broad range of the problems mentioned above. It will set forth only some aspects of the subject, first and foremost the interconnection between economic crises of various kinds and the strike struggle by the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries; and a number of ideas will be expressed concerning the link between periods of deterioration in the material position of the masses and political struggle by the workers. Most attention will be given to the Seventies and Eighties.

Under capitalism, economic crises can be of the most varied kinds: cyclic, sector, structural, agrarian. In most cases they are crises of overproduction. Capitalism is the only socioeconomic system in which the problem of overproduction of material values has arisen. All other systems have known only crises of underproduction. The problem was output production, but marketing presented no difficulties. Capitalism placed marketing, sale of output, in the forefront. Of course, in this case it is a question not of absolute but of relative overproduction compared with effective demand. Human demands are unlimited, at least according to the existing scale of values among the main mass of the population. This scale of values has come about historically and has changed over time. The attention of researchers on capitalism has been attracted most by the so-called production cycles. The cyclic nature of the development of the capitalist economy was finally established by the middle of the last century. During the second half of the 19th Century, after the system of the world capitalist economy had been established, crises started to occur in most of the capitalist world. The periodic contraction or expansion of production usually took place over a

period of 7 to 10 years, that is, the industrial cycles assuming the most obvious forms were moderate in terms of duration.

In contrast to cyclic crises, sector crises inflict harm on a particular sector or group of sectors. Their causes are most varied: structural shifts, partial disproportions, sector overproduction. Examples of such crises are the crisis in the world textile industry in 1952, world shipping in 1958-1962, and ferrous metallurgy in West Europe in 1961-1963. Even at times of greatest boom there are sectors and production facilities where the state of affairs is bad, and vice versa.

Economic development since the mid-Seventies has differed sharply from the entire postwar period. It has been characterized by a general slowdown in growth rates, a combination of various profound and prolonged crisis processes starting with the world cyclic crises of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, structural crises in power engineering, the automotive industry, ferrous metallurgy, shipbuilding and the textile industry, all culminating in a currency and financial crisis, a collapse in the effectiveness of traditional methods used to regulate the economy, a sharp rise in unemployment, runaway inflationary processes, a crisis in state finances, slowing growth rates in world trade turnover, and a debt crisis in the developing countries.

Economic crises effect social movements indirectly rather than directly, primarily through deterioration in the economic position of the popular masses. Social awareness, which determines social movements, alters significantly only when people's living conditions change. Social tension can occur in both the crisis and the boom phases of the cycle.

The economic cycles have always had a great effect on the position of the workers and the workers movement. The crisis phases have led to abrupt increases in unemployment and a decline in real wages, and to hardening of the state's social policy. This has led ineluctably to a sharpening of contradictions during periods of deterioration in the economic position because the question of who should carry the burden of the economic upheavals, and to what degree, becomes very acute.

From the standpoint of the workers' position, the period covering the Seventies and Eighties, from the moment when the prolonged run of profound crisis processes started in the capitalist economy, can be divided into two stages. The boundary between them lies approximately in the early Eighties following the start of the 1980-1982 cyclic crisis, when the socioeconomic consequences of the technological restructuring of production started to be felt more strongly and in some capitalist countries the entire axis of political life shifted "to the right." During the Seventies workers and employees had in general successfully resisted attempts by the bourgeoise to place the main burden of the crisis consequences on their shoulders. In most cases the movement of the nominal wage kept up with increases in consumer prices. Unemployment started to grow rapidly but had still not reached the alarming level that it has in the Eighties. The social security system had still not been subjected to serious pressure on the part of states and entrepreneurs, and in some cases the workers had even managed to achieve some expansion and deepening of it. In the Eighties a deterioration has taken

place in the economic position of the workers and generally negative changes have been seen in the conditions of the economic struggle.

In our view, the following general proposition can be made: economic crises exacerbate social contradictions and thus stimulate the social protest movement, but at the same time the conditions for meeting the demands of the popular masses using traditional forms of economic struggle are worsening. And contrariwise, the deterioration of the economic position is easing the conditions for economic struggle by the workers. In the relative long term, however, it is often leading to increased demands and social expectations on the part of a considerable proportion of the workers and thus creating new stimuli for sociopolitical dissatisfaction and for raising the level of the mass political struggle. [4] In these cases the mechanism of "relative deprivation" once described by W. Runciman comes into play.

The contradictory nature of the effect of change on the economic position of the workers' movement leads to the indeterminate nature of the results at different times and in different countries, depending on which group of factors overrides.

At the same time the external manifestations of internal contradictions have often been inadequate vis-a-vis the acuity of the social tension since the scales of open actions by the workers in the struggle against capital has depended not only on the burden of the crisis processes but also on other factors, namely, the relationships of class forces and the objective opportunities for expressing protest, changes in the sphere of awareness, the level of organization among the workers and so forth. The pressure on the army of redundant workers and the active anti-trade-union policy of many bourgeois governments have worsened the positions of workers and employees during negotiations.

Another circumstance that complicates the economic struggle by the workers during periods of economic difficulties is the increased intractibility of the entrepreneurs and the state resulting from falling profit margins and increases in the deficits in the state budgets during these years. The crisis phases are accompanied by a general market deterioration, intensification of the competitive struggle and increasing numbers of bankruptcies, and as a result a decline in profit against capital invested. At this time state income usually falls while expenditures grow, primarily on anticyclic policy (another heavy burden is military expenditures, which the bourgeois governments usually leave intact). Hence the desire to shift the burden of crisis onto the workers and employees both in the form of direct decreases in real wages and in the form of limiting social payments made by the state.

Contrariwise, during the upswing phase of the cycle the objective opportunities increase for the workers and employees to put forward and achieve socioeconomic demands: pay increases, improvements in the social security system and so forth. Increased production and lower unemployment ease conditions for the workers' struggle.

In what specific forms and scales, therefore, is the interconnection seen between the cycles and change in the economic position of the workers and the

economic struggle of the popular masses? Some general features in the effect of cycles and crises can be seen by analyzing of the correlation between the phases of the average cycle and the strike movement. With regard to the effect of prolonged and profound crisis upheavals (the crisis phases of the "long cycles"), in our view many of the general features of this effect can be traced in the example of the processes taking place during the Seventies and Eighties.

It goes without saying that the dimensions of the strike movement cannot be sufficiently accurate indicators for the level of economic struggle by the workers and employees. These conflicts often assume other forms: the struggle to conclude collective agreements, the introduction of social legislation and so forth. The interconnection between the industrial cycles and the strike movement is more amenable to analysis because it relies on sufficiently reliable statistics over prolonged periods. In any event, strikes are a very important part of the workers' economic struggle, and analysis of their dynamics in terms of the interconnection with the industrial cycle makes it possible to draw a number of important conclusions.

A statistical analysis covering the postwar period for five of the leading capitalist countries gave the following results.

In about 50 percent of the cases an inverse correlation was found between the phases in crises of average duration and the dimensions of the strike movement, that is, the onset of crisis was accompanied by a decline in the struggle. A positive link or an indeterminate correlation was found about equally in the other 50 percent. The phases of the economic cycles were determined according to the classification generally accepted in the economics literature (for example, in the United States according to the methodology of the National Bureau of Economic Research). The indicator used for the scales for the strike movement was the number of strikes and the number of man-days on strike as the most generalized indicators.

In analysis of the interconnection between clearly marked sector crises and the strike movement within the sector, the trends were conflicting. The coefficient of inverse correlation fell to 0.2-0.25 while the positive correlation increased to 0.55.

In the phases of the world cyclic crises in the Seventies and the early Eighties, that is, in 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, the inverse correlation was significantly stronger as compared with the effect of crises on the strike movement during the period covering the Forties through the Sixties.

The period of profound crisis upheavals in the Seventies and Eighties exerted a much more serious effect on the social protest movement (that is, structural crisis because, as has been shown above, it exerted a much stronger influence on the labor force and on the socioeconomic position of the workers).

What, then, have been the main features of the strike movement in the Seventies and Eighties? They provide us with an opportunity to judge several aspects of the effect of the "major" crises on the social protest movement.

Like the the general socioeconomic position of the workers, during this period the strike struggle has also undergone two stages of development, namely in the Seventies and in the Eighties. During the first stage the scope of the strike movement was quite large. According to figures from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers' Movement, the total number of participants in economic strikes during the period 1981-1985 was 85 million compared with 124 million during the period 1976-1980. [5]

The deterioration in the position of the workers and of their organizations during the Eighties has led to significant changes. The scales of the strike movement have shrunk.

The aims of the struggle have somewhat changed. The struggle against unemployment and to retain work places, and for control over the social consequences of the technological restructuring of production has been moved to the forefront of worker demands. The struggle to maintain, and in some cases increase real wages, has been pushed into second place (examples: the miners' strike in Great Britain in 1984-1985, the metalworkers' strike in the FRG in 1984, the strike by workers in the metallurgical and shipbuilding industries in France in 1983-1984).

The strike movement has started to spread increasingly to the services sphere, where previously strikes were a quite rare phenomenon. This has been promoted by the continuing change in the general structure of employment in favor of the services sphere and the objective rapprochement in the socioeconomic position of many detachments of employees vis-a-vis the position of the working class. This trend can be seen with particular clarity in the United States and Canada where the proportion of the services sphere is one of the highest in the capitalist world.

As before, however, the nucleus of the strike struggle has been found in the industrial sectors in terms of the importance of the strikes and the more significant demands put forward by strikers and the seriousness of the clashes. The more extensive involvement in the strike movement of those employed in the services sphere has been hampered by the extensive spread of female labor in those sectors, the legislative ban on strikes in a number of fields, and certain other factors.

The position of the trade union organizations has deteriorated under the influence of the decline in the numbers of members in trade unions as the result of the shrinkage in the nucleus of the factory and plant proletariat and the anti-trade-union policy of many bourgeois governments. At the same time, some of the internal contradictions in the workers' movement itself have been exacerbated: contradictions between the employed and the unemployed, between those employed in crisis sectors and those employed in expanding sectors, between indigenous workers and employees and immigrants.

The strike movement has been concentrated to a greater degree in the sectors of industry especially hard-hit by crisis processes and structural reorganization: metallurgy, the mining industry, the automotive industry. The struggle by the workers in these sectors has often been of a serious and prolonged nature.

The forms of social protest in general have started to undergo certain changes. In addition to traditional strikes in the form of witholding labor for a particular time, the role of warning actions, demonstrations of readiness to engage in conflict, "work to rule," and enterprise sit-ins has grown. This means that the statistics on the strike struggle reflect less realistically the actual scales and forms of social protest.

In some countries the strike movement has become more politicized. The logic of its development brings the workers increasingly into political conflict with entrepreneurs and the state because demands such as the retention of work places, the struggle against cuts in social programs, retaining wage indexing, introduction of the shorter working week, the democratization of labor legislation and so forth are becoming central. These kinds of demands can be met only within the limits of a definite political program and broad actions extending beyond the framework of local strikes.

Thus, the experience of the Seventies and Eighties is ambiguous from the standpoint of the effect of cyclic fluctuation on the position of the workers and social movements. On the one hand it shows that significant economic difficulties may be accompanied by such a serious deterioration in the position of the workers' struggle that at some stage it leads to a contraction of the strike movement and other open forms of social conflict. On the other hand, a prolonged and significant decline in the living standard of the population and increased lack of social security and instability ultimately promote the politicization of the workers' struggle, the emergence of new forms of social protest and the increased seriousness of social conflicts that have assumed open forms.

The interconnection between economic fluctuations and the workers' political struggle is a separate problem. First of all, it is a question of the effect of the deteriorating economic position of the workers on the political struggle and on social movements. We shall deal with only some of the broad range of problems here.

The effect of fluctuations in the economic conjuncture on the disposition of internal political forces is seen primarily in the electoral behavior of the voters. With a deterioration in the economic conjuncture, in most cases the rightist parties lose votes while their opposition gains; and vice versa. However, the effect of short-lived fluctuations in the conjuncture cannot be prolonged or profound but is as a rule transient and as variable as the variability of the conjuncture itself. Only prolonged and serious changes in the economic position in general and correspondingly in the economic position of broad strata of the population are capable of exerting any significant effect on social movements.

In this case, however, the interconnection between economic processes and social movements is even more contradictory than the interconnection between the crises and the economic struggle. As an example we could take the periods of the greatest upswing in the workers' sociopolitical struggle since the end of World War I. These obviously include the period from 1917 through the early Twenties, the time of the "great depression" and fascism's rise to power

in Germany, 1936 (the National Front in France), the latter half of the Forties, and the late Sixties and early Seventies (the youth disturbances).

We see that the periods of the most active social movements in most cases coincided with periods of prolonged and significant deterioration in the economic position of the population. The exception was 1936 and the late Sixties; however, the social protest movements of those years were significantly smaller in terms of scale and significance than the periods when the economic position of the masses deteriorated sharply.

The sociopolitical thrust of these movements differed most sharply. The periods following the end of both world wars, 1936, and the late Sixties were characterized by a general democratic and anticapitalist orientation. The crises of the Thirties and of the last decade have been distinguished by their contradictory nature and the intensification of reactionary and conservative trends.

Attempts have long been made to establish a certain periodicity in the class struggle on the basis of the economic cycles. It has been mainly a question of the "long cycles" because the influence of the regular industrial cycles of average duration can be discussed only by analyzing the economic, primarily strike, struggle by workers and employees, and even then with a mass of conditionals. The interconnection between the cycle of average duration and the political struggle has quite obviously been secondary, and has often not been traced at all. In our view, these attempts have still not provided convincing positive results even for the "major cycles" in the economic struggle of the workers, and even less for the cycles of the political class struggle, which could have been explained by the change in the various phases of the "long" economic cycles.

First, the measurement itself of the intensity of the political class struggle has encountered serious methodological difficulties. The forms of the political class struggle are so varied and noncomparable that the element of subjectivism is very great in the choice of indicators, and correspondingly in defining the boundaries and amplitudes of the fluctuations in the "cycles of the class struggle." Even in the "major economic cycles," the definition of turning points, boundaries and the various phases is extremely arbitrary among different authors. For example, some of them regard 1966-1967 as the end of the upswing phase of a "major economic cycle," while at the same time most researchers hold to the opinion that the beginning of the crisis phase occurred in 1973-1974. As a rule, a given author's addition or, contrariwise, subtraction of a number of years from a given phase in a "major cycle" has a significant effect on the periodization and conclusions. In analysis of the economic conjuncture, of course, we have at our disposal much more accurate indicators than when researching the political struggle.

Second--and this is most important--the uneven development of the class struggle is depicted as undulating and cyclic. There is no doubt that economic and political development in different countries and regions has been uneven throughout mankind's entire history. However, the concepts of unevenness and undulation are not the same. An undulating cyclic movement moves through a sequential and more or less even change through different

phases; laws common for the entire process lie at the basis of undulating movement. Unevenness can be caused by a random combination of various factors in the absence of a single "tuning fork," a law according to which the entire process of movement is tuned. Whereas in undulating cyclic development phase change and phase sequence occur within particular time frames and can accordingly be predicted with a greater or lesser degree of accuracy, in an uneven, random process the points of discontinuity are not defined.

For changes in the workers' class struggle the role of political, organizational and similar factors is so great that the latter usually outweigh the effect of the various phases of the "long waves" of the economic cycle. There is no adequate factual basis for asserting that at the end of the upswing phase of the "long cycle" the class struggle usually intensifies for reasons linked directly with the long-term strengthening of the accumulation of capital (a numerical increase in the working class, relative decline in unemployment, growing unionization and so forth). [7]

In our opinion, given periodization in the class struggle and analysis of its law-governed patterns, it must be said that the economic cycles only help or hinder the corresponding fluctuations in the intensity and scale of the class struggle but are not in and of themselves a decisive factor on which this struggle depends.

Social movements and the intensification of the class struggle are born out of changes in the material position of the broad popular masses. However, a significant and prolonged deterioration in the economic position is undoubtedly a more powerful detonator for social protest.

Analysis of experience in the struggle by the masses shows that a prolonged and significant deterioration in the material position of the population has exerted an ambiguous influence on the political movements of social protest.

On the one hand, these processes have promoted the "shift to the left" among the masses, while on the other part of the population has been subject more to the influence of rightist slogans. As a rule, there has been a sharp increase in nationalism, which splits workers of different nationality. The one common and noteworthy factor in all social movements in periods of economic upheaval has been the radicalization of the masses. The effect of the series of profound crisis processes in the Seventies and early Eighties confirms this general law-governed pattern even though it is also manifest in specific forms inherent only to this period.

The great practical significance of analysis of the law-governed patterns lying at the basis of the mass movements of social protest and the debatable nature of many aspects of the effect of changes in the material position of the workers on these movements require further research. There is a special need here for empirical work to determine the causal interconnection between these processes, and primarily to determine the quantitative relationship between them. The ambiguity of the cause-and-effect links in this field, the diversity in the forms of social protest, and the methodological difficulties in revealing and comparing their scales make the achievement of this goal an

extremely complex task. However, if it is not resolved it will be difficult to count on results of fundamental importance for science and practical work.

FOOTNOTES

2. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works. Vol 17 p 282.

4. One example is the socioeconomic "floods" caused by the upswing in the workers' and democratic movement in the late Sixties and early Seventies in some capitalist countries. For an analysis of these processes see in particular "Mezhdunarodnoye rabocheye dvizhenie. Voprosy istorii i teorii" [The International Workers' Movement. Questions of History and Theory], Vol VI, Moscow, 1981; "Sotsialnaya tipologiya klassov" [Social Typology of the Classes], Moscow, 1985.

5. Calculations were done from ILO figures and national statistics from 18 capitalist countries.

7. E. Mandel. "Long Waves of Capitalist Development." Cambridge University Press, 1980, p 45.

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CSO: 1807/27

FRENCH ELECTORAL SHIFT TO RIGHT, COMMUNIST LOSSES ANALYZED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86, pp 67-78

[Article by E.A. Arsenyev: "Topical Problems in the Working Movement in France in Light of the Election Results"]

[Text] The 16 March 1986 elections to the French National Assembly were a major event in the country's political life, reflecting an exacerbation of the class struggle in many issues of domestic and foreign policy. Over the five years that have elapsed since the previous elections, when the socialists came to power and a leftist government majority was formed with the participation of the communists, the balance of political forces has changed sharply. While effecting some positive reforms during the first years that they were in government, the socialists soon set out on the path of a policy of "strict economy" accompanied by a decline in the workers' living standards and increased unemployment. And although during these years the socialists did manage to achieve some economic results (reducing inflation to 4.7 percent and significantly reducing the foreign trade deficit), on the whole they not only were unable to insure an improvement in the economic situation but were also unable, to use the words of former prime minister L. Fabius, to do the "dirty work" in controlling the crisis and unemployment. As a sign of disagreement with the socialists' policy, in July of 1984 the communists withdrew from the government. The dissatisfaction of the workers grew, but in the difficult conditions of crisis it did not always become any form of mass action.

At the same time, speculating on the economic difficulties and the deteriorating position of the workers, those on the extreme right preaching racism, violence and double-dyed anticommunism were reanimated. The leader of the neofascist "National Front" Le Pen stated candidly that his goal was to destroy the communist party. Various kinds of provocative actions against the democratic workers' organizations and attacks on activists in the communist party and trade unions became more frequent.

The parties on the right--the Union of Democrats for the Republic [RPR] and the Union for French Democracy [UDF]--acted in the elction campaign on a joint platform and in many electoral districts ran on joint tickets even though there were still serious disagreements between these parties and their leaders (J. Chirac, Giscard d'Estaing and R. Barre) were prepared to fight for the post of president. They were united in their desire to get their revenge for

the defeat in 1981, that is, to gain a decisive majority in the elections, remove the socialists from power, set up a rightist government and liquidate many of the social gains that the workers had achieved in recent years. J. Chirac stated that the rightists had prepared about 30 pieces of draft legislation and decrees on a new economic policy in the spirit of "Reaganism French style," and also on restoring the majority electoral system and denationalization. [1] The goal was set of handing over to private capital the banks and industrial groups nationalized not only during the period 1981-1983 but even during the years immediately following the war, that is, under de Gaulle. The rightists also spoke out in favor of total abolition of price controls and of reductions in social expenditures and corporation tax and other privileges for big capital.

They spoke out in favor of strengthening France's cooperation with NATO and the further modernization and buildup of France's nuclear potential. The rightists demanded increases in the military budget and the adoption of a broader military program envisaging the building of a new strategic mobile missile, production of neutron weapons, increasing the number of new-generation nuclear submarines and so forth. The rightists sharply criticized F. Mitterrand's policy on the question of preventing the militarization of space and advocated France's involvement in R. Reagan's "strategic defense initiative." At the same time the main leaders of the rightist parties did not question the importance of Franco-Soviet cooperation and favored its further development.

It should be noted that the process of stratification continues in the milieu of the French bourgeoisie. The so-called liberal wing, which favors certain bourgeois-democratic reforms, plays a significant role. An overwhelming proportion of the French bourgeoisie, however, is distinguished by its great conservatism. The reforms made by the socialists (introducing a small tax on great wealth, limited nationalization, and extension of the rights of workers at enterprises, which basically remained just on paper) were perceived by the big bourgeoisie as encroachment on its rights and were met with fierce resistance.

The most active role among neoconservative circles is played by the RPR, which lays claim to leadership among rightist forces and is the main strike force of the bourgeoisie. Little of the earlier Gaullist party remains in the RPR. From the positions of an independent policy under de Gaulle and his successors it has in fact switched to extremely pro-Atlantic policies. Wishing to close the ranks of rightist forces, the RPR leaders have extensively cultivated nationalistic attitudes and made use of the idea of the "unity of the French nation."

Some figures in the UDF, notably former president Giscard d'Estaing, are trying to play the role of more moderate centrist forces. They call for the cohesion of rightist forces on the basis of centrism and "advanced liberalism" and the power of big capital combined with bourgeois reformism, which they regard as "the French and even the European alternative to socialism." The former prime minister R. Barre, who speaks out decisively against "coexistence" with Mitterrand, is becoming increasingly active in political life. On questions of foreign policy, there is a quite extensive range of

views among the UDF leaders, from Lecanuet's and Poniatowski's double-dyed atlantism to R. Barre's moderately independent concept.

The rightist parties and the socialist waged the election campaign on a large scale, making use of the methods of political advertising and mass promotion among voters. According to the French sociologist A. Duhamel, it was a question of a real Americanization of the election campaign both in content and form. "The ideological struggle and comparison of programs are giving way to the razzmatazz of commercial and political advertising. The comparisons are made not between one doctrine or another but between one picture and another, between one catchword and another. The clash is not so much between opposing political views as between opposing leaders who have been appropriately prepared and trained... The money flows like a river, tens of millions, much more than at previous presidential elections. The Americanization has seized the political organizations themselves; the Socialist Party claims to be an alternative, just as the Democratic Party does in the United States. As far as the UDF and RPR are concerned, their labels and leaders differ but for the rest one needs to be very observant to see the difference between them." [2] One feature of the elections was that for the first time in the last 30 years they were held on a proportional basis (although incomplete) in one single round of voting. This enhanced the role of the independent actions of the parties but did not, however, exclude candidates appearing on joint tickets. The number of electoral districts was increased to 577 (previously it had been 491). At the same time members of regional councils and organs of self-management in the major economic regions, whose powers have been somewhat extended in recent years, were also running in the elections.

As before, the election struggle took place under unequal conditions that discriminated against the communist party. The fire of virtually all other political forces, from the ruling socialist party to the neofascists, was concentrated against the communists. Communist candidates' access to the mass media, especially radio and television, which are under government control, was restricted in every possible way, while at the same time the bourgeois parties used them extensively to wage an anticommunist campaign. President Mitterrand played an active role in the election struggle, appearing repeatedly on television. The state aparatus at the center and at the local level was also at the disposal of the socialists and rightist forces, and their campaign was extensively subsidized by the private banks, monopolies and other private funds.

One of the main results of the elections was the success of the rightist parties, which togethher with the extreme rightist "National Front" grouping took about 54.5 percent of the votes, which insured the election of 328 rightist deputies, including 155 from the RPR, 131 from the UDF and 35 from the "National Front." The rightists won particularly high results in the central agricultural regions of the country, and also in Brittany and Alsace. Nevertheless, the total vote for the RPR and the UDF combined was 1.1 million less than for J. Chirac and V. Giscard d'Estaing at the presidential elections in 1981. This was not the "total revenge" that the rightists, between which the disagreements still exist, had counted on. Some of those who

traditionally vote for the rightist parties gave their vote to the extreme rightist "National Front."

The socialists took 8.8 million votes or 31.6 percent of the voters. This was a quite good result although 6 percent less than in 1981. In 8 departements the socialists took 23 to 27 percent of the votes, in 65 departements from 27 to 36 percent, and in 23 from 36 to 45 percent. [3] It was suggested to the workers in every possible way that the only means of stopping the rightist parties from being returned to power was supposedly to vote for the socialists. This "complex of useful voting" for their candidates cultivated by the socialists was not without consequences for some of the voters, including those voting for the French Communist Party [PCF]. As in 1981, some of them voted for the socialists in order to bar the way against the rightists while others did not vote.

The socialists lost their majority in the National Assembly but still have the largest group of deputies (198, and, together with the "left radicals," 215). The socialist party is now the government opposition and maintains its support for President Mitterrand. The socialists' losses were primarily the result of their policy of "crisis management," which caused dissatisfaction among the workers. They were also the result of attempts to strengthen their own influence at the cost of other democratic forces and to the detriment of the communist party. The elections showed that ultimately this kind of policy turns against those who pursue it.

Thus, an unprecedented situation has now taken shape within the country: a rightist parliamentary majority and a rightist government are ruling the country together with President Mitterrand, who intends to retain his position for the 7 years of his mandate, that is, until 1988. This situation is fraught with possible serious political complications even if we consider that Mitterrand's policy on many issues of domestic and foreign policy is virtually the same as the policy of the rightists.

The president of France is given extremely broad powers, and in particular he can dissolve the parliament and appoint the prime minister and other members of the government, and is the commander in chief of the armed forces, including nuclear forces. At the same time, the new prime minister J. Chirac has stated that he favors enhancing the role of the government in policy implementation and very important decisionmaking.

A new and dangerous phenomenon seen in France in recent years is the revival of neofascism, whose deep social causes are enrooted primarily in the exacerbated economic crisis and the deteriorating position of broad strata of the workers, and also a considerable proportion of the petty bourgeoisie. Speculating on their dissatisfaction, the ultrarightists are making extensive use of demagogic slogans in the spirit of "Reaganism French style." They promise to insure reduced taxes and prices, make loans cheaper, nurse the economy back to health, make an end to the debauch of crime and corruption, bring about public order, close off the channels of underground immigration and make an end to unemployment. The members of the "National Front" are not only cutthroats and thugs, although they do include such people. They are also brazen and dangerous demagogues. The neofascists took 9.9 percent of the

votes and for the first time they have their own parliamentary group. They achieve their best results primarily in areas with a high concentration of immigrants. "Work for Frenchmen, Coloreds out of France": this was one of the election slogans of the "National Front," which is trying to depict the immigrant workers (who total 4 million counting their families) as almost the main reason for unemployment and the growth of crime in France. It is not therefore fortuitous that it was precisely in those regions of high concentration that the neofascists polled the greatest percentage of the vote, as, for example, in Marseille 24 percent, in the Departement Alpes-Maritimes about 20 percent, and in some worker cities in the Paris region (Saint-Denis, Courneuve, Bobigny) about 15 percent.

For the French communists the elections were difficult in all respects. They are waging a selfless struggle for the interests of the workers, a democratic solution to the crisis, and an independent foreign policy. Here, they take into consideration the fact that in French society the trend toward "the delegation of power" is deeply enrooted, that is, the hope that all problems can be resolved "from above" in the parliament without active intervention by the workers. The communists are trying to dispel these illusions and constantly emphasize that only a powerful popular movement can insure conditions for profound democratic changes.

The communists have been virtually forced to wage the struggle "on two fronts": against rightist forces and also against the socialists and their attempts to weaken the communist party. The communist party has laid bare the thesis put forward by the bourgeoisie about the "fatal nature" of the crisis and has pointed out that there is a solution to the crisis; and it has put forward a concrete program for dealing with unemployment and inflation and restoring the economy to health. The communists have called for the road to be blocked against rightist forces, their attempts to take revenge to be frustrated, a decisive struggle to be waged against the anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaigns, and a rebuff to be delivered to pressure aimed at forcing it to abandon the principles of the party of the working class and the ideas of internationalism and friendship with the Soviet Union.

In the unequal struggle and under conditions of a real "ideological war" unleashed against the communist party, the PCF sustained serious losses. At the 1986 elections its candidates took 9.78 percent of the votes against 16.08 percent in 1981. A total of 35 deputies were elected (there were 44 previously), including the PCF general secretary G. Marchais and PCF Politburo members A. Lajoinie, R. Leroy, M. Gremetz, G. Hermier, J-C. Geyssot and others. And although in comparison with the elections to the "European parliament" in June 1984 the PCF candidates received almost half a million more votes, the communists consider the results of the elections unsuccessful.

The PCF took 20 to 25 percent of the votes in only three departements. The best result for the PCF ticket was that obtained by (G. Rembo), the mayor of Bourges, for whom 24.8 percent of the electorate voted. In 8 departements 15 to 20 percent of the electorate voted for communists, in 27 departements 10 to 15 percent, and in 58, less than 10 percent. [4]

What are the reasons for these electoral results? Do they mean that some PCF voters have finally abandoned it and that the process of the erosion of its influence among the workers is irreversible, as the enemies of the PCF assert? And finally, what conclusions are the French communists themselves drawing from these events?

In his introduction to K. Marx' work "The Class Struggle in France from 1848 to 1850," F. Engels wrote: "If the conditions for war between nations have changed, then they have changed to no lesser degree for the class struggle." [5] In our time this conclusion acquires special topicality and significance. The conditions for the class struggle in the countries of capital, including France, have changed significantly both within the country and on the international scale. These changes are of a complex and ambiguous nature. Essentially, in recent years the class struggle in France has been developing under qualitatively new conditions.

In this article, which, of course, does not pretend to make an exhaustive analysis of the issues raised, certain changes and shifts of an internal nature that are influencing the development of the workers' movement, are considered.

Let us consider first of all how the evolution in the balance of political forces looks specifically on the basis of election results over the past 10 to 15 years (see table 1), bearing in mind that the indicators for the elections are not the only or even the main criterion for evaluating the power and influence of the communists. However, not to consider them would be incorrect, the more so since they reflect quite accurately a definite trend.

It can be seen from table 1 that starting in the Seventies the national elections have shown a gradual decreases in the indicators for the communist party, while in the Eighties the decreases have been significant and sharp. At the 24th PCF Congress the French communists themselves noted that the erosion of PCF influence among voters had taken place even earlier. "If we look into the more remote past, this is an expression of a more prolonged evolution that started as long ago as 1958, during the course of which our party's influence has changed and oscillated around a level that is significantly lower than the level during the period 1945-1956." [6] Since it is a question of a long-term trend the factors responsible for its appearance must also be long-term. French communists pay great attention to this question both in their theoretical work and in the everyday political struggle. The 25th PCF Congress provided even more specific substantiation: "Any consideration of the existing situation and the decisions put forward by our party or of the difficulties that it encounters should take into account what lies at the basis of all of France's problems in the 20th century: the crisis in French society. During the period 1981-1984 this crisis has ultimately merely been exacerbated because the opportunities inherent in the first positive reforms have not been utilized." [7]

In fact, during the Seventies and Eighties the French workers' movement has been developing in a situation of growing crisis phenomena, including a structural crisis in the economy of France and of the other cpaitalist countries. The immobility in entire sectors of industry, the closure of many

Table 1. The Elections in France

Party and Grouping	Parliamentary 1973	Presidential 1974	Parliamentary 1978	Presidential 1981	Parliamentary 1981	Parliamentary 1986
PCF	21,4%	PS + PCF	20,6%	15,5%	16,1%	9,78%
SFIO-PS	19,1%	—36,48%	22,8%	26,1%	36,9%	31,04%
"left radicals"	2,1%	—	3,5%	2,2%	1,4%	0,38%
UDR-RPR	26%	14,5%	22,8%	19,7%	21,3%	RPR + UDF
centrists-UDF	27,7%	32,9%	23,9%	27,8%	21,6	46%
extreme rightists-"National Front"	0,5%	1,5%	0,7%	—	0,3%	9,65%

Source: REVOLUTION No 315, 14-20 March 1986; LE MONDE 18 March 1986

enterprises, economic stagnation, unprecedented growth in unemployment--these and many other social consequences of the crisis are hitting hard at the interests of the workers and exerting a contradictory effect on the development of social actions by the workers. Under the crisis conditions there is growing economic, political and ideological pressure from the bourgeoisie on the workers, aimed at forcing them to bear the brunt of the policy of "strict economy" and reconciling themselves to its social consequences. The 27th CPSU Congress noted that "since the mid-Seventies the increasingly frequent economic crises and the next technological restructuring in production have altered the situation and enabled capital to move over to the counteroffensive and deprive the workers of a considerable proportion of the their social gains." [8]

The struggle is intensifying on questions of finding a solution to the crisis and dealing with its consequences; day after day, with the aid of powerful means of ideological influence the bourgeoisie is trying to inculcate in the workers the idea that since the crisis is allegedly worldwide in nature nothing can be changed.

The crisis situation has engendered contradictory phenomena and moods among the different strata of French society: the desire for democratic changes and dealing with the crisis on an antimonopoly basis and at the same time fear of these changes; attempts to find a solution on the basis of any alternative, even an unreliable one, in particular on the path of bourgeois and social-democratic reformism, and at the same time increased resistance to any democratic changes.

Under the conditions of economic depression, rightists governments and the socialists have been pursuing a policy of deindustrialization in some of the major industrial centers, particularly in the Paris region. As a result, in some worker cities over the past 15 to 20 years the proportion of the working class has declined significantly. This is one of the objective reasons for the declining influence of the PCF in some traditional working regions, including the towns in the Paris "red belt." It is indicative that it is precisely in these regions, which historically have been distinguished by the stability of the electoral core favoring the PCF, that the decline in the number of votes cast for the PCF has in recent years been even greater than for the country as a whole.

Mass unemployment is having a serious adverse effect on the thinking and moods of people, their ideas about the future and their sociopolitical activeness. Essentially it is a major factor of social destabilization and a means through which the bourgeoisie is trying not only to achieve "improvement in the economy" but also paralyze the will of the workers to struggle. By the beginning of 1986 about 3 million people, more than 10 percent of the ablebodied population, were unemployed. Unemployment has affected all social strata of the workers and virtually all industrial sectors, but particularly metallurgy, the coal industry, machine building and construction in which there has been a significant contraction of the industrial proletariat.

Unemployment among young people is particularly high. At the beginning of 1986 about 875,000 young men and women under the age of 25 were without work.

As many young people again have temporary or unreliable work. Essentially, one-third of French youth has been affected by unemployment one way or another. [9] Unemployed young people or, as they are sometimes called in France, "the children of the crisis," make up a politically and morally very unstable population group that often looks for a solution in extremism, drug addiction and so forth. The well-known sociologist and physician Patrick Brown has written that "the crisis is a catastrophe for youth but even more for the society which it is being called upon to build." [10]

The ranks of those distressed and overwhelmed by the crisis are also being swelled by tens of thousands of ruined merchants, artisans and peasants. In 1985 alone there were more than 25,000 bankruptcies in France. This mass of small-time proprietors, "panic-stricken by the horrors of capitalism," often sets out on the path of racism and violence and becomes a breeding ground for reaction and neofascism. It is indicative that about 14 percent of merchants and artisans and 11 percent of peasants voted for the neofascists. [11]

In the crisis situation social and human relations are degenerating even more. Within society, tension, impatience, uncertainty about the future and crime are increasing. Extreme individualism, apoliticalness and a skeptical attitude toward all democratic traditions and ideals are presented by the bourgeoisie as the only principles worthy of respect.

All of this has its consequences for the workers, the workers' movement and democratic forces. Historical experience shows that a situation of economic crisis not only fails to favor the development of the workers' movement and increase the influence of democratic forces but even puts a brake on the development of the workers' political awareness and creates additional difficulties for the workers' movement. This has also been confirmed in the French experience of the Seventies and Eighties, when the number of strikes and the numbers of workers participating in them have declined significantly. The number of strike man-days averaged 5.89 million during the period 1974-1976, 3.24 million in 1978-1980 and 1.73 million in 1982-1984. [12]

Nevertheless, during this period the class struggle on more than one occasion led to mass action by the workers. For example, at the height of the crisis in 1984 waves of strikes and demonstrations rolled across the entire country. In the spring of 1984 there were paricularly powerful actions by the miners and metalworkers, which sometimes became tense. Attempts made by the socialists to "link hands" with the workers ended in failure. These and many other actions by the workers showed that they reject the policy of "crisis management" and are continuing the struggle to solve urgent problems.

The vanguard role in the struggle to find a solution to the crisis is being played by the communists, who orient the working class on profound democratic and political transformations and the struggle for radical changes. It is precisely during the years of crisis that the PCF has put forward and started actively to propagandize its own concept of the struggle for socialism in France as a specific alternative to the crisis of capitalism.

At the same time it should be noted that under the crisis conditions democratic forces have encountered serious difficulties in the matter of

mobilizing the workers, particularly in the trade union movement. The numerical strength of the Confederation Generale du Travail [CGT] has declined by 700,000 over the last 7 years. Moreover, in the crisis situation and its aftermath the very idea of a social alternative to the crisis and the existing system, as put forward by the communist party, has still not been adequately supported by the workers. It was stated at the 24th PCF Congress that "it is precisely here that we find the main obstacle which absolutely must be overcome in order to move ahead. It is a question of the substantial gap between the objective needs in the transformation of society and today's level of political awareness among popular forces, and between the nature of the decisions needed to find a solution to the crisis and the nature of the goals about which it is now possible to effect a broad unification of the masses and which are essential in order for further advance. This is the main problem whose solution we must work on." [13]

The qualitative changes in the social structure of French society, and also the composition of the working class are raising new and complicated problems for the communists. In fact, over the past 15 to 20 years France's social appearance has changed substantially, and at unprecedented rates. It is a question primarily of the proletarianization of new strata of the population, the growing proportion of the ablebodied population employed through the hiring of their labor, and the expanding social base of the workers' movement. The numerical growth of the working class is creating new potential opportunities for struggle for the interests of the workers and for their cohesion. At the same time, it is presenting the workers' movement with new and complicated problems and sometimes causing considerable difficulties. As V.I. Lenin noted, "the involvement of increasing numbers of new 'recruits' and the participation of new strata of the working masses must inevitably be accompanied by perturbations in the field of theory and practice, repetition of old mistakes, temporary returns to outdated views and outdated methods and so forth. The workers' movement in each country periodically wastes greater or lesser reserves of energy, attention and time on 'training'the recruits." [14]

The proportion of hired workers employed in physical and mental labor (in French--salaries) rose from 72 percent in 1962 to 85 percent in 1982. [15] This process took place very unevenly: the decline in traditional industrial sectors such as coal mining, metallurgy, textiles and some others led to the erosion of significant groups of the industrial proletariat among which the communists and other democratic forces have enjoyed great influence for a long time. At the same time, under the effect of the scientific and technical revolution and development in the leading industrial sectors, the stratum of engineering and technical workers grew, new highly skilled ctaegories of workers and employees came into being, and a new type of worker associated with modern production is emerging. The proportion of the engineering-technical intelligentsia is now about 20 percent of the gainfully employed population. The bourgeoisie is trying to use the social differentiation in the working class and the differences thus engendered in the position of its individual strata in order to undermine the unity of the working class by setting one social group against another.

The working class has now become the largest class in terms of numbers not only in the major industrial centers but also in the previously backward agricultural regions, namely, Brittany, the departements of the Massif Central and also in the southwest. Here, it is primarily yesterday's peasants, immigrant workers, young people and women who are merging into the ranks of the working class. The augmentation of the working class from other social strata (peasants, artisans, merchants and so forth) has been particularly strong in terms of young people. Thus, 45 percent of the children of peasants and 63 percent of the children of agricultural workers become industrial workers. Overall, the working class in industry has become significantly younger: one in five is under 25 years old, and this is posing new problems for the democratic forces.

The proportion of working women continues to grow in many industrial sectors. For example, women make up 44 percent of the medium-skilled and unskilled workers in machine building, 64 percent in the electrotechnical industry, 43 percent in the paper industry, 47 percent in the pharmaceutical industry and even 21 percent in the automotive industry. [16] The monotonous and poorly paid work on conveyer belts in various industrial sectors is being increasingly done by women.

All these new strata of the working class are usually isolated from the existing workers' centers, are politically and professionally poorly organized, and do not have a high level of class awareness. Suffice it to recall that in modern France with its long traditions in the trade union movement, only one-fourth of workers are members of the trade unions, some of which are under the influence of the socialists and rightist parties. About 6.3 million people are employed in small and medium-sized enterprises where there are no trade union organizations or works committees. Temporary work, work at home and other forms of work that place the workers in conditions of total disfranchisement and social isolation are becoming increasingly widespread.

Over the past decades there has been further development in the so-called middle strata employed in the services sphere, trade and the banks, the higher and secondary educational system and so forth. France has always been distinguished by the great diversity of the numerous nonproletarian strata of the population, which are subjected to the influence of the ideas of reformism. Now too they occupy a significant place within the country's social structure. The numbers of students and student youth have also grown during this period.

Of course, in their activity the communists take into account these and other changes in the social structure and do constant work to strengthen links with all the working strata in the population, first and foremost the working class. However, this work does not always produce the desired result. The links between the communists and individual social groups, as, for example, the scientific and technical intelligentsia, the peasantry and the students, are still not close enough.

The French communists also self-critically note that in their work they have given inadequate consideration in certain changes in French society and have

not always responded in good time to the needs of new strata of workers and the working class. Thus, the PCF's response to steps taken by the government and patronat to deindustrialize the Paris region, which actually began in 1956, was not adequate or timely. The PCF started to speak actively on this issue only after 1976. [17]

Changes in the social structure of society and the make up of the working class are being used by the ideologues of bourgeois reformism in an attempt to justify the false thesis that the working class has lost its historical role and the communist party is in "an historical decline." They emphasize that this process of the splitting and "segmentation" of the working class into various groups is taking place according to the level of their professional training, specialty, material position and so forth. From this they conclude that the role of the working class is allegedly decreasing both in production and in political life and that its place is being taken by new strata, particularly engineering and technical workers. This opinion is expressed, for example, by (E. Mer), the leader of the reformist Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail [CFDT], in his book "The Crisis and the Future of the Working Class." He thinks that the very idea of class is giving way to a new concept for a broader grouping with vague contours. Some bourgeois figures are expressing a similar viewpoint, as, for example, Giscard d'Estaing, who thinks that in French society a process of "social unification" is supposedly taking place that does not leave room for a working class and a strong communist party. [18]

For their part, the socialists are propagandizing in every possible way the concept of a "class front" within whose framework the working class is assigned the place of an auxiliary force, with the same role being given to the communist party.

Essentially it is a question of an extensive political campaign which has as its goal disparaging and nullifying the role of the working class as the main revolutionary force and theoretically "substantiating" the thesis about the "decline of the PCF" and disarming the workers' movement ideologically.

The communists are unmasking this campaign and by working to develop links with the various strata of the population are not losing their class landmarks and are attaching priority significance to strengthening the influence of the party within the working class. They stress that under present conditions the leading role of the working class as the main revolutionary force around which all other working strata rally is not only not declining but on the contrary growing.

"Expressing and defending interests of the working class is our primary task. No matter how it may be asserted theoretically that the working class is in decine, its historical role is growing constantly... Its actions play a decisive role in the successes of the class struggle, and its demands and aspirations lie at the center of the very important problems in French society. Satisfying its expectations is not only in its own interests but also in the interests of all other categories of workers and the interests of the entire nation." [19]

There are also serious contradictory consequences for the French workers' movement in the existence and activity of the Left alliance, which has been an important factor in the internal political struggle. The communists' withdrawal from the government in June 1984 was the culmination of a long period during which the PCF had been pursuing a course aimed at creating an alliance "at the top," first in the form of a Left alliance with the socialists and leftist radicals (1972-1978) based on a joint government program, and then in the form of participation in a government in which the socialists dominated (1981-1984). And although during this period the French workers managed at the cost of a stubborn struggle to achieve certain social gains and, as was noted at the 25th PCF Congress, the experience of the Left alliance cannot be considered all negative [20], this form of alliance turned out to be advantageous primarily for the socialists, who used it to the detriment of the interests of the workers' movement.

In recent years the French communists have thoroughly and self-critically analyzed the experience of the Left alliance and its negative consequences for the PCF and the workers' movement, which are still being felt to this day. A great deal of attention was given to these problems in particular at the 24th PCF Congress (February 1982) and the 25th PCF Congress (February 1985). They noted that all the theoretical and practical activity of the PCF during the period of the Left alliance had in fact been oriented on achieving agreements "at the top." This gave rise to the illusion that solutions could be found to all problems from above, without active movements by the workers, and led to a weakening of political work by the communist party in the masses.

In connection with the policy of the Left alliance, in the eyes of the workers the fundamental differences existing between the communist party and the socialist party were gradually smoothed over, and the socialists took advantage of this to strengthen their own influence to the detriment of the communist party.

As a result, during the Seventies and Eighties there has been a decline in the number of votes cast for the communist party at the elections, a weakening of its influence and a contraction in its numerical strength. During the Eighties, the numerical strength of the PCF has contracted by about 100,000 members and the number of primary cells have declined by several hundred.

One of the most important conclusions drawn by the French communists from the experience of the Left alliance has been the need to intensify work in the masses in every possible way, and effect an ideological-political and organizational strengthening of the communist party and of its vanguard role in the workers' movement on the basis of a class policy. Lenin's conclusion that the creation of political alliances and making compromises in the revolutionary struggle cannot be done at the price of any retreat from principles and that when it is doen the communist party must be totally independent in pursuing its own policy and in criticizing both its enemies and its partners in an alliance, has been fully confirmed.

In the opinion of the French communists, the weakening of the PCF influence and its poor showing in the elections are also the result of the "strategic delay by the PCF," that is, its tardiness in working out and implementing a

new party strategy and concept in the struggle for socialism for France. Although individual elements of this strategy have been worked out over a prolonged period historically, it was finally adopted and made the basis of PCF activity only in the mid-Seventies.

"The problem of the need to change society had already arisen by the mid-Fifties. The big bourgeoisie adapted to this very quickly. But our party did not succeed in doing this. We did not sense the urgency of this question. And we were not ready to provide a correct solution to this problem--a solution suggesting to France its own distinctive socialism and the appropriate path to it." [21]

* * * * *

In general, the election results in France have led to a significant shift to the right in the balance of political forces and the creation of a climate of sociopolitical instability and tension, which betokens a further intensification of the political struggle in rapidly changing conditions and forms. The socialists' policy, which has resulted in profound dissatisfaction and disenchantment among the workers, has prepared the ground for the return to power of rightist forces that have as the result of the elections advanced almost everywhere, including those regions (Lorraine, the North and so forth) where the results of the crisis have been particularly destructive.

The socialists have suffered defeat and have now become the government opposition, but they have retained much of their influence. In the new situation they face the task of transforming the French Socialist Party into a major party capable of providing a social-democratic alternative to rightist forces. Essentially, the socialists are trying to set up a system of "democracy American sytle," which under the conditions prevailing in France would mean the alternation of power between rightist parties and the socialists and squeezing out the communist party from political life.

The shift to the right is also expressed in the results of the elections to the regional councils where the socialists took 495 seats, the UDF 346, the RPR 328, the PCF 170 and the "National Front" 130. In 20 out of 22 of the regional councils the RPR and UDF chairmen were elected with the support of the neofascists.

According to the assessment of PCF general secretary G. Marchais, the chief reality of the new political situation is a weakening of popular forces and the influence of progressive ideas and the entire set of values espoused by leftist forces. These results do not mean that France is returning to the position that existed before 1981. The rightists have not succeeded in taking total revenge for their earlier defeat but the workers have no intention of reconciling themselves to the attempts of the rightists to attack their gains.

French communists note that they have still not succeeded in turning around the trend unfavorable for them: "Although the efforts of the communists have also brought some positive results and made it possible to attract many thousands of new votes, the party has been unable to halt the decline in its

influence among voters. It was impossible in such a short period to overcome the negative trends born out of the tardiness in their course typical of the entire historical period." [22] However, the party has preserved its main strengths as the largest and most organized party in France, numbering about 600,000 members and playing a vanguard role in the workers' and democratic movement.

The CPSU Program notes that "the strength of the revolutionary parties lies in the fact that they stoutly defend the rights and vital aspirations of the working people, point out the solutions to the crisis condition in bourgeios society, put forward a realistic alternative to the exploiter system, and provide answers filled with social optimism to the basic questions of the age." [23]

A thorough and keen discussion of the results of the elections to the National Assembly took place at the PCF Central Committee plenum held on 24-25 March 1986. On the eve of the plenum, under the pretext of the struggle "to renew" the party some PCF members were advocating a review of its policy and rejection of some of its most important principles, such as internationalism and democratic centralism, and were demanding that an extraordinary party congress be convened. The plenum rejected this demand and expressed itself in favor of fighting even more actively for the vital interests of the workers and for restoring party influence and strengthening its vanguard role. The communists do not regard as lost to the party those of its voters who this time for one reason or another refrained from voting or cast their vote for the socialists.

The resolution of the PCF Central Committee plenum states the following: "The entire history of the PCF shows that communists have never remained passive in the face of severe pressure and attacks from the bourgeoisie and its accomplices. And today, having repulsed attempts to smash the party, the communists are rejecting all calls that the French people should meekly reconcile themselves to the crisis, deprivation and unemployment." [24]

The French workers' movement has entered an exceptionally complicated and crucial period in its development, a period characterized by a counterattack by reactionary forces and a simultaneous weakening of the communist party. However, the potential of the workers and the democratic movement in France remains significant. Illusions about social democracy are being increasingly dispelled and rightist forces are putting forward virtually the same recipes for dealing with the crisis that led to their defeat in 1981. There must be a prolonged and persistent struggle to restore the influence of the PCF and strengthen its ties with the workers. In this complex situation the PCF is persisting in its class, internationalist course and rebuffing attempts to shatter its ideological-political unity.

FOOTNOTES

1. L'EXPRESS 14 Mar 1986.

2. LE MONDE 14 Mar 1986.

3. REVOLUTION 21-27 Mar 1986.

4. Ibid.

5. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works. Vol 22, p 544.

6. "XXIV syezd FKP" [The 24th PCF Congress], Moscow, 1982, p 5.

7. "XXV syezd FKP" [The 25th PCF Congress], Moscow, 1985, p 119.

8. "Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials on the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, p 13.

9. LE MONDE 6-7 Apr 1986.

10. REVOLUTION 18 Apr 1986.

11. LIBERATION 18 Mar 1986.

12. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 7, 1985, p 120.

13. "The 24th PCF Congress," p 143.

14. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works. Vol 20, p 65.

15. See "L'Etat de la France et ses habitants" [The State of France and Its Inhabitants], Paris, 1985, p 346.

16. See SOCIETE FRANCAISE No 2, 1982, p 14.

17. Ibid., p 17.

18. V. Giscard d'Estaing. "La democratie francaise" [French Democracy], 1976, p 56.

19. "The 24th PCF Congress" p 162.

20. "The 25th PCF Congress, p 167.

21. Ibid., p 11.

22. L'HUMANITE 27 Mar 1986.

23. "Materials on the 27th CPSU Congress." p 134.

24. L'HUMANITE 27 Mar 1986.

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WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS' EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING STATES EXAMINED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 90-101

[Article by N.Z. Volchek: "The Economic Crisis of the Eighties and the Position of the Workers in Developing Countries"]

[Text] During the last decade (1974-1984) the crisis trends seen in sharp recession and the relatively prolonged phenomena of stagnation in national production have intensified in the economies of the liberated countries. As a result, the growth rates of the domestic gross product in the developing world (from 4.6 percent in the Fifties to 5.5 percent and 6 percent in the Sixties and Seventies respectively) [1] have been falling. Calculations made on the basis of actual figures and official predictions show that during the period 1980-1985 growth rates will not exceed 1.4 to 1.5 percent. [2] The slowdown in economic growth has been even more marked for individual regions. Over the past two decades (1960-1980) the average annual values did not fall below 4.7 percent, but in the current five-year period (1980-1984) it will evidently not exceed 0.5 percent in Latin America, 0.6 percent in Africa and 1.2 percent in West Asia, and only in the countries of South and Southeast Asia will it amount to 5.2 percent. [3]

Economic crises in the developing countries are unique because of the socioeconomic features of national production and also their backwardness and dependence on the centers of world capitalism. Accordingly, their effect on the living standard of the population has its own particular features and as a rule is seen in forms that are more acute and painful than in the developed capitalist countries.

In this regard, the crisis developing in the early Eighties at the periphery of the world economy has been "harsher" than previous crises. For the first time in the past 30 years there has been not only a relative but also an absolute decline in the per capita income throughout the entire developing world. The food problem has again become acute in many regions. The situation with regard to food has become particularly tragic in the sub-Saharan countries: by 1984 the numbers of the starving had grown to 150 million. The problem of employment has also become very acute. It has been noted in a UN economic review that "...unemployment continues to grow and in many countries has reached an unprecedented level." [4] The crisis, during the course of which the prices for products exported from the developing

countries have fallen sharply, has resulted in a significant decline in income for most of the population. Inflation has been growing. During the Eighties average annual price increases have risen sharply in the developing world: 37.3 percent in 1981, 41.6 percent in 1982, 68.4 percent in 1983 and 107.5 percent in 1984 (against 35.2 percent during the latter part of the Seventies). [5]

These baneful consequences of the most recent crisis for all strata in society are associated with its quantitative and qualitative characteristics, which differ substantially from the crises in past years. Analysis of the quantitative characteristics indicate that the scale of its spread is unusual compared with the period of the Sixties and Seventies: in those decades the crisis involved 15 and 31 countries respectively while during the first half of the Eighties the figure has reached 54. [6]

Taking into account the differentiation between countries in terms of the development of production forces as proposed by the Soviet researcher V.L. Sheynis [7] (the higher the number of the group the more developed the countries included in that group, and vice versa), table 1 presents the calculations that show that already by the early Eighties 60 percent to 80 percent of the countries involved, representing almost all the groups of countries within the framework of this differentiation [8], were involved in this crisis. By the end of the last decade they were producing at least two-thirds of the GNP for the developing world and about the same proportion of the population of the developing world was living there.

The scale of this crisis is also characterized by its protracted duration. In Africa and West Asia it started in 1980, in Latin America in 1981, and only in 1984 has there been a very slow and weak revival in economic growth. The depth of the crisis is also unusual compared with preceding crises. The decline in production in the first half of the Eighties has been significantly stronger than during the period 1985-1980 [as published: probably 1975-1980--ed], when the trend toward crisis depressions in the national economy could already be seen in quite acute form (see table 2).

During the period 1975-1980 minimum domestic gross product growth rate for the whole of the developing world was 4.2 percent while the regional values varied between 0.3 percent and 4 percent; during the first half of the Eighties growth rate fell to 0.4 percent while the regional values varied between minus 4.6 percent and minus 3.5 percent, and there was no absolute decline in the domestic gross product only in South and Southeast Asia. The considerable spread in domestic gross product rates (the difference between the maximum precrisis levels and the minimum crisis levels) also indicates the increasing depth of the crisis: it increased up to 5.4 percentage points against 2.9 during the period 1975-1980.

Because this most recent crisis is significantly worse than the crisis depressions in the Sixties and Seventies in terms of all its main parameters, its role in lowering the living standards of the broad masses of the population has also grown. When investigating its qualitative characteristics it is also essential to take into account the unique nature of the economic crises occurring here and the growing differences between the countries as a

Table 1. Scales of Development in the Economic Crisis 1980-1982

Groups of Countries[1]	No of countries observed[2]		No of countries involved in crisis		Proportion of group 1979 (%)[3]	
	Total	% of countries in given group	Total	% of countries observed	aggregate population	GNP
group I (15)	12—14	80—87	5—10	36—64	12,6	40,6
group II (11)	3—5	27—46	3	60	3,1	8,7
group IV (24)	13—15	54—62	3—10	20—77	16,6	10,2
group V (3[illegible])	17	46	8—10	47—59	16,8	14,1
group VI (3)	3	100	1—2	66	41,9	14,9
group VII (34)	13—17	44—50	7—11	46—83	15,3	16,1

1. The figures in brackets are the numbers of countries in a given group

2. The extreme (minimum and maximum) number of countries observed 1980-1982 is given

3. Given as an aggregate of the population and GNP in 125 developing countries

Calculated from "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: ekonomicheskiy rost i sotsialnoy progress" [The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress], Moscow, 1983, pp 51, 615; "International Financial Statistics" Vol XXXVII, N X. August 1984, pp 121-122

Table 2. Destabilization of Economic Growth in the Developing Countries

Region \ Period, growth rate	1975-1980			1980-1985		
	gross domestic product growth rate (%)		Percent decline in gross domestic product[1]	gross domestic product growth rate (%)[2]		Percent decline in gross domestic product
	Annual average	Lowest		Annual average	Lowest	
Developing countries overall	5,4	4,2 (1978 r.)	2,9	1,5	—0,4 (1982 r.)	5,4
Including:						
Latin America	5,0	4,0 (1975 r.)	3,0	0,5	—2,6 (1983 r.)	9,1
Africa	5,8	2,8 (1975 r.)	4,0	0,6	—0,6 (1982 r.)	5,4
Near and Middle East	4,7	—0,3 (1978 r.)	11,1	—1,2	—4,6 (1982 r.)	0,6
South and Southeast Asia	6,1	2,5 (1979 r.)	4,6	5,2	3,5 (1982 r.)	2,5

1. The difference between maximum precrisis and minimum crisis rates
2. 1984-1985 estimated

Calculated from "UN Yearbook of National Accounts StatistICS." Vol 3, 1981, New York, 1983, pp 203, 205, 243, 275, 283; "UN World Economic Survey 1985." New York, 1985, pp 8, 105.

result of the differentiation since the early Eighties between the liberated countries in terms of socioeconomic development. Of course, as previously, the dual nature of the socioeconomic structure of national production results in an interweaving of economic crises that are different in nature, typical of a backward and socially heterogeneous economy. Nevertheless, in the current crisis a clear differentiation can be seen between the liberated countries in terms of their leading (main) type and the combination of factors that have primarily caused general economic depression and because of this have determined the dominant methods and forms of pressure on the living standard of the population and on those strata that have suffered most from it.

It is known that in the development of economic crises at the periphery of the world capitalist economy, external factors play a major role, particularly in the Eighties. But the importance of the contribution made by these factors to the crisis situation that has developed in the liberated countries does not mean that their is no internal base for its development. A study of internal reproduction contradictions and their specific nature and the mechanism by which they intensify makes it possible to reveal the nature of the crisis phenomena that have unfolded and hence concretize their role in the deterioration in the workers' position and explain how and in what forms they are being realized and which strata of society are suffering the most in each specific typological situation.

The agrarian crisis has exerted a marked effect on the destabilization of economic growth in the Eighties. It has come about in three developing regions and has been quite acute in nature: even on the overall scale of the developing world the volume of agricultural production has remained at the 1981 level, and in 1984 per capita production did not even reach the 1981 level. [9] But this crisis has been the most profound in the African countries (particularly the sub-Saharan countries) where it has affected the food sector associated with the domestic market, and also production for export, which in these countries is specialized in the growing of food crops (coffee, tea, cereals and so forth).

The food crisis that is developing in Africa in the form of an acute shortage of the basic food crops has been expressed in an absolute average annual per capita contraction of 1.8 percent during the period 1980-1984. In 14 of the 20 African countries stricken by drought the per capita production of cereals was lower in 1984 than in the mid-Seventies. [10]

The exacerbation of the crisis has coincided chronologically with the world cyclic crisis even though it is obvious that there is no direct cause-and-effect connection between them. The unfavorable world conjuncture has curtailed opportunities to improve the serious situation with food in the African countries through the use of external factors because it has promoted a decline in their export accumulations and in this connection resulted in a decrease in the import of foodstuffs (thus in 1982/83 in 24 African countries the amount was less than half of import requirements). The development of the food crisis in the liberated countries was the result primarily of internal causes. The socially archaic nature of the agrarian sector, which retains its technological backwardness and is dependent totally on the weather and other natural factors, does not in principle make it possible to sustain steady

growth in the production of foodstuffs in line with domestic demand. After the former colonies gained political independence their backward farming lost even more the ability for balanced growth, on the one hand because of the rapid growth in market demand (resulting from high natural population growth and intensive urbanization), and on the other, under the influence of the destruction of seminatural farming because of the division of farming tracts, the expansion of areas sown to nonfood crops and so forth. The trend toward the development of a food crisis could be seen in many African countries as long ago as the Sixties; during the next decade it intensified noticeably: at that time the stagnation in average annual per capita production became an absolute decline in the average annual growth rates to minus 1.4 percent. [11] During the first half of this decade the development of this crisis has been further intensified by unprecedented drought. In 1984 it affected 27 countries, destroying from 35 percent to 85 percent of the harvest and causing massive losses of cattle. [12]

Thus, the imbalance between food production and demand in backward countries is of a permanent nature and is reinforced by the technologically archaic structure of the agrarian sector, and the main reason for this is the social backwardness of agriculture. This also provides a basis for classifying the food crisis that has developed in the African countries as a category of structural economic crises. In principle this type of structural agrarian crisis is typical of the precapitalist forms of production. Their growing acuteness in the African countries is connected with the fact that while promoting growing commodity demand, the process of economic development that has started there has not only not been accompanied by social and technological modernization of the agrarian sector but on the contrary has led to a further decline in productivity.

For many African countries opportunities for dealing with the food crisis even in the medium term are quite problematic because any solution to it presupposes first and foremost a change in the social basis in the agrarian sector and hence the implementation of profound socioeconomic transformations in agriculture, the modernization of its technological structure, a sounder relationship between development of the export sectors and the associated domestic market, and the introduction of significant amendments in state pricing policy, capital investments and so forth.

The need to advance in this direction was to some extent fixed in the "Plan for Action" adopted at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference in 1980 in Lagos, but consistent realization of this plan at the level of the agrarian sector is at present impossible for a whole set of reasons. In the immediate future, therefore, any mitigation of the severity of the food crisis will obviously be associated with the natural end of the drought, resettlement of part of the population (where possible) to regions that are climatically more favorable, more effective state assistance for small farms, and also improvement in the world conjuncture, which will make it possible to increase imports of food.

As already noted, the agrarian crisis has also spread to the export sector in many African countries that offer foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials in the world market. It is developing in a quite acute form: export aid sent to

African sub-Saharan countries in 1983 was more than one-third less than in 1980; compared with the Seventies the trend toward price decline intensified for important export crops such as coffee, cocoa (in 1983 the price had fallen to half the 1977 level), nut oil, sugar and so forth.

The nature and causes of the crisis development in the export sector in these countries are more complex than for the food crisis. First because crops for export are produced not only by precapitalist farming (small-scale and seminatural) but also capitalist farming; and second, because of the involvement of farming in the world capitalist market. In some cases the development of the agrarian crisis in the export sector has been the result of exacerbation of capitalist-type reproduction contradictions, while in others, while its traditional character and inherently small-scale production are preserved, it is either a reflected crisis (that is, the result of exclusively external factors) or expresses the intermittent misfires in small-scale production connected with technolgical backwardness, and also under the influence of other internal causes. In more than half of the sub-Saharan countries of Africa the traditional nature of a backward economy sustains the agrarian crisis that has developed in the export sector because it is in production for export that the small-scale forms of farming play a significant role.

Its development during the Eighties has been more associated with the world cyclic crisis. But the internal factors that help to make it deeper must not be ignored. During these years the decline in exports has also been caused by a contraction in the production of agricultural crops because of adverse weather conditions, which determine the fact that, like the food export sector operating in the domestic market, the agrarian export sector depends increasingly on natural production forces. The trend toward stagnation in the production of food crops for export was seen in many African countries during the Seventies, and even then the average annual production of cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, cereals and oleaginous crops was declining. Its development was associated with diverse causes, from unprofitable low state prices paid to commodity producers for export crops to the effect of various kinds of structural factors unfavorable for economic growth, primarily the technological backwardness of small-scale production for export, and also gradual shifts in the structure of foreign demand for food crops. These shifts led to a decline in the average annual dynamics of production for the group of commodities in the temperate zone (corn, beef, sugar and so forth) from 2.8 percent (during the period 1963-1965 through 1971-1973) to 1.3 percent (during the period 1971-1973 through 1978-1980), and for the group of commodities in the tropical zone (cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas and so forth) from 1.9 percent to 0.1 percent (during the same period). [13]

Thus, given all the similarity with the food crisis, the agrarian crisis that has developed in the export sector has more complex causes and mechanism for its development. In many African countries it is the result of the effect of both external and internal factors and it is developing simultaneously in a cyclic (introduced from outside, reflected) and a structural form. The structural factors putting pressure on the dynamics of development in the export sector act in a more complicated combination than those discussed when analyzing the food crisis, while the permanent imbalance between production

and demand for export crops is reflected not only in the form of their absolute production shortfall but also in overproduction, both absolute and relative. Taking into account the complex nature of the agrarian crisis that has developed in production for export, it is correct to conclude that it is only slightly mitigated as the world cyclic crisis weakens because the pressure of both internal and external structural factors will, as before, affect its dynamics. Neutralization of these factors presupposes a better balance of all national production (especially in a case when it is still highly dependent on the export sector), and also changes in the technological basis of farming for export and bringing its sector structure into line with shifts in the foreign market.

The crisis that has developed in the agrarian sphere in Africa has also been instrumental in the development of the crisis situation in many of the sub-Saharan countries both because during the Eighties it has developed in quite acute forms and because the significant role of agriculture is still maintained in the economies of these countries (production averages 30 percent of the value of the domestic gross product and even more than 40 percent in the less developed countries, where more than 70 percent of the independent population is concentrated). The present exacerbation of this crisis has made the position of the main mass of Africans significantly worse. In 1984 the crisis involved 36 African countries. And if we take into account the main role of foodstuffs in the consumer budget of the population (regardless of whether it is formed on a natural or market basis), and also the fact that 70 percent to 90 percent of the incomes of at least two-thirds of the workers in these countries (more than 200 million people) is formed through agriculture, then we gain an idea of the depth and scales of the disaster. The unique effect of the agrarian crisis on the living standard of the population is seen in the fact that it is the nonproletarian strata owning little or nothing that are suffering first and foremost and to the greatest degree. And the forms themselves in which the deterioration of their situation takes place as this crisis develops are also specific. The crisis brings not only a sharp reduction in income but often destroys the most fundamental conditions for existence and helps to increases the mortality rate resulting from prolonged and acute hunger (according to a UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) evaluation, during the Eighties drought and starvation in Africa are having more severe consequences than in 1972-1973, when at least 300,000 people died of starvation). [14] Thus, the effect of the agrarian crisis on the living standard of the population in the developing countries (primarily African countries) is also seen mainly in extremely harsh antediluvian forms, and because of its connection with structural factors it is characterized by a high degree of stability and its protracted nature.

* * * * *

As the liberated countries advance along the path of capitalist development, the role of industrial crises, developing in a modern sector associated with quite mature forms of industrial capital, increases in the destabilization of their economic growth. Already during the Seventies the number of industrial crises was growing sharply. Even according to the most approximate calculations (based on figures for 63 of the developing countries), during this period there were 75 industrial depressions against 35 during the

preceding decade. In half of the countries included in the analysis, during the two decades industrial production experienced crisis depressions more than twice, and in about 60 percent of all these countries they lasted from 6 months to 1 year, in one-third from 1.5 to 2 years, and in the remainder more than 2 years. [15] The maximum values characterizing the depression in industrial production varied from country to country but everywhere it interrupted the process of expanded reproduction. Because of the incomplete statistical information it is not possible to show the dynamics of industrial crises in the developing world as a whole over the past 5 years. The figures at our disposal apply only to 30 countries. Industrial crises occurred in all these countries during the period 1980-1982. [16] Even a highly aggregated indicator like contraction in the volume of industrial output in the entire developing world indicates the acute nature of these crises. The decline started in 1981, in 1982 its general index had fallen to 93.8, and in 1983 it stood at 95 (1980 = 100). Growth in the processing industries slowed sharply: 100 in 1980, 101.4 in 1981, 103.1 in 1982. [17] And in individual countries the decline in industrial output often reached 10 to 20 percent.

The industrial crises are exerting a marked and growing influence on the decline (or slowing growth) in the general indicators for the domestic gross product in the developing world. But the number of countries in which these crises play a main role in the development of the general economic depression is limited: according to approximate calculations they make up no more than two-thirds of the 30 states in which the available statistics indicate industrial crises in 1980-1982. It is, however, important to take into account the fact that it is precisely in these countries that a considerable proportion of the developing world's industrial production is concentrated. Analysis of the crisis situation in industry in these countries shows that in some cases it also reflects a crisis depression in the extractive and processing industries (as happened, for example, in 1983 in the Philippines and in 1984 in Bolivia), while in other countries stagnation and crisis phenomena in industrial growth result from a sharp decline in production mainly in the extractive industries. Finally, in a group of countries that is numerically small but significant in terms of its contribution in the processing industries of the developing world, the epicenter of the industrial crisis is being shifted or has already been shifted to the processing sector.

Today not enough figures are available to determine the number of countries in which the crisis in the extractive industries has played a main role in the general economic depression. But they evidently include primarily those countries in which the proportion of exports connected mainly with the extractive industries make up more than 30 percent of the domestic gross product. Sample figures from 22 countries with this kind of production structure showed that in 16 of them (6 mineral-exporting countries and 10 oil-exporting countries) it was precisely the crisis depression in the extractive industries in 1980-1983 that led to an absolute decline in national production. [18] The most acute crisis took place in the oil-recovery industry. In the main oil-exporting countries the production volume in the petroleum sector during the period 1979-1983 declined 41.6 percent. Accordingly, here the effect of the crisis in oil recovery on economic growth was seen quite clearly. During those years the dynamics in the development of the domestic gross product followed the curve for growth in the petroleum

sector: the annual decline in production varied between 1.1 percent and 4.3 percent, and for 1979-1983 as a whole the size of the domestic gross product in those countries fell 11 percent. [19]

During the period 1984-1986 oil recovery declined in most of the oil-exporting countries, and the sharp decrease in the prices for oil in 1986 will undoubtedly lead to an even more significant decline in their domestic gross products and will in many cases require a fundamental reexamination of development strategy.

The crises in the extractive industries played a growing role in the destabilization of economic growth during the depression period of 1980-1982. Analysis of available figures (see table 3) shows that in slightly less than half of the "new industrial" countries, in which about 50 percent of the industrial output is produced, the role of the processing sector in the development of the general economic crisis is becoming or has even become basic. Of course, other sectors of the economy are also slightly involved in its development. But, first, the crisis depression in these sectors is now to some extent linked directly with the crisis in the processing industries, and second, their effect is relatively small even though, with the exception of South Korea, the proportion of these sectors of the economy in the value of the domestic gross product does not exceed 10 to 15 percent.

Taking into account the existing differences in their nature from one country to another, during the Eighties the role of external factors has intensified everywhere in the development of industrial crises. This is the result, on the one hand, of the sharp deterioration in the world economic conjuncture and shifts in the international division of labor starting from the latter half of the Seventies, and on the other, the growing involvement of the present-day industrial sector in the young national states in the world capitalist economy. However, it would hardly be correct to link these industrial crises exclusively with the effect of external factors. External factors can play a main role in the development of crises if within a country there is no socioeconomic basis for a crisis depression, namely, a more or less capitalist industry. In this case the crisis has a purely external origin and, as K. Marx emphasized, is reflected in nature. [20] But today, a modern industrial sector has been formed in a number of the developing countries and its development is based on stages of the higher forms of capital, while the small-scale and small capitalist enterprises functioning within the national industry are predominantly linked directly with it and operate largely in the domestic market. The fact must also be taken into account that in these countries the modern industrial sector is gradually losing its enclave character, and in any case its direct socioeconomic dovetailing with the reproduction process of former homelands is gradually disappearing. For these reasons the industrial crises that developed in liberated countries that have already moved fairly well along the path of capitalism cause first and foremost an exacerbation of the reproduction contradictions in the industrial capital formed there. Of course, under conditions of the growing internationalization of the capitalist economy and the greater role of its new forms (intergration trends, nationalization), during the Eighties external factors have really aggravated the reproduction situation without the nonsocialist world, while in the liberated countries, because of their BLANK

Table 3. The Role of Crises in the Processing Industries during the 1979-1983 Depression (election figures)

Countries	Share of processing industries (%) 1980		Year		Production growth rate (or decline) (%)		
	in gross domestic product	in exports	precrisis maximum production	maximum decline in output	processing industries	gross domestic product	agriculture
Hongkong	23	96	1981	1982	—4,9	+2,2[1]	—0,9[1]
Singapore	29	46	1981	1982	—5,5	+6,3	—3,1
South Korea	29	80	1979	1980	—2,0	—3,0	—21,7
Brazil	27	33	1980	1983	—25,0	—3,8	+9,6
Argentina	30	23	1979	1982	—23,1	—10,0	+2,3
Uruguay	26	36	1980	1983	—32,5	—12,3	—4,5
Mexico	23[2]	11	1981	1983	—10,3	—5,8	+2,8

1. Calculated on the basis of nominal deflation of indexes in current prices

2. Excluding primary oil refining.

Compiled and calculated from: "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1982." Vol 1, Part I, p 1038 and Part II pp 1119 and 1505; "UN Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1983." pp 183, 311, 522; "UN Economic Survey of Latin America 1981." pp 82, 176, 746 and 1983 pp 78, 137, 442, 628; "UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics" No 2, 1985, pp LXXXII-XCVII, No 7 pp LXXI-LXXII and No 1 1986 pp 22-30, 222.

dependence and backwardness, the deformed nature of capitalist development has exerted a particularly strong influence on industrial growth, allowing developed capitalism partially to shift its own economic burdens onto them. But it is important to emphasize that external factors are not now the main reason for the industrial crises that develop there but rather play the role of a unique catalyst in their internal reproduction contradictions.

During the Eighties the very nature of these crises has become noticeably more complicated. The relatively high degree of maturity in local industrial capital and its considerable involvement in the world capitalist economy, which is now experiencing a cyclic depression, are what have caused the cyclic nature of the industrial crises occurring in the developing world. Of course, in the young national states that are less developed industrially the cyclic form of movement in the industrial capital functioning there is, as previously, introduced from without. The external origin of this form in the development of internal reproduction contradictions is also retained for industrial capital connected with the extractive sectors because here the crisis depression always develops, in K. Marx' words, in secondary form, that is, as a result of the crisis in the processing industries, in this case in the developed capitalist countries. However, in the young national states that are more developed industrially, and internal mechanism for the cyclic development of reproduction contradictions is obviously already being formed. This can also be seen by the presence there of the two conditions that K. Marx regarded as essential for the emergence of an industrial cycle (development of the stages of the higher forms of industrial capital and its broad ties with the world capitalist market), by the very structure of an industrial production characterized by a relatively high level of development in the primary sectors (in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico the proportion of machine building and metallurgy is already more than 20 percent of the value of industrial output) [21], and finally, by the universal nature of their industrial crises. Of course, the industrial cycle that forms here differs significantly from its classical model, inherent in capitalism of the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th century, because of state involvement in economic development and--the main thing--as the result of pressure on economic growth from the various kinds of specific structural factors inherent in a developing economy. Because of its profound imbalance, the industry being developed in the liberated countries leads first in one group of liberated countries and then in another, to the development of structural industrial crises accompanied by increased instability in industrial growth, protracted production cutbacks and stagnation phenomena, which must deform the cycle and complicate ways of dealing with the crisis situation.

It is common knowledge that the trend toward the development of structural crises in industry appeared first under the conditions of import-substitution industrialization. The sharp disproportions that occurred, and also the growing gap between industrial output and the capacity and structure of the domestic market, were realized in disturbance of the link between production and demand (both in the form of absolute underproduction and relative overproduction) and gave rise to stagnation phenomena in industrial development. [22] In some countries the slowdown in industrial growth lasted five years or more (as, for example, in India, the Philippines and Brazil). By the early Eighties in many of the developing countries we again saw the

contradictory nature and weakness of the unbalanced structure in industrial production, which under conditions of transition to an export orientation for industry and the extensive use of external development factors became more profound. Intensification of the processes of monopolization and transnationalization of national production and the undermining of market regulators in development because of growing voluntarist trends in the economic policy of a state combined with preservation of archaic forms of production (precapitalist and early capitalist) led to the formation of permanent disproportions throughout the entire economy, including the industrial sector, and to a growing gap between it and the domestic market and opportunities for funding it from its own sources (thus, in the Latin American countries the proportion of external funding was rising throughout the entire preceding period and in 1982 made up 15.7 percent of total investments against 7.4 percent in 1965 and 10.6 percent in 1975). [23]

Opportunities for an unbalanced development of the industrial sector have now been largely undermined because further use of the foreign market, which in earlier years enabled many developing countries to neutralize (or mitigate) the pressure of structural factors on industrial growth, is now problematical. It can therefore be stated that the cyclic crisis involving the industrial sector of the liberated countries in the Eighties has become interwoven with a structural industrial crisis that is distinguished from the agrarian structural crisis by its different nature and the different combination of structural factors under whose effect it is developing, and--the main thing--the qualitatively different socioeconomic basis for the permanent disturbance of the balance between production and demand. The industrial structural crises now developing in the liberated countries are associated with the reproduction contradictions of industrial capital whose mechanism of movement has been deformed by the dependent nature of the capitalism developing there and the pressure of the precapitalist and early capitalist milieus. Whereas the agrarian crises express a crisis of traditional social structures at the reproduction level, the industrial crises express a crisis of the dual social structure that has taken shape under conditions of realizing a rapid-growth strategy oriented on an unbalanced, focal development of modern forms of industrial capital.

Since the structural factors are exerting a growing influence on industrial growth, for most of the liberated countries finally overcoming the structural industrial crisis that started in the Eighties is hardly possible even in the medium long-term. It presupposes fundamental shifts in their socioeconomic development, and it will take a long time to do this (even if ruling circles set out on this path, which is quite problematical). Moreover, as has already been noted, opportunities for mitigating the structural industrial crisis through use of the foreign market (as was done in earlier years) have now been significantly curtailed. For a developing economy, the deterioration of external reproduction conditions has thus become a permanent trend. Of course, this trend will be somewhat mitigated as the capitalist world comes out of cyclic crisis, and also if the developing countries can gain for themselves economic concessions from the developed countries. Nevertheless, the trend will remain quite strong. Its action is determined by complex and irreversible processes, primarily the development of the structural crisis in the centers of world capitalism, and also those caused by the further

deepening of the scientific and technical revolution and fundamental shifts in the international division of labor; and in most countries the opportunities for adapting a developing economy to them remain limited, particularly in the processing industries. Transition to a higher technological basis and accelerated development in hi-tech sectors are being hampered by the seriousness of the employment problem, financial complications and the frequently still poor skill level of the work force and inadequate scientific potential.

Some prospects for the use of external factors still exist for a group of countries whose economic development relies more on the extractive industries. However, even they are experiencing difficulties (which will obviously grow) because of the structural shifts now taking place in the world capitalist economy, because they are accompanied by lower materials intensiveness and energy intensiveness in production. It is indicative that from 1973 to 1982 oil consumption declined 25 percent in the developed capitalist countries.

The increasing influence of industrial crises on the development of the general economic crisis is enhancing their role in lowering the living standards of the workers and makes it possible to assert that in the countries most developed industrially this decline in living standards is being increasingly determined by the law-governed patterns of capitalist production itself: affecting as they do primarily the present-day proletariat, industrial crises are exacerbating the problem of employment for the proletariat and promoting an absolute decline in nominal and real wages.

Because of the unsatisfactory condition of the statistics characterizing the living standards of the proletariat it is impossible to show an integrated picture of the decline in living standards during the period that the economic crisis has been developing. Notwithstanding, it can be asserted that during the Eighties the pressure of the industrial crises on the workers has been growing and has been seen primarily in the most developed countries of Latin America which have experience a serious decline in industrial production (during the period 1981-1983 industrial growth declined in absolute terms by at least 2.5 percent). [24]

In these countries development of the industrial crisis has resulted in a sharp decline in the employment level in the modern sectors, primarily industry. Thus, in Argentina already by 1981 urban unemployment growth rates had reached 4.4 percent (against 2.2 percent in 1980), and the employment level in the processing industries had fallen 13 percent. [25] In Brazil, where a serious recession is also being observed, the level of urban unemployment increased from 7.3 percent (1981) [26] to 9.1 percent (1984). [27] A similar situation was observed in those years in Mexico, Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica. The growing problem of employment has been accompanied by a relative and frequently absolute decrease in wages (in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Bolivia). Thus, in Argentina already be 1981 it had fallen (in real terms) 11 percent, standing at 70 percent of the 1974 level. [28] Despite some increase in the nominal wage in subsequent years increases have lagged behind price increases for consumer goods. In

Mexico a very sharp fall in real wages (40 percent [29]) occurred in 1981-1982. Similar trends can be traced in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and some other Latin American countries.

Thus, the industrial crisis that has started in the Eighties has tangibly affected the population strata associated with modern production. The protracted decline in economic growth rates resulting from it will in the future worsen the situation even more because the desire to neutralize this trend (and its adverse consequences for capital) will most likely slow even more the flow of manpower into the industrial sector, reduce even more a national consumption fund already contracted in absolute terms, and wages, and limit increases in imports of consumer goods.

* * * * *

The crisis that has been developing since the early Eighties in the liberated countries has effected broad strata of the population and promoted a further deterioration of their position. In the least developed countries an enormous effect on the lowering of the workers' living standards has been felt from the agrarian crisis, traditional for a backward economy, that involves the export and food sectors of agriculture. In the most developed countries the effect of the industrial crisis on the deteriorating condition of the workers has intensified.

The economic crisis of the Eighties has had numerous adverse consequences for the broad masses of the population throughout the nonsocialist world. In the developing countries, however, it has also been more acute than in the developed countries because these consequences have been superimposed on poverty and destitution of a fundamentally different nature and scale than in the centers of world capitalism, because they have been seen in more odious forms, and because the possibilities for the workers involved in the crisis to fight for their economic interests are limited.

FOOTNOTES

1. "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics" New York, 1967, p 819; New York, 1976, Vol 2, p 124; New York, 1983, Vol 2, p 203.

2. Calculated from "UN Yearbook of National Statistics." Vol 2, New York, 1982, p 203; "UN World Economic Survey 1985." New York, 1985, pp 8, 105.

3. Calculated from "UN World Economic Survey, 1985." New York, 1985, pp 8, 105.

4. "UN World Economic Survey 1984." p 73.

5. "UN World Economic Survey 1985." p 106.

6. In this case the decline in production (gross domestic product) is regarded as critical if it lasts at least a year, involves an absolute per capita decline and signifies serious misfires in the reproduction process. Because of the lack of statistical data, during the Sixties only 46

countries were observed, but already by the Seventies and Eighties the number was almost 70. Calculated from "UN Yearbook of National Statistics" New York, 1967; New York 1976; New York 1983.

7. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany: ekonomicheskiy rost i sotsialnyy progress" [The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress], Moscow, 1983, Chapter 2.

8. Ibid., p 615. Because of the lack of statistical data the table does not include group III countries, in which 0.1 percent of the population of the developing world lived in the late Seventies and 0.7 percent of its gross national product was concentrated.

9. FAO MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS No 11, 1984, pp 13, 15.

10. "UN World Economic Survey 1985." pp 17, 19.

11. Ibid., p 16.

12. UNDRO NEWS Sep/Oct 1984.

13. "World Economic Outlook. A Survey by the Staff of the Internaitonal Monetary Fund." Washington, 1983, p 66.

14. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 5, 1984, p 13.

15. Calculated from "UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics." Vol 2, New York, 1967; Vol 2, New York, 1983. (Calculations include only the industrial sector because in the liberated countries it is precisely this sector that is associated with the stages in the higher forms of production capital and plays a main role in the development of modern production).

16. Calculated from "International Financial Statistics." Vol XXXVII, N X, August 1984, pp 121-122; "UN Statistical Yearbook for Latin America." Santiago de Chile, 1983, pp 134, 141.

17. UN MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS No 2, 1985, pp XVIII-XIX.

18. Calculated from "International Financial Statistics." Vol XXXVII, N X, August 1984, pp 121-122.

19. "World Economic Outlook. A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund." Washington, 1984, pp 1, 170.

20. K. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Works. Vol 6, p 350. It is therefore difficult to agree with the opinion recently expressed that "proceeding from the high degree of the effect of external factors on the emergence of the crisis in Latin America... it is possible to talk about its reflected nature." MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 5, 1985, p 109.

21. "UN Statistical Yearbook for Latin America 1983." Santiago de Chile, 1983,

p 147.

22. For further detail on the structural crises in industry in the developing countries see "The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress." op. cit., Chapter IV.

23. "UN Statistical Yearbook for Latin America 1983." Santiago de Chile, 1984, p 158.

24. Ibid., p 141.

25. "UN Economic Survey of Latin America 1981." Santiago de Chile, 1983, pp 26, 27.

26. Ibid., p 27.

27. RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR No 1, 1985, p 161.

28. "UN Economic Survey of Latin America 1981." op. cit., p 61.

29. RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR No 1, 1985, p 162.

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EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' VIEWS ON PEACE, DISARMAMENT NOTED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 102-116

[Article by V.Ya. Shveytser: "Preventing Nuclear War: the Positions of the West European Social Democrats"]

[Excerpts] The explosive international situation in the mid-Eighties, connected primarily with the aggressive direction of the course being pursued by the present U.S. Administration and NATO, is causing serious concern throughout the world, including among broad circles of the population of West Europe. The workers in this region, whose territory has in this century been the arena for two bloody wars and has today through the fault of imperialism been transformed into a powder keg, are recognizing with increasing keenness the danger, in the event of a continued arms race, of the demise of human civilization. They are gradually coming to an understanding of the obvious truth that the struggle to satisfy vital interests can hold out any promise only under conditions of a guaranteed peace.

Taking these circumstances into account, the West European social democrats are seeking out their own approaches to find solutions for the key questions of disarmament, to which their generally firm positions bind them within the system of political institutions. In this region there is virtually no state in which parties that are members of the Socialist International (SI) have not from the mid-Seventies through the mid-Eighties been part of the governments or played an important role in the legislative organs. Consequently, the social democrats' participation in fashioning and pursuing the foreign policy course of the West makes them a significant factor in present-day international relations.

As they strive to consolidate their claims to active participation in world policy, the social democrats act not only as a national force operating within the confines of individual states but also as a movement united in particular international organizations, first and foremost the SI, which since the mid-Seventies has regarded problems of international security as a key aspect of its course. At the 13th SI Congress (Geneva 1976) its president, W. Brandt, declared a "new start" for this organization and set as its main task "an offensive to guarantee peace," meaning by this the activation of efforts by social democrats in the direction of detente and disarmament. [1]

The intervening years have confirmed that the broad range of issues connected with the struggle for peace have been constantly held in the field of vision of the SI and its leading parties. This theme has been pivotal in the agenda of all five SI congresses taking place during the period 1976-1986, not to mention the regular sessions of its permanent organs--the Bureau and Presidium. The SI has convened two disarmament conferences, in Helsinki (April 1978) and Vienna (October 1985). Questions of military relaxation have been dealt with by the SI Working Group on Disarmament set up in 1978 and transformed in 1980 into an SI Bureau permanent organ--the Consultative Council on Disarmament--which is headed, as was the earlier group, by the leader of the Finnish social democrats K. Sorsa.

During the Eighties the problems of military relaxation became the main subject at numerous meetings of the West European social-democratic parties. The Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]--the party in the country that stands at the boundary of the opposition between East and West--shows the greatest activity in organizing and holding them. Since early 1981 Scandilux--a consultative organ of the social democrats from a group of NATO countries (Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg)--has been functioning. Representatives from the SPD, the British Labor Party and the French socialists attend as observers in Scandilux.

Not setting for himself the task of dealing in their entirety with the concepts and practice of social democracy in the Eighties on questions of the struggle for peace and against the arms race, the author has focused his attention on the essential nature of the social-reformist interpretation of the relaxation of international tension, the attitudes of social democrats to the arms race, the interconnections between parties that are members of the SI and the West European peace movement, and contacts on the problem of disarmament between the CPSU and the other fraternal parties of the countries of the socialist community and the social democrats.

Social-Democratic Concepts of Detente.

When they advocate the restoration of detente as the mode of international relations most acceptable for all states on our planet [2], the social democrats proceed from the specific interests of the movement that they lead. In the opinion of the social democratic leaders a climate of peace in the world reinforces people's faith in the future, including the prospects for building "democratic socialism." A slackening in the arms race will create the preconditions for social-reformist initiatives in the economy and promote the redistribution of means used also to modernize the system of state monopoly regulation. The social democrats consider that in a period of lower international tension the belief will be fostered among broad strata of the population in the principles of democracy, which is the basis of "democratic socialism." The events of the mid-Seventies showed that all-European detente to some degree favored the transition made by Greece, Spain and Portugal from regimes of dictatorship to bourgeois-democratic forms of government. Here, for the leaders of the SI it was especially important that in subsequent years the social-reformist parties would be able to consolidate their positions in those countries.

Nor can the circumstance that the peak of the postwar electoral successes gained by the social democrats in a number of West European countries occurred during the greater part of the Seventies be considered fortuitous. And contrariwise, the strengthening of the positions of conservative forces in the bourgeois camp took place at the turn of the Seventies and Eighties when, as is known, as the result of the actions of imperialist forces detente started to experience obvious misfires. The situation in which the glaciers of the "cold war" started to move once again, aggravating the general crisis of capitalism with new strains, led to a situation in which part of the social democratic electorate, particularly in Great Britain, the FRG, Denmark and Norway, responded to the demagogy of conservative circles and gave them their political sympathies.

Detente, the SI leaders suggest, will also help to solve another important task that the social democrats set themselves in the mid-Seventies and which W. Brandt defined as "new relations between the North and the South." The bridge connecting the two problems--disarmament and development--should be a redistribution of some of the means used for military purposes into the sphere of aid for the liberated states. "Our party notes," (L. Budtts), one of the leaders of the Danish social democrats, has reminded us, "that rearming places a heavy burden on the economic and political structures in all states East and West and diverts resources that could have been used to help the developing countries." [3] However, while upholding the interconnection between disamament and development, the social democrats are guided not only by considerations of a global nature but also the ideological-political demands of their own movement. Setting themselves the task in the historical perspective of effecting a social-democratization of political trends in the liberated states, the SI leaders suggest that by placing the emphasis on the needs of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and, moreover, advertising themselves as pioneers in the noble mission of helping countries that have thrown off the yoke of colonialism, they will be able to attract into the ranks of their own international organization a broad range of parties from the so-called Third World.

The social democrats constantly emphasize that there is no alternative to detente and that to return the world to the path of cooperation is possible only by making progress in arms reductions. In this connection the SPD leadership puts forward the concept of "two phases" in the policy of detente, regarding the latter as an integrated process whose most important component is not only the cooperation partially achieved in the political sphere during the Seventies but also progress in the field of disarmament, essential for the Eighties. According to W. Brandt it is now essential "... to monitor things carefully to prevent a gap from forming between political and military detente." [4]

At the same time, particularly at the turn of the Seventies and Eighties, the social democrats were unable to provide an objective evaluation of the main causes that had led the world to the brink of thermonuclear catastrophe. Rejecting the version about "a threat to peace" exclusively from the USSR, which was current during the "cold war," the social democrats now speak about the supposed equal responsibility of the two "superpowers"--the USSR and the

United States--for the failure of detente in the political sphere and the intensification in the arms race.

The new situation prevailing in the world in the Eighties required from the social democrats a modification of their international doctrines. It was necessary to offer an alternative to the neoconservative foreign policy pursued by R. Reagan, M. Thatcher, H. Kohl and other rightist figures in the bourgeois camp. Whereas for these leaders in the West the concept of "balance of terror" was the starting point for an arms buildup, the social democrats suggested another way. Thus, at a meeting of the SI bureau in November 1983 in Brussels a resolution was adopted which pointed out in particular that "... the present 'balance of terror' should be replaced with a balance of reason reflected in the corresponding concept of joint security." [8]

The Arms Race: the Social Democrats' Answer.

Whereas the concepts of the social democrats reflecting their attitude to the struggle for peace and to limit the arms race, and to the efforts of other forces of the age in dealing with the present tension in international affairs are unique searches for an ideal to which the reformist part of the workers' movement strives, their practical course is shaped primarily under the influence of the specific political situation. In this connection it is important to distinguish the scale of priorities that determine the "national versions" of the policy of individual social democratic parties on urgent international problems. First of all these are the foreign policy orientation and degree of involvement in the process of the West's preparations for war in given countries where the corresponding national detachments of the social democrats operate. Thus, the position and even less the practice of SI parties from the neutral European countries do not usually coincide with the actions of their colleagues from states that are part of NATO. We note that some members of this bloc (France, Spain, Greece) are not part of its military structure and this also determines the unique nature of actions by the local socialists.

Another parameter on the scale of priorities is the place occupied by the social democrats within the system of political power in the corresponding West European states, that is, the degree of their representation in the highest legislative and executive organs. Freedom of action for parties in a coalition (particularly when they are the "junior partner") is more limited than for social democrats that form a one-party government or who have much greater weight within a coalition than their partners (on the right and the left). On the other hand, it is hardly possible to place under a common denominator the social democrats who to one degree or another possess the levers of power and those who are in opposition. The advantage for the latter is that since they do not carry governmental responsibility they are freer in any kind of alternative proposals whose true value, however, depends on to what degree they are implemented during a period when the political swing again "brings" the local social democrats to the helm of government.

The struggle between the various trends within the corresponding parties also leaves a certain impression on the course fashioned by the social democrats, including on international issues. Neither should we ignore the influence

exerted on the social democrats by the mass organizations of the workers, both traditional (first and foremost the trade unions) and the new social movements (the antiwar and ecological movements). The degree of pressure from the mass organizations depends in turn on circumstances such as the keenness of the class struggle within a country and the influence and activeness of the masses in the matter of resolving issues connected with the arms race.

The central problem around which the entire policy of the social democrats revolves is the participation of most West European countries in the activity of NATO. In contrast to the situation during the "cold war" period, when NATO was regarded by "democratic socialists" exclusively as an instrument of confrontation with the socialist community, today in social democratic circles the call is heard with increasing persistence not to oppose "bloc policy" and the desire to relax international tension. Thus, asserting that "the system of alliances in the form in which it now exists fulfills, inter alia, the function of insuring security in Europe," E. Bahr sees in this an opportunity for realizing the idea of "partnership for security." [14] The latter can be achieved only jointly with a potential enemy, that is, with the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, since NATO is "an instrument of balance," it at the same time carries out the function of maintaining a balance in the policy of security. The ideas expressed by E. Bahr have also been reflected in the program documents of the SPD. Thus, in late January 1984 the SPD Board issued a document entitled "For a New Strategy of Alliance." This document stressed the need to achieve compromise agreements between Nato and the Warsaw Pact, and, according to the SPD, NATO should orient its strategy on a search for ways to prevent a policy of confrontation and the arms race. [15]

We note that even a few years ago leftist circles in a number of SI parties (the British Labor Party, the Norwegian Labor Party, the Dutch Labor Party, and the Danish Social Democratic Party) were actively advocating that their countries withdraw from NATO. However, the buildup in international tension has led to a situation in which these ideas have been less in evidence. Nevertheless, some social democrats on the left are raising the question of more limited participation by their countries in NATO than previously. For example, asserting that "NATO is outdated," O. Lafonten, an eminent SPD figure and prime minister of the Saar Land, has proposed that the FRG choose the "French way," that is, withdraw from the NATO military organization. [16]

Some social democrats, particularly those from the countries that are militarily and politically dependent on the United States, are obviously fascinated by the fact that France, which withdrew from the NATO military organization as long ago as De Gaulle's time, has, in their opinion, acquired greater national independence within the West European framework. However, as shown by practice in the French Socialist Party, which led the French government during the period 1981-1986, the government did not maintain the line that it had promised immediately before the socialists came to power. Thus, the "Socialist Plan" (1980) emphasized that "NATO remains for our country an essential counterweight to Soviet might in Europe, but it must not serve as a pretext for aligning France with the positions of world imperialism or for integrating it directly or indirectly in the U.S. strategic system in Europe." [17]

Notwithstanding, it can be stated that at the turn of the Seventies and Eighties definite changes have been seen in the evaluation made by social democrats from the NATO countries of the U.S. role in the alliance. Whereas before R. Reagan came to power and the policy of "from a position of strength" pursued by the new administration had been initiated, recognition of the United States' leadership within NATO was regarded as self-evident, by the mid-Eighties the emphasis had started to shift. For example, discussions within the Scandilux framework resulted in the concept of "a broad and independent Europe in the defense of the West." Without raising the question of a breach in political and military relations with the United States, the Scandilux social democrats insisted on giving their own countries greater rights in resolving the issues of this bloc's policy and strategy and greater freedom in the question of easing relations with the East. The final document of a conference of social democrats from the NATO memeber countries that took place in December 1985 in Bonn stated the need to create within NATO "a truly European basis." Thus, once again it was stressed that the social democrats see in the traditional "Atlantic solidarity" not only a clamp that links all NATO allies but also an important lever for strengthening the independent role of West Europe in international affairs.

Without breaking with NATO, some social-democratic parties are nevertheless are trying to find new ways to reduce the risk that their states become involved in a possible thermonuclear conflict. In a report entitled "For a Realistic and Responsible Defense Policy" published by a group of SPD experts, the following is stressed: "We see no danger in denying nuclear weapons to the NATO land forces and air forces in Europe. On the contrary, this would become a decisive step toward improving security." [18] The plan to create a nuclear-free and chemical-free zone in Central Europe drawn up jointly with the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] can be regarded in the same context as the SPD proposals aimed at reducing the threat of war. According to this plan, made known by the SPD faction in the Bundestag in October 1985, FRG territory should be cleared of combat nerve and paralyzing agents made in the United States, after which some NATO countries (the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) should reach agreement with Warsaw Pact member states (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland) to proclaim their territories a zone where deployment of chemical weapons is impermissible.

One solution to the problem of national security is also the proclamation of nuclear-free zones by given groups of European states. In particular, this question of zones was reflected in the discussions and documents of the 16th SI Congress in 1983 in Portugal. In the words of the leader of the Danish Social Democratic Party, A. Jorgensen, "work by the socialist parties of Northern Europe on the concept of creating nuclear-free zones is a concrete step in the struggle for peace." [19] The same thought is present in the "Albufeira Declaration" issued by the 16th SI Congress: "... we regard positively the possibility of setting up a Scandinavian nuclear-free zone within the larger European context, as proposed by the social democratic parties of Scandinavia." [20] We note that proposals regarding the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe have also been put forward by the leaders of the Flemish section of the socialist movement in Belgium.

If, however, we talk about the content imparted by the social democrats to the concept of nuclear-free zones, then the ideas, which have a rational core, are sometimes accompanied by conditions that make realization of these proposals difficult. In particular, some social democrats think that the creation of such zones could come about only as the result of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the entire complex of disarmament problems, although independent actions by the corresponding countries of Northern Europe might provide exactly the impetus needed for these negotiations. The leaders of the Danish and Norwegian social democrats consider one indispensable condition for creating such a zone to be a guarantee not only from the USSR (which has already repeatedly been confirmed by the Soviet government) but also the United States, although it is known that the U.S. administration sees "nuclear-free zones" as a deliberate breach of the NATO defense system.

Given all the contradictory nature and inconsistency in the social democrats' approach to the problem of nuclear-free zones, it should be pointed out that the activation of their efforts in the Eighties has been in some sense a reaction to the new round in the nuclear arms race that started following the decision of the December 1979 session of the NATO Council to deploy U.S. intermediate range missiles from the autumn of 1983 on the territory of a number of NATO countries. Today, an absolute majority of SI parties in West Europe have assumed a sharply negative position in regard to the "Euromissiles." Among the parties in countries where deployment of the mssiles has already started only the socialists and social democrats who have come to power in Italy support the NATO "missile" decision. The British Labor Party, representatives of the Dutch Labor Party, the socialist parties in Belguim and the social democrats in the FRG are expressing in one form or another the desire to reconsider the question of missiles after they are returned to power.

The "star wars" plans have caused particular objections in the SPD, the more so since the government of H. Kohl, which is now in power, has announced the FRG's desire to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative. Thus, in the opinion of E. Eppler, an eminent figure in the left wing of the SPD, Reagan's idea to create a "space shield" is a utopia. "But this utopia," Eppler notes, "is not only false it is fatally dangerous: and not only for an enemy but also primarily for those who seek it." [23] E. Bahr has pointed out another aspect of the dangerous plans of the U.S. administration. In his words, "in the U.S. program for the militarization of space we can clearly trace as never before the desire for superiority." [24] The extremely negative consequence of SDI were also obvious to the SPD leaders. "Our party," (L. Budtts) notes, "is against the militarization of space in any form: it would lead to an unrestrained arms race in a place where at the moment it does not exist." [25] In (Budtts') opinion the "star wars" program also hides another danger: it could become a reason for halting Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks. We note that sharp criticism of the U.S. plans was also heard at the Vienna (1985) SI disarmament conference. The "Vienna Appeal" stated that the SI member parties "reject SDI and other similar concepts." [26]

In general it can be stated that by the mid-Eighties, given all the inconsistencies in and the contradictory nature of actions in the position of the social democrats on issues associated with NATO and general defense

strategy for the West, there has been a clear trend toward greater dissociation than heretofore from the adventurist course of the United States. The growing realism in this sphere is the result of a number of circumstances, including the extensive antiwar movement, which has become a new phenomenon in European politics during the first half of this decade.

The Attitude toward the Antiwar Movement.

Today, in one form or another eminent figures among the social democrats recognize that those fighting for peace have already played an important role in mobilizing West Europeans in the struggle against thermonuclear conflict and have promoted among the masses the popularization of plans to prevent it. Entering into polemic with neoconservatism on the entire complex of foreign policy problems, some social democratic leaders dissociate themselves from the extremely negative attitude of rightist forces in the bourgeois camp toward the antiwar movement and the goals and tasks that it pursues. "In contrast to our adversaries," W. Brandt stated in his speech at the 16th SI Congress, "we do not think that the international movement in defense of peace is operating in the interests of specific groups." [28] In the words of A. Jorgensen, who also spoke at the same forum, "in their struggle socialists should rely on the peace movement, which has in recent times demonstrated its activeness in political arena." [29]

Since throughout their entire history they have been closely associated with the mass democratic organizations and have used them as a reserve for augmenting their own membership and relied on them in the struggle to gain voters, the social democrats take into account, in particular, the broad contacts between the antimilitarist movement and the youth and women's organizations, and since the early Eighties the trade union organizations having a social-democratic orientation. The latters' support for those fighting for peace has become one of the decisive internal factors influencing the positive evolution of social-democratic policy.

The ruling social democrats in countries pursuing a course of active neutrality--Sweden, Finland, Austria--offer very significant support to the national organizations of the supporters of peace. For example, the Swedish government not only approves the actions of the antiwar movement in its own country but is in solidarity with those fighting for peace in other European states. The participation of leaders from the Swedish and Austrian social democrats in antiwar meetings is also indicative. The rapprochment between the social democrats and the antiwar movement in the neutral countries has been helped by the authority of eminent figures in those states as active fighters for peace. For example, O. Palme, who was villanously murdered on 28 February 1986, enjoyed universal respect not only in Sweden but far beyond its borders and did much to strengthen trust and cooperation between peoples in his position as chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament Questions.

For their part, the antiwar movements in Sweden and Finland actively advocate peace initiatives (a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe and a nuclear-missile-free zone in Central Europe) that have been put forward or are supported by the leaders of the Social Democratic Labor Party of Sweden and

the Social Democratic Party of Finland. At the same time the relations between the social democrats and the antiwar organizations in the neutral countries are not totally serene. However, the "bone of contention" here is not foreign policy measures but increased defense expenditures (in Sweden) or the attempts to sell arms to certain military-dictatorial regimes, which have been rebuffed by those fighting for peace in Austria. It is also indicative that as a rule the leftist social democrats, who are activists in the antiwar movement, also criticize their own governments on these issues.

Whereas the neutrality of a country led by social democrats positively influences their relations with the antiwar movement, the situation is different in countries where governments led by the socialist are actively involved in the arms race, both within the framework of the NATO organization and outside it. In particular, the well-known role of the Italian socialists in pushing through the NATO decision on the "arms buildup" [dovooruzheniye] (December 1979) as it were defined their generally negative attitude toward the peace movement in their own country. Quite recently they were given the post of prime minister in the country, and this strengthened this trend even more in the policy of the socialists, who have called the antiwar movement in Italy an "anti-order" factor that allegedly not only weakens the very shaky Italian democracy but also the country's position within NATO. In Craxi's words, "... it is not possible to organize illegal demonstrations and movements whose goal is to hinder or block the construction of a military base or any other project or installation that has to do with a public order or the country's security." [30]

After the French socialists gained power in the French government, while pursuing a course aimed at strengthening the country's military might, the government slighted the antiwar movement in every possible way as "pacifist" and "neutralist." Here it was also pursuing a purely pragmatic role, namely, to prevent mass movements, which, as the history of France shows, have always helped to strengthen the positions not of the reformist but rather the revolutionary part of the workers' movement. Thus, the French Socialist Party is trying to prevent any consolidation of PCF positions (especially since the latter withdrew from the government). Obviously, the negative attitude of the French Socialist Party and the Italian Socialist Party to the mass struggle for peace is a factor that weakens the antiwar movement in France and Italy.

When they gain power or, contrariwise, lose it, parties that are members of the SI alter their own positions significantly on military issues, and this must be reflected in their relations with the national peace movement. Since they have been removed from the helm of the ship of state the Danish social democrats have been looking more soberly at the problem of NATO's preparations for war. The Norwegian Labor Party, which is also now in opposition, has officially spoken out against the Euromissiles. All this has brought the antiwar slogans of the social democrats in these countries closer to the position of the local peace movement and promoted broader participation in the movement by the rank-and-file members of these parties.

Obviously, the degree of activeness by social democrats in opposition and the degree to which their programs diverge from the course of the bourgeois-conservative governments also affects in a most direct way the relations

between the social democrats and the antiwar movement. The critical attitude of members of the British Labor Party regarding the United States' and NATO's preparations for war and their wide support for the local antinuclear movement became possible thanks to the increased opposition by the British Labor Party to the course of the conservatives not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy. This can also be seen in the official support by the British Labor Party for the mass demonstrations organized by the "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" and the participation by eminent Labor figures such as M. Foot, A. Benn and N. Kinnock in antiwar meetings.

Recent events indicate that while in opposition the social democrats in a number of the NATO countries are more positive than when in power with regard to the demands and slogans of the antiwar movement and in terms of ideas within the parties. Removal from power usually leads to turmoil within the ranks of the social democrats and a reappraisal of values, and leftist party groups demand that the party pay more attention to the antimilitarist actions by the masses. Turning once again to the example of the SPD we see that the activity of the left wing immediately before the most recent party congresses promoted a general turn by the party toward the antiwar movement. And it is not fortuitous that one-time influential leaders in the SPD such as H. Schmidt, (G. Leber) and (G. Apel)--the enemies of extraparliamentary actions by the masses--were in an obvious minority. Another example indicating that a weakening in the position of the right wing strengthens the influence within the party of those that support union with antiwar organizations can be seen in the British Labor movement. The withdrawal from the British Labor Party in 1981 of a group of rightists to form the Social Democratic Party activated those members of the Labor Party who had always spoken out in support of the British peace movement.

Given all the significant features of the situation in the individual parties, the delineation between most social democrats and the conservative political camp in respect to the peace movement is now quite obvious. While expressing in one form or another support for the antiwar movement the SI also points out the fundamental difference between its own position and the viewpoint of conservative circles in respect to the antiwar movement. For it is not happenstance, for example, that in 1982 a faction of the West European conservative parties in the European parliament issued a decision on the creation of a special committee to oppose those fighting for peace. Comparison of the two positions in individual countries is also indicative. Whereas the government of M. Thatcher used force against the women sitting-in at the base at Greenham Common, the British Labor Party sharply condemned this violence. Whereas the CDU/CSU-FDP government promulgated a special law against those participating in the antimissile movement, providing imprisonment for those fighting for peace, the SPD spoke out against these measures in the Bundestag.

The strategy of the social democrats with respect to the antiwar movements is now built in such a way that, as a rule, while not officially participating in the mass actions by a public in an antimilitarist mood but regarding this as a private matter for the individual memebers of their own parties, the leading organs in most of these parties make use of this for their ties with the peace movement. Thus, in the opinion of the social democrats, they will on the one

hand be able to maintain the respectability of a force supporting "law and order" and, on the other, rely on antiwar circles among the public in the political struggle against the adversary on the right. In this connection we point to the example of the Dutch Labor Party, the SPD and the British Labor Party, whose eminent figures participate actively in antiwar organizations in their own countries such as the Dutch "No! to Cruise Missiles," the "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" (Great Britain) and the "(Krefeld) Movement" (FRG). While declining to offer direct support for some of the actions of those fighting for peace that the social democrats consider doubtful, eminent social democrats are prepared to participate in them as "private individuals." For example, the SPD did not support the idea put forward by the FRG peace movement for a national referendum on the issue of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the country, timed for the elections to the European parliament (June 1984). At the same time some party leaders, including W. Brandt, signed the special "antimissile" petitions distributed by referendum activists. A similar situation is seen in Austria, where officially the local socialist party does not support the platform of the antiwar movement--the "Linz Appeal"--but has no objection to officials of the Austrian Socialist Party, including its leading figures, supporting this document on an individual basis.

Communists and Social Democrats: Continuation of the Dialogue.

Recent events testify to the fact that, by supporting the concept of returning to a relaxation of international tension, participating in one form or another in the movement for peace and against the arms race, and in some cases assuming a position different from the United States and bourgeois-conservative forces in Europe on questions concerning the way in which NATO functions, the social democrats are capable of making a positive contribution to the cause of preventing thermonuclear war. Given all the differentiation of positions both between parties that are members of the Socialist International and within the parties, in general it can be stated that the social democrats' course with respect to questions of war and peace has moved more in line with the fundamental aspirations of the international working class and all workers. This offers hope on the plane of the historical prospective for an even greater contribution by the social democrats in creating in the world a situation of guaranteed peace. In this connection, speaking at a meeting with a delegation from the Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament (March 1985), CPSU Central Committee general secretary M.S. Gorbachev noted as follows: "Taking into account their political weight and influence, the parties of the Socialist International can do much to promote improvement in the international atmosphere and halt the arms race, and increase their contribution in the cause of saving mankind from nuclear catastrophe." [31]

The problem of mankind's survival, which in the latter part of this century is raised with greater keenness than at any other previous time, requires a search for a mutually acceptable basis for cooperation by all forces interested in a real change in international events. And here, cooperation between the two main detachments of the workers' movements--the communists and the social democrats--is not only vitally necessary but, based on recent experience, quite realistic. Despite the certain oscillations in the social-

democratic milieu it is obvious that this part of the workers' movement is in general the closest partner of real socialism and the international communist movement in the struggle to reestablish an atmosphere of trust and cooperation in the key issue of world policy.

Advocating contacts and dialogue with all political forces in the West, communists pay attention to the fact that, while not breaking with the military-political system of capitalism, the social democrats nevertheless are trying to prevent the development of processes that promote confrontation between the two social systems. Their rejection of Marxism-Leninism is not a hindrance to cooperation with the revolutionary part of the workers movement in the struggle for peace, both at the level of mass movements in general in a number of countries and in the sphere of "major policy." Neither does the rejection of real socialism as the system that most adequately reflects the vital interests of the workers' movement create for the social democrats an insurmountable barrier for cooperation with the ruling parties in the states of the socialist communities. [32]

The common ground in the understanding of a broad range of problems connected with the arms race has led to the establishment of contacts between the ruling parties in the countries of the socialist community and leading social-democratic parties in the West. The latest confirmation of this was the presence at the 27th CPSU Congress of guests representing 15 parties that are members of the SI, including social democrats from the FRG, Sweden and Finland, socialists from France, Italy and Spain, and members of the British Labor Party. Bilateral ties are also being actively developed between the ruling parties in the countries of the socialist community and leading West European members of the Socialist International. In particular, already in 1985 a working group from the CPSU and the SPD dealing with issues concerning cutbacks in military expenditures and using part of the funds freed up for giving aid to developing countries had started its activity. Another aspect of the disarmament problem--the creation in Europe of a chemical-weapon-free zone--is the subject of a study by a working group set up by the SED and SPD. We note that the fruitful cooperation between these parties was assessed highly at the October 1985 Vienna meeting of the SI Bureau.

In recent years some experience has been gained in the mutual exchange of opinions between the CPSU and the Socialist International. Thus, in 1978 and 1985 a Soviet delegation took part in the above-mentioned SI disarmament conferences. A working group and the SI Consultative Council on Disarmament set up on this basis visited Moscow in 1979, 1982 and 1985, where they met with the CPSU leadership and representatives of the Soviet public. Both at the meetings on various scales held within the SI framework and in the statements by individual figures in this organization a high evaluation has been made of the constructive initiatives from the USSR on questions of limiting the arms race. This aspect of the social democrats' position serves as an important addition to the efforts by both sides in the practical realization of the "program for survival" that in recent times has been a priority task for all the political forces of the age.

FOOTNOTES

1. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1977, p 8.

2. "... If correctly understood, despite all the discrepancies, detente is is the general interests of, and, if correctly pursued, to the advantage of all participants": this is what W. Brandt said at the 14th SI Congress that took place in Vancouver (Canada) in November 1978. (SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1979, p 7).

3. (L. Buddts). "To Develop Dialogue, To Strengthen Trust." PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 1, 1986, p 70.

4. VORWAERTS 4 Jan 1986.

8. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1984, p 7.

14. E. Bahr. "Was wird aus den Deutschen?" [What Will Become of the Germans?], Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1982, p 22.

15. VORWAERTS 9 Feb 1984.

16. O. Lafonten. "Angst vor dem Freuden" [Anxiety about Friends], Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1983, p 81.

17. "Projet socialiste pour la France des annees" [Socialist Plan for France for the Times], Paris, 1981, p 340.

18. VORWAERTS 21 Sep 1985.

19. "O mundo em crise. A resposta social." [The World in Crisis. A Social Response], Lisbon, 1983, p 107.

20. Ibid., p 39.

23. E. Eppler. "Die toedliche Utopie der Sicherheit." [The Deadly Utopia of Security], Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1983, p 28.

24. E. Bahr. "Partnership instead of Confrontation." PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 7, 1984, p 81.

25. (L. Buddts). op. cit., p 72.

26. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 4, 1985, p 2.

28. "The World in Crisis..." op. cit., p 20.

29. Ibid., p 106.

30. L'ESPRESSO 9 Oct 1983.

31. PRAVDA 23 Mar 1985.

32. "The great and positive result of our policy of detente," W. Brandt notes, "is that we have subordinated ideological disagreements to the need for peaceful coexistence between states. In other words, insuring peace is more important than disputes about theories, or, in other words, there is no struggle between world outlooks, no matter how important it may be, that because of it specific agreements between states on cooperation, disarmament and maintaining the peace should suffer." DIE NEUE GESELLSCHAFT No 10, 1983, p 932.

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U.S. 'IDEOLOGICAL EXPANSIONISM' IN W. EUROPE ASSAILED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 149-161

[Article by S.D. Polzikov: "West Europe: U.S. Ideological-Political Expansionism"]

[Text] The course of the political trend of the times differs from the seasonal changes of the year. The relatively warm autumn in international politics in 1985 was replaced with the colds and thaws of winter, a cool spring and a quite cold summer. In international relations, in the military sphere and in economic policy U.S. ruling circles are doing everything to make events in the world arena flow out of the channel of Geneva and into the closed loop of Fulton. Whereas in the "hot spots" in the world and in the developing countries intervention by force and the deteriorating situation have assumed a dangerous character, in West Europe the United States is trying through imperial-colonialist methods (making use of military-political pressure and the opportunities of bloc policy) to "regionalize" its own domestic development model. The imperial tactic of diktat and ignoring decisions adopted jointly with allies was seen strongly during the aggression against Libya in April, when this decision was made virtually without any serious consultations within NATO and evidently even without informing the allies. Open pro-Americanism in Europe was taught an object lesson despite the solid foundation that the United States has built (and continues to build) as it acts from the positions of ideological-political expansion.

In the opposition between the forces of socialism and imperialism, war and peace, and reason and uncompromising confrontation, an increasing role is being played by the way events unfold in the West European region, where of late the United States has been making colossal efforts: using the methods of ideological, political and cultural aggression it is trying to hamper, first the consolidation of the positions of democratic and anti-imperialist forces, second the natural trends toward detente and multilateral development of relations with the USSR, and third the emergence within the capitalist world of political and economic centers that oppose the United States. [1]

In his State of the Nation Address to the U.S. Congress on 4 February 1986 President Reagan directly emphasized that the United States is shaping its policy with regard to West Europe proceeding from the premise that "the hopes of the world depend on the future of America." He called on the countries of

that region to follow "the American establishment" in everything so as to maintain "the unity of Western democracy in the face of the Soviet Union's desire for supremacy." [2] Moreover, within the framework of the strategy of "neoglobalism" proclaimed by the U.S. President in January 1986 and envisaging open interference by the United States in any region of the world at its own discretion in the event of "a situation threatening the national interests," West Europe is one of the main objects of this policy. To the point, when assessing this fact Z. Brzezinski stated that he "could add nothing except what had already been said 10 years ago" [3] (when he stated that Europe should become the pole for the most extensive political struggle in history, during which the fate of "Western democracy" would be decided since "liberalism and Marxism" retain a high degree of competitiveness there and remain a powerful force). The United States' "new approach" to political-ideological ties with West Europe, finally settled by the start of 1986, was the result of political, economic, diplomatic and other quests during the Sixties and Seventies, when relations with Europe were changing very rapidly but, in the words of former assistant to the President for national security affairs R. Mcfarlane "U.S. European policy remained unchanged." [4] This direction in U.S. policy is nothing new. There is a certain continuity. A.N. Yakovlev notes that even in the Fifties through the Seventies in U.S. propaganda "the nightmare was the Soviet threat to West Europe..." "This 'great opposition' in Europe was the source and main sphere of the 'cold war' into which the great powers were drawn. The fantasy was an Atlantic community, an alliance of supposedly like-thinking people united not only by their opposition to communism but also their determination to build an economic and political society under the leadership of the United States." [5] This thrust also determines the components of that part of the policy of "neoglobalism" that affects West Europe.

The first component is active ideological-political opposition to any increase in the influence of leftist forces in West Europe, proceeding from the premise that, as former deputy intelligence director of the CIA R. Cline has emphasized, "if West Europe cuts the bonds that have historically tied it to North America... a significant change will take place in the world balance of power." [6] In this struggle, which is being waged not only directly against the communist parties on the continent but also other democratic forces, constant use is made of ideological, cultural and political measures designed to distract the masses from the struggle and doom them to political passiveness. The main task for this kind of American-style ideological brainwashing is to underpin belief in "the Western establishment" or at least in its invulnerability.

Another aspect of this policy is open and obvious anti-Sovietism and the propaganda of hatred, disbelief and mistrust in the USSR and the socialist countries. When speaking about the penetration of "neoglobalism" into West Europe (true, he "gently" referred to it as the "United States' European allied strategy"), Vice Admiral J. Poindexter, who was recently appointed as an assistant to the President for national security affairs, emphasized that "in line with U.S. policy it is essential to reduce the Soviet presence in West Europe to a minimum. This applies to both economic and political aspects. The individual position of Europe should be replaced with a collective position jointly with the United States. This would make it

possible, in particular, to delineate the defensive line more clearly." [7] Here, the U.S. claims to hegemony and the attempts to "export" to Europe a rigid and essentially aggressive line in relations with world socialism blend into one; and another basic goal can also be clearly seen, namely, insuring that the militarist positions of U.S. imperialism in Europe, reflecting the viewpoint of the U.S. military-industrial complex, in fact involve Europe in the arms race. In particular, in recent years the USSR has become, in the words of USIA director Ch. Wick, one of the main objects of American propaganda aimed at West Europe. It is not happenstance that the United States has engaged in busy activity against the trends toward "European detente" that have been discerned. [8]

The third direction of this policy, which is the desire to insure and guarantee within the West European countries a dominant economic and political influence from the United States to the detriment of their national interests, to some extent also reflects the interimperialist contradictions. And, just as in the late Seventies, the United States is trying to force through its own hegemonic aspirations, hiding them behind propaganda about "mutual interest." J. Poindexter has said that "it is most essential for the United States to establish effective control over allied economic and military centers so that they may operate in a coordinated manner, dealing with the global problems of the democratic world within the framework of U.S. policy." [9] In the mid-Eighties the trend toward diktat in U.S. West European policy is growing with increasing obviousness into a unique kind of "neocolonialist political model," as it has been defined by a Socialist International Spanish sociologist Bruno Arraya. [10] He links the hard-line U.S. approach to West Europe with three factors: the intensification in the competitive struggle between West European and North American capital both within Europe and in the U.S. and "Third World" markets; the increased struggle in Europe against U.S. military policy in general and its "European strategy" in particular, and, moreover, some of Europe's "ruling elite" are involved in this struggle; and the development of Soviet-West European relations, especially economic relations.

What then are the main directions in the United States' ideological-political and propaganda efforts within the framework of the new doctrine of West European policy? The British communist newspaper MORNING STAR has rightly noted that analysis of these main directions makes clear that they are integrated within the structure of the policy of "psychological warfare." [11]

Among the main directions of the "psychological warfare" unleashed by the United States in West Europe the following can be distinguished:

--Apologetics for capitalism, the "free market" and "moderate" political pluralism. In contrast to the models traditional for Europe, U.S. propaganda is imposing theses on the need for total rejection of state intervention in the economy or any kind of planning, urgent denationalization, and a hard line with respect to the trade unions. The words of (K. Blest), an observer on the British journal NEW AGE to the effect that "the United States has recently been augmenting its propaganda with its own model for the development of multilateral efforts and pressure via political and diplomatic channels with the aim of foisting this model on Europe," are obviously correct. [12]

--Propaganda on many planes to besmirch real socialism and its achievements. And according to USIA directive No 137 (September 1985) to its representatives, in pursuing this line "there is no need to be limited to traditional methods of official propaganda; more active use should be made of literature, the cinema, unofficial sources of information, and data from private individuals and independent information centers." [13] Thus, the United States has secretly called for the use of all possible works of pseudo-art, direct lies, the falsification of information and so forth in anti-Soviet propaganda aimed at West Europe, that is, methods just like those employed by Goebbels. This course is a unique continuation of the doctrine of "democracy and public diplomacy" proclaimed in 1982.

--The United States is focusing all its efforts directly in the ideological sphere on discrediting in West Europe Marxist-Leninist teaching both as theory and practice. "... Along with this the processes of general Atlantic integration are still operating and sometimes even intensifying. On the economic level they are stimulated by the activity of the major transnational corporations, and on the political level by the claims of the United States, which have intensified during the period of the Reagan Administration, to the role of absolute dictator in world capitalism. On the ideological level the priority of the unity of the entire capitalist world over its disunity is underscored by the concept of interdependence, which has influential followers in the West European capitalist states." [14] This is evidently associated with the United States' growing dread that truly leftist forces will gain power in a number of countries in the region. As long ago as 1977 the American "Marxologist" W. Laquer wrote: "In the years immediately ahead the question of communism in the countries of West Europe will become central in U.S. foreign policy, and perhaps the most important issue." [15]

--In the foreign policy field U.S. propaganda in West Europe is imposing the idea of "the aggressiveness" of the Soviet Union, pursuing at least three goals by this. The United States is using every possible means to nullify the West European contries' independent course in foreign policy, insure massive support for its course aimed at building up the arms race, associated with SDI, and undermine the basis of the antiwar movement in Europe. In practice what is happening is what V.I. Lenin described: "In order to justify new arms they are trying, as usual, to paint as bad as possible a picture of the dangers threatening 'the homeland.'" [16] In the West European context the United States is trying to foist on the region the desires and misgivings of the North American military-industrial complex.

In the mid-Eighties it is not only all the above that is being accentuated in U.S. policy but a qualitatively new aspect is also emerging, namely the desire to involve West Europe in militarist, pro-American propaganda aimed at the socialist countries. For example, consideration is given to the fact that up to 80 percent of the inhabitants of the GDR are able to watch West German and Austrian television broadcasts, and the proportion of the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and so forth that can do the same is also high. Robert (Gilly), the FRG correspondent for the British DAILY TELEGRAPH, has noted that through "direct contact" the United States will in the long term be able to achieve much, and not only in the "war and peace" policy but also in spreading its own ideals generally. [17]

During the same period another direction of American ideological expansion in West Europe has crystallized, namely, attempts to weaken forces with a social-democratic orientation. "Whereas Carter tried to make advances to the Socialist International and even rely on it to solve some questions ("human rights," the notorious "Soviet threat" and so forth--author's note), the Reagan Adminstration, which has encountered serious opposition from socialists on the global problems of the arms race, including SDI, "hot spots," arms exports, "terrorism," and so forth, has been typified by increasingly open confrontation with the social democrats, including in the propaganda and political fields"; this is stressed in the statement issued by the socialist and workers' parties in West Europe in 1985. [18] According to information leaked to the American press, it has been recommended that the CIA, diplomatic missions and the USIA compile dossiers on the leaders and officials of the social-democratic parties, do everything possible to manipulate public opinion in the interests of right-centrist forces, and pursue a policy aimed at splitting the Socialist International and work with people "individually" in order to neutralize the activity of the "disarmament group," which is causing the greatest alarm to the U.S. Administration. Here, according to the press, these kinds of propositions make up the components of the above-mentioned USIA directive No 137. [19] Thus, the United States is once again grossly interfering in the domestic political life of the West European countries through state channels.

Within the framework of the "psychological warfare" unleashed by the United States in the countries of West Europe great attention is paid to the use of religious propaganda and propaganda via the church. Here, active use is made of the unique pro-American "lobby" set up in the late Seventies in the top hierarchy of the Vatican, and of various factions in the reformist church. Vatican links with the CIA and also the U.S. military-industrial complex have been described elsewhere. [20] Here we need only emphasize that they are being used to weaken and isolate pacifist groups and movements, including within the church itself, and in the struggle against contacts between West Europe and the USSR, and for ideological campaigns against real socialism (such as the "Polish" struggle) in order to brainwash public opinion and split leftist forces. It is in no way out of sympathy for democratic forces that the Rome weekly LA STAMPA states that "during the Eighties the United States has made it a permanent rule to make regular use of clerical movements and the church itself on the continent (West Europe-author's note) for propaganda purposes, juggling the various campaigns in its own political interests." [21] According to figures from the Independent Center for Sociological and Applied Studies in the United States (in Oregon), the USIA has a special $30-million fund for "work" with the European churches. [22] A special "mobile group" answering to the deputy director operates within the CIA and this group is engaged exclusively with problems "of insuring the flow of information through the European churches and through them manipulating public opinion and neutralizing undesirable trends in clericalism." [23]

Finally, an important place is occupied by "antipersonnel propaganda," which according to THE NEW YORK TIMES has become an integral part of the propaganda of the "American establishment." "All officials who in some way oppose American interests in Europe are subjected to criticism by the United States

or pro-American elements, and there is an obvious desire to ostracize and isolate them and politically simply push them aside. Here, any means is considered suitable, from intimate details about their lives to accusations of espionage or groveling to the Kremlin." [24] It should be added that it is a question not of communists or the representatives of "anti-American" organizations (but which are in fact antimonopoly and antiwar movements) but of major political figures representing the bourgeois, social-democratic and other parties that make up an inseparable part of the capitalist political structure in West Europe. The badgering of Swedish prime minister Olof Palme in the rightist press culminated in his murder. Pro-American propaganda spoke out actively against former Austrian chancellor F. Sinowatz and is besmirching the chairman of the German Social Democratic W. Brandt; and this is by no means a full list of those who have become the objects of this campaign over the past two or three years.

Thus, in general the United States has engaged in an "ideological onslaught" against West Europe, an onslaught that is multilevel in its thrust and anti-European, reactionary and anticommunist in substance, and that makes up an integral part of the global ideological-political expansion being implemented by the Reagan Administration. Any kind of means is used here and the sovereignty of the European countries is being grossly violated. The United States has officially legitimized this course even though it also assumes "illegal" methods and actions. It was not without reason that L'HUMANITE wrote that "to some extent the ideological-political expansion by the United States in West Europe is in some ways reminiscent of a policy of state terrorism." [25]

Within the framework of this policy increasing significance is attaching to U.S. manipulation of European public opinion in its own interests, using various methods and means. These include primarily the broadcasts by the official "foreign policy" U.S. radio stations of Voice of America to the European countries in all languages of the region. This kind of broadcasting now takes place about 900 hours each week. [26]

Typically the American radio is engaging increasingly actively in attempts to undermine the development of economic contacts between the USSR and the West European countries. Thus, following the conclusion of a number of major trade agreements between Austria and the USSR, including for supplies of Soviet gas to Austria, American radio propaganda started to lay emphasis on the fact that increased imports from the socialist countries allegedly threaten Austria's sovereignty and neutrality. When this is done, it was "actively" silent about the fact that the deliveries from the CEMA countries are making it possible for Austria to stabilize its economy and that they provide a guarantee for a significant level of employment. A "counterargument" has been invented: the threat hangs over Austria that it will be subject to "an energy cabal from the East." [27] Voice of America has repeatedly taken the same position with respect to the FRG, Belgium, Italy and France (on the "gas-for-pipeline" contract), the Soviet-French political consultations, and many other cases, always using the "Soviet threat" thesis. This is precisely why as they oppose direct American propaganda, the communist parties in the West European countries set the task of tirelessly telling the truth about the Soviet Union, which from the moment of the October Revolution has been the main force in the

struggle for peace. This is important because the U.S. radio centers devote up to 60 percent of information and analysis material to direct insinuations against the USSR, first and foremost in the military-political field. [28]

In 1984-1985 the United States embarked on the next phase of ideological warfare for West Europe, namely, direct television broadcasting to the countries in the region, opening up its "Worldent" television network via the Intelsat satellite system. Announcing the start of this program, Ch. Wick stated that its purpose was "to improve understanding of politics and life in the United States among the West Europeans" and "reduce tension and lack of understanding to a minimum." [29] However, in fact the very first political broadcasts were devoted to justifying the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Numerous news commentaries whip up anti-Soviet war psychosis and give an extremely distorted picture of events in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Indochina and other "hot spots on the planet."

Present-day space communications made it possible to organize a political show on the day of the presidential elections in 1984. Austrian television carried direct reportage from the Hotel Imperial where representatives of business circles, businessmen, the directors of a number of banks and political figures had been invited by the U.S. Embassy. "Our joy is your future happiness": this was the leitmotif of the statements by commentators from the land of "universal prosperity." In a huge hall in the hotel the wine flowed and the best chefs of Vienna and Washington prepared and demonstrated dishes from across the ocean. But man does not live by bread alone... and so, the refreshments were interspersed with "live" inserts of the "most democratic" (in the words of the television commentators) elections. And now the culmination. Strauss and American marches blend together--we are present at the birth of a new president. Ronald Reagan. A large close-up on the screen. One of the channels on ORF (Austrian television) carried nothing but this event the entire evening.

However, in addition to direct political television propaganda, indirect propaganda no less effective than the former is also carried on the American channels to West Europe. It is a question of the massive renting through Worldent of anticommunist and anti-Soviet series such as "Transformers," "Rocky IV," "The Nicaraguan Murderers," "Rambo," "Red Dawn," "Invasion," "Stars and Stripes Versus the Red Stars" and so forth. Television propaganda through pseudo-art is most effective. The ratings are always higher than for any other broadcasts, totaling, for example, 48 percent of the audience in Belgium and France, 57 percent in the FRG and about 50 percent in Austria (against an average of 20 to 23 percent of the West European audience that watches political or information television programs). [30]

However, American radio and television propaganda does not restrict itself just to this. Criticizing "information imperialism," the Italian communist newspaper UNITA emphasizes that the United States "has invaded the national European radio and television broadcasting systems and through them conducts its own propaganda and fobs off American morals and norms of life." [31]

According to comparative data from the "independent research centers"--data that official U.S. circles have not disclaimed--the United States controls

directly or through its own "lobby" an average of up to 60 percent of the entertainment programs shown on the national television channels of West Europe, 30 percent of the domestic economic reviews and information-and-analysis programs on radio and television in the region, about 50 percent of foreign economic reviews and programs, two out of every five television political information programs, and four out of every nine radio programs of the same kind. Seven out of every ten movies shown on European television channels are American. Virtually all the major radio and television stations and centers in West Europe cooperate with USIA on a contractual basis. In September 1985 about 4,000 of its staff were working under contract. [32] To this must be added the fact that up to 60 percent of current information for West European radio and television is supplied by services controlled by USIA, namely, United Press International and the Associated Press; even the "purely European" information centers--Reuter and France Presse--depend on some extent on the American information center. [33]

Under these conditions the American propaganda machine in West Europe pays special attention to insuring that political and ideological problems are perceived emotionally by the audience. A directive letter from Ch. Wick to the European section of USIA (September 1984) recommended that special emphasis be laid on reinforcing among West Europeans "the American way of success, comfortable life, happiness and good fortune." [34] It is a question of deliberate manipulation with illusions: propaganda telling of the possibilities for getting rich, making more money, unexpectedly "realizing one's dream." And this is done not only through lighthearted television movies but also through documentary television series that make apologia for "the American way of life," and use of the stereotypes of "dream machines," "equal opportunity" and "total freedom" traditional to this way of life. It is not so much an attempt to depoliticize West European society as a desire to promote an ideology of the American manner according to the recipes of "neoconservatism" that dominate under the Reagan Administration.

Another method used by the United States in "work" with European radio and television is the "effect of democratic discussion," when a well-rehearsed discussion takes place on issues not worthy of attention, creating a semblance of dispassionateness and the clash of opinion. The semblance of "plurality of opinion" is, the U.S. "European experts" have concluded, one of the most effective methods with the West European audience. [35] R. McNeil, an American specialist in the field of propaganda for West Europe, has written that this kind of system of convictions built on "false discussion" forces people to believe in what the initiators of the discussion consider essential and advantageous for themselves. [36]

The radio and television programs cooked up by the United States are always saturated with stereotype words. The commentators and observers on these programs, as for example (G. Levental) in the FRG and (P. Lendvay) in Austria, make extensive use of "word images"--"communist threat," "totalitarian society," "communist terror," "Marxist dogmatists," "latest deception" and so forth. The DAILY WORLD has written the following: "For even greater emotional effect on television, for example, very frequent use is made of showing silhouette shots of the Kremlin, soldiers with red stars, masses of Soviet tanks, Cuban commandos." [37] Typically these kinds of propaganda methods

make use of constant repetition of anti-Soviet and anticommunist inventions with appropriate commentaries. Thus, in October and November 1985 television in the FRG and Austria showed a "documentary" television series entitled "At the Leading Edge" created on CIA orders to the USIA, investigating the situation with the bandit formations on the territories of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua. The propaganda took place, claiming reliability by using the same reactonary stereotypes accompanied by "on-the-spot" information. [38]

Finally, in 1984 the the United States tied radio and television in West Europe into a militarization of the broadcasts. And not only by imparting such content to the radio broadcasts and movies. "In West Europe," representatives of the "Independent Center for Sociological Studies in the United States" write, "by using the USIA contract system the United States is trying in all the programs, including even the harmless programs for children and housewives, to introduce militarist information, the spirit of war neurosis and the idea of a Soviet military threat... It would not be an exaggeration to say that up to 90 percent of all U.S. assets used to fund these kinds of contacts go for this." [39] The issue here is evidently not only involving Europe in the Pentagon's militarist plans but also wrecking the improvement in relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries within the framework of the process opened up by the latest Soviet peace initiatives. It was not without reason, for example, that the central committee accountability report to the 25th Austrian Party Congress stated: "We call upon the federal government and the National Council finally to take effective steps to halt the propaganda of lies and slander about the socialist countries that Austrian radio and television engages in daily, and to stop those trying to use these public institutions as an instrument for ideological preparation for war... Radio and television should serve to strengthen friendship between peoples and consolidate peace. We therefore support the slogan 'NATO out of Austrian Radio and Television.'" [40]

The press plays an enormous role in U.S. strategy in West Europe. The above-mentioned USIA directive No 137 particularly emphasized that the "efforts to strengthen Atlantic solidarity and the struggle against the Soviet threat and terrorism within Europe (that is, West Europe--author's note) should be built on the exchange of newspaper information prepared by the best qualified press workers and on help in preparing the materials from 'informed sources' and analytical publications of mutual interest." [41] This instruction has become the basis for U.S. penetration into the West European press. We have already discussed West Europe's dependence on the United States. Here we need only emphasize that up to 70 percent of the political, information and analytical publications in West Europe are prepared on the basis of materials from American agencies. This is, of course, a question of the bourgeois press because the press of the communist parties and partly of the social democrats and a number of other leftist and left-centrist trends, as, for example, the "Greens" in the FRG, Austria and Switzerland, is to some extent free from the effect of U.S. "information imperialism," and likewise some of the semi-official press in France, Sweden and elsewhere. [42] Entire associations in the West European press--the Springer concern in the FRG, the "Fleet Street Federation" in England, the Christian-democratic press in Italy, the "European Murdoch Concern" and others--that have firm contractual ties with USIA operate

virtually within the channel of American policy. But most of the European periodicals claim "independence" and "a national character." Here, the influence of the United States is less marked, although still significant.

This takes place primarily through training personnel for the West European press within the United States. By the end of 1985 about 22 percent of middle- and higher-echelon personnel in the British press had undergone comprehensive training and "seniority" of this kind; the figures for Italy were 29 percent, for Spain 17 percent, for the FRG 24 percent, for Switzerland 18 percent and for Austria 20 percent. With respect to individuals who take advantage of invitations to visit the United States both through the USIA and through the editorial offices of major U.S. newspapers, the numbers are rising significantly. [43] The professional associations of journalists and press workers in the United States are working actively in this direction. "Personnel dependence" is being added to information dependence.

The "preventive" counterrevolutionary spirit based on the anticommunist tasks and ideological line of the United States in the West European press was formulated by one of the ideologues of the present administration, W. Styron, who stated that "it is essential to teach them (that is, the West Europeans--author's note) to hate communism... Hatred for communism should be an urgent requirement." [44] The leitmotif of subjects suggested by USIA to the West European press is now materials about "the dehumanization of the individual under socialism" and "encroachment on equal opportunities throughout society." Typically, in the FRG the "yellow press" has included this kind of propaganda in the "cultural" articles that it publishes: comic books, "comparisons" of the biographies of figures in the arts in socialist and capitalist countries, verse, historical references and so forth. Here, as L'HUMANITE writes, the aim of the new wave of "cultural propaganda of the imperialist kind consists of creating a system for applying political pressure 'via the soul,' which has been more effective than the hackneyed thesis about 'an international communist conspiracy led from the Kremlin' because it would appeal to the concept of 'safeguarding beauty' and 'freedom.'" Here it is useful to remember the words of V.I. Lenin: "Freedom is a great word but it is under the banner of freedom that industries have waged the most predatory wars, it is under the banner of freedom that the labor of the workers has been pillaged." [46]

Of special interest is American propaganda of "direct contact," which affects primarily West European youth but is also disseminated essentially to all other age and social strata in society. In the words of former assistant to the President for national security affairs R. McFarlane, propaganda for "direct contact" assumes "the use of direct methods and means, not only emotional but also material and visual, to exert a direct influence from the diverse values of American civilization on our (that is, American--author's note) friends and allies so as to promote in the long-term the creation of a single Western democratic society." [47] Thus, it is a question of American political and ideological expansion via American centers in Europe--"houses of friendship," "centers for cultural links," discotheques, and a network of Americanized "public catering facilities"--McDonald's-type eateries, bars, restaurants and so forth, and equally via the educational system by way of

student exchanges, the preparation of training programs and textbooks, teacher exchanges and so forth.

According to figures leaked to the American press, in a report by "an analytical group" in the scientific and technological section of the CIA (May 1985) recommendations were drawn up for the methods and means to be used to propagandize "direct contact," and the main thrust of this propaganda was determined. The recommendations were immediately implemented both through USIA channels and through cultural and educational exchanges and by means of numerous people, sometimes occupying official positions in the government organs of West Europe, who had been "processed in the spirit of the United States." In particular, the recommendations pointed out that the main thrust should be aimed at "isolation from politics," that is, excommunicating the masses from active political activity and introducing a blind faith in the strength and correctness of actions by the government and its institutions, and insuring support for official courses. [48]

Another method of "direct contact" recommended by CIA "analysts" is "the cultural equivalent." This is a question of deliberately avoiding serious issues in conversation, in "conditions of unconstrained intercourse," during "evening leisure time" in discotheques and so forth, and of reducing everything to leisure, the "mass media," and "totally sanitized entertainment" American style. "... Eat, drink and be merry, live the good life, discuss generally accepted music, films, drinks, argue about food; this is the best way of getting away from fatigue, the burdens of work, the melancholy of everyday life": this is what the European edition of PLAYBOY tells its readers to do. [49]

In the CIA recommendations a major place is given over to a method that has been named "obscuring the fact." Its use is recommended among the student audience, when organizing cultural and educational exchanges, and within the system of probational training [stazhirovka]. The suggestion is that from a multitude of aspects on a single problem, for example, regional conflicts, a single fact is taken (for example, the fact that the uniforms of military personnel in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan are different from regular uniforms) and exaggerated, adding false facts and a false analysis in order to instill in the audience (as the American "professor," sovietologist D. Kirkman tried to do at the Hanover University in the FRG) the thought that "the Afghan army is being replaced by the Soviet army," that "preparations are being made for total penetration by the USSR into the army of the East," and so forth). [50] Advantage is taken of the West European audiences' lack of training in perceiving pseudofacts that hide the reality; the features of direct emotional perception by West Europeans are being actively studied.

The CIA "analysts" also insistently recommend the method of "substitute support." Its use involves presenting political events as entertainment material, discussions about sports competitions or intimate "tidbits" about the lives of movie stars or millionaires. Problems of the class struggle are considered in the same way. In this connection the London TIMES was forced to acknowledge that, for example, "during the miners' strike in 1984-1985 we reported more about the scuffles between the pickets and strikebreakers than

the essential nature of the problem..." [51] It is a question of the deliberate distortion of and silence about the problems of the class struggles, war and peace, and the policy of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. "Do not talk about nuclear war and peace-loving Soviets," the ultrareactionary WASHINGTON TIMES cynically advises American tourists going to West Europe. "Try to convince them that the young Reds like sex and pop music and drinking... Do not lay emphasis on European problems in Europe..." [52] And this, evidently, is the general thrust of "direct contact" propaganda.

Finally, the last methodological component of this kind of propaganda is "reversal of interest." The West German sociologist (R. Kheypler) writes the following: "In our time the individual often resorts to a world of illusions in order to escape from an everyday life that he does not like. What must be done, therefore, is to satisfy the instinctive desire for illusion." [53]

The entire American propaganda-political machine is also used precisely to spread pro-American illusions on the continent, a blind faith in the "strength of America," and the "nobleness and appeal of its system." The 1985 annual report of the USIA director pointed out that "it is essential that our cultural and other centers in West Europe be as a corner of the United States with its lack of constraint, exciting gaiety, friendliness, ideals and vital attributes." [54] By January 1986 some 261 American "houses of friendship," 826 American discotheques and 44 "centers for cultural links" were operating in West Europe. [55] And to this, of course, we must add the network of Americanized "public catering facilities." No accurate or complete figures are available on this but it is known that in 1984 the net profit derived from this network in West Europe was, according to the U.S. tax department, $231 million, gives an indication of the scale of this activity. [56] "How does a network of Americanized eating establishments pursue the U.S. propaganda line?" L'HUMANITE asks; and it gives the following answer: "With the abundance of American posters and other propaganda material on the walls, numerous comic book animated cartoons programs or American mass culture programs, the fast service, relatively low prices, American names for the dishes and drinks, the style of operation, the atmosphere, the constant availability of American newspapers and magazines, American music, American slang, American advertising, in short the quiet but overwhelming influence of the American 'establishment' that permeates everything and satisfies the tastes of all age groups (in line with the gradation and specific nature of each kind of establishment) but aimed first and foremost at the Americanization of young people--the future of the continent." [57]

Here it is useful to remember that, as Professor A. Schlesinger has said, the United States frankly recognizes the need "for intervention beyond its own frontiers, and it is trying once and for all to put an end to the traditions of isolationism." According to figures in the U.S. press these kinds of establishments are visited by up to 50 million Europeans, and up to 70 percent are younger than 25. This is also an example of the United States' direct and many-sided ideological-psychological influence on the minds of West Europeans. It is just as obvious that for West Europe this a phenomenon that is antinational in character, a manifestation of obvious U.S. expansionism.

The thrust of other "direct contact" propaganda centers is just as obvious. Both the "houses of friendship" and the "centers for cultural links" regularly hold cycles of lectures, discussions and meetings both on the theme of propagandizing "the American way of life" and on international issues. Here are some of the subjects recommended by USIA for lectures in these centers in Austria and the FRG: "Problems of Opposing the Bloc Policy of the USSR in Central America," "Afghanistan: the Struggle against Soviet Aggression," "Soviet Jews: the Untouchables of Communism," "Totalitarianism and Dissension: the Soviet Experience," "Racial Segregation in the USSR," "Soviet Economic Expansion in West Europe" and so forth, a total of 478 subjects. [59] In 1985 some 14,033 discussions, lectures and meetings took place in West Europe through the efforts of 520 American "specialists" in Sovietology, and more than 1,100 West Europeans underwent training courses in U.S. higher educational establishments. [60] To this we must add the effect of the "American atmosphere" reigning in these centers and all kinds of cultural programs, video tape libraries and screenings of American movies and animated films. In particular, according to L'HUMANITE, 7 out of every 10 movies shown in the U.S. "centers for cultural links" and "houses of friendship" are of an openly anti-Soviet and anticommunist nature or preach antihumanism. [61] The same mission is carried out by the American discotheques, which have been described even by the moderate press in West Europe as places where "young people learn about misanthropy, drugs and cultural and aesthetic outrages." [62] On orders from USIA all U.S. discotheques in West Europe have been involved in the "Freedom for Poland," "Freedom for Afghanistan" and "We Are against the Soviet Threat" campaigns, when for months on end the young people danced to songs like "Kill the Communist" (the group Genghis Khan), "Reds-No!" (Rolling Rocks) and so forth. All kinds of "contests" have been organized for the best performances of these kinds of songs or for dance routines done to these songs, with money prizes for the winner or prizes in the form of trips to the United States.

Whereas this kind of activity is mass propaganda within the framework of "direct contact," the steps taken by the United States in the field of university exchanges with West Europe and "help in the preparation of training programs and textbooks" are designed primarily to instill a pro-American mood in the stratum of the "technical and political elite." During the period 1975-1985 more than 210,000 West Europeans (mostly citizens of the FRG, England and Italy) were given scholarships in the United States or participated in "student exchanges." In addition, during the same period more than 85,000 scientific associates and workers from higher educational establishments in West Europe spent time or retrained in the United States. [63]

It is obvious that the United States' ideological-political expansion in West Europe is taking place on many levels and is being conducted using direct, indirect and hidden methods in order to influence public opinion in West Europe in an anti-Soviet and anticommunist direction and to form elements that could make use of such a situation in order to "bind" West Europe even more closely to U.S. policy. By the mid-Eighties this policy has acquired the staus of a U.S. state doctrine, and this has created a direct threat to the sovereignty and independent policy of West European countries, including the "neutrals" (primarily Austria, Sweden and Switzerland). The new American

foreign policy and propaganda doctrines on West Europe are affecting the interests not only of leftist, democratic forces in the region but also traditional European institutions and the processes of economic integration.

One other fundamental aspect of the problem should also be emphasized. Pro-Americanism has already for a long time been actively penetrating the various sociopolitical strata of West European society. It is impossible to ignore the fact that this diffusion has had a strong foundation of economic ties, the influence of the transnational corporations, and a certain integration of the region into the "pax americana."

A certain tradition has taken shape in which the United States is seen (to some degree among certain of the most numerous strata) as some kind of panacea for all ills both economic and military-political (in the latter case a not unimportant role has been played by the anti-Soviet hysteria that has been artificially and systematically whipped up by the United States). Making use of the stereotypes that have been formed, it is precisely during the Eighties that the United States has deepened and extended its ideological-political expansion on the continent, imparting to it a new quality that is close to a unique kind of "neocolonial" model. At the same time, however, this expansionism, accompanied in the mid-Eighties by gross interference in the affairs of West European countries in connection with the spread of the doctrine of neoglobalism in the region (violent acts from Europe against third countries, "antiterrorist actions" on West European territory without the consent of allies, anti-European "financial games," interference in election campaigns and so forth) has also led to a contradictory and complex but backlash reaction. The American adventures have shown that the United States' blocking action at the state and private levels on a whole range of problems in the ideological-political and military spheres is no kind of guarantee against aggression, destabilization or political discredit.

In this connection note must be made of a number of new factors important for the communist parties and other leftist forces in the region when shaping an effective policy of opposition to the expansionist plans of the United States.

The fact that American policy and its secondary results in the region are affecting the interests not only of the workers but also some elements of the ruling classes offers a unique opportunity for expanding the ranks of the patriotic, democratic and antiwar movement led by the working class and its parties. This can significantly alter the class and political balance of power in West Europe and involve in the policy of opposition to U.S. expansion elements remote from the revolutionary movement (part of the big bourgeoisie, religious circles and so forth).

FOOTNOTES

1. This has been discussed earlier in other historical and political frameworks: A.V. Valyuzhenich. "Vneshnepoliticheskaya propaganda SShA" [U.S. Foreign Policy Propaganda], Moscow, 1973; V.P. Lukin. "Tsentry sily" [Centers of Power], Moscow, 1983; A. Bovin. "Pogovorim po sushchestvu" [Let Us Talk to the Point], Moscow, 1985; A.N. Yakovlev. "Ot Trumena do Reygana" [From Truman to Reagan], Moscow, 1985.

2. THE NEW YORK TIMES 5 Feb 1986.

3. DAILY CHRONICLE 19 Jan 1986.

4. THE NEW YORK TIMES 26 Jan 1986.

5. A.N. Yakovlev. op. cit., p 389.

6. R. Cline. "The World Power Assessment. A Calculus of Strategic Drift." Washington, 1976, p 129.

7. THE WASHINGTON POST 3 Feb 1986.

8. A.V. Valyuzhenich. op. cit., p 189.

9. BALTIMORE SUN 7 Feb 1986.

10. B. Arraya. "En los bosques de la politica europea." Madrid, 1985, p 41.

11. MORNING STAR 2 Nov 1985.

12. THE NEW AGE 19 Dec 1985.

13. FOREIGN POLICY No 107, 1985, p 4.

14. V.P. Lukin. op. cit., p 97.

15. W. Laquer, "America and West European Communism." San Francisco, 1977, p 37.

16. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol 23, p 182.

17. DAILY TELEGRAPH 5 Aug 1984.

18. "For Peace, Democracy, the Future and Prosperity." Madrid ACCION SOCIALISTA No 42, 1985, p 15.

19. THE NEW YORK TIMES 20 Nov 1985.

20. For more detail see G. Vachnadze. "Za kulisami odnoy diversii. Kto napravil ruku terroista na ploshchadi Svyatogo Petra?" [Behind the Scenes at an Act of Sabotage. Who Guided the Hand of the Terrorist in St. Peter's Square?], Moscow, 1985.

21. LA STAMPA No 207, 1985, p 51.

22. BOSTON GLOBE 4 Apr 1984.

23. "Hablan los ex-officiales de la CIA" Mexico, 1984, p 12.

24. THE NEW YORK TIMES 17 Oct 1985

25. L'HUMANITE 27 May 1985.

26. ADELANTE 15 Apr 1985.

27. I.G. Zhiryakov. "SSSR-Avstriya: itogi i perspektivy sotrudnuchestva" [The USSR and Austria: Results and Prospects for Cooperation], Moscow, 1985, p 141.

28. "The Informative Imperialism." New York, 1985, p 3.

29. THE WASHINGTON POST 25 Apr 1985.

30. "Radio and Television, Information and Future." New York, 1985, pp 13-15.

31. UNITA 12 Jul 1985.

32. "Radio and Television, Information and Future." op. cit. pp 31-33.

33. See "The Informative Imperialism." pp 66, 67-68.

34. WORLD POLITICS No 36, 1985, p 10.

35. "Radio, Television and Future" [sic], p 89.

36. R. McNeil. "The People Manipulation Machine." New York, 1980, p 2.

37. DAILY WORLD 7 Sep 1984.

38. DAILY CHRONICLE 17 Dec 1985.

39. "Radio, Television, Information and Future." p 63.

40. Franz Muhri. "Selected Articles and Speeches." Moscow, 1985, p 333.

41. FOREIGN POLICY No 197, 1985, p 8.

42. L'HUMANITE 14 Dec 1985.

43. "The Informative Imperialism." p 103.

44. WASHINGTON TIMES 18 Feb 1985.

45. L'HUMANITE 26 Apr 1985.

46. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works. Vol 6, p 9.

47. THE WASHINGTON POST 27 Nov 1985.

48. THE NEW YORK TIMES 19 Jun 1985.

49. PLAYBOY No 147, 1985, p 34.

50. THE WASHINGTON POST 19 Dec 1985.

51. THE TIMES 23 Dec 1985.

52. THE WASHINGTON TIMES 4 Nov 1985.

53. IDEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY No 97, San Francisco, 1985, p 20.

54. THE NEW YORK TIMES 12 Dec 1985.

55. "The Ideological War of the U.S. Imperialism against the West European Countries." Berlin, 1985, p 27.

56. L'HUMANITE 11 Oct 1985.

57. L'HUMANITE 11 Oct 1985.

58. THE NEW YORK TIMES 3 Dec 1985.

59. "The Ideological War of the U.S. Imperialism against the West European Countries." op. cit., p 70.

60. THE NEW YORK TIMES 3 Dec 1985.

61. L'HUMANITE 11 Oct 1985.

62. THE GUARDIAN 19 Mar 1985.

63. EDUCATION AND SCIENCE No 236, 1985, p 127.

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EAST GERMAN BOOK ON SOCIALIST COMMUNITY UNITY, ECONOMIC TIES

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 184-186

[Review by Yu.S. Novopashin and A.E. Savchenko of book "Die Sozialistische Gemeinschaft. Interessen-Zusammenarbeit-Wirtschaftswachstym" [The Socialist Community. Interests, Cooperation, Economic Growth] by a collective of authors led by Hans-Georg Haupt, Berlin, Dietz Publishing House, 1985, 238 pages]

[Text] The CPSU Program and the documents of the other communist and workers' parties have provided a well-founded substantiation for characterizing the socialist community as the vanguard of the world socialist system where the principles of the international relations of a new type are most adequately realized. The problems of establishing and developing the world socialist system and its vanguard--the socialist community--has traditionally occupied a major place in the studies conducted by social scientists in the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries. These issues are acquiring even greater topicality under present conditions.

Many valuable works dealing with particular aspects of socialist development in the fraternal countries have been published in the scientific literature of the GDR in recent years. [1] The monograph under review, prepared by a collective of scholars from the SED Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, attracts attention primarily by the topical nature of the task that the researchers set themselves, namely, "examining mainly from the economic angle a range of problems that need to be resolved in the countries of the socialist community under present conditions, and thus helping to achieve a deeper understanding of the dialectic of the general and the particular in the development of the community (page 7). The debatable nature of many of the issues dealt with, moving beyond the framework of purely theoretical interest, enables the GDR scholars to regard their work as a contribution to the scientific discussion now underway on the problems of further development in the socialist countries.

When examining any of the problems concerning further improvements in relations between the socialist countries the researchers consider it essential to take into account the evolution that has taken place in the understanding of the realities of the socialist world and to proceed from its heterogeneity and complexity and the different degrees of maturity in social

relations in the socialist countries. The lack of uniformity in internal development and also the differences in the political conditions in which the socialist states exist also result in different initial positions in the resolution of particular issues. In substantiating this conclusion the authors cite in particular the CPSU documents that talk about need to overcome illusions and erroneous judgements and draw conclusions in good time from the changes taking place in the socialist world.

The book talks primarily about the socialist community--the alliance of fraternal countries united "by the common nature of interests and goals and the ties of cooperation on many levels." [2] The law-governed trend in the development of the socialist community is the process of the rapprochement between the fraternal countries, during the course of which their cohesion is strengthened. And here it must be remembered that it is not so easy to overcome the existing differences in levels of economic and social developments; this takes many years: "The initial conditions for the building of socialism were so different that it has not been possible fully to overcome them in only three decades" (page 147). Moreover, as the result of errors of a subjective nature that have been permitted, there has often been deformation of the socialist order, particularly in Poland, where "contradictions during the course of socialist development were not resolved in a timely manner, which made it possible for enemies to use them for their counterrevolutionary actions" (page 22). As the authors note with resonance, "although the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries rest on objective foundations, acting as an objective requirement for the building of socialism, they do not arise spontaneously, of their own accord, as it were" (page 27). The role of the subjective factor--the activity of rightist parties and the conscious creativity of millions of interested workers--during the course of which this objective requirement is realized, is most crucial.

The book pays considerable attention to questions of strengthening the unity of the countries of the socialist community; a special section in the book is devoted to this. Noting that the foundation of cooperation between the fraternal countries is a new type of interstate relations, at whose basis lies the principle of socialist internationalism, the authors emphasize that consistent embodiment of this principle is associated with consideration of the interests of all states and "makes it possible to unite the similar and specific interests of individual countries more effectively" (page 28).

We must welcome the attempt made to trace the evolution in the forms of fraternal international cooperation from the simple level (bilateral links in the exchange sphere in the mid-Fifties) to significantly more complex and multifaceted levels (cooperation within the framework of comprehensive programs, production specialization and cooperation, coordination of five-year plans, direct production links and so forth). The authors emphasize that "the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community are not some static condition" (page 38), and they point out that the motive forces for deepening cooperation will ultimately ascend to the contradictions in the development of socialism, during the course of which the contradictions that are resolved will be replaced by other new ones but at a higher level. They will not be of an irreconcilable nature because "the objective basis for

antagonistic contradictions in the socialist countries and in their mutual relations has been lost" (page 17).

The monograph convincingly unmasks the attempts being constantly made by antisocialist forces to drive a wedge between the countries of the socialist community by setting international interests against specific national interests. For example, (G. Khedtkamp), an author from the FRG, asserts that economic integration by the CEMA member countries is "ineffective" because allegedly it "eclectically blends together" the "Soviet-type" centralized planning system and the desire for a "market economy" among other members of the alliance. The book notes that socialism's bourgeois enemies "try to use to this end not only the real, objective problems in the development of socialism as a social system but also speculate on certain omissions and errors in the domestic policy of individual states, "'applying' them to the entire practice of the building of socialism" (page 47). In reality, however, "socialist economic integration takes place between sovereign socialist states that, however, also have a similar but by no means common economic basis" (page 29). Great theoretical and practical importance attaches to the conclusion that it is impossible to "transfer" mechanically the methods and experience of one socialist country to the conditions in others. In this connection the book convincingly criticizes the thesis put forward by bourgeois science about "Soviet hegemonism" and "imposition of the Soviet development model." The GDR scholars show in a well-argued manner that real socialist development "affirms the dialectic interaction of the general and the particular and makes absurb the bourgeois theses about the 'uniform nature' of socialism" (page 29). The growing similarity and likeness of the main and basic tasks in the building of the new society at the same time assume a growing variety of specific forms and decisions in individual countries. It is here that the true dialectic is seen in the approximation of the socialist countries and nations, along with their increasingly full development.

Moreover, the variety of forms and methods in the building of socialism is the basis of the "objective interests in and need for strengthening fraternal relations with other socialist countries, and their comprehensive cooperation" (pages 19-20). From this standpoint, each new socialist state is a potential ally of the socialist community; its emergence serves the cause of strengthening the entire socialist world.

When considering the various forms of cooperation between the fraternal countries the authors dwell in greater detail on an analysis of the processes of cooperation in the economic sphere as a most important direction in strengthening unity. As the monograph points out, the effective development of each socialist country also favorably affects the strengthening of cooperation in general. This is particularly important under present conditions when "socialism has reached a level of economic development at which realization of Lenin's demand for insuring higher labor productivity compared with capitalism has become an urgent task" (page 61).

The authors note that the need to transfer to an intensively expanded type of reproduction also results from a whole series of new tasks that have arisen in the community countries during the Eighties in the significantly altered

domestic and international conditions (page 77) and which are connected, in particular, with the slowdown in the rates of economic and social development that have occurred in all the European socialist countries since the mid-Seventies right through to the Eighties, the exhaustion of quantitative growth factors and the need for production intensification. At the same time, the authors write, it would be incorrect to explain the need to switch to an intensive type of reproduction merely by these causes (page 113). This type of reproduction is essentially in line with the stage of development at which most of the community countries now find themselves. Objecting in a well-argued way to anticommunist theories, the authors emphasize that the switch to intensification must not be perceived as a "life preserver" under the conditions of some imaginary "crisis," which is how some in the West have been inclined to regard development in the socialist economy in recent years. [3]

A major section of the book is given over to the problems of agreeing the economic interests of the socialist countries as the motive force in strengthening their unity and cohesion. These interests, both the general and the specific, are regarded by the authors as an objective reality although this does not mean that in every case they automatically become a source in the development of integration processes. By no means all researchers now recognize as objective the nature of the interests, nor the fact that "objectively existing interests should be recognized by those that have them before they realize their potential as a motive force; which does not change their objective nature" (page 80). The effectiveness of use by the subjects of socialist international relations depends on the degree to which objective interests are recognized; and this is extremely important under conditions of economic intensification.

Within the book an attempt is made to reveal the complex structure of economic interests: the state economic interest of each of the socialist countries is itself a set of interests that are the same for all these countries and specific interests. Convincing criticism is made of the bourgeois viewpoint according to which individual countries are supposedly being forced to subordinate their own interests to the "strong power"--the USSR (page 94). It is noted that although the task of equalizing levels of economic development and labor productivity growth rates in the various countries on the basis of the introduction of advanced equipment and technology, the extensive exchange of experience and so forth is now urgent, "leveling" of interests and stereotyping of actions, no matter what may cause them, cannot be a basis for equal, economically efficient cooperation. It is therefore impossible to speak of a "linear" nature in the development of integration that does not take into account the differences in the participants. The following thesis deserves attention: when drawing up integration measures "work is done on those versions that guarantee for all the partners the kind of increased effect that would be impossible to achieve without economic integration" (page 91).

Within this process, "contradictions of an objective nature may arise between the economic interests of individual countries. Their presence... in no way compromises the new society" (page 103); resolving them in the spirit of the principles of socialist internationalism is a most important motive force in development.

The authors devote a special section to revealing the specific features of economic and sociopolitical development in some of the socialist countries. Here it is emphasized that today by no means all reserves have been exhausted in achieving the greatest efficiency, reducing output prime costs and energy intensiveness and the capital/output ratio, accelerating the renewal of fixed capital and improving ways and means of rationalization. An extraordinarily important role is now played by the strengthening of conscientious labor and planning and contract discipline. Full resolution of these tasks will make it possible significantly to accelerate the process of intensification.

There is no doubt that, depending on historical and national features in the individual country and the level of its economic development and political situation, different tasks will be moved to the forefront in different countries. For example, one typical trend in agricultural development in the majority of the socialist countries is the desire for maximum intensiveness in the utilization of agricultural funds in order to increase output. But if we look at the development of this sector of the economy in the GDR and Czechoslovakia then it is a question mainly of the transfer to a reproduction strategy that saves funds, even though in the final analysis the thing that is common to all community countries is the desire for fixed capital to be used in such a way that the economic and social effect covers expenditures of live and embodied labor.

The resolution of these kinds of important tasks is helped by constant improvements in the economic mechanism in the CEMA countries, the strengthening of democratic foundations in management and planning, and enhanced independence and responsibility; which have become particularly urgent in the Eighties.

The specific forms of restructuring in the sphere of national economic management and the involvement of the broad masses in management are different in the different countries. However, the authors of the monograph rightly suggest that "the richer the experience in further improving the economic mechanism the greater the opportunities for the exchange of experience on the plane of the quest for effective ways for further development... Learning one from another, making use of all that is valuable and not repeating mistakes--herein lie important reserves for this kind of improvement" (pages 220-221). One task for this kind of cooperation is a significantly greater use than now of the rich and varied experience gained by the socialist countries in the interests of the all-around strengthening of real socialism.

The book under review reveals quite fully the extensive range of problems in the building of socialism. At the same time it is thought that a more thorough characterization of the specific interests of the socialist countries and an analysis of the factors that hamper agreement of economic interests would have significantly enriched the study, particularly chapter 2 (which deals with the interests and motive forces of development). In our view what was needed was to set forth in a more developed way the authors' position on the question of the main contradiction in the world socialist system--a question that up to now has not been unambigously resolved in the scientific literature.

We note in conclusion that the value of this work by the GDR scholars is largely determined by its originality and the sharp presentation of the issues, and by the fact that it does not avoid the complex new issues of socialist development. The book is also of value through its use of the latest factual and statistical material and the strictly logical presentation of it. By raising research in the field of the theory of socialist international relations to a new level the monograph is thus of undoubted interest to social scientists.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, J. Pabst. "Internationale Beziehungen neuen Typs" [New Types of International Relations], Berlin, 1981 (see Russian translation "Y. Pabst. "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya novogo tipa" Moscow, 1983); S. Quilitzsch and E. Crome. "Die sozialistische Gemeinschaft zu Beginn der 80er Jahre" [The Socialist Community in the Early Eighties], Berlin, 1984. See also the basis study by GDR historians led by Professor E. Kalbe. "Geschichte der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft" [History of the Socialist Community], Berlin, 1981.

2. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials on the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 129.

3. See, for example, "Osteuropa" [East Europe], Stuttgart, 1983, Part 9, pp 705-723.

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BOOK ON 40-YEAR HISTORY OF WFTU REVIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 187-189

[Review by A.S. Oganova of book "Vsemirnaya Federatsiya Profsoyuzov 1945-1985" [The WFTU 1945-1985] by A.V. Shumeyko, Profizdat, 1985, 256 pages]

[Text] The book under review is the first monograph in our scholarly literature specially and totally devoted to the history of the WFTU. Previously there were only pamphlets and articles on individual aspects of the WFTU. The publication of this new work by A.V. Shumeyko [1] was timed by the Profizdat Publishing House for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the WFTU, which has been extensively marked by workers throughout the world as a notable event in the international trade union movement.

The WFTU has always been true to the goals it set for itself in 1945 at the time it was founded, which were formulated as follows: "Struggle for the total liberation of the working class from capitalist exploitation and the yoke of the imperialist monopolies, and for the development of worker solidarity at all levels of trade union activity in joint struggle by trade unions in all countries." The path traversed by the most representative and combative international trade union center, the most mass organization, uniting more than 206 million workers in 81 countries on the common platform of struggle for the vital interests of the people of labor and for social progress and peace, is extraordinarily instructive. It is instructive both for the trade union figure truly striving to defend the interests of the workers, and for the scholar studying the problems of the international workers' movement. The 40-year experience of the WFTU also provides a tool in practical everyday struggle and serious food for thought. Thus, the attempts repeatedly made by the enemies of the unity of action by the international working class and the supporters of right-reformist ideology to belittle the significance and role of the WFTU in the development of the world trade union movement and thus to show the "incompatibility" of the trade unions that are members of it, where the communists supposedly "dominate" the other trade union organizations of the working class, are totally refuted by the history of the WFTU, which was reconstituted on the basis of the class approach and from the positions of true historicism.

The first chapter of this book offers a quite detailed examination of the process by which the federation was created. A.V. Shumeyko convincingly shows

that the cohesion of the workers' movement in many countries and the unification of trade unions with different ideological orientations, which was the result of the general struggle against fascism during World War II, promoted the very birth of a unified universal world trade union center. The presence of a common platform for joint actions, including the struggle "to improve working and living conditions for the masses, and the struggle against war and causes of war, and to establish a long-lasting and stable peace" (page 37), provided an opportunity for the representatives of national trade union centers with different ideological orientations to unify in a single organization. This lesson from the past is also topical in the Eighties. The idea of unity of actions in defense of the vital interests of the workers and against the threat of war is now increasingly breaking through to the lower levels of the trade union organizations. Analyzing the events that led in 1949 to the breakup of the world trade union center as a result of the subversive activity of the right-reformist trade union leaders (primarily from the United States, and also Great Britain), A.V. Shumeyko emphasizes that the split "did not weaken the desire of the progressive wing of the trade union movement to rally the organized masses of workers and develop unity of actions among trade unions having different political thrusts" (page 65). The book shows that throughout its entire history the WFTU has striven for the unity of the international trade union movement. And in our time, too, it is not slackening its efforts to unit the workers in the struggle for peace and social progress.

The federation pays great attention to work among the various categories of workers, including the "new" members of the trade unions (women and young people), many of which have only recently entered the job market. As the scientific and technical revolutions unfolds, the importance of the technical intelligentsia grows, and in terms of its social characteristics is coming closer to the working class; the proportion of this socioprofessional category in the trade union masses is growing. The book offers interesting material on the conferences and symposia organized by the WFTU to study the position of these groups of workers.

The international associations of trade unions, which base their activity on the program principles of the WFTU, are playing an important role in promoting the cohesion of the workers. Tracing their history (from 1949), the author emphasizes that the serious historical task laid on them, namely, not to permit any spread of the split into sector trade union associations, has been largely resolved. Now, of the more than 800 sector trade unions making up the international associations of trade unions, more than 200 belong to national trade union centers that are not members of the WFTU.

At the WFTU constituent congress in 1945 in Paris the trade unions of several colonial and dependent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America were represented. [2] Right from the start, in the activity of the world trade union center priority attention has been given to the problems of workers in particular regions, and help has been forthcoming to set up trade unions there. The WFTU has acted in support of the struggle by the peoples of colonies and dependent countries for their political and economic independence, and warmly welcomed the victory of the national liberation revolutions in the countries of Asia and Africa during the Fifties and

Sixties. Later, in the Seventies and Eighties, "the WFTU energetically supported the struggle by workers in the liberated and developing countries finally to liquidate the influence of neocolonialism and imperialist oppression, which slow down progressive socioeconomic transformations in the young national states, and to establish a new world economic order, and also their measures to limit the power of the monopolies and in defense of the sovereign rights of the young states to manage their own natural resources" (page 149). It is a pity that the book does not reveal with sufficient thoroughness the position of the WFTU on the question of establishing a new world economic order; in particular, no mention is made of WFTU participation in the International Trade Union Conference on Development Problems (Belgrade 1980), which played an important role in working out the positions of the world trade union centers on this issue. At the same time A.V. Shumeyko quite rightly notes that through its own sources, work on and the presentation of problems that were subsequently reinforced in the concept of a new world economic order can be traced back to the 2nd Milan Trade Union Conference (1949) and the 8th World Trade Union Congress (1973), with its report on the international crisis in the capital currency system. However, the position of the WFTU in the latter half of the Seventies and the first half of the Eighties on the complex of problems concerning a new world economic order, as set forth in the documents of the WFTU socioeconomic commission and the commission on transnational corporations, have, like the activities of the commissions themselves in general, not been dealt with by the author.

Within the book an interesting attempt is made to compare the positions of the WFTU and the ICTU in terms of development problems (page 172). Here, the author rightly stresses the certain approximation between the positions of the two trade union centers. Among the causes that explain the evolution of views in the ICTU leadership, however, note should be made of the influence of the position of the West German social democrats, who in connection with the growing role of the liberated countries in world politics, have deemed it necessary to support the demands of peoples in the developing countries to establish a new world economic order. And in general, the following can be said of the desire to extend the comparative analysis of positions of the WDTU and other trade union centers on the most urgent problems: if this is done, the role and significance of the WFTU in the world trade union movement as a trade union center striving to unite all workers in the struggle for peace and sociali progress will be shown even more clearly.

Analyzing WFTU activity in Asia, Africa and Latin America, A.V. Shumeyko presents interesting factual material on the development of cooperation and unified actions by the federation and the continental and national trade union centers. At the same time we would have liked to see more information on the activities of the WFTU regional bureaus in Hanoi and Brazzaville, and on the difficulties that the federation encounters in its regional activity, associated with the diversity and heterogeneity of the trade unions on those continents.

A.V. Shumeyko's work convincingly shows that the WFTU is a truly universal organization. It unites within its ranks trade unions that are operating under different social systems. The book notes the active role of the Soviet trade unions in all the activity of the trade uniuon center. At the same

time, in our view, it would have been possible to show more clearly the specific nature of the activity of the trade unions in the socialist community in the field of protecting the economic interests of the workers, in the struggle to prevent the threat of war and so forth. This was evidently hampered by space limitations in the book.

The author suggests a periodization of WFTU history, and this appears justified in the three chapters of the book (II through IV) devoted to the consecutive stages of its development, namely the period of its establishment and the federation's first years of activity up to its breakup by right-reformist trade union leaders (October 1945 through mid-1949), the period of its successful struggle, under the difficult conditions of the "cold war," to assert and expand its influencein the masses of workers and for their unity of action on a range of socioeconomic and political problems (until the mid-Sixties), and the contemporary stage (since the early Seventies), which has occurred under conditions of a further deepening of the crisis of capitalism and been characterized by an intensification of socioeconomic aspects in WFTU activity and its activation in the struggle for peace and disarmament.

The final chapter deals specifically with the Eighties. In these years the WFTU has continued consistently to pursue a course toward unity of actions by workers in the struggle for peace and social progress. The book analyzes the program document of the 10th World Trade Union Congress (Havana 1982) entitled "The Trade Unions and Tasks for the Eighties," in which among the main tasks the need is underscored to strengthen international solidarity and unity of action on a class basis with regard to problems that unite all efforts in the world trade union movement. In its activity the federation is striving to link the antimonopoly and antiwar struggle more closely and to activate work to mobilize the workers to united actions in the struggle against the antihumane policy of state monopoly capital and the growing aggressiveness of the military-industrial complex. As it prepares for a new struggle and an increase of efforts, it is with these affairs and concerns that it approaches the 11th World Trade Union Congress.

A.V. Shumeyko's monograph, which relies on an extensive range of sources, including many WFTU documents and documents from national trade union centers, is an important first contribution in describing the basic history of the WFTU. Together with other works that have been published to mark the 40th anniversary of the WFTU and analyze the path traversed by that organization [3] this book not only extends our knowledge of the history of the largest international trade union center but also helps in gaining a better understanding of the contemporary trade union movement in general and all its complex problems.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the work published earlier dealing with research into the main directions of WFTU activity: A.V. Shumeyko. "Vsemirnaya federatsiya profsoyuzov v borbe za sotsialnyy progress i mir" [The WFTU in the Struggle for Social Progress and Peace], Moscow, 1982; and also a number of articles dealing with the role of the WFTU in finding solutions to many urgent problems in the international trade union movement.

2. As the general secretary of the Organization for African Trade Union Unity D. Akumu said in his speech at the jubilee session of the WFTU General Council in early October 1985, it was precisely the Paris congress that provided the opportunity for African delegates to meet and discuss "ways to intensify the struggle to liberate the continent and for pan-African unity." After the congress the representatives of the African trade unions were invited to the Pan-African Congress in Manchester, which played a notable role in mobilizing progressive forces on the continent. Thus, D. Akumu concludes that "the history of the WFTU is associated closely with the history of the struggle by the peoples of Africa for liberation." See VSEMIRNOYE PROFSOYUZNOYE DVIZHENIYE No 11, 1985, p 18).

3. Here, note should also be made of the book "WFTU. 1945-1985" published in Prague in 1985 by the WFTU in cooperation with the Czechoslovak trade union publishing house Prace (in addition to English, the book was also published in French and Spanish).

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