

2 JUNE 1987



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

# **West Europe**

19980616 130

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

2 JUNE 1987

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## POLITICAL

## BELGIUM

- Spring Poll Shows Politicians' Popularity Remains Stable  
(Guy Daloze, Andre Mean; LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 30 Mar 87) .. 1

## DENMARK

- CP Convention Names New Chairman, Deputy  
(BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 21 Apr 87) ..... 10
- 'Open and Critical Line', by Per Lyngby ..... 10  
Paper Sees 'Generational Shift' ..... 11

- Poll Asks Voters' Opinion of Cabinet Members  
(Asger Schultz; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 21 Apr 87) ..... 12

- Briefs ..... 15  
Socialist People's Youth Chairman

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- GDR Power Plant Emissions Threaten Berlin's Air Quality  
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 8 Apr 87) ..... 16

- Prospects for CDU/FDP Coalition Examined  
(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 11 Apr 87) ..... 18

## GREECE

- Polls Reportedly Show ND Rising, PASOK Losing  
(I VRADYNI, 4 May 87) ..... 20

Former Minister Criticizes PASOK (TA NEA, 7 Apr 87) .....	21
New 'Democratic Initiative' Party Leader's Comments (I KATHIMERINI, 28 Apr 87) .....	23
Briefs	
Warship To Visit USSR .....	25
PORTUGAL	
Analyses, Opinions Given on Censure Motion, Government's Fall (Various sources, various dates) .....	26
Disapproval Expressed, Editorial .....	26
Constancio Seen as Loser, by Jose Antonio Saraiva .....	30
Machinations of the MFA, by Agapito Pinto .....	32
Eanes Versus Soares, by Vicente Jorge Silva, et al. ....	34
Majority Favors Elections .....	39
Voters Want Stability .....	40
PCP Said To Have Infiltrated Intelligence Service (TEMPO, 26 Feb 87) .....	47
SPAIN	
Suarez Denies Anti-Americanism, Anti-NATO Position (Adolfo Suarez Interview; TIEMPO, 13 Apr 87) .....	48
SWEDEN	
Poll: USSR Greater Threat to Country Than U.S. (Sven Svensson; DAGENS NYHETER, 23 Apr 87) .....	57
Environment Party Gain Dominates Latest Poll News (Various sources, various dates) .....	59
Absence of Voter 'Antagonisms', by Gunnar Andren .....	59
Paper Comments on Poll, Editorial .....	60
Environmentalists' 'Spokesman' Explains Goals, by Herman Melzer .....	62
Paper on Environmentalists' Program, Editorial .....	66
Greens Advance in Stockholm .....	68
Youths Vote as Parents, Editorial .....	69
Liberals Largest Nonsocialist Party .....	69
Book on Election, Voter Trends Sees Danger Signs for SDP (DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Apr 87) .....	71
Voters Moving to Right, by Sven Svensson .....	71
Party's, Voters' Views Differ, by Hans Bergstrom .....	73

## SOCIAL

### ITALY

- Women With Foreign Husbands No Longer Subject to Foreign Laws  
(Carla Rodota; LA REPUBBLICA, 7 Mar 87) ..... 77

### Briefs

- 1986 Statistics on Population ..... 79

## ECONOMIC

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- EC Solution Proposed To Replace National Steel Subsidies  
(SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 10 Apr 87) ..... 80

### FINLAND

- Economic Study Institute Sees Slower Growth Ahead  
(HENSINGIN SANOMAT, 31 Mar 87) ..... 82

### GREECE

- Spectrum of Trade With USSR Reviewed  
(Vas. Danos; TO VIMA, 12 Apr 87) ..... 85

### ITALY

- ENEL President Explains Strategy After Energy Conference  
(Franco Viezzoli Interview; L'ESPRESSO, 15 Mar 87) ..... 90

### PORTUGAL

- Businessmen Express Satisfaction With EEC Membership  
(EXPRESSO, 21 Mar 87) ..... 96

- Decline in Foreign Investments in 1986 Analyzed  
(O JORNAL, 3 Apr 87) ..... 98

- Economic Indicators Continue To Improve  
(O JORNAL, 20 Mar 87) ..... 101

### SPAIN

- Losses to Economy From Continuing Strikes Detailed  
(Gonzalo San Segundo, et al.; CAMBIO 16, 13 Apr 87) ..... 106

- Outward Success Seen Hiding Profound Difficulties  
(A.J.R. Soares de Mello; SEMANARIO, 28 Mar 87) ..... 112

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Air Force Looks To Replace Pershing 1A's With 1B's  
(Kurt Kister; SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 13 Apr 87) ..... 115

GREECE

Poll Reveals Majority Wish Closure of U.S. Bases  
(Bambis Papapanagiotou; I AVGI TIS KYRIAKIS, 12 Apr 87) . 117

/9987

## SPRING POLL SHOWS POLITICIANS' POPULARITY REMAINS STABLE

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 30 Mar 87 pp 1-2

[Article by Guy Daloze and Andre Mean]

[Text] The Belgians are stable! Stable, but with a certain lack of coherence. The quarterly barometer, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE-Marketing Unit, has confirmed this spring the trends that were reflected in the winter poll. Obviously, the "conclave" of the budget audit, its decisions and the persuasive effects that preceded it in the parties (Ah! The supposedly mobilizing congresses!) did not have decisive influence (unless, perhaps, it would be to the slight benefit of the Flemish liberals). On the other hand, the Fourons affair and the Zeebrugge disaster did help the popularity of some.

## PVV Nibbles Away

Our barometer is, in fact, essentially one which confirms the trends and changes registered in the winter, however contradictory they may have been.

It is a confirmation of the high degree of confidence (40 points) granted in December to the government, joining that of the 1985 elections. It is also a confirmation of the high result of the French-speaking and especially Walloon socialists. The "serious" PS of the Spitaels line is at its ceiling of 42 percent of all Walloon votes and holding. It is a confirmation of the return to grace of the "authentic PVV," which is slowly (but surely) eating away at the CVP, but also the SP, which should persuade it to ensure its vocation, which is more centrist than rightist. It is a confirmation of the stagnation of the Social Christians "on the search" in the north and the south (with a slight advantage for the latter), the unquestioned "leadership" of the liberals in Brussels, the decline of the Flemish socialists (seeking a proper mixture), the disappearance of the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] (despite the Cappart affair), while the Volksunie is holding its own. Finally, it is a confirmation of the fact that priority has been granted more than ever to the fight against unemployment

## Happart-De Cross: Same Fight?

There are few differences also regarding the notoriety of politicians, with a general downward trend. There is one exception, however: Jose Happart, who joins Guy Spitaels on the first step of the podium of Walloon popularity.

The president of the PS is down 3 points, while the first alderman from Fourons moves up 4. The "Fourons carrousel," which in a sense is one way of making a long face at the authorities, is an attraction enjoying a good deal of success because Happart is now marking up a higher score than the one he had after having been "broken" by the Council of State. Has he managed (while linguistic problems continue to figure among the least concerns of all Belgians) to embody a kind of revolt against the traditional political class, toward which the people are showing a certain feeling of disaffection?

Another result could confirm this analysis: In Wallonia and especially Brussels, the Wathélet "effect" has lost its edge, manifestly because the minister-Walloon president has completed no further phases of his "Tour of Flanders" in the past 3 months, a move that was attractive because of its innovative and untraditional nature; scarcely political, in sum.

Is there a third illustration of this irritation of the public regarding traditional practices? De Croo has had very good results in the southern and central regions of the country, probably because the very human and well-documented speeches by the minister of communications following the Zeebrugge tragedy were very impressive and gave politics a new face.

#### Women

There are few changes in Flanders, unless it is the excellent position of women in politics: Demeester, Smet and Neyts, confirming the demand for new faces for new problems.

In Brussels, Martens remains, as in Flanders, in first place, despite a slight slump. But it is Jean Gol who now comes in second, "leaping ahead" of his colleague Francois-Xavier de Donnea. And the three big losers of the quarter are PSC Wathélet and socialists Moureaux and Spitaels. There is one consolation, however, for French-speaking Social Christians, who are very absent from the Brussels scene: Maystadt and Wathélet are among the Walloon leaders, again outrunning their liberal fellow team members. And presidents Deprez and Michel are running a (fairly) good race together, while Damseaux has in no way benefited from his defenestration.

#### Voting Intentions

If legislative elections were held Sunday, what party would you vote for?

	December 1986		March 1987		
	<u>Nationally</u>		<u>Flanders</u>	<u>Wallonia</u>	<u>Brussels</u>
Responded	80	79	81	74	81
Did not respond	20	21	19	26	19

The rate of response remains substantial for such a poll and Belgium remains politically aware. However, one-fifth of the voters were undecided and they might give the coming elections a different trend.

# Wallonia: PS Confirms

	Poll <u>March 1987</u>	Poll <u>December 1986</u>	Elections <u>October 1985</u>
PS	42.0	42.1	39.4
PRL	22.2	22.1	24.2
PSC	20.5	20.3	22.6
ECOLO	6.1	5.9	6.2
Others	9.2	9.6	7.6

In Wallonia, There is no movement whatsoever. Has the game already been decided, even if 1 out of every 4 Walloon residents has not yet declared his preference? Whatever the case, nothing has changed in Wallonia compared with the previous poll. The majority remains the minority party.

The PS, which is, in a sense, the rallying ground for all malcontents in Wallonia, seems to have found a kind of ceiling at 42 percent, after crossing the historic barrier of 40 percent last year. Its rise is therefore confirmed.

The two majority groups are also growing, but very little, infinitesimally and insignificantly compared with the winter poll. Their Walloon "majority" therefore remains endangered more than ever, but they may have checked their fall. It should also be noted that the ratio of strength has scarcely varied since the elections between the two "enemy brothers": It is still on the order of 1.5 percent.

The PSC-PRL regional majority is in no way a majority, with 42.7 points (.3 more than 3 months ago), but 4 less than in the 1985 elections. The socialists have 42. One is therefore witnessing the establishment of two blocs, especially since no little party has crossed the credibility bar of 2 percent.

## Flanders: PVV Nibbles Away

	Poll <u>March 1987</u>	Poll <u>December 1986</u>	Elections <u>October 1985</u>
CVP	30.9	31.4	34.6
SP	25.0	26.4	23.7
PVV	20.1	18.9	17.3
VNP [Flemish National Party, VU]	12.1	11.9	12.7
AGALEV	6.9	6.8	6.1
Others	5.0	4.6	5.6

Undeniably, the PVV is slowly but surely eating away at the confidence of the Flemish voters. In two directions, however, its success is coming about at the expense of the CVP, down again, but not only the CVP. But since neither the VU nor the AGALEV nor the "others" are losing votes, it is likely that a fringe of the SP is being enticed by the position of the PVV. The fact is that the Flemish socialists, who had not moved for months, are now losing 1.4 points, a significant decline.



Geens' majority is thereby strengthened, despite the new decline of the CVP. It is in fact 51 percent compared with 5.9 percent in the elections.

In December, we said that "nothing is for sure." Today, one can state that the PVV has shown definite progress and is in the process of regaining the positions it lost in the 1985 legislative elections.

	March 1987 Poll	December 1986 Poll	October 1985 Elections
PRL	19.9	19.5	19.7
CVP	12.7	13.0	14.6
PS	12.5	12.6	11.3
PVV	9.6	9.4	8.0
SP	8.8	9.1	8.7
VU (VNP)	7.7	7.7	6.4
PSC	6.9	7.1	7.0
FDF	4.8	5.0	8.3
ECOLO-AGALEV	4.8	4.8	6.3

One can note a rise of the imprecise responses (example: the PRL or the UDRT) and the substantial place occupied by the smaller lists, all grouped together under "others." But it is the power of the liberal family that is significant in the arrondissement.

Together, the PRL, making steady progress, and the PVV make up nearly 30 percent of the votes. They have risen over 6 percent in relative value compared with October 1985. On the other hand, the Christian family is suffering somewhat in the arrondissement with new declines, which means that the majority is not moving (49.1 points compared with 49 in December and 49.3 in the elections).

In Brussels as in Flanders, it is therefore the liberal family that maintains the scores of the coalition.

The FDF continues to crop, unlike the Volksunie. It is now next to last, along with the ECOLOS.

#### Popularity of the Politicians

For each of the following personalities, would you tell us if you want to see him exercise major political influence in the coming months?

A total of 44 names were proposed to persons questioned throughout the country: Vic Anciaux, Philippe Busquin, Willy Claes, Georges Clerfayt, Daniel Coens, Andre Cools, Andre Damseaux, Herman De Croo, Francois-Xavier de Donnea, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Jean-Maurice Dehousse, Wivina Demeester, Gerard Deprez, Patrick Dewael, Mark Eyskens, Jaak Gabriels, Gaston Geens, Jean Gol, Michel Hansenne, Jose Happart, Anne-Marie Lizin, Wilfried Martens, Jacqueline Mayence, Philippe Maystadt, Louis Michel, Philippe Monfils, Philippe Moureaux, Anne-Marie Neyts, Roger Nols, Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, Charles Picque,

Edouard Pouillet, Hugo Schiltz, Henri Simonet, Mier Smet, Antoinette Spaak, Guy Spitaels, Frank Swaelen, Leo Tindemans, Louis Tobback, Iarel Van Miert, Guy Verhofstadt, Melchior Wathelet, Freddy Willockx.

Compared with the previous poll, the following have been removed from the list: Urbain, Van den Brande, Van Rompay and Van den Bossche. Picque, Anciaux, Willockx and Mrs Demeester have been added.

It should be recalled that all the names on the list are listed in the order of the persons questioned. The latter must say whether they want that official to exercise important responsibilities in the months ahead.

Nationally: Still Martens

	Fall 1986	Winter 1986	Spring 1987	Difference
Martens .....	44	42	43	+1
Tindemans ....	37	38	38	-
Eyskens .....	34	34	35	+1
De Croo .....	28	29	30	+1
5. Verhofstadt ....	29	29	29	-
Van Miert .....	30	29	27	-2
Claes .....	30	28	27	-1
Geens .....	24	24	24	-
Neyts .....	22	22	23	+1
10. Dewael .....	19	20	21	+1
Smet .....	19	19	20	+1
Swaelen .....	18	20	19	-1
Schiltz .....	22	19	18	-1
Anciaux .....	P.N.	P.N.	18	.
15. Demeester .....	P.N.	P.N.	17	.
Coens .....	P.N.	P.N.	17	.
Dehaene .....	P.N.	P.N.	17	.
Gabriels .....	P.N.	18	16	-2
Tobback .....	P.N.	P.N.	16	.

PN = Not noted.

The level of popularity of national personalities scarcely changes from one quarter to the next.

The first 19 are Flemish. No French-speaking person is popular in Walloon and at the same time "supported" in Flanders in order to join this table of national glory.

The differences are minimal. Curiously enough, only two party presidents--from the opposition: Van Miert (SP) and Gabriels (VU)--have recorded a decline of 2 full points.

Martens has improved his national popularity a little. Minister of Finance Eyskens has also. One will note the "joyous entry" into the national lead of Mrs Demeester and Dehaene and Coene.

Tobback is in last place and takes the place of his French-speaking socialist colleague Guy Spitaels.

# Happart: Moral Victor

	Fall 1986	Winter 1986	Spring 1987	Difference
Happart .....	29	29	33	+ 4
Spitaels .....	36	36	33	- 3
Maystadt .....	33	31	29	- 2
Wathelet .....	23	31	28	- 3
5. Martens .....	27	25	25	-
Gol .....	24	24	22	- 2
Lizin .....	22	21	21	-
Cools .....	23	20	20	-
De Croo .....	P.N.	P.N.	19	•
10. Tindemans .....	19	20	18	- 2
Monfils .....	19	19	17	- 2
L. Michel .....	18	18	16	- 2
Deprez .....	18	17	16	- 1
14. ex aequo				
Hansenne .....	18	18	15	- 3
Dehousse .....	23	20	15	- 5
Eyskens .....	P.N.	P.N.	15	•
Spaak .....	18	17	15	- 2

The event in Wallonia, in addition to the fact that all the stars are declining, is the return of Zorro: Jose Happart, who has regained, *ex aequo* with Spitaels, the title of Mr Wallonia. And yet, the president of the PS is down 3 points, while Happart (the only one on the rise) has gone up 4 full points, which gives a moral victory this quarter to the burgomaster of Fourons. The latter has obviously been helped by the different "rounds of the Fourons carrousel" and his ability to hang on despite all the threats.

For the socialists, let us note the "equal" scores of Anne-Marie Lizin and Andre Cools, but the tumble of Jean-Maurice Dehousse, who has lost 5 more points.

It is undoubtedly the impact of savings-pension, but Eyskens has succeeded in joining the Walloon picture, while Martens is crawling. De Croo has also penetrated Wallonia. His clear, moderate speeches at the time of the Zeebrugge tragedy, perhaps explain his performance. Despite Happart, one still finds four Flemish figures in the Walloon picture.

The PSC personalities are all in a decline: Maystadt, Wathelet, Deprez and Hansenne. Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb had not yet published his book at the time of our survey and his name no longer appears. However, the PSC must be satisfied: Two of its ministers (Maystadt and Wathelet) are the most popular members of the government.

Nor is the PRL overjoyed: Gol, Monfils and Michel have all three dropped 2 points.

In Flanders this quarter, one sees women well-represented. Demeester (CVP) has registered a fine score in order to make her entry onto our list of personalities. Smet, also from the CVP, has jumped up 5 points, while Annemie Neyts (PVV) holds steady.

## Flanders: Women Score Well

	Fall 1986	Winter 1986	Spring 1987	Difference
Martens .....	54	54	55	+ 1
Tindemans .....	50	53	53	-
Eyskens .....	51	51	50	- 1
Van Miert .....	47	45	45	-
5. Verhofstadt ...	43	43	45	+ 2
Claes .....	45	42	42	-
Geens .....	42	42	41	- 1
De Croo .....	37	37	37	-
Dewael .....	34	36	37	+ 1
10. Neyts .....	36	37	37	•
Smet .....	32	31	36	+ 5
Demeester .....	P.N.	P.N.	32	•
Schiltz .....	39	33	32	- 1
Swaelen .....	30	31	31	-
15. ex aequo				
Anciaux .....	P.N.	P.N.	30	•
Coens .....	P.N.	P.N.	30	•
Dehaene .....	30	30	30	-
Gabriels .....	P.N.	32	30	- 2
Tobback .....	P.N.	P.N.	30	•

PN = Not noted.

Martens has risen 1 point and remains the uncontested leader of the CVP. Unlike what has happened in Wallonia, there is no Eyskens effect due to savings-pension.

Verhofstadt continues his rise and is far ahead of De Croo.

Van Miert holds steady, like Claes, but Tobback is knocking on the door. He is definitely a man on the rise.

In the VU, Gabriels is losing some ground, while Anciaux shows that he keeps his support.

As usual, there are no French-speakers in the Flemish classification.

### Brussels: De Donnea Regresses

During the last quarter, one witnessed the boom of Melchior Wathelet, whose "charm operation" aimed at Flanders was highly appreciated in the capital. But everything is quickly forgotten and the head of the Walloon Executive Branch has paid with a spectacular 6-point drop. In our tables, it is the most substantial variation. Philippe Maystadt is also down in Brussels. Edouard Pouillet has still not "come out."

Among the socialists, one notes a slight rise of Jose Happart, who, in Brussels also, obtains the same score as Spitaels, the dropping by 4 whole points, like Philippe Moureaux. For his first appearance on our list of personalities, the burgomaster of Saint-Gilles, Charles Picque, has made a fine penetration. He is a man to follow.

	Fall 1986	Winter 1986	Spring 1987	Difference
Martens .....	40	37	36	- 1
De Croo .....	28	29	30	+ 1
Gol .....	28	29	30	+ 1
de Donnéa .....	29	29	27	- 2
5. Tindemans .....	27	26	28	-
Simonet .....	23	23	24	+ 1
Eyskens .....	23	23	23	-
Spaak .....	22	21	21	-
Verhofstadt .....	21	21	21	-
10. Maystadt .....	24	23	21	- 2
Happart .....	14	17	19	+ 2
Spitaels .....	23	23	19	- 4
Nols .....	24	21	18	- 3
Wathelet .....	14	24	18	- 6
15. Moureaux .....	18	21	17	- 4
L. Michel .....	19	19	16	- 3
ex aequo				
Claes .....	P.N.	P.N.	15	
Lizin .....	16	16	15	- 1
Monfils .....	17	17	15	- 2
Neyts .....	P.N.	P.N.	15	•
Picqué .....	P.N.	P.N.	15	•

For the liberals, De Donnea has lost his second place. He is outdistanced by 1 point by Gol and De Croo. Nols continues to drop and Simonet has risen by 1 point. Verhofstadt remains stationery, while Neyts appears in the classification.

The prime minister remains the favorite of the Brussels, but his star is fading. He has dropped since the fall of 1986.

#### Concerns of the Belgians

Confidence: At a Peak

To solve the problems that now confront Belgium, do you trust or not the government of Mr Martens?

#### Nationally

Complete confidence	11
Fairly confident	29
Not too confident	13
No confidence at all	28
No opinion	19

When one compares the results with polls conducted in the past, one obtains the following:

	Spring 1987	Winter 1986	Fall 1986	Summer 1986	Spring 1986	Winter 1985	Fall 1985	Summer 1985	Spring 1985
Confidence	40	39	30	26	29	45	37	39	34
No confidence	41	41	41	45	40	33	37	36	37

This is the best score of the government since the elections in the winter of 1985 and the spectacular rise of the latest poll is confirmed and even expanded.

Nevertheless, Belgium remains cut into two blocs: 40 percent pro-Martens and 41 percent against.

#### Unemployment

In your opinion, what action should the government now make its priority?

	Spring 1987	Winter 1986	Fall 1986	Summer 1986	Spring 1986
Fight against unemployment	79	75	77	77	78
Reduce taxes	59	60	59	59	62
Fight rising prices	42	48	41	50	57
Fight violence and lack of security	38	42	42	41	44
Improve education	31	30	27	26	25
Further social peace	31	37	32	34	25
Solve the problem of immigrant workers	25	24	24	25	27
Settle the linguistic problem for good	25	23	22	20	21

A few changes: Rising prices, social issues and violence have dropped on the scale of concerns and even substantially. At the same time, there is a timid rise of education and the linguistic problem. However, the latter remains solidly in last place.

Whatever the case, unemployment remains the most important concern and by far.

This poll was conducted at the request of LA LIBRE BELGIQUE from 12 to 23 March 1987, by 52 surveyors from the Marketing Unit, a company specializing in marketing studies and opinion polls. The surveyors questioned a sampling of 2,111 Belgians 18 and over, chosen based on quotas of sex, age and social class (margin of error: plus or minus 2.1).

The poll covered 900 persons in Flanders, 850 in Wallonia and 471 in Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde.

The results were weighed in terms of the importance of the regions of the country.

Affiliations: ESOMAR, FEBELMAR.

All rights reserved: LA LIBRE BELGIQUE and Marketing Unit.

11,464

CSO: 3619/39

## CP CONVENTION NAMES NEW CHAIRMAN, DEPUTY

## 'Open and Critical Line'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 87 p 7

[Article by Per Lyngby]

[Text] Both candidates for the chairmanship of the Communist Party were appointed. The post of deputy chairman is a new creation, and the goal is now to get back into the Folketing.

King Solomon did not live in vain. With a solution worthy of the wise king, the Communist Party has avoided trouble by having two rivals for the post of chairman share the honor of being the leader of the party.

The decision of the central committee was loudly applauded by the 900 participants in the 28th congress of the party, held in Brøndby during the Easter holidays.

Ole Sohn, 32, chairman of the Semi-Skilled Workers' Union, Horsens, will succeed Jørgen Jensen, the deceased party chairman. The Solomonic decision is that the other candidate for the chairmanship, Jan Andersen, 47, of Copenhagen, will be given the entirely new position of deputy chairman with responsibility for the organizational work. Ole Sohn will safeguard the political work of the party and its parliamentary profile.

Both will be given the task of soliciting political support in the upcoming parliamentary elections since the Communists want to get back into the Folketing, from which they have been excluded since 1979.

That will be a major task, seeing that the Communist Party only obtained 0.7 percent of the vote in the election in 1984. A more open style within the party and a more up-to-date method of work will pave the way, says Ole Sohn.

"We need an open and critical line, both with respect to developments in this country and developments in the socialist countries," says the new party chairman. But it must not become fashionable or a principle with the Communist Party to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union. There is no basis for that."

Organizational struggle is political struggle, says one of the doctrines of the Communist Party.

For this reason it may very well become difficult for Ole Sohn and Jan Andersen to maintain the distinctions between their tasks when entering the partner race. If things do not go well for the chairman and the deputy chairman, they must keep in mind Khrushchev's thesis of peaceful coexistence.

#### Paper Sees 'Generational Shift'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 87 p 10

[Commentary: "Also the Communist Party?"]

[Text] During the Easter holidays, the Communist Party elected a new chairman to succeed the deceased chairman, Jørgen Jensen. Following an internal discussion, the central committee elected the chairman of the Semi-Skilled Workers' Union in Horsens, Ole Sohn, as chairman, while his opponent, the chairman of Metal Workers' Union, Branch 13, Copenhagen, Jan Andersen, was given the post of deputy chairman, a post created for the occasion.

The election of chairman indicates a generational shift, even if 'old boys,' such as Poul Emanuel and Ib Nørlund, are still party secretary and unofficial chief ideologist. The new chairman did, indeed, immediately give expression to his hope that the voters will now evaluate the Communist Party on the basis of its future work and not on the basis of the way in which it used to tackle the various problems. "In this context, I also have in mind our relations with Moscow," he told EKSTRA BLADET. And he told BT: "We need not defend things within the Soviet Union which the Russians themselves cannot even defend."

It is, of course, a welcome sign that the Communist Party of Denmark--as the last West-European communist party-- also sees the glasnost signals from Moscow. On the other hand, the facts that the party only now changes its viewpoints and only allows itself to become modernized in pace with developments within the Soviet Union hardly lend it credibility.

It is understandable that the Communist Party only got 23,085 votes in the last election. It is to be hoped that it will never get further support.

7262

CSO: 3613/74



## POLL ASKS VOTERS' OPINION OF CABINET MEMBERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 87 p 5.

[Article by Asger Schultz]

[Text] Poul Schluter: the strongest one; Mimi Stilling Jakobsen: the most honest one; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen: the most intelligent one; Christian Christensen: the highest moral standard.

In 1985 the Gallup Institute carried through a survey in which it asked the voters to evaluate the members of the government with regard to a few general qualities, honesty, strength, intelligence, and moral standard.

After the most recent ministerial changes in August 1986, a number of new ministers have been added and have had occasion to make themselves known to the voters.

The Gallup Institute, therefore, has repeated the poll, in which a representative section of the electorate, comprising approximately 1,000 respondents, were asked to give the names of as many of the members of the government as they could recall and subsequently asked the following four questions:

"It is often said that politicians are not honest in the sense that one cannot always believe what they say. Which of the ministers of the nonsocialist government do you find the most honest one, that is to say, the minister whose words deserve credit?"

"It is said that a politician is strong in the sense that he or she has the ability to stand firm even in the most difficult situations. Which of the ministers in the nonsocialist government do you consider the strongest one in this sense, which does not necessarily mean having the most influence but thus the ability to stand firm?"

and

"One also talks about the moral standard of politicians, meaning that the person does not abandon his principles because it may be convenient to do so in a given situation. Which one of the ministers of the nonsocialist government do you consider to have the highest moral standard?"

and finally:

"Not all politicians are equally intelligent. Which of the ministers of the nonsocialist government do you consider to be the most intelligent one?"

ken- der	(1)	(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
		hæder- lig		stærk		mo- ralsk		intel- ligens	
%		% 85	% 87	% 85	% 87	% 85	% 87	% 85	% 87
94	Poul Schlüter	23	13	21	22	14	12	22	19
77	Uffe Ellemann-Jensen	8	7	17	16	7	7	20	22
71	Britta Schall Holberg	5	1	31	16	10	3	3	2
62	Mimi Stilling								
	Jakobsen	9	22	3	7	5	10	3	7
51	Chr. Christensen	8	12	4	4	10	13	2	1
30	Palle Simonsen	8	8	7	5	4	2	5	9
30	Isi Foighel	2	2	1	2	1	2	11	4
22	Bertel Haarder	8	5	9	6	6	7	5	6
20	Anders Andersen	11	3	13	8	5	4	4	4
19	Erik Ninn-Hansen	7	10	4	3	6	6	4	8
19	Frode Nør Christensen		3		1		3		0
18	Lars P. Gammelgaard		1		0		1		0
14	Mette Madsen	13	5	1	0	4	2	3	4
13	Hans Engell	1	0	0	3		1	1	0
12	H. P. Clausen		5		2		2		9
9	Henning Dyremose		3		0		1		7
9	Nils Wilhjelm		5		3		2		6
8	Tom Høyem	1	0	1	0		0		0
6	Knud Enggaard	1	2	1	0	2	5	2	0
6	Thor Pedersen		2		1		2		1
2	Svend Erik Hovmand								
4	Ved ikke	54	50	38	41	58	58	51	46
596	I alt								

Key:

- (1) Knows
- (2) Honest
- (3) Strong
- (4) Highest moral standard
- (5) Intelligence

As will appear from the survey, the strong effect of the prime minister is very apparent. He is in a strong position or the strongest one in all areas. However, there is also scope for others, and it is interesting to make comparisons with the previous poll.

With regard to honesty and credibility, Mimi Stilling Jakobsen is in a very strong position. No less than 22 percent of those interviewed stress her honesty, which is given the highest rating of any minister. Following Mimi Stilling Jakobsen, Prime Minister Poul Schluter, Christian Christensen, and Ninn-Hansen are given the highest ratings with regard to honesty.

With regard to strength, there has been a clear shift. Prime Minister Poul Schluter now stands as the strongest one, while Britta Schall Holberg has declined sharply and now shares the second place with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.

High moral standard ratings are especially given to the Minister of Environment (13 percent) and the Prime Minister (12 percent). But also in this respect Mimi Stilling Jakobsen holds a strong position (10 percent), while Britta Schall Holberg has dropped back sharply in this area as well.

Finally, as far as intelligence is concerned, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is regarded as the most intelligent minister (22 percent), followed by the Prime Minister with 19 percent.

A comparison of the two polls shows that certain ministers have become very prominent, while others have faded somewhat out of sight. Minister of Economic Affairs Anders Andersen, for example, is no longer as prominent. In contrast, Minister of Environment Chr. Christensen has become more prominent.

The current Minister of Agriculture Britta Schall Holberg is now in a far weaker position than in 1985, whereas Minister of Social Affairs Mimi Stilling Jakobsen has become very prominent.

A comparison of all of the ratings shows the Prime Minister to be the strongest one. If all of the figures are added up, he gets a total of 66. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen becomes second with a score of 52, closely followed by Mimi Stilling Jakobsen with 46. One then has to go all the way down to 30 for Chr. Christensen and 27 for Ninn-Hansen.

Reprinting subject to indication of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and the Gallup Institute as sources.

7262

CSO: 3613/74

POLITICAL

DENMARK

BRIEFS

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S YOUTH CHAIRMAN--Bjarke Møller, 21, Copenhagen, was elected new chairman of the Socialist People's Youth Organization at its national congress held in Odense during the Easter holidays, the Socialist People's Youth Organization states. The organization was previously headed by a triumvirate. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 87 p 2] 7262

CSO: 3613/74

## GDR POWER PLANT EMISSIONS THREATEN BERLIN'S AIR QUALITY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Apr 87 p 5

[Article datelined Berlin, 7 April, by Rt.: "Much Pollution From the GDR in the Berlin Air; Alternative List Demands Cooperation in Environmental Protection; 'Threat From GDR Nuclear Power Plants'"]

[Text] In the opinion of scientists of the Berlin Institute for Economic Research, Berlin is ecologically endangered by the GDR lignite and nuclear power plants. In a study commissioned by the Alternative List (AL) on the possibilities of cooperation in the field of environmental protection between the GDR and West Berlin, it is stated that the ecological locational disadvantages of the city resulted on the one hand from the "GDR's extensive use of electricity based on lignite" and on the other hand "from the threat coming from the GDR nuclear power plants."

According to the findings of the scientists, the five GDR reactors in normal operation discharge three times as many radioactive components as all FRG reactors combined. As late as the end of 1985, the GDR energy scientists had predicted a capacity demand of 23,000 megawatt for the year 2020.

## After Chernobyl

According to the decision of the 11th SED Congress of February 1986, the "Nord" nuclear power plant near Greifswald is to be expanded to more than 3,000 megawatt. Moreover the decision has been made to put the Stendal nuclear power plant with two blocks of 1,000 megawatt each on stream by 1991. Stendal is a "special threat" to West Berlin because it is located in the main wind direction about 80 km from the city limit as the crow flies. "If a super disaster were to happen there, the viability of the city would be seriously jeopardized." Immediate evacuation of a large part of the population in Western direction is impossible.

## Imported Sulfur Dust

Since Chernobyl in the GDR, too, has caused "second thoughts as regards nuclear energy," East Berlin is now increasingly relying on lignite. As

a result, environmental pollution especially in the southern GDR bezirks has further increased. In the opinion of the scientists, the health of the people living in these areas has been "negatively affected" to a considerable extent. Studies to this effect, it is further stated, thus far have not been published in the GDR. The former GDR economist Maier points out that, e.g., the life expectancy in the Halle area is 6 years below the GDR average.

The emissions, especially from the GDR lignite power plants, it is noted in the study, brought about "additional pollution of the Berlin air," especially if a south wind occurs during low-exchange inversion weather conditions. For these periods a share of 50 to 80 percent of imported sulfur dioxide and sulfur dust has been ascertained.

Therefore like no other city in Europe, West Berlin has a "reason caused by its location" to cooperate with the GDR in energy questions to achieve an improvement of the environmental situation. In this connection Berlin could assume a "pioneer function". For this purpose an innovative policy related to energy technology is required in the city.

#### "Powerful Energy Industry"

In the opinion of the scientists it could "have a demonstration effect in the regional environment" and could be expanded in connection with a research and development cooperation with the GDR. In West Berlin as well as in the GDR "a comprehensive energy-technical rationalization strategy" is however possible only if the "powerful energy industry" is subjected to institutional reforms.

12356

CSO: 3620/209

## PROSPECTS FOR CDU/FDP COALITION EXAMINED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Apr 87 p 2

[Article, datelined Wiesbaden, 10 April, by ptn: "Optimism in Coalition Negotiations Between CDU and FDP in Wiesbaden; Personnel Questions Put Aside; Supplementary Budget; Law Amendments"]

[Text] Hesse's CDU and FDP have reached agreement during the very first session of their coalition negotiations on numerous topics relating to Hesse's policy. Both parties reported on Friday in Wiesbaden that the talks had taken place in a "pleasant climate"; "political common ground" was noted in a "multiplicity of points." Kanther, the general secretary of the Hessian CDU predicted a "fruitful and politically friendly cooperation" as a result of the initial talks. The coalition of CDU and FDP in the coming four years will be able to offer "a picture so convincing" that at the next election it will "achieve a greater majority." According to Kanther, both coalition partners are aware that the narrow election result of 5 April places a "special obligation in dealing with one another and with the political opponent."

CDU and FDP would like to continue the coalition negotiations all day next Tuesday in Bad Nauheim and, if possible, conclude them prior to the constituent session of the new Land parliament on 23 April. At this session the present Federal Environmental Minister Wallmann is to be elected new Hessian minister president. According to the provisional schedule of CDU and FDP, the vote of confidence on the new cabinet is to take place the following day or the coming week. On Friday the Greens asked SPD parliamentary group chairman Krollmann to be a candidate against Wallmann. Former environmental minister Fischer, who was chosen chairman of the Greens parliamentary group, promised Krollmann the ten votes of his parliamentary group for this ballot. The SPD has left the question open as to whether or not Krollmann would be a candidate against Wallmann.

Concerning the results of the first round of coalition talks, CDU politician Kanther and FDP politician Weghorn reported that their two parties first of all agreed on a supplementary budget to the Red-Green 1987 budget and secondly on a package of law amendments. Personnel and

organizational questions have not yet been dealt with. With the planned supplementary budget the investment volume is to be increased, namely for "practical environmental protection" (waste water purification plants, care of forests, conservation) and for "protection of man" (funds for road building to bypass localities); promotion of research, promotion of agriculture and more jobs for police and the judicial system are said to be additional points of emphasis of the supplementary budget. Kanther and Weghorn pointed out that because of the binding effects of the Red-Green budget, it will take until the 1988 budget to notice a clear CDU-FDP outlook. With all the justified expectations in the new government, it must be taken into consideration that this government "steps into an ongoing policy even though the latter has been standing still."

The planned laws of the two coalition partners which have already been negotiated deal with the rescinding of the Red-Green "compulsory educational qualification phase," the adaptation of the university law to the federal framework legislation obstructed by the former Hesse government, the change in the Hessian staff representation act (the Red-Green staff representation act was recently declared partially unconstitutional by the Hessian State Court and requires reenactment with amendments), abolition of nuisance taxes and last but not least a media law by which the organization of private broadcasting is to be made possible. The coalition partners want to establish working groups which are to prepare the draft bills as quickly as possible. In Kanther's and Weghorn's judgment, CDU and FDP have "made very, very good progress" with the arrangement concerning the supplementary budget and the planned laws.

In response to the question as to where the differences between CDU and FDP are, Kanther said what is important to the two coalition parties is to formulate a joint governmental policy but not to work out the differences in the party programs. He said SPD and Greens "cultivated their programmatic differences with Hesse's policy at a standstill," their alliance negotiations of many years resulted in ponderous agreements, which did not prevent repeated breaks in cooperation. CDU and FDP, on the other hand, are interested in decision as soon as possible. The coalition partners also feel "spurred on" in their negotiations by the latest decisions of the Boerner cabinet after the elections, action by which prior to the change in government promotions and raises in salaries for SPD members in Hesse's public service were quickly awarded.

12356

CSO: 3620/211



## POLLS REPORTEDLY SHOW ND RISING, PASOK LOSING

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 4 May 87 p 6

/Text/ All recent polls conducted either for ND, American experts or the KKE (in view of its forthcoming congress) give a comfortable majority to ND, ranging from 11 to 26 percent (in the big urban centers).

According to information of I VRADYNI TIS KYRIAKIS, three polls were recently taken that showed that ND is not at present the number one party in strength in the country but the difference that separates it from PASOK is such that it offers it the possibility of forming a government all by itself.

According to the same information, American experts also conducted a poll for a big western embassy that carefully follows the trends of public opinion. The poll was conducted in three big cities (Athens, Salonica and Piraeus) and showed ND with approximately 51 percent while PASOK was under 30 percent, around 26 percent.

Moreover, the KKE also conducted a poll in view of its coming congress (so as to ascertain trends in its grass roots). This poll too showed ND as the number one party with a 10 percent difference from PASOK.

Finally, the results of a poll conducted by ND (at the end of February), i.e. before the open rift between the church and state and the Aegean crisis. This poll showed ND to be ahead of PASOK throughout Greece by 11 points which when translated into percentages means 12.5 percent with 13.5 percent, In other words, ND had 46.5 percent and PASOK 33 percent.

Other interesting points in the poll were the following:

1. Of every 10 party members that leave PASOK 4 go to ND, 2 to the KKE and the other 4 remain undecided.
2. Young people up to the age of 25 show a clear preference for ND, contrary to what was the case up to 1985.
3. ND has the highest percentage of "steadfast members" throughout Greece.

Finally, this poll showed that the government's and A. Papandreou's credibility is at its lowest point.

## FORMER MINISTER CRITICIZES PASOK

Athens TA NEA in Greek 7 Apr 87 p 5

[Text] "Neither Papandreou nor Mitsotakis. The road must open to new political forces," stressed former Minister Gerasimos Arsenis on 6 April, speaking during a press interview.

In his first public interview since his expulsion approximately a year ago, and presenting his book, "Political Testimony," Arsenis, referring to his government experience, strongly criticized PASOK and accused the prime minister of personally bearing a huge part of the responsibility for the failure of the attempt for change.

In particular, he dwelt on the lack of intraparty democracy in PASOK and the functioning of "alternating power circuits" in the government frameworks, through which policy is exercised in practice. Through such optics, he continued, the present government is unable to be defined politically. "It is indistinguishable."

The Council of Ministers, he maintained moreover, is a "debasement of democracy" because it does not discuss the government's policy at all, while he added, referring to Drettakis' resignation, that it is not a rare phenomenon for ministers to learn the fate of the policy they are following on television.

Arsenis supported his right to criticize PASOK, stressing that the perception that one must keep silent after his expulsion serves the logic of the "sovereign" and his court, and indicts those who are in PASOK and do not talk, even though they understand what is happening, about the "historic responsibility" they shoulder.

Answering questions about why he did not say all these things when he was part of the government, Arsenis said that since 1982 he has had no illusions, he saw the problems and the weaknesses, but he made his political choices and he should be judged by the positions and opinions which he supported, by his successes and failures.

Summing up his criticism of PASOK, Arsenis referred to the credibility crisis

which emerges from the fact that the "soul" of its leadership does not believe in its ideology, to the lack of seriousness, to the absence of clear priorities and the lack of mechanisms for solving the differences which are developing in the heart of the party.

Concerning the political party being created, which Arsenis is promoting, he said that it mainly coalesces former PASOK officials and adherents and also independent leftists, but he refused to call it "rightist" or "leftist," maintaining that such a distinction is outmoded and that the real opposition is between the "old" and the "new" which are in both the Left and the Right.

9247

CSO: 3521/109

POLITICAL

GREECE

#### NEW 'DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVE' PARTY LEADER'S COMMENTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Apr 87 p 12

/Excerpts/ The goal of Mr Ger. Arsenis' Democratic Initiative party is to attract dissatisfied PASOK members as well as other leftist voters. In a press conference given yesterday Mr Arsenis indirectly but clearly linked his evolving party's going into the next elections with the establishment of the simple proportional electoral system, not, however, ruling out cooperation with parties or other forces of the Left if the political situation should require this.

Mr Arsenis ruled out any possible cooperation with PASOK because of the untrustworthiness of the government party as well as ND's and DIANA's /Democratic Renewal/. He observed that cooperation with other parties "is not something approved on the top level but something that is deemed worthy in practice"--a prospect that will appear in time.

According to Mr Arsenis, "the country is facing a political and social impasse" and he pointed out that Democratic Initiative aspires to express the deepest change that is taking place in society.

Mr Arsenis leveled strong criticism at the government. He noted that "PASOK did not succeed because it confronted organized opposition but sank because of its own errors."

He said the governing of the country by PASOK has permitted Democratic Initiative to draw certain conclusions that constitute a valuable experience for the party now being formed. Mr Arsenis summarized his thoughts as follows:

1. Democratic processes are absolutely safeguarded in Democratic Initiative so that any dictatorial phenomena are ruled out.
2. Special care is given to the selection of party cadres that must not aim at financial or social status from within the party organization as has been the case with PASOK.
3. Demagoguery and populism are rejected and a form of intercommunication is adopted whereby the people are informed about the basic aspects of the course being taken and are given an idea about the cost involved in implementing it.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, Mr Arsenis observed that "foreign policy has domestic dimensions."

Referring to the issue of problem companies, Mr Arsenis said that the government does not venture to make decisions one way or the other with the result that the overall issue is getting worse.

Officials are not making any progress on either the privatization of these problem firms nor are they trying to restore them within the context of the public sector.

Moreover, Mr Arsenis clearly pledged himself against any partisanship in trade unionism and said that today we are witnesses to an unhealthy phenomenon, mutual blackmailing of trade unionists and the political leadership.

Finally, he did not hide the fact that the course for development presupposes not a populist policy but sacrifices for the workers. He said, it suffices that some prospect exist for these sacrifices.

5671

CSO: 3521/120

POLITICAL

GREECE

BRIEF

WARSHIP TO VISIT USSR--The Greek vessel Elli is scheduled to visit Odessa on 11-15 May to repay a visit made by a squadron of the Soviet fleet to Piraeus in 1986. That squadron was under the command of the heroic Soviet Admiral Khronopoulos having that Greek name. (That Khronopoulos did not say much good when he was in Istanbul during the recent Greek-Turkish crisis because when he was asked by Turkish reporters he said that "he was opposed to the armament of the islands" and added that "the problem must be settled with peaceful means." Now that we are talking about this we must add that Soviet policy is for the maintenance of the legal status quo in the Aegean). To return to the visit by Elli, our NATO friends worry about love whenever a Soviet warship visits Greece or one of ours goes there. For that reason the answer must be a double one: on the one hand to indicate that Khronopoulos went to Turkey with his vessels and on the other hand that every now and then Soviet and Turkish commanders in chief and generals exchange visits. As for the Elli, it does not need Turkey's permission to go through the Dardanelles. According to the Montreux Agreement, Greek vessels require only "an announcement with verbal communication" from Greece to Ankara. OK? /Text/ /Athens PONDIKI in Greek 29 Apr 87 p 3/ 5671

CSO: 3521/120

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ANALYSES, OPINIONS GIVEN ON CENSURE MOTION, GOVERNMENT'S FALL

Disapproval Expressed

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 4 Apr 87 p 8

[Editorial by J.A.S.]

[Text] On the editorial level, EXPRESSO cannot let the political crisis the country is experiencing pass in silence.

It is not a question of undertaking a political analysis of events here, as this is better done in other places.

It is solely a question of taking a position, in a column which reflects the opinion of this newspaper, concerning an incident which has obvious consequences for the country.

The first thing to be said is that there was nothing, at this time, which would justify the initiation of a crisis.

It is a fact that the government has its weak points, as any government does.

It is true that it often conducts itself with excessive arrogance, if not contempt for its political adversaries.

It has indeed created entirely unnecessary friction here and there.

But would this justify the removal of the cabinet by the parliament?

That is not the case.

One reason, among others, is that whatever the political position we adopt, we must also recognize that few governments since 25 April have shown the efficiency, capacity to make decisions and to act, and even independence where group interests or pressures are concerned, that this government has.

It should be added that the opposition took the initiative in bringing the government down without preventing a concrete proposal for a political alternative, which does not seem, moreover, an easy task.

It does not seem likely, in fact, that the opposition parties (the PS, the PRD and the PCP), which are waging an energetic battle among themselves for leadership of the left wing, could produce a consistent and stable government solution.

There remains another possible alternative--the holding of early elections.

Holding early elections is only justified, however, when it is clear that the trends of opinion which have developed are of such importance that the parliament has ceased to reflect the will of the voters.

Now, this is not what is happening, either.

While there were indeed changes in the voters' opinions between October 1985 to the present, they have tended more toward strengthening the position of the government than toward weakening it.

There is, then, no basic reason to justify the effort to oust the executive team at this time.

We should then recognize that we are faced with a maneuver having to do above all with the particular interests of this or that party.

If this is the case, it is the duty of the president of the republic, for whom an important role is reserved, to establish the real reasons underlying the crisis and to make a decision which does not give the "infringing party" the advantage.

No one denies the right the political parties enjoy to seek to change the course of events when they disapprove of it.

However, when this is done, they must fully assume their responsibilities.

In the case at issue, it is not easy to understand why, before presenting a motion of censure, the PRD did not seek to ensure the viability of an alternative government solution. Nor has it come out clearly in favor of elections.

The PRD gave us the impression that it had fired a random shot, with the thought that "afterwards, we will see."

If this was what happened, it is serious.

And the members of the renewal faction will have difficulty avoiding an electoral test which will make it possible for the country to express its approval or disapproval of their conduct.



## PRD Is Hurting Itself

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 28 Mar 87 p 20

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice]

[Text] The censure motion suddenly presented by the PRD this week was an act of desperation on the part of a party which, however much it tried to conceal the fact, is definitely losing voting support. And it represents a decision directed much more against the PS, in the internal struggle to establish who will lead the left wing, than against the PSD. It is perhaps for this reason that Ramalho Eanes stated during his unfortunate television interview that the censure motion was not designed to bring down the government. It may not be just a tempest in a teapot, but without a doubt, the authors shot themselves in the foot, and this is yet another indication that fate is smiling upon the present prime minister. But let us take things one by one.

The real purpose of the censure motion was to create the conviction that the PRD leads the left wing ("forcing" the PS to retreat and not to bring the government down), and it was really an attempt to prevent the government from falling in the short or medium time range. In the short run, because the PRD foresees, expects and hopes that the PS will step back. In the medium time range, because if the government remains in office it will be practically impossible to create a new crisis during the balance of 1987, until the constitutional revision makes early elections no longer viable. The PRD fears the elections, and for this reason it has to show that it does not fear them.

The pretext used to carry out this intent, perfectly understandable, moreover, was a total absurdity and an evidence of political surrealism. At this time the country does not want elections, it does not want political crises, and it does not want instability. Probably due to a lack of understanding of the real issues, the country is entirely uninterested in Estonia, being much more interested in everyday matters of a domestic nature. To create a political crisis because of Estonia would perhaps make sense in Moscow, but it makes no sense at all in Lisbon. Whatever the result of the censure motion, the PRD will be penalized. Either because the motion fails and the PS will be forced to train all of its batteries on the PRD to justify its attitude, or because the motion passes, and then the PSD (and even the PS) will do everything possible to put the blame on the PRD for creating instability on the basis of such a ridiculous issue.

The PRD may be about to lose votes, but it is not made up of idiots. In deciding to present a motion of censure, it was surely aware of everything that would be said. But it believed that it had no other alternative, because from now on it would perhaps be the PS which would find a pretext for a political crisis. This, therefore, would be the last time the PRD could suggest that the PS lacks firmness or is lagging behind the renewal movement. But the problem is that despair is a poor adviser, and the members of the renewal movement probably could not see that they had everything to lose, whichever solution ensues.

This is the case because it is increasingly possible that the PS will in the end have to vote in favor of the censure motion, against its real interests and against the personal interests of Vitor Constancio.

If it does that, the most natural consequence will be early elections. This is true on the one hand because Cavaco Silva will not miss this sovereign opportunity to demand elections and blame the opposition. And on the other hand, because the PS can only want to support the PRD censure motion the better to destroy it, never to allow the concept of renewal leadership to strengthen. Given this hypothesis, the PS will not participate with the PRD in any cabinet without elections, but will demand elections in order to focus the blame on General Eanes.

But if, on the contrary, the PS were to vote against the motion, there are two or three consequences which could result. First of all, the socialists would have to make their opposition to the government still more radical. Secondly, the coming months would see a very great rise in the level of the aggressive attitudes of the two parties toward each other. Thirdly, Cavaco Silva's second wind (with the natural government adjustment) would strengthen the trend toward bipolarization, leaving no space for the PRD. All of these possibilities are undesirable for the party of Eanes, which would be still more isolated and deprived of any hope of constituting an alternative by itself.

The most curious aspect of all of this is that the PRD sought to fire a shot at Cavaco Silva's government, but in the end it rendered him more aid than it ever did before it fired. One would almost be led to conclude that the PRD is the ideal ally when it does not want to be one, because it trips over its own feet and is therefore especially dangerous when it seeks to provide aid.

Whatever happens, Cavaco Silva is bound to emerge from this crisis strengthened. On the one hand, because he will again rally the PSD, where some minor indications of unease had been noted, and because this will push some shortcomings and temporary failings in some governmental departments into the background. And the other hand, this is true because he will achieve what he wanted without having had to pay any price for it.

Cavaco Silva wants early elections, or at least he has for the past year. But he could not say so and could not even make any move which might suggest that he wanted elections. Cavaco Silva needs elections in 1987, not only so that thanks to the majority which might be won, he could undertake basic measures while the economic situation allows, but also because after the middle of 1988, elections will be more disadvantageous to him, apart from the fact that after October, he will be the hostage of the opposition for as long as the constitutional revision lags.

The major problem for Cavaco Silva was to bring about early elections without the country's having any doubt about his innocence in connection with the "crime" perpetrated. If the opposition had remained calm and tactically intelligent, Cavaco Silva would have had tremendous difficulty achieving what he wanted without at least flooding the Assembly of the Republic with intolerable legislative demands, and without paying some price, at least for

"complicity in the crime." The PRD handed Cavaco Silva on a silver platter what he would have had a difficult time achieving through his own efforts, and that only at a price.

The crisis initiated by the PRD will lead to a fratricidal internal war within the left wing, bringing into relief the calm and superiority of Cavaco Silva (who showed mastery in the psychological game in his statements to the country last Wednesday). It will make legislative elections before October more probable. It will make a rapprochement between the CDS and the noncommunist opposition more improbable. It will make an alternative for the present government without elections less viable, and it will allow Cavaco Silva to strengthen Cavaco Silva's position if the motion is not approved.

From the point of view of the PSD, therefore, whatever happens will in the end prove positive. This, in political terms, is a situation so enviable that it is hardly likely to occur again. It remains for the party now to wait with the serenity of one who is preparing a counterattack under ideal conditions, wasting not a single trump card in this preliminary stage so that the counterattack can be the more forceful.

An old saying which is a part of the wisdom of the nations asks God to protect us from our friends if we can get along with our enemies. In a modernizing effort, the PRD has brought this phrase up-to-date. The new version should be the following: "Thank you, Lord, for the enemies you have given us, because with them to attack, we do not even need friends."

Constancio Seen as Loser

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 4 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] A question which many Portuguese citizens (and some socialists) will ask themselves now is the following: Did the PS act wisely or foolishly in deciding to vote in favor of the PRD censure motion?

With this move, will the PS lose or gain?

There can be only one answer. It will lose.

In order to be clear we must begin by saying that the Socialist Party is the leading opposition party, and, that being the case, it will necessarily be the party which will determine events.

It cannot be ordered, but must give orders.

Thus with regard to the PRD censure motion, there was only one thing it could do. That was to remove itself from the undertaking, to term it untimely (as, moreover, it did), and to assert with conviction that it would launch its own undertakings when it deemed them appropriate.

In this way it would become clear that the PS had its own personality, that is knew what it wanted, that it had a strategy, and that it had the necessary determination to carry it forward.

By making the decision it did, the Socialist Party left room for all sorts of doubts. It made it possible for others to say that it had no strategy.

It allowed room for the suspicion that it lacks will.

It made it possible to say that, like the small parties, it can only follow in the wake of developing events.

Obviously the question as to what else the socialists could do will be asked.

Isn't it true that the PRD faced them with a dilemma in which any choice would be bad, since even if they did nothing, they would be accused by the government of lacking the courage to face up to elections?

This line of thinking contains a basic error.

Courage does not lie in failing to meet the challenges of others, but in the capacity to carry through to the end that in which one believes.

And this kind of courage the Socialist Party did not have.

For the vote in favor of the censure motion went against everything Vitor Constancio had defended and seemed to believe. To be consistent with the position Constancio defended, his party should set itself clearly apart from the Renewal Party.

Now, voting with the PRD does not separate the two parties, but brings them closer together.

Constancio wanted to assert the PS as the party leading the opposition to the government.

But the decision to vote for the PRD motion meant recognition by the PS that the renewal advocates also might, at a decisive moment, lead the opposition.

Constancio wanted to use the future elections to clarify the political situation, and to gain a definite lead over the PRD in numbers of votes and deputies.

Now, the holding of elections at this point will hinder political clarification, inasmuch as it is still too soon for the leftist voters to perceive that the only way of ousting Cavaco Silva is to vote massively for the PS.

And, finally, Constancio dreamed of a system in which the PSD and the PS alone would alternate in power, thus confirming themselves as the two great parties, on the right and on the left, on the Portuguese political scene.

Now, by accepting the possibility of governing with the PRD, he buries what was perhaps his most important political proposition.

At the time when he decided to vote for the censure motion put forth by the Democratic Renewal Party, the secretary general of the PS thus ceased to be himself, surrendered everything he thought and defended when he took over the leadership of the PS, and began to follow in the wake of the circumstances of the moment.

And he was certainly aware of this.

He knows that what would be consistent with the goals he established for his party would be to isolate the PRD in the parliament, leaving it to depend upon the Communist Party and making the PS appear to be an autonomous, responsible force with its own goals and belief in itself.

This means that I am personally convinced that Vitor Constancio did not have the internal or the political strength to ensure that his point of view won out in the PS.

Therefore Constancio has lost. And he has done so in two ways.

First of all, because he perhaps saw his strategy for making the country bipartisan hopelessly compromised, and this, let me repeat, was his main political proposition and the ultimate reason for his presence at the head of the PS.

And secondly, because he allowed those who are the most impatient and the least farsighted, the defenders of proposals and alliances which are not his, to define the leadership of the PS at a time when the party was faced with a basic choice as to whether to follow one path or the other.

He followed the other.

He exchanged the essential for the incidental.

He confused strategy with tactics.

He sacrificed the long run for the short run.

#### Machinations of the MFA

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 7 Apr 87 p 10

[Article by Agapito Pinto]

[Excerpts] The new alliance between the MFA and the PC was in reality the background for the motion to censure the government approved by 134 deputies, including the socialists, who had begun by saying that it was an untimely and

irresponsible undertaking. Physically absent were some of the April creatures who have no place in the parliament due to unnatural circumstances, which disturb them greatly. But the fact that the motion was conceived and generated by a party which still shelters so many of those frustrated April creatures and so many other useless idiots, and whose leadership falls to Ramalho Eanes (the usual link in the PC transmission chain), were all facts which reduced everything to a symbol--that of the destruction of Portugal.

It is unlikely that a political maneuver would lead to such broad condemnation as did the censure motion urged by the communists, put forth by the PRD and also approved by the socialists.

They brought down the government, without a doubt. But as a cartoonist showed very clearly in one of the daily newspapers yesterday morning, the "stone" the opposition threw at the government ended up by falling on the "head" of the opposition itself.

### The Responsibilities

No one thinks that the censure motion was put forth by accident or as a result of an ill-considered decision.

No. It was carefully drafted, thought out and analyzed by the political-military group so often denounced by those who have always urged a strategic line for the PSD which, when followed, has resulted in the best period the party founded by Francisco Sa Carneiro and headed today by Cavaco Silva has ever seen. When all is said and done, this was the same group which at other crucial times in our national life has always done everything to retain power and to break up the central forces in the Portuguese political system.

The crisis, instigated and promoted by the communists, had as its main executors members of the former Coordination Commission of the now defunct MFA, who survived throughout the years in various bodies or institutions, in particular the Council of the Revolution, and who today yearn for a return to the seats of power. But along with them, there was also a group of civilians, some now members of the PRD, and others who have long since been affiliated with the Socialist Party.

Let there be no illusions then as to any accidental development of the crisis. It was a carefully orchestrated segment of the effort to achieve one of two goals--either to bring about elections now or to prevent their being held a few months from now, at a time still worse for the PRD, or secondarily, to put the PRD, made up of the former MFA members and some others, in the government again, so that these individuals could once more take their places in the various levels of administration and civil society itself. In either case, one thing would be guaranteed. The PRD would carry out its function of exerting pressure on the PS, forcing it to swing into line or else justifying its criticism of the left wing for "lack of consistency."

## Eanes Versus Soares

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 4 Apr 87 pp 26R-28R

[Article by Vicente Jorge Silva, Teresa de Sousa (in Brazil), and Ines Dettino and Jose Manuel Saraiva (in Lisbon)]

[Text] A play which is already ancient has returned to the boards, although the main actors have exchanged the roles they played when the production was mounted earlier. Behind the immediate appearance of the censure motion put forth by the PRD and the expected fall of the government, there is again a duel, now in the shadows, which we will see take place between the former and the present occupants of the Belem Palace.

This is the reopening of a wound which never closed, the fanning of the flame of hostility which never went out between two individuals who, apart from an almost permanent political confrontation, embody two psychological profiles which are radically different and therefore doomed to clash. In a way, it is already the prospect of the 1990 presidential elections which this final duel at dawn presages. It is a duel which will determine who is the winner and who is the loser in a battle which has already been going on for a decade.

With this prospect in mind, Mario Soares would like to appear to be a supra-ideological candidate representing a consensus of the liberal right wing and the modern left wing, thus "freeing himself" from the embarrassing sponsorship of communist support. And Ramalho Eanes, who has counted on benefiting from the erroneous description of Soares as the candidate of the left, "pushing him" toward a strategy of alliance with the right wing (which the current president cultivated, moreover, during the Central Bloc era), would then emerge as the personality who would polarize the PS-PRD-PCP vote. Although none of the primary or secondary actors in the play which began with the PRD censure motion recognizes himself in this farfetched political fiction, all the signs of a future presidential duel between Mario Soares and Ramalho Eanes are present in outline in the events of the past 15 days.

### The PRD Wager

According to the analyses undertaken within the PRD, the predictable (and practically inevitable) electoral decline of the party, which will decisively threaten its role as a hinge factor, would be the more serious the later the early elections (desired simultaneously by Cavaco Silva and Vitor Constancio, with the prospect of constitutional revision and the "two-thirds pact," concerning which the two political leaders have had encouraging talks in recent weeks) were held. The autumn "timing" on which Cavaco and Constancio would be counting for the holding of elections, after both agreed to "play down" a censure motion sponsored by the PS (foreseeably in May) which would lead to the fall of the government, would thus seem to be a worrisome scenario for the PRD, inasmuch as the renewal supporters would be totally at the mercy of the political venture of the two largest parties, and doomed in the future to the role of mere figureheads (auguring their eventual disappearance from the Portuguese political-party scene).

For the PRD, then, the future wager, or the flight forward, on which it relied by putting forth the censure motion was therefore a condition of its survival, and it has even run the risk of provoking a wave of unpopularity with the voters, the vast majority of whom are opposed to a premature race to the polls. On the other hand, the renewal advocates, although they fear a late election date from the point of view of their electoral expectations, did not close the door on the possibility of a government with the socialists, since in a direct governmental relationship, or if they could influence the PS undertakings, they could obtain the maneuvering room which they have been gradually losing since the initial courtship with Cavaco Silva. The logic of having a hinge party makes an active policy of alliances, either with the party in power or with the majority opposition party, indispensable. Now both Cavaco Silva and Vitor Constancio, in a surreptitious effort to promote a rapprochement which would lead to making the "two-thirds pact" a fact and to excluding the PRD, have been increasingly forcing the renewal movement into a dangerously isolated position.

#### The Battle To Lead the Left

In the meantime, however, the Estonian issue came along, introduced by the hand of fate--and the calendar--immediately prior to Mario Soares' trip to Brazil. The gods seemed benevolently inclined toward the party of Eanes, since it was handed on a platter an opportunity which at the outset gave it enviable trump cards. But it was to be the weakness and the changes of direction on the part of the socialist leadership during the current crisis which would in the end convert the PRD's flight forward into a strategic plan for winning leadership of the left and bringing about a clash with Mario Soares--the dreamed of duel in the shadows between the former and the present occupants of the Belem Palace.

In their strategy, moreover, the members of the renewal movement did not hesitate to dismiss the risk that early elections would result in an "absolute conservative majority," which Herminio Martinho admitted publicly last week is a possibility, as secondary. The potential for wresting the political initiative away from the PS and creating a situation of confrontation between Mario Soares and the current socialist leadership weighed more heavily in the balance for the PRD than the foreseeable strengthening of the political power of Cavaco Silva and the PSD.

#### Vulnerability of the PS

The duplicity shown by the PS concerning the projected visit to Estonia by a parliamentary delegation--initial disapproval which was later to change into solidarity with the members of the delegation--was already a signal warning of Constancio's vulnerability to the pressures from the party apparatus. But it was the sponsorship of the censure motion which was to plunge the PS into a leadership crisis without precedent, with the precise exception of the period in which Mario Soares removed himself from the post of secretary general in order to avoid supporting the second candidacy of Eanes for the presidency of the republic.



For the PRD, then, the future wager, or the flight forward, on which it relied by putting forth the censure motion was therefore a condition of its survival, and it has even run the risk of provoking a wave of unpopularity with the voters, the vast majority of whom are opposed to a premature race to the polls. On the other hand, the renewal advocates, although they fear a late election date from the point of view of their electoral expectations, did not close the door on the possibility of a government with the socialists, since in a direct governmental relationship, or if they could influence the PS undertakings, they could obtain the maneuvering room which they have been gradually losing since the initial courtship with Cavaco Silva. The logic of having a hinge party makes an active policy of alliances, either with the party in power or with the majority opposition party, indispensable. Now both Cavaco Silva and Vitor Constancio, in a surreptitious effort to promote a rapprochement which would lead to making the "two-thirds pact" a fact and to excluding the PRD, have been increasingly forcing the renewal movement into a dangerously isolated position.

#### The Battle To Lead the Left

In the meantime, however, the Estonian issue came along, introduced by the hand of fate--and the calendar--immediately prior to Mario Soares' trip to Brazil. The gods seemed benevolently inclined toward the party of Eanes, since it was handed on a platter an opportunity which at the outset gave it enviable trump cards. But it was to be the weakness and the changes of direction on the part of the socialist leadership during the current crisis which would in the end convert the PRD's flight forward into a strategic plan for winning leadership of the left and bringing about a clash with Mario Soares--the dreamed of duel in the shadows between the former and the present occupants of the Belem Palace.

In their strategy, moreover, the members of the renewal movement did not hesitate to dismiss the risk that early elections would result in an "absolute conservative majority," which Herminio Martinho admitted publicly last week is a possibility, as secondary. The potential for wresting the political initiative away from the PS and creating a situation of confrontation between Mario Soares and the current socialist leadership weighed more heavily in the balance for the PRD than the foreseeable strengthening of the political power of Cavaco Silva and the PSD.

#### Vulnerability of the PS

The duplicity shown by the PS concerning the projected visit to Estonia by a parliamentary delegation--initial disapproval which was later to change into solidarity with the members of the delegation--was already a signal warning of Constancio's vulnerability to the pressures from the party apparatus. But it was the sponsorship of the censure motion which was to plunge the PS into a leadership crisis without precedent, with the precise exception of the period in which Mario Soares removed himself from the post of secretary general in order to avoid supporting the second candidacy of Eanes for the presidency of the republic.

Taken dramatically by surprise by the PRD censure motion, the PS began by pulling away from an undertaking it termed "tremendously irresponsible politically," in order then, following the refusal (entirely predictable) of Cavaco Silva to negotiate the conditions of socialist abstention with Constancio, to emerge as the hostage of the renewal movement.

Despite Constancio's desire to separate himself from communist support in a future PS-PRD government, the simple fact that the socialist leadership moved into line to support a renewal undertaking when there were other alternatives available for dealing with the impasse, apart from the holding of general elections, in fact raises a question about the credibility of the leadership of the PS and threatens the political survival of Constancio as the head of the party.

### The Regime Orphaned

But the crisis of direction which the PS is facing does not involve just the majority, but Vitor Constancio as well. In fact, it was precisely one of the individuals in the PS minority who admitted to EXPRESSO that with the announcement of the PRD censure motion, the minority "shattered." "Majority members" Manuel Alegre and Sottomayor Cardia fell into line with the second most important minority figure, Almeida Santos, relying on government scenarios which would involve the immediate return of the PS to the realms of power without the holding of prior elections. Orphaning the government in fact appears intolerable to a whole range of socialist leaders of different opinions, above all those who see in political activity an exercise of influence based on the holding of posts in the state administration and public enterprises. Another irony of fate--a legacy of the Soares era is challenging the position of the president of the republic himself today and weakening his political action in connection with the choices for dealing with the crisis.

But the image of PS weakness was enhanced, moreover, by the spectacle of the scattering of some outstanding party leaders, who were not in Lisbon at the time when the crisis reached its peak. Jaime Gama, who throughout the process maintained a notably "low profile," departed calmly for the United States, while Jorge Sampaio was in Lusaka or Cravinho and Torres Couto remained in Brazil during Mario Soares' visit there. The absence in Brazil of the invisible, but never replaced, father of the party had its effect, with an internal atmosphere of perplexity and disorientation. After the passage of the date already announced for the vote on the censure movement by the renewal advocates, in accordance with their "timing" plan, with a factual denial of the statements by Herminio Martinho to the effect that the vote would take place with the president in Lisbon), Mario Soares, despite the unpleasantness and embarrassment caused him by the situation, did not want to distort the image of a statesman with international influence which he has been cultivating in Brazil, by making a dramatic return to Lisbon.

### Dilemma for Soares

The fact is that Soares finds himself "squeezed" between two problematical solutions to the situation created by the PRD censure motion. If the renewal of Cavaco Silva's invitation to participate in government again is merely a

formal gesture, since the prime minister has already said that the formation of a new cabinet without the holding of prior elections would be a political deception, the two possibilities available to the president might make it necessary for him to play the role of a distant spectator watching events, and here we see the specter of a duel with Eanes being raised again.

The coming elections will inevitably strengthen the weight of the PSD and Cavaco Silva, the latter as an active spectator and early winner on all the playing boards, and it may allow the prime minister, in the midst of the atmosphere of political confusion which exists, to achieve that dream which Soares never realized--an absolute majority in the parliament.

But on the other hand, the president will not be able to reject the establishment of a PS-PRD government, if it is supported by a majority of the deputies, among other things if he is to be consistent with his professed faith in parliamentarism, and above all to set himself apart from the conduct which characterized Eanes' term of service in the Belem Palace. Close associates of the president recall that Soares always criticized the fact that Eanes "would not permit the parliament to attempt to resolve crises, and above all, that cabinets were dismissed and the Assembly dissolved for lack of a so-called stable and consistent majority." The same sources say that "In Soares' view, not only does the Cavaco Silva government have complete legitimacy, but so would an alternative government which the Assembly generated, unless it appeared from the very beginning too much divided and precarious."

#### Eanes' Revenge

It is admitted in circles close to the president that in his view, this would be the ideal time for the socialists "to deal a great hatchet blow to the PRD and Eanes, along the lines, moreover, of his actions as the leader of the PS, with isolation of the renewal faction and description of Eanes as the eternal agent of destabilization and the fall of governments." Thus the "timing" of the motion is being interpreted as having been designed to allow the PRD to deal with the socialist leadership without the sponsoring presence of Soares (and short circuiting his well-known powers of persuasion where the party leaders are concerned). The disenchantment of Soares where Constancio is concerned could not be, under these circumstances, more definitive. The president finds himself faced with the possible need to make a decision which may not be to his liking as he sees his party allying itself with his worst enemy.

In attempting to force Soares into a "decorative" presidency, Ramalho Eanes is also taking his vengeance here for the constitutional revision sponsored by Soares, which would deprive him of authority during his second term of office. Despite the ineptitude which he continued to reveal in developing his image, as seen during his recent television interview when he denied knowledge of the existence, already made public, of the PRD censure motion, Eanes has capitalized throughout the 10 years he has been in the "pink palace" on the basic trump cards in the art of pursuing politics in the Portuguese fashion.

## Majority Favors Elections

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 4 Apr 87 p 1

[Text] Following the fall of the Cavaco Silva government, 56 percent of the citizens of Portugal believe that new elections should be held, while 38 percent believe that the president of the republic should appoint a prime minister to form a new government, and 6 percent have no definite opinion about the political solution required for the crisis initiated by the approval of the censure motion. These percentages were obtained in a poll which the EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao Panel took on Wednesday and Thursday of this week, using a sampling representing the electorate on the continent.

If the president were to opt for the appointment of a new cabinet, 45 percent of those questioned would prefer an executive team representing the PS alone, while 36 percent want a coalition PS-PRD government, with the number of those who did not know or did not respond increasing to 19 percent. It appears that in such an eventuality, only the APU voters would defend an alliance of the socialists and the renewal advocates (70 percent) as better than a government by the PS alone (18 percent). The Eanist voters made the opposite choice (46 percent for a PS government and 40 percent for a PS-PRD coalition), as did those of the PS (56 percent and 33 percent) and those of the PSD and CDS.

### 125 PSD Deputies?

The poll further showed that the PSD, for which 45.5 percent intend to vote, is in an excellent position to win an absolute majority of deputies in a new parliament (an extrapolation from these percentages establishes the number of Social Democratic parliamentarians at between 125 and 130), with its score up 4.2 percent as compared to last month. At the same time, the PS saw a slight increase to 29 percent (27.2 percent in February), the PRD remained steady at 11.8 percent (11.1 percent the preceding month), and the two parties situated at the extremes of the party spectrum--the APU and the CDS--are those mainly damaged by the radicalization of political positions. The CDS lost almost a half of its supporters (only 4.3 percent intended to vote for it, as compared to the earlier 7.5 percent) and the communists dropped from 8.8 percent to 6.2 percent (it should be reiterated that the APU percentage routinely tends to be underestimated in these polls because of the characteristics of its electorate).

### PR and PM Gain, Opposition Leaders Lose

On the other hand, both the president of the republic and his prime minister saw their popularity strengthened with the beginning of the current political crisis, in a development diametrically opposed to that seen for the opposition leaders. Vitor Constancio, Ramalho Eanes and Alvaro Cunhal experienced a sharp decline in the voters' opinion of them. Mario Soares, who is away on a visit to Brazil and who has had no direct participation in events as yet, has now reached his popularity peak (61 percent approval and only 2 percent unfavorable votes), while Cavaco Silva saw the attitudes toward him diverge. Support for him was up 3 points (53 percent) but disapproval of him was also up 2 points (14 percent). The leaders of the PS, the PRD and the APU, for

their part, all had negative balances in terms of the favorable and unfavorable opinions. Vitor Constancio (20 percent for, 27 percent against) lost 12 points. Ramalho Eanes (19 percent and 38 percent) was also down 12 points, and Alvaro Cunhal (8 percent and 54 percent) lost 11 points. Adriano Moreira, in a post less involved in the present crisis, was the subject of a large number of neutral opinions (59 percent), and he emerged as the most popular opposition leader, with 24 percent in favor and 17 percent against.

#### Disapproval of Censure Motion

The poll further indicated that a large majority of the citizens of Portugal--62 percent--disagrees with the move the PRD made in submitting the censure motion, and that only half of these--31 percent--were in agreement with the attitude of the renewal supporters. It should be emphasized that equal numbers (44 percent) in the PRD itself condemned and approved the motion. Only the APU voters favored it (81 percent for and 15 percent against), while the voters for the PS (29 percent for and 65 percent against), the CDS (13 percent and 87 percent) and the PSD (7 percent against 88 percent) indicated that they were clearly against it.

It is also curious to note that 54 percent of the citizens of Portugal are unaware of the reasons which led the PRD to call for a vote on the censure motion in the Assembly of the Republic. Among the others, the main reasons given for this undertaking by the party of Ramalho Eanes were "bad government" (18 percent), the "visit to Estonia" incident (16 percent) and "bad relations between the AR and the government" (5 percent). It was mainly the APU voters who mentioned these reasons, revealing that they are still the best informed about current political events.

#### Voters Want Stability

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 2 Apr 87 p 8

[Text] The poll which Socioeconomic and Opinion Studies, Ltd. (ESEO) took for our newspaper was not designed to establish what the intentions of the voters would be in the event that the president of the republic chooses to convoke elections, as the only possible solution to the present political impasse. However, it is possible to conclude from the poll that these voters respect and desire stability, and that as a result, the political forces responsible for destabilization would be penalized if the voters were called to the polls.

There are many indications which justify this reasoning, outstanding among which, first of all, is the high level of political awareness on the part of Portuguese citizens, the overwhelming majority of whom indicated that they had knowledge of the PRD censure motion and were aware of the possibility that this parliamentary initiative might bring the government down.

Further evidence in favor of the desire of stability is seen in the results obtained in the poll revealing that 56 percent of those questioned regard the PRD undertaking "bad" or "very bad," while 64 percent said that the present government should continue its activities. In view of these results, it is to be expected, then, that the parties believed to be responsible for the

political instability of the country would be penalized at the polls if an electoral vote were taken, for going against one of the expectations--stability--to which the Portuguese electorate attributes considerable value.

Based on the opinion poll taken on 27, 28 and 29 March by the ESEO, exclusively for TEMPO, concerning the motion to censure the government put forth by the PRD, which was carried out on the basis of the technical data set forth in Table 1, we are reporting the most significant figures and the results deemed of greatest interest to the public.

Table 1

#### Technical Data

**Sampling Area:** The area covered by this study was individuals of over 18 years of age living in Greater Lisbon and Greater Oporto.

**Sampling:** Questions were asked of 500 individuals selected on a quota basis.

**Interview Technique:** Direct and personal interviews were conducted on the basis of a prestructured questionnaire.

**Field Work:** The interviews were carried out on 27, 28 and 29 March.

**Margin of Error:** The overall margin of error is plus or minus 3.5 percent, with a reliability level of 95 percent, with  $p = q = 50$  percent.

**Responsible Agency:** Socioeconomic and Opinion Studies, Ltd. (ESEO).

It can be concluded from an analysis of all the data collected that the majority of the people knew about the motion to censure the government presented by the PRD. This same majority was aware that the fall of the present government might result from the presentation of this motion, which was not very well received by more than half of those questioned.

As to the continuation of the present government in office, a very substantial majority were in favor.

In connection with the fall of the government and the attitude to be adopted by the president of the republic, a half of those questioned favored early elections, a little more than one quarter favored the formation of a new cabinet headed by Cavaco Silva, fewer than one fifth wanted the formation of an opposition government, and a minimal percentage of those questioned said they did not know.

As to the relevance of the PRD initiative and its consequences, the views of the voters seem to be made very clear by the report presented here of the poll taken by the ESEO, as the following detailed analysis will show.

To what extent was it public knowledge that the PRD had said it would present a motion to censure the government? The poll showed in percentage terms that an overwhelming majority knew of this fact.

political instability of the country would be penalized at the polls if an electoral vote were taken, for going against one of the expectations--stability--to which the Portuguese electorate attributes considerable value.

Based on the opinion poll taken on 27, 28 and 29 March by the ESEO, exclusively for TEMPO, concerning the motion to censure the government put forth by the PRD, which was carried out on the basis of the technical data set forth in Table 1, we are reporting the most significant figures and the results deemed of greatest interest to the public.

Table 1

#### Technical Data

Sampling Area: The area covered by this study was individuals of over 18 years of age living in Greater Lisbon and Greater Oporto.

Sampling: Questions were asked of 500 individuals selected on a quota basis.

Interview Technique: Direct and personal interviews were conducted on the basis of a prestructured questionnaire.

Field Work: The interviews were carried out on 27, 28 and 29 March.

Margin of Error: The overall margin of error is plus or minus 3.5 percent, with a reliability level of 95 percent, with  $p = q = 50$  percent.

Responsible Agency: Socioeconomic and Opinion Studies, Ltd. (ESEO).

It can be concluded from an analysis of all the data collected that the majority of the people knew about the motion to censure the government presented by the PRD. This same majority was aware that the fall of the present government might result from the presentation of this motion, which was not very well received by more than half of those questioned.

As to the continuation of the present government in office, a very substantial majority were in favor.

In connection with the fall of the government and the attitude to be adopted by the president of the republic, a half of those questioned favored early elections, a little more than one quarter favored the formation of a new cabinet headed by Cavaco Silva, fewer than one fifth wanted the formation of an opposition government, and a minimal percentage of those questioned said they did not know.

As to the relevance of the PRD initiative and its consequences, the views of the voters seem to be made very clear by the report presented here of the poll taken by the ESEO, as the following detailed analysis will show.

To what extent was it public knowledge that the PRD had said it would present a motion to censure the government? The poll showed in percentage terms that an overwhelming majority knew of this fact.

Another question was posed in more precise terms. To what point were you aware that such a motion could bring down the present government? The percentage of individuals questioned who were aware of the possible consequences of the presentation of the censure motion was indeed substantial.

How, in terms of a general consensus, are the attitude of the PRD and the consequences of the position it adopted viewed?

Generally speaking, more than 50 percent termed this move bad. More accurately, there were some gradations in this opinion.

Should the current government continue in office? To this question, a rather high percentage answered yes.

In still more specific terms, they were asked what the attitude of the president of the republic should be if the government fell, and 50 percent said they favored early elections. It should be emphasized, however, that the percentage of those who favored an opposition government was very small.

Apart from the overall results, this poll showed a breakdown of the responses based on the votes cast in the last election. The results in this connection are truly interesting, and are shown in Table 7 in greater detail.

A reading of the table indicates that most of those questioned believe that the Cavaco Silva government should continue in office, independent of the party for which they voted, with the exception of the PRD and the APU voters. It should be emphasized, however, that 36 percent of the PRD voters and 22 percent of the APU voters said that Cavaco Silva should continue to head the cabinet, which could still be regarded as a rather significant percentage.

This table also reveals that it was those who voted for the PRD (61 percent), the PS (56 percent), and the PSD (52 percent) and those who abstained (52 percent) who were most forceful in favoring early elections. It should be noted that among them, it was the PRD and PS voters who were most favorable to this solution, unlike the APU voters, of whom only 29 percent were in favor.

It should be emphasized that although the percentage of the PS and PRD voters who said they favor early elections was greater than that percentage among PSD voters, this is fully explained by the fact that the majority of the PSD voters want the creation of a new Cavaco Silva cabinet, so that their answers were split between those who want early elections and those who want a new Cavaco Silva cabinet.

It was the APU voters who indicated a preference for an opposition cabinet in the largest percentage (56 percent), even greater than that for PRD voters, of whom only 25 percent favor this solution.

Curiously, a new Cavaco Silva cabinet as a solution was most favored by the CDS voters (48 percent), followed by the PSD voters (44 percent).

Of the other categories of voters, only the electorate of the PS (27 percent) and those who did not say how they voted (36 percent) expressed approval in



answer to this question in relatively significant fashion. Where the voters for the APU, PRD and other parties and those who abstained were concerned, the percentage in favor was minimal.

Table 2

Public Knowledge of the Censure Motion

Aware--91 percent  
Not aware--9 percent

Table 3

Aware of the Possible Fall of the Government

Aware--91 percent  
Not aware--9 percent

Table 4

Position on PRD Initiative

Very good--8 percent  
Good--29 percent  
Bad--42 percent  
Very bad--16 percent  
Don't know or did not respond--5 percent

Table 5

Should the Present Government Continue in Office?

Yes--64 percent  
No--35 percent  
Don't know or did not answer--1 percent

Table 6

What Should the President of the Republic Do?

Convoke early elections--50 percent  
Let the opposition form a government--18 percent  
Ask Professor Cavaco Silva to form a government again--28 percent  
Don't know or did not respond--4 percent

Table 7

Breakdown of Voters by Party Supported in October 1985	Should the Cavaco Silva Government Remain in Office?
CDS	Yes--90 percent No--10 percent Don't know or did not answer--
APU	Yes--22 percent No--76 percent Don't know or did not answer--2 percent
PRD	Yes--36 percent No--64 percent Don't know or did not answer--64 percent
PS	Yes--53 percent No--45 percent Don't know or did not answer--2 percent
PSD	Yes--96 percent No--4 percent Don't know or did not answer--
Other parties	Yes--50 percent No--50 percent Don't know or did not answer--
Abstention	Yes--73 percent No--27 percent Don't know or did not answer--
Rejected, don't know or did not answer	Yes--69 percent No--22 percent Don't know or did not answer--9 percent

Table 8

Breakdown of Voters by Party  
Supported in October 1985

What Should the Choice of the President  
of the Republic Be If the Present  
Government Falls?

CDS	Early elections--44 percent Opposition government--8 percent New Cavaco Silva government--48 percent Don't know or did not answer--
APU	Early elections--29 percent Opposition government--56 percent New Cavaco Silva government--13 percent Don't know or did not answer--2 percent
PRD	Early elections--61 percent Opposition government--25 percent New Cavaco Silva government--13 percent Don't know or did not answer--
PS	Early elections--56 percent Opposition government--16 percent New Cavaco Silva government--27 percent Don't know or did not answer--1 percent
PSD	Early elections--52 percent Opposition government--3 percent New Cavaco Silva government--44 percent Don't know or did not answer--1 percent
Other parties	Early elections--43 percent Opposition government--21 percent New Cavaco Silva government--22 percent Don't know or did not answer--14 percent
Abstention	Early elections--52 percent Opposition government--15 percent New Cavaco Silva government--21 percent Don't know or did not answer--12 percent
Rejected, don't know or did not answer	Early elections--35 percent Opposition government--11 percent New Cavaco Silva government--36 percent Don't know or did not answer--18 percent

5157  
CSO:3542/76

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# PCP SAID TO HAVE INFILTRATED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 26 Feb 87 p 64

[Text] The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) has repeatedly tried to infiltrate the Military Intelligence Service (DINFO), most recently a little over a year ago. Despite rather limited resources, those responsible for the only information service in operation since 25 April 1974 have frustrated these efforts and they have transferred the military personnel suspected of collaborating with or membership in the clandestine structures of the PC.

The communists in Alvaro Cunhal's party who, although they did not deny the report published in our most recent issue, took the solidarity meeting with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to call us "fascists," are the only groups which have organized cells in the three Armed Forces branches, and also the Public Security Policy, Republican Guard and Customs Guard. One of the main goals of these cells is to infiltrate their members into military bodies with access to NATO intelligence and the second divisions of the three branches of the Armed Forces, which are responsible for collecting and processing intelligence data.

With regard to the DINFO, the top level of the entire system, which functions under the direct jurisdiction of the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, the interest of the PC is permanent.

According to reliable sources, many communist militants who are members of the so-called clandestine structure regularly carry out tasks for the KGB and other Eastern secret services, some of them under the orders of the officials in charge of these services in Portugal.

The charges made recently concerning the DINFO, and more specifically the services headed by Lt Capt Serradas Duarte, which are mainly responsible for counterespionage, to the effect that the PC has infiltrated these bodies with its agents are but a smoke screen designed to conceal the activities of their clandestine structures, which are currently seeking at all costs to place agents in the Security Intelligence Service (SIS), which answers directly to the cabinet and is still in the process of being set up.

5157

CSO:3542/77

## SUAREZ DENIES ANTI-AMERICANISM, ANTI-NATO POSITION

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 13 Apr 87 pp 17-20

[Interview with Adolfo Suarez by Nativel Preciado; date and place not given]

[Text] In order not to be a prisoner of his words, Adolfo Suarez prefers to be the master of his silence. The following are the first exclusive statements he has made since the elections. Four long hours in his office at 4 Antonio Maura provide a new image of the former head of the government. The leader of the CDS is once again on the rise. Feeling better than he did in his best days, at 54 he is now ready to take on the world. The polls reflect his popularity. His party is growing and the socialists are beginning to consider him an election threat. The Duke travels around Spain embracing the people and the women tell him: "You are better looking than in your pictures!"

[Question] Do you like to be called "Your Grace"?

[Answer] It is a title I wear proudly because of the person who bestowed it upon me and the reasons for which he did so, but since I was a little boy, I have been used to being called "Adolfo" or perhaps "Mr Suarez."

[Question] But you would prefer to be called "Mr Prime Minister."

[Answer] Probably so!

[Question] Is that not rather utopian and somewhat of a dream when they say that in 1990, you will return to Moncloa?

[Answer] I no longer speak about 1990, but rather, 1989. It may be a little unrealistic, but at this point, I see it as a very real possibility and above all, something necessary for Spanish democracy.

[Question] Can a party be built with a program that is against the Americans, the banks and the rest of the rest of the powers that be?

[Answer] I am not against everything. What I am not is on my knees to anyone, not even the banks or the Americans! Putting into practice the principles of freedom, equality and solidarity that are contained in our constitution often implies confronting powerful groups.

[Question] When did you realize that you were on the left?

[Answer] I am not; I am in the center. I want the center to exist ideologically, for it to be a philosophical definition of man, society and the state. Freedom, justice and solidarity are on all our lips.

[Question] In order to change this society, revolutionary elements would have to be incorporated.

[Answer] If you wish, you can call them revolutionary. We live in a universally unjust society and we must try to change that.

[Question] Would you not like to have been Felipe Gonzalez?

[Answer] Absolutely not. Felipe is Felipe and I am who I am. Each one has his own background.

[Question] Do you feel you are a prisoner of your biography?

[Answer] No. I may have felt that way at a given time, but not now.

[Question] If you had been born in Seville instead of Avila and were the son of a rancher rather than a prosecuting attorney....

[Answer] Where one is born does leave its mark and being born in a city with a long cultural tradition is an advantage. However, being born in a town where the first cultural impact you receive is a *paso doble* played by a municipal band does imply a limitation. I have very few ideological points of contact or character traits in common with Felipe Gonzalez.

[Question] You seem more a professional of power rather than of politics.

[Answer] That is not true. I am a person who knows how to use power, but power is to govern, not command.

[Question] Does Felipe Gonzalez command more than he governs?

[Answer] He is also the product of a personal biography that is much more democratic than mine, but I am the prime minister who brought freedoms to this country and who never neglected anyone. All in all, I think that Gonzalez commands more than he governs. I was more understanding, more tolerant, engaged in dialogue more. I never felt I owned the truth, much less political truth, which must be shared by many people.

[Question] Does Gonzalez think he owns the truth?

[Answer] What Mr Gonzalez does too frequently is scorn the opinions of the rest of the people.

[Question] What did Gonzalez do to disappoint you so much? In the beginning, you were very tolerant with him.

[Answer] For some time, when I was head of the government, I was aware that I had to build the foundations of a solid democracy. Do you remember that business about being able to promise and promising?

[Question] Naturally.

[Answer] One of my obligations was to make alternatives to government possible. I was the target of very harsh opposition; I would have needed more of a consensus. After the ups and downs of the motion of censure in 1980 and with the socialist victory in 1982, Gonzalez' program started many Spaniards on wishful thinking, for which reason I understood that it was good to support him and not disappoint the expectations that existed for political change.

[Question] Did the socialists ever offer you any institutional post to make you happy?

[Answer] Never. I would never have been part of a socialist government.

[Question] Gonzalez got along better with Calvo-Sotelo than with you and has received him much more frequently at Moncloa.

[Answer] I do not know how often Calvo-Sotelo has gone. During the past legislative session, I went to see him quite often, but that stopped over a year ago for a very specific reason: the NATO referendum. Since that time, I have not spoken with him again.

[Question] Why have you not come out openly against NATO?

[Answer] Out of a sense of responsibility. I could not lead the manifestation against it. After being head of the government, one is not the same person one was before.

[Question] Did your "stay in the desert" purify you?

[Answer] I think it did. The limitations of power make you see the important issues more responsibly, as in the case of the policy of peace and security, which must have the maximum consensus.

[Question] Were you not trying to swim against the current?

[Answer] That is true. The majority in Parliament favored Spain's remaining in the Atlantic Alliance with some changes. Consequently, opposition to that policy meant going against the trend. I sent a letter to Prime Minister Gonzalez telling him that I would never lead the "No" movement.

[Question] That created great confusion.

[Answer] No, I left people their freedom to vote. What would have been logical would be for the prime minister not to call a referendum, to dissolve the chambers of Parliament and call elections. The negotiations went poorly and

that created an anti-NATO feeling. We are now paying for it in negotiating the treaty with the United States.

[Question] Why are you so anti-American?

[Answer] I am neither anti-American nor anti-NATO. Nor am I a foolish, boastful pro-American. I believe that the strategic interests of the United States, supported from bases set up in Spanish territory, can be contrary to our own interests.

[Question] If you become prime minister once again, do you think you are capable of being more independent of the Americans than Gonzalez?

[Answer] I do not know what degree of dependency he has. My idea is that the existing bipolarization should be replaced by other nuclei of power. Europe should play the role that belongs to it, historically, culturally and militarily. Spain has priorities that should also be taken up by the Western world.

[Question] Are the American bases excessive in Spain?

[Answer] Obviously. In Spanish territory, we already have a NATO base which is Gibraltar and which is fundamental in defining Spain's contribution to the defense of the southern flank.

[Question] Can one engage in an intimate dialogue with the Americans?

[Answer] Of course.

[Question] Without consequences or reprisals?

[Answer] There may be some, but such tensions occur every day. We were on the brink of freezing Spanish exports of shoes to the United States because of pressure from American shoe exporters. But we never have to do what others say.

[Question] Who is more sympathetic to you, Reagan or Gorbachev, with his reform?

[Answer] I do not know Gorbachev, but I think that his reforms cannot be dismissed with a simple "I just can't believe it." They seem truly important to me. We shall see whether they bring about a change in East-West relations.

[Question] Why do you think that Gonzalez has achieved what you could not as prime minister: calming down the military, the banks, the Americans?

[Answer] We are always speaking about the past, but then.... The two situations cannot be objectively compared. At that time, the political process was very tense. All those tensions served to calm things down. We have already spoken about the Americans. The hard-liners in the military have gradually gone into retirement and the financial institutions have said repeatedly that they agree with the socialist economic policy.



[Question] Have you had any personal problem, any disappointment, with Felipe Gonzalez?

[Answer] I have felt great frustration; I do not know whether there is anything personal about it. Felipe Gonzalez was given many important things; he obtained them without effort. He gives the impression that he is thinking: "How can there still be problems when I am prime minister?" I have the feeling that criticism bothers him.

[Question] What else do you accuse him of?

[Answer] Above all, I accuse Gonzalez of not paying sufficient attention to criticism from the opposition and the street.

[Question] Do you bear many scars from your time in government?

[Answer] No. My political makeup is not born of resentment. I am not one of those who believes that revenge is the pleasure of gods; that seems to me to be an absurdity, a real absurdity. I do not want to waste my time on revenge because it produces no pleasure for me. I was wounded many times, just as I suppose I often wound others without wishing to. But all those wounds have healed.

[Question] Following the disaster of the UCD, you were reduced to ashes. Do you now feel like the phoenix?

[Answer] I do not feel like the phoenix, but one must evaluate things realistically and I think that we are providing a real alternative of government.

[Question] On the right or the left?

[Answer] Since 1986, I have occupied the same place: the progressive center. If others move, that is something else!

[Question] Where is Gonzalez?

[Answer] I think that is a mystery. The PSOE is a party of the left. However, the Socialist Government takes positions that are not comprehensible from that standpoint. The process of transformations he announced in 1982 has turned into piecework.

[Question] And yet, the PSOE again won an absolute majority in 1986.

[Answer] I think they won because the other parties had no political strength. If we had been able to do a mailing, send envelopes containing ballots to the homes of the voters, we would have four or five more deputies and there would probably not be an absolute socialist majority.

[Question] It appears that the banks are again starting to support you.

[Answer] We have no other means than what comes from our 27,000 members. We take in an average of 1,850 a month, meaning about 27 million pesetas every quarter. Plus the advance payments from party financing based on election results.

[Question] Is the role of victim profitable?

[Answer] Being the victim is not good. I do not play the victim, although I was the victim of the 1986 elections. The person negotiating in the name of the banks did not grant us loans based on the results anticipated in the polls.

[Question] When you were at Moncloa, you made Emilio Botin wait 3 hours and did not meet with Rockefeller.

[Answer] I believe I treated everyone with respect. Sometimes I could not meet with a person, but I do not recall making Mr Botin wait. I never snub anyone, whether or not that person is a representative of the powers that be.

[Question] Is it not a paradox that Botin is now your banker?

[Answer] He is not my banker.

[Question] A CDS leader works closely with the president of the Bank of Santander.

[Answer] A member of my party works with Botin. I suppose that many CDS members work at banks, but that does not mean that they give us money; they have no reason to. Look, if I should become prime minister again, I would be more sensitive to the problems of all sectors.

[Question] What would you do with your second chance?

[Answer] Correct many defects. I will be supported by a more homogeneous political force, which is very important, and I will naturally not tolerate privileges in any sector. I am convinced that the day after I win the elections, every citizen in the most remote corner of Spain will begin to perceive that he has more freedom, more justice, more solidarity and that he plays a more active role.

[Question] If you become prime minister again, will the CDS card be as sought-after as that of the PSOE?

[Answer] The CDS card will not be necessary at all to hold a post of responsibility. There are many independents who are profoundly democratic and who must be called upon to work in the government. The CDS card will not be a passport to political patronage.

[Question] Do you hope that the CDS will experience the miracle that occurred with Fraga's Popular Alliance?

[Answer] I have never worried about Manuel Fraga. I have never criticized him. I have always kept my distance from the PSOE.

[Question] Could you ever come to an understanding with Fraga if the two of you were on a desert island?

[Answer] Probably not. We have very different personalities. But would I like to go from 12 deputies to 106 like Manuel Fraga? I hope to have more.

[Question] You are dreaming.

[Answer] I am determined, but the 1986 elections changed the political map and above all, the trend. The CDS is gaining strength.

[Question] What is there behind the poster image of Adolfo Suarez?

[Answer] You know, there are many ways of disqualifying me and that is one of them. You could say the same thing about Felipe Gonzalez. The CDS has prominent persons in our national political life and there are individuals who are absolutely unknown. We have a solid program and an ideology capable of meeting the problems of the next century. I have the feeling that the so-called problem of security is winning out while freedoms are being curtailed.

[Question] Do you think the Spanish people are more interested in freedom than security?

[Answer] I hope so. Security is important in life, but I believe that freedom is indispensable in order to think, express oneself, have more justice, live with dignity and assume that solidarity is something more than rhetoric.

[Question] Why do you want to return to the top? Adolfo Suarez already has a place in history.

[Answer] I am a politician and I want to put what I believe into practice. In addition, there is personal frustration in my case. I want to exercise power when I have the trust of the people, but I also want to be in the opposition. Since 1982, parliamentary debate has been on different wave lengths.

[Question] Are you not concerned about the people's alienation from institutions?

[Answer] Extremely. All political parties are doing something wrong if they do not enjoy the support of public opinion. There is debate in our institutions, but it is limited because the work of the opposition is held back by regulations designed for another age. There is an anomaly because it is complicated to control the government backed by a majority political force.

[Question] In other words, you would like to have governed with an absolute majority.

[Answer] I do not know to what point it would have been better. Perhaps we would have had the temptation to make a constitution less valid for all Spaniards. It is obvious that the absolute majority fairly obtained by the PSOE legitimizes it to reject all amendments and propose all the laws it wants. But I do not think it is very intelligent not to heed the amendments of the opposition. I would like to modify the regulation to permit the creation of investigative parliamentary committees.

[Question] Are you not afraid they will start getting out all your "dirty laundry" now that you are starting to gain strength?

[Answer] I think I am clean, even if I may have made mistakes. Theoretically speaking, they have brought out a lot of so-called dirty laundry and I have gone through very hard times, but if someone wants to take that tack, let them go ahead. I will naturally defend myself.

[Question] Let us speak of concrete solutions. What would you do about unemployment?

[Answer] I would radically change the current economic policy. I am not going to read you the CDS program on that point, but I think that there would be less unemployment with me.

[Question] And less tax pressure?

[Answer] There would be greater fairness in the distribution.

[Question] Do you feel closer to Nicolas Redondo or Felipe Gonzalez?

[Answer] I am closer to many of the positions of Nicolas Redondo than of Felipe Gonzalez.

[Question] Is Redondo right when he complains?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Is Spain today happier or unhappier than it was under you?

[Answer] It is not my place to speak on behalf of the Spanish people, but I believe that this Spain has fewer illusions. Before, we all felt a little more involved in the political process.

[Question] What change would Adolfo Suarez make?

[Answer] The change that Gonzalez has not made, the one he offered in his program. My change would depend on a more sovereign foreign policy, an economic program less discriminatory toward the poor and a bigger dose of freedom.

[Question] You look happy, Mr Suarez.

[Answer] One is never totally satisfied with oneself, but the truth is that I am at peace with myself.

[Question] Are the rumors about your health part of your mysterious attraction?

[Answer] I am fine, really! On all my checkups, they say that I am perfect, although I should not say so.

11,464

CSO: 3548/69

POLL: USSR GREATER THREAT TO COUNTRY THAN U.S.

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Apr 87 p 12

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Changed Attitude Toward Superpowers--Soviet Union a Greater Threat to Sweden Than United States"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Submarine violations have caused the voters to regard the Soviet Union as a very strong threat against Sweden's security. This was revealed in a poll of the voters conducted by political scientists Soren Holmberg and Mikal Gilljam.

During all of the 1980's there has been a strong security policy debate in Sweden between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, especially on the subject of submarine violations. Even certain personal traits have played a part.

On no single question has there been such a rapid change in attitudes toward the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Uncertainty about the attitude of the Soviet Union has increased very dramatically, while attitudes toward the United States have clearly become more positive since the days of the Vietnam war.

The poll takers asked the voters the following question:

Considering the Soviet Union's and the United States' relations with Sweden, to what extent do you believe that Sweden is now threatened by these countries?

Two choices of answers, "Is a threat to Sweden" and "Unfriendly, but not a threat" were considered negative, while "Not unfriendly" and "Friendly" were considered positive.

The poll shows that between 1973 and 1985 there was a major change in relations between the superpowers and Sweden.

The opinion of the Swedish people about the Soviet Union changed by no less than 115 units--from plus 55 to minus 60. The opinion of the United States moved in the opposite direction--from minus 5 to plus 59.

Over the years opinions of the Soviet Union have become more negative. The most dramatic change took place following the grounding of the Whiskey submarine off Karlskrona in the fall of 1981.

From the days of the Vietnam war in 1973 to the election of 1976 opinions of the United States changed from minus 5 to plus 60, and since then only minor changes have occurred.

Changes in the negative direction for the Soviets have been somewhat greater among socialist voters, while the more positive attitude toward the United States was due mainly to socialist voters. Social Democrats are relatively less negative toward the Soviet Union and less positive toward the United States.

Women generally believe that the policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union are more threatening toward Sweden than men. The strong shift of opinion toward the Soviet Union comes primarily from young and middle-aged voters. Changes in the positive direction toward the United States come primarily from younger voters.

9287  
CSO/3650/123

## ENVIRONMENT PARTY GAIN DOMINATES LATEST POLL NEWS

## Absence of Voter 'Antagonisms'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Mar 87 p 2

[Commentary by Gunnar Andren: "Seven Parties in Parliament--or Four?"]

[Text] The paradox of politics is that minimal differences in voter strength between blocs and parties can produce maximum changes in political strength.

Recall how the 1973 election ended with an equal number of Social Democratic/Left-Communist Party [VPK] seats and Conservative/Center/Liberal seats (175 apiece). The Social Democrats and VPK received 3798 more votes than the three other parties. Olof Palme remained in office. The 90,388 votes cast for the Christian Democratic Party [KDS] (1.8 percent of the vote) played no part in the outcome.

In the 1979 election the Conservative/Center/Liberal bloc won a majority of the seats in Riksdag (175-174) with a margin of 8404 votes out of the approximately 5.5 million votes that were cast. The KDS votes had the same effect as before.

What is the point of this exercise? Both political developments and a series of barometers from the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls [SIFO] indicate that a much larger number of votes may be cast for parties that fail to reach the cutoff limit of 4 percent.

KDS, now on its own again, could account for about 1 1/2 percent of the vote.

Although it is true that the Environment Party is prospering just now, it will not--in my opinion--come close to the necessary percentage points on election day.

VPK, which is having obvious problems in attracting new voters, could very easily fall below the magic barrier.



The consequence? Instead of seven Riksdag parties we might have just four, the Conservatives, the Center Party, the Liberals and the Social Democrats.

And in that situation it is quite possible that Ingvar Carlsson might have to assume the role of opposition leader in spite of a good campaign movement and even an increase in votes to top things off.

Where do the Environment Party's voters come from?

According to a quarterly survey conducted by SIFO the Greens have acquired a net of 0.5 percent from the Conservatives, an equal amount from the Liberal Party, 0.2 percent from the Center Party, an equal amount from KDS, 1.2 percent from the Social Democrats and 0.4 percent from VPK. That is a total gain of around 3 percent in addition to the 1.5 percent of the votes that the party received in the 1985 election (a remarkable setback that is worth recalling during these sunny spring days).

But SIFO also regularly asks party supporters if they "feel strongly enough about your party to vote for it in the next election." Here it is not surprising to find that Environment Party supporters are far more doubtful even now than the supporters of other parties. The intention to vote for all the established parties lies in the area of 86-89 percent, while the figure for the Environment Party is 76 percent.

It is not yet time for the Environment Party to become a member of Riksdag.

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political mood at the present time is the absence of longstanding bitter public antagonisms of a partisan or personal nature.

"Divide (the opposition) and rule" was the central idea that characterized Tage Erlander's long period in government. Under Olof Palme conflict, confrontation, emerged as the major political strategy. Now the pendulum is swinging back.

It is true that Ingvar Carlsson has been successful so far. But elections are still won on the basis of conflict in some sense. And if there is any conclusion that can be drawn from the recent TV duel between Carlsson and Westerberg it is that Bildt/Westerberg/Johansson do not have to pick up the gauntlet prematurely.

#### Paper Comments on Poll

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Political Pathfinders"]

[Text] In the long-range perspective the period 1982-86 contained two events or political changes of really great size or importance.

First of all, the economic trend was reversed.

The entire nonsocialist government period was dominated by the economic crisis that followed the oil crisis and the catastrophic Social Democratic policy of reconciling differences. The Social Democrats returned to government power and showed that they had learned their lesson better than all the other parties. When it comes to the cost situation in Swedish industry there is no room at all to abuse one's trust. The Social Democrats were quite ignorant about wage costs in the mid-seventies, but in the mid-eighties they deliberately based their policy on a strategy that would give Sweden a cost advantage over the major competitive nations.

It did not take long to see the results. The combination of the nonsocialist devaluation in 1981 and the Social Democratic devaluation in 1982, which amounted to 16 percent in all, led to real bargain sales of Swedish goods and services on world markets. The effect on the Swedish economy was also extremely obvious.

Secondly, of course, the unique and tragic murder of Sweden's prime minister was of unparalleled importance.

An unbiased observer might expect that partisan developments would reflect both the economic recovery and the trauma represented by the murder of Olof Palme. But today's SIFO barometer, like so many earlier ones, testifies to a large degree of stability among the electorate.

One reason why the changes are slight in periods between elections is probably that political interest is simply low then. People in general are not particularly interested in politics. If nothing else they are rational in using their time. They know that they have a chance to exert their influence every 3 years on election day. Then why spend time on acquiring information and becoming involved in politics at other times?

But the stability with regard to potential choices is even greater in a way than it is during periods between elections. Properly speaking there can be very big shifts among the nonsocialist parties. But bloc lines seem to constitute an almost insurmountable barrier for people who are switching from one party to another.

The importance of bloc lines is illustrated once more in today's SIFO poll. In spite of everything that has happened since the elections of 1982 and 1985 the Social Democrats are still anchored at a support level of 45 percent.

Swedish bloc policy has been confirmed over and over again. Politicians do not necessarily accept bloc lines without question. But the voters seem to do so. They move to the line between the blocs but they do not cross it.

The consequence is that elections are decided partly by new voters and partly by the small minority of voters, only a few percent, who are prepared to change parties across bloc lines.

Those are the conditions of the political game in Sweden as we have come to know them over a long period of time and that is how they appear in today's opinion poll.

But now there is an element that could change the picture. The Environment Party is registering a support level of over 4 percent.

It cannot be stressed enough that this is a figure in an opinion poll. The percentage shown for the Environment Party is not an election forecast. It is extremely likely that the Environment Party will not be part of the Riksdag that is elected in 1988.

But at the same time it is not a wild guess to predict that the Environment Party will attract more votes than the 1.5 percent it noted in the last election. And the Environment Party is moving in a political landscape through which both the Social Democrats and VPK have tried to find paths in recent years. It has been the ambition of these parties to attract people who are interested in the environment, of course. But a kind of reverse political effect has been inevitable. Both the Social Democrats and VPK have told their traditional supporters with their body language, in a manner of speaking, that the Environment Party is pursuing the right political issues.

The Environment Party has been legitimized by the somewhat haphazard wandering of the two socialist parties through a landscape in which the Environment Party is at home.

Thus it is definitely unlikely that the Environment Party will get into Riksdag in the next election. But the votes it takes away from the two socialist parties could prove to be very hard for the Carlsson government to do without.

#### Environmentalists' 'Spokesman' Explains Goals

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 6 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Herman Melzer]

[Text] Scrap the wage-earner funds. Eliminate deductions for home interest payments. Reduce military defense. Limit union influence. The Environment Party will not allow itself to be classified as either fish or fowl, blue or red.

"If we get into Riksdag we will not be loyal to anyone on a single issue," said Environment Party spokesman Birger Schlaug in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

The Environment Party is making a serious effort to get into the heavyweight class of politics, Riksdag. For several months now the voter barometers in the big morning papers have been playing sweet music for the environmentalists.

The figures give the Environment Party a place in Riksdag. The fact that there are usually big differences between voter surveys and election results does not seem to worry the Environment Party at all.

#### No Support

The Environment Party will not vote for any candidate for prime minister.

"We will probably not vote for Westerberg or Carlsson. Those are the two people we are really talking about," said Birger Schlaug. "We will abstain from voting."

The Environment Party's refusal to make up its mind means that the voters will not know for sure who will be Sweden's next prime minister even when they watch the televised election returns on 18 September 1988, always assuming that the Environment Party makes it into Riksdag.

It is environmental involvement that determines which people the environmentalists support.

Party programs don't count; the important thing is what parties intend to do during the mandate period.

During the 1984-85 parliamentary year the Environment Party conducted a survey based on how the parties now in Riksdag voted on some major national issues.

#### Conservatives and Social Democrats Worst

"The Conservatives and the Social Democrats were the two worst parties," said Schlaug. "Of the two the Conservatives were clearly second best."

The Liberal Party ended up in the middle. VPK and the Center Party had the best records.

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has accused the Environment Party of being a single-issue party. Although Birger Schlaug defended himself against the accusation, he was quite pleased about the attention that was being paid by the government party.

Schlaug, a 38-year-old freelance journalist, small farmer and weather forecaster, glanced at his watch and said:

"The basic idea is to reduce the differences between the peoples of the world. Conditions must be improved for underdeveloped countries. They can never achieve our standard of consumption. That would be impossible because the world would collapse within a few months.

"Just think what would happen if everybody used batteries in their clocks," he added.

But Riksdag seldom concerns itself with the use of batteries; it deals more often with things like funding, taxes, health care and school reports.

### Tactical Cruising

Schlaug is already clear about some of the tactics the Environment Party will use in cruising among the Riksdag parties.

"We will be glad to help the nonsocialists to reduce employer taxes," he said. "The Social Democrats will get our help instead when it comes to increasing energy taxes."

The Environment Party will also help to abolish wage-earner funds. But Schlaug does not support an earlier nonsocialist proposal to return the money from the funds to individual citizens.

"There we will give the Social Democrats a chance to introduce our local funds," he said. "These are funds that would be used to aid cooperatives and individuals who want to start up their own enterprises."

Today it looks as if taxes will be one of next year's big election issues. The Environment Party favors the preparation of a distribution policy manifesto.

Earlier the Environment Party proposed making the first 30,000 kronor a person earns tax-free. This means that the basic 1988 deduction of 10,000 kronor would be increased substantially.

### High Marginal Tax

"The proposal we are discussing now means that taxes will be proportional for incomes between 30,000 and 300,000 kronor," Schlaug said.

The Environment Party has not yet decided whether taxes in that bracket should be 40, 50 or 60 percent.

"Above the level of 300,000 kronor we favor a substantial marginal tax, perhaps 75 percent," Schlaug said.

The Environment Party wants to eliminate deductions to a large extent. This involves deductions for almost everything, including interest on homes.

The automobile deduction might manage to survive.

"But only for those who live in relatively unpopulated areas," said Schlaug.

Luxury items would be taxed at a high rate while the value-added tax would be eliminated on basic necessities.

The Environment Party is not opposed in principle to the one-time tax on yields from private pension savings. But it was wrong to change the previous conditions.

The Environment Party can accept privatization of health care, schools and daycare facilities. But only up to a point.

"The workers should be able to take over and operate a daycare facility," he said. "But we say no to companies or chains operating them."

People should be able to select schools with the help of "school money" that parents would be allowed to use as they wish.

"Our proposal is reminiscent of the Liberal proposal on that point," said Schlaug.

Those who want report cards will have to do without if the Environment Party has any say in the matter.

"Report cards should be eliminated in elementary schools," declared Schlaug. "They would be replaced by parent conferences."

There is a lot of emphasis on small-scale solutions in the Environment Party. Big powerful organizations need to be combatted.

If the Environment Party is able to decide, the influence of trade unions will be reduced.

#### Less Union Power

"The power of the organizations is based on the idea that the only thing that provides human dignity is paid employment. Therefore the power of both employers and employees must be reduced considerably," said Schlaug, who has been active himself in the State Civil Servants Union.

"The unions have prevented workers from taking over their firms. That is terrible. Later the same unions want to speculate on the stock market. That is unparalleled hypocrisy."

In the Environment Party's Sweden, military defense would get much less money than it does now.

"We want a strong total defense," said Schlaug. "A onesided emphasis on military defense leads to a flimsy defense."

"The Conservatives are the least favorable to defense," Schlaug stated. "It is just shells and powder. They do not understand that it is our energy policy and our food policy that make us vulnerable."

We must still have a military defense, but Sweden should not have any weapons that can reach the territory of other countries.

## JAS Wrong System

"The JAS airplane, for example, can penetrate far into the space of one of the superpowers (the Soviet Union). Peace researchers have explained that those who have aggressive weapons can also be perceived as a threat in a conflict situation."

With regard to the arms trade the Environment Party has stated in its ideological program that Sweden should neither buy nor sell arms.

"We should manufacture the weapons we need ourselves," said Schlaug.

Does he think Sweden can afford this kind of weapons industry?

"I have a figure from Swedish Peace that indicates that it would cost only an extra 300 million kronor," Schlaug replied. "I think that sounds a little low, but when I called up the Defense Ministry and asked about it, I did not get any answer. Therefore I must rely on the figure of 300 million kronor."

Despite uncertainty about defense finances, Birger Schlaug feels the Environment Party can justify its proposals economically.

"We know that the economy is linked to the environment and we want to be able to justify the cost of our proposals."

Does he want the Environment Party to assume such a large responsibility that the man who becomes prime minister will have to offer the party a cabinet post?

"No, we do not want to be part of any government," Schlaug said quickly. "A small party like ours would just be a hostage in that situation."

## Paper on Environmentalists' Program

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Environment Party's Program"]

[Text] What does the Environment Party stand for? The environment, of course. But all our parties want to protect the environment, forests that will rustle over our children too, lakes in which fish thrive, air that provides us with fresh oxygen. None of them can be opposed to an emotional chord so important to the Swedish people.

Thus in examining the parties one must go further. What methods do they propose? How do they weigh different values against each other? What is their analysis of causal relationships?

It is not enough to want something that is good. Lofty intentions that are combined with a weak or incorrect analysis of reality can lead to effects

that no one or very few people would want. A policy that leads to economic chaos, for example, would slow down even the most openhanded environmental activist.

The Environment Party does not stand naked before an examination of other matters besides its green resolve. The party's program is not exactly thinner than those of its established competitors. The general program of ideas also covers social policy, schools, culture and the economy. It is supplemented by 14 different action programs. It is impressive that such a new party with a mixed assortment of members could agree on such a comprehensive program without devastating conflicts.

The Greens' proposals relating to concrete environmental policy are quite conventional although motivated by deep commitment. Often similar demands can be found in other parties.

More distinctive for the Environment Party is the total social structure the party advocates. It can be roughly characterized as a kind of combination of the Center and Liberal Youth Leagues of the early seventies and 19th century socialist Utopianism. The assessments are appealing: all people should have a place in the community, women and men should have equal rights and opportunities, immigrants should be welcomed, violence must be prevented. This is to be accomplished in the local community which will also take care of most of the production.

There are two main problems with this kind of program. One is that it is based to a very large extent on the assumption that social structure is an act of will. "We will" are the most common words in the Green program. And resolve applies to some very large issues, for example an entirely new development structure is needed in Sweden, we must have a "small-scale balanced economy without a concentration of either private or state power" and "a new human being must emerge."

But it is seldom a shortcoming of political parties that they lack resolve; it is rather that they have made a much too weak analysis of the inter-connections and goal conflicts in real life. Therefore things are not the way they imagined and wanted them to be.

Swedish working and living patterns are based on our having an advanced industry that is successful in selling its products on the world market. This industry has provided the basis for a prosperity that does not consist primarily of "luxury consumption" but of good housing standards that benefit almost everyone, a large public sector devoted mainly to schools and providing care services, and a social insurance system that is as expensive as it is cherished by the Swedish people.

Now the Environment Party wants to reduce trade with other countries, increase tariffs and restrict free trade. Within the country economic activity will be "based primarily on local resources and meet local needs," which means that trade inside Sweden will also be drastically reduced. The party is also opposed to the "money economy" which is said to have "created--along



with technology--the basic conditions for an increasingly rapid exploitation of nature and mankind."

It is hard to see how these and other sweeping economic demands--such as the elimination of both interest and profits in the long run--could function in practice and in the face of countermeasures adopted by other countries.

The second problem with the Environment Party's program is that it could easily lead to precisely the centralization and elitist control that the party says it wants to avoid. "Products should be manufactured more for their utility value (usefulness) than for their exchange value," the party says. But who will decide usefulness if individuals are not allowed to do so themselves in the marketplace?

The party proposes a special council to undertake ongoing planning of the nation's production, which brings us to a planned economy. It is scarcely more reassuring that it is proposed that much of the production be initiated and administered by separate municipal planning groups with the help of money from the wage-earner funds. Total price regulation is suggested for the entire housing market. The result will be a system of standing in line that is controlled by public authorities.

The Environment Party advocates such a sweeping transformation of today's production, lifestyle and housing patterns that it is hard to see how the vision could be carried out even approximately without very extensive central direction. The risk will be especially great when the "new man" refuses to emerge spontaneously.

The old parties should not be guaranteed eternal control over Sweden. New parties must be given an honest chance. The voters should know more about them than what their names are. The Environment Party has now reached the point where it is due the respect that is involved in seriously examining its program.

#### Greens Advance in Stockholm

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Apr 87 p 29

[Text] The "Greens" are advancing in Stockholm too. Together the Stockholm Party (9.1 percent) and the Environment Party (6.8 percent) could claim a city council seat after the next election if the opinion poll figures are borne out. The third environmental party, the Center Party, continues to slip but it is hoping that a newly-elected leadership with "genuine big city residents" will turn the tide. The Social Democrats and the Conservatives who have taken turns at holding power since the election showed an almost identical decline. Least dramatic compared to the 1985 election were the results for the Liberal Party (+1.6 percent) and the Left-Communist Party (-0.7 percent).

## Youths Vote as Parents

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Young Voters Resemble Their Elders"]

[Text] Young people between the ages of 18 and 24 divide their sympathies as evenly between the political blocs as the electorate as a whole, according to SIFO's 1987 youth survey.

The differences in support for individual parties are also smaller now than they have been in the past. So the Social Democrats again have a comfortable cushion of support among young people (perhaps under the influence of the Palme murder?).

The Conservative youth wave--with support levels of up to 40 percent in SIFO polls--has ebbed and the party now has a support level of around 20 percent among young people, just as it does among adults.

The same thing applies to the Left-Communist Party. For at least 15 years after 1968 VPK was predominately a young people's party as far as its voters went. Today it is almost the reverse that is true.

The Liberal Party has a support level among young people that is somewhat, but not much, larger than the party's total share of the electorate.

The Center Party is relatively weak among young people, with half as much support from them as it has from voters as a whole. A party's general problems often have the greatest effect on young people.

But for both the Center Party and VPK it is also a factor that the Environment Party has become a tough new competitor for the support of environmentally idealistic young people. Among the seven youngest voter groups the Environment Party is currently rated higher than the Center Party and VPK--at least when they are asked by pollsters.

The total picture of young people's party preferences in the spring of 1987 is one of less polarization than was the case in the first half of the eighties, less support for the communists and at the same time a diminishing wave of conservative support. This is a healthy development.

## Liberals Largest Nonsocialist Party

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 6 Apr 87 p 6

[Text] The Liberal Party is now the biggest nonsocialist party according to the latest voter barometer from the Institute for Market Research [IMU]. However the socialist majority consists of 47.5 percent compared to the nonsocialists' support level of 45.5 percent.

The Environment Party registered 6 percent, an increase of half a percentage point compared to the last poll in February.

With the exception of the Center Party's decline of a whole percentage point, all the changes from the last poll represented half percentage points.

All the changes, including the Center Party's, are within the margin of error. Interviews with 922 people were conducted in the period 2-25 March.

According to IMU voter sympathies were distributed as follows, with the percentages in parentheses indicating changes in comparison with the February poll.

#### Voter Sympathies

<u>Party</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Change</u>
Social Democrats	42.5	(-0.5)
Conservatives	17.0	(0)
Center Party	10.5	(-1.0)
Liberals	17.5	(+0.5)
Left-Communist Party	5.0	(+0.5)
Christian Democrats	0.5	(-0.5)
Environment Party	6.0	(+0.5)
Others	1.0	(+0.5)

6578

CSO: 3650/116

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BOOK ON ELECTION, VOTER TRENDS SEES DANGER SIGNS FOR SDP

Voters Moving to Right

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Apr 87 p 17

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Voters Increasingly Mobile--Election 85 a Warning Signal for SDP"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] The election of 1985 was a clear warning signal for the Social Democrats. Splitting of votes between the Riksdag and the municipal elections increased drastically, and the identification between the Social Democrat Party [SDP] and its voters declined dramatically. This was asserted by pollsters Soren Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam in the book "Valjare och val i Sverige" [Voters and Elections in Sweden].

The tendency to vote differently in Riksdag and municipal elections and to identify less and less with the party one is voting with are often the first steps to a change of parties, said Soren Holmberg when he presented the book at a press conference.

He hastened, however, to add that the situation could have changed since the 1985 election because of many dramatic events. Olof Palme was murdered and three parties have changed party leaders since 1985, reminded Soren Holmberg.

During the 1970's the number of voters who clearly identified with the party they voted for rose to about 60 percent. Between 1982 and 1985 this figure declined by 7 percent to 53 percent.

The reason for the large decline in 1985 is that for the first time Social Democrat voters showed weakened solidarity with their own party, said both pollsters. Party identification for Social Democrats has previously remained constant at 77-78 percent.

This declined in 1985 to 69 percent despite the reduction in the election from 44.7 to 42.5 percent. A lower voting frequency usually means higher party identification because the nucleus remains. The SDP figure is still higher than in the nonsocialist parties, where changes within the bloc are common.

One explanation for the reduced party identification figure is said to be that the SDP is too far to the right on the left-right scale. The number of Social Democrat voters who put themselves on the same level as the party on this scale declined from 1982 to 1985 from 49 to 39 percent. The Social Democrats who believed that the party was to the left of them rose instead from 40 to 48 percent.

#### Wind From the Right

The reason for the changes is not that the party has become more radical, but that the voters' opinions have moved to the right. The wind from the right in society in the 1980's was therefore, according to both pollsters, an important cause for the reduced solidarity between the policies of the SDP and its voters.

Both pollsters see the reduced amount of party identification as a warning of increased mobility in the coming election. The tendency to change parties is said to be 4-5 times greater among voters without party identification than among voters with party membership. Among voters with low identification, 30-40 percent will change parties in the next election--voters with strong party identification will change 5-9 percent of the time.

#### A First Step

The pollsters emphasized that splitting votes is related to a low degree of party identification. Splitting can be seen as a first step toward changing parties.

An important explanation for splitting votes is, however, that the small parties find it easier to enter municipal councils than the Riksdag. The thresholds in municipal elections are not as effective as the four percent threshold in the Riksdag.

In national politics the question of government is a dominant issue, but hardly in municipal politics. The pollsters believe that the importance of local problems is growing in municipal elections.

In the 1985 Riksdag election the socialist edge over the nonsocialists declined from 6.2 to 2.2 percent. The nonsocialist success was described partly as a turn to the right of voter opinion, and partly as a turn to the left.

The nonsocialist demands for more market economy, no to major socialization, abolition of the wage earner funds, advertising on Swedish TV, more private health care, day care support for parents of small children, more for defense, etc., were influential in both blocs.

At the same time the pollsters confirmed that there was also a wind from the left in the voters' opinions, which favored the SDP. That was the questions of welfare and employment. The nonsocialist proposal of delay days in health

insurance became an attraction for the SDP. The investigation disclosed that election gains could have gone as high as 0.8 percent.

In reality this wind from the left could be better described as the survival of the ghost of the right, as other pollsters claimed. By concentrating the attack on the Conservative demands for a change in Swedish policy, the SDP succeeded in frightening many voters into voting for a nonsocialist party.

Westerberg

The investigation asserted that in the 1985 election campaign Bengt Westerberg was the most popular party leader. Of the voters who changed from the other nonsocialist parties to the Liberal Party, 3.1 percent of them could have been due to the so-called Westerberg effect.

Many voters left the Center Party because of dissatisfaction with Thorbjorn Falldin and doubts about Ulf Adelsohn. The party leader effects were not as obvious within the socialist bloc.

In the 1985 election the generation and sex patterns were broken. The turn to the left by women and to the right by men was an obvious result. In the 1985 election for the first time in history women voted more socialist than men, and men for the first time voted more nonsocialist than women.

For a long time the Social Democrat and Communist Left Parties have had greater support among young voters than among older. In 1985 the Social Democrats were mainly supported by the older voters, while the Conservatives, which historically has been the party of middle-aged men and women received greater support from the youths than the average of all voters. The ghost on the right did not frighten young voters.

#### Party's, Voters' Views Differ

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Apr 87 p 2

[Commentary by Hans Bergstrom: "Social Democrats--a Party Like the Others"]

[Text] The Social Democrat Party in Sweden has been something entirely special. Its stability through the decades has been unique internationally, but also when compared with the other parties in Sweden. Before the Swedish social development of the latest half century the strong, secure Social Democrat Party stood like the foundation itself--through wars and economic crises.

The stability of the Social Democrat Party has largely been that of its voters. Eight of ten SDP voters have supported the party through thick and thin. Their loyalty has gone much deeper than to one issue or the other. It has withstood the strains of even the short-sighted unpopular measures of a Social Democrat government. And it has included a relationship of confidence between the leaders and the voters which made it possible for the party leadership to influence actively their own voters' views on important issues.

Referendums on ATP [General Supplementary Pension System] and nuclear power are two important examples.

It is therefore a change of historic proportions which appears in a study of the 1985 election, now published by Goteborg researchers Soren Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam in a book entitled "Valjare och val i Sverige" [Voters and Elections in Sweden] (Bonniers). The Social Democrat Party is becoming a party like the others, with all the less reliable voters and subject to the nervous demand to struggle for daily public opinion via the media.

The conclusion is supported by a number of different circumstances:

- The number of SDP sympathizers who also see themselves as adherents to the party declined in 1985 to 69 percent, after remaining stable at 77-78 percent for election after election. The degree of identification with their own party remains high, but is declining.

- SDP voters are now also beginning to split their votes between municipal and Riksdag elections. Of the SDP voters in the 1985 Riksdag election, 11 percent voted for some other party in the elections for municipal councils. That need not be seen primarily as an expression of dissatisfaction with SDP municipal policy. Soren Holmberg's interpretation is that it can be seen as "one-half a vote against the party," as a notification that next time they will completely change parties.

- Fewer SDP sympathizers believe that their own views coincide with the party's. When a selection of SDP voters are asked to place themselves and the party on a left-right scale, the result is that shown on the diagram. Only 39 percent in the 1985 election, compared with 51 percent in the 1979 election, say that they have the same ideological position as the party.

There are almost four SDP voters who believe that the party has gone too far to the left for each SDP voter who believes that the party has gone too far to the right!

The real problem with SDP voters is the direct opposite of that reflected in party congresses, namely that over half of their own supporters believe that the party is too far to the left on questions such as government control of business, wage earner funds, taxes, freedom of choice in child care and public monopoly.

During the SDP election victories in 1982 and 1985 (in which the party gained government power), there has been a nonsocialist wind blowing through these questions. This has been combined, however, with continued strong support for the social welfare system where the "left wind" blows strongest. The strength of the Liberal Party in 1985 was not only the party's leader, but also that the party joined both voter tendencies: for the market economy and for social welfare.

If the SDP accepts the pollsters picture of reality, they have two alternatives: to change the party's policies so that they better agree with


the opinions of the voters, or to try to convince the voters that they should think about the party.

When Finance Minister Feldt speaks about marginal taxes and when Industry Minister Peterson pleads for the introduction of a national stock exchange and sings the promises of small business, the first process appears to be well underway. But both important cabinet ministers are forced into a tug of war with party activists who are far removed from voter opinion and reality.

Social Democrats were afraid in 1985 that the Conservatives were going to challenge social welfare and that the nonsocialists were not a reliable government alternative. On the other hand the pollsters show that the Liberal Party presents a clear social profile, and is therefore significantly more dangerous than the Conservatives as challengers to social democracy in an election. There remains the nonsocialist weakness on the government question.

A social liberal policy, conducted by Kjell-Olof Feldt--on which most of the voters will apparently land if the nonsocialists do not pull themselves together and utilize the increased vulnerability of the Social Democrats.





Key: 1. The party is to the left of your own position.  
 2. The party is on the same position as your own.  
 3. The party is to the right of your own position.

Caption: Supporters of the Social Democrat Party place themselves and the party on the same left-right scale in the elections of 1979-1985.  
 From Holmberg/Gilljam: "Voters and Elections in Sweden."

9287  
 CSO:3650/123

## WOMEN WITH FOREIGN HUSBANDS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO FOREIGN LAWS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 7 Mar 87 p 7

[Article by Carla Rodota: "If a Woman Marries a Foreign National, the 'Law of the Husband' No Longer Prevails"]

[Text] Rome--From now on, in order to regulate the personal relations between spouses when husband and wife are of different nationality, one need no longer have recourse to the national "law of the husband." This determination has been made by the Constitutional Court in response to a request to intervene from the courts of Palermo, Rome, and Turin, where three Italian women who had been "penalized" by the national "law of the husband" had appealed their cases. One of their number--who is married to a Chilean--had been unable to obtain a divorce, for which no provision is made in Chile; the other two--married respectively to a West German and a Tunisian--had been unable to obtain a separation: an institution unrecognized in those countries.

The judges of the Court acknowledged as justified the objections raised against Article 18 of the introductory provisions of our civil code. On the basis of this article, "the personal relations between spouses of different nationalities are regulated by the most recent national law applicable to both of them at the time of the marriage or--in the absence of such law--by the national 'law of the husband' in effect at the time of the marriage." It is precisely this principle of the "supremacy of the national law of the husband" that was adjudged by the Court to be "contrary to the principles--accepted in our Constitution and in the majority of foreign constitutional laws--that prohibit all forms of discrimination based on gender (Article 3) and establish the moral and legal equality of husband and wife (Article 29)."

The decision of the Constitutional Court emphasizes that our laws--even including the decisions of the Court--are being adapted to these "constitutional imperatives." We may recall that the most obvious example of this trend is Law No 151 of 1975--the reform of family law--"whereby the traditional concept of the supremacy of the husband within the family organization is renounced." The solution adopted in Article 18 of the introductory provisions of the civil code must therefore be declared illegal, inasmuch as there is no doubt that it was based on recognition of the husband as occupying a position of supremacy within the family.

The Constitutional Court does explain, however, that it is not within its purview to indicate criteria for identifying the particular law to be applied in order to "resolve difficulties arising from the cumulative application of diverse national regulations." The Court further states that the decision is up to the legislators, precisely because the judges of the Constitutional Court do not wish to invade jurisdictions of other instruments of governmental authority; above all, they refuse to take the place of the legislators whenever someone wants to choose among hypothetical solutions. Parliament should therefore have the responsibility for establishing "a criterion based on the domicile or residence of the spouses," or establishing that the law that "provides for divorce or personal separation" shall be regarded as applicable in all cases, "inasmuch as these are inviolable personal rights."

Another decision by the Court--also relating to matrimonial affairs--declares illegal a regulation that prohibited sergeants, corporals, and privates of the Italian National Military Police from marrying "upon completion of their fourth year of service," regardless of how that year is served: that is to say, even when instead of being "immediately reenlisted" they are still required to complete successfully "1 trial year of service."

10992

CSO: 3528/112

## BRIEFS

1986 STATISTICS ON POPULATION--Rome--In 1986 the Italian population increased by 1.5 per thousand. According to the most recent statistics compiled by ISTAT [National Statistics Institute], from the end of August 1985 to the end of August 1986 the number of residents increased by 87,292 (in 1985 the population was 57,156,787 and in 1986, 57,244,079). The data regarding the movement and sum total of the population--data developed by ISTAT on the basis of the reports transmitted on a monthly basis from the various municipal departments--show a decrease of 5.9 percent in live births and 0.3 percent in deaths of citizens. The number of marriages also decreased. The total of all marriages performed in the period January-August was 189,030: a decrease of 679 from the figure for the corresponding period in 1985. The number of civil marriages, however, increased by 14 percent. [Text] [Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 22/23 Mar 87 p 21] 10992

CSO: 3528/112

## EC SOLUTION PROPOSED TO REPLACE NATIONAL STEEL SUBSIDIES

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 10 Apr 87 p 29

[Article by jas, Essen: "World Steel Capacity Much too Big; RWI Demands Equalization Levies to Overcome the Subsidies"]

[Text] In the view of the Rhenish-Westphalian Institute for Economic Research (RWI), the removal of the competition-distorting effects of subsidies is the central regulatory problem of the present steel policy. However, since the national economic policy can achieve this in its own jurisdiction within its borders, but not abroad--according to the demand of the institute--subsidy equalization levies should be introduced. The present market-effective excess capacity in the United States, Japan, and the EC countries is estimated at 50 million tons. Together with the reduction in production to be expected up to 1995, a requirement for the shutdown of as much as 75 to 100 million tons of raw steel capacity is assumed for the next 10 years.

In view of the magnitude of the excess, adjustment steps in the enterprises alone are no longer enough, according to the RWI. Rather a sizable number of firms will have to get out of the market completely. The institute sees as the cause of the plight the fact that the steel associations, workers organizations and governments in virtually all steel countries from the start did not leave any chance for competition that is regarded as quite suitable for adjustment of capacity but rather bet on cartelized limitations of offers, state plans, subsidies, and protection against competition.

Thus reductions in capacity were not made at all or were accomplished too slowly. Against this background it cannot be surprising that the emergency measures, originally of limited duration, became permanent fixtures. Even abandonment by some countries of the subsidy merry-go-round is regarded as risky: "The affected steel industry presumably would have only a chance within relatively narrow market corners to hold its ground against the concentrated competitive pressure of the protected and subsidized competition."

As regards subsidy equalization, the RWI feels that such a levy would differ economically favorably from the quantity and price regulations thus far practiced. In self-restraint agreements or minimum prices, subsidized and unsubsidized enterprises would be treated the same way and the competition in favor of the domestic industry would be limited. However, in the case of enterprise-related equalization duties, staggered depending on the degree of subsidizing, only those enterprises would be affected that have a competitive advantage as a result of state subsidies. According to RWI, even the GATT anti-dumping rules do not help with regard to steel because nearly all export shipments fulfill the general finding of dumping. However, the instrument of the subsidy equalization levy is regarded as suitable to interrupt the disastrous intervention spiral, particularly if it were simultaneously applied by several countries.

But the institute does recognize that even for the FRG, where subsidies within the EC are least prevalent, subsidy equalization levies can hardly be plausibly justified as long as the FRG does not stop its support payments to enterprises threatened with bankruptcy.

Moreover it is emphasized that the crisis of the steel industry is not limited to the FRG but has reached all highly industrialized countries. In the United States the integrated large steel mills under the influence of declining consumption, rising imports, and growing competition from mini steel mills have been forced to make dramatic adjustments. In Japan the steel industry encounters growing difficulties since the advantage of the cost depression of the large production units has become a disadvantage because of the low utilization. In the young industrial countries the capital costs are viewed as a decisive weak point of the steel industries. The superiority of these countries occasionally generally assumed by reference to the wage cost advantage thus far could only be proved for few plants.

In an analysis of the available entrepreneur reports on the 1986 business development, the Metalworkers Union emphasized that the earning power of the FRG steel group firms is considerably better than the impression that is being created in public. In an analysis of the monthly DER GEWERKSCHAFTLER on 1986 business development it is stated that the announced mass dismissals which threaten to ruin entire cities and regions are by no means compelling in terms of business economics. Thyssen, Kloeckner, Hoesch, and Krupp, according to the analysis, have operated in the black since 1984, Salzgitter since 1985. In view of the new price system to be expected, the periodical regarded the latest losses in the steel industry as "limited in terms of time."

12356

CSO: 3620/210

## ECONOMIC STUDY INSTITUTE SEES SLOWER GROWTH AHEAD

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 Mar 87 p 28

[Article: "ETLA's Forecast for 1987-1988: Growth Will Slow Down and Imports Will Increase"]

[Text] The Economic Research Institute (ETLA) predicts that this year and next year the Finnish economy will continue to follow the course of 3-percent growth of the early 1980's. "The outlook is not rosy," ETLA general manager Pentti Vartia summed it up.

As the Finance Ministry sees it, Finland has stayed on the 3-percent course. ETLA presents as the reason for its pessimism the slowdown in growth of overall production and an inflation rate higher than those of competing countries.

ETLA predicts that overall production will increase 3 percent this year and 2 percent next year. Production growth this year is described as "modest," even though exports to the West have increased appreciably. This has not, however, plugged the gaps in exports to the Soviet Union.

Exports to the West have slowed down this year from a growth rate of 8 percent to 4 percent. Exports to the Soviet Union will not drop any further in 1988. Total exports will increase 2 percent this year and 3 percent next year.

Many factors threaten the stable growth of the Finnish economy. The balance of trade and the problems of inflation narrow down the room to maneuver our financial policy has.

In Vartia's opinion, we might be able to introduce a marginal tax reform next year. At most a couple of billion markkas would be spent on it and it could be controlled through the monetary and financial policy. A major tax overhaul would only be possible later.

In ETLA's estimation, the trade balance deficit will be 5 billion this year, but next year almost 7 billion. The deficit will probably get bigger in comparison with overall production and that is a sign of unbalanced development of the economy. Imports will increase faster than overall production.

ETLA estimates that the financial policy situation will become critical in 1988. If the financial policy should be eased up, the monetary policy,

especially the interest policy, would have to be tightened. A loose financial policy would merely support a rise in consumption, which would chiefly affect imported goods. After that we would have worse problems with the balance of trade than we do now.

ETLA also warns us that the different sectors of the economic policy may come into conflict with one another. Trade balance problems would appear first on the foreign exchange market. Wage agreements will also have to be moderate. Actually, wage inheritance included, general increases may not exceed 2 percent next year.

As ETLA sees it, wages paid through the national economy have risen faster than they have in competing countries. The profit rate for industry has declined and will continue to decline in 1987-1988.

The real purchasing power of households will increase considerably this year because nominal wages have risen somewhat in comparison with the rate of inflation and taxes have been reduced.

#### Closed Sector Price Problem

Although the profit rate for businesses is declining and wages are rising, the unemployment rate will remain at roughly the same level it is at now. This year the unemployment rate will be 5.5 percent and next year 5.4 percent. If recipients of unemployment benefits are included, the unemployment rate for 1988 rises to 7.4 percent.

Finnish prices are rising faster than prices in competing countries. In 1986 consumer prices rose 3.6 percent. This year and next year prices will rise 3.5 percent.

Open sector prices will remain fairly well within the inflation rate of the OECD countries, but closed sector prices will rise more ungovernably. According to general manager Pentti Vartia, there is good reason for closed sectors--that is, sectors that have no foreign competitors--to abandon their customary practice of always passing wage hikes on to prices.


Investments will increase 2.5 percent this year and 1.5 percent next year. Investments in the national economy will drop by the end of 1988; investments in machines and equipment, which have increased especially the past couple of years, will continue to increase slowly.

#### Research Institute's Economic Forecast for 1987 (percentages)

<u>Institute</u>	<u>GNP Growth</u>	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>Unemployment</u>	<u>Export Growth</u>	<u>Import Growth</u>
VM	3	3.25	5.4	2.5	3
KOP	3	3.6	5.5	2	3
ETLA	3	3.5	5.5	2	3.5



VM=National Economy Department, Finance Ministry.  
 KOP=Economic Research Department, National Bank.  
 ETLA= Economic Research Institute.



Key:

1. Total exports.
2. Exports to the Soviet Union.
3. Exports to the West.
4. Index.
5. 1987 forecast.
6. 1988 forecast.

11,466

CSO: 3617/71

## SPECTRUM OF TRADE WITH USSR REVIEWED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 12 Apr 87 pp 12-13

[Article by Vas. Danos]

[Text] The finalizing of the agreement with the USSR to absorb the total alumina production of the state factory which will be created in the Fokis area is now facilitating development of a "Barbarossa" plan for Greece's spring "offensive" against the USSR.

The implementation of the plan has a basic target of further developing the trade and exchanges with this country, which cut its purchases of Greek products quite a bit in 1986, the excuse being the drop in oil prices and the Chernobyl accident.

The president of the Russian department of the Athens EVE [Chamber of Commerce and Industry], Khr. Tamouridis, is already in Moscow in order to investigate the possibilities of exporting Greek products to the 16 USSR Republics and to prepare for the visit of a large trade delegation in 1987.

In addition, a conference is being planned for the beginning of May at the Athens EVE, the goals being:

1. An analysis, by leading officials from the Moscow Chamber, of Gorbachev's policy for reconstruction (perestroika).
2. The possibility of developing cooperation in the industrial and technological sectors, in accordance with the new Soviet legislation which encourages mixed enterprises.

In the meantime, preparations are under way for conducting in Athens in June the sixth conference of the Greek-Soviet Inter-Governmental Committee which will examine:

1. Development of trade, economic and industrial cooperation between the two countries.
2. The prospects for developing further sectors for cooperation.

3. Implementation (application) of the time chart for activities between the two countries for the period 1986-88.

The committee's previous conference took place in Moscow on 25-29 August 1986 and the two delegations were led by the Greek deputy minister of national economy, Giannos Papandoniou, and the Soviet Union's first deputy minister of foreign trade, N. Komarov.

At this conference, there was discussion of absorbing the production of the alumina factory under construction, an issue which has now been resolved and is opening the door for implementation of other plans for cooperation, such as the ones for stainless steel and natural gas.

#### The Trade Exchanges

GENERAL BALANCE GREECE-USSR (in thousand dollars)						
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Exports	73,949	141,494	142,809	121,154	142,058	92,055
Imports	330,924	220,926	247,234	508,152	532,178	315,907
Trade Balance	-256,975	-79,432	-104,425	-386,998	-390,122	-223,825
Invisible Re-						
sources	5,091	5,397	3,251	6,269	2,880	
Invisible						
Payments	3,328	6,890	3,966	4,424	4,310	
Balance on						
Invisibles	1,763	-1,493	-715	1,845	-1,430	
Balance on Cur-						
rent Accounts	-255,212	-80,925	-105,140	-385,153	-391,552	
Capital Reflux	172	313	153	137	629	
Capital Outflow	30	56	43	29	12	
Balance of						
Working Capital	142	257	110	108	617	
General Balance	-255,070	-80,663	-105,030	-385,045	-390,935	
(National Statistical Service of Greece import-export data)						

As is stressed above, the trade exchanges between Greece and the USSR did not develop favorably in 1986, but also in recent years. The trade balance shows a great inactivity at our country's expense ; contributing to this has been:

First, the large imports of Soviet oil.

Second, the Soviets' rigidity concerning more purchases of Greek products which is based on the falling tendency of oil prices and the economic problems faced by the country, aided by Chernobyl.

And yet, although the USSR had announced that it would curtail its purchases from all countries, in 1986 it bought increased quantities of items from other European countries (for example, from Denmark), while for 1987, it is preparing to buy from Turkey goods worth a total of 750 million dollars when it bought from Greece in 1986 products worth only 92 million dollars. In the same year, 1986, Greece bought from the USSR products with a total value of 316 million dollars (including oil).

#### How Exports Will Increase

Certainly, in 1986 the difference between imports and exports from and to the Soviet Union decreased quite a bit in contrast to 1985 and 1984, but this does not mean that there are not margins for further improvement.

The decrease in the deficit in the balance which was noted in 1986 is owing basically to the fact that Greece restricted its purchases from the Soviet Union. While in 1984 Greek imports were worth 508 million dollars, and in 1985 they rose to 532 million dollars, in 1986 they were cut to 316 million dollars. Of course, the Soviets did something similar; from 142 million dollars in 1985, they restricted their purchases in 1986 to 92 million dollars.

Based on the above data, as well as the data from 1981, 1982 and 1983, the deficit in the general balance, at our country's expense, amounts to 1,440 million dollars.

At a recent conference of the Soviet department of the Athens EVE, in which importers and exporters and representatives of state organizations, companies and ministries took part, it was stressed that Greek products are not well known on the Soviet market and both the government and the private sector will have to activate itself.

Thus, in the exports program which the Ministry of Commerce drew up for the two-year period 1987-88, the USSR holds first place among those countries to which our attention will have to be turned for long-term results.

To stimulate Greek exports and exploit the existing interest, the following are provided for in the two-year period:

1. Activating the Organization for Exports Promotion [OPE], and strengthening and reactivating the trade adviser's office in Moscow, for participation in exhibitions, and organizing "Greek weeks," conferences and presentations to government and private trade circles.
2. Full exploitation of state procurements as a lever for effecting exports.
3. Continual campaigns to promote specific products (for example, ready-made

clothes, shoes, wines, fruits and vegetables, etc.).

4. Inviting Soviet buyers to come to Greece to explore, locally, the production possibilities, and carrying out mixed trade missions to the USSR.

In a recent report of the Greek trade adviser in Moscow, I. Paskhalis, to the Ministry of Commerce, it is reported that in 1986 the value of Greek exports to the USSR fell 51.9 percent in comparison to 1985, covering 29.5 percent of the imports from this country (1985 covering: 22.6 percent). Moreover, it is reported that the ratio of Greek imports and exports from and to the USSR changed from 4.42:1 in 1985 to 3.3:1 in 1986. We import from the USSR, besides oil, mechanical equipment, scrap, pig iron, ammonia, sawed timber, coal and electricity.

Greece exports bauxite, wires, pipes, raw hides, tobacco, cotton, synthetic fibers, flour, oranges, lemons, raisins, juices, olive oil, olives, wines, ready-wear clothes and shoes, blankets and sponges, and Soviet ships are being repaired at Greek shipyards.

After the talks which took place last year to re-examine exchanges between the two countries, and after the Chernobyl accident, added to the list of Greek products for export were wheat, dried figs, tomato-paste, cloth and canned fruit.

#### GREECE-USSR COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES, 1985-1986

I. Soviet exports to Greece (values in thousand rubles= 1.425 dollars)	1985		1986	
	quantity	value	quantity	value
Machines and equipment	-	56,000	-	16,700
Oil (thousand tons)	2,060	414,000	2,300	137,600
Petroleum Products (thousand tons)	588	80,500	246	15,900
Scrap (thousand tons)	156	12,600	175	10,400
Pig Iron (thousand tons)	8.6	1,000	12	1,200
Ammonia (thousand tons)	37	5,800	125	8,600
Sawed Timber (thousand 3-meter)	66.8	5,800	68	5,700
Electricity (thousand kwh)	-	-	600	10,400
Coal	-	-	86	1,700
Other Products		18,300		10,800
Total (million rubles)		594.0		219.0
II. Soviet imports from Greece				
Bauxite (thousand tons)	550	14,100	443	9,200
Ferrous Metal Plates (thousand tons)	13.2	2,200	4.7	800
Thick Wires (tons)	-	-	530	310
Pipes (thousand tons)	20	5,100	28	6,300
Manganese Dioxide (thousand tons)	-	-	1.3	1,000

Lead Concentrates (thousand tons)	-	-	3.0	1,000
Raw Hides (thousand pieces)	500	2,200	315	1,300
Tobacco (tons)	10,823	16,965	1,100	2,400
Cotton (thousand tons)	21.5	30,700	-	-
Synthetic fibers (tons)	376	825	306	900
Flour (thousand tons)	10	1,345	-	-
Oranges (thousand tons)	53.6	8,700	29.7	4,700
Lemons (thousand tons)	42.9	9,200	45.4	9,300
Raisins (thousand tons)	4.4	2,500	-	-
Juices (tons)	1,461	642	587	300
Olive Oil (tons)	10,957	10,500	8,000	8,000
Olives (tons)	-	-	498	300
Wines (tons)	24,000	1,042	-	-
Ready-Wear Clothes and Underclothes	-	6,200	-	5,000
Cloths (thousand meters)	2,200	5,800	150	320
Blankets (thousand pieces)	20	212	-	-
Shoes (thousand pairs)	237	3,200	217	2,600
Ship Repairs	-	9,300	-	8,100
Natural Sponges (tons)	4.2	180	3.3	120
Other Products	-	3,381	-	2,650
Total (million rubles)		134.3		64.6

9247

CSO: 3521/109

## ENEL PRESIDENT EXPLAINS STRATEGY AFTER ENERGY CONFERENCE

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 15 Mar 87 pp 206-209

[Interview with ENEL president Franco Viezzoli by Salvatore Gatti: "I Am Pro-Energy"; date and place not given; first paragraph is L'ESPRESSO introduction]

[Text] So you don't like nuclear power? Then you have to have more coal and new laws. How about the ecologists' energy alternative? Fine, but it's too expensive. Here, in this interview, ENEL's strategy is explained by its new president.

Now that the high water of the national conference on energy has passed, with the precise reports of the "experts" (from Paolo Baffi to Umberto Veronesi) and the violent polemics that accompanied it, the government (the new government) will have the task of establishing the policy that ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] should follow in order to give the nation the energy it urgently needs, in view of the fact that in respect to energy production Italy is in last place in Europe. It will be the duty of the new ENEL president, Franco Viezzoli, to carry out the new national energy plan. We asked him--in this, his first interview since his installation as head of the ENEL--to sum up the conference results and the Italian energy situation.

[Question] Dr Viezzoli, LA STAMPA ran a headline, "Obscurity Following the Summit." Do you agree with that thought?

[Answer] The conference certainly came late and was perhaps not complete, but the basic reports and the final report of the three experts provided a definitive answer to many questions; they brought clarity to the situation.

[Question] But wasn't the conference undermined to some extent by the rigidity of the political positions?

[Answer] I'd say not. The political parties were marginal to the conference. If there was anything of interest in this area, it was the Radical Party's cautious opening to the nuclear power option."

[Question] And what definitive points did the conference make?

[Answer] Basically three: the need for using all sources of energy, provided only that they can provide energy to the nation without incurring vulnerability and in a harmonious manner; the danger inherent in the various sources, as indicated in the Veronesi report; and the need for amending the laws concerning site selection.

[Question] In view of the fact that we are living in the emotional climate of the "post-Chernobyl" period, what has Professor Veronesi's group determined with respect to the danger of the various energy sources?

[Answer] That the older coal-fired plants release sulfur oxide into the air; that the fuel oil-fired plants emit even greater quantities of it; and that the nuclear power plants are only very slightly polluting, but there is always the possibility of accidents with attendant consequences. As for converting to alternative energy sources, even geothermal energy would not be exempt from environmental consequences; whereas those types of energy which like nuclear energy are clean--solar and wind energy--do not have much of a future, quantitatively speaking, compared to the others.

[Question] But since Chernobyl there is still the fear of a drastic increase in the incidence of tumors.

[Answer] Veronesi has given precise answers to these fears too. Here are the comparative percentages for the risk of deaths by tumors that are attributable to various environmental factors: in first place is food, with 35 percent; then comes tobacco, with 30 percent; then the various infective agents, with 10 percent; then sex, 7 percent; work, 4 percent; alcohol, 3 percent; pollution, 2 percent; sunlight, 1.6 percent; natural radioactivity, 1.4 percent; food additives and industrial products, each with 1 percent; drugs and radiotherapy, each with 0.5 percent; the rest is due to unknown factors. These--according to Veronesi--are the real causes of tumors.

[Question] But you're an out-and-out nuclear advocate, are you not?

[Answer] No, but I do regard the atom as clean, and our nuclear power plants as the safest in the world: precisely because they are the latest to be constructed, for we learned from all the others. And the cost of nuclear power is low--less than 60 lire per kilowatt-hour. At the present time, the Nuclear Energy Plan calls for eight 1,000 megawatt units, in addition to the four units at Montalto and Trino, which by the year 2000 will provide 20 percent of the nation's energy needs.

[Question] Franco Reviglio says in effect that Italy is too dependent (80 percent) on foreign countries for its energy, and that this fact makes our economy vulnerable. Do you agree?

[Answer] Yes; this is the main problem. We must reduce as much as possible the nation's dependence on foreign countries with respect to energy sources, whose price fluctuations (suffice it to remember the last two oil shocks) brought our economy to its knees. It is no accident that Japan--a country in many respects similar to ours--is going forward undaunted with its accelerated



program for the construction of nuclear power plants. It does not want to continue to be dependent on petroleum, which is produced for the most part in politically unstable regions and whose price is always unstable.

[Question] But don't you believe that one of the results of the energy conference will in fact be that the role of nuclear power in Italy will be re-dimensioned--that the Energy Plan will be revised along these lines?

[Answer] The role of nuclear energy in our country is under attack. There remains the problem of discovering a possible alternative scenario that will supply energy at low--and also stable--prices, so that companies can program their own costs.

[Question] Naturally, fusion is not included in your scenarios....

[Answer] That's correct. It will come between the years 2020 and 2025, but it too will present some dangerous problems to be solved--problems associated with tritium and a plasma that reaches a temperature of 40 million degrees. But when these problems are solved, the world's energy problem will be solved once and for all.

[Question] How much energy does Italy need to meet the industrial challenge of the other world powers from now until the year 2000?

[Answer] At the present time, in fact, our per capita consumption is half that of the other OECD countries. Conservation is therefore a false problem, a marginal problem; the real danger is recession. Today our annual consumption is 195 billion kilowatt-hours: exactly half the OECD average. If our economy grows--as we hope--at the annual rate of 3 percent of the gross domestic product, that means we shall need 345 billion kilowatt-hours; if it grows at a 2.5 percent rate, 315 billion kwh will unfortunately suffice for us. Considering that we must shut down--because of obsolescence--power plants having a total production of 20 billion kwh, in the first of the two above hypotheses we would have to construct enough plants to meet a need of 170 billion kwh; in the second--the minimum hypothesis--enough plants to produce 140 billion kwh. These forecasts, moreover, have found substantial confirmation in the conclusions reached by the conference.

[Question] In short, we are chasing the European and OECD countries....

[Answer] On the basis of our current programs, it is only in the year 2000 that we shall attain the level of energy consumption that exists today in France, Germany, and Japan--let alone pass anyone in these areas of international comparisons! We can catch up with the other European countries in the year 2025; for the next 45 years we shall merely be chasing Europe.

[Question] In other words, we are a country that is deficient in electric power. But what must be done to catch up without spending too much money?

[Answer] We should, of course, implement whatever role the new Energy Plan assigns to nuclear power. It is not a large role but is better than nothing,

in view of the low costs. We should likewise reduce substantially the consumption of fuel oil, of which we are today the world's largest importers. Moreover, this is a product that pollutes, is expensive, and is subject to constant changes in price for political reasons; and the oil we use is produced primarily in regions that are politically unstable, such as the Middle East. Today, 41 percent of all energy generated in Italy comes from fuel oil; by the year 2000 this figure should be reduced to 15 percent.

[Question] Then there is methane: Italy has been invaded by slogans that sing the praises of this energy source....

[Answer] As for its use in power plants, it is an excellent substance but somewhat wasteful. It's better to use it for heating. We are, however, planning to go from about 13 percent of electric power derived from methane in 1985 (currently, its cost per kwh is comparable to that of fuel oil) to a figure between 8 and 10 percent in the year 2000.

[Question] The key to the future, however, appears to lie with coal--the energy source that will enable us to survive even without having as many nuclear power plants as the Japanese have....

[Answer] That's right. Coal embodies the maximum degree of all the possible advantages. It is present everywhere in the world, and therefore one does not end up being dependent on any particular area. It is not very expensive: it costs, on the average, 40 percent less than fuel oil. If we equip all our coal-fired power plants with scrubbers, power generated by these plants will cost--including the cost of the plants--approximately 80 lire per kwh; coal will therefore always be very competitive vis-a-vis power plants fired by hydrocarbons, whose power costs from 110 to 115 lire per kilowatt-hour. We are therefore assured of a supply of coal (and stable prices for it) for a long time to come, because there is plenty of coal in the world. In Italy today we are producing 15 percent of our electric power through the use of coal; in the year 2000 that figure will be 37 percent (and perhaps even a bit more, if some nuclear power plants are canceled). After we have rendered it absolutely clean, coal will be for us what nuclear power is for Japan.



[Question] But we are forgetting the hydroelectric power plants....

[Answer] They are, in fact, very important: they provide 22 percent of our nation's electric power, but not much can be done in the future other than to make better use of the existing power plants and bring some smaller plants on line that have already been identified.

[Question] And what of the visions for the future? What about solar and wind energy?

[Answer] With regard to solar energy, we carried out an important experiment at Adrano; but we discovered that solar uses twice as much electric energy as it produces. Solar power plants are not logical (except in hot countries such as Israel). With regard to solar panels, in Italy they can be put on roofs, to provide hot water. As for wind energy, we have experimented with it in Sardinia, but it costs 10 times the average for the other forms of energy!

1. Figures 1 and 2. The Problem Stated in Numbers



The top chart shows how many billions of kwh Italy will need between now and the year 2000. The bottom chart shows the cost (in lire per kwh) of the various energy sources. It will be noted that fuel oil is the most expensive energy source, and the nuclear option the most economical.

[Question] According to the "experts" who expressed their opinion at the conference, there is danger of an energy shortage in the near future. But this is also a consequence of the complicated Italian administrative procedures.

[Answer] Today, it takes all of 17 administrative actions to build an electric power plant. Even if the objective is to make a small change, a new building permit is required.

[Question] But it is primarily local governments that block construction of power plants, and not just nuclear power plants....

[Answer] No one has any intention of asking every last municipality in Toscana Region for its consent to build the Sole Freeway. What is needed is a new law that provides for obtaining the views of municipalities, provinces, and regions but that then allows the government--which represents the interests of the entire nation--to decide.


10992

CSO: 3528/112

## BUSINESSMEN EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH EEC MEMBERSHIP

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 21 Mar 87 p 1

[Text] The balance for the first year of Portuguese membership in the EEC is definitely positive in the view of the businessmen and managers who make up the panel organized by EXPRESSO for the purpose of assessing the Portuguese business climate on a monthly basis (see p 15).



The entry of Portugal into the Community produced negative effects in the businesses of only 5 percent of those questioned, while it favored the business activities pursued by two thirds of the members of the panel (54.5 percent term the first 14 months of membership "positive" and 6.9 percent even say "very positive"). About a third of the businessmen admit, however, that their businesses developed during that period of time in a manner "unaffected" by the fact that the country became a Community member with full rights.

Moreover, the business climate improved last month as compared to that in January, to judge from the substantial decline in the number of managers who expressed the view that the situation had worsened.

Business prospects for the next 3 months also show a substantial improvement. The results reported by the panel justify the conclusion that 81 percent of the businessmen and managers expect to expand their activities in the months of March, April and May.

The panel organized by EXPRESSO represents a stable sampling of 50 businessmen from various economic sectors, scattered geographically throughout the country. The members of the panel were chosen with a view to establishing a significant sampling of the Portuguese business network, giving priority, however, to individuals known to be regarded as "leaders of opinion" in their sectors or regions.

5157

CSO:3542/77

## DECLINE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 1986 ANALYZED

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 3 Apr 87 p 16-E

[Text] The large foreign investment projects in Portugal totaled 3.3 million contos in 1986. In 1985, the total reached was 21 million contos. Current accounts have stabilized.

The statistical data on direct foreign investments cannot be accurately compared due to the change in criteria.

The legal concept of foreign investment was changed with the publication of Decree Law No 197-D/86 dated 18 July. "The holding of the power of decision by nonresidents" came to prevail over the approach based on participation in enterprise capital which had previously obtained.

Some operations carried out after the publication of that decree law did not involve the elements pertinent to earlier years. Participation in establishments to the extent of less than 20 percent by nonresidents, acquisition of and increases in the capital of stock companies fall within this category.

On the other hand, as of 1986, indirect participation by nonresident bodies in enterprise capital, considered prior to 1986 as indirect investments, are as of 1986 regarded as foreign investments. But this type of participation has little weight.

A source at the Foreign Investments Institute admits that the "legislative change has led to a slight undervaluation."

The large projects, those with a value in excess of a million contos, only came to 3.3 million contos in 1986, whereas the figure for 1985 had been 21 million (British investments in the Soporcel and Somincor, among others), while that for 1984 was 8.2 million (Ford Lusitana, Chase Manhattan and Manufacturers Hanover).


The current projects, which involve less than a million contos, have remained stable at about 20 million contos per year, as compared to 19.4 million in 1984, 21.4 in 1985 and 21.3 in 1986.

Among the large investments last year, those financed by Swiss and North American capital in Companur stand out, as does the purchase of the Penina Tourist Company by British interests.

#### European Investments

The Western European countries have increased their already considerable share of the foreign investments in Portugal (see chart).

Foreign Investments in Portugal



Key: (1) England, (2) Switzerland, (3) FRG, (4) Spain, (5) France, (6) United States, and (7) others.

Great Britain and Switzerland are the largest investors, accounting for more than a fifth and almost a sixth of the total, respectively.

The development seen for Spain is particularly notable. this country is beginning to emerge as one of the leading investors in Portugal, with an increase in its share from 2 percent in 1984 to 4 percent in 1985 and 11 percent in 1986.

On the other hand, French investments failed to show the dynamism seen earlier, and a substantial decline was also seen in American investments, down from 14.7 percent in 1985 to 7.7 percent in 1986.

#### Tourism Predominant

The investment structure, in a breakdown by type of activity, is characterized by the significant weight of the tertiary sector, with 60 percent of the total investments. Tourism was without a doubt the sector most attractive to foreign investors in 1986, having garnered almost 25 percent of the total.



The primary sector accounted for a limited portion, with a little more than 7 percent, while the processing industries accounted for about 33 percent of the investments. However, this figure showed a considerable reduction in comparison to 1985.


5157

CSO:3542/77

## ECONOMIC INDICATORS CONTINUE TO IMPROVE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20 Mar 87 p 4-E

[Text] The main trends in the Portuguese economic picture continue to develop favorably. But there are some dark spots in the panorama.



Key: (1) February 1986, (2) February 1987, (3) Food and beverages, (4) Clothing and footwear, (5) Housing expenditures, (6) Miscellaneous.

The annual rate of inflation is continuing to decline, being reported last February at 11.1 percent according to the official figures which have now been published by the INE. In comparison to the same month the preceding year, this value showed an inflationary decline of 6.6 points. However, our prices are continuing to rise more than are those of our partners.

Inflation is continuing to slow. However, the prices of clothing and footwear have not ceased to climb at a rapid rate, despite the recent admonitions addressed to businessmen in the sector by the minister of finance.

On the other hand, while prices are declining in Portugal, this is even more true for our partner countries. In February, the monthly increase in inflation was 1.3 percent. In the OECD countries, the average increase in January was 0.4 percent, only a third of that in our country.


The sluggishness of the rental housing market is another factor which merits attention.

The job offer notices, which are showing a significant increase, are more encouraging.

The foreign trade figures for last year brought no surprises. But they nonetheless were good--the rate of coverage of imports by exports (75 percent) was the highest in recent years.

And the decline for the dollar and in the prices of raw materials allowed us to save more than 161 million contos.


#### Forest Products--Prospective Stability



Key: (1) Production, (2) Exports, (3) Wood, (4) Cork bark, (5) Cellulose and paper.

The stabilization of production levels and a slight trend toward increased exports are the main predictions for the first quarter of this year, as revealed by the poll taken by the Forest Products Institute among enterprise heads in this sector.


Public Works--Year Begins Well  
Thousands of Contos Public Works Bids Solicited (in current prices)



Key: (1) January-February 1986, (2) January-February 1987, (3) Bids solicited, (4) Bids awarded.


The value of the public works bids awarded in the first 2 months of the year came to 22,378,000 contos, according to the figures which have now been published by the Association of Construction and Public Works Enterprises of the South (AECOPS). This is almost triple the sum reported for the same period last year, and represents more than half of the total value of the bids awarded during 1986.

Jobs--Offers Set Record



After 2 weeks of apathy, the volume of job offer notices reached its highest point last week, 82.8 percent above the average for last year. The search for jobs also showed an increase, but a more timid one.


### Foreign Trade--Deficit Down in 1986



Key: (1) Imports, (2) Exports, (3) Trade balance.


The foreign trade deficit declined last year by about 5 percent. The figure for the negative balance was 336.5 million contos. And this is one of the main conclusions to be drawn from the provisional Portuguese foreign trade figures for 1986 which have now been published by the INE.

### Houses for Sale--Timid Recovery




During the last week, the volume of advertisements of houses for sale went up to a point slightly above the annual average seen for 1986. On the other hand, the number of houses offered for rent is continuing to decline.

Electricity--Consumption Varying  
Millions Weekly Electricity  
of KWH Consumption



Electrical energy consumption last week totaled 399.1 million KWH, a figure which only partially compensates for the breakdown last week.

Raw Materials--We Bought Cheaper  
Millions of Imports of  
Contos Raw Materials



Key: (1) Grains, (2) Oleaginous crops, (3) Fuels, (4) Organic chemicals, (5) Cotton and (6) Iron and steel.

The value of the six principle raw materials imported during 1986 showed a decline of 26.5 percent from the figure the preceding year, making possible foreign exchange savings equivalent to 161.5 million contos. This basket of products represented about 32 percent of our total national imports last year.

5157

CS0: 3542/77

## LOSSES TO ECONOMY FROM CONTINUING STRIKES DETAILED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Apr 87 pp 60-69

[Article by Gonzalo San Segundo, with information contributed by Luis Diaz Guell, Cruz Sierra, Javier Arce, Ana Martin and correspondents]

[Excerpts] Strikes staged during the first 3 months of the year have cost this country 70 billion pesetas, 10,000 pesetas per taxpayer. The public sector is the source of 3 out of every 4 pesetas lost. This week, Spain will be plagued with disputes. A million workers will go out on strike.


Every year at this time, just before Holy Week, the streets are filled with demonstrations, the factories shut down their machinery and transportation causes millions of Spaniards to curse. In addition, this year high school teachers have given students additional vacation and those students joined in the commotion in the streets resulting from labor disputes. Doctors and other health care personnel affiliated with Social Security have added their own disruptions to patient care.

The health of the Spanish economy has also been affected. During the first 3 months of this year, some 40 million hours of work were lost, nearly double the total for all of 1986. According to trade union experts connected with the Employers Union (CEOE), the National Institute of Industry (INI), the Bank of Spain, the Ministry of Labor and independent experts, the direct harm which strikes have caused the Spanish economy during the first 3 months of the year amounts to 70 billion pesetas, give or take a million, according to the sources consulted.

Those 70 billion pesetas could have been used to create 40,000 jobs or buy two banks such as the Urquijo-Union. With that same money, Spanish Caritas could do its social work for 14 years or, if one prefers, build over 20,000 moderate-income housing units.

The figures used to reach the total of 70 billion pesetas are based on the fact that the average value of production of an hour of work per wage earner in 1987 is 1,750 pesetas. One has but to multiply the 40 million hours of work lost during the first quarter by 1,750 pesetas to obtain the total.

Cost of the Strikes (January-March 1987) (Millions of net pesetas in losses)



Source: Data supplied by enterprises.

However, that total is the direct cost to the Spanish economy caused by strikes during the first months of the year. There are also indirect losses that are practically impossible to quantify.

For example, how is one to evaluate the hours lost by a person who arrives at the office or factory one or several hours late due to the Metro or RENFE strike? How can one quantify the economic harm caused to a businessman or board of directors that loses a commercial deal because of Iberia? How is one to calculate the damage suffered by a hotel owner who sees his hotel half empty because the tourists from a charter flight that AVIACO suspended could not arrive? Such indirect losses "are much greater than the direct losses," the experts consulted agree.

Despite such a high economic cost, half of all Spaniards believe that strikes are the only way to make the government pay attention to the problems" of Spanish society, according to a poll completed by ASEP for CAMBIO 16.

One out of every five persons questioned believes that the strikes "do great harm to the Spanish economy" and 18 percent believe that they are "not very effective" and "only serve to make daily life more difficult" or "serve no purpose at all."

During this week from 6 to 10 April, when tens of thousands of Spanish families are packing their bags for their Holy Week vacations, we shall see once more the purpose of the strikes and whether the government pays heed. During these



5 working days, nearly a million workers, 1 out of every 10 with jobs--based on trade union figures--will be in the street or remain idle on the job.

This week, which some business sources now call "the black quintet" of recent Spanish labor dispute history, will perhaps be one of the most massive and lengthiest in the memory of Spain under democratic rule.

Of the 40 million hours of work lost due to labor disputes during the first quarter of the year, public enterprises and services have originated three-fourths of the total. The cost of these lost hours to the Spanish economy exceeds 52 billion pesetas.

Some Win; Others Lose (Cost of strikes to enterprises; disputes between January and March 1987)

				Coste en millones de pesetas 5)		
Empresa 1)	Días en huelga 2)	Huelguistas (1) 3)	Plantilla 4)	Ingresos 6) no percibidos	Ahorro en gastos (2) 7)	Pérdidas netas 8)
Iberia .....	Dos (3) 9)	30.000	23.000	1.400	250	1.150
Aviaco .....10)	Cuatro (3)(4)	3.500	1.500	163	58	105
Renfe .....	Dos (3)	80.000	63.500	240	267	- 27
Metro Madrid .....	Uno (5) 11)	4.100	6.300	20	10	10
Hunosa .....	Casi todos 12)	300.000	21.000	7.250	6.119 (6)	1.131
Insalud .....	Cinco 13)	130.000	224.000	Insignific.	700	- 700
Universidad (PNN) .....	Diez 14)	50.000	16.000	Insignific.	300	- 300
(1) Se han sumado los participantes en cada huelga. 15)						
(2) Principalmente en salarios. 16)						
(3) Convocadas nuevas huelgas para los días 10 y 15 de abril. 17)						
(4) Incluida huelga del 30-XII-1986. 18)						
(5) Convocadas nuevas huelgas para los días 7 y 10 de abril. 19)						
(6) Incluidos 4.219 millones de pesetas de subvenciones del Estado que no recibirá. 20)						
Fuente: Datos facilitados por las propias empresas y elaboración propia. 21)						

Key:

1. Enterprise 2. Days on strike 3. Strikers (1) 4. Regular staff
5. Cost in millions of pesetas 6. Revenue lost 7. Savings in expenses
8. Net losses 9. Two 10. Four 11. One 12. Nearly all 13. Five
14. Ten 15. The participants in each strike were added together.
16. Mainly in wages. 17. New strikes called for 10 and 15 April.
18. Includes strike of 30 December 1986. 19. New strikes called for 7 and 10 April. 20. Including 4,219,000,000 pesetas in government subsidies it will not receive. 21. Source: Data supplied by the enterprises themselves and our own.

To a great extent, the strikes are also a subject of great concern in the government and a reflection of the confrontation between the government, the Socialist Party and the UGT [General Union of Workers]. But according to the mood in the streets and information from the mass media, the government's main concern is that the labor demands might destroy its economic policy. It would appear that the Executive Branch is less concerned about the strictly social aspect of the strikes.

# What Spaniards Think About the Strikes and Demonstrations (%)

## Warning to the Government

The only way to make the government pay attention to problems	50
Do great harm to the Spanish economy	22
Not very effective and only make daily life more difficult	10
Serve no real purpose	8
Do not know; no response	10

## Students Attract Attention\*

University, high school students	80
Agriculture, rural workers	36
HUNOSA, miners	25
Doctors, health care workers	13
Blue-, white-collar workers, unemployed	7
Professors, teachers	6
MAGEFESA dispute	5
RENFE, Iberia	4
Shipyards, port	3
Iron and steel	3
Do not know; no response	63

\* The sum of percentages exceeds 100 when more than one response is included.

Participation in Latest Strikes or Demonstrations	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
National total	25	75

## Sex

Men	33	67
Women	17	82

## Age

Under 30	43	57
30-49	29	70
50-64	8	92
65 or over	8	92

## Ideology

Left	44	56
Center-Left	33	67
Center	18	81
Center-Right	18	81
Right	14	85

# One Out of Every Two Would Participate in General Strike\*

Yes	40
Depends	32
No	24
Do not know; no response	4

\*On the basis of the 25/100 who claimed to have participated in strikes or demonstrations.

## Type of Demonstrations or Strikes in Which They Participated\*

Labor	43
Student	36
Political	24
Pacifist	23
Social	14

\*On the basis of the 25/100 who claimed to have participated in strikes or demonstrations.

Percentages add up to over 100 when more than one response is accepted.

Sampling: The poll was conducted among 1,200 persons of both sexes 18 and over, residing in Spain. The selection system was that of aleatory routing and final selection using Kish tables. The poll was conducted between 9 and 14 March 1987.

## Year and a Half of Losses in Three Months (Strikes in Public Services, Excluding Enterprises)

Concepto	1986	% total huelgas 1)	Enero-marzo 1987 (1) 2)	% total huelgas 1)
Num. huelgas 3)	182	8,1	85	10
Trab. afectados 4)	1.950.337	52,4	1.500.000	50
Núm. huelguistas 5)	807.326	45	750.000	52
Horas perdidas 6)	21.380.413	42,1	30.000.000	75

(1) Estimación.  
Fuente: CEOE y elaboración propia para 1987. 7)

## Key:

1. % total strikes 2. January-March 1987 3. Number of strikes  
4. Workers affected 5. Number of strikers 6. Hours lost 7. Estimate;  
Source: CEOE and our own figures for 1987.

# Strikes in Public Enterprises (January-March 1987)

Empresa 1)	Días de huelga 2)	Horas perdidas 3)
Astilleros Españoles 4)	1	8.500
Santa Bárbara .....	4	69.494
Forjas y Aceres Reinoso 5)	3,5	44.380
Hunosa 6)	55	275.214
Iberia y Aviaco 7)	2	190.768
Renfe 8)	2	400.000
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>67,5</b>	<b>988.356</b>
Fuente: Datos facilitados por las propias empresas. 9)		

Key:

- Enterprise
- Days of strike
- Hours lost
- Spanish Shipyards
- Reinosa Foundry and Steel
- National Northern Coal Enterprise
- Aviation and Trade Corporation
- Spanish National Railroads
- Source: Data supplied by enterprises

## Strikes in Democratic Spain

Año 1)	Huelgas 2)	Millones huelguistas 3)	% trabajadores afectados 4)	Millones horas perdidas 5)
1977	974	2,31	77	92,52
1978	1.356	3,63	64,5	128,73
1979	1.789	5,75	57,1	171
1980	1.669	2,46	40,9	108,62
1981	2.556	3,35	53,7	74,56
1982	2.582	1,63	33,7	57,83
1983	2.714	2,99	38,5	78,37
1984	3.091	5,49	34,6	122,07
1985	2.029	4,53	29,5	64,18
1986	2.239	1,79	48,2	50,79
1987 6) Enero-marzo 7)	850	1,45	40	40

(1) Estimación  
Fuente: CEOE y elaboración propia para 1987

Key:

- Year
- Strikes
- Millions of strikers
- % workers affected
- Millions of hours lost
- January-March
- Estimate; Source: CEOE and our own figures for 1987.

11,464

CSO: 3548/69

## OUTWARD SUCCESS SEEN HIDING PROFOUND DIFFICULTIES

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 28 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by A.J.R. Soares de Mello]

[Text] In the 1940's and 1950's, it was easy for an air traveler to see where Portugal ended: the end of the tarred road marked the beginning of Spain. And for a few more years, you could tell whether you were in Portugal or Spain just by looking at people's feet: most people in Spain wore sandals instead of shoes.

And by the 1960's, there was another difference: while the cars here in Portugal were new, somewhat luxurious, and well cared for, in Spain they were extremely few, old, and held together with wire.

All of that leads one to think that Spain's economic superiority over Portugal is a recent phenomenon. It is not.

Spain has always constituted a much larger integrated market than our own. That is a vital factor: no matter how advanced national societies may be, if their dimensions are below a given critical mass--and this applies even more to available talent than to number of consumers--it is impossible to carry out certain economic activities economically. Anyone who doubts this should compare India with Iceland. The former, which is one of the least developed nations in the world, has been manufacturing locomotives for 100 years, jet aircraft for 30 years, and atomic bombs for 10 years. Iceland, an extremely developed country, is unable even to manufacture economically the fishing nets it needs to be rich.

It is that critical mass of population which has enabled a society whose stage of culture has never differed much from ours to be almost always more prosperous than we.

Today, Spain is a reputable aerospace manufacturer, shipbuilder, and producer of steel, heavy, medium, and light equipment, energy equipment--including nuclear reactors--heavy and light chemicals, advanced pharmaceutical products, and, in short, all the industrial paraphernalia of an advanced country. Even more important, Spain has an industrial and commercial fabric

of mass consumer goods which is comparable to--and in some cases superior to--that of any other advanced Western economy. It is said that Spain has the biggest seller, purchaser, and producer of ready-to-wear clothing anywhere in the world. Its fishing industry is also one of the world's most advanced and perhaps its most aggressive--even in the literal meaning of that word. The fish distribution network in Spanish territory has no rival.

Isn't the picture we have just painted too rosy? No, it is not. That--plus financial services in one of the fastest-growing stock markets in the world--is the strongly positive side of the current Spanish economy. The worst thing is its negative side.

Spain depends on foreign technology. To a greater extent than--surprise!--the USSR, and to a greater extent than Brazil.

But even worse than the lack of creativity is the lack of quality. Saying that brings a chorus of protests: the canned goods are superb, the ready-to-wear clothing is magnificent, the Airbus wings are excellent, and even the Seat is one of today's most successful automobiles. No doubt, but ask any mechanical engineer to look at the boilers, cranes, nuclear reactors, and big diesel engines Spain produces. And at the finish work in civil construction, the reliability of electrical circuits, the quality of the dyes in textiles, or--and it may be cruel to mention this--the supposedly edible canned oils.

That same lack of quality appears in every country that has industrialized by erecting barriers to keep out foreign imports.

There is another bad consequence of the historical protectionist process of Spanish industrialization: the ludicrous lack of competitiveness in open economic spaces. The comparative cases of Portugal and Spain are revealing in that respect: Portugal, traditionally a country where imports are easy, has increased its industrial exports by joining the European Community, whereas Spain is having to cope with an increase in imports. Worse than that: a year ago, we all feared that there would be an invasion by Spanish products. And that is, in fact, what has happened in those areas where Spain dominates (mass consumer items, food products, ready-to-wear clothing, and raw materials). But in the case of processed goods, the situation has been the reverse. The Spanish customs barriers had scarcely fallen before the rate of cover in our trade deficit with Spain improved noticeably. But those three defects--the lack of creativity, quality, and competitiveness--are structural. Current economic conditions are much more disturbing at the moment.

There is a graph which indicates the health of any national economy at a glance. Its lines form a quadrilateral whose vertices show inflation, unemployment, the growth in national product, and the balance of payments. The larger the area between those lines, the better the economy is doing. The graph for Spain is reduced to one stroke, with no inside area. Worse than that, one of the lines on the graph has crossed to the opposite side and is about to go beyond the line that is supposed to be on that side. Official unemployment stands at 22 percent. More than 50 percent of young people are unemployed. And unemployment in Andalusia may be as high as 40 percent.

It will be said perhaps that the underground economy makes up for that. Does it? Underground economies are difficult to measure, but it is almost certain that the underground economy in Spain is identical to that in Great Britain and far below that in Italy or Portugal. Italy's unemployment rate stands at 14 percent, while ours is below 10 percent.

Wherever we look, Spanish unemployment--the highest in the industrial world--is alarming. It is now reaching levels close to those that existed in the industrial world during the Great Depression of the 1930's. Is anyone still surprised that strong social agitation is beginning to be seen in Spain and that it is making itself felt precisely in those sectors of the population hardest hit by unemployment--young people and students in particular?

But unemployment is not the only area where things are going badly: the poverty index (an artificial but significant indicator which is the sum of the unemployment rate and inflation) is higher in Spain than in any other of the OECD's major economies. It is up to 30 percent; only little Greece exceeds that figure, but not by much.

Economic growth is also extremely slow: less than half our rate of growth and below the European average, which, as we well know, is itself clearly far below what is desirable. The balance of payments and inflation are also worse than the OECD average.

But of all the indicators, perhaps the worst is one which cannot be precisely measured at the moment: it concerns the financial health of the firms. As is true here, Spanish firms have always suffered from undercapitalization. But there the phenomenon is growing worse. Contrary to what good economic sense would suggest and what legislation in some places requires, the banks in Spain are the major stockholders in big industry. In Spain, shaky credit is combined with the danger of shaky investment, if we may be permitted a financial neologism. If we add to that the fact that Spanish banks have lent money to slow-paying Latin American countries, we have a mixture that may become explosive.

Let us hope that it does not.

11798

CSO: 3542/81

## AIR FORCE LOOKS TO REPLACE PERSHING 1A'S WITH 1B'S

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Apr 87 pp 1,2

[Article by Kurt Kister: "Luftwaffe Asks for New Pershings--Federal Security Council to Decide in May on Modernization of Short-Range Weapons"]

[Text] Munich, 12 April--The Federal Security Council will probably decide in May on modernizing of the 72 Pershing 1A's which are part of the present arsenal of the German Luftwaffe. According to an internal study conducted by the defense ministry, the military would like to see the 1A's replaced by the so-called Pershing 1B, a one-stage variant of the medium-range Pershing 2 presently deployed by U.S. forces in Europe. The missile in question has a range of less than 1,000 kilometers. In contrast to the exclusively nuclear Pershing 1A, the 1B is capable of delivering nuclear as well as conventional payloads. According to ministry estimates, total cost of the missiles by 1990 will be about DM 4 billion. The missiles are to be put in service in 1991. Development and procurement costs are likely to be included in the 1989 Bundeswehr budget. In a first comment on the subject to SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, SPD defense expert Erwin Horn termed the project an attempt "to torpedo nuclear arms control."

The defense ministry study on which the Security Council decision-making process is based underlines the continued importance "of nuclear delivery systems in order to preserve Germany's voice in NATO nuclear decisions." The FRG, the study concludes, cannot relinquish any components capable of "influencing nuclear policy." In addition to nuclear-capable aircraft, these components include the Pershing 1A missiles. The Luftwaffe presently maintains 72 of these missiles (with a range of up to 750 kilometers) in readiness in two missile squadrons. The nuclear warheads which go with these missiles are U.S. property. The military consider the Pershing 1A's to be technically obsolete and not target-accurate enough. For another thing, the supply of spare parts is expected to present problems a few years hence.

The defense ministry study obtained by SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG deals in some detail with the question of why the Bundeswehr should have a ballistic missile capable of carrying conventional warheads such as the Pershing 1B for the first time ever. The rationale behind it is not only to comply with the NATO decision to strengthen the conventional combat effectiveness of its armed forces but also the plan to replace the Luftwaffe's aircraft with target-



accurate systems. Still another reason given in the study is that there is a need "to increase efforts on behalf of FOFA," i.e. the Rogers follow-on forces attack Plan designed to provide NATO with the capability of engaging the second echelon of attacking forces.

The Luftwaffe is opposed to having aircraft assume the operational responsibilities presently assigned to the Pershing 1A's. "Assigning additional nuclear targets" to e.g. the Tornado aircraft for would cut into conventional capability. The procurement of additional combat aircraft is out of the question for material, financial and manpower reasons. The military planners also believe that replacing the Pershing 1A's with cruise missiles or some variation of the French "Hades" missile would not serve the purpose. According to the study, the advantage of the Pershing 1B is that (due to the existence of the Pershing 2) it already includes all the pertinent components which saves both time and money. The missile can also be developed onward for "conventional operations."

SPD Bundestag deputy Erwin Horn termed the defense ministry project "a first step toward a new armament program." Horn was particularly critical of the fact that the project is being launched at the very time that negotiations on the zero option are going on in Geneva. Horn also said it is dangerous to "obscure the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons" which throws an obstacle in the way of arms control and verification. For still another thing, the Pershing 1B is tantamount to acceptance of the FOFA concept which the SPD "rejects because it is destabilizing and cannot be paid for."

In response to a query by SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, a defense ministry official stated that the upgrading of the Pershing 1A had already been discussed by the socialist-liberal coalition government in the summer of 1982. Thus far, neither the defense ministry, nor the Federal Security Council has made a decision on the matter. In view of the time schedule involved, the ministry spokesman said, it is easy to see that the replacement for the Pershing 1A has "absolutely nothing" to do with the ongoing medium-range missile debate. In addition, all appropriate parliamentary committees have continuously been kept informed about the Bundeswehr plan and "the indications of a possible modernization program which are a part of it."

9478

CSO: 3620/208

## POLL REVEALS MAJORITY WISH CLOSURE OF U.S. BASES

Athens I AVGI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 12 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Bambis Papapanagiotou]

[Text] When the recent Greek-Turkish crisis was at its highest point, at midnight on Friday, 27 March, the government announced, almost triumphantly, the "closing" of the Nea Makri base. There were many who wondered "where Andreas is going," while not a few acknowledged in the government's "decision" a "bold and nationally proud" stance. Of course, there were those who with uneasiness wondered, "And now what will we do without bases?" And those who took off, "as if...ready for some time," and went out to the streets of Nea Makri, celebrating that "the bases are leaving."

Very quickly, however, nearly all of them were about to find out that shining that night in the sky of Nea Makri was a very showy fireworks display which, like all fireworks displays, soon was extinguished, leaving behind the "dark sky" of Greek-U.S. negotiations for the future of the bases, leaving behind the talks on the bases which, according to some information, have already begun or, according to other, will begin any time. With their apparent ending in a new agreement which will renew the U.S. military presence on our soil.

Of course, the "bases issue" is considered one of the paramount issues open for "bluffs" since it is all a "flagrant game." However, in any case, public opinion and the correlations of forces formed in favor of the removal or maintenance of the bases will probably be one of the most determinative factors for the form and content of the government's final decisions.

For this reason, public opinion acquires increased importance under the given conditions.

What do the inhabitants of Athens, Piraeus and Perikhora--the parties' supporters--say, however? Let us see, through the conclusions of a poll conducted by "Evrodin" in these areas on 19-29 October 1986 and 6-16 February 1987, which I AVGI exclusively is publishing today.

For many years there have been military bases for U.S. planes and ships in Greece. Today, some people are seeking for these bases to leave. Do you think the U.S. bases should:

	Leave	Leave in a few years	Leave right now	No answer
TOTAL (in percentages)	39	25	30	6
1985 Vote				
ND	75	11	7	7
PASOK	20	42	32	6
KKE(INT)	25	18	57	0
KKE	1	14	83	2

In 1988, the agreement for these bases ends. In your opinion, the PASOK government is determined to:

	Expel all the bases then	Maintain only some	Maintain all the bases	No answer
TOTAL (in percentages)	9	29	47	15
1985 Vote				
ND	3	16	68	13
PASOK	15	37	30	18
KKE(INT)	4	46	43	7
KKE	9	33	46	12

For many years there have been military bases for U.S. planes and ships in Greece. Do you think the U.S. bases should:

(in percentages)	Feb 1987	Oct 1986	May 1986	Nov 1985	Jun 1985	Apr 1984	Oct 1983
Stay	39	37	39	38	40	27	23
Leave	55	61	61	60	58	72	75
No Answer	6	2	0	2	2	1	2

#### "We Say No" to the Bases

Only 39 percent of those questioned were in favor of the bases staying while 55 percent were in favor of the bases' removal, either immediately (30 percent) or "in a few years" (25 percent). Six percent gave no answer to the question "yes or no" on the bases.

As emerges from the poll's comparative tables, since 1983, the percentage of those in favor of the bases staying has increased 16 percent, while those in favor of their removal have decreased 20 percent. Catalytic to these changes

apparently is the effect of the "adaptation" of PASOK's policy which passed gradually from the bases' removal "here and now" and discussion about a "zero base," ending in the realization-"speculation," "maybe closing the bases will harm our country economically and defensively"....

A clear majority in favor of the bases staying exists only among ND adherents (75 percent), while among KKE backers there is an even clearer majority in favor of the bases' immediate removal (83 percent). In contrast, both PASOK and KKE(Int) supporters give more split answers. Twenty percent of PASOK adherents are in favor of maintenance, 42 percent support removal "in a few years" and 32 percent are in favor of immediate closure. Fifty-seven percent of KKE(Int) adherents want immediate closure, 18 percent favor removal "in a few years" and 25 percent are in favor of the bases staying.

It is worth pointing out--as emerges from the comparative tables--that since June 1985:

1. ND supporters in favor of the bases staying have decreased (by 18 percent).
2. PASOK adherents in favor of the bases staying have doubled (from 10 to 20 percent).
3. KKE supporters in favor of the immediate removal of the bases have remained almost stable, with a small decrease from 86 to 83 percent.
4. Totally (from all the parties), those supporting the immediate closure have increased--comparatively--(from 21 to 30 percent) and the more "compromising," or the "realists," who prefer the removal of the bases "in a few years" have decreased (from 37 to 25 percent).

#### What Will PASOK Do?

The answers of those questioned concerning what they think the government is determined to do are interesting.

Only 9 percent believe it "will expel all" the bases, 29 percent believe it will maintain some, 47 percent believe it "will maintain them all", while 15 percent did not answer, expressing their perplexity in view of the "ambiguity" or..."unexpectedness" which characterize the prime minister's choices.

It emerges from the poll's comparative charts that, since May 1985, those who believe that PASOK will expel all the bases have decreased quite a bit (from 31 to 9 percent). Also, those who believe that it will maintain only some of the bases have decreased (from 42 to 29 percent), while those who believe it will maintain all the bases have increased (from 23 to 47 percent)--all showing an admirable adaptability to the changes in the government's policy.

Concerning their party, PASOK adherents believe: Thirty-seven percent, that it will maintain some, 30 percent that it will maintain all, and only 15 percent that it will expel all of the bases.

Sixty-eight percent of ND supporters believe it will maintain all the bases, 16 percent, some of them, and 3 percent think it will expel all of them.

Conversely, 46 percent of KKE adherents believe that it will maintain all the bases, 33 percent some of the bases, and 9 percent think it will expel all the bases.

It is clear that those who believe all of the bases will leave are now the fewest in number. Moreover, those who did believe it (mainly PASOK voters) seem to be coming down to earth since those PASOK adherents who think all the bases will be removed have decreased from 49 to 15 percent.

If "The National Security Is In Danger?"

The opinion of those questioned, in the case that "the government ascertains in 1988 that the bases' removal will harm the country's national defense," is shown to be pretty different.

Bypassing the seriousness of a realization which occurs "at midnight," let us look at the answers.

In this case, 66 percent believe that the government must keep the bases, 27 percent remain unchanged and insist upon the bases being removed, while 7 percent have a difficult time answering.

The significance of the above question from the "Evrodin" poll, as well as the answers, is great. Because all the signs lead to the conclusion that PASOK (signing a new agreement) will seek the least cost (if not benefits) by playing the "card" of national security and probably economic stability.

Furthermore, a forerunner of such a thing is the prime minister's speech before the debate on the agenda in the Chamber on foreign policy on 23 January, that is between the two sections of the poll.... How, however, do the adherents of the parties react to such a possibility?

Fifty-eight percent of the PASOK supporters would, in this case, agree to the bases staying, while 89 percent of ND adherents, 28 percent of KKE supporters and 64 percent of KKE(Int) backers would agree. Those who, in a case of "danger for the national security," would agree with the bases staying have increased 12 percent between the two sections of the survey (October 1986 and February 1987).

If the bases' maintenance is associated with the national security, the majority would be in favor of the bases' removal only in the KKE (62 percent), despite the fact that in this party those supporting keeping the bases increased 21 percent. All these, of course, without the stance chosen by the parties' leaderships being taken into account.

At any rate, it is becoming clear that, while the majority of those questioned are clearly in favor of the bases' removal (55 percent) (either immediately or later), it is transformed into a stronger majority (66 percent) in favor of the bases staying when this is associated with danger for the national security.

Certainly, such behavior on the part of the electoral body facilitates the already apparent choices of the government. But the effectiveness of invoking such dangers in the "critical period," that is, when the new bases agreement will be signed, cannot be considered in advance a given. Just as "bluffs" are anything but excluded in the political game. And this is tending, more and more, to become commonly known...at a point, in fact, when the myth of the "boy who cried wolf" is acquiring a tragic timeliness, after the "clever maneuvers," the "disputes" and, of course, the machinations which are admitted to in..."the highest arena of politics." Just like, let us say, the "closing" of the Nea Makri base....

It is shown by the "Evrodin" poll that, if the immediate removal of the bases is infeasible (because, for example, of the correlation of forces or economic encumbrances), "political reflexes" do exist. It is enough that it is about this and not "something else." And, above all, that the people are expressing an opinion after being given the complete facts of the problem. And, of course, that it is becoming clear that the choices which are made are in the direction of forming the prerequisites for definitely removing the U.S. bases....

9247

CSO: 3521/109

END

37

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated. Those from English-language sources are transcribed, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names which are rendered phonetically or transliterated by FBIS/JPRS are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source.

## SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in 8 volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Africa (Sub-Sahara), Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically. Current JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcovers or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. DOD consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate

command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.) For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (703) 527-2368, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.