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THE NATIONAL GUARD AND CHALLENGES OF 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE

BY

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DEFENSE

by

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ABSTRACT

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America's National Guard has been an integral part of her defense for over 360 years. Coming into its own by law and extensive use during the 20th century, it now stands on the threshold of the 21st struggling again for its survival and the right to be a full partner with the Regular Army.

Questioning its relevance in the modern concept of short, high-tech wars envisioned by the Army, the large combat formations remaining in the Guard, particularly its 8 divisions, are seen as too big, too hard to train, and too long to deploy to be of any use in projected war plans. This assertion, despite the huge increase in commitments of a drawn-down Army and the warnings of responsible authorities within and outside the military, is the crux of the debate now raging over the Guard's future.

The premise of this paper is that America cannot afford to cut the National Guard combat capability. A sufficiently large and well-equipped combat reserve is necessary to counter threats to our national security and interests. While a smaller, hightech Regular Army is postulated as the force of the future and able to handle any eventuality; what if it's not?

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THE NATIONAL GUARD AND CHALLENGES OF 21ST CENTURY

DEFENSE

The only probable means of preventing hostility for any length of time, from being exempted from the consequent calamities of War, is to put the National Militia in such a condition that they appear respectable in the Eyes of our Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies.

--General George Washington,

Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 1783

As the new millennium dawns, the active duty armed forces of the United States will have shrunk by 33% from their 1990 level. The Army will have taken the biggest loss at 36% while its reserve components will shrink by a quarter.¹ The scramble to secure a national "peace dividend", as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and her conventional offensive military capability, has led to cuts in defense spending not seen since the late 1940s. The largest service, the Army, has been the target of choice to absorb the brunt of the defense drawdown. In 1990, the active Army boasted over 751,000 troops and eighteen divisions. The Army National Guard fielded 437,000 troops, ten divisions, and a plethora of separate brigades organized into combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units spread throughout the country.² As defense funds have been cut back and force structure reduced, the Army leadership has consistently and aggressively proposed cuts in the Army Guard, that are not proportional to Regular Army reductions. This assault on National Guard force structure has been only partially successful, due primarily to the intervention of the traditional Guard ally, the United States Congress.

This paper will address some of the underlying problems in the relationship between the Regular Army and its principal combat reserve, the Army National Guard. It will focus predominantly on the necessity of maintaining and even strengthening this vital component of our nation's defense. The level and intensity of debate on this issue makes it difficult to subordinate emotional rhetoric, but this paper will provide an objective appraisal of the facts regarding the Guard's role as a key component of the Total Force, coupled with carefully considered opinions of the future of America's defense establishment.

The National Guard is stipulated by the 1933 amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916 as the primary reserve of the Army.³ Having a robust reserve gives the National Command Authority (NCA) flexibility in the employment of forces whether the mission is offensive or defensive in nature. At the strategic level, any force, regardless of how well manned, equipped, and trained,

operates at a disadvantage without an adequate reserve. This is why the maintenance of a strong National Guard is so important.

The wars of the 20th century have consistently found America and her armed forces unprepared. In World Wars I and II, the National Guard was able to field 17 and 18 divisions respectively at the beginning of the conflicts.⁴ These large bodies of manpower, though spartanly equipped and unevenly trained, were able to immediately bolster the regular Army and contribute to the nation's war readiness much sooner than if the country had been compelled to wait for the products of the conscription process.

On the eve of World War I, the regular Army numbered less than 200,000 men. The mobilization of the Guard's 17 divisions immediately doubled the Army's strength. 40% of the American Expeditionary Force to France was comprised of Guard divisions and three of the first five divisions to enter combat were National Guard. After the war, the German General Staff named eight of the toughest U.S. divisions they faced; six were National Guard.⁵ World War I, the first big test of the viability of the National Guard as an American defense institution, was a resounding success.

American isolationism followed World War I. With its accompanying lean defense budgets, the stage was set for a repeat of our World War I unpreparedness. The active component was only slightly larger than the Army of 1917. The call-up of the 18

Guard divisions in late 1940 and early 1941 again doubled its size in short order. This major infusion of manpower provided the nation with a still comparatively small but viable force as the country entered World War II.

After Pearl Harbor, some of the first U.S. Army units to deploy overseas were National Guard. By late 1944, the induction of volunteers and the draft had enlarged the Army to 89 divisions, most of whom had never seen combat. Meanwhile, many Guard divisions had been fighting for over two years in the Pacific and Mediterranean.⁶ At war's end, there was no question that the Guard divisions and other combat formations had played a significant role in the Allied victory. There was no argument about "relevance."

Demobilization after World War II was rapid and debilitating, especially to the Army. The dawn of the nuclear age, so it was believed, had made land armies practically obsolete. Indeed, the bulk of what was left of the Army was pulling occupation duty in Germany and Japan in the late 1940s.

At no other time this century does our current military situation so approximate itself as the period immediately preceding the Korean War. As that conflict suddenly erupted in 1950, the regular Army was composed of 10 understrength divisions. The Navy and the newly designated Air Force had been judged to be the new decisive arms of national power, capable of handling any potential military rivals as well as greatly

increasing U.S. deterrent capabilities.⁷ With our near monopoly on nuclear weapons, jet aircraft, and the largest fleet on earth, the U.S. was indeed a formidable-*looking* adversary. Unfortunately, the North Koreans, whose primary, high tech weapon in June 1950 was the T-34 Soviet tank, were not deterred by the American arsenal. They preferred to wage war the traditional way; on the ground with thousands of infantry and World War II vintage armor. They very nearly succeeded in driving hastily deployed American troops and their South Korean allies into the sea.

This attack by North Korea again necessitated the Army's rapid expansion. Though greatly reduced in size after 1945, the Guard and its divisions were available for deployment to Korea. Their mission had not changed; to provide wartime flexibility to the Commander in Chief and as a hedge against unforeseen world developments. Four National Guard divisions were mobilized in September 1950 and four more were called up during the course of the war.⁸ The strategic hedge had again proven its worth.

The experience in Korea did not significantly alter the strategy of reliance on nuclear weapons as the Soviets still maintained a huge, heavily mechanized Army. In the years after the Korean Armistice of 1953, the Army began to focus on a simple factor - technology - as the principal determinant of how future wars would be fought.⁹ Doctrine, tactics, and training at all

levels underwent rapid and profound changes as new weapons and supporting technologies proliferated.

The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 brought a new and dramatic shift from the "New Look" defense strategy of the Eisenhower administration that had relied heavily on nuclear deterrence. President Kennedy appointed Robert S. McNamara, a statistical expert and president of Ford Motor Company, as his Secretary of Defense. One of his first steps was the elimination of four Guard and three Reserve divisions and by May 1963 Secretary McNamara had trimmed 416 units of various size from the National Guard roster.¹⁰

Retained by Lyndon Johnson when President Kennedy was assassinated, Secretary McNamara dropped a bombshell at a press conference in December 1964. He announced his plan to merge the Army Reserve into the National Guard and reduce all reserves from 700,000 to 550,000. He also intended to cut the number of units from 8100 to 6000 including the inactivation of 15 Guard and 6 Reserve divisions.¹¹

The fierce opposition to this plan, aided by McNamara's arrogance at congressional hearings, succeeded in quashing it in the Appropriations Act for the 1966 Fiscal Year.¹² With the war in Vietnam heating up, the Defense Secretary gave up his "merger" idea. It is interesting to note that in 1967, he proposed shifting all Reserve combat units to the Guard, a proposal that met the same fate as the merger plan. For many of the same

reasons, however, this plan was resurrected and carried out a quarter century later.

No appreciable numbers of National Guardsmen (and certainly no divisions) were mobilized for the Vietnam Conflict due to political considerations. For President Johnson, his "Great Society" program with its emphasis on domestic policies was his priority. To mobilize the nation by calling up units from hometown America to fight in an increasingly unpopular, undeclared, and unending war could totally destroy the political base of the political party in power. By the time of the 1968 national elections, this base was seriously eroded even without the Guard factor. It should be noted here that the Defense Department did create a Selected Reserve Force (SRF) at the end of 1965 that would include over 115,000 Guardsmen a year later. This fully manned and equipped force drilled twice as often as traditional Guard units. With the exception of two infantry brigades mobilized in 1968, the SRF was permitted to die a quiet death by the end of 1969, a victim of funding cutbacks and readiness issues.¹³

In the years after Vietnam, Army manpower was cut in half to 750,000 active duty soldiers. With Cold War antagonisms showing no signs of abating, the Total Force Policy, as promulgated by then Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, opened a new and enlightened era of cooperation and reliance, if not total respect, between the

Army's components.¹⁴ The Roundout Program (whereby understrength active duty divisions were "rounded out" by National Guard brigades) coupled with real wartime missions to the Guard divisions, for the first time made the National Guard full partners in America's defense in the absence of a shooting war. This "One Army" concept, while perhaps not totally accepted by the Regulars or the National Guard, made for a generally peaceful coexistence from the mid-1970s until the outbreak of the Gulf War. While difficult to quantify, there is no doubt that the Soviets, Chinese, and North Koreans fully took into account the robustness of National Guard forces in their Cold War order of battle analyses.¹⁵

The call-up of National Guard roundout brigades for Operation Desert Shield was delayed by the Army leadership, who initially complained of difficulties with the Selective Reserve call-up law i.e., the Guard brigades could only be activated for 90 days with a presidential option to extend the period of active duty another 90 days. The Army felt this time frame to be totally inadequate should the crisis drag on for any appreciable period. As events unfolded, this "war stopper" appears to have been merely a subterfuge to deny the Guard the opportunity to prove that the roundout program was viable. The enlightened policies initiated by General Abrams and the One Army concept were shattered by the replacement of these brigades by less qualified and hastily organized active Army formations.¹⁶ Had these units faced

immediate combat, the results could have been disastrous. When three Guard roundout brigades were eventually called, they were subjected to Army-induced public humiliation through innuendo and selectively damaging criticism about their training performance. These damning tactics have continued throughout this decade wiping out the progress of General Abrams' policies and breeding unprecedented suspicion and tension between the Army and the National Guard.

The Guard believes, with considerable justification, that had National Guard maneuver units performed as well or better than their active Army counterparts (as did the Guard artillery units belatedly mobilized just prior to the commencement of the ground war), America would return to its traditional posture of a small, professional Army backed up by a larger, but highly capable The Army was not willing to take that risk. In fact, reserve. in the aftermath of the Gulf War, then Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, announced to Congress that it would take a year to prepare a National Guard division for combat.¹⁷ Sadly, this 365-day misperception lives on, even in exercises at the Army War College where reserve component integration has been a priority.¹⁸ To further aggravate the message, Sullivan claimed the Army could organize, train, and deploy a division from scratch in less time than that. Since the Cold War planning standard for deploying a National Guard division was 180 days,

the Guard community and its supporters were outraged by this premise flippantly delivered by the Army's senior officer.

Unconvinced of General Sullivan's assertion and concerned by the increasingly strident criticisms of National Guard combat forces by the active Army, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs took action. In early 1996, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) was contracted to determine how long it would take for a National Guard division to mobilize, train, and deploy to an overseas combat theatre ready to conduct combat operations.¹⁹ The largest and most complex division in the National Guard force structure was selected for this study; the 49th Armored Division of Texas. As the Guard's only armored division, the premise was that it would take longer to mobilize, train, and deploy this unit than any other comparably sized Guard organization. The seven-month study, completed in January 1997, showed that the 49th had the intrinsic ability to train to validated readiness status in 94 days and deploy in theatre in 132 days.²⁰ The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations politely received this study with the caution that one had to be careful with numbers.²¹

The most significant caveats to the report's conclusions involved the Army's provision of necessary resources to accomplish required training and overseas transport. In their closing remarks, the authors' state:

Training and deployment data is important, and the study by the 49th Armored Division puts a mark on the

wall that has not been there before. Perhaps the real significance is not how many days it takes a Guard division to become ready to fight, but that it can be done fast enough to change the issue focus to one of adequate support and resource availability.²²

To add credence to the Institute's findings, Philip Gold, a respected and well-credentialed defense expert, has

editorialized:

There is no inherent reason the Guard cannot perform adequately across the range of its missions. The Marine Corps and Air Force have demonstrated what can be accomplished when reserves are *treated as assets not rivals* (emphasis added). In short, the Guard's proficiency is limited only by resources and creativity - and by a standing Army that, for reasons of its own, prefers not to acknowledge it.²³

In the present era of stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and "smart" bombs it is easy to draw parallels with the '50s political disdain for land power with its potential for largescale casualties and financial expense. However, as the Persian Gulf War so aptly demonstrated, air and naval power acting alone, or even in concert, is still no substitute for the often messy business of engaging the enemy up close and personal with tanks, artillery, and infantry. The physical occupation of an enemy's territory, despite all of the modern technology, is still the best way to impose your will on your adversary. To accomplish an occupation requires troops on the ground whether in the execution or aftermath of a major theatre war, in peacekeeping operations, or in support of treaty commitments (such as NATO). Nothing demonstrates national resolve more clearly than a country's deployment of its army to seize, guard, or garrison foreign

territory. Where are the troops to execute this real as well as potentially expansive mission? According to COL (Ret) Harry G. Summers:

The active military today, cut to the bone and deployed on peacekeeping operations around the world, could not begin to accomplish its assigned wartime mission of defending two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously without massive help from the reserves.²⁴

The threat to our national security did not collapse with the Berlin wall. The precipitous decline in the size and lethality of Soviet conventional forces followed closely by the fragmentation of that once monolithic communist state has reduced, but not eliminated the threat of a major war in Europe. In Russia for example, there is stated evidence that the rapid decline, both in numbers and quality, in its conventional forces has made the resort to nuclear weaponry, with its global consequences, more probable than before.²⁵

Meanwhile, many states of the former Soviet Union, as well as her satellite countries of the Warsaw Pact have gone their own way in the world. Few of them have the economic, political, or military wherewithal on their own to pose a significant threat to world peace. Many are actually doing their best to embrace western capitalism, western military principles, and western democracy. Under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace program, the National Guards of several states have even "adopted" east European militaries. Examples include Texas and

the Czech Republic, Pennsylvania and Lithuania, and California and the Ukraine.²⁶

The National Guard is involved more internationally today than they have ever been in peacetime. There are just not enough troops with the required skills in the Regular Army to devote to the important, but non-crucial tasks associated with interacting with foreign militaries. Increasingly, the Army is having to reevaluate its missions throughout the world and conduct risk and fiscal analysis on their level of participation.²⁷ The recent National Defense Panel report even recommended turning over the entire mission of the Army in SOUTHCOM to the National Guard.²⁸

The Army is becoming increasingly pressed for resources in its involvement with domestic support operations, termed civil military relations. In its search to justify its force structure and therefore, by default, its budget, the Army is making a strong play for a greater role in domestic disaster training and response. In 1996, Congress gave the Defense Department \$52 million to conduct the nation's largest civil defense effort since the Cold War. Essentially, the program was designed for the military to train emergency workers in 120 cities to cope with a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attack. While local officials conceded that these DOD officers were experts in the field, these same officers had no concept of working in a non-military environment. They had to be reminded that civilians, in this case fire, police, and other emergency

personnel, do <u>not</u> work for the military.²⁹ This distinction has always been very clear to the National Guard. In most communities, bonds of trust forged by years of interaction have created an environment where cooperation and sensitivity to local lines of authority are understood and respected.

It is highly doubtful that the off-and-on presence of the federal military will ever supplant the long term state and local reliance on the Guard. Besides, the Army does not have the resources to do this. The huge deactivation of Guard units sought by the Army, particularly the Guard divisions, would significantly impact on civil military operations with potentially highly detrimental consequences. Recognizing this, the National Defense Panel, in its report to the Secretary of Defense in December 1997, noted that the Guard, with units in 3200 communities "...will not only provide the United States with a more effective deterrent, but it also will provide a quicker and more comprehensive response to crises should they occur."30 The obvious implication is that the Guard will be needed even more now in the cause of homeland defense. To accomplish this enhanced traditional mission will require more, not fewer Guardsmen.³¹

Despite the validation that Guard combat divisions could be deployed in a far shorter time frame than predicted by General Sullivan, in March 1996 the Army unveiled a unique plan that called for the creation of two new "divisions". These units

would each be comprised of three National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERBs) under an active component division headquarters.³² At this time, there appears to be no provision for a division artillery component or division support command. Ostensibly, the objective is to enhance the training efficiency of the ERBs with no intent to ever deploy them as integrated divisions, although that eventuality is certainly within the realm of possibility. This initiative, which includes the conversion of twelve National Guard combat brigades to combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units, has the approval of the National Guard community. This program will include the elimination of the combat capability of two Guard divisions. While these two divisions will retain their division headquarters, it is clear that, like the integrated AC/ERB divisions, these are not designed to be deployable as entities. The bottom line is that National Guard combat structure is being reduced from 42 to 30 brigade equivalents, including the 15 ERBs.

This compromise will alleviate CS/CSS shortfalls in the active component and demonstrates the Guard's willingness to address critical, current national defense issues. It is also an acknowledgement that the reserve component will absorb its fair share of the defense drawdown cutbacks. The question, which can only be answered by the passage of time, is is this a prudent course? It can only be hoped that the prognosticators at the seat of national power are correct in their assurances that

global war or the emergence of military "peer" competitors is unlikely for the next decade, maybe two.³³

Getting past the rhetoric of who's ready and who's not, the efficacy of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP) reports, and the accompanying vitriolic attacks between the Army and the National Guard, the issue comes down to money. Shrinking defense budgets throughout the 1990s and into the foreseeable future have generated much of the unpleasantness and acrimony between the Armed Services and, in the Army's case, between them and the National Guard.

As noted earlier, the Guard has been successful in avoiding large cuts in its force structure by offering to convert almost 30% of its combat forces to less expensive CS/CSS units. An interesting note is that all eight of the current National Guard divisions operate for the cost of <u>one</u> active Army division. The Guard budget for its divisions in FY 1997 was \$1.4 billion. The entire Army Guard received only \$5.5 billion in funding during the same period. These figures represent 1/2 of 1% and 2% of the DOD budget respectively.³⁴ For a force that provides over half the combat power, nearly half of the combat support and a quarter of the combat service support in the total Army for just 9% of the Army budget, this is a pretty good deal.³⁵

Cost efficiency has long been a hallmark of National Guard economics. It is this economic fact, coupled with a myriad of tangible and intangible assets, that has won for the Guard a

large and influential following in the United States Congress. With its strong ties to local and state governments, the Guard, working through its membership and state and national associations, has been a very effective voice in cementing its constitutional role with national lawmakers. This relationship has helped insulate the Guard from draconian cuts and detrimental shifts in policy perpetuated by the Army leadership. Given the Army's dismal track record in combating or undermining this special kinship, dramatic changes contrary to Guard interests are unlikely. Therefore, current Army attempts to finance modernization of the active force at the expense of the Guard, while still at issue, will probably not succeed.

Current national defense structure is based on the Armed Services' ability to fight and win two major regional contingencies (MRCs-recently revised to major theatre wars-MTWs) erupting almost simultaneously on opposite sides of the globe.³⁶ This strategy has come under considerable scrutiny and criticism. A single MTW is postulated to require five Army divisions, according to a very highly placed guest speaker at the Army War College.³⁷ Should the two MTW scenario indeed develop *and* the Army is doing anything else, like peacekeeping operations *and/or* the situation requires more troops *or* takes longer than expected, the math has us coming up short very quickly. In addressing this force structure inadequacy, COL (Ret) Harry Summers observes, "By claiming to be able to do what in fact it is unable to do, the

United States is not only bluffing - a most dangerous thing to do - but even worse, it is kidding itself into a false sense of security."³⁸

The DOD Annual Report for 1996 states that "...in the event of unforeseen circumstances, such as a failed initial defensive effort, more forces could be committed. These additional forces would come principally from the reserves."³⁹

These views, shared by diverse voices in the political as well as defense communities, argue well for a strong, combatcapable reserve that can insure the success of the National Military Strategy. The attempted dismantling of this capability, to save what amounts to small change in the Pentagon, is both misguided and dangerous.

To illustrate this danger are two excerpts from recent articles in the U.S. Army War College quarterly, *Parameters*. Commenting on the results of the Gulf War and their implications for the future, LTG Paul Van Riper and MG Robert H. Scales wrote:

But the military forces which won that war had been built to fight another, and in that fact there is a stern warning for today's planners. In an uncertain world, we dare not base force requirements on preconceived assumptions about whom we might fight in Instead, American military the next century or how. able to fight and forces win on must be any battlefield, under any conditions, and with whatever means the nature of the contest requires. And to do that, America will need robust, well-equipped, and sustainable land combat capabilities as far ahead as we can foresee.40

Under the title,"21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths", Charles Dunlap states Myth #2 as, "We can safely downsize

our military in favor of smaller, highly trained forces equipped with high-technology weapons."⁴¹ Convincingly describing a future, hostile world where advanced technology is coupled with minimal skills and education, he concludes that, "...with adversaries armed with technology similar or even superior to ours, success in 21st century land warfare may depend upon the sheer numbers of combatants engaged."⁴²

Thus, knowledgeable voices in our defense community are very aware of the shortfalls in a technologically advanced but numerically weak combat force. As these fundamental questions continue to be raised by experienced active component officers and informed journalists, perhaps the idea of eliminating the strategic insurance policy provided by the Guard combat formations will be reconsidered.

Beyond employment in their traditional role as the combat back up for the Regular Army or performing state duties under the orders of their governor, other potential missions are looming for National Guard combat forces. Besides the obvious shortage of active component forces to perform them, there are other high profile, important missions that are well suited to National Guard participation. Among these are peacekeeping, the war on drugs, and border security.

As this paper is written, numerous National Guard units are serving and have served in Bosnia since 1995. Other Guard CS/CSS

units and individual volunteers have served in the numerous humanitarian missions the Army has undertaken during this decade.

With a good part of the developing world in various stages of tumult, the global requirement for American attention, to include American forces, shows no signs of subsiding. The Army, with some justification, does not regard peacekeeping as a good use of its dwindling and already over-committed combat units.⁴³ But, they appear to be unwilling to give up these missions in favor of the Guard. A good example is the Multi-National Observer Force (MNF) in the Sinai. Although an extremely quiet assignment and despite the success of a recent combined AC/RC battalion for this mission, the impression is that any cutback of AC missions will cost the Army dearly in terms of budget and political leverage. Meanwhile, their harried troops continue to bounce from one hardship tour to another...and leave the Service in great numbers.⁴⁴

These two highly visible and manpower intensive missions (Bosnia and MNF) have been declared open-ended American commitments, which are likely to continue well into the 21st century. We continue to add to the list places like Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Central Africa, and Southwest Asia. The majority of these are, or easily can be, scenes of long term American military presence. If we are to maintain our national security strategy of global engagement, the increased use of National Guard soldiers will soon become obligatory. The

deployment to Bosnia in late 1997 of a Virginia National Guard infantry company, the first such unit to be sent to an imminent danger area since Vietnam, may have already signaled the acceptance of this necessity.

Working with citizens and local governments is natural for the Guard. One of the best things the Army could do for itself and to begin repairing the Army vs. National Guard rift is to lobby for more active participation of Guard units in all but the most explosive peacekeeping missions it currently shoulders. National Guard combat units, properly trained and then deployed for a six to nine month tour of duty, would certainly take advantage of a virtually untapped resource while concurrently building the confidence of the Regular Army that Guard units under Guard command can handle sensitive, important missions while giving the AC troops a breather.

On the domestic front, the war on drugs, illegal immigration, and border security are very real concerns for the United States on the threshold of the 21st century. Again, these issues can be addressed by a National Command Authority with the grit to use <u>all</u> elements of national power, to include the National Guard, to accomplish national security goals.

It has been estimated that illegal drugs cost the U.S. economy \$67 billion in 1997.⁴⁵ President Clinton has promised to increase the commitment to this problem by vastly expanding the Border Patrol and various drug enforcement agencies. The Guard

has been active on the Mexican border for a number of years already, assisting the Border Patrol and port authorities in freight/cargo inspections as well as covert surveillance of areas outside the legal crossing sites.

Illegal immigration and border security dovetail with the illegal drug trade. In February 1995 the Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, in summing up his views on the border situation, declared, "This is a war."⁴⁶ Similarly expressing the concerns and hopes of the Clinton administration, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California added, "We can and must have a border that is both secure and business friendly."⁴⁷ The attainment of these two goals, given the deteriorating conditions there, will challenge our best political and enforcement efforts.

In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson federalized the entire National Guard and sent them to the Mexican border in response to the cross-border depredations of Mexican bandits. If anything, the threat is much worse today with absolutely ruthless narcotics traffickers, assisted by increasingly corrupt Mexican government officials and police, penetrating our southern border at will with their cargoes of death, misery, and crime. If called upon, the Guard <u>could</u> seal that border, halting most illegal immigration and sharply reducing the drug traffic. But, are we willing to pay the price for such a dramatic action, politically and economically? Probably not, but this option should be one

that the NCA and the Army have a contingency plan to execute when the costs to the American way of life become unbearable.

Not to be overlooked, although a minor concern at present, is the military build-up in Mexico. Since 1994, Mexican troop strength has increased by some 15% to 180,000 and will reportedly reach 210,000 by early next century with a corresponding 40%-plus increase in military spending annually.48 Significant numbers of modern aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and other armored vehicles have been purchased this decade. Given the political turmoil, rampant corruption, and increase in social unrest, the potential for destabilization and even revolution or coup d'etat in Mexico cannot be ruled out in the not too distant future. Increasing evidence of collusion in the drug trade by the Mexican military is even more disquieting.⁴⁹ The recently acquired plethora of arms, in unfriendly hands, could pose unacceptable risks to U.S. borders and interests. Should that time come, the Guard could once again find itself in Texas and the Southwest carrying out the most important mission an army can have - defense of its Homeland.

In conclusion, a dispassionate view of America's armed forces, particularly her Army, on the eve of the third millenium, would see a force continuing to contract physically while its real and potential missions continue to multiply. When looking at the "shadow Army", the National Guard, that same observer could logically question why this historically valuable military

asset, maintained at minimal taxpayer expense, seems to be under attack by its supposed brothers in arms.

The National Guard is a national asset. While preserving the tradition and role of a state militia, they remain, as so often in this past century, a ready and willing first reserve of the Regular Army. Dissipating or weakening that reserve through shortsighted reductions in its combat capabilities puts America at risk - unnecessarily. John Brinkerhoff, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense has recently written:

If we eliminate the General Reserve and find that we need one, no amount of money will build one quickly. The Army says that it will take a full year for an existing National Guard division to be ready for That division today is equipped, manned with combat. experienced officers and enlisted personnel (many of whom have substantial active duty service), and has undergone 40 days of unit training for several years. How much longer would it take the Army to form a new division from scratch: procuring a new set of equipment; taking from other divisions a cadre of 4000 and noncommissioned officers; and commissioned enlisting 12,000 new volunteers, putting them through basic combat training and skill training at the entry level, and training them collectively until they can operate effectively as battalions, brigades, and an entire division? If the Army National Guard divisions are eliminated or converted to truck companies or engineer battalions, it will take two or more years to get that combat power back after the need is perceived. Are the citizens of this country willing to take that chance?⁵⁰

The world, America, and the Army have undergone considerable changes since the Revolutionary War. They have changed dramatically in just this decade. Given the fact of declining defense budgets in the face of pro-active use of the military, the country can ill afford to cut its proven combat reserve.

As enumerated in this paper, there are multiple missions available, current and projected, which emphasize the need for a strong reserve. The potential for armed conflict with China and/or a resurgent Russia when coupled with the perennial threat posed by Iraq and the Middle East tinderbox, argue strongly for American combat forces equal to the tasks. Fully resourced and fully accepted as part of "One Army", National Guard units can meet this challenge effectively and at a fraction of the cost of a standing military ground force.

The primary mission of the National Guard is, and should remain, as the principal combat reserve of the Regular Army. Added to this priority task are missions to support the parent States, availability to support the Army in overseas peace operations, and participation in national security programs such as border protection, drug enforcement, and reaction to domestic WMD threats. It is in America's vital interest that we develop effective strategies to accomplish these missions *as a team* before a catastrophic crisis, or a series of them, will again find us ill prepared.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Steven M. Kosiak, Tables by Elizabeth Heeter, <u>Analysis of</u> <u>the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Budget Request</u> (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 1998), Appendix, Table 8.
² Institute of Land Warfare, <u>Profile of the Army</u> (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 1997), 20. ³ John K. Mahon, <u>History of the Militia and the National Guard</u> (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 174-175.
⁴ Robert J. Brandt, "The Silent War: The Relevancy of Army
National Guard Divisions," <u>National Guard</u> , April 1997, 61. ⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid., 62.
⁹ A.J. Bacevich, <u>The Pentomic Era - The U.S. Army Between</u> Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1986), 53.
¹⁰ Mahon, 230.
¹¹ Ibid., 231. ¹² Ibid., 231-233.
13 Ibid., 234–235.
¹⁴ Brandt, 62.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Lewis Sorley, "Roundout Brigades and the Gulf War: A
Commentary," <u>National Guard</u> , May 1998, 22. ¹⁷ John G. Roos, "Unequal Partners," <u>Armed Forces Journal</u>
International, May 1997, 2.
¹⁸ From data sheets used during the conduct of the Strategic Crisis Exercise at the Army War College, March 1998.
¹⁹ Charles F. Hawkins, Stanley A. Horowitz, and John R.
Brinkerhoff, "Combat Readiness of National Guard Divisions - A
Study of Mobilization and Deployment Capability," National Guard,
May 1997, 20. ²⁰ Ibid., 21.
²¹ Garry L. Patterson, Chief of Staff, 49 th Armored Division,
Texas National Guard, telephone interview by author, 30 January
1998.
²² Hawkins, 22.
²³ Philip Gold, "The Army Versus the National Guard," Washington Times, 5 June 1997, sec C, p. 3.
²⁴ Harry G. Summers, "Reserve That Valuable Trump Card," <u>Army</u>
Times, 10 November 1997, p.54.
²⁵ "Russia's Nuclear Temptation," <u>New York Times</u> , 12 January 1998, sec. A, p. 20.

²⁶ National Guard Bureau, NGB State Partnership Program Overview. NGB-ARO-OY Information Paper (Alexandria, VA: National Guard Bureau, 1 March 1997), 1. ²⁷ Richard J. Newman, "Can Peacekeepers Make War?", U.S. News and World Report, 19 January 1998, 40-44. ²⁸ National Defense Panel, <u>Transforming Defense: National</u> Security in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: December 1997), 54. ²⁹ Douglas Stanglin, et al., "Washington Whispers - Taking Civil Liberties?", U.S. News and World Report, 12 January 1998, 15 - 16.³⁰ National Defense Panel, 52. ³¹ Steven Komarow, "Panel Wants Beefed-Up National Guard," USA Today, 2 December 1997, sec. A, p. 1. ³² Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., "The Army National Guard Division Redesign Decision," memorandum for Secretary of Defense William Perry, Washington, D.C., 23 May 1996. ³³ Newman, 40. ³⁴ George Batsakis, "Taking the Fight to Capitol Hill," National Guard, June 1997, 13. ³⁵ Ibid. ³⁶ William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997), 12. ³⁷ The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series. ³⁸ Harry G. Summers, The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future (New York: Touchstone Books, 1995), 153. ³⁹ John F. Troxell, "Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 15 September 1997), 49. ⁴⁰ Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," <u>Parameters</u> 27 (Autumn 1997): 14. ⁴¹ Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997): 30-31. ⁴² Ibid. ⁴³ Newman, 41. ⁴⁴ Rick Maze, "Word from the Field: We Are Really Hurting," Army Times, 23 March 1998, p. 8. Dan McGraw, "The Iowan Connection," U.S. News and World Report, 2 March 1998, 34. ⁴⁶ Peter Andreas, "U.S.- Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Border," Foreign Policy, 103 (Summer 1996): 62. Ibid., 63. ⁴⁸ Donald E. Schultz, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The United States, Mexico, and the Agony of National Security," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 24 June 1997), 19.

⁴⁹ Tim Golden, "U.S. Officials Say Mexican Military Aids Drug Traffic," <u>New York Times</u>, 26 March 1998, sec A, p. 1. ⁵⁰ John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power," <u>Parameters</u> 26 (Autumn 1996): 16. .

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