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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE CHANGING FACE OF NATO: FAMILIAR OR UNRECOGNIZABLE INTO THE NEXT CENTURY?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVEN C. FUNK United States Air Force

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The Changing Face of NATO: Familiar or Unrecognizable

Into the Next Century?

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:	Lieutenant Colonel Steven C. Funk, USAF
TITLE:	"The Changing Face of NATO: Familiar or Unrecognizable Into the Next Century?"
FORMAT:	"USAWC Strategy Research Project"
DATE:	06 April 1998 PAGES: 37 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Since defeating its Cold War enemy, NATO now faces new challenges posed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and their emerging ramifications. The big issue today for NATO is whether an alliance built around a defensive posture can respond adequately to these newly emerging challenges.

In response to these challenges, NATO has embarked on a new policy of expansion of the Alliance. By expanding its membership east, NATO seeks to fulfill a much broader strategic objectivethe creation of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.

The question this paper addresses is whether the policy of expansion is the appropriate vehicle to achieve that strategic objective. In order to answer this question, the paper begins with an historical summary of NATO and provides a description of the fundamental tasks the Alliance was created to perform. The study then explores current U.S. policy to determine whether that policy is clear, consistent, and adequately resourced. Finally, the paper reviews and evaluates some of the current thinking on

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NATO enlargement and concludes with the assessment that NATO expansion reflects sound strategic policy.

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The Changing Face of NATO: Familiar or Unrecognizable

Into the Next Century?

The pact (NATO) will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union, and, come what may will survive it.

- Walter Lippman, 1949

INTRODUCTION

Although successful in defeating its Cold War enemy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) now faces a new set of challenges spawned by that same victory. The immediate post-Cold War issue for NATO was survival. Today, the question is whether an alliance built around a defensive posture can respond adequately to the new challenges posed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and their emerging ramifications?

In response to newly emerging challenges, NATO underwent a fundamental strategic review. The initial result of the review was the release of *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* in November of 1991. Based on this strategic review, and as further expressed in the 1994 Brussels Declaration, NATO embarked on a new policy of expansion of the Alliance. By broadening its membership to the east, NATO seeks to fulfill a much broader strategic objective-the creation of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.

This paper explores the policy of NATO expansion to determine whether NATO is the appropriate vehicle to help create a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. To facilitate this analysis, this paper begins with an historical summary of why and how NATO emerged from the aftermath of World War II, and a description of the fundamental tasks the Alliance was created to perform. With this foundation established, the study then explores current U.S. policy to determine whether that policy is clearly articulated, internally consistent, and adequately resourced. Finally, this paper reviews and evaluates some of the current thinking on NATO enlargement and concludes with an assessment of the future of the Alliance.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The war was over and victory was ours. But out of this victory grew a new era of rising tensions between the East and the West. While Western governments began demobilizing their forces and reducing their defense establishments immediately following the end of WWII, it was clear the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) intended to maintain their forces at full strength. This set the stage for the ensuing superpower rivalry that was not long in coming. As one State Department

publication summarizes: "By 1947, the United States and the Soviet Union had clashed over nuclear disarmament, the nature of the postwar economic and political settlement in Central and Eastern Europe, Iran, and the shape of the peace treaties with the defeated Axis nations."¹ In Europe the pace of economic recovery was slow, creating the potential for further political instability. Given the Soviet Union's policy of aggrandizement and establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the U.S. responded with the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan of 1948-52 was key to the stabilization of Europe following the war. Implementation of the Plan established the basis for economic rebuilding, provided a mechanism for political discourse, and more importantly, committed the U.S. as a long-term partner in the affairs of Europe.² At the same time, European states began their own initiatives for integrating their political and economic interests. In 1947, they established the Organization for European and Economic Cooperation and, in 1948, five Western European countries-Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-signed the Brussels Treaty (after 1955, known as the Western European Union). These alliances were to serve as a basis for common defense and did much to strengthen the ties between the countries in an effort to resist further pressures from the East. But no matter how strong the intentions of the countries, the economic realities of a

post-war recovery did not provide the solid economic foundation for a common defense.

In response to these realities, the U.S. held lengthy negotiations within its own executive and legislative branches of government, leading to an agreement to participate in a defensive peacetime alliance and to provide military equipment and technical assistance in support of this alliance. This agreement became formalized through the Senate in June of 1948 with the adoption of the Vandenberg resolution, encouraging U.S. participation in a collective defense arrangement. Quiet treaty negotiations initially took place between the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom, culminating in signature of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949 by 12 member countries. These countries were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. The North Atlantic Treaty officially entered into force on August 24, 1949. Later, in 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.³

This Treaty provided the needed economic foundation and formed the basis for a common defense of all its member nations. As was expressed in the NATO Handbook, the Alliance was

...entered into freely by each of them after public debate and due parliamentary process. The Treaty upholds their individual rights as well as their international obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It commits each member country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as

well as the benefits of collective security and requires each of them the undertaking not to enter into any other international commitment which might conflict with the Treaty.⁴

FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

In the sharing of risks and responsibilities as well as benefits from its collective security, the Alliance was chartered to perform essential, fundamental tasks. According to the <u>NATO</u> HANDBOOK, the essential tasks it performs are:

-Providing one of the indispensable foundations for stable security in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. It seeks to create an environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat of force.

-In accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it serves as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, including developments which might pose risks to their security. It facilitates appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

-It provides deterrence and defense against any form of aggression directed at the territory of any NATO member state.

-It preserves the strategic balance within Europe.⁵

CURRENT U.S. POLICY

As noted earlier, NATO performed a fundamental strategic review that culminated in 1991 with the publication of "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept." In this Concept the Alliance recognizes the changing nature of security in a global context. It also recognizes new risks to the Alliance which include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of disruption of the flow of vital resources.⁶ In response to the changing nature of security and these new risks, NATO has embarked on a policy of expansion of the Organization.

The U.S. position on this policy seems very clear, at least since President Clinton's trip to Central Europe at the beginning of 1994. It was on this trip that the President announced that the question was no longer whether, but rather when, NATO would expand to Central Europe.⁷ Subsequent to the announcement, the President, his cabinet, and the Pentagon have all been consistent and clear about the U.S. policy of supporting NATO expansion. Some examples of this consistency follow.

In his remarks at the graduation ceremony at West Point in May of 1997, President Clinton expressed four reasons why we should take in new members to NATO:

-First, it will strengthen our Alliance in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century, addressing conflicts that threaten the common peace of all.

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-Second, NATO enlargement will help to secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe. NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West at the end of World War II-provide a secure climate where freedom, democracy and prosperity can flourish.

-Third, enlarging NATO will encourage prospective members to resolve their differences peacefully.

-Fourth, enlarging NATO, along with its Partnership for Peace with many other nations and its special agreement with Russia and its soon-to-be-signed partnership with Ukraine, will erase the artificial line in Europe that Stalin drew, and bring Europe together in security, not keep it apart in instability.⁸

In the latest U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), there is a discussion of Integrated Regional Approaches. For Europe, our policy is expressed as the desire to complete the mission that was embarked upon 50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO. That mission was the construction of an integrated, democratic and secure Europe, with a democratic Russia as a full participant. And to that end, the NSS asserts that

Enlarging the alliance will promote our interests by reducing risks of instability or conflict in Europe's eastern half. It will help ensure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of great power competition or a sphere of influence. It will build confidence and democracies powerful incentive to give new а consolidate their reforms. NATO enlargement will not be aimed at replacing one division of Europe with a new one; rather, its purpose is to enhance the security of all European states."

Finally, the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Strategy demonstrates the clarity and consistency of this policy. In the

strategy, there is a discussion of nine theater objectives. Objective 2 ("Maintain, Support, And Contribute To The Integrity And Adaptation Of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization") states that NATO creates a stable security environment in Europe. It goes on to say that, as NATO adapts to the changing environment, a regionally integrated U.S. military presence as a part of NATO makes that adaptation possible. Further, in Objective 3 ("Promote Stability, Democratization, Military Professionalism, And Closer Relations With NATO In The Nations Of Central Europe And The Newly Independent States") the strategy notes that these entities are moving toward integration in the regional structure. Some will integrate through full NATO membership, some through Partnership for Peace (PfP), and some through low-level participation in some PfP activities. It further states that through USEUCOM's active engagement with the militaries of the nations of the region, USEUCOM is supporting the region's transition to democracy.¹⁰

ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS ANALYSIS

To facilitate analysis of this regional policy, the policy will be viewed using the US Army War College strategy framework. Applying this framework leads to the following questions: What are the U.S. policy objectives for the region, what methods do we

have to achieve the objectives, and finally, what resources do we have to support the policy?

Ends. The U.S. has historical interests in the region which reach back nearly 50 years to the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO. Our objectives and interests in the region have not diminished over time, and with the collapse of the USSR, new opportunities present themselves to strengthen democratic reform in the region. In a report to Congress on NATO enlargement, the State Department argued that

The enlargement of NATO is part of a broad, long-term U.S. and Allied strategy that supports the evolution of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe (emphasis That strategy benefits U.S. security and added). builds on the long-standing and bipartisan premiseaffirmed by American sacrifices in two world wars and the cold war-that the security of Europe is a vital American interest. The transatlantic region is also a vital community of values-a circle of shared beliefs in institutions, free-market economies and democratic human freedom-and it is in America's interest to recognize and encourage the widening of that circle.¹¹

Ways. The method of achieving the objective of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe, is through the enlargement of the existing architecture that has long been established in the region. New members, however, will join an alliance that is different from that which existed during the Cold War. As the common enemy and threat have eroded, it appears NATO has shifted and continues to shift from a "collective defense" organization to that of a "collective security" alliance.

A large step in this process of using NATO enlargement to achieve the objective was the Alliance's adoption of the New Strategic Concept. Of great significance in the document is the fact that NATO has now formally justified out-of-area operations. NATO always recognized, through Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington treaty, that an attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America would be considered an attack against them all.¹² But, through the Strategic Concept, in recognition of the wider nature of risks to security, the Alliance now emphasizes more flexibility to respond to these new threats. Article 4 of the Treaty states that, "The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any other parties is threatened."¹³ The Concept takes Article 4 a step further by indicating that after consultation, where appropriate, there can be coordination of their efforts including responses to such risks.¹⁴

NATO has refocused from the Cold War forward defense posture to an emphasis on the "development of multinational force projection, supported from extended lines of communication and relying on deployable and flexible logistics support capabilities for crisis management operations." Some of the new principles have already been embraced by NATO as was demonstrated by the NATO-led mission in the former Yugoslavia, and NATO's acceptance

of the concept of Combined Joint Task Force in preparation for future crisis management missions.¹⁵

The expansion of NATO will be a slow process with only three new members being considered for admission in 1999. But, the admission of new members is just one part of the broader transformation process for the Alliance. The Alliance will review and adapt its political and military structures, develop new capabilities to meet its new challenges, and continue dialogue and interaction with non-members through PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, and the NATO-Ukraine Council.¹⁶

Means. There are costs associated with enlargement, as security is not free. For the Allies to meet the requirements of the strategic concept adopted in 1991, increased emphasis is required in the areas of force projection, modernization, and restructuring of forces. For the U.S., these costs will be minimal as we already possess the world's pre-eminent deployment capability and have substantial forces deployed to Europe. According to the National Military Strategy, these forwarddeployed forces in Europe will be maintained at roughly 100,000 military personnel to signal our commitment to stability and peace in the region.¹⁷

There is also a dollar figure associated with enlargement. According to President Clinton, "[e]nlargement will require the

United States to pay an estimated \$200 million a year for the next decade." He asserts that: "[o]ur allies in Canada and Western Europe are prepared to do their part; so are NATO's new members. So must we."¹⁸ In short, the resources are there to support the enlargement process.

As can be seen from this brief analysis of ends, ways, and means, the policy of NATO enlargement is consistent. The ends to be achieved are a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. The methods to achieve these ends are through adaptation of the existing architecture refocused from a forward defense posture to possible deployment out-of-area. And finally, resources have been identified and/or committed in the form of personnel and dollars in order to meet the objectives. There is a reasonable balance among the three component parts of the strategy.

CONTENDING VIEWS ON EXPANSION

Despite the conclusion that the ends, ways, and means of the policy are in balance, not everyone agrees with the policy of NATO enlargement. In fact, there are a plethora of opinions and arguments for and against it. To gain a greater appreciation about the diversity of thought on the issue, the following is provided as a sampling of the numerous arguments found in literature. A general understanding of these contending views is

necessary for the subsequent discussion of policy alternatives to NATO enlargement.

Arguments Against Enlargement

According to Susan Eisenhower, a critic of NATO expansion, rejecting the policy of expansion would be more in line with, as she calls it, the Russian perception of an agreement between the former Soviet President Gorbachev and the former U.S. Secretary of State Baker. She states that Russia was willing to acquiesce on the issue of the unification of Germany for assurances that NATO would not proceed further east.¹⁹ She further asserts that PfP was a positive response to the moves that were occurring in Russia and within Eastern and Central Europe in that the partnership allowed military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries without exclusion or alienation of any of them²⁰.

George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, believes expansion to be "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era." He asserts that expansion

...may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations; and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.²¹

Michael Mandelbaum, another critic of NATO expansion, argues that domestic politics is the only reason behind expansion. At the end of 1993, he explains that it was American policy to bring Russia into the international community and assist the Russians in their historical transition to a market economy. It was at this time that the Clinton administration introduced the Partnership for Peace program. Through this program, military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries was possible, and it was possible without alienating or excluding any of them, including Russia. Then, "without warning" in the beginning of 1994, President Clinton announced to the world that the question was no longer whether, but rather when, NATO would expand to Central Europe.

According to this argument, the decision to expand NATO resulted from the worries of the President's reelection campaign. Concern focused on the President's vulnerability to the charge that he had done too little for the countries of Central Europe, and that this charge would be reflected in the votes of Americans with Central European ancestry—"many clustered in electorally important states." Mandelbaum believes that these ancestral ties are not a proper justification for granting countries full membership in NATO.²² Skeptical of the final outcome of the process, Mandelbaum concludes:

Perhaps the likely result of NATO expansion falls between the best possible outcome, the continuation of the unprecedented tranquility that Europe now enjoys without it and the worst case, the return of some of

the most dangerous features of the Cold War. This immediate outcome would be marked by the restoration of a tradition of European international relations that predates the Cold War, a tradition featuring a great power rivalry, shifting alliances, and continuing concern with an unregulated military balance. In this third case, the future would turn out to be a version of a more distant and now dimly remembered past. NATO expansion would fulfill one 1996 campaign promise that Bill Clinton did not make. It would be a bridge to the 19th century.²³

Arguments For Enlargement

Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, in their article "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," argue in favor of NATO expansion. They describe Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger as "[b]oth fearing the seductive effect of a 'security vacuum' in Eastern (newly re-christened 'Central') Europe." If that vacuum were left unabated, Russia would be tempted to fill the void caused by a divided Europe. The authors further the discussion through a description of the "new Russia".

Containment advocates cite a new Russian assertiveness, demonstrated in diplomatic, military, and economic interventions large and small around its periphery. Russia brings three dangerous qualities to the table: it possesses tremendous inherent strategic reach, considerable material reserves, and the largest single homogeneous ethnic-cultural population in Europe. Brzezinski asserts that Russian culture somehow contains within it the seeds of expansion.²⁴

New York Times correspondent Jane Perlez presents views little talked about in the discussion of NATO enlargement. She reports on views aired at a debate in a conference on German-Polish relations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

sponsored by the German Marshall Fund in December of 1997. Participants during the debate on the role of NATO enlargement included Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissenger, German Defense Minister Volker Rühe, and top Polish officials. During the debate the argument emerged that allowing three of the former Soviet Union's Central European satellites-Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary-membership in NATO served two purposes. First, it takes the satellites out of the Russian sphere of influence. Second, it binds the "disproportionate power" of Germany within an enlarged NATO, requiring it to take the interests of its neighbors into consideration. According to Brzezinski, the eastward expansion of the alliance places Germany in a larger European framework where it can work with good intentions toward Poland rather than act as a threatening neighbor.²⁵ These views echo the long-standing purpose of NATO as expressed by Lord Ismay: "Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down."26

Carl Conetta, another proponent of NATO expansion, explains that "(e)xpansion serves the goals of stabilizing policy and increasing situational control in several ways." First, it centers the attention of the East on the Atlantic Alliance as a whole (and especially the United States), rather than on Germany. With the uneasiness in the East over Russia, he explains that the NATO and American reach create a balance to German economic links. Therefore, expansion helps create a balanced Eastern

policy caucus within NATO between the United States, Germany, and the new Eastern members. Second, because most prospective members are pro-American, their inclusion in NATO would help bring about consensus and support for U.S. security issues. Finally, expansion to the East reassures Germany that its allied members are sensitive to its security concerns and willing to guarantee its Eastern frontier and its investments.²⁷

ALTERNATIVES TO EXPANSION

Thus far, the focus of this paper has been on NATO enlargement as the strategic concept to create a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. The focus will now shift to a consideration of alternatives to expansion of the Alliance. In particular, it will focus on the possible alternatives embodied in: the European Union, the Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Partnership for Peace program.

European Union and the Western European Union

As argued by Paul Gallis of the Congressional Research Service, "Central Europe's true needs are strong economic structures and democratic institutions, which are not NATO functions and [something] the EU can do more to encourage. EU

countries are wealthy, and can well afford the costs of stabilizing their eastern neighbors."28

As Central and East European states continue their transformation process from privatization to free and open markets, critical economic challenges will emerge. The EU is well suited to tackle these challenges, and they are part of the reason why the U.S. supports enlargement of the EU to the East.²⁹ But, the slow pace of EU enlargement is not something that the U.S. has a say in, as we are not a member of that organization. In addition, the EU lacks a security umbrella for the region. The EU does not currently have a military capability to preserve European security and provide the stable environment for fostering democratic and market reforms.

Although the EU does not currently have a military capability, efforts are under way to define the relationship of the WEU to the EU in establishing a European defense identity. Currently, the WEU has ten full members who also belong to both the EU and NATO. But trying to define and establish a European defense identity does not come without headaches.

In the "Strategic Forum," published by the National Defense University in April 1997, there is an excerpt that clearly illustrates the future challenges of the plan and poses some interesting questions about the subordination of the WEU under the EU. According to the Forum:

Britain does not wish to turn the EU into a collective security organization as well as an economic union because it would raise difficult questions. For instance, would the four neutral nations in the EU have a say in European security policy? Could they maintain their neutrality? How could sovereign nations accept a majority decision to engage in warlike or costly operations, especially if individual peacekeeping nations were able to opt out of sending troops themselves? What hope have the Baltic nations of the EU accession if Russia perceived the EU as a Western military alliance?³⁰

As mentioned earlier, the ten members of the WEU are also members of NATO. Richard Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, believes that "(i)t would be self-defeating for the WEU to create military structures to duplicate the successful European integration already achieved in NATO."³¹

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE came into being during the 1994 Budapest Summit when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe recognized that it was no longer simply a conference. The OSCE with its current 53 members is the one organization that incorporates members from the EU, the WEU, the PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and NATO. The Budapest Document, which originated from the summit, established the OSCE as the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management in the OSCE region.³²

Past accomplishments of the OSCE include contributions to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the adoption of a comprehensive document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and the Declaration on the Open Skies Treaty. However, due to its large size and diversity of members, there are often disagreements on standards to be implemented, resulting in a lengthy and cumbersome resolution process.

Through adaptation and change, the OSCE has an important role to play in the overall security architecture in Europe through early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management. According to Holbrooke, the United States has taken the lead on pursuing innovations within the OSCE with an eye toward more vigorous use of the OSCE's consultative and prevention mechanism. But, he feels there should be limits on the role the OSCE can play: "(u)nder no circumstances can the OSCE be a substitute for NATO or the EU," nor can the OSCE "be superior to NATO; the functions of the two organizations are and shall remain entirely different."³³

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

During the Brussels Summit in January of 1994, NATO endorsed a series of initiatives to reaffirm the political course of the Alliance. One such initiative was the PfP program through which NATO invited members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council,

including Russia, to join in efforts to work politically and militarily alongside the Alliance. PfP has grown in popularity and its 42 members have become an important part of the European security framework.

PfP is not one large organization, but individual agreements between each participating country and NATO. Each partner tailors its program to meet its individual needs. In his statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Richard Holbrooke described the function of PfP as helping newly democratic states to:

-restructure and establish democratic control of their military forces;

-develop transparency in defense planning and budgetary processes;

-develop interoperability with alliance forces;

-better understand collective defense planning; and -learn new forms of military doctrine, environmental control, and disaster relief.³⁴

PfP serves another very valuable purpose—it provides a framework for evaluating each prospective partner's ability to comply with the obligations and commitments of NATO membership. For those not seeking NATO membership, PfP provides a mechanism to increase close cooperation with NATO, strengthening overall European security. PfP is not a collective security or defense

organization and does not itself provide a security umbrella for the European continent. It does, however, serve as a major contributor to the European security framework.

CONCLUSIONS

This discussion of NATO expansion has shown that the process has evolved quickly during the past several years. Perhaps future research should focus on the question of why NATO was selected as the vehicle to facilitate the creation of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. Vice President Gore suggested the following reason at a conference in Berlin in 1994.

Everyone realizes that a military alliance, when faced with a fundamental change in the threat for which it was founded, either must define a convincing new rationale or become decrepit. Everyone knows that economic and political organizations tailored for a divided continent must now adapt to new circumstancesincluding acceptance of new members-or be exposed as mere bastions of privilege.³⁵

And as was shown earlier, others have argued that U.S. domestic politics played the critical role, while some have suggested that lingering security threats justify the decision to expand. But, whatever the rationale, the process of NATO expansion is moving so fast that it can't be stopped without severe embarrassment to the United States and its NATO allies. What then is the way ahead?

NATO will serve as the vehicle to help create a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe and will survive into the next century, but not in its familiar form. NATO is rapidly transforming itself with its adoption of the New Strategic Concept and its new initiatives to include the Partnership for Peace program. But, neither NATO, nor any other single institution, can provide for all the security requirements in the European security architecture. Each of the organizations discussed (the European Union, the Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Partnership for Peace program) have important functions within this security framework. Each must adapt to meet the changing environment in Europe, but must do so in a manner that is coordinated with the other pillars in the developing security architecture. And as each adapts, it must do so in such a way that does not further antagonize Russia.

As a group of U.S policy experts wrote:

The task is to build a security structure in which Russia assumes а place commensurate with its geostrategic importance and its progress toward democracy and a market economy. With due respect, those campaigning to expand NATO confuse the longer term challenge of shaping a comprehensive security system with our continuing responsibility to sustain a robust NATO as our security bulwark.³⁶

NATO, however, is an organization focused on the security and defense of its members. It has a viable and credible structure, and is available now to provide the "security

underpinnings" for the common goal of the evolving Europe. As NATO transforms and evolves to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world, it will become the cornerstone of a new security and economic architecture in Europe. All the organizations within this architecture are complementary and can run parallel in their expansion efforts.³⁷ But of even greater importance from an American perspective is the fact that NATO is the core institution that links North America to Europe, thereby providing the United States with a voice in helping to mold this new structure. For this reason alone, expanding NATO may well be the most appropriate and cost effective approach for accomplishing the strategic objective that underlies it: the creation of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. Given the cost effectiveness and time-tested qualities of existing NATO structures and processes, the selection of NATO enlargement as the core strategic concept for achieving the objective reflects sound strategy.

WORD COUNT: 5,287

ENDNOTES

¹ James E. Miller, "A Short History of NATO," Department of State Bulletin, (Washington DC: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, August 1989), p. 1, paragraph 2.

² Ibid., p. 1, paragraph 4.

³ NATO HANDBOOK, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), pp. 20-21.

⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 18-19. For full text of the Treaty itself, see Appendix VIII of the NATO HANDBOOK.

⁶ "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, November 7, 1991.

⁷ Susan Eisenhower, "The Perils of Victory," Paper presented to the Cato Institute Conference on NATO Enlargement: Illusion and Reality, June 25, 1997, p. 14.

⁸ "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement," 31 May 1997, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/New/Remarks/Mon/19970602-10734.html>; Internet; accessed 19 August 1997.

⁹ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, May 1997), p. 21. It is interesting to note in this document the careful wording of U.S. policy towards NATO expansion. It speaks from an authoritative position as a member of the alliance, yet avoids direct wording as to U.S. acceptance of new membership, as this can only be done by consent of the Senate.

¹⁰ USEUCOM Strategy Of Engagement And Preparedness, November 1996; available from <http://www.eucom.mil/library/sep/sep00.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 October 1997. ¹¹ "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 24, 1997, p. 3; available from <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/atlcomm/9702nato.html> Internet; accessed 12 October 1997.

¹² NATO HANDBOOK, p. 232.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," paragraph 12.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁶ "President Clinton's Response To Senators' Questions On NATO Enlargement," The White House, Washington, DC, September 12, 1997, p. 1; available from <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/atlcomm/97091202.htm> Internet; accessed 18 August 1997.

¹⁷ National Military Strategy, 1997, "Today's Force;" available from <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/>; Internet; accessed 12 October 1997.

¹⁸ "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement," 31 May 1997.

¹⁹ Susan Eisenhower, "The Perils of Victory," pp. 5-6.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

²¹ George F. Kennan, "NATO Expansion Would Be A Fateful Blunder," International Herald Tribune, 6 February 1997, p. 8.

²² Michael Mandelbaum, "NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century," Occasional Paper, The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, June 1997, p. 8; available from <http://www.cpss.org/nato/mandel97.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 1998.

²³ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁴ Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," International Security, Winter 1996/97, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 5-53, and reprinted in DNSS Readings: Volume 1 Course 2: "War, National Policy & Strategy" P. 28.

²⁵ Jane Perlez, "Blunt Reason For Enlarging NATO: Curbs On Germany," The New York Times International, 7 December 1997, p. 5.

²⁶ As quoted in Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1996), p. 12.

²⁷ Carl Conetta, "America's New Deal With Europe: NATO Primacy and Double Expansion." Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA, October 1997, p. 16; available from http://www.comw.org/pda/eurcom.htm; Internet; accessed 8 February 1998.

²⁸ Paul E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1997; available from <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/atlcomm/atlantic.htm#related>; Internet; accessed 18 August 1997.

²⁹ "President Clinton's Response To Senators' Questions On NATO Enlargement," p. 7.

³⁰ Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Number 108, April 1997, p. 2.

³¹ Richard Holbrooke, "America: A European Power," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 47.

³² Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Fact Sheet, March 1995.

³³ Richard Holbrooke, "America: A European Power," pp. 48-49.

³⁴ Richard Holbrooke, "The Future of NATO and Europe's Changing Security Landscape." Statement before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as published by The Bureau of Public Affairs in *Department of State Dispatch*, Volume 6, Number 16, 17 April 1995. ³⁵ Quoted in John M. Goldgeier, "U.S. Security Policy Toward the New Europe: How the Decision to Expand NATO Was Made." Prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Washington Hotel, August 28-31, 1997, p. 18.

³⁶ Howard Baker Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft, and Alton Frye, "NATO: A Debate Recast," New York Times, 4 February 1998.

³⁷ "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," p. 26.

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