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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INFORMATION: AN INDEPENDENT ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Information: An Independent Element of National

Power

by

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This paper posits that information is the only independent element of power. As such the traditional elements of power, diplomatic, economic and military, are derived from the informational element of power. To support this thesis, the paper reviews current views of information, message, means, and matter. With this understanding, it considers the evolution and purpose of the national security apparatus. This paper then turns to a review of the elements of power. It concludes by restating the thesis "information is the only independent element of power" and offers national policy makers recommendations to address the misapplication of information.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACTiii
INTRODUCTION1
VIEWS OF INFORMATION
MESSAGE3
MEANS6
MATTER8
EVOLUTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY9
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY13
ELEMENTS OF POWER14
INFORMATION15
DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL19
ECONOMIC21
National Economic Policy21
Incentives and Inducements23
MILITARY
RECOMMENDATIONS26
CONCLUSION27
ENDNOTES29
BIBLIOGRAPHY33

INTRODUCTION

Carl von Clausewitz, an acclaimed military philosopher, proposes the central purpose of war is to impose one state's will upon another state. Furthermore, this imposition is accomplished through the use of force. Specifically Clausewitz states,

War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed -that is the only way it differs form other conflicts. Describing war, Clausewitz goes on to state, "kather comparing it [war] to art, we could accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities, and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops - where its outlines already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.'

The idea that nation states pursue their interests is not a new one. The way nations pursue these interests is also not new. Through cooperation or competition, nations engage each other. In the United States, national policy makers determine the ends, ways, and means necessary to pursue national interests. Within the national policy community, there is consensus that the United States has three elements of national power: military, diplomatic and economic. These elements, used independently or in combination are generally considered the means to achieve national objectives (ends).

Within the framework of the national security policy process, a fourth element of power, information, is emerging. However, within the national security affairs community it has not reached consensus. Serious discussion concerning the informational element has been somewhat muted because the Post Cold War period has left the U.S. security apparatus reeling. Uncertainty of its collective purpose as well as trying to maintain the vestiges of its Cold War bureaucratic structures seem to dominate discussions inside the Beltway. By hanging onto its Cold War structure, the national security apparatus has stifled significant debate or review of information's role as an element of power.

Many academics view information as a subset of the three traditional elements of national power. Others see it as a separate element of national power. This paper posits that information is the only independent element of national power. As such, the purpose of the traditional elements of power is derived from the informational element of power. With a better understanding of the perspectives of information in mind, a review of the national security apparatus, its establishment, purpose and functions will aid the paper's central theme.

VIEWS OF INFORMATION

What is information? It seems to be everything to anybody who looks at it. Rightly so! Information has been described as the dynamic energy from which life is derived. Information is also described in terms of communication — sender, message, and receiver. It is described as the message, such as nice doggy, nice doggy (until you get a big stick). Information can also described as the essence of order. All of these characterizations are correct. Research revealed information fit into three definable categories. Two are widely accepted, but the third is a relatively new concept. The three categories are entitled message, means, and matter.

MESSAGE

This classic characterization of information is the most ancient and common. Webster's II Dictionary defines information as, "The act of informing or state of being informed." Reduced to its barest essentials, information is an intangible message or signal that contains meaningful content that can be transmitted between sender and receiver. These essentials of communication are applicable at every level, even that of international relations. The


essence of American state-craft or diplomacy is the interstate transmission and reception of information.

To better understand this concept, it is important to break down the definition into its respective parts. most obvious are the sender, receiver and message or signal, none of which merit expansive explanation. The sender and receiver engage in communication via messages or signals. However, the concepts of intangibility and meaningful content warrant further discussion. Thoughts, ideas, concepts and theories all lack substance while contained in the minds of the sender and/or receiver. Granted these thoughts, ideas, concepts and theories are generally related to tangible things or actions. They in themselves are nonmaterial. To take this up a level, thoughts, ideas, concepts and theories that provoke the sender or receiver to take or not to take an action are intangible. extremely difficult to empirically measure information processing within the minds of the sender or receiver. However, all thoughts, ideas, concepts and theories are both information and the results of information.3

This thought is easily captured in the concept of an "information pyramid." The pyramid consists of four layers that are independent, dependent and interactive. The

foundation or bottom
layer consists of
disorganized raw
data. The next layer
is organized
information. Atop
this level is refined
information or
knowledge. At the
pyramid's pinnacle
rests distilled
information or

wisdom.4



The "Information Pyramid"

Quantum mechanics offer another spectrum from which to view information. Consciousness is casual. The conscious mind determines everything a person sees, touches, feels, hears and tastes. Fred Wolf put it this way in his book, Taking the Quantum Leap, "Fundamentally, the observer creates reality by observing it. ... It is precisely how we observe that creates the reality we perceive. Change the how of it and you change the what of it." In other words, perception is reality.

These ideas found in quantum mechanics correlate with the 1960s theory of structuralism wherein language allowed us to encode and decode meaning very successfully. Eurthermore, it is postulated that the language in which a person learns determines how they will process information. The patterns used to process information are fundamental in establishing human's cultural make up. An understanding of a person's cultural make up, as well as how they process information, provides a reasonable basis to predict their behavior.

Madison Avenue public relations firms learned these lessons long ago. To get people to buy specific products, it is important to understand their language, culture and how they process information. As long as nations are run by human beings (individually or collectively), it is essential to undertake study of the various way to affect behavioral change that are in the interest of the sender or nation state. The "message" is the essence of any national objective. How the "message" is transmitted is the business of diplomacy.

MEANS

Information is being described as the bits and bites of the computer revolution. It is this view of information that is being popularized as an element of power.

America's reliance, or better dependence, on computers, interconnected computer networks and communication venues like the Internet is mind-boggling. Telephone, electric power, ground transportation systems, airline travel and most significantly financial transactions are dependent on computers and interconnected computer networks. Winn Schwartau's attempt to alarm the national consciousness in his 1994 book, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, provides a disturbing picture of the ways and means of warfare in cyberspace and the specific threats the United States faces.

In 1995, DoD commissioned RAND to explore the possible effects the information revolution might have on warfare. Many of the concerns and policy dilemmas identified by Schwartau and RAND are receiving attention not only from DoD but also from Congress and the President. The President commissioned a fifteen-month review of our national information infrastructure. The opening paragraph of the commission's report states,

Our national defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life have long depended on the essential services that underpin our society. These critical infrastructures—energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications—must be viewed in a new context of the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and integration of telecommunications and computer systems have connected infrastructures to one another in a complex network of interdependence. This interlinkage has created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an

emerging constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk.

The Department of Defense (DoD), through its focus on "Revolution in Military Affairs," is leading the way in information [systems] assurance and warfare. DoD, in coordination with the private sector, is designing ways to protect national systems while also exploiting adversaries as well as non-adversaries information systems. These efforts may someday become a means to achieve national objectives.

MATTER

Margaret J. Wheatly, in her book Leadership and the New Science, posits that many, if not most, people envision information as a "thing," an inert entity to disseminate. 11 Wheatly counters by describing information as unlimited and not quantifiable. She defines information as the creative energy of the universe. In the new theories of evolution and order, information is the dynamic element that gives order, promotes growth and defines what is alive. 12 This view insists that all matter and energy in the universe are not only based on information but are designed to convey and process it as well. Both order and chaos depend on information. This applies to all objects, including social/cultural ones, that reflect and depend on their informational content and ability to process it. 13 While

this third view does not appear to affect the use of information as a means to an end for national security, if it proves to be accurate and moreover manageable, it would dwarf the importance of the other two identified categories.

These three categories: message, means and matter, encompass the essence of information. With this understanding, information and its applicability as an element of power can be derived by reviewing the background and parts of the U.S. national security apparatus.

EVOLUTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY

American democracy is best described as inefficient. However, much of its strength can be found in its inefficiency. American democracy ensures issues of significance are debated and evaluated before courses of action are determined. Its system of checks and balances protects the democracy. This process moves forward slowly, sometimes at a glacial pace.

While many Americans are comfortable with a governmental system that only can function incrementally, most would be surprised by the inefficiencies within each branch of the government. Inefficiencies within the Judicial and Legislative branches might not be as disturbing as the ones in the Executive branch.

For over one hundred and sixty-plus years, the United States viewed the world from the safe haven of its geography. The United States and it citizens tended to be isolationist. They enjoyed the protection two oceans provided to their national security. American foreign and military policy relied heavily on this central fact.

Immediately prior to World War II the pace of world events and their distressing direction focused the need to establish a mechanism to deal with problems of national security.

Ironically, the first and most ambitious proposal to develop a national security coordination system was made in 1919 by the acting Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The proposal was lost in the bureaucratic process and never acted upon. Remarkably, as president he did not formalize a system for national security coordination. 14

Prior to World War II, the president's cabinet functioned as stove-pipes. Diplomatic and military recommendations reached the White House separately. The president had to gauge the relationships between political aims and military objectives. The president, as the chief executive, managed foreign (diplomatic and military), and domestic affairs independently of each other. World War

II forced the president to make ad hoc arrangements for policy coordination.

Following the war, Congress imposed upon the president a coordination mechanism to allow the executive to quickly and judiciously address issues of national security across the entire government.

There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council...the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security. ¹⁶

The National Security Act of 1947 featured the establishment of two distinct entities, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense (the first step towards the unification of the military). Both were designed to afford the United States an ability to remain engaged in an ongoing, ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. The purpose of the National Security Council was to inextricably tie national defense and foreign affairs into a collective policy process. The National Security Council provided a place to combine and coordinate elements of national power, which consisted of military, diplomatic and economic elements. While the NSC has coordinated policy and provided some level of oversight, it has never had the authority to direct policy.

The interagency process provides a means to facilitate policy coordination.

The interagency process is designed to ensure that information and options are developed and passed up the line and that decisions and guidance are passed back down to staffs which must write orders and oversee their execution. 17

Participation in this policy coordination process is not fixed. It is determined from crisis to crisis. By virtue of its structure, the mechanism is for the most part reactive. The reactive nature of the interagency process makes it very difficult to develop a collective approach to shape the international environment. Because of its ad hoc nature and reactive approach, the NSC assists the president, many times, in using one instrument of power at a time, sequentially.

The NSC usually assists the State Department in obtaining presidential authority to execute a series of diplomatic approaches. If these efforts fail to bear fruit the NSC directs the DoD to develop military options to achieve national objectives (granted this explanation is simplistic but it makes the point). After military courses of action are proffered, the need to obtain domestic and international support leads to the development of domestic and international information programs.

This approach is backwards at best. The NSC should help the NCA determine long, mid, and short term goals. An

information analysis should precede national security strategy formulation and the development of subsequent foreign affairs and defense strategies. A closer look at the national security policy process and application of national policy vis-à-vis the elements of power provide greater insight.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Every general officer has probably studied the works of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz taught the object of arms in limited war is always more than just battlefield success. It is to establish a "better kind of peace." For Clausewitz war was a stronger form of diplomacy and the field of battle was an extension of the conference room. The diplomat and the warrior are twinned in purpose striving to achieve the same national objectives. Put slightly different, the warrior and diplomat are opposite sides of the same coin. It is this idea of twinned purpose that sets the stage for a review of Post Cold War national security policy and the elements that support it. 18

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faced a defined national military threat.

Absent this defining threat, the national security apparatus does not appear flexible enough to prioritize national

interest or utilize elements of national power in a combined, synergistic or coordinated fashion.

Military force, once viewed as a last resort, is being used more and more in military operations other than war. Unfortunately, most of these military excursions, notably Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, were designed to address issues that are extremely hard to define as important much less vital. These operations placate political constituencies but lack a definable military end-state or well thought out and attainable US national objectives. Arguably, the national security apparatus has failed to evolve into an organization that can amply address America's needs in the "New World" disorder. Information in its broadest sense (message, means and matter) will change the application of military and diplomatic power. It will also significantly impact world economics. This next section will review the make up and purposes of the elements of power as they relate to national security.

ELEMENTS OF POWER

Viewed simplistically, the notion that the nation has elements or instruments of power implies, not unlike mechanical tools, that these instruments are designed for specific purposes with finite applications. Unfortunately, national security parlance is less exact. The elements of

national power, while widely accepted, lack specificity and overlap each other. Individually considered and applied, they are not easily adaptable to suit many complex international situations. The interrelationship of the elements of power provides the national strategist the means by which to develop national policy and achieve strategic objectives. Put more succinctly, for the national strategist to develop means to achieve national objectives he or she must first understand the history, culture, and language of the entity to be influenced. A closer look at the elements of power is in order.

INFORMATION

The Executive Branch of the United States Government currently lacks any mechanism to coordinate the informational element of national power. As stated earlier, there also is no consensus on what defines the informational element of national power. Absent a coordinating mechanism and a clear definition of information, it will be impossible to develop synergy, thereby preventing a proactive means to achieve the interests and objectives articulated in the National Security Strategy of May 1997.

Information is generally defined broadly to include the two primary aspects, message and means, that were discussed earlier. In the Washington D.C. bureaucratic process, definitions that mean all things to all people can be

characterized as good or bad, or good and bad simultaneously. Addressing the information infrastructure is good for national security. Confusing the information infrastructure and activities to enhance it with information in its largest sense is bad. Bifurcating information into its two commonly accepted parts suits the central theme of this paper. While both the means and message require coordination at the national level, this paper focuses primarily on message aspects of information which are by far the most difficult to quantify.

The United States, unlike France and other Western democracies, has never had a ministry of information.

America did develop extremely effective propaganda and psychological warfare capabilities during World War I and World War II only to demobilize them after each conflict.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was established by executive order in 1953 and charged with administering U.S. international information programs, including the foreign broadcasting service and Voice of America. The State Department provided policy guidance to USIA and its subordinate broadcast organizations. Further, under its enabling legislation, USIA was restricted from propagandizing the American public thereby prohibiting the dissemination of any of the agency's products, programs or broadcasts inside the continental United States. USIA was

the external public affairs operation of the United States. Foreign policy organizations within the executive branch maintained separate public affairs offices to address domestic constituencies. This arrangement prevented utilizing policy advocacy in an effort to shape the domestic political agenda. Consequently, by fracturing the public affairs apparatus into distinct entities, foreign and domestic, information as an element of national power has never been fully actualized.

The ability to separate these entities has become more difficult if not impossible with the evolution, or possibly better the explosion, of information technology. The line between foreign and domestic information activities is extremely blurred. The migration of media between foreign and domestic audiences makes it impossible to segregate information under the rubric of public diplomacy (advocacy for American policies and objectives abroad via international information, international political action and public affairs).²²

During President Reagan's first administration, two
National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were
promulgated to enhance coordinated international information
activities. The first was NSDD-77, "Management of Public
Diplomacy Relative to National Security." The cornerstone
of this document was the establishment of a senior level

Special Planning Group, chaired by the NSC with representatives from State, DoD, USIA and USAID. (CIA was excluded, as covert political warfare was not within the purview of public diplomacy.) NSDD-130, "U.S. International Information Policy," began with the following statement:

International information is an integral and vital part of U.S. national security policy in the broad sense. Together with the other component of public diplomacy, it is a key strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments.

These two initiatives resulted in creating a number of interagency groups and were somewhat effective as long as the NSC led the activities. But both directives failed to clearly define interagency roles and responsibilities. When the NSC staff withdrew from its activist role in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, these initiatives withered away.

In the 11 November 1991, Joint Pub 1, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, said it best,

United States undertakes military the operations, the US Armed Forces are only one component of a national level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, informational and military. diplomatic, level Instilling unity at the national is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal department and agencies.

General Powell further states that there is a constant, often urgent need to coordinate various aspect of the informational instrument of national security strategy; and, "Contemporary military operations require the support of the American people, allies, friendly nations and the morale of the opposing side." General Powell noted that DoD was not overall in charge of any of these areas. Unfortunately, no part of government is in charge of these areas.

DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL

The diplomatic element of power refers to the political means by which a nation conducts its foreign affairs. Put another way, diplomacy is the process of interstate [nation state] relations. Foreign policy is the national objective or ends of diplomacy. The core foreign policy/diplomatic institution of the U.S. government is the Department of State. It employs the various instruments of diplomacy. These diplomatic instruments fall into two general categories: negotiations and signaling. 27

The Soviet Union's threat to America's existence fundamentally changed the U.S. approach to foreign affairs. The majority of the foreign policy community: the NSC, DoD, and single-issue agencies like the USIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), were established to augment the Department of State. While the State Department developed foreign policy and managed the diplomatic process, the single-issue agencies and foreign affairs components of other cabinet level departments served as the operational component of American foreign affairs. The effect or aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union on America's approach to foreign policy remains uncertain.

As Americans turn their attention toward domestic issues, calls for reorganizing the U.S. foreign affairs community are beginning to crescendo. In a budget cutting drill, USIA, USAID, and ACDA are being abolished. Their functions are being transferred to the State Department. The international affairs account will decline approximately 43 percent in real terms from 1985 to 2000. Funding to foreign affairs, the category most related to diplomacy, is projected to decline 19 percent in real terms from 1995 to 2000.

A lack of funding, coupled with major organizational restructuring, proved an excellent opportunity to reevaluate diplomacy, the process of developing foreign policy, vis-àvis the national security system. Cutting programs without understanding their respective importance to the system could be fatal. Funding cuts threaten twenty language

services provided by the Voice of America. As noted earlier, the importance of being able to process information in the language of the intended audience aids significantly in attaining national objectives. To cut these "soft power" services would be to hamstring diplomacy and information as an element of power.

ECONOMIC

The idea that the United States has a definable economic element/instrument of power might be overstated. This is not to imply that a seven trillion-dollar economy does not affect international markets and the world economy. (There is a certain quality in quantity.) But, for the economy to be an element of national power, the government would have to be able to control and regulate activities of the private sector (principally corporations and firms) and it does not. Using incentives or inducements, the government can use the economic element of power to influence another nations behavior. A review of the national economic policy process sets the stage for a closer look at incentives and inducements.

National Economic Policy

The most recent US attempt to create a consolidated economic approach vis-à-vis the international community was the creation of the National Economic Council (NEC).

President Clinton established the NEC in January 1993, the first month of his presidency. The council's charter was fourfold. First, coordinate economic policy making process for domestic and international economic interests. Second, coordinate economic advice to the president. Third, ensure economic policy recommendations where consistent with the President's stated goals. Fourth, to monitor implementation of the President's economic policy agenda. 32 Reviews of this latest effort to harness the economy are negative to mixed. President Clinton's efforts to make a parallel structure to the NSC that could develop national economic policy, while laudatory, failed to connect the separate entities of the executive branch toward a common framework for economic policy, as has the NSC for security policy. their book Making Economic Policy: An Assessment of the National Economic Council, Kenneth I. Juster and Simon Lazarus evaluated the Clinton council structure to determine its effectiveness and whether it should be modified and, more importantly, continued as a mechanism of the executive branch. They concurred with the continuation of the NEC but recommend strengthening its role, control and access.

Unfortunately, the NEC does not assure economic issues are integrated into the nation's international security strategy any better than in the past. 33 By having two parallel advisory structures designed to develop and

coordinate foreign and domestic policy, one economic the other security, the integration of the elements of national power will be schizophrenic at best. A single structure, Post Cold War in design, to develop coordinated foreign and domestic policy for the president would be the best possible solution to integrate the elements of national power.

Incentives and Inducements

U.S. foreign aid, seizures and sanctions/embargoes are definable economic tools designed to achieve national objectives. The United States has used these tools and received mixed reviews.

During the Cold War, the US focused aid to nations, regardless of their type of governance, as long as it stood against the Soviet block. Since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of Egypt and Israel, US foreign aid is undergoing a transformation. American ideals and values are supplanting the pragmatic realist approach to foreign affairs. Granting and withholding without a long-term view of the positive and negative impacts/results make it impossible to optimize the effect of this tool.

Absent an understanding of the language, culture and history of the nation to be influenced, the economic element is easily misused and extremely ineffective. Iraq and Cuba offer examples of economic policy built from an American perspective that failed to properly consider language,

history and culture. The unintended consequences in both cases did more to strategically harm the United States than to compel a behavioral change.

MILITARY

The US military element of power is the easiest to quantify. Dollar costs, equipment levels and number of military personnel are finite and relative in size to other nations' militaries. The U.S. military is undoubtedly the most capable nuclear and conventional force on Earth. The military's purpose is, first and foremost, to provide for the nation's defense against all enemies foreign and domestic. Secondly it is to win the nation's wars. Clausewitz, the father of modern military philosophy, at the beginning of his treatise On War, provided the following:

I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, literary definition of war, but rather go straight to the heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus the act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.

Clausewitz goes on to explain that war is the continuation of policy by other, albeit bloody, means.

American history is replete with examples, positive and negative, of the use of the military instrument of power to

achieve national objectives. World War I and particularly World War II propelled the United States to the forefront of the world stage and provide excellent examples of the effective use of military force to achieve national objectives vis-à-vis international competitors.

Vietnam epitomizes the negative aspects of military force misapplied. National policy makers appear to be forgetting the lessons of Vietnam. U.S. use of military force following the Cold War has been reactive and often times lacked clear military objectives much less national strategic objectives.

Bosnia, while successfully militarily, is probably an accident (strategic mistake) waiting to happen. Somalia, a well-intended effort to end egregious suffering, showed the futility of military power misapplied. The international embarrassment suffered by the United States is only surpassed by the loss of perceived power. Haiti offers another example of the use of military power to unseat a military dictator, only to leave the country in the same morass as before the invasion. In each example, the US failed to think past the military action and define the "better peace" described by Clausewitz.

The strategic results of these ongoing US military actions are probably no more than the squandering of precious military resources during a period of fiscal

constraint. The long-term result is that DoD will not be able to modernize or re-equip the military. Furthermore, the relevance of American military will be lessened each time the military tool is misused by the national command authority. (Arguably just as the other elements are denigrated though misuse.) By failing to understand the language, culture and history, these three examples show the futility of policy developed exclusive of an informational analysis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The foreign affairs community should capitalize on this special moment in history. The national security and foreign affairs communities should rethink the interrelationship of the four elements of power and develop a mechanism to optimize them individually and collectively. At a minimum the National Security Council should direct the development of a national information strategy. It should also develop an information coordination mechanism. The impending dissolution of USIA offers an excellent opportunity for the Executive Branch and Congress to reevaluate the separation of foreign and domestic information programs and establish a mechanism to coordinate the informational element of national power.

CONCLUSION

Knowledge, now more than ever, is power. America has an advantage in information technology that stems from the Cold War. This advantage can strengthen the intellectual link between diplomatic and military power and provide new ways of establishing and maintaining leadership in alliances and coalitions. Properly coordinated information, grounded in American ideals and values, can engage powerful states, like China and Russia, in security dialogues, thereby preventing them from becoming hostile. Information, properly applied, can bolster new democracies and communicate directly with people living under the scourge of non-democracies. 35

America is at an historical cross roads. To rise to the challenge of the 21st Century, the information age, the United States need to restructure its security apparatus. This paper argues that information is the only independent element of national power. The traditional instruments of national power, diplomatic, economic and military, will not be effective, unless they are applied with an analysis of the history, language and culture of the competing nation states, leaders and populations. Put slightly different:

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself and not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.³⁶

Sun Tzu's military analogy is most telling. It applies regardless of the element of power employed. It is imperative to understand the history, culture, and language of any person or nation the United States wishes to influence.

The misuse of national power, diplomatic, economic, military or informational, only serves to waste national treasure and dilute international influence. The crucial ingredient of each element of power is knowledge or information.

"Good understanding wins favor ... Every prudent man acts out of knowledge, but the fool exposes his folly." Proverbs 13:15-16

(5,414)

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