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SECURITY ASSISTANCE, A VIABLE MEANS IN BUILDING COALITIONS AND PROVIDING FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. MICHAEL LINEBERGER
United States Army**

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**SECURITY ASSISTANCE, A VIABLE MEANS IN BUILDING
COALITIONS AND PROVIDING FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY**

by

J. Michael Lineberger

DR. Richard L. Winslow
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: J. Michael Lineberger

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In a time when the threat of global conflict is at an unprecedented low and opportunities are boundless, the United States plays a pivotal role in the New World Order. The demise of the Soviet Union has provided a significant opportunity to expand its sphere of influence and spread its values. The enthusiasm to pursue this opportunity is curtailed only by the assets at the United States' disposal. In order to maximize this potential, it must leverage those assets available for maximum benefit.

The U.S. Government has clearly articulated its intentions concerning the United States' position in the New World order. This paper outlines the objectives of this strategy, discusses the domestic agenda versus the international agenda, and examines the impact of limited resources on the ability to pursue both. This paper also analyzes the method chosen to maximize U.S. efforts; to wit, coalitions, their attributes and detriments, and their viability in leveraging assets.

Next, this paper explores the six components of the Security Assistance Program (SAP) as a way to assist in the development and sustainment of coalitions, and as a tool of diplomacy and of international politics. It links the SAP directly to coalitions and then, in turn, to our national security.

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INTRODUCTION

We are at a time in history when the world order is in fluctuation. This fluctuation provides us with a golden opportunity if we capitalize on the situation. Because of our position in the New World order, the last remaining Super Power, we have the ability to help shape this new order while actively pursuing our own self-interests. The then United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright, summed it up in her September 1993 address to the National War College. She says "with greater opportunities for international cooperation came hope, particularly within the early Clinton Administration, that the overwhelming military force employed in Desert Storm would not often be necessary; instead, international consensus and pooling of military, economic and diplomatic resources would provide the U.S. and its international partners the leverage to persuade aggressors or 'rogue' elements, through coercive diplomacy, not to disturb the international order."¹

For years we had sustained ourselves with clear objectives and a very definable enemy. In 1989 the status quo and the world changed forever. The demise of our long standing enemy, the Soviet Union, was hailed as a great victory for democracy, but after all the celebration was over, we were left with some major issues. First, the end of bipolarism concluded a rather easy time in our world history in terms of choosing sides. In

simplistic terms, a nation state was classified into one of three categories: it was either neutral, in the sphere of Soviet influence, or it followed our lead.

As of 1989, the Soviet Union dissolved into smaller nation states. Many of these states no longer followed the communist ideology. Russia no longer actively pursued a foreign policy of expansion of communism. These newly formed nation states as well as some of the old nation states were searching for a better political system while still trying to protect their newly acquired sovereignty. These new nation states turned to the United States for an example of a successful form of government. Why not? We had prevailed over communism. We had a thriving economy and we provided social programs for the needy. We occupied the moral high ground and we took the lead on international issues such as human rights. The United States' political system of democracy based on capitalism was a proven winner. America had defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Nation states that had been decimated as a result of World War II, and had rebuilt based on the U.S. model, were successful and showed potential for continued growth. It was only logical that these infant states followed suit.

There was a problem however. These new bastions of liberty brought some cold war baggage with them. Internal social problems, degraded economic system, failing infrastructure, human rights, ethnic problems - all were issues that now must be

addressed. Resolving these problems while still developing an emerging political system would quickly consume and exceed any available resources. The degree in which each of these issues required attention varied between states. There was an overarching problem that each state shared. Even with the internal issues, they still needed to protect their sovereignty and their borders. Their assets are limited but the threat is real. How can they address both domestic issues and defend their borders?

This is the world stage on which we now stand. Where and how could these new nation states find relief and assistance in their plight? What other nation state had the resolve, inclination and assets to assist in such a monumental problem? Enter now the United States.

The United States has clearly articulated its position in terms of assistance to others. The commitment is outlined in the U.S. National Security Strategy.² In our role as a super power, we bear the responsibility and obligation to demonstrate global leadership, and to demonstrate our commitment to those values and beliefs that we articulate and follow. This responsibility enhances and supports our own self-interest while making the world a more stable and safer place. The alignment of the United States with other nation states in the form of a coalition to pursue a mutually shared interest provides a mechanism for relief.

In order to fully understand our National Security Strategy, we must examine it in detail. The U.S. National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement is our country's cornerstone strategy document.³ It defines our interests and objectives as they relate to National Security. Paramount in this document is the overarching objective of "insuring the Security of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, while protecting its fundamental values, institutions and people".⁴ This is accomplished through an interaction of engagement and enlargement.

The objectives of this strategy are three fold: first, we enhance our security; second, we promote prosperity at home; and, lastly, we promote democracy. It is under the objective of promotion of democracy, that we further refine and focus our methodology. The objective of promoting democracy is based on a "framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on strengthening democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union."⁵

From this overarching strategy, we build a U.S. National Military Strategy. This military strategy outlines a methodology of achieving our objectives on an international basis. This document, developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staffs, emphasizes worldwide engagement and the enlargement of our democratic ideals. It defines the limits and parameters involving various flexible and selective activities and capabilities that can assist us in addressing and shaping the evolving international environment.

As outlined before, the international environment has and continues changing since the end of the Cold War. It is because of this, that the challenges to our nation's global interests are heightened. The threats facing our security today are much different that they were when we were in a bipolar world. Challenges are widespread and it is very uncertain and unpredictable where conflict will occur next. This strategic landscape of potential crises is defined into four principal dangers: regional instability, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers such as terrorism and drug trafficking, and the dangers emanating from other nation states directly relating to democracy.⁶

It is from this common view of the international arena that the concept of peacetime engagement has evolved. Peacetime engagement is a term that describes a full range of broad non-combative activities. These activities are specifically designed to occur prior to and to deter any hostilities. These activities demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democracy and enhance regional stability.⁷ One of the premiere activities that enable us to achieve our goals is the

Security Assistance Program. This program and its viability as a tool in developing coalition partners and in turn supporting our National Security Strategy is the basis of this paper.

In this paper we have already discussed the current international environment and the cornerstone document that defines our interests and objectives in interacting within that environment. Next, we will talk about coalitions as a mechanism for leveraging limited resources thus allowing us to maximize our capabilities in these frugal times. Finally, we define the Security Assistance Program as a coalition building program that allows us to pursue peacetime engagement in support of our national interests.

In order to clearly understand the importance that coalitions play in the pursuit of our national interests we must examine coalitions in detail. Defining them, contrasting them with the more formal alliance, and discussing their associated benefits and detriments. Once we fully understand coalitions, we will then analyze the Security Assistance Program. We will focus on its role in building coalitions and in doing so, enhancing our National Security.

COALITIONS

*"The only thing worse than fighting with our allies is fighting without them."*⁸

-Winston Churchill

If coalitions are going to be the paradigm of the future, we must enhance our knowledge of all aspects associated with such operations. The first step towards understanding their intricacies is defining a coalition. A coalition is defined as an operation where various nation states with a common objective come together under an informal agreement to pursue or conduct military/political actions.⁹ Coalitions normally are short lived and have very focused purposes.

This definition may initially cause you to think that we are simply talking about alliances. That is not the case.

"Alliances are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations in a formal legal/treaty arrangement, with standard agreements for broad, long term objectives."¹⁰

Alliances and coalitions do have some aspects in common in that they are both based on multinational forces in pursuit of shared objectives. States participating in an alliance share more than a formalized agreement and a common goal. Alliances strive to fully integrate all aspects of an operation. For example, alliances attempt to achieve interoperability in terms of compatible military systems. They attempt to fully integrate their staff as compared to simply augmenting the lead nation staff as in a coalition. Alliances attempt to develop and structure common staff procedures. At the strategic, and in some cases, the operational level, staff officers in an alliance would be appointed alternately or by selected position from the nation

states comprising the alliance. This concept of an integrated staff demonstrates a greater burden sharing and commitment. Additionally, it provides a deeper insight into the operations of your alliance partner. This staff structure does have a downfall. Friction may occur within the alliance if loyalties, work ethic, dedication and professionalism differ greatly.¹¹

A key ingredient in an integrated staff under an alliance is a single dedicated commander. The commander in an alliance is normally selected by consensus and he can be drawn from any member of the alliance. The deputy commander would then normally be designated from another member of the alliance.

On the other hand, coalitions are much less regimented. They too have their problems that must be addressed. The recognition of these problems can defuse potential issues that could split the coalition partners. Coalitions, as previously stated, operate along informal and temporary lines. They have only joined forces to accomplish a very specific shared political or military objective. Once that objective has been accomplished, the partnership may dissolve. There is the possibility however, that once the initial objective has been accomplished, a new objective may be identified and the coalition could evolve into an alliance.

The common thread in developing coalitions is a shared political or military objective by potential partners. That objective, and the desire by the separate partners to achieve

that objective, is the glue, which binds the coalition. It defines and provides a common vision.

Depending on the type and scope of the shared objective, we must analyze our partners intent and sympathies. By doing this, we can attempt to identify and understand their motivation. Further we can compare and contrast their motivation to ours. Even though coalition partners may desire the same objective, it is important to determine motivation. Identifying motivation helps determine the will or resolve to achieve our common objective. Just because we share an objective with a potential partner, it may only be a single point that we have in common. There may be another agenda at work.

It is important that we translate our partners' motivation into a political goal. By defining and studying our partners' political goals, we can provide the coalition commander and the staffs a focus for detailed planning. We can determine a basis for consensus within the coalition and a purpose for the campaign. The ability to maintain a consensus at both the strategic and operational level of war is paramount to preserving a unified effort. By going through these processes of identification, we can uncover, compare and/or contrast our agenda with our partners. We can become more sensitive to the needs of our partners and identify areas that we may need to come to a compromise or a consensus early on into the coalition.¹²

Political considerations are weighted much more with coalitions as compared to alliance operations. Alliances are held together by a formal agreement. It is political objectives through consensus that binds the elements of a coalition.¹³

By identifying and resolving issues related to goals, motivation and objectives, we can help prevent the problem of incrementalism. Incrementalism is an issue that arises when interests creep and mission creep occurs within a coalition partnership. "Interest creep describes situations in which original national interests in resolving a crisis or conflict - that determine political objectives or the ends sought by American leaders - widen in absence of conscious decision making. This can happen in coalitions when U.S. objectives fall short of those of our coalition partners or of the United Nations. Mission creep is its military counterpart and occurs when Armed Forces take on broader missions that are initially planned."¹⁴ In short, one of the coalition partners exceeds the scope of their initial objective without a conscious decision. The reverse can also be true. Currently, the United States is struggling in a situation with coalition partners were the U.S. objectives have remained constant, or even expanded, but our coalition partner's objectives have shrunk. Whatever the case, the divergence of goals is what causes incrementalism and could ultimately cause the dissolution of the coalition. This divergence of goals

between coalition partners has become a major issue as coalitions have matured as political tools.

Finally, U.S. motivation for entering into a coalition cannot be based solely on international pressure because we are the last remaining Super Power and we have the means. Nor should it be because of a higher social and moral calling. We must address all aspects of our objective, conduct a cost/benefit analysis and define the means. Defining the objective and its ability to be accomplished with a limited means becomes the issue. As the United States pursues its National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, the military is cast in more and more expanding non-traditional roles. Examples of these new types of missions are operations other than war; specifically peacemaking and peacekeeping, counterterrorism, counter drug and humanitarian assistance.

As these new types of missions evolve or are derived, current military planning does not easily fit the new idea of coalition operations. Conditions for committing our most precious national asset, our service men and women, must be right and include definitive objectives, leading to a common shared vision. We must define an "exit strategy based on an attainable notion of victory, overwhelming or decisive force and a clear U.S. interest".¹⁵

Coalitions provide us the ability to leverage politics both at home and on an international basis. An alliance does not

provide that ability. Under an alliance, we are committed regardless of our basis of political support. First, on a national level; entering into a coalition aids us in building our national will and support both by the people and in Congress. Depending on who our coalition partner is, by simply aligning ourselves with that partner, we formulate support. The reverse can also be true. If we enter into a coalition with a partner whose political ideology is divergent from ours, or if the American people cannot empathize with the potential coalition partner, we could not only lose support but we might never receive it.

Coalitions provide legitimacy through collective action. Legitimacy assists us in shaping and building world and national support for our cause. Legitimacy provides us the moral highground. Coalitions by their nature require consensus. Consensus provides diversity through different opinions. International consensus, as demonstrated by coalition formation is the substance of legitimacy. Legitimacy provides us the political power/strength to attract other nation states outside of our coalition and bring their power to bare. An example that is used extensively is the United Nations. Legitimacy infers legality.¹⁶

Coalitions provide us the opportunity to leverage limited assets and resources. Coalitions by their nature allow us to burden share. Sharing the economical costs of pursuing a

political objective in this austere environment is a substantial benefit. As previously stated, with the emergence of new nation states and the reorientation of old nation states, domestic issues take precedence over international issues. Very few assets are left to provide for the external security. Coalitions provide a means to leverage those limited resources in terms of both people and equipment. This is contingent on your coalition partner and his ability to provide a minimal amount of assets. There may be a circumstance where a coalition partner is in such a dire situation that they cannot contribute any tangible assets. In such a case, the other associated benefits of coalitions must be weighed and examined as appropriate to the situation. These indirect benefits include aiding politically, inferring legitimacy, and other intangibles that will be discussed later in the paper.¹⁷

Once the assets each coalition partner can provide have been identified the means is defined. As a superpower, we may be able to assist our coalition partner by providing the equipment and training. This is executed through the Security Assistance Program. This program will be discussed in detail later into this paper. Suffice it to be said that the Security Assistance Program is America's best investment in terms of executing the National Security Strategy of enlargement and engagement and building coalitions.

The most important element in preparing for coalition warfare is developing the command and control element of the coalition. This is the basis that the actual execution of the operation will be directed by. It defines relationships between the partners and provides unity of command.¹⁸ Once the partners have agreed on the coalition command structure, then unity of effort is more easily realized and an agreed upon strategy can be achieved. The key element in the successful execution of coalition warfare is identifying unity of effort among the participants.¹⁹ This then provides a methodology to overcome the most basic problem of how to integrate coalition forces into a central scheme of maneuver.

Although it would be much more efficient for a single command structure to exist as in alliances, nations that comprise the coalition may not accept this method. They may for either political, religious, or because of morality, not be willing to subordinate their forces to another nation's command.²⁰ The concept of singular command is the method alliances normally execute. In contrast to the alliance method of command, coalitions most likely have a parallel command structure. "Parallel command is the simplest to establish, and often the organization of choice. While other command structures emerge as the coalition matures, the parallel model is often the starting point."²¹ That command structure will normally consist of a headquarters for each coalition partner or for a group of

coalition partners if agreed. Partners may be grouped under these headquarters based on previous relationships, language, commonality of culture or other reasons. Under this parallel command structure, there is no single commander identified. Member nations retain control of their own national forces and the coalition designates a methodology of effective coordination. An alliance's command and control structure is much more streamlined.

Regardless of the methodology, it still takes time for adequate coordination and staffing to occur. As a result of parallel commands, a method of resolving disagreements and deciding issues must be designated. This can be handled effectively by establishing a coordination cell. This cell's purpose is to provide a viable method for coalition members from dissimilar nations to address and resolve these issues; thus another staff level is a necessity to enable unity of command. Any number of issues can be addressed at this cell to include tactical, operational, strategic, logistical, training and other issues that may impact on the coalition. This cell is normally staffed with action officers from the coalition partners or each coalition member provides a complete parallel staff. They link up with their coalition counterparts. The coalition members agree on the command and control structure of the cell to oversee the combined operations internal to the cell.²²

The support cells address such diversified issues as evolving goals, mission/interest creep, compliance with agreed upon strategy, understanding and employing respective partners doctrine, the list of potential issues goes on. The final point is coordination and synchronization can now be achieved in a parallel command structure.²³

Another topic for discussion is the level of military proficiency that each of the coalition partners exhibits. This can be further expanded to include the limitations and capabilities of the weapon systems with which a partner fields his force. Both of these concepts impact directly on the coalitions' ability to wage war. Both of these issues have very little impact at the strategic level, but may cause adjustment at the operational level in order to maximize and capitalize on the similarities of partners. This is an area where the Security Assistance Program not only increases the relationship between coalition partners but it can also enhance interoperability.

Each national force comprising a coalition comes with its own doctrine and proclivities regarding the conduct of military operations. If the issue of common doctrine or a mechanism for translation of doctrine is not established, the doctrine compatibility problems can greatly reduce military effectiveness.²⁴

In addition, the pairing of several types of coalition efforts can impact on the military potency. A current trend is

to conduct military and humanitarian operations simultaneously. When this occurs, the humanitarian mission usually suffers for various reasons. First, the warring factions must curtail their military agenda and in most cases actually support the humanitarian effort. Often, one warring party, regardless of reason or justification, conducts a military action on the humanitarian effort in response to military actions by the coalition. Additionally, the coalition partnership may be stressed due to one partner placing more importance on the fulfillment of one mission over another.²⁵

Diplomatic constraints may also hinder coalitions: each partner in a coalition possesses its own set of diplomatic ties, alliances and political connections with other nation states. Because of this, multilateral efforts of the coalition may create tension as well as affect the perception of legitimacy. Influences from outside sources, such as ethnic ties, religious backgrounds, and trade relations may create an unforeseen reluctance with some coalition members to use force.²⁶

Coalitions do provide a viable means to spread our ideals, values, and ideology of democracy. Simply observing and participating in the day to day operations involving the members does this. By witnessing our methods, living beside and among us, the American ethic can be observed first hand. There is a drawback, however, in that as our partners are exposed to our way of life, values, and morals, we are exposed to theirs. We as

Americans take for granted that we are the best at everything we do. That is our perception. Our coalition partners may not share that perception. In fact, that perception may actively hamper obtaining our mutual objectives. In order to achieve these objectives, we may have to operate and adapt to their value system as long as it does not violate any of our basic beliefs or human rights.

Another associated benefit of a coalition is the shape and the speed in which a coalition can be formed.²⁷ Coalitions can be structured very quickly. Before they come together, they must first have a reason or a common objective. It takes time to identify and define a political objective, assess resolve, and measure the importance of achieving that objective. An alliance is quicker to act in an emergency because the objectives have already been formally identified and commitments or actions are predetermined. The command and control arrangements of the alliance forces are in place and the staffs have developed and exercised contingency plans. Should the situation dictate anything different from the original objectives of the agreement, the alliance must be reevaluated. In short, if a situation arises that has not been already addressed, then the execution of the commitments in the alliance may or may not occur because of divergent objectives. In contrast, a coalition will be formed with a common objective in mind. So if the situation does not require a predetermined objective forming a coalition and

conducting a combined action to achieve that goal may be faster than an alliance.

On the other hand, because of the differences in the command and control structure, a coalition may be less responsive in the execution of an agreed upon course of action.²⁸ The staffing of multinational actions consumes time in translating that consensus from the strategic level to the operational level and through different nationalities.

In summation, the United States has a long-standing tradition of exercising the building of coalitions in pursuit of its national interests. Rarely in this century has the United States acted unilaterally in exercising military might. Coalitions have been, currently are, and will be a dominant instrument for engaging in or coercive warfare. We now understand the importance of pursuing our national interests within a coalition framework. The benefits of these joint interactions and the legitimacy that it infers upon the world stage are paramount in our ability to build and sustain world opinion. The benefits that a coalition partner may bring to a union with us, be they direct or indirect, greatly assists us in leveraging and maximizing our assets. These benefits far exceed any associated costs. Coalitions are our best weapon available in the pursuit of our national interest. They directly follow the U.S. strategy of enlargement and engagement. Coalitions provide us a method of interaction that allows us to achieve our

strategic goals of enhancing our security, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy.²⁹ The sustainment and the development of new potential coalition partners are political actions that must be actively pursued, if we are to enjoy the associated benefits of this form of political alliance. What is available to assist us in maintaining and building coalitions? What would allow us to leverage our limited assets while maximizing coalition building in the most expeditious and frugal manner? What tool is available to stand the test of world opinion and still allow us to claim the moral high ground? That tool is the Security Assistance program.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

"Dollars invested to help friends and allies build indigenous military capabilities and to gain their confidence bring tremendous returns in helping the U.S. to meet its regional objectives."³⁰

-General Colin Powell

What is Security Assistance (SA)? The average American has no concept of this program. They don't relate to, nor do they properly understand even the most general aspects associated with this tool of U.S. Foreign Policy. From its name the Security Assistance Program may infer images of security police training, law enforcement assistance or images of a police state.³¹ Security Assistance is none of these. Perhaps the title itself causes the confusion. In reality the Security Assistance Program

is known only to a select few, even though the program is by no means classified. The reason for this is simple. The SA program is not as glamorous in the world of international politics as some of the other diplomatic tools. Rarely are any of the applications of the program news worthy. Therefore, the SA program is a relatively politically stable and mundane application of foreign policy.

Security Assistance is often confused and the term is commonly exchanged with other programs such as foreign aid, foreign assistance, military assistance, arms transfers, international defense cooperation, etc.³² In order to understand what Security Assistance is and how it facilitates coalition building, we must examine the program.

Security Assistance is range programs that enable friends and allies to acquire equipment, services, and training for legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts. As an integral part of peacetime engagement, the SA program contributes directly to U.S. national security by enhancing deterrence, encouraging defense, responsibility sharing among allies and friends, supporting U.S. readiness, and increasing interoperability among potential coalition partners.³³ The SA program expands our ability to demonstrate democracy and to share our values by direct interaction and through observation by other nation states.

We can also use the SA program to encourage, influence, or shape the behavior of a potential customer. If a nation state wishes to acquire services, training or equipment offered in the program, then that nation must comply with parameters outlined by our government. The U.S. can adjust these parameters to fit the situation and to stress or enhance acceptable actions or behavior. The SA program is a critical element of U.S. forward presence. It provides proof of commitment and of U.S. resolve to both our potential coalition partners and our adversaries. The execution of this program provides our allies and potential coalition partners the ability to defend against aggression. It enhances their ability to fight alongside of the U.S. in a coalition effort, and increases our ability to identify potential coalition partners

The Security Assistance program is based in a statutory sense on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (FAA), as amended, and the Arms Export Act (AECA), as amended. The most comprehensive definition of SA is in Section 502B of the FAA.³⁴ In this document the term "Security Assistance" means:

"(A) Assistance under chapter 2 (military assistance) or chapter 4 (economic support fund) or chapter 5 (military education and training) or chapter 6 (peacekeeping operations) or chapter 8 (anti-terrorism assistance) of this part;

(B) Sales of defense articles or services, extensions of credits (including participation in credits), and guarantees of loans under the Arms Export Control Act; or

(C) Any license in effect with respect to the export of defense articles or defense services to or for the

armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act.³⁵

The intent of this very broad definition is to provide statutory leverage over a spectrum of activities. This provides the Government the leverage and the ability to apply a cohesive type of diplomacy over a wide variety of options. The bottom line is simply that the Security Assistance Program increases the odds that the U.S. Armed Forces will find effective coalition partners and a relatively favorable situation should an U.S. military action be required somewhere in the world.³⁶

The SA program is executed by means of six principle components; four requiring United States Government funding and two not. The components of the program are: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), Direct Commercial Sales (DCA), International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The current administration validated all six of these programs when President Clinton addressed Congress in his *Congressional Presentation (CP) for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1998*.

The current administration has not fully capitalized on the benefits that the SA program provides. It has limited the resources allocated and, in some cases, not actively pursued possible coalition building.

Between 1992 and 1997, the resources allocated to the SA program have declined by a third. Additionally, military to military exchanges, military schooling opportunities and grants have also declined dramatically under the current administration. Currently the 1998 budget for the SA program is 6,481.05 million dollars as compared to the 1997 budget of 6,234.97 million dollars, excluding excess Defense Articles Grants and Sales. This is an increase of 246.075 million dollars or 3.9%.³⁷

The SA Program currently exports American ideals and values all over the world in support of our National Security Strategy, specifically the strategy of enlargement and engagement.

Currently the SA program is employed as follows:

- FMS - Kuwait, Jordan, Israel
- FMFP - Israel, Egypt, Warsaw Initiative, Jordan, Caribbean Region, Cambodia, Support of the Baltic Peacekeeping in Partnership for Peace (PFP), Greece and Turkey
- IMET - over 5, 000 foreign military and civilian Grants: Personnel from over 100 countries annually Grants authorized by FAA under ESF - Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru
- PKO (dramatic increase) - Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, United Nations in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Haiti

New for 1998 is South Korea. South Korea is again becoming very active in the program in that they will be receiving two major weapon systems this year; a missile defense system and long range artillery.³⁸ We have now defined the SA program, discussed methods of its application as a political tool, and identified some of the foreign nation states where the program is active. What is the current administration doing in this area? What is their policy and how is this administration applying that policy in the New World order? It has been said that the current administration has no foreign policy. If that is so, is the SA program doomed because of lack of application. What is the current status of the program?

The Clinton Administration's position on the SA program has been somewhat ambiguous. The administration turned its focus on "rebuilding the U.S. economy and establishing a predominantly domestic agenda."³⁹ Even though it has adopted the previous administration's goals of "building democracy, promoting and maintaining peace, promoting economic growth and sustainable development, addressing global problems and meeting urgent humanitarian needs,"⁴⁰ initially very little effort was exerted. Under the then Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, the SA program was seen as a money making apparatus in pursuit of the domestic agenda - the State Department actively engaged in marketing efforts.⁴¹ These efforts were designed to encourage the direct commercial sales and Foreign Military Sales under the

SA program. As a result, even though the Administration's rhetoric stated we were pursuing the SA program to assist our allies and build coalitions, the SA was in fact used as a revenue generator. Additionally, the demise of the Soviet Union created an opportunity to "attain additional peace dividends in the form of reduced defense budgets and the rapid down-sizing of the U.S. military force structure."⁴² The savings generated would directly be used to support Clinton's domestic agenda, the agenda that he was elected upon.

In 1993, FMS sales set a record in generating \$33 billion dollars from FMS sales. The application of the program in this method continued through 1996, but the funds generated leveled off at around \$10.5 billion.⁴³ Since Madeline Albright has assumed the position of Secretary of State we are starting to witness a shift in the administration as it relates to and exercises the SA program. A Clinton foreign policy, still somewhat ambiguous, is starting to emerge and the need for intercourse with other nation states has been established. Old coalition partners, who have not been maintained and who counted on the grant or loan aspect of the SA program are now hesitant to align themselves with us. In the past, they, with limited resources, could not generate funds to participate in the funded FMS program.

The current world situation now dictates that we need the support of some of these old partners. The Clinton

administration now realizes the importance of these old coalitions and we are starting to see revision in the execution of the SA program to bring it more in line with the loftier goals that the Administration ordinarily outlined in our Security Strategy. The realization has finally set in that the benefits received in coalition building through the use of the SA program far exceed the associated costs. For the time being the program has a resurgence of energy and resources. In order to better understand the way in which the SA program is administered we must discuss each component.

Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Construction Sales are non-appropriated programs that allow eligible foreign governments the ability to purchase defense articles, services and training. The purchasing government pays all associated costs. This program furthers national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, supports building of coalitions and enhances interoperability. Other benefits associated with this component are improved balance of trade and sustainment of highly skilled jobs, through the extension of production. The expanded market may even lower unit cost for systems and spare parts.⁴⁴

The Foreign Military Financing Program has evolved substantially since its inception. The evolution reflects Congress' oversight execution of the component. Congress is the appropriating authority and the funds are held in the

International Affairs budget. The State Department determines eligibility and allocates funds. The Department of Defense executes the program. This program encompasses loans and grants. The changes implemented in this program reflect Congress' attempt to provide oversight in the execution of this component. The selective application of this program can be used to promote regional stability and security, foster democratic development and increase interoperability. These associated benefits are in addition to the FMS benefits because the funds provided would be exclusively used to purchase U.S. equipment or training.⁴⁵

The Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is an authorized and Congressionally approved sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. DCS transactions are not overseen by DOD and do not require a government to government agreement. Oversight of this component is applied through the licensing by the Office of Defense Trade Control in the State Department. Governing rules and regulations vary based on the type and amount of sales allocated. This program is the most beneficial to civilian contractors and businesses, but it also offers the greatest possibility of risk. The risk is in the loss of our technological superiority. Technology can easily be transferred undetected even with the requirement to notify Congress of sales.⁴⁶

International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program provides U.S. training to selected foreign military and related civilian personnel on a grant basis. The training is relative low cost with very high pay off. Training is focused on professional military education. Benefits from this program are extensive in that future leaders of other nations are exposed to our value system, respect for human rights, democratic institutions, military under civilian control (extremely important for emerging democracies), defense resource management, military justice and civil-military relationships. In light of the emergence of new democracies throughout the world this program has the most direct and immediate impact on the democratic development through their leadership.⁴⁷

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is a grant authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act. The fund was established to promote stability in areas where we have specific security interests. ESF is an important instrument used to avert major economic or political crises in emerging nations. ESF fund is administered through policy direction by the Secretary of State. Initially, the ESF was a loan available on adjustable terms at a low interest rate. Those terms could be adjusted or modified depending on the need and the interest in the requesting Nation State. In 1989, the loan aspect was changed to a grant basis.⁴⁸

Lastly, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act. Security Assistance funds under this

component are specifically set aside to support multinational forces on peacekeeping or peace making operations. Support in terms of either grants or equipment is made available. Participation in this program does not directly support another nation state in terms of building a potential coalition partner. Supporting these types of operations demonstrates our Nation's resolve in being a role model and supporting morally correct actions. This aspect allows us to demonstrate our role in world leadership and our commitment to the peaceful resolution of issues. In Fiscal Year 1997, appropriated peacekeeping operations monies totaled \$65 million dollars. "The following eight PKO programs have been funded:

- Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) - \$15.5 million. This is one of two traditional PKO programs. The other such program, the United Nations Forces in Cypress (UNFICYP), has had its funding transferred to a non-security assistance account, the "contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA). This account represents the assessed changes the United States contributes to the United Nations for its various peacekeeping programs.
- African Regional - \$2 million
- Organization of African Unity (OAU) - \$3 million
- African Crisis Response Force (PKO) - \$8 million

- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- \$18.6 million
- Haiti - \$15.2 million
- Israel - Lebanon Monitoring Group - \$12 million
- Northern Iraq Peace Monitor Force - \$1.5 million⁴⁹

It is plainly evident that this program does not directly help in directly assisting a single nation state. However, through exposure, observation and working with America's equipment, we greatly enhance the probability that the state participating in PKO may turn to us to participate in the more traditional Security Assistance program. Then we will have the discretion should it be in our own self-interests, to form a coalition.

In addition to these six major programs, there are four additional programs or authorities that are now available and fall under the Definition of Security Assistance. They expand the political leverage available in a traditional SA sense. These programs will be short lived and are available because of the military drawdown that our nation is experiencing. The programs will only be available as long as we have the assets. Once the equipment is expended the programs will terminate. These four additional limited programs are leases of defense articles, the sale or grant transfer of excess defense articles, emergency drawdowns, and third country transfer of U.S. origin defense equipment. These programs are outlined as follows:

"Leases. The Chapter 6, AECA, authorizes the President to lease defense articles to friendly governments or international organizations for up to five years (renewable). The law allows the President to lease defense articles only for compelling foreign policy or national security reasons, and stipulates that the full cost of the lease, with some exceptions, must be borne by the recipient. Furthermore, leased articles must not be needed, for the time, for U.S. public use, and the U.S. retains the right to terminate the lease at any time. For the recipient country, leases may be cheaper than purchasing the article outright, and they provide a convenient vehicle for obtaining defense articles for temporary use. Leases are executed through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), with an associated FMS case to cover repair, training, supply support and/or transportation.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Under the AECA, the President is authorized to **sell** defense articles (via the FMS process) declared by the Military Department or Defense Agency to be in excess of requirements. Prices range from five to fifty percent of original acquisition value, depending on the condition of the article. Additionally, the FAA authorizes the President to transfer EDA on a **grant** basis to eligible countries for which receipt of such articles was justified, usually in the annual *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations*, commonly referred to as the CPD. While EDA can be transferred at no cost, the recipient must pay for any transportation or repair charges.

Under certain circumstances, the transportation charge can be waived (cost absorbed by the MILDEP).

Emergency Drawdowns. During a crisis, the FAA authorizes the President to provide USG articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation. There is a \$100M ceiling per fiscal year on articles, services, and training provided for military purposes; and another fiscal year ceiling of \$150M for articles, services and training required for nonmilitary purposes such as disaster relief, counternarcotics, refugee assistance, and Vietnam War-era MIA/POW location and repatriation. When emergency support of peacekeeping operations is required, the FAA separately authorizes the President to draw down up to \$25M per fiscal year in USG articles and services from any agency.

Third Country Transfers. The AECA authorizes the President to manage and approve the transfer of defense articles from the original recipient to a third country. Requests for third-country transfers are normally approved if the USG is willing to conduct a direct transfer to the third country." ⁵⁰

In summary, the Security Assistance program is a very viable and relatively inexpensive tool for furthering our national interest through assisting other Nation States. This program far exceeds the possible cost associated with either maintaining a sizable standing military force or the ultimate expense, war.

"If the past is any predictor of the future, security assistance is not just a short-range program; rather, it will be in existence for many years to come. In this regard, the words of former Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, Jr., are as appropriate today as when they were spoken several years ago (*Commander's Digest*, July 12, 1973):

Many contend that such a program (as security assistance) has outlived its usefulness and is an anachronism in these days of a trend toward détente'. To do so is not only to misread the history of the past 25 years but also to misinterpret the signs of the times. The record is open to all that care to consult it. That record fully substantiates the conclusion that the world situation in which we currently find new hope for the future would not exist if the people of the United States had earlier refused to concern themselves with the common defense of the Free World. Had we not become 'involved' and, for more than two decades, supported and encouraged the efforts of allied and friendly countries to protect themselves against threats to their territorial integrity and internal security, the complexion of the globe might be dangerously different today, and the international climate far more hostile."⁵¹

CONCLUSION

In summation and to directly tie the aspects of security assistance and coalitions to our National Security strategy we must review the facts as they have been presented throughout the paper. This will facilitate deducing the answer to the theses: is the Security Assistance Program a viable tool in the development of coalitions and the execution of our National Security Strategy?

First, we have as a nation, clearly articulated our national security strategy. We have outlined its objectives of enhancing our security, promoting prosperity and promoting democracy. We have linked the importance of achieving these objectives with the maintenance of our way of life and the preservation of democracy. We have discussed the political conflict in terms of domestic agenda versus international agenda. We have discussed the impact of limited resources on our ability to pursue both. If we are to accomplish both, we must find a multiplier that enhances or increases our already stretched assets. We determined that multiplier was the formation of coalitions. We have defined and discussed in detail the importance of coalitions. We described the role that they play in leveraging or pooling limited assets to maximize our ability to achieve our national security objectives. It is through the political alignment of a coalition, that a threat to regional security may be held in check. We have shown that we enhance defense and create stability through the alignment of our nation with other nation states to achieve a shared political or military objective. We have compared and contrasted coalitions and alliances. We have identified and discussed the benefits and detriments of coalitions. We have seen that coalitions provide us the political leverage to further our national interests while assuming the moral high ground and shaping world opinion. We have clearly established that in this New World order and its

evolution into the future, coalitions are the political tool of choice. If all of this is fact, then what can we do to facilitate coalition building? What tool is there in our diplomatic arsenal that would allow us to pursue our own national self interests while increasing the desirability to be aligned with and fostering friendships with other nation states?

That tool is the Security Assistance program. The desirability of American arms, equipment and training make the SA program a valuable and viable tool in the world of international politics. In this paper we have linked the Security Assistance program directly to coalitions and in turn to our national security strategy. We have discussed how the SA program contributes directly to spreading democracy through the national security objective of engagement and enlargement. The application of the SA program allows us to maintain a forward presence but with a limited footprint. This forward presence provides us with a multitude of options in response to a crisis. We have defined the SA program and identified the six components that constitute it. We have discussed the Clinton Administration's initial position on the program and its evolution and maturity. We have outlined the current Nation State participants in the program and by doing so we have deduced the propensity and the proliferation of the program. We have discussed the importance of the SA program as a political tool in shaping current and future political agendas in other nation

states. We have discussed the role that the SA program plays in identifying potential coalition partners and its side benefits of interoperability.

We have identified the dual benefits of the application of the program; political and military. We have seen how this program aids our defense industry. In the most simplistic terms, we can sum up the concept of national security, coalitions and Security Assistance by an elementary equation: ways, ends and means. National security is the end we desire. The way is through coalitions. The means is the Security Assistance program. Therefore, the Security Assistance Program is definitely a viable tool to assist in the formation and maintenance of coalitions, thereby achieving of ends of National Security.

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