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CONTENTS

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NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Draft on USSR Federative Structure Discussed [A. Salmin; KOMSOMOLET, 24 Oct 89]	1
Party Sponsored Roundtable Considers Multiple Parties, Factions [Yu. Shabanov; MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 26 Aug 89]	2

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Baltic Parliamentary Group Declaration [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 26 Oct 89]	6
Armenian CP Central Committee Faults Earthquake Recovery Progress [KOMMUNIST, 24 Aug 89] ...	6
14th Session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Concludes	8
Information Report [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 Sep 89]	8
Resolution Implementing Political Reform [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 Sep 89]	8
Kirghiz Supreme Soviet September Session	9
Information Report [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 23 Sep 89]	9
Dzhumagulov's Report [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 23 Sep 89]	10
Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet on Economic, Social Shortcomings [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 26 Sep 89]	16
New Uzbek SSR People's Control Committee Chairman Appointed [PRAVDA UKRAINY, 20 Aug 89]	22
Personnel Changes Made at 19 August Uzbek CP Plenum [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 20 Aug 89]	22
Joint Tajik CP, Komsomol CC Plenum Boosts Role of Youth	23
Makhkamov Speech [K.M. Makhkamov; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 28 Sep 89]	23
Plenum Report [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 28 Sep 89]	25

NATIONALITY ISSUES

CC Journal Warns Against National Parties Emerging in Georgia, Baltics [V. Pavlov; POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE No 14, Sep 89]	34
Soviet UN Official Barsegov on NKAO Self-Determination Issues [Yu. Barsegov; KOMMUNIST, 3 Oct 89]	41
Azerbaijani Official Denies RSFSR Control of NKAO [E. Asgarova; AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI, 6 Sep 89]	47
Karabakh Aid Committee Chairman Interviewed [KOMMUNIST, 1 Sep 89]	48
Foreign Press Faulted For NKAO Coverage [ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT, 8 Sep 89]	48
KGB Chief Comments on Foreign Interference in NKAO [KOMMUNIST, 10 Sep 89]	48
Azerinform Reports Results of Poll on NKAO [AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI, 15 Sep 89]	48
Azerbaijani Writers' Union Recognizes People's Front [ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT, 29 Sep 89]	48
Azeri Language TV Studio Opens in Shusha [KOMMUNIST, 5 Sep 89]	49
Situation in Novyy Uzen Following June Violence [I. Mordvintsev; SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 6 Oct 89]	49
Dangers of National Extremism Noted [T. Gaidar; MOSCOW NEWS No 36, 10-17 Sep 89]	50
People's Deputy Bratun on Easing Ethnic Tensions [R. Bratun; MOSCOW NEWS No 40, 8-15 Oct 89]	51
Discussion of Ethnic Problems, Political Freedoms [L. Mlechin; NEW TIMES No 40, 3-9 Oct 89]	53

LAW AND ORDER

Georgian MVD Notes Growth In Crime Figures [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 8 Sep 89]	57
18 September Deaths Of Two Militiamen In AzSSR Examined [A. Petrushov; PRAVDA, 27 Sep 89]	58

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Scientists on Right to Information [N. Bolkhovitinov; MOSCOW NEWS No 36, 10-17 Sep 89]	62
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Georgian Subcommittee Reports on Media Treatment of 9 April Events [R. Chkheidze; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 26 Sep 89]	62
Journalists Denied Access to Ukrainian People's Congress [S. Ganichev; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 9 Sep 89]	68

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Latvia's History Outlined; Claim of Former Sovereignty Rebutted [L. Nikitinskiy; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 13 Sep 89]	70
Estonian Supreme Soviet Commission on 1940 Events in Estonia	72
Report on Findings [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 11 Oct 89]	72
Inclusion in USSR Deemed 'Illegal' [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 11 Oct 89]	75

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Deputy Chairman Yablokov on Supreme Soviet Environmental Politics [A. Yablokov; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 5 Oct 89]	78
Goals, Charter of 'Azerbaijan Ecological Union' Society [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 14 Sep 89]	78
Development of 'Ecological Glasnost' in Media, Society Explored [D. B. Oreshkin; POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE No 10, Jul 89]	82

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Transcaucasus Muslim Leader Interviewed on Role of Islam [A. Pasha-zade; NAUKA I RELIGIYA No 9, Sep 89]	86
Kazakh Demographer Interviewed [M. Tatimov; MADENIYET ZHANE TURMYS No 8, Aug 89]	87
High Aral Region Throat Cancer Rate Linked to Diet, Not Environment [M. Kabulov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 9 Sep 89]	88
State 'Neglecting' Chernobyl Cleanup Workers [Yu. Zylyuk; SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 13 Sep 89] ...	89
AIDS, Health Care Situation in Uzbek SSR [Kh. Tadzhiyev; KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 5 Oct 89]	91
Isolation May be Used to Prevent Spread of AIDS [V. Nikolayev; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 41, 14-20 Oct 89]	92
Update on Shortage of Disposable Syringes [Ye. Danilevich; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 15 Oct 89]	92

Draft on USSR Federative Structure Discussed

90UN0309A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
24 Oct 89 p 1

[Interview with A. Salmin, chief scientific worker of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers' Movement, by D. Radyshevskiy: "Federation Without Conflicts?"]

[Text] The improvement of interethnic relations in our country is being considered by A. Salmin, doctor of historical sciences, lead scientific workers at Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a member of a group of scientists working on the draft for a reorganization of the federative structure in the USSR.

[Question] Why are the interethnic relations in our country so complicated?

[A. Salmin] The roots of many problems go very deep into history. As it expanded its borders, Russian absorbed peripheral zones of independent ancient civilizations, the centers of which were outside its boundaries. The gravitation toward these cultural and social centers has not disappeared: the Muslims of Central Asia would like to make a pilgrimage to Mecca; the Shiites of Azerbaijan have a lively interest in what is occurring in Iran; the Catholics in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine listen attentively to what is being said in the Catholic centers of Poland and Italy. This "centrifugal nature" is increasing as nations are currently striving to acquire their historic memory.

The RSFSR agencies of authority have largely fused with the union ones, so that the Russian nation—the largest ethnic group populating the USSR—seemingly does not have its own autonomy, whereas, in various segments of other nationalities and ethnic groups in the USSR, people perceive their ethnosocial existence as though it were under "Russian" control. Ideas such as this, I feel, are caused by the overconcentration of the authoritative functions in Moscow, a geographical point that, since ancient times, has been equated with Russia, with the Russian nation.

Another "Gordian knot" is the fact that the boundaries of the national-territorial formations do not conform to the boundaries of settlement by those ethnic groups.

Two nations whose size, according to the 1979 census, is more than a million (Germans and Poles) and nine nations (Koreans, Bulgarians, Greeks, etc.) with a population of from 100,000 to a million, do not have any territorial autonomy at all: for 16 nations (for example, the Kazakhs, Belorussians, and Armenians), from 20 to 50 percent of their representatives live outside the confines of their autonomic formations; for seven nations (including the Tatars, Khanty, and Komi), more than half of them do. The fate of the representatives of these nations is developing in a complicated manner.

[Question] How do you think these "knots" can be untied?

[A. Salmin] In the Constitution it is necessary to define more precisely the concept of the sovereignty of the union republic, the right of the peoples that are living together compactly to have their national-territorial autonomy, and the right of groups residing outside the confines of their republics and autonomous formations to have representation in the agencies of authority.

Provision must be made for equal and proportional representation of the union republics in the Supreme Soviet, and the reduction to an intelligent minimum of the number of union ministries and the limitation of their administrative functions; it is necessary to carry out the republics' rights to establish direct relations with foreign countries, to participate in the activities of international organizations, etc.

[Question] You have mentioned the rights of the union republics. But the rights of the autonomous oblasts and republics continue to be limited. Potential conflicts can also be found here.

[A. Salmin] That is a justified fear. We need a federation of completely equal lands. National autonomous formations of all types should be put on a par with the union republics. For all federative units in relations with one another and with the central authority, the rights should be equal.

[Question] It is well known that national movements sometimes advance separatist slogans. Aren't you afraid that your proposals, if they are adopted, will make the situation more acute?

[A. Salmin] As a rule, the slogans that you are talking about are born among people who lack political experience, who have a poor knowledge of history, who do not sense their responsibility for the fate of their nation. At times they simply do not have any idea of the very grave consequences that the destruction of the common home can have for their very own nation. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that the old political-economic system under present-day conditions not only does not guarantee the stability of the unification but, rather, intensifies and sometimes also gives rise to centrifugal tendencies. The task lies in creating a political system and an economic situation which, without making any encroachments on the constitutional right of nations for self-determination, would forms those conditions under which the the very posing of the question of withdrawing from the USSR would be obviously meaningless.

[Question] Perestroika includes that goal. But what could be undertaken within the immediate future, when the path to that goal appears to be such a long and difficult one?

[A. Salmin] Scientists propose a principle for the formation of the Council of Nationalities that is different from the one that is currently in effect: every nation, regardless of how small it is, must be represented in it by an equal number of members. In those instances when a decision that has been made by the Supreme Soviet is capable, to one degree or another, to infringe upon the interests of some other nation, there must be a mechanism that neutralizes such decisions—for example, the veto right. In

order to establish whether a specific veto harms the interests of other nations or whether it violates the union Constitution, it would be desirable to create authoritative and influential arbitration. It is, of course, very complicated to preclude the arising of any interethnic conflicts. However, we shall hope that the special agencies of expression of the national will—the National Soviets that were formed democratically in the course of open discussion of the candidates—will not occupy extreme positions, but will operate in a more responsible manner than the self-designated “leaders of nations” who have appeared in such large number recently, and will seek and find intelligent decisions.

Party Sponsored Roundtable Considers Multiple Parties, Factions

18001648A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Aug 89 pp 1-2

[Article by Yu. Shabanov: “Honest Discussion: The Party Today and What It Should Be Like; Mutual Understanding Through Dialogue”]

[Text] Epilogue to a roundtable meeting attended by party workers, scientists, representatives of the Russian and Moscow People's Fronts, the United Moscow Workers' Front, the Social Initiative Fund and other unofficial organizations.

One and a half years ago, someone came up with the idea of discussing a meeting between party workers and leaders of newly declared informal political associations. Unfortunately, the plan was not destined to see the light of day. At that time—to think it was only one and a half years ago!—the very idea of such a meeting, or even a discussion of the problems of restructuring as they are viewed by both sides, seemed unrealizable. What could we possibly talk about, both sides wondered?

As it turned out, there was room for discussion. Understandably, I am not referring to “Pamyat” [Memory] with its disgusting aura of the “Black Hundred”, nor to the Democratic Union or the transnational radicals for whom the socialist system itself is anathema. Dialogue with them is impossible if only because they want to listen to no one but themselves. I am referring instead to the unofficial organizations—and they are in the majority—that are worried about restructuring, even if this worry sometimes takes too radical a form. After all, it is known that the more opinions and views there are, including the most extreme, the shorter the path to the truth will be.

So here is a new spire in the building of bridges of mutual understanding—a roundtable conducted by the party city committee. Seated there, along with party workers, were members of unofficial associations, scientists and workers. Strictly speaking, this was a continuation of a party-wide city discussion initiated by the gorkom plenary session on the place and role of the CPSU in society, and on inner-party democracy.

It is indicative that the last discussion of this sort in the party took place 62 years ago, in 1927. D.M. Dankin,

director of the Institute of Party History under the Moscow City Committee and Moscow CPSU Committee, and leader of the roundtable, shared this recollection with the others gathered at the meeting, adding by the way, that it would be somewhat awkward to call it a discussion in the literal sense. It was a basic assault on the party opposition, ostensibly under the guise of democracy.

“But needless to say, we didn’t gather here to point out, these are ‘reds’ and those are ‘whites’, let’s get after the ‘whites’,” he said. “We are all ‘greens’ in the sense that we are only starting to thoroughly grasp the forgotten ABC’s of discussion, and respect for other opinions and other points of view. However, the very fact that we are beginning to comprehend and beginning to move toward discussion in the literal sense of the word, is highly significant. It says that the party is alive and developing, and is returning to Leninist norms...”

Incidentally, it is also germane to recall that Moscow, together with Petrograd, was a traditional center of discussion in the first years of the revolution. Muscovites frequently presented alternative proposals. True, some of them were unacceptable, but then, they opened possibilities for a richer, more comprehensive search for different approaches in the party’s strategy and tactics. Or take, for example, the struggle against the “rightist opposition” staged by Stalin. The Moscow party organization, in support of this “opposition”, came out against the repressive methods of collectivization.

Subsequently the city party organization was brought into line under cover of the slogan that Moscow was a model city—a slogan first advanced, incidentally, at the start of the 1930’s by Kaganovich.

I mention all this to point out that history, with all its contradictions and radical departures, nonetheless steadily advances, destroying previous stereotypes. That which just yesterday was presented as an upheaval of foundations is today perceived as a normal interpretation of reality. The foundations, by the way, do not become less strong because of this. Who, for example, could believe that a party official would criticize the sixth article of the Constitution which deals with the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party. A.I. Zemskov, first secretary of the Voroshilov Party raykom, began his address with precisely this criticism.

“I think that we have absolutely no need for this article as it now stands,” he said. “Moreover, it is an insult to the state and to the party...”

To be honest, I thought at first, isn’t this grandstanding on the secretary’s part, and a desire to wow the unofficial group members with feigned left-wing views? But listen further:

“The leading and guiding role of the party—and it is a role I do not deny—must be ensured in actual fact, and not by declaration. We communists must affirm our right to this role on an hourly basis by our deeds. Then the people will acknowledge it, regardless of written codification.”

No, this is no word game, but rather a concern for the party's prestige, which has begun to fall in the eyes of fellow citizens due to the fact that it lags behind society with respect to democratization. And also a desire to raise it. That is, it is imperative that what is written in the Constitution reflects reality.

At this point, Yu.A. Prokofyev, second secretary of the city party committee, sounded a resonant rejoinder :

"In my opinion, we are moving, all the same, from the specific to the general, while it should be the other way around. We should first clarify the role of the party in society and then determine whether and what sort of written codification is needed."

"It is problem against which many a lance has been broken," V.V. Ivanov, a member of the Russian People's Front continued the conversation. "We are now engaged in a great deal of discussion about the distribution of functions between the party and soviets. But first we need to work out the mechanism for such a discussion. The party should study ideas. Then the ideas must win over the masses. After this, the party representatives will become leaders of the state..."

Isn't there a contradiction here? The party is assigned the role of an ideological institute and at the same time is required to concern itself with administrative affairs. Yu.A. Prokofyev also noticed this!

"All the trouble lies in the very fact that the party by virtue of the existence of a command system, has turned into an agency of administrative management. But it must operate by the methods of persuasion, by the methods of theory development, and by its intellectual potential. Even when the party, say, wins at the polls, it doesn't mean that it must fill an administrative role. Its essence in that case is distorted. The party should remain a party, implementing its ideals through its representatives in state agencies, but under no circumstances should it become a state agency itself. The party shouldn't be involved in sending people out to dig potatoes or ringing deliveries out of suppliers, etc. After all, the crisis arose in large part because the party became buried under economic problems..."

Again, agonizing searches for the truth: Just where is the watershed between policy and administration?

"Doesn't that throw the baby out with the bath water?" pondered A.I. Zemskov. "A pure division of functions doesn't exist, in my opinion. Take foreign parties for example. Who's policy is Margaret Thatcher implementing through administrative methods? The Conservative Party's. Reagan, during the years of his presidency, implemented the ideology of the Republican Party. After all, it's no accident that the term "Reaganomics" was coined. So it's senseless, I think, for the party to relinquish the practice of state administration. Otherwise it would be transformed into a Marxist fan club..."

Another point of view was voiced here.

"There is experience in which the party implements its policy, and quite successfully, not through state agencies but through social agencies," said S.A. Popov, chairman of the social self-management committee of the "Saburovo" fats and oil combine. "Like in Sweden, for example, through agencies of self-management. As Lenin wrote, they are the higher school of democracy. Together with the party raykom, we now decide how it can best conduct its policy through these agencies..."

Note, it should conduct, and influence, but by no means should it dominate or pressure through the use of bureaucratic levers. Until recently the Party presented itself as a monolith of compressed unanimous voices. They were compressed to such an extent that the voices of individual communists were indistinguishable. D.S. Klementyev, deputy secretary of the Moscow State University party committee spoke about this. He was supported by A.V. Seredinin, a member of the coordinating council of the Moscow United Workers' Front and brigade leader of mechanical plant No. 2.

"Workers have relied and continue to rely on the Communist Party as a political vanguard. But the fact is that the party has become bureaucratically entangled in its apparatus and has caused rank-and-file communists, including workers, to forget how to think. We were the mechanical executors of someone's will. The task now, as I see it, consists in teaching people to think, to make decisions, and to take responsibility not just for their own affairs, but for state affairs..."

Teach them to think, and perhaps to act.

"We must not forget that the party is not simply an ideological institute," said V.V. Trushkov, department head at the Moscow Higher Polytechnical School. "It is a political organization defending class interests. We admit that it is now in crisis. But after all, it has not failed or collapsed. The issue at hand is a critical—but what is more, please note—a temporary condition from which there are always two ways out. One way is through the restoration of a healthy situation. The party reminds me, in this way, of a slowly convalescing patient. It is very bad that some defeatist attitudes, confusion and scepticism have emerged within the party. Others generally say, 'Let's give up power, stand on the sidelines and watch.' Yes, the party openly declared: state power is being transferred to the soviets. But some sort of political power remains. How can we renounce it?! If you are a communist, you must be a political warrior. Otherwise, there will be a long convalescence..."

That's how it is—confusion and scepticism. Recall the recent election of people's deputies. Many party committees and organizations have withdrawn, for all intents and purposes, from conducting this important political campaign. At this point people, a good many people, turned up prepared to speculate on these difficulties and to groundlessly accuse the party of every deadly sin. So where were the communists? In the best case, they had silently stepped aside.

"Why is this?" One tries to understand.

"We have still not learned how to work under the new conditions," comes the pat answer.

Yet where else does one learn, but in the streets and squares and in the heat of battle at meetings? Meetings and discussions with voters on the most pressing issues could become an excellent school of political struggle.

The round table discussion then turns toward a new problem: Whose interests should the party defend—the working class, all society, or some consolidated portion of it?

"Let's stop speaking of classes altogether," said V.A. Ivanov, again entering the polemic. "It's time to acknowledge that Marx's theory of class is bankrupt. It cleaves society and engenders envy and hostility among individual structures of the population. We argue over whose interests the party expresses, formerly assuming that they were different for workers as opposed, for example, to the intelligentsia. This is a profoundly flawed thesis. There are interests common to man, and they are identical for everyone. The party should express the interests of society and people as a whole."

"'Common to man' sounds eloquent but at present mankind is very strongly divided, including a division into military blocs," objected V.V. Akimov, secretary and coordinator of the interclub party group and board member of the social initiative fund. "Marx is not the issue. Classes existed before him. It is a historical division. No one advocated antagonism between the classes. On the contrary, people have sets of varied interests. They must be united and brought into agreement. The party should fulfill the role of this integrative force..."

"I also disagree with the term 'common to man'," said A.V. Babushkin, member of the coordinating council of the Moscow People's Front. "Our society has social groups with diverse interests. And the party cannot defend them all simultaneously. This means that the one-party theory is, in principle, artificial. It seems to me that we now have five possible models for the development of society, in accordance with which the party's place in it changes."

"First, new parties emerge apart from the CPSU and enter into severe confrontation with it. Second, new parties again emerge apart from the CPSU, to which the party itself gives the 'green light' and with which it cooperates. Third, the CPSU systematically divides into 2, 3, 4 or more parties of a socialistic-communistic type. Fourth, factions and platforms emerge within the party, resulting in a de facto multi-party environment, even though the one-party system remains de jure. And the fifth model, I think, is the most negative possibility: the present unitarian party environment is maintained and society continues to develop along the well-worn rut it has been in for decades."

"For me, as a representative of the party that is ruling nowadays, the second model for the development of

society is most desirable. By taking this tack, the party would demonstrate its moral ideological, and political stability."

This view point was by no means supported by everyone there, not even representatives of the unofficial organizations.

"The Russian People's Front, which I represent here, could call itself a party as early as tomorrow," noted V.A. Ivanov. "But we do not do this, on the assumption that the time has not yet come for a multi-party environment. As a prerequisite, we must revive the personality, and a civil society, in which people know how to listen and hear each other, and how to seek compromise. In my opinion, a multi-party environment is marked not only by a variety of viewpoints, but of necessity, by the search for joint solutions and concerted actions. At present, it might lead to angry flare-ups and confrontations."

"We have already had a multi-party system," added T.P. Arkhipova, chairman of the Moscow city party KRK organization. "There is nothing fundamentally new in this. What is needed are not artificial, but natural prerequisites, if we are to discuss this—both in the spiritual sphere and in the economic..."

"What is more, the party is a part of society and a part of the system that is converting from command-and-administrative methods to democratic ones," said A.I. Smirnov, first deputy head of the CPSU Moscow City Committee's Ideological Department. "The party is also changing. We have still not properly tested its democratic potential, which is quite great..." This engendered a new burst of heated discussion on democratic centralism, the possibility of factions and platforms existing in the party, and the rights of primary party organizations...

"Every Communist should have the opportunity to express his opinion without fearing that he'll have to listen to an overbearing diatribe," said A.I. Zemskov. "I think that we need to formulate in this regard proposals for the 28th party congress. For example, we should directly reflect in the Charter the need for a multiplicity of views in the party, and the obligation to publish articles in the press conveying both majority and minority opinions, and alternative proposals..."

But perhaps the most heated arguments developed over the relationship between elective agencies and the apparatus, and over increasing the prestige of those to whom the party's authority has been delegated.

"This requires that we rescind provisional instructions on the election of leading agencies in the party," said D.S. Klementyev. "If we don't do this, we'll end up with the very same composition of the Central Committee, with which we are now dissatisfied, and with toothless party committees. The multi-stepped system of elections should be replaced by a direct secret vote on the basis of alternative choices."

"I agree with you," A.V. Babushkin said in support. "It seems to me that if we now give the apparatus—even if a

very good, very honest apparatus—the opportunity to eliminate, choose, and think through everything for the party itself, people will see that once again their will, their opinions and their thoughts mean nothing. Communists are beginning to seek out different channels for their activism outside the party. The best forces will be leaving the CPSU.”

Yes, the time has now come, as Yu.A. Prokfyev and other of the conversation's participants noted, to rouse the party organizations and to lift them to the level of the problem being discussed during the roundtable. To gather diverse opinions, needless to say, without coercion. To study them, integrate them and submit them to the congress. One platform, developed by the apparatus, even if jointly with well known scientists, will not replace the platforms coming 'from the bottom up' which set forth the will of many, many communists.

V.M. Ivanov, professor of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee expressed a somewhat unexpected point of view:

“We are giving in to stereotypes here, but we shift the discussion from its guiding agencies to the apparatus and back. Incidentally, from Lenin's point of view, and from the viewpoint of Lenin's contemporary communists, the party apparatus consists of the elective portion, members of party buros, committees, etc. While the non-elective workers are the people who help them and who serve the elective portion of the party. Therefore, when Trotsky struck against the party apparatus in 1923, it was a shock throughout the party. After all, he was not targeting the instructors of raykoms and obkoms, nor even department heads. He was striking against the elective portion of the party, its very backbone.”

“I am of the opinion that even today, in criticizing the apparatus, some people are striking against the elective portion of the party, and at the party as a whole,” said A.P. Shustov, metal worker at the Stankokonstruksiya plant. “The party, of course, is responsible for everything taking

place in the country, and it cannot renounce this responsibility. But when its very existence is brought into doubt, this is going too far.”

“We workers will stick up for our party,” added L.I. Gracheva, brigade leader of a team of plasterers at the Mosotdelstroi-8 trust. “But the party itself must resolutely change and free itself from everything that lowers its prestige, and from the people who have besmirched its honor. And all of us, every communist, must change. So that we aren't embarrassed to look people in the eye...”

The discussion came to a close. But not because the topics of the conversation had been exhausted. On the contrary, a wealth of topics hadn't been touched. After all, can one really resolve them at one sitting? Therefore, it was decided to make such roundtable meetings a regular occurrence at the Social-Political Center.

Now I would like to mention certain problems that the participants of the next roundtable meetings intend to address, and propose that the readers express their opinions with regard to these problems. So...

Is there glasnost in the country or semi-glasnost? Why do we know far from all that we need to know?

Are factions and platforms needed in the party, if we are to speak of a pluralism of opinions?

What specifically needs to be changed in the party program and charter?

How can we raise the prestige of primary party organizations?

What involvement should party organizations have in elections to local soviets?

What relationship should the party have to unofficial organizations?

Democratic centralism - an anachronism or urgent necessity?

We await your letters, respected readers.

You may view a televised report on this meeting on the program “Good Evening, Moscow” on Monday, August 28 after the program “Time”.

Baltic Parliamentary Group Declaration

*18002001 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
26 Oct 89 p 1*

[Declaration adopted at USSR Supreme Soviet: "For Democracy and Guaranteeing of Nationalities' Rights; Declaration of the Baltic Parliamentary Group"]

[Text] LATINFORM special correspondent S. Prokoshenko reports from the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the goals and tasks of the Baltic Parliamentary Group. The group was formed by deputies from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The declaration adopted by them, and addressed to the USSR People's Deputies, states:

We, the USSR People's Deputies from the three Baltic republics, asserting the principles of democracy and national rights, created the Baltic Parliamentary Group on 13-14 May in Tallinn.

The creation of the BPG was brought about by the necessity to more actively use the intellectual and organizational capabilities of the deputies of the Baltic republics in the realization and protection of democratic principles in the work in the Supreme Soviet and USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The BPG announces its readiness to cooperate with deputies of all republics and autonomous entities for the protection of the rights of nationalities living within the USSR.

The BPG intends to coordinate its activity with the Inter-regional Deputies Group and other groups holding positions close to ours. This can take the form of actions directed toward the rebirth of state sovereignty of union republics, radical changes in economy and policy enabling the creation of a market economy, the dismantling of the command-administrative-bureaucratic system of management of the USSR and by republics and the intolerable usurpation of authority by any party.

We support the activity of different deputies and groups directed toward ensuring real conditions for national self-determination, goodwill and equal rights in all forms of cooperation and interaction of states and peoples. The BPG is ready for joint action with those deputy groups and various deputies whose intentions and efforts are directed toward elimination of the reasons for the Terror: disintegration of national cultures and morality, degradation of man and the means necessary to the life of future generations.

We are with those who realize the necessity of restoring historical rights in the relations of peoples of the USSR and that the realization of human rights is unthinkable without the realization of the rights of nationalities, and that the rights of nationalities includes human rights.

We are in solidarity with those who realize that bringing about human rights requires humanization of the Armed Forces through its voluntary formation and complete subordination to citizens' authority. We are with those

who strive toward the peaceful resolution of all conflicts and the creation and expansion of a demilitarized zone.

We are sure that setting aside our national and regional interests can only be done through consolidation of democratic forces, that the freedom and happiness of one people can't be attained at the expense of limiting the rights and freedoms of other peoples."

Ninety deputies from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia affixed their signatures to the BPG declaration.

These deputies announced that the BPG is open to contacts and intends to inform deputies and society of their activities by means of press conferences, public discussions, and other measures of this kind.

Armenian CP Central Committee Faults Earthquake Recovery Progress

*90US0040A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
24 Aug 89 p 1*

[Armenpress report: "Meeting at the Armenian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] On August 22 a meeting at the Armenian CP Central Committee was held on expediting the course of recovery work at the zone of the earthquake. The following people took part in the meeting: a group of senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee Staff; leaders of a number of union ministries and departments; deputy chairmen of Councils of Ministers; ministers and deputy ministers of union republics, first secretaries of Armenian CP gorkoms [city party committees] and raykoms [rayon party committees]; chairmen of ispolkoms [executive committees] of city and rayon soviets of people's deputies; directors of departments and large economic organizations.

N.A. Stashenkov, first deputy chairman of the CPSU Central Committee of the Department of Socio-Economics, gave an analysis of the course of the recovery work.

It was observed that a considerable amount of work has just been carried out in mobilizing forces and resources to expedite the recovery of the cities, rayon centers, and villages from the after-effects of the earthquake. Around 50 construction associations and trusts and more than 350 detachments and trains have been mobilized. Eighty-two thousand people are employed by this effort, half of whom are from the local population.

Measures have been taken towards creating the production basis for construction within a shorter period of time. Experimental production ranges of reinforced concrete structures with a total capacity of 300,000 cubic meters have been set up. Reinforced concrete and concrete goods have been issued to factories destroyed in Leninakan and Kirovakan. Twenty-five modular cement-mixer installations have been assembled and put into service. Production capacities for non-metallic building materials have been increased to 3.9 million cubic meters, and the capacities for porous filler have been raised to 2.0 million cubic meters.

Those most actively taking part in work at housing sites and sites of cultural and communal facilities have been construction organizations from: the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building, the USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, and a number of oblasts of the Russian Federation.

However, seven months into the current year, the adopted targets for making housing and cultural and communal facilities operational have not been met.

Difficulties with meeting one-year targets have developed for the organizations working in Leninakan from: the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, the RSFSR Ministry of Construction in the Southern Regions, the RSFSR Ministry of Construction in the Northern and Western Regions, the Moscow city ispolkom and the Leningrad city ispolkom. Here the use of labor resources is at less than half of potential. There is a shortage of metal equipment for massive housing construction. Slowdowns in construction and recovery efforts have been permitted in the following rayons: Aniyskiy, Akhuryanskiy, Artikskiy, Amasiyskiy, Gurarskiy, Spitakskiy, and others.

The work with which Armenian SSR organizations have been entrusted—restoring residential buildings and other public facilities which have suffered elemental damage—has progressed very poorly. The Armenian Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction] is not fulfilling the clearly understated plan adopted for 1989, which targets the restoration of only 23 out of a total of 1,200 residential buildings. Work is under way at nine sites.

Work on individual housing construction is an important step towards expediting the solution to the housing problem in the stricken areas of Armenia. A goal of creating no fewer than one million cubic meters of individual living space has been set. However, not all of the republic's reserves and capacities are being used for this work. Plots of land have still not been allotted for Kirovakan, Spitak, and a number of other cities and rayon centers. Not enough construction materials and structures are ear-marked for residential construction.

Of an entire complex of tasks being carried out in the zone stricken by the earthquake, the ones causing the most anxiety are the laying of surface lines and the construction of engineering facilities. The laying of water and sewage lines as well as the installation of heating lag far behind the time-table approved by the USSR Ministry of Water Resources and Construction. The USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification has also allowed work on construction projects in electrical and heating installation to fall significantly behind schedule.

The tempo of the recovery efforts and the new construction of industrial enterprises has a significant impact on the republic's economy and the population's ability to find employment. Of 162 enterprises and projects earmarked for restoration and rebuilding, about 78 should have production capacity restored in 1989.

As the situation appeared on August 1, the targets set in the resolution had been met for only 23 enterprises. The

deadlines for the restoration of capacity in eight enterprises are in danger of not being met.

Chronic shortages of sand, road metal, and sinter are seriously slowing the course of recovery work. This is a consequence of the unsatisfactory work done by enterprises of the industrial association "Armpromstroyaterialy." As a result, ministries have had to deliver these materials from other regions of the country. This is greatly increasing the cost of construction and taxing the resources of the railway rolling-park.

The targets approved in a resolution by the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers on the construction and restoration of sites of agro-industrial complexes are not being met.

The following persons addressed the meeting: V.I. Reshetilov, RSFSR minister of construction in the northern and western regions; A.N. Shchepetil'nikov, RSFSR minister of construction in the southern regions; V.N. Zabelin, RSFSR minister of construction in the Urals and West Siberia regions; V.M. Vidmanov, deputy chairman of RSFSR Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee]; N.G. Muradyan, first secretary of the Spitak party raykom; V.P. Salo, Ukrainian SSR minister of construction; G.N. Sudobin, USSR deputy minister of construction of petroleum and gas industry enterprises; L.S. Firisanov, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers; N.M. Makievskiy, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers; G.M. Fadeev, USSR first deputy minister of railways; S.O. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Amasiyskiy Rayon Committee; V.P. Batrakov, USSR deputy chairman of Gosstab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply]; G.F. Murav'ev, deputy chairman of the Tadzhik SSR Council of Ministers; A.V. Kocherga, USSR deputy minister of the power industry; K.D. Ambartsumyan, chairman of the Leninakan gorispolkom; V.I. Vorontsov, collegium member of the USSR Ministry of Water Resources and Construction; V.N. Tokmakov, USSR deputy minister of the timber industry.

Those who addressed the meeting with sharp criticisms analyzed the state of the work towards restoring the zone struck by the earthquake and made note of a number of mistakes and omissions which have significantly hampered the course of the recovery. In particular, representatives of local party and soviet organs and organizations carrying out construction work noted the unacceptably poor quality of material and technical building supplies. There was also talk of large-scale breakdowns in the organization of rail freightage, as a result of which considerable shortages of cement and building materials developed. It was suggested that special staffs should be created to accompany and protect trains carrying cargo to Armenia. A shortage of timber and joiner's material, whose overdue delivery is holding up the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, has given rise to serious criticism by builders. It was observed that many buildings which are

almost completed are not yet operative because of a lack of water and sewage lines as well as heating and electric systems.

Representatives of the Ministries of Power and Electrification, of Water Resources, of Light Industry, and of Railways reacted very seriously to criticism directed at them and assured the meeting's participants that they would take all of the necessary steps to correct the situation. A whole range of constructive suggestions was put forward towards making fundamental improvements in the business at hand, expediting the construction of housing and cultural and communal facilities, and insuring the implementation of the adopted program for eliminating the after-effects of the earthquake in Armenia.

Taking part in the meeting were G.M. Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; V.S. Markar'yants, chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministries; O.I. Lobov, second secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; and L.K. Ishutin and D.S. Afanas'ev, senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee.

14th Session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Concludes

Information Report

90US0081A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Sep 89 p 1

["Information Report on Session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On 22 September the Special 14th Session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, continued its work.

On instructions from the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, a report on the results of a review of the corrections and comments pertaining to the legislative drafts that were expressed in the course of the session was given by Deputy V.I. Yefimov, chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission.

Then, by a separate vote, the deputies adopted Kazakh SSR Laws entitled "Changes and Amendments to the Kazakh SSR Constitution (Basic Law)," "Languages in Kazakh SSR," "The Election of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies," and "The Election of Deputies to Local Soviets of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies," and Supreme Soviet resolutions entitled "Measures for the Further Carrying Out of the Political Reform in the Republic" and "Procedure for Implementing the Kazakh SSR Law Entitled 'Languages in Kazakh SSR.'"

With regard to questions concerning the scheduling of elections and the formation of the Central Electoral Commission for Electing and Recalling Kazakh SSR People's Deputies, a report was given by Deputy I.I. Sharf, member of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and general director of the Tselinograd Association for Poultry Raising.

The Supreme Soviet adopted resolutions concerning the scheduling of an election of Kazakh SSR people's deputies on 25 March 1990, the scheduling of an election of deputies to local soviets of Kazakh SSR people's deputies on 24 December 1989, and the formation of the Central Electoral Commission for Electing and Recalling Kazakh SSR People's Deputies.

The Supreme Soviet also adopted resolutions concerning the confirmation of Ukases of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Thereupon the Special 14th Session of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, completed its work.

Resolution Implementing Political Reform

90US0081B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Sep 89 p 1

[Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Measures for the Further Carrying Out of Economic Reform in the Republic, 22 September 1989]

[Text] Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, having considering the question of measures for the further carrying out of the political reform in the republic decrees:

1. The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the soviets of people's deputies, during the remaining period of their term of office, are to guarantee the consistent implementation of the second stage of the political reform in the republic, which is linked with the fundamental restructuring of the agencies of state authority at all levels, with the guaranteeing of the complete power of the soviets, and the further democratization of the forms and methods of their activity, and to coordinate closely the organizing work with the resolution of the key problems of the economic and social development of the republic and the regions.

They are to guarantee the complete study of the proposals and comments expressed by citizens with regard to Soviet agencies in the course of the public discussion of the draft versions of the Kazakh SSR Laws concerning the changes and amendments to the Kazakh SSR Constitution (Basic Law), languages in Kazakh SSR, the election of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, and the election of deputies to local soviets of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, and to take them into consideration in their practical activity.

They are to make broad use of the reports being given, in conformity with the 1 August 1989 resolution of USSR Supreme Soviet, by the executive and directive agencies at special sessions to work out the ways to resolve the social problems that have come to a head, to reinforce the ties between the soviets and the workers, and to increase the participation rate of the deputy formations.

2. Taking into consideration the importance of the forthcoming election of Kazakh SSR people's deputies and the deputies to the local soviets of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, in the system of measures to carry out the perestroika in the area of state construction in the republic, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and

the soviets of people's deputies, in conformity with the new legislation concerning elections, are to provide the necessary conditions for the complete use by labor collectives, public organizations, and the voters of their rights to the democratic, open, and public resolution of all questions linked with the nomination of candidates for election as deputies, their registration, voting, the establishment of the election results, and the tallying up of those results.

3. The republic's soviets of people's deputies, in conformity with decisions of the September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and basing their actions on the principles stated in the CPSU platform entitled "The Party's National Policy Under Present-Day Conditions," are to take decisive steps to repudiate every kind of national limitation, local selfishness, corporativeness, and departmental approach, and are to guarantee the complete and consistent implementation of the constitutional principle of the equal rights of citizens, irrespective of their race or nationality. They are to view every attempt to infringe upon individuals on the basis of nationality as being actions that contradict the basic principles of the Soviet legal system.

Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, for purposes of implementing the Law governing languages in Kazakh SSR, is to develop and submit to Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet a long-term public and state program for the development of languages and cultures in Kazakh SSR until the year 2000 and for the long-term period, having considered in it the resolution of personnel, material-technical, financial, training-methodology, and other questions, as well as the necessary measures for rendering assistance to the public in studying the local languages.

In conformity with the Self-Government and Self-Financing Concept, Kazakh SSR is to accelerate the preparatory work for converting the regions to cost-accounting principles, having in mind the maximum use of the available capabilities and resources for resolving the tasks of the socioeconomic development both of the regions themselves and the republic as a whole.

4. Noting the need for the radical reorganization of the court and legal system as a very important link on the path to building a law-governed state, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Legislative Recommendations Commission of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet are to be instructed to concentrate their attention on preparing legislative acts that are aimed at improving the law-enforcement mechanism, at guaranteeing the maximum recognition of the citizens' rights and freedoms, and at increasing the authority of the law and its strict observance by all state and public organizations, collectives, and citizens.

The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic's soviet and law-enforcement agencies are to make complete use of the capabilities of the provisional committees for fighting crime with regard to the decisive reinforcement of law and order and the stopping of violations of the law, and are to take all steps to develop public initiative and to use both the new and the time-tested

forms and methods of interacting with the public in the fight against crime, drunkenness, and alcoholism, and in guaranteeing the intactness of state and public property, as well as the citizens' personal property.

5. The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers is to review the proposals and comments expressed in the course of the public discussion of the legislative drafts, and also by deputies at the present session with regard to questions of economic and sociocultural construction, and is to make decisions to implement them.

Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, M. Sagdiyev. Secretary of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, K. Zhusupov.

Kirghiz Supreme Soviet September Session

Information Report

90US0105A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in
Russian 23 Sep 89 p 1

[KirTAG report: "Information Report on the Session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On 22 September, in the meeting hall of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, the 10th Extraordinary Session of the Kirghiz SSR of the 11th convocation began its work.

10:00 am. The places in the working presidium are occupied by Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro members T. Akmatov, D.B. Amanbayaev, A. Dzhumagulov, A. Zhunusov, V.K. Kandakov, R.S. Kulmatov, A.M. Masaliyev, U. Sydykov, N.M. Chepelev, U.K. Chinaliyev, M.Sh. Sherimkulov; Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro candidate member E. Abakirov, members of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, leaders of ministries and departments.

The following were invited to participate in the work of the session: USSR people's deputies, party raykom and gorkom first secretaries, leaders of a number of republic departments, public organizations, creative unions, ispolkom chairmen of city and rayon soviets of people's deputies, scientists, Kirghiz CP Central Committee and republic Council of Ministers officials who are not Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet deputies.

The session is being chaired by Deputy T. Sadykov, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

The deputies stood to honor the memory of Supreme Soviet Deputy P.M. Khodos, who died after the 9th session.

The session's agenda is confirmed:

1. The report of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers on the measures taken for the restructuring of their own work and the activity of the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies, republic ministries and departments in resolving economic and social problems, and fuller satisfaction of the population's inquiries.

2. On the Kirghiz SSR Draft Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Kirghiz SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law).

3. On the Kirghiz SSR Draft Laws on Elections of Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies and on the Elections of Deputies to Local Soviets of the Kirghiz SSR.

4. On the designation of elections for Kirghiz SSR people's deputies and for people's deputies to local soviets of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR.

5. On the formation of the Republic Electoral Commission for the elections of Kirghiz SSR people's deputies.

6. On the Kirghiz SSR Draft Law on the Kirghiz SSR State Language.

7. On the ratification of the Ukase of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The deputies are beginning the consideration of the agenda issues. The floor is given to Deputy **A. Dzhumagulov**, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers for the speech, "Report of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers on the measures taken for the restructuring of their own work and the activity of the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies, republic ministries and departments in resolving economic and social problems, and fuller satisfaction of the population's inquiries."

Debates on the issue under discussion begin.

The following spoke at the session: Deputy **N. Asanov**, Batkenskiiy electoral okrug No 244; Deputy **I.A. Medvedev**, Severnyy electoral okrug No 222; Deputy **E. Ormonov**, Toktogul electoral okrug No 347; Deputy **A.N. Zhelezov**, Shamaldy-Say electoral okrug No 224; Deputy **M. Tynarova**, Bokonbayevskiy electoral okrug No 44; Deputy **V.K. Dolmatov**, Priozernyy electoral district No 130; Deputy **O. Abdykalykov**, Ak-Korgonskiy electoral district No 226; Deputy **A.I. Biryukov**, Frunzenskiyi-Zapadnyy electoral district No 25; Deputy **G.T. Turdakunova**, Toktogul electoral district No 165; Deputy **Zh. Tyleberdiyev**, Tash-Kumyr electoral district No 223; Deputy **N.N. Vasilchenko**, Pushkinskiy electoral okrug No 204; Deputy **M.U. Nosinov**, Salamalikskiy electoral okrug No 316; Deputy **K. Tynaliyev**, Pervomayskiy electoral okrug No 128; Deputy **S. Kokoyev**, Kara-Kochorskiy electoral okrug No 288; Deputy **T. Kasiyev**, Chon-Sary-Oyskiy electoral okrug No 148.

The concluding speech was made by Deputy **A. Dzhumagulov**, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers. He also answered questions submitted by the deputies.

The deputies adopted a decree on the report of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers on the measures taken for the restructuring of their own work and the activity of the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies, republic ministries and departments in resolving economic and social problems, and fuller satisfaction of the population's inquiries.

The session entrusted the republic Council of Ministers with the consideration of all the deputies' comments and suggestions expressed during the discussion of the revision of the draft decree, and with its presentation to the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The floor is given to Deputy **T. Akmatov** for the speech, "On the Kirghiz SSR Draft Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Kirghiz SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)."

Then Deputy **K.B. Gusev**, deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium gave the speech "On the Kirghiz SSR Draft Laws on Elections of Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies and on the Elections of Deputies to Local Soviets of the Kirghiz SSR."

The session created an editorial commission for the summary and registration of the revision of suggestions and comments on the Draft Laws on the issues under discussion, contained in the deputies' speeches.

Debates on the issues under discussion are beginning. The following spoke during them: Deputy **M. Alymbekov**, Tee-Moyunskiy electoral okrug No 237; Deputy **N.P. Davydov**, Tsentralnyy electoral okrug No 213; Deputy **K. Chotoyev**, Ketmen-Debenskiy electoral district No 348; Deputy **V.K. Kandakov**, Lenin-Dzholskiy electoral district No 286; Deputy **T. Tabyldiyev**, Oktyabrskiy electoral okrug No 129; Deputy **G.A. Manuylova**, Yaroslavskiy electoral district No 15; Deputy **I.T. Gubarev**, Verkhneuzgenskiy electoral okrug No 310; Deputy **N.T. Mamatov**, Gulchinskiy electoral okrug No 200; Deputy **A.S. Moiseyev**, Gagarinskiy electoral okrug No 10; Deputy **K.I. Shamyrbekov**, Tertkul'skiy electoral okrug No 155; Deputy **Ye.G. Semenenko**, Derzhinskiy electoral okrug No 327; Deputy **T.O. Yusupova**, Nikolayevskiy electoral okrug No 75; Deputy **N.N. Kuzmina**, Alma-Ata electoral okrug No 47; Deputy **E. Dzhurabayev**, Stroitelnyy electoral okrug No 199; Deputy **A. Salibayev**, Kyzyl-Tuuskiy electoral okrug No 300; Deputy **A.I. Suttubayev**, Kuturginskiy electoral okrug No 158; Deputy **K. Abdrayev**, Alayskiy electoral okrug No 228, and USSR People's Deputy, Chief of the "OSH KPDproeyktstroy" **Yu.G. Gorbunov**.

On 23 September, the 10th Extraordinary Session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation will continue its work.

Dzhumagulov's Report

90US0105B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 23 Sep 89 p 3

[KirTAG report on speech by Deputy **A. Dzhumagulov**, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, at the Extraordinary Session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet: "Report of the Kirghiz Council of Ministers On the Measures Taken for the Restructuring of Their Own Work and the Activity of the Ispolkoms of Local Soviets of People's Deputies, Republic Ministries and Departments in Resolving Economic and Social Problems, and Fuller Satisfaction of the Population's Inquiries"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

In essence, the entire restructuring of the republic's national economy is entrusted to the Council of Ministers and its organs of the Supreme Soviet and Kirghiz CP Central Committee. Therefore, the demand upon it is special. In organizing and directing the efforts of the labor collectives, we first and foremost had to actively restructure ourselves, offering to the rest a worthy example of new-style work.

Can the Council of Ministers simply report today that it has more or less satisfactorily fulfilled the tasks entrusted to it? Unfortunately, it cannot. There are many reasons here. This is both work under the conditions of the extremely tense assignments of the 5-year plan, ratified by the Supreme Soviet, and work under the conditions of a transition and introduction of a new economic mechanism, and an almost complete renewal of the composition of the government. But all the same, the most important thing is the lack of a concrete, broad-scale economic strategy for all the main trends of activity.

All the same, certain measures for restructuring its work, and for improving the activity of the local soviets' ispolkoms were taken by the republic government. We attempted to turn particular attention to the key issues: A noticeable improvement in the population's foodstuffs provisions in the coming years; a significantly expanded volume of housing, school, children's institution, hospital, and clinic construction; satisfaction of the demand for consumer goods and services; the problems of health care, education, and culture. At the Supreme Soviet sessions, in addition to national economic plans, issues of the general plan of guidance of the national economy, environmental preservation and rational use of the republic's natural resources, the housing construction program and other issues introduced by the government were examined in detail.

The number of meetings of the Council of Ministers' Presidium was reduced. They are now held once a month rather than twice a month. The republic's scientists are more frequently involved in preparing the issues. The government and presidium members have reviewed their style and method of work. Expeditious decisions are being made on the scene more often. Such approaches have allowed for a reduction in the number of resolutions and instructions made, and an increase in their concrete and realistic nature. The number of reports and the amount of information requested from the localities has been noticeably reduced. The multitude of commissions of the Council of Ministers has been curtailed. The structure of the central apparatus has been reviewed; staff has been reduced by 33.2 percent. Certification has been conducted of chairmen and deputy chairmen of oblgorrayispolkoms [oblast, city, and rayon executive committees], all administration of affairs officials of the Council of Ministers, ministers, state committee chairmen, and their deputies.

The composition of the republic's Council of Ministers has been renewed and rejuvenated significantly. Of 34 ministers and state committee chairmen, 11 are under 50 years

of age, and only 4 leaders have recently reached pension age. Seven remain of the preliminary composition of the government confirmed by the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation. The composition of the oblgorrayispolkoms has been practically completely renewed.

The speaker said that although there are certain movements, we are not satisfied with our work. The restructuring of our activity is being implemented too slowly. There is no radical improvement in the management of the economy and the realization of many principles of economic reform. In effect, the commission for improving the economic mechanism, and the economic council distanced themselves from this important cause.

The ministries and departments are restructuring work slowly. Primarily occupied with current, small-scale work, they overlook many issues of the branches' long-term development. Here also is the shortfall of the republic Council of Ministers' leadership. Deputy Chairmen Comrades Aseyinov, Begaliyev, and Fisher; Presidium member Comrade Kunakunov, and I myself as chairman of the government are still not manifesting the needed persistence in introducing the new economic mechanism.

A great deal has not yet been done in restructuring the work style and methods of the Council of Ministers and the apparatus of the Council of Ministers' Administration of Affairs. An emphasis is frequently made on the administrative methods of leadership, without taking into consideration the new role of the organs of administration, and the expansion of enterprises' rights in accordance with the Law on State Enterprise.

The Council of Ministers, ministries, departments, and local soviets' ispolkoms still do not have close contact with the workers; they do not always inform collectives of major problems, of resolved and unresolved issues. Moreover, certain substandard leaders ignore the collectives' sensible suggestions and lawful demands. Evidence of this fact is the wild construction in the city of Frunze, the capital city bus drivers' tardiness, the workers' strike at the Ak-Tyuz mine and the Makmalskiy goldmining combine, and other cases which had to be fully studied by many organs, despite the fact that the majority of the issues raised should have been decided by the ispolkoms, ministries, and enterprise managers without losses for the collectives.

Comrades! In the republic over recent years, changes have been noted in the activity of the local soviets of people's deputies. They began to pay more attention to matters of developing the economy and the social sphere.

We already have definite results here. For example, of the 254 settled points of the Kantskiy, Kalininskiy, Kirovskiy, Sokulukskiy, Panfilovskiy, and Leninpolskiy rayons, 112 villages are provided with general educational schools, kindergartens, clubs, and medical facilities. Many village soviets of Osh and Issyk-Kul Oblasts have started to resolve these important matters better.

The contribution of private plots is becoming more important for the fulfillment of the Foodstuffs Program. While in

1986, a total of 91,000 metric tons of meat was produced by the population on the private plots, by 1988, the total was already 135,000 metric tons, or 35 percent of the republic's overall meat production volume; there was 477,000 metric tons of milk, or 45 percent.

A reorganization of the administrative-territorial structure of the Kirghiz SSR has been implemented in the republic; 64 administrations and apparatus departments of former obispolkoms were abolished; the number of staffers was reduced 30 percent, or by 667 units. Schemes for managing the national economy of oblasts, the cities of Frunze and Tokmak, and cities and rayons of republic subordination were considered.

However, in evaluating the work of the local soviets on the whole during today's breakthrough phase, it should be said that we are still poorly assisting in unleashing the colossal opportunities for mobilizing the workers for improving the standard of living, of cultural life and labor, and the resolution of social problems through the efforts of the farms and the population. Hence also come major derelictions in organizational work. Oblast, city, and rayon soviets have not yet fully perceived their role in the transition of regions to the principles of self-management and self-financing.

The results of any organ's activity are evaluated first and foremost by its contribution to the development of the economy and culture, by how realistically promises coincide with deeds. In light of this, the speaker cited several basic indices of the course of fulfillment of the assignments of the 5-year plan, confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. On the whole, the republic's national economy developed in accordance with the assignments of the 5-year plan during the past period of the 12th 5-year plan.

The gross social product over 3.5 years exceeded R41 billion, and grew 17 percent by comparison to 1985; the produced national income was R17 billion, and increased by 17.7 percent. There appeared progressive tendencies in the industrial structure. Over 3.5 years, the group "B" production growth rate exceeded the corresponding indicator for group "A" by a factor of two. Even though this is small, it is still a breakthrough.

Over 3.5 years, the growth in industrial production was 21.8 percent, against 18.4 percent. According to the assignment for 4 years, by early 1990, the republic's industry must get up to the rates stipulated for the end of the 12th 5-year plan. Over 3.5 years, the production volume of consumer goods rose 42.7 percent, while the assignment for 5 years was 38.9 percent. Some R662 million worth of goods have already been produced in excess of the 5-year plan's assignments. Over 5,000 new types of products have been assimilated.

Measures have been taken for the development of the material-technological base and infrastructure of the agroindustrial complex. Some R180 million has been invested in the development of the processing industry and the storage facilities alone. Over 3 years, R365 million of state and kolkhoz funds have been directed toward the

construction of sites with social, cultural, and living designations, a 164 percent growth. Capital investment in education, culture, and health care has increased 3.5-4 fold.

Over the past 3 years, the average annual gross output volume of agricultural products increased 12 percent, and reached R2.9 billion last year. Meat purchases grew 16 percent; milk, 21 percent; eggs, 42 percent; grain, 10 percent, and vegetables, 31 percent. As a result, the per capita consumption of meat and meat products increased by 8 kilograms, and the per capita consumption of milk and milk products increased by 71 kilograms. All these figures take into consideration a population increase of 265,000 people.

Serious changes are taking place in capital construction. Over 3.5 years, the 5-year assignment for housing erection has been 115 percent fulfilled; plans for construction of clinics, hospitals, and schools have been overfulfilled by 500,000 square meters. By comparison with 1985, last year's volume of housing erection increased by almost 30 percent.

Significant energy and resources are being directed toward industrial bases of construction materials, the construction industry, the Housing Construction Combine. Capital investment here last year alone grew by a factor of 2.5 compared with 1985. A 6 million square meter linoleum plant, a bath fixtures plant for producing 300,000 units annually, and wall materials and brick plants are under construction.

The plans for retail commodity circulation are overfulfilled, with growth over 3.5 years of 36.3 percent; the rate of growth for paid services over that time is 143.5 percent. But at the same time, we did not saturate the market with goods to a sufficient degree, balance income and expenditures, nor resolve the problem of supplying the population with foodstuffs. The rates and deadlines for resolving urgent social problems, especially housing, cannot satisfy us.

We did not manage to achieve a noticeable increase in the efficient use of production potential. The level of contract discipline is low. In total, over 3 years and 8 months, R197 million worth of industrial goods have not been delivered.

One of our main shortcomings is an underestimation of the role of economic management methods, stemming from our incapacity to master them. For example, the leasing system is being poorly introduced into industry. The managers' conservatism also has its effects here. Indeed, the transition to leasing does entail certain difficulties, especially with provision and packaging. However, the experience of individual enterprises is yielding encouraging results.

For example, in light industry, starting this year, five major enterprises with a total of 14,000 people work in a leasing system, or almost 30 percent of the branch's workers. All collectives finished the first 6 months of the year with plan overfulfillment and a profit of 5-23 percent.

The next step must be the creation of new forms of management in the form of associations or concerns. These matters are being worked out at this time.

The orator further noted that the existing structure and management of industrial production for the time being weakly influences the qualitative resolution of an important socioeconomic problem—the output of consumer goods in sufficient quantities and assortments. The republic is in 11th place in their per capita production—R674 versus R1,200 in the country overall.

In 1988, per ruble of salary fund, the entire machine building complex produced 1 ruble 37 kopeks worth of goods for the people, including an appliance manufacturing plant, (Comrade Ugarov), 77 kopeks; computers (Comrade Glushich), 38 kopeks; an agricultural machinery plant (Comrade Posnyy), 37 kopeks; the Khaydarkanskiy mercury combine (Comrade Kurmanayev), 17 kopeks; the Kadamdzhayanskiy antimony combine (Comrade Kayzer), 27 kopeks; mining (Comrade Yezhov), 3 kopeks value produced per ruble salary. In total, in the republic, enterprises of all-union subordination hold almost 36 percent of the overall volume of industrial production, with production of consumer goods holding only 18 percent.

It should be noted that neither the republic's Gosplan (Comrade Begaliyev, Aybalayev), nor economic institutions could set the given issue on a multilateral, considered scientific systems basis. For this reason alone, as before, we bring in over 180 types of the simplest goods, including axes, nails, glue, brushes, plastic bags, and others.

Measures are being developed in the republic to increase production of consumer goods. They stipulate the technological retooling of shops, sections, and enterprises turning out consumer goods, the creation of new production lines and enterprises. In 1990 alone, this will allow for an increase in consumer goods production volume by 20 percent over the plan for the current year. For example, it is envisaged that production lines under construction at the plant imeni Lenin will be retooled, allowing about 25,000 square meters space for producing refrigerators, kitchen suites, and electric meat grinders, raising the volume of consumer goods production from R65 million in 1989 to R90-100 million in 1990. Construction of a consumer goods shop at an appliance manufacturing plant for assimilating microelectronic motors into household electric appliances will be continued. The "Kirgizelektrodvigatel" plant and many others will assimilate new products. The "Ala-Too" association will begin production of new electronic watches; the computer factory, student and household computers, videotape recorders; the Tokmak radio factory, televisions (1991); the "Tyazhelektromash" plant, electric mixers, etc.

Measures are being taken for the organization of a broad network of affiliates, of small production lines in the system of light and local industry. The responsibility for a number of ministries, departments, and committees which do not produce or do not exploit opportunities to increase consumer product output will be examined, in particular, Goskomtransavtodor [State Committee for Motor Vehicle

Road Transportation], "Kirgizles" production association, the construction ministries and others.

We are making poor use of the significant local resources suitable for manufacturing, in particular, crystal, glass, porcelain, ceramic, and china products, as well as construction materials.

It is also a major shortcoming that we have not actively included the ispolkoms, oblast, city, rayon, and village soviets in the production of goods for the people. There is obviously insufficient initiative, entrepreneurship, and independence on the scene.

The production of goods must become a common cause.

Despite certain movements in the agroindustrial sector, its many possibilities are not being exploited satisfactorily. Under almost identical natural-climatic conditions, some farms function with stability, and profitably, while others hobble in place.

In 1988 alone, 45 percent of farms reduced their volume of meat production, 27 percent reduced milk production. Over 40 farms in the republic and 2,000 dairymaids get less than 2,500 kilograms of milk from each foraging cow, including the Chuyskaya valley with 6 farms and 272 dairymaids respectively; Osh Oblast, 20 and 992, and Issyk-Kul Oblast, 16 and 556.

Some 127 farms allowed losses of large horned stock, and 167 had losses of sheep and goats. The kolkhozes and sovkhoses of Keminskiy, Panfilovskiy, Talasskiy, and Manasskiy rayons did not meet the planned milk production volumes. A total of 7 of the 11 farms in the Tyan-Shanskiy Rayon, and 5 of the 16 in the Uzgenskiy Rayon have not fulfilled the meat production plan for 3 years. In Sokulukskiy Rayon, 15 of 23 farms missed the grain production plan. The reserves of the milk yield growth here are also poorly used.

In our view, the experience of the kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Talasskiy Rayon has earned particular attention and all possible development for its organization of farmers' land units for milk production. The kolkhoz workers were granted loans of R277,000 for 10 years to buy cows. The farmers were provided with combined feed. By 1 September, they had sold 344,000 metric tons of milk, with individual owners selling 15-20 metric tons each.

Comrades! The main thing is to ensure that farms be run with the application of various forms of contracts, leasing, and leasing relations on a long-term basis.

Working on a lease at the "Issyk-Kul" sovkhos, Ak-Suyskiy Rayon, the Orozovbayaev family last year got 53 quintals of winter wheat from each of 130 hectares, as opposed to 40.7 quintals from the brigade; for perennial grass seed, the proportion was 7.3 quintals to 4.9 respectively; potatoes, 305 to 186 quintals; beetroots, 711 to 358 quintals. Each family member produced R72,000 of farm products, as opposed to R13,400 from the brigade. There are more than a few such examples.

However, we allow much formalism, chasing for reports, and superficial relations into the cause of inculcating leasing. According to Gosagroprom's data, 4,900 (72 percent) of the crop-raising subdivisions, and 4,400 (62 percent) of the livestock subdivisions have leasing contracts. Yet an analysis of their activity shows much formalism, and many of them have low indicators. The farms of Keminskiy Rayon are an example. They received only R2.973 million profit, or cut it in half over a year's time. Two farms finished the year with losses.

The reorganization of the administration of the agroindustrial complex is being implemented. Councils of oblast and rayon agroindustrial formations are being created, as well as agrocombines, agroindustrial associations, and agrofirms.

All of this has found its reflection in the decisions of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee plenum which defined the tasks of the republic party organization for the realization of the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and which approved the agroindustrial complex development program. The average annual meat production yield in 1995 must increase by 32 percent in comparison to the level already achieved; milk, by 39 percent; grain, by 19 percent; eggs, by 45 percent; vegetables and melons, 44 percent, and potatoes, by 45 percent.

Within the agroindustrial complex, at housing construction sites, for municipal economy, educational, cultural and health care construction in 1991-1995 it is envisaged that financing of R1.8 billion from all sources will be assimilated, or twice as much as during the 12th 5-year plan.

The realization of these decisions will secure in the 13th 5-year plan a 28-30 percent increase in the production of foodstuffs items. The per capita consumption of basic products will draw noticeably closer to rational norms.

The speaker further said that in spite of the measures being taken, there is no radical breakthrough in the work of the construction complex. The growth of the volume of capital investment in 1988 was only 15 percent of the 1985 level (Comrades Fisher, Anpilogov). Over 3 years, R110 million of capital investments were not assimilated, or 3 percent of the overall volume.

The execution of the construction tasks for children's pre-school institutions was ruined. In the city of Frunze alone (Comrades Muraliyev, Moiseyev), in 1988 1,535 kindergarten spaces were not brought into operation. Capital investment is continually unassimilated: In 3 years, almost R20 million, or 10 percent, was underutilized in kindergarten construction; in health care facilities construction, R18.6 million, or 17 percent. Higher educational institution and Academy of Sciences facilities construction continues as poorly as before.

There is a strained situation with construction of social-cultural facilities in the cities of Frunze, Dzhahal-Abad, Przhevalsk, Osh, Tokmak, Talas, Issyk-Kul, Naryn, and Sokulukskiy, Moskovskiy, Kalininskiy rayons, and many rayons of Osh and Issyk-Kul oblasts.

Capital construction in the republic requires radical restructuring. We are examining the structure of the construction complex administration; measures are planned to strengthen low-capacity, unprofitable organizations.

Gosplan, ministries, and departments must bring uncompleted construction up to normative indicators, concentrating capital investments on hand and material resources in the facilities under construction, sharply decreasing the number of facilities under simultaneous construction. The main indicator must be a facility turned over and ready to function.

The development of the municipal economy should be given serious attention. Over 3.5 years, only 62,000 square meters of decrepit housing has been repaired. This is very little.

A number of immediate measures for the expansion of paid services to the population has been taken. The volume and types of services have grown significantly; quality, somewhat. However, there has been no success in making radical movements in this important sector.

In the near future, it is necessary to resolve the problem of expansion of forms paid services in severe shortage, to provide growth of the overall volume in the current 5-year plan 1.9-fold, and in the next 5-year plan, 2.5-fold.

Unfortunately, trade development did not become the subject of the Council of Ministers' constant concern. Over 3 years, the population was sold various goods worth R10.3 billion, or R174 million less than the assignment. Trade is the only branch in the republic which did not handle its 3-year assignment. The causes of this lie not only in the reduction of the sale of wine and vodka products. Goods present in sufficient quantities at warehouses and storage facilities are frequently absent in the stores. Miscalculations are frequently made in the study of the population's demands, in making contracts for supplying goods. Thus, trade has not yet come to be the client, the legislator, the initiator for producing many everyday items, especially clothing and shoes. The Supreme Soviet session is correct to seriously question Comrades Aseyinov, Kydykov, and Zheleznov.

The assistance to industry must be more tangible. For many years now, the volume of goods production at our enterprises has been lower than the level of the retail commodities circulation.

There are unresolved matters, problems, and shortcomings in the work of the organs of education, culture, and medicine.

The republic's government has begun to pay more attention to the development of science, and the problems and concerns of the scientific institutions. In the last year alone, the issues of the Academy of Sciences were examined four times. It makes a definite contribution to economic and cultural development, yet the state of affairs here leaves something to be desired. The inherent potential

of the Academy of Sciences and other scientific institutions and places of higher learning are only weakly influencing the development of the national economy. The scientific level of many developments, the scope of their inculcation are still low; scientific cadres are not prepared satisfactorily. Along with practical assistance for the scientists, we intend to increase their responsibility for resolving the problems of the economy's accelerated development.

Comrade Deputies! Measures for the financial recuperation of the national economy are constantly at the center of the government's attention. Profit plans are being implemented; the number of enterprises operating at a loss and non-production expenses and losses are being reduced. The republic's currency exchange has improved somewhat.

At the same time, the republic's financial situation remains strained. In 1988, the number of losing enterprises was reduced to 274, and losses reduced from R124 million in 1986 to R58 million. Over 3 years, the number of losing enterprises in the APK [agroindustrial complex] was reduced 4.2 fold. At the same time, the ministry leaders and enterprises managers had unfortunately grown accustomed to operating at a loss, and are not taking concrete measures to reduce and eliminate it.

The republic government is firmly in favor of 1990 being the last year for such a situation, now impermissible under new management conditions.

It is no secret that for many years, the Kirghiz SSR state budget has been subsidized. In recent years, even though the sum of the subsidy has been lowered somewhat, it still remains on the level of R500 million.

What are the main reasons for subsidizing? In the first place, imperfect functioning of the price-formation mechanism. Such expenses as the difference between the wholesale and retail prices of meat and meat products, milk, cream, sugar, and canned goods are reimbursed from the republic's budget. These expenses amount to about R500 million annually.

Secondly, the existing structure of the economy is based upon the production of raw materials and their export beyond republic borders. For this reason, we have an annual shortfall of over R600-700 million in income.

Thirdly, we have many major enterprises and organizations of all-union subordination, in which work 240,000 people. While enjoying labor resources, social, cultural, everyday and other benefits, they all fail to participate in the formation of the Kirghiz SSR budget. They produce 36 percent of the volume of industrial production, and their share in the budget is only .4 percent of its overall volume.

The realization of the concept of transferring the republic to self-management and self-financing, the draft of which is now under broad discussion, must serve as an important step in solving this problem.

According to the concept, enterprises of all-union subordination situated within the territory of the Kirghiz SSR

will contribute to the republic budget a portion of their profit (income) up to 40 percent (we introduced a proposal to transfer 65-70 percent of the profit contributed to the Union to the republic), in addition to transferring payments for the land, water, and labor resources.

We must view the republic's transition to self-management and self-financing on 1 January 1991 as an instrument for bringing our economy up to a qualitatively new level. In view of this, the central economic organs of administration, the local soviet ispolkoms, ministries, departments, and enterprises must execute an enormous volume of economic calculations.

The validity of the existing volumes of the income and expense portions of the budgets should be thoroughly analyzed on all levels of economic management; a system of upper limits and normative utilization of natural resources should be established, along with the scale of payment for them; a program for accelerating the transition of the republic's material-technological provision to wholesale trade, and direct economic relations.

Organizational-structural changes being implemented in accordance with the decision of the republic Supreme Soviet are a constituent part of the perestroika of the country's economy.

As a result of the realization of a general outline of administration, the number of staffers of the ministry, department, and other administrative organs' apparatus has been reduced 26 percent. A number of ministries and departments have been abolished, their number decreased from 43 to 34.

Some 41,000 square meters of space in official buildings has been freed up, including almost 30,000 square meters of space for hospitals, clinics, kindergartens, and schools; 6,000 square meters for housing and dormitories; 5,000 square meters for commercial enterprises and services, as well as 157 units of motor vehicle transportation, hard and soft inventory, and furniture given to social organizations. In addition, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has been given 4,000 telephone numbers to be installed for invalids.

However, the changes undergone in the structure of the administration have not yet yielded the expected effect. Reduction and order were brought only primarily on the level of the oblast leadership, ministries, and departments, without affecting the apparatus of the production associations and enterprises.

The transition of republic, oblasts, and their territorial subdivisions to self-management and self-financing will sharply increase the dependence of the republic's social development, increase the population's standard of living, due to the efficiency of its own economy. The preconditions for active manifestation of internal reserves will be created, including a significant reduction of the apparatus on all levels, which will raise the interest of all organs of power and administration, and the entire population in the economy's development and successful function.

Regional economic accountability will substantially strengthen the economic mechanism, and we must prepare even now to use it effectively. The scientific level and the economic grounds of planning should be raised.

Today, the acceleration of perestroika and the realization of radical reforms is unthinkable without a resolution of the problems of inter-ethnic relations. The recently held CPSU Central Committee Plenum adopted a resolution on holding in October 1990 the 28th CPSU Congress, based upon Leninist principles and the existing realities; it discussed the issue of the party's nationality policy under modern conditions in a multilateral manner. The strategy developed is an invaluable contribution to the cause of perestroika, a concrete program of action for party, soviet, and economic organs.

The Kirghiz CP Central Committee and the Council of Ministers pays particular attention to matters of inter-ethnic relations in our inter-national republic. The draft Law on the Kirghiz SSR State Language has been prepared, and is being introduced at the session after general discussion and revision; a group of measures on the inter-national indoctrination of workers is being implemented, and associations with fraternal union republics are being strengthened. However, all of this is only the first steps. Based upon the decisions of the September Central Committee Plenum, we must ensure the harmonization of inter-ethnic relations on a new basis, decisively opposing any attempts at nationalism, chauvinism, extremism, or schisms on an inter-ethnic basis.

Comrades! As you see, many socioeconomic problems have accumulated in our republic; they all merit most serious attention. In the final analysis, all these shortcomings are related to the work of the Council of Ministers, its leadership. There would be significantly less of it, and the population's standard of living and culture would be higher if we could implement the party's course for acceleration in a more qualified manner, if we inculcated economic methods of management, the new economic mechanism, and the achievements of science and technology more demandingly and persistently. The resolution of these issues is possible only with the active, creative work of the oblgorrayispolkoms, with the intensive work of all ministries, ministry collegiums, and departments, in a word, of all the national economy, of everyone at his workplace. Unfortunately, the Council of Ministers has not yet achieved this. And this, of course, is my fault and my underfulfillment.

We are faced with great work in the realization of the party's course for our society's renewal. It can only be executed under conditions of the persistently effective work of all branches, the strengthening of state discipline and order in every workplace, and the consolidation of all the republic's healthy efforts for perestroika.

Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet on Economic, Social Shortcomings

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[KirTAG report: "The 10th Extraordinary Session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet: Better to Utilize Perestroika's Potential"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the 10th extraordinary session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet was held 22-23 September in Frunze.

In discussions on the republic's Council of Ministers concerning the measures taken for restructuring of their own work, and the activity of the ispolkoms [executive committees] of the local soviets of people's deputies, republic ministries and departments in resolving economic and social problems and satisfying more fully the population's demands, the deputies concentrated their attention on the priority trends of development of the economy and the social sphere, disclosed shortcomings which hinder movement forward, introduced proposals and recommendations to resolve many important problems of improving the economic mechanism and the guidance of the perestroika processes.

N. Isanov, chairman of the Issyk-Kul Oblast soviet of people's deputies ispolkom [executive committee] opened the debates. He said that in recent years, positive movements have been made in the work of the republic's Council of Ministers; the style of its work is becoming more democratic and businesslike. Yet command-pressure methods are not infrequently set into motion; the transition to economic methods of management is being implemented slowly.

It is not as a result of this that Issyk-Kul Oblast has primitively developed industry; it does not have its own production base for the construction industry. The oblast is particularly involved in livestock; it is a supplier of raw material. It is doomed to social backwardness.

In the oblast, only 34.6 percent of the schools are standard schools; 1.4 percent of the housing has natural gas; 4.8 percent of the housing has hot water. The city of Issyk-Kul, the new oblast center, is extremely neglected with regard to municipal habitation.

All of this is the result of planning "haphazardly," a narrowly departmental approach. But even today, no way out of such a situation is envisaged. Let us say, for what reason should Comrade Nosinov, minister of construction materials, retool and expand the Naryn brick factory for the sake of some 10-15 million bricks? Their branch in the Chuyskaya valley could be paved over. On the whole, the plan will be met.

And Comrade Kozhomkulov is, as they say, lukewarm about building or not building in Issyk-Kul city the brick factory included in this year's plan. A water management construction project is closing down in the oblast; entire

subdivisions are being eliminated. A long-term, scientifically based Government program must be adopted to resolve all these matters.

Further on, the orator paused on the problems of developing sheep farming. The oblast's head count of sheep is nearing 4 million, with close to 6 million in summer. This does not include the private sector. Sheep farming has become the only branch for many rayons. But after all, the social and ecological consequences of such one-sidedness are obvious.

Undoubtedly, the republic's management of the national economy is improving, but the unwieldiness of the organizational structure is still perceptible.

The Council of Ministers must once again carefully examine the organizational structure of management in the republic.

Deputy I.A. Medvedev, mining foreman of the "Severnaya" coal-face cleaning mine of the "Tash-Kumyr" mining administration, says that as a deputy working in the coal industry, he will express his opinion of the branch, since the Council of Ministers managed to find the optimal resolution to organizing its management.

I think that it is time to put an end to the situation where the republic's Council of Ministers acknowledges in words the need to meet its obligations, but in deeds reduces them to making decisions without practical steps behind them.

Shepherds are worried by the issues of lowering the pension age, their material status, and the fate of the children. In fact, the entire large family tends the flock, and if the parents' salaries are divided among all, then the majority of shepherds fall below the poverty level. These problems deserve fixed attention on the part of the Government.

In the spring of this year, the respected Apas Dzhumagulovich and USSR Deputy Minister of the Coal Industry Comrade Korkin came to present us with the challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] for the success achieved in 1988. At a ceremonial meeting, it was promised that R1.5 billion would be allocated for housing and school construction. The money was allocated, but upon receiving the republic Council of Ministers' indication that the funds had been assimilated, Kirghiz SSR Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction] did not consider it necessary to fulfill them, did not bind the sub-contracting organizations of the "Tash-Kumyrsstroy" trust. To this day, the money is "hanging" in the air.

As a miner, it is difficult for me to evaluate the ministries' and departments' activities on the republic level. However, the economy's obstructions which concern the coal extraction branch are quite visible to us, even though we work underground.

The deputy expressed his voters' desires to accelerate the construction of a bypass road, and also noted the inattentiveness to the people's needs on the part of the leaders of the republic's Ministry of Railways. For 2 years, the miners of the city's northern section have requested that the television transmissions on the republic channel be adjusted. The Tash-Kumyr residents do not have the opportunity to watch programs in the Kirghiz language.

Deputy E. Ormonov, secretary of the Kirovskiy Rayon committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia, has the floor. He said that in connection with the reservoir construction, the settlement of Kirovskoye was transferred to another location. At that location, the construction of industrial, social-cultural, and residential-living facilities was conducted by a multitude of ministries and departments without a unified plan. Some 32 boiler rooms and 23 septic systems were constructed, but they had low capacity, and did not meet people's needs.

The House of Culture has appealed to the republic's Council of Ministers, ministries, and departments on matters of construction a central heating system, a unified sewage system, water main system, and housing tract for 12 years now, without results.

The construction of the Kara-Burinskoye reservoir has been going on in the rayon since 1985, with an estimated cost of R19.3 million. To this day, only R5.66 million worth of work has been fulfilled. At such a pace, its construction will drag out over a few more 5-year plans.

For effective utilization of the reservoir, the canals must be repaired to a general length of 31 kilometers. Yet the "Glavkirgizvodstroy" administration to this day has not started the work.

A gas pipeline passes through the rayon's territory, even though not a single settlement in the Talas valley has gas.

A total of R20,000 has been allocated in 1990 to bring gas to the Kirovskoye settlement. That is not enough.

In the first 6 months of the current year, a petroleum pumping hub has come into operation. However, due to the lack of a reserve railroad network, it is idle to this day.

The deputy also paused on problems related to the rayon's increase in population. The schools are overflowing; a 3-shift schedule of teaching children has been introduced in some schools; there are 40-50 pupils in a class. The majority of the rayon's schools are housed in old, jerry-rigged premises.

The rayon's toilers widely supported the initiative of the Lyaylyaktsy. Village gatherings are held; people who spare neither effort or resources participate in the construction of social-cultural facilities. But there are not enough construction materials.

The deputy recognized the activity of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers are being satisfactory.

Kirghiz SSR Minister of Trade, Deputy A.N. Zheleznov paused in his speech on the problems of trade development. He said that in the current 5-year plan, the Government adopted a number of decrees directed toward accelerating production of consumer goods and services, and developing the material-technological base of trade and feeding the public.

Some 90 percent of all market reserves of foodstuff items are produced in the republic. Increasing their output allowed for a rejection of shipping a number of goods in from other regions of the country.

The republic's industry fulfills and overfulfills the plans, but there is frequently nothing to buy in the stores; the most everyday items are in short supply. Goods continue to be delivered in short supply, especially when they are combined with other goods by agreement. The output of many groups of goods needed by the population is being reduced, including goods for children and fur products. Local construction materials—bricks, gypsum, mortar, window glass—cannot be obtained.

The necessary return from the cooperatives is not there. The minister of trade made note of the branch's poor material base. There are only 119 square meters of trading space for every 1,000 residents—60 percent of the established norms.

With the assistance of the local soviets, in the current 5-year plan, a slight improvement in providing the population with foodstuffs was managed. Yet there is an acute shortage of commercially prepared foods for schools', students' and workers' cafeterias.

Based upon the experience of many world countries, special territorial funds should be created from deductions and resources from the local budget. This would allow an expansion of the ration of foodstuffs, and make them cheaper or free for pupils and trainees in professional and technical institutions.

The deputy expressed his wish concerning worker control. He feels that the efforts of the controllers should be directed toward improving the quality of the goods produced by industry and foodstuffs.

Deputy M. Tynarova, a pattern worker at the Frunze footwear production association, emphasized that while working under conditions of economic accountability and self-financing, the collective of the "Arman" industrial-commercial footwear association began to resolve its problems more successfully. The workers' and employees' responsibility for the final results was raised, and personnel turnover was reduced. Technological retooling is progressing more actively, and social and cultural life is developing.

However, we have a serious problem with replacing equipment with more modern elements. Orders for spare parts are only 20-30 percent fulfilled. We receive raw materials, accessories, and chemical materials for footwear production from 248 suppliers located in various regions of the

country. A short delivery from one of them leads to a halt in the production cycle. We cannot get around this without the Government's help.

The speaker also paused on the problem of housing, and assisting individuals who build their own houses. She said that 452 workers are waiting, and that 300 need space in small-family dormitories. The collective managed to accumulate funds for constructing a 100-apartment residence, and co-opted funds from those wanting to receive cooperative housing. However, wherever we turned to be included in shared participation, there was no support.

Sixty-four workers received plots of land. The administration gave them loans, even though there are no retail building materials to be had. Why do they get that kind of help?

Speaking of urgent problems of the current phase of perestroika, Deputy V.K. Dolmatov, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee on Labor and Social Security turned attention to the new approaches to resolving principal problems. Primary attention must be directed toward the development and execution of practical measures for deepening the economic reform, for improving labor compensation, its organization and conditions, for providing full and effective employment for the population, and for increasing the quality of its social services. Their interconnected consideration on the basis of a unified program is a necessary condition for resolving these problems effectively.

The orator turned particular attention to the work in ensuring employment and rational utilization of labor resources. He said that with this, it was necessary to concentrate not on providing employment in general, but employment in a person's place of residence. For example, in a village location, contract work should be developed; the development of homework, individual labor activity, cooperatives, and the opening of branch affiliates of active production lines.

Further, the orator paused on the matters of labor organization and compensation. The Republic Center for the Introduction of Economically Accountable Labor Organization has been created; it is operating quite effectively. Simultaneously, the measures aimed at introducing new equipment, progressive technology, and equipment modernization are frequently not being satisfactorily fulfilled. The necessary attention is not being shown to the creation of normal production and living conditions for the workers. The proportion of manual labor is being lowered at a slow rate. In industry, one out of every three, and in construction, every other worker is engaged in physically difficult operations.

The speaker further stated that a great volume of work must be done along the lines of the social services of our republic's population. A special program has been developed for improving services to the elderly and handicapped. Construction of five boarding houses with 1,000 beds is under way. A new form of services for people has been organized with the creation of home-care social

assistance departments; in certain localities, at the initiative of sovkhoz [state farm] and kolkhoz [collective farm] managers, veterans' homes have been opened. There are, however, more than a few problems. The course of construction of the Tokmak and Kalininskiy boarding houses, the Dzhahal-Abad boarding home for handicapped children, and the Suzakskiy boarding house for the elderly have caused some concern. The Frunze gorispolkom [city executive committee] did not allocate premises for the creation of a territorial pensioners' social services center for temporary or day visits, even though there are over 500 veterans in the city who need this help.

In recent months we have begun to receive many complaints from invalids and participants in the Great Patriotic War, especially from Osh and Issyk-Kul oblasts. They are not getting sufficient numbers of motorized vehicles on their personal accounts. This problem must be resolved in the next 2-3 years; the veterans must be helped.

The floor was given to Deputy **O. Abdykalykov**, chairman of the Kara-Kul city soviet of people's deputies ispolkom [executive committee].

The problems of small cities are at the center of his attention. According to the speaker, for a long time, the republic's Council of Ministers has not paid the needed attention to the systematic development of these cities. They have practically turned into the domain of the central ministries and departments. The speaker illustrated this idea with the example of the city of Kara-Kul. In the beginning, it was built as a temporary settlement for the water project construction workers, and in 1977 it was transformed into a city subordinate to an oblast. For all these years, the city's fate was in the hands of USSR Minergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification]. As a result, today, 40 percent of the housing fund, a number of children's pre-school and medical buildings built for temporary use have become run down and must be replaced immediately. The city does not have enough schools, kindergartens, medical facilities, commercial and consumer service enterprises.

The gorispolkom and USSR Minergo are now implementing special measures to bring the city management to order. Deductions from part of the profit and pay for labor resources at a number of enterprises are being made. The city soviet is ceasing to be an administrative notary service, as it was for all intents and purposes, and turning into a real master, possessing certain financial opportunities.

However, these are only the first steps, and it is still quite a ways to its complete independence in solving the territory's problems. Apparently, we will receive this independence after the adoption of the law on local self-management.

In mentioning Kara-Kul's heating problem, the speaker introduced a proposal to use the inexpensive electric power produced by the city itself, and requested that the republic's Council of Ministers solve this problem. The orator further paused on some of the problems of the labor organization of the soviets' executive organs' staffers.

Deputy **A.I. Biryukov**, director of the "Kirgizmebel" production association, said that as the chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Consumer Goods and Services to the Population, he was charged with verifying the work of two Council of Ministers departments: the department of consumer goods, of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers' Administration of Affairs, and the department of trade and paid services.

The volume of paid services to the population has grown by a factor of 1.5, and in 1989, reached R510 million. Over 170 ministries, departments, enterprises, and associations are involved in rendering paid services to the population. At the same time, the demand of the republic's population for needed goods and services is not yet completely satisfied.

The Council of Ministers' decree on the growth of the network of stores and enterprises for public food supply feeding causes particular alarm. No growth in the commercial network is envisaged in Tokmak or Talas at all. Growth in the city of Frunze will be only 5.9 percent.

The deputies' attention should be directed to the attitude of V.V. Anpilov, deputy chairman for capital construction at Kirghiz SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] toward enterprises producing consumer goods. In particular, the speech on "Kirgizmebel."

Our republic is practically in next to last place in per capita furniture production in the USSR. But on various pretexts, Gosplan has not set limits on the contract work for the construction of the enterprise's second line. This has lasted 20 years. However, the factory imeni M.V. Frunze has always had limits for the mining and gold mining industry. Thanks only to the personal intercession of Council of Ministers Chairman A. Dzhumagulov have we been apportioned a limit for 1990.

The deputy further noted that discussion of the draft Laws which will be confirmed at the session, was held in all the association's labor collectives; on the whole, people support them.

Deputy **G.T. Turdakunova**, a knitter from the Naryn combine emphasized that glasnost has been widely introduced into the work style of the Naryn gorsovet [city soviet]; public opinion is taken into consideration.

There are positive movements in capital construction. Over 8 months, the volume of capital investments has grown by 13.7 percent. Some 5,600 square meters of housing has been opened. Vegetable storage facilities and public baths have been built; extensions have been added to schools.

Undoubtedly, the industrial enterprises we have in our city are in no condition to fully satisfy the population's demand for goods. But I think that we can significantly reduce the amount of products brought in from other regions. The output of local goods must be increased; their assortment must be expanded.

However, not enough work is being done in this area. For over 8 months of the current year, the plan for production of consumer goods was not fulfilled.

One of the reasons is the weak material base. In view of an equipment reduction in the oblast, it was decided to transfer a number of buildings to production purposes. For example, the former home of the oblast headquarters was made into a sewing factory. But a great deal of time has passed, and the matter still stands. True, the proposed factory is outfitted with the old machines from Frunze's "40 Years of October" sewing factory. How is this to be understood?

The republic's ministry of light industry should think about what type of production we may decide upon. Clothing for shepherds and children is most needed.

Deputy **Zh. Tuleberdiyev**, chief of the Kirghiz SSR main power and electrification administration spoke about the results of the branch's work under conditions of complete economic accountability and self-financing. On the whole, the indicators are not bad, but the great difficulties in the area of capital construction are interfering. An especially unsuccessful situation developed at housing and social-cultural facilities because of imbalances in providing construction materials. And in addition, the republic Gosstroy creates additional difficulties. Construction has been halted on two 74-apartment residences for the collectives of the Frunze city TETS [heat and electric power station] and a reinforced concrete plant, and to this day there has been no new final decision, even though the project plans correspond to all normative requirements. The speaker cited other concrete examples of the construction workers' failure to meet the needed volume of work; he criticized the specialists of the "Kirgizpromproyekt" planning institute, and the Kirghiz SSR Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee] construction organizations.

The speaker also paused on the power consumption problems in the republic. Electric power shows practically no growth. The electric power supply of labor in the Kirghiz SSR is 2-3 times lower than average USSR indices, especially in everyday and social spheres and in rural locations. The level of electric power usage is especially low in settlements situated in the zone of cascade of the Toktogul GESs [hydroelectric power stations]. The basic reasons for this are the high rates for everyday use, especially for heating, as well as the lack of low-capacity electric water heaters for household use. The republic's Supreme Soviet should petition the country's directive organs for the application of special rate for electric power used for the village's household, municipal, and social needs. The production of low-capacity electric water heaters and other household electrical equipment should be organized in one of the republic's factories in order to expand the electric power consumption of the population and the social sphere.

Deputy **N.N. Vasilchenko**, Kirghiz SSR minister of housing and municipal economy, spoke of the changes taking place in the branch. A structure for the administration has been developed and confirmed; it will be oriented

toward primarily economic methods of management, in accordance with the principles and statutes of the USSR Law on State Enterprise (association).

At the proposal of the Osh, Issyk-Kul oblispolkoms [oblast executive committees] and the Frunze gorispolkom, a multi-branch production association has been created collecting all services of the housing and municipal economy; this must raise the administration's function to a higher level, and increase the responsibility of the managers of these services and ispolkoms for the condition of the population's municipal services.

However, in light of the budget difficulties, the ispolkoms are reducing allocations for territories' sanitation, amenities, lighting, and greenery, but the unreasonable demands upon the organization managers who perform these works are increasing. And so the ispolkoms' debts increase, and the municipal services do not always have the opportunity to acquire the necessary materials and equipment in time, to deal with the suppliers.

For years, the Naryn, Talas, and Kyzyl-Kiy gorispolkoms have not paid for completed work, placing municipal economy enterprises in difficult financial circumstances, which do not allow cities and rayons the opportunity to store coal for winter, or to pay for completed work on time.

At Gossnab's proposal, equipment services in all ministries and departments were eliminated at the beginning of the 5-year plan. All of their strength was transferred to the Gossnab organizations. Now, Gossnab, citing direct connections, gets out of resolving issues of providing the national economy with material and technological provisions, turning all the ministries and departments with their needs directly to the factory-producers. But if, with direct connections, the production enterprises can exchange products to some extent, for example, sewer service to a Belorussian factory, which now promises to keep only one of the six allocated excavators. And this for the republic's 190 organizations in the republic's municipal economy! It doesn't take a specialist-supplier to understand that such direct connections lead to legitimization of corruption and bribery on a large scale.

In making the transition to complete economic accountability, while introducing a collective system and leasing, the enterprises' collectives demand of the administration that they conclude contracts fully backed with material and technological resources. But we cannot sign such contracts inasmuch as they do not meet our needs for the most common types of needed equipment and materials.

The floor is given to Deputy **M.U. Nosinov**, minister of the construction materials industry.

He said that the republic Council of Ministers, its leadership, has implemented a number of measures for restructuring their work, for improving the activity of the republic organs. Sessions and conferences have been shortened considerably; decisions have become more economically justified. The level of concrete activity has been raised, as has the main thing, the reality of the decisions and the decrees adopted. A concrete program has been developed

for the republic's transition to self-provision of construction materials. Further on, the speaker cited figures testifying to the decent results achieved in the branch. However, certain issues which would seem to demand priority decisions, considering the the accelerated development of the entire construction complex in the future have not, for the time being, been given the necessary attention.

The reconstruction of the glass works is falling through; the gravel-sorting plants in the cities of Przhevalsk and Issyk-Kul are not being built, nor is the dormitory at the Belovodsk brick factory. With each passing day, the republic's construction organizations are demanding more and more materials, but in many regards, this depends upon them. The speaker said that such major organizations as Agropromstroy, headed by Comrade Kozhomkulov, build practically nothing for us; they just demand materials. And Goskomavtodor is boycotting construction of a plant to produce mineral powdered additives for asphalt, even though this is what will help the department increase road longevity. Such a position is completely incomprehensible.

The speaker continued that for purposes of rapid development, he requested the republic Council of Ministers and Gosplan to involve even these forces in the construction of facilities for our branch in 1990.

Today, the economic organs are feeling the lack of provisions for themselves. That which was created by the decades is partially ruined, and this is leading to major complications.

By its decree, the republic Council of Ministers transferred a large portion of our production to wholesale trade; however, with a shortage of construction materials, wholesale trade practically will not work. And Gosplan has transferred its obligations to our shoulders.

The provision of production and ever-increasing number of construction sites with equipment and other materials drastically worsened. In spite of the growth in production volume and orders, Gosplan and Gosplan allocate funds on the basis of last year, and the equipment which is not allocated to them in Moscow is transferred to us by direct connections. But this way, many matters go unresolved.

The elimination of the USSR Ministry of Construction Materials Industry and Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine building exacerbated the situation. Some of these former ministries' plants had their production lines changed, and the production of equipment for the production of local building materials was farmed out to the regions. It should also be added that the republic's Gosplan under-allocates funds, and Gosplan under-allocates them with goods.

The orator said that we ask the Council of Ministers to figure out once again the system for providing material-technological resources, and the development of the machine-building base for our branch.

At the tribune is Deputy K. Tynaliyev, general director of the republic scientific-production association for feed, pasture, and irrigation construction of the Kirghiz SSR Gosagroprom.

He states that within the republic agroindustrial complex, a complex of scientific research institutes has been created, but unfortunately, on the part of the Council of Ministers, not enough attention has been paid to the scientists' useful recommendations, and their introduction into production. Thus, the republic's economy suffers a great loss.

The casual attitude toward the scientists' recommendations on the use of rotation for grazing land lead to the pastures being choked with poisonous grasses, to their degradation. Grazing land has begun to improve somewhat only in the last 2-3 years.

Science and practice have recently proved that application of mineral fertilizers increases pasture yield by a factor of 1.5; treating weed-choked pasture with herbicides adds 2-3 fold, and irrigating pasture while applying fertilizers, 5-6 fold. This conclusion is confirmed by the practice of a number of farms in Issyk-Kul and Osh oblasts, and rayons in the Chuyskaya valley.

With the scientists' help, the farms of Tyupskiy and Shchety-Oguzskiy rayons took the right course in the destruction of the persistent hellebore weed and elm; the farms in the former Narynskiy Rayon, where the grazing land had low yields and was degraded, the plan to introduce pasture fertilizers was continually hampered.

Livestock productivity grows poorly in view of the low yield of feed cultures, but after all, by actively supporting the scientists' recommendations, local soviets could fortify the feed base. For example, if alfalfa and esparsette were sown in the grass mixture, the harvest in the mountain zone could be increased by 40-45 percent, and 15-20 percent in the valley.

The speaker cited examples of the effectiveness of the associations between science and agricultural production. In light of this, the deputy proposed that a group for the introduction of scientific recommendations and developments for production be created under both the local soviets and the republic Gosagroprom.

Deputy S. Kokoyev, director of the "Karakuldzha" sovkhoz of the Sovetskiy Rayon, Osh Oblast, spoke of the fact that due to the village residents' low standard of living, the lack of modern housing and social-cultural conditions, and poorly organized leisure activities, there is a drain of youth into the cities. It is thus impossible to exploit with full return the latent production potential of agricultural products. There are not enough funds for construction and amenities. Agricultural products are being sold to the state at low wholesale prices.

By the method of [khashara], supporting [lyaylyaktsy], we built in seven villages of our farm Houses of Agitation and Propaganda at a total cost of R1.087 million. They contain movie theaters, reading and sports halls, rooms for

aksakalov, for youth, and for women. The population collected R179,000, and this was used to purchase construction materials.

Twenty-five residential homes for the sovkhoz workers were built. All those who want to build their own home receive a plot, and are given material support. An average of 70 individual apartments are built in the sovkhoz annually.

However, the roads which connect the sovkhoz's villages are not up to today's demands.

But there is no asphalt factory in the Sovetskiy Rayon, and this hampers work. It would be good if the Supreme Soviet could help is on this issue.

In his speech, Deputy T. Kasiyev, chief engineer of the Issyk-Kul Rayon Kolkhoz imeni K. Marx noted that at the sessions and plenums recently, the slogan, "All power to the Soviets!" rings out. In real life, however, this appeal remains a hollow sound. To this day, the village soviets are in the role of petitioners before the enterprise and farm managers. Their budgets are miserly. The salary of village soviet associates is significantly lower than that of farm toilers. The village soviets have no funds to stimulate material interests, and no transportation to execute their numerous functions. Therefore, no one, especially young people, aspires to work in the village soviets. But after all, qualified cadres are the basis of perestroyka.

The Issyk-Kul Rayon is a resort area; its summer population reaches 800,000-900,000. The majority of the pensions and pioneer camps are located within the territory of the village soviets; this is where the service personnel live. However, the curative institutions come under the jurisdiction of the Cholpon-Ata city soviet, and thus are not subject to the decisions of the local soviets. I am introducing a proposal that the pensions, rest homes, and pioneer camps be territorially subordinated to those village soviets within whose territory they are located.

The defense of Issyk-Kul is everyone's sacred cause. I consider it correct to deduct R10 from the cost of every vacation package to give to the local soviets. Every enterprise, farm, and institution located within a local soviet's territory must pay ecological dues or a tax into the soviet's budget for the use of the land and water. If they violate environmental protection norms, as a sanction, this tax will be increased 5-10 fold. The money should be taken from the funds for material development and salary, and then the collectives will feel for themselves how bad it is to pollute the environment.

The deputy further paused on the problems of housing construction and medical services for the population.

New Uzbek SSR People's Control Committee Chairman Appointed

90US0043A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 20 Aug 89 p 1

[Ukase of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the appointment of Comrade B.F. Satin as Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Committee of People's Control, issued 19 August 1989]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To appoint Comrade Boris Fedorovich Satin chairman of the Uzbek SSR Committee of People's Control.

Born in 1939, Russian, member of the CPSU since 1968. Higher education: completed Chelyabinsk Polytechnical Institute in 1961, engineer-metallurgist; in 1984 completed the Sverdlovsk Higher Party School.

Began labor activity in 1961 at the Chelyabinsk Road Vehicle Plant, where in 10 years he rose from master to deputy shop superintendent. Beginning in 1973 served in union and party as: trade union committee chairman, Chelyabinsk Road Vehicle Plant party committee secretary, second and first secretary of the Chelyabinsk soviet party raykom, and instructor in the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department. In 1985 chosen as first secretary of the Tashkent party gorkom. Candidate for member of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee Buro. USSR people's deputy.

Personnel Changes Made at 19 August Uzbek CP Plenum

90US0043B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 20 Aug 89 p 1

["Information Report on the Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] On August 19, 1989 the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee took place.

The plenum heard accounts from First Secretaries M.M. Aripdzhanov of the Andizhan party obkom and R.M. Khudaybergenova of the Khorezm party obkom on insuring the development of individual subsidiary farms and the construction of rural housing. They identified this development as the most important condition for stabilizing the socio-political situation in the provinces.

The plenum discussed steps towards examining and implementing urgent measures towards satisfying the population's wants and needs.

The plenum considered organizational questions. In response to a statement by the first deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, the plenum relieved D.D. Berkov of his duties as secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee. Because of retirement, M.Kh. Khal-mukhamedov was also relieved of his duties as secretary and member of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro. Relieved of his duties as member of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro was K. Salykov, who was chosen as

chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of National Resources. V.I. Ogarok was relieved of his duties as member of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro as a result of his election to the post of deputy chairman to the USSR Supreme Soviet Union Soviet Commission on Planning and Budget-Financing. The plenum removed Sh.R. Mirsaidov from his position as head of the Uzbek CP Central Committee socio-economic department in connection with his appointment as deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's State Planning Committee. D. Khamidov has been chosen as buro member and secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee. He has worked as academician secretary for the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Department of Biological Sciences. B.S. Khamidov was confirmed as the head of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Department of Social Economy. He has worked as chairman of the republic's state-cooperative construction association "Uzagrostroy" and as a minister of the republic.

The plenum heard a report from N.A. Mukhitdinov, deputy chairman of the republic's Council on War and Labor Veterans, on the findings of the Central Committee commission which looked into the criticisms of V.P. Anishchev, former second secretary of the Central Committee, at the 15th Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum.

The following persons took part in the discussion of all issues raised: Comrades D.D. Berkov, first deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Agrarian Committee; F. Israilova, partkom [party committee] secretary of the 20th Party Congress Sovkhoz of the Bozskiy Rayon, Andizhan Oblast; A. Iskandarov, chairman of the Narimanov Kolkhoz in the Bagatskiy Rayon, Khorezm Oblast; S. Erzhanov, first deputy chairman of the Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the autonomous republic's agro-industrial committee; A.A. Alimov, chairman of the Uzbekistan Society for the Protection of Nature; M. Ismatov, chairman of the kolkhoz "Communism" of the Yangiyul'skiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast; R. Charyev, chairman of the kolkhoz "Moscow" of the Kumkurganskiy Rayon, Surkhan-Darya Oblast; I. Iskanderov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Productive Forces; A. Abduvasikov, first secretary of the Almalyk'skiy party gorkom; P.K. Khabibullaev, laboratory director of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Department of Thermophysics; A.I. Glushenkova, director of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Chemistry of Plant Substances; E.Yu. Yusupov, vice president of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences; M.M. Mirzaev, general director of the R.R. Shreder Research and Production Association for Horticulture, Viticulture, and Wine-making; L. Kayumov, departmental chair at the V.I. Lenin Tashkent State University; D. Dadazhanova, secretary of the Namangan'skiy party obkom; S.A. Khodzhaeva, first deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature.

The plenum adopted the appropriate resolutions on the issues discussed.

I.A. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, closed the plenum.

V.S. Borodin, a senior official of the CPSU Central Committee Commission of Party Control, took part in the plenum.

With this plenum, the Uzbek CP Central Committee has finished its work.

Joint Tajik CP, Komsomol CC Plenum Boosts Role of Youth

Makhkamov Speech

90US0112A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 28 Sep 89 p 1

[Concluding speech presented by Tajik CP Central Committee First Secretary K.M. Makhkamov at the joint plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Committee]

[Text] Comrades!

In the course of preparing for this plenum, and after the discussion which was held today, we have become firmly convinced of the fact that the main reason for serious inconsistencies and gaps in solving the republic's youth problems is the absence of a strong and integrated youth policy, and specifically such a policy which would be realized at the level of the party, soviet, state, and economic organs and public organizations.

The development and realization of such a policy, in our opinion, would strengthen and increase the faith of the republic's youth in perestroika and in the renewal of our society. Such a policy would make the youth its active and interested executor. It is needed also for developing a strategy and tactics for solving current and prospective problems such as employment and provision of housing, goods, services and facilities to the social infrastructure of the youth.

Finally, such a policy is needed to ensure an ongoing and constructive dialogue of the party and state organs and the public organizations with the youth.

In developing a youth policy, I believe, we must pursue one important goal—to create for the young people such conditions and stimuli under which they could most fully realize their energy and creative potential for purposes of perestroika and renewal of socialist society.

In order to develop such a policy, which is aimed at the future, we need an in-depth scientific analysis with involvement of our best scientific forces—philosophers, economists, sociologists, pedagogs, and so forth.

Obviously, for this policy to be realized, we must plan a system of organizational, legal and material guarantees.

We believe that the republic's Supreme Soviet, which we will soon be electing, must give serious consideration to

the status of the future Commission on Youth Affairs, and primarily to granting it the necessary powers.

In order to resolve day-to-day questions and to coordinate the activity of the republic's economic management organs, which are associated in one degree or another with youth affairs, it would evidently be expedient to create a small subdivision within the Council of Ministers which would be permanently and practically engaged in the organization and realization of those measures which would be developed by the Supreme Soviet Commission.

It is also necessary to adopt the Tajik SSR Law on Youth. This law must be, on one hand, a normative statute which proposes an entire system of social measures for the youth, and on the other—a political document aimed at developing democratic processes within the youth environment.

Evidently, it makes sense to create a special youth fund at the republic level, in the oblasts, cities, rayons, and labor collectives. This could become one of the means for creating a material base in youth policy.

In order to ensure the irreversibility of democratization in the youth movement and to increase its role in perestroika, we must radically change the forms and methods of interrelation of party, trade union and other social organizations with the youth organizations, and primarily with the Komsomol.

The party committees must respect and ensure the organizational independence of the Komsomol, its right to independently decide all questions of intra-union life without exception, to participate in the development and implementation of party policy, and to defend the interests of the youth in party, soviet and economic management organs.

The resolutions of the Tajik CP Central Committee bureau and plenums have repeatedly presented this question. However, no significant changes in the interrelations of party and Komsomol committees have been achieved. Many party committees still have not completely defined the full great significance of this question.

The basis for formulating the current conception of interrelations between the republic's party committees and the Komsomol must be the full restoration of Leninist traditions of party leadership of the Komsomol, the Leninist principles of interrelations with it, which mean the moral-political leadership of the party with adherence to the organizational independence of the Komsomol, and independent forms and methods of its operation. However, all this is being affirmed in a rather difficult manner, and at an unacceptably slow pace.

Can we consider the situation normal when the Komsomol committees cannot independently resolve even their own cadre questions?

The Komsomol leaders must be answerable in greater degree to the Komsomol organizations and to the youth, and not to the party apparatus.

The party organizations are called upon to create conditions for ensuring the organizational independence of the Komsomol on the basis of:

- granting full independence in resolving intra-union questions, and especially in implementing cadre policy;
- rejecting the practice of accepting directive orders addressed to the Komsomol organizations;
- bringing to life new forms of joint organizational and ideological work of the party and Komsomol organizations such as joint plenums, bureau meetings, joint solution of youth problems, and preparations for the electoral campaign.

Such forms of work by the organizations were practiced during the period of preparations for the plenum, and the responses on them were favorable.

We also cannot discount the fact that the organizational independence of the Komsomol is beneficial for the development of the party itself. We must be interested in the leading democratic development of standards and regulations of intra-union life of the Komsomol, viewing this process as a unique experimental model for the future development of party organizations.

At the same time, these measures must not mean a weakening of the ties between the party committees and the Komsomol. They must take on new quality. We know that the Komsomol stands on a single ideological platform with the party. The party committees must exert their political influence on the Komsomol primarily through the communists working within it.

In short, we must create such a socio-political atmosphere in our republic which would most fully help the youth to actively participate in the processes of perestroika.

For this we must replace patronage with political trust, didacticism with dialogue, authoritarianism with democratism, and dogmatism with free thought and pluralism of opinions. All this must become the norm of political culture.

In speaking of the processes of democratization of the youth movement, we must focus on the objective desire of young men and girls to accelerate the processes of perestroika in the republic. Although it is annoying that all this often bypasses the Komsomol. Yet the dialogues of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the republic's government with various categories of the youth are very beneficial.

In the course of such dialogues, many valuable and constructive proposals are presented for the continued development of the economy and culture, and for the improved operation of the party and state apparatus, as well as the ministries and departments.

At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that irresponsible people sometimes find their way into the youth

movement. Under the guise of representatives of independent organizations, they engage in instigation, speculating on the difficulties of our life and on the unsolved problems of the youth. They sow the seeds of discord and mistrust among the people.

In regard to such "leaders", who pass themselves off as expressing the public interests, the party and state organs, the Komsomol organizations and the community must take a principled position, as stated at the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Comrades! We know that the difficult situation with the republic's economy definitely hinders the successful resolution of the social problems of the youth. A disproportion has arisen between the commodity and monetary masses. The consumer market remains strained. Prices are increasing, and the housing question and problems of food provision to the population remain acute. The effectiveness of labor and production is still low.

One of the most acute problems in the republic is that of ensuring full and effective employment of the able-bodied population, and primarily the youth. At the present time, a paradoxical situation has arisen. On one hand, over 200,000 people are out of work. Almost half of these are young people. At the same time, there is an acute shortage of manpower in industry, construction, and transport. This is happening primarily due to the shortage of trained workers, the unresolved problems of the social infrastructure, and a number of other problems. The existing system of training youth worker cadres does not correspond to the character and demands of the national economy.

The transition of enterprises and organizations to the principles of full cost accounting will exacerbate this problem even more. Even the first steps on the road to this new economic mechanism have already put several thousand people out of work. Here we must foresee the fact that the enterprises will primarily lay off the unskilled and inexperienced workers. And this will affect primarily the youth.

Evidently, the set of measures on the changeover to cost accounting undertaken in the center as well as at the local sites must take this situation into consideration.

On the whole, however, we must recommend that the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, working in conjunction with all the republic's interested organizations, develop a comprehensive and economically substantiated program which provides for a radical solution to such acute youth problems as employment, provision of housing needs, and development of facilities for culture and leisure time.

We must say that the entire series of problems could be solved by the young people themselves. First of all, we may specify the creation of MZhK [youth housing complexes], the leasing of low-profit or unprofitable enterprises, and the participation in cooperatives for manufacture of consumer goods.

Life presents the need for organizing new, so-called small-scale forms of economic management. This opens up a

broad expanse for exhibiting sharpness of wit, business-like manner, and practical realization of the ideas and innovations of the youth.

Comrades! Under conditions of cardinal transformations in the national economy and the breakdown of the old structures, it is important not to infringe upon the social rights of the working youth. Under these conditions, it would be expedient to create youth centers, production and construction associations, whose goals would be the realization of the interests of the youth and the solution of their problems.

There are many other questions concerning education, everyday life, and leisure of the youth, whose resolution we must undertake immediately.

I would like to hope that the plenum participants will draw the appropriate conclusions from the in-depth discussion which was held here today, and will take specific steps toward the realization of the plenum's resolutions.

Plenum Report

90US0112B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 28 Sep 89 pp 2, 4

[Report of the Joint Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee and Komsomol Central Committee: "At the Center of Attention—Problems of the Youth"]

[Text] As we have already reported, the joint plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee and Komsomol Central Committee was concluded on 25 September in Dushanbe. A large number of its participants took part in the discussion of the speech, draft formulation and resolution of this plenum. Over 30 speakers expressed their feelings on the pressing problems of the youth and presented proposals and critical comments. The content of these speeches is published in this report.

"The youth rightfully demand and want to specifically define their place in the sphere of protection of their interests," said Leninabad Party Obkom First Secretary T.M. Mirkhalikov. "And the republic's CP Central Committee has taken the correct course in defining, along with its own tasks, also the tasks of the Komsomol organizations on increasing the role of the youth in perestroyka and in democratization of social life."

Today we must speak out synonymously in favor of developing a youth policy in the republic. As a first step, we must create a community-state commission on developing policy in regard to the republic's youth. The commission should be financed from state and public funds and have broad powers for involving departments and organizations in this work. It would be expedient to form a creative collective within it, made up of a number of the republic's scientists and specialists. Similar commissions should be created at the local sites. The commissions must juridically develop the principles of youth policy and prepare a draft of a "Law on Youth".

Another means of improving the position of the youth in society is its involvement in social production. At present,

there are 197,000 people unemployed in the oblast. Of these, almost 73,000 are young people. However, this problem is difficult to solve, even though specific matters are firmly finding a place in the content of the Komsomol committees' work. This is the organization of summer labor activity of school children in Volgograd and Vitebsk oblasts and the assignment of young men and girls to PTU [vocational-technical schools] in the RSFSR and the Ukraine. That is a good thing. However, upon returning from their studies, these young people are faced with a number of questions in connection with their employment. This is where the republic's Komsomol falls short. Enlightenment work on the goals and tasks of assignment to study in other regions of the country is weakly developed. Another question is: What specialties of workers are they training there? If it is specialties which we need, then we should send [our young people] there. However, if we send them merely for the sake of sending them, this will not increase either the Komsomol's or our authority. We have our own vocational-technical schools which prepare cadres, and they are fully adequate. For example, the Kanibadamsk PTU- 18 trains machine operators for agriculture, but there is already an overabundance of these in the rayon. Today we need lathe operators, casters, electricians, and factory start-up technicians. I believe that in this plane the work of the Ministry of Public Education should be more flexible. We must listen to proposals from the local sites.

It is no secret to anyone how difficult it is for young families to get started. Because of existing traditions, they usually live in the same house with the parents and keep a common household. This is 4-5 families, or 20-25 people. At the same time, there are efforts to resolve this question. Thus, the Komsomol Central Committee, working in conjunction with interested central organs, have developed a position on a youth housing complex (MZhK). However, this movement is being stifled. I believe that both we and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee must cooperate in every way possible in the creation of the MZhK and other cost accounting youth associations.

R.K. Alimov, deputy secretary of the Dushanbe party gorkom, devoted his presentation to the problem of training Komsomol cadres. Unfortunately, he said, in the years of perestroika an inconsequentially small number of serious-minded fellows have emerged in the Komsomol. Most of them, as before, are oriented primarily toward executive functions. The party committees must seriously undertake the task of training Komsomol cadres. This is a matter which is primarily ours, the party's. Moreover, we need a concentration of efforts of scientists and specialists in the development of youth problems. I believe that the coordinating center under the republic's Academy of Sciences could undertake this matter. It would stimulate the scientific study of youth problems utilizing current methods of social experiment, prediction, simulation, and collective creativity which, as we know, give quick and significant effect. Naturally, the center must have an adequate material base for start-up operations, its own finances, entry at the union level, and the right to make foreign contacts.

The speaker focused on the primary directions in work with the youth—moral as well as economic upbringing. In his opinion, there is an alarming tendency toward an increased number of school and vocational-technical school graduates coming to the labor collectives with a negative attitude toward labor and without a desire to become involved in production. This is associated also with carelessness of workers, as well as with talk of pilfering and money-grubbing. Today as never before we need competent propaganda. Much depends on the position of the journalists who formulate public opinion. What they sow, you and I, as they say, will reap.

Here are two minor examples: Two weeks ago, the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ran a small publication on the front page, which presented an editorial analysis of the course of the subscription campaign for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. One correspondence out of two presentations was from the city of Dushanbe. It told about how the primary subscriber to the newspaper—the student, cannot subscribe because he is away doing agricultural work. Yet not a single student has been asked to do farm work. Naturally, people ask, continued the speaker, when the students will go, and if perhaps some have already gone.

Or another publication in the newspaper IZVESTIYA signed by A. Karpov, which motivated the exodus of the Russian-speaking population from our republic by the adoption of the Law on Language. Who conducted this study, and how does the correspondent know that all those who left Tajikistan associate their departure only with the adoption of this law? We believe that such unsubstantiated conclusions only do harm.

I believe that such publications must appear after appropriate study, and if the editors agree to publish them, then they must present their apologies.

N.Kh. Kurbanov, first secretary of the Khatlonskiy Komsomol obkom, spoke about the inadequate representation of Komsomol members and youth in the party, soviet and economic management organs. In the oblast, only one kolkhoz representative, 4 sovkhoz directors out of 114, 16 party committee secretaries out of 121, and 12 chairmen of kishlak Soviets out of 116 are in their 30's, and not one in the village Soviets.

In Khatlonskiy oblast in the year the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum was held, 14 persons were nominated for party work from among the secretaries and section heads of gorraykoms who had left the Komsomol, and in the following year—only 12 persons. The number for soviet work was 2 and 1, respectively. However, in 1987, 5 left the Komsomol for their specialty, and in 1988—14. Yet there are many worthy and energetic workers among such "untapped" reserves.

The speaker focused specifically on the work of youth centers, cost accounting associations created under the obkom, the Kulyabskiy and Kurgan-Tyubinskiy gorkoms, and the Ilyichevskiy and Kolkhozabadskiy Komsomol

raykoms. We strive to orient Komsomol economics toward educational and charitable goals.

Thus, the "Shabcharog" association under the Komsomol obkom allocated its funds for the victims in Gissara, while the cost-accounting sports clubs are engaged in preparing young men for service in the army.

For the additional funds which it has realized, the Ilyichevskiy Komsomol raykom has organized the regular publication of KHAYETI KOMSOMOLI—a monthly supplement to the rayon newspaper.

The speaker also proposed that the Komsomol committees introduce a question which they have prepared or a note to a party organ on a quarterly basis. This would increase the prestige of the Komsomol committees and, on the other hand, also increase their responsibility.

We may recommend a similar order also to the ispolkoms. This would be the personal responsibility of the Komsomol secretaries, who would be members of the appropriate organs, while at the present time their participation is limited merely to voting.

We must define our positions on many problems which remain unsolved to the present day, said Tajik SSR Minister of Public Education T.N. Nazarov.

Our system is undergoing serious changes, which at the same time are also encountering certain difficulties along the way. Despite the presence of numerous decisions and measures, no positive results have been felt as of yet. The primary reason for this is the lack of correspondence between word and deed. Today the quality of education and instruction does not meet the demand. The number of cases of law-breaking by the students and the youth as a whole is increasing. Undoubtedly, we cannot blame only the young people for everything. Unfortunately, a certain part of them are always encountering difficulties of everyday life, lack of social protection and unemployment.

Another problem is the training of cadres in the labor professions, which is being done without regard for the needs of the republic's national economy. With this situation, in a few years we may find ourselves faced with great difficulties associated with the emergence of serious disproportions in the system of training experienced specialists.

Material want and inconsistent application of the principle of social fairness have led to the disenchantment of the young people and to the spread of socio-political passiveness among them, noted Khorogskiy Komsomol gorkom First Secretary Ye. Fayzov in his speech. This has led to a sharp decline in the authority of the Komsomol among the youth. In Khoroga and Shugnanskiy rayon, the number of unemployed youths is increasing from one year to the next. There are no current social-cultural-domestic facilities, stadiums, palaces, and no elementary conditions for labor and everyday life at the city enterprises and at the farms. The average monthly wage of the sovkhos worker does not exceed 40-50 rubles, and in a number of settlements the

students walk 10-12 kilometers to school. There are thousands of young people on the waiting lists for housing.

The housing problem could be solved by building youth housing complexes. However, due to the absence of a construction base in the oblast, such a possibility is unrealistic. To resolve such questions, aside from the aid of republic ministries and departments, the effort and energy of the youth is required. Therefore I believe that the Tajik CP Central Committee and Komsomol Central Committee acted in a timely manner in introducing at the joint plenum the question of working out a state youth policy.

"In our rayon there are 4,000 people who are unemployed", said M. Khuseynov, a drill operator at the Anzobskiy GOK [ore concentrating combine]. "One thousand of them are young people. At the same time, the rayon has PTU No 53, where over 300 students are learning the professions of chauffeurs, tractor operators, and machine operators at livestock raising farms—which the rayon does not need at all. The republic's Ministry of Public Education should look into this. After all, we have a shortage of lathe operators, fitters, and electrical repairmen."

Meanwhile, there is a coal mine in the rayon which, by fault of the union ministry, is not operating at full capacity, while its full operational load might partially solve the problem of employment. The speaker also raised the questions of accelerating the construction of a town for the coal miners and laying a transport tunnel through the Ushtur pass.

Tajiksovprom [Tajik Council of Trade Unions] Chairman M.S. Salikhov expressed concern at the current state of affairs among the youth. Urgent measures are needed. The republic must take certain steps independently. For example, it must eliminate the income tax on all wages earned by students studying at vocational-technical schools. Already by the start of next year it is necessary to adopt a republic integrated program for the creation of new jobs. We must think not only about increasing their numbers, but we must also consider the interests of the young people themselves. There are directions of work which they consider promising—these are the ecology, the tasks of bringing to life the Law on Language, the recultivation of lands, and the rebirth of neglected kishlaks [Asian villages]. A significant moment is the youth policy within the framework of the specific enterprise. How is it that not one large plant or construction site in the republic includes in its plans funds allocated for social betterment of the youth? Not to mention the fact that in building housing, not one enterprise plans for young people on a share-participation basis.

In conclusion, the speaker stressed that the youth and the Komsomol must overcome their attitude of dependency. They must roll up their sleeves and set about the task at hand. They must be more resolute in exercising the rights and opportunities presented by the trade unions toward the realization of their goals. The young people must make their contribution to the struggle against crime and nationalism, and stand up in defense of the friendship of peoples. The youth must understand that no social guarantees and

programs will remove the acuteness of the problems without their active participation in the renovation and democratization of our life.

In the opinion of A. Sitnikov, retired partkom secretary at the "Zarya Vostoka" Plant in the city of Chkalovsk of Leninabad oblast, it is specifically the economic management activity and economics that are today the main point of application of efforts by the youth. Only here can we train true fighters for the cause of perestroyka. At the same time, if we speak of the independence of the Komsomol, any independence, as we know, begins with economic independence. The speaker presented an example from the work experience of the Chkalov city Komsomol organization, which last year created a cost accounting fund for youth initiative. Part of the income from its activity goes to the account of the Komsomol gorkom. From this fund, a youth cafe has been opened, the sewing firm "Ale-nushka" has been formed for making children's clothing, whose products are in demand among the city residents, and several video salons have been opened. Of course, there are also miscalculations, but on the whole the path selected is the right one.

The speaker expressed his opinion regarding the published resolution on the results of the joint discussion. Specifically, he proposed that those personally responsible for its implementation be named on the part of the CP Central Committee as well as on the part of the republic's Komsomol Central Committee.

Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary A.T. Kasy-mova touched upon serious problems concerning the upbringing of young people. In her opinion, the questions associated with young families are very acute. The good old traditions are being forgotten, when the husband treated the wife with love and kindness, and did everything to maintain the home as the central focus. Unfortunately, today there is an increase in the number of divorces, and it is primarily the children who suffer. Today there is no more important task than to show concern for their bright future.

We must involve young women into the sphere of social production. However, there are many shortcomings here. Thus, in Dushanbe there is only one medical school, although several are needed. Then the situation with specialists, whose shortage is very acutely felt, will be alleviated.

It is time to review the role and place of the Komsomol. Among its leaders today there are very few people who have the experience of practical work. How can they respond to the requests of people their own age, how can they know their needs if they themselves do not know life? The time for discussions has passed. We must act—decisively and bravely!

"The lack of jobs despite the excess of labor resources, as well as the housing shortage, force us to conduct a search for acceptable solutions," said A. Dzhabarov, chairman of the Pendzhikentskiy gorispolkom. "Forty percent of the elected deputies in Pendzhikentskiy rayon are young

people. Through joint efforts, we have created a new PMK [mobile motorized column], which employs over 700 people. The average age of this collective is 23. One more PMK will be created, as well as a motor pool, and a branch of one of the Leninabad enterprises is already in operation, employing tens of young people.

The problems of leisure time are being solved. A youth center and club for teenagers have been opened at the cannery. A dance floor and three clubs accommodating 1,200 people have been built with the funds of enterprises and organizations. We have an agreement with the collegium of the republic's Ministry of Light Industry for the creation of joint enterprises employing 14,000 young women. It would be a good idea for the republic's government to substantiate this with material resources. In conclusion, the speaker asked the Komsomol Central Committee to aid in allocating physical culture complexes to the rayon, which has 112 schools, as well as in granting loans for construction of housing for young families.

M. Yusupov, secretary of the Lenin Komsomol raykom, focused the attention of the plenum participants on the poor implementation of previously adopted decisions on the application of unused labor resources. Thus, through the fault of the Minmestprom [Ministry of Local Industry] and Minlegprom [Ministry of Light Industry] a shop producing folk-art craft products in the village of Varzob and the second phase of the hosiery-stockings production at the "Leningrad" sovkhoz were not placed into operation. These would have provided 70 and 260 jobs, respectively.

Gardens and vineyards are being planted in the rayon over an area of 3,300 hectares. However, the questions accompanying them are not being resolved: The construction of roads, social-cultural-domestic facilities, processing shops, and storehouses. Another problem is that around 40,000 villagers work in the city. However, the city shows no concern for the social, housing, or cultural provision of the workers.

The question arises: On what basis was the program "Zhilye-93" [Housing-93] compiled, if this problem was not taken into consideration. Or is this once again an error by the planning organs in regard to young families?

Yu.F. Levchuk, second secretary of the Khatlonskiy Komsomol obkom, who spoke at the plenum, proposed including the following in the plenum resolutions:

"The sections and commissions of the party Central Committee must begin developing a political line, and the communists working in government and in the Supreme Soviet must begin developing legislation on the transfer of all, including irrigated, land to the dekhkans and on the resolution of the future fate of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes". The speaker substantiated this by saying that the existing system of agriculture is economically ineffective. Thus, it ensures a growth in production, for example, for Khatlonskiy oblast, of 1.7 percent a year, while the population is growing at double that rate, approximately by 4 percent.

M. Khuseynov, secretary of the Komsomol buro of the Tajik Pedagogical Institute faculty of Russian language and literature, devoted his primary attention to the lack of domestic provisions for students, a significant portion of whom are not provided with spaces in dormitories. What good are these annual meetings with the leadership, the plenums, and the high level meetings, if, in his opinion, only the facts are summarized? How long will this logomachy continue?

In the opinion of the speaker, we should reduce the unsubstantiated plan for admission to republic VUZes and take the necessary measures to prepare highly trained specialists for whom there is a need, based at the leading VUZes of the country and abroad from among the young people of our republic.

We should re-specialize the Russian language and literature pedagogical institute for training specialists for rural areas and allocate additional stipends to those students who rent apartments.

Furthermore, the speaker dealt with questions of poor organization of leisure time of the youth, and a weak material base. In 1986, the construction of a republic school for the Komsomol aktiv was begun in the republic. The Tajik Komsomol Central Committee wants to use this building as a Youth House. Yet various organizations and institutions want to take it away. This should not be done.

Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary A. Yakubov who spoke at the meeting stressed that the problems of the youth are the problems of our entire society. The primary part of the developed youth policy must be comprised of the resolution of economic and social problems. Without this it is impossible to raise either the spirituality or the social activity of the youth, and this requires centralized allocation of monetary funds and material resources and unification of the efforts of state and public organizations.

The course of the republic Komsomol toward specific deeds and the experience in participation in creation of MZhKs, small construction industry enterprises and joint enterprises, and in the resolution of "bottlenecks" in production through cost-accounting centers by NTTM [scientific-technical creativity of the youth] today present the need for a transition to qualitatively new tasks—to the creation of a MZhKstroy trust, a republic MZhK association, to the broad development of youth housing cooperative, and to the creation of a center for youth labor associations. However, this is possible only under the condition of a radical review of Komsomol relations with the state organs.

We need legal and material guarantees for the realization of youth initiatives. In our opinion, the primary directions of youth policy must be consolidated into state statutes and laws at the republic level and reflected in the state plan for economic and social development and in the state budget, and passed on to regional and departmental levels.

The creation of a Tajik SSR Committee on Youth Affairs would have decisive significance in ensuring the organizational guarantees of state youth policy. This committee

must have the necessary powers and material resources, as well as a well-branched system of organs at all levels, down to the rayon.

It must have the right to control work with the youth by all ministries and departments, and to veto the adoption of any resolution if it does not correspond to the principles and tasks of youth policy.

All this may be reflected in the Tajik SSR Law on the Principles of State Youth Policy, which will bring all legislation on youth into a single integral system.

Questions of work provision must have full clarity and broad openness. We must give an answer to the question of what year the republic's population will be fully provided with jobs. In other words, we need to work out a scientifically substantiated program for creating new jobs, a program which takes into consideration the demographic situation. The draft of this program must be presented for public discussion.

Under conditions of the republic's transition to self-recovery and self-financing, the problem of training national skilled cadres becomes very acute. The outflow of specialists which has been noted has clearly exposed the inconsistency of the existing system, which does not take into consideration either the prospects for development of the regions or the location of production capacities and educational institutions.

Perhaps we will need to develop economic guarantees for employment of the youth in social production, including payment of unemployment benefits.

Various types of independent youth movements are emerging in the republic. The current stage of interaction of Komsomol organizations with independent associations is built on the basis of the formulated methods of organizational work under the direct control of the Komsomol committees. These are various youth initiative funds, amateur associations, centers for creative youth and scientific-technical creativity, military-patriotic clubs, and associations on social and professional interests.

The republic Komsomol Central Committee buro has a clear understanding of the fact that only by consolidating all the youth forces on the platform of perestroika is it possible to make a significant contribution to solving the entire set of problems which have accumulated in our republic.

There must be a constant dialogue with the newly formed neo-formal youth associations which interact with us or are outside the sphere of our influence. A clear example of this may be the political discussion club "Ru ba ru", created at the republic's Komsomol Central Committee.

We believe that only cooperation on the basis of mutual respect of organizationally independent and materially generalized initiative formulations will make it possible to combine their social and financial mobility with our organizational-political capacities, and to become a building force in society.

We are convinced that as long as the institution of empowering Komsomol workers as economic managers who undermine their projects is not eliminated at all levels, there can be no question of increasing the role of the Komsomol.

Republic Military Commissar M.M. Mamadzhanov, who spoke at the plenum, talked about preparing the youth for service in the ranks of the country's Armed Forces. The quality of this training has improved. Today there are fewer representatives of Tajikistan serving in non-combatant units. Nevertheless, there are considerable problems, especially in the general physical training, and in the very tradition of sending the young men off to service. After all, there used to be good traditions of send-off ceremonies, with participation of veterans of the Soviet Army, party, soviet and Komsomol workers. We have lost these to a significant degree. I did not see any Komsomol representatives at the induction center at Dushanbe, from where thousands of fellows are sent off for service.

And now the question of instructors in basic military training. Most of them are 60 years old or older. It is time for the Minister of Public Education to rejuvenate this membership.

The voyenkom [military committee] has given a special place to the study of the language of inter-national communication, thanks to which today there are many regimental, battalion, and company commanders among the Tajiks serving in the military, as well as instructors at military institutions of higher learning. Is there a reason for changing all of the training over to the Tajik language? Will our young people then be able to assume command duties in the army and navy?

The speaker related with pain the cases of inattention to war veterans and former soldiers-internationalists. He said also that we should erect a monument to those who died in the land of Afghanistan.

A.R. Nazriyev, head of the ideology section of the Garm-skiy party raykom and Komsomol Central Committee member, focused primary attention in his speech on questions of utilizing labor resources. In the rayon there are many hundreds of people who are unemployed, and two-thirds of them are young people. And although a line for production of reinforced concrete, an asphalt making plant, and a potato storage facility have been placed into operation here, 154 hectares of new orchards have been planted, and leasing and the family order have been developed, still it is impossible to solve all the problems of excess labor resources. Especially since the rate of population growth in the rayon comprises 6 percent—almost double that of the overall republic indicators. Therefore, we must develop a republic program for step-by-step resolution of this problem.

The speaker also told about the need for developing ideological work among the youth and for creating a material base for development of physical culture and sports in the rayon.

Dushanbe Komsomol Gorkom First Secretary A. Abduvakhidov spoke about social questions, everyday life and leisure of the youth. An especially alarming situation has arisen in the student and worker dormitories.

Focusing on questions of ideological work, the speaker stressed that there is a shortage in the republic of works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism translated into the Tajik language. Every year this question is discussed, but never resolved.

G.B. Bobosadykova, deputy chairman of the all-union "Zhaniye" society governing board, expressed her opinion at the plenum about the processes which are taking place. She focused the attention of those present on the excessive critical attitude in regard to the past. Yet there is very much of value in our country's history.

The speaker ascribed an important role in her presentation to the problems of the young family, stressing that these are also international problems. How many international families are there in our republic? Is this also a zone of silence? The speaker expressed disagreement with the preceding speaker, R.K. Alimov. Perhaps some people exaggerate the exodus of the Russian-speaking population in connection with the adoption of the Law on Language. However, neither should we oversimplify the situation. We must all have a careful attitude toward the cadres, especially those who have lived all their lives in the republic. We must pass on the real truth to our youth about the basis of friendship of peoples in Tajikistan.

Touching upon the youth problematics, Second Secretary of the Kabodiyenskiy party raykom and Tajik Komsomol Central Committee member A.V. Merzlyakov noted the timely nature of the joint plenum. The speech, he noted, gives a true picture of the youth problems, which are characteristic also for Kabodiyenskiy rayon. Here too the excess manpower is felt. Today the waiting list for housing here numbers 7,000 people, most of whom are young families.

Komsomol Central Committee member and machine operator at the "Rokhi Lenin" kolkhoz in Parkharskiy rayon, N. Azizova, devoted her presentation to questions of youth employment. There are over 10,000 people unemployed in the rayon, primarily young people. The speaker proposed creating a textile factory in the rayon.

Moscow Komsomol Raykom Second Secretary N. Boboyeva expressed the opinion that the questions of employment may be resolved with appropriate help from the ministries and departments by building branches of labor-intensive enterprises through our own efforts. Today there is a branch of a sewing association operating here which employs 350 young women. They asked me to tell the managers of the Association imeni 50th Anniversary of the USSR and the republic Minlegprom about their poor working conditions. The speaker criticized the methods of planning the assignment of young people for study at vocational-technical schools in the RSFSR and the Ukraine, saying that such methods of "ordering" have long outlived their usefulness.

Speaking at the plenum, Leninabad Komsomol Gorkom First Secretary I. Ibragimov noted that the 30,000-person membership of the city's Komsomol organization is ready to sign its name under every letter of this long-awaited resolution.

"Today much has been said about who is at fault for the decline in authority of the Komsomol, who is at fault for the bad deeds in the Komsomol and the youth environment," noted N.N. Degtyareva, first secretary of the Gissarskiy Komsomol raykom. "However, I would like to say right now that it is primarily our leaders who are at fault: The Komsomol workers, the heads of the Komsomol gorkoms and raykoms. It is true, there are tasks which the lower-level organizations cannot resolve independently. However, there are also such problems which the Komsomol leaders could easily solve locally."

And one more thing. The method has been practiced by which the Komsomol organizations trained the cadres and submitted them to the party organs for review. Would it not be better, for example, to recommend for Komsomol work those party organizers and party raykom, gorkom and obkom instructors who have excelled in solving youth problems? Then we could implement the party policy through CPSU members, and not merely in words.

"Distortions in national policy, a mania for slogans, and a tendency toward show have dealt a heavy blow to the cause of international upbringing," said Zheleznodorozhniy rayispolkom Chairman A.A. Achilov, who spoke at the plenum. "We, the workers of the Soviets, have a direct relation to many problems, for which we are sometimes subjected to sharp criticism. Today I would like to deal with the problems of employment of the youth and the older generation".

It is become unclear by what principle the selection and placement of cadres is taking place. For example, specialists from outside come to our republic. This may be justified only when the specialist is highly qualified and is invited to operate the machinery. However, when an enterprise manager, raykom or obkom secretary is invited, one has to wonder about the reasons for this.

Furthermore, the speaker said that we are already into the fifth year of perestroika, yet on many questions the position and behavior of many party workers have remained the same. We are speaking of a crisis in the Komsomol and in the economy. Today we must take radical measures, and these measures must be directed at improving cadre selection and placement.

I propose that the cadres should be taken into the party from the labor collectives. Secondly, curatorship of the cadres should be handed over to the Central Committee first secretary. Why? Because there is a high turnover rate for second secretaries.

"There are 13 professional theatres in our republic," said Kh. Abdurazakov, chairman of the Tajik Theatrical Society governing board. "Part of them are in ruins. Yet this is our national pride. In general, the attitude toward culture, literature and art leaves much to be desired.

Particularly on the part of the party workers. Yet many of them read Firdousi, Dzhami, and Omar Khayam in order to raise a toast."

Look at the building we have for our Tajik CP Central Committee! What a Council of Ministers we have! Marvelous architecture. The raykoms and the city party committee are all marvelous buildings. Everywhere we have our own halls. There was, after all, a reduction in the party and soviet apparatus. And so: During the times of stagnation the Komsomol Central Committee and the party gorkom lived under one roof—the Tajik CP Central Committee. Everything was normal. But as soon as they built another building, again it was not enough. The gorkom for itself, the raykoms—for themselves. Everyone for himself. We have very many studio theaters. It is simply that we have nowhere to rehearse.

"All the negative things that we have today among the youth are the result of our great shortcomings yesterday," noted Tajik SSR Minister of Public Health G.K. Pulatova. "The state of health of the school children evokes great concern among our medical men. Today there is a clearly formulated opinion that the system of medical services to children in schools does not ensure the effective resolution of the integrated program for strengthening health and reducing the illness rate of school age children."

The situation which has emerged in the republic's social sphere, particularly the exacerbation of problems of housing and employment, are most clearly reflected in the lifestyle of the youth and their living indicators. According to the status as of 1 January of this year, in terms of alcoholism and use of narcotic and toxic substances, there were 465 youths listed on report in the republic's preventative-treatment institutions. This is 88 more than last year.

There is another acute problem which was also mentioned here. That is the housing problem for young doctors and mid-level medical workers. In Kulyabskiy region of Khatlonskiy oblast alone, there are 720 medical workers in need of improved housing conditions. Over 80 percent of the young specialists assigned to rayons which are in greatest need of doctors are transferred within the first 2 years to "their own rayons", to relatives, because they have not been provided with housing space.

R.R. Rakhimov, senior scientific associate of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, said that there are a number of acute problems which hinder creativity, realization of potential, and active inclusion of young scientists into the solution of national economic problems. The main one is lack of domestic arrangements and absence of housing and visas. Back at the 26th republic Komsomol Congress, young scientists raised the question of building a dormitory for the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences. Our academy is the only one in the country which does not have its own dormitory or "graduate student and work probationer house" The republic Gosplan promised to resolve this question in 1988. 1989 is on the wane, but the measures have not been taken.

Our republic has a very low percentage of dissertation defense after completion of graduate study. Part of the candidates' dissertations are not introduced in the republic.

Young people are often accused of dependency. However, many of their real initiatives and proposals find no support. The republic's first display class created at our initiative is poorly utilized, and sometimes not according to its purpose. There have been cases of using this class for transporting people and for cooperative use.

The chairman of the Tajik cultural society "Sogdiana" governing board in Moscow, R. Safarov, acquainted the plenum participants with the directions of work and tasks of this group, which represents a 3,000-member detachment of the youth of Tajikistan in our Homeland's capital city. He devoted much attention to the problematics in the republic and criticized the dictate of the departments which have brought agriculture, ecology, and demography to a sorry state.

The problem of unemployment, in the opinion of the speaker, may be solved by means of family planning. Another way is to build enterprises. Then the speaker talked about the low educational level of the population which is conditioned by the poor quality of education, about the need to consider the positive aspects of Islam, on which the culture, everyday life and customs of the people have been built since ancient times. He assured the plenum participants that the "Sogdiana" society will always show concern for its sisters and brothers living outside the boundaries of Tajikistan. Specifically, the speaker proposed that we speed up the creation of a Tajik television channel in Uzbekistan.

"At today's plenum, questions are being discussed which concern the life of the republic's youth," said D. Isoyev, executive secretary of the discussion club "Ru ba ru". "Today it is no secret to anyone that Soviet youth, and especially the youth of Central Asia, have poor living conditions as compared with the youth abroad. For many years our leaders, speaking from their tribunals, have told the young people the tale that they are the best, the most fortunate. Deception and concealment of the facts have led to the situation where gradually they stopped talking about the youth altogether. Such a situation existed not only in our republic, but in the entire Soviet Union."

In our republic, youth problems have particular significance, because the young people make up half the population of Tajikistan. They are capable of giving all their energy to the cause of perestroika. However, sometimes the force of the young peoples' energy does not have a place for application. One of the reasons for this is that the general education schools do not give enough attention to vocational selection.

T. Dustov, party committee secretary of the Sovkhoz imeni 50th Anniversary of the Tajikistan Komsomol in Komsomolabadskiy rayon, devoted his speech to problems of utilizing labor resources, developing new lands, and increasing agricultural production. Specifically, he said

that many critical comments have been addressed here to our rayon, and rightly so. In Khakimi rural soviet alone there are 5,000 people who are not engaged in socially productive labor. The picture is the same at the Sovkhoz imeni "50th Anniversary of the Tajikistan Komsomol" and "Samsolik", as well as other farms. This is associated with the fact that there has still not been a single plant or factory built in Komsomolabadskiy rayon.

According to preliminary data, almost 52 kishlaks are located in the zone of flooding. Considering this fact, we have been allocated 12,000 hectares of land in the rayon of Tavildara, Sangvor, and the "Miyenadu" sovkhoz. This is good, but for the assimilation of these lands we need a material-technical base, which we do not have. We must allocate additional technology so we can cultivate this land in time and grow crops of potatoes and other products here.

We must note that the state of affairs in the rayon is difficult. The rayon party committee is unable to solve all these problems. Therefore, the support and help of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers are needed. As a member of the Central Committee, I propose that we declare the construction of the new rayon center in Komsomolabad as a first-priority construction site, so that the republic's Komsomol members will participate in it.

"I believe that we must seek the root of many errors in work with the youth not only in practical application, but also in that theory which was consciously applied in practice," said Komsomol Central Committee Secretary N.I. Paltsev. What are the primary directions which we see in solving the youth problem? In our opinion, the first direction is the scientific-theoretical one. It presupposes the destruction of outdated dogmas and stereotypes. The second is the development of a common conception of current-day youth, its place and role in the life of socialist society at the stage of perestroika. The third direction is ideological. In the process of renewing socialism, a largely different, significantly renewed ideology must arise, which among other things will refute much of what was previously affirmed, and will affirm much of what was previously rejected.

In this sense, today's plenum, the atmosphere of trust and comradeship which reign in this hall, the joint search for solutions, are a good example and rather valuable experience for the entire country, a weighty argument in favor of solving the problems which have come to a head at the all-union level in just this way.

The speaker expressed the conviction that youth policy will only then be truly effective if it is not reduced to the adoption of "emergency" and tactical measures for attenuating the most obvious contradictions in the sphere of the social life of young people. Only then will it have a truly promising character. This may be achieved if the central link in youth policy becomes the concern for education, upbringing, and development of the intellectual potential of the upcoming generation. If this is done through coordinated action of all the segments of our political system.

The entire system of major social programs, upheld economically, organizationally, and juridically, must serve this purpose. We are not speaking of certain specific rights and privileges for the youth, but merely about equal and fair conditions commensurate with their role in society and their participation in social production.

Today, when perestroyka is opening up broad prospects for the youth, the most important task is to show them these prospects and possibilities, to strengthen their faith in the future, and to strengthen their faith in socialism. Youth policy must be built on the complete trust of the youth, and on the other hand—on their responsibility to society. This presupposes also participation in all-political processes, as well as support of initiative in all of its forms, as well as trust in the young cadres.

The most pressing problems of public education resounded in the speech presented by Dzh. Shermatova, senior Young Pioneer leader at Secondary School No 3 in Ordzhonikidzeabadskiy rayon. She noted that we must focus attention primarily on the quality of the cadres

which are coming to the school. The department of theory and methodology in Young Pioneer and Komsomol work at Dushanbe State Pedagogical Institution is not performing its function. Therefore, we literally have to struggle with the young pedagogs who come to work at the school.

In 1988, at the proposal of the republic Komsomol Central Committee, the "Mashyal" club was opened in Ordzhonikidzeabad. To our shame, the club still does not have its own building, but huddles in one small room allocated to it by the city's House of Young Pioneers. I believe that today we have the right to ask our officially responsible comrades about this.

Military serviceman T. Martynov devoted his speech to the organization of joint measures with the local Komsomol organizations, and to problems of international upbringing of the youth. He expressed concern about the problems of unemployment of young people about to enter military service. Unemployment is associated with drug addition, drug smuggling, and other crimes.

**CC Journal Warns Against National Parties
Emerging in Georgia, Baltics**90US0087A Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE**OBRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 14, Sep 89 (signed to
press 1 Sep 89) pp 62-69[Article by V. Pavlov: "What is Behind the Slogans of
Sovereignty?"]

[Text] *"In connection with the tragic events in Tbilisi, there has been talk of the so-called Democratic Party of Georgia. What does this organization represent? What are its program and aims?"* (Yu. Guryev, city of Aleksandrov). *"In the article about the Democratic Union, which was published in your journal (No 9, 1989), a whole series of parties were mentioned—the League of Freedom of Lithuania, the Independence Party of Estonia, and others. Please tell us in more detail about their goals, strategy, and tactics"* (N. Silin, city of Moscow). *People are also asking about movements of a similar kind in Armenia. The journal's editors have asked the journalist V. Pavlov to respond to our readers' questions.*

Perestroika is a complex and sometimes contradictory process. On one hand, it has moved our society far ahead. On the other, it would seem, it has resurrected times past. From where, from what dark corners of our life, have these forgotten ideas, old slogans, and antiquated appeals emerged into the light? Some are reminiscent of the Constituent Assembly, others have the intent of spiritually reviving monarchism—in a word, under circumstances of glasnost, on the stormy wave of perestroika, political formulas that seemingly have long laid on the bottom now have come to the surface, like a froth.

Something similar is also occurring in such a complex and delicate area of interethnic relations, as that of the relationships between the national-state formations of the nations and peoples of our country. Many problems have accumulated here, and clearly we cannot count upon their being solved soon. The paths of search for solutions that have been proposed by various forces are sometimes very, very different. At the same time, as events show, far from all the ideas that are being advanced with the alleged aim of overcoming ethnic problems actually pursue this goal. We cannot, in particular, close our eyes to the fact that, in a number of regions, tendencies and groups exist that are striving, while using these problems as a basis, to accomplish their own, basically destructive tasks. Exacerbating inter-ethnic relations, such forces are setting for themselves the goal not of removing or overcoming the difficulties or conflicts that are arising here, but of using them as a way to undermine the Soviet federation, to destroy the Union of Soviet peoples with their help. And most often these attempts are tied to questions of our national and state structure and are taking place under the flag of defending the national sovereignty of one people or another.

It is precisely from such positions that the so-called "national parties" in a number of union republics are operating today.

AND SO, what is concealed behind the facade of these "unions" and "parties" that are supposedly operating under the banner of perestroika? I cannot say that the materials that I possess will make it possible to give an exhaustive answer. But nevertheless it is possible to name and characterized the best known of such organizations, which are operating primarily in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic area.

Among the Transcaucasian "parties" and organizations, the principle ones that need to be mentioned are certainly the "National-Democratic Party of Georgia" [Natsionalno-demokraticeskaya partiya Gruzii], The "Georgian National Independence Party" [Partiya natsionalnoy nezavisimosti Gruzii] (also known as the "Democratic Party of Georgia" [Demokraticeskaya Partiya Gruzii]), and also the Armenian "Association for National Self-Determination" [Obyedineniye natsionalnogo samoopredeleniya].

The history of all these organizations is in many ways similar. They have been formed during the years of perestroika under the flag of national sovereignty and the national independence by people who hold firm anti-socialist and anti-Soviet views.

Both Georgian "parties" are offsprings of the Ilya Chavchavadze Society—"an organization which, having initially proclaimed cultural and educational goals, is increasingly taking part in political life in the role of a conduit for nationalist ideas, of a force for the resurrection of nationalist slogans and consciousness.

The "National-Democratic Party" broke away in the summer of 1988. Its leaders became G. Chanturiya, I. Batiashvili, and I. Tsereteli, who occupied the posts of chairman, political secretary, and secretary-treasurer, respectively. In fact, the directors of this newly-appeared political force did not work long in agreement with one another. Already at the beginning of 1989, Tsereteli and Batiashvili split off and established the "National Independence Party," also called the "Democratic Party of Georgia."

The program positions, the charter principles of these organization are in many ways similar and are directed toward achieving a common goal—the withdrawal of Georgia from the USSR. It is in this way, and only in this way, that they view their idea of restoring national sovereignty.

But doubts necessarily arise when we more closely examine the program documents of these parties: Is national self-determination really their main goal, their most important task? Are not goals of other kinds being concealed by the slogan of sovereignty?

Alas, even a fleeting acquaintance, for example, with the program of the "National-Democratic Party of Georgia" (NDP) indicates that, behind the "national," but essentially nationalistic, tasks that are formulated in it, other social and political tasks can be clearly seen. Thus, in its "Program," the NDP sets as a goal the restoration of Georgia's independence. But this independence turns out

to have a very specific social and political orientation—its restoration is directly tied to liberation from Soviet power which supposedly was imposed on the republic by force.

And what is offered in return? The "Program" does not give an answer to this question, but rather only the hint of one, referring to history and declaring the NPD to be a direct continuer of the same political line which the old Georgian NPD followed in the first quarter of the 20th century. It speaks also about recognition of the heirs of the old national democratic party who are located in the emigration. This open enthusiasm for the line of the old NPD, in my view, best of all characterizes the political aspect of its successors and speaks about their political goals. Indeed, acknowledging its own commonality with this line, the new NPD is proclaiming a definite ideal for the political structure of Georgia.

What kind of political structure is this? The old NPD, created in June 1917 by representatives of the Georgian national bourgeoisie including S. Kediya, G. Gvazava, and G. Veshapeli, and numbering 6000-7000 persons, was in terms of its political ideology and program a run-of-the-mill bourgeois party that advocated the establishment of an independent Georgian bourgeois state. It cannot but be noted that the old NPD was at that time not a very influential force. But it joined in a coalition Council led, incidentally, by the Georgian Mensheviks who later formed the government of bourgeois Georgia. The aims of the council, as acknowledged by its founders, were to satisfy the political, economic and cultural needs of the Georgian people but were mainly—to defend the revolution, the bourgeois, February revolution, from the ripening socialist one (see "The Nonproletarian Parties of Russia: The Lesson of History," Moscow, Mysl publishers, 1984, pp 312, 321). Announcing its solidarity with these political goals, the "new" NPD, in essence, is supporting restoration of a bourgeois social system within the economy and in politics.

The position of the NPD with regard to the nationalities question is a very inconsistent and, I am not afraid to use the term, two-faced one. On one hand, it speaks out in the name of a supposedly enslaved, oppressed nation and, consequently, in defense of national justice. However, this is a strange justice that has an obvious smack of ethnic inequality: "Our device: Georgia for the Georgians..." True, at the same time, the proviso is made that "...this does not in any way mean an infringement on the rights of ethnic groups living within the territory of Georgia or a restriction of their political freedom." But one should not put a great deal of faith in this stipulation, inasmuch as it has as its neighbors within the "Program" formulations such as the following: "Following Sovietization ... three autonomous entities were established within Georgia, and this was when the territory of the so-called autonomous Abkhaz Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, from times immemorial, have been the historic lands of Georgia, and as regards the Adzhara ASSR, then its population is Georgian, and the Adzhara autonomous republic was in fact established taking account of regional principles, which for an atheistic state is a total surprise."

Any person who recalls the addresses of the envoys of the Abkhaz ASSR at the first Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies or the June events in the Abkhaz ASSR knows that Georgian-Abkhaz relations are far from being as simple and straight-forward as the authors of the "Program" attempt to portray them. And things are also not so simple with the Adzhara ASSR: We should also not forget about confessional, denominational differences so long as, along with freedom of conscience, real religious tolerance has still not been ensured in society.

Perhaps the NDP will be able to ensure this, while preaching pluralism in all spheres of life? Alas, here too, to put it lightly, there is inconsistency. "The ideological basis of our party," the "Program" emphasizes, "is theodemocracy, which, besides traditional democratic values, presupposes the leading role of the Church in moral questions and in overseeing policy." So that, within the framework of such a concept of democracy, Muslims by faith should not particularly hope for recognition of their own rights. And in the political area, control is also openly promised. It is noteworthy that the NDP limits itself to a general declaration about pluralism and does not give a single guarantee of recognition of the political rights and freedoms of those who profess other views and approaches. Nowhere within the entire text of the "Program" of a party that calls itself national-democratic, does one encounter such fundamental democratic concepts as freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and demonstration, of religion, and the like. It would appear that the promised pluralism may turn out to be akin in spirit to a principle which Henry Ford once proclaimed when advertising his well-known "Model T"—a simplified passenger car with a black color: "An American can get any model from us, if he chooses a "Model T", and any color, if he chooses black..." There is nothing more to say; he paints a good picture of pluralism!

From the entire set of democratic tools, the authors of the "Program" selected only the referendum, and this only as a means for withdrawal from the USSR. Moreover, it is conceived that the referendum will be "...with the direct participation of representatives of the UN and other experts..." i.e. more like an international action.

And the allies of the NDP from the "Georgian National Independence Party", while sharing common goals, do not take shelter behind the United Nations, but openly say with whom they want to be in the same ranks with. Their program, in particular, envisages the secession of the Georgian SSR from the USSR, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Georgia, the rejection of Soviet power, the proclamation of Georgia as an independent state, and its subsequent entry as a military ally into NATO. Here it is possible to judge, without waiting for actions, on the basis of words alone, who is who.

In terms of spirit and direction the founders of the Armenian "Association for National Self-determination" have something in common with the goals and programs of the Georgian "national parties." It was created in the fall of 1987 by a group of people who had earlier belonged to the

so-called "Armenian Committee for the Protection of Political Prisoners in the USSR"—P. Ayrikyan, exiled in 1988 from the USSR and deprived of Soviet citizenship, S. Avakyan, M. Garbrielyan, M. Gorgisyan, V. Markosyan... The "association" has not declared its program, limiting itself to statements by its leaders, in which its main goals are set forth. What kind of goals? Reestablishment of the national statehood of Armenia (also by means of conducting a referendum on the question of Armenia's withdrawal from the USSR)... The prevention of biological genocide (striving to evoke associations with a tragic page in the history of the Armenian people, the Turkish genocide of 1915, the declarations characterize in this way the worsening ecological situation within the republic and negative tendencies in the genetic fund of the population that are related to it are described)... Unification of all historic Armenian territories, including the former Armenian lands in Turkey, the return of all Armenians to their homeland, and a revival of national spirit... They are talking about the creation of a state, lying on the border between Christian and Muslim cultures, between socialism and capitalism, and enjoying the benefits of such a situation.

The distinguishing feature of the "Association" is its organization of and very active participation in openly anti-Soviet, anti-socialist actions that at times have no connection with its declared goals. It is also noteworthy that the "Association" is attempting to enter the international arena, for which it has declared the ousted P. Ayrikyan its "representative" and an "ambassador plenipotentiary abroad of Free Armenia."

There are also "national parties" in the three Baltic republics. These are the "Movement for the National Independence of Latvia" [Dvizheniye za natsionalnyu nezavisimost Latvii], the "Party for National Independence of Estonia" [Partiya natsionalnoy nezavisimosti Estonii], the "Lithuanian Freedom League" [Liga svobody Litvy], and the "Party of Democrats of Lithuania" [Partiya demokratov Litvy]. Each of these organizations has its own specific positions and approaches. However, they also have common ones: They all actively exploit the idea of national self-determination of the Baltic republics and identically view being a part of the Soviet Union as occupation. Besides this, they all also come out against migration to the republics from other regions, especially from Russia, as aggravating social and economic problems and supposedly limiting the rights of the indigenous population.

In particular, a clearly nationalistic stance is being taken by the "Movement for the National Independence of Latvia" (MNIL), which was established in Rome in the summer of 1988. A former deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, E. Berklavs, became its director, having declared (to be sure, after his retirement) that Latvia had been "occupied by Soviet troops." However, the principle role has been played by an initiative group, which include people who are well-known for their anti-socialist and anti-Soviet views, such as V. Baikovs and A. Zarinsh...

This movement has formulated its program goals as follows: to reestablish Latvia as a sovereign republic and to realize the national self-determination of Latvians. I do not want the impression created that I am against the national sovereignty of Latvia or of any other republic. But they are able to strengthen and broaden their sovereignty within the framework of the Soviet federated state. This is one path of national self-determination. It is also possible to take other paths: to transform the struggle for sovereignty into a weapon for the destruction of the federation's unity.

I am not casting the slightest doubt on the well-founded indignation of the Latvians and, indeed, of the peoples of any other Soviet republics, that their national feelings have been offended. Aggravated socioeconomic questions, the willfulness and sometimes even the dictates of all-union departments within the republic, and the problems created by the migration, with a real threat of transforming the indigenous people into national minority on their own land—all this is troubling and cannot but be troubling to Latvian national self-consciousness. In the course of perestroika, these problems can and must be resolved, gradually eliminating from our lives those things that impede the normal relationships of the Soviet peoples. And it is possible, by using them as a battering ram, to try to undermine both perestroika and the national-state structure of the USSR, to restore the old order.

This is the path that the MNIL is taking: It is idealizing the bourgeois Latvian republic and is striving to revive its form of statehood. "The 20 years of Latvia's independence still live in the memory of the Latvian People," one of the appeals of the "Movement" stresses. "No kind of barriers can subdue our struggle for our land, language, and freedom."

But once again, the same doubt: Are we talking only about land, language and freedom? Is it only separatism that motivates MNIL activists? It's hard to give a single answer to these questions. Indeed, the "Movement's" program documents do not say a word about the social nature of the Latvian statehood that it is trying to achieve. On one hand, one also encounters the concept of "socialist pluralism" within the MNIL charter. And if there is condemnation, it seems as if this is only of the deformations of socialism: "In 1940, duped by Stalin's people, hundreds of Latvian communists installed the regime which led our people to the threshold of destruction—to so-called barracks [kazarmenny] socialism." On the other hand, a very nebulous picture is presented of the future political and economic structure which they propose to establish in a Latvia liberated from "occupation and colonization": "Only after it has obtained its freedom and independence will Latvia be able to raise itself up and achieve real well-being... Correct information will prevent lack of understanding and will unmask the false teachings that have been fabricated for years." As an example for Latvia, MNIL documents see the small countries of Europe—Finland, Denmark, and others, whose social nature and affiliation leaves no doubt. At the same time, there are no calls to change the social system—the problem of what

kind of social system is being considered for after Latvia has been freed from the "guardianship of the USSR" is avoided entirely.

And this, in general, is characteristic of all similar parties: Trying to stir the people to serious, far-reaching changes in the political structure, they—consciously or accidentally—do not bind themselves with obligations for the future. And this provides an opportunity to use all those who follow them "in the dark," as it is called, without their knowledge and agreement, for the achievement of undeclared goals and tasks to which the people within the society do not even aspire.

In its words, the MNIL advocates the restoration of ethnic justice in the relations of the Lettish people and opposes any kind of ethnic exclusiveness and privileges. But to whom, for example, is the "Movement" preparing to give the right of deciding the fate of the Latvian state? As is underlined in the appeal of the 2nd MNIL Congress (May 1989), solely to citizens of Latvia—to those who had Latvian citizenship before 17 June 1940 and their direct descendants, irrespective of their place of residence. At MNIL initiative so-called "committees of Latvian citizens" have been established in various regions of the republic, which, according to the ideas of their organizers, will have the job at their conference of deciding the question of Latvia's withdrawal from the USSR and then, once outside the framework of Soviet statehood, will determine the political and economic structure of the republic. (It is planned to convene this congress as a counterweight to the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the Latvian SSR elected in the upcoming republic-wide elections.) On one hand, demands are being advanced by MNIL activists "to achieve by economic, political and ideological means the return of a part of the migrants to their own lands," and on the other—"to consider Letts living beyond the boundaries of Latvia to be a part of our people. Somehow, this political double bookkeeping does not square well with the assurances in the MNIL charter that the "Movement" is directed against any kind of force and chauvinism. But to make up for this, it indicates unambiguously what the national self-determination of Letts, as advocated by the "Movement," will come to mean for representatives of other peoples...

Demands that are related in spirit but are much more open are contained in the program documents of the "Party for National Independence of Estonia" (PNIE), established in the summer of 1988 by a group of people with fixed anti-socialist views. The "Political Declaration" and the "Charter" adopted by the founding meeting of PNIE in August 1988 advance the problems of restoring the political independence of the Estonian republic and liquidating "socialist colonialism." These tasks have not only a national-political but also a nationalistic orientation—in a revived republic it is proposed to make "a transition from a planned to a market economy, together with a transition to cost recovery and with the creation of a national economy" and to "encouragement of private enterprise and the creation of normal trade relations with foreign enterprises."

Measures of a restrictive character against representatives of other nationalities are much more consistent. In particular, along with halting the flow of migrants from other republics—a measure against which few who will categorically object today—it is intended to introduce Estonian citizenship. Understandably, they are not talking about that kind of republic citizenship, alongside all-union citizenship, that is proposed by the draft CPSU platform for "The Nationalities Policy of the Party Under Modern Conditions." No, this citizenship is thought of as an alternative to all-union citizenship, as a privilege for a part of the population of the Estonian SSR. At the initiative of the PNIE, so-called "committees of Estonian citizens" are being formed at a forced tempo, which include only persons who have lived in Estonia before 1940 and their direct descendants, and the proposal has been made to conduct an "Estonian congress", delegates to which will be elected by these committees. And at it, to resolve the question of the future of the Estonian republic. Thus, we are seeing an attempt to exclude the non-indigenous population from decisions concerning the destiny of the Estonian SSR.

At the same time, the political structure is sketched out rather obscurely. On one hand, the concept of a "Soviet Estonia" is employed. True, in a sharply negative sense. On the other, there is no mention of any kind of guarantees that the Soviet system will be preserved. And the basic documents of the PNIE also proclaim restoration of the sociopolitical order that existed in Estonia before 1940, of private property, etc. The same epithet, "Soviet" is also used in such word combinations as "Soviet occupation troops and military bases," which clearly shows that, in the opinion of PNIE ideologues, what is Soviet should be outside the borders of Estonia.

Also provocative and, in its way, curious is the interethnic part of PNIE's program. Like all national parties in the Baltics it is demanding admission of the republic as a member of the United Nations. In particular, in its memorandum entitled "About the Situation in Estonia," approved in the fall of 1988, The Tallin branch of this "party" calls for the UN to include in the agenda of the General Assembly the question of the acceptance of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as full members of the UN, that it ensure that elections will be held under UN supervision and that, if necessary, UN troops be used to maintain order... We have here an attempt to transform a question which, in essence, is a domestic one (and the right of each people to self-determination, according to our Constitution, is an internal affair of the people and the country) into a subject of international speculation...

Articles in this journal have already talked about the "Lithuanian Freedom League," its program and activities. (See V. Dorofeyev, "Sayudisa": For and Against," *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* NO 18, 1968, and, by the same author, "Unity and Contradictions," *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE*, No 11, 1989.) To this, we can add only the information that, from 1978 to 1988,

according to its leader A. Terlyatskas, the "League" allegedly operated underground and that it was only in the summer of 1988 it openly declared its existence.

The program demands of the "League" are not distinguished by their breadth but unambiguously testify to the orientation of the political sympathies of its ideologues. The primary demand is for withdrawal of "Soviet occupation troops" from the territory of Lithuania. Other demands are advanced as well, such as for "legalization of Lithuanian citizenship and the removal from high governmental posts of persons not of Lithuanian nationality." And "monuments be raised in memory of those who showed resistance to the Soviet regime during 1940-1950," including armed Lithuanian nationalists. This hardly needs be commented upon. Other demands—to limit migration to Lithuania by citizens of other Soviet republics, to halt the construction of a nuclear reactor and of large chemical plants in Lithuania, to make Lithuanian the official language—have been advanced for the masses, in order to encourage them to also accept the remaining points in the program.

With regard to the future political and economic structure of Lithuania, the "League" maintains cautious silence. Moreover, its activities have recently become increasingly conspiratorial; it is attempting to penetrate the organs of the "Lithuanian Movement for Perestroyka" ("Sayudisa") and take control the conduct of its policies without binding itself with obligations for the future. As history shows, such political "dark horses" are an extremely dangerous phenomenon because they hide from the people, as a rule, plans which are dangerous for democracy and progress... And if it is considered that those active in the "League" idealize the pro-fascist, openly terrorist movement of the "forest brothers" [lesnyye bratya], these fears are clearly very well-founded.

In the beginning of 1989 still another nationalist organization announced its existence, the so-called "Party of Lithuanian Democrats" [Partiya demokratov Litvy]. To a large extent its program goals are identical to the goals of the "League," with which the party coordinates its activities. It cannot be excluded that the newly-appeared "Party" is, in fact, only a legal screen for the "League."

In the summer of this year, the Baltic "national" parties took part in a campaign in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, which have come to be called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. A whole series of Baltic movements connect the history of the incorporation of their republics into the USSR to this pact, particularly to secret protocols to the treaty. The existence of these protocols is not denied in principle by specialists, although the question of the reliability of the text which was printed in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian publications and is viewed as the true one, remains open.

Very indicative of the level of their legal sophistication are the slogans which have been advanced in connection with the 1939 treaty, and particularly the most popular of these—"Denounce the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact!" From

the viewpoint of international law, this demand is nonsense, a testimony to political illiteracy, inasmuch as, like any kind of agreement between two states, the pact became null and void with the initiation of military actions between them, that is on 22 June 1941 (indeed, in the statement of the Soviet government made on that very same day, the treaty was declared null and void). So that to demand its denunciation is, essentially, the same as knocking on an open door.

Incidentally, the most highly qualified among the "unmaskers" of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are beginning to understand that this position doesn't hold together and are trying to find a new one. In particular, I. Tsipule, in an article entitled "On the Juridical Force and Political Consequences of the Hitler-Stalin Pact," published in the organ of the People's Front of Latvia—the newspaper *ATMODA*, acknowledges that the pact lost its force on 22 June 1941. But at the same time the article advances a demand not that pact be denounced, not that be declared null and void, but that it be declared to have been invalid from the start (similar to the way certain of the signatories to the Munich Agreement—France and Italy—acted with regard to it after the war).

What is the goal of this demand? The same one as the demand to denounce the treaty. This is nothing other than a call for a "quiet" withdrawal from the Soviet federation and for a return to 50 years ago with the aid of the mechanisms of international law. More precisely, for a declaration that this entire 50 year period in the history of the Baltic republics—their development within the framework of the USSR—is "null and void"... This was clearly shown by the hasty declaration of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet commission for study of the German-Soviet treaties and their consequences (which hurried to forestall the conclusions of a corresponding commission established by the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies), where doubt is placed on even the legality of the entry of the Lithuanian SSR into the Soviet Union.

It is true that, from the viewpoint of international law, not all ends come together here. Indeed, the same western border of the USSR which an attempt is being made today to review, with the help of manipulations centering around the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was fixed not by it, but by the Potsdam agreement of 1945 and by the entire system of international agreements that consolidated the principle of the inviolability of the postwar borders in Europe. And by undermining this principle the "self-determining Baltic republics open themselves up to very serious problems because, if is not operative, territorial claims may be laid against them....

Why is it, in this case, that the advocates of "self-determination" place such heavy reliance on the international legal aspect, which is dangerous for them, and do not wish to make use of the formula of self-determination—up to an including secession—which is set forth by the Constitution of the USSR? Obviously there are several reasons here. In the first place, without talk about occupation, annexation, and deals between dictators, the moral flame

which the national parties in the Baltic region are using as a basis today will inevitably be extinguished. In the second place, against the background of the criticism which the USSR Constitution is being subjected to in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, there may not even by any desire to rely on it for support of any kind. Finally, in the third place, mercenary considerations are also clearly playing a role. Indeed, no matter how you twist it, being a part of the USSR has brought the Baltic republics certain perceptible benefits. At least, no agrarian country (and until their entry into the USSR they were all underdeveloped agrarian countries) would have the opportunity on its own to create such a social and services infrastructure, such a transportation net, such an urban and scenic environment as have Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is not an accident that European agrarian states are striving to gain entry into the EEC, in order to make use of the potentials and possibilities offered by a community. But the "national" forces in the Baltic region, to the contrary, are trying to leave the Union to which they belong, but having avoided the indelicate questions of who owes whom and how much for their life together?

ALL THE ORGANIZATIONS that we have talked about above call themselves parties or movements. Are their pretensions legitimate? If you judge on the basis of numbers, then hardly. As a rule, their ranks number from several dozens to two or three hundred persons. Thus, there are about 80 members in the "National Democratic Party of Georgia" by its own count. The "Association for National Self-Determination" in Armenia, besides its organizers, has about 80 members. There are barely more than 100 persons, united in nine cells, in the "Party for National Independence of Estonia." Against the background of these, of course, the "Movement for the National Independence of Latvia" looks gigantic but, according to the calculations of the MNIL itself, there are 9000 persons in its ranks. So that we cannot speak about massive political organizations, although this what we take the concept of a party to mean. If they are parties, then they are sectarian ones of the secret society type that do not have massive support. And they look like some kind of antique that has come to life—like a nationalistic society from the past...

If we are talking about the political coloration of these organizations, then here, perhaps, there is even less clarity. Inasmuch as they stand on openly nationalistic positions, and nationalism is a tendency of bourgeois social consciousness and political life, certain researchers and publicists have already hastened to speak of them as bourgeois or at least petit-bourgeois tendencies. Also supporting this, it would seem, is the fact that the parties and movements, as a rule, come out in favor of one or another bourgeois social or political system.

However things are taking a strange turn: There is no longer any bourgeoisie, but bourgeois parties are springing up?

The parties and movements themselves declare, however, that they are representative of the interests of the people

and pretend to a populist role... But are they one of the varieties of populism? Again, clearly, one cannot agree. On the other hand, it would seem that the parties and movements draw their ideal of a social structure from the form of life in prewar or pre-revolutionary times. But it turns out that this was the form of life not of the entire people, but only of a certain relatively privileged part of it. Thus, the Baltic movements idealize the life of the well-to-do part of the rural population, and the Georgian parties—that of the intelligentsia. So that, although all the movements are placing their hopes in the national feelings and instincts of the people, they cannot be classified entirely as populist movements; there is only a patina of populism here.

Most likely, in the parties and movements of a number of republics, we are dealing specifically with so-called national—in essence, nationalistic—parties (without the quotation marks, as we have given their titles from the first) that have been revived in modern conditions. Organizations of this type, it seemed, had become a thing of the past. You judge, what kind of sense was there in creating a party or an organization that is based on the idea of ethnic exclusiveness, on ethnic privileges, in a country where the nationalities question had been solved?! But aggravating inter-ethnic relations became worthwhile when organizations of this sort began to spring up everywhere where ethnic problems exist. Moreover, coordination, ties, an exchange of experience exists between such parties and movements. And those who have been organized earlier help others to become established. Not because of the "internationalism of nationalists," but based on calculation: the more similar movements there are the more difficult it will be for everybody—the authorities, society, all of us—to politically and ideologically oppose each of them.

All the national parties and movements that we have been talking about, as a rule, pretend to the status of being democratic. Is it possible in any sense to speak of them as being national-democratic. I think not, inasmuch as there are a multitude of anti-democratic demands in their programs and inasmuch as they have no massive, truly democratic base and support. And in general, as history testifies, nationalistic movements, which by definition presuppose an inequality of peoples, the primacy of certain ones over others, are inconsistent with democracy. Most often they lead to authoritarian-dictatorial or oligarchical regimes, but never to democracies. However, if you look at the history of those republics in which the movements examined above have arisen and are now operating, then it is precisely such anti-democratic regimes that also existed in them during the times that are being idealized today...

The national parties and movements that have arisen in the union republics are attempting to present themselves in the eyes of Soviet and world public opinion as champions of progress. But how do their proposals and programs look against the background of the trends in contemporary world development? Integrational processes, the internationalization of the political, economic, and cultural life of mankind are growing deeper and stronger

throughout the world. The national parties, however, are calling for isolationism and for severing ties among nationalities... A struggle is going on the world against apartheid. The national parties under the banner of sovereignty are attempting to establish an apartheid, to transform the non-indigenous population into "Gastarbeiter" without political or social rights... The process of migration is expanding throughout the world, based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights about freedom of movement and in a number of countries (for example in the GDR), subjects of other states are being given the right to participate in elections of local organs of power. But the national parties are fighting for the exclusion from political life of an overwhelming majority of the non-indigenous population, and even for their deportation... In our times, the roots of chronic conflicts among peoples are being eliminated. The national movements, however, are reviving and fanning national dissension. And it is sad that the intelligentsia is taking the lead here. What, for example, is the worth of the bluntness of USSR Peoples Deputy and member of the "Sayudisa" Assembly [Seym] Council R. Ozolas, published in one of the recent issues of the journal PRYRALE: "For the Russian, to work was worse than death. This is why the NEP showed that, taking this route, you can't live. The Russian has always loved to live beyond his means. Stalin, with his concept of world revolution as a war for foreign territory, so materialized illusions of life beyond one's means that the matter could not look prettier..." You will agree that all this is far distant from the tendencies of progress and completely contradicts them.

FINALLY, the final question on which we will dwell: What kind of role are the national parties and movements playing in the political life of one republic or another?

First of all, it is obvious that they cannot be listed among the forces that are supporting perestroika. Although they also enjoy the conditions of perestroika, their purposes and those of perestroika diverge.

Although not all of such parties and organizations speak of themselves as oppositional forces, in fact they are emerging precisely as a political opposition. For example, the members of MNIL do not consider themselves representatives of a national or opposition party but in terms of numbers, make-up, structure, program and charter—this is a ready party, striving for power.

Another thing is also clear: These self-proclaimed parties and movements nevertheless cannot pretend to an independent role. They are too small and they do not have enough influence, despite the fact that they are all trying to find contacts with the mass information media (and are sometimes finding them).

But still these pygmy-like organizations do have a definite political role: They exercise pressure on other national organizations and, by threatening to deprive them of mass support, are pushing them toward increasingly irreconcilable positions. Examples? For a start, a prognosis made back last year by an Estonian nationalist professor at the University of California, R. Taagepera. According to this

prognosis (published, by the way, in the organ of the Tartu city Estonian CP committee), the separatist platform of restoring the independence of Estonia on the basis of the Tartu world of Lenin's time, advanced by the PNIE, will force the People's Front to shift from the idea of federation and confederation to the idea of breaking away, of separatism. This prognosis, for the moment, alas, is being coming true, which testifies either to its author's good knowledge of his subject or to a well-adjusted allocation of roles.

And here is an example from the recent political of Latvia. V. Stein, the former chairman of the republic's People's Front Duma, speaking as a guest at the MNIL congress, explained his policy "step-by-step" as follows: "The moment for the next step has come—a step away from the idea of confederation, for which I have campaigned, to come out openly today for the idea of an independent Latvia. And to this I call all members of the Latvian People's Front." But this evolution occurred under powerful pressure on the part of the MNIL, under the threat that it would win over a part of those who support the Latvian People's Front.

And in Lithuania, the Vilnius and Kaunas councils of "Sayudisa" responded at the 18th Lithuanian SSR CP Central Committee Plenum with an appeal that criticizes the formula, contained in the materials of the plenum, of Lithuanian sovereignty as a part of the USSR. "In our opinion," this document emphasizes, "the cited concept of sovereignty is unacceptable inasmuch as it does not address the state sovereignty of Lithuania, i.e. independence."

A similar evolution is also occurring today in questions relating to a state language, citizenship, and local self-management... The ideas which just recently these same Baltic "people's frontists" called extreme, from which they rushed to distance themselves, are making their way into their own documents, and then, under pressure from them, into draft laws and legislation that is being passed. Thus, that same Duma of the Latvian People's Front turned to the republic's Supreme Soviet on 10 June 1989 with the demand that points envisaging possession of the state language as a condition for receiving a passive voting right be included in the law that is being prepared on elections to republic and local organs of power. And an analogous law passed in Estonia envisages a residency requirement for voters and candidates for deputy—not less than two years within an [election] district or a total of 5 years within the territory of the Estonian SSR for voters and, correspondingly, not less than 5 years within a district or 10 years within the republic for candidates. Everyone is familiar with the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium regarding the incompatibility with the USSR Constitution of certain provisions of the Estonian SSR law "On Elections to Local Soviets of People's Deputies in the Estonian SSR." This is not interference in the internal affairs of a union republic, not an infringement of its sovereignty, as some try to present it, but rather a legal act, which involves both international and all-union obligations on the part of

the USSR to guarantee that the legal rights and freedoms of each of its citizens are observed.

Overall, a definite "division of labor" can be observed: The parties, lacking influence but through manipulation by means of extremist ideas, are pushing, are moving the fronts toward the right, using them as political tools and are strengthening their weak possibilities... It is precisely in this way that the role of the nationalistic movements is assessed in the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics. And this "division of labor" is confirmed by the fact that the people's fronts have taken upon themselves the dubious honor of portraying this statement as interference in the internal affairs of these republics, thereby taking still one more step in the direction of separatism.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that still another role of the national parties and movements is to create the prerequisites for a change in society's ideological and political climate. Like battering rams, like demolition equipment, they are attempting to shatter the foundations of our social structure, to tear breaches in it. The programs of all the parties and movements contain, for example, points demanding that churches be given the right of religious propaganda and broadened political opportunities. A majority of the programs contain demands that the creation of "independent democratic parties" be permitted and that the freedom of meetings and demonstrations and to publish "independent" newspapers be guaranteed. In many of them there are points concerning the creation of national military units. All these are real levers of power. For whom are they demanding them?

The simplest and most inviting answer is—for themselves. But these organizations do not represent the kind of power which, even if their programs are realized, would be able to profit from the fruits of this. They have neither influence nor support... One gets the impression that they are paving the way for somebody. And that this is where the anxiety about "independent democratic parties" comes from, and also the demand that their creation be permitted.

Such supposedly independent and democratic parties have still not entered the political arena. But it can be predicted that, if we do not succeed in destroying the negative tendencies in interethnic relations, even more dangerous forces will emerge within this arena. In the darkness of such underworlds of our social life, where many threads lead, it is difficult for the moment to see anything distinctly. But even now we are more frequently feeling an influence on political life from there, from the underground, from the shadow economy, from corrupt circles, from organized crime... These forces have already tried to use the election campaign in their own interests. They are attempting to seize control of social and political organizations that are springing up. And is it not for them that the national parties and movements are paving the way?

It would pay for everyone to ponder all these questions—both those of us who live in the so-called center and those who live in the union republics. Because the peoples of the Soviet Union share a single destiny. The only way to

resolve the problems that have accumulated in the sphere of interethnic relations is by developing a nationalities policy which responds to the spirit of perestroika, to the new political thinking. And it is for this reason that the Soviet people are placing such hope today on the decision of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum concerning interethnic relations and on the forthcoming Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies.

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Soviet UN Official Barsegov on NKAO Self-Determination Issues

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[Interview with Yuriy Georgiyevich Barsegov, doctor of juridical sciences, by Zoriy Balayan: "Whom to Live With? That Is the Question. Notes of a Writer and USSR People's Deputy"]

[Text] I had waited a long time for this little book. Collecting all kinds of excerpts, statements, and quotations from various sources concerning the right of nations to self-determination, I kept hoping for a handy book in which the author, disdaining emotions, would calmly and seriously examine the principles of democratic and constitutional solutions to interethnic problems. To be honest, I not only had a hunch, I knew that Yuriy Georgiyevich Barsegov could handle a work like that better than anyone.

I have known him for many years. We have shared common concerns, the same goals, a sense of worry over our homeland's future. Whenever, because of circumstances, we have not met for a long time, we have got in touch by telephone, even if he was in Geneva or New York in his capacity as a member of the UN's Commission of International Law, elected by the General Assembly. It was not by chance, of course, that the prestigious world organization chose Barsegov to be a member of this important commission. A famous jurist and legal expert, doctor of juridical sciences, the author of a number of monographs and over 200 articles dealing with international relations, international and state law. Specialists are very familiar with Yu. Barsegov's fundamental monograph, "The Territory of International Law," and numerous special articles devoted to questions of laws regulating territorial relations.

Now I hold in my hands the long-awaited booklet, published by Ayastan Publishing House on the very eve of the opening of the Second Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first thing I noticed was its combination of a profound knowledge of and, I would say, respectful attitude toward Lenin's legacy and contemporary world practice in the field of interethnic problems. Exceptionally high professionalism. A strict analysis of existing norms of constitutional and international law. The author has titled his work "The Right to Self-Determination—The Foundation of Democratic Solutions to Interethnic Relations (With Regard to the Problem of Nagorny Karabakh)." It deals in particular with the essence of the problem of

NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and shows convincingly that it has to do with the right of the oblast's population to self-determination rather than a territorial dispute, as those who oppose a democratic and constitutional solution to the problem have attempted to present it.

While I was working on these notes, I had a long conversation with the author of the booklet, made notes, and later discovered that I was all but literally quoting my interlocutor and leaving out quote marks. In particular, I didn't even want to think about what parts of my notes were from the conversations and which were extracts from the booklet. One thing I did know: the right of nations to self-determination did not fall to mankind as manna from heaven. Nations have shed blood for it over the course of centuries and even millennia. Because we are dealing with one of the supreme accomplishments of civilization, the result of its lengthy and thorny ascent from primitive bloody conflicts over land (when the instincts and passions for territorial expansion dominated, for enslaving, expelling, or exterminating other, weaker nations) to civilized forms of international relations based on equality and mutual respect among all nations without exception.

Among us, frequently, the lack of desire to find a prompt solution to the long-drawn-out Karabakh problem is rationalized by reference to the so-called constitutional impasse, contradictions between particular articles of the Constitution. Barsegov points out that we are faced with a legal and political situation that is unprecedented in the history of the USSR, in which one union republic, drawing upon the constitutional principle of self-determination as proclaimed in Article 70, has supported the right of reunion of a forcibly detached portion of its people, while another republic, citing Article 78, has withheld its consent to change the borders and thereby refused to recognize the right of the indigenous population of the foreign [chuzhenatsionalnaya] oblast to self-determination.

The Soviet mass media, many of which suffer from pronounced incompetence, have assessed the situation as a constitutional impasse. They have added fuel to the fire. And foreign newspapers, assessing the situation as a "constitutional crisis," have concluded that under socialism it is practically impossible to resolve the nationality question by democratic means on the basis of a nation's self-determination.

Well, we have not only failed to resolve nationality questions under socialism—we have given birth to a multitude of new problems. So that it is not a matter of the social system, which perestroika is trying to save. It is a matter of specific articles of the USSR Constitution. I questioned Yuriy Georgiyevich about the impasse. He said that from the juridical standpoint there is no such impasse. There are just two directly opposed approaches to the principle of self-determination. Under the one interpretation, the right to self-determination presupposes that a nation has the right, when deciding the question of its own fate, thereby also to decide the question of the status of the territory it inhabits and, consequently, to determine the boundaries of

the state by its own free will. The other interpretation denies the people of an annexed oblast the right to decide its own fate and, consequently, the fate of the territory it inhabits if the republic from which it wishes to separate itself does not consent. In essence, it casts doubt on the fundamental Leninist principles of relations between nations and states in general, and between Soviet socialist republics in particular.

[Balayan] How did it happen (I asked the author of the work)? Why is it that we speak more about perestroika than perestroika speaks about itself in practice? Nothing has worked for it in the sphere of interethnic relations. Yet people have believed in it. People in Karabakh came out to the first rallies with the slogans, "Lenin, Party, Gorbachev." And they continued to believe for a long time.

[Barsegov] Perestroika in the sphere of interethnic relations, as in the economic sphere, requires more than courage—it requires great courage, revolutionary consistency, and decisiveness. Halfway measures are contraindicated. They are tantamount to death. If we confine ourselves to merely acknowledging the fact that the present injustices and violations of the rights of peoples have resulted from the tyranny of the Stalin era and the neglect of the time of stagnation, and fail to take vigorous steps to restore rights and justice, if we allow ourselves to be frightened by the threat of "a sumgait" and ourselves warn of the "unforeseeable consequences" of a demand for self-determination, we will lose any moral right to act in the role of fighters for perestroika.

[Balayan] Karabakhians have been zealous fighters for perestroika from the beginning. They believed that they had the indisputable right to self-determination. And in fighting for this right, they manifested their political, social protest within the framework of the Constitution. As we see, however, people have not understood the Karabakhians or shared their concerns. Their worries are about tomorrow.

[Barsegov] The Karabakhians were the first. It's always toughest on those who come first. You recall how critical—I would even say, "condemnatory"—society was regarding the first strikes. But then those who had denounced the Karabakhians set up strike committees themselves and went on strike, forgetting, to be sure, that their countrymen in Karabakh had stayed away from work for four months, expressing their protest and demanding just one thing—self-determination. The Karabakhians not only intuitively sensed—they knew with certainty that the Leninist theory and practice of resolving the nationality question must serve as a sure guideline in the process of the restructuring and perfecting of interethnic relations. But they were also aware of something which, if one may say so, the rest of the country did not know. They knew that the leaders of Azerbaijan were not about to resolve the question in the Leninist manner.

Barsegov is right. The Karabakhians were the first. In truth, they have fought for self-determination over the whole course of 70 years. And, incidentally, they have appealed to Lenin all those 70 years. Karabakhians have

wanted to live, especially since the Revolution, for whose victory they shed blood, as they had lived for millennia in their own homeland with their fellow countrymen, next to the 1500-year-old Amaras Cathedral and the 800-year-old Gandzasar. And for all those 70 years they have known no other alternative but to live with their brothers, their mothers and family members—and all this, frequently, in just about the literal sense of the word. Barsegov's booklet adduces Lenin's formula: The people, and only the people, have the right to decide "whom to live with," and "boundaries are determined by the will of the people." All these 70 years the Karabakhians have fought against the annexation of Karabakh. Until perestroika, however, this term was simply "abolished." As we know, Glavlit [Main Administration for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press] went through the legacy of Lenin himself with its scissors. At any rate, one did not often read what we read today in Yuriy Barsegov: "Not just any violation of the 'status quo' can be considered annexation: to do so would constitute the greatest reactionaryism and a mockery of the fundamental concepts of historical science...."

"Clearly, the adjoining [prisoyedineniye] of territory against the will of its population can and must be considered annexation. In other words, the concept of annexation is inseparably linked to the concept of self-determination." Lenin never expressed his thoughts in roundabout ways, ambiguously, "ours and yours," so to speak, "there should be no winners in this question." Directly and precisely. Speaking of the liquidation of annexation, of deciding matters of boundaries, in particular within the framework of a unified, special socialist state, he emphasized to his opponents: "However you twist and turn, you cannot escape the conclusion that annexation is the violation of a nation's self-determination, the establishment of borders against the will of the population. To be against annexation is to be in favor of the right to self-determination. To be against the forced holding of any nation within the boundaries of a given state" is tantamount to being in favor of the self-determination of nations."

[Balayan] I read in one of the Azerbaijani newspapers that Karabakh is "an inseparable part of Azerbaijan" because its "place" had already been determined prior to the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan. This refers, no doubt, to the provocative notion that Karabakh formed a part of the Mussavatist Republic prior to that time.

[Barsegov] Well, first of all, that is a lie or else actual provocation. Secondly, Lenin warned in this regard: "If a socialist party declares that it is 'against the forced holding of an oppressed nation within the borders of the annexing state,' then that party is thereby obligating itself to renounce such forced holding once it is in power."

[Balayan] There are those who think, just as they did in Lenin's time, that under socialism self-determination no longer makes sense, since what we have is a "comradely" society, so to speak, in which there ought not to be any nationality problems. Incidentally, Yuriy Georgiyevich, the exact same naive illness afflicted many Armenian

bolsheviks who thought that the Revolution would immediately create that kind of bolshevik nation, bolshevik land. None of your boundaries, none of your social, ethnic, or religious differences. Hence the notion that self-determination is superfluous under socialism. But now that Gorbachev has proclaimed the slogan "More Socialism!", probably, both blatant and latent opponents of self-determination suppose that it makes no sense at all to speak of the fundamental principle of Lenin's nationality policy.

[Barsegov] The principle is firm for all formations. Not only that, under "big socialism" it acquires even greater significance. Lenin emphasized: "When people say that self-determination is superfluous under socialism, it is as much nonsense, the same kind of hopeless confusion, as if to say that democracy is superfluous under socialism." The party has not betrayed the Leninist concept, the Leninist principle. At the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: "The party will consistently implement the Leninist nationality policy, including the fundamental principle of the right of nations to self-determination."

[Balayan] As soon as we raise the question of self-determination, immediately, as if to counter it, someone raises the problem of borders, or interprets the essence and meaning of the redrawing of borders in a deliberately incorrect manner. I get the impression that we sometimes forget the main point. I refer to the fact that we are talking about the crimes of Stalin, who is now being condemned by history itself. Except for some reason people are obstinately and stubbornly keeping silent about the fact that the Karabakh problem, even the problem of the borders of Soviet Armenia as well as the two historical oblasts of Nakhichevan and Artsakh, were also created by Stalin. And so this question gets bypassed. Yet we need to talk about the fact that it was Stalin who drew and redrew the borders of Karabakh, in particular. Today, under perestroika, we are correcting what was done under Stalin. So that the accidentally rhymed dogma "restructuring does not mean redrawing" [perestroika—eto ne perekroyka] is simply, in my view, fundamentally wrong.

[Barsegov] Not only in your opinion. Foreseeing that the imperialist era would bequeath to the socialism that replaced it the borders which were based on tyranny and injustice, Lenin insisted on the necessity of bringing them fully into line with the principles of self-determination. Seeing this as the only possible way for peoples to unite firmly and voluntarily, Lenin did not shy away from "redrawing" (his term) of boundaries; quite the contrary, he demanded that they be changed in all cases where they conflicted with the right of self-determination. He was convinced that universal democratic principles of demarcation must be applied fully and consistently in relations among socialist republics. "These borders," said the Leader of the Revolution, "shall be determined democratically—that is, according to the will and the 'sympathies' of the population."

[Balayan] The idea of juxtaposing such concepts as "sympathy" and "a sumgait," "sympathy" and "blockade." And how can a people express its desire as to "whom to live with" under conditions when it is in effect under the oppression of another people? What legal means are available for this?

[Barsegov] It seems to me we are acting correctly if we refer once again to the authority of Lenin, because his concept is in no way inconsistent with today's norms of international law, which, in my opinion, we ought to be discussing here today. The Karabakhians have expressed their right to self-determination at assemblies, at the Session, at party forums, and in the press. In short, just as Lenin instructed: "It makes no difference whether the desire is expressed in the press, at people's assemblies, in party decisions, or in revolts and uprisings."

[Balayan] We might add that during the entire year preceding the start of the Karabakh Movement, the entire adult population of the oblast collected signatures demanding the exercise of the right to self-determination.

[Barsegov] Here again, Vladimir Ilich had this to say: "The right to self-determination... does not entail deciding the question by the Central parliament but by the parliament, sejm, or referendum of the seceding minority." And there are numerous examples in which national formations were created by referendum during the time of Lenin.

[Balayan] You stated that the principles of Leninist nationality policy are not in conflict with the norms of international law. In your booklet this theme is explored in a special chapter titled "The Self-Determination of Nations—An Imperative Norm of International Law." Over the course of many decades we have read that progressive forces in the world, including the Soviet Union, have waged a tireless battle against colonial and foreign domination by racist regimes incompatible with the UN Charter. Through the decades, however—I mean prior to perestroika—the voice of suffering Karabakh was drowned out by the Brezhnevian and Aliyevian slogans that socialism had resolved all nationality problems, that "Karabakh is an inseparable part of Azerbaijan." How do specific international laws today relate to the Karabakh problem?

[Barsegov] In Karabakh, as an analysis of the events of recent years has shown—indeed, as "the sumgait" showed, practically until the 20th of February 1988, the population was living under national oppression. Inasmuch as under the actual conditions of the modern world national oppression is maintained by force, international law, on the one hand, directly and unequivocally forbids the use of any form of force by a state, or the threat thereof, against peoples striving for self-determination; and on the other hand, just as categorically and definitely, international law provides for such peoples' resort to necessary means, up to and including the use of force, by way of self-defense, in order to exercise its right to self-determination, including the attainment of national and territorial unity. In its Declaration on Strengthening International Security (Resolution 2734 [XXV] dated 16 December 1970), the UN

General Assembly calls on all states to refrain from any forcible or other actions depriving peoples of their unalienable right to self-determination and to refrain from repressive measures.

Reading Yuriy Barsegov's study, I frequently caught myself thinking that from the very beginning of the Karabakh Movement, many of the country's leaders and much of the mass media, as if out of fright, decided to resort to the tactic of "arm-twisting." Only later did a few people here and there rather timidly begin to find some justifying aspects of the Movement. But as soon as you slapped the person who raised his hand against you (against the Christian dogma of turning the other cheek), people all over the country raised an uproar. People all over the country saw a broadcast in which a young soldier showed his bruise from being hit with a yoghurt bottle. Certainly one cannot justify a man who hits another man with a yoghurt bottle. What's surprising is that nobody in the country is aware of the Melkumyanov family from Sumgait. On 29 February 1988, Document Sh-ZhG No 4212 54 was drawn up. "Death certificate." Melkumyan, Irina, Sogomonova. Born 1961. Place of birth, Gadrutskiy Rayon, NKAO. Residence, Sumgait, Block 41A, Building 2B, Apartment 21. Killed along with four members of her family—mother, father, two brothers. Raped and dragged naked into the street. Mocked, beaten, and burned. "Hemorrhage into the membranes, matter, and ventricles of the brain, lacerations on the head with fractures of the bones of the fornix and the base of the skull, charring of the corpse." No one knows about Irina's death, or the death of her 75-year-old relative Firuza Melkumyan, who was raped and decapitated. No one knows about the fate of dozens of victims of Sumgait. Yet on Central television they show the bruise on the face of a soldier who was hit with a yoghurt bottle. Let no one misunderstand me. I repeat, whoever hit the soldier should be punished. But we're talking about the ideology of approaches to resolving the problem. We're talking about the danger of a phenomenon in which a state formation—a republic—is illegally organizing repressions.

Citing international laws, Barsegov's work states directly: Whenever a state ignores its international obligations and uses repressive measures against a people demanding self-determination, that people has the complete right not only to resist but also to appeal to the international community for help. All other states (republics) should not only withhold any help whatsoever from the annexing state (republic) but should in fact render assistance to the peoples fighting to affirm their right to self-determination, all necessary moral and material assistance. I recall how, just three weeks after the tragedy of Sumgait, the leaders of the parliaments of all the republics assembled in Moscow at a session of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and, led by A.A. Gromyko, accused the Karabakh Armenians of all the deadly sins. Yet our country has signed international documents and legal norms which proclaim that a state's violation of the right of nations to self-determination shall entail the political and international responsibility of the states themselves and the criminal responsibility of the individuals (physical persons) guilty of committing it.

Somehow I don't see that anyone has instituted proceedings against Aliyev, although we have an enormous amount of evidence implicating the former head of the KGB [Committee for State Security] and former head of the party organization of Azerbaijan. On the one hand, in short, we are signatories to international acts; on the other, we do not always comply with them. And so I put this question to the author of the booklet "The Right to Self-Determination":

[Balayan] On 14 December 1974, the UN General Assembly—and that means the USSR as well—established that no territorial acquisitions obtained as a result of annexation can be recognized as lawful, and that any changes in a territory's state affiliation shall be based on the free self-determination of the people inhabiting it. So the guilty must bear responsibility for the annexation. That's what it says in international law. But the law is not complied with. What should we do in such cases?

[Barsegov] Civilized countries are called civilized because they comply with laws. To classify violations of peoples' self-determination as crimes under international law means that a state which violates the norm of behavior shall bear international responsibility, and all other states together, constituting an international community, as well as each one separately, are obliged to react appropriately—that is, to do everything in their power to prevent or halt such violation.

[Balayan] That is all very well. It is all written down on paper. As you say, it is all accepted as the law by the international community. So what is to be done when laws are violated? When a demand for self-determination is answered with repressions, "stone wars," "sumgaits," and blockades? When the head of state issues a couple of days' deadline to lift the blockade, and immediately after that the crime takes on new, more monstrous forms? When, as in our specific case, the head of the Azerbaijan republic, ignoring Armenia's tragedy, its landlocked position, and the so-called enclave situation of Karabakh, declares to the whole country that the blockade is reciprocal? It seems, then, that there are indeed laws—including international laws—yet they come to nothing. So in such a case do we have any internal rights of our own?

[Barsegov] A state cannot cite a provision of its own internal law as a justification for failure to comply with norms of international law. Regarding this there is Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the law of international agreements. In the event of the promulgation of a law or administrative regulation which is in conflict with the obligations under international law, a case of international responsibility may arise. Hence, the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR should bear direct responsibility for the repressions and the blockade.

We must have a clear understanding of the blockade. This type of aggression is equivalent to war. And in this country, and in all the civilized countries of the world, war is outlawed. Even the propagandizing of war calls for criminal punishment, let alone warlike actions. So it's not a matter of, let's say, the trains have left and the matter is

closed. The whole country ought to be rising to its feet and condemning the organizers of the blockade.

[Balayan] In your study you keep speaking of the state as subject [subyekt]. Most often, however, we are dealing with a specific republic which, of course, forms a part of the USSR. I would like to know this: When we talk about compliance with international laws, are we referring only to a state or to a republic as a separate formation?

[Barsegov] This aspect is also defined precisely in the law. All state organs of the union republics are obligated to act in full compliance with Soviet and international obligations. They may not cite their own sovereignty in order to refuse to comply with the international obligations of the USSR, because they delegated the relevant rights to it. The Soviet Union, as embodied in its supreme organs of state power, shall serve as guarantor of compliance with accepted obligations, including the right of nations to self-determination, and shall ensure their enforcement throughout its territory. That is the law.

In his booklet, Yu. Barsegov states directly that it is impossible to refer to the sovereignty of a union republic, to the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in its domestic affairs, and at the same time claim that they are exempt from the necessity of recognizing the self-determination of peoples within their borders.

By virtue of the juridical equality of the union republics, themselves exercising the right to self-determination, the republics cannot deny the same right to other peoples. In this aspect, the Azerbaijan SSR's denial of the NKAO's right to self-determination is tantamount to the Soviet Union's violation of its own international obligations in regard to universally accepted rights of men and nations, and inflicts irreparable harm on the USSR's international authority.

In March 1921, Turkey took advantage of the young Soviet Russia's lack of international prestige when it imposed its own conditions at the time of the signing of the Moscow Treaty. Using this essentially illegal treaty as an example, the author of the booklet demonstrates the outrageous violations of fundamental principles of international law, namely "no one can give away what he does not have," and "no one can give away more rights than he has himself." Yet to this day we have kept mum, as if nothing like that had occurred on the 16th of March of '21, when, at Stalin's dictates, the Moscow Treaty was adopted, which decided to take Armenian Nakhichevan Oblast and "form an autonomous territory under the protectorship of Azerbaijan," with the added "condition that Azerbaijan shall not cede this protectorate to a third state"—that is, to its lawful owner, Soviet Armenia. Not satisfied with this cynical deal, which was not all that usual even in terms of world practice of the era of imperialism, Stalin continued the policy of redrawing the borders of defenseless, homeless Armenia, which had suffered genocide in the years 1915-1920, and managed to turn over to the Azerbaijan SSR one more Armenian oblast—Nagornyy Karabakh,

whose indigenous Armenian population at that time comprised 95 percent. The remaining 2 percent was made up of Azerbaijanis, with 3 percent consisting of Kurds, Greeks, Tats, Russians, and Talyshes. In turn, the Moscow Treaty gave birth to the Kars Treaty, as a result of which Armenia was deprived even of what it had had prior to the revolution. By all international legal norms, both these treaties should have been annulled, with all the conclusions proceeding therefrom.

I recall how we contemporaries sort of sighed when it was suddenly discovered that our state is not governed by law [nepravovoye]. We also realized what courage it took for M.S. Gorbachev to say so in front of the world, to state that we must undertake to achieve a law-governed state, for there is no other way. And now, when we seem to be heading for that cherished goal, it turns out that the logic of life and law juridically obligates the Azerbaijan SSR, in compliance with the USSR Constitution and the Soviet Union's international obligations, to give a portion of the Armenian people (the population of NKAO), which is held by force in the republic, the right to freely determine the status of the oblast on the basis of the inalienable and irrevocable right to self-determination. Attempts by the anti-perestroika forces to make the existing territorial status quo "permanent" within the USSR will inflict irreparable harm on M.S. Gorbachev's proclaimed principle of the primacy of the LAW over POLITICS.

I recall how one of Aliyev's henchmen, Kevorkov, was peddling the absurd notion that Karabakh forms a part of the Azerbaijan SSR because, as he said, it is linked to it by economic ties. And the same kind of anti-Leninist notion is still being peddled by the leaders of the Azerbaijan SSR.

[Barsegov] If we now speak of the primacy of the law over politics, the same thing can be said about economics [my interlocutor went on to say]. Lenin emphasized specially that the real goal of those who attempt to argue the "economically progressive nature of annexation" is to avoid the necessity of complying with a people's right to self-determination.... "It is fundamentally wrong to speak of any unfeasibility of self-determination in terms of economic impossibility."

[Balayan] So much has been written alleging that the Azerbaijan SSR is concerned for the economic fate of the autonomous oblast and that in social terms life in NKAO was much better than in the neighboring administrative regions of Azerbaijan. I do not want to cite data here showing the gravity of Karabakh's situation. M.S. Gorbachev spoke on this matter, emphasizing that the Azerbaijan leadership's treatment of the oblast was inhuman.

Your booklet and our conversation are about law. To what extent is it reasonable to speak of so-called guardianship [popechitelstvo], of "guardianship [opekunstvo] in cases where the parents are still living"?

[Barsegov] Lenin warned against the perfidy of those who strive to achieve their goals of annexation with a false concern for the welfare of their victim and the imposition of an unsolicited "happiness" on other peoples. Lenin put

the question another way. If those who forcibly keep foreign oblasts under their power are really concerned about the welfare of their population, they ought to offer these oblasts the freedom of choice. One cannot speak of democracy and the right of choice and at the same time deny a people the opportunity to make a choice. In general, Lenin's concept of self-determination derives from the fact that arguments about "the economic impossibility of self-determination" are tantamount to "an economic justification of annexation." These are two sides of the same coin.

[Balayan] One gets the impression today that those upon whom the attainment of peace in Karabakh depends are engaged in self-deception, presuming that by not making decisions it will be possible to maintain peace in the region. Hence, the constant warnings to the Armenians of "unforeseeable consequences." Basically, your study is built on Lenin's legacy. I would like to know how Lenin dealt with speculations about "unforeseeable consequences."

[Barsegov] Vladimir Ilich unmasked the deliberately false, hypocritical "argumentation" of the advocates of annexationism and showed that it is not the exercise of the right to self-determination that leads to friction and conflict but rather the flouting of that right. Condemning the force utilized by advocates of the policy of "grab and not let go," Lenin reminded people of "the 'pogrom-like' actions (to put it mildly) frequently brought about by the application of this 'immemorial right' in practice." It was as if he foresaw the "sumgait" and all of the "pogrom-like" acts today. And he derived one of his most impeccable and indisputable formulas: The forcible annexation and holding of "someone else's oblast" creates a gulf between peoples and leads to conflicts and wars.

[Balayan] To continue the theme of "formula," we probably ought to say something about the fact that at the present stage a new principle has been worked out, confirmed by the CPSU platform. I refer to the formula, "A Strong Center, a Strong Republic." I have my own rather critical attitude toward this principle, but that is another matter, so to speak. Is this principle the key to the resolution of nationality questions?

[Barsegov] Going along with the resolution of nationality and interethnic problems by means of the seemingly simple and clear formula of "strong center, strong republic," we inevitably come up against the question of just what to do with the 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous oblasts, and 10 autonomous okrugs. If we break the chain and confine ourselves to strengthening the union republics, leaving the 38 autonomies subordinate to them in their previous situation, it will worsen existing nationality problems even more. Before resolving the question as to whether all the autonomous formations should enter directly as equal subjects, clearly, the chain must be extended and the proposed formula should incorporate the missing third element: "Strong center, strong republic, strong autonomies."

[Balayan] Of the 38 autonomous formations, Karabakh is the only administrative entity making a claim to reunion

with its motherland, as the saying goes. A portion of the Armenian people want to be united with the Armenian nation. An autonomous Armenian formation wishes to be united with the union republic of Armenia on a democratic and constitutional basis. In accordance with international laws, "the peoples concerned" live in both places. The formula should be plain as day: "Armenian people plus Armenian people."

[Barsegov] What was probably most important happened a year and a half ago. The Armenian population of Karabakh and the Armenian population of the Armenian SSR expressed their free will. They did this on the level of supreme state authority. Further, Soviet and international laws come into force. Thus, for example, the International Court, referring to the well-known resolution of the General Assembly, affirms that "the exercise of the right of self-determination can be carried out only under conditions of the free expression of the will of the people concerned...."

[Balayan] And the people concerned, the Armenian people of Karabakh, decided the question themselves. They decided it in the way formulated by Lenin—"whom to live with."

[Barsegov] A child should live with its mother. That is the law of the USSR. That is the law of the United Nations. That is the law of nature.

Azerbaijani Official Denies RSFSR Control of NKAO

*18310040E Baku AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI in Azeri
6 Sep 89 p 1*

[Article by E. Asgarova: "No Basis For Rumors"]

[Text] At an unauthorized meeting which took place in Baku last Saturday the following information was issued in the name of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, an unregistered, informal organization: on 22 May 1989 the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers confirmed the 6 May decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on turning over to the RSFSR the solution of all socioeconomic questions pertaining to the NKAO.

Decree number 384 dated 6 May 1989 of the USSR Council of Ministers, titled "On administering the economy of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR while the special administration is in power" is in our possession, and after familiarizing ourselves with it in detail we are satisfied. The document in question has been interpreted in a way which lacks any connection with the truth.

Why was such a document accepted?

An Azerinform correspondent addressed this question to A. N. Mutallibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers. He said:

"This is a completely legal document. After passing the 12 January 1989 decree of the Presidium of the USSR

Supreme Soviet on the application of a special administration in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR as a necessary temporary measure, it was necessary to define the form of economic administration of the autonomous oblast under these conditions.

Shortly after this decree was issued, the USSR Council of Ministers formed a government commission to study the main foundations of the system of economic management in the NKAO under the conditions of the special administration. The relevant order of the USSR Council of Ministers was sent to us. We began to think over a variation of this system. The basic principle we raised was this: the NKAO is an indivisible part of Azerbaijan and all forms of administration must be implemented in this context. We sent our proposals to the government commission.

In the course of a detailed discussion, principled positions were prepared which are reflected in the decree that was passed. In my opinion, the most important is that we have maintained our basic position in the management of the NKAO economy and we gave the independence which all institutions and organizations in the country possess for the implementation of economic reform to the oblast's institutions and organizations.

Because it is impossible to quote the entire text of the decree, I will use just one part as an example: "The USSR State Planning Committee must consider the most important indices (in accordance with the rule made for Moscow Oblast) of the economic and social development of the NKAO within the makeup of the plan for the Azerbaijan SSR as a separate line item in the projected state plan on the economic and social development of the USSR. After approval of this plan the relevant indices will be sent to the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers and the special administrative committee of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

The Finance Ministry must consider as a separate line item the relevant indices of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast budget in the makeup of the Azerbaijan SSR state budget in the projected USSR State Budget."

There are similar additions in all other articles of the decree. All aspects of the NKAO's economic activity under the special administration are shown in detail in the decree. The subordination to the Azerbaijan SSR has also found its reflection in the list of production organizations established in the NKAO.

Our decree was accepted on the basis of the USSR Council of Ministers and this decree is completely appropriate to the spirit and text of the union decree.

We have to say that since the NKAO special administrative committee assumed authority, efforts have been made to remove several institutions of the NKAO from republic control and to give them over to the control of union organs. But the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP and the republic government have resisted this. Union organs have always accepted our protests without problems.

Thus, there is definitely no basis to talk about turning over the solution of all social and economic questions pertaining to the NKAO to the RSFSR.

Here we also wish to state that there is no basis to rumors which have been spread and raised again at the 2 September meeting on the future application of a presidential administrative form in the NKAO."

Karabakh Aid Committee Chairman Interviewed *18310404A*

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 1 September 1989 carries on page 2 a 700 word interview with Bayram Bayramov, writer and newly elected chairman of the Karabakh Aid Committee, under the title "If You Want to Help Karabakh...." Bayramov points out that "neither the oblast special administrative committee, nor the special rayon commendant, nor the law enforcement organs can establish law and order here. So the Azeri people, represented by the Karabakh Aid Committee, have taken this on their own shoulders." In answer to a question on his interpretation of the word "aid," he responds that "aid" has both a material and a spiritual connotation. He dismisses Armenian claims that the Karabakh Aid Committee is "nationalistic" and states that "we are defending our own land." The deputy chairmen of the Karabakh Aid Committee are Sabir Rustamkhanly, chief editor of Yazychy Publishing House; Aydyn Mammadov, director of the republic's Center for Artistic Translation and Literary Relations; Shakir Karimov, responsible worker at the AzSSR Council of Ministers; and Alakbar Safarov, chairman of the republic's Oil and Gas Worker's Trade Union.

Foreign Press Faulted For NKAO Coverage *18310404C*

[Editorial Report] Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri on 8 September 1989 carries on page 2 a 1,500 word Azerinform report titled "The 'Eastern' Policy of Western Correspondents," in which the pro-Armenian bias of correspondents' reports in the WASHINGTON POST, the NEW YORK TIMES, National Public Radio, Agence France Presse, and other media are analyzed in detail. Azerinform claims that "it is no secret to anyone that journalists maintain a close relationship to the most reactionary circles of the Armenian emigration." The tendency of the press to explain the conflict in terms of Christian-Muslim antagonism is also criticized. Western reporters are accused of stating that the subject of the mass meetings in Baku was the "demand to free all criminals." Azerinform points out that "neither the People's Front of Azerbaijan nor anyone else ever demanded this." The report lauds efforts made by the Azerbaijan People's Front press department, but adds that it is having no effect on Western media.

KGB Chief Comments on Foreign Interference in NKAO

18310404D

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 10 September 1989 carries on page 3 a 500 word statement by USSR KGB chief V. A. Kryuchkov headlined "Special Administrations and Nationalism," in which he discusses the "role played by foreign states and intelligence agencies in the organization and administration of the process of inflaming interethnic hostility" in the NKAO. Specifically, he points to a recent decision by the Armenian Socialist Party in Venice to "internationalize the conflict." He also notes the work of the Paruyr Ayrikyan Committee in Paris. He adds that "I would not exaggerate the role of foreign intelligence in the NKAO."

Azerinform Reports Results of Poll on NKAO *18310404*

[Editorial Report] Baku AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI in Azeri on 15 September 1989 carries on page 1 a 500 word Azerinform report titled "The Results of Azerinform's Express Survey," in which a poll was taken of public opinion on various aspects of the NKAO issue. There were responses from 618 people: 449 Azeris, 80 Russians, 35 Armenians, 28 Jews, 6 Ukrainians, 1 Tatar, 6 Georgians, 1 Ossetian, 2 Belorussians, 5 Lezgians, 2 Talysh, 1 Turk, 1 Tat and 1 Kurd. Among the responses: 302 urged the abolition of the NKAO's special administrative committee and the incorporation of the NKAO into the rest of Azerbaijan; 204 proposed resettling Azeri refugees in depopulated villages in the NKAO; 263 recommended the abolition of the NKAO and 95 proposed the establishment of a Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which would include the territory of the present NKAO plus the plains region of Karabakh. Other proposals included the withdrawal of MVD internal troops from the NKAO and the "formation of a joint commission of deputies from the AzSSR Supreme Soviet and representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan to control the implementation of the republic's sovereign rights on NKAO territory."

Azerbaijani Writers' Union Recognizes People's Front

18310404F

[Editorial Report] Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri on 29 September 1989 carries on page 7 a 1200 word unsigned report on a meeting of the primary party organization of the Writers' Union of Azerbaijan to discuss the CPSU platform on nationalities. Nadir Jabbarov, a secretary of the primary party organization, said: "Comrades, we must make known our interest in and relationship with the People's Front of Azerbaijan, which has identified itself as a leading democratic people's movement. In my opinion, the time to recognize the Azerbaijani People's Front has come." At this point, representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan took over the meeting. They rejected the view of the Azerbaijani government that 50 percent of oil revenues should remain in the republic and proposed a figure of 83 percent instead.

Azeri Language TV Studio Opens in Shusha
18310404B

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri on 5 September 1989 carries on page 1 a 300 word unattributed report titled "Television Studio on Top of the Mountain." The report announces the establishment of a "local television studio in Shusha to broadcast television in Azeri. Yet another wish of Shushaites and of all Azeris living in the NKAO has been fulfilled. When the television studio in Stepanakert was set up its broadcasts were supposed to be two-thirds in Armenian and one-third in Azeri. Unfortunately, this did not occur. Stepanakert television continued to beam its broadcasts only in Armenian. Furthermore, subjective, biased, and slanderous programs, misrepresenting events in NKAO, have been poisoning people's minds." Azeri broadcasts, on the other hand, will be "clear, objective, and truthful."

Situation in Novyy Uzen Following June Violence
90US0078A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 6 Oct 89 p 2

[Report by correspondent I. Mordvintsev: "Exodus"]

[Text]

Novyy Uzen—Shevchenko—I had kept from my previous assignment in Novyy Uzen a small square of pink cardboard: pass #2104 for the curfew period. It was not now needed. The internal troops have been withdrawn completely. The smashed kiosks have been repaired, the fragments of glass have been swept up and the shop windows restored. And the central streets, where at that time blood was spilled, have even been newly asphalted.

But such things are not erased from the memory that quickly....

...The city square. An encampment is formed in the twilight by those born on one side of the Caspian. The women and children are within a living ring of men. And they are approached by an even larger crowd—inhabitants of the opposite shore. And it is not that important from which side the first stone was cast....

I cannot believe any explanation. Were there many profiteers from one side? Each side has such, after all—its odds and evens, its Judases and lovers of the truth. And can whole peoples be measured and judged, as if in the evil Stalin times, by a dozen, by a hundred, if you will?

Had the food supply deteriorated? After all, as concerns a piece of bread we have known far harder times also, but, never mind, we adapted.

Heaping everything on the intrigues of religious fanatics? But does any faith approve of bloodshed? "Do not follow the majority into evil and do not bear false witness," one of Moses' commandments proclaims. Similar commands are hallowed by the authority not only of the Bible but of both the Talmud and the Koran.

Well, we will in time look into the causes. Let us as yet ponder a consequence. Staying with the said terminology, I would term it an exodus.

As distinct from the legendary mass resettlement of the tribes of Moses, the sons of the Caucasus did not have to cross the sea as if on dry land. Aircraft were sent for them. The height of the undertaking chanced to fall on a truly sorrowful day also: 22 June. The bustle of the men, the weeping of the children, the grief of the women over the abandoned hearth.... After all, many had begun everything here "from scratch". Many were born and grew up here.

And for this reason it was not believed at that time that these people were going away forever. But, alas!

"Before the well-known events," R. Isayev, head of the Kazakh CP Novouzenskiy Gorkom Organizational Department, reports, "there were in our city approximately 10,000 persons of Caucasus nationalities. As of today 3,834, of whom 2,732 are women and children, have left. Some 535 apartments became vacant, 320 have been occupied as yet. Should the evacuation process be halted? It is difficult to say...."

"What is difficult: it should not!" N. Beybutov, instructor of the Organizational Department, categorically corrects his boss. "All our people will go! It is a question merely of the timeframe."

It transpires that Noyabr Kerimovich is not only a gorkom instructor, he is additionally chairman of the "Solidarity" Committee elected by the Caucasus people that June evening right there in the square (the Kazakh "Birlik" or "Unity" Committee exists in parallel also). Contact has already been established with people's deputies from the Caucasus republics, and the appropriate questions have been submitted, and over there the refugees are being rendered assistance as casualties from a natural disaster.

"Who is now allegedly persecuting whom?" Rakhman Dzheksenbayevich can no longer restrain himself. "The situation is normal. What more do you want?"

"Measures have been adopted, I do not dispute," Beybutov sullenly takes issue. But they have not stopped the migration. For the seeds of mistrust have been sown, and they have sprouted.... The evening movie showings in the city now run to half-empty houses: our people are afraid to go to them."

Noyabr Kerimovich continues to count off the grievances. When the June events began, people begged to be urgently granted leave to wait out the passions somewhere further away. They were allegedly refused point-blank: "If you don't wish to work, quit!" He cites a family: a Lezgin woman with four children, her husband died here, there is nowhere outside of Mangyshlak soil for her to bow her head. But her neighbor keeps dinning into her: whenever it is that you move away from here, it will happen, all the same. She would very much like to take possession of her apartment. Imagine yourself in her place!

Is this the case or not? While Beybutov was speaking, Isayev was distractedly shaking his head. The former had only to leave for the head of the Organizational Department to immediately start to say that there was much that was superfluous and unreliable in the "Solidarity" chairman's stories. Manifest rumor....

But I thought: if even these two so well-informed comrades, party comrades, what is more, cannot—or are unwilling to?—separate the wheat from the chaff, how is this to be done by the ordinary working man? And the rumors are multiplying, each more disquieting than the last. And how will we be able to combat the rumors? All is clear on this score in theory.

"We need to work daily and hourly with the masses," N. Bekbosinov, general director of the "Mangyshlakneft" Production Association (virtually everything in Novyy Uzen and all around for 100 versts belongs to this association), who quite recently even was head of the Novouzenskiy Gorkom, argued in conversation with me. "To know who has what kind of family, how the children are getting on at school and which of them will join the enterprise to take their parents' place. Not wait for people to come to us but to go after them ourselves. Win real authority among them, without the unnecessary disturbance of the air by lengthy speeches. Only then is it possible to properly lead."

Well said! However, the practical refraction of these theoretical principles could be observed, perhaps, only those hot June days. And it was oblast leaders A. Kulibayev, F. Novikov and certain others, who had arrived urgently, who, at that, went "to the people," in the main, while the "city fathers" and many enterprise directors had to be pushed into this "exploit" virtually by force.

Do we ultimately recognize how important this is? Let us count up: Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan, Armenians from Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis from Armenia, now Caucasus people from Mangyshlak. And subsequently? Are we to expect a resettlement from the Baltic, from Moldavia? Who next?

No one needs to have it explained what it means to a person of mature years to leave his old haunts. And how to treat thousands of "mixed" families? And their children?

But perhaps the expulsion of "foreigners" will help the "indigenous" immediately to improve their own well-being? Some might, but I cannot believe this old story. For were anyone to gain from paring our income to the bone, these would be the mafia figures who remain in the background and who frequently occupy good positions in the bureaucratic machinery, regardless of the republic in which it has established itself.

However, the word has been spoken, and a draft concept of the republic's self-management and self-financing has been published and is being discussed today in Kazakhstan. Consequently, it will in the future be necessary to rely on its own resources and efforts, which will need to be built up constantly for a better life. But highly skilled personnel will be needed for this primarily!

The same N. Bekbosinov, elected a people's deputy of the USSR this spring, is putting forward a plan for the construction in Mangyshlak, in the currently decaying small town of Fort-Shevchenko, of an oil refinery. The arguments are reasonable ones. Several million tons of oil with a high asphaltresin substance content are being produced on the Buzachi peninsula, and the neighboring refineries are reluctant to take it, nor is transporting it easy. On-site refining, on the other hand, would produce inherent material for the building of highways. And costly vanadium may be recovered from the local oil, what is more. And, what is most important, refined products are not some crude sold cheap.

But where would the personnel come from were the construction project to begin tomorrow? Nurlikhan Uteuvich makes a sweeping gesture in reply: there are 18,000 unemployed in the district!

All this is so, but they will not solve the problem. First, an oil refinery can only be put in service by highly skilled people with many years of practical experience. Consequently, specialists would have to be invited in. And, second, where are the guarantees that those 18,000 would move to the said refinery? After all, there are more than sufficient vacancies even today in Mangyshlak and in Tengiz. No one is rushing to fill them, however.

In a word, regional cost accounting, so attractive to many people, will certainly not bring quick dividends, unless the blinders of national narrowness are removed from people. Alas, there is no managing without them. And the future promises no changes for the better as yet.

Specifically, it is contemplated introducing in the Kazakh SSR as of 1990 the certification and selection of personnel with regard for knowledge of Kazakh. ...And rumors are already circulating everywhere to the effect that the measure which has been announced will bring about a new far-reaching "exodus". And that its consequences are hard to predict....

Dangers of National Extremism Noted

90UN0094B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 36, 10-17 Sep 89 p 2

[Article by Timur Gaidar: "Let the Captain Come Back Home"]

[Text] Battalion CO, Captain Alexander Pochyotny has tired and sad eyes. And not only because he hasn't been home for a very long time and has not once kissed his baby daughter. The families of military officers are used to prolonged separations. Alexander's grandfather, an officer, fought in the Great Patriotic War. His father, also an officer, served at the border. And the Captain has a very different lot—for 18 months he and his soldiers have been trying to prevent Soviets of one nationality from killing Soviets of another nationality.

Sumgait, Nagorny Karabakh, Ferghana, Novy Uzen, Abkhazia....

The situation in the Abkhazian ASSR has for the most part settled down since internal troops came in a month and a half back. Bloodshed has stopped. Many arms have been confiscated. Planes and trains work on schedule. The anger is gradually abating and the flood of fantastic rumours receding. Holidayers are beginning to return to the deserted health resorts.

However, apprehension is still great. In the mountains, Georgian and Abkhazian villages continue to post guards along their borders, afraid of attack. And on the seashore, too, an Abkhaz and a Georgian, who lived as good neighbours for decades, go past each other in silence. Especially if there are strangers around. Only in private do they speak.

I went to a funeral at a new district in Sukhumi. Women's wails drifted in the air. A neighbouring courtyard responded with its own lamentations. Two children—Irakly Sanaya and Liya Sartaniya—were being buried. They found a home-made bomb in a heap of rubbish and were killed in the explosion. And the day before an Abkhazian boy was almost killed by the same kind of bomb.

How many such bombs are still to be found in the dump heaps in Sukhumi? How many offences, mutual claims and unsettled problems are ready to explode both here and in some other regions?

Internal troops cannot serve as a reliable defence against interethnic strife. A realistic way is set out in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

When reading this document, I thought involuntarily how harmful the impatience of hotheads can sometimes be and how dangerous it is when responsible and enlightened people are slow to respond. I'm sure, if the draft had appeared earlier, when passions were not so high, and if the ideas expressed in it had been implemented before, it would have been possible to avoid quite a few mishaps.

Tensions are expressed today in several interconnected ways at once. The natural aspiration of Union Republics for sovereignty, a sense of national awareness, and the protection of their language confronts the same natural and lawful hopes of other national minorities. If the contradiction is grave, the centripetal forces begin to oppose the centrifugal forces.

It is possible to avoid a dangerous confrontation, proceeding from the indisputable principle of our times that not a single nation can solve its problems at the expense of reducing the rights of other nations, and not a single "majority" will become genuinely free through oppressing a "minority."

But if something different happens, if people become divided into "first- and second-class citizens," if historians start seeking historical proof, like militiamen who check on when certain nations were "registered" on the earth, and if someone hurries to try on the dilapidated uniform of the "big brother," then this inevitably causes a reaction which extremism intensifies.

National extremism, blinding people, leads nations up the blind alley of self-destruction. It is dangerous not only in terms of bloodshed, split families and streams of refugees. It can undermine the moral basis of the nation's existence, weakening its ancient noble traditions.

Will reason take the upper hand? Will we at last realize the fruitlessness of national extremism, and understand that the way forward is not in confrontation and the endless repeating of mutual, even though well-grounded, claims, but in unity? It can be found if we see our neighbour not as an enemy but as a friend, and if we abide by the ancient wise rule—"Don't do to others what you don't want others to do to you!"

But now the affair has gone beyond the field of incantations.

It is high time for the peoples themselves to stop their own extremists who, violating the law, are consciously unleashing national strife and calling for violence, thus bringing trouble to their people.

If this isn't done, it may well be that military transport planes will hurry internal troops to new trouble spots to stop the bloodshed. And we might not have time to start implementing the ideas expressed in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee on the nationalities question.

People's Deputy Bratun on Easing Ethnic Tensions

*18120014A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 40, 8-15 Oct 89 p 13*

[Interview with poet Rostislav Bratun, USSR people's deputy from the Zaliznichny constituency in Lvov, by MN correspondent Alexander Petrov: "Western Ukraine, A Hot September"]

[Text] Soviet troops entered Western Ukraine from the east on September 17, 1939—16 days after Germany had attacked Poland. Soon afterwards, new regions appeared in the Soviet Ukraine which today are also called Western because Russia's border had for so long separated them from Eastern Ukraine.

[Correspondent] In the five days I've spent in Lvov I attended three crowded meetings: near the building of the "Lvovskaya Pravda" newspaper people protested against publications charging unofficial movements in the city with nationalism and extremism; in front of the regional procurator's office thousands of people demanded the release of a priest from the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC), rumored to have been arrested the day before; at the Druzhba Stadium tens of thousands of people demanded that those who fan interethnic strife be sued. "Lvovskaya Pravda" published an interview with A. Opalkov, secretary of the Party Committee of the Administration of Internal Affairs of the Lvov Regional Soviet Executive Committee. He said: "I'm against meetings in general. I think we're going in a bit too much for meetings and slogans. We should work harder."

[Bratun] I'm afraid such declarations will not reduce the number of meetings. The majority of participants in them are not at all against working harder, they simply want better working conditions. Now, imagine boatmen who learn of the existence of steamships, get together and ask to be hired as sailors on them. But they are told: "Your meeting won't change anything. Just pull the old rope-harder." The complacent didactics of some slogans, their high-and-mighty style irritate people, make them react unreasonably—the more so that in our country we have no developed tradition of conducting meetings. But democratic methods are being developed at today's meetings, and if someone tries to shout people down—there will be growing confrontation with the authorities.

[Correspondent] Hasn't the word "nationalism" been uttered too often lately because of the sharpening of interethnic relations?

[Bratun] We must clearly define what this word means. Not so long ago, even speaking one's mother-tongue could earn you the label of nationalist. Now, with the growth of national self-awareness among Soviet nations, an inaccurate use of this term causes sharp protest. In Western Ukraine the word "nationalist" was very frequently used to suppress national feelings. I was thus labeled more than once—because of my works, my attempts to restore folk traditions. Today it has become possible to discuss this problem openly.

Western Ukraine was separated for ages from Eastern Ukraine—either by the Austro-Hungarian border or by the border with Poland. Cultural and linguistic assimilation was inevitable in these conditions. Yet we managed to preserve ourselves as a nation. This was naturally, possible due to a developed feeling of national belonging, of national pride. Attempts to suppress this feeling only sharpen it and lead to more extreme forms of its expression. In the 20s and 30s the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) emerged as a result of discrimination by the Polish authorities. In the Soviet period its members were more often known as Banderovites.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was of extreme importance in preserving our national culture in Galicia during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Poland in the 20 years leading up to the war. It preserved folk traditions and served as a symbol of Ukrainian self-awareness.

[Correspondent] The question of legalizing the Greek-Catholic Church is very urgent—people are tired of waiting for permission to pray to God as they see fit. I have the impression that procrastination in this instance may have serious consequences.

[Bratun] Yes, very serious. This question needs to be settled at once, if we are to avoid a social explosion. Keeping the majority of believers artificially within the Russian Orthodox Church exacerbates an already tense situation. Turning empty church buildings that used to belong to the Greek Catholics into Orthodox churches, which some executives call an expression of new thinking

in relation to religion, can only be a source of interethnic strife. The same goes for the refusal to discuss with the representatives of some religious communities the question of the autocephality of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, a question which believers are beginning to pose more and more often to the authorities. As I see it, the restoration of the Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox Church deserves close consideration, including from the point of view of reducing tension between the two Christian denominations in Western Ukraine.

[Correspondent] At the meetings I saw quite a few people with blue-and-yellow badges and flags. A trident was often depicted on the flags. But early in August, the newspaper "Pravda Ukrainy" published a leader called "We resolutely reject Petlyura's symbolism", in which those who like blue-and-yellow flags and tridents were again labeled nationalists.

[Bratun] Injustices and crimes were perpetrated under the blue-and-yellow flag when Petlyura was at the head of the Ukrainian state. But show me a flag which has always been in clean hands! Small wonder that, as people learn about the crimes of Stalin's hangmen, there appear some who prefer other symbols, especially ancient symbols: according to many respected historians Ukrainian regiments fought under blue-and-yellow flags as far back as in the battle of Grunwald in 1410. In the Ukraine Prince Vladimir's trident—even more ancient—is a symbol of historical pride in the once blossoming Kiev Rus. In Stalin's times the trident was repressed, too. You remember the statue of Neptune by the Lvov town hall? For quite a few years the sea god had stood there unarmed—his trident had been sawn off at the orders of "fighters against Ukrainian nationalism". Today this may cause a smile, but at that time it was no laughing matter.

[Correspondent] The 50th anniversary of Western Ukraine's unification with the USSR is drawing closer...

[Bratun] Speaking about this date, I'd like, not giving political assessments, to mention that the unification of the two Ukrainian states, which appeared on the crest of a revolutionary awakening—of the Ukrainian People's Republic and of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic happened on January 22, 1919.

The Ukrainian population was overjoyed when the Red Army came in 1939. I remember how people welcomed Soviet soldiers, waving red and blue-and-yellow flags. Unfortunately, the holiday was short—late in 1939 cruel repressions followed in Western Ukraine. But, I repeat, throughout that September everything was seen differently.

[Correspondent] They say that it was precisely the cruelty and obvious injustice of the mass repressions in the 18 months leading up to the war that helped generate first anti-Russian, then pro-German feelings among the Ukrainian population.

[Bratun] Anti-Russian? Maybe. But I believe people likewise recalled the events of 1914-1915, when the Russian army took Lvov. Military occupation is always connected

with oppression of the peaceful population, and at the time the Ukrainians of Galicia were doubly offended by the persecution of the Greek-Catholic Church and the exile of its head, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptitsky, deep into Russia. In 1939-1941, people were exiled much further and en masse.

The German authorities capitalized on this. Lvov was taken on June 30. The local NKVD staff members didn't bother to evacuate prisoners—all of them were executed. The Germans laid their bodies out in the streets.

There apparently was a pro-German feeling in the beginning—Galicia was included directly in the Reich, which meant better food supplies as compared with “occupied territories”. Add to this the memory of the preceding 18 months. But illusions concerning the nazi regime quite soon disappeared—it became evident that they were cruel aggressors, not liberators. People felt this especially when the massive annihilation of Jews started. I come from Volyn and remember how, by the end of 1942, the Ukrainian Insurrection Army (UIA) was formed. It controlled practically all of the countryside until the arrival of the Red Army. Many UIA soldiers joined the Soviet troops and fought with them until V-Day. But on returning home they were repressed. Then the UIA was restored—to fight against NKVD units. An initially anti-fascist organization became an anti-Soviet one.

Tension grew with the post-war personnel policy: the bureaucrats, military men and NKVD men who were sent to Western Ukraine were mainly Russians or East Ukrainians. Stalin's nationalities policy caused not only people of different nationalities to clash, but also people from regions with different traditions and ways of life. Remember the Moscow and Leningrad workers who were sent to Cossack villages on the Don during collectivization? Even today in Western Ukraine there are, unfortunately, still very few local people in leading posts.

[Correspondent] I suppose there are also journalists who don't quite grasp the essence of things aren't there?

[Bratun] Unfortunately, there are. In the localities people are especially sensitive to the inadequate, sometimes simply distorted, assessments of the central mass media. An example of that is the campaign to discredit the People's Rukh of the Ukraine, after its inaugural congress. The arsenal of means employed tells us a lot. They include the old habit of speaking on behalf of the public of an entire Union Republic, the a priori division into the pure and the impure, who are unfit to even hold a dialogue with, the attempt to hide the true reasons for the unfavorable situation—bad supplies, housing problems, the rule of bureaucrats—and to blame everything on the activities of unofficial groups.

And all this is presented as the “Party stand”. As a Communist, I'm resolutely against such a stand. We should explain the term “nationalistic thinking”. If it refers to the increase in democratic protest against accumulated evils, which often acquires national forms, then

its roots should be sought not in someone's zealous preachings, but in former policy, including nationalities policy, which for decades used the “Party stand” to camouflage its inhuman nature.

Today it only irritates people. The new policy means dialogue with people, not shouting down at them or bigoted slogans. The recent CPSU Central Committee Plenary Meeting convinces us that this is a policy for the future.

Discussion of Ethnic Problems, Political Freedoms

18120012A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 40,
3-9 Oct 89 pp 27-29

[Article by Leonid Mlechin, “The Individual Comes First”]

[Text] The very newspaper issues which covered the proceedings of the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee featured on-the-spot reports from Yerevan, saying that Armenia had been practically cut off from the outside world. The motorroads and railways stretching across Azerbaijan had been blocked with the result that the supply of raw materials, food and fuel to Armenia stopped. Post-earthquake reconstruction work has come to a standstill. These developments are unprecedented in our country's history, although it has become obvious after Sumgait and Ferghana that we are heading for ethnic cataclysms. Our society wants immediate decisions, greater stability and calm, and is looking for all this to the Party which has full powers of government.

The issue of inter-ethnic relations today does not boil down to the problems of languages, culture and economic independence. This is a matter of life and death, because inter-ethnic conflicts have become violent, blood is being shed, and anti-riot troops have turned into fire brigades of sorts rushed to various parts of the country. The existence of our entire federation is now at stake, because the influence of centrifugal forces is felt in many regions.

The decision to convene the 28th CPSU Congress has been adopted. As a matter of fact, the subjects of discussion at the Congress, and our country's very ability to make further progress, depend on the solution of what we traditionally call “the nationalities question.”

Let us now take a broader view of this question. Is it solely about the national emancipation of the peoples of the USSR? Or about their wish for national identity they have done without for decades? Or about the desire, unexpected at the end of the current century, to get national independence, even if within the framework of a federation or a confederation?

Principles and Methods

The discussion at the plenary meeting has shown that the nationalities question reflects the imperfection of our life, that it is a loop in a tight knot: the harder you pull at the

knot, the tighter it gets. You have to untie the whole of the knot at once—this way you will proceed slowly, but surely...

An attentive reader of the TASS report has probably noticed that almost every speaker looked at the nationalities question from his own angle. Autonomous republics want a Union republic status; some republics insist on having all the missing links in their state machinery filled; others want full economic independence; still others demand measures to enforce stricter discipline and order in the Party proper, in public life and, by all means, in the press, which is, of course, to blame for inter-ethnic conflicts. This testifies not only to pluralism of opinion, but also to the absence of a consensus in public opinion which, to my mind, is only natural. First of all, problems differ from region to region. Second, inter-ethnic conflicts have caught our society unawares: it has neither the experience, nor the means to deal with them. Therefore it has to learn the hard way, with decisions often made before weighing all the pros and cons, with all the ensuing consequences.

Nevertheless, the general programme of the plenary meeting's action has been approved, its basic lines mapped out by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statements and recorded in the text of the Party platform. Judging by everything, these basic lines of action have gone down well with Soviet public opinion. They are as follows:

- to revise the principles of federalism, to grant the republics a larger margin of political and economic independence;
- to promote self-government as a mechanism guaranteeing every nation the right to decide between the course of progress open to it;
- to decentralize national economic management and planning with a view to overcoming the people's estrangement from the means of production and from the products made;
- to provide conditions for the free development of national cultures and languages, for the assertion of national dignity;
- to restore justice with regard to the nations whose rights have been trampled upon;
- to guarantee the protection of the interests of those who live outside the limits of their national republics, or do not belong to any...

While the principles as such evoke practically no objections, opinions on how to realize them differ. Are individual regions to be granted full or partial economic independence? Are natural resources and mineral wealth to be managed by the central or local authorities? Are all the autonomous regions to be granted equal rights, or is some kind of hierarchy to be preserved? No consensus has been—or is likely to be—reached on these questions. What is to be done under the circumstances? Is this or that version to be accepted by a majority vote and then be made binding on all? Will this option prove effective?

Won't it escalate confrontation, intensify centrifugal tendencies and confirm certain quarters in their conviction that the use of such methods by the center rule out the possibility of cooperation with it? So what's the way out? Is everyone to be allowed to act as he thinks best? Where does the state, as the uniting and cohesive force, come in then? After all, even those who stand for a confederation want to live in a strong and influential state carrying a lot of weight in international affairs.

How are we to arrive at national accord? The whole trouble is that we are trying, once again, to decree new forms of life which are to take shape and mature naturally, of their own accord. This method of "artificial implantation" will no longer do.

The absence of a law on property allowing a free choice of its forms, the absence of a free market, of a self-adjusting economic mechanism, the command system of planning and economic management—this is what pushes our republics and regions to autarky, to economic separatism. Persuasions and appeals will not work: people no longer believe in the effectiveness of the old model, they believe in their own ability to get things going, to manage the economy to the best advantage. A rapid advance towards the emancipation of the economy, the promotion of the hitherto forbidden forms of ownership, the establishment of a real market—this, and this alone, can effectively countervail the separatism, the wish to break loose from the fetters of poverty and to strike out on their own. It is the Common Market, rather than standard instructions from the center, that holds together the Western European countries whose tendency towards integration we now hold up as an example to follow.

The Baltic republics come under the heaviest fire. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are certain that having emerged from a mismanaged "national economy" they will put their own economies right in no time. They are not scared of the severance of old economic links, which they are usually warned against, and presume they will be able to establish new and more profitable ones. I think it is absurd to reproach them of anything. In trade and economic matters emotions are out of place; these matters require scientific approach. The whole nation should be left free to act in accordance with plain common sense, and an all-Union market should be established; then the logic of economic advantage, rather than that of the Gosplan planners, will materialize in new and very strong links among the regions of our country. These links will be immune to changes in public sentiments.

Economic freedoms are inseparable from political ones. Why are the republics hungering for sovereignty? Why don't the autonomous formations want to put up with their subordinate position? Why are the peoples deported and humiliated under Stalin demand their lost statehood back—a slogan which sounds somewhat archaic today?

Because over the decades the superstate we live in has failed to guarantee their rights, to give them adequate protection to make them "confident of the morrow" (using

a formula once much favored by our propagandists). The sovereignty a republic craves for is the sovereignty of the individual.

The advocates of this idea seek guarantees of their rights and freedoms in any likely forms of national statehood. They demand more autonomy from Moscow in the hope that their "own" rulers and their "own" officials will prove more democratic and fair. This is why the way out of the impasse of ethnic confrontations lies in an early embodiment of the entire complex of rights and freedom in legislation and political practice.

Agony and Madness

"All people are related in close kinship with one another. All our profound differences, differences in character, remoteness from one another which runs into lack of understanding and into mortal hostility, our horrible mute estrangement," the West German philosopher Karl Jaspers wrote, "all this is agony actually engendered by kinship, which has either been forgotten all about, or lost its way to realization."

Agony and madness is perhaps the most accurate description of our current situation where people are killed or driven away for reasons of their nationality by those who try to put an end to their own economic and political rightlessness this way. It stands to reason that acts which carry criminal punishment are to be dealt with by law-enforcement agencies. However, the militia, prosecutors, riot troops and the KGB are in no position to remove the causes of inter-ethnic violence. All of us are now wondering why those guilty of kindling inter-ethnic strife get away with it? Relevant crime statistics are conspicuously absent. Courts of law put the blame on prosecutors, and the latter shrug the question off. But where are the criteria whereby this or that public statement or magazine article can be pronounced illegal? Has anyone attended to that? Judges and prosecutors breathe the same air as we do. In office, during a lunch break, or at home after hours, they read in perfectly legal publications frankly nationalist articles, without as much as a word of critical comment added. How can they be prepared, under the circumstances, to put on trial those sued for writing such articles?

The very atmosphere of our society is contaminated with nationalism, and therefore insulting references to anyone's nationality no longer sound offensive to us. Nationalistic vocabulary finds its way to the pages of Party publications and to the language of Party committee secretaries. Having learned from the bitter experience of the past elections, the more conservative of our bureaucrats in high places are trying, on the eve of the new elections to the local Soviets, to make a deal with nationalist forces, hoping to keep in power under their banner. Nationalism is condemned only if it manifests itself in a neighboring republic, but not at home. Accusations of nationalism are now proffered only against the republics' movements which put forward a left-wing democratic programme. This is supposed to achieve the dual purpose of compromising the left-wing democratic forces and gaining popularity at home. Frankly, I find it hard to believe in the sincerity of many

participants in the noisy campaign launched after the CPSU Central Committee had issued its Statement on the Baltics. Even those known for anything but internationalism, tolerance and broad-mindedness fumed at Baltic nationalism. The fervent advocates of the "one-nation-more-equal-than-others" concept obviously rejoiced in the chance to declare against the political reform in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and at the same time to imply that they were their readers' and listeners' guardian angels and protectors...

There is no denying the fact that the programme outlined by the plenary meeting ought to be put into practice as soon as possible. Leaving it to the people themselves to decide on the language in which to apply for a marriage licence, on the anthem which to sing, and on the banner under which to hold a meeting is certainly a must. Any step towards bringing economic life back to normal is simply necessary, as is a change in the structure of the Union (although this would mean the enforcement of new government institutions—the Russian Federation alone will need its Party Central Committee, Komsomol Central Committee, Trade Union Central Committee plus additional ministries, public and non-public organizations. The Union status is claimed by several autonomous republics, and if some of the claims are met, the other republics will take offence). This move also appears necessary or, at any rate, is bound to be popular. This approach is based on the principles of broadening the rights of nations and ethnic groups. Is that sufficient? And isn't this principle secondary with regard to the fundamental principle of human rights observance?

An autonomous republic needs the Union republic status in order, for instance, to obtain the right to set up a film studio of its own, to engage in academic science. Isn't such a bondage dependence on the status endowed on it from above humiliating to such a republic? Why can't it set up a film studio if it has the talent and the material facilities to do so? Why does the content of the school history course in an autonomous republic depend on the will of a Union republic, rather than on the wish of the school pupils themselves? Our life is permeated with hierarchic structures, and we must destroy the old ones rather than create more. Human rights and human opportunities still depend on where the man lives, rather than on his own abilities and skills. And as long as such a dependence remains, the conditions for nationalist feelings, inter-ethnic conflicts and inter-republic confrontations persist.

In Europe and at Home

At the Paris Conference on Human Rights, our diplomats made their debut with a fine-sounding idea of a common European legal space, the idea being that on the continent it is possible to guarantee human rights and liberties and to bring them in line with the universal world standards.

The integrated legal space is a necessity for our country, in the first place. In one republic, you can put forward a candidate and vote for him at the elections, and at another

republic it's no use, because your candidate will be blackballed at a precinct meeting anyway. International standards are out of the question here. So, a republic is trying to fence itself in so as to run things at home the way it thinks fit. But is there any need for barbed-wire fences in an integrated legal space? I think we must change the strategy of dealing with national problems proceeding from the fact that they come chiefly for the failure to observe human rights. And let us not harbor any illusions: ethnic problems will not disappear either tomorrow, or in the foreseeable future.

There's no use crying over spilt milk. How is a settlement in Nagorny Karabakh to be achieved? Now we see that this volcano is becoming active. It can be added to by new ones: the process of serious social changes in the country,

which many take as something which threatens the fundamental principles, gives rise to envy and to the inferiority complex, makes people susceptible to the flow of suggestions about the perniciousness of the "internationalists," "cosmopolitans" and "aliens." We are witnessing the obvious vulgarization of many people's world outlook. The increasing aggressiveness of national self-awareness, tacitly supported by the administrative-state structures, is targeted on national minorities, which exist in every republic, every territory and region...

All this throws out into prominent relief the inadequacy of the parliamentary, liberal, democratic component of our life. What we lack is the emphasis on democracy, on human rights, on respect for the individual, the awareness of the fact that the individual comes first...

Georgian MVD Notes Growth In Crime Figures

18300831A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian

8 Sep 89 p 3

[Report by Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Press Group: "The Georgian SSR Ministry Of Internal Affairs Reports"]

[Text] An analysis of the results of the activities of Georgian SSR internal-affairs agencies and subunits in the first eight months of 1989 shows that the total number of recorded crimes of all types grew by 4.8 percent in comparison with the same period of last year, and that the number of grave types of crime rose by 16.4 percent. There was also an increase in comparison with the first seven months of this year (.9 percent and 3.4 percent respectively).

The number of recorded crimes subject to criminal investigation grew by 11.9 percent, and the number of grave types of crime rose by 34.4 percent. The greatest increase by region was recorded in the Abkhaz ASSR, where the total number of recorded crimes subject to criminal investigation increased by 22.9 percent, and the total number of grave crimes by 118.4 percent. The figures for the Adzhar ASSR were 4.2 percent and 39 percent, and for the city of Tbilisi, 2.6 percent and 10.6 percent. An increase in both indices was also recorded in the cities of Kutaisi and Tskhaltubo, and in Abashskiy, Bolnisskiy, Zugdidskiy, Lanchkhutskiy, Ozurgetskiy, Khashurskiy, Ambrolaurskiy, and Samtredskiy Rayons, as well as by the internal-affairs agencies for transportation.

The number of crimes directed against citizens' lives and health continues to grow. The number of premeditated murders and attempted murders increased by 14.1 percent, the inflicting of grave bodily injuries by 18.3 percent, and rapes and attempted rapes by 10 percent.

The situation where property crimes are concerned remains alarming. In the republic as a whole, the number of thefts of state property grew by 51.1 percent; of open stealing, 25.7 percent; of violent assault with intent to rob, 44 percent; and of thefts of citizens' personal property, 9.8 percent.

The number of instances of illegal carrying, storage, and manufacture of weapons increased sharply—by 38.2 percent.

The situation on the republic's motor roads remains complex. The total number of automobile accidents increased by 8.6 percent, and there was an increase in the number of traffic accidents with a fatal outcome, which claimed 434 lives.

The greatest increases in traffic accidents were recorded in Tbilisi and Tskhaltubo, and in Akhaltsikhskiy, Bolnisskiy, Gardabanskiy, Mtskhetskiy, Sagaredzhoyskiy, Telavskiy, Khashurskiy, Ozurgetskiy, and Mayakovskiy Rayons.

The number of crimes committed in public places showed a tendency to decline (by 2.2 percent), though the number of such crimes committed on streets and in squares, parks,

and public gardens increased by 12.2 percent. The number of auto thefts grew sharply—by 64.2 percent.

Officers charged with combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation were less active in uncovering such mercenary crimes as thefts of socialist property and bribetaking. At the same time, more active efforts were made to combat petty thefts of state property, profiteering, and deception of customers.

The Georgian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs conducts a systematic analysis of the operational situation in the republic on a weekly basis. The results for the final week of August have now been analyzed. Based on the daily summaries, 77 crimes subject to criminal investigation were recorded, which is three, or 4 percent, fewer than in the same period of last year. Of the total number of crimes, 55, or 71.4 percent, were solved.

Of greatest concern is an increase in violent assaults with intent to rob (from zero to two), in cases of open stealing (from one to five), and in auto thefts (from five to 15).

For example, on August 31 of this year at 16:00 hours, in the trade center building in the town of Gurdzhaani, an unidentified criminal took 4,000 rubles in receipts from citizen Kartvelishvili, a clerk at the Gurdzhaani consumers' cooperative food store, and fled. An investigation is under way.

On August 25 of this year, during services in the Jewish synagogue in the town of Senaki, three unidentified criminals armed with sawed-off rifles took from citizens Israyelashvili and Mikhelashvili 70 rubles, a gold ring, and two church books, after which they fled. An investigation is under way.

During the past week, the number of thefts of personal property in the republic declined (from 23 to 15), as did the number of traffic accidents with a fatal outcome (from 19 to 13).

Officers charged with combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation were more active in exposing such crimes last week. Sixty-seven crimes were uncovered, which is 27, or 40.2 percent, more than in the same period of last year. The crimes break down as follows: 11 instances of profiteering, 20 instances of deception of customers, and 13 thefts.

In connection with the fact that the summer tourist season has ended and a large number of people are returning from vacations to cities and other communities, the problem of traffic safety has become urgent.

In the last 10 days of August, the republic recorded 88 traffic accidents, in which 27 people were killed and 115 sustained bodily injuries.

Private vehicles accounted for the largest number of traffic accidents (55), in which 16 people (59.3 percent) were killed and 63 people (60 percent) were injured.

Of the total of 88 traffic accidents in the period under analysis, four accidents (4.5 percent) involved as yet unidentified vehicles, as a result of which one person was killed and three sustained bodily injuries.

There was an increase in the number of injuries sustained in traffic accidents by minors who were pedestrians or riding bicycles at the time.

In the period under analysis, the operational situation with respect to transportation accidents in the city of Tbilisi grew somewhat more complex.

Despite measures that the Georgian Administration of Internal Affairs for Transportation is taking, the total number of crimes subject to criminal investigation grew by 11.9 percent, and of grave types of crimes, by 94.2 percent. The increase in the total number of crimes was largely attributable to thefts of state property (which were up 56.2 percent), including thefts of freight from rolling stock, which rose by 94.4 percent. The operational situation was made considerably more complex by an increase in the number of recorded premeditated murders—four. An increase in criminal encroachments on passengers' personal property is cause for concern. The number of recorded instances of open stealing more than tripled and amounted to 13, one of which remains unsolved. Indices for combating drug abuse were stable—18 instances have been recorded this year. On August 14 of this year, officers of the LOVD [expansion unknown—"L Internal Affairs Department"], acting on the basis of operational data, arrested at the Tbilisi train station V. A. Korolskiy, born in 1941, a unemployed resident of Chikment, and R. N. Aliyev, born in 1967, an unemployed resident of the village of Giorgitsminda, Sagaredzhoiskiy Rayon, who were found to be in possession of 25 kilograms of the narcotic substance "marijuana," which was confiscated. On September 1 of this year, officers of that same department, in conjunction with officers of the Georgian Administration of Internal Affairs for Transportation, arrested, on a sovkhos in Chuyskiy Rayon, Dzhabul Oblast, Kazakh SSR, the seller of the aforementioned narcotic substance, A. A. Krikbayev, who was born in 1955 and is an employee of the aforementioned sovkhos.

The operational situation in the Abkhaz ASSR remains complex. In the final 10 days in August of this year, 1,489 citizens were arrested and taken to internal-affairs agencies for violating the special regulations governing citizens' behavior in the autonomous republic. One thousand four hundred eleven motor vehicles were impounded as well. Efforts to confiscate firearms and explosive devices from the public continue.

On the whole, 4,555 firearms were confiscated on the territory of the Georgian SSR between July 16 and September 3 of this year, including 755 rifles, 11 machineguns, 285 assault rifles, 99 pistols, and 360 rifles and carbines. Confiscated weapons included 3,803 hunting knives. In addition, 1,764.4 kilograms of explosive substances were confiscated.

18 September Deaths Of Two Militiamen In AzSSR Examined

*18300845A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Sep 89 Second Edition p 6*

[Article by special correspondent A. Petrushov: "Drama On The Highway: What Happened Near The Town of Agdam"]

[Text] Stepanakert and Agdam—Agdam is the place where, on September 18, officers Andrey Tyugayev and Sergey Gaba of a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs operational-investigative group were killed in the line of duty. One was 27, the other 28. Both were married and had children.

It is a typical rural highway, with low tilled hills on either side. The villages of Shakhbulak and Giasly are not far away. The latter is adjacent to the town of Agdam. There are dark brown spots on the asphalt, which is littered with documents, magazines, and newspapers. There are piles of rocks and gravel along the curbs. The tracks of dozens of motor vehicles mark the fields.

Hundreds of people blinded by anger and enmity were involved in the incident. And only the deaths of two totally innocent officers stopped the crowd and, it can be said, prevented a massive bloody clash.

An investigation is under way. An investigative team of the USSR Procuracy has been enlisted in it. Three people have been arrested. Without intruding in the investigation in any way and without offering any assessments, we present to our readers the accounts of those who saw the events with their own eyes and experienced them in their own hearts. Just what happened, then, on the highway near the Azerbaijani town of Agdam?

Major A. Vishnyakov. On the day in question, I was in charge of an escort for a column of vehicles—five gasoline tankers and four trucks—that were carrying national-economic freight. The column had gone from Mardakert to Stepanakert without incident. Only at a fork in the road were we met by a small group of people. We set out on the return trip at 1430. At checkpoint No. 13, I was warned that, at that same fork (Agdam-Mardakert), up to 300 people had gathered. At the next checkpoint, I got orders over the radio to change routes. The column turned onto another road and arrived safely in Mardakert by evening.

Senior Sergeant S. Khotyaintsev. Our subunit was roused at the signal "assemble." What did we see? The highway was blocked at two points. There were crowds of people on both sides.

The people present behaved themselves in a defiant manner and demanded that we get out of there, and they didn't try to hide the fact that they themselves would settle scores with any Armenians who might pass by. We formed a combat chain. Then they started throwing rocks at us. We moved to a bridge, in order to cover the BTR. The crowd followed us, shouting insults. Major O. Noskov repeatedly tried to calm the people down and called on them to keep order. Their response was abuse. What

surprised us all was that there were quite a few Adgam militiamen among them, though they were doing nothing to put a stop to the disturbances.

Lieutenant Colonel L. Tsvetkov. After the very first talk I realized that it was no accident that so many people were there. Representatives of the Azerbaijan People's Front were calling the shots. They knew that a column of trucks carrying goods for the Armenian population was due to pass through there. And they had resolved to do everything possible to prevent the column from getting through. The rocks had been hauled in in advance, in plain sight of the militia and rayon authorities. At about 1500, a subunit led by Colonel B. Ponomaryev arrived at the site of blockade from the city of Stepanakert. The subunit stopped by the bridge. Ponomaryev and I set out for the second blockade. Along the way, we spoke with the people, tried to calm them down, and advised them to disperse. After examining the blockade, we headed back. At that point we heard assault rifle fire from the bridge.

Senior Lieutenant Yu. Tkachev. When we got to the place, I immediately saw the following picture. A lieutenant from the subunit that had arrived earlier and whom I didn't know was coming down the hill. He was carrying a knife, a homemade explosive device, and some ammunition that had been confiscated from the people. A soldier-photographer was following him. They were being pursued by 10 to 12 people, who were demanding that the film be exposed and the camera turned over to them. They pushed the soldier, and then surrounded him. Standing nearby, I pulled him out of the circle of people and shielded him with my body. I was joined by Lieutenant S. Yegorov, and the two of us pushed back those impudent people back. Suddenly a wild howl rang out, and the crowd surged down the hills toward us, throwing rocks and bottles containing a flammable mixture at us. One frenzied man threw himself on the soldier-photographer and tried to take the camera by force. I had to use hand to hand combat techniques. I sent the soldier to the armored personnel carrier. Then I saw that some people were trying to grab Yegorov's assault rifle. By that time the crowd had doubled in size. To my order "Stop" there was no reaction. The crowd had gone wild. At that point I fired two rounds overhead from my assault rifle. That allowed us to make it back to the vehicle, where I started positioning the soldiers to guard the equipment. Then Lieutenant Ponomaryev became surrounded. Taking a sergeant with me, I rushed to the commander's aid. We knocked somebody in the crowd down. That person soon came to his senses and began spouting unprintable abuse, and then, pointing his finger at me, started screaming that I had killed somebody. Within moments a dense crowd had surrounded me. They chanted at the top of their voices: "Killer!" At that point I saw some people carrying a man out from behind the hill; they put him in their car and drove him off somewhere. I managed to make it back to the personnel carrier. The crowd surrounded the company and began demanding that I be turned over to it. Over the radio, the commandant of the special rayon ordered me to leave the company and to go to the internal affairs department in Agdam.

Colonel V. Zabaznoy. It was a formal interrogation. At the militia station, Tkachev was accused of being intoxicated. Needless to say, an analysis that was performed failed to confirm the absurd charge. Then they tried to put the officer in an IVS [transliteration] cell. My arguments were categorically rejected. The officer's situation was grave. They wanted to make a scapegoat out of him. That evening, Major General V. Safonov, commandant of the special rayon, came to the rayon internal affairs department. Tkachev returned to his unit.

Major V. Shaurov. Only the soldiers' and officers' restraint and self-control prevented more terrible things from happening. There were people in the crowd who were intoxicated and under the influence of narcotics. Many openly attacked the soldiers and threatened to use weapons to settle scores with them. Some of the soldiers were wounded. The ringleaders clearly stood out. They directed the actions. Some of them had cameras. They took pictures of the officers, shouting as they did so, "We'll get even with anyone whose picture we have."

Sergeant V. Kapustin. I saw Major Chernenko give some weapons that had been confiscated from the crowd to a group of investigators who had arrived from Stepanakert. I remember how they put the weapons in their briefcase, photographed them, and took a few pictures of the crowd. Later, after I had returned to the unit, I learned with bitterness of the tragic fate that befell the two young militia officers. Yet they were armed, they could have defended themselves.

The accounts of the surviving members of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs operational-investigative group:

R. Valiulin, Case Officer for especially important affairs of the Main Criminal Investigation Directorate of the USSR MVD. This is my second month in Nagornyy Karabakh. I've already managed to spend some time in the hospital, after a difficult investigation. I was just discharged. At 1500, Militia Colonel A. Solodovnikov, a brigade leader, instructed me to put together a group and to leave immediately for the vicinity of Agdam, where a skirmish between soldiers and the public had allegedly occurred, one in which firearms were said to have been used. There were even wounded. The group consisted of Militia Captain Leonid Petukhov, an investigator from Kurgan, and the following expert criminologists: Andrey Tyugayev of Penza, Sergey Gaba of Chernovtsy, and Pyotr Lyubov of Arkhangelsk. Our Volga was driven by Junior Sergeant Sergey Shpilev of Kursk. The vehicle was clearly marked "State Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration" and "Militia."

We set off at 1510. About 20 to 25 minutes later we arrived at the Agdam Internal Affairs Department. The duty officer told us that nobody was at the department, that everyone was out on the highway. We set off for it. We stopped the Volga 350 meters away from some vehicles blocking the road. We couldn't drive any farther, for the area was clogged with vehicles and people. At the site were some people had allegedly been shot at, we met with Lieutenant Colonel Tsvetkov. We learned that nobody

from the local procuracy and militia would talk straight with him. For all practical purposes, we had to start the entire investigation from scratch. And some serious questions had to be answered. First, were shots fired or weren't they? Second, how were they fired—into the air or at people's feet? As is customary, we began with an examination of the scene of incident, with a search for material evidence, and so on.

While the fellows did that, I set out to find Militia Chief I. Pashayev. We know each other. I found him, along with the city procurator, raykom first secretary A. Kuliyeu, and other rayon officials. I introduced myself, informed them of the purpose of my coming, and asked for assistance in carrying out my mission. The procurator quickly said that their investigator, Abbasov, had already conducted an examination. I started looking for Abbasov. I found him. It turned out that the investigator, though he had been on the scene for some time, had accomplished little. I became suspicious: Did he want to remain impartial? I asked the soldiers for help. They gave me material evidence and told me that, after the shots, none of them had seen or examined the victims, and that the victims had been driven off to the rayon hospital right away. It became clear that we would have to go to Adgam, and the sooner, the better. We completed our examination at 18:00 hours. I informed the procurator of this and told him that the group was going to the hospital. We got in the car and slowly drove a few dozen meters. The crowd followed behind us, shouting and making demands. I thought to myself: Where is the local militia? And some cars were coming toward us from the opposite direction. In order to speed our progress, I got out of the car and went in front of it. Suddenly I heard the word, "sakhla, sakhla," which in Russian means "stop, stop!" The voice came from behind me. And all of a sudden a yellow Zhiguli pulled sideways across the road. Our car was literally boxed in. I was stuck between the two cars. They began questioning us in a demanding tone. "Who are you? Why are you here? Where are you going?" I pointed to the identifying markings on the car and began to explain. Someone shouted: "They're Armenian terrorists." Nearby me stood an imposing, well-dressed man whose opinion the others heeded. He demanded the fellows' documents. They gave him their identification cards. Then he ordered them to give him the film. We complied even with that demand. True, I asked him not to expose it, since we needed it for our work. He nodded in agreement and skillfully and professionally opened up the camera. Taking him to be an official, I pleaded with him to help us. He nodded once more, though no actions followed from him. Meanwhile, someone reached through the window and grabbed Petukhov's briefcase containing the material evidence. They opened it, revealing the knife, shells, and explosive device... A roar spread through the crowd. In an instant they had pulled Petukhov and Shpilev from the Volga. They began beating them. They took their pistols. It became clear that a new crime was being committed. I decided to force my way through to the rayon leaders or to the soldiers.

Senior Investigator L. Petukhov. They beat us all standing up. They beat us about the head and back. They snatched

our wallets out of our pockets. They punctured the tires of the car. They began smashing up the Volga, then overturned it. One person removed the front windshield and ran off with it. Then they led us off somewhere. I heard a voice from the crowd say, "Take them farther away." They put us in somebody's Moskvich, all of us in the backseat. Then the crowd surrounded the car again. There were shouts, abuse, howls. They began rocking the car. The back door slammed shut. Sergey suddenly cried out in a loud voice, then Andrey, as the car was pushed onto its side. Then it was sat back on its wheels. Some militiaman ran up and tried to calm the crowd. Tyugayev and Gaba were taken out of the car. To this day I can't understand how they went. For someone stabbed Andrey in the heart and Sergey in the liver area with a knife. We were put in another Zhiguli.

R. Valiulin. Honestly, I didn't think I'd get far. Behind me, people were yelling, "Grab him, he's getting away." I somehow managed to reach some militiamen. The two sergeants listened to me but stayed put. I moved on. I came across Militia Deputy Chief Navruzov by the armored personnel carrier. I asked him for help. He clearly took his time assembling a rescue team. "I gave you a senior lieutenant, what else do you need?" he said spitefully. Finally, I couldn't take any more; I grabbed him and two or three other militiamen, who then dropped back. I came across the overturned Volga; our men weren't there. I got up on the curb: I saw the crowd rampaging 300 meters ahead. We ran to the site. And there I saw a red Zhiguli. I'll never forget it: In the backseat, Petukhov and Shpilev were holding the bloody and nearly naked Andrey and Sergey. They had enormous, gaping wounds. The road was cleared, and the car sped off for the hospital in Adgam.

L. Petukhov. On the way, everybody was silent. Andrey died before they could operate on him. Sergey, in addition to the knife wound, had a broken leg. He had lost five liters of blood. Soldiers gave blood right on the operating table. Gaba died immediately after the operation.

R. Valiulin. An investigation got under way only on September 21, after we appealed to the republic procuracy. For several days, the fellows stayed in the Karabakh Hotel with no documents or money and wearing borrowed clothes.

Special Correspondent A. Petrushkov. This requires some explanation.

On September 21, the republic newspaper VYSHKA [Derrick] carried an article entitled "On the Incident in Adgam." At the request of AZERINFORM, I. Pashayev, Chief of the Adgam Rayon Internal Affairs Department, recounted what had happened in detail. After the things I heard from witnesses, that interview seems like some kind of strange babble, to put it mildly. Here is his first sentence: "However, they made no attempt to attack the soldiers." What about throwing rocks, hitting people on the face and back with one's fists, hurling explosive packets, and stealing weapons—what are all these things? Pashayev goes on: "Unexpectedly for those present, a

group of unknown civilians appeared at the site of the incident. Without identifying themselves, they began photographing the scene."

Yes, that's right, the group did not identify itself to the rampaging crowd, although even the crowd knew who had come in a car marked "Militia" and why they had come. And it's no accident that the group managed to work a full two hours. During that time, let us recall, R. Valiulin met with rayon leaders—including the militia chief—and informed them of everything. In that situation, what should I. Pashayev have done? He should have given all possible assistance and support to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs group. But he gave it neither.

As is clear from the accounts, the militiamen, led by the chief and deputy chief of the rayon internal affairs department, failed to do their direct duty and in effect facilitated the tragedy. I remember the words of one of the victims: "They were not the militia but something opposite."

The incident near Agdam brings on many distressing thoughts. A succession of questions arises, each more serious than the preceding one. But we are obliged to get answers to them. And not only in memory of the innocent officers who were killed, but so that good may triumph over evil. The terrifying drama on the highway shows that it's just one step from blind hatred to crime. Here's another example. It happened in Stepanakert. As a soldier was escorting a column of Azerbaijani vehicles carrying freight in the vicinity of the electrical equipment plant, a homemade explosive device was thrown at him. Private

Sergey Pykhteyev of Perm Oblast lost the sight of one of his eyes. Yet the guy had just over a month to go before the end of his term in the army. And now, instead of going home, he'll undergo prolonged treatment in a hospital. Such is the dear price that is paid for the incitement of hostility and hatred.

And here the principal question arises: Why isn't a stop being put to nationalistic and extremist "preoccupations"? The time has come for all of us to profoundly realize the measure of our own responsibility for what is happening in society. Both at the center and in the provinces. The problems of Nagornyy Karabakh can be solved only through compromise. This would seem to be understood in Yerevan, in Baku, and in Stepanakert. What, then, is preventing them from taking steps to accommodate one another? For we cannot continually walk on the thinnest of ice. Before the nationalist and chauvinist abyss, any army and any people are impotent. It was with this distressing feeling that I flew out of Stepanakert, and before that out of Baku and Yerevan. Honestly speaking, I expect a lot from the fall session. Especially from the People's Deputies of the two republics. The key to mutual understanding is in their hands!

Suspects in the murder of Militia Captain A. Tyugayev and Militia Lieutenant S. Gaba, officers of an operational group, on September 18 near the village of Giasly, Agdamskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan SSR, have been arrested. They are one Zeynalov and one Ismailov. A PM pistol with eight rounds was confiscated from Zeynalov; it had been stolen from Capt Tyugayev.—TASS.

Scientists on Right to Information

90UN0094A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 36, 10-17 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by Nikolai Bolkhovitinov and Alexander Fursenko, corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Valery Tishkov, D.Sc. (History): "About the Right to Information"]

[Text] We would like to propose a more consistent and broader version of the law on the press which would consolidate the gains of glasnost constitutionally: a law on freedom of information.

In a law-governed, free state all citizens need access to information, not only journalists. One of the reasons behind society's crisis is the crisis of knowledge about society: historians were deprived of archive materials, sociologists and ethnographers could not get the necessary statistics, economists and lawyers were not allowed the right to ministry documents, etc.

Unfortunately, the situation in this field is changing very slowly. The main holders of the most important information are the USSR Archives, the State Committee for Statistics, the archives departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. They, obviously, intend to channel glasnost, to select documents for small, elite "teams," ordered to set up the "correct" concept of our past. And the mass of research associates and people simply interested are obliged to beg these organizations and listen to inadequate excuses for refusal.

Nearly all material about USSR population censuses remains closed as do the most important documents about state and Party organs.

We need a law on freedom of information which would include the following fundamental rights:

1. The right of all citizens (not only research associates and journalists) to have access to any information of any state organization, if this doesn't harm the country's defence interests.
2. The right of a citizen to apply to court if information is refused.
3. The right of a clear time limit (even if it's 50, and not 25-30 years, as it is in many other states), after which all archival documents must be made accessible to researchers or other interested citizens.

The history of similar law in the USA is quite interesting in the early 50s the mass media demanded that Congress pass the law. In the 60s the question became very serious due to the scandals around the activities of special services.

Finally, after long postponements, the Congress approved a law on freedom of information in 1966 despite strong opposition from the executive organs of the state apparatus, which continued to violate the law until 1974, when complaints became so strong that the Congress had to make amendments to it.

Now, all US citizens have access to federal government documents, but each department has the right to limit access to, or close, certain documents. These include documents that should be kept secret in the interests of national security, documents concerning rules within organizations, inter-departmental memorandums, trade-financial information, personal files, medical biographies, geological and geographic information, maps indicating mineral resources, and so on. After the 20-year time limit, the documents from federal departments and services are put into the national archives of the USA and, after 30 years, all without exception become open.

We think we should pay particular attention to the American experience here. It is high time to establish in this country the right to information, which is also glasnost, on a firm constitutional basis.

Georgian Subcommittee Reports on Media Treatment of 9 April Events

90US0083A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
26 Sep 89 p 3

[Account by People's Artiste Rezo Chkheidze, chairman of the Information Subcommittee of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Investigating the Circumstances of the Tragedy Which Occurred on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi: "In a One-Way and Distorting Mirror..."]

[Text] The Information Subcommittee, which incorporated prominent figures of Georgian culture, scholars, journalists and writers, studied the work of the media as fully as possible.

The subcommittee observes that in the first days following the tragedy up to 14 April—the day of the Georgian CP Central Committee plenum which made a political and moral assessment of what had occurred—the majority of newspapers had confined themselves merely to sparse accounts and photographic illustrations from the meetings, spurning analytical publications revealing the essence of the phenomena, in-depth sociological, historical, ecological and political surveys and evaluations and the demands of various social groups, informal associations and the students. The press, unfortunately, was no harbinger of crisis and platform of current and candid debate, expressing mainly in the spectrum of pluralism of opinions the viewpoint of the republic's official leadership. Unable to escape from the atmosphere of briefings doled out from "above," the press failed to learn lessons from the experience of the November events of 1988 and shunned an analysis of the demands of the mass meetings in January, February and March, failing to keep pace with the rapid course of events and glossing over the problems which culminated in the hunger strikes in April 1989. Thus the press in fact absented itself from the problems troubling the nation and was characterized by indistinctness of position.

On Bloody Sunday, 9 April, Georgian television and radio remained silent virtually the whole day. The appeal of the party leadership and government to the working people and youth in the papers was carried after the monstrous

reprisal against the peaceful inhabitants, women and minors. This appeal, like the television speech of Dzh. Patiashvili, former first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, on 8 April, had virtually no effect.

The commission believes that the republic's journalists should have reacted instantly to the tragic events which rocked the whole of Georgia and evoked immense world public comment. However, this was not the case. Under the pressure of censorship the majority of editorial offices were at the start of April either displaying a strange passiveness or attempting to hush up the truth. Yet their duty called on them to remember and always abide by the behests of the great Ilya Chavchavadze, who said: "What, oh my precious pen, is the point of fame for us? What we have served, let us serve anew. We have been given the right to throw to the people the glad tidings. We have been given the right to direct our stern gaze toward the end of evil...."

The newspaper KOMUNISTI carried the first 11-line account "Meeting in Tbilisi" on the hunger strikers at Government House in the 6 April issue. It was followed by a short account with a mention of the so-called "Abkhaz" question. The 8 April issue emphasized in the article "Appeal to Commonsense" that the unsanctioned meetings were complicating social and political life and the work of transport and upsetting the city's work rhythm and reported the demands of the aircraft manufacturing workers of the Plant imeni Dimitrov for the adoption of decisive measures to restore order. In the first issue following the tragedy, for 11 April, KOMUNISTI carried mournful comments, among which the publications of the scholars Vakhushki Kotetishvili and Valerian Advadze, who were the first to call the tragedy in Tbilisi a "stab in the back of perestroika," should be distinguished in terms of emotional attunement and thought. The 12 April issue clearly manifested the duality of the situation: on the one hand it revealed the journalists' objective position and their endeavor to serve the truth and truthfulness in the illustration of events and carried a report from the hospital, the newspaper being the first in the republic to give notice of the casualties as a result of chemical poisoning, a collective letter from staff of the Center for State and Law demanding the creation of a state commission to investigate the circumstances of the tragedy and made an evaluation of the tragedy and, on the other, reflected the pressure of the Georgian CP Central Committee demanding the publication of official briefing blocks with charges leveled against the leaders of the informal associations and emphasis on the anti-Soviet, anti-Russian nature of the slogans and the demands. As N.G. Cherkezishvili, chief editor of the newspaper, told the subcommission, these briefings, whose value criteria, wording, style and mood were amazingly coincident with the wording of the telegrams sent to Moscow and the thrust of the editorial of 14 April in ZARYA VOSTOKA, came to the newspaper editors directly from the Georgian CP Central Committee press center.

After 14 April, the newspaper actively and extensively covered the work of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet

republic commission for studying the circumstances of the 9 April tragedy, carried articles by prominent lawyers, medical practitioners and figures of culture, deputies' inquiries and the protests of artistic unions and the public, revealing all aspects of the tragedy, and published telling photographs. Also effective was the position of the Georgian Journalists Union in the organization and staging of a press conference in Moscow and an open party meeting in the Georgian Journalists Union, at which the republic's journalists expressed a protest against union publications and the Vremya program for biased and unobjective coverage of the April events.

Information forwarded to the commission by the editorial office of the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA explained the nature of the paper's publications in the first days following the 9 April events wholly by the conditions of the curfew and the intensified censorship. It pointed out that only following the lifting of the curfew did the editorial office acquire an opportunity to publish truthful information on the events and also repudiate the unobjective, biased articles of certain publications. Indeed, alongside its latest publications the newspaper repudiated the biased and largely false interpretation to whose propaganda and affirmation it itself, unfortunately, had in the first days applied itself. A typical paradox of our information policy in general was manifested here: an orientation toward the official guideline of the current moment. It was with this substitution for and shifting of responsibility that the publication of, specifically, the editorial article of 14 April, which evoked extensive and negative public comment, was possible.

This article was a subject of the commission's particular attention for several reasons:

1. It was most consistent and strict in developing the propositions of the first, official, version of what happened (to the effect that the April events were the handiwork of adventurers and demagogues, that the peaceful nature of the meetings was an illusion since there was "a real danger of a seizure of power," that the decision to use force was a comprehensively justified political decision and so forth);
2. The article was published on the day of the opening of the Georgian CP Central Committee plenum with the agenda "The Political Situation in the Republic," and an endeavor to anticipate its conclusions to a certain extent and direct them in a particular channel could be seen in this fact alone;
3. The fact of the publication of such an article in the Russian newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA, and not in the Georgian KOMUNISTI (although usually the reader initially finds fundamental evaluations of the most important social issues precisely in the latter), compels the assumption of certain ulterior goals also. As is known, the article was subsequently quoted in detail at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies by Gen I. Rodionov in justification practically of the actions of the military on 9 April, which points in itself to the proximity of the positions of the author (or authors) and the command.

Does it need to be said that the article was essentially not that much in contrast with the tone of the semi-official reports which filled the pages of ZARYA VOSTOKA after 9 April? It should be noted that in its publications of 31 May the newspaper and, then, Editor A. Ioseliani assumed at the sessions of the commission and subcommission their share of the responsibility for publication of the editorial article since they were unable to wholly go against the diktat of B. Nikolskiy, former second secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee. The commission determined that the article had been prepared on the direct instructions of B. Nikolskiy and had been sent by him late at night with M. Guliyev, deputy head of the Georgian CP Central Committee Ideology Department, to the editorial office and that, following the article's appearance in the 14 April issue, the original was asked to be handed back to the Central Committee by B. Nikolskiy. It was learned from A. Ioseliani's information at the commission meeting that N. Popkhadze had initially been involved in the business of conveying B. Nikolskiy's assignment to the editorial office in connection with the publication of this article. This tendentious article, programmed for the former political leadership and the military command and written in the Georgian CP Central Committee, was reprinted by the newspaper VECHERNIY TBILISI. Whereas the Georgian municipal newspaper TBILISI was in the first days following the tragedy able to define more objectively its positions and the viewpoint of the workforce expressed in the current affairs writing of D. Charkviani, N. Mgeladze and other figures of culture condemning the brutality and violence and analyzing the scale of the national tragedy, the newspaper VECHERNIY TBILISI was not always able to do so. On 11 April, for example, the paper reported: "The tragic events and disturbances in Tbilisi which led to human casualties are on the conscience precisely of some self-styled extremist leaders and nationalists. Nationalist demonstrations have begun to take on an antisocialist coloration..." In a submission at the subcommission meeting V. Anastasiadi, editor of the newspaper, explained himself as follows: "...instead of informing, the briefings conducted in the Georgian CP Central Committee, often owing to the highly contradictory statements of the military, frequently disoriented the journalists, about which the editorial office deemed it necessary to speak in the published article 'Will We Learn the Lessons?'..."

While understanding the entire difficulty of the prevailing situation in Tbilisi and the tightness of the "bridle" of military censorship, the subcommission notes that even under these difficult conditions journalists of the republic nonetheless contrived to tell the truth, displaying both courage and honesty. A good lesson was taught in this respect by the republic's youth newspapers.

The issues of MOLODEZH GRUZII for 6 and 8 April present material evaluating current events. Specifically, the publication "Confrontation or Dialogue?" in the 6 April issue describes the Georgian public's reaction to the "Abkhaz letter" and the appeal adopted at the meeting in the village of Lykhny. The article pursues the idea of the need for a stop to be put to fabrications and for the

complaints to be given the cogent, scientifically substantiated response of historians. On 8 April the newspaper published the interview with Merab Mamardashvili, "The Philosopher Does Not Meddle in Politics, But He Should Be Heard Out," which analyzed most important events occurring in the republic, evaluated the activity of the machinery of state and the public movements and examined the positions of the informals.

In the 13 April issue the newspaper carried the report of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Yuriy Rost. Finding himself a witness to the events, Rost, as a true professional, did everything possible to record in documentary fashion what was happening in the square. Having had the photographs developed and having written the text, in which, making no evaluations, he adduced only the testimony of an eyewitness, Yu. Rost transmitted the material to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Inasmuch as for certain reasons the newspaper refused to publish the material, MOLODEZH GRUZII requested that the author put the report and the photographs at its disposal. Signed to press by the editor and the Glavlit, the issue had gone to the newspaper primer, but at four in the morning of 13 April the printing plant was ringed by the military and ordered not to distribute MOLODEZH GRUZII to subscribers and kiosks and the entire edition was seized. Only a day after two sessions of the Georgian CP Central Committee Bureau (following the intervention of Politburo Member E.A. Shevardnadze and G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate of the Politburo) was the paper received only by Tbilisi subscribers.

The newspaper regularly published material on the legitimacy of the decisions which were adopted and the actions of the command and the government.

The issue which carried Ye. Yakovlev's interview (20 April) was published without the permission of the Glavlit. This was evidently closely connected with the fact that literally the day before the issue of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI containing objective reporting and the statement of a group of deputies from the USSR Cinematographers Union had also been published without having been passed by the censor. It could be understood from the analysis of the Tbilisi events made by Yakovlev that the causes of the tragedy went beyond the intra-republic level and were a consequence of the processes which were occurring and which continue to occur in the system, which is actively opposed to perestroika. All the more primitive was it to reduce all this to nationalist demonstrations.

It was clear from the very first days of the tragedy that an anti-Russian mood was being spurred artificially, on the part of certain all-union media included. All the more relevant was the letter in the issue for 18 April from Yu. Bogomolov, K. Gerasimov, V. Semina, A. Anpilov and V. Saneyev "Whom Does This Benefit?" which from the standpoints of the republic's Russian-speaking population debunks the myth of the existence of an anti-Russian mood in Georgia and the oppression of representatives of other nationalities.

The first information concerning the meetings in Tbilisi and other cities of the republic appeared in AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI on 25 March. Subsequent issues reported the "Abkhaz letter," the separatist tendencies of a certain part of the Abkhaz intelligentsia and the abrupt and critical evaluation of this provocative letter by the Georgian public. Following the 9 April tragedy, AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI was the sole republic newspaper not to publish the official false information about the casualties in Tbilisi who died "in the crush". The editorial office took the decision not to publish at all lest it disinform the readers. However, it did publish the paper subsequently, trying to publish information approximate to the truth. In the night of 13 April the newspaper AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI was, like MOLODEZH GRUZII, impounded. This issue had reported the use of toxic substances, the brutal methods of dealing with the mass meeting, the killing of the 25-year-old G. Karseladze and the instances of looting by the soldiers in citizens' apartments on Rustaveli Avenue. In the morning of 13 April both editors of the youth papers, V. Abashidze and M. Balardzhishvili, were summoned to the Georgian CP Central Committee. V. Baklanov, head of sector of the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department, and B. Buyanov, senior official of the CPSU Central Committee, angrily communicated to the editors the inexpediency of their remaining in their positions and raised the question of party proceedings against the editors.

Subsequent issues of AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI constantly carried articles by scholars and figures of culture and demanded the release of the leaders of the informal associations and the summoning to Georgia of foreign medical practitioners and specialists of the International Red Cross. On 15 April the paper presented the initiative concerning the creation of a memorial to those who died on 9 April. The position of the editorial office of the journal KOMMUNIST GRUZII in its evaluation of the April events was very scrupulous. At an open party meeting on 11 April the editorial office evaluated the events for the first time in the moral sense as a tragedy and in the political sense as a crisis, drawing the conclusion as to the need for the resignation of the Central Committee leadership and Georgian government. Journal Editor V. Keshelava conveyed the workforce's decision to N. Popkhadze, secretary of the Central Committee for ideology. The distinctness of the positions and thrust of the newspaper of the "Gruziya-film" film studio—KARTULI FILMI—evokes respect. Even prior to the April events the newspaper was condemning the provocative demands of a certain part of the Abkhaz population. On 19 April it carried the full account of the meeting at the film studio between E. Shevardnadze and G. Razumovskiy and the Georgian public and the appeal to M.S. Gorbachev signed by members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The meetings with the public held on the initiative of KARTULI FILMI evoked great public comment. Particular significance was attached to the meeting with the editorial office of the newspaper of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District—LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA. The account of this meeting, at which the Georgian intelligentsia branded the

falsity and bias of the publications of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA devoted to the tragedy, was published in the issue for 26 April. The newspaper systematically published letters of protest, sharply assailed the unobjective articles in defense of the army insulting to the Georgian people, carried reports from the hospitals and interviews with the casualties of 9 April, revealed tragic pages of public grief and published reports from the press conference with Academician A. Sakharov, who concluded with the words: "Yes, I consider the government to blame...."

Rightly popular with the readers, the newspaper LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO carried in its April issues much interesting material distinguished by a multiplicity of genres and advocacy journalism and imbued with the notion of a revival of national self-awareness. However, it should be said that the first issue put out following the tragedy appeared comparatively insipid. This applies to SAKHALKHO GANATLEBA also.

When analyzing Georgian television programs before and after the 9 April tragedy, the subcommission ascertained trends characteristic of the work of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting in that period:

1. The strong pressure and urging of the Georgian CP Central Committee controlling all programs.
2. Pressure on the workforce by the military command and the virtual occupation of the state committee building as of the evening of 6 April.

On the eve of the tragedy, on 7 and 8 April, calls for calm and appeals to the people by representatives of the public were relayed, in the main, and the topic of the meetings prepared by American journalists and a direct appeal to Gen I. Rodionov by R. Chkheidze for no repetition of the 1956 tragedy and for a way for dialogue with the informal associations to be found were shown.

Following the tragedy of 9 April, television remained chiefly silent. Just three broadcasts went on the air: at 1600 hours a Central Committee appeal to the working people, at 2250, I. Rodionov's speech reporting the imposition of the curfew, the latter having arrived at the studio at 2230 hours and having completed his speech 4 minutes before the time of imposition of the curfew. The broadcasts of 10 April were confined, in the main, to appeals for order and briefings by the city prosecutor and justice minister. Then began reports from Health Minister I. Menagarishvili daily castigating the brutality of the action against the population. The truth slowly began to permeate the broadcasts only as of 11 April. A broadcast relayed from the Georgian Academy of Sciences and devoted to the meeting with the scholarly community of E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Razumovskiy spoke sufficiently fully about the tragedy for the first time and went beyond emphasis of the charges merely against the leaders of the informals and stressed the need for the speediest lifting of the curfew.

On 14 April the health minister reported for the first time the use against the mass meeting of chemical toxic substances. The broadcast on the meeting between E. Shevardnadze and G. Razumovskiy and the teachers and students of Tbilisi State University had great repercussions.

Having acquainted itself with the material prepared by employees of GRUZINFORM, the subcommission notes that the two TASS correspondents working in the Georgian CP Central Committee press center had arrived in Tbilisi on 8 April, several hours prior to the tragedy. The first TASS report on the Tbilisi events was not transmitted via GRUZINFORM, which Director E. Kandelaki reported on 10 April at the meeting in the Georgian CP Central Committee. The republic newspapers did not receive the Central Committee, Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium appeal, like the editorial article in ZARYA VOSTOKA of 14 April also, via GRUZINFORM channels. Following the tragedy, a special team was formed for covering events which operated in the press center which had been set up at the Georgian CP Central Committee. It should be noted that in the majority of cases the material prepared in the Georgian CP Central Committee, Ministry of Health and the commandant's staff was transmitted without right of alteration.

GRUZINFORM's own material of this period was not of an evaluative but purely informative nature. Practically every item was officially stamped in the Georgian CP Central Committee. The sole unstamped material in this period was the article "Only the Truth Is Needed," which was devoted to E. Shevardnadze's and G. Razumovskiy's meeting with the intelligentsia on 10 April.

The diktat of the military command and the one-sidedness of the evaluations and lack of objectivity were manifested particularly fully in publications of the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA—the organ of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District. Reprinting biased information from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and comments and reports from individual authors and publishing "three pen" group reports and numerous reflections, the editorial office attempted initially to conceal the truth, trying to argue the proposition concerning persons "killed in the crush" through the stories of servicemen. In the issue for 13 April V. Denisov, D. Kushnir and V. Drobot emphasized in a report from the streets of nighttime Tbilisi while the curfew was in effect the benevolence of the soldiers and wrote about things being right and proper in the curfew zones and the laughter and jokes at the guard posts, falsifying the tragic reality and reporting nothing about the killing of G. Karseladze and the wounding of a 13-year-old boy.

The newspaper was generous in granting space for anti-Georgian articles, reprinted A. Abramkin's article from LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, organized a series of responses to it and went further, creating the lengthy treatise of Col Ya. Pavlov "Only the Truth Will Remove the Questions," which was carried in four issues of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA starting 10 June and which was aimed against the truth, Georgia and its deputies.

Although the author announced that he intended going deep into the causes of the tragedy, he reported nothing about the USSR MVD special squads' use of chemical toxic substances, the particular brutality when breaking up the demonstration, the persecution of women and the heroic exploit of the policemen in defense of the peaceful population, who for some reason or other were ascribed to the general list of servicemen casualties. Ya. Pavlov wrote: "Incidentally, E. Shevardnadze and G. Razumovskiy were in Georgia at this time. They were, naturally, au courant as concerns the decrees adopted by the republic leadership. But for incomprehensible reasons the entire responsibility for the imposition of the curfew was for some reason or other entrusted to Col Gen I. Rodionov." The allegiance of a subordinate to his general, who had come to Georgia from Afghanistan, can be understood, but the journalist's deliberate falsehood slandering members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo is manifestly amoral. In Ya. Pavlov's concoction the facts are suspended, there are unconcealed insults leveled at USSR people's deputies and the present party leadership of the republic and the people who took part in the meetings are called "drunkards and drug addicts".

Garbling not only Georgian names, sayings and the facts, Ya. Pavlov shuns nothing, relying on the testimony of "eyewitnesses" who saw in the square empty bottles, syringes, vials, drug addicts and drunkards and distorts the meaning of events. The facts, however, testified that of the items removed from the square on five trucks were women's shoes and purses, sheet music and books, textbooks and prayer books, "Borzhomi" bottles and poetry exercise books. And that the tragic April of 1989 bore off 20 lives and caused severe poisoning in more than 4,000 persons and did irreparable harm to people's mentality and the cause of perestroika. Attempting to whitewash the army and the commander to the utmost, he engages not only in a juggling of the facts but also openly drags in lies, accusing G. Gumbaridze, T. Gamkrelidze, I. Menagarishvili and others of lack of objectivity.

Militant malice, tendentiousness and a complete lack of objectivity are also manifested in Ya. Pavlov's subsequent serialized feature carried in LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA from 30 June through 6 July. The new anti-Georgian series of lengthy articles "Let Us Bestow on One Another a Smile" appeared in the paper despite an official warning by a commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies for a withholding of publications devoted to the 9 April tragedy until the commission had completed its work. Shamelessly employing words from the well-known requiem in memory of the deceased, Ya. Pavlov "bestowed" on the readers another malicious treatise of "news," "reflections" and insults directed against the Georgian people in daily five-column pages. Unquestioningly following orders, betraying professional ethics, ignoring the invitation to dialogue of the Georgian Journalists Union and criticizing articles of the republic press—of the newspapers LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO, ZARYA VOSTOKA, MOLODEZH

GRUZII and others—LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA deliberately propounded anti-perestroika propositions and published material insulting to the Georgian people. And the commander ignored the call of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet commission, did not receive Academician Sakharov, calling him a "private individual," and did not even attempt to excuse himself for the reprisal meted out under his command, yet the tragedy which occurred in Tbilisi was an example of struggle against democracy, and it is possible in any part of our country.

People's tragedy was intensified even more by the all-union campaign directed against the Georgian people and unleashed by Central Television and the press.

The commission, like the entire Georgian people, was incensed by the first TASS report on the "casualties in Tbilisi who died in the crush," which subsequently began to do the rounds of many papers, the sugary sickliness and half-truths of the reporting of I. Fesunenko on the Vremya program, the truncated interviews with representatives of the Georgian public and the outrageous lies in the reporting on a briefing from the Dzerzhinskaya Division, at which there was not one single Georgian representative. The commission was angered by a 29 April item in the Vremya program, which reported persecution and threats in Tbilisi leveled at the wives and children of servicemen. The central press rubbed salt in the wounds deliberately, as it were, and incited a people deep in mourning to recklessness. Particularly successful here was a military paper—the organ of the USSR Defense Ministry—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Whereas PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and other publications confined themselves merely to sparse information doled out from above, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA transgressed all conceivable standards of falsehood. The baton of lies was taken up by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA, SELSKAYA ZHIZN, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA.... Even such a publication as ARGUMENTY I FAKTY was not on top of things and in the issue for 16 April quoted in answer to the question: "What chemical substances were used in Tbilisi on the night of 8 April?" the reply of an employee of the USSR MVD press service, who remained incognito: "The internal troops used only special tear gas substances, which are used by the forces upholding law and order," remaining silent about the use of CS gas, the thousands of people poisoned and the barbaric and brutal reprisals against the peaceful population. The first information concerning the use of chemical weapons forced its way into PRAVDA on 19 April. However, the most immoral and scandalous example of shamelessness and falsehood was the publication of TASS correspondent V. Yegorov in PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA of 27 April. Writing as an eyewitness to the events, V. Yegorov told the young readers that it was painful for him to see "that the victims of the tragedy were elderly women and young schoolgirls who had found themselves through some people's evil wishes at the epicenter of the confrontation. To whose benefit was it that grown men had placed them in front of them as a protective barrier against the military ranks? I

can imagine the feelings of the young officer who before my very eyes tried to save a young Georgian girl and received from her compatriot a blow against his legs from a heavy club.... The local papers subsequently wrote that that night the soldiers had used not only nightsticks and tear gas (I saw this myself) but also engineers' spades. It is hard to believe this, but in an embittered crowd spurred on by hysterical cries everything is possible." V. Yegorov not only was not an eyewitness to the events and not only lied to the children, having arrived in Tbilisi on 13 April, but he betrayed the professional commandment of service of the truth, falsified the utterances of Georgian figures and tendentiously and falsely arranged material aimed at kindling inter-nation strife. The commission and the Georgian public raise the question of the advisability of the removal from the press organs of such false witnesses and falsifiers. Analyzing the material of the central press and television devoted to the Tbilisi events, the subcommission believes that the media engaged, in the main, in purposive disinformation, attempting to fan the flames of inter-nation discord, warding off the blow of criticism from the actual initiators and organizers of the mass reprisal against innocent people and betraying their professional duty of service of the truth. Having encountered the deformation of the truth in the distorting mirror of press bias against a general background of programmed falsehood, the subcommission, like all the inhabitants of the republic, notes with particular gratitude and respect the civic courage of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, which was the first to breach the profound wall of tendentiousness, the publication NEDELYA, the authors of the program Vzgl'yad and Do i posle polunochi, the exploits of A. Sakharov, B. Vasilyev and Yu. Rost, who shot a photographic record of the tragedy, the journalistic investigation of I. Gotsiridze and the propaganda work here in the country and overseas by T. Gamkrelidze, A. Bakradze, E. Shengelay, L. Gogoberidze, G. Lordkipanidze, N. Natadze, R. Tabukashvili, M. Kokchashvili, M. Khananashvili, D. Charkviani, O. Chiladze, Ir. Shengelay, Z. Tsereteli, R. Esadze, G. Pandzhikidze, N. Gelashvili and many others who did everything possible to bring the Georgian people's pain closer to all progressive forces.

The subcommission deemed it necessary to ascertain all the covert and manifest causes impeding the dissemination of correct information concerning the Tbilisi events. A typical illustration of what has been said was the removal of A. Golovkov's article "9 April" from the issue of OGONEK (the material was subsequently carried in MOLODEZH GRUZII). In his letter to Georgia published in ZARYA VOSTOKA V. Korotich, editor of the journal OGONEK, communicated the following: "When censorship stops such material as the truth concerning the events in Georgia, I am afraid not because it is we who will not be having our say. I fear the forces attempting to halt the process of ascertainment of the truth...."

This process of hushing up the truth was also manifested in an interview with USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov at a press conference in Cinema House which was carried in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in the 11 June issue. The

USSR defense minister maintained that none of the casualties in Tbilisi was the victim of poisoning, although there are official findings by competent specialists. The identical nature of the wording and expressions of the minister and Gen I. Rodionov on other questions also referring to the decision of the republic government to commit troops and glossing over the fact that this decision was not solely the prerogative of the republic was astounding.

Having acquainted itself with the activity of the correspondents of the central newspapers in Georgia, the subcommission ascertained the fact of the existence of editorial scissors, substantial cuts and the tendentious correcting of material transmitted to the editorial offices, from which material information discrediting the army had been removed. The correspondents experienced double pressure—locally, on the part of the Georgian CP Central Committee and V. Baklanov, head of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department, who maintained repeatedly that not a line would appear in the central papers without his stamp of approval, and in Moscow, on the part of the CPSU Central Committee, which gave the editorial offices the guideline of printing material from Georgia by taking as the basis only the TASS bulletins.

Thus was a thick wall of bias and distortion of actual reality erected.

This is what LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's correspondent in Georgia, E. Yeligulashvili, reported in this connection.

"A report on the Tbilisi events and their true meaning was transmitted to LITGAZ on 10 April at 11 o'clock, Yu. Rost's material at 4 o'clock. Both authors stipulated that no corrections be made. At 9 o'clock I called the editorial office and learned in the evening that the issue would run editorial material, which had used: a piece of the material I had prepared on the events in Abkhazia, a tailpiece from my report and information transmitted by TASS. Yu. Poroykov, deputy editor of the newspaper, who produced the issue, reported that my material and Yu. Rost's report had been removed following two calls from the Georgian CP Central Committee recommending against their publication. In addition, Yu. Poroykov said, an instruction was given on the Monday morning, 10 April, at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee for the Tbilisi events to be covered per the TASS version."

Collating what has been set forth above, the commission notes that the mirror of the press reflected the blunders and shortcomings of all ideological work both at the center and in the republic and clearly displayed the reluctance and inability of certain officials to listen to alternative opinions, finding ways toward constructive solutions in a dialogue with all social groups. The analysis revealed that the administrative-command style is still very much alive and that attention to the nation's interests, problems and hopes is having a hard time becoming established.

Having studied and analyzed the work of the media, the subcommission observes:

1. Up to 15 April the republic press was just as dramatic, contradictory and complex as the entire political situation. It reflected the diktat of the party leadership and devotion to the unthinking execution of official guidelines. However, even under the conditions of national grief, psychological stress, the curfew and the pressure of censorship journalists' courage and positions were revealed. Many journalists attempted to truthfully reveal the causes of the tragedy and formulate correct creative and professional reference points in service of the truth.

2. Before and after the 9 April tragedy CPSU senior Central Committee officials in Georgia (V. Baklanov, V. Buyanov and the group of correspondents from Moscow) participated actively in the preparation of tendentious material in defense of the former leadership of the republic and the army and determined the one-sided and unobjective thrust of the briefings, the press center and the headquarters set up at the Georgian CP Central Committee. They made every effort to prevent the truth about the Tbilisi tragedy leaking out, directing the blow of criticism only against the leaders of the informal associations.

3. The subcommission notes the weakness of the civic position of the editors of the newspapers ZARYA VOSTOKA and VECHERNIY TBILISI—A. Ioseliani and V. Anastasiadi—which was revealed particularly in the fact of publication of the article of 14 April "It Is Our Duty To Return Calm to Georgia". Considering the fact that both newspapers are published in Russian and are disseminated outside of the republic, it is difficult to evaluate the negative impact of these publications on the shaping of unobjective opinions concerning the events in Tbilisi on the scale of the whole union.

4. Having studied the publications of the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA—the organ of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District—the subcommission emphasizes their anti-democratic, anti-internationalist thrust and notes the editorial office's endeavor to kindle inter-nation discord and reluctance to objectively reflect the social and political life of the republic. The subcommission raises the question of the dismissal as editor of the newspaper of V. Martynyuk.

Journalists Denied Access to Ukrainian People's Congress

90UN0071A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian,
9 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by S. Ganichev, M. Derimov, and V. Lukyanenko: "Why We Did Not Carry Out Our Editorial Office Assignment"]

[Text] The founding congress of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika convened yesterday. However, we shall be unable to tell our readers about its sessions firsthand. PRAVDA UKRAINY's correspondents were not admitted to the congress.

The start of journalist accreditation was set for 1200 on 7 september. We were at the appointed place on time. Our

colleagues had already assembled there, but had not succeeded in finding the persons in charge of accreditation. Understanding that all sorts of organizational mix-ups can occur, everyone waited patiently. Finally, Press Bureau Chief L. Karnaukhov came out to us and announced: Those who had previously sought an invitation would be accredited first, and the rest would receive no answer before 1600.

After 1600, decision in the matter was again postponed—this time until the end of the press conference scheduled for 1800. Inasmuch as many of our colleagues had been put in the same position, we naturally laid no claim to a special attitude toward ourselves.

However, it became clear at the press conference that the congress organizers' attitude toward PRAVDA UKRAINY was special anyway. With almost their first words, many organizational committee members felt it necessary to attach insulting labels to our newspaper, and to deeply offend and then even insult those representing it in the pressroom.

The reason for this attitude was made quite plain: PRAVDA UKRAINY's position with respect to their statements and actions is displeasing to the founders of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika [NDU]. During recent months, our newspaper has informed the republic's public of what was being said and done at certain NDU conferences and rallies, and has given a principled evaluation to what was seen and heard. This is precisely what has caused the movement founders' displeasure.

Anyone has the right to express disagreement with the newspaper's position, and to express a critical opinion of it; on principle, however, and argumentatively, not the

way it was done by the press conference organizers: They turned everything upside down, declaring that the newspaper, not the rally orators who have been spreading the poison of confrontation and enmity, is sowing the seeds of evil by reporting on these extremist displays.

The question arises: Do the congress organizers truly adhere to pluralism of opinions when they tolerate only such variety in positions as pleases them?

In our view, this is totally inconsistent, not only with the principles of glasnost and democracy, but even with words uttered at the press conference by V. Donchik, one of the NDU founders, to the effect that confrontation is unnecessary, and that the Rukh [not further identified], by its ideologists' intentions, contains no sort of confrontational base.

In reality, a confrontational tone was set, and obvious discrimination was displayed against those with differing ideas. It was impossible to ask all of the questions that interested us and calmly write down the answers. People who obviously had not come into the pressroom for professional journalistic work built up an emotional tone. They made their appearance, by the way, after the journalists' credentials had been carefully checked. With the help of these people, the press conference organizers essentially turned the conference into a rally.

The organizational committee's decision, passed on to us by Press Bureau Chief L. Karnaukhov, became the undisguised obstruction's natural conclusion: Deny accreditation to PRAVDA UKRAINY's journalists. According to Karnaukhov's words, moreover, the decision had already been made in the morning.

To what extent all of this is democratic, and to what extent it is in the spirit of glasnost—we leave to our readers to judge.

Latvia's History Outlined; Claim of Former Sovereignty Rebutted*18001654A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 89 p 2*

[Article by special correspondent L. Nikitinskiy: "Between the Past and the Future"]

[Text] I have known Old Riga for a long time, so as I stepped down from the train, I searched for obvious changes and signs of crisis. However, the outer life of the city was serene, peaceful and comfortable, just like a year, two years, ten years ago. The streets had possibly become even more favorable to visitors, accentuatedly favorable, and the soft accent of the Latvians had acquired features of ideal correctness. It was only after I had spoken with a lot of people, gone to meetings and chatted in the evening near the famous Freedom Monument that I began to detect the tension which reigns here.

There is a phenomenon in nature where storm clouds begin to gather on the horizon, but it is still impossible to foretell whether the thunderstorm will blow over or strike directly overhead. This is how the sky looks over the Pribaltic at the moment. It is not cloudless. However, I only experienced something like fear once; on a Sunday at a meeting when a group of "Russian-speaking" people, as the phrase has been coined here recently, surrounded me in a tight circle and a fiftyish-year-old activist began questioning: "And what nationality are you?"

Oh, my dear woman, there is no need for you to scorch my "suspicious" beard with your angry eyes. We are all of one blood. Of one blood but, apparently, of very different convictions. But whereas you believe all of mankind belongs to the "fifth column", I have always considered its existence disgraceful.

The nationality of the person whose hand I am shaking does not interest me. All people are brothers, and I will never be dissuaded from this viewpoint. However, in the light of recent events, I am coming to the conclusion that my former cosmopolitan views were one-sided. The national question has a "minus" sign and a "plus" sign. If a brother does not want to make a show of his national origin, no one has the right to ask him about it, much less form his own crazy conclusions on it. But if another brother emphasizes that he is in fact Russian, Latvian, Jewish, or God knows what, if he wishes to be proud of his blood, then he has the right to do so.

However, there is one important reservation: no right should be abused. If a Latvian wants to call himself Latvian and not a "representative" of a supernatural "new community", God be with him, this cannot be considered nationalism. Nationalism is not national pride but self-conceit, caddish and senseless in its very nature, when a person of any nationality considers it a mark of highest quality. And when he considers another nationality a mark of inferior quality, this is chauvinism.

We are obliged to fill our minds with a danger which conceals within it the dynamite of international relations.

Nevertheless, in Latvia today, along with the phenomena of normal national self-consciousness, we encounter signs of not only nationalism but also chauvinism. When they clash, two powerful waves create a great deal of foam. In any case, you no longer see anyone here with the word "occupant" written in Latvian or the word "fascist" pronounced in Russian.

The idea of Latvia's sovereignty "right up to..." is being discussed very legally not only at street meetings, but also at the level of republican organizations and in the local press. The sharp polarization of opinions surrounding this basic issue resulted in the creation of the People's Front of Latvia (PFL) and Interfront (IF) last fall. Whereas the majority of Latvians and a small number of "Russian-speaking" intelligentsia follow the first, a significant number of the working class is ready to rise up under the banner of the second in the event of a crisis.

Interfront is responding to the actions of the People's Front with the threat of a strike at the enterprises, many of which are completely "Russian-speaking". However, in the words of one of my interlocutors, who is Russian by the way, the IF is more like a "child of fright". Nevertheless, completely justified fear for one's own status and one's future cannot be substituted for a political position, therefore "internationalism" is more often compared with nationalistic extremism. I place this word in quotes because this "internationalism" is a completely dogmatic and often just as extremist trend.

The moderate leaders of the People's Front, who constitute the majority, are definitely not calling for withdrawal from the USSR in the small hours of next Friday morning. Understanding the colossal complexity of the problem, they consider the achievement of Latvia's sovereignty a program designed for more than one decade. However, a more extreme wing in the form of the MNIL, the Movement for National Independence of Latvia, is affiliated with the PFL, which also has its advocates among the Latvians.

It is the MNIL which is currently conducting a campaign for registering citizens of the Latvian republic, who lived there up to 1940, and their descendants. The leaders of the movement propose that the "citizens of Latvia" then gather at a congress and decide its future. In essence, based on the illegality of the well-known Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, it is proposed to simply cancel those fifty years which Latvia existed as a Soviet republic and "jump" back to 1940.

This position is not simply vulnerable, it is in my opinion stupid. If we follow the logic of the MNIL, we could return to the time of the Livonian War or even further with the same success. This is a blind alley. History is not an amateurish chess game in which the pieces can be returned to their former positions and a new move made.

We must come to a sensible understanding of what the right of the people to decide their own fate represents. Despite the fact that this right was consolidated in the Constitution of the USSR from the moment of its creation,

it had not entered anyone's head until recently that this is more than a formal declaration. Of course, the legislator is not concerned with how this right is realized. The very first word uttered aloud about this caused a storm of protests at an emotional, gut level. The meaning of what was happening simply did not enter the heads of those who programmed the version of many years of propaganda concerning the impossibility of conflicts in the "united family of peoples".

Nevertheless, the right of Latvia, like other republics, to withdraw from the USSR does not need any acknowledgement, it flows from the very idea of a federal government, which we, admittedly, have never in fact been. However, the problem is complicated by the fact that the nation cannot define itself other than in conjunction with its historical territory; there are no uninhabited islands for this. In addition, up to half of the population of the Latvian SSR is currently "non-indigenous", and in some cities significantly more.

Of the two fronts, Interfront insists on immediately carrying out a referendum concerning the question of withdrawal of Latvia from the USSR. This referendum will more likely have a negative response if all the inhabitants of the republic participate in it, both "indigenous" and "non-indigenous". For its part, the PFL, taking advantage of its influence in the Supreme Soviet of the republic, is gradually tending toward restricting the rights of "migrants" in resolving the question of Latvia's future fate.

In August, a law concerning elections was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR according to which citizens living in the republic for at least five years have the right to be elected to the local Councils, and those living in the republic for at least ten years to the Supreme Soviet. The PFL newspaper "Atmoda" (awakening) published the draft of a law concerning citizenship according to which it is proposed that only those who have lived in the republic for at least ten years have the rights of a citizen of the Latvian SSR.

It is easy to imagine what a tempest these actions aroused in the Russian-speaking population, who justifiably see this as an attempt to discriminate their rights as USSR citizens. Analyzing the question from the legal point of view, it must be acknowledged that any conditions concerning "the right to a permanent way of life" contradict the USSR Constitution and are illegal. The Supreme Soviet of the republic is attempting to place the cart in front of the horse: in order to adopt its own laws in contradiction to the laws of the Union, the republic, if we follow this logic, must first withdraw from this union, and not vice versa.

But this brings us to a more complex question which, as far as I am aware, does not have an analogy in world practice. Do only the Latvians and those people of other nationalities living here have the right to decide the fate of Latvia? Including those who arrived here yesterday? Or one year ago? Or ten years ago, as is proposed in the draft of the law concerning citizenship?

These are questions which are easier to ask than answer... At least the USSR Constitution of 1977 (Article 72), declaring the right of each union republic to withdraw from the USSR, does not provide an answer to these questions.

While discussing the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the "Situation in the Republics of the Soviet Pribaltic", many people in Latvia today recall "the right to self-determination". Others add "right up to separation". But at this juncture, it is important not to succumb to emotions. The current economic situation in the Latvian republic does not provide objective prerequisites for its withdrawal from the USSR.

Latvia has essentially no raw material or energy base of its own. Ninety-three percent of fuel, 90 percent of ferrous and 100 percent of non-ferrous metallurgy and 77 percent of chemical and petroleum products are imported. Within the framework of the national economic complex of the USSR, the republic imports (in percentages to that which is consumed) a total of 48 percent and exports (in percentages to that which is manufactured) 44 percent of the volume of industrial production. The number of Latvians employed in the republic's enterprises and organizations in 1987 was only 47.6 percent of the total number of blue and white-collar workers, and this number was 38.1 percent in industry and construction. What does Latvia expect if it isolates itself as an independent state?

The leaders of the MNIL refer to the fact that up to 1940, small bourgeois Latvia was a flourishing state, but all at once we are catching up with Finland in skips and jumps. Not suddenly! Up to 1940, Latvia successfully traded on the foreign agricultural market. Now the situation is different. All solvent countries, apart from us, are already eating their fill. In Europe the sausage is as abundant as firewood in the forest, and no one will pay Latvia's exorbitant prices. Of course, there are international powers who will be willing at first to feed the newborn state from a baby's bottle, but how long can it be maintained on sops? And how will we be able to pay for this?

I am not sure that, in this situation, the trend toward withdrawal from the USSR will find support from the majority of Latvians. Some of the PFL and MNIL leaders, in particular, have no objection to acquiring political capital by speculating on the idea, which is not supported by realistic programs, of the rapid isolation of Latvia, which has the greatest hypnotic power for the Latvians. But already, according to some evaluations, this false catchword is beginning to lose some of its power. The hypnotic dreams are giving way to common sense.

The mutual refusal of the two "fronts" to hold a constructive dialogue is having an extremely detrimental effect on the situation in Latvia.

But we must talk about something. You cannot tear off the Russians, or the Poles, Belorussians or Jews, living in Latvia like a page from a calendar. Right behind the self-determination of the Latvian people stands the issue of the self-determination of the Russian-speaking people in

Latvia, where they do not have their historical territory, but where they are in fact living. We must become familiar with and think about the entire series of complex problems associated with citizenship, rights and guarantees of individuality, state language, etc. But, in turn, all these questions can only be discussed in a single language: a humanitarian one. However, the leaders of both fronts generally act as though Latvian words are directly untranslatable into Russian and vice versa.

Yes, the Russians in Latvia (for we are mainly talking about Russians) are in a trap. They came here forty, twenty, ten, five years ago as the citizens of a united state, frequently by invitation of those same enterprises and organizations of Latvia, and during those years have made a significant contribution to the development of its industry. And now suddenly it transpires that they are guests and it is implied that they should not move the furniture unless the hosts requests it.

No one is driving them out of here, by the way. In my opinion, there is no discrimination against Russians in Latvia at the level of official politics and legislation. But at the domestic level, a certain amount of alienation is unavoidable. As a result the difficulties of adaptation to different customs and lack of opportunity or desire to master a foreign language, "non-indigenous" inhabitants can in fact turn out to be "people of inferior quality". And this danger increases as the degree of Latvia's isolation increases.

Somewhere in the ancient books I came across an aphorism which is surprising in its poetic accuracy, "Our fathers ate sour grapes, but it is our teeth that are set on edge." Yes, this trap is the last blind alley in the labyrinth. A "mine" set five decades ago is revealing its terrible rusted metal. Any careless movement threatens its explosion and detonation throughout the entire country and the whole world. But we cannot cover it with sand and run away: do we really want to leave this dangerous inheritance to our children?

In the hierarchy of human values, only morality is placed higher than freedom. And in turn, it is completely derived from and comes down to the fact that the freedom of another person, another state, cannot be placed lower than our own. This simple thought, by the way, belongs to the "Kaliningrad" philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Commission on 1940 Events in Estonia

Report on Findings

90UN0124A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 11 Oct 89 p 3

[Speech by Deputy A. Kõorna, chairman of the Commission for Elaboration of the Historical-Legal Assessment of the Events Which Took Place in Estonia in 1940, at the 11th Convocation, 13th Session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, held 10 October 1989]

[Text] Esteemed deputies!

On 20 July of this year, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a decree:

1. To ratify the body of the commission for elaboration of the historical-legal assessment of the events which took place in Estonia in 1940.
2. To allow the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet legislative propositions commission, international relations commission, and foreign affairs commission to consider the proposals and conclusions drawn by the commission formed on the basis of the decree.

Citizens' numerous appeals to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium demanding that the 1940 events in Estonia be clarified served as one of the reasons for the creation of the commission. Statements came to the Supreme Soviet Presidium signed by over 435,000 people.

The commission comprised 19 experts, primarily historians and lawyers, acknowledged specialists on the history of 1940.

The commission familiarized itself with all historical research both in our republic and beyond its borders, with supplementary archival materials, as well as with eyewitness testimony of participants of the 1940 events, and the materials reflecting these events published in the press. The legal assessment of these events stems from the historical assessment made on the basis of the analysis of these materials. In its subgroups, the committee also held consultations with other specialists; during the course of its work, new materials and reminiscences of eyewitnesses, etc. came to the Supreme Soviet.

In its work, the commission could use the materials of the expert commission created on 27 July by the Presidium of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, and rely upon on its evaluation. It should be noted that the conclusions of the Academy of Sciences commission were approved by the Estonian Academy of Sciences on 12 September and published in the press on 22 September. I think that many deputies are familiar with them.

As a result of the commission's work, an historical reference work was prepared, with numerous copies of historical documents and the commission's decision attached to it. Seventeen of the commission's 19 members signed the decision. Two commission members, E. Cherevashko and V. Chetvergov, did not participate in its work. Both the historical reference work and the documents have been turned over for translation and copying, and in light of this, it was simply technically impossible to present it to the deputies for close examination.

Now on the essence of the problem.

Relations between the Estonian Republic and the Soviet Union from 1920-1939 were regulated by a system of treaties based upon the recognition of the right of nations to free self-determination, and the Tartu peace treaty (2 February 1920).

Unfortunately, relations between the two countries changed sharply after the conclusion between the Soviet

Union and Germany of the non-aggression treaty of 23 August 1939. The secret supplemental protocol to the pact divided Eastern Europe into the states' spheres of interests, relegating Estonia to the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, and allowing here the opportunity for territorial-political reorganization.

On 25 September 1939, Stalin informed Hitler of his intention to resolve the problem of the Baltic states in accordance with the protocol of 23 August, and that he awaited certain support in this matter from the German Government. From the Estonian Government, Stalin's leadership required conclusion of a pact for mutual assistance together with the stationing of Soviet armed forces within the territory of Estonia. The demand was accompanied by a show of force (Soviet military ships repeatedly invaded the internal territorial waters of Estonia; on 25-26 September, massive flights of Soviet aircraft took place over the territory of Estonia; concentrated on the border from Narva to Pechor were up to 20 infantry divisions, tank and artillery subdivisions, then came the military provocation [the sinking of the Soviet steamship "Metalist"], and direct threats to use force [on 24 September, V. Molotov recommended to K. Selter, Estonian minister of foreign affairs, that he compromise with wishes of the Soviet Union in order to avoid anything worse, and not impel the USSR to use force in order to achieve its goals]).

Under superior military pressure, on 28 September, Estonia was forced to sign an essentially unequal agreement, which despite formally recognizing Estonia's independence, guaranteed the Soviet Union the continued presence of its armed forces (25,000 versus 15,000 armed forces of Estonia). Thus the Soviet Union created additional prerequisites for the implementation of the ultimatum policy of force.

The internal political situation in Estonia spring-summer 1940.

In spring of 1940, the Estonian economy overcame the difficulties accompanying the war which had begun in Europe. The economic situation was stable: Employment was at its highest level of the entire period of the republic's existence; the standard of living approached that of the Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Norway (Finland had been surpassed); there were no strikes.

Without denying the class contradictions and internal political tension in Estonia, as in every bourgeois state in general, it should be acknowledged that within Estonia's internal politics of that time, the dominant conflict was that between the people's democratic aspirations and K. Päts's authoritarian regime. The existence of a democratic opposition is evidenced by the State Duma of 1938, and the elections to organs of local self-management in the autumn of 1939, where opposition candidates received more votes than did supporters of the K. Päts regime. The CPE [Communist Party of Estonia] took this into consideration; the task of establishing Soviet power was not put into its appeal, rather, the achievement of democratic freedoms, the improvement of the material conditions of

working class, the creation of a new Government. However, it would be incorrect to see in these democratic demands, as is unfortunately done in historiography, an automatic preparedness to establish Soviet power and enter into the Soviet Union. Thanks to a united front with the left socialists, the CPE had fairly strong influence in the majority of trade unions and in other workers' organizations. A portion of the intelligentsia also supported the ideas of socialism. It was clear, however, that it was impossible to overcome the K. Päts Government and change Estonia's social structure with the forces of the so-called internal opposition. Obviously, the CPE had in mind the Soviet Union's interference in Estonia's affairs, and hoped to thus come to power and gradually make a transition to socialism.

Thus, it can be asserted that neither the economic nor the political situation in 1940, on the eve of Estonia's June events, could confirm the existence of a revolutionary situation here.

The military events in Europe undoubtedly activated the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Estonia felt this as well. If until this time, the Soviet Union had dragged out concluding a treaty legally regulating the placement of military bases within Estonia's territory, by contrast, now it suddenly hastened to resolve this matter. The corresponding negotiations were conducted with the tone of an ultimatum, and under conditions of dictation. The treaty was signed on 15 May under conditions disadvantageous to Estonia: The city of Palidiski, the Suur-Pakri and Vyayke-Pakri islands, and Osmussaar were to be given over to Soviet military bases, along with about 100 villages and settled points from which a major portion of the population was evacuated. The prerequisites for accepting a large military contingent were created. With this, the Soviet side noted that in its part of executing the pact it had no claims on Estonia. But by 10 June, the Soviet military bases had been brought to a condition of combat readiness, and on 14 June, the Soviet armed forces executed actions (closure of harbors and outlets to the sea, escort to ports of commercial and fishing vessels located at sea, the destruction of a Finnish passenger airplane in Estonian airspace, shooting at an Estonian airplane, etc.), which corresponded to a naval and air blockade, and which the London convention signed by the USSR qualified as an attack (page 2, paragraphs 3-4 of the convention).

On Sunday 16 June at 15:20, Molotov summoned A. Rei, Estonian ambassador to Moscow, and handed him the Soviet Government's note. He demanded that a reply be given within 8 hours and 40 minutes.

The Soviet note was based upon imaginary accusations that Estonia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, had formed a military alliance for attacking the Soviet Union.

V. Molotov introduced the following theses as supporting material for the military danger to the Soviet Union from Estonia:

1. Secret participation in the Baltic Conference in December 1939 and March 1940.

2. On the secret expansion of collaboration of the general headquarters of the Baltic states.

3. The creation of a special military press organ, "Revyu Baltik," in February 1940.

The Soviet Government's accusations were groundless, since in the first place, the treaties among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were open, registered with the League of Nations; the genuine content of these treaties could not have been unknown to the Soviet Union as a former member of the League of Nations (until its withdrawal on 14 December 1939). Secondly, neither the Estonian political nor military leadership had planned at the Baltic Conferences either secret or open attacks on the Soviet Union; the conclusion of a pact on mutual assistance with the USSR did not obligate the Government of the Estonian Republic to declare its treaty on mutual security concluded with the Latvian Republic 1 November 1923. Thirdly, the "Revyu Baltik" was a common newspaper for the three Baltic states, which reflected matters of economy, literature, music, architecture, and history of the three states; it was not secret, but openly sold in book stores and newsstands, and advertised in other newspapers (see appendix 13).

In the form of an ultimatum, the Soviet Government demanded of Estonia the formation of a new Government, and the introduction of supplemental Red Army troops in regions selected by the USSR. The ultimatum was accompanied by an unconcealed threat that if consent was not given by the designated deadline, the troops concentrated on the border would be given the order to cross the border into Estonia and quash any opposition by force.

The treaty system between the Estonian Republic and the USSR had a finely tuned mechanism for peaceful resolution of misunderstandings, disagreements, and disputes. The ultimatum deadline—8 hours, 40 minutes—proves that the Soviet Government had no intention of explaining the accusations presented in the ultimatum, but had submitted the decision for the sake of the policy of force and the immediate occupation of the Estonian Republic. The Estonian Government obediently responded to the ultimatum in the time demanded. Issues of stationing supplemental Red Army troop units had to be decided by the armed forces of both Governments. In fact, this took place on a unilateral basis: Negotiations on these matters were to have begun in Narva, 17 July at 9:00, but the Red Army had already crossed the border at 4:00 Estonian time. Instead of negotiations, Ye. Laidoner was ordered to sign a protocol which fixed supplemental space for the distribution of the 90,000 troop contingent of the Red Army (they encompassed the entire territory of Estonia), a demand for the creation of military commands at railroad hubs and in major postal and telegraph installations, the confiscation of arms from the civilian population, a 2-week flight prohibition for aircraft of the Estonian Republic, etc. And added here was the demand that had come in that day from the chiefs of special troop subdivisions on the transfer of military and civilian objectives to the Red Army.

The international law commission qualified as a military occupation the actions of Stalin's political leadership and the military leadership of the Red Army from 10 June to 17 June, and the incursion of 17 June 1940 (see the convention, definition of attack, article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, 4), and the subsequent state-legal conclusions as legally insignificant.

At the very latest, the formation of a new Government began in the Soviet Embassy in Tallinn on 18 June. The Embassy ignored the fact that the Estonian Government had accepted the ultimatum, and, on the basis of the Fundamental Law, K. Päts came to negotiations on the formation of a new Government. The Embassy, and A. Zhdanov, who arrived in Tallinn 19 June, formed a new Government during 18-20 June. A. Zhdanov pointedly rejected proposals of K. Päts, and the candidacies for the post of prime-minister. The former left socialists, and the members of the so-called "Unity" [Yedinstvo] group directly participated in the formation of the new government. The Estonian Communists were not trusted. Stalin's attitude toward them is characterized in a cynical statement during the negotiations associated with the pact in 1939: If the Communists give you any difficulties, they may be shot.

In A. Zhdanov's scenario, the new Government must come to power as the result of street demonstrations. The corresponding order was issued on the evening of 20 June to Maksim Unt, a staffer at the Soviet Embassy, whom the Soviet Embassy had designated for the role of minister of internal affairs.

M. Unt noted in his autobiography: "Comrade Zhdanov ordered me to organize in one night a rally and a demonstration on 21 June."

The local Communists, who numbered from about 130 to 150 in Estonia, were involved in this. On the designated day, rallies took place in 10 of Estonia's 33 cities, and 2 villages. About 5,000 people participated in the rally on Freedom Square in Tallinn. TASS allows that Soviet armed forces also participated in the rally. I quote: "The appearance on the square of Soviet tanks, soldiers, and commanders was greeted with general rejoicing." (PRAVDA 22 June 1940). The Red Army commander who spoke at the rally was indeed met with applause.

The demonstration of force took place in front of the Kadriorg Palace, after which A. Zhdanov, together with Deputy K. Nikitin and Embassy staffers made an 8-minute visit to President K. Päts, and dictated to him the body of the Government of I. Vares. The new Government was announced over the radio that evening at 22:15. Further regulation of the composition of the Government was also done in concordance with the Embassy of the Soviet Union (see the removal of Minister of Justice B. Sepp. Memoirs of N. Andresen. RAHVA HAAL, 22 July 1989).

A portion of the Estonian people welcomed the new Government, but for various reasons. The democratic mood of the intelligentsia associated with the new Government aspirations for democratization; the poorest

hoped for an improvement in material and social status; the fundamental share of the peasants strove to relieve their burden of debt encumbering their peasant farms; the small farmers and landless peasants wanted to receive land; the Communists saw in it one of the stages in the implementation of their programmed demands. This was confirmed by the numerous rallies and people's meetings, resolutions of labor collectives, and the program documents of the newly created organizations. The people did not know of the backstage affairs of power, and the plans of the Stalinist policy with regard to Estonia.

Along with the Soviet Embassy and army, the Soviet special services also participated actively in the reorganization of the entire state apparatus and the implementation of the Stalinist regime of terror in Estonia. Leningrad Chekists, and citizens of the Estonian Republic who had been arrested and deported from Estonia came here for these purposes.

After 21 June, an attempt was made to formally follow the Estonian Republic Constitution.

The situation changed dramatically after Zhdanov's order that elections for the new State Duma were to be announced and held 14-15 July under conditions in contradiction of the Fundamental Law: Elections were to be held in a period three times shorter than that stipulated by the Law on Elections, and elections were to be held without the legal defense of rights. We note that Dekanozov dictated the same conditions to the Lithuanian Government and Vyshinskiy, to the Latvian Government. Estonian Republic Constitution Articles 30, 68, and 99 were violated by these and other arbitrary acts, along with the Law on Elections to the State Duma, Articles 16 and 27.

At the direct order of A. Zhdanov, the candidacies of those who did not belong to the Union of the Working People of Estonia were withdrawn: At first, they were required to present their pre-election platform in less than 24 hours—the Government gave the order on the evening of 9 July to present a pre-election platform by 14:00 10 July—then the main electoral committee was given the right to eliminate even those candidates for deputy who did not belong to the Union of Working People of Estonia who had managed to present a pre-election platform. The declarations of nomination for 57 candidates were nullified. Twenty candidates refused to be on the ballot under the influence of threat and blackmail. The elections were held under conditions of direct and indirect pressure and threats. Both during the pre-election campaign and during both days of the election, the Red Army demonstratively participated in the events (election districts were guarded by Red Army men; their transportation was used during the elections). According to the reminiscences of many, the electoral instructions were violated and the results of the voting were falsified.

While speaking at a Tallinn rally on 17 July, K. Säre said that the victory in the elections would seem to demonstrate convincingly the people's trust in the Soviet Government and in I. Stalin personally. In the political situation which

came about, it seemed that the issue of establishing Soviet power and of Estonia's entry into the body of the Soviet Union was imminent.

Without having the authority of the people, and not actually being the State Duma—only it had the right to make decisions on matters of state structure—the deputies of the Union of the Working People of Estonia who gathered 21 July 1940 made decisions to change Estonia's state structure which were not based upon the new Government's election platforms or program documents, and even less so on the free exercise of the will of the people of Estonia. Neither a poll of the people nor a referendum was held on the issue of power in Estonia. "Stalin has deceived even more clever and experienced Communists than we Estonian Communists. We were deceived, and we deceived the people, but neither consciously nor intentionally," testifies O. Lauristin, party veteran and secretary of the second body of the State Duma, who expressed agreement with the commission's legal assessment in a 20 September 1989 letter to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Based upon the preceding, the commission notes in its decision that it qualifies as:

—Legally worthless all treaties from 1939-1940 between the Estonian Republic and the Soviet Union concluded after the 23 August 1939 pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, and the pacts' appended secret protocol which unlawfully divided Eastern Europe between two powers and relegated the Estonian Republic to the Soviet Union's sphere of interests, stipulating for this territorial-political reorganizations;

—As an aggression, military occupation, and annexation of the Estonian Republic the foreign policy and military actions of the leadership of the Soviet Union against the Estonian Republic in 1940.

The Leninist Decree on Peace states "The Government (the Soviet Government is in question here—A.K.) understands, in compliance with the legal consciousness of democracy in general and of the working classes in particular, annexation or seizure to be any joining to a large or strong state of a small or weak nationality without the precise, clear, and voluntarily expressed consent and desire of this nationality, independent of when this forcible joining is completed, of how developed or backward the nation forcibly joined or forcibly retained in the borders of the given state." (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, V. 35, p. 14).

The commission concludes that the inclusion of Estonia in the body of the Soviet Union in 1940 was illegal.

Inclusion in USSR Deemed 'Illegal'

90UN0124B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 11 Oct 89 p 3

[ETA report: "Decision of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Elaboration of the Historical-Legal Assessment of the Events Which Took Place in Estonia in 1940"]

[Text] On the threshold of the 50th anniversary of the non-aggression pact concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany 23 August 1939, over the course of 6 weeks, joint declarations with over 435,000 signatures of citizens with electoral rights have come to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, demanding an introduction of clarity to the events of June-August 1940 in Estonia. The declarations express the conviction that the Soviet Union's aspiration for the construction of a law-governed state and the creation of a common European home, based upon mutual trust of peoples, presupposes the establishment of historical truth and justice.

In light of the aforementioned declaration, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium formed a commission for elaborating the historical-legal assessment of the events which took place in Estonia in 1940. The commission familiarized itself with the appropriate materials and came to the following conclusions:

1. Between 1920 and 1939, relations between the Estonian Republic and the Soviet Union had been regulated by a system of treaties, which, stemming from the recognition of the right of peoples to free self-determination, was based upon a peace treaty concluded 2 February 1920 in Tartu. In 1939-1940, with Germany's knowledge, and coordinating its steps with same, the Soviet Union in its relations with the Estonian Republic initiated the realization of legally destructive claims for the division of spheres of interests, and territorial-political reorganization in Estonia, stemming from Point 1 of the secret protocol of the pact concluded with Germany 23 August 1939, doing so in a unilateral order, grossly abrogating all treaties concluded with and ratified by the Estonian Republic.

2. The 23 September 1939 pact on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the Estonian Republic was in effect an unequal treaty, essentially limiting the sovereignty of the Estonian Republic and in fact eliminating its political neutrality with a treaty binding under threat of use of arms, despite the fact that the pact recognized Estonia's neutrality.

An agreement on military bases appended to the pact stipulated the billeting of Soviet armed forces on bases situated within the territory of the Estonian Republic, with the quantity of Soviet armed forces brought in exceeding the numbers of the Estonian Republic armed forces two-fold. Thus the Soviet Union created supplemental conditions for the implementation of an ultimatum force policy.

3. The air and sea blockade against the Estonian Republic later begun by the Soviet Union 14 June, and the subsequent 16 June 1940 note to the Estonian Republic, which made fictitious accusations, and contained an ultimatum demand for the formation of a new Government of Estonia, excluding the procedures specially stipulated in agreements for reconciliation in the event that conflicts and misunderstandings arose, and the introduction of supplemental military subdivisions of the Soviet Union and their arbitrary stationing within the territory of Estonia, qualify as a violation of international law and a

violation of the treaty obligations incumbent upon the Soviet Union, and qualify as aggression against the Estonian Republic.

4. The 17 June 1940 incursion, the military occupation of the Estonian Republic, the gross interference of the leadership and organs of security of the Soviet Union in the affairs of Estonia deprived the Estonian people of the opportunity to manifest their will freely. In order to conceal the aggression from the international community, an attempt was made to lend a semblance of legality. From the viewpoint of international law, the state-legal repercussions which emerged following the military occupation are legally insignificant.

5. At the demand of the 16 June 1940 note of the Government of the Soviet Union, the Government of the Estonian Republic resigned. The composition of the new I. Vares Government was dictated by the staffers of the Embassy of the Soviet Union and A. Zhdanov, member of the higher Soviet leadership who arrived in Tallinn 19 June. President K. Pats ratified the composition of the Government 21 June 1940 under the strong pressure of the representatives of the Soviet Union.

6. At Zhdanov's order, elections for a new body of the State Duma were announced. Statutes of the Estonian Republic Constitution, guaranteeing democracy, were violated during the electoral campaign and on election days, as was the Law on Elections of the Estonian Republic; blackmail was used, the rights of voters and candidates for deputy to legal defense were annulled; all candidates not included in the list of the Union of the Working People of Estonia were illegally removed. The presence within the territory of Estonia of a 115,000 troop Soviet armed forces contingent made the free manifestation of the will of the Estonian people impossible.

7. The electoral platform of the deputies from the Union of the Working People of Estonia did not contain the declaration of Soviet power in Estonia, nor its entry into the body of the Soviet Union. The deputies from the Union of the Working People of Estonia had neither the voters' empowerment, nor the constitutional right to resolve matters of changing the state structure, especially without the formation of the second chamber of parliament and its participation. Neither a poll nor a referendum on the matter of power in Estonia was conducted among the population.

From the viewpoint of international law and the legislation of the Estonian Republic legislation, any consequences of the activity of the State Duma created by illegal means, including changes in the state structure and unification with the Soviet Union are qualified as being legally worthless.

It follows from the aforementioned that the 1940 inclusion of Estonia in the body of the Soviet Union was not lawful.

8. Based upon the aforementioned, the committee notes in its decision that it qualifies;

—as legally worthless all 1939-1940 treaties between the Estonian Republic and the Soviet Union concluded after the 23 August 1939 pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, and the secret protocol appended to it, which unlawfully divided Eastern Europe between two powers,

and relegated the Estonian Republic to the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union, stipulating for this territorial-political reorganizations;

—as aggression, military occupation, and annexation of the Estonian Republic the foreign policy and military actions of the leadership of the Soviet Union against the Estonian Republic in 1940.

Deputy Chairman Yablokov on Supreme Soviet Environmental Politics*90US0068A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 5 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by A. Yablokov, deputy chairman of the Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Utilization of Natural Resources: "Priority—to Comptency"]

[Text] I look upon the work of the current session of the Supreme Soviet with a certain amount of optimism. I would like to believe that the principle of the work itself—the work in the committees and commissions—is not just a procedural decision, but a step in the direction towards admitting the paramount role of the committees and commissions in the work of the Supreme Soviet. No matter how much we criticize the composition of the Supreme Soviet, we must admit that in the committees and commissions people have come together for the most part according to their interests and, for example, that even the Committee on Ecology is significantly better informed on its issues and is more professional than the body of deputies as a whole. And, this means, the opinion of the committees on ecology or science concerning the corresponding sections of one or another draft law should be definitive for the Supreme Soviet.

And it is right that, during discussion of a packet of draft laws last Monday, the floor was given first to the representatives of the committees and commissions, and not simply to everyone who wished to speak. I believe that if we consciously move towards strengthening the role of these structures in the work of the parliament, we will raise both its competency and the quality of its results. However, in order to do this, we must still determine the status of a member of the committees and commissions, his rights and obligations.

For example, in our committee a nucleus is being formed, made up of people who are beginning to get involved in ecology professionally and for government reasons. But there are also, of course, if I may to express myself in this way, "dead souls." To my great regret, Valentin Rasputin does not take part at all in the work of the Committee on Ecology, of which he is a member; he has not been at any of its meetings. Despite the fact that with his whole position and actions he has already shown that this sphere of activity is both significant and important. I know about thirty people's deputies who would like to and would be capable of becoming involved with our problems, but who have remained outside the work of the Supreme Soviet. What are the obligations of members of the committees and commissions, under what conditions can they be called back and replaced or, on the contrary, appointed to the committee for the entire five years of the Supreme Soviet's work? We must determine this, if we are seriously planning to strengthen the role of the working parliamentary structures.

What can I say about the circumstances and atmosphere of the plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet? For two days out of the week, people's deputies can associate freely, can speak about their problems with the chairman of the

Council of Ministers, with any minister, with the president. It seems to me that these are the first relationships of this kind in decades, and this is very important.

What about the Supreme Soviet itself, its members, how they show their worth at plenary sessions; here, it is difficult to give only one evaluation. On the one hand, the Supreme Soviet is distinctly, figuratively speaking, "maturing." It is becoming more experienced in questions of procedure—the deputies already understand that before taking the rostrum with a sore subject, one must glance at the addenda to determine when that sore subject will be the center of discussion. Over their vacations at home, the deputies have seen what is happening locally better than the representatives have, sitting here in the Kremlin. And this has forced them to become more active, and has made a portion of the deputies more radically defined. Incidentally, at the sessions, it is easy to pick them out, working actively and professionally. The portion of the deputies that reacts to almost nothing, that is passive, however, remains significant.

It was because of this that the situation in the first days of the session became possible, when the Supreme Soviet nearly closed the cooperatives. We were, after all, close to adopting a hurried, unreasoned decision, which, I am certain, we would immediately have regretted. We need mechanisms that would protect the parliament from adopting decisions like that one. One of these is—strengthening the role of the committees and commissions.

And about one more of those as of yet undeveloped mechanisms for the operation of the parliament—on our reciprocal connection with the electorate, which should have the opportunity to influence its deputies, and to know exactly where and when draft laws are being examined, how its deputy behaves during their writing, and should be able to help him in determining priority areas in the work of the parliament.

In his pre-election program, every deputy had a solution to the alcohol problems, and where do they stand in the addenda for the session? Thirty-fourth. At this session, we must approve a minimum of two documents on ecology, but for this we need to at least read them to the Supreme Soviet.

I think that the question of creating a mechanism for a reciprocal connection between deputies and their constituencies may be a deciding one for the effectiveness of the work of our parliament.

Goals, Charter of 'Azerbaijan Ecological Union' Society*90US0057B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 14 Sep 89 p 1*

[Draft Charter of the Voluntary Society "Azerbaijan Ecological Union"]

[Text] 1. GENERAL STATUTES

1.1. The Azerbaijan Ecological Union, a republican voluntary society (herein referred to as the Eco-Union

[Ecosoyuz)]—is a self-administering public organization, which conducts its activities in accordance with the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR, the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR, and the present Charter.

1.2. The Eco-Union is one of the forms of citizens' initiatives aimed at the formation of ecological awareness and uniting its members on the basis of facilitating the solution of ecological problems, the war against the consumer attitude towards the environment, and the development of social guarantees for maintaining man's ecological rights and personal rights to a normal living environment.

1.3. The founders of the Eco-Union are: the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for the Preservation of the Environment, the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of National Education, the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Health, the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research] Scientific Production Association for Space Research, the Azerbaijan Republican Hydrometeorological Administration, the Azerbaijan Writers' Union, and the Azerbaijan Artists' Union.

1.4. The Azerbaijan Ecological Society operates in the entire territory of the Azerbaijan SSR.

1.5. The Eco-Union conducts its activities in cooperation with the state, public and religious organizations of the Azerbaijan SSR, the USSR, and all-union and international organizations and funds.

2. GOALS AND TYPES OF ACTIVITIES OF THE ECO-UNION

2.1. The Eco-Union sets for itself the following goals:

(a) active participation in the protection and restoration of the environment, and in the creation of conditions for the preservation and multiplication of natural resources;

(b) to promote the improvement and execution of legislative acts of the Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR, and of international agreements signed by the USSR that deal with environmental protection;

(c) advocating the principle that ecology is a priority in the implementation of economic operations;

(d) participation in the development of progressive environmental technology;

(e) providing the public with trustworthy information on ecological problems;

(f) participation in the work of planning commissions and commissions on land use and environmental protection in the ispolkoms of local Soviets and their organs;

(g) assuring an exchange of information on various levels about the results of the newest studies and various projects that are concerned with ecological problems.

2.2. In order to achieve the goals set down in the Charter, the Eco-Union conducts the following activities:

(a) mobilizes public opinion to reach the Society's goals as set out in the Charter, using appearances in the mass information media, the collection of voluntary contributions, and the collection of signatures on petitions and through other legal means;

(b) conducts conferences, symposia and seminars on ecology, calls upon representatives of Soviet, economic and other organs and organizations in discussions, organizes public monitoring of the execution of adopted decisions, advances initiatives for people's discussions and referenda on ecology, and develops a close cooperation with deputies at all levels;

(c) promotes open accessibility to sources of information, collects, systematizes and analyzes information on environmental protection, creates ecological data bases of information, where necessary sees to the maintenance of the state of the environment on its own power (through its own systems), publishes books, documents and materials on the subject of public action;

(d) issues a periodical informational bulletin on its own activities, and with data on the ecological situation;

(e) conducts independent public examinations of plans and drafts, the implementation of which could have a negative effect on the environment and human health, works toward changing or replacing them;

(f) advances its own candidates in Soviets and other elective organs and to elective positions related to achieving the goals of the Eco-Union;

(g) takes legal action against agencies and individuals whose actions or inaction damages people's living area or health;

(h) provides public protection for its members;

(i) cooperates with the environmental protection agencies of the republic, the USSR and foreign countries;

(j) creates various subdivisions of the Eco-Union—a scientific coordinating council, a press center, a legal defense group, public inspections, and others;

(k) organizes its own economic operations in accordance with the goals of the Eco-Union.

3. MEMBERS OF THE ECO-UNION. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS.

3.1. Individual and collective members enter the Society with equal rights.

3.2. Citizens of the USSR, enterprises, institutions, organizations, creative unions, cooperatives, amateur associations and clubs (with collective member's rights) may be members of the Eco-Union, sharing the Charter and the goals of the Society, participating in its activities and paying members' dues.

3.3. Members of the Society are approved by the Ecological Council and regional chapters, based on written applications from citizens and organizations.

3.4. The amount of entrance and members' fees, the procedure and frequency of their payment are determined by the central organs of the Eco-Union.

3.5. Members of the Eco-Union have the right to:

- participate in all Society events;
- vote on and be elected to elective organs of the Society;
- develop draft documents concerning all aspects of the Society's activities, and contribute them for examination to the Conference or the Ecological Council;
- propose their own programs of action that do not conflict with the goals and principles of the Eco-Union;
- represent the Society within the limits of power set by the administrative organs;
- organize, in accordance with the present Charter and operating legislation, cooperatives, economic-accounting or other types of enterprises (collective members), and participate in their activities (individual members).

3.6. Members of the Eco-Union are obligated to:

- actively participate in one of the Eco-Union's programs;
- conduct their activities on the principles of consolidating the ecological community;
- observe the present Charter.

3.7. Membership will be terminated for the following reasons:

- (a) a written declaration from a Society member;
- (b) by decision of a regional chapter of the Ecological Council, taken in connection with violations of the Charter, chronic non-payment of membership dues, or serious damage done to the Society's authority.

3.8. In the case of a regional chapter's activity conflicting with the present Charter, the Ecological Council has the right to examine the question of the regional chapter's membership in the Eco-Union.

4. CENTRAL ORGANS OF THE ECO-UNION

4.1. The central organs of the Society are:

- (a) the Conference;
- (b) the Ecological Council (in the periods between conferences);
- (c) the Inspection Committee.

4.2. The Conference is the highest administrative organ of the Eco-Union. It is called by the Ecological Council of the Society not less than once in two years. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference are called on the initiative of the Ecological Council, or by the demand of not less than one-third of the regional chapters of the Eco-Union.

4.3. Representatives of the regional chapters and founding organizations of the Society participate with deciding votes in the work of the Conference. Norms for representation and election procedure for delegates are determined by the Conference.

The Conference ratifies the Charter of the Eco-Union and introduces changes in it; approves the Society's budget; hears and approves the operational goals, work plans, and accounts of the Ecological Council and the Inspection Commission; chooses the chairman and members of the Ecological Union, the members of the Inspection Commission and other elective organs of the Society; approves the membership of the Scientific Coordinating Bureau, the press center and the legal defense group, as well as making decisions on issues connected with the activity of the Eco-Union.

The decisions of the Conference are approved by a simple majority vote in the presence of not less than half of the delegates elected to it. Voting procedure is determined by the Conference.

4.4. The time and place of the Conference, its agenda, and representation at the Conference are determined by the Ecological Council.

4.5. The Ecological Council of the Eco-Union is formed by the Conference from delegates of the regional chapters with deciding votes, and by the founding organizations of the Society, which delegate their own representatives (each of the Society's founding organizations may delegate one representative to the Council).

The Ecological Council is elected for the period between Conferences. The number of members of the Ecological Council is determined by the Conference. Members of the Ecological Council and the chairman of the Council may be elected more than once.

The Ecological Council approves the chairman's choice of deputies from the membership of the Council.

The Ecological Council develops its own work plans, the Society's budget and special purpose programs, presents them for approval to the Conference and reports to the Conference on their utilization.

The Ecological Council coordinates the work of the regional chapters and administers the spending of budget funds from the Society's central account.

The Ecological Council approves new chapters of the Eco-Union.

4.6. Meetings of the Council are conducted not less than four times a year. The Ecological Council's decisions are approved by simple majority votes and are valid with participation in the voting by not less than half of the members of the Ecological Council.

4.7. In order to conduct the day-to-day work of the Eco-Union, the Ecological Council can choose from its

membership a Working College, whose number is determined by the Conference. The Working College is subordinate to the Ecological Council in its actions. Any of the members of the Ecological Union has the right to take part with rights in the work of the college.

4.8. The chairman of the Ecological Council is guided in his activities by the decisions of the Conference and the Ecological Council; the chairman and his deputies report regularly on the results of the work at meetings of the Ecological Council.

4.9. The Inspection Commission of the Eco-Union controls the administrative and financial operation of the Ecological council and the state and inventory of material valueables in the Society's account, and reports on the results of its work at the Conference. The Inspection Commission functions on the basis of the Statute on the Inspection Commission approved by the Conference. The chairman of the Inspection Commission participates in the work of the Ecological Council with the right to a deciding vote.

5. REGIONAL CHAPTERS OF THE ECO-UNION

5.1. Groups of not less than five members who have joined the Society as individual members may create regional chapters. The territory of operations for regional chapters need not conform with the existing administrative territorial divisions of the republic.

5.2. The establishment of a local regional chapter of the Eco-Union is registered by the Ecological Council within a month's time, during which the regional chapter of the Society is issued the appropriate documents. The Ecological Council is obligated to register regional chapters whose formation has been conducted in accordance with the Eco-Union Charter.

Regional chapters that have been registered by the Ecological Council are legal persons, retain their own organizational and financial independence, and choose their own financial managers.

5.3. Regional chapters, within the framework of the Society's Charter, are free to choose their forms and methods of operation, and their interior structure.

6. THE ECO-UNION'S FINANCIAL MEANS

6.1. The Society's financial means (the Ecological Fund) are made up of:

(a) voluntary contributions and other dues from citizens, enterprises, institutions and organizations in the republic and outside of it;

(b) entrance and membership fees;

(c) deductions from founding organizations;

(d) income from lecture, economic and other charter functions of the Society.

6.2. The Eco-Union Society holds a central account in the Zhilsotsbank. Funds are credited to account No. [blank].

6.3. All membership dues and income from the activities of regional chapters in accordance with their own programs are credited to the accounts of the corresponding chapters.

All income from republican programs is credited to the Society's central account (the Ecological Fund).

6.4. Regional chapters may transfer funds to the Society's central account, and the Society, by Conference decision, may transfer funds to the accounts of regional chapters. The procedure and conditions for transfers is established by agreement of the Ecological Council and the regional chapters.

6.5. The Eco-Union and its regional chapters, enterprises and organizations are exempt from the payment of taxes, government duties and other collections for the state budget.

7. LEGAL STATUS OF THE ECO-UNION

7.1. The Azerbaijan Ecological Union Society is a legal person.

7.2. Regional chapters enter the Eco-Union with independent legal rights.

7.3. The Eco-Union can open spending and credit accounts in credit establishments, as well as special accounts, can conduct any financial operations, can carry out the construction of necessary facilities, can rent property from private persons, cooperatives, government enterprises and organizations, can conduct trade and other activities in accordance with the present Charter, and enjoys all the other rights and has the all the obligations of a legal person as stipulated by current law.

7.4. The Society's Ecological Council and its regional chapters have a stamp, a press with the image of the Seal of the Azerbaijan SSR, letterhead of an established form, lapel pins and other symbols.

7.5. The Eco-Union may be liquidated by decision of the Conference which—after the satisfaction of legal claims—decides the question of its possessions in accordance with current law.

7.6. The location of the Eco-Union's central organs is the city of Baku.

The Draft Charter is in agreement with the founding organizations of the Eco-Union.

PETITION OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE FOR THE AZERBAIJAN ECOLOGICAL UNION SOCIETY FOUNDING CONFERENCE

We are all very upset by the fact that in Azerbaijan almost no regions or populated areas remain that have not been affected to one extent or another by the ecological crisis. An especially urgent situation has developed in the larger cities—Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad, Mingechaur, where more than 2.5 million people live, and where a large share of the republic's industrial products are manufactured.

The situation is no less complex in rural areas, where the uncontrolled, heartless application of chemical pesticides and mineral fertilizer in cotton fields threatens the health of millions of people, especially children, as the alarming statistics on health show.

In the rivers and lakes, which are the basic source of drinking water, the concentration of lethal chemicals and heavy metals has risen catastrophically. The unique Caspian plays for aid...

Too bitter are the lessons, too deep are the wounds that have been afflicted on nature. They appeal to our consciences, warning us that the process has gone too far, and that if extraordinary, all-encompassing measures are not taken to protect the environment, not only will there soon be nothing left to protect, restore and develop—there will not be anyone left to do it.

Today, only one force exists that is truly capable of averting the impending destruction of the environment, and of preserving what is left—that is the people. Because of all of this, people, fighting for the environment, must unite on the basis of real actions, each person must think out his own concrete part in this difficult battle.

The organizing committee, whose members include representatives of the initiating ecological groups and founding organizations, based on the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR, is creating a self-administering voluntary society called the Azerbaijan Ecological Union, whose founding Conference will take place in the near future.

We appeal to all amateur organizations—ecological clubs, circles, friendship societies, associations, committees, to all citizens who would like to play a real part in solving ecological problems, to join together in a new union.

Here is the address of the organizing committee: 370065, Baku, prospekt Stroiteley, d. 28 "a", kv. 43.

Development of 'Ecological Glasnost' in Media, Society Explored

90US0055A Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 10, Jul 89 pp 60-63

[Article by D.B. Oreshkin, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography, candidate of geographic sciences: "The Phenomenon of Ecological Glasnost"]

[Text] While for many years ecological journalism has not been quite mute, it spoke in a whisper. It is like a break-through here. Incidentally, precisely now, it seems, the period of unnatural talkativeness is bit by bit decreasing to naught. Two years ago, the Mosgorspravka information service found up to 1,000 newspaper excerpts on the "preservation of nature" in a year, but today their number has reduced by 20-25 percent.

What is happening? Are there indicators in this of a revival of administrative pressure on glasnost? Or has the natural fatigue of writers and readers set in and the sweet "forbidden fruit" of ecological exposes has become boring

already? Or maybe it is a question of the structural perestroika and self-organization of this new phenomenon, ecological glasnost?

The answer should not consist of general opinions, but specific analysis. The above-mentioned excerpts from central newspapers, prepared by the neutral Mosgorspravka on an order from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography, serve as material for this.

Newspaper excerpts are easy to categorize and count. It was discovered, for instance, that during 1987-1988 about 35 percent of ecological publications on the average were devoted to the protection of natural waters; 15-20 percent—to general ecological problems, as well as to organizing nature-protection movements and to their experiences, difficulties and rights; about 10-12 percent—to protecting the animal kingdom and the air; about 5-7 percent—to the problems of protecting forests, the operation of preserves and the ecological aspects of chemicalization. Compared to the time of stagnation, not only has the overall number of ecological articles in the press increased, but their thematic correlation has also changed. Previously, articles about animals and the forests predominated. The organizational problems of ecological movements were not raised at all. Although water was written about a great deal, it was nonetheless significantly less than today.

It is interesting that the relative indicators of the "popularity" of subjects are quite steadily maintained, reflecting the inertia of the media's approach to reporting on ecological problems. From the viewpoint of a specialist on the protection of nature, this is a dangerous tendency: much is said about water, but clearly not enough is said about the potential (including genetic) threat of chemical pollution. Articles on radiation danger are very rare in general (according to data for the first half of 1989, the topic of chemicalization began to be encountered significantly often). The number of articles on radioactivity has increased, albeit less steeply. A sign of coming maturity?

Characteristically, in the Western press, according to preliminary observations, the "water" peak has already passed, but the "chemical" and "radiation" topics have just reached a maximum, to the point that foreign tourists refuse to visit Central Asia, fearing food products contaminated with pesticides.

The youthfulness of our ecological glasnost is also reflected in the secondary nature and lack of independence in the selection of topics. The articles appear as though in volleys. As a result, fairly isolated events often receive a great deal of press, while many serious problems remain in the shadows. In 1987, in an interval of a few days, five major newspapers ran articles about the threat to the suburban home of A.N. Ostrovskiy in connection with the construction of a chemical combine. Unquestionably, the memorial warrants attention and protection, but, essentially, the splash of interest in this local topic was provoked by such an arbitrary factor as a visit to the construction site by a group of writers. The rather randomly chosen problems of

the Moscow Zoo, protecting the Losino-Ostrovskiy Preserve, Khortitsa Island on the Dnepr, and many others, generally lacking real significance, received such prolonged publicity in the media. Obviously, the laws of the press are already at work here: a brilliant article provokes a trail of commentaries, and then commentaries on the commentaries, turning an isolated event into a matter of special importance.

Be this as it may, while lances are being broken around Khortitsa, the threat of disappearance of the forests of Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, which are being destroyed by acid rain, is becoming ever more real, being virtually ignored by ecological journalism. Through the mass information media's crystal ball, the little island's problem seems more significant than the destruction of an entire region. This is said not in reproach, but in warning: in striving to catch sight of the more general behind the isolated, ecological journalism inevitably resorts to exaggeration, and if not stopped in time, it is but a step to hysteria from here.

We are all concerned about the fate of the Aral Sea. The party and government have determined large-scale promising projects to save the sea. Construction and water management work to restore the damaged natural balance is now fully under way. In its day, during the discussion of this urgent problem, there were certain costs as well. In the article "The Aral Should Live" (SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 19 November 1987), five great leaders of Uzbek science and culture voiced justifiable concern for the sea's destiny. The authors were full of pathos. Out of 25 paragraphs, there were 23 exclamation marks in the article. Exaggeration! However, the situation is rather critical, and it is opportune to shout out. Fair claims were made against the then Minvodkhoz for organizing an irrigation system which was also a cause of ecological crisis. To this day, this is all true. However, here, in concert, the accusation should be made against this very same department that precisely it left the Aral region without drinking water. It seems like a trifle, but this is already, rather, a juggling of facts. Drinking water is not a quantitative, but qualitative problem. Of the cubic kilometers of liquid which nonetheless burst through Minvodkhoz's traps into the Aral region, there is quite enough for the whole local population to drink and still have water left for ecological needs. Here is the problem: it is absolutely impossible to drink this water. However, not only Minvodkhoz appears to be the main culprit here, but those who, in pursuit of excellent reports, are scattering and pouring more pesticides and chemical fertilizers on the fields than on the average in the country by factors of 20, 30 and even 50. All of these chemicals later mix with irrigation water and drain into the Aral. The lack of a sewer system and the direct discharge of untreated domestic and industrial sewage into the river is not Minvodkhoz's fault either. When we tried to boil tea on a trip along the Syr Darya, the water curdled on the fire like sour milk. The flakes of sediment drove thirst away instantly... However, this was a greeting not so much from the Moscow Minvodkhoz, so much as from the Uzbek and Kazakh agroprom. There is not so much as a word about

this in the article. Yet to make up for it, there is indignation against the generally quite reasonable idea of using water-distillation systems in the Aral region. Is this really just because the idea came from the infamous Minvodkhoz? Exaggeration is far from always apropos.

In court cases in the time of the French Revolution, a questionable method called the amalgam was used. The case of an inveterate criminal, thief or rapist was heard simultaneously with the case of a member of the political opposition. They were placed on the same level beforehand, judged together, and sent to the guillotine together. In a modified form, the amalgam is readily employed by the practitioners of ecological journalism. Two or three other fictitious culprits are added as a makeweight to the real culprit. It seems plausible and often makes it possible to write of one's own losses at someone else's expense. According to A. Pokrovskiy (PRAVDA, 16 April 1988), the shrewd managers who explained the spring cattle plague through the infernal action of a protein and vitamin concentrate (BVK), developed by a plant in Kirishi, acted precisely thus. The amalgam is a far from selfless method, and it is a pity that it is appearing in good articles.

The example with Kirishi, incidentally, well illustrates both the inertia, as well as the spasticity of the course of ecological glasnost. After a sensational article by S. Razin (KOMSOLOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 15 March 1988), waves spread through the pages of periodicals until mid-year. From every quarter where new biochemical industries were being built or planned, there was correspondence about the tense reaction of the population. This includes Volsk in Saratov Oblast (PRAVDA, 10 May 1988), Gudermes in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 5 May 1988), and Zhesart in the Komi ASSR (TRUD, 15 June 1988). Thus inertia is manifested. In addition, the BVK problem, having crowded out solid ecological information of a chemical nature for 3-4 months, somehow ran dry later, having left an unpleasant feeling of incompleteness. Thus, spasticity is manifested, which gives rise to distrust and rumors that the subject was "closed."

Yet another detail is also important. Judging by the aggressive reaction of residents at biochemical plant construction sites, they have firmly grasped the thesis of the danger of BVKs, yet they do not especially believe the opinions and explanations of specialists published later, such as A. Pokrovskiy's article. The unique asymmetry of interpretation of ecological data must be verified: negative information is accepted with a great deal of trust and spreads far more rapidly along the rumor channels, than positive information. Many years of experience teach us not to believe calming assurances too much. Hence the temptation of the opposite extreme, ecological hysteria. Apparently, a reaction to the long years of silence, when smooth words from high rostrums had no relation whatsoever to the realities of daily life, is having its effect. Incidentally, people's reaction to glasnost is a whole, special subject.

It seems, its appearance reflects a very old delusion of domestic journalism to the effect that "the moral right is far above the truth." A young, still quite nice-looking, but already sharp-tongued diktat of the nature preservation demagoguery is arising. The fact that it was born as a reaction to the diktat of the bureaucratic departmental machine may be an explanation, but is not a justification. These phenomena have a common root: the shortage of political culture.

A respected Georgian academician spoke at a scientific session of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography against the Trans-Caucasus railroad project through the Main Caucasus Ridge, which would directly unite the European part of the country with the Trans-Caucasus for the first time, would reduce the trip from Moscow to Tbilisi by 800 kilometers and would unburden the amazingly overloaded passenger flow along the Black Sea. Along with entirely reasonable fears about the large ecological threat that the construction carries for the Caucasus, he appealed to the need to protect the unique animals of these areas: the snow leopard, white-tailed eagle, and others. A purely emotional argument, intended for the unprepared audience. Snow leopards are found in the Caucasus no more often than snow people. Most specialists on mammalian fauna generally assume that its habitat range is limited to Central Asia. Open the Red Book of the USSR and see for yourself.

Unquestionably, it is possible to sincerely protest the railroad, fearing for the inviolability of the mountains, the ecological well-being of cities, and the preservation of monuments of antiquity. Moreover, the delicate question of the national self-existence of the Trans-Caucasus was drawn into the matter. However, in the fervor of ecological prohibition, why mix the real truth with poor-quality arguments?

The arguments against the city of Severobaykalsk are also vulnerable from this viewpoint.

Probably, we ought to proceed from reality. Baykal really is an invaluable example of nature's creativity, unique and not repeatable. However, is it a realistic task to preserve it in absolute inviolability? Yes, a national park. Yes, a specially protected territory. However, in this regard, in order for the Baykal phenomenon to truly be a national monument, it above all requires, in my opinion, a well-considered, organized transportation network, skilled service, and an infrastructure.

However, this is simply impossible without creating a fairly large center of social activity nearby, in other words, a city. The simple law of transportation connections dictates the need to create a city where the Baykal water route joins the BAM railroad route. One can curse Severobaykalsk as much as one pleases and make good decisions banning its growth. The city nonetheless will grow, just as Moscow is growing, time and again stepping beyond the borders set for it by the leadership.

So, maybe it is not a question of malicious intent? The objective laws of society's territorial organization exist,

according to which the friable system of human settlement surrounding Baykal will sooner or later self-organize and create a new center of crystallization, a city, gravitating toward the northern end of Baykal. Would it not be better to undertake its planning right now, proceeding from thrice-true considerations of the need to minimize ecological danger?

The alternative is illusory. Severobaykalsk, even put outside the law, will nonetheless be developed. However, it will develop deformedly, all over the place, filling the shore with shacks without running water or sewers, semi-industrial saw mills and temporary departmental shops, where not only does no one think about ecology, but also not about industrial safety for workers. As a result, we will get that which we always get: a feeling of deep moral satisfaction for some (they fulfilled their moral duty, they forbade this!) and a squalid, rickety and ecologically poisonous human habitat for the others. This is the price of compromising truth in the face of a mistakenly understood moral appeal.

It is striking that certain brilliant, talented journalists, having taken so much in their day from the apologists of forbidden thinking, easily throw themselves into this very same prohibition when they finally acquire the well-deserved right to free speech and thought. Perhaps it is precisely nothing striking... Impatience, haste, trust in feelings but not in reason, and a certainty of the priority of the end over the means: does not this really all come from the same root?

Sincerity and good intentions have not replaced reason. Every sandpiper quite sincerely praises his own swamp. Hence the flow of ecological glasnost is divided along departmental, territorial, social and national lines. In a concerted front, the writers of Russia are speaking against redirecting the outflow from Siberia to the Aral region. Among ecological journalists in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the exact opposite tendencies are strong, which, for example, ZVEZDA VOSTOKA is trying to vindicate. Clearly, the difference in viewpoints on this sharp problem is not only permissible, but also desirable. Protest evokes only an increasing intolerance toward the opponent's opinion, and the same nasty habit of manipulating the facts. As a result, serious and independently thinking scientists often avoid expressing their own convictions, knowing beforehand that these will be "attached" to one of the two platforms, or they will accuse him of lack of principle if they cannot succeed in "attaching." Essentially, polemics has lost meaning and the representatives of polar viewpoints are already struggling "on principle," gradually departing from criticism of ideas and switching to criticism of individuals. In the north, the supporters of redirection are accused of lack of patriotism, in the south—its opponents. What self-respecting person would wish to play such a game?

One carries away only vexation and a certainty of the author's bad taste from reading articles that explain ecological difficulties by way of the machinations of secret ill-wishers who belong to another nation. Whereas in the

central press, to give it its due, this is a rarity, in the republic press such allusions do happen. For example, the Uzbek literati see the chief cause of the Aral crisis in the excessive use of water from the Kara Kum Canal, which takes away "almost half the flow of the Amu Darya..." The canal operates outside the borders of Uzbekistan, in the Turkmen SSR. However, this is not stated directly, and solution of the artless charade is left to the reader. It is true that the canal takes a great deal of water and uses it far from ideally. True, it is not "almost half," but about one-quarter of the annual outflow of the Amu Darya. Nonetheless, there is a difference. Precisely thus, intelligently avoiding direct mention of the neighboring republic, the defenders of the Aral from Uzbekistan are protesting the construction of the Tashauz branch of the canal, which could take up to 8 cubic kilometers more water from the canal.

They protest rightly! However, why does the indignant finger of the republic ecological journalists, aimed at their neighbors, take an unexpected twist and bypass examples of the mismanaged utilization of water in the Golodnaya and Dzhizak steppes of Uzbekistan, where many cubic kilometers of it undistinguishedly decay and evaporate in the Arnasayskiy lake-cesspool? On the other hand, how come the Turkmen ecological community is not protesting the above-mentioned Tashauz branch? Possibly, because it primarily promises a benefit for the republic, and the Aral Sea, from which the canal will take the last cubic kilometers of water, is located outside of Turkmenistan.

With disbelief, one reads how great authorities of the Turkmen SSR on the protection of nature advise their Uzbek colleagues with unusual ease to use the "freed" area at the site of the degraded sea for the cultivation of cotton. Under conditions of an acute water shortage, the severe salinization of the former sea soils, and the noticeable worsening of the climate, provoked by the sea's withdrawal and, mainly, in a background of the struggle against the domination of cotton mono-culture, this advice smacks of insult. To be sure, it is interpreted precisely thus on the other side of the republic border.

Why is this? Why these strange lacunas and selectivity in the activities of ardent fighters for ecological well-being? It is a rhetorical question. It verifies that, at the present time, the development of ecological glasnost has taken the path of intensifying divergence.

The mass information media hold a special place in the contemporary world. Whereas previously they served as a megaphone for ideas coming "from above," now their channel is beginning to work both ways. To put it scientifically, the mass information media have switched from purely communicative functions (one-way transmission of directives, agitation, and explanations from above to below) to interactive functions (mutual exchange of information), and have opened a window for opinions coming "from below" and even "from the side." This is a world-wide tendency of cultural development.

The intellectual and administrative "tops" can voice as much dissatisfaction as they please with the incompetence of claims against them made from below. This does not change the fundamental situation. The mass information media are becoming a field for discussions and the development of new cultural postulates. This includes the postulate of tolerance toward the opinion of one's opponent, of respect for a personal point of view.

The present trouble is that the former communications pyramid for mass information was destroyed, but inertia, which does not accept the pluralism of opinions, is still very strong. Therefore, on the ruins of one information super-pyramid, several small but just as closed and intransigent small pyramids rapidly grew. They rely on departmental, national and other clan interests and prejudices. Faithfulness to the communicative principle and tolerance toward dissidents among "their own," and the aspiration to suppress "someone else's," remain their distinctive feature. They want to speak as loudly as possible, but do not know how to listen.

Possibly, that is why the impression of slowing down and marking time is also created. Or, to put it otherwise, we have departed from primitive communication and still have not approached genuine interaction. Much has already been said, but has not yet been heard. Ecological glasnost has seemingly frozen in a teen-age state.

Essentially, the question of its future destiny reduces to which one will mature more rapidly: the new cultural code, which treats glasnost as an indisputable civic value towering above individual, group or national interests, or the new communicative diktat of the small information "pyramids," which are putting their own ideals above the ideals of freedom of opinions.

Having fully realized the depth of the divergences among individual ecological trends, journalists and printed organs, it is nonetheless necessary to act as a unified front against attempts to restore the communicative nature of the mass information media. Infringement against any press organ must be interpreted not as the victory of one journalistic trend over another, but as a wound to glasnost, a narrowing of the sphere of interaction.

The aggravation of inter-clan disputes and the related supercharging of ecological extremism (essentially often just a screen for achieving the local goals of one group or another) serves as convenient grounds for restricting all glasnost on the whole. Ecological glasnost is at a crossroads. A fundamental choice lies before it. It can take the course of the 18th century French thinker, Voltaire, who said: "Your opinion is profoundly inimical to me, but I am ready to give up my life for your right to say it." Or it can keep the former style, when they "lay down their lives" for the sake of directly opposite goal: not letting an opponent express himself... At the end of the 20th century, any extremism, including ecological, is pathetic and amusing above all. There is something ineradicably trivial about it. Yet, aggressive triviality is always dangerous.

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Transcaucasus Muslim Leader Interviewed on Role of Islam*18300849A Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 3 Aug 89) pp 14-16*

[Interview with Sheikh-ul-Islam Allakhshukiyur Pasha-zade, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Transcaucasus, by P. Savin: "Do Not Produce Disorder on the Earth..."; date and place not specified]

[Text] The chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Transcaucasus, Sheikh-ul-Islam Allakhshukiyur Pasha-zade, received me in his study. On the walls there are sayings from the Koran, executed by masters of calligraphy—the traditional art of the Muslim East. Behind the glass of massive bookcases, there are ancient manuscripts, age-old folios, elegant modern editions in Turkish, Russian, Arabic, English, Farsi, and Uzbek—Sheikh-ul-Islam reads in all of these languages, and he speaks the majority of them fluently. The Muslims of Transcaucasia elected him as their spiritual mentor when he was not yet 35 years old. Since that time, almost 10 years have passed. His authority has become firmly established, and he enjoys a good reputation not only among believers. Allakhshukiyur Pasha-zade is famous for his peacemaking activity, for his work with the Soviet Children's Fund, and for the organization of charity. He was elected People's Deputy of the USSR—in conditions of free, democratic elections this is indicative of the trust of people. And my first question is about how he regards this event in his life.

[Pasha-zade] According to our strength, if this is the will of Allah, we have to help to improve our life, to promote the new that is today happening in the country, and this can be done only together. To our joy, the public atmosphere is now favorable to the cooperation of believers and non-believers. Being a member of a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for questions of glasnost and the rights and appeals of citizens, I am taking a direct part in the preparation of a law which will permit believers to satisfy their spiritual needs more fully. As a people's deputy, I will support everything that is being done and will be done to create a rule-of-law state.

In many respects because of the fact that we did not, and do not now, have enough mosques (their number in Azerbaijan does not at all correspond to the real needs of the religious life of the believers), self-styled mullahs [mully-samozvantsy] appeared among us; these are frequently highly-ignorant people, far from Islam, who think only about profit. We turned to the local organs of power with a request to have some of the previously-closed mosques turned over to the Muslims of Transcaucasia—mosques that stand empty or that are being used for other goals.

Today, the Muslims of Transcaucasia, as all Soviet people, welcome restructuring, it gives hope for normal work and for a normal, worthy life. Like other people's deputies and all citizens of the country, I cannot but be disturbed by the

tension in inter-nationality relations, the conflicts that are arising on nationality and other grounds.

During our recent meeting with the first secretary of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee, A.Kh. Vezirov, we were united in thinking that all of us, believers and non-believers, have one path—a joint life, joint efforts, and the concern to see to it that every man, regardless of nationality and religion, feels that he is an equal citizen in any region of the country.

[Savin] You mentioned conflicts, disagreement among people. But how does Islam tell [its adherents] to treat the people of other religions? What is prescribed concerning the interrelations of peoples? How sad that one has to hear the following kind of opinion: "The thing is that the Azerbaijanis are Muslims, the Armenians are Christians, therefore they will never understand each other..."

[Pasha-zade] In Transcaucasia, Muslims and Christians have lived side by side, have worked together and have interacted with one another for centuries. We have the experience of good neighbor relations. During the past year, the Christians of our country had a great holiday, and I, on behalf of the Muslims of our territory, brought sincere greetings to the Russian Orthodox Church on its 1000th anniversary, and, at its invitation, was a participant in the festivities in Moscow. The Holy Koran tells us to maintain friendly relations with the people of the Scriptures, i.e., with the Christians. But one also must recall the bad experience in order to avoid a repetition. And great blame on those who, in the name of Islam, in the name of Allah, incited animosity during the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it. In my sermons, during collective prayers, in appeals to Muslims, and during public appearances when I am given such an opportunity, I appeal to the Muslims and the people of all other religions and nationalities for a peaceful life together. We have one country, one fate, and this fate is in our hands. This induced us to come out with the initiative of a meeting of the clergymen of the Christian churches and the Islamic organizations of Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus. Such a meeting took place during the past year in Rostov-na-Donu. Its participants expressed the unanimous view that the spiritual mentors are called upon to sow good intentions in the minds and souls of people. We adopted an appeal to the believers and called upon them to promote, through prayer and deed, the renewal that is taking place in the country, to help the achievement of changes for the better.

People of various nationalities and various religions live among us in Azerbaijan. Incidents of religious intolerance happen among them. But does religion, be it Islam or Christianity, really teach this? In its foundation, religion itself is charitable, if man has become truly a believer, then intolerance of any kind is alien to him—both to the people of another faith and to the people of another nationality.

[Savin] And how did you yourself come to the faith?

[Pasha-zade] From my childhood years I had a desire—a desire which grew stronger with the years—to devote myself to Islam; I prepared for this and enrolled in the

Tashkent Islamic Institute imeni Imam al-Bukhari. Having been graduated from it, I became the imam of the Baku Taza-Pir Mosque. Then I was elected kadi [kazi = judge], and since 1980 I have been here, in this office.

[Savin] Your entire family is religious?

[Pasha-zade] The Pasha-zade family consists of more than 130 people of different generations, among them there are, of course, believers, but there are also Komsomol members and members of the Communist Party. I have a brother, he is an engineer, and nine sisters—some chose medicine, others teaching, there are also collective farmers. My children, they are six of them, are still schoolboys. Whatever profession they choose, the main thing I would wish for them is to always have a clean conscience, not to be indifferent to evil and to injustice, and to work honestly. To raise them as such is the holy obligation of the Muslim, the father, the citizen.

[Savin] As far as I know, your fatherly concerns extend far beyond the limits of the family; indeed, you are a member of the board of directors of the Soviet Children's Fund.

[Pasha-zade] The fate of children is the common concern of all to whom the physical and moral health of society is dear. The Muslims of Transcaucasia direct funds for the construction of children's institutions, for the needs of orphans and the sick. True Muslims think with sincere pain about children whom the terrible natural disaster in Armenia left without relatives, without shelter, and they take part in the organization of assistance for them. I consider the concern for children to be my main obligation as a people's deputy.

[Savin] Peacemaking activity occupies a large place in your life....

[Pasha-zade] For me, as for millions of people in our country, the word "peace" is filled with a special meaning. During the past war, my father was seriously wounded and two brothers died. The memory of the millions who gave their lives, who shed their blood at its fronts, obligates us not to spare efforts in the name of peace. In 1986, the believers of our republic invited representatives of Muslims from the entire world to hold the conference "Muslims in the Struggle for Peace" in Baku. Delegations from 60 countries came to us—religious, state, and public leaders, and ordinary believers. The time that has passed since that time has brought appreciable achievements—the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the destruction of medium and shorter range missiles, the removal of our troops from Afghanistan, the cessation of active military actions between Iraq and Iran. I believe that the Baku Conference, its appeal to all parliaments, governments, and the United Nations, as well as to all the Muslims of the Earth, made a contribution in these matters.

It was with a feeling of great responsibility that I took part in the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear—Free World, for the Survival of Mankind."

The international contacts of the Muslims of Transcaucasia are expanding. During the past 3 years we have taken part in more than 100 foreign delegations, we ourselves have been with good [-will] missions in many countries. Every year our Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca. There and everywhere where we are we strive to strengthen contacts with people of good will, this is one of the paths to the strengthening of peace.

[Savin] Our conversation with Sheikh-ul-Islam is coming to an end. I go together with him to the Taza-Pir Mosque, which is located next to the residence. Beautiful are the slender minarets and the stone lace of the high portals of this Shiite mosque, the country's largest, built at the beginning of our century by Muslim masters in accordance with the plan of the architect Z. Akhmadbekov. We approach the wide carved doors of Taza-Pir. Here we greeted a married couple: The man, strong, broad-shouldered, about 35 years old, and the woman, whose face was almost not visible, she covered it with a large silk shawl—the kelagay [not further identified]. The man said something to the Sheikh, now and then turning for support to his wife, the latter nodded in agreement every time.

Sultan-aga and Zuleyka-khanum said that now they always, when they come to the mosque, pray for peace in their street, where literally a house across there live Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The tragic events have not embroiled them with their lady neighbor Ashkhen. They say that Ashkhen prays for the same thing in her Armenian church. Let there be peace over us!

When I tell Muslims about peace on Earth and about peace in their street and in their home, I remind them of the words of the holy Koran. "Do not produce disorder on the Earth after its establishment. . . ." We want to return to the mosque its former role—when it was not only a house where people pray together, but a place for the intercourse of believers, where they discuss the problems of present-day life, assess actions, give and listen to good advice of wise and experienced people. This will also improve the general atmosphere in society. . . .

I said good-bye to Sheikh Pasha-zade. The believers who have assembled for the Friday prayer in Taza-Pir are waiting for him. Today words about peace and the unification of peoples, about wisdom, charity and tolerance, will again be heard there. It is good that such words are being uttered in temples and prayer houses. There is hope that those who hear them and utter them will be guided by them in their daily life. And prompt others to the same.

Kazakh Demographer Interviewed

18320006

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata MADENIYET ZHANE TURMYS No 8, August 1989 carries on page 13 a 2,500-word interview recorded by P. Beysenov with demographer Maqash Bayghaliuly Tatimov, senior research worker of the Nationality and Nationalities Relations Center of the KaSSR Academy of Sciences and candidate in pedagogical science, entitled "How Many Kazakhs Live in Foreign Countries." In the interview Tatimov is asked

about present Kazakh demographic levels and demographic changes and projections, how many descendents of the 1.1 million Kazakhs forced to flee what is now the Soviet Union live in foreign countries, where they live and in what numbers, the various reasons why they fled, the question of the preservation of culture and language by exiled Kazakhs, and the connections of the KaSSR with Kazakhs and Kazakh groups living abroad. In answer to the interviewer's first question, Tatimov notes that the Kazakhs are now a major world nationality and that there should be a total of 10 million Kazakhs, including those living abroad, by May of 1990 (—during the last 10 years 1,835,000 Kazakhs were born in the USSR, and 395,000 died, making a total gain of 1,440,000). This means, he notes, that Kazakhs are now in 85th place among the 5,000 world nationalities. There would, of course, Tatimov stresses, be even more Kazakhs today but for the 2,200,000 victims of Stalin. Of the 10 million total Kazakhs, some 1,450,000 live outside the Soviet Union, including some 1,150,000 estimated to live in the PRC and 150,000 in the MPR. Other Kazakhs live in Afghanistan (40,000, mostly in the north), Iran (15,000 near the Caspian), and in Turkey (25,000), from which some have migrated to Europe and points farther afield. Some 50,000 Kazakhs fled the Soviet Union during World War II (350,000 were killed); many now live in Western Europe, although some are in North and South America and even in Australia.

Tatimov details the various reasons for Kazakh migration, noting two major factors exercising a particular influence: 1) Russian and Soviet oppression, and 2) a PRC-USSR border that was more or less open until relatively recent times (this also allowed some Kazakhs to return, in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, during the Chinese "Cultural Revolution"). Tatimov claims that most of these emigres live where they do today largely due to involuntary migrations and that most harbor no ill feelings towards the Soviet Union. He is, however, clearly dissatisfied with what is being done by the KaSSR "Otan" Society and other groups and individuals to maintain ties with Kazakhs living abroad (—except for the Kazakhs of the PRC and the MPR, these ties are haphazard at best—) and feels that the loss of culture of Kazakhs living abroad, particularly in Western Europe, has been one result. (Tatimov has visited the 450-person strong Paris Kazakh community, where this is clearly the case). In his concluding remarks, Tatimov stresses ties with emigre Kazakhs as a human rights issue.

High Aral Region Throat Cancer Rate Linked to Diet, Not Environment

90US0066A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
9 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by M. Kabulov, deputy director of scientific work at the Uzbek Ministry of Health Kara-Kalpak Scientific Research Institute of Clinical and Experimental Medicine: "A Deficit of Vitamins—Causes Serious Ailment"]

[Text] Hot arguments are boiling around the problem of "ecology and cancer." I think that having all of the

information is the best weapon against conjecture. As a specialist in oncology, I would like to express my opinion on this subject.

In the South Aral region (the Kara-Kalpak ASSR and the Kzyl-Orda and Tashauz Oblasts), each year doctors register about 1000 people (that is, almost every second patient with malignant tumors) as suffering from throat cancer, 45% of whom have become ill during their working years. The sick rate indices for serious illnesses are 5-6 times higher than the all-union average.

In order to study this problem deeply and comprehensively, a Kara-Kalpak affiliate of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health Scientific Research Institute of Oncology was established, with the stated goal of developing measures for prevention, early diagnosis, and treatment for cancer of the throat. And, of course, to study deeply and comprehensively the causes and conditions that have promoted an increased rate of illness.

Working on the current scientific assumption that a deficit of certain vitamins, specifically C and A, causes a predisposition towards oncological illnesses, we studied their content in food products and in the blood. The results exceeded our expectations. We discovered a definite connection between a deficit of vitamins C and A in the population's blood, on the one hand, and characteristic inflammatory and pre-cancerous alterations in the throat and increased risk of consequent contraction of cancer of the throat on the other. I am consciously omitting the numerous proofs of this conclusion, so as to save newspaper space for stating more important observations.

What has caused this clearly expressed lack of vitamins? In our opinion, it is related to three conditions. First, the character of the diet. Among the population that is native to the Aral region (Kazakhs, Kara-Kalpaki, Uzbeks, Turkmeni) an unbalanced diet was established long ago: it is monotonous and irregular, there is a prevalence of starches, an absence of vegetables and fruits, the use of excessively hot tea, tough salted and dried meat, and smoked and dried small-boned fish, all taken primarily in the evening and during the night. Second, the geographical living conditions: the climate, and peculiarities of the water and soil. The peak sick rate for throat cancer comes at the peak in the deterioration of the quality and quantity of the water used by the population. In the last few years, the concentration of nitrates and nitrites in water from rivers, water lines, and especially wells has exceeded the PDK by 2-3 times. For this reason, we must accelerate construction of the Kaparaskiy water shed, and the Tuyamuyun-Nukus-Takhtakupyr water line. Third, unsatisfactory provision of the population, especially in the northern regions of Kara-Kalpak, with necessary food products—meat, milk, fruits and vegetables, of which each person gets 30-65 percent of the rational dietary norms. It is appropriate to quote the words of USSR Academy of Sciences Academician A.P. Avtsyn: "Central Asia, which is literally heaped with fruits that are amazing in the quality of their tastes, in actuality is one of the widest zones of vitamin C

deficiency, because the content of ascorbic acid in plant products of local origin is significantly lower than the necessary standard."

But Kara-Kalpak is far behind all of the oblasts and republics of Central Asia not only in its production of fruits and vegetables, but also in milk and meat. Single-crop systems of rice and cotton have crowded out of the fields all of the plant products that are necessary for a healthy human diet.

What is being done for the ecological well-being of the Aral region? Since 1984 in the Muynak region, the first completely free, year-round vitamin C dispensation in the country has been operating, for everyone aged seven years and older, and, since 1986 in the same region, for persons suffering from pre-cancerous throat ailments, there is a vitamin A dispensation. Strict observation of patients is maintained. There have been encouraging results.

As in any large matter, we have significant difficulties, especially in organizing early diagnosis and radical treatment for those suffering from throat cancer and its pre-cancerous states. The existing laboratory for diagnosis and treatment does not have its own clinical base, and its capacity is low. Also for this reason, it is unable to complete the tasks set for it by the State Committee for Science and Technology.

The general dispensary for the population of Kara-Kalpak and the Khorezm Oblast cannot detect the early forms of throat cancer without endoscopy, as its beginning form exhibits no symptoms. For this reason, as before, the percentage of late diagnoses is high (about 70 percent out of 100 throat cancer patients counted die within a year of the establishment of a diagnosis).

In order to introduce into practice modern, scientifically based methods of prevention, early diagnosis and treatment of cancer and pre-cancerous throat ailments, we consider it advisable at the first stage to organize an inter-oblast or inter-regional center among the population of the South Aral region—the ecological disaster zone—for the study of throat pathology, with a 50-60 bed station in Nukus.

If we continue to be careless, short-sighted and slow (questions have been raised before at the directive organs) in attacking this serious illness, we will not return that which is the most valued and dear to man—his health.

State 'Neglecting' Chernobyl Cleanup Workers
18001690A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 13 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by Yu. Zilyuk, SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent and member of the Chernobyl Union: "We Didn't Send You There..."]

[Text] "We didn't send you there..." was the frequent answer to the "Chernobylites" legitimate questions and demands. So they decided to join together in their own union under the motto "Humanity and Mercy".

The news of the tragedy that occurred on the night of April 25-26, 1986 at the Chernobyl AES rocked the entire country. In the very first days after that alarming announcement, letters and telegrams from hundreds of cities and villages flew to Moscow, Kiev, and Chernobyl itself, from people asking how they could help in eliminating the effects of the accident, and what they could do that would be of use at their own workplaces. Many even left immediately for the Chernobyl region.

At that time, thousands of people and tens of labor collectives, in our republic as well, responded to the frightening catastrophe that had occurred in the Ukraine. I remember a conversation that I had in the first days of May of that year with S. Yavorivsky, metal worker brigadier at the Oshsk Pump Factory. He told me about how his brigade of Kirgiz, Uzbek, Russian, Tatar and Ukrainian workers, disregarding the time, filled an urgent order for Chernobyl; how they waited, worrying, for the late-arriving plane that was supposed to deliver the pumps to the appointed location. In May and June, several groups of construction workers left Frunze and other cities in Kirgizia for the Chernobyl AES and, together with colleagues from other parts of the country, under conditions of heightened danger, erected the now world famous "sarcophagus" around the ruined fourth reactor block [ener-goblok]. Among the volunteers from Kirgiziya who left at that time to work in the 30-kilometer zone were some, who went independently, on their vacation time, to participate in eliminating the effects of the accident—without special invitations or arrangements for compensation. One of these was Aleksandr Serafimovich Yurchenko, a Frunze radiology engineer.

I first saw Aleksandr Serafimovich in December of 1986 at the Chernobyl AES, where our group of chemical investigators was working on cleaning radioactive wastes off of one of the roof sections of the third reactor block. Upon arriving at Chernobyl in June of that year, he was picked to be a member of a dosimeter reconnaissance crew, and soon became its commander. The dosimeter patrolmen from that crew, which included representatives of Russia, the Ukraine, Kirgiziya, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic, went over the most dangerous areas meter by meter—the territory of the AES, housings, the covers of the third and fourth reactor blocks. You can see them in the first documentary films on the effects of the accident at the ChAES; many of them have been awarded orders and medals for their heroic labor, among them A. S. Yurchenko—who received the Order of Friendship of Peoples.

Thousands and thousands of construction workers, drivers, nuclear specialists and chemical investigators, having worked in the zone for a certain period of time (not more than half a year), would leave for their homes, and others would take their places. Aleksandr Serafimovich did not leave. He became a member of the newly created subdivision of the PO [production association] called Kombinat, working full time to liquidate the effects of the accident in the 30-kilometer zone, and is now head of a laboratory there. Three years spent in the zone and, specifically, at the ChAES itself and in Chernobyl and

Pripyat, have given him an opportunity to see and evaluate from within the scale of this tragedy, to analyze the causes and effects of what happened. Tens of thousands of people who came voluntarily or who were sent to work in the zone during this period (and these detachments, albeit fewer in number, are there even now), numbering among them thousands of his countrymen from Kirgizia, have passed before his eyes. Aleksandr Serafimovich did not come by his knowledge of the conditions under which they lived and worked in the zone, of the attitude held towards them at their places of work after their return home, and of their state of health, through hearsay. And he—a veteran of Chernobyl, a man with a sharpened sense of social justice—could not help but be upset by these things.

Now, a lot is already known about what led to the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power plant, about how the evacuation of inhabitants of the cities and villages situated around the AES was unjustifiably delayed, about the sort of irreversible mistakes that were made in the first weeks and months of the work being done to eliminate the effects of the accident, due to incompetent leadership and bureaucratic delays and procrastination. But much more is being kept silent, is not being brought into the open even today. There are the facts about the burial of highly radioactive wastes, and the state of health of the children and adults living in Chernobyl, Pripyat, and the villages in the zone, of the civil and military servicemen working there, the attitude towards them at the places where they work and serve, towards their medical treatment, and towards the legitimate privileges allotted to them. These and other glaring incidents have led Aleksandr Serafimovich and his many comrades-in-arms, who have seen with their own eyes what an accident at a nuclear electric power station can do, and who have felt in themselves its effects, to the idea that they must create a mass public organization that would unite everyone who, one way or another, has suffered from the effects of the accident at the ChAES, and that would become the organizing nucleus in the battle to prevent similar catastrophes.

On May 13, 1989, at a conference held in the watch settlement Zelenyi Mys, located on the border of the 30-kilometer zone, such an organization was formed. It was named—the Chernobyl Union. Aleksandr Serafimovich Yurchenko was elected chairman of the Chernobyl Union Council, which has headquarters in a series of cities throughout the country, including Moscow.

Not long ago, Aleksandr Serafimovich visited Frunze. Recalling Chernobyl and the difficult months of '86, he and I, of course, spoke about our many countrymen from Kirgiziya who had spent time in the zone. Alas, several of the people that A. S. Yurchenko mentioned, like "Chernobylites" from other parts of country, are no longer among the living. And the rest, those hundreds and thousands? How are they doing, how is their health? "It is necessary to find them all, and we will search them out," said Aleksandr Serafimovich firmly. "Our union will help everyone who needs help. But why are the local authorities so indifferent to the people who protected us all at Chernobyl?" And

Yurchenko showed me a letter written to the Union Council by Rybachye city resident, A.A. Bork. This is what it said:

"Aleksandr Andreyevich Bork, participant in the elimination of the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, is writing to you. I worked as a driver from August through December of 1986. I was awarded the medal 'For Excellence in Military Service,' I have received thanks from the USSR Council of Ministers, certificates, letters of thanks for my work. In May, 1987, I began to feel ill. At the Institute of Oncology and Radiology in Frunze, I had an operation (a broad excision of tumors), after which I was transferred to a the second disability grouping on the basis of—"labor mutilation." For the first year I received a pension through Social Security, and the enterprise where I worked made supplementary payments. After an examination in October, 1988, as a result of which I was left in the same second disability grouping, the enterprise refused to make up the difference between the pension and my average salary. Allegedly, our lawyer has found an Ukase, according to which Social Security must make the additional payment. And now neither the enterprise nor Social Security is paying the difference between the pension and my average salary (and that is 140 rubles). The military office [voyenkomat], through which I was sent to Chernobyl, has divorced itself completely from this matter. I went to Gosstrakh [State Insurance], as I have been insured since 1984. But here, too, I was refused, supposedly because people like me do not fall under specific articles. But I have two children, and my wife is a nurse. How can we live? At work they have already told me that 'We didn't send you to Chernobyl, so we don't owe you anything.'

It seems that when I was healthy—I was needed, but now that I have become disabled, they 'don't owe me anything.'"

Forgive me for such a long quotation, but in this case, I think it is appropriate. Even if only for the reason that it gives one an opportunity to become convinced that this man, who has lost his health saving people from (think about this!) the effects of government officials' criminal lack of discipline, is not complaining, he is not weeping, but is bitterly at a loss to understand why he is being refused **legitimate government aid**. And, as hundreds of letters like this one in A.S. Yurchenko's possession specifically testify, there are many similar cases. Why has this happened? Why are people who have never been there so deliberately indifferent to those who were maimed in Afghanistan, or irradiated in the 30-kilometer zone? Maybe it is exactly because they were not there that they say "we didn't send you there?" But what about mercy and humanity? And finally, what about the state, which actually did send many, many people? After all, if it cannot compensate for the damages done to those whom it obligated to risk their lives in the course of duty or by law, then what can be said for the volunteers...

I remember how, on our return from Chernobyl, all of us were called to the republic oncological clinic for a medical check-up. They assured us that every two months they

would do analyses, and would monitor the state of our health—for a three-year period. In January it will be three years since we heard those assurances. But there have been no more calls to the clinic.

On his last visit to Frunze, Aleksandr Serafimovich Yurchenko brought with him the Chernobyl Union Charter. The new public organization had received legal status, operates on a financially independent basis, and has its own bank account. And so, in the section "Goals and Tasks of the Union," the first point reads: "the creation of a community of people, concerned with the medical, social, ecological and other effects of accidents at nuclear facilities." One more of the union's tasks is, according to the Charter,—"...to bring legal suit against the government organizations and individual officials who are responsible for damaging the health of Union members and for material damages."

The question arises: Why is a public organization, the Chernobyl Union, taking upon itself the protection of the "Chernobylites," and not the government itself? After all, then and now, after having become members of this union, they were and are, first of all, citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Is it true that a public organization is the only one with the strength to bring the motto "humanity and mercy" to life?

Of course, the Chernobyl Union brings and will in the future continue to bring under its protection people like A.A. Bork, all the "Chernobylites" who have experienced injustice at the hands of government organs or individual officials. But even today, its members have the right to ask the Ministry of Social Security, the republic Gosstrakh agency, the Rybachye military office, the enterprise where Aleksandr Andreyevich worked, why they acted this way to a person who had lost his health while doing his duty with honor. People will have to answer these and many other questions like them.

In the last three and some years, thousands of residents of our republic have worked on the elimination of the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. Many are now in need of help, or just need to be better informed about the effects of the accident, privileges, compensations, or about their comrades, who have scattered throughout the country. The Chernobyl Union will do all of this. For "Chernobylites" who wish to become members, all they need to do is write an application to the Union Council, at the address: **Kiev Oblast, Chernobyl, Headquarters of the Chernobyl Union Council.**

The accident at Chernobyl was the result of the thoughtless attitude of people invested with power towards the future of the country and its people. To bury it in oblivion means allowing the possibility that something like it might be repeated. And this must never happen again, not in any place and not at any time. Let us remember it...

AIDS, Health Care Situation in Uzbek SSR

90US0106A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 5 Oct 89 p 5

[Article by Kh. Tadzhiyev, deputy director of Uzbek SSR Gosplan: "AIDS and Children: The Issue Remains Open"]

[Text] After the publication of the article "AIDS and Children: Who is Next?" (4 July 1989), which raised the issue of the disastrous situation of the children's hospitals, we received a reply from the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health (published 23 August 1989), from which it should be taken that the funds allocated for children's health care are woefully inadequate. Today, the republic's Gosplan responds to the question, "Are the children of Uzbekistan insured against AIDS?"

Uzbek SSR Gosplan examined the article in the newspaper KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA.

Together with the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health, Uzbek SSR Gosplan and other ministries and departments conduct constant work to strengthen the material-technological base of health care.

With the work in the union organs, the volume of state capital investment in the republic's "Health Care" branch increases annually. Thus, for 1990, with a 5-year plan of R110 million, R136.4 million was allocated, and in total, an over-fulfillment of the 5-year plan is envisaged with the introduction of hospitals and clinics totaling 3,100 beds and 7,800 visits per shift. Sixty percent of the facilities being brought in will be dedicated to pediatric and obstetric and gynecological services.

The given course will be continued in the 13th 5-year plan as well. In accordance with the October 1988 Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers' decree "On measures for the further improvement of the population's health care and strengthening the material-technological base of health care," it is planned to introduce treatment and prevention facilities of 52,000 beds and 140,000 visits per shift; children's sanatoriums, infants' homes, rehabilitative treatment facilities for children of 3,500 beds, and implement regional broad-range programs for restructuring the work of maternal and child health maintenance facilities.

For the purpose of AIDS prevention, 20 diagnostic laboratories have been opened in the republic, including inter-rayon ones in Kokand and Birunya for donor risk group tracking. The Republic Diagnostic Center acts as the coordinating center.

Considering the acute supply insufficiency of syringes and single-use systems, the republican government adopted a decision on the production of single-use syringes starting in 1990 at the "Sovplastital" mixed enterprise in the volume necessary to meet the medical facilities' demands. At the present time, the needed work is being done on building transfers, the development of project estimate documentation, and equipment installation, which is estimated at 6 million hard currency rubles.

In addition, for the purpose of assisting pediatric health care, a number of industrial enterprises have made adjustments to put out medical items, such as single-use scari-fiers (at the "Algoritm" plant); "Uzbekkhimmash" produces up to 300,000 spatulas, and such unique devices as barometric chambers.

From the Gosplan and Ministry of Health responses, it can be perceived that the problems of pediatric and obstetric services are at the center of their attention. We understand that improving the state of the republic's health care will take more than a single month. But all the same, it is to be hoped that not one of us has forgotten that today, Uzbekistan's children's hospitals are in a lamentable state. The threat of AIDS is quite likely. It is everyone's task to do all possible to prevent this tragedy.

Isolation May be Used to Prevent Spread of AIDS

90US0106B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 41, 14-20 Oct 89 p 8

[Response to reader inquiry by V. Nikolayev]

[Text] Won't detention facilities become hotbeds of AIDS, the 20th century plague? What are we doing about this? After all, there isn't a word about it in the newspapers. L. Korneyeva, Orenburg

Questions such as these are being asked more and more frequently. And the citizens' apprehensions are completely understandable. It is known that the AIDS precursors are spread, as a rule, by individuals leading an irregular sex life, drug addicts, intravenous drug users, and prostitutes, especially those who come into sexual contact with foreigners. It is hardly worth denying that detention facilities have a fairly high concentration of those convicted within the categories indicated. In light of this, taking world experience into consideration, since 1987, the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], together with the health care organs, have taken the necessary prophylactic measures to prevent the appearance of the AIDS disease in corrective labor institutions and LTPs [labor treatment prevention centers].

What is being done concretely in this area? A collection of material has been organized, and research is being conducted by means of immuno-fermentation analysis of citizens being held in receiving and distribution facilities for vagrancy or begging, and in receiving and distribution facilities for minors; samples are then sent to the laboratory. AIDS observation is provided for those individuals falling into the risk groups (those who have received numerous blood or blood product transfusions, ill hemophiliacs, drug addicts, and homosexuals) of those sent to LTPs.

Of course, material is being collected for AIDS research from those under investigation, under guard, or held in the country's isolators, and convicted risk-group members. It has been established that the indicated categories of citizens are observed upon their arrival to the lock-up and for 3 months before their release from detention facilities. Of

course, if during the course of such observation, individuals with positive immunological reactions and clinical symptoms are detected, they will be hospitalized immediately for further observation in medical facilities.

Update on Shortage of Disposable Syringes

90US0106C Moscow SOVetskaya Rossiya in Russian 15 Oct 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Ye. Danilevich, V. Griniv, V. Vtoryy, I. Pyrkh, V. Kuznetsov: "A Needle in Cement: Why the Program for Producing Single-Use Syringes is Failing"]

[Text] The shortage of single-use syringes is a sadly popular topic. From a narrowly specialized problem of medical instrumentation, single-use has turned into a social problem—people are even earning political capital from it. Yes, after a long delay, society has recognized that the single-use syringes, catheters, and injection needles lacking in our hospitals and clinics are not a luxury. This is an item of utmost necessity! AIDS? We are already frightened by it. And the other hospital-caused infections, in which we "lead the planet" today? Public opinion is much less familiar with this. Purchases of imports will not save us; there is not enough hard currency to purchase them on a regular basis, guaranteeing another shortage. And this means that there may come times when these imported syringes, so elegant and convenient, in the hands of medical personnel easily turn from being single-use to being multi-use, that is, "multi-infectious." Unfortunately, there have already been such examples. The solution is to start our own production of such instrumentation in order that there be enough of it. Departments were pressed to work in this direction by a special 1986 USSR Council of Ministers decree. For the Russian Federation enterprises alone, in 1988-1989 the introduction of capacity to produce 1.4 billion syringes and 3.5 billion needles was envisaged. However, the reports from RSFSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] are alarming—in the very first year of their execution, the plans broke down. What is the problem? A raid conducted by our correspondents describes this.

Leningrad. On the Leningrad black market, at the "hot goods" point at Devyatkin station, a new short-supply item appeared—single-use syringes. The price—three rubles each. True, people are not eager to buy them, and it isn't the price; they are worried about the sterility.

However, there are no syringes in the Leningrad pharmacies, even though this is the location of "Lenmedpolimer," the enterprise producing the lion's share of the country's product. Some 14 years ago, this plant was the first and only one in the country to begin producing single-use syringes. At first they turned out only a few millions items annually. Last year the decision was made to develop production capacity in the association for 200 million syringes annually.

"Well, so they built it; there are walls, but you're not going to make syringes with your hands," says in the association's general director O. Nikitin with desperation. "Last year, the Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological Industry purchased single-use syringe production lines in

the FRG. No less than 20 million hard currency rubles were spent on that. This is what they used to venture into the association's urgent reconstruction. But now this equipment has been redirected to the branch's biochemical plants, which are retooling at public demand, due to their lack of ecological security. The lines went to Omutinsk, Kirov Oblast, and Berdsk, Novosibirsk Oblast. Now it is not known whether we will receive such equipment."

There is another problem which the association tries in vain to regulate. Just the syringes are made in Leningrad. The needles for them are made at the Tyumen plant for medical equipment and instruments. They are transported from Tyumen to Leningrad, and from hence, the needles are dispersed throughout the country, including some being sent back to Tyumen. This shipping warehouse function is completely superfluous for the association; it only ties up workers' hands. All the more so because it packs only 25 percent of all the production, that is, it puts a syringe and a needle in one package; the rest is sent to addresses separately. Why shouldn't the "Medtekhnika" administration take upon itself the role of packing agent? It is to its warehouse that the syringes from Leningrad and the needles from Tyumen come, and they are sent by orders to clinics and hospitals.

Tyumen. They have been producing single-use needles here since 1983. Our medical personnel need them in enormous quantities, but for the past 5 years, production volume has grown only to 90 million items. The assignment for this year is 150 million needles, and 250 million for next year. So, if until this time, the enterprise managed with equipment retooling and reconstruction, now construction of new facilities is needed to augment volume. That must begin here next year.

We don white coats and change our shoes (they are very strict with this here, even though only experimental equipment model testing is going on), and proceed to the needle production unit with enterprise director G. Toporov.

"These rotary conveyor lines came to us from the defense industry construction bureau," said the director. "Time will prove their reliability and work capacity. But in the time being, we are annoyed that the equipment came to us a year or more late, compared with Government-established deadlines. Moreover, there is still no line for assembling single-use needles..."

This April, the plant started to send consumers one more product—single-use syringes. In the meantime, medical facilities were supposed to have received the first 30 million syringes last year. What is the problem? It turns out that our planning departments did not consider the industry's real possibilities (and incidentally, not only our planning departments), and simply misled medical personnel. The Council of Ministers decree was issued in 1986. The Ministry doubled it about 2 months later. Then the plant took time to select a foreign firm with which to collaborate. The firm needed a year to place equipment orders and produce the equipment, and about 2 months to ship it... In a word, the latest import lines got to Tyumen just last winter. In spite of the extraordinary situation with

single-use instrumentation, as they say, you can't do more than your best. You can't make up for lost time in the wink of an eye.

But here the collective must be given its due: They nevertheless fully came to terms with the consumers even while failing to meet production assignments. How? The plant took a desperate step: It is purchasing the short supply syringes from foreign firms with their own hard currency resources, and selling these to the hospitals.

Rybinsk. Needle production for single-use syringes is also coming around at the "Prizma" optical mechanical plant. Incidentally, "coming around" is too strong a definition of what is happening at the enterprise. Despite the fact that "Prizma" chief engineer Yu. Sutyagin is himself heading up the "single-use needle output acceleration group" created here, he frankly admits, "The planned deadlines will fall through."

On the plant territory, the future new facilities open one's eyes. They impress with their dimensions. It seems that the conveyers will start to work in a little while. But this is a deceptive impression. A construction worker's foot has not stepped on this site since...1986, that same year when the decree on the production of single-use syringes was issued. Paradoxical? No, according to the bureaucrats' papers, everything is in order here. The new facilities were built for the "Prizma" plant's main line, production of eyeglass lenses. But needles proved more important at this moment. The decision to retool was made, and construction frozen; after all, the project had to be altered.

A year passes, then another, and then the new designer, Yaroslavl's "Giproprigor" organization, started developing the project equipment documentation for needle production, and... declines to carry through. It turns out that the gorsovet [city soviet] exploited the situation and ordered social-cultural facilities of the designer, along with the project. At least another year went toward the litigation and explanation, and only now are the plant workers enticed with the prospect of seeing the design documentation. But there is still a problem: It turns out that the factory missed the ordering company's deadline for construction materials...

Incidentally, even if the cataclysm with the construction had not occurred, the Rybinsk plant all the same would not have begun to produce needles in time. The equipment delivery deadlines were not being met.

"Ours will be the first plant in the country to produce needles with domestic equipment," explains needle production chief A. Zarubin. "But the technological chain requires 31 types of equipment. And we only have contracts for 22 of those items. The rest they simply refuse to make for us."

Mtsensk. Even though the history of this construction is not so famous, it seems as if its fate will be equally unenviable. We speak of the former alcohol production line of the Mtsensk medical industry plant. It was closed 2 years ago in light of the famous decree on the struggle against alcoholism and drunkenness. But last year the

decision came down to create in its place nothing less than a shop for single-use syringes. And this is in a region where you could not find tool makers for such fine work if your life depended on it?!

Mtsensk party gorkom [city committee] First Secretary V. Petukhov told me, "By the way, nobody asked us whether they could find cadres for the plant in this deserted rural rayon. This is how they decided it in Moscow: There will be a single-use syringe production line at the Mtsensk biochemical plant, that was it."

Whatever happened, the facility is under construction. The space has been prepared; a road to it is being made. According to plant Director A. Driga, R1.7 million is planned for start-up construction. It must be said that that is quite a hefty sum for the Mtsensk construction workers, who are being torn to pieces. And it is not surprising that serious lagging has already been noticed today.

Vorsma. An undertaking doomed to failure—that is the only conclusion to be drawn upon acquainting oneself with the state of affairs at the Vorsma medical instruments plant. Here, the start-up construction costs alone will be R35 million for the production of single-use syringes and needles. This does not include construction of a rail spur to the factory for shipping the prepared product, nor housing for the work force brought in from the outside. But what

does that R35 million mean for the Pavlovskiy construction trust servicing Vorsma? It is the trust's 3-year program.

Perhaps we should lend an ear; is it not too late to reject the utopian idea of turning little Vorsma into an industrial giant? To let it make that which it manages to make well, scalpels, clamps, forceps, and multi-use syringes, of which, incidentally, there is also a catastrophic shortage, and seek out space freed by conversion within the defense plants for the production of single-use instrumentation?

From the Editors: As we see, each enterprise has its stumbling block. Yet on the whole, the picture is painfully recognizable: The irresponsibility now showing through in many affairs brought us here, too. The materials from the raid allow a basis to assert that the USSR Council of Ministers decree is being implemented incredibly poorly.

This is all the more alarming because the situation with single-use instrumentation in our medical facilities remains in critical condition, meaning that the horrifying statistics on victims of hospital-caused infections will grow. The editorial board feels that the urgency of the problem requires that it be given back to the country's Government, with high demands made of those who manifest a direct lack of discipline.