STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD: FORCE MULTIPLIERS OR DETRACTORS?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The defense force of the United States has undergone a significant reduction since Desert Storm, and projected budget dollars promise further reductions for the next several years. The forces envisioned in *Joint Vision 2010* will require a radically different support structure. We must make innovative decisions to offset the steadily increasing investments required for the warfighter. Recently, experts have argued that one way to decrease these costs is to employ contractors on the battlefield as force multipliers. We have previously used contractors in a rear area support role. What are the implications for taking the next step: contractors on the battlefield in forward areas, maintaining key weapon systems? A proposal was submitted to the Army to provide Prime Vendor Support (PVS) for a battlefield weapon system. The response to this proposal will establish a precedence for future battlefield operations. "Imbedded contractors" may indeed be the "Wave of the Future." However, we must assess the risks responsibly. We must proceed carefully, evaluating the second and third order

effects of any decisions we make. The critical decisions we make on how to proceed can mean the difference in contractors being force multipliers or detractors, and could tip the scales in favor of the enemy.

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INTRODUCTION

The defense force of the United States has undergone a significant reduction since Desert Storm, and projected budget dollars promise further reductions for the next several years. Further, our military forces and operations are changing dramatically in response to the changing security environment and advances in technology.[1]

Although the goal of the National Security Strategy of the United States is to shape the international environment, it recognizes that shaping efforts alone will not guarantee the international environment we seek. Our changing and dynamic global environment requires that we continue to maintain a strong military force in support of our national security strategy of engagement as we approach the 21st Century.[2] According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),

> we will be able to execute the full spectrum of military operations, from deterring an adversary's aggression or coercion in crisis and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars.

This is a tall order, and is exacerbated by declining resources. The QDR's approach is to trim current forces--primarily in the "tail" (support structure), and only slightly in the "tooth" (combat structure). This mandate not only changes the way we fight, but extends those changes to the way we support the warfighter. The forces envisioned in *Joint Vision 2010* will

require a radically different support structure, as well as some important and innovative decisions to offset the steadily increasing investments we must make to serve the warfighter.

To decrease our "tooth to tail" ratio, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Army have targeted our ever-increasing support and infrastructure costs historically consuming over half of our defense budgets.[3]

One way to decrease these costs is to employ contractors as force multipliers. This concept is not new, but the extent to which we have used contractors in recent conflicts has increased dramatically. Civilians and contractors represented less than three percent of the total force during the Gulf War, but they now represent nine percent of the Bosnian force.[4]

As we increasingly rely on contracted support as force multipliers, we must develop employment doctrine which supports our National Military Strategy in general and the theater commander's campaign strategy in particular.

Although we have previously used contractors in a rear area support role, what are the implications for taking the next step: Contractors on the battlefield in forward areas, maintaining key weapon systems?

This next step was proposed in 1997. At that time, the Army determined that we needed to develop an overarching concept,

doctrine, and policy to govern integration of civilian contractors on the battlefield.

This paper will examine the concept, what that employment doctrine should be, and the implications for theater commanders of employing contractors on the battlefield as force multipliers. It will discuss the risks for expanding contractor utilization, and make recommendations on policies and procedures for the future.

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT IS KEY

The forces envisioned in *Joint Vision 2010* are deployed in accordance with four operational concepts--dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics.[1] According to FM 100-5, logistics links a nation's economic base (people, resources, and industry) to a theater of war. In supporting the warfighter, civilians and contractors will always be part of this logistics infrastructure.

Strategically, logistic capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the National Command Authority (NCA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the combatant commander. Because of our excellent logistics and support structure, we have been successful in conducting military operations from Desert Storm to the present time. During Somalian operations, one lesson learned was that "we have the finest theater-level combat service support

organization in the world; it will be either sought after or modeled in any future peace operation."[5]

The U.N. Logistics Support Command (UNLSC) in Somalia was modeled after the Army Corps Support Group structure, and augmented by U.S. logistics personnel. Although doctrine states that each country will be responsible for its own support structure, in practice the wide variations in the equipment among national contingents resulted in a constant competition for resources. Often the U.S. made up the difference.

However, as this operation progressed into more intense combat, the correspondingly greater logistical demands severely strained the operation. The eventual demands on both the U.N. logistical structure and its U.S. underpinnings were intense, accomplished only by the extraordinary efforts of U.S. logistical personnel.[6]

Therefore, if we must change our logistics and support structure as a result of fewer resources and an expanded mission, whatever changes or decisions we make must be based on acceptable risk and not significantly degrade our capability.

CHANGE BRINGS RISK

When we discuss courses of action, one of the things we often hear is: "That is a risk we accept with this decision." But does the decision carry <u>acceptable</u> risk? Is it a risk that we can accept, is the risk a detractor to warfighting, or is it a

risk that will be a warstopper? What criteria can we use to define when an acceptable risk becomes an unacceptable risk? Is the risk of relying on noncombatants in a forward Area of Operation (AO) an acceptable risk if hostilities increase?

Like it or not, risk taking is a vital component of meeting the critical challenges that will ensure survival in the 21st Century.[7] Risk enables us to manage uncertainty--an important part of everyone's life. Faced with a high-stakes choice, the decision maker must accept trade-offs. Many daily risks, and our judgment on whether they are acceptable or unacceptable, make modern life itself a high-stakes game. But these routine personal risks seem trivial in comparison to the strategic risks of human lives in the defense of our country.[8]

CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

For the Army, the issue of "contractors on the battlefield" is a subset of the larger issue of "civilians on the battlefield." This larger issue includes several categories: Department of the Army (DA) civilians; systems contractors (mostly weapon systems managed by Army Materiel Command [AMC]); contingency contractors, which include the contracted AMC support piece called Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP); and Theater contracting done by the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC).[9]

Historically, civilians have deployed in support of the military, but never to the degree occurring today.[10] The role of DA civilians in support of military operations is now recognized as an important part of our national military strategy. Former Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan declared in 1994 that:

> The civilian presence in the Gulf Region meant more than moral support and filling in for soldiers. Gulf-War veterans say that combat soldiers could owe their lives to the DA (Department of the Army) civilians who helped maintain equipment. Their support tells it all; they've been with their military colleagues every step of the way.[11]

Although controversial issues remain, the Army has come a long way toward accepting the deployment of DA civilians as an integral part of modern military operations. They have proven themselves to be dependable and deployable.

LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

Contractors on the battlefield are not new. They were used during the Napoleonic Wars, the American Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the Korean War. President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision not to call up the reserve component, and the subsequent reliance on civilian contractor support during the Vietnam War, led Army logisticians to develop a preplanned methodology for using contractors. The Army formalized the contractor support concept in 1985 in Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP's objective is to preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces.[12]

In the 1980's Total Army Analysis (TAA), a resource tool Army uses to determine force structure requirements, reflected significant shortages in logistics units, and identified units where civilian contractors could meet logistic requirements.[13] To acquire these assets, the Army tasked each major command to coordinate with each supported Commander In Chief (CINC) to use the LOGCAP concept to establish contracts with civilians to support the identified TAA shortfalls in its Area of Operation. Army force planners and senior leaders thus acknowledged that civilian workers would be necessary to meet the logistic requirements in regional contingencies and war plans.

Despite this formalized requirement to have civilian contractors ready to support the plans, the Army did very little with LOGCAP until 1992. Under the proponency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the program took on an Operations Plan (OPLAN) orientation. As a result, only 3rd U.S. Army (ARCENT) awarded a contract under the LOGCAP umbrella. This contract expired in 1990, having never been utilized beyond the planning stage. Reasons cited were its "high cost for limited application and its dependence on U.S. forces to preposition and transport materials."[14]

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reinforced the growing reality that to support and perform its assigned missions, the U.S. military was dependent on civilian contractors. LOGCAP was not used in the Gulf, but hundreds of

civilian contractors were nonetheless individually "contracted" to provide the logistic support coalition forces required. LTG William G. Pagonis, U.S. Central Command's senior operational logistician, commented: "It has been and will continue to be necessary to rely upon the private sector for support that we should have in-house."[15]

LOGCAP contractors perform services that support U.S. forces. The program is designed primarily for use in areas where no bilateral or multilateral agreements exist. However, it may also provide additional support in areas with formal Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements, where other contractors are involved, or where peacetime support contracts exist.[16] Examples of LOGCAP contractors serving in Bosnia during Task Force Eagle were Brown and Root, who helped build and run base camps and base operations-type activities, AT&T, providing telephone services, and BDM, with linguist services.

Although there are still many challenges associated with LOGCAP, the program is working. We now have hard data on risk levels associated with the Army's uses of contract civilians in recent military operations. We know LOGCAP contractors can get the job done, and the risk level for using DA civilians and LOGCAP contractors are acceptable. Further, since these civilians have been employed primarily in the rear AO, they are relatively secure.

THE NEXT STEP: FORWARD SUPPORT AND INCREASED RISK

What has not been evaluated, however, are the risks associated with using contractor personnel in mission essential positions to maintain key weapon systems forward in the AO.

In April 1997, the Army received a joint (Boeing and Lockheed Martin) proposal for the implementation of a Prime Vendor Support (PVS) arrangement for the Apache helicopter system. The Boeing-Lockheed Martin program would transfer responsibility for complete wholesale support for the Apache helicopter to a single accountable entity--a limited liability company known as Team Apache Systems (TAS). TAS would essentially eliminate the need for government personnel and facilities to acquire, manage, store, and distribute spare parts; it would interface directly with and provide repair parts to the soldier at the retail level.[17]

There are significant advantages to this proposal. According to LTG Paul J. Kern, the Army's Acquisition Corps Director, "the major advantages of such an arrangement would be a significant reduction in operation and support (O&S) costs, a modernized and more capable system, and an increase in readiness."[18]

Further, by reducing the length of the supply pipeline, we are guaranteed to receive spare parts quicker. According to LTG Kern, the money saved can then be reinvested into modernization of weapon systems.[19]

Since no policy or doctrine existed on the use of U.S. contractors for this support to Army operations and/or weapon systems, the Army leadership took the following steps:

a The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment (IL&E), and the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA), signed a policy memorandum on this subject on 12 December 1997.

b. The Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, developed a draft DA Pamphlet 715-XX, Contractor Deployment Guide, that provided an overview of the wide spectrum of contractor deployment issues/topics required for day-to-day operations.

c. The Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) at Fort Lee developed a White Paper, dated 19 February 1998, which laid out a conceptual framework (not guidance). This document focused only on Army issues; it did not address joint implications. Nor did it address the theater commander's responsibilities to civilian contractors who may be deployed forward in the AO.

d. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition formed a General Officer Steering Committee to address the lack of a comprehensive Army doctrine on the issue of contractors on the battlefield. Mr. Eric Orsini, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics), noted that using this PVS concept for a battlefield weapon system

represented a radical change in the way we do business. He went on to say that warfighting CINCs and other users must be made aware of the impact of this approach which will be essentially a force multiplier.[20]

The Army plans to test the PVS concept later this year. What if this test is successful? The logical extrapolation would be to expand the concept to other weapon systems. What are the implications of contractors on the battlefield, being used by the Army, when expanded to 200+ systems, with different chains of command and management support systems? How does this affect joint operations?

Anticipating these questions, in 1997 the Department of the Army began a doctrinal review from "both the business and warfighting perspective."[21]

Even if we solve the problems of multiple contractors on the battlefield with all of their inherent management systems, we face an unprecedented risk: What if hostilities increase and the contractor leaves? What if the military is by then dependent to the extent that there is no one else to maintain a weapon system except the contractor? Other major issues involve who supports the contractor for food, housing, resupply, etc., and if it's the Services, what are the planning and resource implications? Are the risks justifiable and acceptable?

EVALUATING THE PROPOSAL

In a speech to the AUSA Symposium, 13 Jan 98, the Acting Secretary of the Army, Mr. Robert M. Walker, stated that he would evaluate PVS proposals with the following measures:

> First, we must ensure that any new approach results in no degradation of readiness.
>
> Second, that it works in both peace and war.
>
> Third, that it meets accept applicable statutory requirements.
>
> Fourth, that it provides significant cost savings.
>
> Fifth, that it guarantees a competitive industrial base and vendor base will remain for the future.
>
> Sixth, and perhaps most important, that any new approach is politically sustainable.

Only after satisfying these criteria will we be able to use contractors with acceptable risk.

RISKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMMANDER

There are many risks associated with depending on civilian contractors in a battlefield situation. Some of them affect mission readiness: What are the implications of contractors to readiness evaluated in terms of timing, command and control, and force protection? Can we guarantee that the vendor will be there in times of war? Will a decision to expand the use of contractors as a force multiplier provide a significant cost savings? In the following pages, this author will discuss six of these issues, particularly as they apply to the commander in the

joint theater: mission readiness, timing, command and control, discipline, force protection, and resources planning. They are not all encompassing. Rather, they represent a theater commander's initial concerns.

1. Mission/Readiness.

Walker stated we must "ensure no degradation of readiness." We can evaluate readiness in a variety of ways.

Commitment to the Mission

An advantage of using a contractor is that it allows military personnel to focus on the mission, since civilians provide support functions. However, one of the basic differences between contractors and soldiers is their dedication to the mission.

When asked what the major disadvantage he saw to working with contractors in Bosnia, a former commander said, "Lack of some sense of commitment to mission as compared to the unit they are supporting." Other comments were "playing both ends and promises made and not kept (blaming their bosses)." Commanders felt that sometimes the contractors created unnecessary work to generate greater income. Without a good management system that specifically shows what the mission (job) is and what the end states are, this problem may be hard to overcome. However, one commander also allowed that "...through close cooperation, we developed in them a commitment over time."[22]

Mission Essential Services. Implications of using systems contractors in war as we do in peace means that their services will be mission essential. Although the DA policy states unequivocally that contractors will not replace force structure, the reality is that if the capability is not in our force structure during peacetime, it will probably not be there in wartime. This opens two areas of risk. What if contractors choose to leave when a conflict intensifies? Also, can noncombatants legally stay in the conflict zone when conflicts escalate?

> Contractors providing services designated as essential are expected to use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such services, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract, during periods of crisis until appropriately released or evacuated by military authority.[23]

Even if a contract calls for employees to stay during a conflict, and the company is liable for that, an employee merely has to resign to relieve himself of that obligation.

Interestingly, the question of mission essentially is not a new one. In 1984, a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, conducted hearings on this problem and issued a report based on a Logistics Management Institute study. According to this study, civilian field maintenance technicians believed that in their absence, materiel readiness would be degraded substantially and that some complex equipment (HAWK missile batteries) would become totally

inoperable in as little as five days.[24] At that time, Congress said that DoD needed comprehensive and reliable data to assess the extent of its dependence on contractor support in areas of potential hostilities. Congress was especially concerned with vulnerabilities caused by civilians leaving positions they filled in peacetime.

The contractual terms of civilian service overseas are critical in assessing the prospects for continuity of this support. A General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation cited in this hearing found that contingency clauses for crises in conflicts did not establish a firm obligation for employees to continue providing services during periods of increased tension or hostilities:

> Some contractor personnel interviewed said that their companies permit them to leave areas of potential hostilities at their own discretion and to be reassigned elsewhere in the company organization. Many of the 25 employees interviewed in Europe said they were not likely to remain.[25]

Most companies had not discussed with their employees the possibility of being caught in a war zone. Recruiting pitches typically concentrate on the various advantages of living and working in Europe. As a result, most of the interviewed contractor personnel were not sure what their companies would expect of them during mobilization or hostile action. Some thought they would be scheduled to leave along with other noncombatants once the State Department ordered an evacuation.

We cannot overcome the problem of contractors leaving by requiring clauses that obligate the contractor to compensate for the unplanned departure of their personnel. It is not unlawful for employees to leave a hostile area. In the absence of a formal declaration of war, there are no legal sanctions which can be imposed against civilians who leave overseas jobs without permission.[26] This represents a key vulnerability which could have serious consequences, and could impair the ability of the U.S. command structures to direct and control their operations in theater.

This uncertainty establishes the need for provisions to ensure that civilians remain in critical positions under adversity. It also illustrates DoD's limitations in using civilians on the battlefield. Although contractor and DoD civilian personnel have historically been willing to go into a war zone to work and have proven to be reliable, there is still no assurance that essential civilians hired and serving in peacetime would be willing to remain in a potential war zone should the likelihood of war increase or should a conflict actually start.[27]

Finally, as stated earlier, even though the Army can hold the company liable, the employee simply has to submit a resignation. In effect, warfighting cannot be conducted successfully through legalisms or litigation.

2. Timing.

The outcome of a given choice can be measured over time. In order to be successful, and to be effective as a force multiplier, the right support must be in the right place at the right time.[28] With proper timing, a joint force commander can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy's ability to react.[29] Timely support, or responsiveness, "..is the keystone..all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of the operations of the supported commander."[30]

Planning for the contractor, along with all the other myriad of logistics and support tasks, is a key task that will have timing implications for the commander. For example, construction of base camps for Task Force Eagle was delayed due to contractor absence. This delay triggered a further change in the deployment order, so other units were delayed. However, the deployment was a success, although it was conducted under adverse weather conditions. It concluded within the planned period, without loss of life. Working with general guidelines, systems contractors normally begin performing services quickly, but not normally before C+30 in a violent environment. They may arrive much sooner in less violent environments. They normally operate during peacetime, so transition to operational support usually requires only a ramping-up of contractor activity. However, they are subject to lift availability, specific training, and

qualification requirements, just as their military counterpart elements.[31]

The newly developed DA Pamphlet 715-XX specifies contractors' pre-deployment activities:

> As part of deployment processing for contractor employees, the Individual Deployment Sites (IDS) or CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) will screen contractors' records, conduct theater specific briefings and training, issue theater specific clothing and individual equipment, verify that medical requirements (such as immunization, DNA screening, HIV testing and dental examinations) for deployment have been met, and arrange for transportation to the theater of operations.

The pamphlet also states that the contractor must ensure that his employees receive all required processing information. Obviously, unless the peacetime contract specifically calls for the contractor's organization to ensure that all deployment information is up-to-date, there will be a delay in their deployment.

3. Command and Control.

Command and control of battlefield personnel is critical to success of the mission. A contract with a Scope of Work (SOW) controls private companies and their civilian employees. Any changes to this SOW to provide services not addressed in the original contract requires modification. Contractor support is only as good as the ability of the Contracting Officer (KO) to modify the contract on a timely basis so that the contractor can perform the work. Further it is only as good as the ability of the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) to convey these

changes to the KO, who in turn negotiates and authorizes the change.

So, who controls the civilian contractors? The commander is responsible for the given AO, to include the soldiers and DA civilians under his command. By law, however, the KO is responsible for the civilian contractor personnel. If the commander exceeds the terms and conditions of the contract in a battlefield environment, has he broken the law? What are the implications for the commander in that situation?[32]

In an interview, this author asked a former battalion commander in Bosnia that if he were the theater commander, what would be his biggest concern in using contractors? He replied:

> Besides force protection, a "We-They" impact on morale and discipline. Contractors are not in the chain of command, call their own hours, do not have the same pride and commitment to mission accomplishment, will not suffer (may, in fact, avoid) hardships suffered by troops, and have separate R&R policies--creating a natural separation between contractors and soldiers. Under difficult and dangerous conditions, this gulf can be exaggerated. Also, without supervisory disciplinary responsibility over contractors, commanders are at risk in getting things done, under extreme conditions, that are absolutely mission essential."[33]

4. Discipline.

Military law is set forth in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Active duty soldiers are subject to the UCMJ at all times, on and off post. However, UCMJ only applies to contractor employees when they are serving with or accompanying an armed force "in time of war." The U.S. Supreme Court has

ruled "in time of war" to mean a congressionally declared war.[34] According to DA Pamphlet 715-XX, the commander has limited discipline leverage on a contractor:

> Discipline may be conferred on contractor personnel by suspending administrative privileges, but this is for infractions such as making a sale, or purchasing for unauthorized members, of exchange merchandise and services, theft of exchange merchandise, shoplifting, or intention and repeated presentation of dishonored checks or other indebtedness.

The pamphlet does not discuss other forms of discipline. Nonetheless, discipline is necessary with contractors just as it is with soldiers. On base, contractors should be subject to the same standards of conduct as soldiers. Although these standards can be enforced by the commander on post, off-post activities and/or restrictions will be hard to enforce for contractor personnel. One commander reported:

> If I had a problem with a contractor, the chain of discipline went to their supervisor. As base commander, I felt I had responsibility for their behavior and the authority to report problems and demand removal/replacement. This only surfaced once in eleven months: a contractor sexually harassed a female MP; supervisors immediately reprimanded him; there were no more problems.[35]

5. Force Protection.

Protecting the lives of our soldiers, as well as the civilians who work along side them, is our greatest responsibility. The risk of danger is always present; peaceful operations can turn hostile.

Contractor civilians must understand that hostilities can erupt with little or no warning. They must be informed that they may be required to defend themselves and operate in a hostile environment, and trained to do so. Some important questions quickly surface:

> --What happens if a contractor is captured or detained? What happens if a contractor is killed in hostile territory?
>
> --What is the process of repatriation?
>
> --Will the policy of not leaving wounded or killed behind apply to civilians as well?
>
> --Who will be responsible for ensuring that the remains are handled appropriately, contractor or military personnel?[36]

In the DA Policy memorandum signed by the ASA(IL&E) and the ASA(RDA), these issues were addressed:

> If captured, a contractor's status will depend on the type of conflict, applicability of any relevant international agreements, and the nature of the hostile force. When the United States is a participant in an international armed conflict, contractors are entitled to be protected as POWs if captured by a force that is a Geneva/Hague Convention signatory.

Civilians working for the military in a hostile environment face a certain amount of risk above what can normally be considered the "cost of doing business." We must carefully analyze this risk, since it has a direct bearing on the operational commander's decision to use a contractor. However, if the only way to maintain a weapon system is to use contractors because no redundant capability with military personnel exists,

the commander will be forced into using contractors regardless of the risk.

A hostile environment affects the contractor's ability to perform his mission. The contractor requires military units to protect his personnel and equipment, creating a potentially unacceptable situation. If hostilities increase, the commander may require additional troops to protect the civilians under his control. Such diversion of armed forces could jeopardize the commander's mission. Uncertainty regarding Operations Other Than War's (OOTW) volatility impedes precise risk assessment. Nonetheless, commanders at all levels must conduct risk analyses before deciding to use contractor support during such operations.[37]

Force protection in Bosnia provided us valuable lessons learned. Knowing the location of all soldiers 24 hours a day and restricting off-post activities were key elements in force protection during Task Force Eagle. Hostile elements would have loved to kidnap or kill unsuspecting American soldiers found in an off-post restaurant or motel. Many U.S. and allied soldiers bristled under the restrictions on their movement, but all soldiers came home without loss of life to an off-post incident. Their survival offers proof of this policy's worth.[38]

In Bosnia the off-post restrictions were sometimes violated by Brown and Root workers, who did go off base to drink and go to a brothel.[39] Thus they were exposed to risks because they were

not subject to the restrictions placed on military personnel. Fortunately, this did not turn into a crisis; however, the potential risk was there.

Large numbers of contractors moving around the battlefield (especially a suburban or urban battlefield) pose an additional concern for commanders--a potential detractor that could divert combat power. Commanders must plan in new and creative ways with noncombatants on the battlefield. As another commander said:

> Army cooks can fight as well as cook. So can Army mechanics and fuel handlers; Army engineers are expected/have an additional mission--to FIGHT AS INFANTRY. But contractors are not armed. They don't pull guard. They do not have the inherent self-protection capability of Combat Service Support units. Replace such units with contractors and you lose "guns"....further, you take on a new, heavier protection requirement.[40]

6. Resource Planning Implications.

Is outsourcing to contractors as Combat Service Support force multipliers cost effective? If the contractor is supporting mission-essential operations, then support to the contractor must be equivalent to the support provided the military forces they are supporting (i.e., food, billets, medical, recreation/morale, personnel, legal, etc.). This support can either be provided by the military or the contractor, depending on the contract.[41]

However, the commander must meet the requirement to plan carefully for these support requirements and for the additional resources required. For example, if the contractor provides this support, the contract will cost more money, since the means to

provide the support must be factored into the contract. This puts the theater commander in the business of knowing what the contractor should be doing, of determining whether any changes are needed, and also of being constantly attuned to costs.

If the military provides the contractor's support requirements, key planning considerations go beyond money: Time, facilities, and force structure must be allocated for this support. For example, seaports and airports, as well as warehouse facilities, will be prioritized for the military equipment and supplies to support the warfighter. Those same key ports will be critical to the contractor as well. Since competition already exists between the military combat units and logistics units for space, the addition of contractor competition could overload the system.

Further, if contractors maintain weapon systems and are mission essential, should contractors then be included on the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL)?

DA Pamphlet 715-XX, Appendix A, provides a list of Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment and Chemical Defense Equipment (OCIE/CDE) that may be issued to the contractor employees at the discretion of the Theater Commander. Further, the pamphlet gives the Theater Commander the task of determining the requirement for equipment and training contractor personnel with CDE. It is reasonable to assume that the Theater Commander is expected to provide the same force protection to his civilian

contractors as he provides to his soldiers. In Bosnia, force protection included providing security for redundant communications with base headquarters; constant tracking of missions, locations, departure and arrival times; escort and guard when threat assessments required it; and providing military escorts for areas on base which were off limits to contractors. Large numbers of contractors becomes a significant resource issue for the commander in terms of security escorts.

Another resource implication is fitness for duty and medical infrastructure. In Bosnia, commanders found that many contractors were not physically capable of withstanding the harsh environment. Since resources for medical equipment and personnel are based on the number of military personnel in theater, a significant number of contractor personnel could put a severe strain on the medical system.[42] A doctor who provided support in Bosnia related an example of a contractor who was diabetic. They had no facilities to store his insulin or treat him. The decision to send a stricken contractor to a local hospital depends on the country and its medical capabilities and infrastructure, which are usually already strained in a wartime environment. Their only choice was to send him home, but it was some time before they received a replacement.[43]

Additionally, our Somalia deployment reinforced the lesson that medical personnel must come prepared to deal with some of the world's most deadly and exotic diseases. It is imperative

that all personnel, regardless of whether they are military or civilian, be properly vaccinated before deployment. Therefore, we must provide the resources to vaccinate our civilians as well as our military before deployment.

At the present time, the Army is gathering cost data to determine whether using contractors would be cost effective. Some costs, such as vaccinations, could be offset by requiring contractor reimbursement. However, although Army policy states that "the Army will provide or make available, on a reimbursable basis, force protection and support services commensurate with those provided to DoD civilian personnel to the extent authorized by law," no management system currently exists for commanders to capture those costs. These costs then must be carefully estimated up front, and included in the contract as a cost of doing business.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.

In evaluating the risks associated with using contractors on the battlefield, to some degree we have made the "shoot or no shoot" decision already.[44] Contractors are currently deployed in theaters of operation. They will be deployed in the future, perhaps in greater proportions.

How we approach the next step, however, is key. In evaluating the risks of increasing contractor support to include depending on contractors for mission-essential tasks without

redundant military capability with military personnel, this author recommends an eight-step process:

Step 1. Make decisions within the reality that warfighting cannot always be driven by low cost decisions.

Step 2. Evaluate the Apache PVS test under the same warfighting considerations we would use for any change in military operations, including joint implications.

Step 3. Refuse to proceed with additional battlefield contractor maintained or operated systems until a Joint Task Force studies all the risks and implications of supporting the warfighter this way, including Army doctrine development.

Step 4. Involve the CINCs in decisions to outsource services.

Step 5. Identify a lead agency in the Army to coordinate these studies.

Step 6. Incorporate the use of contractor support in key exercises and training events to familiarize commanders and staff elements with the critical issues of employing contractor support.[45]

Step 7. Develop a comprehensive and effective management control system to capture and evaluate costs that compare using contractors to maintaining key weapon systems versus their military counterparts.

Step 8. Accomplish all of the preceding steps before eliminating force structure, active or reserve components, associated with contractor support.

In Operation Desert Storm, we used contractors extensively. According to a Logistics Management Institute Report, Assessing the Adequacy of the Industrial Base, May 14, 1992, directed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (IL&E), up to 100 contractors representing 23 companies operated the CECOM Special Repair Activity (SRA) in Southwest Asia (SWA). Contractor personnel representing the other MSCs worked at similar SRAs established to support the systems of the other MSCs. According to the report:

> The large number of contractor personnel in SWA supporting all the MSCs highlighted numerous issues about their full integration into theater operations. Beginning with the appropriate contract language, the Army must address the identification, indoctrination, transportation, housing, provisioning of support and maintenance facilities, in-theater transportation of contractor personnel, and the establishment of appropriate policies to account for their expected presence.[46]

"Imbedded contractors" are here to stay, and contractors on the forward area of the battlefield during conflict may indeed be the "Wave of the Future"[47] even with its inherent risks. However, risking responsibly means attempting to outmaneuver any threat to the risk's success.[48] This means making sound and deliberate decision on the best way to use contractors to accomplish the mission, the best way to enhance the use of available military personnel, and the best way to reduce risk.

In order to risk responsibly, we must proceed carefully, evaluating the second and third order effects of any decisions we make. The way we proceed with these critical decisions can mean the difference in contractor support being a force multiplier or a detractor--decisions that could tip the scales in favor of the enemy. That we can't afford. For as Bertrand Russell said, "A life without adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is allowed to take whatever form it will, is likely to be short."

(6,161)

ENDNOTES

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[3] Paul J. Kern, LTG, "Prime Vendor Support: Wave of the Future," Army RD&A, January-February 1998, 5.

[4] Peters, 27.

[5] Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 82.

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[27] Ibid, 8.

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[29] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), III-15.

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[48] Calvert, 152.

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