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**AMERICA'S POST-COLD WAR MILITARY HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE POLICY: A STUDY IN INCONSISTENCY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**America's Post-Cold War Military Humanitarian
Assistance Policy: A Study in Inconsistency**

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ABSTRACT

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In the decade since the end of the Cold War, American policy on the use of the military in humanitarian assistance operations has been remarkable for its inconsistency and, for the last several years, its timidity. As a result, instead of achieving a new world order based on its values and interests the United States is poised to enter the twenty-first century in a world of disorder where it is viewed as unwilling to intervene in crises for fear of placing American lives at risk. To rectify this situation, the United States must embrace a policy that recognizes there are times when military force should be used to protect basic humanitarian values even in the absence of other national interests. This paper traces the evolution of U.S. military humanitarian assistance policy since 1991, concludes that the flexible use of force policy enunciated in the 1997 National Military Strategy is the right one for the new century, and recommends the Clinton Administration adopt this policy in the next revision of its National Security Strategy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AMERICA'S POST-COLD WAR MILITARY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE POLICY: A STUDY IN INCONSISTENCY	1
THE BUSH YEARS: PURSUING "A NEW WORLD ORDER"	2
CLINTON'S FIRST TERM: RETRENCHMENT IN THE FACE OF CHAOS	15
SOMALIA: TEST CASE FOR THE CLINTON VIEW OF PEACEKEEPING	17
NSS 94: SOMALIA'S STING PROMPTS A NEW, MORE LIMITED POLICY ..	20
THE "PERRY DOCTRINE" EMERGES	27
NSS 95: CLINTON ADOPTS THE "PERRY DOCTRINE"	34
POLICY IN CLINTON'S SECOND TERM: AN EMERGING MIDDLE GROUND? ...	39
NSS 97: THE SHAPE, RESPOND AND PREPARE NOW STRATEGY EMERGES .	39
PDD-56: MANAGING COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS	45
NMS 97: THE CJCS JETTISONS THE PERRY DOCTRINE	48
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	50
ENDNOTES	53
BIBLIOGRAPHY	65

**AMERICA'S POST-COLD WAR MILITARY HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE POLICY: A STUDY IN INCONSISTENCY**

The people of Somalia ... need our help. ... We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act.

— George Bush¹

With these words on the night of 4 December 1992, President George Bush effectively announced his rejection of both the Weinberger Doctrine, which permitted American military intervention only to protect interests vital either to the United States or its allies,² and the Powell corollary, which insisted that military force be employed overwhelmingly and only as a last resort.³ Instead, as the only remaining superpower, the United States had a responsibility to do more—to act when a crisis somewhere in the world could not otherwise be resolved or when American action could be the “catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations.”⁴ American troops would intervene in another nation, forcibly if necessary, to protect basic humanitarian values in pursuit of a new world order.

This expansive policy did not last long, however, for when eighteen American soldiers were killed and seventy-eight more were wounded in Somalia ten months later,⁵ the Clinton Administration began a policy retreat that bottomed out with its adoption in February 1995 of the “Perry Doctrine.” This doctrine

not only eschewed the use of force to uphold purely humanitarian interests, it announced that American troops would be committed to humanitarian assistance missions only once certain preconditions had been met. As a result, instead of achieving a new world order based on American values and interests we are poised to enter the twenty-first century in a world of disorder where the United States is viewed as unwilling to intervene in crises for fear of placing American lives at risk. To rectify this situation, the United States must embrace a flexible use of force policy that recognizes there are times when military force should be used to protect basic humanitarian values even in the absence of other national interests. This paper traces the evolution of America's use of force policy from 1991 to the present in the context of humanitarian assistance operations, concludes that the flexible policy enunciated in the present national military strategy, *Shape, Prepare, Respond Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era (NMS 97)* is the right one for the new century, and recommends the Clinton Administration adopt the policy suggested in *NMS 97* in the next revision of its National Security Strategy.⁶

THE BUSH YEARS: PURSUING "A NEW WORLD ORDER"

When freedom-seeking East Germans tore down the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, its crash generated a wave of American opti-

mism that built as the Soviet Union crumbled and crested with the thrashing of Iraq's army in Operation Desert Storm in February 1991. America was resurgent. The Cold War had ended, the threat of nuclear holocaust had faded, and the American military and way of life had been vindicated. Seized with this optimism, President Bush declared that America had within its grasp an opportunity "to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals," a new world order founded on democratic ideas, free trade and a commitment to settling differences peaceably.⁷

As a political realist, President Bush recognized that the world he envisioned would not appear simply because it was the right one. Too many people did not subscribe to American values for wishing simply to make it so. On the other hand, the United States also could not become the world's policeman, taking action against "each and every outrage of violence."⁸ Instead, American global leadership would be required to make the new world order a reality. As President Bush later would explain, "In the wake of the Cold War, in a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace."⁹ But President Bush recognized that the United States could not lead simply by advocating its values and demanding change. To persuade like-minded countries to join in building

the new world order, the United States had to prove its commitment through action.¹⁰ As missions subsequent to Operation Desert Storm would reveal, to President Bush that commitment to act clearly included deploying our armed forces and, when required, exercising our military might, to uphold basic humanitarian values, even when no vital American interests are at stake.

The first such military mission arose when dissident Kurdish factions in Northern Iraq rebelled against Saddam Hussein's regime just a month after Operation Desert Storm ended. Despite Iraq's weakened military state the regime possessed more than enough firepower to crush the rebellion and rout the Kurds, causing thousands of refugees to flee into Turkey, Iran and Syria. An estimated 500,000 refugees eventually massed in so-called "sanctuaries" in the mountains of Southern Turkey, where they began to die of exposure, malnutrition and disease.¹¹ Media coverage focused on the Kurds' plight galvanized public opinion on yet another depredation by Iraq.

In response, the Bush Administration quickly put together an ad hoc coalition under American military leadership to provide humanitarian and security assistance to the refugees. Over the next several months the coalition forces of Operation Provide Comfort provided thousands of tons of food, medicine and supplies and opened up a security zone in Iraq, convincing the Iraqis to evacuate previously captured Kurdish areas. By July

the Kurdish refugees had left the mountains and were safely back in Iraq. American military forces, with the help of eleven nations and numerous humanitarian organizations, had stopped the misery and dying without bloodshed.¹²

While Operation Provide Comfort was a huge success largely because it followed immediately on the heels of Operation Desert Storm (the consequences to the Iraqis had they failed to acquiesce were obvious), it would be a mistake to view it as merely a continuation of that operation. Operation Desert Storm had been the quintessential post-Vietnam military operation; an overwhelming application of military might employed with the support of the American people as a last resort in pursuit of a clear-cut military objective against a threat to a vital national interest—in this case continued access to oil.¹³ Operation Provide Comfort differed in a number of ways. First, the operation involved the threat of military force, not its application. Second, whether coalition forces had the capability to quickly overwhelm the Iraqis had they chosen to fight is debatable. But most importantly, the interests at stake, preservation of regional stability, protection of basic human rights, and probably a lingering measure of guilt for not having supported the dissident Kurds after encouraging them to overthrow Saddam Hussein, while important, were not interests vital to the United States. Consequently, in Operation Provide Comfort President Bush ap-

peared to have rejected, at least in part, the Weinberger Doctrine, which had shaped American military use of force policy since 1984.¹⁴ It also signaled President Bush's willingness to use military force to help build a new world order based in part on America's belief in the fundamental human right to live.

The next military humanitarian assistance mission took place in April 1991 when a typhoon devastated the coast of Bangladesh, killing approximately 150,000 people and leaving some 1.7 million more homeless and in danger of dying of starvation and disease.¹⁵ In response to an official government request for assistance, the United States launched Operation Sea Angel to provide disaster relief to the affected population. American military forces provided logistics, water purification, communications, and air traffic control for the relief operation, which resulted in thousands of lives saved and another Bush Administration success.¹⁶ Significantly, in this operation President Bush had acted not to protect important national interests but rather to promote values basic to the new world order he envisioned. At the same time, he sent a message to the military: American troops must be prepared to respond across the entire spectrum of operations, from fighting major theater wars to providing food and water to victims of natural disasters. Moreover, the military had better be prepared to shift quickly from one to the other, because President Bush intended to make mili-

tary humanitarian assistance operations foreseeable, if not routine, military missions.

The Bush Administration's March 1990 *National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS 90)*, the version in effect when Operations Provide Comfort and Sea Angel took place, was silent on the subject of humanitarian assistance operations, no doubt because it still reflected Cold War realities. While the United States safely could have embarked on a disaster relief mission like Operation Sea Angel, a humanitarian intervention mission like Operation Provide Comfort would have been virtually unthinkable in the Cold War environment. The danger of a superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union simply would have been too great. *NSS 90* thus mentioned the only humanitarian assistance truly possible during the Cold War, providing economic aid to relief agencies.¹⁷

By the time the Bush Administration updated *NSS 90* in August 1991 (*NSS 91*), however, the world had changed dramatically. While the Cold War was not yet over, the Soviet threat had faded while the United States had become stronger. Not only were humanitarian interventions possible, Operation Provide Comfort proved that the target could be a Russian client state. The White House thus could freely declare in *NSS 91* that the United States "will respond quickly and substantially to the suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters."¹⁸ This pol-

icy statement contained no limits whatsoever; it covered the spectrum of humanitarian assistance, from Operation Sea Angel's natural disaster relief mission to Operation Provide Comfort's humanitarian intervention mission. It also encouraged action in response to other humanitarian crises, and new missions soon appeared.

In early summer 1992, when the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees requested an airlift of food and supplies to prevent starvation among the population of Sarajevo, then under siege by Serbian forces, the United States and other nations responded with a massive airlift. Operation Provide Promise eventually delivered more than 160,000 metric tons of food, medicine and relief supplies to, and evacuated more than 1,000 patients from, that war-torn city of 380,000.¹⁹ Of significance, Operation Provide Promise was effective largely because it was combined with Operation Deny Flight, which involved, among other things, enforcing an exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Had U.S. and other NATO aircrews not secured the airspace over Sarajevo and silenced the guns shelling that city, the humanitarian effort would have been ineffective. Once again, the President had used military force to address a threat to basic humanitarian values.

At the same time, he had not used military force to stop the fighting, which threatened a more important U.S. national interest—a stable, democratic Europe. This dichotomy illus-

trated two important tenets of President Bush's evolving policy: Military force should be used when it can be effective and when the potential benefits outweigh the potential costs. President Bush had correctly judged that while it was far too risky to introduce combat troops to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, he could avert starvation in Sarajevo with minimal risk to American lives by applying air power to protect the airlift and humanitarian effort.²⁰ And once again President Bush had successfully demonstrated America's willingness to lead a coalition of like-minded nations in addressing a threat to the values aspect of his new world order.

Another humanitarian airlift, Operation Restore Hope, began in August 1992, this time in an effort to stop the dying in Somalia, a nation wracked by civil war. By December the Air Force had flown over 1,400 flights, delivering 17,000 tons of food; however, the security situation continued to deteriorate, making it increasingly difficult and dangerous for relief agencies to distribute aid.²¹ Over 500,000 Somalis died and hundreds of thousands more were at risk of starvation.²² Finally, on 4 December 1992 President Bush ordered 25,000 American troops to deploy to Somalia in the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Its mission was to create a secure environment within which relief agencies could deliver aid to the areas hardest hit by the famine. The American troops then were to be withdrawn, handing

the security mission back to a U.N. peacekeeping force, which for the first time would include regular U.S. units.²³

In his Address to the Nation on Somalia, President Bush responded to critics of his decision to send in the troops:

In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations.

Nevertheless, he said, "The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act."²⁴ In other words, it was America's responsibility to exercise global leadership by using military force both to stop the dying and to encourage other nations to support the United Nation's long term effort to rebuild the Somali nation. President Bush clearly was risking American lives to promote fundamental human values and a new world order aligned with value-based American national interests. Unlike Northern Iraq and Sarajevo, with their plausible linkage to stability and security interests, Somalia was totally values based. The UNITAF operation thus represented yet another enlargement of America's post-Cold War humanitarian assistance policy. While that policy was as yet largely unwritten, it did not remain so for long. President Bush outlined his views on the subject at the U.S.

Military Academy on 5 January 1993, in a speech entitled "The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice."²⁵

In his address to the Corps of Cadets, President Bush stressed the necessity for the United States to demonstrate leadership in order to build the new world order he envisioned. Otherwise, the United States risked the emergence of a world marked by chaos and violence led by "dictators and tyrants bent on denying fundamental human rights and seizing territory regardless of the human cost." And he declared that real leadership requires a willingness to use military force when necessary. The difficulty, he said, was in knowing when to employ military force and when to demur:

Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally. In some circumstances, it may be essential; in others, counterproductive. I know that many people would like to find some formula ... to apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force. [But] anyone looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment. In the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of rules for using force. Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgment. Each and every case is unique.²⁶

If there had been any doubt before, there could be no doubt now that President Bush did not subscribe to former Secretary of Defense Weinberger's view that military force was to be employed only once certain preconditions had been met. In fact, President Bush viewed such rule sets as dangerous:

... To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives and would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions. It could signal U.S. friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on.²⁷

President Bush also confirmed his rejection of the Weinberger Doctrine's insistence that military force was to be employed only in pursuit of interests vital to the United States or its allies. "The relative importance of an interest is not a guide," he said, "Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, by less than vital."²⁸ President Bush had already demonstrated in Iraq, Sarajevo and, most recently, Somalia, his willingness to use force to protect fundamental human rights and to foster a new world order based on humanitarian values. This statement confirmed his new realism—the use of military power to shape a new world order reflecting fundamental American values.

President Bush then outlined three principles that informed his decisions on the use of military force, one that dealt with when to use military force and two that dealt with how to do it. The principle regarding when to use military force contained three decisional elements. First, using military force makes sense when it can be effective and when no other policy is likely to be effective.²⁹ In other words, if military

force can achieve the desired result, the United States need not exhaust every policy alternative before taking military action. It does not have to be the option of last resort. Instead, it is enough to conclude that other policy alternatives likely would not be effective. In rejecting yet another element of the Weinberger Doctrine, President Bush gained the ability to use the military option sooner and to do so with surprise. Would-be tyrants could no longer count on the United States pursuing time-consuming economic and diplomatic efforts before turning to the military element of power to resolve a crisis.

President Bush's second consideration was whether the interests at stake in the crisis and the potential benefits of military intervention justify the potential costs and sacrifice involved in sending American troops into harm's way.³⁰ For a President determined to analyze crises on a case-by-case basis, this cost-benefit analysis seems the next logical step after determining that military force is likely to be the most effective way to address the crisis. If the balance tips against intervention the decision should be to not act, hard as that may be to do. That, President Bush asserted, was why he had declined to introduce ground troops into the former Yugoslavia: "Up to now it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force ... would have had the desired effect, given the nature and the complexity of that situation."³¹ When the balance tips

in favor of intervention, though, President Bush's third consideration, whether the application of force can be limited in scope and time, becomes important.³² President Bush clearly believed that if those limits can be achieved the use of military force makes sense. If they cannot; in other words, if escalation cannot be avoided, President Bush apparently believed that military force generally would not be the right policy choice.³³

President Bush's remaining two principles addressed not when to use military force, but rather how to use it once the decision had been made to intervene militarily. First, he said, the United States "must act with ... maximum possible support. [While] the United States can and should lead, [we should], where possible, involv[e] the United Nations or other multinational grouping." This principle is important in at least two respects. First, it recognizes the importance in a unipolar world for the United States to seek consensus and support for its use of force and the value the weight of numerous nations can have in influencing the actions of the nation they oppose. Second, it emphasizes a hallmark of every Bush Administration humanitarian operation: The proper place for the United States in most multilateral military operations is in the lead, which helps to ensure force protection and protect against mission creep.³⁴

President Bush's final principle addressed how to limit the scope of the military mission: "In every case [it is] essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete."³⁵ President Bush intended to ensure that American troops would be committed only in pursuit of well planned and clearly defined objectives and that a plan would be in place (an exit strategy) that would bring them home when their job was done. Taken together, President Bush's principles for decision defined an expansive and flexible policy appropriate to the building a new world in line with America's interests and values. It was a policy born of President Bush's deep understanding of foreign policy and the role of humanitarian missions in shaping a new American Century. This new world order promoted American values but maintained a realist's perspective. Unfortunately, this would not last long.

CLINTON'S FIRST TERM:

RETRENCHMENT IN THE FACE OF CHAOS

While President Bush had focused largely on foreign policy, President Clinton took office in January 1993 determined to focus on domestic issues, the area he understood and the one that had carried him into office. A political idealist with no mili-

tary or foreign policy experience, he saw the opportunities presented by collapse of communism and the triumph of democracy somewhat differently than President Bush:

... My vision is of a world united in peaceful commerce; a world in which nations compete more in economic and less in military terms; a world of dynamic market-generated growth that narrows the gap between rich and poor; a world increasingly engaged in democracy, tolerant of diversity and respectful of human rights; a world united against the common enemies of mankind: war, poverty, ignorance, disease, and environmental destruction....

He saw America's strengths (prioritized most likely in the order listed) as "our values, our economic power, [and] when necessary, our military might." It was a decidedly idealist-oriented viewpoint.³⁶

While President Clinton recognized that the world remained a dangerous place, one of his "key assumptions" was that:

America must regain its economic strength to maintain [its] position of global leadership. While military power will continue to be vital to our national security, its utility is declining relative to economic power. We cannot afford to go on spending too much on firepower and too little on brainpower.³⁷

Consequently, President Clinton entered his first term of office with three national security objectives: First, to restructure the military for a new era; second, working with our allies, to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy; and third, to reestablish America's economic leadership at home and abroad.³⁸

How President Clinton would achieve his second objective illustrates one of the main differences between his idealist view of the world and President Bush's realist view. While both presidents believed it important to maximize support from multinational organizations such as the United Nations and ad hoc coalitions composed of like-minded nations, President Bush saw coalition support as a means to lend credence and weight to U.S. actions in shaping a new American Century.³⁹ President Clinton on the other hand saw the organizations and coalitions themselves as the political entities shaping a new idealist world order. Indeed, he did not see the U.S. military leading coalition operations; he saw our military operating with other "partners" within the coalition.⁴⁰ This fundamentally different view of the military's role, when added to President Clinton's desire to reduce and redirect military spending to domestic issues, his inexperience in military matters, and his relative disinterest in foreign policy, later would contribute to tragedy in Somalia. That, in turn, would lead to a humanitarian assistance policy retreat from which the United States has yet to recover.

SOMALIA: TEST CASE FOR THE CLINTON VIEW OF PEACEKEEPING

Upon his inauguration President Clinton inherited the UNITAF humanitarian intervention operation in Somalia; 20,000 American troops engaged in providing security for food deliveries in a

failed nation in the midst of a civil war.⁴¹ His initial focus thus was going to be overseas despite his desire to focus on the American economy. In December President-elect Clinton had welcomed the U.N. Security Council decision to intervene militarily in Somalia and had commended President Bush "for taking the lead in this important humanitarian effort" that would give "new hope" to the Somali people.⁴² Now President Clinton had to decide when it was safe enough for the troops to begin the process of handing over the UNITAF mission to the UN peacekeeping force.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the decision came quickly. Just two weeks after President Clinton took office, on 4 February 1993 Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnson, the UNITAF Commander, declared the mission ready to hand over to the UN peacekeeping force.⁴³ President Clinton must have concurred, because the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II began the next day. The UNITAF mission, as defined by the United States, had been a success. In just two months the task force had virtually eliminated deaths from starvation; secured and improved the ports, airfields, and roads to permit regular convoys to deliver food to all nine humanitarian relief sectors; and reduced the widespread factional fighting to isolated clashes.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, the factions merely had been waiting for the United States to leave before resuming their fighting. While warnings that this would occur had been sounded from the begin-

ning of the UNITAF mission,⁴⁵ the Clinton Administration paid them insufficient heed, perhaps because Somalia was interfering with the president's domestic agenda, or perhaps because the Administration believed the U.N. peacekeeping force could and should handle the situation.⁴⁶ Either way, the Clinton Administration, "committed to a world-wide, assertive U.N. peacekeeping role and to nation-building and fostering democracy as a part of U.S. national policy,"⁴⁷ handed over the operation to a UN force that did not understand "what resources would be needed for implementation of the expanded, more confrontational mandate" it had been given.⁴⁸ It was a recipe for disaster.

The situation in Mogadishu began to deteriorate virtually as soon as UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF. On 5 June, a Pakistani unit was attacked with the loss of 23 soldiers. In response, the UN Security Council upped the ante by calling for the arrest, trial and punishment of those involved. Over the next month, clashes between the UN peacekeeping force and the Somalis resulted in the deaths of Pakistani, Moroccan, and Italian peacekeepers. In mid-July, U.S. quick response force gunships attacked a meeting between warlord Mohammed Aideed's militia and other subclan and faction leaders, killing twenty to forty Somalis. This incident greatly escalated the fighting, which stopped much of the humanitarian aid effort in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration, which was using Somalia

as a "test case" for an expanded U.N. peacekeeping role throughout the world, balked at augmenting the peacekeeping force with more combat troops, doing so only after American soldiers began to be killed in late August. By then it was too late. The situation had deteriorated so much that even Task Force Ranger was insufficient to control the situation. In a fierce firefight with Aideed's forces in Mogadishu on 3-4 October 1993, eighteen Rangers died and seventy-eight more were wounded.⁴⁹ This incident ignited a public and political firestorm across the United States. Americans were outraged that the President had allowed so many American casualties in a place where the nation had so little at stake. Deeply stung by the failure of UNOSOM II and his test case for UN peacekeeping, President Clinton eventually called home the troops and reevaluated his national security strategy.

NSS 94: SOMALIA'S STING PROMPTS A NEW, MORE LIMITED POLICY

The Clinton Administration published its first comprehensive national security strategy, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS 94)*, in July 1994, nine months after the tragedy in Mogadishu.⁵⁰ In that document the White House recognized that American military forces are frequently called upon to aid victims of disasters and that U.S. forces provide humanitarian assistance, including emergency food, shel-

ter, medical care, and security, to those in need both at home and abroad.⁵¹ Nevertheless, having been stung badly by Somalia, the Clinton Administration took pains to discuss when and how U.S. military forces would be employed in the future. In doing so, the Administration took its first major step back from the Bush-era humanitarian assistance policy by reinstating the principle that the decision to engage military forces is linked to the intensity of the interests at stake.

Citing the need to conserve scarce resources and the truism that the military is not always the best means of affecting change, *NSS 94* declared the level of our national interests the most important principle informing the decision to deploy forces.⁵² The United States would respond to threats to our vital or survival interests decisively and, if necessary, unilaterally. In all other situations, military engagement would depend on the intensity of our national interests, with a bias toward "areas where we have a sizeable economic stake or commitments to allies, and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies [sic]."⁵³ By inference then, the Clinton Administration's bias would have been against engaging the military in Somalia, where the only interests had been promotion of humanitarian values and a new world order.

Other *NSS 94* principles of concern included whether our allies are prepared to assist, the cost and feasibility of engagement, whether nonmilitary means offering a reasonable chance of success have been considered, the types of military capabilities that should be used, whether the use of military force is carefully matched to political objectives, whether the American people and their representatives support the operation, and whether timelines and milestones for success and an exit strategy have been defined.⁵⁴ Most of these principles paralleled the ones President Bush had announced in January 1993 (except that cost had not been nearly as important to President Bush) and, as with the Bush principles, the *NSS 94* principles were not intended to be preconditions on the use of military forces. They were to guide the decision making process, not dictate its result, and they were quickly put to the test.⁵⁵

In July 1994, President Clinton decided to commit military forces to aid the victims of another African civil war, this time in Rwanda. For months the international community had been providing ever-increasing levels of aid to Rwanda while at the same time using diplomatic tools in an effort to stop the bloodshed.⁵⁶ The diplomatic effort failed, however, and more than two million Rwandans fled to Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania to escape the genocidal civil war.⁵⁷ Cholera quickly broke out in the tremendously overcrowded and unsanitary refugee camps, cre-

ating what Secretary of Defense William Perry called "a human tragedy of Biblical proportions."⁵⁸

President Clinton declared the situation possibly "the world's worst humanitarian crisis in a generation ... a disaster borne of brutal violence [that] is claiming one life every minute."⁵⁹ In response, and acting on an appeal by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), President Clinton created a joint task force titled Operation Support Hope. Its mission was to alleviate the suffering as quickly as possible by establishing a safe water supply and distribution system and by improving the airlift of relief supplies to the refugee camps.⁶⁰ The President made it clear that our troops would not be engaged in peacekeeping; any U.S. troops deployed in Rwanda would be there "for the immediate and sole purpose of humanitarian relief."⁶¹ There would be no repeat of Somalia.

The military mobilized quickly, and in just two months a joint force of water purification teams, engineers, medics, logisticians, airborne troops and airlift specialists created an airlift hub at Entebbe, Uganda; established 24-hour airport operations at Goma, Zaire and Kigali, Rwanda; flew 1,250 airlift sorties, delivering 15,500 tons of food, medicine and supplies; and provided purified water to 1.2 million refugees in the Goma refugee camp. Their efforts stemmed the cholera epidemic, reduced the death rate from 5,000 per day to less than 250, and

saved thousands of lives.⁶² Operation Support Hope had been an unqualified success, but had it been an appropriate mission under the interest-based principles set out in *NSS 94*?

The situation in Rwanda did not pose any appreciable threat to the United States or its allies' economic or security interests, and while the Administration could have acted to promote its view of the new world order it did not hint that it was doing so. Instead, President Clinton's response was based on his idealist belief in America's responsibility to act on its sense of values, his least intense basis for action and the one that, according to *NSS 94*, most constrained his ability to engage the military. Add to that Somalia, which was still fresh on everyone's minds, and avoiding risk to American troops became a critical political objective if they were to be deployed at all. Consequently, while President Clinton did dispatch troops to Uganda and Zaire to aid the humanitarian relief effort, he initially did not send them to Rwanda. Then, when he later authorized the Defense Department to open the airport in Kigali, Administration officials made it clear that because our troops were being deployed with the express welcome of the Rwandan government there would be little risk to their safety.⁶³ And President Clinton stressed that the American troops in Kigali would be engaged only in the relief effort, not peacekeeping.⁶⁴

At a press briefing following the President's statement, National Security Advisor Tony Lake elaborated on the point, comparing the Rwanda operation to that of Somalia:

First of all, on Somalia, the mission from the start of American forces when they went in [sic] was to put an end to the fighting so that we could deal with the humanitarian crisis...

Here the mission is not a peacekeeping operation. It is not explicitly designed to expand throughout Rwanda and to carry out the same kind of mission. It is limited, as the General [Shalikashvili] said and the President said, to the humanitarian mission.

... The mission is designed to deal with the immediate humanitarian crisis. This is not a long-term peacekeeping commitment in Rwanda. That is for UNAMIR, the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.⁶⁵

So Operation Support Hope met the most important principle enunciated in NSS 94, that the decision to deploy forces and in what way be guided primarily by the level of our national interests.

The other principles of concern outlined in NSS 94 also supported the mission. First, our allies were prepared to assist. Several countries, most notably France, had peacekeeping troops in Rwanda, and the Germans helped build the water pipeline to Goma.⁶⁶ Other countries provided financial aid. Second, nonmilitary means, specifically diplomatic efforts, were tried in the months preceding the operation in hope of averting the refugee crisis, but they did not work. Third, the military capabilities provided; namely, airport services, logistics base support, and water supply and distribution, were areas particularly suited to our forces.⁶⁷

Fourth, the Administration's policy on the use of military force in Rwanda was not to apply any; nevertheless, that level of force (none) did match the President's political objective for Operation Support Hope, which was to alleviate human suffering as quickly as possible. American military forces were able to accomplish this task with minimal risk because by the time the United States responded to the crisis the vast majority of the humanitarian aid was needed in refugee camps outside Rwanda, well away from the fighting.

President Clinton did not assign to the military his other objective in Rwanda, to establish conditions to enable the refugees to return home. Instead, he assigned it to the State Department and the Ambassador to the United Nations, declaring that the United States "will support and urge the immediate deployment of a full contingent of United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda to provide security for the return of the refugees."⁶⁸ While American troops certainly could have participated in this operation, that would have required selling U.S. involvement in Rwanda as more than a humanitarian effort. The president would have had to invoke new world order concerns. But President Clinton, who apparently had not viewed the U.S. interests in Somalia as involving more than the protection of humanitarian values, certainly was not about to try selling military involvement in another risky African peacekeeping operation to the American

people or Congress.⁶⁹ He could be reassured of their support, thin as it was, only by ensuring that the troops stayed out of harm's way. As a result, Operation Support Hope met all of the NSS 94 principles and the president was able to take credit for a successful humanitarian assistance operation.

On the other hand, by reestablishing the link between the use of military force and the intensity of the national interests at stake in a crisis, NSS 94 constrained the Administration's ability to influence the direction of the post-Cold War world order. And by taking no action to stop the genocide in Rwanda, the United States had sent a message to the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa: While we will not intervene to save you from genocidal regimes, we will save you from starvation if you can make it to safety. The NSS 94 policy did retain a large measure of flexibility, however, and that did not satisfy the Secretary of Defense. He soon would espouse a much more precise and circumscribed policy.

THE "PERRY DOCTRINE" EMERGES

Defense Secretary William J. Perry was elevated from Deputy Secretary to the top job in the Pentagon in January 1994 when President Clinton picked him to replace Secretary Les Aspin. A scientist, successful high-tech businessman, and former Pentagon official in the Carter Administration, Perry holds a doctoral

degree in mathematics.⁷⁰ Described as a "paragon of predictability" with a "penchant for precision," Perry readily admitted his preference for clarity in thinking and expression.⁷¹ It should come as no surprise, then, that Secretary Perry attempted to reduce *NSS 94's* flexible policy on when and how to use military force to a set of rules for decision. President Clinton, on the other hand, prefers "maximum flexibility in all his policies, but overwhelmingly so in the area of national policy."⁷² Secretary Perry's level of success, then, depended on his ability to convince the President of the wisdom of precision and clarity.

In a 3 November 1994 keynote speech to the Fourth Annual Fortune 500 Forum, Secretary Perry outlined his thought process for determining when and how to employ the military element of national power.⁷³ While similar in some ways to President Clinton's *NSS 94* policy, Secretary Perry's policy formulation, at least insofar as it applied to humanitarian assistance operations, more closely resembled the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine's list of preconditions on the use of military force.⁷⁴

Like *NSS 94*, Secretary Perry began with an analysis of our national interests. Significantly, however, Perry broke with *NSS 94* by defining three categories of interests, not two: vital or survival interests; important but not vital interests; and humanitarian concerns. He agreed the United States would use military force to end a threat to our vital interests, even at

the risk of a military conflict.⁷⁵ He also concurred that when important but not vital national interests are at stake the U.S. response would be proportional to the level of our interests, ranging from using military assets for logistical operations to deploying U.S. combat forces. The decision to use military force in these cases would be based on a risk/benefit analysis.⁷⁶ Where Secretary Perry departed from NSS 94 was in his analysis of cases involving humanitarian concerns.

Because NSS 94 did not distinguish between important and humanitarian interests, it employed a risk/benefit analysis for all but our most vital interests. In no case did it automatically rule out the use of force. Secretary Perry, however, made clear that he would not advocate using military force in cases involving only humanitarian concerns. In these cases, he declared, "we are using military forces, as opposed to military force, to meet a specific need." Furthermore, he declared, "the sole objective for our operations in Rwanda and the original purpose of the deployment of forces to Somalia" was to meet the need with military forces rather than military force.⁷⁷ By linking Rwanda with Somalia, Secretary Perry implied that he was not breaking new policy ground; instead, he was merely stating more specifically a policy that had been in effect since the Bush Administration. But Secretary Perry's linkage was not correct.

President Bush deployed troops to Somalia in December 1992 pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on member states "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."⁷⁸ That mission clearly involved the potential use of military force, as President Bush acknowledged: "[Our] troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard ... the lives of Somalia's people."⁷⁹ The U.S. military deployment to Somalia thus had been a peacekeeping mission based on humanitarian concerns; UNITAF never had been a purely humanitarian mission, something other members of the Clinton Administration understood. As National Security Advisor Tony Lake stated in July 1994 in explaining that the U.S. forces in Kigali, Rwanda, were going to be engaged solely for humanitarian purposes:

...[The Somalia] mission from the start of American forces when they went in [sic] was to put an end to the fighting so that we could deal with the humanitarian crisis...

Here the mission is not a peacekeeping operation...⁸⁰

So in describing the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia as not having involved the use of force, Secretary Perry was not merely overreaching he was minimizing both the extent to which U.S. humanitarian operations policy had contracted since the Bush Ad-

ministration left office and that his formulation would restrict it even further.

President Bush had been willing to use U.S. military force in Somalia to achieve humanitarian ends and promote a favorable new world order. President Clinton had not been willing to do so in Rwanda. While his national security strategy (NSS 94) would have permitted it, President Clinton concluded that he lacked public support. Secretary Perry would back off even further; he would never permit the use of military force to achieve solely humanitarian ends.⁸¹ In fact, he would strictly limit the use of military troops to meet humanitarian concerns even when the use of force was not at issue.

In his Fortune 500 Forum speech, Secretary Perry stated that the military generally is not the right tool for humanitarian operations; the United States prefers instead to address humanitarian concerns by funneling financial aid to international and non-governmental agencies. Furthermore, he declared, because our armed forces need to focus on their war-fighting missions the Department of Defense ordinarily will not be involved in humanitarian operations: "We field an Army, not a Salvation Army."⁸² This attitude reflected the prevalent thinking both within the military and the Department of Defense, neither of which had ever truly abandoned the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.

Secretary Perry then discussed the appropriate role for military forces in humanitarian operations, declaring it "appropriate" to use them "under certain conditions":

... First, if we face a natural or manmade catastrophe that dwarfs the ability of the normal relief agencies to respond. Second, if the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump start [sic] the effort. Third, if the response requires resources unique to the military. And fourth, if there is minimal risk to the lives of American troops.⁸³

Secretary Perry asserted that the operation in Rwanda had met all of those conditions. Regarding the first condition, he said: "The civil war there created a human tragedy of Biblical proportions. Bodies of the dead and dying lined the roads where people fled the fighting. And in the refugee camps, thousands of people were dying from disease and thirst." In other words, a man-made catastrophe had occurred, and this catastrophe had "overwhelmed the ability of the normal agencies to cope."⁸⁴ The first condition had been satisfied.

As for the second condition, Secretary Perry declared that the tragedy in Rwanda had "required an urgent response. In the entire world, only the U.S. military had the capability to conduct a massive airlift, over long distances, on short notice, to bring in the specialized equipment needed to relieve the suffering." These capabilities, taken together, gave our military the ability to jump-start the effort, the essence of the second con-

dition. And since only the U.S. military possessed those capabilities, this statement also proved that the Rwanda operation had met Secretary Perry's third condition, that the response required resources unique to the military. Secretary Perry elaborated on the third condition, however, claiming that our military's ability to purify huge amounts of water was one of its "unique capabilities," and that the water purification equipment had been "the key to checking the cholera outbreak in the camps."⁸⁵

Finally, Secretary Perry claimed that "there was minimal risk to the lives of American troops" in the Rwanda operation, but he provided no evidence to back up his claim.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, he was correct. At first our troops operated outside Rwanda, away from the fighting. When they later were deployed to Kigali to open the airport, the Rwandan government, which had welcomed our presence, safely controlled the area. The risk to our troops thus had been minimal. Operation Support Hope had met Secretary Perry's four conditions; therefore it had been an "appropriate" mission. But Operation Support Hope had been more than that. It had been the ideal military humanitarian operation: low risk, high visibility, positive results, and over quickly. The military built goodwill, both at home and abroad; the logisticians, engineers, and cargo aircraft crews exercised the same skills they would use in wartime; and since no combat

troops were involved, none had to be "retrained." If Secretary Perry could convince the Administration to accept his preconditions, the military could go back to focusing on what Secretary Perry—and many military leaders—believed is its "real mission," fighting and winning our nation's wars.

NSS 95: CLINTON ADOPTS THE "PERRY DOCTRINE"

In February 1995, the White House published the second edition of President Clinton's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS 95)*, parts of which clearly reflected Secretary Perry's preference for clarity and precision.⁸⁷ Perry's influence was most obvious in the section entitled "Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces." NSS 94 had declared it "unwise to specify in advance" the limits on our use of force and had outlined certain general principles to guide the decision process, the most important of which was our national interests. NSS 95 concurred, both as to the principles themselves and their relative importance. However, while it also retained NSS 94's doubts about the wisdom of specifying limits in advance, NSS 95 declared that "we must be as clear as possible about when and how we will use [military force]."⁸⁸ It therefore laid out in much greater detail the process for determining when and how to employ military forces, beginning with the categories of America's national interests and the level of response

threats to those interests would draw from the United States.⁸⁹ NSS 95 included each of the guiding principles of NSS 94.⁹⁰ It also adopted virtually all of the Perry Doctrine. Where it did not, the differences can be attributed either to President Clinton's idealism or his preference for policy flexibility.

Like Secretary Perry, the White House now recognized three categories of national interests: vital, important but not vital, and humanitarian.⁹¹ Given President Clinton's idealist bent, however, the Administration had no difficulty calling the last category "humanitarian interests." Secretary Perry never did seem to be able to do so. He continued to call them "humanitarian concerns" even after the White House had adopted his taxonomy of interests.⁹² While this might have been another way for him to indicate their low level of importance to the Department of Defense, it might also have reflected a realist's reluctance to emphasize humanitarian values.

The White House also was not ready to rule out the use of force in humanitarian operations. Secretary Perry had been pretty blunt, stating his view that the U.S. would use only military forces, not force, to meet the need in humanitarian operations and that we would only use force to protect our troops and those agencies helping us.⁹³ NSS 95 was more circumspect, commenting that "our decisions focus on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military

rather than on the combat power of military force."⁹⁴ While this statement clearly seeks to de-emphasize and express a preference against using force in humanitarian operations, it does not preclude it altogether. In fact, in his Preface to *NSS 95* President Clinton specifically included humanitarian interventions in the category of operations in which combat was possible.⁹⁵ Regardless, *NSS 95* still adopted all four of Secretary Perry's preconditions on the employment of our armed forces in humanitarian operations.⁹⁶ The Department of Defense had convinced the White House to further back away from President Bush's expansive military humanitarian assistance policy.

Three months after *NSS 95* was issued, evidence surfaced that the Defense Department wanted to clarify further the Administration's humanitarian assistance operations policy. In a May 1995 speech to the 42nd Annual National Security Forum at the Air War College, H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Defense Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, revealed that a Presidential Review Directive (*PRD 50*) was being staffed through the interagency. Holmes said that *PRD 50*, titled Emergency Humanitarian Relief, "addresses the military's role in and capabilities for creating a more responsive, effective and equitable system for foreign humanitarian assistance operations."⁹⁷ Further, he stated that the Department of Defense had suggested

"four general criteria for intervention" in these sorts of operations:

First, military forces should only be used where there is a clear purpose, an achievable objective and an identified end-state.

Second, military forces should only be used when we face a natural or man-made humanitarian emergency that dwarfs the ability of the normal relief agencies to respond and the need for the relief is gravely urgent. DoD's intent will be to facilitate the rapid introduction of relief operations by other organizations.

Third, military forces should only be used if the response requires resources and/or capabilities unique to the military.

And finally, military forces should only be used where the costs and risks of military engagement are commensurate with the interests at stake in the situation.⁹⁸

While NSS 95 already included most of this information, the Defense Department formulation added both precision and clarity in the areas most important to the military.

DoD's first suggested criterion, that "military forces should only be used where there is a clear purpose, an achievable objective and an identified end-state," dealt with the military's fear of being sent on ill-defined missions. NSS 95 had addressed parts of this criterion, but in the form of questions to be "considered": "Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? ... What is needed to achieve our goals? ... Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure...?"⁹⁹ The only part of the criterion the Ad-

ministration had been willing to commit to in *NSS 95* was that troops would be send abroad with a "clear mission."¹⁰⁰

DoD's remaining criteria restated the Perry Doctrine, but with both more precision and certitude. The criteria also contained additional qualifiers that would further limit use of the military in humanitarian assistance operations. For instance, all three criteria reiterated the military should be use "only" under the circumstances laid out in the particular criterion. The second criterion limited the military's response to crises in which the need for relief is "gravely urgent," rather than merely "urgent."¹⁰¹ And it defined what Secretary Perry and *NSS 95* meant by using the military to "jump-start" the process: DoD's role would be to quickly introduce the relief operations of other organizations, not to engage in relief operations itself. If DoD's suggestions were to be accepted, the military would have succeeded in placing additional constraints on its civilian masters. Another step would have been taken away from using the military in humanitarian assistance operations. *PRD 50* apparently did not survive the interagency process, however, for it was never published. And DoD's suggestions for inclusion in *PRD 50* were not adopted in the final iteration of the first Clinton Administration's national security strategy, *NSS 96*, published in February 1996.¹⁰² But the effort to develop a com-

prehensive humanitarian assistance policy did not die. It simply had to await President Clinton's reelection.

POLICY IN CLINTON'S SECOND TERM:

AN EMERGING MIDDLE GROUND?

In May 1997 the White House published both a new national security strategy and a Presidential Decision Directive on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.¹⁰³ At the same time, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen published the *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report)*.¹⁰⁴ Six months later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the 1997 National Military Strategy (*NMS 97*).¹⁰⁵ Taken together, these documents outline an emerging, less restrictive policy on the use of the military in humanitarian assistance operations that reflects the reality that in order to compete the United States must remain involved in this increasingly interdependent world.

NSS 97: THE SHAPE, RESPOND AND PREPARE NOW STRATEGY EMERGES

In May 1997 Secretary of Defense Cohen published the *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. At the same time, the White House published *A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS 97)*, the guiding vision for President Clinton's second term. These documents create an integrated approach focused on

"*shaping* the international environment to prevent or deter threats ... maintaining an ability to *respond* across the full spectrum of crises ... and *prepar[ing]* today to meet the challenges of tomorrow's uncertain future."¹⁰⁶ This approach argues for the United States to engage first in international assistance activities focused on preventing humanitarian crises that might require a more costly emergency response.¹⁰⁷ Because those efforts alone cannot "guarantee the international environment we seek," NSS 97 further asserts that "the United States must be able to respond to the full spectrum of crises that may arise." Nevertheless, to avoid dissipating the nation's resources the actual response in a particular case will depend upon the threat to our national interests and the likelihood that the response will make a real difference in the long term.¹⁰⁸ NSS 97 and the QDR Report thus present a strategy of selective response, focused for the first time in the Clinton era on trying to achieve a new world order.

NSS 97's discussion of national interests and how the United States will respond to threats to those interests is located in a section entitled "Responding to Crises." The portion of this section that discusses humanitarian interests and contains NSS 97's version of the Perry Doctrine reads, in part:

... In the event of natural or manmade disasters or gross violations of human rights, our nation may act because our values demand it...

The U.S. military is at once dangerous to our enemies and a bulwark to our friends. Though typically not the best tool to address long-term humanitarian concerns, under certain circumstances our military may provide appropriate and necessary humanitarian assistance. Those circumstances include: a natural or manmade disaster that dwarfs the ability of the normal relief agencies to respond; the need for relief is urgent and the military has a unique ability to respond quickly; and the U.S. mission is narrowly defined with minimal risk to American lives. In these cases, the United States may intervene when the costs and risks are commensurate with the stakes involved and when there is reason to believe that our action can make a real difference. Such efforts by the United States and the international community will be limited in duration and designed to give the affected country the opportunity to put its house in order. In the final analysis, the responsibility for the fate of a nation rests with its own people.¹⁰⁹

This policy, retains much of the Perry Doctrine and the policy in NSS 95, but it also contains a number of changes that reveal a definite move to enlarge the circle of permissible military humanitarian assistance operations.

Two significant changes in policy lie in the initial sentence quoted above. The first is its declaration that our nation may act in response to a humanitarian disaster "because our values demand it." Add to that President Clinton's declaration in NSS 97 that "our responsibility is to build the world of tomorrow ... based on current realities but enduring values and interests,"¹¹⁰ and it begins to become clear that in NSS 97 the Clinton Administration is headed in a new direction. NSS 97 is a reflection that the world order has changed and that while

U.S. prominence in the past rested on its role as leader of the Western world, in the new order U.S. leadership lies in working within the international community to help nations in need help themselves. President Clinton's "National Security Strategy for a New Century" sounds a lot like President Bush's call for a new world order based on American values in NSS 91 and his passionate call to action in Somalia on 4 December 1992!

The second significant change in the first sentence is that NSS 97 enlarges our bundle of humanitarian interests to explicitly include the preservation of human rights. Add to this NSS 97's assertion that America's core values include "respect for fundamental rights," and it is easy to understand why NSS 97 states emphatically that our values may demand we act.¹¹¹ A nation that fails to act on a threat to its core values relinquishes them by default. Present policy thus says in essence that because gross human rights violations (e.g., ethnic cleansing and genocide) threaten a declared core value, America will act to defend the victims of those violations.

Unfortunately, the significance of this policy change is diluted by a phrase further down in the section on humanitarian interests quoted above that limits military humanitarian assistance to natural and manmade disasters, not gross violations of human rights. While it would be tempting to call this omission an oversight, the presence of other changes in the same para-

graph shows that the sentence must have been scrutinized.¹¹² The Administration still seems to be wrestling with those who would prefer the Weinberger or Perry Doctrine limitations on the military role in humanitarian disasters as well as with the issues of national sovereignty that are of greater magnitude when interventions address human rights violations.

NSS 97 also alters both the focus and the conditions of the Perry Doctrine in ways that enlarge the scope of military humanitarian assistance. NSS 95 introduced its version of Perry Doctrine by stating that "under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces may be appropriate." NSS 95 meant that when a crisis met the enumerated conditions it was fitting to call upon the military to respond because the operation would be one for which our forces were especially suited. NSS 95 neither stated nor assumed that under those conditions the military actually had to be deployed to assist.¹¹³ NSS 97, on the other hand, states that "under certain circumstances our military may provide appropriate and necessary humanitarian assistance." The NSS 97 phrasing essentially says that when a crisis meets certain conditions then our armed forces have permission to assist so long as the type of assistance provided both fits the situation and is needed. NSS 97's focus then is not on whether to use the military but rather on the type of assistance we can

provide. *NSS 97* seems to assume that once certain circumstances have been met the military will be used.¹¹⁴

NSS 97 alters *NSS 95's* version of Perry Doctrine conditions in two ways. First, it eliminates the doctrine's third condition, which said the humanitarian response had to require "resources unique to the military."¹¹⁵ There is thus no requirement for the military to provide anything unique; our assistance only has to be "appropriate and necessary." Second, *NSS 97* adds a requirement to the Perry Doctrine's fourth condition, which now states that "the U.S. mission is [to be] narrowly defined with minimal risk to American lives."¹¹⁶ This requirement clarifies the "appropriate and necessary assistance" phrase in an attempt to ensure that our forces are used only to provide appropriate and necessary assistance and nothing more.

The most significant change in policy in *NSS 97*, however, is in something it doesn't even mention—the use of military force against threats to humanitarian interests. Secretary Perry would not have allowed it.¹¹⁷ *NSS 95* expressed a clear preference against it.¹¹⁸ *NSS 97*, on the other hand, is silent on the subject. While it is always dangerous to infer too much from silence, the reality here is that the Clinton Administration has removed policy language that discouraged the use of force to uphold humanitarian interests. This is an affirmative action, not mere silence. One thus may infer that the Admini-

stration policy is shifting toward a more interventionist position, or at least that it recognizes the value of flexibility. Either way, one can conclude that President Clinton's humanitarian assistance policy pendulum definitely swung back toward the center in mid-1997. In addition, because the *QDR Report* and *NSS 97* share the Shape, Respond and Prepare Now strategy, one can also conclude that the White House and the Department of Defense have moved closer to an agreement on the proper role of the military in the post-Cold War world.

PDD-56: MANAGING COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The second White House document concerning military humanitarian assistance published in May 1997 was *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive-56*. This document is classified; however, the Clinton Administration published a White Paper to explain its key elements.¹¹⁹ *PDD-56*, which undoubtedly evolved from the successor to *PRD 50*, defines "complex contingency operations" as:

Peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in Central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991).¹²⁰

PDD-56 would apply as well to all of the other operations discussed in this paper, including both UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia.

PDD-56 recognizes that the U.S. response to virtually every complex contingency operation will involve numerous agencies of the federal government. Its function, therefore, is to provide an integrated planning and management tool to encourage (one might say force) "military and civilian agencies [to] operate in a synchronized manner."¹²¹ Since the White Paper on *PDD-56* hits only the key elements of the policy, it does not go into great detail concerning the role of the military in complex contingency operations. Nevertheless, what it does say reinforces the shift in policy evidenced by the changes in *NSS 97*.

First, while *PDD-56* reiterates both that the military is not the best tool for many aspects of complex emergencies, it states that sometimes "military forces can quickly affect the dynamics of the situation and may create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving underlying conflict or dispute [*sic*]."¹²² This statement recognizes both the military's unique ability to respond and its ability to stabilize a situation through coercive presence or, if necessary, the use of force. *PDD-56* thus reinforces *NSS 97's* removal of the restriction on the use of force to uphold humanitarian interests.

A key element of *PDD-56* is its requirement for the inter-agency to develop a political-military implementation plan ("pol-mil plan") to serve as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions in complex contingency operations. The pol-mil plan for each contemplated operation must include a "comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired end state ... an integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency efforts ... identify the primary preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation ... [and] address major functional tasks."¹²³ The pol-mil plan then must be rehearsed and reviewed, to identify and resolve agency disagreements about mission objectives, responsibilities, and resource allocations, preferably before the operation begins.¹²⁴

An annex to *PDD-56* contains an outline of a typical pol-mil plan. Its components include, among others: an explanation of the national interests at stake in the crisis and "the requirement to secure those interests;" "a clear statement of the USG strategic purpose for the operation and the pol-mil mission;" the key military objectives to be accomplished; the conditions to be created before the operation ends or transitions to a follow-on operation (i.e., the end state); and an exit/transition strategy linked to the end state, "requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats, military leaders, and relief officials of

the USG and the international community."¹²⁵ These sections address the concerns DoD, the military services, and the public have expressed about military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations since the end of the Cold War. PDD-56's pol-mil plan concept should result in complex contingency operations that involve military forces—and force—appropriately and effectively when necessary and that leave the operation to others when military involvement is not required.

NMS 97: THE CJCS JETTISONS THE PERRY DOCTRINE

Approximately six months after the White House published NSS 97 and PDD-56 the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, issued the 1997 National Military Strategy, *Shape, Prepare, Respond Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era (NMS 97)*.¹²⁶ This document allowed General Shalikashvili put to rest once and for all the argument that humanitarian assistance missions really are not appropriate for the military. Despite what Secretary Perry had said ("We field an Army, not a Salvation Army"),¹²⁷ General Shalikashvili did not subscribe to that argument. For instance, in a 4 May 1995 speech, he said:

Now I must tell you that some, at least in my profession, would prefer that we put a sign outside the Pentagon that says *We only do the big ones*. ... But as strong as the temptation may be to do this, the fact is that we cannot lead, we cannot remain that most influential nation if we turn a blind eye to tragedies where millions are at risk... I do not be-

lieve that our nation is morally capable of watching tragedies of the scale of a Somalia or Rwanda and of remaining a silent bystander. Surely there are some things that are so morally reprehensible or so inhumane that we as Americans, when we see them, must act.¹²⁸

General Shalikashvili acknowledged the difficulty of grasping the issue of "employing our forces—and sometimes having to use force—in operations short of war, such as humanitarian operations," and the need to set guidelines to ensure we helped but did not get use the military to "rebuild or restructure other nations."¹²⁹ What he did not do, unlike Secretary Perry, was translate those guidelines into preconditions on the use of military forces. As he said in a speech a year later, General Shalikashvili believed "there are no ironclad rules that govern the employment of forces or the use of force."¹³⁰

In *NMS 97* General Shalikashvili followed the Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now strategy of *NSS 97* and the *QDR Report*, agreeing our armed forces must be prepared to respond to the full spectrum of crises, from fighting and winning major theater wars to humanitarian assistance operations. He also declared the armed forces must be able to respond to those crises from a "posture of global engagement" and that they must be capable of transitioning quickly from one type of operation to another.¹³¹ However, General Shalikashvili jettisoned *NSS 97's* detailed guidance on when and how to use military force, including the

Perry Doctrine's preconditions on military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations. Instead, consistent with his rejection of ironclad rules, he espoused a much more flexible policy based on three guidelines: "the importance of the US interests involved, the potential risks to American troops, and the appropriateness of the military mission."¹³² General Shalikashvili had positioned military policy squarely in line with the national policy President Bush had espoused five years earlier.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the decade since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled to define an appropriate policy on the use of our armed forces in humanitarian assistance operations. In the euphoria that followed the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and America's triumph in Operation Desert Storm, President Bush saw the possibility of a new world order based upon American values and interests. This led him to develop a flexible, interventionist humanitarian assistance policy intended to help the United States shape the new order.

President Clinton initially embraced the Bush humanitarian assistance policy, not because it would lead to a new world order, but rather because acting to uphold America's values was

the right thing to do and coincided with his idealistic view of a new world order led by a reinvigorated United Nations. When tragedy struck in Mogadishu, however, President Clinton recoiled from his support of the United Nations and bowed to public and political pressure, instituting an ever-constricting policy engineered by Secretary of Defense Perry. The Perry Doctrine strictly limited the circumstances in which military forces would be deployed in humanitarian assistance operations and virtually eliminated the possibility that our forces would be deployed if the use of force might be necessary. As a result, by the end of President Clinton's first term the new world order envisioned by former-President Bush was no nearer to attainment than it had been in 1991.

In his second term, President Clinton seems to have recovered somewhat from Somalia and to have suddenly discovered the need for the new world order envisioned by former-President Bush. As a result, the Clinton Administration's national security strategy has begun a move away from the Perry Doctrine in favor of a more active, realist policy that recognizes a larger, more realistic role for the military in humanitarian operations. Nevertheless, the White House has not abandoned the Perry Doctrine, which it should. General Shalikashvili had the better view: There should be no ironclad rules on the use of military forces or the use of force. The decision should be based in-

stead on a well thought out analysis of the crisis at hand in light of our national values and interests, a balancing of the importance of the interests at stake in the emergency, and the appropriateness of the proposed military mission. There is no need to say any more than that in discussing this subject in the national security strategy, especially now that the White House has promulgated the tool for conducting the required analysis—the political-military plan called for in *PDD-56*. The next edition of the national security strategy therefore should drop the Perry Doctrine in favor the 1997 national military strategy's guidelines. That strategy then truly will reflect a realist strategy for the next century—one that envisions a new world order led by the United States based on American values and interests but that does so without unduly risking the lives of America's sons and daughters.

11,728 words

ENDNOTES

¹ President George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 28, no. 49 (7 December 1992): 2330 (hereafter cited as "Address on Somalia").

² See note 14, *infra*.

³ Edwin A. Arnold, in "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests," *Parameters* 24 (Spring 1994): 7, discusses the four points of the Powell Corollary:

- Force should be used only as a last resort....
- Military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut military objective....
- Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved....
- Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion.

Ibid., citing Les Aspin, "With the Soviets and the Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US Forces?", *ROA National Security Report* (November 1992): 22-23 (hereafter cited as "Future for US Forces").

⁴ Bush, "Address on Somalia," 2330.

⁵ Robert B. Oakley, "Somalia: A Case Study," in *Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations*, ed. Earl H. Tilford, Jr. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 July 1997), 21.

⁶ John M. Shalikashvili, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997) (hereafter cited as *NMS 97*).

⁷ President George W. Bush, preface to *The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: August 1991), v (hereafter cited as *NSS 91*); President George W. Bush, "The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice," *Defense Issues* 8, no. 1 [Address to the Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 5 January 1993] (hereafter cited as "West Point Address").

⁸ Bush, "West Point Address," 2.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ James L. Jones, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Humanitarian Assistance and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette* 75 (November 1991): 99.

¹² Ibid., 99-107 passim.

¹³ Compare with Aspin, "Future for US Forces," 22-23.

¹⁴ The first of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's six criteria on the use of force stated: "The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement ... is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies." Casper W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense '85* (January 1985): 10.

¹⁵ Gary Anderson, "Unity Rewarded in Typhoon Rescue," *Marine Corps Gazette* 75 (November 1991): 90.

¹⁶ Donald R. Selvage, "Operation Sea Angel: Bangladesh Disaster Relief," *Marine Corps Gazette* 75 (November 1991): 88-98.

¹⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: March 1990), 13-14, 18.

¹⁸ The White House, *NSS 91*, 17.

¹⁹ "The UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Feature: The Sarajevo Airlift" [from the Briefing Book on International Organizations published by the United States Information Service], available from <http://www3.itu.ch/MISSIONS/US/bb/unhcr.html#airlift>; Internet; accessed 4 April 1998; "Sarajevo Humanitarian Airlift Ends," *Air Force News*, available from http://www.af.mil/news/Jan1996/n19960110_960038.html; Internet; accessed 4 April 1998.

²⁰ In a January 1993 address to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, spoke about his decision not to send troops to the former Yugoslavia:

Sometimes ... the decision not to use force, to stay our hand, ... [is] just as difficult as a decision

to send soldiers to battle. The former Yugoslavia - well, it's been such a situation.

There are, we all know, important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there, but up to now it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the United States and its traditional friends and allies would have had the desired effect, given the nature and complexity of that situation.

Bush, "West Point Address," 2.

²¹ Bush, "Address on Somalia," 2330.

²² National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 135.

²³ Oakley, 4.

²⁴ Bush, "Address on Somalia," 2330.

²⁵ Bush, "West Point Address."

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ The obvious exception would be a total war scenario, when the President would be acting to protect interests vital to the survival of the United States or its allies.

³⁴ Bush, "West Point Address," 3. President Bush did, however, warn that international support is not a prerequisite for U.S. action. "Sometimes," he said, citing Panama, "a great power has to act alone." *Ibid.*

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Governor Bill Clinton, in "The Candidates and National Security," *ROA National Security Report* (October 1992): 43.

³⁷ Governor Bill Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security," in "CANDIDATES '92: Their Positions on Defense," *ROA National Security Report* (February 1992): 150.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ See note 34, *supra*, and its accompanying text.

⁴⁰ Clinton, in "The Candidates and National Security," 36 ("Our new military must be more *flexible* to operate with diverse partners, because in the new world coalition operations will often be important for political legitimacy.") (emphasis in original).

⁴¹ According to Ambassador Oakley, "on January 19 [1993], the first U.S. combat troops rotated out of Somalia and U.S. force levels began to decline from their peak of 20,000." Oakley, 9.

⁴² Michael R. Gordon, "U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees a Longer Stay," *New York Times*, 4 December 1992, A1.

⁴³ Oakley, 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, "Crossing a Line, and Redrawing It," *New York Times*, 5 December 1992, A1; Michael R. Gordon, "Envoy Asserts Intervention in Somalia is Risky and Not in Interests of U.S.," *New York Times*, 6 December 1992, 14(1).

⁴⁶ The reason certainly wasn't ignorance of the U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's feelings on the issue:

"The U.N. Secretary General ... wanted UNITAF to forcibly disarm all factions and seize all heavy weapons. [He] also wanted a military push against the various factions... The Secretary General saw this as a prerequisite for the United Nations takeover from

U.S./UNITAF forces. The United States rejected this approach."

Oakley, 13. As the 4 May hand-off date approached, the U.N. Secretariat also "argued for the United States to stay longer and assume more activities ... but the United States insisted" on holding to the departure date." Ibid., 19.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 19-21.

⁵⁰ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1994) (hereafter cited as *NSS 94*).

⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

⁵² Ibid., 10.

⁵³ Ibid. Not surprisingly, this definition covered all of the areas in which the military was then involved: Iraq (economic/commitment to allies), Bosnia (commitment to allies/potential for refugee flows into allies' territory), and Haiti (refugee flows into our nation).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "It is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force, but it is appropriate to identify several basic principles that will *guide* our decisions on when to use force." Ibid. (emphasis added). *NSS 94* did concede, however, that humanitarian interventions must be limited in duration. Ibid., 26.

⁵⁶ "Statement by the Press Secretary," White House Office of the Press Secretary, 15 July 1994, available from <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri~res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/7/15/6.text.1>; Internet; accessed 17 April 1998.

⁵⁷ According to U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Brian J. Atwood, the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, by 21 July 1994 there

were 1.2 million refugees in the vicinity of Goma, Zaire; 800,000 in the Southwest Quadrant of Rwanda by the border with Burundi; 450,000 in a camp in Tanzania; and about 150,000 in a refugee camp in Uganda, for a total of about 2.6 million refugees. "Press Briefing by AID Administrator Brian Atwood," White House Office of the Press Secretary, 21 July 1994, available from <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri~res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/7/21/28.text.1>; Internet; accessed 17 April 1998.

⁵⁸ William J. Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," *Defense Issues* 9, no. 84: 3 [remarks prepared for delivery by Secretary Perry before the Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, 3 November 1994].

⁵⁹ President William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing Assistance to Rwandan Refugees and an Exchange with Reporters," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 29 (25 July 1994): 1535 (hereafter cited as "Assistance to Rwandan Refugees").

⁶⁰ Specifically, the President tasked the Defense Department to establish an airlift hub in Uganda, to assist in expanding airlift operations near certain refugee camps, to increase the capacity of those airfields to handle relief supplies, and to establish a safe water supply and distribution system. *Ibid.*

⁶¹ President William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing Further Assistance to Rwandan Refugees and an Exchange with Reporters," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 30 (1 August 1994): 1571 (hereafter cited as "Further Assistance to Rwandan Refugees").

⁶² The White House, "Memorandum for Correspondents," *DefenseLINK News*, Memorandum No. 300-M, 30 November 1994, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1994/ml13094_m300-94.html; Internet; accessed 16 April 1998; William J. Perry, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, February 1995* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1995), 23.

⁶³ "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili and Acting Secretary of Defense John Deutch," White House Office of the Press Secretary, 29 July 1994, available from <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri~res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/7/29/5.text.1>; Internet; accessed 21 March 1998 (hereafter cited as "Lake, Press Briefing").

At the briefing, one member of the media grilled General Shalikashvili and Mr. Lake about whether we were opening the airport at Kigali with the welcome of both sides. Mr. Lake emphasized that the government of Rwanda (the Tutsis) welcomed the U.S. presence, and he emphasized that was all the U.S. required because the government was in control in Kigali. He never actually said the rump Hutu government had not welcomed our presence; however, he did state that the U.S. did not recognize the Hutus, which meant there had been no contact between the U.S. and the rump Hutu government. Ibid. The Hutus probably were at best neutral to the U.S. presence: Their people were the primary beneficiaries of the relief aid; but it appeared that the rump Hutu government was encouraging the refugees to flee, and that was counter to the other U.S. goal of repatriation. In any event, the Hutus apparently never threatened our troops in Kigali.

⁶⁴ Clinton, "Further Assistance to Rwandan Refugees," 1571.

⁶⁵ Lake, "Press Briefing."

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ The White House, "Memorandum for Correspondents."

⁶⁸ Clinton, "Assistance to Rwandan Refugees," 1536.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Jim Hoagland, "Perry: Policy Spokesman by Default," *Washington Post*, 10 May 1994, A10.

⁷¹ Ibid. ("I do not yet believe that lack of clarity is an advantage in thinking or expression...").

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ "DOD Press Advisory No. 245-P," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1 November 1994, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1994/p110194_p245-94.html; Internet; accessed 19 April 1998; Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 2-4.

⁷⁴ Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁶ "Our use of force will be selective and limited, reflecting the relative importance of the outcome to our interests. ... The decision of what to use ... will reflect the cost we are willing to pay to achieve the outcome we want." Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 3 (emphasis added).

⁷⁸ U.N. Security Council Resolution 793, 3 December 1992, quoted in "Excerpts from a Resolution on Delivering Somalia Aid, *New York Times*, 4 December 1992, A14. In diplomatic and military circles the phrase "use all necessary means" is understood to include the use of force.

⁷⁹ Bush, "Address on Somalia," 2331.

⁸⁰ Lake, "Press Briefing."

⁸¹ That's not to say, however, that Secretary Perry wouldn't permit our troops to use force in self-defense or the defense of others. In his Fortune 500 speech he made clear that he would permit the use of force in these cases: "In humanitarian operations, we only use force to protect our troops or members of the humanitarian agencies helping us." Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 3.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid. The February 1995 Defense Department Annual Report to Congress changed two of the four conditions: In the second condition it replaced "jump start the effort" with "respond quickly enough"; and it added a requirement to the fourth condition, namely that the "mission is narrowly defined." William J. Perry, "Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, The Forrestal Lecture, United States Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference," News Release, Ref. No 210-95, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 18 April 1995, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1995/b041895_bt210-95.html; Internet; accessed 16 April 1998 (hereafter cited as "Forrestal Lecture"); Perry, *1995 DoD Annual Report*, 16. Because subsequent documents attributable to Secretary Perry use his original language, little significance should be attached to these changes. They probably were editorial, not substantive. See Perry, "Forrestal Lecture" and William J. Perry, *Report of the*

Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, March 1996 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 16 (hereafter cited as *1996 DoD Annual Report*).

⁸⁴ Perry, *1996 DoD Annual Report*, 16.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: February 1995) (hereafter cited as *NSS 95*).

⁸⁸ Compare The White House, *NSS 94*, 10, with The White House, *NSS 95*, 12.

⁸⁹ The White House, *NSS 95*, 12-13.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 13. *NSS 95* also made clear the decision to employ military forces and military force would be based on a cost-benefit analysis: "In all cases the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved." Ibid. Interestingly, in this regard the *NSS 95* policy looked like that of former President Bush. See the text accompanying notes 28-29, *supra*.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Perry, "Forrestal Lecture."

⁹³ Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 3. As discussed above in note 79, I believe Secretary Perry most likely used the word "protect" as meaning "defend," as in self-defense and the defense of others. Another possibility is that he meant "protect" to mean "provide security for," which would include at least the potential for the use of force. That probably was not Secretary Perry's intent, however, because he didn't even think the original operation in Somalia involved the use of force.

⁹⁴ The White House, *NSS 95*, 12.

⁹⁵ Clinton, preface to The White House, *NSS 95*, ii.

⁹⁶ The White House, *NSS 95*, 12.

⁹⁷ H. Allen Holmes, "Looking into DoD's Geopolitical Future," *Defense Issues* 10, no. 74 (30 May 1995): 4-5 (paraphrasing changed).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁹⁹ The White House, *NSS 95*, 13.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Compare Holmes, "Looking into DoD's Geopolitical Future," 5 with Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 3 and The White House, *NSS 95*, 12.

¹⁰² The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1996).

¹⁰³ The White House, *NSS 97*; The White House, *White Paper—The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive-56* (Washington, D.C.: May 1997) (hereafter "*PDD-56 White Paper*").

¹⁰⁴ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).

¹⁰⁵ Shalikashvili, *NMS 97*.

¹⁰⁶ The White House, *NSS 97*, 6 (emphasis in original); William S. Cohen, "The Secretary's Message," in Cohen, *QDR Report*, iv ("We determined that U.S. defense strategy for the near and long term must continue to shape the strategic environment to advance U.S. interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond.") (emphasis in original).

¹⁰⁷ Specifically, *NSS 97* states: "Whenever possible, we seek to avert ... humanitarian disasters through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range of partners, including other governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations. By doing so, we may not only save lives but also prevent the drain on resources caused by intervention in a full-blown crisis. *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 9.

¹¹⁰ William J. Clinton, preface to *The White House, NSS 97*, i.

¹¹¹ *The White House, NSS 97*, 1.

¹¹² While an argument also can be made that gross violations of human rights constitute a manmade disaster, the argument is unpersuasive. If the Clinton Administration had intended such an interpretation there would have been no need to add gross violations of human rights to its listing of humanitarian interests, which already listed manmade disasters.

¹¹³ See the discussion accompanying notes 78-79, *supra*.

¹¹⁴ Interestingly, the May 1997 *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* had a third formulation, which asserted that "the U.S. military is generally not the best means of addressing a [humanitarian] crisis. In some situations, however, use of our military's unique capabilities may be both necessary and appropriate." Cohen, *QDR Report*, 8.

¹¹⁵ Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 3. DoD's suggestions for inclusion in PRD50 would have expanded this to "resources and/or capabilities unique to the military." Holmes, "DoD's Geopolitical Future." The *QDR Report*, on the other hand, eliminated resources and discussed using the military's "unique capabilities." Cohen, *QDR Report*, 8. While interesting, these distinctions are not all that important.

¹¹⁶ *The White House, NSS 97*, 9 (emphasis added to highlight addition/changes).

¹¹⁷ See text accompanying note 77, *supra*.

¹¹⁸ See text accompanying notes 93-95, *supra*.

¹¹⁹ *The White House, PDD-56 White Paper*. All references to PDD-56 in this paper actually refer to the White Paper.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 1.

¹²¹ Ibid., 2.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 7.

¹²⁶ Shalikashvili, *NMS* 97.

¹²⁷ Perry, "The Rules of Engagement," 3.

¹²⁸ John M. Shalikashvili, "Humanitarian Missions Challenge Military and Media," *Defense Issues* 10, no. 54 (4 May 1995): 2 (emphasis added).

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ John M. Shalikashvili, "The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection," *Defense Issues* 11, no. 39 (10 May 1996): 2 [prepared remarks at the CARE 50th Anniversary Symposium, Washington, DC].

¹³¹ Shalikashvili, *NMS* 97, 15, 21. The military finally had received the message President Bush has sent it when he sent Marines returning from Operation Desert Storm to Bangladesh in 1991!

¹³² Ibid., 6.

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