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25 June 1985

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

GRATZ ON FOREIGN POLICY, RELATIONS WITH USSR

PM221840 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 20, May 85 pp 22-23

[Article by S. Polzиков: "Three Decades of Neutrality"]

[Excerpt] With the anniversary of the state treaty in mind, I interviewed the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz, for NEW TIMES.

[Polzиков] Herr Minister, what would you say has been the impact of the 1955 state treaty on your country's political and economic development?

L. Gratz. For the Austrian people the state treaty, which restored Austria as an independent and sovereign state, meant, above all, the realization of its aspirations, and was a reward for its efforts to regain full-scale sovereignty in conditions of liberty and democracy. The state treaty, however, was also a significant prerequisite for a further cultural and economic advance.

After the withdrawal of all foreign troops in accordance with the treaty (I should note that the Soviet troops left the country on 19 September 1955, earlier than any of the other allied forces), a law was adopted on 26 October 1955, which constitutionally proclaimed Austria's permanent neutrality. That Austria abides strictly by its status as a permanently neutral state under international law is universally recognized. Two underlying principles of our neutrality policy should be mentioned-- first, it is defined by Austria itself in conformity with international law; second, the content of our decisions concerning our neutrality are not open to negotiation. Thus, in a Europe split into military blocs, a neutral zone of detente emerged which stretches from the Lake of Geneva in the west to Neusiedlersee Lake on our eastern frontier.

That same year, 1955, Austria became a UN member, and has ever since been using the opportunities this offers to contribute to the cause of international cooperation and peace.

[Polzиков] Thirty years have elapsed since the treaty was signed. What, in your opinion, is its importance today?

L. Gratz. The treaty not only grants its signatories certain rights but also imposes certain obligations on them. The security of Austria, situated in the heart of Europe and bordering on seven states, is inseparable from the universal observance of international treaties.

Constant and meticulous observance of the norms of international law is dictated by Austria's own vital interests. Today, just as 30 years ago, such an undeviating and consistent stand undoubtedly encompasses the state treaty, which has made us free and independent. As former Chancellor Dr Bruno Kreisky stressed when the Helsinki final act was signed in August 1975, the state treaty besides playing a prominent role in Austria's policy, presents a striking example of how much the Soviet Union and the United States can achieve through negotiations.

[Polzikov] How do you visualize Austria's foreign policy and its international relations and ties in the future?

L. Gratz. The state treaty, neutrality, comprehensive observance of human rights and of the principles of international law, the UN charter included, and efforts in this direction all determine Austria's foreign policy and open up new horizons for it. Austria seeks to maintain good relations with all states, irrespective of their social system or affiliation to one or another alliance, and thus to contribute to easing tension and lessening confrontation. An active policy of good-neighborship is a task of top priority for us, and we pay special attention to our relations with the five permanent U.S. Security Council members.

The vital stake Austria has in the prevention of international conflicts is all the more understandable and legitimate if we bear in mind that any conflict nowadays is fraught with the danger of becoming a superpower confrontation and subsequently, a global catastrophe. Constant efforts for mutual understanding, dialogue and detente are inherent in Austrian foreign policy. Austria shares the common responsibility of the states for peace and works in the UN to maintain it.

Much attention is devoted to Vienna's dynamic development as a UN centre, a venue for international meetings and conferences.

Thus, Austria has set its external policy to serve greater regional and world understanding among nations, and is instrumental in improving understanding and peaceful relations between East and West, North and South.

[Polzikov] And one final question. How do you assess Austrian-Soviet relations and what, in your view, is needed to improve them still further?

L. Gratz. Relations between our countries have developed especially successfully since the war. Intensive delegation exchanges at all levels bear witness to this. The Soviet Union is among the countries to which Austrian "visit diplomacy" attaches especial significance. In my opinion, Austria in this respect is important for your country too.

It was to Austria, in April 1981, that Nikolay Tikhonov made his first trip to a capitalist country as premier. Mention should also be made of the visits to your country of Federal President Rudolf Kirchschlaeger and Federal Chancellor Fred Sinowatz. We shall soon have an opportunity to welcome Foreign Minister Gromyko, who is coming here to attend the celebrations to mark the 30th anniversary of the state treaty. With the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of CPSU general secretary, we are confident that our bilateral relations will continue to develop dynamically and fruitfully.

In the field of economic relations, it is of particular importance that the Soviet Union has become Austria's fuel supplier. Special significance attaches to the fact that in recent years Austria's share in Soviet foreign trade has grown considerably and has helped lower the Austrian balance of trade deficit.

The wide range of bilateral agreements, concluded largely on the basis of the important trade and shipping treaty of 1955, serve as the foundation of our economic relations.

It should be noted that in the past decade three important intergovernmental economic agreements have been reached--the 10-year agreement on trade and payments, the long-term development and cooperation programme for 1981-90, and the 10-year agreement on the promotion of economic, scientific, technical and industrial cooperation.

Our trade and economic relations are mutually advantageous and are a vivid example of fruitful cooperation between countries with different political systems and which, moreover, vary greatly in size and potential.

Alongside political and economic relations, our cultural ties, including exchanges of tours by famous companies and troupes, should be mentioned. Extensive scientific contacts are also helping in the development of ties.

We hope that contacts between our peoples will continue to grow, and friendly ties, above all in the fields of culture and science, to strengthen, as provided for by the Helsinki final act.

CSO: 3600/16

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

KYPRIANOU SEEN NOT RECEIVING PAPANDREOU'S SUPPORT

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 23 May 85 p 1

[Editorial: A False Hope....]

[Excerpts] It is believed, with good reason, that President Kyprianou is persisting in his opinions because he believes that on 3 June he will have Papandreu's full assistance. If the president believes that this will obviate the domestic crisis, it means he is living in another world. It means that neither he nor his advisors have any perception of what is happening in this country. They have not understood where the domestic affairs of our country are being led to.

The president's hope is false.... Let us agree that Papandreu will get elected. How does Mr Kyprianou believe that the ever-increasing domestic chaos will be overcome? Does he believe that Papandreu will take a position opposed to that of the majority of Greek Cypriots? And even if he did, will there be an acquiescence by the majority to the Papandreu positions, or will there be a confrontation between Cyprus and Greece? Political logic dictates that were Papandreu to be elected, he would do exactly the opposite. He would counsel Kyprianou to proceed to a government of national unity or to immediate resignation and the holding of elections.

This means that the president cannot expect any assistance from Athens. In exactly the same way that he cannot expect any assistance from any initiative by Cuellar for a new summit meeting, since there will be more and more unsolvable problems that will be created by Turkish intransigence. To wait for the second of June, to lose time, to entertain illusions will worsen the domestic crisis....

If this, then, is the situation, does the president expect perhaps a Deus ex machina to help him? Things are very clear at this time, and much simpler. Kyprianou denounced the fateful Minimum Program in favor of Unity. He is now rejecting unity. He is rejecting a government of national unity for personal and political reasons of no special relevance. He rejects unity, but will have elections! Because elections are, by now, the only choice left.

CSO: 3521/263

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

KYPRIANOU INTERVIEWED ON ARAB TIES

PM240943 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 22-28 May 85 p 26

[Interview with Cypriot President Spiros Kyprianou by Salih Qallah in Nicosia; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Qallah] You are always saying that you support the Palestinian cause, but we notice that Yasir 'Arafat has so far not visited Cyprus although he has visited several countries which maintain a lower level of relations with the PLO than your country. Are there any particular reasons for that?

[Kiprianou] It is known and clear to everyone that Cyprus fully supports the Palestinian cause and that the government and people of Cyprus are following with admiration the Palestinian people's heroic struggle for the restoration of their legitimate rights. As regards the question of Yasir 'Arafat visiting Cyprus, I have already discussed this matter with him and may do so again in the future.

[Qallah] How do you view Arab-Cypriot relations? Are you satisfied with the level of these relations, and what do you expect from the Arabs in relations to your own cause?

[Kiprianou] Arab-Cypriot relations are excellent, very strong, and based on firm foundations of principles and common interests. We are satisfied with the Arab attitude toward our cause and our struggle for freedom and justice. We would like our friends to continue their support for us because we consider that support to be an important weapon in our attempts to promote a settlement in the interests of Cyprus and peace in the region. Here I reaffirm that the Cypriot people are against any use of the bases in our country for acts of aggression against any state in the region. We have frequently stressed that.

CSO: 3521/259

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

KIPRIANOU ADDRESSES COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARIANS

NC281532 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1500 GMT 28 May 85

[Text] President Spiros Kiprianou has accused Turkey of seeking to partition Cyprus, most probably as a first step to be followed by complete Turkish occupation at a later stage. Kiprianou has also stated that the reason why the Cyprus issue has not yet been resolved is because the Turks are working for the partition of Cyprus. The president made these remarks during an address to the members of parliament who are participating in the conference of the British islands and the Mediterranean region of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. President Kiprianou appealed to the international community to use its influence on Turkey so that it may abandon its partitionist plans. Kiprianou said that the Greek Cypriots have accepted federation, as well as a great deal of autonomy for the federated regions. He stressed: However, it is necessary to secure the country's unity, the smooth functioning of the federal system, the citizens' human rights, and the withdrawal of the occupation troops. In the absence of these necessary prerequisites, Kiprianou said, any settlement would not be a solution but a patching up which would lead to a new Cyprus issue that could result in the complete destruction of Cyprus.

The delegates attending the conference also met with House of Representatives President Yeoryios Ladhas who called upon the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and other international organizations to substantively contribute to the efforts for a Cyprus solution.

CSO: 3521/257

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

CYPRIOIOT'S IRONIC LOOK AT HIS PEOPLE

Nicosia I SIMERINI TIS DEVTERAS in Greek 20 May 85 p 2

[Article by Stavros Stavrou: "Wonderful People!"]

[Excerpts] We are truly a wonderful people, who has nothing to envy others. This is recognized daily by anyone who watches others, or even himself, who feels that he possesses almost everything and is missing nothing, except for what he is missing.

We have the same concerns as all other people, the same expectations, the same humanity and inhumanity, rich houses and poor dwellings, presidents and spies, streets, holes and back alleys, dogs and puppies, ministers and flatterers, deputies and foxes. We have large parties and small parties, we have strikes and gourmets, capitalists and proletarians....

We are thus a wonderful people, hot-blooded and proud, generous and ready to fight, sincere, honorable, just, hospitable and unvanquished.

We are so proud, that we feel that others are dumb. The others are falsely proud, they are snobbish and vain.

We are so courageous, that we are always ready to resort to laziness and a good time in order to throw the enemy into the sea.

We are so sincere, that we become hypocritical even with our dog.

We are so full of a fighting spirit that each one of us is ready for his own battle: from the soccer battle and for the diet battle to throw off the pounds we accumulate because of our gluttonry, and for the battle to defeat our neighbor.

We are so full of a sense of honor, that we consider all foreign women "dishonorable," while we want our sisters to be "honorable." If someone impugnes our own honor, there is always the gun or the axe.

We are unvanquished, so much so that we don't respect even what we ourselves believe, but only what public opinion and others believe.

What is not in doubt, of course, is the Cypriot sense of hospitality; we appreciate good things, especially "Swedish imports."

We are also a just people, because we all insist to the end that we are right, even if it is obvious that we are wrong. What our leaders have been repeating to us, is to insist until you get what you want.

So much for the Cypriot in present-day Cyprus. I may be wrong. But don't get angry with me. I am a Cypriot as well....

CSO: 3521/263

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

SOVIET TRADE UNION VISIT--A two member delegation from the USSR Federation of Workers in the automobile, tractor and agricultural implement industry recently visited Cyprus at the invitation of the trade union of workers and employees of metal machine technicians and electrical technicians, which belongs to the PEO. In a joint statement, the two sides expressed their solidarity with and support for the Cypriot people's struggle to resolve the Cyprus issue on the basis of UN resolutions and high-level agreements. [Text] [Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1630 GMT 21 May 85 NC]

BULGARIAN TOURISM DELEGATION--A delegation from the People's Republic of Bulgaria arrived in Cyprus yesterday. The delegation consists of Lachezar Avramov, chairman of the Bulgarian Tourism and Leisure Association; Andon Yordanov, Balkan tourist director; and Donka Georgieva, an official at the Tourism and Leisure Association. The delegation will hold talks with the Cyprus Tourism Organization [KOT] and will sign a protocol within the framework of the tourism agreement signed by Cyprus and Bulgaria in Nicosia in June 1976. The Bulgarian visitors were met at Larnaca Airport by KOT senior official K. Papayeoryiou. [Text] [Nicosia KHARAVYI in Greek 26 May 85 p 8 NC]

CSO: 3521/259

POLITICAL

DENMARK

FOREIGN MINISTER'S U.S. TALKS UNLEASH DEFENSE POLICY DEBATE
Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Apr 85 p 20

/Editorial by 'V.S.': "The Pleasure of Rape"/

/Text/ Talks in Washington between Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and his U.S. colleague George Shultz ushered in a new and bitter feud over Danish security policy early this week. Throughout the week, much has been said about Shultz levying the most severe criticism ever of Denmark's security policy. And Anker Jorgensen stormed that Uffe was to blame for this criticism of us.

With respect to Shultz's criticism, one might say that the chicken suddenly developed more feathers after Ellemann-Jensen met with the Danish press in Washington prior to his departure for Denmark last Saturday when he said that Shultz "did not criticize." Rather, the talks were said to be "an exchange of ideas between free democratic countries." It was also said that the United States "does not understand Denmark." The atmosphere was open, friendly and rather serious.

Had the minister of foreign affairs received history's biggest rebuke for Denmark's security policy, he certainly managed to conceal it very nicely. However, what he could not conceal was the frustration over being sent shopping with something he dislikes as much as the Danish Parliament's position on the U.S. "Star Wars" program--SDI. Of course, if the frustration becomes too much for him, he will have to resign.

On the other hand, it is mildly speaking pathetic when Anker Jorgensen says the reason the United States is cross with us is simply that Ellemann-Jensen was not able to state our position well enough. Anker Jorgensen cannot be very serious about his party's position on SDI if he feels the minister of foreign affairs ought to be able to convince Shultz the position has no merit.

It is a rather controversial matter for the Reagan administration when a NATO country decides to dissociate itself from the Columbus egg it believes has been laid. No foreign ministerial charm could explain this away if it actually means anything to the stated opponents of SDI.

Furthermore, Washington knew very well prior to the arrival of the Danish delegation that the minister of foreign affairs does not agree with the parliamentary majority on this point. When it was announced that, besides paying a visit to the World Bank, Ellemann would also have talks with Shultz, a reporter for INFORMATION at the Danish office in the U.S. Foreign Ministry was told that the two foreign ministers were to discuss a SDI resolution "that had been forced upon the Danish government." Anker will probably say that Uffe called the United States and said the government felt the resolution had been "forced upon it."

The fact is that no such phone call was necessary and, with respect to this fact, the Social Democratic Party chairman might claim it was the foreign minister's fault that the United States knew ahead of time where the shoe was pinching. However, he probably cannot take all the blame because the United States also follows our domestic debate on security policy and no one can rightfully prevent the minister of foreign affairs from expressing his opinions to the Danish public. It is different, of course, when he goes abroad. But the fact that a Danish parliamentary majority opposes his stand does not reasonably require that he not discuss his well-known personal position on the matter. It would be something entirely different if he were disloyal to the majority, Denmark's official position. If the majority feels it cannot live with any of the proposed conditions, it has the duty to remove the minister of foreign affairs.

But perhaps the opposition is not that serious about its security-policy position either? Perhaps wicked tongues are correct when they claim that the big arm-waving in connection with security policy is supposed to divert attention from the fact that the opposition cannot come up with an alternative economic policy.

The Foreign Policy Committee's expected decision quietly failed to materialize as well. Many newspaper headlines assailing Ellemann-Jensen gave way to fewer and less bold headlines concerning the Foreign Policy Committee which failed to come to a decision. The meeting during which Shultz is supposed to have severely criticized our country lasted less than one hour.

Actually, Shultz could not have spent much time on the "unusually severe criticism of Denmark." It must have been done rather quickly. Indeed, it is true that the two foreign ministers were together for almost 4 hours, but only 30 minutes were spent in direct negotiations between the two. The rest of the time was devoted to a party on the training ship Denmark. During the 30 minutes, they also managed to discuss international affairs and bilateral issues, such as Danish ham exportation to the United States.

However, Ellemann-Jensen shall not be completely absolved. He does have the democratic right to his personal opinions on SDI. But the speed with which he sided with the United States is something else. We should be able to request of our foreign minister that he study a situation thoroughly before forming his own opinions. How in the world can he be positively disposed toward something the United States has not even been able to explain to us what it is? Obviously, Ellemann-Jensen is just as interested as the opposition in achieving results in Geneva. But you need not ask many questions of Americans about the SDI program before you get the dreaded feeling that Reagan's real agenda is the defense system which so far can only be characterized as an embryonic fantasy. Has arms control been removed from Reagan's agenda? This is an issue which Parliament and the Danish people must request that the foreign minister provide more answers to than just the United States' assurance that they will indeed be negotiating seriously in Geneva before he whispers to Shultz that the parliamentary majority's repudiation of SDI is foolish.

It is obvious that quite a few West European resolutions against the program cannot stop SDI research. It is already well under way at research institutions throughout the United States, and an SDI office has also been established in Washington to coordinate research efforts on the part of the navy and the army.

Because of this, however, the minister of foreign affairs should not be giving Washington the signal that what the Danish government really means is that when rape becomes a fact you should "lean back and enjoy it"—if Parliament will allow it.

8952

CSO: 5200/2614

POLITICAL

DENMARK

CHRISTIAN PARTY MP'S DEFECTION MAY SPELL TROUBLE FOR COALITION

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 7 May 85 p 5

[Commentary: "He Is His Own Damn Man"]

[Text] The Christian People's Party (KRF) has a 25-year history in Danish politics. The party was created in protest against the VKR government from 1968 to 1970 and especially against the legalization of pornography and abortion. The party calls itself a social-liberal party that believes a Christian world view is the foundation of human and social interests. The party's first chairman was Jacob Christensen, a doctor, who was followed by Jens Moller, who led KRF into parliament in 1973. Later the party was "taken over" by the former school principal from Ringkøbing County, Environmental Minister Christian Christensen.

The Christian People's Party cannot be placed directly into the left-right political spectrum. It has gained and continues to gain its primary support from people with a Christian view of life and from people with a sense of social involvement and responsibility for the weak and the suffering. This is the background for Arne Bjerregaard's revolt. Along with a significant sector of the party's membership, he places a greater emphasis on the party's social involvement than on the party's liberal affiliation--unlike the party's only cabinet minister. From the very beginning, he has opposed the party's almost unconditional support of the conservative government and on various occasions he has led the opposition against his own group in parliament.

Piet Hein's words about the little cat on the road could be applied to Arne Christian Bjerregard: "I am my own damn man." But God forbid that we should put such a curseword into the mouth of this man of the church.

Of course, Arne Christian Bjerregard is not a preacher, but he certainly sounds like one when he speaks. He speaks of economic problems with precisely the same intonation as the minister we listened to as children, as he described the forgiveness of sinners, the temptation of Joseph, or the devil's work in the maid's quarters. It was not even necessary to know what he said. There was religious fervor and admonition in every tone of his voice. Bjerregard's tone is always the same, as well.

But he is not a clergyman. His appearance and voice are deceptive. He is a school teacher from Norre Nissum Teachers College and principal of the Jens Risgaard Knudsen Youth Town School up in Fjerritslev.

When Arne Christian Bjerregard stepped forward to speak at the Christian People's Party Congress shortly before a lunch break, it was as if angel wings could be heard fluttering in the air. It was clear that Bjerregard did not intend to speak on tax policy. He did not disappoint his audience, either.

Now the government and the Christian coalition party find themselves in a situation in which Bjerregard has "made it clear," as they say in Christiansborg, that he will not automatically be the government's safety net. In other words, Christian Christensen and Kofod-Svendsen cannot count on Arne Bjerregard's vote if they continue to vote for legislation that clashes with Bjerregard's concept of correct Christian family, social, abortion, and taxation policies. This statement was taken lightly at the Christian People's Party Congress--where they know Bjerregard. According to reports, even cabinet minister Christian Christensen took the statement with a forced smile, since he had tried to become accustomed to the idea of a clash after Bjerregard had been removed as the party's group leader in Christiansborg.

Nevertheless, there was a feeling at the congress that the party had some serious problems. Of course, Bjerregard, as a person, is not vital to the survival of the Christian People's Party. The party feels that the opposite is true. But Bjerregard is important to the survival of the government. Of course, it is a serious matter when a politician distances himself from his party. Christian Christensen, Kofod-Svendsen, Inger Stilling, and parliamentary group chairman Steffensen may be the reasons for the departure of Bjerregard, but leaving one's party is a serious matter and it may just be possible to hear the doomsday trumpets when one member of a five-man group suddenly bolts, endangers, the influence of his party, and shakes the foundation of the government.

The Christian People's Party just held a serious discussion as to whether or not the party should demand another seat in the cabinet. In the spirit of cooperation, Christian Christensen stated that, for the moment, they would not demand more cabinet positions! If Bjerregard is leaving the Christian People's Party--and he is preparing to do just that--there are only three men left in the group from which to choose a new minister. This is an impossible situation.

Arne Christian Bjerregard must have had extreme difficulties and many quiet, contemplative hours before he decided to ask for the floor just before the lunch break. He lowered his voice a few more tones and announced that he was not automatically a supporter of the government.

Perhaps Bjerregard spoke with both Kofod-Svendsen and Christian Christensen about his decision before making it public. Perhaps he went to confession a few extra times to talk about what he was getting himself into. On many political questions he is close to the Social Democrats. At the same time, he insists that he has uncompromising positions on several important political issues. Finally, the parliamentary group of the Christian People's Party threw him out as its group leader. Eventually, the problems compounded themselves and forced Arne Christian Bjerregard to seek a substitute for the

cathedral door in Worms as a background for his classic conclusion:

"Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise. God help me! Amen!

Of course, Arne Bjerregard has always felt a compulsion to speak in public, but this time it must have been somewhat different.

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CSO: 3613/153

POLITICAL

DENMARK

PAPER VIEWS LEFT SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN SEARCH OF ALLIES

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 7 May 85 p 12

[Editorial: "The No Party"]

[Text] Apparently, history will repeat itself three times--the first time as a tragedy, the second as a farce, and the third time, perhaps, as vaudeville, according to one of the speakers at the VS (Left-Socialist Party) Congress last weekend, in reference to the current debate over a new labor majority and to a famous passage in the article by Marx on the 18th Brumaire of Napoleon III.

That certainly sounds promising. As we know, vaudeville always has a happy ending after a simple intrigue and numerous catchy tunes with the unification of the protagonists.

But it was hardly the multiple wedding in A Sunday at Amager that the VS speaker had in mind. Instead, the congress clearly preferred to see the party's political spokesman Anne Grete Holmsgaard in the role of the popular Sophie in Johan Ludvig Heiberg's "No." She is the one who is believed to be so stupid that her lover directs her to answer "no" to any question asked by the lecherous bell ringer Link. This she does steadfastly, even when the bell ringer asks what word is spelled by the letters y, e, and s and even in the face of violent death as a result of strangulation by the bell rope.

The vaudeville concept indicates that the debate within VS is somewhat out of date. Another indication of this is the unanimous demand by the congress that despotism be eliminated.

There is something to this, although the party is stuck not in the 1830's, but in the 1970's.

Unlike the comrades in the SF (Socialist People's Party), VS members feel that the memory of the first two labor majorities still frighten people more than the prospect of 20 more years with Schluter. As a result, the congress was more interested in discussing the circumstances under which VS would bring down a labor majority than it was in finding out how to achieve one in the first place, although the latter is a necessary condition for the former.

In this sense, VS is far ahead of its time. On the other hand, it would be

something of a misnomer to characterize what transpired at the open third of the congress as current political debate. The clumsy attempts at a new course with regard to the struggle for higher wages, democracy on the job, and the balance of payments, presented by Anne Grete Holmsgaard last Friday in INFORMATION, were interpreted by most speakers as a "shift to the right."

The worst part of this interpretation is not that they were completely wrong, but that they rejected Anne Grete Holmsgaard's ideas without really examining them.

Instead of examining Anne Grete Holmsgaard's concepts, which are of great current interest, the congress decided that leftist policies would continue to consist of an endless series of high-priority, uncompromising demands in the social sphere. Of course, the rest of us should be thankful--and this is said without malice--that VS has assumed the task of guaranteeing that no reasonable demand is forgotten. But if the party believes that policies of this type will motivate the Danish people, then it should delete the statement in one of the many resolutions passed by the congress that VS members are "not wide-eyed and naive adventurers."

Unfortunately, a leftist orientation is not something you can have--at least, not something you can patent. Like any orientation, it is something you must find as long as the earth turns and a changing society offers new problems in new combinations. By the way, it is also possible to lose a leftist orientation.

SF now seems to be on the right track after many years of discussions, but VS members are also beginning to admit that they are lacking in one or two areas.

It was clear for everyone to see that Anne Grete Holmsgaard was trampled by her fellow party members and there is hardly any doubt that she is high on the political hit list of the VOPPER faction, which captured just under one third of the seats on the new executive committee. VOPPER stands for left opposition. This is what the faction members themselves believe they are. Presumably, this faction will play about the same role as the now defunct Joint Labor List.

But the congress also decided that a one-sided campaign supporting the wage demands of strong labor groups could be dangerous, since it could result in a split in the working class. In addition, the proposal to reject "economic democracy" was approved by a slim majority. This is striking, considering the party's crude agitation over many years against the economic-democracy concept.

We must also remember to note that, at long last, the congress put an end to the time-consuming debate over democratic rights by passing a resolution stating that they support VS.

Thus, one of the most basic conditions for taking VS seriously has been eliminated--at long last.

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CP'S NEW POLITICAL SECRETARY TAKES ACTION AGAINST STALINISTS

Stalinist Newspaper on Dispute

Helsinki TEDONANTAJA in Finnish 24 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "As What Point SKP?"]

[Text] Is there a Communist Party even left in Finland? Many members and friends of the Finnish Communist Party asked this question as the situation in the party continued deteriorating.

The Finnish Communist Party still exists in Finland, though its current right-wing leadership is trying to liquidate it as a communist party. This work of destruction cannot go on forever without destroying the Communist Party.

But a communist party still exists in our country for various reasons: because the current leadership of the Finnish Communist Party has not openly dared to throw the party's Marxist-Leninist principles and essential course on the junk-heap, although it watered them down in the decisions of the extra party congress, and although it does not follow them in practice.

Because the majority of the Finnish Communist Party members, eight of the district organizations, and hundreds of main organizations are active in the Finnish Communist Party and follow, in practice, the Finnish Communist Party's communist course.

Because the Finnish Communist Party is still one of the brother parties to the international communist movement, though its right-wing leadership dirties the party's international principles.

Because the struggle within the Finnish Communist Party to save it as a unified communist party has not ended, but continues with determination and setting clear tasks geared toward the ending of Aalto's leadership, as last was indicated by the Finnish Communist Party Turku district's annual meeting.

We are thus in the stage where we are struggling over whether the Finnish Communist Party be saved or destroyed as a communist party. If we were to make the judgement that there currently is no communist party in our country, the conclusions would be different.

25 June 1985

The judgement of the current situation does not, of course, make the claim that we will not enter a different kind of phase despite the efforts to save the party. But neither can the judgement on the current situation be made as though the threatened firing, dispersing, a liquidating actions has already happened in reality.

'Time to Return to Party'

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 May 85 p 10

[Article: "Initiative in changing the Finnish Communist Party Membership Books"]

[Text] The Communist Party will make a decision on changing its membership books next September. In its meeting on Sunday the central committee of the Finnish Communist Party began the possible changes in membership book and the revision in membership fees.

The central committee has still not made the decision on either of the reforms, but sent the matter to the district organizations for evaluation. The districts will voice their opinions by mid-August and the central committee of the Finnish Communist Party, meeting in September, will make the final decision on the issue.

The secretary general of the Finnish Communist Party, Esko Vainionpaa, did not want to predict the support of the district organizations on Sunday, nor whether the membership rolls of those in the party's minority will be left unrenewed during the possible change.

The majority in power in the party is thought to be planning a procedure by which each member trying to renew his membership would have to personally decide on whether to stay in the party, and at the same time to promise to follow the party's decisions and policies.

Secretary General Vainionpaa stressed during his Saturday outline that the minority has only until next fall to return to party activity consistent with the bylaws, and to break up its parallel organization. On Sunday he thought that return did not seem likely, but that the decision is in the so-called TIEDONANTAJA group's own hands.

Finnish Communist Party Membership Sale

The reform in the membership fees would, according to Vainionpaa, mean decreasing the fees required by the Finnish Communist Party closer to the membership fee level of other parties. The membership fees of the Communists now range from half a percent to one percent of the member's gross income, and they have generally been considered too high. Neither has it been possible to collect the fees in full.

The central committee is presenting new alternative solutions to the district organizations, in which the actual membership fee varies from 60 markkas to 450 markkas a year. The goal is that the party would collect at most .5 percent of the member's gross income, and that includes election aid.

At the same time the Finnish Communist Party is intending to change its manner of collecting membership fees. The current membership roll is considered unsuitable for the new method of collection.

There are now slightly under 35 000 members in the communist party; of them, about 10 000 belong to the minority.

The Sunday meeting of the central committee will not deal with the internal problems of the party. In practice, however, the central committee supported Secretary General Vainionpaa's understanding according to which the party majority should not make even technical election alliances with the minority in the 1987 representative elections, but that the organizational problems would be taken care of long before the elections.

Possible Membership Card Exchange

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 May 85 p 11

[Article: "Minority Has Time Until Next Fall To Return to the Party"]

[Text] The internal situation of the Finnish Communist Party must be cleared up within a year. The secretary general of the Finnish Communist Party, Esko Vainionpaa, stressed this in his party's central committee meeting on Saturday. He noted that the party minority members have even less time; that is, that the return to normal party activity should happen by next fall at the latest.

"After that the internal logic of these matters will lead to them running themselves out of the Finnish Communist Party, the Finnish People's Democratic Alliance, and thus also out of the Finnish Communist Party's election lists," said Vainionpaa in his organizational politics overview. He emphasized the the 1987 March parliamentary elections largely determine the conditions for clearing up the Finnish Communist Party's internal situation. According to him, a mutual election alliance between the party majority and the TIEDONANTAJA group is possible only if the latter returns to activity that accords with the bylaws and breaks up its parallel organization.

If the minority were to found its own party or join the parliamentary elections through the electoral associations, Vainionpaa judged that its success would be quite modest, that is, two percent of the votes.

Vainionpaa thinks that it is likely that the minority would not get any representative seats from its own lists. In his opinion, the theoretical maximum from excellent election results would be three representatives.

The central committee meeting that is ending Sunday is not expected to offer any specific solutions to the party's inner problems. According to Vainionpaa all the information necessary for practical decisions is not available. Along with its own problems, the central committee is handling, for instance, the drafting of next year's government budget, and improvement in employment security.

On Saturday the Finnish Communist Party also set up a seminar, in which perspectives connected with the anniversary of the end of World War II and the victory over fascism were studied.

POLITICAL

FINLAND

DEPARTING SKDL CHIEF KIVISTO URGES SEPARATE CP PARLIAMENT LISTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 May 85 p 8

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen: "SKDL's Kivisto Examines Vigor of His Successors and Supports SKP Election Plans: 'The Next Elections Will Be a Singularly Bitter Business'"]

[Text] On Sunday a change will occur in the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] leadership when Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat), who has headed the organization for 6 years, will yield his post to Member of Parliament Esko Helle (People's Democrat).

In Tampere Kivisto will inform the newly elected leader that vigor is needed in defense of SKDL independence. The SKDL congress starts today, Friday.

SKDL chairman Kalevi Kivisto gives the impression of being liberated.

Behind him are several months as governor of Keski-Suomi Province. His transfer to Jyvaskyla transformed the thoughts of abandoning day-to-day politics that had crept into his mind into reality.

The mannerisms of a governor are already evident from Kivisto's external appearance: The almost mandatory combination of previous years -- a corduroy suit and a Marimekko shirt -- has been traded in for a stylish pinstripe. The frustration that was visible during his final days in the exhausting world of day-to-day politics is gone for good.

The degree of liberation will only increase next Sunday when Kivisto relinquishes his duties as leader of the SKDL. Kivisto's term as leader lasted 6 years.

In the RKP [Swedish People's Party] they are in the habit of calling middle-aged deserters from the front line like Kivisto raw frying chickens. Kivisto does not succumb to chicken-like behavior in stating the reasons for his departure.

"Fifteen years at any job is certainly a long time and rotation in positions of trust is important. A situation in which political positions of trust are pension posts is a sick one," Kivisto stated as the reason for his decision.

His departure comes at a time when the administration of the estate, long yearned for by Kivisto, in the biggest and sickest member organization of the SKDL, the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], has gathered momentum.

The SKP's organizational war reverberated in the SKDL in every way during Kivisto's years as party leader. Because of the party dispute, the blame for political actions shifted largely to the SKDL and the support curve was constantly moving downward.

The SKP leadership has made it clear that the clarification of relations with the Stalinists will, if necessary, even go as far as the dividing of assets and that during the next parliamentary elections the Stalinists can gauge their support on their own tickets.

One would think that the voluntary relinquishment of some 10 seats in Parliament is a suicidal course of action. Kivisto thinks differently.

"Actually, for 20 years we have tried to handle this in some other way. We took no risk, but we seem to have reached the end of the line with that course of action.

"At any rate, it is a singularly bitter business. When we get back to normal activity, the chances of increasing our support will be of an entirely different kind. The situation was the same with the Social Democrats in the 1962 elections and it changed completely in the 1966 elections," Kivisto argued.

Kivisto is not enthusiastic over the idea briefly raised by SKDL parliamentary delegation chairman Veikko Saarto (Communist), that the moderates form a technical election coalition with the Stalinists.

"I don't feel that it is likely if only for political reasons and, on the other hand, it would lead to an even bitterer election campaign concentrated on votes. People are definitely fed up with that."

Otherwise, Kivisto avoids taking stands on SKP affairs. We could not get a clear answer from him either to the question as to what the SKDL plans to do with the Stalinists.

"It's possible that the Stalinists will shift the party dispute to the SKDL. In that event the SKDL too must have a response ready. However, there is no reason to get sick over a future illness if it does not materialize anyway."

"Solution to SKP Problem a Basic Condition for the SKDL"

"If they go their separate ways in the SKP, it will be a political solution, which, of course, implies that they will be making decisions that affect the whole movement.

"The finding of a solution in the SKP is a basic condition for the SKDL's being able to continue. The SKDL is capable of concentrating on building up its own

image," Kivisto replies to the doubters who have challenged the need for an SKDL because of the "moderatization" of the SKP.

Kivisto readily admits that the SKDL-SKP dual decision-making arrangement is not a sensible one.

Kivisto alluded to K.H. Wiik and the so-called "Sixes" postwar notion of a broadly based Marxist worker party. "The SKP did not approve of the idea. I don't believe that the present trend is leading in that direction either. This judgment is the same in the SKP, regardless of who has been leading it.

"In the SKP they have always felt that it is part of the international communist movement and that its ideological basis required it to be its own party."

The Stalinist minority maintains just the opposite. It has accused the SKDL of "orienting the party" and the SKP leadership of taking the party down the paths of heresy.

"The Stalinist criticism is a matter of impractical theory since the SKDL is a registered party which has the responsibilities that appertain to a party in politics," Kivisto said.

Some SKDL members fear that an SKP that is becoming more moderate is digging the ground from under the SKDL and that future chairman Helle is a lightweight helper alongside master mason Arvo Aalto.

"What kind of people constitute the SKDL leadership and the party administration is, of course, important. There are no differences of opinion on the importance of independence among those chosen to lead the party. It is more a question of the vigor with which they lead," Kivisto put it.

Kivisto did not announce his own candidate for chairman of the SKDL. "If the former chairman is extremely or on the whole busy, it easily gets to be a strain. That's why I haven't participated in the preparations for the party leadership nominations. Of course, it would be a good thing if this does not result in a difference of opinion."

"Presidential Election Is No Exception"

Kivisto is famous for his cautiously roundabout statements. The caution grows visibly when the forbidden presidential race comes up in conversation. Kivisto has one statement on the presidential race that has created a stir to account for, one in which he speculated that President Mauno Koivisto would also be nominated as the SKDL presidential candidate for the next elections.

"I would rather not go into that matter. I had no intention of interceding in public.

"If I'm questioned about a delicate matter and if I reply that I have to think about it, it doesn't mean that I'm making a proposal.

"It would on the whole be a good thing if the Left were capable of appearing as united as possible in its policy, and a presidential election is no exception. I think that this is a matter the party's new leadership must consider right from the start. I'd rather not make any recommendations about this."

Kivisto is just as roundabout on his own presidential candidacy.

"It's best to think about that too only if it in general becomes opportune. I haven't considered it any more than that."

Kivisto spoke much more readily about the SKDL's internal policy situation. The migration into the opposition began on the last day of 1982, he remembered exactly.

"The fact that the SKDL had to leave the government was a decisive and fateful step which has led to a cycle of isolation. The biggest challenge for the SKDL in the coming years is to break this cycle and rediscover the tune of a policy of cooperation. We must increase our strength and, in addition, obtain guarantees that the whole movement supports movement policy."

Kivisto is one of those rare Finnish party leaders who have presented critical views of the Soviet Union and practical socialism in general. Because of this he has sometimes been tagged with the label of anti-Sovietism.

"Relevant criticism is under no circumstances anti-Sovietism when a socialist indulges in it."

Labels have been applied with a free hand in Finland these past few months. "It would perhaps be a good thing if those who cultivate this topic of discussion were to define what they mean by it. Anti-Sovietism is often associated with my predecessor (Ele Alenius) and in some situations with me as well. We both vigorously deny this."

As a 44-year-old, Kivisto is still at an age when a governorship is not necessarily a pension post. It would in any event be rare for a governor to return to politics.

"The bit of wisdom that says that one should never say never is a well-proven one. At this moment it is, however, impossible for me to think of a return to political activity as my chief occupation."

11,466
CSO: 3617/114

POLITICAL

FINLAND

SDP VETERAN SEES PARTY LOSING INFLUENCE IN NEW POLITICAL PHASE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 May 85 p 11

[Commentary by Bo Ahlfors: "'SDP Has Completely Surrendered to the State'"]

[Text] Bo Ahlfors sees democracy as becoming reactionary and a new power structure arising in Finland which includes the top leaders of the parties, the unions and special interest groups and the administration.

A new power structure has taken shape in Finland, composed of the top leaders of the government and the economy, the more important parties and the administration, the unions and special interest groups. This is what Social Democrat Bo Ahlfors, whose article HELSINGIN SANOMAT publishes here, writes.

Ahlfors criticizes his own party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), for surrendering to the state, to some extent a new corporate system of government. In his opinion, the SDP has gotten farther away from the people and changed from a party run by its members into a party that controls its members.

Ahlfors feels that the SDP may already be so tied to a power and administrative structure largely of its own creation that pressures to change a narrowed democracy are now coming from elsewhere in the society.

In Ahlfors' opinion, either the SDP will have to face up to tough decisions or content itself with leading a double life that is not credible. The author urges the Social Democrats to spend more time in preparing their basic platform so that they will have time in its formulation to ponder the SDP's relation to the power structure.

Bo Ahlfors

The author of this article, Bo Ahlfors, 51, is employed as a program activity specialist in Yleisradio's [Finnish Broadcasting Corporation] Research and Planning Department. He has worked for Yleisradio since 1970.

In the mid-1960's Ahlfors achieved notoriety as a Social Democrat student movement activist. After that, he participated for years in the formulation of

SDP platforms. Ahlfors was one of the 10 experts employed by the Drafting Committee who was still engaged in drafting the new SDP platform in 1981-1984.

After the summer 1984 party congress, Ahlfors was no longer authorized to participate in the drafting of the platform. They plan to endorse the new SDP platform at the 1987 congress.

Not all the parties are at the moment going through a state of some uncertainty. Those by now oft-repeated and in part justified claims that citizens' interest in the parties has declined are familiar. The question as to whether citizens have become alienated from the parties or the parties from citizens, nevertheless, demands an explanation. It can even now be seen that citizens are probably not fed up with party activities as a whole, but do feel uncomfortable with the new approach to governing that isolates the government from citizens, an approach party leaders are also participating in.

Stemming in part from their uncertainty, the parties too have begun to revise their principles and objectives platforms. Issues involving our way of life and the participation of the little man are beginning to become familiar new expressions. Many parties are being forced to subject themselves to particularly heavy ideological pressures, if they really intend to make their own ideologies compatible with the current power and governing system. A party like the SDP, whose ideology is a strong (?) one, will either have to face up to tough decisions or be content with leading a double life that is not credible.

Power Is Being More and More Concentrated Among a Few

The picture of our social and national democracy presented by the Constitution and the parties is, of course, an overly pretty one. The degree of democracy is, however, different at different times. The misconception that we are linearly progressing in a more democratic direction in the use of power must be corrected. Democracy may actually be narrowed in so-called democratic states as well.

Right now we are living through a period of democratic reactionism in Finland. This assertion may sound surprising since citizens' right to participate in decision-making is at the present time being strongly emphasized in speeches. The use of power is, however, constantly being concentrated under the cover of this level of verbiage. A new power structure is being created about which the Constitution says nothing. A new power structure a real power structure that is called a corporate power structure, has almost imperceptibly come into being, one that is beyond the laws and other rules. The concept has been re-applied to the shaping and creation of a theory for our present-day society and the nation's power and governing system.

Hierarchy in Parliament Too

A corporate power structure can be described as a corporation, a power elite which is nowadays composed of the top leaders of the nation and the economy, the top leaders of the biggest parties, among other the top officials controlling social affairs and the top leaders of the most powerful unions and special interest groups.

The corporate power structure has not completely replaced the parliamentary system. It has, however, also damaged the parliamentary system in that the heads of the democratically elected bodies have themselves become removed from the democratic foundation because of the nature of the corporate elite. For example, over the years a strict hierarchy that is not written into the rules and whose leaders are part of the power elite has come into being inside Parliament.

This present-day corporatism is referred to as a liberal one in contradistinction to fascist and some other current forms, for example, the forms of corporatism found in Latin America. The term is, however, pointlessly complimentary; "liberal" corporatism means a narrowing of liberty. Present-day corporatism is a governing cartel that cuts the power of government off from citizens and the democratically elected institutions. As for the internal power elites of the parties and the trade union movement, they come into being by increasing "centralized" democracy and the power of the leaders.

It is pointless to just criticize the press for personalizing affairs; the party leaders themselves personalize affairs.

Party Getting Away from Citizens

The current SDP leadership has viewed full participation in the power and governing system as being highly beneficial. It participates in it through three institutions: the party, the labor union movement and the government. In so doing, whether it wants to or not, the SDP is participating in the narrowing of Finland's otherwise modest democracy. It is getting to be more and more difficult to recognize the SDP's qualities as a popular movement.

In its way the SDP's withdrawal from citizens and its own members is twofold: First, the SDP is tied to a nonsocialist state in a way that is lacking in independence and submissive and, second, as an institution it participates in a corporation that has cut off contact with citizens. Somewhat the same can be said of the Social Democratic leadership of the trade union movement: At the present time the Social Democratic leaders of the trade union movement are more national government ministers without portfolio than anything else.

In Finland too, the corporate power structure is naturally dominated by non-socialists in a clearly nonsocialist majority. For the SDP, participation in a corporate system is more dramatic than it is for its nonsocialist partners. It has, as the saying goes, everything at stake, whereas, as far as its non-socialist partners are concerned, they retain the things they want, for example, property rights, outside the corporate system.

SDP Patches Up Cracks...

The current leadership of the SDP does not seem to be worried about the corporate power and governing system. It is not participating out of "force of circumstances"; rather it is playing a fully active role in preserving the corporate system. The SDP seems to have the role of a sort of patcher-upper: It always rushes to patch up those potential cracks that every now and then may

be produced in the corporate system. In this function it makes particular use of the machinery of government.

In return, however, the SDP does not get to enjoy the sweetness of corporate power. Just as does the Social Democratic leadership of the trade union movement, the SDP in return has to keep sharp tabs on its own members. We are in the midst of a paradoxical situation in which the leadership of the reform movement, which should therefore be heading reforms, has indeed assumed the functions of a preventer of reform. Through the organization, preventive control is aimed at actions and above all the objectives that are set.

... and Keeps Tabs on Itself

No one at present keeps tabs on the SDP more than its own leadership, operating through and with the help of the government machinery. The control that takes place with the help of the government apparatus to supplement normative and ideological control is also physical in that those Social Democratic ministers who have never been elected to the party executive committee also participate in executive committee meetings and pertinently in its decision-making. Perhaps intended as a "one-time affair," this practice has turned out to be a regularly continued one.

They have shifted from a policy of possibilities to a policy of necessities and control.

The SDP is at present revising its platform, which they plan to discuss at the 1987 congress. So far discussion of the platform has not quite broached the subject of the power structure which the SDP itself participates in, nor will they manage to engage in it without an extension of time either. If they do not begin to discuss it, there is the danger that the future new platform, which may possibly be approved, will be a document detached from reality in which we will read a number of in themselves good "basic values." Even now an extension seems to be objectively justified and it is appropriate to hope that they do not artificially speed up discussion by making the platform an individual problem.

"We Are the State"

As a concept, everyone is thoroughly familiar with the state, but it may nevertheless be a very complicated maverick to the different forces operating in the society. The SDP's relation to the state is particularly complex.

In the SDP ideology democracy occupies a central position and the state is regarded as an apparatus for realizing democracy. A great deal of fighting has been engaged in over precisely the power of the state. The SDP has felt that it can exert its influence both on the state and through the state. But at the same time the line between the society and the state has become blurred. Supranationally it is believed that the relative spread of state policy has in itself also spread democracy and that democracy has simultaneously spread throughout the whole society. At the same time another error has been made,

that is, people believe that the nonsocialist forces are only negatively interested in the state. One need only glance at the annual national budgets to realize that the nonsocialist forces are very positively interested in the state.

The SDP occasionally gives the impression that its kind of democracy is linked with the state and only the state. The historical ballast is: The SDP has taken astonishingly seriously the lesson Bernstein in his time taught the Social Democrats, namely that "we are the state."

The SDP's relation to the state might be described in an abridged way in terms of three phases. At first, its relation to the state was negative; the state was felt to be merely an apparatus of oppression. The second phase was a sort of contradictory love-hate relation in which the state was also regarded as a practical means. Now a phase is in progress in which the SDP has completely surrendered to the state.

State Is the Authority

Traditionally, by the state we understand the power of the state and the machinery of state. The relative growth in the influence of the state and the increase in its functions have, however, made earlier definitions of the state too narrow. Moreover, the hidden functions performed by the state apparatus have now been revealed thanks to the social sciences. Thus some scholars divide the state apparatus into two components: an administrative and coercive apparatus and state ideological apparatuses.

This division is positively insightful; it has undoubtedly demanded a considerable amount of intelligence to demonstrate the existence of state ideological apparatuses that operate alongside concrete state institutions but which are rather difficult to perceive.

Instead of one administrative and coercive apparatus, there are several state ideological apparatuses. Let us mention here the economic, political, news media, educational and cultural state ideological apparatuses. The fact that there are also private institutions among these is a purely legal one, in this case stemming from the basis for the division: One of their functions is to operate as ideological channels that produce state power. The state administrative and coercive apparatus naturally also serves in ideological functions, but recognition of the state ideological apparatuses helps us to analyze the real functions of the state.

Without underrating the other above-mentioned state ideological apparatuses, we will here examine the state political and ideological apparatus and the SDP's relation to it.

The basis for this is the fact that everything that is said is a message by the authority, and in this case the state is the authority. Let it be given to understand that the state is neutral, objective and in the name of justice knows what is right and what is wrong. This already an ideology. And since an authority is established first, almost anything at all can be fed through it, as in fact happens.

The SDP very actively makes use of the state ideological apparatus. Speeches and articles are at present without exception associated with the state.

The SDP creates and ideology authorized by the state, one whose content is very far from the party's own more and more rarely publicly stated ideology.

New Realist Ideology

The concept of "realism" is the original mother of the ideological content produced and transmitted by the state ideological apparatus. The whole ideological gyration explicitly and implicitly derives from this. The concept of "realism" is positively charged; by it we mean factually based, objective, scientific. The SDP has based its theory and its activities on realism, which only strengthens the positive value of the concept. The word realism is thus the best possible device for ideological use.

The concept of realism acquires ideological content when it is mixed with the pair of antonyms immutability-change. Apparent logic advances the fact that, since realism correctly and objectively describes a prevailing situation, a prevailing immutable situation is also correct. "We must recognize the facts, the realities" is one of the most familiar ideological statements. Very rarely do we ask whose realities must be recognized. And even more rarely do we create our own realities.

The state political ideological apparatus subordinates everything to the economy. "Economic realities" are the fist that knocks out everything else. Demands requiring wage-policy settlements for "zero agreements," "protecting exports," "the state of the national economy," "excessive wage-hike demands," "being born in Finland is like winning at lotto," "the world's best wage policy," "the ability to compete internationally," "don't rock the boat," "we're in the same boat" and "don't make promises you can't keep" are familiar manifestations of this.

Thus at this year's SDP May Day celebration we were taught as by a kindly uncle: "If one government party improves its image, the others will also certainly do so. And if one's image is improved, the tax rate and the national debt will also be raised." This definitely incontrovertible logic and it leaves the listener speechless and helpless to do anything, as is obviously the intention. And yet, improving one's image at this point would involve nothing more than rising to a standing from a kneeling position.

Blind Belief in Economics

The ideological circle is closed, for example, in this way: "Moderation in nominal figures creates jobs for the jobless through reinforcement of our ability to compete. It is this practical solidarity, without which it is futile to talk of anything else." Of whom is solidarity really being demanded in saying this? When, to top it all, we were recently informed that our social security is a threat to Finland's road network. There seem to be no limits to their inventiveness in finding arguments that move in the prescribed direction.

Justifications are not mainly based on economic facts, the economy, but on economics, ideologically based political economics, for which reason some other understanding of the situation might be a more correct one. We can with a certain attentiveness relate to, for example, nationalism or moralism, but we believe blindly in economics.

The above-mentioned direct quotations are all selected from the positions assumed in the Social Democrats' own speeches and in the Social Democratic newspapers. The selection is not an intentional one; quotations of the kind mentioned here are predominant. They are not composed of individual statements, but form a coherent ideology that restricts activities and lowers objectives. Just as if it were outside itself, the SDP is channeling this ideology in the name of the state and in this way it becomes authorized by the state; the SDP is loose like a dog that has slipped through the gate.

While we have primarily examined only one wielder of power, the SDP, above, the shift to a corporate power and governing system and the strengthening of the state's ideological grip naturally affects all citizens. The SDP is probably already so deeply anchored in a present-day system largely of its own making that pressures to change in a more democratic direction will come from elsewhere in the society. During the past few years the normal pressures stressing dependence on one's party have clearly been eased. It is easier than before for citizens to switch parties and objects to vote for.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

MYSTERY OF YURIY KOMISSAROV PROBED BY NEWSPAPER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 May 85 p 11

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "What Sort of Man Is Yuriy Komissarov?"]

[Text] What sort of man is Yuriy Komissarov really? The question certainly occupies the mind of the layman who has noticed that his books and articles have received a certain amount of attention. A few weeks ago Yuriy Komissarov's latest work, "Policy Line," appeared — first in Finnish — in the bookstores. There was a rush to extract the "news" from it on television newscasts and in the news sections of the daily newspapers even before the culture departments.

According to the Finnish publisher of Komissarov's books, he is a "well-known Soviet historian." Komissarov's first work published in Finnish, "Finland Finds Its Policy Line" (1974), began with the history of independent Finland, but otherwise the focal point of his works and articles has been on the postwar period, even on quite topical foreign policy issues, for which there is no shortage of historians in the Soviet Union.

Komissarov has dared to present very extensive interpretations of the application of the military provisions of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact and to argue about the way neutrality is emphasized in Finland. On the other hand, we have noted that he is alive to the official nuances of Finnish-Soviet relations right down to the details.

After his first book, Komissarov publishes a couple of books together with T. Bartenyev, but the latest work, "Policy Line," is once again written by him alone. In addition to his books, Komissarov has on several occasions over the past few years published articles in Finnish newspapers, articles in which he has presented views on Northern Europe's security issues that go farther and deeper than the official Soviet position.

Yuriy Deryabin of Komissarov Street

In inner foreign policy circles in Finland and the Nordic countries they have for a long time now known Yuriy Komissarov's true identity. He is Yuriy Deryabin — one of the most experienced experts on Northern Europe of his country's Foreign Ministry — who lives on Baku Commissars [Komissarov] Street

in Moscow. Deryabin has on several occasions served as a diplomat in Finland and the other Nordic countries and he speaks Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish. Before his transfer to the Scandinavian Department of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow a couple of years ago, Yuriy Deryabin served as a ministerial advisor in Helsinki.

As a diplomat, Deryabin cannot appear as a writer and foreign policy commentator under his own name. The liberties afforded by a pen name are quite a different matter. Yuriy Komissarov can go much farther than the official Soviet line and discuss matters on which the Soviet Union does not officially take a stand. Most particularly this pertains to Finnish domestic policy, which Komissarov deals with on many occasions in his latest work, "Policy Line."

A diplomat's appearing under the cover of a pen name as an active writer in a special branch of his own field and at forums in the country that forms the object of his writings is probably a very rare and perhaps even sensitive occurrence in the Soviet Union. This is why the man behind the pen name has not raised a rumpus.

Komissarov on Northern Europe: Stability Is an Ever More Relative Concept

In an extensive article published in the newspaper KESKISUOMALAINEN, the man using the well-known Soviet pen name of Yuriy Komissarov writes that more and more new elements are being introduced into Northern Europe's military strategy situation, elements that are reducing the region's chances of continuing to remain safely remote from hotbeds of international tension.

In Komissarov's opinion, the concepts of "stability," "peaceful situation" and "security" are getting to be more and more relative in the sense that is usually applied to the situation in Northern Europe. Komissarov views the activation of U.S. policy on NATO's northern flank as drawing Norway and Denmark into ever closer participation in military preparations.

The general tenor of Komissarov's article is the danger the North Atlantic defense alliance, NATO, constitutes for Northern Europe, one which, in his opinion, has already changed the traditional concepts of stability and security in the region. Komissarov criticizes the United States of, among other things, also making efforts to change Finnish and Swedish foreign policy in various new ways.

Support for Vayrynen's Ideas

In his discussion of the agreement on the proposal made by Finland in 1965, whereby Finland and Norway banned military operations on their border in the event of a conflict between the superpowers, Komissarov says that Foreign Minister Vayrynen had proposed just such ideas. He says that Vayrynen had stated that the possibility was not excluded that in Northern Europe they might on the basis of the results of the Stockholm conference attempt to implement far-reaching measures involving trust and security, measures especially well-suited to the region.

Komissarov also goes into President Mauno Koivisto's proposal for the banning of long-range cruise missiles. According to Komissarov, the Soviet position on this is clear. "In the event — and only then — that space weapons are banned, our country would be ready to agree to a radical reduction in strategic weapons as well as in new strategic weapons, including long-range cruise missiles, and to a simultaneous banning or radical restriction of their development and application," he writes.

In his criticism of NATO and U.S. efforts to change Northern Europe's security policy situation, Komissarov says that the United States has been casting "longer and longer glances" in the direction of Sweden and Finland too, although its attention has been mainly focused on military plans for the ever stronger commitment of its NATO allies.

"Since the Americans can do nothing about the fact that Sweden's neutrality policy and Finland's Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact concluded with the Soviet Union pose an obstacle in principle to anti-Soviet alignments to wear down these countries, they are energetically looking for other methods," Komissarov writes.

Komissarov also goes into President Mauno Koivisto's visit to the United States and particularly mentions President Ronald Reagan's speech in which he extended support for "Finland's internationally known neutrality." "Those Finnish factions that have not abandoned their attempts to belittle the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact and the importance of all its principles and provisions to Finland's foreign policy immediately latched onto this," Komissarov writes.

According to Komissarov, as far as Sweden is concerned, the United States and NATO are trying more vigorously than before to exploit the country's military-industrial and scientific-technological potential as well as the country's territory. "NATO regularly uses Swedish territory to transport arms to Norway. Danish and Norwegian soldiers have been trained at Swedish military academies since 1983," Komissarov says.

All things considered, according to Komissarov, NATO activities and some Scandinavian countries' membership in NATO have constituted and still do constitute the biggest factor threatening the bases of peace in Northern Europe. According to him, more and more new elements are being introduced into Northern Europe's military strategy situation, elements that are reducing the region's chances of remaining remote from international hotbeds of tension. For this reason, according to him, the concepts of stability, peaceful situation and security are getting to be more and more relative.

Zone Discussion Is Useful

As for the Soviet Union, Komissarov says that that country "is, as a matter of fact, taking steps to improve the Armed Forces in the northwestern part of the country, also those the purpose of which is to improve the armament level and combat strength of the Navy." According to Komissarov, the sole object of these measures is, however, to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union and

its allies; these measures are solely defensive and are not directed against the Nordic countries.

With regard to the Northern European zone proposal, Komissarov says that "certain changes" have recently occurred in the Scandinavian countries' attitude toward the establishment of a nuclear-free zone. Ticking off the factors operating in favor of the zone in the different countries, Komissarov writes that this does not necessarily mean that the governments of the Scandinavian countries are already actually prepared to go ahead with the zone.

Komissarov views the idea of the northwestern part of the Soviet Union's joining the zone, among the ideas proposed during the discussion over the zone, as being entirely unrealistic.

According to him, animation of the discussion is, nevertheless, especially important and is adding to the vitality of the idea. The importance of the effort that has been made on behalf of the initiative and its realization is unquestionably growing in a situation in which the installation of U.S. missiles in Western Europe also poses a threat to the security of Northern Europe, Komissarov says.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

FINAL ELECTION RESULTS, LOSING DEPUTIES

Details Provided

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Jun 85 p 1

[Text] The New Democracy Party won one seat from the last vote distribution yesterday evening. Thus the final number of seats is: ND: 126, PASOK: 161, KKE: 12, KKE [int]: 1.

More specifically, the parties won the following number of seats by district:
At large: ND: 5, PASOK: 6, KKE: 1. First District of Athens: ND: 10, PASOK: 9, KKE: 2. Second District of Athens: ND: 11, PASOK: 15, KKE: 5, KKE [int]: 1. First District of Piraeus: ND: 4, PASOK: 4, Second District of Piraeus: ND: 3, PASOK: 4, KKE: 1, Rest of Attiki: ND: 3, PASOK: 4. First District of Salonica: ND: 6, PASOK: 6, KKE: 1. Second District of Salonica: ND: 3, PASOK: 4. Voiotia: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Evvoia: ND: 2, PASOK: 4. Fthiotida: ND: 3, PASOK: 3. Fokida: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Argolid: ND: 2, PASOK: 1. Arkadia: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Korinthia: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Lakonia: ND: 2, PASOK: 1. Messinia: ND: 4, PASOK: 3. Aitolokarnania: ND: 3, PASOK: 5. Akhaia: ND: 4, PASOK: 5. Ileia: ND: 2, PASOK: 4. Arta: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Thesprotia: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Ioannina: ND: 2, PASOK: 4. Kerkyra: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Preveza: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Grevena: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Karditsa: ND: 3, PASOK: 2. Kozani: ND: 2, PASOK: 3. Larisa: ND: 3, PASOK: 4, KKE: 1. Magnisia: ND: 3, PASOK: 3. Trikala: ND: 2, PASOK: 3. Evrytania: PASOK: 1. Pella: ND: 2, PASOK: 3. Kilkis: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Kastoria: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Imathia: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Pieria: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Serrai: ND: 5, PASOK: 3. Florina: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Khalkidiki: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Drama: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Evros: ND: 2, PASOK: 3. Kavala: ND: 2, PASOK: 2. Xanthi: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Rodopi: ND: 2, PASOK: 1. Dodekanisa: ND: 1, PASOK: 3. Kyklades: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Lesvos: ND: 1, PASOK: 2. Rethymni: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Irakleion: ND: 2, PASOK: 5. Lasithion: PASOK: 2. Khandia: ND: 1, PASOK: 3. Khios: ND: 1, PASOK: 1. Zakynthos: PASOK: 1. Kefallinia: PASOK: 1. Samos: PASOK: 1. Lefkada: PASOK: 1.

No Longer Deputies

The results of last Friday's election removed from the Chamber of Deputies a number of deputies from all three parties.

Those who were not elected on the ND ticket are: Sp. Marketos (First District of Athens), Kalliopi Bourdara (at-large), Th. Khoutas (Aitolokarnania), Froso Spentzari (Ileia), Ath. Kondaxis (Arta), K. Sapsalis (Evrytania), St. Tataridis (Evros), D. Kopelouzos (Kyklades), I. Sergakis (Lasithi) and Th. Sofoulis (Samos).

Those not elected on the PASOK ticket are: I. Koronaios and G. Kasimatis (former secretary general of the Ministry of National Economy), who were both at-large. Also, P. Papageorgopoulos (former deputy, captain in the ASPIDA [Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals of Democracy and Meritocracy] (First District of Athens), Nora Katseli, former deputy, V. Vasilikos, former alternate director general of the ERT [Greek Radio and Television] (Second District of Athens, Emm. Beteniotis, former deputy and former deputy director of IKA [Social Insurance Institute] (First District of Piraeus), I. Kapsis deputy minister of foreign affairs (Second District of Piraeus), Il. Khatzoplakis, the first PASOK deputy to express his opposition to President Karamanlis' candidacy (Karditsa), Khr. Kharalambopoulos, former director general of the EOT [Greek Tourist Organization] (Messinia) and D. Kolovos, former president of the ODDY [expansion unknown] (Arta).

Finally, the following were not reelected on the KKE ticket: And. Ambatielos (First District of Piraeus) and former PASOK deputies collaborating with the KKE A. Intzes (First District of Salonica) and V. Evangelinos (Second District of Salonica).

Final Results

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] In the total 14,738 electoral areas:

Registered:		8,119,410
Voted:		6,422,352
Valid:		6,365,039
Invalid - Blank:		57,713
Parties	Votes	%
New Democracy	2,599,949	40.85 percent
PASOK	2,916,450	45.81 percent
KKE	629,518	9.89 percent
KKE (int)	117,050	1.84 percent
Liberal Party	10,633	0.17 percent
Free	5,182	0.08 percent
EPEN	37,934	0.60 percent
ASKE	10,368	0.16 percent
EKKE	7,001	0.11 percent

Communist Left	5,356	0.08 percent
EDE	3,684	0.006 percent
EKHE	256	0.00 percent
OL. DIMOKRATIA	161	0.00 percent
Greens	5	0.00 percent
Humanistic Party	47	0.00 percent
Patriotic Right	177	0.00 percent
Independent	21,268	0.33 percent

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POLITICAL

GREECE

REPORTED APPEARANCE OF NEW POWER CENTER WITHIN PASOK

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26-27 May 85 pp 1, 3

[Article by Rikardos Someritis, correspondent in Paris]

[Text] Paris--At this moment --and perhaps for some time now-- neither party organs nor the parliamentary group has had power within PASOK. Perhaps Kastri itself does not have it, but a "para-political" apparatus that is active outside of all structures --official or not-- of the "Movement." Publicly it is being expressed by the "Koutsogiorgas-AVRIANI" clique.

These points are included in analyses by officials of the European socialist movement who recently studied political developments in Greece over the last 3 months and who, according to reliable sources, have already transmitted their views in writing to the leaderships of at least three parties, namely the French, German and Italian.

These analyses include many questions (and concerns) over the development of and prospects for PASOK whether it wins or loses the elections. Also, the confirmation that while the "first electoral round" that was played among the political parties was won by the liberal wing of ND, not easily, by the way, with regard to PASOK this first internal round was won by "populist neo-petit bourgeois elements," politically and ideologically vacillating but determined as to the means to be used, whose common characteristic is not so much their "anti-Right" stance but their frightful hatred of all the Greek "elite" --both leftist and progressive. In other words, they correspond to many of the "prescriptions" of fascist mentality.

For many Greeks (according to these European socialist officials) who belong to the broader "progressive-democratic faction," as it is called, the problem is no longer the prevalence of the conservative or socialist view on 2 June, with or without mistakes, omissions, confusion and questionable promises but the coming to power of "people having the mentality and methods of AVRIANI."

The analyses, of course, do not ignore the possibility of new forms of opposition and other such prospects within PASOK. They, nevertheless, express the view that in case of an electoral victory:

- It will not be PASOK's work and its official promises for the future that "will be justified" but the line and methodology that, prepared for some time now, was publicly expressed when last March Mr Papandreu himself was forced --for reasons that are not known-- to embrace it.

- The sponsors of this line will demand the cashing in --with interest-- of those promissory notes that had been signed, with unknown consequences not only for the country's institutions but for its general orientation.

- If, indeed, in case of a borderline victory, the problem of "political alliances" is definitely brought up for consideration, then it is believed that prospects will prove to be even more gloomy for any possible allies.

Mr Papandreou's Fears

According to data that has been assembled, it is not at all impossible that Mr Papandreou will "capitulate" to the "populist" wing of his party based on the pathological fear that every disagreement or differences with cadres causes him, such as the one that resulted in the impressive switch of PASOK leftists to the KKE. Evidently, Mr Papandreou is not altogether wrong: it is most probable, even in case of a borderline victory, that the divisionary tendencies within PASOK might assume greater proportions, while in case of a defeat PASOK's "EDIKification" /Democratic Center Union/ cannot be ruled out, in other words a development similar to that of the Center.

The "problem" of many European socialist circles with regard to Greece is thus the strengthening (at present) of those forces in PASOK that could oppose the "Koutsogiorgas" wing so that either through the present party framework or possibly in some future party setup the effort to establish in our country a truly democratic socialist movement might not be scuttled.

However, the knowledge of the dangerous developments within PASOK but also their experience from the international policy line that PASOK has put forward since 1981 explains (at least) the doubts the big western socialist parties are showing to manifest their solidarity with the Papandreou movement. Anyone who remembers the general mobilization of leaders of political parties, governments and states in 1981 on behalf of the "Movement" by every means and manner (the concept of a Mediterranean opening of a European Left prevailed at the time), can objectively judge the meaning of a short trip to Athens by Mr Lang or by a delegation of the socialist group in the Euro-Parliament that could not do otherwise.

Of course, the European Left does not have any "political interest" in losing PASOK because today these victories or these defeats in any given country influence all other countries, creating a "European ripple effect," more or less. The interest (of both socialists and conservatives) is, nevertheless, regardless of the outcome of the 2 June elections, not to have Greece upset its European perspective.

It is, of course, certain that if something has led most of the European leaders, regardless of their political affiliation, to accept the invitation to attend the 21 June celebrations in Athens it is exactly to underline --following the elections and regardless of their outcome-- the European ties of the country a few days prior to the meeting of the European Council in Milan.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

LEFT'S ATTACKS AGAINST PASOK SEEN SELF-DESTROYING

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26-27 May 85 p 9

/Editorial: "Attempt at Self-Destruction"/

/Text/ The two communist parties believe that they are working for the maintenance --or increase-- of their electoral strength when "they denounce" PASOK for really seeking to have a bipartisan system established in Greece "so that the Left can be put into the corner" and so that Mr Papandreou can rotate with the Right in power to the detriment of the popular and national interests.

Once again, the KKE's attempt --in this particular case there is no difference between "dogmatic" and "Euro-communist"-- to promote its ambitions through participation in democratic, parliamentary processes, leads to a distortion of reality and to results that are contrary to what it is aspiring.

What the "concurring" communist parties are seeking to do is to "finance" in parliamentary seats their strength in votes so that they might thus influence political developments and government practice on the basis of what they believe is the proper direction on behalf of the workers. In other words, they tend toward party "pluralism."

But this assertion, namely that PASOK is a "prefabricated" political force and is prepared to alternate power with New Democracy because it differs from the latter only with regard to the way it handles the social and economic system, precisely distorts the truth. It helps PASOK in winning over social forces that do not belong to it. Not to "alternate" power but in order not to hand it over to anyone else. Therefore, "in order to put the Left too in the corner!"

Mr A. Papandreou's "Movement" does not intend being a party that will sometimes be a government party and sometimes a government opposition party. And it does not intend to do so because this kind of format is one of those correlation of political forces to which "pluralism" might lead. As, for example, the Italian multi-party system that has permitted the perpetual possession of power in the post-war years by the multifold but always bourgeois political parties. PASOK detests pluralism because obviously it is its major opponent for the restoration of the one party state. Of the state party in which despotic regimes of all hues "nest."

If PASOK were "programmed" for alternation in the handling of the same system it would not have done whatever came to its power to dissolve this system during the 3-1/2 years that it has been in power. Of course, whatever it did do was in the opinion of the communist parties enough so that the "system" would no longer have social supports capable of reproducing its political representation as the claimant of power.

But a "supporter" of this or that political and social regime is not "measured" by the extent of the success in its effort to...dissolve it. It is measured by what it has done to preserve it or to develop it.

Was that the goal of the PASOK government? Is that what it promises to do if Mr Papandreou becomes prime minister again? How, then, can it become admissible that the political representation of the liberal, parliamentary regime "agreed" with Mr Papandreou, while one "is building" for 4 years and while the other "is demolishing" for 4 years?"

The traditional Left, imbued with its traditional customs and mores that all evil comes from the bourgeois "pseudo-democratic" regime which, as the traditional Left itself has finally admitted cannot be overthrown by armed force or terrorism, it tries to undermine or weaken.

The traditional Left, taking aim with its slings and guns at those forces from where political and economic liberalism emanates, threaten those very sources from which it draws its right to existence and unimpeded activity. Exactly the right that PASOK denies it.

It is one more of its historic errors.....

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POLITICAL

GREECE

WINS, LOSSES OF PASOK, ND REPORTED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Jun 85 p 6

[Article by G. Tambakopoulos: "Parties' Profits and Losses from Elections"]

[Text] The New Democracy is the party that most profited from last Sunday's parliamentary elections, since it increased its power more than its opponents did.

On the other hand, the KKE was the loser, since its electoral losses were not caused by the exercise of--or even the participation in--power.

From 1981 (48.07 percent), the PASOK lost 2.25 percent in 1985 (45.82 percent). Through a series of simple arithmetical calculations, we shall see below where the PASOK and the New Democracy lost.

First calculation: As we mentioned above, the PASOK lost 2.25 percent. Let us see what did the KKE lose from 1981 to 1985 (1981: 10.93 percent, 1985: 9.89 percent). That is, a loss of 1.04 percent. We suppose that this percentage went to the PASOK. If it is considered "circumstantial" and not coming from PASOK voters, then the loss of the government party rises to 3.29 percent.

Second calculation: New Democracy had received 35.87 percent in 1981 and garnered 40.84 percent of the vote in 1985. There is an increase of 4.37 percent between the two elections.

If we calculate that within this increase is included the EPEN vote of 2.29 percent, then (after deducting from this percentage 0.60 percent that it received in this year's election, the New Democracy received 1.69 percent of the EPEN vote.

Therefore, the real increase of the New Democracy is 3.28 percent. Let us go back to our first calculation and compare the real increase of the New Democracy --3.28 percent--with the (real) decrease of the PASOK--3.29 percent!

It is then obvious that this percentage of the PASOK vote went to the New Democracy....

At the same time, we can reach other conclusions: The KKE vote for the PASOK is 1.04 percent. However, this calculation is effected on the basis of the same number of voters in 1981 and 1985. If we calculate, though, that a large number of new voters was added to the electorate, then our calculations are not valid, since we don't know how these individuals voted. There is thus the possibility that this percentage may be higher or lower. Logic usually suggests that the largest number of new voters turned left. It would be risky, however, to maintain that these new voters preferred the KKE and the KKE (int), but turned to the PASOK because of psychological violence and the polarization climate fomented by the PASOK.

Results Compared

We give below the percentage of increases for the New Democracy and the PASOK between 1981 and 1985. At the same time, we note by nome where and how much each of the two parties lost.

New Democracy

It gained votes: in the First Athens District (9.6 percent); in the Second Athens District (8.44 percent); in the Second Piraeus District (6.63 percent); in the rest of Attiki (9.29 percent); Argolida (2.04 percent); Khalkidiki (1.97 percent); Drama (2.62 percent); Evvoia (8.06 percent); in these areas: Pella (3.66 percent); Fthiotida (5.15 percent); Thesprotia (4.35 percent); Preveza (1.28 percent); Fokida (4.88 percent); Rethymno (9.66 percent); Kastoria (1.45 percent); Irakleio (6.82 percent); Khania (6.05 percent); Dodekanisa (5.82 percent); Lasithi (1.89 percent); Rodopi (10.06 percent); Xanthi (9.15 percent); Kavala (3.93 percent); Voiotia (4.48 percent); Evros (6.82 percent); Magnisia (3.78 percent); Kozani (0.16 percent); Larisa (3.04 percent); Grevena (5.24 percent); Pieria (3.91 percent); Kilikis (4.52 percent); First Salonica District (8.44 percent); Second Salonica District (5.54 percent); Serres (3.73 percent); Ilea (1.27 percent); Kerkyra (0.56 percent); Arkadia (2.22 percent); Zakynthos (0.56 percent); Evrytania (1.97 percent); Messinia (2.87 percent); Aitolokarnania (1.83 percent); Akhaia (5.5 percent); Lakonia (3.06 percent); Trikala (3.18 percent); Kefallinia (4.43 percent); Korinthia (5.23 percent); Imathia (4.44 percent).

The New Democracy only lost in 9 areas. Very little in Kyklades (0.39 percent); in Khios (3.59 percent); in Lefkada (2.06 percent); Karditsa (7.03 percent); Florina (1 percent); Ioannina (1.58 percent); Arta (0.71 percent); Samos (5.01 percent); and Lesvos (1.16 percent).

PASOK

The PASOK won in these nomes compared with its 1981 howing: Lesvos (4.56 percent); Rethymno (6.05 percent); Florina (3.17 percent); Samos (7.26 percent); Karditsa (0.28 percent); Kozani (0.57 percent); Kilikis (1.24 percent); Kerkyra (0.33 percent); Khios (3.36 percent); Lefkada (1.29 percent); and Kyklades (1.12 percent). The PASOK lost: in the Second Piraeus District (1.8 percent); Evrytania (3.34 percent); Messinia (1.23 percent); Aitolokarnania (2.05 percent); Akhaia (3.38 percent); Trikala (2.72 percent); Korinthia (3.62 percent); Imathia (2.92 percent); First Athens District (4.67 percent); Magnisia (0.97 percent);

Larisa (1.06 percent); Grevena (1.5 percent); Pieria (1.91 percent); First Salonica District (3.02 percent); Second Salonica District (2.34 percent); Serres (2.29 percent); Ileia (2.06 percent); Arkadia (0.09 percent); Second Athens District (3.78 percent); Fokida (3.89 percent); Kastoria (0.83 percent); Irakleio (1.58 percent); Khandia (0.3 percent); Dodekanisa (1.53 percent); Lasithi (1.65 percent); Rodopi (20.41 percent); Xanthi (2.62 percent); Kavala (1.23 percent); Voiotia (5.03 percent); Evros (1.26 percent); Argolida (1.02 percent); Khalkidiki (1.27 percent); Ioannina (1.29 percent); Arta (0.53 percent); Drama (0.32 percent); Evvoia (4.66 percent); rest of Attiki (6.08 percent); First Piraeus District (4.16 percent); Pella (1.56 percent); Fthiotida (2.35 percent); Thesprotia (6.31 percent); and Preveza (2.93 percent).

The New Democracy increased its power in 47 nomes and lost in 9...which happen to be mostly one-seat nomes and in which population "movements" were noted!

The PASOK won in only 14 areas and lost in the remaining 42.

CSO: 3521/266

POLITICAL

GREECE

UNEASE EXPRESSED OVER FUTURE TREATMENT OF CHURCH

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 6 Jun 85 p 16

[Article by Spyros Alexiou: "Our Concern"]

[Excerpts] As for us, we must ponder the electoral results from another side. From our side, that is, the position of the Church, and what it can expect from the new governmental term. We are not being political, and we are not exercising any opposition. Our position is known. Besides, we are not afraid of writing the truth, when this is just an expression of reality.

We don't know yet what the new victory of the PASOK will mean for the Church. Will the old tactics of friendliness by the leadership and the government in general continue, while those below are allowed to do everything in their power to move Orthodoxy out of the picture? Will the PASOK now proceed to an open war, following the Marxist adherence to the party of individuals who are openly fighting against the Church? In this last case, the PASOK will surely want to hew the line of a new group which has entered its ranks. This group is the extreme leftist faction that joined the PASOK--in spite of their leaders' warnings--because of the Thursday rally in Athens which inspired in them the fear of a "return of the right." What will those in charge do when subjected to the pressure of this new materialistic power? Obviously, they will intensify the war. However, there is also a third alternative: they may not turn against the Church.

The increased power of the New Democracy (5 percent) and especially the fact that it is the only party that grew, will surely make the ones in charge think twice. They are perfectly aware that many good Christian left them only because of what occurred against the Church. They also know that they don't have the luxury of numerical ease, and thus the fear of new losses is very tangible; this may compel them to be more careful. Perhaps.

There is no doubt that the prime minister will give the Archbishop new assurances, that he will visit him officially, that he will congratulate him and tell him he will take good care of Church issues. And it is even possible he will be telling the truth. However, the recent past has taught us that we cannot be sure that those below him will be following the same policy.

Besides, the data available on the new governmental policy vis-a-vis the Church do not shed any light on what the PASOK intends to do. Only in one instance did Mr Arsenis, in Trikala, say that "the monastery holdings will be given to the peasants." It is known that the government's strong man, who has complete jurisdiction on financial policy, does not entertain very strong religious beliefs. And when he refers to "monastery holdings," he means the full socialization of the Church, so that it, too, will come under the severe "tsarist" control.

For all these reasons, the responsibility of the Orthodox majority is now very great. The vigilance of all those in charge in the Church, regardless of position and rank, should now, more than ever, increase. We must all know that among that 46 percent of the majority, there are many who are not willing to accept measures against the Church.

Let us hope that our fears are only the result of an unpleasant experience. Let us hope that they derive from what we have seen and described in recent years, and that the many concerns of the "friends" of the Church about other urgent matters will not allow them the opportunity to become "interested" in the Church.

CSO: 3521/267

25 June 1985

POLITICAL

ITALY

NATTA REPORT TO PCI CENTRAL COMMITTEE

PMO41201 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 24 May 85 pp 9-11

[PCI Secretary General Alessandro Natta 23 May report to PCI Central Committee and Central Control Commission session in Rome: "Natta's Report: 'Analysis of the Vote, Political Outlook, and Party's Tasks'"]

[Text] 1.

We considered it a duty and a necessity to promote without delay an open, in-depth examination by the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the results of the 12-13 May election results to identify the causes of and reasons for the severe blow that our party suffered and to initiate a debate on the ways and means of a new advancement of our policy.

We can and must approach this need for critical deliberation and innovation very calmly and clearly.

Indeed, we are well aware that the PCI's representational strength due to the support of 30 percent of the Italian people; its character and role as a major national and democratic party essential to a policy of development and regeneration of our country; and our responsibility to millions of citizens permit and require that the debate here within the leadership bodies and throughout the party organizations take place calmly but penetratingly.

At the same time we must, without hesitations or inhibitions, increasingly elucidate fundamental matters of policy line, political options, and party organization and leadership, which is essential if we want to impart a clearer and surer foundation to the PCI's strategy and outlook.

We were not of the opinion that the tasks--substantial and not easy--before us, and especially the referendum campaign, should cause us to postpone the start of the debate. On the contrary: The debate and a free and responsible exchange of ideas will--as is, and must increasingly be, the case within our party--help to impart a more solid approach to our initiative and action for the formation of local councils, to determine our conduct, and to impart an impetus and a boost to our struggle for the referendum.

Obviously after the referendum we will have to have another session of stock-taking and deliberation, when it will be necessary to assess and to decide on the forms and aims of the debate and initiative which our organizations have, for that matter, already begun, promptly and boldly, and on the orientation of our regional congresses scheduled by party rules.

2. Essential Political Factors of the Vote

In our analysis of the results of the 12 May elections I believe it would be opportune to concentrate our attention on the essential political factors.

The first is unquestionably our party's serious failure. The serious point is not only or not so much our failure to maintain the level of support gained in last year's European elections, which seemed and certainly was extraordinary owing to a combination of circumstances, but our decline from the 1980-81 local elections, which was almost universal and particularly marked in the municipal results.

So as far as the party's overall strength is concerned we are witnessing a return to our 1983 position--as emerges from the provincial election figures, both in the percentage and in the total number of votes--and, much more importantly, a lessening of the party's weight on regional, provincial, and municipal councils and a reduction of the area of democratic and left-wing administrations in local government.

The second prominent aspect is the DC's recovery from its heavy 1983-84 losses. It should be noted that the DC has still not matched its 1980 result and that the recovery from the 1983 result is very limited in the provincial elections, while the improvement in its vote in the cities and municipalities seems more significant, albeit inconsistent.

The figures are well known. The PSI's progress is mainly from its 1983-84 results; it is less significant compared to its result in the 1980-81 local elections. The PRI's position has improved since the previous local elections but it has failed to reach its level in the 1983 general election. The PLI and the PSDI, in particular, have been heavily penalized and all three nonconfessional parties remain below the 5 percent mark.

The Italian Social Movement's result shows that there has not been a shift to the Right--except in the alarming case of Bolzano, on which everyone, including of course ourselves, must reflect particularly carefully. Last, the Proletarian Democrats' limited expansion and the success of a number of Green lists could indicate some losses on our part in these directions rather than a strong trend toward radical stances.

One could deduce from the overall results that the political panorama has not undergone any upheavals or substantial changes.

But it is a fact--and one of obvious political significance--that the alignment of government parties has been strengthened both at the national level and within the local context and that within the present coalition the DC

has earned an undoubted political advantage thanks to its recovery from its 1983 defeat and its 1984 shock, its reconfirmation as the majority forces, the rescaling of the nonconfessional area, and, last, the containment of the PSI's aims and attempts at an advance. Of course the PSI has slightly lessened the distance between itself and both the PCI and the DC, but after 2 years of government leadership there cannot be said to have been any substantial change in the balance of forces either on the left or within the five-way coalition--despite the Social Democrats' losses and the Radicals' nonparticipation--while there is still no answer to the question whether the 13-14 percent it gained in these local elections is a politically acquired result or whether, instead, it still corresponds to the traditionally more favorable local election factor. Be that as it may, it seems clear to me that the 12 May result threatens to accentuate the Centrist character of the coalition and it has posed anew for us and for all left-wing and progressive forces--in more difficult and more acute terms--the problem of the regeneration and democratic reform of society and the state.

Perhaps it would be worth making this assessment less general and more explicit by referring to the trends over the past decade. The phase opened up in 1975 by our advance and that of the Left has unquestionably reached a critical stage. On the other hand neither the DC nor the traditionally Centrist forces have made a recovery since then. The advantage has been earned by groups which emerged outside the party system (the Radicals), by new pressure groups (such as the Greens), and by local or corporative organizations. These points I have mentioned certainly reflect a difficulty on the part of the traditional parties, but also and above all the obstacles encountered, especially after 1979-80, by our struggle to unblock Italy's democracy and to promote a democratic alternative, though I believe it would be an oversimplification to believe that the situation has returned to where it was 10 years ago.

3. Why We Have Suffered This Failure

So let us come to the heart of the matter: Why have we suffered this failure? What does this difficulty teach us?

The specific character of local elections undoubtedly played a part.

One influence has been the increased participation, the fact that, compared to the 1984 European elections an additional 2 million proper votes--leaving aside spoiled or blank ballots--were cast by voters stimulated by mobilization which exploited a raising of the stakes. It has been pointed out that in the orientation and conduct of the election campaign there was a radical overemphasis on the significance and political importance of the 12 May elections and of the referendum, as though they were crucial events involving not only the future of the government but, more fundamentally, our country's democratic order, security, and chances of development. It is entirely legitimate to wonder about the correctness and effectiveness of our response. But the overtaking [of the DC by the PCI] was not our invention. It was a fact that emerged from the 17 June [1984] elections--an unavoidable reference

point. Above all it was a cause for concern which immediately tormented the DC, and the PSI too, and probably also sectors of the public and which, immediately after the European elections, prompted 12 May to be indicated as the opportunity for a revenge and for mobilizing forces of the electorate who had been indifferent or aloof.

We, and I personally, tried to respond to the manipulatory use of that factor and to the revival of the oldest and most shameful arguments of anticommunist prejudice not only by citing the positive impact in so many parts of the country of the PCI's assertion as the majority force in 1975 and 1980 but also by stressing the need to acknowledge and fully to implement Italian democracy, The democratic forces' equal rights, and the PCI's absolute legitimacy as a government force, and by stressing the need for a change, for a democratic alternative. Perhaps we helped in this way to politicize the dialogue, though it would be a distortion not to recognize the effort--perhaps the greatest ever--that was made in the formulation of a platform in connection with the specific topic of the elections.

It is difficult to assess the actual impact of the elections' objective political significance and of the radicalization that was made of it. But this in itself is not enough to explain our failure. The tension and sharpness of the electoral contest always have a twofold impact on its leading forces. Over and above the election campaign, its character, and possible errors in its conduct, our analysis must be extended to the processes and events within society and political life which have characterized the eighties and especially the period 1983-85.

The fact is that an attempt has been made to respond to the crisis of development and of the welfare state in the West with a conservative offensive on a European scale, under the impetus of Reagan's policy.

The processes of economic restructuring and innovation have been based essentially on an attack on the working classes' positions and gains--jobs, pay, social services, and the rights and power of the trade union organizations. More generally, an attempt has been made to assert a conception of the technological revolution, of the modernization of the production system, and of development which challenged--as though by virtue of some objective and unavoidable logic--the social and human demands and values of freedom, justice, equality, and improved working and living conditions for the individual and the community.

Undoubtedly the economic and social crisis, the weight of the United States' superiority over Europe, and the pressure of U.S. economic, financial, and military options have confronted the European left-wing forces with new and very significant and difficult problems concerning political strategies, policy platforms, and the system of alliances needed in individual countries and within the European context in order to lead a process of democratic change.

It is on issues of this kind that the dialogue and the struggle in the political, social, and cultural fields has actually developed in Italy too over the years and it is in this regard that we must assess the limitations or shortcomings of our formulations and our initiative.

It seems to me that it would be a distortion of our policy to sum up our commitment to a democratic alternative simply as a partisan battle or--a charge often leveled at us--as a prejudiced and splittist attack on the government coalition, especially since there has been a Socialist prime minister.

If we want to reach the substance and the truth of the facts it must be recalled that in the 1983 elections, which we contested following the famous meeting [with PSI leaders] at the Frattocchie, we did not at all align against the PSI; that we did not adopt a stance of preconceived hostility toward the Craxi government; and that our conduct, as a democratic and constitutional opposition force, was not motivated by stubbornness and confrontation but, on the contrary, missed no opportunity to make both critical and positive contributions on important issues, as in the case of foreign policy, the revision of the Concordat, and very significant legislative measures such as the Visentini bill.

Last, it must be remembered that the political conclusions that we drew from the 17 June vote explicitly opened up the possibility of an elucidation and of less tense and conflict-ridden relations on the Left.

This does not imply a denial of the impact that may have been exerted on the political events of the past years, both on the national level and in the various regions and major cities, by distortions of or deviations from our policy line, contretemps, and exacerbated controversies. In assessing these controversies both with the PSI and with the DC, we could even say that we do not bear the major share of the blame, but the most important thing is not to lose sight of the basic facts. The truth is that between 1983 and 1984 a profound and serious conflict developed over the orientation of economic and social policy and over the conception of the state and of the country's democratic government. The decree reducing the escalator increments was not a normal legislative measure, more or less open to argument, but a major and typical act of an unproductive line of economic policy and of unfair distribution of income and wound inflicted to fundamental principles of social relations. That blow was aimed at the trade unions' autonomy and unity. It was part of an offensive designed to advance the centralistic tendencies, which emerged right at the start of the eighties, to reduce the functions and opportunities open to the regional and local administrations, and in fact gradually to alter the balance and relations between the various constitutional bodies--and not by means of institutional reforms.

Our clash with the coalition and the splits within the Left occurred, therefore, not over the occasional unimportant episode, still less over matters of partisan rivalry, but over very significant issues--the nature of economic development, the regeneration of the democratic system and institutions, the question of ethics, and the nuclear rearmament problem. And our conflict with the PSI, which had negative repercussions even within the

left-wing administrations, did not escalate because of the Socialist premier-ship. It was Berlinguer who stressed to the lower house that this premier-ship was partly a result of the Left's overall strength. The point is that the policy pursued by part of the PSI leadership group not only ruled out the possibility of an accord on a democratic alternative but ultimately re-inforced prejudices and aimed at isolating the PCI.

There is certainly real evidence that this line claimed a price from the PSI too; that it encountered open reservations and objections within that party, so that it would be wrong to identify the whole of the PSI with it; and that it could even create new problems and contradictions; but it is equally true that we must also take account of these political approaches and of the reality as regards the PSI in assessing the election results and seeking the ways and means of a policy of unity and regeneration of the Italian Left.

Many different factors influenced the DC's stability and recovery--not least, I believe, a recovery of its positions in the current distribution of power in essential fields--from the economy and finance to data handling--and some success in the contest, in this connection, with the PSI, which has continued and which has every likelihood of becoming exacerbated.

Of course the church's return to the fray had a major impact. We must be careful not to think in terms of an automatic return to far-off times, to a new appointment of the DC as the party of the Catholics' political unity. Nevertheless the stances adopted by the episcopate in Rome, Emilia-Romagna, and elsewhere and, last,--albeit more moderately--the latest Italian Episcopal Conference document constituted an obvious indication of support. Neither must we underestimate the significance of the specific stances adopted against the so-called non-Christian councils.

The salient fact, however, seems to me that the church's action was aimed at encouraging and organizing a more active and stronger involvement of Catholics and their organizations, both old and new, in society and at pledging the Catholic world to a more specific choice of values. This initiative has undoubtedly been marked by a plurality of stances and a comparison of approaches within the episcopate and the lay Catholic organizations. It brought about an activation of considerable numbers of people, especially young people, but it also made possible the transition from forms of critical prompting addressed to the DC to forms of support, as soon as there emerged a few signs of a renewal of the party's image--as in Sicily--and of the recovery of Catholic motivation, albeit for ulterior motives and sometimes in a rather clumsy manner.

During this period there has also been a return to explicit forms of collaterality [collateralismo], from which the DC has undoubtedly benefited.

Be that as it may we must thoroughly examine the Catholic question, though it must be clearly realized that the issue with which we must come to terms with regard to the needs of a dialogue with the Catholic world and its organizations is of a general nature and involves our capacity to formulate policy and proposals on the major ideological issues and on the choice of values in connection with the problems of the world and of contemporary society.

Emphasis must also be placed on the essential topic of political substance and relations in connection with the other element which undoubtedly influenced the 12 May negative result--I mean the overall weakening of the experience of the left-wing democratic councils.

Let this be clearly understood: When we talk about erosion, on our part too, we must certainly not challenge the innovative significance of the 1975 swing on the life of the major cities and, more generally, on Italian democracy; we must not overlook the positive, and in many respects extraordinary, work done over the past 10 years; nor, still less, can we raise doubts about the present validity of solutions based on the legacy of this experience and the ideas behind it.

We rightly responded in our election campaign to an attempt to introduce a standardization [of local government coalitions], on the issue of political probity, and to a coarse and dismissive attack.

Distinctions must be drawn even among left-wing councils. It cannot be denied, however, that between 1983 and 1984 a heavy blow was dealt to a basic distinguishing characteristic--that of correct government, obvious probity in the administration of public affairs. And we have discovered yet again that the public are tough on us, even when we are not directly to blame.

But this is not the basic issue. We had already noticed that after the first and positive 5-year period, there came about within the left-wing administrations in general a loss of impetus, of innovative capacity, of real and vigorous connections with society, and of relations with the progressive movements and organizations.

Undoubtedly this was partly a repercussion of the centralistic political tendency which, following the propulsive phase in the local government system begun during the democratic solidarity period, blocked and drove back the process of complete implementation of the regional system and of the enhancement of local government's functions: It is enough to consider the distressing case of the regional and local finance laws. But we must also ponder our own responsibilities, carefully considering whether we have not committed errors--and I believe we have--perhaps because of an excessively institutional, sometimes even elitist, view of government, thus rendering less sensitive and constant that vital rapport with people, with what is stirring within society and within the collective consciousness and demands a response. Our most serious losses in working class areas and among the working class strata of the major cities must stimulate a reappraisal in this direction, irrespective of the party's position.

We must examine in particular our shortcomings in our formulations and options in connection with the new and difficult problems which gradually confronted regional and municipal authorities--in the field of economic development and employment, in the relationship between industrialization and the environment--and which require not only closer attention and an improvement of our capabilities at the local level but above all a more precise and consistent national approach and coordinated action.

The defects and limitations which I mentioned generally probably lessened the effectiveness of our response to the change brought about by the PSI in the local government field since 1980-81.

The policy of governability and of a return to cooperation with the DC brought about a gradually more accentuated change in the PSI's approach and action, and I believe we are aware of the various stages in this--from the assertion of the equal validity of alliances and solutions (the balancing of councils), to the declaration and practice of conflict which, particularly in councils headed by communists, often became a factor of paralysis and erosion and resulted, following the formation of the Craxi government and the subsequent tensions, in disengagement and disunity. This led to the declarations of a preference for the five-party formula, first at the July 1984 Villa Madama meeting and then, more openly, during the final phase of the election campaign.

Our attempt to impart a new boost to our platform, our defense of the validity of the experience of the left-wing democratic councils, and our proposal of more open progressive alliances came up against the inconsistency, which became more acute--though we must acknowledge that the Socialist comrades' stance and conduct did vary from place to place--between our proposal and the PSI's disengagement, distancing, and divergent orientation.

This political factor, together with the other points I mentioned, has combined with a general factor which actually did not emerge during the past year but which I believe has constituted the major difficulty for and the central issue of our democratic alternative policy and proposal since the breakup of the national solidarity agreement and the PSI's gradual change of approach.

We have not been unaware of this difficulty and contradiction. Even after our success in the 1984 European elections, when we stressed the issue of the PCI's democratic equality and absolute right to stand as a candidate for government, we were well aware, as we explicitly asserted, that the democratic alternative was a long-term process.

The very fact that we did not then stress the possibility of a "different kind of government" was certainly designed partly to attenuate the tensions on the left but also to emphasize the need for an effort, which we made, to develop and elucidate our program and to build a new and broader fabric of social and political alliances.

It must be admitted that by the time the elections arrived we had not succeeded over the past year in invigorating the mass initiative, mobilization, and struggle on the most acute problems--from unemployment to peace. We placed more emphasis on the political aspect and less on struggles, less on the involvement and pressure of the working masses and the people.

For these reasons too the democratic alternative appeared to lack real substance and specific possibilities both in the immediate term and as a short-term government solution. This lack of plausibility could have created the

impression that a success on our part would not have opened the way to a change of course, but could in fact have involved a risk of a state of uncertainty, lacking foreseeable and sure solutions.

From what I have said so far it seems clear to me that we would like to suggest as the focus of our deliberations on the election results and the consequent problems matters having to do with our own policy and action rather than others' offensive.

Nevertheless our analysis would be incomplete if we failed to take account of another political fact. At present a campaign is under way to portray the harsh actions and statements addressed to our party purely as a consequence of excessive aggressiveness on our part.

But this is not so: The communist question concerns not a name but the substance of the interests, ideals, and proposal for democratic change which we represent, at the major part of the workers and left-wing movement.

From this setback we derive a further confirmation of the profundity of the resistance organized at what are considered crucial moments, but also a confirmation of the significance and value of our presence as a force for real change.

4. For a Platform of the Progressive Forces

The difficulty of building an alternative in no way alters the fact that it remains a necessity for the country's requirements and the future of Italian democracy.

The problems facing the workers and the nation remain the same as before, as do the causes, within the political context, that have prevented their solution.

In the past we did not trust, and now we have even more reason not to trust, the government coalition's capacity to provide valid answers to the serious questions raised by the economic situation and by the indispensable need for democratic regeneration. If anything, the increased weight of centrist-type stances increases our anxiety about new regressive approaches, new attempts to deal severely with the working masses and the least defended part of the people.

The conflicts and contradictions within the coalition are not likely to disappear. We are well aware that the cohesive strength represented by the possession and use of power, both in government and in other official bodies, has been and still is great, so that many disputes arise or are resolved on the basis of a redistribution of posts and advantages. So one must not imagine a disruptive conflict or an impossibility of action in every discussion or every dispute within the coalition--partly because there has been a rapprochement of viewpoints on many essential issues among parties which have acquired a joint familiarity with government over the past 20 years.

Nevertheless, the conflicts and contradictions are rooted in the differing interests which each party aspires to represent both in the socioeconomic field and within the context of ideology, lifestyles, and the conception of the state. It was no mistake to emphasize, both in the distant and in the recent past, this fact and its consequence, namely the frequent recourse to the shelving of important decisions, to the extent of outright instances of nongovernment.

Now in particular the strengthening of the DC's weight within the coalition raises and will continue to raise serious problems for the other parties. However, there can be no question of trusting in the majority's internal conflicts: The very contradictions that pervade the coalition could result in a further decline in political standards through an exacerbation of rivalry and of the practice of apportioning power in public affairs. Neither can there be any question of our considering using these contradictions for ulterior motives, as though the issue were to deal some kind of blow to the government coalition, no matter how. On the contrary, our basic line has always been, and will remain, that of a major constructive force of government which, even when in opposition, must and can put forward specific objectives and fight for them and make positive use of others' contradictions with a view to eliciting all possible support for the solutions which we consider most correct.

As I have pointed out, this is how we have acted toward the present coalition. We must not now alter our resolute opposition to a government and a majority which we believe have not so far tackled the country's problems positively and fairly. If any innovations emerge when the announced stock-takings as regards the government's program and composition have been completed, we will assess them and issue our verdict on them when the time comes.

Starting now, however, we must return to the issue of the proper approach to the constitutional opposition. We are witnessing serious anomalies which are establishing an implicit inequality of rights. The government forces have abused their power--which is nothing new--but we ourselves have perhaps failed to present an adequate struggle, almost accepting as normal the continued existence of forms of corruption and discrimination. The problem remains unsolved and has in fact grown worse, even though in fact it involves not only the need to observe basic democratic duties but the prime conditions for less tense political relations.

The recognition of the constitutional opposition's rights cannot be made subject to its greater or lesser distance, or to the greater or lesser vigor of its action with respect to the majority's stances, as we were told in connection with the appointment of Italy's EEC Commission members. On the contrary. It is in the vital interests of democracy that the opposition fully perform its monitoring, stimulative, and alternative role.

We have fulfilled this duty and must try to do so more and more, by stepping up the debate on the specific substance of the government's action. The special nature of the Italian situation and the lack of homogeneousness of the majority have often forced us into a role which could be abstractly

defined as improper for an opposition force but which it would have been absolutely wrong to shirk. I mean that without our contribution essential measures could in no way have been launched, because of the splits within the coalition.

We will not shirk this duty if it presents itself to us again, but it is no less essential to establish the distinction of tasks and policies. From the opposition we must more sharply outline a program and specific policies capable of meeting the challenge and the novelty presented by the present situation.

This is the real and most profound reason for the need for an alternative and at the same time the reason for the difficulties encountered by us, but also by a large proportion of left-wing forces in the West. It is clearly recognized that the policies introduced by the conservative tendencies that have become established in the major countries have not been, and are not, able to deal satisfactorily with the contradictions of the modern world. At the same time, the left-wing forces, including us, are encountering difficulties with their own responses, if they do not want to make themselves entirely subordinate to approaches that conflict with their own original values.

All progressive forces, particularly those which participated in the Third International experience, are affected by the extreme difficulty of economic and political innovation and evolution in the countries where the first experiments in revolutionizing production relations took place.

Another major negative influence has been an international situation in which the barely nascent elements of detente are continually being placed in jeopardy. Stronger appeals seem to be emerging not only for balance and therefore observance of agreed alliances but also for internal discipline within each bloc. On the other hand the political course unilaterally determined by the hegemonic power creates, directly or indirectly, outside its own borders binding ties and consequences which are tending to reduce more and more spectacularly the decision-making scope of individual national states.

It would be a mistake to imagine a different objective situation. And this is certainly not because we want to gloss over the observations on the inadequacies of our program. But because to propose once again and revive a left-wing government program cannot be done without a careful examination of the situation and above all of the conditions in which we must act.

However, it is not in the least true that the Italian communists have returned to a kind of starting point, as was stated in the most vicious and at times arrogant of the many lectures directed at us. For instance, if our ideas in every sphere were to be really compared with those of the parties now in government it would be possible to demonstrate the inadequacies of others rather than our own with regard to the nation's fundamental problems and with regard to the administration of the regions and local authorities. The studies from reliable sources which place communist-run regions in the lead with regard to capability and efficiency have certainly not lost their validity.

But all this should not lead us to ignore a basic point. In view of the problems and the crisis, the policy of attacking the achievements of the welfare state seemed convincing despite the enormous costs generated by the increase in unemployment or even, as has been observed in the United States, by the return, in the richest country in the world, of areas which consistently lack means of subsistence [sentence as published].

Aside from increasing mutual fears of extermination, the rearmament policy does not seem so abominable to those who are worried about the economic situation or, more immediately, about their own jobs.

However, the most important question is that a left which seemed to be unable to make critical examination of the situation, including the new and major problems caused by the enormous growth in the state's functions, would really be destined to become alienated from its progressive function.

We have tried not to remain caught in this rearguard position. In our relations with other European left-wing forces we have been able to note that others are not always further forward than us in understanding what the new situation means.

However, we give warning that a party like ours, which for many years has adhered to the basis of a program and which wishes increasingly to define its secular nature through its own program, needs to make a more decisive and marked step forward.

This requirement does not stem from the losses we have suffered or from the need to break the isolation in which people are trying to lock us. Both these facts certainly prompt us to move forward, but they do not necessarily show us one direction: And, furthermore, it would not have been at all possible to maintain such a vast consensus if we had not started our renewal a long time ago and if this process had not been recognized as the right one by so many of our people.

The need for qualitative progress in the drafting of our program stems primarily from the awareness of the existence of problems not solved by us or by others, and, at the same time, from the awareness of the duty we shouldered as a renovating and reforming force, not only toward those who put their trust in us, but also toward all the working masses and the country. Perhaps never before as on the occasion of this failure--in addition to the many insults, sarcastic remarks, and displays of fanatical hatred which seem to us, perhaps mistakenly, to belong to the past--never before has so much expectation and hope been vested in our party, although of conflicting natures and at times unconsciously expressed.

In fact it is clear that however great the support for the present government formula, it seems paradoxical to many people to believe that it can stake some kind of permanent claim on the nation's future. Of course, we must realize that much of the advice addressed to our party is not impartial and has ulterior motives, if not inspired by even worse intentions. But this must not cause us to close in on ourselves and to avoid the debate and dialogue. Quite the contrary: We can have no new platform to submit for discussion among the

left-wing and democratic forces unless we throw open our doors still wider so that new ideas and information can circulate within our ranks and so that we can delve deeper and a rigorous effort to acquaint ourselves with the real situation can prevail. We need to assert clearer and more sharply defined stances on the major options and fundamental orientations to be put to the country.

The debate on this essential issue too has begun within the party and this Central Committee session will impart a crucial boost to it. We must make sure to urge the participation of all comrades, with the most varied experience of life in society and in the multiplicity of associations and organizations to which communists belong. We must encourage a contribution from the major cultural forces, starting with individual specialized areas, but not confining ourselves to them. We must ensure that worker and working class comrades--the essential backbone of our struggle--feel fully involved in the discussion.

Of course, we are not embarking on this debate without guidelines, nor do we have to go back over all the ground that has already been covered. We are being urged to state our opinion on Italy's international position, on the management of the economy, and on the issues of democracy. But, under Berlinguer, we have already adopted clear and sharply defined stances on all these issues, confirmed by our congresses.

As far as international matters are concerned, we have no retractions to make, and we have completely reasserted at every opportunity our party's full autonomy, our critical convictions expressed with regard to Soviet-type societies, the reality [realta, possible misprint for "lealta"--loyalty] with respect to our country's international agreements, and our Europeanist commitment. But neither are we willing to relinquish our right and our duty to formulate our own stances on every issue--not necessarily in opposition to others' stances, but certainly distinct whenever it seems to us that other viewpoints do not adequately defend the country's general interests.

We must pay close attention to the fact that an attempt is being made to encourage a climate of profound intolerance toward us. Other European political forces--Socialist, Christian, and Liberal-Democratic--have expressed open opposition, sometimes much harsher than ours, on the issues of missiles, Latin America, and South Africa and have adopted stances sometimes no different from ours on the Middle East problem and the Palestine question. But there are those who claim that our stances on these issues imply that we have not yet accomplished a civilized option! Controversies of this kind demonstrate only the guilty conscience of those who conduct them--but they are not uninfluential if spread persistently and, above all, if broad masses of people are not involved in the struggle experience. Therefore we must pay close attention to the future and experiences of the movements taking place independently within society, sometimes developing, sometimes declining. For instance, we cannot regard the weakening of the movement for detente and peace as separate from the unresolved problems inherent in some of its stances or even as something unconnected with the need for more precise and clearer options, on our part too, since we want to be part of that movement.

Within our own ranks we are witnessing the emergence of stances whose diversity must not frighten us but for which we must in each case succeed in establishing a proper synthesis. The difference between movements--which represent a large range of stances, some of which can be purely demonstrative [di testimonianza]--and the parties lies primarily in the political party's duty to find valid and immediate solutions in a specific historical situation. We have therefore supported, and will continue to support, even the smallest of steps toward detente-oriented solutions of the unresolved international problems; the need to avoid decisions--as on space weapons--occurring at the same time as the issue in question is being discussed; and the policy of balanced and controlled disarmament, which also involves a more precise definition of the problems of defense and of security policy for Italy and Europe.

The unilateral moratorium announced by Gorbachev for the Soviet Union seemed to us a major initiative and we greatly appreciated the Italian prime minister's acknowledgement of that move, even in the midst of the electoral controversies. More generally, we realize the need for a resumption of the initiative and of the struggle on the issues of detente and peace, taking account of the proven opportunity for the active intervention of the minor powers.

But in this regard, apart from the immediate proposals on which to concentrate our political initiative, there must be a more thorough investigation and development of what has rightly been called a "culture of peace" in a world largely dominated by the culture of violence and the elevation of force and we must step up our ideological commitment and practical work in tackling, in terms of solidarity and in political terms, the tragedy of the deepening gulf between the North and South of the world.

Indeed, the task of imparting a new boost to our platform cannot take place properly unless we emphasize the new way in which old problems are now being posed and the now acute manifestation of hitherto unknown contradictions. This is the source of forms of mass behavior on which we must also reflect. One is amazed by the great difficulty encountered in organizing movements of young unemployed people, while an environmentalist awareness is spreading very rapidly among the young generations, and organizations are multiplying and votes are gathered. But this stems from the fact that although unemployment itself is, individually and collectively, a major tragedy, generally it does not display its former characteristics. It is well known that developed capitalist societies are organized on the basis of an interdependent relationship between a major growth of productivity of those in employment and the growth of the welfare state. It is impossible to alter this situation unless it is recognized--including in cultural terms--for what it is and unless it is countered in terms of one's value options too. The motivations of movements that characterized other periods of struggle were simpler and immediate.

But for this very reason our policy must be developed, avoiding the serious risk of confining ourselves to juxtaposing mutually conflicting stances. For instance, it is not a matter of choosing, as we have already said, between science and nature, between development and the environment, setting one

against the other; it is a matter of finding proper syntheses based on the most rigorous research and on the broadest debate, to make it possible committedly to transcend contradictory stances on our own part too. But this need to surmount shortcomings and contradictions is separate from the argument put forward by those who attempt to portray a PCI still undecided and vacillating in connection with the fundamental options of political democracy or the function of the market. This is a coarse propagandist argument, because our congress declarations are sharp and clear and our political conduct is evident to all. On the contrary, the issues which we raise concern the complete observance of democratic and constitutional requirements and of the working rules of the market and of the relationship between the market and planning.

There do not seem to us to have been any more pertinent proposals regarding the development and effectiveness of democracy and its institutions than the ones that we have formulated, both as regards the central bodies and as regards the local government system.

Our battle on the question of ethics, which we do not intend to relinquish, cannot be reduced to the issue of the unethical behavior of individuals or to that of the albeit necessary correct functioning of justice. We have tried to resolve a problem crucial to the future of democracy--a problem rooted in the blockage of our democratic system.

Despite what one reads, it is not we who need to take lessons in modernity. The ones who need to go back to school are in fact those who really believed that the neoliberalism launched by the United States was something more than an ideological banner. Those who failed to realize that what lay behind the neoliberalistic propaganda was--since it had become impossible to relinquish--a Keynesian-type policy, that is, a particular, and not very new, kind of expansion of public spending for the sake of a recovery, namely on expansion of military spending.

And in Italy the attempt to resolve economic problems at the expense of incomes has certainly been no lesson in modernity. In fact it is a very old remedy whose application has not only caused profound social ruptures but has failed to resolve any of the Italian economy's structural problems.

Apart from these unacceptable and sometimes presumptuous lessons, we must realize that our failure, as well as the difficulties of the Left, can only be resolved by subjecting our most fundamental lines to a careful examination. A policy of reforms, development, and progress; a policy inspired by the socialist ideals of justice and freedom must also come to terms with the need to reexamine the current significance of each of the major ideas through which the socialist and communist movement has changed the world.

In view of the attempt to change the cards on the table and to indict the very idea of social change, it must be remembered that the most profound aberrations, even fascism and nazism, stemmed from conservative and right-wing ideas. But the response to the new Right now involves a renewal

which demands great courage; and we must play our proper part as a fundamental force of the European Left.

5. PSI, Catholics, Councils, Referendum

Our work on renewing our program must be accompanied by a more careful investigation of the subject of social and political alliances. We do not need substantially to alter the line defined by our latest congress in this connection--a line which established a correct relationship between the need to hear the voice of the real movements represented in society and the need always to seek a dialogue among the political forces, each of which, to a greater or lesser extent, represents real tendencies, interests, and needs. We must constantly consider whether our unitary thrust has not weakened under the pressing attack designed to isolate our party in every possible way. But in order to give a careful and constructive answer we must remember that the commitment to a unitary policy has always had to contend, in order to obtain effective results for the workers and the country, with changes in political situations, the changing composition of classes and society, and the evolution of ideas, mentalities, and behavior.

Though the unitary motivation is a characteristic trait of our party, its specific tradition has always had to contend with constantly new problems. What I mean is that there would not be much point, even now, in conducting an investigation that failed to perceive the most fundamental reasons for any shortcomings and errors.

The fact is that the moderate or conservative solicitations and thrusts, proceeding from the substantial real base that I mentioned earlier, have caused a redeployment of the political forces which seemed to lessen the significance of values and policies which in the past guaranteed important forms of democratic unity and a long tradition of unity on the Left.

The divergence of stances on the Left has in fact extended as far as split-tist phenomena, in those places where the tradition belongs to a single party, as in Britain. In Germany there was a simultaneous rupture on the Right between the liberals and the SPD and the birth, on the other hand, of the Green Movement and their party.

In both countries we are now witnessing what we regard as a very significant recovery of the two parties that represent the major part of the workers movements and trade union movement. In our country there is an objective need to emphasize that the Socialist improvement does not resolve the problems created for the PSI by its closer integration into the present government coalition and its more aggressive disputes on the left.

Now that the election period is over it is certainly not possible--even for the Socialist Party as a whole--to regard as positive the result that will be constituted by the new councils in a number of major cities. However aggressive the controversy against us, it is, and will continue to be, difficult to argue that five-way alliances can represent an advance and a success

in comparison to the previous experiences. The PSI is preparing to negotiate, if the request is repeated, an accord for the duration of the legislative term--but it will have to do so with a DC within which the influence of hard-line and neo-centrist tendencies has grown stronger.

Of course, there can be no question of passively awaiting the outcome of these hypotheses. But we must realize that although in some respects PCI-PSI relations promise to be more difficult, it is also true that the necessity not to suspend all dialogue and understanding on the Left is an objective one for the PSI too, since the communists' isolation would be counterbalanced by the PSI's more or less comfortable imprisonment within the moderate coalition, as happened to the PSDI during the Centrist period.

As far as we are concerned, we have not stopped stressing the historical value of the special and lengthy experience in Italy of the unity of both components of the workers movement. And despite the harshness of the recent controversies, we have never underestimated the importance of socialists' and communists' cooperation within the trade unions and the trade union movement, with in the mass organizations, and in local government, as we have demonstrated through the most loyal cooperation in councils headed by Socialists.

This kind of relationship remains an essential part of our outlook. And obviously, in our opinion it must be built not only through complete and mutual observance of each party's autonomy and dignity but by means of an exchange of views on platforms and specific policies and open political discussions witnessed by the workers and the public. We are well aware that at present the disagreements are over fundamental issues. It is important in broaching them to follow the principle of discussing political merits, not distinctions of an ideological nature. Of course, I am not trying to say that we must exclude theoretical and ideological issues from the debate, but the artificial emphasis on the PCI's alleged lack of legitimization constitutes a hindrance and is simply a gift to the conservative forces.

The situation of the PRI and the nonconfessional forces cannot be regarded as simple either: Again they have experienced how great a burden is placed on them by the holy crusade against the major party of the Italian left. At the moment heavy pressure is being brought to bear on the Republicans and Social Democrats to cooperate in smashing the local government agreements already successfully tested on the Left and to refrain from considering others--but that would imply for those parties too retreading a path already pursued, and painfully so, for many years. Unless some kind of dictatorship is desired, the constitutional principles of local government must be fully observed. And this is why we have emphasized--and not just now but in defining the election campaign--the priority of platforms for future alliances.

Last, I cannot understand the feigned outrage over our assertion of the intention to conduct a discussion and a dialogue with everyone including--logically--the DC. This outrage is being voiced by those who in fact aim to

establish preferential cooperation or a strategic pact with the DC, no less. As far as we are concerned, there is no apparent reason why we should exclude the possibility even of a dialogue, having asserted the need for the respect of local councils.

This raises another issue which we defined back at the congress and which is no sudden discovery on our part, as has been written for purposes of journalistic distortion. In our opinion two forces' alternative nature cannot and must not prevent the necessary convergences on the major topics affecting the defense of fundamental values shared by the national community and it must not and cannot imply a kind of failure of communication. It is others--not we--who support these extremist stances. We, on the contrary, have combated and still combat these stances because they lead to the disintegration of the national community into mutually hostile groups, to the extent of the ultimate example provided by the Lebanese situation which, with its rigid separation of ethnic groups, religions, and beliefs, was presented to us as a model of calm social and state coexistence.

Above all, however, we feel we must devote new attention to the Catholic world. In the latest phase too we have been fully consistent with the fundamental inspiration of our policy on the problems of relations with the Catholic world and the church, both when we believed, for instance, that we had to challenge the political substance of the Ratzinger document, and when we worked positively on the revision of the Concordat. We must remind those who point out that this latter and substantial commitment has certainly not attenuated the disputatious stances against us that I have already mentioned that our party does not work to secure any petty advantage: Religious peace is an asset that must be defended, and Togliatti's work to this end was correct, even though it did not prevent the attitudes then prevalent within the Vatican from leading to the famous excommunication.

Nevertheless, we must resume and update our examination of a situation which, following the Concordat, we accustomed ourselves to regarding as more freely diversified than perhaps it was but which we must certainly not now regard as reduced to a rigid unanimity. New problems and a number of dangers are emerging--but here too we must be clear about what we have not managed to do. Here is just one example: abortion. We have never considered it a method of birth control, since that idea implies, among other things, a shameful abuse of women. We therefore pledged ourselves to an idea of the implementation of the law that would provide a necessary assistance to women having to make such a painful choice, but that would also permit a form of prevention with a view to free and responsible maternity. But in this latter regard our effort has been inadequate; nor are we consoled by the fact that precisely in prevalently Christian Democrat areas there are particular shortcomings in the provision of the preventive assistance required by law. This is just one example of a serious negligence, but also of an incorrect conception of our own policy. We defined the policy of the alternative as democratic precisely because we considered, and still consider, the contribution of Catholic opinions and forces essential.

Now we are confronted with the immediate problem of the formation of councils.

We are not, and must not be, anxious to participate in local governments at all costs, no matter how.

We must propose anew a dialogue on the major issues of orientation and on specific and realistic programs, without presuming to have already indicated all the valid solutions in our formulations. We must certainly aim at a reappraisal of the left-wing democratic councils on the issues, as we have said, of development, the improvement of the environment, the improvement of urban living conditions, and democratic participation. In many cities and provinces there are broad opportunities for creating progressive and left-wing administrations. We must commit ourselves to these solutions, on the basis of clear understandings and observance of the people's will.

In the immediate term the most pressing and demanding task for the part is to organize and win the battle for the referendum. Thousands of committees for a "yes" have already sprung up throughout the country and are receiving support not only from employed workers but also from intellectuals, trade unionists, representatives of the productive middle class, young people, women, and the unemployed. These are headed by an authoritative and representative national committee, which yesterday again explained to the press the arguments for a "yes." Indeed, this is not a partisan battle, though obviously we have committed all our strength to it, neither is it an attempt to avenge the 12 May election results. A "yes" corresponds to very broad national demands and material interests, and forces which disagree with us in other fields may vote "yes." Partisan and power-oriented calculations are on the other side, because quite obviously a "yes" victory would serve to restore correct rules of the game and to restore the unions' right and ability to bargain freely, once the ground has been cleared of the unfair blows imparted by separate agreements imposed by decree, and would also serve to restore democratic relations of trust and consensus with the grassroots workers. Not only the trade union movement but the very fabric of real democracy would be strengthened, thus benefiting everyone.

And a victory for the "yes," far from representing a disaster for the economy, would halt the present tendency--which is indeed disastrous--to approach the country's fundamental problems not as they really are but by taking the dead-end shortcut of lowering the peoples masses' incomes and living standards, limiting the powers of the trade unions, and challenging fundamental social gains. This too is in the interests of all--of the workers and honest employers, of the unemployed and the weakest and least defended sectors, of women, young people, and the south.

Precisely because it was these by no means partisan concerns that were behind our decision to call a referendum, we have never regarded the demand for a referendum as a conflict to be pursued at any price. We have constantly urged the trade unions and the social partners to resume the initiative and

called on the government and parties to reconsider. Many months have been wasted. Only the CGIL, united, has put forward its own proposal for the reform of wages and the taxation system which, in our opinion, had it been accompanied by a legislative act annulling Article Three of the decree, could have formed the basis of a positive accord. To reject or distort it means making the referendum inevitable. And the blame would be clear to all. This is being decided at this very moment. No further maneuvers are possible. So we are entering the fray. Our campaign has begun and must be conducted in the broadest and most resolute manner.

6. The Party: Politics as a Mass Phenomenon

Dear comrades, the confidence and optimism with which the party as a whole contested the 12 May elections have been contradicted by the results. We should ask ourselves why this discrepancy occurred. The simplest but probably the best founded answer is that the comrades' attention and assessments were centered mainly on more strictly political [word indistinct] and arguments, on current opinions to some extent supported by the media. Furthermore, the persistent agitation of fears by the DC and the PSI helped to nurture a misleading belief in our success.

Therefore the miscalculation indicates a defect in our perception of the real attitudes of considerable numbers of citizens, which must be attributed first and foremost to a difficulty on the party's part in understanding and taking account of what is stirring and changing most fundamentally in society, in people's minds, and in the feelings and aspirations of the various strata of the population and the broad masses. On other occasions we have already perceived the risk of rifts in the albeit extensive and vigorous relations between the party and society--the dangers of elitist complacency, of bureaucratic narrow-mindedness that can occur when politics are approached too much from the viewpoint of the confrontation and struggle among the parties or are confined to the albeit most important aspect of work and leadership within the institutions.

I believe the point I have made about local councils should apply in general and remind us yet again of the need for regeneration of policy on which Comrade Berlinguer placed such emphasis.

In order to sharpen our capacity to understand fundamental trends and social and ideological changes and to impart greater scope and vigor to the party's initiative and action and to its government role, we must make a complete return to the idea of politics as a mass phenomenon. And we must succeed in forging a better and more consistent link joining the major options of political and ideological approach, the aspect of the current struggle for precise and specific objectives, and the mass political movement.

There is no doubt that to this end it is necessary to impart greater openness and transparency to the exchange of ideas and stances within the party and with the public. It is necessary to make clear and democratic choices and

decisions in the political and planning fields and in the fields of organization, party and representative responsibilities, and leadership posts at all levels.

We have striven to do this, including most recently and in connection with the definition of election platforms and the choice of candidates, which were made by means of a more substantial involvement of members and voters than in the past and with an openness demonstrated by the presence of our lists and by the election of a larger number of independents, women, and young people.

We approached and conducted the election campaign with a substantial unity on the part of the leadership group, which was neither a formality nor mere opportunism.

Nevertheless, there is a need to take more decisive steps with regard to democracy and the democratic functioning of the party, and the national and local leadership bodies. We must take them without anxieties and without inventing nonexistent obstacles and impediments. We--all of us--have always believed that the organization of factions and currents does not constitute a development of democracy, and we must stand firm on this point. It has enabled our party to avoid both an internal system based on the rule of faction leaders and the decline into plebiscitary centralism. But this positive factor must definitely not prevent us from recognizing and satisfying the need for a greater openness and transparency of debate. It is not a matter of organizing or promoting majorities and minorities. Each of us, in every party body, must fully exercise our rights and, by means of a clear presentation of problems and solutions, facilitate the possibility of the free adoption of stances and alignments.

It is in this frame of mind that we must tackle the issue of the party's political and ideological stance. I do not want to make references, which could appear superfluous, to the fundamental inspiration of our policy, to the unitary view of our nation's development that stems from togliatti, or to the linchpins of our conception of a party, namely its national and democratic nature, the pass policy, and "political action" in terms of the constant correlation between constructive commitment in the immediate term and the major goals of democratic and socialist reform. It is worth mentioning these things, however, because it is on these foundations that the party's regeneration and progress have taken place; it is on these bases that we have defended ourselves and have averted the dangers of intransigence and split-tist presumptuousness, of opportunist capitulation and subordination. There have been other political phases when we have found ourselves confronted with serious plans and persistent attempts to isolate and ostracize our party, and within our own ranks there were doubts about our ability to pass the test and temptations to become entrenched in our certainties. Analogies with the Center-left experience of the sixties are of course impossible with regard to the merits of the situation and the political stances of the various forces involved, including those of our own party, but the lesson of the method we used to emerge well from that difficult situation remains crucial.

The intelligence and courage of our theoretical and political innovation has been decisive. It has thus been possible to wage the struggle, at its harshest, with a great capacity for unity and government.

There is no doubt that it is necessary to avoid the lapses, which may have occurred to some extent, into superfluous harshness or splittist tones, just as it is necessary to avoid any attitude of opportunist compliance or relinquishment of the struggle--which may also have occurred. But as we well know, both errors are always due to a defect in our analysis of real conditions and thus in political innovation.

Our analysis must also embrace our party's methods. The effort to open up our organizations more to society was certainly correct. We must realize, however, that this approach must be adapted to the various situations, since in some of them there still exists the problem of a social foothold that will enable the party to act as an effective force. But even in our strongest areas our first obligation is to attend to the crucial strata of the workers and working classes. We cannot fail to be worried by the fact that we suffered losses in several workers and working class areas again this time.

There should be no contradiction between our attention to the new problems and needs and our prime commitment to the vital requirements of the broadest masses: jobs, pay, pensions, housing, and health. This applies in particular to women's status: there is an apparent difficulty here on the part of the women's movement and the party. We can now use the significant result with regard to the number of communist women elected partly to encourage renewed attention to social problems, though obviously this need applies not just to women representatives but to the entire party.

We cannot fail to be worried by the fact--though it is difficult to assess precisely--that young people do not seem to be turning significantly toward our party.

With regard to the aging of the party, the membership level cannot be regarded solely as an organizational aspect. The attempt to reform the Italian Communist Youth Federation has prompted some debate. Let us discuss it by all means, but our duty is to encourage and support our fine young comrades in what is an arduous but absolutely essential task.

Furthermore, it is the party itself that must acquire a greater capacity for a new kind of rapport with the young people's masses, and this cannot be done without great specificity and a major ideological impetus.

These elections have also shown us some shortcomings in the part of the commitment of the communist forces as a whole. There is no question now of issuing appeals or challenging our stance on local government; but we must remember that the choice of political solution and the particular form of government of public affairs are not irrelevant to the country's democratic fabric. Hence the essential importance of the unity of the communist forces as a whole.

The regeneration of the party's policy and methods cannot proceed without facilitating the advance of new outlooks, new experiences, and new cadres.

I have read in several papers that some of us consider the younger leaders responsible for the election result. This is clearly a malicious fabrication. First, because if the criterion for establishing responsibilities were simply one of age, then we older ones are responsible, but above all because every communist age group can boast that it has contributed new leadership forces. This process must continue.

In view of these assertions, let nobody tell us that we are following an erroneous principle, based on a criterion of cooperation supposedly unique to us.

The fact is that we have striven, and are still striving, to form leadership groups on the basis of working skills, training, dedication to the struggle, and democratic commitment, independently of any group-oriented considerations. This is an approach which we can always improve on. But it would be another matter if we were to pretend that there are not people outside our party exerting pressure to limit the autonomy of our decisions.

This aspect of our international and internal autonomy embodies an essential characteristic of what is defined as our diversity.

It is pure propaganda to attempt to associate the PCI's identity with a presumption of superiority over other parties or with a shortcoming in our conception of democracy or our deficient westernism.

The PCI's strength and individual character lie in the fact that it has reflected and represented not only broad progressive demands, a historical class and peoples movement, and an advance toward justice, freedom, and peace, but also an outlook and a policy of our country's democratic and socialist transformation. But we have never regarded these characteristics as everlasting.

At all times we have earned ourselves in practice the right to be considered a force that cannot be confused with any other.

This has been important not only for us but for the workers movement and for Italian democracy. This is why we want to defend and regenerate the PCI's strength, making it more solid and united. This end we need an open and frank debate, because for us unity has been and must be the result of joint work and jointly reached convictions.

And we need unity within lucidity in order to contend with difficulties, to work well, honoring the mandate entrusted to us by the voters, in the interests of our country.

CSO: 3528/74

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON NICARAGUA

PM220855 Lisbon DIARO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 May 85 p 8

[Editorial: "The Embargo on Nicaragua"]

[Text] The issue could be summed up in a question: What is U.S. policy on Nicaragua? Apparently there are at least two: that of Congress, or part of it, and that of the White House. But does either of them have well defined aims, limits to action, and action programs appropriate to the local situation?

Nobody is unaware that the problem is one of some complexity, particularly if we approach it within the geostrategic context of the region. Nicaragua is today the second-ranking military machine in Latin America, after Cuba, and the shipping of military equipment from the East-bloc countries is continuing at an increasing rate. Its relations with Moscow are intensifying, and its domestic policy is based increasingly on the principle that it is necessary to defend the revolution, which means, as in any part of the world where the expression has been used, severe restriction of individual freedoms. As an ideological stimulant, the Sandinist Front announces from time to time that a U.S. invasion is imminent, thus feeding the flames of a revolutionary patriotism copied from the Cuban example and justifying the military assistance reaching it from the communist countries. Of course, Marxism-Leninism is never acknowledged as an official doctrine, nor is even the system of ownership governed by the rules of traditional collectivism. The prevailing ideology is, as is known, that of a Third World socialism in which Christian principles--albeit suspect in the eyes of the Vatican--are intermingled with Leninist tactics of consolidation of the state apparatus and galvanizing utopias which guarantee progress through the redistribution of wealth without paying much attention to the ways of producing it.

This amalgam has the virtue of keeping the regime in that vague or transitional stage in which it is not known whether the significance of the changes is outright collectivism or just a rebalancing between individual and social rights. It is precisely here that the diversity of interpretations and the consequent diversity of attitudes toward the same facts arise. Thus, in the opinion of several European countries, it is necessary to prevent Nicaragua falling totally into Moscow's arms, like a second Cuba; a danger which, in their opinion, will increase as a result of the assistance which Reagan is

seeking to give to the Contras--the regime's opponents--and of the trade embargo now decreed, as in the case of that which struck Havana 25 years ago and had the results which are known. However, the White House believes that this interpretation stems merely from a faulty assessment of the facts, since Managua is already in all respects in Moscow's orbit. So in other words, the question boils down to whether the embargo is the cause of the rapprochement with Moscow, as some Europeans and, of course, the Sandinist Front, claim, or, on the contrary, is its consequence, as the U.S. president maintains.

Whether cause of consequence, this measure will deal the most severe blow to a situation heading by leaps and bounds toward despair. Suffering, like all states in the area, the effects of the international recession, keeping a considerable proportion of its working population mobilized in the fight against opponents, and seeing, moreover, the support which the revolution initially aroused in the West gradually dwindle, Nicaragua is increasingly a country without prospects of recovery. If we add to this the fact that the United States, despite all the reservations which it has been expressing over the past few years, is still Managua's foremost customer and foremost supplier, we will be able to have an idea of the U.S. embargo's real effects.

However, these effects have their strategic other side. The Nicaraguan president, visiting the Kremlin, has just received a promise of "considerable military and economic support." That is, the operation carried out in Grenada is now unrepeatable in Sandino's country, unless the United States wished, which is inconceivable, to cause a new Vietnam to break out really close to its borders.

CSO: 3542/185

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

EFFORTS TO INCREASE TIES WITH MOZAMBIQUE CONTINUE

Trilateral Cooperation 'Important'

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 20 May 85 p 32

[Text] Aquino de Braganca, personal advisor to Mozambican President Samora Machel, pronounced himself convinced that the Portuguese Government will take measures against RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] activities in Portugal. Interviewed on Radio Commercial's "Adam's Apple" program, Aquino de Braganca stated that the ties between Portuguese personalities and interest groups and RENAMO are a certainty. On the other hand, Machel's advisor affirmed that the trilateral cooperation between Portugal, Mozambique and the United States is very important and desirable; however, he also stressed the importance of bilateral agreements. In addition, Aquino de Braganca spoke in favor of Portugal's military cooperation with Mozambique.

On Military Cooperation

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 23 May 85 p 24

[Text] According to "sources contacted" by the NOTICIAS DE PORTUGAL press agency, Mozambican President Samora Machel does not wish to have Portuguese troops return to his country to fight "weapons in hand." Nevertheless, Samora Machel is anxious to see the reinforcement of military cooperation with Portugal. He is even a precursor in this field. How would this cooperation, then, be implemented? According to the same sources, Samora Machel would like to have Portuguese military instructors train his troops. "After all, it would be a cooperation at the 'know-how' level. Weren't the British the ones to train Zimbabwe's army?"

The presence of Portuguese instructors in Mozambique, acting within well-defined rules and working at a military training school, does not exclude, but also makes necessary the presence of Mozambican cadres in specialized training schools in Portugal, the same sources specifically noted. At this time, the issue of military cooperation with Portugal is one of the main concerns of the Mozambican president, they added. Whether the Portuguese answer is positive or negative, one thing is certain: the Portuguese government cannot remain indifferent to Machel's proposal, which would allow the return of

Portuguese influence in Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. For the first time in five centuries, Portugal is definitely losing presence and influence in Sub-Saharan Africa because it has been unable to adjust itself to post-1945 times. It is time to begin thinking whether we shall encounter happiness in being substituted by Russians, Cubans or South Africans....

CSO: 3542/186

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

REPORTED REASONS FOR MALAISE PERMEATING SOCIETY

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 22 May 85 p 8

[Article by Jose Ribeiro e Castro: "Ten Reasons for Dissatisfaction in Portuguese Society"]

[Excerpts] I have spoken many times of the need to build a new democracy and to work in that spirit. Indeed, this would [be] the indispensable basis to face the national problems and to open new democratic avenues for the country's reconstruction, denouncing and fighting the 10 main reasons at the source of the increasing malaise settling within Portuguese society.

1. The prolongation of problems. Because of a lack of realism in analysis or because of a lack of decision-making capability, the truth is that never was so much heard to reach a conclusion about so little, never was the popular will so queried in successive elections to implement its wishes so poorly, never was so much promised and discussed to carry out so little. It is the first negative feeling: "Nothing ever changes."
2. The lack of coherent models at the party level and the inherent excess of clientage. A party scene that, still under the pressure of the circumstances deriving from the revolution and except for rare occasions, is characterized by frequent incoherence. Everything is done to hide reality: more attention is frequently paid to clientele and clientage than to doctrine, to principle, to values, to ideas. It is the second negative feeling: "They are all the same."
3. The lack of a horizon for the country and the national identity crisis that also emerged. There is a latent anarchy, a common disorientation, an anxiety that alternates between slight indifference and a more acute anger. The lack of enthusiasm and pride to do well what has to be done. The pride, the very nature of being Portuguese, is put in doubt (or perhaps even forgotten). More than just despair, one gives up hope. It is the third negative feeling: "This is never going to succeed!"
4. An economic system built against creativity and initiative. A system that implanted freedom in politics but brought about dictatorship in the economy, with an implicit invitation to the clandestine or parallel economy. A system in which, in order to take an initiative, it is necessary to ask for a thousand

licenses and to almost apologize for it, but in which there are no state enterprises that don't present generalized deficits. A system in which the state took over the most lucrative enterprises and, not satisfied with that, put a heavy burden on the remaining private sector. It is the fourth negative feeling: "One can't do anything. It is better to remain quiet."

5. The harmful and inevitable mentality of the state as a crutch, in which everything depends on the state, without regard to criteria, to conscience, to rationality, in which it is almost universally expected that the state will do everything, or will do it free, or will subsidize it heavily. This is the fifth negative feeling: "I have nothing to do with this. The state must solve the problem."

6. The progression of irresponsibility, in which the one who does nothing is praised and the one who is concerned and carries out is punished. A general picture in which there is guilt but no guilty parties. A system in which investigations are initiated but never brought to a conclusion, in which the criminal is more pitied than the victim. This is the sixth negative feeling: "People goof off when not compelled to do something."

7. The crisis as psychological nourishment. The nature of a system in a state of chronic deficit which has a negative social utility: because it is more important to spend than to produce; because initiative is obstructed and inertia is rewarded; because one's own responsibility is fought against; because excess is regarded more highly than probity; because accounts don't even have to be balanced as long as they present a "reasonable" deficit, since the system does not seem to care. This is the seventh negative feeling: "It was inevitable! It's because of the crisis." And this is going on for 10 years....

8. The heavy heritage and the glorious debt. The present habit to live at the expense of the past and of the future, using reserves and mortgaging income still to be produced. It is the eighth negative feeling: "It is not costly to live; it is costly to know how to live," or, in a different perspective, "Let the last one close the door!"

9. The increasing selfishness prevalent today, even though it appears within that context in which, because of the present generalized parlance, generous words attempt to give a golden aura to the hard realities of the day. The feelings of social solidarity are deteriorating and getting lost. No one remembers that everything is necessary to everyone and that all are necessary to everything. What becomes increasingly essential, in the enterprises, in society, in the family, in the country, is to shout louder and louder, not with everyone else, but against everyone else.... The employees against the bosses and vice-versa, the cadres against those who are not, the educated against the uneducated, those who turn screws against those who use papers, the merchants against the farmers, the women against the men and the men against the women. Everything against everyone and everyone against everything. It is the ninth negative feeling: "Everyone for himself!"

10. The pervasive acceptance of a situation indisputably negative in a society that seems to have no will to face the future. A society which knows its defects and even guesses what the solutions should be, but which lacks the courage to undertake the alternatives. A society which continues to expect some Dom Sebastiao to arrive on a cloud, without realizing that, perhaps, it is itself that is "Dom Sebastiao." It is the tenth, and the worst, of the negative feelings: "It's not worth it! It will come...."

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CAVACO SILVA'S VICTORY SEEN TURN TO RIGHT

Lisbon GRANDE REPORTAGEM in Portuguese 24-30 May 85 pp 21-24

[Article by J.J.: "Cavaco Silva: The Stroke of Destiny"]

[Excerpts] Invoking a half a dozen times the name of Sa Carneiro, speaking of "destiny" and "fate," and saying that the words of the founder of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] had been for him "like the first chords of the Fifth Sumphony," Anibal Cavaco Silva made his first ritual speech as leader of the PSD at the Grande Casino Peninsular in Figueira da Foz.

In somewhat surprising victory of the former minister of finance in the first AD [Democratic Alliance] government was doubtlessly a blow, and a strong one, to the hopes of Joao Salgueiro, Mota Amaral and Pinto Balsemao to recover the control of the party. Sure of victory by margins that were vaunted to reach 70 percent, the wing--or, more exactly, the wings--more to the left in the PSD saw themselves suddenly routed by an outsider, Cavaco Silva, supported by a faction of various tendencies whose only common denominator seems to be, at this time, the attempt to prevent Pinto Balsemao from returning to power.

"It is a return to 1981," a social democratic deputy commented. Indeed, after Mota Pinto's interregnum and Rui Machete's interlude, the PSD seems again to be split down the middle. The doubt persists: what are the goals of each of these halves of the PSD?

In the view of the most cynical ones, there aren't any. Lost in a forest of factions, tendencies and groups, set aside by the obvious conflict of personalities the projects hidden behind the 17 motions presented in the Figueira da Foz's discussion are difficult to determine.

However, two ideas common to all tendencies can be emphasized, and they have more to do with the life of the party rather than with a project for the country: the unification of the PSD and a strong, clear leadership for it.

Neither of these two ideas was achieved in the congress, and if the internal life of the party continues to be the same, the life of the new permanent committee will not be a bed of roses. After the results were announced and after the very small majority of the Cavaco Silva list became known (57 votes),

one of the most ferocious followers of the new leadership, Jose Miguel Judice, added to the opposition's enthusiasm by saying: "Beginning now, what is most necessary is that decisions should be made by units. And, in spite of everything, it seems that it will be easier for Cavaco Silva to unite with the opposition than to impose on it his own points of view: this is due to the fact that the new leader has a largely minoritarian position in the important National Council, to which it succeeded in electing only two more members than the Joao Salgueiro list. Considering the regular members of the council such as Pinto Balsemao, Mota Amaral and Alberto Joao Jardim, Cavaco Silva is at a disadvantage from the outset.

For a leader whose program--soon enunciated in a dry, tense style--simply consists in ending the PSD's internecine struggle, the task does not seem easy. In the midst of his sympathizers' frenetic ovation, Cavaco Silva announced what will henceforth be the rules of the game: "My dialogue will essentially be with the grassroots of the party and "I do not tolerate organized tendencies within the party."

At the end of the final session of the congress, the favorite subject of speculation was the date of the next extraordinary congress of the PSD, because: either Cavaco Silva succeeds in destroying the tendencies, decapitating the barons and imposing his own line, or he will have no other recourse than to campaign among the grassroots and attempt to gain in an extraordinary congress what he did not succeed in obtaining in the present one: an absolute majority in the national congress.

To obliterate tendencies, the influence of the barons and the behind-the-scene games would, no matter what, be the immediate task of any leader desiring to stay in place long enough to give the party a clear direction. From the time of its establishment 11 years ago, the PSD has already changed directions a good half a dozen times, and, except for the brief Sa Carneiro period, it was unclear who was in charge at each turn. It was Mota Amaral, who built from his Azorean basis his own image of austere distance from the palace intrigues, who best defined the shortcoming of the PSD. From the podium, he castigated the "disloyalty," the "intrigue" and the "treason" permeating the party.

But, however much Cavaco Silva cites Sa Carneiro, he is not a Sa Carneiro, and neither are the circumstances similar. Beyond his prestige and his internal strength, Sa Carneiro was the symbol of a clear political project--the unification of the right and the alliance with the CDS [Center Social Democratic Party]--to which the militants and voters of the PSD adhered with the well-known enthusiasm.

At the end of last week, the simple mention of Freitas do Amaral caused a chorus of protest in the audience. And Cavaco Silva, who had initially appeared willing to have his support of Freitas do Amaral approved with the assistance of the Jose Miguel Judice and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa group, was finally elected after a spectacular backtracking in the presidential issue and the question of the participation of the social democrats in the coalition with the PS [Socialist Party]. In order to garner the support that would elect him, Cavaco Silva had to abandon Freitas do Amaral to, among others, the "Mota-Pinto" sectors.

Meanwhile, few doubts are left: the support to Freitas and the end of the coalition with the PS are goals that remain in Cavaco Silva's mind, in spite of the unexpected appearance at his side of personalities like Amandio de Azevedo, who, until recently, was rumored to be a discreet sympathizer of a Soares campaign.

Will Freitas do Amaral--even if the (temporary) backtracking of Cavaco Silva has temporarily removed him from the social democratic horizon--have come out a winner from the PSD congress? To impose to the party the support to the candidacy of the former CDS leader will certainly be the greatest political risk that the new leader will run. Most of the PSD Leaders don't have the best remembrances of the former AD deputy prime minister. Pinto Balsemao, who made it a point to stress the fact that he is the sole survivor of the founders of the party--and, as such, the guardian of the "original idea"--stated clearly that "we shall have to leave here shouting either 'long live the PSD,' or 'long live Freitas do Amaral.'" Balsemao piled criticism on his former ally. He accused him of treason, disloyalty and of having ended the AD.

However, more than just remembrances, the adversaries of Cavaco Silva see in Freitas do Amaral a threat to the future of the PSD. The plans for a "liberal party" under the tutelage of a Freitas do Amaral, unifier of the Portuguese right, joining a CDS without Lucas Pires and a LSD without the well-known "Quinta da Marinha-Cascais axis" was one of the non-official points in the agenda of the congress, a threat ever-present in the numerous behind-the-scene games. Once again, Balsemao was very clear: "The AD did not become institutionalized because such was not the project of the PSD." Rejecting the decisive alliance with the right, Balsemao opined that "Freitas do Amaral of the CDS, or Freitas do Amaral independent is the same thing."

The congress ended without clearly resolving the two problems facing the PSD: the lack of a presidential candidate and the continuation of the participation in the government. In its moderate form--purged of its clear reference to Freitas do Amaral--Cavaco Silva's winning motion points to a candidate without an affiliation to any party, a fact which obviously leaves the door open to the former CDS leader. The socialists were those who refused to be duped: 2 days later, they reminded their partners very explicitly that one of the points of the agreement between the PSD and the PS was, indeed, the promise not to support a presidential candidate opposed to the centrist government.

There are still two unknown elements: Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Alberto Joao Jardim. In spite of having thrown his support to the Cavaco Silva candidacy, Marcelo stayed on the outside; to have the restless creator of political facts stay there is reason enough for Cavaco Silva not to feel very secure. Alberto Joao Jardim supported no one. He declared he would not choose between Cavaco and Salgueiro. Had he voted, Jardim would certainly not have done it for Cavaco, the protagonist in the Freitas do Amaral dilemma. There is something that those present at Figueira da Foz could see with their own eyes: support for Jardim is one the rise. It is clear that the Madeiran leader does not believe that Cavaco is here for the duration. As an enthusiastic supporter said: "In 3 months Alberto Joao will advance." To where remains unclear: whether to the

leadership of the party or, more probably, to the presidential candidacy. With his populism and his electoral talents, Jardim would be a serious rival for Soares.

However, one thing is clear: the PSD will never campaign for Freitas do Amaral in Madeira, if it came to that.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CAVACO SILVA SEEN EMBODYING BEST TRADITION OF RIGHT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Jun 85 p 8

[Article by Luisa Manoel de Vilhena: "Fate"]

[Excerpts] We do not think it strange that Cavaco Silva referred to the force of fate in the congress and that he repeated the idea in his recent TV interview, reaffirming, almost timidly, his conviction that there was the finger of fate in the process that led him so suddenly to the leadership of the party, placing him in the first rank of national leaders.

At the right time, Cavaco Silva assumed the right attitude. The party's salvation demanded a man like him--and there he was. It was a meeting. Fate was involved.

But more than that, it was a courageous attitude, showing determination and conviction. By his firm and decisive action, Cavaco Silva has marked the destiny of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], at least for now. And the destiny of the PSD has a lot to do with the destiny of the country, at least in the short and medium term.

Within the parties and outside of them, we were saturated with empty words in order to hide the inability to plan and to implement. We are tired of disorientation. We cannot take more maneuvers, more consensus, more indefiniteness, more weakness. We want responsible leaders who can act.

We believe that conciliation, malleability and tolerance are only virtues when they are exercised from a position of force, and from the top down: by the privileged classes, by the solidly dominant political positions, by the strong countries sure of their hegemony. But they are a weakness and even a lack of ability when they are used to defend unstable and vulnerable positions by those who find themselves in a situation open to attack.

This principle has been amply demonstrated by the international left. Perhaps because this left has been orchestrated more or less obviously by the very adroit Soviet intelligence. Or because, in the last 50 years, the most brilliant political intelligence has found its best niche in the left, which

represented for a long time the hope for a more just society. It was an illusory hope, as has been harshly demonstrated in the countries where the experiment is alive. But the principle remained and persisted. The left continues to affirm itself through the strength of its positions, through aggressivity, through the abolition of tolerance.

To the same extent that the right, on the contrary, feels it can afford the luxury of entertaining guilt complexes. It is very strict with its own errors, generally minor, and tolerates the errors of the left, as unacceptable as they may be.

When we speak of the "right" or of the "left," we are aware that they are superseded expressions, whose classic meaning no longer corresponds to present-day reality. But we continue to use them for linguistic ease. And despite the fact that, as we have already mentioned, all Portuguese parties are attempting to snuggle up to the center, we believe that the center does not exist today and that in Portugal, the border between the left and the right is to be found in the line separating socialism from social democracy. We believe that this is a legitimate division, because if we say that there was a majority of the left in any vote, the dividing line will be exactly this, as much as it may displease Mario Soares, now comfortably intalled in his increasing (and perhaps temporary) tendency to the right, or Helena Roseta and some others who, like her, are inconsolable because they are militants of the PSD and not of the PS [Socialist Party].

Within this concept of the right, which indeed corresponds to the Portuguese political spectrum, one can almost say that suddenly, the right has awakened in Portugal. It was high time.... To listen to the concrete, carefully studied proposals by Freitas do Amaral is a balm for despairing Portuguese. To witness the resurgence of the social democrats and the meeting of Cavaco Silva at the right time with the plenitude of his leadership capabilities, never before demonstrated and, therefore, impressive, was like a clarion of hope on the grey scene of national tiredness.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL RESULTS SHOW PSD, CDS SLIPPING, PS GAINING

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 11 May 85 p 10

[Article by Margarida Viegas]

[Text] If there was a navigation warning a month ago, now they should indeed be breaking out the lifeboats. At the rate at which the PSD [Social Democratic Party], which is confirmed as the fourth-ranking party in this new NORMA-SEMANARIO poll on the legislative elections, is continuing to sink, it will have disappeared by November and will never see the presidential elections. Nor has the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], which saw a sudden halt in its advance toward glory in April, any reason to laugh. Nor does the APU [United People's Alliance], which the opposition has only damaged. Above this confusion, the PS [Socialist Party] has taken off and is increasing its lead.

Exactly 2 years had passed since the last legislative elections when NORMA undertook to ask citizens (between 17 and 29 April) whom they would elect to the Assembly of the Republic. Freitas do Amaral declared his candidacy for the Belem post and with a PSD as scandalous as it is scandalized, Soares shines brilliantly, to a greater extent than usual, in the media.

How will the national grand jury react? It will not let itself be shaken nor will it turn its back. The abstention level, generally higher in polls than in real life, equals that of April 1983 (about 19 percent) and as we already remarked in a preceding edition, the verdict is clear.

A Chastisement for the PSD

For almost a year, it could bask in its position as the leading national party, slipping from power on the sunny side, while the rainfall of our discontent pounded on its coalition partner. December topped it off--the PSD outdid its own 1983 electoral record. But with 1985, the trouble began. It was already a declining PSD which Mota Pinta handed on to Rui Machete, who in turn was incapable of halting the downward spiral. In March there was sudden consternation at ranking fourth on the party list, and in fact only avoiding last place thanks to the merciful emergence of the PRD. With a new decline in the month of April, it appears that the PSD is being devoured at the rate of more than 2 points per month, standing at 8.4 points, below the last election level, now. This bad luck is distributed democratically throughout the country.

It is particularly severe, however, in Lisbon, where thanks to a further retreat between March and April, the social democrats, with the PRD frighteningly close on their heels, today rank fourth, with 14.1 percent (the widest gap on the national level), ranking lower than the CDS in the last elections. Heavy penalties are also seen in Coimbra (fourth place) and Vila Real (second, as in Oporto and Evora), while the damage is minimal in Viseu, where it ranks highest today (30.6 percent), its sole consoling primacy.

But the misfortunes of Buenos Aires do not seem in any way to benefit Caldas. The trends in vote transfers established by NORMA indicate that the discontented social democratic voters have not the slightest intention of shifting to the CDS, and vice versa. Moreover, generally speaking, the supporters of the various parties seem rather stable, preferring to refrain from switching their votes. The PS and the PSD have only lost to each other in Coimbra, and both to the APU and the PRD in Evora (the PS also lost to the PRD in Lisbon). As to the CDS, it has only yielded voters to the PSD in Evora, while the APU finds itself threatened here and there by the PRD.

On the whole, fidelity prevails.

CDS---Was This Expected?

But returning to the party of Lucas Pires, which since December has experienced the euphoria of flight, it is down now in April by 2.2 points, together with the PSD, which it only surpasses in Lisbon and Coimbra. Outdone here by the APU and there by the social democrats, and always by the PS, it is holding third place in all the cities, except Evora, where it is only fifth.

Even so, there is a happy aspect to the matter. The CDS is the only one of the large parliamentary parties to have seen an increase since the last elections, up 3 points (and in Oporto, it gained 5). Despite the April upset, its rate of advance in 1985 continues to be more than a point a month, and if one views it and the PSD as the Portuguese right wing, it again bests that party, by eight-tenths only, but it nonetheless leads.

The fact is, with such a definition, the right wing is reduced to 33.5 percent. Something exceptional would have to be done (with the CDS leading or lagging) if there were elections now, as the suicidal fervor of a certain pro-Eanes PSD faction would seem to desire.

The Socialist Party Surge

Now the PS has begun to gain ground. With 10.3 points less than in 1983, but with a lead of 6.3 over its closest contender, the APU, it has a substantial lead in polls in which the major parties are usually separated by mere tenths.

If the party of Soares regained first place nationally with one of its worst scores ever, it is now confirming it with one of its best--24.7 percent--thanks to the energetic leap of 3.6 points, distributed more or less throughout the country. Excluding Coimbra, where all showed a decline, the perplexed and undecided tended to form a party.

The Socialist Party recovery, at a time when all of the others are doing badly, restored its strength in Lisbon, Coimbra (despite the loss of more than half the 1983 votes), Oporto (an excellent recovery, 28 percent) and Vila Real (where it showed the slightest decline since the last elections).

Thanks to the upsurge of the PS, and despite the decline of the social democrats, the bloc is recovering and, with 41.1 percent, it surpasses the sum of the opposition parties today by 5.6 points. A month ago it was only three-tenths. But in 1983, with its notorious 59.8 percent majority, it had an advantage of 24.7 points. It absorbed its own loss, since with the drop of 2.7 points in 2 years for the APU, which almost canceled out the 3.1 points won by the CDS, the parliamentary opposition to the bloc is still of the same size as at its birth.

Losses for the APU

It might in fact be said that the tireless campaign by Cunhal against the bloc government served no purpose. There is a decline from the 1983 level everywhere, and it took its greatest punishment in Evora, where it lost 10 points, further shrinking a little more in April (2.6 percent), because of the disfavor shown in the large cities--Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra. This was relative: in Lisbon and Coimbra, where a month ago it ranked first, it is now the second party. And the same is the case on the national level, not due to its own glory, but due to the misfortune of others.

Should the collapse in Evora be attributed to the intervention of the PRD?

The figures do not give a clear answer. In fact, engineer Martinho's party achieved its second best score nationally there--8.7 percent, but in relation to March, it had shrunk by almost half. Conversely, the "other" parties reached the 19.3 percent level. What "other" parties? That "Eanist party," which the people of Evora have not as yet realized the PRD represents?

It continues to experience mysterious ups and downs. Beginning in the polls at 10 percent, it dropped to 5.5 percent in March and has moved up again to 8.8 percent, thanks above all to the good will of Lisbon, where it scored 11.3 percent (that ill-starred preponderance of the capital city). To achieve that absolute majority of which its proponents dream, only 41.6 percent is lacking.

5157

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25 June 1985

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL SHOWS MISTRUST OF TV POLITICAL REPORTING

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 11 May 85 p 33

[Text] In his favorite seat on the sofa in front of his television, with the newspaper which he abandoned 20 minutes ago, when the Telejornal came on, on his knees, the televiewer, married and 41 years of age, finally shifted uncomfortably and exclaimed in a burst of muttering: "This news is definitely controlled by the government."

There are many who share his view. This is the thinking, and they say so if asked, of 50.1 percent of the citizens of Portugal. His view is shared by the woman watching television with him, one of the 42 percent who think that the manipulation is perceptible. If the viewer lives in Lisbon, 59.6 percent of the city dwellers will share his thinking as he watches and perhaps echo his audible protest. The best fate for a viewer in socioeconomic terms is to belong to the upper class, not for the obvious reasons, but because he will have the support, in his protest against government influence on television news, of 68.2 percent of his peers. The worst for him, for reasons of company if not from an environmental point of view, is to live in Oporto, a city in which 26.4 percent of the residents regard the news as manipulated, while 40.8 percent have no opinion and 32.8 percent say that no, they see nothing wrong with the Telejornal news. And in this Oporto is alone. Of those polled throughout the country, 44.1 percent of those in Coimbra, 57.2 percent of those in Evora, 50.2 percent of those in Vila Real and 44.8 percent of those in Viseu believe that the news is controlled.

What is the matter with Oporto? Is it the ardor of the central bloc? A preference for cozy coexistence with the one-time prime minister, now again a candidate? A focusing of interest on the news about the FC Oporto in its festival year? We will never know.

Nor will we ever even know if this northern peculiarity extends to the view of those polled on the influence exerted by the government and the political parties on general programming, since the country thinks it is so in percentages ranging from 36 in Viseu and 40 in Evora to 43.9 percent in Lisbon, while again Oporto differs. Such influence exists, 22.1 percent said, while 40.1 percent had no opinion and 37.8 percent said there was no influence.

But this should be noted. When Oporto was asked if the government exerts an influence on televised news, it gave one answer, and when asked about the

influence of the parties, its answers did not vary noticeably. Apparently the city lives in the conviction of objectivity.

In a division of those polled by sex, it is curious to note (as will happen in the variations among those polled in the different socioeconomic categories) that the variation is greater with those lacking any opinion than among those who, depending on their sex, believe that television news is or is not manipulated. The figures are high: 58.6 percent of the males believe that the government exerts an influence on news (45 percent see it in general programming as well), whereas 42.4 percent of the females said there is government influence. Among the men, 16.4 percent had no opinion, while among the women, 37.3 percent had none.

The theoreticians with an inclination to divide democracy into politics and economics will find food for thought in this poll: the majority in the lower class had no opinion. On the subject of government influence on news, 53.7 percent of those polled in the lower class had nothing to say; concerning party influence 59.7 percent remain silent; concerning government influence on programming, 56.2 percent said nothing; and on party influence, 56.8 percent had no opinion. One reason having to do with basic needs may perhaps explain this. It is possible that the upper class believes that it has been touched too many times by the hand of the government in its activities to be willing to tolerate it during leisure time. And it is possible that the lower class pays more attention to day-to-day life than to the television picture of it.

The chart on this page (see article entitled "RTP" [Portuguese Radio-Television System]--The Government Uses and Soares Abuses") compares the broadcast time devoted to the government in 1980 with that in 1985, and Portuguese citizens were asked in the course of this poll how this appeared to them in April of this year of presidential elections. Of those who have watched this diligent supply of news provided to us by Soares in seminars and at the dinner hour, in statements made or merely because he was there, 50 percent said there is manipulation, while 40 percent of those polled who had watched the chaotic bonhomie which characterizes the program see the hand of the government therein.

Technical Data

Scope: Portuguese population over 18 years of age residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Oporto, Vila Real and Viseu. Sampling: 605 individuals. Method: Random, stratified by city, without proportional attribution. Selection: use of the "random route" method for the home, and the Kish method with individuals interviewed. Technique: direct and personal interviews using structured questionnaires at the residence of the person polled. Sampling points: cities in which points of departure were selected. Fieldwork: interviews conducted in the period between 17 and 19 April 1985. Margin of error: on the overall level, the error runs to plus or minus 4 percent with a reliability interval of 95 percent for $p = 50$ percent. Institute responsible: the study was conducted by a limited liability company, NORMA, the Portuguese representative of Gallup International.

<u>Total</u>	<u>City</u>						
	<u>Coimbra</u>	<u>Evora</u>	<u>Lisbon</u>	<u>Oporto</u>	<u>Vila Real</u>	<u>Viseu</u>	
Total 10,356	598	317	6625	2571	94	152	
Government influence on Telejornal news							
Yes	50.1	44.1	57.2	59.6	26.4	50.2	44.8
No	22.5	10.7	18.7	19.8	32.8	20.8	21.7
No opinion	27.4	45.2	24.1	20.6	40.8	29.0	33.5
General programming							
Yes	38.1	40.8	40.0	43.9	22.1	38.4	36.0
No	28.5	11.8	35.3	26.0	37.8	28.4	26.8
No opinion	33.5	47.4	24.7	30.0	40.1	33.2	37.2
Political party influence on Telejornal news							
Yes	41.8	37.5	56.5	47.5	26.2	49.1	38.0
No	25.8	18.4	22.3	23.5	34.0	20.4	28.5
No opinion	32.4	44.1	21.2	29.0	39.8	30.5	33.5
General programming							
Yes	32.3	37.1	46.5	34.8	23.0	37.7	31.6
No	34.8	15.9	28.7	33.6	43.1	28.8	34.0
No opinion	32.9	47.0	24.8	31.6	34.0	33.5	34.4

	<u>Sex</u>		<u>Age</u>		<u>Socioeconomic Class</u>		
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>18-45</u>	<u>44+</u>	<u>A/B/Upper</u>	<u>C/Middle</u>	<u>D/Lower</u>
Total 10,356	4920	5437	4960	5397	3507	5984	866
Government influence on Telejornal news							
Yes	58.6	42.4	55.9	44.8	68.2	42.1	31.9
No	25.0	20.3	28.4	17.1	20.7	24.8	14.4
No opinion	16.4	37.3	15.7	38.1	11.1	33.1	53.7
General programming							
Yes	45.0	31.8	39.7	36.6	50.9	32.3	26.0
No	33.7	23.7	35.2	22.3	26.6	31.1	17.8
No opinion	21.3	44.5	25.2	41.2	22.5	36.6	56.2
Political party influence on Telejornal news							
Yes	44.2	39.7	49.0	35.2	43.3	35.6	34.3
No	32.6	19.7	32.3	19.9	29.4	26.6	5.9
No opinion	23.2	40.7	18.7	44.9	16.4	37.8	59.7
General programming							
Yes	33.2	31.5	34.5	30.3	38.4	28.5	34.2
No	41.0	29.1	48.1	22.5	44.0	33.1	9.0
No opinion	25.8	39.4	17.4	47.2	17.7	38.4	56.8

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ALLEGED ESTABLISHMENT OF LISBON ANC REPRESENTATION

Nzo Statement

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 25 May 85 p 24

[Text] Alfred Nzo, secretary general of the African National Congress will be received by Mario Soares to discuss the opening of a center of the ANC in Portugal. The main objective of this center will be to advertise in our country "the struggle of the South African people," according to Alfred Nzo's statement. He is in Lisbon on the invitation of the ambassadors of the countries members of the Organization of African Unity accredited in Portugal. Nzo has already taken the opportunity to emphasize, in an interview with the NP [NOTICIAS DE PORTUGAL Press Agency] that the Portuguese people must remind its leaders that it is dangerous to "cooperate with the South African dictatorship."

Dismay Expressed

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 28 May 85 p 20

[Text] Mr Kwanlobota, Zambian ambassador in Lisbon, stated to the NP that Prime Minister Mario Soares is on the verge of authorizing the installation in Portugal of a delegation of the terrorist movement ANC. If this is true--that is, if Mr Kwanlobota is not lying--Mario Soares must have absolutely lost, not only a sense of propriety, but also his common sense. Only this could explain how a prime minister who spends his time worrying about the news that the RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] and the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] transmit to the Portuguese media--alleging that such news is not to the liking of the communist governments of Luanda and Maputo--will now establish in Lisbon a center for terrorism aimed at a country where more than 600,000 Portuguese immigrants reside, and with which it is important to maintain the best relations. But Mr Kwanlobota may even be right....

CSO: 3542/194

25 June 1985

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ANALYSIS OF 'NORMA' SURVEY OF PORTUGUESE YOUTH

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese Vol 68, 9 Mar 85 pp 1-10

[Article by H. Rebelo Pinto: "Youth: Who Are They, What Do They do, What Do They Want?"]

[Text] The problems of youth have been broadly debated since the 1960s. However, there has not always been an effort to find out who these young people actually are; what they think; how they live; what troubles them the most, how they feel about the family, sex, politics and religion; what values they choose; what principles they reject; what motivates them; what dreams they still dream. Let us then draw a picture here, which these young people, so much discussed, themselves described for us.

Young people between 15 and 25 years of age constitute 18 percent of the Portuguese population today. In quantitative terms, the percentage is not very large; on the other hand, the social value which this age group represents is difficult to measure. We only know, and believe, that it is significant, for the country, for each community, for each family.

Where does this importance originate? Where is it rooted? How can it be explained?

An economist would probably invoke such reasons as the money invested in youth and the return on that investment. The sociologist would prefer to point to the increasingly well-defined characterization of youth as a social group. The demographer would certainly examine the problem in the light of the changing structure of the Portuguese population, which has already ceased to replace its generation--which will lead in the future to a decline in the percentage cited above. The psychologist would tend to stress the importance of this phase of development in the formation of the adult personality. The politician today can hardly afford not to listen to the young people and consider them in his decisions.

The opinions of the specialists and the strategies of politicians do not exhaust the analysis of the question; by the very nature of their expertise, they present only one restricted, or restrictive, facet.

Such an approach avoids the intensity of the real concerns of the common citizen, adult or young person, who is seeking to understand what is happening around him in a rapidly changing world and who is searching, perhaps anxiously, for possible solutions to pressing problems. The approach also ignores the amount of emotional energy and material resources that have been mobilized in families and in some small communities to solve these problems.

From a technical standpoint, the issue is almost incomprehensible without a multidisciplinary approach. Incidentally, this approach has been used to develop studies of adolescence and early adulthood, taking into consideration various factors that affect the lives of young people and the interaction of these situational factors with the personal aspects of their behavior. In addition, there is an effort to study this age, not as an isolated period, but as a certain stage in the development process which takes in the entire life cycle of the individual.

And what about solutions? Experience has taught us how expensive and frustrating it is to rely solely on public organs--political, technical and administrative--to seek out and implement solutions for the problems that affect the lives of citizens. When such problems affect a population group that is capable of making itself heard and has shown itself to be activist--the case with youth in the Portuguese society--there can be no effective solutions without their real participation--participation which, in itself, has educational value in a democratic society.

These reflections serve as background for a reading of the results of a survey of Portuguese youth between 15 and 25 years of age, residing in the greater Lisbon area. It was conducted by NORMA in December 1984.

The survey sought to determine the opinions and behavior of youth with regard to their basic values, their worries, their political interests and positions, their desired model of society, the family, religion, sex, educational and professional plans, leisure time, etc.

NORMA interviewed a sample of 601 young people (299 males and 302 females). There were two subgroups by age (between 15 and 19 and between 20 and 25 years of age) and four socioeconomic classes, defined according to the occupation and educational level of the head of household, the type of house, total family income and the form in which it was earned. Consideration was also given to three types of "habitat" (communities with less than 10,000 inhabitants; between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants; and more than 100,000 inhabitants).

The information was collected by direct and personal interview, through a structured questionnaire calling for closed-end responses.

The description of the sample and subsamples examined gives rise to some comments which may be useful for a correct reading of the results.

The first comment refers to the two age groups for which partial results are presented. In fact, the phase between 15 and 19 years (the end of adolescence) and the phase between 20 and 25 years of age (the beginning of adult life) present characteristics and involve tasks that lead to distinct opinions and

behaviors, reflected in quite different results in some parts of the survey. Something similar occurs in the more controversial area of the differences between sexes, although, in studying the difference between the averages of the two groups, there is nothing significant that would lead to basic conclusions with regard to the sexes. In any event, these factors indicate that, in interpreting the results, it would be useful to consider the percentages listed for the various groups studied, as well as the overall results.

On the other hand, the distinction between types of habitat in the greater Lisbon area, including the districts of Lisbon, Oeivas, Cascau, Cintra, Amadora, Loures, Almada, Seixal and Barreiro--may not be very significant, inasmuch as these areas are all within the zone of influence of the city; hence a smaller number of inhabitants is not sufficient to infer rural or semi-urban characteristics.

Finally, in a reading of the results of this survey, it is important to remember the population at which it was directed. The survey measured the opinions and behavior of young people in the greater Lisbon area, through a representative sample of these young people--and only these young people. Thus the results cannot be generalized to describe all Portuguese young people in this age group. Statistically speaking, Lisbon is not representative of the country.

The data collected in the survey were submitted to a statistical treatment enabling the presentation of results in percentages. In the following tables, these percentages are presented in columns: the results for the total sample, (Column 1), followed by results by age group (columns 2 and 3, respectively, for the group between 15 and 19 years old and the group between 20 and 25 years old); by sex (columns 4 and 5); by socioeconomic class (columns 6, 7 and 8); and by type of habitat (columns 9, 10 and 11). To the left of each table, in abbreviated form, are the choices of response in the order in which they were presented to the respondents, along with the category "no response," for which the respective percentage is also indicated.

What Do They Think, What Do They Want, What Do They Reject?

An examination of the results reveals some more marked trends in the opinions of the young respondents. In addition to the need to struggle for equality of the sexes, expressed by about 78 percent (Table 4), more than 80 percent of the young people feared the possibility of another world war (Table 30) and felt that an increase in the number of universities was the most just solution to the problem of providing a higher education (Table 16A).

Only 1.2 percent considered sex the most important aspect of life (Table 1). It is, however, in the opinions regarding sex that the greatest number of high percentages are observed: more than 80 percent of the young people favor sex relations between unmarried adolescents, the use of contraceptives and sex education in the schools (Table 25). The highest figure of all--over 91 percent--was registered in the rejection of prostitution. About 80 percent rejected group sex.

In contrast to these more marked trends, however, there was great variability in other areas of opinion and, above all, in regard to actual behavior. For example, about 51 percent of the young people were in favor of a collective endeavor in the future, while about 40 percent said they would prefer an individual program. Slightly fewer than 30 percent thought the results of

25 April were beneficial, while just as many others thought they were harmful (Table 13). About 46 percent felt that education is an effective contribution to job training, whereas about 50 percent thought otherwise (Table 15). A wide variety of responses was offered regarding the use of leisure time (Table 23). Political leanings (Table 12) are distributed along the entire range of the five areas considered (with responses leaning more to the Right and Center). A large group (about 31 percent) of young people had no opinion in this regard.

The verification of this great variability is an important element in the analysis of the survey results. In fact, even in a survey like this one, it is not always legitimate to see youth as a homogeneous group with dominant characteristics which appear to determine their behavior.

From another perspective, the contrast between certain more outstanding trends of opinion, on one hand, and the diversity of behavior, on the other, also gives rise to some reflections on the material and the way in which the opinions were elicited. It is noted that these were "opinions" on current topics which have been widely publicized and have been the object of more or less controversy and perhaps some political or journalistic exploitation. In some cases, they are also topics which have an impact on the lives of young people and which involve them emotionally. To formulate them in terms of opinion ignores this reality.

Thus these young people appear to mirror, not only the concerns of today's society regarding the future, but also certain contradictions or inconsistencies in this same society. Unconsciously, they resort to the same defense mechanisms which the society uses to hide behind or to try to present as pretended alternatives to situations which are becoming intolerable.

Perhaps the most serious result of this is the increasingly marked split between the aspirations of youth for attitudes and behavior considered "adult" and the impossibility of actually achieving them. The young people thus find themselves in the crossfire of two contradictory trends. Society encourages them to form adult opinions at an ever earlier age, but is slower and slower to provide the real conditions for young people to assume responsibility for their opinions.

What Is Important to Young People?

According to 63.7 percent of the respondents, the economy is the most pressing problem at this time (Table 5), and 43.9 percent point to unemployment as the most troubling problem (Table 8).

Meanwhile, the aspects of life indicated as most important to the young people (Table 1) are love (35.3 percent), friendship (29 percent) and family (15.1 percent). There were no great differences among groups.

An apparent contradiction between the former and latter responses (Table 5 and Table 1) may be linked to the above-mentioned split. Although they identify the economic situation as the most important problem, the young people do not yet feel any personal involvement in its solution.

From another perspective, perhaps of greater interest to an understanding of today's youth, it is noted that the aspects considered by the great majority (almost 80 percent) to be most important are in the area of emotional relations, love, friendship and family, although other factors in family relationships may be considered.

What Values Do the Answers Reflect? What Aspirations Do They Express?

Naturally, the results cannot be dissociated from the phase of development which these young people are experiencing--the gradual abandonment of the ego-centric shell of adolescence in the search for interpersonal dialogue and intimate relations that are gratifying and productive.

It is worth considering where these young people are going to find a response to this new other-directed behavior. What type of response will they receive, and what satisfaction will they derive from this response? From their families? Among their peers? At school? In their free time?

Regarding the family, and apparently contradicting what has been widely stated, 72.2 percent of the young people report a good or very good relationship with their mothers and 62.6 percent say the same about their fathers (Table 18). Moreover, 86 percent of the respondents mentioned their parents and siblings as the people they trust the most (Table 19).

With regard to their peers, only 32 percent consider their friends as the individuals whom they trust the most, and 19.3 percent trust their boyfriend or girlfriend the most. Teachers are at the bottom of the list, with 1 percent, along with spouses, although the percentages are not comparable since it is certain that very few of the respondents are married.

What other values are respected by the young?

Questioned about acts which they would consider unacceptable practice, 69.9 percent listed "stealing cars," 64.4 percent listed "taking things from home to pawn," 45.3 percent listed "keeping found money" (Table 21A). Asked about acts that they would consider committing, 64.6 percent of the respondents would "ride a bus without buying a ticket," and 34.4 percent would "steal fruit." To "cheat on exams" is acceptable to 73 percent of the youth, and 27.1 percent think it is all right to "lie to your parents." There were no differences between the two age groups (Table 21B). Also, 22.1 percent think it is acceptable to "forge documents for exemption from military service," mostly among the older respondents, and 19.5 percent would "work while receiving unemployment compensation."

An analysis of these results suggests two possible conclusions. On one hand, the young people seem to condemn most strongly acts involving property belonging to individuals or groups, known or unknown: "stealing from home," "stealing a car." "Stealing fruit" is not so harshly condemned, perhaps because the ownership is less clear, or because it is in the hands of a middleman.

On the other hand, acts detrimental to the public welfare, such as "riding the bus without paying the fare" or "working while receiving unemployment compensation," are not so severely condemned or are acceptable to most of these young people. The data lead one to think that, if the tendency to come out

of one's shell and seek out others is characteristic of this phase of development, this does not necessarily imply a spontaneous and free concern for the welfare of others and of the community, and if the society in which this behavior sprouts tends to reinforce the individual mechanisms to escape from the suffocating net which is inexorably closing in, it would be utopian, if not idiotic, to expect the young people to emerge unscathed from the influence of that society. They are taught to perpetuate behavior which society publicly condemns but which it privately condones; tax evasion is a troublesome but expressive illustration of this.

In support of this conclusion, it may be added that acts which these young people tend to see most clearly as unacceptable are those in which it is most difficult to escape from external controls, legal or institutional.

From another perspective, it is also noted that these same young people are more apt to reject acts against private property, such as theft, than behavior contrary to other values, such as lying to one's parents or cheating on exams.

What Do Young People Believe In? In God? In their Country? In an Ideology?

According to this survey, 57.7 percent of the young people say they profess the Catholic faith, and 39.3 percent do not profess any religion (Table 20). As for practicing their faith, 20 percent practice it regularly, 31.2 percent practice it occasionally and 45.2 percent do not practice it at all. (Table 20A) This is not, then, simply a matter of a faith but also the form in which and the conviction with which it is manifested.

The percentages with regard to a profession of faith are lower in these groups of young people than in the general population, but the percentages are higher with regard to religious practice.

Although doubts persist as to the probable differences in criteria, these results are a reminder of how, through their most active voices, the materialistic and materializing societies of the 20th Century have pointed to the de-Christianization of youth as the self-evidence of their success. Incidentally, some sectors of Portuguese society have reacted to such voices, to the point of leading stands and movements in various sectors of the Church, in which groups of young people have become increasingly active in recent years in Portugal.

Are the young people seeking enlightenment? Are they seeking participation? In any case, the building of an identity, in which the energy of young people is primarily engaged in this phase, almost always involves challenging inherited values and beliefs before rejecting or accepting them, in an exercise of freedom of choice.

The real problem, which is felt particularly sharply in Portugal, is to safeguard the conditions which guarantee this freedom. Can the anti-Christian messages which have been directed at Portuguese youth in their educational institutions, in the news media and in social and political life be considered compatible with the exercise of this freedom?

Asked whether they identified with international cultural symbols (music, computers) or national symbols ("fado" [Portuguese ballads], bull fights), 64.1 percent of the young people favored the former and 34.2 favored the latter (Table 7). Also, 57.9 percent are prepared to defend the country if there is a foreign invasion, although the percentage is smaller among older youths. On the other hand, among the older youth there is less attachment to international cultural symbols, which is stronger among the younger group.

These survey results are obviously insufficient to permit any commentary, either regarding the conception of what it means to be Portuguese or about loyalty to this nationality and to the country that confers it. However, the young people's opinions and feelings in this area become clearer on analysis of their replies to other questions.

Thus, 33.1 percent think that the political event in recent history with the most serious consequences for the Portuguese people was 25 April, followed by decolonization, cited by 29 percent of the respondents (Table 11). Asked about the conquests of 25 April, 54.7 percent noted the abolition of the PIDE [International and State Defense Police] and 53.1 percent cited the possibility of holding free elections (Table 14).

The underlying thread of these results seems to be an appreciation of liberty, although in differing forms of expression. They also share--and this is borne out in other results--a recognition of the country's worth in terms of the quality of life it provides for its citizens. This would indicate that the loyalty of these young people tends to depend more on satisfactory living conditions than on sentiments of fidelity to a patriotic ideal.

This is a legacy of colonization, converted by the legacy of emigration, but it might also point to a new mentality which is less dependent on certain community values and which flourishes more in the large urban centers, where the sense of belonging is diluted. Although at a different level, it is like the destruction of the image of the soccer player forever loyal to his team. This symbol no longer has any great meaning for younger people, whereas the 1940's generation still finds it difficult to imagine Eusebio in a green shirt.

This detachment is also expressed elsewhere in the survey results. Thus, 66.4 percent of the young respondents express little or no interest in politics; this is particularly true of the lowest socioeconomic classes, where 77 percent of the respondents expressed little or no interest. A carryover from the past? Disenchantment with the present? In any case, it is a risk for the future. In fact, if these results show that youth between 15 and 25 years of age in the greater Lisbon area are not interested in political issues, it is not to be expected that they will become actively involved in the analysis and solution of the country's problems when they become adults. It might also be feared that the passivity or indifference demonstrated by these young people will provide fertile ground for projects and modes of intervention which depend on that indifference and feed on it.

What Are They Seeking: What Kind of Society, Family, Employment, Home?

Asked if they prefer a society which places more importance on income redistribution or on individual effort, 35.9 percent preferred the former and 54.6 preferred the latter (Table 27). Greater importance was given to individual effort in all socioeconomic classes, although it was stressed more in the highest class. On the other hand, many young people certainly stressed the importance of income redistribution.

These results can be viewed from the perspective of the variability of behavior, referred to above, but they may also have another meaning, deriving from the false dichotomy contained in the question itself. In actual fact, it is difficult to find a society capable of dividing up the goods produced without rewarding the efforts of the producers. The belief in the utopia of the collective well-being which has deluded Portuguese society in recent years is apparently not shared by these young people, nor do they have much faith in the great solutions proposed; 40.8 percent of the youth think that admission to the EEC could help to solve the nation's problems, while 37 percent feel it will be of no help (Table 9).

This realism is not so apparent in the young people's ideas about the type of home and employment they desire: 59.7 percent would like to live in a house with a garden in the suburbs (Table 22), which is consistent with the lack of importance attributed to the housing problem, particularly among the younger group (Table 8).

Regarding employment, 42.1 percent expressed a preference for the liberal professions. Here again, we observe differences among the socioeconomic classes under consideration: 62.4 percent in the highest bracket, as against 30 percent in the lowest bracket. Some 34.4 percent would choose services industries; 9.8 percent would go into industry; 2.8 percent would choose agriculture; and 9.7 percent would like to enter government service. In all these results, differences are observed between the sexes (Table 17).

These results are very different from the distribution actually existing in the Portuguese labor market, as well as that of more developed countries. It might be more interesting to relate these results to the predictions on the future structure of the labor market as a result of new technologies. In that case, not only the figures for each sector but even the description of the various sectors might be challenged. These young people have voiced their preferences for the future based on current models which will probably be soon altered and outdated.

The survey presents another statistic regarding employment: it ranks fourth among the aspects of life considered most important by these young people (Table 1). This ranking could be understood in the context of the new combination of activities and roles observed in modern society, not only a new sequential combination--the period of professional life is tending to be shorter, with a longer period of education and with earlier retirement--but also a new simultaneous combination, with shorter working hours and more leisure time. Individuals and societies are thus faced with the opportunity and the need to

create new endeavors and to play new roles, or to give greater emphasis to some already existing roles.

However, the analysis of the relative importance of work in the Portuguese society could give rise to another type of consideration, related to what could be designated as its devaluation or lack of validity. In fact, the image of work presented today to young people in the big city is very closely associated with the idea of a job which you do not have and cannot find, or one which you do not like, or one which is poorly paid or pays nothing, or is poorly organized, if it is organized at all, and in which poor productivity is almost always a given. This is not an attractive picture, nor does it offer any incentive for young people. It is not consistent with their aspirations nor does it offer the conditions to carry out their plans.

These plans certainly include marriage. Asked if they planned to marry in the next 10 or 15 years, 37.9 percent foresaw that they would be married in church and 25.1 percent would have a civil ceremony; 19.3 percent predicted they would be living with someone (this figure was lower in the older group) and 7.5 percent thought they would remain single. Another 9 percent had no idea what they would do (Table 29).

The concern expressed for equality of the sexes suggests that marriage for these young people would be based on models with very little differentiation of family roles, which will probably lead to a new distribution of functions between the sexes, in marriage, in the family and in the household.

It is a pity that the survey does not furnish data regarding the opinions of these young people on fertility, which would add a new dimension to their future plans for marriage. In contrast, Table 25 provides an ample set of data (the most specific in the entire survey) regarding personal attitudes about sex-related topics. The issue of sex is focused on the present time by the list of questions themselves: since the first question is on sex relations between unmarried adolescents, the following questions could easily be interpreted as bearing on this situation. This ambiguity also contributes to a treatment of the topic which is totally divorced from the [affective] aspect, on which the young people place so much value, as well as from their plans for marriage and child-bearing.

Thus the survey itself does not appear to escape the influence of certain currents which see sex as the most important thing in the life of young people, which seems in contradiction to the ranking in Table 1, in which the young people put sex down in seventh place on the list of the most important aspects of life.

In conclusion, what new information does the survey present regarding young people between 15 and 25 years of age in the greater Lisbon area?

Surprises, Confirmation, Ambiguities and Contradictions

A first aspect worth noting is the coexistence of great variability and some (few) more dominant trends; these trends appear particularly in opinions on the so-called "hot" topics. The young people in this group thus appear to be

influenced by the mass media--no surprise, incidentally. However, the results also suggest that the same young people, where not subjected to this powerful influence, tend to preserve their individuality, as if seeking to insure the exercise of the right to be different in a society which tends to foster conformity. This conclusion makes it even more difficult for anyone who is concerned with the problems of youth to think in terms of a uniform group for which stereotypical solutions can be manufactured.

The great importance given to affective relations (love, friendship), and to their institutionalization in marriage and the family, suggest a concern for emotional stability which is characteristic of this stage of development. However, this desire for security is also manifested in lively fears regarding survival (war, famine) or obstacles to personal fulfillment (unemployment, limited education).

Thus these young people seem to look to the smaller support system of family and community for the answers to problems which the political and social order has proved incapable of solving efficiently.

These thoughts may be of some use to educators in examining the answers which they offer to young people in this age group; they might also be of some interest for the definition of certain policy measures which could maximize or reduce the power of action of the [family and community], to the extent that the latter are equipped and encouraged to effectively fulfill the role which the young people expect of them, in contrast to a society in which the state is ostensibly omnipresent but is, in fact, highly ineffective.

How should one interpret some apparent contradictions observed in the survey results? As the ambivalence and ambiguity typical of this age group? As a discrepancy between what they think and what they say, between what they do and what they say they do? A gap between the dream and the reality?

Possibly only a combination of all these factors will provide a framework for a proper reading of reality. One cannot hope to find consistency in a phase of development which, because it is focused on the building of an individual identity, necessarily implies circular movements and much experimentation in various and perhaps opposing directions.

The lack of understanding of this reality is generally the result of a lack of current information, which it is important to make available to the educator, in the home and in the school.

Moreover, it is known that behavioral changes do not always result from changes in thinking, nor do they necessarily represent progress in terms of development. Thus, in the passage from adolescence to early adulthood, we occasionally see young people abandon certain practices with which they have experimented but have not adopted because they did not receive the respective attitudinal reinforcement and were finally found to be counterproductive or detrimental to their project for adulthood.

This project is initially utopian and then becomes a compromise between the ideal and the possible. However, even if young people honor the individual effort to

accomplish it and attempt to use all the resources available to them to this end, their project will only be viable if the future measures up to it. The lower the predicted return on their investment in that future, the more easily young people will tend to mortgage it to improve an unsatisfactory present, seeking immediate gratification with deferred costs.

This is likely to be one response to the Portuguese society's general invitation to "live now and pay later," unless we are able to turn the process around and introduce a system of prepayment, but with a guaranteed return on the effort invested.

[Charts follow]

Results of NORMA Survey of Portuguese Youth

Table 1: Most Important Aspects of Life

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			Habitat		
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D	-10,000 Inhab	10/10,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab
Friendship	29.0	28.6	29.2	30.1	27.8	27.6	30.0	29.0	28.6	27.8	30.1
Love	35.3	36.2	34.5	31.1	39.4	36.5	34.5	35.0	30.4	39.2	35.6
Family	15.1	17.8	12.9	12.0	18.2	9.4	15.9	19.5	18.5	17.5	10.9
Politics	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.3	1.1	0.5	-	1.2	-	0.4
Work	8.8	7.6	9.8	9.7	7.9	8.3	9.5	8.5	13.7	3.1	10.0
Scient. Progress	4.8	4.3	5.2	6.0	3.6	8.8	3.6	2.5	1.2	5.7	6.7
Money	3.5	2.9	4.0	5.0	2.0	5.0	3.6	2.0	4.2	3.1	3.3
Sex	1.2	0.7	1.5	2.3	-	0.6	0.9	2.0	1.2	1.0	1.3
Music	1.0	0.7	1.2	1.7	0.3	1.7	0.5	1.0	-	1.0	1.7
Sports	0.3	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.6	-	0.5	-	1.0	-
Religion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	0.9	-	-	0.5	0.4
No Response	0.3	-	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	-	0.5	1.2	-	-

Table 2: Preference for a Society Which Places Importance On:

Redistribution of Income	35.9	38.8	33.5	35.1	36.8	34.3	33.2	40.5	35.7	36.6	35.6
Individual Effort	54.7	52.9	56.3	56.9	52.6	60.8	57.3	46.5	50.6	56.7	56.1
Don't Know	9.0	8.0	9.8	7.7	10.3	5.0	9.5	12.0	13.1	6.2	8.4
No Response	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	1.0	0.6	0.5	-

Table 3: Project for Future Endeavor

Collective Individual	50.6	52.5	48.9	48.5	52.6	44.2	54.5	52.0	51.2	56.2	45.6
Don't Know	9.7	10.5	8.9	9.0	10.3	5.0	9.5	14.0	10.1	7.2	43.1
No Response	0.2	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.6	-	-	0.6	-	11.3

Table 4: Equality Between Men and Women

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	10/100,000 Inhab.	Habitat +100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
		Exists de facto	13.6	15.2	12.3	14.7	12.6	17.1			
Must Be Fought For	77.9	78.6	77.2	74.9	80.8	71.8	81.4	79.5	74.4	75.8	82.0
Should Not Exist	6.7	5.1	8.0	8.0	5.3	8.8	7.3	4.0	8.9	2.6	8.4
Not Interested	1.8	1.1	2.5	2.3	1.3	2.2	1.4	2.0	1.8	3.6	0.4
No Response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 5: Most Important Problems to Be Solved

Economic	63.7	64.5	63.1	60.5	66.9	64.1	61.4	66.0	58.9	65.5	65.7
Political	12.1	12.3	12.0	12.0	12.3	10.5	14.1	11.5	13.7	15.5	8.4
Cultural	15.0	10.1	19.1	16.4	13.6	17.1	15.5	12.5	15.5	11.9	17.2
EEC Entry	6.0	9.4	3.1	7.4	4.6	5.5	6.4	6.0	7.1	4.1	6.7
No Opinion	3.2	3.6	2.8	3.7	2.6	2.8	2.7	4.0	4.8	3.1	2.1
No Response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 6A: Willing to Fight in the Colonial Wars

Yes	29.0	36.6	22.5	29.8	28.1	29.8	25.5	32.0	32.7	32.0	23.8
No	68.1	61.6	73.5	69.6	66.6	68.5	70.9	64.5	58.9	67.0	75.3
Don't Know	0.3	0.4	0.3	-	0.7	-	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	-
No Response	2.7	1.4	3.7	0.7	4.6	1.7	3.2	3.0	7.7	0.5	0.8

Table 6B: Willing to Fight if Portugal Were Invaded

Yes	57.9	65.9	51.1	63.5	52.3	56.9	50.5	67.0	62.5	56.2	56.1
No	38.8	32.2	44.3	35.1	42.4	39.8	45.5	30.5	29.2	41.8	43.1
Don't Know	2.0	0.7	3.1	0.7	3.3	2.8	1.8	1.5	4.8	1.0	0.8
No Response	1.3	1.1	1.5	0.7	2.0	0.6	2.3	1.0	3.6	1.0	-

Table 7: Identification with Cultural Symbols

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat 10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
National	34.3	27.9	39.7	31.4	37.1	44.2	31.4	28.5	33.9	33.0	35.6
International	64.1	71.0	58.2	67.6	60.6	53.0	67.7	70.0	64.9	64.4	63.2
None	0.7	0.4	0.9	0.3	1.0	-	0.9	1.0	0.6	1.5	-
Don't Know	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.3	0.6	-	-	0.6	-	-
No Response	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.7	1.0	2.2	-	0.5	-	1.0	1.3

Table 8: Most Troubling Concerns

Cost of Living	24.5	20.7	27.7	26.1	22.8	20.4	23.2	29.5	31.0	26.3	18.4
Unemployment	43.9	47.5	40.9	42.5	45.4	38.7	44.5	48.0	39.3	45.9	45.6
Education	10.8	14.9	7.4	10.0	11.6	13.3	9.5	10.0	7.1	10.8	13.4
Housing	6.2	3.3	8.6	5.7	6.6	8.3	5.9	4.5	6.5	4.6	7.1
Family Matters	4.8	5.4	4.3	4.0	5.6	5.0	6.4	3.0	3.0	5.7	5.4
Political											
Instability	10.0	9.1	10.8	11.7	8.3	14.4	10.5	5.5	13.7	7.2	9.6
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No Response	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.4

Table 9: Will EEC Membership Help Solve National Problems?

Yes	40.8	49.6	33.2	43.8	37.7	40.3	41.8	40.0	45.2	40.2	38.1
No	37.8	27.9	46.2	37.5	38.1	44.2	35.5	34.5	32.7	35.6	43.1
No opinion	19.8	19.9	19.7	16.7	22.8	14.9	20.5	23.5	20.2	22.7	17.2
No Response	1.7	2.5	0.9	2.0	1.3	0.6	2.3	2.0	1.8	12.5	1.7

Table 10: Interest in Politics

Much	6.8	5.8	7.7	8.0	5.6	10.5	5.5	5.0	7.1	5.7	7.5
Some	26.6	16.1	27.1	26.8	26.5	35.9	26.8	18.0	18.5	22.2	36.0
Little	29.1	30.8	27.7	28.1	30.1	28.2	30.9	28.0	32.7	30.9	25.1
None	37.3	37.3	37.2	36.8	37.7	25.4	36.4	49.0	41.1	41.2	31.4
No Response	0.2	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	0.5	-	0.6	-	-

Table 11: Political Events With Most Serious Consequences

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat 10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
28 May	7.5	6.9	8.0	7.4	7.6	8.3	8.6	5.5	7.1	5.2	9.6
25 April	33.1	34.8	31.7	26.4	39.7	33.7	33.6	32.0	30.4	36.6	32.2
25 November	5.3	4.7	5.8	6.4	4.3	5.0	5.5	5.5	6.5	3.6	5.9
Decolonization	29.0	23.6	33.5	33.1	24.8	32.6	24.1	31.0	25.6	28.9	31.4
Death of Sa											
Carneiro	18.8	23.6	14.8	21.1	16.6	19.3	20.9	16.0	20.2	21.6	15.5
Don't Know	4.0	3.3	4.6	3.3	4.6	0.6	5.9	5.0	6.5	3.1	2.9
No Response	2.3	3.3	1.5	2.3	2.3	0.6	1.4	5.0	3.6	1.0	2.5

Table 12: Political Leaning

Right	15.5	21.4	10.5	16.1	14.9	18.2	16.8	11.5	16.7	18.6	12.1
Center Right	11.0	8.3	13.2	11.0	10.9	16.6	10.9	6.0	4.8	12.4	14.2
Center	15.8	14.1	17.2	17.1	14.6	19.9	15.0	13.0	16.1	12.4	18.4
Center Left	8.3	5.4	10.8	8.0	8.6	9.9	7.7	7.5	7.7	5.2	11.3
Left	10.0	8.0	11.7	10.4	9.6	7.2	11.8	10.5	6.0	9.3	13.4
Independ.	1.2	0.4	1.8	0.7	1.7	0.6	2.3	0.5	1.2	-	2.1
No Opinion	31.3	35.1	28.0	28.1	34.4	19.9	30.5	42.5	39.9	36.6	20.9
No Response	7.0	7.2	6.8	8.7	5.3	7.7	5.0	8.5	7.7	5.7	7.5

Table 13A: Consequences of 25 April (personal level)

Beneficial	28.8	26.8	30.5	30.8	26.8	27.6	30.9	27.5	26.2	24.7	33.9
Harmful	29.5	30.4	28.6	30.1	28.8	40.3	25.5	24.0	29.2	30.9	28.5
Neither	41.6	42.4	40.9	38.8	44.4	32.0	43.2	48.5	44.6	44.3	37.2
No Response	0.2	0.4	-	0.3	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.4

Table 13B: Consequences of 25 April (national level)

Beneficial	44.1	39.9	47.7	45.8	42.4	41.4	41.4	49.5	40.5	37.1	52.3
Harmful	34.6	35.9	33.5	34.4	34.8	40.9	30.9	33.0	36.9	37.6	30.5
Neither	18.8	21.4	16.6	19.1	18.5	16.0	23.2	16.5	19.6	22.7	15.1
Don't Know	2.0	2.9	1.2	0.7	3.3	1.1	3.6	1.0	2.4	2.6	1.3
No Response	0.5	-	0.9	-	1.0	0.6	0.9	-	0.6	-	0.8

Table 14: Greatest Conquests of 25 April

<u>Response</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Age</u>		<u>Sex</u>		<u>Socioeconomic Class</u>			<u>-10,000</u>	<u>Habitat</u>	<u>+100,000</u>
		<u>15/19</u>	<u>20/25</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>A/B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Inhab.</u>	<u>10/100,000</u>	<u>Inhab.</u>
Legalization of of Parties	29.3	28.6	29.8	33.8	24.8	34.3	29.1	25.0	32.7	29.4	26.8
End of PIDE	54.7	54.3	55.1	51.2	58.3	51.4	54.5	58.0	53.0	53.6	56.9
Abolition of Censorship	37.1	35.5	38.5	36.5	37.7	40.9	40.5	30.0	31.5	37.6	40.6
End of Wars in Africa	52.7	41.3	62.5	57.2	48.3	53.0	50.5	55.0	54.2	49.5	54.4
Free Elections	53.1	52.5	53.5	54.5	51.7	55.2	54.5	49.5	48.2	52.1	57.3
Agrarian Reform	6.7	8.3	5.2	6.7	6.6	6.1	5.0	9.0	9.5	5.7	5.4
Right to Strike Sex Equality	18.0	21.4	15.1	15.7	20.2	17.1	15.5	21.5	17.3	19.6	17.2
(Constitutional)	34.3	40.6	28.9	32.1	36.4	29.3	33.2	40.0	35.7	35.6	32.2
No Response	1.3	1.8	0.9	1.3	1.3	2.2	1.8	-	1.2	1.5	1.3

Opinions on Education (Tables 15, 16, 16A)

Table 15: Helps to Prepare for Profession

Yes	46.1	51.4	41.5	48.5	43.7	46.4	46.8	45.0	57.1	44.8	39.3
No	51.9	46.7	56.3	49.2	54.6	50.8	52.7	52.0	41.1	52.6	59.0
No Opinion	2.0	1.8	2.2	2.3	1.7	2.8	0.5	3.0	1.8	2.6	1.7
No Response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 16: Opinion on Restricted Admissions [?Quotas]

Totally Agree	7.3	5.4	8.9	9.7	5.0	10.5	7.3	4.5	10.1	7.7	5.0
Partly Agree	33.1	36.2	50.5	30.1	36.1	43.6	26.8	30.5	34.5	29.9	34.7
Totally Disagree	53.4	52.2	54.5	52.2	54.6	43.1	59.1	56.5	47.0	55.2	56.6
No Opinion	6.2	6.2	6.2	8.0	4.3	2.8	6.8	8.5	8.3	7.2	3.8
No Response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 16 A: Most Just Solution for Admission to University

Restricted	11.3	10.5	12.0	12.7	9.9	20.4	7.3	7.5	10.1	13.4	10.5
More Universities	80.7	83.0	78.8	79.3	82.1	70.7	85.5	84.5	79.8	77.3	84.1
No Opinion	7.5	6.5	8.3	7.4	7.6	8.8	5.9	8.0	10.1	8.8	4.6
No Response	0.5	-	0.9	0.7	0.3	-	1.4	-	-	0.5	0.8

Table 17: Preferred Sectors for Employment

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat 10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
Agriculture	2.8	1.8	3.7	3.7	2.0	2.2	3.2	3.0	3.0	2.1	3.3
Industry	9.8	8.7	10.8	15.7	4.0	6.1	10.5	12.5	10.7	9.3	9.6
Services	34.8	42.0	28.8	30.4	39.1	23.2	35.0	45.0	38.7	41.8	26.4
Civil Service	9.7	9.4	9.8	6.7	12.6	4.4	14.1	9.5	11.9	10.3	7.5
Liberal Prof.	42.1	37.7	45.8	42.8	41.4	62.4	36.4	30.0	35.1	36.1	51.9
Others	1.0	0.7	1.2	0.7	1.3	1.7	0.9	0.5	1.2	-	1.7
No Response	0.2	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.6	-	-	-	0.5	-

Table 18A: Current Relationship (with mother)

Very good	32.1	34.8	29.8	35.5	28.8	32.6	27.3	37.0	35.7	35.1	27.2
Good	45.1	43.5	46.5	47.5	42.7	50.3	44.5	41.0	45.8	40.7	48.1
Reasonable	16.8	16.7	16.9	11.7	21.9	11.6	22.3	15.5	13.1	19.1	17.6
Poor	3.0	3.3	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.7	3.5	3.0	2.6	3.3
Very poor	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.7	1.7	0.6	1.4	1.5	1.8	0.5	1.3
No mother	1.0	-	1.8	0.7	1.3	1.1	1.8	-	-	1.0	1.7
No Response	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.7	1.1	-	1.5	0.6	1.0	0.8

Table 18B: Current Relationship (with father)

Very good	22.6	27.9	18.2	26.4	18.9	22.1	20.0	26.0	24.4	24.2	20.1
Good	40.3	38.8	41.5	42.5	38.1	47.5	40.0	34.0	43.5	39.2	38.9
Reasonable	22.6	22.5	22.8	20.1	25.2	20.4	27.3	19.5	20.8	22.2	24.3
Poor	4.3	4.3	4.3	2.3	6.3	2.8	3.6	6.5	3.0	3.1	6.3
Very poor	2.8	2.2	3.4	1.7	4.0	2.2	2.3	4.0	1.8	3.6	2.9
No father	4.5	1.8	6.8	3.3	5.6	1.7	4.1	7.5	4.8	5.7	3.3
No response	2.8	2.5	3.1	3.7	2.0	3.3	2.7	2.5	1.8	2.1	4.2

Table 19: Most Trusted Individuals

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat 10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	Class C	D			
Parents	54.6	55.4	53.8	59.5	49.7	54.1	54.5	55.0	63.1	55.7	47.7
Siblings	31.4	34.8	28.6	33.1	29.8	34.8	30.9	29.0	27.4	29.9	35.6
Other Relatives	6.3	6.5	6.2	6.7	6.0	7.7	6.8	4.5	8.3	6.7	4.6
Girl/Boyfriend	19.3	14.1	23.7	17.7	20.9	23.2	17.3	18.0	15.5	23.2	18.8
Friends	32.6	33.7	31.7	30.4	34.8	39.2	32.7	26.5	31.0	32.0	34.3
Teachers	1.0	0.4	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.7	0.9	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3
Priest	1.2	0.4	1.8	1.3	1.0	1.7	1.8	-	0.6	1.5	1.3
Husband	1.0	0.4	1.5	-	2.0	2.2	0.5	0.5	1.2	0.5	1.3
Wife	0.2	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	0.4
Nobody	3.8	3.6	3.0	3.0	4.6	3.3	4.1	4.0	2.4	3.1	5.4
No response	1.3	0.7	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.7	0.9	1.5	0.6	2.1	1.3

Table 20: Religious Affiliation

Catholic	57.7	62.0	54.2	49.8	65.6	58.6	56.4	58.5	58.3	53.6	60.7
Other	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.3	2.6	6.1	1.4	2.0	2.4	3.1	3.3
None	39.3	35.1	42.8	46.8	31.8	35.4	42.3	39.5	39.3	43.3	36.0
No response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 20A: Practice of Religion

Regular	20.0	26.8	13.4	20.8	19.4	27.4	16.5	16.5	19.6	20.0	20.3
Occasional	31.2	29.6	32.8	25.8	35.4	34.2	33.1	26.4	33.3	26.4	33.3
Nonpracticing	45.2	41.9	48.4	49.1	42.2	35.0	48.0	52.1	42.2	50.9	43.1
No response	3.6	1.7	5.4	4.4	2.9	3.4	2.4	5.0	4.9	2.7	3.3

Table 21A: Inacceptable Acts [would not commit such acts]

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	10/100,000 Inhab.	Habitat +100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
Steal fruit	18.6	19.6	17.8	15.7	21.5	17.1	20.9	17.5	16.1	21.6	18.0
Steal a car	69.9	69.9	69.8	67.9	71.9	67.4	72.7	69.0	73.8	71.6	65.7
Cheat on exam	3.2	2.5	3.7	2.0	4.3	6.1	1.8	2.0	3.0	2.6	3.8
Falsify documents to avoid military service	19.6	25.7	14.5	23.7	15.6	14.9	20.9	22.5	26.2	19.1	15.5
Keep found money	45.3	41.7	48.3	37.8	52.6	51.4	40.0	45.5	44.0	44.3	46.9
Take unemployment compensation while working	23.5	26.1	21.2	21.7	25.2	27.1	21.8	22.0	25.0	27.3	19.2
Ride bus without paying	5.5	2.9	7.7	5.4	5.6	3.3	6.8	6.0	6.5	4.6	5.4
Lie to parents	16.5	17.8	15.4	14.7	18.2	15.5	17.7	16.0	13.7	16.0	18.8
Take item from home to pawn	60.4	57.6	62.8	58.9	61.9	63.0	61.4	57.0	60.1	61.3	59.8
No response	12.1	10.9	13.2	16.7	7.6	9.9	12.7	13.5	12.5	8.8	14.6

Table 21B: Acceptable Acts [would commit such acts]

Steal fruit	34.4	35.5	33.5	35.8	33.1	37.0	34.5	32.0	34.5	35.6	33.5
Steal a car	4.3	4.7	4.0	5.4	3.3	6.6	2.7	4.0	1.2	4.6	6.3
Cheat on exam	73.0	76.1	70.5	71.6	74.5	75.7	76.4	67.0	75.0	74.7	70.3
Falsify documents to avoid military service	22.1	16.3	27.1	23.7	20.5	27.6	19.1	20.5	18.5	19.1	27.2
Keep found money	9.3	11.6	7.4	11.4	7.3	6.1	8.6	13.0	8.3	9.3	10.0
Unemp. / Work	19.5	15.9	22.5	20.1	18.9	15.5	20.9	21.5	23.2	17.5	18.4
Bus without pay.	64.6	69.6	60.3	60.2	68.9	71.8	59.5	63.5	61.3	68.0	64.0
Lie to parents	27.1	27.2	27.1	20.7	33.4	19.9	31.4	29.0	32.7	30.4	20.5
Take item from home to pawn	5.2	5.4	4.9	4.0	6.3	4.4	4.1	7.0	6.5	6.2	3.3
No response	11.8	10.1	13.2	14.7	8.9	11.0	11.8	12.5	12.5	8.2	14.2

Table 22: Preferred Location To Live/Reside

Response	Total	Age			Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D				
		Country	21.6	18.1	24.6	23.4	19.9	21.0	16.8			
City	18.6	20.3	17.2	19.1	18.2	17.1	18.6	20.0	15.5	15.5	23.4	
Suburbs												
house/garden	59.7	61.6	58.2	57.5	61.9	61.9	64.5	52.5	58.3	70.1	52.3	
No response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Table 23: Leisure Activities

Read	43.6	40.6	46.2	31.1	56.0	44.2	41.8	45.0	39.3	42.3	47.7
Watch TV	21.0	23.2	19.1	20.4	21.5	19.3	22.3	21.0	21.4	21.6	20.1
Go out with girl/boyfriend	28.1	28.3	28.0	26.8	29.5	33.1	28.2	23.5	25.6	27.3	30.5
Drink with friends	34.8	32.2	36.9	38.8	30.8	39.8	36.8	28.0	34.5	28.9	39.7
Go for a car ride	13.3	12.3	14.2	12.7	13.9	18.2	15.0	7.0	10.1	14.9	14.2
See a movie	34.6	31.9	36.9	32.4	36.8	43.6	33.2	28.0	29.8	31.4	40.6
Have a hobby	15.6	14.9	16.3	16.1	15.2	23.2	15.5	9.0	7.7	21.1	16.7
Play a sport	29.0	33.3	25.2	37.5	20.5	32.6	33.2	21.0	22.0	30.9	32.2
Listen to music	51.6	52.2	51.1	47.2	56.0	48.6	50.9	55.0	44.0	54.1	54.8
Ride motorcycle	8.5	9.8	7.4	8.7	8.3	11.6	9.1	5.0	7.7	9.3	8.4
Play cards	0.8	1.4	0.3	1.3	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.0	-	2.1	0.4
Computer games	0.2	0.4	-	-	0.3	-	0.5	-	0.6	-	-
See soccer match	0.2	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	0.5	-	-	0.5	-
Make lace	0.7	-	1.2	8 [?]	1.3	0.6	1.4	-	0.6	1.0	0.4
Others	11.6	11.2	12.0	10.4	12.9	11.0	11.8	12.0	13.1	6.7	14.6
Do nothing	3.2	3.6	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.3	2.7	3.5	3.0	6.2	0.8
No response	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.0	0.3	0.6	1.4	-	-	0.5	1.3

Table 24: Participation in Group Activities

Yes	34.3	38.8	30.5	41.5	27.2	39.2	33.2	31.0	32.7	31.4	37.7
No	65.2	60.9	68.9	58.2	72.2	60.2	66.4	68.5	66.7	68.0	61.9
No response	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4

Table 24A: Group Activities

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class				Habitat	
		20/25		M	F	A/B	C	D	-10,000 Inhab.	10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25								
Sports	54.4	62.6	45.5	60.5	45.1	47.9	56.2	59.7	61.8	55.7	48.9
Cultural events	21.8	17.8	26.3	18.5	26.8	25.4	20.5	19.4	16.4	14.8	30.0
Political act.	2.4	3.7	1.0	3.2	1.2	2.8	2.7	1.6	-	1.6	4.4
Student act.	14.1	13.1	15.2	8.1	23.2	22.5	8.2	11.3	9.1	14.8	16.7
Social action	4.4	5.6	3.0	3.2	6.1	8.5	2.7	1.6	1.8	6.6	4.4
Religious act.	10.7	14.0	7.1	5.6	18.3	16.9	8.2	6.5	1.8	18.0	11.1
Union act.	3.4	1.9	5.1	4.0	2.4	2.8	4.1	3.2	7.3	-	3.3
Other	6.8	4.7	9.1	8.9	3.7	5.6	8.2	6.5	12.7	4.9	4.4
No response	1.9	0.9	3.0	1.6	2.4	1.4	1.4	3.2	-	3.3	2.2

Table 25: Personal Position on Sexual Relations between Unmarried Adolescents

In favor	81.7	77.5	85.2	87.6	75.8	85.6	82.3	77.5	79.8	75.8	87.9
Against	14.5	18.8	10.8	8.4	20.5	12.2	10.9	20.5	17.9	17.0	10.0
No response	3.8	3.6	4.0	4.0	3.6	2.2	6.8	2.0	2.4	7.2	2.1
Use of Contraceptives											
Favor	84.0	76.8	90.2	84.3	83.8	90.1	88.2	74.0	81.0	80.9	88.7
Against	12.3	17.4	8.0	12.0	12.6	8.8	8.2	20.0	17.9	12.4	8.4
No response	3.7	5.8	1.8	3.7	3.6	1.1	3.6	6.0	1.2	6.7	2.9
Abortion											
In favor	55.4	48.2	61.5	58.5	52.3	51.4	55.9	58.5	50.0	54.1	60.3
Against	37.8	46.0	30.8	35.8	39.7	40.9	36.8	36.0	43.5	36.6	34.7
No response	6.8	5.8	7.7	5.7	7.9	7.7	7.3	5.5	6.5	9.3	5.0
Group Sex											
Favor	14.6	11.2	17.5	23.4	6.0	11.6	14.5	17.5	15.5	12.4	15.9
Against	79.0	84.4	74.5	69.6	88.4	82.9	79.1	75.5	81.0	77.3	79.1
No response	6.3	4.3	8.0	7.0	5.6	5.5	6.5	7.0	3.6	10.3	5.0

Table 25 con. (Attitudes Regarding Sexual Relations) [Item "Homosexuality" appears at end of next page]

Prostitution	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat	
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D		10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
Response											
In favor	5.5	5.4	5.5	9.7	1.3	5.5	3.2	8.0	8.3	4.1	4.6
Against	91.5	91.7	91.4	87.3	95.7	91.7	93.2	89.5	90.5	89.7	93.7
No response	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.6	2.5	1.2	6.2	1.7

Sex Education in Schools

In favor	89.2	86.6	91.4	89.0	89.4	87.3	89.1	91.0	87.5	84.0	94.6
Against	7.7	10.9	4.9	7.4	7.9	10.5	6.8	6.0	10.7	8.8	4.6
No response	3.2	2.5	3.7	3.7	2.6	2.2	4.1	3.0	1.8	7.2	0.8

Nudism

In Favor	74.7	75.7	73.8	81.9	67.5	74.0	75.9	74.0	73.2	67.5	81.6
Against	17.5	16.3	18.5	13.4	21.5	18.2	15.5	19.0	22.0	16.0	15.5
No response	7.8	8.0	7.7	4.7	10.9	7.7	8.6	7.0	4.8	16.5	2.9

Free drugs [?]

In favor	38.4	33.0	43.1	49.8	27.2	44.2	37.3	34.5	31.5	34.0	46.9
Against	57.2	62.0	53.2	46.8	67.5	53.0	58.2	60.0	66.1	56.7	51.5
No response	4.3	5.1	3.7	3.3	5.3	2.8	4.5	5.5	2.4	9.3	1.7

Table 26: Drug Experience

Yes	36.3	33.3	38.8	46.5	26.2	40.3	36.4	32.5	27.4	37.6	41.4
No	61.6	64.1	59.4	51.5	71.5	58.0	61.8	64.5	69.0	60.3	57.3
No response	2.2	2.5	1.8	2.0	2.3	1.7	1.8	3.0	3.6	2.1	1.3

Table 26A: Drug Use

Regular	27.1	22.8	30.2	29.5	22.8	30.1	25.0	26.2	26.1	28.8	26.3
Occasional	72.0	76.1	69.0	69.1	77.2	68.5	73.7	73.8	73.9	71.2	71.7
No response	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.4	-	1.4	1.2	-	-	-	2.0

Table 27: Opinion of Virginity in Female

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat 10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
Virtue in itself	32.3	38.8	26.8	31.1	33.4	32.0	31.4	33.5	38.3	33.0	26.8
Physical state	61.7	55.1	67.4	61.2	62.3	62.4	63.2	59.5	55.4	57.7	69.5
No opinion	5.7	5.8	5.5	7.0	4.3	5.0	5.0	7.0	5.4	8.2	3.8
No response	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.7	-	0.6	0.5	-	-	1.0	-

Table 28: Experienced Sexual Relations

Yes	64.4	47.5	78.8	82.9	46.0	70.2	65.0	58.5	58.9	58.8	72.8
No	27.1	43.8	12.9	13.4	40.7	21.5	26.8	32.5	29.8	32.5	20.9
No response	8.5	8.7	8.3	3.7	13.2	8.3	8.2	9.0	11.3	8.8	6.3

Table 28A: Frequency of experience

Regular	48.3	33.6	55.9	43.1	57.6	53.5	46.9	44.4	42.4	48.2	51.7
Occasional	47.8	63.4	39.8	52.8	38.8	39.4	52.4	51.3	52.5	48.2	44.8
No response	3.9	3.1	4.3	4.0	3.6	7.1	0.7	4.3	5.1	3.5	3.4

Table 29: Prospects for Marriage Within 10/15 Years

In church	37.9	41.7	34.8	33.1	42.7	40.3	38.6	35.0	38.7	37.6	37.7
Civil ceremony	25.1	18.5	30.8	23.1	27.2	24.3	27.3	23.5	23.8	28.4	23.4
Common law	19.3	21.7	17.2	23.1	15.6	21.0	18.6	18.5	21.4	21.1	16.3
Celibate	7.5	8.7	6.5	9.4	5.6	8.3	6.8	7.5	5.4	5.2	10.9
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Don't know	9.7	8.7	10.5	10.7	8.6	6.1	8.2	14.5	10.1	6.7	11.7
No response	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.3	-	0.5	1.0	0.6	1.0	-

Table 25: Attitude Toward Homosexuality [omitted from previous page]

In favor	28.0	22.5	32.6	25.4	30.5	32.6	27.3	24.5	20.8	21.1	38.5
Against	63.6	71.0	57.2	68.9	56.3	58.6	62.3	69.5	73.2	68.0	53.1
No response	8.5	6.5	10.2	5.7	11.3	8.8	10.5	6.0	6.0	10.8	8.4

Table 30: Greatest Fears for Future

Response	Total	Age		Sex		Socioeconomic Class			-10,000 Inhab.	Habitat 10/100,000 Inhab.	+100,000 Inhab.
		15/19	20/25	M	F	A/B	C	D			
Possibility of world war	81.0	82.6	79.7	81.3	80.8	82.3	81.8	79.0	75.6	83.0	83.3
Unemployment	37.8	38.0	37.5	36.5	39.1	35.9	35.0	42.5	39.9	36.1	37.7
Breakup of EEC	1.2	1.4	0.9	0.7	1.7	0.6	2.3	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.7
Escalation of terrorism	29.6	27.9	31.1	25.1	34.1	38.7	27.7	23.5	23.2	26.8	36.4
Political instability in Portugal	8.2	3.3	12.3	8.7	7.6	11.0	7.3	6.5	10.1	6.7	7.9
World Famine	61.4	67.0	56.6	53.5	69.2	60.8	60.5	63.0	56.0	64.9	62.3
Pollution	17.5	14.9	19.7	22.4	12.6	18.8	20.0	13.5	15.5	17.5	18.8
Famine in Portugal	22.0	22.1	21.8	23.1	20.9	12.7	23.6	28.5	28.0	20.1	19.2
Possibility of revolution in Portugal	8.3	9.1	7.7	7.4	9.3	6.6	9.5	8.5	7.7	9.8	7.5
Lowered standard of living	16.5	16.3	16.6	20.4	12.6	18.2	15.9	15.5	19.6	14.4	15.9
Others	0.2	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.4
No response	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

25 June 1985

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

ALLEGED IRANIAN INFLUENCE--Valy Mamede considers invalid in the eyes of Portuguese law the assembly that elected last Sunday the new president of the Islamic community in Portugal, Moussa Omar. This statement was made by Valy Mamede to ANOP [Portuguese Press Agency]. According to him, Sunday's assembly was a mere "meeting of members," because various legal formalities were not observed. As for himself, Valy mamede said that he continues to consider himself as having resigned from the post of president of the Islamic community, and that if his resignation is not accepted, he will ask to be suspended. The ANOP cites another source close to Moussa Omar, according to which the list B--adhering to Moussa--received 279 votes, while Valy Mamede's list only obtained 79. Meanwhile, there are already some who, with or without reason, see in these events Khomeyni's finger. [Excerpt] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 21 May 85 p 24]

CSO: 3542/184

POLITICAL

TURKEY

PROBLEMS WITH BULGARIANS DISCUSSED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 10 Apr 85 p 1

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) - Turkish-Bulgarian relations, which are escalating on both sides because of the pressures exerted on Turks in Bulgaria, are now the scene of a new crisis as a case of espionage has been uncovered at the Bulgarian Consulate General in Istanbul.

When the individual called Ali Yusufov, who came to Turkey some time ago asking for political asylum but was discovered by the MIT [National Intelligence Organization] to be working for Bulgarian intelligence, fled for protection to the Bulgarian Consulate General in Gayrettepe, in Istanbul, this gave rise to serious frictions between the Turkish and Bulgarian governments.

The fact that the Bulgarian consul Pavel Pavlov, together with Ali Yusufov who was exposed last week as a spy, organized a press conference to which only foreign journalists were invited, and at which he openly accused Turkish authorities, caused reactions in Ankara. According to officials, the consul's organizing a press conference jointly with an individual who appears to be a spy, and his making a series of claims, which were characterized as a "scenario," created a "delicate" situation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned the Bulgarian government, pointing out that the consul's stance and behavior constituted a grave faux pas from the standpoint of diplomatic standards.

Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that, according to internationally accepted rules of diplomacy, a consul cannot adopt such an attitude against the country in which he is posted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesman, Yalim Eralp, confirmed that contacts are taking place between Turkish and Bulgarian authorities on this subject.

While Turkey made its reactions caused by the consul's stance known to Bulgaria, it also hardened its own stance and surrounded the consular building, in which the individual called Ali Yusufov is known to be, with security forces which have begun to search all the means of transportation emerging from the building. The other day an attempt was also made to search the official limousine of the Bulgarian consul general, Georgi Lubenov. But rather than permit this, the consul general chose to go back to the residence.

It has been learned that the Turkish security authorities' decision to search

the cars belonging to Bulgarian diplomats further deepened the crisis in relations and that the Bulgarian government reacted to this measure. As for officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were content to give a cryptic reply to journalists' questions as to whether or not means of transportation bearing diplomatic license plates could be searched, to the effect that "This varies according to the category of the diplomatic representatives."

12278

CSO: 3554/130

POLITICAL

TURKEY

WEST GERMANS FIND TURKISH AID REQUEST TOO HIGH

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 May 85 p 14

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) - Turkey asks for military aid in the vicinity of DM 400 million from the Federal Republic of Germany. Turkey's expectations on this subject were conveyed to the members of the Bundestag (Federal Republic of Germany Parliament) Defense Commission who are in Ankara for a series of official contacts.

The West German parliament members who are experts on matters of defense met in Ankara with the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Mesut Yilmaz, and the members of the National Assembly Defense Commission, and they also participated in the briefings which took place in the National Ministry of Defense and in General Staff Headquarters. In the course of those briefings the German parliament members were given information on the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces as well as on the strategic importance of Turkey.

The president of the National Assembly Defense Commission, Ferruh Iltis, confirmed during his talks with the German parliament members the inadequacy of the DM 130 million German military aid.

According to information obtained from official sources, in the course of the talks with the German delegation it was pointed out that the aid level of DM 130 million from the German government was insufficient to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces, and an additional aid package of DM 400 million was requested. The Turkish officials also explained to the German delegation what equipment and materiel the requested aid should include.

For their part, the German members of parliament pointed out that the Turkish side's "list of military requirements was too broad" and indirectly said that it would not be possible to fulfill the demands in their entirety. At the same time, the visiting parliament members promised to do their best so that at least part of the Turkish requests could be met. At the conclusion of the talks the German parliament members invited the TBMM [Turkish National Assembly] Defense Commission members to Germany.

The topic of an increase of German aid was also brought to the agenda in the course of Premier Turgut Ozal's talks with the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl, in Bonn last month.

POLITICAL

TURKEY

TURKISH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS REACH IMPASSE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 May 85 p 14

[Article by Hadi Uluengin]

[Text] Brussels - When viewed from the standpoint of Brussels, Turkey's relations with Western Europe do not lead to optimism. As a matter of fact, the present picture is the worst from the 6 November elections to the present.

In Turkey's relations with the EEC, which have been in effect suspended since the 12 September intervention, and were expected to "soften" after the 6 November elections, there have been no concrete developments whatsoever to confirm that expectation. While the light of hope fails to shine on the horizon for the activation in the short term of the 600 million ECU [European Currency Unit] Common Market credits which were frozen, "smaller and concrete" steps also failed to materialize, despite Turkey's direct and indirect interventions.

It is understood that while the uncompromising stance of Greece and Denmark is seen as the "overt obstacle" to a decision of the EEC Council of Banks that would gratify Ankara, aside from "overt obstacles," the Turkish side is also confronting the problem of "hidden obstacles." And the two capitals which will be the "motor" nations within the EEC and which are said to be the "hidden and invisible obstacles" are Bonn and Rome.

The fact that the minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, who is rumored to say one thing to Ankara and another thing to Brussels, was unable to get Turkey's file off the shelf during his term as president of the EEC, while on the other hand, in the Council of Europe meeting held in Strasbourg last week, he only gave "lip service" to the defense of Turkey, is viewed as a sign that from now on he will not side "too loudly" with Ankara.

Another widespread belief in Turkish diplomatic circles is that Italy, on whom great "hopes" were placed for an improvement of Turkish-Common Market relations, and whose turn now it is to preside over the EEC, has "sunk" those hopes. Specifically, the fact that the Italian minister of foreign affairs quite unexpectedly spoke to the effect that "It is too soon for Turkey's term in the Presidency" is viewed by foreign observers as a confirmation that from now on there is not too much to be expected from Italy.

Diplomatic observers who stress that the various European organizations which will give the "green light" for an improvement of Turkey's relations with Western Europe will trigger a chain reaction also point out, however, that the light remains "yellow." Indeed, while it was noted that if Turkey were to be elected to a term in the Presidency the EEC would not remain "insensitive" to this, matters became more difficult in Brussels when this failed to materialize.

Bulgarian Problem

Another factor that led to a further "cooling" of Turkey toward Western Europe is the "distancing" stance adopted by those nations regarding the issue of the Turkish minorities living in Bulgaria. Turkey's plea that "the allies unanimously" defend their cause on international platforms failed to achieve total support either in NATO or in the Council of Europe.

Is This The Eve of a New Ankara Policy?

Diplomatic observers from various nations with whom we conferred in Brussels agree on the view that this negative picture could spur Ankara to adopt a new policy toward Western Europe.

Those observers point out that Turkey might opt for an approach of "no longer leaning so much on Europe" and "opening up to the Middle East," "maintaining good relations with Washington," "and the status quo with the Eastern Bloc," while giving "tit for tat" in its relations with Western Europe, which would not be dealt with as a whole but within a dual framework.

12278

CSO: 3554/130

POLITICAL

TURKEY

YAZAR AS RIGHT-WING PARTY VIEWED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 22 Apr 85 p 14

[Article by Prof Dr Haluk Ulman in the column: "Comments"]

[Text] Much activity is surfacing as the time for the Right Way Party's big congress draws near. All overt or covert candidates for the leadership have rolled up their sleeves and gone to work with a will.

The DYP [Right Way Party] is a party which openly claims to perpetuate the line of the old DP-AP [Democratic and Justice Parties]; from that angle, it expects votes from the "conservative" electorate. At the same time, since it claims to be the symbol of "democratization" and "a return to civilian rule," at least in the eyes of some of the old, influential politicians who support this party, it isn't as if it doesn't also think of attracting the votes of some of those among the supporters of a "pro-Western, secular state who share those aspirations."

In fact, this is where its greatest difference with the ANAP [Motherland Party], which appropriated the "conservative" votes, becomes apparent. That is, while the ANAP studiously avoids any controversy about 12 September which established today's "system," the DYP, waving the flag of "democratization" and "a return to civilian rule," openly opposes it. Otherwise, it is hard to find any difference in their "philosophy" with regard to their economic policies. Both favor the liberal economic order, a market economy and the predominance of the private sector. As a matter of fact, it is a moot point whether it is the ANAP or some of the old politicians supporting the DYP who hold the patent on the economic policies the ANAP follows today.

It is true that DYP supporters claim that there are also big differences between the DYP and the ANAP from the standpoint of a philosophy of the economy. And according to them, those differences arise essentially from differences in their concept of the "political system." "The liberal economic system" can only be established and function through a "liberal political system" which works in a truly democratic way, with the people's active participation. Since the ANAP has neither "such an agenda nor aim" it cannot be expected to implement a liberal economic policy successfully. And moreover, since the people's voice in general can't be heard, while no one listens to what little can be heard, grave mistakes are being made in the "management" of the economy. When you add to this the present day "system," there is no

chance of following any economic policy whatever, let alone a liberal economic policy.

As can be seen, the DYP's two fundamental characteristics are following the former DP-AP line and opposing the "system" founded after 12 September. And for that reason, in the minds of those who wish to lead that party, the new leader who is to be brought to head it must also embody those characteristics. Because, as they rightly believe, the leader of a party is the symbol of that party and its line.

And this is where Mehmet Yazar comes into the picture. To those who wish to lead the DYP, Yazar is not only far from being the symbol of the old DP-AP line, but because of some of his connections he emerges as someone that could easily fit into today's "system." In fact, I believe that they even fear that he might have been instructed to act as a "bridge" between today's "system" and the DYP. If one stops to think that complaints from some of the circles which offered Yazar as a candidate and gave him their support originate from Ozal's government rather than from today's "system," those fears are more easily understood.

At the same time, that is, in the eyes of those who want to lead the DYP, while Yazar may not be "trustworthy" it is a fact that he is increasingly gaining ground among the party's base. Because the DYP's local administrators and cadres are more interested in "power" than in such things as "systems" or economic policies, and what they want above all is to present an "alternative leader" opposite to Ozal who will be satisfying in the eyes of the people. To them, Yazar, with the experience he acquired as chairman of the Chambers of Commerce Union and the connections he established and the support he gained therefrom, with his organizer's and fighter's personality and wealth, is the man to challenge and defeat Ozal among the conservative voters. In other words, he is the man who can lead them to "power"...

And for that reason, until such a time that they can deliver it into the hands of one of their own, it doesn't look as if those who wish to lead the DYP will be searching very hard for a "trustworthy," "illustrious unknown" they would deem worthy to be at the head of the party.

Provided, of course, that an "old" name, who will activate his "old" ties, does not emerge...

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

DOGAN ON NEED FOR TURK-IS CHANGE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 29 Apr 85 p 7

[Article by Yalcin Dogan in The Column: "From Ankara"]

[Text] Who is Sadik Side, the "decision making" Secretary General of Turk-Is? He was the government's "Social Security Minister" at the time the laws implemented today, which curtail the workers' rights, were being drafted. And who was the minister of labor in the same government, who flourished his signature at the bottom of the laws curtailing workers' rights? Turhan Esener. And now one sees those two former ministers, the one who curtailed rights and the one who signed the laws, getting up to organize a seminar. The topic of the seminar is the following:

"How is it possible to save workers' rights from the legal impasse?"

And just as those who curtailed rights and set down their signature emerge today to organize a seminar, saying: "How can we save the workers' rights from this impasse?" Turk-Is too, which did not utter a peep about these measures, puts up the pretense of yelling: "We will take action to obtain what is owed to us." And in order to keep this alive in public opinion, it keeps having meetings "at government level" in order to "give weight" to its stance or to achieve the appearance of it. Thus another one of those meetings, unless there is a last minute change, will take place today between Premier Ozal and Turk-Is administrators.

The government side, which has accurately evaluated all the weaknesses of Turk-Is, whenever Turk-Is attempts to say anything, gets up on the platform and declares: "What are you talking about, were you not the ones who, at the time, endorsed all of this?" And when it hears those words, Turk-Is does not breathe a sound the next day...

So what came over Turk-Is, which for years served governments of the Right, to suddenly stand up and scream "I demand the workers' rights, otherwise I will take action"? Why does Turk-Is insist on making far from convincing declarations and speeches of a nature to bring it up against a government of the Right, for the first time in its history? Is this the first time after five years that Turks-Is has become aware the workers' rights have been curtailed? Is this the first time after five years it has noticed that workers' salaries are far behind costs? Is this the first time it has been able to

discern what obstacles were introduced by today's laws to the right to strike? Did it begin to reflect today, for the first time since five years, that workers get the lowest share of the national revenue? So what happened to Turk-Is to make it go public on such issues as "workers' rights" in which it does not believe in the least?..

We think that we have several points here. First, between the Turk-Is administrators and the member workers there are mountainous differences of opinion. Then, there is the distrust the member workers feel toward their administrators. And how could they trust them? First, one sees Chairman Sevket Yilmaz rising, at the time the draft constitution is made known, to say "With this constitution workers' rights are being curtailed, this is unacceptable, we are against it." Following that, precisely two days before the voting on the constitution, he appears on television and makes a declaration to the effect "We must trust this constitution, this constitution defends the workers' rights." It is another matter whether Turk-Is likes the constitution or not, whether it supports it or not. But what worker's trust in an administration would not be shaken when, within the space of a month, it appears twice before the workers to express totally divergent views on the subject of the constitution? If, naturally, it was not already shaken before then? These differences of opinion between the administrators and the base and this kind of contradictory behavior appear to have exhausted the patience of the workers who are members of Turk-Is. Because of the great pressures emanating from the bottom, Turk-Is administrators feel they have "to do something."

Because, at last, the threat that workers might oust the Turk-Is administrators is becoming clear. Turk-Is has totally alienated itself from the workers who are its members. Up to now, collective bargaining constituted the only tie between Turk-Is administrators and workers, and now even that tie has been cut. When it was decided that the workers' salary raises would be determined by a resolution of the "Coordinating Committee," the last tie between the workers and the administrators of Turk-Is was also gone. And, in all likelihood, this is the chief reason which plays a part in the Turk-Is flurry.

It is possible that determining salaries through a method independent from Turk-Is may have been one of the chief factors that opened the eyes of the workers at the bottom. That no intervention in the name of "Trade Unionism" brought about any results, that almost no worker's rights were upheld in the name of "Trade Unionism," quite on the contrary, that at the time its secretary general was a minister it remained a spectator while the workers' rights were eroded, have now become facts of which every worker "at the bottom" is aware. And it is precisely at this point that Turk-Is began to display such comical reactions as: "Workers are being unfairly treated. We will take action."

Turk-Is will be staging yet another "episode of the comedy act" summarized today. Sevket Yilmaz will meet with Premier Turgut Ozal. It cannot be said that Ozal is very much fooled by this fake Turk-Is excitement. Because Ozal is quite aware of what goes on in Turk-Is. And even if this were not the case, the fact remains that the Ozal government, which has "the upper hand",

holds powerful assets. The first being that Ozal doesn't have to worry about "workers becoming socialists" overnight. The second is that he knows there is no question of the workers going over to the DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers] whose activities have been banned. And the third, that Ozal need not fear that "Workers will take matters into their hands and resort to striking." There is no reason for him to feel such fear within the framework of today's laws. There may be also other reasons. But especially because of those three fundamental reasons, Ozal's bargaining strength before Turk-Is appears to be fairly great. And in particular, Ozal couldn't care less about threats of action, of strikes, from a Turk-Is that is well on its way to being cut off from its base.

The image of the Turk-Is administration today makes it imperative to convey willy-nilly a single message to the workers who are its members: change the present administration.

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

CONSTITUTION, DEMOCRACY DEBATED

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 Apr 85 pp 1,11

[Text] Ahmet Nusret Tuna, recalling that the second article of the constitution states that the Turkish Republic is a democratic, secular and social justice state, said: "If you pay attention, it does not say that the law is in the hands of the state." Tuna emphasized that this carried the meaning that legislating was a task entrusted to the governing politicians.

Ahmet Nusret Tuna explained that the first duty of those in power was to investigate whether existing laws were just and conformed to human rights, and to revise the ones which went against justice and human rights. He also explained that article five of the 1982 constitution states that the fundamental aim and duty of the state is to: "Ensure the individuals' and the population's prosperity, peace and happiness, to eliminate economic and social obstacles limiting their basic rights and freedoms in ways incompatible with the tenets of a social rights state and justice, and to promote the conditions needed for the development of the people's moral and material life," saying that such duties had to be performed by those in power. Tuna added that it was even superfluous for him to speak on this subject, and that those in power should perform that obligation of theirs.

The deputy to the leader of the DYP [Right Way Party], Ahmet Nusret Tuna, stressed that constitutions themselves were open to debate as to whether they conformed with constitutional law and justice, and that, if necessary, their faulty aspects could be emended, saying the following:

"For instance, this constitution's provisional article four has tied the hands and variously curtailed the activities of some people whose only crime was to serve their country. Is this in conformity with justice now? The duty of those in power is to investigate such laws, such articles of the law, find them and bring them to the fore, and emend them in accordance with justice. We call on those in power to do their duty."

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MILITARY

AUSTRIA

FRISCHENSCHLAGER ON ROLE OF DRAKEN INTERCEPTORS

Vienna PROFIL in German 29 Apr 85 pp 29-31

[Interview with Friedhelm Frischenschlager, minister for national defense, by Hubertus Czernin and Otmar Lahodynsky: "It Also Means Opening Fire"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] How long will we still be able to call you the minister?

[Answer] That depends on how long the legislative period lasts. Since it is expected to last until 1987, I would imagine until then.

[Question] Would it constitute grounds for your resignation if the decision on the Draken or the signing of the contract with the Swedes had to be postponed?

[Answer] Will it be postponed?

[Question] According to newspaper reports, sources within the federal chancellery say it will. You know nothing about a postponement?

[Answer] I know that there are people who are working toward that end because they want to upset the whole process.

[Question] You continue to insist on 21 May?

[Answer] Of course.

[Question] What will happen if the discussions which the chancellor wants to hold with the Laender representatives does not take place until June?

[Answer] I assume that they will take place before then.

[Question] And if the 21 May deadline is not possible?

[Answer] I am proceeding from the point of view that this deadline will be met. I would even place bets on it.

[Question] And if worse comes to worst will you pay the consequences?

[Answer] My political reaction would be to show in a very thorough manner to those who used this to obstruct the Draken interceptor issue--which I do not believe is happening--who all was in favor of it, who exerted pressure, with what interpellations and with what speeches. There is so much to do. I will be occupied for a long time--as minister.

[Question] Your resignation would not be one of the consequences?

[Answer] Why should I step down when I am accomplishing, or working on accomplishing, something which all three parties have agreed to? Where an allocation has been subjected to involved procedures such as are seldom seen in this country? Where all parties knew the what, when and how--why then should I step down when others have failed?

[Question] No defense minister before you has paid so much attention to this project.

[Answer] That is correct--for several reasons. First, the pressure was greatest for me because this decision, which was made about 20 years ago, has become very urgent. In this regard it was more difficult for me than it was for my predecessors who had more time. Second, I find it strange that a minister is reproached for efficiently pursuing something in accordance with the desires of all three parties.

[Question] Does it in fact disturb you that the media describes you with such attributes as "aggressive, militaristic tone, loses control?"?

[Answer] Of course that disturbs me, because it is not true. Where have I lost control? I have perhaps become more forceful, because untruths are being spread by those who know better. Naturally that makes me angry. Since I am at times an excitable person, perhaps I have been more forceful from time to time in contrast to my otherwise more moderate nature.

[Question] It is apparent, however, that you are undergoing a change in image. Two years ago you entered the defense ministry as a liberal reformer. Now in the Reder case you stand accused of being "immature". In the Draken matter you are called "inept," "aggressive," "bull-headed" and "incompetent."

[Answer] Let's not discuss the Reder issue. That is a different matter altogether. Regarding the question of these aircraft I have been neither bull-headed nor do I know where I have been inept. Perhaps I was too friendly with the Land governor.

[Question] With Governor Krainer?

[Answer] Yes. Perhaps I was too friendly for too long. Perhaps I really believed he was serious about the discussions. That was perhaps a mistake.

[Question] Back to your image.

[Answer] I would concede that a certain impression is created because I do not become disheartened about the aircraft question. The public was apparently not used to such things. Now all of a sudden people are acting as if this is some colossal, unexpected event.

[Question] From time to time you accuse your opponents of lying. Do you have a monopoly on truth?

[Answer] I don't say anything that I cannot prove. What others are saying are--lies is perhaps too strong a word--untruths. My unwillingness to discuss matters with Styria, for example. That is demonstrably false.

[Question] The Land government of Styria is now initiating an environmental impact study. Are you in favor of this?

[Answer] Yes. I also proposed to Professor Moese that we work together.

[Question] Why did you not bring up such a study much earlier? There was certainly an awareness of environmental and noise pollution.

[Answer] That it just now occurs to those people is not my fault. Ever since I have been leading this debate, I have said minimize pollution, decentralize air traffic . . .

[Question] That is what you say. But have you initiated an environmental impact study?

[Answer] We have the data. That is why we first need to decide on the type of aircraft, so that we can determine the amount of pollution, including noise pollution.

[Question] Do you think the noise level is acceptable?

[Answer] They are loud. It would be a lie to maintain that aircraft of this type are quiet. But the noise pollution level can be reduced. Not with a muffler, of course. And when we talk about environmental pollution due to exhaust gases, then the quantities involved are in fact slight in comparison with the overall pollution level in this region. Therefore I do not shy away from an environmental impact study. They should investigate to their heart's content.

[Question] Now this environmental impact study will be performed. What would the consequences be if the study established that this additional pollution is not acceptable?

[Answer] The Zeltweg military airfield is very old. Jet aircraft have operated there since 1959. In any case the pollution caused by aircraft is very slight compared to overall pollution. Regarding the purchase of surveillance aircraft, everyone knew that there were theoretically only three military airfields--Hoersching, Thalerhof, Zeltweg. Anyone who has looked into the situa-

tion at all knew that the plane used by the surveillance squadron in Zeltweg and Thalerhof was being replaced . . .

[Question] That still does not answer our question. What will you do if the environmental impact study establishes that the additional pollution is unacceptable?

[Answer] Overall pollution in this area caused by industry and other factors is incomparably greater than that caused by the fliers. This is what the study will show.

[Question] But perhaps the fliers represent the environmental straw that breaks the camel's back.

[Answer] That is a hypothetical question.

[Question] Basically, then, it does not matter to you what this study brings out. The aircraft will be stationed one way or the other.

[Answer] I cannot depart from this decision, because we have the workshops and everything down there.

[Question] Why, then, did you not tell Professor Moese right away: Don't bother--it will be of no use anyway? It may turn out to be a nice scientific study, but it will not change the outcome!

[Answer] For me it is a very interesting endeavor which will show that pollution produced by the airfield itself will be slight. Therefore, I have absolutely nothing against it.

[Question] It will have no influence on where the aircraft are stationed?

[Answer] Regarding the question of where the aircraft will be stationed, the armed forces have very little latitude. We can be more flexible in conducting exercises and in terms of what measures can be taken with regard to them. If I were to say that Zeltweg will be closed down, it would have far-reaching consequences for the region. But I don't want to think about that.

[Question] Aren't you beginning to get a little worried? In the Reder case you initiated a huge discussion on dealing with the past and on fascism--now we are in the midst of a huge debate over national defense because of these interceptors.

[Answer] Let's leave Reder out of this. What have I instigated?

[Question] A debate over national defense itself.

[Answer] It may be that certain emotions have been aroused and that the purposes of national defense are being debated. I would even say that that is important.

[Question] Are the interceptors really important for national defense?

[Answer] That is the central question. Yes they are important.

[Question] The past twelve years, in which there have been over 300 airspace violations, have proved that national defense can also be conducted without interceptors.

[Answer] From that point of view we would have needed no armed forces since 1955. What is true on the ground must also be true in the air.

[Question] Were there cases in the past where the necessity of interceptors . . .

[Answer] . . . I think your question is wrong. I ask you: Can you think of a situation after 1955 in which, from that point of view, we have needed the armed forces?

[Question] The Hungarian crisis, 1956. The Czechoslovakian crisis, 1968.

[Answer] In both cases it would have been important to have air surveillance, particularly in the latter case.

[Question] At that time the Russians flew into the country.

[Answer] They fly in all the time. But at that time it was a crisis situation. Two things need to be differentiated. The first is whether we even need the aircraft. The second is long-term planning. The reason I have been so consistently "aggressive" and "bull-headed," as they say, is that if we do not get a successor to the Saab 105 as a surveillance aircraft, then Austria in the foreseeable future will not be able to conduct air surveillance. This is, then, a decision which can hardly be reversed. The basic question is not, Draken yes or no, F5 yes or no, but rather do we continue or do we stop. If we stop, we will be the only nation in Europe without air surveillance. This is a national security risk on a huge scale.

[Question] How about a national referendum?

[Answer] This is not a point-by-point decision but one for 10 or 15 years. Once the flight personnel have dispersed, once the infrastructure is gone, once construction encroaches more and more on the airfields, once the mayors have placed their hospitals on the airstrips themselves, then we will require years and years before we will again be where we are now. That is in fact the dramatic point. I say that a nation which sends out signals to the rest of the world of its indifference regarding the dominion of its airspace, signals that it is relinquishing sovereignty and freedom.

[Question] But nothing has happened within the past 30 years.

[Answer] Thank God. But who is to say that something cannot happen? That we will not be exposed to political pressures? Who is to say then that there

will not be a crisis situation which will extend to Austrian airspace? Who is to say that Austria will not be exposed to blackmail with regard to its airspace? That our airspace will not be intentionally violated?

[Question] Let us pursue the crisis situation. Austria's airspace is being violated in order to provoke us. Our interceptors take to the air and approach these other aircraft. What can we effectively do against the intruders?

[Answer] There are very specific international regulations. We must be in a position to identify who is violating our airspace. We must be in a position to engage him, to force him to leave, to force him to land or, in an extreme case, to defend ourselves. This also means opening fire.

[Question] Who gives the order to fire?

[Answer] That is determined by regulations laid down for this purpose in the constitution.

[Question] You then.

[Answer] Among others.

[Question] Would not such an order to fire really serve to create the crisis if we shoot someone down?

[Answer] Those are hypothetical assumptions. We will not shoot planes down or carry on the way some of our neighbors do with every little private airplane. In a crisis situation we must be in such a position that our neighbors can count on the fact that Austrian airspace will not be misused to their disadvantage. In a defensive situation we can only manage to withstand a low-level threat, but in a crisis situation we must come up to certain level in order to prevent our airspace being knowingly and intentionally violated.

[Question] Are we, with our 24 Draken, even capable of such emergency maneuvers? The Land governor of Tirol said recently that when foreign aircraft fly from Germany to Italy they are already out of our airspace before our planes can even take off.

[Answer] Naturally, there are unbelievably many experts on the subject. Of course it is true today that when a plane flies over Tirol at the speed of sound there is nothing we can do right then--in this particular case. But this is not the kind of situation we need to be prepared for, even though we are naturally aware of it. For this kind of situation there is "Goldhaube."

[Question] And "Goldhaube" without interceptors is pointless.

[Answer] Of course. That is how it was planned. These are not just things that occurred to me in the middle of a sleepless night. In a crisis situation we are of course also in a position to do something in Tirol. In a crisis situation we would move aircraft to Tirol as happened in 1958 when the Americans flew over our country. Even at that time we were making a gesture. Or we would fly patrols.

[Question] The whole thing is therefore primarily of symbolic value.

[Answer] No. A policeman on patrol does not have just symbolic value. He naturally has a deterrent effect. The whole interceptor question is more a political than a military question. It is a matter of whether Austria will stand by with no show of will or objection and watch what happens in her airspace.

[Question] The Swiss have moved some of their training flights to Sardinia. Where can Austria go for supersonic flights?

[Answer] I will also try to arrange as much flight training as possible abroad, but not in Sardinia.

[Question] In Sweden? Weapons exercises, as well?

[Answer] I would not like to comment on that right now.

[Question] We hear over and over that aircraft without missiles are pointless, that our pilots would be at risk if they were only able to fire their onboard guns.

[Answer] The missile or guided weapon is an instrument which can only be used to shoot the enemy down. For surveillance activities the onboard gun is definitely more essential. In the case of self defense the guided weapon is naturally important. For all other situations, for the required maneuverability, for identifying and driving away intruders, etc., the onboard gun is much more important.

[Question] Of course, the other party can return fire.

[Answer] During air combat the guided weapon would of course be more important.

[Question] Back down on political ground: How will you induce the Land leadership and mayors to go along with you?

[Answer] At the moment the debate is very heated. There is an excess of emotionalism in it. I assume that after all of the controversy and after my own sometimes ardent statements, we will still be able to find some common ground of objectivity. We will minimize the environmental impact. But I cannot remove the fliers.

[Question] Why can you not accept the suggestion to postpone the decision once more and first solve all of Austria's internal problems?

[Answer] A call for bids is in progress right now. The bidders must hold to their prices and their bids until 21 May. If the decision is not made, the call for bids must be reinitiated. It could then take another three, four or five years.

[Question] Demonstrations are being planned for Zeltweg and the surrounding area. How would you react to the possible occupation of the airfield?

[Answer] To me that is a question for the whole country.

[Question] Does that mean take action?

[Answer] The airfield is no bucolic scene. I do not think it will come to that.

[Question] Since the call for bids began, there have been rumors of corruption and party financing. Can you exclude all these possibilities?

[Answer] Yes. You cannot defend yourself against rumors. I only know what I have negotiated, what I have said and what I have done. I would walk over hot coals in my own defense. My conscience is clear.

12552

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MILITARY

DENMARK

SDP MILITARY SPOKESMAN DENIES PLANS TO CUT STANDING FORCES

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 6 May 85 p 5

[Article by Erik Matzen]

[Text] Social Democratic defense spokesman Knud Damgaard denied assertions by defense chief Gen O. K. Lind, which appeared in AKTUELT recently, that the politicians involved in the defense agreement based their agreement on a draft drawn up by officers at the Defense Command. According to this draft, about 2,300 enlisted privates in the army would be replaced by about 1,400 draftees.

Knud Damgaard said:

"According to Lind, the politicians in the 11-man committee received the draft as early as April 1984. In that case, it must have been an old draft. In any case, it could not be based on the agreement reached on 29 June for the simple reason that negotiations on the structure and content of the armed forces were not conducted until the period from 1 May to mid-June."

"I know Lind as an extremely commendable and able officer. He is also one of the most honest men in the Danish military. For this reason, I believe he will be willing to admit that this argument does not hold water in this context."

"Does Lind really believe we will be able to maintain the army's preparedness if these 2,300 men are eliminated from our standing forces? In any case, this is contrary to the opinion of a number of officers, namely that the initial threat to Denmark will be from helicopters and the threat of the air-landing of troops. If we wait until then to mobilize, we will be in a situation in which volunteers of the Home Guard have no one to whom to report until 24 hours later. Does Lind believe that this is a reasonable level of preparedness for the army? The leader of the American reinforcements has said that Denmark is making a serious mistake by counting too much on reserves and too little on preparedness. The agreement states clearly that the standing forces of the army must be strengthened. For this reason, we are against the solution outlined in the draft, which has caused so much concern among employees of the military."

This will be a hot topic on Wednesday when the 11-man committee meets in parliament.

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MANNESMANN CHIEF ON CEMA TRADE, SDI, COMPETITIVENESS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 May 85 pp 72-82

[Interview with Franz Josef Weisweiler, CEO of Mannesmann AG, Duesseldorf, conducted by SPIEGEL editors Rudolf Wallraf and Richard Rickelmann, date and place not given: "In Microelectronics, we are tops"]

[Text] Franz Josef Weisweiler has been CEO of Duesseldorf's Mannesmann group since July 1983, succeeding Egon Overbeck. Son of a physician in the Ruhr area town of Gladbeck, he studied mining and iron works engineering. In 1955 he started with Mannesmann as a junior executive; in 1972 he became part of management. Weisweiler, 56, proved his renowned talent for negotiating for many years in wage negotiations as chairman of the employers' association

[Question] Dr Weisweiler, in the pokergame over the takeover of the Dornier Aircraft Company, Mannesmann came out second best after Daimler-Benz. Is that a personal defeat for you?

[Answer] Land boss Lothar Spaeth wanted nothing but a purely Baden-Wuerttemberg solution. He pulled out all the stops to make his dream merger come true. Our corporate headquarters is in Duesseldorf, which is why we had only a long-shot chance in Baden-Wuerttemberg.

[Question] Why did you get into the bidding anyway?

[Answer] I can't withdraw from a football game just because I know that the referee is pulling for the other side.

[Question] Spaeth has a different version. He says that he had been dropping hints about Dornier to Mannesmann one year ago.

[Answer] I know nothing about such hints. One year ago we started talks with Dornier about technological cooperation. But we found out only 2 months ago that Dornier wanted to divest itself of some of its parts. So of course, we entered the bidding.

[Question] What was it that interested the Mannesmann pipeline and machine tool construction enterprise in such an extraneous type of business?

[Answer] To remain oriented toward the future, Mannesmann has considerably broadened its activities in the areas of new technologies. Electronics, controls and systems technology already account for one-fourth of our sales. We took a close look at Dornier and found that it works in broad areas which are complementary to ours.

[Question] Such as?

[Answer] Dornier has a great development potential for software and is a leader in logistics. Mannesmann subsidiaries such as Kienzle, Demag-Systemtechnik and Hartmann & Braun would have been compatible with this. Since Dornier has as a greater R&D potential than it can market, while Mannesmann has wide experience in facilities construction and world trade, it would have been an ideal partnership. At least in Europe we would have gained a terrific position in space and satellite technology. This is Dornier's long suit, and our subsidiary ANT Nachrichtentechnik is a leader in communications technology. In looking at Dornier's activities individually, one finds that about 80 percent of them bear a close relationship with Mannesmann interests.

[Question] Does that mean that Daimler-Benz is the wrong partner for Dornier? And that Swabian vested interests are obstructing a logical merger in German industry?

[Answer] I wouldn't say that Daimler-Benz's entry into Dornier is not a logical merger. But in my opinion Dornier would have been better off with Mannesmann.

[Question] Mannesmann wants to be a technology enterprise. Having lost out with Dornier, does that mean that you have missed the boat?

[Answer] No. We have a clear picture of what our firm will look like in the future. We can implement this objective by internal growth and external additions, by buying other firms. Reorganization plans of a conglomerate are made with a long-term view and do not depend on the purchase of a single firm.

[Question] In diversifying its technology, Mannesmann took the path of least resistance: you have simply bought other firms. You are not the only one. Daimler-Benz recently took over the MTU turbine manufacturing works: Siemens has for many years joined up with futuristic enterprises in the United States. Are German firms suffering from last-minute panic and seek to join the international competition through mergers, because they did not make internal arrangements early enough?

[Answer] We are not panicking, nor surely are others. As one of the great industrialized nations, the FRG must strive to have its product spectrum reflect what is in greatest demand. As to the breadth of this spectrum, German industry is the absolute leader. Mannesmann has always had the goal of being ahead of the pack in the technology of its products. That is why we were the first steel producer to enter machine tool and facilities construction, and thereafter into electrical products and electronics.

[Question] How good or how bad are German firms in the high-tech area?

[Answer] There is no unequivocal definition for high-tech. But taking a broad view of the subject, the FRG has a very good position in it. In the use of microelectronics for instance we are tops. In electronic machinery controls, where Mannesmann has made its own innovations, we do not take a backseat either in systems or in development. But I will admit that there are areas where we came in very late.

[Question] Such as?

[Answer] In the development of microelectronics, communications technology and data processing. This includes the related secondary areas such as machines for manufacturing microelectronic components and the instrumentation to manufacture chips.

[Question] The German managers missed out on development. Is the reason for this, as former Chancellor Schmidt sees it, that they are not as good as their colleagues in the United States and Japan?

[Answer] If we weren't as good, then German industry would not constantly achieve trade surpluses. Despite the fact that we are more expensive than others. There is so much demand for our products that they are easily sold on the world markets despite their high prices and partially in the face of government-supported competitors. Do you call that a sign of bad management?

[Question] Then how does it happen that we are lagging behind in some high-tech areas?

[Answer] In the development of new technologies we are up against competitors who are simply in a better position than we are. American industry profits from the enormous defense technology and its research results. Our Japanese competitors benefit from the fact that their government supports specific industrial research programs. You might say that their economy is government-controlled. In addition, Japanese and U.S. domestic markets are many times the size of the German market. Anyone launching a new product in such large domestic markets has fewer problems than one who must immediately prove himself on international markets.

[Question] What is the FRG Government doing wrong? Should more funds go into defense here too, should the economy be more tightly controlled? With an arms buildup like in the United States and a controlled economy like in Japan, do you think German industry might be in better shape?

[Question] I have described the situation of the others without evaluating them. We don't want to abandon our system simply for the sake of making a better showing in one or two particular areas. We don't want any more defense industry and we don't want any control mechanisms; we can't get a larger domestic market either. We have to come up with another solution. But this is primarily a task for this country's industrial policy.

[Question] What do you suggest? Do like Spaeth and Strauss in their Laender?

[Answer] What we need is better coordination of research programs. No industrial policy can be successful if it is managed differently in every Bonn ministry and in every federal land. There must be a common effort by all concerned. The framework conditions of industrial policy must be promulgated by the economic, research and defense ministries in Bonn, the postal service and the transport ministry, in cooperation with the Laender.

[Question] "Framework conditions--" the word is being used to death. It sounds as though industry is once again trying to obtain tax exemptions or government support funds for poorly performing areas.

[Answer] Nothing of the kind. What it amounts to is that the Federal Government must make better use of the control elements at its disposal for bringing about organizational changes.

[Question] You are talking in abstracts.

[Answer] It is about time that the politicians pay specific attention to the R&D area and thus assist in restructuring the economy. Structural change can be visualized as a block of ice which is starting to melt at the bottom. The melting parts would be the obsolescent structures. Care must be taken that something new is then added at the top. However, the melting process must not be interfered with, as is so often the case here.

[Question] Where does this happen?

[Answer] Look at the European steel industry. Billions of the taxpayers' money are spent to preserve obsolete structures. The worst part of this is that other areas become sick as a result.

[Question] Could you explain?

[Answer] It is happening to us at Mannesmann just now. The regulated steel industry branches into unrestricted pipe production, even using subsidized raw materials. Two years ago a new pipe factory was built in the Saarland with the help of government subsidies. We needed this like a hole in the head. Worldwide there is a 50 percent excess capacity for large pipe. As a result we had to fire almost exactly the same number of employees as new jobs were created there. This is a good illustration of that kind of stupidity.

[Question] Too little has melted off your structural ice block. Is too little being added on top?

[Answer] Things are beginning to change, thank God. Research and Technology Minister Riesenhuber is now supporting fewer applied, but more basic research programs. The advantage of this is that it does not support one single specific project of an enterprise, but rather a broad-based development. This also avoids undue competitive excesses.

[Question] This should then do away with cases such as Siemens. This pet supplier of the railroads and the post office has during the last few decades been practically inundated with cash from Bonn's research budgets.

[Answer] I won't talk about other enterprises. But if we were to coordinate better our government-supported research with actual governmental requirements potentials in transports, postal services or defense, the Federal Government would be in a position to at least partially compensate for the shortcomings due to the small domestic market. In any case, subsidized development is actually being turned into products in this manner.

[Question] Hasn't Mannesmann had a generous share of Bonn contracts?

[Answer] That is not Mannesmann's problem. It is a problem of German industry as a whole, to bid on government high-tech projects on behalf of its own products. Many countries have standards and norms for this. The Americans especially frequently have a certain preference. German firms have to go to a lot of trouble to get a contract from one consortium or another.

[Question] What kind of projects are these--preponderantly defense contracts? Are you thinking about the Siemens-developed friend-enemy aircraft identification system which is better than the U.S. system but was turned down by NATO nevertheless?

[Answer] There are other examples. It is, for instance, very difficult to sell German hydraulics to civil aviation.

[Question] The FRG Government is forever proclaiming its strong desire that German enterprises be represented in international projects also. This is said to be the case for the U.S. space missile defense system as well. The Chancellor wants to get in on SDI so that the Germans don't miss the technology boat.

[Answer] This is the wrong thought process. Participating in a project which will become reality in any case, and looking for research objectives for the purpose of advancing technology are two entirely different things. The decision for a defense-strategic, i.e., political, program like SDI cannot be made on the basis that it will result in technological advances for civilian applications for us. It makes no more sense for me to promote space travel because I've invented the Teflon frying pan.

[Question] What benefit would there be for Germans to participate in the SDI program?

[Answer] To my way of thinking, SDI has no importance for German industry. If a political decision is made in favor of SDI, then the FRG too must benefit from civilian applications of the results. Any such participation should be made only with the proviso that we are not merely participating as subcontractors. It must not become a technological one-way street.

[Question] What kind of civilian benefits do you see coming out of SDI?

[Answer] I don't believe anyone could give you an answer to this question today. No one can predict what all could come out of such programs. Which is why I don't believe that such a program can be justified on the basis of eventual civilian benefits.

[Question] Would Mannesmann participate in the SDI program if it considers it good policy?

[Answer] Knowing too little about SDI, I cannot say whether or not our products would be appropriate.

[Question] If you could have gotten hold of Dornier, you would certainly have been in on it. Was that why you wanted to buy the aircraft factory?

[Answer] No, certainly not. It would be the height of irresponsibility to try to take over an enterprise with that in mind. Incidentally, more than 50 percent of Dornier's sales are in non-aircraft related areas. And that was the part which interested us the most.

[Question] In contrast to several of your colleagues in other technology firms you are specifically trying to distance yourself from SDI. Would that have anything to do with your trade with the East? Mannesmann is one of the big East traders, and the Soviets would probably take a dim view of your participating in U.S. defense matters.

[Answer] First, let me talk about your statement of our being a "big East trader." On the average, about one-fifth of our exports go to the European CEMA countries--8 percent of our total sales.

[Question] You are too modest. You are selling more than DM 1 billion to the East. To hang on to that, don't you have to be politically sensitive?

[Answer] Mannesmann is among those who get into political controversies now and then, as we did in the gas pipeline deal. But in our business dealings with other countries we cannot consider their preferences as to governmental systems, ideologies and religion. People who talk and trade with each other do not escalate political tensions; they reduce them.

[Question] According to a study by the FRG Ministry for Research & Technology, a number of enterprises complain about restrictions imposed by the United States concerning technology transfer. The U.S. administration worries that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, would immediately pass it all on to the East.

[Answer] Mannesmann has no complaints there. We have always been able to buy high-tech products from the Americans. I do, however, know about such complaints from other enterprises. If this should get worse, it would spell the end of free international trade. I cannot see the objective of doing this. Is Europe to shrivel up technologically, or is the purpose to prevent transfer to the CEMA countries? If it is the latter, I must say that I consider it naive to think that the Soviets could be deprived of advanced technologies through stricter embargoes.

[Question] At this very moment the Americans want to tighten up the so-called CEMA List, with the result that still less high-tech could be exported to the East. Can you see a loss of business in this for Mannesmann and the German East traders?

[Answer] Negligible. We in the West are forever underestimating the East bloc's high-tech capabilities. The Russians develop a lot of things; others they obtain despite CEMA. Technically they have progressed to the point that in giving us a contract they insist that we do not include components which could not be delivered due to a U.S. embargo. When in doubt, they contribute these components themselves.

[Question] In other words, business as usual. You make your sales, even if they benefit the Soviet arms buildup.

[Answer] Why this hidden reproach? If trade with the East is to be viewed as narrowly as is done by many a U.S. politician, the Americans would have to stop their wheat sales too. Let us not fool ourselves: any truck that is exported could easily be put to use by the army. Machines designed to produce lipstick tubes can stamp out cartridge cases just as easily. All past experience points to the fact that embargoes cannot be enforced.

[Question] You are referring to Reagan's boycott in the gas pipeline deal?

[Answer] He shot himself in the foot with this. It is true that because of the embargo, U.S. firms were unable to deliver certain items. So the Soviets went elsewhere to buy them--Japan, as far as I know. The pipeline was completed on time anyway.

[Question] Wouldn't you have to worry that because of SDI and possible German participation Moscow would drastically reduce its orders?

[Answer] I cannot imagine that the Russians would let themselves be influenced by that. At the moment we are negotiating with the USSR about delivery of a complete pipe factory. The Russians have already told us that under their next 5-year plan they will build several transmission lines also.

[Question] If you sell complete pipe factories to the Soviets, aren't you cutting down your own future sales to Moscow?

[Answer] We do not have to worry about that. The USSR has an enormous need for pipe. And despite increased competition, particularly with the Japanese, our business relations with the East have remained smooth over the last few decades. The West, in contrast, has gradually reduced its demand for pipe.

[Question] What is the reason for this? The declining oil business?

[Answer] Yes, but only partially. But there are atmospheric disturbances also. We had envisioned once to split our major pipe exports evenly between East and West. Apart from the North Sea, we were of course thinking also of Alaska and Canada. But the Americans kept changing the specifications for their trans-continental oil lines until their own manufacturers could enter the bidding also. If the pipelines had been left in their optimum configuration, only the Japanese or Mannesmann would have had a chance.

[Question] What does that mean to Mannesmann?


[Answer] If the orders from the West continue to be so meager, we will have to adapt our capacities.

[Question] Do you have plans for laying off workers?

[Answer] No, but as far as pipe manufacture goes in the future, all I can say is: it depends. In the other two-thirds of our organization we are even hiring additional people just now.

[Question] Thank you for the interview, Herr Weisweiler.

Figure 1: Weisweiler's Empire



Key:

Weisweiler's Empire

1. Mannesmann Subsidiaries; Sales (in billion DM) and Products, 1984
2. Pipe Manufacturing Group: Sales: 3.0 (steel production, pipe)
3. Brazil Group: Sales: 1.1 (iron mining, steel production, compressors, transmissions, construction and plastics machinery)
4. Trade Group: Sales: 3.7 (trade in pipe, rolled steel, coal, coke)
5. Facilities Construction Group: Sales: 1.7 (pipe transmission lines, pipelines, chemical technology)
6. Rexroth Group: Sales: 1.3 (electric motors, electronic control technology, hydraulics, transmission technology)
7. Hartmann & Braun Group: Sales: 0.7 (process, measuring and controls technology)
8. Demag Group: Sales: 3.1 (mining technology, compressors, conveyor systems, construction machinery, plastics technology)
9. Kienzle Group: Sales: 1.2 (tally-periphery instruments, data systems)
10. Sales (in billion DM)
11. Earnings (in million DM)
12. Employees

9273

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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

INSTITUTE PREDICTS LOWER FOREIGN TRADE TO CUT INVESTMENTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 May 85 p 33

[Article: "ETLA Economic Forecast: Investments Will Increase Only Four Percent"]

[Text] The Economic Research Institute (ETLA) predicts that investments will increase 4 percent this year and 2.5 percent in 1986.

The estimate for this year is lower than the institute's last economic forecast and more pessimistic than the corresponding figures of several other national economy prophets (see accompanying table).

ETLA assumes that the evolution of our foreign and domestic trade situations will follow a downward trend, which will reduce interest in making investments. On the other hand, interest rates will probably continue to drop, which will in turn to some extent produce an effect in the opposite direction.

The fact that the overall structure of firms' investments is constantly changing also explains the insignificant growth in fixed investments.

Firms are investing their funds in the purchase of other companies. Moreover, nonsubstantive investments in, among others, research and product development have sharply increased.

According to ETLA, company purchases from foreign countries and investments in research and development accounted for about a third of private sector investments last year in industrial firms.

GNP Will Grow 3.5 Percent in 1985

ETLA predicts that the GNP will grow 3.5 percent this year and 2.5 percent next year.

Industrial production will increase faster than production on the average. There will be big differences among the business sectors: According to ETLA, the metal industry, which is gaining momentum from a revival in exports to the East, among other things, will do best.

Exports to the West will increase 1,5 percent this year and 2,5 percent next year. The growth figures for exports to the East are 14,5 and 7,5 percent.

Private sector consumption will increase 3 percent this year. ETLA predicts an increase of 2,5 percent for next year.

Consumer purchasing power will rise 2,5 percent in both years.

Imports will increase 5,5 percent in 1985. The trade balance will be a slightly deficit one, but will continue to be exceptionally favorable in view of the economic situation.

ETLA estimates that there will be a trade balance deficit of 400 million this year. It is assumed that trade will be in balance next year.

ETLA believes that the daily credit interest rate will drop to an average 13 percent this year and to 11,5 percent next year. By the end of the year the daily credit interest rate is expected to drop from the current 13,8 percent to less than 12 percent.

Our ability to compete in terms of price will decline: Finland's rate of inflation will hold at 6 percent this year and at 5 in 1986, while the inflation rate in our biggest competitor countries is lower.

Industry's ability to compete in price declined 5 percent in 1984. The forecast for this year is just under 2 percent.

The number of employed increases with growth. Since the labor force is increasing at the same time, the unemployment rate will remain at 6 percent in 1985 and rise to 6,3 percent in 1986.

There will be an average of 155,000 unemployed this year and 164,000 next year.

Economic Forecasts for This Year
(growth percentages)

<u>Category</u>	<u>ETLA</u>	<u>VM</u>	<u>KOP</u>	<u>SYP</u>	<u>TMT</u>	<u>PTT*</u>
GNP	3.5	3.5	4	4	4	2.5
Imports	5.5	4	6	6	8	4
Consumption	3	3	3	3	3	2.5
Investments	4	4.5	7	5	6	2
Exports	4	4.5	5	5	5.5	3.5
Inflation	6	5.5	-	6	6	6
Unemployment rate	6	-	5.7	5.5	5.4	6.1

* VM = Finance Ministry, KOP = National Joint-Stock Bank, SYP = Finnish Union Bank, TMT = Workers Economic Research Institute, PTT = Pellervo Economic Research Institute.

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CSO: 3617/114

ECONOMIC

ITALY

STUDY ON EMPLOYMENT IN NEXT DECADE

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 15 Mar 85 pp 10-11

[Article by Anna Avitabile and Patrizia Ferrante: "The Discouraged Worker"]

[Text] Two reports, the Bank of Italy's and a still unpublished CESPE [Center for Studies in Economic Policy] report, focus on the job situation in the next 10 years. We talked with Aris Accornero about the behavior of people looking for work.

One thing is certain: the next 10 years will be especially hard for job-seekers in Italy. This prediction is based on a series of quantitative analyses, the latest of which is a study by the Bank of Italy research department. This study shows that between 90,000 and 150,000 people a year will be added to the labor market between now and 1993, alongside the 2.3 million that were looking for work in 1983. The two factors that determine labor supply are demographic trends and business activity. However, demographics are easier to estimate because relatively few variables influence them (fertility, mortality, migrations); business activity is harder to extrapolate. The option of joining the job market depends on numerous economic variables (growth rate, labor demand, productivity, kinds of government spending, etc.) in addition to socio-cultural variables.

Bankitalia research foresees an extremely restricted general population dynamic, one that contains an aging process due to the growth of working-age groups balanced by a drop in the number of young people under age 24. If employment rates remain constant at 1983 levels, if only because of this demographic factor, the additional labor supply will increase noticeably until the end of the decade (700,000 men and 200,000 women), but this is the most optimistic projection. If, on the contrary, the projection is based on the last 7 years' employment rates, which have shown rapid growth, especially for women, a much higher increase in the labor supply can be extrapolated (more than 1.5 million), one that is due almost exclusively to the increase in women workers. A third hypothesis, which researchers deem more realistic, predicts that more than 1.1 million people, two-thirds of them women, will be looking for work by the end of the decade.

How can all these people be absorbed into the market? The average age of people on the labor market is going to rise as a result of both the aging of the population and the difficulty of accommodating young people. Just to avoid making unemployment worse, the Italian economy would have to grow at an average rate of 2.4 to 2.8 percent a year. The researchers warn that the scope of these projections do not make it possible to predict the future so much as to evaluate the probable consequences of labor-market trends in the absence of corrective action. In this case, then, the objective of full employment appears to be quite unrealistic (it would require creating 300,000-400,000 jobs a year; no more than 130,000 jobs a year were created in the 1970's). However, it remains imperative to create additional jobs for the new groups that will be moving into the labor market.

Employment Also Depends on Indirect Factors

There are those who question the usefulness of this kind of approach to examining the employment problem. "Forecasts beyond 1 or 2 years are unreliable when the subject under consideration is rapidly and continuously changing," says economist Sergio Bruno, dean of the University of Rome, "because the projections are all based on past trends and can therefore not be depended upon to continue. The question then becomes: What to do? It must be said that no single remedy exists. The real problem is to create conditions favoring the greatest possible use of the labor force. It must be kept in mind especially that employment also depends on indirect factors." The most common case, as cited by Bruno, is that of conditions that make possible a more expansive monetary policy, such as a less stringent limit on the balance of payments: deficits might be an indirect way of increasing employment by making greater financial resources available as an incentive to agricultural production.

This type of analysis is also limited by considering labor supply in the aggregate, especially because it would seem to suggest a policy of intervention that would be valid in every situation. That can be seen to be mistaken, especially when it is realized that the labor market in Italy is much more heavily influenced by regional differences than those in other European countries are. A still-unpublished CESPE study coordinated by Aris Accornero analyzes the characteristics and behavior of labor supply by means of an innovative reading of data from ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute] (the questionnaires for "Studies on the Labor Force" used on a field of 25,000 families). The main thing that comes out of them is the close correlation between the labor environment (the level of employment and unemployment in the region) and the way in which people look for work. "Where there is more demand and less unemployment, people look for work more actively, more frequently, in greater numbers, and over a shorter period of time (provided they finally find work), and fewer of them sign up at the employment office. The opposite happens when there is little work and a

lot of unemployment" Accornero explains. "This may be the first empirical demonstration of the 'discouraged worker theory,' which is based not only on deduction but also on the behavior and statements of the people affected."

The ISTAT questionnaire also reports that different methods are used by people looking for work. Where market conditions are more favorable, people search more actively and show up at the place of employment itself; they make more use of classified ads and inside information and depend less on bureaucratic means such as written applications.

A second conclusion emerging from the study involves the various behaviors of the people who make up the labor market. Unskilled workers make rather less of an attempt to find work than others do, because they have either less hope of finding jobs or less need to do so or both. The unemployed look for work more frequently, while those looking for a first job do so less insistently but over a longer period of time because they have more difficulty in finding one. In the South, the difference in behavior between the unemployed and those seeking a first job is even more evident, because young people must wait three times as long to get a first job.

In conclusion, which is worse and who is worst off? We know that young people in the South are worst off. The study belies many a commonplace, such as the one that tends to attribute a higher unemployment rate to high school or college graduates. Diplomas are distributed over a broad range of groups, but people are still more likely to be unemployed if they have only an elementary or intermediate school education. If this data is correlated with that of age, the rate of unemployment rises, but what is decisive in this case is age and not the level of education.

The study analyses the phases of labor supply and reconstructs an unemployment index by occupation, measuring the extent and seriousness of the situation. The usefulness of the indicators is clear. A policy that is intended to create new jobs in a group of a few thousand people among whom unemployment is very high (e.g. women with a high school education or college graduates in a depressed area of the South) cannot be conducted in the same way as another policy directed at a labor supply group that is very large but in which the unemployment rate is markedly below the national average (such as middle-aged men living in developed areas of the country). What are the coordinates, then, that should orient public policy? "I don't mean that policy should be based on labor supply groups," answers Accornero, "but rather that in such a diverse situation an undifferentiated policy might expend resources upon areas of least social need."

There are two other elements to consider when labor applies for work. They are not directly related to the study but they can be deduced from it. The "discouragement" effect says that where there is no work not only do people tend not to look for it but they also tend to withdraw from the labor pool. The real "discouraged worker" is the one who is not counted as part of the labor force. The unemployment rate, which already varies by region, would be even more varied if this datum were taken into account. What would happen if labor demand showed signs of recovering?

In the second place, it must be remembered that relative to other European countries Italy presents a range of situations in labor supply (rate of employment and unemployment) that is diversified by more than differences in income distribution. In other words, the distribution of income on a regional basis is not as unequal as the variations in the labor market would imply. One possible explanation is the role of government spending as a social shock-absorber and as income support.

What is its effect on labor supply? "It is plausible to suppose," suggests Accornero, "that the 'discouragement effect' amounts to a 'disincentive,' which, when variously analyzed, determines a further variable to be added to the study of the labor market." Thus interpreted, the data do not suggest a recipe for public policy but rather make the whole subject more complicated.

Which Policies Contain Innovations

Accornero proposes two subjects for discussion. "The labor policies expressed by Gorla and De Michelis, although too general to be implemented, contain some innovations. The first is that among so many policies that might be tried to reduce unemployment (work schedules, placement, starting pay, on the job training), it focuses on the need to create new businesses rather than on increasing employment in existing businesses, which often destroy jobs as well as creating them.

"In the second place, Gorla's proposal provides for an exchange between wages and hours and is thus unacceptable, but it does consider additional employment as the sole objective parameter for evaluating new initiatives. This may become not only a governing principle but also an operating criterion for justifying once and for all any kind of government incentive to production. I am thinking of small-scale initiatives promoted at the local level, even cooperatives," Accornero explains, "ones that are launched by promotion, support and coordination conducted by government bureaus or agencies: the economic profitability may seem to be very low, but the social benefit would certainly be very high."

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

COMPARATIVE STUDY ON CGIL UNION MEMBERSHIP FOR 1980, 1985

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 22 Mar 85 pp 15-16

[Article by Enzo Cermigna: "Membership: How We Have Changed"]

[Text] A comparison between the data of 1980, on the eve of the 10th congress, and that of 1984, on the eve of the 11th.

The comparison of union membership in 1980, on the basis of which the 10th congress was held, with that of 1984, which will provide the basis for the 11th, requires consideration of two questions: (1) How and how much has the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] changed its representation relative to the Italian work force? (2) How and how much has representation changed within the organization?

The first question involves the CGIL's impact on society; the second, the specific effect that individual regional structures and categories have on the organization as a whole.

We had already made a precise and thorough analysis in Rimini in December 1983. The 1984 data confirm its general outline. Between 1980 and 1984 the CGIL's level of membership relative to employed workers decreased from about 24 to 21 percent. It was a sharp, steep drop. As the labor force shrinks, the CGIL's membership lags and the rate of union membership goes down.

It is obvious that this fact is not uniform either by industry or by region. But a more thorough study does not contain elements that might mitigate the judgment: the rate of union membership between 1980 and 1984 is holding steady in agriculture, dropping sharply in industry (down 2.5 percent), registering some progress in the transportation and communications sectors, and is having trouble in public administration, schools and research. But the serious decline is taking place in commerce and banking, despite the growth in employment.

An Organization Rooted in Regions

There is, therefore, a weakening of our overall representation and a sense of crisis, but we are also not succeeding in following the positive trend of employment where it is occurring: in business, banking and government service. In this context, the results of Federbraccianti have been exceptional; despite very difficult conditions it has been holding firm and consolidating its already exceptional 50.5 percent organization rate.

This means that practice has shown that the proposals drawn up and renewed at Rimini to meet the crisis are appropriate: a highly decentralized organization that is rooted in the regions; renewed democracy within the organization and in the role, functions and rights of the union member; an assembly of members constituted in all jobs, and nomination of delegates by the membership.

The other question --What and how much has changed within the CGIL in the last 4 years-- is extremely interesting, but it is also a very delicate one, because these changes may be reflected in the makeup of the congress.

It is much too easy to show that the sharp drop (-15 percent) in so-called "active" membership has been complemented by a much sharper upswing in retirees (+35 percent).

Of equal importance is the advance of the South relative to the Center-South; together with the upsurge in the industrial sector (+23 percent) and the advance in the tertiary sector (specifically government service (+5 percent), communications (+9 percent) and the steady state of banking, commerce and schools) these gains show that there is a crisis in traditional "industrial hegemony."

Finally, an important trend should be mentioned, one that has been affecting the large metropolitan areas for some time (Turin, Genoa, Milan, Rome, Naples, and Palermo), namely these areas' loss of influence within the organization.

This, then, is the "internal" and "external" situation, so to speak, that the CGIL faces as it goes into its next congress. It is a situation that has its problems, but the latest figures for 1984 show some signs of reversing the trend: a more militant work force and a desire for renewal are some of the reassuring signs. The congress should be an opportunity to consolidate a generalized, grassroots organizing policy that recognizes the need and seizes the chance to renew the trend to growth.

Comparison of CGIL membership on the eve of the 10th and 11th congresses
(by regions)

Regioni		Confronto iscritti Cgil alla vigilia del X e dell'XI Congresso (per Regioni)						Unemployed
Regioni	Regions	'84	Attivi	Employed workers	'84	Pensionati	Retirees	Disoccup.
			'80	diff.		'80	diff.	'84
Piemonte		198,974	250,360	- 51,386	75,416	47,715	+ 27,701	186
Valle d'Aosta		4,740	4,408	+ 332	1,650	1,150	+ 500	-
Liguria		112,848	130,201	- 17,353	56,380	40,720	+ 15,660	2
Lombardia		531,832	671,607	- 139,675	205,685	146,220	+ 59,465	1,084
Veneto		181,281	214,963	- 33,682	99,071	72,600	+ 26,471	-
Trentino		20,953	14,350	+ 6,603	4,850	3,500	+ 1,350	-
Alto Adige		12,994	23,500	- 10,506	5,600	4,700	+ 900	-
Friuli V. G.		58,869	65,127	- 6,258	31,685	23,850	+ 7,835	29
Emilia R.		412,609	485,084	- 72,475	341,206	288,778	+ 52,428	-
Nord	North	1,535,200	1,859,600	- 324,400	821,543	629,233	+ 192,310	1,301
Toscana		293,853	340,272	- 46,419	151,775	114,780	+ 36,995	309
Marche		66,687	71,267	- 4,680	66,607	55,290	+ 11,317	349
Umbria		53,140	54,281	- 1,141	31,035	23,200	+ 7,835	300
Lazio		243,522	268,573	- 25,051	44,216	32,200	+ 12,016	600
Centro	Center	657,102	734,393	- 77,291	293,633	225,712	+ 67,921	1,558
Abruzzo		45,973	47,327	- 1,354	27,900	21,400	+ 6,500	300
Molise		8,502	8,200	+ 302	6,700	4,700	+ 2,000	150
Campania		211,735	220,877	- 9,142	64,460	37,018	+ 27,432	300
Puglia		178,935	205,464	- 26,529	70,050	44,000	+ 26,050	1,033
Basilicata		33,287	30,239	+ 3,048	14,000	11,500	+ 2,500	356
Calabria		102,184	100,906	+ 1,278	31,599	18,450	+ 13,149	509
Sicilia		199,225	214,578	- 15,353	122,600	80,500	+ 42,100	2,557
Sardegna		70,280	73,863	- 3,583	42,743	31,000	+ 11,743	620
Sud	South	850,121	901,544	- 51,423	380,052	248,568	+ 131,484	5,825
Totale	totals	3,042,423	3,495,537	- 453,114	1,495,228	1,103,513	+ 391,715	8,684

Rassegna Sindacale / n. 12 - venerdì 22 marzo 1985

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Comparison of CGIL membership on the eve of the 10th and 11th congresses (December 1984, December 1980) by categories

* Fisac (formerly Filda-Fidac-Uspie) was formed in 1984, hence the data are not broken down.

[No expansions known]

Confronto iscritti Cgil alla Vigilia del X e del X e dell'XI Congresso (dicembre 1984 - dicembre 1980) per categorie				
Categorie	Categories	1980	1984	Differenza
<i>difference</i>				
<i>Industria</i>	<i>Industry</i>			
Filziat		108,628	98,466	— 10,162
Filcea		243,485	191,998	— 51,487
Fillea		472,047	415,922	— 56,125
Fiom		597,250	468,596	— 128,654
Filis		95,295	77,342	— 17,953
Filtea		269,198	202,939	— 66,259
Totale	Totals	1,785,903	1,455,263	— 330,640
<i>Agricoltura</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>			
Braccianti		553,193	440,616	— 112,577
<i>Trasporti</i>	<i>Transportation</i>			
Filt		249,950	227,516	— 22,434
<i>Commercio</i>	<i>Business</i>			
Filcams		183,865	180,538	— 3,327
<i>Credito*</i>	<i>Credit</i>			
Filda		14,211	—	
Uspie		4,522	—	
Fidac		45,667	—	
Totale	Totals	64,400	64,859	+ 459
<i>Servizi Pubblici</i>	<i>Public services</i>			
Fnlc		64,470	61,496	— 2,974
Fip		23,829	—	
Fidat	46,578	22,749	51,155	+ 4,577
Totale	Totals	111,048	112,651	+ 1,603
<i>Funzione Pubblica</i>	<i>Civil service</i>			
Ff.pp.		380,817	402,283	+ 21,466
<i>Scuola</i>	<i>Schools</i>			
Sns		137,974	137,395	— 579
<i>Altri settori</i>	<i>Other sectors</i>			
Sinagi		10,375	11,048	+ 673
Finlav		560	264	— 296
Snav		598	879	+ 281
Snr		4,633	4,058	— 575
Varie		12,221	5,053	— 7,168
Totale attivi	Total workers	3,495,537	3,042,423	— 453,114
<i>Pensionati</i>	<i>Retirees</i>			
		1,103,513	1,495,228	+ 391,715
Totale	Totals	4,599,050	4,537,651	— 61,399
<i>Disoccupati</i>	<i>Unemployed</i>			
		—	8,684	+ 8,684
Totale generale	Grand totals	4,599,050	4,546,335	— 52,715

* Dal 1984 è stata costituita la Fisac (ex Filda-Fidac-Uspie) pertanto il dato va considerato complessivamente.

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ALIAGA FREE ZONE BOUNDARIES BRINGS SPECULATION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 29 Apr 85 p 12

[Article by Turey Kose: "Share Snatching in Free Zone"]

[Text] Aliaga - Aliaga entered a process of change after the "free zone" was proclaimed, even though no "official" effort has been undertaken in this regard beyond publishing the boundaries in the RESMI GAZETE.

While the villagers living in the area are afraid that "their land will be expropriated," district administrators have begun thinking about how they will meet the growing needs. Land, housing and commercial building rentals went up in the district in the wake of becoming a "free zone" and real estate values doubled. While area natives and new-comers have been thinking about "how they could profit" from the free zone, politicians are hard at work to turn the free zone into "votes."

The villagers who were toting up the "profit" for the free zone were also thinking about whether it could do them any harm, wondering, "Will our land be expropriated?" Ali Yasemin, headman of Cakmakli Village, some of whose land falls within the announced area of the free zone, summed up the villagers' worries in this way:

"The free zone has been announced, but is not very clear what will happen to us. If we lose our lands to expropriation, the villagers are afraid that they will not get as much money as they should. If we sell our lands voluntarily, perhaps the villagers can line their pockets a little."

Ibrahim Utanc from Cakmakli, who said they had seen no money in earlier expropriations, added, "Other organizations have bought up land also. We did not get our money properly. Villagers already hit by expropriations are afraid land will be expropriated for the free zone."

Aliaga Mayor Irfan Onaran pointed out that free zones were something new for Turkey and there were many unknown aspects. As to the problems the free zone would create, in that only the boundaries were announced, he expressed these views: "Nothing has been done except to announce the boundaries. We do not expect work to begin until after September. Land speculators are lying in wait, wondering what's going to happen. We will do everything we can to permit no speculation."

Pointing out that the district's problems had started growing with no further impetus than the announcement of the free zone, Onaran said, "There are quite a few industrial establishments in the district. They caused a higher cost of living and higher rentals for homes and workplaces. Many barns were torn down or converted into housing when these facilities were built. Now there are no barns left that have not been put up for rent. Needs will increase with the free zone. Our population at present is 35,000. The problems that will come with added population will be insurmountable."

Cetin Cevat, Motherland Party district chairman, said, "We informed the people that this would be declared a free zone. There were some who doubted. We have kept our word."

Architect and contractor Erol Baydemir left Eskisehir and brought his family to the district 2 years ago as soon as rumors began circulating that Aliaga would be a free zone. He started a contracting business here. He joined the founding activities of the Motherland Party. Baydemir was disappointed at first, but is smiling now. He explains the move from Eskisehir this way: "I came here 2 years ago when the free zone rumors came out simply to invest. At first, I was disappointed; nothing happened for a long time. Now I own 40 shops. There were shops that I was going to sell for 15 million liras before the free zone boundaries were announced. Now I wouldn't let them go for less than 30 million. Everything suddenly increased in value. I'm happy."

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

'SPRING HIKES' TO REPAIR STRONG-DOLLAR DAMAGE TO BUDGET

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 May 85 pp 1, 13

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) - Prime Minister Turgut Ozal obtained extra funding for the budget, damaged by the high dollar, with two new price hikes. The price hike on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, so long denied by everyone from the Monopoly general director to the prime minister, took place yesterday at the rate of 30 percent. The other price hike on petroleum products, where there has been no increase for 73 days, was around 9 percent.

In the "spring hikes," the contribution to the budget by the Monopoly hike is measured as 100 billion liras, and support for the Public Housing Fund was specified at 40 billion liras. Liquid fuel prices, which were raised on the day that the IMF delegation, in Ankara for contacts, had pointed out that no agreement could be reached unless a way were demonstrated to close the budget deficit, mark the thirteenth price hike since the Ozal government took office. The last price hike on liquid fuels was on 13 February and on products controlled by the Monopoly General Directorate, on 25 September 1984.

Following the 10-percent hike on petroleum, the same rate of increase is expected on electricity. After that, the next question is reportedly hikes on cement, iron-steel, petro-chemical products and coal. The government does not have to adopt a separate decision for electricity following the liquid fuels price hike. A price hike on petroleum products carries over at the same percentage to electricity, under a decree in effect since 1978.

Prime Turgut Ozal, answering a reporter's question phrased as "It is said price hikes are coming in everything from needles to thread" as he left the general session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly last night, said, "No, not everything from needles to thread. You waited and waited and now you see. We raised prices only on Monopoly products and liquid fuels." Ozal said in answer to another question that there would be no price hike on tea and, in reference to the Monopoly hike, added jokingly, "You kept tickling its tummy until it got excited and made two price hikes in one day." Ozal contended that the hike on petroleum was normal and said, "We did not raise prices for a long time, but there is no other hike."

Monopoly Hike

Sales of monopoly products were halted by an early morning telegram sent to the organization yesterday. New prices were reviewed at meetings held at the Ministry of Finance and Customs. Minister Alptemocin confirmed the price hike report at around 1300 hours. He chose to call it a "price adjustment," however, instead of a price hike. The minister recalled that it had been almost 8 months since prices on monopoly products had been raised.

Smokers had to go all day without cigarettes because of the halted sales. News of the price hike was put in a news bulletin at 1900 hours. Alcoholic beverages went up 30 percent and filter cigarettes, 28 percent-30 percent. Imported cigarettes went up 11 percent. The price of short filter cigarettes was raised to 170 liras and long filters to 180 liras. "Buyuk Kent" raki will cost 1,400 liras, "Birinci" cigarettes 80 liras, and "Marlboros" 500 liras.

Monopoly General Director Yucel Ozden released the list of price increases approved by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and Finance and Customs Minister Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemocin to the press at around 1800 hours. He gave six [as published] reasons for the "price adjustment": "The Monopoly's price-stabilizing function, exchange-rate increases, higher transportation costs, black market prevention, efforts to improve quality, tobacco purchases and irregular tax payments."

In answer to a question, the monopoly general director said that the new price increase would allow the 40-billion lira contribution to the Public Housing Fund made in 1984 to rise to at least 80 billion and perhaps as much as 100 billion liras. Ozden said the organization now transfers 25 billion liras monthly to the Treasury, including 20 billion liras in surtaxes and around 4 billion in VAT. Thus Treasury tax revenues from the Monopoly will increase by 8 billion liras monthly and 100 billion annually.

The biggest price hike was on salt, a Monopoly item. Salt went up from 5 liras to 10 liras a kilogram. Imported German cigarettes "HB," "Lord," "Ernte 23," "Efes 100," and "Topkapi" cigarettes will cost 475 liras. Size 70 quality wine will go up to 250 liras, "Buzbag" and "Guzbag" to 300 liras, "Hosbag" to 350 liras and "Kopuklu" to 500 liras.

The Ozal government, since it took office in December 1983, has raised prices on monopoly items three times, with the price of cigarettes rising 116.7 percent and the price of alcoholic beverages rising between 83.8 percent and 160 percent overall, according to data compiled by an ANKARA AGENCY correspondent.

The liquid fuel price increase that Prime Minister Turgut Ozal had said would not happen came last night, on top of the back-to-back occurrence of [appreciation] of the American dollar and the visit of the IMF delegation. Regular gasoline was raised to 239 liras and super, to 258 liras. Bottled gas will cost 2,355 liras and number 6 heating oil will be 10,900 liras a ton.

This thirteenth price hike since Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's government took office is the biggest yet. Fuel prices rose between 8 percent and 10 percent. This brings the Ozal administration's total petroleum price hike to 84 percent.

There had been no new price hikes to offset the 9.5-percent rise in value of the American dollar against the Turkish lira in the period since 17 February, the date of Ozal's last hike of liquid fuels prices. Prime Minister Ozal waited, first, for the conclusion of the Motherland Party Congress and , then, for press reports of price hikes to simmer down. After reviewing the proposal submitted to him by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources that included price hike options ranging between 4 percent and 15 percent, however, he did not this time wait until the weekend for the "price regulation." Said to have played an important role in this was a threat by the IMF delegation, in Ankara for contacts to discuss the new credit agreement, that they could not conclude an agreement unless a way was demonstrated to balance the budget.

Since liquid fuel prices are being raised more than 3.5 percent, dealers will have to make inventory reports.

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

LIBYA PROMISES TO PAY TURKISH CONTRACTORS

Libya Signs Protocol

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 30 Apr 85 p 9

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) - The twelfth regular meeting of the Turkish-Libyan Joint Economic Commission was opened last Friday by Libyan Agriculture Minister Omer Durda accusing Turkish exporters and contractors of not doing honest work. It came to a conclusion on the weekend with an agreement reached after talks that were the scene of some hard bargaining.

The protocol containing the decisions reached by the commission was signed in a ceremony yesterday by Libyan Minister Durda and Minister of State Kazim Oksay. Libya commits itself in the protocol to pay as soon as possible the amounts overdue to Turkish firms for contracting services and also to open the accumulated transfers in the days ahead.

Minister of State Oksay, in a CUMHURIYET interview after the signing ceremony, said in reference to the contractor receivables, "We expect the impediments to be removed as soon as possible." A top-level bureaucrat who attended the meetings described the most positive outcome of the meeting as "the expression of good will by Libya as regards resolving the accumulated problems relating to the contractors which had reached a chronic state."

The Libyan side agreed to make during May a \$50-million payment on the accumulated debt to Turkish contractors, according to information provided. When reminded that the amount of the debt to Turkish contractors is \$500 million, one official said, "This is the figure the contractors are asking for. But the Libyans say they can pay the Treasury only the amount of the contracts. If the red tape for the work performed by the Turkish contractors is completed and forwarded to the Treasury, then the necessary payments will be made."

Liquidation

Another important solution achieved at the joint commission meeting was that Libya agreed to halt proceedings "at this stage" on the projects it wants to cancel that have been taken on by Turkish contractors. One official said that "liquidation cannot begin immediately," that they cannot proceed to any kind of liquidation without consulting the Turkish side. According to the agreement reached, a bilateral committee will be formed to sit continuously in Libya to discuss both the

contractor debt and the matter of liquidation. Of the 400 projects which it had been announced would be liquidated, 180 had been awarded to Turkish contractors. The committee, on which the Turkish side will be represented by two officials from the Treasury, will review the completion status of the 180 projects in question and make recommendations to the governments.

Payments

The joint commission also decided that a banking agreement will be concluded between the two countries to define new payment principles and make related arrangements. Oksay pointed out in his statement at the ceremony that the banking agreement will facilitate payments between the two countries.

Export Figure

The Turkish side drew attention during the meetings to the fact that Turkey's exports, which were in excess of \$400 million in 1981, had dropped to \$140 million in 1984 and called for increased purchases by Libya. Durda agreed to increase imports from Turkey as requested. However, a definite figure was not set during the talks for the 1985 export goal.

Labor

Libya also committed itself in the protocol signed yesterday to help make things easier as regards the transfer of Turkish workers' wages, taking more workers to Libya and assisting workers coming back. It was also decided as a new area of cooperation that a joint firm would be formed in Libya for the manufacture of agricultural machinery and tools and spare parts for maintenance and repair.

Durdah's Comments

In his speech at the ceremony, Libyan secretary of agriculture Durdah said that the agreements reached had opened a new era in relations. "The spirit of mutual help and brotherhood between us has played a role in our reaching a positive outcome. New horizons are now opening between the two countries. We will make strides in the future and remove the intervening snags," he said.

Reasons for Delayed Contractor Payments

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 30 Apr 85 p 9

[Text] ECONOMIC SERVICE - According to the Libyan government, matters were delayed because the Turkish contractors did not fulfill their contracts on time or completely. But the contractors, who worked in that country and of whom it is pointed out that "there is no longer much difference between the good work and the bad, because Libya has not paid anyone," put the reasons for the delay in these categories:

--According to the agreement signed with Libya, the Libyan government is supposed to pay 40 percent of the money due in Libyan dinars and transfer the remaining 60 percent to any country, in any monetary unit, the firm desires. However, one should remember that Libya has not made a single dollar transfer in connection with these 60 percents in 7 or 8 months.

--The Turkish contracting firms, unable to get the 60 percent of their remuneration for 8 months, reached the point, on one hand, where they could not buy the materials to carry on and, on the other, were unable to pay the difference in their workers' salaries. The cumulative debts of contractors to Turkish workers employed in Libya is \$100 million today and, for this reason, Turkish workers no longer want to work in Libya. Just a while ago, there were 100,000 Turkish workers in Libya and, now, there are only around 30,000-40,000.

--The Libyan government allowed Turkish workers employed in Libya in the early 1980's to transfer 90 percent of their earnings, but has reduced this rate since 1983, first to 75 percent and later to 50 percent. In this situation, when the Turkish workers, whose room and board was provided by the firms, accumulated Libyan dinars that they could not spend, they chose to lend this money to the firms and get it in Turkish liras back in Turkey. The firms used the money they got from the workers in Libya, but when they could not make good the vouchers they had given the workers because Libya was holding back their payments, they would run into things such as the workers pressuring their offices in Turkey and having distraints placed on them. An article was placed in the protocol when Prime Minister Turgut Ozal visited Libya to restore the transfer to Turkey of 90 percent of workers' salaries. However, the Libyan government did not comply with the protocol it signed. A protocol was signed during Labor Minister Mustafa Kalemli's trip relating to the transfer to Turkey of 75 percent of worker wages. But Libya continued to hold 50 percent of the money in Libya despite the protocol.

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

PRIVATE SECTOR-FOREIGN CAPITAL PARTNERSHIP IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 Apr 85 p 12

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU) - The project involving the partnership of the Turkish private sector and foreign capital in the defense industry was discussed in a briefing at General Staff headquarters attended by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal.

A study of the ability to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces through domestic production had been launched after the 12 September 1980 operation by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff and the Defense Office of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, coordinated by the Ministry of National Defense. The Ministry of Industry and Trade requested lists from the chambers of industry in large cities showing facilities having the capacity and capability to supply the army and specified the areas in which the private sector could go into production.

Once the decision was adopted to open up to the private sector areas, other than supplying the army's food requirements, such as the manufacture of clothing, arms, ammunition and military vehicles and the maintenance and repair of them, files were begun on each concrete project. Information was provided on the projects in which they were interested to the firms that applied and were able to pass the obligatory security investigation. The Koc conglomerate, which plans to produce rocket launcher parts in partnership with the American company Ford Aerospace, and Profilo Holding, which applied for military communications, are awaiting their investments in the defense industry, while Mercedes and the British Motor Corporation reportedly will begin producing military vehicles for the use of the army at their facilities in partnership with foreign capital.

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ENERGY

TURKEY

FIRMS BID ON SECOND TURKISH-IRAQI PETROLEUM PIPELINE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 26 Apr 85 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara (DUNYA) - Gama Industry, Inc put in a bid of \$370 million on the contract for the second petroleum pipeline to be built between Turkey and Iraq. Tekfen [Construction and Installations, Inc] reportedly has offered "alternatives" at less than \$300 million.

The BOTAS [Pipelines and Petroleum Transport Corporation] General Directorate ordered the examination of the bidders' proposals on the second oil pipeline to begin. Opening of the proposal envelopes, reduced in number to four by the withdrawal of Entes [Industrial Installations, Manufacturing and Assembly Contracting, Inc], began on Monday. Preliminary confirmations, meanwhile, were completed day before yesterday.

While the firms bidding on the contract were seen to be rather "sensitive" as regards BOTAS' keeping the bids secret, the group that includes Gama Industry was said to have submitted a \$370-million bid on the pipeline, for which the value has been estimated at nearly \$500 million.

The proposal by Tekfen, the firm that earlier built the first Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline, contained alternatives, but "on average was below \$300 million," officials said. A source close to Tekfen said that "they submitted a very low bid" on the second pipeline but "have credit available."

The other bidders, ENKA [Construction and Industry, Inc] and the Sezai Turkes-Fevzi Akkaya firm, refused to provide information on their proposals.

Though Tekfen holds the advantage in the second Turkish-Iraqi pipeline contract "as the company that built the first line," ENKA completed the "extension project" for the first line. As a result of certain defects that occurred in this project, later when BOTAS started up, extensions of time were necessary, leading to complaints by the Iraqi government to Turkey.

Sources close to Tekfen, who according to their own estimates "have the best chance," gave the following information on their proposal "with appropriate credit and a low price":

"The consortium that includes Tekfen offered a very low bid and credit in an appropriate amount. We will not relinquish the leadership on this contract, and we think we have a good chance. It is very hard to give a definite figure because we offered alternatives. However, the average of all the alternatives is below \$300 million. The size of the pipe to be used is among our alternatives. BOTAS asked for 46-inch pipe for this project. But very little of this size pipe is manufactured. [We] prepared a different proposal for using 48-inch pipe instead, which is more readily available. We offered a proposal also for the 46-inch and several different combinations as well. However, the differences between them in figures is not great. The decision is up to BOTAS."

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OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

FISHING PROTOCOL WITH MAURITANIA--Portugal and Mauritania have signed a fishing protocol in Lisbon. It contains working proposals to be agreed upon at the next meeting between the two countries in June. It envisages the possibility of Portuguese vessels catching shellfish in Mauritanian waters. The Mauritanian fisheries minister, who has come to Lisbon for an appraisal of bilateral relations in this sphere, has discussed with the Portuguese authorities the renegotiation of our country's debt to Mauritania and the percentage of the catch to be paid by the Portuguese shipowners to the Mauritanian authorities. The negotiations will be concluded in a month's time. [Text]
[Lisbon International Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 May 85 LD]

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