

JPRS-UPA-90-053  
13 SEPTEMBER 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

## ***Political Affairs***

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# Political Affairs

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CONTENTS

13 September 1990

## REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Nazarbayev Speech on Kazakh Sovereignty [N. Nazarbayev; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 8 Jun 90] .....	1
Law on Status of Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 11 May 90] .....	20

## NATIONALITY ISSUES

Adverse Effects of Lithuanian Activism on Soviet Army Reported [V. Gavrilov; AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA No 8, Apr 90] .....	28
Turkmen Cultural Association With Links to Expatriates Created [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 1 Jul 90] .....	29
Western Ukrainians Incite Civil Disorder in Chernovtsy [A. Fedorov; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 30 Jun 90] .....	30

## MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

USSR Supreme Soviet Press Center Functions Detailed [E. Kovalev; SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 5 May 90] .....	31
Council of Ministers Official Urges Improved Economics Reporting [L. Tsvetkov; ZHURNALIST No 5, May 90] .....	32
Officials View Media Distribution, Costs [A. Fedotov; PRAVDA, 13 Jun 90] .....	36
Armenian KGB Scores Accuracy of Radio Liberty Caucasus Reporting [KOMMUNIST, 25 Apr 90] .....	40
Armenian Historian Blasts Weekly SOYUZ Nationalities Reporting [K. Barsegyan; KOMMUNIST, 14 Apr 90] .....	41
Ownership Conflicts at VECHERNIY MINSK Newspaper Chronicled [L. Yunchik; SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 21 Jun 90] .....	42
Director Explains Renamed Latvian News Agency Function [A. Baumanis; SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 14 Jun 90] .....	44
Officials on Restarting Latvian Paper Production [Y. Ogurok; SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 6 Jun 90] .....	44
New Ukrainian Cooperatives Newspaper Profiled [B. Yavorovskiy; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 7 Jun 90] .....	45

## ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Goskompriroda Official Views Environmental Policies, Priorities [A. Orlenko; VETERAN No 24, 11-17 Jun 90] .....	47
Commission Reviews Draft USSR Environment Law [IZVESTIYA, 1 Jun 90] .....	50
Commission Declares Ecological Disaster in Danube-Dniester Region [G. Vorotnyuk; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 5 Jun 90] .....	51
USSR Procuracy Official Views Environmental Law Enforcement Issues [L. Kornilov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 5 Jun 90] .....	51
1989 Sewage Treatment Effectiveness Data [VESTNIK STATISTIKI No 6, Jun 90] .....	53
State Environmental Protection Construction Funding Statistics [VESTNIK STATISTIKI No 6, Jun 90] .....	54
Goskompriroda Chairman Comments on Hazards From Syrian Chemical Imports [N. Vorontsov; IZVESTIYA, 21 Jun 90] .....	58
Study Reveals Need for Greater Ecological Awareness in Fishing Sector [Ye.V. Nikonorova and Yu.P. Ozhegov; RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, No 6, Jun 90] .....	59
More Stringent Environmental Oversight of Maritime Fishing Zones Sought [N.A. Yastrebova; RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO No 6, Jun 90] .....	63
Inland Waterways Said To Be in State of Toxicological Crisis [V.I. Lukyanenko; RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO No 6, Jun 90] .....	67
Estonian Views Tallinn Baltic Ecology Conference [G. Golub; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 27 Jun 90] ..	70

## SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

All-Union Census Tables on Ages of Population [VESTNIK STATISTIKI No 6, Jun 90] .....	73
Estonian Census Figures Reported [J. Bergvald; RAHYA HAAL, 5 Apr 90] .....	85
Indifference to High Infant Mortality in Turkmen SSR Criticized [G. Olshanskiy et al.; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 18 Jul 90] .....	88
Drug Addiction Statistics From MVD, Gabiani Study [Y. Albats; MOSCOW NEWS No 24, 24 Jun-1 Jul 90] .....	89
Mentally Ill Exploited in Occupational Therapy Workshops [A. Yefimev; TRUD, 20 Jul 90] .....	90
Slow Progress for Planned Pharmaceutical Joint Ventures [Yu. Stepanov; IZVESTIYA, 24 Jul 90] .....	92
Improved Medical Services Proposed for Chernobyl Zone Workers [M. Odinets; PRAVDA, 11 Jul 90] ..	92
Health Ministry Official on Battle Against Drug Addiction [N. Ivanets; IZVESTIYA, 8 Jul 90] .....	92
People's Deputy on Development of Freedom of Conscience Draft Law [S. Averintsev; SEMYA No 25, 18-24 Jun 90] .....	93
Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth Profiled [O. Vitovich; SOBESEDNIK No 25, Jun 90] .....	95
Trade Union Official Defends Expenditures on Culture [V. M. Mishin; TRUD, 20 Jul 90] .....	97

### Nazarbayev Speech on Kazakh Sovereignty

90US1179A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 8 Jun 90 pp 2-4

[Speech by Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary N. A. Nazarbayev at the 17th Congress of the Kazakhstan Communist Party: "17th Congress of Kazakhstan Communist Party: Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee Report to the 17th Congress, Entitled 'For Party Unity and Socialist Choice, for Genuine Kazakhstan Sovereignty in a Renewed USSR'; keynote speaker: Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary N. A. Nazarbayev"]

[Text] Comrades! As First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, I am faced with a difficult, critically important task. In my accountability report I shall be presenting a party assessment of the complex events which have occurred during the years since the 16th Congress and presenting the Central Committee's view on a number of vitally important theoretical and practical issues dealing with the root problems of renewal of the Communist Party and all aspects of life in our multiethnic republic, and I shall be submitting for your consideration general lines of strategy pertaining to restructuring activities in the political, ideological, cultural, social, and economic domains.

The very critical nature of the present moment is heightened by the swiftness of the political processes which are taking place in this country. Alongside positive phenomena, dictated by people's passionate desire to speed up the renewal of society, there are phenomena which evoke profound concern for the fate of the people, the Communist Party, and for the future of our Union and socialism. Precisely for this reason the 28th CPSU Congress is being convened early, considerably sooner than prescribed by the Party Rules, and it is precisely for this reason that this republic forum of Communists has convened ahead of schedule.

The crisis state of the party faces us with the necessity of a difficult choice. The appearance of various platforms within the CPSU, intensification of centrifugal tendencies, and open forms of political struggle for power—all this shakes the party and leads to weakening of its ideological and political position.

We Communists of Kazakhstan cannot permit ourselves the role of outside observers when the question at hand is preservation of unity of the CPSU and faithfulness to the fundamental ideas of Leninism. We cannot sit things out "in the trenches" when the party's authority, prestige and honor are placed on the scales. We cannot and should not remain silent when the party is so badly in need of support and defense against opportunistic accusations and against the ideals for which millions of Communists, our predecessors, fought from being trampled in the mud. On the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress

we must make a statement which, I am confident, will have considerable weight in determining the party's future fate.

Unquestionably an enormous stride forward has been accomplished in the last five years, a stride which has radically overturned our concept of the world, of ourselves, and of the true measure of common human values. Courageously acknowledging the mistakes of the past, in April 1985 our party's Central Committee and leaders sharply altered the course of party policy and took a resolute step in the direction of democratization of Soviet society. The party assumed responsibility before the people for the implementation of perestroika. As a result we have been witness to profound reforms in the political system, in the course of which fundamentally new soviets were created, and legislative and executive powers were divided. The crimes of Stalinism and the period of stagnation were exposed. The legislative foundation was prepared for implementation of a radical economic reform. Our country has appeared in the international arena in a qualitatively new countenance, which is making it possible successfully to resolve the most difficult problems of today's world. This was particularly vividly demonstrated by the recent visit to the United States of America by our country's president, M. S. Gorbachev. In short, development of society on principles of the new thinking is taking on an irreversible character. And all this is taking place within a historically short period of time.

But also indisputable are the mistakes which have been made by us in the post-April period, all those negative phenomena which accompany perestroika and which our political opponents are adroitly utilizing today. We see better than anybody else that the party has not yet achieved pacemaking renewal in the content and methods of its activities and has failed to create conditions for extensive democratization of intraparty relations. How can these two diametrically opposite poles of our life, one of which attests to unquestionable successes of perestroika, while the other inspires anxious concern for the success of reforms and evokes sharp criticism of the party and its leaders, both "from the left" and "from the right," be compatible? A thorough, unbiased analysis of the road we have traveled is needed in order to reply to this question.

Do you recall with what enthusiasm we greeted the 16th Kazakhstan Communist Party Congress? It seemed that nothing would be able to impede the affirmation of healthy, vital ideas, which expressed our innermost aspirations for democratization and radical restructuring of our society, aspirations toward the formulation of which generations of Communists had agonized. This was genuinely a congress of hopes and bold plans. Candid speeches rang out for the first time from this forum, statements free of considerations of political opportunism, statements pertaining to the most "off-limits" aspects of life, which traditionally had not been subject to criticism.

What was present in greater quantity in these speeches: absolute faith in the new course of policy, or sober calculation, grounded on analysis of the disposition of forces which existed at that time? I would say that faith predominated. At that time we still had only an approximate idea of the power and the "sinister" capabilities of the system of rule by administrative fiat, which was easily capable of choking off the first shoots of perestroika and of turning things back into the old dead-end channel.

And this is essentially what happened. The Central Committee leadership elected at the 16th Congress proved incapable of assessing its activities in a critical manner. Persons dedicated to the previous work style and methods ended up in key positions, persons who attempted to do everything possible to remove from the republic political arena by crude force dissident bearers of constructive ideas. Insinuations and direct threats were used, and a feverish struggle to preserve their shaken rule was under way. The year 1986 became for healthy, progressively-inclined forces a year of persecution, of virtual absence of any protection whatsoever. All this could not help but do detriment to democratic reforms and could not help but impede the processes of renewal in this republic. Persistent attempts to leave everything as it was and to reduce the changes mandated by the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum to another short-lived campaign, however, were unsuccessful. The ideas of perestroika had become too popular among the people. But when the question of replacing the leadership came to a head, the apologists of stagnation did everything possible in order maximally to alleviate the consequences, which were disadvantageous to them, and to place in leadership a "person from the outside," who was unfamiliar with local conditions. You are well aware of how this ended. The 5th Central Committee Plenum, which lasted exactly 18 minutes, served to emphasize one more antidemocratic action, which evoked widespread negative response among party members and the entire population of Kazakhstan.

We are stating this today not in order to dredge up the past. The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee considers that what happened was a direct consequence of authoritarianism and the flourishing in this republic of all kinds of cults of influence, which deformed the natural process of succession of political leadership. The people in power, by virtue of a "bossism" which was rooted deep in their consciousness, gave the very least consideration to preparing worthy successors. On the contrary, they made every effort to impede growth in the prestige of and respect for those whom they saw as potential rivals, a threat to their autocratic rule. This should be for us a strong lesson for the future.

In the period following the 5th Plenum we encountered an intensified form of the system of rule by administrative fiat, which harshly blocked any and all dissidence, any opinion which differed from that of the primary leader [pervyy rukovoditel; term used to avoid directly stating "first secretary"]. The habit of worshipping

authoritarian rule, inculcated over the years, rule which by inertia remained embodied in the same old makeup of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, was also a contributing factor. In these conditions some of our "ideological bosses" decided that the time had come when they could carry over the barracks-command methods, which they had mastered so well, into the spiritual/intellectual [dukhovnyy] domain. It was precisely at their bidding, for example, that "percentage mania" in determining the ethnic composition of students, the worker class, etc flourished. All of us remember how the very possibility of emergence of new sociopolitical organizations in this republic was ignored and disregarded, what a savage campaign was waged against them in the press, and what opposition was encountered by attempts by members of the ethnic national intelligentsia to raise the question of the official status of the Kazakh language. These people were quite willing to set cadres to bickering, to slander honest, upright officials and, in essence, to engage in a policy of repression. And all this was for the sake of pursuing their own advantage. It is not mere happenstance that many party oblast committee secretaries who had made a mess of their job were able to leave their office with honor, with maximum individual pensions, and freed even of moral responsibility.

There was also little restructuring observed in the economic domain. At the present time there are those who are inclined to blame perestroika for the economic mess, failing to consider the fact that it is precisely now that we are being forced to reap the bitter "fruits" which were grown during the period of stagnation. In order not to make unsubstantiated statements, I shall cite specific facts. The negative balance between generated and consumed national income in this republic reached a peak figure in 1985—7.2 billion rubles. Kazakhstan's indebtedness for shipments of industrial goods totaled 591 million rubles, and almost 30 percent of enterprises and organizations were now operating at a loss. Things got to the point where 60 percent of consumer goods was being hauled in from outside the republic, and social problems were being resolved exclusively according to the residual principle.

Agriculture had been particularly heavily damaged. The endeavor to deliver to the state that vaunted billion poods [pood=16.381 kg] of grain, for the sake of honors and the title "Hero of Labor," which frequently would be awarded for just one good harvest year, just about wrecked our livestock feed base. The average milk yield per dairy cow on ration declined by 100 kilograms below the 1980 level; the average weight per head of cattle dropped by 54 kilograms, while the average weight per sheep declined by 3 kilograms. Per capita meat consumption remained virtually unchanged over the decade from 1975 to 1985. To this we should add that approximately 10 percent of cattle not privately owned were infected with tuberculosis and brucellosis.

Things were no better in capital construction. Capital construction showed a 1.6 billion ruble shortfall below

target in the 10th Five-Year Plan, while this figure increased to 2.6 billion rubles in the 11th Five-Year Plan. The rate of bringing new housing on-stream proved to be practically frozen. The same can be said about children's facilities, hospitals, outpatient clinics, and schools.

These are the starting conditions in which we commenced perestroika. To be fair we should note that from the early months of 1987 the Central Committee and party organizations in the localities were paying greater attention to the problem of overcoming stagnation phenomena in the branches and sectors of the economy. In particular, things began to move in housing construction and in the food supply area. But once again this was being done with approaches which had long since become obsolete. Party committees continued to usurp the functions of soviet and economic management bodies, and coercive pressure prevailed over economic methods. At the same time direct work with and concern for people's needs weakened, which had an immediate effect. Strikes by the Karaganda miners, riots in Novyy Uzen, and instances of mass public anger in Ust-Kamenogorsk and Pavlodar attested to the fact that party committees had diverged from the interests of the rank-and-file party members and working people.

The downward slide of restructuring processes in this republic, just as throughout the country, was due in large measure to ill-conceived, hasty voluntaristic decisions, streaming from the central authority and frequently unthinkingly executed in the localities. Suffice it to recall the fiasco of the anti-alcohol legislation or the Law on the Enterprise which was never implemented, the state acceptance procedure, which quietly disappeared from the scene, legislative enactments which caused uncontrolled growth of income, etc. And how many reorganizations of Gosagroprom have there been over the last five years? All these things were consuming time and effort, but they were not producing the desired result; they were merely irritating people and were making ever fainter their hopes for favorable progress of perestroika.

It will probably be a long time before we are able to shake the habit of tackling highly complex problems of life with a single stroke, artificially simplifying them in our own consciousness. In April 1985 the words "perestroika" and "acceleration" had become practically synonyms, and the thinking was that a year or two, three at the most, would suffice to bring the country out of its crisis of stagnation. Realities prove to be much harsher, while formally articulated tasks proved to be much more substantial and complex. But does this mean that the path was not correctly chosen and that the stated goals are unattainable? Of course not. If we discuss past mistakes and errors in a straightforward manner, one should equally candidly admit that some of them were objectively unavoidable in a certain sense. Only by tackling a specific job and receiving a certain number of "bruises" and "lumps" while performing that job can one acquire the necessary experience and understand the full scale and difficulty of the task we have begun.

I believe that we have gained such experience and have become wiser, more cautious and prudent. And unquestionably we have produced to date not only a negative result; and, as we know, even this negative result also possesses some value. Substantial strides forward have been accomplished in these past years, both in political and in economic development. Kazakhstan Communist Party initiatives directed toward attaining republic sovereignty in a renewed federation and affirmation of autonomy of the republic party organization within the framework of the CPSU have generated broad public response. The general plan which we have advanced, calling for the republic to transition to self-government and self-financing, has gained great public support. This is indicated by election results: the majority of USSR people's deputies from Kazakhstan and Kazakh SSR and local soviet people's deputies are party members.

Incidentally, the election campaign itself became an important element in the development of democracy and implementation of political reform, a powerful instrument for accelerating the processes of politicization of societal affairs. This happened in large measure because the party rejected dictate and a fixation on percentages in preparing for and organizing the elections, and resolutely supported a spirit of competition and contested election. The election campaign was transformed into a unique popular referendum, which confirmed the confidence of the masses in the policy of perestroika. The result was a demanding body of deputies with the ability to function, who are capable of effectively influencing the state of affairs in this republic. This has already been demonstrated by the first session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, which formed a government which can scarcely count on maintaining its influence and authority if it does a poor job.

Party organizations conducted an extensive discussion and debate on the new concept of a humane, democratic socialism proposed by the February (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. On the whole the people of Kazakhstan voiced approval of the draft Platform of the Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress. The draft Platform of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, entitled "For a Renewed Kazakhstan Communist Party and Republic Sovereignty in a New Federation," was also supported by party members and workforces. Today the sociopolitical situation is on the whole stable in this republic, and the republic Communist Party possesses genuine political weight and is supported by the people.

Thus, in summing up the main political result in the period under review, we are entitled to state that in implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 16th Congress of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the republic party organization, operating in difficult conditions, has maintained its position as a consolidating societal force.

### Renewed Ideology for a Renewed Party

In discussing the tasks facing the Kazakhstan Communist Party, we should focus priority attention on the root problems of its renewal and improvement of the forms and methods of party activity. It is high time to analyze in detail what is taking place in our own "party house" and by what paths and under what flag we shall be proceeding forward. People expect us to provide clear-cut political assessments.

Breaking with authoritarian-bureaucratic deformations and banal unanimity of opinion, the Communists of Kazakhstan are resolutely in favor of renewal of the CPSU as party of the socialist choice and a Communist future, which builds its policy on a foundation of contemporary analysis and innovative development of the legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

In what way is Marxism-Leninism of value to us today?

It provides us with a solid theoretical foundation for a new view of socialism and enables us to understand more deeply the essence of the socialist economic system, which presumes a diversity of forms of ownership and development of money-exchange relations, cooperative enterprise, and worker self-management. That is, this makes it possible to revive in a practical manner and to affirm in man a lost sense of proprietorship and to bring to an end man's alienation from the means of production and the results of his labor.

Leninist approaches to the development of democracy and glasnost, to fighting bureaucracy, and toward seeking ways to achieve harmonization of interethnic relations are highly relevant for us today as well.

We rely on Leninist teaching on the party which is capable of serving as political vanguard of the people, and we are supported by Leninist ideas on the preeminence of universal values, on peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, plus many, many other things.

Western political scientists, just as, incidentally, home-grown half-baked critics of Leninism, are making heavy use of the crisis state of society in order to discredit socialism: here, they claim, is what the communist idea has led us to. The juggling of facts is obvious, for we are not living poorly because of the fact that we built socialism, but rather because we were unable to build it right. And now in the course of discussing the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, there are those who would attempt to convince us that the sources of the system of rule by administrative fiat trace right back to the founders of Marxism-Leninism and that a socialist framework is too narrow for perestroika. Some "ideologists" suggest that we must remove from the party's name the word "Communist," which has determined and which unquestionably will continue to determine the highest strategic goal of the struggle by all generations of Communists.

For what is all this being done? And can one regard the intensifying attacks on Lenin and Leninism as a politically harmless scientific-theoretical debate? The answer is quite evident: our opponents are not at all interested in seeking the truth. Their task is to strike a blow against the ideological foundation of the party, to destroy it from within, to sweep it from the political arena.

Lenin's teaching needs no defense, it is said. In a larger sense this is probably true, for this science has captured the mind and morally enriched the soul of millions of people throughout the world, and to date nobody has been able to refute it, let alone surpass the idea of building a socialist society. But in the present specific political situation it would be a mistake to close one's eyes to the aggressive activities of those who have taken up arms against Leninism. Pursuing selfish, schismatic aims, they have united behind the so-called "Democratic Platform" and have seriously set about to devise a strategy and tactics of struggle against the CPSU, right up to determining a timetable for seizing political power. To quote the words of V. I. Lenin, "battle with them is absolutely unavoidable."

In this connection we fully support the CPSU Central Committee open letter to our country's Communists, which does not at all call for getting rid of persons with independent views, as our political adversaries are currently attempting to claim. Views on various problems and ways to solve them can vary, but all of us—members of a single party—should be bound together by the socialist choice. Herein lies the essence of unity today.

The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee believes that if Communists firmly and consistently support the platforms of the CPSU Central Committee and the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, there should occur no split, no factionalism, no double-dealing in our ranks. We are absolutely opposed to a loosening of party discipline under the guise of combating bureaucracy.

We know to what serious inflammatory processes boundless political pluralism and unconstitutional forms of struggle are leading in some of our country's major cities and in the republics of the Baltic, Transcaucasia, and Moldavia. To some extent there has been a like experience of bitter lessons in Kazakhstan as well. This is why we advocate firm consolidation of all those to whom are dear the goals of perestroika, the fate of our party and country, and the ideals of humane, democratic socialism.

We must also mention the danger threatening the CPSU from the right. It is no secret that there still exist in this country a large number of conservatively-inclined Communists who express the opinion that a "strong hand" is needed, that is, a return to past administrative-command methods, which have been resolutely condemned by the party. This path also is inappropriate; it will once again lead us into that impasse from which we are just now beginning to emerge.

In short, we must clearly understand what aims are being pursued both by the radically-inclined "democrats" and by those for whom genuine democracy and normalization of intraparty affairs is not to their liking. I hope that our republic party forum will clearly and unequivocally speak out against the arrogant, clearly selfish aspirations of those who, according to the well-known saying, are not averse to fishing in troubled waters and to provoking a split on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress. The situation at the present time is such that disorder and wavering within the party—the vanguard force of perestroika—would mean a halt to the processes of renewal of society. This cannot be permitted.

At the same time we must clearly understand that one can no longer employ methods of prohibition or fence oneself off from various opinions with an ideological barrier. Other approaches are needed here, the ability to defend one's point of view persuasively in political debate. We presently lack this ability. Is this not why some ideological workers, who profess past dogmas and stereotypes, would become thoroughly confused upon coming face to face with an unaccustomed and often hard-to-predict spread of political, economic, ecological, and other pluralism?

One should state for the sake of fairness that perplexity has been observed not only at the local level but also at the top ideological echelons. We are entitled to level serious complaints at the CPSU Central Committee and its Ideological Department, which at the most acute moments of social and interethnic tension have preferred to take up a perimeter defense in place of sensible advice, and in place of recommendations they have made do with stereotyped phrases such as: "act as circumstances warrant." Analyzing the actions of CPSU Central Committee ideological workers, led by Central Committee Politburo member V. A. Medvedev, one cannot help but conclude that their loss of initiative as well as their reconciliationist policy toward patent derogators of Leninist ideas have seriously demoralized party forces.

It is evidently high time to conduct a proper examination to determine whether our political-indoctrination arsenal contains reliable methods capable of transforming party ideas and slogans into firm convictions and whether our ideologists are prepared to work in the new conditions. These questions could most probably cause perplexity: were we not in the recent past flaunting astronomical figures pertaining to numbers of propagandists, agitators, political briefers, and other categories of ideological workers who were allegedly actively working within the political instruction and education system? But just where is this entire "ideological army" today, if I may phrase it in these words?

It has not gone anywhere. All cadres are in place. It is not so much their fault, however, as it is our common misfortune that at the present time they are not generating any appreciable result. For many years the ideological corps, just as the party as a whole, was working, quite

frankly, in hothouse political conditions. Was there a need to defend Leninist ideas, to champion party policy among the masses, to fight for them at mass rallies, meetings, and demonstrations? There were neither mass rallies, demonstrations, nor obvious political opponents. The entire role of ideological work boiled down to formal educational and service functions. In the recent past there even existed the term "ideological support." Party workers periodically "supported" harvesting, planting, lambing, and other seasonal farm activities. And maybe this work would have been of benefit if it had not taught people to act in a routine, predictable manner, if it had not taught people to attempt to avoid sharp corners and to look good in reports.

Cadres were also selected proceeding from actual functions. Today women for the most part are performing ideological work in republic party committees: women comprise approximately 80 percent of rayon, city, and oblast party committee secretaries. The majority are educators by training, with a very small number of legal specialists, sociologists, philosophers, and economists. And yet one extremely rarely finds a woman, and particularly a woman with training in the humanities, at the head of a party committee. As a rule representatives of the industrial professions serve as party secretaries in the cities and towns, while in the rural areas they are livestock management technicians and agronomists.

Of course we are not talking about a purge of ideological cadres or distrust of persons who have devoted their lives to a noble cause. Such an approach would be in conflict with the root ideas of party renewal. We are talking about something else: the vital need to alter our views on the substance and objectives of ideological work, to reject the past regimentation of people's thoughts and feelings, as well as the willingness and ability of ideological workers to conduct a dialogue and to persuade.

The very logic of party work at the present stage demands that each and every Communist become an ideological fighter, and particularly party committee officials. In determining the basic directions of ideological and political indoctrination, one must work persistently to overcome the inertia of total ideological dependence on others. Encouraging in this regard is an attempt by the Central Committee Ideological Commission to draw up a specific long-range plan of ideological activity, involving priority tasks in the area of linguistic policy and linguistic organizational development, moral-aesthetic education of youth, and the functioning of culture and the mass media.

Essential to implement this plan is a fresh inflow of manpower into the social sciences, because without fundamental theoretical syntheses, movement along the path of renewal will be accomplished by groping one's way. Special attention should be devoted to the development of such areas as sociology and political science. It is the job of the social sciences to provide practical workers

with validated recommendations, to conduct sociopolitical research, and to forecast the development of societal processes.

It is senseless today to seek universal forms of ideological indoctrination work. When undertaking any step, one should proceed from actual economic and social conditions, the moral-psychological climate, and other objective factors. This is particularly important when organizing ideological activity in such a subtle and sensitive area as interethnic relations. A high degree of awareness and sophistication, reasoned judgment and sober assessment are particularly important in nationalities policy.

One must address the events of December 1986 within the context of this problem. In a delicate political situation, with nothing at all to do with interethnic issues, former party leaders demonstrated a total disinclination to listen to people's opinion. On the contrary, they made every effort to confine human feelings with an ideological corset, which inevitably resulted in an explosion of passions, breaches of the peace, and rampages. And then subsequently the claim of "Kazakh nationalism" was made for the purpose of ideological camouflage.

Could one hope for a trusting dialogue between the republic's leaders and the participants in a demonstration which at first was of a purely peaceful nature? Could one hope that the "people from the center," invested with vast powers, would want to understand the perhaps not entirely justified but nevertheless sincere indignation on the part of young people, who on the one hand were hearing calls for democratization and perestroika and on the other hand were encountering peremptory dictate in the worst traditions of the time of stagnation? Of course not.

We all remember what an ideological hue and cry was raised in order to justify every line of the decree on the Kazakh Republic Party Organization issued by the CPSU Central Committee. How many lances were broken in the controversy over the Kazakh-language kindergarten opened in Alma-Ata! An entirely normal, even routine event by today's measure was categorized as an undermining of internationalism. Various commissions, departments and sectors for interethnic relations were hastily formed, and these entities proceeded to march heavy-handedly into the delicate domain of interethnic affairs like a bull in a china shop.

This contrived uproar produced a totally reverse result. People who for many years had been living in a normal atmosphere of good-neighbor relations began looking at each other with concern and apprehension: could you be a nationalist, or a chauvinist? Little boys would have a fight, and people would immediately begin asking: what is their ethnic affiliation? As if Balkhash and Kazakhstanskaya Magnitka, Dzhezkazgan and Turksib, the virgin lands and Baykonur—as well as dozens and hundreds of other material and spiritual/intellectual evidences of our genuine friendship—did not even exist.

Of course even these ill-conceived actions, based purely on the political situation, could not shake the centuries-long foundations of trust of the Russian people by the Kazakhs and of the Kazakhs by the Russians. The majority of people realized that these were short-lived events and refused to give in to the psychosis being whipped up by certain political activists.

They grasped the true cost of this action much faster than did party officials. During all these years letters were continuously being sent to the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and to the CPSU Central Committee, letters from workers, young people, and persons active in culture and science, expressing their disagreement with accusations of nationalism and conceit being leveled against the Kazakh people as well as accusations of freeloading against the republic. Here is an example. Aleksey Stepanovich Shachnev, a shop mechanic at the Lenger Sock and Knitwear Factory in Chimkent Oblast, writes: "I feel that the accusation which has been so unfairly leveled at an entire people is uncalled for and insulting even to me, a person of Russian nationality.... Having lived among Kazakhs for more than 30 years now and feeling their friendly attitude every single day, I was dismayed to learn that the entire people had suddenly become nationalists. He who calls a Kazakh a nationalist is at the same time inflicting deep injury on me, a Russian." And this is not the only statement of this kind.

The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee and the republic Supreme Soviet unambiguously stated their position regarding the well-known CPSU Central Committee decree. Justice triumphed as a result, and the disgraceful label was removed from the Kazakh people. This was joyously welcomed by all the people of Kazakhstan. Recently considerable work has also been done to rehabilitate those persons against whom administrative-liability and criminal charges were unlawfully brought for participation in these events.

Nor can we be indifferent toward attempts to place in doubt the integrity of the territory of Kazakhstan. Opinions of this kind which have recently surfaced evoke sharply negative reaction on the part of the republic's entire population. Particular indignation is aroused by articles on this provocative topic by learned gentlemen with academic degrees, persons whom, one would think, could hardly be suspected of incompetence. The reputable and highly-respected journal *ISTORIYA SSSR* [History of the USSR], for example, published an article by a doctor of historical sciences and staff member at an academy institute, who categorically declares that part of the republic's territory, including Semirechye, belonged to... the Siberian Cossacks. He apparently is not very concerned about the reaction to this by peoples which have lived here for centuries, although knowledge of history would seem to be essential for a historian. Today we declare once more from the speaker's stand of this congress that the entire territory of the republic, within

its present boundaries, constitutes the historical property of multiethnic Soviet Kazakhstan and cannot be altered without its consent.

This republic's Communists, party committees, and soviets of people's deputies, supporting the CPSU Central Committee Platform "Nationalities Policy in Present-Day Conditions," will seek to ensure that members of all nationalities residing in this republic treat one another with respect and solicitude. We have done and shall continue to do everything possible in order more fully to consider the interests of the members of all nationalities and ethnic groups and to foster and promote the development of their culture, traditions, and customs.

Linguistic organizational development is the most important item in interethnic relations. A great deal of work has been accomplished in this area during the period under review. In conformity with the Law on Languages adopted by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kazakh language has been given the status of official state language. Russian has been designated a language of interethnic communication and is guaranteed full freedom of utilization throughout the territory of this republic, on an equal basis with the official state language. The law also prescribes the principles of protection of the interests of the members of each people as regards their language.

Improvement in the interethnic situation will certainly be fostered by the Law on Persons Residing Outside Their State Entities [gosudarstvennyye obrazovaniya] or Without State Entities on the Territory of the USSR, as well as the union-level Law on Language and other legal enactments. I want to emphasize in this that, having commenced building a state governed by rule of law, we should instill in ourselves a feeling of respect for and unswerving observance of the letter and the spirit of the law. Neither winking at violations of the law nor excessively harsh enforcement can be tolerated. Unfortunately some officials fail to see this fine line and attempt to interpret the law as they see fit. In particular, we cannot help but be concerned by occurring incidents of forcing people to learn the language of the indigenous nationality, which is absolutely impermissible and is in conflict with the adopted Law on Languages.

Did anybody force the settlers from central Russia who came here in the last century to study the Kazakh language? But members of the older generations remember well that Russians, Ukrainians, and members of other nationalities who had long resided in Kazakhstan possessed an excellent mastery of Kazakh. The reverse process began 30-35 years ago, when large-scale farming development of virgin and long-fallow lands commenced. This great project, which moved the republic's economy sharply forward, did not occur without growing pains, and particularly a negative effect on development of the language of the Kazakh people. Did anybody explain to the young virgin-lands pioneer farmers to what land they were going? Did anyone

explain to them what kind of people lived there, the culture and folkways of that people? On the contrary, emphasis was placed on the position that they were pioneers settling unpopulated lands somewhere out in the wilds. Hence the psychological attitude of not troubling themselves to learn the language of the local people.

Of course the point is not arrogance, and certainly not insults or complaints against the people who created the rich breadbasket of Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee considers that it should express profound gratitude to all generations of people of Kazakhstan who contributed their labor to the development and prosperity of this republic, which has become our common multiethnic home, and that it should reemphasize the great value of friendship with the Russian people and with all brother peoples. We must today correct the mistakes of the past precisely in order to preserve and strengthen this friendship, in order to deepen the rich spiritual and intellectual bonds which have formed over the centuries of our common life. The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee considers it to be the duty of every Kazakh to make every effort to create a kindly, I would say grateful attitude toward those members of other nationalities who are endeavoring to learn and more fully to master this republic's official language. And of course all necessary conditions must be created to accomplish this.

Unquestionably the adopted law will make it possible to change public opinion regarding languages and will be a guarantee of their free and unrestricted development. Concern with one's native language, however, lies first and foremost with the people to whom this language belongs. Consequently our main goal is to ensure that each and every people become fully cognizant of the moral essence of hard work to preserve their language, while of course not forgetting to respect the language and culture of a neighboring people.

There is another item to which we should devote special attention. The people in this republic are concerned by manifestations of a low level of political knowledgeability, instability of ideological position, and loss of moral reference points on the part of many young men and women. In this connection the Central Committee considers it advisable to adopt laws on youth and to devise programs aimed at creating conditions for a full-fledged spiritual and intellectual life for our young people. Komsomol must be aggressively enlisted to take part in this, becoming a dynamic political organization which most fully expresses the interests of the younger generation.

The party has irrevocably rejected the imposition of work forms and methods on Komsomol organizations. There are many problems in the ideological and political domain, however, which we must resolve together. Many of them are connected with attitude toward socialist values and ideals. In particular, we are concerned by attempts to discredit the role and significance of the

Armed Forces and state security agencies. We consider it our duty sacredly to preserve the heroic traditions of the people and army, to enhance the prestige of military service, and to concern ourselves in a more practical manner with the housing and living conditions of veterans, serviceman-internationalists [e.g. veterans of the war in Afghanistan], and other military personnel. It is also necessary to instill in young men and women a respectful attitude toward our state symbols: the republic's anthem, flag, and coat of arms.

The Central Committee has recently received many letters from veterans and serviceman-internationalists expressing great concern over articles which discredit the historical past of our homeland and which lay the blame for political and economic mistakes on all Communists of the older generation. And this is being done deliberately, without specific historical analysis; everything comprising the pride of the Soviet people is also essentially discounted. It is our obligation to state unequivocally that we not only do not share such views but, on the contrary, consider it essential to adopt from the older generations such qualities as devotion to the ideals of the Leninist party, dedication to the assigned task, collectivism and comradeship. We must do everything possible to ensure that their wealth of experience is fully utilized in the practical business of perestroika, in the business of patriotic and internationalist education, ideological and moral conditioning of workers, especially young people.

Matters pertaining to youth education are of particular importance to the party. In this area there have been specified new approaches to refurbishing the content of pedagogic practice at secondary and higher schools and toward strengthening school facilities. 667 new schools have opened in the last four years, and more than 776 million rubles allocated for school construction have been spent, 40 percent more than in the preceding five-year plan. The shortfall occurring in this domain in previous years, however, has proven to be so great that, in spite of measures taken, we still have a long way to go to accomplish a fundamental solution to the problem. For example, our schools are accommodation-short to the tune of 1,300,000 students. In this republic there is 1,400 rubles worth of equipment per college student, while the figure is 2,400 rubles for the country as a whole. In addition, a certain percentage of young specialist personnel cannot find employment. Last year more than 400 college graduates were not hired by Gosagroprom, Mintorg, Minavtotrans, and a number of other ministries and agencies. And yet we have excellent experience in training specialist personnel on the basis of direct contractual agreements with enterprises and government agencies, which eliminate the possibility of their "overproduction." And if this experience is not being widely adopted, it is only due to a disinclination on the part of officials to take on additional responsibilities and to give up an accustomed although obsolete scheme of doing things.

Culture—the most effective tool for ennobling man—plays an indispensable role in renewal of societal affairs. The Kazakhstan Communist Party is called upon consistently to implement a policy of preserving the uniqueness of the cultures of the Kazakh and other peoples of this republic, promoting the development of art and literature, and of opposing crass commercial approaches in the spiritual and intellectual domain and manifestations of nihilism in regard to ethnic cultural heritage. We are constantly and continuously supported in this by our intelligentsia, and we heed their opinion and advice. And we believe that, gaining creative freedom, members of the intelligentsia not only will enrich the people with fitting works and worthy scientific discoveries but will also always be with us in implementing the shining ideals of perestroika, in work directed toward the prosperity of our native land.

The works of Sh. Kudayberdiyev, M. Zhumabayev, A. Baytursynov, Zh. Aymautov, and M. Dulatov have been returned to the people. Study of the legacy of major representatives of Kazakh oral poetry has commenced. Creditable works in dramaturgy and cinematography have appeared. Aytysy akynov [improvisational song competitions among oral folk poet-singers] are becoming quite popular, and folk arts and traditional folk holidays are experiencing revival.

We can see, however, that intellectual barrenness of spirit is making threatening inroads in our society. The cult of idleness, banality, and drabness has become too glaringly evident. Here is just one fact: last year dozens of traveling rock and pop music groups visited this republic, holding more than 16,000 concerts. They performed on the stages of theaters, concert halls, recreation centers, at athletic stadiums, and at sports arenas. Why is it that, while justifiably complaining about poor cultural facilities, we nevertheless hand over our stages to fly-by-night sharpers, who turn them into a profitable venue for themselves?

It is high time for party members of the Kazakh SSR State Committee for Culture to learn to implement cultural policy in a manner behooving the state, and to unite the republic's creative forces.

An important place in strengthening the party's consolidating role is assigned to the party press, which exerts enormous influence on development of the processes of democratization and glasnost. The process of the press acquiring its voice, however, is not taking place entirely smoothly. A certain superficiality is evident in the job being done by many editorial staffs, including a superficial statement of important economic problems. Instances of championing group interests and the chase after sensationalism have not yet been fully eradicated in the activities of the press, television and radio.

Elaboration of urgent measures to strengthen the party press should become a matter of particular concern. What do we mean by this? First of all there is needed a decisive restructuring of the operations of our party

publications, particularly the newspapers SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN and KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. Guidelines for their operations are spelled out in the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On the Newspaper PRAVDA."

Party organs should work unwaveringly to strengthen that stratum of the press which is closest to the people, to workforces, and to party organizations. We are talking first and foremost about a substantial improvement in the professional level of these publications and improvement in their structure. The local press in this republic is operating at a loss. Therefore why not, for example, set up on the foundation of oblast newspapers and publishing houses economic-accountability regional party press concerns, which would put out oblast newspaper materials tailored to rayon party organizations and would engage in book publishing activities? This is just one of the ways to increase the effectiveness of the local press.

We must work unwaveringly to increase the prestige of the party word and resolutely to nip in the bud attempts to utilize the mass media to discredit the party and for extremist, anticonstitutional purposes.

Recently, as a result of pronounced politicization of the masses, there has been a significant increase in the activeness of voluntary public organizations. I can state quite frankly that not only new structures of informal movements but their ideology as well are forming before our very eyes. In connection with this, party organizations are faced with the task of finding more constructive approaches to the unofficial ["informal"] organizations, to find mutual understanding and to organize joint actions to attain goals which are in the interests of the majority of the people of Kazakhstan. It is evident that the majority of the unofficial movements support perestroika.

We should also exert influence on the developing worker movement. We see that its strength lies in a striving toward social justice, in its fight to protect working people. In this as well it has common features with the goals of the trade unions, which unfortunately are presently going through a serious crisis of confidence, precisely due to passivity in defending the vital interests of the working people. Party committees should help trade unions find their voice in a difficult situation, help them achieve consolidation with the worker movement, and on this foundation assist in deepening perestroika processes in this republic.

The party has clearly stated that it makes no claim to a monopoly on the truth as the final authority. It is willing to engage in dialogue with representatives of any and all political movements which are striving to deepen perestroika and whose goal is to improve people's lives. While calling for joint effort, however, we cannot make concessions on fundamental issues of party policy. Today, for example, there is a great deal of talk about a multiparty system, and frequently without a thorough

grasp of this term, and sometimes even indiscriminately embracing all initiative societal movements.

Manipulation of the very term "multiparty system" takes place in less than comprehensive presentations geared to the common level, with deliberate failure to mention that both a despotic regime and an antipopular policy, far from the interests of society and genuine democratic rule, may be hiding behind its facade. Take, for example, just one general excerpt from the democratic and Marxist platforms, dealing with ethnic national movements. Neither makes any attempt to point out the difference between the legitimate demands of peoples pertaining to their ethnic and cultural revival and the activities of extreme nationalist and chauvinist groups, which pursue the aim solely of confederation and of seizing power even by means of terror tactics and bloodshed. And yet without this demarcation one should not proceed with resolving nationalities problems in society, whether it be at the all-union level or within a specific region.

Nor can one perceive a multiparty system as a panacea for all the social ills which we are combating. Not merely slogans and declarations stand behind the very term "party," as some today have the impression, but rather the interests of various strata of society, the ability, readiness and willingness to defend them, to implement them with political and economic methods. It is hardly likely that many of the movements claiming the role of a party realize the complexity of this work.

In any case, we must be thoroughly familiar with the aims and tasks of the various political platforms and movements, and we must be able to engage in reasoned debate with their leaders. In building mutual relations with them and hammering out our position regarding a multiparty system, however, it was hardly appropriate for us to look at other regions or listen to the "specialists" who have appeared in great number, who seem to be able to give recommendations for all situations. In the final analysis events in the republics are not evolving according to a single scenario; we have our own characteristic features, and we should not copy somebody else's experience, experience which in addition has not always been successful.

We should bear in mind that the people of Kazakhstan have retained profound hopes for healthy forces in the CPSU and faith in our party. We should proceed from this in drawing up our policy and program of action. In particular, Communists cannot ignore attempts to utilize political pluralism for the purpose of whipping up social tension and destabilizing the situation. It seems necessary in this connection to go to the republic Supreme Soviet with a legislative initiative and to reflect in the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR regulations for forming new political entities and the manner and procedure of their functioning taking into account the realities in our republic. This is essential on the road toward a state governed by rule of law.

In the situation which the country and this republic are experiencing, political indoctrination work has many common features with actions to strengthen rule of law, legality, social and labor discipline. It is important to make every effort to enhance the reputation of law enforcement agencies and to expand glasnost in their activities via active cooperation with the mass media. Party organizations are pledged to step up indoctrination work and to instill in people a respect for law and order. It is our direct duty, if you will, to instill in everybody a respect for the law; democracy should not be confused with total license.

In developing and improving lawmaking, we should seek to ensure that each and every legislative enactment functions actively. Although we have good laws in this republic, their implementation is not yet backed up by adequate prosecutor oversight, especially in the social domain, connected with implementation of labor and housing laws and enactments regulating trade and services. Oversight pertaining to observance of the legal protection of citizens is also being inadequately exercised.

It is the duty of Communists working in law enforcement agencies to seek to ensure unconditional supremacy of the law in all domains of republic affairs and to respond severely to instances of departure from legal standards, occurrence of tendentiousness in judicial processes, red tape, and an indifferent attitude toward worker petitions and complaints.

Renewing and refurbishing the ideological and political arsenal and giving free rein to innovativeness and initiative in the spiritual/intellectual and ethical/moral [nravstvennyy] domain, the Kazakhstan Communist Party will endeavor to create conditions enabling people to have confidence in the future and to preserve the unity of aspirations and ideals, which is so necessary to us at the present time. We are for humanitarian, democratic socialism grounded on free, unconstrained labor, cultural and scientific-technological advance, and social justice. This is the main pivot today around which diversified ideological work should be conducted.

#### **Economic Sovereignty—Basis For This Republic's Prosperity**

Practical implementation of the Leninist idea of socialism depends in large measure on how rapidly and effectively economic reform is implemented. The most intensive effort is in progress within this domain, affecting deep strata in the affairs of society. It is precisely for this reason that this problem is so heavily emphasized in the draft Platform of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee for the congress.

Today people are not simply concerned but greatly alarmed by the situation developing in the economy. Distortions in economic policy, where over the course of decades the bulk of investment has been channeled into capital-intensive group A branches with their slow and low rate of return on investment, have led to loss of

dynamic response and diminished effectiveness of production. The republic was single-mindedly assigned the role of a raw-materials adjunct for the entire country, with all consequences proceeding therefrom. We paid too high a price for the selfish policy dictated from the central level, which demanded that attention be concentrated only on certain branches and that we not concern ourselves with such "trivia" as consumer goods, social, cultural, and consumer services. If anybody obtained any benefits, it certainly was not the people of Kazakhstan, but only the republic's former leaders, who were pleasing the whims of the all-union ministries. Today, however, when the discipline of interrepublic supply flows has crumbled, the central executive authority has proven powerless to help us. This has placed our economy and the consumer domain in an extremely difficult position.

Of course republic agencies have attempted to make corrective adjustments as they went along. We even succeeded in achieving some positive trends in the economy. The main trend among these is a turn by the economy toward social needs. In the past four years of the five-year plan the consumer goods industry has shown an output increase of 23.7 percent, while the counterpart figure for group A is 14.2 percent. Goods production has increased by almost 35.7 percent. Appreciable changes to the benefit of the social domain have also taken place in capital investment policy. With an overall increase in state capital investment in the economy of approximately one third, capital investment volume in housing construction has risen by a factor of almost 1.5. The five-year plan target for bringing housing on-stream was reached in the first quarter of this year. The pace of construction of schools, outpatient clinics, and hospitals has increased substantially.

Food supply has improved thanks to a trend toward increased agricultural production. Meat production has grown by more than 285,000 tons over the average annual level in the last five-year plan, and the corresponding growth figure for milk is 649,000 tons. One third of the growth was obtained by outpacing growth in the individual sector. This republic was one of the first in the country to remove restrictions in this domain, as a result of which the total quantity of cattle owned by private citizens increased by 500,000 head, with a 1.5 million increase for sheep and goats, and 100,000 for hogs. Healthy growth in the number of orchard plots and vegetable gardens has helped in providing the public with foodstuffs: the number of families with summer-cottage plots with fruit trees has increased by 302,000 in the last four years, while the figure for family plots with vegetable gardens has increased by 82,000. The cooperative movement is growing stronger: in a year's time enterprises in this domain produce more than one and a half billion rubles worth of goods and services.

These results are by no means reassuring to us, however, since they are far from meeting existing needs. And they were also achieved with an unpromising, artificial combination of command-administrative and economic

methods. We are still far from a stable and balanced economy. The present economic and sociopolitical situation in this country and in this republic dictates the need for decisive measures to form and shape an economic environment which would create incentives for highly-productive labor, initiative and enterprise, and would focus on accomplishing essential structural changes.

How is this to be accomplished? The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee sees affirmation of the principles of economic sovereignty of this republic as a way out of the crisis situation. But in order to obtain the possibility of dealing with new directions in the economy, it is essential to attain an aggregate of political and legal standards. Of central importance among these is formal legal articulation of the status of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state which constructs its relations with the USSR and the other republics on the basis of treaties. We are in favor of a federative union, but we believe that the republic should delegate to the central authority only a portion of its rights, and at the republic's own discretion. Herein lies the essence of the matter. To use the words of V. I. Lenin, "we want a voluntary union of nations..., a union which would be grounded on total trust and confidence, on a clear consciousness and awareness of fraternal unity, on the basis of entirely voluntary consent...."

At the present time both confidence and consent are empty words for Kazakhstan, as, incidentally, is the declaration contained in our country's Fundamental Law [Constitution] to the effect that each union republic is an independent state entity. In fact, can a state be called sovereign if it is not the sole and absolute owner of its land and natural resources? In this republic union-level management control encompasses 93 percent of Kazakhstan's industry. It is obvious to any sensible individual that if there is no control over the economy, there is no sovereignty.

During the period of stagnation fine words about the untold riches of Kazakhstan roamed from book to book, from article to article. But not once was an attempt made to analyze why this republic, while possessing truly immense potential and producing enormous quantities of valuable commodities, found itself in the status of an underdeveloped nation. One need not go far for an answer, for workforces did not have at their disposal the results of their labor; at best the republic's people received crumbs from the republic's wealth. Everything was dragged off to distant ministerial granaries and treasure-houses.

Each year from 1.3 to 1.5 billion dollars worth of various raw materials is exported from Kazakhstan; 10-12 million tons of grain are contributed to national stocks, as are more than 300,000 tons of meat and 270,000 tons of milk. But we rank only ninth in the USSR in consumption of foodstuffs and 10th in level of housing provision. And how does one reconcile the existence of extremely poor segments of the population with the nature of our

system? More than 2.5 million persons in this republic, or almost one out of every six, has a monthly income of less than 75 rubles. Only 4 percent of the population has such miserably low income in the Baltic republics, for example.

This is the legacy we have received. And we, knowing our strengths and our capabilities, do not intend to go on living this way. It is not mere happenstance that the idea of presidential authority gained such enormous support in this republic, with literally all strata of the Kazakhstan population favoring the establishment of such authority. The very logic of life demanded that we take this step, since it did not seem possible to stand up to authoritarian methods in the area of national and state organizational development and ministerial dictate in the economy with the former structures of control and management. Only presidential authority, consolidating executive and legislative elements, can ensure the effective operation of the entire mechanism of state, overcome rigid centralization of the economy, and defend the interests of the republic and its citizens.

It would seem that, being under the influence of the ministries, some CPSU Central Committee leaders and union government officials do not want to understand our firm position. In spite of serious and well-reasoned argument, the granting of sovereignty to this republic is being dragged out. In addition, recently the central agencies have begun displaying their "muscle," prohibiting freedom of external economic relations. And yet separatist forces, seeking collapse of the Union, are exploiting such shortsightedness for their own interests. It is precisely delay in settling the matter of sovereignty which has served as one of the reasons for centrifugal movement on the part of certain republics.

Right now, when the economic reform is entering a decisive phase, all the republics of our Union are in particular need of close unity, firm and stable national consent, without which the most scientific, the most reliable economic plan and concept will collapse like a house of cards. No wonder all Soviet citizens are following the proceedings of the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies with such hope and concern, for the future of the entire country depends on the direction which will be taken by Russia—the backbone of our federation. On behalf of the Communists of Kazakhstan, on behalf of our congress I would like to express fervent confidence that the struggle by the people of Russia for their sovereignty, a struggle which is so near and understandable to us, will not result in separatism and irresponsibility toward those peoples which Great Russia gathered together and united. And although Kazakhstan is not a "poor relation" in the family of Soviet peoples, and its place and significance in the national division of labor is well known, we feel that we cannot allow the republics, like quarreling neighbors sharing a communal kitchen, to start counting up who owes whom and how much covering the period of joint residence.

Economic autonomy is not some kind of fad but rather an urgent need for societal development, a component part of genuine political sovereignty. Nor do we want to tour Moscow offices "with outstretched hand" in order to obtain a subsidy—which after all has been earned by us—with a humiliating stigma for the people of Kazakhstan. But this by no means signifies a desire for isolation or introversion. We see in economic autonomy a means to establish diversified economic ties both within this country and abroad. Kazakhstan possesses truly immense potential for establishing long-term mutually beneficial external economic contacts, establishing joint ventures with foreign companies, and establishing free economic zones. All this is vitally essential, since the republic's economy cannot be boosted in rapid fashion without attracting foreign capital. It is not a matter merely of outright pragmatism. We can and should borrow on world experience in a time of openness and broadening of international contacts.

Some things have already been accomplished in this direction. Three external economic associations and 19 joint ventures, as well as the Kazakhintorg Foreign Trade Association, are operating on the territory of this republic. As you know, literally a few days ago an agreement was signed in Washington with an American trade consortium concerning joint exploitation of the natural resources of West Kazakhstan. This agreement will be carried out with the primary and direct participation of this republic and will first and foremost help increase the prosperity of the people of Kazakhstan. Right now it is important to consolidate and expand ties in the processing of waste materials from production processes: stocks of secondary resources amassed at our enterprises run into the billions of tons. If foreign technology is sensibly utilized, we can not only conserve natural resources but also obtain substantial hard-currency revenues. We are presently addressing this matter. It is also necessary to establish joint ventures for the production of electronic goods, complex household appliances, building materials, and "turnkey" construction projects on a compensation basis. We must make maximum use of favorable opportunities to expand trade and economic relations with the adjacent border region of China and with other countries on the Asian continent. In the future we should seek to attain a situation whereby all branches and sectors of the republic's economy without exception are drawn into the domain of external economic and scientific-technical relations.

But exercise of our possibilities once again comes up against a solid wall of prohibitions, quotas and licenses imposed by the central ministries. The bureaucratic obstacles they are setting out are trying not only our patience but that of many Western businessmen, who do not want to deal with all-union ministries but want to establish economic and trade relations directly with the republics. The rigid centralization of external relations is becoming a ridiculous archaism, especially when framed by pretty words about economic sovereignty, which,

incidentally, emanate from that same central authority. The workforces of Kazakhstan do not want to put up any longer with this state of affairs.

As for transition to market-oriented relations, practical realities have demonstrated the importance of this radical economic act. Recently, however, the commonplace word "market" has been filled with disturbing content and is causing people to have considerable apprehensions. The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee feels that it is essential to state its position on this burning issue.

First of all it is apparent that during the entire history of the Soviet State we have failed to find stimuli or incentives for influencing production and the domain of distribution, competition on an equal basis, and entrepreneur initiative, which are inherent in market-economy relations.

Secondly, there exist objective patterns and mechanisms of development of the economy which are not subject to ideology. The market, with its money-exchange relations, is one of these areas. V. I. Lenin himself came to this understanding, but his successors at the helm of government led the country along another road, the road of rule by administrative fiat. Consequently the planned transition to a market-oriented economy is dictated not only by the present crisis state of the economy but also by the entire objective course of its development. Sooner or later we would be compelled to take this step. The present moment merely aggravates the situation and demands that society immediately make a choice.

The principal law of the marketplace is the law of supply and demand. Capital investment, the energies of enterprising individuals, and the attention of business executives flow to where there is demand. A command economy is powerless to make such a turn. Enormous amounts of free cash have amassed in the hands of the public, but the heavy, poorly maneuverable, bureaucratized state of the command economy cannot accomplish a turn in the direction of unsatisfied demand, which under market-economy conditions is capable of causing an immense upsurge in production and in the service industry. Things cannot go on like this. We must therefore either decide right now to adopt a market-oriented system, or we shall proceed toward it in any case over the course of long, agonizing years. This country has reached a point where the civic courage to endure temporary discomfort for the sake of prosperity in the near future is required of each of us.

Shifting this country and this republic over to a market economy involves substantial difficulties, not only socio-economic but ideological as well. For decades the notion of the harmfulness of money-exchange relations and a mixed economy has been pounded into our heads. It is true that we have arrived at an understanding of the need for pluralism of property ownership, but the ideology of barracks socialism is holding us firmly in its grasp and is pulling us back. It is probably for this reason that we still,

using various pretexts, avoid responding to the question: but will we have a full-fledged market without even small-scale private ownership—a most important component of a market economy? In actual fact we have already arrived at this point, in the form of individual ownership, but we are afraid to call a spade a spade. Unfortunately such “delayed ignition” is becoming in this country a chronic ailment both of ideological and administrative agencies.

We see how the ideas of economic accountability are being shamelessly distorted and adoption of the lease arrangement and other progressive methods of economic management is being impeded. It seemed that lease arrangement was the talk of the town, and yet only 3.9 percent of industrial enterprises, 9.7 percent of construction enterprises, and less than 1 percent of trade and service enterprises are involved in lease arrangements. Only one concern and six voluntary associations of goods producers have been established in this republic. Veiled threats emanate from the central ministries: don't even think about gaining any kind of independence. All this is nothing other than relapses to the past, which are capable of becoming a serious obstacle to perestroika. This is why we cannot stop, let alone retreat from our stated path. A market economy must be allowed to build up a full head of steam, establishing in society an atmosphere of universal vested interest and creating incentives for highly-productive labor, initiative and enterprise. Otherwise we risk remaining outside the development of civilization.

We must be prepared both for price increases, for a temporary decline in living standards connected with price increases, and for unemployment. It would be criminal deliberately to ignore the possibility of occurrence of these phenomena. But we want to emphasize that during the period of renewal of the economy considerable work will be done to ensure the social protection of our people, especially low-income segments of the population. An aggregate of broad-scale measures has been drawn up, which will help overcome a negative attitude toward a market-oriented economy. These measures include passage of a number of important laws: against monopoly, on enterprises, on unemployment, and on compensating the public for price increases. Finally, we must obtain the consent and support of the people before we set about to take this radical step. In this connection it is essential persistently to explain to people that there is no more effective way to accomplish an upsurge in the economy than the development of free-market relations.

Strengthening labor discipline should play an important role in the aggregate of measures to accomplish the material and psychological preparation of working people for life in conditions of a market economy. It is a utopian notion to continue working like we are working today and to expect strong results from the new economic mechanism. This very mechanism, however, will make short work of loafers, chronic absentee workers, profiteers, and other social spongers and idlers. For this

reason a number of legal enactments are already being formulated, with the aim of substantially increasing the responsibility both of the rank-and-file workers and of management for the level of labor and production discipline.

We hope that the congress will support measures aimed at radicalization of the economic reform and that this republic's Communists will manifest during this strenuous period a maximum of businesslike efficiency, composure, and well-reasoned actions.

One must bear in mind the fact that, in firmly championing the principle of republic self-government in conditions of a market economy, we are taking upon ourselves a great deal of responsibility, for we shall be acting, without any help or prompting from the higher echelon, decisively to alter the raw-materials directional thrust of our industry, to develop science-intensive high-tech industries at an accelerated pace, and to bring the level of light industry and the food processing industry into conformity with requirements. Implementation of important social programs—housing, food, consumer goods manufacture, environmental, and others—will remain a matter of priority importance.

In specific terms, this year we are to bring on-line approximately nine million square meters of housing, and this level is to be a transition to a tougher housing construction phase. We must work consistently to develop cooperative and individual construction, with the target of boosting construction volume in these categories to at least 40 percent.

Major structural changes are contained in the economic development plan. There will be a sharp increase in production of consumer goods. This year consumer goods production is to rise to almost 50 percent above the normal average annual figure, that is, we must make a substantial move forward in transformation of the material and technological foundation of those industries producing for the consumer market.

We should rely more extensively on cooperative and entrepreneurship activity and devote particular attention to the establishment of small enterprises, branch facilities of large enterprises in areas with a labor-force surplus, as well as joint-venture production enterprises with foreign companies. Manufacture of complex household appliances must be set up as rapidly as possible through conversion and reconfiguration of the defense industry.

Normalization of the financial situation has become an urgent immediate task. Intensive printing and issuing of currency is at present not being backed up by a corresponding increase in production volume. Last year, for example, average monthly wages increased by 8.9 percent, while gross societal product rose by only 1.2 percent. Urgent measures to accomplish recovery from our financial crisis include issuing of specific loans for republic enterprises, sale of bonds, stocks, and other securities. It is essential sharply to cut back capital

spending in order to strengthen the ruble. In this country more than 11 billion rubles are "frozen" just in uncompleted construction alone. We cannot continue running the economy in this manner.

The situation regarding for-payment services to the public also requires fundamental change. The achieved rate of growth should delude nobody, for up to the present time we have in this domain settled for a stone-age level of comfort. And yet this republic possesses enormous unutilized potential for development of excursion and tourism business and for provision of services by cultural establishments and service enterprises. There are also vast opportunities for development of various forms of entrepreneurial activities.

No matter how difficult the road to a market economy may be, we must resolutely set about to bring order within trade and commerce and on the whole within the domain of consumer services, public utilities and municipal services, and public transportation, for people's attitude toward perestroika and socialism is formed precisely here. This is why all-out support by healthy forces is so needed in these domains, assistance in creating solid incentives for high quality of labor and provision of decent services.

We must radically alter views on and approaches to provision of health services, focusing attention on eliminating the social causes of diseases: providing a balanced diet, safe drinking water, and adequate living conditions. There is a high incidence of tuberculosis and brucellosis in this republic, and there are many unresolved matters pertaining to protection of mothers and children. More than 65 percent of hospital and outpatient-clinic facilities are housed in ill-suited or decrepit buildings, and approximately one third do not even offer elementary conditions for providing medical care. Recently-undertaken measures to improve medical care should be combined with expansion of opportunities to engage in physical exercise and sports.

The ideas of humanization of society are inconceivable without solicitude for the elderly and the disabled. Important steps have been taken in this republic to improve things for these groups. We must also more fully utilize the potential for enterprises to establish supplementary pension payments, and we must work more actively to enable the disabled and pensioners to perform labor and civic activity to the extent of their ability.

Environmental problems are particularly critical. Today they determine not only people's mood and attitude, which of itself is important, but also determine concern about the future and about providing an adequate living environment both for us and for future generations. The problems of the Aral Sea, Balkhash, the Semipalatinsk region, and a number of rayons in Chimkent, Dzhambul, Pavlodar, East Kazakhstan, and Ural oblasts have today become a genuine national tragedy. We are totally in support of the demand by the people of Kazakhstan for the immediate banning of nuclear weapons testing, and

we call upon all the peoples of Central Asia to take part in the noble endeavor to save the Aral Sea.

The people of this republic are quite legitimately raising the question of whether it is right to permit millions of hectares of Kazakhstan's land to be used as various proving grounds, ranges, test sites and other military installations. While in no way questioning our nation's vital need to strengthen defense, we demand that the USSR Government and military agencies conduct together with us a full review of military-claimed areas, that some of this land be returned to economic use and, most important, that compensation be paid to the public for all material, environmental, and moral losses sustained in connection with the use of land for defense needs.

The faulty practice of placing the interests of production above all else and the unthinking policy of the central ministries, which have rapaciously exploited natural resources, have brought the republic to serious ecological consequences. The task consists in party organizations being able to coordinate the efforts of soviet bodies and the general public, in establishing a united front to combat unwise effects on the environment, and setting the goal of educating people in a spirit of a conservationist attitude toward nature.

In the press of dealing with current matters, we should in no way forget about carrying out in the economy measures of a strategic nature. While fully focusing the economy on social priorities, one should not lose sight of very important items pertaining to intensification of production and increasing production efficiency, connected primarily with speeding up scientific and technological advance. Poor product quality and increasing capital and materials intensiveness continue to be unresolved problems.

We are risking discrediting the new economic-accountability relations by assuming that self-financing is capable of automatically ensuring growth of intensive factors. Since profit incremental growth today constitutes a synthesizing indicator of economic activity, Communists in the republic Council of Ministers and Gosplan, as well as at industrial enterprises, must achieve a close interlinkage between this indicator on the one hand and the adoption of new technology and increase in production efficiency on the other. In the economy the forms and methods of a uniform scientific and technical policy, management of adoption of scientific advances and new technologies, legal protection of intellectual property, and increasing responsibility for the utilization of scientific and technological advances should be clearly defined and formulated in law.

Management structures should be in a continuous process of renewal. But if ministries and agencies, both national-level and republic, simply change names without altering functional qualities, their future in the new conditions will be rather questionable, since a market economy has no need for any "index finger." We

must proceed more boldly with the establishment of multibranch, economically strong companies not subordinate to ministries, as well as associations and consortiums. Wherever there is a high degree of concentration of production, its demonopolization and denationalization as well as the establishment of a network of small enterprises receptive to scientific and technical innovations become very important. Economic management on the basis of the laws of the marketplace will result in breakup of the established system of agencies of administration and management, weakening of the vertical line of control and strengthening of horizontal linkages. Perestroika of the organizational-economic and technological structure of this republic's economic complex is therefore inevitable. But we cannot let this process proceed by inertia, passively waiting for the process itself to lead to a fundamentally new economic model. One should predict new structures in advance, on the basis of advanced economic thought and world practices, and speed up their formation. A special commission formed at the initiative of the Central Committee and republic government, the members of which also include leading scientists from Moscow, is presently working on this.

Communists working at enterprises of the so-called "base" branches (incidentally, this term was thought up in order to perpetuate ministerial dictate) should also take active part in this process and endeavor to secure genuine autonomy for their enterprises, because today the ministries have power over them only because they control the distribution of material resources and equipment. If the republic Gosnab assumes these functions prior to establishing stable horizontal ties, the need for ministries will disappear by itself, and if such ties are established, it should be only on the terms of the enterprises themselves. In particular, all profit with the exception of fixed taxes should remain at the disposal of the workforce. This means that people will genuinely feel a linkage between the quantity and quality of their labor and improvement in living conditions.

In the economy it is essential relentlessly to seek elimination of the psychology of freeloading and the habit of judging results not according to actual realities but on the basis of "from what has been achieved" criteria established by the system of rule by administrative fiat. This particularly applies to the domain of agricultural production. The knot of food-supply problems is becoming increasingly tighter, and people in their daily lives little perceive those changes in which, by habit, people in our country are already beginning to take silent pride. But the people cannot be convinced that success has been achieved, not even with the most persuasive statistics on growth in agricultural output, until store shelves become filled.

One cannot help but note, however, that in the village we already are seeing many signs of the new. Having placed people's interests at the focus of economic reforms, we have succeeded in achieving tangible results. The people of Kazakhstan were among the first in the country to adopt the lease agreement. And it quickly demonstrated

its effectiveness. For example, production profitability has risen from 19 to 41 percent on the more than 50 sovkhozes and kolkhozes which began adopting the lease arrangement in 1987.

But our misfortune most probably lies in the very fact that these individual successes have not spread to all agricultural enterprises. We must, with party firmness and integrity, give a clear-cut answer to the question: what is hindering us from fundamentally resolving the food problem and implementing what was specified at the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum?

As we see it, it is primarily the fact that the new economic mechanism in the village has not yet gotten up to speed. Many party committees are captive to old methods of economic management, are unable and sometimes unwilling to change economic relations which have outlived their usefulness. Managers are impeding the lease arrangement, cooperative farming, and integration, and in some places they are passing off the anticipated for the actual. Even the not particularly large number of rural workforces which have shifted to a lease contract arrangement—35 percent—does not correspond to the true state of affairs. Some managers are slyly passing off the garden-variety individual piece-rate arrangement as a lease arrangement, or are attempting to stuff old content into a new form.

One is astounded at the endless debates by supporters and opponents of the sovkhoz-kolkhoz system and claims that somebody has given up as a bad idea the traditional system of farm operation. On the contrary, it has been emphasized repeatedly that all forms of ownership in agriculture should develop on a basis of equality. Sovkhozes and kolkhozes will unquestionably continue to be the backbone of agroindustrial production. Peasant farms are essential, however, in conditions of a regulated market economy. Joint-stock forms of ownership also merit particular attention, forms which make it possible actively to enlist working people to participation in enterprise ownership.

The state procurement order essentially withers away in conditions of a market economy. The introduction of a foodstuffs tax, the volume of which will be secured by the requisite material-technical resources and procured at government prices, while remaining output will be purchased at market prices, will enable farms, leaseholders, and unions of cooperative farmers to seek optimal variations of actions. We must put an end to the practice of receiving non-repayable loans as well as support of farms operating at a loss at the expense of profitable farm operations.

All these items were examined in detail at a republic conference of agroindustrial complex workers. Priority targets to be attained by agricultural workers by the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan were also specified at this conference. I would like to reiterate them before this forum. We must boost annual consumption of meat

products per capita to 85-90 kilograms, milk to 358 kilograms, and vegetables, squash and melons [bakhchevye] to 130 kilograms.

Nevertheless, no matter what ways are chosen to resolve the food problem, we should not forget that Kazakhstan has been and continues to be a major commodity grain producer. Efficient utilization of this republic's land resources must be subordinated to accomplishing this task, and we must increase return on investment of massive funds on adoption of intensive-farming technologies.

We must continue persistent efforts to boost the capacity of processing enterprises. The acuteness of this problem is diminishing only slowly, and production losses remain very high. One result of the lagging behind of the processing branches is the fact that, while possessing favorable soil and climatic conditions, this republic continues to haul in from elsewhere fruits, potatoes, vegetable oil, confectionery products, pasta products, margarine, and other items. And yet reducing losses to a minimum would make it possible to boost annual meat consumption by 6 kilograms, milk by 26, and vegetables, squash and melons by 29 kilograms.

A substantial deficiency lies in the fact that practically no assistance by agricultural science is being felt. The "research-production-adoption" cycle is too stretched out, and financing is channeled not by area of scientific inquiry but rather by institute.

While leveling justified complaints against the workers of the agroindustrial complex for the slow growth in food production, we should not forget that our society is still deeply in debt to the village, especially as regards resolving social problems. What is planned in this regard? In the 13th Five-Year Plan we are to increase capital spending in the rural nonproduction domain by 50 percent over the current five-year plan, with an increase in road construction by a factor of 2.8, and increase in provision of natural-gas and water supply by a factor of 2.2. There will be a significant strengthening of the construction industry base, with increased production of local building materials.

Problems of development of socially backward rayons, especially rural hinterlands, where the bulk of the indigenous population lives, are of first priority.

In summarizing the above, I would like to emphasize that we are standing at the threshold of big changes. The transition to a regulated market economy will objectively lead to achieving material-financial balance. This will require enormous organizational and practical work, however, a search for fundamentally new, bold approaches to accomplishing practical day-to-day tasks. The Communist Party and party members bear great responsibility during this period. It is important not to manifest perplexity or confusion, and it is important to have a clear-cut program at each stage of the reform and to be demanding on oneself and on one's every action.

### Restructuring of Intraparty Affairs—A Demand of the Times

Radical restructuring of the entirety of intraparty affairs is an urgent task of the day. We have already proceeded with this task, making appropriate amendments to the Kazakh SSR Constitution and confirming in the pre-congress platform our intention to gain and affirm the right to political leadership only by concrete deeds and daily work to improve people's lives.

The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee concentrated its attention in the period under review on restructuring direction of the activities of party committees and organizations. We adopted a resolute policy of division of the functions of party, governmental, and economic management agencies, transfer of genuine power to the soviets, democratization of internal party affairs, eradication of authoritarian methods, and increasing the autonomy of the republic party organization. A number of conceptual documents were adopted, as well as specific programs and recommendations pertaining to priority areas and directions of party work efforts. Thanks to this, the republic party organization retained initiative in many important matters which exert enormous influence on the sociopolitical climate. Communists are becoming masters in their own organizations in a practical way and are exerting genuine influence on drafting and implementing party policy.

I shall not deny that the Central Committee proposal pertaining to conduct of a report-election campaign on the eve of the congress, and in addition on a fundamentally new basis, where election of party committee members and secretaries and delegates to conferences and congresses were conducted on a contested-election basis, by direct, secret ballot, was initially given a hostile reception by many party committees. This idea was given full support by rank-and-file party members, however, and this year's campaign differed considerably from past campaigns by its openness, extensive glasnost, and high degree of activeness by party members. A total of 141 secretaries of city and rayon committees, including 59 first secretaries, were elected on the basis of a choice between two or more candidates. The first secretaries of the Guryev, Karaganda, Kokchetav and Chimkent oblast party committees were also elected on a contested-election basis.

We should note thereby that the fact of a contested election is not some miraculous remedy by means of which we eliminate all problems. If party members have confidence in their leader, support his program of action, and consider his proposed work methods acceptable, then it hardly makes sense to create artificial obstacles in his path.

In analyzing the results of the reports and elections, we should ask ourselves the following question: why is it that there has occurred a fairly substantial replacement of what would seem to be veteran party officials with many years of experience? Apparently even after five years of perestroyka, the inalterable truth that party

leadership is political leadership proved difficult for many of them. Hence a propensity toward a command style, toward rule by administrative fiat, toward broad-brush prohibition and improper response to criticism, that is, a propensity for that which people do not wish to tolerate today.

It is likely that the fact that Ye. F. Bashmakov, who quite recently assumed the position of first secretary of the Karaganda Oblast Party Committee, lost the election may seem unexpected only at first blush. There is no question, and this was emphasized at the oblast conference, about Yevgeniy Fedorovich's honesty and decency, his high degree of professional expertise, his considerable experience and devotion to the cause. But let us call a spade a spade. He failed to abandon the coercive-pressure style of party executive management, and he failed to establish a constructive dialogue with the public, and particularly with the worker movement, which in this industrial region is not only a fact of life but also a genuine force, and by no means a destructive force.

A generally similar situation developed in the Kokchetav, Chimkent, and Taldy-Kurgan oblast party organizations. People voted for those whom they actually trust—democratically-inclined champions of perestroika, who listen to the opinion of the party masses, who enjoy considerable respect and possess a great deal of political experience. Oblast party committees have 70-percent new membership, while the turnover percentage is 80 percent for city and rayon committees. This is natural and logical. The Communist Party Central Committee supports the democratic choice of party members. Incidentally, there was more than a 75 percent turnover in the Central Committee.

Elimination of branch departments in the party committees and exclusion from plenum and bureau agendas of items which do not fall within their jurisdiction also represents a realistic step toward transferring to the soviets those functions which are not appropriate to the party. This of course does not mean that the party will stand apart from implementation of social and economic programs. Experience indicates that as soon as party influence on their implementation weakens, problems are inevitable. But the forms and methods of this influence should be political.

During the years since the 16th Congress, membership of the Kazakhstan Communist Party has increased by 31,600, and now totals 842,400 CPSU full members and probationary members. Almost three fourths of the recently-accepted 104,000 probationary members work in the domain of material production. A total of 91 ethnic groups are represented in the membership of the republic Communist Party.

In spite of these positive figures, the Central Committee feels that the practical business of forming party ranks needs improvement. We cannot help but be concerned that fewer workers are joining the CPSU, particularly in

the Alma-Ata, Aktyubinsk, and North Kazakhstan oblast party organizations. Many worthy workers, especially young people, remain outside the field of view of party organizations and frequently exercise their need for political activity in unofficial associations of various types.

We can see that there has appeared among a portion of CPSU members a defeatist attitude and doubt as to the need for the initiated reforms. They include persons who have displayed cowardice and confusion. The party has parted ways with them. One should probably not overdramatize this situation. The manner of leaving the party is another thing altogether. We have serious objections to the provision in the draft CPSU Party Rules pertaining to free and unrestricted resignation from the party. Judging from numerous suggestions by party members, at the very least a notice of resignation should be considered by the primary party organization, and resignation proper should be treated as expulsion. The point is not to return to party trial and expulsion, to the practice of persecution; the point is the need for a firm decision in such cases. We cannot turn the party into a revolving door and reduce acceptance to party membership to a mere formality.

As we discuss perestroika in the party, we must also address the matter of the activities of its primary components. We have the task of increasing their autonomy and no longer fettering the initiative of the primary organizations. We became convinced of the need for this after establishing the republic council of secretaries of primary party organizations. Participation by its members in preparing materials for plenary sessions and in Central Committee activities promotes the establishment of a direct linkage between party primary organizations and central bodies. And we intend to continue this policy.

We urgently recommend that party committees fully support the primary organizations, and particularly their secretaries. This should entail both moral and, when necessary, material assistance. The primary organization secretary is a central figure in our work. On the whole the administrative apparatus of the party committee should organize its activities proceeding primarily from the needs and interests of the leaders of primary organizations and the advice of secretaries at all levels.

Personnel work directly affects the pace and depth of perestroika processes. Recently there has been a considerable change in approach to the nomenclatura of party committees. The nomenclatura of Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee positions has been reduced by two thirds in comparison with the 1985 figure, while the figure has been cut in half for oblast, city, and rayon party committees. The main thrust of restructuring of cadre policy is transfer of authority to the localities, as well as a transfer "horizontally"—to the appropriate governmental and public organizations.

The job of dismantling the nomenklatura mechanism should definitely be continued. It is essentially described in the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee draft Platform. The aim is to eliminate all dictate whatsoever, any and all imposition of candidates, administrative fiat in placement of cadres, as well as downward delegating of authority in determination of personnel matters—from higher to lower-echelon party committees, as well as ensuring consistent exercise of authority in these matters by agencies of government authority and administration and by public organizations. Party committees shall determine their position as regards personnel primarily in the form of recommendations.

In renewing and refurbishing personnel work, we must return from oblivion the concept of party comradeship and raise it to a respectable height. Its meaning lies in devotion to the cause, to communist ideals, in profound trust toward one another, which at the same time signifies full equality of rights and obligations. Only by implementing a policy of deepening party comradeship and increasing demandingness on party members shall we be able to unite party members, rallying them behind the accomplishment of those enormous tasks which perestroika has brought.

Party comradeship should also find specific expression in attitude toward and treatment of veteran party members, for it sometimes happens that once a person retires—a person who has devoted decades to the party and to party work—he is totally separated from the affairs of his collective, becoming a “second-class” CPSU member, so to speak. What other than bitterness and bewilderment can be aroused in him by such excommunication from his party organization and registration with a housing office or other “pensioner” establishment? In my opinion such a heartless bureaucratic approach to party veterans is not only insulting but shortsighted as well. We are robbing ourselves, depriving ourselves of the support and experience of those who have gone through the vast school of life, who have proven their devotion to the party and to its communist ideals. On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party it behooves us to remember all our senior comrades and to help them take a worthy place in our ranks.

I should like to say a few words about the party apparat. This topic is constantly discussed in the newspapers and is constantly being addressed on television and radio. Everybody today is giving it to the apparat and the apparatchiks.... But let us be candid and ask ourselves: are administration and management possible—of production, government, the political organization—on a volunteer basis, without a full-time management and administrative apparatus? I think the answer is obvious: an administrative edifice is needed, but one that has undergone renewal, which is capable of carrying out its functions in a skilled and qualified manner. We proceeded to reduce the size of the party apparat. We have changed its structure. At the same time we have succeeded in significantly refurbishing and strengthening it.

A general party discussion and debate, in the course of which the most varied opinions on the nature and character of the new CPSU Party Rules and on the points and provisions of the party program were stated and passionately defended, constituted the main event on the eve of the 17th Congress of the Kazakhstan Communist Party and the 28th CPSU Congress. A practical, serious discussion was held, in which the majority of Kazakhstan Communists took active part. Based on the results of this discussion, the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee feels that we must state the position of the republic party organization on a number of fundamental issues which in our view will determine the party's future.

First: radical changes in the structure and functions of party organizations should under no circumstances conflict with the ideological thrust of the party, which remains faithful to the principles of socialism. Therefore our goal, which proceeds from the basic tasks of party members, should be clearly defined in the Party Rules. In addition, we feel that the 28th Congress should elect the Politburo and CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and secretaries.

Second: the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee supports numerous proposals pertaining to development of a genuinely Leninist interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism and on consolidation of the fundamentals of ideological and organizational unity of the party. I feel that our position requires a more detailed explanation.

As we know, V. I. Lenin saw as the substance of democratic centralism an ensuring of the broadest possible freedom of discussion and debate, clash of opinions, and the possibility of submitting any alternative proposals at the discussion stage, but unity of actions after a decision has been reached. We sustained considerable losses by stripping from this principle its democratic essence, reducing it to unanimity for the sake of pretense, due to which many hasty, ill-conceived decisions, sometimes tragic in their consequences, were adopted. Can one reject the principle itself, however, merely because it was unskillfully applied, throwing the baby out with the bathwater? A renewed party should return to democratic centralism its original Leninist definition. Otherwise we risk losing our main organizational foundation.

Third: democratization of party internal affairs is inconceivable without altering the status of the Communist parties of the union republics. In this connection I would like to emphasize once again that we do not constitute a Kazakhstan Communist Party outside the CPSU, but relations between the republic Communist parties and the CPSU require serious reanalysis.

As you know, the Kazakhstan Communist Party will be able, within the framework of the CPSU Platform and Party Rules, to adopt its own program documents, to determine its own organizational, cadre, and financial

matters, and to conduct publishing and other entrepreneurial activities. Adoption of the Platform of the Kazakhstan Communist Party at this congress is an important step in this direction.

The renewed status of the republic Communist Party and broadening of its autonomy in determining matters of internal and external policy presume election of a new agency of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee—a Politburo. We view this step as a factor in achieving genuine demarcation of the functions of party and government agencies and a transition to political methods of leadership.

Matters pertaining to forming and disbursement of the party budget, in particular the question of what portion of funds should be placed at the disposal of primary party organizations and what part should go into common party funds, was a subject of sharp discussion at conferences. We feel that the reason for the debate is a lack of glasnost: as a rule rank-and-file party members have no idea where party money goes and how it is spent. Hence the groundless assertions that the lion's share is used to finance the central apparatus. In order to quash any false rumors and idle speculation, I shall state that only 4 percent of the budget goes to pay the salaries of personnel working for the Central Committee and the Institute of Party History attached to the Central Committee, while the remainder is channeled to the lower-echelon party organizations, including primary organizations. Of course the congress should decide what portion of party dues should remain at the disposal of the primary party organization, but I must state the view of the Central Committee on this matter.

At first glance the 50-percent deductions stated in the draft Party Rules would seem to be fair. But let us consider whether all the republic's primary organizations will find themselves operating under equal conditions. Many of them are in different "weight classes," so to speak, as regards membership size and level of party member wages. Can one compare, for example, the budget of the primary organizations of the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine and a sovkhos, office, or school? Centralized redistribution of funds is essential, both from the standpoint of vital party needs and from considerations of party comradeship. Neither the structure of the party nor its operational efficiency can be preserved without this.

Today everybody, both Communists and party-unaffiliated, to whom the cause of socialist renewal is important is concerned about strengthening the prestige of the party and its organizations. This is understandable, since the journey trod by this country and all the complex stages of this journey are connected with the creative, constructive activities of party members. People are placing great hopes on the party, and these hopes can be justified only if substantial, full party internal life and a businesslike, productive atmosphere are ensured in every party organization, if ties with the

masses are strengthened in every possible way and if ideological influence is broadened.

Comrades! In summarizing what has been said, I would like to emphasize that the specific character of the stage of historical development through which we are currently passing lies in the fact that essentially the following item remains on the political agenda: will perestroika start to pick up momentum, will it become consolidated with genuine results, and will new prospects open up for the development of socialism, or will it lose steam, shattering the hopes of millions of people? In adopting the Platform of the republic party organization at our congress and on the whole endorsing the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, we are taking on an incomparable degree of responsibility. Therefore each and every party member, each and every party organization should carefully examine its role and place in society. We must ask ourselves a simple question: who are we—genuine fighters called upon, to use Lenin's words, "to work where the masses are," to march in the vanguard of perestroika, or are we mere followers of perestroika? The answer lies in specific deeds, in genuine improvement in people's lives.

The 28th CPSU Congress lies ahead. This year we shall also be celebrating the 70th anniversary of establishment of the Kazakh SSR and the Kazakhstan Communist Party. These events will unquestionably exert beneficial, stimulating effect on progress in perestroika and the sociopolitical situation. We must maximally combine preparations for these events with active efforts to consolidate all healthy forces within society and to strengthen the people's faith and confidence in the party.

We are well aware that societal unity can be achieved only if we present people with lofty, inspirational goals, goals capable of capturing their minds and hearts. We have such goals; they comprise the very core of the Platform of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee.

First and foremost we shall be striving to affirm the political and economic sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR, for the sake of improving the life of our people. This republic's wealth of resources and mighty economic potential must be placed in the service of the present and future generations of Kazakhstanians, and must constitute the foundation of free, productive labor and prosperity for every individual.

We shall champion the unity of our Union, since we are firmly convinced that the stronger our federation, the more united the Soviet people, the greater will be the prestige and authority of our country, and particularly of each republic, in the eyes of the world community.

Internationalism and fraternal friendship of peoples continues to be our banner. The Kazakhstan Communist Party will defend with its entire prestige and authority the equal rights of this republic's citizens, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, and will ensure the observance of rule of law and legal order.

We support unity of the CPSU, the main consolidating force of perestroyka, which is deeply committed to the concerns and aspirations of the people, and which affirms the ideals of humane, democratic socialism.

I hope that I am expressing the unanimous opinion when I state before this congress that the republic party organization possesses sufficient creative and ideological potential in order not to succumb to confusion and paralysis, to be able to surmount with dignity and honor the difficult ordeals which have fallen to the lot of our generation, and to demonstrate loyalty to the Leninist course of policy and to the socialist choice, the only possible choice for us Communists.

### Law on Status of Kirghiz SSR People's Deputies

90US1061A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 11 May 90 pp 1, 3*

[Law of Kirghiz SSR "On Status of People's Deputies of the Kirghiz SSR" signed by Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Masaliyev in Frunze on 14 April 1990]

[Text] The citizens of the Kirghiz SSR exercise governmental power through the deputies they elect freely to soviets of people's deputies. The deputies, as fully authorized and responsible representatives of the people, are entrusted by the public to express and defend the public interest in the soviets, manage the affairs of state and socioeconomic development, and direct and oversee the operations of the machinery of state.

The deputies are the main element of public self-government in the Soviet society. The immutable principles of the deputies' activity are maximum concern for the needs of voters, public welfare, the reinforcement of Soviet democracy, and the reconciliation of the interests of the individual, social groups, classes, nationalities, and the society as a whole.

The purpose of this law consists in defining the status of all people's deputies in the Kirghiz SSR, their principal powers and performance guarantees, and the deputies' responsibilities to the voters and to the social organizations nominating them, and in creating the necessary conditions for effective work by deputies.

#### I. General Provisions

Article 1. Participation by deputies in the exercise of governmental power

The exercise of governmental power by the soviet of people's deputies will be based on enterprising and active participation by each deputy in its work.

By participating in the work of the Supreme Soviet and of local soviets of people's deputies and their organs, deputies will make major decisions on governmental, economic, and sociocultural policies, pass laws and other soviet resolutions, and oversee the work of governmental and other agencies, enterprises, establishments, and organizations.

The actions of deputies will be guided by the public interest, will express and defend the interests of their constituents, and will be taken with a view to the distinctive economic, cultural, ethnic, and other features of the republic, oblast, rayon, city, village, or rural soviet within the territory of which the deputies exercise their authority.

The deputy will plan his work in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the Kirghiz SSR and the resolutions of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies and the mandates of voters and social organizations and will strive to carry out his campaign program.

#### Article 2. Legislation on the powers of deputies

The powers of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR are vested in them by the Constitution of the USSR, the Constitution of the Kirghiz SSR, this law, and Kirghiz SSR legislation pertaining to the people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR.

#### Article 3. The source and duration of the deputy's powers

In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Kirghiz SSR, the deputy will receive his powers as a result of his election to a soviet from an electoral district on the basis of universal, equal, and direct voting rights with a secret ballot.

The deputy's term of authority begins on the day he is elected a people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR or of a particular local soviet of people's deputies. The powers of the deputy will be verified by the mandate commission elected by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies. On the basis of information submitted by the mandate commission, the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies will pass a resolution recognizing the powers of the deputy or, in the event of violations of election laws, declaring the invalidity of the election of the deputy.

The deputy's term of authority will end on the day of the election of new people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies.

#### Article 4. The combination of deputy activity with the performance of production and official duties

As a rule, the deputy will exercise his powers without giving up his production or official duties.

#### Article 5. The deputy's relations with voters and his accountability and responsibility to them

The deputy will maintain contact with the voters, with the collectives and social organizations nominating him for deputy, and with the collectives of other enterprises, establishments, organizations, and government and social bodies located within the territory of his electoral district.

Voters will give mandates to their deputies.

The deputy will be responsible to the voters and accountable to them.

A deputy who does not justify the trust of the voters can be recalled in the manner prescribed by law.

Article 6. The deputy's relations with the soviet and its organs

The deputy, as a member of a collective representative organ of governmental authority, is endowed with all of the rights securing his active participation in the activity of the soviet and its committees, standing commissions, and other organs, has a responsibility to the soviet, and carries out the orders of the soviet and its organs.

At the request of people's deputies, the soviet will have the right to ask for reports on his work in the soviet and the fulfillment of the decisions and orders of the soviet and its organs.

In the event that the deputy has not fulfilled his responsibility to the soviet or has violated the established procedures of work in a representative organ or the requirements of deputy ethics, the behavior of the deputy can be investigated by the soviet or by the appropriate soviet commission.

The presidiums and executive and directive organs of soviets of people's deputies will give deputies the necessary assistance in their work, inform deputies of the activities of the soviet and its organs, the progress in carrying out plans for economic and social development and the mandates of voters, and measures taken in response to the criticism or suggestions of deputies, and will assist deputies in studying Soviet legislation, the work experience of the soviet, and public opinion.

Article 7. The protection of the rights, honor, and dignity of the deputy

The state will guarantee each deputy the necessary conditions for the unimpeded and effective exercise of his powers and will defend his rights, honor, and dignity.

Individuals who attack the honor and dignity of a deputy will be subject to administrative or criminal penalties in accordance with law.

The officials of government and other agencies and of social organization, enterprises, establishments, and organizations who do not honor their obligations to the deputy, impede his work, supply him with information known to be false, or violate the guarantees of deputy activity will be subject to disciplinary liability to the point of dismissal from office or administrative or criminal liability in accordance with law.

Article 8. The early termination of the deputy's term in office by a decision of the soviet

The deputy's term in office can be terminated early by a decision of the soviet in connection with the deputy's

election or appointment to a position or occupation which is incompatible, by law, with the performance of a deputy's duties or in connection with the conviction of the individual serving as deputy in a court of law or the loss of the deputy's USSR and Kirghiz SSR citizenship.

The deputy's term can be terminated early by a decision of the soviet in connection with the deputy's personal request to resign for reasons preventing him from carrying out his duties or for other personal reasons.

## II. The Deputy's Activity in the Soviet

Article 9. The deputy's participation in soviet sessions

At sessions of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets, the deputies will engage in collective and free discussion and use this as a basis to consider and make important decisions on the affairs of the corresponding representative body of governmental authority.

The deputy will be obligated to attend sessions of the soviet and meetings of soviet organs to which he has been elected and to take an active part in their work. The deputy will inform the soviet presidium or chairman of his inability to attend a meeting or session.

The presidium of the soviet of people's deputies or the chairman of the city (in cities of rayon jurisdiction), village, or rural soviet will inform the deputy of the time and place a soviet session will be held and of the scheduled topics of discussion and will provide him with all of the necessary information on these topics in advance, within the period stipulated in the soviet's rules of procedure.

Article 10. The deputy's rights at soviet sessions

The deputy will have the right to cast a deciding vote on all matters considered at a session of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies.

The deputy will be empowered:

To elect others and be elected to soviet organs;

To suggest matters for discussion by the soviet;

To submit proposals and comments on the agenda, the discussion procedure, and the content of the matters to be discussed;

To submit draft resolutions and amendments to resolutions;

To express opinions on the composition of organs being formed by the soviet and on the candidacy of officials elected, appointed, or installed by the soviet;

To participate in debates, to make requests, and to ask questions;

To substantiate his proposals and explain the reasons for his votes;

To request that a session of the Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies hear the report or information of any organ or official accountable or answerable to the soviet.

The deputy can transmit the text of his statements, proposals, and comments on a matter being discussed at the session to the presiding officer for inclusion in the record of proceedings.

The procedure for the exercise of these rights will be defined in this law and the rules of procedure of the corresponding soviet.

Article 11. The deputy's right to call for a vote of confidence in organs formed or elected by the soviet and in officials

The deputy will have the right to call for a soviet vote of confidence in the members of organs formed or elected by the soviet or in officials elected, appointed, or installed by the soviet in accordance with the laws of the Kirghiz SSR.

Article 12. The right of legislative initiative of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR

The people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR will have the right of legislative initiative in the Supreme Soviet.

The right of legislative initiative will be exercised in the manner stipulated in the laws of the USSR and Kirghiz SSR.

Article 13. Deputy inquiry

Deputy inquiry is the procedure by which a request is made at a soviet session for government agencies or officials to provide official explanations or state their positions on matters of public interest.

At sessions of the Supreme Soviet the people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR will have the right to make this request of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers and of the heads of other government agencies formed or elected by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

The people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR will also have the right to make this request of the administrators of enterprises, establishments, and organizations of union jurisdiction on republic territory with regard to matters of republic jurisdiction.

The deputy of the local soviet will have the right to make this request of the soviet presidium, the soviet chairman, the executive committee, the heads of its departments and administrations, and the administrators of enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the territory of the soviet on matters within the jurisdiction of the soviet.

The request can be submitted by a deputy or group of deputies in written or oral form. A request submitted in written form will be read aloud at the soviet session.

The government agency or official to whom the request is addressed must respond in oral or written form at a soviet session within the period of time and in the manner prescribed by the laws of the USSR and Kirghiz SSR. The request, the reply, and the decision of the soviet on the results of the inquiry will be published.

The soviet will have the right to obligate a government agency or official to submit a report on the fulfillment of the decisions arising from the deputy inquiry by the date stipulated by the soviet.

Article 14. The procedure for the consideration of the proposals and comments submitted to the soviet session by deputies

The proposals and comments deputies make at a soviet session or submit to the presiding officer in written form at the session will be discussed by the soviet and its committees or commissions or will be sent to the appropriate deputies and public agencies and officials for consideration.

The government and other agencies, public organizations, and officials receiving the proposals and comments made by deputies at a soviet session must consider the proposals and comments and report the results directly to the deputies and to the appropriate presidiums of the Supreme Soviet or oblast, rayon, or city soviets of people's deputies or the chairmen of the appropriate soviets of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR, Council of Ministers, or soviet executive committees within a month.

The consideration and implementation of the proposals and comments of deputies will be overseen by the corresponding presidiums of the Supreme Soviet or the oblast, rayon, or city soviets of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR or the chairmen of these soviets, the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, and soviet executive committees.

Article 15. The deputy's participation in the work of soviet organs

A deputy serving on the presidium of the Supreme Soviet or oblast, rayon, or city soviet of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR, a standing commission, or another soviet organ will have the right to submit any matter or proposal to these organs for consideration and to participate in preparing them for consideration, in their discussion, in the decisions made on them, and in organizing and overseeing the implementation of the decisions of the soviet and its organs.

A deputy who does not agree with the decision of the soviet organ in which he serves will have the right to express his point of view at the soviet session or report it in written form to the presiding officer.

The people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR who is elected to serve on a standing commission will participate in the work of the standing commission with the right to cast a deciding vote.

The people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR who is not a member of a standing commission can attend meetings of the standing commission and cast a deliberative vote. The deputy will have the right to join permanent and temporary deputy groups formed in the soviet and will be free to resign from them.

Article 16. The deputy's participation in inspections of the work of government and public agencies, enterprises, establishments, and organizations

At the request of the soviet or its organs, the deputy can take part in inspections of the work of governmental and other agencies, social organizations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the territory of the soviet in connection with matters of soviet jurisdiction, examine the necessary documents, and conduct an investigation. The deputy will report the results of the inspection to the soviet or its organs and to the concerned governmental or other agencies, social organizations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations and, if necessary, will suggest ways of improving their work, correcting shortcomings, setting aside illegal decisions, and instituting proceedings against officials guilty of violating government regulations and laws.

The deputy will have the right to inform the soviet and its organs of the need to conduct inspections of the work of government and other agencies and social organizations or enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the territory of the soviet or to conduct an investigation of any matter in the manner prescribed by law.

### III. The Deputy's Activity in the Electoral District

Article 17. The deputy's rights in connection with work in the electoral district

In their electoral districts, deputies will have the right:

To participate in discussions of any matter of considerable interest to the citizens of electoral districts in organs of public administration and the organs of social and other organizations, and these organs must inform deputies in advance of the discussion of such matters;

To verify, on their own initiative and with the aid of the public and members of people's control committees if necessary, information received from citizens, organizations, or other sources about violations of the law or the rights and legal interests of citizens and organizations or cases of red tape or bureaucratism, to obtain all of the facts needed for this purpose, and to request the appropriate agencies and officials to stop any confirmed violations;

To hold assemblies and conferences with district voters and meetings with labor collectives and local organs of social organizations;

To attend meetings of organs of public self-government and assemblies of the soviet and economic aktiv, labor collectives, and citizens' neighborhood associations.

The deputy will have the preferential right to speak on aspects of his deputy activity on local radio and television, in the local press, or in the periodical publications of the social organization nominating him. The materials the deputy submits for publication cannot be edited without his consent.

Article 18. The deputy's obligations in connection with his work in the electoral district

In their electoral districts, deputies are obligated:

To regularly inform the population, labor collectives, local agencies, and the social organizations nominating them of the work of the Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies and the fulfillment of plans and programs for economic and social development, soviet decisions, voters' mandates, and their own campaign programs;

To participate in the organization and supervision of the execution of laws and decisions of the soviet and its organs;

To study public opinion and the needs and requests of the population, report them to the soviet and its organs, and submit proposals and take other measures for their satisfaction;

To aid in the development of various forms of self-government and of social activity by citizens and in their involvement in the administration of governmental and public affairs.

Article 19. The deputy's consideration of the suggestions, statements, and complaints of citizens

The deputy will consider all of the suggestions, statements, and complaints he receives from voters and the members of the social organization nominating him, will arrange for timely and appropriate action on them, and will regularly receive citizens in populated points in his electoral district, in the place of his residence or employment, or in another place specified by the deputy. He will be empowered to invite the officials of government and other agencies and public organizations and of enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the electoral district to these meetings with the citizens.

The deputy will study the reasons for complaints and will submit his proposals to the Supreme Soviet, the local soviet of people's deputies, other government agencies and public organizations, or enterprises, establishments, and organizations.

The deputy will have the right to oversee the consideration of the suggestions, statements, and complaints he receives in government and other agencies and public organizations and in enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the territory of the soviet and to participate in the discussions. The officials of government and other agencies and public organizations must assist the deputy in his supervising activities.

Article 20. The deputy's reports to voters and public organizations

Deputies must make periodic reports—at least once a year for the people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR and at least twice a year for the deputy of the local soviet—on their work, on the fulfillment of campaign programs and mandates, and on the work of soviets and the organs to which they have been elected, to the voters, collectives, and public organizations nominating them for deputy. The deputy can also be requested to make a report by the voters or the members of his nominating organization in the manner stipulated in the laws of the USSR and Kirghiz SSR.

The deputy will make these reports at assemblies of voters convened for this purpose and at conferences of delegates representing the voters of the electoral district or at plenums or conferences of agencies or the members of the public organization nominating him.

The assembly or conference hearing the deputy's report will pass a resolution containing the suggestions and comments addressed to the deputy by the voters, and this resolution will then be brought to the attention of the district voters or the members of the nominating public organization.

The deputy will inform his soviet of the report.

Article 21. The assistance the deputy receives in making reports and holding meetings with voters

The voter assemblies and conferences to hear the reports of deputies and the meetings with them will be convened by the presidiums of soviets, labor collective councils, the local organs of public organizations, and organs of public self-government.

The deputy will be provided with all of the necessary conditions to make reports to voters and the members of his nominating organization and hold meetings with them. For these purposes, the presidium or executive committee of the concerned soviet, local organs of public organizations, and the administration or social organizations of enterprises, establishments, and organizations will make the arrangements for meeting facilities, inform citizens of the time and place the deputy will make his report or hold a meeting with voters and members of his nominating organization, or the time and place the deputy will be receiving citizens, will send their own officials to receptions and meetings at the request of the deputy, and will take other measures to assist the deputy in his work on the local level.

Statistics and other informational materials needed for reports and speeches will be given to the deputy at his request by the appropriate presidium or executive committee of the soviet in which he is a deputy, the presidium or executive committees of soviets located within his electoral district, and the organs of the public organization which nominated him.

Article 22. The deputy's participation in the work of subordinate soviets

The deputy will have the right to attend meetings of subordinate soviets and their organs within the territory of the soviet to which he was elected and to cast a deliberative vote at these meetings.

Article 23. Deputy petitions

The deputy will have the right to petition all government and other agencies, enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and officials on matters connected with the deputy's activity and to take part in the investigation of these matters. These agencies and officials must respond to the deputy's petition immediately or, if additional investigations or verifications should be necessary, within 10 days.

The deputy's petition on the most important matters, including the need for the particular agency to make, change, or cancel decisions, will be subject to discussion by the deputies and the presidiums and executive committees of soviets, the collegiums of ministries, state committees and departments, and the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR. The deputy must be informed of the date of the discussion 3 days in advance.

With the consent of the deputy, the discussion can take place even in his absence.

Article 24. The deputy's right to seek immediate access to officials

In matters connected with deputy activity, the deputy will have unrestricted access to governmental and other agencies and public organizations and to enterprises, establishments, and organizations within the territory of the soviet and the right to seek immediate admission to the offices of their administrators and other officials.

The procedure of the deputy's tours of organizations whose operations are connected with state secrets and other secrets protected by law will be established by law.

Article 25. The deputy's right to demand the cessation of violations of the law

If the deputy encounters people violating the rights and legal interests of citizens or committing other offenses, he, as a government agent, will have the right to demand the cessation of the violations and, if necessary, to request the appropriate agencies and officials to stop these violations. The violation can be recorded in a memorandum composed by the deputy or, at his request, by a representative of a law enforcement agency or other supervisory body.

The officials of government and public agencies, the administration of enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and the militia personnel to whom the deputy addresses his request must take immediate action to stop the violation and, if necessary, to institute proceedings against the guilty party and report this to the deputy

later. If action is not taken, the officials will be subject to disciplinary or criminal penalties in the manner prescribed by law.

#### Article 26. Deputy groups

Deputies can unite in deputy groups by mutual consent for collective work in electoral districts, labor collectives, and public organizations.

People's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR will be able to join the deputy groups formed by the appropriate local soviets if they should wish to do so.

### IV. Organization of Work with Voter Mandates

#### Article 27. The mandates issued to people's deputies

Mandates are the instructions issued to candidates for people's deputy by assemblies or conferences representing district voters.

The mandates issued to people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies are instructions pertaining to the management of the affairs of the concerned republic or local agency.

A candidate for deputy has the right to refuse to accept the proposal of a voters' assembly or conference as a mandate if it contradicts his own campaign program or for any other valid reason.

#### Article 28. The preparation and adoption of decisions on mandates

The summarization and preliminary discussion of the mandates issued to people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies will be the function of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers or the presidiums and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, with consideration for the suggestions and comments of committees and standing commissions of soviets of people's deputies.

Soviets of people's deputies will pass resolutions on the acceptance of mandates. A soviet will have the right to pass a resolution explaining the inexpediency or impracticability of certain mandates.

Soviets of people's deputies will take the mandates into consideration during the compilation of plans for economic and social development and budgets and during the drafting of resolutions on other matters. The measures for their fulfillment will be listed separately in special sections of plans and budgets.

#### Article 29. The organization of the fulfillment of mandates

The fulfillment of mandates accepted by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet will be secured by the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers and other governmental and public agencies; the fulfillment of mandates accepted by local

soviets of people's deputies will be secured by their executive and directive organs and other local agencies.

The proposals contained in the mandates issued to candidates who do not win the election will be sent to the appropriate agencies and officials for consideration.

The fulfillment of mandates issued to people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR will be overseen by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, and the fulfillment of mandates issued to people's deputies of local soviets of people's deputies will be overseen by the appropriate soviets of people's deputies.

Executive and directive organs will report to soviets of people's deputies at least once a year on the fulfillment of decisions pertaining to mandates.

#### Article 30. The people's deputy's participation in work with mandates

People's deputies will participate in the planning and discussion of measures for the fulfillment of mandates, will oversee their execution, and will inform voters regularly of the progress in the fulfillment of mandates.

#### Article 31. Glasnost in work with mandates

The decisions of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies pertaining to mandates will be reported to the voters directly by the deputies.

The news media will cover the fulfillment of the mandates of voters and public organizations.

### V. Basic Guarantees of Deputy Activity

#### Article 32. The guarantee of the necessary conditions for the exercise of the deputy's powers

The soviet, other government or public agencies and public organizations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations, or their officials will guarantee the necessary conditions for the deputy's exercise of his powers.

The soviet presidium and executive committee will guarantee the deputies' access to facilities for participation in the work of the Supreme Soviet, local soviets of people's deputies, their committees and standing commissions, deputy groups, and soviet libraries and archives.

Enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the territory of the local soviet will assist the soviet in the use of their computers, office equipment, copying and duplicating machines, and typewriters to support deputy activity.

Government and other agencies and public organizations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations will assist people's deputies conducting deputy activity in the organization of tours of the electoral district and in securing transportation and hotel reservations. People's

deputies of the Kirghiz SSR occupying permanent positions in the Supreme Soviet will be provided with office and living space if necessary for their entire term in office.

To maintain closer contact with the population and obtain constant assistance in his work, the deputy can have public volunteer assistants. The statute on these assistants will be ratified by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 33. The release of the deputy from production and official duties and compensation for the costs of deputy activity

While the Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies is in session or while the deputy is exercising his powers in other cases envisaged by law, the deputy will be released from production and official duties and will be compensated for the costs of deputy activity with funds from the republic or local budget.

The people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR and people's deputy of the local soviet will be released from production and official duties for the period needed for the performance of development activity.

The specific cases and procedure of compensating people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR for the costs of the exercise of deputy powers and the procedure of granting leaves to people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR occupying permanent positions in the Supreme Soviet will be defined by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 34. The right of the deputy to obtain information and advice; the offer of legal assistance to the deputy

The soviet presidium and executive committee will supply the deputy with documents approved by the Supreme Soviet or local soviet of people's deputies and the official publications and informational materials of the soviet and its organs.

Government and other agencies and public organizations and the administrations of enterprises, establishments, and organizations located within the territory of the soviet will be obligated to satisfy a deputy's request for consultations with experts on matters connected with deputy activity and supply him with the information he needs immediately or, if this should be impossible, within a month.

The presidium and executive committee of the soviet and the administration of enterprises, organizations, and scientific, academic, and legal establishments will assist the deputy in legal matters arising during the course of his deputy activity.

Article 35. The deputy's right to free transportation

The people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR will have the right to travel for free on all railroads, motor vehicles,

waterways, and air routes and all forms of municipal passenger transport (with the exception of taxis) within republic territory.

The deputy of the oblast, rayon, city, municipal rayon, village, or rural soviet will have the same right to travel for free in motor vehicles and water transport of republic jurisdiction, all types of municipal passenger transport (with the exception of taxis), and air lines within the territory of the appropriate oblast, rayon, city, village, or rural soviet.

The procedure and conditions of the free travel of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies, the procedure for the compensation of transport organizations for this travel, and the conditions of the use of personal motor vehicles by deputies in connection with deputy activity will be defined by the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers.

Article 36. The protection of the deputy's labor rights and the rights of deputies from the armed services

A deputy cannot be dismissed from a job in an enterprises or organization or from active military service, excluded from a kolkhoz (or other cooperative) or academic institution, or be transferred to a lower-paying job (or demoted) as a form of disciplinary action by any administration (or military command) without the preliminary consent of the soviet.

A deputy who has been released from production and official duties because of his election to a soviet or to one of its organs will be reinstated in his previous job (or position) or in an equivalent job (or position) at the end of his term.

The time the deputy spends working in the soviet and its organs will be included in his record of continuous service in his specialty.

Article 37. The deputy immunity of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR

A people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR cannot be prosecuted, detained, arrested, or be made subject to administrative penalties by a court of law without the consent of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

The decision of the soviet will be valid if it is supported by at least two-thirds of the deputies.

Criminal proceedings against a people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR can be instituted by the procurator of the Kirghiz SSR.

Article 38. The deputy immunity of deputies of local soviets of people's deputies

The deputy of the oblast, rayon, city, municipal rayon, village, or rural soviet of people's deputies cannot be prosecuted, arrested, or be subjected to administrative penalties by a court of law within the territory of his soviet without the consent of the soviet.

The procedure for the institution of criminal proceedings against a deputy of a local soviet of people's deputies is stipulated in the laws of the USSR and Kirghiz SSR.

Article 39. The procedure of obtaining the soviet's consent to the prosecution of a deputy

To obtain a soviet's consent to the institution of criminal proceedings against a deputy, his arrest, or the application of administrative penalties imposed by a court of law, the local procurator will submit a request to the soviet. The request can also be submitted by a superior procurator.

The request will be submitted before the deputy is charged with a crime or a warrant is issued for his arrest or before he is tried for an administrative offense in a court.

A superior procurator can cancel the request a subordinate procurator has submitted to a soviet for its consent to the institution of proceedings against a deputy.

The soviet will consider the procurator's request within a month and can ask the procurator for additional information needed for a decision on the matter specified in the request. The soviet will issue an opinion and will inform the procurator of it within 3 days. The soviet can revise its opinion if necessary. The deputy will have the right to take part in the soviet's discussion of his immunity.

If a superior procurator disagrees with the opinion of the local soviet of people's deputies, he will have the right to submit a request to a superior soviet for a review of the matter. A rayon or city procurator will also have the right to request a rayon or city soviet to set aside the decision of a rural, village, or city (in a city of rayon jurisdiction) soviet and to review the matter. If the soviet upholds the initial decision, the matter can be investigated by the

oblast soviet of people's deputies at the request of the oblast or republic procurator.

If the request a procurator submits in the manner prescribed by this law is not considered by the local soviet of people's deputies within a month, a superior soviet will take measures to secure its immediate consideration at the request of the procurator concerned or his superior.

Within 3 days after the proceedings come to an end, the procurator who submitted the request to the soviet must inform the soviet consenting to the institution of proceedings against the deputy or to his arrest of the results of the investigation or trial.

The consent of the local soviet of people's deputies to the institution of criminal proceedings, arrest, or application of administrative penalties imposed by a court of law will not be required if the crime or administrative offense was committed by the deputy outside the territory of the soviet to which he was elected. If the deputy of a local soviet of people's deputies is within the territory of the soviet to which he was elected when the decision is made to institute criminal proceedings against him, to arrest him, or to exact the administrative penalties imposed by a court of law, this consent will have to be obtained in the manner stipulated in this article.

Article 40. The deputy's credentials and badge

The deputy will have deputy credentials and a deputy badge, which will be issued to him after his authority has been confirmed by the soviet. The deputy will use these credentials and badge throughout his term in office.

A statute on the credentials and badges of people's deputies and sample credentials and badges for people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and local soviets of people's deputies will be approved by the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

### Adverse Effects of Lithuanian Activism on Soviet Army Reported

90UM0613A Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA  
in Russian No 8, Apr 90 (signed to press 12 Apr 90)  
pp 18-19

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Gavrilov, under the rubric "Commemorating Events in Lithuania": "Where Is Sayudis Leading Us"]

[Text] Literally on the second day after the leaders of Sayudis, who had become firmly established in the republic's Supreme Soviet, actually carried out an unconstitutional coup, I had occasion to visit the capital of Lithuania. On the surface, the recent political events had in no way disturbed the daily rhythm of Vilnius life. And only by walking around the city, did I become convinced that this impression was misleading. Everywhere—on the streets and on public transports—people were discussing the changes that had taken place, arguing, and were either outraged or happy. I accidentally overheard the conversation of several youths—Russians and Lithuanians. One of them stated with pleasure—"No longer will everyone have to serve in the military". Another shrugged his shoulders in response: "All the same one cannot do without an army. And somehow it turns out to be frivolous. The secession from the Soviet Union has not yet been legalized and they have already declared that the military commissariats are unnecessary and that there will not be conscriptions"...

Such statements are not uncommon. Sayudis and certain other Lithuanian public organizations of a nationalistic persuasion have conducted a broad campaign aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces. With that end in view, political rallies have been organized, pickets have been set up near the regimental command posts of units stationed in the republic's territory, and inflammatory leaflets have been disseminated. Figuratively speaking, the mass media has participated and continues to actively participate in this. One only has to leaf through a number of newspaper files for recent months in order to be convinced of what a crock of filth local journalists and supernumerary authors have poured out on the army. And in so doing, they do not particularly care about conclusiveness and are guided primarily by emotions. By way of illustration, two articles of an antimilitary nature were carried in one of the issues of the so-called independent newspaper, POLITIKA, which is published in Vilnius. In one of them, signed by R. Grigas, a Roman Catholic priest in Poland, the conscription of the young Kaunas resident D. Kazalupskas into the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is presented as a tragedy. The article emphasizes that the youth was enticed, almost fraudulently, to the military registration and enlistment office and subsequently "he was taken a thousand kilometers away from Lithuania". In the other article, a certain T. Nikolskaya from Leningrad joins her accomplices from Sayudis in unsubstantiated attacks against the army. The goal of such publications is

obvious: to create an illusion of "nationwide" condemnation of "inhumane military service".

The lion's share of such negative information is intended for young people. A particularly single-minded cultivation of conscripts was carried on. It was instilled in them that service in the Soviet Army is "immoral" and "is not in keeping with the vital interests of the Lithuanian nation". The repudiation of basic military training has taken place at secondary schools everywhere and classes conducted by military subfaculties at the universities have been boycotted. And it is no wonder that such "brainwashing" has had an appreciable influence upon a significant portion of young Lithuanians. Cases of conscripts failing to appear at military registration and enlistment offices and of burning military service cards or turning them into the military commissariats in protest have become more frequent.

During a discussion on this topic, Colonel K. Golubev, the chief of the political section in the republic's military commissariat, stated: "After scarcely coming into power, Landsbergis and his accomplices hastened to announce they would defend the borders of Lithuania themselves and announced the abolishment of military commissariats in the republic. One can hardly consider this a serious and well-thought-out step. Rather, this is evidence of the fact that the Sayudis activists Vayshvila, Yasukaytite, and others responsible for military issues in Landsbergis's government are simply ill-informed about them".

"Immediately after it was reported over local television that the military commissariats were being dissolved, we held a general meeting of the staff at the republic's military commissariat. The resolution adopted by us required the holding of a referendum, which would determine the legality of the resolutions passed by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. Afterwards, we personally handed Landsbergis our protest..."

Let us speak frankly, it is difficult to predict the consequences of the adventurist actions of Lithuania's new leaders. But here is what the facts indicate. Within just three days of the enactment of the corresponding laws, more than fifty Lithuanian servicemen in units in the Baltic Military District deserted. Kolesnikovas, one of the local Sayudis leaders in Alitus, demanded that the leaders at the city military registration and enlistment office begin negotiations on dissolving the military commissariat and turning its building over to the gorispolkom. Attempts were also made to disorganize the work of military registration and enlistment offices in a number of other cities and rayons in Lithuania. The registration of draftable men was immediately hindered. Incidentally, the committee on questions of military service for Lithuanian youths, which was created in May 1989 and is subordinate to the LiSSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium, took the Lithuanian soldiers, who deserted from the USSR Armed Forces, under its wing. It is planned to create some "frontier" units, which supposedly should stand guard over the republic's borders, from

none other than these deserters. On 15 March 1990, reports on the creation of 76 "border checkpoints" slipped into the local organs of the press.

Despite their frequent assertions of peaceableness and declarations that "Lithuania does not need an army", the new leaders understand perfectly well that they cannot do without armed forces. The so-called army without weapons, commanded by the self-styled General Raudonisa, was created with the leaders' blessings. The "soldiers" in this army took the oath as long ago as 14 May 1989 in Vilnius's Nagorniy Park. The Lithuanian Reserve Officers League, which is considered the basis for forming the officer corps of the future "national army", is actively functioning. Young people are being urged to join various paramilitary organizations with very obscure missions.

According to estimates of officials at the republic's military commissariat, from 50 to 80 percent of the youths might not report to induction centers this spring, thereby evading service in the USSR Armed Forces. In this case, will they not become that dangerous force, which is capable of provoking various conflicts? If this occurs, the consequences of such conflicts will be unpredictable. It would be advisable for those who are assuming responsibility for Lithuania's future destiny to ponder this. Especially, if one takes into account that many people do not share the view of Landsbergis and his supporters regarding the republic's future. And I would like to believe that common sense will prevail.

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#### **Turkmen Cultural Association With Links to Expatriates Created**

*90US1178A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 1 Jul 90 p 1*

[Turkmeninform report: "In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan"]

[Text] The Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro adopted the decree "On the Creation of a Turkmen Society for Cultural Relations With Expatriates (Vatan Society)."

It notes that, according to available data, more than 3 million Turkmen live abroad. Most of them are in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey, China, and Jordan. Many Turkmen live in India, the FRG, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, and other countries. Diverse contacts have been established between the republic's native population and Iranian and Afghan Turkmen. Many of them have relatives in Turkmenistan, correspond with them, and make frequent visits to them. In the Turkmen SSR they see the only state formation of Turkmen in the world with its organizational and socio-economic infrastructure, language, and developed national culture and history.

The rise in USSR prestige in the international arena, the perestroika going on in the country, and the development of democracy and glasnost evoke ever greater interest among Turkmen abroad. A rise in national self-consciousness is intensifying among them, the movement for the creation of favorable conditions for overcoming their economic and cultural backwardness and for autonomy is spreading, and the aspiration to acquire education in the USSR and the Turkmen SSR is increasing.

The section on work with expatriates established in December 1977 under the Turkmen Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries carries out the work with Turkmen abroad. The measures implemented by it find a broad positive response among the overwhelming part of the Turkmen population abroad. The section is engaged in active correspondence with Turkmen living in Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria, India, and other countries. More than 700 letters on various matters were received in 1988-89 alone. At the request of Turkmen abroad, more than 10,000 books—political literature, fiction, children's literature, school textbooks, photograph albums, photo-exhibitions, promotional material and booklets, newspapers and journals in the Turkmen language, and phonograph records and tape recorder cassettes of national music and songs—are annually sent abroad.

Much attention is paid to expatriates who come to the republic through different channels. They become acquainted with the life and customs of Soviet Turkmen and with the republic's sights. Meetings with literary and art figures, scientists, public figures, and representatives of youth organizations are organized for them.

Contacts with about 100 Turkmen from abroad, who study at higher educational institutions in Moscow, Leningrad, Volgograd, Minsk, Tashkent, Baku, Dushanbe, and the country's other cities, have been established. Some of them used to come to the republic and became acquainted with its national culture and art, historical sites, and ancient monuments.

Regular contacts with Turkmen living in Syria have been organized. On the section's application the All-Union Rodina Society granted two scholarships to Syrian Turkmen for study at higher educational institutions in Turkmenistan, as did the republic. At present four young men study at the Turkmen State Medical Institute. Another ten Syrian Turkmen have expressed the desire to study at higher educational institutions in the Turkmen SSR. Many other Turkmen living in other countries also wish to study at the republic's higher educational institutions. They want to study the modern Turkmen language and the literature and history of Turkmenistan.

The volume of work with ethnic Turkmen groups abroad is increasing and developing constantly. Therefore, the section with its small staff cannot fully ensure the solution of problems connected with the organization of

work with Turkmen abroad and is unable to organize under its auspices a purposeful trip by figures in science, culture, and art and by the republic's public representatives to foreign countries, where Turkmen reside compactly, or to invite the most prestigious and influential representatives of expatriates to Turkmenistan. Nor does the section have the appropriate base for the publication of a special newspaper or a sociopolitical journal.

The opportunities to more widely and intensively develop relations with neighboring USSR republics, krays, and oblasts, where the Turkmen population resides compactly, and to strengthen fraternal relations with other nations in our country are also limited.

With due regard for the above-stated the establishment of the independent Vatan Society in the Turkmen SSR, as in almost all the Union and most autonomous republics of the USSR, would contribute to a more effective sociopolitical activity with respect to Turkmen abroad. The practice of the establishment of such societies shows that their activity is politically justified and brings positive results.

The Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro has instructed party members—directors of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers—jointly with the Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance, and the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Security to determine the staff of the Turkmen Society for Cultural Relations With Expatriates (Vatan Society), providing an editorial and publishing body for the publication of a sociopolitical journal—VATAN—under this society.

The ideological commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan jointly with the Ashkhabad City Party Committee, the capital's rayon party committees, the Turkmen Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Turkmen Republic Committee for the Defense of Peace, and the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs should give practical assistance for the preparation for and holding of the founding conference, for the preparation of appropriate documents on the creation of a Turkmen Society for Cultural Relations With Expatriates (Vatan Society), and for its further work.

An organizational committee headed by academician M. A. Annanepesov, vice-president of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, was established for the preparation for and holding of the founding conference.

### Western Ukrainians Incite Civil Disorder in Chernovtsy

90UN2406A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
30 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent A. Fedorov, Chernovtsy: "Uninvited Visitors. They Came to Chernovtsy From the Western Oblasts of the Ukraine to Ruin the Local Residents' Holiday"]

[Text] The words "uninvited guests" are usually not meant to be at all flattering. And it's understandable that normal people try to avoid getting into such a situation, considering it to be in bad taste. But some residents of Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol and Rovno have recently been persistently trying to prove to everyone the opposite. They show up in various cities of the Ukraine, suddenly, often in large groups and of course without the invitation of local residents, to incite the local population to unsanctioned marches, meetings and disorder.

Such a "landing" of undesired visitors occurred on June 28 in Chernovtsy, on the day when the multinational population of the oblast was celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the reunification of Northern Bukovina with the Ukraine.

At first, the local residents thought the newcomers from neighboring oblasts came to their city for the holiday. But everything soon became clear: the crowds of visitors moved along the city's central streets with yellow and blue flags, with suggestive, sometimes insulting statements on banners, with loud cries and hooting.

The residents of Chernovtsy, suspecting that the neighbors simply wanted to spoil their holiday, began to avoid the uninvited guests. These latter casually formed a human chain along Lenin Street, from the MVD building to the Party obkom building, obstructing traffic and creating unnecessary tension among the local population. The Chernovtsy residents expressed their silent protest by yielding one side of the city's main street to the uninvited guests, demonstratively crossing to its other side. A sort of stand-off ensued. Outside activists wandered along the chain with megaphones and called upon the local residents to join the crowd of newcomers, loudly repeating that the Ivano-Frankovsk oblast Soviet accepts full responsibility for the unsanctioned march and meeting in the city.

Speaking plainly, the announcement produced the opposite effect: people became indignant—what does this mean? By what right has the Ivano-Frankovsk oblast Soviet ordered that an unlawful gathering take place in a neighboring oblast's city?...

What was the objective, other than disorder, of the directors of the landing in the western region of the republic, organized, as it later turned out, by the neighboring oblast's Rukh directors...to help their Chernovtsy colleagues who, it turns out, enjoy no authority among the local population? Yes, the goal was an unsanctioned meeting, attended primarily by the guests. They were entertained with speeches by the well-known Rukh members L.I. Sandulyak, V.Yu. Kuzmin, V.A. Klym, I.A. Kravchuk, O.E. Panchuk.

The oblast's law enforcement agencies are now studying the issue of bringing the lawbreakers to justice. Most of the oblast center's population supports this decision and demands of those job it is to defend citizens' peace and quiet that they suppress such disorders more decisively.

### USSR Supreme Soviet Press Center Functions Detailed

90US1067A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
5 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Eduard Vasilyevich Kovalev, consultant to the press center of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Vadim Smetannikov, parliamentary observer for SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA: "Journalists in the Kremlin"; Moscow, date not specified]

[Text] If anyone had told me 5 years ago that I could just walk up to, say, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and simply ask him two or three questions and hear a plain answer, I would have thought it a bad joke. I wasn't just that they were the head of Government—ministers were inaccessible to us newspapermen. Even more so for republic journalists.

I will never forget a scene at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies that astonished not only me, but hundreds of my colleagues as well: N. Ryzhkov entered in the morning by the lower vestibule of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, and he was immediately surrounded by a ring of journalists... Such a picture, with other leaders of our country making their appearance in the foyer, leaders of ministries and departments. And of course, those deputies who, depending upon the situation at the sessions, turned up as the focus of the acute attention of the press, television, and radio.

New "titles" appeared for us [S] [S] parliamentary correspondent, parliamentary observer.

Naturally, when the work of the permanent USSR Supreme Soviet began, the question arose of covering its activity, of assisting journalists in their difficult mission. At the very first session of the parliament, its press center was formed by special resolution. In fact, it has existed in its current form since August of last year.

We asked E. Kovalev, consultant to the press center of the USSR Supreme Soviet to familiarize our readers with this organization's work under the country's parliament.

[Kovalev] I'll begin with the difficulties we are experiencing. In particular, this is the low numbers of the press center, just a few staffers. As experience accumulated at the Supreme Soviet and USSR Congresses of People's Deputies shows, over 1,200 Soviet journalists are accredited to work with the deputies. In addition, about 500 foreign correspondents visit the Congresses and the sessions of the houses of parliament. On certain days, they all literally flood either the Kremlin Palace of Congresses or the Supreme Soviet Building. And there are constantly representatives of various movie and television associations at the sessions. You'll agree that five or six people can have difficulty helping such a large writing and picture-taking "army."

[Correspondent] What exactly does this help consist of?

[Kovalev] First of all, we provide journalists with materials from the Congress and sessions—the transcriptions and the accompanying documents in the form of draft laws, various certificates, the deputies' appeals... In May of last year, we were beginning with laughable figures, 150 copies a day. Now we hand out much more of these materials. But I myself am against such handouts: in my opinion, we have to set up a subscription so that every one of the foreign and permanent Soviet parliamentary correspondents have guaranteed receipt of maximum information, as they say, straight from our hands.

We are cultivating the idea of forming a circle of domestic correspondents who would be fully immersed in studying parliamentary affairs, acquiring the necessary knowledge, experience, and ability to yield material. Direct interaction is observed here: We help them, and they will help us. Both sides win.

I feel that the optimal thing to do is to create an association of Soviet parliamentary journalists. These people would have certain ethical responsibilities to one another and to the parliament. Professionalism would be raised to a higher level. It is noticeable that the journalists who are working with us for almost a year at the Congresses of People's Deputies, at the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet have an easier time orienting themselves in the problems under discussion, and experience fewer difficulties. The representatives of the houses, and many deputies already know their faces.

One other form of our assistance to journalists is the press conferences, which we put into practice at the 2nd Congress. Leaders of the Government, committees, and commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and people deputies speak at them. The press conferences are devoted to the pressing issues of interest to the correspondents. At least, our press center in the Palace of Congresses has always been overflowing. If we take all our activity in this area, its apogee was the first press conference of the first President of the USSR, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

In April, we organized regular press conferences and briefings during the course of the session of parliament. As a rule, they are held twice weekly, and are devoted to the just [S] adopted laws of greatest importance to the country.

And a Moscow-Washington TV bridge is planned for 8 May. Representatives of the houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet will participate in this for the Soviet side, and for the American side, leading member of the U.S. Congress.

Even now, before the formation of the association of which I spoke, we are attempting to hone personal contacts with permanent parliamentary correspondents, both those from the central, and those from the republic publications. In particular, good relations have been established with SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA.

[Correspondent] Do you familiarize people with the publications devoted to the work of individual deputies, and of the entire parliament?EE[Kovalev] Of course, as best we can. The Secretariat of the USSR Supreme Soviet receives the basic newspapers, the central ones, Moscow, Leningrad, ones from the union republics. Obviously, when the computerization of the Supreme Soviet is realized, such familiarization will be more detailed in the press center.

[Correspondent] Are you satisfied with all the publications from the Congresses and sessions?

[Kovalev] It's not for us to tell the journalists what and how to write. This would contradict the conditions of glasnost. But we do see to it that ethical norms be observed, and that there be no distortions of the facts. There have been cases when hasty, non-objective evaluations were made. Or when words and thoughts of individual deputies were distorted, giving rise to completely natural censure on their part.

In such cases, we limit ourselves to a talk with the journalist who prepared the material, and find out why this happened. Most often, the reason is a lack of familiarity with the problem, a superficial approach to the topic. There have been no incidents of malicious distortion of facts by the journalists accredited to us.

[Correspondent] Please tell me about the press center staffers. Many readers have the impression that they are just apparatus bureaucrats.

[Kovalev] An absolutely incorrect impression. Until recently, we were managed by Arkadiy Afrikanovich Maslennikov, a born journalist, one may say. He used to work for PRAVDA; he was their correspondent in India, Pakistan, and Great Britain, then the editor for the capitalist countries department. He possesses enormous energy. On 2 April, A. Maslennikov was appointed to the position of press secretary to the USSR President.

Now, Valentin Ivanovich Kulikov is executing the duties of the manager of the USSR Supreme Soviet press center; he worked at TASS for a long time.

I worked at TASS, too; specifically, I was the manager of the department in Lisbon. And I came to the press center from the CPSU Central Committee.

Yelena Grigoryevna Bogush has great editorial experience; she is a graduate of a journalism faculty.

In his day, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Sorokin has worked at the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and before that was a staff correspondent for the central publications in the Altay, in Uzbekistan, and in Krasnodarskiy Kray. He is well-acquainted with problems of internal politics.

Albert Aramovich Gritoryants, is a journalist[§]internationalist; he has worked at TRUD, and then at IZVESTIYA; he represented this newspaper in FRG.

So you see, we are all solidly of our own "flock." Therefore the interests of journalists are close and understandable to us.

In the USSR Supreme Soviet building on Kalinin Prospect there are necessary prerequisites for the better development of the press center's activity—a great conference hall, small halls on almost every floor. The journalists come to the committee and commission sessions in this building.

We plan to install here teletypes, faxes, many typewriters, and telephones. And television broadcast points, in order to "intercept" the videotapes by cable or on the air at Ostankino. For the time being, the tape has to be transported from Kalinin Prospect to Central Television.

In effect, there are now no secrets in the Kremlin. And we are concerned with the broad dissemination of information on the activity of the country's parliament, the deep analysis of its work and of the entire Supreme Soviet as a whole, and of each deputy.

### **Council of Ministers Official Urges Improved Economics Reporting**

*90US1115A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian  
No 5, May 90 pp 30-33*

[Article by USSR SOVMIN Information Department Chief Specialist Lev Tsvetkov: "On the Market—Not in the Bazaar Fashion"]

[Text] **How to enter market relations without breaking your neck? This question is increasingly troubling the readers, but they do not find clear-cut answers in the press. Why?**

### **THE FACT**

On 18 February newspapers published a TASS report—the AUCCTU had sent the government a protest in connection with plans to develop auction and commercial trade in consumer goods in the country: "For millions of people, and especially persons with fixed income (pensioners, students, young families and families with many children), many goods will become practically inaccessible in connection with their sale through commercial stores, wherein the prices will exceed retail prices two-to-fivefold. Extremely hard-to-get goods will be accessible to mainly sharp dealers in the 'shadow' economy, but not to the ordinary laborer."

Thus, the fact. But we all have known since our university days, that one must proceed from the fact to the phenomenon, and from the particular to the general. Those who have already been working in the press know, however, that it is not always that easy to see the phenomenon through the fact—especially a newly-arrived phenomenon.

## THE PHENOMENON

The phenomenon is already revealed in the headlines: "The Market and Prices," "The Market—the Great Uniter of Nations," "The Difficult Path to the Market," and "The Market or the Barracks"...

In reading and preparing such articles, we gradually master the phenomenon. First we understood that the market—is not the bazaar. What is even a broader conception—the "consumer market"—is merely a part, a fragment, or sector... "Why?" asks the reader. Giving the appearance that—you see, that the "why" has been clear to us all along, we began to write on other elements: the market of the means of production, valuable papers, the work force, products of intellectual labor, and so on.

Piecing together from this mosaic a likeness of the whole, the reader began to pose other questions as well: How do the parts interact with one another, and how does the market (in the very broadest sense of the word) operate? Our brother, the all-knowing newspaperman, did not falter, and bravely began to expound on the "alternative economy." Once, he says, we have a market—the alternative economy—it will not operate like the administrative-command economy. On the contrary: there will be competition—as opposed to monopolism; free agreements—as opposed to the Plan; and market prices—as opposed to centrally-established prices.

The discerning reader, however, was not entirely satisfied with an argument "from the opposite." The people did not want to hear copy-book maxims—this is a question of a serious choice. But the press, puzzled, not to say dismayed, by the complexity of the problems heaped up upon it, and urged on by the increasing politization of social processes, did not, with rare exceptions provide clear-cut answers to the readers' increasingly troubling question: How to enter market relations without breaking your neck?

The phenomenon, served up piecemeal in the publications, was perhaps for the first time presented to us and the readers in all its complexity only in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress (PRAVDA, 13 February). A draft is a draft, and the system of views and approaches expounded in it will no doubt be subjected to some kind of amendments. It will be attacked in terms of content as well. For example, can the proponents of the rigid formula, "the plan or the market" really agree with those posing the question of a "planned-market economy"? But with all this, the draft provides an impression of "construction" and the internal ties between the elements of the market. The phenomenon will come through more precisely out of it.

## BETWEEN THE FACT AND THE PHENOMENON

The story of the AUCCTU protest lodged in January can serve as an example of how newspaper people sometimes wander between the fact and the phenomenon.

At that time an acute financial situation had taken shape in metallurgical enterprises and enterprises of other branches. The cause was—an increase in wholesale prices for diesel fuel, and increased rates for freight shipments and electric power. The mechanics of the loss are uncomplicated: as the expenses of the users of these resources increase, their profits decline. Nor are the customary solutions complicated: either compensate for the losses by raising prices for your own product, or hold out your hand and demand compensation from the budget. It would appear there is no other recourse. But you see, neither are there any extra resources in the budget.

The press sounded the alarm; at the metallurgical plants, they began to talk about electing strike committees. One can judge the attitude of the authors of these reports toward raising wholesale prices by the headlines: "A Stumbling-Block to Reform" (TRUD, 31 January), and "Trade Unions Protest Ill-Considered Government Decisions" (RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 1 February). And because of the "stumbling block," without further commentary, it goes without saying, they reported of the ultimatum which the trade unions declared in their Protest No 1: If the government does not correct its "ill-considered decision," before 5 February... What followed was a transparent hint on the law on collective labor disputes.

If one takes a look at these and earlier articles—and no fewer than 10 had accumulated by 1 February—one sees that the correspondents' attempts to delve into the essence of what was taking place did not go beyond an elementary estimate of the enterprises' possible losses; which by the way did not, for example, stop A. Yevgenyev in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA from immediately and unconditionally condemning the actions of the government organs. In the same manner, the correspondent accepted the arguments of the trade union officials, and in any case arranged them in a certain logical order—and then met the explanations of Minfin representatives with obvious sarcasm: "It turns out that the correction of the prices and rates of which we are speaking, is in pursuit of the noblest of goals."

But you see the goal is indeed a noble one—to normalize the situation in the national economy and to force the pricing mechanism to operate to economize on resources in short supply. It is hard to imagine anything else which the national economy requires more acutely. Everyone can remember the miners' demands to increase prices for coal. Next there were the serious conflicts with the railroad workers, for whom the rates have not been changed since 1955, although the costs of the means of transport and other resources necessary to them have increased significantly. And now the very same questions are arising among the manufacturers of cement, among metallurgists, and in other branches. In each separate instance there are grounds for such demands. But what will happen if this exploitation is not cut short? From the raw-material and transportation branches it

will move quickly to the processing industry, and then the wave of higher costs will inevitably dash into the sphere of retail prices.

This is one part of the problem, the most obvious one, which everyone understands, because it directly concerns one's own pocket. So much has been said about escalating prices, that in the minds of many of us, "one" has unwittingly turned into "the only one." However, the other part of the problem has certainly not ceased to exist because of this. Alas, it too costs us a pretty penny; but it is not as obvious as the former except through a chain of cause-and-effects associations.

We never tire of branding our economy as "cannibalistic" in the press. But you see, just as the word "candy" does not produce sweetness in our mouths, nothing at all changes from our incantations. Once one decides to move toward cost-accounting and market relationships—one must take the practical steps. Careful steps—but take them, all the same! One of the first is to force the prices to operate for thrift. For example, on the world market diesel fuel is on the average only one-fifth cheaper than gasoline; in our country, however—it costs half as much. Is it surprising then, that certain managers utilize motor fuel in their boilers! Why then did raising the price of fuel for diesel engines—that is, changing it from a kind of symbol into a price-stimulus, a price-lever—cause such dissatisfaction on the part of the author of "A Protest [Against Ill-Considered] Government [Decisions]"?

I will remind you how the story of this protest turned out. The government was unable to examine it prior to 5 February. It was examined somewhat later. And then its representatives met with an inter-union trade union commission, apologized for the delay in answering the inquiry and set forth its own proposals, which after discussion and, naturally, certain clarifications, were adopted.

On the essence of the proposals—a bit later. But now, on the nature of the reactions to this event. A TASS report published in the papers on 11 February started out triumphantly: "The sharp conflict brought about by the government decision to raise wholesale prices for diesel fuel and freight shipment and electric power rates, was decided in favor of the workers and their trade unions. In fact, the government itself established a 'moratorium' on this decision until 1 April." And in order not to leave any doubts that the capitulation was complete, it reports about the apologies of the Council of Ministers, and about "those miscalculations which were committed in drawing up and adopting the decision." In short, it was a fiasco. Certain other newspapers gave their estimates in the very same key.

I truly do not know what there is to celebrate here. Just the fact that they managed to avoid a strike? But if the press continues to provide such one-sided analyses, there can be no doubt: somewhere down the line a strike will occur.

There were, however, other articles as well, the authors of which delved far more deeply into the essence of what took place. For example, as I. Ognev wrote in "Opazdyvayut novyye tekhnologii" [The New Technology is Late] (IZVESTIYA, 1 February), "Is it necessary to raise prices on energy sources? Alas, we are forced to do so, even immoderately. But at the same time I can recall that about seven years ago scientists at the Power Engineering Scientific Research Institute imeni G. Krzhizhanovskiy were telling me about installations of the fountain type, in which a mixture of half coal and rock burns marvelously. Others cited principally new technologies as well... But then—where are they?" It is not hard for the reader to come to the conclusion: If we continue to merely proclaim market management methods, and not take advantage of them, we shall continually be asking fruitless questions, and all the while engendering needless-futile "measures" on technical retooling and economizing on resources.

V. Mamontov, writing in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (11 February, "Urok Soglasiya" [The Lesson of Agreement]), clearly sees the danger of tendentious approaches, where the only way out of financial difficulties is compensation from the state budget:

"Send compensation!"—cry the business executives today...and immerse themselves in losses (from increasing prices—L.Ts.) from paying fines for delivery shortfalls and losses from their own mismanagement. Many 'burned out' people, as it turns out from detailed examination...have rejected orders from the state and have not concluded agreements. Alas, one must admit, that some people have decided on the Q.T. to negotiate a quiet life for themselves."

V. Golovachev, writing in TRUD (13 February, "Trudnyy put k soglasiyu" [The Difficult Path to Agreement]), provided what is in my view a particularly weighty article, which also put all the accents in the right place. He, it goes without saying, noted that the government organs—the union-level Minfin, Gosplan and Goskomsen [State Committee on Prices]—have been acting improperly, and did not coordinate in a timely manner with the trade unions regarding their intentions to raise prices. Moreover, the mechanism for implementing this decision was not completely thought through. But the incomplete organizational work did not screen the essence of the matter from the author: "...The goal of the governmental decision is understood: to put into operation an important economic stimulus, aimed at increasing resource conservation, a regimen of thrift, and a reduction in production costs." The enterprises, of course, do need compensation in order that they are not bled white. And the author described in detail what kind of compensations these are, and why certain working collectives were given a grace period for payments to the budget until 1 April (the same "moratorium"). However, it is clear to the reader: the enterprises themselves must tighten their belts, in order that the economizing on resources provided for in the plan do not turn out to be a "paper exercise." Whether they can succeed in

expending less while not reducing, but even increasing the volume of manufactured products, as is done in many countries—there is your second, and principal channel for compensation. the “principal” one because the deeper we go into a market economy, the more important its role will be.

#### FROM THE FACT—TO THE PHENOMENON

The thread that stretches from the fact to the phenomenon is at times not immediately visible to the naked eye in the reports of some experienced journalists. But one certainly senses in their dispatches or conclusions the “connection” of the fact to a certain pivotal thought. What can that pivot be right now? The economic recovery program. No matter how each of us relates to it individually, I am convinced that any practical step in the economy must be considered in the context of this program.

In spite of the fact that rampant speculation has had an adverse effect on public opinion, I dare say that having voted on 19 December 1989 in support of the government’s economic recovery program (I would remind you that three-fourths of those taking part in the by-name voting spoke out for it), the Second Congress of USSR People’s Deputies reflected prevailing public opinion—which is in favor of a moderately-radical development variant, and for a perspicacious and gradual entry into market relations. And it is opposed to throwing both individual people and entire collectives and social groups under the relentless millstone of a “free” market.

What were the newspapers saying about the transition to these relationships before and after 19 December?

The “before” was extremely rich, especially for *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*, which illuminated in detail the preparations for and the course of the All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference on Problems of Radical Economic Reform.

The theoretical squabble had only just subsided, when various deputy groups at the Congress plunged into the fray. One can judge even now from the minutes how the situation had hardened by the day of the vote. The blazing discussion also heated the pages of the periodicals.

Youth publications were no exception. One after another, deputies from the Komsomol rose to speak, sharply criticizing the government’s conception and insisting upon examination of their own. On 12 December they spoke out through *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*, *MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS*, *SOBESEDNIK* (No 50), *MOLODEZHNYI KANAL*, and national radio, with appeals to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, demanding that their alternative program not be ignored.

All this was “before.” But after 19 December, it was cut off. For one thing because, of course, the Congress of People’s Deputies had taken up other questions—they were also important and critical, and it was necessary to

devote attention to them too. But all the same it appeared somewhat strange that even after the conclusion of the Congress, the program on which the country was to have begun work on 1 January was moved from the front page—not even to second place, but to tenth. The press, for example, enthusiastically discussed the escapades of a UFO, which obstinately appeared in full view but impudently ignored the radars. Then, the mass information media all marked the coming of Christmas... And only on New Year’s Eve, invoking the traditional forecasts that the coming day had in store for us, did they once again turn their gaze on this sinful world, and remembered the program.

How, and at what rate are we to undertake transition to market relationships? Many editors once again asked the people’s deputies to speak out on this. And they once again spoke in complete agreement with the by-name voting record.

Some kept on bashing the program, as before. For example, in *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*, (31 December, “Dva voprosa v kontse goda” [Two Questions at Year’s End]), Deputy G. Filshin bluntly wrote: “Here is the kind of situation I would find most desirable: that the government would, not later than the first quarter, sit down at a ‘round table’ with the deputies and specialists who had introduced constructive suggestions on radical changes to the economic strategy at the Supreme Soviet session and at the Second Congress...” And if the Council of Ministers does not sit down at the table and does not start to re-shape the strategy approved by the Congress, then “there is no guarantee that the present government will last to the end of the year.” This is the kind of “democracy” proposed through the press by those who had voted against the program.

Those who wanted the program to be adopted by the Congress only for information, also remained at their previous positions. This position was formulated in all its nakedness in the magazine *KROKODIL* (No 3, “Zanimatsya svoim delom” [Mind Your Own Business by Deputy A. Sobchak, who himself, it is true, did not vote all that logically in my opinion—both for adopting the program “for information,” and for declining it: “Today the Premier is trying to share his responsibility with us, so that tomorrow we would not be able to say, ‘the Government’s program has failed; it has not fulfilled its functions—it should be retired.’” Here the key word is “responsibility.” Many people do not want it thrust upon their shoulders at all. And they did not shoulder it. In spite of the resolution of the Congress.

In their public pronouncements, a third of the deputies—those who voted to support the program—stressed over and over the difficulty of implementing it. And one would have to look through a very powerful magnifying glass in order to find how these difficulties are overcome in real life. In my opinion, the fog is spreading, and not without our journalistic “assistance.”

Whether our concern with the economic crisis is genuine or for show is relatively easy to determine today: by the orientation of the printed word. Such as, that which is in most cases characteristic of IZVESTIYA. It was this very newspaper that declared at the beginning of the year: Enough arguing; let us do our business, independent of the "leftists" and "rightists." Such a note was fleetingly glimpsed in the articles of certain other newspapers, but soon faded away. But IZVESTIYA continued to follow that line, issue after issue.

Many readers probably noticed the page in the newspaper of 21 January, which was almost completely devoted to two letters: one from the general director of the Korvet Association in Kurgan, and another in response, from USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman L. Abalkin. The authors "ran their fingers over" all the most urgent problems of the contemporary stage of economic changes—and one can imagine how many works were referenced in order for the articles to coincide; so that they would be free of "trivialities"; and so that not a single truly major question would be left without a well-argued response.

Were this a one-time publication, perhaps it would not have been mentioned. But the fact of the matter is, that from the first days of the new year, IZVESTIYA began to report on every step being taken at the central organs for implementing the economic recovery program, and keenly followed how these steps were received at the enterprises. More often than not, the subject concerned adopted resolutions. But occasionally, as in the 17 January issue ("Tri dnya—na dorabotku proekta" [Three Days—to Finish Working on the Draft]), about those who were only preparing.

I consider IZVESTIYA's position with respect to the author of the program—the USSR Council of Ministers—respectful in every way. The government asked for enough time to reach a turning point in the unfavorable trends—and the newspaper finds it impossible to place a stick in the spokes; on the contrary, it has taken upon its shoulders the burden of common concerns. (This is the impression one gets, at least from the articles published in January and February.)

In the aforementioned IZVESTIYA issue of 21 January, L. Abalkin wrote: "...Public opinion has not yet grasped the design of this (governmental—L.Ts.) program, nor even the practical steps for implementing it. Nor has it grasped the connection between the planned measures and the evaluation of the current situation in the economy." This observation, incidentally, amounts to criticism of us, as journalists.

How are the newspapermen conducting themselves in this situation?

It is time to return to the fact with which this review began—to the new protest of the AUCCTU, and this time in protest of the plans for auction and commercial trade. You read the news dispatches—and you get the feeling that indignation is growing. But just what is in

fact happening? The best color TV's, convenient dual-compartment refrigerators, "vidiki" [possibly—VCR's] and Volgas—an ordinary mortal cannot buy any of these things at the state prices, and at auctions there simply are no reasonable prices. The gossnab organizations are sending surplus valuable material goods there from the enterprises. It's not enough that trade is also introducing commercial stores—and is sending to them a flow of scarce imported goods. Well, how can one help grabbing someone by the shirt here: "Just what did we fight for?" And how can one not stand up together with the trade unions in defense of the interests of the hapless pensioners, students, young people, and large families!

On that very day, 18 February, IZVESTIYA published a front page dispatch by V. Romanyuk: "Incident at the Goods Market: Why the Trade Unions Are Protesting Again."

In a restrained, even rather laconic manner, we are asked to "Try to look at this situation without emotion. First of all..." And, having cooled off, you begin to ponder. If we affirm that the enterprise is an independent goods-producer, then, apparently, one should not become indignant that it has accumulated above-plan reserves—whether this be equipment, building glass or special clothing—it has the right to sell them at the maximum price. In "exquisite" foreign stores the price of the goods on sale threw us into considerable confusion; but we understood and could relate to the fact that along with goods "for everyone" there are also goods there (and this is not at all confined to luxury goods or antiques) for the few also. Then why can we not put up with commercial stores at home? And how is this method of drawing off the money some people have accumulated because there were no goods to buy worse than, for example, monetary reform, with the help of which some people are proposing to simply confiscate this money?

IZVESTIYA, in short, once again returns our thoughts to the economic recovery program, and once again faces everyone with the choice: Either we take practical steps toward the market, or... Or should we just talk and talk? For how long?

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### Officials View Media Distribution, Costs

90US1051A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jun 90  
Second Edition p 4

[Report on roundtable discussion by A. Fedotov: "The Newspaper and the Postman"]

[Text] "Mail From the Stage Door," "Comrade Postman," "Mail From the Mail".... The Roundtable, an editorial, a selection of letters about the work of the mail and the postman and about their links with the publishing houses and subscribers have flooded into PRAVDA literally for half a year. And with good reason. Recently, more and more frequently the newspapers and

magazines have been late in reaching the subscribers. Why? How can things be improved?

Reflecting on this in a roundtable discussion of the editors were: the RSFSR Minister of Communications E. Pervyshin, the Director of the CPSU Central Committee Publishing House PRAVDA V. Leontyev, the USSR Deputy Minister of Communications Ye. Manyakin, the RSFSR First Deputy Minister of Communications V. Matsnev, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Newspaper PRAVDA M. Korolev, the Chairman of the Central Trade Union Committee of Communications Workers N. Zheltova, the member of the Editorial Board and Editor of PRAVDA for the Department of Letters and Studying Public Opinion V. Lyubitskiy, the Deputy Chief of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Production-Technical Communications Administration V. Vyalov, the Postmaster of the Perm Post Office A. Kubekin, the mailman of the Moscow Post Office Production Association V. Filatova and the member of the Editorial Board and Editor of PRAVDA for the Press and Public Affairs Department V. Kozhemyako.

The discussion at the roundtable was chaired by the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Editor-in-Chief of PRAVDA I. Frolov.

[I. Frolov] It is no accident that after a comparatively short time we have reassembled in our editorial offices. The relationships of the publishing house and the Ministry of Communications between the subscriber and the mailman are, without exaggeration, at the focus of glasnost, as they directly influence the level of reader information and, consequently, the level of glasnost itself.

In light of the new economic relations, we are reviewing the system of former, judging from everything, decrepities and we are setting out approaches to the job which are more oriented at profitability, profit and economic independence. We must, putting it figuratively, check our watches in order not to lag behind the times.

This is all the more important, as practice shows, our interests are not uniformly alike, and there are differences of opinion over the questions of delivering the newspapers to the subscribers, disseminating publications, paying for postal services and so forth. In brief, we are open for discussion and at the same time are ready to seek out ways for mutually advantageous, productive work in the future.

[I. Zheltova] At present, it is even becoming fashionable to severely criticize the postal workers, and we have a lot of shortcomings. It is more difficult to understand the postal workers. I should say that we are certainly not threatened with unemployment as we simply cannot find anyone who wants to work! The wages are low and the conditions are more than bad. There is a number of questions which must be settled immediately.

In the first place, the newspapers continue to be late. And the announcements of publishing delays which have been made in some of them do not save the situation. All

the complaints still rain down on the heads of the postal workers. The second question is the batching of the newspapers. At present, with such large publication runs, we simply are unable to do this manually. Particularly as the publishing houses do have an opportunity to batch them.

The third problem is that recently many new publications have arisen. But who has consulted with the communications workers? No one. At the same time, our facilities are the most antediluvian. No one has established the possibilities for increasing these. And so it turns out that a new publication begins to come out, it is addressed for distribution, transported and delivered to the postal workers. But few are concerned with how this is to be done. But people are not carthorses....

[L. Vyalov] The economic relations between the publishing houses and the post office remain as before, I would say, fettering. Who is to blame for this? I feel there is reciprocal failure of obligation. For instance, we visited the deputy chairman of the State Price Committee and he promised us that delivery rates would be set by January of the current year. At the same time, there have been no rates and they do not exist now.

Or the problem of the delayed delivery. Why do the newspapers stay for a long time at the post office? Because the postal workers do not have the opportunity to deliver each individual publication in turn. We at present are in an inconceivable transport blind alley. The allocations used for purchasing vehicles to transport the mail are being cut back and cut back. The transport is operated to the limit. It will come to a halt if not today, then tomorrow. Who is responsible for this?

From a Letter to the Editors:

"Previously, our Odessa Post Office leased taxis but they stopped this because of economy. For approximately a year now, they have been operating private passenger cars. They explain that this is due to a shortage of transport.

"But what is the case actually? The Odessa Communications Base which is charged with carrying the mail has leased out 86 vehicles. Now they are transporting everything imaginable except newspapers and letters. Why? The leadership wants to be trouble-free. To have lots of money without any problem related to delivering the mail.

"A. Rozentsvayg, Driver  
at the Motor Pool of the  
Odessa Production-Technical  
Communications Administration."

[E. Pervyshin] Let me begin, as the leader of the sector, with replies to the problems raised here. In accord with the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Ministry of Communications of the nation together with the

Union republic ministries of communications, considering the existing demands, has worked out and submitted a program for the next 65 and 10 years. It sets out literally all areas for the development of our sector, including, of course, the mail. What does it lack to make it a working program? In the first place, equipment. The following figure is indicative. During the five-year plan, we will spend about 400 million rubles on the development of postal communications while the United States, with a highly-developed facility, will spend around \$12 billion. As we can see, it is rather difficult to draw a comparison. But all the same, we are not standing still.

What are we doing to develop the postal communications service? A decision has been taken to allocate for these purposes 1.5-2 billion rubles instead of the 400 million rubles in the next five-year plan. The funds will be used to establish the required large communications centers equipped with modern facilities—both large sorting and small automated ones. Here also is included the providing of transport for all the communications departments which, it can be said, have been reduced to the most primitive facilities. For this work, an entire main administration has been assigned and it will only be concerned with supply.

The second question is construction. In many regions of the nation they have agreed to put up the necessary facilities for us.

But in order to better solve the problem, we must naturally have some earnings. At present, just for the postal area, delivery, dispatch and so forth, our expenditures comprise the colossal figure of 1,226,000,000 rubles. But the income is just 650 million rubles. How has this happened? Because our rates were set...back in 1939. And since then how many increases and monetary reforms have there been while we were working and still are working according to long-obsolete rates. In order for us to get on our feet, the rates and retail prices must be revised. We have forwarded our proposals to the Council of Ministers.

Understandably, I am hopeful that for us the questions of economic relations and the transition to a realistic, effective cost accounting is not a tribute to fashion but rather a vital necessity. Without this, the mail cannot exist anymore, particularly as our resources are being soundly cut back while the amount of work constantly jumps upward. From the economic viewpoint an absurd situation has arisen where the better the mailman works, the worse it is for him.

Now an observation of mine. We also have figures: of the 70 billion copies of publications disseminated in the United States, only a sixth is sold by subscription and 60 billion are distributed through the retail network.

In the USSR, of the 60 billion copies, 52 million go by subscription. Here one involuntarily asks: is such a practice justified? If you look at a newsstand an hour and a half after it opens, there is nothing except "informal" literature.

If we cannot provide enough newsprint for the publishing of all the subscription publications, would it not be better to sell a certain portion of the newspapers by subscription and the rest turned over for retail sale? Let our newsstands work. This would relieve a certain portion of the burden from the shoulders of the much-suffering mailman. On the other hand, retail sales would be saturated. I am constantly rebuked: Why are there so few newspapers on sale? With a little fuss, we could distribute the newspapers, but why then should we still deliver the magazines to subscribers?

Editorial Comment:

We feel that the minister is right as labor should be properly compensated. But it scarcely seems the best way out of the problem by lifting the burden from the "much-suffering shoulders" and bent-over mailman by redistributing the retail sales and subscriptions? Was not the subscription itself conceived of so that people would not suffer the inconvenience of seeking out "their favorite" publication at the newsstand? And is it not the direct task of the post office to service clients? The subscriber receives his publication not for nothing, not from charity, rather he pays for the subscription ahead of time, delivering money to the Ministry of Communications for future labor.

[V. Leontyev] The minister of communications ended with retail sales. Let me start with this. It is easy to understand the desire to get rid of delivering the press. But there are essential considerations which the minister has skipped. With every desire to do so the Ministry of Communications cannot presently provide for retail sales. If there was a representative of Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for Distribution of Publications] here with us today, he would certainly say that there is no retail sales and will not be any for the next 10 years. We would completely leave the mass of readers without any publications. For this reason, this path is unrealistic.

Now about distribution. It seems to me that the root of the evil, when we speak about delays in the newspapers reaching subscribers, is not so much that the newspapers are late in being printed as it is in the reticence of the postal workers to disseminate the press. At present, we hear that the publishers themselves should be concerned with the distribution of their publications. Since the postal communications enterprises are supposedly overloaded, under contractual bases they will accept only the volume of printed products which can be promptly handled. Then what should we do? Reduce the publication run because of this?

[E. Pervyshin] It is really a question of one thing. If this work is paid for as it should be, then there would be no problem. At present, it is disadvantageous for us to do the job. Because of this, the sector suffers losses of 600 million rubles a year. For this reason, it is imperative for us to eliminate this obvious planned loss.

[V. Leontyev] But proceeding from your new rates, we would either become bankrupt or we would have to

substantially increase the prices for our periodicals: by 2.5-3-fold for newspapers and by 2-2.5-fold for magazines. Only then could we meet your conditions.

[Ye. Manyakin] For something to think about, let me give the following figures. For the entire run of the newspaper TRUD, we are currently paid 40 million a year. We have asked that according to the new rates we be paid 90 million. An addition of 50 million. I read the newspaper TRUD and it turns out that each year it pays 62 million rubles to the budget of the AUCCTU. What should I reply to the postal communications workers who say that the AUCCTU should protect us and be the first to say that the 62 million which it receives from the newspaper TRUD is the underpayment to the postal communications workers. I favor not increasing the cost of the newspaper, leaving it as before, but redistributing the 60 million for the work of the post office. Even in this instance, there will still be the 12 million for the AUCCTU. Probably the same could be done in terms of other newspapers.

[V. Lyubitskiy] Throughout the world, when expenditures are calculated, then they mean how to make production profitable, and they try not so much to compensate for them at the expense of someone else as to reduce them. At present, if expenditures are calculated as you calculate them, then we will merely preserve the backwardness of the post office. But if it were said that the money is needed so that in a year or two the sector would move to modern work methods, to modern equipment and so forth, then it would be a completely different discussion. But now it turns out the money which you are insisting on will go "into the sands" to feed whatever one likes, only not for the technical reequipping of our mail. As has been repeatedly the case, the best way to keep everything in the old fashion is to raise prices and report increased profits to the state.

At the same time, as is shown from the letters from the very workers of the system of the Ministry of Communications, the people see the real ways and not the bypasses to improve the work.

From a Letter to the Editors:

"I have been working in communications since January 1957. In over these more than 30 years, I have heard and read a good deal of criticism directed against our ministry. But the replies from there have always been the same: measures are being taken, the proposals are being considered....

"But these are just phrases, and things are making no headway! During my employment there has been virtually no mechanization in the post office and, as I feel, none is planned. On the other hand, the output standards have risen and the postal workers—and they are women!—are forced to work like horses.

L. Shishmentseva, Chief of the  
14th Communications Department  
of the Sverdlovsk Post Office

[V. Kozhemyako] Let us descend, so to speak, from the heavens to the earth, from the relationships of the publishing houses and the Ministry of Communications to the problems of the local postal division which, as is known, is one of the weakest links in our general technological chain. Let us listen to the representative of a post office.

[A. Kubekin] As an economic leader, I am interested primarily in one question: staffing. If there are not the proper conditions, the corresponding pay, there is no personnel. In order to pay overtime to the postmen—and only them—we need an additional increase of 200,000 rubles in the wage fund. The social development fund for our enterprises is 85 rubles per worker. How, please tell me, can social problems be resolved with such a miserly, symbolic fund?

Not so long ago, we converted to cost accounting. We went over our figures with economists. And it turned out that in order for us to bring wages into conformity with the amount of work performed and give the personnel what they had already earned, we would need a million rubles. And, at the same time, the losses in 1989 for delivering the press were 4 million. We agreed to sit down at the roundtable and discuss and we agreed to calculate, figure and re-estimate. But we do not agree when the Ministry of Communications says one thing and the publishing houses something else. We need concrete economic calculations agreed upon by the sides and on which we could rely in concluding direct contracts with the publishing houses. It seems to me that the essential must be understood and that is that until we solve the problem of the postman, we will not solve the problem of delivering the press.

[M. Korolev] If my memory does not deceive me, in the developed capitalist nations the rates for the delivery of the press equal 25-27 percent of the value of the publication run. For us it is about 36 percent and that is the figure of the Ministry of Communications. But why, in figuring this in the plan for the rerating, not consult with the publishing houses? Possibly then there would be fewer uncertainties and disputed questions. Particularly as we, the publishing house workers and the journalists are becoming familiar with work in a new setting, under different economic conditions which are unfamiliar for us.

[E. Pervyshin] Here, I agree, we must investigate and clarify the percentage above which it is wrong to take money from the publishing houses.

[V. Matsnev] Let us agree together on the percentage of deductions which would not lead to losses for the publications. Having accepted these, having excluded the surplus, we would set a more just rate for the dispatching.

One other important question which I would like to take up. The publishing runs have recently increased, for instance, by 25 percent over the last 2 years alone. But the availability of a transport is much worse. With a lot

of difficulties, 5 years ago, we introduced motorized delivery and this greatly eased the work of our postman. Now such delivery has in essence been abolished as we have cut back the allocations for motor transport to the limit. We must hire taxis to carry mail to the distributing centers. But the motor transport workers have already cautioned us that from the middle of the summer you must not count on our taxis. What, we ask, are we to do?...

[V. Filatova] It seems to me that we are right to expect from the press—and the post office considers the publishers and journalists to be their direct, involved partners, a most attentive attitude toward our “sore spots.” You must tell more about what is concealed from outside eyes and what alarms my friends, simple mailmen like I myself. And our situation, I am hopeful, ultimately will alter. And it must alter without fail, as we can no longer live this way.

[V. Kozhemyako] I feel that it is hard to argue against the words of Valentina Nikolayevna Filatova. We are not the opponents of the communications workers but rather their allies. And if our relations are viewed from this perspective, then I am convinced there are no problems which cannot be solved for the mutual interest of the publishing house, the journalists and the postal workers. Ultimately, we all are doing the same thing, we are working for the subscriber, for man, for our glasnost.

[I. Frolov] As for the results of our current meeting, the issue has been correctly joined here: together we must draw up the documents which govern our work in the future and submit them for review to the government and to the corresponding commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The editors are an interested party in this.

### **Armenian KGB Scores Accuracy of Radio Liberty Caucasus Reporting**

90US0970A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian,  
25 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by the Armenian SSR KGB Press Bureau:  
“Rumors Instead of the Truth”]

[Text] The impudent attack of a crowd of hooligans on April 14 in the city of Yerevan on the republic's KGB building attracted public attention not only in our country, but also abroad.

Foreign information agencies also reported on this criminal action. The majority of them objectively threw light upon events and assessed the facts of the revelry in the republic, the violence and tyranny.

However some foreign radio stations, for whom it is customary to draw information from unconscientious sources, juggle and distort facts that cannot be considered differently, like rejoicing at the misfortune of others and an attempt to use each situation in its interests.

As, for example, when “Radio Liberty” (Russian editorial staff) on April 16 in its radio program “In the Country and the World” reported specifically the following: “In the course of two hours the militia did not interfere. Besides this, members of the Armenian National Movement did this, who, having surrounded the KGB, drove away the crowd. And then when the danger was past, the State Security decided to demonstrate its might...Immediately after the incident, columns of tanks and armored vehicles entered Yerevan near the KGB building.”

If, in the given case, “Radio Liberty” permitted “some inaccuracies and misrepresentations,” then its Georgian editorial staff on the next day decided to go further and announced: “Only two hours after the start of the protest demonstration in front of the KGB building did they succeed in dispersing demonstrators with the help of tanks and armored vehicles.”

The intent of the radio station is clear—to show the nobleness of the popular public organization and its sympathies toward it, and simultaneously to brush black paint on an institution hated to them.

The Committee for State Security does not have anything against the Armenian National Movement or other organizations promoting maintenance of the social order. We are talking about something else—about the pursuit of truth, about the exact reflection of that which was a matter of fact.

But the truth lies in the fact that no one surrounded the committee and drove back the crowd. However, one of the leaders of the Armenian National Movement on that day tried, although unsuccessfully, to exert restraining force on the hooligan crowd.

As far as armored equipment goes, in the moment of attack (but in no way after), provision had actually been made for this sort of thing in subdepartments of the MVD within the city boundaries. However it did not advance toward the committee building and did not participate in the dispersal of the crowd.

To the point, in its announcement about the given question, the Armenian SSR KGB reported that they have sufficient forces and means for the protection and defense of the military objective. However, Chekhists understood that besides obvious criminal offenders, the bulk of those gathered was made up of accidental curious people who could prove to be innocent victims of an organized provocation.

How is this to be understood—is it that maybe such humaneness is not to the liking of the radio station's editorial staff?

In this broadcast “Radio Liberty” reached the point of uttering that “by KGB approval, Armenian public indignation provoked the arrest of those four persons who attempted to take away weapons from Soviet border guards.”

The word "attempted" already should provoke bewilderment in broad strata of the population, to whom it has long been known that a large quantity of weapons and ammunition were stolen from border guards as a result of an armed attack.

As concerns "indignation of the Armenian public," the Committee for State Security in its announcement clearly pointed out that the given attack of hooligan elements was organized by a criminal world. But actual indignation of the Armenian public appeared already in this relation and some other illicit and impertinent actions.

So that here is direct evidence already not of misrepresentation, but of a barefaced lie, casting aspersions on the community of the republic.

As is apparent from the stated facts, the "Radio Liberty" editors themselves are not concerned about their own reputation, using information from doubtful sources.

It seems that they are quite content to go on using rumors instead of the truth.

#### **Armenian Historian Blasts Weekly SOYUZ Nationalities Reporting**

*90US0970B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian, 14 Apr 90 p 2*

[Article by K. Barsegyan, doctor of historical sciences, professor, chairman of the interdepartmental science council for the study of national processes, Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences: "Weekly is Not Unbiased"]

[Text] The beginning of 1990 was marked by the issuance of a new publication—a supplement to the newspaper IZVESTIYA—the weekly SOYUZ. The necessity of a similar newspaper made itself felt long ago.

It would seem that a new publication would infuse a fresh spirit, by frank conversation with the reader marking its entry into life, but this did not happen. Although only 10 issues of the weekly have been published, this has proved to be enough in order to be convinced that the new organ of the press is far from objective.

We will take interethnic problems and materials dealt with in its pages, shedding light on questions of their settlement—but there are already many such issues being published.

The reader awaits the very burning, vital truth about all questions of interethnic life, and wants to see in SOYUZ the ways by which a renewed federation should go. The last time much was said about the fact that the federation is in need of renewal. But where is the model for this renewal? And should not SOYUZ be one of the first champions of ideas for this renewal of the federation?

SOYUZ should give answers to questions of vital importance, to events in the Baltic republics, Transcaucasia,

Moldavia, the Ukraine, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other regions, not leaving out the RSFSR. Everything that happened in recent years in interethnic relations demands serious analysis, and not a surface glance for the reader's "general acquaintance." Sometimes, of course, very unsuccessful attempts are made, incidentally. For example, in the 7th issue an interview with the CPSU Central Committee Secretary A. N. Girenko was printed under the headline "Politics worked out. Its Solution Realized." The speech is about the federation problem, in particular about events in Transcaucasia. Besides exaggeration of generally known truths and facts, and also exiles on the CPSU Central Committee on national party politics in contemporary conditions, A. Girenko does not propose anything radical or new. But he was urged to give the most qualified answer to arising interethnic problems. Strangely, the CPSU Central Committee Secretary cannot (or does not want to) acknowledge the right of nations to self-determination—in the given case, the right of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, justly demanding reunification with the motherland—with Soviet Armenia, and repeating the thing that we are all sick of hearing—"perestroyka is not perestroyka." But who is it that is trying to recarve the borders? We are talking about the reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh AO with Soviet Armenia within the limits of the Soviet Union, and not about secession from the Union. Is it not a result of this similar superficial approach that Armenians are now being driven out of their native villages and becoming refugees right before the eyes of the Soviet Army?..

We turned our attention to the column "Ethnographic Dictionary," acquainting the reader with peoples living in USSR territory. The idea undoubtedly is remarkable, but initial articles are alarming. In them, according to evidence from scientific experts, there are many distortions (specifically, in the article "Azerbaijanians" in the 6th issue). But who is it that answers for them: only those columnists M. Guboglo, Y. Simchenko and others, or the editorial staff too? And there are many mistakes...As in the article "Abkhazians" (SOYUZ, No. 2) the newspaper LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA (16 January 1990) published an extensive review of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member M. Lordkipanidze, in which were shown mistakes allowed in SOYUZ. In the article "Azerbaijanians" the ethnic history of Transcaucasia and Iran was openly falsified. It did not note that up until the beginning of the 20th century this kray was not called Azerbaijan, that Baku and a number of oblasts along the Caspian Sea were added to Russia not in 1723, as was said in the information, but a century later...

We will turn to events in Lithuania. In SOYUZ there was quite a number of articles about them. However the position of the editorial board of the weekly in the given question is not clear: there is no analysis of the problem and perspectives of its decision. Toward similar questions the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh AO is related. There are many conversations, but its main

point is sidestepped. And the most scandalous fact is that the central means of mass information with all their strength try to preserve parity between that which took place in Azerbaijan and that which agitated people in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. As if someone from above with blindfolded eyes was weighing what happened on unbalanced scales...as, in particular, material of Yuri Orlik's "Mountains and Grief" (No. 9), in which the picture of events in Transcaucasia is again distorted with a subjective selection of readers' letters. Even in commentaries of the weekly one can observe the same line of "levelling" of events in Azerbaijan and Armenia. So, in the 5th issue, SOYUZ commentaries were published under the heading "The Shattering of Myths."

Incidentally, the weekly is unscrupulous in its publications. Sometimes it grants pages to authors who, similar to the two-faced Janus, proclaim to the All-Union reader its striving toward normalization of interethnic relations, advocate brotherhood of peoples, and in local editions come out with contrary positions. So, in the third issue of SOYUZ a discussion was published between special correspondent A. Lugovskaya and sheykh-ul-islam Allakh-Shukur Pasha-zade, chairman of the spiritual administration of Muslims in Transcaucasia, by the USSR People's Deputy. The spiritual leader here preaches peace and love toward all people, nations, that undoubtedly causes joy and raises hopes... However, before his eyes in his native land during the days of January 1990, bonfires were blazing with the bodies of Armenians, Christian churches were burning, and the last people of Baku from Armenian descent, placed as sacrifices to the pogroms, in horror left their native city, which they built with their own hands together with other peoples in the course of the decades... Where then was Allakh? It is appropriate to remember other facts. Is the SOYUZ editorial board familiar with the appeal of that minister of religion (with the mark of the USSR People's Deputies) to M. S. Gorbachev, with the published newspaper VESTNIK GYANDZHI (24 January 1990)—with the CP gorkom organ of Azerbaijan and gorsoviet of People's Deputies? Apparently not. Otherwise it is doubtful whether it would pass by similar tactless and preaching violence, fraught with tension of words.

Expressing its anger against bringing troops into Baku, when there was created actually the threat of liquidation of Soviet power and massive deportation already of Russians, Jews and representatives of other nationalities, instead of the fact that in order to correctly estimate the forced step of the administration, by a member of which he appears, the spiritual leader is indignant with this act of the central administration and crudely stamps the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary: "Having led punitive troops into Baku, where they behave like occupants, you discredit the Soviet power, having confirmed that such concepts as sovereignty and dignity of peoples are unknown and alien to it. You completely discredited yourself as a political figure, having proved your unsoundness as a head of State. The

myth was dispelled about you as a 'champion of peace,' for it is blasphemy to call such a man with one hand signing peace with a foreign state, and with the other—sanctioning punitive actions against its citizens of the country."

This too Allakh-Shukur Pasha-zade, only a week after his interview with the SOYUZ correspondent...Is not this spiritual leader a hypocrite? And indeed his religion (Koran, 63rd sura), specifically says that a hypocrite—is the same as a liar...

We cannot engage in a thorough analysis of the articles of the weekly as a whole. Therefore we are limiting ourselves to these remarks...

### Ownership Conflicts at VECHERNIY MINSK Newspaper Chronicled

90US1144D Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 21 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by L. Yunchik: "On Monday 'Independence' and Tuesday as Before"]

[Text] ...The waiting was dragging on and becoming tiring. You could feel the tension and the uniqueness of the situation which had forced us to assemble immediately in the meeting room of the members of the buro of the party gorkom and invited guests.

Incidentally, the session of the buro of the Minsk Gorkom was also attended by those who were not invited. In any event, its First Secretary M. Misuno, having read the list of invited persons, mentioned just some of those journalists from the city newspaper who were present in the hall. Many had come to the session on their own will and with the very decisive intentions of defending their editor the plight of whom had purportedly been predetermined in the gorkom offices.

In excusing himself for having diverted such a large number of persons in vain from their job, Maryan Iosifovich Misuno stated:

"Due to the fact that there is not the required mode of representation, the buro will not meet today. We will talk with the comrades from VECHERNIY MINSK at the editorial offices on Thursday."

Those present in the room stood up and began to leave. But the journalists from VECHERNIY MINSK remained in the room and insisted on a discussion and a clarification of the position of the gorkom and editorial collective.

"The editorial offices have existed for some 23 years now. We deserve proper attention."

"We are not children here. We understand perfectly what has happened. Why should the discussion be put off if we have met today for this purpose?"

These and others at times very unpleasant replies for the gorkom workers were heard one after another. From all

you could feel that the cup of patience, as they say, was about to overflow and the gorkom leaders, I feel, acted correctly having decided to talk with the journalists without waiting until Thursday.

What was happening with VECHERNIY MINSK?

The day before, on 18 June, a Monday, the 140th issue had arrived at the readers and the kiosks of Soyuzpechat [USSR State Committee for Press] with unusual publishing data. "Daily Independent Newspaper of the Capital of Belorussia" was the new line appearing under the title. And although the content of this issue in no way differed from the previous ones, observant readers immediately spotted the innovation. Each person had his own attitude toward it. Thus, having telephoned the editorial offices of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, some supported the unusual step by the journalists, some did not accept it or some were skeptical. And when the readers of VECHERNIY MINSK received the next issue in order to ascertain just where its "independence" lay, they discovered not the new but rather the old line: "Newspaper of the Minsk Gorkom of the Belorussian Communist Party and the City Soviets."

Why had these metamorphoses become possible? Why had the line which caused such emotions, disputes and passions appeared and suddenly disappeared from the newspaper?

Let me say immediately that its appearance was not the result of an error or some "provocation." The editors took this step consciously and more or less consistently. Several months ago, the editorial collective had both asked and demanded to ascertain what publication the city newspaper would be. But time passed and the question remained moot. Finally, at a session of the new membership of the Minsk City Soviet on 28 May, a decision was taken "to consider the newspaper VECHERNIY MINSK as of 1 January 1991 the organ of the Minsk City Soviet."

This decision caused the editorial board of VECHERNIY MINSK to conduct an investigation of the circumstances for the founding of the newspaper. In the course of this, it was disclosed that the decree for the founding of the publication VECHERNIY MINSK had been adopted by the Belorussian CP Central Committee on 21 August 1967 on the basis of a decree of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. At that time, the Minsk party gorkom was instructed to organize the publishing of the newspaper VECHERNIY MINSK. But actually it only established the leading personnel of the editorial staff. The plenum and buro of the party gorkom and the session of the City Soviet did not discuss this question. The CPSU Central Committee as the founder of the newspaper did not rule on whose organ it would be. Nor did the Belorussian CP Central Committee take such a decision. A decree of the latter established that the Publishing House of the Belorussian CP Central Committee would be the publisher of the newspaper.

The editorial board also established and verified at its session that the Minsk party gorkom and the city soviet had not provided any financial aid to the editorial personnel over all the newspaper's operations. Proceeding from all that was set out above, it felt that the publication data were wrong to state that VECHERNIY MINSK was the "newspaper of the Minsk Gorkom of the Belorussian CP and the City Soviet."

In the opinion of the editorial board of VECHERNIY MINSK, the ruling of the city soviet of 28 May also could not be accepted as legitimate. On the basis of this, it ruled as of 18 June to incorporate the changes in the publication data of the newspaper and indicate here: "VECHERNIY MINSK the Daily Publication of the Capital of Belorussia."

The given ruling was put up for discussion by the editorial collective and it voted for incorporating the changes in the wording, adding the word "Independent" to it.

It was this word that challenged the buro. After the leaders of the Publishing House of the Belorussian CP Central Committee stated that they would not print VECHERNIY MINSK with the new publication data, its collective decided not to surrender but merely to halt its decision and, as they say, sit down at the negotiating table with its publishers and all involved parties. Here the collective let it be clearly understood that it would no longer tolerate anyone whosoever determining the newspaper's fate without the collective's involvement.

For the leaders of the party gorkom, the discussion with the editorial collective was a difficult one. The workers of VECHERNIY MINSK voiced a number of insults, rebukes and complaints against their unempowered, as it was to turn out, founders. Probably the main one here was that the editors at times had been forced from above to accept dubious articles and because of these reader interest in the newspaper was steadily declining.

During the talks there were also rebukes against the newsmen. They supposedly, as they say, had gotten the cart before the horse as even before the Press Law had come into effect and without any legal or financial grounds, they had planned to change the masthead of the newspaper.

But they had still taken the first steps toward one another. The previously established commission to determine the status of the newspaper added editorial workers to its membership. There is still the difficult task of seeking out an optimum approach which would be mutually acceptable for all parties. The editorial bylaws which should be worked out before 1 August should help greatly in regulating relations between the founder, the editor and the editorial personnel and determining the powers of the latter collective.

VECHERNIY MINSK is a publication which actually consists of three parts, a daily newspaper published in

two languages and appendices. It is completely possible that this publication in the future will assume a completely new appearance.

### Director Explains Renamed Latvian News Agency Function

90US1144C Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 14 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Ayvars Baumanis, the new director of LETA and chairman of the Board of the Latvian Journalists Union, by Olga Avdeich: "What Policy for LETA?"]

[Text] Recently, on the pages of the republic newspapers, there has begun to appear a signature previously unknown to the readers, LETA. This is the new or more precisely, the restored name of the Latvian Telegraph Agency which goes back to 1920. Recently, the Union Republic Agency LATINFORM, by a decision of the Latvian Council of Ministers, was abolished and in its place the republic Telegraph Agency LETA was organized. From 1 June, LETA has been headed by a new director, the Chairman of the Board of the Latvian Journalists' Union, Ayvars Baumanis. Our correspondent has spoken with him.

[Avdeich] Having become the director, you began with the personnel. At present, many staff members are concerned for their fate as they fear cutbacks and dismissals.

[Baumanis] Under Article 33 of the Latvian KZOT [Labor Code], there is the provision to abrogate a labor contract upon the initiative of the management in the event of the liquidation of the enterprise or institution. Since LATINFORM was actually liquidated, all staff workers have signed a document which says that at the end of 2 months the labor relations will either be dissolved or restored. This is a legal move for renewing the membership of the newly established agency.

[Avdeich] What are your criteria in selecting staff members?

[Baumanis] Honesty and professionalism. In addition, I would introduce a surpayment amounting to 15 percent of the wage for the knowledge of a foreign language. If a person knew two foreign languages, he would receive a 30-percent surpayment.

[Avdeich] And what languages do yourself know?

[Baumanis] English, German, Swedish and Polish. I can read in Czech, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch.

[Avdeich] Plus Russian and Latvian...

[Baumanis] Undoubtedly. I feel that for creative workers of LETA, there is one other criterion and that is a knowledge of Russian and Latvian. But this does not mean that a worker can be dismissed merely because of an ignorance of the language. If he is a first-rate professional he will be

useful for the agency. And he will be given sufficient time to build up his knowledge of a language.

[Avdeich] What will be the political orientation of LETA?

[Baumanis] During all these years, LATINFORM, being the official agency of the Council of Ministers, was closely tethered to the CPSU. The Party directed everything beginning with the recruitment of the personnel and ending with the censoring of the materials and photos. Now that we are a government agency, we must propagandize the policy of the republic government. Moreover, we must establish contacts with the Parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Avdeich] What is your attitude toward the idea of the depolitization of LETA?

[Baumanis] I have already issued an order according to which any sort of meetings and assemblies of any political parties, public organizations and unions are not to be permitted in the offices of LETA during working hours. I have nothing against the Greens, communists or the NFL [Latvian People's Front], but not during working time.

[Avdeich] What will the relations now between LETA and TASS?

[Baumanis] The Lithuanian Telegraph Agency has generally refused to work with TASS and has concluded a contact with the Polish agency PAP. I feel that business-like, friendly relations must be maintained with such a major agency as TASS. We have already prepared a draft contract which provides mutually advantageous conditions for collaboration. We will receive TASS information and transmit our own to Moscow.

[Avdeich] Will you also collaborate with foreign information agencies? If so, how do you intend to pay them?

[Baumanis] There has been the idea of establishing contacts with the agencies of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We are conducting preliminary discussions on exchanging information with the English Reuters. We have recently received photographic equipment from the Associated Press. We will pay with photographic information and services for their correspondents to travel through Latvia. We also want to open in one of the houses in Old Riga a permanent service center for foreign journalists where there will be a photographic lab, transport, communications equipment and the necessary information for their services. For a definite fee, of course. Those are our plans.

### Officials on Restarting Latvian Paper Production

90US1144A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 6 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by Yevgeniy Ogurok: "Wingless Pegasus"]

[Text] No, the theorists of journalism are not right. At present, a newsman is fed not by his feet or even his head

but rather...by paper. There is no paper; no matter how intelligent a journalist may be, no matter what effort he might make, the newspapers and magazines don't appear. Incidentally, everyone has been speaking and writing about this recently, that is, the paper hunger as a permanent deficit which no longer amazes anyone.

...The Slokskiy TsBZ [Pulp and Paper Mill] is an enterprise known in the Union and in Latvia. For long months it has been besieged by the public and the deputies. It has been closed down and reopened for the same reasons: polluting the environment and the necessity of producing paper. Ultimately, ecology and economics have reached a shakey compromise. The plant has reduced the output of pulp and treatment facilities are under construction and reconstruction. Upon a decision of the session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, in May the TsBZ did not produce anything at all as technical and ecological measures were being carried out.

"During this month we have done a great deal. But we have also lost much," said the plant director, A.M. Piskun. "In the first place, paper was not produced. Secondly, the collective virtually did not work. The total loss is around 2 million rubles. Incidentally, the loss will be covered by the Council of Ministers."

"Anatoliy Mikhaylovich [Piskun], will the TsBZ produce newsprint?"

"We will try. But I want to say immediately that at the current prices it is not advantageous for us to produce it. Our equipment does not possess a 'profitable capacity'..."

At present, the TsBZ after a month-long break is beginning a trial batch of pulp. The technical and ecological measures will be continued. But it is clear that the dispute between ecology and the economy cannot go on indefinitely. The Slokskiy TsBZ sooner or later will be shut down or its production restructured. And this has long been obvious. But only now have they begun discussing the question of building a new pulp and paper combine.

"Such a combine is simply essential for the republic," said the General Director of Latvijas Papirrupniyetsiba, Yu.M. Mizh-Mishin. "The Slokskiy TsBZ has reduced pulp production from 70,000 tons a year to 40,000. Each year, Latvia imports on the order of 100,000 tons of pulp for producing paper at our mills."

"Yuriy Mamertovich [Mizh-Mishin], what sort of combine will this be and where do you plan to build it?"

"We have major plans. We have already concluded a contract with the contractors and we are analyzing the proposals of foreign firms. We are planning that the combine will turn out on the order of 300,000 tons of pulp a year. This will meet the needs of the republic papermaking enterprises and provide an opportunity for exports or trade. Pulp at present is in great demand on the market. We are hoping that foreign partners will be

involved in building the combine, and we will pay them by pulp or paper. That is advantageous.

"The construction site has not yet been chosen. But already the Ventspils and Liyepaya Executive Committees have agreed to construction."

"Can it be hoped that the new combine will make it possible to produce newsprint in the republic?"

"In the first place, the question of construction is just being settled. Secondly, construction itself will take not months, but rather years. And most importantly it is simply not advantageous for us to produce newsprint. Why should all the fuss be made in developing capacity, spending foreign exchange, if we can 'survive' by ordinary trade? That is, do what we are doing now. We supply the Union with one type of paper and in exchange receive another. That is better."

Agreeing with the opinion of Mizh-Mishin were the Deputy Chief of the Equipment and Materials Department of the Republic Ministry of Economics S.A. Shilov and the Deputy Chief of the Administration Latlesstroyoptorg [Latvian Lumber and Construction Wholesale Trade Organization] Ya.A. Saulit.

And even if it is considered that the prices for paper, according to the forecasts of the specialists, will rise by 100 and more percent, with the existing capacity it will be disadvantageous to produce newsprint. But when will the new combine be built? At present, the runs of the republic newspapers have been cut back. Subscribers have been confronted with the fact and we, the journalists, also.

As I was informed at the Ministry of Economics, the suppliers are shipping newsprint within the limits. But due to the inefficiency (how else to call it?) of the responsible workers, these limits were 3,700 tons less than the total volume needed for the runs of the republic editions. And the situation, according to the forecast of the specialists, will not improve but quite the contrary. Possibly the newspaper runs will be further reduced.

**New Ukrainian Cooperatives Newspaper Profiled**  
*90US1144B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian*  
7 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by B. Yavorovskiy: "The Cooperatives Are Publishing"]

[Text] A new publication entitled INITSIATIVA, the organ of the Ukrainian Union of United Cooperatives and the Republic Trade Union Council of Ukrainian Cooperative Workers, is designed not only for cooperative members and entrepreneurs but also for a broad range of readers.

The first issue of INITSIATIVA was devoted to the Kiev Meetings of the nation's cooperative members and where the question was raised of creating a confederation of trade unions of cooperative workers. Problems of the cooperative movement were discussed and in particular, the main ones, activities under the conditions of a market economy. What is the market at present? Here is what President of the Union of USSR United Cooperative Members, USSR People's Deputy and Academician of the VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin], V.A. Tikhonov, had to say on this question: "It is essential to be realists. A planned economy at present simply doesn't work. For this reason, it is essential to abandon the administrative-command system. We must not fear a market economy. As is known, this process can be completely regulated, although for this it is essential to have resources, foreign exchange and measures for the social protection of the less well-off strata of the public. The market is a unity of the unorganized and organized."

On the pages of the first issue of INITSIATIVA, one can find a story about V.S. Sadovenko, the first cooperative member who became the mayor of Zhitomir, an analysis of the foreign trade activities of the cooperatives, an excursion into the history of the Ukrainian cooperative movement and an economic review.

In the future, the newspaper plans to describe the activities of republic cooperative members, to provide advice on legal, juridical and economic problems, to take up economic trends and various sorts of reformist innovations in the aim of investing capital, to public economic forecasts, to provide an analysis of the situation on the consumer market and financial activities. A special place will be given to analyzing individual articles of laws concerning the cooperative movement, ownership, land, departmental enforceable enactments, instructions, their execution or nonconformity to the current standards of Soviet legislation.

So, good luck, INITSIATIVA!

**Goskompriroda Official Views Environmental Policies, Priorities**

90WN0159A *Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 24, 11-17 Jun 90 pp 10-11*

[Interview with Doctor of Economic Sciences, Nikolay Nikiforovich Lukyanchikov, chief of the Main Administration for the Economics and Organization of Nature Management under the USSR Goskompriroda by Correspondent A. Orlenko: "Let Us Defend Our Common House"]

[Text] [Orlenko] "The earth in strife!" "Ecology crisis!"—these are the voices most often heard when discussing nature. What is your assessment of the current situation?

[Lukyanchikov] You are right, almost every day we encounter information concerning acute ecological situations: the release of gases into the atmosphere, the falling of phenol into the water lines of a major city. Hence, our times require emergency measures to protect the environment. At present, civilization is beginning to degrade and this threatens the existence of life itself on earth. This has appeared in the trends for a global change in the climate, a reduction in the earth's ozone layer, and in the destruction of the integrity and the loss of individual regional ecosystems. One can learn in detail about all of this from the reports published in 1989 by the International Commission for the Environment and Development and entitled "Our Common Future" and that of the USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Environment] entitled "A National Report on the State of the Environment in the USSR."

The first problem is tied to a change in the climate. In line with the significant release into the atmosphere of the so-called "hothouse gases" (carbon dioxide, methane, Freon and so forth), the solar radiation is retained in the surface layers of the earth, causing a general warming. As a result, the surface temperature in the Northern Hemisphere has become 0.4 of a degree Celsius higher than in 1956-1980. If measures are not taken, it is expected that its rise will average 1.3 of a degree and by the year 2050 by 3 or 4 degrees. These seemingly insignificant anomalies are fraught with dangerous consequences. A temperature rise can lead to the thawing of the permanent ice and consequently to a rise in the level of the world's ocean and here many low-lying cities and river deltas will be inundated. The air currents in the atmosphere will change and this can also lead to unpredictable consequences.

In addition, an increase in droughts is expected in the arid and semiarid regions while increased precipitation is expected in the humid zones. Such a change in the climate can tell negatively on the production of agricultural products.

A particular concern is the fate of the earth's ozone layer. With a decline in it, harmful radiation will increase and

this can cause skin cancer and reduce productivity in agriculture and the world's ocean.

Even now in Antarctica the ozone layer during the spring months drops by 40-50 percent. In 1988, the "ozone tear" spread into a populated region encompassing Melbourne, Perth, Hobart and Macquarie Island. A 10 percent decline in the ozone layer lasted a month here. The further uncontrolled rise in the release of chlorofluorocarbons which destroy the ozone layer will lead to a situation whereby by the middle of the next century the ozone content in the middle latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere will decline by 4-8 percent, and in the polar regions of the Arctic and Antarctic by 12-15 percent. This will be a serious threat to human activity as a whole.

There has also been great concern over the destruction of the tropical forests in the world and the intensive growth of desertification and as a result of this the dried-out lands become economically unproductive.

Up to the present, one-half of the tropical forests has already been destroyed and with each passing year their area drops by 11 million hectares. Each year, around 6 million hectares are turned into desert.

[Orlenko] The picture, to put it frankly, is gloomy. How do you view the ecological situation in our nation?

[Lukyanchikov] As very tense. With good reason, the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1989 adopted a decree "On Immediate Measures for the Ecological Amelioration of the Nation."

The release of polluting substances into the atmosphere is around 100 million tons a year. In 103 cities (with a total population of around 5 million persons), the concentration of pollutants in the atmosphere significantly exceeds the maximum permissible level according to the health standards. Water quality in more than one-half of the sources also does not meet the requirements of the sanitary and ecological standards.

The Aral Sea Basin and certain areas which have been subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant have become ecological disaster zones. As you know, they plan to relocate thousands of inhabitants from a number of regions of Belorussia, the Ukraine and the RSFSR.

Also on the brink of an ecological crisis are Kalmykia, the Dnieper and Dniester regions, the Donbass, the Ural, Kuzbass, the basins of the Volga, Sevan, Issyk-Kul, Balkhash and Lake Ladoga, the Black, Azov, Caspian and Baltic Seas and a number of other regions.

The state of our land resources causes great concern. Everywhere we have noted the chemical contaminating of the soils, a decline in natural fertility and the degradation of the land because of erosion, salinization and a technogenic overload. As a result of erosion, each year around 1.5 million tons of fertile soil is lost. The drop in fertility is the main reason for the low return on our investments into agriculture.

More and more harmful substances are being taken into the human organism along with food products, drinking water (for example, Bashkiria) and the air. As a consequence of this, there has been a rising morbidity of the population and an increase in the number of children with inherited defects. In recent years, a new category of persons has even appeared called the "ecological refugees."

The anthropogenic effect is felt particularly strongly on the populations of the rare species of the animal world. For example, over the last 10-20 years, the Turanian tiger, the cheetah, the leopard racer snake, the Aral elk as well as over 10 species of higher plants have disappeared in our nation. In 1984, the USSR Red Book contained 463 species of animals and 684 species of plants. Natural fish productivity has declined significantly and hence the catches of the valuable species of commercial fishes from the inland seas and waters. Thus, over the last 50 years, in the Azov Sea, these have declined by almost 20-fold and in the Caspian Sea Basin by 6-fold.

In the nation there is a very high expenditure of primary natural raw material per unit of end product. Ending up on the dumps are over 50 billion tons of wastes and a portion of these could be efficiently used in the national economy but.... As it seems to me, a further advance of our economy along such a wasteful path is simply inadmissible if only because it is incompatible with the protection of nature.

Serious ecological danger threatens all. It is important to instill ecological culture in all strata of society in order to arouse each person to action for the sake of saving our common home, the earth. I feel that our veterans can also find their place in this movement.

Recently, your weekly (No 51, 1989) published sharp material on ecology entitled "What the Amur Waves Are Whispering?" For Goskompriroda this article was an alert to include the Amur Region in the list of zones with a tense ecological situation. It is a good thing that the weekly intends to organize a social movement to save the nature in the Amur River Basin with the most active participation being assigned to the veterans. Certainly we who live today should give some thought to tomorrow and hence to the future of our children and grandchildren and what we are leaving after ourselves on the earth.

[Orlenko] Nikolay Nikiforovich, what ways are there for a comprehensive solution to the ecology problems in our nation?

[Lukyanchikov] I feel that the basis of this can and should be a long-term state plan for the protection of environment and the rational utilization of natural resources for the 13th Five-Year Plan and for the long run up to the year 2005. Its elaboration is now being concluded and the result of implementation should be the gradual achieving in 1991-2005, as the scientists say,

of the normed environmental quality, that is, scientifically based indicators for the utilization of natural resources.

In order to carry out the program, during each five-year plan we must increase by approximately 3-4-fold the volume of investments into protecting nature. It will be hard to find this money but it will be impossible to improve the ecological situation in the nation without radical measures. Hence this money must be found. One of the possibilities is the converting of the defense industry as well as restructuring the national economy on the basis of resource-saving and integrated waste-free production. Without saving resources it is impossible to solve not only the ecological problems but also social ones. And certainly economic methods of nature management should also be given a major role.

[Orlenko] What do these consist of?

[Lukyanchikov] In the first place, for the territories and ecosystems we must set limitations within which the productive forces should be allowed to develop and be located.

As such restrictions there should be:

- Limits on the release (discharge) of pollutants into the environment by territories, enterprises and individual ecosystems;
- Limits for the maximum permissible removal of natural resources from the individual ecosystems.

The first type of restriction assumes an annual decline in the discharges and ultimately the bringing of these to a standard level. Then nature would be able to urge itself.

The second type of restriction concerns the maximum permissible removal of natural resources. The aim here is to observe an equilibrium in one or another ecosystem and not allow it to be destroyed. From the example of the Aral Sea we can see what such destruction leads to.

In order that something similar happens nowhere else, it is essential to set ecologically sound limits on the removal of water from the river basins. Even now, for example, the ecosystems of the Azov Sea have been brought to their lower limit.

From this it follows that any intervention into nature should not lead to the violating of the established ecological limitations.

If, for instance, new construction in the future will lead to the increased discharge (release) of pollutants on one or another territory, then we must provide for a decline in the discharges at the operating enterprises so that an ecological equilibrium is maintained for the entire region.

We are placing great hopes on the veterans and on the informal organizations of the Greens who, from our

viewpoint, could watch this and prevent a deteriorating of the ecological situation in their region.

But, in addition to the designated restrictions, with large-scale interference into nature, we must consider without fail the possible consequences and they, as practice shows, can be the most unexpected. For example, it is known that as a result of the construction of the Krasnoyarsk GES, below its dam the Yenisey River does not freeze in the winter even in the hardest cold. During frosts, thick fogs hang over the water surface and these, like a sponge, absorb harmful substances from the polluted air. With temperature changes over Krasnoyarsk, an aerosol "cap" is formed and this contains a significant amount of particularly toxic elements which easily penetrate into the human organism through the respiratory tracts.

The construction of the GES on the Volga has had a different impact. Before the appearance of the dam, water traveled from Rybinsk to Volgograd in 50 days (in flooding in 20 days) but now in a half year. Water exchange in the basin has declined by 12-fold! As a result of evaporation from the reservoir of the Volga-Kama series of GES, descending cold air currents from the atmosphere are formed. This in turn delays the start of the growing season of the plants by 10-30 days and contributes to the development of drought to some 10-30 km away from the shoreline.

Stagnation phenomena in the basin of the great Russian river have led to the degradation of the Volga as a unified ecological system.

But can we allow ourselves to lose the Volga? There is only one answer: no we can't! This is why for saving the river and preserving nature in the Caspian Sea Basin, the USSR Goskompriroda is preparing the draft of a special decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. The Social Committee for the Saving of the Volga is also active.

The goals of the long-term program mentioned here should be incorporated in the plan for the social and economic development of both the nation, the republic, as well as the individual regions and enterprises.

If for some reason they are not incorporated in the 13th Five-Year Plan, this will be an enormous blow to the environment and beyond comparison with any previous disasters.

[Orlenko] You have mentioned establishing a payment for the use of nature. Would you describe this in greater detail?

[Lukyanchikov] In many regions of the nation, as an economic experiment for the industrial enterprises they have introduced a payment for environmental pollution. This is set for the discharge (release) of pollutants into the air and water and for the dumping of solid wastes. The source of this payment is enterprise profit and with

above-standard pollution the net income of this enterprise's collective. From 1991, such payments will be introduced everywhere. This will make it possible first of all to employ the internal reserves of the plants, factories and kolkhozes for reducing environmental pollution. And these reserves, as analysis indicates are enormous. According to an expert evaluation, merely by bringing environmental equipment to a normal state and increasing production efficiency it is possible to reduce the release (discharge) of pollutants into nature by 20-25 percent!

A payment for natural resources will be introduced simultaneously with the reform in wholesale and purchasing prices. Certain types of payments have already been introduced. Pollution penalties as well as fines for the irrational use of resources and for violating conservation legislation will be used for the betterment of the rivers, seas, forests, the tundra, arable lands and so forth.

[Orlenko] Certainly not only a system of payments and penalties but also a system of encouragement should be set up for encouraging conservation?

[Lukyanchikov] Certainly. In our opinion, we should introduce easy crediting conditions for the conservation activities of the enterprises and organizations and set tax benefits for increasing the wage fund for enterprises which build treatment facilities and which carry out the reconstruction and repair of conservation facilities. There should also be the establishing of other benefits depending upon the ecological purity of production.

[Orlenko] Nikolay Nikiforovich, what is your attitude toward international collaboration in solving ecological problems?

[Lukyanchikov] As a very important factor. Alone now, we cannot save ourselves from ecological disaster. The basic goal of such collaboration should be to establish a favorable "economic climate" for the sake of protecting nature. For this we should sharply increase the pace of technical progress in all countries of the world. The exchange of advanced technologies, preferential crediting and other mutually advantageous agreements should become the law. Probably we should set up an international fund for the protection of nature. A portion of the money for this fund (on the basis of mutual agreement between countries) could come from the conversion of defense production.

[Orlenko] One last thing. What must be done for the protection and reproduction of the plant and animal world?

[Lukyanchikov] You obviously have in mind the protection of typical and rare landscapes in a natural state, saving the genetic pool of wild plants and animals and improving the quality of the environment. It is essential first of all to broaden the network of reserves, preserves and national parks and monuments of nature. The total number of reserves and reserve hunting farms in the USSR at the beginning of 1989 reached 164 and the area

occupied by them some 216 million hectares. However, these do not cover all the climatic zones of the nation and their territories protect only 39 percent of the species of mammals, 55 percent of the bird species and 68 percent of the reptile species. Under the condition of intense economic activity this does not guarantee the preservation of the entire diversity of wild animal and plant species.

We should also protect against anthropogenic impact the territories which are of particular cultural and historical importance, for example, Yasnaya Polyana, Mikhaylovskoye, Melikhovo and many others.

There must be a special attitude also for the "ethnic territories" which require unstinting conditions of nature management and ensuring the preservation of the national culture and way of life of the small peoples and nationalities in the areas of their historical dwelling.

In a word, in everything we should endeavor for harmony, for creating for the sake of the future of our earth and man as the main value of nature and society.

#### **Commission Reviews Draft USSR Environment Law**

*90WN0157A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Session of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Emergency Situations: "When Nature Is in Danger"]

[Text] The Commission reviewed and basically approved the draft USSR Law on the Protection of the Environment. The basic aim of the draft law is to protect the nation's natural wealth, to use them rationally, to provide the reproduction of the natural resources, to prevent the harmful impact of economic and other activities on nature, to ameliorate and improve the state of the environment, to strengthen legality, law and order in the sphere of social relations, to reinforce the rights of citizens for an environment favorable to life. In comparison with the current legislation, the draft law broadens the range of protected natural objects, considering as these the plant world with its entire specific diversity, other components of the natural ecological systems and biosphere, the climate and the ozone layer of the earth along with the land, its mineral wealth, soils, waters, atmospheric air, forests and animal world. The concept of "a zone of emergency ecological situation," "an ecological disaster zone" and others were formulated.

The draft law defined and delimited the competence in the sphere of governing relations on environmental protection of the USSR, the Union and autonomous republics, the krays, oblasts, districts, rayons and cities.

After further work on the draft law and after bringing it into full conformity with the recently adopted legislative enactments, it will be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Pursuant to monitoring the course of carrying out the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 3 May 1984, the question was examined of recovering, decontaminating and storing toxic industrial wastes. It was pointed out that the accumulating of toxic wastes at industrial enterprises, the dumping of them on municipal dumps, in ravines, quarries, and unauthorized burying in the ground in many instances cause polluting of the surface and underground waters, the land and atmospheric air. Thus, the accumulation of toxic wastes at the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead-Zinc Combine, at the Rubezhanskiy Production Association Krasitel [Dye] and at the Lisichansk Soda Plant has involved the polluting of the underground waters in concentrations which surpass the permissible by several-fold. Unsanctioned dumping of industrial wastes at the Gorlovka Chemical Plant has been the source of the seepage of harmful toxic substances into the Aleksandr-Zapad Mine and this caused the poisoning of miners and mine rescuers in December 1989. The polluting of the environment with pesticides has also evoked serious concern. But, regardless of the acuteness of the problem, the USSR Minmetallurgiya [Ministry of Metallurgy], the USSR Minkhimneftprom [Ministry of Petrochemical Industry], the USSR Minavtoselkhoz mash [Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building], Agrokhim [Agricultural Chemistry Administration], other ministries and departments the enterprises of which form toxic wastes as well as the Union republic councils of ministers have actually been removed from working on this problem and as a result many of the quotas set by the decree have not been carried out. Over the 6 years which have passed since the adoption of the decree, not a single regional interdepartmental grounds has been built for decontaminating and storing toxic wastes. Up to now, technologies have not been developed for the recovery, decontamination and storage for a majority of the toxic compounds and the measures are not being taken to create the necessary equipment, instruments and other technical means for this.

The commission has instructed the USSR ministries and departments and the Union republic councils of ministers during the current year to carry out a one-shot inventorying of the toxic industrial wastes and on the basis of this implement measures aimed at improving the existing situation and, in particular, build a network of economically and ecologically efficient regional treatment grounds. The commission feels it essential to conduct extensive explanatory work among the public that these grounds built according to plans which have undergone state ecological expert evaluation are nature-protective facilities and their location and operation have been planned for on the basis of engineering decisions which exclude the possibility of environmental pollution.

A decision was taken to return to a review of this question during the first quarter of 1991. The USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Protection of the Environment], the USSR Ministry of Health, the USSR

Gospromatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in Industry and Atomic Power Industry] and the USSR Ministry of Geology have been instructed to strengthen control over the observance of the nature protection legislation for the disposal of toxic wastes and in discovering instances of their particularly dangerous impact on the environment as caused by flagrant violations of the current standards and rules, to submit the corresponding materials to the bodies of the USSR Procuracy.

The question was reviewed of expert evaluation of the machine-building products produced by the industrial enterprises for their conformity to the requirements of the environmental protection standards and rules.

The session of the Commission was chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, V.Kh. Doguzhiyev.

### **Commission Declares Ecological Disaster in Danube-Dniester Region**

*90WN0157B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 2*

[Article by TASS Correspondent G. Vorotnyuk from Odessa: "They Have Created a Disaster Zone"]

[Text] Instead of a zone of abundance, as was promised by the reclamation workers, the region of the Danube-Dniester Irrigation System has been recognized as an ecological disaster by the interdepartmental commission and which upon the demand of the public had been sent out by the USSR Council of Ministers. And this was after both here and in the south of Odessa Oblast, over 200 million rubles had already been invested in creating the system.

The "delayed action mine" under the nature here and under the socioeconomic development of the region was laid even when two decades ago the institute Yuzhgioprovdkhov [Southern State Design and Scientific Research Institute for Water Management Construction] (Odessa) and the Ukrainian Minvodkhov [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management] worked out the technical plans and began building a major water management facility. The basic project in its first stage was the enormous (with a volume of 800 million m<sup>3</sup> of water) Lake Sasyk by the Black Sea, having decided to convert it from salt water into fresh. This lake precisely was given the role of the first storage facility for the Danube water and from whence it was to be moved to the Dniester, the Southern Bug and then to the Dnieper, turning the adjacent arid steppes into flourishing oases.

They did as they planned. At a shock pace they dug a canal from the Danube to the Sasyk and they filled in a 14-km barrier between the lake and the Black Sea, they began pumping out the salt water, replacing it with fresh. The plan was that after two or three changes the water would be fit for irrigating. But even after eight changes the water was unfit for irrigation. All the same, they began delivering it to the fields. Intense degradation of

the invaluable southern chernozems and their salinization had begun. Here the harvests were often worse than on dry-farmed land and in addition the cost of agricultural products jumped sharply.

"But what about the lake itself?"

"It, without exaggeration, is dying before our very eyes," feels the Deputy Chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Oblast Soviet for Ecology and Rational Nature Management, Candidate of Biological Sciences I. Rusev. "Its medicinal muds, in essence, have been destroyed. The water which is oversaturated with blue-green algae blooms and rots. Fish kills have become more often. The appearance of bacterial flora has been observed. As a biologist, I assert that the only way for saving the lake is to reconnect it with the sea. And this must be done as quickly as possible."

This is the opinion of not just I. Rusev, but also many other practical scientists. The inhabitants of a number of villages lying around Sasyk, in demanding the immediate adoption of conservation measures, have stated that if their voice is not heeded, then they themselves will remove the barrier between the sea and the lake.

But what about those who are to blame for the ecological disaster? Seemingly, they are more concerned now not by the fate of the doomed lake or the people living around it, but rather the honor of their own reputation. Having abandoned Sasyk to its fate, they are hurriedly seeking out ways for delivering Danube water to the fields, in bypassing the nonworking storage capacity. Their reasoning is: let us do this and increase the crop on the irrigated lands and everything will be forgotten and everything back in place! But in their hurry there have again been poorly conceived actions not backed up by ecological expertise and soundness. For example, the digging of a canal along the eastern bank of Sasyk, across the seacoast which possesses priceless recreational opportunities and where a governmental decision prohibits any industrial construction.

### **USSR Procuracy Official Views Environmental Law Enforcement Issues**

*90WN0158 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1*

[Article by Leonid Kornilov of Moscow: "Shagreen Leather; 5 June—World Environmental Protection Day"]

[Text] We have long ceased to be shocked by a dead river, a fish floating belly up or the dried out tree trunks. Now we have been knitting our brows over a different matter: in shock therapy is there more of a shock or more therapy? The empty shelves concern us more than the devastating raid by civilization. We are not even concerned that the hour is approaching when suddenly the roar of political passions will die out and we will be completely indifferent to whom is elected to one or another post, women will forget their cosmetics, athletic

records will be of interest to no one and children will not learn how to smile. This will happen when each of us realizes what monstrous record-breakers we have been in the area of self-destruction.

Can we really be someone who sees clearly just before death?! Some 100 million tons of harmful wastes! Some 22 km<sup>3</sup> of untreated water!... This is the annual injection of poison which each year we put into the living space which we call our motherland. We, in essence, are burying ourselves, each year depositing in the earth some 100 billion tons of toxic and household waste. Over a million hectares of the territory of the Soviet Union has already been given up to the suicidal grounds, dumps and heaps and this lethal cemetery is growing and it is washed by the ground waters....

Don't drink water from wells! Don't drink water from the Volga! The Aral...Baykal...the Caspian...the Baltic...the Black Sea...the Ural...the Kuzbass...Chernobyl!... Are these the names of the living or are these the listing of the doomed? In our nation is there a real force capable of halting the ecological offensive against nature and man?

For an answer to this question I turned to the USSR Procuracy. Was it for an answer? No, of course not. Rather for support and for the search for protection. There certainly, I felt, at the highest levels of justice an ecological violation would be qualified as nothing more than a crime against man and possibly against mankind. And if the toxin was being beaten somewhere, had its alerting call reached the ears of the procurators? Certainly the strict judges know how to punish the guilty parties? How else to seek protection against radioactive rain if not by the law?

With good reason in the USSR Procuracy, they have established the Administration for Supervising the Execution of Nature Protective Legislation. This is headed by Anatoliy Sergeyevich Sugrobov. On my way to meet him, I was thinking that this man had an opportunity to become the savior of the fatherland. Were there possibilities for this? Anatoliy Sergeyevich himself with frankness and bitterness recognized that....

The nation has enough monitoring and law enforcement bodies. But the results of their activities are extremely low. Because an assessment of their work has not been produced. Actually, how can one assess the activeness, for instance, of the USSR Goskomprroda [State Committee for Protection of the Environment] or the sanitation-epidemiological stations or even the procuracy bodies? At present, we have in use few expressive numerical indicators: the number of protests, filings, initiated criminal cases.... But in the given instance we are not involved with an apartment thief. Take away his "jiminy" and escort him to those not so far off places and you should be able to live more calmly. But the situation is developing differently. Let us assume that we have removed the director of a smoke-producing plant and

have shifted him to another place. But the plant continues to go on smoking. So we must not be lulled by paper reports on how much was paid in fines or how many held accountable. The plants must be closed down. As they say, cussed cows have short horns: and the arms of the procuracy are also short. Why?

Because its duty in our nation is to supervise the fulfillment of legislation. And nothing more. Supervise execution, I emphasize, and not the activities of the supervised enterprises. This is the crux of the matter: the fewer supervisory functions for the procuracy the more nature protecting it becomes. It should actively intervene into organizing the work of the enterprises which pollute the environment. But it has no such right. And hence the administrators have no respect for the law. And hence, there is nothing to breathe in the residential blocks adjacent to the industrial zones.

On the conscience of the Astrakhan Gas Condensate Combine there are many inhuman actions. That is the only way to call them! Around a hundred persons were poisoned by a recent release of hydrogen sulfide. The enterprise is presently devouring, like some monster, the health of the people. It should be closed down, its output changed or a global reconstruction carried out at it. Possibly then it would obtain the right to exist. But the procuracy does not have the power to close it down. It only has the right to make such a proposal to the USSR Council of Ministers. And it did this. In response, it received a pro forma document rejecting the proposal to close down the gas condensate murderer.

"How is it that the official who signed this letter of reply is not criminally liable?" I asked Anatoliy Sergeyevich.

"No," he replied. "The Council of Ministers is beyond our reach. We are disarmed before it because the nation does not have any law on the protection of nature. We proposed a draft for approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet but it was turned down.

Was this because of a lack of timeliness? Clearly, the USSR Council of Ministers, in focusing its attention on purely economic goals, to put it figuratively, is holding a gun to the temple of the present and future victims of ecological disasters. Poisoned bullets are flying toward those currently alive and those who have still not been born. From high loopholes beyond the reach of even the Union Procuracy completely innocent people are being swept away as the hostages of homegrown progress.

On paper things do not seem so bad. They have set up the USSR Goskomprroda. It has existed now for 2 years. But the problem is that it only exists because up to now they have not even defined the functional duties of the committee and there is no regulation.

Anatoliy Sergeyevich feels that again this is an oversight of the USSR Council of Ministers. Together with the CPSU Central Committee the Council on 7 January 1988 worked out a Decree "On a Fundamental Restructuring of the Protection of Nature in the Nation."

According to the mentioned document, the USSR Goskompriroda should become what it should be. That is, certain ministries and departments would be obliged under this decree to turn over to it definite institutions, obligations and rights. But they are resisting and the Council of Ministers is not supervising the fulfillment of its decree. The departments have no fear of the law because there is no law itself. The instinct of self-preservation has clearly not hinted anything to them and it has merely atrophied behind the thick office walls. At the same time, the USSR Procuracy must be content with an article according to which a person guilty of polluting the environment can be charged at most a fine of 300 rubles. Blasphemous!

And what sense does it make to give data here on how many officials last year were held disciplinarily, administratively or materially liable because in their predominant majority they are all "small fry." Those who have real power are beyond the reach of the procuracy. Without beating around the bush, in the USSR there is no ban against the polluting of the environment. Moreover, looking at it from the economic aspect, it is more advantageous for the enterprise to pollute than it is to build treatment facilities.

In Yaroslavl Oblast the soviet did not want to tolerate the adventurism of the "polluters" anymore. Recently, a decision was passed there that all fines paid by the Yaroslavl enterprises would go to the local Council for the Protection of Nature and would then be used for the designing and construction of treatment facilities. But the fines are still by the "penny-ante" method. A radical approach for solving the problem is essential.

For example, A.S. Sugrobov imagines this as follows. The immediate approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet of a law for the protection of nature. And an obligatory large state subsidy for the USSR Procuracy to expand the personnel of the Directorate for Supervising the Execution of Nature Conservation Legislation. At present, in Sugrobov's administration there are only 309 persons. These are basically legal workers. But they need specialists in the area of water utilization and specialists who know the technology for treating the air and soil. They, to put it figuratively, could become the "fangs" in the presently toothless system of nature-defending procuracies.

Such a one exists in the Greater Moscow Area. But even here, under the very wing of the Union Procuracy, the nature protecting subdivision does not possess the required prohibiting, let alone punitive force. A nature protecting procurator here cannot even oppose the expansion of the orchard and dacha societies. In the Greater Moscow Area there is the mass allocating of swamps and swampy forested waste plots for development. As a result, the threat has arisen of the disappearance of an enormous number of streams and small rivers. The supply of the large rivers can thereby be destroyed. Let us give a specific example.

The Storozhka River which flows near Zvenigorod empties into the Moskva River. It does for now. It rises in the upland swamp of Goreloye. In any corner of the world an upland swamp, that is, one fed by springs, means a taboo for human interference and is protected by international legislation. But in our nation the Odintsovo Gorispolkom lightheartedly turned over Goreloye to the Ikar dacha cooperative from the Vnukovo Production Association of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. The Goreloye swamp, incidentally, is among the places where the locating of garden plots has been prohibited by a special document signed by the deputy chairman of the Committee on the Questions of Ecology and the Rational Utilization of Labor Resources. Here we are confronted with ecological illiteracy and legal nihilism of the local authorities.

This example has been given to persuade others that as for ecology, on large and small matters we are acting with barbarism shortsightedness. Because our living space is inexorably shrinking like shagreen leather. We have been stealing from ourselves and we should be held responsible for this to future generations, because to an even greater degree we have stolen from them. We are confronted with an unprecedented theft of three dimensions—mineral resources, water and land. We must recognize, finally, that we are proceeding thoughtlessly and merit an immediate and strictest law for the protection of nature. Here lies our physical and moral salvation.

#### 1989 Sewage Treatment Effectiveness Data

90WN0173B Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI  
in Russian No 6 Jun 90 pp 43-44

[Unattributed report: "On the Operation of Sewage Treatment Plants"]

[Text] In 1989 USSR Goskomstat jointly organized with USSR Goskompriroda [State Environmental Protection Committee] the conduct of a one-time selective investigation into the operating effectiveness of sewage treatment plants in connection with the discharge of effluent into the surface water supply, and summarized the data derived.

In all the study embraced about 500 major industrial enterprises, and municipal organizations in cities, with over 700 sewage treatment plants.

Among the factors determining the ineffective operation of sewage treatment facilities, enterprises and organizations, was the increased workload as compared with the designed norms for the volume and nature of the effluents coming in for purification (24 and 31 percent of the respective plants inspected); the physical and moral wear, including technical imperfections in the treatment plants (21 and 20 percent); the lack of or the disconnection of the appropriate equipment (10 percent); the conduct of start-up and adjustment work (7 percent); and the lack of reagents and materials for purifying the effluent (2 percent). At the same time a significant

number of enterprises indicated two and more reasons for their ineffective sewage treatment operation.

Overloaded to the greatest extent are the sewage treatment plants of enterprises in the medical, microbiology, coal, light industry, lumber and cellulose, oil-refining and petro-chemical industries and a number of other branches. In the housing and municipal-services economy a most unfavorable situation exists because of overloading sewage treatment plants came to pass in Tajikistan, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and a number of other union republics.

At the present time a significant number of sewage treatment plants have been operating for a long period (20 years and more). The norms for treatment of effluents employed during the designing of these facilities

quite often do not correspond with contemporary environmental protection requirements, nor with the actual pollution of the water reservoirs into which the waters are drained. In this connection, in order to characterize the quality (the degree of purification) of effluents discharged, the indicator of maximum allowable discharge (PDS) is used, which is calculated in consideration of contemporary ecological requirements for specific water reservoirs.

The results of the investigation have shown that, whereas the operating effectiveness of existing water-conservation installations with respect to their design characteristics amounts to 59 percent, only one-third of the effluents are reduced to the maximum allowable discharge.

**Observation of Design Characteristics in Operation of Sewage Treatment Plants  
(According to Results of Selective Investigation)**

	Actual Amount of Effluent Passing Through Treatment Facility (during the period of investigation), thousands of meters <sup>3</sup>		
	In All	Including that brought to the level of treatment stipulated in the design characteristics	Proportion of effluents brought to designed level of treatment to the total volume of effluents passing through the treatment facilities, in percentage
USSR	43485	25807	59
Including for enterprises of:			
Housing and Municipal Services	20779	16336	79
Industry	22705	9471	42
Of these:			
Power Engineering	354	200	56
Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry	1665	915	55
Coal Industry	6617	750	11
Ferrous Metallurgy	3884	2884	74
Nonferrous Metallurgy	675	322	48
For Mineral Fertilizer Production	1318	815	62
Chemical Industry	1303	805	62
Motor Vehicle and Agricultural Machine Building	181	132	73
Lumber and Pulp-and-Paper Industry	5479	2106	38
Light Industry	131	37	29
Medical and Microbiology Industry	234	16	7
Agroindustrial Complex	110	63	57

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### State Environmental Protection Construction Funding Statistics

90WN0173A Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 39-43

["1989 Environmental Protection Construction Projects"]

[Text] In 1989 3.8 billion rubles in state capital investments were directed toward environmental protection and rational

use of natural resources, which is 21 percent more than in 1988; 3.3 billion rubles were actually used, or 4.0 percent more. Capital investments for environmental protection construction amounted to less than 2.0 percent of the total volume of investments in the national economy. In the United States this proportion is nearly 1.5 times greater.

In 1989, as in years past, ministries, departments, and union republic Councils of Ministers did not devote proper attention to environmental protection construction, although the ecological situation in a number of

regions remains extremely tense. Failure to carry out tasks for erection of environmental protection projects and increasingly severe reaction of public opinion to shortcomings in protecting the environment have led to a situation in which, in a number of regions in the country, the operation of over 1,000 enterprises and individual factories was halted by decision of local authorities.

Capital investments allocated for the year were only 86 percent utilized. Of the total volume of capital investments assimilated for environmental protection purposes, 1.1 billion rubles, or a third, consisted of the enterprises' and organizations' own assets; moreover, these assets were utilized at a lower level (82 percent) than the centralized funds (88 percent).

The state order for putting the most important environmental protection projects into operation in 1989 was spoiled: out of 150 projects, only 74 were put into operation.

Two point two billion rubles in state capital investments were used for protection and rational use of water resources, or 85 percent of the ceiling.

With the significant increase in the volume of contaminated waste water dumped into the nation's water reservoirs each year, the task for putting into operation facilities for treating effluent was only half-fulfilled. Facilities capable of treating 4,352 cubic meters of water per day were put into operation, which is 16 percent less than in 1988. Introduction of highly-efficient inter-branch common-system installations for waste water purification using valuable components and sediment deposition was not introduced at USSR Minmetallurgii's Chiaturmarganets Metallurgical Combine, at the USSR Minkhimneftprom's [Ministry of Chemical and Oil Engineering] plastics plant in Nizhnii Tagil, and also USSR Minugleprom's [Ministry of the Coal Industry] plants at Prokopenvsk and Mezhdurechensk in Kemerovo Oblast; and at the housing and municipal services facilities of the cities of Kostroma, Magadan, Ivano-Frankovsk and Ashkhabad. The aforementioned projects are situated on the whole in regions where the pollution of water resources with toxic substances significantly exceeds the allowable sanitary norms.

Putting into operation water-recycling systems, which provide for economizing on fresh water and reducing the discharge of polluted wastes, increased in comparison with 1988. At the same time, the annual task for introducing these systems has been carried out by only 52 percent. Systems such as this, with a 24-hour capacity of 14.8 million cubic meters, were not put into operation. USSR Minenergo failed to introduce a 5.3-million cubic meters-per-day water-recycling system, and USSR Minatomenergoprom, whose enterprises are the primary water-users in industry, failed to introduce a 7.3-million cubic-meters-per-day system. The task to introduce a conservation-intensive (closed) water supply system at

Mosenergo's TETS-8, Tyumen's TETS-2, Tbilisi's GRES, and Rostov's AES, was frustrated.

In 1989, 404 million rubles in capital investments were utilized for construction projects to ensure the protection of the atmosphere, the annual ceiling for which was 76 percent assimilated. Installations were put into operation for regulating and removing harmful substances from exhaust gases expelled at a rate of 31.2 million cubic meters of gas per hour, or 56 percent of the annual task. At the same time discharge of harmful elements into the air from stationary sources is still great, although it has declined somewhat in comparison with the preceding year.

Of the overall discharge of harmful elements, the greater proportion falls to enterprises of the USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power Engineering] (25 percent), Minmetallurgii (26 percent) and Minkhimneftprom (7 percent). At the same time USSR Minenergo did not ensure putting into operation gas-treatment installations capable of treating 8.6 million cubic meters of gas per hour (57 percent of the task), USSR Minmetallurgii—3.5 million cubic meters of gas per hour (28 percent), and USSR Minkhimneftprom—0.6 million cubic meters of gas per hour (31 percent). These ministries frustrated the plan for introducing such installations at enterprises in a number of cities, were an especially high level of air pollution is noted: at Krasnoyarsk TETS-3 and Irkutsk TETS-7, at the Donetsk metallurgical plant, at the Severodonetsk Stekloplastik Production Association, at the regional boiler works in Bratsk, and at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine.

In 1989 140 million rubles in state capital investments (86 percent of the ceiling) was spent for preservation and rational use of mineral resources. Of the 10 structures and installations planned for comprehensive use of mineral resources, only 4 were put into operation. Because of the insufficient support by such installations, significant losses of valuable minerals continue during the refinement process, and valuable by-products are lost during the extraction and refinement of gases. The total amount of minerals lost during the extraction and refinement process amounts to about 7 billion rubles. Every year up to 20-25 percent of petroleum gas by-products are burned up, the loss of which is valued at 70-100 million rubles.

Fifty-two million rubles in capital investments (83 percent of the task) were utilized for measures to preserve forest resources and fish reserves.

The situation with respect to measures taken for preservation and rational use of the land is somewhat better. For these ends, 441 million rubles in capital investments, or 104 percent of the ceiling, were assimilated. Of this amount, 229 million rubles, or 100.7 percent, were spent for construction of anti-erosion hydraulic engineering, flood-control, anti-landslide and other installations (including bank-shorings). By virtue of state capital investments, protective forest strips were established on

31,100 hectares (93 percent of the task), and work carried out on terracing steep slopes encompassing 800 hectares (96 percent).

The situation that took shape in 1989 with respect to use of capital investments allocated for environmental protection

purposes and for putting into operation environmental protection projects requires fundamental changes in attitude toward such construction by the ministries, departments and councils of ministers of the union republic, in order to significantly improve the ecological situation in the country.

**State Capital Investments for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources for 1989.**  
(Millions of Rubles)

Capital Investments— in all	Including for Protec- tion and Rational Use		Water Resources		Atmospheric Air		Land		Mineral Resources	
	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used
USSR Total	3255	86	2166	85	404	76	441	104	140	86
<i>Fuel-Energy Complex</i>	597	93	328	92	103	83	97	123	53	85
USSR Minenergo	123	94	95	95	19	82	1	196	-	-
USSR Minatomener- goprom	87	109	84	108	2	97	0.3	172	-	-
USSR Minneftegaz- prom	159	101	57	93	33	86	69	118	-	-
"Gazprom" Concern	166	86	39	79	49	81	24	142	46	81
USSR Minugleprom	48	80	39	75	-	-	2	99	7	117
USSR Minneftegazstroy	14	85	14	86	-	-	0.5	75	-	-
<i>Metallurgical Complex</i>	403	86	220	89	115	78	6	102	59	94
USSR Minmetallurgii	360	83	181	111	77	6	105	59	94	-
"Norilskiy Nikel" Concern	43	133	39	135	4	116	0.0	2	-	-
<i>Machine-Building Complex</i>	109	77	93	13	78	2	192	-	-	-
USSR Mintyazhmash	26	74	21	72	5	78	0.4	100	-	-
USSR Mineletrotekh- pribor	21	82	19	83	1	53	0.1	89	-	-
USSR Minstanko- prom	6	68	5	65	1	92	0.01	100	-	-
USSR Minavtoselkhoz mash	54	78	46	76	6	92	2	103	-	-
<i>Khimiko-lesnoy Kompleks</i>	522	75	317	78	132	68	19	91	24	78
USSR Minkhimnefte- prom	181	68	112	72	56	58	4	73	8	108
"Agrokhim" Associa- tion	178	86	93	91	37	71	14	102	14	72
USSR Minmedprom	43	75	36	72	7	93	0.3	79	-	-
USSR Minlesprom	112	74	70	74	32	85	1	65	-	-
"Tekhnokhim" MGO	8	88	6	116	-	-	-	-	2	54
Union Republic Councils of Ministers: RSFSR	504	85	374	82	6	79	110	97	-	-
Ukrainian SSR	233	93	141	91	2	78	81	102	-	-
Belorussian SSR	30	88	25	87	2	74	3	109	-	-
Uzbek SSR	59	94	34	79	0.4	76	22	136	-	-

**State Capital Investments for Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources for 1989.**  
(Millions of Rubles) (Continued)

Capital Investments— in all	Including for Protec- tion and Rational Use		Water Resources		Atmospheric Air		Land		Mineral Resources	
	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used	Used	Percent of Ceiling Used
Kazakh SSR	85	126	78	130	0.4	75	3	91	-	-
Georgian SSR	40	95	16	91	-	-	12	98	-	-
Azerbaijan SSR	20	64	15	66	0.3	66	5	60	-	-
Lithuanian SSR	36	91	34	90	0.1	100	2	-	-	-
Moldavian SSR	42	74	18	65	0.1	17	23	93	-	-
Latvian SSR	30	92	30	92	-	-	0.02	107	-	-
Kirghiz SSR	10	77	7	69	-	-	3	106	-	-
Tajik SSR	21	89	5	51	-	-	15	119	-	-
Armenian SSR	11	49	11	53	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkmen SSR	7	75	5	71	0.1	53	2	101	-	-
Estonian SSR	23	87	22	90	0.4	43	1	65	-	-

**Environmental Protection Projects Put Into Operation Through State Capital Investments in 1989**

	Works for Effluent Treatment, thous. met. <sup>3</sup> per Day		Water Supply Recycling Systems, thous. met. <sup>3</sup> per Day		Installations for Trapping and Neu- tralizing Harmful Elements from Gas Discharges, thous. met. <sup>3</sup> of gas per hour	
	Introduced	Percent of Plan Fulfilled	Introduced	Percent of Plan Fulfilled	Introduced	Percent of Plan Fulfilled
USSR as a Whole	4352	50	15897	52	31222	56
<i>Fuel-Energy Complex</i>	398	47	10736	46	7865	33
USSR Minenergo	108	52	1519	22	6529	43
USSR Minatomener- goprom	28	26	9189	56	1209	15
USSR Minneftegaz- prom	120	49	8	19	63	100
"Gazprom" Concern	38	104	15	-	64	100
USSR Minugleprom	102	40	5	59	-	-
<i>Metallurgical Com- plex(USSR Minmetal- lurgii)</i>	856	92	795	42	9089	72
<i>Machine-building Complex</i>	324	33	441	84	3994	66
USSR Mintyazhmash	119	72	101	100	2237	67
USSR Minelektrotekhpribor	38	48	299	96	8	6
USSR Minstanko- prom	42	65	0.2	2	471	50
USSR Minavtoselkhoz mash	125	19	33	35	1278	81
<i>Chemical-Forestry Complex</i>	408	56	2670	79	2584	62
USSR Minkhimnefte- prom	125	54	238	37	1336	69
Agrokhim Association	186	72	1805	74	423	95

## Environmental Protection Projects Put Into Operation Through State Capital Investments in 1989 (Continued)

	Works for Effluent Treatment, thous. met. <sup>3</sup> per Day		Water Supply Recycling Systems, thous. met. <sup>3</sup> per Day		Installations for Trapping and Neu- tralizing Harmful Elements from Gas Discharges, thous. met. <sup>3</sup> of gas per hour	
	Introduced	Percent of Plan Fulfilled	Introduced	Percent of Plan Fulfilled	Introduced	Percent of Plan Fulfilled
USSR Minmedprom	22	21	415	91	817	73
USSR Minlesprom	75	55	212	81	8	1
Union Republic Councils of Ministers:						
RSFSR	773	48	19	892	49	
Ukrainian SSR	404	71	20	111	825	82
Belorussian SSR	25	70	16	100	443	72
Uzbek SSR	93	94	600	100	10	97
Kazakh SSR	305	62	3	100	-	-
Georgian SSR	0.8	2	-	0	-	-
Azerbaijan SSR	0.1	0.02	-	-	-	-
Lithuanian SSR	18	100	0.4	47	83	100
Moldavian SSR	24	40	0.3	1	-	-
Latvian SSR	9	42	0.3	31	-	-
Kirghiz SSR	0.4	0.3	-	0	-	-
Tajik SSR	4	18	-	0	-	-
Armenian SSR	89	79	-	-	-	-
Turkmen SSR	-	0	-	-	-	-
Estonian SSR	2	2	-	-	-	0

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### Goskompriroda Chairman Comments on Hazards From Syrian Chemical Imports

90WN0192A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by N. Vorontsov, chairman of the Goskompriroda: "Oranges Instead of Phosphorites"]

[Text] The USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Protection of Nature] has conducted a second ecological expert evaluation of the plans to build a facility in Bryansk for processing Syrian phosphorites. Here is what our correspondent was told by the chairman of the Goskompriroda about this:

"As is known, by the time of our expert evaluation, the Ecological Expert Evaluation of the RSFSR Goskompriroda had voiced a negative opinion on the question of the plans. However, representatives of the Agrokhim [Agrochemical] Association did not agree with the opinion of the experts. The USSR government instructed us to conduct a new ecological study.

"In such a situation it was very important to provide an assessment of the project which would not cause any doubts among the different parties. Just how balanced was the final decision can be seen from the fact that even

after the conclusion by our expert commission, a decision was taken to consult again with different scientific research institutes and centers. The additional information supplied by the specialists was completely persuasive as to the correctness of the conclusions by both Goskompriroda expert evaluations: the Syrian phosphorites in the form in which they are delivered to our nation are ecologically dangerous. In addition, one must consider the socioecological tension in Bryansk Oblast the population of which has suffered from the Chernobyl disaster. Goskompriroda feels that the construction of the facility could intensify this tension.

"The danger of the offered phosphorites is not so much in the increased level of the concentration of radionuclides, as many feel, as it is in the fact that with their "aid," the soil is polluted with a number of heavy metals as well as fluorine and strontium. This can lead to the build-up of harmful elements in the agricultural products and to the polluting of the ground water. Both the radionuclides as well as the heavy metals are classified as mutagens which increase the frequency of the cancer rate and to the appearance of hereditary illnesses. Such a conclusion was also drawn at the Institute of General Genetics under the USSR Academy of Sciences imeni N.I. Vavilov and at the All-Union Oncological Scientific Center.

"There is also a great danger from the phosphorite dust. Under the conclusion of the Medical-Genetic Center of the USSR AMN [Academy of Medical Sciences], with the release into the atmosphere of dust having a complex chemical composition, particularly with volley releases, one can note a carcinogenic and mutagenic effect on man. Specialists from the Tayfun NPO [Scientific-Production Association] of the USSR Goskomgidromet [State Committee of Hydrometeorology] have also warned of the possible fluorine pollution of the zone adjacent to the plant. Within a radius of several kilometers, plants in just one season can pick up the maximum permissible concentration of this element.

"Thus, the danger of the Syrian phosphorites for the health of man and the environment has been shown by numerous specialists. But there are also other arguments against their importing. Phosphorite meal is effective only on acid soils. However, due to the extensive liming, there are fewer and fewer such lands. This was mentioned in the conclusions of the Institute of Plant Physiology imeni K.A. Timiryazev and the Institute of Soil Science and Photosynthesis of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

"In a number of Western European nations, phosphorite raw material is employed to obtain universal phosphorous-containing fertilizers. I feel that we should follow the same path, using the already existing production capacity. Incidentally, abroad they willingly purchase our phosphorites which are ecologically purer than the Syrian. Would it not be better for us to use these materials ourselves while Syria could repay the credits from our nation in something better for human health, perhaps citrus?

"In reflecting on the result of the expert evaluation, one involuntarily wonders about the level of our farming. For instance, is the desire to constantly increase mineral fertilizer production valid? According to the data of certain experts, last year the nation produced almost double the amount than in the United States. But the end result? Far from in our favor.

"I feel that it is essential first of all to utilize more efficiently the available fertile soil. Over a year we lose 3-fold more valuable humus than mineral fertilizers are applied. The annual losses from soil erosion reach 15-16 billion rubles. We have not done enough to introduce contour farming, dry reclamation, the reforesting of ravines and other methods of rational farming. Due to bad plowing (along and not across the slope), a tractor operator in a single season is capable of destroying the fertile soil layer the formation of which required decades and sometimes even centuries.

"Undoubtedly, questions will arise: Why has so much time and money been spent to prove what has already been proven? And how in the future will we organize our relations with the republic committees in such instances?

In the given case, our committee carried out the government assignment, it conducted an expert evaluation of a plan which involved both interrepublic as well as international interests.

"But as a whole we are in favor of sharing functions. Those plans and ecological problems which do not go beyond the limits of a republic should be studied on the spot. I feel that with an increase in the economic independence of the republics, the sharing of our functions will be more noticeable. The USSR expert evaluations will be responsible for reviewing interrepublic problems and conflicts as well as assessing international plans and technologies from the viewpoint of ecological safety."

### Study Reveals Need for Greater Ecological Awareness in Fishing Sector

90WN0174A Moscow RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO  
in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 18-22

[Article by Candidate of Philosophy Ye.V. Nikonorova, Komsomol CC's Higher Komsomol School, and Doctor of Philosophy Yu.P. Ozhegov, Scientific Research Center of Komsomol CC's Higher Komsomol School: "Ecological Awareness and the Fishing Sector"]

[Text] One of the trends in the development of the fishing industry is a growing dependence upon the ecological condition of the fisheries. This trend is clearly manifested in the unique Volga-Caspian basin, where 90% of the world's sturgeon supply is concentrated. Hydraulic engineering works on the Volga, the removal of large quantities of irreplaceable water from it and pollution of the river and sea with industrial and agricultural waste have brought the Volga delta and the North Caspian to the brink of an ecological crisis.

The development of ecological awareness in workers in the fishing industry and other sectors and among the general population of the Volga and Caspian areas is one of the important requirements for restoring the basin to ecological health.

In view of Astrakhan Oblast's special importance in the fishing industry, the authors of this article chose it as one area for an All-Union study of problems of developing ecological awareness in the youth. A total of 454 residents of Astrakhan Oblast, the Volga and Caspian regions were surveyed as part of the study. They included students at the Astrakhan Technical Institute of the Fishing Industry and Management, members of the Gidroribpromyekt institute, blue-collar and kolkhoz workers, and students at secondary schools and SPTUs [special vocational and technical schools].

An understanding of the essence and the role of ecology in the contemporary situation is a prerequisite for acquiring ecological awareness. The term "ecological awareness" is encountered more and more frequently of late in newspapers and magazines, on radio and television. The term is ordinarily used not as a scientific concept, however, but in the figurative, journalistic

sense, outside the sociological context: with extremely vague meaning, without "linkage" to regional or sector specifics, outside the sociological context.

Nonetheless, more than 55% of those shared a definition of ecological awareness which includes ecological literacy, an aware and responsible attitude toward nature and actual participation in nature protection and resource conservation. Another 35.2% of the respondents limited ecological awareness to ecological literacy and an aware, responsible attitude toward nature, and 5.3% reduced it to ecological literacy alone.

Negative changes in the environment are evoking growing concern in students, future specialists and workers in various sectors of the economy. When asked whether they were concerned about problems of nature protection and the use of natural resources in Astrakhan Oblast, 77% answered "Yes."; 9%, "No."; 14%, "I haven't thought about it." Around 58% of the respondents expressed great concern about the state of the environment in their city (village, settlement) and its environs, while 38% were somewhat alarmed. Only 3% of those surveyed are not concerned at all, and several people had difficulty answering the question.

Ecological literacy as an integral part of ecological awareness entails an aware interest in environmental problems. In their own estimation, 64% of Astrakhan's young people have developed an increased interest in these problems in recent years (interest did not increase in 14%, and 22% had difficulty answering the question). In the course of the study we were also able to establish the distribution of the youth's cognitive ecological interest in the subject. Of 15 urgent topics listed on the questionnaire, the following drew the greatest attention: 1. Nature, rest and relaxation, and health (66.5% voted for this topic); 2. The specific ecological situation in Astrakhan Oblast (50%); 3. Scientific and technological progress and the environment (49%); 4. Nature as a factor in the development of the individual (around 46%); 5. The individual's ecological awareness and how to development it (44%).

A growing interest in matters of protecting nature and making efficient use of its resources has helped to orient the young people toward increasing their ecological knowledge. A total of 63% of those surveyed had this orientation; 20% did not presently feel it necessary to increase their knowledge of ecology; 17% had difficulty in answering the question. The predominant motives for increasing their knowledge were the following: for overall development (32%); to be able independently to understand the ecological situation (21.6%); to satisfy an interest in nature and environmental problems (20.3%). A fairly small group needed the knowledge to participate in ecological activities (slightly more than 17% of those surveyed).

Three interrelated sets of knowledge need to be identified in the structure of ecological literacy.

The first set consists of an ecological view of the world which reveals the nature of relations between man and nature. The concept of the new ecological thinking occupies a special place in this vast set. It has replaced the stereotypes of the old ecological thinking.

These stereotypes appeared both at the global level, including ideas about the World Ocean (its inexhaustible biological resources, its infinite capacity for absorbing pollution, and so forth), and at the level of the nation and its individual regions.

It was determined that a part of the youth, albeit a small one, is still influenced by the old ecological approaches to environmental problems and the use of natural resources. In the opinion of 10% of those questioned, for example, our nation covers such a vast territory that the bad ecological state of individual regions is not a basis for serious concern about the environment as a whole. Around 6% of the respondents felt that our nation's natural resources are practically inexhaustible, which means that we do not need to concern ourselves with their efficient utilization.

A considerable part of the residents of Astrakhan and the oblast have already accepted the principles underlying the new ecological thinking.

More than 43% of those who participated in the survey, for example, were convinced that the global nature of ecological problems demands closer interaction between the USSR, foreign nations and international organizations to expand the effort to solve them.

Around 39% of the respondents understood that the extensive application of scientific and technological achievements, particularly low-waste and waste-free technologies, is the main means of improving the use of natural resources and the ecological situation.

More than 34% of those surveyed classified strict coordination of economic activities and ecological requirements in the situation of growing interdependence between economic development and the state of the environment as one of the principles underlying the new ecological thinking.

The figures cited have show two things. Along with reflecting positive changes in the ecological education of the youth, they indicate that many of the youth have still not grasped the fundamental distinctions between the new ecological thinking and the old.

The second, central component of ecological literacy includes a knowledge of the scientific principles for the use of nature and environmental protection, information on the ecological situation and trends in the way it is changing, an understanding of the sources of environmental pollution, ways to prevent it, and so forth.

It was particularly important in the sociological study to determine the degree to which the young people are aware of the factors which have the greatest effect upon the environment in Astrakhan Oblast, including fish

productivity in the Volga-Caspian basin. This knowledge is essential both for an overall understanding of the ecological situation and for application in the actual work of eliminating or limiting the effects of specific factors harmful to nature and human health.

Of 13 sources of environmental pollution and disturbances of ecological balance listed on the questionnaire, 40% of the respondents listed machine building, light industry and other enterprises among the main polluters of the air, soil and water; 31%, the extractive industry; 26%, the chemical industry.

On many of the questionnaires the respondents voluntarily indicated specific sources of pollution, most frequently the Astrakhan Gas Condensate Complex, following the start-up of which the ecological situation deteriorated drastically.

More than 24% of those surveyed named the use of toxic chemicals in agriculture among the main sources of environmental pollution. And this is in fact so. Approximately 600 tons of pesticides are washed into bodies of water each year from the rice paddies alone.

The effect of a number of man-made factors on the natural environment was clearly underestimated, however, because many of Astrakhan's residents are not aware of the extent of the damage these factors cause to nature and to their lives.

Fewer than 15% of those surveyed indicated land reclamation as a source of ecological stress, for example. Apparently, few of them are aware that two thirds of the oblast's irrigated land is now saline or boggy because of reclamation work performed in Astrakhan Oblast.

It is difficult to believe, but only 9.5% of the respondents included hydraulic power-engineering among the main sources of damage to nature, particularly to the natural reproduction of sturgeon. Apparently far from all young people imagine the effects of this construction such as the drastic reduction in the extent of spawning-grounds in the Volga, the blockage of passage to them by dams, the intensive pollution of stagnant pools, and so forth.

The limited knowledge of most of the respondents about the main sources of pollution of the environment and the death of plants, birds, fish, and so forth, is due to the many years when there was no ecological glasnost and to real problems in ecological education.

The third set of knowledge making up ecological literacy involves the interconnection between ecological relations and scientific and technological progress, the economy, the law, morality, and so forth.

We shall restrict ourselves to "measuring" the knowledge of young people in the area of ecology and technology. This is the distribution of answers to the question: "Two methods are used for protecting the environment from industrial waste. Which of them seems the most promising to you?"

A total of 54% of those surveyed chose as their answer: "The development of comprehensive industrial and agricultural units using little-waste and waste-free technologies." The other answer was chosen by 31.5%: "The construction of nature-protection (gas purification and other) installations and plants and the achievement of their efficient and trouble-free operation." The other survey participants had difficulty answering.

The structure of knowledge making up ecological literacy "programs" the main trends in ecological education, which are common for all social groups, and predetermines its comprehensive nature. At the same time a comprehensive approach to its formulation is a prerequisite for effective ecological education.

This approach involves taking into account the specifics of each category of workers (type of occupation, educational level, and so forth) and the ecological features of the region resulting from its natural and climatic, geographic, economic and other conditions. The features of the work performed by fishing industry workers in the Volga-Caspian region must be taken fully into account.

Along with ecological literacy, ecological awareness must include also a high level of ecological consciousness, i.e., an aware and responsible attitude toward nature. This kind of awareness is developed through the logical processing of knowledge, but it constitutes a qualitatively new level above the knowledge itself, because the ecological knowledge is transformed into strong convictions in the people.

It is precisely convictions, the synthesis of which forms a certainty of the extreme necessity of protecting and improving the environment, making efficient use of natural resources, including fish stocks, observing nature protection laws, and so forth, which determine the value orientation and aims of people and make them aware and responsible to nature.

An attempt was made in the sociological study to ascertain the factors shaping the ecological consciousness of Astrakhan Oblast residents.

This attempt used the assessments of the respondents as to how they were personally influenced by the factors listed after the following question: "Please indicate what has most influenced your awareness of ecological problems." The various factors were arranged in the following order of importance by the group of respondents as a whole.

The largest number of those surveyed (43.4%) acknowledged as the main factors determining their ecological consciousness (concern about the state of the environment, a sense of responsibility for protecting nature, and so forth), the actual ecological situation in Astrakhan and its environs and in the communities in which they live, work and study.

The mass media—the press, television and radio—were in second place overall with respect to their affect upon

the ecological consciousness of Astrakhan residents. More than 28% of those surveyed indicated their influence.

In third place as an influencing factor were the personal impressions of residents of Astrakhan and the oblast in places they had visited (on official trips, on vacations, on holidays, and so forth). This factor was indicated by 27% of those surveyed.

Compared to the three factors mentioned above the other 11 were far less significant with respect to the extent to which they affect the ecological consciousness of the youth. And they include almost all of the main methods of developing this consciousness: the training and indoctrinational process in the public education system (only 7.3% of those surveyed indicated this factor), various kinds of promotional work, and so forth.

Attitudes reflecting opinions and thoughts on the main causes of the deterioration of the ecological situation and a predisposition toward and selective attitude toward specific ideas contained in the "prescriptions" for healing the environment were an important feature of the ecological consciousness of the people.

According to the sociological survey, the reasons for alarm about the state of the environment "ranked" as follows (in percentages of those surveyed):

Violations of nature protection laws by the managers of a number of large associations and enterprises, and by other workers—45.4

Inadequately effective monitoring of nature protection and the efficient use of its resources—42.1

Inadequate application of scientific and technological achievements for improving the use of nature—33.3%

Departmentalism and a subjective approach to the use of nature in the work of sector administrative agencies—33.0

Lack of ecological enlightenment in a part of the population (indifference, an irresponsible attitude toward the protection of nature, and so forth)—32.2

Lack of a smoothly functioning economic mechanism for utilizing nature—27.8

Inadequacy of material and financial resources allocated for performing the jobs involved in protecting nature—19.4

Ignorance of ecology on the part of many citizens—19.4

Inadequate involvement by the general public in nature protection and resource conservation—17.4

Difficulties in predicting the adverse ecological effects of industrial development—11.0.

This was accompanied by the following question: "It is important to use all means of preserving and improving

the environment, but which of them might you single out? Please indicate those means." These were ranked in the following order (in percentages of those surveyed):

Increasing administrative and material liability for violating laws in the area of nature protection—37.9

Involving the general public in various types of nature protection and conservation of resources—35.5

Improving the ecological education of all segments of the population—34.4

Increasing the effectiveness of state monitoring of the use and protection of the land, plant and animal life, and so forth—33.0

Establishing a unified system of state control for the protection of nature and the use of its resources—31.3

Increasing the material and financial means allocated for protecting nature—26.2

Thoroughly studying the possible ecological effects of industrial development—25.3

Improving the economic mechanism for assuring that efficient use is made of nature—19.8

Establishing a system of continuous ecological education in the nation—19.6

Including ecology in the in scientific and technological development, i.e., making it a means of improving the use of nature—15.4

A comparative analysis of the views of Astrakhan Oblast residents on what they consider to be the main causes of strain on the ecology and the most promising ways to improve it shows a focus on the legal and state monitoring, administrative and educational aspects in the use and protection of nature.

The core of ecological awareness, its "support structure," is ecological work which meets three requirements.

The first is that the work be directed toward the scientifically based accomplishment of current tasks in relations between the society and nature.

The second requirement is that it increase and stimulate nature protection and resource conservation, and develop initiative and creativity in the participants.

The third involves the caliber of the work, i.e., that it be performed by people who strive to improve their skills and acquire new ecological knowledge, and who skilfully apply that knowledge in their practical work methods, in the means and forms.

Sociological studies have shown that the youth are not doing enough in the area of ecology: 3.3% of those surveyed help to organize this work; 4% regularly engage in it; 52% take part in specific ecological undertakings (planting vegetation, and so forth). More than 40% of the

respondents do not participate at all or participate extremely rarely in nature protection and resource conservation activities.

The responses to the following question are of special interest from the standpoint of increasing the ecological activity of Astrakhan's residents: "If you do not take part in ecological work, how do you explain this"?

According to the responses, most of those young people who do not take part in ecological work understand its importance. A total of 30% of those surveyed stated that they are prepared to take part in activities to protect nature and assure that efficient use is made of natural resources, but no one in their labor or training collectives seriously engages in organizing this work, and 16.7% of them feel that their understanding of ecology is deficient.

There are many among the youth, however, who do not see the point of ecological work (around 15% of those surveyed) or feel that it should be performed exclusively by the specialists, public figures and leaders who make the decisions (7%).

It is clear from the study results what large reserves still exist for increasing the ecological work of Astrakhan Oblast citizens and enhancing its effectiveness.

The sociological study should help specifically to define these tasks through the prism of the fishing sector's significance in the Volga-Caspian basin.

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### More Stringent Environmental Oversight of Maritime Fishing Zones Sought

90WN0174B Moscow RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO  
in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 40-45

[Article by N.A. Yastrebova under the rubric "Marine Biological Resources—Fish Protection: Facts, Problems": "It is Becoming More Difficult to Work"]

[Text] The departmental approach to the use of water resources has resulted in destruction of the habitat of many kinds of fish and other marine organisms. Hydroelectric power plants have blocked the way to spawning grounds, water is being removed for irrigation, large and small rivers, lakes and seas are being polluted with industrial and agricultural waste and oil. The bioproductivity of internal and external bodies of water is dropping due to economic development.

In the complex situation of hydraulic engineering construction and the development of industry and agriculture, Glavrybprom [Main Administration of the Fishing Industry] is expected to resolve a large number of problems pertaining to the protection and reproduction of fish stocks, the regulation of fishing in inland seas, territorial waters, the economic zone and the continental shelf of the USSR, and establishing a stable supply of raw materials for the fishing industry. Glavrybprom includes

43 basin administrations and a branched network of fish protection inspectorates (700), fish breeding enterprises (82), production acclimatization stations (9), fish monitoring stations and sites (300), expeditions (9) and other subdivisions.

During the past two years the fish protection agencies have had to work under extremely difficult conditions, in a situation of instability and uncertainty. Nonetheless, the work performed to protect and reproduce fish stocks even in the extremely unsatisfactory ecological conditions is making it possible to maintain the fish stocks and assure a stable catch in inland bodies of water and in the economic zone of the USSR.

There are numerous problem areas in the work of fish protection agencies. No real progress has been made toward providing them with the modern specialized vessels they need so much for monitoring fishing in the economic zone of the USSR. Problems have arisen in connection with the matter of granting the State Committee for the Protection of Nature and its agencies authority to control fishing and protect fish stocks, and of granting authority to regulate fishing to soviet organs of a number of republics and oblasts, making it more difficult to regulate fishing and weakening the protection of fish stocks. Malicious poaching has increased. The fishing inspectors lack social, physical and legal protection. The wage system has not yet been rectified for workers with the fish protection agencies. There is a shortage of supplies and transport. This is far from a complete list of the issues being discussed in the Board of the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry.

We are reporting for our readers the results of the work performed by Glavrybvod in 1989 to protect live resources in the economic zone and on the continental shelf of the USSR and to protect and reproduce fish stocks in our nation's inland bodies of water, and informing them of the problems which are hampering the fish protection agencies in their work.

The economic (fishing) zone and the continental shelf of the USSR contain huge biological stocks. Suffice it to say that the industry harvests more than 5 million tons of valuable fish species and other marine products in these waters annually.

A fishing quota is granted to foreign states in the 200-mile zone of the USSR (the USSR has quotas in fishing zones under the jurisdiction of foreign states). Nine nations fished within the USSR's zone in 1989 under reciprocal agreements: Japan, the DPROK, China, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Bulgaria, the GDR, Sweden and Finland. Their total catch in 1989 amounted to 646,200 tons, and the number of fishing vessels permitted to fish there totaled 2,149 (6 years ago the figures were 1.5 million tons and 5,370 vessels).

Border patrol ships, marine fish protection vessels and aircraft of the border troops and the Ministry of Civil Aviation with special fish protection inspectors and interpreters aboard patrol Soviet and foreign fishing

grounds and areas where fishing is prohibited to assure that fishing is conducted in a prudent manner and that a stable raw materials supply is maintained. Meteorological, ice and fish reconnaissance aircraft are used concomitantly.

A total of 7,309 fishing vessels were inspected and 758 violations of fishing rules were revealed during 10 months of 1989. The violators were fined 121,600 rubles, and 6,400 tons of fish worth 995,400 rubles was confiscated. Inspectors made 2,285 on-board inspections of foreign fishing vessels, 193 violations were discovered, and the fines levied against the violators plus the amount of the declared loss totalled more than 2.1 million convertible rubles.

The combined catch of all foreign vessels was 182,000 tons, against a quota of 646,200 tons (28.2%). Japanese, Korean and Chinese vessels caught 171,200 tons of fish in our zone in the Far East, against a quota of 530,000 tons (32.3%). Fish protection agencies conducted 2,145 inspections of Japanese, Korean and Chinese vessels in the region and revealed 175, 10 and 7 violations respectively. The total amount of the fines and compensation amounted to 2,119,000 convertible rubles. The foreign fleet caught 8,700 tons in the Barents Sea, against a combined quota of 98,500 tons. The Norwegians caught 9,130 seals, with a quota of 9,500. A total of 118 foreign vessels were inspected in the economic zone of the USSR in that sea, and no violations were found. The foreign fleet caught 10,000 tons in the economic zone of the USSR in the Baltic Sea, against a quota of 17,700 tons. Inspectors inspected 22 foreign vessels. One violation was detected, involving a Swedish ship, and the captain was issued a warning.

Japanese fishermen were the main violators, as in past years, committing 90% of all the violations.

In areas of the Northern Kurils and Southwest Kamchatka fish protection agencies detected cases of large-scale poaching by Japanese vessels carrying phony numbers and names. Glavrybvod suspended fishing for all Japanese vessels committing violations. Appropriate notice was issued to the General Consulate in Nakhodka, and a note was delivered to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those committing the violations were fined a total of 1.4 million convertible rubles, and Japanese authorities confined the violating vessels to dock for four to five months. Fish protection agencies subtracted all of the illegally caught fish from the allocated quota.

Salmon of Soviet origin were protected on their migratory routes outside the 200-mile zone in the Pacific Ocean. In 1989, as in previous years, Taiwanese vessels caught the salmon illegally. Two Taiwanese vessels were detained by a border patrol ship. By decision of a people's court fines and compensation totalling 779,940 convertible rubles were levied against the violating ships. It should be mentioned that the problem of exacting fines and compensation for losses from Taiwanese

fishing vessels has been with us for more than a single year. A Japanese trade firm is presently being used as a channel for operational communication with Taiwan on the execution of the court's decisions.

Fish protection agencies monitored Japanese salmon fishing beyond the economic zone of the USSR under an intergovernment agreement. Ten fish protection vessels, two border patrol ships and an Il-18 DORR [not further identified] aircraft participated in the monitoring. There were 188 Japanese vessels and one mother ship in the fishery. A total of 117 vessels were inspected, and 55 violations of the fishing regulations were discovered, including 52 from aircraft (fishing in a forbidden zone). The salmon quota for the Japanese outside the 200-mile zones of the USSR, Japan and the USA was set at 10,700 tons (8,004,000 fish) in 1989. According to figures from the fish protection agencies, the actual catch amounted to 10,040 tons (7,512,000 of fish, or 93.8% of the quota).

The technical facilities of the fish protection agencies leaves something to be desired. Our nation's fish resources continue to be protected from SRTM-800 and SRTM-1000 vessels. The vessels have a speed of less than 10 knots and their technical specifications do not measure up to the requirements of fish protection work. Practically all of the foreign fishing vessels which fish within the USSR's zone are superior to the SRTMs in both speed and maneuverability. Glavrybvod is outfitting these vessels with landing boats, outboard motors and satellite navigation systems with available currency. A basic reequipment of the fish protection agencies is essential, however, and the obsolete SRTM class of vessels must be replaced with high-speed specialized vessels.

The fact that there are no real prospects for replacing the vessels is causing great concern. The four specialized vessels to be built in Denmark will in general not solve the problem. (A detailed report on one of them, the patrol vessel Komandor, was published in issue No. 3 of RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO in 1990). The fish protection agencies need 30 specialized seagoing vessels, however. We must immediately resolve the matter of building such vessels in the USSR.

With the conversion of state industry to economic accountability and self-financing, fish procurement organizations of the Far East basin will want to stop assigning vessels to protect the USSR's economic zone without being paid rent. Because of this Glavrybvod should allocate funds for renting patrol vessels.

A very acute situation has developed with respect to the use of aircraft. The waters guarded are extensive, and this cannot be done without aircraft. The IL-14 aircraft, which suited the fish protection agencies in every way, was taken out of production long ago, and only individual aircraft still have some service life left. There is presently no replacement for this aircraft, which was so suitable for use in the national economy. The fish protection agencies have been forced to use the Yak-40

and AN-26, but these aircraft are expensive and are not satisfactory with respect to speed, altitude or range. The USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry should probably join forces with other interested departments and ask the Ministry of Aviation Industry to develop such an aircraft.

Nor has the situation improved with respect to organizing the reception, automated processing and operational transmission of information from foreign fishing vessels to fish protection vessels Dalryba [Far Eastern Administration of the Fish Industry] GPO [state border guard?]. The information is still being processed practically by hand, and its transmission is extremely slow.

There have been advances in the protection of our biological resources, however. There has been a perceptible rectification of foreign fishing, and the maritime sites set up for inspecting Japanese fishing vessels have worked out well. Three such sites are presently operating. There has been improvement in interaction among the fish protection agencies, border troops and the USSR Navy to protect salmon originating in the USSR beyond the borders of the economic zone of the USSR. The raw material stocks have been stabilized in a number of fisheries. According to scientific forecasts, the overall permissible harvest of fish and marine organisms is still fairly high.

Fish protection agencies discovered 263,900 violations of laws protecting fish stocks in 1989, 139,300 of them gross violations, compared with 329,500 in 1987 and 308,400 in 1988. The reduction resulted from the transfer of fishery and sanitation monitoring of bodies of water to the State Committee for the Protection of Nature in 1988. The total amount of suits filed against organizations for damage to fish stocks in the form of fish killed by pollution and in water intake installations came to 15.3 million rubles, and the sum total of the suits filed against citizens in the form of fixed rates for illegally catching valuable species of fish amounted to 4.6 million rubles. A total of 2,871 cases were assigned to investigative agencies for bringing the guilty parties to court on criminal charges.

In 1989 fish-raising enterprises released 3,896,000,000 fish of the valuable species into natural bodies of water and reservoirs (exceeding the plan by 10%), including 96,400,000 sturgeon, 603,500,000 salmon, 3,157,400,000 small-mesh fish and 38,500,000 plant-eaters.

There was a continuation of the work performed to improve the biotechnology for raising fry in order to improve the quality of the fry and the industrial return coefficient in the fisheries, and the feeding of salmon fry was introduced at fish-raising plants of the Far East, which increased the industrial return by an average of 2-2.5-fold. Work is underway to increase the capacities of the fish-raising enterprises and on their reconstruction and technical reequiptment.

The data of fish-management science show that 70-80% of the sturgeon catch in the Sea of Azov involves fish released from hatcheries; 26-30% in the Caspian. Acclimatization measures being carried out in the nation assure an annual harvest of around 32,000 tons of fish.

A deteriorating ecological situation is reducing effectiveness. Each year around 200 cases of fish mortality are recorded in various of the nation's bodies of water. Sturgeon larvae and fry die at Astrakhan and Volgograd hatcheries, and the numbers of anchovies and herring have been drastically reduced in the Sea of Azov. However, charges are not always filed promptly and with evidence for losses of fish killed by sudden-discharge pollution, or as a result of defective or missing fish-screens at water-intake facilities, and proper persistence is not demonstrated in the consideration of this information in agencies of the procuracy, arbitration and the courts. Monitoring of the construction of compensating facilities has been relaxed.

In 1989 Glavrybvod helped prepare and consider the draft Law of the USSR on the Protection of Nature, the drafts of the decrees passed by the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Fundamentally Improve the Ecological Situation in the Caspian Sea Basin" and "On Urgent Measures to Normalize the Situation in the Sea of Azov Basin," the Regulations For Protecting Surface Water, the Statute on State Ecological Expert Assessment, the "Methods For Assessing Damage to Fish Stocks..." and many other normative documents.

Glavrybvod continued to work jointly with scientific research institutes to regulate the amount of pollutants acceptable in fishing waters. Glavrybvod's NTS [Scientific and Technical Council] established the maximum acceptable concentrations (PDK) for 106 substances and the approximate safe levels (OBUV) for 24.

The significant losses suffered by the fishing industry from water pollution demand immediate steps to enhance the protection of inland bodies of water and the coastal waters of seas from the effects of man's activities. The resolution of these problems was made more difficult, however, by the transfer of environmental protection functions to USSR Goskompriroda agencies.

The Ministry of the Fishing Industry turned over to Goskompriroda and its local agencies 40 units of the central organization (50% of the former Glavrybvod system) and TsUREN [Central administration of reconnaissance and ecological oversight?] (50% of the total system), 1,170 staff members of the basin directorates, 3.7 million rubles allocated for their wages, 104 special automobiles, 34 trucks, two SChS-150 maritime fish protection vessels, 30 diesel-powered lake boats, 64 boats with fixed gasoline engines, 138 outboard motorboats, 482 tons of the gasoline stocks for 1989 and 116 tons of the diesel supply for 1989.

As a result, the Glavrybvod and TsUREN administrations which performed preventive oversight and expert appraisal of projects were eliminated. A significant

reduction in operational sanitation and fish industry oversight and the halting of fish industry evaluations of projects by the basin administrations and TsUREN have reduced the influence of fish protection agencies on the implementation of measures to protect fish stocks by industrial, agricultural and municipal facilities.

It should be noted that Glavrybvod continues to receive plans for the development and distribution of production forces of the USSR, plans for the development and distribution of individual sectors of the national economy, plans for the comprehensive use of water resources, nature protection plans and plans for the construction of individual projects from various ministries and departments, even though there is no one to consider them either in Glavrybvod, in TsUREN or in the basin administrations of the fish protection agencies.

The Ministry of the Fish Industry also has an interest in seeing to it that in their economic work in the bodies of water, ministries and departments work out and implement measures to preserve conditions conducive to the natural reproduction of fish stocks and other biological resources. It would therefore be a good thing to set up in the VNIRO [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Sea Fisheries and Oceanography] (or some other institute of the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry in Moscow) a special subdivision with at least 10 members to review these materials in the interest of the fish industry.

By a decree of the party and the government on the fundamental restructuring of nature protection in the nation, USSR Goskompriroda was assigned the functions of state monitoring of the protection and use of fish stocks, aquatic animals and plants in inland bodies of water and territorial waters of the USSR, on the continental shelf and in the economic zone of the USSR. The same decree charged USSR Goskompriroda with the function of issuing permits for using the animal world, including fish stocks, which is an integral part of fish industry management. At the same time the actual protection of fish stocks is still the function of the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry.

Due to the imprecise wording of this decree, Goskompriroda and the Ministry of the Fish Industry have for two years argued over who has authority to manage the fish industry and protect the stocks. The USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR Academy of Sciences and other departments have been drawn into the dispute. The situation has complicated the work of regulating fishing and weakened the protection of fish stocks.

USSR Goskompriroda and the USSR Ministry of Justice have presently submitted a number of draft enactments to the USSR Council of Ministers calling for removing from fish protection agencies their authority to bring violators of fish protection laws to administrative and material accountability.

Since it is impossible effectively to protect fish stocks without the authority to punish violators of the law, the adoption of these enactments could lead to a total breakdown of the system of fish protection agencies. Repeated appeals on the matter to the USSR Council of Ministers by the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry have not yet had a positive outcome.

In addition to difficulties in relations with Goskompriroda, the work of fish protection agencies has recently been complicated by relations with the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies.

With the conversion to regional economic accountability and increased authority for the soviets of people's deputies, the latter are assuming functions not their own and making decisions which are in conflict with existing laws. This applies to the revision of the Fishing Regulations without the participation of fish protection agencies, the revision of established ceilings on catches in the fisheries and the transfer of bodies of water to the use of secondary fish procurers. Actions taken by the Tyumen, Kamchatka and Chelyabinsk oblast ispolkoms are an example. Attempts to divide up the economic zone of the USSR (Estonia and Kamchatka) according to administrative territory pose a special danger to the fish industry. It will inevitably lead to the fragmentation of resources in the economic zone to suit localized interests and ultimately, to their detriment.

Unresolved problems with respect to materials and equipment support for the fish protection agencies are also having a significant effect upon the effectiveness of measures to protect fish stocks and combat poaching. The state fish protection inspectors have at their disposal motor vehicles, motorboats and launches. Delays in the replacement of worn-out transport, radio and other kinds of equipment and equipment which has used up its service life, and limited allocations of gasoline make it difficult for the fish protection agencies to perform their job of protecting and reproducing fish stocks. The 40-45 motor vehicles allocated by USSR Gosplan for the fish protection agencies annually does not cover 10% of their need. In 1989 not a single passenger car was allocated for the use of Glavrybvod. The number of Vikhr and Neptun outboard motors allocated has been sharply reduced in the past 5 years. They have a short service life (500-700 hours), and 1,500-1,700 of them are needed annually to replace worn-out motors. During the past 3 years practically none of the outboard motors so needed by Glavrybvod have been allocated.

Despite the fact that the USSR Council of Ministers has ordered USSR Gosplan and the corresponding ministries to take steps to improve the provision of fish protection agencies with transport and other equipment, there has still been no decision on the allocation of motor vehicles, motorcycles and outboard motors.

A lack of legal protection for state fish protection inspectors also makes it difficult for them to combat malicious poaching, a fact particularly apparent in 1989, when

there was a drastic increase in crime in the nation. Eight state fish protection inspectors were killed in the performance of their official duties. This included four killed while arresting malicious poachers, three of them with firearms. Three other inspectors were wounded and disabled in a skirmish with poachers. At the same time law-enforcement agencies have become less persistent and demanding in halting malicious actions by poachers. Many cases involving malicious violators are submitted to labor collectives for consideration, as a result of which malicious violators of fish protection laws go free of criminal liability.

The USSR Ministry of Justice reports that it has repeatedly discussed the matter of increasing criminal liability for attempts upon the life or health of an individual while he is perform his official or public duty, as well as the life or health of close relatives of such a person. The draft new Criminal Code of the RSFSR will specify increased liability for murder or serious bodily injury.

The matter of increasing the wages of workers with fish protection agencies has also been dragged out. The official salaries of Goskompriroda have until quite recently been twice those of workers with fish protection agencies performing identical jobs.

The uncertain situation of fish protection agencies, their low wages and lack of social and legal protection have caused extensive loss of specialists. More than 1,700 specialists (mainly inspectors), or 17.6% of the total, quit in 1989 alone.

The positive resolution of these and other problems will help Glavrybvod to perform efficiently and protect the fish stocks.

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### **Inland Waterways Said To Be in State of Toxicological Crisis**

*90WN0174C Moscow RYBNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO  
in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 45-49*

[Article by Doctor of Biology V.I. Lukyanenko, Institute of Biology of Inland Waters of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "A Toxicological Crisis in the Bodies of Water"]

[Text] The purity of our natural bodies of water has become a particularly acute problem. Water quality and other water conditions in the commercial fishing waters are the most important factor affecting the numbers and commercial supplies of fish. The amount of waste water dumped into bodies of water of the USSR has increased from 35 km<sup>3</sup> to 150<sup>3</sup> in the past 20 years alone, which is almost a 5-fold increase, and it is planned to further increase the amount 2.5-fold in the future. A total of 40 km<sup>3</sup> of this is discharged without any purification at all.

Obsolete and wasteful water use technologies, the inadequate provision of cities and enterprises with purification facilities and the low technological level of the purification are resulting in a situation in which millions of tons of various organic and inorganic substances containing thousands of compounds harmful to marine life are entering the bodies of water along with the waste water.

Toxic chemicals from agriculture pose a particular danger to marine ecosystems and fish stocks. The use of pesticides is growing rapidly in the USSR. It will amount to 440,000-480,000 tons this year. The large-scale, uncontrolled use of pesticides, mineral fertilizers and growth regulators, many of which are carcinogenic or mutagenic and have an enormously harmful effect on commercial fish populations and their food. As much as 60% of mineral fertilizers is lost just in transport and storage. An average of 30-70% of the pesticides used in agriculture end up in bodies of water. The result of such a wasteful and negligent, even criminal, attitude toward the use of chemicals in agriculture and the purification of industrial, municipal and household waste has been a universal rise in the pollution levels of practically all of the nation's most important fishing waters and a drastic deterioration of water quality and the environment for fish. I shall discuss only a few examples describing the extend of pollution of the Baltic, Azov and Caspian seas.

There are seven highly developed states in which more than 70 million people live in the Baltic Sea basin. It accounts for around 15% of the world's industrial output. The intensive development of industry, agriculture and maritime transport in the Baltic nations are producing ever-increasing man-made pressure on the environment and the biota of the Baltic Sea. Pollutants enter the water in industrial and agricultural waste and river drainage and are carried there through the air and in the water exchange with the North Sea. The amount of waste water entering just the eastern part of the Baltic Sea's coastal zone has now reached 14 km<sup>3</sup> per year, most of which undergoes only mechanical purification. If we subtract from the total the so-called "regulation-pure without purification" waste water (a term not used in GOST 17.1.01-77 but frequently used to describe the composition of drainage water), up to 45% of the remaining discharge of polluted drainage goes into the gulfs of Finland and Riga and the open sea, and 85-90% goes into Kursh and Vislinskiy bays. We should bear in mind the rapid growth of thermal pollution of the water, which originates at nuclear power plants. The volumes of drainage water and other industrial waste entering rivers of the Baltic Sea basin and its coastal zone today equal its potential dilution capacity, and there is no justification for counting on the sea to purify itself or on being able further to increase the load on its ecosystems. According to far from complete data around 600,000 tons of nitrogen, 60,000 tons of phosphorus, around 70,000 tons of oil and petroleum products and 50,000 tons of ligno-sulfonic acids, as well as heavy metals, pesticides, organosilicon and many other compounds enter the sea's

coastal zone each year. The highly productive coastal area of the sea, those places where valuable species of fish of various ages feed, suffer the most.

The ecological situation in the Baltic Sea's Kursh Bay, a large freshwater lagoon, is causing particular concern. Around 50 species of fish, including 34 commercial species lived there. Each year more than 500 million m<sup>3</sup> of waste water enters the Kursh Bay basin, 335 million m<sup>3</sup> of it without any kind of purification. Discharged into the body of water along with the waste water are 55,000 tons of suspended substances, 100,000 tons of organic substances, tens of thousands of tons of sulfates and chlorides, up to 70,000 tons of nitrogen compounds (total nitrogen), around 3,000 tons of active phosphorus-containing substances and considerable quantities of petroleum products, heavy metals and other toxicants. The average annual concentration of ammonium nitrates exceeds the PDK 23 times over; petroleum products, 7 times, with an absolute maximum of 66 PDK in the upper layer of water and 48 PDK in the bottom layer. Concentrations of nitrates and nitrites exceed the PDK, which is a clear indication of eutrophication of the bay water. A concentration of pesticides has been found in bottom sediment in the southern part. Their concentrations in the water do not exceed the PDK but are 2-5 times the PDK in the livers of commercial fish.

There is an even more dramatic toxicological situation in the basins of the USSR's southern seas, including the Azov and Caspian. According to AzNIIRKh [Azerbaijani Scientific Research Institute of the Fish Industry], the average annual concentration of pesticides in the Sea of Azov has increased 5-fold over the past several years. According to the data for 1988 the total averaged concentration of stable organochloride pesticides alone has increased 17-fold in the sea; 27-fold in the Gulf of Taganrog. A disastrous toxicological situation has developed in the coastal areas of Krasnodar Kray. Amounts of toxic chemicals in the Kuban's estuaries has reached hundreds of times the PDK, several thousands of times the PDK during certain periods. This is the second most important region for the reproduction of commercial fish for the Azov. Concentrations of pesticides in the runoff canals of the region's rice paddies sometimes exceed the PDK tens of thousands of times over. A total of 1.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> of contaminated drainage went directly into bodies of water in Krasnodar Kray from farmlands in 1986. Around 17,000 tons of 128 different toxic chemicals have been used in Rostov Oblast alone in recent years, 60% of which have no PDK at all.

An acute toxicological situation is also developing in the Volga-Caspian basin, the nation's main commercial fishing area. Each year 23 km<sup>3</sup> of waste water is discharged into the Volga basin alone, 13 km<sup>3</sup> of which is what is called "regulation-pure," and 10 km<sup>3</sup> is contaminated. In all, more than 40 km<sup>3</sup> of waste water enters the Caspian Sea basin each year, which is slightly more than 25% of all the nation's waste water. Hundreds of thousands of tons of suspended and organic substances, tens of thousands of tons of nitrates, petroleum products and

phosphorus, hundreds of tons of zinc, copper and other heavy metals and thousands of tons of pesticides enter the Volga and Caspian basin along with it. The contamination of the Volga-Caspian basin with pesticides has become a real disaster. More than 85,000 tons of 108 different pesticides were used in the immediate basin of the Caspian Sea (in Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia and Astrakhan Oblast of the RSFSR) from 1983 to 1987 (17,000 tons a year).

The "traditional" contamination of the Caspian basin with oil and petroleum products is doing enormous damage to its fish industry. The oil content of the water frequently exceeds the PDK 10- to 100-fold in the South Caspian, 3- to 4-fold in the Middle and North Caspian. The rapid development of oil extraction in coastal regions of the North Caspian, a unique body of water on the planet, is causing particular alarm.

The many years of overall contamination of the Volga-Caspian region by man had to have disastrous consequences for the fish industry. The first signs of the sickness in Volga-Caspian sturgeon appeared as early as 1984 in the form of muscle breakdown and weak sacs. This became a large-scale phenomenon in 1987 and 1988. It drew the attention of the press and the general public. A hasty diagnosis of myopathy was made. This would have been terrible and irreversible, because myopathy is a "progressive *hereditary* (italics ours—V.L.) disease of the muscles involving a breakdown of metabolism in the muscle tissue." Not until the spring of 1988, at the initiative of the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry, was an interdepartmental scientific team set up at the initiative of the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry, whose members included associates of a number of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry. The "Sturgeon" program was developed, the financing of which was assumed by the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry (and not the polluting departments). The all-around, comprehensive study of sturgeon, mainly Russian, conducted during the following 2 years under the unified program showed that the "new" disease was not limited to a breakdown of the muscles and deterioration of the roe quality. Many other serious changes were detected in the diseased fish, primarily a breakdown of ionic homeostasis and the metabolism of proteins and carbohydrates, erythropenia and leukopenia, liver dystrophy and necrosis, changes in the kidneys and sex glands, and a breakdown of gametogenesis and gonadogenesis. In addition, studies conducted by fish management institutes detected chloroorganic substances in the organs and tissue of the sturgeon, including such highly toxic substances as DDT and its derivatives, hexachloran, lead, (keltan), (dual) and others. The pesticide content in the liver and fatty tissue sometimes exceeds the permissible levels 2- to 5-fold. Concentrations of cadmium, nickel, mercury, lead, copper and other heavy metals were also found in the sturgeon livers far exceeding the PDK for food products. A critical analysis of the complete data obtained on the biochemistry, physiology,

histology and toxicology of the sturgeon, as well as the scope of the multicomponent contamination of the water, the soil and food organisms, enabled us to diagnose the disease of the Volga-Caspian sturgeon as cumulative toxicosis with multisystem infection.

With respect to the toxicological situation in other commercially fished bodies of water in the nation, it should be classified as extremely serious; as disastrous or near-disastrous in some of them (the Aral and Balkhash). Many large and medium-size rivers (the Volga, Dnep, Oka, Kama, Kuban, Ob, Irtysh, Northern Donets and Northern Dvina) and practically all of the small rivers in the nation's settled regions are in disastrous condition. An ecological crisis has developed or is developing in the Azov, Black, Caspian and Baltic seas and in lakes Baykal, Issyk-Kul and Ladoga. It is planned to extract oil in the Sea of Okhotsk, which provides 20% of the All-Union catch of sea fish today.

After assessing the severity of the problems of protecting natural bodies of water and fisheries, we would have to acknowledge that, overall, man's pressure on the marine ecosystems as a result of the so-called "comprehensive use of water resources" has reached the critical level universally. We are at the final line, and if we overstep it a national ecological disaster is inevitable. It is self-evident today that the route which we have taken over the past 30 years in our quest for a "cheap" solution to the problem of protecting our bodies of water from pollution is a blind alley, and the starting concept for resolving this problem with the self-purification (assimilation) capacities of the bodies of water themselves is fundamentally flawed and has no scientific basis whatsoever. A new strategy is needed—that is, a scientifically based, general plan for protecting the bodies of water of the USSR from pollution, one based on the enormous body of experimental data and field observations.

The enormous amount of experience acquired by the specialists in the field of sanitary hydrobiology and fish management toxicology shows unequivocally that the new general plan for protecting bodies of water of the USSR from pollution must be based on the biological or ecosystem approach, instead of the pseudoeconomic or departmental approach of "minimizing outlays for purifying waste water" which has dominated for the past several decades. With this approach the discharge of waste water into bodies of water or streams was regarded as "one kind of special water use." It was based on the principle of making maximum use of the capacity of a water facility for self-purification under multipurpose use. The fallaciousness of this concept is becoming self-evident today, when a crisis or a disastrous toxicological situation has developed in most of the bodies of water with commercial fishing. A momentary savings on the purification of waste water is resulting in losses of millions to the national economy, reducing the nation's food resources and threatening human life.

The basic unacceptability of using natural bodies of water as receptacles for waste water, as a sort of "biological purification facilities," has led Soviet researchers to the fundamentally important conclusion that the only constructive way to protect our bodies of water from pollution is to prevent pollutants from entering the bodies of water and streams. This is clearly born out by almost a century of studying problems of pollution of bodies of water from the standpoint and using the methods of fish management toxicology and sanitary hydrobiology.

Regulation of the discharge of contaminated water into bodies of water by means of the PDK has been and continues to be an important tool for accomplishing this task, although certainly not the main one and all the more, not the only one. Purifying the waste water to a specific level is not a means of fundamentally resolving the problem of preventing pollution, of course, but only a forced and temporary measure, since the imperfect and incomplete purification of waste water is still better than discharging it into bodies of water without any purification. Two PDKs, sanitary-hygienic and fish management, are presently used for protecting surface water from pollution. More than 1,200 sanitary-hygienic PDKs and around 800 fish management PDKs have now been worked out in 4 decades of hard work in this area. At the same time more than 4 million chemical substances are presently known, and approximately 25,000 new compounds are developed each year. Around 150,000 have been classified as pollutants, and from 10,000 to 40,000 end up in our bodies of water. Since, however, dozens or even hundreds of polluting substances whose toxic properties can be combined or intensified when jointly affecting fish and aquatic creatures, are entering a specific body of water simultaneously, it is perfectly clear that the problem of protecting bodies of water from pollution cannot be resolved with PDKs alone either in the near or the distant future. We should be particularly cautioned, however, against prematurely abandoning the system of PDKs as an important temporary measure for restraining a further increase in pollution of bodies of water with commercial fishing.

In order to adopt the preventive method of protecting bodies of water from pollution we must have new ecological thinking on the part of each and every person and the society as a whole. The logic of the new thinking demands the rejection of the very idea of permitting the discharge of waste water into bodies of water and the concept that self-purification and dilution will do their work in these bodies of water. For several decades many people in our nation and abroad have felt that "self-purification" is a Nature-given mechanism to be used to its full capacity and beyond. The so-called ecological-toxicological studies which regard pollution as a sort of ecological factor are based on precisely these views. Precisely these views are the basis for the so-called normative ecology and the idea, popular among nonbiologists, of "norms" for the discharge of toxic waste into

bodies of water. These, they say, should not lead to the destruction of the ecosystems, which provide for the "self-purification" of streams and bodies of water. We need resolutely to reject the stereotypes of the old pseudoecological thinking. We understand that it is not easy to do this, just as it was not easy to change the political thinking in the nuclear age. It was done, however. Life forced us to do it. In politics we now give priority to common human goals over class goals, and in ecology we must proclaim and implement priority for common national interests over departmental interests.

It is especially important for those whose lot it is to deal with ecological problems, and especially hydrobiologists in the field of ecotoxicology, to use as their tools the basic principles of the new ecological thinking (interlinkage and interdependence between nature and the society, the life-support functions of bodies of water and the inadmissibility of discharging waste water into bodies of water). The personal sense of responsibility of the scientists, their ethics and competence and, finally, their human conscience must counter those who, in the race for transient, momentary benefits are prepared, contrary to the truth of science and the truth of life, to sacrifice public interests and defend departmental interests, to justify both the reversal of northern rivers and the construction of ecologically devastating canals for the interbasin transfer of water ("river diversions") and to "norm" man's impact upon water ecosystems for purposes of "minimizing" departmental outlays for the purification of waste water, to substantiate maximum permissible discharges (PDS) into bodies of water already overloaded with toxic substances, and to insist on lowering the PDKs for unique bodies of water such as that national treasure, Baykal.

We presented the main components and ways to implement the new general concept for protecting bodies of water from pollution to the All-Union Conference on Fish Management Toxicology (Riga, 1988) and submitted them to the press (Lukyanenko, 1989 and 1990). I therefore consider it essential to stress only its essence here: an organic combining of strategic (little-waste and water-conservation technologies) and tactical (regulation of pollution of bodies of water by means of fish management, ecological and regional PDKs, the filtration of pesticides, water protection sanitary zones, increasing the capacities of purification facilities, improving water purification technologies, and so forth) tasks in the staged resolution of the problem of protecting the USSR's bodies of water from pollution. This approach deserves the closest of attention, because one of the main shortcomings of our ecological policy all these years (if one existed) has been the primacy of tactics over strategy and brief, routine measures for individual basins over long-range plans. A fundamental solution of the problem will depend upon achieving new frontiers in the technology and the equipment for purifying waste water. We must have more than just new technology and equipment, whoever; we also need cadres, a better caliber of work and new ecological thinking at all levels and in all

areas. Resolution of the problem can only be assured with the comprehensive and consistent implementation of the entire package of measures, through their parallel implementation without excesses or distortions.

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**Estonian Views Tallinn Baltic Ecology Conference**  
*90WN0192B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA*  
*in Russian 27 Jun 90 p 2*

[Interview with Doctor of Geological-Minerological Sciences Anto Raukas by G. Golub: "Global Disasters in the Mirror of the Republic"]

[Text] Yesterday in Tallinn, a conference opened for the leaders and specialists of the academies of sciences of the three Baltic Republics and the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences devoted to the problems of ecology. The Estonian delegation included several academicians and leading specialists in the area of geology, physics and so forth. One of them was Academician and Doctor of Geological-Minerological Sciences Anto Raukas and he answered questions posed by our correspondent.

[Golub] Anto Viktorovich, judging from the membership of the conference participants, they were brought together by a common interest in the ecology of the Baltic Sea?

[Raukas] Yes, this is a great pain and concern for all eight states located along the coast of the Baltic. And there are more than enough justifications for alarm. Judge for yourself.

The Baltic comprises 1/1,000 of the world ocean in terms of area and 1/70,000 in terms of volume. Here 15 percent of the product produced in the world comes from this region. And the region is overpopulated. If it were possible to evenly spread people out around the world, then 100,000 persons should live here. But 150 million do. For this reason, the Baltic has the highest load in comparison with the other seas, the pollution level is higher and, respectively, the responsibility of man.

The capitalist nations have long understood this and are taking measures to protect the Baltic Sea. Moreover, they have realized that it is easier to provide subsidies to the Eastern countries than to wait for them to put themselves in order.

[Golub] This explains the involvement of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences in the conference?

[Raukas] We have old contacts with Swedish scientists and there is even a common program. But at present, having established a Baltic Common Market, it is essential to think about cooperation.

[Golub] At the conference you gave the main report on the ecological situation in Estonia. Could you briefly describe its main areas?

[Raukas] Let me begin by saying that the history of protecting nature in Estonia goes back to the year 1910, when for the first time in Russia the small Estonian island of Vayka was put under protection for the sake of protecting birds. By 1940, Estonia had 47 nature-conservation territories. In 1957, the republic government passed the nation's first law on the protection of nature, and in 1971, the Lakhemaaskiy National Park was organized (again the first in the nation). Presently, 7 percent of the republic territory is a nature conservation zone.

[Golub] Nevertheless, we, seemingly, have not been very successful in the real protection of nature.

[Raukas] Yes, the current situation can be described in a word, a crisis. And we have approached it with giant strides in producing this crisis. This is confirmed by the following data.

In the postwar years, the republic population grew by 1.4-fold and the number of manual and white-collar workers by 3.8-fold. Here the production of industrial product rose by 42-fold, mineral resources by 15-fold and electricity by 100-fold.

[Golub] Previously, the same figures were given in amazement: just look at the pace!...

[Raukas] Yes, there was a payment for this pace and 8 percent of the territory where shale and peat were mined was completely destroyed with the historical natural landscape. Each year, our enterprises released around 4,000 tons of harmful ingredients into the atmosphere. Around the Narva power plants, if there were no winds, within a radius of 40 km each year some 32 tons of dust, soot and so forth precipitated out per square kilometer. In real life, a portion of this "good" was carried off by the wind to other regions.

[Golub] Including to the opposite coast of the gulf. I remember many years ago an engineer from the Baltic GRES joked bitterly in pointing to the black trail of smoke emerging from the smokestacks of the plant: "Well, we are sending free mineral fertilizers by aid. And in response there are only complaints and accusations of polluting the environment."

[Raukas] Yes, no one was thankful for such "gifts." For completeness of the picture, let me give data on the water. Each year some 2,200,000,000 m<sup>3</sup> of water flow into the river and lakes of Estonia. Of this amount, 52 percent is treated in keeping with the standards, 37 percent is partially and 11 percent not at all. Let me point out that such components as phosphorous and nitrogen are not removed at all in treatment. One of the most flagrant examples is the Purtse River in the shale basin where the water has a phenol content which exceeds the standard by 500-fold.

Nor can we hope that we will be saved by the underground waters as 45 percent of these is already polluted or is being polluted.

[Golub] And then all these, to put it mildly, polluted rivers and streams empty into the Baltic....

[Raukas] As a result, we have the following picture: a liter of sea water contains 500,000 micrograms of nitrogen, 49,900 of phosphorous, 9,000 of zinc, 4,000 of copper, 35,000 of oil products and so forth.

[Golub] Terrifying figures.

[Raukas] Very. I have been using them for a long time in my work, but up until now they could not be said outloud and particularly at an international conference. For so long we have been forced to pretend that everything was fine. Now, the coming generations will have to pay for the years of the thoughtless attitude toward nature. It is no secret that in the Northeast, infant morbidity and mortality are higher. According to the medical data, in Kokhtla-Yarve people suffer 2.5-fold more from bronchitis and 2.7-fold more from hypertension than in Rakvere.

[Golub] But it cannot be said that we did not pay any attention to the questions of protecting the environment. There was and is a system of control and so-called MPC or maximum permissible concentrations were set for various substances.

[Raukas] Correct. There were standards and there were good laws. Only they were not carried out. The questions of protecting the environment were secondary and merely impeded the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan.

[Golub] Which of the ecological problems do you consider most crucial for Estonia?

[Raukas] I can list them: the mining and processing of minerals, power, the chemical industry, military installations, agricultural pollution. And common to all these sectors is the problem of a shortage of specialists.

[Golub] Ecologists, biologists?

[Raukas] No, intelligent engineers. Our ecologists can state and describe the existing picture. For example, with the aid of lichens they can determine the degree of pollution. But they do not provide engineer recommendations and they cannot say how to get rid of this pollution. For this reason, we must welcome the initiative of the Tallinn Technical University where upon a proposal of Academician Veyderma they have decided to incorporate on all faculties a new course for the principles of protecting nature. It is also essential to use the aid of the developed countries.

[Golub] What do you have in mind?

[Raukas] A specific example. Under the aegis of UNESCO there is the Baltic Sea Project, a youth movement which involves the schoolchildren of the Baltic countries, including Estonia. This is the Azeriskaya Secondary School, the Pyarnu Fourth, the Kadrinaskaya, Kundaskaya and others. Among them are even primary schools such as the schools at Vormsi and at Kikkonka. So there is a chance that the future generation will be more literate in ecological terms.

[Golub] Anto Viktorovich, from our conversation it emerges that we are to blame for our own disasters. This, of course, is true. Although it is no secret that the process of polluting goes on everywhere, including in the developed countries. There are global problems.

[Raukas] Undoubtedly. There is the hothouse effect, the acid rains, the ozone hole which concern all inhabitants of the earth. But each does his bit.

It is possible to speak of global problems. Ten days ago I was at a cement plant in Finland where it is cleaner than it is in Estonia in the center of Tallinn. And I remembered our Kunda. What can we say?...

[Golub] In conclusion, several words about the questions of the discussions and debates at this conference.

[Raukas] Our work with Swedish scientists is in the following areas: the elaboration of alternate (wind-powered) energy, protection of the air and water, and legal aspects of the protection of the environment. I feel that these questions will be common for all the conference participants.

All-Union Census Tables on Ages of Population [Text]

90UN2318A Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI  
in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 62-79

[All-Union Census Tables: "1989 All-Union Census Tables"]

USSR Population According to Age						
	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	285,743 *	187,746	97,997	892	884	906
Including by age in years:						
0-4	26,643	15,896	10,747	1,037	1,041	1,033
5-9	24,342	14,950	9,392	1,031	1,035	1,026
10-14	22,581	13,924	8,657	1,028	1,030	1,024
15-19	21,268	14,343	6,925	1,048	1,016	1,119
20-24	20,394	13,589	6,805	1,013	995	1,049
25-29	24,356	16,561	7,795	1,008	978	1,076
30-34	23,483	16,597	6,886	997	960	1,093
35-39	20,824	15,253	5,571	979	947	1,073
40-44	13,829	10,311	3,518	957	939	1,012
45-49	14,919	10,239	4,680	904	895	923
50-54	17,492	11,683	5,809	877	861	911
55-59	14,940	9,362	5,578	810	794	837
60-64	14,855	9,462	5,393	655	658	649
65-69	8,420	5,201	3,219	472	469	478
70-74	6,360	3,959	2,401	410	424	387
75-79	5,939	3,519	2,420	365	370	357
80 or older	4,989	2,810	2,179	298	283	317
General population by age:						
Pre-working age**	77,905	47,528	30,377	1,032	1,034	1,029
Working age***	158,911	109,961	48,950	1,064	1,028	1,150
Post-working age****	48,818	30,170	18,648	369	371	366
Average age of the population	33.2	33.4	32.9			
*Permanent population; on-hand population including foreign citizens temporarily residing—286,731,000 people.						
**Children and teenagers up to 16 years old.						
***Men 16-59 years old and women 16-54 years old.						
****Men 60 years or older, and Women 55 years or older.						

## RSFSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	147,022	107,959	39,063	877	873	889
Including by age in years:						
0-4	12,032	8,498	3,534	1,038	1,041	1,033
5-9	11,360	8,108	3,252	1,032	1,034	1,026
10-14	10,592	7,599	2,993	1,029	1,029	1,029
15-19	9,968	7,741	2,227	1,056	1,015	1,211
20-24	9,754	7,384	2,370	1,033	1,012	1,100
25-29	12,557	9,423	3,134	1,031	999	1,133
30-34	12,863	9,812	3,051	1,013	975	1,146
35-39	11,684	9,149	2,535	993	958	1,130
40-44	7,663	6,156	1,507	971	949	1,068
45-49	7,955	5,959	1,996	900	891	927
50-54	9,594	6,970	2,624	867	848	917
55-59	8,399	5,760	2,639	795	773	844
60-64	8,360	5,804	2,556	633	641	613
65-69	4,510	3,132	1,378	435	439	427
70-74	3,653	2,482	1,171	383	402	343
75-79	3,333	2,197	1,136	326	343	294
80 or older	2,660	1,715	945	236	245	220
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	35,995	25,693	10,302	1,033	1,033	1,032
Working age	83,746	63,618	20,128	1,078	1,038	1,212
Post-working age	27,196	18,578	8,618	343	352	325
Average age of the population	34.7	34.4	35.8			

## Ukrainian SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	51,452	34,297	17,155	857	873	827
Including by age in years:						
0-4	3,791	2,558	1,233	1,041	1,044	1,035
5-9	3,694	2,526	1,168	1,036	1,039	1,028
10-14	3,617	2,436	1,181	1,030	1,033	1,022
15-19	3,549	2,586	963	1,038	977	1,224
20-24	3,352	2,383	969	1,010	965	1,129
25-29	3,957	2,859	1,098	991	956	1,088
30-34	3,899	2,862	1,037	974	936	1,089
35-39	3,742	2,780	962	953	924	1,044
40-44	2,707	1,965	742	918	914	928

Ukrainian SSR Population According to Age (Continued)

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
45-49	3,221	2,121	1,100	876	888	854
50-54	3,704	2,383	1,321	872	878	861
55-59	2,956	1,734	1,222	803	828	768
60-64	3,233	1,903	1,330	651	686	604
65-69	2,020	1,089	931	489	510	465
70-74	1,414	789	625	423	459	379
75-79	1,425	737	688	383	407	360
80 or older	1,164	580	584	326	327	324
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	11,828	8,028	3,800	1,037	1,039	1,032
Working age	28,722	20,217	8,505	1,046	1,007	1,146
Post-working age	10,895	6,046	4,849	387	406	364
Average age of the population	36.5	34.8	39.8			

Belorussian SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	10,152	6,642	3,510	879	895	849
Including by age in years:						
0-4	819	577	242	1,045	1,048	1,038
5-9	787	565	222	1,036	1,040	1,028
10-14	731	503	228	1,031	1,035	1,024
15-19	707	521	186	1,014	926	1,311
20-24	706	518	188	983	916	1,195
25-29	857	638	219	1,016	947	1,247
30-34	837	633	204	1,003	938	1,236
35-39	726	555	171	989	932	1,200
40-44	526	387	139	968	947	1,030
45-49	540	350	190	918	931	893
50-54	654	378	276	852	870	829
55-59	628	305	323	794	796	791
60-64	580	281	299	645	687	608
65-69	359	161	198	513	534	496
70-74	229	101	128	434	480	400
75-79	235	88	147	397	403	393
80 or older	231	81	150	351	313	372
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	2,483	1,747	736	1,038	1,041	1,032
Working age	5,685	4,013	1,672	1,071	992	1,287
Post-working age	1,984	882	1,102	379	391	370
Average age of the population	35.1	31.8	41.3			

## Uzbek SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	19,810	8,041	11,769	976	959	987
Including by age in years:						
0-4	3,216	1,091	2,125	1,029	1,031	1,028
5-9	2,611	909	1,702	1,021	1,027	1,018
10-14	2,256	804	1,452	1,019	1,023	1,016
15-19	2,005	812	1,193	1,001	1,052	968
20-24	1,832	754	1,078	988	1,063	939
25-29	1,786	746	1,040	996	994	997
30-34	1,393	629	764	999	975	1,020
35-39	1,013	498	515	988	963	1,012
40-44	573	301	272	1,001	962	1,047
45-49	625	302	323	1,032	961	1,103
50-54	651	316	335	983	914	1,052
55-59	561	258	303	898	850	942
60-64	484	238	246	805	689	932
65-69	270	131	139	563	506	621
70-74	184	98	86	484	443	533
75-79	166	82	84	538	451	634
80 or older	184	72	112	587	470	674
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	8,507	2,958	5,549	1,023	1,028	1,020
Working age	9,720	4,322	5,398	1,052	1,054	1,050
Post-working age	1,583	761	822	460	406	514
Average age of the population	23.9	26.4	22.3			

## Kazakh SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	16,464	9,402	7,062	939	907	984
Including by age in years:						
0-4	1,941	988	953	1,030	1,031	1,029
5-9	1,700	869	831	1,025	1,024	1,025
10-14	1,606	797	809	1,019	1,017	1,021
15-19	1,444	804	640	1,067	962	1,216
20-24	1,346	772	574	1,022	960	1,113
25-29	1,544	919	625	1,003	968	1,058
30-34	1,364	854	510	997	967	1,048
35-39	1,130	731	399	971	954	1,002
40-44	697	453	244	959	949	977

**Kazakh SSR Population According to Age (Continued)**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
45-49	751	445	306	908	899	921
50-54	836	497	339	915	890	952
55-59	586	352	234	853	817	912
60-64	593	365	228	657	632	700
65-69	306	187	119	495	473	530
70-74	234	145	89	440	427	461
75-79	199	120	79	390	383	401
80 or older	176	97	79	337	303	382
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	5,551	2,810	2,741	1,024	1,022	1,027
Working age	9,079	5,478	3,601	1,051	1,006	1,122
Post-working age	1,823	1,107	716	386	372	408
Average age of the population	28.5	29.9	26.8			

**Georgian SSR Population According to Age**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	5,401	2,992	2,409	903	881	930
Including by age in years:						
0-4	466	249	217	1,045	1,041	1,051
5-9	441	242	199	1,037	1,040	1,033
10-14	432	236	196	1,037	1,034	1,040
15-19	419	236	183	1,080	1,125	1,026
20-24	414	227	187	967	895	1,061
25-29	468	268	200	937	857	1,054
30-34	417	247	170	934	866	1,041
35-39	362	224	138	929	885	1,004
40-44	261	162	99	914	894	949
45-49	296	170	126	882	855	920
50-54	346	190	156	902	870	941
55-59	304	156	148	863	840	888
60-64	298	153	145	779	732	831
65-69	161	83	78	560	535	587
70-74	123	63	60	470	473	468
75-79	100	48	52	486	488	484
80 or older	93	38	55	431	426	434
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	1,423	773	650	1,039	1,039	1,040
Working age	3,039	1,749	1,290	1,039	982	1,121
Post-working age	939	470	469	443	429	458
Average age of the population	33.6	33.1	34.2			

## Azerbaijan SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	7,021	3,806	3,215	952	964	938
Including by age in years:						
0-4	862	436	426	1,062	1,061	1,062
5-9	759	395	364	1,055	1,060	1,050
10-14	681	342	339	1,048	1,060	1,036
15-19	694	349	345	1,112	1,237	999
20-24	687	354	333	926	969	882
25-29	706	390	316	905	923	883
30-34	561	333	228	939	947	926
35-39	389	250	139	944	956	924
40-44	232	154	78	932	948	900
45-49	257	154	103	925	944	896
50-54	356	191	165	913	915	911
55-59	286	150	136	923	893	958
60-64	217	126	91	809	766	871
65-69	108	63	45	578	547	622
70-74	77	46	31	474	467	485
75-79	70	39	31	496	473	527
80 or older	79	34	45	407	403	409
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	2,433	1,236	1,197	1,054	1,061	1,048
Working age	3,888	2,182	1,706	1,024	1,050	993
Post-working age	700	388	312	421	417	427
Average age of the population	27.3	28.1	26.3			

## Lithuanian SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	3,675	2,487	1,188	898	891	914
Including by age in years:						
0-4	295	200	95	1,041	1,043	1,038
5-9	274	191	83	1,038	1,041	1,032
10-14	263	181	82	1,025	1,026	1,023
15-19	281	200	81	1,074	1,047	1,143
20-24	280	200	80	1,056	1,002	1,206
25-29	312	227	85	1,019	964	1,184
30-34	277	208	69	989	937	1,161
35-39	246	185	61	956	903	1,140
40-44	211	155	56	918	881	1,032
45-49	227	156	71	894	884	916
50-54	220	143	77	840	830	860
55-59	211	128	83	789	814	752
60-64	187	111	76	654	663	642
65-69	133	72	61	594	577	614

**Lithuanian SSR Population According to Age (Continued)**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
70-74	80	42	38	528	507	552
75-79	81	41	40	449	402	501
80 or older	97	47	50	522	424	630
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	886	609	277	1,035	1,036	1,033
Working age	2,093	1,494	599	1,064	1,012	1,207
Post-working age	696	384	312	431	404	465
Average age of the population	34.9	33.4	38.2			

**Moldavian SSR Population According to Age**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	4,335	2,020	2,315	908	922	896
Including by age in years:						
0-4	438	193	245	1,039	1,047	1,032
5-9	401	174	227	1,028	1,041	1,018
10-14	371	153	218	1,025	1,033	1,019
15-19	326	205	121	1,046	1,170	865
20-24	299	162	137	949	937	963
25-29	368	189	179	939	886	998
30-34	365	187	178	952	889	1,022
35-39	349	178	171	943	914	974
40-44	197	103	94	900	936	861
45-49	228	100	128	867	928	823
50-54	237	99	138	846	867	832
55-59	210	77	133	795	800	792
60-64	194	76	118	700	699	701
65-69	144	50	94	648	595	678
70-74	84	31	53	589	569	601
75-79	72	25	47	570	509	604
80 or older	52	18	34	460	390	501
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	1,282	558	724	1,031	1,043	1,022
Working age	2,390	1,220	1,170	1,012	998	1,026
Post-working age	663	242	421	465	445	476
Average age of the population	31.8	30.4	33.0			

## Latvian SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	2,667	1,889	778	868	853	903
Including by age in years:						
0-4	208	139	69	1,040	1,040	1,040
5-9	188	128	60	1,039	1,044	1,029
10-14	175	121	54	1,030	1,024	1,044
15-19	185	135	50	1,068	1,055	1,105
20-24	185	136	49	1,057	1,047	1,087
25-29	209	150	59	1,004	960	1,126
30-34	200	148	52	983	932	1,143
35-39	184	138	46	956	901	1,141
40-44	157	118	39	926	883	1,066
45-49	178	128	50	898	860	1,000
50-54	173	124	49	853	826	925
55-59	162	114	48	802	795	820
60-64	148	106	42	604	609	590
65-69	103	70	33	501	503	497
70-74	70	46	24	473	486	449
75-79	71	44	27	429	418	446
80 or older	71	44	27	356	320	418
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	606	412	194	1,038	1,035	1,043
Working age	1,508	1,102	406	1,065	1,023	1,187
Post-working age	553	375	178	381	378	389
Average age of the population	36.3	36.2	36.8			

## Kirghiz SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	4,258	1,625	2,633	953	901	986
Including by age in years:						
0-4	618	191	427	1,020	1,024	1,018
5-9	516	161	355	1,023	1,018	1,025
10-14	460	142	318	1,013	1,006	1,016
15-19	408	160	248	1,037	937	1,108
20-24	363	146	217	999	947	1,035
25-29	380	152	228	985	929	1,024
30-34	315	136	179	986	926	1,034
35-39	245	114	131	979	939	1,014
40-44	135	68	67	974	929	1,021

**Kirghiz SSR Population According to Age (Continued)**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
45-49	147	65	82	992	919	1,055
50-54	168	74	94	929	883	967
55-59	150	61	89	842	793	878
60-64	137	60	77	751	667	823
65-69	75	33	42	534	514	551
70-74	50	24	26	470	457	482
75-79	44	20	24	454	423	481
80 or older	44	16	28	408	328	458
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	1,680	520	1,160	1,018	1,013	1,020
Working age	2,143	915	1,228	1,057	988	1,112
Post-working age	432	188	244	419	392	440
Average age of the population	26.0	28.6	24.4			

**Tajik SSR Population According to Age**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	5,093	1,655	3,438	987	965	998
Including by age in years:						
0-4	901	236	665	1,029	1,037	1,026
5-9	698	191	507	1,025	1,027	1,024
10-14	587	166	421	1,023	1,023	1,023
15-19	526	168	358	1,002	1,134	946
20-24	464	150	314	962	1,083	909
25-29	441	147	294	991	962	1,006
30-34	326	124	202	989	949	1,015
35-39	239	101	138	979	937	1,011
40-44	139	60	79	1,058	967	1,134
45-49	151	63	88	1,114	977	1,223
50-54	165	68	97	989	906	1,052
55-59	142	54	88	923	839	978
60-64	120	49	71	875	693	1,027
65-69	69	28	41	634	530	711
70-74	46	20	26	587	458	707
75-79	37	16	21	635	475	779
80 or older	40	13	27	670	438	803
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	2,296	625	1,671	1,026	1,033	1,024
Working age	2,410	875	1,535	1,054	1,060	1,050
Post-working age	385	154	231	509	409	585
Average age of the population	23.1	26.1	21.6			

## Armenian SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	3,305	2,222	1,083	961	942	1,001
Including by age in years:						
0-4	375	237	138	1,056	1,053	1,062
5-9	335	224	111	1,054	1,054	1,055
10-14	292	201	91	1,048	1,041	1,063
15-19	278	187	91	1,081	1,085	1,072
20-24	281	179	102	968	912	1,074
25-29	330	217	113	960	883	1,126
30-34	292	207	85	955	897	1,112
35-39	216	163	53	938	908	1,033
40-44	131	101	90	935	938	924
45-49	137	98	39	928	942	891
50-54	175	116	59	934	934	933
55-59	154	96	58	936	937	933
60-64	136	86	50	833	818	860
65-69	56	38	18	652	656	645
70-74	41	27	14	529	547	497
75-79	38	23	15	583	581	585
80 or older	37	21	16	557	560	552
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	1,059	699	360	1,052	1,049	1,059
Working age	1,858	1,277	581	1,048	1,004	1,151
Post-working age	387	245	142	477	479	475
Average age of the population	29.1	29.2	29.0			

## Turkmen SSR Population According to Age

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	3,523	1,591	1,932	971	969	972
Including by age in years:						
0-4	560	220	340	1,027	1,033	1,023
5-9	462	187	275	1,020	1,026	1,016
10-14	407	166	241	1,012	1,024	1,004
15-19	366	158	208	1,053	1,132	997
20-24	327	148	179	976	1,046	921
25-29	322	150	172	962	974	952
30-34	253	128	125	964	964	964
35-39	185	101	84	958	957	959
40-44	106	58	48	981	972	993
45-49	109	57	52	994	966	1,026
50-54	114	61	53	977	935	1,028
55-59	97	48	49	911	855	968
60-64	84	43	41	783	700	881
65-69	48	24	24	569	522	619

**Turkmen SSR Population According to Age (Continued)**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
70-74	34	18	16	511	448	587
75-79	27	14	13	539	449	650
80 or older	22	10	12	491	397	571
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	1,505	604	901	1,020	1,029	1,014
Working age	1,751	852	899	1,040	1,058	1,023
Post-working age	267	135	132	450	404	500
Average age of the population	23.8	25.6	22.21			

**Estonian SSR Population According to Age**

	Urban and Rural Population, in Thousands of People	Including		Number of Males per Thousand Females		
		Urban Population	Rural Population	Urban and Rural Population	Urban Population	Rural Population
Entire Population	1,565	1,118	447	877	860	919
Including by age in years:						
0-4	121	83	38	1,033	1,038	1,021
5-9	116	80	36	1,039	1,035	1,048
10-14	111	77	34	1,035	1,033	1,039
15-19	112	81	31	1,109	1,071	1,219
20-24	104	76	28	1,051	1,030	1,113
25-29	119	86	33	1,015	980	1,116
30-34	121	89	32	980	935	1,119
35-39	114	86	28	959	913	1,112
40-44	94	70	24	926	881	1,066
45-49	97	71	26	910	868	1,033
50-54	99	73	26	862	826	973
55-59	94	69	25	797	781	839
60-64	84	61	23	650	644	664
65-69	58	40	18	513	514	511
70-74	41	27	14	491	497	480
75-79	41	25	16	403	382	439
80 or older	39	24	15	309	277	362
General population by age:						
Pre-working age	371	256	115	1,036	1,034	1,042
Working age	879	647	232	1,073	1,030	1,204
Post-working age	315	215	100	383	374	404
Average age of the population	35.8	35.6	36.3			

## Number of Families and Their Grouping by Size Throughout the Union Republics\*

	Number of Families	Including Families Consisting of						Average Family Size (Family Members Residing Together)
		2 people	3 people	4 people	5 people	6 people	7 or more people	
<b>USSR</b>								
Entire Population	73,078,251	22,917,807	18,880,420	17,800,832	6,983,830	3,122,082	3,373,280	3.5
Urban Population	49,644,045	15,481,011	14,113,516	12,965,367	4,291,208	1,596,604	1,196,339	3.3
Rural Population	23,434,206	7,436,796	4,766,904	4,835,465	2,692,622	1,525,478	2,176,941	3.8
<b>RSFSR</b>								
Entire Population	40,246,172	13,758,807	11,281,527	10,153,931	3,353,720	1,106,123	592,064	3.2
Urban Population	29,663,343	9,824,227	8,788,536	7,735,558	2,310,658	697,905	306,459	3.2
Rural Population	10,582,829	3,934,580	2,492,991	2,418,373	1,043,062	408,218	285,605	3.3
<b>Ukrainian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	14,057,509	4,939,347	3,803,941	3,383,806	1,209,494	486,192	234,729	3.2
Urban Population	9,397,048	3,066,087	2,777,518	2,448,018	731,772	258,143	115,560	3.2
Rural Population	4,660,461	1,873,260	1,026,423	935,788	477,722	228,049	119,169	3.3
<b>Belorussian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	2,796,121	971,734	766,089	747,707	212,423	66,392	31,776	3.2
Urban Population	1,790,410	502,705	541,999	556,567	133,586	38,566	16,987	3.3
Rural Population	1,005,711	469,029	224,090	191,140	78,837	27,826	14,789	3.0
<b>Uzbek SSR</b>								
Entire Population	3,415,375	409,276	432,808	570,137	509,414	451,785	1,041,955	5.5
Urban Population	1,569,894	284,496	278,420	332,219	229,049	161,249	284,461	4.7
Rural Population	1,845,481	124,780	154,388	237,918	280,365	290,536	757,494	6.2
<b>Kazakh SSR</b>								
Entire Population	3,824,595	866,378	852,065	972,711	519,866	273,947	339,628	4.0
Urban Population	2,331,290	603,486	592,660	642,846	272,015	114,810	105,473	3.6
Rural Population	1,493,305	262,892	259,405	329,865	247,851	159,137	234,155	4.5
<b>Georgian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	1,243,677	264,490	242,576	313,964	200,272	122,192	100,183	4.1
Urban Population	698,200	147,674	145,350	193,222	105,109	58,924	47,921	4.0
Rural Population	545,477	116,816	97,226	120,742	95,163	63,268	52,262	4.2
<b>Azerbaijan SSR</b>								
Entire Population	1,381,409	203,204	200,131	293,573	252,318	181,906	250,277	4.8
Urban Population	784,429	132,317	127,775	189,692	142,258	89,418	102,969	4.5
Rural Population	596,980	70,887	72,356	103,881	110,060	92,488	147,308	5.2
<b>Lithuanian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	1,000,002	338,139	226,882	255,197	79,651	26,064	14,069	3.2
Urban Population	670,805	206,547	206,295	185,906	49,949	14,844	7,264	3.2
Rural Population	329,197	131,592	80,587	69,291	29,702	11,220	6,805	3.2
<b>Moldavian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	1,143,423	351,006	291,590	305,970	126,403	44,982	23,472	3.4
Urban Population	520,712	149,396	152,860	154,000	44,312	13,140	7,004	3.3

Number of Families and Their Grouping by Size Throughout the Union Republics\* (Continued)

	Number of Families	Including Families Consisting of						Average Family Size (Family Members Residing Together)
		2 people	3 people	4 people	5 people	6 people	7 or more people	
Rural Population	622,711	201,610	138,730	151,970	82,091	31,842	16,468	3.5
<b>Latvian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	731,855	276,877	210,163	164,452	54,814	16,923	8,626	3.1
Urban Population	523,370	194,423	158,166	119,429	36,066	10,527	4,759	3.1
Rural Population	208,485	82,454	51,997	45,023	18,748	6,396	3,867	3.2
<b>Kirghiz SSR</b>								
Entire Population	856,148	145,950	148,185	178,093	130,577	93,865	159,478	4.7
Urban Population	369,620	87,388	83,698	90,976	50,345	26,684	30,529	3.9
Rural Population	486,528	58,562	64,487	87,117	80,232	67,181	128,949	5.2
<b>Tajik SSR</b>								
Entire Population	798,914	89,143	90,717	115,201	103,255	95,043	305,555	6.1
Urban Population	319,684	62,475	58,260	65,945	43,142	28,849	61,013	4.7
Rural Population	479,230	26,668	32,457	49,256	60,113	66,194	244,542	7.0
<b>Armenian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	558,540	70,084	77,827	147,054	115,638	72,316	75,621	4.7
Urban Population	384,140	48,851	55,657	110,954	77,912	45,851	44,915	4.6
Rural Population	174,400	21,233	22,170	36,100	37,726	26,465	30,706	4.9
<b>Turkmen SSR</b>								
Entire Population	597,668	70,578	77,946	97,845	84,460	75,328	191,511	5.6
Urban Population	309,929	54,607	55,917	64,902	44,187	31,825	58,491	4.7
Rural Population	287,739	15,971	22,029	32,943	40,273	43,503	133,020	6.5
<b>Estonian SSR</b>								
Entire Population	426,843	162,794	117,973	101,191	31,525	9,024	4,336	3.1
Urban Population	311,171	116,332	90,405	75,133	20,898	5,869	2,534	3.1
Rural Population	115,672	46,462	27,568	26,058	10,627	3,155	1,802	3.2

\*For the census, a family is understood to be the total number of individuals living together who are associated by blood or property and common budget.

For 1979-1988, throughout the country as a whole, the number of families increased by 6.8 million (by 10 percent) and the average family size did not change. At the same time, certain shifts occurred in family structure according to the number of members. As a result of the change in the marriage rate and the birth rate, the ratio of four person families increased and the fraction of families consisting of three people decreased. Furthermore, we noted an increase in the number of two person families and the fraction of large families consisting of five or more people remained at the 1979 level.

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**Estonian Census Figures Reported**

90UN2425A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian  
5 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by Juta Bergvald: "About Results of the 1989 Union-wide Census in the Estonian SSR"]

[Text] The first materials about results of the 1989 census have arrived from the USSR Committee of Statistics. Data are now available about population size, age composition,

marital status, educational level, sources of livelihood, ethnic composition, as well as the number and sizes of families living in the Estonian SSSR. What follows below is a short summary of the materials mentioned.

The population total of the Estonian SSR, as of January 12, 1989, was 1,572,900 people. Compared to the same day in 1979, the total had increased by 107,100 people or 7.3 per cent.

The dynamics of population figures, based on census data obtained during the post-war years, have been as follows:

	Population Total (in thousands)				Average Annual Growth Rate (per cent)		
	1959	1970	1979	1989	1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988
Total in Estonia	1,196.8	1,356.1	1,465.8	1,572.9	1.150.86	0.70	
Urban Pop.	675.5	881.2	1,022.3	1,126.0	2.45	1.660.96	
Rural Pop.	521.3	474.9	443.5	446.9	0.85	0.76	0.07

The data show that, over the last 30 years, the population total for Estonia grew by 376,100 people, with 45 per cent or 169,200 of that number attributable to natural population growth.

During the years between 1979 and 1988, the population total of our republic grew by 54,600 people due to immigration, and by 52,500 due to natural population growth.

For the period between the last two census takes, Estonia's population growth due to immigration was indeed the most vigorous one among other Union republics—36.3 per one thousand inhabitants (for Latvia and Lithuania these figures were 36.0 and 28.3 respectively).

The urban population grew by 103,700 people or 10.1 per cent over the last 10 years. The portion of urban dwellers grew from 69.7 per cent in 1979 to 71.6 per cent in 1989. Out of this growth 56,500 was attributed to natural population growth, and 47,200 to immigration.

	Population Total (thousands) at Census Times			
	1959	1970	1979	1989
Total Population	1,196.8	1,356.1	1,465.8	1,572.9
Includes:				
Below Working Age (0-15)	285.4	318.8	335.7	372.0
Working Age (men 16-59 & women 16-54)	688.3	762.0	847.4	883.9
Past working age	223.1	272.9	282.4	317.0

The above data indicate that the portion of children (up to 15-year-olds) has been holding steady within the limit of 23 per cent, that of persons of working age between 56 and 57 per cent, and that of retirees from 19 to 20 per cent. In general, one can say that the growth rate in the number of working age persons will in all likelihood be increasing over the coming decade, while those reaching retirement age will be 17.7 per cent less in number than those reaching working age.

Over the last 10 years, the numbers of children, working age persons, and retirees grew by 10.8 per cent, 4.3 per cent, and 12.3 per cent respectively.

According to the census data for 1989, the average age of inhabitants in Estonia is 35.8 years; 35.6 in cities and townships, and 36.3 in the country.

The size of the rural population had been declining in the early 1980's up until 1983, when a reversal was first noted due to immigration and, from 1986 on, also due to natural population growth. Between the last two census takes, the size of the rural population went up by 3,400 people, 2,000 of which reflect an adjustment in the the boundaries of administrative units, when Ambla, Mustla and Järva-Jaani were switched to the category of rural communities. The rural population grew by 5,400 people due to immigration, and decreased by 4,000 due to natural attrition.

The portion of rural residents in the population total went down from 30.3 to 28.4 per cent.

For urbanization of its population, Estonia now holds second place among other Union republics, after the RSFSR, where the population of urban settlements makes up 74 per cent of the total.

Some of the more significant socio-demographic indicators include the age-and sex structures of the population and the changes occurring in them. Using the census counts taken during the after-war period, the following table was compiled:

Compared to 1979, the portion of males in the population has grown by 0.5 per cent by now. According to census data for 1989, 46.7 per cent of Estonia's population was male. Hence, there are 877 men per each thousand of female persons (860 in 1979), 860 in cities and townships (852 in 1979) and 919 men in the country (879 in 1979).

The ethnic composition spectrum of our population is quite colorful, consisting of representatives of more than 70 nationalities. Based on the 1989 census data, there were 963,300 Estonians in the Estonian SSR, which makes up 61.5 per cent of the population total. Of the major nationality groups: 30.3 per cent or 474,800 are Russians, 3.1 per cent or 48,200 Ukrainians, 1.8 per cent or 27,700 Belorussians, 1.1 per cent or 16,600 Finns, 0.3 per cent or 4,600 Jews. It is also interesting to note that 92 per cent of the Russians, 91.8 per cent of the Belorussians, 87.7 per cent of

the Ukrainians, 98.5 per cent of the Jews, 67.6 per cent of the Finns, and 59.4 per cent of the Estonians live in cities

and townships. A good overview is given by the following table:

	Urban Population		Rural Population	
	Total (thousands)	per cent of Total	Total (thousands)	per cent of Total
Total Population	1,118.8	100	446.9	100
Including:				
Estonians	572.5	51.2	390.8	87.4
Russians	436.7	39.0	38.1	8.5
Ukrainians	42.3	3.8	5.9	1.3
Belorussians	25.4	2.3	2.3	0.5
Finns	11.2	1.0	5.4	1.2
Jews	4.5	0.4	0.1	0.0

Between the last two census takes, nationality groupings such as Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and Tatars grew significantly. While the permanent population of Estonia grew 6.9 per cent during this period, the number of Estonians grew only by 1.6 per cent and that of other-nationals by 16.6 per cent. The portion of the native population diminished due to vigorous immigration from other Union republics, also, the natural population growth is higher for other-nationals than it is for Estonians. Contributing to the latter were also several resolutions passed by the republic's government that were geared to stimulate natural population growth.

This makes Estonia one of the Union republics whose portion of native population has been dwindling. Lagging behind us in this respect are Kazakhstan (native population 39.7 per cent), Latvia (52 per cent) and Kirgizia (52.4).

The census also included the native language question and the mastery of languages of other nationalities within the USSR. The data obtained show that 94 per cent of Estonia's population considers the national language to be their native language. As many as 98.9 per cent of Estonians, and 2.6 per cent of other-nationals

consider Estonian to be their native language. Russian is considered to be their native language by 98.9 per cent of the Russians, and 7 per cent of other-national persons.

As shown by the latest census survey, 33.6 per cent of Estonians have a full command of Russian, while 0.1 per cent master the language of some other people of the USSR. For 1979, these figures were 23.1 per cent and 0.1 respectively. Out of our other-nationals, 13.3 per cent have a full command of Estonian, while 9.6 per cent of them master some other language of the USSR; for the previous census these figures were 11.3 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectively. The number of Estonians speaking fluent Russian grew 47.9 per cent, and the number of other-nationals speaking fluent Estonian grew 37.4 per cent.

A comparison of data on the level of education between the 1979 and 1989 census takes shows that it has risen considerably. When, in 1979, there were 679 persons with complete or partial higher or secondary school education per 1,000 inhabitants age 15 and over, then in 1989 such persons numbered 801. That shows an 18 per cent rise in the level of education. The table that follows gives a good overview of the corresponding structural changes:

Type of Education	Persons 15 and over (thousands)		Per 1,000 persons 15 and over		Growth/per cent
	1979	1989	1979	1989	
Higher, incomplete	92.6	142.3	81	117	45.0
Higher	20.0	22.6	17	19	6.9
Secondary & Vocational, incomp.	376.5	554.1	328	455	38.9
Secondary	291.0	255.6	253	210	-17.1

The gap between the educational levels of the urban and rural populations has narrowed over the past 10 years. When, in 1979, 75.2 per cent of all persons age 15 and over living in cities and townships had either a complete or partial higher or secondary school education, compared to 51.1 per cent in the rural areas, then, according to the 1989 census data, these indicators were 84.6 per cent and 68.2 per cent respectively.

The portion of illiterate persons and those without elementary education among the age 15 and over population went down from 3.8 per cent in 1979 to 1.9 per cent in 1989. Of all the Union republics, Estonia has the lowest illiteracy rate—0.3 per cent. This group consists of under-developed children and invalids with mental handicaps.

As did the census takes from the post-war period, the forms for the last census also asked about the sources of livelihood. The replies showed that 54.3 per cent of the Estonian population makes its living working within the national economy, 25.8 per cent are dependents, 17.1 per cent of the population receive retirement benefits, assistance or complete state support, 2.3 per cent receive scholarships, 0.3 per cent consider working in a personal household to be their source of income, and 0.2 per cent claim other sources of income.

During the period between 1979 and 1989, the number of persons whose main source of income was working in the national economy went up by 52,000 persons, while in the period between 1970 and 1978, the number of such persons went up by 76,000. The reason for this is that, during the 80's, working age was reached by many of the young people born in the 60's, when the birth rate was fairly low, and retirement age was reached by persons born in the 30's. The latter numbered 63,000 for the years 1971 to 1979, and 90,000 for the years 1980 to 1989.

Based on the census data for 1989, 15.1 per cent of the Estonian population had two sources of income. This was largely due to working retirees, and also to persons who, in addition to their primary jobs in the national economy, worked in personal households or received scholarships, support or assistance from relatives.

**Juta Bergvald** Estonian SSR Bureau of Statistics Chief,  
Department of Population Statistics

### **Indifference to High Infant Mortality in Turkmen SSR Criticized**

*90US1222A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 18 Jul 90 p 3*

[Article by G. Olshanskiy, K. Martynov and G. Osadchii, special agent-physicians of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin and chief specialists in the USSR Ministry of Health, under the rubric "Health Protection": "The Diagnosis: Indifference"]

[Text] Sad as it is to say this, infant mortality in Mary has been steadily rising over the past five years. The figure was 48.3 per 1,000 births in 1985, it reached 69.9 in 1989, which is worse than in many rural areas. And this is despite the fact that the main oblast children's and maternity facilities are concentrated in the city. The complement of pediatricians and obstetricians/gynecologists is 80% complete; that of nurses and midwives, 100%. We have a large staff of organizers in the oblast and city health departments.

Apparently, however, the city fathers and leaders of the oblast and city health departments have only a theoretical interest in the lamentable statistics. In any case, when the commission for the protection of motherhood and childhood under the Mary Oblast Ispolkom performed a study in May, it found that these organizations exert practically no influence upon the performance of

the children's and maternity service. B. Batyrov, head of the city health department, made an extremely optimistic, five-minute report on the performance of the pediatricians and obstetricians. But he was unable to answer a single one of the questions subsequently addressed to him. D.O. Gocheva, deputy chief for childhood and maternity services of the oblast health department, uttered not a word during the entire session, as though the discussion did not pertain to her service. Nor did E. Mamedova, deputy chairman of the Mary Gori-polkom, say anything concrete or enlightening.

One has the opinion that it is the main job of many workers in these respectable organizations not to improve the work but to preserve good relations with bosses and fellow workers. Otherwise, how does one explain the formalism with which the deaths of children and mothers are discussed at the city's pediatric and maternity facilities?

The fact that the Mary pediatric polyclinic operates at the level of the worst rural rayons can only be attributed to indifference to the health of children. More than a third of the city's children [who die] in their first year of life, die at home without medical assistance. Furthermore, a "scientific" explanation is given in half of these cases, which relieves the medical workers of any responsibility. Sick children are detected and sent to a hospital late, and hospitalization is refused in many cases.

More than half of the small babies die primarily because of inferior pediatric and neonatal care.

The alarming situation does not appear to concern many people in the city health department, however. Life goes along peacefully in the midst of the paperwork. So perhaps this office is simply not needed, and the city ispolkom should give the matter some thought? Why are the oblast ispolkom, the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Health and agent-physicians concerning themselves with the women and children of Mary, and not those to whom this matter is officially assigned?

Mary Oblast occupies a lamentable first place in the republic with respect to mortality of mothers. These figures stem from poor organization of the children's and maternity service and indifference on the part of those in charge toward the output from their subordinates, which is preventing the situation from being improved. Even during pregnancy women are monitored and examined poorly and unconscientiously. A dentist contrives to pronounce 90% of the pregnant women he examines healthy in order later... not to treat them. And they go into labor with seats of chronic infection.

Do you think that we discovered all of this ourselves? Nothing of the kind. Both the oblast and city health departments are aware of it.

Do all of the medical workers in Mary perform poorly? Of course not! There are dozens of conscientious and honorable workers who achieve fine results: the pediatricians and nurses in the city's 9th and 16th pediatric sections, for example. Their experience is not studied or disseminated, however. Not a single one of the 43 city pediatric sections has become a school of advanced know-how.

The Mary children's and maternity service unquestionably needs help and the consolidation of its position. The city and the oblast have an extreme need for a maternity home and their own women's consultation service, and the laboratory service requires development. The main thing the women and children of Mary need, however, is attention and concern. On the professional level, this should be in the form of timely and skilled monitoring and treatment. It is the direct and urgent job of the city ispolkom and its health department to arrange this.

In response to the sharp criticism at the oblast commission's meeting, the leaders of the city ispolkom and the city health department gave assurances that the situation will be improved in the immediate future. One would like to believe them

The oblast commission for the protection of motherhood and childhood will return to this matter in October and November of this year.

### Drug Addiction Statistics From MVD, Gabiani Study

90US1158A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 24, 24 Jun-1 Jul 90 p 15

[Article by Y. Albats: "Narcotics, Narcomania, Narcobusiness"]

[Text] Under the supervision of Professor Anzor Gabiani, an expert in abnormal behaviour studies, and on the initiative of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the first all-Union study of narcotism has been held.

Five years ago the words, "narcotics," "narcobusiness" and "drug addicts" were used solely to describe the Western way of life. Although by that time Anzor Gabiani's monograph *Narcotism* had long been published for a classified audience, as well as other classified papers, a dozen reports and three sociological studies undertaken by him in Georgia (with little financial support but much enthusiasm, to begin with); despite the fact that by that time Gabiani's flat had been set on fire, a recognized threat made on his life and his laboratory closed, narcomania was not recognized as a feature of life here.

Then the problem was "discovered" and there was surprise at its gravity. Our newspapers published a series of articles on the subject and then forgot about it under the onslaught of other pressing and formerly hushed up issues such as prostitution, inflation, organized crime, budget deficit, the racket, poverty, etc. In the meantime, there was ever increasing misuse of morphine, hashish,

ephedron and cannabis and more and more new addicts were recruited, mostly young people who believe in neither God, Satan, Stalin, nor Gorbachev. They find narcotic hallucinations far more appealing than the reality of everyday life.

How many drug addicts are there in this country? Nobody knows the exact answer. The "approximate" figure is also subject for debate. Today there are 121,000 registered patients. According to V. Pankin, chief of the Central Criminal Investigation Department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, this figure ought to be multiplied by five. On the basis of his 20 years of research, Professor Gabiani suggests that there are actually ten to twelve drug addicts for every registered addict. Consequently, there are 1,200,000 to 1,400,000 drug addicts in this country, according to Gabiani.

Who are they? 51.2 per cent are young people aged 20 to 29. The majority of those questioned by sociologists (63.1 per cent) became addicted before the age of 19. So drug addiction in the USSR is for the most part a problem associated with youth, with all the relevant consequences. I would specially like to point out that 20 to 29 is the time most people tend to have children.

95.9 per cent drug addicts are city dwellers.

75.8 per cent have a secondary school, incomplete or complete higher education.

70.5 per cent of those with jobs and a work record are workers; 0.7 per cent are collective farmers; 8 per cent work in public services and trade; 5.8 per cent are drivers; 3.2 per cent are engineers and technicians; 1.4 per cent are people in artistic professions; slightly less than one percent are doctors; 0.5 per cent are teachers. All in all, people in culture, education, science and public health account for 8.4 per cent of all drug addicts polled. This fact deals a heavy blow to the myth of the elitist, bohemian nature of narcomania in this country.

The distribution of the disease among different sections of the working population is quite interesting. The biggest frequency is found in the food and light industry (21 per cent). Slightly less (20.1 per cent) in the construction industry. Trade, public services, transport and public health follow quite far behind.

There aren't that many social parasites among addicts: 15.4 per cent.

Among students the greatest number of drug addicts are found at colleges (43.7 per cent) and vocational technical schools (26.2 per cent).

What drugs do Soviet addicts use?

Priority belongs to hashish, known in professional quarters as "plan". 53.3 per cent of those polled named plan as their drug. Next comes koknar (a comparatively cheap drug made of poppy straw)—29.4 per cent; opium—28.9 per cent; cheefir (very strong tea)—13.5 per cent; codeine in tablets—13.3 per cent; promedol—13 per

cent; ephedron (a concoction of ephedrin and various additives)—11.3 per cent; morphine—10.8 per cent, etc. Cocaine and heroin, so widespread in the West, are relatively unknown in this country (3.6 per cent and 1.2 per cent respectively), primarily because there are no locally grown raw materials for them. Coca doesn't grow in this country, and the 100 or so kilos purchased by the Ministry of Public Health every year are the only source of illegally obtained cocaine. As for heroin, it is not produced by any pharmaceutical factory in this country, although occasional batches of heroin privately produced in Odessa do appear on the narcotics market.

Where do addicts get narcotics? Chiefly, from middlemen (43.3 per cent), from pharmaceutical employees and other medical institutions (8.7 per cent). Approximately a third of drug addicts pick up poppy seeds and cannabis themselves or make narcotics from various medical preparations. An insignificant number (4.1 per cent) have them made to doctors' prescriptions, while 1.8 per cent simply steal prescriptions.

The question, "Where do they get the money?" is not important. There is always a way to finance the habit. Drug addicts spend a lot, of course. One gram of morphine costs 300 to 500 roubles. A gram of hashish ("plan") costs from 3 to 10 roubles—hence its wide use.

A drug addict therefore spends up to 650 roubles a month (almost 8,000 roubles a year) on drugs. Remembering that a pair of women's boots costs 300 roubles on the black market, and a new Volga car up to 75,000 the addiction is quite affordable.

The question "Where does the money from the business go?" is more interesting. Professor Gabiani has no doubt that the money goes to narcomafia. The fact that such a mafia with a well-organized and ramified structure exists in this country was first stated in Gabiani's monograph *Narcotism* 15 years ago. He reasserts the fact in his recent book, *On the Brink: Narcomania and Narcomaniacs*, produced by Mysl Publishers.

The most conservative estimates put the profits of the Soviet narcomafia at two billion roubles a year. Less conservative sources double that figure.

As compared to the United States or Columbia this is negligible, of course.

### **Mentally Ill Exploited in Occupational Therapy Workshops**

*90US1198B Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jul 90 p 2*

[Article by A. Yefimev: "From the Invalid's Plate—Who Encourages the Pitiless Exploitation of the Mentally Ill in Moscow's Occupational Therapy Centers?"]

[Text] For a long time the best way to avoid an answer has been to keep silent about the main point. I thought about this as I became acquainted with the case of

Doctor Slozhenikin in the People's Court for Oktyabrskiy Rayon. The doctor asked the court to file to recover a document that is very important to him.

"It is not necessary," Judge T. Dolgova cut him off. "It is clear enough that the administration acted illegally."

The court did rule for recovery. However, beyond this narrow aspect of the relationship between Slozhenikin and the administration of the occupational therapy shops where he works, the court did not want to see the problem to which the doctor has devoted 30 years of his life. Having seen an inhuman picture, the court had a chance to take measures to halt this evil. It could have made an interlocutory decision addressed not only to the institution permitting the wrongdoing but also to the procuracy. Probably much would have changed. However, the court did not take advantage of this change. Thus, in my view, it indirectly supported this arbitrary rule.

Why did Anatoliy Ivanovich Slozhenikin seek support from the court? He is a psychiatrist at the occupational therapy shop (LTM) at the Hospital No 8 imeni Solovev, which is better known as a clinic for neuroses. Before answering this question it is necessary to describe these shops to the reader.

In 1932-1933, at the initiative of the well known scientists P. Kashchenko, N. Bazhenova and V. Gilyarovskiy, LTM were set up at hospitals and dispensaries in order to return the mentally ill to a social environment and to restore their ability to work. The idea behind this is contained in the very title—therapy through work. Naturally, not all patients can be rehabilitated in this manner. The work itself, its nature, duration and conditions, should be appropriate to the condition of the patient. However, in all cases the primary emphasis should be upon the medical aspect—treatment.

With time another aspect—commercial—became primary both at the Moscow and at other LTMs. In the 1960's an indicator for production plan fulfillment by patients was introduced. Also, in addition to a 25 per cent markup for danger (the "workers" tend to be rather nervous) to the LTM technical personnel, from the director to the labor instructor, there is also a 40 per cent progressive piece rate at the end of the quarter. As everywhere, this is for work in addition to the plan. This progressive rate also depends upon maximum inclusion of patients and upon savings in the wage fund.

Such a system has led to disabled people with the first group of mental illnesses being turned into slave labor under the complete control of the shop administration. Here is what a professional, A. Slozhenikin, first category doctor and an outstanding health worker, says about it:

For several years in the shops at Hospital No 8 defenseless patients have been robbed and their health ruined, all with the total acquiescence of the management. Any review by the procuracy will easily show this (in essence

I have attained this from the court, which already has the documents on the situation in the shops). The gang of do-nothings and robbers is operating in the open, just as in the "Twelve Chairs" by Ilf and Petrov. Of course, Director M. Tishchenko gives first priority to having appropriate cadre. Thus, V. Savelev became a labor instructor even though he cannot work—he is not trained and his eyesight is poor. His mother, S. Saveleva, is in charge of cadre at the LTM. Nepotism was involved in appointing O. Lvovskiy, husband of the deputy secretary of the party organization, to the same position. One can even find mentally ill people among the workers hired in such a manner. There is no need to be surprised that a former saleswoman was head of the operation, and that money was spent for workers who did nothing; they had moved to another town.

Such is the majority of "specialists in work." It is laughable to talk about their participation in the labor process. Doctors' recommendations and requirements (for example a given patient should have a certain type of work, depending upon his present condition) are simply ignored. In the daily records there are 130 cases in which doctors' orders have been revoked!

Now something about finances. There are many crimes committed in this area: the illegal payment of money to shop associates, to some of the medical personnel and the theft of monetary rewards for the labors of dozens of hospital patients, beginning back in 1986. A suburban hospital in Kudinov was classified as being under supervisory assistance. Associates from the LTM go there and, without any doctor's orders, distributed raw materials to mentally ill people and ordered them to work. The finished products—boxes, shirts, sheets and small electric motors are sold and counted towards plan fulfillment. The patients do not get a single kopeck. Is it possible for the director and the shop foremen to deal with the patients as if they were dumb animals? Alas, it is possible—at the administration's order the patients silently and selflessly fulfill the LTM plan on their days off, on "black" Saturdays or evenings and work overtime.

However, this is in fact only small potatoes. The sale of products made by the patients brings in huge sums. Where does this money go? It is impossible to learn.

Here we can help Doctor Slozhenikin. The ZHURNAL NEVROLOGII I PSIKHIATRII reported in 1986 that the earnings from engaging 100 mentally ill in the work therapy process averaged 200,000 rubles annually; if these patients are not staying in a hospital this figure is 400,000 rubles. Every patient earns the LTM from 2,000 to 4,000 rubles' profit a year. By law all of this money should go to improving the services to patients, without any state deductions. With such an income the LTM should long ago have become a millionaire—building saunas, installing air conditioners, rugs, luxurious furniture; serving excellent food and providing individual

treatment. There are such things, but they are next door, in the neurosis clinic, and not for those whose "therapeutic" labors built them.

"In the LTM I see harsh, amoral exploitation of the patients; I see their sad situation," A. Slozhenikin says bitterly. "Recreation and procedural rooms have been eliminated. The patients have no bathrobes, soap, refrigerators or mirrors. Initially, so as not to mar the landscape or to disturb the prominent patients at the neurosis clinic, they were forbidden to walk around on the grounds, which are actually sanatoria for select patients. Later they were crammed into damp basements in three different areas."

Everything that Slozhenikin said was carefully verified by the court. His accuracy was affirmed by the RSFSR Ministry of Health. Nevertheless, the crimes continue against the persons and the rights of people whose illness demands that they be treated with special concern and mercy.

In 1987, at the decision of the Main Administration for Health Care in Moscow, medical personnel at the LTM were transferred to the clinic—it was said that medical personnel should be together. It thus became possible for the administration of the shops to completely ignore the demands of doctors. The senselessness and professional stupidity of this decision are obvious. It has been shown to be so by many abuses at the LTM that negate any meaning of the word "therapy" in its title. There can be no talk about treatment.

Of course, Dolgova's court could not go into every detail of the situation that became evident during the investigation of the recovery. However, a partial determination, based upon materials of the investigation and—when it is filed—on the document that Slozhenikin gave the judge would, I think, be helpful to many. This document, seized by V. Chugunov, the chief doctor at Hospital No 8, precisely pointed out the illegal actions and proposed realistic measures to be taken. Slozhenikin proposed creating a commission for accepting people to LTMs, improvements and simplification in accounts, the monitoring of medical, social and economic results from shop operation. He demanded better working and treatment conditions for the patients and also affordable food and material support for those who are below even the poverty level. Finally, he spoke about the need for systematic exercises with LTM associates. These would cover occupational therapy and working with patients. He also urged the creation of a council for relatives of patients. True, eliminating this would require eliminating the main obstacle, the "Alkhenov" and "Sashkhenov" of our times. Clearly, it is much easier to eliminate the one who stirred up the trouble—Doctor Slozhenikin. This was the path taken by managers of the hospitals and LTMs. But how would this help things?

Moreover, people are talking about a huge scandal concerning the elimination of our psychiatric society from the International Association because of the use of

psychiatry for political purposes. Finally, after 7 years of improvements, we have again entered the association. The managers of our psychiatric services painted this horrible situation in glowing colors! However, doesn't the humiliation of patients permitted and encouraged at occupational therapy shops really put the question of inhumanity and professional incompetence of many psychiatrists on the agenda?

### Slow Progress for Planned Pharmaceutical Joint Ventures

90US1198A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
24 July 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by Yu. Stepanov: "Thirty Firms Sidetracked"]

[Text] Modern pharmaceutical industry enterprises are now as essential as air. Without them the shortage of pharmaceuticals would have increased even more.

Following the instructions of the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Council of Ministers proposed constructing four "turnkey" pharmaceutical factories with the help of foreign firms during 1991-1993.

"This should be enough not only to increase production by almost one-fourth, but also to raise our sector to a qualitatively new level," said Deputy Minister of the Medical Industry R. F. Romanenko. One of these plants, to be built in Gorkiy Oblast, is to produce synthetic pharmaceuticals. These are for cardiovascular, stomach, psychiatric and various children's diseases. So far we have not produced enough such items.

It is intended to build another plant near Novokuznetsk. The production of general purpose antibiotics should begin here.

Another plant, whose site has already been selected in Leningrad Oblast, will completely meet requirements for insulin.

Finally, in Tomsk it is planned to build a plant to manufacture a broad range of vitamins, something very necessary during massive outbreaks of virus caused illnesses.

Each of these ecologically safe plants will produced 200-250 million rubles' worth of products.

About 30 foreign firms, including ones from England, Italy, France, the United States, the FRG, Finland and other countries, have expressed the desire to participate, on a competitive basis, in the construction of these enterprises. From the beginning of design work to the start of production at the new plants should not take more than three years.

In the spring the Ministry of the Medical Industry made a detailed study of the proposals by foreign firms. Previously the USSR Council of Ministers had decided to allocate the resources needed for construction not

later than 15 May. More than two months have passed and the foreign firms are still completely in the dark about the fate of their proposals. They are becoming increasingly disappointed. Is it worth it to deal with us if, even at the highest government level, there is no clear answer concerning the fate of their plans?

### Improved Medical Services Proposed for Chernobyl Zone Workers

90US1151B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
11 Jul 90 Second Edition p 8

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent M. Odinets, dated Kiev, 10 July: "Benefits for Chernobyl Workers"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, jointly with the Ukrainian Trade Union Council, has adopted a resolution calling for measures to achieve further improvement in medical care and social services for persons who took part in disaster recovery and cleanup at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

They will be given an additional medical examination this year. Pursuant to an enactment issued by the national government, the USSR Ministry of Health is setting up a unified government register to contain everybody who worked in the disaster zone. Special expert councils are to establish the causal relationship for sickness and disability involving work in the nuclear power plant zone. Their conclusions will constitute the basis for health and social services agencies and establishments and trade union organizations in determining work fitness and degree of disability of persons who have worked in the zone. Other measures are also prescribed. Persons who took part in disaster recovery and cleanup activities at Chernobyl will be issued credentials confirming their entitlement to these benefits, as well as a chest badge.

### Health Ministry Official on Battle Against Drug Addiction

90US1151A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
8 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with N. Ivanets, director of the USSR Ministry of Health's All-Union Scientific Center for Medical and Biological Problems of Drug Addiction, by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Zaykin: "Is the Medical Profession Ready for an Upsurge of Drug Addiction?"]

[Text] It has not yet reached threatening proportions in this country. While there are millions of addicts in some developed countries, at the present time there are only tens of thousands in this country. But the medical profession is experiencing major difficulties even with this level. But what awaits us tomorrow? Will Soviet medicine not prove to be defenseless in the face of a wave of drug addiction? IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Zaykin discusses this question with N. Ivanets, director of the All-Union Scientific Center for Medical and Biological Problems of Drug Addiction of the USSR Ministry of Health.

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[IZVESTIYA] Nikolay Nikolayevich, are apprehensions exaggerated?

[Ivanets] Unfortunately, they are not. We have solid grounds today for somber predictions. Black-market prices on narcotic drugs have risen recently. For example, a "cup" of coke is presently going for up to 200 rubles. A hit of heroine—0.1 gram—costs approximately the same. According to USSR MVD figures, prices have been rising at a rate of 100-150 percent during the last two to three years. This indicates a very high demand for drugs.

Hundreds of thousands of persons cross our borders each year. These numbers will run into the millions with passage of the Law on Entry Into and Exit From the USSR. Drug trafficking is extremely profitable. Even if a negligible percentage of the total number of persons crossing our borders decides to improve their financial situation by transporting drugs, we shall be faced with serious problems.

[IZVESTIYA] And they can become further aggravated by the disquieting situation regarding drug prevention in the Soviet Union?

[Ivanets] Of course, for the situation is downright pitiful. We do not even have any effective Soviet-made equipment for diagnosing drug addiction. We even lack the elementary preparations with which all police in Western countries are "armed." These are unique "litmus paper strips," with which one can immediately determine the presence of narcotic drugs in the system of a detained individual.

A government enactment was recently passed, dealing with combating the most widespread ailments: atherosclerosis, cancers, diabetes, alcoholism, and drug addiction. For the first time our work is receiving regular financial support, but nevertheless we need more funding than we are getting. I feel that priority should be given to alcoholism and drug addiction: they serve chiefly as a cause of many ailments. Our colleagues in the United States tell us, for example, that 60 percent of occupied hospital beds in the United States represent individuals whose ailments developed due to the action of alcohol or narcotic drugs.

We also lack a system of rehabilitation of those who have undergone treatment. As a result only 20-30 percent of these remain drug-free during the first year following treatment. This figure drops off sharply after the first year. The first year or two following illness are extremely important for recovery. In many countries "halfway houses" are established under the sponsorship of municipalities: several such facilities are built at rural locations, where former drug addicts and alcoholics run these houses on a shared basis, helping one another to return to a normal life. We must adopt all these useful things.

[IZVESTIYA] How many drug addicts are there in this country today? Both officially registered and unrecorded?

[Ivanets] There are 60,000 registered drug addicts and 9,000 "glue-sniffers." The people at the USSR MVD Scientific Research Institute claim that there are approximately half a million addicts in this country. I shall cite some figures for comparison: in the United States, for example, 23 million persons regularly use narcotic drugs. Half of them are addicted.

Apparently we are blessed at present with a unique situation, which we simply must take advantage of. Therefore the time we still have (we have not yet begun to catch up with the developed countries in number of addicts) must be used intelligently. The appropriate ministries and agencies must draw up a unified program of action to prevent drug addiction. This applies chiefly to the USSR Ministry of Health, USSR MVD, and the USSR State Committee for Public Education.

Frankly speaking, as yet there are very few who are fully aware of the acuteness of this problem. Here is a typical example: specialists from our center are constantly at the State Committee for Public Education. We are proposing organization of anti-drug education, using our methods, in the schools and particularly the vocational schools where, according to our figures, from 15 to 50 percent of students are exposed to drug use and "glue sniffing." We get in reply: when we need such methods, we shall purchase them in America.... Well, in the first place, American methods are not suited to us, since they are designed for people with a different psychology, living in a different society. Secondly, we simply cannot drag our feet and wait until the calamity strikes. It will be too late by then. We must take preemptive action.

#### **People's Deputy on Development of Freedom of Conscience Draft Law**

*90UN2252A Moscow SEMYA in Russian  
No 25, 18-24 Jun 90 p 8*

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Sergey Averintsev, by Mikhail Pozdnyayev: "The Law and Freedom of Conscience: Article Six All Over Again?"; date and place not given]

[Text] *On 5 June IZVESTIYA published for examination the USSR Draft Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations—a law guaranteeing the right to be oneself..*

*SEMYA Commentator Mikhail Pozdnyayev appealed to USSR People's Deputy Sergey Sergeyevich Averintsev and asked him to describe how the work on the draft law went, and to point out the provisions to which the public, which has waited so long for this Law, should pay special attention.*

[Averintsev] Considering your newspaper's special concern for children, I must tell you that Article Six was the

cause of the most vehement conflicts during discussion of the Draft. We spoke of it in detail at the sessions of our commission; next, your obedient servant and Deputy Zaslavskiy, who supports me, spoke of it in the Soviet of the Union; then, Deputy Engler, who also shares our alarm, took the floor in the Soviet of Nationalities.

Here is the question. At the insistence of certain members of the commission, without consensus, the following provision was introduced to the Draft as a variant, and not as the basic text:

“The teaching of religious dogma in academic institutions in which general educational subjects are taught is not permitted.”

First of all, how could the reader judge? The basic text of Article Six already speaks of the secular nature of the state educational system. Thereby it does not decide in advance the question of what kind of schools with general-educational subjects, generally speaking, our rapidly-changing life might give birth to...

[Pozdnyayev] Even now lyceums and gymnasiums are operating; and it persistently speaks of poorly-equipped schools, of “cooperative” schools, and so on and so forth...

[Averintsev] That’s right. Thus, legislative caution seems to be in order here, from any point of view. The “variant” that was entered into the text of the Draft arouses conflict situations—not the kind that might occur in the distant future, when a great many schools of various types appear—but right now in our present reality.

[Pozdnyayev] On the whole we have not been astonished by the newspaper and TV reports about the priests who come to class to teach our extremely disrespectful adolescents—not theology, but the moral law, and—about how these energetic Fathers were shown the door.

[Averintsev] And that does not exhaust the possible consequences—of which I will speak later on... But first, I want to talk about the amendment which I proposed (with the support of two deputies) to the “variant” cited above.

I proposed adding just two words in all, which would make this variant not only acceptable, but, I think, precise and desirable as well. The first additional word—“MANDATORY teaching of religious dogma...” and the second was—“AND ATHEISM...”—and so on, according to the text.

[Pozdnyayev] That’s a significant difference!

[Averintsev] In fact, the word “mandatory” would establish a procedure under which pupils would not be forced to study one system or another, that would prejudice to one side or another, his attitude toward belief or toward unbelief. Coercion is excluded! And what is more, coercion in both directions...

Apart from such instances which one could name, I am afraid that the concept of “teaching religious dogma” in and of itself could, if one desired, be interpreted even more broadly. We won’t talk about a priest coming to class, but after all a teacher is hardly teaching a lesson on the Law of God when he speaks of some episode in our history or about the works of some of our great writers... Or a conversation might simply spring up between the teacher and the pupils in the corridor, let’s say, or on the street, on some kind of excursion; Alas, such conversations do not often occur these days, and this testifies to the decline in spiritual contact between teachers and school-children... But look, in a lively conversation the pupils might ask the teacher: “Tell us please, just what do you personally think about all this?” And the teacher, if he is a believer, or even if he’s an atheist, it’s all the same, is obliged as an honest person and as a teacher to give a direct answer to a direct question. A situation in which he speaks of his unbelief, or of his belief, in answer to a request from his pupils, speaking directly, frankly, honestly and freely—this is a desirable situation! An undesirable situation would be one in which the teacher would somehow, taking advantage of his official position and his power over the pupils would persecute those who dare to argue with him; or, on the other hand, to inspire the disproportional success of those who demonstrate their complete agreement with him. And the removal of the word “mandatory” could pertain to just such a situation; here it would be appropriate to use the word “compulsory” as well. Today it is important for us to preclude any coercion to like-mindedness, any compulsion to hold back from dialogue, or to fear of any kind of conversation about one’s world-view. If we live to see such a Law passed—it would be desirable to express with complete clarity the provision on equality before the Law and before the secular State (an atheist State, moreover) not only of people, but of their world-views themselves.

[Pozdnyayev] Sergey Sergeevich, what do you think—is there no way out of this tough situation with Article Six in terms of the fact that the new Law proclaims the right of religious organizations, who now receive the status of a juridical person, to establish academic institutions; for it states in that same Article Six, that citizens may teach dogma and receive religious education by private means?

[Averintsev] I would direct your attention the fact that at this place in Article Six it states: “by private means,”—“including at home or at a religious organization.” This formulation—“including”—presupposes that some other possibilities exist. Possibilities which the Law is in no hurry to name, but which it does not exclude...

What would I like to say on this regard? In the future this, one must suppose, is altogether possible. At present—hardly. Simply because, our churches at present do not have the capability to take upon themselves the wardship for hundreds and thousands of

secondary schools set up at churches or religious associations. It is another matter that if the initiative would proceed from the laymen themselves, if the creation of parish schools is one of the forms of the charity that is so welcome today. But this is more likely from the sphere of fantasy...

[Pozdnyayev] One more question. The state has "separated the church from itself." But the state is not the people. It is not the people, it is not man that adapts to the state, but just the other way around (in the ideal, of course, and not in the practical experience we know)...And there are laws not regulated by the state, but which are "pivotal," fundamental for the church. Man is born, gets married, produces offspring, and dies... It is no accident that the principal episodes in the life of the church are connected with the stages in our lives—the sacred mysteries. Today the situation is practically excluded, of which Solzhenitsyn wrote 20 years ago in his well-known epistle to Patriarch Pimen, and we no longer need to present our passport when bringing our children to be baptized. But when registering a marriage or when holding a burial service for the deceased, it is mandatory to present a certificate or a document issued by the state, from which...the Church is separated. And ever for a baptism, from time to time, a birth certificate is required. That's absurd! The church does not conduct the sacraments without "ksivy" [translation unknown], or formally conduct the sacraments of baptism, marriage and burial rites as if without the proper document from the state they would be invalid.

[Averintsev] That's a complicated question. I'm not sure that it is possible to pose this question in isolation today, although twenty years ago it had to be posed in just that way, and it remains a timely one to this day. But, I repeat, that in actuality this is a much broader question. It is a question of the self-perception of a believing person in our society. And—simply as a person. If everything were normal with us, then believers would not be second-class people to the state—the legal registration and legal self-definition of a person according to the principle of denomination would be natural. But... You see, this little "procedural" question is directly associated with another: on the role of the laymen in the Church. The Church, and any religion, is subordinate on this basis to the church leaders. This is true; but the Church is not the hierarchy, and it is not the clergy. The Church is—God's People in their entirety. During all the decades of struggle with the believers and with the Church, the myth became implanted that the Church is—exclusively the clergy and even so, it is restricted to the Holy Synod, which lives, as it were, in a special reservation. Right now this question is being posed very sharply—and threatens the possibility of a schism. And here a great deal will depend on the Church—on whether, having finally received the status of a juridical person, it recognizes its own children. There are certain intonations, which when explaining relationships in the Church are inappropriate—as in a conversation with one's mother. On the other hand,

Mother Church can answer its children as sternly it likes, but it cannot fail to hear its children—that is completely unmotherly. Thus, the schismatic attitude of some of the laymen is directly associated with establishing that the Church supposedly has no such problems. But they do exist, and the new Law will help remove many of them: however, they must be removed by the Church, and by God's People in their entirety...

It is most important that after the examination and adoption of this new Law, there be as little opportunity as possible for future reinterpretation and distortion. In a certain sense it is not necessary to demand too much—that is, it is not necessary to invite the secular [svetskiy] (or Soviet [sovetskiy] if you wish) authorities to take upon themselves the regulation of spiritual and religious life. Especially when this power—is a power that for the time being remains an atheist power; thus, such an invitation is absurd and unnatural. And, well, in addition there are things in spiritual life that are so subtle that they cannot be regulated by police measures, for they pertain to matters of our conscience. We are prone at times to act against our conscience—well, what of it; I beg your pardon, that's the risk in the world, as God made it. God might have made us in such a way to deprive us of our freedom, and we would not have sinned—but then we would not be free spiritual beings.

I beg your pardon for the fact that I suddenly assumed such a high tone, but it seems that we expect Utopia from this Law, that it will solve all problems right away.

I expect that the discussion of the Draft will be lively—and both the articles in the press and letters addressed to our commission will have their role to play in its adoption. You can write to us at the following address: Moscow, Kalinin Prospect, House 4; the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislative Committee, the Commission on the Law on Freedom of Conscience... Actually our commission is called [The Commission] "On Completing Work on the Draft Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations"; but we would like to continue our work after adoption of the Law as well, in order to monitor its execution; and therefore, I think that there is no sin in such an arbitrary abbreviation of the address on the envelope...

#### **Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth Profiled**

*90UN2343A Moscow SOBESDNIK in Russian  
No 25, Jun 90 p 4*

[Interview with Oleg Vitovich, organizational-ideological consultant, Lvov branch, Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, by Sergey Kholoshevskiy and Sergey Gaponov, cadets at the Lvov Higher Military Political School; published under the rubric, "Youth Movement: Parade of Planets": "What Road They Have Chosen"]

[Text] *Oleg Vitovich, born 1967, Ukrainian. In 1987 dismissed from the Lvov Polytechnic Institute for "ideological unsuitability," subsequently studied for two years*

*at the Ternopol branch of the Leningrad Pedagogic Institute. Dismissed. Worked at a telegraph equipment plant. Currently "temporarily unemployed." Served as a delegate to the constituent congress of Rukh in Kiev. Deputy to the Lvov Oblast Soviet. Organizational-ideological consultant, Lvov organization of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM).*

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[SOBESEDNIK] SNUM unites more than 1,000 members, 300 of whom are residents of Lvov. This young organization, which is less than a year old, has already become renowned not only within the republic but beyond its borders as well....

[Vitovich] The idea of establishing the union was born at the beginning of the summer of 1989 in Kharkov. An initiative group formed, an organizational status was formulated, and a draft program was roughed out. On 19 August, in the Carpathians, at the foot of Mount Makivka, we took an oath of fidelity to the idea of struggle for independence of the Ukraine, and the Lvov SNUM organization was formed on 19 August. Several days later branches of the union were formed in Kiev and Chernovtsy; at present we have branches in Ternopol, Rovno, Lutsk, and other cities in the Ukraine.

SNUM sets for itself the purpose of encouraging young men and women to engage in political activity and of educating them in a spirit of struggle for national interests; each member of the union should become a model of patriotism, honesty and integrity for all persons around him; we preach a healthy way of life.

[SOBESEDNIK] Some people consider your union to be a subdivision of the Ukrainian Helsinki Alliance....

[Vitovich] They are in error. Although it is true that SNUM was established on the initiative of members of the UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Alliance]. But now we have become more independent, both financially and ideologically.

As for our principles, SNUM is for total political independence of the Ukraine. Other positions follow from this: establishment of the Ukrainian language as the sole official language, establishment of national symbols, and a national anthem. One important principle is adherence to a multiparty system. We want to democratize our schools and higher educational institutions. We advocate preservation and development of the specific characteristics and customs of the ethnic minorities living in the Ukraine.

[SOBESEDNIK] Many youth organizations are oriented in their activities toward some political party and its ideological platform....

[Vitovich] We have no specific "beacon." Some members of SNUM are at the same time members of UKhS, and some are members of Rukh.... However! Neither members of All-Union Komsomol nor members of the CPSU can join our union. There is a reason for this: we

denounce class struggle, and we advocate an idealist philosophy with features of romanticism. We inject the cult of heroism into our ideology. It is true that this was attempted in the past, by Komsomol, but I feel that they were following other examples.

[SOBESEDNIK] How do you envisage the economy of the future Ukraine?

[Vitovich] It should be grounded on a combination of various forms of property ownership, of course including private ownership, and the existence of hired labor. Of course cooperative ownership is also a necessary form. While energy resources, the primary extractive industries, and transportation should belong to the state. We are interested in the Swedish experience, but every state develops in its own way, and the Ukraine also must find its own road.

[SOBESEDNIK] You advocate establishing a Ukrainian National Army. How do you envisage this?

[Vitovich] Technically we could have a National Army right now. In 1946 Stalin issued an edict calling for establishment of republic ministries of defense on the territory of the Ukraine and Belorussia as sovereign states and members of the United Nations Organization. This edict has never been revoked; it was simply forgotten. For this reason a Ukrainian army and a Belorussian army can officially exist in the USSR in addition to the Soviet Armed Forces. This would not be contrary to the law.

But one must look at things in a sober manner. It is not possible to establish army national units right now, today, and therefore SNUM puts forth a realistic proposal: that Ukrainian youth should do their military service within the republic.

Incidentally, we did not organize the first mass political rally in support of forming a Ukrainian National Army. It arose spontaneously. It was held by the mothers, sisters, and wives of those who had been in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

Interethnic and interrepublic conflicts should be resolved by the United Nations, for all the republics are sovereign, as stated in the USSR Constitution. If troops are needed, once again one should turn for assistance to the United Nations, armed units of which are intended precisely for performing missions of this kind.

[SOBESEDNIK] Oleg, who can join SNUM?

[Vitovich] Even you, if you are not members of Komsomol.... Essentially acceptance to membership is based on a written application, after submitting which the candidate for membership is given a probationary period of from one to three months. After this period a person automatically becomes a member of the union. SNUM has both full members and "sympathizers"—those who take part in all the organization's activities but who, as a rule, are unable for a number of reasons to be a full member. After all, even today membership in SNUM

threatens some young people with unpleasant consequences. "Sympathizers" even include police school cadets.

I personally feel that membership requirements should be made more stringent, that in the desire to sign up as many new members as possible we should not ignore their "quality." For this reason there will soon be introduced a mandatory interview with an ideological evaluation.

There are several consultants in the union: for propaganda, sports, youth, and cultural-educational work. Each works in his own narrow area, which makes it possible to carry out all measures and actions at an appropriate level. The general meeting is the supreme body of the Lvov SNUM.

[SOBESEDNIK] With whom do you work in cooperation?

[Vitovich] We have close contacts with the Student Brotherhood, and we are seeking common points of contact with the Society of the Lion. Outside the republic we have contacts with Young Lithuania and with the Estonian Geneva-49. We are trying to establish contact with the Christian Democratic Youth Union in Georgia and with the Polish Pomost Cultural-Political Organization.

We also have "our own" deputies: Igor Derkach, deputy to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (it is true that he is actually a deputy from the UKhS, but he is also one of our leaders); SNUM member Andrey Sokolov is a deputy to the Lvov City Soviet; we also have several rayon soviet deputies.

[SOBESEDNIK] How do you envisage the future for Ukrainian youth?

[Vitovich] It is a future of people who passionately love their homeland, an independent and sovereign Ukraine.

[SOBESEDNIK] But are you sure that you are proceeding along the right path?

[Vitovich] Of course. Otherwise we would not have chosen this road.

### Trade Union Official Defends Expenditures on Culture

90UN2418A Moscow TRUD in Russian  
20 Jul 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Viktor M. Mishin, AUCCTU secretary, by N. Vladimirov, TRUD correspondent: "Culture Must Be Defended"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Viktor Maksimovich, lately there has been more and more talk to the effect that the trade unions need to be delivered from the functions that are not characteristic of them. Many trade union leaders assert that the chief task of the trade unions is the social protection of the workers, and that expenditures in the

sphere of culture, sports and tourism should be reduced, since they undermine the trade union budget. What is your opinion?

[Mishin] I begin with the fact that in the sphere of culture a catastrophic situation has developed. There was an eloquent statement about this recently in a message from leading figures in Soviet culture and art to the delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress. It contains the following words: "Concern for culture is concern for the soul of man and for human destiny." But about what else, if not about the worthy fate of the honest toiler—and, indeed, this concept includes all aspects of human life—should the trade union be concerned? To close down, eliminate, reduce, and destroy—you see, this is the simplest thing of all. . . . As far as the expenditures for cultural needs are concerned, this would be completely incorrect.

In recent years, the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] has taken a number of decisions that have consistently expanded the independence of the trade union committees in the expenditure of their funds, in the organization of cultural leisure and in setting the salaries of officials in the cultural institutions. In so doing, naturally, there was a reduction in the receipt of money in the centralized funds, and thus the possibilities of the AUCCTU to extend assistance to the regions in the financing of the construction of new and the reconstruction of old cultural and sports facilities narrowed.

In these conditions, in many places there was a sharp reduction in the trade union appropriations for work in the mass dissemination of culture: For example, in Tyumen Oblast—to half. What does this mean? That, let us say, in the palaces of culture and clubs near you, children's circles and studios have unexpectedly started to require payment, and some of them have altogether found themselves "in the street", as this happened with the club of young technicians of the Palace of Culture in Donetsk imeni Franko, that is with 300 boys and girls.

[Correspondent] But why is it the trade unions that must "maintain" the palaces of culture? Is this not the business of the appropriate ministry and the local organs of power?

[Mishin] The question, of course, is legitimate. But can the Ministry of Culture do much today if only 1.2 percent of the state budget is allocated for the development of culture? If the minister, N. Gubenko, is forced to call on the leading figures of culture and art for a symbolic strike in order, if you like, to somehow draw the attention of society to the process of cultural degradation? For the time being, the ministry is not in the position even to create if only the minimal conditions for normal activity of theaters and museums, concert halls, and libraries, many of which are genuinely national property. But now imagine that one day we "will hang" the 24,000 club institutions of the trade unions on it! Indeed, they will simply remain without means of subsistence. But, you see, in many small towns, not to

mention settlements, the trade union club is the only cultural center! What is more, the culture of society is all the same not only the Bolshoi Theater and the Tretyakov Gallery. . . .

As far as the Soviets of People's Deputies are concerned, their role in the formation of the cultural character of the town and regions for the time being is not so large as one would want. In essence, we do not even have such a concept as municipal cultural policy. However, until the time when the Soviets do not become the sole masters in their territory, until a system for the formation and expenditure of the local budget is not developed, it would not be legitimate to talk about their responsibility for the state of affairs in the sphere of culture. It goes without saying, the trade unions must take an active part in the strengthening of self-government in the provinces and promote it, but to give back from balance to balance its material values and its property should be done with a great deal of caution: First of all, compensation is necessary, secondly, it must fall into reliable hands in order for the interests of the workers not to suffer. This work can be reasonably conducted on the basis of long-term agreements with ispolkoms and with the administration of enterprises about the proportional financing of the activity of cultural and sports institutions. Otherwise, the picture will develop as in Pskov Oblast, where last year about 50,000 adults and children were deprived of the possibility of engaging in amateur creative work.

Various trade union organs cannot always come to an agreement with one another. For example, the Komi Oblast Trade Union Council henceforth does not decide either organizational or financial problems of the trade union institutions of culture—it shifts the responsibility to the industrial committees. But they declare that they have no intention of taking up these problems.

And the squandering of trade union libraries? It has now become truly avalanche-like. The reduction in financing is causing an outflow of cadres. In only a year, in Amur Oblast, 76 library workers left, in Leningrad—136, in the Ukraine 431. In many oblasts the base libraries have been closed, and already the library collection is being sold off. The centers of methodical activity of libraries proved to be useless to the councils and committees of the trade unions, with their fate being solved without regard to the opinion of specialists and readers.

[Correspondent] That is, one can speak of the costs of intra-trade union democratization?

[Mishin] To some degree, yes. It seems to me, people often forget that democratization is not the final goal. It is only the condition for the realization of positive changes, for the better organization of concrete activity in the interest of man, it is a method for awakening initiative, the desire to think and, what is the main thing, to act independently. But some people understand democracy only as the possibility to escape responsibility

before the "ruling circles", forgetting that no one will repeal responsibility before the "lower strata" for inactivity or bungling.

Many trade union committees are dreaming of "getting rid of" the concern for pioneer camps and for summer holidays of children in general and turning it over to someone else. One can understand them: This undertaking is extremely troublesome. Of course, the economic guarantee of the pioneer camps is carried out by the enterprises and institutions, but the selection of personnel and the entire bustling camp life together with responsibility for the health of the children is, as they say, the headache of the trade union committees. What is more, without funds being allotted from the trade union budget, the summer holiday for children is impossible.

I think that the workers, the same ordinary trade union members whose interests are so defended and looked after by some orators, are ready to forgive us many flaws in work, but they really and truly will not understand if the trade union committees are withdrawn from care for children's holidays. Well, really, is the health of children from the zone stricken by Chernobyl really not a trade union affair? This year we have significantly increased the number of travel authorizations for camps and health resorts allocated to them: 200,000 for Belorussian children, 130,000—to children from the Ukraine, 15,000—for young inhabitants of Bryansk Oblast.

[Correspondent] Readers write to us that the trade union committees and the trade union councils are increasingly "shifting" their sports work with the workers.

[Mishin] Alas, many "innovations" in mass work in athletics reduce themselves to the fact that the oblast and republic trade union councils, so to speak, "with a view to the coordination of efforts" strive to transfer their entire sports establishment to the state organs—together with the responsibility for the breakdown of work. Well, and those would not mind, not having raised a finger, receiving additional sports complexes and installations, but—for commercial purposes.

We have talked a great deal about the vices of monopolism, which played a pernicious role in all sectors of public life. However, in practice, no matter how paradoxically, we frequently kill those few elements of pluralism and diversity of social structures that still exist in our life. The sports schools for children and young people, in particular, became the victim of such a practice. The reduction of their financing along the line of oblast councils of the VDFSO [All-Union Voluntary Federated Sports Society] in the final analysis has already deprived 74,000 children of the possibility to continue their sports studies. In Krasnoyarsk and Chelyabinsk, at the entrances of enterprises, one could see pickets of the students of the DYuSSH [Sports School for Children and Young People] with the transparencies: "Dads and Moms. Don't Close the Sports Schools!" In Kemerovo, Donetsk and Lvov, meetings were held in defense of workers in athletics. You see, in the RSFSR

alone, about 900 instructors and specialists in teaching methods were dismissed under the pretext of reduction. . . . of administrative and management personnel!

The presidium of the AUCCTU, through its decree No 3-1 of 13 February 1990, recommended to the trade union councils and committees to support the sports schools for children and young people at the expense of funds from the state social insurance budget, in order not to allow a breakdown of the health improvement work with the children. But it is clear that this measure is a temporary one, that it is necessary to find a cardinal way out of the situation. One cannot sacrifice culture, children, and the health of the people to khozraschet egoism.

[Correspondent] How are your relations with the new minister of culture developing?

[Mishin] Not badly. The point is that Nikolay Nikolayevich Gubenko, before he became minister, for a year on public principles was chairman of the Commission for Soviet Trade Union Prizes in the Sphere of Literature and Art. So that we much earlier than the Supreme

Soviet felt the necessity to turn the authority, competence, and public temperament of Nikolay Nikolayevich to the good of culture. After he came into his new post, we succeeded in combining efforts and attaining after all the solution of the question of increasing the wages of workers in the field of culture. Unity is manifested in our views on the necessity of the adoption of a USSR Law on Culture, which would secure the guarantee of accessibility of spiritual values for Soviet people and the participation of state institutions, public organizations, enterprises of the production sphere, and private individuals in the creation of the cultural life of the country. Culture must be saved through the entire world!

But I must say that even earlier we tried to find a common language with the minister of culture and to work out a coordinated policy. Many important joint actions are on our account, for example the Third All-Union Festival of Popular Creativity. I am convinced that in the future, too, we will develop such cooperation.