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ERRATUM: In JPRS-SEA-91-001 of 4 January 1991, the article "Discussion of Renovation in Banking Activities" on page 18 should have appeared under the ECONOMIC section of VIETNAM instead of the SOCIAL section; also the article "Tire Corporation's Capacity, Exports Noted" on page 7 should have appeared under the STATE OF CAMBODIA section instead of LAOS.

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Discontent Among Youth Reported

91SE0115A Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
8 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by James Pringle]

[Text] Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei—Simmering discontent among young people in oil-rich Brunei, and a perceived identity crisis among Bruneians as a whole, has prompted the usually fun-loving Sultan to promote a more strict Muslim way of life in the tiny Southeast Asian state.

Western diplomats call it a kind of "Victorian Islam."

Behind the youthful disaffection, which Western diplomats here say is the most serious problem facing Sultan Sir Hassanal Bolkiah, is a certain chafing over some of the privileges of the immensely wealthy royal family.

Part of the youth problem is caused by affluence, and the fact there is little entertainment for young people in the sultanate, where films and television are heavily censored, diplomats say. And part is prompted by growing unemployment—six percent last year—in a state that otherwise provides citizens with free schooling and medical care.

"Young people here are unsettled," said one foreign diplomat. "The kind of jobs they want are often not there. At the same time, they are fascinated by Western rock music and punk hair-styles, though such manifestations of youth are frowned on."

Young People

A government minister warned recently that, as a group making up 60 percent of the population in Southeast Asian countries, young people "were a force to be reckoned with."

"A country which does not look after its youth properly will suffer the consequences of this neglect," Deputy Foreign Minister Awang Modh Ali said in a speech. "If improperly handled, they could become a time bomb which could explode with catastrophic consequences."

Western envoys here said that, although ostensibly speaking about youth in the region as a whole, the official was almost certainly thinking about this Muslim sultanate, population 245,000, an immensely rich former British protectorate which is now the last of the region's autocratic monarchies.

"It's quite clear there will be problems with youth in the future here," said one envoy. "There are just no outlets for them."

A young man driving a sporty Japanese car and wearing expensive European clothes told a visiting correspondent: "Sometimes I would like to go to a disco, but there are no discos here."

"Of course, when the Sultan wants to go to the disco," he added wryly, "he just gets on one of his planes and flies to London."

Despite the implied criticism, the 44-year-old Sultan, who as both prime minister and defence minister, remains popular here and there is no talk of open revolt or demonstrations. There is just what one diplomat called "an unfocused discontent."

It is this, and a need to provide an "ideology" for his people to live by, as in neighboring Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, that has prompted Sultan Sir Hassanal to promote the influence of Islam, diplomats say.

His concept is embraced in the watchwords 'Malay Muslim Monarchy,' or Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) in Malay. MIB promotes conservative Islamic values and Brunei Malay culture—with the monarchy as the third element. Courses in MIB are de rigueur at the university.

In a speech on October 1, Prophet Mohammed's birthday, the Sultan—who is leader of the faith in Brunei and who has recently adopted a more serious demeanor—claimed that MIB was God's will, adding: "We should not question this."

He said the perfection of character demanded by Islam should be extended "to all spheres of life."

"It's a big campaign," said a diplomat. "The government feels it has to tell its people who they are. They need an identity and an understanding of their place in the world."

There are, after all, no political outlets, political parties having been proscribed in 1988, after Sultan Hassanal toyed briefly with the idea of more democracy. The last remaining party dissolved itself.

Diplomats say that there seems no place in MIB for Brunei's Chinese, who make up 18 percent of the population; only 10 percent at present have citizenship, and many are leaving for a new life overseas. "We sense we are not really wanted here," said one Chinese woman.

"It's difficult to say whether the Sultan got religious or was pushed into this," said one foreign diplomat. "In the past he got into trouble over his flamboyant private life, gambling and other things, and it could be that he is getting more serious about life."

"But it is obviously self-interest for him to say it is all 'God's will'."

Of the nature of new national creed, another envoy noted: "It isn't a threatening kind of Islam—not fundamentalist of anything like that, and certainly not republican. You could say rather that it is a kind of Victorian Islam."

Economically, there is a growing shortage of well-paying jobs in the government sector, which supplies 53 percent of employment. "There's no real unemployment in the

Western sense," said a foreign diplomat. "There are young people who don't work. The job they want is not there."

Diversification

"People here don't want to change the government but they want it to govern better," said one envoy. "They want to see diversification away from oil and gas and more investment in other areas that will provide jobs."

Recently, when one foreign concern advertised a minor office job, there was a flood of applications. "One young man told me he had applied 10 times for jobs in government departments, but had been turned down though he had all the qualifications," noted a foreign executive.

Diplomats say there is more drinking among young people, though the sale of alcohol is banned to Muslims, and some usage of mild narcotics.

Some foreigners fear all alcohol might be banned as it has been already on Royal Brunei Airlines, the national flag-carrier. Local Chinese say they think the importation of pork, anathema to Muslims, might also be discontinued. Envoys discount both points.

The Sultan, claimed by some authorities to be the world's richest man, is keeping a higher and more

responsible profile, with relatively fewer high-living trips abroad. The other day he drove himself downtown on a snap tour of inspection of public works projects.

His picture, together with separate portraits of his two wives, Saleha and Mariam, decorates the walls of most public buildings, hotels, shops and restaurants.

The marriage to his second wife Mariam, a former air stewardess, was criticized at the time by more conservative elements, including the Sultan's more pious brother, Prince Mohamed, because she is a commoner.

But Mariam seems more or less accepted now, diplomats say, and sometimes the Sultan's two wives appear together on state occasions.

Wives of state guests or foreign diplomats call on wife Number One at the 1,788-room Nurul Imam Palace before heading for the somewhat less ostentatious Nurulizza Palace 15 miles away to call on wife Number Two.

The Sultan's two spouses and the minor personality cults surrounding them has led to one perhaps predictable spin-off—an upsurge of other Bruneian men taking second wives.

Said one foreign resident here: "You can't very well oppose for others what you have yourself."

Karens Vow To Attack Concessioned Thai Trawlers

91SE0116B Bangkok THE NATION in English
8 Jan 91 pp A1, A2

[Article by Apisak Danasettakorn, Charoenlak Phetpradab, and Yindee Lertcharoenchokl

[Text] Burma's Karen resistance fighters have given an ultimatum to fishing boats and companies concessioned by Rangoon, threatening them with "all forms of opposition and attack" if they do not abandon their agreements with the Burmese regime.

The move is considered to be aimed directly at Thai trawlers, which form the majority of fishing concerns concessioned over the past two years with the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in Burma.

The Karen threat came last month in a form of two-page statement addressed to the Ranong Fisheries Association, which passed it on to the Agriculture Ministry's Fisheries Department. Upon receiving the Thai-language statement yesterday, the department then dispatched copies to the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry and the National Security Council.

In the statement, dated Dec 10, the Karen National Union (KNU) demanded that all foreign concessionaires nullify their fishery pacts with SLORC, request fishing rights and register their trawlers with the KNU by the end of this month if they did not want to face attack.

All the trawlers were also to pay marine taxes to the KNU's Mergui/Tavoy Division within the agreed time-frame. Trawlers found without Karen permission "will be destroyed or face punishment according to KNU laws," said the leaflet, issued by the KNU's Mergui/Tavoy Division.

Asked to verify the report, KNU spokesman Dr Em Martha told THE NATION that he had not seen the statement but that he had earlier heard of the plan from representatives of the Mergui/Tavoy Division, which is under the administration of Governor Charles Tada. The area is designated militarily as the 4th brigade of the Karen National Liberation Army under the command of Col Oliver.

"We have requested to all these foreign fishing boats that since they are doing business with the SLORC and indirectly supporting the regime, they should also consider our situation and in one way or another provide financial support to the KNU," said Martha, who said he could not confirm if the Karen plan has already been put into practice.

An informed source said it was still unclear who or which group was responsible for the statement and that concerned government agencies were investigating who might be behind it.

The KNU threats have caused great fear and concern among Thai fishermen in Ranong province, a southern coastal town next to Burma's Tenasserim Division.

Lien Mahaphanthip, president of the Ranong Fisheries Association told THE NATION that Ranong fishermen, who own some 300 trawlers, "are all alarmed by the Karen orders, because each trawler and its equipment costs millions of baht."

He said he had informed Fisheries Department Director-General Plodprasob Suraswadi of the Karen threat but has not yet received any response from him.

The Karens, who have a small fleet of their own, have threatened Thai trawlers and demanded protection fees in the past but not in very large amounts, according to Lien.

He said he believed that the new order came because of the formation of a rival Burmese government. "The orders have called for the cancellation of Thai fishing concessions with the Burmese government, and instead make new pacts with [the Karen]," he said.

Despite the Karen threats, Lien said Ranong trawlers are afraid that it would affect the whole fishing industry if they stopped business. "The only way out is to fish outside Karen territory," he added.

The fishery president said protection from Thai authorities would be impossible because the fishing is conducted in Burmese waters. "We only want the Burmese government, which allows us fishing rights in its territory, to provide officers to protect us," he said.

In its seven-point-demand statement, the KNU said foreign trawlers fishing in Burma "should sympathize [with] the Burmese people who are brutally suppressed by the military dictatorship, and... support the Karen people in their struggle to end political unrest in the country."

"All foreign trawlers which have not contacted the KNU but are receiving benefits from agreements with the Burmese dictatorial government, will face all forms of opposition and attack," it said.

A mobile telephone number was listed in the statement through which trawler operators could contact KNU authorities for registration.

About 165 Thai trawlers are currently fishing in Burma under an agreement reached last April setting up the Thai-Myanma Fisheries 1990 Co to facilitate the business. But many boats have been fishing illegally in Burmese waters and have been seized by Burmese authorities.

Coalition Government's Views on Military Government*91SE0116A Bangkok THE NATION in English
6 Jan 91 p A5*

[Article by Ralph Bachoe, Joe Joshi and Yindee Lertch-
aroenchok]

[Text] Dr Sein Win, the prime minister of the newly-formed provisional government of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, expresses his views about the military government in Rangoon, the ethnic minorities, students and the formation of his government.

The prime minister of Burma's provisional government in exile, Dr Sein Win, says his country has for the first time a government that groups together politicians who won a mandate from the people and ethnic groups who are no longer fighting to break away from the Union of Burma.

On December 18 last year in Manerplaw on the Burma-Thai frontier, eight MPs from the National League for Democracy (NLD) elected in the May 27 polls, appointed Sein Win prime minister and declared the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB).

To lure the minorities, the provisional government agreed to form the Democratic Front of Burma which embraces Sein Win's Cabinet and the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), an umbrella group of 21 minority, religious, student and expatriate factions.

The provisional government is supported by the Karens and Kachins who along with the Mons, Arakanese, Shans and other ethnic groups have been fighting for autonomy since Burma gained independence on January 4, 1948.

In a recent interview with THE NATION on the Thai-Burma border, Sein Win said Karen General Bo Mya and Kachin Chairman Brang Seng supported the provisional government and had given up their plan to seek autonomy.

Sein Win said it also is important to note that "the Karens and the Kachins have their army and now they army is our army because they are supporting us... They are no more rebels fighting for secession. They are fighting for the same cause as us. So their army is our army."

'SLORC a Rebel Group'

He said the new government also has a territory "and SLORC [the ruling military-led State Law and Order Restoration Council] is just a rebel group which does not want to recognize the people's wish."

SLORC was formed by the military following bloody nation-wide pro-democracy demonstrations in Burma in

1988. It has refused to hand over power despite the NLD's landslide election victory.

Earlier, Brang Seng said his group the Kachin Independence Organization and its military wing Kachin Independence Army including other ethnic organizations supported Sein Win's government, and that they would cooperate to win international support for the provisional government.

"We support the NLD or legally elected MPs to form a government whether in Rangoon or Mandalay or in other parts of the country within the boundary of Burma... We have expressed our willingness to support them... and we will cooperate with each other to receive international support and recognition," he said.

The KIO, he said, had its own "foreign contacts and friends" and that he had travelled around the world many times and would soon start more overseas trips, "If they [Sein Win's government] need foreign backing, all our friends will support this government." He, however, believed that international backing would come only after the provisional government wins the support of the Burmese people inside the country.

Sein Win said it was too early to say if his government plans to use force to destabilize the military regime in Rangoon. "I cannot say now but I want to emphasize that we have a plan."

Just when Sein Win's government was announced, the NLD's Central Executive Committee in Rangoon expelled the eight MPs in the provisional government.

"The NLD had to expel us or SLORC would just cancel their party... We have some understanding with the people inside Burma," said Sein Win.

The 47-year-old prime minister said he also is a NLD member and his Party for National Democracy (PND) is closely allied with the NLD. The party was intended as a backup in case the military dissolved the NLD.

Sein Win, who easily won a parliamentary seat in the May elections, said he was chosen to be prime minister of the provisional government by NLD members.

Asked if the provisional government's alliance with the minority groups might help or hinder it from gaining acceptance by the people of Burma, because the military has always portrayed the ethnic groups as rebels, insurgents and bandits, Sein Win said: "The military government has portrayed the minorities as such long ago. But I'm very positive that our alliance with the DAB will not have a negative effect on the people of Burma... The people know who are the bandits and who are the real revolutionaries."

Good Relations

He added that the NLD has very good relation with the ethnic groups. "We understand each other very well and

we have sorted out many problems. We think we have unity now—something Burma never had after independence."

Asked what was the attitude of the general public in Burma toward the ethnic groups and the provisional government's alliance with them, Sein Win said the Burmese people are very politically active and understand what is really going on. "Minorities are fighting for their freedom and democracy, like us, so I don't see any negative impact resulting from our alliance with the minority groups."

Meanwhile, Brang Seng added that the Kachin and other ethnic races including the Burman, the majority race in Burma, have now realized that they "must live together and must not be the master of the other. We must have equal rights in both politics and in other fields. Though the central administration will oversee defence, foreign, economic, telecommunications policies, the ethnic must have some autonomous rights in our states and to try our best to promote our union [of Burma]."

The Kachin leader said: "The Burman must not be the master of the smaller ethnic groups and the latter must not be too narrow minded because they can't stay alone and must join with other family members."

He quoted Sein Win as saying that he and other elected MPs "are not coming out from the dark [not knowing what the ethnic people want] and we already know what to do... and that Aung San Suu Kyi [detained top NLD and popular leader] had already mentioned about this."

Sein Win said he had received several feedback from Burma since the formation of the provisional government. "We are listening to their voice."

SLORC has arrested more than 300 monks and many students in Rangoon, he said. "We can only assume they did it as a preventive measure because they are afraid of an uprising or some disturbance."

He said SLORC had suppressed the people and the general atmosphere in Rangoon and other big cities was very quiet. "They are bidding their time may be," added Sein Win.

A diplomat based in Rangoon recently described the move by Sein Win and other NLD members to set up a provisional government as "madness," adding that by resorting to such actions, the military would crack down harder on remaining dissidents and NLD members in Burma.

'A Very Harsh Word'

"The term 'madness' is a very harsh word," said Sein Win, obviously disturbed by the question. "Before we fled to the jungle to set up this government, we gave it much thought."

"And even before we set up the provisional government, the military had already suppressed the people... Many

people were jailed, not only elected members of parliament but also party members... and the party headquarters were searched by the military....

"So it's not because of our action that the SLORC will suppress us or NLD members; they have already suppressed other NLD members.... And because there is suppression, we came out, not the other way."

Some Burma analysts see Sein Win's move to set up a rival government as untimely. They say he has fallen into a trap set up by SLORC... a trap to divide and weaken political parties in Burma, especially the NLD.

But Sein Win says "The NLD already was weakened before we came out. Many CEC [Central Executive Committee] members were arrested. So my action has not weakened the NLD... the NLD already was weakened and that is why we came out."

He says it is difficult to say how many NLD members have been arrested "because SLORC never makes an announcement when they arrest somebody. We have only an estimate.... More than 80 MPs have been arrested, many others are in hiding and maybe between 2,000 and 3,000 other NLD party members are in detention."

Sein Win says his authority is in touch with some NLD members whom he obviously cannot name and adds "some are coming out to join us."

He says his government is well protected in manerplaw from an expected Burmese military onslaught. The Karen stronghold is heavily fortified "and has withstood Burmese military onslaughts for many years.... I hope the Karens will do their job well."

'Clearly the Leader'

Asked where Aung San Suu Kyi will figure in his government, Sein Win said: "She is clearly the leader chosen by the people. The NLD won a landslide victory in the elections because of her.... Even though we didn't mention her in our government, she is chosen by the people to lead Burma."

He added that "we have made it very clear in our declaration of the government that our task is first to topple the military junta and then hold a national convention to group many national leaders... those from the NLD, other elected MPs and representatives of the DAB. Of course Aung San Suu Kyi will also be there. And then this convention will decide the leader of Burma and we will respect the decision. A new constitution also will be drawn."

Win Ko, an MP from Sagaing Division said Aung San Suu Kyi had earlier told the NLD's Central Executive Committee to "do whatever is necessary to carry out the will of the people."

Asked if he or other officials from his government were in touch with foreign government representatives and intelligence agents, Sein Win shrugged the touchy question with a light laugh.

When pressed for an answer, he said "They are sympathetic to us but we don't have any promises of recognition yet."

He said he plans to attend several international forums to promote the cause of freedom in Burma.

Asked how his government is financed, Sein Win said most of the funds were now being provided by the DAB. "But we also hope to attract some funds from our friendly countries and friendly organizations."

Turning to Thailand, Sein Win said he would be happy if the Thai government could mediate in his country's political affairs to drive home the message of democracy and human rights.

He also appealed to the Thai government not to deal harshly with students fleeing across the border, and not to place them in camps.

He appealed to Burmese students to abide by Thai laws and regulations, adding that the provisional government was "very sympathetic to the students and would like to help them."

Thai foreign Minister Dr Arthit Urairat recently met with Burma's Ambassador to Thailand U Nyunt Swe and urged Rangoon to patch up differences with the dissident students.

The offer surprised the envoy, who later told THE NATION that he was ready to "explain the real situation inside the country" to the students but insisted that it was not the form of "talks."

Big Difference

Sein Win says that while Thai officials deal with SLORC... "I say the SLORC, not the Burmese government," their activities should be kept to a minimum. "There is a big difference between SLORC and our government. The SLORC has no mandate because nobody elected them. Our government has the mandate of the people and the mandate of the party."

Asked if he was ready to compromise with the military in a bid to arrive at a peaceful solution to Burma's problems, Sein Win said: "I've not sent any message of

compromise but I want to say very clearly that if SLORC gives up its hold on power and gives the people back their democracy and human rights and let the NLD form a new government.... I mean a real government not one under their influence, then of course we won't oppose them.

"I won't say we will negotiate. I like to emphasize we have some principles and these principles we cannot negotiate... for example democratic rights and human rights.... We also have the principle that... we will call a national assembly of many parties—the DAB also—then write a constitution.... That we cannot compromise."

There also have been reports of a split within the military. The NLD captured many votes in military strongholds during the last elections.

Sein Win's reaction to this was that it's still too early to send feelers to the military. "But we know that the common soldier doesn't want to fight or risk their lives for the cause of SLORC. So we have to take advantage of that.... We want to send a message that we are for peace and not for civil war.... We have to end the civil war."

"And I got the feeling that in the long term there will be a split in the military," added Sein Win.

He said the provisional government will be headquartered in Manerplaw till Rangoon is liberated and added that they have information that many NLD members are preparing to join them.

Several NLD MPs had earlier wanted to set up a provisional government in Mandalay but by the first week of October last year the main temples in the northern city were surrounded by tanks, gun-mounted jeeps and hundreds of soldiers.

On October 18 the MPs cancelled the plan and agreed to set up the provincial government in Manerplaw instead.

Four days later soldiers launched a massive crackdown on Mandalay's monks who were refusing to minister Buddhist rituals to military personnel.

Dozens of NLD MPs were jailed. Maung Ko, an executive committee member was allegedly tortured to death for withholding information on the Mandalay meeting and the monk's activities linked to it.

Sein Win is said to have opposed the plan to declare a provisional government in Mandalay and did not attend the October gathering there.

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

ANS Demobilization Plans, Conditions Described

91SE0137A Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
22 Jan 91 p 6

[Article by Supapohn Kanwerayothin]

[Excerpts] Oddar Meanchey—The political settlement that Khmer leaders are clamoring for on behalf of the Cambodian people exists in a world away from the reality that these villagers wake up facing each day.

Undernourished children without schooling and adults with no other occupation than subsistence farming pass their days worrying about what to eat and what to do instead of the free and fair election that is the ultimate goal of those seeking a peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict.

The Khmer resistance army loyal to Prince Sihanouk claim to have "liberated" a significant portion of this province previously controlled by the Phnom Penh army.

But with external support for the fighting dwindling and weary of the war, the Sihanoukist army [ANS] plans to demobilize half of its troops this year, and turn its meager resources to a more challenging battle—development.

The army boasts an estimated 18,000 soldiers, 10,000 of whom will be discharged this year. Field commanders also received orders from the high command three months ago to slow down recruitment.

The resistance force is thus trying to help the estimated 20,000 people living in the province by building schools, teaching basic sanitation and farming and providing occupational training for women.

Site B Camp administrator Chim Siek Leng in Surin, which houses some 60,000 Sihanoukist Khmers, is shuttling between the camp and a community center in a village in Oddar Meanchey.

In addition to supervising a census, he is trying to teach administrative skills and introduce development projects in the area.

Villagers are most worried about lack of food due to draught and primitive farming technology, lack of work for women and lack of schools.

The list of needs goes on and on, and Mr Leng admitted with a weary smile, "We need at least 15 years to catch up with the rest of the world."

In the absence of outside assistance, the Khmers are making do with whatever is available in the battle against hunger and poverty.

STATE OF CAMBODIA

Local Atmospherics on Thai Tour, Leadership Attends Reception

91SE0138A Bangkok THE NATION in English
18 Jan 91 p c8

[Report by Promporn Pramualratana: "Hands Across the Border"]

[Excerpts] I did not know that Phnom Penh's residents raved about Thai television stars until I witnessed the crowds gathered at the Phnom Penh airport, anxious to catch a glimpse of the stars who were with us on our Bangkok Airways flight to Phnom Penh.

The chartered flight, sponsored by a Thai company (that didn't want to be named) included three Thai performing artists Ekaphand Banluerit, Patra Tivanond and Suphansa Tangjaitrong.

So I was told by Jai Tot, the wife of a high-ranking Cambodian official, that Phnom Penh television aired such popular Thai TV series as "Koo Kam," starring Bird or Thongchai McIntyre, "Sawan Biang" and "Kehart See Dang" starring Sam or Yuranand Pamornmontri.

Somporn Sahawat, Chairman of Wanachai Mai Ad company, promised Jai Tot that he'd bring Thai TV stars to sing for the Phnom Penh residents on their national day. So Jai Tot informed the Cambodian deputy prime minister and subsequently Radio Phnom Penh.

Tickets for the national day concert on Jan 7 sold like hot cakes. The event was to be a joint show between Thai and Cambodian stars. So there we were at the airport without Sam, who Phnom Penh residents call Patavi after his TV role.

However, the Cambodians were quite delighted to see Patra, Ekaphand and Suphansa flashing their superstar smiles. Phnom Penh tourism staff and the wives of high-ranking Cambodian officials including Pi Tuen, the Thai wife of Tia Bahn, Cambodia's minister of defence, were there to welcome us. [passage omitted]

We were registered at Phnom Penh's only five-star Hotel Cambodiana which, newly renovated, looks like it was inspired by Angkor Wat. It's probably the equivalent to Bangkok's riverside hotels, and has the Mekong River flowing past behind it.

The hotel currently has 100 rooms and will soon have another 280 rooms. Rooms cost between \$80 and \$85 per night. A discotheque, night club and gift shop will open in the hotel soon. The hotel's owner is named Hui Klung who has a Thai wife, Wanee, and a son (who has Thai citizenship). Hui Klung frequently travels between Phnom Penh, Bangkok and Hong Kong.

Our group, stars and all, were soon whisked to Phnom Penh's National Stadium to attend the Thai, Laotian,

Vietnamese and Cambodian football matches. We made it in time to watch the Cambodia vs Thailand game. The Thai team seemed to be losing rather badly and, at one point, film star Ekaphand wanted to help them out but there wasn't much time left.

The final score was 5-0 in favour of the Cambodians. When I asked Khun Kambhu, the "everything man" from the Cambodian Prime Minister's Office, who was the master of ceremonies at the games, he said it was Hok Lundy, the governor of Phnom Penh. To make himself clearer, he added, "This is Phnom Penh's Chamlong."

As Polla, the tourism official taking care of us, explained, the Cambodian National Day marks the liberation of the Cambodian people from Pol Pot on Jan 7, 1989. "If you talk to any Cambodian, you will see that each and everyone has been touched by the tragedy and atrocities of Pol Pot. "In one day, Pol Pot wiped out millions," she said. [passage omitted]

I did not expect this kind of atmosphere in Phnom Penh. I'd thought that there would just be a lot of guns. Well, the patrol car for our motorcade (let's call it the filmstar motorcade) carried machine guns. Everytime there was a turn, one guy would stand up and put out an arm and then abruptly sit down again.

The next day we were off to Siemreap on a rickety Soviet 30-seater plane. [passage omitted]

We had a jiffy tour of Angkor Thom and Angkor. Our guide at Angkor Wat, a young man in his 20's, used to run around the ancient compounds as a child. Now he is an established guide. We viewed magnificent Angkor Wat in glaring sunlight exactly at noon. We wanted to go early but the morning was spent waiting for Bangkok Airways representatives to make a call through to Sam in Bangkok. They couldn't get to him. Jai Tot was visibly unhappy.

The deputy prime minister didn't think that she should have promised Sam to the people. We all wanted to send a telephatic message to Sam saying, "Get over here Sam, Cambodia waits for you."

One hour at the magnificent Angkor Wat—one of the seven wonders of the world—felt like one minute. [passage omitted]

Cambodia's most popular singers and comedians also flocked the stage to entertain us all. Ekaphand sang the last song—"Loy Krathong"—during the grand finale when the handful of Thai women present at the show invited the Cambodian officials to dance the ramwong.

The Thai entourage, stars and all, were invited to the home of Jom Prasit, an official of the Prime Minister's Office, whose wife cooked mouth-watering Cambodian food.

The next morning, it was off to the Phnom Penh airport and goodbye Cambodia. Now who did we find seated

forlornly at the airport's waiting lounge? It was Sam—the Thai Star whom all of Phnom Penh was waiting for. [passage omitted]

Sam had been sick and there were some slight complications at the airport. But Phnom Penh was relieved. Radio Phnom Penh blasted the news on the air and that evening the indoor stadium was jam-packed. As Khun Prapai, who stayed on in Phnom Penh later related, the welcome for Thailand's singer/actor was overwhelming.

Hok Lundy, Phnom Penh's "Chamlong," made a formal speech of welcome for Sam at the Government House. The Defence Minister and his wife were there too. Khun Prapai says that even Prime Minister Hun Sen wanted to see Sam in person but he was still recovering from a fainting spell. Sam received thunderous applause from the thousands who flocked to the indoor stadium. His song "Rak Sao Lae Thammachart Kampucha" (I Love Cambodia) thrilled the audience. At the airport, Sam was heard saying, "I'm coming to Cambodia."

Troops Misconduct, Conditions in Southeast

91SE0138B Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
18 Jan 91 p 4

[Text] Sre Ambel, Cambodia (Reuter)—The only gunfire heard on the streets of this port town comes from the rifles of undisciplined soldiers, not the weapons of Khmer Rouge guerrillas.

Fighters of the radical communist faction claimed last month to have captured Sre Ambel, but the town is firmly in the hands of Phnom Penh government soldiers, although who is controlling them is often in question.

As a boat carrying Thai tourists neared a pier recently, a burst of gunfire was put across its bows. Three government soldiers approached and asked the visitors for money.

They got 3,000 riels (six dollars).

The Thai tourists were en route to Phnom Penh to join Victory Day celebrations, which marked the ouster of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese army 12 years ago.

The Khmer Rouge is now the most powerful of three guerrilla groups fighting the Phnom Penh government.

"I was very embarrassed that this thing happened before your eyes," Chew Hui, a government official, said.

Citizens of the town of 50,000 people said undisciplined soldiers extorting money from travellers had become a normal practice.

Threat

In recent months that has been the major threat they face, they said.

"I don't think there will be a major fight in this dry season. We are on the offensive, not the defensive

anymore," said Col Mao Sam Ane, commander of the Phnom Pleal army camp, where 500 soldiers are stationed to protect the district.

"But if they attack us I am very confident that we have enough soldiers to protect the town," the 32-year-old colonel said.

Citizens say many young men in southwestern Cambodia had been conscripted in recent weeks.

"They have been rounding up the young men and sending them to the front line since last month," said a 22-year-old daughter of a forestry official on Koh Kong, an island nearer to the Thai border.

"They capture the young men and put them in the camp," she said. "Those who resist face tough punishment."

"The prison is full. They have been arresting the people until it's full and now there are not enough rooms to detain them."

The Thai visitors are taken by bus from Sre Ambel to Phnom Penh, 120 km along Route 4, a good, asphalt road. They are guarded by 30 heavily armed soldiers, more against the possibility of robbery than guerrilla attack.

"I admit that the travellers are at risk of being robbed by bad people not by the guerrillas," said Seng Seun, one of the officers accompanying the group.

"The bad people are everywhere in the world."

The Phnom Penh government has felled trees and cleared underbrush for 50 metres on each side of the road.

"We do this to prevent the guerrillas hiding and ambushing the cars," Seng Seun said.

For 20 kms out of Sre Ambel no one lives along the road, but closer to the capital roadside villages are growing, with hundreds of new shelters being built.

"People flee from the guerrilla harassment in the jungle to live near the road where they feel safer," the officer said.

Article Reviews Savannakhet Losses in U.S. Bombing

91SE0121H Vientiane PASASON in Lao 11 Jan 91
pp 2, 3

[Report by Phouvattana: "Sepone Past and Present"]

[Excerpts] Sepone District is a district of Savannakhet Province which was liberated early. It was liberated in the early Sixties, and it was one of the districts which suffered heavy destruction from American air attacks among the towns in the liberated areas of the province as well as in liberated areas throughout the country. [passage omitted]

Forests which include a great deal of valuable timber still cover the land in those areas not destroyed by the war. [passage omitted]

The people of past generations in Sepone District created many traditions for later generations, for example, the tradition of perseverance in the struggle against the enemy. [passage omitted] During the period of struggle for liberation against the imperialist invaders, Sepone District became a stronghold for the revolution in liberating the nation. The people of the district gave up thousands of their children to the front lines to do their revolutionary duty. Many hundreds gave their blood and lives for their country then. [passage omitted]

During the struggle for liberation and especially during the period when the American imperialists were escalating the war in Indo-china, the land and people of Sepone District became the targets for the brutal destruction of the American air bandits. The people here, who had lived happily in peace in a liberated area, experienced great hardship. It would be impossible to describe the hunger, pain, and death which they faced day after day. The people of the district left the homes where they had lived happily for so long and went to live in the

forest dozens of kilometers from their old homes. Their old homes, streams, and ponds where they had lived so happily were destroyed and burned by the American air bandits.

During the almost 10 years that American imperialists used aircraft to destroy this liberated area, the land of Sepone was destroyed day and night by bombs dropped by American aircraft of all types including B-52 strategic bombers. Immeasurable blood and tears flowed here because almost everything was destroyed.

Highways No. [9], 28B, and 28A were the important targets of the American air bandits, and people's homes next to these targets were completely destroyed so that there was a great loss of life and property. According to the figures which they managed to keep during this war, almost 200 people officially died throughout Sepone District. In Ban Sanong Village of Keng Lek Tai Canton 30 people died at one time from bombs from B-52's as did 60 people in Ban Phon Beu Village of Keng Lek Tai Canton and 21 people in Ban Mouang Louang Village of Nakai Canton. In some villages whole families were killed at one time as for example in Ban Soppa Village, Ban Vangmahang Village, Ban Vanghai Village, Ban Sopnam Village, Ban Kenghouapa Village, Ban Sepone Neua Village, and many others.

This brutality created a great deal of resentment among the people of Sepone District. So these people contributed to the liberation of the nation with determination until they achieved victory in 1975 along with other patriots throughout the country. [passage omitted]

Now the land of Sepone and the new lives of the people of this district have progressed a great deal, and there have been some prominent accomplishments, in particular the living standard of the people has improved in many areas. Where the houses in villages along Highway No. 9 were heavily destroyed by the American air bandits during the war, new houses and shops are reappearing more and more. [passage omitted]

POLITICAL

MCA Trying to Improve Organizational Work

91SE0127A Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese
24 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Liang Ching-lan: "Splits in Malaysian Chinese Association. Negative Attitudes Among Party Members"]

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 23 Dec—*Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA] Secretary, Datuk Huang Chia-ch'uan does not deny that splits exist within the MCA and that negative attitudes exist among party members.*

Nevertheless, he adds that this is purely a local phenomenon. Overall, the MCA remains an organizationally very intact political party.

He said that the MCA is a microcosm of the Chinese community, and that a certain negative frame of mind can also be found throughout the Chinese community. Consequently, the appearance in the MCA of such a frame of mind can scarcely be avoided.

He made the above disclosures in a special interview with this newspaper.

He said that the present low ebb of the MCA can hardly be avoided. Following the party election and the national election, in particular, the entire party is in need of a restructuring to give party members an orientation to follow and goals to pursue.

When the subject of whether disciplinary actions that the MCA is now taking to deal with certain party members is a "ruthless action," Huang Chia-ch'uan denied that such is the case.

Smooth Operation of the Organization Needed To Maintain Party Discipline

He said that "In order to insure smooth operation, every organization must unavoidably take action when necessary. However, the MCA has already revised its charter, and the leadership has used an extraordinarily democratic process in taking disciplinary actions against offenders."

He hoped that party members as well as the Chinese community would regard the MCA with this healthy frame of mind.

He emphasized that in the future he will use realistic actions as well as a more effective work attitude in making nationwide visits for the purpose of soliciting the views of the grassroots. This will include a requirement to attend all local association meetings to understand the desires and the aspirations of the grassroots to be reported to the chairman of the board of directors.

He said that so far he has visited Trengganu, Penang, Kedah, Perak, and Kelantan to gain an understanding of the problems they face as well as what is wanted from the party.

He said that the party line and the future orientation to be taken was not up to him to decide personally. All he could do was to coordinate the views of the grassroots and the problems that the Chinese community faces, organizationally providing these views and reflecting their desires to party leaders.

He said that in every part of the country, the local organizational secretaries of the MCA are coordinating relevant tasks.

He said that in the general election, the MCA was able to gain only slightly more than 10 percent of the Chinese vote; therefore, the urgent task of the moment is to find out how to increase the Chinese community's confidence in the MCA.

He said that the MCA has established a team headed by Datuk Shih Ch'ing-lin to analyze the reasons for defeat in the general election, and has also mandated He Jen-te to study ways to strengthen organization, improve party member quality, and actively conduct planning and cadre training work.

He said that at the present time the MCA is looking for a permanent training site in the area under direct administration of the Federation government that can serve as a future center for the training of MCA cadres.

He said that the MCA has also set up a team under leadership of deputy association chairman Datuk Lim Ah Lek for active study of an MCA 10-year plan as well as the future orientation of the MCA.

Founding of Team To Study a 10-Year Plan for the MCA

He emphasized that the present electorate is young; therefore, the Malaysian Youth Association, the Women's Organization, the Cadre Training Bureau, the Publicity Bureau, and the Organization Bureau are actively conducting all sorts of activities in order to recruit young party members.

He said that his initial idea is to divide up the whole into parts for the running of activities on a small scale, such as small family-style meetings.

He believes that such family-style meetings would be more intimate, and could also more effectively transmit information to people in small cities and to the party grassroots.

ECONOMIC

Finance Minister Says Gulf War Will Not Hurt Economy*91SE0140A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 20 Jan 91 pp 1, 2*

[Text] Sungai Petani—Finance Minister Datuk Paduka Daim Zainuddin stated that the Gulf War will not hurt the nation's economy, because early actions were taken.

These steps included making sure that the prices of oil and goods cannot be raised arbitrarily.

He said national oil reserves are enough to prevent such a situation.

Speaking to reporters yesterday afternoon after chairing a committee meeting at the Merbok Division of UMNO [United Malays National Organization], he gave assurance that the national economy will not be hurt by the Gulf War.

"When the national budget was drawn up recently, the government saw to it that early steps would be taken to ensure that the country's economy will remain strong," he said.

Commenting on Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's statement yesterday that Bank Bumiputra Malaysia, Ltd., has been sold to the Ministry of Finance, Datuk Paduka Daim said that the action was "right and appropriate."

"The Ministry of Finance 'bought' Bank Bumiputra Malaysia at a cost of more than 1 billion ringgit, because the government has the money," he said.

He said the action would not have been possible earlier when the government was facing an economic recession.

He said the government will sell Bank Bumiputra shares to the public in the next two or three years.

Mentioning the duty-free status of Langkawi, Datuk Paduka Daim said he hopes that goods sold on the island will be at the suitable prices the government desires.

"If prices are high, there is no need for the government to make Langkawi a duty-free island. It would be better to buy things in Kuala Lumpur," he said.

He said the government's objective in doing this is to attract more tourists to the country.

Datuk Paduka Daim reiterated his determination to resign from his minister of finance and UMNO treasurer posts, although a number of community groups have urged him to remain in office.

"I do not need to keep repeating this. Once is enough, for my decision is final," he said.

He said he has also informed Prime Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad of his decision.

"I have submitted my decision to the prime minister. Wait for an answer from him," he said.

He said he also told members of the Merbok UMNO Division committee about his decision.

"They gave their blessing to my desire to resign, despite my lateness in informing them of the matter," he said.

Financial Futures Market Proposed*91SE0126A Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese 13 Dec 90 p 19*

[Article by San K'o: "Another Investment Opportunity"]

[Text] If all goes well and there are no hitches, the country's investors will have another investment opportunity within the coming two years. This investment opportunity is investment in intangible financial futures.

In addition to buying and selling of stocks, one can also trade in commodity futures at the Kuala Lumpur Commodities Exchange as means of investment at the present time. However, because of lack of understanding, insufficient spread of information, and frequent cases involving swindles by con men, commodity futures are not very well accepted by investors in general.

The promotion of futures trading (including both commodity and financial futures) is a process that well developed and advanced financial centers must go through. Kuala Lumpur is no exception.

In order to raise the level of the country's finance industry, the Ministry of Finance, as well as Kuala Lumpur in its position as a major financial center in the region, have spared no pains in overhauling domestic financial activities, including encouraging medium size and small banks, finance companies, and brokerage houses to form mergers or seek markets. They have ruled that foreign-capitalized banks must become indigenous banks within five years; they have improved and stimulated trading in secondary financial markets (such as debentures); and they have permitted the Kuala Lumpur stock market to conduct share subscription trading against documents, all of which are advances toward this objective.

Actually, the promotion of financial futures trading is by no means new. The Kuala Lumpur Commodities Exchange long ago proposed trading in stock index futures and interest rate futures, and in August the central bank asked World Bank experts to explore the possibility of conducting financial futures trading in Malaysia.

What is fairly surprising is that the local authorities failed to use the existing trading facilities (the Kuala Lumpur Commodities Exchange), but rather adopted the recommendations of a financial group in the private sector.

Since this is a complex issue that has a bearing on both public finance and credit, we believe that the parliament must draw up additional regulations to control financial futures trading.

Similarly, since the country lacks experts and knowledge in this field, it must bring it in from abroad for consulting purposes.

In view of the financial group composed of Lenggong, the NEW STRAITS TIMES, La-hsi-hu-shen [2139 2497 5170 3947], and Ch'a-li [2686 4539] Securities Firm, it will be necessary to wait until 1991 for presentation to the authorities of a detailed proposal. Therefore, there is no way of knowing at the present time which futures may be promoted.

No matter the futures promoted, the following three points must be carried out: a complete trading system and a reliable trust process; constant promotion and education of investors to improve their understanding in this regard; and provision of encouragements such as fairly low stamp duties and commissions on trades in order to create a fine investment climate.

The Kuala Lumpur period of authority [ch'i-ch'uan 2601 2938] and financial futures trading should maintain close links with the Kua Lumpur Commodities Exchange for, after all, the latter has accumulated substantial experience in futures trading activities and the problems that have to be dealt with.

Government Economic Report for 1990/1991 Critiqued

91SE0126B Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese
23 Dec 90 p 25

[Editorial by Special Correspondent Chang Can-ch'uan: "1990/1991 Economic Report"]

[Text] The 1990/1991 Economic Report has been published along with next year's fiscal budget. This is a policy document that evaluates 1990's and forecasts 1991's domestic economic development trends, which should be read by those concerned with the country's economic activities.

Analysis of the key points of this economic report shows that with the sudden rise in petroleum prices, a slowing of overall world economic activity has occurred. Forecasts also call for a decline in global economic growth from the 3 percent of 1989 to 2 percent in 1990, and a decline in the growth of western industrialized countries from the 4.4 percent of 1988 and the 3.4 percent of 1989 to 1.5 percent in 1991 even though the world trade growth rate will continue at the 5.3 percent and the 5.4 percent level. During the past three years, Malaysia's economic growth rate has remained at a strong average 8 percent. Sustained by strong domestic demand, it is estimated that the economic growth rate will reach an extraordinary 8 percent level in 1991. This is truly an extremely difficult performance to attain.

As a result of the adverse effects of the Persian Gulf crisis on the world, the global economy will continue unsteady during 1991. In addition to the slowing of economic expansion in the industrial field, currency inflation will also gradually worsen, the inflation rate rising from the 4.4 percent of 1989 to 4.8 percent. The debt crisis of third world non-petroleum producing countries will intensify, seriously hurting great plans for the development of their economies, improving the people's standard of living, and rebuilding national strength.

The appearance just before the close of the decade of the 1980's of a climate in which east-west tensions eased, the tremendous changes in eastern Europe, and the gradual shaping of an economically unified Europe will imbue the economy and trade of the 1990's with vitality, and produce an encouraging outlook. Nevertheless, the Persian Gulf crisis casts an extremely contrasting cloud over this magnificent world economic scene. Once the Persian Gulf crisis turns into a rise in petroleum prices, in order to prevent another round of serious inflation, both industrially developed countries and developing countries will rush to take various corresponding preventive measures, one of which will be an increase in interest rates that will curtail currency flow. Not only will this have a great adverse effect on economic expansion in each country, but it will also cause fluctuations in the world's financial and stock markets. Among western industrial countries, America's economy will be the first to bear the brunt. The pace of its development will slow, or an economic recession may even occur that may cause it to lose its continued leading position in the world economy.

For the ASEAN region as a whole, the average economic growth rate for 1990 was originally estimated at 7.6 percent, but the Gulf crisis has already weakened this growth trend. The real growth rate will depend on how the Gulf crisis evolves further. However, the trend toward rise in interest rates and the possibility that the inflation rate will increase from the average 5.7 percent rate of 1988 to 7.6 percent in 1990 is obviously a direct result of the rise in petroleum prices. The countries hardest hit with inflation are the Philippines, where the rate of inflation is 12 percent; Indonesia at 6.5 percent; Thailand with 6 percent; Malaysia with 3.2 percent; and Brunei and Singapore with 2 percent each.

Analysis of the national treasury economic report shows a slowing of economic growth in prospect for Malaysia, forecast economic performance in numerous sectors being slightly down. In the largest sector, manufacturing industries, for example, the 15.8 percent growth rate of 1990 will fall to 13 percent in 1991. In the agricultural sector, the growth rate for 1989 was 5.8 percent. This year it will decline to 3.7 percent, and forecasts call for a lesser performance in 1991 than in 1990. This results mostly from a decline in output of natural rubber, palm oil, and sawed lumber products, as well as a general decline in the price of unprocessed products. In the construction sector, where the trend has been toward high speed growth, the forecast for 1990 is a growth rate

of 15 percent. This is the highest growth since 1983. As a result of a sharp drop in tin output, the mining industry is on the downgrade, its growth rate declining from 8.5 percent in 1988 to 4.9 percent in 1990 with a forecast growth of only 2.2 percent for 1991. Performance of petroleum has been startling, however, and the outlook for returns is also extremely hopeful. If the price of crude oil is \$22 a barrel in 1991 and suddenly rises to \$40 a barrel as a result of the outbreak of war in the Middle East, Malaysia's returns from exports will shoot up to \$3 billion. On the negative side, with a rise in the price of oil, prices of imports will rise on the same tide. Where there is strong domestic market demand for consumer goods, particularly imported wares, the inflation rate will rise appropriately, thereby offsetting the windfall benefits from petroleum.

We were happy to read in the economic report that government will adopt a more flexible and more realistic monetary policy during 1991 in keeping with events in the rapidly changing international financial system that will improve the country's position in the world's financial markets. Government's monetary policy will also have as a strategic objective support for continued growth of national economic strength, maintenance of price stability, and further improvement of the country's international balance of payments. It is noteworthy that the country's favorable balance of international trade for 1990 will reach 4.439 billion ringgits for a net international reserve of 26.099 ringgits, the value of 4.1 months of exports. However, the balance sheet shows a deficit of 3.33 billion ringgits. This is attributable mainly to a great decline in the surplus from trade in visible commodities, and the fairly huge invisible trade wage bill, which includes transportation, insurance, and tourism payments.

In view of the country's actual present financial situation, economic planning authorities have resorted to various concrete steps to encourage a relaxation of monetary system controls. This has provided increased market guidance, and it has prevented a resurgence of inflation, including the drawing of more funds from statutory reserves, and central bank introduction of an electronic accounts transfer system. It has enhanced securities control, abolished the need for a commercial bank 5 percent main working capital rate, and provided plans enabling factories to enjoy more export finance capital, all of which are important actions.

The treasury economic report systematically analyzes the foreign and domestic situations, and enunciates a series of financial policy actions that government should formulate to deal with this economic situation. Diligent implementation of these policy actions will clearly help the country successfully overcome the economic difficulties that stem from external factors and go on to achieve anticipated economic results.

North-South, East-West Highway Construction Status Given

91SE0126C Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH in Chinese
9 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Lei Tzu-chien: "Once North-South and East-West Highways Are Completed, Country Will Be Able To Maintain a 10-Year High Speed Economic Growth Rate"]

[Text] Kuala Lumpur 9 Dec (Special Report)—Deputy Minister of Works Kuo Mo-chen said today that once construction of the north-south and east-west highways is completed, Malaysia will be able to maintain a high speed economic growth rate for 10 years.

He said that transportation facilities are, without doubt, the main basis for an economic take-off.

He also pointed out that so long as the country is able to maintain economic growth at approximately 8 percent for the next 10 years, the next two Malaysian five-year plans will enable us to occupy a leading position in the local region.

Kuo Mo-chen made this remarks to the newspaper after attending ceremonies on the founding of this newspaper's Chinese Language Computer Club.

He said that once the north-south and the east-west highways are in being, the entire economic and industrial structure of the country will change from the former concentration in a single area to dispersal everywhere.

He noted that the highways will also stimulate the development of suburbs along both sides of the right of way, of which Julai in Sen-mei-lan is a fine example.

Kuo Mo-chen also disclosed that unless political or other non-technical problems occur, he believes that work will be completed on the north-south highway during early 1993.

He said that on the two stretches running from Pangoh to Yong Peng, and from Yong Peng to Tu-nai, construction is proceeding smoothly. In addition, there should also be no problems on the section running from Tanjong Malim to Bidor, and from Butterworth to Shuang-hsi-ta-nien.

He noted that the worrisome places are from Bidor to Ipoh, and from Taiping to Butterworth. The geography of these two places may occasion some obstacles.

As for the east-west highway, he said that the two sections currently awaiting completion are between I-li and Kulim, and between Kulim and Butterworth.

In addition Kuo Mo-chen mentioned that the Ministry of Works bears responsibility for the construction of fairly large scale Federation government plans. To suppose that every highway is constructed by the Ministry of Works is a mistake.

He gave as an example the China New Village Road which has generally no connection with the Ministry of Works. Mostly it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and local authorities.

Criticism of Aquino's Bureaucracy

91SE0124D Cebu City SUN STAR in English 7 Jan 91
p 6

[Editorial by Godofredo M. Roperos: "Why Had President Cory Allowed Her Government to Over-Expand?"]

[Text] Let's face it, over the past four years, so much of the Aquino government's financial resources have gone more to support an expanded organizational structure and personnel than to initiating programs and projects. New offices and increased number of personnel, specially at the higher levels, is behind the reported eight to ten billion pesos weekly operational expense of the administration. This is what the finance secretary said he borrows every week from the domestic money market by selling government treasury bills at very high interest rates.

Now, in order to correct this anomalous situation, the government is moving towards merging some offices and abolishing a number of them. The new executive secretary has announced a magic number—twelve—as the ideal level he desires to reduce the cabinet offices to. Latest cabinet agency that may get the axe is the Department of the Budget Management which may be reduced to a bureau level under the Office of the President. The Department of Tourism is due for a merger with the Department of Trade and Industry. But why were they allowed to exist in the first place? What did the reorganization in 1987 do?

It seems clear now that the reorganization was initiated by President Aquino merely to ease out civil servants of the previous regime, and give jobs to the then new administration's loyal supporters. Many of those who had supported her in 1986 belong to the cities who were out in the cold during the previous government. Hence, it was not fitting they should be working as ordinary civil servants as a reward for their sacrifice. Thus new positions of power and influence befitting those or the scions of those who backed her up, have to be created. Consequently, the structure of the administration have to be expanded to accommodate the newcomers.

As a result, we now witness the spectacle of Cabinet offices having three or four undersecretaries and four to six assistant secretaries. And since each of these so-called bigwigs of the incumbent administration must have their own staff, new positions at the rank-and-file levels have also to be created. What happened, therefore, is the doubling of civil servants in the present government. And of course, it goes without saying that the cost of maintaining such an organization has also to double. Proof of this is the enormous amount of the national budget in recent years. Even if we take into consideration the P60 billion supposedly to be used for our foreign debt servicing, there still remains more than P200 billion the country's taxpayers must shoulder.

The present budget under which the administration is operating is reportedly a replay of last year's appropriation, since Congress has failed to pass a new one. Besides, Congress was adamant in approving the President's 1991 budgetary request because of the enormous amount involved. We recall, Congress and Malacanang were haggling for days on the amount it should be reduced. While the 1991 budget finally passed the House, it is still pending approval in the Senate. Last Friday, Sen. Alberto Romulo, senate finance sub-committee chairman, came out with a statement the proposed P270.6 billion budget could still be pruned by P70 billion, thus making the "P200 billion 1990 budget suffice for government operation in 1991."

It is obvious the Aquino government has been overly profligate with its financial resources, it is now hard put in making ends meet during these difficult times. Romulo suggested trimming down government operations to its very basic and essential expenditures, doing away with foreign travels, entertainment, high-period vehicles, representation expenses, office buildings, consultants and the like. Non-essential and non-productive items should be lopped off and removed. In a sense, Romulo recommends an almost total exercise of frugality in all facets of government activity, something we doubt can be done under the administration's present organizational set up.

With the kind of lifestyle our top government officials are living in and have been used to in the past four years, it would make public service very much less rewarding to them. It would not do for many of them to move around sans the plushy new cars as symbols of their power and influence. They would feel less respectable and less authoritative if they are seen around without the symbolic appurtenances of the high positions they occupy in government. This is how President Cory's administration has grown so "fat" beyond its means to support.

Ramos Reports AFP's 1990 Victories

91SE0097B Manila DYARYO PILIPINO in Tagalog
29 Dec 90 p 8

[Article by Fer Taboy and Luisa Novella]

[Text] The campaigns of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the rebels from the Left, from the Right, and the Muslims constitute a victory for this calendar year.

This was the gist of the report submitted yesterday by Secretary Fidel Ramos of the Department of National Defense (DND) to President Aquino at the end of 1990 regarding peace in the nation.

Ramos also stated that crimes have decreased significantly in the nation during 1990.

According to Ramos, from 1989 to November 1990, the number of regular guerillas of the New People's Army (NPA) has decreased by 4 percent, or down to 17,910 fighters.

The highest number of regular guerillas of the NPA in 1987 was 25,200, one year after President Aquino took power from former President Ferdinand Marcos.

Also shown was the failure of the coup d'etat attempts and of the rebellion of the soldiers who were members of the Revolutionary Alliance For The Nation-Young Officers' Union (RAN-YOU), "whose kind of bloody adventurism the people did not support."

According to Ramos, the number of encounters (battles) between the government troops and the rebellious Muslims in Mindanao has also decreased by 5 percent, from 324 battles in 1989 to 306 in 1990.

The Secretary further stipulated that over 7,125 Muslim rebels have surrendered, and they have also surrendered about 3,388 weapons.

In addition, since 1989, crimes in the entire nation have decreased by 6 percent, according to Ramos; this year, there are only 19.22 crimes committed per 100,000 people.

Meanwhile, men of the 165th PC Company and of the Limay Police captured three members of the Sparrow Unit in Bataan yesterday.

The authorities raided the home of a former rebel in Barangay Townsite, Limay, Bataan, where the three men (captured above) were staying.

According to a report received by Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Galang, Jr., commander of the Constabulary (PC-INP [Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police]) in Bataan, those arrested were Norman Llanda, aliases "Ka Marvin" and "Ka Julis", Victoriano Sevilla, alias "Ka Bastian", and one named Elmer Enriquez.

AFP Continues Counterinsurgency Role

91SE0124A Cebu City SUN STAR in English 5 Jan 91 pp 9, 11

[Text] Manila—The military will take the lead in the counter-insurgency campaign during the first 24 months since the establishment of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

This was contained in the preliminary joint standing operating procedure signed between AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] chief of staff, Gen. Renato S. de Villa and Maj. Gen. Cesar P. Nazareno, PNP director-general last Jan. 1 when the PNP law took effect.

Under the agreement, the "AFP shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and external security of the state" during the first 24 months.

This will be extended not exceeding 24 months when the President finds it justifiable.

The same agreement said the Armed Forces will take charge of the internal security of the state for the next two years.

During the interim period, the PNP assumes the primary role, especially in law enforcement and police functions, with the AFP playing the supporting role.

In cases where there is joint operation by both the AFP and PNP, "the commander of the unit which has the primary role in a given mission shall take command of all participating forces to achieve unity of efforts in the given campaign or operation."

After the interim period, the PNP will take charge of internal defense while the AFP will concentrate on the country's external defense.

Budget Cuts Limit Air Force Missions

91SE0143A Cebu City SUN STAR in English 27 Jan 91 pp 16, 15

[Text] Philippine Air Force [PAF] Commander Maj. Gen. Gerardo Protacio yesterday said the resources of his command will be limited to counterinsurgency missions because of the reduction of the military's budget allocation.

The flying time program of the Air Force will be reduced by 50 per cent because even the price of aviation gas has increased by 80 per cent.

Protacio was the guest of honor at ceremonies marking the Second Air Division's 21st founding anniversary held at the Mactan Air Base yesterday. The theme of the observance was "Pagkakaisa para sa Kapayapaan."

In his address, the PAF commanding general stressed the need to adopt austerity measures in the light of cuts on the military's budget. The proposed budget for the military for 1991 is P20 billion but was slashed to P17.69 billion. The reduced budget is still subject to Congress' approval.

Protacio also said that the Air Force's plans and programs, such as its modernization program, may be adversely affected by the budgetary cuts.

Despite these difficult times, he urged Air Force officers and men to pool their efforts in support of the Government and consider these limitations as a challenge.

Protacio also congratulated the Second Air Division under Commander Brig. Gen. Leopoldo Acot Jr. for its assistance in the recent supertyphoon Ruping which ravaged Cebu. He also sounded pleased by the civil-military operations projects of the Second Air Division.

Acot, in his speech, said the Second Air Division has spent 660 hours on combat operations in support of

ground forces in the counterinsurgency campaign and sent 752 sorties during the past year.

It also stood behind the Constitution during the October mutiny in Northern Mindanao last year. This resulted in the death of one of its pilots, Lt. Huberto Yulo, who was returning from a mission to Cagayan de Oro, scene of the mutiny.

The Air Force units here, Acot added, also accommodated all requests of government officials and private companies engaged in public welfare, especially in relief operations following the Nov. 13 supertyphoon.

Also in yesterday's anniversary celebration, a street inside the air base was named after the late Lt. Yulo. A hangar, an administration building and a grandstand were also blessed.

Fourteen Air force officers and men and two civilians were awarded merit medals and plaques of recognition.

Import Levy To Be Increased

*91SE0097C Manila DYARYO PILIPINO in Tagalog
3 Jan 91 p 8*

[Article by Luisa Novella and Ernesto Reyes, DYARYO Correspondents]

[Text] President Aquino agreed to increase the import levy from 5 percent to 9 percent. It is necessary to do this in order to increase government revenue, and to reduce the huge budget deficit.

Likewise, the chairman of the Executive Committee stated that he still has to study the proposal carefully, so as to lessen the predicted negative impact of the proposal on the industries dependent on the imported products.

Secretary Jesus Estanislao of the Department of Finance (DOF) proposed the imposition of a 9 percent import levy on imported products because of the failure of Congress to pass the measures necessary to help collect government revenues.

On the other hand, Secretary Peter Garrucho of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) opposed the 9 percent import levy because of its bad impact on the processing of basic goods.

Meanwhile, Senator Alberto Romulo, asked for an increase, indexed to the rate of inflation, in the current tax rate on interest on the money deposited in the local banks.

The legislator made it clear that the government will be able to collect reserved funds, once the taxes on money deposited in the banks will be changed.

According to Romulo, the increased rate of tax on interest on the money deposited in the local banks will help reduce the nation's budget deficit.

Inflation increased to over 15-16 percent in the nation, as a result of economic changes, such as the decrease in the value of the peso as against the dollar, the increase in oil prices followed by a subsequent increase in transportation fares, and in the prices of goods.

Romulo fears that the Philippines will lose even more if private banks will deposit their funds in foreign banks.

In this connection, Romulo appealed for a study of his proposal by the UP (University of the Philippines) School of Economics.

NPA Cash-Strapped

*91SE0124B Cebu City SUN STAR in English
11 Jan 91 p 4*

[Text] Philippine National Police (PNP) Cebu Provincial Director Lt. Col. Enrique Cuadra yesterday said the hold-up of a delivery van by New People's Army (NPA) members in Tuburan last Jan. 7 was an indication of the local Communist movement's dwindling financial resources.

Pursuit operations are still being conducted by the police in Tuburan and neighboring towns where the armed group is believed to have fled.

Cuadra believed the armed group that held up the delivery van is the same group that operates in the hinterlands of midnorthern Cebu.

He added the NPA will continue to undertake criminal activities such as robbery to replenish their dwindling finances and try to rebuild their forces.

But Cuadra expressed optimism that the police will continue to gain ground in the counter-insurgency campaign with the cooperation of the people.

In a yearend assessment on the counter-insurgency and anti-criminality campaign, Cuadra said the provincial office "is still on top of the situation."

The first NPA-initiated atrocity this year, Cuadra said, was the killing of one Renerio Matos in Catmon, Cebu last Jan. 1 by eight armed men.

Last Jan. 7, a J and P delivery panel was held up and robbed of P22,000 in Barangay Fortaliza, Tuburan. Two salesmen aboard the panel were later released unharmed. TCR

Muslims Raise Demands

*91SE0124C Cotabato City MINDANAO CROSS
in English 15 Jan 91 pp 1, 12*

[Article by Jess Dalisay, Boy Tendero and Jun Acbar]

[Text] An estimated 10,000 Muslims from various parts of Mindanao converged on Cotabato City Thursday to press for the redress of grievances.

The show of force was peaceful and did not produce the expected paralysis of traffic, business and other daily activities.

In addition to seven demands they raised in a manifesto days before the rally, members of the Aggrupation of Muslims for Peace and Unity (AMPU) raised several others during the mass action at the city plaza.

They asked that City Mayor Ludovico D. Badoy make a public apology for having sought the city's exclusion from the observance of Muslim holidays beside the five prescribed by law, and the transfer of the seat of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao from the city to another site.

Badoy Nov. 22 had retracted these two proposals; the retraction letter was received by the Office of the President Nov. 26, as Secretary Elfren Cruz confirmed yesterday in an interview by radio station DXMS of the Notre Dame Broadcasting Corp. Secretary Cruz said that the two items will no longer be submitted for consideration by President Aquino. He added that the Office of the President is no longer studying the two items.

The rallyists demanded that Mayor Badoy have a public apology published in national newspapers.

They also asked that he make tangible moves to prove his sincerity in achieving cultural harmony and solidarity.

Thirdly, they demanded that he be more consultative on matters affecting them, to avoid ruffling sensitivities and sensibilities.

AMPU secretary-general Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga also wrote President Aquino a letter dated Dec. 8, asking her support for 10 items, which touched on the seven demands in the manifesto. The 10 items:

1. Rejection of the city government's request that 169 hectares of the public domain in the Kalanganan district be declared an agro-industrial and resettlement zone. He said the area "is an ancestral land of the Muslim residents" of Kalanganan. He asked that the 169 hectares be declared, through an executive order, as ancestral land for division among Muslim residents.

2. Apportionment, on a 50-50 basis, between Muslim and Christian vendors, of stalls in a new market complex.

3. Rejection of a proposal to have the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College transfer to another site.

4. Priority in financial assistance for depressed barangays, which he said "incidentally are inhabited by Muslims."

5. Support for the city government's request for P8-million for its flood control projects. The city government Dec. 3, five days before Lingga's letter, already received the P8-million from the national government.

6. Rejection of the basing of an Army battalion in the city. In its stead, more policemen must be recruited, he said, with slots apportioned equally between Muslims and Christians. The city early in November already asked the national government for more policemen.

7. Rejection of the move to transfer ARMM's capital from the city, and the city government's taking over of properties of the defunct Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook 12.

8. Rejection of the city's exclusion from the area covered by Muslim holidays. Lingga said the "majority of city residents are Muslims."

9. Rejection of the city's bid to have its own seat in Congress.

10. Rejection of Mayor Badoy's recommendation that Associate Justice Jesus Mohammad Elbinias be appointed as a justice of the Supreme Court, to represent Maguindanaons. Lingga said Elbinias "is not a Maguindanaon," and branded Badoy's support as a "deception." Elbinias was originally endorsed by ARMM Regional Governor Zacaria A. Candao and ARMM's Regional Legislative Assembly.

Among the Muslim leaders at the rally were Atty. Didagen Dilangalen; Tawi-Tawi Assemblyman Abdul-cadir Ibrahim, who represented the ARMM-RLA; and Sultan Blah K. Mama.

Politicians Linked to Illegal Logging in Cagayan

91SE0128A Manila *MANILA CHRONICLE* in English
6 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Manny Mogato]

[Text] Senior military officers said they are readying charges against some politicians for "interfering" in the government's efforts to stop illegal logging operations in the Cagayan Valley region.

The officers said some prominent politicians have been harassing and offering bribes to military men so they would not intercept the transport of illegally-cut logs along national highways in northeastern Luzon.

Brig. Gen. Orlando Soriano, commander of the 5th Infantry Division based in Region II, claimed some politicians had approached and offered him P1 million in exchange for the continued illegal logging operations in the Cagayan Valley.

Soriano, who is also head of the government's Task Force "Luntian," claimed they have enough evidence to link some local politicians in illegal logging operations in the Cordillera and Sierra Madre mountain ranges.

Evidence gathered during interceptions of illegally-cut logs and raids on saw mills pointed to powerful politicians and businessmen as the main operators of illegal logging in northern Luzon.

Soriano's group, which also includes personnel of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, had already seized P50.2 million worth of illegally-cut logs and about P87.4 million worth of logging equipment.

Some 140 soldiers have been dismissed and 50 others demoted because of their involvement in illegal logging.

The military said that aside from damaging the environment, the illegal logging operations have been the richest source of funds for the New People's Army in the Cagayan Valley and the neighboring Cordillera mountains.

POLITICAL**Chawalit Questions Value of Southern Seaboard Project***91SE0117C Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 7 Jan 91
p 21*

[Excerpts] At 1600 hours on 7 January, General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the leader of the New Hope Party, went to open the New Hope Party Coordinating Center and the party branch in Surat Thani Province. [passage omitted]

General Chawalit talked with reporters about the southern seaboard development project. He said that he is pleased that the present administration has authorized this project. But he would like people to consider whether this project will really benefit the people, particularly people in the upper southern region. Various problems have now arisen, including foreign problems. Also, the cost of land has skyrocketed, and this has promoted increased consumption among the people.

General Chawalit said that he is worried about industry emitting more and more pollutants unless things are considered very carefully before starting this project. The people will be poor. They will just be laborers. Most of these will be local people. The advantages and disadvantages and the benefits must be considered. He said that he supports this project, but things must be considered carefully.

Ministerial Appointee Narcotics Record Draws Controversy**Prasong Sunsiri Comments Noted***91WD0403A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 16 Jan 91
p 3*

[Text] Chaloe's party is striking out at the leader of a government party who has been charged with trafficking in narcotics. They have submitted a letter to Chatchai asking him to conduct an immediate investigation. Prasong Sunsiri has said that the international police have this person's name on file.

At 1330 hours on 16 January, Mr. Sophon Phetsawang, an MP from Buriram and the secretary general of the Mass Party, announced that he had submitted a letter to the prime minister asking him to form a special committee to determine if a minister is involved in narcotics trafficking. Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, the former secretary general to the prime minister, wrote a newspaper article stating that the leader of a government party is on the narcotics blacklist of international police. Besides this, in the 8 January issue of SIAM RAT, in the "Lua Kin, Lua Chai" column, the columnist wrote that this is apparently true and that Squadron Leader Prasong probably has data or information from the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), or he has obtained the list of names from international police. If this minister

does not resign or the prime minister does not quietly dismiss him, this will be tantamount to protecting a minister who traffics in narcotics.

Mr. Sophon stated that whatever the truth is, this charge has tarnished the image of the government and of Thailand throughout the world. In particular, the prime minister, who is an honest man and who has never been involved in narcotics trafficking, will be dragged into this, too. If this charge is true, foreigners may think that this administration has promoted drug trafficking.

A reporter said that during the debate in parliament on 9 January, the opposition had protective privileges. Why didn't it reveal the name of the minister at that time? Mr. Sophon said that he wanted to speak out, but he had to discuss this matter with the leader of the Mass Party first. If it had been up to him, he would have informed parliament or the police.

MP Surin Phitsuwan Comments*91WD0403B Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 9 Jan 91
pp 1, 16*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Mr. Surin Phitsuwan, a Democrat Party MP from Nakhon Sithammarat Province, said that on the day that the policy was announced, Mr. Samphan Thongsamak, an MP from Nakhon Sithammarat Province, raised the issue of certain ministers having dealings with heroin traffickers. This issue has done great damage to the country. He said that the information that has been obtained on this was obtained from foreign sources, which are very reliable sources. "Those who administer the country must be honest. Relying on the power of narcotics traffickers is inappropriate and illegal," said Mr. Surin.

A reporter asked, Will the evidence that has been obtained force that person into a corner? Mr. Surin said that that person will undoubtedly deny the charge. "He will probably try to skate," said Mr. Surin. He repeated that this is a very important issue, because certain police officers in the Police Department have been implicated, too. He said that if the president of parliament prevents people from raising this issue in parliament, believing that this is a matter for others, he won't know what to say. [passage omitted]

Buriram MP Comments*91WD0403C Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 16 Jan 91 p 3*

[Text] Mr. Sophon Phetsawang, an MP from Buriram and the secretary general of the Mass Party, issued a statement at parliament on 15 January about last week's debate in parliament on the government's policy. During that debate, it was stated that the leader of a political party who serves as a minister is involved in narcotics trafficking activities. This matter has been discussed in the newspapers. In particular, Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsiri, the former secretary general of the National Security Council and secretary general to the prime minister, wrote an article stating that "the leader of a

government party who has been appointed to a ministerial position is on the narcotics blacklist of international police." This was printed in NAEO NA and other newspapers.

"People in general are probably suspicious like me," said the secretary general of the Mass Party. "Thus, I have asked that a committee be established to investigate this matter in order to keep this from doing further damage to the image of the government and Thailand." General Chatchai Chunhawan, the prime minister, may become mired in this matter, too.

Police Captain Chaloe Yubamrung, the leader of the Mass Party, cited the statements made by others when he raised this issue in parliament. People have said the leader of a government political party is involved in drug trafficking, but he said that he doesn't believe this. Besides this, it has been said that the older brother of the secretary to the minister of agriculture and cooperatives was arrested on narcotics trafficking charges.

Mr. Sophon said that if the investigation shows that the charges are true, this will benefit Thailand, because "foreigners won't think that the present administration is supporting narcotics trafficking. If this is true, that minister should resign. But if this is not true, the government will have to inform the people."

Chaloe Yubamrung Comments

91WD0403D Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 16 Jan 91
pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] At parliament at 1330 hours on 15 January 1991, Mr. Sophon Phetsawang, an MP from Buriram and the secretary general of the Mass Party, told reporters that Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsi, the former secretary general to Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon and the former secretary general of the National Security Council, had written a newspaper article stating that the leader of a government political party was on the narcotics blacklist of international police. On 9 January 1991, Police Captain Chaloe Yubamrung, the leader of the Mass Party, spoke out during a debate on the government's policy. He said that the lack of confidence in this administration stems from the fact that the leader of a government political party who has been appointed to a ministerial position is involved in narcotics trafficking activities.

The secretary general of the Mass Party also said that because of this, he has sent a letter to the prime minister asking him to establish a committee to investigate this matter. Otherwise, this could damage the government's image both here and abroad. If the facts show that the leader of a political party or a minister is involved in drug trafficking, that minister or party leader should resign.

Other MPs React

91WD0403E Bangkok KHAO PHISSET in Thai
21-27 Jan 91 pp 12, 13

[Text] At the Princess Hotel on 16 January, following a meeting of opposition parties, Police Captain Chaloe Yubamrung, the leader of the Mass Party, discussed the fact that the government had refused to make a statement during the debate on the government's policy, which was discussed at a special session of parliament, about his statement that the brother of the secretary to a minister had been arrested on narcotics charges and that the leader of a government party is involved in this, too. Concerning this matter, Squadron Leader Prasong Sunsi has evidence. He said that he is prepared to reveal this evidence when parliament convenes in May. He also confirmed that the name of this minister is definitely on the narcotics blacklist. He said that he would pursue the issue raised by the Solidarity Party during the time of the last administration, when this party was an opposition party. At that time, it charged that Mr. Pramuan Saphawasu, the former minister of finance, was unusually wealthy. As for his charge that certain ministers have sexual abnormalities, he said that he would like the prime minister to conduct an investigation and solve this problem, because this will only complicate the administration of the country. In other countries, these people would have been dismissed from their positions.

That same day at the Government House, Mr. Chaloe Phan Siwikon, the secretary general of the Solidarity Party, said that the opposition parties should reveal the names of the people involved in narcotics trafficking. He said that he is sure that they don't have any evidence. The Solidarity Party was once an opposition party and is well aware of the fact that the opposition parties must do everything possible to destroy the government. As for certain ministers being homosexuals, they should reveal the names of these people, too. He said that he does not consider this to be a very important matter. What is more important is their ability to carry out their duties. If a minister conducts himself improperly, the political party probably wouldn't submit his name for a ministerial position.

Controversy on Drug Charges Against Minister

Chaloe Yubamrung Interviewed

91WD0436A Bangkok EKKALAK in Thai
20 Jan 91-2 Feb 91 p 1

[Interview with Police Captain Chaloe Yubamrung, leader of Opposition's Mass Party, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [EKKALAK] There were reports that the leader of a political party was involved in narcotics trafficking activities. Then, several members of the Solidarity Party denied that. Do you have any evidence concerning this?

[Chaloem] As for the matter of a politician being involved in narcotics trafficking activities, during my speech in parliament when the government announced its policy on governing the country, I clearly stated that the older brother of the secretary to a minister had been arrested on narcotics charges. He was arrested in Hat Yai with 13 kg of heroin. Abroad, that heroin would have been worth approximately 100 million per kg, or more than 1 billion baht for all 13 kg. Later on, I clearly stated that that suspect is the older brother of the secretary to the minister of agriculture. I stated that quite clearly. People in government circles said that they wanted to see evidence of this and so I provided documents showing who had been arrested and charged and to whom the suspect was related. I informed the mass media of this. But I don't think that this is the right time to disclose the specifics of this. But I want to assure you that when parliament convenes, I will reveal the identity of the person involved. I don't think that revealing information outside parliament would be beneficial.

But I can confirm that senior people in government circles know the identify of the politician in the government who is involved in narcotics trafficking. I want to assure you that some senior officials know his identify. Some government politicians have said that the Police Department has been asked to conduct an investigation, but there is no blacklist. But I have to say that even if there is a blacklist, they could not reveal that. Because if someone has been put on the blacklist, it indicates that they are involved with narcotics traffickers. There is a narcotics blacklist. But there isn't sufficient evidence to take action against these people. Let me give you an example. One police general was put on the blacklist based on evidence provided by the United States. The Police Department then formed a committee and dismissed him from government service. That involved a relatively low level government official. But it will be very distressing if the prime minister keeps a senior government official who is involved in such activities. I have to inform my fellow citizens of this and get them to take an interest in the behavior of certain people in government circles.

[EKKALAK] This indicates that the prime minister already knows about this, is that correct?

[Chaloem] I don't want to say whether the prime minister knows about this. But I can confirm that some senior people in the government know about this based on what I said in parliament that day.

[EKKALAK] Solidarity Party MPs have said that the secretary general of the ONCB [Office of the Narcotics Control Board] sent a letter to the party stating that no member of the party was involved in narcotics trafficking activities.

[Chaloem] Mr. Chamni (Sakdiset) called me just a short time ago. During our conversation, he said that he had issued a statement on this. As personal acquaintances, we discussed this a little. I said that each of us must do

his duty. He is a member of the government and so must do his duty as a member of the government. And as a member of the opposition, I must do my duty as a member of the opposition. I don't understand why some of the government parties think that other parties are doing nothing. The Solidarity Party has taken much action on this. We are very surprised by this. The fact that the secretary general of the ONCB sent a letter shows something. But that is his affair. Even if he did, he couldn't disclose that, because this is an official secret. It isn't something that can be disclosed publicly. And the opposition shouldn't discuss this in public right now. We have to raise this matter in parliament. We would be like those opposition political parties that demand power outside the system to form a democratic system. We don't want to emulate such opposition parties. We don't want to play politics in such an aggressive manner. We want to use the parliamentary apparatus to solve the problems.

[EKKALAK] The people would like to know about this as soon as possible. You shouldn't wait until parliament convenes. Couldn't you disclose things publicly in the middle of Sanam Luang?

[Chaloem] As for certain parties disclosing things at Sanam Luang, I don't think that they have sufficient evidence to do that. All they have done is to criticize the government. But they haven't had any evidence to back up their criticisms. As for revealing the blacklist, there isn't any evidence. This is just spinning a web that requires much talk. But I will present specific evidence, but not now. You will be pleased with the evidence that I have.

[EKKALAK] Some people have said that you play politics by browbeating others. Even though you have been successful in the past, this time, you will have to take responsibility for what you have said, and legal action will be taken against you.

[Chaloem] People are free to take legal action against me. But I would like to know what the charge is. I may play rough, but I have never been arrested for extorting money. It's members of other parties, as people know. There are reasons why I have to act in an intimidating manner on certain issues. I am playing politics as a member of the opposition. But no one can buy me. Some people think that I want to discredit the government in order to have parliament dissolved.

I don't think I have that much weight. If the government hasn't done anything wrong, there isn't anything to worry about. Some have charged that I am corrupt. That didn't bother me when I was in the government. I am ready to respond. But when the opposition at that time questioned me, I didn't have a chance to respond. That put me at a disadvantage. But what was strange was that the administration didn't respond in parliament. I wanted to respond in parliament but was prevented from doing so. There was even a "walkout" but the government did not respond in parliament. There was much

talk in parliament but no response. But outside parliament, they waved their hands, saying this and that. It was very strange. That was their new way of playing politics. We don't want to imitate them.

[EKKALAK] Did you obtain this evidence from Prasong (Sunsiri)? Have you been coordinating things with him?

[Chaloem] No. I have not coordinated things with him. Actually, we are on opposite sides of the political fence. He is in the government, and I am a member of the opposition. But sometimes the data match. He has written about this twice, which shows that he has some evidence. I spoke out in parliament. But we probably obtained our evidence from different sources. I have not coordinated things with him. [passage omitted]

[EKKALAK] Returning to the narcotics issue, some have said that this is not fair, because the criminal is the brother of the secretary to the minister. The secretary is not involved.

[Chaloem] In what respect is this not fair?

[EKKALAK] It doesn't concern the MP directly.

[Chaloem] Who said that the MP was involved in trafficking? They said that it was his brother. Why isn't this fair? We have said that it is his brother who is involved. We have not said that it is the MP who is involved. In parliament, I stated quite clearly that it was the brother of an MP. People wanted to see evidence and so we showed them our evidence. What else should we do? I didn't say that this involved Mr Mongkhon (Chongsutthamani). During the debate, I said referred to his brother. How is that unfair? My statements in parliament were recorded. You can watch the video recording. But I haven't said anything about a minister. I will be saying something on 1 May when parliament convenes. It is a relative. I don't think that there is anything to apologize for. I didn't say that an MP was involved. I said that it was the older brother of the secretary to the minister of agriculture. Is what I have said correct? Is this blackmailing someone?

[EKKALAK] What about the head of a government party?

[Chaloem] I did not mention him directly. I will make a statement in parliament. At this time, I don't want to say anything. But in parliament, I will definitely speak out. I will take action on people in government circles who are involved in narcotics trafficking.

[EKKALAK] There have been reports that there will be a cabinet reshuffle in the wake of U.S. embassy statements that a leader in the Thai Prachakon Party is involved in this. What are the facts about this.

[Chaloem] Reporters know more about this than I do. But I can assure you that after the debate in parliament, senior government officials will know the facts. But I don't want to say anything about this now. I will wait until parliament convenes. [passage omitted]

Sources Comment on Charges

91WD0436B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
28 Jan 91-3 Feb 91 pp 24, 25

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The charges made by opposition parties following the joint session [of parliament] on the matter of the leader of a pro-government political party being involved in narcotics trafficking are being discussed widely, and this is building people's confidence in members of the pro-government parties.

Even though Police Lieutenant General Chawalit Yotmani, the secretary general of the ONCB [Office of the Narcotics Control Board], wrote a letter stating that no MP is involved in narcotics trafficking, the statements made by the leader of an opposition party have led to a split in how people view this matter. That is, some people believe the government's letter. Others lend greater credence to the charges made by the opposition parties. And among these are members of government parties, who are heartbroken by this.

People have quietly begun to take action. They have expressed their dissatisfaction by meeting more frequently. At the same time, if they obtain any data that support these charges, the data will be introduced at the meeting of the opposition parties. However, the leaders of the main government parties, including the Thai Nation and Solidarity parties, are well aware of these movements. But they haven't been able to take any action. [passage omitted]

A news source of ours said that the opposition's charge that the leader of a government political party is involved in narcotics trafficking activities is a charge that cannot be ignored. It is worth noting that several opposition party leaders have mentioned this matter many times. This shows that if there is a lack of confidence, the frequent talk about this might not have a good effect. People might grow tired of this. At the same time, the frequent talk about this shows that data is definitely being collected on this. But the data may not yet be clear. In addition, the political currents inside have receded as a result of the war in the Persian Gulf. Thus, nothing serious or clear has been presented.

Another news source said that besides the ONCB, the National Security Council, and the Police Department, the American embassy in Thailand also knows a lot about narcotics trafficking in Thailand. And in certain cases, it knows even more than others.

"As for opposition charges that the leader of a government political party is involved in narcotics trafficking, one of the best informed people today is not someone in Thailand but the American ambassador in one of the ASEAN countries. In the past, he served as the consul general in Chiang Mai Province. Thus, he is well informed about this, because he was once involved in narcotics work. Others have only some knowledge and don't know as much as they should," said the news source. [passage omitted]

[Photo caption] Narong, old but still caught up in underwater currents.

Narong Wongwan, Chawalit Yotmani Comments

91WD0436C Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 22 Jan 91 p 3

[Excerpts] The Solidarity Party held a meeting at the Central Plaza Hotel on 21 January. Before the meeting, Mr Narong Wongwan, the leader of the Solidarity Party, talked with reporters about [passage omitted] opposition party statements that a member of the Solidarity Party is involved in narcotics trafficking. He said that that charge is groundless. They are relying on their parliamentary privileges.

As for the charge that a person in the government is on the narcotics blacklist, on 21 January, Police Lieutenant General Chawalit Yotmani, the secretary general of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board, or ONCB, said that the ONCB does not have sufficient evidence and so it cannot reveal any details. That would damage the person involved. If there is clear evidence, the person will be arrested immediately. As for questioning suspects, the ONCB is examining the existing data. This does not concern American narcotics units. The United States would not disclose the details or names to us, because that would violate the code of conduct. [passage omitted]

Chaloem's Documents Noted

91WD0436D Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 17 Jan 91 pp 1, 15

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Police Captain Chaloem Yubamrung said that the opposition has asked many questions, but the government has not answered the questions. [passage omitted] He said that he has evidence showing that a minister is involved in narcotics trafficking. And the older brother of the secretary to a minister was once arrested on narcotics charges. But if the opposition has evidence, why doesn't it disclose this evidence? He said that he has a blacklist with the name of the minister involved in narcotics trafficking. The opposition will disclose this data when parliament convenes in May.

"Narcotics is a very important issue. In particular, those in the government must be honest people. Mr. Chaloemphan said that no one in the Solidarity Party is involved in narcotics trafficking and that no one in the party is on the blacklist, because he checked with the Police Department. But I would like to ask him who his police source was. I was once a police officer. I know that policemen cannot disclose anything about blacklists. Those on the blacklist are suspected of engaging in illegal activities, but there isn't enough evidence to arrest them," said the leader of the Mass Party.

Police Captain Chaloem also distributed copies of the charges made by the prosecutor in the narcotics case against Mr Arun, or Koyai, Chongsutthamani, the

brother of Mr. Mongkhon Chongsutthamani, a Solidarity Party MP from Chiang Rai Province who serves as the secretary to Mr. Narong Wongwan, the leader of the Solidarity Party and minister of agriculture and cooperatives.

Mr. Arun was arrested by the Songkhla provincial narcotics unit in Hat Yai District, Songkhla Province, in 1990 and charged with having 13.497 kg of heroin in his possession with intent to sell. [passage omitted]

Chaloem's 23 January Comments

91WD0436E Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 24 Jan 91 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] At 2000 hours on 23 January 1991 at the Princess Hotel on Lan Luang Road, Police Captain Chaloem Yubamrung, the leader of the Mass Party, talked with reporters about the matter of opposition parties raising the issue of the leader of a government party and the brother of the secretary to the minister of agriculture being involved in narcotics trafficking. Mr. Chaloemphan Siwikon, the deputy prime minister, ordered the ONCB [Office of the Narcotics Control Board] to investigate this to determine whether an MP is involved in such activities. The ONCB responded by saying that no MP is involved in narcotics trafficking. Police Captain Chaloem said that even if there is evidence, no one can disclose this, because if they did, they could be subject to libel charges. If a person is suspected of criminal activities, it means that legal action can't yet be taken because of the lack of evidence. As for this matter, people can say whatever they want. But he said that he has evidence that he will disclose once parliament convenes.

A reporter said that the Solidarity Party has said that the two brothers have nothing to do with each other. But Police Captain Chaloem responded by saying that that depends. A father and his son may not have anything to do with each other. That isn't a problem. He hasn't said anything about that. As for the charge that he likes to blackmail people, why would he want to do that? He said that he doesn't understand why just one party is so concerned about this even though there are several government parties. They seem very agitated about this.

Solidarity Spokesman Demands Evidence

91WD0436F Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 19 Jan 91, pp 1, 19

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] On 18 January at parliament, Mr. Chamni Sakdiset, the deputy government spokesman and a Solidarity Party MP, issued a statement on the charge by opposition parties that the leader of a government party is involved in narcotics trafficking. He said that the government is concerned that this will tarnish the government's image. Mr. Chaloemphan Siwikon, the deputy prime minister, sent a memorandum about this, No. NR0104/1069, to the prime minister on 17 January 1991. He has requested the

names and data concerning the narcotics trafficking activities of the party leaders and/or MPs whom opposition MPs charged with being involved in narcotics trafficking activities during their debate on 9 January.

Mr. Chamni said that the opposition party leader who made this charge refused to name the government party leader supposedly involved in this, but there are five government parties. Thus, he would like the opposition to reveal the name of the person involved. And he must present evidence of this instead of just making charges. Furthermore, with respect to the arrest of Mr. Arun Congsutthamani, the brother of Mr. Mongkhon, the secretary to the minister of agriculture, the opposition has tied the appointment by the minister in his capacity as party leader to narcotics trafficking activities. Such statements are aimed only at making political gains.

A reporter asked if the ONCB will be ordered to obtain information from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Mr. Chamni deflected the question, saying that the facts must be determined instead of just making indirect comments. The ONCB has already contacted international police.

Mr. Chamni showed reporters a copy of a letter sent to him by Police Lieutenant General Chawalit Yotmani, the secretary general of the ONCB, on 17 January. The letter stated that with respect to names and data on narcotics trafficking activities of a party leader and/or MPs, whom the opposition has charged with being involved in narcotics activities, the ONCB has examined the evidence and failed to find any evidence that any party leader or MP is involved in narcotics trafficking activities as charged.

The letter also stated that the ONCB will coordinate its investigation of this matter with the DEA. If any further evidence is obtained, he will be informed of this.

Chiang Rai MP, ONCB Chief React

*91WD0436G Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 18 Jan 91
p 3*

[Excerpt] Mr. Mongkhon Chongsutthanami, a Solidarity Party MP from Chiang Rai Province and the secretary to the minister of agriculture, discussed the matter of the opposition charging that he is involved in narcotics trafficking. He said that this does not involve him but his older brother, who was convicted by the court a long time ago. This occurred before the Solidarity Party was formed. He said that the reason why the opposition is attacking the Solidarity Party like this is that the opposition is disappointed at being left out of the government.

Police Lieutenant General Chawalit Yotmani, the secretary general of the ONCB [Office of the Narcotics Control Board], was interviewed on the matter of the opposition charging that a government party leader is on the DEA's blacklist. He said that he has contacted American officials about this, but he doesn't know who

is involved. The investigation must continue until the person's identity is learned. If someone is implicated, action must be taken regardless of who is involved, even if it is the leader of a political party. But even if there is a blacklist, without evidence, no action can be taken. [passage omitted]

'Assassination' Plot Details Reported

*91SE0117A Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai
28 Jan 91-3 Feb 91 pp 12-14*

[Excerpts] For the past six to seven years, an important case known as the "security case" or "assassination case" and which newspapers have recently begun referring to as the "Manun case" has frequently been discussed in the pages of a daily newspaper and political magazine. At the same time, this case has at times led to fierce power struggles. The situation has at times been very tense. But few people know very much about this case. [passage omitted]

KHAO PHISET would like to present details about this case that we have obtained. Senior officials are well aware of the data presented here.

It should be understood that the facts presented here are facts that appeared in summary documents (certain parts) of the various committees concerned with this case. KHAO PHISET will not analyze the facts any further. We have omitted certain sections that are inappropriate and will print them with other parts in order to make this summary more coherent.

The Committee To Consider National Criminal Cases, which is known as Committee 827 and whose members include the undersecretary of interior, Mr. Anan Anantakun, General Athaya Phaeophalachon, the director of the National Intelligence Office, Police General Sawaeng Thirasawat, the director-general of the Police Department, and Police Lieutenant General Bunchu Wankanon, the commissioner of the Central Investigation Bureau, held a meeting at the National Intelligence Office on 20 September 1990 to discuss the attempted assassination of important people at the National Stadium during the opening and closing ceremonies of the 12th Queen's Cup soccer match and the attempted assassination of General Prem Tinsulanon and General Athit Kamlang-ek. After assassinating these people, the killers planned to seize power.

Several attempts were made on the lives of General Prem and General Athit, but all these assassination attempts failed. Attempts were made in both Bangkok and in the provinces. This assassination plan was implemented in 1982.

The assassination attempts stemmed from the fact that the 1981 coup staged by Young Turk officers failed. Some of these officers then joined forces with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and tried to trick the communist soldiers into joining their movement. Some regular troops joined them, too. Their target was to

topple the government and set up a so-called democratic government. Experts who had served as commanders in the military participated in this, too.

The reason why this group wanted to kill General Prem and General Athit was that both were important people who had blocked the coup.

Officials learned that professors at certain universities were coordinating things between the Young Turks and communist leaders in various zones in the northeast. During the time that Police Lieutenant General Bunchu was the commander of the Suppression Division, the Suppression Division's Ripusathan Unit conducted a search and seized a large number of weapons at Kasetsart University and at Ayuthaya. On 14 September 1984, a warrant was issued for the arrest of 43 perpetrators. These included officers with the rank of colonel (at that time), communist military commanders in northeastern zones, professors, laborers, and other people. But military and police investigators were not able to arrest them because of the influence of politicians and certain military officers, who did not want these people arrested.

The first attempt on the life of General Prem was made on 16 July 1982 when General Prem went to dedicate a memorial to Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram. Later on, officials arrested and filed charges against:

Master Sergeant Amon Indichot. He confessed and implicated those who had ordered this. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Master Sergeant Prawet Phumphueng and Sergeant Suphat Thongsukphon. These two men were used as witnesses.

During the initial investigation, it was learned that communist terrorists and certain soldiers were behind this. After that, officials issued Order 915/25 of 31 August 1982, which called for the formation of a committee having the power to conduct an in-depth investigation. Military and police officials cooperated with each other. After that, the army asked the Police Department to appoint investigators to work with military officials in investigating this matter. Police General Sawaeng and Police Lieutenant General Bunchu were responsible for this.

As for the plan to assassinate important people on 1 October 1982, from the investigation, Colonel Sanghiem Rattanasimak, the intelligence chief of the 2d Army Region, turned over Comrade Tha Le, who confessed after surrendering, to Committee 915/25. Comrade Tha Le's remarks can be summarized as follows:

His group joined forces with Young Turks and civilians, most of whom were CPT members from Zone KC 555 under the command of Mr. Withit Chandawong, or Comrade Pan, the son of Mr. Khrong Chandawong. The Young Turks included Colonel "M" and Colonel "P" (who provided financial support and places to stay) and Colonel "B" and his men. A meeting was held at the

house of Comrade Pan in Nong Khaem on 29 September 1982. The Young Turk representative was A. Choetchai, or Colonel Decho. During the meeting, it was A. Choetchai who urged those attending the meeting to commit this crime. At the same time, he set 1 October 1982 as the date for the assassination, the day of the opening ceremony for the Queen's Cup soccer match at the National Stadium. After assassinating these people, the plan called for detaining important people and toppling the government. At the meeting, it was agreed to implement this plan. The next day, more plans were formulated in Room B4 at the Chomthian Villa Hotel in Pathaya. Nine people participated in formulating this plan.

The plan called for firing M-72 rockets at the intended victims. The men who were to launch the attack were divided into two groups. The weapons were concealed in two ice carts, with each cart carrying two rockets. But this plan was not implemented on 1 October, the day of the opening ceremony. Instead, it was postponed until the closing day of the soccer match, that is, 20 October.

The day before launching this operation, that is, on the evening of 19 October, a final planning session was held at the Khlong Tan Apartment in Khlong Tan. A total of 13 people attended this meeting. The plan formulated was similar to that formulated at Pathaya. Each person was given two-three grenades and a smoke grenade for use in escaping.

But on 20 October, the Young Turk forces failed to appear or refused to participate in the assassination. Moreover, there were large crowds of people, and the environment did not facilitate the operation. Thus, the operation was halted. [passage omitted]

List of the 43 people charged with participating in the rebellion for whom, according to the case file, arrest warrants were issued on 14 September 1984:

1. Mr. Choetchai Runphanit
2. Colonel Bunsak Phocharoen
3. Mr. Withit Chandawong (Comrade Pan)
4. Mr. Kan Khunmi (Comrade Thongkham)
5. Mr. Sairung Pawako (Comrade Rung)
6. Mr. Winai (surname unknown)
7. Cpt Surasak A.
8. 1st Lieutenant Sonthirat N.
9. Mr. Triwat R.
10. Mr. Chamnan R.
11. Mr. Songphon R.
12. 1st Lieutenant Chanaphon K.
13. Mr. Monthon (surname unknown)
14. Mr. Samphan (surname unknown)
15. Colonel Panlop Pinmani
16. Colonel Kampanat Ketwiriyanan
17. Colonel Prachak Sawangchit
18. Colonel Manun Rupkhachon
19. Colonel Phirat Sawamiwat
20. Major Sanchai Bunthariksawat
21. Mr. Sanit Mikarat (Comrade Chairab)
22. Mr. Saengthian Khamkao (Comrade Phrai)
23. Mr. Decha Daengla (Comrade Chatri)

24. Mr. Winai Phatdamtan (Comrade Camp)
25. Mr. Somchit Nuanchanthuk (Comrade Mot)
26. Mr. Bunloei Champachan (Comrade Kit)
27. Mr. Sinthanu Lakthong (Comrade Chaisaeng)
28. Mr. Monthian Chanwohan (Comrade Sombat)
29. Mr. Sanghiam Lakthong (comrade Tha Le)
30. Mr. Sommai Ratchaphli (Comrade Choeng)
31. Mr. Thongdi Namsaengkhot (Comrade Phichit Yai)
32. Mr. Prasit Nuanchanthuk (Comrade Song)
33. Mr. Saengthong Chettanan (Comrade Phichit Lek)
34. Mr. Saman Kaeoma
35. Mr. Thara Worawiset
36. Mr. Warun Thanomwong
37. Mr. Em (surname unknown)
38. Mr. Charun Awela (Comrade Lung Kae)
39. Mr. somphong Pusing (Comrade Sumet)
40. Mr. Udomsak Mingkitthancharoen
41. Comrade Thianchai
42. Comrade Yothin
43. Comrade Wichit

(Note: The names and ranks given are those at that time.)

MILITARY

Military Contacts With Cambodia on Missing L-19

91SE0117B Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 24 Jan 91
pp 1, 15

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] A report from Aranyaprathet District, Prachinburi Province, stated that on the morning of 23 January, an L-19 reconnaissance aircraft of the Burapha Force that was flying near the Thai-Cambodian border crashed inside Cambodia in an area controlled by the Heng Samrin government. It crashed approximately 16 km inside Cambodia opposite Aranyaprathet District. The pilot was slightly injured.

Initial reports stated that this aircraft was on a training mission in preparation for National Military Day on 25 January. This aircraft was to have scattered popped rice and flowers on the Aranyaprathet market. But it developed engine trouble. The pilot couldn't restart the engine and so he landed his aircraft in a field near Ban Nimit in Battambang, Cambodia. [passage omitted]

A senior official with the Burapha Force talked with NAE0 NA about this accident. He said that this happened about 1900 hours as the L-19 aircraft was returning to the Burapha Force airbase after undergoing repairs at the Khakraphong airbase. As it was flying over Sakaeo District, it developed engine trouble. [passage omitted] At 1330 hours, the pilot contacted the Burapha Force, saying that he was safe and that he had been injured only slightly. But the aircraft suffered serious damage when it made this emergency landing near the Suvannason Highway, or Highway 5.

The news source said that this L-19 aircraft was definitely not on a training mission for National Military Day.

As for the search for the pilot and the aircraft, the news source said that besides coordinating things with Cambodia, the Burapha Force has ordered Psyops Infantry Unit 123 to participate in the search. However, that is a forest area, and there are still many mines in this area. This has slowed down the search. "As for talks with Heng Samrin forces, if the pilot is under their control, there shouldn't be any problem, because officials in that area are in regular contact with them."

However, it seems that the Phnom Penh government has not yet made a decision on returning the pilot to Thai officials.

Python Missile Purchase Discussed

91WC0053B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
21-27 Jan 91 p 9

[M.C. Wan Hotline column]

[Text] The air force has planned to purchase an air-to-air guided missile for its F-16 aircraft since the time of Air Chief Marshal Woranat Aphichari. It plans to use the Python-3 missile of Israel. During the war between Israel and Syria, this missile showed itself to be very effective in shooting down MiG aircraft. This is a high quality weapon. But several Arab countries have politely warned Thailand that if it purchases weapons from Israel, Thailand may encounter problems in exporting rice to the Arab world. Israel has now opened a production plant in Germany. This is a German company, but this is still the Python-3 missile. Those who purchase this weapons are buying it from Germany. This includes Thailand, which has purchased a number of these missiles. Besides this, the F-16 also has two pods for Atlas-2 type laser guided missiles from Thompson C.S.F, France. The 18 new F-16 aircraft that the air force has purchased are scheduled to arrive two months from now. It isn't known if Chatchai will be on hand to "welcome" these new aircraft like Prem did with the first flight of F-16.

Army Commanders Listed by CRMA Class

91SE0109A Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA
in Thai 2 Dec 90 p 12

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] 1. Army region and equivalent echelon:

Lieutenant General San Siphen (CRMA [Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy] Class 5), 1st Army Region commander, and Lieutenant General Wattana Sanphanit (CRMA Class 8), commander of the 1st Corps.

Lieutenant General Phaibun Hongsinlak (CRMA Class 5), 2d Army Region commander, and Lieutenant General Anuphap Songsunthon (CRMA Class 5), 2d Corps commander.

Lieutenant General Phairot Chantha-urai (CRMA Class 5), 3d Army Region commander, and Lieutenant General Withun Suntharachan (CRMA class 5), 3d Corps commander.

Lieutenant General Yutthana Yaemphan (CRMA Class 4), 4th Army Region Commander.

Lieutenant General Khachon Ramanwong (CRMA Class 5), commander of the Special Warfare Command.

In summary, of these eight men, six are members of CRMA Class 5, one is a member of CRMA Class 4, and one is a member of CRMA Class 1.

2. Divisional commanders:

Major General Chainarong Nunphakdi (CRMA Class 11), commander of the 1st King's Guard Division.

Major General Thitiphong Chennuwat (CRMA Class 11), commander of the 2d Infantry Division.

Major General Wattana Bunyasit (CRMA Class 8), commander of the 9th Infantry Division.

Major General Banthit Malairisun (CRMA Class 8), commander of the 11th Infantry Division.

Major General Somphan Bunkangwan (CRMA Class 10), commander of the 3d Infantry Division.

Major General Prasoet Phakcharoen (CRMA Class 11), commander of the 6th Infantry Division.

Major General Winit Krachangson (CRMA Class 9), commander of the 12th Infantry Division.

Major General Sommai Wichawon (CRMA Class 11), commander of the 4th Infantry Division.

Major General Panthep Phuwanatnurak (CRMA Class 9), commander of the 5th Infantry Division.

Major General Prasan Premmasakun (CRMA Class 9), commander of the 15th Infantry Division.

Major General Awut Wiphathaphan (CRMA Class 9), commander of the 16th Infantry Division.

Major General Ruthai Nilobon (CRMA Class 8), commander of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Major General Thotsaphon Songsunthon (CRMA Class 6), commander of the 2d Cavalry Division.

Major General Samphao Chusi (CRMA Class 12), commander of the AAA Division.

Major General Suwit Chaiprapha (CRMA Class 6), commander of the Artillery Division.

Major General Somsak Saengchanloet (CRMA Class 12), commander of the 1st Special Forces Division.

Major General Han Phethai (CRMA Class 11), commander of the 2d Special Forces Division.

3. Divisions and special units:

Major General Narunat Kampanatsaenyakon (CRMA Class 7), commander of the 1st Development Division.

Major General Phichit Phumiwattana (CRMA Class 9), commander of the 2d Development Division.

Major General Angkun Rotsawat (CRMA Class 10), commander of the 3d Development Division.

Major General Suwit Boribunnangkun (CRMA Class 11), commander of the 4th Development Division.

Major General Thongchai Chuasanit-in (CRMA Class 8), commander of the Engineers Division.

Major General Prasoet Chumunwai (CRMA Class 8), commander of the Air Defense Center.

Thus, it can be seen that in the combat and development units, each CRMA class controls the following number of divisions:

1. CRMA Class 6: two divisions (the 2d Cavalry Division and the Artillery Division).

2. CRMA Class 7: one division (the 1st Development Division).

3. CRMA Class 8: five divisions (the 9th and 11th infantry divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the Air Defense Division, and the Engineers Division).

4. CRMA Class 9: five divisions (the 12th Infantry Division, the 2d Development Division, and the 5th, 15th, and 16th infantry divisions).

5. CRMA Class 10: two divisions (the 3d Infantry Division and the 3d Development Division).

6. CRMA Class 11: six divisions (the 1st King's Guard Division, the 2d, 6th, and 4th infantry divisions, the 4th Development Division, and the 2d Special Forces Division).

7. CRMA Class 12: two divisions (the 2d Special Forces Division and the AAA Division).

CRMA Class 5 controls the army regions.

Official Discusses Military Capability

91WC0053A Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai
21-27 Jan 91 pp 20-22

[Interview with Admiral Banthit Chunhawan, senator, assigned to the Office of the Undersecretary, Ministry of Defense, date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [KHAO PHISET] How does our military power compare with that of our neighbors?

[Banthit] In Asia, we have superior power in terms of both personnel and weapons.

[KHAO PHISET] How do we compare with Vietnam?

[Banthit] Vietnam has older weapons that it obtained from the United States. These weapons are now virtually useless, because they don't have parts. We are stronger than Vietnam. We have been developing constantly. We have been buying ships. We have sufficient weapons to defend ourselves. But we can't use our superior weapons to launch an offensive, because our budget is limited. We carry on training throughout the year. Thus, we have sufficient combat capabilities to defend ourselves.

[KHAO PHISSET] There have been reports that the navy plans to buy an aircraft carrier. Is this true?

[Banthit] I have seen reports that the navy will purchase a helicopter carrier, because a helicopter carrier is a multipurpose ship that can serve as a mobile base. A helicopter carrier can carry helicopters into action throughout the Gulf of Thailand. Helicopters can be used to attack submarines, destroy mines, transport troops into battle, and so on. They can help deal with threats at sea. They are very useful. Thus, the prime minister has authorized the navy to procure a helicopter carrier. We are now in the process of doing this. I don't know what the result will be.

[KHAO PHISSET] We have never had such a ship.

[Banthit] No, we haven't, because this is a large ship.

[KHAO PHISSET] How much does one of these ships cost?

[Banthit] About 4 billion baht.

[KHAO PHISSET] How many will be purchased?

[Banthit] Just one to start with. It will take us four years to pay for just one of these ships. That is, we will have to pay 1 billion a year.

[KHAO PHISSET] From which country will we buy the ship?

[Banthit] I don't know. This is still in process.

[KHAO PHISSET] There have been reports that two carriers will be purchased.

[Banthit] We will start with just one carrier. If additional funds are available, we may buy another one. We will use budget funds.

I have commanded three ships. I consider myself to be very experienced in carrying out my duties. [passage omitted]

ECONOMIC

Defense Ministry Authorizes Production for Export

91WC0055A Bangkok NAEO NA (LOK THURAKIT Supplement) in Thai 31 Dec 90 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Ministry of Defense supports having the private sector set up military arms plants to produce war materials for the military. But so far, few have shown any interest because both domestic and foreign markets are limited. Even if permission is granted to export items to Burma and Vietnam, it is feared that they won't have the money to pay for the goods. As for the munitions plant in Nakhon Sawan, foreigners have expressed an interest in purchasing explosives.

Lieutenant General Wirasak Nakson, the director of the Armed Forces Industrial Department, told LOK THURAKIT NAEO NA that so far, five military arms plants have been granted permission to begin production. These are the Chai International Development Company, the Jupiter Associates Company, the Thai Arms Company, the Tharung Phaisan Industrial Company, and the Sugo Engineering Company. Most of these will produce explosives used in the civilian sector, such as primer cord, small arms ammunition, and dynamite.

The defense ministry's policy is to allow the private sector to play a role in producing military materials. It is expected that the private sector will play a larger and larger role in producing military materials such as guns and ammunition and in assembling and producing parts for combat support vehicles. These will be produced in accord with the standards set by the department. This will depend on the capabilities of the private sector. Today, an attempt is being made to reduce the number of steps involved in granting the private sector authorization to set up military arms plants. But so far, no other private companies have expressed an interest in setting up plants.

The reason why few private companies have shown any interest in setting up arms production plants is that markets are still very limited. If they produce military materials and sell them to the military, they will have to compete and meet the standards set for quality. And there are only a few groups in the private sector that have a need for such items, such as ammunition for training purposes and dynamite used in industrial activities.

Besides this, there are also problems concerning export markets. The government has authorized the export of certain types of war materials, such as small arms and dynamite used for industrial purposes, to only 19 countries, including the ASEAN countries, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Burma, and Laos. But with some countries, there are problems in negotiating payments. As a result, sales of private sector military materials to other countries are still very small.

The Ministry of Defense has also authorized 13 private factories to produce military materials for the various branches of the service on a temporary basis. These materials consist mainly of weapons parts such as primers, casing molds, ammunition, and parts based on specified models. These will be produced when the services place orders, and the quality of the items must meet the standards.

Today there is an explosives production plant in Nakhon Sawan Province. This plant produces gunpowder used in producing bullets of various sizes. Besides supplying this to the military services, it also exports gunpowder to various countries. Indonesia and Singapore, for example, have contacted this plant concerning making purchases. The plant is now adjusting the production chain to meet the needs of the buyers.

SET Official on Computerized Trading, Bond Sales

91SE0114A Bangkok NAE0 NA (LOK THURAKIT SUPPLEMENT) in Thai 31 Dec 90 p 6

[Interview with Securities Exchange of Thailand [SET] Manager Maruai Phadungsit by Sasithon Ong-di, date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Sasithon] What are the plans of the Securities Exchange?

[Maruai] The Securities Exchange will develop centers for depositing shares by increasing the shares deposited with custodians and sub-brokers. In the past only brokers held shares on deposit. In the future there will be links with foreign centers for deposit. Information centers for the securities business will also be developed. At present the information system for companies listed in the Securities Exchange provides information which goes back over three years. In the next stage this system will be developed so that it can provide information which goes back over five years as a service to the general public. At present a computer link-up for securities information has been started with some foreign countries using a network system.

Computerized securities trading will begin on 1 February 1991. It will start with those groups of securities which are traded less. At present it is expected to start with the automobile and insurance groups. It is expected that all groups will be so traded by April. After the Securities Exchange has switched to the computerized trading system, trading time will be expanded to the afternoon. However we will have to examine the trading patterns around the world and in Thailand. It is not expected that trading time will be expanded in 1991.

When the trading system is changed from the board system to the computerized system, the behavior of investors will change depending on their knowledge of investing and not because of the computerized system—the risk-takers will remain the same.

In addition the Securities Exchange is also preparing to protect investors by stressing education so that investors have a better understanding of investing. The Securities Exchange has plans to set up a center to provide securities information to the outlying areas. It has been decided to set up centers in Hat Yai and Chiang Mai first because there are many brokers who have opened securities services in these two provinces. Officials of the securities market have organized units to produce radio and television reports to broadcast securities information, which will provide more safety for investors. At present the project committee has made the arrangements; it is waiting for another meeting of the securities commission after the New Year's celebrations.

[Sasithon] What is the Securities Exchange's policy toward developing bond sales?

[Maruai] The Securities Exchange plans to bring government bond trading smoothly into the market within three years. There have been talks with the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand. However all this depends on the actions taken to bring it about. There will have to be discussions beforehand about the standards required. In any case officials of the Securities Exchange will proceed with the goal of making government bonds appealing to investors. In the short run it is thought that this will be difficult because the government's budget is in surplus and so there is no need to issue government bonds to bring in money. However in the future new bonds will have to be issued. Of course Thailand already has a bond market; it is just that bonds are not traded in the securities market. In addition there is a redemption market for government bonds run by the Bank of Thailand.

If someone says that developing a market for government bonds is impossible or is a daydream, we could tell them that if we do not dream, nothing will come true. We must dream, but not idly—we must also act.

As for the requirements to make government bonds attractive, there must be sufficient "supply", and the interest rate must be fairly elastic. If the interest rate is fixed, there will be no incentive for people to buy and sell. However it is not at the point where the law has to be changed to allow this to proceed smoothly. As for a futures market this will depend on permission from the Ministry of Finance. Since this ministry already has a policy of supporting it, there probably will not be a problem.

POLITICAL

Central Committee Meets To Discuss Ideas

912E0110A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 10 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Hoang Van Khang]

[Text] On 3 and 4 January 1991, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front held a meeting to contribute ideas to the draft documents of the Seventh Party Congress. More than 20 intellectuals and members of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front in the city and a number of provinces such as Dong Nai, Song Be, Tay Ninh, Tien Giang, and Kien Giang attended the meeting. They contributed many ideas on the specific contents and on the general and basic problems of the documents.

As for the general problems, Tran Ngoc Lieng, a lawyer, and Ly Chanh Trung, a teacher, said that given the present complex international and social situation and given the difficulties facing the country, a program should not be put forth. Instead, we should make an appeal calling on the people to overcome the difficulties in building the country. As for the theme of "building socialism in the transitional period," in the view of these two men, it is sufficient to stipulate building a "peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, and rich and strong" Vietnam. In this, emphasis should be placed on "democracy" and "rich and strong." Conversely, a number of other people said that formulating these two Party Congress documents is necessary and correct. Nguyen Minh Hoang, a lawyer from Tien Giang Province, said that clearly informing all the people and society about the contents of socialist construction is the right thing to do. This will not do any harm and will even help increase the confidence of the party members, cadres, and people, because true socialism has long been the ideal and dream of all the people and the entire party. Remaining steadfast on the path of socialist construction will give us a strong basis and clear direction in the struggle to build our country. Huynh Trung Dong, a scientist, said that the two draft documents are very important documents that have been painstakingly prepared and that must be perfected through the ideas contributed by all the people. A number of people said that the program should clearly delineate the socialist model. There must be a careful scientific analysis, and the persuasiveness and correctness of socialism must be increased. This is particularly necessary in the present situation following the complex changes in other socialist countries in the world. Two people said that the program should focus less on the lessons and achievements of the wars of liberation and instead give more attention to the lessons in building peace, because this will be of practical use in building socialism in the coming period.

As for specific problems, people concentrated above all on building the state system. The program must clearly mention "building a strong legal state by the people and

for the people," manifested by building and perfecting the legal system. It is essential to mention the legal rights and the responsibilities and obligations of citizens and the management powers and responsibilities of the state. Stress must be placed on improving the organizations that defend the laws such as the public security forces, the courts, and organs of control to ensure that they are strong and pure. The boundaries between and functions of legislative, judicial, and administrative work must be clearly defined. Some people said that the program should clearly stipulate the functions of the various organizations in the state management system in order to prevent organizations (particularly administrative and public security organizations) from abusing their powers. As for social forces, Father Tran Xuan Thao, a Catholic priest from Dong Nai Province, and Father Nguyen Huy Lich said that the sections of the program on religious problems are too simple. They do not mention specific policies or new themes concerning Catholics. Recently, mistakes have been made in implementing the correct positions and policies of the party and state. In particular, a number of cadres in various localities have committed violations. Thus, the program must contain a more complete and clearer theme on religious issues. The best thing would be to promulgate a law on religion to give people peace of mind and greater confidence in the party's program in building the country. The program must analyze and evaluate the past training and use of the intellectuals, and based on the coming requirements, implement good policies to exploit the capabilities of the intellectuals in developing society. Nguyen Minh Hoang, a lawyer, said that in the past period, too little has been invested in training and education. This reflects a limitation in the use of our brainpower and is related to scientists. The program should point out ways to overcome this situation. Instructor Tran Duc Thao proposed using the phrase "worker-peasant-intellectual state" in order to correctly define the role and significance of intellectuals among the forces building socialism. With respect to overseas Vietnamese, from analyzing the potential of overseas Vietnamese in various countries, Huynh Trung Dong said that an important problem is to bring modern science and technology to our country through overseas Vietnamese. This must be given attention, but the program does not mention this at all. He also said that besides contributing to building the country, an important theme regarding the overseas Vietnamese problem is to build a strong community of overseas Vietnamese who will look to their fatherland. This is related to the organizational work of the state. The program and specific policies should give sufficient attention to this.

Besides this, a number of people analyzed the weaknesses in leadership, organization, and management and the technical and scientific weaknesses of a number of cadres (in many scientific sectors) and proposed that the program give more attention to training and building ranks of cadres of various types, standardizing the state management forces, managing the economy in the immediate stage and making long-term preparations,

and satisfying the development requirements of socialism today. On the other hand, attention must be given to building a system of individual responsibility. There cannot be only collective responsibility. Nguyen Xuan Roanh from Dong Nai Province proposed adding a section on "opposing corruption" in the economic and social strategy in order to quickly eliminate a negative phenomenon and serious hindrance in the wholesome development of society, particularly a socialist society.

Almost all of the participants welcomed the fact that the party's draft documents have clearly manifested the role of the family and the rights and responsibilities of all members of society with the credentials of individuals in a collective socialist society. These things should be defined even more clearly.

Articles Discuss Right To Be Informed

People's Need To Be Informed Not Met

912E0108A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
28 Dec 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Le Huyen Thong: "What About Democracy and the Right To Be Informed?"]

[Text] Discussing the draft program at the Fatherland Front and Federation of Trade Unions conference, many delegates representing Ho Chi Minh City, the capital city of Hanoi, and many party chapters unanimously supported the party document, which says **"The true nature of renovation and improvement of the political system is to build and gradually improve the socialist democracy,"** in which very great attention must be paid to ensuring **"the right to be informed, the freedom of speech."**

Offering their opinion on this matter, many people affirm that in the last few years, the intellectual standard of the people in our country, mostly in cities, has been raised to a much higher level. As a result, the need of the masses for information has become much greater and varied. However, in many localities, the party organizations and administration have not yet attached importance to responding to the people's right to be informed. Even in the capital city of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, there exists a "hunger" for information in some areas. A survey in two villages in the area of Bat Bat in Ba Vi District and in two Binh Chanh District villages shows that 90.7 percent of party members who have retired do have an urgent need for regularly getting information on the current affairs and policies, and earnestly hope that they could read party newspapers and listen to the radio. Regretfully the local authorities failed to satisfy their need. It is this limited access to information that usually leads to a situation in which there is disagreement between the party members in power and the retired cadres in a locality. What we should worry about is the fact that information usually is "interfered" by the effects of the kinds of "sidewalk" information. There are many rumors that are very illogical. And yet sometimes these rumors have come from a number of cadres in

power—sometimes without their knowing it—who actually repeated the false information. It is obvious that democracy goes hand in hand with the intellectual standard of the people. If the party members and people in a locality do not know the problems that need to be discussed and the things that must be done, to talk about democracy there is just an empty slogan. What can be easily seen today is the fact that in many localities, mostly in the villages that are far from the cities, a great deal of information on the current affairs and policies has not reached the people. The reason why a segment of the masses remains indifferent to politics or expresses the pessimistic and worried attitude of the cadres and people is that it has not been informed fully, accurately, and in time about the situation of the country, positions, and policies, and on the other hand has been affected by false propaganda. In the meantime, the reactionaries are very active and use many meticulous tricks to win the masses over to their side from ours, even in the areas of ethnic minorities, base areas of the revolution, and former resistance areas.

To ensure the right of our party members and people to be informed is an important condition for raising the intellectual capacity and responsibilities of our citizens. In reality, the fact that many cadres have quickly matured, have improved their knowledge, and have changed their thinking was first of all due to their regular access to information and their well-defined purposes. On the other hand, in the case of quite a few cadres who used to be profoundly knowledgeable, the fact that the level of their knowledge and practical understanding has quickly declined after they resigned from their offices was because they no longer were in a position to receive information and did not make any personal efforts to actively seek sources of information.

Discussing this matter, many people have emphasized this fact: Democracy must be closely linked with the right to be informed. Many localities have made these suggestions:

A. The party has adopted the slogan, "The people know, discuss, act, and control," and has set "the people know" as the first need to be fulfilled. Therefore, the program must set the task of providing information to let "the people know" as a content of extremely important significance. It must contain a part dealing with the strategy of providing information and the appropriate policies to be implemented to ensure the right of the people to be informed.

B. The state must soon adopt a financial policy to boldly invest in strongly expanding the wired radio network to every family, building many libraries and reading rooms, and giving special financial aid to a number of newspapers, particularly **daily newspapers** and **radio and television stations**.

C. To set up at an early date in the party as a whole and in administrations at all levels a network and a system to provide fast and accurate information from top to

bottom, and vice versa. To properly organize a network to conduct polls, or investigation of social opinion, and to adopt soon regulations that would overcome the habit of making false reports due to three reasons—bureaucratic practice, poor knowledge, and lack of personal integrity.

It is obvious that we cannot talk about leadership and democracy without information availability.

People's Right To Debate Within CPV Discussed

912E0108B Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Jan 91
p 3

[Article by Colonel Pham Xuan Phuong, Political General Department: "On the Right To Debate and Argue Within the Party"]

[Text] I fully agree with and support author Le Huyen Thong who said that "democracy begins first in the party" and about "democracy and the right to be informed" (NHAN DAN, 28 December 1990).

In this article, I want to mention another aspect of the question of democracy in the party.

We all know that the 6th Party Congress resolution has a paragraph that clearly says: "To develop internal democracy, to correctly implement the principle of democratic centralism, to ensure discussions and debates being conducted in an equal and frank manner, and to listen attentively to and respect different opinions."

Our party has issued regulations and guidelines on many forms and measures aimed at developing internal democracy. It is perfectly correct to say that many party leading cadres at all levels have encouraged and advocated, with sincerity and goodwill, the development of democracy. But let us review in a serious and objective manner the real results of these forms and measures.

One, the party chapter activities were recently expanded in the entire party. All party members were free to debate and argue about all of the matters that were mentioned in the draft 7th Party Congress documents. Through the discussions there appeared two kinds of opinion: unanimity (total or partial) and lack of unanimity (total or partial, and regarding different points). In all discussions, secretaries recorded both opinions in minutes. What is worth mentioning here is the fact that the discussions at each level regularly ended only with a session in which the superior echelons answered questions. These answering sessions normally were not long enough for them to clarify the matters that people worried about the most, nor the problems about which there still was a lack of unanimity as to how to resolve them. We do not mention here the level of knowledge of those officials who had to prepare for the superior echelons' answers, nor the level of knowledge of the very people who had to answer questions. There were many cases in which those superior echelons only read a statement that had been prepared beforehand, repeated

the points that the draft document already mentioned, and avoided the thorny questions that those people who had failed to agree asked them. The matters about which there was no unanimity were consequently "hung up" and postponed, with no time allowed for even a continued discussion with the answering officials, let alone arguing with them. The process of democratic activities was thus cut off, stopped, and ended before reaching its most important phase. The answering officials and the more superior echelons certainly felt that they had done their very best to develop internal democracy.

Two, a number of articles and statements expressing personal opinions on certain matters and appearing in the mass media never received responses from the responsible persons. Writers of letters that were sent to the organs, if they were lucky, would get standardized answering forms containing the same words, "We have received.... We appreciate...and will study...."

Three, in scientific symposiums, papers were presented, ideas were expressed, but without any participants being willing to agree with others and to debate with one another. And (I would like to apologize to the speakers for saying this) everybody happily left the symposium with an envelope, either thick or thin, in his hand.

We do not mention here the way of organizing the forms and measures to develop democracy (it usually was hurriedly carried out, without the necessary and sufficient time being spent on important matters affecting the destiny of the country as a whole and the party), the way of providing guidelines (the latter usually were one-way and lacked the necessary information that would allow consultations), and mostly the attitude of the responsible leading echelons (not everybody among them would sincerely and wholeheartedly listen to and respect the various ideas as the 6th Party Congress resolution requires).

In short, if the authors of the above-mentioned articles mentioned the right to be informed, I would like to mention the right to debate and argue within the party as the 6th Party Congress resolution mentions.

On the basis of the above-mentioned situation, I would like to suggest two basic matters, one long-term and the other immediate.

A. I think that as the level of knowledge within the party (both the theoretical awareness and experience accumulated through the struggle realities) has been raised, it is time for the party to study more positive regulations and guidelines on the above-mentioned paragraph in the 6th Party Congress resolution dealing with the development of democracy within the party. If the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] statutes clearly state that every party member can express and present his opinion to any party committee echelons, including the Central Committee, I think we should also clearly state the right of party members to debate and argue within the party. I believe that this is truly a major matter in the party's activities that needs to be carefully studied, with the pros and cons

being fully weighed and with the contents, scope, and way of organizing its implementation to be clearly defined. If possible, let us clearly state the position and attitude of the party regarding this matter in chapter 6 of the draft program, as well as in the draft document on party building and on revising the CPV statutes, so as to solicit the entire party for opinions.

B. At the present time, the different ideas that resulted from the wide discussions in party chapters on the draft documents have been summarized through many levels and presented to the CPV Central Committee. The matters about which there is unanimity or there is no unanimity have thus become known, along with the full arguments that accompany them. I wonder whether the Central Documents-Drafting Committee should select some of the most basic and thorny matters mentioned in the draft documents and organize debating and arguing about them in two forms. The first form is to open a number of symposiums on different scales within the party to deal with the specialized subjects about which opinions still greatly differ. Meetings will be open for people of the differing opinions to attend under the chairmanship of the Central Documents-Drafting Committee, which will aim at arriving at concluding ideas (to determine the right and wrong, the good and bad, among the different opinions) and notifying the entire party about such conclusions. The second form, in the case of the matters that can be presented to the entire party for open debate, is to open forums for exchanges of ideas and debates in newspapers and on the radio, with the same contents and in the same manner as mentioned above. When these forums and debates end, it is necessary to make public the final conclusions of the Documents-Drafting Committee.

As I am a combatant who took part in the party's armed forces in the pre-uprising period (May 1945) and have been actively serving in the army for the last 45 years, I have just presented my own suggestions to contribute to the public debate on the matter. I strongly hope to get responses in the party newspaper from the comrades who are responsible for this matter.

Transitional Steps in Building Socialism

912E0111A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 8 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by Phan Van Dang: "Some Thoughts on the Transitional Period in Our Rural Areas' Socialist Construction"]

[Text] The draft program and socioeconomic strategy of the party has been given to cadres, party members, and the masses for discussion and for them to offer ideas so as to allow the 7th Party Congress to pass it. With these new contents, the goal of socialism is further asserted and the steps to be taken in the transitional period also become clearer. This is a very major and very new matter having to do with the Vietnamese revolutionary undertaking led by our party in the modern time. Newspapers

have reflected the abundant and varied ideas brought about in the discussions of the matter. Here I mention only the few matters in connection with the guiding views on the process of building the new socialist rural areas. The responsible organs are studying and reviewing these matters and will propose them to the party.

In the last three years, our country's agriculture and rural areas have reached a new state of development, but the latter cannot be said to have become a historic border stone marking the stage of socialist construction in rural areas. Why did our country's agriculture and rural areas get into such a situation? We can say now we have seen the reason: We cannot afford not to distinguish the destination to be reached from the steps to be taken to arrive at this destination. Realities have shown that not only agriculture but also the entire national economy have made the same mistake, which deprives the socialist ideals of their persuading quality in the real life.

The realities of life have shown us the ways of thinking and acting that would be suitable for the law of objectivity. As we now look back, we are profoundly aware of the mistakes in our concept and work as we made cooperativization synonymous to "collectivization," i.e., in reality, not recognizing the right of ownership, making all private and individual interests secondary, and considering any claim to this right a concept of living totally strange to socialism. We thought that the sooner we accomplished "collectivization," the sooner we would have socialism, but the realities were opposite because such positions and policies worked against the will of the people and were contrary to the laws in the real life. About those mistakes, for a long time we raised methodological criticisms and said that they had resulted from impatient and hurried steps, but we did not see yet their party-line meaning. It was obvious that those mistakes led to many disadvantages not only in the economic but also in the political and social fields while the party was in power, and caused unprecedented harm to the relationships between the party and the farmer population. Consequently, we now profoundly understand this stern critical comment by Lenin: "The intention to use decrees and laws to establish the collective farming system will be a great stupidity." Our party has concluded that those mistakes had profound historical reasons and were the aftermath of many years of war; however, the main reason was the fact that we had been building socialism on the basis of a model being heavily dogmatic, molded, and subjectively voluntaristic.

Our agriculture occupies an extremely important position in our country's entire economy and social development. Here we conceive agricultural development in a broad sense, link it with building the new socialist countryside, and want to raise the level of all aspects of our farmers' capabilities. This long road, which is a job to be undertaken by many generations, cannot be trodden too subjectively and hurriedly as if we want to get things done quickly and then bypass the steps required by general rule. If we fail to see, nor to fulfill the needs of, the first steps of the transitional period, we will

be led to production relationships that are not only unsuitable for the production force but also contradictory to it. As of now, we must definitely abandon any kind of irrational coercion and create favorable conditions for agriculture to fully develop itself in the direction of producing commodities. Along this direction, let us strive to expand and step up cooperativization in accordance with the new cooperative economic system, in many different forms, and at different levels, with many ownership elements mingling together while moving in the same chosen direction and truly respecting the principle of working voluntarily and seeking mutual benefits. The new cooperative economic system in rural areas will be an important factor that creates the necessary rungs of the development ladder of the rural production force in conformity to the objective law of development of our country's agriculture. The road to large-scale production in agriculture is accomplished through the process of redistributing labor, socializing production, applying scientific and technical progresses, bringing industry to rural areas, promoting circulation of goods, expanding the market, and so on. These activities conform to the law of development of the commodities-based economy itself.

In the cooperativizing process, we must grasp the whole significance of the *household economy*, which is the cell of the cooperative system in various forms. The household economy is a suitable step in the tendency to develop cooperativization; the cooperative economy can flourish only on the basis of the household economy being liberated and developed. When we find a place for farmer households in production, we must see in this action a stimulation of the potential of the household economy under new conditions, for this economy is a base, both lasting and flexible, of the reproduction system in rural areas, and at the same time a motivation urging the household economy to cooperate with those who know how to do business in order to jointly expand production and the production and business-supporting services.

This process is widened and helps to accelerate cooperativization in rural areas in many forms and at different levels, with many forms of ownership in the multicomponent rural economic structure. In this process, human interests and individual interests particularly constitute a direct motivation for creating a base that will help to serve better the interests of the collective and society. Through the effects of the interest relationships we thus build the appropriate cooperative relationships. This process does not resolve only the matters having to do with the production relationships but also the ones that are related to the production force, and through them brings about the direction-setting results, which turn the process of socializing households' production into that of socializing the socialist production.

To affirm that farmer households are self-ruled economic units has to do with granting farmers the right to use farm land. The land problem contains rather complicated contradictions, not only economic but also

political and social. The recent distribution of land in many localities obviously was contrary to the process of collecting and centralizing land necessary for development of production of commodities and redistribution of labor. But these complicated contradictions must also be resolved carefully, gradually, and partially to ensure logical solutions and to avoid causing more troubles and complications.

Rural areas hold a key position in creating favorable conditions for the economy as a whole to "take off" in the chosen socioeconomic strategic direction in this decade. If in the near future we can resolve the matters systematically, without patchwork, and without stopping at the halfway mark, we will have the ability to stabilize things early and to achieve a new stage of development within our practical capabilities. In order to carry out these strategic intentions, in agricultural development we must closely put together agriculture, farmers, and rural areas in a unified state, i.e., we must put all economic, political, cultural, and social efforts into the construction of the new socialist countryside.

In order to carry out the socioeconomic strategy in rural areas, we must realize that the question of raising the level of understanding and work ability of the basic organizations there has a decisive significance. In spite of the remaining difficulties, if in the near future all echelons and sectors, from top to bottom, boldly carry out the renovating task and truly have confidence in and rely on the masses, we can be sure that "any difficulties will be overcome, any enemy will be defeated."

Observations on National Assembly's 8th Meeting
912E0104A Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 27 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Hoang Hai: "Observations From Eighth Session, Eighth National Assembly: Elected Representatives With Members of the Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Among life's burning and intense issues which the National Assembly representatives brought to the eighth session from all regions of the country, not so few were related to areas each member of the Council of Ministers had to address. Primarily because of this, on the agenda for this session, unlike previous ones, the National Assembly set aside time for the representatives to continue to ask questions after members of the Council of Ministers had responded to substantive matters. This change not only further clarified the function and authority of National Assembly representatives but also made the relationship between the representatives and each Council of Ministers' member closer.

The Cambodian Question Also Receives Attention of Haiphong Handicraft Industry Representative

At the outset, the National Assembly reserved an entire period of time for the representatives to discuss foreign affairs in teams. This has been reported fairly completely in the news. The 173 ideas expressed during the half day

of team meetings have proven that our country's National Assembly representatives' understanding of and attention to foreign affairs, despite poor conditions for regular information and limited opportunities for regular contact with the outside, has not become limited for these reasons. The point that came out of what the representatives said is that it is obvious that the elected representatives' foreign political vision is fairly extensive—politically, economically, scientifically, culturally, educationally and even in such fields as the work of cadres and the life of those who perform foreign tasks. Moreover, there also were opinions expressed about our foreign military and political strategies with each country, each region and over the whole world.

Certainly, even now, when the session has ended, all those fortunate to be involved in it will still recall representative Vu Thi Lien who, among her 10 questions, had one reserved for the diplomatic field. This was the question about the future of the Cambodian issue and our prognosis. If anyone there unintentionally or intentionally had heretofore underestimated physical labor without knowing anything about the world story, then let him consider this to be a lesson of experience. This is because in order to respond to the questioner, the representative of the Haiphong handicraft industry, Foreign Trade Minister Nguyen Co Thach had to spend not so little time out of the approximately half hour the National Assembly had set aside for responding to substantive questions.

When the Report Caused Trouble About Gold!

In the report on the status of combatting black marketing presented to the National Assembly on 5 December, there was a section from the minister of trade that troubled not so few representatives. This was the figure for gold and the value of black market goods for the past period. The main point of the concerns raised in the team discussions and submitted to the secretariat was: why in the report from the minister of trade was there a statement allowing everyone to understand that a not-so-small quantity of our country's gold was used to pay for black market goods? The questions had already been submitted, but their echo remained heavy in each of the representative's private conversations with one another outside the conference hall and during breaks.

It wasn't until the afternoon of 11 December, when Minister Hoang Minh Thang requested that the National Assembly permit the report to be clearer about combatting black marketing, that the representatives became clear about the gold situation and the black marketing story. Actually, so much trouble was caused simply because of an unclear and incoherent style of writing. To be fair, admittedly the minister of trade also was quick to recognize the careless point and correct it.

Furthermore, in the 20 December morning session, representative Pham Hung (Hai Hung), after hearing about the status of combatting black marketing, stated: "I don't have in hand the list of the 78 black marketing

agencies and units, but I did borrow it a while ago from the delegation that had it. Let me ask why the Ministry of Trade is only administratively prosecuting these cases and not turning them over to the legal organization for prosecution, even though these are huge cases?" This was a question to which everyone in the conference hall paid attention because the questioner was not only a National Assembly representative but also the presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court. Just as quickly as explained the time before, Minister Hoang Minh Thang promised to submit to the representatives the list of black marketing organizations as requested.

Candor in Questions...

On the morning of 20 December, after Minister of Energy Vu Ngoc Hai spoke at length about the power situation and the production of electricity not making enough profit now, he reserved a few minutes to answer questions about the power corporations that are building tremendous hotels which troubled the representatives. He stated that in order to do the building the power corporations had had to appropriate a portion of their own capital and that repayment was going as planned.

Arriving at the part when the representatives ask questions, Representative Nguyen Quyen Sinh (Ho Chi Minh City) raised his hand to pointedly ask: "Why is that business is not making enough profit yet there is enough of your own capital to build large hotels?" This was a question that seemed insignificant, but it raised a fairly tough problem. This was could it be that there are "false losses, real profits" or something else? This candor received response from the National Assembly representatives present at the conference hall that morning.

Similar to this, after the minister of labor, war invalids, and social welfare presented three scenarios on wages and life presently, a fair number of representatives expressed their views clearly, showing no sympathy. There were even representatives who recommended the necessity of abiding by National Assembly's resolution which is a minimum wage level equal to 45 kilograms of rice.

Now, when the session has ended, writing about these stories might have readers thinking that the atmosphere of the National Assembly at that time was tense. Not so. In fact, these mainly were the times National Assembly representatives gave candid views to members of the Council of Ministers. To us that's so.

...But Friendliness, Mutual Understanding of Each Other's Work

Even though there were moments of contributing views and struggling honestly with each other as above, were it not for this the friendliness and mutual understanding of each other's work among the National Assembly representatives and members of the Council of Ministers would have deteriorated. On the contrary, as we noted, virtually all the days of meeting at the conference hall had fairly complete participation by members of the

Council of Ministers, including members who were not National Assembly representatives. On the day of the session's adjournment, Minister Ngo Xuan Loc of the construction sector, although not a member of the National Assembly, also sat in attendance to the very end at 1730 hours even though he was very busy with preparing the summary of the sector's effort. Or like Minister of Labor Tran Dinh Hoan who also was frequently present, recording fairly completely the views of the representatives. He also was not a representative of the National Assembly, but he acted like one in mutual understanding of the work of the representatives. This was also the ministers' sense of responsibility to the people.

It would be wrong to note the results of the eighth session of the Eighth National Assembly without mentioning those who did the preparatory work. Here we cannot overlook all of the work done by everyone like the drivers, guards, receptionists, document distributors, lighting, etc. Please permit me to reserve a couple of sentences to talk about the people who typed the documents. So the representatives could have clean, accurate, and legible documents, the women had to concentrate efforts. From the evening of 20 December to daybreak on 21 December, all the typists stayed up through the night (till 7 o'clock in the morning) to finish the draft laws and resolutions of the session following changes by the representatives.

For the above reasons, and even things not mentioned, the results of the eighth session of the Eighth National Assembly truly merit acknowledgement before the country enters a new year—1991.

MILITARY

Colonel Discusses Issue of Mobilizing Forces

912E0107A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese Nov 90 pp 77-81

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Dong Minh Tai]

[Text] Recently, during maneuvers in the Ha Son Binh provincial defense zone, the rear service reserve forces carried on mobilization activities and opened a combat hospital on a large area. This hospital consisted of 148 reserve military personnel and had two operating rooms, and four emergency rooms. It was capable of giving emergency aid to 40-50 wounded soldiers a day, providing care to 300-400 wounded soldiers, and treating 150-200 wounded soldiers. The active duty program was carried on as scheduled with adequate forces and elements and the necessary means. The hospital was ready to receive wounded soldiers.

In the transportation sphere, three transport vehicles, two buses, two command cars, one crane, and three ambulances were mobilized. The technical equipment reception stations were improved in accord with the

requirements and on time. The time it took to receive each means was 3-10 minutes.

Based on the realities of mobilizing transport and public health forces in Ha Son Binh Province, the cadres monitoring this rated the exercise a success and recognized the great effort made by Ha Son Binh Province. From this, the sectors and echelons in and outside the military can see the position and tasks of mobilizing medical and transport reserve forces in mobilizing rear service reserve forces in particular and reserve forces in general. They grasped a number of elements in the mobilization process such as organizational methods, technical capabilities, the transfer process, the work of combat hospitals, ways to organize stations to receive technical equipment from the national economy, and so on. The reserve military and transport personnel who were mobilized formed work themes during the mobilization process, understood the responsibilities of each person in the training process, and were prepared to carry out the tasks when ordered. From this, it was possible to evaluate the combat readiness capabilities of the reserve medical and transport personnel of Ha Son Binh province and gain valuable experience for combat readiness tasks and future exercises.

However, from this, it is clear that there are still many problems that need to be studied and discussed in order to unify thinking and achieve unity in actual operations. This will enable us to evaluate more accurately the combat readiness capabilities of the medical and transport reserve forces, look objectively at the work of controlling, building, and training the rear service reserve forces of the agencies and units concerned and gradually perfecting the plans dealing with building these forces, and contribute to improving the quality of the reserve forces mobilized.

Above all, it can be seen that the way that these regular troop maneuvers was organized was too formal in nature for the training to be in line with the realities of mobilization. As we know, the reserve medical and transport forces of the province that participated in the exercise were notified ahead of time and assembled to make preparations 10-15 days before the start of the exercise, and the location of the exercise had been stipulated. With respect to a concept of responsibility to participate in this exercise, that way of doing things was an excellent manifestation. But this did not correctly evaluate the level of combat readiness of the reserve medical and transport forces during actual wartime conditions. In war, particularly at the beginning of a war, with the various forms of war and new strategies such as "low-level conflicts and partial occupation and partial invasion strategies," our preparation time will be very limited. It will be difficult to have such favorable places to set up hospitals and stations to receive equipment and vehicles. Setting up field hospitals with dozens of tents in unprotected areas that are difficult to camouflage and conceal and where it is difficult to set up air defenses and disperse things is not in accord with the realities of war. We can make use of our storehouses, schools, and clinics

that can be camouflaged and for which air defenses can be organized in order to maintain safety in setting up hospitals. This will ensure that things are done in accord with the realities of war and have training and educational significance.

The recent mobilization of reserve medical and transport forces was carried on in just a number of end elements of the entire mobilization process. At the same time, other very important elements that cannot be overlooked include elements from when the mobilization orders are issued and sent to the mobilization sources and the mobilization sources are assembled to when they are turned over to the receiving units and put into action.

In reality as well as in practice, when just a short order is issued, a small movement in one of the themes mentioned above will require close coordination among many related organizations and units. For example, when members of a field hospital (doctors, nurses, and other personnel) are mobilized when war breaks out, these people should not be mobilized from just one hospital in the province. Rather, based on the plan, a number of people and elements should be selected from various places from throughout the public health bases in the districts and province. They may be treating hospital patients, or they may be on leave at home or at work somewhere else. With respect to the reserve transport forces, the means of transportation of state enterprises, cooperatives, and private individuals are usually quite dispersed. They can operate within one province or within many provinces. It takes several hours or a day for vehicles to move a short distance, and it may take many days for them to make a long trip and depart from a district or provincial loading stop. How are we to transmit the orders directly to the personnel and owners of the means, that is, the reserve military personnel, so that they can implement the mobilization orders on time? If a number of people are busy with unexpected tasks and cannot be present at the assembly points, what will the leaders do? And so on and so on.

Another problem that must be mentioned is that through setting up technical equipment reception stations, we have seen that the coordination of activities of the forces concerned is still quite poor. Those sending things and those receiving things do not fully understand and have not carried out their specific functions. Many of the tasks have been omitted, or they have piled up. Could it be that planning and training in developing the mobilization of reserve forces are still encountering many problems?

The requirements of mobilizing rear service reserve forces in general and reserve medical and transport forces in particular are to provide enough good-quality forces on time and, after mobilization, immediately carry on specialized training. The target in holding mobilization exercises is to train the reserve forces so that they understand the requirements and tasks assigned them, improve their capabilities so that they

can undertake and complete the tasks, correctly evaluate the level of combat readiness of the reserve forces mobilized, correctly evaluate the registration, management, and building of reserve forces at the various echelons, and based on this, create a practical basis for studying and reviewing the mobilization of reserve forces.

From the exercises held in Ha Son Binh and a number of other provinces, we think that the leading problem requiring attention in mobilizing reserve forces today is to formulate plans and provide the reserve forces with training. The plans for mobilizing reserve forces must start from the political tasks, the economic and social development plans, and the national defense consolidation tasks of the party and state. At the same time, they must be based on the special characteristics, needs, and capabilities of each province and city. The plans must provide data and list the enemy's capabilities with respect to various forms of warfare. They must state the needs and requirements of reserve force mobilization, methods of organization, signals, orders, and specific actions when mobilization orders are issued. The more specific and accurate the plans, the better the mobilization of reserve forces will be. Also, the organizational mechanism will operate more quickly and precisely. If the general plan is specific and accurate, the plan to mobilize rear service reserve forces will be able to stipulate tasks. It will have a chance to develop its specialized tasks and, along with the other military and national defense plans, create a unified body.

In order to successfully implement the plans put forth, we must organize training. In training, we cannot hurriedly assemble forces when necessary in order to quickly complete the program and then "remain silent" again. Also, fearing the effect that this will have on the economic activities of individuals, units, and localities, some places have organized training on holidays and during work breaks. And some have not organized training at all, particularly among the reserve forces in the private economic sector. With such training, quality cannot be maintained, and this wastes manpower, money, and time. This also creates tension in thinking and a tendency to slight the combat readiness tasks.

To train the reserve forces well, the training contents and times must be clearly fixed depending on the way production is organized and on the requirements of the tasks and the specialties of the various economic elements of society. This must be regarded as part of the production and business plan. Training expenses can be paid for in part from the national defense budget and the national defense funds (of the localities and independent bases), or they can be added to product production costs (for production and business units).

In order to improve training results, besides improving the quality of the instructors and organizing efficient training methods, the contents of the training must be based on the real requirements of specialization in war and of implementing things when mobilization orders

are issued. With respect to the medical and transportation sectors, the contents can concentrate on organizing medical personnel, emergency aid, and transportation tactics during combat, fighting to protect transportation, and so on. With these specific contents, each year, the lessons must be renovated and improved based on the requirements of war, and an effort must be made to avoid repeating things year after year.

Concerning regular troop exercise methods, today, because the number of reserve medical and transport forces in the localities is quite large while the amount of money and time invested in training is quite limited, there will be many places that won't carry on regular all-round troop exercises. Thus, what training methods must we select to enable us to hit the targets and fulfill the requirements as discussed above?

The best plan for carrying on regular troop exercises for reserve forces is to tie this to exercises to change the state of combat readiness. Exercises can be carried on together with the zone defense exercises of the provinces and cities as we did just recently. However, exercises can be carried on separately by holding regular troop exercises for each element and dividing things into sections and elements. But the exercises must be very concrete, and they must be held regularly. For example, we can issue orders to mobilize reserve surgical forces of Hospital X to assemble at Y. Or we can deploy a military team at a communications center to issue orders regarding the movements of a number of vehicles of Corporation Z. They can be ordered to immediately unload their cargo and passengers in order to begin providing combat support. Orders can be issued and Military Unit K can be inspected regarding its capabilities to accept and move reserve forces.

Although the contents of regular troop exercises may be interrupted, the exercises must be carried on adequately from when the mobilization orders are issued and sent to the mobilization sources and the sources are assembled at the assembly stations to when materials and equipment are provided, political mobilization is organized, and the specialized tasks are carried out. Besides this, the choice of directions and drill locations must be in accord with the realities of war so that the reserve forces can carry out their tasks well if war does break out.

With such a formula for organizing exercises, in holding exercises, if we don't cut the contents and implement things in a symbolic and formal way, the units will have mobilization sources (the corporations, enterprises, and hospitals) and the military units will always be in a state of combat readiness and have plans to deploy and reinforce forces promptly (people and means) when the mobilization order is given. The reserve force mobilization plans of the provinces, cities, and echelons will always be inspected and revised. This will enable us to carry on training evenly and regularly and reduce training expenditures and time while improving quality.

Discussion on Concept of Depolitization of Army

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DAN in Vietnamese Nov 90 pp 70, 86-90

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Le Quang, MA in philosophy]

[Text] First of all, a simple question is, when people talk about "depolitization of the army," are they confused about this and is their way of expressing this wrong? As for understanding and capabilities for manifesting this, there can no longer be any doubts, because those academics who advocate "depolitization of the army" are all very learned people who are good at expressing their views. This enables us to go deeply into the substance of the targets and the political motivation of the "depolitization of the army" viewpoint. Not too long ago, a politician responded very candidly to questions organically related to the viewpoint that we are discussing. He said that the genius of Marx was that he invented the theory of class struggle. But he also said that we must now abandon the theory of class struggle. Abandoning the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle will certainly give rise to right-wing opportunism, which includes the concept of "depolitization of the army."

The revolutionary struggle waged by the international proletariat has proven that the proletariat can fulfill its historical tasks only if it is equipped with a spiritual weapon (Marxism-Leninism), mobilizes a large force (the masses of laboring people), has a vanguard unit (a real communist party), and has sharp tools (the state apparatus, in which the military plays a special role). Thus, "depolitization of the army" in the socialist countries would separate the army from the influence of the proletarian ideological system and the political activities of the proletariat with its credentials as the class that has the right to rule society. This would strip away the leadership rights of the communist party with respect to the army and isolate the army from the socialist state system. Thus, it can be understood that "depolitization of our socialist army" means making it "non-proletarian" in order to gradually transform a once revolutionary army into a "bourgeois" army.

Another question being asked by those who are skeptical about "depolitization of the army" is, Why is this necessary? No one can deny the great role played by the army in the class struggle of the proletariat and in the struggle to seize and hold power and defend peace for the people. Without this sharp tool, enemies both inside and outside would certainly have destroyed the revolution. An important question is, Is it necessary to strengthen the leadership role of the communist party with respect to all of society and the socialist state? Once there are no longer any conflicts between countries with different political and social systems, once the conflicts have been resolved and there are no longer any enemy forces, and once the conflicts between nations have been resolved, it

will be time for the communist parties to fade out of existence, and the armies will have to be disbanded, not "depoliticized."

But that is not the case today. The above assumptions are contrary to objective reality. That is a future prospect. That is a false picture painted by rightist opportunists, and no matter how beautiful it seems, it does not reflect life accurately. Because no matter how benevolent the leaders of the various countries are and no matter how great their humanitarianism, it's impossible to eliminate the political and class boundaries between countries with different political and social systems. The statements and minor reforms amount to nothing when confronted with the reality of the conflict between the working class and the bourgeois class and the conflict between imperialism and dependent peoples. The modern world is witnessing a fierce class struggle even though that struggle is controlled by the special characteristics of the age and the new developments in the economic, political, and social situation. Recently, there was a collision between socialism and forces of the enemy, and the battle is still underway. But many people want to do away with the very complex and violent reality of the struggle and have a dialogue in place of the theory of class struggle. The motive forces and political methods used in solving a number of important problems have revealed unprincipled compromising and exposed the fact that people are trying to take advantage of each other in order to gain control over other countries.

In reality, it is not because of the logic of action of the right-wing opportunists that the armies of the socialist countries have lost their combat targets when carrying out their internal and external functions. The army must be the tool of the working class, of the laborers, and of the socialist state. The desire to transform the army into the tool of individuals or a group of people must be resisted, because they are not outside politics and have very clear political objectives.

"Depolitization of the army" has exposed the desire of individuals or groups of people to seize control of the army. In order to do this, they must first attack the leadership of the communist party with respect to the army, do away with the political and class guidelines, and distort the principles of building the army on the political front. As a result of that, the revolutionary army will gradually degenerate and become a professional army just like a bourgeois army. It will no longer have the nature of an army that comes from the people and that fights for the people. In reality, even though they are not members of any party, individuals and groups of people can never stand outside politics or above classes. Those who are shouting the slogan "depolitization of the army" are actually very political people. Thus, it can be concluded that the concept of "depolitization of the army" is a ruse, a dangerous political trick, that has harmed the revolution and people and that will cause even more harm in the future.

In order to gain an even deeper understanding of the concept of "depolitization of the army," we must analyze the army's history of development in all respects. Today, true communists still have strong faith in the revolutionary and scientific viewpoints of the founders of communism with respect to the class nature of the army. Marx, Engels, and Lenin were the first to demonstrate the appearance of the army in connection with the appearance of economic and social inequalities among people. The birth of an army is organically related to the appearance of the state. At birth, an army is imbued with politics. It is the tool of a class, or to put it another way, it is politics.

History has recorded four types of armies in line with the types of states: armies of slave states, armies of feudal states, armies of bourgeois states, and armies of socialist states. And because of the special characteristics of the development process, a special type of army has appeared in the developed countries. The political and social themes are the main basis for distinguishing the armies of states in societies with antagonistic class systems and the armies of socialist states. For a long time now, bourgeois theorists have examined armies from a non-scientific standpoint. They view an army as an organization that rests on classes and that is outside politics and the political and social contents. For them, the use of the army has nothing to do with the relationship between political rule and submission. But the history of development of armies has refuted that unscientific viewpoint. In reality, an army always represents the interests of a certain class and, based on that, it carries out its internal and external functions.

Today, bourgeois academics continue to fabricate many vague points in the hope of proving the correctness of their illogical views in order to fool people. They have tried to make it seem as if bourgeois armies spring from the "people" in order to show that the bourgeois armies are neutral and have no relationship to right-wing parties. But regardless of the form, the "anti-people" nature of bourgeois armies and their relationship to the ruling parties cannot be changed.

I don't understand why people have intentionally refused to recognize the deception inherent in bourgeois theories on the relationship of the army to politics and rushed to apply these theories to armies in socialist countries. Is it that "depolitization of the army" is a theoretical development in building the new army? Clearly, there has been a merger between bourgeois concepts and the concepts of the right-wing opportunists in the communist parties.

The growth and success of the army of a socialist state cannot be separated from the correct leadership of the communist party, the nurturing and organizational activities of the socialist state, and the care and attention given by the people. The nature of an army in a socialist state reflects the unified and dialectical centralism of the proletariat and people. This is something that no army of

a state or society with class antagonisms has. The elements, principles of organization, and operations targets of an army in a socialist state reflect "the common denominator" of class and national interests and national and international interests. It is the political tool of the state and serves the people.

The complex political situation is imposing heavy tasks on our army. Above all, it must hold firm to the class position and effectively defend Marxism-Leninism, socialism, the communist party, and our socialist state. More than even before, it must heed the instruction of President Ho Chi Minh: Be loyal to the state and party and filial to the people. Attention must be given to the problems of a regulatory nature in building an army that is strong in all respects. The active and dynamic role of the entire system must be improved in order to strengthen the leadership of the party, solidify scientific confidence in communist ideals, heighten socialist awareness, maintain vigilance and combat readiness, and be able to distinguish friend from foe. Second, there must be great political sensitivity, and there must be many methods for opposing the plots and stratagems of imperialism and blocking the influence of right-wing opportunism.

In order to oppose the influence of "depolitization of the army" concepts, we must concentrate on solving the following pressing problems:

First, the sources and political motivations of the concept of "depolitization of the army" must be systematically studied in order to further clarify its anti-scientific and politically reactionary nature. Particular attention must be given to the relationship between this concept and the system of other basic concepts. There must be a theoretical and practical search for any merging between the plots of imperialism and anti-socialist actions by neo-rightist opportunists during the all-round crisis in socialism. The changes in the situation must be studied carefully in order to predict the direction of development of the armies of the countries that are controlled by the concept of "depolitization of the army" and to have scientific methods to block the influence of this on our country and army.

Second, the leadership of the party with respect to the army must continue to be strengthened. Based on analyzing the lessons in leading the army, we must start from the actual situation today in order to improve the party leads the army mechanism. The relationship between the system of one commander and the leadership of the party organizations and the role of the political cadres and party work, or political work, must be resolved. We must discover the irrational aspects that are limiting the influence of the communist party with respect to the army or the loopholes that may appear when we indiscriminately apply the experiences of armies of fraternal countries in our country.

Third, various steps must be taken to ensure that the entire party, all the people, and the entire army clearly

recognize the plots of the imperialists and the right-wing opportunists in destroying our socialist army with respect to ideology and organization. As for ideology, they are now trying to influence our cadres and soldiers, create doubts about the truths discovered by Marxism-Leninism, plant the idea of class reconciliation, do away with the class struggle, deny the superiority of and achievements of socialism, and praise capitalism and capitalist society. As for organization, they are concentrating on eliminating the leadership powers of the communist party with respect to the army, disbanding the political organizations and political cadres, and abolishing the party organizations in the army. They are trying to gradually remove commanders, officers, and other military personnel who have experienced challenges and who have strong political capabilities from important positions. They are trying to gradually change the recruiting forms and formulate policies in line with having a professional army. They are gradually creating suitable capabilities to form an alliance with the armies of the capitalist states. As for our army, in order to prevent this, we must firmly oppose all destructive activities concerning ideology and organization from the primary level units on up.

Fourth, the contents, methods, and forms used to provide the cadres and soldiers with political and ideological education must constantly be renovated and used in a sensitive manner. In the present situation, the enemy is making use of the all-round crisis in the socialist countries and using the loopholes and mistakes in reform in order to destroy us ideologically. Thus, there must be a profound understanding of the importance of political and ideological education. On one hand, the depth of the theoretical concepts must be increased, and we must find today's rich scientific and practical foundations in order to persuade people in political education. The effect and quality of today's political and ideological education is evaluated based on the role of education in solidifying people's confidence in Marxism-Leninism and in socialism and their recognition of the decisive role of the party's leadership in the growth and success of the army. On the other hand, because of the growth of the educational targets and the very subtle ideological destruction by imperialism, synchronized use must be made of the various contents and methods in order to have an effect on the targets. In the present situation, if only simple political lessons are applied, it will not be possible to carry out the political and ideological tasks and that will further weaken political and ideological education. The educational system must use measures that will have an effect on the cadres and soldiers through the results of scientific research and through the press and arts and letters. Dogmatism and rigid themes and methods and the imposition of political concepts must be overcome, and a high degree of independence in thinking must be manifested once the principles have been stipulated in order to form concepts and generate confidence.

In summary, the army is a political and social phenomenon whose appearance and survival is tied to politics.

Or to state this another way, the army is the child of politics and always bears the bloodline of politics. As long as the army is in existence, its fate will be bound up with politics. Politics bears the nature of some class. The question is, Which class? Naturally, the political content and political nature of the various types of armies in social systems with class antagonisms and armies in socialist states are basically different. It is the economic and social structures, and most directly, the state that will determine those differences. Thus, on one hand, we cannot deny the objective existence of the relationship between the army and politics or believe the lie of "depolitization of the army." On the other hand, we must have a concrete historical concept in order to analyze the relationship between the army and politics.

Building Combat Villages in Defense Areas

912E0106A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Nov 90 pp 15-19

[Article by Major General Vu Van Ba: "Building Combat Villages in District, Provincial Defense Areas"]

[Text] Throughout the history of our country's national construction and defense, our ancestors had been relying on villages to organize and to mobilize the people for the fight against foreign aggression, and to create a solid village-country combat position to guarantee victory over the aggressors. In the Tran Dynasty, during the war of resistance against the Chinese invaders, villages throughout the country—with the exception of three—had all risen up to fight aggression; the three villages that had refused to fight the enemy later found their names erased and tax exemption rights withdrawn for 3 years.

In the two wars of resistance against the French colonialists and the American imperialist aggressors, under the correct leadership of the party and Uncle Ho, combat villages were set up and developed everywhere and actually became the strong support for the all-people fight against the enemy. Combat villages were the strong base for achieving "all-people mobilization, all-people armament" and conducting the people's war; the sources of supply of abundant manpower and resources for the front; and the battlefronts that were made ready as unbroken links in a single combat chain to divide the enemy in his own strategy, military campaigns, and combat, and to create favorable conditions for the three arms to join with the people in achieving combat mastery and launching offensives against him.

Today, because of the fact that the country has been reunified, our people are concentrating efforts on carrying out two strategic tasks in accordance with the party line on renovation. Although the socioeconomic situation still encounters many difficulties, it is gradually getting more and more stable and moving in an encouraging direction toward development, which constitutes the basic advantages for building combat villages.

Combat villages are the base of the all-people national defense and the local people's war, and an important

part of the combat position as provided by provincial, municipal, district, and ward defense areas. In order to turn provinces and municipalities into strong defense areas, we must first of all build combat villages and combat neighborhoods.

The question that is raised today is how to build combat villages in terms of both long-term direction and positive steps (actual steps and measures to be taken to organize them). There are many different opinions regarding this question. Some people think that under present conditions, it is still inappropriate to raise the question of building combat villages and that we should instead raise only the question of building villages that are strong in terms of national defense and security to be closely linked with building totally strong villages. Other people emphasize that realities have proved the role and position of combat villages and that the views on and direction for building combat villages in provincial and district defense areas have also been clearly determined. Consequently, they say that it is necessary to strengthen the leadership aimed at building combat villages within the plans for building provincial and district defense areas. They say that not only pilot projects must be carried out but they must be quickly multiplied in order to build a network of strong combat villages and to create the village-country combat position within both the local defense and the national defense. We think that if the building of combat villages does not go beyond building only politically strong and economically rich villages without paying appropriate attention to the task of building national defense and security, it will not be sufficient.

Therefore, we wonder whether we should build totally strong villages, with priorities given to building politically strong and economically rich villages, build a base for gradually building them into strong combat villages within the combat position of provincial and district defense areas, and satisfy the immediate need for effectively encountering the enemy's total sabotage strategy, actively preventing and thwarting his attempts to sow disorder and armed rebellion, maintaining security and order, protecting the party, the proletarian dictatorial administration, and the fruits of the revolution at the basic level, and being ready to deal with any circumstances of war.

As the result of a study of the combat village pilot projects that were carried out in recent years, we can assert that in order to build combat villages and combat neighborhoods in provincial, municipal, district, and ward defense areas, we must first of all make the party committee echelons, administration, and people at the basic level clearly recognize the important strategic position of villages under both peaceful construction and wartime conditions; recommend the appropriate purposes, factors, and steps to be taken to satisfy the immediate and long-term tasks; and at the same time thoroughly understand the total renovation need suggested by the party for the period of construction at the basic level. The factors involving the building of villages

must be total, with political construction being the basis on which economic, military, national defense, security, and other construction will be carried out. There must be plans for carrying them out steadily one step after another, with importance being attached to the key and vital areas, with efforts being made to ensure that the plans are realistic and economical, and with attention being paid to quality and efficiency and to avoiding being showy and formal. The factors involving the building of combat villages and combat neighborhoods can concentrate on these basic points:

1 - The political construction first of all starts with building clean and strong party organizations, which really serve as the staff at the basic level and are fully capable of leading the people in the villages toward rallying around the party organizations to successfully fulfill the assigned political task. Each and every party member must have good moral quality and be exemplary in productive labor, daily activities, and combat activities so as to generate the confidence of the masses in the party, to strengthen party prestige, and to consolidate the blood-and-flesh relationships between the party and the people.

In political construction, we must attach importance to consolidating the mass organizations and groups, such as the Youth Union, Women's Union, Farmers' Association, Association of Elderly People, Veterans' Union, and so on. We must renovate the operating methods of these organizations by directing them toward realistic activities that benefit their members and effectively serve the country's political, socioeconomic, national defense, and security construction.

The building of combat villages and combat neighborhoods is an undertaking of the people, by the people, and for the people. Consequently, it must rely on the people, develop the true ownership right of the people, and encourage all people to take part in all of the work involving the political, socioeconomic, national defense, and security construction. We must on a regular basis teach the people the nation's traditions of invincible struggle, patriotism, and love for socialism, and at the same time educate them about revolutionary vigilance in the face of the enemy's destructive plots and tricks and about remaining ready to fight to defend the land and the fatherland. To properly carry out the above-mentioned work is to realistically contribute to building the combat position, in which the people's hearts become a support for developing the all-people strength to be devoted to building strong villages in peacetime, thwarting any enemy sabotage activities, and remaining ready to fight and defeat aggression in wartime.

2 - The socioeconomic construction is a very important task and a decisive factor that creates the physical strength of combat villages in district, ward, provincial, and municipal defense areas. In order to properly fulfill this task, each and every village and neighborhood, on the basis of its own potential capabilities and strengths, must set an appropriate direction for itself to achieve

socioeconomic construction and development and to improve every aspect of its people's standard of living. As for villages in the rural areas, they must exploit and further develop the strengths of land, forests, the sea, and so on; produce large quantities of agricultural, forest, and marine products, and foods, to satisfy the local people's needs; and create sources of accumulation and contributions to the state revenue. Wards and neighborhoods must also set the same direction as they draft appropriate plans for socioeconomic construction and development. The state has recently adopted many policies to encourage and expand production, and to create new motives for production development. This is a basic advantage for wards and neighborhoods as they find themselves under more favorable conditions to expand and develop various occupations, to create jobs for their surplus labor, to manufacture many products for society, and to contribute to achieving steady socioeconomic construction and development.

The plan for socioeconomic construction and development must be closely linked with the plan for national defense-security construction and consolidation within the framework of the overall plan for building totally strong villages. The linkage between socioeconomic development and national defense-security consolidation must be reflected in all such activities as building networks of waterconservancy works, roads, stations, barracks, and storehouses; making plans for population arrangement and distribution, and so on. Good socioeconomic development will create good reserves which guarantee abundant logistical support for national defense. We must have plans for building up reserves and guaranteeing strong logistical support at every level during peacetime so as to maintain their readiness for war. These plans must continue to be revised and improved in accordance with the needs of our villages' task and socioeconomic development. On the other hand, we must recognize the fact that the combat position of villages is a part of the overall combat position of district and provincial defense areas and that consequently the villages' plans for guaranteeing logistical support should serve not only their own needs but also, under certain conditions, the needs of the forces from higher echelons and the friendly forces that take part in the local combat activities.

3 - The military construction is one of the most basic factors in the building of combat villages.

First of all, we must **draft basic village (neighborhood) combat plans**. When we draft such basic combat plans, on the one hand we must rely on the assigned task and on the intentions and common defense plans of districts and provinces. On the other hand, we must rely on a general evaluation of our terrain, population, political situation, and capabilities, and a projection of enemy plots, tricks, resistance capabilities, and so on. On the basis of all that, we propose plans for fighting the enemy under any circumstances. As an immediate goal, the basic combat plans of combat villages must project and prepare for plans to thwart the enemy's overall sabotage

activities. These plans must be continually revised and improved to keep pace with any changes in the overall plans for building totally strong villages.

Secondly, **to build the armed forces** of villages and neighborhoods is a permanent need and at the same time a basic and long-term one. The villages' armed forces are the all-people forces which are organized and equipped with weapons of various kinds, with the militia and self-defense forces playing the key role. Consequently, we must first build the militia and self-defense forces, the villages' "main force" combat force, in terms of their political, ideological, and organizational capabilities, as well as their combat, combat-serving, and production capabilities. The organization and activities of the militia and self-defense forces must be placed under the direct and unified leadership of the party committee echelons, the supervision of the administration, and the command of the local military command. In order to improve the quality of the militia and self-defense forces, the important thing to do is to consolidate the ranks of cadres. Cadres doing military work at the basic level must have a knowledge of military and economic matters and have the capabilities of organizing and commanding the militia and self-defense forces in both combat and regular work, and serving local party committee echelons and administration as their staff in military work and in combining economic matters with national defense and security. The number of military cadres at the basic level must be sufficient so as to avoid the situation in which a single person has to be given so much work to do by himself. The militia and self-defense forces must be organized in such a manner as to conform to the characteristics of a local area in terms of its political situation, socioeconomic and cultural development, population distribution, geographical features, and so on; to have plans for development based on its wartime task; to be appropriately equipped with suitable weapons, both modern and rudimentary; and to attach importance to studying and widely using self-made weapons. We must regularly organize training for the militia and self-defense forces in accordance with combat plans for fighting the enemy, maintaining security, and knowing how to fight in an independent manner, as well as in coordination with other forces, in the terrain already prepared by villages and in other terrain in district, provincial, and municipal defense areas.

Thirdly, **to build the reserve forces** is a strategic task and an important factor in the building of combat villages. The reserve forces are the ones that are subordinate to the superior echelons but are located in local areas, which along with the mobilizing units organize and manage them. In order to improve the quality of these forces, these localities along with the superior echelons must be responsible for maintaining their accurate registration, strictly managing them, carrying out training plans, and following alert and control procedures as the regulations dictate. In peacetime, the reserve forces assist the militia and self-defense forces in a locality in

maintaining political security and social order and security, and in protecting the local party and administration. In wartime, they supplement in a timely manner the regular-army units.

Fourthly, **to build the combat position** of combat villages. This combat position is a national-defense one being a sum of political, economic, social, military, and security factors, with the position for combat being the key one. Militarily speaking, to build combat villages consists of building villages, hamlets, state forests, and enterprises into strong fortresses, which when linked together create a coordinated network of district and provincial defense areas. This network must ensure both strength and impenetrability; can fight the enemy from the front, the rear, and the flanks; must be able to stretch, encircle, divide, and weaken the enemy; and can force him to become passive and confused, thus creating favorable conditions for the forces from higher echelons to launch counteroffensives and offensives to destroy the enemy. In order to satisfy the above-mentioned need, the building of combat villages' combat position must be carried out in steady steps in accordance with the plans that are drafted in conformity to the plans for building the combat position in district and city defense areas, and in compliance with the principle of national defense being combined with economic matters. As an immediate need, we must concentrate efforts on achieving socioeconomic and cultural development, improving the people's material and moral living conditions, stabilizing the political situation, and thwarting all enemy sabotage activities at the basic level. As a long-term need, we must have plans for consolidating and building fortifications, battlegrounds, tunnels, caves, secret shelters, obstacle systems, and the logistical and technical bases, which include the things that can be done right away in the course of combining economic construction with national defense and the things that are part of the plans that may be carried out only just before combat action starts. In addition, we must also project and have plans for perfecting the holding position of our leadership and command under various circumstances, including the worst one, namely, the terrain being temporarily occupied by the enemy, for the purpose of maintaining direct and continued leadership over the people and armed forces in local areas.

Activities Relating to Defense Areas

912E0106B Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese Nov 90 pp 59-64

[Article by Colonel Pham Xuan Huyen: "Combat Activities of Provincial (Municipal) Defense Areas"]

[Text] To engage in combat activities is a basic factor in building provinces (municipalities) into strong defense areas. It is the principal method of achieving the goals and tasks of defense areas in the time of war. The results of combat activities reflect in a concentrated manner the

results of building all aspects of the defense areas in peacetime and the power of the local people's war in wartime.

The combat activities of defense areas are the combat activities of all the people in a locality, mainly of the local armed forces (which consist of local troops and militia and self-defense forces), the hard-core force of the all-people movement for fighting aggression in a province (municipality).

The basic meaning and at the same time the primary purpose of the view on building defense areas is to organize the troops and people in a province (municipality) to allow them to build an on-the-spot national defense potential, to let them organize their own strong defense and **be capable of defending themselves under any circumstances**, to contribute to creating a strong people's war combat position for the country as a whole, and to closely combine their combat activities with those of the main-force corps [binh doan] in order to defeat the aggressors.

As an immediate need and perhaps in several years to come, the need for the defense areas to fulfill is to thwart the enemy's total-sabotage strategy and various forms of partial armed-aggression activities, to strongly maintain political security and social order and security, to protect our national sovereignty on land, in the sea, and in the air, and at the same time to get prepared in every way along with the main-force corps to defeat the enemy in an aggressive war if and when he starts.

Under any circumstances, when the enemy attacks a locality, the defense areas must **fight back in time from the very beginning**; if the enemy is weak, they must destroy him and chase him from the locality; if the enemy is strong, they must continually weaken, destroy, and hold him back, gradually stop him, force him to be bogged down, reduce the speed of his attack, or force him to switch from the offensive to the defensive, thus creating favorable conditions along with the main-force troops for launching counteroffensives and offensives, first within the military campaigns and then moving toward strategic counteroffensives to score total victory.

It is obvious that the defense areas' task and need for armed struggle are very demanding. Therefore, in addition to building the leadership mechanism, building the combat position, building the local armed forces, building the material base, and organizing a guarantee of logistical and technical support, we must concentrate efforts on studying to find the **most appropriate and effective formula, method of engaging in combat activities**.

As we study and carry out exercises of defense areas' combat activities, many questions are raised: What is the basic combat method of the defense areas? What is the actual fighting method in each and every specific situation? Should the deployment and use of local troops be concentrated or scattered? Do local armed forces apply battleground defenses? Are provincial and municipal defense areas capable of launching military campaigns?

For all of these questions arguments will be gradually found to arrive at appropriate conclusions.

However, in order to come to a unified way of resolving actual problems, let us study and apply the basic principles on combat activities of defense areas, which have been mentioned in the official document of the General Staff.

This document suggests 10 basic principles on combat activities of defense areas. Each principle mentions one or two relatively specific matters. However, all 10 principles form a perfected general guide for all aspects of combat activities of defense areas. Therefore, in terms of perception, we should not underestimate any principle. Naturally, when we apply the principles, depending on the actual conditions and specific time frame involved, we can emphasize just a few particular principles.

In order to facilitate the perception and application of the principles, we can temporarily divide them into three groups (relative division). Each group consists of the principles that have similar meaning and guide the same kind of matters having to do with combat activities.

The first group of principles (consisting maybe of principles 1, 2, and 3) [Footnote 1] [The ordinal numbers of the principles are based on the document, *Guidelines for Building Provincial (Municipal) Defense Areas*, compiled in March 1989 by the Combat Operations Department of the General Staff.] generally deals with overall guidelines for *combat activities of various forces and branches of service in the defense areas*. We can think of the following major factors involving this group of principles:

The local militia and self-defense forces and troops make up the local armed forces and are under the leadership of the local party committee echelons and administration in terms of their construction, management, and use, and under the unified command of the local military organs in terms of performing the military task of defense areas. But the local militia and self-defense forces and troops are not identical with one another in terms of their nature, function, and actual task.

The militia and self-defense forces are the armed forces of the masses that are widely organized in all villages, neighborhoods, organs, state farms, enterprises, and so on. According to their natural distribution, militiamen and members of the self-defense forces are present everywhere. They form the people's hard-core force that fights the enemy at the earliest time and in widely scattered areas throughout a province.

The local troops are the regular troops who are organized at the district and provincial, municipal levels. Their function is to serve as "the main-force force" of the defense areas and coordinate their activities with those of the militia and self-defense forces during the fighting and guide them in combat activities. But because they are "the main-force force" of a province and municipality, they naturally must be in charge of combat

activities in the most vital and important parts of the provincial and municipal defense areas. Under the current conditions of their organization, equipment, training, and so on, in addition to their ability to coordinate their activities with those of the local militia and self-defense forces for fighting the enemy on a regular and continued basis, the local troops can also organize battles and military operations on a medium and small scale. Some people also think that along with the militia and self-defense forces the local troops can launch small military campaigns (within the concept of campaigns in the local people's war or joint campaigns).

The militia and self-defense forces and local troops always are closely linked together, support one another, and create favorable conditions for one another to fulfill their task. By the experience learned from the war of liberation, only if the militia and self-defense forces are active and operate effectively can the local troops find themselves under favorable conditions to conduct major battles and combat operations; on the other hand, only if the local troops are capable of conducting concentrated battles and combat operations can they motivate the militia and self-defense forces for engaging in combat activities.

Consequently, the first and foremost principle on combat activities of defense areas calls for *combining the widespread and continued offensive activities of the militia and self-defense forces in a province (municipality) with the defense areas of the local provincial and district troops in the key positions (the key defense areas), and combining the widespread and regular combat activities with the concentrated activities on a medium and small scale.*

We can see that the tendencies to deploy and use the local troops away from the militia and self-defense forces, to involve the local troops in defensive battle formations in the style of main-force troops, or to divide the local troops into small detachments so as to join with the militia and self-defense forces in fighting the enemy everywhere and on a regular basis without setting up key areas, nor conducting concentrated battles or combat activities, are all unsuitable for this principle.

In certain provincial (municipal) defense areas, particularly in important strategic areas of interest, in addition to the local armed forces, in peacetime and particularly in the time of war, there also are the main-force troops and corps [binh doan] of a military region or the ministry deployed there and assigned the task of protecting the key strategic positions (both inside and outside of the provincial defense areas), mostly the units of such branches of service as antiaircraft, infantry, engineer, air force, and navy. These units, along with the local armed forces, form the *on-the-spot armed forces* of the defense areas (this does not include the cases in which main-force mobile units are sent over to operate in specific periods of time).

The main-force troops and corps, whether they are regularly stationed or are mobile units sent over to operate in the locality, must rely on the people's war combat position of the provincial and municipal defense areas, closely coordinate their activities with those of the local armed forces, and provide the latter with guidance. On the other hand, *the local armed forces must also closely combine their own combat activities with those of the main-force troops and corps.* This is a principle that reflects a very basic factor of the military strategy, combining the combat activities of both the local armed forces and the main-force corps. This is also a new unique creative feature of the Vietnamese people's war military art, which has inherited the multifaceted and rich experiences in combining two forces and three branches of service. This art has proved its superiority and great strength in the realities of the recent war for the liberation and defense of the fatherland.

In short, the factors behind this group of principles affirm the view on the combined strength that is obtained from joining the all-people fight against the enemy with the hard-core forces and three troops—the main-force troops, the local troops, and the militia and self-defense forces—and the view on the function, task, and strategic position of each and every kind of troops in the fight for defense of the fatherland.

The second group of principles (consisting of principles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) deals with the relatively positive guidance factors having to do with the combat concept and the form and method of combat activities of defense areas.

We today build provincial (municipal) defense areas not for the purpose of turning each province and municipality into a defensive area having strong points and clusters of strong points, nor forming belts and lines in the style of defensive battlegrounds as in a war in the classical sense. We should not associate the concept of defense with that of the defensive.

To be on the defensive is a kind (form) of basic combat action aimed at preventing the enemy from attacking, weakening him, and destroying him while strongly defending a specific terrain. Defense has the same goal and task. The basic differences between defense and the defensive are the fact that defense areas do not consider the defensive a major kind of combat action, let alone the unique kind. Combat activities in defense areas apply many kinds (forms) of combat action, including offensives, counteroffensives, and the defensive, and organize fighting the enemy in various situations—when the enemy attacks, temporarily stops, is on the defensive, launches a military operation, and so on.

The principle of combat activities in defense areas is to *thoroughly understand the concept of actively attacking, being very active and acting on one's own initiative, and flexibly applying and closely combining the various forms of offensive and defensive combat actions.* Depending on the actual object of combat and at the same time relying on the task of each district and provincial (municipal)

defense area, we must apply the right deployment and use of forces, as well as select the most appropriate and effective form and method of combat action. Generally speaking, the local provincial (municipal) and district troops must be deployed and used in such a manner as to have both troops strong enough to defend the key defense areas and mobile forces to launch attacks on the enemy. The militia and self-defense forces must firmly cling to their locality, villages and neighborhoods, in order to fight; use various offensive forms and tricks primarily to weaken and destroy the enemy; and under any circumstances, maintain the right to be masters of the locality. With the concept of actively attacking and with rational deployment and a very flexible fighting method, the local armed forces are totally capable of implementing the principle of *both striking the enemy and stopping him in the front and thwarting all enemy counterattacking and encircling actions on the flanks and in the rear*. Even in the cases of temporary enemy occupation or enemy overrunning attacks, the local armed forces still can *rely on combat bases and secret caves and shelters to organize clinging to the pillar to remain behind enemy lines and to continue attacking command posts, storehouses, artillery positions, logistical transportation groups, and enemy troops in the rear*, thus creating for themselves the posture of mingling with the enemy, cutting up enemy troop formation, and forcing him to deal with them both in the front and in the rear.

Relying on the strength of the people's war in defense areas, taking advantage of and deepening the attacking enemy's weaknesses, the forces in defense areas, *by taking every possible measure, actively attack enemy logistical and technical communications and transportation, and seize enemy material resources to supplement ours*.

In a war of aggression, the enemy not only launches military attacks with troops from without but also joins with reactionaries within the country, wages psychological warfare and political warfare, and causes social disturbances. Therefore, being strategic units, provincial (municipal) defense areas cannot carry on solely military and combat activities but they must also *closely combine combat activities aimed at attacking the enemy from without with resisting and destroying the reactionaries inside the country, who cause trouble and arouse armed rebellion in the rear, and combine military struggle with other forms of struggle*.

Thus this group of principles not only sets no restrictions but on the contrary requires that combat activities of defense areas be very flexible and creative and be not so rigid and mechanical in terms of applying various forms and formulas for combat, other forms of struggle, as well as the scale and time frame for such activities. It is this flexible and creative fighting method of the local armed forces that has been devised into the formula for the local people's war. This formula, combined with the formula on waging the war with the main-force corps, is the law of development of our country's people's war art.

The third group of principles (consisting of principles 9 and 10) guides the other activities for the purpose of maintaining the fighting strength, guaranteeing the ability to fight for a long time in accordance with the law of the people's war, namely, the more to fight the stronger to become.

As we pointed out earlier, the task and need of provincial (municipal) defense areas require that they take care of building their own potential by themselves and defend themselves. (Naturally, this does not mean that the military regions and the central administration have no responsibilities for defending our provinces and municipalities.) Therefore, in peacetime construction, particularly in the time of war, we must stress even more the spirit of self-reliance and the sense of responsibility toward the lives and properties of millions of people. Defense areas must take care not only of fighting the enemy and stopping the enemy from committing crimes against the local people but also of the people's normal activities. In wartime, interruption of communications is something that can easily happen, particularly since our country is long and narrow. The sending of supplies from the central level to the provinces cannot avoid being cut sometimes. We must therefore pay attention to teaching the concept of the armed forces "fighting with whatever material resources available," seizing enemy properties to supplement ours, and *combining all relatively modern means and weapons with rudimentary and self-made weapons and using enemy weapons to fight the enemy*.

Consequently, for the country as a whole and for every provincial (municipal) defense area, we must achieve *both fighting and producing locally, both having combat activities and consolidating and building on-the-spot forces*. Only by so doing can we maintain our fighting strength, even in difficult times, and guarantee our ability to fight for a long time.

The above-mentioned factors clearly indicate that what involves in defense areas is not only the combat activities of the local armed forces but actually *the local people's war* (in provinces, municipalities, and districts) and *the people's war at the basic (village) level*. Therefore, combat activities of defense areas must be based on the strength of the local people's war and the people's war at the basic level.

Preparing Battle Grounds for Defense Areas

912E0106C Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese Nov 90 pp 71-76

[Article by Major General Vu Trong Ha: "Preparing Combat Position Works in Provincial (Municipal) Defense Areas"]

[Text] To prepare combat position works in provincial (municipal) defense areas is to make ready and equip in advance a part of a system of works in a locality in accordance with a basic combat design in a defense plan. First of all, this activity is aimed at ensuring an active participation on the part of the people and armed forces

in the locality in fighting the enemy, defending the locality, stabilizing production, and maintaining normal activities in the locality in the time of war. It possibly involves preparing the works for the mobile corps [binh doan] and technical branches of service to come to operate in the locality.

To prepare combat position works in a province (municipality) is to prepare a part of the territory for war, a factor that cannot be ignored in the building of strong defense areas. Combat position works reflect a part of the national defense potential and strength of the locality, and of the entire country as well, and are an important factor that creates the combined strength of the provincial (municipal) and district (ward) defense areas in the people's war. The stronger and more impenetrable the works are, the greater the locality's combat efficiency, initiative, and stability under any circumstances of the war will be.

For the time being, we are under favorable conditions for doing anything we want with our time and our territory, and building any appropriate works in each and every defense area. Therefore, first of all, **we must do good planning and draft total and scientific plans suitable for the actual situation of our locality and our country.** Each locality must outline a plan and devise a common rate of progress on the basis of the actual position, task, and capabilities of the province (municipality). The important thing is to weigh the pros and cons to see what works we should build first, or later, or just prior to an outbreak of military activities. Let us avoid doing things in a big rush and just for the form, which means expending a great deal of manpower and wealth without obtaining very good results; in other words, we must consider both the national defense need and the economic aspect of a project. Furthermore, to build combat position works in peacetime requires that secret be kept at a high level; therefore, the number of works to be built remains limited and normally is combined with the civilian projects that already exist in peacetime and can be usable in the time of war.

We also need to note that since the changes in equipment and weapons nowadays are very quick, the military art also involves a great deal of new development. Consequently, this characteristic must be taken into consideration as we build combat position works in defense areas so that we could ensure that the works would not become obsolete, lose their usefulness, nor be left unfinished. The works that we build in advance must serve as the base for the next phase of construction so that after an outbreak of war we would have to do only some supplemental and improving work before the combat position works could satisfy the combat needs.

Because of various geographical characteristics and the tasks based on strategic considerations, to prepare combat position works in the border and coastal provinces and in the heavily populated municipalities and cities involves different factors and needs.

In the border provinces, under any circumstances combat position works must be totally and carefully prepared; however, the measures, scale, and steps having to do with them must be suitable for the political, economic, and social situation of the country and locality. Right now, the combat position works of these provinces have been basically completed in a closed and uninterrupted posture, particularly in the important directions and vital locations. We must pay immediate attention to the localities ranging from the border villages and border defense outposts to the near-the-border districts.

As to combat fortifications, the border defense outposts can prepare in advance a number of lasting combat fortifications made of reinforced concrete or transform caves, natural shelters, and so on. Fortifications for use either to deliver fire or as shelters must be built in advance in appropriate numbers so as to cope with and resist unexpected enemy attacks and to hold our positions for a definite period of time. Later they will be improved to become a network of works for combat, hiding, normal activities, and so on of a border defense outpost. What needs to be studied is how to make the network of combat works of these outposts closely linked with the combat position of combat villages along the border and to combine them into a network of strong battlegrounds capable of fighting the enemy in all directions and under any circumstances.

The key enemy-stopping battlegrounds of the villages' militia and self-defense forces, which primarily consist of wooden and earthen fortifications, are built, reinforced, and continually improved during and after the annual military exercises, which the militia and self-defense forces must perform in accordance with their regular training plan. Units of local troops in districts and provinces must build a number of lasting works in the peacetime permanent locations where they are stationed, and perhaps in some remote locations which in the future will become key enemy-stopping battlegrounds or key defensive areas in the time of war. The lasting fortifications being built here can be made of solid concrete or they can be transformed caves and tunnels. The fortifications to be used by the command posts of provinces and districts must also be prepared in advance; however, they must be blended with the civilian works of a locality, should not be built unexpectedly, and must always be camouflaged in order to keep their combat design secret. Mines and industrial enterprises near the border, in addition to the works that they use for protective purposes, can also prepare a number of lasting fortifications in peacetime, which can be used as regular training facilities of the enterprises' self-defense units and at the same time serve as battleground bases later.

In the border provinces, the best and most convenient *barriers and obstacles* are the "living barriers." We must plant more trees (thorny trees and timber trees) and use them as fences to keep our animals in and to fend off enemy commando and reconnaissance forces; if trees are planted in a calculated manner, they can be effective

obstacles to stop enemy tanks and infantry troops in the time of combat. We need to select the kinds of trees that are suitable for the soil and climate in a locality. We must fully use water conservancy canals and ditches in the highland and the fire-stopping forest-protecting moats, and later combine them with mines to form enemy-destroying traps. As to explosive barriers, except for the mines that are "manufactured on a trial basis" and supplied by the superior echelons, all explosives must be stored in warehouses and placed under tight management in accordance with peacetime regulations. However, all localities must always have plans for using various kinds of explosive barriers to cope with the situation in the time of war.

The road network also is an important part of the combat works and must be prepared in advance. The primary interest is to fully use the roads that serve the people's livelihood, to make them serve national defense purposes, and to pay attention to using the military roads, which had been made in a hurry in the previous wars. In the localities and areas where there are few and greatly scattered roads that do not satisfy the needs of mobile forces (particularly in the areas where we anticipate the participation of motorized forces, tanks, and armored vehicles in combat action), there must be plans for repairing and improving roads and enlarging the road networks. We can rely on rivers, streams, and dried brooks to make roads for mobile units, for attacking units, as well as for forces retreating to and dispersing in the rear.

We must prepare sources of water in areas of rocky and high mountains, where water is scarce (particularly in the dry season), and step up the building of dams and reservoirs, which are used by the people in their daily activities and for watering in peacetime and satisfy military needs in wartime.

The measures taken to camouflage individual targets, different battlegrounds, as well as whole areas must be partially carried out in peacetime. The most simple and best way is to avoid building military works in an unexpected manner, to try to combine and mingle the military and civilian works, to draft plans for the civilian works that will be useful in wartime, to carry out afforesting activities, and so on.

In the coastal provinces, to prepare combat position works must consist of preparing combat position works for the offshore islands, coastal combat villages, local troops, and main-force units stationed in a province (municipality).

The combat position works on offshore islands must be prepared on the largest scale possible as the capabilities of the islands allow so that they could both resist the infiltrating activities of enemy reconnaissance and commando forces and defend themselves against unexpected attacks by enemy infantry troops, marines, warships, and air force. In a short period following an outbreak of war, the ability to move people to inland areas is very limited.

Therefore, the army and people of these islands can rely only on their own forces and aid from the superior echelons, as well as on the works that exist there, even after a part or most of the islands have been seized by the enemy. This fact requires that the combat fortifications used by the armed forces of these islands be prepared on a larger scale than in inland areas. In the more important islands, where topographical conditions allow, we should build combat position works, first of all command posts, storehouses, and surgical stations; dig tunnels; and fully use and transform caves into strong fortifications capable of protecting us from biological and chemical weapons.

We must fully exploit any topographical and material features that we find close to our houses and neighborhoods, and fully use and transform caves and canals into fortifications to provide the people with the means to protect themselves. To prepare barriers to fend off troop landings on the islands, with the immediate activity being afforestation, must be gradually carried out and aimed at ultimately creating a network of combined and highly effective barriers.

In addition to the above-mentioned work, the islands must also build combat bases. These bases primarily rely on topographical features and exploit the impenetrability of such features to remain strong. Combat bases must be linked with the key defensive areas on the islands and use secret grounds and terminals to communicate with the inland areas in the case they are surrounded or they must fight to hold back the enemy.

To prepare combat position works for the offshore islands is a job that is both independent and linked with the job of preparing the same works on the nearby shore. The network of offshore island works provides us with a place where we organize our forces to observe, discover, and fight the enemy from afar; to stop, hold back, inflict losses on, and destroy the enemy; and to thwart his scheme for unexpectedly landing on the shore. On the other hand, the network of on-shore works must be a closed and strong one and provide the islands with the most effective aid. Long-range artillery battlegrounds, airfields, and terminals must be planned and built in prime locations on the shore. The networks of coastal villages' combat works must not only provide protection but also fulfill the task of providing the islands with aid and setting up combined combat action with them. Many coastal villages must also dig secret shelters and tunnels in order to cling to the terrain and to fight the enemy following his temporary occupation of a locality. However, in the present situation, to build combat position works for the coastal combat villages mainly consists of preparing the more important ones, which will serve as the base for building improved networks following an outbreak of combat activities. We should not build too many combat works everywhere for the villages because these wooden and earthen works cannot survive for long the coastal weather and climatic conditions.

As in the case of the network of fortifications, the materials that are locally available must be fully used by the coastal combat villages to build the barriers used to fend off enemy landings. Following an outbreak of war, they should build in water rafts made of bamboo and nua (a species of slender bamboo), combine them with barriers made of tree branches, and lay among them locally-made waterproof mines. Along the edges of the body of water they can lay the various kinds of antitank and antipersonnel mines, which are either supplied by the superior echelons or locally made. Mines-, spikes-, and grenades-firing traps, used to kill enemy landing troops close to the shore or following their landing, must be combined with ambush locations outside of villages. However, in peacetime, we only prepare the key combat position works and, in most cases, only planning takes place along with confirmation of the selected locations. The common and most effective measure we can take now is to plant rows of trees along the shore, to build dikes to contain the salt water and sand, and to build the works that combine economic goals with national defense.

We must carefully prepare the supplying of water to the troops and people in coastal areas, particularly the islands, during the time of combat. First of all, we must step up the digging of wells and building of tanks of the right capacity; at the same time, we must continue to study the more effective methods of desalinization.

The networks of battlegrounds and defensive areas of the local provincial and district troops in the coastal provincial defense areas must be very closely linked with the combat position of villages in the areas and combined with the networks of battlegrounds of the main-force units subordinate to the superior echelons (if they are both stationed in the same location). We must concentrate efforts on building the works in the major locations where enemy landings would be expected, as well as in the communications axes through which the enemy could attack deep in the inland areas. In peacetime, we also prepare only the key and larger fortifications so as to be ready to fight back immediately after an unexpected enemy attack.

In the coastal provinces, particularly the delta and areas where there are rivers and waterways, we must pay special attention to preparing in peacetime the network of roads to be used by mobile units and for retreat. This network of roads consists of roads used by infantry troops and by armored vehicles, river routes, and airfields for the landings and takeoffs of helicopters (not including military and civilian airfields on the coast in these provinces, which are under the management of the superior echelons).

The coastal areas usually include a large network of canals, ditches, rivers, and streams. In peacetime, we must improve and turn them into the means of mobility for small forces (which use junks or amphibious means) during combat action, as well as the routes used to

evacuate the people, to send wounded and dead soldiers to the rear, and to ensure retreat routes for our detachments.

Our country's coastal areas often have beautiful tourist sights and resort areas for both our people and foreign tourists. Consequently, when we build the works, we must take appropriate measures to keep them secret and at the same time avoid destroying the natural beauty of these areas.

In the heavily populated municipalities and cities and in the political and economic centers, what is of topmost importance is to prepare the works in order to fend off enemy air attacks.

Enemy activities in the air usually are unexpected and involve a high density of bombs and shells expended in a short time. Therefore, the key targets in municipalities, such as airfields, ports, railroad stations, fuel storages, information centers, radio and television stations, leadership and command centers of the party and administration, and densely populated areas, must all be protected by defensive and protective fortifications. These fortifications can rely on the terrain and be built in the ground floors of high-rise buildings and in the basement of organs and enterprises. The combat fortifications for use by the local armed forces to fight enemy aircraft at low altitude are built only for the units being directly involved in combat, and are not enlarged or fortified until the state of combat readiness is moved to a higher level.

In peacetime we are not required to build defensive and protective fortifications on a large scale for the people because they are both expensive and disruptive for the people's daily activities. However, planning and preparing for construction plans aimed at quickly building them with locally available materials must be calculated right in peacetime, along with the measures to execute such plans within the shortest period of time.

In the municipalities and cities where there are axes of national routes or where interprovincial roads cut through and there are no alternate routes, we must build beltways within the framework of the localities' plans for socioeconomic construction and development. We must also carry out step by step the plans for building detour routes to avoid the key locations that can easily be attacked and destroyed by the enemy in wartime, such as large bridges, terminals, gasoline and oil storages, or economic and military targets.

We must do our best to avoid planning the use of the same roads for evacuation of the people from urban areas to the suburbs and for transportation of weapons, or for mobile forces to go through and for a rearrangement of combat position. We must have plans for using and protecting these road networks, which include land roads, river routes, railroads, and air routes (if any) for evacuation of people and for use by mobile forces in the time of war.

As for resisting enemy air attacks, in addition to organizing fighting back, destroying enemy aircraft, defending targets, and limiting losses, to organize and carry out the task of overcoming the aftermaths of such enemy attacks is also very complicated. This work consists of fighting fires, rescuing victims, restoring communications, disposing of unexploded bombs and shells, and quickly stabilizing normal activities in the municipalities. To prepare combat position works for overcoming the aftermaths of enemy air attacks consists of making organizational preparations, deciding about the use of forces, and actually building the works to be used to overcome these aftermaths. This work primarily involves the full use of the means and organizations in a locality in accordance with a common plan drafted by the provincial people's committee.

To prepare combat position works for resisting enemy air attacks must be planned in a thorough manner, but there must be key points in the plans. Preparations primarily will involve planning and be combined with daily activities, in accordance with the locality's annual plan for socioeconomic development. There should be specific exercises aimed at this task to allow the locality to be familiar with the matter and at the same time to check the accuracy and practicality of the works.

With the country's large municipalities and political and economic centers, such as the capital city of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, we must actively study in a scientific, rational, and highly effective manner arranging a location for the network of works for our "electronic struggle" units. This also is an active and most effective measure we can take to resist the enemy's very dangerous trick of carrying out unexpected air attacks and to ensure the strength of our municipal defense areas.

ECONOMIC

VFF Holds Meeting on Socio-Economic Situation

912E0109A Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese
20-26 Nov 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Khanh Duong: "The Cadre Organization and Ideology Tasks Must Be Completely Renovated"]

[Text] [Editor's Note] Recently the presidium of the central committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front [VFF] met and expressed determination to contribute to resolving the nation's urgent socio-economic problems. At present, the Front is organizing a mass struggle movement against corruption, black marketing, and waste and to protect domestically produced goods. Beginning with this issue, the newspaper DAI DOAN KET will publish opinions regarding the nation's urgent socio-economic situation, in hopes that the responsible organs of the Party and state will have a basis on which to take steps to resolve it. With the enthusiastic assistance of the Fatherland Front in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, on 23 October 1990 the editor-in-chief of the newspaper DAI DOAN KET had a useful meeting with

representatives of retired mid-level and high-level cadres in the locality and with intellectuals and industrialists in the municipality of Da Nang. [end editor's note]

Regarding Urgent Socio-Economic Problems

The opinions concentrated on analyzing the initial accomplishments of the great undertaking of renovating the nation in accordance with the resolution of the 6th Party Congress. At the same time, the conference discussed and analyzed the principal problems in our economic management during the recent period: we do not yet have an economic-financial development strategy and there has been a lack of guidance, which have resulted in spontaneous, unorganized development.

Attorney Huynh Ngoc Loc, Municipal Industrial Association:

With resolutions 306 BCT, 76 HDBT, and 217 HDBT, I believe that during the recent period the Party and state have taken many steps to resolve economic problems. But to date our accomplishments have been very limited. Many production installations are very stagnant.

Why has our economy not been able to advance? I believe that we do not yet fully realize the complications in economic management since the ending of the subsidy system. The autonomy of the production-commercial units is very great but merging and consolidation have not been done well and have all but been ignored and neglected in management, especially in the banking and credit sector. Many production units are stagnant because we do not yet have an economic-financial strategy. Although occasionally changes have been made, in essence they are incomplete and are of a patchwork nature. The state economy is very important but lacks the necessary investment and there is as yet no truly dynamic model to study.

The lack of orientation inevitably leads to spontaneous, unorganized development, the abandonment of production, and plunging into commerce and services because they are very profitable. The situation of competition in buying, price gouging, and black marketing is very widespread and has resulted in the corrupting of many cadres.

Mobilizing the people's surplus money is a correct policy, but if we do not take effectiveness into consideration or rationally regulate input and output we will kill production. Indeed, it is a mistake to lower interest rates on savings accounts twice in one month. In addition, there exists the situation of the bankruptcy of large numbers of credit funds.

Comrade Vo Thu, a Lieutenant General and former deputy commander of Military Region 5:

Our disease is talking a lot but doing little, doing things half-way, or not doing them at all. The press has uncovered many incidents but they still have not been resolved. What law permits the setting up of credit funds to deceive the people and expropriate their money?

What law permits black marketing incidents to be handled only internally? How many cadres and party members lost money in the Thanh Cong credit fund? If a ship had not sunk off the coast of China, when would the major smuggling incident at the Commercial Corporation of Hoa Vang District have been brought to light?

Comrade Pham Duc Nam, former chairman of the Provincial People's Committee:

Is our economic situation still beset with many problems because we have not made correct evaluations and found the disease, or is it that we have found the disease but no one has treated it? I believe that both are true. The inevitable result is that society has no order.

Last year our country experienced five major "fevers": cement, fertilizer, insecticides, rice, and banking and credit. With regard to credit, the state lost more than 800 billion dong. Who had to bear responsibility? No one. I admit that I believe the central echelon has not strictly criticized itself. When there was a fertilizer shortage the Soviet Union was blamed immediately. That was too simplistic.

Comrade Vuong Tuan Kiet, a Major General and former deputy commander of Military Region 5:

The resolution of the 6th Party Congress was very correct and pleased the people very much, but the situation has not changed very much because the central echelon has not given resolute, thorough guidance. Party crimes should be treated harshly but are treated lightly. The voice of the people at the local level is very clear but the central echelon has not caught them all.

Comrade Hoang Van Chung, vice chairman of the Attorneys' Association of Quang Nam-Da Nang:

I believe that a considerable number of party members have degenerated, including quite a few in positions of authority. The people have lost confidence in the Party primarily because of them. There exists the situation of there having taken form in the Party a group of people who have grown rich illegally. They do not do the work of the Party but only concern themselves with matters related to their personal benefit. Individualism has developed to an alarming degree.

Fight Corruption and Black Marketing

Everyone agreed that corruption is a disease that is difficult to cure and is seriously sabotaging our social order, so why, since corruption exists, do no resolutions or directives explicitly mention it?

Comrade Vo Thu:

Corruption has developed to a serious degree. What can be done to fight it? In the past our ancestors had the expression, "Treat poison with poison." But now people say, "Treat corruption with corruption!" That is very hard to believe, isn't it? The spread of the disease of

corruption has enabled many people to sit around doing nothing but still have an income and still cause trouble, even to be promoted.

Comrade Hoang Van Chung:

Black marketing has taken form in an unorganized manner and dominates the economy of the entire country. The slogan of fighting corruption has been set forth, but the important questions are who will be fought and who will do the fighting. In the past there were usually only corrupt officials. In order to fight corruption there must also be honest officials. Only when democracy is built on the foundation of the people's state can there be hope of fighting corruption.

Urgent Corrective Measures:

The principal factors, as many comrades said, are the ideology and cadre organization tasks. How must they be corrected? Everyone agreed that only with rapid renovation can the organization and cadre tasks be completely rectified.

Comrade Pham Duc Nam:

I believe that it is necessary to concentrate on correcting the irrationalities in the distribution-circulation (banking, finance, and credit) sector, monetary stabilization, and the resolute reorganizing of production. Enterprises that are no longer able to survive must not be rescued. This year the National Assembly promulgated many laws, but the important matter is that the laws be made part of life. Comrade Vuong Tuan Kiet:

An urgent mission at present is to organize the people and rally them in the spirit of the recent Resolution 8 of the Party Central Committee. If the people cannot be rallied they can have no strength. No one can fight corruption as well as the people.

The people are now very much in need of the specific concern of the central echelon. The era of "living by potential, eating by tradition" is over.

Attorney Huynh Ngoc Loc:

I would like to recommend the following measures:

There must be an over-all plan regarding production and a suitable investment environment must be created to attract capital. It is necessary to set standards for cadres. Managing cadres must study at administration schools, financial schools, etc. The legal organs should have funds to reward integrity.

Mr. Le Cong Thuc, Quang Nam-Da Nang Industrial Association:

I recommend that the state be managed according to law. Legal documents must be specific. All citizens must be conscious of respecting the law, and it is especially important for cadres to be exemplary. The importing of contraband goods and goods our country is capable of producing and produces well must be strictly forbidden.

Producers of counterfeit goods must be strictly punished. We should import machinery, equipment, materials, and raw materials in order to promote production. International relations should be expanded and dialogue should replace confrontation. Economic relations with foreign countries must be strengthened and the investment law must be made part of life. There must be a clear, specific, long-term economic strategy, not a patchwork one.

Organizations Contribute Ideas on Party Documents

912E0112A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Jan 91
p 3

[Article by Tran Su, Ministry of Interior]

[Text] Recently, all 23 party organizations and party chapters directly subordinate to a party organization of the Central Security Party Committee held debates and contributed ideas to the draft program and economic and social strategy. Almost all of the people agreed that disclosing the program and strategy in today's situation is necessary and urgent. These important documents manifest the will power of the party and the hopes of the people in the face of a situation in which socialism is entering a critical stage and the world economy is undergoing complex changes.

Based on a profound analysis, the party members subordinate to the people's security forces contributed many concrete ideas to these two draft documents.

Concerning the program, many people said that the party has shown a serious attitude in evaluating the mistakes and shortcomings in guiding strategy. But the lessons and experiences must be scientifically rearranged and have greater persuasive power. "The revolution is of the people, by the people, and for the people" must be considered to be the No. 1 lesson. "Raise high the banner of national independence and socialism" and "coordinate the strength of the people with the strength of the present age" must be combined to form the second lesson. The third lesson is "the leadership of the party is the decisive factor in the successes of the Vietnamese revolution. Party unity must be maintained just as a relative would be protected." A number of people suggested that the fourth lesson be "obeying objective laws," because this is a very important problem in putting forth lines, policies, and positions. This also has great significance in the renovation activities being carried on by the party and people.

Many people said that the problems discussed in Section II are too general and that some of the points bear traces of the old way of thinking. The program cannot be specific, but in order to unify understanding, it must set directions. The program must provide an overall picture of the present situation, that is, the basic conflicts of the age and of Vietnamese society and, in particular, of socialism in the present situation.

As one of the activist and assault forces on the national security front, the members of the party organizations have studied and carefully analyzed the contents of Section IV of the draft program. Almost all suggested dividing the contents on national defense and security and the foreign affairs policy into two separate sections (a national defense section and a foreign policy section). International trends, the changes in the socialist system today, and the specific circumstances of our country require this. The passages on the position, functions, and tasks of national security work and the maintenance of social order were viewed as clear and correct. But as for the cadres and people's security forces completing their tasks, such explanations lack regulations to provide the necessary conditions. "The people's security forces have been built solidly based on regular and modern guidelines." But what is decisive strength? What is being done to provide political, occupational, cultural, scientific, and technical education to the public security officers and non-commissioned officers? How much attention has been given to the material and spiritual lives of the cadres and forces and to the public security rear area policies? Views on these questions must be manifested in the program. Another problem that is just as important is that the party and state must implement policies and procedures suited to the people's public security forces to ensure that these forces remain armed combat forces that are absolutely loyal to the fatherland and people under the leadership of the party. The public security forces must not have to engage in economic activities reluctantly as in the past period, which affected the role and prestige of an administrative organization. The work of studying and producing means to support the requirements of the specialized work of the public security forces must be concentrated in one center.

Almost all of the people in the party organizations proposed combining sections V and VI, because this is a program to build socialism (in the transitional period), and the Communist Party is an element in the country's political system. The problem is, the party must be renovated in all respects, particularly with respect to leadership formulas, so that its leadership role throughout society is affirmed. The party must avoid undertaking things in place of other organizations. The functions and tasks of other organizations, particularly social organizations and mass organizations, must be delineated more clearly and scientifically.

As for the economic and social stabilization and development strategy, many people proposed making "national budget economization" the sixth point in Chapter I, "Development Viewpoints," of Part 2, "Development Viewpoints and Targets." The serious effects of the period of bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies and the waste and corruption have made our poor economy even poorer. In the developed countries, economizing is always considered and even holds a leading position in economic development viewpoints. Because of this, in a poor country like Vietnam, this problem must be given proper attention.

As for "strategic targets," the objective and subjective bases must be analyzed in order to "stabilize and develop the economy and society and improve the lives of the people." The goals are to provide jobs for laborers, greatly reduce the population growth rate, eliminate the slums in the cities, and rebuild most of the houses in the rural areas, but nothing has been said about how this is to be done. A number of people proposed implementing unified policies and rewarding and fining people in order to implement family planning effectively.

In a number of spheres of social policy such as education and training, public health, and culture, it must be clearly stipulated that the state must provide help in manifesting the superiority of socialism. The state must give attention to things in order to stop the present decline. It must restore the cultural and educational achievements scored during previous decades and use this as a precondition for future development.

Many party organization members and troops who are experiencing hardships in various areas of the fatherland hope that the policies on mountain areas that are promulgated in the final decade of the 20th Century are implemented in all respects. This must be done in order to gradually reduce the gap between the mountain and lowland areas and improve the material, spiritual, and cultural lives of the minority groups from the remote northwest to the great Central Highlands.

Comments on Sudden Increase in Rice Prices

912E0119A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
27 Dec 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Dao Viet]

[Text] Since 7 December, the price of paddy in the north has skyrocketed. In Hanoi, in just two days the price of tenth-month rice increased from 1,500-1,600 dong per kg to 1,900-2,000 dong. In the days after that, the rate of increase slowed, but the price continued to go up. Today, the price is about 2,600-2,700 dong per kg. Rice prices have also increased in other localities, including provinces such as Thai Binh, Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh, and the central coastal provinces that have sufficient rice.

Is there anything different from previous "rice crises?"

Some people say that the sudden increase in paddy prices this time is not due solely to psychological factors. Prices have been affected by the recent increase in the price of other goods when calculated based on international prices. (The price of gasoline has tripled, the price of electricity has more than doubled, the price of cement has almost doubled, the price of iron and steel has gone up two-three times, and the price of fertilizer and insecticide has increased.)

But in spite of this, the sharp increase in paddy prices today is abnormal in view of the fact that the wages of workers in the state sector have not increased.

Some people have said that this is a reflection of the relationship between supply and demand with respect to grain. That is, there is not enough grain to meet the demand. Nationwide, this year's grain yields reached more than 21 million tons converted to paddy equivalent, which is equal to 98.5 percent as compared with 1989. In this, the southern provinces have had a good harvest, with yields exceeding those of last year. As for the northern provinces, yields for the year declined 300-400,000 tons as compared with 1989. But that decline would not be large enough to cause grain instability in the northern provinces as long as grain activities continue on as normal.

The imbalance in the relationship between supply and demand for grain must be examined from the standpoint of the grain forces controlled by the state, the needs that the state must satisfy, and the psychological effects that this has. Many people have said that by collecting taxes and debts in cash, the state (the central echelon and the localities) has failed to control the amount of paddy that it should have. Furthermore, in calculating paddy prices in order to calculate taxes, taxes have been too low. That is, the amount of money collected in taxes and debts has not been sufficient to purchase the amount of paddy needed. The state grain enterprises in the north have not purchased enough grain for circulation. It must also be said that the state grain enterprises have encountered many difficulties in purchasing paddy. They have not been allotted sufficient capital, the bank loans are insufficient, there is a shortage of cash, and loan periods are very short (one-three months). Because of this, at the beginning of the season, when they can purchase paddy at lower prices, they lack money. By the time they obtain sufficient money, paddy prices have already gone up.

The shortage of rice at northern markets has resulted in localities tending to hold back their paddy in order to maintain a balance in their own locality. Circulation has been limited and markets have been impeded in a rather large number of places. As a result, the paddy has not been shared equally among the localities, which has just increased the tension concerning rice and given rise to negative phenomena such as price increases, tax avoidance, bribery, and corruption.

Some people think that regulating and balancing grain needs nationwide has failed because the export of rice has not been closely controlled in terms of quantities and export periods. Thus, during periods when grain needs to be balanced among the various regions of the country, the price of rice in the south has been higher than in the north. Here, it must be affirmed that exporting rice is essential. In agricultural production, our country is now capable of providing a quantity of rice for export. The amount of rice exported and the export periods must be tightly controlled based, above all, on a spirit of maintaining balance for domestic needs. Actions contrary to that spirit must be harshly criticized.

The reality of many years shows that the state grain enterprises have a very important role to play in stabilizing grain prices and contributing to maintaining and stabilizing the standard of living. However, during the initial stage of switching to economic accounting and eliminating state grain subsidies, many people think that everything from managing things to determining operating formulas for the state grain enterprises is still very confused and irrational. This has limited the role of the state grain enterprises in market management. The shackles of the financial, banking, and currency policies, of the policies on preserving quantities and value, and of the present system for fixing prices have made it impossible for the state grain enterprises "to purchase and sell" [grain]. They have lost their ability to compete against other economic elements. The problems facing the state grain enterprises must soon be studied and solved so these these enterprises can play their role.

At a time when rice prices on Hanoi markets are skyrocketing, there is a paradoxical situation. That is, while the amounts of rice of the Hanoi federation of grain corporations and the amounts of rice provided to Hanoi by Central General Grain Corporation 1 are fairly large, sales to consumers at the rice shops are very small, 5-10 kg per person. This paradox may stem from the effort to prevent employees of the stores from making use of the confusing situation, in which various types of rice are sold at different prices, to profit personally and harm consumers or pretend that they want to stabilize and lower rice prices. Thus, should all the rice that costs 1,600 dong be sold before selling other types of rice? What will the real result be? Because people think that there is a shortage, rice prices at the markets are being pushed even higher.

The realities of fighting "rice fever" in the past have shown that making available a quantity of rice to satisfy consumer needs is the decisive measuring for "reducing the fever." The government and the organizations concerned are making a great effort. With the present quantities of rice on hand in Hanoi and at Central General Grain Corporation 1, this can certainly be done. And this does not include the large quantity of rice that is being transported from the south by the state grain enterprises in the north. The price of rice in the southern provinces is now around 1,400 dong per kg. With this price, natural adjustments by the other economic elements will take place quite swiftly.

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Personalities

91P30093A

[Editorial Report] The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. An asterisk indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.

Ho Thi Bi [HOOF THIJ BI], Colonel

*Standing member of the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association; on 22 December 90 she attended a ceremony held by the municipal Communist Youth Union to mark the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 23 Dec 90 p 1)

Nguyen Van Chien [NGUYEENX VAWN CHIEENS]

*Deputy head of the Former Resistance Fighters Club; on 20 December 90 he attended a symposium held by the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association to celebrate the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA [Vietnam People's Army]. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Dec 90 p 1)

Nguyen Van Chinh [NGUYEENX VAWN CHINHS]

*Deputy head of the Organization Department of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee (Pho Truong Ban To Chuc Trung Uong); on 26-30 December 90 he co-chaired a conference held in Ho Chi Minh City on organizational work in southern provinces. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 4 Jan 91 p 1)

Lai Van Cu [LAIJ VAWN CUWR]

*Head of the National Grain Reserve Department (Cuc Du Tru Luong Thuc Quoc Gia); on 14 December 90 he made a report to the National Assembly. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 18 Dec 90 p 1)

Le Van Dung [LEE VAWN ZUNGX], *Major General

*Deputy commander of the 7th MR; on 22 December 90 he attended a ceremony marking the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 23 Dec 90 p 1)

Tran Cong Ham [TRAANF COONG HAMF], Colonel

SRV military attache in Laos; on 20 December 90 he attended a ceremony marking the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 23 Dec 90 p 4)

Nguyen Van Huan [NGUYEENX VAWN HUAANS]

Vice Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee; on 22 December 90 he attended a ceremony marking the 46th anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 23 Dec 90 p 1)

Phang Trung Kien [PHAN TRUNG KIEEN], *Colonel

*Deputy chief of staff of the Ho Chi Minh City Military Command; on 22 December 90 he attended a ceremony marking the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 23 Dec 90 p 1)

**Nguyen Van Kiep [NGUYEENX VAWN KIEEPJ],
*Major General**

*Permanent representative for special tasks in the south, Ministry of Defense; recently he was interviewed by SAIGON GIAI PHONG newspaper on smuggling by military personnel. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 29 Nov 90 p 2)

**Vuong Tuan Kiet [VUWOWNG TUAANS KIEETJ],
*Major General**

*Former deputy commander of the 5th MR; on 23 October 90 he attended a conference held in Da Nang City on renovation in organization and cadres' work. (DAI DOAN KET 20-26 Nov 90 pp 1, 3)

To Ky [TOO KYS], Major General

He was previously reported as Lieutenant General. On 20 December 90 he attended a symposium held by the Ho Chi Minh Veterans Association to celebrate the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Dec 90 p 1)

Nguyen Ky [NGUYEENX KYF]

*Vice minister of education and training; he was mentioned in an article relating to Vietnam teachers day, which was published in the cited source. (DAI DOAN KET 20-26 Nov 90 p 1)

**Tran Thanh Lap [TRAANF THANHF LAAPJ],
*Colonel**

*Deputy commander of the Ho Chi Minh City Military Command; on 20 Dec 90 he attended a symposium held by the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association to celebrate the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Dec 90 p 1)

Pham Si Liem [PHAMJ SIX LIEEM]

Vice minister of construction; his article on problems relating to Vietnamese cities was published in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 30 Nov 90 p 2)

Nam Long [NAM LONG], *Lieutenant General

On 20 Dec 90 he attended a symposium organized by the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association to celebrate the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Dec 90 p 1)

Ho Ngoc Nhuong [HOOF NGOCJ NHUWOWNGF]

Chairman of the People's Committee, Khanh Hoa Province; on 28 November 90 he attended a film festival in Nha Trang City. (NHAN DAN 4 Dec 90 p 1)

Do Van Phuc [DOOX VAWN PHUCS], *Major General

SRV military attache in the USSR; on 19 December 90 he made a speech at an exhibit held in Moscow to mark

the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 23 Dec 90 p 4)

Tran Hai Phung [TRAANF HAIR PHUNGF], Major General

Former commander of Ho Chi Minh City Armed Forces; on 6 January 91 he spoke at a ceremony held to commemorate the founding of Saigon-Cho Lon-Gia Dinh special forces. (NHAN DAN 9 Jan 91 p 1)

Nguyen Ngoc Thach [NGUYEENX NGOCJ THACHJ]

*Editor in chief of DAI DOAN KET newspaper; recently he was present at a meeting with a group of Vietnamese from Canada who donated a computer and a laser printer to DAI DOAN KET newspaper. (DAI DOAN KET 27 Nov-3 Dec 90 p 3)

Bui Hong Thai [BUIF HOONGF THAIS]

Secretary of the CPV Committee, Khanh Hoa Province; on 28 November 90 he attended a film festival in Nha Trang City. (NHAN DAN 4 Dec 90 p 1)

Huynh Tho [HUYNHF THOJ]

*Deputy head of the Organization Department of the CPV Central Committee (Pho Truong Ban To Chuc Trung Uong); on 26-30 December 90 he co-chaired a conference held in Ho Chi Minh City on organizational work in southern provinces. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 4 Jan 91 p 1)

Le Tho [LEE THOJ]

*Head of the Consular Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 1-5 December 90 he worked with a delegation of the ECC (European Economic Community) which was visiting Vietnam. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 6 Dec 90 p 1)

Vo Thu [VOX THUWS], *Lieutenant General

*Former deputy commander of the 5th MR; on 23 October 90 he attended a meeting in Da Nang City to discuss renovation in organization and cadres' work. (DAI DOAN KET 20-26 Nov 90 p 3)

Nguyen Huu Xuyen [NGUYEENX HUWUX XUYEENS], *Lieutenant General

On 20 December 90 he attended a symposium held by the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association to celebrate the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Dec 90 p 1)

Pham Van Trong [PHAMJ VAWN TRONGJ]

Vice minister of finance; recently he discussed SRV-Laos financial cooperation with a Lao delegation visiting Vietnam. (NHAN DAN 22 Nov 90 p 4)

**Tran Van Tra [TRAANF VAWN TRAF], Colonel
General**

Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association; on 20 December 90 he attended a symposium to celebrate the 46th founding anniversary of the VPA. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 21 Dec 90 p 1)