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KOMMUNIST
No 15, October 1989

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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KOMMUNIST

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The Age of Revolutions

905B0009A Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 15, Oct 89 (signed to press 4 Oct 89) pp 3-4

[Text] Although 72 years separate us from October 1917, have we ever been closer to that great time than we are now, today?

This closeness is expressed, perhaps, in the fact alone that the country, the people, the party and society are essentially solving anew the same old problems of power, ownership, land, democratic freedoms and national self-determination.

Naturally, these problems were solved in the past and the memory of the initial decrees issued by the Soviet system is sacred. In the course of the past decades, however, some of these resolutions were distorted and grossly simplified; others were replaced by more recent and worse resolutions; others again were kept only as beautiful words behind which hid unseemly consequences.

Historical experience, which is filled with the self-sacrifice of the people but also with immeasurable grief and tremendous losses, carries with itself the memory of victories and defeats, triumphs and failures, severe social diseases and protracted recoveries. The negative part of this experience is a clear warning to all the living, to anyone who is active in the public field.

If we take into consideration the fact that warnings are not always heeded, how great is the responsibility and caution which the memory of the revolution demands of us, the people of today! It is precisely today that thanks to the growing energy of perestroika we can truly feel what was done at that time and how it was done, and what can be done tomorrow and how.

Many of the events of 1989—the elections for USSR People's Deputies, their first congress, the establishment of people's fronts and other social forces, and the debates in the country's new Supreme Soviet—are of a truly revolutionary nature. These events promote the activeness of the people. At the same time, however, they reveal the conflicting trends in the process of social renovation and force us critically to assess some durable social concepts, including the priority of various class interests over the interests of the entire society and the people. The search for achieving a reliable balance among social forces and the sensible dialogue and agreement among them in preserving the socialist ideal, which was felt and preserved by the people and the party, become vital tasks.

The 72nd anniversary of the revolution is a time of thousands of questions and many thousands of answers. The answers are so numerous that occasionally some people become confused and yearn for the former categorical clarity which made questions unnecessary. There is nothing one can do, the ideological comfort has collapsed and we are parting forever, let us hope, with the kingdom of undisturbed clarity. However, we are as yet to reject yet another and by no means better clarity within which the rejection, with the greatest possible thoughtlessness and denial of all the results of the revolution and of the 72 years of life of the country and the people, has acquired inertia.

To delete and to triumph is not a very complex occupation. Now, after the cleansing work done by the party, it does not require any courage and is all the more easy the less burdened a person becomes with responsibility and knowledge.

Such a light-heartedness and this kind of new social demagoguery which is by no means any better than the old complacent and frightening one, can be opposed only by restoring historical reality: facts, events and human destinies.

Should we repeat the old error according to which, in order to achieve the quickest possible revolutionary settling of accounts with the accursed past, we simplified and belittled the history of prerevolutionary Russia, ignoring its experience in the development of life and culture?

On 3 November 1917 the great Russian scientist V.I. Vernadskiy made the following entry in his diary: "The impossible is becoming possible and it is either a catastrophe unparalleled in history or, perhaps, a new global phenomenon that is appearing. One feels helpless in the face of it.... Actually, the masses are following the bolsheviks...." Several days later he wrote: "...Unquestionably, the bolshevik movement contains a great deal of something that is profound and national."

To depict the development of life, particularly with the help of revolutions, as being the result of secret global conspiracies and intrigues, based on a racist or any other narrow squalid foundation, means having little respect for it and a poor idea of its power.

To think of the people as obedient clay from which any treacherous strong hand could mold anything it wishes means lack of respect for one's people.

The October Revolution was indeed a catastrophe of the old governmental and social order, which had exhausted its possibilities. It was also an unparalleled "global phenomenon," a heroic effort to break into a new and previously unfamiliar socioeconomic system and into the promised land of socialism.

Although the miracle of a theoretically computed global revolution did not happen, toward the end of the 1930s Jawaharlal Nehru had good reasons to write that "we are

living in the age of revolution, a revolution which began with the outbreak of the 1914 War and which is continuing year after year, while the world is suffering the pains of conflicts."

The fact that the great Indian philosopher proved to be right is confirmed by looking at the contemporary picture of the world, transformed by anticolonial and national liberation revolutions and movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

On the occasion of the 72nd year of our revolution, our journal has published a number of articles hardly remindful of any kind of celebration: one of them is dedicated to Nehru, a man who highly valued the experience and role of the October Revolution in universal history but who, in his own struggle for the liberation of India, remained loyal to the principle of "nonviolent action." Another one takes us back to the year 1917, restoring that which for a long time was neglected by the science of history: the live thoughts of ordinary people—participants in and witnesses to the great events. Is it not interesting to find out what workers, soldiers and peasants wrote in their appeals to the new authorities? What did they hope for and what did they reject?

Such publications, whether letters written during the time of the revolution, collectivization, the 5-year plans and the war, reveal the true state of mind and real moods of those times. They refute the myth of the obedient, enduring and not understanding people. The letters written in 1917 show that the people never stopped thinking and that their thinking was healthy and far-sighted.

The reader will also note a review of the recently reissued two volumes (in a single book) of the Granat Encyclopedic Dictionary, which contains biographical and autobiographical materials dealing with the personalities of the Russian revolutionary liberation movement of the end of the 19th century and the October Revolution.

The social specifics and the reality of life paint an image of prerevolutionary Russia which poorly coincides with some of today's idyllic views about it. This proves yet once again that any simplistic histories, regardless of who their beneficiaries may be, are both sterile and dangerous.

The new thinking is new probably also because it is getting rid of a very strong inertia of dogmatism and the long years of persistent simplification of life, history and man and his character, interests and culture.

The new thinking, which gives perestroika its spirit is, therefore, also revolutionary. It takes from the revolution its most profound and pure passion: the aspiration for justice and freedom. Can we ignore this source?

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Letters From 1917

905B0009B Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 89 (signed to press 4 Oct 89) pp 5-13

[Article by Gennadiy Leontyevich Sobolev, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of the department of History of Soviet Society, Leningrad State University]

[Text] "History is **nothing other** than activities of a person pursuing his aims," is the classical Marxist conclusion (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 2, p 102). As historical experience indicates, man proclaims his goals most openly and strives most actively to attain them during a period of revolutionary upheavals. This was manifested particularly strongly in Russia in 1917, where the revolution led into active participation in political life the multimillion strong masses of people, promoting their expectations and ideals in the strongest possible manner.

However, after studying for many years the place and role of the people's masses, classes and parties in the period between the February and October Revolutions, our historians somehow "lost track" of the ordinary person, with his interests, thoughts and feelings. Yet it was precisely that ordinary person who was making the revolution and who either did not take a stand or else assumed a vacillating one. Rare is the historian who does not quote Lenin to the effect that any revolution means a sharp turn in the life of huge popular masses. However, as a rule the historian limits himself to this statement without trying to determine the nature of such a turn on the level of the mentality of the individual. Yet we find in Lenin fine observations pertaining to the ordinary person in an age of revolution. For example, the work "Will the Bolsheviks Retain the State Power?" cites the statement of a worker (in whose home Vladimir Ilich hid to avoid capture in July of 1917) which, in the view of their author, reflected the political situation as accurately as could be: "Look at how good the bread is. They no longer dare, I suppose, make bad bread...."

"We put pressure 'on them.' 'They' no longer dare, as they did in the past, engage in mischief. If we put more pressure we shall throw them out entirely. That is how the worker thinks and feels," Lenin concludes "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, pp 322-323).

The process of politicizing the individual awareness, which was taking place at that time at a headlong pace, could not be reduced to the influence exclusively of external forces, represented by political parties and ideological trends, propaganda and agitation. A great deal also depended on the individual's perception of reality. Furthermore, everyone correlated his own fate with the outcome of events and, correspondingly, chose his own position.

Naturally, a number of factors influenced the behavior of the individual: social and class relations, the educational system, human needs and the extent to which people

were aware of them in terms of social criteria and objectives. However, whereas in ordinary crisis-free times man is prevented by some kind of "inner shell" from openly expressing his state of mind and actively interfering in "governmental" affairs, at crucial times such a shell suddenly vanishes. At such times how does the "philistine" turn into a citizen? This question is important not only to the politician or the sociologist but also to the historian of the revolutionary age.

A more profound understanding of the nature and essence of revolutionary events means also an understanding of the qualitative changes which occur in the social regulators of human behavior. As the consequence of the disruption of the old regulatory agents, in turn, the revolution develops new relations in society. This is a complex process which expresses the interaction between man and the social group, class or society as a whole. However, the mechanism of such interaction, in terms of the period of revolutionary events in Russia in 1917, has remained practically unstudied. It is true that in his time Russian sociologist P. Sorokin, who subsequently became one of the founders of the American school of sociology, raised the concept of the "primitivism of psychological life in a revolutionary society," which "suddenly forgets all of its traditions, concepts and ideas and breaks with the past." In his view, this starts with the disappearance of the reflex of subordination, as was noticed in Russia on the eve of the overthrow of autocracy. In his view, the February Revolution meant the full "destruction of the reflexes of obedience to the authority of the emperor." Subsequently, Sorokin himself did not return to this question, whereas we, after spending many long years in rejecting his theories, failed to suggest anything different on the level of historical-psychological analysis.

Finally, yet another circumstance which, I believe, should be borne in mind in discussing the influence of a revolutionary situation on man, is the shaping of the type of personality consistent with his attitude toward changes. In his work "On the Question of the Role of the Individual In History," G. Plekhanov himself noted that "the awareness of the unquestionable need for this phenomenon can only increase the energy of the person who sympathizes with it and who considers himself one of the forces bringing this phenomenon to light." Initially, such an awareness is acquired by a small percentage of people who, precisely, are the revolutionary vanguard. A significant intermediary stratum of people develops between them and the petit bourgeois mass, a stratum which previously took no part in political life but which, by the force of circumstances, suddenly becomes involved with it. It is this stratum that reflects that special type of individual with his "transitional" awareness.

Therefore, in order to solve the problem of "man in the revolution," the historian must deal with an entire array of complex problems. However, if in such studies the sociologist can rely on the methods of modeling, social experimentation, surveys, and so on, the historian can

deal only with the sources preserved from the period which interests him, i.e., he must seek manifestations on different levels of awareness in documents, letters, memoirs and diaries. In this case he furthermore must follow the rule aptly formulated by French historian M. Bloch: "In order to enter someone else's mind, separated from us by several generations, one must almost totally ignore one's own 'I'."

The sources of the revolutionary year 1917, on the basis of which we can judge of the individual and social awareness of that time, include numerous letters which the people addressed to various organizations and establishments of the revolutionary authorities. They contain extremely rich material for the recreation of the "psychological climate" of that time and for determining the concepts, moods, needs and aspirations which were then prevalent. The letters reflect more than simply the individuality of their authors. They enable us also to judge of the way the thinking and behavior of the people were affected by their affiliation with a given social class, group or collective; as a rule, their most profound expectations and ideals are expressed in such letters in more direct and immediate terms than we find in the mass sources, such as minutes, resolutions and instructions formulated at general meetings of plants, military units, peasant rallies, etc.

However, the letters of the contemporaries of the revolution have still not become in our country a topic of specific and thorough study, whereas our foreign colleagues-historians have not ignored this valuable source. For example, French scientist M. Ferraut has summed up interesting observations on the social aspirations of the masses after the overthrow of autocracy on the basis of a mathematical processing of letters, telegrams and appeals by Russian workers, soldiers and peasants to the provisional committee of the State Duma and the Provisional Government.

Naturally, the study of the letters of 1917 requires extensive and painstaking work, for most of them are scattered among central and local archives and have not as yet been made public. There was a particularly heavy flow of correspondence from factories, plants, villages and hamlets, and from the fronts and the Navy, addressed to the Petrograd Soviet of Worker and Soldier Deputies and, after the Soviet Central Executive Committee was formed, addressed to it. A significant part of such sources are kept at the Central State Archives of the October Revolution and the Central State Archives of the October Revolution in Leningrad (the letters we quote subsequently are kept in these archives). Only a few of them were published in the *IZVESTIYA* of the Petrograd Soviet. As a whole, however, all indications are that at that time they had been looked at and classified as "political moods," "important," "symptomatic," "file" and rarely "to be published."

The study of the letters addressed to the Petrograd Soviet show that the working people in Russia considered it an authority of the revolutionary system, from which they

wanted to obtain the necessary clarifications and instructions. "For the sake of freedom, send us agitators and instructions!" wrote workers from Riga in March 1917. "Please come to establish the new system," workers at the Ostrov Railroad Station demanded. A worker from Berdyansk wrote: "I see from the press that the soviet has a decisive influence on the establishment of the new system, for which reason I address myself to it." In welcoming the soviet, worker A. Vyshnegradskiy described it as the supreme manifestation of the hopes of the people: "The voice of the people is the voice of God and the soviet of worker and soldier deputies is the voice of the Russian people, proclaiming the will of the people to those who deserve the anger of God and humanity."

It is interesting that some letters are addressed directly to the workers of Petrograd, which confirms their tremendous reputation among the working people in Russia. The workers at the Putilov Plant were particularly respected. "We turn precisely to you, Putilovs, for we consider you the most serious people who wish our dear mother Russia well," the soldiers of the 150th Taman Regiment wrote in March 1917. "The Putilov workers were always the mind of the workers," notes soldier N. Prokov in his message. It was precisely the Putilov workers who were asked by I. Savichev, a resident of a village in the Kuban, to send the necessary materials "for broadening and strengthening the new principles" among his fellow-villagers.

Despite the extraordinarily wide range of problems raised in these letters, the overwhelming majority of them are imbued with the thought of the destinies of the revolution and the warm wish to actively participate in it. Grabbed by the revolutionary events, the workers of Petrograd and the soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison, as they went to the countryside to help the farmers, on assignment or else on furlough, demanded of the soviet directives on the revolutionary reorganization of the countryside and expressed the wish "to apply their small knowledge to benefit the common cause." T. Apenkin, a worker at the Obukhov Plant, reported that according to information he had received from peasants in Khlystovskaya Volost, Mogilev Guberniya, the landowners were continuing to cut down the trees even after the revolution which, in his opinion, was henceforth inadmissible. Putilov Plant worker I. Ovsyankin, in appealing for a defense of the interests "of the entire proletariat and the peasantry," pointed out another "scandalous fact:" the cattle of the peasants in Kaluga Guberniya were being requisitioned "as during olden times." A Petrograd janitor objected most firmly in his letter to the waste of (formally) "official" but now our own national fuel, and called for "restraining the spongers preying on tsarist or government property."

As one can judge from the numerous letters, the attitude toward the overthrown monarchy was the topical problem of March 1917 in Russia. "Now, when the yoke of the Romanovs has been thrown off, there must not be any restoration of the monarchic system, albeit constitutional," cautioned railroad worker M. Sidorenko. "A

republic is that which we, citizens, want. That is what attracts us, that is what we see in the darkness before dawn and we are telling you that nothing other than a republic will satisfy us." A group of workers from Kharkov demanded that "the sacred wishes of the people for a social democracy, and for a republic system be implemented without hitches." Expressing the viewpoint of the peasants in Tver Guberniya, one M. Kirillov wrote that "in terms of the Romanovs and all the members of the former government, the opinion of the people is that they must be tried and punished according to the law."

Nonetheless, as many of the letters sent by soldiers reveal, some of them, displaying a very confused idea of the forms and prospects of the political system in Russia, continued to relate the satisfaction of their needs to the "good tsar." We find among these letters expressions such as "it would be good to have a republic with an active tsar." Or else "we shall have a republic with a new tsar." Some of those authors of messages on the "tsarist topic" believed that the people "had still not become used to considering the tsar and his circle as mortals, with their faults and weaknesses. They had not become accustomed to understand the actions of their rulers because obedience to the tsar had sunk deep roots." A worker from a Petrograd factory called for the following: "Do not judge cruelly the tsars, for they are also people. Not all of them were bad. Let everyone get what he deserved." Soldier N. Prokov, furthermore, urged: "Remember my words that the salvation of Russia lies only in having a tsar.... The Russian people will be yearning for a tsar later, as they are yearning now."

These and other materials confirm that after the overthrow of autocracy in Russia tsarist illusions had not been outlived at all among the masses. This, incidentally, was noted by historians already then, in 1917, as we can judge from the letter by one of them who wanted to remain anonymous. In cautioning the Petrograd Soviet against a repetition of the "fatal errors" of autocracy, he noted: "In your case these errors are more dangerous and fatal than they were to the old system. Obedience to the old system and faith in it were maintained, in addition to force, also by age-old traditions of obedience. You do not have such power and you are underestimating its importance."

Characteristic of most letters by soldiers addressed to the Petrograd Soviet immediately after the overthrow of tsarism was an enthusiastic attitude toward the February Revolution. "The people are intoxicated with this great act," confirmed in this connection A.M. Kollontay, in March 1917, in a message addressed to V.I. Lenin and N.K. Krupskaya. "I am saying the people, for today primacy belongs not to the working class but to the loose heterogeneous mass in soldier's overcoats. Today the mood is dictated by the soldiers; it is the soldiers who are also creating this specific atmosphere in which the greatness of clearly manifested democratic freedoms and the

awakened awareness of equal citizenship rights are intermixed with total lack of understanding of the difficulties of the time we are experiencing."

However, as the numerous letters confirm, the enthusiasm and the mood of celebration were of short duration. The tempestuous development of events drastically separated classes, social groups and political parties from each other and brought to light opposite views on the most pressing problems of war, peace, power and, naturally, the daily bread. In May 1917 a Peter worker warned: "Autocracy cracked above all because the people were hungry and could not see the end of this hunger. Whereas for the intelligentsia, the Army and the conscious workers the inability of autocracy to wage the war or rule was the main reason for the sharp hatred of it, to the average petit bourgeois hunger and hunger alone was the immediate motivation for the struggle against the old regime.... Comrades, time does not wait, and the mood in Petrograd is depressed. Do not forget, comrades, that it is the capital that sets the tone for the rest of the country; therefore, this tone must not be one of depression."

The letters also reflect the fact that the revolutionary program for the problems which were facing Russia in 1917, suggested by the Bolshevik Party, was by no means uniformly welcomed by the masses. A fierce struggle developed on the subject of Lenin's April theses, which formulated the party's course of ending the war, and the socialist revolution. Whereas the progressive workers immediately sympathized with Lenin's ideas, the politically less mature soldiers and peasants and even some workers took a different approach as a result of the campaign of slander unleashed by the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeois press. "Today I read in the newspaper that the malicious enemy of the young Russian freedom is the recently arrived Lenin," wrote V. Manushkin, from the front. "I am in favor and I am ready, if you are ready, to take his life away.... For the past 3 years I and all my comrades have been suffering and he wishes for us to suffer forever."

In struggling against such concepts, the bolshevik PRAVDA printed, in its 21 April 1917 issue, a "Letter From One Who Saw the Light," in which, among others, we read: "I shall personally describe my views to Comrades Lenin and Zinovyev and others of their friends. It is because of my ignorance and trust in the press... that I developed an evil feeling toward Comrades Lenin and Zinovyev. I would have hesitatingly drowned, shot or hanged them. However, after hearing the report by Comrade Zinovyev, I realized, despite my ignorance, that Comrades Lenin and Zinovyev are right.... I shake your hands, Comrades Zinovyev and Lenin, and I fully agree with you. To begin with, it is necessary to publish the secret treaties concluded by bloody Nicholas with the allies and immediately take the land away from the peasants, without compensation, through the peasant committees." In answering the accusations of the bourgeois press, Pskov resident A. Borkovskiy wrote: "And if Lenin came to Russia like a criminal, why was he then

welcomed with a celebration; why is it that in the last third of April it was not Lenin who was expelled to Germany but it was Guchkov and Milyukov who were removed from the Provisional Government? It is because Lenin was the only enemy of the bourgeoisie which stood up against him, headed by Aleksinskiy and company."

However, other letters written during that period reflect the petit bourgeois positions in which petit bourgeois views on politics, unconscientious-trustful attitude toward the Provisional Government, and uncritical acceptance of the tremendous flood of information and an essentially emotional reaction to the events, particularly to political crises, predominate.

In interpreting his new status in society, the petit bourgeois wanted his voice to count, for him to be taken into consideration, proclaiming his wish to retain "his personal convictions," and "not to depend on any party whatsoever" for, as one of them said, this way one is "more tranquil and healthier." At the same time, however, something else is also typical of the letters written in March. "It is difficult to be cured from a disease immediately," wrote a "comrade-petit bourgeois" from Petrograd. "Many among us have not become accustomed to social activities, for the tsarist government suppressed such activities wherever it could. Many have not become accustomed to linking their personal interests with those of the public. Many have kept the scabs of Philistinism.... Let us stop being Philistines and let us become citizens in everything."

But the moment the universal exultation and intoxication with the February Revolution stopped and an uncompromising struggle between the working class and the bourgeois began, the petit bourgeois, judging by the mail, began to panic. He clearly feared the aggravation of the struggle and the uncertain future. Thus, the "average petit bourgeois" from Moscow, expressing their categorical disagreement with the revolutionary acts carried out by the Petrograd Soviet and, particularly, its Order No 1, putting the Petrograd Garrison under its command, began to express "deep concern for the fate of the homeland." T. Petrov, a student from Shuya, reported that the petit bourgeois "will be disappointed both in the revolution and the republic.... They are already speaking of the superiority of the old system and the superiority of the monarchy, for under them there was order."

Frightened by the scope of the revolution, the petit bourgeois began to yearn for the old order. "I have always kept away from politics," admitted one of the correspondents. "Let me frankly say that under Nicholas II life was more peaceful, more just and stable." Under the impression of the first open clash between the bourgeoisie and the workers during the April political crisis, another one demanded: "Take away the freedom along with the revolution. We lived better in the past, without freedom and comrades. Better to have a limited monarchy." The petit bourgeois feared what were, from his viewpoint, "excessive" demands of workers and

soldiers and objected to having his fate determined, as one of the letters put it, by "ignorant soldiers and workers poisoned by bolshevik propaganda."

In May 1917, in the third month of the revolution, that same petit bourgeois was already in a state of complete panic: "Bring order, we have suffered enough. Your army is killing and plundering its own; your militiamen are killers and plunderers. Surrender the power, let the Germans in and that entire riffraff will calm down, there is sadness and darkness all over. I am not affiliated with any party, all I want is order." However, he himself feared to act (he would not like to get into a fight!) for which reason he preferred "with deep sorrow in his heart to stand aside and wait for the outcome." "The petit bourgeois is unable to engage in active counterrevolutionary activities, nor is it in its interests," a worker wrote in May 1917. "However, this is the most favorable environment in which all reactionary and cowardly elements are hiding, whispering to the petit bourgeois all sorts of fears and feeding him all sorts of malicious gossip."

What was most dangerous was the fact that the petit bourgeois, fearing for his life, would take the side of the reaction and consider that the solution was a military dictatorship, and would set in public opinion a favorable base for the counterrevolution to mount an offensive. "My suggestion is to have a military dictator. But do it faster," someone asked. "Choose anyone, even if it is only for three months," someone else suggested, "as long as he can bring order, for all of your blabberings can only lead to the doom of the homeland." Reacting to the July events in Petrograd, the petit bourgeois already demanded "to restrain the demonstrators with fire power and to wound and even kill more of them, and to pluck the weeds from the field.... Without victims we shall not have any rest but only a postponement and an imaginary tranquillity." It was precisely as of then that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Petrograd Soviet received a flood of letters of this kind, which called for raising "civil order battalions."

According to some correspondents, "the main trouble" was that during a period of revolution "the uncontrolled forces of the people are in some kind of state of nightmare, a nightmare which befalls the statesmanlike reasoning of the people." For example, a teacher in Petrograd wrote: "The sooner the people realize the harm of the future development of the revolution, the faster will the freedom of Russia be saved. The new order will be strengthened forever. It would be good for the people to stop at the point they have reached, to join the Provisional Government and to realize that the time for reforms has come."

Here is also another view. "The Russia people, and even the peasantry, well understand that the Provisional Government and the ministers keep asking for the trust of the Russian people and blind obedience to the Provisional Government," the peasant L. Frolov wrote. "However,

trust comes when the ministers obey the will of the people. If a minister does not obey the will of the people, the people remove their trust. I, as a peasant, would deem it against my conscience to ask for confidence but not fulfill the will of the people." At this point, we believe it important to note that the problem of trusting the authorities was, to the simple peasant, not only political but also moral. This helps to understand why the Provisional Government lost, in the final account, the support of the masses and was unable to stay in power.

The letters particularly sharply criticized the unwillingness of the Provisional Government to put an end to the bloody war and to conclude a just demographic peace. V. Stankevich, who was the commissar of that government, later bitterly admitted that "in the mentality of the people there was no place for war and that the war was an unparalleled, a monstrous violence committed over the people's soul." Nonetheless, many people were trapped by the ideology of "revolutionary defense," linking the implementation of their social expectations to the victorious end of the war. This is clearly exemplified by a letter sent by a soldier in the army in the field in March 1917: "God willing if we defeat our external enemy we shall then turn and settle with the internal enemy, i.e., the landowners." Very soon afterwards, however, the soldiers' masses changed their attitude toward the war, as is confirmed by letters to the Petrograd Soviet. With increasing frequency voices from the front called for "let us look at those who are shouting 'fight to total victory'." Soldiers of the 433rd Novgorod Infantry Regiment openly said: "We, the proletariat, need neither conquests nor enslavement. They are needed only by our bourgeoisie." Asked why they should not mount an offensive, a soldier of the 696th Infantry Regiment, S. Korochkin, answered: "The entire army is exhausted, we are fed up with the war, the objectives of the war have not been made clear. Everyone firmly believes that the war is being fought in the interests of the bourgeoisie." "We do not want the Dardanelles and are fed up with the Carpathians," noted another soldier serving at the Southwestern Front, in his address to the Petrograd Soviet.

Starting with the summer of 1917, as the mail clearly reveals, a qualitative change occurred in the minds of the simple people. As stated by one of the authors of the letters, the soldiers "yearn for peace." Peace propaganda is meeting with universal sympathy and now it cannot be ascribed to the bolsheviks, as had been tried earlier by the heads of the bourgeois and petit bourgeois parties. Thousands of antiwar messages came from the front, from cities, villages and hamlets, which frequently contained the single phrase: "Comrades, at all cost let us put an end to the war." It was no longer possible to deceive the masses with appeals that it was necessary to fight the war for the sake of defending freedom. "I do not need any such freedom, may you be cursed if I have to spend an entire week without bread and go to bed hungry," was the view of an anonymous author from Petrograd.

"Unless peace comes about soon, whatever type of peace it may be, your entire freedom will collapse," G. Glushko, a soldier serving with the 318th Chernoyarsk Rifles Regiment said. Furthermore, it was precisely the end of the war that was seen by many soldiers as the only means of preserving the freedom which had been gained and having their demands met. "End the war, strengthen this precious freedom, so that no one can take it away from us and after peace has come, with freedom we shall be able to acquire land," wrote a soldier serving with the 12th Army. Incidentally, the peasant yearning for the land is present in virtually every soldier's letter.

By the autumn of 1917 the hatred of the people against the war had reached its peak. From requests to "worry about peace," soldiers converted to the firm demand of putting an end to the war at all cost. Otherwise, they cautioned, "matters will go so far that the soldiers will stop holding the front and, arms in hand, will march on Petrograd." "We are telling you honestly and justly," we read in the letter written by a soldier in the 3rd Caucasian Corps, "that we no longer have any strength and we shall not march forward but rather turn around and march with our weapons on the bourgeoisie, for they would like to kill us so that they could fight more easily our wives and children we left behind." The warning from the 5th Army was even more categorical: "Unless there is peace by the end of October, the soldiers will march on Petrograd and slaughter the entire Provisional Government." It was no accident that, analyzing the range of feelings among the masses, on the eve of the October Revolution Lenin pointed out also the growing anarchy, based on the feelings of the masses, which were nearing despair (see op. cit., vol 35, p 412).

The feelings of workers, soldiers and peasants were an important indicator of their readiness to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie in a revolutionary way. "Comrade workers! Where are you looking! The new government is leading Russia down the old path," wrote soldiers on the Northern Front to the Putilov workers. The soldiers from the Kazan Military District openly appealed to the Petrograd Soviet: "...Overthrow all the ministers of the Provisional Government, headed by Minister Kerenskiy." Describing the Provisional Government as a "wolf in sheep's clothing," a group of soldiers from the Western Front demanded that it be replaced by the "best people" from the soviet of worker and soldier deputies who, in their view, alone could ensure equality and fraternity. "I beg of you: take the power more firmly in your hands and take up the people's idea," said soldier V. Kutovyy, from the Southwestern Front, addressing himself to the worker and soldier deputies.

The distinguishing feature of the letters in the autumn of 1917 was the growing criticism of the S.R.-menshevik leaders, already noticeable earlier as well. For example, as early as April, Balaklava resident Miloglyadov wrote in his letter to the Petrograd Soviet: "You have not achieved anything. All that has changed is the form and the people have remained the same. These are the same old representatives of capitalism and big landowners who have taken

the power from your hands and are pursuing their previous pursuits." Such criticism could be heard not only from the left but from the right as well. An anonymous ill-wisher threatened: "All that is left for you now is to wait for the appearance of a more ferocious military executioner such as Robespierre, for you can redeem your sins only with your own blood."

Finally, here is another important trend which can be traced in the letters sent by workers, soldiers and peasants to the Petrograd Soviet: the growing influence of the Bolshevik Party and the weakening of the positions of its political opponents. Whereas in the flood of letters during the first months following the February Revolution many were those who were accusing the bolsheviks of being "German agents," "provocateurs" and "enemies of freedom," later the authors of such letters begin with increasing frequency to consider the reasons of the growth of the bolsheviks' authority. For example, soldier S. Dyakonov, a member of the S.R. Party, considered this to be the result of the faulty policies of the Provisional Government which, in his opinion, "from the very first steps of the new system, should have spoken only with the people, at which point no Lenins or bolsheviks or crazy hotheads describing themselves as anarchists, could have shaken up the people's trust in the government." However, as the decisive moment of struggle approached, the clearer the letters display the idea of supporting the bolsheviks, headed by Lenin. Thus, a group of Irkutsk workers and soldiers wrote in September that in leading the struggle for socialism "Lenin should be put above all others." In October, addressing himself to Vladimir Ilich, soldier F. Nakonechnyy said: "We, soldiers and front line veterans from the Caucasus, read the press and we understand that Comrade Lenin is defending our interests and is trying to lead us along the right way.... We, the soldiers of the Army of the Caucasus, are entirely with Comrade Lenin. We agree to give full power to the party and to Lenin himself."

These letters from "simple people" are not only specific traits added to the "portrait of the time," which contributes to the historical picture of events on the eve of the victory of the October Revolution. They are above all live echoes of the process of development of a civic awareness at a crucial moment in social development. It is from this viewpoint that the historian's penetration into the mentality and way of thinking of the members of different social strata and categories, experiencing that moment, is of essential significance. For the sum total of the historian's observations, including lofty thoughts and the entirely basic interests of the people, help to determine, in the final account, the dominant feature of the social aspirations of a society which had reached a historical landmark.

As the letters of the contemporaries indicate, the dominant feature of 1917 largely determined the legitimate nature of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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Above One's Destiny; On the Centennial of Jawaharlal Nehru's Birth

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[Article by V. Vasilyev]

[Text] Today we cannot ignore the centennial of the birth of the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru. One must see in it not only an acknowledgment of the positive results of the activities of this outstanding politician and philosopher, and not simply a gesture of respect for his memory. It is also confirmation of the vitality of his ideas and their continuing significance in terms of our time and the future at which mankind looks with hope and concern.

One could hardly go wrong by saying that in terms of our own country, at this crucial stage in its history, looking at the personality and the policies of Nehru is of particular significance, for it provides us with valuable food for thought. Nehru's political legacy includes examples of approaches to problems and individual practical actions inherent in the new political thinking. Naturally, we cannot forget the fact that his activities took place within the framework of a different social system, distinct in terms of its class nature, and that most of it was related to the anticolonial and antiimperialist struggle and, therefore, was dominated by other tasks and objectives. However, in the same way that in order to acquire a truly efficient force, the socialist doctrine must inevitably master everything valuable gained in the course of the previous development of human thinking, and in shaping the concept of the new political thinking and trying to implement it in our practical actions, we cannot ignore the tremendous contribution which Jawaharlal Nehru made to global political standards. In any case, this is the only way that we can give its proper due to the memory of this outstanding person, who justifiably holds a place in history for, like a literary classical writer, the greatness of a political leader is realized by subsequent generations, looked at through the lens of their own time.

I

The main objectives of Nehru's activities were the liberation of India and its spiritual and physical renaissance. That is why his life is inseparable from that of his country and from the struggle waged by its people against British colonial rule.

Half a century before the 17-year old Nehru, the son of a noted Indian lawyer, enrolled in the university in Cambridge, in England, exploding popular anger shook up the foundations of British rule in India. The 1857 uprising was drowned in blood and India was taught a harsh lesson. However, the colonizers as well learned something: it became clear that the British Crown could not remain in power without the support of the local landowners and bourgeoisie, and without ties with the educated strata in Indian society. The first organization

of the national movement—the Indian National Congress—was established with the active participation of the British Government itself, in the hope of protecting the British Raj from the growing forces of the popular movement and anti-British feelings. However, the awakening national awareness gradually changed the situation in the country, and from an instrument of pacification and a party of loyal opposition, the Congress Party increasingly became the true opponent of the colonial regime. The process of radicalizing of political life increased. An outstanding representative of the left-wing revolutionary movement was B.G. Tilak, who called for armed struggle. Nehru strongly sympathized with his actions. However, the person who exerted a decisive influence on his development as the future leader of the national liberation movement was Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

What attracted Nehru to this man with his doctrine, which was so far removed from Tilak's revolutionary radicalism, but which, nonetheless became an entire age in Indian history? Prior to Gandhi political parties and groups representing the opposite poles of the National Liberation Movement—the moderate liberal wing of the Indian National Congress and the "extremists," headed by Tilak, despite all their differences, shared something in common: both were distant from the popular masses which bore on their shoulders the burden of colonial oppression, and neither was prepared to organize extensive practical actions. This was largely related to the low political standard of the overwhelming majority of the country's population—the peasantry, suppressed by poverty, deprived of all human rights, subject to the double exploitation of the feudal landowners and the foreign rulers.

It may have seemed that decades or, perhaps, even a century of "going to the people" and enlightenment might have been needed to develop among this unfortunate and uncoordinated mass people the necessary high political awareness. It may have seemed that the slowed-down development of capitalism, under colonial conditions, and the weakness and small numerical strength of the working class made inevitable a lengthy maturing of prerequisites for a broad revolutionary movement. However, Gandhi found a way through which he was able to involve millions of Indians in the mass national liberation movement and shape it in ways, furthermore, which did not give the colonial authorities grounds for cruel repressive reaction: the campaign of nonviolent resistance, expressed in boycotting foreign goods, avoiding state service, refusing to implement the orders and laws of the government, nonpayment of taxes and, finally, strikes, considered the highest form of nonviolent struggle. It was thus that Gandhi laid the beginning of a broad and, despite its very specific features, a revolutionary movement for national independence, which rallied within its ranks a great variety of social strata, turning the Congress Party into a party of mass practical

action. "What appeared," Nehru wrote, "was something totally unlike our own noisy policy of condemnation, which led to nothing.... It was a policy not of discussions but of struggle."

The close cooperation between Gandhi and Nehru, the two recognized national leaders, played a decisive role in the shaping of a united antiimperialist front in colonial India and made possible the broadening of the mass base of the movement and the systematic expansion of its scale and pressure power.

Although Nehru accepted Gandhi as the leader of the Indian people, he nonetheless was critical of individual aspects of Gandhism; he repeatedly expressed his disappointment with Gandhi's tactics of waiting, extreme caution toward radical revolutionary methods of struggle, and refusal to formulate a clear program of action. Already during his student years, Nehru had begun to be drawn to the socialist ideas. Subsequently, in seeking answers to the questions which motivated him, he repeatedly turned to socialist theory. "The study of Marx and Lenin had a tremendous influence on my awareness and helped me to see history and contemporary life in a new light." In addressing the Congress Party session in Lucknow, in 1936, he said: "I see no way for the elimination of unemployment, degradation and dependence of the Indian people other than socialism. This requires broad revolutionary changes in our political and social system, the removal of the rich from agriculture and industry.... It means the elimination of private property (with few exceptions) and replacing the present system based on the pursuit of profit with the lofty ideal of cooperative production."

Nonetheless, differences in Nehru's and Gandhi's views and in their approaches to the forms of political, economic and social organization which India required, as well as some differences on tactical problems of the national liberation movement, did not destroy their alliance. Nehru well realized how consistent were Gandhi's methods with the conditions and traditions of India and did not join in the criticism voiced by supporters of radical revolutionary trends, who accused Gandhi of conciliation with imperialism, social demagoguery, the use of confused ethical elaborations instead of radical political slogans, and deliberate aspiration to lower the intensity of the revolutionary struggle. The explanation of such a criticism of Gandhi, including some based on Marxist views, should be sought in the subjective distortions in evaluating the situation in India. Stalin, for example, believed that as early as the 1920s a revolutionary situation had developed in that country which, like Russia, could have led to "breaking the chain of the imperialist global front." Indeed, the cruel colonial exploitation created occasionally a situation which made possible spontaneous eruptions of popular discontent and violence. However, there were no conditions for the development of the movement and for preserving its unity and, consequently, nor was there a revolutionary situation.

Nehru realized that the degree of maturity of the revolutionary movement in India and the level of political consciousness of the masses in the period between the two world wars were not consistent with the features of a revolutionary situation. Public awareness had as yet to be developed; the national liberation movement had to be given not a random and explosive but a broad and organized character. Therefore, displaying his political clear-sightedness, which combined a profound analysis with intuition, Nehru was in no hurry to skip the steps of history with the careless sharpness of a schoolboy. He preferred the more accurate although longer and, therefore, occasionally seemingly painful way, leading to the liberation of the homeland from foreign domination, for during those years the empire, in his own words, could behave toward his compatriots "as though a mat on which to wipe its feet, while its dominions kept the Indians in a state of slavery...." Nehru walked his path to "swaraj"—independence—not with the party of the moderate liberals-swarajas, who truly wanted a compromise and reaching an accord with the colonizers or with the extremist conspirators who hid in narrow conspiratorial circles and who were hoping for a spontaneous outbreak of popular indignation. He marched along with Gandhi and the people of India, sensitively feeling their expectations and thoughts, soberly appraising their forces and extent of resolve and doing everything possible to strengthen them.

To Nehru personally, as it was to Gandhi, this path was a very hard one. Panditji, as the Indians called him, out of respect for their leader, had spent nearly 10 years in various jails. He had crisscrossed this sunburned country repeatedly, on foot or in third-class train carriages. However, this self-denial involved neither Gandhi's asceticism nor political self-advertising. It was the natural behavior of a person who had adopted Gandhi's method and on whose initiative, as early as the end of 1921, the Congress Party had developed a mass movement for voluntary imprisonment. The image of the hungry India, suppressed by foreign oppression, inspired Nehru to assume a tremendous responsibility for its future.

II

On 15 August 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru was the first to raise the flag of independent India on New Delhi's Red Fort. For the next 17 years he was to stay at its head, combining the positions of prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the Planning Commission.

The cherished objective of "swaraj" had been achieved. India had gained freedom. It was not only the policy of nonviolence that ensured the victory; under the conditions of the growing revolutionary upsurge in the country, the strengthening of progressive forces as a result of the defeat of the fascist bloc and the intensifying crisis in the imperialist colonial system, Great Britain was unable to keep the Indian people in a colonial prison any longer. However, independent India faced difficult

problems. Illiterate, exhausted from colonial exploitation and feudal vestiges, the poor countryside was unable to meet the nutritional needs of the population which at that time had already reached 350 million. As late as the start of the 1950s there were tens of millions of hungry people. The weak national industry, which had developed during the colonial period, was unable to produce even the most basic items to ensure industrialization and agricultural upsurge. The economy was heavily dependent on foreign countries. A huge unemployed labor army demanded the solution to the urgent employment problem. Its gravity was worsened by the caste system which doomed entire social strata to a life of pariahs deprived of human rights. Almost nowhere else in the world was the worker paid so low. Child labor was extensively used. The famous Indian economist R. Mukerji wrote at that time that the children go to work in the plantations "the moment they can stand on their feet."

In that country with a population belonging to dozens of national and ethnic groups, divided by caste, religious and social differences, tortured by religious-communal discord, politically disintegrated (at the time that it acquired its independence, British India included 562 feudal principalities), and burdened by the conflict with seceded Pakistan, a unifying form of political power had to be found, which would be consistent with contemporary requirements and take into consideration national traditions, for without this most Indians would be deprived of the opportunity actively to participate in the building of the new India. The country was living in profoundly dramatic and tense times, and it was precisely then that it lost Gandhi. His life was cut short by the bullet of a fanatic, at the time that Gandhi was trying to stop the bloody slaughter in which the Hindu and Muslim communities had plunged after the division of India.

To Nehru Gandhi's death was both a national and a personal tragedy. In the critical moments of the struggle for "swaraj" he repeatedly turned to Gandhi for advice and it was Gandhi's inflexible faith that was his source of strength. Now, there was no more Gandhi. All that were left were doubts and the problems of the further development of the country, which had to be solved by the first government of independent India, set up by Nehru, a government which represented primarily the interests of the national bourgeoisie. The tactics of nonviolent resistance, developed by Gandhi, was an efficient means for leading the Indian people to the struggle for national liberation. However, Nehru realized that merely raising the people and helping them to master certain ideals of justice and moral norms was insufficient. There were no real foundations for reorganizing society on a socialist basis. Under India's conditions, where the rich classes, the national bourgeoisie above all, were the best organized part of the national liberation movement and where, on the one hand, the traditions of the rural communities and rural self-management and, on the other, the strength of the positions of the land-owning class made possible only a gradual implementation of

agrarian reform, where the relatively small working class was not the basic revolutionary detachment, the general principles and theoretical concepts of the socialist theory were abstractions unrelated to life. As was the case during the period of the struggle for "swaraj," forms of social organization accessible to and understood by the masses had to be found. The realities and the conditions of the historical period experienced by the country were the following: a parliamentary republic; a federal structure based, in the final account, on the establishment of equal states based on the principles of national language; rural self-administration with the democratic authorities traditional to India—the panchayat. None of this, however, provided a key to solving the problem of socioeconomic development. Now, after independence had been achieved, Nehru's main objective was to promote the country's economic and social progress and the well-being of its people. Addressing himself to the All-Indian Committee of the Congress Party in 1958, he wrote: "Democracy and socialism are means of achieving an objective but not the objective itself. We speak of the public good. Is such good something superior to the good of individuals of which society is made? If the individual is neglected and sacrificed for the sake of what is believed to be the social good, is such a good then a worthy objective? Everyone agrees with the fact that man must not be sacrificed and that real social progress will come when every person has been offered the opportunity to develop, providing that this individual is not a member of a group of the elect, but of the entire society."

Nehru persistently sought new solutions. He closely listened to the heartbeat of India, rejecting all stereotypes and dogmas. He formulated the essential question of developing a new dynamic model of social development, taking into consideration the experience of other countries without, however, duplicating it in its entirety. He introduced the system of national state 5-year plans and for a long time remained the head of the Indian Planning Commission; he pursued a systematic course toward the creation of a powerful governmental sector as the main support of the policy of industrialization and of resolving the country's social problems; he paid tremendous attention to the reorganization of social relations in the countryside, doing everything possible to ensure the implementation of the policy of agrarian reforms. He opposed the caste system or, at least, its most extreme manifestations which doomed masses of people belonging to the lower castes to rightlessness and degradation.

He was criticized from the right and the left by landowners, members of the big national bourgeoisie, supporters of the interests of foreign capital, people who demanded full freedom for private enterprise, and representatives of left-wing parties and groups, who accused him of indecisiveness and of making concessions to the rich classes and social conciliationism. Nor should we fail to note that many Soviet social scientists as well accused him of liberalism and social reformism, support of eclecticism, and "Gandhian utopias." However, he

was neither eclectic nor utopian. He was a political realist who did not reject reality. He did not let himself be led into the area of mirages created by outside imaginations but relied on profound rational analysis.

In the 1950s India was gripped by a broad social debate on choosing a path of development. In dozens of his speeches, which were clear and simple, without verbal acrobatics, Nehru tried to concretize the idea of a "third way." Here is the way he expressed his ideas in the course of economic debates in parliament: "The society toward which we aspire is a society of a socialist model.... I beg of you not to imagine matters as though since socialism proceeds from the idea of nationwide industry we must nationalize all sectors. I believe that as society develops the socialist model, the dominion of nationalized industry will increase. The most important thing, however, is not to try to nationalize everything but to advance toward the final objective, which is a higher standard of productivity and employment."

In Nehru's views, social justice and equality, which are inherent features of a socialist society, presumed achieving certain material conditions and a certain standard of output through the development and strengthening of the economic base which had already been developed in India. However, the problems which had to be resolved far exceeded the possibilities of the Indian economy with its variety of capitalist and precapitalist systems and forms of ownership and a relatively low accumulation potential. Nehru firmly promoted the development of the state sector, which he considered the foundation for the country's industrialization and economic progress. "...Today it no longer makes any sense to deify private enterprise. Today we must go toward socialization. Without it, in an underdeveloped country such as India, in particular, we must follow precisely this path." With deep conviction he argued that "...we must break through the shell of this structure (describe it economic or social if you wish), which is preventing progress and blocking the free manifestation of the energy of the popular masses. I want to release this popular energy. That is why everyone must gradually break this shell, the shell of feudalism and capitalism. Actually, this is a process which is taking place the world over... for no one believes any longer in the principle of free competition...." Shaping his thoughts into a clear concept, he summed it up as follows: "We must have both a state and private sector as coordinated units of a **single plan.**" In dozens of articles and speeches, particularly in the 1950s (governmental work virtually deprived Nehru of the opportunity to use his brilliant talent as a political writer), he concretized and developed his understanding of the interaction between the private and state sectors on the social and the economic levels.

The meaning of his concept was the need for a natural progress, free from manifestations of social destruction, not dividing but mobilizing all the forces of society for the solution of national problems. "I want a socialist society for India but I do not believe that it can be reached exclusively through revolution and slogans. I

want for India to advance toward its objective, involving a greater number of people in this movement." "...It is not a question of asking the capitalist for their agreement. We are trying to attract on our side even those who are being hurt by our policies. We shall create an atmosphere of cooperation." However, Nehru's concept was not amorphous. It also included the idea of priorities: "It is essential for the state sector to grow as rapidly as possible. I believe that, under India's conditions, the private sector must function under a certain broad strategic control." Nehru did not formulate a sufficiently specific plan for the building of a society in the socialist model, nor did he set himself such a task. However, he quite clearly analyzed and shaped the basic principles of the strategy, the objective of which was progress toward socialism. This principle not only included planning and progressively developing a state sector and extensive development of cooperatives, particularly in the countryside, but also defined the approach to the use of external economic factors and problems of interaction with the global capitalist market, which was of particular importance to a country in which the positions held by foreign capital, British above all, were quite strong. In this area Nehru did not tend to simplify the matter or to belittle the difficulties and possible negative consequences of such interaction. "I do not oppose the involvement of foreign capital. However, foreign capital triggers certain consequences. Whenever the state resorts to foreign loans on conditions acceptable to it and helps the private sector, we know what we are doing. However, if foreign capital participates in the development of the private sector, associated with Indian capital, it could play a more important role.... We must bear in mind the difficulties which foreign capital will create." In the course of debates on the ways of development, again and again he cautioned his compatriots: "We cannot eternally beg for foreign aid. Our prestige as a nation will suffer if we start begging around, collecting funds to meet the needs of our development. This also triggers weakness and doubt about our own building capability."

Nehru's objectives of socioeconomic strategy were a society of social justice, built on the basis of broad political and economic democracy, relying in its progress on its own resources and rallying within a single interrelated organism the variety of social systems which existed in the country.

III

Jawaharlal Nehru was an absolute authority in the area of international politics. The principles he formulated are to this day the foundations of India's foreign policy course. We know that the foreign policy of any country is an extension of its domestic policy. It was natural, therefore, that in India's relations with other countries its anti-imperialist, anticolonial and prodemocratic traditions and its aspiration toward constructive activities, love of peace and tolerance were bound to show up.

However, there were tremendous difficulties to be surmounted in the formulation of such a course! The gain of

political independence in itself neither brought nor could bring any automatic rescue from economic dependency. The break of relations with the former mother country greatly worsened the already difficult economic situation of the country. Nor should we forget the fact that the first years of independence were darkened by the consequences of the British imperial policy of "divide and rule." The conflict with seceded Pakistan, which was largely the consequence of British intrigues, developed a military tension along India's borders. The dependence of the Indian Army on British armaments and military supplies at that time was too substantial to be ignored. Under such most difficult circumstances yet another facet of Nehru's brilliant political talent was manifested: his art as a diplomat. Once again drawing on himself the fire of criticism he, who had dedicated such great efforts to the cause of the liberation of his homeland, was forced repeatedly to prove to his opponents the expediency of joining the British Commonwealth of Nations. Subsequent events proved that the position held by Nehru was the right one: by maintaining its ties with the Commonwealth, which was increasingly turning into a symbol, and thereby avoiding isolation and the disruption of relations it vitally needed, India was nonetheless able to preserve its freedom of choice in matters of domestic development and in defining its course in the international arena. Fears that, in the final account, India would find itself involved in the orbit of British foreign policy, did not materialize. The policy formulated by Nehru, which was becoming increasingly independent with every passing year, pursued clear objectives consistent with India's national interests: a systematic struggle against colonialism and racism and for peace and disarmament.

As he did during the period of the struggle for independence, Nehru developed essentially new ways leading to its implementation, which were subsequently adopted by the overwhelming majority of developing countries and which made possible their unification within the broad progressive movement in world politics: nonalignment. The decisive and systematic separation from the opposing military blocs and the constant and persistent aspiration toward settling conflicts and arguments through peaceful means were of basic significance. This approach to the solution of the difficult problems in the period of intensifying confrontation between the military-political blocs and growing tension caused by the cold war was an unquestionable manifestation of the new approaches and demanded a great deal of courage. This was a manifestation of support for Gandhi's methods and their projection in the area of international relations. Unlike the emphasis inherent in Gandhism on moral-ethical values and moral norms, in considering political problems Nehru based himself more on the dynamic actions stemming from the concept of national interests, attainable within the scale of his own time, and in the course of their organic interaction with the external world. A new feature here was the philosophy of Nehru's foreign policy course toward the theory of "classical neutrality," the universally acknowledged

example of which was that of Switzerland. In this case the main distinguishing feature was the aspiration not to adopt a policy of noninterference but, conversely, active participation in solving the actual problems of the global community; not self-removal from the acute and, therefore, risky situations, but an active role in the efforts to ensure their just solution through peaceful means. This was not a policy of neutrality but of positive neutrality which reflected India's special role in international affairs, consistent with its world status and indicating that it had assumed a great responsibility.

Naturally, such a course could not fail to provoke a sharp reaction by the supporters of Western power policy, who hoped, through economic, military and diplomatic pressure, to be able to force India to abandon its independent foreign policy course. However, neither persistent offers for loans and food nor the threat to interrupt them, or else a variety of military and political intrigues in the Indian-Pakistani conflict, the question of Kashmir and subsequent attempts to make use of the border conflict with China brought the United States and its allies in the military-political blocs the desired results. During the first years of independence, which were difficult for India, when Nehru was forced personally to conduct talks with the United States on receiving aid, he remained loyal to the principles he had proclaimed. In addressing the joint session of the U.S. Congress, in October 1949, he said: "Wherever freedom and justice are threatened or wherever there is aggression we neither can nor will be neutral. That which we support and try to implement... is to combine belief in peace with the inexhaustible aspiration of thoughts and actions for the sake of security...."

Nehru's policy earned India a deserved reputation and highly enhanced its international prestige. Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that Nehru's services in that area remain to this day not fully appreciated. His contribution to the elimination of colonialism and the struggle for the assertion of peaceful coexistence as the only possible way of development of the contemporary world is truly tremendous. The course of positive neutrality was inseparably linked to anticolonialism from the very first, and with the struggle waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for national liberation and against neocolonialist dependence and racial discrimination. Essentially, Nehru was the first among the leaders in the National Liberation Movement who profoundly realized that the total elimination of colonialism and the peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems are mandatory prerequisites for attaining India's national objectives as well as for ensuring progress in the contemporary world as a whole. As an increasing number of political leaders in the young independent countries reached such an understanding, the policy of positive neutrality became the foundation for the broad Nonalignment Movement in which India played the role of acknowledged leader. India's example and its attitude toward military-political blocs played, in particular, a

decisive role in the failure of the plans of Western militaristic forces to involve Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon in SEATO.

It is impossible to deny that the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Countries, which was of tremendous importance in consolidating national-liberation forces and strengthening Afro-Asian solidarity and shaping a platform for the nonaligned movement, became possible thanks to Nehru's energy and personal organizational efforts. The declaration adopted in Bandung on assisting universal peace and cooperation remained, for many long years, not only a banner in the struggle against the colonial imperialist system but also a contribution to the rapprochement between third world countries and the socialist states. It helped the PRC to strengthen its positions in the international arena.

Equally important was Nehru's merit in the development and concretizing of the idea of peaceful coexistence. In this case the Indian prime minister was the first to be able to raise it to a category of international law and thus, to translate it from the language of political declarations into the language of contractual-legal documents. On 29 April 1954, an agreement on trade and relations between Tibet and India was signed by India and China in Beijing. In its preamble, for the first time, the "five principles"—"Pancha Shila"—were formulated, which subsequently foundation of the joint declaration signed by Nehru and Chou Enlai, which was to define relations between these two great Asian powers. Even the border conflict which broke out 5 years later and which complicated relations between China and India for a long period of time, could not nullify the significance of the "five principles." These principles were repeatedly applied in treaties and agreements between India and other countries. They were the base for comprehensive cooperation between India and the Soviet Union and gained their logical development in the New Delhi Declaration On the Principles of a World Free From Nuclear Weapons and Violence. Unquestionably, the time is not too distant when the principles of peaceful coexistence will once again become the foundation of relations between India and the PRC.

The 25 years since the death of Jawaharlal Nehru have confirmed the viability of the foreign policy course he had formulated. He was followed in his position by his daughter Indira Gandhi, who became prime minister. India continues to be loyal to this course to this day.

Nehru approached many essential international problems not only as an outstanding governmental leader but also as a profound and original thinker. His strong great mind had mastered the historical experience of many ages and nations. The combination of Gandhian traditions with contemporary scientific methods, embodied in his legacy, enabled him to reach a number of conclusions in the area of foreign policy which anticipated individual aspects of the new political thinking.

Unquestionably, one of them, and perhaps the main one, should be the introduction into international practices of the idea of nonviolence, which was so typical of Gandhi's thinking and had deep roots in ancient Indian ethical-philosophical tradition. A number of articles and statements by Nehru on this topic comprehensively bring to light the significance of the nuclear factor in global politics. As early as the start of the 1950s he had reached the conclusion that a radical change would occur in the system of international balance as a result of the appearance of nuclear weapons. "To think of war during this nuclear century is in itself insanity," he said in addressing the Indian Parliament in February 1955. "...There is no protection from nuclear weapons.... The only solution is to prevent war...." Such was to him the starting point of an essentially new approach to the problems of international balance and a balance of forces, in terms of the basic political realities of the contemporary world. In an address at the inauguration of the first Indian experimental reactor, once again he cautioned against the threat of nuclear war and clearly formulated the conclusion that "when you are thinking of control over the use of nuclear weapons you are thinking of disarmament...." No, this was not pacifism but one of the manifestations of the new realistic thinking of the nuclear age.

IV

It would be difficult to find an aspect of Indian social life in which Nehru's activities did not lay the beginning of profound changes directed toward the gradual building of a "socialist-model" society. Unquestionably, he had reasons to be satisfied, having witnessed the implementation of many of his plans. During his lifetime an industrialization base was laid; agrarian reforms and plans for communal development, related to the cooperative movement, substantially changed the situation in the countryside and made possible the subsequent solution of the problem of self-support of the country with food, freeing it from the need to import grain. During Nehru's lifetime major contemporary scientific research centers, such as national laboratories, organized on his initiative throughout the country, became the foundations of domestic science. Thanks to his efforts, persistence and purposefulness, industrial sectors of vital importance to the country appeared: petroleum, in the establishment of which cooperation with the Soviet Union played a decisive role, a nuclear power industry, aerospace building and other high-technology sectors. On the basis of the policy of self-support (the share of foreign capital investments does not exceed 4 percent even in the private sector), the economy has retained its capability for further dynamic growth. What was immeasurably more important, however, was the fact that from a neglected and obedient mass of the people, a new man began to develop, a contemporary worker, a peasant-farmer, gradually converting to cooperativization. The momentum which Nehru's activities gave to India took it to the path of socioeconomic progress.

Nonetheless, the main objective which Nehru set has still not been attained. In terms of per capita national income, as in the past, India is among the poorest developing countries. However, there is more to it. What is much more serious is that India is still facing the unsolved problems typical of the third world. More than one-half of its 800 million strong population subsists below the official poverty line. The overall socio-economic dynamics is such that the absolute and relative number of some of the poorest groups is increasing. Social contrasts are intensifying and becoming sharper. The gap between the prosperous "middle" class, which has firmly mastered a bourgeois life style, and the overwhelming majority of the country's population is widening. While cars, color televisions and VCRs have become firmly part of this growing and prospering "middle class," nearly three-quarters of Indian children suffer from lack of protein. The gravity of such unsolved problems is constantly enhanced by remaining communal-oriented and ethnic-communal contradictions.

The fact that this array of problems which burdens the so-called third world remains unresolved in India as well (as is the case, actually, with the overwhelming majority of other developing countries, including such extremely big countries as Brazil and Nigeria) is precisely a manifestation of the fact that the main tasks which Nehru set in defining the strategy for the development of the country remains unsolved: the absence of a new model of development consistent with the requirements of our time and the specific conditions of India itself. Nehru did a great deal to ensure the solution of this problem. He identified in his notes and speeches the organic interconnection between the socialization of basic means of production and the broad democratization of society, including its basic primary cells: the rural panchayat—for it was only such a combination that could save the country from horrifying poverty and extreme social inequality. Gandhi's moral and ethical concept not only did not oppose this approach but, conversely, was one more proof of the need for adopting a socialist model.

The unfinished nature of Nehru's main concept indicates, above all, how difficult the problem is. In the search for answers to the question of the path to be followed by India, Nehru turned to the historical experience of other countries and nations and to a variety of doctrines and theories. He moved from theosophical reflections to Fabian utopias and, subsequently, to the systematic study of the theory of Marxism. He was interested in the Soviet practices in building socialism. We are quite well familiar with his profound assessments of the universal-historical significance of the October Revolution. However, he had a critical approach to the Soviet experience as well, aware of its positive and negative aspects. With his amazingly sharp sense of time, Nehru approached socialism not as a theoretical abstraction but as a phenomenon of real life, firmly rejecting the possibility of arbitrary elaborations, in favor of the active creativity of the masses. The thoughts of socialism

and its Indian model and the concretizing of its individual aspects, pertaining to forms of political democracy and the place of the cooperative movement, particularly in the reorganization of the countryside, the use of reserves, artisan and petty industrial production, and the role of planning and the state sector as the foundations for the development of society along the path of socialism, while retaining the multiplicity of economic systems and forms of ownership and a "mixed economy," which he conceived not as a mechanical combination of a variety of forms but as a single socio-economic essence, and the need for a cultural revolution and its democratic foundation, along with many other factors, which are Nehru's legacy, are of tremendous value to the contemporary world at its present critical stage of development and can be a source of inspiration and self-knowledge. Nor should we fail to see that Nehru's legacy is also the key to the new contemporary perception of Gandhi's ideas with their wealth of new methods, new approaches and new thinking.

The study of the reasons for which India's socio-economic development in the time after Nehru deviated (albeit perhaps temporarily) from the path he had earmarked exceeds the scope of this article. The author of this article considers as one of his tasks precisely to draw once again the attention to the exceptional importance of this problem. Unquestionably, two reasons here were of decisive significance: the limited nature of national-bourgeois reformism, which was the essence of democracy in India, and the dependence of the country on the global capitalist economy. Nehru clearly and unequivocally warned against the possible negative consequences of an improper interaction with it. Today this conclusion is of tremendous importance to the developing countries, including those which are trying to apply various models of "socialist orientation."

Without undertaking a comparison between such different historical figures as V.I. Lenin and Jawaharlal Nehru, we can nonetheless say that they share one thing in common: both of them were unquestionably bigger than their time and bigger than life. Their ideas were not implemented in full and remain a source which can nurture the intellectual activities of latter generations.

Nehru was the great son of India who dreamed of the cultural and spiritual revival of his great country. Today as well, he remains a contemporary and compatriot of all nations on earth, regardless of whether they belong to the so-called "East," "West" or "South." The search for a new model or type of development, consistent with the requirements of the contemporary world, becomes a historical imperative. Unquestionably, this means that in the opposite case social, economic and ecological conflicts and catastrophes will become the destiny of mankind and its sad end, for the contemporary world has still not been able to make proper use of the already created material wealth or adequately apply the already acquired knowledge, for which reason it can be described with the words of Dandin, the Indian medieval poet:

"I did not become wealthy, nor learned; I did not acquire the merits of a saint, and my time ran out."

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The People of October

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[Review by O. Khlevnyuk, candidate of historical sciences, of the book "*Deyateli SSSR i Revolyutsionnogo Dvizheniya Rossii. Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar Granat*" [Leaders of the USSR and the Revolutionary Movement in Russia. Granat Encyclopedic Dictionary]. Reprinted edition. Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1989, 832 pp]

[Text] Volume 40 and three sections of volume 41 of the Granat Encyclopedic Dictionary, containing the biographies and autobiographies of leaders of the USSR and of the revolutionary movement in Russia, came out between 1926 and 1929. Soon afterwards these books were put in special storage, where they were kept for many long decades. Very recently Izdatelstvo Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, jointly with the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism prepared them for publication and reissued them in an edition of 100,000 copies.

The publication of this voluminous dictionary—currently both volumes of the previous edition have been combined in a single book—is, with no exaggeration, a noticeable event. The history of our country after the October Revolution, the interest in which has increased inordinately, is still extremely poorly documented. Difficulties in re-establishing the true history of Soviet society exist not only because certain events and facts were improperly interpreted and evaluated over a long period of time. The main trouble is much worse: there are a great many things about which we do not know anything. This new book makes a substantial contribution to surmounting this lack of knowledge.

The book is of great help as a source in studying the history of the revolutionary movement and the first years of the Soviet system. The reprinting of the Granat Dictionary makes extensively accessible the autobiographies of 44 leaders of the "Popular Will" Organization and 245 biographies of participants in the October Revolution, the Civil War and the first years of the NEP. Furthermore, these texts, which were published in the 1920s, have been supplemented in the new dictionary with photographs of the leaders included in the book and with brief information on their further lives in the 1930s to the 1950s. The book includes a new addendum: a detailed reference on the structure of the leading authorities of the Communist Party and the Soviet state between 1917 and 1927.

This reprint of the Granat Dictionary can be considered with full justification a typical description of sociopolitical life of the mid-1920s with its standards, biases and level of democracy. During the few years in the course of which the dictionary was compiled, repeatedly the leaders in the higher power echelons changed: the Zinovyev-Kamenev-Stalin triumvirate was replaced by a new alliance between Stalin and Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy. Naturally, this influenced the various articles in the publication; nonetheless, not one of the figures of the revolution worth mentioning was ignored in the book. There were extensive and quite objective articles even about Trotsky and his supporters, already expelled from the party. The praises of the politicians who were in power during the time the dictionary came out do not exceed the limits of decency. What is important to us is the fact that the materials drafted under those circumstances could be considered a rather good quality source: some things may have been deleted but direct distortions are extremely unlikely.

For its time, this dictionary was a phenomenon also from the viewpoint of the work methods applied in dealing with biographical data. In its preface to Vol 41, the editors pointed out the following: "...The history of these leaders gives flesh and blood to the conclusions based on mass observations and reflects excesses in life which cannot be statistically classified. However, to this effect the history of the individual figure should be exclusively subjective and written by the person himself; it is only at that point that it assumes an objectively high value, reflecting the life of the various strata which nurtured the revolution and the way it was influenced by its leading ranks." These ideas of considering history through specific human destinies and identifying the social mechanisms which molded the individual and its inverse effect on history became widespread in the 1920s and beginning of 1930s. Scientists collected the autobiographies not only of outstanding people but also of rank-and-file citizens: workers, peasants, and even children. However, soon afterwards such initiatives were halted. Increasingly, history assumed a simplistic-schematic aspect. The tradition of depersonalizing it and the fictitious equalization among people, converted into a mass of figures and percentages, and the automatic application of the current way of thinking and mentality to the past became widespread. That is perhaps the reason for which the literary genre of political biographies is still poorly developed. In frequent cases such biographies turn either into an enumeration of dates of the life and activities of the person or else into moralizing storied of "bad" and "good" people.

In this sense as well this publication is of great interest. It is not simply a work of reference which helps us to follow the path of the leaders of the revolution, to find the details of one or another event and the role which various people played in it. Most of the entries in the dictionary are autobiographical. They are sometimes short but in most cases expanded, with explanatory digression by their authors.

The close reading of this book inevitably leads to the idea that it was written by people with a similar and, to us, largely unknown experience. These were, in the full meaning of the term, people of the revolution, who had been trained by their entire previous life for its upheavals, tragic turns, defeats and victories.

Naturally, the destinies of those individuals developed differently. For example, their origins and first vital impressions were different. As a rule, the people of the revolution had begun their labor careers early in life, regardless of what they did, whether they plowed the land, used hammers or taught classes. Frequently their work was forced and exhausting. "My workday was 11 hours long, handling the levers. From this type of Egyptian-slave work my hands became covered with blisters and my muscles were burning from the pain of stress," recalls I.I. Vatsetis, the first commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR. Many of the future participants in the revolution had been subjected to persecutions and insults since childhood. They had met with national oppression, had been victimized by pogroms and classified as second-rate people.

Generally speaking, the regime which existed in Russia quickly increased the ranks of its opponents. Cruelty, illegality and violence triggered an active counteraction. "...The world is built on struggle and not on love among people." This cruel and, in general, not entirely just conclusion was nonetheless the actual reaction to surrounding reality in which "some people misbehaved scandalously while others went hungry and lived like animals." Frequently people became revolutionaries not at all under the influence of any doctrine. "I promised myself actively to struggle against the existing system. At that time I did not know exactly where my enemies were. I found the virtually entire world hostile," N.A. Milyutin wrote on this subject. These people made their choice well aware of what they were facing: "Am I willing to stand in the ranks of the revolutionaries, with all the consequences stemming from this fact, such as being expelled from high school, breaking with my family, jail, exile, and so on? It was then that I made the decision and firmly told myself: yes, I shall join the ranks of the revolutionaries whatever may happen," Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy recalls.

Even their darkest premonitions came true. "...In the course of the investigation I was twice beaten to the point of bleeding. I came out of prison enraged; 10 or 11 months in jail had turned my dark brown hair gray." "Frequently at night the wing for people in solitary at the Tomsk Suburban Jail would echo with heart-rending shouts of prisoners "on death row" who were parting with their comrades and who were led to their execution." Such facts are frequently encountered in the biographies. Jail, exile, escapes and foreign exile were a way of life. This way of life shaped the people, dictating to them a certain vision of the world and of what was admissible and inadmissible.

Russian society gained new experience during the period of the 1905 Revolution. "Bloody Sunday," recalls A.M. Kollontay, "found me on the street. I marched with the demonstrators toward the Winter Palace, and the picture of the cruel reprisals against unarmed working people remains forever impressed in my memory. It was an unusually bright January day, and there were trusting faces full of expectation.... There was a fatal order given to the troops lined up against the Palace.... Blood tainted the white snow.... Whips were used, the gendarmes shouted mockingly, there were killed and wounded..., children were shot." This was followed by a reactionary period, during which many friends withdrew from the revolutionary movement; there was treason, decline and quarrels. The war unleashed by the bourgeoisie once again confirmed the views of the revolutionaries of the inhumanity of capitalism and its reactionary nature. The war shook up an entire generation, and the enrichment of a handful of people in power and the war intensified the hatred within society and made shedding blood a daily habit, reducing the price of human life to nothing. Finally, the war maximally aggravated all contradictions within the society and led to revolution, which was the starry hour of the majority of the characters in the dictionary.

These people wrote little about their postrevolutionary activities, possibly because such was the intention of this publication or, perhaps, the characters themselves found a great deal of unclear features in the realities of the 1920s. Victory in the revolution—the life purpose of these people—was behind. Ahead of them was tragedy. The generation of revolutionaries was unable to defend even its own life. Out of 245 leading personalities of the revolution, included in the dictionary, 104 perished or died before the start of the mass repressions, while 97 died as a result of them.

All these people had lived the type of life they wanted. They were shaped by their harsh times. Their path was difficult and by no means within the reach of all of them. They had fought for this path and they were concerned with being properly understood by the generations which would follow. "...In my own albeit rather modest position," M.N. Pokrovskiy wrote, "I am also a participant in the revolution: Is the revolution not filled with petty contradictions? It is woven of such contradictions but it is only a pedant who could seek fault in them. The historians of subsequent generations... should not glorify every single thing that we did, working under devilishly difficult conditions. I do hope that they will acknowledge that it was thanks to us that they have something with which to begin.

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RENOVATION OF SOCIETY— RENOVATION OF THE PARTY. TOWARD THE 28TH CPSU CONGRESS

What Should the Party Be: Two Viewpoints

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[Continuing publication of materials received for the discussion section (see *KOMMUNIST* Nos 12, 13 and 14 for 1989)]

[Text] Delegates to the September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted that currently a debate is taking place on the ways of perestroika in the party and the enhancement of activities of party members in the struggle for the socialist renovation of our society. It is within the framework of this discussion that we publish the following two articles whose authors express quite different views on such matters. We hope that the readers will join in this discussion.

V. Amelin, candidate of philosophical sciences, Moscow:
"A Dynamic and Flexible Force"

One of the contradictions in contemporary party life is the one between the old and new forms of work. The traditional administrative methods of party management of economic and social processes and the ideological area have still not been eliminated, although they not only fail to yield the desired results but even trigger negative consequences. Meanwhile, the political methods which should replace the administrative ones are not easily "adapting" to party work. To this day, more than 1 year after the 19th Party Conference, unfortunately, the conclusion drawn at the conference to the effect that in the party "the new democratic methods of management, openness and glasnost, are making their way with difficulty and encountering conservatism and inertia, dogmatism in thinking and action," remains topical.

The reasons for this are numerous. One of them, an important one at that is, in my view, the fact that by no means have all party officials acquired a sufficiently clear idea of the nature of political methods in party work. Some of them see as their essence "strengthening the social area;" others see it as turning "to the individual, his awareness and inner behavioral and action motivations." It cannot be said that these views do not reflect the spirit of the time, so to say. However, the nature of political methods does not end there. I believe that the nucleus of political methods is a consideration of the basic interests of the different social forces: classes and social groups, ethnic communities and social organizations, the determination of the specific importance of a given phenomenon within the overall context of social relations; anything which affects the vital needs of millions of people becomes an area for politics.

The satisfaction of social interests is inevitably related to **power relations**. Although this may be so, in my view, it

is insufficient if we want to understand the nature of political methods. I believe that the political influence applied to a group (or groups) of the population whose interests are manifested on the political level is no less, if not more, important. Some party workers link politics only to the use of power instruments, forgetting that power relations are based on the capacity to influence the minds and hearts of people. This can be achieved only on the basis of close ties between party leaders and every party member, on the one hand, and the various population groups, on the other, which makes the expression and realization of the interests of the latter possible.

At the present time the party organizations must take into consideration the fact that new independent organizations have appeared in the political arena: sociopolitical informal clubs and associations, and others. How to structure relations between them and the party? This is a rather complex problem, bearing in mind that some informal associations include a certain number of extremist elements who are unwilling to establish contacts with the official authorities. In my view, this conflict can be resolved only on the basis of political work methods which make it possible to take into consideration the interests of all social strata and groups, and the clear identification of problems which demand different approaches and become topics of discussion. It is precisely this that is the foundation of a dialogue in the course of which reciprocally acceptable solutions are reached, consistent with the common interests. Political methods also make it possible to isolate various types of extremist forces and forces opposing socialism, depriving them of their social support and thus preventing the development of destabilizing trends. By this token they become an important factor which consolidates society and prevents the development of destabilizing processes.

Increasing the autonomy and activeness of public organizations requires for the party committees to review their traditional relations with them. Unquestionably, it is necessary, above all, to abandon bureaucratic administration, "shaking up cadres" and other such methods. In my view, it should be a question of partnership in solving the difficult perestroika problems. In shaping such relations we cannot do without a compromise. Nonetheless, it is also important clearly to realize that a struggle is just as necessary.

One of the areas for the application of political methods is the electoral campaign, in the course of which the party engages in a real struggle for influencing the various population groups. These new methods are already taking shape. M.S. Gorbachev's report submitted at the CPSU Central Committee Conference earmarks the basic trends of political work in the course of the forthcoming elections for local authorities. Above all, they call for the formulation of a strategy of the electoral campaign, the study of public opinion, the

choice, preparation and promotion of candidates, corresponding ideological work, the study of the candidates, backing a program for the electoral campaigns, and so on.

The experience of the elections of last spring prove that it is precisely the programs of many candidates that were their weakest point. The electoral campaign demands the promotion of objectives of social development which are clear and understood by the voters and, above all, which are attainable. The habit of presenting grandiose "universal-historical" ideological structures develops in the population and the voters heightened expectations or else is interpreted as verbal nonsense. Realistic programs not only presume political responsibility on the part of their authors in making electoral promises but should also be subject to public control. Nonetheless, let us note that the electoral campaign formulates, in terms of ideological work, new and largely nontraditional tasks. For example, each party organization, as well as the party as a whole, needs ideological flexibility and fast reaction to different situations which develop in the course of the campaign. This is even more necessary in terms of the ways and means of propaganda itself.

Therefore, political work methods are oriented toward upgrading the influence of the party among the various population groups on the basis of taking into consideration and meeting the variety of their interests. Such methods presume convincing the people. They demand a dialogue with the various movements and organizations. In other words, they are essentially democratic. Let us emphasize that thanks to such methods decisions could be made which would not only meet the expectations of the majority of the people but would also be efficient instruments in solving contradictions and conflicts. In other words, these are also methods used in molding a national consensus, capable of consolidating all progressive forces in the course of perestroika.

I believe that under contemporary circumstances the main obstacle on the way to the extensive use of political methods is the aspect of the party which developed in the course of decades of the domination of the command-administrative system. The position of the party as the nucleus of this system clearly contributed to its falling behind the overall democratization of society.

What are the ways for solving this situation? We must restore the Leninist concept of the party and firmly eliminate the Stalinist-Brezhnevian understanding of the principles governing its organization, which conflicts with the laws of party life and role in a law-governed democratic state. In my view, the theoretical legacy of the noted leader of the Italian and international communist movement A. Gramsci, the possibility of the application of which should not, naturally, be absolutized under our circumstances, could be of some help in seeking answers to this question. It would be equally erroneous to ignore it altogether.

A. Gramsci clearly distinguished between two types of parties. The parties of the first type have a strict command-based structure which does not allow any variety of views and opinions and which resembles an order of knights. The parties of the second type are "organic," as Gramsci described them, and are structured differently: they express the interests of both "their own" social group as well as other communities and strata, concerned above all with maintaining a balance between their various interests, while they personally somehow performing an integrating role. What prevail in such a party are ideological-political and cultural functions, while the party itself acts as the "collective intellectual," whose main task is to formulate theory and policy, and display intellectual and political initiative. Unlike the "party-order," whose rigid organizational structure inevitably leads to exaggerating the role of the center and, in the final account, alienating it from the bulk of the membership, the organic party is open to the challenges of history. Its character changes constantly, depending on the nature and complexity of social problems.

Let us note the certain similarity between Gramsci's ideas and Lenin's views, particularly those which Lenin expressed in the last years of his life. Here is an example: in discussing the resolution on unity within the party at the 10th RKP(b) Congress, in answer to an amendment submitted by D.B. Ryazanov on firmly condemning the elections for the party congress based on platforms, Lenin said that this view was erroneous. "We cannot deprive the party and the members of the Central Committee of the right to turn to the party, if a basic problem creates differences" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 112). V.I. Lenin considered as grounds for the impossibility of strengthening party unity once and for all a decree on the continuous development of the party which, in order adequately to react to different situations, should constantly change itself.

What was most important to Gramsci was not the fact that the organic parties allow factions and the struggle among them (we are currently dealing with a cycle of such problems) but above all the fact that such a party is a form of internal freedom for the working people, a form of converting them from "performers into initiators," and from masses into "leaders and managers." In this situation, the intellectual and spiritual resources of the party assume an essentially new significance. Yet harnessing them with the help of the traditional and still existing relations of domination and subordination is virtually impossible. That is precisely why the party's spiritual leadership is its qualitatively new function, essentially different from the formal understanding of its ideological role.

Therefore, in my view, the formulation and use of political work methods can be accomplished by transforming the party from a formalized hierarchical organization, based on a strict automatic discipline, into a self-governing organization based on internal party democracy and encompassing within itself the broad

progressive social forces and performing the role of spiritual and, therefore, political leader of society. The renovation of the image of our party is a very contradictory and sensitive process which affects the views and interests of tens of millions of people. Which, in my view, are the most important problems in the party's renovation and democratization and the possible ways of resolving them?

As we know, ideology not only formulates political objectives toward which the party aspires but also performs the most important function of the self-determination of the party member; it is a form of realization on his part of his own place and role in society and in historical development. At the present time the perestroika in ideology is blocked by the monocentric method of such self-determination. It calls for the primary orientation of the party member toward the center which formulates and sanctions the basic objectives and values of society. Since the center is actually personified by the party leader, we obtained a situation in which any new leader in assuming the leadership imposed upon the socialist values and objectives such a strong imprint of his own biases, interests and aspirations that he can sometimes change them to an unrecognizable degree. Today the people frequently ask the party members: What type of socialism are you discussing: that of Stalin, Khrushchev or Gorbachev?

A uniform system of values cannot be imposed from the top down but must be shaped democratically, in the course of discussions and clashes of interests, views and opinions. Today there is an increasing number of party members who radically reject the command-directive based method of self-definition. They consider that their interests can be represented by other people but totally disagree with the fact that anyone else, even the most intelligent and authoritative person, would do their thinking for them. They are not satisfied with blind support of "great plans," petty supervision and aspiration to solve all problems of party life by the center. They counter the imperative of "that is how it is" with the demand for rational substantiations; they want real participation in party decision-making instead of discussions about democracy, and to influence in fact party policy. The new vision of socialism is developing in them not in accordance with instructions from above but in the course of heated debates with ideological opponents, including within the party itself. The universal culture and special qualities of the intelligentsia are not a slogan for them but a profound reason for their behavior, which can be implemented in a great variety of ways, both as a moral imperative and an inner feeling of duty as well as high professionalism, competence and skill.

Understandably, party members who are unwilling to "understand the situation" and "realize the circumstances," and so on, do not trigger the particular enthusiasm of some managers. However, the more such party members exist the stronger will the party become, for their main advantage is their autonomy and their special

approach to the solution of political problems and constant correlation between their own path in life and their views with the destinies of perestroika. It was no accident that V.I. Lenin emphasized the significance of such a quality in the party member: "The title of party member and builder of a workers party can be awarded only to those who closely study, consider and independently solve problems involving the fate of their party" (op. cit., vol 23, p 77).

Another no less important obstacle which hinders the establishment of political work methods is the formulation of the principle of democratic centralism adopted at the 17th Party Congress, which has been retained in its basic features to this day. In the existing Stalinist version of this principle, it was only the centralist principle that was actually implemented, whereas democratic principles were a formality and were not seriously adopted. For example, in the 1930s, an item such as reports to be submitted by superior authorities to subordinate ones was actually dropped from the agenda of party conferences and meetings. Whereas at the 4th Oblast and 3rd City Moscow Conference of the VKP(b) (1934) there was still an accountability report submitted by the party Central Committee, at the 5th Oblast Conference (1937) no such report was considered. The results were not slow in coming: the primary organizations lost their possibility of controlling the superior authorities and to recall party managers who had not justified the confidence placed in them. Adding to this, furthermore, the system of "appointments" in the selection and placement of leading cadres, inevitably the possibility of their alienation from the party masses develops. The right to make "policy" is given only to the superior authorities, while the inferior ones must only implement the resolutions. In this connection, we believe, we must first of all restore the mechanisms and procedures which existed under Lenin, according to which rank-and-file party members can control the activities of the party's leadership.

The present formulation of the principle of democratic centralism, in my view, does not call for any "horizontal" relations among party organizations and individual party members affiliated with different primary organizations. Deprived of the possibility of uniting in order to solve the problems of a given area, the party organizations found themselves in the course of the spring elections, for example, unprepared for the formulation of the type of political programs which would be fully consistent with the interests of the voters. The need for establishing horizontal relations, above all for the sake of jointly formulating programs for action by the communist parties in the Soviet Baltic area on solving pressing problems was discussed at a recent meeting held between M.S. Gorbachev and the Baltic republics' leadership.

We should point out also that in its present interpretation the principle of democratic centralism does not guarantee minority rights. Yet the new approaches, ideas and concepts have always initially been generated by a few minds; initially supporters of anything new are in the minority. By depriving them of the opportunity to

defend their viewpoint in the press and at meetings and conferences, it is as though the party dooms itself to stagnation. Political methods, as an adequate reaction to challenges, conversely, are based on openness and extensive glasnost and pluralism of opinion.

Nor does the current formulation of democratic centralism solve a major organizational problem, such as unity of action and variety of opinions. This adversely affects the level of initiative-mindedness of its members and, in the final account, their political activeness. Under circumstances in which party unity is attained not through the democratic process of the formulation and implementation of decisions by the party members themselves but primarily through the activities of the apparat which holds in its hands all instruments of control, it is as though the party is divided into "first class" and "second class" party members: the former know precisely what the party needs and are the only spokesmen for the party's interests. The latter frequently are unwilling to deal with social work and carry out assignments properly, as viewed by the former. The obvious fact understood by all, that a member of the apparat and a rank-and-file party member are not equal in terms of rights and opportunities, is the main feature of crisis phenomena in the party itself, for it is obvious that the party can be a de facto political vanguard only after "a political orientation" becomes inherent in every party member, regardless of his status within the party hierarchy.

It would be worthwhile to note yet another important feature which hinders the implementation of political methods under contemporary conditions. This, in my view, involves the initial postulate that the party is involved in administrative-power relations. The status of vanguard, which the party assumed in October 1917, as the spokesman for the people's interests, enabled it directly to influence the activities of economic and soviet authorities. As a result, today it finds itself so deeply involved with the structure of power relations that without the sanction of party authorities no somewhat serious problem can be solved. The party has found itself in a false position for, undertaking to answer all questions, it lacked the possibility of solving them; by assuming responsibility it lowered the responsibility of the authorities. The involvement of the party in power relations inevitably leads to its interference in governmental and economic decisions and lowers its role as a political vanguard. In that sense, Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, according to which the CPSU is "automatically" assigned a leading and guiding role, must be refined in accordance with the basic principles of a law-governed state. Furthermore, a vanguard role must be implemented within the framework of the Constitution and continually backed with actions and the support of the people, and tested in the course of elections for soviets.

Incidentally, the elections for USSR People's Deputies indicated that party workers who considered that the status of the party as the leading and guiding force would

in itself ensure their victory were wrong. They had at their disposal significant organizational, information and financial resources and yet they were unable to withstand the competition with other deputies, for they lacked the main thing: political methods, which alone could assert the influence of party candidates on the population. Let us note that free elections are an indication of the trust of the voters in political initiatives suggested by the various candidates. In other words, the political fate of the party is determined by the people, who are the source of all power relations.

Therefore, an orientation toward political methods demands the renovation of the entire party: its ideology, structure and functions in society. The assertion of political methods is a complex process involving the surmounting of many contradictions which have accumulated within the party. It is also a process of awareness and consideration of qualitatively new conditions of party work.

V. Kornev and A. Ryabov, candidates of historical sciences, Moscow: *Some Lessons of History and Contemporaneity*

Concern was expressed at the July 1989 CPSU Central Committee Conference at the fact that in the press and in some of the speeches at the Congress of People's Deputies the very essence of Marxist theory was being questioned. In numerous press articles more frequent efforts are being made to revise the fundamental ideological principles and to cast aspersions on the Leninist legacy. Claims have appeared alleging that the origins of the command-administrative system could be traced back to Lenin. Naturally, problems of the organizational structure of the Communist Party and the principles and standards governing its activities have also been discussed.

Let us recall that Lenin ascribed exceptional significance to the organizational structure of the party on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism. The combat capability of the party and its organization, and ideological and moral potential are shaped by ideological convictions and the conscious discipline of its members. That is why Lenin considered the question of membership, i.e., the type of membership that the party should have if it is to implement its political objectives and tasks, the cornerstone of party building.

The Workers Party in Russia was established and acted under clandestine conditions, which inevitably left its mark on all aspects of its life and even deformed it. The ability strictly to implement guiding instructions was not always combined with the equally necessary ability of the rank-and-file party members to engage in independent study of internal party problems. In clandestinity, the party inevitably sacrificed democracy for the sake of preserving centralism. Delegating rights to superiors was the rule, as was the right of managers to co-opt, cashier others, etc. Naturally, it is impossible to ignore these

circumstances, which have left deep marks in the post-October period as well, if we want to look at its development objectively.

Nonetheless, on the level of our current experience, we can now assess more soberly the struggle which developed after the 2nd RSDWP Congress between bolsheviks and mensheviks on the problem of organization. The main question was that of centralism in the party. The report submitted by the bolsheviks at the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International (1904) noted the following: "We had to face the question of whether it was possible at all to create a large political proletarian party with clearly expressed socialist objectives within the framework of an autocratic Russia, given the total lack of freedom of assembly and association and, which is even more important, the total lack of freedom of speech and the press. Our entire organization, from top to bottom, had to be secret; nonetheless, being proletarian, our organization had also to be a broad party, encompassing all conscious and struggling elements within the working class."

Therefore, the creation of a strictly centralized party was necessary to the proletarian movement under the conditions of autocratic Russia. It marked a conversion from activities as amateurs and dilettantes in the revolutionary struggle to the systematic and organized leadership of the political and economic actions of the proletariat and training it as the hegemonistic element in the liberation movement.

The mensheviks failed to understand the significance of the idea of centralism and fiercely attacked Lenin and his supporters for displaying an allegedly bureaucratic understanding of this idea. "The organization of professional revolutionaries," Trotsky, who had taken menshevik positions after the 2nd Congress wrote, "or rather its leadership is the center of social democratic awareness and under this center there are disciplined performers of technical functions." A sharp and principled debate broke out, as we know, between Akselrod and Lenin. The two different positions were analyzed in the articles by one of the leaders of menshevism, published in ISKRA in 1903-1904. To Akselrod, Lenin's supporters were the extreme wing of the democratic intelligentsia, allegedly struggling against the class independence of the proletariat and aspiring to dissolve the movement of the latter within a general revolutionary popular movement under its aegis. According to him, they had no other means for channeling the essentially petit bourgeois movement into the bed of socialist aspirations other than the "authority of the leadership" and "bureaucratic centralism in the party organization." These means, however, were essentially unacceptable to the Socialist Party. Naturally, as an opponent of Lenin he could not avoid attacks against the "bureaucratic regime in the party" which, should it win, would become "a bulwark of and weapon for new opportunistic trends, this time not of economic but of a political nature."

"Feuilletons" (as Lenin described the articles in ISKRA) authored by Akselrod were subjected to principled criticism in Lenin's work "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward." In describing his positions and views on the party's organizational structure, Lenin wrote: "Making fun of discipline—autonomism and anarchism—are the ladder along which our organizational opportunism goes up or down, from one rung to another, skillfully avoiding any clear formulation of its principles" (op. cit., vol 8, p 394). Already then Lenin paid great attention to the future development of internal party democracy. Under the conditions of a clandestine existence of the RSDWP, as a rule the local organizations could not be structured on the basis of elections, for which reason Lenin gave priority to the idea of centralism as opposed to menshevik-autonomism. However, he believed that after conditions would change and the party would become legal, all of its organizations would be entirely structured on the basis of democratic centralism. Meanwhile, in the book "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward," he noted that the underdeveloped form of party work makes it impossible to ensure any further major progress in the development of its content, that it triggers stagnation and leads to the waste of forces and inconsistency between words and actions. Subsequently, on the basis of this Leninist concept, the 10th RKP(b) Congress emphasized in its resolution that "the party of revolutionary Marxism radically rejects the search for the absolutely accurate form of party organization, which would be suitable for all levels of the revolutionary process, as well as its work methods. Conversely, the form of organization and work method are entirely determined by the characteristics of the given specific historical situation and the tasks which directly stem from this situation."

It would be pertinent to recall some of Plekhanov's just fears. In May 1904, he expressed the following doubt: "Imagine that the still questionable right of "cashiering" has been accepted by all of us, in the case of the Central Committee. Here is then what would happen: With a view to an approaching congress, the Central Committee would "cashier" all troublesome elements. It would install its own people everywhere and, filling all committees with such creatures, it would have no difficulty in securing a fully obedient majority at the congress. The congress, consisting of Central Committee creatures, would jointly shout "hurrah!" and approve all of its successful and unsuccessful actions and would applaud all of its plans and initiatives. At that point indeed there would be no majority or minority in the party for the reason that in that case the ideal of the Persian Shah would be achieved in our party" (G.V. Plekhanov, "Sochineniya" [Works], vol XIII, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p 90).

The Leninists themselves were aware of the danger of supercentralism. To counter it, the principle of democratic centralism was formulated at the December 1905 Bolshevik Conference in Tammerfors. Acknowledging it as unquestionable, the conference deemed necessary "the implementation of a broad elective principle,

granting those elected to the center full authority in ideological and practical leadership, along with their replaceability, and the broadest possible openness and strict accountability of their actions."

Under conditions of clandestinity a variety of restrictions imposed on internal party democracy were inevitable. But even then Lenin called for democratic methods in resolving internal party conflicts. He demanded more openness. Let the party know everything in order to be able to assess differences. "More trust in the independent judgment of the mass of party workers..." (op. cit., vol 8, p 94). He asked that the shortcomings and ills within the party not be concealed but for boldly to develop "self-criticism and merciless exposure of our own minuses..." (ibid., p 190). It was no accident that Martov in blaming Lenin for "freeing himself from 'control and leadership' of that nucleus which had so far headed party work," he appealed to the entire party (L. Martov, "*Struggle Against the 'State of Siege' in the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party.*" Geneva, 1904, p VII).

During the first years of the Soviet system, the party tried to follow the principle of democratic centralism. However, after Vladimir Ilich's death, under Stalin, the integrity of this formula was violated and democracy was rejected, while centralism assumed monstrous dimensions.

The distinguishing feature of the Stalinist party model, based on the principle of bureaucratic, apparat centralism, is that it makes the adequately efficient functioning of the entire party mechanism possible only under the conditions of the undivided rule of the administrative-command system, in which the possibility of any democratic opposition to various decisions or actions by different social forces is totally excluded. In a situation in which in an atmosphere of glasnost numerous sociopolitical initiatives and groups begin openly and energetically to act, pursuing their own visions and programs for solutions to arising problems, such a model begins to break down. In expecting guiding instructions from the center, the party committees show sluggishness, a passive attitude and confusion or else completely distance themselves from the struggle.

Such is precisely the situation which has faced the party of late. This precise contradiction—between the essentially remaining bureaucratic-centralist model of functioning of the party mechanism and the new conditions of activities—is, in our view, the main reason, as was noted at the CPSU Central Committee July 1989 Conference, for perestroika in the party began to fall behind perestroika processes in society. The crisis of the bureaucratic-centralist model of the party led to the appearance among some party strata views on the need for totally rejecting centralist principles in the organizational structure and principles governing party activities, triggering the aspiration to seek a solution to the situation through the extensive decentralization of the entire

party mechanism and the creation within it of autonomous organizationally structured factions and groups working in different directions.

The essence of the problem which faces the party today, therefore, is reduced to the question of whether it is possible, in general, to combine centralism with the new functions of the CPSU in society and with the task of converting from administrative-command to political management methods. In our view, the party reform which has now become pressing must take place not by rejecting centralism as such but by following the Leninist tradition of democratic centralism, cleansing intraparty life from bureaucratic-administrative distortions traceable to the Stalinist period. Under today's conditions it is important, relying on the Leninist ideological legacy, and creatively reinterpreting the party's practical experience acquired in the course of perestroika, to create the type of democratic centralism which, organically combining both of its components, would clearly define the boundaries and extent of their application in the organizational structure and nature of CPSU activities.

The need for centralist principles in party life at the present stage is defined above all by the need for adopting a uniform understanding of the objectives and tasks of revolutionary perestroika and the ways for its successful implementation. It is only a party which act as a collective of like-minded people, united by a common program for action, clearly aware of the social guidelines which must be achieved by society, that can preserve and strengthen its vanguard role in perestroika. Let us remember that V.I. Lenin himself always considered ideological unity as a most important prerequisite of the party's viability. Such was the case during the difficult period of the establishment of bolshevism, in the course of preparation for the Great October Socialist Revolution, and during the difficult time of the Civil War.

Centralism in understanding the commonality of objectives and programmatic stipulations of the party is inconceivable, in the course of practical activities, without strictly observing the CPSU Statutes and the principles of party discipline. In other words, it would be impossible unless supported by unity of action. Of late, however, it is precisely these principles that are increasingly becoming targets of criticism, allegedly conflicting with the development of the initiative and autonomy of rank-and-file party members, found in a number of press articles and speeches at large meetings. In our view, we must not demand of the party committees systematically to implement resolutions if the party members distance themselves from political work or participate in a variety of actions under openly antisocialist, anti-Soviet and nationalistic slogans, or else become personally involved in conflicts between ethnic groups. Such cases, as practical experience indicates, are not all that infrequent.

However, the centralist principles in party activities under contemporary conditions cannot function at all unless based on the broad development of internal party

democracy. "The vanguard role of the CPSU in perestroika and the renovation of society is impossible without a profound democratization of internal party life," delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference emphasized. We believe that at the present stage democratic principles must assume a particularly important position in the process of development and making of decisions on the basic trends of domestic and foreign policy. It is only those among them which are based on the broad and free discussion by all party organizations, rather than those adopted in accordance with the old secretive "apparat" method that can prove to be viable.

Today we hear from many rank-and-file party members and party officials frequent complaints about the alleged lack on the overall party level of clear guidelines concerning the end objectives of perestroika, the basic features of the future renovated socialist society and the scientific evaluation of various social movements which have actively entered political life. Such guidelines and assessments do exist on the level of general principles. They were provided at the 27th Congress, the 19th Party Conference, the CPSU Platform on the National Problem, and other documents. Naturally, this is not to say that all problems have been solved. We believe that in this connection there is an objective need to have a party-wide discussion on the eve of the 28th Congress. Such a discussion should not be limited to a narrow circle of social scientists. The project must be organized in such a way that those representing the interests of the various social strata found in the party would participate in drafting the basic CPSU documents which not only highlight the objectives of its policies in various areas of social life but also describe in detail the ways and means for achieving them. It is only thus that the party can fulfill its role as an integrating and uniting force in Soviet society. In our view, it would be entirely natural to have alternate draft theoretical documents submitted in the course of the debates by different party organizations or groups of party members. In the course of a free and open discussion, one of the drafts, which would be the most consistent with the interests of the bulk of the party members, could be selected as a basis.

Taking into consideration the interests and guaranteeing the rights of minorities are major elements in the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism. As a result of the assertion of the Stalinist bureaucratic-centralist party model, this concept was actually excluded from the practices of internal party life and from the political vocabulary. The principle of democratic centralism, which can be traced back to the Stalinist ideological tradition, found in the current CPSU Statutes, does not stipulate the right of the minority to defend its positions once a decision has been made. We believe that granting such a right would not harm the party's organizational unity, for it does not exclude in the least but, conversely, presumes unity of action in accordance with decisions which have been made.

In this sense, turning to the history of the Bolshevik Party would give us quite an instructive lesson. As we know, the 4th (Unification) Congress of the RSDWP, in which the numerical superiority was on the side of the mensheviks, passed menshevik resolutions on the basic items on the agenda. The bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, obeyed the resolutions of the congress. However, they retained the right to criticize those of them which they considered wrong. Systematically supporting their ideological positions, soon afterwards confirmed by the practices of the political struggle, the bolsheviks were able to summon the next 5th Congress as soon as possible and to revise the previously passed wrong resolutions.

Taking into consideration the interests of the minority should take place, in our view, also along the line of mandatory minority representation in the party bodies on all levels, from the rayon committee to the Central Committee and the Politburo. This will create the necessary prerequisites for the formulation and adoption of better considered decisions and for implementing a flexible political line. At the same time, this approach will stimulate the mastery by political workers of political management methods. This circumstance is particularly worth emphasizing, for we cannot demand of the party members the creative mastery of such methods in an "external environment" if they have not been applied within the party itself.

In speaking of the need for the party members strictly to observe party discipline in implementing adopted resolutions, it would be also expedient to consider and suitably to codify in the CPSU Statutes the right to free resignation from the party by those among its members who, for a variety of reasons, question the accuracy of the course which has been adopted on basic problems of contemporary policy and CPSU objectives and programmatic stipulations. In the spirit of the Leninist traditions, this would make it possible to strengthen the ideological unity of the party, based on high conscientiousness and responsibility, compared to an exaggerated "unity of thought," which does not reflect the actual situation.

The efficient functioning of the principle of democratic centralism in CPSU activities is impossible without the further democratization of the electoral process within the party. The 19th All-Union Party Conference formulated the basic trends in this work. However, taking into consideration the specific nature of today's situation and the need for the fastest possible elimination of administrative-command atavism in the activities of party committees, these areas must be refined and developed. Thus, we believe noteworthy the suggestion on electing delegates to the 28th Party Congress by direct secret vote by all party members. This would make it possible to delegate to the congress those who are truly the best among the best and the most active and initiative-minded party members, who enjoy the trust of the broadest possible party strata.

The currently popular view on the principles of democratic centralism notwithstanding, this principle does

not contradict in the least the important imperative of our time: broadening the autonomy of local party organizations. As of now, some of them are actively working on the formulation of their own platforms on the intensification of perestroika, in which general party assignments are concretized in accordance with regional specifics. We believe that in the course of time such a practice must become comprehensive. This, however, requires material backing. In this connection, obviously, it would be expedient to consider the question of increasing withholdings to meet the needs of the local party organizations (from republic down to rayon and primary) out of the party budget. This will create favorable opportunities for enhancing practical work in all areas of social life.

Let us note, in conclusion, that restoring to its full size the principle of democratic centralism in CPSU activities and enriching its practical experience with perestroika are reliable guarantees for the preservation and strengthening of the vanguard role of the CPSU in society in the course of the revolutionary renovation of socialism. Unity of action, based on the universal recognition of programmatic stipulations, responsibility and discipline, combined with broad democracy in decision-making and execution, are necessary prerequisites for the successful implementation of the party's tasks.

S. Rizayev, interim docent, Tashkent Higher Party School, member of the Uzbek Communist Party Auditing Commission: Comrades or Chiefs?

Currently extensive discussions are taking place on the question of the party apparat. It is being criticized for bureaucratism and stagnation. However, few people try to understand the origins of various negative phenomena and to link them to the moral climate which developed among professional party workers. Yet it is this climate that accounts for a great many things.

In the course of my work as member of the apparat of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, I frequently came across unseemly actions. I recall an anonymous letter received by one of the members of our department. In accordance with tradition, the investigation of the report was assigned to a member of another department. That member traveled to the site, collected some data (including intrigues) and drafted a report in which he passed a "sentence" of the inexpediency of the further use of that official in her position. This document was already signed by the second secretary of the Central Committee when we, in violation of the apparat ethics, decided to have a talk with the "culprit." We showed to her the anonymous denunciation and the consequent reference and asked her to provide her own version. She convincingly refuted all accusations. To this day, however, I cannot forget her reaction. Her tears and hurt were caused not by the slanders but by the uncomradely attitude of the colleagues who had "investigated" her, even without informing her of the fact.

Was this an isolated case? It was not. A slander of a party gorkom secretary was investigated while he was out of town. The people waited for him to go on leave, after which they hastily drew up the conclusion of the need to take him to task.

If among people, not to mention among the personnel of a party committee, there is no suitable trust, how can we work successfully? This natural question is not even asked in the course of practical dealings. In the apparat of many party committees an atmosphere of comradeship has long been replaced by relations between chiefs and subordinates. On the one hand, there is total obedience and personal loyalty; on the other, there are administrative-command methods with their typical neglect of the individual. What is particularly worrisome is that it is precisely party members to whom party work has become the main profession who should set the example of how to develop new interrelationships.

Surveys conducted at the skills advancement department of the Tashkent Higher Party School and talks with party personnel indicate that in the party committees the process of democratization is taking place extremely slowly and half-way. Thus, raykom and party gorkom instructors in four Uzbek Oblasts, attending interoblast courses at the Tashkent Party Obkom, were quite frank: "In the apparat of our raykom (gorkom) there is no democracy;" "no one is interested in our opinion;" "no attention is paid to the individual in the apparat of the gorkom (raykom)." In the course of a debate, an instructor at a party raykom said: "Until recently I worked in a school: the atmosphere there was much more democratic. In the raykom apparat one feels oneself a pawn which can be moved as one wishes. That is why there is no satisfaction with the work."

Such dissatisfaction was expressed in the course of a survey conducted in 1988 by more than one-third (35.1 percent) of the surveyed party apparat personnel. The main reason was disagreement with the existing work style and methods and the attitude toward cadres; 38.1 percent of the respondents noted that either always or in most cases they are forced to check with their superiors about problems which they could solve by themselves. Only 9.6 percent of the respondents said that they act without instructions from superiors.

Many of the respondents noted the lack of attention of the leaders to their subordinates as individuals. Furthermore, they believe that a barrier difficult to cross has been erected between secretaries and instructors. Even when the party committee secretary issues an instruction to a specific official, he does this as a rule not directly but through the department head. Information on whether the document has been drafted or carried out by the instructor is once again submitted to the secretary through the middleman. Furthermore, the view of the instructor on his assignment is either of no interest or else ignored. Objections, not to mention refusals, albeit substantiated, are firmly rejected and qualified as disobedience.

Most frequently the secretary communicates with the instructor on the former's initiative. To this day in a number of party committees direct contact between them is infrequent. Furthermore, it may trigger a negative reaction on the part of the department head. Meetings and talks in an unofficial environment (such as during lunch breaks) are virtually excluded. Is it therefore strange that the secretary usually judges about an instructor on the basis of what the instructor's immediate superior has to say? Meanwhile, according to 79.7 percent of surveyed party workers, more than anything else an objective assessment encourages initiative, whereas a biased one, conversely, kills any desire to do anything.

In the course of the reductions of personnel at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and the obkoms, its size was reduced by 25 percent, i.e., one out of four workers was laid off. To any person this would present a difficulty, and he would have the right to demand that some attention be paid to his situation. Obviously, the party committee secretaries were forced to talk with everyone and to explain why precisely that particular individual was now being asked to change jobs, what this was related to, and whose opinions were considered in making such a decision. Unfortunately, this was not done in many party committees. Through the middle of December here not a single manager had discussed the problem with the apparat personnel or shown any interest in the opinion of the primary party organization. Subsequently, as though suddenly remembering, 10 days before the new year the groups of people whose fate had been actually predetermined were summoned by their managers and asked to find themselves other jobs. Among those who were laid off there were many who were knowledgeable and initiative-minded but, however, who had been considered "uncomfortable" by some managers for being principle-minded.

It seems to me that the atmosphere in the apparat describes quite accurately the attitude toward criticism as well. The party workers are always criticizing economic and soviet managers but extremely rarely their own superior colleagues. It is indicative that many party gorkom and raykom secretaries, who have now been relieved of their positions for errors, had never been subject to any critical remarks on the part of their fellow workers. In the course of said survey, 68 percent of the party workers noted that they virtually never criticize their superiors; 45 percent do not criticize their colleagues of equal rank. What should be done in order radically to improve the moral climate in professional party circles? Above all, as was justifiably pointed out by S. Kozlov, a consultant at the Kaliningrad CPSU Obkom, in the article "The Party Apparatus: A View From Within" (KOMMUNIST No 14, 1989), it is necessary to formulate and implement a system of measures aimed at strengthening the social protection of the personnel of the apparat. If a secretary wishes it, an instructor can be relieved from his position without any substantive charge. The decision is frequently made behind his back and no people's court would consider his appeal.

What to do? Should we create a party corps of lawyers, as some people have suggested? I believe that this would not solve the situation. The solution should be sought in the democratization of the procedures governing the hiring and firing of party cadres. In Uzbekistan, occasionally preliminary discussions are held in the labor collectives on the candidacies of future party workers. Experience has indicated that, if so supported, a person becomes confident in his own forces. The question of releasing a member of the apparat could and should be considered with the participation of the collective which has recommended him. Why not codify these requirements by including them in the CPSU Statutes?

Unquestionably, the use of competitive elections of party committee secretaries would help to improve the situation in the apparat. In this case as well there have been more than enough discussions. However, in the course of the last accountability and election campaign only one out of 30 party gorkom and raykom secretaries in Khorezma Oblast was elected as the better of two candidacies. Meanwhile, shortly before the conference, some raykom secretaries, whose style and work methods had been rated negatively by the party members in the course of an anonymous survey of the rayon aktiv, had been replaced. Why were they spared criticism?

Obviously, we are still underestimating the possibilities of the primary party organizations within the party committee apparat. Who if not the primary party organization within the apparat would be concerned with developing in the people a feeling of party comradeship and creating an atmosphere of reciprocal exigency, principle-mindedness and intolerance of the violation of standards of party life by the communists, regardless of their official position? It is above all the party organization within the apparat that must be concerned with the inaccessibility of some party leaders and their inclination to isolate themselves in their offices. It would be premature to think that such phenomena are now in the past. As was noted at one of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee plenums, many secretaries of republic party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms rarely meet with the people outside their scheduled participation in single policy days; they do not try to exchange views or seek advice but judge of the situation only on the basis of reports. That is precisely why they lose their professional qualities and are unable to engage in an open dialogue and convince their audiences. Assignments carried out by the republic's Central Committee personnel or the personnel of party obkoms are frequently in the nature of "shows." They are limited to participation in specific projects. It is absolutely abnormal for the personnel of party apparats to avoid contacts with acquaintances, neighbors or residents of their own microrayon. Ordinary excuses claiming the pressure of too much work may be interpreted as the unwillingness to participate in public activities at their place of residence, such as rallies, subbotniks, or family celebrations by neighbors, despite extended invitations. One can easily imagine what the people think about such

party members. Could it be that such exclusivity or avoidance of people that are the sources of disrespect for fellow workers?

We must point out that some of the currently applied "unwritten rules" should have been abandoned a long time ago. Here is one: no one over the age of 30 can be appointed raykom instructor. Unquestionably, there is a certain logic to this. However, should we need an age limit as such? Thanks to it, quite a large number of the new recruits turn out to be people who have had experience working with the Komsomol apparats but have never worked a single day in production and are unfamiliar with the life of labor collectives. Why artificially block the path to the raykom apparat, for example, of the secretary of a primary or a large shop party organization who has suitably proved his capabilities? Such a person not only has his own opinion, based on rich practical experience, but is also ready to defend it.

The final item I would like to mention is the system of party worker wages. We must firmly avoid equalization. Instructors within the apparat are paid the same salary regardless of the number of primary organizations they supervise or the number of party members in such organizations. We must convert to a system of differentiated salaries, which would take into consideration the amount and quality of the work of the specific worker and his professionalism and competence.

V. Peshnikov, CPSU member since 1924, pensioner, Ivanovo: We Lived An Honest Life

Under the conditions of perestroika many of the old assessments, including of some events in party history, are being revised and refined. For example, currently Lenin's appeal is frequently mentioned. Some authors consider this one of the fatal errors made by Vladimir Ilich's fellow workers, which allegedly led to "sinning" or to worsening of the class composition of the party. A variety of statistical data and facts are even being cited in support of this thesis. In my view, however, such a view casts undeserved aspersions on all party members of the Lenin Enrollment.

The history of this enrollment starts with the 11th RKP(b) Congress which, as we know, was chaired by Lenin himself. The congress summed up the results of the party purge and considered as the most important task of the forthcoming years tireless concern for upgrading the party's qualitative structure. To this effect, in particular, for the first time three categories of new members were established. The strictest conditions applied to the nonproletarian elements. However, at best, both these and other measures could only diminish the possible adverse trend of a lowering of the proletarian nucleus within the party. As we know, V.I. Lenin demanded its mandatory increase through the recruitment of the best representatives of the working class.

Prerequisites for solving this problem were established in 1922-1923 by strengthening the ties between the party and the broad worker masses and upgrading the latter's

political activities. Following are a few examples: In 1922, in Petrograd, in the month of May the attendance by nonparty workers of open party meetings reached 50 percent of the total number of attending party members; in December, at some enterprises, the figure was already coming closer to 100 percent. At the Tula Arms Manufacturing Plant, in 45 days in that same year, open party meetings, circles and other undertakings promoted by the party cells were attended by nearly 11,000 nonparty workers. At the Vologda Railroad Workshops, in December 1922, as many as 400 nonparty workers attended open party meetings. During that period political and educational work was conducted among them. In Moscow, for example, in February 1923 there were 3,805 nonparty workers, 617 members of the Komsomol and 6,658 party members attending 192 courses for political literacy and 217 circles. The correlation between party members and nonparty members was quite characteristic of that period. In short, in 1922-1923 an aktiv of nonparty workers was being created and increased. The process of consolidation of the healthy social forces around the party in the Soviet countryside as well was developing similarly.

All of this contributed to the fact that as a result of the spontaneously developed movement, after V.I. Lenin's death, among workers who had shown their willingness to continue his work as members of the RKP(b), within a short time the party was able to ascribe an organized nature to the movement. This was necessary, among others, because in frequent cases collective petitions for enrollment in the party were being submitted by entire sections, shops and even enterprises! The party organizations considered them within the shortest possible time, choosing the most worthy workers recommended by their comrades, those who stood by the same machine tools.

Naturally, with such a major and complex matter not everything went smoothly. There were substantial shortcomings as well. For example, occasionally there were delays in promoting candidate members to full party membership; some of the new recruits poorly mastered the program of the political literacy courses. However, it was only many years later that the Soviet people found out for the first time that Stalin had tried to use the party members of the Leninist Enrollment (and, actually, not only they) to establish a regime of personal power and encroached on the infinite love which the working class and all toiling people felt for V.I. Lenin. This, however, does not provide reasons for belittling the objective significance of the Leninist Enrollment, which helped to increase the proletarian nucleus within the party. Nor should it cast aspersions on the party members who joined the Leninist Party at the urging of their own hearts, thirsting neither for personal glory nor an easy life. The absolute majority of them lived a difficult but honest life, always remaining loyal to their word, which they had given in joining Lenin's party.

Excerpts From Letters

V. Belyakov, senior foreman, Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast:

Not far from my home, on a long multi-storied building, hangs a huge slogan praising the party. It is not being displayed for holidays only. The meter-high letters are exposed to rain, sun and snow. The citizens have long become accustomed to its presence and simply fail to notice it. I do not understand what ideological contribution this piece of cloth could be making. Why is it that it is hanging there day and night on the front of that building? Above all, does the party need such a permanent glorification?

In this city it is becoming increasingly more difficult to buy food and durable goods. Even potatoes are being rationed: 4 kilograms per month per person. This is happening in the Nonchernozem.

We should not cover our city with slogans and appeals. It would be better to make use of the efforts and time for work of which there is a great deal in the city. The best visual agitation is found on store shelves.

N. Malyutin, Leningrad:

I do not know whether there is today a problem more important to the party than the enhancement of activities of rank-and-file party members and primary party organizations. Activeness will unquestionably appear if every CPSU member begins to feel his involvement with the decisions made by the party. For the time being, such decisions are considered the result of the efforts of a small group of people, who impose them on the rest. This leads to a corresponding attitude toward them and affects their implementation.

Therefore, we must adopt the following rule: we must direct to the primary party organizations materials on problems being discussed by the party. The party members will express their attitude toward them which the secretary will submit to the superior party authority.

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Let Us Not Substitute Interest for Control

905B0009F Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 89 (signed to press 4 Oct 89) pp 40-45

[Article by Aleksandr Iosifovich Leshchevskiy, *KOMMUNIST* special correspondent]

[Text] The 18 party members at the livestock breeding shop of the Kolkhoz imeni XXII Syezda KPSS, in Saratov, know each other not only, as they say in documents, on the basis of joint production and social activities: in the countryside everyone knows everything about the others. Therefore, at party meetings procedural formalities here are frequently ignored. This time again they had decided not to increase the number of members of the presidium. The featured speaker—V.

Chernyshev, the party bureau secretary—was nominated presidium chairman: "Go ahead, Yakovlevich do what is necessary." Having announced the agenda and the rules, without any interruption he turned to his assistant: "Well, Valya, give me the floor for my report." "Ah, yes," she said, startled, accompanied by the kind laughter of those present. "The floor for the report is given to..."

In such an atmosphere one can speak slowly, frankly, about pertinent matters. However, no discussion took place. The chair found it difficult to locate people who would agree (not to say who would be willing) to participate in the debates. "You start, Mariya Andreyevna, you were our delegate to the 19th Party Conference.... Nikolay Nikolaich, explain to us why there was loss of cattle.... Kusanov, tell us, as the representative of the Kazakh people...." Those present showed a feeling of activeness only once, after the statement "the meeting is hereby closed," by jointly leaving the office of the kolkhoz chairman.

What was the reason for such an indifference displayed by the party members, what had caused it? Was no one affected by the accountability report? This may have been one of the reasons. Vladimir Yakovlevich Chernyshev spoke not as the party secretary but rather as the head of the kolkhoz dairy farm which he manages. The report included accurate statements "on the present situation," a list of individual assignments, the agenda of the meetings which were held and suggestions on the topics for political instruction. However, the analysis of the vital concerns, detailed and properly substantiated, dealt essentially with the technological and organizational problems of animal husbandry. There was nothing to add or argue about. The specific living individual and his attitude toward labor turned out lost behind the indicators: he may have been there, but remained unnoticed. Admonitions did not "stick." The moment Sergey Shukayevich Kusanov, the horse-breaker, said that at the first farm the people worked worse than at the second, immediately Mariya Andreyevna Korobkova stood up to defend her friend....

I do not believe that the party members were bothered by the presence of the raykom party first secretary, the CPSU Obkom inspector, or the journalist from Moscow. One hour after the meeting, the same people were gathered at the field camp where an interesting and serious discussion developed. Could it be that the reason for the uneventful accountability meeting was that a great deal, if not everything, had already been discussed back and forth by the party members prior to the meeting? The kolkhoz chairman and the party committee secretary visit the livestock farm at least every second day. If something is wrong they are being told of it immediately rather than at the appointed time. Furthermore, Chernyshev can be approached not only at work but also later, as a neighbor.

However, all of these are superficial reasons. The internal ones should be sought in the daily activities of the rural party organization and the sequence of its affairs and interests.

The concern of the peasants for their daily bread has become today a major political problem for the party organizations in town and country. The condition of the shelves in food stores is perhaps the determining factor of the social climate. If this climate, in Saratov Oblast, is unusually mild for the present, perhaps the main reason for this is the wide choice of available goods, looked at through the eyes of a Muscovite. For example, at 9:00 p.m. one can buy at the Moloko Store, on Kirov Street in Saratov milk, kefir, fermented milk, ice cream, cream, butter, processed cheese, etc. I saw the virtually identical variety of products in the store of the one-storied workers settlement Piterka, which is 170 kilometers distant from the oblast center. It is true that in that store meat products were being sold only at cooperative prices. Nonetheless, the choice was not bad: beef, mutton, pork, sausages and sardines. This 5-year plan, with every passing year in the oblast the volume of output of meat and dairy products has been increasing by 8 to 10 percent. It is thus that one of the programs adopted by the oblast party organization is being implemented.

A map-diagram of the long-term development of the rayon hangs on the wall of the office of V. Korolkov, first secretary of the Piterkiy Rayon CPSU Committee.

"We drafted a work program jointly with the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. We proceeded from the real needs of the people. We meet with the heads of the farms exclusively to discuss such problems and demand nothing else," Valentin Grigoryevich said. "We do not get into technological matters or engage in petty supervision."

All of this is unusual in the case of rural raykoms which, throughout their entire history, have never had any experience in democratic management. Such raykoms began to be organized in the summer of 1928. One year later, the VKP(b) Central Committee Resolution "On the Rural Rayon Party Organizations" specifically formulated the functions of the new party authorities. By that time life in the countryside had taken a sharp turn: collectivization had begun. It was asked of the raykom not only to explain the party policy and convince the people but also "firmly to follow the line." This was the start of the command-pressure style which in subsequent years reached a point of absurdity, when the annual rural activities were converted into "agricultural campaigns." Today this means that the schedules for sowing and harvesting which had been set are becoming part of the past. But why is there a printed sheet on the desk of the first secretary: "Indicators for the Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes of Piterkiy Rayon for... 1989?" The vertical columns list the farms, and the horizontal lines indicate deadlines for the procurement of hay, haylage, silage, fodder, threshing.... Some of the figures are circled in red pencil.

"Why those red circles? I am supposed to control," V. Korolkov smiled and then explained: "Here, in that kolkhoz, all of a sudden milk production declined. One should telephone and find out what is happening. For example, if the tractor has broken down or the farm has remained without electricity, I must quickly inform the respective services."

"Is there no one in the kolkhoz to do this?"

"There is, but my intervention greatly speeds up the discussions. Furthermore, without the intervention of the raykom, the oblast services would make the kolkhoz wait. Naturally, I understand that these are not the proper methods. But what am I to do, just sit and look at higher production losses?"

It is not that people are resorting to such methods because they like it. The new economic relations, which are as yet only being developed, could and should eliminate the need for them. The people have become accustomed to the old and firmly mastered procedures. Who in the rayon could make careless workers do that which they should? Only the party raykom. On the territory of the farm as well it is the party committee that can act more confidently than the local soviet. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Mashkov, party secretary at the Progress Kolkhoz, convincingly proved this with examples borrowed from his own practical experience. He headed the rural soviet for 2 years and remembers how difficult it was to ask for a truck to deliver firewood to a pensioner. Now all he has to do is pick up the phone. At the Kolkhoz imeni XXII Syezda KPSS, it is as though the kolkhoz chairman and the party committee secretary have the same standing: the way to their respective goes through the same reception room. The chairman of the rural soviet, meanwhile, goes to see the party secretary for "operative meetings" as do the heads of the social organizations.

Unquestionably, the situation will change with the development of regional cost accounting, when the local soviets will have more money. For the time being, however, there usually exist two situations: either the party authorities distance themselves from economic affairs, at which point both order and discipline begin to break down before one's very eyes, or else they strictly control the situation, as is the case in Piterka, and achieve positive results. In that case, however, recurrences of the command style of management are present.

Let us assume that the party members at the Kolkhoz imeni XXII Syezda KPSS adopt a plan for organizational and mass political work to be carried out by the party committee during the fodder procurement campaign. It stipulates in detail the tasks to be carried out and the people responsible for them. I asked party committee member A. Zlygorev to describe to me what should to be done in such cases.

"For the duration of the grain crop harvest I was assigned to the second brigade," Aleksandr Alekseyevich Zlygorev explained. "I visited the brigade every second

day or even more frequently. I looked over the work. I suggested to them to go to work earlier and to take better care of the machinery.... In the winter I dealt with the third farm. I supervised the prompt feeding of the cattle and the cleanliness of the feed.

"Are the milkmaids and the livestock breeders unaware of their immediate obligations?"

"They may know them but, nonetheless, party control urges them on. If we notice a violation we immediately 'raise the question'."

G. Ksenofontov, who heads a crop growing brigade, told me that the brigade council does not even discuss any somewhat serious matter without "running it by" the party group in advance, and without the group's agreement. Apparently, Gennadiy Nikolayevich sincerely believes that any other method would be inconceivable. The fact that I questioned it amazed him. He shrugged his shoulders and admonished me: "The party's influence is the party influence. It is the foundation."

We must point out that the people do not object to the direct intervention by the party committee and the party group in production matters. Possibly, in the aftermath of the zealous orders of the representatives, who went so far as to almost determine which tractor should be sent where (the old residents remember that that too has happened), the recommendations of today's controllers appear like the peak of democracy, the more so since the local party organizations deal with the problems which are of particular concern to the population and are able to accomplish a great deal. Over the past 3 years 250 homes with amenities have been built in the rayon, virtually identical to those in the cities. Most farms have natural gas. This means that there is gas heat in a steppe area where firewood is scarce! Ever new villages are being linked to the rayon center with paved roads. People from neighboring rayons are moving to Pitserskiy Rayon and forgetting about their idea of moving to the city. Since the beginning of the 5-year period here the population has increased from 17,000 to 19,000 people and now at harvest time the help of the city population is no longer needed. During our visits to farms and field camps I could see that V. Korolkov, the raykom first secretary, was well-known to the people. The kolkhoz members willingly discussed matters with him and he knew many of them by name. I believe that this neat, energetic and communicative person should not fear the results of the next elections to local soviets.

The party appears to enjoy a good reputation in Pitserskiy Rayon. The party members at the livestock shop of the Kolkhoz imeni XXII Syezda KPSS positively assessed the work of their party bureau, as did the other shop organizations. The question is one of results, while the methods employed are not all that important. The troublesome question, however, remains: For how long will the farm economy continue to rely on the ubiquitous "party influence?" The extreme efforts made by the party committees could be considered a temporary, an

exceptional measure. However, one does not have to be an economist, I believe, to clearly realize that with such a method our agricultural production cannot be raised to the level of world standards. That is why throughout the countryside such great attention is being paid to the development of new economic relations and leasing. Here, in Pitserskiy Rayon, leasing has had a hard time adapting. The essential method used is that of collective contracting. The wages of mechanizers as well depend on end results but they are also paid separately for plowing, harrowing, etc. We did not meet open opponents of leasing. However, very few people were interested in promoting it intensively.

Vladimir Vasilyevich Tsybin leased, together with four other mechanizers, 1,500 hectares of farmland to grow grain crops. In the past he was the head of a crop growing brigade and is perfectly familiar with the equipment. His aging Kolos tractor, with its tarpaulin bags which prevent the loss of grain, works reliably. "He is a man of substance," said V. Deryabin, the kolkhoz chairman, in qualifying him. "He is not fussy. Occasionally, unable to restrain myself, I get after him. He would answer me with dignity: I know what I am doing, chairman, do not interfere. It is indeed true that I cannot recall a case for his combine to break down in the field." Why is it that Tsybin so easily took up this new project which other kolkhoz members consider somewhat suspect?

"I became fed up with being driven here and there," Vladimir Vasilyevich answered. "Not all agronomists are smart. I would go in the morning to the field and someone would come to me: turn around, go to that other sector! A whole day may be wasted and everything goes haywire. Now I decide for myself what to do and when to do it."

I must admit that at first I felt uneasy to be taking up his time. Every minute costs money! I did not immediately realize that the work of this leasing unit does not resemble at all a conveyor belt in which every single drop of strength is squeezed out of body and soul. The lessees ended their work even at harvest time by 10:00 p.m. while the other brigades kept working almost until midnight. They have no qualms in advancing money to a comrade if his brother from afar has come to visit him or if he has to take his daughter to the doctor. Tsybin is seriously considering the possibility of working 8 hours daily: "We do not live only for the sake of the fields. We are also human." Will this happen? We shall see. In any case, the "only possibility of 'shortening' that incredible amount of work which absorbs all peasant life without rest," which was described in the 19th century by Gleb Uspenskiy, consists not only of "joint work" and "fellowship," but also the organization of farm labor, and its proper planning, which should be inherent in a real farmer.

Naturally, they also think of the earnings of the lessees but it is not the ruble alone that controls their actions. I asked Tsybin whether he would buy a new combine if he could? Vladimir Vasilyevich nodded his agreement:

"Yes, for in that case I could harvest an additional 2 or 3 quintals per hectare. You say, the combine would be expensive? The main thing is for the harvest not to be lost as to the rest, we would deal with it later." That is how he thinks: first comes the grain and only then come the economic calculations. This is not a question of shallow thinking but profound conviction: intelligent and conscientious work is bound to be profitable. If there are losses, it means that something is wrong with the prices.

The attitude of others toward the lessees was, at first, one of disapproval. Some people mocked them, described them as kulaks, others were greatly indignant at the fact that the kolkhoz board was distributing land. Now there is less joking and everyone is waiting for the results. In the countryside, the example set by a neighbor frequently turns out to be more convincing than any kind of appeal, for the peasant has always been a practical person and a realist. The fact that leasing has become popular and that they themselves are hearing and reading about it is less important than the experience of their neighbor. The same cautious expecting stance is being displayed also by the party members at the Kolkhoz imeni XXII Syezda KPSS.

Brigade leader G. Ksenofontov was quite skeptical in referring to the leasing team set up at the farm. In his view, only big collectives can be useful, for they have the freedom to maneuver, whereas Tsybin was simply "lured" by the new equipment. However, Gennadiy Nikolayevich has not spoken with Tsybin, he has not found the time to do so. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand his references to the new equipment. Similar words—"leasing is not for us"—I also heard from A. Alimov, the head of the threshing floor. At the accountability party meeting held at the livestock breeding shop, V. Chernyshev mentioned the need to increase leasing but then immediately started detailing the "peak levels" to be reached, and what to do and how to do it. Those who took part in the debates did not even mention the topic.

Perhaps, actually, this is not a problem of interest to the people. They are able to achieve good results even without leasing. Leave good enough alone. By no means does everyone want, like Tsybin, to be "a chief." Kolkhoz chairman V. Deryabin described the hurt expressed by the mechanizers if he "ignores them" for a few days: Why do you not come to see us? But why should he go see them if their assignment is known and everything needed to carry it out is available? Is it not better to do more threshing instead of talking. However, those who have become accustomed to supervision feel uncomfortable if the chiefs do not come to take a look. Ksenofontov recalled that he suggested for one of the links to be taken away from the brigade, take over a field and do all the necessary work itself and then, in the autumn, be paid on the basis of the size of the crop. This meant total independence! This, however, frightened the people. The mechanizer was unwilling to do it. He felt more confident if backed by the brigade.

It seems to me that fear of independence is the main obstacle blocking the path to new economic relations in the countryside. In itself, the adoption of the necessary legislation will not guarantee a mass conversion to leasing. Naturally, the new laws will help but they will not teach a person to think differently. Such a task can be accomplished by the party organizations. Do they set it for themselves? My impression, from discussions with party committee members at the Kolkhoz imeni XXII Syezda KPSS, is that they do. Both Chernyshev and Zlygorev said: The main thing in party work is to convince the people. The essence of the various decisions must be clarified, after which the person will break them down in their details with the thoroughness of the farmer. However, the rank-and-file communists avoid engaging in explanatory work, considering this to be the obligation of the managers.

"What can I do? I can work," said F. Koreshkov, tally clerk at dairy farm No 3, speaking at the accountability party meeting. "As to discussing things with the people, those from the office should come and see us more frequently."

S. Kusanov also expressed similar wishes concerning the "bosses." Would such views expressed by the party members encourage the people to become independent? I do not think so.

Here is another problem. The new economic management methods are bound to clash (and are already clashing) with our widespread lack of exigency, which has created the expression that "you cannot earn all the money there is." A. Borzunov, party committee secretary at the Malouzenskiy Sovkhoz, explained that few people are tempted by the opportunity of earning more by converting to leasing. The sovkhoz mechanizers average more than 400 rubles monthly, raise their own cattle and find this to be enough.

It is true that money is not worth very much when there is nothing to buy with it. Durable goods (unlike foodstuffs) are virtually unobtainable in the rayon stores. The farm itself is not all that interested in increasing its volume of output. It has more than 1 million rubles in its bank account yet it cannot buy the slate it needs. A hurricane lifted off the roofs of the sheds and they have now been replaced by rubberized material. As to making use of above plan output in signing direct contracts, that would be a different matter. In practical terms, however, all such discussions have yielded nothing. According to the 5-year plan the rayon farms must deliver to the state 6,100 tons of meat this year. The expectation is that some 7,900 tons will be produced. However, from this the farmers will essentially obtain nothing other than the "thank you" for fulfilling the state order.

Finally, there is the cost of the equipment. According to my interlocutors, the prices are not consistent with the prices of farm commodities. A Don combine costs the equivalent of 280 tons of wheat. This amount of grain could feed 20,000 people for 1 month. Contractual prices

are higher as it is: they are triple the level of state prices. However one may compute, lessees cannot afford more productive farm machinery.

Nonetheless, life itself is leading the crop growers and animal husbandry men of Piterkiy Rayon to leasing. Without it the next step in the economic development of the countryside cannot be taken. No supervision or control can take the place of an interested attitude toward labor, as shown by V. Tsybin. Nor are they necessary to the brothers Muldashev, who have undertaken to raise 150 heifers and 1,200 sheep and whose average daily weight increases are higher compared to the kolkhoz livestock breeders by 200 grams. Eight shepherd brigades at the Progress Kolkhoz are grazing their herds under approximately similar conditions; yet the highest results are achieved by Azerbay Abolov, who is raising the herd on the basis of a leasing contract.

There are enough local examples proving the advantage of leasing relations to other fellow-villagers. However, as I could see during the discussions I attended, the people are poorly informed about them. Could it be that something should be changed in propaganda work? This is stupid: the people know about the situation in Poland but not about the situation in the neighboring field. If examples are nonetheless insufficient, why should the party organization not be concerned with increasing their number? Obviously, it is the duty of the party member not only to call upon others to take the new path but for himself to blaze it. In any case, such a resolution was adopted at the accountability party meeting at the livestock breeding shop.

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PUBLIC OPINION

CPSU Central Committee Mailbag: The National Issue

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[Text] The Soviet people are seriously concerned with the state of affairs in the area of relations among nationalities. Characteristically, in the course of last year and the first 8 months of this year the party's Central Committee received 60,500 letters on this topic, 40 percent of them collective, frequently bearing dozens or hundreds of signatures. Their authors are members of different ethnic groups and social and age groups, party members or nonparty people. Their opinions were one of the "pillars" of the platform for "the party's national policy under contemporary conditions," which was adopted at the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum. This document is justifiably considered a major constructive step in bringing harmony to relations among nationalities, formulating scientific approaches and developing an efficient

program for action, as the beginning of a major and difficult work which today must rely on the power of public opinion as well.

What is the current situation? What do the people think about national policy in general and about the ways and means of its practical implementation? How do they see the future of our multinational country?

Following are excerpts from a survey of letters sent by the working people to the CPSU Central Committee on problems of improving relations among nationalities in the USSR, presented to the participants at the September Central Committee Plenum.

A full survey of the letters will be published in issue No 10 of the journal IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS for 1989.

"Under the Soviet system impressive changes have taken place in the socioeconomic and cultural development of all fraternal peoples in our country. However, during the periods of Stalinist illegality and stagnation, as a result of the violation of the Leninist principles of national policy many difficult problems and contradictions accumulated in relations among nationalities," notes Z. Minniyarov, Kazan.

"Unity among the people of all national groups is needed to solve problems of economics, health care, housing construction, cultural development and building a law-governed state," we read in a collective letter from Kishinev (32 signatures). "In order to prevent this, the opponents of perestroika would like to make us quarrel with everyone.... No mine could have a greater explosive power than national discord in a country in which people belonging to more than 100 nationalities live side-by-side." "Today nationalism is more frightening than the scarcity of food" is the opinion of Ye. Zavalishin (Yaroslavl).

Particular concern is expressed in letters from areas where bloodshed and reciprocal cruelty have occurred.

"To describe the horrors experienced and still felt by all honest people of Azerbaijan and Armenia is simply impossible," writes S. Kaprelyan, from Baku. "Repressive measures were taken against me, during the time of the cult of personality, although I was a veteran in the Great Patriotic War from its very beginning. Believe me, however, in 4 years of war and 8 months in jail I suffered less than during the period of aggravation of discord among nationalities on the subject of Nagornyy Karabakh. It is horrible that in a period of democratization and glasnost there are people who are fanning the passions of national groups. The instigators are working on both sides and they have innocent victims on their consciences."

In expressing their dissatisfaction with the indecisive and initiative-lacking actions of the local authorities, members of a meeting of workers at the Ferganagiprovodkhoz Institute (95 signatures), write: "The events in Fergana have proved that there are some local forces

which are capable of paralyzing the work of the party and state apparatus, turn the people's intolerance of shortcomings into destructive actions, and direct their anger caused by social injustice at the populations of nonnative nationalities. In our view, the main target of the pogroms were truth, glasnost, democratization and perestroika."

"What worsens the situation," emphasizes **G. Timonenko, a worker from Krasnodar**, "is the fact that the party and Komsomol leaders, having lost the skill of directly communicating with the masses, turn out unable to control the situation and to take the initiative through ideological means. Instead, they use the internal troops and the army to normalize the situation."

Many authors of letters raise the following question: Are such exceptional steps not the consequence of the fact that the ordinary methods for solving the problem prove to be ineffective?

"The USSR Law according to which the budgetary rights of republics were significantly broadened was passed in 1959. However, the law was not implemented in full, for the centralizing principle in the formulation of the budget of the republics, with its individual articles, has still not been eliminated. It would be expedient to consider the possibility of forming budgets from the bottom up and not the opposite. That same year a procedure was drafted for the formulation of plans for economic and social development. Essentially, it called for formulating plans from the bottom upwards.... However, practical experience developed differently and the legal mechanism for the implementation of said principles have not been formulated to this day. For the time being centralism is prevailing over democratic forms in the formulation of plans," notes **V. Dedyayev, Rostov**.

His views are supported by **A. Alekseyev, chairman of the executive committee of the Lamynkhin Village Soviet, Kobayayskiy Rayon, Yakut ASSR**: "CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decrees on the further socioeconomic and cultural development of the ethnic groups in the North were passed in 1957 and 1980. However, they largely assumed the features of blank cartridges and were not implemented." "The fundamental stipulations of these documents, including the development of ethnic villages, have not been implemented in any one of the 15 Northern territories," write **a group of ethnic writers from the North**.

In the view of **Z. Minniyarov**, whom we mentioned, it was the low efficiency of the adopted resolutions (if the word "efficiency" indeed fits here at all), the administrative-command management methods, the monopoly status of the central ministries and departments, and the belittling of the role of the local soviets that have led to "neglecting national interests and the unresolved nature of many socioeconomic problems of republics and autonomous areas."

"The working people in Union republics, particularly the native ethnic groups, cannot tolerate the way the all-Union ministries and departments throw their way

about in their ethnic territories. It is inadmissible to present narrow departmental interests as being national or state interests. As a result of the connivance with such policies on the part of the obedient center, displayed by the republic leadership in the Baltic areas, we are faced with the excessive development of industry and a state of crisis in all other areas. There is depopulation. The Latvian people are gradually being dissolved in a sea of outsiders. Hence friction among ethnic groups and the real danger of a division among the forces of perestroika in the republic," we read in a letter drafted at an open party meeting held at the **Latvian State Conservatory**.

The threat of such a division based on ethnic features concerns **S. Tolyautas, Vilnius fitter**: "The view is quite popular in our country now that it would be better for the Lithuanians if they secede from the USSR. I do not believe, however, that we would be better off in a separate state. Today the interconnection and interdependence of our world has become entirely obvious. Many problems can be solved only through joint common efforts. It seems to me that the idea of establishing a separate and independent Lithuanian state is needed only by a certain segment of Lithuanians, those who hope to extract personal gains from it. I am confident that this would not bring to the majority of the nation any improvement in their lives or happiness."

Following is the opinion of **Muscovite V. Krasilnikov**: "The interests of the socialist nations do not mandatorily coincide in everything. However, they should not conflict with the national interests. From this viewpoint the centrifugal trends in interrepublic relations, which have been noted today, cannot be considered justified. The ideas on which they are based appear somewhat provincial against the background of the concept of integrity, of the integration of the contemporary world on the basis of universal human values."

The same idea is supported by **A. Sentsov, candidate of juridical sciences, Krasnodar** who points out that "the European Economic Community plans to open in 1992 its economic borders to its members."

The mail addressed to the CPSU Central Committee includes many specific suggestions. The following, for example, is frequently mentioned: the building of large-scale industrial projects of Union significance should be substantiated not only on the basis of economic and ecological but also national-demographic expert evaluations (related to importing manpower, and the threat of deformation of the social and cultural-linguistic development of the population of a given republic).

Many people see giving to the soviets on the respective levels all fixed production assets on the basis of a leasing contract with the state the optimal way of coordinating all-Union with regional interests. Hence the other suggestion: strict observance of the principle of self-financing and self-support of republics and oblasts; abandoning the system of subsidizing republics from of

the Union budget (other than under exceptional circumstances, such as natural disasters, unpredictable events, etc.).

A substantial number of letters discuss problems of the governmental-legal status of the RSFSR. "Perestroyka could hardly develop successfully," believes **M. Yegorova, Moscow**, "unless the RSFSR assumes an equal status among the other Union republics and is given greater autonomy. The republic is being steadily ruined. Its natural resources—timber, natural gas and petroleum—are being predatorily used. Thousands of industrial enterprises, making use of its manpower, raw materials, land and water, work for the Union budget, leaving little to the republic."

"For 7 decades we, Russians, worked for the basic equality among nations," writes **A. Rusakov**. As a result, look at the Nonchernozem, where today no conditions for normal life exist. The Russians have scattered among the national outlying areas...."

The letters deal extensively also with possibilities for converting to management by large area within the RSFSR. In particular, their authors suggest that the question of recreating a Far Eastern Republic be considered, based on two oblasts: Chita and part of the Amur, as the Zabaykal Republic, and other territorial multinational units, on the basis of economic zoning. According to **A. Brinken, scientific secretary, USSR Geographic Society Presidium, Leningrad**, in order to restore to their full stature the role and rights of the soviet as the real subject of economic management on their territory, a territorial reform is needed. "The objectively developed economic rayons, taking into consideration the contemporary condition of the economy, the ecological situation and long-term future developments, should become the foundations for the new territorial structure," he writes.

The letter writers single out the development of the cultures and languages of the peoples of the USSR as some of the most important trends in present national policy, noting the particular significance of combining national with international aspects in this area. "In our republic," writes **Ye. Zhanybekov, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, Kazakhstan**, "the curriculum in Russian schools is exactly the same as the one in the RSFSR. I believe that the curriculums in Union republics should be formulated in such a way that the literature, history and culture of the native population are studied in greater detail. For example, knowledge of the Kazakh language should be considered mandatory for secondary school graduates."

I. Kuchmazokov, Nalchik discusses the need to display "the greatest possible responsiveness, sensitivity and respect for the languages, cultures, traditions and customs of national and ethnic groups." "Nothing should be instilled by force in their way of life," he notes and cites the following example: For ages hog breeding has been totally alien to Kabardi and Balkar populations. However, they are being coerced into doing it.

"In the past we rejected the slogan of cultural and national autonomy on the grounds that they divide nations and bring the workers of a given nation closer to its bourgeoisie," emphasizes **Ye. Angald, Salekhard, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Tyumen Oblast**. "Today, however, when socialism has been established and there is no bourgeoisie, we must not reject cultural-national autonomy. Each nation, particularly one without territorial autonomy, has the right to preserve and develop its national culture."

I. Demchenko, Yalta, believes that "each nation or part of nation with a compact population, should have the right to set up its own oblast or okrug or else, if it is not in the majority on a given territory, a national-cultural community. Only thus can we exercise the right of each ethnic group to develop its own culture and language, even if it does not live on its 'own' territory." In developing this idea, **A. Lipinskiy, Nikopol**, suggests that such national associations be represented in the respective soviets of people's deputies.

S. Krasnopolskiy, Moscow, Great Patriotic War veteran, notes: "The representation of ethnic groups in the USSR Supreme Soviet is based on the territorial principle. For that reason some ethnic groups many of whose members live outside their autonomous units are not fully represented in the highest agency of the government. Citizens belonging to ethnic groups, such as Poles, Koreans and Germans have no legitimized representation at all. This situation must be somehow corrected."

The most frequent among the suggestions included in the letters is the following: Publish newspapers in the national languages in settlements in which more than 10,000 members of one or another ethnic group reside. In Moscow, for example, newspapers and journals should be published in Tatar, Jewish, Ukrainian and other languages. The authors of such letters raise the question of the restoration of national toponyms and insist on legislatively banning the renaming of geographic sites without taking public opinion into consideration.

Particular attention is being paid to the problem of national schools and supplying them with textbooks which they need to study the languages, and the history of the peoples and national literature. **P. Kuzin and A. Tsarkov, Ryazan**, note that "today in a country with a large population historical publications are coming out in small editions. Meanwhile, the publishing houses keep producing many books which gather dust years on end on bookstore and library shelves."

"Schools offering training in the Belorussian language are virtually nonexistent," writes **G. Lanevskiy, Minsk**. "The children begin to study their native language from the second grade, while Russian is studied from the first. It must be understood that the restoration of the Belorussian language in Belorussia does not conflict with socialism. It will not make the Belorussians feel exclusive

or boastful. No, the restoration of the Belorussian language will strengthen the international ties and respect between Belorussians and other nations.... And, with it, their self-respect."

"The growing generation should be provided with the opportunity, from the school bench, to master the Latvian literary language. Ignoring all logic, we are doing the opposite: in the already existing schools with parallel teaching in Russian and Latvian, we are developing the type of psychological atmosphere such that they are forced to be separated into Russian and Latvian schools," notes with concern **M. Arkhangelskiy, Riga.**

The question of the status of national languages and of the Russian language as an instrument for international communications, and their use in various areas of social life are among the most widely debated. Following are a few typical views.

"We are not against national languages," emphasize **workers at the Azot Production Association in Fergana (34 signatures).** "Many among us are fluent in two languages, while others are also learning Uzbek. However, to force literally everyone to learn a language within a short time, as ordered from above, is simply unrealistic. It is precisely this that we consider to be the main danger in all the laws on languages which have been passed or are being passed in the country. It is only a rather high educational standard of the population that could eliminate all linguistic problems. Any hasty steps without corresponding material outlays will not enhance the cultural standards. Hasty actions in this area are quite dangerous and harmful."

Here is a letter from Tashkent: "Students at the aircraft building department of the Tashkent Polytechnical Institute," writes **F. Mutaliyeva, teacher,** "turned to the rectorate with the request for classes in aircraft building to be taught exclusively in Uzbek. I am Uzbek. I care for the Russian language as much as I do for the Uzbek. It is aggravating to see how the results of the work of my colleagues could turn into our training untrained engineers, for all available information in science is based on knowledge of the Russian and European languages."

Agreeing with her is **A. Golikov, candidate of technical sciences, docent, Lvov Polytechnical Institute.** "In the course of discussions on the status of languages," he writes, "the opinion is occasionally voiced about the need for the more extensive use of national languages in the production-technical area. However, standardization in technology is one of the main principles which ensure efficiency. That is why in this area it would be expedient to assign priority to a state language. The spiritual culture of the people would hardly improve from the fact that technical instructions will be translated into national languages. Meanwhile, the likelihood of errors in the translation and in the practice of technological systems will increase."

Equally typical are the following two letters which are also from the Ukraine. The views they express are

frequently encountered in addresses reaching the CPSU Central Committee from other republics as well. "We have gone too far in rejecting anything national; for decades it was being uprooted from the consciousness of the people. We went, for example, so far as to discuss whether there should be a state language for the 50-million strong Ukrainian people. In this case we should not rely on bilingualism, for in practical terms the result would be people not fluent in either language," **L. Voloshin, Yalta,** believes. "By the will of history," writes **G. Shramenko, Kiev,** "the Soviet people have acquired the greatest possible wealth: a ready-made language for communicating among nationalities. However, a faulty national policy turned this resource into a factor for restricting the use of the national languages. Every citizen of the USSR needs the Russian language precisely in order to communicate with the population of the other republics."

"Friendship among the peoples is a prerequisite for fruitful toil and for the strength of our Union. In this connection, the role of the local soviets is very important. The situation of the members of different nationalities on a given territory and, therefore, the conditions for strengthening the friendship among the peoples greatly depends on their activities in solving various national problems," **V. Rummyantsev, Krivoy Rog,** emphasizes.

This letter reflects the feelings of the authors of most addresses to the CPSU Central Committee. It is very important, they write, to find democratic and mutually acceptable solutions on the national level, which would not harm anyone's interests; however, a great deal also depends on the way such decisions will be implemented in the specific areas and the attitude toward them on the part of the local authorities. Pointing out that "the idea of restoring the statehood of Soviet Germans is meeting with the understanding and support of all sensibly thinking people," **G. Grout, G. Vormsbekher and Yu. Gaar** nonetheless express their concern: "Since last autumn anti-German feelings have been manifested in some areas of Volgograd and Saratov Oblasts. We believe that this is assisted by a number of reasons. Efforts to restore the German ASSR on the Volga also being undertaken without proper publicity. The local mass information media do not pay proper attention to this matter. International upbringing has weakened. The situation is worsened by some actions on the part of the local authorities such as, for instance, allocating land on the left bank of the Volga for garden plots to the population of Saratov, and hasty allocation of land to lessees and cooperatives. We consider necessary that urgent measures be taken to prevent the spreading of negative feelings among the population along the Volga and that a governmental commission be set up to draft a resolution on the restoration of the German ASSR on the Volga."

"Unfortunately, ever new arguments are still being brought forth opposing the restoration of the status of the Crimean-Tatar people. There is talk of the difficulty

of the problem and of all-Union interests; the resolution of this matter is being postponed indefinitely," writes F. Nomanova, Kuva, in her address to the CPSU Central Committee.

B. Elkin, Grodno points out that "there is no government anti-Semitism in our country. However, in the local areas, in daily life, it seems to me that there is a covert discrimination against Jews in school enrollment and job hiring.... The Jews react quite painfully to all this. Hence the aspiration of many of them to leave the USSR. I beg of you to dot all your "i"s" in terms of the Soviet Jews, so that we can feel equal with the other citizens of the USSR."

The letters raise the following question as well: How realistic and adequate are the possibilities of the local authorities fully to participate in the exercise of national policy? **O. Lisichkina, honored teacher, Voronezh Oblast** asks: "How can we avoid conflicts among ethnic groups in our country if, for example, Chukotka, like other autonomous areas in the North, is unable to handle its own natural resources? Redfish, red caviar, furs, reindeer hides and seal skins are all shipped out of the area and exported."

A. Kolonichenko, Moscow Oblast, notes, in turn, that the Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug exports more than two-thirds of the furs through auctions. Meanwhile, the entire foreign exchange goes to the center and the okrug does not receive even a single kopek. "A high percentage of the foreign exchange withholdings should go to the okrug to purchase the necessary goods, schools and medical equipment and to meet other needs," he suggests.

"It is important to create prerequisites for surmounting the isolation of republics," writes **S. Polovtsev, Bryansk Oblast**. "To begin with, the republics must open their economies to each other. It is a question of broadening economic relations. For example, currently in the overwhelming majority of cases Belgorod and Kharkov interact only after a decision to this effect has been made in Moscow and Kiev. They should be given the opportunity independently to establish their economic relations and cooperation among them should be thoroughly encouraged."

The observations and suggestions contained in the letter by **Muscovite A. Ivanov** could clearly apply not only to the Baltic republics: "Gradually, we are beginning to understand that no single major domestic problem can be solved separately from the entire global community. The problem of relations among nationalities is no exception. Take as an example the Baltic republics, whose cultural and historical traditions and way of life lean toward Western Europe. However, due to the lack of free foreign travel, poor contacts among people, and insignificant and controlled foreign economic relations, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians sharply react to their separation from their native cultural environment.

Hence the growth of nationalistic feelings, fear of 'Russification' and loss of national and cultural originality. Free business and tourist trips abroad, economic independence and unlimited foreign economic activities would not separate the republics of the Baltic from the USSR in the least but, conversely, will lift the obstacles which are today hindering an understanding of the advantages of being a member of a strong Union state."

Professor V. Zibarev, doctor of historical sciences, who heads the department of CPSU History at the Tomsk Engineering-Construction Institute, somehow sums up in his letter the thoughts and wishes concerning the harmonizing of relations among nationalities. "The task is," he emphasizes, "to clear all the dumps, to normalize and heal relations among nations and ethnic groups in the country. This calls for a reinterpretation of the Leninist theoretical legacy and a critical analysis of the experience in solving the national problem in the USSR; it would be also useful to turn to the positive experience of other countries. It should be a question not simply of improving national relations but of their restructuring as part of the overall process of perestroika of society and its democratization."

The authors of these letters consider that the resolutions of the September Central Committee Plenum and the CPSU platform on "National Party Policy Under Contemporary Conditions" it adopted provide the foundations for the solution of these problems.

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PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE

A Socialist Market or An Exhibit of Illusions?

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[Article by Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Yasin, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] This article by Doctor of Economic Sciences Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Yasin, a noted specialist, is published as a basis for discussion. The editors believe that at this point the discussion of the problem of price setting should be given a "second breath," and should be considered a structural part of a most complex set of problems of financial healing. Society must become acquainted with the facts, however unpleasant they may seem, and freely discuss any, including unpopular, options. We are relying on the interested response of our readers and point out, once again, that the assessments and suggestions contained in the article are Ye. Yasin's own.

It is time to abandon the illusion that there is an easy way to solve the economic problems facing the country. We have reached a level at which decisive, albeit painful and unpopular measures must be taken and a point at which

their implementation can no longer be postponed, for the more time passes the more difficult will the surgical intervention become.

It has already been acknowledged that the most urgent task is that of financial recovery. Without it we shall be unable to strengthen incentives, promote wholesale trade and organize price setting or, perhaps, continue the reform and create prerequisites for an economic upsurge. The government has adopted a program, and a wide range of steps were discussed at the Congress of People's Deputies.

They include a reduction of state expenditures, stabilization of the consumer market by increasing the production of goods and services, reviewing the structure of imports, conversion, and restraining the growth of population monetary income. The floating of state loans and the selling of stock are being considered. Cost accounting must finally become truly full; obstacles preventing the development of leasing and the cooperatives must be removed, and tax and credit reforms are necessary.

All of these are absolutely necessary steps. The possibilities of each one of them must be maximally used. Consistency and firmness in the implementation of the governmental anti-inflationary policy are irreplaceable. However, we must realize that it is a question of difficult decisions which may trigger social conflicts and by no means should we rely on finding a magic wand which would enable us to correct the situation immediately and without major costs. For example, any drastic increase in cost accounting and credit policy would be fraught with the bankruptcy of a large number of enterprises, disruption of economic relations, reductions in output and a worsening of the employment situation. In order to avoid a dangerous aggravation of such problems it would become inevitable to ease the economic pressure on enterprises, and to extend the time needed for conversion to a restrictive monetary policy over a longer period of time.

We are still quite far from the limit of required and possible reductions in state expenditures. The fact that such a limit exists, however, is obvious. Centralized investments in 1989 will be reduced by 7.5 out of 82.1 billion rubles. This is unacceptably little, considering the size of the budget deficit! However, even if we were to reduce the planned amount of investments by 30 percent, this would not amount to more than approximately 25 billion rubles. Furthermore, the possibility of reducing centralized capital investments would be directly determined by the direction in which the sectorial economy will develop. Unless we abandon the idea of reducing centralized investments in the agroindustrial complex, where they are the least efficient, it would be difficult to achieve even that type of scale in reducing state expenditures, and structural disproportions may even worsen.

Finally, we must also take into consideration the fact that many state expenditures will increase despite our

best wishes, thus absorbing a significant percentage of the savings achieved in the items we already mentioned. At the very first session of the Supreme Soviet, in its new convocation, about 6 million rubles were planned to be spent on increasing pensions. Since retail prices will remain fixed, subsidies will be increased as well. In 1989 as well they will total 103 billion rubles, with an annual increase of 12.6 percent, including 87.9 billion in food subsidies.

Steps to develop leasing, cooperatives and other progressive forms of economic management should provide a powerful impetus for the restructuring of economic relations and the enhancement of the economy. The USSR Supreme Soviet has decided to give priority to drafting laws on ownership, leasing and leasing relations, socialist enterprises and regional cost accounting.

All such new developments, however, could yield substantial returns only if we have the freedom to maneuver, which is provided by the market. Under the present circumstances, its development is either being hindered or else assuming distorted forms, triggering the objections of a significant percentage of the working people. Such was the case with the cooperatives and with the so-called "group egotism" of state enterprises.

There is a feeling of incompleteness in this entire set of measures. The ways to develop the market are not clear: cost accounting alone, even in the forms of leasing and wholesale trade is insufficient. We lack the key which would merge everything within an overall program, albeit difficult and not promising immediate successes, but convincingly indicating the way the reform will be carried out and the crisis will be surmounted.

Yet such a key does exist. Yesterday we became aware of the importance of improving the financial situation; today the time has come to realize that price-setting is the heart of the reform. Without it we shall be unable to provide scope for the development of a variety of forms of ownership and open the way to the market.

Balanced prices, which would ensure the balance between the supply and demand of goods and services, is consistent with the principles of the new economic reform. Prices set on a centralized basis are not excluded. However, since it is impossible for the center to set the prices of an infinite variety of goods, most of them should be based on contracts and should be free. Free prices, combined with the autonomy of enterprises and direct economic relations are the minimum requirements in the development of the market.

The instant introduction of free prices is impossible. Considering the present lack of balance and disruption in the monetary system, prices would unrestrainedly increase, enriching some and bankrupting others and giving free reign to galloping inflation. But then what are we to do?

Let us remember that the resolutions of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum stipulated a radical

reform in price-setting as of the new 5-year period. The initial draft formulated by the USSR State Committee for Prices presumed, however, the simultaneous revision of prices, differing from the previous one only by the fact that it applied to all types of prices—wholesale, purchase and retail—which was usual for the administrative-command system. Its purpose was to create favorable starting conditions for the new economic system. Essentially, the price setting mechanism itself was not affected. The question of converting to balanced prices was not even raised. Strict administrative control over prices, as the principal means of restraining inflation, remained a postulate not to be even discussed. The actual increase in prices as a result of the use of various types of markups and contractual prices, albeit within a small range, was simply interpreted as an argument in favor of the need for such control and was used as a pretext for the introduction of new and even more rigid restrictions.

Meanwhile, the broadening of enterprise autonomy, reduced share of state orders with existing outlay prices, which intensified the imbalance, led to the loss of opportunities for influencing, in particular, the production of goods sold at losing or underprofitable prices. That was the area in which it was felt that command pressure had weakened while the economic incentives which were to replace it had not been enacted.

Uncontrolled price increases where administrative control could be bypassed, varietal changes in favor of producing profitable goods and barter deals based on reciprocal deliveries of scarce goods or transferring some wage funds were all efforts to adapt to a deformed and inefficient price system and the normal reaction on the part of enterprises which had been granted a certain degree of independence, and to abnormal economic conditions under which they were placed. Need we provide more proof of the inadmissible delay in the reorganization of price setting?

Could such processes be corrected with a simultaneous revision of prices? Naturally, this would have eliminated the most severe disproportions. However, it is precisely the phenomena which are caused by increased enterprise autonomy and the development of direct economic relations among them that were things which a price revision could not correct. This required flexible prices reacting to the dynamics of supply and demand.

In a market-oriented economy, one way or another the enterprises will have to adapt to price dynamics, for in that case no one would protect them from losses caused by sluggishness and inability to take the market situation into consideration. Nonetheless, such a lesson would have to be learned. Why not start right away?

Furthermore, if increased costs as a result of price increases of fuel and energy would be, as is usually the case in revisions, compensated by increasing the prices of commodities, in machine building for instance, why should machine builders try to save on energy and apply

energy conserving technologies? In that case the stimulating effect of prices is either reduced to naught or else substantially lowered.

The most complex tangle of problems in the restructuring of price setting is that of retail prices. The need to eliminate deformations in the retail price system is acknowledged by everyone. However, solving problems through a large-scale simultaneous price review here as well proves to be entirely unacceptable from the social viewpoint, even if the losses to the population from price increases and, particularly, in terms of food compensations, are totally unacceptable. Such "reform," which contributes nothing to reducing the budget deficit but merely replaces subsidies with compensations, would greatly worsen the meaningless spending of money and the already weakened incentive to work. It would cause significant redistribution processes among the various population groups and areas, the consequences of which would be unpredictable.

The one-time sharp increase in food prices would also mean sudden and quite substantial changes in the consumption structure. It would hit established customs and the living standard of a very large number of people.

The positive effect which could be expected in connection with the elimination of deformations in price ratios and changes in demand becomes quite unlikely in this situation. As a result of the even greater scarcity of available product substitutes such as, for example, fruit, vegetables and fish, one should rather expect in this case the so-called Giffen effect, i.e., increased demand accompanying price increases, to the detriment of other commodity groups. In that case a balanced market would be unlikely. Meanwhile, the population's reaction would be not difficult to predict.

Currently, under the pressure of public opinion, the revision of retail prices has been postponed. Steps related to other types of prices as well are being held back. It has even been suggested to draft the 13th 5-Year Plan on the basis of current prices and to postpone the price setting reform for 1992 at the earliest, when we could take up again the question of retail prices, in the hope that by then the situation on the consumer market would improve. Such hope, let us point out, is not especially substantiated.

In solving the price-setting problem, waiting is as unacceptable as a simultaneous price revision. The solution is seen in initiating as quickly as possible a conversion to balanced prices. However, this should take place gradually, holding back the pace of price increases in order to avoid their destructive impact on the economy.

The price-setting reform, which is related to the organization of the market and other steps involved in the restructuring of the economic mechanism, has assumed a sliding aspect, if one may use this term. The following variant in its implementation appears sensible:

First, an entire array of steps related to the financial improvement of the economy must be implemented, making full use of their potential. This is a necessary prerequisite, for success in the restructuring of price setting will decisively depend on the extent to which the growth of the money in circulation could be halted. Particularly important on this level is the credit reform, the establishment of a commercial banking system and the introduction of modern economic methods for controlling the amount of money in circulation, such as an interest rate policy and keeping mandatory credit reserves in USSR Gosbank accounts.

Second, a certain share of all types of goods produced over and above state orders should be marketed at contractual and free market prices. Setting aside a certain percentage of the output to be sold freely would immediately develop a commodity market, which would be realistic albeit limited in scale. Enterprises—producers and consumers—would be given additional freedom to maneuver and would be protected from the need to resort to primitive bartering methods.

The idea of developing wholesale trade with the old fixed prices was groundless from the very beginning. This motivated the Gosnab to use the so-called commercial prices which differed from the official price lists on the basis of demand. As practical experience has indicated, however, the allowed range of deviation of as much as 50 percent proved to be insufficient under present-day circumstances; the enterprises prefer bartering.

The market would make it possible to assess the economic situation better. The situation is such that free prices would inevitably assume the upper hand. This triggers fears and the demand for administrative prohibitions. However, if we are developing a market, we must take its laws into consideration. Prices must drop as a result of increased sales, the development of competition and the strengthening of the ruble. It is precisely along such channels that economic price controls are taking place. Meanwhile, the market would absorb the surplus funds of enterprises and the population, and would find a use for them.

Third, goods produced on the basis of state orders should be marketed at fixed and regulated prices. Fixed prices are set by the government for long periods of time and essentially for prime resources and basic consumer goods. Controlled prices are set for the remaining goods in signing contracts for meeting state orders, taking into consideration production and consumption conditions. They can be set by the ministries, as authorities which place the state orders, providing that the enterprises are no longer subordinate to them. Otherwise they could not pursue a state price policy. Another option would be for the Gosnab to handle the matter. At that point, however, the placing of state orders should be given to it and it should become a state contracting system.

The share of state orders, in that case, would increase initially. However, this would eliminate the present

unnatural situation of reducing state orders and instead setting consumption limits and engaging in other maneuvers so that, without violating the letter of the law, maintain the production process and economic relations. In the future, the share of the market should increase while the volume of state orders should diminish.

On this basis a gradual restructuring of price setting could be achieved without any comprehensive simultaneous revision.

The initial step would be a partial review of fixed prices of prime resources in order to stimulate the economy with their help and to create economic conditions for a structural reorganization, the purpose of which would be to abandon the "self-consuming" economy. At the same time, the budget would obtain a stable income from extraction and, subsequently, land rental payments. In the second stage, the main factor will be the gradual and restrained process of increase in regulated prices and improved correlations among them, bringing them increasingly closer to balanced prices. In itself, this would become a factor of financial improvements.

This approach implies the use of so-called "double prices." As the experience of the PRC and other countries has indicated, such prices lead to the development of a number of negative phenomena such as, for example, speculating on price differentials. Nonetheless, in the transitional period double prices are the least of all possible evils. Their negative aspects could be significantly neutralized by a strict anti-inflationary policy. In any case, they would make it possible to come out of the impasse; by systematically taking controlled prices closer to the market prices and mastering economic control methods for the latter, we could develop a normal price system which would ensure the balancing of the market and stimulate the economic upsurge.

Fourth, we must begin to increase retail prices within an acceptable period of time, above all of products which are subsidized out of the budget. This should not take place with a couple of strokes but also gradually, in order not to subject to stress the structure of consumer expenditures and to enable us to take into consideration changes in the production structure and the lowered cost of such products, should this be achieved.

I fully understand the gravity of the problem and the social stress and feverish nature of the market which could be triggered simply by talks about raising prices of goods and the custom of readers to take any printed word as the official viewpoint as an indication of surreptitiously drafted resolutions. I know that in the eyes of the people prices have become a kind of fuse for social stress. One author even said that the day the prices are raised will be the last day of trust in perestroika. To speak of increasing retail prices has become unseemly. At the risk of being universally condemned, I shall nonetheless claim that the demand for stability in retail prices dooms, in the final account, the economic reform

to failure. It is not even a question of the fact that without reducing budget subsidies we would find it difficult to improve our finances or that with fixed retail prices nothing serious could be accomplished in the area of wholesale prices.

The essence of the reform is a conversion from an economic system which operates against objective economic laws to a different system resting on such laws. One of them stipulates that if prices are to remain stable the growth of commodity supply should match the increased income of the population with an amount of available cash not exceeding the requirements of economic turnover. If income grows faster than commodity resources so should prices. Only thus can we maintain a balanced market and, with it, efficient incentives for the development of output and labor activeness.

Holding back the growth of prices through administrative methods, even though motivated by the best of reasons, leads with absolute inevitability to a deficit. The longer and more systematically we support stable prices, the worse will become the scarcity and the problems which it invariably creates: undermining economic incentives and the need to allocate resources and, as a consequence, a return to the administrative-command system. Wherever there is distribution, a certain percentage of resources sticks to the hands of those who are in charge of distribution. The greater the scarcity, the more such products are kept and the greater becomes the temptation to hoard valuable commodities for oneself and people one may find useful. Is this not the reason for which worker control does not work while the amount of scarce goods kept in bases and under the counter keeps increasing? We have studied such lessons for more than a decade and we are still totally unable to learn them.

As to the budget deficit, each step in increasing the production of the most needed products, such as meat, milk and housing, given the current fixed prices, will result in a steady increase. Simple computations would indicate that increasing meat production by 1 kilogram per person would increase budget expenditures by no less than 1 billion rubles. In order for the consumer to feel an improvement, this increase should amount to perhaps 10 to 12 kilograms. Therefore, the budget deficit would increase by 10-12 billion rubles. Let us remember that even a radical 33 percent lowering of budget allocations for centralized investments would save approximately 25 billion rubles. Consequently, any increase in price subsidies threatens to defeat all of our efforts of saving on state expenditures.

Naturally, every person will most tangibly feel price increases. A budget deficit is not felt directly. Nonetheless, the budget deficit means a flow of meaningless cash which is poured into the national economy. The ruble becomes a kind of lottery ticket: if you buy a commodity in short supply you have won; if you do not, you have lost. The more tickets there are the lesser becomes the likelihood of winning, particularly bearing in mind that

some people have the opportunity of determining which lottery tickets have winning numbers.

Naturally, stable prices are good. In our country maintaining them is considered the obligation of the state. However, the state can no longer assume the unbearable task of protecting its citizens from the effect of the laws of economics or the consequences of maintaining stable prices at all cost.

Actually, the most important social problem in the economic reform is replacing the models for the work and consumption patterns of the people. The current model is closely related to the old economic system: stable prices, stable low wages, high share of free services, weak incentives, poor work and scarcity. All of these links reciprocally supplement each other. Stable prices can be achieved only as a set. We cannot select exclusively their good qualities and drop the bad ones. We must convert to a different model: flexible prices-high earnings-intensive and skilled labor-healthy adults paying the full price for everything-saturation of the market and accessibility of goods without lines and connections. The transition is difficult but necessary, for the good of everyone and the health of society. The widespread view that the people will not accept this stipulation is not confirmed by sociological surveys. Scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences TsEMI surveyed 18,000 workers and employees about their choice of one of said models; 84 percent of those surveyed were in favor of the second and only 9 of the first.

The argument most frequently cited to oppose a rise in retail prices is the following: prices have already been raised repeatedly but no positive changes have followed. Promises have been made which were never kept. What guarantee do we have that this time things will be different?

That is all true and, it is equally true that no such guarantees exist. We cannot expect that increasing the price of any specific item would immediately lead to increasing its production or even to a stable reduction of demand. Under the old mechanism, bankruptcy was the inevitable result. The only thing that can be guaranteed is that unless retail prices are changed and unless at any given time we become reconciled with the thought that they should be flexible, we shall never pull ourselves out of the clutches of the administrative-command system.

It has also been suggested not to raise prices but reduce expenditures, eliminate irresponsibility and, to this effect, introduce leasing, family contracting and other similar forms of economic management. We can agree with this. However, production costs cannot be reduced by order. Leasing requires a lessee and a lessee requires suitable equipment. The dissemination of new economic relations should advance at its own pace. It cannot be hastened the way we have repeatedly tried to do. This takes time. Meanwhile, it is today that we lack meat.

We may close down a losing farm which no one wants to lease. The costs would decline but this will not increase the amount of meat. The main task, however, is to increase the amount of meat and to satisfy the needs. Therefore, we must tolerate high production costs and make purchase prices consistent with them and pay subsidies. Here again we face the objective economic law that the price must equal maximal outlays such as to satisfy demand.

In order to eliminate irresponsibility, reduce costs and offer scope for the development of progressive economic management methods, we need a reform. A reform, in turn, requires normal prices.

The decisive objection to raising prices is that it will hit at the pocketbook of the working people, above all the low-income families, trigger a burst of discontent and weaken trust in perestroyka.

This is quite a serious argument which cannot be countered with logical counterarguments. We need a strong program of social protection measures which should include the following:

1. An objective computation of the cost of living index, which would take into consideration increases in all types of prices by region and main social group;
2. A social insurance reform, which would guarantee that the real income of individuals living on their pensions and aid will not be reduced, using the system of corrections based on the cost of living index. The system of indexing should be applied to all types of fixed income even before prices have been raised, and everyone must become convinced of its efficiency;
3. Increasing aid for children, based on the principles of demographic policy. We can find throughout the world many examples of efficient organization of state aid in raising children. This experience could be used.

Funds for such measures could be provided by reducing price subsidies. Since the budget will thus compensate losses caused by price increases for only part of the population, enough such funds will be available, and some of them will even help to reduce the budget deficit;

4. In order to prevent this from harming the active population, a wage reform will be necessary. Its main objective will be to increase the flexibility of state wage controls, based on end production results and the dynamics of retail prices. The present system with its centralized large number of wage rates and salaries was linked to the model of "fixed prices-fixed earnings." In the case of the new economic system, however, this model becomes totally unsuitable.

We could suggest a different system according to which the state would set only the minimum wage and wage coefficients for the various worker categories. Wages and salaries would be computed on their basis, which would constitute the state guarantee of the individual labor participation, providing that the worker meets his labor

norms and official obligations. The enterprises would have no right to pay less than that. The minimum wage would be indexed and, with it, so would all state wages and salaries, indicating the minimal increase in labor wages which enterprises must pay to compensate for price increases. Above that level, the enterprise could pay as much as it likes and in whatever form the labor collectives would decide. There should be no restrictions in the amount of earnings other than those set by the tax rate, including payments for resources, tax on profit, tax regulating payroll expenditures, based on the consideration of price dynamics and the graduated income tax on personal income.

This kind of system will make it possible for people to earn at their enterprise salaries commensurate with results, and will inspire them to upgrade the quality of their labor. It will lead to increased reciprocal exigency, including in relations between workers and the administration and, at the same time, will compensate for price increases. It is on this basis that one can and must achieve increased efficiency which alone could make more goods available. Also important is the fact that without limiting the growth of earnings or undermining production incentives, the state would eliminate from the budget a substantial share of the burden of subsidies and compensations.

The controlled dynamics of prices of consumer goods, based on increased production and higher incomes, and the indexing of fixed income based on the dynamics of the cost of living would mean developing a flexible mechanism of interaction between prices and revenues, which would make it possible to advance toward a balanced market and, at the proper time, eliminate social tension whenever it appears. In the course of perestroyka such tensions will inevitably appear simply by virtue of the uneven nature of the processes related to it.

Does that mean, however, that this would free the hands of inflation? Indeed, the gradual increase in the share of free prices, higher prices controlled by the state, and compensation of their increase by increasing personal income, increased costs and compensation with further price increases are a classical development of the inflationary spiral. If allowed to exceed a certain limit, it may become destructive to the economy. This danger does exist.

Here is the other extreme: freezing prices, to the extent to which this is possible, and an unrestrained increase in population income and, on a parallel basis, budget subsidies, a worsening deficit and increasingly relying on command methods aimed at preventing chaos in the production process. This would mean a retreat and, in the final account, a crisis and the need to initiate yet another reform, only this time under worse circumstances.

It is obvious that we must avoid extremes and sail our economic ship somehow between the two extremes.

Let us consider what is currently taking place in our country. The classical open inflation, manifested by price increases, is assessed by specialists at the rate of 7-8 percent annually. However, this is only the visible part of the iceberg. The other is an increase in the mass of money, reflected not through price increases but through a reduction in the likelihood of making the necessary purchase per ruble in circulation, i.e., our typical concealed inflation, which is manifested in scarcity and lines. I shall not undertake to assess its amount. However, it is clearly higher than the figures cited for open inflation.

One way or another, inflation has become a universally acknowledged fact, and has assumed a very dangerous and distorted form. The prices which should be raised in order to reduce subsidies, for example, have remained firm. Other prices which are perhaps not all that burdensome to the budget, are rising simply because they are difficult to control. This increases price disproportions and deformations of demand. Public opinion is affected, increasingly by scarcity and also by price increases.

The situation with income is roughly similar: in some population groups income has risen rapidly while in others it has remained stable. The increased gap in income is by no means determined by differences in labor results and is another contributory factor to the growth of social tension.

In order to avoid the crisis we must undertake the constant and prompt equalization of arising disproportions, using the least painful method: increasing income and streamlining prices. In such a case no strata of the population would loose in terms of the size of nominal income and, at the same time, it will become possible to improve price balancing. It is thus that the process of conversion from hidden to open inflation will take place. This is unpleasant. However, there simply is no way of leaving the crisis behind which would be pleasant in all respects. This, however, would still prove to be less costly than anything else. The question is, shall we be able to keep inflation within the admissible levels. This would be difficult and we have no experience other than that of using administrative prohibitions which, in fact, are unable to stop it. The banking system, which can reliably regulate the mass of currency is as yet to be developed. That is why one can understand the fears expressed on the subject of our ability to control inflation.

Nonetheless, we must make this decision. We must learn how to combine inflationary with anti-inflationary steps. The latter are known: reducing costs, strengthening cost accounting, increasing interest rates, etc. If used to an excessive extent, this suppresses incentive, increases the number of bankruptcies and makes open inflation necessary. The growth of prices and income would encourage output and enable us, at the right place and time, to increase the output of necessary commodities and encourage enterprise.

Higher costs, with a sensible price control, would make it possible, taking into consideration the needs of the enterprises, seriously to consider resource conservation, to give an impetus to technical progress and to force us to be more flexible. At the same time, we shall be able to stabilize the differentiation in prices and social relations. The moment any group rushes ahead in terms of earnings, price increases and increases in the income of other population strata would enable us to moderate their benefits.

Should inflation gather speed and begin to be uncontrolled, once again counterweights could be used above all by imposing stricter financial and credit rules and intensifying price and income controls.

The strategy of controlled inflation, which is the least painful way for solving the crisis, consists of such a flexible combination, based on the developing circumstances, and taking inflationary and anti-inflationary steps. Despite all of its dangers, this system has two major advantages: first, it provides the government with economic instruments for controlling the economy during the transitional period. Today no such instruments exist and the leadership is faced with the dilemma of either simply helplessly monitoring the worsening of the situation or else increasing administrative pressure.

Second, the processes of controlled inflation will lead us toward a balanced economy and market, eliminating along the way the obsolete stereotype in the behavior of individuals and enterprises. During that entire time prices will rise. We must be prepared for this.

Price increases can be truly stopped only by a developed market and competition. In that area as well we must act by encouraging an antimonopoly policy and eliminating all kinds of organizational monopolies, such as artificial trusts, main administrations and fictitious concerns and associations, making all enterprises independent of the ministries and allowing any producer to market his goods anywhere, and thus establishing a market infrastructure.

Naturally, this method promises neither easy nor fast victories. We need time, willpower, competent leadership and the art of pursuing an economic and social policy. However, this also helps us to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

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Comparing Figures

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[Article by A. Sizov, economist]

[Text] Problems of importing food, as discussed in KOMMUNIST (Nos 6 and 12 for 1989) have unquestionably drawn the increased attention of the readers.

For a long time we were being told that we were importing nothing but feed grain. The needs concerning our daily bread were being fully met out of our own grain resources. Alas, this was by no means the case. In recent years about 50 out of the 130-133 per capital kilograms of bread products used imported grain. In other words, one out of three loaves which we eat is of foreign origin. The situation with pasta products is even worse: virtually 50 percent of them are made with imported grain.

Let me immediately define my own position: our situation as a bread hostage is not the result of "intrigues" or failures in the work of any individual ministry. It is by no means exclusively the result of commercial circumstances and the organization of specific foreign purchases. On this level, the answer given by Minister K. Katushev (KOMMUNIST No 12, 1989) is quite convincing. The origins of the problem lie elsewhere: in the objective interest on the part of many departments, over a long period of time, to import food products, grain in particular.

Regular mass imports of grain enabled the Gosplan to plan without taking particularly into consideration the unstable nature of domestic grain production; the gosagroproms were not burdening themselves with problems related to the struggle for production quality; the Ministry of Grain Products paid no attention to this for, in all cases, "foreign imports will help;" "Eksportkhleb" became actually "Importkhleb," i.e., an enterprise which was not exporting thousands of tons of grain but importing tens of millions of tons. In short, departmental interests dominated, laying grounds for the blossoming of dependency moods in grain production and processing.

While the volume of average wheat crops has remained approximately stable over the past 20 years (90 million tons in 1966-1970 and 85 million tons in 1985-1988) internal procurements for bread-quality wheat dropped by a factor of 1.7; procurements of hard wheat dropped by a factor of almost 3. The worsened quality of the bread during those years cannot be explained by the treachery of the weather or the lack of natural conditions for growing wheat. It is most closely related to the weakening effect of imported "injections" administered to our food supply system which, like a drug, must be administered again and again.

In this connection, one can hardly agree with the fact that imported grain plays a significant role in solving the Food Program. Conversely, this program demands an increased level of the country's self-support. It is precisely this key problem of what must be done to reduce our dependence on imports, that is not mentioned in the answer provided by Minister K. Katushev.

Talks about the efficiency and even saving of tens of millions of foreign exchange rubles in specific deals lose all meaning if the overall cost of food imports is not reduced but increased. Last year it totaled 8.7 billion foreign exchange rubles (excluding fish products); 10

years ago it was 7.6 billion. The traditional use of imports as a means for patching up holes does not bring us any closer to the solution of the food problem.

I fully agree with the minister's statement that "grain agreements concluded between the USSR and a number of capitalist countries provide certain guarantees to our partners that they will be able to sell their grain, which is consistent with their interests!" This becomes even more important in the 1980s, when competition for markets has sharply increased throughout the world. Naturally, the Americans were pleased when in 1983 they were able to raise the level of mandatory minimum grain purchases from the United States from 6 million tons, as stipulated in the 1975 Agreement, to 9 million. As to the advantages which such agreements provide us, they are quite problematical.

To begin with, there is historical proof that the existence of grain agreements among governments do not exclude in the least the possibility of "introducing all kinds of limitations or prohibitions on exporting grain to the USSR." Suffice it to recall the embargo imposed by the U.S. Administration in 1980.

Second, advantageous prices are related less to the presence or absence of grain agreements than the strength of the competitive struggle on world grain markets. The Americans give us discounts only for wheat, in which they are fiercely competing for the Soviet market with other suppliers, above all the European Economic Community, which heavily subsidizes grain sales. As to corn, here the United States does not give us any discounts whatsoever. Today, when the stocks of exporters have substantially dropped as a result of poor harvests and world prices have slid upwards, discounts granted on the state level have been virtually eliminated. Whereas between April 1987 and December 1988 the average discount in purchases of American wheat was \$35 per ton, last May our trade delegation was able to achieve only a few dollars discount, with a great deal of difficulty. Meanwhile, any specialist who has been following the dynamics of global grain prices knows that the very fact of initiating talks on concluding or extending a grain agreement is a signal of higher prices or (if prices had been previously declining) a slowdown in their reduction.

K. Katushev's claim notwithstanding, our grain agreements are quite specific. Thus, we are obligated to purchase grain from the United States, in amounts set not only in terms of volume but also structure (4 million tons of wheat and corn each and only 1 million according to our own choice).

However, the main "effect" of long-term grain agreements is related to their unstimulating influence on the development of domestic production. By concluding an agreement on the purchasing of wheat from the United States, Canada and other countries, the departments thus seriously limit possibilities of encouraging the

development of domestic production by spending foreign currency which is being paid and will continue to be paid out above all in accordance with existing agreements or for buying the mandatory minimum of foreign grain. Today this amounts to no more and no less than 10 million tons of wheat.

Another element in the reproduction of our import dependency is related to the structure of purchases of foodstuffs and fodder. As was justifiably pointed out by D. Bulatov in his letter (KOMMUNIST No 6, 1989), the share of high-protein feeds which enable us to save on grain and improve returns on animal feeds is more than modest in this case. From Katushev's viewpoint, their share is not all that small: "About 13 percent in weight and 30 percent in terms of value of the overall volume of grain and leguminous crops imported in the USSR during that period (1987-1988). However, simple estimates based on the recently published collection "Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR in 1988," of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, show different results: their share is 6.7 percent in weight and 14.4 percent in terms of value in grain imports.

What is the reason for such more than 100 percent differences I shall not undertake to judge. However, in any case the fact of protein imbalance in the feed base in the country is obvious and demands taking more consistent steps to change the structure of grain imports.

References to the fact that soybean purchases are unprofitable, compared to other feed crops "in some cases due to the correlation of world prices" are equally not all that convincing. Judging by the dynamics of soybean imports, the consideration of this correlation in the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, if it plays any whatsoever role, is quite insignificant. Thus, in 1987 the average import price per ton of corn was 50.8 rubles in foreign exchange, compared with 125 rubles for soybeans. In 1988 the cost of corn increased compared to that of soybeans. Import prices of corn rose by 32.3 percent, compared to 6.7 percent for soybean. One would think that under such circumstances soybean purchases should increase faster than corn. Actually, it was precisely the opposite. Soybean purchases declined from 1.53 to 1.35 million tons while corn purchases increased from 9.2 to 11.4 million tons.

Let us also note the fact of importing soft wheat, which is suitable only as animal feed. In 1987 we purchased from Western Europe alone 5.6 million and, in 1988, 4.4 million tons. The geography of such purchases itself (Great Britain, FRG, Denmark, Austria, Finland) proves that we are importing ordinary wheat for animal feed. Under our circumstances, the use of wheat in animal feed rations intensifies, more than anything else, the scarcity of protein in animal nutrition and is one of the factors for the overexpenditure of grain which, even according to the most conservative estimates, amounts to no less than 25 million tons annually. Hence the high cost of livestock products, which is a heavy burden on the state budget.

We cannot say that the ministry specialists are unaware of such problems. It is entirely possible that steps to resolve them are being taken or drafted. If such is the case, the public should be informed of them, for the way foreign exchange is spent and its purpose is by no means a matter of indifference to it.

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View From the Side: Reform in the Defense Sector

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[Article by Steven Rosenfeld and Ralph Fots]

[Text] Following is an article by American Economists Steven Rosenfeld and Ralph Fots, professors at the University of North Carolina. This article is in answer to that by A. Isayev "Reform and the Defense Sectors" (KOMMUNIST No 5, 1989).

The article by S. Rosenfeld and R. Fots is published with some deletions pertaining essentially to mathematical computations and estimates. The authors' terminology has been retained, although in a number of cases it is not entirely consistent with Soviet economic practices. For example, by "privatization" the authors mean a transfer of ownership of means of production to the collective of a given enterprise. Actually, it is a question here of establishing not private but collective ownership.

Our attention was drawn by the article by A. Isayev in KOMMUNIST. It includes interesting suggestions dealing with radical changes in the Soviet defense complex. The author claims that privatization, combined with the enterprise granting the labor collectives the right to make economic decisions will enable the defense sectors to become the "locomotive engine of perestroika" and provide an impetus in the conversion of defense enterprises. One can only welcome such objectives. Unfortunately, achieving them is quite problematic, for major aspects in the suggested model contains serious faults. We shall try to highlight these difficulties and indicate the ways to surmount them and thus to contribute to the implementation of progressive changes.

A. Isayev bases his model on the aim of the labor collective to maximize the end income of its members, which is formed after meeting all obligatory payments (taxes, rentals, interests, etc.). Superficially, this resembles the aspiration to maximize profits but a more profound consideration of the matter turns out that this is by no means the case.

The law of the dynamics of other factors (nonworking) for collective enterprises is the same as for companies oriented toward profit earning. As to labor, in this case neither the market (as is the case in the West) nor the state (as is traditional under socialism) sets the wage. The labor income, in this model, can fluctuate but is not an

entirely autonomous factor, for its level is influenced by fixed and other payments. The nature of this circumstance is more or less clear. A collective enterprise would react entirely differently to changes in fixed payments and prices compared to a capitalist company. It would increase employment and the volume of output with an increased amount of payment, and reduce them should payments decline. Paradoxical though it might seem, if the state would wish for the output to increase it should set a higher leasing payment. With low production rates output would most likely decline.

Another feature of collective enterprises has to do with prices. The connection between the volume of output and the price here is the reverse of what is normal. In other words, they may tend to lower output while increasing prices and increase output while lowering prices. Granting the enterprise collectives the right to conclude agreements concerning contractual prices under existing market conditions rather lowers than improves customer satisfaction. If a customer (the Ministry of Defense) agrees to pay high prices, the collective enterprises will develop the inclination to lower their volumes of output.

The activities of a collective enterprise are also influenced by progressive taxation of the distributed profits (after withholding the proper share of the gross income for investments). The tax rate lowers the share of the distributed profit which is kept by the company. The taxation model which is suggested in the article under discussion could lead to insufficient accumulations in collective enterprises, for after paying the taxes, capital investments would most likely be low.

Said difficulties have three main reasons: inadequate definition of the right of ownership, an unrealistic tax strategy and the maximizing of equally distributed dividends. All of them can be resolved partially or entirely within the framework of socialist principles. The country's leadership finds itself in a divided position in the means of dividing profits among working people. On the one hand, it would like to grant full right of ownership to the entire collective; on the other, it tries to formulate individualized incentives for initiatives and investment. Such conflicting objectives could be eliminated by establishing a procedure according to which the initial contribution of collective assets will be a gift from the state. All subsequent accumulations, based on reinvestment by the workers of some of their dividends will remain their private property. The annual contribution of the individual will be established and give him the right to a certain share of future dividends. Since the income from such investments is derived more from capital than labor, the workers should have the right to sell their shares on the open market unless, naturally, the government is ideologically prepared to allow the creation of a stock market. The individual members of the labor collectives themselves, rather than the labor collective council, as their representative, should be given the right to determine the share of their dividend for investments. Such a distribution of the right of ownership is an

entirely realistic alternative, for it broadens the area of individual decisions and strengthens initiative without rejecting the principles of socialism. In this case ownership is related to labor participation and is based on the equal distribution of income.

Problems related to taxing dividends can also be fully solved. Instead of forcing the labor collective to invest with the help of a rigid progressive taxation of the distributed profit, this objective can be achieved in a more delicate way by linking voluntary investments by the working people to their profits and the taxation policy to the individual income. This could be done in two stages. First, instead of taxing the distributed share of the collected income, there could be a progressive tax on dividends and capital increases obtained as a result of ownership or sale of shares of the collective enterprise. This would make it possible to avoid the danger of reinvesting in underprofitable projects, which could tempt the enterprises in order to avoid the "penalty" of a high tax on distributed profits. Second, the regulating authorities could take steps which would encourage the members of the collective to increase their share in the investment program of the enterprise by providing favorable market opportunities, regulating prices and guaranteeing demand. This would ensure the channeling of capital investments into socially advantageous projects more successfully than if this is automatically regulated with a rigid tax pressure on profits subject to distribution.

Finally, individual initiative can be more efficiently encouraged by reopening the labor market. To this effect every working person should be given the right to decide for himself what he prefers: to earn a fixed wage or a general collective dividend plus an additional dividend based on the share of his participation. Those who prefer a variable labor income will, as co-owners of the enterprise, hire other workers through the stipulated channels. Their own earnings may be independent of their labor contribution.

Such changes do not eliminate all difficulties related to the specifics of socialist ownership but, obviously, they would reduce distortions to an acceptable level. Finally, as to conversion. The successful creation of efficiently operating collective enterprises would satisfy one of the important objectives of the reform. However, it would not adequately solve another problem, that of conversion. According to the author, who agrees with M. Gorbachev's familiar position, a significant share of defense production capacities could be converted to the production of civil goods. However, it does not explain how this will be done. Under the conditions of economic decentralization he suggests, the conversion can be accomplished only through some kind of market process. But what kind? The article provides no answer to the question. Probably, the author believes that by maximizing profitability the problem could be solved. However, he provides no arguments to support his view. Could it be that the objective will be achieved by

splitting the huge producing enterprises and thus eliminating monopoly trends? In that case as well the results may be quite unexpected, for demonopolization of the defense industry would probably increase the monopoly power of the customer—the Ministry of Defense—with all the consequences stemming from this fact.

It is clear that the problem of conversion requires further study and discussions, for otherwise the reform will not be successful.

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SPIRITUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

Mankind and Civilization on the Threshold of the New Millennium

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[Text] A roundtable meeting was held by KOMMUNIST and the journal VOPROSY FILOSOFII on the prospects of the present and the future of man and mankind, problems which are increasingly of interest to social scientists, natural scientists and the broad population strata. The following participated in the discussion of this many-faceted topic: **E.A. Arab-Ogly**, doctor of philosophical sciences, KOMMUNIST editor; **D.I. Valentey**, doctor of economic sciences, head of the Moscow State University Center for the Study of Population Problems; **Ye.P. Velikhov**, academician, USSR Academy of Sciences vice-president; **A.G. Vishnevskiy**, doctor of economic sciences, head of department at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population; **A.I. Volodin**, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **A.A. Galkin**, doctor of historical sciences, prorektor of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences; **D.A. Granin**, writer; **V.P. Zinchenko**, corresponding member, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and director-organizer of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Man; **Kirill**, doctor of theology, archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad; **V.A. Lektorskiy**, doctor of philosophical sciences, editor-in-chief of VOPROSY FILOSOFII; **N.N. Moiseyev**, academician, consultant at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center; and **I.T. Frolov**, academician, president of the USSR Philosophical Society.

Following are excerpts from the discussion. We hope that this material will inspire our readers independently to interpret not only an interesting theoretical but also a vitally practical problem of contemporary social developments.

New Thinking—Thinking of Humanism

I.T. Frolov. The new thinking is the thinking of the new humanism. It is precisely from this viewpoint that we approach the forecasting of the future, and not simply

forecasting but actual planning until the year, shall we say, 2005 which, as it has now become clear to all, is a relevant problem on the practical level.

The study of the future of civilization on a qualitatively different level and, particularly, the picture of the future and the condition of society at the borderline separating two ages, on the eve of the third millennium, was started in the 1960s and was largely based on the views of Marxists cooperating with non-Marxists. It was related to the study of global developments in terms of the aggravation of global problems, which was being described with concern by the Western ecologists, and which has influenced in recent decades the development of new thinking.

Let me particularly emphasize that the formulation of the question of the future of human civilization from the viewpoint of a threatening worsening of global problems proceeded from generations of Soviet natural scientists, philosophers and sociologists, who had accepted the ideas of the 20th CPSU Congress. This enabled us, if not to rush forward, at least to remain on the global level of development of scientific and philosophical thinking. The characteristic feature of the Marxist formulation of the question was the specific social approach to the entire array of problems, which enabled us to take a more realistic look at the situation as a whole and to study and resolve universal human problems taking into consideration the existence of socialism and capitalism.

Furthermore, we say that socialism should define itself more clearly as an inseparable part of the single process of development of global civilization. It is precisely within the framework of the new entity that it is called upon to display its advantages and, at the same time, make use of the forms of organization of contemporary society which, although not characterized today as socialist, nonetheless provide some positive features and lead us forward. For example, in the developed capitalist countries this involves the tempestuous growth of vanguard or, as they call it, high technology, which leads to the creation of a number of previously unknown situations. They could be considered to some extent as models of our future as well. We are currently studying such models and trying to make use of the thus obtained knowledge in our own projections.

The study of the contemporary dynamics of society indicates that the new vanguard technology should be closely related to the development of civilization, culture and man himself. It is only thus that the further development of progressive processes is possible. The consideration of culture, man and his spiritual world is dictated by the need for changes in the production forces themselves and not for some sort of traditional humanistic considerations. It becomes the dominant feature of our age. For that reason, the development of a way of thinking related to concepts relative to the integral nature of the world and the interconnection among its various parts, and the priority of man and universal human values inevitably presume a new form of

humanism introduced in history. Conversion to a humane society is very complex. Every one of us must shed his old hardened skin. We must radically change a great deal in our views on reality and even in our own way of thinking. Although quite recently we boasted of our freedom of scientific creativity, we must not forget that even its few achievements were possible through struggle and occasionally involved persecution. The situation has now changed. Any unjustified pressure on science has vanished and pushed back, for the scale of contemporary thinking is incomparably higher than the one which prevailed in the past. However, our time has set a difficult and tremendous task, which demands the application of all of our intellectual efforts.

A.I. Volodin. Let me point out the evolution of the initial concept itself concerning the object of our discussion: the concept of "humanity." To the philosophers of the distant past this meant the human species and was not a subject of special individual studies. In any case, the content which was invested in it was extremely abstract. It consisted either of naturalistic concepts of mankind, as the totality of all people, of the entire population, or else phraseological interpretations on the same order.

The theoretical views of the utopian socialists ascribed a key significance to this concept. In an effort to straighten out historical development, they assumed that history, as it had been in the past, had distorted the nature of mankind. In their view, mankind would live in accordance with its own specific laws only when we support it, when we send it along the true path, for the actual laws are leading mankind only to unhappiness. Happiness could be gained only by attaining some kind of special condition. The utopians linked the latter to the achievements of civilization. It is thus that they essentially excluded many nations from the global human community. In other words, the initial concept was antihistorical in its content. Mankind was compared to a small child, as yet immature and untrained, ignorant of how one should live normally.

Compared with the utopian socialists, in his philosophy Hegel combined the concepts of "mankind" and "history." To him the history of mankind was an active history. The people should be judged by their actions. He emphasized the many-faceted aspect of mankind, which is a live organism, a complex and contradictory one. According to Hegel, mankind is a process of its own development.

As to Marx, we cannot fail to notice that he approached very cautiously the concept we are now considering. He repeatedly emphasized that the target of his study is not man in general, and even less so mankind as a whole, but a specific period in the history of society and the relationship among basic classes which determine the aspect of one or another historical time. What was characteristic, however, is that while skeptically considering the very concept and not including it in his basic array of tools for the study of contemporary society, he

nonetheless considered capitalism a system which creates the overall material prerequisites for a society in which the true freedom of man and his universal development become possible. Marx's idea of the universal man is used here as a study of the results of historical ascension, the prerequisites for which are provided by capitalism, which limits the local development of individual segments of mankind and thus contributes to its development as a single entity.

Today, taking the new realities into consideration, the social scientists must enrich the Marxist set of instruments, our mental apparatus and method, for the word, the term existed but the concepts and categories as instruments of scientific research were absent. The new reality makes this task topical. To begin with, at the present time there is a development of a truly universal history in which everything is interrelated. It is a question of the development of mankind as a single entity and of the processes of internationalization of life: economic, informational, etc. Second, an increasingly important problem is that of universal human interests, the problem of dialogue, partnership, and establishing a balance among different and occasionally contradictory and even antagonistic interests. Finally, the development of the self-awareness of mankind is intensified; it formulates the practical objective of developing within every individual the concept of affiliation not only with his family, nation and state but also with the single planetary family, with humanity as a new community of people.

Therefore, it is a question of the appearance of some kind of spiritual formation which, in the final account (this is a trend) makes mankind the true subject of historical motion, an active subject under the conditions of a complex structure of relations among different countries, regions, parties, social movements, and so on, and so forth but, nonetheless, a subject with his own specific interests and acting within certain specific limits.

Archbishop Kirill. Yes, indeed, we must seek some specific forms of dialogue for correlating diverging views and convictions, which we could translate properly and adequately into the real life we live today. As a religious person I am convinced that God is the creator of history. However, He acts without violating the inner laws of the freedom of the individual. Therefore, if we speak of the future as believers, we must invest in the concept of "God's will and God's Divine Providence" the concept of human freedom. The future will be largely determined by what the people will do, how they will act and how they will think.

Freedom of thought based on the principles of the priority of universal human values, in my view, is the fundamental principle of the new thinking. It must be comprehensively applied in our inner life. Our progress will be accelerated to the extent to which we can build our society on the basis of this ethical principle.

D.I. Valentey. I support the idea that the problems of our future are also the problems of our present. An awareness of the integral nature and continuity of the development of history in society is an essential feature of the currently developing way of thinking. Although some 10 years are left until the end of the century, we have already entered the new century, for many of the problems which are affecting us now will remain relevant for a long time to come. Naturally, in entering the 3rd millennium no one among us will risk making a precise prognosis concerning the development of social, national and demographic processes and the development of culture and religion as global phenomena, because of their extraordinarily dynamic nature. However, it is necessary to formulate the problem and to interpret it, albeit in a first approximation.

Let us note in this connection that in our philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias, so far there are no entries dealing with mankind, and the concept of "civilization" is presented extremely briefly and unsatisfactorily. Most frequently, civilization is interpreted as being synonymous with culture, with the level of social development which followed barbarism. What is civilization if, on the threshold of the new millennium, we are still seeing numerous elements of lack of culture, and barbarism in various areas of social life both in our country as well as elsewhere in the world?

E.A. Arab-Ogly. Many Marxists, even the majority of them, and no more than a few years ago believed that the problems which we consider today global will be solved only after the victory of socialism on a universal scale. Today the social scientists have reached the conclusion that such is not the case. The understanding has been reached, as part of the new thinking, that they should be resolved without any further delays, under the conditions of the coexistence of various social systems, when there are some 150 different countries on earth, hundreds of nations different from each other and thousands of ethnic groups. Furthermore, we should not be too pleased with the level reached in the extent of our knowledge. Above all, we should not allow, as was frequently the case in the past, for some ideologues to convince society of their absolute wisdom. In the final account truth and wisdom are not the prerogatives of an individual. They belong to history.

Nonetheless, we must bear in mind that the new thinking does not demand of anyone to abandon his views and convictions. This does not apply to the Marxists alone but to all thinking people. Otherwise, the new thinking will not win over a significant number of supporters. Naturally, the new thinking is also compatible with the Marxist class analysis of history and the class approach to social phenomena. However, references to class orientation and party-mindedness should in no case justify encroachments on universal human interests and values, humanistic ideals and the democratic rights of man. If we define on the basis of universal human positions the fundamental criterion, the purpose of social development and the basic human interest, we shall avoid a

number of errors and will not be excessively concerned with what specific way leads to the temple.

Is there such a temple which we must jointly build or is it already located somewhere and is waiting for us, should mankind either make its way to it in the course of our stressed relations, build a dam to block the swamp of ignorance or else build a highway toward that temple with the help of scientific and technical progress? Generally speaking, this temple is mankind. There is no other temple on earth for mankind other than mankind. The road to it is history. Any attempt at turning history away from its own way has always been very costly. I would particularly like to point this out and reemphasize the tremendous importance which the problem of freedom has for man and mankind.

We must accept that man has and must have freedom. Strictly speaking, freedom means whatever precisely man chooses to be, that which is true and beautiful, which may be good or bad, and no one has the right to encroach on the freedom of man. If any kind of power or ideology assumes full responsibility for the behavior of mankind and monopolizes the right to determine what is goodness, truth and beauty, it becomes historically unjustified and could cause only harm to man. The individual remains an individual and man remains a man as long as he is the free arbiter in his judgments. That is why the future of mankind depends on the extent to which it will be able to preserve its freedom, conscience, judgments, views and ideas.

I.T. Frolov. As to the prospect of mankind, obviously it would make sense, based on the understanding of the current processes, such as internationalization and the development of new features, including political thinking, to concentrate more on the future aspect of global civilization. In particular, it is a question of the subject of our discussions concerning the possibility of achieving some kind of unified, democratic and humane global community in which a variety of forms of ownership will coexist—both public and private—as well as different forms of social relations. However, under one condition: these must be democratic societies, societies in which man is the center of all relations. We must formulate and develop a model of a new global community as a specific objective of the currently developing political thinking and acting, for in developing now social processes in a specific direction and in practically implementing the principles of humanism, we must have a concept of the objectives we are pursuing.

Man as the Objective of History

I.T. Frolov. In considering the problem of establishing new forms of humanism as a reaction to worsened social problems, it would be expedient to recall the important thought expressed by A. Pececi. He linked the question of the new humanism to the problem of man. He believed, perhaps somewhat excessively, that the development of the world takes mankind to the brink of self-destruction and that the only solution was to change

man himself, his morality and awareness, which could bring our salvation. While warmly supporting this idea, I nonetheless would like to emphasize another essential aspect. The Marxists formulated the idea of the new humanism, based on the concepts developed by Marx in his early works and, particularly, in his economic-philosophical manuscripts of 1844. Under contemporary conditions, these works should be reinterpreted, for they express the essence of Marxism as a science of the liberation and development of man and mankind. The economic side of Marxism, the theory of the class struggle and revolution, and anything else which Marx dealt with subsequently, are essentially substantiations of the idea of real humanism and the search for its implementation in practical life. Our task is to understand Marxism precisely as real humanism, and to identify its human content and the new features which fit both the present and the future.

It may seem strange to describe as new a doctrine which was developed more than a century ago. However, society, the features of which were developed on the basis of the Marxist concepts of real humanism, is still a thing of the future. Consequently, the principles of humanism which were formulated at that time are not something which is behind us but ahead of us, something toward which we must aspire. It is above all from this viewpoint that we must consider Marx's interpretation of the Kantian concept to the effect that man is the target of the historical process. It is precisely this fundamental concept that is the essence of the new humanism. Today, in the course of perestroika, and of the renovation of our society, this idea is acquiring, to a certain extent, a practical implementation.

Ye.P. Velikhov. Indeed, we nurture the hope that the 21st century will rescue man from all difficulties and traumas of the 20th century. That is why we discuss so extensively the question of the joint efforts aimed at converting the next century into a century of humanism and all-round well-being. Do we have an accurate concept of the future, and would we be able to plan our actions accordingly? Can science help the people in this matter? This is by no means the full list of the relevant and difficult questions related to the present awareness of reality. For example, would it be possible for science, through extrapolation, as it has frequently done in the past, to define the dynamics of industry and national income, and to determine the level which will be reached by a country in the material, technological and spiritual areas as it enters the 21st century? All such questions are not all that easy.

Consider, for example, recent decades in the course of which the "silent revolution" took place in equipment and technology. It is not only changing our time but will have a significant influence on the next century. However, even the most "educated and democratic science" has a poor idea of its possible consequences which would affect the destinies of man, by simply considering the impact which the tempestuous development of computers and the information industry will have on man.

With the conversion to extensive computerization of many areas of human activities and the development of a widespread system of person computers, an information coup, a leap took place in the developed countries. A new concept has even appeared, that of "the social information revolution." The consequences of this process, however, have still not been profoundly studied.

What does the latest technology contribute to man, and how does it reflect on his sociopsychological condition? How does man enter the computerized world? The only thing that is clear is that without the development of information systems and the shifting of information functions from man to machine, mankind cannot conceive of its future existence. For the time being, however, nor could it assess the consequences of the global development of the information industry. In other words, we are still facing a great secret, the secret of man and, in particular, that of his mind, feelings and potential. In this area we somehow walk around our objective and make no progress toward it. However, I believe that science—living, flexible and seeking—will find an answer, providing that it becomes, and it is already becoming, a "human science."

However, there is yet another essential aspect in the functioning of science today, of the new scientific thinking. Neither people nor society as a whole any longer wish for all scientific problems to be solved strictly by a small circle of specialists, and for the conditions governing their lives to be defined without their participation, by uncontrolled scientific departments and social institutions. This was manifested particularly clearly in the movement against nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. People on different intellectual levels rose and declared that they are unwilling to leave any longer their destinies and the destinies of their children in the hands of scientists and politicians. They want to understand for themselves the problem of life, for they have become truly aware of the fragile nature of the world around them and have already felt that they have the power to hold the future in their own hands.

How efficient is this feeling? Are today our universally acknowledged institutions—scientific research and educational—and the mass information media capable as of now to provide the necessary knowledge so that society could competently, responsibly and sensibly solve the vitally important problems of the development of the production process, science and technology? In itself, this is a major scientific problem.

The development of the democratic process in the area of the interaction between science and society is largely determined by the situation prevailing in the educational system and in the training of specialists in universities. In a world which is tempestuously changing under the pressure of democracy, it must increasingly develop a humanitarian trend. However, our higher training, despite certain positive changes in the country, retains

many so-called "black marks" and "blank spots," something which is intolerable under the conditions of the renovation of socialism. This includes, for example, the way the world's history of science is described, the priorities assigned to discoveries and familiarity with the scientific concepts of contemporary foreign researchers. Society is still losing a great deal due to shortcomings in the teaching system. We must realize that the humanizing of education is impossible without surmounting a basic cultural ignorance on the part of a significant percentage of students and "deaf" pedagogical ignorance displayed by many teachers, which is the result of the narrow specialization in training, arising along the line of the interrelationship between science and pseudo-science and between scientific and superficial-popular literature. Our difficulties are found also in the fact that trainees are frequently subjected to fashionable trends in science and officially acknowledged viewpoints, yielding to the pressure of the authorities. This has been the case in our history and has still not been entirely eliminated.

Humanizing in the area of science and higher education cannot be reduced to the more extensive teaching of purely humanitarian subjects. The civilized person of the 21st century must not only be familiar with history and culture but also have an idea, shall we say, of the revolution in quantum mechanics, the problems of high-temperature superconductivity, electrolysis and thermonuclear synthesis (naturally, within certain limits). For in interpreting the problems of survival and further scientific and technical progress, we cannot rely exclusively on common sense. The latter does not provide an adequate answer to the question of what any given technology can promise from the viewpoint of man and his normal civilized existence and development.

V.P. Zinchenko. The future of science will be largely influenced by the subsidizing of scientific research. The cost of the recent "Phobos" was 272 million rubles, which was our contribution, and 60 million rubles contributed by other countries. Only 5 million rubles have been allocated for the basic research program by the USSR Academy of Sciences on the topic of "Man, Science, Society." The disparity here is quite indicative. Furthermore, your own Institute on Problems of Transmission of Information did not find funds for the study of a "human" problem, such as the development of consciousness. The corresponding funds were given to the institute to develop the "Man, Science, Society" Program.

In this connection, the question I would like to ask you is the following: Do you believe, as vice-president, that in the very near future there will be a reallocation of funds within the Academy of Sciences in favor of the development of the humanities, in the broad meaning of the term? This is because without the development of humanitarian knowledge there will be neither a soul nor spirituality nor, incidentally, any major changes in education.

Ye.P. Velikhov. Unfortunately, the question of priorities has not been discussed so far. We are a country living under the conditions of all kinds of shortages. It was believed in the past that the main thing was to convince the leadership to appropriate funds for a given program and that subsequently the funds would be found. However, such funds are being granted at the expense of other and no less important scientific studies. As to space programs, I am not a supporter of their very extensive development. If they are a corollary of national economic or military programs, this is one thing; when it is a question of the specific and strictly separate development of space research of the universe, we must seriously study the existing proportions. What do we need as far as space is concerned, what is needed on earth and what does man need? In my view, today we must substantially increase our contribution to the study of the earth, the environment in which we act, for by virtue of a number of subjective and objective reasons we have fallen substantially behind global science in such areas of scientific research. We must intensify programs which directly influence the future development of our society, including studies in the areas of the humanities.

Archbishop Kirill. In a telecast on Timofeyev-Resovskiy the idea was voiced that nothing can be higher than science, and that science has an absolute value. Problems of the individual life of the scientist, his happiness, his family and his marriage should be kept separate from his aspirations. He must subordinate himself to serving science, for science alone is the supreme, the main value. I believe that this is the gravest error of our time.

Society commits another error as well. We frequently focus our entire attention to problems of economics and the development of production forces. Open any newspaper or journal. Everywhere, day after day, they discuss problems of economics, production and management. Therefore, economics becomes a self-seeking objective. Let us ask ourselves the question: What is the purpose of the existence of economics and its efficiency? Why do we need science and what is the purpose of culture and art? I even risk to ask: What is the purpose of religion?

In considering the civilization of the future, we must define, above all, what are our objectives, what global problems must be solved and what do we wish to see as the result of our efforts? To me, the final objective is the one which was mentioned by the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians, as being the fullness of life. This means a new creation, beginning with the transformation of the human personality, which includes the entire universe. In my view, this is the final eschatological objective. If we acknowledge that the objective of civilization is the transformation of man and his advancement, we shall develop a proper guideline for social development. Therefore, one of the reasons for which I have accepted the perestroika which is developing in the country is statements indicating concern for the spiritual and moral status of man. The aspiration exists of developing the economy, politics and social life

turned to man. It is important, however, for this development not only to enrich the people materially but also to create conditions for a spiritual-moral cleansing.

How did it happen that we have started to discuss with a feeling of concern future civilization and the existence of a some kind of impasse. The roots of this crisis may be traced to the depths of history. Thus, the idea that truth is one was disrupted at a certain stage of historical development. All of this started during the Renaissance and, subsequently, went through the Reformation, the period of Enlightenment and the industrial revolution in which an egotistical anthropocentrism in the understanding of human civilization was established. The intensification of scientific analysis splintered the integral vision of the world and this oneness was cut into parts. Man was placed in the center of civilization. Along with the development of scientific research methods for the study of nature, a new end objective was shaped: the fact that man must make comprehensive use of nature and take everything from it. Nature was considered a value only to the extent to which it served the human good. It was on the basis of such an anthropocentric approach that our science, economics and social changes, as well as our thinking, began to take shape. In the final account, man indeed began to treat nature and the world around him as his patrimony. The famous slogan of the 1930s to the effect that we cannot expect any kindness from nature but must take its wealth, this being our task, was the result precisely of a certain development of human thinking and society, and of the sociopsychological and philosophical attitude toward the creation which surrounds us.

The main philosophical and conceptual conclusion which we must draw from the approaching ecological crisis and in order to come out of the impasse in which our scientific and technical civilization finds itself is the following: the new man, who built his relationship with nature and with the universe on different basic humanistic principles is the value. Otherwise, we shall simply pollute not only our planet but, perhaps, even space around us.

Ye.P. Velikhov. The impression is created that you are not interpreting anthropocentrism quite traditionally, by emphasizing the danger of pursuing it in the contemporary world. Perhaps, however, we merely took a small step backward or sideways in our practical attitude toward nature and, still by following this principle, we should reach a more fundamental understanding of the interconnection between man and nature. There is something lofty in the life of every person. To Timofeyev-Resovskiy it was science; to Saint-Exhupery it was flying; to Mother Teresa, it is charity. If we start pitting one value against another, we shall not find a definitive answer to the question of how are we to survive.

A.A. Galkin. Initially it seemed to me that the bishop puts man at the center of life and, on this basis, accepts the restructuring of Soviet society. This was followed by

his philippic against anthropocentrism, which is conceived as the opposite of the initial thesis. Apparently, it is a question of, nonetheless, making man the center of life providing, however, that he will not abuse this.

Archbishop Kirill. The concept of "anthropocentrism" does not cover my entire concern in the use of this definition. If man puts himself as the center of the world for the sake of exploiting reality surrounding him and achieving his own egotistical objectives, he cannot fail to trigger our concern. This was written, among others, by Berdyayev, who emphasized that today's human activities have their spiritual base. It is precisely spiritual development, particularly in the 20th century, that triggered the egotistical, the anthropocentric attitude of man toward the world.

In speaking of the objectives which society and man set themselves, we must distinguish between end and intermediary goals, and absolute and relative ones. In this context science and economics are relative values. If we consider them as absolute we lose all perspective in development. It is a good thing when the specific individual puts the interest of science above egotistical and material interests. It is a different thing when the means for achieving objectives such as science, economics and art are identified with the supreme objectives and become the self-seeking objective of man and society.

D.A. Granin. We must take into consideration the dangerously increasing self-opinion of man, which has largely contributed to the ecological crisis. Man is being considered so far as the crown of creation, the king of nature. This self-esteem is not declining but growing as a result of the power of machinery and the veneration of reason.

Actually, consider a textbook in biology. What does its content remind you of? It indicates enthusiasm expressed for the human mind which was able to penetrate the secrets of the cell. There is absolutely no admiration of the harmony and beauty of nature and the inexhaustible nature of its secrets compared to which the achievements of the mind are nothing. In other words, since early age man is raised in the spirit of an awareness of his power and exclusivity. He does not consider himself part of nature. There is something that is more pagan than Christian in this.

Man is part of nature. It is precisely such an approach and concept that must be the foundations for humanism.

Or else, let us consider ecological problems. The crises which appear in this area are considered from the viewpoint of the threat to our existence and not of our love for nature. These are two different approaches. What right do we have to think this way? The only right we have is that of might and nothing else. That is why the ecologists have assumed a peculiar defensive position. Here, however, we need a different feeling, a different way of thinking, i.e., love for anything that lives, a feeling of reverence toward it and realizing that man is by no means the best part of nature.

N.N. Moiseyev. Indeed, anthropocentrism, as we understand it, appeared during the Renaissance and the subsequent development of the natural sciences. This principle seemed to have led man outside the framework of nature, turning him into a rational observer. Furthermore, it put even human nature on the service of society.

However, as V. Odoyevskiy said, the rationalism related to this process took us to the gates of truth but did not let us open them. This, precisely, is the difficulty of the old anthropocentrism. We needed the synthesis of natural scientific with philosophical thinking, with humanistic thinking. Such a synthesis was achieved in the second half of the 19th century in Russian culture. It led to the development of an entirely new concept. The concept of anthropocentrism was given a different content which could be acceptable by us and used as a foundation for a consensus.

Its essence is that man, as was noted by Sechenov and Mendeleev, and after them by Vernadskiy, is not an outside observer or an impartial element of nature. Although he is part of nature, he is also an active and interested agent, he is a component of nature the role of which is increasing continuously. However, since man is the basic element of the constituent forces, he cannot develop and preserve himself without the preservation and development of nature. This precisely is a natural process which we describe as universal evolutionism.

I.T. Frolov. We must define the concept of "anthropocentrism" more accurately, for otherwise we would indeed find ourselves in a contradiction. We speak of the need for a human dimension of science and the fact that European science has essentially relied on the principle of reduction and that it was with the help of reduction that it achieved tremendous accomplishments. Now it is important to restore the overall approach and view and give a human dimension to everything, including science. In particular, in this connection we separate ourselves from evaluations and understanding of Marxism which are reduced to ascribing to it a technocratic nature, which excludes human evaluations and humanistic principles.

Furthermore, even before the new political thinking began to take shape, Soviet philosophers formulated a principle according to which humanistic values are superior to those which can be obtained through purely scientific knowledge. It is on this basis that they developed an approach to genetic, biomedical and gene-engineering studies, emphasizing the need for some prohibitions, for the threat appeared to man and, therefore, the problem appeared of formulating certain principles of research or even possibly laws which must guide scientists. In the 1970s, for the first time the scientists suggested a moratorium on some types of gene-engineering research. The question now has been raised of developing an ethical code for science. This has already been accomplished in some countries such as Poland, where an Ethical Code for Scientific Workers has already been drafted.

This question is being discussed by religious personalities as well. Under the guidance of the World Council of Churches, by the end of the 1960s noted scientists and major specialists classified what was admissible and inadmissible for moral and ethical considerations in human experimentation.

Therefore, there not only is a mechanism for social control over scientific research taking shape; a mechanism for self-control and self-regulation of science is also being established, based on the ethical, the humanistic values of the new thinking.

The Spiritual-Moral Potential of Man

Archbishop Kirill. Naturally, it would be a most profound error to believe that an attitude toward nature, of an exploiting and egotistical kind, is triggered exclusively by scientific methods for the study of the world. Naturally, anthropocentrism did not come from the discoveries made by Newton, Galileo, Copernicus, Descartes and Bacon. It is a question of a certain spiritual foundation for human activities, which largely determines his vision of the world and of surrounding reality. It is this spiritual world, this general feeling of man and society, which prevailed during the time of the Renaissance, that had the type of influence which, in my view, led scientific discoveries to have a one-sided anthropocentric development. It penetrated the area of the humanities, thinking and philosophy.

The spiritual forces of man are the basis for his historical activities. Hence the greatest possible priority should be given to the spiritual life of man. In discussions on this subject I am concerned by the false interpretation of the concept of spirituality. It is essentially identified with two levels of human development—rational and esthetic. The simple conclusion which can be drawn on this subject from listening to television and radio is the following: when you go to the theater you live a spiritual life; if you do not, you live some kind of different life. If you go to exhibitions and museums you are spiritually developed; if you are not interested in art, you are spiritually immature. This, naturally, is a simplistic view. We forget the greatest possible spirituality of our simple people, of the Russian peasants. This spirituality largely fructified the works of outstanding Russian writers and cultural personalities of the 19th century, who sought and found superior values in people's spirituality.

To me spirituality does not mean at all a rational level of life and not at all an esthetic living standard. One can be a scientist and a monster, or else a painter and a criminal. The question of the possibility of combining creativity with moral harm was raised by Pushkin himself. Today, in my view, it has been historically solved clearly: such things can go together.

The problem, in the final account, is that spirituality means morality, it means an ethical level of life. If a person is moral he shapes his inner life, its conditions and his behavior in accordance with the moral law (by

this I mean absolute ethical principles), which makes him spiritual. Spirituality means the embodiment of the moral law of life in the human personality.

A variety of views on the origin of morality exist. I single out the ontological source. As long as we do not acknowledge the existence of an objective moral law which is inherent in human nature, what will happen is what Rozanov cautioned us against. In his words, the freedom of man is terrible where there is no acceptance of a supreme moral law and there is no responsibility other than the one which people may invent today. What kind of human society could there be a question of if one day the people are guided by one specific concept of good and evil and the next day, by another? If morality is based on the principle of relativity, neither our society nor human civilization has any chance of survival. If we proceed from the stipulation according to which morality is based on an objective law and moral values are absolute, we have a future and we can agree with one another.

We must achieve a moral consensus on the basis of universal human values. I accept that on the level of a theoretical discussion this is possible. It is possible but, alas, insufficient. A theoretical consensus must be converted into specific political actions and, above all, instilled in the awareness of society through the educational system. We must have some kind of common "moral catechism," and teach on its basis children, starting with kindergarten, the elementary ethical standards. Furthermore, a moral catechism, as the sum total of moral ideals and principles, based on universal human standards of morality, should guide the entire humanistic trend of our education process.

I have always been attracted by the idea of the Hippocratic Oath. Why is it that only doctors are asked to take this oath? Perhaps, based on a moral catechism and a moral consensus, such an oath should be asked of any secondary school, technical college or VUZ graduate? It would be expedient for every professional, as he enters life, to swear to his own conscience, society and people and God, if he is a believer, that his behavior and professional activities will not conflict with the humane, with the moral principles.

Naturally, any oath can be violated. On the other hand, however, beautiful considerations on the need to be moral and honest and not to do evil change absolutely nothing in society. It is only when we combine global moral concepts with an educational system, and when we support our moral consensus with real policies in education that we shall be able to shape the new man, the new morality, which would motivate social, political and professional-transforming activities of the people of the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.

I.T. Frolov. Is there not a contradiction in the concept of the existence of some kind of objective and absolutely firm standard of morality inherent in human nature? In that case, are they to be found in genetic, in physical

human features and parameters or is this something different, related to certain social factors which mold the personality? Naturally, in the area of morality relativism is inadmissible. We must proceed in our activities from certain absolute moral values. This thought was perfectly expressed by Albert Schweitzer. However, is there something that is totally unchanged, nonhistoric in morality, rigidly embedded in the very nature of man? Does not man change in history?

Archbishop Kirill. From the viewpoint of Christian theology and the religious understanding of the world, the moral law has been instilled by God in human nature and is realized through the conscience. Conscience is a variable concept which is subjected to the influence of the surrounding world. Therefore, the requirements of the written law are necessary, with which man could check his conscience. However, from the Christian viewpoint morality, which has been instilled by the Creator is an objective given.

V.P. Zinchenko. As to the formulation of a certain foundation for consensus, let me point out the following. In our philosophical literature we can already see a line related to the study of the ontological aspect of phenomena, processes and events. It presumes singling out as a minimum a level of reflectory action and a level of ordinary life. In the latter we find a certain sense—practical, moral and ethical. In this type of understanding one can speak of ontologized ethics, and ontologized roots of the mental component of the mind. The fact that Marxists have a different idea of the adaptation of consciousness is a different matter. Unquestionably, however, consciousness has an ontological component although it, naturally, as culture, is a historical category. This precisely could be the foundation for the development of a consensus.

E.A. Arab-Ogly. In this connection, it would be expedient to emphasize that Marxists firmly reject moral relativism. The stability of the moral foundations of man is based on the thousands of years of the development of man as a biosocial being. Hence any arbitrary interference in genetic human heredity and in the cultural legacy of mankind, including his moral foundations, is inadmissible. It is only in this sense are there some permanent and invariable values.

N.N. Moiseyev. Earlier I discussed the idea of universal evolutionism. Linked to this idea are many concepts on the development of mankind, including that of the shaping of morality. It is through the lens of this approach that morality appears naturally. Without it, in a certain sense, man could not become man. For example, without the appearance of the moral principle of "thou shalt not kill" it would have been impossible to prevent the intraspecies selection and conversion to the track of social development. The same prevails today, for as long as a true morality imperative has not been established, we cannot seriously speak of, let us say, the ability of man to surmount the ecological crisis.

I.T. Frolov. P. Kropotkin himself tried to interpret the aspect of social development which you pointed out, in his two-volume "*Ethics*." Today many theories of the evolutionary-genetic mechanism of the origin of morality and superior ethical principles, including that of altruism, are based on the scientific views which were formulated in that work and developed subsequently. In particular, this is the origin of the popular Western concept of sociobiology, although M. Ruse, its noted representative, does not refer to the work of Kropotkin or, actually, F. Dobzhanskiy's book.

In our country such approaches by scientists were energetically discussed at the start of the 1970s. The articles by Astaurov and Efromson in the journal NOVYY MIR marked the peak of the discussion which developed at that time. Today, unfortunately, we are not only unable to rise the level of philosophical interpretation of problems which was reached in the past but simply even to resume and productively continue their discussion.

D.A. Granin. In considering the problem of moral consensus in terms of the future, in my view we should not ignore the difficult period of our history and the features of the present. Starting with Ancient Greece, mankind has always created various types of utopian projects, models and systems for the future desired society and civilization. Some principal idea of life has invariably been a structural part of them. Today we have abandoned utopias and have become more rational. At the same time, however, we have lost the very idea of life which would justify the self-sacrifice of a person and define his moral aspirations. It is as though the general idea has exhausted itself and triggered disappointments, doubts, and so on. That is why the spiritual aspect of life of many people is not saturated with a moral content. Therefore, the following question arises: Is today such an idea necessary at all and can society survive without it? Furthermore, could we think of some kind of universal idea which will bring together, which would combine all of the ideas of life? In my view, this is possible. It is the idea of the humane, of the spiritually rich man, the idea "for" man and society and not the idea "against" something or someone.

Where do we find the possibility for the implementation of such an idea under the conditions of our society? Could it be in that universal conciliation of which Dostoyevskiy spoke, or perhaps by bringing people together in a certain way? But what will it be, if we remember that the past few generations of Soviet people learned to read by mastering the slogan which calls for the unification of the proletariat? Obviously, a new unification must be adopted, for the inadequacy of the old one is clear today to all. There are not only "proletarians," or anything that specific to unite people. All people must unite on the basis of something, something which is somewhat different, which is new and universal.

A moral condition of society, characterized by a position of perimeter defense, protecting it from all possible threat, does not contribute to the development of the

human spirit or to humanistic and moral ideas. It is no accident that the indicator of this condition is the lack of humanistic heroes. Today we live essentially in a deheroized society. Whereas in the past, in the old Russia, there were saints, martyrs of their faith, and heroes of morality such as Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoyevskiy and Przhevalskiy, in our time we replace them with heroes who were record-setters, shock workers in mastering and transforming nature, heroes-conquerors of all possible peaks, and so on and so forth. But where are the heroes of the spirit, of moral life, the heroes of love in the broad meaning of the term, without whom it would be difficult to do not only for young people but also the entire society, heroes such as Mother Teresa, Schweitzer, and others? Was it by accident that we were deprived of them, or was it deliberate? What is this: Is it a temporary condition or the logical consequence of our development? Furthermore, how can we avoid a damaging moral development without standards, the development of which was the concern of religion?

It seems to me that the problem of the idea of life, of a truly popular idea and not simply a philosophical-abstract one but an idea which would enhance and ennoble man, which would enable him to interpret his decisions, joys and sorrows and his achievements not only within the narrow professional framework, should exist and be adopted as the foundation of society. Without it life cannot acquire any moral content. Charity, simple sympathy or compassion are the starting point in the process of the development of man and a major component of his guidelines in this motion: Will he stand still, go forward or go backward?

Archbishop Kirill. You have touched upon a very important topic. Yes, the idea of the moral character, of that same character who bases his activities on universal human principles, has vanished from our social awareness. It has disappeared. The hero of mass culture is motivated by an entirely different morality, the morality of the 1920s and 1930s. Naturally, this hero is not eternal. He dies together with his time. It is impossible today to appeal to the old examples and to the old authorities. It is the character who has grown up on the foundations of internal moral values that can capture the human soul. However, such characters were not part of our "critical" standards. Such heroes were imagined by us as the bearers of the so-called petit bourgeois morality. Yet we justifiably had a very scornful attitude toward it.

However, who is the main character in those worn out novels on industrial topics? These characters are strong, manly, uncompromising and in some respects even cruel. They are capable of defending their ideas in arguments and in their actions, always to the end. They are not like Dostoyevskiy's Prince Myshkin. There is no place for such a character and there should not be any place for him in society, although he may be the bearer of eternal intransigent moral values. It was this character that developed as a positive hero in our literature, imbuing different values within himself. However, any

truly moral literature is not a weathercock which today depicts one side of life and one road and tomorrow, another. That is precisely why taking literary creativity on the path of discovery of eternal moral truths and permanent values of mankind is an exceptionally important matter.

I.T. Frolov. We could hardly assess the history of our literature as one of consistent adaptability. It is hardly possible for the hero it has depicted not to bear any positive moral charge. The hero of Soviet literature such as, for example, in Sholokhov's "*And Quiet Flows the Don*," which is a profoundly humanistic novel, is a seeking hero, he is multidimensional but active, asserting something in life or, as is sometimes said, a Faustian man. In general, he has not exhausted this quality of his. Therefore, the assertion of universal human values in our life does not lead us necessarily to the unconditional recognition of Prince Myshkin as the hero, although, naturally, certain elements in the literary image could be conceived as positive. Nonetheless, he is not the hero of our future.

The point is that a turn in social consciousness and in the assertion of universal human values in all areas of life of Soviet society was caused not by people like Prince Myshkin. The turn was made by active individuals who were born during the most difficult years of the cult of Stalin's personality and the so-called period of stagnation, people who endured and who won in the great battle of the Great Patriotic War. This also includes people who struggled in such a "peaceful area" as philosophy. All of these are strong personalities who frequently suffered defeats but who endured and who consistently restored the spiritual values, universal human traditions and humanistic thinking. Their struggle is, in general, something worthy not simply of amazement but of admiration. That is precisely why our character is an active person who asserts through his actions something positive and not the result of some kind of ivory tower thoughts or moralizing.

Many honest writers, such as Mozhayev, Abramov, Tendryakov, Rasputin and Astafyev, who were not passive observers, have asserted the character of such a person in the social consciousness and in the history of culture. In different times and differently, we find in Soviet literature the conflicting facets of the process of shaping the moral man, reflecting his own age and the real historical change of events. Obviously, we must not adopt a nihilistic attitude toward the searches which took place in literary creativity.

Archbishop Kirill. Naturally, you are right. Despite historical happenings, the traditions of Russian classical literature were not entirely destroyed. They were present in Soviet literature even during its most difficult years. Nonetheless, a significant share of responsibility for the shaping of a nonspiritual life is borne by this literature as well. In many works one does not come across concepts such as compassion and conciliation, not as features of being downtrodden and not as weakness, but as an inner

strength, for terms such as "no surrender" or, in the higher meaning of the words "turning the other cheek" constitutes a tremendous inner strength and not human weakness. It is much simpler to strike at something we do not like. It is much more difficult to surmount evil through love, conciliation and inner strength. I am deeply convinced that there is no other way of struggling against evil other than, naturally, extreme cases in which one must simply throw back the aggressors.

I.T. Frolov. Possibly, what you just said contains some kind of metaphorical truth expressed in an abstract form. However, we are not talking about this. Consider the present situation, when we are engaged in the restructuring of the entire social body. Does this presume any kind of conciliation? The path from the old to the new is one of real struggle. There is a real struggle that is being waged and not abstract debates. Therefore, will the one who "turns the other cheek" prevail in this case? He will not. We emphasize the need, which is today an extremely urgent one, of combining spiritual strength (Prince Myshkin was strong in terms of moral potential) with activity, with direct personal participation in social affairs, including activeness in the struggle for perestroika and for the ideas of humanism, for past experience has taught us that one cannot yield and surrender, that one must engage in consistent and stubborn struggle for change, not limiting oneself merely to moral preachings and passive expectation, waiting for the time when everyone will accept the truth of life.

N.N. Moiseyev. Not only literature is involved in the assertion of moral standards and humanistic principles in the life of society. In this case science and education, which must act as a single mechanism in preparing man for accepting the achievements of culture, play a tremendous role. Under the existing system, for the time being they act as two separate departments with a strict narrow understanding of their tasks. However, we are not all that rich to have two complete sets of scientists, one of them dealing with problems of development of "pure" science and strictly professional research, and studying the problem of the training of cadres, their scientific outlook and cultural-moral training and specialized education. One poorly exists without the other and we must create a new mechanism for the cooperation between these two branches of the scientific process (such as a university and a scientific research institute) and, on its basis, shape a common program for perfecting education, which would include problems of the moral upbringing of the future specialists and the development of their creative humanitarian thinking. We could use the rich experience of the Russian scientific intelligentsia and major Soviet scientists, such as Vavilov, Vernadskiy, Losev, Kapitsa and others. We frequently rated only the scientific results of their activities and forgot their tremendous contribution to the morality of science and the establishment of a cultural-moral environment for the creative intellect. It was precisely they who maintained the permanent flame of humanism and preserved the possibility of turning it into a raging fire.

V.P. Zinchenko. Today science is not only poorly related to education but is also alienated from culture. It has even stopped being conceived of as an inseparable part of culture. To the extent to which we shall organize the lost connections between them and promote their new unity, we shall also restore in society a true spirituality. This is the only way, for an engineer, any specialist without knowledge of the humanities is unable to have an integral perception, which is so greatly needed today, of nature, society and reality surrounding him and of the very object of his activities. Otherwise the overall view is replaced by a viewpoint with negative consequences. Furthermore, humanitarian knowledge and general culture provide the opportunity, in addition to having an integral perception of the world and its values, to develop a profoundly moral perception. It reduces the number of subjective components of all possible industrial accidents, technological tragedies and catastrophes.

D.A. Granin. We have a tremendous number of technical VUZs in which, as though with an impersonal conveyer belt, we stamp out a technical intelligentsia which has filled up the entire country. The flood of mass training is difficult to stop. Here it is not a question of culture; one is asked only to master his specialized curriculum.

I have had the opportunity to visit many foreign universities specializing in a variety of subjects. In those universities, I was amazed by the following circumstance in the area of the humanizing of specialized training: in virtually all universities the tables of organization called for a resident poet, painter or a worker in culture. They have no specific obligations. Their task is to live in a university, in a student environment and to create a certain cultural background and thus justify their salaries. The very presence of a poet among future physicists, chemists, mathematicians, and so on, has a beneficial influence on the development of a humanistic scientific awareness and provides something morally quite important in shaping the overall standards of natural scientists and technicians. Clearly, in our country as well this could become an intrinsic component in the humanization of higher education.

The humanizing of education should affect the content of textbooks as well. Science is international. For example, there is no such thing as national biology. There is only one biology as there is only one nature. It is one also in the sense that it is closely interwoven with the other sciences. In this connection, a noteworthy idea is that of writing some general textbooks which would reflect the development of global overall scientific thinking. For example, there is only one history of the Ancient Orient, Ancient Greece, and latter periods. For some reason, however, we have separated such histories, and the textbooks more divide the people that make them aware of their close interdependence and common grounds. Our textbooks must contain the idea of the unification of the people, the idea of interconnection among the various branches of knowledge.

I.T. Frolov. Indeed, our knowledge of civilization and culture are developing today as isolated fragments. The huge array of new scattered knowledge is poured on the individual and creates some kind of fragmented views. In some cases even scientists, like the tower of Babel, speak in different languages. Today this is perhaps one of the greatest threats to contemporary civilization. We do not understand each other. Occasionally, we do not even wish to do so. How can there be a question of solving global problems in such a situation? Therefore, we should welcome the UNESCO idea of developing some kind of code of knowledge and make it universal and, on its basis, promote an "innovative training." It should be based not on the study of the laws which have been derived and their application in the various areas but the development of a mind ready to accept the new and on teaching methods for knowledge.

The Turns of Progress

A.G. Vishnevskiy. In speaking of man and civilization on the threshold of the new millennium, we should show greater concern in our discussions, for the situation is extremely complex. Many people entered the 20th century with great optimism. This century is now ending, and we have far fewer reasons to be optimistic.

The pressure on our planet, applied by growing mankind, is increasing steadily. It has put on a new plateau the question of assessing progress and its future. The question of where we are going and the direction along which civilization is advancing and whether its way does not lead to an impasse, it seems to me, should be raised in its entire magnitude, although for the time being it is exceptionally difficult to provide a definite answer to this question.

Could the terrible pressure put on nature and its resources, destroying all systems of life support available on our planet be called progress? On the other hand, could we abandon technical progress and influencing nature in general when both have freed man from his dependency on them? People have made a tremendous leap in the past 100 years in the struggle against disease, death, etc. The life span has increased from 35 to 70 years. Every person has benefited. All this, put together, is it progress or regress?

At the turn of our century there were slightly more than 1.5 billion people on earth. There are now 5 billion and by the middle of the 21st century there will be no less than 10 billion people on earth. The so-called benefits of civilization are being used fully today by no more than 20 percent of mankind. However, the remaining 4 billion would like to use them as well. In order for them to be able to satisfy this wish to some extent we must develop material production, consume resources, use equipment, energy, chemistry, and so on, and so forth. This must be largely based on traditional methods, for no one is willing to wait. Furthermore, it is immoral on the part of those who have everything to prove that one could live, for example, without running water, electricity, sewage

lines or paved roads. Therefore, whether we wish it or not, the destructive influence on nature will continue.

Some of the new humanistic thinking must mandatorily include absolute honesty in looking at the gravity of problems. In my view, in this case the biblical appeal to "go and see" must be heard by every man of science, whether he deals with global or national problems. Furthermore, moral appeals alone will not do. We must eliminate a great deal of what is immoral. The task is converting from the old to the new morality and combining the existence of poverty with wealth in the consumption of the goods of civilization and develop a human attitude toward nature and man.

Archbishop Kirill. We are able to describe quite clearly the nature of scientific and technical progress. Even taking ecological costs into consideration we could find the right criteria. How to define the moral, the spiritual progress of mankind? In my view, historically it is simply impossible to prove its presence. For example, after the 19th century, which was brilliant in many respects, and on the spiritual basis of which the people were hoping for a splendid 20th century, there was the "blossoming" of fascism, the Stalinist repressions, the explosion of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The expectations were not justified. In other words, we would hardly be able historically to substantiate any spiritual progress achieved by mankind.

There is both a great temptation and great danger of faith in the inevitability of progress. The age of Enlightenment and the industrial revolution provided a rather primitive model of an even progress in the dynamics of society. On this basis it is still being said that nothing terrible is occurring in ecology, for science will develop, reach a new level and solve the critical problems. There is nothing terrible about overpopulation on the planet. We shall develop the oceans and outer space, we shall eat algae, or something else. We forget, however, that the 20th century has already destroyed the old model. It proved that faith in the possibility of solving all problems strictly with the help of scientific and technical progress is naive. An even advance forward does not exist. Furthermore, to believe in it is not simply difficult but also dangerous.

In my view, however, there is an area in which we could formulate more definite opinions and detect some sort of movement: it is individual progress. It is precisely to this aspect of the problem, the person dimension that we should pay particular attention in formulating the concept of "progress." Otherwise we lose all guidelines in life.

A.G. Vishnevskiy. I support the appeal to morality, to a moral attitude toward life and toward one's own beauty and vocation. Nonetheless, how can we combine the practical solution of the most pressing world problems with progress toward a new (or the old!) morality, how to combine a high spiritual thrust with a justified desire for a breakthrough in material well-being felt by billions of

people? A movement toward the new should not be considered simply as a transition from worse to better in everything. Nonetheless, it is highly expedient in general to abandon our judgmental understanding of progress outside the framework of morality or one or another attitude toward social changes from the viewpoint of the changed status of the individual in society. In my view, modern man as a whole nonetheless is becoming freer than were the people of previous generations and I see in this a certain progress.

I.T. Frolov. Today the very understanding of progress is changing drastically. Whereas in the past we related to it essentially the intensive development of production forces and technology, improvements in the class structure and planned management of society, today the emphasis is put on processes directly affecting the development of the individual and his capabilities and potential. Progress and its criteria cannot be defined today without answering the question of whether the situation of man becomes better or worse as a result of any given social and scientific and technical development. The measure of progress is the possibility of realizing the essential forces of man and, therefore, the level of his freedom, moral advancement and personal development, and the progress of society on the path of reason and humanism.

Naturally, straightforward progress in its "pure aspect" did not exist in the 19th and will not exist in the 21st century. Progress is accompanied by certain deformations and even regress in some areas. In the same way that life and death are interconnected, so is progress in its universal value and specific applications, be it inanimate nature or society and mankind, becomes indivisible, to a certain extent, from regress. Taking this situation into consideration, we must find a more precise definition for progress. It must be consistent with the contemporary stage of development of mankind and include universal human criteria and values.

A.A. Galkin. We have characterized progress essentially in its moral aspect. Clearly, we should also consider the problem on its sociopolitical level as well. Here again a number of questions, by no means academic, arise. Is there social progress in general as a form of development of society? Can we predict, albeit in general features, the ways and means of its advance? Do we have the possibility, through purposeful actions, to shape, bring closer, or change social progress? A person raised on the values of the Renaissance and Enlightenment will answer these questions, in the final account, in the positive.

Nonetheless, we must stop and consider the reason for which this problem arises, again and again, as a topic of debate. This is taking place under circumstances in which apparently the entire existing system for developing and shaping a scientific outlook is aimed at developing a corresponding attitude and approach on the part of the researcher to the development of a theoretical and methodological foundation for practical action. Clearly, the entire matter is that in terms of

specific policy, a great deal of errors and even criminal actions affecting man were committed. This circumstance, precisely leads to pessimistic conclusions.

Yet, in considering this problem, one reaches the conclusion that so far we have been analyzing on a rather normative basis the factors and conditions and mechanisms for the evolution of social progress. We based the development of society primarily on something which is consistent with our views on the future, as we wish it to be, ignoring the actual events taking place. For example, on the level of the general theory of historical materialism, we emphasized the contradictoriness between the history of society and social progress; in our specific consideration of real social phenomena we tore the living fabric of reality.

In our concept we legitimately raise the question of the unity of the world and the commonality of human destiny as well as the increased internationalization of various areas of social life (economic, political, culture) and the growing aspiration toward a single world, the creation of a single universal human organism. However, little attention is being paid to the features of the present situation, which are that progress toward universality is triggering continuing and varied opposition. Furthermore, the stronger the movement toward universality and internationalization becomes, the greater the opposition becomes. This is not simply a treacherous conspiracy on the part of some reactionary forces, as some guardians of progress claim, who believe in demonic effect on history and social relations and who try, if something goes astray, mandatorily to find a "terrible" enemy who, allegedly, is the destructive reason. No, this is a natural objective process and a comprehensive reaction which is manifested in the aspiration to separate oneself from the world with a view to self-preservation and to ensuring one's independence. Naturally, in this case the community which tries to isolate itself loses much more than it gains. However, the awareness of this fact is not immediate.

If we remain on the positions of a normative approach to the social process we will be unable to see the real contradictions which we shall have to encounter in the future. Consider the problem of national relations. Currently the growth of national conflicts in our society is justifiably related to the unsolved social problems. All of this is true. However, something else should be taken into consideration as well: the aggravation of national feelings and national opposition to internationalization is a global phenomenon which is inherent today in all societies. In particular, it is related to the qualitatively new movement of huge human masses, of various national streams, caused by the contemporary shifting of production forces.

There is a movement of the people not only among individual countries but within the countries themselves. Industrial centers are shifting. As a result, areas of difficulty and areas of prosperity develop, which inevitably affects the destinies of the people, for this changes

the structure of population employment and the professional and skill levels of workers as well as working and living conditions. In some areas people remain unemployed while elsewhere there will be an acute shortage of manpower. People are taken out of their customary life style activities. Furthermore, the painful perception of such changes is nurtured by the threat of a growing ecological overstress in individual territories. All of this triggers feelings of anti-industrialism and national egoism and becomes a major hindrance obstructing both the development of our country and of the human community as a whole.

D.I. Valentey. In my view, we are making an error by considering problems of civilization through the eyes of the Europeans and by discussing mankind only from the European viewpoint. It is precisely this that leads, in particular, to the concept of big and small, civilized and underdeveloped nations and cultures. We cannot satisfactorily explain such factors, particularly if we are discussing the interests of nations or the priority of some "small" or "large" ethnic groups within the framework of a single country.

The CPSU Program stipulates the need to look for a specific international mechanism which would make it possible to find an optimal correlation among national and state interests, on the one hand, and human interests, on the other. However, national and state interests, even as related to human interests, are different things. Recent events in the country have convincingly proved that they frequently and largely do not coincide with each other. Consequently, we must correct our views and consider this circumstance in the course of our practical activities. We must proceed from the fact that this problem is by no means new, as we look at the history of our multinational state. In our current searches it would be useful to look at previous experience and pay attention to the works of scientists, public figures and men of culture during the pre-October period in the country's development. Naturally, in no case should social, national and demographic problems (the latter in particular) be considered separately, outside of their interconnections and even outside the context of changes in the religious awareness occurring in different parts of the country.

E.A. Arab-Ogly. In interpreting the prospects of future development of man and mankind, we cannot ignore the concept expressed by the Marxist-Leninist classics to the effect that the purpose of socialism is, in particular, the elimination of both the breakup of the global community into small separate states as well as any separation of nations and not only a rapprochement among nations but their merger as well. This was no random statement made by the founders of Marxist philosophical tradition. It is part of their overall concept of the historical process.

We are forced to consider once again this clearly stipulated Marxist concept because nationalism and the national movement have become a powerful force which must be taken into consideration in the 20th century and

which cannot be ignored in the 21st. The need for us to turn once again to its methodological content is caused essentially by the threat of a new vulgarizing of this concept under the conditions of a developing qualitatively peculiar humanistic thinking today. So far the concept of the merger of nations as a process of disappearance of the nations themselves and the transformation of mankind into something averaged, in which all people will essentially be members of some kind of single ethnos, speak in a single language throughout the earth and have something similar in their appearance, something in the nature of a "crossbreed," a concept which prevailed in the past has not disappeared.

Today we can confidently say that this will not happen in the foreseeable future. In general, it is very unlikely. Consequently, this is not only a utopian idea for the next century but also not a true ideal to be aspired to by all mankind in the future.

Naturally, a process of the economic, social and cultural integration of mankind is taking place. It is as though it is blending within a single feature which expresses the strengthening of the commonality of human destinies and the shaping of the elements of a spiritual community and the creation of a unified civilization. However, with all this there remains the variety, the uniqueness of closely interrelated nations which cannot exist without each other. In other words, the nation remains in a condition which does not reject the unity of mankind. The development of nations and of mankind are not different and mutually exclusive processes but, conversely, movements which reinforce each other. In my view, it is precisely this that we must emphasize both in our abstract considerations and our practical actions.

There is, however, yet another restraining factor blocking the merger among nations: the multiplicity of languages. The establishment of a single language by restricting and suppressing the national languages with a view to achieving a better mutual understanding among people would entail tremendous losses. A single language cannot embody the entire variety of the wealth of national languages in a multidimensional reflection of reality. Losses are inevitable. Such a language would not pass on to the new generations, in a unified fashion, the variety of cultural legacies of mankind resulting from the activities of numerous nations which have experienced a unique way of development over the millennia.

Therefore, once again we must reinterpret some of the basic Marxist concepts. We must not simply delete them but somehow shift them from a position where they could be perceived in a vulgar or utopian way to the rank of concepts which are realistic and scientific in terms of the new conditions and the new thinking.

V.A. Lektorskiy. Probably it would be impossible to conceive of the domestic situation which worries us and the ways to resolve it and our future progress without taking into consideration the processes which are taking place in the world at large, for global problems and

problems of national relations and of man with his spiritual development, do not face our country alone but mankind as a single human community. Obviously, such problems cannot be solved fully without making them part of a broader context of pressing problems the roots of which go into the past, as well as problems which could be considered part of the new technology and technological civilization as a whole.

These are fundamental, philosophical problems. For example, what is progress, what is its price, what is mankind, what is technological civilization, what are its possibilities and limits of development, and what is the nature of the new thinking? These are indeed no simple questions and although something, or perhaps even a great deal, has already been accomplished in their interpretation, we find ourselves at the initial stage of understanding them, not to mention the fact that a great deal more should be done for scientific knowledge to become familiar to the broad masses. Otherwise we shall not have a solution to the complex contradictions in the life of our society or, perhaps, even of mankind as a whole.

This discussion has led us to yet another important conclusion. In considering the nature of human civilization in the 3rd millennium, it is entirely insufficient to try to structure a model through simple extrapolation of what was and is. Straight extrapolation is impossible. We must not simply project that which is but eliminate things which we find unsuitable. That is why we spoke not so much of the future than of the present. If there is nothing new in the present, if we do not solve today's problems there will be no 3rd millennium in the development of mankind.

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A Name on the Map; Topical Interview

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[Interview conducted by O. Petrunko]

[Text] Problems related to contemporary toponymics have already been raised by our readers (see KOMMUNIST No 14, 1987). As in the past, however, frequent letters on this topic are found in the editorial mailbag. The question of naming and renaming, as we recall, was raised also in the course of the electoral campaign and was mentioned in the electoral programs of many candidates for people's deputies. The people are concerned with the inconsistency and halfway nature of the decisions which are made and the absence of clear criteria and of an efficient mechanism for the preservation, restoration or renaming of geographic sites.

Taking into consideration the widespread public interest in this matter, including that shown by our readers, the editors asked Professor Vladimir Petrovich Neroznak, chairman of the Toponymics Council of the Soviet Cultural Fund, doctor of philosophical sciences and

professor, and Mikhail Viktorovich Gorbanevskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences, his deputy, and member of the commission on naming Moscow streets, of the Moscow City Executive Committee, to answer a number of questions.

[Editors] Vladimir Mayakovskiy was born in... Mayakovskiy City. Where was Sergey Mironovich Kirov born: in Kirovo, in Kirovabad or in any other of the 150 settlements named after him? Where did disappear the city of Tilzit, which was founded by the Teutons in the year 1288, where Aleksander I and Napoleon signed their famous peace treaty? It appears that it is reliably concealed from the rest of us under the name of Sovetsk. Incidentally, today in the USSR this name has been given to three cities and a number of settlements. The epidemic of renaming, which broke out after the revolution, deleted from the country's map more toponymics than had disappeared during the entire previous history of the country....

[V. Neroznak] A name on a map is not only an address but, above all, the landmark of native history, a monument to language or, in a word, a guideline in the national culture of any nation. "A name is an omen," says a Latin saying. With the change of a name a sensation of the firmness of roots, the continuity of generations and the ability to find one's way in the pages of chronicles and literary works are lost.

Our experience in the destruction of our own toponymic wealth can be truly compared to an epidemic, for many names which trigger historical and cultural associations disappeared, replaced by new "landmarks." It is as though a fine but impenetrable fabric separated the new generations from the bountiful soil of the ancient cultures of the peoples of our country.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] One can understand the enthusiasm of the first postrevolutionary years, when even newborn children were given the names of Tractor, Soviet Militia, or Electrification. There was a sort of romanticism of a young world, blowing in the wind. The adolescent maximalism of the age was also reflected in the renaming.

Furthermore, the appearance of new names on a map is a natural process and the developing toponyms always reflect the age which has created them. They are added to the already acquired stock of historical names. Unfortunately, however, during those years it was the practice of renaming that developed, rather than naming new projects. Furthermore, the names were not always apt and they were frequently illiterate and hastily formed. How, for example, can we assess still actually existing names, such as Malaya Kommunisticheskaya Street or Mosneftekip Street? In settlements it was first the main and, therefore, the oldest streets and squares that were renamed.

[Editors] Streets and squares of cities, separated by hundreds of kilometers, bear the very same names: Soviet, October, Komsomol, Communist, Revolution, and so on. Scientists have estimated that as many as 70

percent of the names are duplicated in Soviet cities. Obviously, this is the result of the fact that in addition to works of art and traditional ceremonies, toponyms were considered not historical-cultural monuments but means of propaganda.

[V. Neroznak] Yes, the new toponyms were mandatorily politicized. However, the symptoms of the disease had appeared long before 1917. With the strengthening of the Russian Empire, the creation of names by the people yielded to arbitrary naming, which was the prerogative of the authorities. In the 17th century, when Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich tried to rename the Borovitskiye Gates in the Kremlin, the new name did not stick. Meanwhile, in 1835, Mechetnoye Village became the city of Nikolayevsk, named after the then ruling emperor. In 1918 it was renamed Pugachev. At the turn of the century there was a monster of a toponym in Petersburg, the Prince Aleksandr Petrovich Oldenburgskiy Prospekt. In the Soviet period, however, the politicizing of toponyms exceeded the boundaries of reason and there developed a kind of "saints" of words and names on the map.

[Editors] If we were to go back to all the old names (a tendency toward which may be noticed today) would this not totally exclude from our cultural environment its socialist element?

[V. Neroznak] I believe that the socialist element of culture should be meaningful rather than formal. If we give the name of Communist to a street this will not mean that all of its residents work according to their capabilities and earn according to their needs. More than enough words about socialism have been said in our country. Now we must convert from declarations to the specific implementation of its essential characteristics. Such a society no longer needs toponymic labels or other embellishments.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] Possibilities do exist for the strengthening of socialist symbolism. However, let that be a name given to a new project, and an original one at that. The duplication of ideological toponyms achieves the exactly opposite effect, although a certain standardization is inevitable. In any case, the main thing is for the name to be motivated.

The Moscow Soviet Executive Committee Commission on Naming the Streets of Moscow developed, on the basis of a modern scientific concept, practical recommendations for place naming. Thus, if a residential district is under construction, let its streets retain the names of the microtoponyms which existed in that area, such as streams, hills or little hamlets. One could use the "rose of winds" by giving streets in the Northern area names of Northern cities and in the Southern area, of Southern cities. Such a principle was used in the past as well, in Odessa for instance, and in the building of Sevastopol, as well as in the period of the tempestuous growth of "bigger Moscow."

[Editors] There is a particular and quite large group of memorial names among toponyms, preserving the memory of a given person. Some of them were named while those personalities were still alive. How did such toponyms appear and what future could they have?

[V. Neroznak] Memorial names were another invention not of the Soviet system. To this day geographic sites preserve the names of the first settlers, builders or founders of cities or homeowners. Think of Khabarovsk, Yaroslavl, the Potseluyev Bridge in Leningrad and the Vladimir Hillock in Kiev. However, most frequently they appeared on the basis of contemporary scientific principles of "a new name for a new project." Furthermore, never before memorializing had reached such a scale as to turn a map into a pantheon.

Sincere respect and compassion for the leaders of revolutionary battles who had lost their lives were manifested in their instant toponymic perpetuation. The names of Sverdlov, Dzerzhinskiy, Uritskiy, Volodarskiy and others appeared on the map immediately after their death. The cult of someone's memory, which is entirely understandable and characteristic of our people, turned into a by no means innocent "cult of leaders." Names appeared honoring living people. At the turn of the 1920s Gatchino was renamed Trotsk (in some documents, Trotsky); in 1924 Yelizavetgrad became Zinov'yevsk; 1 year later Tsaritsyn (incidentally, this toponym is unrelated to the tsars but comes from the river Sarysa) became Stalingrad. This started the march of the cult model throughout the land.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] In my view, memorializing while the person is still alive is unacceptable above all from the ethical viewpoint. Under Stalin's rule, his name on the map became a sign of award which the "father of the nations" granted to those close to him for their loyalty and obedience. Names on the map appeared and disappeared according to the political circumstances. In 1957 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium promulgated a ukase which banned naming areas in honor of living people. Soon afterwards, however, this prohibition was violated.

[Editors] Some cities have had to change their names several times. Here, for example, is what the republic papers wrote at different times on changes in the names of the capital of North Osetia. "...The working people approved a government resolution on renaming Vladikavkaz into Ordzhonikidze. Lengthy applause turned into ovations... as proof of this action," wrote the newspaper VLAST TRUDA in its 4 September 1931 issue. "Renaming Ordzhonikidze into Dzauzhikau... is consistent with the cultural and economic interests of the Osetian people. This act shows Stalin's personal concern for the Osetian people, their present and their future." This is a quotation from SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA OSETIYA, 1 March 1944. On 26 February 1954, the same newspaper pointed out that "the working people of North Osetia welcomed with profound joy the ukase on renaming the city of Dzauzhikau to Ordzhonikidze,

which was consistent with their will and expectations." Similar quotations may be found in connection with renaming Cheremushkinskiy Rayon in Moscow to Brezhnevskiy Rayon, and back to Cheremushkinskiy. Although all of these decisions were made individually, they necessarily created the appearance of a popular initiative or else of something approved by the public.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] The point is that we still have no legislative grounds for the participation of the public in forming toponyms. I would describe the existing method as one of "ideological imperative:" in other words, a primacy of ideological over ethnocultural considerations and the unquestionable nature of a decision made "at the top." For example, is it normal for M.I. Kalinin personally to sign the adoption of the toponymic "present" from Stalin, by renaming Tver into Kalinin?

The following has also occurred: during one of his trips in the Ukraine, N.S. Khrushchev decided that the city of Stanislav should be renamed in honor of the outstanding leader of Ukrainian literature Ivan Franko and issued that order. On the next day a famous scientist was stopped in the classroom, carrying his thermos and sandwiches, and asked to invent a new name. To name it Ivanovsk would be in honor of some Ivan. Frankovsk was out of the question because the Spanish dictator was still alive. It is thus that the name Ivanovo-Frankovsk appeared on the map.

One of the latest examples is the renaming of Zubovskaya Square in Moscow into Sholokhov Square. This deleted (although it has now been restored) a name which could be traced back to the regiments of streltsy of the 17th century, remindful of the system of the defense of Moscow and of Ivan Zubov, who was the commander of the regiment.

[Editors] What makes in this case Zubov "better" than Sholokhov, for both toponyms are memorial?

[M. Gorbanevskiy] One has a long tradition, and a chain of historical and cultural associations, whereas the second is totally unrelated to that specific area.

[V. Neroznak] The wealth of names, events and works which a name triggers in the memory is one of the decisive criteria. The toponym Sennaya Square is preferable than Peace Square, for it immediately makes us think of Nekrasov's poetry. The name Kirovabad does not trigger any kind of cultural associations. Yet the ancient name of the city of Gyandzh, bears with it, since the 7th century, the memory of historical ties and of the poet Nizami Gyandzhevi.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] In principle, contemporary toponymics has a negative attitude toward the practice of memorializing. In the commission which I already mentioned, in general we try to avoid new personal names. It is better to ensure one's immortality embodied in "ships' names, writings and other long projects." However, the tendency toward instant perpetuation remains quite durable. Respected scientists speak out in the presidium

of the USSR Academy of Sciences, suggesting that a Moscow street be named after a deceased colleague. Forgive me, but we have several hundred academicians and corresponding members.... Currently in Moscow some 20 streets are named after marshals and 10 after generals. As in the past, however, the Defense Department comes up with suggestions on memorializing. The commission is flooded by letters from widows of writers, socialist labor heroes and veterans. This is a difficult topic and embarrassing to consider yet one more time. However, unless we block this flood, our cities will begin to resemble cities of the dead.

[V. Neroznak] Without a discussion on this topic we shall never get rid of toponymic "coups." Present interest in and compassion for the victims of Stalinist arbitrariness is unfortunately giving birth to a new cult. Last autumn I spoke at an "informal" meeting whose participants demanded that the name Zhdanov be deleted from the map of Moscow. Other proposals were submitted as well. In particular, I spoke out in favor of giving back to Kirov Street its age-old name—Myasnitskaya. After the meeting, I was approached by one of the demonstrators, who said: "It would be better to name it after V. Shalamov, a writer-martyr, who deserves this for his pains. Let the Zhdanov Subway Station be renamed Bukharin." Shall we be creating new toponymic "saints" without any scientific grounds?

[Editors] We find on the map of the USSR 150 names based on the name Kalinin and 40 based on the name Kuybyshev. There is yet another group of toponyms which, unquestionably, lead in terms of its frequency. I am referring to those based on the first, patronymic and last name of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. When you speak of the need to limit on the map memorial names, do you exclude all of these toponyms or do you consider them on an equal basis as the others?

[V. Neroznak] Toponymic Leniniana is one of the most delicate problems of our science. Usually, the frequent presence of Lenin's name on a map has not been discussed even in linguistic debates, for this could cast aspersions on the leader. Let us remember, however, who and for what purposes gave Lenin's name to geographic sites.

During Lenin's lifetime renamings in his honor were isolated cases. For example, Rogozhskaya Zastava in Moscow, where revolutionary battles took place, was renamed, on the initiative of the rayon's population, into Ilich Square.

Toponymic Leniniana marked its tempestuous expansion under Stalin. Thus, in 1929 he renamed Dyushambe, the capital of Tajikistan, into Stalinabad; in 1936, for the sake of "balance," he renamed Khodzhen, the oldest city in the republic, known since the times of Aleksander the Great, into Leninabad. There are reasons to believe that the system of cult toponyms was developed less for the sake of perpetuating the memory of Lenin than that of Stalin.

Throughout the country, for absolutely no reasons, the name of Lenin has been given to many streets, squares, rayons and settlements. Thus, each city mandatorily has its statue of Lenin and by no means is it of high artistic quality. How many are the kolkhozes which are on the verge of collapse, owing millions of rubles, named "Lenin's Behests?!" If we study the map, the excessive memorial Leninist toponyms are striking and, in my view, exceeds the boundaries of common sense. I believe that the name of Lenin should be preserved only for geographic sites which are closely related to Vladimir Ilich's life.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] It is not a question of belittling anyone's merits or making names on a map consistent with the assessments found in encyclopedias and somehow dividing everything into those are "worthy" and "unworthy." Yes, Zhdanov has become once again Mariupol and Brezhnev has become Naberezhnyye Chelny; but then also Andropov City has once again become Rybinsk, for that name reminds us of Rybnaya Sloboda, which appeared on the Volga as early as 1152. The Soviet Cultural Fund is promoting the restoration of the age-old names of ancient cities despite the fact that they are currently named after people who have not compromised themselves in any way.

[Editors] Renaming is expensive....

[V. Neroznak] But not as much as some people try to convince us. In discussing the question of restoring to the city of Gorkiy its historical name, it was said that such renaming would cost 50 to 60 million rubles. According to experts of the Soviet Cultural Fund, it would cost 300,000 rubles, a sum which could be provided with a single subbotnik worked in the city.

Speaking of the cost, why did the leaders in Vinnitsa and some rayon centers in that oblast ignore it when one nice day in 1988 (!) it changed the Ukrainian spellings on all street signs to Russian. The cost of this project was 100,000 rubles.

[Editors] To what extent has the toponymic stock of national republics been destroyed?

[V. Neroznak] In Turkmenia and Uzbekistan two-thirds of the national names have disappeared; only 6 percent of the ancient Udmurt names remain.... In many republics historical and national names have been replaced by Sovietisms or by international names. In short, in the case of the national republics all the difficulties experienced by Russia are precisely the same.

In some areas there has been a totally unjustified Russification of names. In the Ukraine, for example, there are 36 settlements named Pervomaysk and 51 bearing the corresponding Ukrainian name of Pershotravnevo. The word "Pervomaysk," is, incidentally, a linguistic nonsense. It is not found in either Russian or Ukrainian languages. By the will of name-coining officials, it was combined from a Russian root and a Ukrainian ending.

[M. Gorbanevskiy] Let us furthermore point out that the Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography simply does not print maps of national republics in the languages of the native populations. Due to the lack of knowledge of the local languages and the meaning of the names, the compilers of atlases distorted in their transcription the sense of many names to the point that it would be difficult without any special studies to establish their original form and content. As a result, such toponyms are no longer considered historical monuments or monuments of oral folk tradition.

How would a person feel if in his home all things would be given different names? It is no accident that the suggestion of restoring the ancient names to one's cities is persistently raised by the public.

[Editors] What is your view on the mechanism for renaming or restoring historical names?

[M. Gorbanevskiy] Officially, such matters are within the jurisdiction of the soviets of people's deputies—city, oblast and republic—except for cases in which the name of a street or city was given in accordance with the instructions of a superior authority. Therefore, waiting for the drafting of an all-Union legislative act is totally unnecessary; the local authorities could and should show some initiative. In Georgia, for example, recently the historical names of the two cities of Senaki and Ozurgety were restored although since the 1930s they had been named after the revolutionaries M.G. Tskhakaya and F.I. Makharadze. Many toponyms have been restored in Lithuania. The Moscow Names Commission has drafted a list of some 50 toponyms the revival of which it suggests for the capital's map.

[V. Neroznak] Naturally, any haste would be harmful in restoring names. A campaign approach is inadmissible. Above all, we must consult with specialists: toponymic councils have been created today in virtually all branches of the Soviet Cultural Fund. I believe that problems of renaming should not be resolved through referenda, perhaps for the reason alone that public opinion in our country is not formed and is poorly informed. Unquestionably, it should be taken into consideration. Now, however, the primary task is to provide the population with the necessary toponymic knowledge.

[Editors] Who, in your view, could name new geographic sites?

[M. Gorbanevskiy] This should remain within the competence of the soviets of people's deputies. They should set up a names commission, similar to the one which exists under the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee. The deputy commission with the right to veto would include specialists—historians, philologists, and jurists. Such an authority, armed with scientific principles, would be able to assess the suggestions submitted by rayon soviets, organizations and private citizens. Naturally, the proper legislation is also necessary.

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SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

The Intersectorial Scientific and Technical Complex—Offspring of Perestroika

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[Discussion between A. Merzhanov and A. Antipov]

[Text] In order to have a stimulating impact on the development of production forces, scientific developments must cover the stage of applied research and assume the shape of new material, technology, or equipment and prove its progressive nature and, finally, be mass produced. The search for an efficient mechanism for the acceleration of this process led to the idea of the intersectorial scientific and technical complex (MNTK), within which basic and sectorial sciences and industry interact closely. Currently the country has 23 such complexes dealing with the most promising areas of scientific and technical progress. The problems and difficulties of their development are the subject of a talk between A. Merzhanov, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences and general director of the Termosintez MNTK, and A. Antipov, editor of the science and education department of *KOMMUNIST*.

[Antipov] Aleksandr Grigoryevich, in one of your articles you metaphorically described the MNTK as the offspring of perestroika. Today such complexes are some 4 years old and, therefore, they are among the eldest. This makes it even more interesting to find out whether they have justified the hopes.

[Merzhanov] I am not abandoning my metaphor. To the scientists and the technical intelligentsia the fact that one of the first major undertakings after April 1985 was the June Conference of the CPSU Central Committee on Scientific and Technical Progress remains significant. The fact that perestroika relies on the scientific analysis of reality and makes active use of the achievements of science and technology and shows profound interest in their development is, in my opinion, guarantee for success.

The idea of the MNTK is unquestionably fruitful. The point is to rally the efforts of the active scientific organizations and enterprises and direct them toward the solution of specific scientific and technical problems. It is not only progressive but also profitable. Bearing in mind the severe deficit of the state budget, this approach is the only accurate one. It is quite important that the structure of the MNTK includes both scientific research institutes and design-engineering and technological bureaus and experimental plants, and the fact that enterprises engaged in mass production are involved in the work of the complexes. The purpose of all of this is to ensure the shortest and preplanned development from scientific idea to finished modern production. Naturally,

this form of integration of science with production is both attractive and efficient.

However, as is frequently the case in our country, and a "tradition" has not been abolished by perestroika, after taking the initial step (the creation of the complexes) we did not decide to go further; we have not eliminated the aspiration to make the new form of organization fit the old cumbersome framework of the existing mechanism of the national economy. Yet this undermines the entire "ideology" of the MNTK. Actually, to this day the complexes lack the rights and possibilities which would enable them to work with the type of efficiency which was anticipated in their creation.

[Antipov] To the best of my understanding, unquestionably these structures are complex in terms of their structure and scientific and technical in terms of their activities; however, their intersectorial nature, the basic reason for which they were conceived, proved to be quite difficult to achieve.

[Merzhanov] That is the entire problem. The MNTK were created for the purpose of lifting sectorial barriers and solving problems which go beyond departmental interests (as we know, in frequent cases the interests of society and the departments do not coincide). Nonetheless, the complexes turned out to be greatly dependent on the ministries. The organizations and enterprises which joined the complexes retained their departmental affiliations and subordination. They "live" according to the laws of their sectors. Therefore, we cannot speak of any kind of organizational-economic unity within such collectives. The complex can influence their work only through a plan and can promote its own "line" only once a year, when the plan is drafted (and even then not always, since the plan must be cleared by the ministry). Ministries do not consider work on the basis of such a plan as their own (there is some justice in that) and do not help in their implementation; they do not ensure the priority allocation of resources (although this has been stipulated). It is thus that they hinder MNTK activities.

Incidentally, some of the complexes are directly affiliated with a given sector and under the jurisdiction of a ministry. The intersectorial scientific and technical complex of such a ministry, naturally, becomes a nonsense. This conflicts with the basic idea of the MNTK. I believe that the real intersectorial problems cannot be solved with such an approach.

Here is another absurdity. Although the MNTK is a juridical person, it does not have its own funds, for which reason it cannot efficiently implement new ideas. Therefore, the complex has neither the incentive nor the possibility of self-development. The MNTK achievements actually do not influence its possibilities due to the lack of a feedback mechanism. All of these problems are beginning to be seriously discussed only now, in the 4th year of the existence of the complexes.

[Antipov] Does the practical experience of the MNTK not provide an answer to the question which is frequently asked of late: Do we need ministries and, if we do, what kind and why?

[Merzhanov] Working in the MNTK, we not simply realized but literally felt that it is much easier to establish business relations and apply scientific and technical developments in industry by dealing directly with enterprises rather than ministries. The enterprises are more interested in new developments and are more willing to establish contacts. The ministries behave cautiously and conservatively. They find greater pleasure in seeking arguments "against" than "for." They need excessive amounts of proof for suggestions and reject even the slightest risk. Yet it well known that without sensible risk no scientific and technical progress is possible. The worst is departmental prestige, I would even call it honor. The ministries will not accept an "outsider's" development even if it can clearly benefit the sector. I can quote as many examples as you like in this area, including those involving our own Termosintez MNTK.

We were able to apply virtually all of our developments on the basis of direct relations with plants and scientific-production associations. The ministries became involved in the final stages. I believe that the reorganization of the ministries, which is taking place in the country, will have a positive effect on MNTK activities. Furthermore, as strictly intersectorial organizations, the complexes can only benefit from this.

Do we need ministries at all?

This is a more difficult question to answer. It seems to me that MNTK experience does not lead to a simple answer. On the one hand, under the new economic management conditions, they are not needed. One could cite a number of arguments in support of this conclusion. Furthermore, the Law on the State Enterprise conflicts with the existing ministerial functions. On the other hand, however, it is also clear that there are many factors which hinder the one-sided interpretation of the problem: the chronic scarcity of resources, which does not allow the enterprises to operate on the basis of the laws of a free market, the need to formulate state (in the full meaning of the term) orders and the management of long-term scientific and technical developments of the sectors, and many others.

The question of what to do with the ministries is a major and separate problem, the solution to which is as yet poorly related to MNTK activities.

[Antipov] Everyone with whom we have discussed this topic has highly rated both the idea and the fact of the establishment of MNTK. Perhaps, however, there may have existed and still exists alternate possibilities of involving our national economy in scientific and technical progress? Could there be some other efficient structures?

[Merzhanov] The MNTK is an experiment. Its future development and the nature of the new form of integration between science and production are totally unpredictable. That is why, in my view, there was no need to experiment with 23 complexes simultaneously.

I am convinced that initially we should have organized a few complexes only (no more than 5), allocate funds for their establishment, supply them with resources and provide them with advantageous economic management conditions and rights consistent with their new functions. In other words, we should have given a few complexes the possibility truly to experiment in a variety of ways, in accordance with the creative plans of their managers, rather than limit their activities on the basis of so-called "standard regulations." This would have given us a variety of data to consider and the possibility of recommending the most efficient ways of integration of science with production.

The objection to this argument may be that a prototype for MNTK existed and that an experiment had already taken place and yielded positive results. Naturally, you guessed, this referred to the institute headed by Boris Yevgenyevich Paton which, indeed, brilliantly proved how scientific developments can be applied in the national economy. Unfortunately, however, this experiment is difficult to duplicate. Let us not forget that it took Boris Yevgenyevich dozens of years to develop this enterprise. He was not only director of the institute but also president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In other words, he had the possibility of deciding how to spend funds and resources allocated to the entire Ukrainian academic science.

[Antipov] Do we need today more MNTK? In your view, who should be their promoter and under what circumstances?

[Merzhanov] We need more MNTK. Having adopted such a form for the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, we should develop it. An MNTK can be set up on the basis of a fruitful original domestic idea or a most recent (global) scientific and technical problem. To this effect, however, we also need a serious scientific school which could provide a base for the solution of this problem, as well as a leader—a major scientist with a bent for organizational work, who can lead the people with his ideas. To create MNTK for the purpose of resolving strictly technical problems (albeit very important) in which we are behind the developed capitalist countries makes no sense, for to this effect we have scientific production associations. MNTK are needed to lead science toward industry and not vice versa. It is precisely complexes whose activities are based on outstanding scientific ideas that works fruitfully. The new MNTK could prove efficient in the areas of high temperature superconductivity, superplasticity, etc. In such cases they should be organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences, while the Council of Ministers should act as the guardian of the new units. Naturally, it is as important to shut down unnecessary MNTK as it is to open new ones.

[Antipov] How do you conceive of the development of existing MNTK? Judging by what you said, they have not only retained their potential but have not even displayed it in full. How can we increase the efficiency of intersectorial scientific and technical complexes?

[Merzhanov] Let us go back to the start of our discussion. We said that the establishment of MNTK was boosted by the initiated restructuring of our social and economic way of life. The establishment of MNTK and the reorganization of the national economy are taking place simultaneously. In the course of this process our concepts as to what to do and how to do it are steadily changing. Therefore, a description of the nature of the complex must inevitably be based on circumstantial and, to a certain extent, temporary features and largely depends on the actual development of our economy.

A great deal depends on the structure of the MNTK. They must be given all the necessary components in order independently to advance from a scientific concept to the production of goods in small series. To this effect, the complexes should have the following:

A head institute, to play the role of "ideologue" and work organizer (I believe that this must mandatorily be an academic institute);

Engineering centers of the institute (development of basic technologies);

An engineering-design and technological bureau (designing industrial technological processes and specialized equipment);

Experimental plants (experimental production of original items, including technological equipment, and the production of batches of science-intensive but not mass-produced goods);

Marketing companies (commercial activities, internal and external).

All such organizations and enterprises must actually be structural subdivisions of the MNTK and form a single economic system. The system may differ according to the complex. All complexes must have their study center which should be an institution working together with the USSR State Committee for Education.

The main channel for the application of MNTK developments in large-scale industry should be that of an intersectorial state production association (MGPO) of industrial enterprises, especially created for the mass production of MNTK goods for intersectorial use, unrelated to any specific ministry. It is precisely the MNTK-MGPO link that I view as a realistic solution of the problem of acceleration of scientific and technical progress. At the first stage of activities, the MNTK and the MGPO should be independent. Subsequently, however, with a successful development of the project, one could expect their merger and the organization of a large cooperative.

The results of MNTK activities could also be of purely sectorial interest. In that case their developments should be applied at enterprises of ministries, primarily on the initiative of the latter. In my view, in order to pass MNTK developments on to industrial sectors, licensing would be an efficient way, protecting all the rights of the developers.

It would be a mistake to think that such a complex would ignore an assigned scientific and technical problem. Obviously, conditions must be created for interesting independent creative collectives in its resolution, and the development of alternate approaches. It would be best for MNTK to be financed on the basis of a state program based on competitive projects. An example in this case is the organization of work on high temperature superconductivity. The MNTK would play a leading but not a dominant role in the implementation of such a program.

Mutually profitable economic relations, which would be unquestionably beneficial from the viewpoint of withholdings for the state budget, should be established among all organizations and enterprises participating in MNTK activities. In that case they would stimulate an active behavior toward the work and contribute to the self-development of the entire structure, dictated by the country's interests. Unquestionably, the complex must be free from bureaucratic obstacles in the implementation of creative nonstandard decisions and suggestions.

Let me emphasize, however, that this is merely my own view of the MNTK as an organization of a new type. As we know, other viewpoints exist as well.

[Antipov] Aleksandr Grigoryevich, regardless of how ideal a structure of the MNTK or even of the entire Academy of Sciences may be suggested, the main characters in them remains the researcher, someone who is highly skilled, as a rule, with his original views not only on the subject of his research but also on surrounding reality. Society, if it wishes dynamically to develop and increase its spiritual and material potential, should be extremely interested in providing its scientists with favorable conditions or professional activities and a certain amenities. What could the MNTK contribute in that case? Could they provide even a minimum of such conditions?

[Merzhanov] The view exists that the MNTK are being created only for the sake of facilitating the application of scientific developments in industry. This is not entirely accurate. The task of the MNTK is the comprehensive and accelerated development of all components in a given scientific and technical area along the "science-technology-production" chain. The scientific part of MNTK activities should be significant and efficient. However, the attitude toward science in a given MNTK largely depends on its manager—the general director. It depends on the type of person he is, and on his personal interests and capabilities. In academic MNTK science holds important positions. Here scientists, both young and mature, work better than in an ordinary academic

institute, and their work is easier and more interesting. It is easier thanks to the more favorable financing of the MNTK (availability of instruments, equipment and materials, wage supplements, bonuses); it is more interesting because of the variety of topics and approaches and the scope of interests and possibilities to see the end results of one's own work personally. I shall not undertake to judge all complexes; at the Termosintez MNTK, in my view, scientists appear quite confident in their work.

[Antipov] Finally, a few questions about Termosintez, the more so since you mentioned it yourself. As we know, the fundamental idea of a self-spreading high temperature synthesis (SVS) was formulated by Soviet scientists as early as 1967. Therefore, the activities of your MNTK are based on a domestic scientific discovery. In this respect the situation comes closer to the ideal you have depicted. What specific features does this add to the work of your collective?

[Merzhanov] Yes, this creates very difficult situations caused by the contradiction between possibilities and realities. The prospects are splendid. Today, however, considering the novelty of the problem (as reformulated, naturally, the SVS problem could be considered new although it has 20 years of history behind it) we lack the necessary material-technical and production facilities; there are no professionally developed industrial technologies; we are short of equipment and the training of specialists has not been organized.

The novelty of the SVS problem has been acknowledged abroad as well. Active research and technological developments in this area are being carried out in the United States, Japan and other countries, giving proper due to the fundamental achievements of Soviet scientists. In our own country, however, we are still forced to prove that the SVS is something needed, useful and promising. Yet, to this day many "specialists" from the ministries have not even heard about the SVS. The same applies to production personnel.

The SVS process in its industrial execution is so unusual and so unlike other technological processes that this creates difficulties in its application at "morally" unprepared enterprises. It is based on a special form of combustion of solid substances, as a result of which valuable solid products (materials) are developed. The principal method of SVS is to burn and not to heat. This enables us to make optimal use of the chemical energy of the reacting substances (thermochemical reactions) instead of the electric energy and the use of simple instruments instead of high temperature heating systems, and the fast internal self-combustion of substances instead of slow heating through the surface. SVS makes it possible to save on all sorts of resources and to raise modern equipment and technology to a new level. This is an alternative to traditional high temperature processes which "burn" the energy of external sources, for which reason it has earned the right to autonomous development. SVS has been applied in the development of new

materials and goods (powder metallurgy, ceramics, hard alloys, abrasives, refractory materials, materials for electronics and electrical engineering, ferroalloys, ligatures, etc.). Whereas during the entire time prior to the establishment of MNTK some 800 tons of SVS products were produced, in 1988 alone production exceeded 1,000 tons.

Above all, the Termosintez MNTK has truly brought together scattered research and production collectives working in the SVS area and led them into solving major problems. It has strengthened the reputation of one of the most important trends in the acceleration of scientific and technical progress.

[Antipov] I would very much like to conclude our discussion on a major note. Nonetheless, I would ask you for specific examples of skidding, for here as in the case of other MNTK, a number of so far unimplemented developments and suggestions remain. Why is it that the acceleration of scientific and technical progress frequently remains a simple slogan rather than an impressive factor for rapidly improving the life of the people?

[Merzhanov] Generally speaking, it seems to me, I have answered this question. Specific examples? ...Let me then start with the "precomplex" period; this will enable us to see what our MNTK inherited. It is precisely the elimination of such legacies that is one of the main difficulties.

In 1978 we developed an entirely new method for producing cutting blades, based on the SVS process. Its distinguishing feature was that it enabled us quickly, as part of a single technological stage, and without preliminary synthesis of high-melting components, to obtain a material for instruments, possessing splendid cutting qualities. Many officials of the USSR Minstankoprom and sectorial specialists (starting with the minister himself) became acquainted with this process. They apparently liked it, and the head organization of the ministry—the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Instruments—assumed the lead bringing the material to the necessary condition. For a number of years the instrument makers submitted all kinds of demands which were met, and after everything had been accomplished, it became apparent that the new alloy (as concluded by that same institute) had a limited area of application, for which reason it was not to be produced on an industrial scale. As subsequent developments indicated, this conclusion was wrong. Today, on the basis of SVS we are developing the production of cutting blades. However, we cannot regain the time which was lost....

This example proves, specifically, also that a ministry which is unwilling to accept something developed by outsiders can "muzzle" (I have no other word for it) quite easily a researcher and developer.

But let us go on. Some 10 years ago, on the initiative of metallurgical workers, SVS specialists from Chernogolovka and Tomsk developed a new technology for

the nitration of ferrovanadium, which is a product used in steel alloys. The results were superb. Both the product and the technology surpassed global standards set for virtually all indicators. This made it possible to equip at the Izhtal Production Association an experimental-industrial sector with a 300-ton annual capacity. The USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy became interested and, on the suggestion of the Interdepartmental Scientific and Technical Committee, Termosintez undertook to create a technological line with a production capacity for 1,000 tons per year and use it at the Chusovoy Metallurgical Plant. Then... national economic adventures began. For some strange reason the USSR Minstankoprom (ignoring the interests of Izhtal metallurgical workers) excluded from the state standards the brand of nitrogen containing fast cutting steel (the production of which requires our SVS product). The USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy replaced it with the popular brand of cold-resistant nitrogen-containing steel and... the already developed product remained without customers.

Matters did not stop there. The USSR Gosplan instructed Termosintez to work on procurements of this product for export and to find consumers abroad. The task was simple, for nitrated ferrovanadium is quoted on the world market. However, the moment our Ekzoterm Foreign Trade Company signed a good contract for \$3 million, it turned out that the country lacked the initial raw material (ferrovanadium) and that the Gosplan voided its own instruction and closed down export activities related to this product.

At this point, allow me to draw the following conclusion: the MNTK, which deals with the integration of science with production, should itself be very well familiar with the national economy. It should enjoy extensive mastery of the situation and should not hope that partners, even on the highest level, would not put their foot in it.

[Antipov] Thank you, Aleksandr Grigoryevich. These are convincing examples. However, I am also convinced by your own program for action and your vision of the problems of Termosintez and the overall situation. I hope that we can end our talk by expressing the firm conviction that the creation of the MNTK has provided a proper impetus to the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and that it could achieve quickly results which everyone would easily see in daily life.

[Merzhanov] I agree. We began this talk by saying that the MNTK are the offspring of perestroika. Therefore, the fate of the complexes is closely related to their successes. Perestroika, all of us are convinced, is irreversible. I am an optimist and always believe in what I do. I do not doubt that the future lies in the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and is in favor of the complexes. Nonetheless, these will not be the same type of complexes as those which operate presently but powerful autonomous corporations, free from bureaucratism and adapted to the conditions of the Soviet economy. These will be fully self-developing associations in which

research and production trends will be balanced and will ensure the optimal integration of science with production. I am confident that the Termosintez MNTK, with its very promising topics, will be precisely one such complex.

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Time of Relaxation

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[Article by S. Shnol, head of laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Biophysics, professor at the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov]

[Text] The unfinished article "Tradition of Posthumous Glory and Scientific and Technical Progress" is on my desk. Eventually, I will finish it. Meanwhile, this depressing topic is expanding and it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep this article within its strictly demanded limits.

For the time being, as in the past, we are experiencing the complex pleasure of thoughts on the former greatness of our science and list in our memory the names of outstanding people and, coming back to the present, once again realize the level reached by our science.

We had become accustomed to being proud of our great country. How sudden was the shakeup: there was nothing to be proud of even in mathematics and physics! First to note this publicly was Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev. The cost of this daring and honest statement was high!

Fifty years have passed since the repressions of 1937-1939; 40 years have passed since 1948 and 35 years after the "case of the killer doctors," and we are still unable to come to our senses.

This is not astounding. The time of relaxation, as the physicists say, the time of restoration of the initial condition in the social area is measured not in years but in generations (that is why, among others, our perestroika cannot be very fast).

What determines today the nature of Soviet science? Who determines the atmosphere in scientific institutions? As a rule, it is those who were able to survive the period of repressions or else their immediate students and followers. Naturally, the former are quite elderly, past the age of 70. The latter are 40 to 60-year old academicians and corresponding members, directors of scientific institutes and publishing houses, chairmen and members of scientific councils, departments and sections, and editors and members of editorial boards of scientific journals. Many of them were able to learn from the previous generation essentially the difficult knowledge of survival. They had to learn alone the meaning of "life in science," which is an underproductive and by no

means the most efficient method. Mankind—civilization—exists by transmitting acquired experiences (including moral) from one generation to another.

That is why the "schools" are important. We had powerful schools. In biology, we had N.I. Vavilov, N.K. Koltsov, N.Ye. Vvedenskiy, and A.A. Ukhtomskiy. These schools were destroyed with a clear purpose in mind at the time we mentioned. The very affiliation of people with a school at that time was dangerous. My university teacher said: "No, I do not like group photographs: if repressive measures are taken against someone, who knows in whose hands a photograph may find itself..."

Forty years ago we fought cosmopolitanism and for the recognition of domestic priority in the sciences. We were quite "successful!" However, there also was a rational kernel! One should not slavishly ignore one's own thoughts, one must not spend one's time catching up. Meanwhile, how many of our contemporary Soviet scientific leaders, who cannot be credited with any exploits in the area of original thinking, are satisfied merely with studies, as they trail after advanced developments in the United States, Japan, Sweden, England, France, the FRG and others?

Usually, a new idea and new trends are born weak. The newborn must be kept warm, fed, protected and nurtured! Instead of supporting new trends, and instead of helping active (and frequently unskillful) ordinary people, we "pacify" them (would it be an improvement if we call it "suppress them?" "strangle them?" "calm them down?" "can them?"). How? By a tremendous number of means! We had detailed methods and one could even issue a special state standard for them. That precisely is the main reason for which outstanding scientific discoveries rarely occur in our country.

Isolated examples merely illustrate this statement. How much has been written about "blue blood!" People wrote "for," or "against" it. I was particularly impressed by the article "Truth Substitute" in the 15 January 1989 issue of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, signed by five (!) academicians and one corresponding member. I was impressed by the aptness of the chosen title.

Let us proceed in order.

Actually, what are we talking about? We are talking about the development of the medical preparation Perfitoran, which is an urgently needed drug in saving human life. Who first of all should judge of the development and results of this work? Naturally, the physicians who conducted the respective clinical tests. These included leading representatives of medicine: Professor A.N. Kaydash, from the Institute of Surgery imeni A.V. Vishnevskiy; A.V. Pokrovskiy, corresponding member, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences; Professor V.A. Mikhelson, from the Second Moscow Medical Institute; Professor L.V. Usenko, from the Dnepropetrovsk Medical Institute; A.P. Romodanov, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences member, Kiev Neurosurgery Institute;

Major General of the Medical Service N.L. Krylov and Colonel of the Medical Service V.V. Moroz, from the Chief Military Clinical Hospital imeni N.N. Burdenko; USSR Academy of Medical Sciences member V.I. Shumakov and Professor N.A. Onishchenko, from the Scientific Research Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics. At the public meeting of the scientific council of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Biological Physics, on 28 November 1985, all of them or else their associates, highly rated that preparation which, at that time, was available.

In terms of all its basic characteristics Perftoran was not only as good as donor blood in transfusions but, in many aspects, was superior to it. It was prepared from sterile components and was much more sterile than any donor blood.

As was pointed out by USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Academician A.I. Vorobyev, in blood transfusion the main thing is not the immediate supply of oxygen to the tissues. The main thing is to open the capillaries. Therefore, the so-called oxygen capacity of this blood substitute proved to be relatively unimportant. So much so that A.I. Vorobyev in general suggested that instead of blood this preparation, frozen in donor plasma, which does not carry any oxygen but which helps to open the capillaries, be transfused. In a number of cases, however, the total sterility of the plasma cannot be secured (particularly in terms of viruses, including AIDS); furthermore, its components are immunoreacting in the victim. By 1985 these shortcomings in Perftoran had been eliminated.

Now we have the authors of the article "Truth Substitute," writing that neither in the past nor at present has there been a substitute meeting the strict requirements of "blue blood." This claim is inconsistent with the strict academic credits of the authors!

On the basis of two resolutions of the Pharmacological Committee, this preparation was accepted for clinical testing. The so-called "medicinal form" was approved—an emulsion in 400 milliliter bottles. More than 500 such bottles were produced and submitted for clinical testing.

In their reports at the mentioned session of the scientific council, the highly competent medical workers gave an official public positive rating to the preparation. I was told that the prosecutor's office has materials in which personnel of the Institute imeni Vishnevskiy are now rejecting their 1985 assessments. Such things have happened before in our history. I believe that we should entrust making responsible public statements to specialists.

As to the fact that currently this preparation is unavailable, it is true. There is no more Perftoran in the aftermath of the suicide of F.F. Beloyartsev and the discrediting of G.R. Ivanitskiy, who were the heads of the project. Not only was its production disrupted at the Biophysics Institute in Pushchino but the collective of

the laboratory was disbanded. The contacts which Ivanitskiy and Beloyartsev had established with such great difficulty with several dozen institutions were terminated.

The purpose of Perftoran was essentially to save dying people. In 80 percent of such cases, according to A.I. Vorobyev, blood transfusions do not help. Whereas the erythrocytes cannot pass through the narrowed capillaries, the minute particles of the emulsion of the preparation can. They carry very little oxygen, their "oxygen capacity" is insignificant but is nonetheless sufficient for the capillaries to begin to open. Increasing amounts of oxygen can now penetrate the cell and death retreats.

In the 1950s I worked for about 10 years at the Central Institute for the Advancement of Physicians. Both then and now, surmounting the tightening of the capillaries was the main problem in dealing with traumas and many other pathological conditions. This is manifested most acutely in brain edemas. The treatment of edemas in cranial-brain traumas with the help of Perftoran could be considered a sensation, an outstanding event in medicine. The effect was noticed in clinics in Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev. The sensation did not occur. The work was stopped and the author was hounded.

Every year some 40,000 people die and 280,000 are hurt on the country's roads. Of the 40,000 no less than one-half die as a result of cranial-brain injuries. Yet our clinics do not have this preparation.... How many lives is this worth? Who should be held responsible? No one. People were destroyed and discredited although they were right. Yet the dignified authors of "Truth Substitute" keep talking and in the prosecutor's office the "case" has already filled 12 volumes.

No claims have been filed against the Serpukhovo CPSU Gorkom, which expelled Ivanitskiy from the party and mounted a campaign for "improving the moral-psychological climate" at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Biophysics; no claims have been filed against the OBKhSS [Department for the Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation], people's control, or the USSR Prosecutor's General Office. Apparently, they know what they are doing. It is strange, though, that the Academy of Sciences and its leadership have allowed these organizations to deal with problems which are within the competence of physicians and scientists, and that it is the Serpukhovo Prosecutor's Office, the OBKhSS and the CPSU Gorkom that have assumed the main role in evaluating this most important scientific work.

The press has repeatedly reported cases of expelling from the party original, nonstandard, "irregular" but essentially most valuable workers. Those who remain are those who are obedient and tow the line. The very style of "developments" and "calling on the carpet" has had a fatal influence on the party's authority. Yet the fate of perestroika directly depends on the structure of the

CPSU, on the talent, initiative and principled-mindedness of its members.

Why is it that we, a country with a most powerful material and intellectual potential, have fallen so far behind in science, technology, industry, agriculture and medicine? In my view, this is to a large extent the result of the despotic treatment of cadres. This is worth thinking about not only in terms of the recent past but even of the present. The history of F.F. Beloyartsev's suicide and the expulsion of G.R. Ivanitskiy from the party and removal from leading positions illustrate this situation. F.F. Beloyartsev and G.R. Ivanitskiy may have had many faults. In what matters, however, in terms of talent and serving the common cause and the good of the country, they are clearly superior to their persecutors.

Naturally, one cannot say that nothing has changed. In the past no one would have known about these events. Now, thanks to television, the newspapers and journals, this story has become widely known. Its ethical and moral aspects have been discussed at a number of meetings where, in particular, once again clinical workers noted the exceptional relevance of this interrupted project and the qualities of this preparation which exists, which was subjected to official tests on the basis of the stipulations of the USSR Ministry of Health Pharmacological Committee. Life in our science changes slowly. Relaxation time is long.... Over a long period of time no single totally original work has been completed in the country in the fields of biology and chemistry, on the level of a Nobel Prize. We keep trying to catch up. Not a single shoot of original thinking in "pure" science and in its applications has been supported.

Let us go back to the problem of the "blue blood." In violation of all legal and constitutional norms, merely on the basis of a letter of the prosecutor's office, G.R. Ivanitskiy was expelled from the party by the Serpukhovo Gorkom and removed from his position as director of the institute by the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. How can a letter, which is not even a charge but, actually, an opinion, a prosecutor's office report on the violation of departmental instructions be used as a guide for similar actions? A very great deal has already been written on this topic! The prosecution does its job but the truth is established in court. Yet the court may decide that the arguments of the prosecution have no grounds whatsoever or else do not apply to Ivanitskiy (he was not responsible for the medical tests) or else, finally, the evaluation of such reasons could lead to remarks such as "please, be more careful in observing official instructions!"

What is happening now? The work has been stopped (illegally); for the past 3 years (!) everyone is waiting for the prosecution to complete its investigation. Meanwhile, the prosecution is in no hurry. It is investigating "a case" and not specific individuals (why is it then that all of its actions turn "against individuals?"). Consequently, there is no time limit for the duration of the

investigation. Who will answer for the fact that a most important project has been interrupted, that a talented person has died, that a collective has been destroyed and that the scientific and organizational work of a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a winner of the State and Lenin Prizes has been actually interrupted? Who takes into consideration "details" such as disturbances in the cardiovascular system of people finding themselves in such a situation? As in the past, however, some members of this "association of servants of science" are hastening to please the "competent authorities" instead of taking up, on the basis of their moral obligations and responsibility to the country, the defense of the honor and dignity of their comrade and the defense of an important governmental project.

This is a familiar situation, and all of this has already occurred in the past. The "leaders" can neglect the view of the collective. Academicians can neglect the opinion of a group of professors (who rank below them!). The Serpukhovo CPSU Gorkom can ignore the view of the party meeting at the institute, where the overwhelming majority of people objected to expelling Ivanitskiy from the party.

In its broadcast at the end of December 1988, the Voice of America reported that in the United States there is no scarcity of surgeons who can transplant hearts; there is no shortage of clinics where such surgeries can be performed; unfortunately, nor is there a scarcity of patients who need such services. Until 1988 the bottleneck was the failure of "donor" hearts in 4 to 6 hours prior to completing the transplant. Now a heart can be preserved for 72 hours in a blood substitute preparation and the problem has been resolved.

This is well and good.... But this is our project of 1985. It is our interrupted project. Now we shall have to be catching up. In 1988 alone, more than 50 scientific articles on this topic were published in the English language. Many of our own results have been surpassed.

Why did it happen that we have gotten into the habit of praising someone only many years afterwards... when there is no longer anyone to answerable to, when it is considered seemly and when it triggers exclusively praiseworthy feelings of pride for the fatherland? Why is it that this specific case, which has been so frequently written about, looks so familiar? Because it is an example of the still not eliminated slogan of the 1930s: No one is irreplaceable! This was a slogan justifying repression.

Scientific creativity and organizational talent are individual and unique! We shall remain behind in science until we learn how to care for and support those who are outstanding and talented. Actually, in frequent cases such people have many personal shortcomings and unsuitable qualities. Those who are calm and lazy are much more pleasant and suitable to their superiors. However, true science has always rested not on such

people but on those who are talented and productive, who are active and restless, who think originally and critically.

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IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, ASPIRATIONS

Poland and the PZPR in the Period of Perestrojka

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[Article by Ludwik Krasucki, political journalist, deputy editor-in-chief of NOWE DROGI, PZPR Central Committee journal, member of the party work commission of the PZPR Central Committee]

[Text] The resolution passed at the PZPR Central Committee 13th Plenum, which was held at the end of July, opens with the statement that "the People's Republic of Poland is at a turning point in its history." This formulation is by no means a due to routine propaganda stereotypes and solemn ceremonies marking approval of changes in the party's leadership. The concept of a "turning point" which was frequently abused in the past quite accurately characterizes the problems of the present.

In our country the processes of renovation and restructuring of socialism have reached their decisive stage. Qualitative changes in the political system are taking place at full speed. The economic reform is beginning to affect the foundations of ownership relations and the system of economic functioning. Unfortunately, a revision of the dogmas of economic policy which prevailed for decades was undertaken with great delay. The difficult process of the restoration of historical truth is continuing. The last obstacles to glasnost are being lifted. All of this is difficult and dangerous. While relations are being organized between the main political forces, the struggle on many other fronts of social development is not abating. The situation is developing in the already established directions, which define domestic and international circumstances, along with the de-Stalinization of political and economic life and under the influence of instability and the numerous problems which are awaiting their answer which, this time, are not tactical but strategic and even programmatic. It would be no exaggeration to say that the prospects which are developing and the dangers which are appearing have engaged in a real race which has now reached a dramatic point.

Unquestionably, changes in Poland are a significant component of the processes of perestrojka of socialism as a whole. Today they have either encompassed to one extent or another all socialist countries or else are already knocking at their doors. Nonetheless, they are

distinguished by clearly manifested specific features and characteristics which, in a period of inevitable intensification of the national aspects in the development of the individual countries, cannot be ignored.

One such characteristic, in particular, is the fact that the "Polish perestrojka" began earlier, in 1980. Furthermore, it was preceded by a cycle of upheavals and attempts to correct party policy and methods of managing the country (in 1956 and 1970 and, partially, 1968 and 1976). From the sociopsychological viewpoint, Poland stubbornly opposed the distortions and paradoxes of the Stalinist system and its post-Stalinist variant. Therefore, the processes which were initiated in 1980 had long good and bad antecedents.

Unfortunately, the reforms which were planned at that time faced the atmosphere and the realities of the period of a conservative stagnation which, prior to the formulation of the concept of restructuring and new thinking, defined the situation in both neighboring and more distant socialist countries. This fact had a tremendous restraining and conflict-fraught influence on the course of the socialist renovation in Poland in 1980-1985. A secured perestrojka acceleration of reforms in Poland in the second half of the 1980s was and is taking place in the course of a constant struggle not only with the old ballast but also the consequences of the dramatic events of the first half of the present decade. The sociopsychological difficulties they triggered remain to this day and leave their mark on the PZPR.

In the eyes of many Polish citizens, the party, described occasionally by dogmatists as a "nest of revisionism," is linked to the state of martial law rather than the major innovative initiative which was formulated at the Ninth PZPR Congress in 1981. It is related more to preventing change than to originating and implementing it. I emphasize this circumstance because, along with the bad memory of Stalinist deformations and difficulties in daily life, triggered by the economic collapse, it provides a key to understanding the reasons for the PZPR electoral defeat last June and the collapse of the previous governmental coalition.

There is no miracle which can save the party from the negative burden of the past although, whatever our opponents may be claiming in their primitive attacks, a number of permanent values were created during that same past. All that exists is a real means of healing: a rebirth of our very movement and faith in it as a factor of future changes which can both dynamize and protect them, and their daring and considered implementation, with scope and efficiency. This must be accomplished now, in the next few months. Otherwise we should expect new failures fraught with a tremendous harm to Poland which needs, regardless of any viewpoint, a modern and viable leftist public party.

That is why the PZPR has only one direction left: the road ahead. There is no longer any time for "further improvements," and cosmetic operations within the

framework of the old model of "sleep treatment." The result of stagnation or backpedalling could be a tragedy not only for the party but also for the people and the state. Today the "capitulationists" and "liquidators" are not the co-authors of further radical changes but supporters of retreats or of halfway internally uncoordinated decisions of a transitional (a truly transitional) period, combining new with old incentives.

The contradiction between the new understanding of reality in which it exists and which it influences through its reform initiatives, and the sluggishness and burden of the old thinking and administrative-bureaucratic methods and habits, inherent in a major segment of party cadres, has become aggravated within the PZPR. The progressive possibilities expressed through the 1982 slogan "the party is the same and yet not the same," have been exhausted. In order creatively to develop the historical traditions of the Polish Labor Movement and bear the flag of the left-wing forces in the new stage, the party must reorganize itself in terms of ideological-programmatic and structural-statutory relations. In other words, it must once again become a party of a new type which has rejected authoritarian and bureaucratic deformations which, to one extent or another, determined its aspect starting with 1948 and which, even earlier, paralyzed the communist movement which, starting with the mid-1920s, had been kept under constant Stalinist pressure.

In mid-September, at the first session of the 15th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, the resolution was passed of sponsoring a party-wide survey, in the course of which people were to answer "yes" or "no" to basic problems pertaining to the future of our movement. The future largely depends on the way we shall prepare for and hold the forthcoming 11th Party Congress. The procedure for the election of delegates and making the congress itself a truly democratic forum, at which everyone would be given the right not only freely to express his views and considerations but also to propose alternate programmatic-political platforms, assumes particular importance. Despite the preserved stereotype this would be (and actually is) proof of the viability of the party and of its inexhaustible strength which, in the drastically changed situation, have not found themselves in a state of shock or yielded to moods of indifference and disappointment and feelings of helplessness. Acquiring the full opportunity to express their views and, subsequently, to implement through practical activities democratically arrived at resolutions, such forces will increase their power and strengthen. We also have reasons to assume that the movement which will thus grow will attract many people who hold leftist views but who, for a variety of reasons, are still not members of the PZPR.

We, the supporters of such a congress, are convinced that this path will lead us not only to improvements but also to an increase in the positive aspects and traditions of the PZPR and its gains. A conservative and bureaucratic

way can create only the appearance of a favorable future but, essentially, would inevitably reduce it to naught.

We do not consider ourselves bankrupt, still existing allegedly only by virtue of our historical past and geopolitical realities or thanks to the desperate struggle waged by the so-called "nomenclature" for the preservation of its positions. However, we cannot deny that the PZPR finds itself in an inordinately difficult situation which it not only must but can surmount. We have, on the one hand, the painful acknowledgment of the truth of the tragic consequences of the fact that the permanent ideas of the left-wing forces and the noble objectives of a democratic and humane socialism, both efficient and enjoying the trust of society, were replaced by its distorted Stalinist version; on the other, we have the shock triggered by the changed role of the party. Having had the actual monopoly of power, today it is only a member of the government; having ruled by virtue of the "verdict of history," today it is forced to earn and strengthen its influence in society by fighting for the votes of the electorate in democratic procedures of true rather than fictitious elections.

Both factors are influenced by the growing pressure of the new problems, the solution to which will require different programmatic stipulations and practical approaches. How to draft a platform which would rally the traditional values of the left-wing forces and the labor movement, and of a broadly understood concept of socialism, with these new concepts and approaches, not merely as declarations or in words, but in fact, in their essence? How to act, while surmounting the extents of such changes, in order to be able to retain a maximal number of party members despite their doubts, emotions and accompanying disappointment and, furthermore, without conflicts and painlessly, and how to keep the party members rallied not by the force of orders and instructions but by a united ideological will and a sensation of new opportunities? Those are the main problems to which we are seeking answers today.

The PZPR, which is gradually making its way toward a radical reorganization of the socialist movement in Poland, does not consider itself orphaned. President W. Jaruzelski, with his authorized rights, and a numerous and active group of deputies, are "ours." The new government has "our" vice-premier and ministers in charge of important areas. Many excellent specialists and outstanding leaders hold responsible positions in many sectors, by virtue of their personal qualities. The party remains a 2-million strong organization in which, despite the entire difficulty of our movement's internal problems, there is an adequate number of people who can put it on a new track. The June elections also indicated that in objectively unsuitable conditions we obtained more than 20 percent of the people's vote. Whether we shall have more or less votes in the future will depend not on providence but on what we dare to do today.

The fact that the party merely participates in the government is a major and painful change. It costs the PZPR a great deal. However, this is neither a difficulty nor a tragedy. In the long-term, eliminating the sign of equality between party and the management of all and everything and responsibility for everything could be of major positive significance, for this makes it possible to get out of the bureaucratic shell and the system of "managing managements, institutions above institutions and directorates above directorates," and once again to become a live political movement which can rally the people through political work under the conditions of true democracy. The possibility is created for the training and development not of bureaucratic officials but of people who are politically talented and for political personalities and, perhaps, for a process for the shaping of leading agencies, such as were inherent in the labor movement before it was fettered by autocracy and a forced "monolithic" behavior. Henceforth the path to victories in the democratic structures and procedures goes through strengthening the trust in the party and upgrading the efficiency of internal party democracy. This will be good training for those who work with the public and in various organizations and institutions.

However, the road is long and time is short. Therefore, lingering and continuing to blame fate are not acceptable. We must make use of the opportunities which have opened. We must solve the pressing problems today, now. There are plenty of people who will undertake to do this, for it is precisely thus, outside administrative-bureaucratic formations, and frequently despite such formations that we have now in the Sejm PZPR deputies who make us feel very hopeful, as well as a galaxy of young personalities who are already at work in the Central Committee, its Politburo and Secretariat, and in many party establishments and organizations and who hold important public and governmental positions. They have no feelings of confusion and vagueness. They symbolize the spirit of the times, dynamism and hope. The task is to disseminate this mood as broadly as possible. I would like to believe that this will be made possible by the congress which will chart a course toward profound changes in the PZPR.

Furthermore, the role of the party as a member of the government, offers other major advantages. We intend to and, as a whole, will support the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, since, judging by his programmatic statements and based on the already substantial number of specific steps, we can see that he tries to uphold, under the new circumstances, the "philosophy" and many of the stipulations of the roundtable and that in essential matters, in his own way and using his own terminology, he is addressing himself to reforms which have either already been initiated or were planned by our party and by the previous ruling coalition.

However, we shall support the government above all because in Poland there no longer is any possibility of implementing the slogan of "the worse it is, the better." The objective Western journalist who said that the major

changes in Poland are taking place while skating on the thin ice of a weak and broken down economy and that under this ice is the threat of an uncontrolled social conflict with inconceivable consequences, was right.

Let us add that the main characters in the compromise and the actual agreements, as represented in the new parliament and the new government, have their dangerous extremist views. In the case of the old opposition, this is an antisocialist, reactionary extremism, in the literal meaning of the term. In the PZPR and other groups of the previous ruling coalition, it is the "old socialist" extremism, which is militant-conservative. The common denominator which, willy-nilly, links these extremes in their various actions, aimed at destabilizing the situation and blocking reforms, particularly in the economy, is a primitive populism and social demagoguery which speculate on the difficulties in daily life and the uncertainty which the working people feel concerning the future. Some totally reject socialism whereas others support it totally. Both, together, cling to the fact that the period of the model of socialism which is now obsolete, totally clashed with economic expediency and, consequently, excluded the possibility of improving living conditions: acceptance of poor work, speculation on social ideals and gains, and equalization which led to "equal poverty for all."

Both extremes also join forces in their negative attitude toward the USSR. The former tried to shift to the present Soviet Union and the party and country of perestrojka accusations pertaining to the time of Stalinism and stagnation. The latter condemned the present USSR for perestrojka, glasnost and new thinking.

Supporting, as a whole, the Mazowiecki Cabinet, the PZPR, as a force participating in the ruling of the country, retains the right to have a different assessment and different attitude toward the various initiatives and actions of the prime minister and his cabinet. The truth is that a radical reform, particularly in such a sensitive area as the economy and its various social consequences, could not be accomplished by the former ruling coalition alone; today they cannot be accomplished alone by the former opposition, which plays a very important role in the new government. We would like to believe that through joint efforts such initiatives can be carried out. However, we can support only steps the economic expediency of which will not clash with our social values. We shall not allow the harming of the fundamental interests of the working people and the violation of the rights and social gains which reflect the intrinsic accomplishments of socialist changes and the power of the socialist principles of social justice. We shall also see to it that under the slogan of the struggle against the former nomenclature no new nomenclature develops and good specialists, experienced managers and loyal executors of governmental policy are not discriminated against for being affiliated with the PZPR.

Therefore, we shall accept some decisions while in other cases our attitude would be either one of neutrality or

criticism and to some decisions we shall say "no." We would wish for the former to be as many as possible and the latter as few as possible. Our partners can unconditionally rely on our good will and feeling of responsibility and conscientiousness in the implementation of coordinated decisions and on our readiness to engage in open debates on basic problems, and achieve compromises beneficial to Poland. However, we do not intend to yield or surrender or, for tactical considerations, abandon the permanent values of a socialist leftist movement which we represent and will continue to represent.

We are saying all of this honestly, openly and simply. We nurture no illusions that under the new circumstances we would be able to avoid arguments and tension. We are ready to seek constructive solutions. The old saying is that "the farther into the forest you go the more there are trees." The nature of such trees does not depend on us alone.

Faced with an entire range of reforms, we must remember that although the model which was developed previously (as well as a model which is 1 year old but has already been significantly modified compared to 1980) was rejected by Poland and that the new model is only taking shape. Currently changes are taking place dynamically but spasmodically, paralleled by numerous contradictions not only between what is "old" and "new" but also within the new. We already have a pluralistic parliament. However, the people's councils have retained their traditional form and structure. This means that "at the top" there is considerably more democracy than in the local areas, where the population is closer to the authorities. We speak of political pluralism whereas it is dualism that dominates in life. We speak, accurately, of observing constitutional procedures, whereas many stipulations of the current Constitution, in which of late other essential changes have been made, are being undermined by practical activities in the political, social and economic areas. The freedom of speech and the press, and assembly and association which exist in our country and of actual rights are ahead of legislative stipulations and of some structures which took shape under different conditions and during different times.

Indirectly, I have essentially presented a program for further democratic changes in the political system of the Polish People's Republic, a program which is not an act of capitulation on the part of the PZPR but a proposal for the implementation of major reforms. They include drafting a new constitution, a profound restructuring of the people's councils and ensuring regional territorial self-management, the drafting of legal regulations which guarantee real pluralism for political parties, and the formulation of a new system in the area of law observance and a new information system. This list coincides with the requirements of Solidarity, although here as well we find a number of both legitimate or deliberately exaggerated differences. Our suggestion is clear and simple: start working on the solution of such problems. What will the answer be? We know that the situation does not allow us to set it aside for the distant future. A

halt and stagnation are fatal in the restructuring of political and social life. If we do not move ahead we inevitably fall behind, losing the opportunity given to us by destiny. The implementation of the latest package of political reforms depends, however, largely on the economic situation. It is precisely here that we find the most dangerous threat to the turn taken by Poland toward democratic forms of socialism.

We have huge debts, high inflation and a tangible scarcity on the market. The price system, despite numerous efforts to improve it partially, compared to the rest of the world looks like an exotic enclave, which is puzzling not only to outside observers but to ourselves as well. With such a price system we cannot trust any statistics, situation studies, plans or evaluation criteria.

Although there is a wage system, essentially it is not functioning. There only exists a semblance of such a system, without basic interrelationships, strongly influenced by the consequences of the former arbitrariness, the constant violation of economic laws and the increasing burden of social elements and consequences of strikes. As a result, wages have become virtually independent of the quantity and quality of labor.

The continuing implementation of the old and the increased number of new steps, combined with the erection of anti-inflationary barriers and an avalanche of problems, are partially justified but, as a whole, inconsistent with possibilities; they have led to inflated capital investments which are being scattered along an increasingly broader front and are becoming increasingly ineffective. This makes housing construction suffer. Its positions in the allocation of investments are weak, for which reason it is stagnating although it should have been developing.

I have mentioned only a few items out of a substantially longer list of major economic problems which demand at least a basic order. Against the background of or under the burden of such problems the problem of the obsolete structure of the production apparatus has become dramatically aggravated; there is stubborn support of proportions and positions which developed over 40 years under the influence of the Stalinist dogma of the prevalence of heavy industry and the priority of Group A over Group B. Although this archaic economic philosophy was the foundation of the social and political dramas experienced by Poland and although it was sharply criticized from various sides in the course of the firm break made with the past, in the course of the present renovation, to this day it is having a strong impact on our economy. One-sidedness in heavy industry has proved to be durable.

Huge funds are being invested in coal extraction; the coal is turned into electric power consumed by metallurgy; steel and iron are used for the production of machines which help us to mine the coal. This satirically simplistic

system, unfortunately, corresponds to reality. It is characterized by complacency, self-justification and self-serving in the so-called first subdivision which, as in the past, dominates the Polish economy. Without getting into the reasons for it, we can claim that such a bias leads to the need for huge subsidies to maintain the losing "Molochs" and hinders the growth of output in modern goods for export. This conflicts with the purpose of the economy as a source for satisfying social needs, for it pushes into the background the production of a variety of goods and services while, at the same time, it absorbs funds needed to modernize the production potential. The main paradox of today's economic life in Poland is that in the period of implementing the line of a multi-sectorial market-oriented economy, essentially it is both the antimarket structure of the production potential and the funds channeled into its development that are retained.

These dogmas and disproportions were the main reasons for the failure of the "command" strategy applied by Edward Gierek, the failure of which occurred not in 1980 but already in the mid-1970s. This was also the main reason for the low results achieved by the so-called first stage of the economic reform in 1981-1985 and, subsequently, the failures of the Zbigniew Messner and so-called second stage of the economic reform, last year. We find here also the reasons for the fact that the government, headed by Mieczyslaw Rakowski for the last 9 months, despite the numerous innovative concepts and energetic actions, was unable to reduce inflation and stabilize the market.

Recently socioeconomic policy has paid suitable attention to agriculture. However, this attention is being poorly felt by the peasants and the consumers, because of the continuing prevalence of Group A, which hinders the development of sectors which could ensure the countryside with everything necessary to convert Poland, based on its potential, into a country self-sufficient in food production.

Two years ago, in an article published in *KOMMUNIST*, Wojciech Jaruzelski wrote that three types of conservatism exist in Poland: the conservatism of the old customs, the conservatism of dogmatic beliefs and the conservatism of egotistical individual and group interests, triggered by the political and economic system of bureaucratic centralism. Let me risk at this point to express the view that a substantial difference may be found among these phenomena as they manifest themselves in Poland and the USSR. Bearing in mind the different course of historical events, in our country the conservatism of the old customs and dogmatic conditions plays a relatively insignificant role, for it is younger and its roots are not all that deep. Meanwhile, the conservatism of egotistical personal and group interests is very strong in our country and has deep roots, closely intertwined with the various types of a bureaucracy which is quite flexible and maneuverable, for which reason the struggle against it is very difficult.

The decision was made at the 10th PZPR Congress to undertake the comprehensive certification of all administrative structures with a view to making their role and dimensions consistent with the requirements of their functioning under the changing circumstances. We were unable to carry out this decision completely, for the opposition to it was stubborn. This highlights some of the mechanisms for the efficient protection of the old philosophy and the old structures in our economy.

Other among them stem from the paradox which is that the process of development of democracy both simplifies and makes changes in the economy more difficult. Why it simplifies is self-evident. But why does it make it more difficult? Because democracy has its own side effects, one of which is the simplicity of defending some specific interests and the temptation to use them to achieve popularity. For that reason, the members of the pressure groups interested, for material and prestige reasons, in preserving the previous economic structures, can inspire and even have the support of numerous and influential social circles. This applies both to the trade union movement, rallied both around the All-Polish Trade Unions Accord (VSPTS) as well as around Solidarity. Operating under different slogans and banners, they frequently do exactly the same thing.

Substantial funds will be needed, in freely convertible currency, to achieve a profound and efficient structural reorganization of the Polish economy, with the help of minor, specific and quickly recoverable market investments and increased expenditures for modernizations, and so on, for the main sources of progress in this area are located in Western Europe, the United States, Japan and the Pacific area. Poland, however, owes money to those countries and cannot hope for any increased aid.

Consequently, the steps which will have a painful impact on the situation of many labor collectives are inevitable. Unemployment does not threaten anyone, for with the fast development of the new forms of enterprise, there is more demand for manpower than ever. However, we shall not be able to avoid the difficulties which will be caused by the need to adapt to the new circumstances and professional retraining. We shall have to adapt our own plans and aspirations to the new circumstances and not avoid the complexities of life. Furthermore, the former economic practices had developed in industry a number of sectorial and plant privileges, which worsen the already distorted, unhealthy and by no means perfect correlation between labor and wages.

In short, the deeper the economic reform becomes, the more unpopular, contradictory and difficult become the decisions it involves for the people it affects. The illusion that a profound economic reform is a simple matter and that the smooth road leading to it will automatically blaze a trail toward a daring political reform vanish they come face to face with reality. In the struggle for achieving the supreme objective, which is to halt the negative processes in the economy and, in the future, to develop an efficient model for socialism, all reform

forces must cooperate with each other, not only in matters which are pleasant but also in what to many will turn into hard, bitter and even painful consequences. I would like to believe that such a cooperation will develop and strengthen before, once again, we find ourselves strong in hindsight.

A policy which is of interest to the workers, which is aimed at the working people and which is a socialist policy in the new meaning of the term, should be targeted at the large-scale radical promotion of order in the Polish economy. Furthermore, it should contemplate everything that is necessary to reduce and ease the initially substantiated consequences of irreversible actions. Such is the main task of all forces interested in building a new society through profound reforms.

Neither the reactionary attraction to 19th century capitalism which, actually, has long stopped existing in the developed Western countries, nor the old revolutionary egalitarian utopias or else pseudocontemporary concepts characterized by a merciless technocratic approach or else loud appeals to the working class which, as a rule, ignore its true situation and problems, will yield any results. It is perhaps precisely when the major purge is undertaken in our economy, that the sterility and harm of all the varieties of conservatism on the part of those who are nurtured by the garbage of the bourgeois-land owning past of our country as well as those who try to preserve on a global scale a deformed socialism in its Stalinist and post-Stalinist version, which caused tremendous harm to the ideals of social progress and the values of the left-wing movement, will be manifested most clearly. It would be no exaggeration to say that the positive solution of our problems is possible only through a victorious struggle against both varieties of conservatism, which are tragically trailing behind the conditions and challenges of our time.

One of them, a factor which is of inordinate importance to us, is the process of restructuring, which is working its way through numerous obstacles and contradictions. This process will give a new content and new forms of relations between the labor movement and the left-wing forces in Poland and the USSR and between our societies and states. In the course of the clash with the heavy burden of the past, both distant and recent, gradually the prospects of true friendship and cooperation will take shape, free from expensive ostentation, pompous celebrations and meaningless statements. This means a future of reciprocal relations based on feelings which have nothing in common with the hypocrisy of complacent bureaucrats.

By "process of perestrojka" I have in mind people, for it is precisely the people who decide everything. These may be different people but, above all, they are those who daringly reject stereotypes, who express their doubts as they advance toward new decisions which are consistent with common interests, and who develop new areas, new forms and new culture for our centuries-old life as neighbors. In order for the readers to imagine clearly

both the strong and weak aspects of that to which we aspire in this area, I believe that instead of my own comments I should quote the statements made by T. Mazowieski and M. Rakowski.

The new premier said: "The world is looking at our efforts with respect and, frequently, with sympathy. I would like for all foreign observers watching the changes in Poland to realize that the Polish events do not threaten anyone or undermine international stability. Conversely, international relations which are based on sovereignty and partnership are more stable than an order based on domination and power...."

"The fact that we are open to all of Europe does not mean that we are abandoning our former ties and obligations. The fact that today we repeat that the new government will honor Poland's obligations as an ally is not a tactical device to calm others down. This proceeds from our understanding of Poland's governmental interests and the analysis of the international situation.

"If the day would come when European security no longer needs military blocs, we shall part with them with no regret. We believe that such will be the case. It is important now for all military treaties and alliances to apply only to the external security of their members and not their internal political and economic order. We welcome with hope anything which indicates that such an understanding of international relations is making its way in our part of Europe.

"The supreme objectives of foreign policy retain their significance whatever the circumstances and regardless of the political orientation of a given government. We must not destroy anything which has so far guaranteed the security of our state...."

"Relations between a superpower, such as the Soviet Union, and countries of average size and strength, such as Poland, are essentially a complex problem. A great power formulates, as a rule, claims to a certain zone of security, which is identified in practical terms with a sphere of influence. The sensible approach to this problem should lead to the search of solutions which, on the one hand, would take into consideration the interests of the big power and, on the other, will not harm the sovereignty of our state and will give it full freedom in establishing its own internal system.

"My government tries to develop relations of alliance with the Soviet Union on the basis of the principles of equality and respect for sovereignty. Our union will have firm foundations if it is approved by society. Today favorable conditions to this effect exist. This will also open the way to the unification among our people, which will put an end to the bitter experience of the past and could acquire far-reaching historical significance."

Recently the PZPR Central Committee first secretary said: "The foreign policy of the Mazowieski Government will be the focal point of our attention. The PZPR welcomes with satisfaction its declaration of respecting

the international obligations assumed by our country and relations of alliance with the Soviet Union. However, governmental declarations are only one face of the coin. There is another as well: statements and actions on the part of opposition politicians, and the articles they write.

"Although the opposition did not appear in the country only yesterday, it is now that it has the greatest possible opportunity for pursuing a way of thinking which looks to the West for guarantees which would ensure Poland's national security. This path was traveled by Beck (Joseph Beck was Poland's prewar minister of foreign affairs—editor). We know the way it ended. Finally, another alarming phenomenon is that of the missionary activities of some members of the opposition, who intend to carry the torch of Polish freedom and democracy to their neighbors to the south and even to the east. Having mentioned national security in connection with the eastern borders along which there are no hotbeds of concern, we should be concerned for such hotbeds not to appear all of sudden.

"I believe that the following conclusion could be drawn: if indeed we come across an effort to change the main trend in Polish foreign policy, we should warn that such a reorientation could end in a tragedy for Poland. This may not occur in the life of my generation but is bound to occur in the life of the next one which, and this is not excluded, could all of a sudden wake up within borders which are entirely different for Poland. This must be remembered. We shall speak out most loudly about such a danger!"

We do not live in the most perfect of all worlds. We shall continue to apply efforts to make it better. A great deal should be changed, improved and enriched in Polish-Soviet relations, in the broad meaning of the term, but in such a way as not to destroy anything which has fully proven itself and not to weaken anything which is yielding results. We shall firmly stick to this concept. That is the way the PZPR acts and that is the way will act the party which will develop in the course of our present searches. The Socialist Party of the Polish left-wing forces, regardless of its form, is and will remain a power in Poland, relying on the ideas of the new thinking and aspiring to make its contribution to their inevitable victory.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Export of Services—Possibilities and Problems

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[Article by Igor Mikhaylovich Averin, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations]

[Text] It has been repeatedly stated that the export potential of the Soviet Union consists essentially of raw materials, while imports of industrial commodities are limited by the nonconvertible nature of our national currency. Major structural changes in contemporary global economic relations are increasingly proving that the traditional processing industry (petrochemistry, metallurgy, timber processing) is being moved to the immediate vicinity of raw materials sources. The customary industrial production facilities are being replaced by science-intensive "sectors of the future" (microelectronics, biotechnology, robotics), as well as trade in services (banking, insurance, "know how," transportation and tourism). Obviously, the long-term trend is such that importing raw material goods by the developed capitalist countries will irreversibly decline in the future. Whether we wish it or not, we must become used to the idea that the revolutionary renovation of domestic industrial output and raising it to the level of global standards must be spread out in time. There is even something like a closed circle that is developing. We would be hardly able to rapidly increase competitive commodity exports without purchasing know how and advanced technology; yet without increasing income from exports it would be difficult to maintain many types of industrial output on the proper technological level.

Furthermore, foreign experience proves that a faster return from invested capital is provided more frequently not by selling goods on foreign markets but by exporting services. As to foreign economic results, trade in services is the same operation as deliveries of petroleum, Lada cars or furs. The only difference is that it requires immeasurably fewer outlays of nonrecoverable natural resources. Could services, as an item of export, ensure quite rapidly the earning of foreign exchange contributing to the foreign trade balance of the USSR? No simple answer is possible here. Everything depends on the future strategy in this area.

The developed capitalist countries dominate the international trade in services. Currently they account for more than three-quarters of the sum total of international payments made in the area of services, totaling more than \$1 trillion annually. Naturally, the types and volumes of exported services vary according to the "specialization" of the economies of the individual countries.

Thus, in terms of the balance of payments of Great Britain, in addition to commodity exports, services as a middleman are a major source of income, essentially in the areas of finance, insurance and banking, providing technical expert evaluations, consultations and technical cooperation with foreign partners. On the other hand, in France, Italy, Spain and Greece, in the postwar years an orientation toward the development of tourism and the related service sectors developed, although insurance, loans to foreign clients and other financial operations are also important items in their activities.

Among the developed capitalist countries, the United States holds a special position in the area of trade in services. Income here from export operations based on such activities have been reducing the trade deficit of the country for a number of years, a deficit which regularly appears in the balance of payments of the country. The main income in the service sector in the case of the United States comes from bank interest rates, operations with real estate abroad and financial transactions between American corporations and their branch companies in foreign countries. Substantial dividends are also earned from trade in "intellectual ownership" abroad.

A different situation is developing in the economy of the developing countries, for the overwhelming majority of which the export of services has still not become and is unlikely to become a source of revenue in their balance of payments soon, but rather the opposite. Whenever a developing country is forced to participate in the international trade in services, its role is most frequently reduced to that of net importer.

To the leaders of the capitalist world trade in services is important not only in terms of its foreign economic aspect but also as a means for strategically outstripping their close competitors. The blossoming of the material base of science-intensive services, characteristic of the development of the global economy in recent years, provides new opportunities also from the viewpoint of manpower employment. According to the most conservative estimates, the share of jobs in services in the 10 most developed countries, members of the OECD (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development rallies 19 developed capitalist countries of Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Japan) increased from 45-48 percent of the total number of jobs in 1960 to two-thirds in 1985. Nor should we forget that as the science-intensive nature of many types of services is growing, so do requirements concerning the training of the manpower. It is thus that the area of services also stimulates the cultural development of society as a whole.

The radical economic reform which was initiated in the Soviet Union has activated the service sector as well. Here, however, the iron clutches of centralization are still proving to be more viable than the initial shoots of the socialist market. Nonetheless, it is clear that lagging in the export of some types of services, both by the USSR and the other members of CEMA, could lead rather to a widening of the strategic gap between them and the developed capitalist countries. Such fears are justified not only in terms of science-intensive and technologically advanced services in engineering, the information industry, and robotics but, above all, in the area of banking, insurance and other financial transactions of an international nature. The United Nations Report on Trade and Development for 1988 notes, in particular, that "despite the growing interest shown by the socialist countries in the role played by services in economic growth, this sector still remains rather poorly developed

and its share (in the national economy) is much lower than in countries with a market-oriented economy." It would be difficult to argue against this conclusion.

As to banking and other financial operations, the disruptions in the system of monetary circulation in the Soviet Union and the likelihood of switching to a convertible ruble not before the mid-1990s, lead us to postpone the creation of suitable forms of migration of production capital between the USSR and the industrially developed capitalist countries and, consequently, our emerging on international markets for banking, financial, insurance and other services at a later date. Matters with transportation, tourism and other production activities, classified by Marx as the fourth production area, are in a different situation. In this area we already have adequate prerequisites, including political ones.

For example, the final document issued at the Vienna Meeting of the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe stipulates that the signatories to the Helsinki Process will encourage the formulation of measures aimed at achieving a more economically efficient transportation system and pay special attention to problems related to the network of mixed transport facilities, combined transportation, transit flows and simplification of formalities. Therefore, transportation has been singled out as an area which awaits specific initiatives within the context of the building of a common European home.

The most attractive idea here could be the development of a multinational consortium for the transportation of large containers between Europe and the Far East and back, making use of the handling capacities of the Baykal-Amur Main Railroad. The activities of such a consortium would make it possible to reduce expenditures in the delivery of hundreds of thousands of containers and shorten their travel time, compared with the current system of transportation by sea, across the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. In the future, the maritime branches of the consortium in the Baltic and the Black Sea could be extended to the Eastern shores of North America and North and West Africa. Another option is that of reloading containers from European trains at Soviet border stations.

Interest in the development not only of a European but of a worldwide intermodal (i.e., including various means of freight transportation) haulage system is increasing steadily. For example, in August 1990 the port of Rotterdam will celebrate its 600th anniversary, with the participation of the global public. The next conference on "Peace at Sea" has been timed for that celebration. Its program will include a discussion of problems of a global transportation network and related activities of sea ports. The combination of transoceanic and transcontinental transport technology promises greatly to lower transportation costs for all participants in such cooperation. For us, it is a question of not being trapped by our own sluggishness.

Tourism is an equally important area in building a European home. We must admit that so far the Soviet Union has paid insufficient attention to the currency earning potential of this area in the service industry.

Naturally, if the USSR State Committee for Foreign Tourism or its heir remains the single owner of hotels and tourist complexes and expands the capacity of the Soviet tourist market only on the basis of investments appropriated by the USSR Gosplan, as in the past we shall have to read in the press letters by foreign businessmen on the impossibility of making a business trip to the Soviet Union due to the shortage of hotel accommodations. Neither will the solution of the problems which have developed in tourism be found, obviously, in involving foreign investors, should Inturist retain the exclusive right to be a partner in the development of joint tourist enterprises on Soviet territory: hotels, camp grounds, recreation centers, tourist-sports bases, etc. Such rights and opportunities should be granted to the trade unions, to transportation enterprises specializing in international passenger transportation, to youth tourist bureaus, hunting facilities, and sports clubs and cooperatives.

Although the regulations on decentralizing foreign trade operations were formulated on the basis of governmental resolutions, the 2 December 1988 resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers in particular, their implementation in the area of services remain sluggish. Clearly, it would be useful to formulate a trade-political strategy for the service sector in the form of a similar governmental document or, which would be even more preferable, a legislative act.

Paradoxical though it might seem, under the conditions of the administrative-command system stimulating the development of the trade in services was rather simple. All it took was to create one more ministry and its successes within the country were based on the "jabbering" force of the minister and other departmental officials.

However, the international market in modern services is rejecting excessive centralization in exporting countries even more actively than do commodity markets. Unlike trade in goods, in which quite widespread ways and means of international control over conditions and rules governing trade exist, in the area of the trade in services intergovernmental agreements are only now taking shape and have not adopted sufficiently clear outlines. The most destructive feature for any type of service, domestic or foreign, is excessive regulation with the help of plan indicators and control yardsticks.

A striking example of the harm of scholasticism in planning may be found in the situation which prevails in the area of Soviet maritime transportation. One of our leading shipping enterprises—the Baltic Maritime Shipping Administration—ended its financial activities with negative results throughout the current 5-year period. Income from the export of transport services received in

foreign currency was annually "short" by several million rubles compared to the planned figures after conversion into Soviet currency. Neither the century-old traditions of the participation of Baltic people in international commercial navigation nor the current specialization of the shipping administration in the most profitable maritime business—the hauling of freight for foreign shippers along regular commercial navigation lanes helped. It was rather the opposite: it was precisely income in freely convertible currency that became the source of financial difficulties.

The point is that the plans for cash income earned by Soviet shipping enterprises from commercial activities abroad, which were established for the period until the end of the 1980s, were computed into rubles according to a course issued "from above": \$100 U.S. equaling 85 rubles. Naturally, such a mandatory exchange rate did not contain any innovation in planning "on the basis of the achieved level." This was an old order. However, the difficulties appeared from just about the very first days of the current 5-year period. It turned out that the planning workers were "let down" by the official course of foreign currency exchanges of the USSR Gosbank which, despite its totally unrealistic nature, could not fail to reflect reevaluations in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar on world currency markets. In the past 3 years, the official rate of the dollar had been assessed at 70, 60 or even 56 kopeks without reaching, even for a short time, the 85 kopek mark.

Essentially, the Soviet shipping enterprises were penalized for increasing their earnings in American currency, for the more dollars they earn in maritime transportation the more they will be "short" of income converted into rubles according to the current rate of the Gosbank, compared with the figures which had been issued for 5 years in advanced according to the "planned" rate of exchange.

A new and more realistic exchange rate of foreign currencies for Soviet rubles and vice versa will be introduced starting with 1991 in foreign economic operations. It is to be hoped that the current "commercial," "noncommercial," "tourist," "planning" "figure-currency" and other rates of conversion of the ruble will be finally abandoned. However, the large-scale use of the foreign exchange generating potential of the transportation system in the area of foreign economic services will be possible only by restoring the universally accepted conditions for trade in transportation "output." Accounts for services related to export-import operations should be based on the currency in which the contract was signed or the currency agreed upon by the participants in the deal, including among Soviet partners.

By virtue of its nature, international trade is general tends to increase the competitiveness of a commodity by including transportation, insurance and other services. However, a disruption in the balance of interests of all components of foreign economic activities leads, in the

final account, to substantial losses to the national economy as a whole. This particularly occurs when we are relying on "correcting" the laws governing commodity-monetary relations with methods based on directives.

The successful implementation of the new political approaches to the solution of the problems of foreign economic activities will require new mechanisms. We need integral concepts of long-term sectorial foreign economic strategies which, after proper discussion, would assume the authority of governmental programs. Exceeding the framework of strictly departmental concerns, such programs would become objects of joint implementation not only by ministries but also by the functional institutions of the state, such as the State Foreign Economic Commission, the USSR Ministry of External Affairs, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Finance and other departments. In particular, we could state that if such principles governing the foreign economic policy of the state in the area of commercial navigation, let us say, would be formulated and approved on such a basis, albeit at the beginning of the 12th 5-Year Plan, i.e., at the time of the conversion of the sector to cost accounting, difficulties with foreign exchange rates would have been successfully avoided.

Unfortunately, even today, literally on the eve of the new 5-year plan, no one is as yet able to say clearly what role will be played by the tourist sector or transportation in the foreign economic relations of the USSR in the 1990s. Will their functions as important currency earning sectors of the national economy be strengthened? The answer to this conceptual problem will determine whether the country's balance of payments will benefit from additional income in foreign exchange. In order to earn an additional \$1.5-2 billion annually over the next 5 to 7 years from foreign tourism or exporting transportation services, a strategic decision must be made as of now.

Nonetheless, the Soviet press reported that the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) will continue to set minimal prices for export goods and maximally admissible cost of imported items. Such an intention on the part of the MVES could be triggered only by lack of faith in the mechanism of commodity-monetary relations or unwillingness to surrender administrative control. In our view, the results will be the direct opposite of expectations.

Regardless of what any cooperative member may be swearing to, concerning the keeping of commercial secrets, such secrets cannot be kept. It is more likely that we shall have to sell in the future our own goods only at minimal prices, while purchasing imported goods at maximal prices. The danger, however, is also that this precedent could serve us badly in the area of services.

If the suggested system for price setting in the area of foreign trade procurements is applied to foreign tourism, and if the State Committee for Tourism sets the prices of

services in that sector while the State Committee for Prices continues to approve international Soviet transportation rates for 5 years in advance, the area of services will find itself squeezed in the clutches of that same administrative-command system which, until recently, was firmly protected from the international "rules of the game."

It would be just as wrong to allow matters of price setting in foreign economic activities to be left to the market element. No single country in the world acts this way today. State control of commodity-monetary relations has long become an inseparable part of economic policy. A vast array of methods has been developed which do not clash with the laws of the market but influence its positive development more efficiently than any one of our administrative prohibition formulas.

The cornerstone in economic management, naturally with a stably functioning monetary circulation, is the policy of investments and taxation. What is taking place in our country in this area is, unfortunately, fraught with most difficult consequences and not only in the distant future. It is common knowledge, for example, that the centralized appropriations of the Gosplan for expanding the commercial fleet are being reduced by it with every 5 year period, while the traditions of residual financing cannot ensure even the simple reproduction of the transportation tonnage. Our national economy, therefore, is facing the real prospect of a growing losses in foreign exchange in foreign trade haulage as a result of the inevitably obsolescence and writing off of the sailing fleet.

The simplest way of putting it would be to say that without additional capital investments the maritime transportation system will be unable to fulfill its tasks over the next 10 to 15 years, even at the present volume. Let us not act against our own conscience. Considering the urgent priorities which are facing Soviet society in terms of solving the food and housing problems, the accelerated development of the machine building complex, improving the health care system and the restructuring of public education, it is unlikely that anyone would be convinced by requests for new centralized appropriations for the building of a commercial fleet even for the sake of earning foreign exchange. The key to the solution to such tangled problems, which have developed in recent years in the area of Soviet maritime transportation as, actually, in many other sectors of the national economy, is found in foreign currency cost accounting.

It is time to convert from experimentation with commercial credits in purchasing ships to the universally accepted system. Today ship owners pay the shipyards out of their own pockets no more than 15 to 25 percent of the price of their purchases. The balance is usually carried by using the vessel under construction as collateral. Subsequently, the shipping company makes the payments as stipulated, out of profits from the transportation operations which, in this case, are free from

corporate taxation. The same method is applied to the rolling stock of automotive enterprises engaged in international transports.

From the viewpoint of experience in activities on international markets, Soviet maritime transportation is the best prepared among the production sectors in the Soviet economy for operations stipulated in resolutions on broadening rights in the area of foreign economic activities. It is precisely here that it would be simplest to test the methods for establishing realistic foreign exchange rates and the technique of foreign exchange relations with foreign financial institutions, operations involving the use as collateral of ships built with commercial credit and other securities pertaining to the area of ship building.

All that we have said on the trade in services and foreign economic strategy in this area pertains to our internal problems. However, export trade cannot ignore the characteristics of the contemporary situation in specific areas of the global economy and the specific regional markets.

On the global level, multilateral talks aimed at liberalizing the international system of operations in the service industry are already taking place within the framework of the GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade)—and influential international economic organization which sets on an intergovernmental level the “rules” of global trade in commodities, in which the drafting of an agreement should be completed in about 1 and a half to 2 years. Obviously, this will be followed by so-called sectorial agreements for the individual types of services. The types of transportation to which the regime of liberalization will be extended have already been defined: aviation, maritime transportation and telecommunications.

For reasons beyond its control, the Soviet Union is not a party to such multilateral talks. Should the drafting of agreements in the trade in services be completed within the stipulated deadlines successfully, Soviet exports in this area would encounter, most likely, a qualitatively new situation in the international markets. The insufficient development of the Soviet foreign economic concept in the area of trade in services today is not only restraining the drafting of national legislative acts aimed at protecting the interests of Soviet exporters but also hinders the participation of the Soviet side in the activities of international economic organizations. It is above all necessary to give a specific content to trade-political categories, such as the principle of reciprocity and the regime of the most favored nation. Legislative advantages and penalties operating within the framework of such principles must become well familiar to our foreign partners.

The Soviet exporters of services should know what governmental institutions in the USSR would protect their interests in the case of discrimination or other conflicts on foreign markets. The appearance in Soviet

foreign economic relations of different forms of ownership (state, cooperative, stock holding) also reformulates organizational problems of protecting their property rights. We should acknowledge that in this area our laws are by no means perfect. Clearly, within the framework of the judicial reform, we should contemplate the establishment of specialized legal offices and special legal institutions which would knowledgeably consider commercial disputes among parties to foreign trade deals. It would be naive to expect that Soviet enterprises and organizations, which intend to offer their commodities and services for export, would be granted unlimited freedom of activity on the so-called “free” markets. Unfortunately, we have not even listed the type of services which Soviet organizations could offer on the foreign markets other than the traditional ones. For the sake of such an inventory taking, we should seriously undertake to formulate foreign economic sectorial strategies which would define the objectives, tasks and ways of participation of Soviet organizations operating in the area of services in international cooperation, called upon not only to take into consideration and protect from discrimination the commercial interests of the Soviet side but also to assist in the full inclusion of the Soviet Union in the system of global economic relations.

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What Is Lacking in Public Diplomacy

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[Article by Mikhail Vitalyevich Ozerov, member of the Soviet Peace Committee and first deputy editor-in-chief of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN]

[Text] Never before has there been such extensive popular diplomacy as there is currently in our country. The sharply increased social activeness of the population has brought about significant changes in the dynamics of society. It is becoming increasingly active and creative and functioning more energetically than in the past. The people no longer believe that the only possible way is that of entrusting their fate merely to professional politicians. Naturally, a social movement cannot be a substitute for state diplomacy. However, it could urge politicians to seek even more persistently new solutions and fresh approaches, and could indicate to them surprising alternate ways.

There have been frequent such cases in recent years. To a large extent it was under the influence of public opinion and as a confirmation of its increased influence that Soviet troops were pulled out of Afghanistan and that a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was imposed. The struggle for environmental protection was initiated, albeit with great delay compared with the peoples in the Western countries, by simple citizens of our country and was subsequently take up “on the official level.”

Many of the present actions of the "public diplomats" help and are a kind of mandate issued to professional political leaders. Ever new forms of movements by the public are developing, such as cruises, "waves" of peace, rock music festivals for peace, and joint marches. The topics discussed at the meetings of the "Peace and Human Rights" Debate Club in the premises of the Soviet Peace Committee (SKZM) in Moscow and again in the same premises, in the course of the debates conducted by 17 public commissions, which include many young people and autonomous informal associations, were until recently considered "prohibited."

The very atmosphere at international meetings has changed. Today not rivals but partners, interlocutors, attend roundtable meetings and try to find points of contact, adopt useful features from the other side and share experience. The discussions which take place could be prefaced by the word "reciprocal:" they are respectful, useful and of interest to both sides. The representatives of the Soviet public behave much more freely than in the past. They criticize themselves, including the superior authorities. They speak not only of past but also of present errors. They express regrets that so much efforts and time were wasted in arguing about their own activities, which were always splendid and outstanding in everything, and the affairs of others, which were always wrong.

Nonetheless.....

Nonetheless the efficiency of our social diplomacy could and should be much higher.

Today we frequently hear from the mouths of our Western interlocutors the very same statements and questions. What are the guarantees that perestroika will become irreversible? Will the new Supreme Soviet change the actual situation? What can be possibly be done in the very near future to improve the life of the population? What can the West do to help the Soviet Union? We are asking ourselves similar questions. However, at international meetings, unlike our "domestic" fora (the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet session are the best examples of this) we do not engage in a thorough and open discussion. Instead of thinking seriously, together with our foreign partners, about the further development of events, we occasionally explode and even adopt a defensive position or else start to justify ourselves (and sometimes simply turn the conversation to other topics).

At a roundtable meeting between representatives of the USSR and the United States, recently held in Richmond, the American delegate asked why in our meat stores the shelves were bare; one of the Soviet participants grabbed the microphone: "Yes, we still have difficulties with the meat, but is that the essence of the matter? Richmond has plenty of products but then at every step of the way we see people who are destitute and in rags!" The speaker obviously assumed that he would be thus defending the fatherland. However, the puzzlement of

our interlocutors was natural: how could it be that in the 73rd year of Soviet system the country lacks even the most necessary products? That speaker was like someone coming out of the past. He was less interested in reciprocal understanding than in heating up passions and rebuffing, acting on the basis of the principle of a tooth for a tooth. Naturally, this is much simpler than convincingly to explain to our interlocutors the essence of our economic reform, analyze our own errors and failures and do it in such a way as to make the situation believable, the more so since some of our own "public diplomats" are still living with the fear of the past: How will the leadership react to their words; they act timidly, glancing back, as though a vigilant matron is constantly behind them watching their actions.

Our time, however, urgently demands the **psychological reorientation** of the people's diplomats. Their contemporary activities must develop in new ways, on the basis of a dialogue and debates, without any claim at holding the monopoly on truth.

The process of reorientation is difficult but absolutely necessary. This is particularly noticeable in the antiwar movement. This movement, above all in the West, had an upsurge at the start of the 1980s, when its participants objected to the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe and were ahead of the governments in their demands, demanding an equal withdrawal from blocs, particularly by the USSR and the United States. The situation now has changed. The paradox is that perestroika in our country, which has led to the implementation in the Soviet governmental program of virtually all main demands of the peace fighters, and positive changes in the international arena have "disarmed" the antiwar movement. Clearly, there will always be elements of protest. However, today the struggle for peace consists not only of condemning "imperialist circles which are urging on the arms race," but also of positive peace promoting activity. Such an activity is aimed at implementing a number of tasks: disarmament, economic security, prevention of an ecological catastrophe, protection and development of cultural values, democratization of life, etc.

In other words, the antiwar movement is undertaking to handle new problems and learning how to act on the basis of a universal human platform.

In order to upgrade the efficiency of our social movement, we need substantially stronger "weapons" to be supplied to the Soviet people's diplomats. I remember the conference on "Global Communications—Foundation for Cooperation," which took place not far from Shannon Airport, sponsored by the Irish Peace Institute and the Irish Center for International Cooperation. It was attended by more than 200 members of the public from 20 different countries.

The most frequently heard word during the 4 days of proceedings was "perestroika." Ireland's President Patrick John Hillery, John Kelley, prorector of Dublin

University (professor and parliamentary deputy), Ted Turner (president and owner of the American TBS Television Company, which organized the Good Will Games in Moscow in 1986) and many others spoke of the possibility, thanks to perestroika, of strengthening economic contacts between East and West, the "Issyk-Kul Fora," which "corrects the picture of the Soviet Union," and the "growing openness" of Moscow television. They spoke whereas we... essentially kept silent and listened. The "balance of forces" was obviously unequal: there were more than 40 Americans and only 4 Soviet participants.

Then there was the "baggage!" The Americans and the Western Europeans came with dozens of reports and suitcases full of photographic and video materials; all we planned was a single paper. Our delegates had neither motion picture or video films. They even lacked pamphlets in English with the latest speeches of the Soviet leaders, although the participants in the conference were interested in them. Incidentally, almost always such pamphlets are a stumbling stone: if we are lucky enough to bring some to an international meeting, as a rule, they are several months old.

Such poor "equipment" hastens even further the sad end results: the partners expect of the Soviet delegates useful information, erudition and objectivity. Sometimes they only get the semblance of information and truth.

In speaking of the insufficiently high efficiency of our people's diplomats, let me mention yet another substantial feature: their words could be heard much more loudly and impressively abroad, not only at conferences but also from the broad rostra of television and the press. Naturally, a major bourgeois newspaper is not eager to offer space to a Soviet author. However, it must take into consideration the realities of today and the wishes of the readers to obtain as complete information as possible about a country which is essentially undergoing a new revolution. For the time being, we are still poorly and timidly reaching the Western "mass media" (not to mention "breaking through").

The "image" of the Soviet representative—the extent to which his personality is interesting and vivid—is of unquestionable importance. But so is his "input." Who could be interested, for instance in the announcement made in Hamburg with the help of our public organization, that there will be a "Meeting with a Professor from Kiev. Topic: 'Disarmament and Ecology.?'?" Yet the ad could have been made much more attractive. Furthermore, no special efforts would have been required to report what was, in fact, the case: A corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences had arrived (not a professor), and people's deputy of the USSR, who had worked in Chernobyl from the very first hours of the accident and who has his rather original program for solving ecological problems. Such an announcement would have unquestionably generated a great deal more interest, the more so since ecology excites literally everyone in the FRG.

A poor propaganda effect is one of the main difficulties in the activities of Soviet social organizations. Both in our country and abroad little is known about the nature of Soviet public diplomacy and its new ways and means.

The people in the West want not only to find out about us as much as possible but also to carry out joint projects with us. However, as practical experience indicates, in this area we disappoint our partners particularly frequently.

The "Alerdink Fund" sponsored a conference at the Ritz Hotel, in the center of Paris, on "A New Future for East and West." The names of the participants spoke for themselves: Dzenek Gorzeni, member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee secretariat and editor-in-chief of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO; V.V. Zagladin, advisor to the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman; the well-known American journalist Paul Salinger; Jean Francois-Poncet, former French minister of foreign affairs; L.P. Kravchenko, general director of TASS; Kurt Bidentkopf, West German political expert; Donald Kendall, president of the American company Pepsico; Arthur Hartman, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, etc.

We heard a number of flattering words about our country. However, there was criticism as well. Particularly frequent was the following: we would make an agreement with the Soviets on a joint project, after which it sinks in your bureaucratic swamp with all sorts of coordinations and connections. Frequently, Moscow does not give us an sensible answer for their reasons for abandoning one initiative or another; one cannot understand at what stage and on whose decision the project was discarded.

While accepting the justice of such criticism, nonetheless, in turn we blamed our partners for their slowness and indecisiveness and the fact that some of them prefer now to apply the following tactic: You, in Russia, make effort and carry on your perestroika whereas for us it is better to wait and look at how everything will end and only then determine whether it is worth cooperating with you. We pointed out that contacts can be developed only by reaching out to one another.

Here is what I think, as I remember the conference at the Ritz: There, as in other similar international meetings, a great deal of accurate statements were made which were then virtually forgotten when it came to their practical implementation. This included entirely specific suggestions. At that time we seemed to have agreed on a number of joint actions such as sponsoring Soviet-American television programs, publishing books on "How Are We Entering the Third Millennium?" and others. However, months have already passed and such ideas have shown no progress....

So far, our people's diplomats have been unable to achieve the type of independence in their actions, views and judgments which are natural in terms of their social status. It is no accident that our Western colleagues

frequently accuse us of the fact that there is an obvious domination of officials in Soviet public organizations, people who are ready to support any official action taken by Moscow and cannot and, in some cases, do not want to influence their country's foreign policy.

Several years ago, such accusations hit the target. Until recently a person interested in what to do to protect his family from death was told: contribute to the Peace Fund, participate in demonstrations (when we call you), and work harder.... Is it amazing that in our country there were more than enough officials and "activists" and obviously little live interest and that we frequently simulated the extensive participation of the masses in the antiwar movement.

To this day a certain dependency, red tape and bureaucratism influence Soviet public diplomacy. This is manifested also in the fact that, as in the past, we do not always boldly seek contacts with "outside" organizations (although in the past 2 years, for example, contacts between the Soviet Peace Committee and antiwar movements in the West have tripled). This is also manifested in frequent efforts to avoid a "conflict," or a discussion of sharp, not to mention sensitive problems of our country, to make the discussion milder if it becomes too painful. It is also manifested in the preparations for foreign trips: as in the past, the procedural matters are cumbersome, long and imperfect; delegations include people who have been chosen by no means always on the basis of their professional qualities but on the basis of position, personal relations, and so on. Finally, the fact that among the leaders of public organizations there still are people who think as in the past, people who are indifferent or simply tired.

If the further democratization of a social movement is to be achieved, it is important to involve in it an increasing number of people. Everyone must feel that his voice will be heard and that he has made a contribution to the formulation of the most important decisions. I believe that the committees for the defense of peace in the various republics and cities could play a noteworthy role in the work of the soviets of people's deputies.

We must have social movements and not organizations with their typical conservative features, such as a hierarchical ladder, command ties between the center and the subordinate areas, "apparatus games," etc. Not only people who are knowledgeable in foreign policy but also those who are sincerely interested, who can be truly informal leaders, should engage in social diplomacy. Bureaucratism, like dependency and careerism, could reduce to naught the efforts of hundreds of enthusiasts.

One of the main "prescriptions" for the acceleration of perestroika in popular diplomacy is the decentralization of the leadership and shifting the center of gravity to regional, to local levels. We should undertake the creation of new groups and organizations and departments of already existing organizations. This could consist of small groups at enterprises, above all those which have

business contacts with foreign partners. There is a real possibility of making more active use of the potential of scientific institutes and schools by involving in the formulation of various projects not only noted scientists but creative young people. It may be expedient to set up special commissions on international problems under the soviets of people's deputies so that they may use the opportunities provided by foreign policy on the municipal level.

We should not ignore the cooperative movement as one of the ways of expanding the infrastructure of popular diplomacy. Its involvement will enhance the participation of new categories of citizens, including those who have little representation in public organizations. Along with their peace-making mission, such cooperatives could efficiently deal with problems such as the implementation of economic programs, the international upbringing of the working people, the struggle against AIDS, etc.

Noteworthy in this connection is the creation of the Soviet "Members of Cooperatives for Peace and Survival of Mankind" Association. Delegates to its constituent conference, which was held on 22 July in Moscow, noted that the professional orientation of the association would make it possible to interest in establishing contacts with it by many foreign partners new to the Soviet social movement, including those which have significant influence in governmental and business circles in their own countries. The appeal which was drafted stipulates that "the world cooperative community" which numbers more than 700 million members and is a powerful socioeconomic force, could and should exert a positive influence on the planet's political, ecological, social and moral climate."

It is very important to merge within a single entity the currently existing "triangle" of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and social organizations. Two of those three have already begun to interact: it has become the practice regularly to hear in our parliament reports on the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, at one of the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, an interested discussion took place on the statement by V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs. Also discussed at that session was the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a new department for liaison with the USSR Supreme Soviet, which should also deal with problems of people's democracy.

I believe that the Soviet Peace Committee, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and other organizations should make even more active use of the experience of their foreign colleagues working in different institutes, groups and foundations. For example, when the discussion turns to one problem or another, one can frequently hear from the heads of organizations the already sacramental phrase: "We are short of forces."

Short of forces? The "Alerdink Fund" we mentioned, however, consists of no more than three people: Frantz Lervink, president and founder, his wife and a secretary. Nonetheless, this fund organizes exchanges of journalists and publications and publishes books and bulletins. How can it do all this? The short answer is, thanks to its energy, enthusiasm and lack of bureaucratic hindrances. Naturally, there is an economic incentive and it would be naive to assume that Lervink, who is a big Dutch businessman, who owns the Phillips Works, is not a practical man. Therefore, why not study most closely the activities of this fund?

Incidentally, our partners do not shun foreign experience. Members of Soviet delegations are literally drowned in the West in questions about the structure of social organizations, work methods, plans, and so on. They ask not out of simple curiosity; our colleagues compare their actions with our own and adopt their useful aspects.

We too, unquestionably, could learn something from social movements in the FRG, the United States, France, and other countries. This applies to developing direct and constant contact with people, the ability to attract true enthusiasts and to support them (which would include bonuses, for they frequently spend their own money on the publication of pamphlets and posters, travels from one city to another and even abroad, to sponsor meetings or demonstrations). This also involves independent action, without checking with superiors....

As we study our reciprocal experience, it is important to draw maximal benefits from meetings with people with whom we attend roundtables or share a hall. This is in order not to be like in the familiar poem, "face to face, we do not see the face." Without "reciprocal application" (without a clear understanding, for example, of the reasons for the success of that same "Alerdink Fund") we cannot raise social diplomacy to a modern level and to the requirements of the present. Yet, we must do so. It is only thus that it will become what it should be: a most powerful instrument in the struggle for the common survival and radical improvement of our life.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

'Yuridicheskaya Literatura': What is New?

905B0009R Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 89 (signed to press 4 Oct 89) pp 120-123

[Discussion by Yu. Kudryavtsev and E. Machulskiy]

[Text] **To the extent to which this is possible in our book publishing, the fast reflection in publications of the efforts in juridical science and the publication in mass editions of the text of laws and popular manuals for the population is**

particularly important in the course of the political and legal reform. The lion's share of this work is done by the All-Union Izdatelstvo Yuridicheskaya Literatura. Yu. Kudryavtsev, editor of the government-legal section of *KOMMUNIST*, discusses the work of its collective and the prospects of the publishing house with its director E. Machulskiy.

[Kudryavtsev] This year Yurizdat published a small booklet—an initiative-minded draft Law on the Press and Other Mass Information Media. Subsequent to that publication, the authors of the draft were hired to work for the commission of deputies. The result, clearly, was a variant quite close to the optimal. Do you plan on supporting such initiatives?

[Machulskiy] Naturally, the publication of such an unusual material is the direct result of perestroika and democratization. Many shortcomings in the new laws are greatly related to the fact that they were not extensively discussed and not only by the general public, but even by scientists. Now the democratic requirement of publicly discussing draft laws has been legislatively codified. It was at that point that three authors—Yu. Baturin, M. Fedotov and V. Entin—suggested to the publishing house to publish their own draft at their own expense. We immediately agreed, hoping that this would be a contribution to the common project, which is drafting an optimal variant of the law.

The publishing house is considering two other similar requests: a draft initiative for a law on archives and archival work, and on USSR Cosmonautics. We support these suggestions for, in the final account, they benefit perestroika.

[Kudryavtsev] What is the attitude of the official authorities to such publications of yours?

[Machulskiy] They differ. This is understandable, for the drafting of many laws, for some reason, so far had been assigned to the departments which, as we know, frequently submit drafts which are quite far from optimal....

[Kudryavtsev] Eduard Ivanovich, let us now speak of the publishing house itself. You have been its director since 1984. What, let us put it this way, did you inherit? What are the strong points of the publishing house today and what is still being resolved with difficulty?

[Machulskiy] The strongest aspect of Yurizdat is its very erudite and highly skilled group of editors. This is a good legacy, the backbone on which everything stands. Naturally, however, there also are problems remaining from the past.

As the prestige of juridical science and the efficiency of legislation declined so did the authority of legal books. This was not our fault, for such processes were taking place throughout the entire society. To us this decline in prestige was felt in everything, even in the availability of

paper and printing facilities. Five years ago, our publishing plan called for 62.2 million printer sheets. Since the beginning of the perestroika processes, the volume of output has been increasing; we were helped in this by the State Committee for the Press and we learned how to procure a few things on our own initiative. Thus, in 1988 we totaled 133 million printer sheets; in other words, we published twice as many books as we did 5 years ago.

Nonetheless, both in the past and today there has been a scarcity of legal publications in the stores while demand has increased sharply. We have received abundant mail on this subject. The requests of even Soyuzkniga cannot be met by more than one-third. On this level Yurizdat is in the worst possible situation. The response to our appeal to the State Committee led, at best, to a one-time "infusions." No radical measures were taken. The situation, I believe, is beginning to change following the adoption of the party resolutions on the legal reform and universal legal training. Currently the committee is drafting a resolution on drastically increasing the production of legal publications.

[Kudryavtsev] In general, the fact that such works do not remain unsold can only be a reason for satisfaction!

[Machulskiy] Depends on the type of works. If we speak of legal publications, not to mention the text of laws, commentaries and reference manuals for the population, I think that we should have even more than we need. This is a particular kind of literature. The "*Legal Manual for the Population*," which was published in an edition of 300,000 copies, was sold out in a few hours! We must at least double our paper and printing capacity.

[Kudryavtsev] Until this happens, where you intend to find further possibilities for the forthcoming mass publication of dozens of new laws and commentaries for them?

[Machulskiy] Immediately after the new laws have been passed we shall be ready to publish them in large editions, using our internal reserves, which will include making some changes in our publishing plan. Naturally, the help of Goskompechat is most important. In my view, we must somewhat review the existing ratios in the production of literary works and increase facilities for the publication of legal books. Furthermore, the State Committee intends to suggest to other publishing houses—central and republic—to duplicate the most popular books needed by the people, which we publish.

Another major reserve should be mentioned: the cooperatives. Today many of them are being sharply criticized and this criticism is frequently justified. As to editorial-middlemen cooperatives, their activities can be assessed only as positive. The reason is, perhaps, that they locate paper stocks where paper has been sitting for years and, in the final account, been discarded.

As you know, the cooperatives have no right to publish books independently and they can do this only on the basis of cooperation with publishing houses. If assigned

by us, they could do the entire work related to the publication of a book (editing, formatting, and so on) and then submit it to us for review and printing. We publish the book under our own name. On our instruction, the cooperatives take the copies from the printing press and, on the basis of a contract with Soyuzkniga or any other state organization, markets them. Incidentally, we set for such joint publications prices which are close to the current price lists. In this case Yurizdat earns a certain percentage of the nominal value of the edition. Above all, this means that books which are necessary and interesting can be produced over and above the plan.

[Kudryavtsev] This would be indeed very helpful, providing that the cooperatives are not hindered. Let us talk about books on jurisprudence. What do you think about them today? Which among them could be classified as successes for your publishing house?

[Machulskiy] Perestroika, the reform of the political and legal system, demand of juridical science and, therefore, of the books, a profound analysis of what is taking place, a projection of social processes and substantiation of new concepts and models of legal regulation in the various areas of life. In this case we cannot do without a clash among viewpoints or discussions. The books must be such as to look ahead, to outstrip the legislator and not march behind governmental or party decisions, performing, as has frequently been the case in the past, merely commentary functions.

Starting with last year, we began to make active use of roundtable meetings, scientific conferences and debates. It is on their basis that several books have already been published. The first among them "*Pravo Sobstvennosti v SSSR*" [Ownership Rights in the USSR], was the first of the entire series entitled "Problems, Discussions, Suggestions." The series will include "*Cooperatives Today and in the Future*," "*Truth and Truth Only*" (on the reform of the judicial system), "*Soviet Legislation: Ways of Perestroika*," and other books. Together with the editors of IZVESTIYA we held a roundtable meeting on "The Socialist Law-Governed State: Concept and Ways of Implementation." This was a rather sharp discussion with the participation of legal scientists and practical workers and journalists, which will be the basis for a book soon to be published. As I already pointed out, the production of books for the mass readers has increased considerably. Perestroika, the building of a law-governed state, are being substantially hindered by the low level of information on the part of the population about its rights and obligations and ways of defending its legitimate interests. Nor is it a secret that the level of legal standards on the part of private citizens and officials leaves a great deal more to be desired.

Let me emphasize the following: first, the number of copies of reference publications of different kinds has been increased substantially. Second, we have undertaken the publication of books as part of the "Legal

Knowledge for All," series. The first such book: "*Grazhdanin i Zakon*" [The Citizen and the Law] by I. Dyuryagin is as though a continuation of the discussion initiated by D. Chechot in his work "*Kak Zashchitit Svoe Pravo*" [How to Defend Your Rights], which came out in 1987 and was favorably reviewed in your journal. Dyuryagin's book, so far, has come out in no more than 100,000 copies. We are currently printing an additional 200,000, although in my view it should reach a million. This book is exceptionally rich in content. It includes a great deal of important legal information covering essentially all cases in life. We are preparing several more works of this nature.

Third, we are planning to publish a series of books aimed at upgrading the knowledge of practical workers, similar to the aid by V. Romanov "*Uchis Primenyat Zakon*" [Learn How to Apply the Law]. We are changing the form of presentation of the material: it will include a great deal of business games and practical sessions; some topics will be in the form of questions and answers.

Things are more difficult in the case of scientific publications and monographs. Clearly, the reason here is that so far legal science has not fully interpreted the perestroika processes and developed a sufficient background. We are concerned with the problem of publishing books on the law-governed state. By no means is everything in this area clear to and understood by the scientists. So far we have been able to publish only two albeit quite interesting books on this topic: the one by S. Alekseyev "*Pravovoye Gosudarstvo—Sudba Sotsializma*" [The Law Governed State is the Destiny of Socialism] and the collection "*Glasnost: Mneniya, Poiski, Politika*" [Glasnost: Opinions, Searching, Policy]. We hope that it is on the same level that the following books will be prepared for publication by the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990: "*Socialism: Law and Social Progress*," by L. Yavich; "*Private Life: Limits of Interference*," by I. Petrukhin; "*Bureaucratism and Surmounting It*," by M. Piskotin and others.

Progress toward a law-governed state begins above all with the restoration of violated legality. This process, in terms of the victims of Stalinist arbitrariness, was initiated by the party and is actively continuing. In 1988 Yurizdat published a two volume work "*Reabilitirovan Posmertno*" [Rehabilitated Posthumously]. The editors have in their portfolio notes by the military prosecutor (on the work of the Commission for Rehabilitation), a book on the events in Kuropaty, the recollections of A. Mirek, who was illegally sent to jail twice, and other similar works.

We are also interpreting the latest experience in the democratic renovation of the country. The book "*Pervyye Vybory: Itogi i Uroki*" [First Elections: Results and Lessons] is being prepared for publication.

[Kudryavtsev] It seems to me that in our current search for optimal management mechanisms and ways of updating many institutions within the civil society and

the drafting of wise laws based on morality and justice, the legacy of the great philosophers of the past and, in particular, of outstanding Russian jurists, assumes tremendous significance. The publishing plans for 1989-1990 which I have been shown include three or four such books. Is this not too little? Do you, perhaps, have some other plans?

[Machulskiy] Personally, I consider this topic very important. I agree with you that it would be more difficult to solve today's theoretical and practical problems without turning to history, to the thinkers of the past.

I must direct your attention to the book by E. Kuznetsov "*Filosofiya Prava v Rossii*" [Philosophy of Law in Russia], which came out in 1989. The publishing house is also continuing with the series "From the History of Political and Legal Thinking," which was initiated 10 years ago. A book about P. Kropotkin has just come out. However, the modern reader finds, in my view, much more interesting current works by Russian scientists. That is why we have already started a new series, "Works of Outstanding Jurists," which will include the works of prerevolutionary and Soviet authors. First to be published was a collection of the works of S. Yushkov, our greatest Russian and Soviet historian of law; books are being prepared on noted prerevolutionary authors such as I. Foynitskiy, S. Muromtsev, L. Petrazhitskiy, N. Korkunov and others. We are planning the publication of one or two collections annually. Let me also point out that this year above plan publications will include books about A. Kon and B. Utevskiy.

Furthermore, we have asked our outstanding juridical scientists to compile our first encyclopedic reference to be entitled "*Russian Jurists*." It will include more than 500 biographies and bibliographic references. We are planning a unique publication to be entitled "*Encyclopedia of Russian Law*."

[Kudryavtsev] Will this reference include jurists from the Soviet period, and if so, what selection criteria will you use?

[Machulskiy] This is a difficult question. Some of the known prerevolutionary Russian jurists continued, as we know, to work after the revolution, and many of them will be included. The question with our contemporaries, scientists and, even more so, practitioners, is more difficult. What criteria should we use in selecting them, particularly in the case of people who are still alive? One may be an elderly doctor and professor without having made any noticeable contribution to the development of science; meanwhile, a young scientist may have said something new and promoted the advancement of science. Should it be based on official position? Should we list anyone who has ever held a leading position within the legal system regardless of the marks he has left, if any? So far, we have not determined the criteria. On the ethical level as well it is difficult to solve such problems when it comes to living jurists. For the time being, we

shall limit ourselves to those who have passed away and whose merits have been rated by history to one extent or another. Nonetheless, we are preparing a book dealing with our contemporaries. This will be the reference work "*Jurists—People's Deputies of the USSR.*"

[Kudryavtsev] A new book also means a new editor. What type will he (more frequently she) be chosen as Yurizdat editor by the turn of the 1990s? What is the condition today of the publishers' "kitchen?"

[Machulskiy] In the past the editor had very little independence. The main requirement was to be the prime sensor of the opinion of the authors. Now the editor becomes the true maker of the book and, quite frequently, its co-author.

Relations between the editor and the administration are structured in our case on a contractual basis. The editor is issued only 50 percent of his plan while the remaining 50 percent become his choice. The editor will seek for himself topics and authors, and develop the structure and content of the book. Interesting finds resulted from such a structure. This includes the collection "*Smertnaya Kazn: Za i Protiv*" [The Death Penalty: For and Against], which includes the works of more than 40 authors, both modern Soviet and prerevolutionary Russian. The head editor of this work also acted as its compiler, interviewer and author of the preface.

Since last spring the editors have been working on a cost accounting basis. Instead of the former specialized editorial boards, creative groups of small collectives of two to three like-minded people, who were granted quite broad rights, were set up. However, nearly one-half of the editors work altogether independently, on an individual basis. The result of such a reorganization was a substantial improvement in the quality and relevance of the books which are being published.

Thanks to economic perestroika, the more intensive work of editors has also resulted in additional material incentives. I can point out that the income of the editors (salaries, supplements, bonuses, and so on) averages 500 rubles per month or more. Let me also add that the work style has loosened, for what is important is not to sit behind a desk but to achieve results.

The use of cost accounting within the publishing house coincided with the solution of yet another major problem: saturating the editorial process with electronic equipment. Phototypesetting has been used by us for many years. In the past, however, it had little to do with the work of the editors. In all developed countries the editors have long abandoned the use of fountain pens, glue, erasers, etc. Everything is being done on personal computers. Editors of Yurizdat have now begun to master these facilities.

This not only lowers production outlays but, above all, makes it possible to accelerate the editing and publishing process and to upgrade the quality of the books. The psychology of editorial work itself changes. From the

viewpoint of the technology of publishing, computerization offers yet another advantage: in reprinting a book the manuscript does not have to be prepared yet once again. All that is necessary is to make changes in the text kept in the machine memory.

Computerization and cost accounting proved to be quite closely interconnected. We set up three groups which lease personal computers. Books are being written on the basis of contracts with the management of the publishing house. Substantial savings are achieved with the help of the new technology and, in particular, in the proofing of the galley. Most of the funds thus saved are left at the disposal of the groups, thus creating additional material incentive for editorial work.

[Kudryavtsev] Judging by what you are telling me, it is clear that something like a model of perestroika in publishing is taking place at Yurizdat. It would be interesting, in this connection, how in general is restructuring taking place within the Goskompechat system, the more so since you were recently made chairman of the council of directors of the country's publishing houses.

[Machulskiy] In my view, the main thing now is to reduce and, in the future, totally to eliminate administrative-command relations in this area. If such a system is intolerable in the economy it is even more harmful in ideology and culture. Here as well we see several solutions.

The first is to continue with the reassignment of functions between the publishing houses and the state committee, something which was already started on the initiative of its former management. We hope that the Committee for the Press will continue to ease its "supervision" of publishing houses and will grant them even greater independence, as was the case, for example, with the area of topic planning. Whereas in the past all plans were approved by Goskomizdat, today no one interferes in such matters. The second way is to create associations of Soviet book publishers. Agreement has been reached on this subject between the committee's leadership and the council of directors which, precisely, is drafting a legal foundation for such a self-governing type of organization.

Bearing in mind the condition of our economy, the backwardness of printing facilities, the shortage of paper, and so on, in my view we must create publishing-printing associations which should assume full responsibility for increasing book production. Yurizdat also intends to follow this trend. Some elements needed for the organization of such associations on the basis of the publishing houses have already been developed: we have publishing houses, progressive publishing photo-offset printing centers and a cooperative operating in the publishing house, active information-propaganda and book trade unions (incidentally, the State Committee for the Press allowed it to market independently books produced above the plan). We are seeking partners in the printing area. In our view, it would be expedient to concentrate within

Yurizdat the production of all legal journals and convert their setting to computerized equipment sooner.

[Kudryavtsev] Yurizdat is the only specialized publishing house in the country in legal publications. Does this mean that the creation of associations and judging from everything you have told us now that there will be a definitive monopolization in the publication of legal works?

[Machulskiy] By no means! Currently our publishing house accounts for more than 50 percent of all legal publications in the country. However, this accounts for only 10 percent of the titles published. What kind of monopoly is this! We are opponents of monopoly even within the publishing house. For example, we publish simultaneously textbooks with different views expressed by their authors. Let them compete. Let the reader judge.

Furthermore, there is such a great shortage of legal publications that the problem of clarifying relations so far remains immaterial. For the time being we must eliminate the shortage and saturate the bookstores with publications for which there is urgent need, such as codes of laws, legal manuals for the population, and law commentaries. This is the main thing.

As to quality, let various publishing houses publish legal works. In my view, there should be healthy competition in this area. This is the main incentive for upgrading the quality of books on legal topics, meeting the demands of our time.

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Nikolay Bukharin Against the 'Austrian School'

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[Review by Yu. Rubin, candidate of economic sciences, and G. Shmelev, doctor of economic sciences, of the book by N. Bukharin "Politicheskaya Ekonomiya Rantye" [Political Economy of the Rentier]. Orbita, Moscow branch, 1988, 192 pp]

[Text] Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin.... Only 2 years ago, what did we know about the theoretical concepts and views of this man who, to repeat after V.I. Lenin, was "the most valuable and greatest party theoretician?" "Renegade" from Marxism-Leninism, "conciliationist," "defender of the interests of the kulaks," leader of the "buffer group," or "right-wing member of the opposition," is a very "modest" list of the descriptions which accompanied the rare mention of his name in the press. Furthermore, there were also political labels, insults and dirty abuse hurled at him in front of the entire world, in the course of the trial of the so-called "right-wing Trotskyite bloc."

The political accusations with which Bukharin was charged were combined for many years with denigrating

references to him as a pseudoscientist. This did not vanish without a trace. Several generations of philosophers and economists, historians and sociologists began their careers by firmly believing that Bukharin was a malicious opportunist who steadily deviated from the party line.

Today, under conditions of glasnost, we have been given the opportunity to study Bukharin's theoretical principles directly on the basis of his works. In less than 1 year, as though out of nowhere, there reappeared "Lenin's political legacy," "The Memory of Ilich," "The Way to Socialism and the Worker-Peasant Alliance," "Notes of an Economist," and others among his works. Unquestionably, such initial publications and reprints will be followed by other.

One of the books which has been freed from the "special storage" shelves is "The Political Economy of the Rentier." This year marked the 70th anniversary of its first publication. The manuscript was completed as early as 1914 in Vienna, where Bukharin lived after fleeing from his place of exile. At that time his idea was to provide an expanded and systematic criticism of bourgeois political economy. He had the opportunity to attend lectures at the university in Vienna, given by the popular economist Yevgeniy Bem-Baverk, whose writings enjoyed very great success in some circles because of their anti-Marxist trend. It was under the influence of his fresh impressions from such lectures that Bukharin wrote his first major theoretical work.

However, he was unable to publish the book in 1914. Destiny separated Bukharin from his creation. The political struggle took him out of Austria and to Switzerland and, subsequently, Sweden, Norway and the United States. For a long time the manuscript was lost and it was only in February 1919 that it reached Russia.

This work was published first in Russia in 1919, although some materials which were subsequently added to the book, had been published by Bukharin earlier, in 1913-1914. At the end of 1988 Izdatelstvo Orbita was able to reprint the 1925 edition.

The main content of "The Political Economy of the Rentier" is the defense, promotion and development of Marxist economic science and, above all, Marx's theory of value and added value. Let us emphasize that Bukharin remained loyal to this topic subsequently as well. In 1933, after the routing of the "right-wing deviation," after he had been forced to abandon active scientific work, he was able to publish the article "Marx's Theory and its Historical Significance," in which he summed up studies in this area.

The reader of this work will easily understand that this is a book written not simply by a Marxist who totally accepted the labor theory of value and added value, but by an orthodox Marxist in the best meaning of the term. Bukharin's attitude toward Marx's theory is even excessively emotional and one feels sometimes that it is motivated by "a single but fiery zeal," the aspiration to

convince the readers of the inviolability of Marx's doctrine and the absolute groundlessness and lack of substantiation of attacks against him on the part of bourgeois economists. Bukharin acts as the zealous defender of Marxism, finding in the course of the dispute new substantial theoretical arguments which prove not only the good political and economic knowledge of this young scientist (Bukharin was only 26), but also his maturity and ability to defend his views in a debate with serious opponents.

A thoughtful analysis of this old work by Bukharin and, above all, the nature of the polemics between Bukharin and Bem-Baverk could be very useful and instructive. It enables us not only to find the sources of Bukharin's development as a political economist and to identify his strong and weak sides and assess his contribution to the defense and development of Marxism but also to understand some important features in the development of Marxist doctrine in our country in the post-October period, and the organization of a domestic Marxist study in the course of surmounting anti-Marxist views.

In order to accelerate the process of surmounting dogmatic and scholastic interpretations of Marx's doctrine, which has legitimately developed under the conditions of perestroika, it is important to determine when, at what stage, did a withdrawal begin in our social sciences from the creative developments of Marxism and toward simple commenting and study of sources, while in fact, well concealed artificially selected quotations and conversion of Marx into the theoretician and ideologue of inefficient economic management and outlay price-setting methods and the command-administrative system.

Yevgeniy Bem-Baverk, who was opposed by Bukharin, was a convinced anti-Marxist, something which no one of his contemporaries doubted. His socioeconomic concept was based on idealizing capitalist production relations and the ideas of universal harmony within which workers and capitalists would exchange services and "values" on a mutually profitable basis. The workers "serve" the capitalists with their labor and the latter offer the workers the possibility to work. Bukharin justifiably pointed out the nonhistoric nature of Bem-Baverk's approach to the study of capitalist society. According to Bem-Baverk, capitalism was merely an economic system founded on labor with the help of means of production (the "circuitous way" of production). However, Bukharin wrote, we combine to the concepts of capital, capitalist, and so on, the concept not of social harmony but of class struggle" (p 124).

Efforts to legitimize the eternal nature of capitalism as a harmonious society led Bem-Baverk to the formulation of a subjectivistic theory of profit in which Bukharin was particularly critically interested. According to Bem-Baverk, "real goods always have a greater value than future goods of the same nature and in the same amount." However, according to his logic, labor has not a present but a "future" value. In other words, its value

is determined by the value of the useful goods it creates. Since future needs, according to Bem-Baverk, are objectively assessed by the people as lesser than the present, the actually existing goods turn out to be more "valuable" than the labor, the value of which is manifested only in the future. The result is that profit is merely the difference between two different assessments and, in general, exists only in the subjective ideas of the participants in the production process. "...Bem-Baverk," Bukharin wrote, "does everything possible to distort the concept of the social foundations of profit.... He tries to avoid any contact with the social aspect of a reality which must be analyzed" (pp 137-138).

In his book Bukharin acts as a defender of the labor theory of value. He justifiably notes that "if we consider the entire theoretical 'system' developed by Bem-Baverk and then try to break the individual aspects of this system apart, we would see that their theory of value is the foundation of the theory of profit; the theory of value, therefore, plays the official role" (p 170). It is precisely from this viewpoint that Bukharin criticized the theory of value of the "Austrian school," which opposed Marx's doctrine. In principle, Bukharin's approach is the right one. Value is created, as is profit, thanks to labor and not thanks to the subjective views of production agents on the extent to which a commodity is useful. Bukharin was firm in defending in this case the labor theory of value.

However, although right in principle, Bukharin underestimated some concepts expressed in the theory of the "Austrian school." Let us point out that such an underestimating had quite important consequences in the further development of Bukharin's political-economic views and the development of "anti-Austrian" trends in the domestic science of economics, many of the elements of which developed precisely in the course of the dispute with the "Austrian school." In criticizing Bem-Baverk for his one-sided analysis of values exclusively from the viewpoint of consumption, Bukharin pitted against him a no less one-sided approach, which was exclusively based on production. Therefore, although his motivations were good, Bukharin unwittingly simplified Marx's theory, which considered values above all from the viewpoint of reproduction.

Anyone who has studied Marx's theory knows that his interpretation of value was not based on "production" positions, although the theory of value in the development of which he actively participated is a labor theory, but on "commodity" positions. According to Marx value is an attribute of the commodity, i.e., it is the bearer of consumer value, of the useful products which can satisfy the needs of the people. "...An object cannot be a value if it is not an object of consumption," he wrote. "If it is useless, the work invested in it becomes useless. It is not considered work and, therefore, it does not form any kind of value" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 23, p 49). Bukharin justifiably noted the vulnerability of Bem-Baverk's structure was based on nonhistoric views on the question of value. However, his criticism was weakened by the fact that he tried to link it

to the "consumerist approach" adopted by Bem-Baverk. The consumer is subjective in evaluating material goods. This is true. However, are the producers who assess the value of their own commodities objective? Value is a socially necessary outlay which cannot be familiar to any one of the commodity producers before the start of the purchase and sale act. It is no accident that Marx noted that the value of a commodity is not something which everyone knows how to handle.

We believe that at this point we should say a few words on the way Marx, Bukharin and Bem-Baverk viewed the very definition of value. As we know, to Marx the word "value" meant that which we have always understood as "cost." It is precisely a question of the word and not of the category "cost," which has a clear ontological content. Therefore, the categories of "consumer cost," "exchange cost" and "added cost" are the same in Marxian definitions as the categories of "consumer value," "exchange value" and "added value" which, incidentally, were quite popular at the start of the 20th century in Russian political economy, which used the traditional translation of the German word "Wert" into Russian precisely as value and not as cost. Bem-Baverk as well writes about "consumer value" and "trade value," with the assumption that "the division of values into consumption and trade... is as old as is our science."

Bukharin conceived of value only in terms of the cost of the commodity. Therefore, he came to the idea that Bem-Baverk allegedly confused different factors of a commodity and gave cost consumer and, consequently, nonhistorical and subjective features. In reality, in distinguishing between the consumer and the trade value of a commodity, Bem-Baverk followed, as he himself emphasizes, Adam Smith (and, let us add, it is precisely in this area that he did not conflict with Marx who believed that there is nothing in common between the consumer value and cost other than the presence of the word "cost" conceived as "consumer value").

Bukharin justifiably criticized his scientific opponent for confusing between the objective and subjective aspects of the value (cost) of commodities, according to which, the price is based, in the final account, on the subjective evaluation of individuals rather than objective factors. However, Bukharin was wrong in totally rejecting the role of consumption in determining—on a labor basis—the cost of commodities.

Overemphasizing production in defining costs and underestimating consumption which could indirectly influence the shaping of socially necessary outlays were quite widespread in domestic economic science. It is being said, in particular, that such concepts were superimposed subsequently on the real practices of economic management. The principle of developing production at all cost, while restricting consumption and undertaking the rationing of products appeared, combined with such an interpretation of cost, entirely suitable. Subsequently, when the methods of organizing and regulating the

economy, which developed during the period of industrialization, became absolutized and declared truly socialist, the trend toward "production for the sake of production" was given additional impetus although, under the conditions of the breakdown of commodity-monetary relations and reducing the market beyond legal economic limits no longer correlated with the labor theory of value even officially.

The concept of the absolute primacy of production over consumption turned out consistent with the ideas on which the administrative-command economy was based. Theoretically, it contributed to justifying any production process and any outlays based on superior command, regardless of whether they were efficient, and whether the results of such production were needed by the people or were not and, if they were, to what extent. The true criteria of the efficiency of such outlays were not the satisfaction of the needs of the people but the stability and strength of the administrative system.

Today, as we criticize the faults of the outlay economic management mechanism, from the outlay mentality and the aspiration to justify any "outlay" sanctioned by superiors, to the deficit which has become a chronic disaster, we must clearly understand that the labor theory of value is totally unrelated to the appearance of that mechanism. The object of the labor theory of value is useful labor and not labor in general, not a physiological process for the realization of the human potential and not simply outlays based on the will of the superior administrator.

Bukharin's books and articles were a reflection of their time. As we analyze them from the viewpoint of today's problems, we must avoid excessive temper outbursts and aspire to achieve historical objectivity, proceeding from the fact that even for the best possible purposes, we must not use hindsight in trying to straighten out the views of a person who died 50 years ago, and did not live long enough and learn that which since then has made our own practical experience wiser. One can only guess at the way his views would have developed in the future if the tragic events which spread in our country in the 1930s and which had severe consequences to the development of economic theory and practice had not affected his life.

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'So Greatly Needed by Our Homeland'

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[Review by A. Antipov of the book by P.L. Kapitsa, "Pisma o Nauke, 1930-1980" [Letters on Science, 1930-1980]. Compiled by P.Ye. Rubinin. Moskovskiy Rabochiy, Moscow, 1989, 400 pp]

[Text] In 1934, in one of his letter P.L. Kapitsa told his wife of a discussion he had with I.P. Pavlov. "You know, Petr Leonidovich," Pavlov said, "all I am doing here is

telling you what I think. After my death you must do it, for it is so greatly needed by our homeland." "As to saying what I think, I am not afraid..." wrote Kapitsa, who was 40 years old at that time.

This was typical! To many of us Pavlov is ancient history; Kapitsa is remembered by today's graduates of the Moscow Institute of Physical Technology (he died 5 years ago, in 1984). Indeed, this conversion symbolizes the live continuity of time; it also shows how unequivocally, at the end of his life, the universally famous scientist and Nobel Prize winner of 1904, established for another future laureate, who was awarded the same prize in 1978, that which is so urgently needed by the homeland.

"I shall not be afraid..." and he was not! By no means do we know everything about the way he served his people. This is confirmed by his letters to Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev, Kosygin, Brezhnev and Andropov. In 1936 he wrote to Molotov in defense of Mathematician N.N. Luzin; in 1937, to Mezhlauk in defense of V.A. Fok; in 1938, to Stalin in defense of L.D. Landau; in 1980, to Andropov in defense of A.D. Sakharov and Yu.F. Orlov.

A great deal of courage was necessary in addressing himself to V.I. Mezhlauk (at that time deputy chairman of the Sovnarkom and chairman of the Gosplan) in connection with the dispute between Lysenko and N.I. Vavilov, writing, as he did in 1937, that "in our discussions views have been expressed not only about stupid but also harmful methods.... The schematically following argument is that if you are not a Darwinist in biology, not a materialist in physics and not a Marxist in history you are an enemy of the people. Naturally, such an argument will shut the mouths of 99 percent of the scientists. And naturally, such methods of dispute are not only harmful to science but also compromise exceptionally powerful theoretical elaborations such as Darwinism, materialism or Marxism. In this area we must authoritatively tell the debaters: argue on the basis of your own scientific strength and not Comrade Yezhov's power."

One had to have courage, that same year of 1937, to write to Stalin that "Comrade Stalin, things in our country are not good in the area of science. All usual claims, made publicly, that in our Union science is better than anywhere in the world, are untrue. Such claims are not only bad, as are all lies, but are made even worse by the fact that they hinder the organization of scientific life in our country."

Most of the letters included in this book deal with how to organize such scientific life. Many of Kapitsa's thoughts, expressed in a period of over 50 years of active scientific and social work, remain relevant to this day. Unfortunately so... and the more profoundly we master them today, in the time of perestroika, the more confident will become our movement toward the renovation of socialism, for the free and dynamic development of

science and social progress and the assertion of the principles of civilized life are indivisible and interdependent phenomena.

Kapitsa believed that in the same way that good theater is impossible without an educated, open-minded and culture-oriented public, the blossoming of science requires the profound interest of society in the activities of its scientists. In order to ensure a high standard of scientific work he suggested that extensive propaganda of science be organized. "...If a significant percentage of the funds allocated for science is now spent on such propaganda, in 5 to 10 years such funds would be recovered by enhancing the entire scientific standard in the Union," he wrote to Stalin. How profound and accurate this idea was: it was not the academy asking funds from the government but an organization of life in such a way that society become concerned with achieving high scientific results and make it incumbent upon its own government to create the necessary conditions to this effect.

The published letters by Kapitsa are a noticeable contribution to such propaganda. They organically supplement his book, which is famous throughout the world and published in a number of languages, "*Experiment. Theory. Practice.*" The outstanding and attractive personality of the author was perceived by the readers of the book. Now we are given the opportunity to enrich our impressions, the way they are enriched by the listeners of even the most brilliant public lecture after the thorough, intimate and personal discussion with the lecturer after he steps off the podium.

"Science must be gay, attractive and simple. Such should be the nature of the scientist as well," wrote P.L. Kapitsa to his wife in 1935. The image of this gay, enthusiastic and attractive person appears in front of the readers who, I am confident, will read this book from the first to the last page. This project has been greatly enhanced by the work done by P.Ye. Rubinin, who compiled the book and who is the author of the introductory article and of notes and comments. For nearly 30 years he was Kapitsa's consultant, and his story of the way, and the circumstances in which these letters were written and the results of the various addresses by Petr Leonidovich to his numerous correspondents, strengthens the published documents, converting them into an uninterrupted narration. I would describe the comments by P.Ye. Rubinin as a painstaking, conscientious and entirely independent research project.

It would be senseless to try to retell the content of all 155 documents included in the book. Let us merely note that they were addressed by no means to the leaders alone. They include excerpts from letters to his wife Anna Alekseyevna, letters to foreign and Soviet colleagues and close associates, and to the director of a school in Yaroslavl on the subject of a talented but "problem" student.... Today, actually, we see this as the letters of any thinking person, concerned with the fate of his country, civilization and mankind.

"...It is entirely obvious and unquestionable that the achievements of science and culture, on the basis of which our country is developing, are largely the results of the international cooperation among scientists, writers, philosophers, artists, etc.... It is only by borrowing everything that is best and created by specialists in a distant nation, by its top people, that culture can blossom and develop.... To imagine that we can receive without giving anything is equally stupid. Even the holy books say that it is only "the hand which gives that will not weaken," Kapitsa wrote to one of his correspondents. I would rather not name him, for it is unlikely that he understood the thoughts of this universally famous scientist. It is no accident that the "fellow-worker" of this correspondent stamped in 1936 the following "resolution" to one such letter: "For unsuitability, to be returned to citizen Kapitsa. V. Molotov."

No! Hundreds of thousands of readers will not "return for its unsuitability" the appeal contained in these wise and just words of our contemporary Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa. If indeed the word also means the act, Kapitsa's word works today for perestroika, intelligently and energetically.

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Chronicle

905B0009U Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 89 (signed to press 4 Oct 89) p 128

[Text] Problems of the work of the editors of *KOMMUNIST* on covering perestroika in the political, economic, social and spiritual life of Soviet society were discussed at a meeting between *KOMMUNIST* editors and teachers, students and associates in the humanities departments of the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov. Particular interest was shown in *KOMMUNIST* publications and editorial plans pertaining to the activities of party organizations under contemporary conditions and the initiated preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress. The participants in the meeting expressed a number of wishes on improving the work of the journal and strengthening ties with the readers.

Problems of renovation of the party under conditions of perestroika were the focal point of a discussion in the course of a meeting between *KOMMUNIST* associates and the ideological aktiv of Sovetskiy Rayon in Moscow.

The ideological-theoretical problems of perestroika in the party and the society were the main topic of an exchange of views which took place at a meeting in the

editorial premises with Moscow City propaganda workers. A broad range of problems related to enhancing the life of the party organizations and labor collectives, where preparations are developing for elections to local authorities and for the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress, were discussed. In terms of the journal's publications on topical political and socioeconomic problems, the participants in the meeting expressed specific advice and remarks aimed at improving the journal's activities.

KOMMUNIST editors were visited by the heads of museums in Bulgaria, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Finland and Czechoslovakia, who are visiting the USSR on the invitation of the V.I. Lenin Central Museum. The guests were informed on the work of the journal at the present stage of perestroika. Particular interest was shown in publications on the activities of party organizations under the new conditions, approaches to the further democratization of internal party life and the initiated preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress. One of the topics under discussion was the study and popularization of the Leninist theoretical legacy. In this context the importance was noted of the joint search for documents and other materials to be presented in connection with the 120th anniversary of the birth of the leader of the world's proletariat.

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